University of Alberta

The Politics of Development in Nunavut: Land Claims, Arctic Urbanization, and Geopolitics

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology

Spring 2013
Edmonton, Alberta

ABSTRACT

This thesis surveys the development of Nunavut as not only a governmental and institutional entity but as a territory that is a political and social space both in the tradition of the Territories of the Canadian State and of Westphalian territorial government generally. It relies on Inuit everyday life, knowledge and values in the Eastern and Central Canadian Arctic. Drawing on first hand ethnographic fieldwork conducted primarily in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, from 2008–2011; interviews with key informants; archival research, and participant observation in local, national and international governmental forums; Iqaluit, capital of Nunavut, is presented as a major case study. Iqaluit carries important lessons for evaluating processes of Arctic urbanization, the centralization and formation of communities and it has been challenged as a meaningful site for Inuit dwelling, rather than purely a governmental place. The poor image of Iqaluit is also related to the differential experience of migrants from other parts of the Arctic and local families who are successful as established insiders. In addition, minor case studies of the human dimensions of climate change and the debate on the European Union seal ban are presented. Attitudes towards social science research illustrate disagreements and conflict between "northern" publics and Canadian and international "southern" values.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is more than a cliché to say that a dissertation requires an entire community of support to be possible in the first place. This has been confirmed to me over and over again throughout the PhD program. I have been fortunate enough to be generously supported over the years of conceiving of and ultimately writing this dissertation by friends, family and colleagues. I wish to thank them here as well as those whose names are surely left out (you know who you are): qujannamiik, merci, thank-you!

The institutions that made this thesis possible provided seed grant monies such as fieldwork funds provided by INAC/CBAR via the Canadian Circumpolar Institute. This surely added to the richness of this work by enabling me to visit the north and meet many northerners on numerous occasions. I would also like to thank the Department of Sociology and the Canadian Circumpolar Institute at the University of Alberta for all the tireless monetary and collegial support over the years of graduate school. I extend my thanks to Rob Shields, Elaine Maloney, Lynn Van Reede, and Karen Hughes in those institutions. I particularly want to thank Jacqueline Koe-Schnell, Darlene Reid (late) and Patrick Kikoak with the Edmonton Inuit Cultural Society for assisting me with meeting local Inuks and studying Inuktitut. I also thank Eric Cameron in Public Affairs with the National Defence and the Canadian Forces for arranging a trip to Resolute Bay in 2011 as a media stakeholder.

In Iqaluit, I would chiefly like to thank Mary Ellen Thomas and Mosha Cote with the Nunavut Research Institute, as well as Geela Tagak and Salomie Arualak for all their friendship during fieldwork. In terms of formal and informal interviews, I would also like to thank (in no particular order): John Amagoalik, Jason Carpenter, Susan Sammons (late), Cameron McGregor, Mikidjuk Akavak, Roy Inglangasuk, David Issakiark, Robert Eno, Edward Atkinson, Jack Hicks, Amanda Kilabuk, Thomas Suluk, Aaju Peter, Ed Zebedee, Moshe Cote, Mary Clark, Michelle McEwan, Lindsay Sowdluapik-Lloyd, Alethia Baril, Elisapee

Sheutiapik, Rob Hogan, and Anja Jeffrey. In Greenland, Upaluk Poppel, Birger Poppel, Paaliit Olsen, and Mikisoq H. Lynge hosted me graciously. In Yukon, I would like to thank Elizabeth, Sarah and Paula Hanson for assistance during a brief stay at their place in August 2008. Within the context of the academic community, I would like to especially thank Rob Shields, Mark Nuttall, Phillip Steinberg, Jeremy Tasche, Hannes Gerhardt, Klaus Dodds, Bryan Sluggett, Emily Snyder, Brock Roe, Heidi Bickis, Charles Barbour, Paul Nonnekes, Tekke Terpstra, Paul Joose, and Imre Szeman for all their help in bringing this dissertation into the light of day. However, any limitations in this study are surely of my own making.

I would also like to thank my family and, most importantly, Ondine Park for all her support and love through the best and the darkest of times. Without question, this project would not have happened quite the way it did without her intellectual companionship.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACIA	Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
ANCSA	Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
BNA	British-North America Acts
CHARS	Canadian High Arctic Research Station
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
COPE	Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement
DOT	Department of Transport Canada
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
GN	Government of Nunavut
GNWT	Government of the Northwest Territories
ICC	Inuit Circumpolar Council
IFA	Inuvialuit Final Agreement
INAC	Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
IPO	Indigenous People's Organization
IQ	Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit
IRC	Inuvialuit Regional Corporation
ITC	Inuit Tapirisat of Canada
ITK	Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami
JBN	James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement
LILCA	Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement
NAC	Nunavut Arctic College
NCF	Nunavut Constitutional Forum
NIC	Nunavut Implementation Commission
NILCA	Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement
NLCA	Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
NTI	Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated
NWT	Northwest Territories
QIA	Qikiqtani Inuit Association
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
TEK	Traditional Ecological Knowledge
TFN	Tungavik Federation of Nunavut
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USAF	United States Air Force

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

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INTRODUCTION

> This land is just like our blood because we live off the animals that feed off the land. We are not like the white people. We worry about our land because we make our living off our land. The white people they live on money. That's why they worry about money.
> -Louis Caesar qtd. in Brody (1987)

These are exciting times for the study of the Arctic, which in the 21st century is at last under a spotlight, mainly because of the innovative politics of the land claim processes in the circumpolar Arctic that brought Nunavut and other indigenous self-governance initiatives into being, as well as subsequent political developments such as government decentralization in Nunavut and social changes involved in the urbanization of Nunavut's capital city, Iqaluit. Later in the dissertation I point out that emergent global issues such as climate change, geopolitics, and trade disputes (such as the global humanitarian outcry against seal hunting and the concomitant ban of the importation of seal products by the European Union) have engaged the interest of the international community. For this reason, this dissertation is divided into two parts, and does not necessarily read as continuous monograph with one narrative style; rather, two sets of interventions constitutes the structure of this dissertation.

Part A addresses the political situation since the 1970s that brought about "modern" Nunavut, divided from the Northwest Territories, that culminated in a comprehensive land claim signed in 1993. I also narrate some of my field experiences. Part B takes a slightly different narrative approach and investigates a series of geopolitical developments that form the context of Nunavut since its formal creation in 1999. These were important (and, at times, heated) debates during the research and writing of this dissertation. My conclusion is that the Arctic can no longer be seen as a space beyond knowledge and presence, as first articulated by European explorers. The fact that we hear more about the Arctic in contemporary political discourse indicates that the Arctic has become much more

integrated in national politics – it is no longer simply "up there" somewhere. The case of the Inuit is important to consider in the current conjuncture because Inuit culture is both traditional and modern, that is, showing the continuity between these often opposed sociological labels, and holds possibilities for opening up new theorizations of sovereignty and modernities in the 21st century.

The polity of Inuit society has changed in remarkable ways since World War II in Canada's vast northern hinterlands. This dissertation briefly considers several moments in this history but it is not intended as an exhaustive treatment of this relative long time span. The creation of the Nunavut Territory in the eastern and central Canadian Arctic in 1999 was an especially important moment in the history of Canada, in part because it brought forth an explicit recognition of the collective rights of Inuit in search of a nationality rather than a strict ethnic identification.[1] This approach is consistent with Articles 25 and 35 of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* that protects the rights of Aboriginal peoples (beginning with the Royal Proclamation of 1763) as national or political identities rather than as ethnic groups. Indigenous peoples, of course, are also founders (or "pioneers") of what is now known as Canada; they have paid with blood, sweat, and tears for the creation of this "modern" nation-state. In the north, as I address in this thesis, the creation of the Nunavut Territory was much more than simply a response to the question of where to arrange boundaries once it was decided that the division of the Northwest Territories was necessary (although it was that as well): Nunavut also represents the culmination of a series of negotiations underway with regards to Inuit rights that re-emerged in a more concentrated fashion in the early 1970s by Inuit across the entire Alaskan, Canadian, Greenlandic, and Russian circumpolar Arctic and sub-Arctic.

The designation of "Inuit" was officially chosen in June 1977 at the Inuit Circumpolar Conference meeting in Barrow, Alaska. This self-identification was chosen as an overarching name for "Eskimos" irrespective of local designation (Figure 2). The Inuit of Alaska, Canada, and Greenland at the meeting resolved

[1] Marybelle Mitchell. *From Talking Chiefs to a Native Corporate Elite: The Birth of Class and Nationalism among Canadian Inuit.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.

that Inuit "are one indivisible people with a common language, culture, environment and concerns" and, most importantly, who share a common homeland.[2]

RESEARCH PROBLEM AND APPROACH

My research question evolved over the course of fieldwork. A research concern throughout the process that I can specify would be the following: to discern the conditions that brought about the Nunavut Territory. In other words, how is it possible that we have Nunavut in Canada? Some of the hesitations and shifts in voice in this thesis reflect the impact that fieldwork brought with it; I found that my thesis question changed over time. When this project commenced in 2007, I was interested in studying Arctic sovereignty defined as the federal presence in the Canadian north. During this time I wrote Part B. However, as I underwent a process of becoming "undone"[3] by fieldwork in Nunavut beginning in 2009 (that is, in relationality bringing about a rupture), I became much more interested in studying the historical development of Nunavut in a grounded, ethnographical fashion, as represented in Part A. At that point, in what was experienced as a difficult personal crisis, I began to follow research leads based on what informants told me was important to know about the Inuit homeland. In short, my relations with others in Iqaluit changed me, and I am deeply grateful for these teachings. I was ecstatic, or literally "outside myself" (Ibid., 20). My working research questions quickly shifted to how Nunavut came into being from a *grassroots* perspective. These transformative experiences influenced how I was able to *narrate* my own influence as a researcher working in a defined area and community. Using ethnography as a research tool strongly advanced the process of writing this thesis.

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[2] Inuit Circumpolar Conference. "First Meeting of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference." Barrow, Alaska, 1977.

[3] Judith Butler informs this idea in statements such as the following: "Let's face it. We're undone by each other. And if we're not, we're missing something. If this seems so clearly the case with grief, it is only because it was already the case with desire. One does not always stay intact." See: Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender*. New York: Routledge, 2004, 19.

The main problem that this dissertation addresses is the complex set of historical and social precursors to the creation of the Nunavut Territory in 1999. The period covered and sources consulted are a direct reflection of the main research questions that I sought to answer when this project began. The period covered spans back to the 1970s, and even earlier, when the seeds that eventually grew to become Nunavut, as a sub-national territory of Canada, began to germinate.

The project uses a conflict approach to understand the social world. Conflict theory is a major sociological approach that recognizes social contradictions in society between groups or social classes with different interests. As these differences are represented in the form of institutions this is usually described as "power". In this perspective, societal contradictions are seen as reflections of deep social and political disagreements at the root of any society and, since different interests clash, this allow interpreters to detect and tease out forms of resistance practices. Different elements in society struggle over resources, identity, and power; these struggles are recognized not as the exception to the rule but rather the rule itself. In terms of the main case study in the dissertation, the creation of the Nunavut Territory, including the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement that made that Territory possible, is a response to the contradictions such as social problems that emerged for Inuit groups once the Canadian state set its sights on claiming sovereignty over the entire Canadian north for geopolitical reasons and irrespective of what Inuit might have thought about that proposition in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s. Prior to continual contact with these colonial interests, Inuit did not have a word for leader, government, or leadership but had to modify their society and language via hierarchal power structures that enables a few to rule over the many in political institutions. This division of powers is, after all, the basis of "responsible government" in the Canadian tradition.

The conflict approach tends to see peace as more of an anomaly than the rule. Modern society is adversarial and conflictual and thus its forms of politics

are no different.[4] Modern politics are a reflection of deep societal contradictions between interest groups. It is clear that this conception of politics clashes with traditional Inuit society that sought to achieve consensus and did not see adversarial or agonistic institutions as a suitable way to organize their group relations. There were no chieftains or bosses in traditional Inuit society; rather, it tended to advocate for the need to achieve harmony in an unforgiving Arctic environment: "Peace, order, and stability were essential. To survive, people needed to share and cooperate, and this meant getting along well with each other. Elders discouraged behaviour that caused uncertainty – gossiping, lying, stealing, laziness, and unpredictable behaviour".[5] The conflict perspective is suitable for this project because it recognizes the deep differences in approaches to justice between representatives of the Canadian state and Inuit society.

One such outcome of this discrepancy is the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), signed in 1993 (discussed in Chapter 1), that sought to re-evaluate key values, disagreements, and relationships and to create new institutions on that basis. The land claims in Nunavut represent an important aspect of decolonization in the north: that is, towards the levelling of the great differences between Inuit and the State – or an attempt at such a bold endeavour. However, the agreement is still tipped in favour of the perspective of the Canadian State. In this respect, the Arctic social movements surrounding the NLCA seek to recognize that certain definitions of property make the document merely a beginning of the discussion about how to level relations between the Canadian state and Inuit society, and this must include the non-written aspects of social life that simply cannot be codified in legalistic documents such as the NLCA. The land claims in Nunavut are a long painful process of beginning again

[4] The conflict approach was initiated by Karl Marx and Max Weber as a way to understand the impact of a particular modern economic system called capitalism on the social world. Marx focused on the nature of commodity exchange, and Weber was concerned with the relationship between meaning and capitalism. Weber, in particular, claimed that social actors have the power to attach meaning to their actions and the goal of social theory was to interpret these individual and group (social class) horizons of meaning. By "modern" I mean the movement beginning in the late 19th century that represents the cultural and social assumptions that evolve out of the Industrial Revolution that concerned itself with progress, rationality, and science.

[5] John Bennett and Susan Rowley, eds. *Uqalurait: An Oral History of Nunavut*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 99.

from the beginning, that is, an effort to reassess the colonial situation in the postwar period and make reparations. In short, the land claims processes created and refined the Inuit political voice. As Qanguk put it in an interview with Hugh Brody, referring to the settlement of Inuit by the 1970s: "Now we are gathered together, all living in one place here".[6]

Or, as elder Uutuva suggested:

> I want to have my own land. This is the land where we were born – the Whites weren't born here. I always wonder why they came here, and why they have all the authority over our land. That's what I always think…I used to think: this is not the Whites' land, because it is too cold for them here, and because there is no fruit and vegetables here….I had always thought this was my land. And then, when I found out that we are merely borrowing it – that's what they now tell us, that we're merely borrowing it – I was utterly miserable (Uutuva qtd. in Brody, Ibid.).

In this regard, the title "land claim" is indicative: from the perspective of the State – the perspective or vantage point from which the land claims are written – NLCA is a "claim" on land by the Inuit. However, if we are to take Brody's interviews seriously, we might suppose that things should be quite the opposite: the state should be asking to use the Inuit land. But it is the extinguishment clauses called "certainty" (Article 2, Part 7) in the document that most clearly show that this is not the case. Article 2 suggests that Canadian sovereignty is primary ("cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada") and Inuit rights exist only as they are defined by the NLCA (relinquish "all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests, if any, in and to lands").[7]

Anthropologist John Matthiasson was very direct in his judgment about the role of government in the region:

> For some decades, Canadians showed little interest in the people who resided in the Arctic regions. This began to change when, for a variety of

[6] Qanguk qtd. in Hugh Brody. "Colonialism in the Arctic - Four Reminiscences." *History Workshop Journal* 1, no. 1 (1976), 252.
[7] Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. "Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada." (1993), 11.

> reasons, the Government of Canada initiated programs of directed change that encouraged the Inuit to move off of the land. The implications of these programs were drastic – an almost total change in Inuit life-style.[8]

In Canada claims having to do with "the Arctic" and "sovereignty" in the same breath, including the history that Matthiasson speaks of, is a product of nineteenth century nationalism in which "surveys and scientific mapping of the land and its products contributed significantly to the emergence of a coherent Canadian nationalism".[9] But until the 1940s Canada's presence beyond non-state actors such as the RCMP, scientific explorations, and Hudson's Bay Company, was sporadic if non-existent.[10] A wealth of critical research has since emerged to demonstrate that it was home to Inuit who had an ambiguous status in the federation because they were not understood as "Indian" under the original terms of the Indian Act of 1876.[11] This absence had repercussions: most importantly, the band council structure was not used by (or imposed on) Inuit as it was by many other "Indians". But soon after Canada's infancy, the Canadian state increasingly took on a concern to govern the north, which often meant prescribing how life would be lived and under what conditions in the Inuit homeland. The relocations of Inuit from Inukjuak (formerly Port Harrison) in northern Québec to parts of the High Arctic in the 1950s provides painful reminder of how crude and invasive this assertion of control could really be, and the longstanding issue of Arctic sovereignty in the north of course never lagged far behind.[12]

It is this unglamorous history of sovereignty that is often surprisingly under-represented (or we might say left unsaid) in the literature on Arctic sovereignty, which tends to focus on the frequent "alarmism" of high-level

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[8] Matthiasson, John S. *Living on the Land: Change among the Inuit of Baffin Island*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009 [1992], 9.
[9] Trevor H Levere, *Science and the Canadian Arctic: A Century of Exploration 1818-1918*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 243.
[10] Shelagh D. Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-50.* Vancouver, B.C. .: University of British Columbia Press, 1989; J. Iain Prattis and Jean-Philippe Chartrand, "The Cultural Division of Labour in the Canadian North: A Statistical Study of the Inuit." *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology* 27 (1990), 51.
[11] Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski, *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocations in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-63*, Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994.
[12] Rene Dussault and Georges Erasmus. "The High Arctic Relocation: A Report on the 1953-55 Relocation." Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Canadian Government Publishing, 1994.

discussions[13] (the dispute between Canada and Denmark/Greenland over tiny Hans Island is a case in point, discussed in Chapter 5) and under-represent the importance of the indigenous peoples-state land claims. There are, however, important scholarly efforts in the area that address the cultural repercussions of sporadic and often arbitrary changes in the governmental attitude towards the northern parts of Canada. The position pursued in this dissertation is that we must begin to come to grips with and thus explore the politics of development – including the development of land claims settlements – that accompanied the expansion of the Canadian state northwards. The rich critical literature on northern state formation demonstrates that the history of Arctic sovereignty has largely been about various forms of state expansionism, which has, for good reasons, been named "internal colonialism" of the Canadian state in (and against) its northern frontiers (the provincial norths and the northern territories).[14]

The longstanding issue of internal colonialism has ongoing implications for making sense of the complex relationships between culture and economy in an increasingly globalized world. Governance of the north by governments in the south is often a fraught issue in northern communities.[15] Yet, as Summerville and Poelzer observe: "Globalization issues are exaggerated for the provincial Norths because they do not have control over their resources" (110). This certainly applies to the three northern territories in Canada as well. In the twenty-first century we are witnessing not simply the increased presence of governmental bureaucracy and other planning methodologies, which have created a tangible sense of urgency about how to assert control and predictability about what happens in the Canadian Arctic (often under the banner of securing elusive Arctic sovereignty) – this includes such issues as providing rigorous accounting methods, health care services, education and training, infrastructure, and the implementation of criminal justice. But we are also witnessing the advancement

[13] Oran R. Young, "Wither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North." *Polar Record* 45, no. 232 (2009b): 73-82.
[14] Hugh Brody, *The People's Land: Inuit, Whites and the Eastern Arctic*. Vancouver, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991 [1975]; Kenneth Coates, *Canada's Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Territories.* Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1985.
[15] Tracy Summerville and Greg Poelzer, "The Tailing of Canadian Politics: The North-South Political Divide." *The Northern Review* 25/ 26 (2005): 106-22.

of a series of other forces of domination in the Arctic, such as the advances of urban centralization, the rise of organized crime networks, food insecurity, low educational attainment, mental health challenges and a lack of counselling, underdeveloped economies, and extremely crowded living conditions in places such as Nunavut.[16] How does a place like Nunavut come to terms with the ever-expanding list of challenges to traditional ways of being in northern communities? And how do these abstract issues relate to particular social problems such as youth suicide? Over a decade ago the popular writer Rachel Attiuq Qitsualik articulated this problem as follows:

> Inuit society has suffered the developmental pangs which wrack every frontier settlement in its evolution into a true community. The Arctic was once ignored by southern culture. Development was dependent upon forestry, mining, and farming – once impossible in the far North. Not only is mining now possible (and hydroponics/ sea farming is on the horizon), but priorities have shifted to fossil fuels and strategic materials, which the Arctic holds in abundance. Ironically, it is modernity – technological prowess and the need for special resources to fuel such prowess – that has effected a form of time travel back to the beginnings of the effort to exploit the resources of a new frontier.[17]

Written in the context of the formal creation of the Nunavut Territory in 1999, Qitsualik's point is indicative of wider challenges involved in articulating the success of the creation of Nunavut with the great social hurdles it faces in the twenty-first century. In short, the problem of internal colonialism remains; most importantly, as Hechter defines the concept: "an indigenous population, living in a specific geographical area, that originally enjoyed socio-cultural and economic autonomy but through contact has lost its ownership and/or control of the means

[16] Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated. "Nunavut's Health System: Annual Report on the State of Inuit Culture and Society, 2007-8." A Report Delivered as part of Inuit Obligations under Article 32 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, 1993. Iqaluit, Nunavut: Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, 2008, 10.
[17] Rachel Attituq Qitsualik, "Nunavut Countdown: The New Land." *Up Here Magazine*, 1999, 55.

of production".[18] Prattis and Chartrand (1990) add that "an internal colony involves economic, political, and sociocultural dimensions" (52). In this sense, there is a complex interaction operating here between wider social discourses and what have been called more specific "social problems". This raises questions about how a form of resistant consciousness can be created to resist structures of domination that can overwhelm subjects. The process of understanding domination (and new forms of emergent domination) is a first step that emerges through critical thinking and the invention of new ways of being in the context of contemporary development pressures. This is by no mean easy but this dissertation traces out some of the historical aspects of this struggle.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PROCESS

When I use the term "fieldwork" in the project description and elsewhere I mean the general process of gaining experience in Nunavut through my participation and engagement with the place as a temporary resident, a temporary but committed participant in a complex social world that I continue to be involved with through social media and links to friends, not just as archival researcher. I acknowledge that this is only the simplest conception of "the field" and "fieldwork" but also acknowledge that although it diverges, it owes a debt to ethnographic traditions. I visited Iqaluit as a researcher in October 2009, October 2010, and July 2011 for a total of over 2 months of fieldwork. While there, I lived in the Nunavut Arctic College Old Residence (and a short stay in a local hotel) with other students from Nunavut studying in the Environmental Technology Program and others, as well as the occasional graduate student or professor from elsewhere (such as Germany in one case). This usually meant being present in the

[18] On the concept of internal colonialism and its application to a variety of cases, see: Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1966*. London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1975; Robert Paine, "The Path to Welfare Colonialism." In *The White Arctic: Anthropological Essays on Tutelage and Ethnicity*, 7-28. St.Johns, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University 1977; Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 3 (1979): 293-318; Kathleen V. Ritter, "Internal Colonialism and Industrial Development in Alaska." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 3 (1979): 319-40; J. Iain Prattis and Jean-Philippe Chartrand, "The Cultural Division of Labour in the Canadian North: A Statistical Study of the Inuit." *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology* 27 (1990): 49-73.

community such as attending convocation, events at the visitor's centre, the museum, and elsewhere. I tried to take in as much as I could in the short time while visiting. This meant for some very long days that would often begin at 7am and finish by midnight or later after writing up field notes and collecting my thoughts. My area of focus was in Iqaluit and the spatial experience that it brings with it, including going to the nightclubs, coffee shops, and other social spaces open to the public (discussed in chapter 3). I tried to take-in as much as I could, looking for insights and following-up on tips from acquaintances based on my research questions outlined in the Appendices that follow. Most of my active research hours were spent in the Nunavut Research Institute (NRI) and Nunavut Arctic College libraries, with very sporadic internet access, where I absorbed as many books, northern journals, and policy reports as possible. I also read a good majority of the NRI ethics compendiums of research on natural and social scientific research being conducted in Nunavut over the past decade or so. The NRI and Nunavut Arctic College completed a major upgrade in 2011 as part of $10.4 million in federal funds to strengthen northern research capacity while I finished my fieldwork. This made my research in the new Environmental Technology Building much easier than the first phase of fieldwork in the old, rundown NRI building. There was a much improved space to write and the library resources were better organized. I arranged interviews, took hundreds of photographs in the community, met as many people as I could by attending public events, and piggy-backing on activities undertaken by the NRI, such as a wonderful boating trip one afternoon to Qaummaarviit Territorial Park (revealing to me the great possibilities for tourism in Iqaluit).

In short, I made myself available as a participant in everyday life and as a visiting scholar in Iqaluit rather than confining myself to simply observing. I used snow-ball sampling methods to meet new people who might have expertise in the questions I was asking about everyday life and popular sovereignty in Nunavut. I spoke to community members, various members of the Government of Nunavut and the Inuit-run corporations, instructors and students at the Nunavut Arctic College, employees with the NRI, other visitors in Iqaluit (such as

contractors/researchers, former GN employees, and tourists), and other residents in the Old Res gym. As a participant in the community I was able to generate more refined research questions and to create what I see as a dynamic research agenda based on emergent field experiences. This thesis synthesizes the insights gained from these immersion experiences to make meaning of legal and policy statements in land claims, government documents and international treaty documents. In effect, the thesis asks what sort of polity arises in Nunavut as an actualization or expression of such discourses.

This research for this project began in 2006-7 with theoretical and historical work into the institutional creation of the north, including the long debate on Arctic sovereignty in Canada.[19] Although this project does not focus on the Arctic sovereignty discourse directly, it should be noted that it was in the background of all phases of this project. The process began with an exploration of theory which continued in parallel with fieldwork. The fieldwork then provided the opportunity to gather data on the urbanization process. The theories of sovereignty added purchase to urbanization issues in the north. Sociologists have been less curious than the discipline of Anthropology (and others) about the meanings and significance of fieldwork and "the field".[20] This project defends the

[19] The most important books were the following: Shelagh D. Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North*, 1936-50. Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia Press, 1989; Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski, *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocations in the Eastern Arctic*, 1939-63, Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994; Ailsa Henderson, *Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007; Natalia Loukacheva, *The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2007.

[20] On "the field" see: Ilana Friedrich Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory." *Social Research* 62, no. 2 (1995): 323-55; Matei Candea, "Arbitrary Locations: In Defence of the Bounded Field-Site." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13, no. 1 (2007): 167-84; Thomas Gieryn, "City as Truth Spot: Laboratories and Field-Sites in Urban Studies." *Social Studies of Science* 36, no. 1 (2006): 5-38; Simon Coleman and Peter Collins, *Locating the Field: Space, Place and Context in Anthropology*. Oxford: Berg, 2006. On "the case" see: Lauren Berlant, "On the Case." *Critical Inquiry* 33, no. Summer (2007): 663-72; Michael Burawoy, "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16, no. 1 (1998): 14-38; Sourayan Mookerjea, "Native Informant as Impossible Perspective: Information, Subalternist Deconstruction and Ethnographies of Globalization." *Canadian Review of Sociology* 40, no. 2 (2003): 125-51. For reasons of space I do not explore the theories of method more fully here, however I can say that my field experiences basically conform to Burawoy's (1998) incisive comment that: "Fieldwork is a sequence of experiments that continue until one's theory is in sync with the world one studies" (17-18). Later he writes, somewhat endorsing "grounded theory": "theory is the result and not the precondition of research" (25).

strengths of a bounded field-space, an area studies, which is rather unusual in sociology that tends to not limit fieldwork to geography but extends to numerous proxies such as archives, museum material culture, data (statistics), interview notes, and so on. In this way, a limited field intersects the scholarly apparatus in a distinct way; my experiences in Iqaluit made evident the challenges of reporting the same reality through different percepts (for example, local meaning making around residency as opposed to demographics of local population). The methodological and theoretical aspects discussed above could be the focus of an entire thesis, which I hope to have the future opportunity to reflect upon at length. However, due to the limits of space and time, I will proceed to discussions of the institutional creation of Nunavut and some of the main contexts surrounding that.

The dissertation is divided into six chapters, each of which addresses a particular set of issues and case studies regarding Nunavut and the Canadian Arctic region. The remainder of this introduction will briefly summarize those chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the separate Inuit self-governance initiatives in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. The main focus is the context surrounding the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement in Nunavut and an outline of some of the implications of that agreement, already touched on above. The chapter also introduces the concept of "accumulation by dispossession" as a conflict theory to make sense of the broad northward expansion of Canada throughout the twentieth century.[21] Other terms could be used, such as "invasion"[22], but I prefer accumulation by dispossession as inscribing the crucial geographical aspects of the northward expansion of empire especially in the Canadian context.

Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of an important democratic aspect of the creation of Nunavut called "decentralization". As a political and administrative call to decentralize governance outside of Ottawa and later Yellowknife, decentralization is an important element of northern political culture

[21] David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*. Oxford University Press, 2003, 137-182.
[22] Frank G. Vallee, Derek G. Smith, and Joseph D. Cooper. "Contemporary Canadian Inuit." In *Arctic, Handbook of North American Indians*. Vol. 5, edited by D. Damas, 662-75. Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1984.

to investigate. The chapter argues that decentralization was an important effort to get Nunavut running in its first decade of existence but which risks being forgotten in the present moment fixated on resource development and other development pressures.

Chapter 3 is the main ethnographic chapter derived from fieldwork reflections and observations while in Iqaluit. It represents some of my efforts to navigate in the community and to learn the language of Inuktitut (meaning "the way of the Inuit") at least in an introductory way. It argues that Iqaluit faces public perceptions issues that relate to the divisions between Inuit and Qallunaat ways of being and processes related to neocolonialism. The chapter investigates some of the hurdles involved in understanding Iqaluit once again as a community and not simply as a government centre for southern bureaucrats, contract workers, and others who see Iqaluit as a mediator between southern Canada and the High Arctic that has many amenities similar to the former. Iqaluit is often seen as a qallunaat launching point or hub for those that are going to set off into the northern wilderness such as scientists and resource prospectors. For this reason, I understand Iqaluit as "a debate" over conflicted ways of being; and, its ambivalent social spaces reveal some of these conflicts.

Chapter 4 (co-authored with my supervisor Rob Shields) expands the scale of analysis to investigate how various parties are attempting to literally "ground" questions of sovereignty in terms of what geographers call territoriality. The main impetus of the chapter is to show that sovereignty itself has undergone great changes that make it an unstable form of authority in the current context of the Arctic debates. The chapter argues that recent sovereignty debates ignore intangibles or virtualities such as groups and communities in how sovereignty is understood and articulated today. The Canadian motto "The True, North, Strong and Free" is used as an example of a virtuality that demonstrates how sovereign power has been contested today through socio-political struggle in Canada's national anthem. The national political context is a significant force.

Chapter 5 asks "what is the Arctic?" in terms of recent social, political, and legal developments in regards to climate change and geopolitical changes.

The chapter uses a narrative approach to investigate a series of new discourses of progress in the international Arctic between state and non-state actors. In particular, it investigates challenges to consensual governance with respect to the United Nations Law of the Sea and the Ilulissat Declaration. Circumpolar geopolitics are an important external stress on the political culture of Nunavut that is keenly felt in economic terms such as the European seal pelt ban.

And, finally, Chapter 6 "Arctic Climate, Arctic Crisis" begins with a discussion of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, arguing that the role of the social sciences needs to be clarified to provide a critical approach to understanding the role of scientific research in the Arctic. The chapter concludes by investigating the European Union ban on seal products and how Inuit political leaders have interpreted such activities.

In each of these chapters I emphasize the *lived* quality of the Arctic as a "lively" social and political space characterized by a series of fundamental disagreements – that is, I address how it is simultaneously a space of conflict and consensus building and thus a crucial area of study for an engaged and renewed social science grounded in Inuit studies.

Part A: Nunavut

CHAPTER 1: INUIT HISTORY, LAND CLAIMS, AND NORTHERN POLITICS

Arctic native peoples are indigenous to the circumpolar Arctic and sub-Arctic of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia. In Canada they have for the most part taken the names of Cree, Dene, Inuit, and Innu, each roughly meaning "the people," or Gwich'in, which means "the dwellers." In Siberia, the Eskimoan people of the region call themselves Yup'ik and have several separate languages. To the east of the Bering Strait, in Alaska, there are at least three distinct native peoples, Aleut, Indian, and Iñupiat, the latter commonly known as Eskimo. In Greenland, or Kalaallit Nunaat, they have—with the Canadian Inuit—rejected the name "Eskimo," a word of contested origin that researchers suspect does not mean "eaters of raw meat." Inuit in Kalaallit Nunaat are identified as Greenlanders or Kalaallit (Kalaaleq singular). Métis, descendants of Dene or Cree women and French fur traders, also live in the Canadian northwest and the Mackenzie Valley and sometimes identify with the politics of the Dene. Archaeologists date the origins of the Tuniit or Dorset culture, whom are not direct descendents of today's Inuit (the Thule culture) but who do influence contemporary Inuit culture, to between 2500 BCE and 2000 BCE in what is now the Canadian Arctic. Tuniit are possibly related to the Independence I and Pre-Dorset cultures. The Tuniit are presumed to have gone extinct a couple centuries after the arrival of the Thule and a rapidly warming climate during the 9th century ACE.[1]

Archaeological evidence suggests that the Algonquians of the eastern sub-Arctic, which include Cree, Naskapi, and Naskapi-Montaignais (or Innu), have lived in the central and eastern sub-Arctic since 7500 BCE. Originating in Alaska and spreading across Canada and Greenland, modern Inuit, or Thule, created an Arctic homeland over the past 1000 years that is far from barren and contains

[1] Alan D. McMillan and Eldon Yellowhorn, *First Peoples in Canada*, Third Edition ed. (Vancouver, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 2004), 268.

unique flora and fauna.[2] In comparison, the Athapaskans, of the western sub-Arctic including the Dunne-za, Dogrib, Hare, Kutchin, Slavey, and others, have been traced to about 500 BCE.[3]

This chapter focuses on the Eskimoan peoples in the Canadian Arctic, including the Mackenzie or Inuvialuit, Copper, Netsilik, Caribou, Iglulik, and Ungava who have lived in the north since approximately 1300 ACE. These histories represent remarkably long spans of human occupation in what is now known as the Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic. Brody (1981) calls this the "living Arctic" to represent the fact that the Arctic is not devoid of social life as is so often assumed in public opinion in the south. Records of the living Arctic began with Russian and European whaling and fishing which provided initial contacts with indigenous Arctic populations in the 1700s, and gained volume in the 19th century with the rise of the commercial cod industry. Inuit have struggled with the pangs of colonialism as their sovereignty has been taken from them and only partially regained during the past 30 years of nonviolent political and legal negotiation with the Canadian Federal Government. Inuit have no historic treaties that go back to the 18th and 19th centuries ACE like some First Nations in Canada. However, particularly in Alaska and various parts of northern Canada, Inuit have been national and international leaders since the 1970s in terms of signing so-called "modern" land claims with national governments.

The people of Greenland embarked on a different political strategy to realize self-determination, which included the creation of a "Home Rule" self-governing province in Denmark beginning in 1979. The current self-governance initiative in that country, called "Self Rule", is a coalition between the Inuit Ataqatigiit, Siumut (social democrats), and Demokraatit parties. The Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA), led by the popular Kuupik Kleist, is a confident leftist party with socialist roots and is partially responsible for the creation of an activist Indigenous

[2] John Amagoalik, "Wasteland of Nobodies," in *Inuit Regain Control of Their Lands and Their Lives*, ed. Jens Dahl, Jack Hicks, and Peter Jull (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2000).

[3] Hugh Brody, *Living Arctic: Hunters of the Canadian North*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987, 25. Internal diversity and regional identities persist most visibly in the diversity of dialects. However, the focus of this thesis will be to highlight the overlay of modern policy community through Territorial and urban form.

Peoples' Organization (IPO) called the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). The IA is an good example of novel political innovation that attempts to walk the line between Inuit traditionalism and Danish modernism. In a short study of Greenland's politics of resistance, Mike Davis describes the IA as "traditionalist, pan-Inuit, Green, and Red at the same time."[4]

Moving closer to the task at hand, the land claims situation in Canada is as diverse as its people. One of the first northern land claim signed in Canada was the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBN). It was signed on November 11, 1975 by the Government of Québec, the James Bay Energy Corporation, the James Bay Development Corporation, Hydro-Québec, the Grand Council of the Crees of Québec, the Northern Québec Inuit Association, and the Government of Canada after several years of social struggle. The JBN was the first and last northern land claim negotiation in which the federal government took a role subordinate to a Canadian province.[5] It is useful to note that Québec recognised the right to self-governance and political innovation.[6] In 1971, the Government of Québec began construction on a road to the La Grande River without an environmental assessment and without consultation with the Cree or Inuit. Resistance to the project was strong because these groups felt that their treaty rights were being violated. By 1972 the resistance took the form of a coalition between the Cree and Inuit who sought an injunction from the Superior Court of Québec to halt construction on the James Bay hydro-electric project until the land claims were settled. Québec Justice Albert Malouf was sympathetic to their claims and granted the injunction. Shortly thereafter, however, it was overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.[7]

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[4] Mike Davis, "Bush's Ultimate Thule?" in *In Praise of Barbarians: Essays against Empire*. Chicago, Ill.: Haymarket Books, 2007, 95.

[5] As such, Olive Dickason argues that it was the Council for Yukon Indians claim that was the "first comprehensive claim Ottawa accepted for negotiation." Olive Patricia Dickason, "Social Fact and Development Theory" in *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times*, 383-99. Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1992, 389.

[6] Frances Abele, Thomas J. Courchene, F. Leslie Seidle, and France St.-Hillaire, eds. *Northern Exposure: Peoples, Powers and Prospects in Canada's North*: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2009, 3.

[7] Paul Rynard. "Welcome in, but Check Your Rights at the Door: The James Bay and Nisga'a Agreements in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 2 (2000), 216; Grand

The fact remained that the indigenous peoples' struggle had at least partially worked: the JBN was rewritten from the earlier proposal to explicitly recognise Aboriginal rights: Malouf's injunction showed that it was no longer acceptable for "governments to deny the legal existence of Aboriginal land rights" (Ryard, 216). As Grand Chief Dr. Ted Moses would suggest in retrospect in 2001:

> This is a very short explanation of my use of the word "struggle," and the reason for our optimism and celebration upon the signing of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in 1975. We had reached a settlement, and there was every indication that there was the necessary good will from Québec and Canada and our people to carry out the work that needed to be done to implement the Agreement.[8]

Yet the results were not outstanding. The negotiations were rushed through in just over a year because of excitement surrounding the project, which was described by proponents as the "Project La Grande." Abandoning the litigation strategy after the Supreme Court decision, the indigenous leadership had to navigate between Inuit and Cree concerns while giving way to government demands to "cede, release, surrender, and convey all their native claims, rights, titles, and interests" to the Crown.[9]

In January 1978, amendments were made to the JBN Agreement that added the Naskapi people in northeastern Québec. In the JBN Agreement "serious problems had developed in the implementation of the land claim. These problems were in the areas of health, social services, economic development, and social development."[10] By this point, Aboriginal rights were being recognised and native groups "served notice to the government that the days of native passivity were

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Council of Crees (Eeyou Astchee). *Never without Consent:James Bay Crees' Stand against Forcible Inclusion into an Independent Quebec*. Toronto: ECW Press, 1998; Richard J. Diubaldo, "A Historical Overview of Government-Inuit Relations, 1900-1980s." *Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, 1993, 57.

[8] Ted Moses, "Address by Grand Chief Dr. Ted Moses: The 11th of November Is a Cree Holiday." *Grand Council of Crees* (2001), http://www.gcc.ca/archive/article.php?id=197.

[9] Government of Quebec. "James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and Complementary Agreements." 1998; see also: Morantz, *The White Man's Gonna Getcha: The Colonial Challenge to the Crees in Quebec*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002.

[10] Peter Kulchyski, *The Red Indians: An Episodic, Informal Collection of Tales from the History of Aboriginal People's Struggles in Canada* (Winnipeg, Man.: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2007), 148.

over."[11] Members of the Grand Council of the Crees began to complain that the government was not living up to its JBN commitments in Eeyou Istchee, the Cree homeland, and demanded further negotiations with both levels of government. The Council of Crees signed an agreement with the Government of Québec and Canada in 2002 called *La Paix des Braves* (the Peace of the Braves), or "The Agreement Respecting a New Relationship between the Cree Nation and the Government of Québec." As addressed in Chapter 2 of the agreement, it boldly takes a "nation to nation" approach to Cree-Crown relations.[12]

The Inuit in northern Québec began to explore separate options. This resulted in Agreement-in-Principle negotiations in August 1993 between the Makivik Corporation, representing all Inuit in northern Québec, and the Government of Canada. Inuit wanted a separate land claim to recognise their distinct claims on the Ungava peninsula in northern Québec. After over a decade of negotiations, the Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement (NILCA) was officially implemented on 10 June 2007. Plans are currently underway for the creation of a new Nunavik Government in northern Québec with reference to Section 35 of the Constitution Act involving the Aboriginal right to self-government as well as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[13]

The second major land claims agreement to consider in the north was the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA). The Inuit—or Inuvialuit—of the western Arctic, represented by the Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE), reached a final agreement with the Canadian government on June 5, 1984 and the agreement was brought into law by the House of Commons in the Western Arctic Claims Settlement Act. The COPE had been negotiating with the Government of Canada since 1974. With the passing of the IFA, the COPE became the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, the corporation responsible for implementing the agreement. The IFA was outstanding in several respects, including the fact that it

[11] Richard J. Diubaldo, "A Historical Overview of Government-Inuit Relations, 1900-1980s," 58.
[12] Government of Quebec, and The Crees of Quebec. "Agreement Respecting a New Relationship between the Cree Nation and the Government of Quebec." 2002.
[13] Makivik Corporation, "Discussion Paper: Declaration of a Nunavik Government," (2012).

was the first "comprehensive" land claim of its kind. (Comprehensive treaties emerge where no previous treaties—or "specific" claims that deal with specific grievances—were previously signed.[14]) The IFA is also distinctive because, like the Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement that came after it, the Inuvialuit Settlement Region includes a great deal of offshore territory (some of it conflicting with US claims in the Beaufort Sea[15]) (Figure 5). The possibilities for offshore oil drilling in the Beaufort Sea have raised hopes of economic prosperity in the region. The IFA also includes measures to ensure the protection of language, hunting rights, and cultural identity. It stipulates that Inuit in the western Arctic have rights to 91,000 km^2 of land, including 13,000 km^2 of subsurface rights on those lands to oil, gas, and minerals (approximately 7% of total subsurface rights). Co-management boards have become a norm since the agreement; they function to ensure all interests are represented. In exchange for "the surrender" of exclusive claims "on traditional use and occupancy," the Government of Canada would assume "certain obligations under the Agreement in favour of the Inuvialuit of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region."[16]

[14] The opposition between specific claims and comprehensive claims began to be used after the 1973 Nisga'a decision in which the federal government issued its policy on First Nations and Inuit claims. William R. Morrison, "The Comprehensive Claims Process in Canada's North: New Rhetoric, Old Policies." In *For Purposes of Dominion: Essays in Honour of Morris Zaslow*, edited by Kenneth S. Coates and William R. Morrison, 261-74. North York, Ontario: Captus Press, 1989, 261; Dickason, "Social Fact and Development Theory," 388.

[15] It is worth noting that parts of this area are under claim by the US and subsequent discussions of sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean have reduced the area to an area of economic interest based on the limits of the continental shelf, currently under negotiation at United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The irony of northern residents not being consulted on these late restrictions (a form of bad faith negotiating) during the Ilulissat Declaration (that did not include indigenous peoples at the negotiating table) should not be lost. The Declaration stated: "Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims." See: Illulissat Declaration. Ilulissat, Greenland: Arctic Ocean Conference, 27-29 May 2008.

[16] Canada. "Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Settlement Act." The House of Commons of Canada, 1984.



Figure 5: Inuvialuit Private Lands in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region

In 1993, the Inuit of Labrador began negotiations with federal and provincial governments. This resulted in the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement (LILCA). Signed in 2005, the beneficiaries of LILCA have worked toward self-government within Newfoundland Labrador called Nunatsiavut, meaning "our beautiful land" in Inuktitut. There are some overlaps with the Nunavik Inuit Settlement Area, as well as with the Nitassinan territory of the Innu Nation (the Innu are not related to the Inuit and speak a language similar to Cree and Ojibwe). These groups all straddle the Québec and Newfoundland/Labrador border, a geographical situation that causes many overlaps in traditional territories and political jurisdictions.

A discussion of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), signed July 9, 1993, follows. It is comprehensive in terms of the sheer size of the land included and the overall significance of the agreement. It includes wildlife management, environmental protection, regulatory boards of various sorts, efforts toward the preservation of Inuit culture and language, and many other aspects. The striking thing about the NLCA is that it set the stage for the creation of a new territory in Canada, the Nunavut Territory. Article 4, "Nunavut Political

Development," would "establish" Nunavut. The Nunavut Territory would be a subnational public government—meaning that anyone could run for office. Like the other territories, Northwest Territories and Yukon, Nunavut Territory would have some provincial-like powers such as control over education, criminal justice, and conservation areas. At least in political theory, this territorial strategy is opposed to the self-government initiatives as pursued by the Dene and Greenlanders in the 1970s. Nunavut brings Inuit of the eastern Arctic deeply into the fabric of the Canadian constitution. Advocates of the Nunavut project pursued a unique employment equity strategy based on the demographic fact that a majority of its inhabitants are Inuit (approximately 85% of the total population[17]). Of course, this could change as newcomers inhabit – or leave – the territory. However, like all of the agreements after the JBN, the NLCA contains an extinguishment clause under Article 2, Part 7, entitled "Certainty":

> In consideration of the rights and benefits provided to Inuit by the Agreement, Inuit thereby: (a) cede, release, and surrender to Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, all their aboriginal claims, rights, title, and interests, if any, in and to lands and water anywhere within Canada and adjacent offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada; and (b) agree, on their behalf, and on behalf of their heirs, descendents, and successors not to assert any cause of action, action for a declaration, claim or demand of whatever kind or nature which they ever had, now have, or may hereafter have against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.[18]

[17] Article 23 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, "Inuit Employment Within the Government", stated that its objective "is to increase participation in government employment in the Nunavut Settlement Area to a representative level". In 2006 the total population of Nuanvut was just under 30,000, with approximately 85% being Inuit. However, Thomas Berger found that only 45% of Government employees were Inuit. See: Berger, Thomas R. "Letter to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Concilator's Final Report "The Nunavut Project"." Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Implementation Contract Negotiations for the Second Planning Period 2003-2013 http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/ccl/fagr/nuna/lca/nlc-eng.asp, 2006, iii.

[18] Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada. "Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada." Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs Canada, 1993.

As Hicks and White would state after the creation of Nunavut in 1999:

> At the heart of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement is a fundamental exchange between the Inuit of Nunavut and the federal Crown. For their part, the Nunavut Inuit agreed to surrender 'any claims, rights, title and interests based on their assertion of an aboriginal title' anywhere in Canada (including the Nunavut Settlement Area - the area to which the terms of the land claim apply). In return, the Agreement set out an array of constitutionally protected rights and benefits that the Inuit of Nunavut will exercise and enjoy in perpetuity.[19]

Although Dene are not Inuit, the Dene situation in the Northwest Territories is worth considering in this context. In some ways it is more complex primarily because of the longer treaty processes and negotiations (beginning in the late 19th century). Members of the Dene and the Chipewyan negotiated Treaty 8 in 1899 and Treaty 11 in 1921. The gold rush in Yukon and the NWT made the issues more urgent during this time—resulting in Treaty 8—and Treaty 11 negotiations were inaugurated because of oil discovered at Norman Wells on Deh Cho land in 1920. This set the pattern of the general rule used by Canadian governments to initiate land claims where there are known resources.

By 1975, the General Assembly of the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories (hereafter, Assembly) was radicalized by an awareness of resource development pressures to come as well as the 1969 "Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy," or what became widely known as "The White Paper." Native studies scholar, Olive Dickason, has argued that after the heated events surrounding the White Paper: "Natives were more interested in entrenchment of their rights than the extinguishment."[20] The Assembly issued the Declaration of the Dene Nationhood and asserted its rights in clear and oppositional terms: "We the Dene of the Northwest Territories insist on the right

[19] Hicks, Jack, and Graham White. "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?" In *Nunavut: Inuit Regain Control of Their Lands and Their Lives*, edited by Hicks, Jull and Dahl. Copenhagen: International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2000, 33.
[20] Dickason, Olive Patricia. *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times*. Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart, 1992, 394.

to be regarded by ourselves and the world as a nation. Our struggle is for the recognition of the Dene Nation by the Government and peoples of Canada and the peoples and governments of the world."[21] The Dene were trying to get out of "internal colonialism"[22] by arguing that they are a separate nation, a "nation within a nation." In other words, they were pushing for self-government, something of an innovation in Canada's political history, and something quite different than the Inuit strategy of constitutional integration.

HOW FRONTIERS EXPAND

Before discussing the NLCA in more detail, I refer to a theory that David Harvey has called "accumulation by dispossession."[23] Related to Marx's famous concept of "primitive accumulation" outlined in *Das Kapital* Volume 1*,* which detailed the appropriation of existing cultural achievements for capitalist pursuits, Harvey argues that accumulation by dispossession has a more explicit geographical resonance. It is a way of explaining how colonial capitalism expanded and encroached upon the lands of "barbarians, savages, and inferior peoples" (45). Here, Harvey makes a crucial link between labour, capitalism, and land.

From this perspective we can see that the natives did not know how to make their land conducive to the project of wage labour. Something had to be done: the land and people must be put to more "productive" purposes; that is, purposes suited to the capitalist theory of development, and what is today called "sustainable development"; Harvey writes: "[a]ny social formation or territory that is brought or inserts itself into the logic of capitalist development must undergo wide-ranging structural, institutional, and legal changes" (153). This theory of sociopolitical change helps to explain how dramatic changes came about in the social formation of the Canadian north and have only accelerated since the contact of its inhabitants with the wider world. The land must be controlled by the

[21] Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories. "Declaration of the Dene Nationhood." Fort Simpson: Second Joint General Assembly of the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories, 1975.
[22] On the concept of "internal colonialism" see: Michael Hechter. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1966*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
[23] Harvey, David. *The New Imperialism*: Oxford University Press, 2003, 137-182.

Canadian state and its people must be administered and accounted for in rational, bureaucratic ways.

