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JAMAICA: FROM SLAVERY TO INDEPENDENCE -- THE CHANGING FORMS OF DEPENDENCY AND LIBERATION -- A STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

by

(C) VINSTON A.S. WILLIAMS

A THESIS

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Date April 7, 1983

To the poor majority of Jamaica

ABSTRACT

In the past two decades a steady growth of "dependency" research, mainly by critical Third World scholars, has generated an increasing pool of insights into the processes of development/underdevelopment. Increasingly, too, researchers are moving towards more sophisticated analyses of the role of education in the processes of development/underdevelopment and of the international forces impinging upon the education system in emergent nations. These studies have increased our understanding of the nature of the contribution which education can make towards development. This dissertation therefore builds upon this body of critical research by attempting to assess the effectiveness of the dominant theoretical models of development which have guided the major public policies in post-independent Jamaica.

Two historical chapters will discuss the major socio-economic and political factors shaping the process of underdevelopment in Jamaica during the crucial periods of world capitalist development. The analysis will show that underdevelopment is a dynamic process involving internal structures of class inequalities, reinforced by external or metropolitan dominance of the Jamaican political-economy.

The next three analytical chapters discuss the major assumptions of the dominant theoretical models and the governmental actions, based on them in the Jamaican context. On the basis of a priori theorizing rather than on an appreciation of the existing or emerging social reality, the intellectual establishment in the post-war period has lent support to the neo-classical paradigm. Many in this group have defined imitative development practice in terms of modernization and

industrialization. For the most part, in fact, their prescriptions amount to a little more foreign aid or trade and technology for "development". The emerging Jamaican ruling class adopted this notion of industrialization as the answer to their problems -- underdevelopment, crushing poverty and increasing unemployment/underemployment. But as this study will show, the decision-making elite was surprised when this path of "development" neither led to their effective consolidation of power nor made any serious impact on the unemployment problem, the rationale for adopting the strategy.

Industrialization on a state level now proven inadequate to the problem, an attempt was made at industrialization on a regional level. The limited gains derived from this strategy led to the adoption of the more "radical" alternative model of "non-capitalist" or socialist-oriented development based on "self-reliance". I hope to document the frustrations the policy-making elite encountered with the fascination for this non-capitalist panacea for development in Jamaica.

Notwithstanding the supposedly contrasting path to development, the foregoing strategies share a common assumption that it is the "modern" industrial rather than the traditional agricultural sector that must spearhead development. This two-sector theory of development, in which the manpower needs of the industrial sector predominate over the agricultural, has had a major impact on educational expansion in post-war Jamaica. The task of the concluding chapter will be to argue that there is a need for a new development ideology for Jamaica (and other underdeveloped countries) and a new integrated development strategy including a supportive new educational strategy.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The real challenge posed by the breakdown of the old plantation system which reigned in Jamaica (and in the British-held Caribbean) from the mid-17th century to the mid-19th century was that of building a new order -- resting on a genuinely integrated society with an autonomous culture and value system, a national economy providing full employment and a rising standard of living, and economic and political unity in the region. But one hundred years after emancipation -- in 1938 -- this was yet to be.

The decade of 1930s found Jamaica in a state of political colonialism, continuing poverty and unemployment and underemployment, and economic dependence on the metropolis, with an ailing sugar industry more than dependent on metropolitan preferences.[1] Substandard wages and conditions of life (particularly housing and health) prevailed on the sugar estates. Malnutrition was widespread, as was lack of educational opportunities and of elementary social services for the population. Falling prices for primary products associated with the world depression of the thirties aggravated the situation. Politically, economically and culturally the centuries-old link with the metropolis prevailed over links among the countries of the region. A century after emancipation, no new order had been established.

The year 1944 ushered in constitutional changes in Jamaica which were to lead to a gradual evolution to independence in 1962.

The changes in the mid-forties replaced the obsolete Crown Colony form of government by a representative system which gradually conceded a large measure of responsibility for purely internal affairs to the elected representatives of the people. With the formation of political parties and the extension of the franchise to the entire population, more attention began to be focused on economic development than hitherto.

In the post-war period the sugar plantation retained its hegemony in the agricultural sector. Indeed, there has not been any serious attempt at agricultural and rural reconstruction since emancipation and the ending of the old slave economy. When, finally, development potential was assessed by the now political directorate one dominant intellectual influence underpinned the attempt to create a new economic and social order: the philosophy of industrial development evolved from the old intellectual framework of thinking. Therefore, the panacea sought by the emerging political elites[2] after self-government and independence from 1950 onwards was industrialization, strongly influenced by the thesis that the manufacturing sector held the key to economic development. The theoretical underpinnings for the policy were provided by the dominant macro intellectual establishment. It is this combination of development theory and governmental practice which will be the central focus of this study.

Scope and Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to use the dominant macro theoretical models of development as frameworks for testing the major developments which have taken place in post-independent Jamaica, as policy planners attempt to create a new economic and social order. In order to achieve the main aim of the research a theoretical discussion is undertaken to identify the dominant models of "development" and "underdevelopment." For the purpose of this thesis the most important theoretical models are those pioneered by Prebisch,[3] Lewis,[4] McIntyre-Demas[5] and Best-Levitt-Beckford.[6] The testing of the major postulates of these models against empirical observations in the Jamaican context may be viewed as a viable approach for validating or invalidating theories.

The period covered by this study is mainly from 1962 to about mid-1982, and concerns the major strategies pursued by successive Jamaican Governments to deal with the problems of economic underdevelopment, poverty and excessive external dependence. The expansion of education is an integral part of Government development strategy and thus will be a major focus of the empirical study.

The Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) formed the first government with independence in 1962 and ruled for two five-year terms to 1972. The JLP followed an internal development strategy of "peripheral" or dependent industrialization, which already had been in operation from the fifties. In the late sixties, two new strategies were formulated at the intra- and extra-regional levels whose major objective was to promote economic development.

In 1972, the People's National Party (PNP) assumed national office for the first time since independence and signaled an abrupt break with post-war development strategies. The PNP, guided by the intellectual influence of the "dependency economics" of Prebisch "centre-periphery" and the Best-Levitt-Beckford "plantation" models of underdevelopment, pursued an internal strategy of "self-reliance" or autonomous development. The party continued and intensified the JLP strategies at the intra- and extra-regional levels.

With the formation of a third JLP Government in 1980 the internal development strategy again emphasizes dependent industrialization. This time there was a new thrust on export-oriented industries.

Chapter Overview

The first task of the study is to trace the development of dependent underdevelopment as a necessary background for understanding the economic and social problems faced by indigenous decision-makers in post-independent Jamaica. This is partly done in chapter two, which presents a descriptive and interpretative analysis of the socio-economic, political and intellectual forces responsible for shaping contemporary Jamaican society. It discusses the rationale for the overseas economic expansion of Europe which ushered in the capitalist era. It then proceeds to describe and analyze subsequent changes in the slave economy and the social structure under the impact of external pressures from the mercantilist and early industrial phases of capitalism.

Chapter three has the task to examine the social class formation of the wage labor plantation economy in the post-emancipation era within the context of the economic relations existing between the ruling colonial elites and the metropolitan government. Also it discusses the struggle for self-determination by the nascent nationalist movement in the early decades of the 20th century under the impact of the new imperialism. It concludes by describing the constitutional changes and the subsequent emergence of an enclave economy after World War II.

The third task of the study, dealt with in chapter four, is to show Jamaica in the context of independence by focusing on the conscious policy strategies formulated by the new political directorate. In the attempt to overcome obstacles to socio-economic transformation, foreign policies have become major preoccupations of the elite decision-makers. These policies have focused largely on forging new international linkages with explicit economic and political objectives to replace the centuries of metropolitan-imposed arrangements that were severed at independence. How well Jamaican political leaders succeed in meeting pressing domestic needs, by pursuing both economic and political intra- and extra-regional strategies, concludes this chapter.

The dominant, orthodox theoretical models of development are reviewed, discussed and contrasted with the opposing Critical or Dependency world view on underdevelopment in chapter five. These models thus form the theoretical framework for empirical analysis of development policies.

It has been said that Jamaica witnessed some fundamental changes in policy-orientation in the 1972-80 period. These changes not only transformed the character of decision-making but redefined the relationships between the political directorate, the private sector and the international business institutions. An effort is made in chapter six to evaluate analytically the major policy strategies in this important period.

The main focus of chapter seven is the relationship between educational changes and the development of the dual economy after World War II. It examines specific educational reforms to discern the role of education in the development process, and raises the question: Is post-independence educational policy a force for development or underdevelopment? In addition, the chapter traces the development of education in the colonial period for understanding the substantial congruence between the economic substructure of the Jamaican society and its education superstructure, which was developed essentially to support, reinforce and reproduce the existing pyramidal economic and social order.

The concluding chapter presents an overall analysis and evaluation of the influential theoretical models underpinning development policy strategies. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the influential development strategies in terms of their effectiveness to accomplish development objectives. Finally it concludes by offering an alternative development strategy and some recommendations.

Limitations of the Study

Although a major focus of the study centered on educational expansion as an important strategy for achieving economic and social development, its scope is limited by the fact that no attempt will be made to examine all levels of educational expansion. While educational extension was rapid at the tertiary level, emphasis will be placed on the secondary level where expansion was greatest, in view of the demand for lower- and middle-echelon administrative staff.

Another limitation of this study is imposed by the materials related to the two major political parties and Government departments. I had access to many materials published exclusively by the two major political parties and Government agencies which includes political party manifestos, Government documents and official reports, and so on. They provide a mine of vital information but they had to be approached with caution because of the tendency to express opinions about the success of their activities. Additional limitation derived from the materials concern the fact that I was denied access to Government documents on science and technology policy. A direct request to the Minister with the responsibility for a Task Force report scheduled for public release, was treated as though it were a classified document and was ignored.

A final limitation of this study is imposed by the methodology, which is an historical one in that the analysis of the data is treated chronologically and subjected in part to interpretation. It is therefore subject to the limitations of all

studies which rely in part on the interpretation of the investigator and the thing investigated. As E.H. Carr reminds us, "the social sciences -- and history among them -- cannot accommodate themselves to a theory of knowledge which puts subject and object asunder, and enforces a rigid separation between the observer and thing observed."[7]

This thesis does not make any pretence to be neutral in the conventional sense of the word. The facts of history cannot be purely objective, since they become facts only by virtue of the significance attached to them by the researcher. In the task of interpretation my standard of significance is my standard of objectivity.

I reject therefore the notion that social science is or ever can be value-free or neutral. The values underlying this study are not veiled. Unlike many rather naive adherents to the functionalist paradigm or world view, there is no delusion that this approach, and this study in particular, will solve any problems on the level of praxis. However critical assessment employing the historical, comparative approach is a powerful tool for understanding social reality. Life is an unending dialogue between the present and the past; we are products of our present and our past; and although we may be ignorant of it, we cannot escape their influence.

In this study, the framework employed is that of critical, conflict theory. Because I feel that by focusing on conflict, a better explanation and understanding of social reality are gained than by focusing on consensus. Therefore, I reject the functionalist framework which is based on value consensus and social harmony.

Finally, I turn to the sense in which the word "critical" is used in this study. The label "critical" is adapted from the innovative scholarship of Swee Hin Toh,[8] who first used it as the alternative world view to "modernization" analysis. The designation "critical" rather than "Marxist" is employed, even though a primary source of concepts and analytical tools for this alternative world view is the social theory first laid down by Marx, then applied by revolutionaries like Lenin or Mao, and in recent decades, renovated by the emergent "neo-Marxist" social-science scholarship based largely in the First World.[9] The label of "critical" allows the inclusion of those thinkers and activists who would find Marxist concepts like class exploitation and imperialism indispensable for explaining facets of social reality (for example, problems of Third World under-development), but who simultaneously for various philosophical reasons, may not deem "Marxism" as the all-embracing and comprehensive theoretical basis for human praxis.[10] It also avoids the problem of identifying the "sub-schools" within Marxism, which often engage in bitter factional disputes.

Review of Related Literature

The primary source material for the study, collected largely between January and May 1980 in Jamaica where this research had its genesis, was adequate and of varying quality and usefulness. The material includes Government documents and official reports; publications and manifestos of the two major political parties, interviews and newspaper reports. The most important documents were those pertaining to development planning.

I had access to the vital Five-Year Independence Plan 1963-1968, A National Plan for Jamaica 1957-67 and the Five-Year Development Plan 1978-82, in addition to examining excerpts of two Ten Year Plan of Development for Jamaica in 1945 and 1947. These national plans are in keeping with the view that useful economic planning is necessarily a part of overall public policy. Where the planning economies are underdeveloped, the economic plan not only helps to transform, but can also help to mobilize. Thus a perusal of the Plans was helpful particularly to the analytical chapters since they contain a summary of the major economic and social strategies and objectives as well as, in a few cases, an assessment of the physical and natural resources of the country.

Most of these national plans have their educational strategies for meeting economic and social goals. One of the most useful for this study is the Five-Year Education Plan (1978-83) Draft Two, the first such plan in which education is viewed as the "key aspect in the overall development policy of the country." Another education document crucial to the analysis of this study, though not conceived of as an integral part of an overall national plan, is A New Deal for Education in Independent Jamaica (1966). The document sets out the rationale for a program of educational expansion which the policy-makers saw as righting the wrongs of the colonial past while meeting socio-economic goals of the new nation.

These policy strategies, though well-intentioned, were deficient and misguided. The educational goals which are embodied in them were not attained because the economic and social goals were inappropriate for the Jamaican society. Moreover, the policy-makers

failed to appreciate the interdependence between the planning process and other aspects of the formation of public policy.

Several documents by the political parties were indispensable to this study. By far the most important are the PNP's "Democratic Socialism -- The Jamaican Model," Political Education Program, and the JLP's manifesto, Change Without Chaos, Kingston, Jamaica, 1980. These materials contained some of the policy strategies and the ideological underpinnings of these organizations' platforms that were essential for understanding the philosophical aspect of development in Jamaica.

Another source of policy strategy information is from periodicals. Jamaican periodicals provided a rich source of information on national events. Preeminent among these are the establishment Daily Gleaner and its overseas edition, The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner. The rival periodical, The Jamaican Daily News, was also an important source for material. Together they carried important speeches, reports, announcements and comments by the decision-making elites which were essential to the completion of this research.

Finally, the primary sources included interviews with influential decision-makers in Jamaica. These included, among others, The Director of Education Planning Division of the Ministry of Education, the Chairman/Director of the Scientific Research Council, the Assistant Director in the National Planning Agency, and the Principal of the College of Arts Science and Technology. Their opinions on Jamaican development policies helped to provide a balanced view on Government efforts in development as expressed in

official publications.

The secondary sources were predominantly historical works. The historical literature on Jamaica (and the Caribbean in general) is abundant in quantity and varied in quality. Some periods and some themes have received more attention than others, especially themes dealing with slavery. Indeed, social and economic historians have provided valuable studies of Jamaican slave society and of the immediate post-emancipation period, but unfortunately they have left a serious gap in our understanding of the years of direct colonial rule, from 1865 to 1944. The neglect of this period both reflects and reinforces the obsession with the "anti-society" of slave Jamaica which still provides the point of reference for many contemporary students of Jamaica.

This gap is therefore a handicap to the understanding of social change in modern Jamaica. The 19th century saw major changes, perhaps the most important being the emergence of a substantial and reasonably prosperous peasant sector and of a racially mixed intermediate class. These developments have been studied in their earlier stages, but the period of direct colonial rule was not one of economic and social stability. The social changes in this period are inadequately documented for two reasons: it is widely felt that the period represented the continuities under slavery and, further, the island (and the region generally) had declined in strategic significance and economic weight in the face of the twin forces of free-trade and the new imperialism.

One general history of Jamaica that was essential to this study is that of Edward Long's History of Jamaica, 3 vols. (London:

1774). Written when slavery was well established, this work is not merely a mine of information but it possesses distinction as historical literature, brilliance as political writing, and unsurpassed importance as one of the most interesting social documents left to posterity by any single historian of the Anglo-Caribbean. Although he was not born in Jamaica, Long was a member of a wealthy and influential family which had been connected with that island since the early days of its occupation by the English.[11] By birth an Englishman, he was nevertheless completely creole in his sympathies. However, his attachment to the island society was such that if he criticized it, as he did, it was always in the hope of stimulating reform. The object of his work was to make Jamaica better understood, not more despised, or, as he himself expressed it, to "obviate slanders and explode those prejudices which malice or error have generated."[12]

Long based his historical work securely upon the evidence of writers who had gone before him, upon consultation of official papers and private records, and upon his own considerable acquaintance with the government, economy and people of Jamaica.[13] His narrative touches upon the contribution and economic development of the island, its political and administrative history, the events of its old privateering days, and the evolution of its social system. In the course of this discussion, he exhibits an impressive acquaintance with the history of New and Old England, as well as Jamaica. He quotes official estimates of population figures, acts of Parliament, Jamaican laws, facts on agricultural history, costs and production, information taken from the Journals of the Jamaica Council

and Assembly, proclamations, letters and other kinds of documentary evidence, some of which he reprints in the body of work and in the appendices to it. There is indeed, hardly any question of historical interest to which Long did not devote some consideration, and, on the whole the documentation of his work reflects as much mastery of his subject as does his extensive range in exposition.[14] Long's book is one of the truly great achievements in the writing of West Indian history.

No one could pretend, however, that Long's interpretation of the facts which he recorded was written without strong bias. Indeed, the controversial character of his work is one of its distinguishing features, and a source of unfailing interest to the reader. Long was obviously a polemical writer. He not only narrates and describes. He constantly argues and criticises. The section of his work which describes the official hierarchy of Jamaica and analyses its functioning, contains one of the most valuable historical studies ever written on the subject of fee'd in Jamaica. It is also one of the most bitter condemnations of official corruption and inefficiency to be found in the literature on the West Indies. Long examines the abuses of the system of administration and analyses the historical and political reasons for their continued existence, exposing the culpability of individuals and the inveteracy of the system itself.

Like the Americans of the revolutionary period, Long had to face the difficulty of reconciling his concern for political liberty with the coexistence of the institution of legal enslavement in Jamaican society. Since he did not deny the validity of slavery, his resolution of the conflict had to be based, as was that of the

Americans, on the assumption that the liberal principles which he defended applied only to free men.

Long was certainly not unaware of the social influence of conditioning factors. He himself attaches great importance to the question of education for the children of free settlers in Jamaica, for this reason. But he lacked the detachment which could have enabled him to look at slavery as a condition, created by men and changeable by their actions. He preferred to see it as a thing of almost divine institution at least in so far as it involved enslavement of the African. For Long is one of the most openly racialist of West Indian writers.

Another interesting and valuable book on Jamaican and Anglo-Caribbean history, this time written from the perspective of the "outsider" in the 19th century, deserves a brief mention. No book on the problems of the post-emancipation period is more important than that of American journalist, William G. Sewell's The Ordeal of Free Labor in the West Indies (New York: 1862). Before it was published in book form, Sewell's work had appeared as a series of "Letters on Free Labor in the British West Indies," written for the New York Times. Its subject and time of its publication suggest that it was not unconnected with the question of slavery in the United States, though the author denied it. Sewell's study includes a most extended consideration of Jamaica, in which he attempts to deal with the economic aspects of his subject without entering into "moral questions." Nevertheless he admits that there were influential moral forces at work, as for instance when he says of Jamaica: "I hope to

be able to show others as plainly as the conviction has come home to myself, that disaster and misfortune have followed -- not emancipation -- but the failure to observe those great principles of liberty and justice upon which the foundations of emancipation were solidly laid."[15]

A summary idea of his conclusions may be given by the statement that he considered the labor question in the West Indies to be fundamentally a land question complicated by lack of capital to pay for high wages, by the failure to economize existing supplies of labor even where these were available, and by an inability or unwillingness to adopt mechanical improvements.

In arriving at his conclusion, Sewell studied the history of each island on its own merits, because he was aware that emancipation had not affected them all equally. He believed Jamaica to be more depressed than the state of its labor supply alone appeared to warrant. He makes the important point, for instance, that other employers, such as builders of new railroads, did not seem to meet with as much difficulty in procuring labor as the planters complained of in exploring their decline. After an exhaustive examination of the island he comes to the conclusion that, though it is true that the planters probably needed "an exclusively laboring class," it was also clear that "capital is wanted to employ the labor that may already be found in the island."[16]

On this particular issue, Sewell's judgment is of considerable significance in West Indian history. For it embodies a view which other observers, notably Edward B. Underhill, Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society of Britain, also expressed in his famous

letter to the Colonial Secretary, Edward Cardwell, which was officially rejected in favor of the more comfortable theory that black inefficiency lay at the root of the Jamaican problems. The evidence of Sewell, an extremely shrewd and penetrating observer, is wholly on his side -- and not only on this question. For Sewell considered the planter class of Jamaica to be bankrupt, not only as a proprietary group, but morally and as governing class as well.

However much Sewell may have appeared to champion the cause of the black peasant, he was not the biased partisan he was held to be on the question of slavery in the United States. While he did not have any sympathy for the pro-slavery group in the U.S., in the West Indies, however, he did try to hold the balance level between the planter and the ex-slave. This is clearly seen in his attitude towards immigration. Even for the island of Jamaica, Sewell was willing to contemplate the introduction of a permanent labor supply for the plantations, provided the planters secured more capital and adopted a more enlightened policy in their dealings with the workers.[17] The introduction of immigrants was contemplated for no other purpose than that of helping the planters. His advocacy of the cause of the black peasant did not blind him to the other interests included in the Jamaican community.

The histories of education in the major English-speaking Caribbean countries have still not been written, though a considerable amount of disparate information exists in theses and articles in libraries in England, North America and the Caribbean. Any collection of essays which makes this material more accessible to the public is welcomed. One such book is Development and Disillusion in

Third World Education, With Emphasis on Jamaica, edited by Vincent D'Oyley and Reginald Murray, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, 1979. The essays deal mainly with the development of secondary education in Jamaica, Guyana and Ghana in the 19th and 20th centuries -- which the editors apparently feel justified the use of the term "Third World." The 19th century pieces form the backbone of the volume and are very well researched.

More academic research has been done on education in Jamaica (and apparently in the other major Anglo-Caribbean countries as well) in the 19th century than in the 20th century. This is not surprising; it reflects accurately the state of the research in the history of the region. In a book of essays, any evaluation of the contents must be essentially an evaluation of the individual pieces. The essays by Ruby King and Trevor Turner are excellent and were indispensable to this study. The strength of these presentations arises from the fact that they are well researched and closely argued; the arguments are related to class, color and political power. The Turner essay on "Objectives and Provisions for Agricultural Education" is probably the best essay in the collection. His other essay is slightly less convincing in parts because he does not make a distinction (one which he made in respect to agricultural education) between peasants' distrust of trade training as conceived by the upper-classes, and trade training such as they (parents) thought would give increased status (even if not always social mobility). All in all students and administrators of education will find some of the essays enlightening and most of them useful.

Notes to Chapter One

[1]Metropolitan preferences had been restored after the First World War as Britain reversed its 19th century policy of free non-preferential trade.

[2]The concept of "the elite" has come to occupy a prominent place in the body of political science theory. Although there have been many refinements and adjustments to the original meaning of the term, it is today taken to refer to functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status for whatever reason in their spheres of activity. The significance of the concept derives from its implications for an understanding of the scope and distribution of power in a society. For, in essence, the notion of the elite is predicated upon the view that in all societies all do not share to the same extent in the administration and government of the society. See Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown, (eds.), Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977), pp. 1-2.

[3]Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 1950).

[4]W. Arthur Lewis, "Industrialization of the British West Indies," Caribbean Economic Review Vol. 11, No. 1 (May 1950).

[5]The pioneering work was first done by Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues in Trade Policy in the West Indies," in Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson, (eds.), Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971), pp. 165, and William G. Demas carried the thesis further in The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965).

[6]The pioneering work was done by L. Best and K. Levitt in Externally Propelled Industrialization and Growth in the Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University, 1968), 4 Vols. mimeo. See, also, L. Best, "A Model of Pure Plantation Economy," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 17, No. 3, (September 1968). The model was extended by George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[7]E.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964) p. 120.

[8]Swee Hin Toh, "Overseas Development Council: An Elite Policy-Planning Group on U.S.-Third World Relations, Its Power-structure and International Development-Education Ideology," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1980, p. 22.

[9]The concept is defined in Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

[10]This global open-ended designation of "critical" thus encompasses such amorphous constructs as the "liberation theology" initiated by "rebel" clergy in Latin America (See Alain Cheerbrant, The Rebel Church in Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1974), the "democratic socialism" of Michael Harrington, The Twilight of Capitalism (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1976), the Frankfurt-school "critical theory" of, for instance, Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), translated by Jeremy Shapiro, the "bourgeois-radicalism" of the Caribbean New World Group (see N. Girvan and O. Jefferson, (eds.), Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean (Kingston: New World Group Ltd., 1971), and the total Marxist commitments of such scholar-activists like Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), Monthly Review's Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), or Guyana's Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

[11]For a study of this family, see R.M. Howard, The Longs of Longsville Jamaica, and Hampton Lodge, Surrey. 2 vols (London: 1925) which contains an account of Long's childhood and of some of his letters.

[12]Introduction to Vol. 1, p. 6.

[13]Long, op. cit. Introduction to Vol. 1. He discusses the sources on pp. 2-3. He spent some twelve years in Jamaica, and during that time he held more than one official position there. Besides this he was himself a planter, born of a planting family, and so, well-acquainted with the agricultural system of the island.

[14]An appraisal shared with Professor Elsa V. Goveia in her brilliant volume entitled A Study on the Historiography of the British West Indies (Mexico: Pan American Institute of Geography and History, 1956).

[15]William G. Sewell, The Ordeal of Free Labor in the West Indies (New York: 1862), p. 178.

[16]Ibid. Ch. XXVI, passim, especially pp. 279-280.

[17]Ibid., passim, especially Chs. XXVI and XXVIII.

CHAPTER TWO

JAMAICA ENTERS THE WORLD SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL INPUT

In the late 15th and 16th centuries there came into being a European world economy. By the 17th century it had expanded into the world beyond Europe. Competition between the European members of this world system made annexation or colonization a popular form of expansion for the flow of primary products from the colony to the metropolitan center. Although the basic linkage in the parts of the system was economic, it was reinforced by political, ideological and cultural links -- the superstructure for colonial exploitation and domination. However, the modern world economy would not have been able to thrive, produce and expand without the techniques of modern capitalism and the technology of modern science.

The Expansion of European Imperialism

Jamaica entered the European world economic system with the accidental arrival of Christopher Columbus in the Western Hemisphere during the age of rapid exploration and exploitation of unknown continents and territories which ushered in the capitalist era. Henceforth the fortunes of Jamaica would be conditioned on the changes in European imperialism. The advent of Columbus to what is now the New World must not be seen as an isolated venture in exploration; it must be considered in connection with its background of political history and

economic needs of Europe. It was Europe's ambition in the 15th century to reach India and the Far East. The increasing power of the Moslem Turks during the 15th century, which culminated in the fall of Constantinople in 1453, had closed the normal overland route between Europe and the East, while the Italian maritime States of Venice and Genoa imposed heavy tolls and duties.[1] The search for a westward route to Asia, which dominated the 15th century, had its roots in practical considerations.

The European nation states wanted gold, which was becoming increasingly scarce in Europe in the 15th century as governments tried to hoard as much of it as they could. Gold was desired as a preciosity, for consumption in Europe and even for trade with Asia -- where it would be exchanged for jewels and spices -- but it was also a necessity for the rapid expansion of the European economy which occurred between 1460 and 1530.[2] The Estates General of France in 1484 complained that in four years two previous Popes had drained France of more than two millions in gold.[3] There was also a growing demand for silver in this period, which the increased production of German mines made possible by technological improvements which permitted the exploitation of what had been hitherto marginal mines -- could not satisfy. The search for the precious metals by the maritime route was unquestionably one consideration for the early Portuguese navigators. The Portuguese and the Spaniards wanted a direct share in the profitable trade in Eastern luxury goods. However, what Europe needed above all was food, especially spices.[4]

Spices were indeed a necessity to medieval Europe for they were of great importance in preserving and seasoning meat. Spices spread

northward from the time of the Crusades. Venice, Portugal and Holland became wealthy on profits from the spice trade until the 18th century witnessed a decline occasioned by the Europeans' demand for sweet in preference to spiced dishes and the progress in animal husbandry which ensured a supply of fresh meat throughout the year.[5]

After the Middle Ages, commodities which had formerly been used by the aristocracies were adopted by other classes in society. Changes in dietary and drinking habits were sufficiently great to be significant in any consideration of commerce. Penetration of tropical and semi-tropical regions would therefore yield a rich harvest of food to lend variety to the coarse fare of people in northern latitudes. There was thus great potential for a lucrative trade with the Far East if the European nations could find a route to Asia.

Sugar, too, was an important commodity and ranked high on the food hierarchy from the early Middle Ages.[6] Sugar had been classified with such luxuries as spices and silk. For many centuries it was considered a rare and costly addition to the ordinary diet and highly regarded for its medicinal properties. With the exception of the aristocracies who used sugar, honey was the only sweetening in use throughout Europe. After the Middle Ages, however, sugar become one of the most important components of European diet; useful both as a calorie source and as a substitute for fats. Furthermore, it was also used for alcoholic drinks.[7]

Sugar was therefore a principal motivation for European economic expansion long before Spain initiated the overseas expansion under Columbus. Supplies of cane sugar entered northern Europe from the eastern Mediterranean where its production had started in the 12th century before moving westward.[8]

The timing of the Age of Discovery and overseas expansion depended not only on economic motivation but on a greater store of scientific knowledge that existed than had previously been available. The flat earth theory of the Middle Ages advocated by Monk Cosmas could not withstand the Renaissance outlook which had developed renewed interest in a knowledge of geography from the study of the classical scholars, particularly Ptolemy and Aristotle, who had speculated on the possibility of reaching the Far East more easily by a western voyage from the Pillars of Hercules. The original contribution of the medieval schoolmen to geographical knowledge was slight.[9] But Roger Bacon's Opus Majus (1214) and Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly's Imago Mundi (ca. 1410) were important and influential works, the latter being Columbus' favorite bedside book. Bacon's scientific method with its subordination of philosophy to mathematics led him to speculate as to the distribution of land and ocean over the globe; to hazard the view that a few days' sail westward from Spain would lead to eastern Asia, and to anticipate instruments for navigation, and the crane. The end of the 15th century witnessed the scientific method of Leonardo da Vinci, one of the foremost figures of the Renaissance. Da Vinci anticipated the discovery of the law of gravity, designed the first submarine, and clearly foresaw the aeroplane.[10]

As knowledge about the Atlantic increased during the 15th century a number of people began to consider the possibility of reaching Cathay by crossing the ocean westward. By 1474 Columbus, even then planning his historic voyage, was assured by Paolo Toscanelli, the Florentine mathematician and geographer, that his intentions were indeed sound and that it was possible to sail straight across the

Atlantic to the Far East in a few days.

In spite of Toscanelli's erroneous calculations, Columbus' voyages were fruitful due to the availability of scientific and technological expertise. Europe had already discovered or borrowed, and learned how to utilize, three decisive innovations which, unknown to or unutilized by the ancients, changed the whole face of the known world. The first of these was printing; the second was gunpowder; and the third was the magnet. Now, these scientific and technological achievements would soon have enormous consequences for the civilization of indigenous populations as they were employed in the expansion of European economic, political and cultural hegemony around the globe.

There were reasons other than technological for this new, vigorous phase of European expansion, however. The political climate in the 15th century too was congenial to discovery and overseas expansion. In the first place the nation state had emerged. The feudal barons had killed each other off in their own wars (in England in the Wars of the Roses); they were more easily controlled by national sovereigns like Tudors in England and Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain; and, thirdly, they were defeated by the rising power of the townsmen (the bourgeoisie), by such bourgeois leaders as Jan van Artevelde in Flanders and Etienne Marcel in France in such decisive battles as Courtrai in Flanders and Mortgarten in Switzerland.

The nation state had emerged also in revolt against foreign domination. The English monarchs, in an attempt to maintain their claim to rule over part of France, suffered a severe setback at

battles over Bordeaux and Bayonne (1451) and Gascony (1453). French resolve, indeed its nationalism, was symbolized by its foremost soldier, the deeply religious peasant, Jeanne d'Arc. Portugal established its independence of Spain and Spain in turn established its independence of the Muslims (Moors). When in 1492 the last Muslim kingdom of western Europe, Granada, surrendered to the centralizing monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella, Spain was therefore ready to emulate in the West the Portuguese triumphs in Africa.[11]

The national sovereign was thus the symbol of a triumph independent of the Roman Catholic Church. Now, the crusading spirit contained by the failure of the Crusades and the fall of Constantinople found a release in discovery and overseas expansion. A contemporary Portuguese chronicler of the conquest of Guinea, Gomes Eannesde Azurara, justified the conquest in 1453 on the ground that the Africans became "as good and true Christians as if they had directly descended, from the beginning of Christ, from those who were first baptised."[12] But the motives of the early explorers were mixed.[13] Religion, to be sure, was important to the discoverers, but the objectives which they consistently pursued and the routes which they followed suggest that acquisitiveness was more often than not their primary motive.

The challenge to the Roman Catholic Church by the heresies of John Wyclif, John Hus, and Martin Luther respectively, culminated in the rise of Protestantism. The foundation was thus laid for the involvement of the Churches with imperialism. And if the respective Cardinals in Spain, England and France represented the Church's service to the nation state, in the new colonial territories the vocation of

Holy Orders involved not merely serving the Church but also serving the State.

Economic considerations reinforced the political, scientific and religious urge to discover a new world and thus establish European political, economic and cultural hegemony.

There were some significant economic changes, however, which manifested themselves in the second half of the 15th century and helped to shape the emerging relationship between Europe's newly discovered territories. In the first place, the vigorous commercial activities of the Italian maritime cities of Venice, Genoa and Pisa, and the German Hanseatic League in the Baltic anticipated in their way the development of the world market. Venice in the 15th century was a city of shopkeepers. The financial transactions of the Lombards, with the powerful Italian commercial centers, were the precursor of high finance. Cloth making signaled the rise of industry in Flanders. There, the primitive cloth manufacturing techniques were perfected during the Roman occupation, when their conquerors introduced them to the technical methods of the Mediterranean. The way was thus prepared for cloth manufacture to become a real industry in England after 1460 where advanced techniques and superior quality wool, stimulated large scale production.[14]

The growth of a market economy exercised a disintegrating influence on the structure of Feudalism,[15] and prepared the soil for the growth of forces which were to weaken and supplant it. The manorial system was being superseded in the 15th century by the enclosure of lands for sheep-farming, the basis of the wool industry. This was the case particularly in Spain and England where pastures

began to cover a much larger area of the land than hitherto, and where the sheep replaced the peasant and his plough.[16] Inevitably the peasantry was left landless, thereby forcing them into the towns and converting some of them into the ranks of the proletariat. Others simply became vagrants and highwaymen suitable for transportation, voluntarily or by force, to any new colonial areas.

The changing economic pattern of the 15th century had two further characteristics of great and direct relevance for the adventure of Columbus. The first was that, in the Mediterranean, the Latins had developed on a large scale the sugar industry learned from India and the Middle East. Important centers of production were Sicily, Cyprus and Syria, where large plantation and large factory areas had evolved.

The second characteristic was the European experience with colonial labor. This was based firstly on the Muslim domination of Spain and secondly the Portuguese conquest of West Africa. On the Cape Verde Isles, off the coast of Guinea, the Portuguese developed a sugar industry based on the large plantation operated by black, Guinean slave labor.[17]

Thus in 1492, when Christopher Columbus set out from Spain enroute to what he believed to be 'the Indies' in three ships totalling some 400 tons and with a crew of about 100 men, his equipment included the European wanderlust, a powerful economic impulse, the requisite technical aids, a dominant crusading motive, all backed by the necessary political organization. Above all he took with him the knowledge that Africa was a capacious reservoir of black labor which would become "the white man's greatest collaborator

in the task of agrarian colonization."[18]

Columbus, then, looking for precious commodities and a shorter route to Asia found instead the New World. His erroneous scientific notions were further distorted by a vain mysticism when he claimed to be the "messenger of a new heaven and a new earth," who discovered "the earthly paradise."[19] Standing on the threshold of the modern age of commerce and imperialism, Columbus' vision was focused on the past.

Yet he was the spearhead of Europe's second and most intensive territorial and economic expansion -- the consequence of the decay of Feudalism, occasioned by progress in the organization of commercial, industrial and agrarian activity. All of this was stimulated, of course, by the pressure of capitalism and the technology of modern science.

Gold, Sugar and Slaves

When the Spaniards under Columbus' leadership arrived in what is now the Caribbean, their immediate attention was centered on the important business of mining for gold. Gold was central to a policy designed expressly to "get rich quick." The Spaniards, it is true, did not set out with the idea of colonizing and cultivating the land. Columbus himself succeeded in convincing the Spanish monarchs that there was "without doubt" a vast quantity of gold in the islands.[20] But there was little of the precious metal in the Caribbean. Hispaniola -- where Columbus and his crew first settled -- Puerto Rico and Jamaica had some gold deposits. To exploit what gold there was in the islands the early settlers required labor. Their quest for gold therefore led to the enslavement and coercion of the indigenous Indian

population with disastrous results to these first colonized people.[21]

The early exhaustion of the gold deposits found in Hispaniola by the unsophisticated technical methods of the time, sent the Spaniards scurrying through Caribbean islands seeking new deposits. It was gold that determined the location of Spanish settlements. When the precious metal was exhausted in the Caribbean islands, the Spaniards were lured to the American mainland where there were plentiful supplies.

Gold brought the Caribbean face to face, not for the last time, with monopoly.[22] Monopoly was the core of the political system, economic organization and social structure in Europe of the 15th century. Therefore, inevitably, monopoly became the core of the Spanish colonial system in the Caribbean. The Caribbean colonies became a royal monopoly and the Caribbean Sea became a closed sea -- closed to all but Spanish trade, Spanish government, Spanish religion, Spanish nationals.

The European nations of Columbus' day were as concerned, as those in our own generation, with the adverse balance of trade, the disparity between imports and exports. The difference, in their view, represented a drain on the country's stock of precious metals, gold and silver. Thus each state sought to strengthen itself by increasing its stock of gold and silver, by encouraging exports and reducing its imports.

It was in this context that Spain's colonial system evolved. There were two aspects to the system, one purely commercial, the other political: both designed to achieve the same end -- the development of the Spanish colonies as the exclusive preserve of Spain. Jamaica

and the other Caribbean islands had begun to emerge as an appendage or satellite of European imperialism, its resources being drained away from domestic development to metropolitan aggrandisement. Indeed, the Caribbean colonies had entered the European dominated, world economic system.[23]

Thus the development of Jamaica and the Caribbean from this historical juncture has been subjected to the changes and pressures created by this new European world system. This naturally resulted in constraints and restrictions on these colonial societies. Institutions in these colonies or periphery of the system, therefore, change and develop in response to local needs determined by the world system.

It was in this imperialist context that the fortunes of Jamaica were cast. Jamaica's early development was a response to the external mercantilist pressure and the internal needs of Spanish colonialism. Jamaica's main use to Spain, once its gold was exhausted, was as a supply base. The Spanish king instructed successive Governors that Jamaica should become a food producing area for export. This was particularly important as gold seekers in Central America did not have the time both to cultivate the land and search for gold. The result was that cattle ranches and crop farms became the characteristic pattern of economic development in Jamaica throughout the 16th century. In this way Jamaica was able to assist the colonization thrust in the early years. The island supplied men, horses, arms, hemp and foodstuffs to help in the conquest of Cuba and much of the American mainland. Thus Jamaica experienced its first period of

prosperity, and very early in its recorded history began the export economy that would become the lifeline of its existence in future centuries.

In their drive to maintain an adequate supply of food, the Spaniards introduced a system in the islands to attract settlers. Large grants of lands were made to Spanish settlers which carried with them the enforced labor of the Indians. Thus originated the system of encomiendas,[24] and commercial capitalism was established in the Caribbean. The system was abused, however. The Indians were overworked, ill-treated and ill-fed. Vast numbers of these first Jamaicans, of whom Columbus claimed there were "no better nor gentler people in the world,"[25] died as a result, and thousands more committed suicide by drinking poisonous cassava juice to escape their bondage. Mothers also murdered their children rather than let them suffer slavery.[26] Thus these people who had greeted Columbus on the glittering beaches of white sand in those far off days of 1494, died. But they died with dignity and courage, these first colonial rebels against imperialism.[27]

With the decimation of the Indians, the Spaniards turned to Europe for poor whites for a solution to the labor problem. Four sources of white labor were available: convict labor, white female slaves, foreigners and free Spanish emigrants. All proved inadequate to the needs; Jamaica could not retain its white workers. An ordinance of 1526 attempted to forbid emigration to the American mainland, as many of these workers were lured to the mining colonies of Mexico and Peru. The fact was that Jamaica was not an attractive area for

Spaniards to settle from an economic point of view.[28]

Spanish Jamaica was an unsuccessful colony. It was a failure from the start and more of a burden than a benefit to Spain. But other Spanish Caribbean colonies such as Hispaniola and Puerto Rico were more prosperous. The reason was sugar. As gold in these colonies was exhausted, the Spaniards turned their attention to the development of a sugar economy. On his second voyage to the West Indies, Columbus had visited the Canary Islands and had picked up livestock and seed for food crops. He also had taken on board the greatest gift from the Old World to the New -- the sugar cane.[29] In the years ahead sugar cane was destined to create a unique society and culture in the Caribbean area.

Columbus introduced the sugar cane to Hispaniola at the end of his second voyage in 1493. Hispaniola became the cradle of the Caribbean sugar economy. But cane cultivation was one thing, the production of sugar another. One was a question of agriculture and largely labor, the other of industry, capital and technology. The former demanded chiefly the laborer; the latter required the capitalist.

Capital was scarce in 16th-century Spain. The wealth from the 'Indies' was dissipated in wars and power politics, while the Catholic Church's ban on interest tended to restrict commercial loans. Would-be entrepreneurs fell back, therefore, on state aid, and from its birth the Caribbean sugar industry was characterized by subsidies from and protection by the state. The Spanish Government provided capital, sugar experts and equipment for those wishing to set up sugar mills. There was a reason for the state's swift action. Spanish colonies in the New World were conceived in monopoly. Monopoly was designed to

further the state and not individual interest.

However, while the Spanish Government could assist the entrepreneurs with capital and technical skills for the construction of sugar mills, the problem of labor was another matter. It overshadowed all other questions. As the sugar economy spread from Hispaniola through the Caribbean to Jamaica, it exacerbated the continuing labor situation. The only satisfactory solution, recommended by the Dominican Monks, was to import black slaves since "the labour of one Negro was more valuable than [sic] four Indians."[30] Thus slavery was introduced to the Caribbean. It was recognized as an integral part of the Spanish economy which the conquistadors had brought to the New World. The seed was therefore sown for a conflict that would rage for centuries: a conflict between white capital and black labor, a characteristic feature of the Jamaican, indeed the Caribbean, sugar economy.

Jamaica received its first "black ivory," as African slaves were called, in 1517. These slaves were few in number, however. Regular and large scale importation did not begin until 1523 when the King of Spain ordered four thousand slaves into the Spanish dominions, of which three hundred were sent to Jamaica. Africans never came to outnumber Europeans in Spanish Jamaica, as they did elsewhere, since sugar production in the 16th century did not become the predominant occupation of Jamaicans. That had to await the advent of the English in the 17th century.

By the early decades of the 17th century, Spanish colonization had attained its greatest extension. Other European nations would

soon challenge Spain by attempting to wrest from it the various territorial possessions. But until the end of the 16th century, Spain's monopoly of the territories in the Caribbean remained unchallenged. This was not for long, however. Gold, sugar and slaves represented an enormous accession of wealth and power in this epoch. Inter-imperialist rivalry in Europe for economic supremacy inevitably spread to the New World. The Portuguese were the first to come; they were followed by the Dutch, the French and the English.

Initially, their presence was felt through adventurers, buccaneers and privateers who were attracted to the Caribbean waters, but who confined their activities to smuggling and raiding rather than settling. Trade and profit, not the export of people founding microscopic European societies, became the major preoccupation. Quick and lucrative returns were to be had from raids on the Spanish colonies or ships. Booty and treasure could be seized by the quick and the strong. They were attracted to the "business" of plunder. More than ever before, it became an axiom that one of the greatest hazards of foreign trade was the risk of being plundered.[31]

European nations were not above using rogues and pirates for their own advantage. Besides being the Age of the buccaneer, the late 16th and 17th centuries were also the age of the privateer. A privateer was an individual who, after arming his own ship, on which he was the chief officer, received commissions from governments to capture merchant ships of competing powers. But every one saw the Spanish as a fair game. For the privateer, the advantage lay in receiving a cloak of legitimacy; for the nation commissioning him,

there was the possibility of profit without risk.[32]

The daring and adventurous buccaneers pioneered in exploring the Caribbean Sea for other European powers. By 1600, for example, the appearance of English seamen was common; and with it came great improvements in the means of shipping and seamanship. Knowledge of the ocean and its shores and mastery of large and long distance expeditions were skills of vital importance for the period of settlement and colonization. Furthermore, the international connections of the buccaneers supplied uniquely rich intelligence on the size, preparation, potential wealth of Spanish towns and Spanish naval activities.[33] Knowledge and technical skills were to create a British empire in the Caribbean in the 17th century.

Now, it was in England rather than in Spain that the economic arguments in favor of permanent settlements in colonies were strongly heard. The Spanish pattern in the Caribbean of conquest, trading post and stockade was for a purpose different from that of the patterns developed by the English to secure the greatest wealth for their nation. England's leaders believed that colonies would enrich the Crown and also the English merchants and manufacturers by serving as markets for English products. Also, as a source of raw materials that were needed at home or could be processed and re-exported to the continent at higher prices, the colonies would provide a lucrative trading asset.

The key to what later would be known as Mercantilism was the enrichment of the nation; the state had become the economic unit, the object of the greatest economic gains. International trade, with

exports greater than imports, was considered the most lucrative commercial activity. The profit would be in the form of gold and silver, the medium of exchange and foundation, it was held, of power. Mercantilism thus became the program of government. The advantage lay with England. England possessed banks, joint stock companies -- the mechanism of international trade. Spain had hardly any.

Against this background of individual and inter-imperialist rivalry for wealth and power, Oliver Cromwell, on his rise to power in England, formulated a scheme known as the "Western Design".[34] It represented England's conscious imperial effort to wrest from Spain all of its vast territories in the Caribbean. The efforts were generated by a combination of religious, political and commercial factors. Upon the arrival of the English army in the New World, they concentrated on the West Indian islands, the weaker links in the Spanish empire. The British made their first attempt to settle in the West Indies in 1605. Later, they landed in St. Kitts in 1623 and in Barbados in 1625. Then in a display of superior force, assisted by the ineffectiveness of the Spanish opposition, Jamaica passed from Spanish control on 10 May 1655.[35] By the end of the 17th century Spain had clearly lost its hegemony in the Caribbean.

This great leap across the barrier of the Atlantic initiated an era of rapid movement of men, ideas, plants, animals, and technology. Englishmen would soon become leaders in establishing colonial settlements in the New World.

The Spanish period in Jamaica has shown that the Spanish attempted to establish types of colonies in the Caribbean that failed to conform to their preconceived notions of an overseas empire.

But the Spanish quickly recognized that successful colonization depended on the settlement of an adequate labor force, able to support itself and ideally produce a surplus for export. Through the enslavement of the recalcitrant Indians, which had not become a policy of state, Spanish form of capitalism was introduced into the Caribbean. Henceforth the Spanish pattern of economic organization served as a model for its European successors. The significance of Spain's earlier treatment of the Indians resides in the fact that it served as a model for Spain's successors in the Caribbean which they were not slow to imitate. It marked the indelible stamp of degradation on labor in the Caribbean. And it formed the basis for the later, more extensive and more comprehensive treatment of the African.[36] Through the doctrine of monopoly, Spanish institutions and class were transplanted to the colonies which formed the basis of societies in the Caribbean that were microcosms of metropolitan Spain.

Spanish control of Jamaica was broken after more than a hundred years not from any seriously organized European threat but from individual buccaneers who attempted to establish rival semi-private colonies in the Caribbean.[37] The existence of communities of buccaneers represented a stage in the transition from pioneering colonialism to organized imperialism. Buccaneering itself in the 17th century was not only a political weapon; it was also a crude form of imperial revenue-sharing.

The international importance of the buccaneers resides in the fact that they had the capacity to perform the free-lance attacks on Spanish Caribbean possessions which the English, then troubled with

civil conflicts or domestic political weakness, could not achieve. The buccaneers, by keeping Spain off balance in the Caribbean, helped to usher in a new order. Furthermore, the buccaneers contributed to the permanent success of non-Spanish attempts at colonization in the New World. Indeed, buccaneering was a significant catalyst in the transition from trading post-frontier society to commercially integrated exploitation society of masters and slaves in the Caribbean.[38] Jamaica and the other British Caribbean possessions would now enter the age of sugar and slavery.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH-HELD JAMAICA

The development of British-held Jamaica can be divided into two broad structural phases. First, the British colonial and slave-sugar period which dates from the conquest in 1655 to the Emancipation of the slaves in 1838, a date effectively marking, not only the political end of the period of slavery, but which ushered in a "new" social and economic order. Secondly, the period between 1838 and 1962 which witnessed the development of the peasantry, the establishment of Crown Colony government and the rise of a dual economic order after the Second World War, and the attainment of political independence.

As the pattern of metropolitan exploitation and domination was solidly set into the socio-economic structure of the island, an attempt will be made to analyze the more salient changes occurring in this structure as the colonial polity reacts, as a whole, to external mercantilist pressures, and at the same time to internal adjustments made necessary by the juxtaposition of master and slave, elite and

laborer in a culturally heterogeneous relationship. In this chapter, which analyses the slave period, the focus of attention will largely be centered on the white plantocratic and settler elites who monopolized power.

Sugar and Slavery

The second half of the 17th century witnessed some fundamental political, economic and social changes in the earlier pattern of settlement and colonization as a consequence of the successful challenge to Spain. The most important of these changes was that the Caribbean colonies became slave societies. The essential characteristic of this revolution was the conversion from colonies of settlement based on mixed small farming and semi-nomadic ranching, into fully-fledged, dependent plantation colonies integrally related both to Europe and Africa.

In order to make the Caribbean possessions much more successful colonies than they had been under Spain, the British introduced the sugar cane crop in their Caribbean colonies. Accompanying the introduction of the sugar cane was the importation of massive numbers of African slaves and the employment of slavery as the main form of labor organization. The eventual adoption of slavery arose from the severe economic crisis of the 17th century Caribbean, and especially from the overwhelming need to establish a more competitively marketable commodity than tobacco as the basis of a colonial economy. After a short period of trial and error, sugar cane emerged as the most valuable potential agricultural crop. European

demand for sugar and the subsequent profits were such that in a few years most cultivable land had been planted. This process was accompanied by the reorganization of landholding: sugar could be most profitable produced on large estates worked by gangs of laborers, small units being unsuited to its economic cultivation. Moreover, sugar production demanded considerable capital outlay because it is a semi-industrial process that requires the use of expensive buildings and equipment, mills, boiling vats, and so on. The more successful farmers and richer arrivals from Europe therefore bought out many of the small holders, combining their individual farms into big plantations.

Sugar production and export, however, required a larger, more reliable, and more consistent supply of labor than was available through contracted servants or irregularly supplied African slaves. For a time an attempt was made to continue sugar cultivation with white labor. A variety of reasons made this difficult. Above all the economic cost was prohibitive. It was at this point in the mid-17th century that the English turned to the massive importation of African slaves, already being used by the Spanish and Portuguese.

In 1640, the introduction of sugar cane from the Portuguese colony of Brazil led to an economic and social revolution in the British West Indian colonies. Jamaica was destined to become the leading British sugar colony in the 18th century. Indeed, the world of 17th and 18th century mercantilism witnessed the rise of the Caribbean sugar industry as the chief source of wealth. Cane sugar, in fact, was probably the most valuable commodity in all the world's trade of the 18th century.[39]

Operating on the experience they had gained in Barbados, the British set out to make Jamaica a major sugar producing center of their empire. The rise in production was rapid. By 1673 there were fifty-seven sugar estates in the island.[40] Jamaica was well on the way to becoming primarily a one-crop sugar economy dependent upon black slave labor. But the demand for labor was growing steadily and seemed insatiable.

The attempts to attract white labor to Jamaica were failures. Oliver Cromwell, through various proclamations, made a determined effort to encourage whites to settle in Jamaica. He had visions of small settlers engaged in diversified farming. At first, several hundred families came from other British Caribbean islands. On the whole these attempts met with little success. Later the British, like the Spaniards before them had done, turned to Europe for white labor. White emigration in the 17th century, however, was not free but involuntary. There were three main sources of white labor: indentured servants, convicts and religious and political non-conformists.[41] All took advantage of the favorable conditions offered for settlement. In Jamaica, for example, this included inducement to prospective white immigrants of thirty acres of land. Even so, in 1698 there was one white to every six Africans. By 1703 the island had 3,500 white men to 45,000 African slaves.[42]

The failure of the white population to expand between 1655 and 1700 was due primarily to certain basic economic factors. In the first place, the exploits of the buccaneers and privateers, through which the island enjoyed a wave of commercial prosperity, did not

benefit the colony in its long term development. By 1670 the British Government held them to be a menace to trade and settlement since they encouraged many servants to run away and become pirates.[43]

Secondly, in 1669 when the sugar industry became increasingly an undertaking of the large capitalist, giving rise to large plantations, the small farm, the white servant's reward at the end of his term, largely disappeared. So did the Caribbean white yeomanry. Thus, less than two decades after the occupation of the island, there were tendencies towards monopolization. This was a significant economic element of this phase of Jamaica's development.[44] The monopoly of arable land was to prove disastrous to efforts in terms of making the island "a colony of people."

The development of the Jamaican sugar economy completed the ethnological transformation which had begun in the other Caribbean islands in the 16th century. As the sugar industry became increasingly an undertaking for the large capitalist, it required more and more African slaves. The 18th century demographic picture of Jamaica showed a steadily increasing ratio of blacks to whites. The diminution of the whites and the growing number of slaves caused considerable apprehension in the Caribbean and the metropolitan countries.[45] This fear was not unfounded, as slave revolts in the years ahead were to demonstrate.

The period between 1700 and 1774 has been described as the golden age of prosperity for the Jamaican planter. The reason was the phenomenal increase in the export of sugar; produced on new and ever increasing large scale systems. At the peak of its prosperity

around 1760, a record amount of sugar and its related products were exported.[46]

Accompanying this massive increase in productivity was, of course, an ever greater increase of the slave population as shown in Table 2.1. It was in this period that the true significance of the introduction of the African as a form of cheap labor in the Caribbean could be recognized. It ranked among the most important acts of European colonization. It also demonstrated the facility with which Europeans could alter old institutions and create new ones to accommodate the needs of capital.

Table 2.1

Sugar Production and Slave Population Figures in Jamaica, 1643-1834

Year	Sugar in Tons	Slave Population
1703	4,782	45,000
1730	15,972	74,500
1754	23,396	130,000
1775	47,690	190,000
1789	59,400	250,000
1808	77,800	324,000
1834	62,812	311,070

Source: Adapted from Franklin W. Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 237.

The Slave Trade and the Development of Commercial Capitalism

To understand the development of the Jamaican slave economy, it is necessary to discuss the genesis of the elaborate commercial system which spanned the three continents of Europe, Africa and the Americas. The supply of slaves was a critical component in what came to be known as the "triangular trade". The slave trade was the indispensable handmaiden of the sugar industry. As more and more slaves were constantly required for sugar cultivation, the speculative business of importing them across the Atlantic ocean became a trade second only in importance to that in sugar itself. Naturally, in a mercantilist world which regarded monopoly as an essential instrument of defense, and commercial competition as a mild form of war, the slave trade gave rise to incessant international dispute; and in the Caribbean it was sharpened and complicated by the disproportion between territorial possessions and maritime strength.

The supply of slaves, on which any large-scale sugar industry depended, did not develop rapidly. African coastal stations had to be found, trade relations with the Africans established, and the exchange of European merchandise for Africans coordinated. So competitive was the international slave trade that, like the earlier experience of colonization, the private entrepreneurs sought and obtained the full support and military resources of their state to assist them in carving and defending their niche in the system. Thus the European powers fought among themselves over access rights to the African ports.

Of the five European powers involved in the Caribbean trade, four -- Portuguese, Dutch, English, French -- acquired slaving bases in West Africa and engaged actually in the trade; but the Spaniards, while possessing by far the biggest and most populous colonial empire, never secured a firm foothold on the slave coasts and never appeared as serious competitors in trade. They were always customers and never suppliers. The policy of each of the other four powers, therefore, was to establish a monopoly of the supply of slaves to their own colonies; to sell a surplus to foreign colonies wherever possible; and above all to secure a share -- or, better still, a monopoly if possible -- in the supply of slaves to the Spanish colonies.

Several governments had long coveted the privilege of supplying the vast Spanish colonies with slaves. Portugal was the first of the European powers on the West African coast, and in the years when the Portuguese empire was incorporated in that of Spain, the Spanish Government commanded its own sources of supply. In 1595 Spain had granted the first of a long series of slave asientos. This was

> an agreement for farming out the slave trade, or the greater part of it, to a contractor who was to organize the whole business maintaining his own stations in Spain, in Africa, and in the Indies. He was to take over from the government the task of selling licences to subcontractors, remitting the licensing fees to the Crown. He and his subcontractor might ship slaves directly from Africa to America, making their own arrangements for convey and escort if necessary.[47]

Between 1595 and 1640 Spanish America got most of its slaves from Portuguese slavers under agreements of this kind. From the 1620s, however, the effects of Dutch competition and hostility began to make

themselves felt, both in West Africa and in the Caribbean; Portuguese contractors found it increasingly difficult to obtain and deliver cargoes, and were compelled to raise their prices. Finally in 1640 Portugal regained its independence from Spain and lost its preferred position as chief supplier of slaves to the Americas. With the asiento trade went an equally lucrative illicit trade in the main products of Spanish America -- sugar, tobacco, cocao, cochineal, hides and silver. The asiento trade was an attractive prize and it was for this purpose that nations competed to obtain it.

Conditions in Europe, in Africa, and in the Americas, however, had changed considerably with respect to national politics and international slave trading. Spain no longer held the dominant political and military position in Europe; England and the Netherlands were no longer Roman Catholic in religion -- which made commercial intercourse with those countries tantamount to [illegible]orsing heresy -- and France and Spain were at war (1674-1720). Spain, therefore, was in a weaker position than ever before to regulate the trade to its American possessions.

The Dutch, turning their attention to trade rather than plantation, early in the 17th century took the lead in the competition for Caribbean commerce. The Dutch were so successful in their chosen field that by the 1640s of the total of 25,000 ships engaged in maritime trade of Europe, the Dutch owned 15,000. Called derisively "sea beggers", they became "waggoners of all seas."[48] Dutch ships were to be found in every sea and every ocean. Amsterdam, the capital of the Netherlands, became in the 17th century the commercial capital

of the European world economy.

In the Caribbean, the Spanish hegemony had been effectively broken as the Dutch -- along with the English and French -- established footholds in the eastern Caribbean islands, and along the maritime coastlands of the North Atlantic. But it was the Dutch who dominated trade with the various European possessions. They purchased and transported the tobacco production of the early English and French planters, and provided them in turn with the necessary supplies. Also when tobacco prices fell in the world market, the Dutch taught the same planters the secrets of cane cultivation and sugar manufacture. Above all the Dutch traders provided the necessary supply of slaves.[49]

England would soon attempt to oust the Dutch from their monopoly position which their seizure of Portuguese ports on the West African coast had given them. The struggle opened when England offered union to the Dutch, on terms which would have given English merchants free access to trade with the Dutch empire and transfer the entrepôt trade from Amsterdam to London. When the Dutch Government (equally responsive to the interests of commerce) refused, war was declared. The Dutch wars (1642-74) broke the Dutch hold on trade in tobacco, sugar, furs, codfish. The first Dutch war opened India and the Far Eastern trade to the English merchants; the second Dutch war, West Africa and the slave trade.[50]

It was against this background that the practice of English planters buying slaves from Dutch traders attracted adverse criticism in England. It was in complete contradiction of the

mercantilist ideology to buy so valuable and expensive a commodity from foreigners; and by 1660 the Navigation Acts forbade Dutch ships to trade in English colonies. An alternative method had to be found.

Seeking to add to what a contemporary economist, Thomas Mun, called "England's Treasure by Foreign Trade,"[51] Charles II in 1663 granted a charter to a group of investors, the Company of Royal Adventurers of England. England's victory in the Dutch wars forced the Dutch to finally recognize the trading rights of the Company of Royal Adventurers of England at the Treaty of Breda in 1667.

The company, succeeded in 1667 by the Royal African Company, was the typical private front for a state enterprise. The foundation of investment or joint-stock companies, as Professor Christopher Hill points out, "was a great advance in the capitalist organization of English society."[52] First a group of merchants would club together for a single voyage, then for several voyages ultimately for an indefinite period. By this means a circle of investors could be widened, and the savings of persons not immediately engaged in trade or industry could be mobilized. By the early 17th century many gentlemen were investing in overseas trading ventures, including a large number of members of Parliament. Of particular interest is the fact that most of them invested after sitting in the House of Commons.[53]

The Navigation Act of 1651 establishing what Adam Smith called "perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England,"[54] initiated a "commercial revolution" which gave stimulus to the growth of "great trading companies ... to control monopoly areas, to force

down the buying price and force up the selling price."[55] The Navigation Acts further marked a transition from an organization based on monopoly companies to a total integration of the country's trade based on national monopoly with the state playing a leading role. In this context the Navigation Acts closed the British Empire to foreign shipping and established a monopoly area of privilege for British merchants: designed for capital accumulation through monopoly of trade. From this time onwards, the government was "in the main a defender of the merchant classes in England, i.e. the capitalist of the day."[56] Thus any company which had joint-stock was in the closest financial association with whatever government got in power in Westminister. It needed government support to get its charter renewed: governments needed the company's financial help.

The Royal African company, like other major capitalist joint-stock companies, had members of the royal family among its subscribers. The company, as Eric Williams et al.[57] have pointed out, was ruled by a very rich and powerful oligarchy. Its list of investors, which was headed by royalty, included "two aldermen, three dukes, eight earls, seven lords, one countess, and twenty-three knights."[58] Many other leading English citizens were associated with the slave trade, such as the mayors of Liverpool and Bristol and members of both houses of Parliament.

Thus, just as the Crown had chartered monopolistic settlement companies, such as the Massachusetts Bay Company in the earlier part of the 17th century, so too in 1663 it lent its strength and prestige to back a monopolistic slave-trading company, to amass treasure,

wealth which could be converted into capital."[59]

Thus the Company of Royal Adventurers replaced the commerce in dyewoods, gold, and ivory with the slave trade. Enthusiastically promising to deliver 3,000 Africans to the English sugar colonies annually at 17 pounds (sterling) per head, the company failed miserably in its goal. By March 1664 the company had landed 33 cargoes of 2,364 slaves at Barbados, at an average selling price exceeding 20 pounds. Despite a cost price of 3 pounds per African, the company proved neither competitive nor profitable and went bankrupt in 1671. The Royal African Company was only marginally more successful. The trans-Atlantic slave trade stubbornly refused to be monopolized by either a chartered company or a trading nation. The demand for slaves in the second half of the 17th century was great, but it was pressing for Jamaica. In area, Jamaica is two or three times larger than any other English Caribbean colony, and this vast virgin land, opened to all comers, was ready for sugar cultivation, provided sufficient labor could be had. The Royal African Company did not prove to be a reliable supplier to Jamaica. After 1690 Jamaica received most of its slaves from private traders. While the Royal African Company supplied 34,480 slaves in all, private merchants from 1690 to 1713 supplied 42,000.

The records of the Royal African Company between 1673 and 1684 illustrate the problems inherent in the slave-delivering component of the south Atlantic system. As shown in Table 2.2, the average selling price of slaves at Barbados, payable mainly with muscavado sugar, varied between 12 and 20 pounds (sterling) per slave per cargo, with the highest prices being 29 slaves sold "to a Spaniard

at 25 [pounds] per head" in 1681.[60] This was a profitable price to attract private, non-company traders who did not have the enormous overhead expenses of the company. Given the annual demand in Barbados based on the previous agreement of 1663 to deliver 3000 slaves per year, the performance of the Royal African Company fell far short of its promise. Based on the records for twelve years, the company managed to deliver an average yearly supply of only 1356 Africans, and only came close to the required minimum target in 1683 when it brought 2963. Eventually, with its carrying capacity depleted by war, the company resorted to subcontracting its slaves for a fee. Nothing, however, could save the company, and finally in 1698 it lost its legal monopoly of the English trans-Atlantic slave trade.

A flourishing trade had developed between the Spanish American colonies and the English slavers, which contravened the Navigation Act. Charles II, although no "free-trader," supported the slavers who, together with the intelligentsia, defended the trade, legal or illegal with the Spanish colonies, in Africans and manufactured goods; it was of distinct value in that the Spaniards paid in coin, and thus the supply of bullion in England was increased. The supply of slaves to the French colonies could plead no such justification..

Naturally there was a clash of interest between the English slave trader and the English Caribbean planter. The royal dispensation from the Navigation Act, which allowed Spanish ships to visit English Caribbean harbors for the purpose of buying slaves, raised a storm of protest among the English planters. The planters

in the colonies wanted all the available slaves for their own plantations. They feared that the competition of Spanish buyers would raise the price, and that the slaves sold to the Spaniards would be employed in producing sugar, which would compete with their own on the European market. They mounted a bitter propaganda campaign against the Royal African Company's monopoly, demanded free trade in blacks "as vociferously and with as much gusto" as one hundred and fifty years later they opposed free-trade in sugar,[61] and continued to buy slaves from free traders. By 1698 their propaganda had its effect when an Act of the Parliament in that year threw open the whole African trade to all British subjects.

It greatly complicated the trade in slaves. The Spanish felt obliged to revive the asiento, by granting it to the French -- England's arch rival. An asiento was concluded with the French Guinea Company in 1702. Naturally this arrangement did not suit the English or the Dutch; and they entered into an alliance to counter the attempt to place a French king on a Spanish throne which they viewed to be a threat to Europe. A subsidiary motive, however, was to prevent the French Guinea Company from keeping the asiento.

The so-called War of Spanish Succession[62] began in Europe in 1702 when Britain and the Netherlands declared war on France and Spain. Successful fighting eventually enabled the British,[63] in a series of treaties which are together known as the Treaty of Utrecht, to dictate the terms of the settlement.

Although the British were rewarded with considerable territories from their inconclusive naval battle in the Caribbean, the original object for which it had gone to war -- to prevent the

French candidate from becoming King of Spain -- was not attained. However, it secured the transfer of the slave asiento, together with valuable trading rights in Spanish America, to an English concern, the South Sea Company.

Notwithstanding these gains the British public was not satisfied and denounced as traitors the ministers who negotiated the treaty. Their viewpoint was echoed by Malachi Postlethwaigt, the most prolific of the mercantilist theoreticians, who condemned the asiento agreement as scandalous and ruinous, an exchange of the substance for the shadow: "a treaty could scarce have been contrived of so little benefit to the nation."[64] However, there was little exaggeration in Lord Acton's famous statement in his 1906 Lectures on Modern History that "we acquired . . . in addition to the Asiento, the right of trading in the possessions of the House of Bourbon -- in fact, the commerce of the world."[65]

Only defeat could have induced the Spanish Government to consent to the concessions extracted at the treaties of Utrecht. The Spanish Crown still claimed a general lordship over all the Americas, except in those places where it had expressly acknowledged the rights of others. The French even more bitterly resented seeing a privileged position, which they had secured by negotiation, taken away from them as a result of war. The South Sea Company had its foot in the door, as it were, while all other foreign traders had to smuggle their goods through the back door. Sooner or later, the privileges of the company were certain to be challenged, and the British Government would definitely be drawn into the resulting conflict.

The English, for all their aggressiveness, had made a bad bargain. Despite the concessions made to them, and impressive as they were in print to send the price of shares soaring, they were much less than had been hoped for, and the opportunities for profit were limited. If the company's opportunities for profit were limited, its opportunities for causing trouble in the Caribbean were very great. The company undertook, in return for its slaving monopoly, to refrain from illicit trade. But this promise was broken either by the company or by its agents trading privately; and admittedly no undertaking given by the company could effectively bind private traders.[66]

It was not long before Spanish resentment against the company's privilege manifested itself in various raids by its coast guards on British vessels. Inevitably, the British Government was dragged in 1739 into the so-called War of Jenkins's Ear -- the first major European war to be fought expressly for Caribbean ends.[67] Thus the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which ended the war, settled no important questions between the rival European nations. No territory changed hands. Peace did not put an end to hostilities.

France, besides being connected with Spain by dynastic ties, had long been Britain's chief rival for trade in Spanish America. In the mood of greedy and truculent imperialism in which the British entered the war, France was prepared to intervene in the conflict in the Caribbean. The reluctance of the French to evacuate the "neutral" islands led to the so-called Seven Years War.

The war between Britain and France which broke out in 1756, was governed not by desire to acquire new territories or new trade but by

the bitter rivalry between two existing sets of sugar colonies. The French Caribbean islands -- larger in area and with soil less exhausted -- were competing more and more successfully with the British islands in the production of cheap sugar and in trade with Europe and British North America. None of the peaceful methods known to mercantilist economists could avail against this growing competition.

The war began, not in the Caribbean but in Europe and North America, and in the mind of the leading statesman, William Pitt, there was no doubt the principal objective of the war in the Americas was to safeguard British North America by seizing Canada.

Nevertheless, the Caribbean was again the scene of major naval battles. The objective of the fighting in the West Indies (which was supported by the sugar planters and their "West India lobby" in London), was now to annex the enemy's sugar colonies, not merely to pillage them. These objectives, suffice it to say, were achieved with the signing of the formal Treaty of Paris in 1763.[68] Britain's triumph in the commercial and territorial war made it the dominant imperial power in the Americas. It became indisputably the greatest slave trading nation in the world. With British control of the slave trade, Jamaica was now assured of regular supply of slaves on which the economic life of this leading British sugar colony depended.

Plantation Economy and International Trade

In 1750 when Jamaica superseded Barbados as Britain's most valuable tropical colony, its slave economy was based on the European commercial system which was never completely successful. Slaves were

bought in Africa in exchange for goods which were often of little value in England. The slaves were taken to the English colonies in the New World where they were sold in return for sugar and other products in the different regions. These were then taken to Britain where they were sold again for a profit. As a predominantly monocultural plantation exporter, Jamaica assumed a commercial importance that transcended the mere buying of slaves and selling of sugar. The colony demanded such a variety of imports, which not only undermined the structure of imperialist mercantilism but catapulted it into a key element of international trade during the period. The triangular trade provided a wide range of consumer products for Jamaica. They included firearms, horses, flour, meat, fish, barrel staves, nails, lumber, tools, machinery, cloth and luxury products to supply the economic, dietary, and production needs of a tropical plantation society.[69]

The so-called triangular trade, with its three distinct margins of profit, brought enormous wealth to the English merchants who engaged in it. Eric Williams, in Capitalism and Slavery,[70] has demonstrated how the wealth accumulated from the trade greatly contributed to the development of commercial, and later industrial capitalism in Britain.[71]

Of course Jamaica, like most of the other "sugar colonies," was never an exclusive producer of sugar. But sugar was the mainstay of the export economy.[71] As such the volume of sugar production increased directly proportional to the increase in the slave population as shown in Table 2.1. By the 18th century "sugar

was king" throughout the circum-Caribbean. Ralph Davis graphically noted this dominance:

> Sugar production, once it had been introduced, showed a tendency to engulf whole islands in single-crop cultivation, and it created its own form of society whose stamp still lies upon the Caribbean. There were exceptions: the small islands of Grenada and Dominica had single-crop coffee economies for some decades of the eighteenth century, and colonies with great land areas, St. Dominique and especially Brazil, could produce immense sugar crops while still retaining some variety in cultivation. But the value of the Caribbean colonies to Europe came to be in their sugar production. So overwhelming did it dominate island economy and society, so vital was it even to Brazil, that the main features of the movement towards sugar, and the adaptation of society to the needs of its production. After 1660 England's sugar imports always exceeded its combined imports of all other colonial produce; in 1774 sugar made up just half of all French imports from her West Indian colonies; over the colonial period as a whole more than half Brazil's exports of goods were sugar. Sugar made up almost one fifth of the whole English import bill of 1774, far surpassing the share of any other commodity.[72]

Sugar and its associated by-products, rum and molasses, accounted for 81 percent of the exports from the British Caribbean in 1770. The second place export commodity was coffee, accounting for 11 per cent. The importance of sugar to the British economy was noted in 1776 by the contemporary classical economist, Adam Smith, when he succinctly wrote:

> The profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West India Colonies are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known in either Europe or America.[73]

Sugar, therefore, occupied the place in the 18th century economy that steel occupied in the 19th and oil in the 20th centuries. Jamaica in the 18th century became the largest exporter of sugar in the British

Carribean.[74] Thus Jamaica in the 18th century was what Barbados had been in the 17th century: the "jewel of the British Empire." Indeed the sugar wealth of Jamaica in the 18th century could be compared to the oil wealth of Saudia Arabia in the 20th century. But Jamaica's wealth was drained away to give stimulus to the incipient metropolitan industrial development.

The export-import economy was only one aspect of the local economic structure, though a very important one. The mature plantation complex not only created two societies by the late 18th century -- one Euro-American, the other Afro-American -- it also created two economies.[75] And like the social division, the two economies co-existed in symbiotic relationship. For if the export of plantation products and the import of consumer articles were major activities, they were integrally related to the system of distribution and merchandising done locally by a significant sector of the population.[76]

The import-export trade was more complex than the selling and shipping abroad of the local harvest. Each colony traded not only with its metropolis but also with foreign colonies. Jamaica was allowed to trade directly with the American mainland colonies and with the Spanish colonies. Writing directly about Jamaica in the early 1800s, J. Stewart aptly indicated the multilateral dimensions of colonial trade:

> The commerce of Jamaica may be classed under the following heads: the trade with the mother country -- which is far more considerable than all the other branches together; the trade with British North America, and the trade with the island of Cuba and Spanish islands, the Spanish Main or Tierra Firma, and other territories on the American continent formerly belonging to Spain.[77]

The trade with Spanish colonies was partly a reflection of the scarcity of money in Jamaica.[78] Almost all the currency used by British Jamaicans during the period of slavery came from the Spaniards through the latter's trade for slaves and English manufactures with the island.[79] Between 1750 and 1800 the amount of currency available in Jamaica varied considerably, depending on the state of the Spanish trade. When this trade was low, the position of the British planter could be very embarrassing, as a creditor who wished to seize his property could easily do so by foreclosing on him. So desperate was the shortage of currency at times that sugar was declared legal tender; but since the legal rate at which sugar exchanged for other goods was often greater than its market price, this solution was strongly opposed by creditors.[80]

The other side of the economic picture was the internal marketing system. This internal economy had two dimensions. The first was the coastal and retail trade, which took the goods of large-commission merchants in the principal parts and distributed them via small coastal vessels to smaller merchants, who serviced the planting and free village communities. The absence of an adequate common currency restricted trade to barter and credit.

The other dimension of internal marketing system consisted of the local "Sunday" markets with their higglers or middlemen, who supplied the plantations and free citizens with ground provisions, livestock, smallstock poultry, and eggs. Unlike the other facets of trade, however, this sector dealt mainly in cash, further accentuating the scarcity of specie in the colonies.[81] This market

was dominated by the slaves. The free "people of colour" participated too. During the early 18th century a series of laws was passed by colonial Assemblies aimed at proscribing the economic activities of the slaves. For example, the Jamaican Assembly in 1711 prohibited slaves from owning livestock or from selling meat, fish, sugar, sugar cane, or any manufactured item without the written permission of their masters.[82]

The planter class which formulated the laws restricting the economic activities of the non-whites were motivated by self-interest. They disliked unnecessary competition, and economic subordination facilitated the social control of the majority of the population. Nevertheless the laws could not be enforced, and the gradual collapse of the economic and political world of the slaveholders opened increased opportunities for the non-whites. By the mid-19th century non-whites or coloreds were, individually and collectively, buying bankrupt and abandoned estates throughout Jamaica and the Caribbean, and peasant economies were competing with plantation economies for land and labor.

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the material basis of the Jamaican slave society consolidated into a largely monocrop economy in which the major product, sugar, was grown and manufactured on large plantations, the ownership of which was concentrated in the hands of a few owners.

A major significance of sugar and slavery is that they provided the catalysts for transforming the settler community of Jamaica into an exploitation colony after 1700. The resort to a sugar

economy represented, in large part, a failure to recreate viable colonies of Europeans in the tropical islands. Thus from the mid-17th century the early capitalist European settler frontier slowly gave way to the rapidly organized commercially integrated exploitation society of masters and slaves. The relationship was one of open domination and exploitation of the slave as a chattel by the forces of planter and merchants, estate overseer and the metropolitan "West India interest." The slave economy that mushroomed from east to west across the Caribbean brought greater and quicker profits to the private and public proponents of empire than did the former struggling enclave of predominantly European farming communities.

In terms of the organization of economic life Jamaica must be seen as a pre-industrial society. According to Gideon Sjoberg, such a society has a tendency to form monopoly over particular economic activity, as well as being devoid of competition between occupational groups.[83] In Jamaica during this period, monopolization of land kept the small farmer settler from the land. Later in the period, monopoly manifested itself in merchant organizations such as the West India Company which was prominent in the triangular trade. It was also responsible for the formation of a political lobby in the British Parliament. Competition within the Jamaican hinterland as well as between the various sectors of the British economic empire was non-existent.

Manufacturing in Jamaica during this period under study was virtually non-existent. This was the result of British metropolitan policy of discouraging colonial industry.[84] The Jamaican periphery of the economic empire was not intended to enter into competition

with the metropolitan center. This would be contrary to the geographical division of labor in the empire. For this reason semi-processed sugar entered the metropolis where refining processes took place. In fact most white sugar used by Jamaicans came from England and was high in price.[85] The productive unit of the Jamaican plantation economy reflected low-level technology where maximum profit rested on the highly organized, regimented labor of the slaves. Jamaican slave society, like the typical pre-industrial society, was preoccupied with trading activity. Trade and profit, raison d'etre of the slave economy, was dominated by export-import merchants. The large merchants had their own agents, middlemen who served a vital economic function and also enhanced their status by removing them from direct negotiation with the lower classes and outcast (slave) persons. Unlike the vast body of small shopkeepers, the large merchants dealt in a wide range of items, a pattern that has long prevailed in pre-industrial societies.[86] The manufactured goods and primary agricultural and other products had to be distributed, the former to the Jamaican hinterland, and the latter to the British metropolis. In this way the merchants and agents in Jamaica contributed to the smooth functioning of the European metropolitan mercantilist system.

In Jamaica also there was a lack of formal, purposive planning in the economic realm by either the business community or the Government. This in a sense is a reflection of the state of economic organization. In the plantation economy of Jamaica, little decision making relevant to colonial economic policy was made on the island. Economic decision making rather than rational planning was taken by

the absentee landowners in London, the center of the British empire. Thus Jamaican slave economy exhibited the major characteristics of the pre-industrial capitalist society.[87] But from the seventh decade of the 18th century the mercantilist colonial economy of Jamaica was a mere declining appendage of a rapidly changing British empire and European world economy.

The Social Structure of the White Society during Slavery

The settler plantation complex in Jamaica eventually constituted a society. It was a society with some unusual characteristics. The Jamaican society lacked the normal growth of African, European and indigenous American communities. At times the Jamaican social structure demonstrated traits that appear contrived and eclectic. But it was "dynamic, resilient and creative."[88]

By the late 18th century the Jamaican slave society assumed a distinctive form of its own. Masters and slaves, merchants and shippers, rulers and the ruled, free and unfree, white and non-white, all had formed closely integrated, mutually dependent groupings already distinctly divided into castes and classes.

The social stratification of the white[89] society consisted only of two classes: masters and servants. The masters were made up largely of old soldiers who by various dubious means had monopolized most of the land in the island. The majority of the master class in the final decades of the 17th century came from among the conquering private soldiers and from immigrants of humble origins.[90] It was these men that employed the indentured servants and convicts sent out from

Britain to the island in the period between 1660 and 1750.

Since the poor whites who came out seeking employment in the island were generally the very scum of Britain, they were treated harshly by the masters. Indeed, the treatment meted out to this class was almost as barbarous as the treatment of the slaves.[91] The laws concerning them were almost as severe as those relating to the slaves, and when their service was completed they had little encouragement to remain on the island.[92]

This class of metropolitan "rejects" were described as rarely qualified for any type of plantation work nor were they welcome additions to society on arrival. However, in later years this category included, according to Brathwaite, "small independent farmers, petty shopkeepers, lawyers, tavern and hostel-keepers, day laborers, preachers, teachers, policemen, firearm bill collectors, pedlers, commission agents, gunsmiths, blacksmiths, bricklayers, coppersmiths and goldsmiths, druggists, midwives, nurses, cabinet makers, hairdressers, seamstresses, cooks, gardeners, bankers, tailors, saddlers, watchmakers and repairers, shoemakers, sailmakers, wharfingers, shipwrights, masons, printers and stationers."[93] Every type of service required by any society could be provided by these whites, who often competed in their occupations with the jobbing slaves and the free non-whites. This mélange group also included a small number of unskilled, unemployed and socially unsuccessful who formed a part of poor white society in every colony.[94]

The first two decades of the 17th century witnessed the wealthy ruling class of planters strengthening their position in the island.

They had little intention of settling the territory, however. It was the signal for the rise of the absentee movement -- a phenomenon to which all the social ills of Jamaica was soon to be levied. By the 1760s the society had been finely molded and the class structure remained unchanged for the rest of the period of slavery. The servants and their descendants, mostly of Irish and Scottish origin, had begun to dominate the senior positions of the community, as the wealthy English planters left the island to become absentee landlords. Thus by this time Jamaica had a dual elite system. There was the absentee elite predominantly English, who lived in splendour in England. There they formed a part of the powerful "West India interest."[95] The other being the resident plantocratic elite.

The local plantocracy included a mixed group of wealthy resident planters, the wealthy lawyers, some of whom supervised as many as 40 estates, and the holders of high offices, both civil and military. There also were some wealthy merchants often the owners of country estates. This elite, the local upper class, was centered on the Governor, whose advice was often extremely influential in the realm of imperial and local politics.[96] H.P. Jacobs reports that old planters often sent their sons to fight and die in places such as Spain and Egypt, in the military service of England, convinced that they fought for their king and their country. As Jacobs put it:

> The old plantocracy had frequently a deep love for Jamaica and a feeling of responsibility; but they were not completely identified with it. The new plantocracy looked for advancement through Jamaica and through Jamaica alone.[97]

Both groups, old and new, formed a powerful alliance defending the economic and political interests of the white planting sector.

The middle class group was composed of merchants and professionals such as doctors and clergymen. The expansion of commerce and the complex semi-bartering nature of the export economy of the period provided the main opportunities for the rise of prominent and wealthy merchant classes. The plantation society was, as earlier shown, a major consumer society importing necessities and luxuries from a wide variety of places. The merchant groups were a diverse, sometimes well-connected class. The Jews were among the most prominent merchants in this period under study. The most successful merchants who stayed on in Jamaica could merge with the planter class. But Jews, while allowed freedom of worship and movement, suffered certain disabilities. They could neither vote nor serve in the military services until the general enfranchisement of all free non-whites in 1826.[88]

The middle class also consisted of middle-sized farmers, owners of slave gangs, clerks who worked in the town and owners of middle-sized property. Finally, there was the stratum composed of the overseers, bookkeepers, machine operators and other white servants. Among the lower ranks were soldiers, sailors and other transient whites. At the apex of this group were the overseers, the more successful of them could expect an attorneyship in due course. This was the group which had the most direct contact with the slaves and was most given to their ill-treatment.[99]

White society was not homogeneous, but it displayed a far greater cohesiveness and unity than any other group.[100] The white sector, after all, controlled the export economy; dominated the political structure; and set what they presumed to be the cultural

norms of the society. But visitors and long-term residents often made scathing criticisms of the plantation society which indicated that white creole culture was a parody rather than a pattern. For the white sub-group reflected the entire spectrum of the European metropolitan society. Edward Long, the contemporary historian, described the white masses graphically:

> The lower order of white people (as they are called here), are, for the most part, composed of artificers, indented servants, and refugees . . . carpenters who never handled a tool; bricklayers, who scarcely know a brick from a stone; and bookkeepers, who can neither write nor read. Many of these menial servants, who are retained for saving a deficiency are the dregs of the society of the three kingdoms. They have commonly more vices and much more fewer good qualities, than the slaves over whom they are set in authority; the better sort of whom heartily despise them, perceiving little or no difference from themselves, except skin, and Blacker depravity. By their base familiarity with the worst disposed among the slaves, they do a very great injury to the plantations; causing disturbances, by seducing the Negroes (sic) wives, and bringing an odium upon the white people in general, by their drunkenness and profligate actions. In fact, the better sort of Creole Blacks disdain to associate with them, holding them in too much contempt, or abhorrence.[100]

Such were the peculiarities of the plantation slave society that conventional class divisions and social distinctions of the metropolitan society largely broke down in the colonies. All white Christians felt the bond that comes from belonging to a powerful minority among the subservient majority. "The poorest white person," the contemporary historian, Bryan Edwards wrote, "seems to consider himself nearly on a level with the richest."[101] For the white people, race and color rather than class and nationality became a consoling, fraternal bond. By the mid-18th century --

when fundamental changes had taken place in Jamaica -- the autocracy of the plantation owner had given way to a society of common law. The colonial society, however, was only a pale reflection of the mother country. The essentially frontier conditions of the tropics facilitated some upward social mobility among the whites that often made a mockery of class consciousness.[102]

Race and color, therefore, delineated the boundaries of caste and highlighted the distinctions between the masters and the slaves. It mitigated the potential class divisions within the whites, and facilitated control of the non-whites.

Race, color and legal status did not, however, preclude some relationships across caste lines. The masters could not live without their slaves. This was evident in the social relations as much as in the economic sphere of plantation life. A peculiar pattern of relationship developed between the masters and slave women in the tropics that defied either law or custom. Careful not to establish any permanent roots in the island, professional men and estate personnel made sure not to commit themselves to any enduring relationships with women. Even if they wanted to, there were so few white women on the island that marriage was difficult, if not impossible. Marriage was forbidden on most estates in the island, not only for the slaves but for whites as well, few attorneys being disposed to employ a man with family encumbrances.[103]

While marriage was proscribed, promiscuity with female slaves was officially sanctioned. It was to be the greatest disgrace for a white man not to cohabit with some woman or other.[104] In the 18th

century, in fact, concubinage was, like slavery, an established institution of Caribbean society.[105] With no one to check their behavior on the estates, the white managers indulged in all kinds of excesses. Also, from the earliest days of settlement many of the white planters had chosen mistresses from among their slave women. Thus miscegenation, so contrary to Anglo-Saxon nature, bequeathed to Jamaica a large and powerful race of human hybrids. This intermediate caste, between the whites and black slaves, was known variously as "free coloured," "people of colour" or mulatto.

In many cases of concubinage white men developed real attachments to their slave women and their brown offsprings. Such "outside children" of white leaders in Jamaica were generally given lighter duties and a status of favor above the other slaves. In time some were freed and given their own land and slaves. Many had taken up professions, others gone into business and acquired considerable wealth. A high proportion of the military, on which the island largely depended for defense, consisted of this racial group. This new, racially mixed group, however, remained the legal inferiors of the whites because they enjoyed no social rights. But at least they had ceased to be property.

The intermediate class was higher in status than the field slaves, but much lower in estimation of Jamaican society than the poorest white man. The free blacks considered themselves far superior to the slaves, however. Far better off than the masses, they learned to hate all slaves, who reminded them of an ancestry they considered degrading. As the rejection of ancestry was the

only way to derive status, the free blacks sought to identify completely with whites. They soon adopted, with almost religious fervor, the customs and habits of the white population. There thus ensued a bitter hatred between the freed mulattoes and the slaves.[106] The attempts to effect adjustment between these discordant racial groups after the disintegration of the slave system, would perplex Jamaican society for many decades.