Before and since Canadian Confederation in 1867, through primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession, the geographical boundaries of Canada slowly moved northward via colonial capitalism.[24] The metropolitan centre encroached upon the northern peripheries, or "frontier," throughout the 19th and 20th centuries with the creation of Canada. The effects upon the people of the Canadian north have been dramatic. Morris Zaslow argued in his 1971 text on the "opening" of the Canadian North that "what constitutes 'the Canadian north' has undergone considerable change since 1870. In the immediate post-Confederation period, anything beyond Lake Nipissing was termed 'North.'"[25] In some ways, the north got smaller and more conducive to capitalist interests. Before colonialism changed traditional forms of sovereignty in the Arctic and sub-Arctic, the reach of the Canadian state did not extend much above the treeline of Canada. And, in many cases, such as in the provincial Canadian north,[26] it reaches far below the artificial line of 60°N that separated north from south with the creation of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905. Postwar Canadian society began to look north in a concentrated way in the 1950s as the Cold War made the Canadian north an important strategic space. As Diubaldo argued, "Its inhabitants, on the other hand, took a back seat to the Cold War and the perceived threat of the Soviet Union"; he continues: "Fundamental … was the issue of arctic sovereignty."[27] A few remarkable changes during the post-Confederation period need to be briefly discussed.[28]

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[24] Tobias, John L. "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy." *The Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology* 6, no. 2 (1976). See also: Stefansson, Vilhjalmur. *The Northward Course of Empire*. London: Harrap, 1922.
[25] Zaslow, Morris. *The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971, xi.
[26] Coates, Ken, and William Morrison. *The Forgotten North: A History of Canada's Provincial Norths*. J. Lorimer, 1992.
[27] Diubaldo, Richard J. "You Can't Keep the Native Native." In *For Purposes of Dominion: Essays in Honour of Morris Zaslow*, edited by Kenneth S. Coates and William R. Morrison, 171-88. North York, ON: Captus Press Inc., 1989, 172-3.
[28] For an analysis of the "space-myths" used in the creation of Canadian nationalist mythology see, Shields, Rob. *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity*. London: Routledge Chapman Hall, 1991, 162-206. See also, Grace, Sherill E. *Canada and the Idea of North*. Montreal

Even in the days of post-Confederation the Canadian Arctic was understood to have a shaky legal foundation.[29] As late as 1920, Canada had very little control over or knowledge of Ellesmere Island, even though it had had formal control over the island since 1895.[30] Inuit hunters from northern Greenland were reported to have hunted musk-oxen on the island. Canada inherited the entire Canadian north from Great Britain and the Hudson's Bay Company on July 15, 1870. Zaslow (1971) would describe this remarkable event as "one of the largest transfers of territory in all of recorded history" which went "virtually unnoticed."[31] This change added 2,500,000 square miles of territory to Canada. Canada named the entire territory "North-West Territories" and included territories as far south as the 49th parallel. It wasn't until after 1912 that this name was limited to the territory beyond 60°N (xi). Historian William R. Morrison would similarly write: "[f]or several decades after Canada acquired title to the Arctic, her claims to sovereignty there rested on theoretical assertions rather than actions. It was not until the beginning of th[e 20th] century that Canada took steps to enforce these claims, and even the steps were mostly of a symbolic nature."[32]

The 20th century Canadian north contained vast untouched living and nonliving resources. The "Roads to Resources" program introduced in 1957 by John Diefenbaker (Canadian prime minister, 1957–1963) was unveiled as a means to exploit the great resources of the Canadian north, particularly in Yukon and the Northwest Territories. In his famous speech after taking office on February 12, 1958, Diefenbaker claimed:

> As far as the Arctic is concerned, how many of you here knew the pioneers in Western Canada? I saw the early days here. Here in Winnipeg in 1909, when the vast movement was taking place into the Western

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& Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001, especially 21-44, that includes a critique of Shields' so-called "dualistic" position regarding the spatial division between north and south.

[29] Cavell, Janice and Jeff Noakes, *Acts of Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty, 1918-25* (UBC Press, 2010).

[30] Morrison, William R. "Canadian Sovereignty and the Inuit of the Central and Eastern Arctic." *Études/ Inuit/ Studies* 10, no. 1-2 (1986), 253.

[31] Zaslow, Morris. *The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971, 1.

[32] Morrison, William R. "Canadian Sovereignty and the Inuit of the Central and Eastern Arctic", 245.

> plains, they had imagination. There is a new imagination now. The Arctic. We intend to carry out the legislative programme of Arctic research, to develop Arctic routes, to develop those vast hidden resources the last few years have revealed. Plans to improve the St. Lawrence and the Hudson Bay route. Plans to increase self-government in the Yukon and Northwest Territories. We can see one or two provinces there.[33]

By the late 1950s, the only thing seen to be lacking in the Canadian north were "roads." The Canadian north was filled with trails and pathways constructed by humans and animals,[34] but it would need the kind of roads that could support trucks and large machinery to secure the resources. To the capitalist developers and distant shareholders who were looking for resources and profit, "development" meant that some of this native environment would have to be sacrificed and the habits of local animals and humans would have to change to fit the development goals. The order of things in the Canadian Arctic began to change after the Second World War. Family allowances were introduced to draw certain members of the community off of the land.[35] The Canadian north became a space of prospective development but also one of contestation and disagreement: there emerged possibilities for "cooperation and conflict"—common buzzwords in northern academic and policy communities.

VILLAGE JOURNEY AND ANCSA

In the context of a variety of northern development pressures invoking cooperation and conflict, northerners began to ask some important questions that are still with us today: Who owns the Arctic? What is the role of "the Canadian south" in the governance of "the Canadian north"? What say do northerners have in their own governance? These questions signal crucial ideological struggles in and about northern life. They also signal powerful political advances by

[33] Diefenbaker, John G. "A New Vision." Civic Auditorium, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1958.
[34] Aporta, Claudio, "The Trail as Home: Inuit and Their Pan-Arctic Network of Routes," *Human Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 37, no. 2 (2009).
[35] Tester, Frank and Peter Kulchyski. *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocations in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-63*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994; David Damas. *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers: The Transformation of Inuit Settlements in the Central Arctic*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002; Diubaldo, Richard J. "You Can't Keep the Native Native."

indigenous peoples and all northerners. The background is colonialism: the lands that had been, even during the 19th century, home only to indigenous peoples and a few whites were dedicated in the 20th century to industrial developments such as whaling and fishing, mining, and hydrocarbon extraction. After a "long and terrible shadow" of European colonialism,[36] the north became an industrial frontier, the last one on the vast North American continent and perhaps the last one in the Western hemisphere. The southern gaze north took the shape of a search for oil and gas reserves in Alaska.

Thomas Berger's *Village Journey* is a fascinating account of the history of postwar society in Alaska. In a study funded in the mid-1980s by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and The World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Berger addresses a land claims agreement called the *Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act* (ANCSA). A 1968 discovery of oil and gas deposits in Alaska and plans to build a pipeline in the Mackenzie Valley raised local concerns about how these changes would affect homelands of the United States and Canada. Congress brought ANCSA into law in December 1971 with little local consultation, an act that would have implications far beyond Alaska and would affect the history of the United States.[37] Berger's study, conducted in the 1980s, involved extensive community engagement in almost every Alaskan village. Berger investigated in significant detail how the Alaskan Native communities were transformed into "a commercial enterprise and every villager a stakeholder in it."[38] These were the dramatic beginnings of the corporate movement in northern indigenous politics coupled with the will of mainstream continental U.S. politics that sought to realize "a vision of economic development and assimilation of Alaskan Natives. That vision was driven by the prospect of oil and gas, mining, and other development"

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[36] Berger, Thomas R. *A Long and Terrible Shadow: White Values, Native Rights in the Americas, 1492-1992*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992.

[37] On the American context see: James D. Linxwiler, "The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First Twenty Years," (Anchorage, Alaska: 38th Annual Rocky Mountain Law Institute, 1992); Arthur Mason, "The Rise of an Alaskan Native Bourgeoisie," *Etudes/Inuit/Studies* 26, no. 2 (2002); Norman Chance. *The Inupiat and Arctic Alaska: An Ethnography of Development*: Harcourt, 1990; J. Rudd. "Who Owns Alaska? Mineral Rights Acquisition Amid Rapidly Changing Land Ownership." *Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst* 109 (1974).

[38] Berger, Thomas R.,*Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1995 [1985]), xi.

(Ibid.) Yet, as Berger argued, ignoring the claims of locals flew directly in the face of the fact that "Alaskan Natives, to a great extent, now as then, live off the land, relying on hunting, fishing, and trapping, their traditional subsistence economy." (Ibid.) Writing from the perspective of the mid-1990s in a new preface to the updated edition of the book, Berger argued that local resistance was successful in the intent to protect the "Native" right to self-determination.

Berger argued that the process would leave the Alaskan Natives with a precarious subsistence economy *and* without a firm legal grasp on their own lands. He wrote: "in fact the land they received would belong not to them or their tribes but to the corporations." In the modern form of postwar capitalist imperialism, corporate colonization of Alaska would make Alaskan Natives part of the vast corporate world. But there was resistance.[39] For instance, in his memoir documenting resistance to U.S. continental plans, William Hensley writes: "I was there. For five years I had battled to secure our traditional lands. As an unknown graduate student, I had helped to organize Alaska Natives, explaining to all who would listen that we were in urgent danger of losing the lands that had sustained our forefathers for thousands of years … 'Take Our Land, Take Our Life.' That was our motto." (5) Berger described the colonial process similarly in his study:

> Native people are proud of their tribal heritage, but Congress did not convey the land to tribal entities. When Congress enacted ANCSA, it considered tribal governments to be an impediment to assimilation. Instead, the law required the Natives to set up village and regional corporations to obtain title to the land. The land that the ANCSA conveyed does not belong to Alaska Natives, it belongs to these corporations. Hence, the Native corporations are the most visible structures established under this legislation. But these corporate structures put the land at risk. For Native land is now a corporate asset. Alaska Natives fear that, through

[39] The Iñupiat story on the North Slope is a fascinating tale of resistance to the encroachments of the American federal government, including the myopic view of the southern states. See: William Hensley, *Fifty Miles from Tomorrow: A Memoir of Alaska and the Real People* (New York: Picador, 2009).

corporate failure, corporate take-overs, and taxation, they could lose their land." (6)

Village Journey describes the early phases of an indigenous corporatism in Alaska. In a massive collection of nearly 1500 pages of observations regarding the transformation of "earth into property" in North America since 1492, Anthony Hall observed how the language of indigenous politics had been brought in line with the corporate status quo set out in the ANCSA:

> Corporate law has, in many instances, penetrated so deeply into the cultures and lands of Indigenous peoples that there is a growing trend to frame what is often identified as Aboriginal self-government in the legal wrappings of corporate charters emanating from the sovereign authority of national, state, or provincial governments. This effort to enwrap and express Aboriginal rights through the enterprise of business corporations was central to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971. It was also integral to a number of modern-day treaties, especially throughout northern Canada, including those with the Inuvialuit of the Beaufort Sea area and the Inuit of Nunavut. More recently, the Nisga'a Treaty in British Columbia described the Nisga'a governments to be established as "natural persons," the term that is frequently used in English-language law to identify corporations.[40]

The ANCSA created 13 Alaska Native Regional Corporations. It also extinguished rights to approximately 320 million acres of land in Alaska in return for $962.4 million dollars payable via regional and village corporations (ANCSA, 1971). The benefits would be distributed through the regional corporations (shown in Figure 6).

[40] Hall, Anthony J., *The American Empire and the Fourth World*, The Bowl with One Spoon Volume One (Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 2003), 23.



Figure 6: Regional Corporations associated with the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act

THOMAS BERGER AND THE NUNAVUT PROJECT

In a recent text Berger explicitly references and builds upon his "Conciliator's Final Report, 'The Nunavut Project'" (2006). He sees land claims in Canada's north as "[a] remarkable Canadian achievement."[41] Berger expands on the analysis to argue that the land claims are at their base "the principle vehicle for land use planning in Canada's North." He references Article 11 of the NLCA, "Land Use Planning," and reminds his readers that, after all, these agreements are *land* claims and this implies that they are also ways to plan how land planning is to be done. Berger asserts that the NLCA—with Inuit constitutionally on board—is the strongest possible way for Canada to assert sovereignty over its Arctic spaces. Nunavut has by far the longest coastline in the Canadian Arctic, comprising approximately 35% of the Arctic coastline and adjacent to 97,000

[41] Berger, Thomas R., "Keep It Up: Land Use Planning: Land Claims and Canada's North," in Canada's North: What's the Plan? The 2010 CIBC Scholar-in-Residence Lecture (The Conference Board of Canada, 2010), 7.

islands of the Arctic archipelago (Nunavut has no authority over off-shore hydrocarbon resources). Berger charts the legal history of Canada's land claims since the *Calder* decision in 1973, filed by the Nisga'a Nation led by Frank Calder, and the *Delgamuukw* case in 1997 which defined the nature of Aboriginal title. The *Calder et al. v. Attorney General of British Columbia* (1973) case eventually went to the Supreme Court of Canada, which, in Berger's words, ruled that "Aboriginal title arises from Aboriginal use and occupation of the land." (11) Most importantly, the Calder case recognised that Aboriginal title should be included as a part of Canadian law. In this sense, *Calder* both recognised that Aboriginal title exists through land use and that legislative authorities are the only authorities that can extinguish it. Berger demonstrates that this was a legal break-through that has several important implications as it now meant that land claims had to be negotiated between the Government of Canada and First Nations, Métis, and Inuit, not provinces or any other entities.

The second point I'd like to raise is one of clarification. Berger writes that after the ANCSA was brought into law, Congress passed amendments in 1988 that continued a ban on the sale of shares in tribal corporations. This was to ensure that all of the shares would remain in Native hands unless the shareholders voted to remove the ban in 1991 (20 years after the passing of the ANCSA). Berger writes in a footnote to this point that "it is fascinating to note that none of the Native regional corporations in Alaska have voted to allow the sale of shares […] In this way, so long as the shareholders maintain the ban on the sale of shares, these regional corporations will more closely resemble the membership corporations that Aboriginal people have adopted in Canada." In the main text he writes that: "[w]hat is important to understand is that *all* modern Canadian land claims settlements have rejected the model of the shareholders' corporation." (30) The model that has emerged ensures that all of the corporation shares stay in the hands of Native and Aboriginal peoples.

I now turn to the situation of central and eastern Arctic Inuit. Roughly since the 1940s, Inuit there have struggled with a set of issues similar to those of Inuit in other regions as development pressures have encroached upon hunting,

fishing, and trapping territories. Inuit in these regions have worked through nonviolent political struggles to achieve genuine political representation, some form of distinctive citizenship under the Canadian state, and effective control of massive extents of lands they have known, occupied, and traversed for centuries. Inuit have been patiently struggling with bureaucratic and research processes to gain meaningful control over their lives and lands. As Nanook remarks in Robert Flaherty's classic 1922 film *Nanook of the North*, "the patient man survives." Much like the patience required for seal-hunting, patience has been evident for over 30 years of land claims negotiations, and these efforts to gain effective representation are far from complete.

The Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (NLCA) was signed by the Inuit-run corporation, the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) (now called Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated [NTI]), and the Canadian Federal Government in 1993. The NLCA, the largest modern land claims settlement, was the culmination of social movements in which Inuit leaders in the Canadian eastern Arctic made significant strides to better represent their own people on local and national stages. This included the development of governance regimes for Inuit to have a say in decisions that affect their lives. The Canadian situation is discussed in more detail in the following section.

THE NLCA

On May 4, 1992, the citizens of the Northwest Territories (NWT) were given the chance to vote on the division of the NWT. This is now simply known as "the division" because of its ubiquity in political discourse in the Canadian north. By plebiscite, citizens of the NWT were asked about whether to separate the region known as Nunavut from the NWT. The line drawn through the hinterlands that would separate Nunavut from the NWT was called "the Parker Line" after a compromise proposed by NWT Commissioner John Parker. NWT residents voted "Yes" (54%) and Nunavut was officially on the path toward becoming a reality.

The agreement was called the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement.[42] On November 12 of the same year, beneficiaries of the NLCA from all across Canada were given the opportunity to vote on its ratification—69% voted in favour of accepting it.

Nunavut was thus established as a public territorial government in the eastern and central Arctic, an important event in the political and social history of the Inuit. This "modern day" treaty was officially signed into law by the Government of Canada, represented by the Hon. Tom Siddon, P.C., M.P., Indian and Northern Affairs, and the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area, represented by the TFN and the NWT, on July 9, 1993, in Iqaluit. July 9, "Nunavut Day," is now a public holiday in the territory. Speaking that day in 1993, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney declared:

> Today, gathered here in Iqaluit, in the transcendent beauty of the Arctic, we are moving together towards the dawn of a new era and a new understanding. You, the Inuit of the eastern Arctic, are today confirming your major role as guardians of the land of your ancestors, Nunavut. With Nunavut and this land claim agreement, you are determining something equally important—your future—because control of the land ultimately means control of your destiny. It means self-sufficiency; it means full partnership in Canada.[43]

This landmark event formalized the division of Nunavut from the Northwest Territories through the *Nunavut Act*, 1993. The Constitution of Canada was subsequently amended in 1999 with the Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut), to extend Parliamentary representation to the Territory of Nunavut through one Member of Parliament (MP) and one member of the Senate. After years of hard work and preparation, the new territory of Nunavut was officially brought into being on April 1, 1999, an achievement of epic proportions for the Inuit of the

[42] It was formally called the *Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada*, 1993.
[43] Mulroney, Brian, "Brian Mulroney, Former Prime Minister of Canada," CARC - Northern Perspectives 21, no. 3 (1993).

eastern Arctic as well as for Canada and indigenous struggles around the world. It is hard to overstate the gravity of this achievement as Nunavut accounts for approximately one fifth of the landmass of Canada; if Nunavut were an independent country, it would be the 12th largest country in the world.

The NLCA is made up of 42 Articles in total. These Articles address everything from general definitions to the geographical boundaries of the Territory to issues of political development, wildlife management, land use planning, language preservation, "ethnographic objects," archival material, co-management boards, Inuit employment equity, taxation, development (Nunavut Impact Review Board), royalty sharing, parks, conservation areas, and many other issues of intimate concern to Nunavumiut. The NLCA enabled, at least in theory, Inuit to have more control over their own territory after colonization by the Canadian state. Some of the Articles have been heavily debated and others largely ignored or slowly implemented (such as the creation of a Nunavut Marine Council re Article 15, which was finally implemented in 2012).[44]

Yet, the agreement itself stands as a testament to the fact that Inuit wanted to go their own way especially when compared to other Aboriginal groups in Canada. The Inuit were never included under the terms of the Indian Act of 1876. Therefore, they never had reserves or Bands. In this sense, the legal and political history and the relation to the Canadian state of the Inuit are different from most of Canada's other Aboriginal peoples. Under the NLCA, Inuit were to choose the lands that they would own outright (Article 18). These "Inuit Owned Lands" (IOL) would account for 356,000 square kilometres of land (approximately 18% of the landmass of the Nunavut Settlement Area) (Article 17).

One of the main differences between provincial and territorial authority is over natural resource development. The catch here is that IOL are primarily limited to surface rights. Second, resource revenues do not go to the Government of Nunavut but to Inuit beneficiaries via the democratically elected NTI and three regional corporations (Qikiqtaani, Kivalliq, and Kitikmeot). Inuit beneficiaries do

[44] Nunatsiaq News. "NTI Applauds Birth of Nunavut Marine Council." (2012). http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nti_applauds_establishment_of_the_nunavut_marine_council/

indeed have mineral rights on 36,257 square kilometres of lands (approximately 2% of the land) located throughout the Nunavut Settlement Area (Article 19 & 21). However, this constitutes a small proportion of the extent of subsurface rights. The Government of Canada, "the Crown," retains 98% of the mineral rights on Nunavut lands administered through Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) under the *Northwest Territories and Nunavut Mining Regulations* (NTNMR). This fact has huge effects on the Government of Nunavut's ability to achieve financial autonomy today.[45] IOL can be sold or traded only to the Government of Canada, with the intention being to limit ownership to Inuit and the Government of Canada. One of the most important, but certainly most debated, Articles states that Inuit should hold the majority (approximately 85 percent) of jobs in the Government of Nunavut (Article 23) because Inuit are the majority population in the territory.

The NLCA became a powerful symbol for Inuit people of what was possible to accomplish with hard work, patience with extensive bureaucratic processes, a determination to see deliberations through to the end, and a willingness to make concessions to the Government of Canada. Inuit are now formally part of Canada because they have surrendered their Aboriginal title to Canada. The land claims would not have been possible otherwise. To this day, the NLCA is a monument to Inuit success in working with the Canadian government for the benefit of all Inuit. Inuit politicians and bureaucrats can be seen carrying copies of the NLCA as they go about their business in Iqaluit. In this sense, the NLCA has become something much more than a legal document; it has become a practical reference and a legal spirit for everyday use in governing Nunavut.

HISTORICAL PRECURSORS TO THE NLCA

[45] Mifflin, Michael. "The Prince and the Pauper—Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated and the Government of Nunavut." *Policy Options*, no. July-August (2009): 92-96; Hicks, Jack, and Graham White. "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?"

When did the historical precursors of NLCA begin? More than a few authors over the years have sought to come to terms with this history.[46] The story finds its roots in the active and passive colonial history of Canada since the late 16th century. The passive colonization of northern Canada occurred over many centuries but it is clear that a turn to active colonization began in the 1940s. My position is that the NLCA is in many ways a bold response to the colonization of the Canadian north. Martin Frobisher arrived on the shores of southern Baffin Island in 1576 and was the first European to set foot in the Nunavut Settlement Area while searching for a Northwest passage to Asia. (He mistakenly thought he had found it in Frobisher Bay in the area that Queen Elizabeth I called *Meta Incognita* [meaning, "beyond the unknown"]).[47] One author has triumphantly argued that it was "not until the passing of the NLCA were the Inuit released from colonialism."[48] Since it is dubious to suggest that Inuit were "released" from colonialism, I suggest we date the origin of this entire process to the 1960s when the Arctic political movements humbly began in the residential schools on the western Hudson's Bay. At least by the 1970s, the Canadian Arctic began to change because of the emergence of innovative social movements. In *Changing the Face of Canada*, John Amagoalik, popularly known as the "father of Nunavut" because of his leadership role in the Arctic social movements that brought about the NLCA, narrates his fascinating biography and rapid transformation from living in small settlements on the land in the High Arctic to participating in a student driven, grass-roots movements to "change the Arctic".[49] This text allows us to read Inuit written social history, and describes the impact of Amagoalik on the social development of the Canadian Arctic.

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[46] For spatial aspects of this history, see André Légaré, "The Process Leading to a Land Claims Agreement and Its Implementation: The Case of the Nunavut Land Claims Settlement." Canadian *Journal of Native Studies* 16, no. 1 (1996): 139-63; "The Spatial and Symbolic Construction of Nunavut: Towards the Emergence of a Regional Collective Identity." *Etudes/ Inuit/ Studies* 25, no. 1-2 (2001): 141-68.

[47] See: Robert McGhee, *The Arctic Voyages of Martin Frobisher: An Elizabethan Adventure* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press and Canadian Museum of Civilization, 2001).

[48] Mercer, Stephen A., *Claiming Nunavut 1971-1999* (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2008), 21.

[49] Amagoalik, John, Changing the Face of Canada (Iqaluit: Nunavut Arctic College, 2009), 45. See also: Mercer, *Claiming Nunavut 1971-1999*, 110-11.

CHANGING THE FACE OF CANADA

As a young child, Amagoalik became a "High Arctic Exile." His family and friends were relocated from Port Harrison in northern Québec (now called Inukjuak, Nunavik) in the early 1950s, to several places in the High Arctic for reasons having to do with securing Canada's Arctic sovereignty.[50] There had never been Inuit living in the High Arctic islands before the relocation. Hunters from Greenland often hunted in the area where there was game (it was known to be rather unpredictable in terms of plenitude of animals available on any given year). There were two movements of Inuit in 1953 and 1955. In June of 1953, 54 people and 10 families were relocated to Craig Harbour, on Ellesmere Island, and Resolute Bay, on Cornwallis Island. Seven families came from Inukjuak, and three came from Pond Inlet on Baffin Island.

Amagoalik's immediate family was relocated from Inukjuak to Resolute Bay (*Qausuittuq*, "place with no dawn") but they were separated from many of their close friends and relatives who were dispersed to various parts of the High Arctic. The Exiles were promised an "Arctic paradise" but they encountered quite the opposite according to Amagoalik. Amagoalik persuasively argues that the situation was one of "colonizer and colonized" in which Inuit had no ability to resist the relocations because "[l]ife was very different from what it is today," (35) that is the development of human rights had not yet taken place in the Arctic. Inequality between the Inuit and non-Inuit in the High Arctic was a significant factor that led to a variety of misinterpretation about what was happening.[51] In an incisive passage Amagoalik writes about the promises made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), an arm of the state backed by the federal government, when they arrived at Resolute Bay:

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[50] The connection to Arctic sovereignty was established in the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, but the economic motivations for the relocations were also heavily stressed. In the early 1950s, economics trumped questions of Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago. Canada could not afford to lose control over those islands.

[51] This point was developed fully as part of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1991) in Dussault, Rene, and Georges Erasmus. "The High Arctic Relocation: A Report on the 1953-55 Relocation." Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Canadian Government Publishing, 1994.

> By [the time we arrived] we were feeling very discouraged because, by looking around, we could see that the environment was very harsh and very cold. The land was just grey gravel. We couldn't see any vegetation. It was at that point that we realized that the description the government had given us had been a total lie. This was not paradise. The RCMP officers were describing this new place as almost a paradise, and we could see that it was completely the opposite. It was desolate. It was cold. It was like landing on the moon. (Amagoalik, 22)

Amagoalik's observations testify to the deep racism involved in the relocations; the idea was that Inuit could simply live anywhere in the Arctic, even in places they had no experience of. For example, they had no experience of the location of animals to harvest, how the seasons morph and change, where fresh water and supplies could be found, where children can learn. He exclaims: "They dropped us off and they left! They had nothing more to do with us." (23)

Amagoalik acknowledges that he was profoundly influenced by the leadership of his father who would not let the government forget about the broken promises that were included in the relocations. He remembers family members often breaking out in tears for no apparent reason because of the general hardships they endured during the first years of the relocations 1953–55. It seems fair to suggest that his childhood was not a happy one as a result of the wrongs inflicted on his family by the federal government. This all occurred without political representation of any kind, as Indians, Métis, and Inuit were not able to vote until 1960. By this time, alcohol was introduced to the Inuit; the idea being that if they officially gained the right to vote, they should also be extended the right to drink. However, Amagoalik reports that the effects of alcohol on the community were debilitating, as alcoholism took what little good spirit was left in the new communities being established in the High Arctic. He describes Resolute as a community in pain and the recourse to alcohol was an outcome–or symptom–of this. (52)

In many striking ways, Amagoalik and his generation of Inuit leaders were tremendous successes. But they could not know the extent of what they would

achieve from the perspective of the early 1970s, shortly after they had learned to speak English in the residential schools on the Western Hudson's Bay, far from their families located in Resolute Bay. There is irony in the fact that a monumental land claims agreement such as the NLCA began in the common experience of Inuit in residential schools. A sense of collective consciousness and the common good of the Inuit was born in Inuit political culture after years of hardship at the hands of the RCMP, missionaries, and the Canadian state. Dating the origin of the land claims to 1971, Amagoalik argues:

> The possibility for Inuit to negotiate land claims agreements in Canada all started in 1971 when the Alaskan Inupiat signed the first modern treaty in North America. When we heard about that, it was a real eye-opener for us, "You mean Inuit can actually negotiate a modern treaty? Wow!" We got very interested. We thought, "Maybe we can do this here in Canada as well." (59)

Amagoalik provides a history of the land claims process from his own very engaged perspective beginning in the late 1970s. He acted as the president of Inuit Tapirisat of Canada from 1981 to 1985 and 1988–1991 and the Nunavut Implementation Commission from 1993–1999. Today he is still active with the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA). In the early 1970s, he and his family moved to Ottawa to continue with the negotiations as things began to heat up. Amagoalik writes about how this was not too much of an inconvenience:

> For my family and me, moving to Ottawa was just a temporary sacrifice while we worked on this land claims settlement … if we do not run our own territorial government somebody is going to run it for us, and this is not acceptable to us. Going to work for the government, working in an office, not being able to spend time on the land and that sort of thing is necessary. If we did not want to be involved in government, we would not have negotiated Nunavut … Not being responsible for issues that we are concerned with, and allowing others to do things for us is a bigger danger than not living on the land. (103)

At this point, Amagoalik and other ambitious Inuit activists were implicated in the constitutional debates that emerged in Canada as a consequence of Québec separatism movements in the 1980s. He agrees with the way Zebedee Nungak represented Inuit motivations at the time, stating: "What do the Inuit want in changing of the Constitution? … We want to do constructive damage to the status quo." (Nungak qtd. in 105) The status quo was that Inuit had no rights or control over their own territory, and so-called Aboriginals, including Inuit, Métis, and First Nations, were not recognised in the constitution as founding peoples of Canada. Something had to change. There had never been a formal treaty signed in the Nunavut Settlement Area, and Inuit were not fully included under the terms of the Indian Act. The 1939 *re Eskimo* decision by the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Inuit were to be understood as "Indian" under the *British North America Act*, 1867. This was never an actuality. In theory Eskimos had become "Indians" but this made little sense because there was never an "Eskimo Act."[52] When the federal government finally recognised that Inuit had rights due to long historical roots in the territory, the next step was for the government to attempt to extinguish those rights. This was the government's motivation in the land claims processes, and could arguably be seen as bad faith right from the start. But Peter Kulchyski was optimistic in his assessment: "the treaties are more than a few written pages. They involve what was said during the speeches or negotiations: oral promises … [that] include a spirit: a spirit of respect, a spirit of mutuality, a spirit of fairness … a spirit so subtle it quietly lays in wait for the day when it may re-emerge to mend the wounds torn into so much flesh by broken promise after broken promise … some day, the treaties will be more than lies."[53]

Throughout the 1980s, Inuit leaders in the TFN worked on negotiations with the federal government and with the other territories and the provinces. Studies were conducted such as the Land Use and Occupancy Project,[54] and all interested

[52] Diubaldo, Richard J. "The Absurd Little Mouse: When Eskimos Became Indians." *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes* 16 (1981): 34.
[53] Peter Kulchyski, The Red Indians: An Episodic, Informal Collection of Tales from the History of Aboriginal People's Struggles in Canada, 42.
[54] Milton Freeman Research Limited. *Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project*, Three Volumes. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1976.

parties were given opportunities to participate in the process. This included the three main participants in the land claims agreements: the TFN, the government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT), and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.[55] Amagoalik writes: "Our Members of Parliament in Ottawa, as well as our Members of the Legislative Assembly in Yellowknife who represented Inuit communities, our national organization, and our regional Inuit associations were all involved in pursuing Nunavut." (20) Amagoalik points out that the creation of Nunavut became possible in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of the need for a good news story in a time of divisive constitutional debates raging about Québec's sovereignty and a vulnerable Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney. The land claims agreement was nearly completed by 1990–1991 and, at this point, the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) began plans to create the administrative body of Nunavut. This was the second major phase of the project as outlined in Article 4 "Nunavut Political Development" of the NLCA.[56] Amagoalik was appointed Chief Commissioner of the NIC, which was established once the Nunavut Act (1993) received Royal Assent—Part 6 of the Nunavut Political Accord (NPA). The NIC was tasked to "provide advice to the parties hereto on the creation of Nunavut" (Part 6.6 of the NPA), to manage the geographical and administrative division with the NWT, and to ensure that the government in Nunavut continued to function and deliver vital social services during the transition period.

The Commission focused on several aspects of developing Nunavut administratively from the ground up. Part of this work included deciding on which community would be the capital of the new territory. The original proposal contained three possibilities for the capital, including Cambridge Bay, Iqaluit on Baffin Island, and Rankin Inlet in the Kivalliq region on western Hudson's Bay. Presenting Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet to the people, the NIC held a public vote to decide which would be the capital of Nunavut. Iqaluit won with a majority. I

[55] Amagoalik, Changing the Face of Canada, 120.
[56] The "Nunavut Political Accord" implemented Article 4 of the NLCA: Government of Canada, "Nunavut Political Accord," (Accord between Canada, the Northwest Territories, and Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, 1992).

return to the decentralization goals of the NIC in chapter 2, and in chapter 3 I look more closely at the rise of Iqaluit as the political, social, and administrative centre of Nunavut. But first I reflect briefly on the current situation of the Government of Nunavut.

POST-1999

On the eve of the creation of Nunavut, Peter Jull wrote:

> Nunavut is not simply another piece of Canada getting its own flag and license plates. It is a very different sort of place. It does not have the same ideas about using resources or buying land. It has a different language, and stories about how things are and should be which are totally unknown elsewhere in Canada. It has a government similar to provincial and territorial governments, but with a second "constitution" in the form of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) enshrining the result of special Inuit negotiations with Canada.[57]

The 10 year anniversary of Nunavut—April 1, 2009—did not entail as much celebration as perhaps it should have. There was a flurry of activity among social scientists, in particular, about what Nunavut had achieved during its first 10 years,[58] but it is possible that many of these writers were disappointed. After all, expectations were unusually high among social commentators and Nunavummiut alike. Nunavut was widely touted before and after its creation as an exemplar of what indigenous social movements can do at their best. However, what stands out today more than anything else are the trade-offs made during the course of negotiations, including extinguishment clauses and the relatively small amount of lands that are known as "Inuit Owned Lands", which include surface and subsurface rights representing merely18% of the territory.

I have heard several times during my fieldwork in Iqaluit that the land claims were designed for all Inuit but not necessarily to strengthen the capacity of

[57] Jull, Peter. "The World Looks North." In *Nunavut'99*, 1999, np.
[58] A special issue of the Journal of Canadian Studies stands out in this regard. See: A. Henderson, "Lessons for Social Science in the Study of New Polities: Nunavut at 10," Journal of Canadian Studies 43, no. 2 (2009).

the Government of Nunavut (GN). This is certainly one unintended consequence of the NLCA. The GN lacks the administrative capacity to carry out the tasks of governing and providing services to Nunavut as the territory's largest employer.[59] Over six years after the creation of Nunavut, Thomas Berger wrote his "Conciliator's Final Report" for the implementation of the NLCA 2003–2013. He opened his report observing the slow political development of Nunavut: "Nunavut today faces a moment of change, a moment of crisis. It is a crisis in Inuit education and employment, a crisis magnified by the advent of global warming in the Arctic and the challenge of Arctic sovereignty."[60] This sentence has often been used to encapsulate Nunavut's disappointing first few years of existence. It highlights the dire results in terms of Inuit employment and education, two areas that Berger argued must be front-and-centre if Nunavut has any chance of being a stable territory and perhaps someday a real province of Canada. Unfortunately, it is neither stable nor holds much prospect of developing much further.

Social problems and government capacity deficiencies have been overwhelming problems since Nunavut's creation, and they are growing more urgent as the years pass. Nunavut remains almost completely dependent on a territorial formula financing agreement with the Government of Canada of approximately one billion dollars annually. This continues to leave Nunavut vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of federal politics in Ottawa.[61] Former auditor general of Canada Sheila Fraser has been critical of the GN's ability to conduct even basic bookkeeping and financial planning.[62] Fraser, along with a handful of

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[59] White, Graham, "Governance in Nunavut: Capacity vs. Culture?," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009).

[60] Berger, Thomas R., "Letter to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Conciliator's Final Report "The Nunavut Project," (Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Implementation Contract Negotiations for the Second Planning Period 2003-2013 http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/ccl/fagr/nuna/lca/nlc-eng.asp, 2006), i.

[61] See: Kirk Cameron and Alastair Campbell, "The Devolution of Natural Resources and Nunavut's Constitutional Status," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009); Michael Mifflin, "Canada's Arctic Sovereignty and Nunavut's Place in the Federation," *Policy Options* July-August (2008).

[62] Auditor General of Canada, "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut—2010: Human Resource Capacity—Government of Nunavut," (Canada, 2010); Auditor General of Canada, "Looking Back and Moving Forward: Auditor General of Canada's First Report to the Second Legislative Assembly of Nunavut," (Canada, 2004); Auditor General of Canada, "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Legislative Assembly of

other observers, have further argued that the land claims' ambitious decentralization goals (to have jobs and government services evenly distributed outside of the capital, as I show in the next chapter) should be abandoned because they are too expensive—as smaller centres struggle to compete with larger communities such as Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet for highly trained staff. Fraser indicated in the important 2004 report that: "[w]e are not questioning the government's decentralization policies, however, with the current high demand throughout Canada for trained accountants, it is difficult for Nunavut Crown corporations in smaller communities to compete for trained staff."[63] This is a classic example of day-to-day pragmatic issues clashing with underlying philosophical principles.

This suggests that the growing pains of the NLCA are still being worked out. Devolution of governance from Ottawa is an important, ongoing part of Nunavut's politics today and constitutes some of the most exciting high-level political deliberations to date. The NLCA is an ambitious effort to "begin from the beginning"—to deliberate the effects of colonialism and to seek remedies—but it has not brought about a happy present for the indigenous peoples of the eastern Arctic. Indeed, several members of the media and scholars have begun again to paint, at least since the 1969 White Paper[64], all of Canada's indigenous peoples with the same brush—as "Aboriginal peoples," not to mention all of North American Natives as "Indians."[65] I think we need to pay attention to the various forms of erasure that this puts into effect in "multicultural" Canada.[66]

Nunavut—2009 Report No. 1—Financial Management Practices—Nunavut Department of Health and Social Services," (Canada, 2009); Auditor General of Canada, "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut—2009 Report No.2—Financial Management Practices—Follow-up on the 2005 Report to the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut," (Canada, 2009). See also: Patrick White, "The Trials of Nunavut: Lament for an Arctic Nation," *Globe and Mail*, 1 April 2011.

[63] Auditor General of Canada, "Looking Back and Moving Forward: Auditor General of Canada's First Report to the Second Legislative Assembly of Nunavut."

[64] Canada. "Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (the White Paper)." (1969). See also: Dickason, Olive Patricia. "Social Fact and Development Theory." In *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times*, 383-99. Toronto: The Canadian Publishers, 1992.

[65] The term "Indian" itself shows the confusion involved in the European contact with the Americas in the 14th and 15th centuries. See: Peter Kulchyski, "Towards a Theory of

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided an introduction to the context of the creation of the NLCA. The chapter also introduces the geographical concept of "accumulation by dispossession" that provides a theoretical vantage point from which to concisely explain the expansion of the Canadian state further north but which alienated the local Inuit peoples in the search for "roads to resources". By discussing the national and international context of this comprehensive northern agreement, the chapter provides a better understanding not only of the history of Inuit land claims but also how one of its leading advocates John Amagoalik made sense of his own personal history in relation to it. Understanding these histories helps to understand the specificity of Inuit social movements in the north beyond simple notions of multiculturalism that often miss crucial elements of northern social movements. In short, Inuit were not simply seeking integration into the Canadian state; they were also seeking to acknowledge the harmful effects of colonialism by the Canadian state which made the NLCA an especially pressing matter of concern.

Dispossession: Native Politics in Canada" (York University, 1988); Hall, *The American Empire and the Fourth World*, 5.

[66] For example, Richard Day argues that "[w]hile liberal multiculturalism offers a 'solution' to this 'problem of diversity' through a system of differentiated citizenship rights, this comes at the expense of excluding dissenting voices from the intercultural dialogue." See: Richard Day, "Who Is This We That Gives the Gift? Native American Political Theory and the Western Tradition," Critical Horizons 2, no. 2 (2001).

CHAPTER 2: GAVAMANGA ("PEOPLE THAT LOOK AFTER OTHERS"): ORIGINS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND DECENTRALIZATION IN NUNAVUT

> What is … striking in the present moment is the interaction of the global with the local, and the expansion of popular, decentralized, and democratic forms of interpreting and responding to the top-down challenges posed by a world economy.[1]

> In southern Canada it is common for many "old timers" revisiting scenes of their youth to be amazed at the transformations: former fields and pastures have been replaced by freeways and sprawling city suburbs, single-family residential housing has been transformed to towering apartment complexes or consumed by edifices dedicated to business and commerce. Though there is nothing on the same scale in today's Canadian north [2002], the degree of change is comparable, with modern housing replacing colourful but substandard cabins and shacks, and Ski-Doos replacing dog teams. Television, computers, and the Internet are now almost as universal in northern Canada as in southern Canada.[2]

This chapter addresses the genealogy of what has come to be known as the government decentralization model in the Government of Nunavut (GN). Nunavut has a unique approach to local government with precursors spanning back to the origins of political development in the Northwest Territories. Decentralization has become a buzzword in northern politics due to many decades of alienation under the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) and the Government of Canada. With the creation of Nunavut in the 1990s, the GN adopted a

[1] Ferree, Myra Marx "Globalization and Feminism: Opportunities and Obstacles for Activism in the Global Arena" in Feree, Myra Marx, and Aili Mari Tripp, eds. *Global Feminisms: Transnational Women's Organizing, Activism, and Human Rights*: NYU Press, 2006, 4.
[2] Wonders, William C., ed. *Canada's Changing North*. Revised ed. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens Press, 2003, xii.

decentralized governance model designed to bring government closer to the people. This is an innovative form of democratic theory at least in part invented in Canada's north in postwar society. The decentralized governance model is not well understood outside a small circle of northern governance experts, but it provides insights and lessons for theorists and practitioners interested in examples of local government and activism in Canada. Decentralization is a unique philosophy, or art, of government that comprises features sensitive to specific characteristics of the NWT and Nunavut in terms of territory, ideology, and population.

This chapter examines the northern model of decentralization in NWT and Nunavut in detail and argues that it was primarily a *practical* or administrative proposal considering the northern jurisdictions it was applied to. Decentralization aimed to distribute government jobs and major decision making powers *outside* of the capital of the Territories as much as possible. In short, decentralization was a proposal meant to limit the centralization of government in the territorial capitals. The primary data source for this chapter is a series of major policy documents that address the themes of decentralization, devolution, and decolonization. In practice, the philosophical principles of decentralization came in conflict with the realities and constraints of building governments in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut in the postwar period; later, as the population expanded it became difficult to offer services across the entire territory in an accountable and sustainable way. Before focusing on those points I discuss how decentralization came into focus with its backdrop and origin in the GNWT.

THE POSTWAR ORIGINS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

A description of all aspects of decentralization in the Northwest Territories (NWT) would require a much longer treatment, in part because decentralization is deeply interlinked with two other fundamental political initiatives in northern

political development: devolution and decolonization.[3] I therefore confine the discussion to the historical and sociological context of the decentralization experiment in Nunavut, an experiment that arose naturally from two historical conditions.

First, decentralization emerged as a philosophy of government from a shared feeling of alienation within the NWT. Inuit, as a minority population in the postwar NWT, felt alienated not only from Ottawa and the various institutions that reluctantly began to represent Inuit in the Canadian north in the late 1940s,[4] but also from Yellowknife, the centre of territorial governance that had taken hold by the 1960s.[5] Second, even as late as 1953 there were very few Canadian state personnel of any kind responsible for local government in the vast northern territory. The north was governed by remote control from Ottawa. The first Northwest Territories Legislative Council was set up in 1951; it was the beginning of representative government and the first time that any Council had met since 1905. As long-time northern bureaucrat Graham Rowley once argued, the Council for many years before and after the Second World War "was difficult to distinguish from the Department of Mines and Resources" as the Commissioner of the Territories was the Deputy Minister of that department.[6] And, as he would later suggest, the only employees located in the Eastern Arctic

[3] To be clear, I define devolution as the effort to devolve power from federal government in Ottawa to the territories (such as resource management and royalties, political self-determination, etc.). By contrast, I limit decentralization to the territorial strategies in NWT and Nunavut to have as many government jobs and capacities located outside of the capital cities of Yellowknife and later Iqaluit. That is, decentralization as I define it here largely involves limiting territorial centralization *within* the territories to better serve the needs of small, isolated communities throughout the north. Decentralization is a practical and philosophical means of offsetting the concentration of power in the territorial capitals. For an impressive and accessible overview of devolution in the Northwest Territories see: Guy Quenneville, "Viva La Devolution." *Up Here Business*, August 2012, 26-33. URL: http://devolution.gov.nt.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/August-Devolution-feature-with-cover.pdf

[4] On the introduction of family allowance and health care in the 1940s that helped to draw Inuit off the land, see: Tester, Frank James, and Peter Kulchyski. *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocations in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-63*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994.

[5] Hicks, Jack, and Graham White. "'Whatever You Do, Don't Recreate Yellowknife!": The Design, Implementation, and Evaluation of a Decentralized Nunavut Government: A Case Study in Organizational Engineering." In *Remote Regions/Northern Development Sessions, 45th annual meeting of the Western Regional Science Association*. Santa Fe, New Mexico, 2006.

[6] Rowley, Graham W. "The Role of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development in the Development of Policy and the Coordination of the Federal Government Activities in Northern Canada." Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1992, 1.

were "a handful" of Department of Transport radio operators and two hospitals at Chesterfield Inlet and Pangnirtung (1). Other than the gold rush in Yukon, the oil discovery at Norman Wells, and gold and pitchblende discoveries near Yellowknife and Great Bear Lake respectively, "in the rest of the north however one year was very much like the one before" (2). As we shall see in this section, the NWT is a territory that has continually decreased in size throughout the 20th century due to a long-standing legitimation crisis that stems from having minimal local government of any kind in the territory.[7] We can see a long line of initiatives since the War aimed to alleviate this problem.

The North West Territories (referred to as "North Western Territory" in Figure 1) was formally created in 1870 when the Hudson's Bay Company ceded its territory to Canada with the passing of the Temporary Government Act, 1869, along with an amendment to the North West Territories Act. In 1875, the Act created a Council of five members "appointed by the Dominion Government to assist the Lieutenant Governor in making provision for administration of justice and passing ordinances on matters of local concern."[8] The North West Council met the next year for the first time at Fort Livingstone (west of the Manitoba border), then the capital of the territory before it was moved to Battleford in August 1877 (1-2). The Supply Bill of 1888 outlined the authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Ottawa which was beginning to conflict with the authority of the Council and the three person "Advisory Council," that was to work with the Lieutenant Governor. This was "responsible government" according to Clinkskill (1920-1929?), but questions of control began to emerge: "Had the Legislative Assembly any control over the Advisory Council, or was it responsible only to the Lieutenant Governor? The debate was long and acrimonious, too lengthy to be repeated here." (9) In 1889, the entire Advisory Council resigned claiming "'grave faults of administration' in which the Lieutenant Governor had either acted without the advice of the Council or had ignored it" (the Council qtd. in

[7] Dickerson, Mark. Whose North?: Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992.
[8] Clinkskill, James. "The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories." (1920-1929?), 1.

Clinkshill, 7). This provides a brief window into the humble origins of formal governance mechanisms in the NWT.

At the end of the 19th century the territories were very large, stretching as far south as the Canada-U.S. boundary until 1882, west to the Rocky Mountains, north into the Mackenzie River and the Franklin Region of the Arctic archipelago, and east through the Keewatin region to Hudson Bay. By the turn of the century, the North West Territories had shed considerable territory with the creation and eventual expansion of the province of Manitoba in 1870, the administrative districts of Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Athabasca in 1882, the Yukon Territory in 1898, and the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905. The provinces of Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec were expanded in 1912 and Natural Resource Agreements were passed in 1930 that began the process of granting the prairie provinces and British Columbia exclusive jurisdiction over natural resources, irrespective of Indian hunting rights.[9] What remained throughout the better part of the 20th century, well before the partition of the NWT to form Nunavut in the 1990s, has been called the "residual" Northwest Territories.[10]

[9] See: Tough, Frank. "The Forgotten Constitution: The Natural Resources Transfer Agreements and Indian Livelihood Rights, Ca. 1925-1933." *Alberta Law Review* 41, no. 4 (2004): 999-1048; Tough, Frank. *As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba*, 1870-1930: UBC Press, 1997; Tough, Frank. "Introduction to Documents: Indian Hunting Rights, Natural Resource Transfer Agreements and Legal Opinions from the Department of Justice." *Native Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (1995). I thank Brock Roe for these references.

[10] Weller, Geoffrey R. "Devolution, Regionalism, and Division of the Northwest Territories." In *Devolution and Constitutional Development in the Canadian North*, edited by Gurston Dacks. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988.

Figure 7 : North-Western Territory, 1859. Source: Dean Tiegs, GNU Free Documentation License. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:North-western-territory.png

Figure 8: Canada Department of the Interior. Concise School Atlas of the Dominion of Canada. Ontario textbook collection (University of Western Ontario). Ottawa: Ministry of Interior, 1900

Surprisingly (because of the distance involved), the North West Territories continued to be governed by various departments of the Canadian federal government in Ottawa until 1967. In 1962, the North West Territories were renamed "Northwest Territories," and, a year later, Robert Sivertz was appointed as Commissioner of the territory (the first Commissioner since 1919 who was not also deputy minister of the federal department responsible for the NWT). Sivertz was expected to act on behalf of the federal government and to uphold the traditional quasi-colonial relationship between Ottawa and the NWT. But his personal disposition and populist sympathies led him to side with the will of the Territorial Council over that of the federal government. At that time, the Council was comprised of four elected and five appointed members.

The pressure to decentralize grew as northern populations expanded and it became increasingly difficult to offer government support and services across the large geographical distances that comprised the northern communities. Decentralization was also a local effort to devolve governance from Ottawa to the northern territories. In this sense, the colonial situation was in a state of deconstruction and decentralization became a word to describe this process.

It seems logical for the territories to develop institutions that are more representative and responsive to the needs of local inhabitants. In theory, Canada's northern territories can have some or all the province-like powers that have been developed since the BNA Acts; in fact, there is no reason why a territory could not have powers that even the provinces do not enjoy. The northern territories are unique spaces of political innovation largely in this sense because of their unique setting and because of a populace that has honed self-reliance in the face of a outside interference from Ottawa and elsewhere. Furthermore, Canadian Territories by their very nature were implicitly expected to change and grow into provinces like that of the Canadian prairies, and we might presume that increased jurisdiction over resource management would be crucial to this.

Important changes came about in the 1950s and '60s that show how this political innovation created conditions for a lively period of activism in the territory in the 1970s, such as events surrounding the Dene Declaration in 1975

and the rise of the Inuit as a political factor through entities like the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada founded in 1971 (representing all Inuit), the Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (Inuvialuit) in 1977, and the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut formed in 1982. Numerous policy documents were created during the first several decades of the postwar period that indicate, if anything, that the late development of governance structures in the territories meant possibilities for innovation in the future (See Appendix F).

In 1965, the Territorial Council passed a motion requesting that the federal government investigate the political situation in the Canadian north. Later that year, Arthur Laing, Liberal MP for Vancouver South from 1949–1968, proposed in the House of Commons that a report be created called the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories. The Pearson Government had established the Advisory Commission in 1963. In a speech in the House of Commons on May 11, 1965, Laing confidently stated: "The terms of reference of the Commission will enable it to review government in the Northwest Territories, and to recommend to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources the form of government that seems most appropriate, consistent with political, economic, and social development."[11] It then set out to find a commissioner and other committee members.

THE CARROTHERS COMMISSION

One crucial outcome of these changes was the landmark 1966 Carrothers Commission report, issued to rationalize the governance structure of the Northwest Territories and to make recommendations for the future. The chair selected for the commission was Alfred William Rooke "Fred" Carrothers who was at the time Dean of Law at the University of Western Ontario.[12] He had absolutely no experience in the north but he was a member of the "old boys' club"

[11] Qtd. in Parker, John H. *Arctic Power: The Path to Responsible Government in Canada's North*. Peterborough, Ontario: The Cider Press, 1992, 43.
[12] Carrothers, among countless other achievements in southern and northern Canada, founded the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

with the federal Liberals, including Jean Chrétien.[13] The two other members of the commission were Jean Beetz and John Parker, then Mayor of Yellowknife and later the Commissioner of the NWT from 1967–1979, both of whom had little knowledge of the eastern Arctic (94). Most of the recommendations of the report were accepted as there was a fear that picking and choosing might discredit the entire report.[14] Notably, Carrothers recommended that Yellowknife become the capital of the NWT. A year after the report was published, amid much public controversy, Yellowknife was chosen as the new seat of government and territorial capital (the main alternative at the time was Fort Smith).[15] This swiftly moved the GNWT from Ottawa to Yellowknife in what Hamilton describes as "thirty tons of paper" and seventy-four civil servants being moved from Ottawa to Yellowknife on September 18, 1967 (103).

[13] Hamilton, John D., *Arctic Revolution: Social Change in the Northwest Territories*, 1935-1994. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994, 94.
[14] Sivertz, B.G., "Government of the Northwest Territories, Tuesday Letter Appendix." NWT Archives/Sivertz/N-1988-507 (1966). This was a lesson not learned in the 1979 Drury Report. See: Drury, C.M. "Constitutional Development in the Northwest Territories: Report of the Special Representative." Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1979, and Dacks, Gurston, "The Drury Report: Constitutional Development for Whom?" *Canadian Public Policy*, no. 6 (1980): 2.
[15] The "Carrothers Commission" was formally known as: Canada. "Report of the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories," Volume 1 & 2, 1966.

Figure 9: "Group of women at a Commission stop". Source: Carrothers/NWT Archives/N-2004-007: 0117

Figure 10: "Taking a break to visit the grave of the Mad Trapper". Carrothers/NWT/N-2004-007: 0120[16]

[16] For a fictional account of the largest manhunt in Royal Canadian Mounted Police history in search of Albert Johnson or "the Mad Trapper," see: Wiebe, Rudy. *The Mad Trapper*. Toronto, Ontario: Red Deer Press, 2002. See also: Katz, Helena. *The Mad Trapper: The Incredible Tale of a Famous Canadian Manhunt*. Altitude Publishing, 2004.

Figure 11: "Beaulieu?, Alex Charlo, Chief Jimmy Bruneau at a Commission stop in Rae". Carrothers/NWT Archives/N-2004-007:002

The Carrothers Commission report was an extraordinary if not curious report that summarized the findings of the commission's consultation with 51 communities in the Northwest Territories over the summer of 1965 and winter of 1965–66. The commission visited the eastern Arctic—at the time part of an amorphous "Franklin region" (see Figure 8)—a place that had no local press to announce meetings, and widespread use of many dialects of the Inuktitut language (members of the Commission lacked knowledge of the language and knowledge of the inhabitants, it is telling that the Inuktitut language is called "Eskimo" in the report). In spite of the language barrier, the commission inquired about what northerners wanted to see in terms of territorial governance, control over natural resources, and whether the territory should be divided into smaller regional units for administrative and political reasons. The commission would write that a major problem during the commission's fieldwork

> was the problem of communicating ideas. Here the difficulty manifested itself differently among the Eskimos and Indians. Nouns in the Eskimo language, we are told, are nearly all concrete; there are very few abstractions. We journeyed to the north to discuss one of the most complex abstractions known to the Western world—that of government. What did we want the Eskimo to understand by the term government? The word may symbolize the local administrator for the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, on whom the Eskimo may depend for welfare and other advantages. It may refer to representatives of other federal departments in the area, such as the department of transport, or National Health and Welfare, or the R.C.M. Police. By "government" sometimes is meant "Ottawa," which to many northern people is not a city or even a collection of persons, but is an idea which ultimately symbolizes impersonal power. (9)

The discussion would move on to portray the difficulties involved with the rather stark cultural differences between the Inuit and the commission officials during fieldwork. It would leave little doubt that the main issue here was one of cultural difference that becomes immediately evident with curious statements such as the following chalked throughout the entire document: "We discovered that the Eskimo word which our interpreter used for government meant, in literal translation, 'people who look after others' [Gavamanga]. These are a people with no word for government, but with 14 words for snow."(10) This statement reveals that both practical and philosophical issues were at play and cultural difference became a tangible problem in the Commission's business.

The report shows how little had been achieved by 1966 to unite the different groups living in the NWT in any sort of meaningful political structure. The report grasps for terms to describe something that had rarely been studied in Canadian history, the development of public government in NWT, stressing that the territory had many different groups of people living within it "divided down ethnic lines" since "there is no panarctic sociocultural structure." (13) The commission would eventually argue that these groups should be united under one

territorial government, although the report does consider "the issue of [the] division of the Territories into two or more political units," which it insists might be the best way to achieve "political freedom." (128) Interestingly, "[t]he case for division arose in the council of the Northwest Territories at a time when all the elected representatives were drawn from constituencies in the Mackenzie district." (145) For the authors, the division of the NWT somewhere between the western Athabasca region and the eastern Franklin and Keewatin regions had to be "a means to an end, a means the appeal of which lay in the conjecture that the central government would not consider political advancement for the whole of the Northwest Territories but might be persuaded to do so for a smaller area in which resided a highly articulate and politically disconnected white population." (145-6) Statements of this nature play on the observation in the report that it was the few whites in the territory that were calling for greater self-government, not necessarily the Natives. But the report concludes that division should be brought about only at the "right" time, and went to great pains to show that that time was not 1966.

The report considered the division of the territory between west and east but recommended it was not feasible at the time but would be suitable if not "inevitable" in the future (143). These remarks provided some of the seeds that would germinate to form Nunavut a decade later. The report stated:

> We have come ultimately to the conclusion that the claim can be satisfied almost as fully at the present time without division as with it; there will be a certain political price, not so much in the form of government as in its operation and administration. We have also come to the conclusion that division would likely bear consequences for the Eskimos in the residual area east and north of the Mackenzie and for the Indians in the west which should be avoided at this time (146-7).

The commission would restate its main conclusion in the form of a motto: "In short, representation now; political division later." (147) Throughout the document, the authors were reluctant to accept the premise that division would

necessarily make things better, confirming the dialectical account that developments bring about new contradictions;[17] they warned: "Division could have the accidental and unintended effect of gerrymandering the indigenous people of the Canadian north out of effective participation in the territorial self-government."[18] The main conclusion here is that division was not recommended primarily because the capital of these separate regions in the eastern Arctic "would very likely remain in Ottawa" (151). This might strike the reader as strange coming from a document that argues that the best place for the capital of the territories is in the territories! However, this contradiction is almost immediately resolved if we methodically parse out the conflict between the philosophical and practical aspects of the decentralization initiative from its origins. The authors were arguing that, although it might be philosophically advantageous to divide the territories, the "political price" that they spoke of earlier would emerge in the form of administrative dysfunction. This tension in the decentralization discourse remains throughout its entire existence (as we shall see in a later section). The report claims:

> We conclude that what is required now is not provincehood but the means of growth to provincehood; that the best move for the people of the Northwest Territories at the present time is to retain the Territories as a political unit, to locate the government of the Territories within the Territories, *to decentralize its operation as far as practical*, to transfer administrative functions from the central to the territorial government in order that the latter may be accountable on site for the administration of the public business, and to concentrate on economic development for the residents of the north." (Emphasis added, 151-2)

After publication of the Carrothers report, a new territory was created nearly overnight. A federal workforce of 56 in 1966 was expanded into a

[17] For more on the contradictions associated with development theory, see: Berman, Marshall. *All That Is Solid Melts into Air*. London: Penguin, 1988.
[18] Canada. "Report of the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories," Volume 1, 1966, 148.

territorial civil service of 1285 by 1970.[19] The first territorial council that was all elected was the 8th NWT Council in 1975. This was a watershed moment in Canada's political history—although rarely recognised as such—not only because it began the long process of localizing and devolving the governance structure of the NWT but also because it raised broad awareness of the great diversity of people—various Indians (now First Nations), whites, and Eskimos (now Inuit and Inuvialuit)—living in a territory of thousands of kilometres.[20] Governance in the Northwest Territories has been anything but easy. An extensive literature testifies to proponents and critics of all aspects of NWT development, especially substantive books on the topic of local governance in the NWT.[21]

In some respects the early days of the NWT and those of Nunavut, over 20 years later, have much in common—they reveal the dynamic experiences of political innovation in the Canadian north. But the ideological divide that remains after the separation of Nunavut from the NWT has meant that the NWT and Nunavut often act as rivals rather than territories that have shared experiences under the Canadian nation-building project. It is apparent from my experience in Nunavut that much institutional knowledge has been lost as the boundary between NWT and Nunavut has become imbued with far more significance than perhaps it should have. Instead of one big "Canadian Arctic region," the Canadian north is informally divided rigidly at least between the western Athabasca region, the northern Kitikmeot Region, the Kivalliq region on the western side of Hudson Bay, and the vast eastern Canadian Shield.

The Carrothers report suggested that "there seems to be an emergent 'northern identity,' as distinct from northern regionalism."[22] Carrothers suggests

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[19] Clancy, Peter. "Politics by Remote Control: Historical Perspectives on Devolution in Canada's North." In *Devolution and Constitutional Development in the Canadian North*, edited by Gurston Dacks, 13-42. Ottawa, Canada: Carleton University Press, 1990, 27.

[20] The changing terminology used to describe these groups underlines the impressive political changes that have occurred in Canada since the 1970s.

[21] Dickerson, Mark. *Whose North?: Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992; Hamilton, JD. *Arctic Revolution: Social Change in the Northwest Territories, 1935-1994*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994.

[22] Canada, "Report of the Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories," 140.

that smaller regional identities have blocked any larger regional affiliations across the north. As Dacks has argued, like the Québécois in Québec, Canada's Aboriginal peoples "fear ever more strongly that liberalism is exposing them to an assimilationist flood which they will not survive as people with their cultures intact."[23] Dacks concludes in words that remain as descriptive today as they were when first written, and can now be applied to the sibling rivalry between the NWT and Nunavut once division was all but agreed upon at least by 1990: "It is unlikely that future events in Quebec and the Territories, despite their similar logic, will directly influence one another to a significant degree." (3) Similarly, as geographer William C. Wonders presciently argued in his 2002 new introduction to *Canada's Changing North*: "Devolution of political power from the older centres, both federal and provincial, is facilitating this process [of integrating the Canadian north with southern Canada]. Control of the resource base to finance it, however, still remains largely outside the North, and the political fragmentation of the region continues to restrict an integrated regional approach."[24] In short, the north remains deeply divided and the separation between the north and south remains.

"BUILDING NUNAVUT"

By the early 1980s, the creation of Nunavut became much more than a philosophical issue to do with the division of the NWT. It became a practical issue of how to best set up a new territorial government in the eastern Arctic. A key document, *Building Nunavut: A working document with a proposal for an Arctic Constitution*, published in 1983 by the newly established Nunavut Constitutional Forum (NCF), was the formal beginning of the notion that the creation of a land claims agreement with the Inuit would be the birth of a "second constitution" in the eastern Arctic. At this point, Inuit leaders recognised that if Nunavut was to become a territorial reality, a constitutional amendment would be required. As the opening line of the paper suggests: "This booklet is a unique

[23] Dacks, Gurston, ed. *Devolution and Constitutional Development in the Canadian North*: Carleton University Press, 1990, 3.
[24] Wonders, William C., ed. *Canada's Changing North*, xi.

invitation to you to join in the building of Nunavut;"[25] this was the first draft of what came to be known as the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement signed on May 25, 1993. Much of the structure of the *Building Nunavut* document was included in the NLCA, such as the main articles on language, culture, social policy, science and research, and many other topics. *Building Nunavut* notably also began the long-term discussion of where the capital of Nunavut would be located; the report states: "Few questions are likely to be debated as eagerly as the choice of a community for the capital of Nunavut." (44) The document attempts to describe and refine some of the debates that were occurring in anticipation of the creation of a new territory in the eastern Arctic. Dennis Patterson, John Amagoalik, Kane Tologanak, Peter Green, Bob Kadlun and Agnes Semmler were the members of the Constitutional Forum who penned the document.

Building Nunavut is a succinct and stimulating report of the history of Nunavut and some of the main landmarks along the way. Notable aspects include the crystal clear principle that Nunavut would be a public government, not an ethnic one. This basic distinction is outlined numerous times throughout the report. For example: "Nunavut is not a government only for Inuit, but a government firmly founded in the Canadian political tradition of public services and the power of participation for all people who live in a geographical area." The report continues:

> A special feature of Nunavut is that land claims settlement acts will form important parts of the "total constitution." These settlements—i.e., The COPE [or Inuvialuit agreement] and Nunavut claims now being negotiated—provide specific guarantees for Inuit in respect of certain of their vital interests and are a means of confirming economic and cultural rights inadequately recognized in law before now … However, in terms of the overall government of Nunavut and the activities carried out by provincial and territorial governments elsewhere in Canada, *these are strictly public and nonethnic, open to Nunavut residents of all language*

[25] Nunavut Constitutional Forum. "Building Nunavut: A Working Document with a Proposal for an Arctic Constitution." Nunavut Tungavikhalikinikkut and Nunavut Constitutional Forum, 1983.

and race. (5; emphasis added)

I have added emphasis to represent the stark differences that had emerged by the early 1980s between the Dene and the Inuit in regard to government in the Canadian north. The Dene argued strongly, at least since the Dene Declaration and the creation of the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories, for an ethnic government (to represent Athapaskan-speaking peoples) that would recognise the Dene as a distinct "nation within a nation,"[26] whereas the Inuit leadership was firmly committed to a public style of government as outlined in this passage of the report and which arguably underlies the entire Nunavut project from its beginnings. The report discusses the purpose of writing the Nunavut Act in the House of Commons that would be the outcome of the constitutional development outlined with many opportunities for community input and consultation.

There are occasional moments of hesitation in *Building Nunavut* meant to indicate—or preempt—criticisms from public sources, including citizens of the NWT, the Government of Canada, as well as other observers across Canada and the world. The report states:

> Nevertheless, some people may feel that there is not enough detail, or that things here are not concrete enough. That is the problem with constitutions. They do not put a seal in anyone's pot on Sunday, nor help bring medical services to people who are sick. They do not say how things are going to be, but rather who will be able to make things happen and what are the limits on their power to do so. (5-6)

In a statement that should be on the first page of any introduction to constitutional law today, the report clearly demonstrates an understanding of the fine line that exists between political theory and constitutional law. It even took some opportunities to engage in polemic with "southern" universities in Canada on the basis of a sobering analysis of borders and boundaries, words that it would be wise to also reconsider in the Canadian north today:

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[26] Asch, Michael, ed. *Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997.

> Drawing a line on a map and calling it a new territory has no meaning unless the people of Nunavut have enough power to run their lives and to control important matters which affect them. These powers have to be suited to the needs of Nunavut and not just the theories of political scientists in southern Canadian universities (6).

This describes the real edge of the Nunavut project all along: it had both philosophical rigour, as well as a strong sense of Canadian *realpolitik*. Again, the report would restate the main thesis:

> Nunavut is not an ethnic government. It is a public government within the Canadian tradition. Canadian federalism was designed to accommodate regional diversity, specific cultural traditions, and political rights of minority groups or regions. In Nunavut that philosophical federalism can reach its final flower. (9)

My view is that this is pitched against the Dene proposal that had an almost entirely different view of what self-government means, and which was never designed to include the Inuit of the central and eastern Arctic. The proposal reads as being crisp and clear, showing an impressive knowledge of a variety of jurisdictions. The Inuit leadership knew who they were opposing and the stakes of making the case in nonambiguous terms. If the Carrothers Commission was correct in its opinion that Inuit had next to no understanding of abstractions such as government even by the 1960s, the Inuit either learned quickly or the Carrothers team was seriously mistaken in their judgment in this regard. The report continues:

> Nunavut will not only be a provincial-type government, but also the homeland of the distinct and ancient Inuit culture. It has a special role in protecting the heritage of all Inuit because it will be a government with the powers and resources to do so (11).

Addressing the issue of decentralization, *Building Nunavut* would state: "[w]e believe that entering into serious discussion with the federal government on the

basis of political development rather than administrative reorganization is key to the Nunavut project." (12) Here, the authors were attempting to move the discussion, alive since the Carrothers Commission, to possible administrative drawbacks in dividing the NWT and creating Nunavut. The *Building Nunavut* project attempts to focus on the philosophical aspects of the project and to argue that the administrative aspects should be debated along the way. It is notable in this respect that one of the most prized aspects of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) became the political one of overcoming scepticism about the feasibility of the project in relation to other governments in NWT and even the federation (for this reason, Article 4 entitled "Nunavut Political Development" became the very heart of the NLCA). Later on, the report stated:

> The first fact which the predominately Inuit population of Nunavut would wish to point out is that when Canada was settled, in the south, the Europeans brought with them from overseas land and resources ownership and management concepts and applied them. This provided a basis for the orderly development of the settlers' economy and society, but simply left out the aboriginal people.(30)

The report concluded: "[t]he whole Nunavut proposal is a social policy proposal" (36) because it aimed to develop government structures to better serve the real needs of Inuit in the central and eastern Arctic.

"FOOTPRINTS IN NEW SNOW"

The document entitled *Footprints in New Snow* (1995) was published by the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC), a body created in 1994 under the *Nunavut Act* (Canada) to advise in regard to Article 4 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (1993). This aspect of the proposal was developed in the *Nunavut Political Accord* (1992). *Footprints* outlined the basics of decentralization and developed the Government of Nunavut in its basic form: "Through a strong commitment to decentralization, the size of the headquarters staff in the capital of Nunavut can be kept to a minimum and the sharing of government employment

opportunities with as many communities as reasonably possible can be achieved."[27] This statement reflects a strong vision of what decentralization would look like as an art of government in the soon-to-be-created Nunavut Territory.

It was recognised early in the land claims processes that government in the central and eastern Arctic would assume territorial offices in each of the communities under the GNWT. The goal was for the new territorial government in Nunavut to have an increased impact in these communities, particularly in terms of job creation in a territory in which government is by far the largest employer. For political and other reasons the GN needed to distinguish itself sharply from the GNWT in each of the 25 communities dispersed widely throughout Nunavut. From the start only 10 communities were considered to be "decentralizable," that is, they had populations of over 1000 and could accommodate fairly major governmental capacities.[28] In 1999, most of the Nunavut communities were small, with only Rankin Inlet and Iqaluit having populations over 2000. Although this initiative found some real success in expanding government operations into smaller settlements during the first years of Nunavut's development, decentralization was often an object of scorn—a virtual voodoo doll for complaining about the GN—in the debates leading up to and following the creation of Nunavut.

To this day many people disfavour decentralization for a variety of regional and political reasons, including the widely perceived expense of decentralizing government functions in small centres. As Hicks and White wrote in an important draft paper on the topic (easily accessible online), "[g]iven the level of skepticism in the communities as the decentralization model was developed … many believed that talk of decentralization was just that—talk—and

[27] Nunavut Implementation Commission, "Footprints in New Snow: A Comprehensive Report from the Nunavut Implementation Commission to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Government of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated Concerning the Establishment of the Nunavut Government," (Iqaluit: Nunavut Implementation Commission, 1995), 25.

[28] The ten "decentralizable" communities in Nunavut are: Gjoa Haven, Kugluktuk, Cambridge Bay, Rankin Inlet, Baker Lake, Arviat, Pond Inlet, Igloolik, Cape Dorset, and Pangnirtung.

that decentralization of jobs would not occur."[29] Skepticism about decentralization lives on to this day, most notably in Iqaluit (the centre), where centralization is naturally favoured. The smaller communities have benefited from decentralization efforts and are, for obvious reasons, known to defend it. Where one stands on decentralization often depends on where one lives or indeed wants to live.

In my view, the now famous decentralization initiative in Nunavut has been a success because it enabled government to expand its impact far outside the capital. The initiative brought bureaucrats, community organizers, and politicians together frequently for face-to-face interactions, and to discuss issues of northern governance including the social needs of those living in the region. Furthermore, since the early 1990s it has generated an enormous amount of debate about what Nunavut could and should be. This latter point is, in my view, the real success of decentralization. In short, decentralization is a process wherein "decision-making can be as close as possible to the people being served in order to promote the greatest accountability to the electorate."[30] In this sense, decentralization comes very close to being identified with democracy itself, which suggests that it has been successful primarily because of its pedagogical value at "the end of the beginning" of the creation of Nunavut.

EVALUATING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF A DECENTRALIZED GN

The Government of Nunavut, created in 1999, faces challenges that it is only now beginning to recognise and struggle to address. Serious issues such as acute social problems, pressure to develop natural resources to feed insatiable global commodities markets, job creation initiatives, and a full-fledged housing crisis

[29] Hicks, John and Graham White, "'Whatever You Do, Don't Recreate Yellowknife!": The Design, Implementation and Evaluation of a Decentralized Nunavut Government: A Case Study in Organizational Engineering," in *Remote Regions/ Northern Development Sessions, 45th annual meeting of the Western Regional Science Association* (Santa Fe, New Mexico 2006), 19.
[30] Nunavut Implementation Commission, "Footprints in New Snow: A Comprehensive Report from the Nunavut Implementation Commission to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Government of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated Concerning the Establishment of the Nunavut Government," 25.

must take a back seat to more long-term, strategic projects such as the incorporation of Inuit traditional knowledge and ways of being into the structure and workings of government and bureaucracy in Nunavut. In this chapter I investigated one of the longer term challenges: how to work out the perceived inadequacies of Nunavut's much touted *and* roundly debated decentralization strategy. I chose to examine the decentralization concept because it is surely linked to the problem of providing sufficient government, job creation initiatives, and services to a large and sparsely populated territory. Decentralization is a direct response to these realities as an explicit government policy coming out of the social processes of the NLCA during the 1980s and 1990s.

The broad strokes of decentralization as a particular way of organizing government in Nunavut were initially formulated on paper in *Footprints in New Snow* (1995) and shortly thereafter in *Footprints 2*[31] (1996). Along with other policy documents related to Article 4 "Nunavut Political Development" of the NLCA, such as the *Nunavut Political Accord* (Canada, 1992), these were important policy documents tabled by the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) under the leadership of Chief Commissioner John Amagoalik. It should be noted that Jack Hicks, whose work I consult and rely upon extensively here, was notably the research director for the NIC and the director of the Evaluation and Statistics Division of the department of Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs (EIA) before that department was decentralized from Iqaluit to Panniqtuuq during phase 3 of decentralization. In short, Hicks was intimately involved in the decentralization strategy right from the start as a researcher and "behind the scenes" architect of Nunavut. For these reasons, his recent conference papers on the topic cited in this chapter and in a forthcoming book length contribution on the topic with Graham White might be read more as a robust defense of the decentralization goals than as an "objective" or distanced analysis of the policies of the GN. When it comes to the decentralization initiative, including the careful analysis of it in the underdeveloped social scientific literature on Nunavut, neutral

[31] Ibid; Nunavut Implementation Commission, "Footprints 2: A Second Comprehensive Report of the Nunavut Implementation Commission," (Iqaluit: Nunavut Implementation Commission, 1996).

ground is nonexistent.

The *Footprints* reports and the lively events in the mid-1990s that brought about the initial implementation of the Nunavut Territory set out the basic decentralization model that would, at least ideologically, distinguish the Nunavut project from the perceived inadequacies of the Northwest Territories.[32] In the early to mid-1990s, the decentralization model was seen to be quite essential to the task which was to keep the headquarters staff in the capital to a minimum so that "employment opportunities would be distributed as widely as possible among communities," as the *Footprints 2* report put it shortly after Iqaluit had been chosen by plebiscite as the capital in 1996. After the alienating experience of centralization in Yellowknife under the GNWT, decentralization of Nunavut's government may not have seemed like an impossible order to achieve. Energy to create something new in the eastern and central Arctic was apparently not in short supply given the historical record. But time has shown these goals to be ambitious, as Nunavut's government today is widely known to be truly Iqaluit-centric. One respondent to a survey included in *Building Nunavut Through Decentralization* stated: "This is decentralization, but major decisions are still made in Iqaluit."[33]

In addition to some Nunavut residents, some high-ranking officials in the Government of Nunavut and the federal government, including the former auditor general of Canada, Sheila Fraser, are not in favour of decentralization. The auditor general conducts an annual audit of the consolidated statements of the three Territories of Canada. As a consequence, the auditor general can play a role in the politics of Nunavut. Sheila Fraser was critical of decentralization from an operational perspective, i.e., expense and lack of personnel for accounting tasks. For instance, decentralization requires a higher than average number of professional accountants because they are each required to work "more

[32] Hicks and White, "'Whatever You Do, Don't Recreate Yellowknife!': The Design, Implementation and Evaluation of a Decentralized Nunavut Government: A Case Study in Organizational Engineering."
[33] Millenium Partners. "Building Nunavut through Decentralization: Evaluation Report." Prepared under contract to Evaluation and Statistic Division, Dep't of Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Nunavut, 2002, 19.

independently" in the communities. Under "Implications of decentralization," Fraser wrote: "A decentralized accounting structure requires a higher proportion of experienced professional accountants. Nunavut does not have enough professional accountants to meet its need given the existing infrastructure."[34] Such important challenges to the practicality of decentralization have contributed to its loss of popular appeal. The massive nature of the geography in Nunavut and the sheer expense of travel in the Canadian Arctic add to the costs of decentralized government. Money is in short supply, and Fraser argued that that money would be better spent elsewhere than having accounting decentralized throughout the territory. However, solving the problem of how to manage a decentralized accounting system in Nunavut would only scratch the surface of the practical challenges associated with decentralization.

The decentralization strategy, furthermore, presupposed the development of extensive communications and information technology networks that, to put it mildly, have been slow to appear. Without extensive telecommunications networks departments cannot effectively communicate with one another. The NWT division did not include the transfer of "fully functional information technology systems" even though there are plans to have a new high-speed infrastructure in place by 2012.[35] To date, Nunavut as a whole has had to make do with relatively low bandwidth satellite Internet access, and this is particularly the case in the more remote communities outside the 10 larger centres. The creation of the Northern Communications and Informations Systems Working Group is a good sign that improvements are on the way.[36] Better Internet access will link communities to governments in the Canadian north, as well as to the Canadian south and elsewhere. Reliable access to the Internet is on the rise across Nunavut because of public private partnerships (PPP) with Qiniq, Northwestel, and

[34] Auditor General of Canada, "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut - 2005," (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2005), 37.
[35] North Sky Consulting Group, "Qanukkanniq? Gn Report Card," (Iqaluit, Nunavut2009), 37.
[36] Nunatsiaq News, "A Failure to Communicate," Nunatsiaq News, 20 September 2011; Inc Imaituk, "A Matter of Survival: Arctic Communications Infrastructure in the 21st Century," (Prepared for the Northern Communications & Information Systems Working Group, 2011).

Xplornet.[37] Similar to other members of the postmodern world, Arctic inhabitants, particularly youth, want broadband access to the Internet with video streaming such as Netflix and YouTube. In *Inuit in Cyberspace* (2003), Neil Blair Christensen writes: "[c]onsequently, if one speaks of Inuit tradition(s), one should not forget to speak of Inuit (post)modernity. Inuit have tradition within their (post)modernity, just as Europeans cherish their history without being any less European or modern."[38] The movement of Inuit from "igloos to the Internet" in a span of only 50 years, represents all sorts of opportunities and challenges at the same time. As with the Western world, access to the Internet is remaking the Canadian north in ways that might be seen as unimaginable only a decade ago.

In recent decades Nunavut life has moved from subsistence on the land toward dependence on the ebbs and flows of a wage economy. But geography is still a major factor in governance. One person I interviewed observed, "geography matters and this was underappreciated during the design of the GN." Decentralization has to a certain degree meant the radical virtualization and decentering of governmental communication and thus has brought an obvious pedagogical value to Nunavut. However, Nunavut is almost wholly lacking in secure, long term sustainable investments in the future in terms of transportation strategy. The pro-PPP, *Igirrasiliqta Nunavut Transportation Strategy*, opined in nothing short of utopic terms (making it quite unclear as to how any of these ideals could be actualized):

> Nunavut's current transportation system was designed to enable administration rather than to grow an economy. As the system currently exists, our communities are viewed as destinations, or isolated points, and the object of the system is to deliver basic services and necessities to those points but not beyond. To date, the area between communities has been treated as a barrier—a great distance with little or nothing to offer. This is

[37] Reaney, Brent, "Internet or Internot?," Up Here Business Magazine, September 2009; Chris Windeyer, "Nunavut Internet Users Lag Far Behind Canada," Nunatsiaq News, 18 November 2010.

[38] Christensen, Neil Blair, *Inuit in Cyberspace: Embedding Offline Identities Online* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2003), 15. See also: Cynthia J. Alexander, "Inuit Cyberspace: The Struggle for Access for Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009).

> obviously an unacceptable situation … The wealth of our land is contained in its size, and realizing that wealth will require accessing as much of that land as possible.[39]

A very real challenge from this perspective is to see Nunavut's geography as a strength rather than as a weakness or a vulnerability. There are operational problems involved with having a tiny population in a very large territory. For example, members of the decentralized offices have to travel to Iqaluit to get back into the loop, but public servants located in the capital do not have to travel comparatively as much. Centralization, curiously enough, returns under the guise of decentralization. The inequality between the capital city and the other communities emulates Ottawa and the other cities in the Canadian federation. The global recession in 2008, coupled with Nunavut's financial struggles and dependence on Canada's federal government, provided an incentive to dump the decentralization model, or at least key parts of it, to cut costs. What is to be done? Recentralize everything back in Iqaluit? This sort of rhetoric is not convincing because it does not propose a reasonable course of action. Furthermore, GN public relations and staffing issues have made decentralization a hotly debated topic. However, I argue that discarding the ideals of decentralization would indeed be unfortunate and perhaps even impossible to accomplish now that the GN is up and running and the decentralized offices have achieved a fair amount of success.

QANUKKANNIQ? OR WHAT IS NEXT?

In May 2009, the GN commissioned the Whitehorse-based North Sky Consulting Group to write a report called *Qanukkanniq? Government of Nunavut Report Card*.[40] The purpose of this report was to evaluate: "What is going right? What is going wrong and should be stopped, and what should be improved?"[41] In short,

[39] Government of Nunavut, "Ingirrasiliqta Let's Get Moving: Nunavut Transportation Strategy," (Department of Economic Development & Transportation, 2009), 3.
[40] The intention to commission the report was announced as part of the *Tamapta*: *Building our Future Together, Government of Nunavut Priorities* (2009-2013) visioning and priorities statement.
[41] North Sky Consulting Group, "Qanukkanniq? Gn Report Card."

Qanukkanniq? boldly requested by the Eva Aariak-led GN, is an attempt to develop an up-to-date audit of the present in Nunavut, including considerations of how well the GN is doing in terms of six priority areas: communications, stability, collaboration, IT infrastructure, recruitment and retention of staff, and decentralization. To even request this report required a good deal of courage on the part of Premier Aariak and her government. The GN is, after all, already *heavily* scrutinized by a range of experts, citizens, and institutions, including Nunavummiut, the federal government, taxpayers, academics, the provinces, and indigenous peoples in Canada and possibly elsewhere. Nunavut "has attracted academic and popular attention far out of proportion to its miniscule population."[42] The consultants who wrote *Qanukkanniq?* interviewed 2,100 Nunavummiut in the 25 communities that make up Nunavut and reported on what they heard. It was released in October 2009 while I was in Iqaluit for the first phase of my fieldwork.

Qanukkanniq? initiated a vigorous debate or, it might be said, added focus to a debate already underway about what the government had achieved in its first decade of formal existence and what it was achieving now under the leadership of its second premier. It attempted to sharpen the focus of many discussions that had emerged since the division of the NWT in the 1990s. The very fact that the government opened itself up to be "graded"—although no grades were ever given— by a group of consultants headed by the former Premier of Yukon, Piers McDonald, signalled a concern to develop accountability and transparency in the day-to-day working of the GN. It is interesting to note that *Qanukkanniq?* translated some of this ideology of openness and accountability into "cultural terms." It suggested that the "Inuit way" is to ensure that "decisions would be made with greater sensitivity to communities' needs; and people would participate in making those decisions and share in the responsibility for the outcomes."[43] Whether this is the "Inuit way" or just simply ideology at its finest, *Qanukkanniq?*

[42] Hicks and White, "'Whatever You Do, Don't Recreate Yellowknife!": The Design, Implementation, and Evaluation of a Decentralized Nunavut Government: A Case Study in Organizational Engineering," 1.
[43] North Sky Consulting Group, "Qanukkanniq? Gn Report Card," 2-3.

found that there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the overall performance of the GN on nearly every account it measured, including education, fiscal performance, accountability, health care delivery, the provisions of adequate housing and living conditions, and general social problems. These are daunting challenges for a young, inexperienced government. The main recommendation on decentralization included in *Qanukkanniq?* is that more research needs to be conducted on the effects of decentralization in Nunavut since 2002.

Qanukkanniq? interviewees were divided about what to do with the staggering problems that the capacity deficient GN faces. In terms of the decentralization initiative, the report card summarized:

> Decentralization was widely discussed and roundly criticized both within the public service and by the public. While many acknowledged that there was limited economic stimulus for some communities from decentralized jobs, the benefits ended there. Decentralization was often characterized as expensive and wasteful. Community people claimed that few local people were qualified and able to assume jobs in the decentralized operations other than in entry-level administrative positions. For the most part, people from outside the community took the jobs and the preferred staff housing that went along with it. The anticipated benefits of bringing decision making closer to the people never materialized.
>
> GN staff said that departments' operational decision making was made more difficult and convoluted as a direct result of decentralization. In fact, some decentralized offices have never been properly integrated into their overall departmental operations. Service levels to the public consequently declined.
>
> It is clear that most people would be interested in another operational review of decentralization to determine what can be salvaged through improved management information systems and protocols and what has to be changed. People said departments need to operate efficiently so service

> levels to communities can improve. The Millennium Report 4 found there are many problems with the decentralization model adopted by the GN. These problems have not yet been addressed. (8-9).

Here we find serious reservations even with some of the fundamental ideals and bases of the GN. However, I argue that turning our collective back on decentralization would represent a critical break with the entire project that enables Inuit to stay in remote communities near the land where they function naturally. Were they to flock to the three main centres of Cambridge Bay, Rankin Inlet, and Iqaluit, other problems would ensue. Inuit are moving to the south at an increased rate. According to the 2006 census, Inuit are moving primarily to Ottawa-Gatineau (725 population count), Edmonton (590), Montreal (570), Winnipeg (355), and Yellowknife (640).[44] Thus, a strong and vibrant local government in Nunavut might encourage Inuit to remain in their homeland.

The *Urban Aboriginal Peoples Study* (2010), conducted by the Environics Institute in Canada, found that change is underway but it is slow.[45] According to the findings of this report, Inuit are the least urbanized of all Aboriginal identity groups in Canada, which includes status and nonstatus Indians, Métis, and Inuit. Yet, the study found that 87% of Inuit living in major cities in Canada today are first generation urban residents (30). Although the numbers are not by any means staggering, we can see a trend toward Inuit moving to southern Canada—known as "the south" in the popular grammar of Nunavut. The report found that only 11% of Inuit urban residents were second generation and only 1% were third generation city dwellers. The study also found that Inuit city dwellers maintain a close link with their place of origin in the Canadian north (about 50% of Inuit interviewed for the survey reported that they "feel they have a very close connection" to their place of origin, compared to only 30% First Nations and Métis. About three in 10 Inuit responded that they plan to return to their place of origin, which was also higher than the other groups). (33)

[44] 2006 Canadian census.
[45] Environics Institute, "Urban Aboriginal Peoples Study," (Environics Institute, 2010).

BUILDING NUNAVUT THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION?

Arguably the most important report written on decentralization after the creation of Nunavut was the Millenium Partners' report: *Building Nunavut Through Decentralization: Evaluation Report* published in February 2002 with Terms of Reference issued in July 2001. It was important because of the tone it set for future evaluations of the functioning of the GN.

David Akeeagok (EIA assistant deputy minister of the Decentralization Secretariat), Jack Hicks (director of the EIA Evaluation and Statistics Division), and Sandra Inutiq (EIA Evaluation and Statistics Division) developed the Terms of Reference for *Building Nunavut Through Decentralization*. Primary author Ken Lovely contended that the main aim of the report was to assess the first three years of government after the initial stages of "decentralizaing both headquarters and regional operations to 10 communities across the territory."[46] Decentralization evolved in three stages: phase 1 included the years before and after 1999, phase 2 began in 1999 and ended in 2001, and phase 3 was conducted from 2002 to 2003, after the writing of the Millenium Partners' report. The report found that 340 positions were decentralized by 2001, but only 209 of them were actually filled in the decentralized communities. Inuit filled 59% of positions in the decentralized communities compared to 42% across the entire current public service area. According to the report, decentralization is good for increasing Inuit employment in the government as dictated under Article 23 of the NLCA. Article 23 proposed a goal of having a representative number of Inuit in all areas of the Nunavummiut workforce. Article 23 stipulated that the ratio of Inuit beneficiaries to the total population of Nunavut be reflected in the government, which, given the current population, would be approximately 85% of the workforce. However, in 2000 the percentage of Inuit in the workforce was 44% and by 2009 the percentage of Inuit in the public service had increased to 52%.[47]

As the Millenium Partners' report argued, decentralization of the

[46] Millenium Partners, "Building Nunavut through Decentralization: Evaluation Report," (Prepared under contract to Evaluation and Statistic Division, Dep't of Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Nunavut, 2002), 1.

[47] Auditor General of Canada, "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut - 2010: Human Resource Capacity - Government of Nunavut," (2010), 5-6.

workforce "is in line with the expectation that bringing jobs to the people will increase levels of Inuit employment."[48] One frequently hears that the complaint that the majority of GN jobs held by Inuit are lower level administrative positions. In 2010, Inuit beneficiaries held most of the administrative level positions (94%) and only 26% of management and professional positions.[49] There is, then, more to the story than sheer numbers and Article 23 is surely lacking in terms of class related issues.

There have not been any so-called "phases" of decentralization since 2003; from what I can tell, the word "decentralization" (but probably not the philosophy) has virtually dropped out of the government's discourse. Phase 2 revealed some of the key struggles with decentralization and with the Nunavut project. The decentralized positions were often not filled because few employees were willing to relocate. They either refused to relocate, thereby quitting the GN and receiving severance pay, or they tried to find a different GN job in a community of choice. Often, those living outside the capital did not have the training to qualify for public service and therefore southern outsiders were brought in, creating altogether new population dynamics in the communities. Indeed, as Peter Kulchyski and others have argued, decentralization has serious implications for questions of housing and the creation of enclaves of outsiders at the margins of town where new houses are built. In other words, decentralization in Nunavut means the division of communities between those who live there and those who are decentralized or, in this case, forced to live in the decentralized communities if they wish to keep their jobs. Speaking from the point of view of Panniqtuuq (the Inuit name for Pangnirtung):

> [o]ne of the post-1999 Nunavut impacts has been the construction of housing and office units on the far side of the river (simply bearing the name *ku* river). Slowly this area is evolving into its own suburb: a ghetto for government workers. While creating jobs at the community level is a Nunavut government priority, and decentralization is one of its mantra,

[48] Millenium Partners, "Building Nunavut through Decentralization: Evaluation Report," 2.
[49] Auditor General of Canada, "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut - 2010: Human Resource Capacity - Government of Nuanvut."

> there is a worry that the creation of areas of a community with government housing and government offices will bring to Panniqtuuq a newer version of a colonial social structure marked by a colonial architectural structure. A critical mass of Qallunaat (non-Inuit) who do not need to interact with local Inuit might make an indelible impression on the place: ironic that Nunavut should be the initiator of such a process.[50]

The Millenium Partners' report found something similar under "Social Impacts":

> Many community members expressed concern about what they perceive as a lack of interest or understanding from newcomers. There is a sense that southern-hired workers do not become integrated into daily community life. This is probably due in part to the fact that GN buildings and staff housing are built on the fringes of communities. Unfortunately, the placement of the buildings has added to the perception that outsiders do not want to be part of community life. The geographical separation of some of the government buildings from town has also caused many Inuit to wonder about what goes on inside. As one resident said "I have not been up to that building. What are they doing up there? Is it a secret?" Interestingly, this isolation was also felt by some of the employees themselves. "The GN building is on the edge of town, hardly anyone comes here. It almost feels like a top secret place."[51]

Decentralization meant that new suburbs were quickly built to accommodate the influx of decentralized government workers, in spite of a lack of public housing. There is a common perception in Nunavut that all of the new housing is saved for Qallunaat who move there from the south.[52] How can the GN enable the citizens of Nunavut to enjoy living and working the Arctic and sub-Arctic *without* maintaining some significant support for the ideals of

[50] Kulchyski, Peter, *Like the Sound of a Drum: Aboriginal Cultural Politics in Denendeh and Nunavut*, Winnipeg, Man.: University of Manitoba Press, 2005, 194-5.
[51] Millenium Partners, "Building Nunavut through Decentralization: Evaluation Report," 24.
[52] See: Frank Tester, "Iglutaasaavut (Our New Homes): Neither "New" Nor "Ours": Housing Challenges of the Nunavut Territorial Government," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009).

decentralization? I believe it cannot.

> To date, the GN's decentralization efforts have been focused on the concrete goal of establishing jobs and worksites in receptor communities. Setting up new jobs in communities may be the visible manifestation of the GN's commitment to a new way of doing business, but the resulting organizational structure and work processes differ only marginally from a centralized model … Now it is time to turn the corner and develop a solid planning foundation to support existing and future decentralized operations. This will require a concerted strategic planning effort with the recognition that additional financial and human resources have to be devoted to this effort if the new model is to be successful. The time is right to plan for a future in which the decentralized operations of the GN function as an integral part of a cohesive organization in touch with, and responsive to, the needs of the public it serves.[53]

A key recommendations in the Millenium Partners' report was:

> The Government of Nunavut should establish program performance measures across the organization and begin the collection of data to allow for a full-blown evaluation of decentralization within a period of five to seven years. This evaluation should have access to sufficient data to assess the GN's success in areas such as local employment and community economic benefits, but also to assess the effectiveness of expenditures across the full range of government programs and services. (30)

Hicks and White in their unpublished papers on the topic attempt to defend decentralization goals. They suggest that many of the well-documented complaints about decentralization since the inauguration of the GN and heard particularly in Iqaluit, are a consequence of a conflation of separate issues and capacity problems with the GN itself. Is this the case? When people complain about decentralization are they in fact complaining about a critically

[53] Millenium Partners, "Building Nunavut through Decentralization: Evaluation Report," 29.

underperforming GN?

CONCLUSION: IN DEFENSE OF DECENTRALIZATION

In the debate about decentralization, there is a risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. This chapter has tried to speak to the long history of the discussion on decentralization in Nunavut. It is a great irony to suggest, then, as the *Qanukkanniq?* report did, that "[o]ne of Nunavut's greatest vulnerabilities is geography." (10) This might be true and ironic at the same time since the land is one of the most prominently valued aspects of life in Nunavut. The land is a crucial part of what makes Nunavut distinctive. The land in Nunavut is only a vulnerability because of issues having to do with the supposed necessity of having Westernized centralized governance systems: how do you offer services to nearly 30,000 people populated sparsely over nearly 2 million square km of territory (the same area as Greenland and about one fifth the size of continental Europe)?

I have shown that Nunavut attempted to invent new norms about how governance could be conducted in the newly created territory through initiatives such as decentralization. Further to this, however, is the problem of material resources. As one report on devolution put it, "Diesel and other fossil fuels are used for all personal, public, and private activities in Nunavut. Twenty percent of the GN's budget is spent on energy."[54] This is a problem that the GNWT could not resolve and which contributed in part to the successful push to bring about an autonomous central and eastern Arctic government that would look very different from the governments of Yellowknife and Ottawa. The question of how to proceed from here, *Qanukkanniq*, has been a difficult one to answer as the new is starting to look somewhat like the old. The decentralization strategy has already been particularly expensive because of the great distances that government officials travel in any given month in one of the harshest climates in the world. One obvious way to alleviate some of these concerns would be to develop an extensive telecommunications strategy. *Qanukkanniq?* suggests that this might be

[54] Mayer, Pual, "Mayer Report on Nunavut Devolution," (Frasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2007), 9.

linked to the federal government's interest in the Arctic (even in regards to Arctic sovereignty). *Qanukkanniq*? the Government of Nunavut Report Card states:

> Nunavut needs world-class telecommunications infrastructure so that it can begin to provide a wide array of virtual services in a cost-effective manner. There are many good reasons to seek improved telecom infrastructure including: a virtual classroom that brings a wide variety of curriculum offerings to small schools and community learning centres; diagnostic services that instantly connect health care patients with experts outside of Nunavut; or tele-justice that easily and regularly brings the court room to a community. (9)

In my view decentralization would allow citizens to live in small hamlets across the land, away from the perceived stifling centralization of the big cities and free from southern governance. However, what has happened over the past 10 years is a combination of centralization and decentralization. The GN had created almost 500 positions in 10 communities by 2001[55] and has paid for the frequent travel across Nunuvut of government officials who often live in thinly populated settlements.

I see a risk that Iqaluit might be equated with the controversial Yellowknife. The "Yellowkife-ication" of Iqaluit, perhaps underway, would further divide the territory between the capital and the peripheral governments. This would represent the stratification of Iqaluit along class lines between elite white-collar bureaucrats and business class versus all the rest (who are now service workers, administrative staff, and consumers) who perceive themselves as missing out on the benefits of the Nunavut project (surely, some of the complaints about decentralization across the Territory stem from this inequality). Stratification would imply that Nunavut is not advancing anything positive for the majority. That is why Nunavut's geography is one of its greatest vulnerabilities.

Since phase three of its implementation that ended in 2003, decentralization has been an ongoing experiment as discussed in this chapter. The

[55] Millenium Partners, "Building Nunavut through Decentralization: Evaluation Report."

recent *Qanukkanniq?* report is correct to suggest "another operational review of decentralization to determine what can be salvaged through improved management information systems and protocols and what has to be changed. People said departments need to operate efficiently so service levels to communities can improve. The Millennium Report found there are many problems with the decentralization model adopted by the GN. These problems have not yet been addressed."[56] The GN has attempted to turn the page on decentralization, a term rarely even mentioned in recent policy documents. The rich philosophical underpinnings of decentralization are in danger of being lost. There are obvious benefits of explicitly pursuing the democratic strategy of bringing government closer to the people. Yet, the story on decentralization has been as much a tale about the operational challenges inherent in the implementation of noble ideas than anything else.

[56] North Sky Consulting Group, "Qanukkanniq? Gn Report Card," 9.

CHAPTER 3: IQALUIT, NU: FROM COMMUNITY TO CITY AND BACK AGAIN?

> Changes in the north, in Nunavut, do not mean that the imbalances between south and north, between the powerful and the disempowered, have disappeared. A sophisticated continuation of the old relationships can include a use of new institutions arranged to ensure the perpetuation of old injustices.[1]

> The first human settlement on the moon will look like Iqaluit.[2]

> [T]he state has always seemed to be the enemy of 'people who move around'.[3]

As discussed in the previous chapter, the push to decentralize the government operations in the territory of Nunavut represents a bold planning effort to enable sparse populations to remain in small settlements near the land and to have governmental services and government jobs provided in those communities. This has been a noble gesture but the operational challenges associated with decentralization have been difficult to overcome. This chapter will move on from this foundational aspect of Nunavut's governance structure to reflect on the territory more generally from the perspective of my fieldwork in Nunavut; this chapter represents a reflection on what I did while in Iqaluit meeting people, conducting interviews, writing drafts, and conducting archival research at the Nunavut Arctic College library.

The chapter investigates Nunavut's promise today in the context of wider modernization pressures such as the urbanization of its capital city and other regional centres. I base my analysis on field visits in Iqaluit, as well as short

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[1] Written in the 1991 preface to: Hugh Brody, *The People's Land: Inuit, Whites and the Eastern Arctic*, Vancouver, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991 [1975], 14.
[2] Quinn R. Duffy, *The Road to Nunavut: The Progress of the Eastern Arctic Inuit since the Second World War*, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, xix.
[3] James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. London: Yale University Press, 1999, 1.

contextual visits to Pangnirtung (*Panniqtuuq*) in 2010 and Resolute Bay (*Qausuittuq*) to attend Operation Nanook 2011 with the Canadian Forces. The literature I engage with addresses key challenges that the territory faces in its attempt to gain a meaningful sense of autonomy from the ominous "south," (which usually means southern Canada but occasionally the U.S. or Europe). For example, in the opening quotation of this chapter, long-time northern researcher Hugh Brody reminds readers about powerful colonial legacies in the Canadian north that do not simply wither away. These legacies are important to keep in mind as key links to the (colonial) past. Interpreting the present is no simple or straightforward matter because it is bound up with political and social aspects of the long and complicated history of the Canadian north. Who has the authority to speak for whom? What are the limits of these representations between colonizing forces and Inuit? In what language does one speak? In this chapter I pay particular attention to the qualitative details of social change in the Canadian north with a sensitivity to colonial legacies that live on in contemporary Nunavut in the form of "Qallunaat-Inuit relations." I attempt to make sense of the present situation of Nunavut from the perspective of specific issues raised during my fieldwork in Nunavut's most important and extravagant urban hub and cultural capital, Iqaluit.

IQALUIT: THE NAME OF A PLACE AND A DEBATE

Figure 12: Iqaluit looking east, 7 July 2011. Photo credit Barret Weber.

Iqaluit has been experiencing rapid centralizing pressures that have accompanied the democratic decentralization theory developed by the NIC. Iqaluit (ᐃᖏᑲᓗᐃᖅ), meaning "place of many fish" in Inuktitut, was the townsite of Frobisher Bay until 1987. Iqaluit, located at 63 44' 55"N/68 31' 11"W, several hundred kilometers south of the Arctic Circle but well above the treeline, was officially declared a city in April 2001, shortly after the formal creation of Nunavut. The compelling history of Iqaluit is related in this chapter.

Iqaluit is a major regional centre of importance in Canada's eastern Arctic and it has enjoyed this status for at least 50 years. It has the smallest population of any capital city in Canada but has the largest population by far in the eastern Arctic. It also has the highest non-Inuit population in Nunavut (approximately 50% of the total population is non-Inuit). According to the 2006 Canadian Census, the population of Iqaluit in 2006 was 6,184; the next-largest community in the territory is Rankin Inlet, with a population of 2,358. Nunavut's total population in 2006 was 29,474, with approximately three-quarters being Inuit beneficiaries of the NLCA. Most current estimates put the Nunavut population at around 32,000. Iqaluit accounts for approximately one-fifth of Nunavut's total population; the population of Iqaluit is higher than the population of the entire Kitikmeot Region in the central Arctic.

The origins of Iqaluit as a settlement date precisely to 1942, although the Hudson's Bay Company operated a post several kilometres further up Frobisher Bay for 30 years prior to this. During the 1940s, the United States Air Force (USAF) built two airstrips as refuelling stations for planes en route to Europe during the Second World War. Before the arrival of the USAF, Inuit had never made permanent or temporary camps at the site they knew as *Ikaluit* (sometimes spelled *Ekalooeet* in historical documents), however, there is significant archaeological evidence of centuries of Pre-Dorset, Dorset, and Thule occupation of various parts of the surrounding area near Koojesse Inlet (the present town site

of Iqaluit).[4] For example, stone formations have been discovered in Qaummaarviit Territorial Park (meaning "a place that shines") (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Qaummaarviit Territorial Park, July 2011. Photo credit: Barret Weber.