It should be emphasized that the slaves were legally the property of the planters and were regarded as disposable chattels. Contemporary opinion did not consider slaves to be part of the society. Rather slaves were tools, in human form, to be used to exploit the land for profitable gain of others. The black was thought naturally suited for the ends he served, a thing rather than a being. As such, he was incapable of playing an independent role in society. Thus the bulk of black slaves were placed far below the lowest rung of the social [illegible]

The Alternative Maroon Society

In addition to the white society comprising the struggling settlers, prospering planters, machinating merchants, ambivalent free colored and suffering slaves, there was a second social type: a mottled group of individuals, commonly considered "transfrontiersmen."[108] The former groups were the true colonists who accepted, albeit under duress, the rules, regulations and interventions of the metropolis, and subscribed in varying degrees to the political integrity of the imperial system. The

transfrontier groups ranged from the organized communities of Maroons, or escaped slaves, to the defiant stateless buccaneers. These groups were not primarily a threat to settled, organized slave society, but represented a temporary alternative to colonial social structure.

The Maroons formed the most successful alternative to organized European society.[109] Born of the resistance of slavery, they were essentially communities of Africans who escaped individually and collectively from the plantations and households of their masters to seek their freedom, thereby continuing a tradition begun by the indigenous Indians. The word "maroon" was first used to describe the range cattle that had gone wild after the first attempts at Spanish colonization on the island of Hispaniola. Then the Spanish transferred the term to the escaped Indian slaves, and finally to their African successors.[110] In any case marronage -- the flight from servitude -- became an intrinsic dimension of slavery in the Americas, enduring as long as the institution of slavery itself.

In Jamaica the word maroon has come to be applied specifically to those runaway black slaves of the Spaniards who took to the hills when the British conquered the island in 1655, and stoutly refused to be enslaved by the new power. Estimated to have been about 15,000,[111] they had maintained their independence in the wild and mountainous country interior, where they lived by hunting and the cultivation of small plots of ground, and they frequently raided the outlying plantations, murdering the white inhabitants when they could and carrying off food and cattle and occasionally slave

women. In addition to the descendants of the original Maroons there were also numbers of slaves who had escaped from slavery since the British occupation and established themselves in remote places, growing crops in the valleys and anxious only to avoid any return to slavery. They also came to be called Maroons and as their numbers were constantly increased by other runaway slaves they were a continual worry to the white population of Jamaica.

The years 1655 to 1740 were marked by one long series of revolts which reached a climax during the last fifteen years of the period, at the end of which the whites, after coming close to disaster on several occasions, were forced to grant the rebels their freedom. The Maroons' knowledge of the island's mountainous interior, their skill in guerilla strategy, their courage and tenacity made them a formidable foe and some of the best detachments of the British army and the local militia were sent out to hunt and recapture them unavailingly. Finally the colonial administration was forced to sign formal peace treaties with the Maroons at the end of two Maroon Wars, in 1739 and 1740.

The treaty granted the Maroons self-government within the island, with their own specified communities over which they were to exercise full jurisdiction excepting cases involving death or requiring the death penalty. Another peculiarly British trait, divide and rule, was embodied in this historic treaty when clause nine bound the Maroons to capture runaway slaves, in as much as the most effective force against the Maroons had come from the slaves, some even gaining their freedom for bravery against the "sneaking and treacherous rogues."

The Maroons formed fully organized communities socially and politically independent of Jamaican colonial enclave. Such communities, for example, Accompong and Nanny Town, encompassed varying numbers of individuals. They not only survived for considerable periods of time but also represented the eloquent negative expressions of the Africans and Afro-Jamaicans about the situation in which they found themselves. Organized bands of Maroons prevailed for centuries in Jamaica and to this day, outlasting others generated by New World plantation slave systems.

Detested and vehemently hated by the slave-owning planters, these towns taxed the ingenuity and resourcefulness of all the participants both for their sustenance and for their survival. Considering the extreme disadvantages under which the Maroons labored, it is most surprising that so many communities survived for such long periods of time, often in close proximity to operating plantations. Their principal ingredients for success seemed to be the nature of their social organization and the physical location of the communities.

Absenteeism and the Slave Society

The basic and dominating element in Jamaican slave society in the "golden age of sugar" was that of the absentee owner. The sugar planter went to Britain with his family and left his plantation to be mismanaged by a European overseer or attorney. This element was central to the whole social order and was in some way related to almost every other aspect of society. Indeed, contemporary historians

are unanimous in singling out this phenomenon as one of the main roots of the evils of the system.

The consequences of absenteeism were manifold. In the first place the black population seemed to have been more harshly treated by the hired managers than they had been by the planters. When slaves received tolerable treatment, it was mainly on estates where the proprietor was resident and took a personal interest in his "black ivory." Secondly, absenteeism meant that the island was drained of the very people it needed for leadership in all aspects of life. The Assembly was composed of attorneys and estate agents, and merchants. Control and government over Jamaica were exercised through them. Most of those who came forward for leadership were less able than the proprietors, and as a result the general level of the society began to deteriorate. From the beginning to the end of slavery, the Governors of the island frequently wrote to Whitehall complaining that they were unable to find suitable men to fill the Council and other important offices.[112]

The absence of the most educated members of society also led to a breakdown in learning, religion and morality. Jamaica was a society where people were subordinated to profit. Schools were virtually non-existent. The occupation of teacher was viewed with contempt. Unsuccessful overseers with the right contacts could procure a living as clergymen. Many clerics were as debauched as the most profligate of laymen. With this kind of leadership, the established Anglican Church in Jamaica failed to provide any thrust that might have raised the spiritual quality of life.[113]

In sum, therefore, it can be discerned that the white social order consisted of a complex of relationships among its various groups. Legally, there were three main categories of stratification: the free whites with civil rights; the free mulattoes with limited civil rights; and the unfree black slaves with no civil rights. The caste divisions of this plantation system tended to be distinguished by race and color, and economic and occupational indices. Indeed, it could be said that race, color, bondage and profits were the fundamental ingredients of the white Jamaican's thoughts in the "golden age of sugar." The Jamaican slave society, like its Caribbean counterpart, emerged as an artificial and novel experience in the history of European imperialism. Its inherent contradiction and the all-pervasiveness of its stratification system, created fundamental inequalities and mutually reinforcing social cleavages that could only be removed by the disintegration of the society. Thus by the third decade of the 19th century, after more than three hundred years, the Jamaica slave society fell apart leaving a painful indelible legacy to its successor.

Disintegration of the System

The era of opulence of the Jamaican and British Caribbean planters that became legend in the mid-18th century was destined to be short. By the closing decade of that century several developments led to the beginning of the decline of British prosperity. The socio-economic forces responsible for the collapse of the sugar economy have been well documented, particularly in Lowell Ragatz's

classic volume The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763-1833,[114] that a detailed discussion of them is unnecessary for this study. But there were many forces that came into play to effect the process that hastened the collapse of the once buoyant sugar economy and slavery upon which it was based.

In the first place, the rise of industrial capitalism proved an enemy of any social system that was inefficient as a mode of production and relatively inflexible to rational planning and cost accounting. As an integral part of international capitalism, plantation producers had to be responsive to the whims of their suppliers of capital, laborers and markets. Rising costs of supplies and falling prices for commodities create severe problems for producers. While the price structure fluctuated, world over-production tended to drive prices for sugar, coffee, cacao, and rum below production costs in the British Caribbean generally.

According to Ragatz, between 1822 and 1833 English Caribbean muscavado prices on the London market averaged only about 30 shillings per hundredweight, while production costs were estimated at more than 24 shillings. Additional transportation costs and import duties meant that the Caribbean producers were selling their product below cost. Sugar was the main commercial commodity, but the downward price spiral of sugar found a parallel in other tropical crops as well. Coffee prices fluctuated from about 117 to 145 shillings per hundredweight in 1822, to 42 to 83 shillings per hundredweight in 1830, and 74 to 94 shillings per hundredweight in 1833. Rum prices in 1830 were estimated to be 2 shillings and 6 pence per gallon below the production cost.

Caribbean producers faced fixed costs, and wild fluctuations of prices returned an unsteady income that left them incapable of making the capital expenditures necessary to maintain equipment, ameliorate the condition of the slaves, or repair damages done by fire, hurricanes, and other disasters. This hit hard at the Jamaican export economy, and increasing numbers of estates succumbed to foreclosure or debt.

Further, British industry and the English economy were no longer narrowly Atlantic and subservient to the domineering West Indian interest. British capital and British manufactured products were no longer confined to their empire. The sugar industry accentuated this growing universality of English commercial activity.

Aside from the competition of other new sugar producers, in Brazil, Philippines and India, exporters of refined sugar faced additional competition of a rising beet production both in the United States and in Europe. British Caribbean production was becoming increasingly uncompetitive both within the imperial system and in the international market owing to its low technological development and correspondingly high labor costs.[115] All of this demonstrated the bankruptcy of mercantilism and led to the movement to Free Trade which culminated in the eventual abolition of preferential duties on Caribbean sugar.

Slavery, the child of the now weakened sugar economy, was under continuous political and humanitarian attack which in time had its effect on Jamaica. The British imperial system provided the first metropolitan-directed abolition movement. The abolitionists

drew their strength from three areas: the religious community, the British working classes, and the imperialists and free traders. In the colonies the non-conformist churches -- Baptists, Moravians and Methodists -- were really fighting for their colonial survival (and a piece of the evangelical action).

The economic factors cannot be overlooked in the process of abolition. The abolitionists' fight, whether English, French, Dutch or Danish, coincided with the period of economic decline in the respective imperialist possessions. The median sugar production in Jamaica, although remained fairly steady between 1821 and 1832, was considerably lower than the median production for the period 1799 to 1820. Sugar and rum production for the entire British Caribbean colonies declined between 1815 and 1833. A similar situation existed in the French colonies. Production had remained constant or fallen slightly, while the price of sugar dropped considerably. The situation varied from island to island, but the predominant trend was towards few estates and diversification of products. In Jamaica, for instance, some 50 percent of the 775 sugar estates operating in 1772 had gone out of business in 1800. When the British Parliament moved to abolish the slave trade in 1807 many estates could no longer recoup their operating expenses, much less repay their creditors. As a result, some 100 estates had simply been abandoned, while another 100 faced claims that jeopardized their continuation.[116]

The slave system was also threatened from below. It is unfortunate that too few studies have failed to accord the slaves sufficient credit for undermining the system of slavery. The slaves

had never accepted the institution as a "satisfactory medium of salvation." Nor, regardless of the belief of their masters, had they acquiesced in it. The long history of the Maroons in all the colonies bore eloquent testimony to the unquenchable desire to be free that permeated every slave-holding society. After the example of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) and the Maroon wars, the restlessness of the slaves throughout the region made the whites even more uncomfortable. In almost every colony the slaves felt that local whites were deliberately obstructing the course of emancipation, which they were. They also felt, especially when the agitation for complete abolition became intense after the 1830s, that they had already gotten their freedom, which they had not. Violence accompanied the final end of slavery in Jamaica (as well as Cuba, Demerara (Guyana), Martinique, Guadeloupe and St. Croix). The slaves made it clear that they meant to emancipate themselves by force.

But even without the forceful pressures of the slaves the slave system was collapsing surreptitiously from within. The vulnerability of the elite to the economic pressures of the international market economy was only slightly reflected in the lower social echelons. The collapse of sugar was not the collapse of the local economy, as the metropolitan politicians and economists thought. The free coloreds -- the group in the ascendancy -- and the slave sectors controlled not only many of the intermediate skills and services but much of the local currency that Jamaica possessed. Edward Long estimated that about 20 percent of the liquid cash in Jamaica in 1774 was in the hands of slaves, and a fair proportion of

the rest among the mercantile community of free non-whites.

The very nature of the sugar culture, moreover, presaged a progressive concentration of slaves in fewer hands on larger estates. As the estates collapsed the slaves either got their freedom or were leased out as jobbers. The collapse of the international economy left the planter-producers unable to operate efficiently with large slave gangs whose perennial maintenance was an additional liability. Free, wage-paid seasonal labor became more economical -- when the problem of availability could be overcome. The collapse of the economic power of the planters led to the acquisition of many more skills by free men of any color. Between 1800-1826, in Jamaica a whole new range of occupations involving sailors on coasting vessels, ship-builders, mechanics, and carpenters had changed from being predominantly slave or white into the control of the free mulatto community. With the constant exodus of the white emigrants to the more lucrative North American colonies or to Europe, the economic position of the free non-whites was further enhanced.

This [illegible] of internal erosion dealt the final blow which eventually broke the system of slavery to its foundation. The abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1838 was simply the official seal of ruin of a system that had already collapsed.

The development of Jamaica in this period was conditioned on the fact that it was a tropical colonial plantation community based on slavery. As a colonial community, the island was attached to and dependent on the British rule for its economic well-being, its protection and -- from the point of view of the whites -- its cultural models. As long as sugar remained "King," all social goals were

subordinated to boosting production. Not only was this period of Jamaica's development conditioned on Britain but the social and economic changes of this growth were non-qualitative.

The abolition of slavery, therefore, must be seen as merely one phase -- albeit the final one -- in the disintegration of the Jamaican slave society, as well as only one phase in the slow evolution of Jamaican society and growth of Jamaican nationhood.

Notes to Chapter Two

[1]Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 14.

Sir Alan Burns, History of the West Indies Vol. 1 (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), p. 58 and

Robert Knecht, "The Discoverers." In Douglas Johnson (ed.), The Making of the Modern World Vol. 1 (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1971), p. 16.

[2]For a discussion on the importance of precious metals in commerce and industry during the 15th century, particularly during the period of economic surge from 1460 to about 1530, that is, the interval between the Hundred Years' War and the beginning of the religious wars in the mid-16th century, see John Nef, The Conquest of the Material World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 30, 42-45, and 62. See also, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press Inc., 1974), pp. 39-41 and 45.

[3]Williams, op. cit., p. 14.

[4]Immanuel Wallerstein posited the thesis that in the 14th and 15th centuries western Europe needed food, that is, more calories and a better distribution of food values, and fuel which is obtained from wood. Wallerstein argues that food was more important than precious metals in the quest for discovery and economic expansion. He asserts that the need for staples, in the longer run, accounts for more of man's economic thrusts than luxuries. See Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 41-45. In contrast to Wallerstein's position, Henri Pirenne has given the demand for luxuries a place of high honor in the expansion of European commerce. See Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1936), p. 81.

[5]Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 19.

[6]According to M.K. Bennett, foods may be placed in a hierarchy in terms of their cost per 1000 calories. Bennett found this hierarchy fairly stable over time and space. Although milled-grain products and starchy roots and tubers are the cheapest, and the most basic of staples, they appear at the top of Bennett's eight tiers. But it should be emphasized that a good diet cannot be built on grain alone. The rest of Bennett's tiers are as follows: (2) vegetable fats; (3) dried pulses (beans, peas, lentils); (4) sugar; (5) milk and its products; possibly fish; (6) pig meat; (7) beef, mutton, goat, poultry and eggs; and (8) vegetables and fruits. See M.K. Bennett, The World's Foods (New York: Harper Row, 1954), pp. 127-128.

[7]Later on, in the 17th century, sugar would be used for chocolate, a usage the Spaniards learned from the Aztecs, and which would become a highly appreciated drink, at least in Spain.

[8]The Latins were producing sugar with Muslim and other slaves in Syria, Cyprus and other Levantine colonies from the 12th century onward and by 1404, when Giovanni della Padua of Genoa received a royal licence to establish a plantation in Algarve, the Genoese had apparently transferred it from Sicily to southern Portugal. See Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 43. The Atlantic expansion was simply its logical continuation. Indeed, E.E. Rich traces African slavery in Portugal back to 1000 A.D., the slaves being acquired by trade with Mohammedan raiders. See E.E. Rich and C.H. Wilson (eds.), The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967), p. 414.

[9]Robert Knecht, op. cit., p. 10.

[10]Williams, op. cit., p. 14 and John U. Nef, War and Human Progress (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 46-49. It should be emphasized that although the Renaissance witnessed many inventions and technological progress, science made no new breakthrough in this period. The term Renaissance therefore must not be applied to science in its literal meaning of "rebirth". A scientific revolution did occur in modern times but it came in the 17th century after the Renaissance had run its course. Crane C. Brinton et al., Modern Civilization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 409. It has been argued that European warfare, especially during the Hundred Years' War, interfered with scientific thought whereas they contributed to technological improvements, by stimulating technical experts and inventors to a higher level of thought and labor than they are able to command when their country is at peace.

[11]Williams, op. cit., pp. 15-16, and Henri Pirenne, A History of Europe from the Invasions to the XVI Century (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939), pp. 419-447, and Sir George Clark, Early Modern Europe from about 1450 to about 1720 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 27-42.

[12]Gomes Eannes de Azurara quoted in Eric Williams, op. cit., p. 15.

[13]For example, when Vasco da Gama reached Calicut in 1498 he declared that he had come in search of "Christians and spices". In 1511 Albuquerque reminded his officers as they were about to attack Malacca of "the great service we shall perform to our Lord in casting the Moors out of the country and quenching the fire of the sect of Mahomet . . . and the service we shall render to the king Don Manoel in taking this city because it is the source of all the spiceries and drugs." Bernal Diaz went to the Indies "to serve God and his

Majesty, to give light to those who were in darkness and to grow rich as all men desire to do." There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these statements. See Robert Knecht, "The Discoverers" in Douglas Johnson, (ed.), op. cit., p. 14.

[14]For a discussion on the rise of the cloth industry in Western Europe, see Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1937), pp. 35-38.

[15]The term Feudalism, as used here, is characterized primarily as a mode of production in which an obligation is laid on the producer by coercive force and independently of his own volition to fulfil certain economic demands of an overlord, whether these demands take the form of services to be performed or dues to be paid in money or in kind. For a comprehensive definition of the system of Feudalism and, also, a discussion of its decline, see Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1973), pp. 33-82, and, also, Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, op. cit., pp. 57-85.

[16]Henri Pirenne, A History of Europe, op. cit., pp. 533-34. On the subject of the supersession of the manorial organization by enclosure, it should be pointed out that from the reign of Henry VI onwards the English Parliament was continually passing Enclosure Acts, which authorized the conversion of arable soil into pasturage.

[17]Wallerstein, The Modern World System, op. cit., p. 43 and E.E. Rich, "Colonial Settlement and its Labor Problems," Cambridge History of Europe, Vol. IV (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 308-9. Rich traces African slavery in Portugal back to 1000 A.D., the slaves being acquired by trade with Mohammedan raiders.

[18]Gilberto Freyre of Brazil, as he described the African in the New World. See quote in Williams, op. cit., p. 17.

[19]Christopher Columbus quoted in Williams, op. cit., p. 18.

[20]Williams, op. cit., p. 23.

[21]For the Jamaican Arawaks, the Spanish ships were ships of death, for in little more than a century after their arrival, the Indian population had declined from an estimated "60,000 to 74." See Fernando Henriques, Family and Colour in Jamaica (London: McGibbon and Kee Ltd., 1968), p. 23.

[22]In Europe in the Middle Ages mines were a royal monopoly. In 1501, therefore, the Spanish monarchy forbade anyone to operate mines without their permission. In 1504 all Spaniards generally received permission to operate mines, on condition that their claims were registered, and provided they took an oath to bring all the produce to the royal smeltery to be assayed, taxed, and stamped. Not

until 1584 were the mines declared to be the property of those who discovered them, able to be freely sold. However, the monarchy received royalties from those who developed the mines.

[23]This system was a kind of social system hitherto unknown to the modern world. It was an economic but not a political entity, unlike empires, city-states and nation-states. Yet it encompassed within its bounds empires, city-states and the emerging nation states. Also, it was a "world-system" not because it encompassed the whole world, but because it was larger than any legally defined political unit. Further, it was a "world economy" because the basic linkage between the parts of the system was economic. And all of this, however, was reinforced by cultural links and, eventually, by political arrangements. See Wallerstein, op. cit.

[24]An encomienda is a postconquest institution, with designated Indian families, usually the inhabitants of a town or of a cluster of towns, and was entrusted to the charge of a Spanish colonist, who thus became the encomendero. He thus "held" these Indians in encomienda. The first encomenderos were permitted to exact both community tribute and labor service from the Indians whom they "held". In this way they derived an income and were able to control labor groups without risk or effort. In return they were expected to render military service and to provide for the Christianization of the Indians committed to their charge. Technically the term encomienda referred to the conditions of trust under which Indian peoples were granted; they were entrusted to an encomendero's care as a responsibility and favor, in return for military and religious obligations on his part. See Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1966), pp. 49-50 and Carl O. Sauer, The Early Spanish Main (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 100-102.

[25]Christopher Columbus, quoted in Williams, op. cit., p. 33.

[26]Clinton Black, op. cit., p. 32. Vast numbers of Indians also died from Spanish brutality. There are accounts of settlers who frequently murdered Indians in sport, laying bets among themselves to see who would most expertly strike off an Indian's head at a blow. But it is also time to say that a great many of Jamaica's Arawak Indians died from European diseases, especially smallpox, to which they would have had little resistance. In 1520, there was in Jamaica a "general pestilence among the Indians" which killed off a large number. Other destructive enemies were the animals introduced by the Spaniards -- the pigs, goats and cattle.

[27]The decimation of the Indians is imperishably associated with the humanitarian effort of a Spanish priest, Bartolome de las Casas to arrest the horror and protect the survivors. But, with the progress of the discoveries, the dice became more heavily loaded against humanitarianism. See Sauer, op. cit.

[28]Samuel J. and Edith F. Hurwitz, Jamaica: A Historical Portrait (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 7. There seemed to have been little colonization of Spanish Jamaica. In 1611, one hundred and seventeen years after the arrival of Columbus, there were "only 1,510 persons of all classes in the island." See Fernando Henriques, Family, op. cit., p. 29.

[29]Williams, op. cit., p. 25.

[30]Quoted in Williams, op. cit., p. 37. The altruistic rationale of the Dominicans was that importation of black workers would protect the remnants of the Indian population from excessive labour demands.

[31]Black, op. cit., pp. 52-63, and Clinton Black, Port Royal A History and Guide (Kingston, Jamaica: Bolivar Press, 1970).

[32]Ibid., and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 8. The difference between the privateers and the buccaneers being only that the former received a royal commission. Privateers and pirates were known generally as buccaneers.

[33]Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 8, Williams, op. cit., pp. 46-57 and C.H. Haring, The Buccaneers in the West Indies, (Hamden, Con.: Archon Books, 1966).

[34]S.A.G. Taylor, The Western Design (Kingston, Jamaica: The Institute of Jamaica, 1965).

[35]Black, op. cit., pp. 42-51; Williams, op. cit., pp. 78-94 and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[36]Williams, op. cit., p. 37.

[37]Haring, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

[38]Knight, op. cit., p. 74.

[39]Sheridan, op. cit., p. 18.

[40]Williams, op. cit., p. 114.

[41]Ibid., p. 96, and Frank W. Pitman, The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-1763 (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1967).

[42]Williams, op. cit., p. 104.

[43]Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (Kingston, Jamaica: Sangster's Book Store Ltd., 1973), p. 19 and Williams, op. cit., p. 98. The difference between the buccaneers and privateers being only that the latter had a royal commission.

[44]Ibid. The tendencies towards monopolization by the large capitalist killed the early, initially successful, attempt at establishing a diversified farming economy by 1700. A report on the island in 1660 stated that the main commodities produced were tobacco, sugar, cocoa, cotton, dyewood, salt, pepper, pimento, ginger and indigo.

[45]By 1778 there were 18,420 whites to 205,261 black slaves in Jamaica; a ratio of more than eleven blacks to each white. Although attempts at peopling the island were never entirely given up until the mid-18th century, it is clear that such attempts were largely stimulated by the fear of internal rebellion by the slaves rather than out of any genuine desire to increase the white population of the island. For an excellent account of attempts at peopling Jamaica with whites, see Frank W. Pitman, op. cit., pp. 108-126. Various legislations were introduced to compel planters to attract white immigrants. An Act of Jamaica in 1703, for example, compelled planters to maintain a fixed ratio of white servants to black slaves, under the penalty of a fine. But even punitive measures did not work. White labor was up against three difficulties. The basic one was that its supply was too inadequate to serve the needs of sugar. The second was that the whites were too expensive. The cost to transport servants from Britain to Jamaica was prohibitive. The third difficulty was that the sugar economy left no scope for the servant at the end of his term.

[46]L.J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class, op. cit., p. 39; and Williams, op. cit., p. 121. In 1774, the peak year of sugar production, Jamaica's exports of sugar to England amounted to more than 50,000 tons.

[47]J.H. Parry and P.M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 96.

[48]Williams, op. cit., p. 156.

[49]Ibid., p. 157.

[50]Christopher Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution: A Social and Economic History of Britain, 1530-1780 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 123-134 and p. 185.

[51]Ibid., p. 58; Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 32.

[52]Hill, op. cit., p. 57.

[53]Ibid. According to Hill, this is one of the ways in which Parliament helped to spread London's influence into the counties, and to involve the leading gentry in capitalist activities. It looks forward to a society in which the rentier could safely invest in branches of the economy with which he had no direct connection. But in the short run companies trading as a body were liable to

interference and control from above. Full freedom for capitalist joint-stock companies was ensured only when governments accepted the principle of non-intervention with private property, after 1688.

[54]Adam Smith quoted in Ibid., p. 123.

[55]Ibid., p. 51. The Navigation Acts closed the British empire to foreign shipping, and established a monopoly area of privilege for British merchants. The Dutch colony of New Amsterdam (New York State) was first out-traded and then annexed. The Dutch wars and the Act of 1660 made London Europe's entrepot for colonial produce.

[56]Ibid., p. 128.

[57]Ibid., pp. 54-62. Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 48.

[58]Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit., p. 48.

[59]Hill, op. cit., p. 58.

[60]Franklin W. Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 85-86.

[61]Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit., p. 49.

[62]As Christopher Hill points out, the War of Succession was for England in all intents and purpose a commercial war. For regaining the asiento England became the greatest slave-trading nation in the world.

[63]Sir Alan Burns stated that the union of England and Scotland took place in 1707. From this year Scotsmen were now able to inhabit and trade with the English colonies as joint citizens of the United Kingdom, and from this time it is proper to speak of "British" rather than "English" activities in the Caribbean. This study will use the two terms interchangeably. See Sir A. Burns, History of the West Indies (New York: Barns & Noble Inc., 1965), p. 428.

[64]M. Postlethwaigt quoted in Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit., p. 33.

[65]Burns, op. cit., p. 428.

[66]Parry and Sherlock, op. cit., p. 101-104.

[67]Ibid., p. 104-105. See, also, Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1963).

[68]Ibid.

[69]Knight, op. cit., p. 88 and Ragatz, op. cit., p. 89.

[70]Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, op. cit. and Williams, From Columbus to Castro, op. cit., pp. 136-155.

[71]Williams, From Columbus to Castro, op. cit., p. 126 and Sheridan, op. cit., p. 270. Tobacco, indigo, coffee, cotton, ginger were grown and exported by middle-sized planters, sometimes with the aim to purchase slaves.

[72]Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies (London: Weidenfeld and Niedson, 1973), p. 126.

[73]Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, Modern Library Edition, 1946), p. 533.

[74]Williams, From Columbus to Castro, op. cit., pp. 121-22.

[75]Knight, op. cit., p. 89. See, also, Phillip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955).

[76]Knight, op. cit., p. 89.

[77]J. Stewart, An Account of Jamaica and its Inhabitants, (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme, 1808), pp. 48-49.

[78]Patterson, op. cit., p. 25, Knight, op. cit., p. 90 and Sheridan, op. cit., p. 278.

[79]Pitman, op. cit., p. 147.

[80]Ibid., p. 242, and Ragatz, op. cit., p. 89.

[81]Knight, op. cit., p. 91, and Sheridan, op. cit., p. 278.

[82]Knight, op. cit., p. 92; Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

[83]Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City Past and Present (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 187-89.

[84]Ragatz, op. cit., p. 16. Two refineries were operating in Kingston, Jamaica's major seaport town about 1770, but they barely met local demand. A foundary, specializing in plantation utensils, was established in Kingston also in 1770. After the American Revolution the owner began the manufacture of copper pans and kettles as well. But this was a unique case.

[85]Ibid. Refining for the home market could not be undertaken because of prohibitive duty placed on finished articles.

[86]This point must be qualified. Jamaican society was really dominated by planters. Although there was little possibility of mobility within the various ranks of the pre-industrial society, persons of certain social groups, such as merchants and the free "people of color," provided exceptions. The merchants, as in late medieval Europe, got around this because of their wealth and their intermarriage into the planting society, or by becoming planters themselves. By the time 'sugar was king' in Jamaica merchants emerged as a powerful social class.

[87]Sjoberg, op. cit., p. 200.

[88]Knight, op. cit., p. 93.

[89]Edward Brathwaite has cautioned about the usage of "white" in the mature Jamaican slave complex. "White" in this context means people from Europe or of patently unmixed European descent -- in Jamaica, mainly English, Scots, and Irish. There was also a small but wealthy settlement of Portuguese Jews, especially in Kingston. These Jews had first arrived during the Spanish occupation of the island and by 1730 numbered about 900. They were legally, politically, and, to some extent, socially discriminated against because of their religion, but counted as white. See Edward Brathwaite, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 105, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

[90]Patterson, op. cit., p. 46. The assumption that the masters had their origins in the gentry and middle class of England is not supported by existing evidence.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid. In the Caribbean, this class of people went under a variety of names, some of which had pejorative connotations -- petits blancs, poor whites, "lesser orders," campesino, quajero, "walking backra," and "red legs".

[93]Brathwaite, op. cit., p. 136. The wealthiest of these served in the Assembly. A wealthy goldsmith like Wolmer -- whose bequest founded an important secondary school in Jamaica -- would have reached the vestry (parish government). So probably would many lawyers, saddlers, watchmakers and tailors -- a group that did particularly well in the island. The most numerous of this group were the shopkeepers -- dealing mainly in dry-goods, provisions, lumber, wine, and liquor.

[94]Knight, op. cit., p. 124.

[95]Patterson, op. cit., p. 48.

[96]Knight, op. cit., p. 112.

[97]H.P. Jacobs, Sixty Years of Change 1806-1866 (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers Ltd., 1976), p. 73.

[98]Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 141. Anti-Semitic comments appeared from time to time in The Watchman, the newspaper of the free coloreds.

[99]Patterson, op. cit., p. 49.

[100]Edward Long, History of Jamaica, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1970 ed), pp. 288-289.

[101]Edwards, The History of the British Colonies ... Vol. II (London, 1801), p. 8.

[102]Knight, op. cit., p. 116. The degree of social mobility among the whites is in need of a consensus among students of Caribbean history. Patterson and Brathwaite have argued that it is difficult to see how there could be much social mobility except that exhibited by the overseers.

[103]Patterson, op. cit., p. 14. The male slave had no choice but to accept the situation. Protest might bring upon him a charge of insubordination and a cruel whipping, or worse still, a charge of rebellion with its consequent death by burning.

[104]Long, op. cit., p. 291.

[105]Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 63.

[106]Peter Abrahams, An Island Mosaic (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), p. 51, and Black, The Story of Jamaica, op. cit., p. 167. This was a situation from the late 18th century when the free coloreds far outnumbered the white population. There were about 35,000 free people of color compared to 20,000 whites in 1820. See Brathwaite, op. cit., p. 168.

[107]See Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery, op. cit. This study is the first attempt to analyze, in all its aspects, the nature of the society which existed in Jamaica, and in particular, to concentrate on the mass of the black people who were central to the system of slavery. This analysis has demonstrated that black slave society had an elaborate social structure even more complex than the white.

[108]Franklin Knight, op. cit., p. 68.

[109]Ibid.

[110]See Richard Price, (ed.), Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas (New York: Anchor Books, 1973).

CHAPTER THREE

THE COLONIAL PERIOD 1838-1962: A DEEPENING OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The old slave plantation society was replaced, after 1838, by the post-abolition society which ushered in what has been called a new order. This so-called new order prolonged itself, with reformist-type changes, until the advent of cataclysmic events -- the widespread riots of 1938, the outbreak of the Second World War, the disintegration of the old colonial empire after 1945, the growth of nationalism -- forced upon it revolutionary changes. For a whole century, the new polyglot free labor tropical society established by emancipation developed along lines set by Victorian Christian modes of thought. It was, almost completely, a unilateral relationship, since the Jamaican creole rulers stood little chance of influencing metropolitan political decision-making.

The post-emancipation society was, to some extent, a new order. New classes replaced the old; a process accompanied by profound changes in the structure of society which marked the beginning of a new societal phase. The old planter-merchant monopolist and white colonial officials were gradually superseded, both in economic and social status, by the new group of creole cultivator, peasant farmer and native politician.

The decline of the old planter class, well under way in the late 18th century, was accompanied by the rise of the "freed colored" or mulatto. This class of free persons, the miscegenated progeny of white fathers and black slave mothers, wielded growing economic power

long before 1838. The offspring of slaves belonged to the master. No legal obligation rested on the slave master to manumit his irregular mulatto children, but it became the custom to do so. It was not uncommon for the white father to take an interest in the future of his freed illegitimate sons, sometimes obtaining for them opportunities for good education in England. By the third decade of the 19th century many had become professional men, doctors and lawyers. Others were trained locally for clerical and skilled work, from as early as the mid-18th century, when they had made the white indenture redundant.

Few fathers troubled to educate their brown daughters, the assumption being that these would know how to take care of themselves, as indeed they did. Mulatto girls became the mistresses of white men in preference to marrying within their caste. Usually their brothers had to be content with darker women. The constant infusion of white blood, however, caused the class as a whole to be of increasingly lighter complexion. Such sexual liaisons at the same time conferred economic security and social placing upon the woman of color who consorted with white men. It ensured, moreover, the social advancement of her children in the sex-slavery situation.

By the end of the 18th century the free people of color had become a powerful intermediate class. They had been given property by their white fathers. They accumulated enough capital from the trading of their surplus produce at Sunday markets to purchase slaves. The contemporary historian and planter, Edward Long,[1] noted as early as 1774 their virtual monopoly of slaves in the internal marketing system. Thus even before the time of abolition there existed in

Jamaica a group of free colored people who wielded enormous economic power, but enjoyed no social and political rights.

The Jamaican Assembly, with its planter representatives, was not happy about the growth in numbers of this class of free blacks and coloreds.[2] It placed legal obstacles in the way of voluntary manumissions, requiring the owner freeing his slave to enter into a bond to save the public revenue from the manumitted slave being charged. Moreover, it also subjected free blacks and coloreds to various humiliating requirements. Nevertheless, the number of free persons of African descent continued to increase.[3]

Prior to 1796 the evidence of free coloreds was inadmissible against whites. Not until 1824 were free blacks permitted to give evidence under oath in a Court of Law. Legal disabilities against free persons of African descent were not removed until 1830, prior to which date they could neither vote nor be elected to the Assembly.

The social disabilities of the free blacks and mulattoes had long been the preoccupation of Abolitionists in England. The changes in the social structure of Britain resulting from the industrial revolution led to a period of sharpening conflict between the British Government and the West Indian Assemblies. A new class had emerged in Britain, wedded to the concept of freedom of contract between worker and employer. To these industrialists, restrictions on the mobility of labor, or indeed on social mobility generally, were anathema. Their emergence as a class of wealth and influence gave real strength to the efforts of the humanitarians on behalf of the slaves. Their influence on Parliament precipitated the British Government in a series of clashes with West Indian Assemblies on a wide range of issues.

Britain thus emerged as the advocate of equality of opportunity for free persons in the colonies, regardless of racial origins.[4]

It was in these circumstances that Abolitionist influence led to a Parliamentary debate on the civil rights of free blacks in 1827. The order of the Privy Council of 1829 putting freed blacks and coloreds on an equal footing with whites in all the colonies was also due to Abolitionist influence. The Jamaican Assembly, bowing to the combined pressures of the British Government and the local bourgeoisie of mixed blood, followed suit in 1830. Paradoxically, the goals of the Abolitionist movement were remote from the thinking of the free coloreds. In meetings held throughout the island in 1831, the mulattoes affirmed that they were in the camp of the white residents. All slave masters, regardless of color, displayed the same attitude towards their black slaves. Having acquired slaves under the same title as their fellow colonists, the free colored inhabitants of Saint Elizabeth parish of the island declared that "the interests" of the white settlers "were inseparably connected" with their own.[5]

Not only was there no bond between the free blacks (of whatever complexion) and the slaves, there was even conflict within the free black community. Those who were not full blooded blacks were by far the largest number. To the "people of color," white blood was a great source of pride. Whereas black skin had been the badge of servitude associated with the contemptible "sub-human" state of slavery, the brown skin was proof of white ancestry, giving those who possessed it claim to kinship with the white race. Degrees of complexion lightness became a significant distinction for the blacks themselves. The lighter the complexion, the greater the pride. The

coloreds had, for the most part, only contempt for those who were darker than themselves.

Racial distinctions and racial consciousness, a legacy of slavery, continued for many generations to be strong. Although the overwhelming majority of the people of Jamaica were full-blooded blacks, black skin color was considered a stigma, a mark of shame. Habit and custom were deeply ingrained. The relationship between a dark skin and slavery might legally be terminated but the effects of that earlier relationship were to be felt long afterward. Whiteness always had been, and would continue to be, a mark of prestige and privilege while blackness was the worst degradation.[6] Almost all groups -- white, "mixed," black -- accepted the pigmentation values of whiteness as an ideal.

Thus, at emancipation the free coloreds formed a flourishing community in regional towns of Jamaica. Sugar, with its handful of proprietors and excessive number of slaves, had created a powerful lower bourgeoisie of mixed race who considered themselves more Jamaican than the white ancestor. Paradoxically, this intermediate class was the most Anglophile of the groups in their political and social attitudes. And yet these people of color who had, over the years, acquired both education and wealth continued to be shut out from equal social relationships with white society. After gaining all civil rights in 1830, the prosperous among them hoped that it would not be long before they would win acceptance in the white community. They supported the white elite and looked to the white community for their own values. But the ruling elites were hostile to the coloreds. They

had always feared, despised and hated these non-white upstarts because of their wealth and growing influence. In subsequent decades the white ruling class would feel the full weight of the colored's economic strength and influence.

By far the most significant development in the post-emancipation period in Jamaica was the newly found independence of the freed slaves. The former slave, no longer under any compulsion to remain on the plantation, abandoned the scene of his enslavement which he despised so much and lived instead in the mountainous interior. It was both a symbolic and actual step into freedom. Even before emancipation some freed blacks had begun moving to the interior, but between 1834 and 1865, this movement of population turned into a mass migration. This process which transformed the emancipated slave into a peasant proprietor was described by Sir Charles Metcalfe when Governor of Jamaica in a letter in 1840 as follows:

> The accompanying statement shows that a large increase has taken place from 1838 to 1840 in the number of proprietors of small freeholds in the several rural parishes of this island, the increase consisting almost entirely of emancipated negroes (sic). It appears that the number of such freeholders assessed in 1838 was 2,004; and in 1840, 7,848. There was no assessment in the intermediate year, owing to the suspension of ordinary taxation.[7]

Five years later a leading Baptist missionary, William Knibb, described the dramatic progress of settlement in these words:

> By the census taken during last year, I find that there were full 19,000 persons, formerly slaves, who had purchased land on which they were erecting their own cottages. In St. James' parish there were 10 new villages, with 1,020 houses; in Trelawny, the parish in which I live, there were 23 free villages, and 1,590 houses; in St. Mary's, 15 free villages, with 632 houses; in St. Thomas in the Vale, 10 free villages with 1,780 houses.[8]

In sum, black freeholders increased from 2,014 in 1838, to 7,848 in 1840, to more than 20,000 in 1845, and about 50,000 in 1859.

By the mid-19th century the communities of peasant farmers had grown up throughout the islands. It was estimated that more than 60 percent of Jamaica's freed slaves moved onto remote Crown lands to found their own towns and villages; other communities sprang up on the edges of estates and on abandoned properties. The most significant aspect of the settlement, however, was the fact that the communities were self-supporting; the former slaves getting the cash they needed by the sale of surplus produce from the "grounds" they had been made to cultivate to raise their own food. Non-conformist Missionary Societies[9] actually financed land settlement schemes for their members, buying properties and re-selling the land on easy terms.

The old provision grounds system, unique to Jamaica, had given the slaves considerable experience in growing root and tree crops and marketing these products. The poorer peasant families produced only enough to meet their basic food needs. They often sought seasonal work on nearby estates. Many families and communities, however, produced enough to sell in nearby markets and eventually even to ship to other parts of the island. Peasants often sold their produce through traders called higglers. Besides local food crops, the villagers produced crafts and export crops like ginger, pimento and coffee that were shipped to the island's two largest cities. Thus in a matter of decades, the peasant diversified Jamaica's economy and began moving the island away from its dependence on sugar exports for survival.[10]

The Land Question: The Road to the Morant Bay Rebellion and Crown Colony Rule

While many freed slaves migrated and settled in the interior of the island, those who remained behind rejected harsh plantation labor. As a result, the workforce available to the estates rapidly declined. Inevitably, the island was faced with a serious economic problem. The white planters required efficient cheap labor and thus did everything possible to discourage the growth of a small farmer class, as they saw in it a serious threat to the plantation system.[11] Chaos and disorder ensued which produced a serious decline in sugar production. Not being able to force the ex-slave to work, the planters, with the assistance of the British Parliament, eventually adopted a policy of encouraging the importation of poor whites from Europe.[12] But these schemes failed to produce the desired results. The supply was limited and the cost high. The few thousands who did arrive in the island generally failed to settle or to remain as laborers. In 1842 a new Immigration Act prohibited the continuance at government expense of the importation of Europeans. The failure to organize a large-scale settlement of whites resulted in the elevation of the Jamaican black from the status of laborer to that of "potential yeoman." Henceforth, immigration policy was concerned with the importation of indentured estate labor from England's new colonial empire in Asia -- India -- and China.[13] While these Asians, especially the East Indians, provided some labor, and were generally efficient, they did not greatly reduce the cost of production and failed to increase the planter's profits.

However vital labor cost might be, a still greater difficulty menaced the Jamaican plantation. This was the low price of sugar. The price of sugar had dropped steeply after the Napoleonic Wars. The extent of the fall in prices can be understood from William G. Sewell's remarkable report in which he noted that:

> between 1805 and 1825 the price . . . fell 25 percent
> . . . between 1825 and 1835 it fell another 25 percent
> . . . between 1835 and 1850 it fell away 25 percent again.[14]

The ruin was completed by the introduction of free trade and the removal of the preferential duty on West Indian sugar between 1848 to 1854.[15] In 1847 also there occurred a commercial crisis in Britain which sent thirteen West Indian finance houses into bankruptcy within twelve months. The West India Bank in Barbados failed, and so did the Planter's Bank in Jamaica. The West Indian planters were desperate. The Jamaican planters simply disintegrated as a class. Some of their plantations were abandoned for debt. Many properties came onto the market for sale. The attorneys left in charge of plantations often bought the holdings themselves at derisory prices, chopped them into smaller lots, and resold them on credit to the thriftier blacks. A number of good estates fell into the hands of the lesser whites or colored men, who operated them much better than they had been in slavery.[16]

After the removal of the protecting duties, most Jamaican planters blamed free trade as well as emancipation for their continued decline. Full emancipation did create new problems. The planters claimed that free labor was more expensive than slave labor, and it was certainly true that most Jamaican estates could not produce sugar as cheaply as the slaveholding plantations of Cuba and Brazil.

The cost of labor, however, was only about half the total cost of production, and to blame the entire picture of high costs on emancipation neglects many other factors. About half the Jamaican sugar estates survived till 1865, and some of them made a profit.[17] Free labor may have been more expensive than slave labor, but if it was, the difference was not great enough to prevent surviving estates from competing successfully with slave owners overseas.

While emancipation certainly made planting more difficult, the claims about the sugar duties cannot be sustained. The greatest decline in Jamaican sugar production came before, not after, the equalization of the duties.[18] And even though Jamaican production declined somewhat after 1854, the decrease was partly due to other causes.[19] This is not to say that the British Government could not have protected Jamaican high cost producers by an infusion of capital. It might have, but it would have been politically impossible.[20] Even if British consumers had been persuaded to pay a premium for colonial sugar, there was no hope of justifying the measures needed to protect Jamaica from the competition of its sister colonies, where sugar still flourished. The root of the matter, however, was not production. By the mid-19th century large-scale production by new methods had permanently lowered the world price of sugar, and the Jamaican estates were high cost producers in relation to that price. The planters failed to implement essential reorganization of production. Rather than introduce modern agricultural methods from England, which would have been in keeping with their penchant for borrowing metropolitan ideas, the planters continued with the backward methods which accounted for considerable loss in sugar production.

The economic changes that produced the decline of the great estates and the rise of the small independent farmers, generated enormous bitterness and tensions among the conflicting classes. The black settlers were not in a position to articulate the reason for their own form of tropical economy, but a few whites and colored Jamaicans did at times argue for them.

These apologists, however, were rarely advocates of further land settlement: they merely said that the settlers seemed to be prosperous enough or defended their right to do what they wanted with their freedom. The occasional Governor or planter who recognized the movement as a success from the ex-slave point of view felt that, on the whole, it was to be regretted. There were very few in fact of the planting class who thought of the settlers' economy as a possible solution to the economic problem and equally few who paid attention to occasional warnings of T. Witter Jackson, a Stipendiary magistrate who knew the small settlers.

> . . . we cannot but foresee the rapidly approaching importance which must very soon attach to these small settlements and their yeomanry possessors. Like the little cloud resembling a man's hand, they will spread over the land and produce -- who shall say which -- a fertilizing rain or a destructive tempest. If ever there was a time when it was necessary that something be done by a government for a people, this is the people and now is the time.[21]

From the planters' point of view, the rise of the small settlers could not be considered a success or an economic benefit to the island. They never even produced the major crops by which success was measured -- not, at least, in quantity or for export. Their flourishing peasant holdings were unimportant, and so they were ignored, except when they seemed to interfere with plantation

productivity. In the planters' view, the economic history of Jamaica between the revolution of 1838 and the rising at Morant Bay in 1865 was one long decline.

For the former slave, settling was something more precious than even the defenders of settlement thought. Clearly, the black settler was not principally interested in economic success. Therefore the fact that his products never replaced the exports lost by the failing estates made little difference. What did make a difference was his escape from the estate -- freedom became a reality, and not simply a change in legal status.

Thus in the decades following emancipation, the plantocracy was faced with two major problems as a result of their own economic failure and the ascendancy of a black peasant class. They had, first of all, to make their own adjustment -- to build a free labor system in the face of economic decline. It was a measure of the planters' failure in this task that the blacks created, as their adjustment to emancipation, a competing economy of small settlements. This development, in turn, added an economic component to the existing cultural division between what Professor Philip Curtin called "two Jamaicas"[22]: one was the Afro-Jamaican cultural system, which was largely a consolidation and revitalization of patterns developed during slavery; the other was the European-oriented cultural system, which was the revival of British civilization in the island after its disintegration during slavery.

The growing separation between the two Jamaica's brought with it new social and political problems. The failure to solve these was to be the final failure of the planting class.

The Road to Morant Bay

After emancipation, Jamaica had continued to be governed by its 18th century forms of administration -- Governor, nominated Legislative Council and elected House of Assembly. However, its representatives now included the colored bourgeoisie reflecting the growing wealth and influence of this middle stratum which made most of them eligible for the franchise. The franchise though narrow before 1838, when the majority of the population had been slaves, was potentially wide in subsequent years of freedom. But the franchise was still not sufficiently wide to enable the black masses to vote.[23] As a result the politics of the island was in the hands of the ruling white elite and a small band of colored upstarts.[24]

In the post-emancipation decades political tensions, which had been latent in the years before abolition, began developing among the whites within the Jamaican Assembly. Two recognized parties developed: the conservative majority "Country Party" representing the large planter interests, and the conservative-liberal, usually pro-British "Town Party"[25] which consisted of an alliance of free-born coloreds and white businessmen and merchants. A third progressive sector, representing small white and colored farmers, entered the Assembly in 1844. In 1866, of forty-eight representatives in the Assembly, twelve were free colored and thirteen were Jews. The white elite of attorneys, estate managers, and other representatives of the absentee landlords, a significant group in an earlier period, became much less influential. The planter interest was still present, but now the planters were mostly permanent residents.

Although bigotry did not disappear, divisions in the Assembly were hardly ever along religious or racial lines. Many prominent colored were planters, and in parishes where they were dominant they often supported a white candidate or a colored representative who promoted the agrarian point of view. Thus coalition built around economic interests did coalesce in the Assembly. Assemblymen could and did shift their votes from issue to issue. Whether planters or merchants, doctors or lawyers, their political loyalties were usually immediate and transitory rather than far-reaching.[26] There was clearly no national outlook among the overwhelming majority of the Assembly.[27] On one problem, however, there was almost unanimous agreement. The former black slave -- be he small settler or estate worker -- must be kept down.[28]

At the same time, Afro-Jamaicans remained without a voice in the laws and conditions that governed their lives. In the post-emancipation decades the political system proved as unresponsive to black interests as it had been during slavery; the representatives of the ruling white and colored elite were indifferent to the burdens the ex-slave acquired at emancipation. This state of affairs, combined with serious social and economic problems in the wake of the now shattered sugar economy, resulted in unrest among the rural masses.

The underlying causes of the peasant unrest can safely be attributed to what Sewell termed the "land question" -- continued conflict between the plantation interests and small peasant farmers -- and "extreme poverty." This poverty was highlighted by the Rev. Dr. E.B. Underhill, Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society of

Britain in a letter on conditions in Jamaica to the Colonial Secretary for the Colonies nine months before what was to be known as the Morant Bay Rebellion. The theme of his letter was "the continually increasing distress of the coloured population."[29] He illustrated this by referring to the increase in crime, chiefly of larceny and petty theft, evidenced by the overcrowding of the jails, the summonses for petty debts, the applications for poor relief. In his view "this arises from the extreme poverty of the people" -- a poverty aggravated by a two-year drought, by increased cost of clothing, and particularly by the want of employment and the consequent absence of wages.

Dr. Underhill attributed the worsening conditions of the masses and the difficulties of Jamaica largely to its form of government. He wrote:

> I shall say nothing of the course taken by the Jamaica Legislature; of their abortive Immigration Bills; of their unjust taxation of the coloured population; of their refusal of just tribunals; of their denial of political rights to the emancipated negroes. Could the people find remunerative employment, these evils could, in time, be remedied from growing strength and intelligence.[30]

Both Sewell and Underhill put forward proposals to the British authorities for handling the post-emancipation problems that led to serious protest by the Jamaican masses. The former argued for a society of freeholders for the arrest of the ruin brought on by the planters. The latter wanted a government which would undertake the remedial economic measures to develop Jamaica's economy along the lines of new crops rather than on old staples, on the basis of the small farmer rather than the plantation, with the emphasis on local

food production rather than production for export. However, these courses of action were ignored, both by the Colonial Office in London and successive Governors in Jamaica.

The rejection of a petition addressed to Queen Victoria in 1865 by peasants of St. Ann's parish appealing to her for some of "Her Land" to cultivate cooperatively in order that the rent might be guaranteed, was the spark that triggered the Jamaica or Morant Bay Rebellion.[31] The Governor, Edward John Eyre, failed to appreciate the grievances of the people and showed a dislike, if not hatred, for them. Fearing a general rising of all the blacks in the island, he retaliated with savage reprisals.[32] Immediately the white planters and merchants realized that their greatest protection against the black masses lay in the superior armed strength of Britain. When Governor Eyre urged the Assembly to surrender the Constitution thereby abolishing representative institutions in the colony, a majority of the Assembly readily agreed. The British Government now assumed full power over Jamaican affairs. The result was Crown Colony Government. Ironically, those who for two centuries had upheld the principle of political self-determination readily rejected it when the disfranchised appeared to threaten their economic and social security.

The colored middle stratum also viewed the rural disturbances from the perspective of their own economic and social well-being. They most certainly did not comprise a single social class. In the Assembly, most men of property, regardless of their skin complexion acquiesced without protest in the surrender of the constitution. Many heartily approved. But already in the 1860s there were a few colored men who saw their best prospects not in restricting the powers

of the elected Assembly but in expanding the franchise. One of these pioneering thinkers was George William Gordon.[33]

Gordon was the son of a Scottish planter and a black slave. At an early age he dealt in real estate with considerable business acumen, became a planter, and was elected to the Assembly for St. Thomas parish in eastern Jamaica. He had no fear of the black masses whose interests he championed. Indeed, from the fact that he held open air meetings at which most of his listeners must have been disfranchised, it would be reasonable to conclude that he regarded the mobilization of mass pressure in support of his political activities as important.

Gordon, a progressive and clearly a nationalist, was the Assembly's most outspoken critic of the irregularities of Governor Eyre and his officials. He appeared to have had no apprehensions concerning political independence. In 1864, for instance, he startled the Assembly in the course of a speech by saying: "If we are to be governed by such a Governor much longer, the people will have to fly to arms and become self-governing."[34]

The Morant Bay "Rebellion" started in Gordon's electoral constituency, led by his agent, Paul Bogle, a black Baptist parson and small farmer. The Governor took the opportunity to get rid of his troublesome critic -- along with Bogle, the other alleged leader of the rebellion -- by sending him, under arrest, to the martial law area where he was disposed of in twenty minutes by a drum-head court martial and hanged.

CROWN COLONY RULE

The 1865 peasant protest clinched, as the political historian Rupert Lewis correctly noted,[35] the victory for the plantation sector (then dominated by British capital) over small commodity peasant production. This led, politically, to the imposition of direct Crown Colony rule and economic underdevelopment which naturally benefited the absentee plantation owners in England and the United States. The latter was about to fulfil the revered weekly, The Economist's prophecy in 1851: the superiority of the United States to England.[36]

The post-1865 period witnessed the growth of a local merchant-planter class which had exploitative relations with the small proprietor strata that formed the basis of the middle class in the 20th century, and "the further pushing into the ground"[37] of the mass of peasants, many of whom were forced back on the plantations either in Jamaica or in Latin America. As a consequence the general process of decomposition of the peasantry was quickened. The major legal instrument through which London merchants secured Jamaican land which had either been abandoned or farmed by the peasants was the Encumbered Estates Act of 1854. Although British capitalist control of the land was predominant most of the colony's exports in the 1870-1890 period went to the United States, where the cane producers did not have to face the stiff competition of the European beet sugar industry until the 1890s. Subsequent competition from sugar in Cuba, Haiti and the Phillipines made the American market a difficult one.

This period marked the first substantial investment of foreign capital in Jamaican agriculture, when American investors brought a new agricultural industry to the British colony. Bananas had been introduced in the island during the Spanish occupation and were later cultivated by slaves on their "provision grounds," but it had never been a commercial crop. The advances in refrigeration technology made it possible to ship bananas for export. Thus by 1870, the U.S. monopoly firm, the United Fruit Company, began investment in the banana trade. The peasant would soon be put at a disadvantage by United Fruit's marketing practices in Jamaica. His products were purchased in the open market at low prices, while the large producers received contracts at a fixed price that was immune to market fluctuations. In any case Jamaica formed, along with the Latin American republics, the foundations upon which United Fruit built its tropical empire. The colonial state was therefore tied to British and American capital, with the former maintaining the dominant position in this period.

One of John Peter Grant's assignments as first Governor after the Jamaica "Rebellion" was to dispossess the peasantry of the land "by prohibiting squatting and inhibiting the development of isolated peasant communities where possible."[38] Through the establishment of the Lands Department the Crown foreclosed on thousands of acres farmed by peasants for which they had no legal titles. Between 1871-75 a total of 90,000 acres were reclaimed by the Crown.[39]

At the same time that British and American capitalist penetrated into agriculture, the conditions of the poor peasants deteriorated and many were forced back into wage labor. But there

was the growth of a prosperous middle stratum within the peasantry whose development had been determined by the economic relations in agriculture at the time and encouraged by British imperialism for its own interest. This is demonstrated in the fact that by the end of the 19th century at least one third of the 7,500 members of the Jamaica Agricultural Society (JAS) were employed as rural constables.[40] The majority of these were small propertyholders who employed wage-laborers.

The growth of this middle stratum is evidenced by the fact that the number of holdings under 10 acres increased from 52,000 owners in a total population of 580,000 in 1882 to 81,900 owners out of a population of 650,000 in 1896.[41] These middle-peasants were those small farmers who, either as owners or tenants, held small plots of land which in good time may produce a surplus which may be converted into capital and therefore they quite frequently resorted to employment of hired labor. As the number of these small freeholders increased, so did their share of total agricultural output. The total peasants' share in exports quadrupled from 1850 to 1890 and continued to grow afterward. By 1930, peasant holdings accounted for more than 40 percent of Jamaica's exports. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the middle stratum of peasants and the agricultural workers on estates (banana and sugar) and the poor peasants who worked occasionally on the plantation and on their own small plots of five acres or less of land.

The middle peasants were engaged primarily in minor export crops -- such as coffee, cocoa, bananas and pimento. The Jamaican

novelist, Claude McKay, reveals in his various works such as Banana Bottom, Gingertown and his unfinished autobiography My Green Hills of Jamaica, the lives of this upper and middle stratum of the peasantry. Also, he provides an insight into the contradictory and ambivalent nature of their relations with the other classes in the society.

Most people believed that direct British rule would result in improved conditions. And, indeed, there were some improvements: it provided the colony with a working administrative system and rudimentary health service and educational system. Even with these innovations and changes, most Afro-Jamaicans viewed the Government as an alien authority wholly unsympathetic to them. The fiscal policies of the Crown in the post-1865 period clearly demonstrates the big planter interests of the colonial state. One of the main tasks of the Constabulary Force set up by the "liberal" Governor Grant, was the immediate imprisonment of all persons charged with non-payment of taxes which also meant the stamping out of any protests against tax collectors.[42] Goods used by the peasants were heavily taxed, while imports of the rich were exempt.[43] Land taxes were regressive so that one paid proportionally less the larger the holdings were. In the 1880s taxes ranged from 1 shilling per acre for holdings under 100 acres to 1 1/2 pence for every acre over 500 acres while on ruinate land belonging to these large holdings, payment was a farthing per acre. Tax on peasant dwellings, draught animals, carts and trade licenses was also high. The peasant practice of transporting produce to market by head instead of using carts or drays was related to the unbearable taxation which made it impossible for them to afford

draught animals. At the same time carriages, carts and wagons for plantation use were duty free.[44]

The Crown Colony regime's land and fiscal policies grew out of general Imperial policy determining the relationship between Britain and its colonial empire. The economic decline of Britain from about 1880 meant that British manufacturers had begun to face intense competition on world markets from their counterparts in the United States and Germany. Gradually, as competition became more severe, the British began to doubt the value of free trade, laissez-faire policy and to find the idea of a self-sufficient empire more acceptable. Colonial raw material and markets began to look more economically favorable and politically secure.

Back to imperialism was the war cry and the policy. Mercantilism was resurrected and Adam Smith must have turned in his grave. Listen to Joseph Chamberlain, the soon-to-be Colonial Secretary, and imperialist architect of imperial federation in a speech in 1888:

> Is there any man in his senses who believes that the crowded population of these islands could exist for a single day if we were to cut adrift from us the great dependencies which now look to us for protection and assistance, and which are the natural markets for our trade . . . If tomorrow it were possible, as some people apparently desire, to reduce by a stroke of the pen the British Empire to the dimensions of the United Kingdom, half at least of our population would be starved.[45]

The man of action reinforced the political theory. The empire was a question of the stomach, said Cecil Rhodes in one of his most famous speeches:

> I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for "bread," "bread" and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism . . . My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e. in order to save 40 million inhabitants of the U.K. from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a question of the stomach. If you do not want civil war you must become imperialists . . .46

Thus, when Joseph Chamberlain assumed office as Secretary of State for the Colonies he accelerated the shift away from the free policy and attempted to tie the colonies more closely to Britain. The colonies could now be developed for the mutual benefit of both Britain and colonists if British capital and technology were applied to its resources. It sought to keep Britain as the industrial heartland of a vast empire and the colonies in the subordinate position of raw materials and consumers of the products of British industry.[47] In Jamaica, this new imperial policy meant strong support for big planter interests over the small peasant sector. It also had severe limitations for the colonial state. For a more self-sufficient colony meant not only greater emphasis on export, which implied acquisition of more land and labor, but the need to increase revenue. Since the Secretary of State had strongly discouraged high import duties on British imports into the colony it meant that more revenue had to be raised through other internal sources. Thus the burden of taxation fell on those who were politically powerless within the context of Crown Colony Government. It is no wonder, then, that so many poor Jamaicans protested with

their feet, as it were, in a massive migration to the Americas at the turn of the century.

The form of Crown Colony Government imposed on Jamaicans after the surrender of the constitution in 1865 was entirely devoid of an elected element. There was, however, little real protest which is puzzling. Most people believed that the introduction of direct British rule would result in improved conditions. While some amelioration did accrue to the society from passing political authority to Britain, the price paid for the reforms was high. The constitution of 1866 gave the British political authority in an autocratic form. The Governor was sure of his majority and the society was represented by his nominees.[48] The Order-in-Council of 1884 set some limits to the extent that any Governor could play the autocrat, by putting the elected members when acting in concert to veto his bills and resolutions. But it did not alter the essential autocratic character of the Crown Colony constitution. Further reforms were of negligible significance, and for the next sixty years this system remained basically unaltered.[49]

In the post-Morant Bay decades autocratic power was used principally to protect the salaries of civil servants from the attacks of the elected members. Thus in any assessments of the use the British made of their political authority in Jamaica, it is necessary to distinguish between the constitution as written and the politics as practiced by the functionaries of Crown Colony constitution. The theory of the constitution asserted autocracy. The practice of politics assumed oligarchy.[50]

The autocratic power was not in general use. It was conceived for a form of opposition which died with the old constitution. The Colonial Office likened the Governor's permanent majority to a phalanx. If any group attempted to block the road to progress, the Governor had the powers with which to stop them. But after 1815 the merchant and planter classes had no need for such crude tactics. And so the autocratic power which originally was to have been the instrument for transforming the society, became merely the instrument for asserting the imperial interest, such as exemplified in the "Florence" case in 1877,[51] and, later still, the autocratic power was used principally to protect the salaries of civil servants from the attacks of the elected members. On such occasions it appeared only after the Governor had uttered the formula "of paramount importance."[52]

Crown Colony Government was in practice an oligarchy. But there was one notable exception: Governor Grant, immediate successor to the tragic Governor Eyre. Grant was the only autocrat. He established the administrative apparatus of a modern state.[53] Grant accomplished in seven years what needed to have been accomplished between 1838 and 1865.[54] The major blot on his tenure in office was his record on the land question.

In 1838 when money should have been spent to inculcate in the ex-slave the new duties, rights and privileges of citizenship, it was spent instead on immigrant labor to keep the sugar estate in existence. The priority thus accorded sugar over the welfare services was justified by equating the private interests of estate owners with the public interest of the state. Sugar was the revenue and the revenue

was sugar. No sugar, no revenue, therefore no public services. It was to Grant's credit that he challenged the assumptions which made this reasoning plausible. The failure of his successors in office and their superiors in the Colonial Office to construct alternative bases of economic development was in great measure due to their acceptance of this reasoning as correct.[55]

The price paid then for the advance in administration was centralization and paternalism. Almost certainly any reforming government would have centralized administration in the capital; but one which had its roots in the country would not have perpetuated the ascendancy of the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial Secretariat. It can be argued that as a device to bring order out of chaos, the institution may have been necessary in the years immediately after 1866. But if the functionaries of Crown Colony rule had taken seriously their professed intention of working towards its death, authority would have been dispersed, at least after the elected element was introduced in 1884.

Equally damaging to the society was the practice of appointing foreigners as heads of departments long after there had been time to train natives for those posts. In most cases it simply argued that natives with the qualities required were unavailable. But for some posts, such as that of Chief Justice and that of Attorney General, it was argued that natives were not desirable in the interest of justice.[56]

Yet in 1865, high posts in the administration were no longer the preserve of white Jamaicans.[57] But with the introduction of Crown Colony regime most of such posts were reserved for white foreigners.

Paternalism and social importance of a white skin were still characteristic of the society in 1865. But these values were by then no longer sacrosanct. By restoring whiteness as a necessary quality for top jobs in the administration, Crown Colony Government reinforced the racial prejudices inherent in the society.

Crown Colony strengthened rather than lessened the imperial relationship which already existed, thanks to the old white ruling class. As the basis of their wealth was eroded by each successive change -- abolition of slave trade, emancipation, abolition of legal distinction of race and color, free trade, easier access to land by freed slaves -- their influence declined and representative government no longer served their interest. But they did not intend to change representative government for Crown Colony Government. For two hundred years they had fought many battles with the British Government for control of local affairs. A majority existed to "reform" the constitution long before the Morant Bay protest. What did not exist was a majority for a constitution to replace the old one. For Crown Colony Government there was hardly a vote. The 1865 Session of the Assembly ended without a majority for any definite form of government.[58] Yet the constitution was changed by a majority of the Assemblymen. It is more than significant that it was changed after the riots, but not because of the riots. They were tricked into this by Eyre.[59]

In light of the absence of precise information, it appeared that the largest group was the one moved by the desire to put the constitution out of reach of the black population. They argued that now was the time. The numbers of blacks qualified to vote had grown,

was growing and would soon be such as to allow them to control the legislature by electing black members. The largest group in the Assembly was motivated to change representative government to Crown Colony because they were angry both against the British and the blacks, and wished to hoist the constitution above the reach of the propertied blacks.[60]

Thus, although the social and economic structure escaped the riots, an alien military force came to suppress riots, found none, and stayed to terrorize a section of the society. Such a change, brought about by Crown Colony, made the society as a whole more dependent, less responsible, less self-directing than it had been. The creole power groups preferred the colonial relationship rather than face the growth of democracy at home.

The abolition of slavery in 1838 and the political changes of the 19th century had not reversed the outward-looking, centrifugal forces of the Jamaican society. It remained divided and divisive. But one change was clear: the old caste structure had collapsed baring the conflicts of race and class. In this sense the "new order" was in reality new more in degree than in kind. The more odious of the post-emancipation injustices -- a repressive legal system, for example -- disappeared with the Morant Bay demonstration.

The social contradiction first, of slavery, and, secondly, of post-emancipation society, still deeply embedded with the spirit of slavery, precluded a positive leadership role for the ruling white elite. Rather than forging a new relationship with either the enfranchised colored group or the vast mass of freed slaves in founding a true Jamaican state, it chose to share its power with the

metropolitan center, and on humiliating terms set by the metropolitan center. It was too much to expect of oligarchs. Thus this ruling class was mainly responsible for the emergence of a political system that did not provide avenues for the cultivation and creative fertilization of sentiments of national consciousness and collective respect.

If effective leadership in the 19th century, for what it amounted to, passed increasingly to the colored group, the dawning of the 20th century witnessed a decisive shift to the masses and their new nationalist movement.

The Impact of the New Imperialism

Britain's conquest in West Africa during the "Scramble for Africa" in the closing decades of the 19th century, and particularly the use of West Indian troops there, became an agitational issue on the streets of Jamaica's capital city, Kingston, at the turn of the 20th century. This new phenomenon must be understood within the broad context of Britain's colonial territorial expansion, the growth of monopolistic commercial capitalism and the rise of nascent nationalism.

At this time the vast majority of the world's population was in a state of direct colonial dependence. The full extent of the domination of a large number of oppressed nations by an insignificant number of oppressor nations possessing great wealth and backed up by powerful armed forces, can be recognized by focusing attention on Jamaica's mother country, Britain.

By the opening decade of the 20th century, Britain controlled more than 9 million square miles of territory obtained through plunder. Between 1884 and 1900 Britain acquired more than 3.7 million square miles of colonial territory. The United Kingdom was in comparison only 121,000 square miles. The population of this empire totalled 431 million people while that of the United Kingdom together with the white dominions, such as Canada and Australia, amounted to 60 million people. On the eve of the Second World War Britain's empire comprised a quarter of the world's population and covered an equivalent amount of the world's area.

The rate of British foreign investment at the turn of the 20th century was reported by Sidney Pollard[61] as follows:

> 1901 - 1905 under 50 million pounds sterling per year
> 1907 - 1910 150 million pounds sterling per year
> 1911 - 1913 200 million pounds sterling per year.

Forty-seven percent of Britain's foreign investment was in the Empire in places such as Canada, New Zealand, India, Burma, Malaya, Ceylon, Africa and Latin America.

British capitalists reaped huge profits from making loans at high rates of interest. It was through Britain's finance capitalists that it met its frequent balance-of-payments problem. Pollard again commented:

> Britain, it must be remembered, showed a substantial unfavourable balance on merchandise trade of the order of 150 million pounds annually. This negative balance, to which must be added (net) bullion imports and tourist expenditure abroad of about 20 million pounds was almost exactly counterbalanced by large and rising credit items for net invisible exports: banking, insurance and shipping earnings. The surplus was provided by dividends and interest rising from about 100 million to 200 million pounds between 1900

> and 1913, and it was these which allowed Britain to increase her foreign investments at an equally rapid rate. Since foreign railways, docks or naval yards, if financed by British investors, would naturally favour British suppliers, a boom in capital exports was bound to be paralleled by a boom in the exports of merchandise . . .[62]

The indebtedness of colonial Jamaica and the high taxes imposed on the peasantry must be understood in the context of these economic relations.

The public debt in Jamaica grew from 500,000 pounds in 1875 to nearly 2 million pounds in 1885. Much of this debt was due to loans for railway construction. In 1884, for example, 130,000 of a 183,000 pounds loan was raised in London at interest rates three to four times higher than that paid on the balance which was raised in Jamaica.[63] This, of course, had to be paid for by tax increases on imports which affected the peasantry more than others.

This period of colonial territorial expansion and economic growth for British capital was at the same time one of intense competition with U.S. imperialism in Latin America and German capital in the Middle East. Britain's Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain's protectionist policy and his colonial policies cannot be understood outside of this context.

It was precisely this inter-imperialist rivalry and particularly the development of monopoly capitalism which led G.S. Salmon in 1884 to criticize the new British imperialism, albeit from the viewpoint of Free Trade liberalism. Salmon cited[64] the restricted inflow of capital; excessive high customs tariffs benefiting a closed monopoly of local merchant houses; a heavy burden of colonial revenues carried by taxation upon local necessities such as corn, flour, rice, fish

and meat; the failure of local real and personal property to share in the tax burden; the excessive costs of colonial administration: all of these, Salmon argued, had produced a maladjusted economy in which the West Indian colonies bought their foodstuffs dear and sold their produce low and from which both planter and worker suffered. Thus Salmon concluded:

> it is obvious that a great injustice has been done to these islands; they have been handed over, as it were, to a powerful corporation, and the consequences of this monopoly are seen in that want of development and that stagnation which is the only end possible to such a state of things.[65]

The conditions which Salmon described remained virtually unchanged until shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. During this period nothing was done to curb the stranglehold of the "powerful corporation" which Salmon described. More than any other group, the West Indian peasant and worker masses paid a high price, in their generally depressed living standards, for that situation.

In Jamaica the rise of commercial monopoly had a devastating effect on the agricultural workers in that it resulted in the continued decline of the sugar industry, with a corresponding decline in the demand for labor for the cultivation of sugar. The decline in the principal economic crop of the island had serious consequences for Jamaica's increasing population.[66] The Crown Colony was uninterested in economic planning and development. It had to respond to the needs and dictates of the metropolitan center. Economic development was left to private enterprise. The dominant philosophy was laissez-faire. Furthermore, the mulatto middle class would join with the upper class whites to protest any government expenditure that attempted

to improve the conditions of the poorer classes. Meanwhile, the mulattoes and whites vigorously demanded more political power for themselves.[67]

Jamaicans in great numbers now sought employment in other lands of the hemisphere. The efforts of first France and then the United States to build a canal across Panama gave Jamaicans their greatest opportunity. By 1905 more than one hundred thousand Jamaicans were lured to Panama. When the canal was completed, there was banana-planting in Costa Rica and work on the more distant islands, in the United States or Canada.

The majority of those who left escaped a cruel reality. The conditions in Jamaica experienced by the poorer classes were grim, although the industrious class of peasant-farmers fared better than most. It was from the poorer class of estate workers that there was a constant drift to the towns, especially Kingston. With migration came overcrowding and more unemployment. Primitive living conditions, unwed mothers, fatherless children and male drifters were everywhere. Yet no efforts were made by the local authorities to create employment opportunities.

Despite the decline of the sugar industry it was nevertheless still the largest employer of labor. For those who continued to work on the banana and sugar plantations there were the problems of miserably low wages and poor working conditions. Indeed, only the question of land ranked greater than the question of labor in Jamaican society. The labor conditions in the early 1900s were little better than they had been at the end of slavery.[68] A laboring man was still an economic slave.

Though there had been some improvement in conditions for some laborers, the bulk of the workers had seen no change. They were still regarded as beasts of burden; still the victims of an economic system under which they labored not as human beings but as living machines designed only to work the plantations. They lived like this, not because they lacked the ambition or desire to do otherwise but because they continued to be economic slaves. Their wages of 18 pence or 36 cents a day in the early 1900s was little better than that paid their slave forefathers.[69]

In light of the labor surplus, employers apparently regard it as their right and privilege to exploit workers. And workers, through long years of submission, came to believe that their exploitation was a part of the natural order that could not be challenged. The attitude of the downtrodden laborers reinforced the complacency of the ruling authorities. The Government, instead of taking steps to improve these conditions, promoted their continuation by spending an average of more than 15,000 dollars each year in establishing and maintaining a system of indentured East Indian migration.[70] This had the effect of providing a class of laborers who were practically modern slaves. To them, 24 cents a day was a considerable sum, for their standard of life was low. The Afro-Jamaicans either had to accept the unsatisfactory conditions or emigrate. Indeed, they chose the latter in vast numbers. The Colonial Government's policy of acquiescing to the demands of the planters, was one of the principal reasons why so little progress was made in the labor conditions of the Jamaican masses.

The Emergence of a New Popular Black Movement: The Impact of Robert Love and Marcus Garvey

The serious economic conditions in face of the continued powerlessness under Crown Colony Government by those who were mostly affected, resulted in protest meetings in Kingston. Those meetings were held largely as a result of a new figure in public life -- Dr. Robert Love. Love was a black physician of striking appearance, scholarly and fluent, both in his oratory and with his pen in the newspapers he published -- The Jamaican Advocate and The Jamaican. In these publications, Love argued with much intellectual force that blacks should take the fight for economic and social justice and democracy to the floor of the island's Legislature.

In 1901 the first blackman, the schoolmaster Alexander Dixon, was elected to the Legislative Council, to be followed in 1906 by Dr. Love. By 1935 there were eight black members. Most were as conservative in their thinking as the white members. Members of the Council had to have an annual income of at least 150 pounds sterling from landed property or 300 pounds sterling if a businessman with no income from real property.[71] Thus they felt distinguished not because they had black skins but because they had risen to an economic position far above that of the masses. Having made the great leap to the middle class, many of them, like the coloreds or mulattoes of the post-emancipation period, had only contempt for those who remained behind. Seeking recognition from those who had long been the eminent members of Jamaican society, the successful black man easily adopted their values and beliefs, feeling

the same cultural distance from the masses. Besides, his constituents were of the middle class, so the black Legislative member was not responsible to the masses as an elected official. The income requirements ensured that in the period up to 1938, no more than 10 percent of the population was able to vote.[72]

Of all the black members of the Legislative Council, Dr. Love was the only one to hold a distinctly black attitude. Love, who described himself as a democrat, was a severe critic of British colonialism. In Love, the lower middle stratum and the mass of poor peasants found their most consistent protagonist. Love's relentless attack on the system of land tenure brought about by British finance capital against the poor peasantry, his struggle against Britain's protectionist policy and his forceful journalistic writings in The Jamaica Advocate made him an outstanding anti-colonial leader in the Caribbean.[73]

In an effort to raise his countrymen to a national consciousness and thereby lay the foundation for the development of an anti-colonial struggle, Love joined with Sandy Cox, a disgruntled ex-civil servant and a Legislative Council member, and founded in 1909 "the island's first nationalist organization -- The National Club."[74] Membership was limited to people born in Jamaica.[75] But this organization was short-lived as Love was past his prime, and Cox, though an energetic organizer, was a poor speaker. Moreover, there was not, as yet, a nationalist momentum capable of carrying it forward.

Compared to the Spanish Caribbean colonies, such as Cuba and Puerto Rico, the manifestations of nationalism, or even of class

consciousness, were slow to appear in the British Caribbean.[76] This is certainly surprising, in view of the enthusiasm the black population in Jamaica, especially, showed for education and for cooperative associations, such as agricultural societies in the 1880s or the organization of free villages in the 1840s. The historian, Richard Hart, posited the view that the new Jamaican nationalism came late because of two factors. The first factor was the widespread loyalty to Britain by the free coloreds for removal of the civil disabilities on them. This loyalty carried over into the post-1865 period and extended beyond the middle classes to the emancipated slaves and their descendants. Because of the relatively liberal attitude of the British Government on such issues as the slave trade and the abolition of slavery -- which contrasted sharply with the attitude so vigorously expressed by the slave-owners -- the slaves, too, had come to draw a distinction between resident whites and the people in England. Secondly, the success over the centuries of the imperial educational policy of inculcating a sense of racial inferiority in many Afro-Jamaicans. A white magistrate, Commander R.B. Bodilly, spelled this out in a statement in England that British rule depended on "a carefully nurtured sense of inferiority" in the governed.[77]

It was this "carefully nurtured sense of inferiority" that Dr. Love had attempted to overcome through his speeches and writings. He was perhaps the first public figure in Jamaica to challenge the tacit assumption that blackness and inferiority were synonymous. It was also Love who urged full-blooded blacks to throw off their

lethargy and step forward and claim their political rights.

The National Club which Love helped found was defunct by 1913. But it had bequeathed to posterity a young man, Marcus Garvey,[78] who would soon have a great impact on West Indians and Afro-Americans. The young Garvey was apprenticed to a printer in Kingston when he joined the National Club and became one of its secretaries. While in this office, he came into close contact with Dr. Love from whom he took elocution lessons. Garvey studied Love's teachings, as these were reflected in the publications and lectures of Love. Garvey became, in time, the most eloquent exponent of the ideals Love enunciated. Dr. Love had a profound influence on Garvey.[79]

Garvey first came into national prominence in 1907 when the Printer's Union, to which he belonged, struck to arouse the moral conscience of employers and governing authorities to the plight of the poor. Having emerged as one of the leaders of the strike, Garvey thereafter devoted himself to improving the condition of the black worker. It was to this end that Garvey launched his first of many periodicals, Garvey's Watchman, which questioned the plight of the average Jamaican. At this time the sons and daughters of former slaves began organizing strikes all over the island to protest their poor working conditions. Since they had no experience in organized labor disputes, however, their protests were short-lived. In this context, the appearance of a new popular black leader willing to organize his downtrodden countrymen would soon have a profound impact on the social, economic and political life of the island.

In 1910, Garvey travelled through several Central American republics to observe the labor and social conditions among the black

migrant workers. On his return to Jamaica in 1914, Garvey struggled for two years to "unite Jamaicans to a consciousness of race"[80] and the economic consequences of being black in a white colonial society. It was an enormous undertaking, since the better-off, educated blacks to whom Garvey turned for financial and political support, largely ignored his cause.

Nevertheless, in 1914 Garvey organized and founded the organization that would enter his name in the annals of black struggle -- the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA).[81] The UNIA declared three basic principles which reflected its founder's political ideology: uniting the peoples of the West Indies, the colored population of the United States, and Africans at home into one brotherhood for betterment and uplift; the redemption of Africa from exploitations of its land and labor; and African nationalism -- nationhood being the only organized means by peoples for self-expression and self-determination in a well-ordered world society.[82]

The new organization was Garvey's instrument for accomplishing these purposes. It was to draw the peoples of the race together through a varied program of education, the promotion of racial pride, worldwide commercial and industrial intercourse and the redemption and development of the African motherland. In addition to the general program of race redemption, the UNIA had a definite local Jamaican program designed to improve the conditions of the poorer classes and to help in the development of the island colony. The keystone of Garvey's program at this time, based on the ideas of Booker T. Washington, a man whose intellectual leadership he would soon reject,

was the establishment of industrial colleges for the further education of Jamaican underprivileged youths. Unable to gain the support of the white and colored strata he needed for his projects, Garvey left Jamaica in frustration and moved to New York.

In the black district of Harlem Garvey's ideas found a receptive audience. The social and economic conditions among the blacks were such as to assure him a ready following. Garvey decided to transfer the headquarters of the UNIA to New York. For eight years Garvey developed and consolidated the most powerful black movement the Western World had ever seen.[83] His message spread like wildfire through lectures and the pages of his powerful newspaper, The Negro World, throughout the United States, eastern Canada, Central America and the West Indies. It also inspired a response as far afield as West and South Africa. Garvey spoke for and to masses of black working people, openly challenging racism, colonialism, and corporate penetration and control of agricultural societies. By 1925, the UNIA had an estimated two million members. A significant reason for the UNIA achievement is to be found in the severe conditions of exploitation and oppression to which African people were subjected.

Marcus Garvey -- Harlem's first grass roots political hero -- posed too serious a threat to white social, business and governmental leaders in the United States, who decided that his movement must be stopped. On trumped-up charges and technicalities he was arrested, found guilty and sent to an Atlanta, Georgia prison in 1925. Released nearly three years later, Garvey arrived in Jamaica, only to discover that The Daily Gleaner, organ of the planter-merchant interests, was hailing his return as a "new and dangerous element in Jamaica."[84]

On his reappearance in Jamaican society, Garvey tried to launch a political revival. In 1929 Garvey organized and formed Jamaica's first political party, the People's Political Party (PPP), and a daily newspaper, The Blackman, to disseminate the political program of the organization. The political platform of Garvey's party was, in the context of the times, progressive.[85] It sounded very much like the nationalist aspirations of other Jamaicans who within a decade would create new political organizations to make their demands known.

Garvey's activities in Jamaica in this period were centered largely around the social legislation and "a larger modicum of self-government" proposal issued by the PPP for the Legislative Council elections.[86] Published in January, 1930 in The Blackman, this platform was a remarkable forecast of things that later came about in Jamaica.

As Garvey could not win over the mulatto and white population who formed the majority of the qualified voters, he and the other candidates were defeated in the election for the Legislative Council.[87] Garvey did win a seat in the municipal council, but it seemed it was not the prize he had wanted. His Peoples' Political Party died as quickly as it had come to life. After this experience, Garvey lost all faith in Jamaicans. In 1935, discouraged and hounded by creditors, who eventually deprived him of his printing press, Garvey left Jamaica for England, from where he continued his consciousness-raising appeal to North Americans and African followers.[88]

Garvey, however, instilled self-confidence and racial self-respect in millions of dispirited black masses in the Western Hemisphere where their background as slaves and second-class citizens had left a deep wound. He went a long way towards overcoming that "carefully nurtured sense of inferiority" that Judge Bodilly had spoken of. Garvey's racial approach to nationbuilding had legitimacy.[89] He had recognized that in the emergence of a national society like Jamaica -- which has been an overwhelmingly black community since 1700 -- any national consciousness must perforce be racial or black consciousness.[90]

Garvey was the first Jamaican political leader openly to espouse the regeneration of society. He was symbolic of a new age -- the age of nationalism and self-government -- which was about to begin. At an end was a period of history in which Jamaica was an administered territory subject to and governed by directives from outside itself. About to start was a period in which those who governed would respond to demands from within, from the masses of the people.

The 1938 Labor Disturbances: Turning Point in the Struggle against Colonialism

More than a century after emancipation, Jamaica's economy was still dominated by foreign-owned sugar and banana companies such as United Fruit, and Tate and Lyle. By the 1930s, the United Fruit Company's holdings had grown to include plantations, shops, shipping companies, agents, wharves and hotels located in many parts of the island. Unable to compete with these large giants' land, new machines and methods, the small peasant farmers were slowly forced

off their holdings and back to the plantations and cities in search of work.

The Depression of the 1930s had an impact on the entire world, and Jamaica was not exempt. As a producer of "primary" products, prices fell more sharply than those of manufactured goods, it was more severely affected than industrial countries. While no class in Jamaican society was immune from the Depression's consequences, for the class of agricultural workers and peasants they dealt a savage blow. In the 1930s the majority of Jamaicans were heavily dependent on agriculture and agricultural-related industries. For example, 61 percent (See Table 3.1) of laborers were employed in the sugar and banana industries, respectively, in 1938, while the value of agricultural products comprised 86 percent in 1937 and 91 percent in 1938, of Jamaican foreign exchange earnings.[91] (See Table 3.2).

In addition, the inadequacy of wages constituted a serious hardship for the poorer classes. By 1935, for example, out of a total of more than 200,368 income earners, it was estimated that 184,000 earned under 65 pounds per year. Ninety-two percent of these employed received weekly less than 25 shillings,[92] and 71 percent less than 14 shillings. The average wage for women was 5 shillings. At least 11 percent of the population was estimated as permanently unemployed in 1935, and at least 50 percent as partially employed.[93] By 1938, the year the crisis peaked, the Orde Brown Report indicated that wages fell to new lows, especially for rural laborers.[94] In addition to the inadequacy of wages there were fluctuations in the cost of living. The steady drop in the cost of living between 1923 and 1936 was followed by an upswing in the cost of living in 1937

and 1938. (See Table 3.3 below).

Table 3.1

Proportion of Laborers Employed by Various Industries in Jamaica 1938

Industry	No.	Percent
Bananas	100,000	43
Sugar	41,000	18
Stevedores	6,000	3
Road and Construction Labor	29,000	13
Miscellaneous and Unemployed	55,000	23

Source: The Orde-Browne Report, Appendix, p. 98, by Major G. St. J. Orde-Brown, Labor Conditions in the West Indies (London: H.M.S.O., 1939).

Table 3.2

Value of 5 Most Important Export Items in Jamaica's Foreign Trade 1937 and 1938

Commodity	1937	(a)	1938	(b)
Bananas	£2,656,883	56.1	2,916,959	60.4
Sugar	864,579	18.2	895,500	18.5
Rum	266,051	5.6	247,892	5.1
Pimento	147,181	3.1	207,070	4.3
Coffee	146,813	3.1	132,907	2.7
Total	4,080,713	86.1	4,400,325	91.0
Total Value of Export	4,739,492		4,833,322	

Source: Adapted from Colonial Annual Reports, Jamaica, 1937 and 1938.
(a) = Percentage of Total Value of Exports

Table 3.3

Statement of Fluctuations of the Index Figure
July 1923-July 1938

	Year	1913-14 = 100	Index Figure
July	1923		190
	1928		184
	1933		143
	1934		136
	1935		130
	1936		121.8
	1937		137.4
	1938		134.6

Source: Adapted from Colonial Annual Report, Jamaica 1938, p. 45.

The weak economic condition of the Jamaican masses was further exacerbated by a significant rise in the prices of a number of widely used items between 1937 and 1938 with "local food" showing the greatest increase. The living conditions of the majority of Jamaicans were grim. Malnutrition and malaria, tuberculosis and hookworm, the workhouse and the poorhouse, became the lot of the laboring class in these hard years.[95]

In addition to the steadily worsening economic picture, thousands of migrants were repatriated from the U.S., Cuba and the Central American republics, adding to the crisis on the island. Hunger for land was strong, especially for those peasants who had become poorly paid workers on large banana plantations. Employment was erratic and the work tedious and hard. A social explosion was building.