Once the USAF arrived, Inuit increasingly began to use the *Ikaluit* townsite as a place to interact; they would shop at the base, trade with the military, and "recycle" the plentiful resources found in the local garbage dump. Due to Canadian sovereignty pressures, USAF left the site after the war, but returned in 1952 as the Korean War and the Cold War once again made the site strategically important. The U.S. military began planning and building of a military instalment at Thule, Greenland in 1951. The Americans and Canadians began calling the whole area Frobisher Bay and it was used to house supplies and workers during construction of the distant early warning (DEW) line several kilometres north of Frobisher Bay near Cumberland Sound. By the late 1950s, Inuit in the area were involved in wage labour employment. Several important sociological studies were carried out regarding the changes to Inuit everyday life as a result of a changing economic base.[5] However, the USAF left the site in the

[4] Personal communication with Mary Clark (Iqaluit Centennial Library) on the basis of an unpublished manuscript called "Historical and Territorial Evolution of Iqaluit -- from land to legislature in 50 years."

[5] See: Toshio Yatsushiro, "The Changing Eskimo." *Beaver* 293 (1962): 19-26; Toshio Yatsushiro, "Frobisher Bay 1958." Ottawa, Ontario: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1963; Toshio Yatsushiro, "Eskimo Attitudes toward Wage Employment and Related Considerations." In *Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. Kingston, Ontario, 1960.

early 1960s after Frobisher Bay, for a variety of reasons, lost its importance as a key strategic locale in the Cold War. By 1963, the U.S. military left for good and Frobisher Bay took on an administrative function governed exclusively by the Government of Canada. The settlement was subject to various proposals for regional planning even though it has never had a solid economic base.[6] Macbain predicted in a 1970 thesis that "both the settlement and its Eskimo population face an uncertain future" (Ibid.). In any case, in 1987 the community changed its name to the Inuit word Iqaluit to better reflect its Inuit origins and inhabitants.

Iqaluit has come a long way since its military origins, but origins are difficult to supersede. Since the 1980s, and even earlier, Iqaluit has become a dominant regional centre of importance in Canada's eastern Arctic, and one of its largest communities, but many elements of its rugged frontier origins remain. City and governmental authorities in Iqaluit today struggle to have it seen by its many Inuit and non-Inuit inhabitants as a "good place to live." Part of the problem is that Inuit members of the community often feel left out of the action, which includes senior government jobs.

EXCURSUS I: SECOND FIELDTRIP TO IQALUIT

I arrived at the Iqaluit airport late in the afternoon of October 4, 2010 (Figure 14). The northern air route from Edmonton to Iqaluit via Yellowknife and Rankin Inlet is sometimes called the "milk route" because of the number of stops along the way. The relatively small airport was busy when I arrived. I took a taxi to the Nunatta Campus of the Nunavut Arctic College where I was to be lodged in the Old Residence (the former Strategic Air Command barracks, often called "the Composite Building" in historical documents. In the 1960s it was renamed "the Federal Building") while in town. It was raining and the many potholes on the paved roads were filled with water. The surrounding hills revealed that it had previously snowed. I felt excited to be back in Iqaluit exactly a year since my first field visit and after thinking about it a great deal while in Edmonton. During the

[6] Sheila Keith Macbain, "The Evolution of Frobisher Bay as a Major Settlement in the Canadian Arctic." M.A. Thesis. McGill University, 1970, xi.

drive to the Residence, the rather philosophical Qallunaat (non-Inuit) cab driver lamented the pace of change in Iqaluit, as if he knew that I was intending to write on that very topic.

Figure 14: Iqaluit Airport terminal, October 2010. Photo credit: Barret Weber.

The cab driver told me that the GN at the time was in emergency meetings discussing how to deal with a looming electricity shortage over the next winter.[7] Iqaluit, now definitively part of postindustrial society which is driven in part by the widespread use of the personal computer, the must-have big screen TV, and an expansion of corporate and commercial services, was consuming record levels of electricity. The five diesel fuelled electrical generators run by Qulliq Energy Corporation (QEC) that supply power to the city were struggling to keep up. The president of QEC, Peter Mackey, commented that there are six power plants in the territory that are "between 40 and 50 years old" (Ibid.). As Kenn Harper, a grocer in Nunavut, wrote to the Utilities Rates Review Commission (URRC): "Our diesel generating plants are pigs. We may not be putting lipstick on them, but we are putting band-aids on them. I'm tired of seeing band-aids put on antiquated diesel plants." Jim Bell, editor of the weekly Nunavut newspaper, summed this up by saying that "because of this, Nunavummiut rank among the most polluting

[7] See: Jim Bell, "Nunavut's Ancient Power Plants Dying of Old Age," *Nunatsiaq News*, 07 January 2011.

people on the planet." Will there be a power shortage in Iqaluit during the upcoming winter? For a city not connected to a back-up grid of any kind, these are fundamental questions of survival in the contemporary Arctic. All environmental concerns aside, if these generators were to fail in concert, chaos would surely ensue.

The stories told by Iqaluit's taxi-driver informants, although most taxi drivers are not *from* Iqaluit strictly speaking, play a part in constituting the public discourse of this booming frontier town. The taxis' history harkens back to the military origins of the place. The issues raised by the driver reflect the rapidly expanding population of Iqaluit, both in terms of official numbers and the growing but always unknown number of transient residents. Another serious issue on many minds in contemporary Iqaluit is the shortage of affordable housing. Questions of urbanization and population growth would prove to be a key avenue of inquiry for my entire field session and subsequent writing/research. The driver headed toward the west industrial area of town, down "the Federal Road" directly north of the airport runway, and dropped me off at the Nunatta Residence (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Old Residence in Iqaluit. July 2011. Photo credit: Barret Weber.

The recent urban growth in Iqaluit and Nunavut is being driven primarily by governmental development, which includes the growth of Inuit owned

corporations.[8] The main Inuit-owned corporation is the Nunavut Tungavik Incorporated (NTI). The NTI, the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA), and several other regional corporations have exclusive mandates to serve the Inuit beneficiaries of the NLCA on a regional basis. Nunavut has three major regions: the Baffin or Qikiqtaaluk region (the main seat is Iqaluit), the Kivalliq region (formerly called Keewatin) (the main seat is Rankin Inlet), and the Kitikmeot Region (the main seat is Cambridge Bay).

Iqaluit is currently undergoing a construction boom as the federal government, the territorial government, and the corporations expand capacities and services in the eastern and central Arctic. There is a strong demand by Inuit and non-Inuit alike to live in Iqaluit. Because these developments have been increasing over the past 20 years, Iqaluit is short of nearly everything that one might commonly associate with a city: it is experiencing critical shortages in housing, infrastructure, road maintenance, communication capacities, locally-produced electricity systems (the power plants still rely on diesel shipped in from the south), commercial and governmental space, infrastructure to capitalize on tourism (City of Iqaluit, 95). Iqaluit has come a long way—symbolically represented by its many paved roads—but it still lags behind most southern cities in Canada in terms of quality of life measures. It also has an extremely limited number of taxpayers, only around 700 in total.

However, with that said, Iqaluit offers many of the conveniences familiar to modern Western societies, such as well-stocked grocery stores, several leisure facilities, access to postsecondary education, a busy airport, courier and mail services, good bars, hundreds of channels on satellite TV, fairly good access to the World Wide Web, healthcare services, and libraries. Although it is struggling to keep up with the pace of change, it is by far the most dynamic community in the territory. As Nelson Graburn argued, referring to Frobisher Bay's early history

[8] City of Iqaluit. "Amended Version of City of Iqaluit General Plan." (2010), http://www.city.iqaluit.nu.ca/i18n/english/5yearZoning.html.

in the postwar period: “Iqaluit was quite different than anything else. [It] was like a training ground for the Inuit to get into modern living”.[9]

NIGHTLIFE IN IQALUIT

The four main bars in Iqaluit include: the Royal Canadian Legion Branch No. 168 (membership or sign-in by a member is required to enter the premises; it is frequented primarily by Inuit. This bar has been described to me as “the social hub of the community”), the Kickin’ Caribou Pub (commonly called “Nova” because of the building it shares with the Nova Hotel), the Storehouse in the Frobisher Inn (usually called “the bar” or occasionally, derogatorily, “the Qallunaat bar”), and the Navigator Inn (another great Inuit pub with great service and the most uneven floor one can find). Each bar to my knowledge closes at 12:30 a.m. sharp. These bars have a distinct Western pub feel to them, and, as in the south, the bars in this community (Iqaluit is unique in this respect in the territory as it is the only community with bars) provide a space for social activity in the evenings. These bars are vital social spaces in the community – and thus a key subject of discussion in Iqaluit – where people meet friends, coworkers, and potential lovers and spouses; they are among the very few places people can go after working hours to meet, visit, and dance.

The bar formats combine a nightclub/sports-bar ambience that features good company, generous (but expensive) drinks, and big screen TVs (there is no state-sanctioned gambling or video lottery terminals to date; one bar has Bingo). Bar staff—a minority of which are Inuit, excluding perhaps Legion and Navigator—are from all over the world, including Québec, various parts of English speaking Canada, and even Nigeria in one case—even though most of the customers are Inuit. I observed that many bar staff are strikingly intolerant of Inuit—particularly young Inuit women—drinking alcohol and “having a good

[9] Graburn quoted in Greg Younger-Lewis. "A Second Look at Early Frobisher Bay." *Nunatsiaq News*, 1 April 2005. For more on the history of modernization in Inuvik and Frobisher Bay, see: Matthew Farish, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. "High Modernism in the Arctic: Planning Frobisher Bay and Inuvik." *Journal of Historical Geography* 35 (2009): 517-44; James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*.

time." It is relatively easy for Inuit to be cut off and even kicked out of these bars with a wrong glance or a slight indication that someone might have consumed too much (this is well-known in my experience amongst those that frequent the bars). Furthermore, because of the small-town nature of Iqaluit, if you are cut off at one time this could affect future prospects in the bars. Iqaluit is large compared to all of the other communities in Nunavut but in my experience it is not large enough for individual members to remain anonymous.

A southern Qallunaaq, such as myself, is often treated with more respect than an Inuit in these bars (confirming the common notion in Nunavut that all southerners eventually leave). I was treated as a tourist whose stay in Iqaluit would be short and sweet. My visits were usually highlighted by many offers to purchase locally produced soapstone or jade carvings, such as seals and polar bears, earrings, seal-skin hair clips, and many other seal-based products; also available are prints and creative works such as floor-plan models of traditional igloos (something that I did purchase) and even amouti (an Inuit parka). Anyone immediately perceived as an outsider must prepare to be offered many beautiful goods produced by local carvers, artists, and their marketers at a fraction of what it would cost to purchase the same thing in Ottawa, Montreal, or Edmonton.

The contemporary situation of Iqaluit's bars provides a simple illustration of the simultaneous uniqueness and ordinariness of this northern Canadian city. For some, Iqaluit is a space of possibility. It is a place where the new can emerge. Yet others expressed to me that it is like a "prison" or a "giant garbage dump". My argument is that the bars tie in many aspects that are recognisably Iqaluit: its taxi cabs, which can be seen in long lines outside of the Storehouse on any given night and which take people to the bars and back home again (a history that spans back to Iqaluit's military origins as soldiers needed to be transported from residence to the bars and back again), its many paved (but often crumbling) roads, and a distinctly Western form of night-life where residents and newcomers can interact and get to know one another in privatized social spaces. Although often perceived as places of Westernization and even decadence, the bars are additions to the community that provide social opportunities not available elsewhere in

Nunavut strictly speaking. Ambivalent attitudes towards these bars speak to the ambivalence that exists more broadly towards southern modernization amongst some *Nunavummiut* (in one case, I was asked by a patron in the parking lot to simply go home; however, for reasons beyond my understanding, less kind words were expressed at the time).

The bars in Nunavut represent one element in the *politics of development*. Public opinion in Nunavut about life in Iqaluit in some important ways hangs on how to interpret the role of the bars/parties and alcohol in Inuit communities.[10] In my fieldwork, I found that some believe that Inuit cannot handle this foreign, distinctly non-Inuit, toxic substance and therefore it should be banned altogether. This constitutes the justification for maintaining dry communities but which produces the major problem in Nunavut—underground bootlegging. Others believe that Inuit have the right to consume alcohol like anyone else. In a word, the problem of how to interpret the role of Iqaluit in contemporary Nunavut is in many ways a debate about how to make sense of different conceptions of *freedom* between that of Inuit and Qallunaat ways of being, which are not perfect opposites; there are points of intersection, particularly in connection to the importance of individual freedoms and consensus-based approaches to justice.

Iqaluit is growing as a significant and increasingly Western, "economically viable" Arctic city[11], located only three hours (by flight) north of the capital city of Canada, Ottawa. However, the question of how to make Iqaluit seem like "home" to Inuit is hard to answer, as Iqaluit is seen more and more as a remote suburb for mid-level bureaucrats (the "B-Team," as they are sometimes

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[10] The role of alcohol and parties was an important theme regarding modernization in John and Imra Hongimann's important ethnographies of Frobisher Bay and Inuvik in the late 1960s. See: John J. Honigmann and Irma Honigmann. *Arctic Townsmen: Ethnic Backgrounds and Modernization*. Ottawa: Canadian Research Centre for Anthropology, 1970; John J. Honigmann and Irma Honigmann. *Eskimo Townsmen*. Ottawa: Canadian Research Centre for Anthropology, 1965; John J. Honigmann and Irma Honigmann. "How Baffin Island Eskimo Have Learned to Use Alcohol." *Social Forces* 44 (1965): 73-83.

[11] As mentioned earlier, this has been disputed by Sheila Keith Macbain (1970) as well as various polemics that emerge from time to time, such as the following: Kris Millett, "The Mistake by the Bay: How Iqaluit Is Kept Afloat by Endless Federal Cash." *Culture Magazine.ca*, 02 September 2008. URL: http://www.culturemagazine.ca/politics/the_mistake_by_the_bay_how_iqaluit_is_kept_afloat_by_endless_federal_cash_.html

called) from southern Canada who come to Iqaluit for government and contracting jobs. These bureaucrats impact the place. The city struggles to make itself conducive to business, satisfying to residents and consumers, and a friendly place for government investment—including a stopping place for exceptional events like the Group of Seven (G-7) meetings held in February 2010 (lack of communication capacity for media and government aides meant that their Blackberries wouldn't work—chaos for the bureaucracy). Yet, Iqaluit also must provide a home for Inuit and northerners in search of good jobs while maintaining important aspects of traditional culture and a long-standing commitment to the Arctic as a homeland. With these questions in mind I turn to a particular "home," the Old Residence on the Nunatta Campus of Nunavut Arctic College. It was my home in Iqaluit as well as several other students, some of whom I met while staying there for over 2 months of fieldwork in Iqaluit.

EXCURSUS II: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT: "OLD RES," STUDENT LIFE IN IQALUIT, AND MILITARY ORIGINS

Figure 16: Old Res, October 2010. Photo credit: Barret Weber.

The enormous and mysterious building announces itself with a large sign in Inuktitut syllabics, ᓯᓚᑦᑐᖅᓴᕐᕕᐅᑉ ᐅᓪᓕᕕᖅᑯᑖ [silattuqsarviup ulliviqutaa], which is written in English as "Nunatta Residence." The residence, known in the community as "Old Res," constructs a sense of interiority in the Arctic; the

building feels like a large ship designed to fend off the harsh Arctic environment.[12] In this sense, Old Res, and other military buildings like it, represent a *turn inward*, characteristic of modernity, against the cold, against the people of the Arctic, and a safe haven from all the contingencies and risks of scarcity. It was originally built to hold up to 200 US soldiers and to this day it contains a massive kitchen and mess-hall serving three full-course meals seven days a week (during regular school terms), a large centrally located gymnasium on the second floor, a run-down weight room, TV rooms with brand new big-screen LCD TVs and satellite signal, staff and faculty offices, an ATM machine (installed during my visit), newly installed surveillance cameras in the halls, and a friendly 24 hour security staff that is rarely seen outside the security office situated at the front door. In many striking ways, Old Res is a prototypical Goffmanian "total institution" that provides everything to its residents (students) but at once feels as inescapable as a prison. For both visits I stayed on the second floor, the men's-only floor. Women stay on the third floor of Old Res.

The first year I stayed in one of the standard rooms that are joined with another room separated by a small living space where students play video games, study, and sometimes even watch TV if they bring one along. Unfortunately for me, during the first year of my fieldwork my new roommate had fallen in love (or lust) with another student shortly before I had arrived at Res; they made love in the room next to me every night and for long hours on end! Luckily, during my second and third field visit, the quality of my living quarters increased exponentially in what I jokingly called "the executive suite"—I had a private room and a reliable Internet connection. What more could a PhD student doing his fieldwork in a strange place want? I felt like I was moving up in the world but I

[12] It is interesting to note that Ernst Bloch once described modernist housing and infrastructure by reference to a ship; he writes: "Even the form of the ship, that seems purely decorative, does not seem real enough for the motif of escape that most people in the capitalist world have." (186) Old Res, in this sense, was an *escape* for the American military and labourers from the Arctic environment and its climate. The relationship to the environment becomes mediated and thus a "landscape." See: Ernst Bloch, *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays*, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988); Charles Rice, *The Emergence of the Interior: Architecture, Modernity, Domesticity* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

do feel for students who live in such rooms away from home for many months, if not years pursuing training and education.

Even today, Old Res feels remarkably durable and its long history is apparent in the structure that exists as an artefact from the past. It is, perhaps, not incidental that many sources have told me over the course of writing this chapter that they have met or heard about ghosts while staying at Old Res. This is indeed a common place myth about Old Res.

For example, the rumoured ghosts were debated in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly on October 26, 2010 while I was in Iqaluit (a suicide at Old Res rippled through the community in late October 2010, as I will discuss in a later section). MLA Paul Okalik asked about the age of Old Res during a review of Nunavut Arctic College (NAC). Hon. Daniel Shewchuk, the Minister responsible for NAC, stated that "we do not have the exact year…I don't have a copy of that exact letter, but the residence is between 55 and 60 years old, as far as I can recall".[13] Mr Okalik responded by stating: "Wow, I did not know it was that old. It's still being utilized today. However, *it is used only by people who have no other alternative but to live in that residence*….that building should not be used since it is getting old and Arctic College has finished construction of the new residence near the college." (emphasis added) Sawchuck replied, representing the current NAC policy about why Old Res is still used in light of recent student suicides: "It's a facility that we have available to us and we need to use it at this time". He argued that Old Res will be replaced once airport construction is completed over the next several years, which may free up space and resources for a new residence (rumours circulate that the current airport terminal may be used as a "new" residence). Interestingly, Mr. Adamee Komoartok, MLA representing Pangnirtung, offered his opinion of Old Res in regards to what he called "ghostly encounters":

> This was partially referred to by my colleague, but I wanted to ask a question about the old residence. It is a very old building as I lived there

[13] Legislative Assembly of Nunavut, *Nunavut Hansard Official Report*. 2nd Session, 3rd Assembly, Day 49, 26 October, 2010, 2761.

> for two years and that's about 40 years ago already that I have not returned. I did not expect to enter it again, but I have had to visit on several occasions. The paint is still the same, the smell is still lingering, the floor is still the same, and it is not very scenic. It seems to have never changed even up to today. We still have students living at the old residence and some students from Pangnirtung are living there. One of the students passed away in that building just recently. Ever since that residence was opened, there have been a number of suicides. Residents talk about ghostly encounters with invisible spirits and I believe that they are true because we hear occasionally about ghostly encounters. I would like to find out about the closure date of this building. It has been well utilized by our people, but in some ways, I think it's best to completely construct a new residence. There are some people from Nunavut who had bad experiences at the student residence while they were there, but not all people underwent those experiences. I am urging the minister and his officials to look for an alternate building or to build another facility to house the students because that building is decrepit and I would like to hear about the closure date. As per some of the comments, that old residence is quite dilapidated. I just wanted to add that further to my colleague's comments. Thank you, Mr.Chairman (2762).

It is difficult to say how these ghostly matters should be interpreted. I was fortunate to avoid encounters with ghosts during more than two months of living at Old Res over three phases of field research, so I can't speak from personal experience. By, as I said, I heard about ghosts at Old Res from informants.

The testimony that there are ghosts made that presence exist by the very absence of "real" ghosts. I began to think of Old Res as a place that harbours ghosts even though I had only heard about them from the testimony of others. Let us remember that Old Res represents a crucial link from a militarized past to the modern present of Iqaluit and one might seriously wonder if this is the mediating role that ghosts play in the public discourse about Old Res. The physical structure

of Old Res, representing a strong link with Iqaluit's military origins, has an interesting history and this should include the current preoccupations of students who dwell there and staff-members such as teachers, cooks, and security staff that work there today. Old Res reminds us that "the time is out of joint"—Old Res is a symbol of Iqaluit's American, Qallunaat origins, military excesses, and the initial southern financial intervention in the Inuit homeland or Nunatta.

As Hugh Brody speculated in his book *The Other Side of Eden*, the Inuit word *ilira*, meaning in Inuktitut something like to be afraid or intimidated in the presence of someone, speaks of those things that make one feel afraid such as inequality: "ghosts, domineering and unkind fathers, people who are strong but unreasonable, whites from the south. What is it that these have in common? They are people or things that have power over you and can be neither controlled nor predicted."[14] According to Brody, ilira speaks to the fear of the social and political aspects of colonialism that distorts common meanings: "The power of colonial masters is indeed like that of ghosts – appearing from nowhere, seemingly supernatural and non-negotiable" (44).

I will now turn to this history based on archival research that I conducted at Library and Archive Canada in Ottawa (the following figures were retained from those visits).

[14] Hugh Brody, *The Other Side of Eden: Hunters, Farmers and the Shaping of the World*, Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2000, 43.

Figure 17: "Crystal II" Air Base, 20 March 1946. Photo credit: Witley, J., LAC PA 164470

Figure 18: Frobisher Bay, 14 May 1961. Photo credit: Gimpel Charles, LAC: MIKAN3611658, R10187-151-6E.

MILITARY HISTORIES AT CRYSTAL II

The history of Old Res is interesting in its own right and could justifiably constitute the subject matter for a much longer treatment in the context of the relatively recent military origins of Iqaluit. I discuss only the broad outlines of the history of Iqaluit/Frobisher Bay from the perspective of present matters of concern in Nunavut. The Department of Transport (DOT) had the Strategic Air Command (SAC) complex built under contract to Pitt Construction Company in Toronto as a barrack for soldiers and workers in 1958–9 during the construction of the nearby DEW line. The report entitled *Frobisher Bay Airport Commercial Air Carrier Activity to 1969*, published by the Economic Division of the Department of Transport on May 27, 1959, stated:

> Frobisher Bay Airport was taken over by the Department of Transport from the Department of National Defense in September, 1957. There is one usable runway which is some 6500 feet long at the present time, although it is hoped by the fall of 1960 its extension to 9000 feet will have been completed. At this length it will be capable of accommodating large civil and military aircraft. The contract for the extension, which is held by the Carter Construction Company of Toronto, also calls for construction of taxiways, refuelling and parking aprons, installation of high intensity lighting, and of draining facilities which will include the diversion of a creek. The bid submitted by Carter for the entire project is $6,300,000. The Department of Transport's role in the matter is purely one of administering the contract, since the cost is ultimately borne by the United States Air Force.
>
> This would suggest that the future of Frobisher will at least for some time be related mainly to defence. Actual military plans are to make it one of four northern Strategic Air Command tanker bases, another being constructed at Frobisher is a "USAF complex" which will consist of accommodations for some 200 men and complete facilities for several large tanker aircraft. The estimated cost of this project is to be in the order

of $10,000,000, the contract having been awarded to Pitt Construction Company of Toronto through the Department of Defence Construction.

There are a number of reasons why Frobisher Bay airport will be of considerable importance from a civil aviation standpoint in addition to its military functions. First there is its location: from a domestic traffic point of view, Frobisher is situated far into the eastern Arctic and can thus serve as its sagging base or refuelling stop for even more remotely located points. It is 1250 air miles due north of Montreal and may be regarded as being one of a chain of airports which enables even light aircraft to fly into the Arctic. Thus an aircraft of limited range can fly to Frobisher by using such intermediate airports as Seven Islands, Knob Lake, Nitcheqon, and Fort Chimo.[15]



Figure 19: Distant Early Warning (DEW) personnel tents 1956-1957. Photo credit: Gavin White fonds, LAC: PA-166336,

In the late 1950s, the history of the townsite of Frobisher Bay was less than 20 years old, and was only in the beginning stages of development. At this time it was both a space of government/military and a space of dwelling. The quote from the 1959 report above indicates how the arrangement between the DOT and the

[15] LAC, file no. 352-2/169 vol. 1311, RG85-D-1

USAF would function: Canada would do the work but the United States was footing the bill. And the bills were not cheap. This relationship would last from World War II until the early 1960s. There was a concern that the very presence of the U.S. would create an extra-military economy that would be difficult to extinguish once it began. The Canadian government did not want the information that the U.S. was constructing buildings on Canadian territory (which it was doing in various parts of the Canadian north after the war, such as at Resolute Bay) leaked to the media. But leaks did occur; as Paine has described: "The alarm raised from time to time, by public media reports, about continued U.S. 'occupation' of posts in the Canadian Arctic must have assisted the Canadian government with its provisions of 'rational justification' for expenditure in the Arctic, however embarrassing such reports were to them at the time of their release".[16]

McCardle, of the American Division, Department of External Affairs, at a meeting on July 16, 1958, concerning the "takeover" of USAF facilities at Frobisher Bay, suggested that the specific phrase referring to "USAF Control" should be avoided and that the agreement should be patterned to fit in with similar Department of National Defence agreements respecting USAF operations at Churchill, Cold Lake, and Namao [now Canadian Forces Base, Edmonton]. He also thought that consideration should be given to the intent regarding security procedures and that understanding should be obtained to avoid the use of "armed guards," etc., at Frobisher, which was under Canadian sovereignty.[17] As summarized during a meeting of 19 people in the Frobisher Bay Airport boardroom, the airport at Frobisher Bay was built by the USAF during World War II. During the war, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) "did not take physical possession of the airport," rather, it "remained in the physical custody of the United States Air Force unto the end of World War Two and was subsequently passed to the RCAF for administration." The meeting minutes continue: "In 1952,

[16] Robert Paine, "The Path to Welfare Colonialism," In *The White Arctic: Anthropological Essays on Tutelage and Ethnicity*, 7-28. St. Johns, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University, 1977, 12.
[17] LAC, file no. 352-2/169 vol. 1311, RG85-D-1

the USAF reestablished a base at Frobisher and on September 1, 1957, the Department of Transport became responsible for all civil operations at the field, including airport maintenance, etc."[18] As this suggests, the USAF had control over the airport at various times after WWII but in 1957 control over all aspects of the airport was taken over by the Canadian DOT. Someone with the initials G.W.R. would write in a memorandum to a Mr. Cunningham in regard to a formal "working agreement" about Frobisher Airport on July 8, 1958:

> I am rather surprised that a formal agreement of this sort is considered necessary; but it was apparently proposed by the USAF. Since the airport arrangement adopts a principle which I consider to be of first importance to Canada—the principle that Canada supplies a service required by the USAF being authorized to provide the service itself—and since this might be extended to FOX, CAM, and other airfields, I do not think we should discourage them.

Figure 20: Hudson's Bay Company post at Apex Hill, 1956. Niakongnang in front of building. Photo credit: Gavin White fonds, LAC: PA-166341.

[18] Ibid.

The Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), which formerly had a post further up the bay at Ward Inlet (located at 63° 30′ 0″ N, 67° 35′ 0″ W, only a few miles up Frobisher Bay from Apex), began to settle and centralized its Baffin operations on the beach of Apex/Niaqunngut in 1949. Some Inuit also began to live closer to the base in the townsite of Iqaluit even though they were actively prohibited from doing so (figure 21 and 22).



Figure 21: Old Ikaluit village in the background, east of the airfield, Frobisher Bay, August 1956. Caption reads: "Sign erected by R.C.M.P. [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] detachment at the end of the road from the airbase … the sign was removed once Apex Hill townsite [sic] began to be developed and more open contact was fostered." Credit: NWT Archives/D. Wilkinson fonds,/N-1979-051:1267

Figure 22: Frobisher Bay, late 1950s. D. Wilkinson fonds, Nunavut Archives Program (GN): N79-051: 1101.

Figure 23: Inuit camps at Koojesse Inlet. D. Wilkinson fonds, Nunavut Archives Program (GN): N79-051: 1262.

Beginning in 1942, and without Canadian authorization, the USAAF developed the site of Frobisher Bay at Koojesse Inlet with a landing strip. The landing strip was to be used for refueling fighter jets being sent to England along the northern Crimson Route in the Second World War.[19] The first runway was built on Crowell Island, 56 km from Iqaluit, but this was eventually abandoned in October 1943 because a year earlier, in 1942, construction had begun on a much more feasible airstrip in Koojesse Inlet, the current site of Iqaluit's airport and runway. Robert Eno, author of the informative article "Crystal Two: the Origin of Iqaluit," writes: "[b]y September 1942, the Koojesse Airbase had developed into a bustling community. A hospital was built, as well as living quarters for workers, a canteen, workshops, garages, warehouses, and a small tent city." (69) By 1944, Malcom MacDonald, high commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada, wrote this about Frobisher Bay:

> Here the Americans have built what is in effect a small town. The present population is about 100 officers and men but there is accommodation for eight times that number. I stayed at the Commanding Officer's house … It has … wash basins … a shower … running hot and cold water … a lounge with a well stocked bar. Besides the runways … there are various establishments in the station … barracks, mess-rooms, and kitchens; a twenty-five bed hospital with a completely up-to-date operating room, X-Ray department, and dentist's quarters; a shop and coffee-house; a theatre … a laundry; a barber's shop and Turkish bath-house.[20]

Construction workers were sent to the site in 1942–3. At the time it was called "Crystal Two" or "Chaplet" and sometimes "Izoc" as secret military aliases. (70) The airbase was part of a line of bases connecting the north and the south through Fort Chimo or "Crystal One" (now Kujjuak, Nunavik). Workers started construction on two runways in Koojesse Inlet, one paved ("Runway no. 1") and one gravel ("Runway no. 2"). The expansion of Runway no. 2, was limited due to

[19] Robert V. Eno, "Crystal Two: The Origin of Iqaluit," *Arctic* 56, no. 1 (2003).
[20] MacDonald qtd in Eno, 69.

surrounding hills, and was used not as a runway but as a valuable fuel road. It is today a wide gravel road leading to a commercial and industrial area, the city's diesel storage or "tank farm," Iqaluit's main city dump, and the Sylvia Grinnell Territorial Park (or Iqaluit Kuunga for Inuit). The townsite that became Frobisher Bay was developed against all odds by the sheer determination of the Americans who, especially when compared to the Soviet Union at the time, had little experience working in the mire of frozen and melting permafrost. However, two years later, in 1944, with the Canadian government increasingly eager to have the U.S. leave the area (because of sovereignty-related issues), the USAAF sold the entire Crimson Route airfields, spanning across the north from The Pas, Manitoba, to Goose Bay, Labrador (then a British possession), for US$31.6 million, and Crystal Two for US$6.8 million. Shortly after the war, Crystal Two, a name whose U.S. origin is unknown, was renamed Frobisher Bay.

Inuit semipermanent settlements around Frobisher Bay began in the 1940s as Inuit moved out of "camps" ("ilagiit nunagivaktangat," meaning "a place used regularly or seasonally by Inuit for hunting, harvesting and/or gathering")[21] and came to Frobisher Bay year-round, mainly for economic reasons. Because of the rich sea resources in the Sylvia Grinnell River,[22] and an ability to trade and work with Qallunaat, Iqaluit was an attractive venue for ambitious Inuit who chose a new life of settlement (figure 24).

[21] The term used by the Qikiqtani Truth Commission: Qikiqtani Truth Commission, "Qikiqtani Truth Commission: Achieving Saimaqatigiingniq," (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Qikiqtani Inuit Association, 2010).

[22] There is today a small ongoing debate/myth about whether Iqaluit still has "many fish." I have found a critical divergence of opinion on the topic—some arguing that the fish have left because of noise and other pollutions, others suggesting that the fish are still there.

Figure 24: Sylvia Grinnell Territorial Park

Inuit remained in a loose way "semi-nomadic" but they did begin to form a settlement in Apex, a few kilometers over a hill from the base, in the early 1940s. The 1940s to 60s were a revolution in everyday life for Inuit. The Qikiqtani Truth Commission concluded in 2007:

> The decision to give up the traditional way of life was almost never an easy one, and once made, it proved to be irreversible. Inuit made enormous sacrifices by moving into settlements, living in permanent housing, giving up their qimmit [dogs], sending their children to school, or accepting wage employment. Once they had made their decision, they discovered that government assurances of a sufficient number of jobs and better living conditions were illusory in many cases.[23]

The "civilizing" pressures of the settlements were anything but straightforwardly good or progressive for Inuit, as a Western bias might ultimately assume. In retrospect, life in settlements could be at once a cure and a curse. The Commission found that by 1975 almost all Inuit lived in "government created permanent settlements" and "many of them felt their lives had become worse, not better." (8) The settlements "imposed a new form of poverty, and hindered access

[23] Qikiqtani Truth Commission, "Qikiqtani Truth Commission: Achieving Saimaqatigiingniq," 8.

to the land and the country food that nourished them." (8) A footnote to this comment is interesting:

> [t]he term "poverty" should be considered in the context of the period. It was possible for Inuit families in ilagiit nunagivaktangat to feel they were living comfortably, even though they had very little income and would be considered extremely "poor" by western standards. Inuit in settlements, however, needed cash income from wage employment or social benefits to meet daily needs. (8)

It is difficult to overstate the enormity of the changes that brought about more intense relations between Inuit and Qallunaat, who began to live together in what are now often called "the communities." Profound changes in Qallunaat-Inuit relations occurred during the time of living in the communities. In the next section some important case studies concerning the effects of modernization on Inuit ways of being are presented. Some of the effects of Qallunaat on Inuit and vice versa are not intuitive.

KABLOONA (OR QALLUNAAT) AND INUIT IN NUNAVUT

Profound shifts occurred in the social world of the north over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. These shifts occurred in a context of forced, sporadic, and subsequently chronically underfunded development efforts by Canadian and American governments, whalers, traders, and missionaries. The romance of the Northwest Passage—a mythic sea route through the Arctic Ocean, along the northern coast of North America via waterways amidst the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans—emerged making the Arctic more attractive as a place to live.[24] The Arctic became a homeland not just for its indigenous inhabitants but also for some whites who began to see the Arctic as a viable place to work and raise a family. Stefansson was by far the biggest advocate of the position that the Canadian Arctic could be a viable place for southerners to live.

[24] Vilhjalmur Stefansson, *The Friendly Arctic: The Story of Five Years in Polar Regions* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 [1922]).

Historian Morris Zaslow has addressed the "opening" of the Canadian north throughout the early to the mid-20th century. He argued that by the early 1970s many of the whites in the northwest were "transient, engaged in prospecting, fur-trading, fishing, and whaling, or the saving of souls."[25] He continues: "[e]xpansion became a 'national' duty for Canada, a commitment with destiny … [i]n their search for a frontier, Canadians found a nation." (2-3) Thus, immigrants to the Canadian north found a home while searching for precious objects and rewards, souls to save, and minerals to harvest and extract. But these lands were of course far from empty, making easy subsumption of the northwest for eastern interests in Upper and Lower Canada impossible. "Indians" lived there. Zaslow comments:

> Though it was scarcely developed at all by European standards, [the northwest] possessed both a firmly rooted economy utilizing such resources as the inhabitants were capable of exploiting, and social patterns based on the tribal organization of the native peoples and their interaction with the few traders and missionaries who lived among them. The contemplated peaceful conquest and redirection of the region would require profound social and cultural adjustments from the original inhabitants. (6)

The interlinked parties doggedly accomplished the colonization of the inhospitable Arctic against what seems in retrospect as insurmountable odds. These efforts were often done in the name of development and resources were often limited and difficult to secure. Throughout the 20th century the resources of the north were developed more than ever before for purposes of resource exploration and in the name of security and sovereignty for the south.

Social scientist Frank Vallee, in a famous case study in the Keewatin Region on the western shores of Hudson's Bay (now called the Kivalliq Region), observed "the emergence of a stratum of people in Arctic communities … [these

[25] Morris Zaslow, *The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 1-2. As a supplement to this see also: Kenneth Coates and William R. Morrison, *For Purposes of Domination: Essays in Honour of Morris Zaslow* (New York, Captus Press, 1989).

people] are increasingly acting as mediators between the more traditionalistic Eskimos and the whites. These are people with command over facilities (language, education, social skills, etc.) required to get into key positions in the work and community systems."[26] Vallee discusses how these "facilities," are not evenly distributed in society and thus some people are "more *advantaged* than others in terms of access to facilities." (3) The interesting point Vallee raises in the study, conducted shortly after his more famous *Kabloona and Eskimo in Central Keewatin,*[27] which I investigate next, is that Inuit society condensed around two main social classes that he labels "the Nunamiut" and the "Kabloonamiut." The former are those who live on the land, and the latter are those who live in larger communities. Vallee writes:

> For the purposes of this report, Nunamiut are classified as those who:
>
> 1) reveal a desire to live on the land rather than in the settlement;
> 2) choose a way of life which requires an acute dependence on the land;
> 3) choose to follow what traditional conventions still exist in the culture, such as in living arrangements, in the ways they bring up their children—in short, those who appear to be oriented more to the traditional way of life than to the Kabloona [white people] way of life.
>
> "Kabloonamiut" are Inuit who:
>
> 1) reveal a desire to live in the settlement;
> 2) reject a way of life which requires an acute dependence on the land;
> 3) choose to follow certain Kabloona-like customs where they could just as well follow traditional ones. (Vallee, 1962b)

A sharp distinction between Nunamiut and Kabloonamiut cannot be made; the distinction is more an heuristic device than a definition. Vallee indicates that not all settlement people are what he calls *Kabloonamiut*, and not all "hinterland or camp people" are *Nunamiut*; Vallee explains: "[i]n this report we give prominent

[26] Frank G. Vallee, Anthropological Research in the Arctic. Differentiation among the Eskimos in Some Canadian Arctic Settlements (Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Northern Co-ordination and Research Centre, 1962b), 3.
[27] Frank G. Vallee, "Kabloona and Eskimo in the Central Keewatin," (Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Northern Coordination and Research Centre, 1962a).

place to the description of the Kabloonamiut because of their special significance in the process of acculturation." (11) Vallee continues:

> [t]heir significance has two obvious features. First, they are Eskimos who are "carrying" the Euro-Canadian culture to the Nunamiut, in the sense that they are becoming stylistic and behaviour models, particularly for the younger-generation; second, they are becoming key figures in the networks of inter-action between the Kabloona [white people] and the Nunamiut. (11)

The distinction between Nunamiut and Kabloonamiut allows us to detect the emergence of class differences within Inuit society due to the introduction of Qallunaat in the everyday lives of Inuit.

Vallee's *Kabloona and Eskimo in the Central Keewatin* shows how the Kabloona economic system overtook that of "the Eskimos" in the region. This involves the creation of settlements in what are now Baker Lake, Chesterfield Inlet, and Arviat. Vallee argues that "[o]ne of the impressive results of this impact is the extinction of much in the traditional Eskimo culture." (25) Vallee was able to come to this conclusion by looking at a variety of indicators of the so-called "extinction" of Inuit culture; in particular he looked at the most obvious changes he perceived in technology and material culture. The introduction of the sewing machine, new clothing, sunglasses, record players, tape recorders are, he wrote, "commonplace in the settlement and spreading among families on the land." (27) Vallee continues to observe:

> a much heightened dependence on materials produced outside of their [Eskimo's] own milieu and, of course, on a cash income with which to procure these materials. The skills required to produce the traditional materials are being lost through disuse, although in recent years there have been attempts to encourage Eskimo people to manufacture a variety of items for sale to Kabloona [white people]: scale models of dog-sleds, leisters, spears, etc., caribou and duffle slippers; corded belts and a number of other objects are manufactured for Kabloona sale. (Vallee, 28)

An interesting example comes to mind. In Chapter II "the Historical Background," Vallee described a contradictory reality that has a certain amount of continuity with what we find in many communities in the 21st century. As much as Inuit material and what Vallee called "supernatural" culture had changed, often these changes came about *against* the wishes of religious and governmental authorities. For instance, Inuit songs were always individually accredited, much like Kabloona copyright laws—that is, a song would always be attributed to an individual writer or singer. Vallee found that some Inuit felt their traditional songs were not approved of by Kabloona (white) authorities. Here, the role of popular perception matters because it has real performative effects in the world—it affected how Inuit acted and made history.

Vallee argues that this provides a major hurdle in understanding these relations that are often riddled with overriding contradictions. He writes:

> of the many anomalies met with in the Arctic, few are more puzzling than the stand taken by spokesmen for the religious organizations ministering to the Eskimos who plead for the maintenance of Eskimo traditional culture. The Eskimos claim that they are reluctant to perpetuate much of their oral and musical tradition because the missionaries disapprove of it. (30)

The example above suggests an important methodological insight: it is apparent that a particular edict issued by Qallunaat (white people in the east) or Kabloona (white people in the west)—across the land that eventually became the Nunavut Territory—is not always the most important position to document in archival sources. Much research in Inuit studies has been devoted to studying the Qallunaat or Kabloona role in the north[28], but we need to consider the interesting role that *resistance* played in the social and political formation of the present situation. The *assumptions* made by Inuit about what Qallunaat or Kabloona want might be quite different from reality, but these assumptions are behind Inuit

[28] For example, Tester and Kulchyski's important archival work on the topic comes to mind in this context. See: Tester, Frank James, and Peter Kulchyski. *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocations in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-63*. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994).

behaviour and therefore Inuit- Qallunaat interactions. There is a curious history of misunderstandings over the nature of the Qallunaaq's often contradictory and ambivalent desire toward Inuit generally and toward Inuit settlements in particular. An analysis of the ambiguous impressions that Inuit themselves had of settlement life, how Inuit acted on particular assumptions, and how they *made a sense of home* in the postwar settlements are features seminal to "Critical Inuit Studies" today.[29] Yet, this process of the urbanization of the Canadian Arctic throughout this time is less than fully understood.[30]

Vallee thought that many aspects of Inuit traditional culture were under threat, in particular because of a critical decline of caribou in the late 1950s in the Keewatin Region. However, he felt that three aspects of Inuit culture would surely *resist* encroachment of Kabloona economy and technology: (1) Inuit as "great manipulators of nature" would remain constant, including "ingenious technology with a substantial repertory of ritual and magical acts to get and maintain the good will of the multifarious spirits whose will determined the response to nature"; (2) the Inuit orientation toward individualism and group consensus over authoritarianism; and (3) the Inuit greater respect for "the man of action" over "the man of thought." (31) Even though Vallee's study was written about another region (not Iqaluit) of what is now Nunavut, these generalizations assist our understanding of the prehistory of the Nunavut Territory. There has historically been a great deal of respect for these aspects of Inuit culture by Qallunaat. We might assume that this is because these values and practices, like the individualized accreditation of songs that Vallee documented in Inuit culture, are at first glance roughly similar to many key values of Western utilitarianism and pragmatism. They can thus easily–yet erroneously–be seen as the *same* thing; for instance, we are not all profit-maximizing, individualist capitalists, a characterization that can fit the three Inuit traits Vallee cited.

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[29] See: Pamela Stern and Lisa Stevenson, eds., *Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography* (London: University of Nebraska Press,2006).
[30] David Damas. *Arctic Migrants/ Arctic Villagers: The Transformation of Inuit Settlements in the Central Arctic*. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 132-63.

A final point raised by Vallee was the widespread fear that Inuit would become *too much* like Kabloona. If the settlements become too attractive, what would happen to Inuit authentic and traditional culture? To respond to this question, the key was to make settlement life seem good enough to attract the small but emerging labour market. Settlement life should not be seen as *too good* or there simply wouldn't be enough jobs to go around. Thus, the issue was not one simply of the colonial power peddling "settlement or bust" but rather settlement for some and a continual reminder to other not-needed Inuit of the virtues of independence on the land in smaller camps. This is the social engineering project undertaken by Kabloona. Vallee writes:

> Indeed, one of the most pressing problems faced by officers of the Department of Northern Affairs and the R.C.M.P is to discourage land people from remaining at the settlement … their problem is sharpened by the tendency to make the settlement more attractive as a place to live. To the extent that they succeeded in doing this, increasing numbers of Eskimos are attracted and many must be somehow repelled because opportunities for wage employment are so very limited at the settlement.[31]

The economic reality made the issue of Inuit settlement difficult for both Kabloona and Inuit. The key difference was that Kabloona were usually well-paid in the settlements and Inuit had to struggle among themselves for an extremely limited number of wage-labour jobs. The complaint coming from Inuit was that there were "too many Kabloona 'bosses' at Rankin Inlet" and Vallee writes that one of his informants "jokingly remarked that the Eskimos like the Kabloona 'when there are only a few and when they are only visiting.'" (57) Inuit and Kabloona remain in tension in the communities and I now describe how these issues have carried forward to contemporary Iqaluit.

CONTEMPORARY OLD RES: A DISASTER IN THE CAPITAL?

[31] Vallee, "Kabloona and Eskimo in the Central Keewatin," 48.

Places like Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet, primarily because of their Western features, are widely seen as the only economically "realistic" or viable settlements in Nunavut. That is, these settlements are under the reign of economics: the profit motive, opportunism, and the supposed modernity of impersonal global markets.[32] These ideologies of markets and money have consequences for Inuit now living in centralized communities. Serving capitalism and some invisible hand of some intangible market is by no means intrinsically meaningful. This has often meant the introduction of Inuit wage labour. These settlements are thus social and economic spaces in tension with much smaller hamlets across Nunavut. Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet are thus ambivalent sites of Inuit modernity whose peculiarly stems from their larger Kabloonamiut populations and regional governmental roles.

Contemporary Old Res houses Inuit students from small northern communities while they study in Iqaluit. In this sense it is a *home away from home* and cushions the sudden immersion in the busy life of Iqaluit, a city with social pressures different from those of other 24 communities in Nunavut. I met several students who were staying at Old Res to pursue their studies at the NAC, which also operates some programs out of the first floor of the Old Res building, for example, the Environmental Technology Program (ETP).[33] That this building still functions, although to a decreasing extent (newer residences have been constructed and are being used in the downtown core of Iqaluit), as a residence for new students in Iqaluit demonstrates the current lack of housing and infrastructure in Iqaluit. The students at Old Res are, presumably, the future of Nunavut, particularly given the push to devolve governance and gain some meaningful autonomy from significant economic and political dependence on the Canadian government. Having Inuit involved in the workings of Nunavut is integral to the operation of territorial construction and governance.

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[32] On the issue of money and markets in the north, see Rasmussen's critical studies on the colonial appropriation of the Inuit for its own gain: Rasmussen, Derek. *Dissolving Inuit Society through Education and Money: The Myth of Educating Inuit out Of "Primitive Childhood" And into Economic Adulthood*. Montreal, Quebec: Intercultural Institute of Montreal, 2000.

[33] In 2011 the ETP moved to the centre of Iqaluit to operate in NAC's new buildings funded in part by an 11 million dollar grant from the Government of Canada via the Nunavut Research Institute.

I can attest that staying at Old Res is a gloomy experience and students can be heard complaining about it regularly. Students often appear to be happiest while in the smoking shack on the north side of the building. It doesn't help the negative perceptions of Old Res that the overcrowded Baffin Correctional Centre and the Nunavut Women's Correctional Centre (officially opened in June 2010) are located in plain view directly across the road. Old Res is a dreary place to live – I can attest to at least that – and this is not to any degree offset by NAC public health posters on the hallway walls promoting such virtues as positive thinking and the importance of seal hunting to Inuit culture. The hallways are long and daunting, the bathrooms are large and always feel empty but generally are well kept and do the job. Overall, Old Res itself "does the job," which could explain the reluctance—or inability because of space limitations—for the GN, NAC, or the federal government to replace it with more suitable student residences. Newer doesn't always mean better, but in the case of Old Res almost anything would be better. One person I interviewed responded by saying the only way to get rid of Old Res would be to "burn it down." The critical problem is that the building functions to house many students and to provide invaluable office/teaching space for NAC staff.

As previously mentioned, one of the biggest problems in Old Res has been a recent string of student suicides.[34] One event that set me off to a more negative view of Old Res was a suicide that occurred while I stayed there in October 2010. I would only later learn the student's name and that she was originally Pangnirtung. Her boyfriend stayed down the hall from me on the south side of the building and, after he found out, he screamed and yelled all night long, and I don't think I'll ever forget such screams. At the time, I didn't know what was going on, but I could tell it was serious and signified more than too much drinking or drugs (more familiar sounds at Old Res where security is lax). I could hear people screaming outside of the building and inside it; I hardly slept a wink all night. The next morning I got up expecting an announcement about what had happened, but

[34] These occurrences (as in most cities) are rarely published in local or national newspapers for fear of copycat suicides. In my experience, the news of suicide is transmitted informally through stories and rumours.

there was none. I went for breakfast as usual and the cooking staff whispered in some student's ears, but no one told me a thing. I imagined that it was determined that I didn't need to know.

I had to be patient to find out what had happened. The evening after the unfortunate event, I talked to a student who was standing out by the smoking shack. When I inquired he told me that a suicide had occurred, but that it happened at the Inuksuk High School, located closer to the centre of Iqaluit. He told me several "facts" that turned out to be less than accurate. Looking back now it is apparent to me that I was not the only one who wasn't sure what was going on.

The Res environment was remarkably unchanged. Students walked around with their heads hanging low, but no more than usual. However, most significantly, the student I first spoke with told me that suicide happens all the time in Nunavut. He told me that hanging is the preferred way for youth to commit suicide in Nunavut. This rather talkative acquaintance then told me what to do if I found someone hanging from the ceiling or a closet hanger. First, he explained, you "cut the person down." Then you have to be sure to massage the neck muscles before administering CPR. He stressed this to be important. I was shocked that this student, probably in his early 20s, went into so many details. I asked him how he knew so much about such a difficult topic. He said that one time he found his cousin hanging, and knew the correct procedures because of what he had learned in health class in elementary school. The amazing thing is that he saved his cousin's life by doing what he had learned in health class.

A few days later, I ran into a good friend who I will call Elisapee (not her real name). I met her during my first stay at Old Res. She lived at the residence for over a year while working on a program at the NAC and still has friends there. I asked her whether she had heard about the suicide. She said she had with a stern look on her face and told me what she had heard about the situation. I was concerned about an acquaintance (I will call her Amanda) in Old Res who I had not seen since the suicide. I ventured to ask Elisapee if the casualty was Amanda. It wasn't. But Amanda was the first to find her friend hanging in the closet. After

finding her friend, Amanda moved out of Old Res to a newer residences provided by the NAC trying to recover. She was shell-shocked and it might take many months or years to recover from her experience. She has been trying to get out of the north, "anywhere but here" as she told me one time, and I can't imagine this will help her to stay in the north. Later in the week, I attended the Legislative Assembly which is a beautiful igloo shaped building in the centre of town with seal skin covered chairs and many examples of Inuit-influenced architecture. The issue of the suicide did come up; one MLA suggested a study be done. Another study to ask: who or what is responsible for high suicide rates in Nunavut?