While the above more than adequately depicts the suffering of the Jamaican mass, it is true that the society afforded inadequate channels for official eradication or even reduction of strains caused by these economic deprivations. The law continued to tie the qualifications for office and for exercise of the franchise to specific property or income criteria, which were beyond the reach of the majority of Jamaicans.[96]

Moreover, modern machinery for adjusting labor disputes was non-existent. The Trade Union Law of October 1919, for instance, had legalized trade unions in Jamaica but it failed to release trade unions from the possibility of damages as a result of strikes and to legalize peaceful picketing.[97]

The inter-war period was one of social agitation. From time to time there were strikes all over the island. The living conditions were bad enough to engender many Royal Commissions of Enquiry, which only showed the mess colonialism had placed the Jamaican people in. An analysis of the media and social comments of the crucial period showed a concern for the economic deprivations of the laborers. A weekly newspaper, Plain Talk called for the laboring stratum to be represented on the Commission of Enquiry on wages.[98] The President of the Jamaica Labor Union, in a letter to the editor of the Jamaica Standard, argued that it was time agricultural workers earned more than 1 1/2 shillings per day.[99] Robert Rumble of the Poor Man's Improvement Association not only condemned the inadequacy of wages but appealed to the Governor for a general land settlement scheme for the populace. It would, he argued, enable them to obtain their own

land thereby reducing possibility of victimization by "unscrupulous landlords."[100]

Not only was there much talk about wages, there were some who were concerned about a Minimum Wage Law, while still others pontificated on the employment situation and its causes.[101] But perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of the system was to be found in the "1938th Psalms," a parody on the Twenty-third Psalm, pointing to monopoly capitalism as the basic source of Jamaica's problems.[102]

At the same time, anti-colonial feeling was growing among the middle class mulatto and black citizens' associations. In 1936 the Jamaica Progressive League -- the forerunner of the Peoples National Party -- was founded. The National Reform Association, the Federation of Citizens Associations, and the liberal newspaper, Public Opinion, were other examples of the new nationalism that was developing among the middle class.[103]

One middle class businessman, speculator and moneylender, Alexander Bustamante, returned to his native Jamaica in 1935 after several years in Cuba, Spain, Panama and the United States. In 1937, Bustamante began writing a remarkable series of letters to the editor of the Daily Gleaner and the British Parliament dealing with the bad social conditions on the island and the poverty of the labouring classes. His message was a consistent one: "The plight of the people must be rectified."[104]

While Bustamante spoke and wrote, it would seem that the people had had enough. There had been no serious protest in Jamaica for

more than seventy years since the events at Morant Bay in 1865. Little wonder that Jamaica had developed a reputation in the Colonial Office as a "model colony," unlike some of the other West Indian islands. When on 2 May 1938 a violent strike began at the Frome sugar plantation -- a monopoly of the West Indies Sugar Company operated by Jate and Lyle of Britain -- it came largely by surprise to local officials and to the Colonial Office in London. The "disturbances" spread rapidly to neighboring towns and villages. Strikes and riots engulfed the island, as the unemployed and the poor joined wage laborers. In Kingston workers on a housing project left their work and joined the rioters to insist that there should be work for all. The significant feature in most cases was the intensity of the feeling generated and the widespread support given to work stoppages or mob actions once they began. Everywhere on the island inflamed people rallied. Angry crowds gathered in the streets of Kingston, the smaller towns and the villages. Discontent, long latent but now intensified and brought to the surface by the economic shocks of the late 1930s, spread like wildfire into mob action, violence and bloodshed. Police dealt harshly with the rioters, but the riot spread. Rioters blocked roads, damaged property, broke down bridges, burned sugar plantations, destroyed banana trees and, on several occasions, ambushed armed police with nothing but sticks and stones.[106] The Colonial Office sent warships, marines and aeroplanes. By 10 June 1938 the uprising had ended, and the ringleaders were arrested.[107]

The outburst of discontent did not at the outset centre upon political demands. The strikes and the riots growing out of them

were spontaneous reactions to appalling economic and social conditions and were not at the initial stage politically motivated or organized. They proved, however, to be a leaven for the rise of modern trade unions and mass political parties. The major issues that were being discussed no longer revolved around the aspirations of the middle classes. They were working class demands. And so the initiative was passing into the hands of trade union leaders and new working class organizations.

In real terms, those who gained most out of the "reformist violence" of May-June 1938 were not the workers and peasants who marched, fought and died in the streets and countryside. They won important changes to the Trade Union Law of 1919, giving them the right to collective bargaining, small increases in wages, improved social welfare legislation, and the promise of land. But the Crown Colony Government, the instrument of colonialism and imperialism which the laborers fought, remained until 1962. And the granting of universal suffrage came about, not as a result of the riots, but by the combined pressure of the forces of war and middle class agitation.

The gain was much greater for the new leaders who emerged from the strikes -- the negotiators and mediators on the part of laborers -- Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley.[108] The riots of 1938 propelled Bustamante into leadership of his own Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU)[109] -- the largest single labor union Jamaica had ever known -- and eventually to head of newly-independent Jamaica, under the banner of Jamaica Labor Party (J.L.P.). For Manley, 1938 was the beginning of a movement to become independent

of England, and the seed of a new Jamaican political party -- the Peoples National Party (PNP). Not long afterwards, Manley's PNP quickly established the Trade Union Congress (TUC) as a challenge to Bustamante and the BITU. At times the rivalry between members of the two organizations became violent. Thus began in the island a form of political unionism in which the Jamaican unions have come to be run by the middle class leaders of the political parties as a vote-catching annex instead of being controlled by the workers.

The PNP, under Manley's leadership, had a clear vision of a Jamaica freed from British rule. Gathering the support of his fellow professionals -- lawyers, accountants and businessmen -- Manley built PNP on the anti-colonial movement of the 1930s. The party called for self-government while Bustamante -- concentrating on economic improvements -- called for "personal" self-government.[110]

Despite its anti-British stand, however, the PNP sought the intervention of the Crown to solve the economic crisis behind the 1938 strikes. Declaring itself a democratic socialist party similar to Britain's Labor Party, the PNP favored a "democratic and fundamentally British" form of government to replace Crown rule. Through careful internal organization and long-range strategy, the PNP grew quickly and led the struggle to win universal suffrage -- the right of all adult Jamaicans to vote. Most Jamaican workers, however, quickly evaluated the PNP as an essentially liberal middle class organization, and the great majority chose to remain behind Bustamante.

However, to counter Manley's growing popularity Bustamante, with characteristic cunning, devised a simple formula for deflating

the attractiveness of the PNP's self-government agitation. "Busta," as Bustamante was called by the working people during the 1938 strikes, came out against it with the slogan: "Self-government means brown man rule."[111] The term "brown man" was, of course, a reference to the colored middle classes who the black masses knew well had a contemptuous, snobbish attitude towards them. Bustamante and the JLP entered the first general elections held in 1944 under adult suffrage with intense loyalty to the monarchy, a firm belief in capitalism and opposition to the expressed PNP demand for self-government.

Bustamante, largely on the basis of party loyalty and his charismatic appeal, won by a landslide. The JLP won twenty-three of the thirty-two seats, leaving the PNP with four, and five independents in the new House of Representatives. But Bustamante in office could not compare with "Busta" on the hustings. "He had no programme, no policy and no sense of direction except opposition."[112] The elections did, however, accomplish one thing above all others: it gave the submerged black laboring population a sense of self-respect and self-assurance that could have come in no other way. Hereafter subsequent constitutional advances and, indeed, economic changes were largely the result of the impact of the Second World War.

The Impact of World War II

The advent of the Second World War had given a powerful stimulus to the nationalist struggles in Jamaica as it did elsewhere in the British empire. The Governor and the British Colonial Office

believed, for a time, they had astutely quelled the strikes and protests of 1938. They did not realize that 1938 and its aftermath marked the beginning of the end of the whole colonial period. Legalizing trade unions, far from ending strikes, made them more effective. Similarly, the push to extend the vote to all Jamaicans encouraged the voters to seek more and more power in local affairs. In this way the middle class elements in the Jamaican Legislature increased their pressure on the British Parliament to grant important changes in the constitution that led to elections on the principle of universal suffrage. Faced by powerful internal and international forces, England was being forced to concede many constitutional powers to the island's middle and upper classes.

The Second World War played an important part in this readjustment. Parliamentary England was locked in a life and death struggle with an authoritarian form of government, Nazi Germany. Yet its own colonial empire was also authoritarian, and Britain could not condemn Hitler without raising some question about its own contradictions. Even the leaders of England's wartime ally, the United States, criticized Britain's colonialism. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt made it clear to Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the Atlantic Charter, which they both signed in 1941, had to be universally applied.[113] As the war raged on, it became clear that Britain could not sustain its old empire and survive as a nation. England was not, however, willing to completely give up control over the resources and raw materials of its colonies. The British were well aware that the Atlantic Charter effectively guaranteed that U.S. economic interests would have "access, on equal terms, to the

trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity"[114] -- including the West Indies.

World War II sounded the death knell for the British Empire. The United States emerged as leader of the Western world after 1945, and began to play an increasingly key role in the Anglophone Caribbean as well as in Latin America. While the Americans opposed the anti-imperialist and pro-socialist ideas emerging in the West Indies, they strongly favored Jamaica's independence from the British Empire, anxious to move in on their economic rival in the region.

Under U.S. pressure Britain accepted Jamaican independence in principle. However the English, faced with huge war debts, wanted to maintain their economic influence over the Caribbean. They proposed a West Indian Federation -- a Caribbean-wide commonwealth of nations that would maintain ties to the mother country even after independence.

Following the war, two important changes occurred in Jamaica. Britain's economic dominance of the West Indian colonies declined, and bauxite (from which aluminum is made) was discovered by North Americans. On the island, rural workers were migrating by the thousands to the cities, especially Kingston, frustrated by lack of jobs and economic opportunities in the countryside. With war-battered Britain unable to offer much assistance, Jamaica began looking for other countries to invest in a new industrial development program.

In 1952, Bustamante's second government passed an Industrial Incentives Law and created the Industrial and Agricultural Development

Corporation to woo foreign industry to the island. Their task was inducement planning -- to develop Jamaica's industry by bringing British and U.S. corporations to the island. This "Industrialization by Invitation" program was modelled after the United States' Operation Bootstrap, developed in Puerto Rico between 1950 and 1952.[115] The "invitation" included tax breaks, cheap land and the promise of plentiful workforces hungry for jobs and willing to work for low wages.

The industrialization policy set in train a rush by bauxite companies from North America to take advantage of the highest yield bauxite ore in the world, and the favorable terms of Jamaican's "invitation" to invest. In the cities the newly-arrived peasants provided the foreign companies with ready-made, cheap labor forces as quickly as plants could be built. The JLP, stating that it was time to "rid this country of Socialism and, or Communism once and for all,"[116] promised that industrialization programs would create thousands of jobs; while Manley hailed the Industrial Development Corporation as an "essential instrument of socialist plan[ning]."[117] But by the election of 1955, there was a huge gap between promises and actual employment, and the JLP was defeated in the elections of that year.

Immediately upon taking office, Norman Manley announced the PNP's "capitalistic expansionism" plan. The program promised to provide one hundred fifty thousand new jobs by attracting both local and foreign investment. Early in his term, Manley boasted never had so many capitalists prepared to come to the country . . . as since the PNP Government been in power."[118] The PNP socialist philosophy

was lost in the early success of the new capitalist expansion:

> By 1957 Jamaica was the world's largest producer of bauxite and the industry made sufficiently large sums of money to help finance a series of impressive public projects . . . tourism also developed into a major component of the economy . . . the annual average rate of growth of gross domestic product between 1950 and 1961 averaged almost 9 percent. . . . [a record] equalled at the time only by the achievement of Japan and Puerto Rico.[119]

The other side of this "economic miracle" was the fact that only 13,000 new jobs were created between 1956 and 1968 while the Jamaican workforce increased at the rate of more than 20,000 per year.[120] During the 1950s, 160,000 Jamaicans were forced to migrate to England in search of work. At the same time, between 1953 and 1959 "the earnings of the resident corporations increased some two and one-half times."[121]

The development of industries was based on a weak basic premise: that foreign manufacturers must be encouraged to set up plants in Jamaica, which would stimulate rapid economic development and, hopefully, solve the critical unemployment and social problems. But what they produce, how permanent their enterprise was likely to be and how much actual benefit they would bring seemed not to have been contemplated. The literature put out to entice companies to Jamaica demonstrated the mentality of the Industrial Development Corporation.[122]

At the same time what had occurred in Jamaica was that the concept of self-determination had been given a new twist. The PNP's nationalism was not only anti-colonialist but also, in the broader economic sense, anti-imperialist. Whereas the JLP leadership had not drawn a distinction between foreign and local investors, the

PNP leadership had made this essential assessment. Once in power, however, the PNP leadership whilst still being anti-colonialist in the constitutional or political sense, had ceased to be anti-imperialist in relation to the country's economics. The result was not purely a Jamaican phenomenon, but a global development which has earned the aptly descriptive label -- neo-colonialism.

In July 1959, Jamaica was granted full internal autonomy within the newly created Federation of the West Indies.[123] But the Federation soon ran into problems trying to integrate the disconnected Caribbean islands into a single "commonwealth." The major islands -- Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados -- wanted to protect their own economic development, while the smaller islands pushed their larger neighbors to share some of their power and privilege. Within Jamaica, Bustamante argued that federation would take jobs away from Jamaican workers, and Manley began to pull back from the project in order to concentrate on island affairs.

In May 1960, the JLP officially came out against federation and began actively campaigning to pull Jamaica out of it, claiming "if you vote for Manley he is going to sell you out to the small islands."[124] In response, Manley called for a referendum on the issue. When it was finally held in 1961, 46 percent of the voters were in favor while a bare majority opposed. The most outstanding feature of the vote, however, was the degree of abstention. Forty percent of the registered voters did not participate.[125]

Now that Jamaica was no longer part of the Federation, it was necessary to formulate an independent island government. In all probability the British, under pressure, would have granted

independence to Jamaica much earlier. But the middle and upper classes had hesitated to give up the special economic and social benefits they gained from Jamaica's colonial status. The rejection of federation, however, assured Jamaica's wealthier classes that they would control the island's economic and political decisions. After that, it was not hard for the island's powerful to accept an independent course for Jamaica.

> The constitutional jog-trot quickened into a veritable gallop to independence. Within two weeks [of the referendum], a Jamaican mission was in London and an official release declared that "Her Majesty's Government will receive a delegation from the Parliament of Jamaica in January or February 1962 to consider proposals "for a Jamaican Independence Constitution." Sovereignty itself would come "at the earliest practicable date" after that Conference.126

The Jamaican independence constitution, approved after alteration by London, was ratified by the Jamaican Parliament on 27 February 1962. Yet despite the independence celebrations and fanfare, the island's powerful made sure that the new constitution was more a continuation of past policies than a new beginning. Stability and continuity were essential to retain foreign investment. And the island's middle and upper classes were determined not to disturb the economic advantages they gained from the presence of the foreign corporations.

On the eve of the constitution's adoption by the Legislature, the island's leaders consulted one last time. Correspondence between Norman Manley, Alexander Bustamante and N.N. Ashenheim -- leading lawyer for the largest corporations in Jamaica -- voiced their strong conviction that the document needed to be agreeable to the foreign investor:

> let the world know that . . . people can come here to invest . . . fully protected by the laws of the land, that we are not committed to any extreme policies whatever, and that property [will] be fully protected.[127]

In an effort to maintain the confidence of foreign investors, the authors of the new constitution included only a limited Bill of Rights, and no provision for any popular referendum on constitutional changes.

Thousands marched through the streets and runners carried a torch of freedom from town to town. In reality, however, independence came more as a "generous gesture" by England than as a hard-earned victory of Jamaican nationalism. The great majority of Jamaicans participated little, if at all, in achieving sovereignty:

> The island entered its independence stage in a mood of half-hearted, simulated enthusiasm, hardly filled with any real passion for its achievement. Colonialism, for Jamaicans, ended not in a bang but in a whimper.[128]

With the advent of independence Jamaican political elites would for the first time be unfettered in policy decision making. The next chapter will examine these conscious policy decisions in an attempt to transform the economic and social structures of inherited colonialism.

Notes to Chapter Three

[1]Edward Long, The History of Jamaica, 3 vols. (London: 1774), Vol. 1, pp. 5-8.

[2]From the mid-18th century onwards full-blooded black slaves were manumitted for exceptional service rendered to their masters; or bought their freedom from money saved from selling of surplus produce.

[3]The first census taken in Jamaica, in 1844, listed the following racial totals: white, 15,776; black, 293,128; colored, 68,549. There were perhaps 40,000 free people of color in 1830. See Philip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas ... (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 240.

[4]Samuel J. and Edith F. Hurwitz, Jamaica: A Historical Portrait (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), pp. 137-140.

[5]Quoted in Ibid., p. 140.

[6]Ibid.; Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), and Douglas Hall, "The Colonial Legacy in Jamaica," New World Quarterly Vol. 4, No. 3 (1968): 8-9.

[7]Sir Charles Metcalfe in a Letter to Lord John Russell quoted in J.H. Parry and P.M. Sherlock. A Short History of the West Indies (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 196.

[8]Quoted in Lord Olivier, Jamaica: The Blessed Island (New York: Russell and Russell, 1971), p. 280. See, also, Douglas Hall, Free Jamaica 1838-1865: An Economic History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 23-27, for evidence of greatly increased numbers of holdings of from five to ten acres -- over 19,000 in five years.

[9]Of the Christian denominations in Jamaica at the time, the Baptists had the greatest influence among the black masses and achieved the best results. This was largely due to the leadership of William Knibb who had great faith in the ex-slaves. To develop their potential, Knibb felt that the blacks should be independent economically. If the black was to become a self-respecting man and a good Christian, he had to be free from the plantation -- but loose from the ties that bound him to those who would keep him dependent and ignorant. Toward this end, Knibb established the "free villages" -- communities of former slaves who were settled as independent farmers on the land. Under Baptist leadership these villages became self-governing. Each village built its own chapel, school house, and community meeting hall and raised its own funds to support its own church and minister, school and teacher. Between 1837 and 1847 almost 200 villages were established. Knibb

appropriately labeled these settlements the "germ of a noble free peasantry." There should be no surprise then the Baptists, especially, were in constant conflict with successive Governors (particularly with Sir Charles Metcalfe) and planter class. See W.J. Gardner, A History of Jamaica (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1873), pp. 415-416. See, also, J.H. Hinton, Memoir of William Knibb (London, 1847).

[10]EPICA Task Force, Jamaica: Caribbean Challenge (Washington, D.C.: EPICA 1979), p. 21, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 157.

[11]It is interesting to observe that the exodus from the estates was unwittingly expedited by the planters themselves. The Ejectment Act, hurriedly passed by the Jamaican Assembly, enabled the planter to eject a tenant on one week's notice. The Trespass Act provided severe penalties. The planters calculated that by Notices to Quit the "grounds" which they had formerly been allowed to occupy for the purposes of raising their own food, or by charging excessive rents, they could make the ex-slaves so dependent on wages for their sustenance as to compel them to work every day of the week for very low wages. But in the effort to make the freed slaves more dependent on wage labor and compel them to work on the plantations, the planters in practise made continued residence on the estate lands so perilous and insecure as to drive large numbers of them away. The effort to force the ex-slave to stay on the estates is graphically described by a contemporary Baptist minister, James M. Phillippo, Jamaica: Its Past and Present State (London: John Snow, 1843).

[12]In order to deny lands to the blacks, it was decided to encourage the importation of whites who would fill the cooler interior mountain districts. The Europeans began arriving in 1834. The first lots were brought in by individual planters under bounty system, but others were to be introduced on a government scheme to settle in a number of inland towns built specially to receive them. Those imported by individual employers were expected to work as laborers on interior estates, those brought in by Government were to be established as small settlers in the planned township. The combined effect would be to deny both land and employment in the cooler interior to the ex-slaves and so make it necessary for them to move to the sugar areas in the lowlands. About 2,685 from Britain and 1,033 from Germany came in during 1834-42. See Hall, op. cit., p. 21.

[13]The first batch of Chinese came not from China but Panama. They numbered 6,000.

[14]William G. Sewell, The Ordeal of Free Labour in the British West Indies (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1861), p. 240.

[15]An Act of the British Parliament passed in 1846 provided for abolition in gradual stages between 1848 and 1854, of the duty of reference which British West Indian sugar enjoyed in the British

market over sugar produced more cheaply in the East, or by slave labor in Cuba or Brazil. It ruined the sugar industry. Production of sugar which had stood at 67,850 tons in 1833, slumped after emancipation to 33,143 tons by 1845. After the sugar bill, a further sharp decline took place. By 1855 production was down to 22,514 tons. This state of affairs continued for many years. Dr. Edward B. Underhill, Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society of Britain, calculated that the sugar industry could not employ more than 30,000 people in 1865. See Eric Williams, British Historians and the West Indies (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966), pp. 103-104.

[16]W.A. Roberts, Jamaica: The Portrait of an Island (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1955), p. 97, and Hall, op. cit., p. 264.

[17]Curtin, op. cit., p. 108, and Hall, op. cit., p. 117.

[18]See Sewell, op. cit., p. 240, and Richard Hart, The Origin and Development of the People of Jamaica (Kingston: Education Department of the Trade Union Congress, 1952), p. 12.

[19]In the early 1850s there was a series of dry years, and an epidemic of cholera in 1850-51 swept away a large number of sugar workers.

[20]Britain was at this time putting its surplus capital into expanding industries, railways and steamships. West Indian sugar grew relatively less important compared to the new iron and cotton industries. The preference duties on sugar had to be bargained away to open markets in the Americas and in the east to British manufactured goods. The industrial bourgeoisie now wielded great political clout in British politics. The planting interest along with the gentry were on the decline.

[21]T. Witter Jackson to H.W. Austin, St. Thomas in-the-Vale 31 January 1854 quoted in Curtin, op. cit., p. 121.

[22]Curtin, op. cit., pp. 23-60.

[23]In 1860, of the total population of approximately 400,000, under 2,000 persons were entitled to vote. The Jamaican oligarchy saw to it that the propertied blacks would be denied participation in politics for as long as possible. The Assembly enacted a series of tax laws -- the hereditament tax, the poll tax and the stamp tax -- all of which had to be paid as a prerequisite for voting, effectively excluded the blacks from the franchise. For a clarification of the meaning of these taxes, see Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 127, and Hall, Free Jamaica, op. cit., pp. 3-4. Phillippo, op. cit., passim, especially pp. 108, 109 and 111-112.

[24]Despite the removal of the disabilities of colored people, the Assembly was still controlled by a substantial white majority in 1860.

[25]These were not tightly knit party organizations. The "Town" or "City Party" was so-called because their support was largely urban, while the "Country Party" support was drawn from the estate owners of the country parishes. The important thing about the Town Party is that it did not develop as a group representative of the mass of the people -- despite the fact that a substantial number of its members were colored. It, or members of it, opposed immigration and declared for Jamaica as an island of small independent farmers, but it produced no constructive proposals to facilitate the growth and establishment of such a class. Although at times it enjoyed a working majority, it introduced no bills to promote road building, to establish a secure system of land tenure, or to provide credit or marketing facilities for the producers of minor export and domestic crops. Indeed, the activities of the Town Party appear to have been almost entirely devoted to political ends, such as the championship of the rights and privileges of the Assembly. See Hall, Free Jamaica, op. cit., pp. 2-8, Roberts, op. cit., pp. 96, 100.

[26]Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 144.

[27]Roberts, op. cit., p. 101.

[28]Ibid., p. 102 and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 144. In fact this point comes out clearly in the literature. Emancipation, the representative system of government and, of course, the sheer numbers of the Afro-Jamaicans signalled the eventual demise of the white and colored groups.

[29]E.B. Underhill quoted in Williams, op. cit., p. 102.

[30]Ibid. Emphasis added.

[31]The peasants were completely rebuffed. The Colonial Secretary, Edward Cardwell, replied that neither the Queen nor Her Majesty 's government could do anything for the peasants of St. Ann. The Queen's Letter, as it came to be known, stated that it was "from their own industry and prudence . . . that they [the peasants] must look for improvement in their condition." Poverty was the result of individual failing, it said, and the government could do nothing.

[32]The punishment meted out was severe. The vengeance was exacted in Saint Thomas parish with the greatest ferocity by soldiers, militiamen, sailors from the warships and the Maroons. From the most reliable estimate, 439 men were executed, some of them after drum-head court-martials, many without a hearing. Wanton killing of other blacks and the indiscriminate flogging of at least 600 persons of both sexes, as well as the burning of 1,005 peasant dwellings completed the reign of terror. The property-owning classes approved Eyre's action. They had been talking for a long time of the danger of Jamaica being "turned into another Haiti." Governor Eyre's panic behavior triggered an international debate. See, for example, Lord

Olivier's The Myth of Governor Eyre (London: The Hogarth Press, 1933) for a well-balanced analysis of the Jamaican Rebellion. For a view opposed to Olivier's see G. Dutton's The Hero as a Murderer (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967).

[33]Ansell Hart, George William Gordon (Kingston: Institute of Jamaica, 1971). This is the most comprehensive of the studies of Gordon to date.

[34]Ibid.; see, also, Eric Williams, op. cit., p. 115, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 145.

[35]Rupert Lewis, "Political Aspects of Garvey's Work in Jamaica 1929-35." Jamaica Journal Vol. 7, No. 1-2 (March-June 1973):30-35.

[36]See Williams, op. cit., p. 154.

[37]Lewis, "Political Aspects of Garvey . . ." op. cit., p. 32.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid., p. 33, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 157-58.

[42]The public safety laws of Jamaica during the Crown Colony period were especially prejudicial to the masses, as they were almost as harsh as in the days of slavery. Whippings for petty larceny were common, and a more stringent code was put into effect. Loiterers and vagrants could be fined. Treadmills were in common use in all prisons. Police were instructed to fire directly into crowds that appeared ready to riot. As late as 1942, flogging was used to punish those who stole growing crops. See Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

[43]In 1870 property taxes yielded 58,500 pounds (sterling), customs receipts 221,300 pounds, while in 1890 property taxes had declined (due to economic depression) to 17,300 pounds but customs receipts had increased to 344,000 pounds. Customs receipts were the most important source of revenue and judging by the items taxed (smoked fish, flour, salted or cured beef and pork, soap and salt), and those exempted (books, carriages, carts and wagons, dogs, diamongs, fresh fish and meat, manure, pipes, ploughs, barbed wire, apples, grapes, peaches, strawberries and bacon, etc.) it was obvious that they were mainly by the poorer sections of the population. Land taxes also hit the peasants hardest. . . . See Graham Knox, "Political Change in Jamaica 1866-1906" and the "Local Reaction to the Policies of the Crown Colony Government" in The Caribbean In Transition, Institute of Caribbean Studies p. 150-151. See also Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 187-88.

[44]See Lewis, "Political Aspects of Garvey's Work . . ." op. cit., p. 32, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 188.

[45]Joseph Chamberlain quoted in Williams, op. cit., p. 157.

[46]Cecil Rhodes quoted in Ibid., p. 159.

[47]James Morris, Pax Britannica. The Climax of an Empire (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 102.

[48]Between 1865 and 1884, the fifteen man Legislative Council were either appointees of the governor or ex-officio members from the colonial civil service.

[49]The reluctance of the British Government to modify the Crown Colony system was no doubt fortified by the increased competition which Britain was now meeting from her industrial competitors in the export of manufactured goods and by the growing importance to the capitalist system of the process which came to be known as the export of capital. Empires had assumed a new importance, and all Britain was back in step with the Colonial Office.

[50]See Roy H. Augier, "Before and After 1865," New World Quarterly Vol. 11, No. 2 (1966), p. 33.

[51]The Florence was a ship that had been detained in Jamaica by order of the governor, Anthony Musgrave, as it made its way from Cuba to St. Thomas. Part of its cargo of guns and munitions was taken off by order of Musgrave for damages. The Governor was sued for damages. A costly judgment was made against Musgrave by the Jamaican courts. The Colonial Office instructed Musgrave that, since he had acted in his official capacity, one half of the damages payable to the shipowners should be paid out of Jamaica's public funds. This stirred enough resentment for the system of government to be called into question. (See Hart, Jamaica and Self-Determination, 1660-1970, op. cit., p. 281, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 178).

[52]See Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 179 for an explanation of the clause, "of paramount importance to the public interest."

[53]The central government's operations were rationalized and modernized, considerably reducing operating costs. The Anglican Church was disestablished in 1870, thereby ceasing to be a financial burden on the government. New courts were established to dispense justice to the poor. The public system of elementary education was started. So too was the public medical service. Roads and bridges were built (Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 180-186).

[54]See Gisela Eisner's criticism of the old regime in her Jamaica, 1830-1930: A Study in Economic Growth (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1961).

[55]Augier, op. cit., p. 36.

[56]Ibid., p. 37, and Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p. 73.

[57]See Lewis, op. cit., p. 74.

[58]It was to Eyre's triumph that he got the second amending act through a much depleted House of Assembly. The Governor over-dramatized the entire problem and played on the fears of the oligarchy by exaggerating the significance of the revolt. (Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 150).

[59]A conclusion drawn from the manner in which Governor Eyre got the majority of members to vote for the surrender of the constitution (See W.J. Gardener, op. cit., pp. 454-457, and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 149-50).

[60]Angier, op. cit., p. 22.

[61]Sidney Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, 1914-1967. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 19.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Lewis, "The Political Aspects of Garvey's Work ...," op. cit., p. 30.

[64]G.S. Salmon, Depression in the West Indies: Free Trade the only Remedy (New York: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1884), p. 24.

[65]Ibid., p. 25.

[66]Providing the greatest security in the surplus labor market were domestic jobs. Women thus had more opportunities than men. They could engage in a wide range of domestic positions such as seamstress, cook, maid and "nanny".

[67]Eisner, op. cit., p. 317.

[68]E. Ethelred Brown, "Labour Conditions in Jamaica Prior to 1917," Journal of Negro History Vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1919), p. 351.

[69]Ibid., p. 352.

[70]Ibid., pp. 353-356 and Lord Olivier, op. cit., pp. 164 and 221.

[71]A. Cariss, "The Official Attitude to the Elected Members in the Jamaica Legislative Council 1918-1938," Jamaica Journal Vol. 7 No. 3 (September, 1973), p. 6 and Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 189.

[72]Out of a population of slightly more than one million in 1935, only 68,636 were registered to vote.

[73]Robert Love established a pan-African Association along with H. Sylvester Williams about 1900.

[74]Richard Hart, "The Life and Resurrection of Marcus Garvey," Race Vol. 9, No. 2 (October, 1967): 189. See, also, Jamaica Times, 6 March 1909, p. 18 and Rex Nettleford, (ed.), Manley and the New Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Longman Caribbean Ltd. 1971), p. xxvii. It lasted only for three years from 1909-1912.

[75]It seemed that if the rule was strictly enforced Love would have been ineligible. He was born in the Bahamas.

[76]F.W. Knight, The Caribbean ... (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 177.

[77]Hart, op. cit., p. 283. See, also, James Carnegie, Some Aspects of Jamaica's Politics: 1918-1938, (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Jamaica, 1973), p. 33. Upon the abolition of the Assembly in 1865, there was a widespread belief that, with the country's destinies now firmly in British hands, all would be well. It took a considerable time for this illusion to die.

[78]For an account of Garvey's political activities see Rupert Lewis, A Political Study of Garveyism in Jamaica and London 1914-1940, unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica, 1973. An interpretative analysis of Garvey's educational influence is given in V.A.S. Williams' The Life and Influence of Marcus Garvey on the Education of the Black People, unpublished M.Ed. thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada, 1977.

[79]Amy Jacques Garvey, Garvey and Garveyism (New York: Collier Books, 1970), p. 6.

[80]Ibid., p. 12.

[81]Marcus Garvey, "The Negro's Greatest Enemy," Current History Vol. 18 (September, 1923): 951-954, and Amy Jacques Garvey, (ed.), Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey (New York: Atheneum, 1974), p. 126.

[82]Ibid., and Jacques Garvey, op. cit., p. 262.

[83]E. David Cronon, Black Moses (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 3.

[84]Quoted in Lewis, "Political Aspects of Garvey's Work in Jamaica 1929-35," op. cit., p. 32.

[85]The historic Manifesto (see Appendix) summed up briefly what amounted to the major political, economic, legal and educational demands of the Jamaican working people.

[86]Garvey, unfortunately, never clarified his views on the question of self-determination for Jamaica.

[87]Even if Garvey's party had won seats it is most unlikely that the program would have been implemented. There was no provision for participation by elected representatives in the area of effective power which under Crown Colony was monopolized by the Crown officials. Garvey should have first campaigned for full adult suffrage rather than after the election defeat.

[88]Garvey's struggle with the Jamaican Establishment, and its ruthless persecution of his efforts, both by its political and judicial machinery is well documented. Equally so his rejection by the Jamaican colored middle class was evident in the denunciating letter against Garvey and the UNIA sent to all Colonial Governors in 1920. Local politicians also feared the prospect of his competition and opposed him strongly. (See, for example, Gordon Lewis, op. cit., pp. 176-177, V.A.S. Williams, op. cit., pp. 102-103.)

[89]Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p. 191.

[90]Ibid., Nettleford, op. cit., p. ixvi and V.A.S. Williams, op. cit., p. 130.

[91]Maurice St. Pierre, "The 1938 Jamaica Disturbances. A Portrait of Mass Reaction Against Colonialism," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1978):171.

[92]One shilling is approximately twenty cents.

[93]Trevor Munroe and Don Robotham, Struggles of the Jamaican People (Kingston: Workers Liberation League, 1977), pp. 99-101.

[94]Major G. St. J. Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions in the West Indies (London: H.M.S.O., 1939), pp. 94-97. The daily wages in 1938 figures for banana, sugar and wharf workers are given.

[95]Carnegie, op. cit., p. 12 and Munroe and Robotham, op. cit., p. 101.

[96]St. Pierre, op. cit., p. 173. The Law also required women to be four years older than men in order to fulfill the age requirements for voting.

[97]O.W. Phelps, "Rise of the Labor Movement in Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 9, No. 4 (December, 1960):420.

[98]Plain Talk, 9 April 1938, p. 3.

[99]Jamaica Standard, 12 April 1938, p. 5.

[100]Plain Talk, 9 April 1938, p. 9.

[101]Plain Talk, 16 April 1938, p. 6. In still another instance there was a letter pointing out that bus conductors were subject to arbitrary reduction in wages, as well as tax fines by employers for misdemeanours.

[102]Public Opinion, 2 April 1938, p. 10.

[103]Carnegie, op. cit., pp. 96-127 and Gordon Lewis, op. cit., pp. 172-175. There were many more middle class organizations which sprang up all over Jamaica, calling for racial equality in the civil service, more democratic institutions, widening of the franchise and constitutional reforms. Few of them, however, had any program specially in the interest of the laboring classes. Some of these anti-colonial movements also had working class followers such as A.G.S. Coombs of the Jamaican Workers and Tradesmen Union (JWTU) founded in 1936. By 1937, Alexander Bustamante had taken control.

[104]Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, Jamaica 1938: The Birth of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (Kingston: BITU, 1968), p. 2. For a critical analysis of the Bustamante Letters, see Trevor J. Munroe, "The Bustamante Letters," Jamaica Journal Vol. 7, No. 1-2 (March-June 1973):2-10.

[105]For a detailed account of the 1938 strikes and protest of the Jamaican laboring classes, see Phelps, op. cit., pp. 417-472. See, also, St. Pierre, op. cit., pp. 171-196 and K.W.J. Post, The Jamaica Labor Rebellion of 1838 (Kingston: The Trade Union Congress, 1977). During the violent protest there were shouts of "Down with competition", an indication that the strikers were against the colonial system.

[106]The Frome protest resulted in the death of four people, injury to thirteen and the arrest of 105 charged with riotous assembly (St. Pierre, op. cit., p. 183).

[107]St. Pierre advanced the thesis that the 1938 violent protest though political was reformist, rather than revolutionary. The former merely involves a desire for limited changes in policies, practices, and so on. An attempt is made to improve society without changing its basic social structure. In the 1938 riots what the participants seemed to be more interested in was some or more employment, better wages, better treatment on the job and in general better jobs, without significantly influencing the structure of the economy or the

political system. Revolutionary violence, on the other hand, involves a desire for widespread thorough-going change (particularly the ownership and management of the means of production). This form of violence produces changes in the society's values, patterns of authority, norms, as well as the replacement of elites (St. Pierre, op. cit., pp. 192-93 and Ted Gur, "The Revolution - Social Change Nexus," Comparative Politics Vol. 5, No. 3 (April 1973):359-392).

[108]Norman Manley, a cousin of Bustamante, had a sharply different background to the charismatic "Busta". He attended Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship and became a brilliant barrister. He brought a first rate mind, a comprehensive diagnosis and remedy for Jamaica's ills based on Fabian socialist postulates. A certain critical aloofness and a polished oratorical style, however, made his appeal to the masses ineffective. (See Nettleford, Manley and the New Jamaica, op. cit. and Philip Sherlock, Norman Manley (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1980).

[109]Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, op. cit.

[110]This is a reference to the impact of Bustamante's personality on his supporters and particularly on his lieutenants in the JLP. This charismatically-oriented party's emphasis was on unity and allegiance to "Busta." The party had no firm commitment to an elaborate political program. Bustamante and his supporters of businessmen and professionals had no positive policy other than laissez-faire and a basic conservatism. (See C. Paul Bradley, "Mass Parties in Jamaica: Structure and Organization," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 9, No. 4 (December, 1960):375-416, Katrin Norris, Jamaica: The Search for an Identity (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 28, Phelps, op. cit., pp. 443-44 and Gordon Lewis, op. cit., p. 180).

[111]Alexander Bustamante quoted in Hart, op. cit., p. 286. See, also, Gordon Lewis, op. cit., p. 182.

[112]Phelps, op. cit., p. 456.

[113]In the Charter, England agreed to seek no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. (See Samuel B. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the U.S. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942), pp. 863-64).

[114]Ibid., p. 864.

[115]Bradley, op. cit., p. 382.

[116]Trevor Munroe, The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization, Jamaica 1944-62 (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972), p. 86.

[117]Ibid., p. 99.

[118]Ibid., p. 100.

[119]Ibid., 101-102.

[120]Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972), p. 145.

[121]Monroe, op. cit., pp. 102 and 104.

[122]See Katrin Norris, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

[123]The Moyne Commission appointed in 1938 to investigate the conditions in the West Indies suggested the setting up of a federation aimed at the "combination into one political entity of all British possessions in the area." Arrangements were made at two conferences held in 1947 and 1956 respectively for Jamaica to unite with the other British West Indian islands to form the West Indian Federation, with one capital, one currency and unrestricted movement of people from one area to another. On 23 February 1958 Jamaica became a member of the Federation. Political realities, as well as the structure and forms of the new Jamaican Government, made the organization of a viable confederation a most difficult task. The federation did not become the "expression of the aspirations of the area towards fuller national status." It failed to develop into an organization dealing with the common social and economic problems of the area. Jamaica, growing ever more confident of its own destiny, was opposed even to the very limited powers granted to the federal government.

[124]Sir John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 126.

[125]Ibid., pp. 135-138.

[126]Ibid., p. 138.

[127]The Jamaican Hansard, pp. 722-723 quoted in Mordecai, op. cit., p. 162.

[128]G. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, op. cit., p. 186.

CHAPTER FOUR

POST-INDEPENDENT JAMAICA: PERPETUATING THE COLONIAL PAST -- THE SEARCH FOR AN APPROPRIATE STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT

Nineteen sixty-two produced some bitter irony for Norman Manley. Having been virtually guaranteed the post of first Prime Minister of the new West Indies Federation, he had rejected it in 1959 to remain in Jamaica where the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) was building opposition to the federation plan. But the year independence came the People's National Party was defeated, and Alexander Bustamante became the first Prime Minister of independent Jamaica. Jamaica as an independent country in the Commonwealth has the Queen of Britain as its titular sovereign. Since the 6th of August 1962, the Queen has been represented by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Before proceeding to discuss the major policy decisions of the governing elites in the post-independence era, it is necessary to present an overview of the demographic, economic and social structure since they have particular relevance to the problem faced in the period on which this study is focused.

Geography and Natural Resources

Jamaica is situated between Latitudes $17^{o}43'$ and $18^{o}32'$ North and Longitude $56^{o}11'$ and $78^{o}21'$ West. Hence it is a tropical

country. It is also an island. The total area of the island of Jamaica is 4,411.21 square miles. The greatest length of the island is 146 miles and its greatest width is only 51 miles, making internal transportation to all parts of the island a relatively easy problem. It is located 90 miles south of the eastern extremity of Cuba and 100 miles west of the Republic of Haiti. Geographically, it is isolated in relation to the nine smaller island territories that comprised the so-called Commonwealth Caribbean countries, and this may be illustrated by the fact that St. Kitts, the nearest to Jamaica, is 800 miles to the east, while Trinidad is over 1,200 miles due southeast. The proximity of the island to the United States (Miami, Florida, for example, is located 500 miles to the North) is important because of the migration of a large proportion of its labor force and its dependence for trade and investment capital with that country. The significance and importance of Jamaica's central position in the Caribbean may perhaps be appropriately summed up in the words of the Handbook of Jamaica as follows:

> From its central position in the Caribbean Zone, and the fact of its being in the direct track between Europe and the United States and the Isthmus of Panama, Jamaica furnishes special advantages and conveniences for trade and commerce between these points.[1]

In terms of its geographical boundaries the island is divided into three counties: Cornwall in the west, Middlesex in the center and Surrey in the east. These are subdivided into fourteen parishes which are almost evenly distributed on a county basis, as may be seen from Table 4.1. Figure 4.1 is a basic map of Jamaica while Figure 4.2 illustrates the island's position vis-a-vis its Caribbean neighbors.

Table 4.1

Jamaica: Divisions by Counties and Parishes

Surrey	Square Miles	Middlesex	Square Miles	Cornwall	Square Miles
1. Kingston (including Port Royal)	10.10	St. Catherine	483.27	St. Elizabeth	474.44
2. St. Andrew	181.30	St. Mary	254.04	Trelawny	352.55
3. St. Thomas	300.17	Clarendon	467.89	St. James	240.61
4. Portland	328.53	St. Ann	481.05	Hanover	177.08
5. --		Manchester	339.79	Westmoreland	320.39
Total	820.10		2,026.04		1,565.07
				Grand Total	4,411.21

Source: Handbook of Jamaica, 1966:6. Kingston: Government Printing Office




Figure 4.1

Map of Jamaica





Figure 4.2

Map of the Caribbean Area

Jamaica, like most other Caribbean islands, is very mountainous, and particularly the eastern part where the range is known as the Blue Mountains the altitudes are considerable. The Blue Mountain Peak attains an elevation of 7,402.4 feet. Jamaica, in fact, has been described as "a long jagged spine of mountain set in a ring of plain."[2] Nearly one half of its surface is flat. The eastern end of the island is composed mainly of igneous, sedimentary and metamorphic rocks. Most of the rest of the country -- more than 50 percent of its surface -- is covered with thick layers of white limestone. Limestone is not good for cultivation; hence the main agricultural settlements occur in valleys. The coastal plains are composed of mixed alluvial clays, sand and pebbles. Close to 60 percent of the land is used productively -- for planting, pasturing, and forestry. Of the unutilized land about 12 percent is potentially productive for agriculture, and 20 percent for forestry, while about 10 percent is permanent waste land. Apart from its soil the only other resource of importance is bauxite which occurs extensively in the limestone region, especially in the western part of the island, as shown in Figure 4.3.

There are wide variations in climatic conditions with the highest temperatures at the sea coast rising to over 90°F. and falling to 40°F. on the tops of the highest mountains. Numerous rivers and springs are to be found in most parts of the island, particularly along the coast, although there are areas in the midland and western parts of the country where it is very dry. The average annual rainfall is very high. As it is to be expected, it varies with the relief of the land -- some places in the eastern and north-eastern

JAMAICA BAUXITE AND ALUMINA INDUSTRY



Capital City
Major Town
Road
Railway
Conveyor Belt
Parish Boundary
Mining Area
Plant Site
Bauxite Export (Port of Departure)
Alumina Export (Port of Departure)
Mining Lease
Bauxite Distribution

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 50 Miles


Prepared by the Cartography Unit of the Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Kingston, Jamaica, November, 1981

Figure 4.3

© Jamaica Bauxite Institute 1981

Figure 4.4

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS



Source: Survey Department, Jamaica Government, 1972.

mountain slopes receive as much as 200 inches per annum while the western and south-western slopes and sheltered plains receive less than 40 inches. But Jamaica's rainfall varies from 40 to 150 inches annually.[3]

Apart from the tropical climate Jamaica, like most other Caribbean islands, has large numbers of beautiful sandy beaches, a resource highly prized in the tourist industry.

Population and Migration

A preliminary Census Report for 1970 puts the population of Jamaica at 1,861,300. This shows an increase of 14.6 percent over the 1960 census population figure of 1,624,400. Although in the two decades between 1950 and 1970 there was a downward trend in the infant mortality rate and the overall death rate -- the former dropped by 34.3 percent between 1950 and 1960 and 37.5 percent between 1960 and 1970 -- the ten-year period from 1950 to 1960, however, witnessed an increase in the birth rate to the extent of 26.9 percent. But, as the following figures in Table 4.2 indicate, there was a subsequent decline in this rate for the decade 1960-1970 from 42.0 per thousand to 34.4 per thousand. There was even a more dramatic decline in this rate in the following decade 1970-1980 from 34.4 per thousand to 26.9 per thousand -- as indicated in Table 4.3.

Table 4.2

Demographic Statistics: 1950-1970

Year	Death Rate	% Change	Infant Death Rate	% Change	Birth Rate	% Change
1950	11.8		78.3		33.1	
1960	8.8	-25.4	51.5	-34.3	42.0	+26.9
1970	7.7	-12.5	32.2	-37.5	34.4	-18.1

Source: Demographic Statistics, March 1971, Department of Statistics, Kingston, Jamaica, November, 1971.

It is useful to look at a more important demographic indicator for the period since 1962. As will be seen from Table 4.3 the rate of natural increase only began to fall steadily since 1967. Between 1969 and 1979 the rate of natural increase fluctuated between 27.4 to 21.3 per thousand. There is thus a significant downward trend in the birth rate, but this has been matched by an improvement in the death rate and particularly in the rate of infant mortality.

It should be pointed out, however, that if it were not for the continued high rate of Jamaican emigration particularly to the United Kingdom in the 1950's and early 1960's and in more recent years to North America, the natural increase in population between 1950 and 1980 would have been even greater.[4] Migration abroad has a long history in Jamaica, but since 1943 emigration has completely eclipsed immigration and re-immigration. Emigration to the United Kingdom had many features of what Adam Kuper[5] termed a "millenarian cult" in

Table 4.3

Population Figures and Birth Rates: 1962-1980

Year	Population at December 31	Birth Rate (per 1,000)	Death Rate (per 1,000)	Rate of Natural Increase (per 1,000)	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)
1962	1,676,000	40.3	8.9	31.4	48.1
1964	1,762,000	39.8	7.7	32.1	39.3
1966	1,859,000	38.9	7.8	31.1	35.4
1968*	1,924,000	34.3	7.6	26.6	34.7
1969	1,863,700	35.1	7.6	27.4	33.4
1970	1,890,700	34.4	7.7	26.8	32.2
1971**	1,911.400	39.9	7.4	27.5	27.1
1972	1,932,400	34.3	7.2	27.1	30.9
1974	2,007,900	30.6	7.2	23.5	25.9
1976	2,072,300	29.3	7.1	22.2	20.3
1979+	2,152,500	27.5	6.2	21.3	12.4
1980**	2,175,300	26.9	5.8	21.1	n.a.

Source: Economic and Social Survey: 1966, 1970, 1972, 1978, 1980.

* Central Planning Unit Estimate Unadjusted
** Provisional
\+ Revised

the 1950s and 1960s, and in these decades 200,000 Jamaicans emigrated. In several recent years recorded migration from Jamaica exceeded 20,000, or more than 1 percent of the total population. Since the gradual closure of entry to Britain with the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, migrants have mainly been going to the United States and Canada. New legislation in the U.S. allowed the stream of migration to gather force again, and in 1969 Jamaica's net loss from migration was officially recorded as being 29,000. This was the peak, but even in 1972 13,427 Jamaicans went to live in the U.S., and 3,092 in Canada. Table 4.4 shows the most recent migration. Between 1972 and 1979 168,677 Jamaicans left the island nation.

Table 4.4

Main Stream of Jamaican Emigration, 1972-1979

Country	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
U.S.A.	13,427	9,963	12,408	11,076	9,026	11,501	19,265	19,714
Canada	3,092	9,363	11,286	8,211	7,282	6,291	3,858	3,213
U.K.	1,620	1,872	1,397	1,394	1,198	1,029	599	592

Source: Economic and Social Survey, 1980.

In 1979 migration to the U.S. was just under 20,000, a 2 percent increase on the previous year and the largest number in recent record. These are legal migrants -- there are others.

Table 4.5

Migration of Jamaicans: 1961-1971

1961	-	39,203 (U.K. only)
1962	-	22,841 (U.K. only)
1963	-	7,494
1964	-	n.a.
1965	-	6,500
1966	-	8,900
1967	-	n.a.
1968	-	20,000
1969	-	29,000
1970	-	n.a.
1971	-	31,000 (provisional)

Source: Economic and Social Survey, 1969, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1960, 1968.

People have not only been migrating abroad. At an increasing pace over the past 50 years, the cities and the towns have grown at the expense of the countryside. As recently as 1943, only 18 percent of Jamaica's population lived in the capital, Kingston, and its suburbs. In 1970 the "Corporate Area" (the metropolitan area of Kingston) contained 27 percent of the total population. At the same time, 13 other towns accounted for a further 10 percent of the population, and if Kingston had been growing quickly, the pace of the other towns was even faster. Between 1960 and 1970 the overall average growth rate of Jamaica's population was 1.46 percent per annum.

The Corporate Area grew at a rate of 3 percent per annum in this decade. Jamaica's second largest city, Montego Bay, and the town of May Pen grew at the rate of 6 percent per annum, Spanish Town, the old Spanish capital city, at an astonishing rate of 11 percent per annum. Virtually all the rural parishes grew in population at the rate of less than 1 percent per annum in the 1960s, but even in the rural areas the patches of mining and tourist development have shown much greater than average population increases.[6]

In short, rural Jamaicans have been streaming into the towns and the places of opportunity. Natural increase in the cities is lower than in Jamaica as a whole, and virtually all the dramatic growth in the urban population is attributable to internal migration. It was estimated, on the basis of the 1960 census, that 44 percent of Jamaicans over the age of 14 had lived in more than one parish.[7]

Consequences of External Migration

It is important to examine the effects of migration since they bring to light a number of central issues which face post-independent Jamaican society. In the earlier migration to the U.K., it is possible to argue that on the whole Jamaica's economic development had benefited. First, all population pressure was reduced: total population was probably 200,000 less in 1962 than it would have been without migration. Secondly, although a disproppртion-ate number of skilled workers emigrated, so depressing total production, per capita production probably increased, as did the rate of employment. And thirdly, the remittances of the migrants were an

important source of foreign exchange. (This continues to be true. The Bank of Jamaica estimated that in 1972 remittances from Jamaican migrants totalled 40 million Jamaican dollars.)

However, the change in direction of migration -- from Britain to North America -- has been accompanied by a change in the kind of migrants. The migration to Britain, which was massive, rapid and non-selective, included large numbers of unskilled and unemployed men and women. The picture of the North American migration is very different. The new U.S. immigration laws, enacted in 1965, which came into force in 1968, placed Jamaica in a Western Hemisphere group of countries which was permitted a total of 120,000 immigrants a year. Jamaica has taken an extraordinary high proportion of these places -- well over 10 percent in several years. In 1971 of 12,000 or so granted entry to the U.S., most of them were women, mainly domestic servants but also nurses.

Two consequences of these arrangements are beneficial to Jamaica. More women than men are migrating, so slightly dampening the future rise in the birth rate. Secondly, nearly 43 percent of the migrants were aged under twenty in 1972; this figure increased to 53 percent and in general a large number of young people are leaving (after having had their education subsidized by Jamaica) for the U.S. as well as Canada.

A third consequence must give policy planners cause for worry, however. The level of skill in the migrating population is very much higher than in the Jamaican population as a whole. The immigration procedures, which are deliberately biased in order to skim off the

skilled people, are in part responsible. Whatever the reason the facts are clear. In 1972, of 13,427 migrants to the U.S., 6,311 were workers and 7,116 were dependents. Less than a third of the workers had qualified for labor certificates, but nevertheless only 30 percent of the workers who emigrated were unskilled or only semi-skilled. Sixteen percent fell into the top bracket professional and technical, managerial and administrative personnel; 14 percent were clerical or sales workers; and 40 percent were craftsmen and skilled workers.

In the case of the Canadian emigration, the bias in favor of skilled personnel is deliberate government policy. Moreover fewer dependents are admitted. While more than half of the Jamaicans who go to the U.S. are dependents, this is true of only about 40 percent of those who go to Canada. Table 4.6 compares the proportion of workers in various categories in Jamaica, with those in the groups of emigrants to North America.

Table 4.6

Workers in Jamaica and Emigration to North America: percentage distributions

	Jamaica (1967)	Emigrating to U.S. (1972) as % of column 1	Canada (1971) as % of column 1
Professional, technical and managerial	6	16	11
Clerical and sales	11	14	24
Craftsmen and skilled workers	18	40	36
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers	65	30	28
Total	100.0	100	99

Source: Economic and Social Survey, 1972; 2nd Five Year Plan, 1970-1975.

It is evident that whether or not the U.S. is following Canada's deliberate policy and concentrating upon the recruitment of economically desirable immigrants, emigration from Jamaica is biased in favor of the very people whose services Jamaica needs most.[10] For example, it is significant to mention that 29 percent of professional and technical people migrating to Canada in 1979 were medical personnel.[11] The less skilled workers, whom Jamaica has in over-abundance, cannot take advantage of the opportunities to seek their futures elsewhere. The less-skilled and unskilled workers who represent two-thirds of Jamaica's work force, contribute under a third to the migrant total.

In fact the situation is even more serious than these gross statistics suggest, for among the most highly trained the drain is already critical. In 1967, Jamaica produced 610 university graduates.[12] In the same year 780 graduates emigrated, and only 100 returned to the island. In the following year, too, there was a net loss of university graduates. The same study estimated the investment gain to the receiving countries from the immigration of 710 Jamaican university graduates in 1968 at about 10 million U.S. dollars.[13]

Thus while the earlier stages of post-war external migratory movement may have been to Jamaica's benefit, at least from the economic point of view, the more recent phase has been increasingly disadvantageous.

The demographic framework of Jamaican society, therefore, exhibits most of the features familiar in underdeveloped societies,

but perhaps in a more extreme form than many -- the strong tidal movement from the farms to the towns and to Kingston, so that an agrarian and rural society has become well over one-third urban within a generation; the high rate of population growth, limited by emigration; and, finally, the development of a "brain drain" so severe that Jamaica is probably exporting each year more graduates than it produces and as many skilled workers as it will need in the years ahead. All these movements both reflect and generate enormous social changes. They are a function, also, of economic development; but each of these movements is potentially fatal to the further economic development.

Structure of the Economy

As has already been stated, bauxite mining in particular has become the mainstay of the Jamaican economy. During the 1960s Jamaica emerged as the world's largest supplier of bauxite, producing over 20 percent of the world's consumption. The tourist industry also expanded enormously and stimulated by the bauxite and tourist development, the construction industry has enjoyed high levels of activity. The Government has encouraged the development of secondary industries, and here too its success has been greater than expected. But there are three serious drawbacks in the success story. First, in the agricultural sector growth has dropped considerably since 1950; in fact to 2 percent per year during the period of rapid industrial development and population growth. Secondly, employment opportunities have failed to keep pace with population growth. And

thirdly, as a consequence of unemployment and the retardation of the agricultural sector, the very unequal distribution of wealth has not improved: it may even have gotten worse.

The dominance of the modern sectors -- mining, manufacturing and tourism -- over the traditional export standby, sugar, is overwhelming. In 1972 bauxite-alumina earned more than three times as much as agricultural exports.[14] It is perhaps even more surprising to note the extent to which manufacturing has overtaken agriculture. In 1959 manufacturing industry for the first time overtook the contribution made by agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 1972, as indicated in Table 4.7, agriculture, forestry and fishing contributed only 9 percent of GDP, while manufacturing contributed 14 percent. As recently as 1950, agriculture was contributing over 30 percent to Jamaica's GDP.

It is estimated that Jamaica's GDP grew at an annual rate of 10 percent between 1950 and 1968 at factor cost. If the effect of rising prices is eliminated, the annual growth rate in this period was 6.7 percent. However, the differential rate of growth between various sectors was great. In 1950 agriculture contributed 32 percent to total GDP; in 1972, only 9 percent. At the same time, mining, virtually non-existent in 1950, contributed 12 percent in 1972, and both construction and manufacturing increased their percentage contribution to GDP. Throughout this period, however, rural Jamaicans have remained in the majority. Nearly two-thirds of the Jamaican population still lives in the rural areas, for the rapid growth of the modern industrial sector has not been matched by

Table 4.7

Jamaica's Gross Domestic Product and its Components
1968 and 1972

	1968 J$ million	%	1972 J$ million	%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	77.5	10	105.6	9
Mining, quarrying and refining	100.1	13	141.1	12
Manufacturing	115.3	15	165.5	14
Construction and Installation	94.9	12	130.9	11
Distributive trades	102.3	13	160.3	14
Financial institutions	35.0	4	76.8	7
Public administration	69.7	9	108.6	10
Other (Tourism, Ownership of Dwellings)	89.8	24	268.8	23
Total	784.6	100	1,157.6	100

Source: Economic and Social Survey, 1972.

an equivalent growth in urban employment. In 1972, manufacturing industry employed only 12.7 percent of the workforce, and although this was an improvement over previous years, employment in this sector was not even keeping pace with the growth of the workforce. Bauxite mining, so powerful a factor in the economy, employs only a few thousand workers, and the tourist industry itself only claims directly to employ 12,000 workers.

In short, as indicated in Table 4.8 below, the new centers of Jamaica's wealth do not employ many Jamaicans; and the old, declining agricultural sector still dominates the employment picture. It has been estimated that in 1958 average urban income in Jamaica was 2.4 times larger than in rural areas. The current estimate is

that average urban income is now five times greater.

Table 4.8

Industrial distribution of classifiable labor force, percentages

Sector	1960	1968	1978
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	38.7	33.8	31.0
Mining, etc.	0.7	1.3	0.7
Construction and installation	7.2	7.3	5.8
Manufacturing	9.1	11.1	11.5
Public Utilities	0.5	0.8	n.a.
Commerce distribution	9.9	11.7	12.4
Transport, communication	2.8	3.4	4.8*
Miscellaneous services	21.8	21.4	18.2
Public administration	7.6	9.2	15.4
Unspecified	1.7	--	0.9
Total	100	100	100

*The 1978 figure for Public Utilities is included in the category Transport and Communication.

Source: National Plan, 1970-1975. The 1968 figures are estimates.

Unemployment

The importance of the "unemployment problem" is such as to warrant a brief look at some of the available statistics. In the first place, although the new sectors of the economy continue to be profitable and grow, they cannot offer new jobs at anything like the required rate. The increased investment in the new sectors brings greater returns and higher wages, but does not have a major effect on employment. The bauxite industry, for instance, is greatly

capital-intensive, but even in manufacturing industry the effect of new investment on employment is disappearing. Manufacturing output in Jamaica grew at an average rate of 8.4 percent per annum between 1950 and 1965 -- but at the same time employment grew at an average annual rate of only 4.1 percent.

In 1963, the JLP Government recognized that "unemployment is clearly the major economic and social problem of Jamaica."[15] Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the employment and unemployment figures for the post-independence period 1962-1980. The unemployment rate has increased rapidly in the two decades since Independence. In 1972, over 22 percent of the labor force said they were unemployed and would like to work. This figure increased to over 27 percent in 1980. And as the 1972 male labor force survey indicated, the young were particularly worse off -- 57 percent of the unemployed men were aged 14-24, although they accounted for only 26 percent of the total male labor force. Unemployment patterns during 1980 "continued to discourage young persons from entering the labor force." This is apparent from the 1980 labor force survey, which indicates that although those under 30 received the largest number of jobs, "this was still disproportionately small in relation to the size of their labor force and in particular their pool of unemployed."[16] Thus there appears to be a segment of the work force, partly but not entirely made up of very young men, who constituted the overwhelming majority of unemployed men. They can be identified with even greater precision: they tend to be urban-born.

Table 4.9

Labor Force and Employment in Jamaica 1960-1980

		1960	1969	1972	1978	1980
Total Labour Force	000	654.6	753.9	808.3	949	981.2
Male		401.2	322.2	456.7	n.a.	n.a.
Female		253.4	331.7	351.6	n.a.	n.a.
Employed	"	566.5	624.3	626.5	708.3	720.4
Male		363.4	375.4	394.7	478.0	
Female		203.1	248.9	231.8	230.5	
Unemployed	"	88.1	129.5	181.8	230.5	270.8
Male		37.8	46.7	62.0	n.a.	n.a.
Female		50.3	82.8	119.8	n.a.	n.a.
Unemployed as percent of Total Labor Force (%)		13.5	17.2	22.5	24.5	27.3
Male		5.8	6.2	7.7	n.a.	n.a.
Female		7.9	11.0	14.8	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: 1960 Census of Jamaica; 1969, 1972, 1978, 1980 Economic and Social Survey.

Table 4.10

Employment in Jamaica, October 1972. Employment and unemployment by age group and sex

Sex	Age group	Employed	Labour force Unemployed Number	%	Total	% of workforce Total	% of workforce Unemployed
Male	14–24	81,709	35,339	30	117,048	26	57
	25–34	78,208	11,185	13	89,393	19	18
	35–54	140,837	10,238	7	151,075	33	16
	55 and over	93,949	5,259	5	99,208	22	9
	Sub-total	394,703	62,021	14	456,724	100	100
Female	14–24	42,400	50,521	54	92,921	26	43
	25–34	52,087	30,250	37	82,337	24	25
	35–54	94,618	30,365	24	124,983	36	25
	55 and over	42,705	8,620	17	51,325	14	7
	Sub-total	231,810	119,756	34	351,566	100	100
	Total	626,513	181,777	22·5	808,290		

(Source: *Economic Survey, 1972*)

These internal structural imbalances in Jamaica's economy are related to its dependence on foreign investment. Jamaican policy-making elites have been able to give some stimulus to the economy, but the direction of economic development has been shaped by the investment decisions of the large foreign companies. According to one authority, foreign ownership:

> ranges from 100 per cent in bauxite-alumina, to 40 per cent in sugar and its by-products, 40 per cent of transport, communications and public utilities combined, about 60 per cent of financial services and 55 per cent of hotel capacity in the tourist industry.[17]

The scale of most of the crucial enterprises demands either great foreign concerns, or direct government intervention. The fact of the matter is that, overall, Jamaica has been too dependent on foreign investment to interfere with the neo-colonial pattern -- particularly in the decade or so after independence.

Social Structure

The political fact of independence did not necessarily change the social system. It merely transferred its control from metropolitan masters to the local ruling class groups. And because those groups understand the majority better than did the expatriate officials they are able "to tighten up the psychological screws that hold the majority in their prison."[18] The Jamaican society has been, and still largely is, a rigidly stratified structure with a pyramidal mound of three separate social tiers: the white upper class comprising the older landed gentry and the top mercantile

families; the urban middle class groups; and the great Jamaican working class, both rural and urban.

The Upper Class and Corporate Power

Jamaica's economy is controlled by a small minority of the population -- a completely non-black elite dominated by what Jamaicans called the "21 families" as shown in Table 4.11. They are the descendants of former British, Jewish, Syrian-Lebanese and Chinese families, and many of them have a long history in Jamaica. Jamaican censuses have for years attempted to classify the population by race and the returns give some idea of the proportion of people who appear to be of African and European ancestry. In 1960 the numerators were instructed to enter the racial classification volunteered by respondents, who were presented with a choice between nine possible categories including one which was labelled "other." Over the past century, the tiny European part of the population has been declining proportionately to the whole, the African proportion has remained stable, constituting about three-quarters of the population, and the various "mixed race" categories have become progressively more significant. The rapid growth of the categories "Chinese, Afro-Chinese" and "East Indian, Afro-East Indian" is attributable mainly to an increase in the number of people of mixed ancestry, and the rise in the category 'others' represents a growing proportion of people whose ancestry defies the numerators' categories.

The 21 Families and Their Corporate Connections, 1972-1975

Family Group	Number of Companies Represented	Number of Directorships Represented	Family Members Who Chair Boards of Top 41 Companies	Companies They Chair	Rank of Company by Capital	Area of Investment
Abrahams	4	5				
Ashenheim	15	20	N. Ashenheim	Caribbean Cement Co.	12,277,000	Cement
				Wray and Nephew	11,941,000	Sugar and Rum
			Sir N. Ashenheim	Caribbean Steel Co.	7,771,000	Steel Products
			L.E. Ashenheim	Gleaner Company	3,370,000	Newspaper & Printing
				Insurance Co. of Jamaica	2,078,000	Insurance
Brandon	2	2	A.E. Brandon	Motor Owners Mutual	669,556	Insurance
Brown	3	3				
D'Costa	4	5	C.E. D'Costa	Lascelles De Mercado	8,681,000	Diversified Distributor
				Western Terminals	2,622,000	Real Estate
Desnoes	6	7	P.S. Desnoes	Desnoes & Geddes	13,955,000	Aerated Beverages
Fletcher	5	5				
Geddes	7	7				
Graham	3	7	Hon. A. Graham	Jamaica Citizens Bank	4,271,000	Banking
Hart	8	11	Hon. C. Hart	Carreras Group	4,096,000	Tobacco
				Jamaica Flour Mills	3,709,000	Flour & Animal Feed
			T. Hart	Montego Free Port	3,429,000	Real Estate
			S.L. Hart	Jamaica Co-op Insurance	3,386,000	Insurance
Hendrickson	3	4	K. Hendrickson	Jamaica Public Service	25,541,000	Electricity
				National Continental Corporation	7,351,000	Baking, Packaging, Real Estate
				Communications Corporation (Ja.)	554,838	Newspaper
Henriques	9	14	R.D. Henriques	West Indies Pulp and Paper	2,447,000	Paper Products
				West Indies Glass	2,238,000	Glass & Plastic Containers
Issa	3	3				
Judah	5	5				
Lai	2	3	E.A. Lai	Lai Corporation	1,995,000	Real Estate
Lake	5	5				
Matalon	4	10	M.M. Matalon	Jamaica Telephone Company	15,071,000	Telephone
				Industrial Commercial Developments	9,629,000	Diversified
Mahfood	4	6	W.H. Mahfood	C.M.P.	3,803,000	Diversified Metal Products
Nunes	3	3				
Rousseau	4	6	P.H. Rousseau	Life of Jamaica	1,732,000	Insurance
Stone	4	4	D.H. Stone	Bryden & Evelyn	2,592,000	Distributors & Importers
			D.H.F. Stone	Kingston Ice-Making Company	874,000	Ice & Refrigeration Facilities

Source: Stanley Reid, "An Introductory Approach to the Concentration of Power in the Jamaican Corporate Economy and Notes on its Origin," in Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown (eds.), Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977), Appendices A1 and A2, pp. 37-38.

Table 4.12

Percentage racial origin of Jamaican population according to censuses 1881-1960

Census Year	African	Afro-European	European	Chinese, Afro-Chinese	East Indian, Afro-East Indian	Other Races	Not Stated
1881	76.5	18.9	2.5	0.0	1.9	--	0.2
1891	76.4	19.1	2.3	0.1	1.6	--	0.5
1911	75.8	19.6	1.9	0.3	2.1	--	0.3
1921	77.0	18.3	1.7	0.4	2.2	--	0.4
1943	78.1	17.5	1.1	1.0	2.1	0.2	--
1960	76.3	15.1	0.8	1.2	3.4	3.2	--

Source: O. C. Francis, People of Modern Jamaica (Kingston: Department of Statistics, 1963), p. 4-2.

The members of the upper class who live mostly in the cities, are university educated, usually in the U.S. and Britain. They exert intellectual and cultural -- as well as economic -- leadership on the island.

With a few exceptions, the top class has been socially and politically reactionary--in economic terms the junior partners of expatriate financial enterprises; and, therefore, mentally colonialist. Their leadership role, therefore, has been a restrictive one, confined to the honorific office like Custos (Lieutenant Governor) or nominated appointment in the old Crown Colony system. As a class in Jamaican history they controlled everything behind the scenes until only recently, silencing black activists like Marcus Garvey with open persecution, buying off the colonial expatriates with the open

hospitality for which they have been famous. Even in their own professional fields, they have rarely been innovators or great captains of industry, technical and managerial advances having been generated, in the main, by the overseas investment companies which they manage.

None of the 21 families of Jamaica's top class is black in a society which is at least 80 percent black, and no blacks are represented in the top corporate management.

> Not one corporate firm is controlled by blacks . . . and of the 6 blacks on the corporate boards two were government appointed, the others providing a face lift.[19]

Many of these families -- the main beneficiaries of Jamaica's economic system -- trace their present power directly from slavery. A number of them originally became wealthy running business or professional services for the early plantations. After emancipation many Jewish, Middle Eastern and Chinese merchants and traders joined the English business owners, and some of them also became rich.

Unlike the wealthy in many colonial societies, Jamaica's powerful agricultural interests moved into industry, rather than being replaced by new, modern elites.

> In Jamaica we find a marriage of interests rather than conflict. Although it can be said that there is difficulty in establishing a continuous and all-inclusive link between the corporate economy and the old wealth derived from specific ownership of land-holdings, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that concentration of land ownership provided some supportive framework for the development of the corporate economy.[20]

As Kuper observed, Jamaica is an extremely inegalitarian society in terms of wealth.[21] By the mid-1960s Jamaica had the highest rate of

income inequality in the world; with the wealthiest five percent making 30 percent of the nation's total income, and the poorest 20 percent receiving only two percent of that income.[22]

Many upper class members are professionals -- doctors, lawyers and academics -- or large landowners. Most, however, have business interests in such fields as banking, export-import firms, or the exploitation of natural resources.[23] For example, much of Jamaica's agricultural production is done by small and middle farmers. Bananas and rum, however, are controlled by virtual monopolies, owned by members of the 21 families. The Jamaican Banana Producers Association is the island's second major agricultural producer. Appleton Estates, which manufactures some 90 percent of all local exported rum, is owned by Wray and Nephew -- in turn controlled by the Ashenheim, Henriques and DaCosta family interests.[24]

Out of 11,435 firms, 41 (only 0.4 percent of all corporations in Jamaica) accounted for 70 percent of gross domestic savings in 1970.[25] Many of these 41 are joined by interlocking directorates, where a head of one firm sits on the board of directors of several others.[26] And in 1972, seven percent of the shareholders held two-thirds of the shares in the 41 leading companies. In contrast, 83 percent of the shareholders controlled only six percent of total shares.[27]

Politically, the 21 families belong to both the PNP and the JLP. They include both conservatives and liberals, who often disagree about the best political strategy to be used to protect their common interests. And because of their corporate interests these elites

have naturally been hostile to political change. When a member of their group entered politics he was rarely a success. Just as their class brothers in 1838 had seen emancipation as the harbinger of social chaos, so they saw the changes after 1944 in the same light.

Notwithstanding their lack of success in electoral politics, the corporate elite constitutes a very influential "class faction" of the island's propertied class. Their common social characteristics (associational, educational and kinship)[28] suggest that the collective economic base of the members gives them the leverage to affect decisions made by the politico-administrative bureaucracy. And as a result of their direct links to local and foreign investment finance and technology, and their subsequent potential to generate, transform, and transfer significant flows of labor and capital, and so on, the 21 families and the rest of the corporate elite's contribution to Jamaican social structure is not restricted to the political and economic sectors. In return for social and material inputs above and beyond those directly related to the activities of their corporations, Jamaica's corporate elite are appointed by Government to sit on statutory boards,[29] head diplomatic missions and participate in commissions of inquiry. They therefore wield enormous power and influence in key sectors of national life. Indeed, they are not unlike the governing classes in the dominant countries of the world capitalist system.[30]

Inside as well as outside the Government, for example, Jamaica's legal representatives and corporate lawyers serve as an important link between economic and political power. Six of the

sixteen-member committee that drafted Jamaica's constitution were corporate lawyers; "the most important were closely involved with foreign enterprise and . . . the present grouping of 21."[31] Many civil servants and party members were -- and are -- lawyers for the corporations. As a result, laws are often drafted to guarantee the corporation special advantages. As G. Arthur Brown, former Governor of the Bank of Jamaica, commented on the pre-1965 law governing corporate disclosure of activities in Jamaica:

> One of the most prominent corporation lawyers has said that to have our company law . . . in this ancient version is one of the best bits of incentive legislation that we have, for the reason that the modern company law placed companies under very strict control in England and the U.S.A. but here they could do pretty much what they wanted.[32]

Most of the foreign industries which have located in Jamaica are branches of larger companies. Some are finishing operations, assembling imported parts into completed goods which are then exported to other markets. Other corporations produce for the Jamaican market; and still others come to take advantage of the island's low taxes and attractive incentives.

Members of Jamaica's elite often hold director or management positions within these foreign-owned companies. They may exercise a great deal of power and influence over the island operations of that firm. In addition, many Jamaican industries, owned and run by the island's wealthy, are partly owned by foreign (usually U.S.) interests. Pillsbury Corporation, for example, holds 32 percent interest in Jamaica Flour Mills, which is owned by the Hart family. Jamaica Flour Mills produces some 80 percent of all flour and 40

percent of all animal feed used on the island.

The 21 families maintain a large degree of control over island economic policy through influential Jamaican Manufacturing Association, the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce and the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica. They are also well represented on other industrial and regulatory boards:

> The Ashenheims are represented on the State Bank, the Matalons on Urban Development Corporation and more recently the Jamaica Bauxite Association, the Harts in Jamaica Industrial Corporation and Jamaica Investment Fund, and the Henriques on the Sugar Industry Rehabilitation Board and Coconut Industry Board.[34]

The result of this concentrated power is a vastly unequal distribution of wealth in the society. For the majority of working Jamaicans, it means low wages, unemployment and inflation. Thus underdevelopment in Jamaica is inequitable as long as the contemporary politico-economic institutions of Jamaican national society continue to favor the expansion of the private sector. Paradoxically, the private sector expanded the scale and scope of its operations despite the PNP's period of "Democratic Socialism" between 1974-1980 and regardless of the resultant "official" political pronouncements alluding to the demise of capitalist exploitation. The return of a JLP Government late in 1980 with a renewed program of "freeing the economy" is bound to entrench the national economic elite.

Middle Class: Conservative Swing Vote

The Jamaican middle class contains small and medium business owners, lower middle-level professionals, managers and technicians, civil servants, and the officer class of the security forces. By Jamaican standards they enjoy high salaries and comfortable life styles. The middle class' influential professionals and business people earned between $50 and $100 U.S. dollars per week in 1974. Other middle class members -- including school teachers, clergy, lower-level union and party bureaucrats -- earned at least $30 a week. The middle class comprises some 336,000 people, about 16 percent of the island's population.[34]

Like the wealthy, middle class members are generally urban, and educated through high school or beyond. In the smaller towns, they hold many key civil service or elected posts. Its institutions resemble, in varying ways and degrees, those of the upper and lower classes, but its aims and alliances are decidedly upper class. Unlike the upper class, however, this intermediate sector is one of the most heterogeneous in the world, both culturally and racially. It contains Jamaicans of African as well as European, Middle Eastern and Asian descent, together with the complete spectrum of the miscegenated mixture of these. (See Table 4.13) They are the "colored" or "brown" men and women of Jamaican history, forming a buffer between the black laborers and the white elite. As Irving Kaplan et al noted:

> Awareness of color varies with class. The traditional elite took their whiteness for granted -- in both the physical and cultural sense. Color became an important issue only when an upstart from the darker- and lower-classes tried to gain entrance.[35]

Members of the middle sector hold key positions in the two main political parties, the two main trade unions and the civil service. The successors of Bustamante in the JLP, Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer, and PNP head Michael Manley, came to power through their work and base in the trade unions. Manley, for example, was island Supervisor of the National Workers Union for many years before becoming head of the PNP upon the death of his father, Norman. In contrast, the JLP's current leader and Prime Minister since the General Elections of 1980, Edward Seaga, developed his power base through the party organization and his strategic Kingston constituency, the poor, turbulent but well-organized Tivoli Gardens.

The middle class controls the core of the party, union and service structures, and serves as a link between the poor and those with power and wealth. The bureaucracy is something like New York's Tammany Hall, with its patronage and wealth. In the parties middle class bureaucrats dispense jobs as favors and payoffs. In the unions they are often cautious, siding with management, resisting strikes and opposing cross-union solidarity. In the civil service, some retain a colonial, pro-British orientation dating back to pre-independence days.[36] While they are supposed to be non-partisan, many civil servants traditionally support conservative programs. In all three structures they act as a swing vote or brake against progressive change.

> Their values center on materialism and acquiring social status. Government jobs are seen as a means to this end, and many professional politicians come from this class, deriving their economic support, personal distinction, and means of advancement from participation in the

> government. Often their primary concern is with their own self-interest, and once inside government they must juggle their self-serving desires with the sometimes conflicting demands of their constituencies.[37]

Many in the island's middle class are strong civic activists, noted for their leadership in church, cultural and community service organizations such as the Jamaican Teachers' Association, the Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs, 4-H Clubs and the Jamaican League. Individuals are often recognized in the press and on television for their service to Jamaica. Yet as a whole the middle class views Jamaica's black working majority as lazy, and the unemployed as potential thieves and terrorists. According to a 1976 American University study, social movements like union strikes, peasant land takeovers and protests appear as a threat.

> Because their position is so insecurely based, the middle class is often even more fearful than the upper class of the majority it represents. One critic of the middle class claimed that no class was louder in denouncing discrimination, yet no class was more fearful of a popular revolution that would destroy its newly acquired privileges.[38]

Middle class members belong to both political parties and run the gamut from liberal to conservative. Most agree, however, on such issues as less government influence in business and social life, defense of private property, and "law and order." They share a strong fear of crime and social rebellion in Jamaica, as evidenced by speeches delivered in various middle class organizations during periods of tension such as in 1977.

The island's service clubs, voluntary associations and churches -- and the friendships made through them -- cut across party and union lines where members are supposedly in competition. In the clubs

influential middle class members share, confer and become to some degree a "common-minded" class. And through these gatherings the upper class can influence and mold the attitudes of middle class leaders towards political policies, and play on their fear of losing power and status.

> The pool of influential [middle class] men is not large nationally, and . . . it is fairly homogeneous, and organized in a number of voluntary associations. Members of this category will be familiar with others in it, at least by name or reputation, or by some contact with their family. I believe, further, that every member of this category has the possibility of personal contact, through no more than one intermediary, with a member of the cabinet, or a leading member of the opposition.[39]

Although few middle class members ever penetrate the upper ranks of society, they generally side with their upper class patrons, adopting upper class values and clearly separating themselves from the working class. In the process, they become a conservative swing vote against those reforms which threaten their power and that of the island's elite.

The Masses and the Land Question: The Continued Struggle for Control of Rural Jamaica

The bottom of Jamaica's social hierarchy contain the masses of African and East Indian descent. The group consists of agricultural workers, unskilled government workers, domestics, dockworkers and factory workers. The vast majority of this sector, however, are small farmers and the peasant class, the original class which had established itself on the land after emancipation. The urban segment of this group has protection in the island's two major

trade unions, the Bustamante-Industrial Trades Union and the National Workers Union, which together account for 80 percent of the unionized workers. Most of this group are unorganized subsistence farmers who live in the countryside on small plots of land. They constitute 60 percent of the island's total population at the time of independence in 1962. It is here that development in Jamaica has been least significant. The problem of rural Jamaica was graphically portrayed as follows:

> Of all the areas of the Jamaican society, it is in rural life that the most backward and oppressive conditions prevail. With 60% of the country's total population still living in the countryside, income for each employed person in agriculture averages only 1/3 of the national average between 1960-72. Widespread illiteracy and cultural exploitation, malnutrition (not merely for children, but also for adults), unemployment and underemployment, poor housing and health conditions are the lot of the country people.[40]

Jamaica, as has been seen, has experienced no revolutionary transformation of the old economic order born of the slave plantation system. The changes that have taken place since independence have not uprooted the stronghold which the descendants of the slave-owners have in the economy. They still retain vast holdings acquired over decades; much of their land continues to be either idle or underutilized; and today's peasants still rent and lease portions of these large properties just as their forefathers did: a system of semi-slave tenancy and tenant/landlord relations which dates from slavery.

Efforts to uproot this old economic order have been sporadic and dependent on the level of development of the class struggle in the country, that is, dependent on the relation of forces between the

various classes. In this confrontation, the organizational development of the masses has so far tended to be generally weak, so that as yet only superficial changes have been made to the economic structure and therefore to the social order, and basically the system remains entrenched.[41]

Meanwhile, capitalist development shaped by the investment of large foreign companies has taken place on the preservation of the old plantocratic system on the one hand, and on the other, the evolution of sections of the plantocracy into modern capitalist activities such as manufacturing, food and commodity distribution. Thus the struggle for land is basic to the struggle against the old order in Jamaica and has characterized the economic relations in agriculture and therefore the conflict between the different classes.[42]

As has been pointed out above, Jamaica is very mountainous: of the 2.8 million acres of total land, less than one-third can be used for farming. The remaining two-thirds is steep hillside or limestone country. In 1961, 63 percent of the island's arable land was farmed. By 1970, only 55 percent was used for farming, in part because the bauxite companies had purchased 200,000 acres of fertile land. Of the total land farmed, the largest acreage is planted in sugar cane. Recently, however, many large sugar plantations have folded or been sold, and many medium-sized farms (25 to 500 acres each) have appeared.

Continued agrarian backwardness, poverty and underemployment have forced many rural Jamaicans to nearby towns and larger cities. Even with this urban migration, however, most Jamaicans still live

on the land and are sustained by it. Surplus crops from small peasant plots, brought to the towns by higglers (small traders) makes up much of the produce sold in Jamaica's markets, stores and supermarkets. And Jamaica's major industries -- bauxite and tourism -- are located in the countryside, not the cities. Yet the urban movement is clear: between 1943 and 1970, the rural population increased only slightly, while the urban population skyrocketed 93 percent.

The main reason for the migration away from the countryside is the increasing concentration of land ownership in Jamaica. According to the 1968-1969 Agricultural Census, 300 of the largest landowners, with properties of 500 acres or more, owned over 40 percent of the island's farmland. The number of small farmers owning between five and 25 acres had dropped from 53,000 to 37,600 in the decade after 1958, while the number of farmers with five acres or less increased by 10,000.[43] In 1972 those with five acres or less made up over 70 percent of Jamaica's farmers, but occupied only 11-16 percent of the total farmland.[44] Table 4.13 shows that the shortage and distribution of farmland has changed little since 1954.

Jamaica's small farmers survive on very little land and plenty of hard labor. Small plot farming, with no modern equipment, fertilizers or transportation, means low yields and minimal income. Over a third of those working plots under five acres earn their main income outside farming; many work for wages on nearby large farms. Only 25 percent of the large planters receive their main income elsewhere, usually from commercial and industrial investment dividends.[45]

Between these two extremes are the "middle farmers", those owning from 25 to 500 acres. In 1968, there were 3,750 owners of mid-sized farms, producing sugar, bananas, coffee, pimento and other crops. According to Kuper,[46] these middle farmers are currently expanding their landholdings, and are bureaucratically angling to gain control of some of the 230,000 acres of land held by the Government. The middle farmers play a major role in rural politics and are leaders of the Banana Association, the 4-H Clubs and the Parish Councils. Many of them are members of the two major political parties and hold key jobs in government, or have close friends in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Any agrarian reform that aims at overcoming the inequalities in rural Jamaica must confront the power and vested interest of the large landowners and middle farmers. Historically, there has been two main landowning groups: the foreign land companies, notably West Indies Sugar and United Fruit, and the large Jamaican planters. The companies have recently left the island. But the planters remain, joined by the growing middle sector, and the issue of rural land control continues. In the 1970s, that issue has focused on the sugar cooperatives, the land lease programs and issue of idle land.[47]

As Professor Edmund Dale et al.[48] have noted, successive government plans have attempted to halt the impoverishment of the small farmer. Until recently none showed success. In fact the reduction in land held by small farmers has occurred while successive governments have carried through a variety of land redistribution schemes.

Table 4.13

FARMS: NUMBER, SIZE, ACREAGE, PERCENTAGE - 1954-69
(000 Farms & Acreage)

	TOTAL		Under 5 acres		5 - under 25 ac.		25 - under 100 ac.		100 - under 500 ac.		500 acres & over	
	Farms	Acreage	Farms	Acreage	Farms	Acreage	Farms	Acreage	Farms	Acreage	Farms	Acreage
1954	199	1,914	139	249	53	503	6	232	0.9	214	0.3	716
Percentage	100	100	70	13	27	26	3	12	0.4	11	0.2	37
1958	199	1,823	141	271	53	546	4	177	0.7	131	0.3	698
Percentage	100	100	71	15	27	30	2	10	0.3	7	0.2	38
1961	159	1,711	113	198	41	389	4	168	0.8	186	0.3	771
Percentage	100	100	71	12	26	23	2	10	0.5	11	0.2	45
1968-69	193	1,489	152	229	38	341	3	127	0.7	148	0.3	644.0
Percentage	100	100	78	15	19	23	2	8	0.4	10	0.1	43


Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Agricultural Censuses 1954, 1958, 1961, 1968-69

To date, three agrarian reform programs have been enacted in Jamaica. Under the 1929 Land Settlement Program, the Colonial Government subdivided lands which it owned or bought, and then sold or rented plots to small-scale farmers. During the next 40 years, this program granted some 42,000 settlers a total of 185,000 acres. Through the JLP's Land Development and Utilization Act, passed in 1966, the Government bought 100,000 acres, but only 50,000 were actually parcelled out to small farmers.[49] Then in 1973, the new PNP Government began a third land reform, "Project Operation Land-Lease."

Project Land-Lease has three phases. Land-Lease I involved leasing small plots of land for five to 10 years. The new farmer also received credit for all major soil, seed, fertilizer, harvesting and transportation costs. Under Land-Lease II, the Government provided farmers with long term leases up to 49 years. Land-Lease III, the core of the Government's agrarian reform, was a cooperative farming program especially for young farmers between 18 and 30 years. These farmers are given a house on the land which is Government-owned, located away from the populated areas and leased to them for 49 years (with option to renew) on terms similar to those of Land-Lease II.[50]

Initially, the programs were successful. The official policy was to place 10,000 small farmers on the land, under Land-Lease I between 1973 and 1974. By early 1976 the three programs placed over 21,000 small farmers on 39,500 acres of the 42,500 (gross) arable acres of land acquired.[51] The Government had reason to be pleased.

Figure 4.5


PROJECT LAND-LEASE, PROJECT FOOD FARMS: ARABLE ACREAGE, 1976
PROJECT LAND LEASE:
Estimated Acreage
Administrative Centre
PROJECT FOOD FARMS
Estimated Acreage
7,000
4,000
1,000
100
Falmouth
Cambridge
Grange Hill 1+2
Claremont
Port Maria
Christiana
Linstead
Port Antonio
Santa Cruz
Mandeville
May Pen
Thetford
Alvia
Yallahs
Morant Bay
N
Scale
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Jamaica (Project Land-Lease, Project Food Farms).

In fact the figures pointed to a very laudable action. However, Project Land-Lease had many major problems. First, the only lands considered for the program were those already under Government control, or areas purchased (as discussed in a later chapter) from the aluminum and sugar companies. Lands of the large landowners were never touched. The Government was reluctant to challenge the property rights of the capitalist class. This was Land-Lease's biggest weakness. Secondly, there was the partisan nature of the program's administration. In the hands of PNP political appointees, the distribution of land often became a reward for PNP supporters or a payment for favors done. Finally according to Professor Carl Stone, the Government and party administrators often acted authoritarian and paternalistic, instead of encouraging a "self-help" attitude among the tenants.

> Firstly, there is the arrogant middle-class view of the inability of the semi-literate small peasantry to make any meaningful positive contribution to such programme management and planning. Secondly, there is a total lack of any belief in democratic decision-making whereby persons affected should have a say in politics that affect them. This is reinforced by a firm commitment to authoritarian forms of decision-making that are rationalized on the grounds of the all-embracing expertise of the technology.[52]

Frustrated by the lack of real land control and program corruption and paternalism, the farmers concentrated on purely personal, individual efforts.