Are the suicides a consequence of the rapid modernization (i.e., Westernization) of places like Iqaluit since the 1940s? Nobody seems to know for sure, but it is thought to be one of the main "determinants." Experts speculate and write papers and blame it on "internal colonialism" and "the state,"[35] which means a lack of culturally-appropriate services, good training for service providers, and a lack of access to therapy in the territory. From this perspective, we begin to understand that recent modernization efforts in Nunavut do not provide any intrinsic meaning for Inuit, or at least those Inuit who contemplate suicide and sometimes commit the act. The suicide rate in Nunavut is among the highest in the world but this is not widely talked about in the territory beyond the high-level realm of policy discourse.

Suicide in Nunavut is clearly a *public secret*, something everyone knows about but hardly speaks of publicly. De Certeau has described how everyday life is made up of remainders of the past, which are often left unspoken but still

[35] See: Antoon A. Leenaars, J. Anawak, and L. Taparti, "Suicide among the Canadian Inuit," in *Suicide Prevention: The Global Context*, ed. R. Kosky et al. (London: Plenum, 1998); Frank Tester and McNicoll, "Isumagijaksaq: Mindful of the State: Social Constructions of Inuit Suicide"; Jack Hicks, "The Social Determinants of Elevated Rates of Suicide among Inuit Youth"; Jack Hicks, "On the Application of Theories of 'Internal Colonialism' to Inuit Societies," in *2004 Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association*; Hicks, "Suicide Prevention and the Responsibilities of Leadership." In *Northern Public Affairs* blog, 2012. For example, the following was released as I composed this chapter: Ellen Bobet, "Towards the Development of a Nunavut Suicide Prevention Strategy: A Summary Report of the 2009 Community Consultations," Prepared for the Working Group for a Nunavut Suicide Prevention Strategy, 2010.

present.[36] Although suicide is not discussed in a public way for fear of copycat suicides, it is much discussed in private settings (as I found). Anthropologist Michael Taussig expands on the significance of the social secret: "For are not shared secrets the basis of our social institutions, the workplace, the family, the state?"[37] However, it is not clear what social structure is developing from this public secret except to reinforce the inappropriateness of southern approaches to the north and interventions in Inuit affairs. In Nunavut we witness a stark separation between suicide prevention policies pursued by experts and the lifeworld of Inuit youth who continue to take their own lives at alarming rates. Today the future of Old Res is in question. There are some rumours in the community that it will be phased out shortly. Others – of a more cynical persuasion – tell me that these rumours have existed for years. Old Res, and its ghostly presence, remains for the time being to haunt those who live there.

IQALUIT AND QALLUNAAT-INUIT RELATIONS: DECONSTRUCTING STRUCTURALISM

City planners recently envisioned Iqaluit as a "unique Arctic capital."[38] They understand Iqaluit as a place that "plays an important and unique role as the major business, transportation, administrative, health, and educational centre serving Nunavut." (11) They argued that development of Iqaluit's "Core Area" could balance a variety of interests in Iqaluit, a city that "has a higher non-Inuit population than that of the other Nunavut communities." Iqaluit's population is expected to continue to grow at unprecedented and barely sustainable rates. City planners imagine the population in Iqaluit will double over the next 10 to 20 years. There is thus a call to "emphasize and reflect in a meaningful way Inuit cultural values and knowledge in the land use planning process." (12) Good planning is based on principles of sustainable development – meaning, in this

[36] Michel de. Certeau, *The Practices of Everyday Life*, Translated by S.F. Rendall. (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1984.
[37] Michael Taussig, *Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labour of the Negative* (Stanford University Press, 1999), 3.
[38] City of Iqaluit, "Amended Version of City of Iqaluit General Plan," February (2010), http://www.city.iqaluit.nu.ca/i18n/english/5yearZoning.html.

case, that the negative effects of urbanization are offset to some degree by improvements in the standard of living – that mitigates against overall negative effects of growth, such as the loss of designated areas for recreation like "beach and camping areas." (12)

Iqaluit is a space where Qallunaat and Inuit values intermingle, occasionally producing conflict over so-called "core" values. Perceptions of the city as a centre of decay and ruin, all that is wrong with Inuit society, are not easily overcome through government and nongovernmental efforts. Implementation of the NLCA "may reduce the number of southerners coming to Iqaluit in the future," (19) assuming that implementation of the NLCA achieves its goal of preferential Inuit employment in the GN (Article 23, discussed in Chapter 1 and 2). This would theoretically decrease the growth demands in Iqaluit when compared with 2006 census numbers. The City of Iqaluit *General Plan* put together some rough numbers based on three growth estimates to be reached by 2020: a low projection (2.04% growth rate) estimated the population of the city at 8,842, a medium projection (2.87%) estimated a total population of 9,830, and a high projection (3.38%) estimated a total population of 10,484. Successful implementation of Article 23 of the NLCA, which requires a designated Inuit organization to ensure that all eligible Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area have the opportunity to be employed, would decrease the number of southerners living in Iqaluit.

Arctic Anthropologist Edmund Searles observes that "many Inuit maintain a rather negative view of urban spaces in the Arctic, identifying them as places where Inuit values and practices have been eclipsed by Qallunaat (white people). Some Inuit have even gone so far as to claim that a person is no longer able to be Inuit while living in towns like Iqaluit."[39] The points Searles makes fit with comments that I heard while doing fieldwork in Iqaluit. Searles suggests that one of the main ways this can be overcome is to ensure that urban planning includes opportunities for outdoor recreation, "out on the land [such as] hunting, fishing,

[39] Edmund (Ned) Searles, "Placing Identity: Town, Land, and Authenticity in Nunavut, Canada." *Acta Borealia* 27, no. 2 (2010), 151.

trapping, and camping." (151)

This makes the problem more tangible, but we should investigate whether it alleviates the problem altogether as the author seems to imply. The problem as I see it is that a culture gap has emerged between Inuit that live in Iqaluit and those who live in the other smaller communities of Nunavut. Iqaluit contains almost an equal number of Inuit and Qallunaat and this is a proportion never seen before in the territory. Searles found that being "on the land" in small camps represents the most authentic place for Inuit since these places are for the most part outside of Qallunaat reach. The land provides a space of escape. And, I might add, these lands are outside of Qallunaat assessments of value, unless those lands contain living and nonliving resources needed to fuel the motors of modernity and progress. Searles writes, "[i]f being on the land is a kind of utopia, then being in Iqaluit symbolizes a dystopia." (153) Searles' conclusion is too simplistic. Life on the land does not mean one thing and life in the city another. The social world is qualitatively more complex than this. We have to understand *home* or *place making* as a process, not a simple abstraction of either utopian or distopian reality. In this sense, Searles' article tends toward the absurd when it assigns a simple formula to the north in "Qallunaat is to town as Inuit is to land." (157) I perceive severe limitations in Searles' structural analysis between town and country. Here Searles summarizes "the assumptions of social science researchers"; citing Hugh Brody and Frank Vallee in this case, he writes:

> [i]n addition to the idea that the land heals while the town hurts are the assumptions of social science researchers themselves who associate the transformation of Inuit culture and society with twin processes of modernization and urbanization (eg., Brody, 1975; Vallee et al., 1984), processes assumed to be beyond the control and against the will of Inuit themselves. (157)

Searles claims that: "Inuit and Qallunaat formed distinct, segregated communities circumscribed by caste-life rules and boundaries limiting interaction between the two groups." (158)

These sorts of explicit divisions did exist, yet Searles misses the point that

Iqaluit represents present and historically ongoing efforts to integrate the different interests and populations that live there. For example, there are certainly examples of these boundaries, such as that of the Storehouse Bar and Grill, which was formerly called the Tulugaq Bar or, more commonly, "the Zoo" and which at one time featured a chain link fence to keep Qallunaat military and Inuit on separate sides of the bar. This was a boundary to keep things simple. This division of the Zoo, surprisingly, remained in place until the early 1990s when the bar was reopened as an inclusive space for Inuit and non-Inuit to congregate. I heard stories of Inuit and Qallunaat meeting to avoid the Zoo fence. History is a struggle between social forces, and not as one sided as some might suggest. Searles himself writes that: "[w]hile it is true that the Canadian government forcibly relocated a number of Inuit families to these villages, there is substantial evidence to suggest that much of the migration was voluntary rather than a government-planned relocation." (159) Here, Searles approvingly cites the impressive, detailed work of David Damas in *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers*.[40]

Damas informs that a "policy of dispersal" was in place during what he calls the "contact-traditional" period of the 1930s and 1940s. Damas writes: "[c]hanges in material conditions were cyclical, rather than steadily declining, as has sometimes been posed. It was a period of stability in several aspects of society and culture, but welfare, health care, and education stagnated." (38) In a recent review of Damas' work in this context, George Wenzel notes, "Damas makes it clear that a much more complex and fluid situation existed for Inuit at particular places and times than is presented by the notion that Nunavut's towns and hamlets exist because of a government policy of Inuit removal."[41] How did these dynamics of consensus and discord, or negotiation and revolt, come to be? Searles' structuralist account can't tell us, but he surely criticizes writers like Brody (1991) who attempt to explain the complicated negotiations between the colonizer and the colonized in the north.

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[40] David Damas, *Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villiagers: The Transformation of Inuit Settlements in the Central Arctic*.
[41] George W. Wenzel, "Review of Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers by David Damas," *Arctic* 56, no. 2 (2003).

My experience in Iqaluit has shown me many spaces of negotiation and consensus building. Here is an example of my concerns with what Searles has outlined: "[a]s a researcher, I found myself subscribing to the stereotypes issuing from the speeches of Inuit politicians and the rhetoric of northern Inuit who portrayed towns as places where Inuit were no longer Inuit".[42] Without providing any examples of these "politicians," or these speeches, these statements have a limited claim to validity. Searles observes:

> Participating in the hunt and butchering of a bearded seal on the ice seemed to be a much more authentic expression of *Inuktitut* ("the way of an Inuit person") than playing video games or dancing at a bar in Iqaluit. I met a number of Qallunaat residents of Iqaluit who possessed even more negative stereotypes about urban Inuit than me and who regarded with suspicion those Inuit who never learned to hunt or live off the land like Inuit elders from a generation ago. (162)

At the end of the article Searles writes, "socioeconomic factors only serve to intensify the assumption that Inuit do not really belong in towns, their natural place is out on the land hunting, trapping, fishing, and gathering." (164)

This perspective defies any research findings that show how hard Inuit are fighting to make their larger and smaller settlements authentic places to live through negotiations for improved infrastructure with the federal government in Ottawa. These sorts of complex social negotiations are being done in a variety of ways, for example by including incorporating indigenous traditional knowledge, as well as their culture more generally, into the underpinnings of these places. "The irony of the spatialisation of Inuit identity in the Arctic is that many Inuit seem unwilling to extend that identity into urban spaces even as more and more Inuit are becoming urbanized." (164)

My fieldwork in Iqaluit revealed that nothing could be further from the truth. Yes, there is still a great respect for life on the land, living on the land in one way or another (for example, as part of what Qallunaat call "a vacation") is

[42] Searles, Edmund (Ned). "Placing Identity: Town, Land, and Authenticity in Nunavut, Canada," 162.

something that Inuit seek to do as much as possible, but this does not dominate Inuit cultural identity, especially in the case of youth. Inuit youth are able to navigate the difficult terrain of balancing Inuit *and* Qallunaat ways of life, and to demonstrate extremely interesting synthesis of these two at times disparate ways of interpreting the benefits and drawback of contemporary postindustrial life. In this way Inuit are respatialising urban life in the Arctic and are perhaps one of the most urbanized cultures on the planet (most residents live in settlements not in camps or in rural areas such as farms in the south). In fact, as one authoritative source on the topic put it, efforts towards development following the Second World War "set in motion a slow but perceptible flow of Inuit families towards more or less permanent residence in the settlements. Later, as the pace of building and provision of services accelerated, the flow toward the settlement became a riptide."[43]

The incidence of high youth suicide rates is something that does to some degree challenge my assertion that Inuit youth are as successful finding their way in contemporary Nunavut. The value of "you can do it if you can afford it" misses the role of desire for a better life. There is certainly more to life than simply work and economics, and Inuit youth have shown us how this sort of navigation might begin through bonding and experimentation with what Western and Inuit culture can offer, such as artistic production, dancing in bars, and traditional Inuit games.

CONCLUSION

There is still much work to be done to clarify the important role that Inuit resistance plays in the construction of social histories of the Arctic over the course of the 20th century and beyond. These issues should not simply be reduced to Inuit versus Qallunaat, as there are uneven power relations here, and many spaces of complex negotiation and disagreement.[44] This important recognition can be

[43] Duffy, R. Quinn. *The Road to Nunavut: The Progress of the Eastern Arctic Inuit since the Second World War*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, 22-3.

[44] McAllister has some interesting suggestions in her paper on Japanese Canadians during World War II in Canada in which she suggests that realist research methods, such as using archival records, have the effect of creating "the nation's hostile construction of racial others". Her point is that realism has a legal-political aspect that acts as an instrument of power to further subject

used, not only in deep social histories that span back to the creation of several Inuit communities in the mid-20th century, such as in the infamous Inuit relocations, but also in how we make sense of the present situation of Arctic communities as they continue to struggle to make life better for inhabitants, including how issues of Arctic urbanization are viewed.

This chapter looked at several key issues involved in such efforts by examining historical issues and present issues that emerged during my fieldwork side-by-side. I am continually struck by the extremely short histories many of these communities have in the modern period, but we would always do well to remember the histories of these places that certainly pre-date what counts as history today. In this sense, we need to understand the centralization that accompanied the creation of settlements and cities in the north via what Damas has called the "policy of dispersal" (that is, a policy to keep Inuit dispersed throughout the territory), as well as those acts of Inuit subjective resistance that challenged the so-called need for centralization in the central tenets of modern bureaucracy and processes of urbanization. In Western societies, centralization is deemed to be necessary, but perhaps Inuit experience teaches us otherwise … or teaches us to think again about how we view these matters. My fieldwork in various social spaces in Iqaluit and elsewhere shows an ambivalence and even a determination to develop Nunavut as an urbanized society while still recognizing the importance of Inuit traditional ways of being.

In subsequent chapters I expand the scope of analysis to reflect on some of the wider social processes that make-up the context of the rapid centralization of Inuit life that we have seen in the past 50 years. The goal is to understand the issue of Arctic sovereignty more broadly than in competing accounts of territoriality, that is, accounts that attempt to anchor questions of sovereignty to solid ground. Arctic sovereignty concerns tend to view Nunavut and its

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minority groups by erasing their specificity and thereby suggesting they only exist as a textual reality; McAllister writes: "While at a legal-political level [narrating Japanese Canadians' history into the form of the nation] aided them in their negotiations for redress, at a semiotic level it functioned to erase the specificity of their experiences." Kirsten Emiko McAllister. "Narrating Japanese Canadians in and out of the Canadian Nation: A Critique of Realist Forms of Representation." *Canadian Journal of Communication* 24, no. 1 (1999).

settlements as governmental spaces rather than social spaces of dwelling and home – places where people live. They cast Nunavut as a particular type of vacant Arctic northlands rather than as homelands. We should also remember to include intangible forms of indigenous sovereignty claims, including Inuit sea ice use,[45] intellectual property rights, values, and alternative worldviews in the national discussion on Arctic sovereignty. This would expand the range of considerations we often make when thinking about political sovereignty today in the context of 21st century politics and struggles over belonging.

[45] Claudio Aporta and his research team have added several important layers to the discussion of Arctic sovereignty. See: Claudio Aporta, "Shifting Perspectives on Shifting Ice: Documenting and Representing Inuit Use of the Sea Ice," *Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien* 55, no. 1 (2011).

Part B: Geopolitics

CHAPTER 4: THE VIRTUAL NORTH: ON THE BOUNDARIES OF SOVEREIGNTY[1]

This chapter expands from the concerns regarding the urbanization of Iqaluit to consider the "virtualization of sovereignty" today in the context of recent debates regarding the status of the Arctic in national and international debates. These are broadly based debates in which various parties, including the Government of Canada, First Nations groups, Inuit, International organizations, scholars, policy makers, and others use the term sovereignty in diverse and at times divisive ways. This chapter highlights the epistemological and ontological stakes of these discussions by drawing attention towards the ways in which sovereignty (De jure sovereignty) as an abstract concept is actualized or made tangible in the course of social and political disputes in the North in the twenty-first century. The previous chapter used Iqaluit as an illustration of the political and spatial dynamics between Inuit and Quallunaat in Nunavut; this chapter expands that scope of analysis to include a reflection on the broader geopolitical context, including a review of the academic literature in the area. Although Nunavut doesn't feature as prominently in this chapter, it should be noted that the terrain covered includes some of most important contextual aspects of the creation of Nunavut and Iqaluit as a territorial centre during my Ph.D study. I am not talking directly of Nunavut and/or Iqaluit because my research questions when these chapters were written are distinct from Section A. Here, I am interested in how "abstract" discourses such as geopolitics and climate change have impacted how social actors define and understand the circumpolar Arctic in contemporary world affairs. These form a broader context within which Nunavut and Iqaluit are nested.

The current resurgence of debate in North America and elsewhere about the status of the Arctic has prompted some researchers, political leaders, and social theorists to return to questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and what has

[1] An earlier version of this chapter was originally published with Rob Shields as: Barret Weber and Rob Shields. "The Virtual North: On the Boundaries of Sovereignty." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, no. 1 (2011): 103-20.

been called by some scholars, "territoriality".[2] In terms of the field of International Relations (IR), Daniel Philpott has argued that the literature on the topic of sovereignty has become "voluptuous" since the 1980s.[3] Increasingly, many social commentators and practitioners have returned to the distinctly modern question of sovereignty as a principle of order-making *and* as a historical construct that in many respects changes contingently. Yet sovereignty is still often seen as a form of authority or at least a definite limit to the reaches of social struggle that has remained stable over remarkably long periods of time, understood as the legitimate control over a definable territory. The concept has had a long and varied history, but more recently it has primarily been seen as a construct that expresses struggle and disagreement over general questions of so-called human nature, the social contract, and "realist" relations between states in the theory of IR. In many ways, the current predicament regarding "Arctic sovereignty" in regards to the governmental presence in the Canadian north is not completely different than that of the seventeenth century, when these questions loomed large amongst political philosophers (38). This chapter considers the virtualization of sovereignty in the Canadian North.

How and under what conditions has the north reemerged in Canada and abroad as an important stage for the exchange of at times conflicting knowledge claims amongst scientists, First-Nations, Inuit, citizens, media, policy makers, and other stakeholders? These exchanges have been particularly focused on concerns about global climate change, resource exploitation, and threats to overall national security.[4] The case of circumpolar states and their contested claims to sovereignty over territory and associated waters exemplifies the problems and paradoxes of

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[2] Jean Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971); David Newman, ed. *Boundaries, Territory, and Postmodernity* (London: Frank Cass,1999); Philip E. Steinberg, "Sovereignty, Territory, and the Mapping of Mobility: A View from the Outside," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99, no. 3 (2009).

[3] Daniel Philpott, "On the Cusp of Sovereignty: Lessons from the Sixteenth Century," in *Sovereignty at the Crossroads?: Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Luis E. Lugo (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1996).

[4] Susan Joy Hassol, *Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Karina Keskitalo, *Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region*; S. Jeff Birchall, "Canadian Sovereignty: Climate Change and Politics in the Arctic," *Arctic* 59, no. 2 (2006).

what we argue to be a *neglect of intangibles* or what will be referred to more technically as "virtualities" (the ideal-real, for example, intangible goods, sets, groups, communities).[5] By making an epistemological point about the acquisition of knowledge and knowing about and in the north, we wish to conceptualize *sovereignty* not values as an intangible but very real form of authority in the Canadian Arctic region. Our central claim is that processes of virtualization have occurred in which diverse parties have called claims of absolute or undivided sovereignty into question. This, in effect, has brought about ongoing and deeply political processes of deferral of the successful actualization of sovereignty claims. That is, sovereignty as a virtuality must be actualized in material actions and bodies on the ground just as much as sovereignty circulates as an abstract idea in political rhetoric. Our perspective is intended to offer up a contribution to the theory of sovereignty, which we define as a form of power and order-making that is always already caught up in practices of socio-political resistance. The unique conception of sovereignty emerging in the north that we have attempted to make sense of in this piece of research is one that changes over time and expresses forms of disagreement, contention, and resistance. In this effort we propose to rethink and formalize the significance of sovereignty and authority today in the context of an age in which the virtual and the ideal has triumphed over the Real; in other words, representation characteristic of secular liberal democracy has won out over a passionate search for the Real. We argue that it is useful to conceive of the principle of sovereignty as a totality of sorts, but this is an abstraction of very peculiar kind: it is one that includes and valorizes interpersonal and ethical relations, and hence we intend to contribute to theorizing the political subject. This is, of course, to enter into the complex terrain of *the politics of ideology* and not to simply ignore it as a dominant social force in the twenty-first century.

What are the stakes of the fact that no state literally holds a monopoly on force as Max Weber theorized it, when he famously claimed that "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly *of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Note that "territory" is one of the

[5] Rob Shields, *The Virtual* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

characteristics of the state"?[6] Weber's main point was not that these processes or claims are always successful; in fact he seems to have added the adverb "successfully" in brackets as an afterthought in this famous but ultimately ambiguous sentence. He reminds us that this monopoly on force is never finally achieved. The important point to which Weber alluded in his 1918 conception of sovereignty as principle of state order making is that at the very heart of modernity rests uncertain foundations that are constantly open to contention and struggle but which are also susceptible to the rationalization of the entire social world.[7] By taking the full force of Weber's concerns about the sociological uncertainties of modern forms of power and the possibilities of freedom in modernity into account, we can see that these relations do not form an either/or (nation-state versus globalization, authority versus freedom, or power versus impotence and so on), but, on the contrary, make room for theoretical and empirical considerations of everyday forms of social and political *resistance* to sovereign power. Language as a form of mediation is of course essential to these considerations, not only as a mode of address and redress or as a way of challenging the violence and authority of sovereignty, but also because of the intangible aspects of language that act as productive vehicles of public subjectivity in relation to various forms of authority. For example, Edkins and Pin-Fat are fully justified in making the claim that: "day-to-day social interactions – lives – are […] productive of both power and subjectivities".[8]

"THE TRUE, NORTH, STRONG AND FREE" AND OTHER VIRTUALITIES

The intangible aspects of the Canadian north–an imprecisely defined region–are illustrated in the ways in which members of the public speak about life there.

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[6] Emphasis in original. Max Weber, "Science as Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.
[7] Derek Sayer, *Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); Terry Maley, "The Politics of Time: Subjectivity and Modernity in Max Weber," in *The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the Twilight of Enlightenment*, ed. Asher Horowitz and Terry Maly (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
[8] Jenny Edkins, Veronique Pin-Fat, and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics* (New York: Routledge,2004), 2.

"The True North, Strong and Free" is a catchphrase emerging out of Canada's history that continually surfaces in questions of its identity but which is certainly not free from ambiguity. In the Government of Canada's 2007 Speech from the Throne, Canada is figured as "The North Star". Statements of this nature suppose that Canada is not one country amongst others and certainly not one like the American mass culture to the south. It suggests that Canada is, on the contrary, a distinctive and authentic place, the *real* north "zone of white purity" with an enduring and substantial identity through lengthy periods of time.[9]

However, this simple, seemingly innocent phrase is a site of struggle over the meaning of Canada and its constituent parts in which the very stakes of that struggle are continually called into question. In regards to Canada's understandings of itself as a northern nation, this becomes a struggle over what the north properly *means* or refers to (in this chapter, "Arctic" refers to the geographical region, "North" refers to a subjective northerly orientation, and "north" refers to the cardinal direction). As media reports and scholarly publications reveal again and again, there is often serious divergence with the straightforward assumption that Canada and its north are "true", "strong" and "free". In the current political context especially, environmental issues continually surface as threats to state stability and normalcy. Claims have been made about threats to Canada's existence as a sovereign nation-state, which constitutes specific threats to the lives of people who live there. Such arguments recommend action as necessary and urgent.[10] From this policy-oriented perspective, the North appears not as a self-contained identity defined by its purity, strength, and freedom, but rather as something delicate, porous and particularly vulnerable to decisions made elsewhere (for example, consider the European Union's ban on seal products, which adversely affects the Inuit fur economy, discussed in a later chapter). To clarify this point we will consider several ways that the North is a

[9] Rob Shields, *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity* (London: Routledge Chapman Hall, 1991), 30.
[10] Rob Huebert, "Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage," *Isuma* 2, no. 4 (2001); Michael Byers, "Who Owns the Arctic?," CBC.ca, http://www.cbc.ca/mansbridge/2007/10/michael_byers.html.

virtuality known in different forms, including probabilistic projections, material objects, and abstract representations such as ideologies, concepts, and stories.

Not only rival states but also many contending claimants inside Canada assert different forms of sovereignty and pseudo-sovereignty that generally range from rights to limited self-governance to assertions of full governance. Even moderate positions in the various debates assert a "We", a political community and a point of view that encapsulates and presents otherwise unknowable information and intangibles. To add to these complexities, indigenous communities often occupy geographic areas that transect (and, in this some ways, puts into question) state territory. For example, the Akwesasne Mohawk Nation lands cross the US-Canadian border of the St. Lawrence River. This bears on negotiations between states as a "right", itself an ambiguous term. As Cindy Dickson of the Arctic Athabaskan Council commented at the 2008 Arctic Summit in Edmonton, Alberta, environmental risk assessments of the Old Crow area in the northern Yukon contain transboundary elements with Alaska and the United States. On this basis, she contends that "international negotiations need to be explored further. Often we, natives, are not there; important information is missed or we attend sporadically. It's important our people are there. It's our right".[11] Issues concerning land, regions, water, environments, and rights are often entwined. Another example is administration of the implementation of land claims regimes and benefits via corporations such as Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI). Many resource co-management boards, whose members are drawn from various communities, represent interests that subdivide the public between residents, ethnic members of indigenous communities, government officials, and researchers from elsewhere. Still other co-management regimes extend the influence if not the authority of Territorial governments such as Nunavut and ethnic *Inuvialuit* to areas of Federal jurisdiction such as the administration of offshore fishing grounds.[12]

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[11] Cindy Dickson, "Climate Change and the Enviornment," in *Canadian Arctic Summit, May 28-30, 2008* (Edmonton, Alberta, 2008).

[12] Nancy C. Doubleday, "Co-Management Provisions of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement," in *Co-Operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and*

We'd like to highlight the manner in which these regimes are state-centric. Citizens are thus expected by authorities to organize their claims in particular logico-ethical ways, even when some diffused notion of sovereignty are shared, sovereignty operates under the guise of "cultural respect" or representation. In some cases, this occurs through the use of secular discourses in which religious belief is considered as a private matter outside of "official" state business. Or, on other occasions, organization is conducted by keeping the democratic ideals of plurality and patience in the process of deliberation at play. In this sense, claims and claimants must presuppose and respect a context of a wider polyphony of voices. Each individual and party must consider and respect challenges to its own position in advance of any utterance or action. Political participation is vital to public life, and this has definite repercussions on how claims are formulated. In short, those who make claims must expect to be challenged and this means that resistance too must be taken into account in advance of any utterance or truth claim, which can be both enabling and disabling.

But, as the political theorist Wendy Brown (2001) comments in another context, we are left today with the language of past categories such as the difficult concept of sovereignty, which doesn't necessarily presuppose equality or democratic values. This makes the current situation one of terminological invention. Brown writes that:

> while most have lost confidence in a historiography bound to a notion of progress or to any other purpose, we have coined no political substitute for progressive understandings of where we have come from and where we are going. Similarly, while both sovereignty and right have suffered severe erosions of their naturalistic epistemological and ontological basis in modernity, we have not replaced them as sources of political agency and sites of justice claims.[13]

Community Development, ed. Evelyn Pinkerton (Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia Press, 1989); Sara Singleton, "Cooperation or Capture? The Paradox of Co-management and Community Participation in Natural Resource Management and Environmental Policymaking," *Environmental Politics* 9, no. 2 (2000).

[13] Wendy Brown, *Politics out of History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3.

The moral and political categories that we continue to utilize have been evacuated of any proper or strictly agreed upon content. Questions of universal human nature and philosophical anthropology (are people "good" or "bad", "rational" or "irrational"?) have been simultaneously discredited for their so-called essentialism after the critique of such categories, all-the-while remaining at the centre (often in the disavowed form of political correctness) of many hot-button political and social issues. We might say that in our neo-Weberian (or, perhaps, neo-Westphalian) moment[14], claims to absolute unchallenged authority or sovereignty over a definite territory seem to be part of an imagined past and even cartography. Thus, the IR theory inaugurated by thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau seem to be more relevant than ever, albeit still "utopian" – aimed to alleviate discord once and for all.

> Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows that political reality is replete with contingencies and systematic irrationalities and points to the typical influences they exert on foreign policy. Yet it shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which experience can never completely achieve.[15]

According to Morgenthau, the problem of delimiting sovereign territory alongside the emergence of international politics inspired a push for more exact languages, and a turn to the legitimation of mathematics and scientific knowledge. However, Morgenthau argued that "the first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible" (21). He pointed out in a detailed manner that control over territory cannot be assumed. Rather, real control must be tested, verified, and exacted via the discipline of scientific models and

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[15] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978 [1948]), 8.

mathematics.[16] The development of foreign policy brought with it the introduction of scientific practices as a basis for legal claims in an unprecedented way.[17] We will return to the impacts of the legal disputes in the Canadian Arctic in the next section.

MARGINALITY

These concerns remind us of the ongoing spectral legacies of exclusion and the peripheral status of regions like that of the Canadian Arctic. In many respects, "the Arctic", as a particular grammar or discourse,[18] is an important marker of an excluded or virtual history that is arguably paralleled with other regions of the world such as the Balkans. A fine and fitting analysis of the political character of the Balkans, and the ensuing cartographic lessons that follow from it, is provided by Slavoj Žižek in *The Fragile Absolute*, particularly in his analysis of the case of Serbia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the context of European nationalist politics.[19] He simply asks: "Where do the Balkans begin?" (3). Žižek argues that from the neutralized perspective of Christian civilization, the Balkans begins spatially and imaginatively "down there", always a bit further to the southeast from where one identifies. According to Žižek's critique of multicultural politics, two forms of racism emerge, overt and repressed, and become imaginatively displaced onto one another. The Balkans are thus formed as an *exceptional space* in which tolerance and racism coincide; it is in this displacement that "racism itself" becomes reflexive or conscious of itself (6).

Reflexive racism plays out, according to Žižek's reading, not only in the heated fervor that is involved in outbreaks of racial violence (overt racism but also in racialization). But neither is this exclusively limited to accusations that those who advocate for forms of multicultural respect towards the other are

[16] Jen Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, ed. Steve Smith, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 39 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 137-58.
[17] Donat Pharand, *Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
[18] Keskitalo, *Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region*.
[19] Slavoj Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* (New York: Verso, 2000).

"hypocritical" (repressed racism). On the contrary, Žižek's claim cuts much deeper, and requires thought about what he calls the "fetishistic disavowal" that Brown also addresses. In the very respect for the Otherness of other cultures and ways of life, the fetishistic disavowal of reflexive racism, in what Žižek calls the *supplement* to multiculturalism, plays out in the logics of displaced racism or what we can understand as *an imagined cartography*.

We wish to apply Žižek's formula to our study of the Arctic, albeit still in defense of the basic gesture of his position regarding cartography. We wish to argue that, in effect, the north is in many important ways usually constituted as being "up there" (as opposed "down there" as in the Balkans). The "Idea of North", as a mythic entity, is always a bit further north as a direction and location from where one is (those who have traveled in the north may understand this feeling). But for some policy-makers, researchers, and members of the media in the south, the Arctic region is treated as an endless expanse of limitless potential which also brings further risks, an "imagined cartography" that is projected onto "the physical body the map of another" north. For all the colonial appropriation of land since the great empires of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the North has, at least so far, in many striking ways resisted large-scale settlement and "land-appropriation" by colonial exploitation of any empire or trading company, be it the Danish, British, French, Norwegian, American, or Russian versions.[20] The region, in this sense, might represent a development *away* from historical structures of centralized state authority because of its particularity. However, can it continue to inaugurate fresh debates about sovereignty, subjectivity, and territorialization?[21]

Our claim is that the north exists as a virtuality or an intangibility that is only ever potentially actual. That is, sovereignty has a specific functionally to it in that it brackets, defers, and even arrests certain claims that challenge its ambiguous borders. The North, in this sense, has become the name for a place without a proper or consensual referent: the very stakes of what is most important

[20] Richard Vaughan, "Who Owns the Arctic?," in *The Arctic* (Alan Sutton, 1994).
[21] Paul Nonnekes, *Northern Love: An Exploration of Canadian Masculinity*, Cultural Dialectics (Edmonton: AU Press, 2008).

in the north is precisely a debate about what the north properly *is* in an ontological sense. Questions of ice, land, sea, identity, home, and so on, become terms that are interchangeably used to describe life there.

These are questions that constantly surface in the current effort to make sense of the Arctic region. It is not without a good dose of irony, then, that the introduction of a plethora of scientific practices there, largely underway at least by the late nineteenth century,[22] have meant a loss of actuality and tangibility of the geography. This speaks to the processes of virtualization that we'd like to highlight and attempt to conceptualize. We might well say that the passion for the Real in the north only led towards a *failure* to really understand or capture its uniqueness in any significant way. Thus, the north is in many ways what it has always been, at least if we take seriously how it is perceived from the perspective of its ideological construction. It is understood as containing "intangible property",[23] such as Aboriginal knowledge forms, ripe with the potential for fortune and political gain albeit with a whole series of rather devastating risks: for example environmental costs of stationary activities such as hydro carbon extraction, changing political identities, variable food quality for local populations, a lack of affordable housing, critical infrastructure (such as boat docks), health care services, and so on. This seems to be one major aspect of the ongoing discourse of "crisis" regarding the environment in the north: it has to be recognized that sovereignty is *contingent* and, that is, historically constituted and far from the monolithic entity introduced in Hobbes" *Leviathan* that was constructed to extricate the fear of a state of "perpetuall war".[24] The question of sovereignty even well before the twenty-first century was always-already embedded within a totality of ideological forces that the myth of the state of nature cannot defy or neutralize but only defer and haunt. These are struggles over

[22] Trevor H. Levere, *Science and the Canadian Arctic: A Century of Exploration 1818-1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Michael T. Bravo, "The Rhetoric of Scientific Practices in Nunavut," *Ecumene* 7, no. 4 (2000).
[23] Government of Canada, "Arctic Region: Aboriginal Intangible Property in Canada: An Ethnographic Review " (Industry Canada Accessed Feb 2, 2010 http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/eng/ip01230.html, 2009).
[24] Hobbes qtd. in Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, 139.

the meaning and discourse of both "the Arctic", "North" and over so-called sovereignty against the background of other social forces and states.

But the latest experience of dialogue about the north should teach us again that sovereignty does not mean political neutralization today, and perhaps it never has. The tangible sense of urgency in and about the north, a sense that can be readily felt in many media reports and scholarly articles, is part of the ongoing historical constitution of sovereignty in the region. It is, therefore, no accident that a (perceived) decline of state sovereignty and control over the region is usually represented as a crisis in all sorts of ways, politically, socially, and in terms of "security".[25] Yet, not only does crisis make for good media sound-bytes (for example, the Canadian "sovereignty exercise" at Hans Island July 20, 2005 to remind Denmark of Canada's claim to that island, or the Russian planting of a flag on an ocean seabed), it has also become in many ways the bread and butter of applied academic scholarship turned moralistic, which seeks "to limit rather than to open, to discipline rather than to incite".[26] The urgency in the north is usually presented as something that we ought to be concerned about. But rarely do we hear about plans for concrete action and how real collective movements might begin.

CONSTITUTING WHAT IS NORTH: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE ACTUAL-REAL

In the Arctic, a term and a place which has long had fuzzy southern boundaries, "the real" is described for most outsiders by the imperial sciences of field studies. Distinctions about what the north properly *is* are by and large based on Canadian and other political system.[27] But southern understandings of the north are also overdetermined by anthropological, botanical, zoological, geological and hydrological surveys and documentaries. Michal Bravo's work helps to illustrate

[25] Tara McCormack, "From State of War to State of Nature," in *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*, ed. Christopher j. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch (New York: UCL Press, 2007).
[26] Brown, *Politics out of History*, 41.
[27] Shields, *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity*, 168; Keskitalo, *Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region*.

this point. Although he neglects the prior period of almost 250 years by which the north was known through the surveying practices of Hudson's Bay Company factors and longer by missionaries, from the often assumed position of the old colonial centre, Bravo summarizes the history of stereotypical southern forms of knowledge of the north:

> In the eras of imperial expansion and colonization of northern Canada, the field sciences were a key vehicle for describing and taking sovereign possession of the Arctic. Darwin and his contemporary luminaries wrote an entire manual of instructions to direct naval officers and other scientific travelers as to precisely what they should measure and collect. It is no accident that the Arctic today is widely known to many people through the lens of the field naturalist. The sciences today therefore have a legacy in which asymmetric relations of power have figured prominently [....] In the post-1945 era, science has had an authoritative role in northern development both as the arbiter of nature and as an ideology of [internal] colonial management.[28]

The field sciences in northern Canada "were a key vehicle for describing and taking sovereign possession of the Arctic" by presenting and availing the region as abstract descriptive and documentary information based on measurements of the concrete flora and fauna, earth and weather. In scientific practice, the empirical (or knowable) is extended from these bare "actual realities", the concrete, to include the "actually possible" as trends, also known as "probabilities" and known in the mathematical language of statistics. Knowledge, particularly of nature, is often conflated with this information rather than the human performance of generating and transmitting data in a refined semiotic, which evokes knowing as sense-making of information. In this form, knowledge of the Arctic is actually an acquaintance with abstract information and other representations of the empirical data of the actual. Argounova and Cruikshank remind us that there are striking similarities with the limitations of the museum exhibit documenting and objectifying the north:

[28] Bravo, "The Rhetoric of Scientific Practices in Nunavut," 469-70.

> collectors and curators have long portrayed northern peoples to distant audiences through material culture in museum exhibits... [but] using material culture for constructing their own narratives, local people may draw on more evocative, referential meanings than those conventionally used in museum displays about northern regions, opening spaces for connections among public and personal memories.[29]

Material objects in museums offer an opportunity for experiential and even, though rarely, tactile knowledge. However, this is divorced from the context of use, and the relations with other objects and flow of embodied activity that constitutes use. Furthermore, the broader context of ideal or intangible elements is missing. These are ideals that go beyond the "referential meanings", abstractions which are a staple of ethnographies such as the one above and also include broader senses of "culture" and of communities as local publics and past events. These virtualities are the intangible but real *mise-en-scène* for more abstract narratives.

Practices and conventions of scientific representations control for, and thus rarely feature, the non-actual, that is, the "ideal" as an ontological category. This includes less easily observed aspects of social reality including "social facts": such as community, communication, inclusion networks, identity claims, value-laden objects, sites and environments. Virtualities include not qualities but entities such as sets even while their elements are concrete "entities". Places and regions, for instance, are often reduced to abstract latitude and longitude coordinates constructed from the "god's eye view", which are supposed to be value-neutral representations rather than the space of other symbolic and topologies or mythical spatializations. Informational surrogates such as genealogy and group belonging come to be used as indicators of membership in groups such as tribes or families. These aspects of the real do not figure as "hard science" data for they are ideal-real rather than actual-real, the latter of which is prioritized by science and used to generate probabilities. They too can be approached

[29] T. Argounova and J. Cruikshank, "Reinscribing Meaning: Memory and Indigenous Identity in Sakha Republic (Yakutia)," *Arctic Anthropology* 37, no. 1 (2000): 98.

statistically as actually-possible configurations of individual empirical elements. However, meaningfulness and question of use are evacuated from knowledge when it neglects all intangible objects in favour of only the tangible.[30]

Perhaps it is appropriate to speak of this as the "bias" of science (that is, prioritizing the actual over the ideal). But a key problem with the notion of "bias"–which brings out the problematic assertions of neutrality and an objective standard–is that it presupposes some sort of an ordered whole, usually including the neutral place of enunciation of *humanism* or ideology as a "system of representations".[31] Usually this neutralized space of enunciation represents what is proper, and what is the unified will of the state, namely, the will of the majority. To speak of bias is already to suppose that objectivity is possible and even desirable, which usually represents an unwillingness to accept who we really are and the historical period in which we exist as subjects.[32]

Northern and native populations have fought to introduce traditional knowledge, *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit* (IQ), as a form of everyday environmental authority and a legitimate description of the reality of the north and of the environmental trends taking place there.[33] Yet, as Bravo points out, the epistemological bases are usually juxtaposed with natural scientific knowledge, which discourages examination of IQ's own historicity, biases, and lacunae. That is, how does traditional knowledge change over time, what does it emphasize and even overemphasize, what does it neglect? IQ is understood broadly to include "language, values, and beliefs" and is distinguished from the more restricted concept Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), which largely applies to Inuit approaches to understanding environment and wildlife.[34] IQ, for instance, is similar to anthropological life history and oral history in that it is recounted, orally

[30] Shields, *The Virtual*, 19.
[31] Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, Radical Thinkers (New York and London: Verso, 2005 [1965]), 231.
[32] Slavoj Žižek, *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 123.
[33] Jocelyne Pellerin and Jacques Grondin, "Assessing the State of Arctic Ecosystem Health: Bridging Inuit Viewpoints and Biological Endpoints on Fish Health," *Ecosystem Health* 4, no. 4 (1998).
[34] Wenzel, "From Tek to Iq: Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit and Inuit Cultural Ecology."

"performed" and situated on, or "as if" on the land and at home even when it is repeated for parliamentary inquiries or in school classrooms. Elders' everyday knowledge identifies not just what is significant, but "what counts" as the reality of the north, and thus what does not matter for decision-making concerning, for example, development. Not only observations of the present, but memory, anticipation, and symbols are wrapped together in statements such as the following: "I need the caribou for more than one reason [...] we are at risk mentally, physically and spiritually".[35]

These representations and conflicting truth claims raise difficult questions about knowledge, authority, and intellectual property rights. For example, as Dickson asked during her thoughtful talk at the 2008 Arctic Summit mentioned before: "Who should protect traditional knowledge?" Although Elders are commonly seen as representing the link between science and traditional native knowledge practices about land and life in the north (sometimes called "elderism" by some First Nations groups because it assumes that senior individuals necessarily know best), increasingly it is being recognized that the gulf between these knowledge forms is difficult to suture by anyone, that is, either by traditional knowledge sources *or* by representatives of non-Inuit social and natural science. A changing or unpredictable environment renders obsolete some aspects of traditional knowledge of regular seasonal cycles, risks (especially on water), or the types of game that may be found and when. Dickson argued that these issues present deep challenges in regards to whether knowledge is collectively or individually based. Members of northern communities often bemoan the intangible "loss of culture" that accompanies a loss of predictability over what happens on the land, and this is connected to the ongoing, reified separation between differing forms of knowledge acquisition (oral, pragmatic) and transmission (written, media-tized, abstract reports on the "data").

Thus on both an epistemological "how do you know?" and an ontological "what exists?" basis, it is not surprising to find confrontations between "traditional knowledge" and scientific measurements and projections, especially

[35] Dickson, "Climate Change and the Enviornment."

in the area of impact assessment of development. Our feeling is that this should not be an either/or choice between contending knowledge systems, that is, between systems of knowledge represented as being completely separate or different from one another. Rather, *science itself should be recognized as an incomplete knowledge form for understanding the real*[36] (that is, what confronts the testable accuracy of scientific information). Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus contending that the consequences of climate warming such as the melting of thick, multi-year sea ice will only accentuate many of the current trends already underway to expand the reach and authority of science and its practices. As more people from the south venture their gaze northward in search of meaning and experience (tourism, science) and resource exploration it is not surprising that the Canadian Arctic Archipelago "quickly becomes a flash point".[37] Michael Byers usefully describes this situation as the "Arctic sovereignty button", in which the north is used by politicians and speculators in the south "for short-term political gain".[38] Unfortunately, as he reminds us–-although paradoxically neutralizing his own position as a social commentator—the gains are often accompanied by "long term, negative consequences" for those who live there.

The recent statements in regards to sovereignty claims over the Northwest Passage put forth by the Government of Canada represent what many observers have described as the "irony" of the present situation: as the thick multi-year ice gives way to seasonal ice which melts in the summer, increasing access seems to invite further exploration and more of the same. The north is once again understood in the light of the historicist assumptions of perpetual decline or inevitable progress (the so-called "Whig interpretation of history"). Thus, anyone presenting their observations and positions is forced to struggle for rhetorical authority and must attempt to present a convincing picture of "reality". Using the Siberian case of Yukutia residents, as we already saw, Argounova and Cruickshank show how "making memory" is essential to constructing current day

[36] Niklas Luhmann, "The Modernity of Science," *New German Critique* 61(1994).
[37] Birchall, "Canadian Sovereignty: Climate Change and Politics in the Arctic."
[38] Byers, "Who Owns the Arctic?."

community and indigenous ethnic identity. If it is understood as simple empirical reports, traditional knowledge seems fantastical, surreal. For example, consider the following testimony, again by Dickson:

> In the Yukon we are also seeing more species. There's more deer, there's cougars. In one of our communities there was a cougar attack. Of course, our hunters aren't used to looking up in the trees when they are hunting. Now they have to look up and look back. That's something they will have to adapt to […] one of the most interesting things is we now have to watch for polar bears. Polar bears are now seen in some of our communities, from Alaska, up in the Yukon and NWT. Now when I was going home, I was thinking 'this is crazy'. Now we have to be on the lookout [...] this is something we also have to adapt to; we're not used to them and this is a huge issue. And most recently, last year, in Old Crow, one of the hunters, he's a relative of mine, went hunting and along the banks of the Porcupine River. He said it was just teeming with giant mice. I said "are you sure?" He said, well, he's never seen them before and similar things have been seen on the [Old Crow] mountain but nobody knows what they are. These are a lot of changes and very quick.[39]

While "polar bears are now seen in our communities" is a statement, a "truth-claim" which represents facticity by presenting baldly the concrete, it implies that polar bears were absent (and not just not seen) previously, a claim to historical fact which can be corroborated by others but is always open to objection (inland away from the Beaufort Sea's ice would not be a typical part of the polar bears' ranges). It is a hostage to fortune of the single witness who denies this statement and thereby casts doubt on its factuality. More dramatically, "giant mice" appears to be a short-form of the statement that creatures resembling giant mice have been observed. We don't know if these are actual mice, or that it is "as-if" the creatures were mice. They are presented as large, virtual, but too large to actually be ordinary, mice. Although this is an ideal-real it remains a report of the actually-real, and cannot be dismissed as merely an ideal-possibility (an abstraction which

[39] Dickson, "Climate Change and the Enviornment."

could be any tall tale or a fiction). They are not intangible, but "giant mice" defy an implied normative order, which science can only respond to by replacement of its own methodological norms. They are thus a tangible and intangible aberration: large on the one hand and abnormal on the other. Virtually "as if" rodents but not actually "proper' mice. In this sense, orthodoxy is always fraught with the contingencies of resistance.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have attempted to draw attention to the privileging of the actual against that of the ideal. We argue that a turn to the ideal through the conceptual form of the virtual can be a fruitful endeavor to reveal some presuppositions involved in various conceptions of "the actual" divorced from any abstract connotations and references. Focusing on the ideal reveals a different sense of the north than that usually asked after in conjunction with wider questions having to do with sovereignty, authority, and control in the twenty-first century. The ambiguity included in Max Weber's theorization of state sovereignty in modernity provides inspiration to take seriously an intangible, virtual north present in traditional knowledge, scientific and academic discourses, political discourses, media, and in everyday understandings. We argue that the virtual opens questions of competing ways of constructing facts and truth about life, land, and ice. Indeed, the ways in which the north is constructed are complementary and mixed in the hybrid language of everyday descriptions of environmental and climatic change.

There is also a political motivation behind our theoretical efforts. Alongside the return to questions of sovereignty in the north, there has been a subsequent attempt to silence voices such as those within the Arctic Council that add significant complexity to questions of sovereignty today. Another example is the Inuit Circumpolar Council's (ICC) Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic (28 April 2009) signed on behalf of a united Inuit whose people span across four Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Russia and the USA). These are politicized voices that make appeals to larger, abstract concepts such as sovereignty, self-governance, and human rights, but which often reveals an alternative sense of

those terms compared to that promulgated by the Government of Canada for example. To make sense of the virtuality of sovereignty in processes of (post)modernity is merely one way to express and find critical terms to make sense of the ongoing transformation in the language of what the Arctic *is*. In this respect, if the discourse of sovereignty in its conventional sociological form expressed by Weber attempts to link the triad state-legitimacy-territory, the virtuality of sovereignty would propose the triad virtuality-resistance-materiality. In this sense, we might say that the virtual is a *different* form of structure and which creates a new mediation between the materiality of state and concrete territory by diplomacy.

CHAPTER 5: WHAT IS THE ARCTIC?

Journalists, policy analysts, policy makers, politicians, scholars and the public are searching for ways to conceptualize and demonstrate empirically and theoretically what has happened in the Arctic in the 20th and now 21st centuries. Most Arctic theorists agree the end of the Second World War marked a decisive break with how the Arctic was understood spatially and how that spatialisation was acted upon.[1] In recent years, writers about all things Arctic have sought to provide answers to the question: what is the Arctic? For example, the well-known academic, anthropological, and politically engaged writer George Wenzel represents the 15 years following the Second World War in Clyde River as "the government era," 1961–83 as the "bricolage era" (a combination of harvesting incomes), and from 1982 to the present "the sealboycott era"—a period of unprecedented introduction of technologies into the Canadian north.[2] This becomes a useful schematic to theorize the expansion of the Canadian state northwards.

The previous chapter sought to the consider the "virtualization of sovereignty" that attempts to acknowledge abstract aspects of sovereignty claims such as rights and traditional knowledge. This chapter presents the Arctic as a virtual multiplicity: a nonunified object that cannot be understood in a neutral, positivistic way—a space that is at once a place, an orientation or idea, a world view, a lived geography, a scientific laboratory, a frontier. I show that resistance and contradictory ideas matter in the struggle to interpret recent events that have helped to reshape the social formation of the Canadian Arctic. The Arctic is being formed in part via the effects of an economic crisis; that is, late consumerist capitalism, literally running out of gas, is desperately searching for objects and substances to market. In the face of depleting global resources, the Arctic has become attractive in the 21st century race for both living and nonliving resources. This scramble for resources threatens to radically upset the status quo for residents

[1] Rob Shields, *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity,* (London: Routledge Chapman Hall), 1991. Shields defines social spatialisation as the "social construction of the spatial which is a formation of both discursive and nondiscursive elements, practices, and processes." (7)
[2] George W. Wenzel, *Animal Rights, Human Rights: Ecology, Economy and Ideology in the Canadian Arctic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 109-33.

and outsiders who live in the Arctic. As with the previous chapter, although it does not explicitly relate to Nunavut or Iqaluit. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that climate change is an issue that directly effects all of the Arctic more dramatically than anywhere else on the planet, at least to date.