The PNP's land reform programs aimed to help the marginal peasants, without angering the conservative civil service and large landowners who have the most to loose from large scale reforms. The uneducated peasants quickly got the picture and many chose to

ignore the program. In spite of Government rhetoric about cooperation and cooperatives, the Land-Lease program was never intended to give the peasant the political and collective power needed to challenge old rural structures.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

North Americanization of Jamaica

An overview of the demographic, economic and social structure in the post-independence period having been presented, the discussion turns to the policy decisions which the political leaders sought to ameliorate Jamaica's serious economic and social problems. Given the existing resource position of the country, Jamaican political leaders have, according to Louis Lindsay, "generally endorsed and propagandized the myth of resource insufficiency and collective incompetence generated, largely, by the interests and agents of imperialist countries."[53] Hence, for instance, the frequent assertions of Norman Manley that independence for Jamaica outside of an association with other states would impose massive strains on Jamaica's limited resources. Because, according to Manley, the problems which Jamaica faced "cannot be met with our own resources . . . . this means that we must maintain the confidence of people abroad."[54]

Similarly, in 1962, Alexander Bustamante in one of his first pronouncements as Prime Minister of the newly independent Jamaican State, declared that Jamaica's only hope for the future lay in the

establishment of an extremely close relationship with the United States. The island was viewed as too poor and its people too illiterate to comfortably stand on its own. As such, Bustamante maintained that it would be foolish for Jamaica to sit on the fence. The country must either be for the United States or against it. And since he would "rather that my people be bombed than submit to communism," it was altogether logical for him to make the "irrevocable decision that Jamaica stands with the West and the United States."[55]

At the Independence ceremonies in Kingston on 6 August 1962, Sir Alexander (as he was now known, after accepting a knighthood from the Queen), said, inter alia, the new state of Jamaica was "pro-Western, Christian and anti-Communist." He followed through on his pronouncement by issuing an invitation to the American Government, proposing that it should establish military bases in the island. Sir Alexander, shortly after becoming Prime Minister, visited Washington for talks with President John Kennedy regarding his country's future in the Western Hemisphere.[56] By 1963, the JLP Government of Bustamante and the Kennedy Administration had signed a U.S.-Jamaica Defense Treaty.[57] The treaty provided the island with ample shipments of police force equipment under the Office of Public Safety of the U.S. Agency for International Development (US-AID). In Jamaica, at the same time, there was much speculation -- and deep concern -- that the new country would soon be absorbed into the U.S. sphere of influence. Jamaica's best course, it was argued, would be to maintain a sensible trade balance with its three best customers, Britain, Canada and the United States.[58]

American involvement after 1962 was aimed not only at penetrating the new Jamaican market and protecting growing U.S. economic input in Jamaica (banking, life insurance, small industries, trade, in addition to bauxite and tourist industries), but shoring up U.S. military control over the Caribbean. The withdrawal of British troops from Jamaica after Independence occurred on the heels of the socialist revolution and discovery of Soviet missiles in nearby Cuba. It seems eminently reasonable to conclude that the Defense Treaty was to ensure that Jamaica did not follow suit. Jamaica and the island of Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), which is situated between Cuba and Puerto Rico, were key links in the U.S. security strategy for the Caribbean. The degree of U.S. nervousness about the rise of progressive or left-wing governments in the Caribbean was shown by the 1965 U.S. Marine's invasion of the Dominican Republic, after the takeover there by a progressive populist movement. Thus geopolitical and ideological concerns suddenly paralleled economic interests.

From Bustamante's perspective, what Jamaica needed was massive injections of private investment and aid for infrastructural projects from metropolitan countries, protection of preferential markets for its primary products (sugar, citrus and bananas) and the encouragement of tourism. The Five Year Independence Plan 1963-68 puts the case for what the Prime Minister called "pragmatism" succinctly:

> The island is subject to the influence of overseas conditions, particularly in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America, which are the main trading partners, the main sources of overseas capital and of tourists, and the areas to which Jamaicans emigrate.[59]

It is to these ends that Jamaican political elites sought to establish and strengthen economic and political links in the metropolitan countries, in the hemisphere, and in the wider world.

In the early years of Independence, Jamaica's foreign policy was to some extent a carry-over from the colonial past. It "consisted mainly in petitioning the British, U.S., Canadian, and other Western Governments for commodity price-supports and markets, outlets for surplus populations and for steady supplies of capital with which to develop its economy."[60] A major diplomatic focus, for example, was on "Britain entering the European Common Market," which threatened to disrupt Jamaica's traditional relationships, "unless Britain succeeded in persuading the EEC [European Economic Community] members to grant favourable concessions to Commonwealth members."[61]

Turning to the pattern of trade, Jamaica's relationship had been changing from dominance by the U.K. to dominance by the U.S. for several decades before Independence. The U.K. was Jamaica's major trading partner in 1938, taking 59.2 percent of its domestic exports and supplying 32.8 percent of the imports. Canada ranked second, taking 26.6 percent of exports and supplying 15.6 percent of the imports. The U.S. took only 3.7 percent of the exports, but supplied 21.0 percent of the imports.[62] Although this pattern was disrupted by the Second World War, by 1950 it returned to approximate the

1938 percentages, with increased imports from the U.K. at the expense of Canada and the United States.

After 1950, however, dramatic changes took place and by 1960 United States had surpassed the United Kingdom in share of imports. By 1974 the U.S. was Jamaica's chief trading partner, taking 41.3 percent of exports and supplying 35.6 percent of imports, compared to 23.1 and 16.7 percent respectively for the U.K. Although Canada showed a relative decline in its share of exports and imports, it had an absolute increase in both.[63] Table 4.14 shows partner concentration for exports and imports defined as the percentage of

Table 4.14

Partner Concentration

	1962	1965	1968	1971	1974	1975	1979
A. % of Jamaica Exports to Main Purchaser	38.1 (U.S.)	28.0 (U.S.)	39.1 (U.S.)	44.4 (U.S.)	41.3 (U.S.)	46.7 (U.S.)	37.0 (U.S.)
B. % of Jamaica Imports from Main Supplier	29.5 (U.K.)	31.3 (U.S.)	38.7 (U.S.)	39.6 (U.S.)	35.6 (U.S.)	37.6 (U.S.)	36.0 (U.S.)

Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (Annual).

exports accounted for by the leading purchaser country and the percentage of imports bought from the leading supplier. Export partner-concentration increased in Jamaica as U.S. dominance is revealed as export-trade partner.

Table 4.15 depicts commodity concentration, defined as percentage of exports comprised of the three most important products by value. The intensification of commodity concentration especially in the 1970s has been attributable to the record high prices for bauxite-alumina and has been abetted by favorable prices on the world market for the island's other main export, sugar. Bauxite-alumina,

Table 4.15

Commodity Concentration[a] (Percent) of Jamaican Exports

1962	1965	1968	1971	1974	1975	1979
80.6	78.1	76.2	80.6	85.1	84.8	n.a.

a. means the percentage of exports comprised by three leading commodities.

Source: U.S. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (Annual).

sugar and bananas in 1975 as in 1962 constituted Jamaica's leading exports. On the whole, primary goods comprised the bulk of Jamaica's exports in the post-independence era. The proportion of manufactured goods in exports, as shown below in Table 4.16, actually fell below the 1962 levels in 1975. However, the trend of manufactured goods relative to exports was generally on the rise in the decade 1962-71. The decline which set in thereafter was due not to the lack of growth of the manufacturing sector but rather to the quantum shifts in the prices of the mineral exports and sugar in the mid-1970s. Table 4.17 indicates that the share of manufactured goods relative to total imports changed marginally in the post-independent period.

Table 4.16

Composition of Jamaica Exports: Selected Years (%)

	1962	1965	1968	1971	1974	1975
Primary Goods (SITC-4)[a]	92.13	92.73	90.55	89.27	94.96	95.07
Manufactures (SITC 5-8)[b]	7.75	7.26	9.45	10.63	5.04	4.93
Total ($ million U.S.)	174.26	209.82	215.39	335.06	718.45	769.35

a. Includes food, beverages and tobacco, crude materials (inedible except fuels), mineral fuels, lubricants and related products, animals, vegetable oil and fats.
b. Includes chemicals, manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials, machinery and transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactures.
Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (Annual).

Table 4.17

Composition of Jamaica Imports: Selected Years (%)

	1962	1965	1968	1971	1974	1975
Primary Goods (SITC 0-4)[a]	35.48	34.12	29.81	31.20	46.97	41.99
Manufactures (SITC 5-8)[b]	64.32	65.77	70.19	68.73	52.84	57.69
Total ($ million U.S.)	222.88	289.06	387.30	550.50	935.52	1123.55

a. See Table 4.16
b. See Table 4.16
Source: same as for Table 4.16.

For example, the share of manufactures (SITC 5-8) for 1962 comprised 64 percent of total imports. The corresponding share of manufactures in imports in 1975 was 58 percent.

In general the data indicate the continuities in the pattern of trade from the pre-independence period. Export-bias persists because of the dominance of the bauxite-alumina products. An important variable, partner concentration, is still much in vogue and have actually increased. The U.S. has emerged as the most important export-market and supplier in the post-independence era. The U.S. assumed even more importance if the earnings of tourism are included, since 80 percent of the tourists in 1973 were Americans. The U.K. retained importance, however, in such traditional Jamaican exports as sugar and bananas. Commodity concentration has increased slightly. As on the eve of Independence, the pattern of exchange remains one of the export of primary materials and the import of processed goods.

Despite the continuities in the pattern of trade from the pre-independence era, changes are also evident which have potential for the future development of Jamaica trade. From the late 1960s, trade ties began to be diversified outside of the traditional "North-Atlantic Triangle" countries (U.K., U.S. and Canada) particularly with the Third World and, in the 1970s, the Soviet areas, that is COMECON, though the composition of exports is still heavily weighted in favor of primary products.

Thus trade dependence was quite high particularly in the first decade of independence. The prospect for the reduction of trade dependence is dependent on action in four areas, namely, food

production, consumer imports, rationalization of industry and fuel imports. The four areas are fraught with political difficulties. Political will in the post-independence period, particularly in the first decade, has often been weak. Action is clearly needed to overcome the pattern of monoculture with export production typified by low levels of processing and import dependence on manufactured goods from metropolitan countries.

Growing North American input into Jamaica went far beyond the explosions in the bauxite-alumina and tourist industries. In fact the foreign exchange needed by Jamaica for its economic development program has come overwhelmingly from the U.S. and Canada. Furthermore, except for Barclay's Bank D.C.O. and the First National City Bank of New York (opened in 1960) and a few life insurance companies, all the banks in Jamaica in 1965 were Canadian.[64] The banks initially were set up to finance trade and there were little attempts to generate much local business. Jamaica has also been asking for a higher U.S. sugar quota than the nominal one it has been getting since Cuba's quota was divided among a large number of countries. Sale of sugar in the U.S. has meant the difference between profit and loss in at least one crop year. Jamaica, in the 1960s, has also been pushing for a greater share of the Canadian sugar markets in face of serious competition from distant sources such as Australia, Fiji, and Mauritius. It led the new Prime Minister, Hugh Shearer (who in 1966 had replaced the aging Bustamante), at an Ottawa Press conference in 1967 to say that his country was not asking for handouts but for respectable terms of trade -- "the form of

assistance we prefer to receive from our friendly neighbour."[65]

Even the United Kingdom's former role as principal source of economic aid for development has been usurped by North America and by international institutions. Upon obtaining Independence, Jamaica became ineligible for grants from the Colonial (later Commonwealth) Development and Welfare Fund and turned instead to the U.S. Britain has given Jamaica some aid, but it was surpassed by the U.S. and, more recently, Canadian aid.

The United States channels its development aid through U.S.-AID, a rather large mission being maintained in Kingston to render technical assistance. Some other aid is channeled through the U.S. Government to Jamaica. Between 1962 and 1972 United States provided some 30.5 million U.S. dollars of loan assistance for large development projects and 49 million U.S. dollars for expansion activity at the Jamaica Public Service Company, in the hotel industry and in the manufacturing sector. In addition, there were various grants for family planning and other development activities.

Canadian assistance program to Jamaica pre-dates Independence. Up to the end of the sixties, Canada's aid allocation to Jamaica was within a package of assistance for the Commonwealth Caribbean, but by 1970 direct bilateral negotiations had been initiated. These negotiations are conducted through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), through which the Canadian Government sponsors aid programs, grants and technical personnel. The first package of assistance was negotiated in August 1970 and was for 36 million Canadian dollars.[66]

Jamaica has been receiving technical assistance from the U.K. since, of course, the country was a colony. After Independence, Jamaica formalized arrangements with the U.K. for the terms and conditions of this assistance. Under the first arrangements, attention was directed to training the executive and supervisory cadres of the Jamaican Civil Service and to the provision of British expertise for some of the country's public sector projects. In the early 1970s, the arrangements were revised to include provision of equipment for special projects, and grants for feasibility studies and research projects, particularly in agriculture. British aid is channeled through the Overseas Development Ministry.

Jamaica's Political Pragmatism: Voting in the United Nations

The decision to join the United Nations after Independence was an important foreign policy initiative by the ruling elite. The United Nations (UN) is an inter-governmental organization whose Charter specifically recognizes "the principle of the sovereign equality" of the member states. It is an organization which vigorously, especially since the advent of the Afro-Asian nations, upholds the principle of self-determination and the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples. But aside from the lofty humanitarian principles enshrined in the UN Charter, Jamaica, like other small states, was interested in membership as a matter of prestige and as a means of obtaining economic and technical aid from the UN Development Program (UNDP), and for membership in two specialized agencies -- the International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (World Bank) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In the UN, Jamaica and the other so-called Commonwealth Caribbean (CWC) States have very limited influence for they do not constitute a bloc. Jamaica's limited influence, like that of most small, underdeveloped nations is indicated by budget quotas and votes in the Bank and IMF.[67] This lack of influence, however, is being modified by the increasing practice in the UN of drawing committee and subcommittee heads from the Third World.

Jamaica, together with the other CWC countries, do exercise influence, however, by virtue of membership in certain UN blocs. Besides the Commonwealth Group, a good example is in the Latin American Group (LAG) which operates within the Group of 77 countries either as a part of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. As far as the LAG and the CWC states are concerned, a case can be made that the latter operate increasingly as a sub-bloc in the former. This results in less cohesion among the LAG members, especially between the Latin American and CWC countries.

From the year it joined the UN, Jamaica vigorously supported decolonization, anti-racism and African-related issues. Consciousness of black Africa, anti-colonialism and anti-racism are linked together in the minds of many Jamaicans and were therefore manifest in Jamaica's foreign policies after Independence. There was a recognition of the relationship between different racial elements in the country's social structure, and the need to have foreign policy reflect a proper balance between these elements. Thus

the policy began to reflect an emphasis on Jamaica's connection with Africa and international questions with which Africa was closely involved.

In his study of voting in the Seventeenth to the Twenty-fourth Sessions of the UN, Harry G. Matthews[68] found that Jamaica and other Caribbean new states, compared to non-Caribbean Commonwealth members, were part of the pro-African and non-white clusters of countries on five racial, African or colonial issues: apartheid in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, Belize, and African territories under Portuguese administration. In the UN, Jamaica "placed much emphasis upon race as a fundamental question of human rights" and took a fairly radical stand on such issues, spearheading, for example, the designation of 1968 as International Year for Human Rights. In general, Jamaica supported African aspirations, decolonization, and anti-racism. And Jamaica did so in the early years of its participation in the UN, while it was still cautious on economic issues so as to maximize the chances for trade, private foreign investment, loans and aid from Western capitalist countries -- especially from its ally, the United States; and also while it was still leaning to the U.S. view on admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN and on Cold War issues generally.[69]

Based on its roll call votes in the Eighteenth General Assembly of the UN, which commenced in the autumn of 1963, Jamaica received a relatively high, pro-western, factor loading (.59) on Cold War issues, the most important factor, in a factor analysis. This compares, for example, with .81 for the U.S. and -.42 for the Soviet Union. In 1965, Jamaica moved out of the U.S. camp for the

first time on the issue of admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN and abstained from voting. In 1971 Jamaica voted for China's admission.

According to P. Schneider and B. Russett's[70] analysis of alignment on the Cold War issue, drawing on roll call votes in the UN from 1946 through 1970, Jamaica became visibly less pro-West in 1965-66, although returning somewhat after 1966. Jamaica's average score on the Cold War factor for all the years it was in the UN through 1970 was .36, less than the .59 for 1963 alone. The average for the United States was .95 and for the Soviet Union it was -2.09. Sixty-one countries had higher averages, meaning more pro-U.S. voting records, and sixty-two countries had lower averages, meaning less pro-U.S. voting records.

Jamaica's decline in pro-Western voting on Cold War issues was, in the first instance, a growing opposition to the "politics of hegemony," that is, opposition to the domination by either the United States or t he Soviet Union. But it was accelerated by detente, which not only reduced the priority of the Cold War for smaller states such as Jamaica, but also underscored the perceived need among smaller states to act in concert in order to preserve their autonomy against possible super power agreement that might negatively affect them.[71] Thus, the non-aligned movement that began in relation to the system of American-Soviet bipolarity continued as a countervailing power to peaceful coexistence among superpowers. Furthermore, Jamaica increasingly sought new relationships of trade, technical assistance, loans, and direct aid from Communist countries in the 1970s. Jamaica, like

other small states, no longer felt that it must stay in one super power's orbit or the other's.

Caribbean Economic Integration: CARIFTA and CARICOM

Another interrelated feature of Jamaica's foreign economic policy since achieving independent statehood is its willingness, from the mid-sixties, to seek new bonds of functional cooperation within the Caribbean area. Despite the fact that it was the 1961 Jamaican referendum which was responsible for the collapse of the West Indian Federation, the JLP Government of Prime Minister Shearer nonetheless pursued policies after 1968 aimed at regional cooperation and "integration" primarily of an economy nature. During the period of rapid economic growth, the balance of trade has been consistently unfavorable. In 1968, for example, imports were 387.30 million U.S. dollars, while exports were 215.39 million U.S. dollars, leaving a deficit on visible trade of 171.91 million U.S. dollars. Food imports alone rose in value from 45.9 million Jamaican dollars in 1968, to 71.3 million Jamaican dollars in 1971. The shortfall on the balance-of-payments is partly met through receipts from tourism, capital inflow, and receipts from Jamaicans abroad. Jamaica was also in deficit in its trade with all three of its major trading partners. It was these economic indicators which led the Shearer Administration to embark on a strategy to diversify Jamaica's trade ties away from its traditional partners in an effort to reduce trade dependence.

Jamaica's view of the region has become a broadly defined one, including all countries whose shores are washed by the Caribbean and the Guyanas and Bahamas, countries of cultural and historical affinity.[72] Thus it includes, in addition to the islands, Mexico and the states of Central America as well as Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Surinam. Formal association proceeded most rapidly, however, among the CWC States themselves that already shared a number of regional institutions, from the wreckage of the West Indian Federation. These include collaboration in university education, shipping and meteorology; joint collective bargaining over prices and access of the region's primary commodity exports to traditional developed markets; and mutual consultation on a wide range of issues at meetings of Heads of Government, at first of the so-called "big four" -- Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Barbados -- and later of all the other countries formerly in the Federation as well as the Bahamas and Belize.

The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was inaugurated on 1 May 1968. CARIFTA was originally founded on the pragmatic and appealing principles of functional cooperation. It aimed to remove tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other limitations on trade among the participating members. This meant that from CARIFTA's inception all trade among member states, with minor exceptions, has been free. By 1973, exports to other CWC countries were 7.7 percent of Jamaica's total while imports were 5.4 percent, although there was an unfavorable balance of visible trade with nearly 5 million Jamaican dollars excess of imports over exports. Jamaica's exports to CARIFTA countries increased nearly threefold since 1969 when they amounted to

7.6 million Jamaican dollars. By 1973 they had reached 20.1 million Jamaican dollars.

Most of the CARIFTA members were apparently so satisfied with the economic and psychic gains realized up to 1972 that at the meeting of Heads of Government at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on 9 October 1972, they agreed to take a step further along the integration road, and formed a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on 1 May 1973. CARICOM's objectives and the economic philosophy underlying the movement will be explored in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Jamaica, whose major post-independence shift in foreign policy was in the direction of the "giant North American market," stretched out a first feeler towards Latin America with the establishment of an embassy in Mexico. It was all part of Prime Minister Shearer's strategy to diversify trade ties in the quest for economic development. Plans were made to set up another embassy in Costa Rica, which would also serve Panama, two countries that have traditionally received a strong flow of Jamaican immigrants. In 1968, the Jamaican High Commissioner to Trinidad-Tobago was also accredited to Venezuela. Jamaica and Venezuela, inspired by the history of Simon Bolivar's sojourn in Jamaica, decided to "strengthen and deepen the fraternal bonds of friendship between them."[73] The Jamaican Prime Minister's Report on Foreign Affairs of that year for the first time mentioned closer links with Latin America as a priority.[74] Jamaica had at last begun to see that its national interests lie more and more with the hemisphere and was accordingly devising appropriate foreign policy. Jamaica's ruling elite saw

that Latin America has enough potential to become an alternative economic partner. Its population was estimated to expand to some 600 million by the end of the century and its purchasing power was expected to grow at the rate of 5 percent per annum.[75]

Jamaica, and indeed the rest of the independent CWC countries, have also given evidence of a rapprochement with Latin America in their voting behavior on wider political issues at the UN. This observation applies primarily to Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Both countries identified themselves quite strongly with the Afro-Asian group after Independence, but later began to operate as effective members of the Latin American Group (LAG).

The new policy of wider contacts reached its logical conclusion in 1969 with the formalization of Jamaica's membership of the Organization of American States (OAS). Joining the OAS was a carefully considered subject and was primarily economically motivated. For in order to have access to the funds of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) as a member, a state was required to be an OAS member.[76] Gaining OAS membership as a channel to the IADB and to the agencies of President Kennedy's brainchild, the Alliance for Progress, was one of the alternatives that Shearer and the CWC ruling elites felt compelled to pursue in view of the imminent British withdrawal from the Caribbean and their entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). Britain, of course, remained the major market for CWC agricultural products and a source of aid. In view, therefore, of the uncertainty of the EEC's position on the Commonwealth preferential system, the CWC countries had to begin not only to seek

diversification of trade links but to plan the industrialization of their economies in order to make their production compatible with the needs of potential customers and suppliers. In addition, they were convinced that they would need to turn to Latin America for trade, stress regional integration and greatly expand economic relations with the U.S. and Canada.

At the same time, however, Jamaica, like other CWC nations, had misgivings about joining the OAS. They were concerned about an organization with such a strong orientation towards Latin America, the group of countries with which they had little contact, and they feared they would be associated with Latin America instability and practices so contrary to English legal and political tradition. There was also concern about the defense and security requirements of the Rio-Treaty. The Rio-Treaty was acceptable against outside aggression but not in the case of aggression by one OAS member against another. Another worry involved becoming a part of the bureaucracy with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and joining an organization dominated by the U.S. and preoccupied with anti-Communism.

It is noteworthy, too, that the rapprochement of Jamaica and other CWC States with Latin America has been paralleled by increased relations with the United States. Membership in OAS has been widely interpreted in the Caribbean as a move towards Latin America. In fact, the increased influence of the U.S. in the CWC cannot be separated from the rapprochement between the latter and Latin America. The OAS serves a variety of purposes, some of which can be obtained in cooperation with Latin America and some by the OAS as a whole.

However, relations in the OAS are not without bitter conflict among the disparate countries with varying interests and motivation[77] -- a subject which is not possible to elaborate here.

Non-Aligned and Third World Group of States

The victory of the PNP in the national election in February 1972 ended the JLP Government's decade (two five-year terms) in office. It brought to power Michael Manley, son of Norman, who abruptly signaled an end to the alliance between Jamaica and the North Atlantic Triangle countries with his announcement that the island nation was a part of the Third World. Prime Minister Manley's statement marked a significant shift in Government policy. Determined to break Jamaica's ties as a neo-colonial partner of the Western industrialized countries, Manley took Jamaica on a more activitist diplomacy as evidenced in its increased participation in the movement of the non-aligned and Third World group of states. This active involvement in the non-aligned group required the adoption of radical postures with respect to Western domination of the international economic system. By siding with the Third World, independent Jamaica for the first time showed signs of nationalism. That meant becoming free of Western domination and developing a foreign policy based on Jamaica's perception of its own interests.

A more detailed discussion and analysis of Manley's economic nationalism will be dealt with in later chapters. It should suffice here to present an outline of a few of the PNP's more significant

policy initiatives aimed at advancing Jamaica's economic interest. Jamaica has been in the forefront of the quest for a "New International Economic Order" from the year Manley assumed office. In 1973, Jamaica sent high-level representatives to the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations held in Algiers. The sense of urgency at the meeting was heightened greatly by events of the past decade -- more crushing poverty, mass starvation in Africa, the infringements of sovefeignty by the transnational corporations (TNCs). Both inflation and unemployment were rampant to varying degrees throughout the whole capitalist world.

In 1974, Jamaica's representative to the UN, Donald Mills, signed the Declaration of the New World Economic Order, favoring, among other things, the right to full compensation for colonialist exploitation for all countries and the regulation of TNCs, more active producer-nations associations, and the encouragement by the UN of the nationalization of the means of production.[78] Furthermore, Prime Minister Manley stated that Jamaica must push the Third World case in order to get reasonable returns from industrialized countries. The avowed aim of Government was to widen and deepen Jamaica's relationships with Latin America and Africa.

One of the first actions to implement the aims of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in which Jamaica participated, concerned the negotiation of forty-six countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the ACPs, with the European Economic Community for participation in the organization. Successful bargaining resulted in an economic, trade and technology agreement

known as the Lomé Convention, signed on 28 February 1975 by 9 EEC states and 46 underdeveloped countries. The main provisions clearly show the demands and influence of the ACP states. In specific terms the Convention allows them duty-free access for their exports to the EEC bloc, without reciprocal arrangements, and access for a wide range of processed and semi-processed goods which must conform to regulations. It established a Stabilization of Export Earning Scheme (STABEX) to compensate for unstable world commodity prices.[79]

A special protocol of the Convention removed the disparity in prices paid to Third World cane-sugar producers and that of beet-sugar producers from industrialized countries. The EEC undertook to import, for an indefinite period, fixed quantities of sugar from ACP at prices that would be "negotiated" and take into account "all relevant economic factors." This was a critical element of Lomé. There might have been no Convention without it. The agreement further provided for industrial cooperation for ACP: the provision of suitable technology and technological skills, training of personnel in their own local areas, and the establishing of industrial plants.[80]

The Lomé Convention not only enlarged Europe's links with the Third World but improved them. Improvement, however, lay mainly in the new possibilities which were opened up. ACP states have achieved a much greater degree of cooperation and interdependence than had hitherto been possible between the EEC and the emergent countries. But as Shridath Ramphal, Commonwealth Secretary-General, himself a former Caribbean ACP representative, noted nearly eight years after Lomé, underdeveloped countries have gained benefits, such as the

preferential entry into the ECC for certain products. However, Ramphal asserted that "after eight years the cumulative impact of Lomé on their [ACP's] economic condition remains unremarkable."[81] In terms of increased exports to EEC, the ACP nations have in fact fared worse than other Third World countries. The contribution of the Convention to industrialization has been negligible. The promise of liberal access to EEC markets, cornerstone of Lomé, has been frustrated by a "less than liberal application of the 'rules of origin' and by other measures."[82] Even the Sugar Protocol has been less than fully honored by the EEC in letter and spirit.

Despite the benefits already secured by ACP, Lomé is hardly a model of partnership since many of its agreements have not been honored and much of its promise still remains to be realized. At the November 1982 GATT ministerial meeting it was the EEC's protectionist stand that posed the major threat to the international economic order. In the "trade war" that could follow, the Third World, particularly ACP, almost certainly will be hurt first and most. This does not augur well for the much publicized Caribbean Basin Initiative Plan of which the Lomé Convention is clearly the model.

A year prior to the Lomé Convention, the Manley Government confronted the considerable foreign control of the country's strategic mineral industry. As has been seen, bauxite-alumina industry is the mainstay of the Jamaican economy. In 1973, for example, bauxite-alumina exports totaled 252.2 million U.S. dollars and together was the largest item (about 65 percent) of Jamaica's total visible exports. Thus relations with the bauxite companies

operating in Jamaica became a major part of Jamaican diplomacy, a diplomacy that necessarily involved both internal and external aspects. Involved were six companies which controlled, directly or indirectly, 76 percent of the "free world's aluminum production in 1974 and were the sole buyers in Jamaica."[83] They were Reynolds, Alcoa, Alcan, Kaiser Revere and Anaconda.

In January 1974, the Prime Minister announced that the Government would negotiate contracts with the bauxite-alumina companies. Part of the impetus was the increase in oil prices that presented the country with a crippling fuel bill of 177.4 million Jamaican dollars in 1974, nearly triple the 65.4 million Jamaican paid in 1973.

Manley travelled to U.S. and Canada in March 1974 to explain Jamaica's problems and the objectives of the renegotiation. In the same month, talks began with the bauxite-alumina companies. During the negotiations, Opposition leader Shearer had written to each of the companies saying that the Government had the full support of the Opposition JLP in seeking to obtain a higher rate of royalty. A more detailed analysis of the bauxite-alumina negotiations is presented in a later chapter. Thus in short, the talks failed to reach agreement and the Government decided, according to Prime Minister Manley, "to exercise its sovereign right and declare, unilaterally, a production levy on all bauxite mined in Jamaica."[84] The Foreign Minister, P.J. Patterson, later announced that the new bauxite levy earnings would finance the budget and allow relief of import restrictions.[85]

The initiatives taken by the Jamaican Government in the case

of the bauxite revenue illustrates Manley's concept of the struggle for implementing a New World Economic Order. By regulating the activities of multinational corporations they can be made to increase contribution to a country's development.

A further example, finally, of Third World solidarity and cooperation is seen when Prime Minister Manley acted to strengthen the diplomatic relations which the Shearer regime had opened in 1972 with Jamaica's closest neighbor, Cuba. Free of Jamaica's earlier alliance with the U.S., Manley initiated a number of technical exchanges with a Caribbean country that has had remarkable results from its education and social revolution. By the end of 1976, for example, there was a total of 83 Cubans on official projects in Jamaica. Twenty were engaged on micro-dam projects, 55 on a school construction project, and 8 on a housing project. Cuban medical teams and groups have since been assisting in other development projects.[86] Considering that the Jamaican leadership with a few notable exceptions had largely been against federation with other CWC territories and that even more culturally different territories, such as Haiti and Cuba, are included "in the Caribbean," it is noteworthy that Jamaican leaders were now prepared to seek to strengthen ties in the Caribbean.

However, as events late in 1980 unfold it became clear that a major shift in Jamaica's foreign and economic policy would occur. The return to office of the JLP under the leadership of Prime Minister Edward Seaga re-established close economic and political ties with the United States and the Western alliance. Existing

links with Cuba -- technical cooperation and diplomatic relations -- were abruptly terminated. But the economic relationship with CARICOM, OAS and ACP was maintained and strengthened. Gone is the Manley rhetoric advocating a new world economic order and solidarity with Third World countries; instead a "low profile" role in the non-aligned movement and a "strong" interest in the North-South dialogue emerged under the JLP, guided by the party's earlier principle of pragmatism.[87]

Finally, the major foreign economic policy of the Seaga Administration was based on the strategy of wooing foreign investors to give impetus to a new thrust in production for the North American market. This export emphasis was planned closely with the U.S. Government of President Ronald Reagan, who not only helped to form a U.S.-Jamaica Promotional Committee for capital inflow but launched, with weighty input from Seaga, the Caribbean Basin Plan -- a Lomé-type package of economic aid and trade for development in the area. These shifts in Government strategy presented above in the quest for economic and social progress, as well as their philosophical and theoretical underpinnings will be critically examined in the next few chapters.

Notes to Chapter Four

[1]Government of Jamaica, Handbook of Jamaica (Kingston: Printing Office, 1966), p. 6.

[2]John MacPherson, Caribbean Lands: A Geography of the West Indies (Kingston: Longmans Caribbean Ltd., 1970), p. 5. See also, L.M. Bent and Enid L. Bent-Golding, A Complete Geography of the West Indies (London: Collins, 1966).

[3]Most of the information in this section can be found in Ibid.

[4]O.C., The People of Modern Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Dept. of Statistics, 1963), pp. 1-4.

[5]Adam Kuper, Changing Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers Ltd., 1976), pp. 9-15.

[6]Ibid., pp. 10-11, passim.

[7]Francis, op. cit., pp. 8-15.

[8]Kuper, op. cit., p. 12.

[9]Ibid.

[10]See The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 25 January 1982. According to a report in this paper, Prime Minister Edward Seaga in a speech in 1982 expressed alarm over the dramatic increase in the migration of economically desirable Jamaican migrants. Seaga stated that just under 50 percent of the professional, technical, skilled and semi-skilled people who were trained between 1977 and 1980, at a cost to the country of 300 million dollars, migrated to the United States.

[11]See Economic and Social Survey, 1980, p. 13-6.

[12]J.R. Buffenmeyer, "Emigration of high-level Manpower and National Development: A Case-Study of Jamaica," p. 137. Cited in Kuper, op. cit., p. 14.

[13]Ibid.

[14]In 1972, primary products accounted for 31 percent of all exports, semi-processed products for 51 percent, and manufactured goods for 16 percent. Within the primary products category, bauxite accounted for 77 percent, and export agriculture for 22 percent. Within the semi-processed products category, alumina accounted for 77 percent, and unrefined sugar and molasses for 22 percent. Thus over three-quarters of primary and semi-processed exports are provided by the bauxite industry, and less than one-quarter by agriculture.

[15]Quoted in New World Pamphlet, Unemployment: What is it? Why it exists? What we can do about it?(Kingston, September 1967), p. 4.

[16]Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica, 1980, p. 14-11.

[17]Owen Jefferson, "Is the Jamaican Economy Developing?" New World Vol. 5, No. 4,(1972):4-11.

[18]Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New York: Monthly Review, 1968), p. 44.

[19]Stanley Reid, "An Introductory Approach to the Concentration of Power in the Jamaican Corporate Economy and Notes on its Origin" in Carl Stone and A. Brown (eds.), Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977), p. 25.

[20]Ibid., p. 18.

[21]Kuper, op. cit., p. 67.

[22]Kaplan et. al., op. cit., p. 105.

[23]Ibid., p. 104.

[24]Reid, op. cit., p. 30.

[25]Ibid., p. 22.

[26]According to a study by Carol S. Holzberg as late as 1975, there were 270 directors for the 41 companies listed on the Jamaica Stock Exchange in 1971 and 278 directors for 41 companies listed in 1974. Thus 548 men sat as directors on the combined Stock Exchanges for 1971 and 1974. Of these, 242 appear once, while 153 appear in both. Therefore, only 392 individuals are represented on the exchanges. Of the 242 directors listed only once, 3 sat as directors for three or more companies, whereas of the 153 on both exchanges, 35 sat as directors for three or more companies. Thus 38 men sat on three or more boards for 1971 and/or 1974. See Carol S. Holzberg, "Social Stratification, Cultural Nationalism, and Political Economy in Jamaica: the Myths of Development and the Anti-White Bias," in The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 1977):368-380.

[27]Reid, op. cit., p. 23, citing Jamaica Stock Exchange Market Review 1970-72, National Savings Committee, p. 25.

[28]That is, many of the directors of companies were found to be members of the same private clubs, attend the same leading schools in Jamaica as well as leading prestigious universities in the metropolitan centres, and a significant number were related by marriage. See Holzberg, op. cit.

[29]Statutory Boards are government bodies set up by law (statute) for a specific purpose. See Edwin Jones, "The role of the Statutory Boards in the Political Process in Jamaica." In Social and Economic Studies Vol. 19, No. 1 (1970):114-34.

[30]See G. William Domhoff, Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America (New York: Random House, 1970), and Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

[31]Reid, op. cit., p. 26.

[32]G.A. Brown, quoted in Reid, op. cit., p. 18.

[33]Reid, op. cit., p. 31.

[34]Robert Girling and Sherry Keith, Jamaica's Employment Crisis: A Political-Economic Evaluation of the Jamaican Special Employment Program (Palo Alto, CA.: Center for Economic Studies, 1977), p. 20.

[35]Irving Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for Jamaica (Washington, D.C.: American University Foreign Affairs Studies, 1976), p. 96.

[36]Lewis, op. cit., pp. 189-195.

[37]Kaplan, et al., op. cit., p. 96.

[38]Ibid., p. 106.

[39]Kuper, op. cit., p. 122.

[40]Dan Robotham, "Agrarian Relations in Jamaica." In Stone and Brown, (eds.), op. cit., p. 45.

[41]See Lewis, op. cit., pp. 190-92.

[42]Rupert Lewis, "Black Nationalism in Jamaica in Recent Years," in Stone and Brown, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 65-66.

[43] Robotham, op. cit., p. 45.

[44] Ibid., pp. 45-46.

[45] Ibid., p. 46.

[46] Kuper, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[47] For a comprehensive study of the sugar cooperatives, the land lease programs and the issue of idle land, see Edmund H. Dale, Spotlight on the Caribbean (Regina: University of Regina, 1977), Robotham, op. cit., pp. 45-47.

[48] Dale, op. cit.; see, also, Kuper, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[49] Kaplan, et al., op. cit., p. 248.

[50] That is, with hereditary rights, compensation for capital improvements, termination with non-performance, and credit arrangements similar to those of Land Lease I. See Dale, op. cit., p. 65.

[51] Ibid., p. 84.

[52] Carl Stone, "Tenant Farming Under State Capitalism," in Stone and Brown, op. cit., p. 133.

[53] Louis Lindsay, "Colonialism and the Myth of Resource Insufficiency in Jamaica," in Vaughan A. Lewis, (ed.), Size and Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (Kingston: ISER, Univ. of W.I., 1976), p. 60.

[54] Jamaica Hansard, 27 Session 2, 1962-63, p. 507.

[55] Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[56] The Daily Gleaner, 13 April 1962.

[57] Jefferson, op. cit., p. 209.

[58] The Daily Gleaner, 13 April 1962.

[59] Five Year Independence Plan, 1963-68, Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 1962, p. 11.

[60] Locksley Edmondson, et al., "The Commonwealth Caribbean and Africa: Aspects of Third World Interactions, Linkages and Challenges," in Basil Ince, (ed.), International Relations of the Caribbean (Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, UWI, 1977), p. 17.

[61] Basil A. Ince, "The Caribbean in World Politics," op. cit., p. 37.

[62]Jefferson, op. cit., pp. 202-206.

[63]Statistical Abstract, 1973, Jamaica, Dept. of Statistics, 1974, pp. 174-77.

[64]For a more detailed discussion on Canadian banking operations in Caribbean generally, see Robert Chodos, The Caribbean Connection (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., Publishers, 1977), pp. 109-129. After 1976 some foreign banks were nationalized and local banks were established with Government involvement.

[65]Prime Minister Hugh Shearer quoted in Ibid., p. 185.

[66]Since 1968 when CIDA replaced the old External Aid Office, total allocations for aid increased from 253 million Canadian dollars to 491 million in 1973. See Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 1972 and 1978.

[67]See Larman Wilson, "The Caribbean States and International Organizations," in Richard Millett and W. Marvin Will, (eds.), The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 268-275.

[68]Harry G. Matthews, "Racial Dimension of United Nations Behavior: The Commonwealth Caribbean," in Studies in Race Relations (Denver: Center on International Relations, Univ. of Denver, 1971), p. 2.

[69]Ibid., p. 10.

[70]P. Schneider and B.M. Russett, "Alignment on the Cold War Issue." Cited in Wendell Bell, "Foreign Policy and Attitudes of Elites in Jamaica," in Millett and Will, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[71]Ibid.

[72]This is sometimes called the Circum-Caribbean States or Caribbean Basin States. A conception of the Caribbean, Caribbean Archipelago, includes, in addition to the English-speaking Caribbean countries, Cuba and Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, the French Departments (Martinique and Guadeloupe) and Suriname. See Leslie Manigot, "The Year 1975 in Perspective: From the late 1950s to 1975: The Emergence of the Caribbean on the International Scene." In The Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations, Leslie Manigot, 1975 (Lydon, Sythoff, 1976), pp. 79-80. This scholarly series is the best on the subject of the characterization of the Caribbean countries and region. See, also, Michael Manley, The Politics of Change ... (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), for evidence of a broad view of the Caribbean region.

[73]Quoted in Neville Linton, "Regional Diplomacy of the Commonwealth Caribbean," International Journal Vol. 26, No. 2 Spring 1971):401-17.

[74]See Prime Minister Shearer's Report to the House of Representatives, Activities of the Ministry of External Affairs during the Year 1966 and Forecast for 1967/68 (Ministry Paper No. 45, 2 July, 1967).

[75]Roy Preiswerk, "The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States," Journal of Inter-American Studies Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1969):245-71.

[76]See Linton, op. cit.

[77]See Wilson, op. cit., for a discussion on this point.

[78]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 12 May 1974, p. 9.

[79]Dale, op. cit., p. 18.

[80]Ibid., p. 19.

[81]Shridath Ramphal, "What became of that Third World Partnership," The Times, 7 January 1983.

[82]Ibid. The Rules of Origin clause call for 50-60 percent of the value of products to be of ACP or EEC origin. The ACP States maintain that the Rules are too stringent and should be relaxed in the interest of their development. See Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica, 1978, pp. 4-14.

[83]See Wilson, op. cit., p. 279.

[84]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 30 March 1976, p. 29.

[85]Edmondson, op. cit., p. 1.

[86]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 23 March 1976, p. 9.

[87]See The Jamaica Labor Party, Change Without Chaos, Kingston, 1980.

CHAPTER FIVE

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT MODELS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY

Since gaining independence, or at least a good measure of internal autonomy, Jamaica's political elites have adopted two broad strategies to lift their country out of its former colonial dependence. Inevitably, their policies have been determined or certainly influenced by their country's special historical and political situation, its links with outside powers, and its scope for development. But most important, these elites have been preoccupied with notions of "modernization" and "development" -- terms that came into vogue after the Second World War. These terms represent processes to transform the plethora of newly independent national societies that emerged from the ruins of West European empires, from a state of "underdevelopment" to one of "development." Accordingly, prior to any attempt to analyze the path of development charted by Jamaica's political elites it is first necessary to provide an analytical framework with which to critically examine and evaluate development policy.

A debate among classical sociologists[1] prior to the turn of the century concerning the elements that constitute modern industrial societies in contrast with traditional agricultural societies, was revitalized, as it were, in the wake of the cessation of hostilities in Europe in the mid-1940s. Theorists and

practitioners alike became awakened to the great poverty, hunger, ill-health, squalor, illiteracy and inequalities afflicting two-thirds of the world's population in what came to be known as the "Third World."[2] The development of the so-called Third World is now regarded as one of the greatest social and economic challenges facing mankind. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 document some of the indicators comparing "underdeveloped poverty" of the poor majority with the "developed affluence" of a rich minority of nations. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 summarize one further important development gap between developed and underdeveloped countries, namely the gap in terms of export and import performances on the world trading system. It is a fact that underdeveloped countries rely more heavily on primary commodities for export earnings (81 percent) than First World or industrialized, capitalist developed economies (23 percent), and Second World or "Socialist"-block economies (37 percent). Underdevelopment countries, furthermore, rely extensively on one to three primary commodities to generate practically all foreign exchange earnings. Developing countries, conversely, have much larger proportions of manufactured products than underdeveloped countries in their national export earnings. On a world scale, developed countries monopolize 83 percent of manufactures export-trade compared to 8 percent of manufactures export-trade for underdeveloped countries. And on the import side, developed countries not only consumed most of the world's primary product imports (73 percent) but also much of the world's manufactured imports (64 percent).[3] These then are the facts of "unbalanced development" on a global scale.

Table 5.1: Indicators of Third World Poverty and First World Affluence, circa 1975-1976 (a)

Indicator	UDCs[b]	DCs[c]
Average per capita GNP	$494	$5847
Absolute poor (millions)[d]	770	5% pop.
Average life-expectancy (years)	56	73
Average infant-mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	102	14
Average literacy rate	49%	97%
Average per capita education budget (1974)	$13	$254[e]
Average per capita public health expenditures (1974)	$4	$114[e]
Physicians per 10,000 population (1974)	3	19[e]
Estimated pop. unemployed (millions)	33	17
Estimated pop. underemployed (millions)	250	n.a.

Sources: ODC(1979:151,172,176); UDC(1977:178). Adapted from Swee Hin Toh, "The Overseas Development Council ..." Ph.D. dissertation University of Alberta, 1980, p. 9.

a. Except when otherwise stated.
b. Figures are averages for some 140 UDCs, including OPEC UDCs.
c. Figures are averages for 22 DCs including USA, Canada, most of Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
d. "Absolute poor" indicates (on an internationally comparable basis) the number of people in each country whose per capita income is below the level at which it is possible to secure minimum shelter, nutrition, clothing in that country; it is only a rough estimate.
e. Figures include DCs, USSR, and 5 other East European states.

Table 5.2: Relative Shares in World Production of Selected Resources and Expenditures of UDCs and "Developed Nations"

Indicator	UDCs	"Developed Nations"
Population (1976)	72%	28%
GNP (1976)	20%	80%
Export earnings (1976)	27%	73%
International reserves (1977)	43%	57%
Military expenditures (1976)	23%	77%
Public education expenditures (1974)	13%	87%
Public health expenditures (1974)	7%	93%

Source: ODC(1979:173). Adapted from Swee Hin Toh, "The Overseas Development Council ..." Ph.D. dissertation University of Alberta, 1980, p. 9.

Table 5.3[a]: Composition of World Exports and Imports by Groups of Countries, 1976 (percentages)

Export-Import Products	DCs	UDCs	"Soc. blocs"[b]	World
EXPORTS (percentages)				
Primary products	22.9	81.2	37.0	39.2
Manufactured products	75.7	18.5	56.5	59.2
IMPORTS (percentages)				
Primary products	42.3	31.0	30.6	39.2
Manufactured products	56.3	65.9	66.3	59.2

Source: Adapted from Table C-1 in ODC(1979:207). Original data extracted from U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. 32, No. 6 (June 1978), special table F. Adapted from Toh, op. cit., p. 10.

a. Read down each column for composition of exports-imports of each group of countries.
b. "Socialist blocs" nations.

Table 5.4[a]: Shares of World Exports and Imports, by Types of Products, 1976 ($billions and percentages)

	World ($ billions)	DCs	UDCs	"Soc. blocs"[b]
		(percentages)		
EXPORTS				
Primary products	387.5	37.9	53.3	8.8
Manufactured products	585.3	83.1	8.0	8.9
Total	988.8	64.9	25.8	9.3
IMPORTS				
Primary products	387.5	72.8	17.6	7.4
Manufactured products	585.3	64.0	24.8	10.7
Total	988.8	67.4	22.2	9,5

Source: Adapted from Table C-4 in ODC(1979:210). Adapted from Ibid.

a. Read across each line for distribution of each product among various regional groups.

But the "development gap" is not just globally based. It also pervades the internal political, economic and social structures of almost all Third World countries, with notable exceptions in "socialist experiments." Typically, in underdeveloped countries, a proportion of citizens -- ruling elites and propertied classes -- monopolize material resources in ostentatious life-styles while the teeming masses suffer hunger, disease and squalor. Thus while theorists and practitioners of "development" will not dispute the factual symptoms of Third World poverty and underdevelopment, the "causes" and "solutions" are strongly contested from the perspective of theorizing, analysis, and implications for practice.

In the debate over such questions of development theory-and-practice, two major world views or paradigms can be discovered. The worldview which enjoys dominant status in academic and governmental "development" circles will be referred to as the modernization paradigm. The opposing radical worldview, which has sought to expose the developing countries and underdeveloped countries' elite interests behind modernization ideology, is referred to as the critical paradigm. The discussion now turns to a summary of the salient themes of both paradigms.

THE MODERNIZATION PARADIGM ON UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Modernization paradigm can be traced to the response by American political elites and intellectuals to the international setting of the post-World War II era. In particular, the impact of

the Cold War and the simultaneous emergence of the Third World societies as prominent participants in global politics following the crumbling of the European colonial empires converged during this period to channel, for the first time, substantial intellectual interest and resources beyond the borders of American society, and even in Europe, into the study of the societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the two decades after the War, American social scientists, initially mostly economists, and their graduate students, with generous financial backing of governmental and private agencies turned attention increasingly to the problems of economic development, political stability and social and cultural change in these societies.[4]

Within this setting, a great deal of attention was devoted to the elaboration of numerous conceptual schemes which in many respects served as substitutes for a tradition of inquiry in the problems of these societies which was almost entirely lacking.[5] Unable to rely for guidance in the design, execution and interpretation of their research upon a previously accumulated body of literature by the classical writers, social scientists engaged in this task now turned for assistance to the familiar intellectual traditions of Western thinking about the nature of social change. The influence of such traditions is particularly evident in the case of modernization theory. Although their terminology is somewhat novel, the manner in which modernization theorists tend to approach social change in non-Western societies is deeply rooted in the perspective of developmentalism which was already firmly established in the

conventional wisdom of Western social science well before the end of the 19th century.[6] Indeed, it has been argued that this perspective -- which may be traced to the idea that social change may be studied by analogy with biological growth of individual organisms -- has dominated Western thinking about social change from Pre-Socratics through 18th and 19th century theorists of process and social evolution to contemporary social science.[7]

Within this tradition of thought, evolutionary theory and 20th century functionalism[8] have been particularly influential in the shaping of modernization theory. Evidence of their influence may be found in many features of modernization theory advanced by some of the foremost social scientists of the 1950s and 1960s such as Daniel Lerner and other scholars.[9] It should be emphasized, though, that the notion of a modernization paradigm does not imply that constituent scholars always agree on any or all aspects of each other's theorizing. Differences in <u>details</u> of conceptualization and theories can and do occur -- for example the debate among modernization economists about "balanced" versus "unbalanced - growth" strategies.[10] But despite such conceptual disagreements, it is still possible to detect (as in the case of the critical paradigm) key common underlying paradigmatic themes implicitly or explicitly shared by those within the paradigm whatever their specific disciplines.[11]

For the modernization paradigm, three basic themes can be identified. These are ably synthesized and summarized in Swee Hin Toh's brilliant study as follows:

> First, there is the 'unilinear' assumption that the UDCs [underdeveloped countries] ought to and can 'develop' along the path blazed by modernized DCs [developed countries], with advanced capitalism as the highest stage of 'social development'. Second, underdevelopment is attributed to the lack of or insufficient 'development' of certain internal UDC characteristics, whether these be capital, technology, cultural attitudes, social organization, or entrepreneurial elites. Simultaneously, one crucial internal structural feature is singularly and consistently downgraded, distorted or ignored, namely that of social relations of production as understood by critical analysts. And thirdly, DCs are deemed to have had and to have a positive role in fostering 'development' via economic and political relationships.[12]

These basic themes -- implicit or explicit, qualified or unequivocal -- are to be found recurring in modernization literature across the disciplinary spectrum.

Modernization Economics

Thus in modernization economics, the deficiencies of various institutional, social and cultural "preconditions" for economic growth are stressed, such as capital scarcity, capital-mobilizing institutions, infrastructure, receptivity to science and technology, human resource improvements (for example, education and health), and an elite entrepreneurial class.[13] The transition from a "traditional" to a "modern" economy entails therefore the filling-up of those deficiencies, a process historically begun by developed countries' colonialism and unquestionably necessitating continued beneficience from developed countries through aid and foreign investment. The key acid test to identifying modernization economics lies clearly in its evaluation of the role of private

foreign investment in underdeveloped countries' "development." For even when certain negativities are admitted (for example, concentration of material resources in elite interests' hands; excessive outflows in export enclave investment), the overall verdict is still favorable to foreign capital's role.[14] In recent development-theory literature, of course, it has been the role of multinational corporations (MNCS) which has come under debate. While some might lament MNC abuses and, or, support establishment of foreign investment codes, modernization economists generally defend MNCs as contributing to global and underdeveloped countries' welfare by transferring "needed" capital, technology, managerial and technical skills to underdeveloped countries short on those factors, and by providing underdeveloped countries with outlets into world markets.[15]

Modernization Sociology

In modernization sociology, much of the theorizing invokes the structural-functionalist and evolutionist strategy of social change initially proposed by scholars like Ferdinand Tonnies et. al., and popularized by Talcott Parsons[16] in his pattern-variable scheme. "Modern" society is characterized by Parsons as having value-orientations (affective-neutrality, self-orientation, universalism, achievement, specificity") contrasting with "traditional" society's affectivity, collective-orientation, particularism, ascription, and diffuseness. Societal development is said to require "differentiation" (for example diffusely-functioning peasant households to modern

specific work-roles) and "value-generalizations" (from ascription-particularistic to achievement-universal norms). Thus when translated into global context, this mode of conceptualizing "development" leads to one obvious implication: underdeveloped countries as "traditional" societies will need to shift their value-orientations into "modern" ones characteristic of developed countries.

Thus prominent modernization sociologists like Daniel Lerner et al.[17] all visualize "development" as transformation and differentiation of "traditional" societies in modern, technological, economic, political, educational, legal, family, and motivational orders characteristic of developed countries. More recently, Harvard University (now Stanford) sociologist Alex Inkeles produced a massive empirical study of "individual modernity," based on four-hour long interviews of some 6000 men in five underdeveloped countries including Israel. Some major findings include identifying education as the "most powerful factor" in making men modern; and the factory as an important "school" for modernity, since it increases workers' chances for "self-expression," "advancement," "innovative potential," and "cognitive openness" while decreasing their "passive fatalism." Inkeles hence draws a typical modernization implication for action -- to develop, underdeveloped countries will need to diffuse modern individual attitudes and values through society. Conversely, in one sentence only does Inkeles admit the existence of structural political-economic causes of underdevelopment. Even then, he is most equivocal:

> Narrow class interests, colonial oppression, rapacious great powers, international cartels, domestic monopolies, archaic and corrupted governments, tribal antagonisms, and religious and ethnic prejudices ... are among the many objective forces which we know may act to impede modernization.[18]

In short, modernization sociologists explain underdevelopment as a lack of "modern" social organization required to complement "modern" economic structures. Such "modern" organization and structures are optimally cast in First World[19] and thereby capitalistic norms.

Modernization Psychology

In focussing on internal institutional barriers to "development," modernization sociologists and economists often also refer to psychological prerequisites (for example Lerner's "emphatic, participant mobile personalities"; Inkeles "modern man"). Not surprisingly, then, a modernization psychology too has appeared. Most well-known in this regard is Harvard University's David McClelland,[22] who postulated the n-Ach (need for achievement) factor as what motivates entrepreneurship and hence economic growth. N-Ach refers to the desire to do well and attain an inner feeling of accomplishment. From studies of historical and contemporary societies, McClelland claimed correlations between n-Ach levels and consequent economic activity or growth. While classical sociologist Max Weber's Protestant ethic[21] is deemed one form of n-Ach, McClelland argued for general applicability of the concept, even to non-capitalist societies. The policy implications of this theoretical position are not difficult to discern. Since

"development" is hindered by lack of entrepreneurial talent, which supposedly reflects high n-Ach, underdeveloped countries should seek to diffuse the ideology of n-Ach through governmental, business and even family circles.[22] A concrete attempt to practice this theory is seen in McClelland et al.[23] training course to increase n-Ach of 150 Indian businessmen. Results attained were mediocre, but more to the point are the following remarks:

> it may not be relevant to present purposes that thousands of lower-class workers in Calcutta experience life as hopeless misery ... though it certainly is tragic ... [But this group] does not take any major decisions about the course of industry and commerce in India. Rather, it is the entrepreneurs, managers, or planners who will be responsible for Indian economic development in this generation. Thus our study is concerned with one of the most strategic sectors of Indian society.[24]

In other words, n-Ach theory assumes that higher "achievement motivation" among present Indian elites will eliminate the "hopeless misery" of lower classes via greater "economic development." The paradigmatic theme of internal-causes behind underdeveloped countries' poverty is hence accentuated by a single, simplistic psychological factor, while the political-economy of class relationships is ignored.[25]

Modernization Political Science

Much modernization research has also appeared in the discipline of political science. Here, the influence of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on Comparative Politics has been substantial. The committee, including such elite scholars as James Coleman, Lucian Pye, Sidney Verba, Gabriel Almond, and more

recently Samuel Huntington, was formed in 1954 to organize conferences and research on political modernization. Basically structural-functionalists, these theorists developed a set of concepts (for example "political culture," "interest articulation and aggregation") to explain political systems and political "development."[26]

A central tenet of this theorizing is that developed country "liberal-democracies" are the zenith of "political development," and thereby the ideal model for underdeveloped countries to emulate. The features of differentiation role-specificities and achievement motivations (modernization sociology), and the existence of political "pluralism" via competitive party politics, are characteristic of the highly "civic political-culture" of developed countries. In contrast, politically underdeveloped countries face problems of dis-articulation, lack of integration, aggregation and communication, under-participation by parliaments in role making, and weak associational groups. Underdeveloped political elites therefore, with developed countries help should work towards the modernization of their political system, including as Harvard's Samuel Huntington stressed, organization of strong "democratic" party organizations.[27]

However, as Donal Cruise O'Brien[28] has critically observed, with the heightening of underdeveloped countries' political instability, it is "political order," not "political democratization" that has become central in such theorizing. Explicit Cold-War philosophy is articulated, warning against the possibility of

revolutionary change caused by over-intense "demands" of "raw" interests upon political system. Exemplifying most crudely the counter-revolutionism of political modernization theory, Lucien Pye identifies the real "culprits" of underdeveloped country "insurrectionary movements" as the "Communists" -- "enemies of freedom [seeking[to exploit all possibilities" for their "wars of national liberation."[29]

> As a result of Vietnam as well as incipient insurgency in Africa and Latin America, the United States government during the Kennedy Administration became deeply absorbed with the problems of counter-insurgency. We have sought to develop a doctrine of counter-insurgency policies to match the Communist doctrine of "wars of liberation"... We can begin to accumulate insights on the art of controlling rebels who would destroy the prospects of democratic development and establish the rule of tyrants.[30]

And comparing the value of "competitive politics" in national development (for example, India) to monopolistic traditions (for example, China), Pye praised India's "remarkable potential for vigorous development" but castigated the "policy failures" of Peking and its "inability" to "realize the potential inherent in Chinese society."[31] Besides Pye, Huntington has also achieved counter-revolutionary notoriety as a United States consultant and as a Cold War theorist. Thus, at the height of the Vietnam War, he stated that U.S. tactics of forced-draft urbanization and modernization were undermining the Vietcong rural-based revolutionary movement, and obtained for the poor migrants "a higher level of economic well-being."[32]

In short, political modernization theorizing embodies the key themes of the modernization paradigm: the First World society as the zenith of "development," the causes of "political

underdevelopment" rooted in internal deficiencies which have nothing to do with hegemonies; and the beneficient role of developed countries can play in "political development," through example and aid, including increasingly counter-revolutionary intervention. Thus, whether the disciplinary focus be economics, sociology, psychology or political science, the basic paradigmatic themes of modernization show through. These modernization approaches have shaped the American and Western strategy vis-a-vis the Third World. They have generated policies with far-reaching effects for underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that modernization theorists are naturally supportive of each other's work. Rostow, for example, is often cited by the others; McClelland by Pye and Hoselitz. Simultaneously, rather than confronting the emergent literature embracing the critical paradigm, these modernization intellectuals have treated it with contempt.

THE CRITICAL PARADIGM ON UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

The critical paradigm, which encompasses varying perspectives on development and underdevelopment, has gradually emerged as a challenge to the modernization paradigm. It has confronted modernization by offering a serious critique of the major postulates and policy formulations elaborated by the modernization theorists. The critical intellectuals were revolted against the abstract -- formal, ahistorical, system approach of the modernization theories of development. The critical paradigm focuses on the concrete historical studies of both developed and underdeveloped countries.

In fact, one of the crucial features of this approach is that it emphasizes historical dimension, in attributing the cause of Third World underdevelopment to the historical growth of Western capitalism.

Prior to delineating the major themes of the critical paradigm, it is relevant to note that one component of critical analysis has focused on exposing the paradigmatic assumptions and theoretical deficiencies of modernization literature. Thus W.W. Rostow's "stages of growth" theory (summarized below) was shown by Paul Baran et al.[33] to be empirically and theoretically reductionist, using static unilinear criteria to distinguish between "stages" that distort the historical and political-economic dynamics of societal development. But most importantly, Rostow fails to analyze the historical impact of developed countries upon underdeveloped countries and explain why "take-off" has not occurred despite this contact -- a failure rooted in his rejection of Marxist understandings of imperialism.

As for modernization sociology, Frank[34] has seminally exposed the empirical and theoretical shortcomings of the "tradition-modernity" pattern variables model. For instance, "modern" developed countries are not free of particularism, ascriptivism, or functional diffusiveness. Most crucially, by apportioning uniform weight to social roles in "development," these theorists neglect the disproportionate influence wielded by elite political and economic roles. This latter bias is rather obvious in Inkeles's study "Becoming Modern," in which it is "modernized individuals" who count in "development." However, as Swee Toh critically observed, Inkeles never asks whose interests are best served by underdeveloped

countries having such "modernized" individuals, nor consider the facts of worker-exploitation in the "modernizing" factory. In a particularly devastating critique of Inkeles study, Irene Gendzier[35] noted the "subjectivistic psychologism" used by Inkeles to explain "developments," while critical political-economic and historical factors shaping individual change are ignored.

Finally, similar criticisms of reductionism, ahistoricism, ethnocentrism and neglect of class hegemony (including international relationships) in the literature of modernization psychologists or political scientists have been made in other important studies.[36] In short, then, when scrutinized through the perspective of the critical paradigm, the modernization theories nurtured in prestigious American universities of Harvard, Stanford, MIT or Princeton really provide more ideological smoke-screen for the vested interests of ruling elites than enlightenment on Third World problems. For a better understanding of the roots of underdevelopment, one must turn to the basic themes and conceptual tools of the critical paradigm.

Critical Paradigmatic Themes

Four salient themes can be identified in the critical paradigm. First, it is maintained that present political-economic and socio-cultural structure of underdevelopment cannot be adequately explained without a grasp of the historical growth of the world-wide capitalist system from its mercantilist, industrial and its colonial-imperialist phase of development, wherein a few countries around the Atlantic developed as the exploiting centers and the rest of the

colonial and semi-colonial countries as the underdeveloped periphery. Secondly, the underdeveloped countries which have been "politically liberated" from the developed imperialist countries, and have taken to the path of development along capitalist lines, are very intimately interlocked with their former masters in a dependent institutional framework. The third theme is that of dependency, of "imperialism without colonies" or neo-colonialism. According to this approach, the structures of dependency are sustained by unequal and exploitative class relationships within underdeveloped countries and the international collaboration between ruling-classes of the developed and underdeveloped countries. And fourthly, to critical theorists, genuine development for Third World masses can only begin to occur with the replacement of modernization policies and programs by liberational theory-and-practice which, in its most ideal expression, fosters humanistic, democratic, egalitarian modes of international and intra-national economic production, distribution and exchange, political participation, and socio-cultural development.[37]

According to the critical analysts, the entire rhetoric of development, aid and modernization as evolved by the scholars of modernization paradigm is in reality the "cloak to hide the fact of a new exploitation" and as a "subtle defence of the policies which are not intended to overcome underdevelopment."[38] Toh puts the critical analysts' position on underdevelopment graphically, when he writes:

> underdevelopment does not result from missing internal factors per se, nor is the First World's role beneficient. Rather underdevelopment is a dynamic process involving internal structures of class inequalities, reinforced by external or First World dominance in global political economy. This process, indeed, dates back some five centuries during which, as the First World developed, the Third World was being under-developed.
>
> The Iberian plunder of Latin American bullion, followed by the sugar and coffee plantations with further decimation of native populations; the horrendous slave trade which denuded Africa of countless peoples in a trail of social devastation; the global scramble for colonies and the spheres of influence as an expanding First World capitalism sought sources of raw commodities and markets for their manufactures, necessitating exploitation of indigenous industries; all these events not only reflect the historical roots of Third World underdevelopment, but also follow a logic that continues to underpin current relationships between rich and poor nations.
>
> Despite ... [and] since independence ... new forms of First World dominance have evolved ... The indigenous elites who took over were essentially prepared to decolonize on terms that preserved the political-economic interests of the former First World rulers. Furthermore, the new ruling-classes are characteristically committed to fulfilment of their ostentatious consumption rather than to the basic needs of their peoples. Repressive government is the rule, necessary to maintain the stability amenable to foreign profit-seeking concerns.39

In short, then, key conceptual tools for critical analysis focus on the interrelated concepts of "dependency" and "imperialism."

Critical theorizing on development of underdevelopment evolved over the past two decades in various regions of the world, both developed and underdeveloped. Its development was due partly to the efforts of individual critical scholars, partly to the emergence of collective challenge to mainstream social science, and partly to expanded publishing opportunities in various critical media. The earliest theoretical efforts, perhaps, came from Stanford Marxist

economist, Paul Baran, whose work, coinciding with Cold War hysteria, met the full force of "academic repression."[40]

In his classic study on The Political Economy of Growth, Paul Baran[41] analyzed the historical process of capital accumulation by developed countries in underdeveloped countries through outright plunder, unequal trade, land seizures, manipulation of pre-capitalist production distribution systems for surplus-value extraction, destruction of local industry, severe exploitation of underdeveloped countries (largely peasant) labor, penetration by foreign firms (especially in raw-materials extraction), and in order to sustain these accumulation processes, the instituting of legal, market, infrastructure and administrative facilities. Such "roots of backwardness" in turn produce, what Baran termed, a "morphology of backwardness," characteristic of a stunted, distorted, dependent capitalism. Thus there is a high dependence on agricultural-surplus accumulation based on extreme exploitation of peasants, on non-food cash crop cultivation for developed countries' needs, on an over-consuming under-investing land-owning class, and on stagnant productivity. A monopolistic, indigenous industrial sector grows up, overprotected by government and neither linking dynamically with agriculture nor expanding the internal market. And foreign enterprise underdevelops the economy -- draining abroad surplus and non-renewable natural resources without creating much employment or re-investment; fostering a self-serving comprador business class who in collaboration with feudal land-owners and military elites, uphold repressive political status-quos with the aid and approval of developed countries' governments and private enterprise.

In greater detail and with more specific historical concreteness, economist Andre Gunder Frank has offered refinements to the underdevelopment so seminally analyzed by Baran. In his early work, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,[42] Frank's historical and political-economic analyses of Latin America yielded a model of the world as a chain of metropolis-satellite linkages that relate internationally and intra-nationally metropolitan centers with satellites. Frank affirms that "it is capitalism, both world and national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and which still generates underdevelopment in the present." His analysis centers on the metropolis-satellite structure of the capitalist system as he traces throughout the history of certain countries the development of underdevelopment. Frank identifies the internal contradictions of capitalism as "the expropriation of economic surplus from the many and its appropriation by the few, the polarization of the capitalist system into metropolitan center and peripheral satellites, and the continuity of the fundamental structure of the capitalist system throughout the history of its expansion and transformation . . ." His central thesis focuses on these contradictions. Capitalism, Frank argues, has "generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites [local, regional and international] whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centers [local, regional, international] which appropriates that surplus." Frank's later works concentrate on class exploitation, intra-nationally and inter-nationally, in the global context of capital accumulation.

Other Latin American dependency theorists like Theotonio dos Santos and Fernando H. Cardoso have stressed more the historical structural process of underdevelopment in terms of class relations, tying the economy and international politics to Latin American dependent role which in turn generate internal contradictions and political struggle.[43] However, they essentially share with Frank the critical theme that underdevelopment is rooted in developed countries' economic hegemony. For even when new forms of capitalist expansion have stimulated some technological-industrial growth, it is of a "dependent" capitalist variety with serious anti-developmental consequences.

The phenomena of dependency and "development of underdevelopment" in other Third World regions have also emerged through such scholars as Walter Rodney, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein. Rodney[44] has documented the historical penetration by European capitalism into Africa, and the decisive underdevelopment effects of pre-colonial modes of exploitation. Amin[45] likewise shows how previously autonomously-developing traditional African societies lost their autonomy under the impact of mercantilism and colonization perpetrated by the capitalist centers, and became integrated into the world capitalist system as dependent peripheral societies. And a growing body of critical analysis has empirically validated the critical paradigmatic themes for regions like the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and for specific underdeveloped countries like Kenya, South Korea, the Philippines, Brazil, and so on.[46]

A brief note should be taken of the Caribbean contribution to the literature on the "New Dependency." The new dependency is a recent phenomenon, based on multinational corporations (MNCs) which after the Second World War invested in industries geared to the internal market of underdeveloped countries. The Brazilian sociologist Theotonio dos Santos, who has elabborated the new dependency, characterizes it as a "technological-industrial dependence."[47] In the Caribbean, in the post-1945 period, certain important mineral export-enclave economies emerged with the extraction of petroleum and bauxite-ore, and operated by vertically integrated corporations. Norman Girvan[48] -- a member of the New World Group of economists at the University of the West Indies -- has documented how this form of economic organization in these industries contributes to economic dependence; the enclave nature of the industry, and the failure of the industry to generate transformation in the host economy, even where the State succeeds in capturing a large share of the surplus which it generates. Girvan concludes that mineral-export economies tend to exhibit "the phenomenon of dependent growth without development."[49] He suggests ways out of the dilemma by identifying the options, seizing the opportunity, marshalling the specifics of change, and appropriating the rights and minerals which legitimately belong to the Caribbean people. Two other New World Group[50] economists, Lloyd Best[51] and George Beckford[52] were the principal architects of what was dubbed the Plantation model, for explaining underdevelopment and persistent poverty in the Caribbean. The Plantation thesis was expanded to incorporate all phases of economic activities within the region. One

outcome of this typology was a pure to non-pure plantation continuum.

There are two other recently general frameworks for understanding development and underdevelopment. To begin with, Samir Amin[53] has distinguished between two systems of capital accumulation. The "self-centered" system (which developed in developed countries and also in USSR and China) is based on dynamic linkages between production of "mass" consumption goods and that of capital goods needed to produce those consumption goods. The "peripheral" system began, however, with an export-enclave form of capital-accumulation, exploiting cheap labor and maintaining backward productive forces in the rest of the economy. Later, a small internal market emerged, but concentrating on luxury elite goods at the expense of mass-consumption goods. Thus peripheral industrialization is primarily oriented to elite consumption and foreign exploitation. This peripheral system of capital-accumulation leads to mass marginalization and the symptoms of underdevelopment delineated above.

Parallel to Amin's world accumulation model is the world-system framework proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein.[54] Wallerstein argues that there exists today a single world economic system -- capitalism, initiated in the 16th century, and spreading to include the whole world three centuries later. Within the world-capitalist system, unequal exchange between "core" States and "periphery" States occurs, propelled by the sine qua non of capitalist production to realize profits on a world market. As Wallerstein graphically puts it, the major aspect, in terms of human suffering, of this "modern world society" is the inability of underdeveloped countries' rural economies

to meet basic-needs of all their masses -- thus, in the near future, "millions will die of quick starvation. Millions more will die of slow starvation."[56]

The central conceptual tool cited in the foregoing discussion has been "dependency." It is not, however, the only one necessary, since analyzing dependency simultaneously requires the concept of "imperialism." In the critical paradigm, imperialism refers to the political-economic and socio-cultural penetration of developed countries into underdeveloped countries that conjoins with internal societal class dialectics to create the condition of dependency.[57] Lenin in his classic study, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism,[58] published in 1916, had related imperialism to dependency. Political control was not necessary. Imperialism was a development of capitalism, characterized by monopoly's decisive role, the merging of industrial and finance capital, predominance of capital export over goods exports, sharing of the world market by competing international capitalist monopolies, and completion of territorial division of the world among the biggest capitalist powers.

Since Lenin's study, Marxist scholarship has attempted to update or revise its doctrine in the light of further empirical evidence and changing conditions of world capitalism. There are many variations to the Marxist-Leninist model of imperialism, one of the most persuasive contemporary discussions has come from Harry Magdoff[59]. In the "new imperialism" or "imperialism without colonies," the key motive force for developed countries' capital-exports worldwide is the inherent imperative of monopoly capital to seek out, stake out,

expand, secure access to maximally or strategically control markets and sources of raw materials to their ultimate, long term, global advantage -- an imperative fostered by developed country governments who seek to ensure as safe an international environment as possible for their industrial and financial multinational corporations. This is accomplished by maintaining historically established unequal systems of exchange and international division of labor through cooptation of Third World ruling-classes, preempting internal radical social change, and political-economic influence via aid relations -- in other words, perpetuating "dependent" peripheries. Thus in short, dependency and imperialism are complementary concepts for understanding the internal and external causes, dialectics and consequences of underdevelopment.

As the foregoing summary of the critical development literature has clearly indicated, dependency theorizing, unlike modernization theorizing, is eclectic in nature. Thus while critical analysts would agree on basic paradigmatic th[redacted]y too do diverge on specifics of explanation or of strategies for action. Two prominent illustrations are the debate among "dependency" Latin Americanists like Cardoso, Sunkel, Dos Santos, and Frank,[60] and the critique of "dependency" theories by Marxists stressing more traditional analytical categories such as imperialism or mode of production.[61] Even Frank,[62] in the light of such criticisms, has shifted his conceptual position to intra-national and international class-analysis in the global context of capital-accumulation. In short, as Ronald Chilcote argues,[63] there are several assumptions which most proponents of dependency theory support, even though their work may not yet have proven their validity.

To begin with, it is generally believed that dependency theory provides a framework for explanations of underdevelopment and development. Secondly, dependency theory offers a foundation for analysis of class struggle and strategies to promote class struggles in the interest of resolving societal contradictions and problems. Finally, an understanding of dependency and the adoption of certain strategies to break dependency leads to the restructuring of societies, a restructuring which limits capitalism and promotes socialism in the seeking of a new and better society.

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT MODEL AND ITS FRUSTRATIONS

The Case for Industrialization

Now that the conceptual framework has been laid for understanding the processes of both modernization and development/underdevelopment, we can proceed to a discussion and analysis of the attempt to alleviate mass underdevelopment in Jamaica. Following the war -- when the political elites first found themselves in the position to influence local decision making, in the wake of the earlier constitutional reforms -- Jamaica and, indeed, the entire Caribbean were bombarded with a series of "development" theories; all aimed at accelerating the transformation of the economy, and with it the accrual of material and social benefits. The "development" theories ran the gamut from Ragnar Murkse's[64] and P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan's[65] "Big Push Theory," W.W. Rostow's[66] "Take-Off," Hirschman's[67] sequencing of investment, Sir W. Arthur Lewis'[68] stress on the growth

of the modern sector and the corresponding "invitation to invest" thesis, up to "Operation Bootstrap" -- the so-called Puerto Rican model.[69]

In accordance with these "principles of development," the Caribbean was impressioned into rising out of the 1950s era of benign neglect into the 1960s era of overtures to modernization and attempts at creating viable economies out of the then-called underdeveloped economies. It should be useful at this juncture to summarize a few of the more influential modernization models, which will provide a useful introduction to an analysis of their impact on development policies in Jamaica.

It has always been tempting to search for regularities in history, and many writers have adopted a unidirectional view of development in terms of some pattern of stages. At one extreme, Adam Smith, referred to the sequence of hunting, pastoral, agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing stages. At the other, Karl Marx related Hegel's thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to the Marxian stages of feudalism, bourgeois capitalism, socialism, and communism.[70] Interest in stage theories of development was given new impetus with the publication of Professor Walt Rostow's book, The Stages of Economic Growth,[71] which represents an ambitious attempt to provide an alternative to Marxist interpretation of history -- hence the subtitle "A Non-Communist Manifesto." Rostow attempted to generalize "the sweep of modern economic history," and presents a political theory as well as a descriptive economic study of the pattern of growth and development of nations.

The essence of the Rostow thesis is that it is logically and practically possible to identify stages of development and to classify societies according to those stages. He distinguishes five such stages: traditional; transitional; take-off; maturity; and high mass-consumption. All we need to say about traditional societies is that for Rostow the whole of the pre-Newtonian world consisted of such societies; for example, the dynasties of China, the civilizations of the Middle East, the Mediterranean and medieval Europe, and so on. Traditional societies are characterized by a ceiling on productivity imposed by the limitations of science. Traditional societies are thus recognizable by a very high proportion of the work-force in agriculture (greater than 75 percent), coupled with very little mobility or social change, great divisions of wealth and decentralized political power. Today there are very few, if any, societies that one would classify as traditional.[72]

Rostow calls the stage between feudalism and take-off the transitional stage or the preconditions for take off. The main economic requirement in the transition phase is that the level of investment should be raised to at least 10 percent of national income to ensure self-sustaining growth. The main direction of investment must be in transport and other social overhead capital to build up society's infrastructure. The preconditions of a rise in the investment ratio consist of a willingness of people to lend risk capital, the availability of men willing and able to be entrepreneurs and to innovate, and the willingness of society at large to operate an economic system geared to the factory and the principle of the division of labor.

On the social front, a new elite must emerge to knit the industrial society and it must supersede in authority the land-based elite of the traditional society. Surplus products must be channelled by the new elite from agriculture to industry, and men must be willing to take risks and to respond to material incentives. And because of the enormity of the task of transition, the establishment of an effective "modern" government is vital. The length of the transition phase depends on the speed with which local talent, energy and resources are devoted to modernization and the overthrow of the old order, and in this respect the political leadership will have an important part to play.

Then there is the stage of "take-off" which is meant to be the central notion in Rostow's schema, and it has received the most critical attention in development literature.[73] The take-off is interpreted as "a decisive transition in a society's history" -- a period "when the scale of productive economic activity reaches a critical level and produces changes which lead to a massive and progressive structural transformation in economies and societies of which they are a part, better viewed as changes in kind than merely in degree." The take-off stage is a short stage of development during which growth becomes self-sustaining. To arrive at this stage, substantial inflows of foreign capital are envisaged. The take-off is defined as requiring all three of the following related conditions: "to begin with, a rise in the rate of productive investment from say, 5 percent or less to over 10 percent of national income (or net national product); secondly, the development of one or more substantial

manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth; and thirdly, the existence or quick emergence of a "political, social and institutional framework" which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects to the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character.[74]

The characteristics of take-off are sometimes difficult to distinguish from the characteristics of the transitional stage; and in fact this has been one bone of contention between Rostow and his many critics. A comprehensive evaluation of Rostow's thesis is not possible here. A few critical remarks have already been offered elsewhere.[75] Suffice it to say that if Rostow's thesis is to assert with a high generality that it is able to trace a structure of history in the form of a sequence of stages, then it must also answer a number of criticisms that have commonly been levied against stage theorists. "Stage-making" approaches are misleading when they succumb to a linear conception of history and imply that all economies tend to pass through the same series of stages. Although a particular sequence may correspond broadly to the historical experience of some economies, no sequence fits the history of all countries. To maintain that every economy always follows the same course of development with a common past and the same future is to "overschematize" the complex forces of development and to give sequence stages a generality that is unwarranted.[76] A country may attain a later stage of development without first having passed through an earlier stage, as stages may be skipped, and different types of economies do not have to succeed or evolve from another. Rostow's theory has been acclaimed as dealing with the "why" of

development, yet it is clear, as indeed Raul Fernandez[77] recognizes, that the only answer it can give to the question "Why hasn't Nicaragua developed?" is that it hasn't taken off!!" As far as underdeveloped countries are concerned, the greatest flaw of this theory is the assumption, obviously unwarranted, of the independence (in terms of economic linkages) of the world's nations; otherwise, at the level of practical policies, Rostow had no doubt that trade, foreign aid, technology, and so on, are potential tools of beneficial intervention by the rich on behalf of the poor.

Other writers, such as Alexander Gerschenton,[78] criticized Rostow for failing to take into account historical economic interdependence. In his assumptions Rostow had discounted the effects that the "modernization" of one country would have on the development of other countries; but there was no question in Gerschenton's mind, either, that the net effect of inter-country relations had been beneficial. Rostow's thesis, one must therefore conclude, offers insights into the process of modernization through industrialization in the developed countries. As such his model must be dismissed as a blue-print for development.

An equally forceful articulation of industrialization as a strategy for "development" was that advocated, notably by P.N. Rosenstein Rodan[79] and Nagner Nurkse,[80] the main proponents of the "big push" theory of economic growth and development. The basic tenet of this theory is that underdeveloped countries can accelerate their economic development through "a high minimum amount" of foreign aid (defined as "loans, grants, and technical assistance") and private investment to the manufacturing sector. In this drive to develop

manufactures to earn foreign exchange through trade, state intervention is essential to control the specific lines of investment and production. In this downgrading of agriculture, underdeveloped countries will benefit from rapid capital accumulation and hence boost the rate of saving in order to achieve self-sustaining growth; at the same time, it would provide employment for their rapidly increasing labor force. The chief basis on which the "big push" of investment for export is justified is the international interdependence of economies. This stress on foreign trade cannot be a model for development since underdeveloped countries are chiefly primary producers and could not hope to earn sufficient foreign exchange in the world market to sustain import substitutes. A general weakness of the "big push" doctrine, quite apart from the obvious one of favoring manufacturing over primary industries, is that it ignores the conditions for evoking investment to which it ascribes such potency in the overall picture of development, as well as neglecting the conditions under which investment, once made, can be fruitful.[81]

While the emerging Caribbean political leaders ponder the torrent of development doctrines of the First World theorists, they recalled that the case for an industrialization path to development originated with intellectuals in their own region of the Third World. As early as 1949 the Argentinian Raul Prebisch's celebrated The Economic Development of Latin America[82] was published. In it he argued the case against the continued reliance of Latin America on exports of primary commodities to provide the dynamic for growth, and the case for industrialization as an (incremental) alternative.

The course of events in the 20th century had made the 19th century pattern of international specialization obsolete, and had made industrialization structurally inevitable. Thus:

> In Latin America, reality is undermining the out-dated schema of the international division of labour, which achieved great importance in the nineteenth century and, as a theoretical concept, continued to exert considerable influence until very recently. Under that schema, the specific task that fell to Latin America, as part of the periphery of the world economic system, was that of producing food and raw material for the great industrial centres. There was no place within it for the industrialization of the new countries. It is nevertheless being forced upon them by events. Two world wars in a single generation and a great economic crisis between them have shown the Latin American countries their opportunities, clearly pointing the way to industrial activity.83

The chief theoretical tool of the Prebisch analysis is the incidence of technical progress and its correlate, productivity growth. The theory underlying the traditional schema of the international division of labor assumed that producers of primary products on the one hand, and of industrial products on the other, would share equitably in the productivity gains resulting from international specialization and technical progress. But in reality the industrial center-countries were appropriating the benefits of productivity gains taking place both in the center and in the periphery. The evidence was to be found in the secular adverse swing in the commodity terms-of-trade being experienced by the primary-producing countries; and the reason for this was, in turn, explained in terms of differential price movements for industrial verses primary commodities produced by upswings and downswings in the industrial cycle. Thus industrialization was the only alternative

for the periphery, the "principal means at the disposal of these countries of obtaining a share of the benefits of technical progress and of progressively raising the standard of living of the masses."[84]

Since manufacturing industry was to be geared to the production of previously imported goods, the post-war development model came to be dubbed "substitutive industrialization."

By what might appear to be a remarkable coincidence, at precisely the same time as Prebisch was making the case for Latin American industrialization, Sir Arthur Lewis, an accomplished West Indian economist, was doing the same for the West Indies. His Industrialization of the British West Indies[85] published in 1950, also became a classic in much the same way as Prebisch's recommendation. Lewis' chief concern was with the generation of full employment in the area. His analysis made use, principally, of two tools: the land/population balance, and a (revised) theory of comparative advantage. The need for industrialization arose mainly out of an unfavorable land/population endowment. Thus:

> The case for rapid industrialization in the West Indies rests chiefly on overpopulation. The islands already carry a larger population than agriculture can absorb, and populations are growing at rates of 1.5 to 2.0 percent per annum. It is therefore, urgent to create new opportunities for employment off the land.[86]

However, this very "overpopulation" gave rise to a West Indian "comparative advantage" in labor-intensive manufactures, relative to the developed industrial countries where labor had become both scarce and expensive. Thus, the West Indies should seek to develop a new export trade specialized in labor intensive manufactures geared to metropolitan markets. This would go a long

way towards filling the deficit in employment opportunities. Since domestic entrepreneurs lacked both the capital and the market connections necessary for the task, the burden of the effort in industrial development would fall on foreign investors. But this implied energetic activity on the part of government, in inducing the influx of capitalists and providing the necessary infrastructure and other facilities. The model was later to earn the pejorative sabriquet of "Industrialization by Invitation."

The virtual simultaneous emergence of theories of industrialization in Latin America and the Caribbean was, in historical perspective, no mere coincidence. Events in both regions during the 1930s had shown that the traditional political economy was unviable in political terms as well as in economic. Moreover, these events in the two regions had a common cause: the total and catastrophic collapse of the international capitalist economy precipitated by the crash in the U.S. in 1929. The result of this was a severe contraction in demand, prices, and production of the primary commodities upon which both the Latin American and the West Indian economies relied. In Latin America this gave rise to the rapid displacement of governments committed to laissez-faire and the prevailing international division of labor, by regimes committed to government intervention in the economy for the maintenance of levels of domestic incomes and employment, and ultimately, for the promotion of economic growth and development. Such policies led, willy-nilly, to a certain amount of so-called "involuntary industrialization."[87] Prebisch's concern was to legitimize the

process with a new theory, and thereby help to make it conscious, official and deliberate.[88]

In the Caribbean, as well, the forces of change had to be directed against the polity before they could affect the economy. The difference was that the region was still under colonial rule, so that the popular demand for economic betterment reflected in the riots and strikes of 1937-38, was effectively channelled by the elite of educated colonials into a demand for political autonomy. The transition towards self-government and independence started with the incorporation of local political leaders into the colonial administration after the war, and was also marked by the acceptance by such administrations of some responsibility for social and economic development. In addition, the Cuban Revolution served as a powerful radicalizing influence which cannot be ignored.

Hence in both regions there was a clear need for new economics to service the new politics: indeed, for a new <u>economy</u> to service the new polity. In theorizing against continued specialization in primary products, the new economics had either to re-interpret the theory of international specialization (Lewis) or to question its assumptions (Prebisch). This meant deviating from the formidable apparatus of conventional economics and its vested interests, intellectual vested interests no less than economic and political.[89] Both these theorists also provided a justification for active government intervention in the economy in support of the private sector's industrialization effort. Perhaps most important -- in light of subsequent events -- both assumed that industrialization would establish the basis for the emergence of genuine <u>national</u>

economies in the regions: that is, that it would be strategic in internalizing the dynamics of the growth process. For Prebisch, the chief feature distinguishing the center from the periphery is a developed manufacturing industry: once the periphery industrializes it can -- and presumably will -- internalize the process of productivity growth which is the basic ingredient of economic growth. Lewis, for his part, foresaw two developments contributing to the smooth internalization of the growth process over time in the West Indies. First, the growth of per capita national income resulting from industrialization would raise the national capacity to save and, therefore, invest; secondly, the "demonstration effect" of the presence of foreign investors in the economy would teach domestic entrepreneurs "the tricks of the trade."[90]

DEPENDENT CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE PUERTO RICAN-TYPE MODEL

It was from the above influential "principles of development" that the emergent Caribbean, and in particular Jamaican, ruling class adopted the notion of industrialization as the answer to the pressures of poverty and increasing unemployment. The view that industrialization was the crucial element in development, was also reinforced by the analyses arising out of the study of development possibilities of India -- at that time the most-studied of the underdeveloped countries.[91] The prescriptions arising out of analyses of this special case as well as the experience of the industrialized countries, tended to be generalized across the whole

developing world including small island economies. In particular, the emerging ruling class came to recognize that the development of some form of industry was the only way to secure the material conditions for their self-reproduction and eventual growth into a big "national bourgeoisie."[92] They began to champion the cause of industrialization and the model of this process then being developed in Puerto Rico was pointed to as proof of its real possibilities elsewhere in the Caribbean. The particular advantage of the Puerto Rican process to this ruling class was its supposed "vindication of the possibility of industrialization of a small country predominantly peopled with persons of non-Anglo-Saxon descent."[93]

However, the advantage to Puerto Rico was seen in a much different light by its Governor, Munoz Marin, the architect of this special kind of industrialization or the so-called Operation Bootstrap. Implicit in Operation Bootstrap was the idea that a country could escape from the squalor of poverty and economic destitution by pulling itself up by its bootstraps. It became excruciatingly clear, however, that Operation Bootstrap was an offensive by the United States to privatize Puerto Rico and make it the model of capitalism to be "aped" by the Caribbean and Latin America. Puerto Rico was ideal. Its position as a low-wage part of the American economy to which capital and raw material could move freely from mainland and finished goods could move freely in the opposite direction seemed to fit it admirably for taking advantage of development along the lines envisaged. That Puerto Rico eventually pulled itself up by its bootstraps underscores the fundamental weakness of the system that was being foisted on an unreceptive region. In any case the era

of "Industrialization by Invitation" had come to the English-speaking Caribbean.

The most salient features of this Puerto Rican model of industrialization adopted in Jamaica and other West Indian territories have been delineated by several critical analysts.[94] First, it required state provision of intentives to multinational corporations or transnational corporations[95] in order to encourage their establishment of branch-plants within the local territory. The plants, it was argued, would provide jobs, transfer technology, create local markets for its inputs, and because they were to be located in the local territory would create opportunities for nationals to acquire business and managerial skills. The incentives offered were varied. They ranged from fiscal incentives such as the provision of duty free imports for raw materials, machinery, and capital accelerated depreciation allowances, and income tax holidays, to the construction of industrial estates, harbors, airports, and so on, and the provision of industrial credit to stimulate local small industries which could service these transnational branch plants. Of particular importance also was the minimization of foreign exchange restrictions on international transactions.[96]

The second major requirement of this modernization process was "political and industrial peace at all cost." It was felt that "over-militant" trade unionism, strikes and other such worker disruptions would inhibit the location of branch plants in the local territories. This resulted in frequent policies aimed at containing the working class movement and nationalist agitation. Since the

middle class, however, needed an alliance with the workers and peasants to promote the independence struggles this conflict with the working class, frequently only manifested itself after independence. It was in the post-independence period after the emergent ruling classes had secured control of the state that efforts were really made to put labor on the "correct path." Here ideology played a significant role. Open and often uncritical support for private property dominated the outlook of the communication media. State intervention in the economy was promoted as being limited to promoting a basis for private initiative. The worker, it was argued, should not strike as strikes disrupted the national economy, scared away foreign capital and made the workers worse off.[97] The Cold War conditions of the period also favored a strong anti-communism and anti-socialism in this propaganda.

The third element of this industrialization model was the complementary promotion of tourism. Fiscal incentives, investments in infra-structural works, particularly in the area of beaches, and transportation, together with the establishment of "tourist boards" to promote the industry in Europe and North America constituted the main elements of state activities in this field. The objective was to attract the construction of transnational hotels in the local territory. Sometimes state support was given to the establishment of locally owned guest houses and small hotels. Usually these were provided through the renovation of existing houses. The tourist industry, however, was promoted as a complement to the industrialization process. A number of expectations were held for this new industrial

sector. It was hoped that it would provide large scale employment in the services sector and so reduce the pressures of unemployment and therefore "buy time" until the industrialization process got under way. The construction of hotels was also seen as a source of employment, as well as a means of improving the skills of the labor force. And it was further hoped that tourism which exposed the attractions of the community (beaches, sun, blue sky and sea, and if possible the docility and servility of the populace) to North Americans and Europeans, would help to attract businessmen to invest in other areas of the country. Above all it was projected that the tourist industry would be a very significant exchange earner.

The fourth aspect of this dependent industrialization model was the relative downgrading of agriculture in the economic developmental effort.[97b] In some instances people were encouraged to leave agriculture in the hope that this would increase the productivity of those remaining on the land and so raise rural incomes. This de-emphasis on agriculture was, however, mixed as it also combined emphases in selected areas. The most important of these were the large estate-plantation export sector, and certain areas of domestic agricultural production, for example, fruits and vegetables for the tourist industry.

Finally, all the above policy elements required complimentary developments of state functions. One important set of these was the establishment of the economic regulatory and management agencies of the state. Professor Thomas et al. have enumerated a few examples:

> Central banks were established; labour legislation governing foreign exchange transactions was introduced; labour legislation was updated and in virtually all the territories employment exchanges were also established. Another important set of these complementary developments was improvement in public utilities. Airports and airport authorities were created. Electricity, pure water supply, sanitation, communication, public markets etc. were all improved upon in ways designed to facilitate the local operations of the transnationals.[98]

None of the above policy measures (downgrading of agriculture, development of certain state functions, promotion of tourism and industrial peace) should be seen in isolation. They were all integral elements of the thrust to create a process of industrialization based on the expansion of the activities of the MNCs in the region.

Nowhere was the foregoing process of dependent industrialization pursued with more vigour than in Jamaica. The introduction of this modern enclave economy, as discussed earlier, was formally launched in 1952 with the passage of an Industrialization Law which created the Industrial and Agricultural Development Corporations to woo foreign industry to the island. Between 1952 and the late 1970s, successive Jamaican governments, regardless of stated political and economic ideology, followed vigorously the strategy of "Industrialization by Invitation." Overtures flooded the island in terms of local industries, infant industries' stimulation in the modern sectors of the dual economy, shifts from the backward agricultural sectors to the modern industrial sectors, invitation to invest from foreign capital, and a myriad of other theories and hypotheses. To the great surprise and chagrin of the ruling elite,

this path of "development" neither led to their effective consolidation of power nor made any serious impact on the unemployment problem which, it had been claimed, formed the principal motive in adopting the strategy.[99] It is thus essential at this juncture that we evaluate the consequences of the first phase of dependent industrialization.

This particular industrialization strategy paid some dividends at least in the initial phase, in terms of boosting production. In Jamaica, the annual average rate of growth of gross domestic product between 1950 and 1961 averaged almost 9 percent -- a record, equalled at the time only by the achievement of Japan and Puerto Rico. Thus economic growth and some "development" occurred; it was, however, growth and development stimulated by expatriate and foreign capital. The bulk of the profits were exported to Euro-American capitalist centers; a minimal quantum was reinvested in the peripheral capitalist economy; marginal consideration was given to critical factors such as equity, equality, and income redistribution. The Government did not attain the vaunted Nurksean "Big Push" nor the Rostovian "take-off" because the country was being milked by foreign and local capitalists to the detriment of its human and physical resources.

Several negative features resulted from the efforts to achieve economic and social development via a modern industrial sector. In the first place, the vast majority of the industries which have been established are of a "final-assembly" "screw driver technology" type. This meant that the value created locally by these products was extremely low since the manufacturing sector was

confined to the assembly of pre-fabricated inputs. These industries were also capital-intensive and contributed very little in terms of capital employed to the acute problems of unemployment. Furthermore, because of the small markets, the production units also did not nearly approach their full capacity levels of output. Consequently the cost of production was therefore relatively high, despite the considerable capital subsidization which took place. This, however, was passed on to the consumer, since the combination of small markets and protection from overseas competitors created many in this sector. Monopoly power was also used to exploit the consumer still further. Thus in addition to high prices, there was a deliberate lowering of the quality of the goods produced by these branch plant companies when compared to their parent production facilities in the developed capitalist or socialist economies. This was facilitated by the fact that the local state exercised little statutory or regulatory control over the standards of output of these industries. Even in the areas of consumer financing costs and the provision of after-sales facilities, there is clear evidence of considerable consumer exploitation by these companies.[100]

Another important corollary of the "nuts and bolts" and "screwdriver technology" type industries was that they were based on the assembly of imported inputs, resulting in "very little intersectoral links" in the national economy. The result was that the development of the manufacturing sector did not generate any autonomous, self-reinforcing sequences of growth in the national economy. Moreover the import content of this sector was very high,

thereby limiting real gains to the domestic economy.[101] In cases such as textile and clothing where the short term prospects for developing a substantial trade were good, the efforts to achieve an import trade ran up against the commercial policies of the metropolitan countries which moved to restrict imports of these goods so as to protect their "ailing" domestic industries.[102] The transnationals, indeed, established with the strategic objective of capturing the local or regional market, consequently developing virtually no export capability in the manufacturing sector. In almost all cases the transnationals either restricted exports (as part of their contract arrangements in undertaking production in the Caribbean), or if exports are permitted this was confined to the regional markets. These are some of the many obstacles which block the development of a substantial export trade in manufactured goods between underdeveloped and industrialized countries. Finally, as a general rule the tariff policies of the latter countries act as a dampening influence since tariff rates tend to be low on primary products but rise steeply as the degree of processing of the product increases. All these metropolitan policies serve to ensure that transnationals, through their monopoly power in these industries, amass huge profits. For example, in Jamaica between 1953 and 1959 the earnings of the transnational corporations increased some two and a half times.[103] For the period 1959 to 1969 the amount of investment income accruing to foreigners exceeded the capital inflow into the country. In other words, during that period Jamaica was, in effect, a net exporter of capital.[104]

A second feature of this industrialization path is that it has generated negative consequences in technology. The technology used is not only limited in most cases to the assembly of prefabricated inputs but is also highly capital intensive. The contribution this "screw driver type technology" makes to the development of technological skills of the population, as well as to reduction of high unemployment is very limited.[105] In fact, the technology arrangements under which the transnationals operate preclude any real transfer to the local economy. There are strict conditions attached to patenting rights and in the licensing arrangements for local production. Maintenance, replacement of equipment and innovation are all strictly regulated in these arrangements. The overall consequences are that the technology utilized in this sector is not rooted in the development of an indigenous technological capability based on the use of local skills or local resources. Thus, as Professor Thomas again observed, "There develops a relation to technology in which people use it but do not produce it. There is no creative social interaction with the local people and the machinery and techniques with which they produce."[106]

A third feature of this process is the urban concentration of these industries. This has encouraged the flow of persons from the rural areas to the cities as the hope of obtaining a job in these industries lures many to the cities. Because rates of pay in these industries are usually higher than those available in the traditional sectors of the economy they exert a strong urban pull, on the labor force, helping to create, as the World Bank Report for 1978 noted, highly dualistic urban systems where islands of high income

'modernity' coexist with shanty towns and slums."[107] It also meant that many workers who were under-employed in the rural areas became openly unemployed living in urban slums unfit for human habitation. An aspect of the earlier periods of this phase of industrialization coincided with high rates of external migration from Jamaica and other Commonwealth Caribbean countries.[108] This reduced some of the pressures of open urban employment. But later, as stricter quotas were employed by the receiving countries to mass migration this effect was diminished. Thus, as Jefferson et al.[109] further point out, the failure of even the rapidly growing modern sector economy to provide jobs at fast enough rates to make an impact on the employment problem was obscured as long as emigration outlets were freely available. Further, since only the relatively skilled were able to obtain residency visas, this combined with the flight of professionals out of the island, has led to a serious "brain-drain."[110]

The fourth feature of this particular modernization process has been the strain it has put on infrastructural facilities in the country. To serve the needs of the transnationals some major expansions have occurred, for example, airport construction, deep water harbors, roads and so on. Most of these were financed on the basis of aid or soft-loans from the major capitalist countries and multilateral lending institutions created by them, such as the World Bank. Despite these as the manufacturing sector became established and along with it the urban concentrations of population, most of the state-owned public utilities have failed to keep pace.[111] This Third World phenomenon has resulted in electricity outages, telephone

and postal systems which do not function adequately, public transport which is inadequate to move the labor force to and from place of work, have become the rule rather than the exception. This also has compounded the difficulties which the state has encountered in promoting industrialization along these lines.

The fifth feature is that this particular model of industrialization has advocated a false dichotomy between agriculture and industry, resulting in the relative neglect of the agricultural sector. This added pressure in the countryside, and further fuelled both increasing unemployment and urban concentration. It is worth noting that some of the orthodox view which stressed industrialization as the key to growth and development had made it clear that in the final analysis the progress of industrialization would depend on the rate at which incomes could be raised in the agricultural sector. But in Jamaica not nearly as much attention was devoted to agriculture, especially domestic agriculture, as was lavished on the industrial sector.[112] This relative neglect of agriculture was perhaps to be expected of an industrialization process which ignored domestic inputs and linkages and which was focused on the domestic assembly of imported inputs.

One final aspect of this phase of government industrialization policy should be discussed here: that is, the focus on tourism. From the inception of the industrialization process, tourism also developed into a major component of the modern economy. This led to a fairly rapid expansion of employment of persons directly and indirectly connected with the industry. Gross foreign exchange earnings

expanded rapidly and the country did not seem capable of having balance-of-payments problems. There were, however, three major difficulties posed by the pattern of tourist development. To begin with, the tourist industry developed on the basis of a foreign owned and controlled transnational hotels, employing local workers almost exclusively at the non-managerial level and appealing to North American and European tourists to come for sun, beaches and a servile population. Out of this arose a number of racial and social conflicts.[113] Secondly, during the period of boom it was too easily forgotten how susceptible the tourist industry is to the levels of prosperity in the countries from which the tourists came and the image of the receiving country in the international media. Periodically political and social conflicts quickly resulted in a flight of tourists either to other countries in the region or sometimes outside the region itself. This in turn led to the intensification of government repression of the likely sources of political and social disruption. The "image" of the country had to be preserved at all cost.[114] Finally, despite the large contributions tourism made to gross foreign exchange earnings, it was also an important source of foreign exchange leakage. Most of the materials, architect skills, and so on, used in the construction of the hotels were imported. The food and drinks consumed in the hotels were mostly imported. In time, this foreign consumption habits greatly influenced the aspirations of the local population. Also, tourism has exacted substantial upward pressure on the price level. Patent fees, licenses, service and management fees had to be paid for in foreign

exchange, while profits were freely remitted overseas. Promotional campaigns in overseas media also cost a great deal in foreign exchange. The combined effect of these major factors enumerated here was to reduce considerably the overall effectiveness of tourism as a compliment to this path of development.

By the mid-1960s it had become evident to a growing number of the intelligentsia and political directorate in the region that the "Industrialization by Invitation" strategy had failed.[115] In the passage of time its shortcomings can be seen to be many, but by the mid-1960s two already stood out. First, the level of unemployment and underemployment in the region was still high and, so far from decreasing over the previous decade, was thought actually to have grown -- and not only in absolute numbers but also as a percentage of total population. The high wage rates paid in the new mineral (bauxite and oil) and manufacturing sectors had the perverse effect of raising the reserve price of labor and thus of encouraging people to sacrifice low-paid agricultural employment in order to join the ranks of the urban unemployed. At the same time, most of the imported technology used in these sectors was highly capital-intensive and unsuited to the special needs of the labor surplus economies into which it had been introduced. For example, the 146 industries which, by the end of 1965, had been established in Jamaica under the incentive legislation program had provided a mere 9,000 jobs,[116] whilst in Trinidad-Tobago the employment potential of industrialization had been equally disappointing: only 4,666 jobs were made available by 99 new industries between 1950 and 1963.[117] Many more were needed, in view of

the steady year-by-year rise in the size of the total population of the region,[118] just to prevent the unemployment level from worsening. Secondly, the use made of local West Indian resources in the progress of growth had been negligible. Foreign investors in the manufacturing sector had preferred, on the whole, to locate within the Caribbean no more of the production process than was necessary to be awarded the tax incentives. The industries that grew up, as has been seen, were usually, therefore, only "screw driver" "final-assembly" operations. In the mineral sector, too, the value added locally to the region's major raw material exports was very small; for example, the bulk of the bauxite mined in Jamaica (and Guyana) was shipped away in its original form as an ore and its processing into alumina and aluminum -- the stages which contribute most to the final cost -- was undertaken outside the region. Even the tourist industry was characterized, as has been seen earlier, by its failure to create a web of linkages with local agriculture and was thus partly responsible for the area's growing imports of foodstuffs. Thus this kind of industrialization clearly showed no sign of internalizing the dynamic for growth.

Political developments, at this time, came to have a significant impact on economic policies, particularly on the industrialization strategy and its basis, import substitution. A growing number of territories in the region was gaining constitutional independence following the collapse of the West Indian Federation in 1962. The view began to gain currency that gains could be made to their mutual benefit through the process of economic integration (or cooperation as some preferred to call it) at the regional level.

Caribbean Dependency Theory and Industrialization

The theoretical foundation of this line of thinking among Caribbean policy-makers is to be found in the challenging theses of a group of brilliant young West Indian economists who viewed "Industrialization by Invitation" as a modern version of the old plantation system. This so-called New World Group, led by the innovative Lloyd Best, included Norman Girvan, Owen Jefferson, George Beckford, Clive Thomas, Havelock Brewster and Alister McIntyre.[119] A comprehensive analysis of these theses is not possible here, but a brief discussion of the evolution of an alternative model of development is essential in order to better evaluate government policies.

It was McIntyre who first raised the issue of the acute contradiction between "constitutional form" and "economic reality" in the region. Thus in 1964 he notes that:

> One of the more striking features of West Indian development is that the process made towards political independence has not been accompanied by parallel advances in the economic field.... West Indian territories are still regarded as outstanding examples of dependent economies.[120]

This consciousness of the limited success of "Industrialization by Invitation," and of the high degree of external dependence in the economies of the region, led in turn to a preoccupation with the need for Caribbean economic integration. In the same article McIntyre made a basic contribution to the thinking on this question. He drew a distinction between "structural dependence" which is a result of smallness and "cannot be helped," and "functional dependence," which is a result of inappropriate policy.[121]

His case was that the preoccupation of West Indian policy makers with maintaining the preferential system was a manifestation of functional dependence. The trend of British and Canadian policy was toward the dismantling of preferences; in any case, the effect of preferences was to shelter high cost West Indian production from world competition, and to act as a negative incentive towards the expansion of manufacturing industry. It was far better to devote the energies of trade policy to the fashioning of a meaningful effort towards the economic integration of the region. McIntyre's case for integration was, moreover, not based on the metropolitan (neo-classical) customs union,[122] which was irrelevant to the Caribbean economy and therefore of little value as a guide to integration policy; but rather on alternative theoretical and practical approaches.

This article is permeated with a consciousness of the need to develop an indigenous theoretical apparatus, a consciousness which was a prominent feature of Caribbean economics in the 1960s. However, as John Ohiorhenuan[123] points out, McIntyre did not attempt to develop a model of Caribbean development. He merely implied that underdevelopment cannot be overcome in the Caribbean (because of size) but that alternative policies, by alleviating the uncertainty resulting from too heavy a reliance on "imperial preferences," could propel the economy somewhat faster along the same (that is, capitalist) trajectory. With the implicit view that structural dependence in the Caribbean is conditioned by some "natural" variable such as size, and is therefore inescapable to some degree, McIntyre thus provided policy-makers with the integration idea as a means of relieving the frustrations arising out of the failure of "Industrialization by

Invitation." As such he has exerted a powerful influence over economic thought in the region.

This trend in Caribbean economic thought reached its theoretical fulfilment in William Demas' 1965 work on The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean.[124] Essentially, this work is inspired by the need to develop a theoretical schema to explain the failure of West Indian economies to achieve "self-sustaining" growth, eliminate large-scale unemployment, and significantly reduce structural dependence, after nearly twenty years of active Government economic policy. The schema developed makes use of a concept of economic transformation,[125] and of the constraints to such transformation imposed by small size.[126] The smallness of the domestic market means that the country must specialize in the production of a small number of commodities for export to the world markets, in order to secure the benefits of economies of scale. The skewed resource base means that a high proportion of capital and intermediate goods must be imported in order to fill the gaps in the domestic production structure. To a much greater extent than large economies, therefore, small economies must rely on international trade to secure economic development. As a result, their dependence on the decisions and tastes of foreign consumers and producers and on foreign technology and technical change, will inevitably be greater. Therefore the capacity of a small country to fully transform its production structure, and to sustain its own development endogenously, is significantly limited by the fact of size itself. These limitations impart special urgency to policies of regional economic integration:

such policies, by expanding the effective economic size of the economies, will expand the possibilities for structural transformation. A major weakness of Demas' work, like that of McIntyre's, is that dependency was used in its descriptive connotation.[127] For, as is now clear, the economic integration strategy propounded by Demas was essentially a neat extension of the economic policies that were being pursued by governments throughout the region. It did not question the principles behind the strategy of "Industrialization by Invitation" or doubt the development potential of "screw driver" "final assembly" manufacturing.[128] Rather, he asserted that the effectiveness of these policies had been muted by the small size of the markets in which they had been promoted thus far and could, therefore, be substantially increased by breaking down regional tariff barriers and extending the size of the available "home" market. The theme was very much "more of the same."

Largely as a result of the work of McIntyre and Demas regional economic integration replaced "Industrialization by Invitation" as the development model in West Indian academic circles during the mid-1960s. Inevitably, these economic theories have become conventional wisdom in the Caribbean and have exerted an unfortunate influence on public policy. However, the geographical determinism implied in the McIntyre-Demas analysis upset the idealism of most of the New World Group economists at the campuses of the regional university. It seemed to lead invariably to V.S. Naipul's (Trinidad-Tobago's intellectual pariah and celebrated novelist) dead end.[129] To escape this blind alley, it became important to show a connection between underdevelopment

and certain institutions in the society, since institutions can always be changed.

In contrast to Demas' analysis which located the impasse to the region's development in the factor of size, the University of the West Indies (UWI) New World economists' interpretation was constructed around the concept of "economic dependence,"[130] defined not just as a reliance upon overseas demand for domestic economic activity but, in structural terms, as "a lack of capacity to manipulate the operative elements of an economic system."[131] Emphasis was laid on the dependence of the Commonwealth Caribbean economies on the outside world for vital elements in the process of economic development, notably the supply of investment capital, technical knowledge and even decision-making by virtue of the widespread foreign ownership of the key natural resources of the Caribbean economies. The theme, in short, was the region's structural integration into the international capitalist economy. Particular attention was paid to the operation of what were seen as the leading mechanisms of economic dependence, the subsidiaries of transnational corporations which dominated the principal export sectors (of agriculture, mineral and manufacturing) and financial systems of all the region's economies. It was argued, in consequence, that much of the wealth seemingly created by the high growth rates of the 1950s had been drained away again by profit repatriation, interest and royalty payments, licence fees and management charges paid to these foreign companies; that, in fact, some West Indian countries had, over a period, exported more capital than they had attracted by incentive legislation. This, it was suggested, was simply the nature of economic dependence.

A team of UWI economists produced a series of studies documenting the empirical possibilities for the development of basic agricultural and industrial activity, and the rationalization of the export sector, afforded by a program of sectoral and functional integration in the region. This development reached its theoretical fullness in the work of Havelock Brewster and Clive Thomas' The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration.[132] Brewster and Thomas argued that for dependent, underdeveloped economies the theory of economic integration was properly a part of the theory of development and structural transformation. It is important to this chapter on development strategies to examine in some detail their main arguments because of their far-reaching impact on development questions in the Caribbean. They posit that, on their own, a free trade area and customs union did not constitute an adequate structure for procuring the gains from integration. Sufficient conditions were only established when this approach was combined with:

> a functional and sectoral approach which explicitly allows for the introduction of planning techniques in an effort to ensure the positive development of certain agreed areas of economic activity in the region. In other words, integration in the West Indies should not be limited to those conditions which govern the exchange of goods, but should also include in its perspective the integrated production of goods.[133]

The emphasis of the study was therefore on the possibilities of production integration, "taking place from the basic resource inputs of the particular sector to the disposition and sale of final output yielded by the sector."[134] The authors sought to identify "integration areas" with a high degree of dynamic development potential and, at the end of their research, were able to conclude

that, by following their recommendations, the West Indies could look forward to the establishment by 1975 of one steel mill based on imported scrap, one plant producing paper other than newsprint, one synthetic nylon factory, one sheet and plate glass factory, one caustic soda plant, one factory producing general-purpose rubber, one car factory (building vehicles with 60 percent value added from regional components) and, in the agricultural sphere, a meat complex and a regional fishing industry.

It would, however, be an error to assume that these proposals merely represented a more advanced stage along the path of economic integration outlined by Demas. Brewster and Thomas were saying much more than that, for, in their view, economic integration was fully capable of acting as an instrument, not just of economic change, bat social change too. At one point they suggested that:

> This expansion of the productive base and the services which go with it, in differentiating human activity and the alternatives available to individuals can create a new dimension in the quality of West Indian life. One painful inheritance of slavery is the claustrophobia of size and our response to it; size not in the sense of measurable phenomena but in the sense of the degrees of psychological freedom which man has without endangering his creative survival.[135]

Evidently, this philosophical perspective added an extra dimension to their more technical economic arguments. Even when they appeared to talk the same language as Demas, in stating that the immediate purpose of economic integration was to promote regional import substitution, they usually mean different things -- in this instance, interpreting regional import substitution not just as a means of reducing the level of imports but as a prime feature of economic development signifying the growth and structural transformation of regional productive

capacity. Economic integration was not to be judged primarily by the extent to which items previously imported were subsequently manufactured within the region, but by the extent to which it reduced the wide disparity between the structure of domestic demand and the structure of domestic resource use forced upon the West Indian economy by the fact of its economic dependence. In short, Brewster and Thomas' priority was to see the West Indies consuming more of what it could produce, rather than producing more of what it wanted to consume -- a fine but important distinction.

Achievement of this end, in their view, demanded a number of fundamental breaks with the economic policy pursued throughout the West Indies in the past and present. They argued, firstly, that "final-assembly" manufacturing could never lead to the economic transformation of the region, and that widespread emphasis on this sort of "horizontal" industrialization should be replaced by a greater concern for "vertical" industrialization of the type they proposed; secondly, that there was "a very strong case for the public ownership and development"[136] of integration industries in order to prevent their monopoly of the regional market being put to private advantage; and thirdly, that there was an urgent need to reorganize those areas of the economy in which the basic resources of the region, such as bauxite, bananas and sugar, were integrated into the operations of companies based in metropolitan areas.

The business sector was naturally alarmed at the emphasis placed on the public ownership of integration industries and the Incorporated Chambers of Commerce[137] promptly countered the UWI

economists' proposals with a vigorous propagation of the merits of private investment in engineering economic development. The view developed in governmental circles that the UWI economists were over-zealous, inexperienced and immature -- even Communist. It is not surprising then to see why, in the final analysis, the novel possibilities contained with the UWI strategy would not be risked and the policy eventually adopted would be based, in principle, on regional free trade.

The impact of the substantial theorizing was the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) and its successor, The Caribbean Community (CARICOM).[138] The success of the Caribbean economic integration movement is limited by the very fact that it derives its rationale from an analysis of Caribbean economic underdevelopment -- Demas' early "small size" thesis -- which focused overwhelmingly on just one of the economic problems facing the region. CARIFTA and CARICOM have been designed, in the first instance, to overcome the constraints upon the economic growth of the region imposed by small size. The "deepening" movement (the upgrading of CARIFTA to CARICOM) was thus intended primarily to extend the thrust of the original approach from a tentative venture in market expansion to something approaching more closely to full market integration. On the whole it has been successfully implemented. Economic integration has unquestionably revitalized the light industrial sector of the regional economy and has significantly advanced the process of regional import substitution in manufactures.[139] To a large extent, therefore, economic integration in the Caribbean has achieved what it was initially established to achieve.

However, even the architects of CARICOM as well as critics came to agree that what has not been done is perhaps of even greater importance. In January 1977 a special meeting of regional technicians took place in Georgetown, Guyana,[140] and was presented with a report, jointly prepared by Demas and McIntyre, which contained an extensive analysis of the accomplishments and future development of CARICOM. Their report, which came to be known as the Demas-McIntyre Report,[141] began with a very significant statement, recognizing the shortcomings of the "market integration" approach which had been adopted at the founding of the organization some ten years earlier and advancing the case for the "production integration" approach which had been rejected. It said:

> one cannot repeat too often the well-known proposition that the main benefits from integration are derived not so much from the freeing of trade as from the development of complementary structures of production and demand.[142]

The report went on to identify a number of the main flaws in the existing integration arrangements and ended by making several recommendations for future action. Amongst these were the adoption of a common external trade policy, a common policy on foreign investment and the transfer of technology, a coordinated regional program for technological development and adaptation and a common regime for regional industrial programing.[143] In short, the thinking underlying the analysis closely followed the conception of regional integration put forward by Brewster and Thomas in 1967.

It would, however, be a mistake to assume from this that "production integration" as a strategy is now acceptable to the region's governments. Indeed, the very reverse is still the situation.

The broad thrust of the approach is scarcely more viable politically in 1981 than it was when it was first unveiled fourteen years ago. The intervening years have undoubtedly witnessed changes in laissez-faire economic policies which was then dominant in the region, but the changes have been neither fundamental nor universal. For example, Jamaica under Michael Manley did acquire, as we have noted earlier, partial ownership of a number of the international enterprises operating in the island.[144] But neither Jamaica nor any of the other territories have wanted to escape completely from dependence on foreign ownership and investment with all the attendant costs that might imply. And under the present JLP Government the likelihood of that position reversing is remote.

"Production integration" as a strategy will only become a politically practicable proposition when the governments of all the leading countries of the West Indies accept the thinking behind it. Anything less -- as at present -- is not enough.

By virtue of its inability to adopt this strategy of integration, CARICOM is exposed to two devastating criticisms. The first was originally made of Demas' thesis by Lloyd Best.[145] In a seminal review of Demas' The Economics of Development in Small Countries, Best argued that the fallacy of the theory was its almost exclusive emphasis on "neutral" variables, such as size, as opposed to "societal," and therefore "manipulable," policy variables.[146] In his view, Demas failed to demonstrate "that smallness necessarily places economies at a disadvantage in the exploitation of their own "endowment" of resources" and often seemed to imply that "the

significant feature of the development of what he classifies as transformed and wealthy nations was the fact that they began as economies with large populations and favourable endowments."[147] Might it not have been, Best asked, "that the crucial factor was their ability to discover and exploit whatever resources they had?"[148] If, as Best believed, the answer was in the affirmative, then it followed that there may be a path of innovation which may lead to the fullest transformation of a small economy[149] and that, from an analytic point of view, the bulk of the potential for explaining economic growth -- even in small countries -- has still to come from more systematic examination of the instruments that control rather than of the "natural" variables themselves."[150] In short, should not political economists place emphasis as much upon the organization of Caribbean economies as on their size? This perspective finds no place within CARICOM.

The second major criticism is of another genre. It is found in the writings of Clive Thomas et al.,[151] and directed at the approach to Caribbean economic integration itself. Professor Thomas argued that the crucial weaknesses of the integration process are derived from the fact "that they have been conceived of as arrangements of the era of constitutional independence, and the partnership (dependency) of national capital with imperialist capital."[152] Thus the major weakness of CARICOM, Thomas asserted, is that, like the past West Indies Federation which sought to advance the class interests of the colonial order, this new body seeks to advance those of the present political leadership, the emerging national

bourgeoisie and the dominant economic base of the present states -- the multinational corporations. For Thomas, the present integration arrangements centered on CARICOM are nothing more than "a framework for the development of capitalism in the area." Thomas further argued that CARICOM's stress on trade liberalization only seek to consolidate market and price incentives for capitalist expansion. Consequently, "those capitalists in what have been labelled as the industrially more developed countries, but what are, in truth, those where the MNCs have already penetrated furthest, inevitably benefit most."[153] In addition, the removal of tariffs, the construction of a common external tariff and the harmonization of institutional and legal systems for industrial activity have, in Thomas' view, "given the MNCs a protected regional market for their exploitation." He cited the well documented evidence that those countries with the most extensively developed MNC manufacturing sector (Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago) have dominated the trading gains in the region. At the moment over 95 percent of the exports within CARICOM come from the "big-four" -- Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados and Guyana. The first two countries -- considered the most developed industrially -- account for the bulk of this trade.[154] The Leewards and Windward territories account for a miniscule proportion of the region's exports (less than 5 percent). Thomas noted, finally, that CARICOM ultimately reflects the weaknesses of the nation states which have created it. Since at the national level the MNCs dominate, the level of unemployment remains insoluble, feudal relations dominate in the countryside, and ruling classes constantly seek to promote scope for capitalist advance,

then at the regional level the same must happen.[155] In other words, regionalism of this particular genre is essentially the free trade, private enterprise, market-oriented conceptions of growth and development as advocated by the ideologists of capitalism.

Economic integration, from the foregoing perspectives, has not been used as a tool to reorganize the regional economy, as the UWI team advocated. There has not been a concerted attempt to take control of the terms on which the West Indian economy is integrated into the world economy and to replace these extra-regional linkages with a real regional economic interdependence. Even the attempt to establish a common stance on foreign investment was a failure. Instead the prime instruments of control -- the MNCs -- have been allowed free rein within the regional market, and indeed in the manufacturing sphere they have had their position underwritten by the existence of the Basic Materials List,[156] with the result that much of the benefit from the trading gains promoted by free trade will have seeped out of the region. Nor have those MNCs involved in the exploitation of some of the region's resources, like sugar and bauxite had to face a united challenge to their position by the CARICOM Governments. Whether or not all of this matters, as Anthony Payne[157] correctly observed, is a point of ideological dispute and a question which only serves to illustrate the difficulties inflicted upon the integration movement by the lack of consensus within the region on the meaning of "economic development."

The problems of the modern Caribbean economy can be traced to a particularly influential school of Caribbean dependency scholars within the New World Group: Gabriel Palma,[158] in an excellent recent survey,

distinguishes three approaches within the Latin American dependency school. The first approach consists of attempts to construct a theory of underdevelopment based on the dependent character of Latin American economies. The second consists of the attempts at a fundamental reformulation of ECLA (Economic Council of Latin America) analysis in the light of perceived obstacles to national capitalist development. The third consists of attempts to analyze the concrete forms in which dependent relationships develop. There is, however, a common denominator to all these approaches. They are all concerned with formulating a theory of capitalist development in Latin America from which policy initiatives can be derived. The third approach, which may appear as more "empirical," is in fact only concerned with providing case studies for theory formulation.

In the Caribbean, in contrast, there was no serious attempt at formulating a comprehensive theory of Caribbean development. The focus of the New World Group which pioneered dependency analysis in the Caribbean tended to be more descriptive.[159] For example, McIntyre's delineation of Caribbean underdevelopment in terms of structural features and "inappropriate policy," and Demas' explicit argument that the capacity of a small country to develop endogenously was severely limited. McIntyre advocated alternative policies which would alleviate uncertainty resulting from too heavy a reliance on "imperial preferences." Demas, for his part, asserted that size was so decisive that for the Caribbean, regional integration was imperative. As in McIntyre's work, it was clear in Demas' that dependence was merely a description. It was out of a challenge to the

geographical determinism implicit in this model of development that the Best-Levitt Model of Plantation,[160] which was to become the centerpiece of Caribbean dependency theory, emerged.

According to this model, the pure plantation economy is structurally part of an overseas economy and it is a locus of total economic institutions. Partly as a result of this, value flows within it are typically incalculable. Best argued that almost all intermediate and final goods are produced within the complex, or advanced, economy by associated merchant bankers. Since in addition, it is these bankers who receive the bulk of the staple for sale in the metropole, the actual flow of money from stage to stage is insignificant, prices being mainly imputed in the accounting system. As a result, prices are largely indeterminate. The main implication of the model is that economic indicators cannot operate in the conventional way in the Caribbean.

The Caribbean is of course no longer a pure plantation. But in its evolution through the "Plantation Economy Modified" to the "Plantation Further Modified," the essence remains: sugar has been replaced and/or augmented by bauxite, petroleum and tourism, but the main characteristics of the original plantation are replicated because the new institutions have the same main features as the old ones.

The modern Caribbean economy is still characterized by "fundamental market failure." Havelock Brewster[161] later demonstrated this quantitatively by constructing a matrix of the coefficients of correlation between several indicators of economic activity in Trinidad-Tobago. He found no significant association between the

variables, contrary to what the conventional wisdom would lead one to expect.

As a description, then, the plantation model is useful. But despite its "historical/institutional/structural" context, the analysis cannot be called dynamic in the sense of relating structure and movement. In fact, comparative statics is suggested by Norman Girvan's observation that the pre-analytic cognitive vision of dependency analysis is based on the contrast between an image of an independent metropolitan economy and the reality of the dependent Caribbean economy.[162] Aside from the fact that such comparative statics have a capitalist bias, because the ideal is capitalism, the fundamental flaw of the plantation model is its economism[163] -- its neglect of the social processes underlying the structural disarticulation which it describes. With this flaw in method, prescriptions appear as artificial adjuncts to the analysis.

When Best enters the realm of prescription, its tenuous link with his description and its utopianism (in the Marxist sense) show up clearly. His approach becomes nothing more than a radical critique in bourgeois tradition. He argues that the spread effects anticipated in the Lewis model fail to materialize mainly because indigens participate in the economy only as wage earners, whereas capital is the source of investment. Thus local investment has no local basis. All that is really needed, therefore, is a different kind of collaboration between the Caribbean and the capitalist world:

> Foreign investment and technology, etc. are sometimes useful. It is direct metropolitan investment that is anathema. Once we have redefined the terms of collaboration and broken down the psychological and material barriers to advance by Caribbean decision-makers

> there will be plenty of room for play.... Fortunately, they will also bring into being a class of independent-minded local entrepreneurs and managers holding positions from which they can change the rules again.[164]

In his survey of dependency economics, Girvan concludes that its implications "will rest on basic questions of personal ideology."[165] While Girvan's comment is correct to the extent that an ultimate goal is important, it supports the contention that the source of motion in the dependent economy has not been identified by this School.

Perhaps the most fundamental support for the position advanced here lies in the extent to which despite its radicality, the descriptive, historical and institutional content of dependency economics became assimilated into bourgeois ideology. Dependency has become supportive of even the most reactionary regimes. At best, its nationalist implications have become the object of "revolutionary" governments. For instance, in February 1975, at the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 (in which Jamaican and other Caribbean countries are active), the participants examined the situation with respect to industrialization in the preceding decade. They argued that the problems of industrial development in the underdeveloped countries at the present stage are caused largely by the policies of most of the developed world. Furthermore, industrial progress has been insignificant in the underdeveloped countries as a whole, "in spite of serious efforts on their part," because the dependence of these economies on the export of primary goods and the measures taken in the developed countries have not made it possible to achieve "a profound dynamic effect which would be capable of transforming internal socioeconomic structures and laying the basis for real development."[166]

The process of conservative absorption was facilitated in the Caribbean by the bourgeois philosophical and methodological bias implicit in the New World School's explicit rejection of Marxism in the name of what has been called "Caribbean exceptionalism."[167] The New World Group declared in 1965 that their radicalism applied only to matters concerning the Caribbean.[168]

The empirical periodization of Best's plantation model similarly dovetailed with the view that Marxism is inapplicable to "classless" West Indian society:

> There is no bourgeoisie here because we have no "bourgs." Nor have we had feudalism or any dynamic class of national capitalists so there need not be any "socialists" or "communists." What is the meaning of "middle class"? In almost every family we can find represented the full spectrum from professional through artisan to labourer. Tapia rejects all these imported categories and we seek to understand what is going on here in terms of Caribbean definitions.[169]

Because of this orientation, Caribbean dependency theory, even while rejecting the neo-classical model of "trickle-down" development and asserting the need to find solutions based on internal resources, could not diagnose the problem of underdevelopment except in terms of structural features. And when the policies adopted to change this structure failed, it was assumed that structural factors explained the failure or imposed new barriers.

Meanwhile, however, as the contradictions of West Indian history continued to unfold, ruling parties and governments were discovering that a dependent economy could exhibit the dynamic of the capitalist mode only to a limited extent. While particular circumstances allowed some to continue assuming that the problem was foreign capital and "market

failure," others were forced to recognize, as John Ohiorhenuan has pointed out, that "foreign" is only the qualifier: the substantive problem is capital.[170] It is not surprising, therefore, that the New World Group disintegrated in the late sixties under the stress of conflicting ideologies. Nor is it surprising, as demonstrated below, that Jamaica (as, indeed, Guyana) began to take steps in a non-capitalist path to development.

NOTES to Chapter Five

[1]Cf. Ferdinand Tonnies, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber Maine.

[2]The concept "Third World" is used in this study in its now customary sense as the underdeveloped and formerly colonial world. The term was coined by Franz Fanon and elaborated by Irvin L. Horowitz. Both conceived of it as a world characterized by poverty and a lack of technology, technological skills and organization. It is thus contrasted sharply with the developed or First or Western World and Japan, and the Second World or the Soviet Union and its bloc, organized by state socialism. See Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963); translated by Constance Farrington from the French edition, Les Damnes de la terre (1961), p. 76; and Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). As Edmund H. Dale points out (see Spotlight on the Caribbean, A Microcosm of the Third World [Regina: Univ. of Regina, 1977]), this concept needs some reconsideration when used in particular situations. For instance, the developing Arab (Oil) States, by amassing considerable investment capital from petroleum are no longer poor. Equally revolutionary changes have elevated China to a stage of development which could correctly be interpreted as "developed." However, the real meaning of the expression "Third World" is clarified for us by Magdoff and Sweezy which they indicate as "in its original usage, was intended to conjure up a picture of a group of countries choosing their own road to economic and social development and standing between the advanced capitalist world on the one hand and the Communist world on the other." Clarifying this original conception of the term, they state that "the countries in question are really the oppressed and exploited majority of the global capitalist system ... [and] it is more and more taken for granted that "Third World" is merely a convenient short hand designation for that large and in many ways diverse collection of colonies, semi-colonies, and neo-colonies which form the base of the global capitalist pyramid." Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy, "Notes on the Multinational Corporations," in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, (eds.), Readings in U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1971), p. 94.

[3]Toh, op. cit., p. 8.

[4]Dean L. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Study of National Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. XV, No. 2, March, 1973): 200.

[5]Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of Western Theory of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 240.

[6]Ibid., p. 242.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Functionalism was the dominant paradigm in sociology as, indeed, in all the social sciences in the 1950s. See Anthony D. Smith, The Concept of Social Change: A Critique of the Functionalist Theory (London: 1973).

[9]See the words of Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958); S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966); and Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955). Examples of these features are the dichotomous types of constructions and concepts such as "social differentiations" and "social system," an emphasis upon the ability to adapt to gradual, continual change as the normal condition of stability; the attribution of causal priority to immanent sources of change; and the analysis of social change as a directional process. As Dean Tipps has observed, these attributes of modernization theories are not simple remarkable parallels with earlier theories. These leading contributors to modernization theory cited here, have been schooled in functionalist theory and the intellectual millieu from which it emerged. See Tipps, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

[10]Paul Streeten, "Balanced Versus Unbalanced Growth," in Gerald M. Meier, (ed.), Leading Issues in Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1976), pp. 643-647.

[11]See Tipps, op. cit., p. 212.

[12]Swee Hin Toh, "The Overseas Development Council: An Elite Policy-Planning Group on U.S. Third World Relations, Its Power-structure and International Development-Education Ideology" (Ph.D. dissertation University of Alberta, 1980), p. 14.

[13]W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958; Sir W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," in A.N. Agarwala & S.P. Singh, (Eds.), The Economics of Underdevelopment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). See also Lewis' The Theory of Economic Growth (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955); Albert O. Hirschman; Ragnar Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958); and Jacob Viner, "The Economics of Development," in Agarwala & Singh (Eds.), op. cit.

[14]H. Myint, "An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness." In Agarwala & Singh (Eds.), op. cit., and Gerald M. Meier, "The Problem of Limited Economic Development" in Agarwala & Singh (Eds.), op. cit.

[15]Toh, op. cit., p. 15 and Peter Drucker, "Multinationals & Development Countries: Myths and Realities," Foreign Affairs Vol. 53, No. 1 (1974): 521.

[16]Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 67.

[17]Lerner, op. cit., Bert F. Hoselitz, "Concepts in the Analysis of the Social Implications of Technical Change." In Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (ed.), Industrialization and Society (Mouton: UNESCO, 1966); and Wilbert E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[18]Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 313. See also Toh, op. cit., p. 17.

[19]Western Europe, North America and Japan. See Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 5-9.

[20]David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Toronto: D. Van Nostrand, 1961).

[21]Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958, ed.).

[22]McClelland, op. cit., p. 93.

[23]David C. McClelland and David G. Winter, Motivating Economic Development (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[24]Ibid., p. 249.

[25]Toh, op. cit., p. 18.

[26]Gabriel A. Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1966).

[27]Samuel Huntington, "The Bases of Accommodation," Foreign Affairs Vol. 47 (July 1968): 642-656.

[28]Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-1970," Journal of Development Studies Vol. 8 (1972): 360-76.

[29]Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 210 and 327.

[30]Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), pp. 126-152.

[31]Quoted in Toh, op. cit., p. 20.

[32]Huntington, op. cit.

[33]Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology." In Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), and Albert Fishlow, "Empty Economic Stages?" in Gerald M. Meier, (ed.), Leading Issues in Economic Development, op. cit., pp. 79-90.

[34]Frank, op. cit., see also Toh, op. cit., p. 24.

[35]Cited in Toh, op. cit., p. 25.

[36]Henry Bernstein (ed.), Under-development and Development: The Third World Today (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1973), Susanne J. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism American Political Science's Paradigm -- Surrogate for Latin American Studies, Berkeley Journal of Sociology Vol. (June 1970): 95-137, and Frank, op. cit.

[37]Toh, op. cit., p. 26.

[38]A.R. Desai, (ed.), "Introduction," Essays on Modernization of Underdevelopment Societies Vol. I (Bombay: Thacker & Co. Ltd., 1971), p. xvi.

[39]Toh, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

[40]Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman, Paul A. Baran, 1910-1964: A Collective Portrait (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965).

[41]Baran, op. cit., pp. 264-401.

[42]Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969 ed.), pp. 14-115, 281-318 passim.

[43]See Ronald H. Chilcote, "A Critical Synthesis of the Dependency Literature," Latin American Perspective Vol. I, No. 1 (Spring 1974): 4-29; Norman Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Comparison," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1973): 1-33.

[44]Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture, 1972).

[45]Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1973): 177-196.

[46]Toh, op. cit., p. 30.

[47]Chilcote, op. cit., p. 9.

[48]Norman Girvan, op. cit., pp. 19-20, and Norman Girvan, "Multi-National Corporations and Dependent Underdevelopment in Mineral-Export Economies," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1970).

[49]Girvan, "Development and Dependency Economics," op. cit., p. 20.

[50]Foremost among the proponents of this school of thought were Lloyd Best, George Beckford, Havelock Brewster, Clive Thomas, Owen Jefferson, Norman Girvan. They formed the core of the Plantation School of Economics. There is a confusion of terms in the name of this school of thought. Some of the authors object to this name, prefering instead to be called Third World Scholars. For a biased and metropolitan view of this School, see G.E. Gumper, "Dependence, Development and the Sociology of Economic Thought," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 23, No. 2 (September 1974): pp. 456-482.

[51]See L. Best, "Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation Economy," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 1968).

[52]George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[53]Samir Amin, "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model," Review of African Political Economy No. 1 (1974): 9-27, and Toh, op. cit., p. 30.

[54]Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[55]Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 16 (1974): 387-415, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Rural Economy in Modern World Society," Studies in Comparative International Development Vol. 12, No. 1 (1977): 29-40.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Toh, op. cit., p. 31 and Chilcote, op. cit., p. 8 and p. 18.

[58]V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Press, 1916).

[59]Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), and Harry Magdoff, "Imperialism Without Colonies," in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman & Son, Ltd., 1972).

[60]See Chilcote, op. cit., pp. 4-29 passim.

[61]Raul A. Fernandez and Jose F. Ocampo, "The Latin American Revolution: A Theory of Imperialism, Not Dependence," Latin American Perspectives Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1974): 31-61.

[62]Andre Gunder Frank, Lupen-Bourgeoisie and Lumpen Development: Dependence, Class and Politics in Latin America. translated by Marion Davis Berdecio (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), and Andre Gunder Frank, "Dependence is Dead, Long Live Dependence and the Class Struggle: A Reply to Critics," Latin American Perspectives Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1974): 87-106.

[63]Chilcote, op. cit., p. 21 passim.

[64]R. Nurkse, op. cit., and "Some Aspects of the Problem of Economic Development," in A.N. Agarwald and S.P. Singh (eds.), The Economics of Underdevelopment, op. cit., pp. 256-271.

[65]Paul S. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," The Review of Economics & Statistics Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (May 1961).

[66]W.W. Rostow, op. cit.

[67]Albert O. Hirschman, op. cit.

[68]W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor." In Agarwala & Singh (ed.), op. cit., and "The Industrialization of the British West Indies," Caribbean Economic Review Vol. 11, No. 1 (May 1950). Also in Industrial Development in the Caribbean (Port-of-Spain: Caribbean Commission, 1952).

[69]S.B. Jones Hendrickson, "A Transformation Process in the Caribbean." In Vincent R. McDonald (ed.), The Caribbean Issues of Emergence: Socio-Economic and Political Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1980).

[70]Gerald M. Meier, (ed.), Leading Issues in Economic Development, op. cit., p. 79.

[71]Rostow, op. cit.

[72]Most societies emerged from the traditional stage, as described by Rostow, some time ago, mainly under the impact of external challenge and aggression or nationalism. The exceptions to the pattern of emergence from the traditional state are those countries which Rostow describes as having been "born free," such as the United States and certain British dominions. Here the preconditions of "take-off" were laid by the "construction of social overhead capital and the introduction of industry from abroad." But for the rest of the world change was much more basic and fundamental, consisting not only of economic transformation but also a political and social transition from feudalism (Ibid., pp. 17-19, 24-26, passim).

[73]Meier, op. cit., pp. 79-89, and A.P. Thirwall, Growth and Development (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), p. 33.

[74]Rostow, op. cit., pp. 36-40.

[75]See pages 4-5 in this chapter.

[76]Meier, op. cit., p. 81.

[77]Raul A. Fernandez, "Imperialist Capitalism in the Third World: Theory and Evidence from Colombia," Latin American Perspectives Vol. VI, No. 1 (Winter 1979): 38-64.

[78]Alexander Gerschenkon, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1962).

[79]P.N. Rosenstein Rodan, op. cit.

[80]Nagner Nurkse, op. cit.

[81]Howard S. Ellis, "Accelerated Investment as a Force in Economic Development," in Gerald H. Meier, (ed.), op. cit., p. 639.

[82]Raul Prebish, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations Dept. of Social and Economic Affairs, 1950). Spanish original published in 1949.

[83]Ibid., p. 1. Emphasis added.

[84]Ibid., p. 2.

[85]W. Arthur Lewis, "Industrialization of the British West Indies," op. cit. This development model was first written for the Caribbean Commission around 1950. It recommended a transformation of the agricultural sector along with industrial development based on a Customs Union and a Federal framework of decision-making.

[86]Ibid., p. 1.

[87]Actually, in certain countries such as Brazil and Argentina, the process of industrialization had started as early as the late 19th century, with the production of simple consumer goods. Some degree of "involuntary industrialization" had also been induced in a number of countries by the First World War.

[88]See Norman Girvan, "Development and Underdevelopment in the New World and the Old," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1974): 1-33.

[89]Ibid., p. 3.

[90]Lewis, "The Industrialization of the British West Indies," op. cit., p. 39.

[91]Owen Jefferson, "The Economic Situation of the Commonwealth Caribbean," Harewood (ed.), Human Resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972), pp. 32-47.

[92]Clive Thomas, "From Colony to State Capitalism: Alternative Paths of Development in the Caribbean," Georgetown: University of Guyana, June 1981, p. 9.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Ibid., Jefferson, op. cit., pp. 34-5, Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972) pp. 140-146, and Norman Girvan, Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1971).

[95]These terms are used interchangeably in this study. A multinational corporation (MNC) or transnational corporation (TNC) is a company headquartered in a developed country (North America, Western Europe and Japan) and operates in other countries, usually in the developing world, through establishment of branch-plants or subsidiaries. Of most importance is that decision making is centralized in the parent company which in effect affords control of the economic activities in the country where the subsidiary operates. Much of the profit that is made by the branch-plant company instead of being reinvested in projects in the local country is repatriated to the parent company, resulting in underdevelopment.

[96]Thomas, op. cit., p. 9. Jefferson points out that in Jamaica for the period of 1959 to 1969 the amount of investment income accruing to foreigners exceeded the capital inflow into the country. In other words, during that period Jamaica was, in effect, a net exporter of capital (see Jefferson, "The Economic Situation of the Commonwealth Caribbean," op. cit., p. 42.

[97]Thomas, op. cit., p. 10.

[97(b)]Ibid., p. 11 and Jefferson, Post-War Economic Development, op. cit.

[98]Thomas, op. cit., p. 10. See also William Demas, The Political Economy of the English Speaking Caribbean (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Caribbean Ecumenical Consultation for Development, 1973), p. 15.

[99]Norman Manley claimed in later years to have encouraged direct foreign industrial investment in the fifties because he was concerned with reducing the rising level of unemployment (see Rex Nettleford, "Manley and the Politics of Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1971). Special Issue.

[100]Clive Thomas, "Neocolonialism and Caribbean Integration." In Basil Ince (ed.), The Caribbean In International Relations (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: UWI, 1974), pp. 288 and 291.

[101]Thomas, "From Colony to State Capitalism," op. cit., p. 12, and M.K. Bacchus, "Education Research and Training for Self-Reliant Development," Keynote Address to Intra-ACP Seminar, Brussels, Belgium, 5-9 October 1981.

[102]Jefferson, "The Economic Situation of the Commonwealth Caribbean," op. cit., pp. 35-36.

[103]Trevor Monroe and Don Robotham, Struggles of the Jamaican People (Kingston: Workers Liberation League, 1977), p. 104.

[104]Jefferson, "The Economic Situation of the Commonwealth Caribbean," op. cit., p. 42. In Trinidad-Tobago a similar situation exists and is even more pronounced.

[105]Thomas, From Colony to State Capitalism, op. cit., pp. 13-14, Bacchus, op. cit., and Jefferson, "The Economic Situation," op. cit., p. 38.

[106]Thomas, From Colony to State Capitalism, op. cit., p. 14.

[107]World Bank, World Development Report, 1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 5, quoted in Bacchus, op. cit., p. 7.

[108]See chapter 3. Between 1953 and 1960 more than 160,000 Jamaicans were forced to migrate to the United Kingdom. This large scale migration virtually came to an end with the British Parliament move to stem the flow with the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962.

[109]Jefferson, "The Economic Situation," op. cit., p. 38; Don Mills, "Employment Situation in the Commonwealth Caribbean," in Jack Harewood, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 48-64; Carmen McFarlene, "The Employment Situation in Over Populated Territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean," in Jack Harewood, (ed), op. cit., pp. 72-84, Kemp R. Hope, "Population Labor, and Employment in the Caribbean Socioeconomic Development." In Vincent R. McDonald, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 265-282, and William Demas, "Is the Present Approach to Economic Development Planning Relevant to the Solution of the Human Resources Problems of the Commonwealth Caribbean?" in Jack Harewood, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 134-144.

[110]Science Research Council, Jamaican National Paper - United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development 1979, Kingston, 1978.

[111]Power outages continue unabated in 1982. When it is not 'power-cuts,' as occurred periodically since Boxing Day 1981, it is 'water-cuts', a situation so familiar to anyone who has lived or ever vacationed in the Caribbean. See The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 1 February 1982.

[112]See Jefferson, "The Economic Situation," op. cit., p. 37, and Jefferson, Post-War Economic Development, op. cit., pp. 8 and 24 passim.

[113]Large tracts of land have been permanently alienated to foreigners, though some of this was reclaimed by the PNP regime of Michael Manley in the mid-1970s. Some of the best beaches in Jamaica became exclusive preserves of foreign (and local) whites -- an untenable situation in a country where more than 90 percent of the population is black. Open color discrimination is sometimes practiced in many of the leading hotels even as late as the early 1970s. A Government cabinet minister, Anthony Spalding, claimed to have been discriminated against in a hotel in the capital city of Kingston in 1973 (The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 21 August 1973). In 1981 there is pressure on the new JLP Administration of Edward Sea ga for the introduction of casinos, with their obvious dangers.

[114]When compared to Education, National Security has made great strides in Jamaica as a priority area. The 1981-82 budget is the best place to start for an illustration of this point. In that budget, national security ranked high on the government's list of priority coping nearly $200 million (education received 315 million dollars) Jamaican dollars in Recurrent and Capital expenditure," which must be one of the highest allocations that this area of government expenditure has ever had. (The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, February 1982). The government, according to this report in the pro-government periodical, is "understandably" concerned about the incidence of crime and violence "which continue to pose a threat to an

important area of economic life like tourism." National security, this newspaper concluded, seems to have gained the kind of importance which appears to ensure that where there is a contest between education and security, the latter has the added advantage.

[115]So conclusive was this failure that Sir W. Arthur Lewis, whose original "neo-Ricardian" model was largely responsible, qualified his industrialization approach by introducing three complications -- the "deepening" of capital; a rapid rise in wage-rates in the modern sector long before all "surplus" labor is absorbed; and the premature exodus from rural occupations to urban areas (see Demas, "The Present Approach to Economic Planning," op. cit., p. 135).

[116]See Owen Jefferson, "Some Aspects of the Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica," in Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson, (eds.), Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971), p. 112. The level of unemployment fell from 25 percent in 1943 to 14 percent in 1960, after which it began to rise again to over 27 percent in 1980 (see Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, 1980).

[117]E. Carrington, "Industrialization in Trinidad-Tobago since 1950," in Girvan and Jefferson (ed.), op. cit., p. 144.

[118]See Adam Kuper, Changing Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers, 1976), pp. 26-33.

[119]For a sample of New World Group literature, see Girvan and Jefferson (eds.), Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, op. cit.

[120]Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues in Trade Policy in the West Indies," in Girvan and Jefferson, (eds.), op. cit., p. 166.

[121]Ibid., p. 165.

[122]Neoclassical customs union theory refers to a fairly recent body of writing associated primarily with the name of Jacob Viner. The classic statement is J. Viner's The Customs Union Issue, New York: 1950. Since the publication of this work a considerable theoretical literature has developed, refining Viner's initial formulation. See M.B. Krauss (ed.), The Economics of Integration, London 1973, a book of readings which contains many of the most important contributions. William Demas was the first Caribbean economist to argue that the conventions of neo-classical customs union theory suggested that a customs union between underdeveloped countries like those in the Caribbean would bring no overall economic benefit (William G. Demas, "The Economics of West Indies Customs Union," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 9, No. 1 (1960), pp. 13-38).

[123]John F.E. Ohiorhenuan, "Dependence and Non-Capitalist Development in the Caribbean: Historical Necessity and Degrees of Freedom," in Science and Society XLII (Winter 1979-80), 386-408.

[124]William G. Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965).

[125]Seven indexes of transformation are used. See Demas, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

[126]Defined in terms of population and land area.

[127]It is argued that the easiest way to approach Caribbean dependency analysis is to distinguish between dependency as a descriptive category and as an analytical category. Several (especially non-Latin American) critics of dependency have tended to focus on the concept as a description of a particular reality. On the other hand, for most Latin Americans (who are being criticized) the concept is meant to represent a conceptualization of the dynamic of underdevelopment. A distinction between the two is in order, according to John Ohiorhenuan, especially because two words, "dependence" (which is essentially descriptive), and "dependency" which is more analytical), are used interchangeably in the literature. Equally important, the distinction helps to clarify, and to locate, a major weakness in the Caribbean contribution. See John F.E. Ohiorhenuan, "Dependence and Non-Capitalist Development in the Caribbean," op. cit., pp. 391-393.

[128]Beyond maintaining that development was facilitated by certain attitudes, institutions and policies, Demas did not attempt a systematic analysis of the interplay of socio-political and economic forces which produced the dependent character of the Caribbean.

[129]"The small islands of the Caribbean will remain islands, impoverished and unskilled, ringed as now by a cordon sanitaire, their people not needed anywhere ... They will continue to be dependent on the books, films and goods of others, in this important way they will continue to be the half-made societies of a dependent people, the Third World's third world. They will forever consume, they will never create. They are without material resources, they will never develop the higher skills." V.S. Naipaul, in the New York Review of Books, 3 September 1970, pp. 32-33. Cited in Ohiorhenuan, "Non-Capitalist Development," op. cit., p. 397. See also William Demas, "Forword," in Richard Millett and W. Marvin Will, (ed.), The Restless Caribbean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. xii.

[130]See, in addition to the articles in Girvan and Jefferson, (eds.), op. cit., George Beckford Persistent Poverty, op. cit., N. Girvan, Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: ISER, 1971), Alister McIntyre and B. Watson, Studies in Foreign Investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Vol. 1 (Kingston, Jamaica, 1970).

[131]Havelock Brewster, "Economic Dependence: a Quantitative Interpretation," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1973), p. 91.

[132]Havelock Brewster and Clive Y. Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Integration (Kingston, Jamaica: ISER, 1967). This is the magnum opus of the series of studies conducted by UWI scholars. The Jamaican and Trinidad-Tobago Governments decided jointly to commission these studies on economic integration. The series of studies were considerably delayed by the Jamaican Government's seizure of the passport of one member of the team, George Beckford, as he embarked on a field-work trip to Cuba as part of the project. In protest against this breach of liberty, the six economists had suspended their use of the government funds which they had been granted and had undertaken to complete the research in their own time, with the result that the majority of the studies in the series were not published until mid-1967. Instead, however, of preparing a standard feasibility study on the question of free trade as applied to the Caribbean, the UWI team advanced a novel theory of regional economic integration conceived not merely as an adjunct to the conventional tenets of customs union theory but as the central feature of a radical theory of social and economic transformation. There was, therefore, a considerable and very crucial choice lying before Caribbean policy makers. In it lay the key to the future pattern of Caribbean economic integration. See Anthony Payne, The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79, Regional Integration Among New States (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1980), pp. 67 and 76, passim.

[133]Brewster and Thomas, op. cit., p. 19.

[134]Ibid., p. 25.

[135]Ibid., p. 333.

[136]Ibid., p. 33.

[137]This businessmen's organization had first been formed in 1917, but had long lain dormant. In 1964 it had been revitalized and, in keeping with the economic fashion of the times, it soon appointed a special committee to consider "the phased freeing of trade" within the region. In June 1966 the Hunte Committee so named after its chairman, Senator Kenneth Hunte, one of the leading businessmen of Barbados, appointed a six-man delegation of prominent local industrialists, several of whom had investments in more than one West Indian territory, and directed them to tour the region, interviewing "all Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean for the purpose of urging joint action to bring about a Free Trade Area between their respective countries (Incorporated Commonwealth Chambers of Industry and Commerce of the Caribbean, Report of the Phased Freeing of Trade Delegation, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 1966, p. 2, cited in Payne, op. cit., p. 68; see also Robert D. Crassweller, The Caribbean Community (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

[138]See chapter four in this study.

[139]Payne, op. cit., p. 187.

[140]The Administrative headquarters of the Caribbean Community is located in Georgetown, Guyana from its inception in 1973.

[141]Towards the More Effective Functioning of the Caribbean Common Market," Report of Special Meeting of Technicians, Georgetown, 17-18 January 1977, cited in Payne, op. cit., p. 187.

[142]Ibid.

[143]Ibid., p. 188.

[144]Trinidad-Tobago has acquired partial ownership of a number of the international enterprises operating in their territories. Barbados, for its part, still vigorously pursues a policy of "industrialization by invitation."

[145]Lloyd Best, "Size and Survival," in Girvan and Jefferson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 29-34.

[146]Ibid., p. 29.

[147]Ibid. Best's emphasis.

[148]Ibid.

[149]Ibid.

[150]Ibid., p. 31.

[151]Clive Y. Thomas, "Neo-Colonialism and Caribbean Integration," in Basil Ince, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 284-99, Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), Girvan, Foreign Capital, op. cit., and N. Girvan and O. Jefferson, "Corporate U.S. Caribbean Integration," New World Quarterly Vol. 4, No. 2 (Croptine 1968): 45-56.

[152]Thomas, "Neo-Colonialism," op. cit., p. 286.

[153]Ibid., p. 288.

[154]Ibid., p. 189.

[155]Ibid., p. 296.

[156]Schedule II (Appendix of the Treaty that establishes CARICOM) gives a list of products which always to be treated as having been produced in the region, irrespective of where in fact they have been actually produced: "These materials may always be regarded as originating wholly within the Common Market when used in the state described in this list in a process of production within the Common Market."

This is then followed by twelve foolscap pages listing products ranging through apples, grapes, barley, oats, semolina, linseed, wheat, paper, silk, wool, iron, steel in all forms, copper, nickel, tungsten, zinc, printing and writing paper, etc. It is indeed amusing that a region which produces none of these items could "accidentally" write a treaty which deems them as local, wherever they are produced. As Thomas ("Neo-Colonialism," op. cit.) pointed out, the choice of products and the structure of the treaty are deliberate. Both secure the position of the "simple fabricating, screw driver, branch-plant firms." Under the treaty, if 50 percent of the value of the product is produced locally then the product is deemed to be a local product. To qualify for the 50 percent local value added a firm can include all the items listed, plus overstated overheads for transport, power, and other local services. The consequences of this are clear. A certain type of industry is protected. Thus even though regional production of tomatoes are limited, tinned tomato juice is a local product because the tin, paper, imported concentrates, etc., are all treated as local! (See, also, Payne, op. cit.).

[157]Payne, op. cit., p. 190.

[158]Gabriel Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?," World Development Vol. 6, No. 7/8 (July August 1978).

[159]While dependency was used primarily in its descriptive connotation, a minority of Caribbean writers did go beyond this level. Havelock Brewster, for instance, contends that "there may be a difference between a country which depends on external factors and a country which is dependent on them (see "Economic Dependence: A Quantitative Interpretation," Social and Economic Studies, Special Issue of Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1973). Thus for him (and his collaborator C.Y. Thomas) dependence reflects a situation characterized by a wide and growing discrepancy between the structures of domestic demand and domestic resource use. On this basis, Thomas later developed a conceptualization of the development process which he integrated into a Marxist framework (C.Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974].) It is fair, however, to say that the Brewster-Thomas position is not characteristic of Caribbean dependency thought.

[160]L. Best and K. Levitt, Externally Propelled Industrialization and Growth in the Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University, 1968) 4 Vols. See, also, L. Best, "A Model of Pure Plantation Economy," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 1968).

[161]H. Brewster, "Economic Dependence ...." op. cit.

[162]Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics ...." op. cit.

[163]Ohiorhenuan, "Dependence and Non-Capitalist Development in the Caribbean," op. cit., p. 398.

[164]Tapia, 29 August 1971.

[165]Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics ...," op. cit.

[166]The Second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of Seventy-Seven, Algiers Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation, February 1975, pp. 15-18.

[167]I. Oxall, "A Prologue to Economic Dependency: Political Economy and the West Indian World," mimeo, 1974.

[168]This declaration was made in a paper presented by the New World delegates to a conference in October 1965. See I. Oxall in Ibid.

[169]Tapia, 29 August 1971.

[170]Ohiorhenuan, op. cit., p. 401.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PATHS TO DEVELOPMENT: THE JAMAICAN MODEL OF "NON-CAPITALIST" DEVELOPMENT AND ITS FRUSTRATIONS

In the previous chapter a critical review of the post-war models of development was presented. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate analytically the development strategies of the PNP and JLP in the post-independence period in light of the world views on development and underdevelopment discussed earlier. The PNP's policies of the 1970s were guided by the theory of "non-capitalist" development.

The Concept of Non-Capitalist Development

In some Marxist circles, there is a theory that a third line of social development exists, one that is neither capitalist nor socialist but which nevertheless leads inexorably to socialism. This "non-capitalist" development is supposed to be achieved by those Third World countries which introduce democratic reforms of an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-feudal nature. Nations that undertake such reforms are thought to be ipso facto in a clear-cut transition stage between national liberation and social revolution.[1]

The concept of non-capitalist development is based on the recognition of the Marxist proposition that socialism requires highly developed productive forces. At the same time it is an affirmation

of the possibility, already demonstrated historically, of bypassing advanced indigenous capitalism in the Third World. Proponents of the theory stress the abstract nature of Marx's concept of the mode of production, arguing that the evolution of a particular society is not linear. They contend that although human society as a whole must pass through the various modes of production, any particular society or nation can bypass stages of social development, as has been delineated earlier, as long as the formation being bypassed has exhausted its progressive possibilities from the standpoint of world social development. Also, of course, a highly social system must already be in existence in the world. These scholars emphasize that political independence for most colonies occurred at a time when socialism had become the main force of world development. Thus, they maintain that some historically untried possibilities for social progress must emerge from these ex-colonies.[2]

The main thesis of the non-capitalist theory can be stated briefly. Under certain circumstances, the post-colonial or neo-colonial state, led by an alliance of progressive forces and supported fully by the socialist countries, can fulfill the "historic" role of a capitalist class, namely accumulation, and in so doing, can create the conditions for a socialist transition. Proponents of this thesis claim to have perceived certain basic patterns from a review of concrete experience of several countries, such as Nasser's Egypt, Nkrumah's Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Algeria, Iraq, and Burma.[3] Non-capitalist development, they argue, involves:

> far-reaching, general democratic changes in a consistently revolutionary manner, with socialism as the long-range goal. . . . Leadership in effecting non-capitalist changes is provided by national revolutionary democrats, who generally have a petty-bourgeois origin.[4]

It is argued that the decolonization process in these places was accompanied by a broad alliance of progressive forces under the leadership of the national petite bourgeoisie. With capital concentrated in foreign hands and with weak working classes, a coalition of all national groups against foreign capital emerged. However, post-independence demands for material advancement tend to drive some elements in the coalition closer to revolutionary (Marxist-Leninist) positions, some to more capitalist line identifications. Meanwhile, state intervention in the economy intensifies the anti-imperialist thrust of the coalition and responds to the objective need for the rapid development of productive forces.[5]

Whatever the weaknesses of the non-capitalist model, it is generally believed that Jamaica under the PNP Government led by Michael Manley embarked on this path of development. Through a series of reforms generated by the philosophy of "Democratic Socialism," the PNP attempted to solve Jamaica's myriad of socio-economic problems, stemming, it was held, from the traditional economy of dependent capitalism. The discussion now turns to the PNP attempt at "non-capitalist" transformation and development.

In the national election campaign of February 1972, for the first time neither Norman Manley nor Alexander Bustamante was leading his respective party into the contest. Running on the slogans "Better must come" and "It's time for a government of love," Michael

Manley's People's National Party (PNP) campaigned as a moderate, dynamic alternative. The skillful campaign swept the PNP to power with 37 of 53 parliamentary seats, a complete turnaround from the previous election. Manley had ended twenty-five years of dependent capitalism, with its Puerto Rican model.[6] Clearly operating on the dependency paradigm, Manley set out to establish "A New Order" under "Democratic Socialism" and bring Jamaicans into the age of development.[7] The socio-economic crisis in the island made the drive for reform especially urgent. Morant Bay and the mass uprisings of 1938 and the mid-1960s were definitely in the minds of Jamaica's new leaders.

Manley's first cabinet, installed in 1972, was liberal, petite bourgeoise, technocratic and sophisticated. Although several were stalwarts of the non-ideological trade union movement, many were economists trained in leading North American and British Universities. They sensed that Jamaica's critical problems -- poverty, inequality, unemployment, illiteracy, underdevelopment and racism -- had to be confronted. Many, including Manley himself, were strongly and sincerely committed to improving the conditions of the Jamaican people. Steeped in the social welfare traditions of activist government, they were determined to apply North Atlantic models to reform their Third World nation.

Once in office the PNP Government moved ahead quickly with its social programs in employment, housing, literacy, education and health. However, no leader who is deeply concerned with transforming the structures of underdevelopment could rest with those reforms. During the tumultuous fall of 1974, the nation's political life changed

dramatically. The PNP's announcement of "Democratic Socialism" kicked off a massive education campaign to drum up support for the Government programs and policies. Socialism became a rallying cry, an attempt to mobilize the poor majority behind the PNP by appealing to yearnings for a better life. Socialism meant being for brotherhood and equality, against exploitation. "The days of capitalism are over. . . . Socialism is running the country now," said Michael Manley.[8]

The basic tenets of the Democratic Socialism program were defined on 2 November 1974 by Manley in a formal address to Parliament. Jamaica's socialism was based on the belief that the Government makes decisions in the interest of the entire society. The country has a mixed economy with clearly defined roles for government and private business. Government's job under socialism is to supervise the economy by combining direct ownership, control by participation, control measures, and incentives for private investment. Government should pay a fair price for any property it buys. Manley concedes that private business is a very efficient way of producing goods and services in some sectors of the economy; it therefore has "a permanent and honourable" place in society. Under Democratic Socialism, private business must work within the bounds of the national interests and the rights of the people.[9]

Jamaica, under Democratic Socialism, would keep a mixed economy with active public and private sectors. Though based on private competition and profit, the mixed economy would try to meet the basic needs of all the people, and regulate private enterprise to curb its exploitation.

In a mixed economy the state should own and/or control on behalf of the people the 'commanding heights' of an economy. Hence the Socialist does not believe that public utilities which are a vital service needed by all the people, should be the subject of private profit. On the other hand, the Socialist believes that private enterprise and economic activity can be a most effective way of producing the general run of goods and providing the general run of services in a country.

What the Socialist demands is that all these private activities be subject to two fundamental considerations. Firstly, all such economic activity must be responsive to and subject to overall national needs and interests. Secondly, the Socialist requires that private business evolve towards a form of relationship in which workers share in the ownership, the profits and the decision-making of each enterprise. The Socialist insists upon this because our philosophy begins with a total rejection of exploitation and continues to hold a fundamental belief in human equality.[10]

In reality, the PNP's Democratic Socialism was an effort to pull existing Government policies together into one clear program. It was not a move to radically change the island's economy. To the PNP, socialism meant the same kinds of government controls over the economy that had existed since 1972. Socialism was not, in their eyes, overall state ownership of the means of production. No sweeping nationalizations, no expropriations without compensation were in store.[11] Rather, socialism was just a clear statement that in Jamaica's mixed economy, the Government was boss, and would use its fiscal and

regulating powers to manage the economy in the general public interest. Private capital could continue to invest, to hire labor, and to receive profits so long as it operated within the Government's definition of the nation's interest.

The PNP's education and propaganda process went into top gear. Tens of thousands of Jamaicans attended government-sponsored rallies where they were told that socialism meant democracy and Christian principles of brotherhood and love. Thousands more received brochures describing the Government social welfare measures as "40 milestone [sic] on the road of socialism."[12] And the publicity stressed that Jamaican Socialism was in the tradition of parliamentary democracy -- the democratic half of Democratic Socialism.

To those who needed further assurance, a Government brochure listed "some examples of nations with democratic socialist governments." These included Great Britain, West Germany, Israel and Singapore. No communist-governed countries were listed.[13]

Since the PNP's Democratic Socialism has been, during its period in office, a cause of considerable concern for Western capitalists, particularly in the United States, and has tended to complicate the party's dealings with international finance institutions, it is worth considering the origins and functions, as well as the implementation, of the doctrine of the PNP Government.

Like its counterpart elsewhere in the Third World, Jamaican Socialism is in part a vehicle for self-assertion against a colonial past and a mechanism for the creation of a sense of national pride and purpose. This is of particular importance for an island with

Jamaica's history. As has been seen earlier, virtually none of the ancestors of Jamaica's population came voluntarily. More than 90 percent of all Jamaicans are of African descent from slavery, and many of the other 10 percent are descended from East Indians and Chinese indentured labor. As a result, the country as a whole suffers the debilitating social consequences of a slave heritage. This is true to an extent of all the Commonwealth Caribbean islands, a fact which seems to deprive any Jamaican leader of the argument that his country has a unique heritage of misery and exploitation to be overcome by extraordinary collective effort. In 1974, when Manley wrote about the psychology of dependency, which he called the "pervasive effect of the colonial experience," he found nothing in Jamaican history to serve as an antidote:

> Neither did the heroic call to racial pride of a Marcus Garvey; nor even the momentous march to independence under Norman Manley; nor even the collective experience of self-discipline of the modern trade union movement . . . together with the political party system, make more than a dent upon the problem.[14]

The socialism with which Manley and the PNP leadership hoped to fill the void is profoundly Fabian.[15] Fabian socialism, reduced to its simplest legal and practical expression, is the belief in the establishment of "a society in which equality of opportunity will be assured and the economic power and privileges of individuals and classes abolished through the collective ownership and democratic control of the economic resources of the community."[16] It seeks to secure all these ends "by the methods of political democracy."[17] In Fabian economics there is no trace of Marx or Proudhon or the earlier revolutionary veterans of 1848.[18] According to a celebrated member of

the Fabian Society, George Bernard Shaw, Fabian economics are original and independent of these dogmas. Writing about the series of Fabian Essays published in 1889, he notes:

> The economics, consisting of Ricardo's law of rent, and Jevons's law of value, are quite orthodox. It is shown that the entry of the State into productive industry, far from being an untried, dangerous, and economically unsound innovation, is a fact already accomplished and in successful operation to an extent hitherto unnoticed. The notion of a sudden change from Capitalism to Socialism by the physical force of an insurrection is ridiculed and dismissed as "catastrophic socialism"; and the transition from Capitalism to Socialism is dealt with as part of the course of ordinary constitutional evolution.[19]

Thus Fabian Socialists, in short, believe it is possible, respectable and even moral to implement socialism through the parliamentary system, and thereby utilize the machinery of state to intervene in the productive process.

Like the British Labor Party, the PNP grew out of trade unions but neither was traditionally socialist.[20] The British left behind an educated, Anglophile middle class, as well as a full complement of British institutions and traditions. Both the political and union leadership came from that class. Michael, son of Norman Manley, and founder of the PNP, learned his political economy at the London School of Economics in the 1940s and returned to Jamaica to become a union organizer and journalist. When Manley announced in November, 1974, two and one-half years after taking power, that he was setting Jamaicans on the path to Democratic Socialism, he had, in a sense, decided to mobilize Jamaicans for development through a personal campaign for the ideas of British socialist and theoretician, Harold Laski.[21] Far from being a mass movement of the underprivileged or

the proletariat, Jamaican Socialism is the product of the British-educated middle class leadership of the PNP -- and to a remarkable extent, of the Prime Minister.

The basic tenets of the PNP's Democratic Socialism is reminiscent of the 1945 British Labor Party Manifesto, with references to state control of the "commanding heights of the economy," "full participatory democracy," "dynamic industrial democracy at the workplace," and an insistent invocation of equality and justice. Even in practice, Jamaican Socialism evokes Britain in 1946 and 1947, with the gradual "nationalization" of key economic enterprises, such as utilities and urban transportation and tighter government control of imports.

Under Democratic Socialism, then, the PNP leadership claimed that they were establishing a non-capitalist-oriented society in Jamaica which would presumably form a model for other Caribbean countries. Their program rested on three fundamentals as can be seen from the preceding analysis: humanizing the capitalist political economy and make it an integral partner of the mixed economy where the government controls "the commanding heights of the economy," democratization of the public institutions; and the promotion of social justice in the widest and deepest sense. The discussion now shifts to a brief analysis of certain reforms aimed at transformation and transition to a non-capitalist model of development.

Social Reform Program

There were new programs in, among others, employment, housing and social development. Early in its tenure in office, the PNP introduced the Emergency Impact Work Program which hired the unemployed urban underclass for public works projects such as urban sanitation reforestation and swamp draining. By 1974, 11,000 people were receiving 30 dollars (Jamaican) per week through this program.[22] However, this program came in for severe criticism from opposition quarters because of its unproductive nature and it was later discontinued. This program was replaced by the Emergency Production Plan with projects developed around such activities as cultivation of "idle" land, rearing of small livestock, garment production, food shops, repair shops, and so on.

New subsidized housing programs for lower and middle income families began in 1972, with a goal of building 25,000 new units in five years. A National Housing Trust was set up to provide mortgages and home improvement loans. However, even publicly subsidized housing was beyond the means of many Jamaicans. In 1974 the Sites and Services Housing Project was started to offer low-income families partly-constructed houses which they could complete themselves. But even with these programs, Kingston's vast shanty towns testify that substandard housing is still one of Jamaica's worst social problems. Table 6.1 indicates the number of housing units completed by various agencies in the public sector between 1976-78. The wide range of programs reflect PNP's development policy for achieving social gains such as the employment of both skilled and unskilled labor and the

multiplier effect on the rest of the economy. According to policy-makers, such "people-oriented programs" cannot be underestimated, since the provision of shelter is a fundamental requirement of the basic needs strategy to which the Government is committed, in face of the large percentage of the population still housed in substandard units.[23]

Considerable importance was attached to the concept of community development, since the community permits a high degree of face-to-face interaction and the sharing of common services and experiences. Given this perspective, the PNP launched a number of programs for cultural and economic activities and social services through which members could influence decision-making at community, parish, regional and national levels. Community development activities were carried out in Community Councils which provided the institutional framework within which residents participate in the administration of local affairs. There were 444 community councils in 1979, compared with 416 in 1978 and 260 in 1977.[24] The formation of Community Councils was followed by the establishment of Community Centers to provide a focal point for community action and thus promote integration. By 1979, 233 centers were completed, the vast majority (95 percent) of which are outside Corporate (metropolitan) Area of Kingston.

A third component organization to realize social development is the Community Enterprise Organization (CEO). The concept of CEO was seen by the PNP to "represent a higher stage of development in socialist relations of production than the cooperative, in that ownership is not vested in individuals, but in the community." The

CEO's major aim was to integrate socio-economic activities primarily oriented toward satisfying the basic needs of the community. Its prime function was the establishment of viable commercial enterprises aimed not only at increasing production and employment, but also fostering structural reform of the economy. The CEO was seen as particularly suited to utilize local materials, resources and skills and to encourage the enthusiasm of workers through meaningful participation in the ownership and control of production. Some of the Project Land Lease farms (to be discussed below) were conceptualized as the organizational and economic base of the rural CEO. Like many of the PNP innovations they experienced severe setbacks. A major problem which inhibited the development of CEOs relates to a scarcity of skilled Government personnel for project analysis, evaluation and implementation.[25]

Agricultural Reform

Government intervention in this vital sector of the economy has naturally been more marked than in the social services sector. The major difficulty was the shortage of farmland. In the Jamaica of the late 1960s, 300 individuals (1.5 percent of all farmers) owned 680,000 acres of agricultural land -- an average of 23,000 acres each. Some 1,500,000 people (78 percent of all farmers) owned farms of less than 5 acres a piece.[26] Jamaica imports close to 75 million dollars worth of food each year. And large landholders kept tens of thousands of acres of prime agricultural land out of production.[27] Table 4.13 in chapter four shows this acute shortage of farmland among large numbers of

small farmers and an unequal distribution of farmland. This shortage and distribution of farmland has changed little since the early 1950s.[28]

Through agricultural reform, the Government hoped to modernize the economy, increase the standard of living and work toward social and economic equality. Land reform was a clear priority when the PNP came to power. The new Government tried to design a moderate program that would avoid, where possible, expropriating holdings of large landowners. However, any agrarian reform program that aims at overcoming the inequalities in rural Jamaica today must confront the power and vested interest of the large landholders and middle-farmers. Historically, as has been seen, there has been two main landowning groups: the foreign land monopolies, such as West Indies Sugar and United Fruit companies, and the large Jamaican planters. The companies have recently left Jamaica. But the planters remain, joined by the growing middle sector, and the issue of rural land control continues. Government strategy to bring about reform in agriculture was focused on the Land Lease programs, the Sugar Cooperatives and issue of idle land.

Project Land Lease

In 1973 the PNP Government began the third major agrarian reform project in Jamaica's history, called Project Land Lease patterned on the Alcan bauxite company plan of supplemental tenancies. Operation GROW (Growing and Reaping Our Wealth), comprised Project Land Lease, Project Food Farms and Project Self-Help. The Government

began renting large tracts of unused land which it then subdivided and leased to capable farmers. The PNP regime promised to supply them with fertilizer, agricultural expertise and markets. Another project provided loans from the Jamaica Development Bank, established in 1974, to farmers along with technical assistance. Project Food Farms and Project Self-Help, set up model farms which were Government owned and cooperatively run.

To support the Land Lease project, there were laws requiring that anyone owning more than 100 acres (later 50 acres) of idle land had to lease the excess to the Government. For this the owner would receive land bonds. After ten years the owner could terminate the lease or sell the land to the Government. A special tax was also placed on idle lands. When large landowners and wealthy business people protested, the Government watered down the idle lands tax considerably. A year later, however, lands in full agricultural production received a 75 percent tax break, while unused lands paid the full rate. The PNP hoped that the three phases of the Project would reduce unemployment. Not only would thousands of small farmers be put to work, but young people from the cities would be brought to work on the model farms and other rural projects. There were irrigation and microdam projects, road building, rural electrification and a plan to bring 23 food processing plants into operation.

Sugar Workers Cooperatives

Another Government scheme based on rural development is the Sugar Workers' Cooperative Farms. During the 1972 elections, the PNP had called for a "politics of participation" that included the idea that workers should have "a voice at the work place."[29] These Cooperative Farms are established on three of the largest sugar estates in the island (Frome, Monymusk and Bernard Lodge) which were considered to be operating unprofitably and were bought by the previous Government from the British-owned West Indies Sugar Company in 1971 to increase their returns. The plan was to subdivide them into a number of farm units of about 300 to 500 acres and to sell them to accredited cane farmers. Before the plan could be implemented a new government reversed the previous decision which, it claimed, would have caused inflation in land prices. At worst, it could have taken the lands out of agriculture altogether, and made a larger number of farmers redundant. This would have been contrary to the new government's policy of keeping the newly acquired land in production. Indeed, it was for this reason, to make lands available to small farmers, and to control land development that the Government sought to own lands and lease them to farmers on a long-term basis.

During 1973 and 1974, sugar field workers began to organize cooperatives challenging the PNP Government to put its promises into practice. The Government therefore had to move quickly in conforming to its election platform promise to develop cooperatives and encourage worker control in all aspects of agriculture and industry, and the belief that greater participation of workers at all levels of sugar cane

production would stimulate better management, increase production and improve the earnings of the workers, the Government began late in 1974 to establish Workers' Cooperatives on sugar lands which it had acquired from the foreign-owned sugar estates.

Reform of the sugar industry is critical to the PNP policy of improving living conditions of the rural poor. Harvesting the rough sugarcane, with its razor-sharp edges, is back-breaking work. For every Jamaican it conjures up bitter images of slave days. For centuries, the men and women who worked in the cane fields have been Jamaica's unsung heroes. The sugar they produced supported the rest of the nation and made some rich. Wages for field hands had always been at the bottom of the Jamaican scale; the work offered little reward or dignity. The trade union struggles of 1938 brought improvements in pay and working conditions, but work in the cane fields was still some of the hardest and lowest paid in the country.

In addition to the lands bought by the JLP Government, in the face of falling world prices and outdated production methods, the PNP Government obtained other lands from the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company. The sugar companies were careful, however, to keep their still-profitable factories and cane processing facilities.

Three pilot cooperatives were formed to test the Government policy, each comprising about 2,000 acres and a membership of about 200.[30] The land was leased as one parcel to the Cooperative at an average of 20 Jamaican dollars per acre for 49 years, to be farmed communally -- planting, tending and harvesting. Management assistance at the initial stage was provided by Frome/Monymusk Company which ensures that assistance funds are properly utilized, and which provides

technical assistance. Each cooperative is run by a democratically elected Council with the assistance of the Frome/Monymusk Company. Initially a central cooperative farm of about 1,000 acres was farmed as a block and individual 25-acre holdings established on the remaining acreage allotted to farmers who wish to farm on their own, but only after proving themselves competent and industrious. Working capital was lent by workers themselves -- a part of the severance pay from the Estates (another of the schemes introduced by the PNP Government to improve the lot of the worker), totalling 1 million Jamaican dollars. Thus their investment in Cooperatives and their participation in the management and control of them promise more effective operation and production.

By 1978 there were 23 Sugar Workers Cooperatives comprising more than 25,000 acres, owned and farmed by 5,000 who previously were laborers on the same estates. The cooperatives account for 30 percent of Jamaica's sugar production.[31] The experience of the Government in establishing the sugar cooperatives presents a mixed picture of failures and successes. As Professor Carl Stone has argued, in the zeal to pursue political imperatives inadequate reference was given to economics or the motivational interest of the participants.[32]

The introduction of the cooperative process as a mechanism of change in the sugar industry was extended to other areas of economic and social life, such as fishing, housing, credit unions, commodity trades, craft and consumer organizations. The Goverhment established the Cooperative Development Center to carry out a program of cooperative education and training.