By describing the Arctic with reference to multiplicity I aim to suggest that abstract ideas are important to consider because they provide outlines of the future. They provide ways to understand future horizons. Appreciating the full range of ways that the Arctic is interpreted as a region and an idea enables commentators to conceive of how subjects are produced in the context of these very discourses (although discourse is not the same as a concept). Multiplicity enables commentators to appreciate the politicization of knowledge that has occurred alongside climate change and indigenous concerns. Multiplicity should not be mistaken for sheer abstraction because ideas must be actualized (or made more tangible) in the course of social struggles. Multiplicity involves questions of the possibility of the actuality of the Arctic along with the virtual forces that help to create and stabilize meaning. As the term "climate change" designates sufficiently, the problem of change is front and centre and these spatial trends make innovation and development to be of the most pressing concerns in the present moment in the Arctic region now an important part of global or collective history. The Arctic is overcoming its historical peripheral status and thus becoming part of "the centre".

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ARCTIC NARRATIVES

Greenland was identified as the "ground zero for global warming" on the cover of the June 2010 edition of National Geographic (Figure 25). This sort of hyperbole is not unusual in references to the Arctic today. Because the warming of the planet is so visible in the melting of ice caps, climate change has awakened the world to the land that for so many years escaped being understood as a part of history. In the past decade alone, the Arctic and its rich history have been viewed as capable of informing the world about the future.[3] Emmerson writes, "[o]ur ideas of the Arctic—permanent, pristine, unchanging—will persist long after they have been

[3] Charles Emmerson, *The Future History of the Arctic* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).

overtaken by Arctic change. But slowly, bit by bit, our ideas of the Arctic will have to adapt." He continues: "[a]s they do, a little bit of our sense of earthly eternity will be lost forever." (314) The loss of firm foundations, along with consequent attempts to link to the bedrock (literally, in housing and other development projects) is a reality the north is experiencing at an alarming pace.



Figure 25: *National Geographic*, June 2010.

But what sorts of innovation are really needed in the 21st century Arctic? How is adaptation possible and what principles are needed to sustain these transformations? These questions are becoming increasingly difficult to answer, at least since 2007 (the warmest year recorded in history, and which may be a tipping point for the Arctic climate). I view these issues through the theoretical lens of late capitalism, a form of advanced consumerist capitalism that truly limits what options are seen as possible in the present. Consumerism demands resources such as rare earths, steel, and other minerals. Most innovations needed for change that is considered "possible" call for capital investment and science. And science is funded by the metropolitan centre. Many researchers predict that the drastic changes occurring in the Arctic today will affect the rest of the world with the same severity over the next 20 to 30 years. Thus we will surely see some movement of capital

investment toward the support of science to alleviate the problems global warming will necessarily produce. The Arctic will be reshaped by the dynamics of climate change and as an outcome of market expansion reaching its environmental limits—mainly the dwindling supplies of global non-renewable resources such as oil and natural gas. The increased interest in the Arctic is welcomed with cautious reservations from northern peoples. In this chapter I seek to illuminate what sustains the recent urgency for and about the Arctic.

The Arctic is an ocean surrounded by continents, whereas Antarctica is a continent surrounded by oceans. The Arctic is also a political space that in recent years has inspired the interest of inhabitants, politicians, bureaucrats, academics, members of the media, national citizens, experts, regulators, international lawyers, and powerful stakeholders such as multinational oil and mining companies. This might be a welcome change compared to the situation of the 1990s which saw a decline in investment in Arctic research. Hik and Sloan observe: "Attention to northern issues has typically been sustained for only short periods in response to external events, usually associated with interests in minerals, oil and natural gas reserves, or pipelines."[4] The upshot of the most recent wave of attention has been a strengthening of the research capacities that support this development, and, more importantly, an increase in development and research that take place *in* the Arctic environment. An example is the Polar Continental Shelf Program in Resolute Bay which was started in 1958 by the Diefenbaker government and today is expanding with Canada Action Plan stimulus funding (providing logistics services and field support to scientists and others). Canada is now beginning construction on an $200 million new Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay that would expand research capacity further and is expected to play a major role in the economy and society of the central Arctic (although it will not be in operation until 2017).[5] These developments bring meaningful infrastructures to these communities; in fact, all of the northern nations—except perhaps the United

[4] David S. Hik and Karen Kraft Sloan, "Putting the Canadian Polar House in Order," *Arctic* 57, no. 2 (2004).
[5] Government of Canada, "PM Announces High Arctic Research Station Coming to Cambridge Bay," ed. Prime Minister of Canada (2010).

States[6]—have raised Arctic issues to the forefront of national agendas over the past decade with a variety of development projects.

The renewed vigor in debates concerning the Arctic that emerged around the turn of the current century can be understood from two interconnected perspectives.

The first is the Arctic's current unsettled geopolitical status. For instance, there is a dispute over Hans Island (Tartupaluk) (located in the centre of the Kennedy Channel of Nares Strait—the strait that separates Ellesmere Island from northern Greenland) between Canada and Denmark/Greenland. There are also overlapping claims in the Beaufort Sea between Canada and the U.S., and the stakes in terms of offshore oil and gas exploration are high (Figure 26).

Another dispute is between the U.S. and Canada over the status of the Northwest Passage—is it an international strait or Canadian internal waters? The ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by (at least) 60 nations includes the prospect of an overarching but ultimately unbinding governance scheme. Each of the nations with a claim to Arctic territory has now acceded to the 1982 UNCLOS with the exception of the United States.[7] This chapter will briefly review these discussions with reference to the academic literature on the topic.

[6] Rob Huebert, "United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power." *The School of Public Policy* 2, no. 2 (2009).

[7] Franklyn Griffiths, "Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: Time to Take Yes for an Answer on the Northwest Passage," in *Northern Exposure: People, Powers and Prospects for Canada's North*, ed. Frances Abele et al. (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2009); Rob Huebert, "United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power." *The School of Public Policy* 2, no. 2 (2009).



Figure 26: Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic Region. Reproduced with permission.

Political Scientist Franklin Griffiths, a long time Arctic commentator, proposes that: "[Canada] ought now take yes for an answer in a set of cooperative arrangements that deepen and widen the Canada-U.S. agreement to disagree on the Northwest Passage." (3) Griffiths argues that Canada "should be able to move forward with confidence and vigour into the Arctic region that's now operating before us" (Ibid.) irrespective of whether Canada can effectively or aggressively enforce these rights. Both the United States and Canada agree that the Northwest

Passage will be used for international navigation, but the bone of contention rests on how much control Canada will have over these voyages, and whether these voyages will be private or governmental. Griffiths is a critic of what he calls the "sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis," pursued by critics such as Rob Huebert and Michael Byers, and politicians such as Stephen Harper, that involves the following logic: "in melting sea ice, global warming promised to open the Northwest Passage to high volumes of intercontinental shipping, which could not but result in a U.S., or a U.S.-backed, legal challenge to Canada's sovereignty claim." (6) Griffiths argues that throughout the entire debate he has disagreed: is the Northwest Passage an internal waterway or an international strait? Ultimately it doesn't matter much: Canada has control and responsibility for the Northwest Passage whether or not this is explicitly recognised in international law (in fact, Griffiths is of the opinion that through UNCLOS Article 234 "Ice-covered areas" Canada has a legal basis to claim sovereignty. Canada helped to develop Article 234 which states that "Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone."[8] It is in the best interests of safe navigation that Canada protects the Northwest Passage from pollution). These debates will continue for many years to come as many areas of disagreement regarding the law of the sea remain.

The second major factor involved in the rise of interest in the Arctic is a widespread fear coupled with a paradoxical sense of optimism (or should I say opportunism?) concerning new realities associated with a rapidly warming climate. Fear and optimism go some distance toward explaining why the Arctic has become so central to recent global discussions about international cooperation and politics. The case for climate change remodelling the Arctic might be overstated; indeed, as Brigham has written "the Arctic hinterland is being driven as much by global economics and natural resource availability as it is by climate change. It is mostly the work of a few industries, natural resource development (think oil and gas,

[8] See: D. M McRae, "Negotiation of Arctic 234," in *Politics of the Northwest Passage*, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987).

minerals, and timber), marine tourism (think cruise ships), and fishing."[9]

ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS

In the first decade of the 21st century, the Arctic region became an important *mise en scène* for at times conflicting geopolitical claims over what the region's future might hold in store. These debates include the precise location of national boundaries and the extension of continental shelves into the Arctic Ocean. These discussions will continue in the foreseeable future because of national pressures to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in regard to Arctic Ocean governance. These initiatives will begin to see the Arctic Ocean legally as being like all of the other oceans, except for the considerable ice-cover during large parts of the year. As Commander James Kraska has argued, these discussions involve not only the Arctic, but also the entirety of international law in regard to the governance of the world's oceans. "In the past, disputes over the width of the territorial sea or the legal status of internationals straits, were the locus of disagreement. Today the competition is manifest in the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone]."[10]

As one source put it: "UNCLOS is one of the largest, and likely one of the most important, legal agreements in history. The treaty contains 320 articles and 9 annexes. It synthesizes and builds upon the agreements that were developed at the first conference … The agreement addresses a myriad of issues including navigational rights of ships and aircraft, limits on the extension of national sovereignty over the oceans, environmental protection of the oceans, conservation of living resources, and mining rights."[11] In this work I refer to the role of UNCLOS in the politics of the Arctic today. Because the Arctic region is defined by its relationship to water, I hypothesise that UNCLOS will establish the international legal norms for how the region should be governed. These legal norms would be

[9] Lawson W. Brigham, "Think Again: The Arctic," *Foreign Policy*, no. September/October (2010): 72.
[10] James Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1.
[11] Encyclopedia of Earth, "United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982."

capable of tying the hands of national governments in a nonbinding legal-normative way in the international community. This would allow nations that border the Arctic Ocean to claim as internal waters (or territorial seas) 12 nautical miles off of coastline baselines (measured with reference to the low water mark on the shoreline) as determined by Article 3 of UNCLOS. This is straightforward. Things get more complicated when claims of exclusive rights to harvest living and nonliving resources can be extended beyond this to a 200-nautical mile limit called an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Kraska states: "From Canada to China and Chile to Croatia, the littoral areas of the seas are imbued with heightened political importance. As the strip of water adjacent to the shoreline, the EEZ has acquired an undeniable psychological and emotional importance as an element of homeland security, national 'sovereignty,' and nationalism."[12] Kraska writes further: "very few people or institutions appreciate the magnitude of changes under way" in terms of the international law of the sea. In short, the EEZs fuse economic and national political space and have been the subject of heated debates ever since climate change has been registered as a serious problem in the public mind.

Beyond the EEZs are international waters (or "high seas")(Figure 27). Each of the five Arctic littoral states can make claims beyond the 200 nautical mile outer limit *if* they can demonstrate that underwater ridges are a "natural" extension of the territorial continental shelf into the high seas (to an absolute maximum of 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 m water depth). This is outlined in Article 76 "Definition of the continental shelf," one of the more frequently discussed articles in UNCLOS. Paragraph 1, Article 76 states: "The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin." But paragraph 5 states: "the fixed points comprising of the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed … shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines." This implies that states can determine the geophysical extension of continental shelves beyond the EEZ and submit these claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental

[12] Kraska, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics, 7.

Shelf (CLCS). Paragraph 8 explains: "[t]he Commission shall make recommendations to coastal states on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding."

These statements have turned out to be ambiguous because it is not clear who is to make the final decision about the extension of the continental shelves—the CLCS or the states. Legal scholars differ on who is responsible for these decisions and the decisions will no doubt be controversial; but it is becoming increasingly clear that these are political decisions that will need to be made among the parties involved (the Arctic states and others). We need to acknowledge the political character of these decisions; they cannot evade public debate. Science cannot make political decision for us. After all, the EEZs will legitimately be exploited for domestic interests so there will have to be some give and take among the Arctic states to determine where the precise demarcations are to be made and what the "official" map of the Arctic will look like once the claims are settled.

These exhilarating matters have an unfortunate tendency to grab headlines and distract from serious social issues in the Arctic. Establishing solid scientific evidence to clearly show the coastal baselines, the EEZs, and how far the continental shelves extend beyond 200 nautical miles has been a primary objective of scientific and legal efforts in this regard. Submissions are made to the CLCS 10 years after an individual state signs on to UNCLOS. So far, the greatest stakes in these claims have been *economic*, involving access to off-shore drilling rights for hydrocarbons and "living" resources, such as fish and whales in the Beaufort Sea, Western Greenland, and in the Russian parts of the Arctic Ocean such as the Chukchi Sea.



Figure 27: "Diagram of the various regions of the ocean over which a State may exercise sovereignty". Source: Encyclopedia of Earth. http://www.eoearth.org/article/United_Nations_Convention_on_Law_of_the_Sea_%28UNCLOS%29,_1982

The importance of these legal disputes was underscored when the Russian explorers Sagalevich and Chilingarov planted a flag and time capsule on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in June 2007 (Figure 28) using two mini-submarines (this was no small feat in the cold and icy Arctic waters) while working to support Russia's enormous claim to include the Lomonosov Ridge as a "natural" extension of its continental shelf under Article 76. Russia has threatened to claim an enormous part of the Arctic Ocean as an extension of its national EEZ leading to a heated debate, and the Canadian government has only stoked that fire. These disputes have legitimized the knowledge of polar legal experts across the world, but at times it appears as though the lawyers are not as qualified to address such matters as it might at first seem, as these debates involve law, science, *and* politics. NDP leader Jack Layton pointed out in a 2007 letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper that Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is directly and indirectly threatened by the Russia flag planting activities: "The Russian mission to place its flag on the ocean floor of the North Pole demonstrates a troubling reality for northern communities and all Canadians concerning Arctic sovereignty. It highlights just how far behind

Canada is when it comes to exercising our legitimate rights in the Arctic."[13]

Planting a flag attached to a state-of-the-art titanium pole on the seabed of the Arctic Ocean to claim national rights to it is not a legal manoeuvre. A bureaucratic paper trail and history of occupation and use is much more important in establishing property rights today. Canadian MP Peter MacKay's comment on the Russian flag-planting event went "viral" as it is repeated in every account of these legal-political events: "This isn't the 15th century," he asserted, "You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory.' Our claims over our Arctic are very well established." What MacKay did not mention, and what was not lost on several media outlets at the time of the media-storm, was that Canada did that very thing two years earlier, July 13, 2005, on Hans Island, a tiny island in the Nares Strait that is still in dispute between Denmark/Greenland and Canada (Figure 29).



Figure 28: Russians plant a flag on the Arctic Ocean seabed on 2 August 2007. Source: Association of Russian Polar Explorers

[13] Jack Layton, "Letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper on Arctic Sovereignty," (2007), http://bit.ly/uVvc24.

Figure 29: Canadian Forces Northern Area troops raise a flag on the contested Hans Island, 13 July 2005. Source: Department of National Defence/ Cpl David McCord.

Several lessons follow from these symbolic and political flag plantings. The flag plantings made perfect sense at the level of the *spectacle*: the deeds raised awareness about what Russia's intentions in the Arctic are, and made the public aware of Canada's dispute with Denmark/Greenland over tiny Hans Island. These were no small technical feats and had huge social effects: they garnered the attention of a large global audience to legal disputes that have been pronounced and perhaps even exaggerated above other considerations since the summer of 2007. Russia's long-term commitment to developing the Arctic for both habituation and oil and gas exploration has huge effects on the ongoing development of Russia. Although Russian authorities denied that the explorers intended to "flag" attention to the legal disputes in 2007, there is no question that they did. The flag-planting spectacle reaffirmed Russia as a major post-Cold War Arctic state actor and put other nations with Arctic claims to differing degrees on the defensive. This has enabled the research community to ask what the post-Cold War social formation of

the Arctic looks like.

Many argue that a new cold war should be avoided because it would deeply affect the people that live in the Arctic.[14] Mary Simon challenges:

> I call upon the leaders of all Arctic states to remember the last Cold War. To remember the lack of trust it created, the international tension, the lost opportunities, the billions of dollars that were spent on military hardware and posturing throughout its course that could better have been spent enriching the lives of ordinary people. No reasonable person should want to return to those stressful and expensive times, especially in an era of global fiscal constraint and austerity.

These reflections of the Cold War have forced environmental concerns to the world stage given the "extraordinary shortsighted nuclear waste management programs in Siberia."[15] Zellen opines that agreement over the extent of environmental degradation in the former Soviet Union has ironically helped to steady the situation in the Arctic: "[t]he enormity of the environmental threats to the physical environment of the Arctic has caused old Cold War divisions to quickly transform into a post-Cold War consensus." (86). For Russia, like Canada, the Arctic is not only a speculative, economic prospect, it is also a space of identification and a profound part of questions over national unity. Indeed it has domestic political implications.

The alarming rates of ongoing melting trends have added fuel to speculation about the opening of new shipping lanes through the Northwest Passage and the opening of previously untapped oil and gas fields.[16] In 2008 the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the Arctic contains nearly one quarter of the world's undiscovered conventional oil and natural gas equivalents, and about one third of the world's undiscovered natural gas resources. Although these estimates are

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[14] Mary Simon, "Inuit Not Interested in Being People in the Middle of a New Cold War," *Hill Times* (2010); ed. Struzik, "The New Arctic Cold War," *The star.com* November 17, no. November 17 (2007). URL: http://www.thestar.com/printarticle/277301; Carolyn Gramling, "Cold Wars: Russia Claims Arctic Land," *Geotimes* 2007.

[15] Barry Scott Zellen, *On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2009), 86.

[16] Barret Weber, "Increased Shipping in the International Arctic? An Overview." *Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce* 43, no. 3 (2012): 301-18.

speculative, they have carried much weight in debates about what the Arctic is—most probably a rich trove of resources for future generations of northerners and nonnortherners. Inuit activist and teacher Sheila Watt-Cloutier encapsulates this situation from the Inuit perspective: "As long as it's ice, nobody cares except us [Inuit] because we hunt and fish on that ice. However, the minute it starts to thaw and becomes water, then the whole world is interested."[17] When the ice melts the impossible becomes possible.[18] Watt-Cloutier, along with a handful of other influential Inuit leaders who do not shy away from publicity, have not pulled any punches in the sheer will to expose the ruling global ideology that continues (or attempts) to marginalize and silence voices coming from the north. These efforts work to expand *who* is included on the geopolitical international stage beyond sovereign states.

MEDIATING CONFLICT: ILULISSAT DECLARATION

Media and recent scholarship has played a strong role in raising expectations of ensuing conflicts over resources and national boundaries over the past decade. This has presented problems for politicians responsible for Arctic development and adaptation assistance. For example, Kraska's highly acclaimed *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea* stages the debate as one of littoral authority in the EEZs versus one of freedom of navigation for the international community; he writes: "many coastal states have become more assertive in their claims over the EEZ. The boldness has paid off for coastal states, as the international community has become more reticent about objecting to the restrictive rules in the EEZ."[19] This is very much the U.S. ideology regarding freedom of navigation on the High Seas, which it argues must be protected above all else (presumably even above pollution protection). Media stories tend to underemphasize the many spaces of agreement that exist and to exaggerate the possibilities of conflict. The perceptions of those

[17] Sheila Watt-Cloutier quoted in Alec Crawford, Arthur Hanson, and David Runnalls, "Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Climate-Changing World," International Institute for Sustainable Development, URL: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/arctic_sovereignty.pdf
[18] Slavoj Žižek, *Living in End Times* (New York: Verso, 2010), 328.
[19] Kraska, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics, 8-9.

that actually live in the Arctic are seldom included unless they reinforce the theme of ensuing Arctic conflict (often these reports are written in the south and are full of factual errors). Even Kraska, in his treatise on the law of the sea and the EEZs, wrote that freedom of navigation is the only thing that can secure world peace: "The legal and political odyssey of the EEZ will profoundly influence the course of future conflicts. The erosion of the regime of the EEZ may be coupled with a general breakdown in order ashore." (8)

Conflict is much more useful for grabbing headlines and selling books than is the longstanding development of cooperation networks—such as UNCLOS—among various actors in the Arctic. Many reports and scholarly publications prophesise the emergence of a new Arctic cold war (or, perhaps, a continuation of the old one) but this time fought over access to resources and shipping lanes through the Arctic Ocean rather than the military posturing and stand-offs of the post-World War II era.

On May 28, 2008, the Ilulissat Declaration was released after a high-level meeting of the five main Arctic states in Ilulissat, Greenland. This was an effort by these states to put a damper on the dominant perceptions emerging in the media that a "race for resources" was underway in the 21st century Arctic. There are a variety of interpretations of the ultimate meaning of the Ilulissat Declaration; debates still rage at Arctic conferences about how to interpret the event. Was it a purposive evasion of the Arctic Council and the voice of indigenous peoples, or was it simply necessary for expediency? For instance, one debate emerged about the lack of indigenous representation, including the Arctic Council, at the meeting. Some have argued that the Arctic Council (discussed in detail in the next chapter) is falling apart and the Ilulissat meeting is a case in point.

However, Michael Byers in this case has taken a position similar to my own: "In a deliberate response to all the misreporting, the Danish government invited the foreign ministers of the other four Arctic Ocean countries to Ilulissat … all five states reaffirmed their commitment to working together within an existing

framework of international law."[20] The signatories to the Declaration made it clear that differences exist among members of the "Arctic Five," a moniker often used to describe the Arctic Ocean-facing nations, but none of these differences are likely lead to military confrontation or a scramble for resources. The Arctic Ocean, like other oceans, has territorial areas and High Seas and thus can be treated in theory in a similar way. The Arctic Five began the Declaration by pointing toward the many issues of agreement:

> The Arctic Ocean stands at the threshold of significant changes. Climate change and the melting of ice have a potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and the potential exploitation of natural resources.
>
> By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean, the five coastal states are in a unique position to address these possibilities and challenges. In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean as discussed between our representatives at the meeting in Oslo on 15 and 16 October 2007 at the level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.[21]

Thus, the law of the sea was the framework used to move ahead with the development of cooperation networks in the Arctic. Yet, this meeting will be forever notable for excluding indigenous peoples from the table. The Declaration also emphasised the need to develop safety protocol:

> [t]he increased use of Arctic waters for tourism, shipping, research, and

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[20] Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 89.

[21] Illulissat Declaration, "The Illulissat Declaration," (Ilulissat, Greenland: Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008). http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf

> resource development also increases the risk of accidents and therefore the need to further strengthen search and rescue capabilities and capacity around the Arctic Ocean to ensure an appropriate response from states to any accident. Cooperation, including on the sharing of information, is a prerequisite for addressing these challenges. We will work to promote safety of life at sea in the Arctic Ocean, including through bilateral and multilateral arrangements between or among relevant states.

Two years later, on March 29, 2010, another meeting was called by the Canadian minister of foreign affairs, Lawrence Canon. The United States, the Russian Federation, Denmark, and Norway were invited to discuss Arctic Ocean governance in Chelsea, Québec. This raised the politically sensitive spectre of another meeting that ignored the Arctic Council. Indigenous leader Bill Erasmus, the international chair of the Arctic Athabascan Council, criticized the event: "It makes no sense for us to be included in the Arctic Council but excluded in meetings of the five Arctic Ocean states."[22] U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton followed suit: "Significant international discussions on Arctic issues should include those who have legitimate interests in the region. And I hope the Arctic will always showcase our ability to work together, not create new divisions." Clinton understood the Arctic Council as an "architecture for international cooperation that is inclusive and transparent."

My argument is that the Arctic resource races and international law based misinterpretations of sovereignty lead to an eclipse of the unique ideas discussed earlier in this dissertation, including those ideas that underpin the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and the social movements that brought about the Nunavut Territory. The comments by Hillary Clinton are especially important to consider in this light because they seem to recognize the importance of these indigenous movements via the Arctic Council in the designation of indigenous peoples as "permanent participants" (discussed in the next chapter). This enables a recognition

[22] Arctic Athabascan Council, "AAC Calls Upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Include Arctic Indigenous Peoples in Arctic Summit," (Whitehorse, Yukon: 2010).

of the importance of the Arctic as a non-normative political space that values the voices of indigenous peoples. We will now briefly consider how these voices as "non-state actors" came to be.

THE LEGITIMACY QUESTION AND CRISIS

Alongside the high-level geopolitical debates about overlapping claims in particular areas and the status of geopolitical identities, there have been many indigenous questions raised since the 1970s by those who call the Arctic *home* or, more technically, a homeland.[23] The prospects of oil and gas exploration have raised the issue of homeland, as Berger's 1977 report demonstrated in such a persuasive way.[24] Questions about who is a *legitimate* actor in the context of geopolitical states fit broadly into the ongoing "legitimation crisis" that sociologists, lawyers, and philosophers have described in many Western nations since the end of the Second World War.[25] For instance, economic crises usually emerge as a consequence of the need for continual growth of the capitalist system and when "the interest of acting groups collide and place in question the social integration of society."[26] In other words, when social integration problems emerge a society seems "out of joint." Hannah Arendt argues that discontent could lead to revolution "when, in the modern age and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent in the human condition."[27] What do we do with those who refuse to accept the status quo as being *good enough*? What about those movements that seek something more from the stagnant postpolitical, neoliberal consensus in which we live? Indigenous movements have shown us what this sort of dissatisfaction can look like, and Zellen

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[23] The concept of the homeland is developed in Nuttall, *Arctic Homeland: Kinship, Community and Development in Northwest Greenland*. On the Arctic environmental movement see: Mark Nuttall, *Protecting the Arctic: Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Survival*, ed. Roy Ellen, (London: Routledge, 2005). One of the most authoritative books on the legitimacy crisis in the political development of the Northwest Territories is painstakingly outlined in: Mark Dickerson. *Whose North?: Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992.

[24] Berger, "Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, Vol 1-2."

[25] See Habermas on the complexity of this question in: Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975 [1973]). See also the theorization of these debates in the current neo-liberal context in Wendy Brown, "With Reason on Our Side," *Theory & Event* 11, no. 4 (2008).

[26] Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, 30.

[27] Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977 [1963]), 22.

has argued that as a consequence there really is the possibility of the emergence of Inuit backlash, even "Inuit fundamentalism". He writes, provocatively:

> It is clear that Inuit leaders have become less distinguishable from their non-Inuit colleagues as they assume power. But if the people they represent, and their values, remain largely traditional, there is potential for a backlash against them. When coupled with the poverty of the Arctic coastal communities, the alienation felt in post-land claims settlement areas—which widens the gulf between the rich and poor in the north by creating corporate elites subsidized by public funds and rounded by a sea of poverty and despair—and the social dislocation experienced by youth caught between the world of their elders and the world of the white man, the concept of Inuit fundamentalism is not so farfetched after all.[28]

However far-fetched these conclusions might seem, challenges of this sort have helped to spawn movements to reconsider how to cognitively map the Arctic as an unbounded space. Ongoing and at times radical challenges to the exclusivity of the system of states have raised exciting political questions of "indigeneity" in Western democracies in which colonialism has simply been replaced by neocolonialism.[29] Waziyatawin opens her essay with an observation: "[w]hat we are experiencing is the endgame of empire – the time when Earth can no longer feed the rapacious appetite of imperial powers or support the paradigm of unlimited growth (69). The author argues that this comes at no surprise to Indigenous Peoples who "have all witnessed the destructiveness of this society within our homelands". Likewise, in Karena Shaw's view, indigenous peoples are continually treated in political theory like children, or as beings "outside" of political forms such as sovereignty or rigorous theories of individuality and collectivity.[30] The abuse of indigenous rights became predictable when "Indians became a part of the territory,

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[28] Barry Zellen, *On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty*, 90.
[29] Waziyatawin, "The Paradoxes of Indigenous Resurgence at the End of Empire," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 68-85.
[30] Karena Shaw, *Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political* (New York: Routledge, 2008). Shaw links the changing conditions of politics today to the Enlightenment debates on sovereignty after Hobbes.

another aspect of the landscape the settlers had to confront and subdue as part of the building of their nation […] democratic sovereignty is connected to civilization and [has] a specific relation to territory." (43) Movements to resist this sort of violent appropriation of land and identity – including conventional abstract understandings of sovereignty in which indigenous peoples are treated like immature beings in need of socialization – quite often surface out of local concerns about whether indigenous peoples can find the means to develop autonomy and even self-sufficiency in the context of a widely accepted and increasingly globalized world.[31] Ambiguous terms that are with us in the 21st century, such as "multiculturalism" and "hybridity," have not helped the cause of understanding racial and cultural differences; in fact terms such as these only seem to open the melting pot to include more and more groups in society accompanied by an erasure of difference as such (the idea, for example, that we are all "Canadian" or "American" or "Danish"). So, if hybridity is on the agenda for discussion in regards to indigenous identity, it very well needs to be a critical discussion that avoids the well-documented problems of the melting pot society.

Since contact and the ensuing explicit colonial policies throughout the better part of the 20th century, it is possible that the Canadian state and other international actors have become *too close for comfort*. As Saskia Sassen argues, globalization enables "local political actors to enter international arenas that were once exclusive to national states."[32] The indigenous perception in the Arctic seems to be something like the following: the geopolitical agendas and high-level international interests, such as the Ilulissat Declaration, have all-too-easily ignored local indigenous human rights and popular social movements. Indigenous inhabitants are often called "nonstate actors" or, even more reductively, as part of some amorphous "civil society."

In this respect, indigenous movements in the Arctic seek to answer questions

[31] For example, there is a tension between the local and global in the following texts: Mary Simon, "Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009); Patricia A.L. Cochran, "A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic," (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009); Heather N. Nicol, "Reframing Sovereignty: Indigenous Peoples and Arctic States," *Political Geography* 29, no. 2 (2010); Zellen, *On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty*.
[32] Sassen, Saskia, *A Sociology of Globalization*. London: W.W Norton & Company, 2007, 190.

about what it means to be a nonstate actor, and what sorts of politicization and responsibility this requires. These movements have developed steadily at least since the 1970s and have indeed fought to introduce alternative ways of representing those whose interests are being served-up on the geopolitical stage. The Arctic social movements of our time are intent on collaboration with other indigenous peoples around the world through the discourse of indigenous human rights, such as the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Human Rights (UNDRIP) and are decidedly at odds with the exclusive nature of "rare" geopolitical actors. This has the possibility to open spaces for collaboration, cooperation, and conflict. States are rare because not just any agent can attain the status of "state actor." When "the state" is viewed from the perspective of recent indigenous social and political movements—the exclusive nature of the system of states is seen as a persistent conservative force that carries with it significant baggage in the form of economic policy and social theoretical assumptions. As Zuckerman usefully suggested, "An explosion of nonstate actors populating the 'global civil society' called for subordinating state authority to cosmopolitan values and international human rights regimes. States themselves willfully surrendered authority to international institutions like the EU, NAFTA, [and the] WTO."[33]

As this suggests, we should not neglect the fact that there are also other "nonstate actors" of a distinctly neoliberal persuasion that rival and successfully limit the sovereignty of the state.[34] In the European context, philosopher Étienne Balibar has alluded to the new international situation as one of "non state statism" in an attempt to define the neoliberal era more broadly.[35] In this situation, the conservative norms of state sovereignty stay—somehow—intact and unified throughout the legitimation crisis, while being continually limited and often undermined by seemingly limitless neoliberal "governance" and the hegemony of the global market.[36] Balibar writes:

> Perhaps we could suggest that what characterizes the experience of the

[33] Ian Zuckerman, "Sovereignty in the 21st Century" (Columbia University, 2005).
[34] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[35] Étienne Balibar, "At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation." *European Journal of Social Theory* 13 (2010): 315-22.
[36] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

> world of globalization in which we find ourselves today, a world both virtually common and deeply divided among incompatible representations of the sense of history, is a new intensity of this overlapping or indecision of the relationship between war and translation, more generally power and discourse. This would come also, on the side of war, from the fact that war has been immersed in a much more general economy of global violence, which is not less but more murderous, and in fact includes permanent aspects of extermination. Ethnocide or culture wars are part of this economy.[37]

The context of the culture war is neoliberalism itself. David Harvey notes: "[t]he assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking, and it has long dominated the U.S. stance toward the rest of the world."[38] Harvey reminds us here that the neoliberalization of the world is simultaneously one of Americanization and, we might presume McDonaldization, in which all things—ideas, natural resources, traditions, laws, languages, authority, sovereignty, body parts—become commodities to be bought and sold on global markets. The motto is the following: if it can be commodified, it can be sold. The trend to marketization has generated inequality like never before: "Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the whole project […] neoliberalization was from the very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class power" (16). The main point to bear in mind is that "[n]eoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite." (19)

What happens in one region deeply affects other places in a predictable chain of events[39] (concerns related to the Gulf of Mexico after British Petroleum's

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[37] Étienne Balibar, "At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation." See also: Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market*. New York: New Press, 1999.
[38] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 7.
[39] Nils Aarsaether, Asbjorn Roiseland, and Synnove Jenssen, eds., *Practicing Local Governance: Northern Perspectives* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2008), 4. See also: Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 63-5.

"gusher" in the summer of 2010 comes to mind). The author of the popular book "Who Owns the Arctic?" admits that the title of his book is not the important question to ask. Instead, he would ask, as a Canadian nationalist, "Are we, as a country, up to the task?"[40] He concludes that:

> The ultimate collective action problem is "the tragedy of the commons." With hundreds of governments, thousands of stateless transnational corporations and billions of consumers embroiled in a fossil-based economy, opportunities abound for pursuing one's own gain at the expense of the common good. This makes stabilizing the atmosphere the most improbable cooperation exercise ever attempted by humankind. Yet there is no Plan B, no alternative Planet to which we can collectively decamp. We simply have to cooperate (128).

Byers continues: The Arctic "is on the front lines of the greatest crisis ever to have threatened this, our fragile Spaceship Earth." (130) These sorts of questions become urgent in the context of global warming.[41] As a consequence of its rising importance, the Arctic has often been represented through powerful metaphors that are often portrayed as explanations in themselves. For example, the "canary in the mine shaft" metaphor for an Arctic warming warning refers to the practise of placing a canary in the shaft of a coal mine to take the brunt of any toxic fumes unleashed by the digging. When the canary stopped singing, the minors knew it was time to leave the shaft. The Arctic canary is often represented as the position of indigenous peoples or beacons of the future. These slogans tend to produce and reproduce bite-sized images of a vacant but rapidly warming Arctic but these are often short on details about how collective human action might be able to change dystopian fates.

It is in the Arctic that we see the reality of global climate change, but so far we are locked between resigned acceptance of a changing climate ("the next generation will have to tackle it") and a state of reactionary disbelief, oppositions that make for the increased possibly of information wars.[42] Instead of outlining

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[40] Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North*, 130.
[41] Oran R. Young, "The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change," *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 24 (2009).
[42] Roger Howard, "The Politics of Climate Change," *Futurist* 43, no. 6 (2009).

concrete planning for the future, we get public relations wars and panicked "actionism."[43] The reigning global ideology is that we must take action of nearly any kind, but what action might be best? And, perhaps more importantly, *who* out of all of the multitude of state and non-state actors involved is to take responsibility for action?

Myserson and Rydin have argued that political action and scientific discourse remain in separate universes: "The arguments from science and diplomacy, the new information and new practice discourse, therefore, circle each other, like the paths of two orbits around a planet, crossing at times, then passing out of sight of each other."[44] This can take "us versus them" narrative form, which promises renewed politics where there is a clear division between the good guys and the bad guys (for example, between south and north, Qallunaat versus Inuit, rural dwellers versus city dwellers, European Union versus traditional seal hunters). As Shelagh Grant writes in the massive *The Polar Imperative* (2010): "[r]ecent representations have attempted to portray the realities of Inuit life, but the impression left in the minds of most southern Canadians is still one of 'we and they.'"[45] Grant here also alludes to the historical analysis she accomplished in an earlier book, *Sovereignty or Security.* Zellen engages this authoritative text and notes that Grant recognised a crucial methodological problem or blind spot in regards to understanding the contemporary situation of the Arctic:

> The dichotomy separating internal and external dimensions of Canada's Arctic sovereignty reflects the tendency of separate levels of analysis to reify when reality requires a synthesis and an understanding of how the levels interact. The bottom line is that both theorizing about the Arctic and implementing

[43] Theodore Adorno outlines a sociological critique of "actionsim"; he writes: "Actionism", or "pseudo-activity" divorced from theory and reflection "is regressive. Under the spell of the positivity that long ago became part of the armature of ego-weakness, it refuses to reflect upon its own impotence. Those who cry 'too abstract' strenuously cultivate concretism, an immediacy that is inferior to the available theoretical means. The pseudo-praxis profits from this." Theodor W Adorno. "Marginalia to Theory and Praxis." In *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, 259-78 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 273.

[44] Myerson and Rydin as quoted in Monica Tennberg, "Climate Change and Globalization in the Arctic: Compression of Time and Space?" In *Nordic Enviornmental Social Studies Conference* (University of Turku 2003), 13.

[45] Shelagh D. Grant, *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America* (Vancouver, B.C.: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010).

> policy in the Arctic have historically succumbed to the very same levels-of-analysis problem that casts its long shadow over the entire field of international relations theory. According to Grant, northern policy thus shifts from an external preoccupation to an internal one, or from a systemic to a substemic level and back again, in response to the dynamic flux of external and internal political realities. Grant's historical analysis of sovereignty and security in the north describes and explains this intersystematic seesaw of northern policy as Ottawa shifted from one to the other.[46]

Charles Emmerson came to a similar conclusion after his work in *the Future History of the Arctic*:

> I think that the problem for policy makers is, on one level, the interest in the Arctic is unbelievably high-level. It's about grand notions of geopolitics and it's potentially quite a long way out in the future, some of the issues. But what people are actually hearing about the Arctic is tremendously local, it's about settlements in Alaska having to be shifted a few hundred miles because of coastal erosion. It's just very hard for policy makers and for people in general to put those two things together: what seems to be super macro, and what they're hearing, which seems really quite micro. I think that's a real intellectual challenge for policy makers in this area, and not just in the Arctic—I think that it's relevant for a lot of quite different areas in the way that people are thinking about climate change and security.[47]

What these bipolar representations often miss or render invisible is that the Inuit in Canada, although maintaining a distinct sense of identity in a regional context, are very much Canadian and do not aspire to "home-rule" as indigenous Greenlanders do. Such representations either paint the Canadian Inuit as reductively the product of an "empty," pristine Arctic, or as outsiders in the Canadian federal system who are constantly making politicised demands for increased inclusion (few understand

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[46] Barry Scott Zellen, *Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), 10.

[47] Christine Partemore, "5 Questions with Someone Interesting: Charles Emmerson," *CNAS.org* (2010), http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2010/07/5-questions-someone-interesting-charles-emmerson.html.

that Inuit are Canadian; they are often described as "neighbours"). Sovereignty (under the system of states) and security (to demonstrate historical occupation) become the ever-revolving doors of Arctic policy and too often Inuit perspectives are lost. The "parallax view" of the Arctic offers two sides of the same Arctic coin in which no neutral perspective is possible. The desire for gain in the Arctic has a long history and has important continuities in the present: "Since the age of Martin Frobisher, the search for gold or other valuable resources had attracted countless adventurers to the Arctic Islands. This time [the 21st Century], however, it was not gold but oil and gas that inspired a new generation of fortune hunters to lay claim to vast tracts of land and offshore waters."[48]

In summary, my perspective is that the Arctic is many things. It is a multiplicity as a space of government, science, politics, domestic and international law, a homeland for indigenous peoples, a space of consensus and dissensus, and much more. Although new cooperation networks are clearly emerging in the post-Cold War climate there remains a perception of imminent conflict. In recent years considerable effort has been exerted by researchers and politicians to show that conflict is really cooperation in disguise in the new consensual Arctic, as we saw in regards to Griffith's position on the Northwest Passage. Fear of a military standoff in the Arctic is low but the media and academia tend to exaggerate areas of discord. The voices of indigenous peoples who strive for legitimacy in their homeland contribute to debates about the Arctic as well. Here, in the vast richness of Arctic resources we can witness the impossible becoming possible – the future of the Arctic is under the spotlight and has revealed a whole series of ways of understanding what it is.

My perspective is that no matter the scale of the topics in question we should consider the perspective of those indigenous peoples who live in the Arctic and have done so for centuries. As I have argued, the indigenous perspective should be included in everything from considerations of the urbanization of Iqaluit, to the geopolitics of the Northwest Passage, to the epistemological debates about what sustains recent preoccupations about the Arctic and the resources it is supposed to

[48] Grant, *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*, 337.

contain. My argument is that the best possible way for Canada to assert its claims to Arctic sovereignty would be by better supporting those who occupy the north, including support of the land claims, and go the distance towards actualizing de facto sovereignty. It is for this reason that I am suspicious of opportunistic – or neo-colonial – efforts to exploit the resources of the north with little consideration of the wishes of local inhabitants.

CHAPTER 6: ARCTIC CRISIS, ARCTIC ECOLOGY

> Just as the Neo-Atlantic [warming] phase led to a cultural shift in the Inuit world a thousand years ago, the latest physical warming in the Arctic coincides with a new set of changes in the Inuit sociocultural environment. What is different is that rather than relating to the direct occupation of the region, this latest change is the result of extensive environmental re-evaluation of the Arctic and the ecological role of Inuit within it by our [southern] industrialized culture. This new way of thinking is an outgrowth of, first, a new, if incomplete, awareness that the Arctic is as environmental sensitive as any other part of the world ecosystem and, second, the 'discovery' that the Arctic has become as accessible and therefore as 'knowable,' as any other part of the earth.[1]

This chapter addresses two case studies involving the Arctic natural and social world to help bring to life the theoretical intervention of the previous chapter. By focusing on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the European Union ban on the importation of seal products, the analysis is capable of shedding light on the concrete aspects of globalization and the "unintended side effects", as Oran Young describes it, of market-based economic relations.[2] The chapter also highlights some of my fieldwork in social spaces such as a fur fashion show and the cooking of seal in Nuuk. These were important experiences that helped me to imagine what it is like to reside in a dynamic Arctic urban environment, such as that offered to me in Nuuk. This provides direct insight into imagining what Iqaluit and Nunavut are in proper sociological context and what they might possibly be in the future if these places take insights from Greenland. This is to take serious how spatialization is lived by how social actors who interact with the spaces in which they reside and work. Here, sociologists can learn to look at

[1] George Wenzel, "Global 'Warming,' the Arctic and Inuit: Some Sociocultural Implications." *The Canadian Geographer* 36, no. 1 (1992), 78.
[2] Oran R. Young, "The Politics of Animal Rights: Preservationists Vs. Consumptive Users in the North," *Etudes/ Inuit/ Studies* 13, no. 1 (1989): 43-59.

specific sites or arenas such as schools, coffee shops, dance floors, and museums as places where newcomers and well-established residents can meet and share stories. These are *social worlds* impacted by politics and the increased mobility of society given globalization processes. The social events I attended, performed for a general, public audience, are meant to show how integral sealing is for Inuit identity and thus provides an articulation between theoretical matters such as colonization, or "Totalization" (Tester and Irniq, 2008), and concrete matters of social struggle in the circumpolar Arctic. Inuit culture has been impacted by its relation to capitalist economies and has shown remarkable adaptations such as the development of an extensive market for hunting and artistic products in various parts of "the south". The events surrounding the seal ban provide unique examples of Inuit modernization. Inuit leaders have argued has this modernization process has been unduly harmed by the ban itself.

ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT

The Arctic is studied by examining traditional knowledge and by employing modern science in the context of a plethora of environmental and social crises. In the first part of this chapter I consider a rich and lengthy example of such a research-based call for action: the Arctic Council's 1042 page *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (2005). As bold as it is beautiful, combining the excellence of empirical scientific research, the deep historical insights and rootedness of traditional knowledge, and the aesthetics of stunning photos of the Arctic, it clearly alerted the world that the Arctic environment and social world is quickly changing.[3] The Arctic Council is a "high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for protecting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States." Its membership includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America. The Arctic Council was officially (and boldly) created in Ottawa on September 19, 1996, as a body with a variety of declarations and mandates, most important

[3] Annika E Nilsson, "A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment." Linkoping University, 2007.

among these is the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities as Permanent Participants.[4] It was designed to reassess the situation of the international Arctic from an environmental perspective after the Cold War. In the Arctic Council, indigenous peoples have gained a secure seat at the table to debate issues that occur in their backyards; they are thus able to assess research being conducted in the Arctic. The Arctic Council addresses all matters to do with the sustainable development of the Arctic except, famously, issues related to military security.[5] The Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (1996) affirms "our commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, including recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of indigenous peoples and their communities." (Ibid.)

The Arctic Council has aided in collaborative efforts between scientific researchers and indigenous peoples to produce some innovative publications and results.[6] Over the past decade, the volume of these publications has been impressive, and the Arctic Council has received much public attention. Yet, what the Arctic Council advances by way of results in the current context is a viable question. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) is now over seven years old, and is an interesting document to read in light of recent changes that have supported the ACIA's rather alarming findings. The ACIA itself was established at the Barrow Ministerial Meeting in October 2000 to "evaluate and synthesize knowledge on climate variability and change and increased ultraviolet radiation, and support policy-making processes and the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); it is further requested that the assessment address environmental, human health, social, cultural, and economic impacts and consequences, including policy recommendations" (ACIA, Policy Statement).

The ACIA has come to represent the best collaborative efforts of the Arctic Council which brings together different parties through this nongovernmental

[4] Arctic Council, "About the Arctic Council," (2007), http://arctic-council.org/article/about.
[5] Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," (1996), http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/ottawa_decl_1996-3..pdf.
[6] See: Timo Koivurova and David L. Vanderzwaag. "The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects." *UBC Law Review* 40, no. 1 (2008); Timo Koivurova, E.J. Molenaar, and David L. VanderZwaag, "Canada, the EU, and Arctic Ocean Governance: A Tangled and Shifting Seascape and Future Directions." *Journal of Transnational Law & Policy* 18, no. 2 (2009): 247-88.

institution (which of course relies on government and other funding). A remarkable aspect is the "extremely high degree of consensus" contained within the ACIA.[7] Further to this, the ACIA attempted to make the material congruent within the scientific community, expressing technical data in plain language comprehensible to a nonspecialist audience interested in the Arctic and climate change. In short, the ACIA made climate change more than a mere hypothesis: it demonstrated in painstaking detail how Arctic inhabitants and animals are experiencing climate change as a daily reality. This was a remarkable feat considering the 21st century debates that raged with pointless polemics between those who believed and those who denied that climate change is real.[8] Nilsson, in her impressive dissertation regarding the scientific endeavour involved in creating the ACIA, argues that: "As scientific knowledge becomes increasingly important for political decisions, we need a better understanding of how this knowledge is generated", including "structures of international cooperation" in this regard.[9]

The synthesis document that accompanied the ACIA was written to achieve some sense of the links between decision-making and knowledge generation. The document is comprised of aesthetic images and short, accessible plain-language paragraphs that evaluated the current environmental situation in the Arctic. The Arctic's warning of climate change is portrayed using the metaphor of the "canary in the mine shaft" that warns the miners of danger and thereby presents what Griffiths and Bravo have called a *crisis narrative*.[10] The abundance of crisis narratives attributed to climate change rivals that attributed to nuclear catastrophe. So far we have not been able to reverse climate change and the chance we will accomplish that in the future is small considering the severe political and sociological deadlocks inherent in the human condition (Are we going to stop

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[7] Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?" *Canadian Military Journal* Winter (2006), 28.
[8] Roger Howard. "The Politics of Climate Change." *Futurist* 43, no. 6 (2009): 24-27.
[9] Annika E Nilsson, "A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment," 2.
[10] Franklyn Griffiths, "Camels in the Arctic? Climate Change as the Inuit See It: 'from the inside out'." *The Walrus*, November 2007 URL: http://walrusmagazine.com/printerFriendly.php?ref=2007.11-arctic-global-warming; Michael T Bravo. "Voices from the Sea Ice: The Reception of Climate Impact Narratives." Journal of Historical Geography 35, no. 2 (2009), 274.

driving our cars or flying in airplanes? Are we going to stop harvesting the tarsands? – these questions speak to crucial political deadlocks of our time). As John Urry has argued, carbon emissions were not a global concern until relatively recently and, interestingly, have been all-together ignored by the sociological canon, even by those explicitly working on the sociology of industrialization.[11] The ACIA preface opens with the following warning:

> Earth's climate is changing, with the global temperature now rising at a rate unprecedented in the experience of modern human society. These climate changes, including increases in ultraviolet radiation, are being experienced particularly intensely in the Arctic. Because the Arctic plays a special role in global climate, these changes in the Arctic will also affect the rest of the world. It is thus essential that decision makers have the latest and best information available regarding changes in the Arctic and their global implications.[12]

The ACIA is a "point in time evaluation of the existing knowledge base" of various scientific approaches to understanding the effects of climate change on the Arctic (chapter 1, p. 7). Furthermore, it uses "indigenous and local knowledge" to "complement" the scientific data. In this sense, indigenous and local knowledge is understood broadly "to include observations, interpretations, concerns, and responses of indigenous peoples." (9) One statement that caught my attention follows:

> The sea ice presently covering the Arctic Ocean and neighboring seas is highly sensitive to temperature changes in the air above and the ocean below. Over recent decades, Arctic watchers detected a slow shrinkage of the ice pack, suggestive of the initial influences of global warming. In recent years, the rate of [ice] retreat has accelerated, indicating that the "canary" is

[11] John Urry discusses the emergence of the term "spaceship earth" during the rise of the environmental movement in post-World War II society resulting from the publication of the first photograph of earth from space, "the Blue Marble," taken by *Apollo 17*. Unfortunately, in his otherwise impressive book concerned with the social aspects of climate change, Urry does not mention the ACIA and his discussion of the Arctic is minimal. John Urry, *Climate Change and Society* (Boston, MA: Polity, 2011).

[12] ACIA, *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), iii.

in trouble.[13]

Calling the Arctic a "canary in a coal mine" (a reference to the canary as an early warning system for the presence of toxic gases in coal mine shafts), reveals the intimate connections between the Arctic and sub-Arctic with other regions of the globe.[14] Recognition of "Arctic environmental issues … [with] complex social, economic, and political connections" has helped to bring the Arctic to the forefront of the globalization and climate change debates. Mark Nuttall continues: "[b]y pointing to these complex processes and how they affect the circumpolar north, social scientists often use the Arctic as an example when driving home the message that environmental problems are global rather than regional concerns."