Economic Reform

In order to finance development and social welfare programs, it was vital to save precious foreign exchange. Yet Jamaica constantly owed more money than the island's exports earned. Early on, the Government moved to limit imports and encouraged the use of domestic products. In September 1972, price freezes, bans on some luxury imports and other measures were announced. It was the first of a long and, for a reform-minded Government, discouraging series of moves to reverse the unfavorable state of the economy.

While import restrictions may seem logical from the need to conserve scarce foreign exchange, it is difficult for a whole nation to accept it. The classes of people who can afford "luxury" imports seldom want to give them up. Since these people usually have more political power than those who can never afford such imports, they are often able to keep loopholes in the restrictions open. However, not all consumer imports were large luxury items. They were often everyday products such as toothpaste, toilet paper and packaging, which even the poor had become used to. Some of these products were produced on the island but from totally imported materials.

To help keep prices of essentials down, the PNP introduced government subsidies of food staples and some utilities. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation (MNC) set up special mobile outlets in poor rural areas and shops in the same urban centers, to sell foods like flour, codfish, salt beef, sugar, cooking oil, some fruits and vegetables, along with local products, at 20 percent below market prices.[33] By the end of 1975, there were 34 shops and 40 mobile

units serving 230,000 people.[34]

Jamaica's other economic reforms can best be considered as part of the PNP's economic direction towards economic independence within the framework of the New International Economic Order. As discussed in chapter four, Jamaica under Prime Minister Michael Manley's leadership in the 1970s adopted a strategy of diversification of foreign trade and economic relations with individual and groups of Third World states. His initiative in personally undertaking an activist stance in international affairs in relation to North-South issues represented a dramatic break from the traditional low profile foreign policy and the pro-Western foreign policy alignment of the previous JLP regime (1962-72).

This radical new direction in foreign policy led the PNP leadership to play an active role in the movement of the Non-Aligned Nations. Called the Group of 77, these countries had since 1964 studied world trade relations and the activities of the transnational corporations. Though the action programs they proposed were extremely mild, their analysis of Third World economic problems became more thorough, more radical and more demanding over the years.[35]

At the fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned nations, Jamaica called for new terms of world trade, known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Prices for the raw materials and commodities produced by the Third World nations had risen only slightly during the previous decade, while prices of manufactured goods from the industrialized countries had doubled and tripled. As Manley aptly stated, it took more and more tons of sugar to buy one tractor.[36] By taking up this call for a NIEO, Jamaica announced that it would join

with other underdeveloped nations to obtain a greater say in international economic matters.

The Bauxite Levy

It was within this context that the PNP Government came to impose its now famous bauxite production levy and its gradual effort to secure national public ownership of the bauxite industry. The struggle with the bauxite companies has been documented.[37] Suffice it to say that the bauxite-alumina industry is the most important sector of Jamaican economy in terms of revenues to the Government. In 1973, Jamaica was the world's second bauxite producer. The island provided 20 percent of the world's output, and exported 252 million U.S. dollars worth of the mineral in raw or processed form.[38] Yet the entire industry -- mining, processing, transportation and shipping facilities, and vast tracts of land -- was completely owned by six U.S. and Canadian aluminum corporations. Of the 252 million dollars exported from the island Jamaica gained about 40 million dollars in taxes and royalties, and employment for approximately 9,000 citizens.[39]

In 1974, based on the Bauxite Commission's report, the PNP Government declared that it would restructure the bauxite industry in order to increase the nation's income and strictly regulate the industry's operations. Manley announced a five-part plan to develop the industry. The highest priority was to immediately increase the revenue coming to Jamaica. The island was short of funds, partly because the cost of imported petroleum had tripled.

The aluminum companies resisted the Government's proposals. The PNP Government promptly and boldly declared a new bauxite production levy, calculated as a fixed percentage of the price of finished aluminum ingot. As a result of the imposition of the levy, the government received a significant increase in revenue. By comparison with the revenue yield through royalties and taxes of 29.01 million (U.S.) dollars in 1973, the levy earned yielded 185 million in 1974 as shown in Table 6.1. The Government earned in excess of 7 billion (U.S.) dollars from the levy between 1974 and 1979. Here was a Third World country beginning to counter the transnational corporations for the good of the people of the producing nation.

Table 6.1

Comparison of Bauxite Levy and Royalties and Production 1973-1979

Year	Levy & Royalties (U.S. dollars)	Bauxite Production (million tonnes)
1973	29.01	--
1974	185.4	15.17
1975	153.0	11.380
1976	130.3	10.296
1977	185.7	11.434
1978	195.2	11.736
1979	196.0*	11.505

* Estimated final figure will be determined by the actual price realized by the five producing companies.
Source: Jamaica Bauxite Institute, 29 January 1982.

Table 6.2: IBA Bauxite Production (tmt)

IBA Member Countries	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	% Change 79/78
Australia	20,065	20,958	24,085	26,674	24,300	27,583	13.5
Dominican Republic	1,477	785	516	722	757	521	(31.2)
Ghana	421	325	268	235	340	251	(26.2)
Guinea	5,010	8,406	11,316	10,871	11,648	12,199	4.7
Guyana	3,168	3,828	3,108	3,344	3,479	3,354	(3.6)
Haiti	641	522	660	588	565	560	(0.9)
Indonesia	1,290	993	940	1,301	1,008	1,093	8.4
Jamaica	15,166	11,380	10,296	11,433	11,736	11,574	(1.4)
Sierra Leone	672	716	660	745	716	680	
Suriname	6,385	4,751	4,588	4,951	5,113	5,073(E)	(0.8)
Yugoslavia	2,370	2,306	2,033	2,044	2,566	3,012	17.4
TOTAL IBA	56,665	54,970	58,470	62,308	62,228	65,900	5.9

Sources: IBA Member Countries
World Metal Statistics
Metallgesellschaft

E = estimate

tmt = thousand metric tonnes

() indicates decrease

Unfortunately, however, the imposition of the levy led to a considerable decline in the production of bauxite in Jamaica. This resulted from the fact that the Jamaican levy was not followed by two of the major producing countries, Australia and Guinea. This had the effect of reducing the competitiveness of Jamaican bauxite and alumina, when the world industry was in a state of depression as in 1975 and 1976.

Table 6.3: Jamaica's Bauxite Production, Bauxite and Alumina Exports 1952-1981

Year	Bauxite Exports (000 Metric Tonnes)	Alumina Exports (000 Metric Tonnes)	Total Bauxite Produced (000 Metric Tonnes)
1952	240	-	346
1953	1,055	29	1,173
1954	1,728	108	2,077
1955	2,183	187	2,688
1956	2,575	217	3,192
1957	3,641	443	4,670
1958	4,799	379	5,820
1959	4,197	406	5,208
1960	4,148	676	5,835
1961	4,975	715	6,770
1962	5,989	638	7,615
1963	5,162	738	7,014
1964	5,969	781	7,939
1965	6,784	732	8,651
1966	7,028	804	9,070
1967	7,142	838	9,268
1968	6,212	923	8,525
1969	7,602	1,157	10,499
1970	7,575	1,717	11,820
1971	7,590	1,813	12,010
1972	7,049	2,137	12,620
1973	7,274	2,417	13,585
1974	8,000	2,806	15,166
1975	5,483	2,375	11,380
1976	6,284	1,623	10,296
1977	6,355	2,036	11,434
1978	6,448	2,142	11,736
1979	6,400	2,074	11,505
1980	6,072	2,395	11,991
1981	5,294	2,549	11,606

Jamaica Bauxite Institute
January 29, 1982

Thus Jamaican bauxite became more expensive than bauxite from other sources. Hence, between 1974 and 1979, the country lost markets to other competing bauxite producers and the volume of production declined, as is demonstrated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. As a consequence, in spite of the unprecedented return being made (on their consolidated operations) by

the companies, the Government had to take note of the situation and renegotiate.

The bauxite and alumina industry in 1980 accounted for 74 percent of Jamaica's exports, 30 percent of government non-loan revenues and 11 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Consequently since 1974 the PNP Government has significantly increased its involvement in the industry's rapid growth. In addition to the bauxite production levy, the Government has been involved in on-going negotiations with individual bauxite companies regarding "state participation." In 1974 the Government pushed to organize the bauxite producing nations. The International Bauxite Association (IBA), modelled on Organization of Petroleum and Exporting Countries (OPEC), was formed in an attempt to control the bauxite market and obtain higher prices for the supplying countries. In the same year, the Jamaica Bauxite Institute (JBI) was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Jamaica National Industrial Corporation (JNIC), the Government company responsible for investigating the levy. The main functions of the JBI include: monitoring of international trends relating to the industry so as to arrive at an accurate assessment of rates for the levy; keeping abreast of ore reserves data so that periodic adjustment can be made; providing technical inputs for any joint ventures undertaken by the Government; undertaking research and development (R&D) in Jamaica's bauxite-processing; and to provide support for Jamaica's representation to the IBA.[40] Given the importance of bauxite in the Jamaican economy, the IBA should be seen as one of the most important institutions created by the PNP Government during its term in office.

The Government has negotiated significant transformations with regard to its role in the industry vis-a-vis the transnational bauxite companies. These include the acquisition of 200,000 acres of operating lands hitherto owned by the companies; the allocation of reserves on the basis of 40 years' supply related to "current" production and/or "rated" capacities of existing operations; and equity participation in the bauxite and alumina operations. The PNP Government has attempted to set up, with other Third World countries, its own alumina plant since alumina is the most valuable part of the industry. An earlier attempt to set up JAVEMEX, an alumina plant with Mexico was unsuccessful due in part to the opposition of the bauxite companies and business interests within Mexico. The companies collaborated in a feasibility study for the project, and advised the Mexican Government to reject it.

The PNP Government's bauxite policy is thus carrying out one of the aims of Democratic Socialism: that is, attempting to obtain national ownership of the country's resources. The Government's approach to gaining greater ownership and control of its vital resource deserves further comment. Only recently was much attention paid to the kinds of contracts a Third World country had with foreign corporations. Some Third World economists felt that a contract with the right terms might be better than outright nationalization. In the past, countries that nationalized corporate assets almost always had to face retaliatory measures from the corporations and one or more governments. Or an attempt would be made to shut them out of the market. If Jamaica nationalized its bauxite industry, it had to be prepared

to operate the industry completely on its own, without technology and capital of the corporations. If, on the other hand, the companies accepted nationalization with only a verbal fight, it could be assumed that the enterprise had become unprofitable and did not have much of a future.[41]

The Jamaican Government opted against complete nationalization. It was aware, however, that certain types of new contracts increased the host country's costs and risks without much improvement in its share of revenue and control. The Government took the position that contracts are a stage in a continuous process of bargaining which takes place within the legal, social, economic and historical context of the relationship between the two parties.

Under Democratic Socialism, then, the PNP Government has made some progress towards controlling and regaining ownership of vital aspects of the bauxite industry, the "engine" of the economy. And by the late 1970s the Government was well on the way to controlling other sectors of the island' economy: estate agriculture, tourism, air and ground transportation, communication, public utilities, banking and export/import sectors. Social reforms took the form of a variety of special social programs aimed at redistributing income and economic benefits to especially deprived groups in the population. These include the introduction of a National Minimum Wage Law, and the establishment of the Bureau of Women's Affairs- whose main functions are to devise strategies and promote policies and develop programs to accelerate the general improvement of women. Out of this has resulted a number of advances for women such as legislation to guarantee

maternity leave with pay. An important reform related to women is the change of laws reducing inequalities between members of legal and "extra-legal" families and between legitimate and "illegitimate" children. In a country where about 70 percent of all children are born out of a legal marriage, the elimination of the legal disabilities of being a "bastard" and the banishment of the term itself from legal documents have been important acts creating more equality.[42] The sincerity of egalitarian visions of social justice can be seen in these acts of the PNP Government.

However, unemployment remained "the cancer of the society." The unemployment rate grew from 13 to 25 percent between 1960 and 1972; but under the PNP administration, unemployment rates increased to 27 percent between 1972 and 1980,[43] a two percent change in eight years. Employment creation has tended to lag behind output growth during previous periods of high growth in the Jamaican economy. For example, from 1960 to 1972 real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at 5.9 percent per year while unemployment grew at only 0.45 percent per year. This was because growth was concentrated in capital-intensive sectors, such as mining, and because of capital/labor substitution (mechanization, etc.) within the growing sectors. A contrasting experience lies in the period since 1972. Although negative real growth of 11 percent was registered between 1972 and 1977, employment grew by a total of 13 percent between the two years. The rate of unemployment declined between 1972 and 1975, increased from 1975 to 1977, and has fallen slightly again between 1977 and 78.[44] This has been due largely to expanding state or public sector employment

especially in the Special Employment Programme, and the land reform program.

The PNP Government did not reduce the 25 percent unemployment figure inherited from the JLP Government's ten-year rule. There has been some improvement in income distribution as a result of direct government intervention such as the minimum wage law which came into effect in 1975. The national minimum wage was set at 20 Jamaican dollars per week; this was revised in July 1980 and raised to 30 Jamaican dollars per week, or 75 cents per hour. In 1972, the year PNP was elected to office, 69 percent of the employed labor force earned less than 20 Jamaican dollars per week.[45] Comparative data for 1980 is not available but as regards income levels, the median weekly income for males stood at 48.85 dollars in November 1980. The median incomes for females stood at 34.72 dollars.[46] But it should be emphasized that high rates of inflation meant that workers were only marginally better off than in 1972.

The unemployment picture, together with the income distribution figures of the working class cited above, should be seen against the background of the negative real growth and the severe economic conditions the country faced during the period 1972-1980. In contrast to the conditions of steady expansion and relative price and monetary stability, which prevailed in the international economy in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s witnessed two major world recessions, sharp price increases for oil and most manufactured commodities imported by underdeveloped countries, and acute price and demand instability for the exports of Third World countries, together with

chaotic conditions in international currency markets. Loans that once cost 8 percent began to cost 12 percent. The quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973 by itself added the equivalent of 11 percent of the GDP to Jamaica's oil-import bill.[47] The overall import price index grew by 139 percent in the four years 1973 to 1976.[48]

Derailing "Democratic Socialism"

The PNP's attempt to bring even modest reforms to Jamaica came in for strong opposition from both the handful of families who have ruled the island for 300 years and their international friends. Indeed as far as Manley's severest critics are concerned, he is a Castro agent, a crypto-Communist. To the Communists, Manley is, and always has been, the model of a social democrat. The opposition to the program of reforms generated what amounted to widespread anti-Government campaigns, as evidenced from the Editorials, Letters to the Editor and commentaries of the Columnists in the Kingston Daily Gleaner newspaper. This also took the form of massive political violence, an international economic boycott of the island, and sometimes hysterical anti-Jamaica propaganda in the international press. Jamaicans have identified this process as destabilization, the systematic effort to politically and economically undermine a government. This development has been widely recognized to have had adverse impact on the socialist-directed economy.

The violent crime and political thuggery are not new to Jamaica. The opening weeks of 1976 saw the violence in Jamaica escalate to new levels, including for the first time, commando raids by

platoon-sized gangs armed with automatic weapons. Throughout the year security forces discovered caches of arms of weapons with higher firepower than needed for ordinary criminal activity. A Montego Bay bomb factory, for example, contained more than 250 sticks of dynamite.[49] The Governor-General declared a state of emergency after approximately six months of escalated violence in the "concrete jungle" outside of Kingston.

In the wake of this development, letters and commentaries began appearing regularly in the pages of the Daily Gleaner, warning of a growing communist threat to Jamaica. And the U.S. press, led by the New York Times, Business Week and Newsweek, began printing a series of scare articles about the island.[50] They claimed that Jamaican leftists, influenced by Cuba, were leading Jamaica toward a communist dictatorship. The stories stressed that violence, anti-Americanism and instability were making the island dangerous and unpleasant for North American tourists.

The economic screws on Jamaica grew tighter. Word spread among U.S. travel agents that Jamaica was not a good place to send their vacationing customers. The number of American visitors to the island dropped 23 percent between 1974 and 1976.[51] Hotels and tourist-related businesses closed down by the hundreds, leaving many without jobs. And the much-needed foreign exchange brought in by tourists became more and more scarce.

The aluminum companies cut both bauxite and alumina production by 30 percent in 1975, while doubling their bauxite import from Africa.[52] Strikes in the industry became more frequent and

longer -- made worse, said some, by the companies' lack of cooperation in negotiations. During the first six months of 1976, strikes by bauxite workers meant that more than 400,000 tons of bauxite were not mined -- and the island lost thousands of dollars in bauxite revenues.[53]

United States assistance dropped from 13.2 million dollars in 1974 to 2.2 million in 1976.[54] And the Jamaican Government failed to get even one loan from private sources. According to a U.S. State Department publication, "there was a tendency for potential investors and lenders to stay on the sidelines waiting for developments. Private foreign investment has all but ended and the Government of Jamaica faces increasing difficulty in finding lenders to finance its debt burden."[58] Without new investment, production stagnated. Although production of export products, e.g. bauxite and sugar, had declined there was a redirection of production towards import substitution of goods.

At what seemed the worst possible time, the bottom fell out of the international sugar market. For the first eleven months of 1976, sugar exports dropped eight percent, but the value of the product fell a crushing 62 percent, from 145 million to 55 million U.S. dollars.[56]

Jamaica's own capitalists contributed to the worsening economic situation. During the summer of 1975 the Government passed broad incentives for private business, including tax relief measures, credit schemes and low interest loan programs. But these were not enough to restore business confidence. Businesses refused to expand their activities, blaming their grave uncertainty about the Government's

regulatory impositions toward private business. Many cut back production or closed their businesses entirely. Added to that, fleeing Jamaicans smuggled 200 million Jamaican dollars out of the country during 1975 and 1976, according to Mining Minister, Horace Clark.[57]

By May 1976 the Jamaican Government officially recognized that they were victim of a systematic destabilization campaign. In a statement before Parliament, Manley declared that Jamaica was the target of "international action" to stop social change. As evidence, he listed "unexplained violence at sophisticated levels, upsurge in industrial unrest, organized letters in the press, internationally orchestrated articles published in newspapers, the slowing down and entangling of aid."[58] The Prime Minister's speech to Parliament highlighted further the fact that his Government and the nation's security forces had proof that the many acts of violence, economic sabotage, and other degrees of oppression perpetuated on the working people of the nation were part of a well organized plan. To what extent the evidence in the hands of the Government and security forces was legitimate is difficult to ascertain. Certainly, for many in Jamaica at that time Manley's speech seemed convincing.

The foregoing events beg the inevitable question: who was responsible for this campaign? Manley did not accuse the United States directly. In fact, he cagily suggested that an angry Mafia, deprived of Jamaica's drug smuggling base by security forces, was getting its revenge. Despite Manley's diplomacy, the Jamaican Government clearly believed that the U.S. was managing the destabilization -- associated so specifically with the U.S. campaign against Allende's Government in Chile -- a political decision to identify the

Americans as the power behind the anti-PNP push.

The PNP Government had discovered by 1975 that it could not simply levy a large tax on U.S. transnational corporations and support Fidel Castro's moves in Angola and live happily ever after. Jamaican credit and loans had dried up after it had imposed the measure that linked the price of bauxite with the price of finished aluminum. A Treasury Department official admitted in an interview: "We are not going to let him (Manley) get away with that kind of thing."[59] Meanwhile, some in U.S. political circles questioned the propriety of aiding a government that continues to support Cuba. This attitude was reflected in Senate debate in 1977 when a group of 30 conservative senators, led by Senator Orrin Hatch (Republican - Utah), opposed aid to Manley's Government on the grounds that "Jamaica had become captive of Cuba through the type of leadership it now has. . . . I am saying it is an extension of Cuba, and I am saying that they are doing the same things as Cuba."[60] Manley's challenge to U.S. economic hegemony with the bauxite levy, as well as the further fact that there was approximately 10 billion U.S. dollars[61] worth of American investments in Jamaica, came at a most unpropitious moment. The declaration of Democratic Socialism, and its underpinnings of economic nationalism by the United States' leading supplier of a strategic mineral, can only be understood within the context of an East-West world view. Portugal, seven months after its coup, was teetering in the balance, heightening concern about Euro-communism; South Vietnam was rapidly deteriorating, and the U.S. was moving to shore up friendly anti-Marxist forces in Angola.

Throughout 1976 the PNP Government focused almost exclusively on fighting the alleged destabilization efforts and winning the election. Staying in power was top priority, and the leadership postponed many basic policy decisions. The PNP political victory in the December 1976 elections coincided with an economic crisis. On 22 December foreign exchange reserves had reached such a record low -- 25 million Jamaican dollars -- that the Government halted all trade in foreign currencies. By the end of December foreign reserves sank to minus 193.6 million Jamaican dollars,[62] following several weeks of unusually large purchases of foreign exchange.[63] Business International magazine explained this as the reaction of wealthy Jamaican business people to the PNP election victory. By their continued run on foreign exchange availability . . . [they] made it clear that the large vote for Manley did not extend to his administration's management of the economy."[64] Before the elections, one financial analyst had not thought such a run on foreign reserves [redacted]pen because "everybody's got their money out. I don't think there's any more money to get out of here."[65]

In the wake of the PNP's landslide victory, a deceptive calm set in. The conservative Daily Gleaner became less hostile towards Manley. Business organizations agreed to cooperate with the Government. Carlton Alexander, then President of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ), called on the business community to stop leaving the island and accept government assurances that an important place remained for private business.

The peace was more public posture than reality, however. A new period of confrontation began, this time within the ranks of the PNP. Upper class interests placed their hopes in the "Right Wing" of the ruling party. They had to make some concessions, such as accepting the PNP's Right Wing program of expanded government control over the economy. For the wealthy, it was a more bitter pill than the JLP's "Free up the Private Sector," but better than the PNP Left Wing program of expanded taxation and expropriation.

The PNP had long been divided between "Right" and "Left." In the exciting days of 1974 and 1975 both the Left and Right flanks of the party had fallen behind Manley, carried along by the nearly irresistible campaign for Democratic Socialism. Throughout those years, the Left pushed to carry socialism forward while the Right attempted to draw clear limits. Under Manley's dynamic leadership, however, power lay in the hands of a center faction. These moderates supported measures to better the lives of the poor majority, and a major role for capitalist production. They hope to create a state-regulated capitalist economy that included broad social welfare measures.

The 1976 election campaign only temporarily united the different elements in the PNP. Once the election was won, the PNP's internal conflict flared anew, focusing on a series of crucial policy decisions. The problem at hand was the critical state of the economy. Jamaica was nearly bankrupt. The country had had a balance-of-payments problem for years, but by the end of 1976, Jamaica had simply used up all its foreign exchange. By December, foreign exchange reserves had fallen below the level needed for everyday

business. The nation was importing 300 million Jamaican dollars more in goods per year than it was exporting.

Now, more intensely than ever, the political struggle centered on the economic structure and the direction it would take. On the one hand, the Government tried to compromise with private business. Meetings began with representatives of the PSOJ, Jamaica Manufacturers' Association (JMA) and the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC) to review the country's economic status. Together, these three organizations represented the country's most powerful business people. They could place tremendous pressure on the Government. Some members of these groups actively opposed the Government's programs, while others tried to work with the Government to safeguard their interests.

The PNP's Struggle with the IMF

The struggle over Jamaica's future narrowed down to one question: whether or not to seek immediate relief in a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). That the IMF is an institution established as an outcome of the U.S.'s post-World War II push for global hegemony is well documented.[67] The IMF began in 1944 as an agency to supervise the international monetary system and to help western Europe in the aftermath of the war. Based on the might of the dollar, the Fund allowed member nations to draw on loans from the World Bank and in general established credit on loans for the West European allies.[68]

By the 1970s the IMF had taken on a new role. Along with private banks and multinational banks, the IMF had become a last

resort, a kind of Household Finance Company for the desperate Third World. The IMF provides emergency loans to countries with balance-of-payments problems, but demands strong economic measures to ensure the payment of debt owed outside the country. Unlike other lenders the IMF is interested not simply in the ability of the borrower to repay the loan, but rather in the structure of that borrower's economy itself.

The IMF negotiators hold a simple economic philosophy. They lend to countries that will focus their budget priorities towards the private sector at home and the transnational corporations abroad. Countries must submit not loan proposals but their entire budgets to the IMF, which then makes "recommendations" on fiscal policy upon which the IMF loan rests.

The IMF recommendations are designed to increase a country's production as quickly as possible, in order to generate enough money to pay off foreign loans. The best way to do that, according to IMF economists, is to open the country up to overseas companies who will invest large amounts of money and generate foreign exchange. The other side to the IMF's program, however, is that the borrowing country must ensure optimum investment conditions, and cut back on all unnecessary government spending. Price controls are frowned on, as are import restrictions. Social programs, minimum-wage guarantees, and government subsidies are discouraged.

For Jamaica, an IMF loan would bring fewer social programs and higher prices for imported necessities like flour and dried fish -- staples in the diet of the poor. Also the IMF usually insists on

devaluing the currency, which would raise the price of imported goods, like food. For all its harshness, however, to the PNP conservatives the IMF prescription seemed based on common sense economics -- get a loan to tide you over, lower your consumption and work towards a long term solution to the problem. It was very convincing logic, and when the country had been spending more than it was earning, very difficult to resist.

To the Left it looked like deadly logic. There are some very large strings attached to IMF assistance. First of all, it means very simply lowering the consumption of most of the people. But beyond that, an IMF loan would force Jamaica to give up its economic independence to the Fund, and open the country to greater foreign investment and foreign control of the economy. And for Jamaica, the IMF solution meant reversing many current social programs.

The IMF question focused the two choices facing Jamaica. The PNP Right, with the business sector and some Government bureaucrats, argued for IMF financing and measures to encourage private business to raise production. On the other hand, the PNP Left, backed by some academics and political groups like the Workers Party of Jamaica, called for rejecting the IMF. They favored recruiting the People in a push towards economic independence, and assistance from "progressive" countries.

The Government's battle over the IMF raged for several long months during the winter and spring of 1977. The conservatives eventually gained the upper hand. Manley finally opened negotiation with the IMF. His pro-IMF advisors had convinced him that he could

negotiate easier terms that would allow Jamaica to keep most social programs. Once the IMF talks began, the rest of the Government's economic policy followed. Going to the IMF forced Jamaica into a web of conditions and regulations, and led the Government to adopt several unpopular economic measures.

The purpose of an IMF loan in these circumstances is short-run salvation. Such a loan -- a Stand By Agreement -- may only be used by the Government and private businesses to pay off some of their old debt owned by the country. Under a Stand By Agreement, large amounts can be borrowed if the recipient accepts certain conditions. On the surface, this seems reasonable enough. Any institution or individual loaning money will want to be sure that the recipient will repay the loan. The conflict is between the purpose of the IMF and the Third World countries' desire to move towards economic independence.

The IMF's goal is to help the international flow of trade and investments according to patterns set and controlled by the industrialized powers. For a country needing a loan, the IMF opposes controls on imports and foreign exchange, even though these controls are meant to save foreign exchange. This may seem contradictory, but exchange and import controls can inhibit the activities of foreign investors. According to the IMF, only if large corporations invest and begin exporting from a country, will the country get off debt. The Fund will also as a rule demand devaluation of currency. However, if it takes more Jamaican dollars to pay for North American and British goods, then the Jamaicans are worse

off. Meanwhile, U.S. and English importers pay less for Jamaican goods. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any of these IMF conditions help the borrowing country; rather, they benefit its trading partners, instead.

Internally, the IMF encourages a borrowing government to control wage increases and dismantle price controls. The idea is that inflation results from having too much money in relation to the number of goods and services in the country. This may all seem economically sound and responsible, but it can wreak havoc in large parts of the population. If social services are cut, wages remain the same or fall, and prices and taxes go up, then the IMF's anti-inflation policies mean inflation and more unemployment for the ordinary people. What has changed is the flow of money. It is no wonder that the negotiations between the IMF and Jamaica were hard fought.

In April 1977, Manley announced these measures as part of the Government's emergency production plan. To gain better control over the economy, the Prime Minister proposed that the Government nationalize (with full compensation) the island's only cement plant, the foreign-owned Radio Jamaica Limited, and three foreign commercial banks. The PNP also made plans to increase trade with Eastern-bloc countries.[69] Ninety-seven percent of Jamaica's trade, as has been seen earlier, was with Western countries, mostly the U.S. and U.K.

The production plan included a wage freeze and two painful reversals of Manley's independent January position. The first was the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar under a two-tier system, with one rate for "non-basic" goods and another rate for essential consumer items. The second was a public announcement that Jamaica was

returning to negotiate with the IMF.

The April announcement ended four months of uncertainty. Jamaica was to take a strong dose of IMF-prescribed medicine. The Government had managed, however, to negotiate an austerity package that softened the worst effects on the poor. The two-tier devaluation, for instance, kept the price of basic goods from going up. Nonetheless, Manley had ended up accepting a large degree of foreign control over Jamaica's economic policy. Now, his Government could only bargain hard to get the best possible terms for Jamaica.

The United States is the strongest nation in the IMF decision-making structure. To obtain an IMF loan, a nation has to negotiate with the U.S. As it became clear that Jamaica was willing to accept IMF discipline, the Americans became more and more willing to provide aid (providing 9.5 million U.S. dollars balance-of-payment loan in 1977), and develop friendly relations with the island.[70]

In July, the announcement came that Jamaica would receive a 75 million U.S. dollar loan from the IMF. Finance Minister David Coore listed the conditions. One was a strict policy guaranteeing that the money income of Jamaican workers would not rise faster than productivity. Also included were controls that limited the Government's budget to 1.2 billion Jamaican dollars annually.

Through hard bargaining, however, Jamaica had managed to avoid sharp cuts in social programs, or a full currency devaluation beyond the two-tier system. As one U.S. business publication explained,

> The International Monetary Fund reportedly insisted upon a devaluation as a precondition for further financial aid for Jamaica. While the two-tier approach is not traditionally favored by the IMF, the agency may be willing to overlook this wrinkle if it does the trick.[71]

The loan would be made in four installments. Before receiving the second installment in January 1978, Jamaica would have to meet certain requirements.

By December 1977 loan difficulties arose. If it seemed at first that Jamaica held up well against the IMF, it was because the first installment of the loan came without many conditions. But the IMF reserved the right to review the situation at the time of each installment, to see how well the conditions were being applied. The first review came in December 1977, and the result shocked many. No more money, the IMF officials said, because Jamaica had failed the Net Domestic Assets Test.

Using a complicated formula, the IMF determined that Jamaica had too much money in circulation. Jamaica's dollar assets should have stood at 335 million on 7 December 1977. They did not. They stood at 364.1 million. The IMF demanded that the loan terms be re-negotiated before Jamaica received the second loan installment. The World Bank also held up a program of loan, 30 million U.S. dollars, which had just been signed. With this news, the Jamaican dollar lost 15 percent of its value.

Five months after the first IMF agreement, Jamaica's leading economists felt it would be even more impossible to try to remain independent of the IMF system. In his major speech on the crisis, the Prime Minister stated that,

> The IMF is the only organization in the Western world that can make it possible for a country in our kind of difficulty to get hold of the foreign currency that we need, in order to keep things going. . . . The key to Jamaica's future lies in export earnings. Indeed, the biggest single stumbling block on the road to

> recovery is foreign exchange. Therefore, it is critical that we press on with the production drive and concentrate our efforts on everything that can promote increased earnings of foreign exchange.[72]

Knowing that the devaluations would raise the cost of living, Manley tried to soften the blow. In the same speech he announced that the national minimum wage would be raised from 20 to 24 Jamaican dollars per week and the national minimum daily rate from 4.00 to 4.80 dollars per day. This meant higher wages, pensions and public assistance for many. While price hikes were announced on certain basic goods, government subsidies continued.

New talks with the IMF began in January 1978 and continued until the end of March. During the long negotiations, the economy survived day to day on a series of short-term loans for foreign exchange, made with the understanding that an agreement with the IMF would be reached. The Government desperately searched for loans. Imports often sat idle on the wharves for lack of funds to pay for them; some suppliers began demanding cash in advance for goods. Manley flew off to West Germany, England, Hungary, and Norway to negotiate other loans and assistance. In February, Mexico offered a 2 million U.S. dollar line of credit.[73] The Government asked the bauxite companies to pay the levy in advance.

Publicly, the IMF simply bided its time. As a Jamaican official described it, "They never told us specifically what policies we had to follow to qualify. All they would say was, 'You show me what you want to do and I'll tell you if it's correct.'"[74] Another observer of the negotiations pointed out that, "There also was more-than-usual regard for appearances. The IMF people were well aware of

third-world attitude."[75]

The new IMF agreements, which came amid a rash of strikes, some of them probably motivated, was signed in May. It contained harsh new conditions including a large devaluation of the Jamaican dollar. New taxes were placed on many consumer goods which were in fact necessities. Though Jamaica had resisted these terms mightily a year before, the Government now accepted them without protest. The Daily Gleaner shouted:

> I.M.F. Shocker! 15% devaluation, $180.3M in new taxes. Gas $3 Per Gal. The announcements were part of a three-year economic programme announced by [Finance Minister Eric] Bell resulting from negotiations between the Government and the International Monetary Fund for a US $240 million loan assistance package. . . . He conceded that the final decisions would be a "shock to the society" over which the Cabinet had agonized in an attempt to ease the burden on the poorest in the society.[76]

The agreement brought an end to the two-tier exchange rate. The dollar was devalued to 1.55 Jamaican dollar to the U.S. dollar, with several more devaluations, to equal 11 percent still to come. The charge was immediately seen in the country's import bill. The value of imports for [illegible] 60.4 million Jamaican dollars. For May they [illegible] to 85[illegible] dollars.[77]

In fact, the IMF officials opposed the important institution of the State sector, the State Trading Corporation, the PNP's welfare projects and most national economic planning. The IMF's goal was to move the island's economic policy from an emphasis on popular sacrifice and centralized coordination to increasing reliance on national and international capital investments. The fears of the Left were coming true -- Jamaica had become so dependent on IMF

assistance that it had lost independent control over the economy. Jamaica was caught in the debt trap.[79]

An IMF press release described the purpose of the agreement as:

> . . . a major effort to reduce consumption as a proportion of gross domestic product, thus making available resources to stimulate production and investment in the private sector, and direct the productive efforts to exports and import substitution by price incentive.[80]

In other words, money had to become much more concentrated in the hands of those with the ability to invest -- the rich. They should concentrate on producing exports and high consumer goods which only the well-to-do could afford. This clearly illustrates the modernization strategy of development.

By the summer of 1978 the PNP was in serious political trouble. The IMF loan brought cutbacks in social programs, lifting of price controls and devaluation of the island's currency; and the hardest hit were the poor and working classes. Between May 1978 and June 1979 real wages in Jamaica had dropped more than 12 percent as inflation rose to 40 percent. Business laid off workers as owners decided they could not afford to pay the price of imported raw materials which had risen with oil prices. More and more of Jamaica's productive machinery fell idle. Opposition charges of mismanagement and corruption gained adherence with each economic setback that the nation suffered. Popular support began to swing away from Manley, while JLP leader, Edward Seaga, went on the offensive. Painted slogans in Kingston and Spanish Town -- presumably the work of JLP supporters -- silently blamed the Government: "I.M.F.: Is Manley Fault. [sic]"

By December 1979, the IMF examiners found that Jamaica did not possess sufficient foreign reserves to meet the requirement that would allow the next inflow of IMF money into Jamaica. In January 1980, the IMF and Jamaica renewed negotiations, which had taken on an air of bitterness. The IMF team demanded that Jamaica further trim its social budget by some 150 million dollars, this time targeting the adult literacy program for extinction, among other projects. In addition to the social loss, the cuts would mean that some 11,000 Government workers would be laid off.[81] This was too much for the PNP Government to take in an election year.

Manley called his Executive Committee to meet in March 1980. He already knew that a majority of them did not want to continue with the IMF. The PNP National Executive Committee (NEC) voted by a two-third majority not to pursue the IMF path for development. This followed an earlier unanimous conclusion that the long-term policy for economic development of the country could not be based on the IMF path. In a statement after the historic decision, the NEC said that "IMF conditionality would mean more hardships and more suffering without resulting in development of a viable economy to serve the interest of the majority."[82] The Party noted that despite the "herculean efforts and great sacrifices" to meet the IMF requirements the two programs with the IMF had been suspended because of the traumatic difficulties in passing the "onerous performance tests." The members therefore concluded that the experience of Jamaica "demonstrated once again the unsuitability of the IMF prescriptions for Third World economies with foreign exchange problems."[83]

Finally, while many Jamaicans blame the PNP Government for not resisting the IMF sooner, they realize it was under tremendous foreign pressures. Even when they were protesting food scarcities and skyrocketing gasoline prices, the role of the U.S. is clearly recognized. The IMF has become a household word, and social protests against the Fund's austerity measures had increased greatly during the protracted and bitter negotiations of 1980. The period from 1972 to 1980 has provided the Jamaican people with a strong new awareness of the dominance of those who hold national and international power. In that new awareness lies the hope for Jamaica's future.

NEW THRUST TOWARDS EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND FREE MARKET PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

As has been seen, the JLP formed the first Government of independent Jamaica in 1962 and served two terms in office until 1972. Like the PNP, the JLP had its roots in the struggle of the workers in 1938 and remain committed to working class movements. During its two terms in office, the JLP represented the typical Caribbean trade union party which avoided ideology and embraced pragmatic reforms that responded to the specific social needs of the unionized workers and small peasants. Unlike the PNP which justified the need for active involvement of the state in economic management, the JLP placed its faith in the more orthodox capitalist system of a dominant private sector.

With its firm commitment to the free enterprise form of economic management, successive JLP Governments pursued the policy of the

1950s which entrusted industrial development to the public sector. It was the JLP that initiated the policy of "Industrialization by Invitation" with the 1952 Industrial Incentives Law which created the Industrial Development Corporation. The intensification of this import substitution, "final assembly" type of industrialization in the 1962-1972 period, led the JLP to affirm a strong pro-U.S. and pro-Western international alignment. This pragmatic foreign policy was seen as necessary to generate the flow of aid, foreign investment capital and technology.

This type of industrialization aimed at social and economic transformation turned out to be a failure. Among other things, as has been seen, it offered only a small amount of employment in relation to the amount of capital invested. Yet in the first decade of independence all the JLP Prime Ministers have claimed the mantle of political genius because of their roles in begging U.S. interests to adjust the profits which they obtain from these branch-plant companies. Alexander Bustamante was said to be a genius because of his alleged ability to persuade business organizations to increase the wages of workers. Donald Sangster was said to be a genius for his skills at obtaining loans from the U.S. and other foreign governments. And Hugh Shearer was given credit for keeping the economy stable for foreign investments.[84] This pattern remains unbroken with the return to power of a new JLP Government under new leadership.

The JLP Government which replaced the PNP Administration on 30 October 1980 was described in the Washington Post as "hard-nosed relatively conservative government backed by, and sympathetic to businessmen."[84] Its "centre-right" leader, Edward Seaga, who held

top ranking portfolios in the previous JLP Government in the 1962-1972 period, including that of Finance and Planning, is a strong free market and private sector advocate. Under Prime Minister Seaga's leadership, however, certain tendencies began to emerge dominant in the JLP from earlier periods. Until 1972 the JLP was traditionally a party based on an alliance between pragmatic trade union leaders and business interests hostile to the PNP's advocacy of socialism. As these ideological divisions between the PNP and the JLP sharpened in the 1970s the business orientation within the JLP assumed dominance over the trade union segment of the party's two main tendencies. Thus throughout the 1970s the ideology and dominant thinking inside the JLP moved more and more away from the JLP's traditional "labor populism" and more towards a "business ideology and technocratic conception" of managing public affairs.[84] These ideological tendencies formed the basis for some shifts in public policies which the JLP under Seaga has brought to bear on problem solving.

The essence of Seaga's development ideology can be seen from various speeches and party publications. Speaking on "The Role of Private Enterprise in Caribbean Development Strategy."[85] Seaga argued that if improvement in the standard of living is the test of successful development, then the strategies which have worked best to improve the standards of living of underdeveloped countries are those established on "the principle of individual freedom operating within the market system of private enterprise." He contends that the industrial world and the newly-industrialized countries are

testimony to this successful strategy, as are "those countries which are making their way up the ladder towards the point of take-off."[86] For Seaga, the "validity of the free-enterprise system can only be that it offers to human society a better hope of improving the lot of the individual than the Marxist system of social and economic organization." The Jamaican Prime Minister referred to what he called the "Jamaican experience" to illustrate his point that the forces of personal motivation, enterprise and freedom of choice could generate economic growth if encouraged. Thus the "means to the end" -- that is, economic growth and improved standard of living -- Seaga asserted, "are reward for personal enterprise to achieve economic goals, and parliamentary democracy to ensure the right to freedom of choice."[87] In addition, Seaga stressed the need for "state intervention" as an essential aspect of his strategy to help the disadvantaged and deprived sections of Jamaican society -- "those who are not fully drawn into the mainstream of development."[88]

These themes together with an elaboration of them are to be found in the JLP election manifesto, "Change Without Chaos."[89] These ideas on free enterprise economy were first echoed in the writings of classical economic theorists such as Adam Smith. Smith, the economic prophet of "democratic or competitive capitalism," held the firm conviction that human freedom was the greatest of social values. And to him human freedom meant freedom not only to think and to worship but to enter into the competitive commercial field. Smith further believed that without commercial freedom, that is freedom of movement of goods and people, no other freedom could survive.[90] He was a critic of the world he saw around him in the 1770s, a world

where neither goods nor people could freely move. He predicted that the wealth of nations depended on the elimination of these restrictions. Smith's writings, in essence, represented a plea for "free markets" and "free private enterprise" as the source of a nation's wealth.[91]

The principles of economic freedom which underpin Seaga's development ideology emanate also from the writings of Milton Friedman, a leading exponent of the so-called Chicago School of neo-classical economics. In his Capitalism and Freedom,[92] Professor Friedman offers the thesis that there is an intimate connection between economics and politics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and that in particular, a society which is socialist cannot be democratic -- in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom. He argues that economic freedom is also an indispensable means towards the achievement of political freedom. Thus for Friedman, "economic freedom is an extremely important part of total freedom." According to Friedman,

> viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.[93]

Thus on the basis of this ideological position the kind of position that would ensure this crucial economic freedom must perforce be limited in scope. Indeed, Professor Friedman posits, the major function of such a government must be "to protect our freedom . . . to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster

competitive markets."[94] Beyond this major function, Friedman insists, government may enable its citizens "at times" to accomplish collectively that which they would find difficult or expensive to accomplish individually. In other words, there should be some level of state economic intervention.

It follows, then, that recommendations of "ideological" economists like Professor Friedman usually suggest implementation of a program based on this world view. For example, the advice to any country would predictably be to minimize governmental "intervention" into the economy. This point of view stems not from his analysis of the country involved nor even from a general reading of history -- which would reveal governmental intervention as a major contributing factor in virtually every nation's economic development, not least of all the United States. This strategy of non-intervention would stem, rather, from Professor Friedman's philosophical, or rather religious beliefs about the relationship between capitalism and freedom, the logic of which must puzzle the critical thinker.

These and other paradigmatic assumptions about economics and politics became the dominant concepts in modernization literature. Seaga, seemingly, imbibed much of these neo-classical ideas of modernization and development during his studies at Harvard University, an elite institution whose scholars, as earlier noted, were in the forefront of modernization theorizing. Like many Caribbean political leaders, it is true to say that Seaga has been profoundly influenced by Western capitalist thinking, as well as such Western sacrosanct ideals as personal freedom although in reality it is questionable whether this basic right has been scrupulously

adhered to in the region. The discussion now proceeds to an analysis of JLP policy framework to achieve capitalist transformation of the Jamaican economy.

The JLP development strategy is outlined in their manifesto under the title "Strategies for the Eighties." The document itself contains the JLP reaction to the PNP's economic policies and was devised as an alternative package of policies designed to move the economy away from "socialist tendencies" and structures and back to a more private sector controlled market economy with low levels of state economic intervention. The JLP perspective on the economy accepted entirely the need for stabilization policies and the need to remove the barriers of protection so as to create a competitive market economy, freed of government controls and maximizing of the profit incentives for local foreign capital.

The JLP took the view that budget deficits were an obstacle to proper economic management and had to be reduced. The regulatory machinery established by the "non-capitalist" approach of the PNP was seen as stifling bourgeois dynamism and initiative. The trend towards "state ownership" was also attacked and the JLP committed itself towards divesting itself of these enterprises. Public enterprises that had become recipients of subsidies because of inability to break even or show a profit would have to be studied to either improve efficiency levels or to sell them to private interests. The JLP came out with a strong attack on the State Trading Corporation and criticized the PNP for setting up social projects which, they claimed, wasted public funds.

The self-reliance concept was by implication rejected by the JLP in favor of an "open economy strategy." The promotion of local ownership such as that which took place with the acquisition of Radio Jamaica from foreign interests, was replaced with an emphasis on foreign ownership. Foreign investment was seen by the JLP as a necessary pre-requisite for economic development. Anti-imperialism and a strong Third World political identity was to be replaced by a strong U.S. foreign policy connection as a means of motivating U.S. foreign investment. Foreign policy was to be moved away from radical leftist ideological postures and towards a more pragmatic path that sought real economic gains.

Export emphases geared to selling products to the "giant North American market" was to be the main economic strategy and this was to be carefully planned in collaboration with the U.S. Government, the local and U.S. bourgeois interests and the technocrats.[95]

Where the PNP emphasized political and ideological mobilization the JLP argued that what was needed was market and labor. A more competitive market was seen as an ideal substitute for government controls to allocate resources and determine price levels. The JLP was emphatic in pointing out how much shortages and black markets -- the result of foreign exchange difficulties -- exploited the consumer and argued vehemently for supply increases to induce prices to find lower levels.

Wage controls were criticized as disturbing free labor bargaining which was projected as preferable to state regulation of labor bargaining. The JLP promised a regime of economic freedoms

for all classes in which freer choice through "supply-demand" adjustments would improve the life chances of all individuals. Stricter financial management by the government, a climate of confidence between the government and private interests and prospects for replacing successive years of negative growth and reduced consumption levels by a "new spurt of investment activity," employment creation and more adequate consumer supplies would all reinforce each other and stimulate more positive orientations to production by workers, managers, owners and investors.[96]

The JLP, in effect, agreed entirely with both the prevailing IMF and World Bank views on what sort of economic strategies are likely to show results in Third World economies that face the problems that have been endemic in Jamaica under the PNP regime in the 1970s. The key to the JLP approach, which parallels and agrees with the export-oriented stabilization policies of several South American economies,[97] is the idea of Jamaica earning its way out of the foreign exchange crisis by a combination of foreign capital investment and a reallocation of resources from import-substitution to exports.

Once in office the JLP Government used the above policy framework as its guide. First of all, the change of government raised the confidence of the Jamaican bourgeoisie who now felt that a climate of confidence had been restored between the public and private sectors with the defeat of socialism in the elections and the take-over of the Government by Prime Minister Seaga, who not only endorsed a capitalist ideology without apology but also treated the task of public management as if it were a business venture in which

profitability and efficiency in management were major goals in public activities. A survey carried out by Professor Carl Stone[98] among business executives in 252 companies between August and September 1981 confirmed the optimism with which the private sector interests responded to the change of government. Sixty-seven percent of the executives interviewed expressed intentions to expand their business activities subject, of course, to the availability of foreign exchange. Ninety percent expressed overall support for the policy directions being pursued by the new JLP Government.

In keeping with the party's private sector strategy, the Government promptly set in motion the divestment of state owned enterprises, but in most cases leasehold rather than outright sale is being used as the basis for passing these enterprises from government to private management. The process of divestment is not as rapid as was anticipated, as with the exception of most hotels and a few other commercially viable enterprises some of the public enterprises which the Government wishes to pass over to private management are not likely to be viable in terms of profitability.

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of "free" enterprise which has characterized the JLP manifesto and their utterances, most of the institutional infrastructure of state regulation of the economy remains intact. As Professor Stone has noted the rhetoric about de-regulating the economy is purely "ideological, theoretical and aspirational," for which there are three reasons:

> Given the acute shortages of foreign exchange, capital, external credit and so on, access to these things continue to be rationed by the State. Given the nature of the economic crisis [domestic and international] we face the government has to try to direct the economic recovery effort by defining priorities. Thirdly, one cannot open up an economy where the money does not exist to import all the things one would like to import. Some restrictions and regulations of imports would have to continue to try to ration the scarce foreign exchange.99

The infrastructure of state regulation continues after some eighteen months in office without much change because most of these areas of state regulation had little to do with PNP socialist ideology but were made necessary by the international capitalist crisis of the 1970s, and in the wake of the OPEC oil price increase which hit hard at non-oil producing Third World economies. On the theme of regulation, it should be noted too that the JLP relaxed the regime of controls over rents with the result that middle and lower middle income housing prices and rents escalated between a range of 50 percent and 200 percent increases. As a result the JLP took the decision to roll back rentals to the pre-election levels in order to control the impact on the cost of living but this decision has yet to be implemented.

In spite of the pre-election pledge to dismantle the State Trading Corporation by the JLP, the Corporation continues to function as the JLP leadership came to recognize its importance as a bulk buyer of basic food items which it is able to pass on lower prices to the Jamaican consumer. Again pragmatism prevailed over ideology, thereby indicating the degree of policy flexibility that remains regardless of the ideological polarization between the two political parties.

The most important change, however, came with the improved relations with international lending agencies in an effort to obtain new inflows of loans to fill the huge gap in the demand for foreign exchange. This was an urgent task, given the fact that the earlier PNP Administration had broken off relations with the IMF in May 1980 and had been unable to secure adequate loans from other sources in spite of extensive efforts seeking loans from private foreign banks and socialist and Third World countries. Without such loan funding the manufacturing sector which employs 80,000 workers[100] would be shut down for factors relating to raw material shortages, and basic goods imports such as drugs, flour, cornmeal and building materials could not be imported. The foreign exchange shortage was rendered even more acute because as the shortage increased the PNP Government secured advanced payments of the levy from the bauxite multinationals which left a serious cash flow problem for the incoming government. The pile up of unpaid debts created by the absence of foreign exchange also meant that if loan funding could not have been secured Jamaica's financial standing would have deteriorated due to its failure to pay debts incurred by the earlier government from IMF, private overseas banks and other such sources.

Even before the change of government and while it was still the official Opposition party, the JLP leader Seaga entered into discussions with both IMF and U.S. Government officials with a view to shorten the waiting period for loans once the election was held and the party elected into office.

Like the PNP, however, the JLP Government took the view that continued large scale overseas borrowing was a necessary feature of any effort at achieving economic growth. The active support for the new JLP Government by the Reagan Administration and the capitalist and "free" enterprise ideology of the Seaga led JLP Government increased its ability to borrow from capitalist sources over and above the access to loan funding available to the socialist PNP Government.

According to a U.S. Embassy report, financial aid from the IMF, refinancing and new credits from foreign commercial banks, pledges of aid from multinational finance institutions and from bilateral donors such as the United States "will total over 800 million dollars in this government's current fiscal year [1981-82]."[101] A highly respected business periodical, The Economist, claims that this figure exceeds one billion (U.S.) dollars from the IMF and Western Governments and through other lines of credits and commercial banks.[102] But this figure was denied by the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) which said The Economist appeared to be confusing commitments with the loan received. In fact, said BOJ, Jamaica received approximately 650 million (U.S.) dollars in 1981 from all sources.[103]

The Economist article written by its special correspondent in Jamaica said further that "improvements in the Jamaican economy reflect Western generosity rather than growth in the private sector." Preliminary estimates indicate a likely 2 percent of GDP growth in 1981 and a 4 percent growth in 1982, in contrast to the successive years of negative growth in the 1970s.[104] The Economist's article went on to say that Jamaica is the Caribbean country that the U.S.

believes, and hopes, is most likely to succeed. An economic success story from Jamaica, it said, would be a riposte to communist Cuba and a model for other Caribbean countries.[106]

As far as government to government (bilateral) aid is concerned, Jamaica has received a substantial increase in U.S. aid since Seaga JLP Administration was formed in 1980. In that year, for example, Jamaica received 23 million U.S.-AID assistance. In 1981 that aid climbed rapidly to 100 million, making Jamaica (in per capita terms) one of the countries receiving the most non-military U.S. aid in the Third World.[107] By the first quarter of 1982, according to a State Department report, Jamaica received another 112 million (U.S.) dollars[108] of the shrinking U.S.-AID program.

In an effort to establish new export industries and to create jobs, the Seaga Government mounted a massive trade and investment mission to major capitalist countries -- U.S., Canada, U.K. and West Germany. Seaga himself made political history in January 1981 by being the first Head of State to pay an official visit to the newly installed President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. The visit set in motion an elaborate network of collaboration with both U.S. Government and private sector interests. President Reagan himself initiated the close Jamaica-U.S. relationship by assisting with the formation of a joint U.S.-Jamaica promotional committee to attract foreign investment. The Committee is chaired by businessman David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank (one of the world's biggest financial institutions) and Jamaican Carlton Alexander, one of the more important of the leaders of Jamaican business community. The Committee also includes two dozen chief executives of major

transnational corporations, many with business interests in the Caribbean.[109] Before the close of 1981 other similar joint ventures were formed in Canada, Britain and West Germany. By year's end the U.S. committee was the most active. The purpose of the Committees was "to stimulate and mobilize new investment, trade and employment in Jamaica, during the critical period of national recovery." In the wake of his visit to Washington, Seaga launched a dynamic new thrust to develop industry with creation of a new official agency -- Jamaica National Promotions (JNP) "to actively pursue and promote investment in industrial projects in the Island."[110]

Partly because of the U.S. promotional committee, Jamaica has registered 470 investment proposals, the vast majority of the foreign ones being from the U.S. But, according to statistics from JNIP, only 21 projects were in production, with a total capital investment of 43 million (U.S.) dollars by November 1981. Another 398 projects still did not pass the stage of preliminary inquiries and opening of files. If all the projects were realized, the total direct investment would amount to 777 million (U.S.) dollars, but the total number of jobs created directly would be 37,000 in a population of 2.2 million, with 263,000 unemployed and underemployed.[111]

It should be recognized, however, that job creation based on industry takes time. This fact was noted by Trevor Boothe, a director of JNIP, who commented that "a lot of the larger projects which would have potential for significantly improving employment are the ones that take the longest to get in place."[112] Even so, in the short run, unemployment remains the major unsolved problem. To date unemployment remains as high as it was in the final years of the

PNP Government in the late 1970s, and any major initiative to reduce it will have to await investment activity. But predictions are that private investment, even over the next three to four years, will not generate enough jobs to solve the problem. Moreover, doubt was expressed even by The Daily Gleaner, a staunch supporter of both the JLP Government and the business community, as to whether some of the enterprises being brought in were of any real or lasting benefit to the island. There was also concern, this newspaper said in its 1981 Annual Report, "as to whether agro-industry, the efficient and profitable use of the indigenous raw materials of Jamaica, was being properly looked into and promoted."[113]

If, as Professor Stone[114] argues, the initial momentum of investment activity is strong enough over the period 1982-83, this should have a positive effect on job creation. If, however, the impact is not big enough to create a significant number of new jobs by direct employment in the range of 30,000 to 40,000 per year, the entire capitalist development strategy of the JLP will be vulnerable to serious attack by their opponents.

The strategy of attracting foreign investment on a large scale is frought with problems. In the first place, "an investment has to be really attractive in Jamaica to compensate for [high] interest rates in the United States" said Paul Chen Young, an economist close to the JLP Government. "You need to have double those rates of return on investment to compensate for the risk,"[115] Young said. Secondly, as one conservative local economist, who refused to be identified, observed, the private sector thrust is likely to fail. He analyzed the situation this way:

> Here you've committed yourself to a private sector strategy. The U.S. and business are committed and giving strong support but the government cannot say, 'You must invest in Jamaica.' So there is this gap; and if it is not supplemented by official flows, the strategy is going to fail.[116]

Despite the palpably difficult path that lies ahead of Seaga Government's private sector strategy, it has already been hailed by the Reagan Administration as a model for development. At Seaga's first state visit to the Reagan White House, the Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., said of the Special U.S.-Jamaica cooperation:

> We feel strongly that the future of Jamaica is not only of vital importance in its own right but also as an example for the entire Caribbean Basin, a region where so many newly formed nations and people are facing the alternatives of authoritarian solutions of economic determinism, or a market economy and democratic process. We are all vitally concerned that Jamaica succeed.[117]

But criticisms of the new JLP Government's strategy had been loud and strong. The now Leader of the Opposition, Michael Manley, called the Seaga's policy "shortsighted." He said that "everything has become, what is the U.S. doing for us. There is a sort of tremendous reversal of any attempt to develop the psychology of self-reliance."[118] When asked by a Newsweek reporter if he saw any good in the Seaga Government after a year in office, Manley replied that he did not see it in terms of good or bad but in terms of a "flawed strategy." He then accused the Jamaican Government of "neo-Colonialism" and of "consciously putting Jamaica into a dependent position."[119]

There has even been an unmuted outcry by other Commonwealth Caribbean nations about what they regard as Jamaica's favored position in the thinking of the United States. One official has gone to the extreme of syllogistic acrimony in reducing the situation to the

following: "What do we have to do? Elect a Manley or a Fidel Castro first, then throw him out in order to get help?"[120] More rationally, the Barbadian Prime Minister, Tom Adams, makes the reasonable point that the Caribbean needs more than private sector initiatives where major soil conservation or agricultural rehabilitation schemes, for instance, are concerned. There is a fear also, especially in Third World countries, that the development of a private sector in which uncontrolled foreign capital is heavily invested might lead to the type of rise in the cost of living that will condemn millions of people to further impoverishment.

CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE PLAN

The Government free market and private sector strategy received a boost when U.S. President Reagan unveiled in February 1982, the Caribbean Basin proposal -- a massive program of "aid" for Central America and the Caribbean. The basic concepts of the plan for Caribbean development was first proposed by Prime Minister Seaga at the January 1981 White House state visit. This Basin Initiative, or what Seaga called a "Marshall-type Plan," is a mix of trade and "aid" that extends to depressed economies a lifeline of uncertain strength. It includes 350 million U.S. dollars in additional funding for 1982 to assist those Basin States which are particularly hard hit economically, with much of it to be channeled to the private sector.

The principal feature of the plan was the proposal for a 12-year period of duty-free entry to the U.S. market for Caribbean Basin products, except textiles and apparels. In fact 87 percent of

Basin products already had such concessions, under the Generalized System of Preferences, the President conceded. The value was, however, in the spur that such duty-free entry could give to investment and production of a wide range of products for the American market.

"Exports from the area will receive duty-free treatment for 12 years," President Reagan emphasized, "The new investors will be able to enter the market knowing that their product will receive duty-free treatment for at least the pay-off life-time of their investments,"[122] Reagan continued.

The Basin Plan also includes a proposal for technical assistance and training "To assist the private sector in the Basin countries to benefit from the opportunities of this program."[123] This will include investment promotion, export marketing and technology transfer, as well as programs to facilitate adjustments to great competition and production in agriculture and industry.

Apart from working in cooperation with Canada, Mexico and Venezuela (countries already committed as partners in the Basin Initiative) and potential donors like Colombia, the U.S. intended to encourage "our European, Japanese and other Asian allies, as well as multi-lateral development institutions, to increase their assistance to the region."[124]

As President Reagan announced the long-awaited Caribbean Basin Initiative before delegates to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C., he showered praise on Prime Minister Seaga and said that Jamaica, under the Seaga Administration, is "making freedom work." The President, having admitted that the Basin

proposal is vital to the security interests of the U.S., warned that Grenada, "in the tightening grip of the totalitarian left," posed a threat to the region. However, Jamaica, from Reagan's point of view, holds out much promise:

> . . . After a decade of falling income and exceptionally high unemployment, Jamaica's new leadership is reducing bureaucracy, dismantling unworkable controls, and attracting new investment. Continued outside assistance will be needed to tide Jamaica over until market forces generate large increases in output and employment. But Jamaica is making freedom work.[125]

All this accolade, it is recognized, is part of an offensive by the U.S. to consolidate pro-U.S. allegiances and encourage the growth of free enterprise in the region.

The major concepts and the underlying assumptions of the Caribbean Basin Plan Initiative resemble to a remarkable degree those embodying the JLP manifesto: free market, free enterprise and foreign investment, that it seems clear President Reagan had little difficulty accepting the Jamaican Prime Minister's "Marshall-type Plan" ideas. It therefore came as no surprise when Reagan made the official announcement of the Basin Plan Initiative that it met with such enthusiastic reception in Jamaican Government and Business circles. Seaga described the Plan as "bold, historic and far-reaching in concept especially in the stimulation of trade and investment."[127] The Prime Minister said the creation of a one-way free-trade area would provide great incentive for investment to promote growth and employment. Seaga further observed that Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative was a positive mechanism which would benefit most of those countries with the "rich investment climate and

domestic policies to encourage buoyancy in the private productive sectors." The Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) hailed the Plan as "a big boost to economic development in the Caribbean Basin." It called on the private sector to "quickly gear itself to gain the maximum possible benefit from the new market opportunities."[128]

The Opposition PNP leader, Manley, was predictably cynical and scathing in his reaction since he felt the Basin Initiative deviated from the original Mexican and Canadian concept. He described the Reagan proposals as "an hegemonic plan which intends to exploit the cash shortage problem in the region so as to force the development of the region along a particular path."[129] He further said the proposal had explicit political intentions, among them to take advantage of the cash-flow difficulties of the Caribbean countries in order to advance the growth of the free enterprise system. "Only if you will bow at the altar of free marketarianism can you enter the kingdom," Manley said, in reference to the Initiative which he said was not in keeping with "the original concept."[130] Deviation from the original plan, Manley further commented, would result in an increase in the dependence of the economies of the region on foreign capital and the multinational corporations.

A similar theme was echoed by the Director of the Institute for Research in Hemispheric Affairs, Larry Burns, who dismissed Reagan's package as "camouflage." He argued that the Plan does not represent aid since the money will provide private sector opportunities for U.S. corporations. The mini Marshall-type Plan, he insisted, will confer no economic benefits just camouflage for U.S. objectives to influence policy decisions in these selected countries,

and to achieve U.S. national ideological aims of anti-communism in its strategic backyard.[131]

These cynical reactions to the Reagan Basin Initiative should be understood within the context in which the proposals were made. For many decades, Latin American leaders have insisted that what their countries needed most was a chance to sell their products in the rich U.S. market than paternalist handouts of package of aid. However, except for one or two countries in the Basin region (including Jamaica), Reagan's "aid" package and offer of increased opportunities for trade have met with lukewarm and cold reactions.

Faced with massive indebtedness, declining revenues and huge balance-of-payments problems, many countries in the Basin region have developed unreal expectations of bilateral aid from the U.S. and other capitalist countries. The countries of Central America, for example, have estimated that their immediate emergency aid needs are in the region of 5,000 million (U.S.) dollars.[132] Although President Reagan hopes to add some 350 million dollars to the "aid" budget to the Caribbean basin countries, which amounts to a 73 percent overall increase (at a time when the U.S. is cutting public spending in the U.S.), the level of proposed "aid" falls far short of these expectations. These expectations have been heightened by the fact that the U.S. is seen as trying to buy political support in the region and some countries are in fact putting a high price tag on their support. It has been suggested, for instance, that the break in diplomatic relations between Jamaica and Cuba in October 1981 was one price the Seaga Government paid for U.S. aid and private sector

investment in order to realize its development strategy. The allegation has been vigorously denied by Seaga and his cabinet colleagues. Nevertheless, a public opinion poll revealed that among the persons who had views on the subject, more Jamaicans were opposed to the JLP Government break with Cuba than those who were supporting the JLP policy stand.[133]

The JLP's economic development policies center around an attempt to shift the economy from import-substitution towards a restructuring in the direction of an export-orientation combined with an openly competitive flow of import trade. Local entrepreneurs accustomed to operating within protected markets are so far reluctant to support the policy but have no choice, as JLP planners view it, as without an increase in export capability the economy will have no prospect of economic growth. Thus the JLP leadership believe the opening up of free trade access to the U.S. market facilitated by the Reagan Basin Initiative and the prospects of significant inflows of foreign investment provide an optimal context for this difficult restructuring to be attempted.[134]

If, however, the strategy succeeds it will convert the Jamaican economy into the beginnings of a new thrust towards industrialization after the exhaustion of growth prospects from import substitution policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Prime Minister Seaga argued that import substitution had outlived its usefulness, but refused to see it as a failure.[135] It is also hoped that a whole new era in the expansion of productive capability could be created provided local and foreign bourgeoisie respond fully to the

Government's policy initiatives and the investment and trade prospects offered by the Caribbean Basin Initiative. As the JLP leadership view the strategy, its success is imperative for upon it depends the profound structural changes contemplated in the economy.

The big question about the export-led strategy is whether the JLP can earn enough credibility for its free market policies to outlast the dislocations that will inevitably occur in the effort to move the economy towards that objective. Secondly, a major question concerns the degree to which visible signs of economic progress can become sufficiently evident before the next election to generate hope and optimism within the electorate which was demoralized by the economic failures of the second term of the PNP (1976-1980). This issue, as Professor Stone[136] correctly observes, turns on whether the economic timetable for "reconstruction" results within the shorter five-year time frame between elections for the political timetable, so as to win mass support in a context of continuing economic hardship. That mass support will be critical to giving the JLP Administration adequate time to carry out the economic task that had been set.

In sum, since gaining constitutional independence Jamaican Government leaders have adopted two major models of development to overcome the legacy of economic underdevelopment, poverty and dependency. On the one hand, there is the JLP's externally propelled private enterprise, "free" market and pro-U.S. strategy and on the other, the PNP's internally determined strategy of "non-capitalist" development based on self-reliance and solidarity with Non-Aligned nations. Notwithstanding these contrasting approaches to development, both strategies share a common assumption that it is the modern

industrial rather than the traditional agricultural sector that must spearhead development. Further, since the development possibilities of Jamaica are seen to be akin to those of the advanced industrialized nations, then the use of production techniques similar to those used in the latter created a need for manpower with the same type of education and training. Thus, the adoption of the two-sector theory of development in which the manpower needs of the modern sector predominate , has had a major impact on educational expansion which forms the subject of discussion in the following chapter.

Notes to Chapter Six

[1]Harry Magdoff, "Is there a Non-Capitalist Road?," Monthly Review Vol. 30 No. 7 (December 1978): 1-7. See also Clive Y. Thomas, "The Non Capitalist Path as Theory and Practice of Decolonization and Socialist Transformation," Latin American Perspectives Vol. 5 No. 2 (Spring 1978): 10-27.

[2]For a representative discussion on recent contribution of scholars from the Soviet bloc to the literature on development strategy, see V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogolovsky, Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline (Moscow 1975).

[3]Magdoff, op. cit., and Berch Berberoglu, "The Nature and Contradictions of State Capitalism in the Third World," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 28 No. 2 (June 1979): 341-363.

[4]O. Igho Natufe, "Soviet Policy Towards African Regimes," Survey, Vol. 22 No. 1 (Winter 1976), quoted in Ohiorhenuan, op. cit., p. 389.

[5]Solodovnikov and Bogolovsky, Non-Capitalist Development, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[6]See Chapter 2. The 'Puerto Rican type of industrialization' was in operation even before the first election under universal adult suffrage in 1944 which Bustamante's JLP won.'

[7]Peoples National Party, Political Education Program Canvassers' Training Manual 1979/1981.

[8]Michael Manley quoted in EPICA, Jamaica: Caribbean Challenge (Washington, D.C.: EPICA TASK FORCE, 1979). p. 67.

[9]The Daily Gleaner, 21 November 1974 quoted in Ibid., p. 68.

[10]Canrade Leader Speaks, "Address by Michael Manley to the National Executive Council of the Peoples National Party"(Kingston, 1974), p. 17. See also Michael Manley, The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament (London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1974), and Government of Jamaica, Five Year Development Plan 1978-82 (Kingston: National Planning Agency 1977), p. v. and p.1.

[11]Michael Manley's position on these issues has been made perfectly clear in his Politics of Change, op. cit.

[12]Agency for Public Information, "Democratic Socialism for Jamaica" (Kingston, 1974).

[13]Agency for Public Information, "Democratic Socialism -- the Jamaican Model," op. cit.

[14]Manley, op. cit., p. 21.

[15]For detailed discussion of Fabian Socialism as a movement, see Margaret Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1961).

[16]G.D.H. Cole, The Fabian Society, Past and Present (London: The Fabian Society, 1942) Tract Series No. 258, p. 1.

[17]Ibid.

[18]The Fabian Society conducted a critical examination of Marx, and rejected this theory of value. This was followed by a less thorough examination of Proudhon's famous thesis that property is theft, mainly because this work had been adopted as a sort of gospel of Anarchism in opposition to Marx's Das Kapital, 'The Bible of German Social Democracy.' However, these critical exercises were then discarded.

[19]G. Bernard Shaw, Socialism: Principles and Outlook; and Fabianism (London: Fabian Society 1930), Fabian Tract No. 233, p. 12.

[20]The British Labor Party was partly founded by the Fabian Society. The Society strove constantly to influence various movements such as the trade union and cooperative societies from which the Labor Party evolved.

[21]Harold Laski was an influential social scientist at the London School of Economics, an institution which was founded by funds from Henry Hutchinson, a Fabian Society member, but the School did not further the ideas of the Society in the incipient years. Laski has been credited with having a profound influence on many Third World leaders of the post-World War II era, Pierre Trudeau, and Lee Kuan Yew, among others.

[22]Agency for Public Information, "Facts on Jamaica" (Kingston, December 1976).

[23]Government of Jamaica, Social and Economic Survey 1978 National Planning Agency, Kingston, p. 181.

[24]Ibid., p. 114.

[25]Social and Economic Survey, 1978, op. cit., p. 21.

[26]Don Robotham, "Agrarian Relations in Jamaica" in Carl Stone and Aggney Brown (ed.), Essays on Power Change in Jamaica (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977), p. 45.

[27]Edmund H. Dale, Spotlight on the Caribbean; A Microcosm of the Third World (Regina: University of Regina, 1977), p. 51.

[28]Dale, op. cit., p. 75.

[29]For an articulation of the PNP position on worker participation see Michael Manley, "A Voice from the Work Place" (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976).

[30]Dale, op. cit., p. 76.

[31]Government of Jamaica, Five YEAR Development Plan 1978-82, Kingston, National Planning Agency, 1977.

[32]Carl Stone, "An Appraisal of the Cooperative Process in the Jamaican Sugar Industry," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 27 Nos. 1-4 (1978): 1-20.

[33]EPICA, op. cit., p. 60.

[34]National Planning Agency, Social and Economic Survey (Kingston, 1975).

[35]EPICA, op. cit., p. 60.

[36]Ibid., p. 61.

[37]O'Flaherty, op. cit., pp. 129-136.

[38]International Bauxite Association Review, March 1977, cited in EPICA, op. cit., p. 61.

[39]Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Bauxite, Alumina and Aluminum in 1975, Kingston, 1976, p. 24.

[40]FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT Plan 1978-82, op. cit., p. 31.

[41]Jamaica Bauxite Institute, "Bauxite, Aluminum in 1975," op. cit., pp. 78.

[42]Wendell Bell, "Equality and Social Justice: Foundations of Nationalism in the Caribbean," in Caribbean Studies, Vol. 20 No. 2 (June 1980): 5-36.

[43]National Planning Agency, Social and Economic Survey (Kingston, 1980), p. 4.

[44]Five Year Development Plan, op. cit., p. 17; see also National Planning Agency, Social and Economic Survey (Kingston, 1980), p. 15.

[45]O'Flaherty, op. cit., p. 128: The most important political fact about Jamaica is its maldistribution of income. Although the island's per capita income in the mid-1970s was over 1000 Jamaican dollars, 85 percent of the population survived on less than 200 dollars per year.

[46]Social and Economic Survey, 1980, p. 1416.

[47]Social and Economic Survey, 1979, p. 51.

[48]Five Year Development Plan, op. cit., p. 6.

[49]See "P.M.'s Statement to the House," Jamaica Daily News, 30 June 1976, p. 7.

[50]Epica, op. cit., p. 74 and David Binder, "Cuba Influence in Caribbean Rises, Worrying U.S. Officials," New York Times, 21 March 1976, p. 1.

[51]Epica, op. cit., p. 75.

[52]Ibid., and Sherry Keith and Robert Girling, "Caribbean Conflict: Jamaica and the U.S.," NACLA Report, Vol. 12 No. 3 (May-June 1978): 29.

[53]"Jamaica's Bauxite/Aluminum Industry: First Half Report," JBI Digest, Vol. 1 No. 3 (September 1976), p. 1.

[54]Epica, op. cit., p. 75.

[55]Ibid. Quoting U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of State.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid. See also Keith and Girling, op. cit., p. 29.

[58]Ibid. See also EPICA, op. cit., p. 75.

[59]Quoted by Saul Landau, "Jamaica's Hot Politics," Mother Jones Magazine (September/October 1980), p. 33.

[60]O'Flaherty, op. cit., p. 138, citing Congressional Record (15 June 1977), p. S9897-8.

[61]Ibid., p. 132 and Jones-Hendrickson, op. cit., p. 78.

[62]Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 11 No. 1 (January 1977): p. 16.

[63]Ibid., Vol. 11 No. 2 (February 1977): p. 4.

[64]EPICA, p. 99.

[65]"Many Problems affect Jamaican Economy," New York Times, 4 December 1976, p. 33.

[66]National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey (Kingston 1976), p. 39.

[67]See Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism (New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1972, pp. 49-76 and Bruce Nissen, "Building the World Bank" in Steve Weissman, ed., The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid (Palo Alto, Ca.: San Francisco, 1974).

[68]Nissen, op. cit., p. 28.

[69]"Text of Michael Manley's Address," Daily Gleaner, 23 April 1977.

[70]The island was visited by President Carter's wife, Rosalyn, and late spring by Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Both pressed Manley to accept the conditions of an IMF loan. Beneath the surface, the visits signalled U.S. satisfaction that limits had finally been set on Jamaican democratic socialism.

[71]Quoted in EPICA, op. cit., p. 103.

[72]Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12 No. 1 (January 1978), p. 5.

[73]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 27 March 1978, p. 1.

[74]Art Rine, "Economic Shock: IMF loan Terms Force Jamaica Belt Tightening," Washington Post, 24 July 1978.

[75]Ibid.

[76]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 22 May 1978, p. 1.

[77]EPICA, op. cit., p. 107.

[78]Landau, op. cit., p. 34.

[79]For an interesting discussion on Third World indebtedness as a result of reliance on international finance as a means to capitalist development, see Jeff Frieden, "Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea," International Organization, Vol. 35 No. 3 (Summer 1981): 407-431.

[80]Jamaica Daily News, 20 March 1980, pp. 1 and 14.

[81]Ibid., 24 March 1980, p. 1.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]See Louis Lindsey, "Colonialism and the Myth of Resource Insufficiency in Jamaica," in Vaughan A. Lewis (ed.), Size, Self Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean. (Kingston, Jamaica: ISER, 1976), p. 60.

[84b]Christopher Dickey, "Jamaica Adrift or Model for Development," Washington Post, 23 October 1981.

[84c]See Carl Stone, "Jamaica: From Manley to Seaga." Paper prepared for presentation to the 23rd Annual Convention of International Studies Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, 23-26 March 1982. unpublished.

[85]"Prime Minister Speaks on Economic Strategy," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 22 March 1982, p. 32.

[86]Ibid.

[87]Ibid.

[88]Ibid.

[89]The Jamaica Labour Party, Change Without Chaos, A National Programme for Reconstruction (Kingston, Jamaica: Jamaica Labour Party, 1979).

[90]Thurman W. Arnold, et al. The Future of Democratic Capitalism (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co. Inc., 1950), p. 3.

[91]Ibid., p. 4.

[92]Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[93]Ibid., p. 8.

[94]Ibid., p. 9.

[95]JLP, Change Without Chaos, op. cit., pp. 38-40.

[96]See Carl Stone, "Jamaica: From Manley to Seaga," op. cit.

[97]See Raul Fernandez, "Third World Industrialization: A New Panacea," Monthly Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 December 1980: 10-17, and W.R. Cline and S. Weintraub, Economic Stabilization in Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1981).

[98]Stone, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

[99]Carl Stone, "One Year of Deliverance," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 16 October 1981, pp. 11 and 31.

[100]Stone, Jamaica: From Manley to Seaga, op. cit., p. 28 and Government of Jamaica, Social and Economic Survey, 1980, (Kingston: National Planning Agency, p. 14.6).

[101]Christopher Dickey, "Jamaica Adrift or Model for Development," op. cit.

[102]The Economist, 23 January 1982. See also The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 22 March 1982, p. 2.

[103]The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, 22 March 1982.

[104]Stone, "Manley to Seaga," op. cit., p. 30.

[105]The Economist, op. cit.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Carl Stone, "Reagan, the U.S. and Jamaica," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 22 March 1982, p. 11.

[108]Voice of America Radio, State Department Commentary, 7 April 1982, Washington, D.C.

[109]Gleaner 1981 Annual; Gleaner Company Ltd. December 1981, Kingston, Jamaica. See also The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, 16 March 1981.

[110]See "U.S.-Jamaica Recovery Talks Open," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 16 March 1981.

[111]Dickey, op. cit.

[112]Trevor Boothe quoted by Ibid. See also Jamaica News, op. cit., p. 9.

[113]Gleaner 1981 Annual, op. cit., p. 3 and Jamaica News, op. cit., pp. 10 and 16.

[114]Stone, "From Manley to Seaga," op. cit., p. 35.

[115]Paul Chen Young quoted in Dickey, op. cit.

[116]Quoted in Dickey, op. cit.

[117]Alexander Haig, Jr. quoted in The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 21 January 1981. See also Dickey, op. cit.

[118]Michael Manley quoted by Dickey, op. cit.

[119]Michael Manley quoted in Newsweek, 13 December 1981.

[120]Quoted in "Editorials," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 22 December 1981.

[121]Ibid.

[122]President Ronald Reagan, quoted in "Reagan Unveils Caribbean Basin Plan," The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, 1 March 1982, p. 1.

[123]Ibid.

[124]Ibid., p. 37.

[125]President Ronald Reagan quoted in Ibid.

[126]Edward Seaga quoted in The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 1 March 1982, p. 27.

[127]Ibid.

[128]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 8 March 1982, p. 2.

[129]See "PNP Wants Basin Plan Amended," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 15 March 1982, p. 5.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Larry Birns, Interview on "The Journal," Canadian Broadcasting Company Television, 25 February 1982.

[132]See Carl Stone, "The Basin Plan," The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, 8 March 1982, p. 11.

[133]"Opinion Poll 1," The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, 14 December 1981.

[134]See Stone, "From Manley to Seaga," op. cit., p. 37.

[135]Edward Seaga," A Development Plan for the Caribbean." Address to the CARICOM Foreign Minister's Conference, reprinted in Jamaica News, Jamaican High Commission, Ottawa, Canada, March 1982.

[136]Stone, "From Manley to Seaga," op. cit., p. 38.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OR UNDERDEVELOPMENT?

-- THE ACADEMIC INPUT

The entry of Jamaica into the European-dominated world economic system, as has been seen, has given rise to a particular set of class conflicts throughout its history. These conflicts have been the most dynamic factor conditioning the growth and change of the educational system. Class antagonism is the outgrowth of the changes in the structure of production and particularly of the productive process itself. The productive apparatus of the Jamaican economy remained relatively unchanged structurally until the Second World War -- likewise the educational system itself. Education trends and specific educational reforms which emerged in the post-war period were conditioned by a change in the thrust of imperialism: that is, from a plantation economy producing raw agricultural commodities for the colonial power to the expansion of manufacturing, mining and local consumer markets within Jamaica and elsewhere in the Third World. Thus the emergence of a two-sector model of development -- a modern industrial sector and an agricultural sector -- in the post-war years has had significant impact on educational extension and reform of institutions than in all of the 19th and 20th centuries when the economy was pure plantation.

In the post-independence period, successive governments

adopted the two-sector model of socioeconomic transformation. Concerned with the manpower needs of this development strategy, policy-makers began to perceive education as an integral part of the modern sector policy. This belief in the efficacy of education to bring about rapid economic growth according to the two-sector theory resulted in a progressive shift in emphasis from primary to secondary and tertiary education.

The vast body of academic literature and political rhetoric during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s assert that education constitutes a key factor in cutting the "Gordian knot" of colonialism and underdevelopment. But, as critical scholars have argued, on the basis of several systematic studies on the function of formal education or schooling in developed countries,[1] schooling does not play a leading role in the transformation of the structure of the economy. Rather the school system is described and analyzed as an ideological apparatus because: first, it teaches capitalist ideology directly through its curriculum; secondly, it serves to legitimize and obscure the social relations of capitalist society; thirdly, it perpetuates, that is, reproduces the class relations of capitalist society both in its organizational and administrative structure and through the process of teaching and learning style which occur in the classroom;[2] fourthly, it serves to reproduce skilled labor power and, in connection with the production of labor power, it helps to reproduce the reserve army of labor; and, fifthly, education is commonly viewed as a panacea for underdevelopment. While education is certainly a <u>necessary</u> condition, it is an <u>insufficient</u> remedy for overcoming underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is the direct

result of the social and economic relations of capitalism itself.

As critical scholars have asserted, furthermore, structural changes in the educational process and organization are a result of changes in basic economic structures, that is, modifications in the mode of production. However, educational reforms -- which may or may not result in basic structural reorganization -- are also the consequence of political struggles between the dominant class wanting to assert its ideological hegemony and subordinate classes resisting dominance and, at times, putting forth their own demands. Although several approaches to the study of education in capitalist society have emerged, there is a common base among these: that is, mass public education, as part of the institutional superstructure of capitalist society, is historically specific to the industrial superstructure of capitalism.

If, as Louis Althusser asserts, institutionalized educational systems in the advanced industrialized countries are the "dominant ideological state apparatus,"[3] they are perceived to have additional functions in the former colonial countries of the Third World. Professor Sherry Keith, for instance, posited that education has certain unique features in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean which do not appear in the metropolitan societies:

> Education has borne and continues to bear the torch of colonialism and now neo-colonialism throughout the Third World. Ideological penetration of the periphery occurs importantly through the culture of schooling. While formal education has not always been important in the colony, it is without doubt fundamental in this day and age. If we are to understand the perpetuation of neo-colonialism and imperialism today, it is essential to study how the extension and reform of educational institutions are an integral part of this process.[4]

Given the foregoing conceptualization of the functions of formal schooling, it is now possible to proceed to an analysis of some specific educational reforms in the post-independence period. But educational reforms in the 1960s and 1970s cannot fully be understood without a perspective on the growth and expansion of schooling during the long period of British colonialism.

An Overview of Education in the Period 1655-1834

A brief historical sketch of formal educational activity in Jamaica indicates that any semblance of systematic, purposeful instruction appeared in the latter half of the 19th century in the decades after the emancipation of slaves. Little is known of educational activity in Jamaica before the arrival of the British conquerors in 1655. The Spaniards who originally ruled the island left no record indicating any systematic attempt to educate the people. After 1655, evidence substantiates the claim that formal education was provided in very small private schools for the privileged. The basic idea was that it was the duty of parents to provide education for their children. The wealthiest planters sent their children to be educated in England, which in their view, was the hub of civilization and culture. The number of young, white or colored West Indians who attended English "upper-class schools" was considerable. Edward Long,[5] a contemporary historian, estimated that three-fourths of the proprietor's children in Jamaica went overseas for that purpose. By the mid-18th century, some 300 a year took passage; two decades later this number doubled. Students aboard

merchant ships bound to or from schools in England, often figure in travel accounts of the period.

During the 18th century there was the practice of wealthy planters bequeathing sums of money to educational endeavors.[6] These bequests were usually left "for the instruction of the poorer classes of all colours, free and slave, in doctrine of the Church of England and in the promotion of industry."[7] In effect, however, these sums of money went to improve the education of the children of the poorer whites and those who could be classified as white.[8] These were educated in endowed schools, some of which have survived to the present as secondary schools. The fact that many of these schools demanded fees effectively eliminated the children of the poor.

A white society that took no interest in the education of the masses could hardly be expected to be concerned about education for its slave workers. It is characteristic of the social philosophy of the time that ignorance should remain an ingredient of the condition of slavery. One of the circumstances of slavery is that the slave workers are kept ignorant. If they are not instructed in any arts or skills other than those required for their unpaid labor, they are less likely to contemplate alternatives and so resist their masters. This was particularly the case in Jamaica because "the occasional advocates of education for slaves meant instruction in the Christian religion."[9] Thus schools operated by missionaries provided "education" for the children of slaves. The curricula and the standard of instruction of both the "endowed" and the mission schools were "fundamentally the same although some endowed schools taught the Classics and the mission schools emphasized religion."

Because many of those who came to Jamaica thought of their life on the island as a temporary interlude, there was little lasting interest on the part of the Legislature in the 18th century to organize an educational system. This was not unusual, however, for state supported public education was also unknown in the metropole. The Government took no major part in the "educational" program except to offer grants from time to time, and to pass minor legislation. In 1671 a law was passed appropriating 500 pounds (sterling) annually to be paid by the Government for the services of five ministers and one teacher.[10] Later, in 1685, an attempt was made to bring all educational efforts under the control of the clergy as only clergymen were licensed to teach. These orders were not strictly enforced but few beside the clergy were employed in teaching, which further underscores the religious basis of the education offered.

The idea of a public system of universal education was not yet born in this pre-emancipation period. The low level of technology used in the production process required very little skilled labor. The aim to attain maximum profit in the plantation economy organized by feudal lines rested on the highly organized regimented labor of the slaves. Education is simply not important in a pre-industrial or semi-feudal society. In an era of laissez-faire, particularly when there was no universal system of education in the colonial power, it is hardly surprising that popular education had not begun under slavery. Notwithstanding the praiseworthy effort of the missionaries and the philanthropists, the rudimentary education offered reflected the peculiar class and color stratification of the plantation society. Thus the efforts of these two prominent groups

laid the foundation for the future primary (elementary) and secondary school system of the island. While there was some intervention and supervision on the part of government there was little control of private educational enterprise.

EDUCATION AND THE COLONIAL STATE 1834-1944

Development of a Popular System of Education

In the 19th century, emancipation was significant in education since the planter class, which has never advocated education for the poor, ceased to have legal control over the lives and destiny of former slaves. The first feeble attempt to provide schooling for the common people in Jamaica (and the British West Indies generally) came in the first year of emancipation of 1834. The Negro Education Act, which enunciated the provision of a financial grant by the British Government, was designed to promote elementary education chiefly among emancipated slaves. The amount of money offered was 30,000 pound sterling for five years on an annual basis; but there was an annual increase in the grant by the Imperial Government until it was terminated in 1845.

The number of emancipated slaves in Jamaica, according to the Colonial Office Memorandum of 8 December 1835,[12] was 311,692 -- the largest of all the British West Indian territories -- and the first allocation was 7,500 pounds (sterling). The local Legislative Assembly was entrusted with the legal responsibility to enforce compulsory education. With the decision of the British Government to

entrust the administration of the grant to the "paternalistic voluntarism" of various British missionary groups, they embarked upon a plan of school expansion and the formulation of an ambitious education program. During the period of the grant the funds were augmented with the proceeds from various bequests and charities, the Mico Charity making the greatest contribution. A small sum of 5,000 pounds (a supplementary Negro Education Grant) aided substantially the preparation of "native teachers" for the fledgling education system; much of that money and the small annual allotments made by the assembly as well went to the Mico Charity and the National Schools, the two best organized of the early innovating teams.[13] Thus it was that the stage was set for a system of popular schooling.

Given the conflict between the British Parliament and the local plantocracy over the loss of their "black ivory" at emancipation, the plantocrat Assembly only grudgingly contributed grants to "education which they did not find appropriate for future labourers."[14] The British, however, viewed the introduction of popular schooling as necessary for the development of more modern capitalist social relations of production. This vision is exemplified by the Sterling Report:

> About 770,000 have been released from slavery by the Emancipation Act, and are now in a state of rapid transition to entire freedom. The peace and prosperity of the Empire at large may be not remotely influenced by their moral condition; the care of this is in itself also a matter of grave responsibility; . . . For although the negroes are now under a system of limited control, which secures to a certain extent their orderly and industrious conduct, in the short space of five years from the first of next August, their performance of the function of a labouring class in a civilised community will depend entirely on the power over their minds of the same prudential and moral motives which govern

> more or less the mass of people here. If they are not so disposed as to fulfill these functions, property will perish in the colonies, for lack of human impulsion; . . . The law having already determined and enforced civil rights, the task of bettering their condition can be further advanced only by education.15

The opposition of the Jamaican plantocrats to the development of popular education was succinctly stated by Carl Campbell in a critical evaluation of the obstacles to the development of popular education in the post-emancipation period.

> From at least two points of view, day schools were viewed as a threat to the plantations. There was still a role for the "little gang" on the plantation; and during the apprenticeship the most consistent attitude of the planting interest towards the 'free children' was that they should be incorporated into the apprenticeship and forced to work like the apprentices. What was more frightening to the planters, however, was the prospect that the next generation of Negroes undisciplined by the rigour of plantation slavery, might have their alleged distaste for agriculture sharpened, by exposure to literacy.16

The British colonial position accurately reflects the ideological need for popular education among emancipated slaves. Education was viewed as a means of teaching the freed slave population to submit to the conditions of wage labor when the threat of violent coercion to work was eliminated by abolition. The plantocrat class view, however, mirrors the particular backwardness of the plantation economy;[17] the overwhelming majority of the population was not (and it has yet to be) fully integrated into the capitalist labor market as wage laborers. The production conditions of the plantation economy during the 19th and early 20th centuries did not require a skilled supply of labor. Labor was needed primarily in connection with the plantation economy for the production of raw agricultural goods (initially sugar,

later bananas, coffee, pimento) which were exported to the metropole. In turn, manufactured goods -- foodstuffs and other consumer items -- were imported rather than locally produced. This meant that the growth of a wage-labor force engaged in industrial manufacture was largely truncated. Thus popular education was marginal in the context of the dominant social relations of production during the colonial period of capitalism in Jamaica. The agricultural proletariat which grew up in conjunction with the plantation economy was held in reserve in the subsistence sector of the peasant economy. And the social relations of the peasant economy hardly necessitated either the type of training or socialization provided by the school for modern wage-laboring class.[18]

The hostility of the local plantocracy towards popular education must be contrasted to their relative generosity with respect to charitable grants for the creation of "endowed" schools for their own children and those of poorer whites in the pre-emancipation period. But plantocrats' opposition was dictated by pique resulting from triple British enemies: free trade, the loss of slave production and the abolition of the duty preferences which British West Indian sugar enjoyed in the British market over sugar produced more cheaply elsewhere. Thus the planter class, faced with an economy in transition from one organized on the regimentation of slave labor to one based on free wage labor, stubbornly held to the outmoded belief that profits from sugar can be produced only by slave labor. These men, born and nurtured in a society of cheap and compulsory labor, demanded new laborers, from elsewhere in the world. Instead of enthusiastically supporting a program of education and training of the ex-slave so as

to develop skills essential to diversifying plantation agriculture, the plantocrats turned, as already seen, to large scale importation of substitute cheap labor.[19] Herein lies the plantocrats' failure to provide the leadership needed for an effective education system. With no support from local government and the virtual evaporation of contributions from abroad, the schools had to charge tuition to meet their operating expenses. As a result, a large majority of blacks were excluded from the classroom. If lack of funds was not sufficient cause to keep children away from school, the failure of the curriculum to include courses related to the practical problems of everyday life tended to discourage attendance. The curriculum, worked out by the missionary leaders, included the 3 R's -- reading, writing, and arithmetic -- and instruction in the "Principles of Religion." No provision was as yet made for manual, mechanical or technical education. In 1864 it was estimated that only one out of five school-age children was receiving full-time or part-time instruction. Thirty years after emancipation, only 13 percent of the adult population could read and write.[20]

The vast majority of the plantocracy in Jamaica felt the former slave should stay ignorant. That way, it seemed, their expectations would not be great and they could still be exploited for the advantage of the few. What was most feared, as Samuel and Edith Hurwitz[21] noted, was that an educated black would have a high level of aspiration, which would make him discontented with his low position in society. The planters were ready to blame whatever the former slaves did wrong on the schools, especially as the schools closest

to the masses were run by Moravian, Baptist, and Wesleyan missionaries who, many believed, preached a creed of insubordination to those in authority. Had not emancipation itself come about in large measure because of the campaign waged in England by sectarian groups? As a result, traditional authority had been destroyed. Because the schools established when freedom was declared were run by those in association with emancipation, they should not be supported. As one planter reportedly commented, the plantations would be productive "if religion would only protect agriculture and education and not unfit the peasantry for labor."[22]

In the light of the prevailing attitude of the plantocracy towards popular schooling it seemed clear that the only educational program they would support was one geared to the needs of plantation agriculture. In 1837 the Imperial Government sent out an Inspector of Schools, Charles Latrobe, to report on the first two years of work under the Negro Education Grant. The Latrobe Report made a number of observations regarding administrative problems and only indirectly mentioned the need to revamp the curriculum of the Normal Schools (teacher training schools) in effort to secure the full co-operation of the planter class, who disliked the emphasis on the "bookish" schooling being offered.[23] But the Report offered no suggestions towards the revamping of Jamaican education. Three years after the Report was published, Lord John Russell, Secretary of State for the Colonies, indicated in a Circular Dispatch of 18 March 1841 that:

> Lord John Russell . . . looks forward with confidence to . . . . (the blacks) being able soon to provide for the education of their children without the aid which is now specifically voted by Parliament for that purpose. After the present year therefore, the vote for Negro education will be discontinued, as it must be left to the local Legislature to consider the best mode of raising the necessary funds for public education.[24]

This was an indication that the British Parliament was approaching the end of the Negro Education Grant, the imminent withdrawal would now draw the plantocracy into the educational debate.

The year 1844 saw the curriculum of the Normal Schools under adverse criticism. At Calabar College, Joshua Tinson, a tutor, who saw his students four times daily, complained of his students' undesirably low academic standard, exhibited in the need for constant repetition of lessons taught.[25] The curriculum of Calabar College included Latin, Hebrew, Theology, Natural Philosophy, and Geography with the Bible as their principal textbook. The absence of agricultural instruction prompted Lord Elgin, Governor of Jamaica, to state on 7 May 1845 that:

> Education . . . at one time seemed to have been prized as a means of enabling the child of the labourer to emancipate himself from the pursuits in which his parents had been engaged . . . but a more healthy impulse may perhaps be given . . . by the introduction of a course of instruction which connects the vocation of the husbandman with subjects of intellectual interests.[26]

Lord Elgin was implying that the failure to include an efficient program of agricultural or industrial training in the curriculum had affected levels of efficiency and most likely would result in limited success.

A Circular Dispatch from the Colonial Office on 26 June 1847 suggested that Industrial Education be included in the Normal School curriculum, along with religious education and "grammatical knowledge of the English language as the most important agent of civilization for the coloured population of the colonies."[27] Clause 3 of the Dispatch read:

> The Requirements of Small Farmers
>
> To communicate knowledge of writing and arithmetic . . . and their application to their wants and duties, as may enable a peasant to economise his means and give the small farmer the power to enter calculations and agreements. An improved Agriculture is required to replace the system of exhaustion of the virgin soil . . . The education of coloured races would not therefore be complete for the children of small farmers unless it included this object.

This Circular Dispatch came at an opportune time for the plantocracy because with the withdrawal of the Negro Education grant, the Jamaican Assembly was faced with the nature of elementary education to be supported. The Circular helped them solve the problem for a while, for between 1845 and 1865, the Jamaican Assembly offered special grants to schools attempting Agricultural Education. Resulting from this offer several religious bodies offered agriculture in the curriculum of their Normal School but the attempt proved futile due in part to lack of suitable instruction. The inclusion of practical courses in the elementary school curriculum was also protested. It has been observed that at the elementary level, parents objected to the soiling of the children's clothes, contending that book learning was what they had sent their children to school for.[28] However Jasper Cargill, Inspector of Schools, reported in

1847 that some efforts were made to introduce practical training in the schools, albeit with little success. A major impediment to the promotion of popular schooling continued to be the grudging manner in which merchants and attorneys contributed grants towards an "education which they did not find appropriate for future labourers."[29] In 1861, therefore, the Jamaican Assembly was only able to vote nearly 3,000 pounds -- a small amount even for the period -- towards the education of the 65,000 children between the ages of 5 and 15 years. This was less than one shilling for the instruction of a child within a twelve month period. Often the local ruling class had wanted to provide more funds to education but it must have been financially impossible in the 1840s and 1850s, given the rapidly deteriorating sugar economy. This picture contrasts sharply with the steady increase in Government expenditure and growth of schooling from the 1870s as shown in Table 7.1.

In the wake of the massive peasant protest of 1865, the so-called Morant Bay Rebellion, control of the island's internal government was transferred from the local Assembly of planters to the British Parliament. In the general reform of social institutions that followed, Jamaica's "national" educational system was placed on a firm footing by the 1867 Code of Regulations. The Code made provision for agricultural training by offering funds to schools for industrial training, additional to the regular grants. The British Government was determined to keep alive the effort at providing adolescents with agricultural skills. Despite the attractive package of incentives including the waiver of school fees, among other things,

Table 7.1

Government Revenue, Educational Expenditure and Growth of Schooling, 1871-72 -- 1891-92

	1871-72	1875-76	1879-80	1883-84	1887-88	1891-92
Govt. Revenue[a]	£466,042	534,512	573,603	555,049	671,657	736,821
Ed. Exp.	14,574	21,271	25,600	25,863	35,200	40,790
Exp. as % of Revenue	3.12	3.98	4.46	4.65	5.24	5.53
No. Schools on Grant's List	438	569	681	701	771	872
Enrolment	38,006	46,654	56,382	57,557	61,643	84,119
Avg. Attendance	22,435	27,270	32,871	33,294	41,920	46,161
Grants to Schools	9,897	14,756	18,992	17,661	23,383	29,005

a. Includes both General and Appropriated Revenue

Sources: For Government Revenue and Educational Expenditure: George W. Kellner, Memorandum Concerning the Finances of the Island of Jamaica, 1822, C.O. 884/4, No. 45, and David Barbour, Report on the Finances of Jamaica, 1891, C.O. 884/6, No. 95. For Figures on Growth of Schooling: T. Capper and M.E. Sadler, "The System of Education in Jamaica," in Gt. Britain, Board of Education, Special Reports on Educational Subjects, Vol. 4, 1901, p. 602. Cited in Trevor A. Turner, "The Socialization Intent in Colonial Jamaican Education 1867-1911." Caribbean Journal of Education Vol. 3, No. 2 (April 1976): 50-83.

the response from parents, managers of schools and teachers to this Government initiative was disappointing. The Government then attempted to implement compulsory education based on the recommendations of the Crossman Commission of 1879, but the refusal of planters to support a scheme which would reduce their labor force made the proposal unworkable.[30]

In 1870, only 1.5 percent of the grants to schools was given for industrial purposes, and in only six of the fourteen parishes of the colony were industrial schools established.[30] One of the problems was a shortage of teachers skilled in the industrial areas. To rectify the situation, the colonial state in August 1870 opened the training college at Stony Hill specifically for training in the conduct of industrial activities in the schools. As further incentive to skill training, the Government in 1873 raised the grants and reduced from three to two the number of daily hours that a school needed to devote to industrial instruction in order to qualify for them. The effort at industrial training then increased, as reflected in the increase in industrial grants from 89 pounds in 1870 to 586 in 1874, the latter amount representing 4.5 percent of the total grants to schools. But from there the efforts declined, with only 1.9 percent of the total grants in 1877 going to industrial training.[32] At that point the Government judged the experiment a failure and discontinued the grants with the exception of those for sewing.

But the Government did not give up the hope completely for stimulating private effort towards industrial training. It allowed for the creation of special industrial schools by offering grants to managers who would arrange to have at least half the instructional time in their schools devoted to teaching in agriculture. Still no one came forward to take advantage of these grants, leaving the Inspector of Schools to admit that industrial schools would have to be established by the Government as it was not

likely that they would be established by private enterprise.[33]

Support for Government provision of industrial schools came from the report of the Commission of Inquiry upon the Condition of the Juvenile Population, 1879. The Commission had been established out of concern for the neglected young people roaming the streets of Kingston. The hearings of the Commission revealed that many people regarded the idleness and unsupervised activities of these adolescents as a threat to the stability of urban society. The Commission recommended, as one way of dealing with the problem, the establishment of two industrial schools for vagrant and destitute children. The Government, lacking funds for such provisions, could hardly do more than arm itself with a law in 1881 giving itself the power to establish such schools. Not until 1891 did the Government find it possible to establish the first industrial school for boys. In 1892, a similar school for girls was opened. The majority of the boys were engaged in agricultural training. The girls also had to do some agricultural work, but their training consisted mainly of domestic activities.[34]

This push to promote agricultural training through specialized institutions had a greater degree of permanence than the first attempt through the elementary schools. In addition to its own schools, the colonial state prior to 1892 also provided some financial support to two industrial schools that had been established in Kingston by the Roman Catholics and to one that had been started by the Anglican bishop, Enos Nuttall, at Stony Hill.

Nonetheless, until economic forces at the end of the 19th century dictated otherwise, agricultural training remained at a low level of development. The Crown Colony Government's efforts at raising the level of agricultural skills through elementary schooling had to face resistance from parents. Parents would not support the idea of having their children learn at school what they believed could be taught at home.[35] The schools obviously had to offer more in order to help their children to be upwardly mobile, a point of view recognized and accepted by the Government. The Inspector of Schools, in considering the problem of poor attendance, acknowledged that the "meagreness of past results produced by imperfect and erroneous systems" had not sufficiently convinced the people that the schools had anything to offer them. It was, therefore, he advised, the responsibility of the schools "to show conclusively and unmistakeably that the instruction imparted by them has a direct and most important bearing upon all the conditions of daily life; and that all improvements, moral, social, and pecuniary are the legitimate fruits of sound education."[36]

The reluctance of parents to have their children engage in agricultural activities in school arose also from the experience of slavery, which was still sufficiently close (most parents over the age of 33 would have been born in slavery) to make them look with suspicion on any attempt to fit their children with the type and level of skills that would make them employable mainly for the sugar estates. The Inspector of Schools interpreted this attitude of the people as a distaste for manual labor,[37] but, as the historian Eric Williams has pointed out, the increase in peasant free-holding and

in the output of peasant production showed that there was no reluctance among the masses to indulge in manual labor that enhanced, rather than limited, their independence.[38]

The Education Act of 1892 allowed for closer supervision and expansion of elementary education. A Board of Education was established to help with supervision and to advise on changes in school regulations, while fees were abolished to give greater access to schooling. In this expansionary policy, efforts were revived towards stimulating the interests of school managers, teachers, and parents once more in agricultural training, and the Crown Colony Government in the two decades after 1892 became involved in the provision of facilities for such training at every level of the education system.

It was within this context that in 1897 two Commission Reports were submitted to the Colonial Government. One was submitted by the Norman Commission of which Henry Norman, former Governor of Jamaica was Chairman and the other, by Charles Lumb, a Puisne Judge. The Norman Commission, inter alia, stated that the fulfilment of the island's potential would be realized only through the return of the masses to the land, and suggested that laborers should be settled in rural areas as owners in small plots, and their system of agriculture should be improved and modernized. Henry Blake had already met the first requirement when he introduced the Lands Department and the Jamaica Agricultural Society (JAS), in 1895, but there was still a vital requirement left to be met: that of helping the small farmers obtain the best results from their plot of land. This was met with the creation of the Jamaica Agricultural Society

(1895) and the Board of Agriculture (1901). These institutions provided instructors credited not only with improvements to school gardens but also with helping small farmers with their agricultural problems.

The Lumb Commission reported that the educational system was unimpressive and unsatisfactory, and its weakest link was the teachers, who trained their pupils in what was useless and impractical. This Commission recommended, inter alia, an alteration in the training college curriculum. The curriculum of the elementary schools was also to be altered with a view to bringing both curricula closer to the need of the country. The inclusion of practical subjects in the Mico College curriculum was to be seen to, and the College was to admit day students with a view to saving Government funds.

As a result of the Lumb Report greater emphasis was placed on the teaching of agriculture in schools. Summer courses in agricultural training were held for practising teachers. In addition, the Colonial Government was undoubtedly spurred to increase the tempo of activity in agricultural training in the first decade of the 20th century by the new agricultural development thrust from the British Government. Clearly, the Imperial Parliament wanted to see the Jamaican reforms in agricultural training extended throughout the British West Indian colonies. In a Circular Dispatch to the Governors of the British West Indian territories, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, in March 1889 directed that "every elementary school maintained or aided by the government should be required to set apart of certain fixed time every day for industrial

teaching, such teaching to include girls as well as boys.[39] He used industrial teaching in the wide sense then commonly in vogue to include both trade training and agricultural education.

In the wake of this new "thrust" in agricultural training special grants were introduced and comprehensive schemes for Agriculture Education were formulated. The incentive of the grants resulted in a favorable response from many teachers who started "school gardens" in 1900-1901 with satisfactory results.[40] One inspector, for instance, reported for the year 1909-1910 an increase in the number of schools with gardens in his district from 17 to 35; another reported an increase from 20 to 32 within the year. The teaching of the subject was considered to be satisfactory, too, and the claim was made that the schools had begun to have an influence on the neighboring peasant farmers, as evidenced by the improved condition of the farms. The grants earned by the schools for agriculture tended to bear out the judgment that the quality of agricultural practice had improved.

This preoccupation of the British Government with Agricultural training grew out of general Imperial policy determining the relationship between England and its colonies. As British manufacturers faced more intense competition from their counterparts in Germany and the United States, Britain began to find the idea of a self-sufficient Empire more acceptable than free trade. Gradually colonial raw materials and markets began to look more economically favorable and politically secure.[42]

Joseph Chamberlain accelerated the shift away from the free trade, laissez-faire policy to a mild system of imperial preference. His attempt to tie the colonies more closely to Britain in a customs union was too strong a measure for the British Parliament.[43] He was more successful in modifying the laissez-faire policy with milder action that respected both the wishes of British free-traders and the sensitivity of the protectionist Dominions. He appointed Imperial Trade Commissioners to assist in the development of intra-Imperial trade. He allowed colonies to borrow at preferential rates of interest on the London money market and strengthened Imperial communications by expanding postal facilities and subsidizing intra-Imperial cables. With some foresight, he recognized that if the colonies were to be vigorous trading partners, then more than just improved communications and trade links would be necessary. That vast, undeveloped estate that he held the Empire to be could be developed to the mutual benefit of Britain and the colonists if British capital and technology were applied to its resources.[44]

The West Indian colonies were among the first to gain advantage from this policy. In 1898, Chamberlain established the Imperial Department of Tropical Agriculture to carry out research into the best varieties of cane and to find improved methods of cultivation. The School of Tropical Medicine was also an outgrowth of this policy.[45] But his most important contribution to West Indian agriculture was his success in getting Britain to break decisively from her free-trade policy in 1902 and prohibit the import of cheap bounty-supported sugar. For the first time since 1870 the West Indian sugar producers were able to compete successfully against

European beet sugar in the British market.

While this policy of colonial development might seem laudable on the surface, it had limitations that severely affected education policy in Jamaica and other tropical dependencies. The policy sought to keep England as the industrial heartland of a vast, tightly knit Empire and the colonies as providers of raw materials and consumers of the products of English industry. For such a scheme to work, the colonies had to be kept in a dependent and largely powerless position through economic, political, and military structures, and had to be led to accept and operationalize their subordinate role through the acquisition of appropriate skills.[46]

The British development plan for the West Indies as an agricultural adjunct to industrial Britain was given further shape by Chamberlain's directive to West Indian Governments to expand the peasant sector of the economy. As earlier discussed, he advised the governments to increase peasant holdings through the sale of Crown lands or the purchase and resale of private estates in order to create permanent settlements and to discourage squatting.[47] Any doubt remaining as to the place of the West Indies in the Imperial scheme of things was dispelled by the preamble to Chamberlain's Circular of 11 March 1899 on the need for Agricultural training. He stated there quite bluntly that "agriculture is and must always, as far as can be seen, remain the principal industry of the West Indies."[48]

The role of the elementary school in Agricultural training as far as the colonial state was concerned was the provision of a general introduction to the subject, a vocational orientation rather than

specific skill training. The Superintending Inspector of Schools did not see much room in elementary education for the teaching of craft or agricultural skills; the main purpose of such an education in his view was the provision of basic knowledge.[49] When the Government embarked on the encouragement of agricultural education through the system of grants and summer school training for teachers, he explained that the purpose was simply to give in the elementary schools the foundation for a future vocation.[50]

The Government's plan for agricultural education at the elementary level was also designed to achieve other objectives: to create interest and sympathy among the adult population for agricultural education in order to erode the old antipathies to manual labor and to the teaching of agriculture to children in the elementary schools; and to train teachers for the new requirements respecting the teaching of agriculture. Inspector of Schools, J.R. Williams, explained that these objectives grew out of an evaluation of the earlier attempts at agricultural education. It had been found that the Government's previous expectations regarding the teaching of agriculture at the elementary level had been too high given the prejudices of the mass of the people against the subject.[51]

The failure to develop agricultural skills through elementary schools was evident within a few years of the passing of the Education Act of 1892. If, as it was argued, planter agriculture needed to be stimulated to accelerate economic growth, a higher level of skills in the subject had to be developed. Thus a shift in governmental policy towards higher agricultural education came in 1896 as a direct

outgrowth of the switch in policy from elementary education to agricultural development. The Government, after 1895, was faced with a stagnant economy, declining tax revenues, and growing expenditures.

A powerful driving force was needed to propel the economy out of its depression, and, spurred on by Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial state chose agriculture rather than education as the engine to do the job. The Governor's report for 1899/1900 made the policy clear; it was stated there that "the special attention of the Government is and must be increasingly devoted to the improvement of the Colony's agriculture."[51] A substantial part of the Government's scarce revenue resources were from then on directed towards the development of the agricultural sector. While expenditure on education was frozen at under 60,000 pounds (sterling) until 1910, funds were increasingly made available for services supporting agriculture.

What was even more significant about this policy was its thrust towards planter rather than peasant agriculture. Peasant farming consisted largely of the production of tubers -- yams, potatoes, cassava -- for the domestic food market and of coffee for export. But the Government's initiatives were directed towards sugar and fruit production, making the upper-class planter community the main beneficiaries of the development program.

It is within this context of the development of planter agriculture that the Government's intervention in agricultural training and hence the growth of popular education has to be seen. Training in agriculture at the elementary level was designed to produce desired attitudes in the mass of the people not only in terms

of the development of their own peasant farms but also with respect to the labor that they were expected to provide on the sugar, banana, and citrus plantations. The Government also recognized that higher skills in the subject had to be developed to satisfy the needs of planter agriculture. The Superintending Inspector of Schools noted that in keeping with the policy of providing only a general introduction to the subject in elementary schools, special institutions would have to be established for training older children at the higher level.

While parents might have objected to agricultural training for their children in the elementary schools, this did not mean a blanket opposition to all forms of agricultural education. There was, in fact, a common pattern to lower-class opinion on the subject: strong objection to agricultural training in the elementary schools but equally strong advocacy of some form of higher agricultural education. The people were quite aware of their continued dependence on agricultural activity and, accordingly, were prepared to support institutions that could enhance such activity. That was the position taken by laborers from Portland in their representation to the Commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry, 1896. Among other requests they asked for the establishment of two or three government farm schools in each parish to teach the laboring class proper methods of working.[52]

Some teachers of elementary schools and teachers' associations also called for similar institutions. Somerville, aware of parental objections to agricultural training at the elementary level,

suggested instead specialized agricultural institutions serving several districts. J.R. Nixon, an "unemployed teacher," wanted an agricultural school in every parish teaching agricultural chemistry, animal physiology, and the cultivation of local food crops, in addition to secondary education subjects such as algebra and geometry. The scheme of J.A. Stewart, teacher of the Church of England School in Browns Town, was not as ambitious, but he also recommended an institution separate from the elementary schools for training in agricultural skills. He thought that thirty such schools scattered around the country would be about adequate to the needs of the people and within the budgetary limits of the government. The Jamaica Union of Teachers (JUT), founded in 1894, supported this position. Its official position was that elementary education could make provision for the development of agricultural skills if it involved nothing more than simple demonstration lessons in pots or on small plots of land adjoining the school. The JUT advocated, for the full development of such skills, special schools catering to children over the age of 14, the graduates of the elementary schools.[53] Resolutions from member associations supporting this position appeared at almost every annual conference of the JUT between 1905 and 1920.[54]

The opinion of one consistently determined defender of the interests of the lower class, Dr. Robert Love, needs to be mentioned. Love, as earlier noted, was the black publisher and editor of The Jamaica Advocate, and in this periodical he also placed his influence behind the establishment of special agricultural schools

offering post-elementary training. As the colonial state began to expand provisions for training in agricultural skills within the elementary school system, the Advocate came out stridently against the teaching of the subject at that level. Claiming that there was too much emphasis on agriculture in schools, it charged that the Government was pressing the subject onto the people against their best interests. Responding to a Government appeal for greater interest in agriculture, the Advocate replied:

> It is rung in their ears "ad nauseam" that this is an agricultural country and recently a very high official is reported to have said to a gathering of school children that we may "all have to go to agriculture." Whatever was meant by the term "all" it is safe to say that he did not mean either himself or his class. . . . . Now every country in the world on which the sun shines six months in the year is an agriculture country and yet it is not deemed necessary to fix the minds of the young on nothing else but agriculture. . . . This trying to fix certain people in certain places is simply foolish. . . . Men are not going to be tillers of the soil simply because some other men demand that they shall be. They will turn to it and work it when they perceive that their interests will be advanced by so doing. Most of all they are not going to till other men's lands in order to enrich the latter whilst they gain nothing but abject poverty and dependence.

The Advocate did not stop there. In a subsequent issue it invoked what amounted to a conspiracy theory to explain the Government's renewed emphasis on elementary agricultural training:

> It is evident to us that there are forces silently though diligently at work to ignore all the traditions and principles of the past. . . . The aim and tendency of those . . . agents are to force agriculture into the common schools, and to force the children of the country into the fields and plantations of a master class and thus to create serfs of the soil for the benefit of selfish and dominating planters.55

The Advocate asserted that it was not against agricultural training but against any form of compulsory agricultural training in the elementary schools.

The Advocate was not alone in its suspicion of a racist or class conspiracy in agricultural training. The JUT through its president, G.L. Young, also voiced a similar suspicion. In his opening address to the annual conference of the JUT in 1906, he confirmed the stand of the JUT in favor of the teaching of the rudiments of agriculture in elementary schools as long as the practical work did not entail more than the simplest agriculture processes. But the JUT was still against any attempt to divert effort away from "useful elementary education in subjects such as reading, writing, arithmetic, scripture, etc." and towards the advancement of practical "weeding" and other simple skills already acquired by the child at home. Young joined the Advocate in complaining that too much emphasis was being placed on elementary agricultural education and suspected that all the concern was being directed "to deprive the son of the peasantry of a more useful education." For this suspicion to be removed, he advised, all secondary schools should include the practical teaching of agriculture in their curricula in the same proportion as in the elementary schools. If agricultural training was not being used to deny upward occupational mobility to the sons of the peasants, then, he said, "if the cry is back to the soil, let it be heard in the Hall as well in the Hut, in the secondary as well as in the primary schools."[56]

Another institutional outlet for the expression of lower-class opinion appeared with the formation of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in 1914 in Kingston by Marcus Garvey, a disciple of Dr. Love. This organization through its manifesto also called for the establishment of institutions of higher education for the teaching of agriculture and the trades. Garvey hoped to set up "industrial colleges" in Jamaica modelled on Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute. He planned to visit Washington at Tuskegee to get his advice, but by the time he arrived in the United States Washington had died.[57]

Thus most groups in Jamaican society supported the idea of higher agricultural education. They shared a somewhat vague hope that such higher training could materially improve the island's agricultural output. But aside from that, Professor Trevor Tarner perceptively observed:

> each social class looked to higher agricultural education to satisfy its particular needs. The middle class saw where it could provide them with the skills to make them employable in middle-level managerial and technical positions on plantations, in teaching, and in the expanding agricultural arm of the civil service. The upper-class plantocracy would welcome the chance to draw on a body of reasonably skilled agricultural technicians and managers. The lower class wanted access to a high-level institution to provide yet another avenue of upward occupational mobility.[58]

Unfortunately, this wish was frustrated by their lack of power in the society. The one institution of higher agricultural education that was provided was priced out of their reach.

As the funds from bequests, left particularly from wealthy planters to support private secondary education, began to taper off in the early post-emancipation period, the question of public support for education beyond the elementary stage arose with the extension of popular education. The consensus of opinion was that secondary education should be supported. The decision makers (missionaries and plantocrats) felt that the middle classes deserved and needed an education superior to that being offered to the poorer classes in the elementary schools, and because, with the decline in the fortunes of sugar, the majority of the white ruling class could no longer afford to send their children "home" to England to be educated. The system of elementary education catered for the lower classes, while the system of secondary education was designed to cater as exclusively for the middle and upper classes. The systems therefore were quite separate and distinct from each other and reflected the main class lines of the society as well as the prevailing view of the nature of the society.[59]

The dynamic for secondary schools came from missionary bodies. As early as 1835, John Sterling, commenting on the missionary proposals for the freed slaves in the West Indies, had confirmed that he could see no progress being made unless some "more mature education" went with the development of primary education. He suggested that day schools with boarding facilities should be established which would be open to those of <u>all</u> classes and colors who could pay a nominal fee.[60] But the missionaries with limited resources endeavored to meet the more urgent priorities: elementary education for the masses, and teacher education for the elementary schools.

In 1837, the need for schools of a superior order was again stressed, this time by Charles Latrobe, the British Inspector for Schools. He, however, unlike Sterling did not conceive of secondary education for all classes in the society. He pointed out the need for "Private Schools of a superior order in which the highest classes of the island could meet with liberal education."[61] This suggestion was to be prophetic of the future development of secondary education; but it was not until 1879 that any long-term plan was made to provide money for secondary education from public funds. In the interim, private schools for the middle and upper classes were sponsored by missionary bodies and private individuals. Indeed, as Shirley Gordon noted:

> There has been an appreciable amount of private education in the West Indies available for those who could pay for it at all levels of society. Many of those private schools have aimed at superior education for the white children whose parents could not afford or did not wish to send them abroad and, in many cases, as the coloured [racially mixed] families became more prosperous, for the middle classes in general.62

The question of public support for education beyond the elementary level arose with the extension of popular education after emancipation. The religious bodies showed interest from the very beginning of their activities in the West Indies. They were by the 1840s becoming concerned about the education of their own children. Yet, interestingly enough, the schools that they were providing for the mass of former slaves were apparently not good enough for their children. In addition to the concern for their own personal needs, the religious bodies were motivated by denominational considerations.

The Protestant missionary societies, for instance, needed better educated Jamaicans to become "catechists" and "school masters" as evidenced in the following excerpt from a "Plan for Promoting the Education of Youth":

> It is deemed of essential importance in order to further the general education and religious instruction of the population that a sort of High School should be established within convenient districts, wherein Black and Colpured might be qualified by a suitable course of education to become themselves efficient Schoolmasters and Catechists.63

A Methodist missionary had hoped that a new colleague's best students would become "ministers" and "lawyers." H.B. Britten, in an address to a Methodist Missionary society, said:

> I trust he will remain long enough in the missionary field, to see some of the stable emancipated infants we are now receiving in our schools, respectably and successfully occupying their stations in the pulpit, on the bench and at the bar. Let the 'liberal and comprehensive principles' of H.M. Government be brought to bear on them and there is little doubt that such will be the result. Your missionaries can furnish from their schools some fine specimens of superior intellect and consequent aptitude in learning.64

Thus the desire to recruit and train Jamaicans for the ministry, for teaching and for the professions provided incentive, while the advantage of having an educated elite among the laity as "influential members of the community" was not underestimated.65

There were criticisms of the secondary schools on the grounds that they were exclusive preserve of the sons of plantocrats and the "transient English civil servants." Furthermore, there were hardly any scholarships so that, whether color was a feature of selection or not, only those who could pay fees were in fact eligible for more advanced education.

The foundation of four of the oldest High Schools -- Munro, Rusea's Titchfield and Mannings -- may be cited as examples of the exclusive nature of secondary education established before emancipation, with its metropolitan orientation. All the inputs into the fledgling system -- teachers, curriculum, books, ideas and values -- were directly imported from Britain. But one of the implications of this type of education was that it served to permeate the system with, and perpetuate, the discriminating values in a society that was marked and marred by a social code of dominance -- subservience relationships. As Shirley Gordon pointed out:

> For West Indians, secondary education was a means of emulating and competing with English colonial administrators and professional people. In most cases they welcomed a pale replica of English secondary or public school education as a means of showing that they could qualify in the same way as Englishmen for posts that Englishmen filled in the West Indies.66

Side by side with this elitist brand of secondary education were private and secondary schools, day or boarding, that sprang up exclusively for the children of planters, merchants and expatriates resident in Jamaica or in the neighboring West Indian territories. The concept that secondary education could be, and did in fact become, at least for the privileged minority who could afford it, a powerful economic instrument in the achievement of upward social mobility, gained ground and spread rapidly.

As in the case of elementary education, the first sustained attempt by the colonial state to provide a system of secondary education came with the reform of social institutions after the 1865 Morant Bay "rebellion." The newly imposed "direct rule" from Whitehall via the Crown Colony

system, together with the autocratic powers invested in the British Governors implied a huge colonial bureaucracy. If elementary education was intended to fit the black lower class for positions as state and general laborers, peasant farmers, artisans and unemployed in the "new" social order, then secondary education was to be supported to provide a privilege white elite of secondary echelon colonial staff for the professions. As Ruby King noted, secondary education after 1870 was intended for the children of those men comprising:

> the "lower" professions such as teachers, clergymen, the less successful attorneys, doctors, clerks, and the more successful small farmers, many of whom were increasing their standing in the community as more and more small settler crops were finding markets overseas. These were the people whose sons and daughters were to be provided with secondary education: middle grade secondary education as befitting their position in the middle grade of society.[67]

The British and the Colonial Governments perceived the objective of education as maintaining and reinforcing the pyramidal social and economic structure of the plantation-based economy. In 1879, two years after the arrival of Anthony Musgrave as second Governor of Jamaica under Crown Colony,[68] the Jamaica Schools Commission, which was to be responsible for the administration of secondary education till 1950, was established and invested with the duty of providing "education of a higher grade" for "those classes of the community who would value it, if it were placed within their reach but whose means do not enable them to send their children to Europe for the purpose of receiving it."[69]

The parallel between educational developments in Britain and those in the colonial periphery is remarkable. It is thus necessary

to examine briefly the origin of the idea for the Jamaica School Commission so as to emphasize the cultural impact of the Imperial power on the colonial possession. The idea of forming a commission to administer schools was by no means an original one. In this respect, a notable precedent was already in existence.

> During the middle years of the nineteenth century, the British government had appointed commissions for the purpose of inquiring into and making recommendations for the improvement of existing educational institutions in England. The Newcastle Commission, the University Commissions, and the Clarendon Commission had inquired into and reported on elementary, university, and public school education, respectively. Finally in 1884 the Taunton Commission was appointed to inquire into "middle-class" education, the bulk of which was being provided by the old endowed schools. The Endowed Schools Commission was appointed to carry out the recommendations of the Taunton Commission. When the Jamaica Schools Commission was established it was evidently formed in the image of the English Endowed Schools Commission.70

Indeed, English administrators felt they had answers to West Indian problems from the solutions only just adopted in the schools system of England.[71] Thus educational ideas and institutions originating in England often were "exported" to alien environment of the colonies.

As Ruby King further pointed out, the English Endowed Schools Commission "published 317 schemes for particular schools, which, by charging fees and by carefully dividing the schools into three grades with different age limits and curricula, in effect provided the middle class in England with a subsidized system of secondary education, thus underlining and reinforcing class distinctions."[72] This procedure is remarkably similar in detail to that followed by the Jamaica Schools

Commission during the initial phase of its work.

It is also instructive to note that these developments in England took place at a time, as King explained:

> when changes in recruitment for the army and civil service placed greater emphasis on education, when the landed gentry were becoming more conscious of the encroachments of the merchant class, and when the middle and upper classes as a whole had been challenged by popular working-class movements such as Chartism. Both Tory and Liberal governments felt impelled to pacify the working class and strengthen the middle class by devising and supporting a system of education for the poorer classes which would make them more efficient as factory hands or farm labourers and would keep them in their proper places. For the middle classes, a system was devised which would enable them to play their pre-ordained roles in the middle reaches of society more effectively.[73]

This conception -- that social class and status in the society was determined by birth, wealth, and to a lesser extent creed -- found a close parallel in the colonial Jamaican situation, except that in this plantation society the class lines had been further reinforced by the circumstances of color.

It is also necessary to examine the composition of the Jamaica Schools Commission to note its exclusive membership. As defined by law, the seven members of the Commission were appointed by the Governor. The Chief Justice became the first chairman. The other members comprised the Superintending Inspector of Schools, the Attorney-General, a representative of the Anglican Church, and two representatives of the nonconformists.[74] This remained, in essence, the pattern of composition of the Commission throughout the long years of its existence. "The prominent public officials gave weight and importance to the Commission, and the inclusion of representatives

of the religious interests ensured their acceptance of this situation if not their active support."[75] Representatives of black lower-class leadership were conspicuous by their absence. Secondary education was clearly not being conceived for Jamaica's majority population.

The law which established the Jamaica Schools Commission, provided that it would establish schools in a hierarchical order of three grades from the Trusts set up in the 18th century. It also provided that property and funds from the Walton Free School (the Walton Trust) in the parish of St. Ann should be vested directly in the Commission to be used to establish the Jamaica High School (later Jamaica College). Some of the other provisions of law 34 of 1879 governing the functions of the model High School and the Commission are summarized by King as follows:

> This school [the Jamaica High School] was to provide a liberal education and promote higher education. The curriculum should include Latin, Greek, mathematics, natural science, and modern languages. It was to provide free education for a limited number of foundationers and was to be open to all religious denominations under the conscience clause. Private pupils were to be allowed. The Commission would appoint and pay masters and visit and inspect the school once a month. The Commission was to have definite powers over the school, governing the admittance and removal of scholars; the number of scholars and foundationers, the admission of day scholars, the discipline of the school, the course of study and system of examinations, the appointment and remuneration of examiners, the auditing of school accounts, and even the establishment of prizes and exhibitions.[76]

In establishing the secondary system, the Commission first reorganized the Jamaica Free School (Walton) as a model or "first grade" school to form of the Jamaica High School. This High School

was fed by the most able students from the other endowed schools thereby placing it at the apex of the fledgling system. Many of the boys came to the school on "Drax or Open Foundations." There were ten Drax Scholarships which were reserved for boys from the parish of St. Ann under the terms of the Drax Trust, and twelve Foundation Scholarships, one for each of the other parishes.[77] Understandably, there was keen competition for the full scholarships. In the case of the Drax Scholarships, the boys had to have a knowledge of Latin -- a condition which "automatically disqualified all but the most fortunate who could afford private coaching or who were already in a secondary school."[78] In case of the Foundation Scholarships, it was the one boy in each parish usually nominated by the Custos who got the chance. Not surprisingly, as King again explained,

> the lower class had no opportunity of reaching the Jamaica High School, as the qualifications for entry were either the ability to pay fees, membership of a higher social class, or some previous exposure to secondary schooling. The boys were in the main sons of solid middle-class families, as the sons of upper-class families continued to go to English Grammar schools.[79]

This situation remained unchanged until 1892 when the colonial regime started to award six scholarships annually under the new secondary education code, the winners of which would receive free secondary schooling.[80] The very fact that "they were open to students from secondary as well as from elementary schools precluded the possibility of any elementary school child winning an award."[81] Most of the boys, then, had parents who could "afford to give them a start in the world."[82]

What emerged from the Commissions' work to develop the secondary school system was the hierarchical organization of Trust schools. Having firmly established the High School, which they saw as first grade school, the Commission drew up schemes for other schools of the old Trust schools, Munro or Potsdam was already developing as rival to the High School. By 1890, others such as Mannings, Titchfield, Rusea's, and Manchester had been recognized. All these schools, except Potsdam, were providing "middle grade" education. Some Trusts did not as yet maintain a school but used the money to fund scholarships to other schools. Thus by 1890 the secondary system began to assume a definite structure.

The "middle class" education provided through the endowed schools was designed to enable "the education of the middle class to keep pace with that obtained by the labouring class in the elementary schools."[83] Elementary education was seen not as a lever of social mobility for the working class but as a means of increasing the efficiency of prospective farm laborers. But the possibility of receiving advanced education through the system of scholarships to the Jamaica High School did provide some chance of upward mobility for the middle class.

Lower-class children could only aspire to secondary education if they could obtain scholarships. These were very few. The most valuable prizes available -- the Rhodes Scholarship, the Jamaica Scholarship, and the Sixty Pound Scholarship -- were awarded at the end of secondary schools and were clearly out of reach. "These went to children of the upper class which took them to Oxford and

Cambridge universities in England. Six scholarships, three for boys and three for girls, were at the time being awarded annually to candidates under 16 years of age who stood highest in the Honours List of the Cambridge Junior Local Examinations."[84] This too excluded the children of the lower class, since elementary schools did not prepare children for Cambridge examinations.

In addition to the Government scholarships there were in existence a number of Foundation Scholarships. If these were added, the Inspector of Schools, H.H. Piggott, estimates that 22 percent of the students in all secondary schools were obtaining their education free of cost and another 7 or 8 percent at reduced rates.[85] Since it was difficult if not impossible for lower class children to win Government Scholarships, and "selection for the Foundations and Exhibitions usually either was dependent on previous superior performance in secondary school or rested on the personnel recommendation of a local chairman or Board of Trustees, the system operated effectively to exclude them."[86] Thus money from Trust Funds was being used to subsidize the well-to-do in "public" secondary schools. Furthermore, the colonial regime was also helping the rich "by the payment of direct grant of 700 pounds (sterling) to the Jamaica College and by the comparatively high rate of interest on the appropriated capital from the various endowments."[87] The only other school then receiving a "grant-in-aid" was the Montego Bay Government School, which had received a grant of 360 pounds for the previous year.

Those students who failed to win the coveted prize of a Government Scholarship -- and these formed the vast majority -- looked forward to "white-collar" jobs as clerks in the colonial bureaucracy or commercial offices. Such Civil Service Examinations, as developed by the Jamaica Schools Commission, were intended to select candidates at this clerical level. And because of the vocational opportunities open to graduates of the secondary schools were few, places in the civil service were strongly competed for, the majority of candidates being those graduates of the secondary schools whose parents did not possess the means to send them to England to train for a profession. It was the best talents of the secondary schools who competed, and the Civil Service Examinations soon came to be used as a device for measuring the progress of the schools. The schools therefore applied their energies, not very successfully, to "obtaining as many certificates at as high a level as possible."[88] Indeed, secondary schools then and now were rated on the performance of a few high achievers.

As a result, the Cambridge Local Examinations became the passport for most "respectable" employment. In view of this, they had been allowed to assume, said the Inspector of Schools, an importance out of all proportion to their value, and their requirements tended to dominate the curriculum with its classical content.[89] There was much criticism of the failure of the secondary schools to adapt themselves to the circumstances and values of Jamaican or West Indian life. Largely because of the almost total absence of science teaching, and the resulting lack of technicians and agriculturists,

it was claimed that they did not make their contribution to economic development of the country.

Criticism of the essential classical nature of the secondary school curriculum led to an argument about the wisdom of the schools engaging in a classical education of the traditional European grammar school type rather than concentrate on a sound schooling in modern "utilitarian" subjects. Reliance on the Cambridge examinations, moreover, did not allow much experimentation with regards to local content. Even when the syllabuses were modified, the "approach was essentially bookish and verbal even in studies which might have been more appropriately learnt by practical experiment and observation."[90] It was perhaps because of such criticism why the Commission embarked on the experiment of teaching agriculture at the secondary level in 1899. Practical horticulture and agriculture were placed on the syllabus of Jamaica College "as an additional course, subject to appropriate staffing."[91]

A similar experiment in "agricultural training" was attempted at Montego Bay High School. However, there is no further evidence of sustained instruction in agriculture at the secondary level in the period to 1920. But aside from these limited experiments to broaden the curriculum, the private, grant-aided schools have followed their model faithfully. Parents, it seemed, preferred their children remain in the regular course to prepare for the Cambridge examinations.

This picture of the secondary schools in the late 19th century changed little either in the inter-war years or even in the early years

following the Second World War. Parents continued to see the secondary "grammar" schools as the place where their sons would be assured of a position of social respectability in the community if they secured "white-collar" jobs, and there was an increasing demand for it. But, in fact, the number of children who were able to get it in the proportion to the number seeking it and those who could benefit from the type that was being offered was very small. This was one of the points made in the West India Royal Commission Report when they looked, inter alia, into the system of education in Jamaica as late as 1939, following the working class riots and social upheaval of the previous year. The Report which was published in June, 1945 stated that:

> Secondary schools exist in the West Indies, many of which provide an excellent classical education, but they provide for only a small proportion even of the children who pass through the primary schools. As it is, unemployment is rife among the products of secondary education owing to the lack of suitable "white-collar" jobs and the disinclination of the pupils to take employment in agriculture as at present organized.92

This "disinclination" is not hard to explain. As D.R. Manley suggested:

> The individual frequently sees education as a major if not the main avenue of social mobility, and in the West Indies, in particular, with its highly stratified and relatively rigid class system, education provides one of the few important channels through which the lower social groups can climb into the relatively privileged vents of the middle classes.93

And he went on to point out that it is secondary or high school education which ensures the greatest employment opportunities for the future, and which carries the greatest prestige.

Thus by 1911, when the Inspector of Schools made his first report on the secondary schools, the Commission had failed to persuade the Regime that it should provide for secondary education. As a result the secondary system was still dependent on funds from endowments, churches, and fees. It was, however, becoming clear that any improvements in the provision of secondary schooling would have to come from public funds. By the second decade of the 20th century, though, the acceptance of and commitment to the idea of secondary education for the few if not for all was firmly rooted.

The period between the 1900-1938 has been recognized as one of comparative inactivity in education in the dual system. Towards the close of the 19th century the finances of the colonial state became precarious and it was decided to curtail expenditure in Government Departments; Education suffered severe retrenchment. The Lumb Commission of 1898 recommended that annual educational expenditure should be kept below a fixed sum. The adoption of this recommendation resulted in a period of stagnation which, though relieved by a number of innovations, lasted until 1938.[94] Even so the period witnessed the attempt to improve schooling, particularly at the secondary level, and to admit more children. At the secondary level, Government instituted a system of "grants-in-aid" under a regulation of 1921 which became law in 1924. By 1940, 23 secondary schools recognized as first- or second-grade schools were receiving grants varying in amount from 98 to 1,245 pounds (sterling). Despite this effort, a 1943 study revealed that only 3 percent of the population received secondary education, at a time when there was

increasing demand for it. The demand for secondary schooling had to await the advent of the education explosion in the wake of the profound political, constitutional and economic changes in the post-1945 period.

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE TREND TO STATE-CONTROLLED EDUCATION

Following the working class riots and social upheaval of 1938, the British Government sent out the Moyne Commission to investigate the social and economic conditions of Jamaica. After some fifteen months of investigation the Commission submitted a long and comprehensive report which severely indicted the Crown colony. The Commission chided the government for failing to make radical reforms and complained, inter alia, about the defective educational facilities. Overshadowing the Moyne Commission specific education recommendations, however, was its recommendations for "a gradual move towards Self-Government." The Order in Council of 1944 granting universal suffrage and an elected lower house was a different outgrowth of the protest of 1938 and the movement for de-colonization. With the introduction of universal adult suffrage into the colony by the 1944 Constitution, the political pace quickened under the middle-class leadership with rapid advances towards Self-Government in July, 1958 in preparation for Independence in August, 1962. All these changes in the political system, as has been seen, were to have their effects on the society as a whole and on the educational system in particular. A great expansion in education was the result. This phenomenon was not unique to Jamaica, however. As Professor Kazim Bacchus[95] has pointed out:

> The rapid expansion of education in most Commonwealth countries since World War II was strongly motivated by a number of factors including 'human rights' and 'economic' or 'human resource development' considerations. In those countries which already had universal primary education, like the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, the human rights concern was seen in their efforts to ensure greater equality of access to secondary education. In Canada, which already had a more egalitarian system of entry into secondary schools, the human rights concern was observed more in efforts to reduce the influence of cultural barriers like language and ethnicity on students' efforts at advancing up the educational ladder. In the economically under-developed Commonwealth countries (UDCs) the 'human rights' concern was seen in their desire to introduce universal primary education -- a consideration which emerged quite strikingly in the deliberations and recommendations of the Unesco conferences in Karachi, Addis Ababa and Santiago in the 1960s.

At about the same time that the "human rights" concern began to gather momentum, economists were discovering the important role played by the 'quality' of human resources in the process of economic growth. Further, they observed that in the underdeveloped countries human capital represented only about 10-15 percent of physical capital as against 38 percent in the developed countries and concluded that the differences in their human rather than in their physical capital resources better explained the differences in their economic development.[96] This general point of view was well expressed by Frederick Harbison, a noted human resource economist, who argued that "human resources, not capital or income nor material resources, constitute the ultimate basis for the wealth of nations."[97] It was from this concern about the preservation of human resources that neo-classical economists were stimulated to articulate the importance of "investment in human capital."

The Theory of Human Capital

It was in this context that the theory of human capital was formulated and promoted by neo-classical economists to explain the relationship between education, occupation, and labor income on the individual (micro) level; and between education and economic growth or development on the societal (macro) level. Economists have drawn on two very different areas of neo-classical economics in their formulation of human capital theory. "One strand is that of micro-economic investment theory which focuses on individual decision-making. The other is macro-economics, focusing on economic theories of growth."[98]

A classical formulation of the theory of human capital is contained in Theodore W. Schultz's presidential address, entitled "Investment in Human Capital," to the seventy-third annual meeting of the American Economic Association in St. Louis on 28 December 1960. The thrust of Professor Schultz's argument is that the process of acquiring skills and knowledge through education was not to be viewed as a form of consumption, but rather as a productive investment. "By investing in themselves, people can enlarge the range of choice available to them. It is the one way free men can enhance their welfare."[99] Investment in human capital, according to Professor Schultz, not only increases individual productivity and income, but, in so doing, lays the technical base for the type of labor force necessary for economic growth in modern industrialized capitalist societies.

Within five months of Professor Schultz's address on the theme of investment in human capital another influential development economist, Professor Sir Arthur Lewis, vigorously articulated the same theme, stressing the macro-economic aspect. In a paper first presented to the UNESCO Conference on the Educational Needs of Africa[100] held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15-25 May 1961, Professor Lewis argued that whatever economic resources may be available to underdeveloped countries for educational change should be disposed of in the light of clear distinctions regarding types of, and priorities in, education. He differentiates between "consumption" and "investment" education, noting that "investment" education "is the type which increases productive capacity"; and educational activity which tends to promote enjoyment of life and is unrelated to production is "consumption." From the perspective of economic development, which is the underdeveloped countries' special interest at present, "consumption" education is just like other forms of consumption -- as it were, competing on the same level with radio, entertainment or a choice of food. Lewis illustrates his distinction with this analogy: "Teaching an African cook to read may increase his enjoyment of life, but will not necessarily make him a better cook."[101] The central point is that which leads to productivity.

The theory of human capital was consonant with the forms of technological functionalism, the dominant paradigm among social scientists in the 1950s. This school of functionalism stressed both the technical function of education and the efficient use of human resources. The technical-function theory of education essentially states that as a result of technological innovations, there is a need

and consequently a demand for increased cognitive and technical skills in most occupations. Thus, the phenomenon of rising educational qualifications required for most occupations is seen as an inevitable result of modern industrialization and bureaucratization.[102]

It is therefore posited by the technical-function theory of education that cognitive and technical skills needed by workers are learned in school and that the acquisition of them will make those workers more productive than their less-educated counterparts. Based on these very important premises of the theory, expansion of the educational system, especially at the tertiary level, was seen as "functionally" necessary during the 1950s to provide workers with knowledge and skills required for job adequacy in a rapidly expanding and changing economy.

With its stress on the maximization of talent in the allocation of individuals to the occupational hierarchy, technological functionalists, criticized the existing system as elitist. Its compatibility with the "ideology of liberal progressivism" led naturally to criticism of conservative ideology and policies which dominated the system of education in Western Europe and North America prior to the late 1960s. The basis of the liberal criticism is that elitist systems of education are technically inefficient because of the wastage of talent from the lower classes. Liberal argument claimed, furthermore, that gross social inequality was neither rational nor just in times of fierce technological and scientific competition with the Soviet Union. Formal education, according to the functionalist argument, needed to be assigned an important role ". . . in the evolution of industrial, and particularly American, societies from particularism and ascription

to universalism and achievement."[103]

Thus, by the late 1950s one witnessed the traditional conservative conceptions of society coming under heavy criticism and a revitalizing of classical liberal notions of equality of opportunity and equalization of life chances. Conservatives, who believe that any society has only ". . . a limited pool of educable ability,"[104] and that social inequality is the natural and inevitable outcome of socially significant, genetically determined differences in intelligence between individuals (manifested in rigid class lines), lost ground to liberals during the 1960s -- but not without prolonged, heated public debate.

Despite its theoretical and empirical shortcomings,[105] human capital theory has had great world-wide influence on public policy since the late 1950s. Although one of the original aims of human capital theory was to provide a "rational" framework for policy decisions regarding efficient investment in the American educational system (which has expanded at a phenomenal [redacted] the post-war period), it achieved almost immediate acceptance and hegemony throughout the world as the model which governments, international agencies and universities would use in planning and implementing national and international programs for social and economic development.

Indeed, the idea of using the theory of human capital in underdeveloped countries "to help them achieve economic growth" was indicated by Professor Schultz's presidential address.[106] Struck by the rapid economic recovery of countries that had suffered massive

destruction of physical capital during the Second World War, Professor Schultz suggested that the "economic miracle" had been due, in no small part, to the reservoir of human capital that remained after the war. His conclusion was that underdeveloped countries, lacking in "the knowledge and skills required to take on and use efficiently the superior techniques of production,"[107] should be provided with aid designed to increase the quality of their human capital.

Various organizations such as the World Bank responded to Schultz's appeal by providing funds for economists of education to spread the gospel of human capital among the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Many countries of the Third World saw some truth in the theory and proceeded to organize their educational systems so as to promote economic growth.[108] But the appeal of human capital theory to institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank resided substantially in the "comforting ideological character of its message."[109] As Karabel and Halsey ruefully noted, in a critical analysis of the consequences of the theory,

> The nations of the Third World, the theory suggested, were poor not because of the structure of international economic relations but because of internal characteristics -- most notably their lack of human capital. As with the poor within the advanced countries, nothing in the situation of the Third World countries called for radical, structural change; development was possible if only they would improve the quality of their woefully inadequate human resources. Attention was thus deflected from structural variables onto individual.[110]

Application of this intellectual theorizing led to diverse and unsuccessful results by the end of the 1960s, and it came under vigorous assault thereafter.

The idea that education is capital in the same sense as material capital has had tremendous impact on "educational participation rates, the proportion of national budgets allocated to education, the administration of public systems of education, the size of public systems of education and their organizational structure, as well as the curricula and pedagogy."[111] Furthermore, the acceptance of the idea that the schools produce capital rather than consume it marked a definite shift in public policy which has been attributed to the efforts of neo-classical economists like Theodore W. Schultz and Sir W. Arthur Lewis in developing human capital theory. Thanks to them the transformation of the educational system from a restrictive, elitist model to an open, mass model occurred in a short time period. Human capital economics has indeed permeated public policy decisions regarding education and social welfare as well as social science research worldwide. The award of the 1980 Nobel Prize of Economics jointly to Professor Schultz and Sir Arthur Lewis is symbolic of the influence of human capital theory.

The Influence of Human Capital Theory on Public Policy in Jamaica and Its Frustrations

It is within the preceding conceptual framework that changes in the dual educational system in post-war Jamaica should be examined. As has been seen, Jamaica's middle-class leadership, like its Third World counterpart, was influenced by neo-classical development ideology which suggested that it was the modern sector of the economy of underdeveloped countries that would spearhead their development.

Jamaica, accepting this development ideology, embarked upon the diversification of its plantation agriculture via foreign investment in industrial manufacture. As a consequence of this new industrial sector several important trends began to take shape in the post-war economy which have altered the form of development over the last three decades. These may be summarized as follows: there was the growth of new productive sectors in the economy; there was the introduction of new techniques of production as a consequence of diversification within the economy; the introduction of more modern industrial forms of technology causes the social relations of production, which characterize modern industrial economy, to develop more fully; and changes in the class structure take place in conjunction with changes in production.

In Jamaica, there were several important additions to the productive base which set in motion new forms of dependent development. Specifically these were the growth of the bauxite mining industry, tourism and the expansion of the "assembly-type" manufacturing sector of the economy. These specific changes in the structure of production and particularly in the nature of the productive process itself have crucial ramifications. For example, the proportion of the labor force engaged fully and directly in wage labor increases. This is evidenced by the data in Table 7.2. Between 1943 and 1970 the percentage of wage earners in the labor force increased by nearly 16 percent. This means that the working class had begun to grow both in absolute and relative terms. What is also critical is the growth in number and proportion of workers employed in relatively large-scale industrial forms of production. As Professor Keith again has pointed

out, these tendencies have contradictory aspects:

> one such contradiction is that while creating a solid economic base for an industrial proletariat, the growth of the proletariat relative to the overall labor force is limited because industrialization itself occurs within very narrow confines. In fact, the surplus of workers (reserve army of labor) grows at an alarming rate. While a massive reserve army is in the interests of employers economically, it creates problems of social control and political management.112

TABLE 7.2

PERCENTAGE OF WAGE AND NON-WAGE EARNERS IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1943-1970

Category of Worker	1943	1960	1970
Wage Earner	56.1	59.6	71.9
Non-Wage Earner	43.9	40.4	28.1
TOTAL	100	100	100

Sources: G.E. Cumper, "A Comparison of Statistical Data on the Jamaican Labor Force 1953-1961," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 13 (December 1964): 430-439 and Sherry Keith, op. cit., p. 43.

These trends have implications for the educational system. The growth of an industrial working class intensifies the need for education as a result of incipient industrial development in capitalist countries. However, one of the major obstructions to the evolution of a modern, mass educational system which meets specific short- and long-term exigencies of capitalist development is the already rigidly established system of schools tightly bound to the plantation phase of capitalism and colonial ideology.[113] This is the dual educational

system or what Reginald Murray, former Dean of Education at the Jamaica Campus of UWI, called a "two-system system":[114] that is, the primary schools for the masses and the private preparatory schools and secondary "grammar" schools for the elite. These two forms of schooling conform to the requirements of the colonial class system: the private preparatory schools and especially the secondary schools taking in an extremely limited section of middle-class and ruling-class students who were prepared in the most traditional type of English public school curriculum for a limited range of professions and for the lower eschelons of the colonial bureaucracy. These schools were closely controlled by and identified with the interests of colonial ruling classes -- landowners, big merchants, a small core of professionals (especially doctors and lawyers) -- who paid for the privilege of educating their children with the expectation that formal secondary education was the class prerogative of an elite and neither the right nor the need of the peasantry or working class. The colonial middle- and ruling-class monopoly on secondary education generated a series of conflicts in the post-war period stemming from modifications taking place in the new social class system -- an outgrowth of the modern, industrial sector theory of development.

Increasing State Control of Education

The change of political constitution in 1944 together with the requirement of the new industrial sector of the economy signaled the growth of the bureaucracy, especially in education. In its attempt to establish a "centralized" system of education, the

Government created a germinal Ministry of Education in which the Director of Education became more and more the Advisor of the Ministry. In 1953, when Jamaica adopted full ministerial responsibility, the two posts of Director of Education and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare were combined and held by one official.[115] In fact, the educational bureaucracy -- at the clerical, professional and administrative levels -- has expanded more rapidly than the increase in school places within the educational system over four decades when the Government first assumed only partial financial responsibility for primary and secondary education. Moreover, the state has centralized responsibility for organizing and planning all expansions, additions and modifications of the educational system. This was previously carried out by channeling funds to religious and charitable organizations which directed and administered educational developments.

The growth in administrative and planning functions of the state paralleled its expanded financial role. As late as 1936, for instance, the Educational Department of the Colonial Administration had assumed only partial financial responsibility for elementary and secondary education and provided 2,823 Jamaican dollars in scholarships for university education abroad.[116] It should be emphasized that a large proportion of the elementary schools were still church-owned and operated, and all the secondary schools were privately controlled although slightly less than half received government grants in aid. By the 1970s, however, the overwhelming proportion of expenditure on education -- as well as the number of

school places at all education levels -- had been brought under direct government control as evidenced in Table 7.3. The percentage of government-sponsored schools tripled between 1936 and 1974 while the total number of schools increased only slightly. The Ministry of Education had assumed one hundred percent of the recurrent financial responsibility for "junior" secondary schools and gave grant-in-aid places to forty secondary "high" or "grammar" schools (approximately 90 percent of those in existence). Additionally, the Government had become the sole supporter of post-secondary education including teacher training, agricultural and technical education, and university education (see the structure of the Jamaican educational system in Figure 7.1 and 7.2).

Although there has been a dramatic and rapid move to direct state control of education in the post-war period, the expansion of secondary school places -- which has been the major concern of the state's increasing involvement -- has been gradual and piecemeal. The truth is that a society so class-divided could not all of a sudden be converted to the idea of a shift in emphasis from the elitist concept of education to one of civil rights and the needs of national economic strategy. During the reforming 1930s and 1940s attempts were made in Jamaica to put an end to the dual system of education by bringing secondary and elementary education under the same direction, but it was not until 1950 that a body (The Education Authority) was created for the purpose. Local conservatism continued to be reinforced by the "superior" reliability of the externally controlled school leaving examinations.[117]

Table 7.3

Percentage of Government and Non-Government Sponsored Primary Schools

Sponsor	1936	1944	1963	1974
Government	23.2	28.9	59.3	66.9
Denominational and Other	76.8	71.1	40.7	33.1
Total Number of Schools	652	667	738	719

Sources: Ministry of Education 1936, 1944, 1954, 1963, 1974 and Keith, op. cit., p. 44.


Figure 7.1

Current Structure of the Education System (1977)

Levels	Institutions	Ages	Grades
1. Pre-Primary	Infant Schools, Infant Departments; Basic Schools	4-5	-
2. Primary and All-Age	Primary Schools	6-11+	1-6
	All-Age Schools	6-14+	1-9
3. First-Cycle Secondary	New Secondary Schools	12-14+	7-9
	Comprehensive High Schools:		
	High Schools	12-14+	7-9
	Technical High Schools	13-14+	8-9
4. Second-Cycle Secondary	New Secondary Schools	15-17	10-11
	Comprehensive High Schools	15-17	10-11
	High Schools	15-18+	10-11
	Technical High Schools	15-17+	10-11
	Vocational Schools	15-17	
5. Teacher Training	Teachers Colleges	Entry at 17+	
6. Continuing Education	Community Colleges	15 -	
	Non-Formal Education Centres		
7. Further	College of Arts, Science and Technology (CAST)	Entry at 17+	
	Jamaica School of Agri.	Entry at 17+	
	Cultural Training Centre	Entry at 17+	
	University of West Indies		

Figure 7.2

FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM (1977)



The Jamaica Local Scholarship examinations were reformed during the 1940s through the use of modern psychological testing methods, but this did not change the picture much. Many of the children performing best in the examinations still failed to get admitted: they could not afford the attendant costs, which included fees. Up until 1956, the secondary high schools continued to have the pick of the young talents. Large numbers of children of secondary school age still remain in the schools in which they received their primary education. Moreover, the preparatory schools still tend to guarantee entry to coveted secondary education, and no device was yet found to redress the balance in favor of primary (elementary) candidates.

Educational Reform

With the achievement of the status of full internal Self-Government in 1957, the PNP Government of Norman W. Manley saw the need for democratizing secondary education and expanding the facilities for every type of secondary education to meet the growing demand for qualified personnel in every field of activity was recognized.[118] The Government, through its "National Plan for Jamaica," appeared to have accepted the major tenets of neo-classical theory of human capital and embarked on a shift away from the previously elitist model of education. Professor Sir Arthur Lewis, who, as development economist, has had the greatest influence on public policy decisions in the Commonwealth Caribbean, argued that underdeveloped countries such as Jamaica experiencing rapid growth rates as a result of the

expansion in the modernized sector of the economy, need to expand secondary rather than primary education. "Failure to make adequate provision for secondary education," he warned, "is a major handicap to economic development."[119] Sir Arthur pointed out that graduates of Secondary schools are the "officers and non-commissioned officers of an economic and social system." These schools, he emphasized,

> supply the persons who with one or two more years of training in institutions or on the job become technologists, secretaries, nurses, school teachers, bookkeepers, clerks, civil servants, agricultural assistants and supervisory workers of various kinds. The middle and upper ranks of business consist almost entirely of secondary school products, and these products are also the backbone of public administration. To have to import large numbers of people at this level, paying them in salaries and allowances two to three times what they could get in rich countries is a blow to most development schemes.[120]

Finally, Sir Arthur stated that the proportion of the population needed in secondary schools is a function of development. He then proceeded to calculate the percentage of age cohort who should receive secondary education in Jamaica. He argued that in a community like Jamaica, where the modernized sector of the economy employs only about a half of the population, and is still making inroads into those engaged in the traditional sector (farming, petty trading and domestic service), secondary school type jobs grow faster than the normal rate of growth of national income, since they depend mainly on the growth of the public sector and other service industry. Noting that the rate of growth in Jamaica then was 6 percent per annum, Sir Arthur calculated that the percentage of the age cohort required in secondary grammar schools is 10 percent. To validate this figure, he reasoned that in most underdeveloped

countries, parents of about 8 to 12 percent of children who start primary education want these children to go on to secondary education of the grammar school type; and where government schools are not provided, many private schools of very poor quality, charging low fees, spring up to meet the demand. "If good grammar schools are provided for 10 percent of children entering primary school," Sir Arthur concluded, "this will just about meet both parental demand and also absorptive capacity."[121]

The aforementioned theorizing clearly implied a widening of opportunity for secondary education to meet the needs of the then "booming" modern sector of Jamaica's dual economy. The innovation of the Common Entrance Examination (CEE) and the granting of an increased number of awards to the traditional secondary grammar and technical high schools were to be the main instruments for effecting greater democratization, while the number of places in these schools was to be increased to allow for an increase in enrollment of 160 percent over the ten-year period 1957 to 1967. It was recognized that even with this increase, which would bring the number of students in high schools and technical schools to 26,000 by 1967, only some 10 percent of the school population 11-plus years of age would be provided for, and consequently some children of secondary "calibre" would have to remain in their senior departments of all-age schools[122] or in the New Senior Schools to be established in areas of dense population.[123] In the thinking of the educational planners of 1957, the vast majority of the children who would be left behind were "not of the high school type," but since these children as well as those

of "secondary calibre" were destined to become "the workers and citizens of tomorrow," and since the country could not afford to waste its valuable human resources, the quality of education which they received should be improved. Efforts were therefore to be made to broaden the curricula for post-primary schools and departments and to provide for each unit a workshop, a modest science laboratory, a domestic science department, and a small farm project.[124] Subsequent educational plans have sought to broaden and extend these ideas.

Up until 1957, admission to secondary schools was largely determined by the schools themselves with the provision made for a small number of scholarships to be allowed to the children of poor parents; and in 1954 the number of places available in the high schools was in the region of 8,000; in 1956, 9,000.[125] What this meant in effect was that most places would go to the children of those parents who could afford to pay for their education. An annual government award of 25 scholarships, called "Code and Unprovided Area Scholarships," augmented by 100 scholarships awarded by the schools was made until 1956 when the Government took over the responsibility for all scholarship awards which was increased to the annual figure of 485. The actual numbers of the scholarships which were provided for the four years commencing in 1956 and providing full fees and grant-in-aid are given by Professor Philip Vernon[126] in a study which he conducted entitled "Selection for Secondary Education in Jamaica," as follows:

Year	Scholarships
1956 (i.e. starting school year in January, 1957)	650
1957 (i.e. starting school year in January, 1958)	1,582
1958 (i.e. starting school year in January, 1959)	1,933
1959 (i.e. starting school year in January, 1960)	1,915

With the announcement of the Government's new educational program in 1957 there was a very substantial increase in the number of scholarships and free places tenable at the secondary high schools, and these were awarded to children between the ages of 10 years 5 months and 12 years 11 months on the strength of their performance on a government-set entrance examination (Common Entrance Examination). It was estimated that approximately 25 percent of the children falling within the specified age range did in fact sit the examination. The figures shown in Table 6.4 indicate the trend in the substantial increase in the number of free and fee-paying places open to children wishing to enter a high school.

The JLP's Education Policy

Further changes in regard to the selection for entry to the high schools occurred by 1962 in a desperate attempt to train the type of educated manpower needed on the one hand, and on the other, to give the children of the peasantry and the working class greater opportunity for secondary education without threatening the educational privileges of the urban professional strata. The first major step in this direction was taken by the JLP Government that came into office shortly before Independence on 6 August 1962.

Table 7.4

Results of Common Entrance Examination: 1957-1961

Year	No. of Examinees	Awarded Free Places on Gov't Scholarships		Eligible for Grant-in-Aid Places	
		Number	Percentage of Entry	Number	Percentage of Entry
1957	14,955	1,582	10.5	No data available	
1958	17,383	1,933	11.1	2,165	15.04
1959	17,522	1,915	10.9	2,599	14.8
1960	16,316	1,803	11.1	2,334	14.3
1961	18,159	2,134	11.7	1,815	10.0

Source: D.R. Manley, "Mental Abilities in Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 12 No. 1, 1963: 53.

One of the early acts of the new administration was to carry out an analysis of the 1961 Common Entrance Examination results on the basis of the number of entrants from the different types of schools and it was established by a Ministry Paper[127] that of the total number of scholarships and Free Place Awards, the percentage per type of school is as shown in Table 6.5. Having set out the data, the Paper then made its social claim:

> Surely social justice requires a new basis of award of these free places. It is therefore proposed that as from 1962-63, 70% of the available free places based on the Common Entrance Examination will be awarded to pupils from Primary Schools and 30% to pupils from other schools.[128]

In justifying this policy the Minister of Education, Edwin Allen, speaking in the Jamaican Parliament in 1962-63 Session, put it this way:

Table 7.5

Free Winners by Types of Schools (CEE, 1961)

Types of School and Location	No. of Candidates Entered	Free Places Gained	%
Primary Schools (in Kingston, Urban and Suburban St. Andrew)	3,053	333	10
Primary Schools (Rural)	11,177	645	6
Preparatory Schools (in Kingston, Urban and Suburban St. Andrew)	1,882	604	32
Preparatory Schools (Rural)	766	129	16
Grant-aided Secondary Schools	1,262	418	33

Source: Ministry Paper No. 31, 1962, p. 5. Schedule D.

> When it is considered that in 1961 there were 84,000 Primary School children eligible to sit and that they received a total of only 978 free places (including those awarded to teachers' children) while of 4,262 non-Primary children as many as 1,555 were awarded free places, this Government feels that injustice of this kind might result in making the poorer classes bitter and resentful.[129]

Having established the social justification as well as the educational logic of the 70:30 policy,[130] the Ministry Paper came full circle and ended on the socio-economic note which was really the basis of the reform and the thrust underpinning the entire proposal. In keeping with Allen's wish for some sort of segregation according to the means of parents, the Paper declared:

> . . . Parents will be asked to apply for scholarships and free places on the declaration that they are unable to pay the fees or could pay only under very severe financial strain.[131]

Allen hoped that this request would restrain many middle- and upper-class parents from applying for free places.

The 70:30 policy took effect in January 1963 when the school year began. Thus in that year and in all subsequent years 70 percent of students entering high schools with public assistance would be from primary schools and 30 percent from preparatory and secondary schools. As a result of this educational tinkering, secondary grammar school places began to expand, though still on severely limited basis as evidenced in Table 7.6. The result of this "reform" was twofold: it created the illusion that there had been a qualitative as well as quantitative change in educational opportunities for the masses when, in fact, the change was only marginal.[132]

The 1962 reform actually strengthened the elite basis of secondary grammar schools rather than democratizing them. The 70:30 scholarship system provided access to secondary schools for an extremely small proportion of children from peasant and working-class origin. As F.E. Nunes points out in a critical analysis of the policy,

> It led to discrimination against the poor and in favour of the better off. In the annual scramble for primary school places the poor suffered and the richer ones gained. It is ironic that this should be one consequence of a policy designed by Allen who had criticized PNP [Common Entrance Examination] policy for just those reasons. . . .[133]

The more educated parents of the private preparatory school children understood the legislation and the mechanism of the selection process and proceeded to find ways to beat the system. As Professor Murray, et al. have observed,

Table 7.6

Expansion of Schools' Enrollment by Educational Level, 1944-1980

Level	1944	1954	1962	1973	1980
Primary	171,455	209,717	300,426	434,551	424,514
Junior Secondary	--	--	--	53,331	98,722
Secondary Grammar	3,997	8,175	18,211	28,009	51,317
Technical Vocational	1,702	1,626	4,508	9,593	15,663
Teacher Training	218	340	535	2,143	5,311
Post Secondary	--	382	1,469	2,781	7,648
TOTAL	177,372	220,240	325,149	530,408	593,175

Sources: Sherry Keith, "An Historical Overview of the State and Educational Policy in Jamaica," Latin American Perspective, Vol. V No. 2, Spring 1978: 37-52; citing Department of Statistics, 1944; 1975: Table 38; Ministry of Education, 1967; and the author, citing Economic and Social Survey, 1980, National Planning Agency Kingston, Jamaica, 1980.

> When their resultant anger subsided, the better-off classes decided to beat the system. This they did by well-known methods, such as securing primary school registration for prospective Common Entrance candidates actually belonging to preparatory schools. Nothing changed except in outward appearance.134

The middle and upper classes tried to circumvent the reform. This shows the emptiness of the request in the Mihistry Paper that appealed to this very group not to apply for free places. Far from eliminating themselves these classes sought to maximize their chances of gaining awards for their children even at the expense of the poorer people. This issue illustrates the meaninglessness of administrative reforms

which the operating agency itself has no capacity to police. That aspect of the regulation served no purpose whatever. The Minister's appeal was totally ignored by the upper and middle classes which simply refused to exercise any self-restraint.[135]

The impact of the reform was so small as to be negligible. The Ministry of Education did provide grant-in-aid places for secondary school students. This amounted to a partial subsidy of the student's educational expenses. However, after some years of providing grant-in-aid places it was discovered that the subsidy was too minimal; for example, students from working class and peasant families were dropping out of secondary schools before completing their course of study due to financial hardship. The initial impact of the 70:30 reform was to obscure the fundamental discrimination against the poorer classes by making the educational system more meritocratic rather than egalitarian in terms of the selection of students for secondary schooling. However, this impact was relatively short-lived; students and parents became aware of the "window-dressing" nature of this reform and pressured the Government throughout the 1960s to genuinely democratize education.

Shortly after the introduction of this 70:30 reform, the JLP Government embarked on a much broader project, the "New Deal in Education," designed to restructure and streamline the educational system further. The New Deal, sponsored and funded by the World Bank and other bilateral lending agencies, was itself the outcome of a study undertaken by another multilateral body, UNESCO, whose report formed the basis for the formulation of the Government's new educational policies and programs contained in the official document

entitled "New Deal for Education in Independent Jamaica."[136] Thus the financial contribution and educational philosophy underpinning these august international institutions combined to have a profound influence on educational expansion or reorganization. The major thrusts of the "New Deal for Education" was to create "Junior Secondary Schools" as well as to expand post-secondary educational facilities. The New Deal represents one of the first thoroughgoing and systematic attempts to formulate long- and short-range educational plans as evidenced in Tables 7.7 and 7.8.

Table 7.7 [illegible]en from the "New Deal for Education," gives an analysis of the [illegible]osed long term program with estimates of the required school places based on demographic projections of the school age cohort (6-19) at different levels in the system.

Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give the respective breakdown of the projected secondary school places for the five-year period up to 1970 and the percentage by type of enrollment of the estimated number of children in each age group. It may be observed from Table 7.8 that by far the greatest provision for the 12-15 age cohort in 1970 was at the level of the Junior Secondary School with 79,000 places out of an estimated population of 165,000 as compared with only 20,358 of the total in the same age group placed in the existing types of Grammar (High), Technical and Vocational schools. And of the 186,200 population estimated for the number of children in the Second Cycle age group (i.e. 15-19), a comparatively small proportion or 14.3 percent, as indicated in Table 7.9, was to be enrolled in the separate types of existing secondary schools, i.e. Grammar, Technical and Vocational. It can clearly be seen also from Table 7.9 where the

Table 7.7

Proposed Long-Term Educational Program 1966-1980

Physical Programme of Additional Places Required

1 Level of Education and Age-Group	2 Estimated Population 1965*	3 Estimated Population 1980*	4 Available Places 1965 (estimated)	5 Replacement of Existing Places Over Period	6 No. of Places Required for Maximum Enrolment Over Period	7 Additional Places to be Provided Over Period	8 No. of Places to be Provided Over Period
Primary and All-Age Schools (6-12)	322,000	432,000	220,000	70,000	389,000	169,000	239,000
Secondary							
First Cycle (12-15)	131,500	195,000	14,000		176,000	162,000	162,000
Second Cycle (15 to17-19)	151,800	248,800					
(i) Secondary General			(b) 24,000	8,000	40,000	16,000	24,000
(ii) Secondary Technical and Vocational			(b) 3,000	500	16,000	13,000	13,500
Total	605,200	875,800	261,000	78,500	621,000	360,000	438,500

*Compiled from projections by G. W. Roberts, Professor of Demography in the Department of Sociology, U.W.I.

(a) Column 7 plus 5

(b) 27,000 includes 15,358 in age-group 12-15 and 11,642 in age-groups 15-19

Column 4: The available places given here relate to the capacity available in the opinion of the UNESCO Mission. Therefore, in most instances, the figure given is greater than present enrolment. This is particularly so for the High Schools (Second Cycle Secondary General).

Column 6: In 1980 it is estimated by the UNESCO Mission that maximum enrolment in the system will be:
90% of the Primary School Population (6 to 12 years)
90% of the First Cycle Secondary (12 to 15 years)

Table 7.8

Short Term Programme for Expansion: 1966-1970

Level of Education	Estimated Population 1970	1965 existing places average	Replacement of existing places	New places	No. of places to be constructed over period	No. of places in 1970
Primary 6-12	367,700	220,000	18,050	36,400	54,050	256,400
Secondary						
First Cycle 12-15 J.S.S.	165,000	14,000	--	65,000	65,000	79,000
High School 12-15	--	14,222	--	3,785		
Technical and Vocational	--	1,136	--	1,215	5,000	20,358
Second Cycle 15 to 16-19	186,200	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary general	--	9,778	3,000	9,000		
Technical and Vocational	--	1,864	--	6,000	18,000	26,642
Total	718,900	261,000	21,050	121,400	142,050	382,400

The salient points of the programme are:

(1) To have available by 1970, 256,400 primary school places;
(2) 79,000 junior secondary school places;
(3) 20,358 junior places in high, vocational and technical schools;
(4) 26,642 in second cycle secondary schools;
(5) 9,000 places will be required as soon as the feeds from J.S.S. are available. These places will be provided within the time schedule to the extent that the J.S.S. programme can provide the required inputs to the Second Cycle Secondary Schools.

Source: New Deal for Education: Ministry of Education, Kingston, Jamaica, p. 11

Table 7.9

Percentage of Places/Total Population in Age-Group for the Years 1965-1970

School Types	1965	1970	1965		1970	
Primary						
6-15 age-group	50%	60% (a)	220,000	162,000 (6-11) 58,000 (12-15)	256,000	221,000 (6-11) 35,000 (11-15)
Secondary						
First Cycle Secondary 12-15 age-group	11%	47.9%	14,000 (b)		79,000	
High School Grammar	11.7%	12.3%	14,222			
Technical & Vocational			1,136		20,358	
Second Cycle Secondary 15-19 age-group						
Grammar Technical and Vocational	7.6%	14.3%	9,778 1,864		26,642	

(a) No. of places in 'All-age Schools'
(b) Existing Junior Secondary School places

Source: New Deal for Education: Ministry of Education, Kingston, Jamaica, p. 13

emphasis on Secondary education was placed, that is, at the Junior Secondary level with an enrollment increase to 47.9 percent in 1970 from 11 percent in 1965, and for the same period a mere .6 percent increase in the enrollment figure of 11.7 percent for the same age group in the Grammar and other separate types of secondary schools.

Unlike the traditional Secondary Grammar schools where admissions are based almost completely on performance in a competitive CEE, the Junior Secondary Schools were conceived to accommodate all children from the primary schools on a non-selective basis once they attain the age of 12 years, and to provide a type of free secondary education for 12 to 15 age cohorts, for the most of whom the education at this level would be terminated.

The objectives of this program as perceived by the JLP Government and set out in the "New Deal for Education", prepared in 1967, read in part as follows:

> The new philosophy is that opportunity for the best education that the country can afford must be open to every child, because all children are equally important. Lack of wealth should not therefore, frustrate or handicap the education of any child . . .
>
> Drawing particular attention to the fact that whereas,
>
> . . . under the old Colonial philosophy, secondary and university education was the monopoly of the ruling classes, and was intended for only the elite, . . .

the author of Ministry Paper (No. 73) sounded a clear note of confidence in the realization of its objectives by declaring that:

> From now on Education will be a unifying and not a stratifying force in our society. While equality of opportunity may still remain an elusive Utopian ideal, the poverty or low social status of parents will no longer be a barrier to a sound education nor will it determine the social, economic or civic

> future of any child. As a result of this Educational Revolution no Jamaican child will be debarred by the circumstances of his birth, or by his poverty from qualifying for any position in this country.137

Thus the new policy stemming from the foregoing social philosophy was clearly designed to destroy the class education bequeathed to independent Jamaica.

It was also envisaged that Junior Secondary school would increase the manpower needs of the country, since the primary schools and their senior departments were failing in this area, and the new nation was being drained of its trained people who were migrating to the U.S., Canada and the U.K., and had to be replaced by the quickest means. The junior secondary school was considered the most expedient way of meeting this requirement since it would provide the underprivileged children, especially in rural areas, who were denied both the benefit of the CEE and the 70 percent allocation of "free places" to primary schools. Junior secondary schools provided for participation in economic development, and would help to better the living conditions of the people. For this reason the New Deal invalidated the "colonial philosophy" which allowed the monopoly of secondary education by the ruling elite with its academic orientation. In this regard the Minister of Education, Edwin Allen, was contemptuous of the fallacy that:

> the only good form of education is one that leads to a white collar job . . . (since) the economy of Jamaica is being rapidly diversified and . . . agriculture is demanding more scientific knowledge and highly trained skill.138

This was Allen's method of promoting the Junior Secondary schools which were expected to give more intensive training in "Vocational courses," than did the former senior schools. Continuing, the Minister further claimed that the majority of the unemployed were persons who possessed neither highly developed skills nor a sound general education. He emphasized that the educational system should stop educating for unemployment.[139] The foregoing statement strongly insinuates that the new philosophy was to stress vocational education in addition to establishing a system of non-competitive entrance into secondary education.

Several general criticisms have been levied at the Junior Secondary schools which should be discussed briefly. It should first be pointed out, however, that several assumptions are implicit in the statements of the "new philosophy" underlying the "New Deal for Education." These are: that during the colonial period there was in fact a conscious philosophy of education; that this philosophy did not include equality of educational opportunities; that education was used consciously or unconsciously as a means of maintaining the class structure; and finally that by simply increasing the facilities for secondary education, the new policy of providing "equal educational opportunities" for all children regardless of race, color, class or creed will in fact be implemented.[140]

The performance of the Junior Secondary schools can hardly be said to justify the new policy of attempting to provide equality of educational opportunities for the Jamaican masses. In an article in the Torch, Journal of the Ministry of Education, Jamaica, under the

heading "Junior Secondary Schools," reference was made to the findings of a manpower survey carried out in 1960 which are revealing. In this year it was reckoned that although there were 65,900 persons who had received a secondary education, the number of skilled and trained people who were required in this same year for a wide variety of jobs from the professional, business and executive level to the category of technicians and craftsmen, was 227,000. This meant that there was a critical shortage of trained personnel to the extent of 161,000 persons. When it is considered, as the article pointed out, that approximately 4,000 graduates with secondary training were produced each year, the nature of the problem assumes greater proportions. It is particularly in this role of seeking to generate and augment the supply of manpower skills as quickly as possible that Junior Secondary schools were, according to the official publication, introduced. The Journal expressed it thus:

> It is against this background that the junior secondary school idea was conceived with the definite intention of bridging the gap as quickly as possible between the number of jobs available and the number of persons trained to fill these jobs. If the junior secondary schools are given maximum support they shall prove to be the pivot of an education structure which will meet our needs for the future.[141]

A further examination of the program analysis reflected in Table 7.9 at the Second Cycle level of secondary education puts the 15-19 age group receiving Grammar-type and Technical education at rather less than 14.3 percent. This does not seem to coincide completely with the claim that particularly at the higher levels of professional, technical and managerial skills there were enough of the Junior Secondary students of the required standard flowing into

the Second Cycle Grammar and Technical schools required to produce the graduates in the variety of skills and in the numbers required.

Further evidence that the cause for optimism in this respect could be more than a trifle offset by an element of illusion, may be adduced from a statement made by Education Minister Allen. Making reference to the overall disappointing performance in the different types of Examinations taken by the different types of schools in the island, Allen said:

> In a meaning-of-words tests carried out in a Junior Secondary School, only 25 per cent of the students gained 50 per cent marks. Given the word "foliage" and suggested meanings of "flowers," "leaves" and "folding," students selected "folding," similarly, given "remember" and suggested meanings of "remain," "recall" and "repeat," students selected "repeat." Setting aside whether these are relevant studies or examinations for development needs of the country the shortfall on achievement is clearly critical.[142]

One of the major criticisms of the Junior Secondary schools was that far too many children who entered them from primary schools were functionally illiterate. Writing in The Daily Gleaner, a former Speaker of the House of Representatives stated that:

> . . . the chief failure of the Junior Secondary School is that 50 per cent of its pupils at the point of entry can neither read nor write. Amazing but true. Therefore, the failure of the Junior Secondary Schools is due to the breakdown of the Primary School and its failure to produce at the age of 12 pupils fit for secondary training.[143]

There is support for this "amazing" situation in the findings of a study done in the Department of Education, UWI campus in Jamaica. The study was concerned with the reading achievement of about 400 students in the 7th grade of the Junior Secondary School: "The

researchers found that slightly more than 60 per cent of 7th Graders were below the level required of them."[144] In the same issue of the country's leading newspaper in which the former Speaker of the House made his observation in regard to the illiteracy of the Grade 7 entrants to the Junior Secondary school, there appeared an article by the Minister of Education where he refuted the claims of its critics that primary education was neglected. Under the bold caption, "Achievements in Primary School Education 1962-1972," Allen catalogued a series of improvements to substantiate his counter claim that:

> . . . this argument about failing to give pride of place to primary education as well as all insinuations about the neglect of primary education is ridiculously untenable.

On the basis of an examination of the available evidence, however, the indications seem to be that in far too many of the primary schools the physical conditions as well as the lack of proper educational facilities and equipment do not appear to justify any other conclusion than that the situation leaves much to be desired. Indeed, the evidence is suggestive of much neglect.[145]

Another criticism that seems justifiable is the heightened sense of expectation leading to frustration and a sense of failure that were associated with the Junior Secondary schools. This heightened sense of expectation of achievements that were for the most part unrealizable can spell social disaster. Much was done by the way in which the Junior Secondary schools appeared to have been used in some instances to create and promote this heightened sense of

expectation which ended in frustration and failure for 80 percent of the 15-plus age group for whom their education in these schools was terminal. Such announcements, for example, as were reported to have been carried by the radio station from 1967 to the effect that "your child can become a lawyer or a doctor in the Junior Secondary Schools"[186] have contributed to the undesirable effects referred to. Perhaps all these strategies were perceived to be necessary in the face of the reality that because the Junior Secondary system had to operate side by side with a selective prestigious type high school, the status of educational inferiority would tend by comparison to become more easily apparent, since in the perception of the general public the Junior Secondary schools were regarded as synonymous with the existing Secondary High schools in terms of the traditional educational structure.