Although the ACIA message is truly global in the sense that what happens in the Arctic affects the entire world, the ACIA does not mention the word "capitalism" and thus does not violate the neoliberal taboo against criticising capitalism (in some ways this speaks to the efficacy of capitalism). The risk here is that the ACIA accepts that capitalism and ecological stewardship can exist side by side in the popularity attached to the concept of "sustainable development." Capitalism can indeed be imagined to exploit catastrophe, as depicted in Naomi Klein's best-seller *The Shock Doctrine* (2008). Commenting on Klein's work, Slavoj Žižek observes: "one can be sure that Klein's shock doctrine also holds for ecological issues: far from endangering capitalism, a widespread ecological catastrophe may well invigorate it, opening up new and hitherto unheard-of spaces for capitalist investment."[15] This is what we might say is happening in the Arctic today: climate change has been seen as an opportunity for business (to discover new minerals, to harvest oil and gas, to ship for more months of the year through sea ice, and so on) and not as a life-shattering phenomenon that endangers everyone and everything on the planet. However, this misses the entire set of

[13] This is mentioned in the ACIA overview report that converts the full document into smaller files. Hassol, *Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, 24.
[14] Mark Nuttall, *Protecting the Arctic: Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Survival* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 27.
[15] Slavoj Žižek, *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce* (New York: Verso, 2009), 19; Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism,* (Toronto, Ontario: Vintage Canada, 2008).

issues attached to "tipping points", "system change", "catastrophe", "winner and losers" and other grave issues of how to represent the future in the context of transformative environmental change.[16]

The idea that science and traditional knowledge are both legitimate knowledge forms, and even complementary to one another, is implicit in the ACIA. The ACIA reminds readers that they are in the 21st century and knowledge forms are evolving – there is a push for alternative meaning-generating systems such as indigenous knowledge. The urgency of present developments demands nothing less. Yet, other than the chapters on traditional knowledge (most clearly in Chapter 3, "the Changing Arctic: Indigenous Perspectives," and Chapter 12, "Hunting, Herding, Fishing, and Gathering: Indigenous Peoples and Renewal Resource Use in the Arctic") but also scattered throughout other chapters, the perspectives of the humanities and the social sciences seem to be almost wholly absent. Is traditional knowledge now part of the social sciences, for instance? It is notable that the policy documented by the Arctic Council outlines some of the political implications of the report. The Council issued the following statements by way of what it calls "mitigation":

> Mindful of their countries' share in total global greenhouse gas emissions, SAOs [Senior Arctic Officials] … recommend to Ministers that the member states:
>
> *Consider* the findings of the ACIA and other relevant studies in implementing their commitments under the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] and other agreements.
>
> *Adopt* climate change mitigation strategies across relevant sectors. These strategies should address net greenhouse gas emissions and limit them in the long term to levels consistent with the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC, integrating mitigation and adaption measures, building on partnerships, and, where synergies are possible, addressing other social, economic, and

[16] Mark Nuttall, "Tipping Points and the Human World: Living with Change and Thinking About the Future." *Ambio* 41, no. 96 (2012): 96-105; Oran R. Young, "Arctic Tipping Points: Governance in Turbulent Times." *Ambio* 41, no. 1 (2012): 75-84.

environmental issues.

Promote the development and adoption of appropriate energy sources, uses, technologies, and efficiencies. The International Partnership for Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) and The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Form (CSLF), together with initiatives to promote renewable energy production and more efficient energy use, are examples of relevant initiatives.

Adopt policies and programmes that conserve and enhance carbon sinks and reservoirs in accordance with the principles of sustainable development. (ACIA, Policy Document)



Figure 30: ACIA Sea Ice Change

On these bases, there has been a push for institutions such as the Arctic Council to provide at least a provisional bridge between the different epistemologies of science and traditional knowledge, and to make policy prescriptions on that basis to member states. In the opening lines of chapter 1 called "Introduction to the report," lead authors Henry Huntington and Gunter Wells (and contributing authors, Elizabeth Bush, Terry V. Callaghan, Vladimir M. Kattsov, Mark Nuttall) argue that the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* "is the

first comprehensive, integrated assessment of climate change and ultraviolet (UV) radiation across the entire Arctic region."[17] As this denotes, the scope was truly the "entire Arctic region" and it did so by dividing the Arctic roughly into four regions using a sectoral principle from the North Pole. The context for the ACIA is explained broadly as follows:

> In the Arctic there are few cities and many rural communities. Indigenous communities throughout the Arctic depend on the land, lakes and rivers, and the sea for food and income, especially for the vital social and cultural importance of traditional activities. The cultural diversity of the Arctic is already at risk, and this may be exacerbated by the additional challenge posed by climate change. The impacts of climate change will occur within the context of the societal changes and pressures that arctic indigenous residents are facing in their rapid transition to the modern world. The imposition of climate change from outside the region can also be seen as an ethical issue in which people in one area suffer the consequences of actions beyond their control and in which beneficial opportunities may accrue to those outside the region rather than to those within (4).

Later in the chapter we read: "[t]he ACIA responds directly to the request of the Arctic Council for an assessment that can provide the scientific basis for policies and actions." (7) Eventually it is argued that:

> examining resilience, adaptation, and vulnerability offers a powerful means of understanding at least some of the dynamics and complexity associated with human responses to environmental and other changes. As with changes to the natural environment, examining societal dynamics can be achieved through models, observations, and the use of analogues. These scientific approaches can be complemented by another source of information; indigenous and local knowledge. This assessment makes use of such knowledge to an unprecedented degree in an exercise of this kind … Indigenous residents of the Arctic have for millennia relied on their knowledge of the environment in order to provide food and other materials

[17] ACIA, *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, 2.

> and to survive its harsh conditions … The review of documented information by the communities concerned is a crucial step in establishing whether the information contained in reports about indigenous and local knowledge reliably reflects community perspectives. This step of community review offers a similar degree of confidence to that provided by the peer-review process for scientific literature. (9)

TK, or indigenous knowledge, is part of the review process, like peer review in the university system. The chapter defines indigenous knowledge cautiously: "Many terms are used to refer to the type of knowledge referred to in this assessment as 'indigenous knowledge.' Among the terms in use in the literature are traditional knowledge, traditional ecological knowledge, local knowledge (often applied to the knowledge of nonindigenous persons), traditional knowledge and wisdom, and a variety of specific terms for different peoples, such as Saami knowledge or Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit. The use of indigenous knowledge, however, is not seen as another 'discipline' or 'method' of understanding the Arctic environment, wildlife, and inhabitants. Rather, it is represented most succinctly as 'using more than one approach wherever possible.'" (10) So, we do see a representation of two separate modes of knowledge generation—science and indigenous or local knowledge—but there appears to be recognition that these separate branches of knowledge can be complementary to one another and the common pursuit of understanding the Arctic environment better and for outlining solid policy prescriptions based on collaborative research.[18]

[18] It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the following follow-up reports to the ACIA requested by the Arctic Council in 2008 called the SWIPA (Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic) report. However, it is significant that the main report claims: "In the period since the completion of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004 (ACIA, 2005), the Arctic has experienced its highest temperatures of the instrumental record, even exceeding the warmth of the 1930s and 1940s. Recent paleo-reconstructions, while subject to uncertainties in the methodology and spatial representativeness, also show that Arctic summer temperatures have been higher in the past few decades than at any time in the past 2000 years" (pp.2-3). See: AMAP. "Arctic Climate Issues 2011: Changes in Arctic Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost." SWIPA 2011 Overview Report, 2012; AMAP. "Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA): Climate Change and the Cryosphere." 538. Oslo, Norway: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 2011.

The language of the ACIA is conciliatory in tone: it points to problems but does not point fingers in terms of major drivers of the issues under discussion. Arguably due to the lack of a critical political position in the document (which is perhaps a space of discord within the large ACIA community of scientists and writers), it becomes possible to see climate change in the Arctic, a major ecological and truly global problem, as an *opportunity* (and not a crisis) to explore and exploit formerly untapped locations for oil and gas, as well as other precious metals—confirming Klein's hypothesis in *The Shock Doctrine* (2008).[19] Moreover, it appears to be the case that climate change has been used as a legitimating reason to implement postmodern technologies (such as satellite systems, military technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and communications infrastructure) to respond to the most recent post-Cold War security fears that occasionally flare up. A quickly rising post-1989 Russia and the hegemony of China, more broadly,[20] has impacted Arctic developments. The shock and awe strategy of "crisis exploitation" has been used in the Arctic for many years—such as during the ever-protracted Cold War[21]—and during 20–21st century concerns about global warming. This is not only because of political pressures associated with rising to the challenge of climate change but also because of the pursuits of science itself which purports to outline secure foundations for action without explicitly indicating what these actions might be. As Koivurova, Molenaar, and VanderZwaag argued in their article, even though the Arctic Council has been "fairly resistant to change" it has become an important mechanism after the ACIA about raising awareness about climate change both inside the Arctic Council and for bringing about "more interest in the work of the Council" from powerful global states such as China.[22] In this respect,

[19] Klein argued that the U.S. invasion of Iraq, itself not sanctioned by the United Nations, used a "shock and awe" strategy to accomplish its goals to establish a "free market paradise" in the Middle East.
[20] Giovanni Arrighi, "States, Markets, and Capitalism, East and West," *Positions: east asia cultures critique* 15, no. 2 (2007).
[21] For the American aspects of creating this tabula rasa see: Matthew Farish, *The Contours of America's Cold War* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
[22] Timo Koivurova, E.J. Molenaar, and David L. VanderZwaag. "Canada, the EU, and Arctic Ocean Governance: A Tangled and Shifting Seascape and Future Directions.", 261.

the strategic role of the Arctic Council may be expanded to deal with new global realities, such as the possibility of developing an international treaty approach, if there was ever such a will to do so.[23] "All the discussions over possible reformation in the council seem to end up in dealing with cosmetic changes within the accepted structure rather than revisiting the governance fundaments in a critical manner" (153).

The ACIA (and arguably the Arctic Council itself) is hamstrung by social and political deadlocks, as I argue in this chapter. Recommendations are left at the general level: lower greenhouse gases, lower carbon emissions, reduce pollution, and so forth. Yet, how do we get there? The Arctic is consistently seen as empty and devoid of people *as such* (this how it is ontologically constituted), let alone people with significant and lasting traditions that will also be affected by these changes. Recent studies have highlighted how climate change is affecting the people of Nunavut, particularly in regards to the results of the ACIA.[24]

Bringing in the dynamics of local political struggles might help. Griffiths perhaps put it best in his influential article called "Camels in the Arctic"; after visiting dozens of former Distant Early Warning (DEW) communities across the entire Canadian Arctic, in an exercise (or form of writing) he calls "community-based climate change reporting", he writes:

> last on the Inuit wish list is to be cast in the role of early warners, because their culture and identity are being undone by climate change, which is to say by others. Such a 'role' may therefore be resisted. Among Inuit, some are indeed skeptical about climate change. Others are deeply troubled. Mary Simon, current president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, has captured the sense of apprehension by saying that Inuit are "the canary in the global coal mine," a familiar reference to miners having caged canaries on hand to warn

[23] Timo Koivurova, "Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance." *Polar Record* 46, no. 2 (2009), 152-53.
[24] James Ford, Tristan Pearce, Barry Smit, Johanna Wandel, Mishak Allurut, Kik Shappa, Harry Ittusujurat, and Kevin Qrunnut. "Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Arctic: The Case of Nunavut, Canada." *Arctic* 60, no. 2 (2006): 150-66; James D Ford, Barry Smit, Johanna Wandel, Mishak Allurut, Kik Shappa, Harry Ittusarjuat, and Kevin Qrunnut. "Climate Change in the Arctic: Current and Future Vulnerability in Two Inuit Communities in Canada." *Geographical Journal* 174, no. 1 (2008): 45-62.

> of the lethal presence of coal gas. What's not so familiar is the comment, made to me in Iqaluit by a non-Inuk, that down south the miners moved only when they saw the canaries were dead.[25]

Yet, Griffiths found that climate change is more of a political reality in the south than it is in the north: "They are telling us different things. A good many Southerners, hearing, seeing, and believing as we do that the Arctic is in the midst of a meltdown, might therefore wonder who's got it wrong: we down here or they on the [new climate DEW] line up there."[26]

Similarly, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council from 2002-6, argued that the results of the ACIA should not be received without reservation but still should be seen as a crucial factually-based aspect of generating sound public policy: "Together we are putting a human face on climate change as [sic] an issue that easily gets lost in technicalities of emission trading schemes."[27] Perhaps most importantly, she celebrated the collaborative efforts of the ACIA to bring together scientific and indigenous knowledge while recognizing that both knowledge forms are evolving through time in the face of serious public policy pressures. Most importantly, she concluded that: "[t]he ACIA should help us all to understand that climate change is about people, about cultures, and about the future that we want for our children."

ICY GEOPOLITICS

In a short paper called "Icy Geopolitics" (2008), geographer Klaus Dodds argues

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[25] Franklyn Griffiths, "Camels in the Arctic? Climate Change as the Inuit See It: 'from the inside out'."

[26] For more on this form of travel writing climate change and differences between northern and southern understandings of the politics of environmental change, see: Ed Struzik, *The Big Thaw: Travels in the Melting North*. Wiley, 2009. Also see my review of the book in Barret Weber, "The Big Thaw: Adventures in the Vanishing Arctic." *Polar Geography* 35, no. 2 (2012): 181-3.

[27] Sheila Watt-Cloutier, "Welcoming Address Given by Ms. Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference at the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) Symposium." Reykjavik, Iceland, 2004. URL: http://inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?auto_slide=&ID=275&Lang=En&Parent_ID=&current_slide_num=

that Canada "has had a long national debate about 'northern visions' and the cultural and political significance of the north."[28] After noting the broad vision that influential social scientists such as Harold Innis had of the north as an "imaginative resource" to bolster national unity, Dodds notes that in both the Canadian and Russian cases:

> expressions of ownership and associated military strategic intrigue are bound up with the relentless search for oil and gas in the northern latitudes … [i]n 2007 global warming has made the North West Passage navigable for the first time and it is likely to become a major shipping route in the coming decades not least because it allows ships to "save" thousands of nautical miles by avoiding the Panama Canal. The shrinkage of ice cover has been recorded by the European Space Agency and its Arctic Climate Impact Assessment makes for sobering reading and more importantly will have dire consequences for indigenous communities such as the Inuit and Inupiat. (5)

Dodds suggests that, given the crucial convergence of renewed territorial sovereignty claims, potential resource extraction, and the prospect of further climate changes: "[t]here are good reasons to be concerned about this unhappy coincidence of icy geopolitics, fossil fuels, and actual sea ice loss." (5) The point, more generally, is that these transformations are linked to the current political pressures of climate change and the rethinking of the previous ordering of the globe based on new geographical realities, however haunting some of the repercussions might be. In many remarkable ways, the history of the Arctic in particular remains a problem of the geopolitical *present* if not the *future*. The remoteness of the Arctic once protected it and its people and animals, but today that insularity is eroding at a rapid pace. Today, even though Canadians have limited knowledge of Canada's third coast in Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon, the future, present, and the past in the Arctic have become

[28] Klaus Dodds, "Icy Geopolitics," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26 (2008): 1-6. 3.

intermingled: the region is left at the mercy, as it was during the protracted Cold War, to the geopolitical back-and-forth of superpowers, particularly the usual suspects—the United States and Russia. Now a strongly emerging China has expressed an interest in Arctic development.[29] In the case of the latter,

> [C]hinese research remains primarily focused on how the melting Arctic will affect China's continental and oceanic environment and how in turn such changes could affect domestic agricultural and economic development. However, a small number of Chinese researchers are publicly encouraging the government to actively prepare for the commercial and strategic opportunities that a melting Arctic presents. (6)

Recent changes in the Arctic are connected broadly to pressures brought on by globalization and heightened market forces with very little opposition (the legitimacy of the market as an economic truth itself has become part of common sense). Roughly speaking, we can historically posit that these political and philosophical ideologies have continued to accelerate since the 19th century along-side the hegemony of the Industrial Revolution. The latter has evolved into what we might call "post-Industrialism" by the late 20th century and certainly spanning into the 21st century.[30]

In many advanced countries today, post-Industrialism has led at the ethical level of everyday *Lebenswelt* [life world] to what many sociologists and economists call "precarious employment," a situation in which workers are continually in search of a job. The paradoxical discourse of "sustainable development" has enjoyed a renaissance in recent years and is implicated in attempts to "make capitalism work," for example, to ensure that locals are employed in development activities. But this has not necessarily been a successful

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[29] Linda Jakobson, "China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic," *Stockholm International Peace Institute* March (2010), http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf; Michael Byers, "China Is Coming to the Arctic," *Ottawa Citizen*, March 29, 2010.

[30] For more on these topics see: Perry Anderson, *The Orgins of Postmodernity* (New York: Verso, 1998); Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Daniel Bell, *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

movement in its own right. In a sense, it has been a spectacular failure, producing a deterritorialized proletariat constantly in search of new development projects located in rural areas. In addition, the carbon emissions engendered by post-Industrialism are truly unsustainable and threaten the entire planet. Globalization and the Reagan/Thatcher project of neoliberalism have only increased the disparities between rich and poor since the late 1980s.[31] It is clear that climate changes and the consequences of modern globalization are *linked* via a common basis in advanced capitalist relations.[32] This link is a consequence of the rise of national and global markets since the 19th century that represent the liberal goal of a "free" unregulated market (even liberals will admit, however, that government involvement has always been heavily implicated).[33] Here, it is the market itself that limits growth and development, not the environment or the state or the people. If the global economic recession or "downturn" (as the elites put it[34]) of 2008 has demonstrated anything, it is that the global markets and globalization itself rely deeply on national governments (meaning tax payers) across the world to bail them out when times are tough. The problem is that this has brought about socialism for the rich and a relentless form of capitalism for everyone else.

I argue that climate change and globalization are catch phrases or ideologies in their own right that help to recognise and theorise the ongoing sociological importance of *grand narratives* after the Cold War. The Cold War previously stabilized the world between two great power blocs for 40 years after World War II and thus kept some of the major outcomes of that war in a frozen state. But since the decline of this great narrative the world is left in a difficult situation in which the old narratives do not work but still carry a certain amount of currency

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[31] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[32] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
[33] John Gray, "What Globalization Is Not," in *Gray's Anatomy: Selected Writings*, ed. John Gray (Anchor Canada, 1998), 237-40; Ha-Joon Chang, *Globalisation, Economic Development, and the Role of the State* (London: Zed Books, 2003).
[34] As Slavoj Žižek has written, one of the most "surprising things" about the 2008 financial crisis was that it was so easily viewed as an "unpredictable surprise which hit the markets out of the blue". See: Žižek. *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce*. New York: Verso, 2009, 9.

and symbolic efficiency. It is already well-known that the Cold War affected the contemporary social formation of the Arctic in dramatic ways, especially once it was widely recognised that one of the more important strengths the two great powers held in common was authority over various parts of the Arctic Ocean. As Oran Young put it, the Soviet Union and the United States eventually realized that they were neighbours in the Arctic and what followed was a grave concern to achieve securitisation or at least the semblance of it.[35]

SCIENCE AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE

Science has had a powerful role in the generation of Arctic narratives in the post-Cold war climate. It has also played an important role in both establishing a governance context of Arctic scientific knowledge, and in contributing to and influencing governance processes. As opposed to traditional local knowledge, science is an international complex of institutions and agreements that generate discourses that seek to establish certainty (while often decontextualized). However, science is often limited to merely illuminating the *unknown*. The trouble with science applications to social problems, such as those in the Arctic, is that science is first concerned with its own internal business and only second with the perspectives of those who live in the spaces in which scientific research is carried out. This creates a legitimacy problem for scientific endeavours.

Recently, sociologists such as Bruno Latour in Europe, and others such as Michael Bravo in northern studies, have established a multidisciplinary mode of study called Science, Technology, and Society (STS). Science, as understood in a multidisciplinary sense, is directly at odds with the politically charged traditional knowledge in the societies it studies. Traditional knowledge purports to "act locally" and would quite reasonably desire a modest form of science externally sanctioned to work through indigenous ethics frameworks and community

[35] Oran R. Young, "The Age of the Arctic," *Foreign Policy* 61, no. 160-179 (1985-1986). See also: Oran R. Young, *Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North* (Hanvoer: Dartmouth College University Press of New England, 1992). In the western Arctic and sub-Arctic, especially in Alaska, matters were much more dramatic and involved the proliferation of desires for a deep-sea port and spaces for nuclear warhead testing. For a detailed history of these dynamics see: Dan O'Neill, *The Firecracker Boys: H-Bombs, Inupiat Eskimos and the Roots of the Environmental Movement* (New York: Basic Books, 2007 [1994]).

consultation protocols. But science has trouble accepting a limit to its authority and meets a traditional enemy in the form of local knowledge and myth. Bravo and Sorlin, have made strides toward conceptualizing the antagonism between science and traditional knowledge perhaps better than most in the context of post-Cold War developments:

> There is no reason *a priori* to suppose that scientific narratives about geological field practices should be convincing to those outside of that "form of life," anymore than to suppose that Saami beliefs about the proper management of reindeer herds should be understood in Stockholm. […] But for scientific travelers in the field to work successfully—whether geologists, ethnologists, or missionaries—they must also carry with them narratives that lend their field practices plausibility. This is not to say that scientific travelers blindingly follow these narratives. While some grand narratives of colonization serve as regimes under which a certain knowledge production takes place, these same travellers as well as indigenous observers possess counter-narratives. In many cases, scientific travelers, while contributing to colonial science, distanced themselves from the official, hegemonic views of the state.[36]

Science is deeply embedded in Western cultures, and some interesting strains of contemporary anthropology have certainly sided explicitly with "the colonized." The main issue in these at times heated epistemological disputes is the much commented upon "gap" between traditional knowledge and science. Science in the modern period has attempted to come to terms with tradition and with researchers being in or near northern communities (foreign and familiar alike). The geological fieldwork funded by the oil industry threatens to swallow a good majority of research agendas in universities across the North America today.[37]

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[36] Bravo and Sörlin, "Narrative and Practice—an Introduction," in Bravo, Michael T., and Sverker Sörlin, eds. Narrating the Arctic: A Cultural History of Nordic Scientific Practices. (Canton, MA: Science History Publication, 2002), 21.

[37] Bruno Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998 [1984]). Michel Serres, *Le Passage Du Nord-Ouest (Hermes V)* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980).

The Arctic Climate Impact assessment is a concrete example of the ongoing spaces of consensus and conflict between science and local knowledge. It shows that neutral ground is hard to find in discussion of the current state of the Arctic environment. The ACIA tries to produce a space of consensus in this context, but, as I have pointed out, it also tended to ignore the effects of capitalism in producing environmental change (in fact, we might say, exaggerating only slightly, that this is precisely what capitalism produces). As these examples suggest, thinking about social phenomena such as science, in the first example, and Arctic sea ice changes, in the second, in relation to late capitalism running out of fuel enables what I find to be a useful reading strategy. This provides an analysis of the current situation in the Arctic that stresses the ongoing importance of contested narratives of globalization (the commodification and capitalization of the world, as Harvey and others remind us) in conjunction with truly global problem of climate change (many researchers predict that the drastic changes occurring in the Arctic today will affect the rest of the world with the same severity over the next twenty to thirty years).

The discussion will now turn to a discussion of the European Union seal ban that raises questions of the relationship between Inuit subsistence economy and governance in the Arctic. In a surprising twist, it is the Inuit that are defending the right to access the seal pelt market in EU member states and the EU that is defending its right to make decisions about how it will be governed (i.e. what it will import and export). Northern commentator Speca argues that the European justification rests "fundamentally on moral grounds" because the EU's ban is "designed at least as much to enforce a moral proscription among European consumers—and to suppress the commercial sealing industry in other countries—as it is to shield the European market from seal products."[38] Let us look now at how this heated, moral debate plays out in what has been described as one of the most important and longest standing trade disputes that has affected the north since the 1950s. In some respects, the EU seal ban that "arose in the 1950s in opposition to the industrial hunting of harp seal pups along Canada's Atlantic

[38] Anthony Speca, "Sealing (and) the Deal with Europe." *Northern Public Affairs* (2012).

coast" has affected the north even more severely than physical climatic warming has to date.[39]

THE SEAL BAN AND INUIT IDENTITY

> "Only when the ice breaks will you truly know who is your friend and who is your enemy."—Inuit Proverb

A case study that helps to get at questions about governance and traditional knowledge is contained in the European Union's decision to ban the purchase of seal-skins across Europe. Indigenous groups in Canada, and most vocally the Inuit in Nunavut and Nunavik, as we shall see, have interpreted this decision as an affront to their traditional ways of life because it effects their ability to sell seal products in the vast European market. The president of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Canada, Duane Smith, put it in the context of what would be best called the *politics of the image*:

> people in Europe are shown photographs of seals being harvested in the wild and recoil in shock at the images, and send what can only be described as "guilt money" to animal rights groups [… the Europeans] don't see the people, the communities, or the way of life they are ruining as a result of their misguided donations. They don't question the information being presented, much of it incorrect.[40]

Critical study of Inuit ways of adapting to changing sea ice conditions, climate change narratives more generally, and ongoing processes of globalization has become much more than a mere cottage industry. Inuit culture with its relatively small population of approximately 150,000 spread variably over Alaska, the Canadian Arctic, Greenland/Denmark, and Russia, is among the most intensely studied indigenous cultures in the world.[41] This is surely connected to

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[39] George Wenzel, "Global 'Warming,' the Arctic and Inuit: Some Sociocultural Implications." *The Canadian Geographer* 36, no. 1 (1992), 79.

[40] Windspeaker, "Inuit Reject Call for European Union Wide Seal Ban," *Windspeaker* 2008, 8.

[41] The deadlock between the EU and the Inuit seal hunters remains and the EU is moving ahead with its policy of banning all imports of seal products to Europe. The literature of "critical Inuit studies" that has emerged in recent years has the potential to address this conflict – or at least raise

ongoing speculation about the opening of the Arctic because of resource extraction and the expanding influence of science as a consequence of climate change discourses. In this section I investigate several of the cultural and governance implications of the European Union's long-standing and more recently publicized ban on the importation of seal products to Europe. I investigate the political stakes of such events, describe effects of the disagreement between the EU and Inuit political leaders on questions of Inuit identity and economy, and review some of the EU's justifications for the ban.

I attempt to understand the debate about the EU ban on seal products from a Canadian (so-called "southern") perspective—something perhaps controversial in itself as I heard from one informant—and from the perspective of someone who has never participated in a "traditional" seal hunt. Much information has been produced about this controversial issue in Canada and abroad, and I wish to join the debate. I outline some common narrative strategies and stories about what is at stake in issues having to do with Inuit seal hunting in the north from a public policy perspective. In this task, stepping on uncertain ice (and thereby learning about friends and enemies, as the epigraph above indicates) is inevitable, as the animal rights and anti-sealing movements today are backed by powerful public opinions, and huge resources are committed to the matter of deeming what it is morally appropriate to hunt and eat.

For those who live in the north, the ban was perceived not as an attack on Canada, and not on "Aboriginals" as one undifferentiated group, but as a threat to the possibility of the Inuit developing a viable and sustainable economy to offset

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critical awareness of it – by educating the public about the unique role that hunting and gathering societies play in the context of global politics. For example, *Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography*, edited by Stern and Stevenson, includes a long list of leading scholars in the field of Inuit Studies, as well as a exhaustive bibliography of sources in the field. The editors of this anthology argue that the political aspects of the study of culture should not be shoved under the rug, but should be registered as critical components of research with political implications, if not ambitions: "the mere identification of certain practices or dispositions as culture-specific become politically charged." (2) In the final chapter Pamela Stern testifies that the anthology was written almost as a manifesto for the promising future of Inuit studies, enabling a movement away from area studies and cultural studies ("writing culture") to a more specific focus on "critical Inuit studies." Stern notes that, among other interesting advances, Inuit now read the social science studies produced about their culture and homeland (261). This suggests the broad outlines of a project that is as ambitious as it is prescient and which might enable the "native informant" to talk back.

the high costs of living in northern communities.[42] Even with the exemption, the European Community legislation was perceived as a slight against Inuit traditions, their "way of life," a phrase that can be often found in the Inuit self-description. National Inuit leader Mary Simon defiantly stated:

> Inuit will continue to hunt seals, develop modern sealskin fashion, and create new markets for these products. We will not have our way of life dictated by European leaders who we believe are being duped by animal rights activists who have little regard for rational debate, or for the truth of this issue.[43]

The ban has brought to the forefront the particular importance attached to tradition *and* modern markets by Canada's Inuit people against various social forces from abroad considered to be "colonial", such as the European Union in this case. The reaction of strong defiance by Inuit leaders that lives on in contemporary Inuit politics has equally infuriated some environmental critics, who challenge the reference to the grounds of a solid tradition or identity to justify particular hunting and other social practices, for example. These critics argue that there is little traditional about the contemporary Inuit seal hunt that uses guns, snowmobiles and other technologies for seal hunting.

During the latest International Polar Year (2007–9), attention was directed with renewed vigour toward the European Union seal product ban. But restrictions on the hunting and marketing of seal products span back to the early 1980s.[44] The

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[42] The ban is outlined in the following legislation: European Community, "Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council L 286/36." Official Journal, 2009. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1007:EN:NOT. The so-called "Inuit exemption" is outlined in point 14, which reads as follows: "The fundamental economic and social interests of Inuit communities engaged in the hunting of seals as a means to ensure their subsistence should not be adversely affected. The hunt is an integral part of the culture and identity of the members of the Inuit society, and as such is recognised by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Therefore, the placing on the market of seal products which result from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence should be allowed."

[43] Simon qtd. in Windspeaker, "Inuit Reject Call for European Union Wide Seal Ban," *Windspeaker* 2008.

[44] Kamrul Hossain, "The EU Ban on the Import of Seal Products and the WTO Regulations: Neglected Human Rights of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples?" *Polar Record* Viewfirst Article (2012), 1.

ban challenges the "traditional"—used in the unique sense this term is used in Inuit qaujimajatuqangit (traditional knowledge), and which, as Pelly demonstrates, involves material and spiritual sustenance[45]—Inuit subsistence economy to react in effective ways once again. Hossain argues that EU regulations attempt to define what is traditional, yet fails to understand "the broader meaning of the [indigenous] right to subsistence" (Hossain, 10). "For indigenous peoples it is crucial to preserve these activities as part of subsistence rights; the rights that, as discussed earlier, international human rights law recognizes in present day international law" (9-10).

This is of course very much in the first place an issue of the *mass media*, which several authors have argued has itself changed in remarkable ways alongside the rise of the environmental and animal rights movements in the past several decades. Opposing the seal hunt has now become part of southern "Qallunaat" common sense, but the effects on Inuit have been profound. Many authors have shown how the media cut its teeth on depicting the cruelty of killing seals, particularly in Newfoundland/Labrador, and how anyone with a sound mind would oppose such vicious acts. In this way, particular *imaginaries* and representations of what the seal hunt entails were constructed to do the work of warning the public about the grim effects of hunting seals.

For instance, the popular Newfoundland writer, Rex Murphy, has argued passionately that "the arts of scenic press conferences and the value of broadcasting their enterprise with a clutch of the B-list celebrities of their day" has become an integral aspect of the deep connection between the environmental movement and the media.[46] But criticism of the environmental movement's stance against the seal hunt is not limited to neoconservatives like Murphy.

Defenders of the Inuit mixed economy, including Iqaluit-based activist and lawyer Aaju Peter, who I spoke with in October 2010 while writing this chapter, have rarely missed an opportunity to remind those interested to learn about the

[45] David F. Pelly, *Sacred Hunt: A Portrait of the Relationship between Seals and Inuit* (Greystone Books, 2001).
[46] Rex Murphy, "How Environmentalists Killed a Proud Enterprise," *National Post*, August 21 2010.

Inuit perspective that this is not an issue of recent origin; as Peter explained to me, Inuit roots demonstrate deep knowledge of wildlife, legal orders, education practices, and cosmological belief systems.[47] Peter reminds us that the international environmental movement, the EU environmental commission, and the Inuit have been debating these complex animal-human relations for many years to no avail; a deep and enduring stalemate exists. As Peter argues in several articles on the matter, Inuit still hunt and rely on the seal for subsistence and economy, and, in her view, the EU is still out to destroy healthy and sustainable seal pelt and meat markets.[48] In short, activists such as Peter have argued strongly that the south needs to be educated on how these decisions affect northern peoples who have a long history of living in the north, a history that would be impossible without the subsistence provided by seals and other wildlife.

IDENTITY AND SEALS

During this project, I witnessed and partook in the sharing of seal at the "Day of the Seal" after a successful hunt in Nuuk, Greenland, at the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) General Assembly in 2010 (Figures 31-39). The general assembly meets every three years and provides a host of events for the public to engage in. The weather was beautiful in the public space – the Nuuk beach – provided to conference attendees to meet community members and participate in the sharing of seal. I tasted some of the raw and cooked seal meat, took some photographs, and felt a sense of the great social organization that is involved in sharing in the hunt and eating the meat.

The EU ban on the importation of seal products is an issue of Inuit and Canadian and Greenlandic identity. There is much work to be done to raise awareness about how these debates have made life difficult for Inuit in Canada. When decisions are made in one jurisdiction they can have binding effects for others; sometimes these effects are deliberate and sometimes they are unintended

[47] See: Aaju Peter, "The European Parliament Shuts Down Seal-Product Imports—Again," *Above & Beyond: Canada's Arctic Journal*, May/June 2010; Aaju Peter et al., "The Seal: An Integral Part of Our Culture," *Etudes/Inuit/Studies* 26, no. 1 (2002).
[48] Aaju Peter, "The European Parliament Shuts Down Seal-Product Imports—Again," *Above & Beyond: Canada's Arctic Journal*, May/June 2010, 43.

side effects.[49] The ban on seal products has had unintended effects on Inuit society, and Inuit are challenging the European Union on the grounds that the ban will have a detrimental effect on their livelihood. Castells writes that in the context of what he calls "network society":

> [W]e have also observed the emergence of powerful resistance identities, which retrench in communal heavens, and refuse to be flushed away by global flows and radical individualism. They build their communities around the traditional values of God, nation, and the family, and they secure the enclosures of their encampments with ethnic emblems and territorial defenses. Resistance identities are not limited to traditional values. They can also be built by, and around, proactive social movements, which choose to establish their autonomy in their communal resistance as long as they are not powerful enough to mount an assault on the oppressive institutions they oppose.[50]

A better understanding of the theoretical and practical aspects of resistance is integral to developing a renewed common sense for how these social processes work today. The Inuit response to the EU seal ban demonstrates this well. As long time Arctic writer Oran Young has reminded us in relation to these sealing disputes: "economic factors are part of the general environment of the [sealing] conflicts."[51] However, economics are always related to *power* through an intimate articulation with politics. Inuit have attained a reasonable amount of power to raise claims about their struggles.

In Canada, to say that the Inuit seal hunt is an integral part of Canada's identity I learned is controversial: there is much talk about the seal hunt in the media and by high-level non-Inuit politicians (such as the Prime Minister of

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[49] This is how Oran Young represented the issue in the following article: Oran R. Young, "The Politics of Animal Rights: Preservationists Vs. Consumptive Users in the North," *Etudes/Inuit/Studies* 13, no. 1 (1989): 49.
[50] Manuel Castells, *End of Millenium, the Information Age, Society and Culture Vol. III* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998), 421.
[51] Young, "The Politics of Animal Rights: Preservationists Vs. Consumptive Users in the North," (1989) 49.

Canada).[52] But different regions of the country look at hunting seals and the creation of animal-product markets in drastically different ways. Representatives from the north, such as a Government of Nunavut official and Mary Simon of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), have argued they will continue to raise awareness of how the EU seal ban has affected them. Expert environmental and animal right opinion is often ambivalent about the seal population (they are not endangered) or the cruelty of the seal harvest (in the Arctic, mature seals are shot, unlike the Gulf of St. Lawrence harvest of seal pups that are clubbed to preserve the quality of the pelts).

AGAINST THE ODDS

The indigenous peoples of the Canadian Arctic have boldly risen to take command of the public spotlight in recent years, in some ways against all odds. As we have seen in this dissertation, Inuit didn't have a national political voice in the 1950s but they do today. This has all occurred in a rather dramatic context in which several crisis narratives have forced themselves to the forefront of public consciousness. Together, these have made the Government of Canada more interested in signing treaties with Arctic indigenous peoples. These include the great challenges that all northern peoples face on a daily basis: changes in climate and sea ice conditions, serious social problems, a lack of government capacities to offer basic social services and jobs, the ongoing quite unusual role of the natural sciences in the north, and the many pressures of "development" in the Arctic more generally.

Alongside the growing sense of the challenges that indigenous peoples face in northern Canada, there has been a determined push by indigenous peoples to implement forms of knowledge other than that of conventional science, such as traditional ecological knowledge and traditional knowledge; for example, Inuit qaujimajatuqangit—roughly meaning "something that has been known a long time." Inuit qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) is related to the oral traditions that "reflect

[52] CBC, "Harper Attacks Seal Hunt Critics," *CBC News*, 18 August 2009.

[the] changing Inuit perspective of the world."[53] However, as Nakasuk has written, "[i]n qualifying the knowledge of the elders as 'traditional,' we should never forget that it was always directed to the future, intended to give a perspective to younger generations so that they were better equipped to [deal with] the changes they were facing." (6) Similarly, Stern contends that IQ gives Inuit knowledge of environment, wildlife, the raising of children, and "the documentation of Inuit indigenous knowledge for political action."[54] She continues: "[i]n this way Inuit indigenous knowledge has become institutionalized, not as a tradition prone to erosion but as part of a repertoire of distinctively Inuit ways of knowing and being in the world." (Ibid.) These are powerful statements that support the thesis I pursue in this dissertation.

I return to the topic of the EU seal products ban and its effects on Inuit livelihood. George Wenzel in *Animal Rights, Human Rights* (1990) argues in his politically engaged case study regarding the EU seal ban controversy as it took shape in the 1980s that the culture of sealing took many forms in the north. Wenzel's perspective highlights the deep connections between seals and community bonding in northern communities. Wenzel's work demonstrates the best of problem-oriented anthropology at work.[55] Wenzel's study shows how important the defense of the seal hunt was for the social construction of modern Inuit political identities against non-Inuit. Inuit in the early 1980s did not know how to effectively defend their cultural practices against various threats from elsewhere, they had to learn. He writes:

> Inuit did not debate or rationalize these points [about what the seal hunt means for their cultural survival]. For them, ecology, hunting, and culture are synonymous. Sealskins, in a northern world colonized and ruled by

[53] Saullu Nakasuk et al., *Interviewing Inuit Elders, Volume 1: Introduction* (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Nunavut Arctic College, 1999), 1.
[54] Pamela Stern, "Area to Cultural to Critical Inuit Studies," in *Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Anthology*, ed. Pamela Stern and Lisa Stevenson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 261.
[55] George W. Wenzel, *Animal Rights, Human Rights: Ecology, Economy and Ideology in the Canadian Arctic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). See also: Richard G. Condon, Peter Collings, and George Wenzel, "The Best Part of Life: Subsistence Hunting, Ethnicity, and Economic Adaptation in Young Adult Inuit Males," *Arctic* 48, no. 1 (1995).

> Euro-Canadians, provide a small measure of independence from mines and oil wells, bureaucracy, and good intentions. (3-4)

In many striking ways, this remains the stalemate today. Around the same time, Finn Lynge published *Arctic Wars, Animal Rights, Endangered Peoples*.[56] As the title suggests, he considered the encroachment on the way of life of the Inuit by animal rights and environmental movements in concert as a violation of Inuit human rights. Lynge, a Greenlandic writer and activist, considers these encroachments as important aspects of colonization of Inuit ways of being. He points out, however, that the important ecological component of the movement was quickly dropped and subsequently the seal hunt was reductively viewed as a debate solely about animal rights *irrespective of all other considerations* such as environmental stewardship.[57] For Lynge this was a serious error, which helps to explain why there is so much misinformation today among those even loosely associated with what has come to be called "the environmental movement." He writes:

> [i]f we safeguard aboriginal peoples' hunting and trapping rights in the modern world, we can save large and important wildlife areas from the encroachment of urbanization, disturbance, and pollution. Everyone who knows something of these matters will agree that the most important threat to wild animals is the mercilessly increasing destruction of wild life habitats. (5)

From this perspective we learn that it is the political and legal rights of the people who have lived with and hunted these animals for centuries that can best ensure the ecological sustainability of the marine mammals (and other animals) and their vulnerable habitats. Lynge implies that it is not Western-based wildlife management, but the people that have been living with the animals for centuries

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[56] Finn Lynge, *Arctic Wars, Animal Rights, Endangered Peoples* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992).

[57] See also: Mark Nuttall. "Sharing and the Ideology of Subsistence in a Greenlandic Sealing Community." *Polar Record* 27 (1991): 217-22; Don C. Foote. "Remarks on Eskimo Sealing and the Harp Seal Controversy." *Arctic* 20, no. 4 (1967).

who can accomplish this. Lynge cites numerous examples of what has occurred in the Amazon, Canada, and Alaska when indigenous rights were trampled upon in the quest to abstractly enshrine animal rights. This has effected the sustainable practices developed by indigenous peoples over millennia. However, and perhaps counter-intuitively, Lynge argues that the best allies indigenous peoples might seek out lie "in the midst of the enemy camp"—that is, those who are interested in animal rights and who may, at some level, understand that recognising indigenous rights to hunt and feed their families is integral to broad efforts to preserve animal species from threats of extinction. Perhaps.

I must stress here that increased attention to a cultural practice can be a mixed blessing. It means both politicisation and mystification at the same time. As some commentators argue, great possibilities lie ahead for sustainable development efforts in the Arctic. On the other hand, an opposing story has forced itself onto the agenda to warn the world about the effects that all the publicity – and spectacle – has meant for local inhabitants of Arctic communities. The headlines commonly depict northern communities as spaces that are derelict and unlivable, ridden with violence, substance abuse, overcrowded, and exposed to pollution.[58] The loss of the freedom to hunt and live outside of market forces, we might rightly suspect, is somehow connected to this. Mary Simon and others seem to suggest that markets are now paradoxically integral to traditional culture itself. These narratives of utopia and dystopia become two extremes of a long-standing historiography that depicts the Arctic as either improving inch by inch, day by day, toward something of a northern Utopia where the best of the West and the traditional subsistence economy can be realized, or, as living out the consequences of uncertain end times toward a future of "more of the same" (neo)colonialism, in which everyone is simply "done to" by the structures of state power. Optimists tell us about the prospects of sustainable development and that hope can persevere against all the odds (like communities partnering with oil and mining companies to provide better northern education, as I have heard at more than one northern

[58] George Manuel and Michael Posluns, *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality* (Don Mills: Collier-Macmillan, 1974).

conference), whereas pessimists claim we are all colonized "subjects" now and that Inuit and their aim toward cultural preservation is doomed to fail. Yet, we should ask: is a middle conjuncture possible? I have asked throughout all phases of research of this dissertation: how is it possible for indigenous peoples to protect their way of life in the north?

How do we come to terms with the recent debate about the production and selling of seal-based products in northern Canada, given its long history, and in the context of these conflicting historiographies? One interesting aspect of this dispute is how the distinction between perpetrators and victims is managed. There are some interesting rhetorical strategies here. From the perspective of Inuit elected politicians in particular, the European Union and its member states are clearly the imperial perpetrators and are simply continuing a dangerous colonial past in the 21st century. Mary Simon, president of the Inuit Tapariit Kanatami (ITK), and national leader of Inuit in Canada, argued just this in October 2010: "the majority of European parliamentarians continue to be blinded by a combination of old, discredited colonialist attitudes and a cynical misinformation campaign from animal rights activists."[59] These campaigns use the politics of the image to suggest that Inuit normally cruelly club seals to death, which they do not.

My position is that the seal ban combines both sides of the utopian/dystopian equation in the form of an argumentation strategy: criticism of arguably ongoing European colonialism opens-up the possibility for Inuit to continue to rely on the sale of seal products and allows them to sell their products to generate much-needed cash for fuel, bullets, and other hunting supplies. This reveals the complex interplay between tradition and modernity in the marketing of seal products – the seal market provides much needed monetary support to cash-strapped Inuit communities in the north.

As we have seen, having a reliable market for seal products and environmental sustainability are not opposites. The sustainability of these practices relies on available seal skin markets, which were established in

[59] Simon qtd. In Nunatsiaq News, "Europe's Top Court Upholds Seal Product Ban," October 29 2010.

partnership with European countries over several decades. In fact, it would seem that from this perspective a strong critique of colonialism and its past is integral to increased Inuit autonomy. Simon has released several statements against the effectiveness of any "Inuit exemptions", proposed by EU leaders as an olive branch, to the ban that would be effective to protect Inuit "traditional" hunting practices while carrying on with a ban to control the importation of seal based products. Simon has rejected this:

> Despite the inclusion of an Inuit exemption in the latest proposed seal ban, we fear another devastating result as our supporting markets and infrastructures are sure to collapse under an outright ban. The market has already reacted to the prospect of the new seal ban and we are feeling the impacts on the fragile market for our seal products that we have been trying to rebuild since the last ban.[60]

She rightly asks: what is traditional and what is subsistence? Inuit are put in the position of having to pass a "tradition test" designed by the colonial EU. Simon depicted the proposed exemptions for Inuit hunters as "an empty box" that failed to demonstrate any real substantive understanding of what the hunt means to today's Inuit.[61] The seal ban is not only an economic issue of mixed economy as strategy but just as importantly it is a moral issue of ideology for Inuit hunters and Nunavummiut; as Aaju Peter has written, "the seal-hunt remains an integral part of [Inuit] culture, […] identity, and […] economy."[62] Inuit leaders continue to demand that the EU recognise and understand this simple but fundamental point.

The European Parliament—now supported by the highest court in Europe—insists that it has the moral authority to respond to the wishes of its own people, including the powerful animal rights lobbyists in several European countries.[63] Animal rights activists have played on powerful images of hunters

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[60] Simon qtd. in Peter, Aaju. "The European Parliament Shuts Down Seal-Product Imports -- Again." *Above & Beyond: Canada's Arctic Journal*, May/ June 2010, 39-43.
[61] Speech at ICC General Assembly, July 2010.
[62] Peter, "The European Parliament Shuts Down Seal-Product Imports—Again," 43; Peter et al., "The Seal: An Integral Part of Our Culture."
[63] Anthony Speca. "Sealing (and) the Deal with Europe." *Northern Public Affairs* (2012).

clubbing cute little Harp seals (often called "baby" seals by advocates and in the media depicted with furry white coats and big doleful eyes), and have used these images to win the popular favour of millions of supporters around the world, most of whom we can assume do not know much about Inuit seal hunters or their way of life. The EU has responded to these charges, commissioning two reports (see: European Commission 2008 and 2009), and has sent representatives to attend some major Inuit events, such as the 2010 ICC General Assembly which I attended in Nuuk, Greenland.[64] Yet, these modest policy interventions and public relations campaigns have not helped to calm matters in any significant sense. They have rather, perhaps unintentionally, raised the spectre of the long history of European colonization of the International Arctic. On 2010 it banned the importation of seal products, again.

CONJURING CRITICAL INUIT STUDIES

The main point is that when *the cultural* is identified it becomes politically charged. When I was in Iqaluit conducting fieldwork, a woman I interviewed made the prescient observation that there is no such thing as "the" seal hunt. This minor remark allowed for a change of frame with respect to *the* seal hunt. She seemed to imply that, from an Inuit cultural perspective, the hunt is an embedded cultural practice that has been heavily politicized in recent years. Thus, in the process of politicization it has become identifiable as a separate and separable thing – not an integrated cultural practice.

The editors of the *Critical Inuit Studies* anthology propose that "a close examination of the way specific cultural practices and beliefs confront the ideal of a universal humanity" has much to teach us about "what it means to be a human today."[65] The seal hunt is surely a crucial aspect of "what it means to be human" under globalization, and perhaps provides a framework to understand some of the

[64] European Commission, "European Parliament Resolution 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance," (2008); Directorate-General Environment European Commission, "Assessment of the Potential Impact of a Ban of Products Derived from Seal Species," (Denmark: COWI, 2008); European Commission, "Study on Implementing Measures for Trade in Seal Products: Shareholder Briefing Note," (Denmark: COWI, 2009).

[65] Pamela Stern and Lisa Stevenson, eds. *Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography.* London: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.

major issues that emerge once policy making and social welfare isn't seen as value neutral after all. Hunter-gathering societies have distinctive cultures, but this shouldn't lead one to the conclusion that they are somehow not human or modern. The EU seal ban teaches us that what happens in one region of the world has deep effects in other places. The geographical stakes of these disputes should not be understated. Fredric Jameson (2009) and Samir Amin (1990) have pointed out that delinking from the global system and markets is extremely difficult. But, ironically, it is the neoliberal EU that has pushed Inuit to do precisely this. Markets link us all, and opting out of the global market system is impossible in the twenty-first century. The EU seal ban teaches us about some of the unintended consequences that can result when globalized, capitalist economies and financial interests clash with moral standards. The threat to the cultural survival of Inuit is an example of these unintended consequences.

It seems fitting to ask whether the seal ban represents a cultural turn in the European Union's domestic and foreign policy, particularly in regard to the situations of northern peoples. Will Europe become increasingly sensitive and sympathetic to Inuit hunting practices even if they are not "traditional," strictly speaking, in that Inuit use many so-called "modern" technologies to hunt for seals? Or, is the recent skirmish a striking example of a *cultural clash* in which there is little possibility for mediation between the two parties? The latter seems to be very likely. However, in this case the massive EU is clashing with a small group of seal hunters and their political leaders, it would appear that the Inuit will surely but unfortunately lose their much valued European market. The disputes over the opening and closing of seal product markets reveals that a continuation of the colonial project lives on in the contemporary EU due to what advocates see as a lack of education about Inuit culture in European political society.

We need to work with the contributions of critical Inuit studies to investigate recent challenges to the subsistence basis of Inuit culture and economy as a consequence of the EU ban controversy. The ban provides a good case study to investigate some of the empirical aspects of these changes. By no means have Inuit practices been subsumed by capitalism and the ideology of efficiency, since

it is clear that a strong sense of indigenous identity remains as a crucial site of "resistance to totalisation" of the state over and against Inuit lives (totalisation means that all aspects of life are brought into line with the dominant capitalist ideology).[66]

To continue to develop critical Inuit studies, we must come to terms with the role of Capital in shaping the limits and possibilities of Inuit identities and fates today in the context of globalization. The question of totalisation by Capital is only part of the problem; we also need to better understand the relativity of Capital in the form of commodities markets where people invest and let others do the dirty work (such as oil and mining companies).

In the meantime, solidarity in Canada with Inuit struggles is necessary. My perspective is that to truly make this an issue of Canadian identity (and not simply a northern problem) we must support the locally produced seal market in Canada as much as we can. This support should be expanded to the rights of indigenous peoples to fish, hunt, and trap for subsistence and to provide income to their families.[67] The "morals" of the environmental movement have already made us scared of wearing furs in "the south." If we don't show our solidarity with Inuit hunters and producers in the north, who use seals as a critical aspect of everyday life, the market for seals in the southern Canada could end up like the market for furs in the EU.

The Inuit subsistence economy continues to play a major role in contemporary Nunavut, both ideologically and materially. Hunting, trapping, and fishing for subsistence is rooted in Inuit heritage and thus continues to provide meaning as well as material well-being in Arctic communities. This simple fact is more noble, much older, and much more exciting than a land claim and a new underfunded bureaucracy called the GN. The findings in my fieldwork in Nuuk, Iqaluit, Qausuittuq, and Panniqtuq confirmed the old maxim that the more things change the more they stay the same. This strong continuity with the past is an

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[66] Kulchyski and Tester, *Kiumajut (Talking Back): Game Management and Inuit Rights, 1900-70*; Frank James Tester and Peter Kulchyski, *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocations in the Eastern Artic, 1939-63* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994).

[67] Kulchyski, *Like the Sound of a Drum: Aboriginal Cultural Politics in Denendeh and Nunavut*, 277.

inspiration for those interested in social and political resistance today. Here is an opportunity to make our scholarly cultural studies of globalization and "the political" more concrete and tangible. Our studies are also *urgent*, as it is no exaggeration to say that these are matters of life and death.

Nunavummiut are all, in their own ways, making the difficult transition from life on the land to the ebbs and flows of wage labour over a very short period of time. This transition subjects them to booms and busts, cuts and cutbacks, recessions, windfalls, financial upturns and downturns, massive development projects, and all the uncertainties involved in living in a "globalized world." Life on the land was not always secure, but adaptation to its insecurity was honed over centuries, whereas the insecurities associated with wage labour have arisen over the last 50 years. Furthermore, the "local" community (a phrase now becoming derogatory) and the national state are somehow passé. The ideological contradictions of a globalized world are felt more keenly in the north than in the south. The process of globalization is undermining the sense of collective being that was once invented by Inuit through centuries of working and hunting with each other in incredibly close-knit communities. Conspicuous consumption, capitalist individualism, and a disregard for nature, are discontinuous with traditional Inuit ways of being in the world.

In this context importance is being placed on Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) today. Whether IQ can be used to deal with advanced capitalist bureaucracy and high development pressures is little more than a wager on the part of government officials, contractors, activists, academics, and Nunavummiut alike. IQ represents an effort to recognise and harvest the great continuities and strengths of Inuit culture in the context of the 21st century with its mad scramble for resources in the "pristine" Arctic.

I think a wager on how resistance is possible is better than nothing. There is no contradiction in saying that this is a *beginning* that relies on experiences from the past. IQ or "that which Inuit have known for a long time" is axiomatic, polemical, dogmatic, and everything that economic liberalism and finance capitalism, with its maxims about abstract pragmatism and stark breaks with the

past, is opposed to. This is precisely the potential strength of IQ: to find a way forward out of the postmodern relativism—including commodification of culture itself—that pervades the most basic tenets of globalization.

Going beyond a discussion of indigenous versus Euro-American knowledge and expertise, Frank Tester and Peter Irniq have argued that IQ is part of a series of resistances to the "totalization" of the capitalist state in Canada that disregards the pursuits of gatherer-hunters.[68] We can only hope this IQ resistance will be effective, but the evidence is far from conclusive. I suggest that the use of IQ in the context of development pressures in places like Mary River and Lancaster Sound might provide some useful evidence. I detect resistance in these places that can be understood as resistance to globalization and the Canadian state. IQ might inaugurate debate among Inuit as to how to cope with the challenges brought by change. If it becomes little more than bureaucratic routine, these hopes will be dashed. IQ, although it formally has recent origins, is an old "concept" that might have staying power in the new initiatives underway in Nunavut in regard to education and policy development, and to roles for elders and youth in social life. IQ is holistic and includes all aspects of Inuit culture.

I mention the role of resistance to globalization because, as Kulchyski and Tester point out, "the state (shop floorman for capital accumulation and its junior partner expansion of the commodity form) is resisted at every step of the way."[69] Kulchyski and Tester's text describes the historical roots of resistance, but does not delve into the difficult terrain of how it impacts the present (the coverage of their study ends at 1970). How do we study resistance in the present? What evidence do these authors have for making this claim? Is this a historical or trans-

[68] By totalization they mean: "after Sartre (1991), in reference to a process whereby attempts are made to bring all aspects of life (spatial, temporal, social, and economic) into line with a dominant or overarching logic: in the case of Canada, that of a modern capitalist state committed to the 'idea of progress.' Totalization is a process that includes not merely incorporating as yet unincorporated geographical fragments of a nation (as was true of the eastern Arctic), but also affecting the consciousness, belief, and behavioural patterns of those seen to be within the state's influence. Totalization inevitably encounters contradiction and resistance." See: Tester, Frank James, and Peter Irniq. "Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit: Social History, Politics and the Practice of Resistance." Arctic 61, no. 1 (2008): 48-61.

[69] Kulchyski and Tester, *Kiumajut (Talking Back): Game Management and Inuit Rights, 1900-70*, 10.

historical (or metaphysical) claim? What shapes or forms does resistance take in the contemporary world? in the contemporary Arctic? However optimistic the theory that resistance is everywhere, the present era is not known for its resistance to capitalism, in fact, we might think that capitalism has never been so popular or so appealing to millions if not billions of people. What implications does *rethinking the role of resistance* carry in the context of globalization?

CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated two case studies in particular: the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the European Union seal ban. These case studies reveal not only the connection between science, governance, and traditional knowledge but also the antagonisms between northern hunters and "southern" market-based economies such as the European Union. While there is no overarching theme to reductively interpret these current preoccupations, my argument is that understanding disagreements between both northern and southern culture in relation to questions of markets and capitalism can be a fruitful way of reading these debates and events as conflicts over fundamental questions of belonging and relating between capitalists and hunter-gatherers. As mentioned, there are some surprising aspects to these disputes because, in the latter case, we find Inuit leaders in Canada fighting for greater integration in the economies of the European Union in order to sell their products. What we have seen at least in the Canadian north since World War II, alongside the armaments of the Cold War in the Arctic in the postwar period, has been the basic encroachment of the state on nearly all aspects of social and political life in the north, and this can be seen to take some unusual forms. Some Inuit are still hunters in the territories in which they live and work but their lives have certainly been threatened from elsewhere such as climate change and trade disputes.

CONCLUSION

> Through something like Brecht's estrangement-effect, naming as renaming can provide insight into what we call history, its making no less than its retelling, especially history of the spirits of the dead as the mark of nation and state, but I have in mind, by renaming, something else as well – namely the evocation of a fictive nation-state in place of real ones so as to better grasp the elusive nature of stately being. After all it is not only the writer of fiction who fuses reality with dream-like states. This privilege also belongs, as Kafka taught, to the being-in-the-world of the modern state itself.[1]

This dissertation depicts how various historical social forces have influenced the contemporary sociological understanding of the Arctic both from the perspective of Nunavut (Part A) and, more broadly, in terms of the Arctic geopolitical region (Part B). My work illuminates the different geographical scales through which the history of the Arctic has been written. In my thesis, I show how Nunavut is involved in a politics of development, a process of simultaneous advancement and contradiction, as it attends to both indigenous and southern hybridized ways of being in regards to territorial governance and social structures. The Canadian Arctic is a place where various renaming projects are underway, and the naming of the central and eastern Canadian Arctic as "Nunavut" is a case in point. The map of Canada has been changed as a result of these efforts to restore indigenous names and governance structures; and, if one can simply appreciate how and why Frobisher Bay can be renamed Iqaluit, we can also imagine all sorts of new possibilities for the future. These new names, these new governance structures, pertain to the changing political situation of the 21st century Arctic where the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, decentralization in Nunavut, and the urbanization pressures in northern settlements have transformed the Inuit way of life and in part represent the unprecedented entrance of the Canadian state into northern public affairs. Indeed, we bear witness to the possibility of *real* or

[1] Michael Taussig, *The Magic of the State*, New York: Routledge, 1997, 1.

legitimate state formation in the central and eastern Canadian Arctic in the name of the "Nunavut Project". But what does this mean for rethinking dominant discourses regarding the political culture of the Canadian north?

Commentator Barry Zellen calls the contemporary Arctic a "systemless system theory" because of its ongoing ambiguous boundaries.[2] My work suggests that the Arctic will be defined in this ambiguous or virtual manner for some time to come, even given its increased importance in national affairs and world politics in recent years. In short, the Arctic has several "internal" divisions (thereby confirming Zellen's notion that the Arctic is an incomplete political system), indeed we have to look at the question of what *internal* is. This is an ongoing story. The divisions that do exist have come under much scrutiny in recent years because of a politics of development; and I have tried to show that increased attention to a set of problems or contradictions can be a mixed blessing. There are interests seeking to exploit crisis – such as climate change – in the Arctic for corporate and stately gain. My perspective is that, overall, it has been for the better: Nunavut and the NLCA represents an opportunity for Inuit to take control over their lives in the context of unprecedented development pressures such as mining.

With that said, it is important to ensure that the individuals and communities of the Arctic keep up with the great changes they face. Those concerned about the real possibilities of social developments have this responsibility. After all, contemporary development projects in the Arctic (many of them megaprojects) will change the environment forever: hills will be razed to the ground in search of iron ore and rare earths, precious metals will be mined deep underground, rivers will be diverted, railroads will be constructed, roads built, shipping and ice-breaking will occur 365 days a year (deeply affecting environmental and marine mammal health), oil and gas leases will take up more and more traditional hunting lands, the marine environment will undergo significant change and likely decline, new species will be introduced to the Arctic, permafrost will melt, ancient forests

[2] Barry Scott Zellen, *Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009, 15.

will be discovered, polar bears will spend far less time on sea ice and become much less recognisable, methane gas will be released into the atmosphere, and so on. None of these changes are minor and no doubt represent a point of no return – there is no going back to pre-industrial times in the Canadian Arctic, or elsewhere for that matter.

Perhaps sociological thinking can help. Industrial development is something that sociologists have been working on for at least a century and a half, yet sociological research in the Arctic has been seriously underrepresented at least since Frank Vallee's path-breaking research in the 1960s and '70s. It is anthropology, law, history, and political science that make up the majority of the contemporary social scientific research being conducted in the north. Law commands much attention and legitimacy, but legal regimes cannot make political choices for us (such as about the limits of continental shelves, as I discussed). Local, national, and international publics will make these decisions about the future of the Arctic. Aside from explicit sociological approaches and the physical sciences that have been studying the Arctic for centuries, there is a great deal of growth of all sorts of literatures on the Arctic. A sociological method investigates the social processes for how increased concern about the Arctic as an economy, homeland, *and* as a frontier for science and capital has effectively brought about the *political-economy*. This is to recognize that an economy is never simply economic or even "merely cultural" but rather expresses political and social disagreements at base. I highlighted some of these disagreements in and beyond Nunavut.

These disagreement arise not only from great environmental transformations due to climate change, but also because the Arctic is a lively political space where a crisis of legitimacy plays out. I have argued that the incorporation of indigenous elements, such as IQ, into the governance structures is an effort to increase legitimacy in government in Nunavut and NWT. The politics of development places great pressure on governments to better respond to the needs of the indigenous locals. In other words, questions of housing, suicide prevention, health care, urban development, and so forth are very important in northern political

culture. However, too often analysis of the region remains at the abstract geopolitical level and fails to address the sheer urgency of local issues. Thus, a crisis of legitimacy.

This problem of levels of analysis can be rendered intelligible via what Slavoj Žižek has called "the Parallax View". In this perspective, a macro geopolitical approach and an engaged local one can only be articulated with an "impossible short circuit of levels, which, for structural reasons, can never meet"[3] As I have pointed out, the rhetoric surrounding geopolitics tends to ignore indigenous issues and local political actors tend to work locally; the latter are rarely able to represent Inuit concerns on the global stage. Thus, non-state institutions like the Arctic Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami are innovative institutions that attempt to perform this "short circuit" between local and global levels of analysis in the interests of representing local people and, potentially, developing sound public policy. This illuminates why working methodologically at different scalar levels is crucial towards understanding the virtual Arctic. I have used the concept of the virtual as a flexible way of coming to terms with the contradictory ways that various social forces such as states and indigenous peoples construct the Arctic.

Arctic sovereignty has become a very good way of rallying the troops (quite literally in the case of the Harper Government) for a variety of causes including annual military sovereignty exercises in the Arctic, the need for better telecommunication in the north, and even highlighting the importance of education as indicated in Thomas Berger's Conciliator's Final Report (2006). My position on this is that we – those who are interested in the north in northern and southern Canada – are saying "yes" to developing a sense of community in regards to the northern latitudes that requires solidarity between northerners and southerners interested in sustainability and healthy northern communities. And, furthermore, solidarity with those that do not want to reproduce the colonial past. This requires research partnerships, amongst other partnerships, as the Canadian north does not have its own university. This is an aspect of Arctic sovereignty that

[3] Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, 4.

should be noted to make sovereignty in the north more than a virtuality or abstraction and to eventually become "real".

As Marilyn Strathern has argued, the modern use of the term "virtuality" is a way of understanding that "connections and relations, like society itself, require imagining and may be (virtually) imagined as virtual as well as (imagined as) actualized interpersonal relationships".[4] Strathern argues that virtuality is an abstraction, or *a process used to imagine the social relations that actually exist*:

> I am going to say that it adds to the capacity of something to point to its own effects. The power of communication is communication. This is not as absurd as it sounds; indeed it has the virtue of resonating at once with the virtual's original meaning and with the subsequent devolution of that meaning. As you know, the term itself has undergone a metamorphosis, from the concrete to the abstract. 'Virtual' started off as a reference to the physical qualities (or virtues) which things have, and to the effects of these qualities, like the virtual heat of wine or of sunshine. It then came to describe the state of being effective or potent. Not until the seventeenth century was the term first used of the essence or effect of qualities by themselves, so that things could be called virtual -- as one might refer to a ruler who was a virtual sovereign -- in reference to qualities that were not endowed in formal or 'actual' terms. The point is that virtual entities point to their own potency: the virtual sovereign did not need to be crowned. Such efficacy appears not to need the props of human social relations or wider contexts of activity (Ibid.).

A real sense of Arctic sovereignty in the north demands the perspective of local human actors. Often concerned with environmental stewardship and responsibility, the best possible way for Canada to demonstrate its sovereignty in Nunavut is to work with northern governments and representatives of the NLCA (including further devolution negotiations). Real sovereignty, like better

[4] Marilyn Strathern, "Abstraction or Decontextualization: An Anthropological Comment Or: E for Ethnography." In Virtual Society? Get Real! London, England: Virtual Society? The social science of electronic technologies, 2000.

understanding the history of the north, produces new certainties. My thesis is that the politics of development in Nunavut has opened up opportunities for governance innovation, such as administrative decentralization. To include indigenous elements in local governments helps to alleviate the ongoing legitimation crisis in places like Nunavut, where trust of the south can be hard to find. This is what makes these interventions both exciting and still in a process of becoming because the success of these initiatives needs to be better assessed. History is the process of coming to terms with the development pressures and contradictions;[5] a better understanding of these histories is essential towards addressing the contradictions that inevitably emerge along the way of partnership.

Ethnographically-inspired work in northern communities clearly shows the precarious relationship between southern and northern Canada. My experience shows that much more work needs to be done to build trust and establish new research relationships to mourn colonial wounds. Furthermore, researchers need to develop alternative ways of publishing research so that it reaches the communities being discussed. In many ways, the colonial history of the north has politicized relationships between northerners and southerners in Canada, making it increasingly difficult for southerners to be involved in decolonization labours.

My Ph.D. work makes a contribution to this long-term project of decolonization in northern Canada by articulating the histories of southern/northern interaction and theorizing some of the implications in the present. For example, the approval of the Mary River Iron Ore project on northern Baffin Island and others like it – in terms of ongoing social impact assessment – would be socio-political situations in the north in which to put this research to work, that is, to the test. Another example would be the proposed Baker Lake Uranium project that has been encircled in controversy.[6] But I do recognize that much more work needs to be done to have academic studies of this nature make a difference in the north (and south). I think that it is important that southern

[5] As Fredric Jameson once famously put it, “History is what hurts”. See: Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. New York: Routledge, 2002 [1981].
[6] For example, see: Warren Bernauer, "The Uranium Controversy in Baker Lake." *Canadian Dimension*, 3 February 2012. URL: http://canadiandimension.com/articles/4470/

researchers working in the north seek out true partnerships and collaboration, and undergo processes of learning from Inuit society via critical Inuit studies. This is significantly different than simply appropriating Inuit culture as one's own. It is, rather, the commitment and responsibility to undergo a transformation in conjunction with the indigenous histories of Canada. Researchers in southern universities can leverage resources (and privilege) to aid in alleviating adverse development contradictions in the north. This is an effort to develop solidarity *between* Inuit and Qallunaat, not simply Qallunaat solidarity *with* Inuit (the difference is that the former would better include northern participants in research). At a minimum all researchers in the north have the responsibility not to reproduce harm while working and writing in Inuit communities, and it is justly no longer acceptable to treat Inuit as passive research subjects.

The politics of development in Nunavut shows that modernity's promise of unlimited progress and enlightenment itself was a myth. Developments bring about contradictions and modernity is far from being the value neutral project it was once thought to be. Marshall Berman's *All that is Solid Melts Into Air*, for example, shows that development is by its very nature tragic since "human powers can be developed only through what Marx called 'the powers of the underworld,' dark and fearful energies that may erupt with horrible force beyond all human control".[7] Here, Berman reminds readers that human progress can be a trap; it can bring about an experimentation with everything that is human (in what Berman calls humanism, such as drug and alcohol experimentation, limit experiences of all sorts such as suicidal encounters) but this experimentation may make human beings both more impoverished and isolated (detached from nature and other human beings) in the process. The politics of development may be a description of this very process of humanity removing itself from the contingencies of the natural and spiritual world.

The politics of development in Nunavut, in Canada, therefore, might very well be an activity of becoming better acquainted with Inuit social life. This is to undergo a transformation. This is to encounter difference. Through this,

[7] Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air*, London: Penguin, 1988, 40.

Canadians and other observers might be able to become both closer to nature as well as welcoming new challenges, failures, and experiments. Nunavut is just such a challenge but much of the work to actualize the great promise of "the Nunavut project" remains very much before us.

THESIS SUMMATION

The original contribution of this thesis is to assemble and bring into conversation the social and historical contexts of the rise of the Inuit as distinct political actors in the Canadian constitutional and territorial systems. The thesis ranges from the early archaeological origins of Inuit in the north, to the unique dynamics of decentralization and urbanization in Nunavut, to some of the more broad-based discussions about how to conceive of the Arctic as an integrated circumpolar region. This thesis brings sociological thinking to directly bear on the emergence of an Inuit polity, as a public realm that is ultimately grounded in the struggles of everyday life – as is evident in my fieldwork in Iqaluit. In this way, this thesis demonstrates that the sociological imagination, linking the personal and the political, can range from the realm of everyday life in urban settings in places like Iqaluit to circumpolar negotiations and national and international treaties.

After developing a refined sense of independence in a challenging environment, Inuit culture was impacted by the northward expansion of European contact that began in the seventeenth century but did not adversely effect Inuit culture in a profound way until the late nineteenth century. This is evidenced by the fact that the Inuit were not included as "Indians" in the 1876 Indian Act. Inuit were not considered at all because they were well outside of the gaze of the new Canadian state. By the turn of the century, Inuit were living largely as they had been for generations. I draw on the geographical term "accumulation by dispossession" as an important conflict theory to interpret the northern expansion of empire after this period. During this time, European and American whaling, not to mention the seminal anthropological fieldwork of Franz Boas on Baffin Island 1883-4, made more frequent contact with the eastern Arctic and laid the initial footprints for a radical alteration in Inuit ways of being at least by the 1940s and

1950s. Chapter 3 addresses how this affected the area of Frobisher Bay starting in the 1940s by the United States Air Force. New American and Canadian social forces made plans to better control the north, such as the military base developed at Frobisher Bay and John Diefenbaker's famous "roads to resources" program in the late 1950s aimed at the western Arctic. By the 1960s and '70s almost all Inuit had moved into settlements of one sort or another while new Inuit political actors emerged, most notably John Amagoalik and other former residential school students who could speak English and who demanded more control over their life and lands. As Amagoalik recounts, these leaders also had a strong sense of the great sacrifices and conciliations that would be needed to negotiate land claims.

The early land claims negotiations in what is now Nunavut, Nunavik, Nunatsiavut, and Inuvialuit were an effort to restore at least some of Inuit traditional sovereignty over these vast northern lands and waters in the context of what Hugh Brody and others described as "internal colonialism". I therefore defend these efforts at self-determination for the sheer courage of trying to "begin again from the beginning", even for all the obvious flaws with some of these land claim agreements. As I explain in some detail, each of these separate land claims arrangements were unique outcomes of negotiations and struggles with the federal government and northern territories and/or provinces. And, as this thesis shows, I am very much interested in the details and nuances of these historic struggles towards reparation. In my view, Inuit leaders across the Canadian north were visionary leaders in regards to the signing of modern comprehensive land claims with the Canadian federal government after the Second World War.

The focus of the thesis is on the creation of the modern Northwest Territories in the 1960s and the creation of the Nunavut Territory during the early 1990s, both at least partially under the banner of government decentralization and decolonization. These are remarkable moments in Canada's political and social history; the histories of these territories carry many lessons for students interested in political innovation in a Canadian context. One of the main lessons involved is the partial realization of Inuit self-governance initiatives in the eastern Arctic after many years of alienation within the Northwest Territories.

Above all, I argue that this was remarkable – and bold – because Inuit society had chosen to go its own way compared to most other indigenous peoples in the Canadian circumpolar north, Canada more broadly, and even beyond that when compared to the situations of Alaska and Greenland. The creation of Nunavut is a unique but by no means perfect response to the colonization of the north over the past two centuries (I cite the extinguishment clauses, Inuit employment issues, as well as relatively small portions of "Inuit owned lands" in Nunavut as evidence of three main weaknesses). I suggest that Nunavut faces great challenges because it does not have full control over resource development, offshore continental shelves along a good portion of Canada's vast northern coastline, and most of its funding comes from a Territorial Formula Financing agreement with the federal government that accounts for as much as 85% of Nunavut's total revenues. For this reason, I agree with Barry Dewar who has called the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement an "unresolved relationship" because it is not clear how the Inuit-run corporations that have mandates to implement various parts of the NLCA can properly work with the unrelated Government of Nunavut. "There is currently no forum where the three parties in the 'new partnership' between Canada and the Inuit of Nunavut (the Government of Canada, NTI and the Government to Nunavut) can transcend the traditional boundaries of treaty rights and federal-territorial relations to bring together their collective resources to address the challenges facing the Inuit of Nunavut."[8]

However this might play out in the context of devolution negotiations between NTI, the GN, and Canada, the architects of Nunavut brought about greater integration in the Canadian federation and were not interested in a "nation to nation" approach, such as that taken in the Dene Declaration of 1975. In fact, my thesis shows that the modern Inuit, whose homelands span all the way from the Russian Arctic, through Alaska, northern Canada and into Greenland (there are no indigenous peoples in Iceland), have developed a wide variety of remarkable political innovations in the context of the geopolitical states that have

[8] Barry Dewar, "Nunavut and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement: An Unresolved Relationship." *Policy Options* July-August (2009), 79.

claimed the territories in which they have lived for thousands of years. None of these groups have formally taken a "nation to nation" approach (even though Inuit land claims are "modern comprehensive claims" in the Canadian tradition), except arguably Greenland that sees itself as potentially an independent state like any other. By contrast, Nunavut is on a very long road towards having province-like responsibilities in Canadian federalism and thereby joining in "the club" with southern Provinces. In my view, the development of a Territorial strategy, after the division of the NWT, set the Inuit of Nunavut on a separate path towards the realization of self-government when compared to all other indigenous groups in Canada.

However, as I have suggested, much more needs to be done to ensure that Nunavut actually benefits from resource development in the Nunavut Settlement Area and can move towards greater self-sufficiency and a reduced relationship of dependency. Furthermore, it is not clear how territories with these land claims could ever have jurisdictions or political situations comparable to the 10 southern provinces. In this sense, the Territories are truly unique because they have innovated since the creation of the southern provinces.

The Nunavut project prioritized "political development" at least after the 1992 Nunavut Political Accord (itself a crystallization of debates that occurred through the 1970s and '80s). Political development amounted to a Territorial strategy that promoted greater integration in the constitution of Canada but so far has been unable to decrease social problems in the north that have precursors long before 1993.[9] Obviously, other possible strategies towards self-determination were possible, such as developing a larger critical conversation about whether the rather generic territorial strategy consistent with Westphalian (or Westminster) government was the best option for advocates of Nunavut project to pursue. However, many of these decisions have now been made with the signing of the NLCA and the parallel development of the GN. In less than 50 years, Inuit moved from a tribal system to a "modern" Territorial one in the tradition of Canadian

[9] Terry Fenge, "Self Determination: Persuading Ottawa to Get Serious: Implementing Land Claims & Self-Government." *Northern Public Affairs* 1, no. 2 (2012).

federalism.

Throughout the duration of this project, I have been interested in how political development occurs in Canada's northlands and waters; I have analyzed a variety of interconnected issues such as the historical emergence of the territories, the role of settlements and towns, as well as broader social forces such as natural scientific research and trade disputes. As a consequence, I have reaped the benefits of an area studies approach to understand how the present in the north has been constituted. The assumption of limiting the range of my research to a broad area, coupled with a conflict approach, I believe creates many possibilities to further develop my research and make a lasting contribution to the field of Arctic political studies. Studying politics as a reflection of disagreement(s) allows social scientists to better understand where northern institutions – such as Nunavut itself – came from and to move beyond the "taken for granted" attitude that most adults learn to develop to navigate in the social world on a daily basis. My research shows how to move beyond the taken for granted image of the Canadian north.

APPENDIX A: NRI SOCIAL SCIENCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE RESEARCH APPLICATION (RENEWAL) IN ENGLISH AND INUKTITUT (2011)

Nunavut Research Institute Social Sciences and Traditional Knowledge Research Application (renewal)

Applicant: Barret Weber, Ph.D. Candidate (ABD)
Department of Sociology
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Mosha.cote@arcticcollege.ca

Supervisor Committee:
Dr. Rob Shields, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta
Dr. Mark Nuttall, Department of Anthropology, University of Alberta
Dr. Imre Szeman, Department of English, University of Alberta

Report of work completed in 2010

In October 2010, from October 4 to 29, I conducted fieldwork research in Iqaluit with a focus on the growth of that city. This research used mixed methods including participant observation, photography, and interviews using snow-ball sampling with participants who have knowledge of the topic of urbanization and Arctic sovereignty. This research investigated local perspectives of Arctic sovereignty as a long-standing, controversial Canadian governmental discourse. A regional, urban-based approach is suitable because it enables an analysis of the ways in which local and global perspectives interact, both supporting and challenging each other in complex and interesting ways. This research considered 'Arctic sovereignty' in the broadest terms possible, which is not simply reducible to the policies of the Canadian Federal Government and its much-touted 'Arctic Strategy'.

Plans for 2011 field season

July 11- August 03, 2011, I will finish my fieldwork by visiting Iqaluit for my Ph.D. research. The intention of this trip is to follow-up with previous contacts and interviewees, as well as to follow-up on interviews conducted by Dr. Rob Shields during his last field visit to Iqaluit, December 6th to 11th 2010. We have begun a longer-term research initiative with focus on the urbanization of Iqaluit as an important regional hub for the Nunavut Territory. We are currently working on an article for publication in an academic journal such as Polar Geography or the Canadian Geographer. We seek to understand how the discourse of Arctic Sovereignty in Canada has impacted the development of Iqaluit as a city, including the ongoing role of the federal government in Nunavut more broadly. This research attempts to bring together global and local perspectives and make sense of the various, complicated ways in which local opinions inform broader questions of Arctic urbanization processes, climate change and globalization. In this sense, this project is oriented towards understanding the complex links that exist between the local and the global, including how climate change and globalization have made these links increasingly obvious and problematic. In addition to this, I am interested in talking to Nunavumiut about the role of seal hunting in the northern economy and how the EU seal ban has affected them.

ᐃᓄᖅᑎᑐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓂᑐᖃᖅᓯᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖅᑎᑦᓂᖅ (ᓄᑦᓯᓇᒪᐊᑭᑎᒥᖅ ᑐᖅᓯᕐᕆᑦ)

ᑐᖅᓯᕐᕆᑐᖅ: ᐃᐅᑦᓪ ᐅᐊᖏᐅ, ᓯᓚᑦᑐᓴᕐᐃᓐᓇᖅ ᐱᓵᓱᖅᑕᕐᓚᐊᓕᕐᕆᑐᖅ (ABD)

ᐃᓄᖅᑎᑐᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓕᓵᖅᓯᑦ

ᐃᐅᕐᑭᒃ ᓯᓚᑦᑐᓴᕐᕆᐊᕐᓇᖅ

ᓄᓇᑭᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓕᓵᖅᓯᑦ

ᒍᑦ ᑯᑕᐃ: (867) 979-7279; (867) 979-7109

ᖃᐅᓪᓚᕆᐅᕐᖅᓯᑦ: mosha.cote@arcticcollege.ca

ᐃᓕᓴᕆᐊᕐᓂᖏᓂᑦ ᐱᓵᓱᑦᑕᓚᐊᓕᕐᖅᑐᑦ ᑲᒪᔨᖏᑦᑕ:

ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔪᕐᕋᐊᖅ ᖁᴳ ᓯᐅᑦᑕᕐᓴ, ᐃᓄᖅᑎᑐᓂᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓕᓵᖅᓯᑦ ᐃᐅᕐᑭᒃ ᓯᓚᑦᑐᓴᕐᕆᐊᕐᓇᖅ

ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔪᕐᕋᐊᖅ ᒧᑉ ᓴᑕᑦ, ᐃᑦᑕᕐᓂᓴᓚᓕᓂᕐᕆᑐᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓕᓵᖅᓯᑦ, ᐃᐅᕐᑭᒃ ᓯᓚᑦᑐᓴᕐᕆᐊᕐᓇᖅ

ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔪᕐᔪᐊᖅ ᐃᐊᒻᕆ ᓰᒪᓐ, ᖃᑦᓗᓈᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖓᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᓕᕆᔨᒃᑯᑦ, ᐃᐅᓪᕘᑕ ᓯᓚᑦᑐᓴᕐᕕᒡᔪᐊᖅ

ᐅᓂᒃᑳᓕᐊᖅ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖑᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ 2010-ᒥ

ᐋᒃᑑᕝᕙ 2010-ᖑᑎᓪᓗᒍ, ᐋᒃᑑᕝᕙ 4-ᒥᑦ 29-ᒧᑦ, ᐊᐱᖅᓱᕆᐊᖅᑐᖅᓯᒪᓚᐅᖅᐳᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᕐᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᖕᓂ ᑐᑭᓯᓂᐊᕆᐊᖅᑐᒍ ᓄᓇᓖᑦᑦ ᐱᕈᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓ. ᑕᕝᕙᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᔾᔨᒌᓐᖏᑦᑐᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖃᓚᐅᖅᐳᖓ ᐱᓕᕆᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᑎᑎᕋᖅᑐᖓ, ᐊᔾᔨᓕᐅᕆᕙᒃᑐᖓᓗ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐊᐱᖅᓱᕐᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᓄᐊᑕᒃᑲ ᑲᑎᑉᐸᓪᓕᐊᕋᐅᔭᖅᑐᒥᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᖃᑕᐅᔪᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓂᖃᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓐᓄᒃᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ. ᐅᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᓱᖕᓂᐅᓚᐅᖅᐳᖅ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᒥᒃᓵᓄᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᓯᒪᔪᓂᒃ. ᐃᓄᒋᐊᒃᑐᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᑕᒪᑐᒥᖓ ᐱᐅᓛᖑᓚᐅᖅᐳᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᓐᓇᕐᑦᑕ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪ ᓯᓚᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᕙᒃᑕᖏᑦ ᑲᑎᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᑕᒪᒃᑯᐊ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᓱᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᓱᓐᖏᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖏᑦ ᓱᓇᒥᒃ ᓴᖅᑮᓯᒪᒻᒪᖔᑦ. ᐅᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᐅᕗᖅ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᑭᒃᑯᓕᒫᓂᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᒃᑯᖏᑕ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖅᑕᑐᐊᕆᓐᖏᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᒥᒃᓵᓄᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓇᓱᐊᖅᑐᓂ.

ᐸᕐᓇᒍᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ 2011-ᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᕐᒥ

ᔪᓚᐃ 11-ᒥᑦ ᐋᒡᒋᓯ 3, 2011-ᒧᑦ, ᐱᔭᕇᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᔪᒪᕗᖓ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖅᑕᓐᓂᒃ ᐅᐸᒃᑲᓐᓂᕐᓗᖓ ᐃᖃᓗᖕᓄᑦ ᐃᓕᓐᓂᐊᕐᓂᓐᓄᑦ ᐱᔭᕇᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᔭᒃᑲᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᕆᓂᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ. ᑕᕝᕙᓂ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᒃᓴᓂ ᐅᐸᒃᑲᓐᓂᕈᒪᕗᖓ ᐊᐱᖅᓱᖃᑦᑕᓚᐅᖅᑕᒃᑲᓂᒃ, ᐊᒻᒪ ᐊᐱᖅᓱᒃᑲᓐᓂᕐᓂᐊᕐᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᐱᖅᑯᑎᓕᐊᕆᓚᐅᖅᑕᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔪᕐᔪᐊᑉ ᖀᐤ ᓯᐅᑦᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᐃᔨᒪ ᐅᐸᓚᐅᕐᓂᖓᓂᑦ ᑭᖑᓪᓕᖅᐹᒥᒃ ᐃᖃᓗᖕᓄᑦ, ᑎᓯᐱᕆ 6-ᒥᑦ 11-ᒧᑦ, 2011. ᐸᕐᓇᒍᑎᖃᖅᓯᒪᓕᖅᐳᒍᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᒃᓴᒥᒃ ᓯᕗᓂᑐᖃᒧᑦ ᐃᓐᓄᒃᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ ᑐᑦᑕᕝᕙᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ. ᒫᓐᓇ ᑎᑎᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓯᒪᕗᒍᒃ ᐅᓂᒃᑳᓕᐊᑦᑎᓐᓂᒃ ᐱᓕᕆᐅᒻᒪᕆᓄᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑐᒥ ᓄᓇᖑᐊᓕᐅᖅᑎᓄᑦ ᑐᖀᖓᔪᓂᒃ (Polar Geography) ᐅᕝᕙᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐅᖃᓕᒫᒐᕐᒧᑦ (Canadian Geographer). ᑕᕝᕙᓂ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᓱᐊᖅᓯᒪᕗᒍᒃ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑦᑐᐃᓂᖃᖅᓯᒪᒻᒪᖔᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᒧᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓕᖅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᖓᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖅᑯᖏᑕ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥ. ᐅᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᖃᑎᖅᓯᐃᓇᓱᖕᓂᐅᕗᖅ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪ ᓯᓚᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᖃᑦᑕᖅᓯᒪᔭᖏᑕ ᑐᑭᖏᓐᓂᒃ ᐊᒻᒪ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑦᑐᐃᓂᖃᒻᒫᑦᑕ ᓄᓇᓕᑦ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᖏᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓐᓄᒃᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ, ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓕᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓯᓚᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᒻᒪᑦ, ᐅᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᖅ ᑐᖀᖓᓗᐊᖅᐳᖅ ᓄᓇᓖᑦ ᐊᒻᒪ ᓯᓚᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥᐅᑦ ᐊᑦᑐᐃᖃᑎᒌᖕᓂᖏᓐᓂᒃ, ᐱᖃᓯᐅᑎᓪᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ

ᐊᓯᕈᖅᐸᓪᓚᐊᓂᖓ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑑᑉ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓕᖅᐸᓪᓚᐊᓂᖓ ᓯᓚᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥᐅᓄᑦ ᐊᑲᐅᙱᓐᓂᖏᓐᓂᒡᓗ. ᐊᒻᒪᑦᑕᐅᖅ, ᑐᑭᓯᒋᐊᕈᒪᕗᖓ ᐅᖃᖃᑎᒋᕙᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓄᓇᕗᒻᒥᐅᑦ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖓᓂᒃ ᓇᑦᑎᖁᓱᖕᓂᐅᑉ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᐃᑦ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑕᖅᑐᒥ ᐊᒻᒪ ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐊᑦᑐᖅᑕᐅᓯᒪᖕᒪᖔᑦ ᑕᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂ ᐱᔪᒪᔭᐅᒍᓐᓃᓚᐅᖅᑎᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᓇᑦᑏᑦ ᖃᓯᖏᑦ.

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Arts, Science & Law Research Ethics Board (ASL REB)

***Certificate of REB Approval** for Fully-Detailed Research Proposal*

Applicant: Barret Weber

Supervisor (if applicable): Robert Shields

Department / Faculty: Sociology / Arts

Project Title: Local Discourses of Arctic Sovereignty in Iqaluit

Grant / Contract Agency (and number): Canadian Circumpolar Institute: the Northern Training Institute and Circumpolar/Boreal Alberta Research 2009-10

(ASL REB member) **Application number**: #2131

Approval Expiry Date: June 25, 2010

CERTIFICATION of ASL REB APPROVAL

I have reviewed your application for research ethics renewal and conclude that changes made to your research proposal meet the University of Alberta standards for research involving human participants (GFC Policy Section 66). On behalf of the *Arts, Science & Law Research Ethics Board* (ASL REB), I am providing expedited research ethics approval.

Expedited research ethics approval allows you to continue your research with human participants. Your application will be presented to the ASL REB board at its next meeting on ***June 29, 2009.*** If the board has any questions, suggestions or concerns, I will communicate them to you in a timely fashion.

This research ethics approval is valid for one year. To request a renewal after ***June 25 , 2010***, please contact me and explain the circumstances, making reference to the research ethics review number assigned to this project (see above). Also, if there are significant changes to the project that need to be reviewed, or if any adverse effects to human participants are encountered in your research, please contact me immediately.

ASL REB member (name & signature): Judith Golec Judith Golec

Date: June 25 , 2009

November 7, 2008

APPENDIX C: LETTER OF CONSENT FOR ADULTS

Project title: Cooperation and Conflict in the Discourse of Arctic Sovereignty

This research is funded by the following sources: Canadian Circumpolar Institute (CCI) Circumpolar Boreal Alberta Research Grant (CBAR) Grant program and the Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Canada, Northern Scientific Training Program (NSTP)

I freely and voluntarily and without element of force or coercion, consent to be a participant in this research study being conducted by Barret Weber and Professor Rob Shields of Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton Canada.

I understand the purpose of this research study is to explore the ways in which local knowledge relates to broader questions about sovereignty in the Arctic region.

I understand that the data generated from this interview may be used in Barret Weber's doctoral dissertation research supervised by Rob Shields. The dissertation is the primary outcome of this research, which may include presentations at conferences, publications in scholarly journals and to be used as examples for teaching purposes. Shields may also use the data in his role as Professor of Sociology in scholarly publications and teaching.

I understand that I will be asked to be interviewed individually about this topic by the researcher. The time commitment for this interview is expected to last approximately .5 to 1 hour.

I understand that the interview may be audio-tape recorded by the researcher for the purpose of ensuring accuracy and enabling the researcher to thoroughly analyze the data gathered in this interview. I understand that the audio tapes will be kept by the researcher in a locked filing cabinet at a secure location. Only the researcher will have access to these tapes and these tapes will be destroyed by June 20, 2015.

I understand my participation is totally voluntary and I may stop participation at anytime. If I choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty of any kind***. I can withdraw from the INTERVIEW at anytime (meaning in the course of the interview). The participant who indicates that he or she wishes to withdraw from an INTERVIEW will then be asked by the researchers whether s/he wishes to withdraw FROM THE STUDY altogether. If s/he indicates so, all data will be destroyed immediately, and s/he will no longer be involved with the study in any way. If s/he would still like to be partially involved, the researcher will specify how much involvement the participant would approve of.***

If a piece of research is already published, the participant cannot fully withdraw from the study. However, the participant will be completely removed from any subsequent (that is, after s/he indicates that s/he no longer wishes to participate in this study as such) studies, publications, reports, and presentations.

I understand there is a possibility of a minimal level of risk involved if I agree to participate in this study. The foreseeable risks are not expected to cause harm or discomfort that exceeds that ordinarily encountered in daily life. I also understand that there may be no direct benefits to me.

I understand that information obtained by the researcher during the course of this interview and this research study will remain confidential, to the extent allowed by law.

Will you allow the researcher to use your name in any publications or presentations that result from the study? **Yes** or **No.**

If 'no', I understand that the researcher will protect confidentiality, in that every effort will be made to conceal your name through the use of the names of the institutions for which you represent in the written analysis of this research study. Through careful coding of the data, the research team will protect your welfare to minimize risks and to maintain the integrity of the substance of the data.

I understand that the researcher will carefully present any data such as descriptions of individuals and locations to sufficiently disguise them to others, but also to maintain the integrity of the substance of the data.

I understand that because the research is being conducted in my institution, it may be impossible to ensure that insiders will not recognize some individuals, particularly those who hold unique positions in the institution. In such situations, even though the researcher has taken the steps to protect confidentiality that are stated in the prior three paragraphs here, confidentiality cannot be absolutely assured.

I understand that this consent may be withdrawn at any time without prejudice, penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. I have been given the right to ask and have answered any inquiry concerning the study. Questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that if I request a summary report of the analysis and conclusions of this research study, it will be provided within 2 weeks of that request.

I understand that if have any questions concerning this research study or my rights, I may contact any of the following. The researcher, Barret Weber, at tel. (780) 965-0474 (ph) (780) 492-7196 (fax) or e-mail: barretw@ualberta.ca or the collaborating faculty Prof. Rob Shields at tel. (780) 492-0488 or email: rshields@ualberta.ca or the Arts, Science and Law Research Ethics Board, University of Alberta at tel. (780) 492-4224.

- *"I have been fully informed of the objectives of the project being conducted. I understand these objectives and consent to being interviewed for the project. I understand that steps will be undertaken to ensure that this interview will remain confidential unless I consent to being identified. I also understand that, if I wish to withdraw from the study, I may do so without any repercussions."*

APPENDIX D: DETAILED SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS TO BE CONDUCTED (2009)

- **Project Title**: *Local Discourses of Arctic Sovereignty in Iqaluit*
- **Principle investigators**: Barret Weber & Dr. Rob Shields, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta
- **Project Location**: Iqaluit, Nunavut
- **Timeframe**: Sept 29, 2009 to October 12, 2009
- **Project Description**
    - Purpose: associate local discourses with wider questions about sovereignty in the Arctic
    - goals & objectives: to gather data through open ended interviews about how local stakeholders make sense of sovereignty in everyday terms
- **Methodology**
    - collection protocol: open ended, semi structured interviews (see details below)
    - collection mechanisms: digital recorder (audio only), hand-written notes
    - indicate why specific communities or individuals were selected for your research: communities and individuals are selected based on their relevance for our interest in making sense of sovereignty claims in everyday terms
- **Data**
    - short term & long term use of data: popular and academic publications
    - other uses of data: community engagement, policy research
- **Reporting**
    - How will the research results be communicated to the individual participants, communities, regional and Nunavut organizations?: This will be done through research feedback mechanisms while we visit Iqaluit. If funding permits, we will also visit Iqaluit again in 2010.
    - Will the research result in a publication? Yes, we will submit to peer reviewed journal interested in northern studies.

Brief Project Methodology

The principal investigators will conduct interviews in Iqaluit, Nunavut from September 29 through October 12, 2009. The overall intention of this research project is to relate or associate local discourses with wider questions about sovereignty in the Arctic (this is the rationale underlying each of the questions for participants, listed below). We attempt to underscore the various ways in which residents of Iqaluit interpret and enjoy life in their town, region, and broader contexts in everyday terms. We will gather data for this project by conducing flexible semi structured and open-ended interviews with local stakeholders (more detail below) and to document the interviews using electronic recorders (audio only). The interviews will be non-intrusive but follow prompts to develop new questions that might emerge throughout the discussion (two-way communication). We will transcribe the interview selectively based on publication demands and the transcriptions will only be used by us.

Participants in this study will be recruited on the basis of a convergence of interests (ours and theirs) from the city of Iqaluit. We hope to conduct at least 12 interviews. We will attempt to minimize risk to participants at all times by adhering to some rather basic principles of respecting others (intersubjective ethics that valorizes dignity, privacy, and voluntary consent during all phases of research). We will ask participants to answer only the questions that they wish or feel comfortable answering, and anonymity and confidentiality will be strictly maintained at all times. We may identify participants by name in the analysis of the data, and use the participants' exact words in quotations, but we will always attempt to respect the intention and meaning of their words. We will not use any strategies of deception in this study – we would like to know what participants think in their own words. The questions will be translated into Inuktitut for the benefit of participants.

The process of recruiting participants is still ongoing as an active part of our research plan. We employ a grounded strategy of approaching citizens (snowball sampling) present in the community and through acquaintance during background preparation and our visit to Iqaluit (this is why our strategy implies a coincidence of interest between researchers and participants – we seek to prepare a study, and perhaps the participants would like to 'tell their story'). In the course of our trip to Iqaluit, we will acquire data as we make sense of community life there. The consent form (attached) will be given to each participant to assist in ensuring transparency at all times. If participants request a debriefing or report of our findings, it will be provided promptly.

APPENDIX E: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Conceptual Question	**Interview Question**	**Possible Answers (things to probe on)**
How is knowledge of the North constructed?	How is knowledge of the North constructed? What does 'Arctic sovereignty' mean to you?	Cooperation initiatives; ecology; politics; social life
To what extent is Northern policy based on perceptions of its materiality (and what is that perceived materiality)?	How has your city/ nation/ region been impacted by climate change?	Ease of navigation, mining, settlement, etc.
Are current opportunities/changes in the North mandating a rethinking of sovereignty?	Several recent declarations (Illulisat, NW Passage Working Group) have emphasized that Northern policy can be worked out through treaties among existing states exercising sovereignty rather than supersovereign comprehensive circumpolar governance. Do you agree? How can new forms of sovereignty be incorporated into this?	Contrast with idea of Inuit Circumpolar Council that Arctic is a space that transcends territorial sovereignty.
To what extent is the North understood through comparison with another place?	As your agency/nation/organization develops its Northern policy, what other spaces do you look to for examples?	Panama Canal, Antarctica, etc.
How is the North being constructed as a space of opportunity/threat/identity?	What do you see as the greatest opportunity (or threat) posed in the North? Why is/isn't the North important to your national government?	Navigation, mining, military, environment, terrorism, tourism, cooperation, rights of First Nations. Contrasting role of North in different national identities/ideologies and histories.
To what extent are negotiations helped/hindered by different parties having different sense of what the North is?	What do you see as major obstacles preventing your country from developing a coherent Northern policy? What do you see as major obstacles to achieving global agreement on Arctic governance?	Media, role of North in national ideology
To what extent is the North a virtual place constructed through media representations rather than through experience?	Do you feel that portrayals of the North in the media accurately reflect your country's/organization's/nations interests and concerns?	

APPENDIX F: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE CREATION OF NUNAVUT[1]

1951- North West Territories Legislative Council re-established

1952- establishment of the Eskimo Committee

1953-55- Arctic Exiles relocated to High Arctic

1957- John Diefenbaker introduces "Roads to Resources" program

1962- North West Territories renamed "Northwest Territories"

1966- Carrothers Commission Report published

1967- Yellowknife chosen as Territorial capital

1969- Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy ("the White Paper") published

1971- Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is passed in United States Congress

-Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) founded

1973- Canada releases policy on comprehensive claims. ITC begins to study Inuit land use

1975- Dene Declaration promotes self-government and a "nation within a nation" approach

1976- ITC proposes the Nunavut Territory, which includes the Beaufort sea and Yukon north slope. Inuvialuit leave the ITC to pursue their own land claim. Federal boundaries commission argues that NWT be divided between Nunatsiaq region in the east and Western Arctic in the west

1977- Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE) presents Inuvialuit Nunangat for Agreement-in-Principle

-Dec.14- NWT Inuit Land Claims Commission calls for the creation of a new territory and government

-Berger Report on Mackenzie Valley Pipeline published

[1] Adapted and expanded from: D. Wall Research Group. "Nunavut, Canada: Significant Events in the Development of Canada's Newest Territory 1971-1981." The Canadian Aboriginal Issues Database (1999).

1978- Greenland Home Rule established

1979- NWT Divided into 2 electoral districts for a federal election: Nunatsiaq and Western Arctic

-ITC in Igloolik releases "Political Development in Nunavut" paper

-Baker Lake ruling by Justice Patrick Mahoney: Baker Lake area is subject to Inuit aboriginal title

1980- Building Nunavut: A working document with a proposal for an Arctic Constitution published

- Drury Report recommends that NWT remain a single political unit

1981- NWT adopts a plebiscite ordinance and sets a date for 14 April 1982 – "Do you think the Northwest Territories should be divided? YES or NO?"

-Dene Nation and Métis Association proposes a province-like jurisdiction called "Denedeh" in a paper called "Public Government for the People of the North"

-Canada "In all fairness—a Native Claims Policy" paper, restates 1973 policy on comprehensive claims. States that benefits are to "facilitate the economic, social and cultural developments of the native communities concerned"

-Nunavut Constitutional Forum established

1982- Tungavik Federation of Nunavut formed to represent Inuit across all of Canada

1984- 25 July Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Settlement Act passed

1985- David Crombie, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs, announces that federal government is willing to support division of NWT when boundary is agreed upon

1986- Dene/Métis sign an agreement with the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) regarding boundaries and overlaps through Kitikmeot and Keewatin regions

1987- The federal government releases "Comprehensive Land Claims Policy" that considers options that do not lead to the formal extinguishment of aboriginal title.

-15 January Constitutional Alliance (CA) sign the Iqaluit Agreement on the ungratified 1986 Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) and Dene/Métis boundary and overlap agreement.

-12 March "Boundary and Constitutional Agreement for the Implementation of Division of the Northwest Territories between the Western Constitutional Forum and the Nunavut Constitutional Forum" approved by Legislative Assembly. It recommends a plebiscite on the proposed boundary be held.

1987- the Iqaluit Agreement fails as TFN and Dene/Métis do not agree on the proposed boundary and overlap agreement.

1990- April 30 Nunavut Political Accord, agreement-in-principle between Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, the NWT, and federal government, was signed. The boundary for the division was adopted

1991- July Gwitch'in reach a land claim settlement with the federal government

-December Tom Siddon, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, announces final agreement with the Inuit of the eastern Arctic

-NWT Commissioner John Parker is appointed as advisor to resolve the boundary dispute between TFN and Dene/Métis of the Northwest Territories. "The Parker Line" was established as the boundary between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories.

1992- TFN accepts the land claims agreement "Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada"

-17 February it is decided that May 4, 1992 will be the date for a plebiscite on the boundary between NWT and Nunavut

-22 April Gwich'in final comprehensive agreement signed

-4 May 54% of residents of NWT vote in favour of division and "the Parker Line"

-3-5 November 69% of Inuit vote in favour of land claims agreement

1993- July 9 Nunavut Act received Royal Assent by Parliament of Canada

-25 May Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act is signed, transferred $1.1 billion to TFN

-Nunavut Implementation Commission is created to implement NLCA

1995- *Footprints in New Snow* report published by Nunavut Implementation Commission

1996- *Footprints 2 report* released. Iqaluit chosen by plebiscite as the capital of Nunavut

1999- April- Nunavut created as a sub-national territory of Canada

2002- February- *Building Nunavut Through Decentralization: Evaluation Report* published by Millenium Partners

2006- Thomas Berger published "Conciliator's Final Report, 'the Nunavut Project'"

2009- October- *Qanukkanniq? Government of Nunavut Report Card* published by North Sky Consulting

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