The PNP's Education Policy

Following the creation of the Junior Secondary schools, the PNP under the leadership of Michael Manley regained power in 1972 and promptly sought an answer to the dilemma the JLP Government had exposed them to, by instituting an in-depth study of primary education to determine whether or not the existing system was constituting an adequate base for secondary education. The "Report of the Committee on Primary Education" under Professor Reginald Murray in 1973, forcibly stressed the fact that the severe inadequacies of this sector not only undermined the higher stages of the system but was completely at odds with any concept of justice since it was the

poorer and the rural people who primarily suffered from the gross disadvantages of attending the primary school.[147] In short, no answer was found to the dilemma. The question, as the author of the Report points out, is one that "socialists in every poor country have to face: how to remove privilege from secondary education without either on the one hand destroying preferred standards already gained or on the other hand spending all the resources available to make schooling not only good but also universally and evenly spread."[148]

In 1973 Prime Minister Michael Manley declared his commitment to an egalitarian philosophy of education.[149] In summary, he pointed out that education must push back barriers to social and cultural change, and foster national pride as it aims at effective citizenship. Education must eradicate discrimination between child and child, and must recapture the "drop out." The Minister of Education, Eli Matalon, supported the Prime Minister's statement by pointing out that the CEE with its 70:30 policy, the Junior Secondary policy and the fee-paying policy all bolstered discrimination of child against child. He asserted that the egalitarian is the best policy, accompanied by efforts to make the school experience enjoyable. Both Matalon's and the Prime Minister's statements prefaced the Government's declaration in 1973 of a policy of "free education . . . from elementary to university level."[150]

Furthermore, the Minister of Education supports the notion that the egalitarian approach rejects regimentation, emphasis on memorization, and undue adherence to textbook material. It upholds critical thinking due to the fact that modern technological and

industrial society requires a diversity of talent and the fullest and highest degree of human excellence. Indication of Matalon's support is seen in his statement that:

> Some people are traditional and regard the end-products of education in terms of subjects passed rather than the person whose development has fitted him into the society culturally and economically.[151]

Matalon was insinuating that examination of the criteria which determine the entry of children to certain stages of educational process was essential. He considered "creaming" and "streaming" in terms of aptitude, artificial cut-points to egalitarianism, and the "pass" "fail" mentality he thought, should be abolished. Prime Minister Manley, in January 1973, referred to the fact that 16,000 children at the age of fifteen had to be taught skills through continuing education. At the same time Manley deprecated the "one shot"[152] examinations, because they were not a fair and proper measure to apply to the worth of potential adults. "One shot" examinations, Manley contended were against the egalitarian motto, "Out of Many One People." What the educational system needed to do, according to Manley, was to emphasize self-confidence and the right attitude to work.[153] The abolition of such examinations would alleviate social unrest and would ease the chronic unemployment problem. Certainly, the elimination of the "one-shot" examinations would be a progressive step, since presumably its replacement by continuous assessment is a fairer way to measure achievement.

The enunciation of the PNP's egalitarian philosophy of education promised a new policy for transformation in the realm of

education. In an effort to extend the idea of egalitarianism, the Government announced in 1972 that it would provide "free secondary education . . . for all who qualified."[154] What was meant specifically, however, was that the Ministry of Education would give full secondary school scholarships to all students who passed the CEE at sixth grade. The effect of this reform is exactly parallel to the earlier JLP Government's 70:30 reform. It enlarged the marginal educational benefits to the peasant and working classes without altering the elite basis of the secondary grammar schools themselves. But the pressure of the poorer classes for greater democratization of the education system has pushed the Government to make further reform of the earlier reform. When it became evident to all that the Junior Secondary school project was inferior to the prestigious Grammar schools in program and status, the Government announced in September 1974 that the title of the Junior Secondary school would be called "Secondary Schools" to eliminate the difference in nomenclature between traditional elite Secondary Grammar or High schools and the Junior Secondary schools for the masses. This change of name, however, was not enough to convince many people that their children were really going to get a genuine secondary education in the Jamaica sense of the term. Thus the Government was forced to develop a scheme whereby students from the "Junior" Secondary schools may take an examination (Grade Nine Achievement Test) at the end of their three-year program and transfer to a traditional Secondary "Grammar" school.[155] At the same time, the Government has moved to extend "Junior" Secondary schools from a three-year to a five-year program

so as not to inundate the prestigious high schools with transfer students from the new parallel secondary schools which have been created.

The rapid expansion of the Junior Secondary schools since 1974 has created problems in relation to the provision of buildings, equipment, staffing and administration for effective implementation of the new grades ten and eleven programs. Evidence for this growth in enrollment is illustrated in Table 7.6; however, the dramatic increase in enrollment can be seen in the two academic years from 1974 to 1976 when 38,000 places were added to the Junior Secondary schools. In order to cope with the great demand for places these schools were put on a shift system emphasizing the inadequate provisions of facilities and equipment for "new" secondary schools.

Notwithstanding the new policy of egalitarianism underlying the "Educational Thrust of the 1970s," the "New" Secondary schools are as much the subject of criticism as when they were first created. W.V. Chambers, in a lead article entitled "Let's Scrap the New Secondary Schools " in the establishment Daily Gleaner, has leveled the most devastating criticism of these schools. He characterized them succinctly as follows:

> . . . they [the New Secondary Schools] are trade schools and remedial schools that graduate semi-literates who are not even well prepared for trades.
>
> Since middle-class children never enter the doors of these schools . . . the schools are a lower-class enclave preserving the class segregation. . . . The New Secondary School system is the most brilliant means I know of perpetuating the old colonial system. It is the most blatant piece of hypocrisy that has ever graced educational planning in this country.156

What has provoked such scathing attack on the major educational reform in Jamaica was the expanded program which maintained "mediocrity." Instead of providing preliminary skills which enable students to go on to further education, "the eleventh grade skills they acquired are simply rudimentary and their certificates are not even respected by the very people who set up the eleventh grade." As Chambers views it, the students who go to these schools regard them as little more than places to spend out their school days and put off their entrance into unemployment. Furthermore, Chambers continued, little emphasis is placed on the academic, the assumption being that these students are "not academic." Therefore, the students learn "electrical installation" inadequately, "business education" for which they do not have the educational background, and "child care, presumably to swell the population more intelligently."[157] Finally, what is needed, Chambers suggests, is an educational revolution that would turn the diversity of secondary schools into High Schools that do not preclude the learning of practical skills, and give back remedial learning to the primary schools.

It is evident from the foregoing analysis that the educational reforms of the 1970s failed to destroy the class education and significantly increase working-class educational opportunities. While the Government declared its commitment to socialism, in the realm of education there has been some discussion but little action. For instance, the Five-Year Education Plan 1978-1983, like the Five Year Development Plan, was drafted more than five years after the Government first assumed power in February 1972 -- an indication that there was no true commitment to fundamental change. Plans to further

expand the number of school places, improve the "supply and quality" of teachers, upgrade the quality of the meager school-funding program, the reorganization of secondary education so as to offer "similar programs," the development of criteria for the movement of students from the primary to secondary schools on a non-selective basis "at the end of the Plan period," and the integration of academic and technical learning in carefully developed "work-study" programs are among the educational objectives drafted.

A great deal of lip service is paid to a number of proposed educational reforms outlined in the Five Year Educational Plan.[158] For example, the introduction of two new "Agricultural High Schools" for agricultural training, as part of a "new thrust" in secondary education is a case in point. As such it is difficult to see how the thrust of this and other strategies differ from previous patterns. The private sector of the dual educational system is suffering due to migration of a substantial proportion of the local petite-bourgeois and bourgeoisie clientele, and it is conceivable that the dual educational system which so strongly marked the face of Jamaican education since the early colonial period will disappear. Already, the administrative heads of these schools have placed frequent notices in the overseas edition of The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner appealing to alumni for donations to aid their survival. In addition, the Government has itself prolonged the life of the private sector by providing generous grants in return for greater control and the inclusion of the "productive work" concept as an integral part of their educational programs. The Government, however, did not succeed in infusing the educational system, especially its curriculum, with

new ideological orientation for important reasons. First, the "experiment"[159] was largely confined to that sector reserved for the children of the working class; and secondly, because the curriculum in the private sector is still geared to the "ambitions of the middle and upper classes"[160] it is conditioned by metropolitan examination requirements. Thus, it is clear that any new orientation would have to include the reunification of theory and practice in the educational system as a whole which would strike at the rigid barriers set up during the colonial period between manual and intellectual labor. Before this can be done, it is imperative to achieve a rationalization of the dual education system with its diverse secondary school offerings.

With the return of a JLP Government in 1980, there is the proposal, as outlined in their manifesto, to rationalize the secondary school system to end "the blatant discrimination in the system." This is long overdue, and if done, will prove that your Government is truly a "people government." The manifesto also states: "By improving the number and quality of high schools, the common entrance examination can be abolished and the discriminatory high school system demolished."[161] The Government plans a major assault on illiteracy "one of the most tragic and saddest" problems in Jamaica. Noting that in twenty years of independence the rate of illiteracy had not changed, the Prime Minister, Edward Seaga, said this is "a situation with which no country can expect to develop."[162] To improve a situation in which "40 percent of pupils leaving Jamaican primary schools were illiterate," a proposal to provide "100 additional schools " aimed at developing the country's human resources, was announced.[163] This "new assault"

involves the imposition of compulsory school attendance "to all parishes within three years."[164]

Whether this approach will remove class privilege in education and at the same time raise the quality of education in this class-ridden society only the future has the answer. While the need to establish single comprehensive secondary schools is long overdue, nothing is learned from the neglect of primary education over the two decades of political independence. A primary school system with some 40 percent of teachers untrained, poor facilities and unsatisfactory conditions of employment, cannot form a sound basis for rationalization and expansion of the secondary school system. As Jamaica enters the 1980s public primary schooling seems to be accorded the same low priority and status as it had in colonial times.

Notes to Chapter Seven

[1]Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers), 1976; Louis Althusser, "Ideology and the Ideology State Apparatus," Louis Althusser, ed., Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) and Joel H. Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

[2]Samuel Bowles, "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor," in Martin Carnoy (ed.), Schooling in a Corporate Society (New York: David McKay, 1972), pp. 36-64; Robert Dreeben, On What is Learned in School (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968); Herbert Gintis, "Education, Technology and Development" in Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling (eds.), Structures of Dependency (Stanford: Institute for Political Studies, 1973), pp. 46-62.

[3]Althusser, op. cit., p. 127.

[4]Sherry Keith, "An Historical Overview of the State and Educational Policy in Jamaica" in Latin American Perspectives Vol. V. No. 2 (Spring 1978): 37-52. See also Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay, Inc., 1974), pp. 78-82, passim.

[5]Cited in L.J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1963), p. 208.

[6]Between 1667 and 1736, more than 218 legacies were made to churches, to benefit the poor and to found schools. Frank Cundall in Some Notes on Secondary Education in Jamaica (Kingston, 1911), pp. 1-10.

[7]Government of Jamaica, Education Department Report, 31 December 1951, p. 2.

[8]See Ouida Marina Wright's, "The Development of Education in Jamaica 1655-1955" (M.A. thesis, University of McGill, 1956), pp. 31-35.

[9]Shirley Gordon, A Century of West Indian Education (Toronto: Longman's, 1963), p. 9.

[10]Cundall, op. cit., p. 1.

[11]The terms "elementary" and "primary" in reference to first level schooling is used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

[12]Cited in Gordon, op. cit., p. 26.

[13]Vincent R. D'Oyley, "Teacher Training in Jamaica" in Vincent R. D'Oyley and Reginald Murray (eds.), Development and Disillusion in Third World Education (Toronto: OISE, 1979), pp. 5-32.

[14]Gordon, op. cit., p. 45.

[15]Ibid., pp. 30-31. See also Keith, op. cit., p. 39 and M.K. Bacchus, Education for Development or Underdevelopment? (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1980), p. 72.

[16]Carl Campbell, "Social and Economic Obstacles to the Development of Popular Education in Post-Emancipation Jamaica, 1834-65," The Journal of Caribbean, 1 (November 1970):62. See also Samuel J. Hurwitz and E.F. Hurwitz, Jamaica: A Historical Portrait (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 125.

[17]See Eric Williams, British Historians and the West Indies (London: André Deutsch Ltd., 1966), pp. 87-91.

[18]Keith, op. cit., p. 40.

[19]See immigration figures in chapter 2. The Jamaican planters, dominating the Jamaican Assembly, voted money for immigration but not for education or for machinery to improve technology in field and factory.

[20]Hurwitz and Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 123.

[21]Ibid., p. 125.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Quoted in Ibid. This view was prevalent throughout the entire colonial period in the Caribbean. In the 1920s, for example, one owner of a huge plantation advocated that the masses should not be "over-educated." Another commented that as long as the colony was an agricultural country education would be of no use to the masses. In the 1930s the attitude was prevalent among the planters that education would "mislead" agricultural laborers and cause "dissatisfaction." See V.A.S. Williams, "The Life and Influence of Marcus Garvey on the Education of the Black People" (M.Ed. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1977), p. 92.

[24]Circular Dispatch to West Indian Government from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 March 1841, quoted in Gordon, op. cit., p. 38.

[25]Vincent R. D'Oyley, "The History of Teacher Education in Jamaica, 1834-1914," 6 sections. (Ed.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1963), Section A: "The Age of Missionary Enterprise," p. 126.

[26]Lord Elgin cited in Gordon, op. cit., p. 59.

[27]Ibid., p. 58.

[28]Gloria V. Burke, "Problems and Progress in Elementary Education in Jamaica 1938-1973" (M.Ed. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1973), p. 20.

[29]Gordon, op. cit., p. 45.

[30]The socialization and ideological intent of the growth and expansion of schooling is evident in the repeated efforts, starting first in 1879, of the successive Jamaican government (colonial and independent) to implement compulsory education. Even in 1982 the Government has not accomplished the task.

[31]Trevor Turner, "Objectives and Provisions for Agricultural Education: The Case of Colonial Jamaica, 1867-1920,' in D'Oyley and Murray, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 64-87.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Burke, op. cit., p. 26.

[35]See Thomas Capper and M.E. Saddler, "The System of Education in Jamaica, Appendix E, in Great Britain, Board of Education, Special Reports on Educational Subjects, Vol. 4 (1901), pp. 580, 602, 604, cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 66.

[36]School Inspector's Office, "General Report of Government School Inspection in 1873" in Supplement to the Jamaica Gazette, 26 February 1874 cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 66.

[37]Cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 66.

[38]See Eric Williams, op. cit., pp. 87-89; see also Gisela Eisner, Jamaica 1830-1930: A Study in Economic Growth (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961), pp. 216-221. The resistance of teachers on the other hand is not surprising, since they came at this time from the same socioeconomic group as the parents and shared values and attitudes.

[39]Joseph Chamberlain to the Governors of West Indian Colonies, cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 73.

[40]According to the Education Department Annual Report 1951 (p. 5), the maximum grant for a school garden was 4 pounds sterling per annum up to 1951.

[41]Jamaica Department of Agriculture, Report, 1909-10, p. 10, cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 70.

[42]L.C.A. Knowles, The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1926), p. 147.

[43]William L. Strauss, Joseph Chamberlain and the Theory of Imperialism (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 102.

[44]A.P. Newton, A Hundred Years of the British Empire (London: Duckworth, 1940), p. 294.

[45]James Morris, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 361.

[46]For a general illustration of this policy see George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); for more specific area studies see Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications 1972), and Keith Buchanan, The South East Asian World: An Introductory Essay (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1967), pp. 74-82.

[47]Cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 75.

[48]Joseph Chamberlain in Circular 94 quoted in Ibid.

[49]See Turner, op. cit., p. 75.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Quoted in Turner, op. cit., p. 76.

[52]Royal Commission on West India, 1896, Vol. 51, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix C, part XIII, p. 416, cited in Ibid., p. 79.

[53]Various submissions to the Lumb Commission, Evidence Taken, pp. 48, 65, 134, 252. See Ibid., p. 80.

[54]See, for example, Jamaica Union of Teachers, Reports 1905, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1913, 1917, 1919. Cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 81.

[55]The Jamaica Advocate, 4 February 1905; 18 February 1905 cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 80.

[56]The Jamaica Journal of Education, Vol. 5, No. 12 (January 1906), p. 181. Cited in Turner, op. cit., p. 81.

[57]See V.A.S. Williams, The Life and Influence of Marcus Garvey, op. cit.

[58]Turner, op. cit., p. 82.

[59]Ruby King, "The Jamaica Schools Commission and the Development of Secondary Schooling," in Vincent D'Oyley and Reginald Murray (eds.), op. cit., pp. 41-57.

[60]S.C. Gordon, Reports and Repercussions in West Indian Education, 1835-1933 (London: Gin & Co., 1964).

[61]See Latrobe Report on Education in Jamaica, 1837, reprinted in Gordon, op. cit., p. 226.

[62]Gordon, A Century of West Indian Education, op. cit., p. 223 [emphasis added].

[63]Heads of a Plan for Promoting the Education of Youth in the British West Indies, 10 March 1835, cited in Ibid., p. 225.

[64]H.B. Britten to Methodist Missionary Society, 2 January 1835 cited in Ibid., pp. 225-26.

[65]King, op. cit., p. 44, see also Gordon, op. cit., p. 223.

[66]Gordon, A Century of West Indian Education, op. cit., p. 224.

[67]King, op. cit., p. 44; H.G. DeLisser, King points out, estimated that in 1911 there were approximately 10,000 persons in Jamaica with incomes over 1,600 pounds (sterling), who constituted the upper classes. There were, according to his estimates, 231,000 peasants and working people, while the remaining 80,000 persons formed the amorphous intermediate class.

[68]Sir Peter Grant was the first Governor of Crown Colony arriving in 1866. It was during his term as Governor that "national" elementary education system was established supported with Government funds.

[69]Cundall, op. cit., p. 604.

[70]King, op. cit., p. 45; citing W.H.G. Armytage, Four Hundred Years of English Education (Cambridge: The University Press, 1964), p. 126.

[71]Gordon, A Century of West Indian Education, op. cit., p. 107.

[72]King, op. cit., p. 45; citing J.S. Maclure, Educational Documents: England and Wales, 1876-1963 (London: Chapman and Hall, 1965), pp. 92-96.

[73]King, op. cit., p. 46.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Ibid., p. 45.

[77]In addition there were weekly boarders' and term boarders' scholarships which covered a part of the fees.

[78]King, op. cit., p. 47.

[79]Ibid., p. 48.

[80]Ministry of Education, Annual Report, 1958 (Kingston, Jamaica: The Government Printer, 1961), p. 4.

[81]King, op. cit., p. 47.

[82]Ibid.; citing Headmaster's Report on Jamaica College, 1905, in Minutes of the Jamaica Schools Commission, 15 February 1905.

[83]The Jamaica Schools Commission, Annual Report, 1888-9, quoted in King, op. cit., p. 47.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Ibid., p. 49.

[86]Ibid.

[87]Ibid., p. 50.

[88]Gordon, A Century of West Indian Education, op. cit., p. 240.

[89]Cited in King, op. cit., p. 50.

[90]Gordon, A Century of West Indian Education, op. cit., p. 241.

[91]Turner, op. cit., p. 72. The practical teaching was to be done by the staff of the Department of Public Gardens at the nearby Hope Gardens. The students attended the Gardens for eight hours weekly for practical instruction. But the experiment ran into the kind of objection from parents that had become familiar to managers of elementary schools.

[92]West India Royal Commission Report, London: H.M.S.O., 1945, p. 99.

[93]D.R. Manley, "Mental Ability in Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1963, pp. 51-71.

[94]Ministry of Education, Annual Report, 1958 (Kingston: Jamaica. The Government Printer, 1961), p. 4.

[95]M. Kazim Bacchus, "Education for Development in Underdeveloped Countries" in Comparative Education Vol. XVII, No. 2 (June 1981): 215.

[96]Ibid.

[97]F. Harbison, Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 3.

[98]S.L. Belcher - El-Nahhas, "Education as Capital" (M.Ed. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1981), p. 26.

[99]Theodore W. Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital. American Economic Review," Vol. 51 (March 1961):7.

[100]Sir W. Arthur Lewis, "Education and Economic Development," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1961):113-127. This is a revised and extended version of the paper presented to the UNESCO conference.

[101]Ibid., p. 113.

[102]Belcher-El-Nahhas, op. cit., p. 124.

[103]Raymond Murphy quoted in Ibid., p. 125.

[104]Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey (eds.), Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 9.

[105]The scientific value of the theory of human capital is much disputed. Of all the possible criticisms levelled at theory, the principle of marginal productivity strikes at the core of its economic analysis. This principle which underlies human capital theory in fact provides the foundation for neo-classical economics. "Marginal productivity means that individuals are paid their marginal product. It is not necessary that each individual worker receive wages equal to his/her marginal product. However, workers as a group in a particular category of labor (such as plumbers) must be paid their marginal product even though all workers in that category will not necessarily be equally productive." See Lester Thurow, quoted in Belcher-El-Nahhas, op. cit., p. 164.

[106]Schultz, op. cit., p. 15.

[107]Ibid., p. 17.

[108]See Martin Carnoy and Jorge Wertheim, "Socialist Ideology and the Transformation of Cuban Education" in Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 573-589.

[109]Karabel and Halsey, op. cit., p. 15.

[110]Ibid.

[111]Belcher-El-Nahhas, op. cit., p. 84.

[112]Keith, op. cit., p. 43.

[113]Ibid.

[114]Reginald Murray, "Later Developments in Secondary Education," in D'Oyley and Murray, (eds.), op. cit., p. 58.

[115]Ministry of Education, Annual Report, 1958, Kingston, Jamaica, p. 5.

[116]Keith, op. cit., p. 44.

[117]Murray, op. cit., p. 59.

[118]A National Plan for Jamaica 1957-1967, Kingston, Jamaica, 1958, p. 39.

[119]Lewis, op. cit., p. 117. Sir Arthur was at this time Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies with administrative offices at the Mona Campus in Jamaica.

[120]Ibid., pp. 117-18.

[121]Ibid., p. 119.

[122]All-age schools are essentially primary schools offering post-primary education to age 15.

[123]Suggestions to Teachers in Senior Schools and Departments (Ministry of Education, Jamaica, January 1961, p. 1). Introduction.

[124]A National Plan for Jamaica, 1957-1967, p. 39.

[125]Manley, op. cit., p. 51 and Murray, op. cit., p.

[126]Phillip Vernon, "Selection for Secondary Education in Jamaica: A Report to the Minister of Education, University of London, Institute of Education," 1960, p. 10.

[127]Ministry of Education, Ministry Paper No. 31, 1962, "New Basis for Free Place Awards," p. 2.

[128]Ibid.

[129]Edwin Allen quoted in Sydney Scott, "The Development of Secondary Education in Jamaica Since Independence: 1962-72" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1973), p. 69.

[130]See F.E. Nunes, The 70/30 Education Regulation: Policy-making, Reactions and Consequences." Caribbean Journal of Education Vol. III, No. 3 (September 1976): pp. 195-97.

[131]Ministry Paper No. 31, 1962, p. 3, par. 14.

[132]Nunes, op. cit., pp. 200-201; Keith, op. cit., p. 47. The marginality of this educational "reform" vis-a-vis children of the working class and small peasantry is evidenced by the fact that 70:30 reform meant that about an additional 422 free places in secondary schools were transferred to primary school students from preparatory school students. Before the 70:30 formula took effect in January 1963, the primary school candidate who sat the exam had one chance in eighty-five of getting a free place. After the introduction of the 70:30 policy the chances were increased to approximately one in sixty. On an overall basis less than one-half of one percent of the 11-plus primary school age group eligible to sit the exam could actually get a free place.

[133]Ibid., p. 200.

[134]Murray, op. cit., p. 60.

[135]Nunes, op. cit., p. 201.

[136]The UNESCO-Planning Mission came to Jamaica at the request of the Government and recommended the establishment of Junior Secondary schools for the age group 12 to 15 on a scale that necessitated the implementation of a major building program. The mission gave many reasons for this major recommendation, reasons that were not only educational but financial and practical (see UNESCO Planning Mission of Jamaica, September-November 1964 (UNESCO Report: September-November 1964 UNESCO Report: Paris, January 1965); and also Scott, op. cit., p. 140 and Wills O. Jervier, Educational Change in Post-Colonial Jamaica (New York: Vantage Press, 1977), p. 108.

[137]Ministry of Education, Ministry Paper No. 73. "New Deal for Education in Independent Jamaica," p. 1.

[138]Edwin Allen quoted in Burke, op. cit., p. 84.

[139]Ibid.

[140]King, op. cit., p. 52.

[141]Ministry of Education, "Junior Secondary Schools," Torch Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1969):1.

[142]Edwin Allen, quoted in Scott, op. cit., p. 148.

[143]The Daily Gleaner, 2 March 1972, p. 10. Cited in Ibid., p. 149. For corroborating evidence, see Adam Kuper, Changing Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers, 1976), p. 70.

[144]The Daily Gleaner, 3 December 1967, p. 5, cited in Scott, op. cit., p. 149.

[145]See, for example, Ministry of Education, Five-Year Education Plan 1978-1983 Draft Two, p. 30 and Burke, op. cit., p. 55 and p. 98.

[146]The Daily Gleaner, 26 March 1972, cited in Scott, op. cit., p. 151. Mr. Allen in 1981 still subscribes to his belief as evidenced from an interview reported in The Daily Gleaner, 25 October 1981.

[147]R.N. Murray, The Report of the Committee on Primary Education, Kingston, Jamaica, 1974. See also Ministry of Education Five-Year Education Plan 1978-1983, op. cit., p. 56.

[148]Reginald Murray, op. cit., p. 61.

[149]Five-Year Development Plan 1978-82, op. cit., pp. 98-104, Five-Year Education Plan, 1978-1983, op. cit., pp. 1-11, and Michael Manley, The Politics of Change, op. cit., pp. 138-161. See also Burke, op. cit., p. 97.

[150]Ministry of Education, The Educational Thrust of the 70s (Kingston: Jamaica 1973), p. 1.

[151]Eli Matalon, The Daily Gleaner, 27 June 1973, quoted in Burke, op. cit., p. 97.

[152]'One shot' examination means that the student has to pass all subjects taken at one sitting in order to earn a certificate. A failure in one subject means that he has to repeat the entire examination.

[153]Manley, The Politics of Change, op. cit., p. 149.

[154]Keith, op. cit., p. 48, and The Education Thrust of the 70s, op. cit., p. 1.

[155]In 1974/75, from 21,673 candidates entered for this examination, 1451 awards were made.

[156]W.V. Chambers, "Let's Scrap the New Secondary Schools," The Sunday Gleaner, 13 April 1980, p. 15.

[157]Ibid.

[158]Impression gained from confidential interviews with two prominent administrators of two leading research and educational institutions, Kingston, Jamaica, April 1980.

[159]A few secondary schools were established with Cuban financial and technical assistance and were based on the Cuban model of integrating productive manual labor with intellectual labor. Children of solid middle-class families were hardly in attendance at these schools.

[160]King, op. cit., p. 54.

[161]Jamaica Labor Party, Change Without Chaos, Kingston, Jamaica, 1980, p. 27.

[162]Edward Seaga, "A Major Assault on Illiteracy," Jamaica News, Ottawa, Office of the Jamaica High Commission, June 1982, p. 3.

[163]Ibid.

[164]"Compulsory Education Island wide in 3 years," The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 28 June 1982, p. 32.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This study has sought to examine the development models that have been pursued in post-independent Jamaica in the search for solutions to the myriad problems of underdevelopment, poverty and dependency. The development models include Lewis' modernization through industrialization, the McIntyre-Demas' refinement and modification of the Lewis concept -- Caribbean economic "integration" and the "non-capitalist" or socialist-oriented path to development. It remains the task of this concluding chapter to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of these models in terms of their policy effectiveness in the Jamaican context.

The Lewis Industrialization Model 1

The Lewis industrialization model is consonant with the general notions of modernization economics which held sway in the sixties and even in the early seventies and basically emphasized economic growth as the raison d'être of development. There is a distinction between growth and development, however. As William Demas[1] and Gerald Meier[2] point out, neither growth nor development can be defined in "value-free" technical terms. In the first place, economic growth (in the conventional sense of an increase in the per capita production of goods and services in a country) can be measured only if one makes certain assumptions about income distribution. The "weights" to be attached to

the different goods and services making up the national product or income depend on relative prices and the relative prices are linked to the distribution of income.[3] Secondly, and more fundamentally, development means not only economic growth but economic growth generated from within a country as well as growth which results in economic diversification in the sense of the creation of more inter-dependence, or "linkages" between different industries and activities within a given country.[4] These are the minimum requirements of any technically objective definition of economic development -- economic independence and diversified inter-related structure of production. There are three other elements that should however be added: a satisfactory level of employment, a fairly equal distribution of income and the greatest level of participation by the populace in the economy.

From a "growth" perspective the industrialization model did achieve results. Jamaica achieved creditable rates of economic growth and increases in per capita national income. In 1970, for example, the per capita income exceeded 600 U.S. dollars which was fairly high by comparison to most underdeveloped countries. Rates of economic growth (that is, the rates of growth of Gross Domestic Product in constant prices or total volume of goods and services produced every year) have been over the decade of the 1960s about 5 percent per annum.[5] This performance was among the "highest sustained rate" ever achieved by modernizing states in an early technological stage."[6] All of this was, conventionally speaking, a "good" economic performance.

However, when one probes beneath the surface of these conventional indices of progress one discerns a picture of continuing

underdevelopment and social and economic imbalance. Growth has been limited to certain sectors such as the emergence and growth of the bauxite-alumina industry, the growth of the manufacturing sector based on import-substitution industries, the expansion of the tourist industry and the beneficial effects of the growth of these sectors on the construction industry and other related industries. The agricultural sector has shown little dynamism, however. Consequently, as has been indicated, the rate of growth of the economy has tended to slow down over time due to factors such as the continued sluggishness of agriculture (as a result of the overemphasis on manufacturing and tourism), which still accounts for a relatively large part of the labor force and the total population, and the passing of the easy phase of import-substitution in the manufacturing sector. According to Owen Jefferson,[7] the rate of growth per capita national income for the period 1965 to 1968 was only 2.0 percent per annum and was heavily dependent on the rapid expansion of public expenditure. The situation, then, was that while on average for the period as a whole the growth rate was satisfactory, the economy seemingly lost some of its momentum towards the end of the sixties when compared to the high growth rate of the earlier period, between 1950 and 1960.

Although the growth of industrial production has been relatively impressive the real contribution to the economy has not been particularly impressive because of the small amount of employment offered in relation to the amount of capital invested, the small amount of local raw material used and the payment abroad of profits, interests and management charges. At the same time, in terms of

structural transformation or diversification, it is reasonable to conclude that far less success was achieved in this direction than in the task of raising production and income. Lack of structural transformation can be seen in the continued dualism[8] in the Jamaican economy by comparing average productivity between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In 1943, the agricultural labor force represented 45 percent of the total labor force[9] and that sector accounted for about 27 percent of GDP.[10] The remaining 55 percent of the labor force accounted for 73 percent of the total product. On the basis of these data it appears that average productivity outside agriculture was approximately 2.2 times the level in agriculture. By 1968 agriculture's share of GDP had fallen to 10 percent (9 percent in 1972) and the labor force in agriculture was about 35 percent (32 percent in 1972) of the total.[11] In other words the ratio of productivity between the non-agricultural and the agricultural sectors had widened to approximately 4.7:1.0.[12] Thus, looked at from this standpoint the extent of dualism in the economy appears to have increased during the twenty-five year period starting in 1943.

Another way to approach the problem of dualism is to examine the level of the technology which is used in different sectors of the economy. Technological heterogeneity of the various sectors of the total economy is a basic characteristic of underdevelopment. Celso Fertado has defined an underdeveloped economic structure as "one in which full utilization of available capital is not a sufficient condition for complete absorption of the working force at a level of productivity corresponding to the technology prevailing in the dynamic sector of the economy."[13] In the Jamaican case the problem has been

the increasing difficulty of absorbing a growing proportion of the labor force into any form of productive employment. Quite apart from the large number of workers who are engaged in low productivity employment in sectors such as agriculture, petty trading and domestic service, there has been a tendency for open unemployment to increase except during periods when emigration has been easy.

Technological heterogeneity has certainly been an important characteristic of the Jamaican economy. This applies not only between sectors which range from the highly capital-intensive bauxite-alumina industry on the one hand to simple handicraft industries on the other, but also within some sectors where different levels of technology, with the concomitant differences in labor productivity, coexist side by side.[14]

Traditional economic theory would lead one to expect that the mobility of factors, for example, capital, labor, etc., together with flexibility of factor productivity would preclude great extremes of technological diversity. But as Furtado has pointed out[15] this theory is applicable only to those situations in which there is entrepreneurial option among technologies providing a wide gamut of combinations of factors. This is not the typical situation in most underdeveloped countries including Jamaica. In many cases the dynamic sectors are in the hands of foreign entrepreneurs who bring with them the technology of their own country which, typically, has been tailored to the needs of an economy with abundant capital and a relative shortage of labor. But even where the industries are under local control the absence of a domestic capital goods market often results in the use of inappropriate technology

since the capital equipment is imported from highly industrialized countries. This tendency is further reinforced where the development of an industrial sector based on substitution of imports dictates the adoption of a technology compatible with a cost and price structure similar to that prevailing in the international manufactured goods market.[17] Technology thus assumes the character of an independent variable.[18] Factor markets become distorted and lead to further distortion through the demonstration effect. The productivity gap between the dynamic "modern" and the traditional sectors widens. Technological unemployment increases and is aggravated by voluntary unemployment as workers become increasingly reluctant to exert themselves for the relatively low levels of wages prevailing in the traditional sectors. The rapid growth of product and income can therefore be accompanied by growing unemployment as has happened in Jamaica, especially in the decade of the sixties.

Another related problem which is relevant to the notion of structural transformation, and to which reference has already been made above in relation to dualism concerns the shift of production and of labor between primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.[19] Because of factors such as differences in income-elasticity for the output of different sectors, historical experience has shown that on the road to economic development economics has passed through stages in which the distribution of the labor force and the composition of output have tended to shift away from primary to secondary and finally to high-income tertiary activities. A casual glance at the National Income and Product accounts for Jamaica[20] would convey the impression

that the economy has been undergoing very rapid structural changes in the direction indicated by the experience of countries which have moved from a state of underdevelopment to one of development. The datum which could convey this impression is the decline in the share of the GDP of agriculture from close to 30 percent in the 1940s to about 9 percent in 1969. However, the corresponding shift in the composition of the labor force which has tended to accompany true structural transformation has not been in evidence. The proportion of the classifiable labor force engaged in agriculture did decline from 45 percent in 1943 to 35 at the end of the sixties. However, this decline was proportionately much smaller than the decline in the relative share of agriculture in total product.

More important, from such evidence as is available, it seems that such decline in agriculture's share of the labor force as actually took place was due not so much to rapid expansion of employment activities in secondary and tertiary industries as to high rates of emigration in the fifties and early sixties and, since the slowing down of the rate of adult migration, to the growing incidence of unemployment. Thus such changes in the industrial composition of the labor force as have taken place do not present a picture of development -- that is, of an economy undergoing rapid structural transformation.

Yet another aspect of structural transformation has to do with the development of an increasing degree of interdependence among the different sectors of the economy. The forging of what Albert Hirschman calls forward and backward linkages[21] within the structure of production

is an essential ingredient of the process of economic development. In the Jamaican case progress in this direction has been of a marginal nature. This is due in some respect to the disparity between the taste patterns of the community, which are largely formed by external influences, and the production possibilities as given by the very skewed resource base and imported technology. In such circumstances industrialization is based largely on import-substitution which, in most cases, means "screw driver type" "finishing touch" industries where raw materials and components continue to be imported since, in a given situation, they cannot be supplied from domestic resources.

The failure to develop substantial linkages in the economy is also partly based on transnational corporation control over the way in which the country's resources are used, through a combination of ownership patterns and commercial policy. For example, sugar is shipped in a raw state even though it is technically and economically feasible to refine it in Jamaica. Similarly and more important, the bulk of bauxite mined has been shipped as raw ore even though there is no technical or economic problem of converting it all into alumina within Jamaica. Production of aluminum is more problematic, as has been seen, but is also possible.

The branch-plant approach to industrialization can also inhibit or at least fail to encourage the development of linkages within the economy. The company which is able to supply raw materials or other inputs from its production overseas is unlikely to encourage the production of local substitutes, where possible, since the gain to the economy may be at the company's expense. In most cases the research which would make the production of domestic substitutes feasible will

only be carried out if the Government intervenes directly. When international companies dominate key sectors of a country's economy for a long time indigenous economic initiative and entrepreneurship are stilled, thereby further inhibiting the creation of backward and forward linkages.

The foregoing should suffice to show that the economy is not being transformed. There are still gross inequalities of wealth and income which have been a legacy of the colonial past and which the dependent industrialization model has tended to reinforce. Between 1950 and 1968, for example, Jamaica's income per head grew at the rate of about 5 percent per annum. However, this new income was very unequally shared. A study based on 1958 figures estimated that in Jamaica the bottom 60 percent of households took only 19 percent of the national income. The top 5 percent of households took 30.2 percent (see Table 8.1). The share of the top 5 percent was not

Table 8.1

Income distribution in Jamaica, 1958, by ordinal groups, of income units (family, household, or tax returns)[22]

Units (%)	0-80	81-90	91-95	96-100
	19.5	18	13.5	30.2

particularly high by comparison with other developing countries, but the next 15 percent of the population did enjoy an unusually high share of national income, and as a consequence of this factor, Jamaica emerged in an international comparison as being characterized by a

remarkably unequal distribution of income. Indeed, "Jamaica has about the most unequal distribution recorded."[23] Later studies, based on slightly different resources, broadly confirmed these findings, and showed that the relative distribution of income remained stable at least as late as 1965.[24] There is no reason to assume that there have been any fundamental changes since. In fact, H. O'Flaherty, writing in 1976, asserted that the most important political fact about Jamaica is its mal-distribution of income. He claimed that though the country's per capita income was over 1000 (Jamaican) dollars, 85 percent of the population survived on less than 200 dollars per year.[25]

Inequality is not only vertical in terms of a simple class model but also "horizontally" between the urban employed on the one hand and the urban unemployed and agricultural and rural population on the other hand. The economic growth of the fifties and sixties has certainly benefitted the local businessman and salaried employees in the importing, manufacturing and service sectors of the economy. The employees in the public sector (both office and manual) have also shared in the improvement of material conditions. At the same time manual workers who have been unionized, in particular those employed in the mining, tourist and manufacturing sectors, have enjoyed good rates of pay.[26] It is clear that the figures in Table 8.1 also reflect, perhaps with equal weight, the differential rewards available to workers in different sectors; and in particular between workers in agriculture and others. Using the 1960 figures, E. Ahiram has calculated that agricultural workers earned 35 percent of the average per capita product; workers in manufacturing industry and private services

earned about the average; while workers in construction, public utilities, transportation and distribution earned much more than the average. Workers in the mining industry earned over four times the average.[27] Thus the burden has been on the urban unemployed and underemployed in the shanty-towns and on the people in the rural areas where agricultural productivity has not increased to raise rural incomes appreciably. As one authority summed the matter up, "much of the poverty in Jamaica is the consequence of the low productivity in agriculture."[28]

Finally, development policy and planning associated with the Lewis model have been highly "growth-oriented" on the assumption that if the growth of total production and income could be kept at high levels (through the expansion of the activities of the MNCs) the other problems of the economy, including unemployment, income distribution and local participation would be automatically solved by the operations of some kind of "invisible hand."[29] This approach has led to a form of perverse growth in the sense that despite a relatively rapid rate of expansion of production over a period of about twenty years, unemployment, after declining due to mass migration in the fifties and early sixties, showed signs of returning to the pre-war level (in 1943 the level was 25 percent).[30]

The McIntyre-Demas Model

The failure of the Lewis model to reduce underdevelopment and dependency, unemployment and poverty led to the acceptance of the McIntyre-Demas strategy of regional import substitution

industrialization. This approach towards regional "integration" was determined by the belief that the markets and the resources of individual Caribbean territories were too small to sustain the limited forms of industrializations. In order to overcome this it was felt that trade should be liberalized in the region in order to widen the market, improve the scope for the development of capitalist enterprises in the region, and thereby induce investments. This is essentially the free trade, private enterprise, market-oriented conceptions of growth and development policies being pursued by all governments in the region. As a result of this a program of integration movements, for example CARIFTA and later CARICOM, was agreed upon and introduced in order to ensure that a broad uniformity was achieved in the regional markets.

The weakness of the McIntyre-Demas thesis is that it failed to question the principles behind the Lewis strategy of "Industrialization by Invitation" or doubt the development potential of "screw driver final assembly" manufacturing, but asserted that the effectiveness of these policies had been muted by the small size of the domestic market and could, therefore, be substantially increased by breaking down regional tariff barriers and extending the size of the "home" market. The economic "integration" model focuses principally on just one of the many economic problems facing the region.

The key to the strategy of Caribbean economic "integration" was the pursuit of import-substitution on a regional basis. In other words, its basis was "more of the same." In that sense the McIntyre-Demas strategy was not an improvement on Lewis' since the latter, although pursued on a national basis, was based on a customs union and a

federal framework of decision-making.[31] Like the abortive West Indies federation, CARIFTA did not address the crucial issues in the success of regional integration, namely: role of foreign capital in regional development; the use and distribution of regional resources; and national political considerations and their impact upon regional strategies.

Because CARIFTA and its successor, CARICOM, stress trade liberalization and a wider market to encourage capitalist enterprise, they have tended to replicate the existing pattern of international division of labor within the region. This has meant polarized growth and unequal spread of the benefits of integration. Thus despite concessions (such as slower rate of reduction of tariffs for smaller industries), the smaller territories, where capitalism has the least developed material base (for example, the Leewards and Windward islands) have become markets for the export of the assembled manufacturing inputs from the larger territories like Trinidad-Tobago and Jamaica. In the CARICOM region, as has already been seen, over 95 percent of the exports within the region comes from the "Big Four" most developed units, with Trinidad-Tobago and Jamaica contributing by far the largest percentage share. Moreover, intra-regional trade is proportionately small; only some 10 percent of the total trade of CARICOM members.[33] This raises another problem which has plagued every attempt at economic integration around the world: the distribution of costs and benefits among constituent units.

The fact that the dependent capitalist form of integration generates unequal development and has no built-in mechanisms for equalizing benefits nationally, has created much friction and at times

has brought the market integration process almost to a halt. Nothing illustrates this more than the fact that CARICOM Prime Ministers have scheduled their first Heads of Government Conference in seven years when they meet in Kingston on 15 November 1982.

In sum, the many weaknesses of the Caribbean integration movement as a commercial and trading venture should not obscure the fact that successes have been achieved in the second major objective of CARICOM: the development of functional, non-economic cooperation between member states. There are clearly many cooperative programs and common services. For example, in education and training such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Examination Council; in Culture with the formation of Caribbean Festival of the Arts; in broadcasting and information; and in health, to name some of the more successful programs. The idea of a Caribbean regional organization is worthwhile and can act as a development catalyst for member countries. As will be recommended below, however, Caribbean regional unity should not be towards supranational implementation of regional policy via a political union, but towards the coordination of governmental policy on a regional basis.

The increasing unemployment, poverty and concern with foreign domination of the economy which resulted from policies pursued along the lines of both the Lewis and McIntyre-Demas models, occasioned a shift to the "non-capitalist" development path for Jamaica. This strategy emerged from the influence of a radical analysis of the problems of import-substituting dependent industrialization by the New World school of "Dependency" theorists. The descriptive, historical and institutional content of this genre of "dependency economics"

identified the primary source of motion as "market failure" and "direct foreign capital investment." In the mid-seventies, this analysis became assimilated into a new "radical" Government party ideology of Democratic Socialism -- intended to promote socialist-oriented forms as a counter to transnational branch plant enterprises.

Manley's Development Model: The "Non-Capitalist" Path

To what extent did Democratic Socialism achieve socio-economic transformation and non-capitalist development? Writing specifically of transformation in the Caribbean, S.B. Jones-Hendrickson posits four major components of this process: that is, the extent to which the Caribbean states individually and collectively are moving towards self-reliance; minimizing dependence on MNCs and capitalist financial markets; increasing the labor power of the masses; and mobilizing the surplus for the people. Movement towards these goals, according to Jones-Hendrickson, symbolizes transformation (non-movement towards these goals signifies rhetoric).[34]

Before applying this framework to the Jamaican context, it is important to bear in mind that the PNP's Democratic Socialism is of the Fabian mold. Thus the PNP-style progressivism seemed to have been moving in the direction that claims assistance, upliftment, and "better must come" for the lumpen elements -- landless peasants and unemployed/underemployed urban masses -- in Jamaica.

The thrust of the policies emanating from Democratic Socialism may not be questioned. Methodologically and ideologically there are serious questions. Aside from the fact that the PNP was

undergirded with the finances of the very powerful capitalist strata in and outside of Jamaica, its leader Michael Manley has made several about-turns since adopting "socialism." He presented a watered-down Emergency Production Plan; exonerated the United States from the destabilization allegations; compromised the party's position on the IMF and accepted loans, after castigating the agency by declaring "we are not for sale," which greatly limits the Government's ability to continue with its progressive social programs; blocked some CARICOM commodities from entry into Jamaica -- a retrograde act for a champion of Caribbean economic integration; and delayed constitutional change and especially the transition to a republican form of government. While the Manley Government has done an impressive job in mobilizing some of the surplus, and whereas some people have been sharing in the benefits of the country "for the first time, at last," the methods of the Manley regime exhibit inherent weaknesses.

In the area of transformation, Jamaica continued to be heavily dependent on foreign food supply. The island's growing import food bill for 1980 stood at 129,000 (Jamaican) dollars, a rise of nearly 50 million over the 1976 food bill.[35] Most of the food categories consist of food items that have been either popularized by the transnational firms or imported to cater to the taste of tourists and local urban middle classes. This meant spending money that the country can ill afford. The agricultural policies have been aimed at making the country more self-reliant in the area of food. A major objective of the land reform projects such as "Operation GROW" and the reclamation of all bauxite-held lands was to produce more locally-grown nutritional food for the nation and raw materials in an effort to reduce the

country's dependence on imports, and to improve the health of the populace. The goal of increased food production was based on the following: expansion of crop lands, new methods and techniques, the introduction of higher-yielding crop varieties, increased use of pesticides, infrastructure development or improvement, and more easily available farm credit.[36] Thus in the area of food, and particularly the utilization of local resources, there is evidence of transformation and self-reliance.

In the financial sphere, Jamaica under the Manley Government was able to take some steps to assert greater national control over the bauxite industry through many "partnerships" or "joint ventures" and the formation of bauxite producers' association, the IBA. But the Government was not willing or able to wrest decisive control from the bauxite companies given the parameters it set for itself: respect for the rules of the capitalist game. An important aspect of this strategy is that much of the capital involved in this "new model" of state ownership was generated abroad in the form of aid and not from an internal dynamic.

As one of the most vocal and successful champions of demands for a new International Economic Order, Manley has also provided a test case for evaluating the impact of those demands. As the earlier analysis has shown, Jamaica has been able to capture a larger share of the profits generated by the bauxite mining industry within the island and exercise greater control over the exploitation of its natural resource. But, it is the Jamaican bourgeoisie, more than any other class, which has benefited from the Government's confrontation with the

companies.[37] Moreover, the effect of Government participation in the industry was to strengthen the tendency towards state capitalism rather than move the country towards socialism in accordance with the rhetoric.

Another aspect of the strategy of "joint-ventures" in the bauxite industry is the determined effort to set up state-owned alumina processing plants. At first there was the plan to set up two alumina plants each in CARICOM countries, Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana, in a collaborating effort. Trinidad would supply the oil needed to fuel the plants and Jamaica and Guyana the bauxite ore. The bureaucrats in the region hailed the decision as the most significant regional effort in the move to self reliance and independence. Many Caribbean development theorists perceived this initiative as only partially addressing itself to the four components of the transformation process. The reason was simple: Foreign capital was slated to have a crucial role in the projects; instead of minimizing the dependence on foreign capital, Jamaica and the other two CARICOM members were about to deepen this dependence.

In addition to the foregoing enigma, there was the attempt to establish JAMAMEX processing plant between Mexico and Jamaica. Finally, when these efforts collapsed the PNP Government then entered into negotiations with other "friendly" Third World states (Iraq and Algeria) to set up Jamaica's own alumina plant.

These attempts at cooperation with Third World states were an integral part of the PNP's policy of economic nationalism: building solidarity with underdeveloped countries and at the same time achieve a measure of economic independence. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the weakness of micro-states like Jamaica as they struggle to gain ownership

by renegotiating the terms of domination with the transnational corporations.

The Jamaican experience with the IMF is a classic example of continuing dependence of a Third World country on international capital which have had severe internal repercussions -- socially, politically and economically. Far from ameliorating Jamaica's critical problems of underdevelopment, the acceptance of IMF loans imposed policies that cut back beneficial social programs and penalized the working class.

From a global perspective, Jamaica was far from the kind of socio-economic transformation that is necessary and sufficient to improve the material well-being of all its people. From a realistic point of view, Manley's Democratic Socialism has been a decidedly progressive force. Not only have some sectors of the underprivileged and working class been sharing in the benefits of the country for the first time, but more important, the Manley era has created a new opening for the growth of forces on the Left. This has done much to conscientize the masses and aid the development of a working class movement in Jamaica. This conscientization or social awakening among the people is of critical import in the long run to the PNP leadership. Much of this awakening has been derived from enlightened elements in the party; some has come from the vanguard elements in the nation, and, lastly, some has emanated from the surging waves of commanding one's own resources as enunciated in Third World forums.[38] This awakening will not be abated.

While a clear-cut trend in socio-economic transformation was observable, the Jamaican people were not too clear regarding the specific

direction of Democratic Socialism. The policies did have an inherent dynamic that was mandating action, informing a perspective, and articulating a sentiment favoring the stratum which is poverty stricken, socially exploited and dispossessed. However, care should be taken that there not be a misreading of the sentiments. It is easy to perceive transformation in changes when in fact they are incrementalist state capitalistic overtures. While there was some evidence of transformation and transition during the Manley Government's period in office, Professor Thomas argues that "it had nothing to do with socialism, but state capitalism."[39] As Professor Thomas points out, "the expansion of state property in the Jamaican context does not mean the use and management of resources by the people, which constitutes a fundamental condition of the socialist path of development."[40]

State capitalism, critical scholars assert, is not a distinct mode of production but a variant of the capitalist mode of production which materialized in the Third World under certain historically determined conditions within the world economy. By "state capitalism" they mean the introduction and institution of the capitalist mode of production (through direct state intervention) by the petite bourgeoisie.[41] As Professor Berch Berberoglu points out, following a historical analysis of the development of underdeveloped nations, Third World countries embarked on state capitalism in opposition to imperialism. Jamaica, under the Manley Government, he asserts, is an example of the emergence of "radical-petty bourgeois regime" following the late 1960s and mid-1970s -- a period coinciding with the gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression, coupled with the oil crisis and the continuing Vietnamese War.[42] Writing with reference to

the Commonwealth Caribbean, Professor Thomas again asserts that the progressive expansion of the state into the system of economic reproduction came with the belated recognition of the negative features of the Puerto Rican-type model of development.

> Where popular resistance to increasing unemployment, poverty and foreign domination of the economy has been strong, the effect has been to promote the development of state capitalist forms as a counter to transnational branch plant operations. This development was signalled by ideological proclamations that the country was going 'socialist.' There were of course domestic variations, such as 'cooperative socialism' and 'democratic socialism,' which were used in order to demonstrate that the state was taking its own indigenous path to Socialism. The proof of this socialist intent was given by the nationalizations of foreign property in order to assert more national control over the economy. The efforts of the nationalization policies were often preceded by other efforts to localize the economy and reduce foreign domination.[43]

In other words the emergence of state capitalism has little to do with socialism but has been justified on the ground of "pragmatic necessities," and to the general structural crisis of world capitalism.

One fundamental feature of state capitalism is nationalization. The nationalization of the commanding economic heights of the Caribbean, critical theorists argue, has not yet been reflected in any fundamental change in social relations of production. "Neither the incomes hierarchy, nor market determination, nor profit calculations have changed very much." Nor, it is argued, can rapid change be expected, "given the dominant imperative of accumulation and the tendency of the agents to the state to prefer bureaucratic to democratic political solutions."[44]

It is argued, furthermore, that following "nationalizations" or "national" control of MNCs, Caribbean "socialist" Governments have

continued to rely on foreign finance (multinational bank loans, bilateral aid and suppliers credit). These nationalizations, more importantly, were accompanied by contracts in the areas of technology, marketing and management. The net effect has been no significant reduction in foreign control over the nationalized enterprises.[45]

While the logic of Dependency may imply a steady expansion of state economic activity, "the generality of this trend suggests that it is neutral with respect to ideological orientation and the choice of a path of development."[46] The pragmatic and gradual approach to taking control of the "commanding heights" in most underdeveloped countries "points to political expediency rather than ideological inspiration."[47] There is therefore little necessarily socialist or even anti-capitalist in attempts at "national" control of the commanding heights of an economy. As the late historian and Prime Minister of Trinidad-Tobago, Eric Williams, was at pains to point out, his twin island nation is following

> a path less revolutionary and more gradualistic, and less totalitarian and more democratic than the Cuban path but more autonomous and ultimately more self-reliant than the Puerto Rican one. It involves continued reliance on outside investment and trade with the outside world; but it also involves steady and increasing assumption of control over the commanding heights of the economy by Government and nationals, a determined attempt to promote racial harmony and social equality, and the conscious development of a national and cultural identity.[48]

This kind of "Middle-of-the-Road" compromise strategy, between the Puerto Rican "sell-out" model on the one hand and the Cuban on the other is precisely the model adopted by Manley's PNP administration in the 1970s. In his latest book titled Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery, Manley has reiterated his commitment to this strategy or

what he termed the "Third Path" -- a potential unity of "peripheral" nations to challenge the authority of both East and West. He again rejects the Puerto Rican-type model and insists that Jamaica under Democratic Socialism straddled the path between the Cuban and Puerto Rican models of development.[50]

As Irene Hawkins has observed, in a review of development strategies in the Caribbean, "Jamaica [under Michael Manley's PNP Government] has gone to quite some trouble to assure foreign investors that it is still a safe place to come to."[51] Manley himself, when asked at a 1969 London meeting with Jamaican immigrants whether the PNP would be returning to an "anti-imperialist policy," clarified the point guardedly:

> . . . in the past too much reliance had been placed on the investments of foreigners and this was a question that was being re-examined. But though there might well be the necessity for changes of emphasis and reconsideration of priorities, he did not foresee the adoption of a policy opposed to the direct investment of foreign capital.[52]

This re-examination has never taken place. Since then Manley-style "socialism" has still not taken a decisive turn from anti-imperialism to anti-capitalism.

Democratic Socialism, for all its ideological and methodological weaknesses, was "positive and progressive" in the sense that it aimed to develop the productive forces and, as a result of its anti-imperialism (necessitated by the drive to facilitate national capital accumulation), to weaken imperialism internationally.[53] Indeed, Professors Sherry Keith and Robert Girling have also supported the contention.

> Events in Jamaica [in the 1970s] have implications not only for the future developments of the island, but also for what they reveal about the prospects for progressive Third World governments like Manley's, which are pressing for reforms in the international economy and addressing some of the demands of the working class. . . . the Jamaica brand of nationalism represents a serious challenge to imperialism by introducing a new element of instability and uncertainty into the system. As the political costs and risks of locating investments in the third world escalate, U.S. transnationals are no longer free to roam the globe at will.[54]

Given the powerful class-based nature of the productive forces inherited from colonialism transformation and transition was limited. Finally, "non-capitalist" development as emerged in Jamaica should be seen as the product of people's responses to objective conditions partly because of, and partly in spite of, the philosophical and methodological orientation of Caribbean dependency theory.

Seaga's Development Model: Lewis Industrialization Model II

The return of the JLP to power in 1980 ushered in a new phase of dependent capitalist industrialization. Based on the classic pattern informed by the Lewis or the Puerto Rican "Operation Bootstrap" thesis, the JLP Government has embarked on a policy of again "wooing and fawning upon"[55] foreign capitalists in an effort to attract investment for "joint-ventures." The effort at industrialization involves a shift away from the failed import-substitution industrialization strategy to the production of manufactured goods for export. The reason for this shift in policy seemed to have been based on a "new orthodoxy" on "growth through exports of manufactures" which is gaining ground in Latin American countries.

In Latin America, during the mid-seventies, a new thinking began to emerge in the wake of the general failure and the massive foreign indebtedness as a result of previous "models of development" -- that is, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). In the circumstances a policy promising an alleviation of the debt situation particularly such as the production of manufactured goods for export would obviously be quite welcome. Such industrialization is regarded, furthermore, as desirable in itself due to beliefs (not generally valid) that only industrialization can lead to genuine self-reliance and a reduction of foreign dependence, and that the key to raising productivity and the rate of growth in an economy lies in the fast expansion of manufacturing industry.[56] Most importantly, the road to such industrialization is considered to be open because: the countries of the Third World have abundant natural resources and cheap labor, elements which are sine qua non of industrial expansion; the previous decades (1950s and 1960s) had already demonstrated the feasibility of industrialization; and despite the problems ("bottle-necks") of the ISI policy, it had provided some countries of Latin America with enough "infrastructure" and "technical knowhow" to sustain the trend of the preceding period.[57]

From the JLP manifesto, it would seem that the policy-makers have accepted the evidence presented by some writers about recent trends in the world economy which indicate not only the industrialization of the Third World but also the "de-industrialization" of the developed capitalist world as well.[58] A summary of the strongest supporting arguments are as follows: the share of the Third World in world industrial production increased from 9 percent in 1955 to 12 percent in

1977; and crude steel output of the underdeveloped countries increased from 2 percent of world steel production in 1950 to approximately 11 percent in 1977. Relatively speaking, the growth was even more pronounced: industrial production in the period 1955-1974 expanded faster in the underdeveloped countries (6.9 percent a year) than in the advanced capitalist economies (5.0 percent a year). In two subsequent periods, 1970-1974 and 1972-1976, the respective growth rates of industrial production were 8.2 percent and 7.0 percent for the underdeveloped economies and 4.5 percent and 3.0 percent for the advanced capitalist countries. The exports of manufactures from Third World countries have grown even more rapidly: from 1950 to 1977, the underdeveloped countries' share of the total manufactured imports of the most advanced capitalist countries increased by 50 percent; from 49 percent to 7.3 percent.[59]

As Raul Fernandez[60] and Swee Hin Toh[61] point out, there are important weaknesses both in the argument and the evidence used to support it. While it is true that Third World countries possess cheap labor in abundance as well as strategic raw materials, both elements can only rarely be found in one and the same country; for example, Hong Kong possesses a lot of labor but hardly any natural resources. Furthermore, the mere presence of these elements cannot in itself be a theoretical significant argument, since the last hundred years (which coincide with the epoch of modern imperialism) have witnessed the exploitation of such resources to the advantage of imperialist countries.

The evidence can be criticized from other perspectives. The industrialization reflected in the data occurred in half a dozen

countries which include such client "city-states" as Singapore and Hong Kong, and small client countries as Puerto Rico, Taiwan and South Korea. Once the proportion of manufactured exports produced in these areas is subtracted, there is not much basis left on which to proclaim a clear-cut trend towards the structural transformation of Third World economies. The industrialization has also been limited in that much of it has been, as earlier discussed, of the "final assembly" type -- which in some countries "represents more than one-half of recent manufactured exports."[62] As far as foreign debt is concerned there is evidence that in recent years the terms of trade of products manufactured in the Third World have deteriorated than in the case of primary products.[63] To the extent that this is so, the ability of export of manufactures to alleviate foreign debt burdens is limited. The geographical pattern of exports associated with the recent spurt of industrialization shows that it remains for the most part within the sphere of influence of one or another of the advanced capitalist countries. Finally, it can be shown that the recent growth in industrial exports from Third World countries is not impressive from a global point of view; manufactured exports from the Third World represent a very small fraction of total manufactured exports, fluctuating between 0.5 percent and 2.0 percent.

Given the foregoing argument, the JLP's renewed industrialization strategy for expansion of exports to earn foreign exchange with which to buy capital goods, raw materials and food is no more promising than the ISI policies. Caribbean Basin Initiative free trade plans do not signify a break with the policies of the past since ~~it~~ is not a true liberalization of trading relations. As earlier noted, the U.S.

protectionist policies only encourage entry of raw, unprocessed Basin countries' materials, so that job gains, value added and foreign exchange earnings of processing are reaped by the United States. Economic conditions in the advanced capitalist countries generally are of decisive importance to the success of the new export development thrust: for the present there is a strong trend toward protectionism in the advanced capitalist countries directed against manufactures from underdeveloped countries.

Exports of countries like Jamaica, furthermore, are especially vulnerable to the vicissitudes and manipulations of world markets. Balance-of-payments deficit therefore crop up repeatedly. Relief is then sought by attracting more foreign investors and lenders. And, as Jeff Frieden points out in the case of "new industrialized" countries (Brazil, Mexico, Algeria and South Korea), this is the route to ever more and greater balance-of-payments crises since profits have to be paid to investors and interest to lenders.[64] There is no way to escape the debt trap.

Another query raised by this industrialization strategy concerns who will be the agents of this new panacea? The new policy of export development is supposed to remedy the evils brought about by the previous policy of the ISI in Jamaica. But it is crucial to recognize that transnational corporations (TNCs) will again be the main actors in the "new manufactures for exports" strategy, just as they were in the earlier ISI strategy. The "track record" of the TNCs is one of relying heavily on imports from their own various branches for their capital equipment and technical needs. Thus there is no guarantee that the currently proposed plans of relying again on the TNCs will

will not have the same results as the policies of the ISI. For Jamaica at the present juncture, U.S. monopoly capitalism -- through its political and economic influence -- seems to be in an excellent position to make the most of the opportunity presented by President Reagan's Basin Initiative proposals.

Finally, to the extent that further industrialization is shaped by TNC investments, it is doubtful that it will lead to the autonomous, self-reliant development of Jamaica as JLP policy-makers hope.[65] As Fernandez further points out, the evidence indicates that the most intense period of actual manufacturing industrialization in Third World countries like Jamaica may be coming to an end in the near future.[66] In so far as this is the case, the JLP blueprint for a new thrust in export manufactures as a panacea for Jamaica's underdevelopment and poverty may be "more of an ideological device to keep alive technocratic and nationalistic hopes for development than a realistic assessment for possibilities."[67]

As long as the United States exercises domination over the Caribbean Basin countries, industrial development will continue to be development within a sphere of influence -- that is, development and growth primarily for the benefit of the U.S. economy. In the present circumstances such development seems to imply "more assemblage, more control and the growth of the technocratic elites."[68] In fact, did not the "mini-Marshall-type" Caribbean Basin Initiative emphasize training for the private sector -- particularly in investment promotion -- export market and technology transfer?

In sum, it is doubtful that the strategy of export-led industrialization supported by joint U.S.-Jamaica business initiatives

to promote bilateral investment and expanded trade will produce substantial socio-economic transformation. Nonetheless, if the questions of reorganization of agricultural production/rural development, unemployment, income distribution and genuine local participation are addressed, then the new thrust in one-way trade and U.S.-Jamaica investment promotion could be beneficial. It remains questionable, however, whether socio-economic transformation can be achieved with a development model that centers on the interests of a few TNCs, the ideological compatibility of the incumbent Jamaican Prime Minister and the American President and, or, the ups and downs of the American market.

The emphasis on technical assistance to the private rather than the public sector is the point at which the Basin proposal begins to take on a decidedly political coloration. The emphasis clearly presupposes a preference for a particular development model. This reinforces the view of the Secretary General of the Society for International Development (SID), Ponna Wignaraja, when he asserts that there is no crisis in development but rather a crisis among those who wield political power. Wignaraja argues that "state" practitioners of development, fed on the dominant macro intellectual framework, have no real commitment to fundamental social change in wider human terms so that the majority of people can benefit. Thus when new development strategies are adopted the hope is for a "faster trickle down of economic benefits." Such "conservative response," Wignaraja contends, "is time barred . . . and will, contrary to popular myth, eventually lead to destabilization, violence and bloody revolution because of inherent contradictions."[69]

Education Strategy for Development

This study has also focused on how the educational system and educational reforms after Self-Government and in particular Independence functioned to maintain the system of dependent capitalist development in Jamaica. The process of dual economic development in Jamaica has generated and perpetuated the coexistence of both industrial capitalist and pre-industrial peasant social relations of production. This process has had a decisive impact on the development of the educational system. The educational system evolved in response to the class relations of the plantation economy. The most important aspects of these relations for the development of education were, first, the need for an indigenous stratum of Jamaicans integrated within the colonial administration and, second, the absence of a growing industrial proletariat.

This led to the accelerated growth of a network of private secondary schools for an indigenous "colonial" stratum and the retardation of the development of a mass popular system of education until the modern industrial working class began to grow more rapidly in the mid-20th century.

Educational reforms in this period are conditioned by the limited process of industrialization which occurs in the Jamaican economy. Modern industrial employment grows more rapidly than previously. However, the growth of employment in the modern industrial sector is greatly outstripped by the general increase in demand for wage labor.

The educational system has a twofold function in this period. One is to take up the surplus (especially in the urban areas) of youth who cannot be absorbed into the wage-labor economy. The other function is to train a relatively small number of "skilled workers" to fill the ranks (in productive, clerical, and semi-managerial levels) of the modern sector of the economy.[70] Educational reforms are clearly designed with these necessities in mind.

The essential problem facing policy-makers has been to make the educational system more responsive to the changing needs of the dependent capitalist economy without appearing to favor the interests of the bourgeoisie to whom the system has traditionally catered. This is why the three major educational reforms (the Common Entrance Examination, The 70:30 Policy and the New Deal for Education) have centered around access and maintenance of the elite secondary schools. The reforms create the illusion of a growing democracy of educational opportunity. However, as has been illustrated, these reforms actually only shift the status quo slightly. This shift is generally in favor of the interest of privileged classes rather than the masses. Nonetheless, as Professor Keith rightly observed, it is noteworthy that educational policy has also been shaped and transformed in response to the growing demand from the masses that the state deliver more and better education for their children.[71]

The task, then, still remains one of converting the education system from being the essentially conservative instrument it has been in the past and making it an integral and dynamic part of economic and social process and development. This cannot be done unless there is a change in the development ideology underpinning the Lewis model

which places the emphasis on industry rather than agriculture. Therefore, if in the 1980s renewed efforts are to be made to ensure that education contribute more effectively to human resource development in Jamaica, then there is a need for a new development ideology and a new integrated development strategy including a supportive new educational strategy.

Before proceeding to outline the direction of the new strategy it should be pointed out, after a rather long foregoing analysis, that the weaknesses of development policies and strategies in Jamaica are to a considerable extent the result of the theoretical underpinnings of the dominant macrointellectual framework and the conception of development itself. For example, the JLP policy-makers view development largely in terms of economic growth and on the basis of modern large-scale industries (including tourism), more often than not in the form of branch plants or subsidiaries of metropolitan firms. This has the effect of giving complete licence to the continuous introduction of the latest, most "modern" technologies, clearly inappropriate to the labor surplus situation, as has been pointed out.

However, this dependent development strategy which emphasizes high rates of growth of the economy as a way of solving Jamaica's social ills, particularly unemployment, has a major weakness. In the first place, it is now widely recognized by economists concerned with the Third World that economic growth and employment creation are really two separate things. As Demas, writing in the mid-1970s, pointed out, in principle it might be possible with, for instance, 15 percent per annum real growth rate of GDP, to absorb annually a significant number of workers into productive employment.[72] But clearly the maintenance of

such an astronomical rate of growth over any reasonable time period is for all practical purposes impossible. Therefore, on any plausible assumption about the likely rate of growth of the economy, employment creation must become an independent objective in its own right.

Although employment creation figures prominently in the stated objectives of the economic plans of Jamaica, the fact is that employment is regarded as a by-product of general economic growth. As Adlith Brown has observed, in a critique of Planning in Jamaica, "the overriding objective is the attraction of foreign investment capital . . . any employment creation would be a by-product of the emphasis on foreign [capital] inflows . . ."[73] Brown also posited that planning has been concerned with the political process and in particular

> the factors determining economic and political decisions, which relate to or invoke only a minority of the various sectors of population on a continuous basis, cannot make use of planning for social, economic or political transformation. Consequently, there is no planning for development.[74]

These critical comments, it should be pointed out, are based on the study of national development plans in the period 1944 to 1968, a period which coincides with the peripheral industrialization in Jamaica.

A major reason for the chronic unemployment situation can be traced to the prescription offered by the neo-classical economists for creating employment in situations of structural underdevelopment: accumulation of capital. But the essence of the problem of unemployment in Third World countries like Jamaica is precisely the difficulty of their accumulating capital to an extent sufficient to cure the problem by the orthodox prescription. Thus the orthodox route to full employment through the "normal" process of growth is not feasible.

Finally, the approach to dependent development planning is one which has underemphasized the following policies and strategies to cope with the unemployment problem: small business and small industry either on individual or co-operative basis; integrated rural development; a re-structured educational system; and the conscious shifting of demand away from imported towards locally-produced goods and services, particularly the latter. A careful study of past and present JLP plans shows that greater emphasis is placed on increasing per capita income -- even though lip service is paid to other objectives such as those listed above.

I am therefore forced to conclude that the dependent capitalist path to development in an underdeveloped economy like Jamaica's is not "viable" (in the long-run) in the sense that it will inevitably provoke a political explosion. It is thus evident from the analysis that the JLP development strategy is imitative of the modernization world view on development/underdevelopment. In other words, "development" is equated simply with industrialization and modernization. This ideological framework for development is part and parcel of the fascination of many Third World political elites with the glitter of American corporate capitalism and the Madison Avenue conception of the "good life."

The PNP development strategy, in contrast, has been a clear reaction to the unequal development of the dependent model. In Manley-led Jamaica emphasis shifted toward efforts to escape dependency and to achieve a more self-reliant path of development, thus placing higher priority than in the dependent models on meeting domestic needs

locally and eliminating gross inequalities of income.

It is clear that in the self-reliant model of development agriculture must play a strategic role. For, as Jay R. Mandle argues in his assessment of the model,

> if external resources of investment are to be minimized, it can only be from the wealth produced in the countryside that new industries can be financed. Similarly if external markets are to be reduced in importance, rural incomes must be increased in order to provide local markets for new products. Further the country's food-import bill must be minimized so as to reduce dependency on foreign exchange, and this too requires an expansion of agricultural output.75

These are the goals that the Manley regime pursued with its cooperative agricultural sector. This approach to self-reliant development required an extended period of experimentation and consequently it enjoyed a measure of success. In the attempt to strengthen the peasants and at the same time raise agricultural production to satisfactory levels a conflict ensued between the requirements of growth and rural democracy. It put the Manley Government to a real test. In particular, it had to cope with the possibility that in order to maintain voluntarism in the countryside by responding to the land-hunger of the farming community a rate of economic expansion slower than the desired one will have to be accepted. Evidently, this was not accepted by some overzealous party administrators who resorted to mild coercion instead of persuasion.

However, while there were difficulties it should be conceded that the strategy was positive, in the sense that it recognizes that agriculture will remain primarily a means of subsidizing people to remain on the land in order to ease the social and political pressures

which follow on rapid population growth, rural/urban migration, and slowly rising agriculture incomes.

Progress in self-reliant development was limited, particularly in the area of democratization of social relations. Because of their reformist policies, informed by Caribbean dependency, there was little success in the social relations of production. With the continuing dominance of foreign capital, a growing monopolization of the means of production, the continued high rate of unemployment, it is evident that the basic relationship between capitalist and workers has not as yet been attacked. Jamaica, under the PNP, was still on the verge of deciding whether or not it would make the transition to socialism. The country, in fact, was traversing the era of struggle between democratic and bourgeois forces over whether or not the country would move to break the pattern of dependent capitalist development or perpetuate it.

The limitation to development is exemplified by the social relations at the international level. As Professor Thomas points out,[76] both the policies of open invitation of foreign capital and "national" control of foreign capital take place in a world context of capitalist accumulation. The interface of internal development (that is, internal class struggle), and the international context (that is, the operation of capitalism on a world scale), is crucial to any consideration of development paths. Manley-led Jamaica was a militant advocate for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Given the critical nature of the NIEO demands (for example, the ending of trade discrimination and the democratization of the decision-making structures of all global financial institutions) to Jamaica's internal development, Manley's

aim was not to restructure drastically the prevailing pattern of international economic relations (along the line of the minority revolutionary tendency, for example, Cuba) but adjust to, or reform the existing division of labor (along the majority reformist tendency, for example, the new Caribbean states) "in a fractured and pragmatic" way so that the more pressing problems of his demands can be accommodated.

The PNP development strategy, therefore, is clearly reflective of the radical bourgeois tradition of the New World Group within the Critical or Dependency world view. The New World Group dependency thesis provides a model of economic underdevelopment, not of economic development.[77] The Group made no serious attempt at formulating a comprehensive theory of Caribbean development. The thesis thus cannot form the basis for an operational model, unlike the Lewis model, to assist policy-makers in formulating a strategy for economic development. Unfortunately, most of the New World Group were attracted into politics before they had even commenced the task of building an operational model. For example, Manley appointed Norman Girvan Technical Director of the National Planning Agency and Owen Jefferson Deputy Governor of the Bank of Jamaica, who was later elevated to acting Governor by Seaga. Lloyd Best became a Senator in the Trinidad-Tobago Parliament and McIntyre served, as did Demas, as Secretary-General of CARICOM. It is not difficult to understand why they have resorted to a reactive nationalism instead of adapting the Marxist model.

Towards a New Development Strategy

"Development," as a normative term, is not easily defined. However, Dudley Seers generalizes that the development process includes "the realization of the potential of human personality." At a more basic level, in terms of income distribution, he believes that enough food, a job and equality all contribute to the realization of development and that if all three of these have improved, "then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned."[78]

Clearly, a new approach to development is needed which will focus on mass development, directly aimed at improving the general living conditions of those at the bottom of the economic and social hierarchy. Thus the primary developmental objective of a new development strategy must be a selective attack on the worst forms of poverty. Rather than taking care of GNP and per capita income and assuming this will take care of poverty, this new self-reliant model would reverse this approach. Such a strategy is "viable" in the sense that it focuses first on meeting the basic needs of the masses in the traditional sector. Production for the basic needs of the masses implies "a systematic, conscious, deliberate and planned attack on poverty."[79] In other words the deliberate removal of poverty becomes a determinant of what is produced. The elimination is not treated as an incidental consequence of production as when profit is the main determinant of output. The needs referred to are personal (food, clothing, housing), and public/collective (health, sanitation, education, culture and recreation, and so on). Thus they are also

material and non-material.

Development means that the satisfaction of these basic needs should be generated through effective exercise of the right to work. In the self-reliant model work must become the overriding objective as profit is in the dependent capitalist model. Work must be seen as both an end and a means of development."

The self-reliant model should also involve a fuller utilization of locally available resources in all production efforts, the development and use of more appropriate technology and a production orientation geared more directly towards meeting domestic consumption needs, particularly of the masses.

Another aspect of this self-reliant strategy must be its concern not only with human resource development but also human resource utilization. As Professor Kazim Bacchus points out,[80] education planners in the past have tended to focus on the former activity while equal attention needs to be given to both aspects of the problem. For example, new economic policies will need to favor labor intensive rather than capital intensive methods of production, thus facilitating the more efficient use of the available manpower in Third World countries like Jamaica.

Finally, the self-reliant model should emphasize categories such as participation, ecological concerns, man as consumer not only as producer, and cultural identity -- a fresh synthesis of ideas which were not provided for in the earlier praxis. This self-reliant model is succinctly summed up in Wignaraja's holistic conceptual framework:

> . . . development is simultaneously a top-down process and a bottom-up one. There is a national macro perspective and the constituent micro grassroots contradictions. Development here is viewed as a process of human development -- a process of social transformation in which man is both subject and the object and in which he participates at all levels of decision-making. Self-reliance is both the means and an end in this process. It is a process that releases the creative energy of man, assures equal access to resources for all, tends to eliminate the difference between mental and manual labour and uses technology appropriate to these goals. All of this . . . squarely faces the issue of people's participation, conscientization and the building of countervailing power.[81]

It is evident that the above approach transcends the usual "capitalist" and "socialist" formulations. This is not to suggest that these concepts which provided the theoretical underpinnings of the models analyzed in this study have not been useful. While their contributions to the ends or goals of development have been limited, enormous gains were made in terms of the ongoing development process. Third World countries, therefore, must continue to experiment with new methodology based both on insights derived from the old framework and emerging realities and even to formulate a new science of knowledge.

Recommendations

It seems clear from the analysis in this study that in the quest to overcome underdevelopment and poverty, agriculture must assume a strategic role. Therefore, one recommendation must be that the agricultural reorganization begun in Manley-led Jamaica should continue. Agriculture's contribution to self-reliant growth requires a fundamental transformation of the social character of small peasant farming moving it away from isolated individualism towards voluntary

joint-farming and collective farming. This can only be achieved through intensive political education, organization and mobilization.

Given that full cooperative development is a long-term process, then what is also required is an intensive study of a range of alternatives in cooperatives and collectives to improve the process. The Israelis' experience in developing successful non-state Kibbutz farms should be carefully studied. So too should the Soviet Union's experience in collectivization and Tanzania's experiment with Ujamaa villages. The experience of the Soviet Union has shown that if democracy is not preserved in the rural areas the peasantry will be driven to retaliation and to the sabotage of the transitional efforts.

Obviously what is required is a close collaborative relationship between the government and the farming community. Only by involving workers and farmers in decisions with regard to organizational forms can governments hope to tap and maintain the good will of these groups. The presence of such good will is the necessary condition which has to be fulfilled if a mutually acceptable structure of farming is ultimately to be created. But something more than this is also suggested. The centrality of agriculture to autonomous development means that, if force or coercion is to be avoided, the desires of farmers and peasants must be respected. Specifically this means that the rural community may exercise veto power over specific policies and approaches to development when those approaches and policies directly affect the organization of agriculture.

This emphasis on agricultural reorganization as the key element in a mass-oriented development strategy would suggest the need for a new supportive educational strategy based on the concept of

self-reliance. It should be pointed out that direct economic benefits from vocationalizing primary and secondary education have been shown by several studies to be exaggerated and the high cost not appreciated. It is thus questionable whether the formal school curriculum with a vocational and specifically agricultural orientation would provide the support necessary for the implementation of such a development strategy.

What is required to help revitalize agriculture is a new approach that would correct the imbalances of the emphasis on educational expansion at the secondary and tertiary levels, consonant with the two-sector theory of development. Thus the mass-oriented development model will have important implications for educational reforms aimed at making the educational system more relevant to overall development goals. In education, as in overall development, the focus will be to meet the needs of the people by utilizing as much as possible local resources and by developing a closer link between education and work.

In any attempt to implement this strategy the educational needs must be identified and defined. For the educational needs and priorities of societies committed to a policy of self-reliance aimed primarily at helping the total population to improve the quality of their lives -- mainly through their own resources -- would necessarily be different from the educational needs of the same societies pursuing the two-sector development strategy.

Intimately bound up with the issue of needs identification is also the problem of needs definition. For example, Third World needs have traditionally been defined, often inappropriately, in terms of institutions and personnel (secondary schools, more primary school

teachers, etc.) rather than in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes needed by the population to cope with life and improve their standard of living in these societies.

Another issue pertains to how these needs are met at the present time -- whether they depend too heavily on imported inputs including imported technology -- and if so, whether new approaches to meeting them can be devised which utilize more local resources. This would have the effect of making the underdeveloped country less dependent on imports.

Space does not permit an elaboration of these issues here, but the first change in a problem-solving approach to education in underdeveloped countries such as Jamaica would require a shift in educational policies directed towards providing a basic level of education for the total population. This new policy will then have a number of implications. It will mean an emphasis on primary education, together with a concerted effort to ensure that it will become more useful in itself, and not simply a means to facilitate entry into the secondary schools.

The economic advantages of literacy have long been recognized. In addition to basic education as a human right, it is known that educated farmers tend to be more productive than uneducated farmers (even though we do not quite understand the process by which this education improves production). Hence a self-reliant development strategy directed towards improving the quality of life, not only in the urban areas but also in the rural areas where, as in Jamaica, some 60 percent of the population live, will seriously question the continued expansion of secondary and tertiary facilities. Further, economists who in the "Development Decade" of the 1960s were urging further expansion of higher education in Third World countries, now point to the fact that

their studies have consistently shown that the social rate of return on educational investment has been consistently highest at the primary level.

Also, if the concept of development is broader than that of mere economic growth, the case for universalizing primary education becomes more convincing. People with an education seem to display a greater willingness and ability to participate more actively in the political decision-making process and in community development efforts. Education also increases the predisposition of the population to try out new ideas and practices such as improved health practices, family planning and the introduction of new crops and cultivation techniques.

The mass-oriented development strategy should also provide basic facilities for the adult population. Thus educators should aim for a supporting adult education program geared to developing adult literacy. Within this context, a range of non-formal (out of school training) programs might play a crucial role in assisting adults to attain not only functional literacy but also relevant life skills which can help them improve their general standard of living.

In addition to these efforts at providing a basic level of education for the total population, there is a need for increasing the relevance of the educational program to the objective needs of a Third World country like Jamaica. Curriculum reform should aim at developing a closer link between the type of education which a student receives and the knowledge, skills and orientation required for the overall development of the country.

At the secondary level, too, there ought to be a closer relationship between school and work in a self-reliant model of

development. In Jamaica, as in many Third World countries, curriculum reform has occurred; but even where the content is right, the orientation is wrong. The aversion to science and technology continues right through to university education. However, the current thrust on the teaching of science and mathematics is not oriented to locally relevant areas such as accounting, business management and agriculture; nor is civics oriented towards such subjects as cooperatives. The whole secondary school system under the two-sector strategy of development is counter-productive in terms of objectives, for example, the creation of employment and the orientation of young people towards agriculture and rural development.

In order to make the basic second cycle level of education contribute to a productive life it is recommended that full-time secondary schooling be supplemented. The weaknesses of the existing system with its emphasis on helping students to obtain credentials rather than a useful education have been well documented. The schools will be moved to the work place where productive activities will be integrated into the curriculum. The students will be expected to go out in the field of work. The work experience to which they will be exposed will be part of an overall training program which will be supplemented by various other types of educational activities. For example, those who want to become skilled workers will work on projects with master-craftsmen in their chosen field. They would at first be assigned to jobs requiring little or no skills and will eventually progress through various tasks as they learn the skills necessary to perform these tasks. Some programs might consist entirely of on-the-job training while in others such training might have to be supplemented by self-study or evening courses offered

through some educational institution. The emphasis will be to ensure that people obtain the necessary skills to function competently in their fields.

China and Cuba are examples of the fairly successful integration of the world of school with the world of work. An intensive study of these systems is recommended. Community and folk schools, which seem to be so successful in Denmark, are only beginning to be introduced in countries like Jamaica. Jamaican political elites pay lip-service to the cooperative philosophy, but the best way to encourage cooperative endeavor and the spirit of self-help might be to make cooperatives a subject of study and practice in all secondary and primary schools. However, it is essential that the cooperative idea be not superimposed on the students from the top but grow up from the bottom through school projects decided on by the students themselves. At the same time cooperatives must be seen to be genuine, democratic attempts at solving a country's problems and not as government institutions under state control and therefore subject to suspicions of government manipulations.

Some of those who want to pursue more advanced training will be able to do so on the basis of their previous primary and secondary education. Tertiary level education and training will utilize the same combination of practical work and theoretical studies which characterized the second level of education. The curriculum at this level will emphasize scientific and technical education. Technological research must be applied to indigenous resources particularly to stimulate agricultural production and development. Thus unlike existing universities which turn out lawyers and arts graduates, the universities of the self-reliant model will produce agronomists, engineers, metallurgists, to

name but a few. Only with this orientation will the underdeveloped country hope to provide the human resource base for its national development and sovereignty.

The foregoing outline has presented some ideas on how the educational system can be reformed, especially at the primary and secondary levels, in a mass-oriented self-reliant model of development. If this model of educational reform is to succeed it must be accompanied by radical changes in the existing social and economic system aimed at reducing the relative massive income gap which exists in underdeveloped countries, especially between those in the modern and those in the traditional sectors of the society. Above all, for any proposed curriculum change to be accepted by the people, it has to be seen as leading to a life that is not entirely unattractive, especially as compared with the alternative opportunities which the existing curriculum offers. Finally, the educational reform will provide free education and training to all the people, for the self-reliant strategy of development cannot reconcile itself to the existence of a minority in society with a monopoly on technical and scientific knowledge and a majority shut out from this knowledge.

A final recommendation has to do with the problem of Caribbean integration. Integration of some kind (at least of the former British territories in the area), has been proposed, discussed and even attempted numerous times beginning at least as early as 1671. The McIntyre-Demas brainchild, CARICOM, is just the latest example. Yet a successful formula has still not been found.

The recent Jamaican experience with the IMF, it is argued, is one more illustration of the fact that without a decisive break with

world capitalism the continuing dependence of Third World countries such as the Caribbean states on international capital will have severe internal repercussions for the self-reliant development path. To many people this seems defeatist, yet it poses the question: is there an alternative? It is argued that the real alternatives for an underdeveloped country like Jamaica may indeed be either to play a very subordinate role in the international capitalist system, with little benefit to the masses or to seek an independent role in an alternative system of poorer but non-capitalist countries, a role which promises less, but might be more capable of fulfilling its promise.

The Caribbean is the natural place to start. But there is a real obstacle to political isolationism in the region -- an obstacle that CARICOM has not been able to overcome. The bane of the dream of a Caribbean collective is the unwillingness of many of the Prime Ministers to give up one single piece of the livery of prime ministerial reception. (The Caribbean is the most politically fragmented portion of the globe with the Anglophone countries alone having some thirteen Prime Ministers for a population of over six million.)

One possible solution that would allow each country to maintain its national identity is the formation of a Caribbean comity. It is not my purpose to discuss the details of the concept here. Suffice it to say that the idea entails not just a federation or customs union but some kind of common central decision-making apparatus for forging a Caribbean nation of nations.

Any attempt, finally, to integrate the plural societies of the Caribbean must first recognize the aspirations of all the people, before they can be translated into common and mutually agreed upon goals,

around which political movements might be able to work for solidarity and a permanent Caribbean collective.

Notes to Chapter Eight

[1]William Demas, The Political Economy of the English Speaking Caribbean (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. CECD, 1973), p. 10.

[2]Gerald M. Meier, (ed.), Leading Issues in Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 5-11.

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[4]See Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 98-119.

[5]Demas, op. cit., p. 10 and Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1972), p. 280.

[6]L. Hunter quoted in Swee Hin Toh, "The Overseas Development Council ..." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1980, p. 318.

[7]Jefferson, op. cit., p. 281.

[8]That is, the continuing existence of a "modern sector" and a "traditional sector" within the domestic economic framework of an underdeveloped country.

[9]Census of Jamaica cited in Jefferson, op. cit., p. 281.

[10]A.P. Thorne, "Size, Structure and Growth of the Economy of Jamaica," Supplement to Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 ISER, University of the West Indies, 1955.

[11]Jefferson, op. cit., p. 281; see also, Chapter Three.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment (Los Angeles, Cali.: University of California Press, 1967), p. 141.

[14]Jefferson, op. cit., p. 282.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Furtado, op. cit., p. 141.

[17]Ibid., p. 142.

[18]Ibid.

[19]William Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries -- With Special Reference to the Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), p. 8.

[20]Jefferson, op. cit., p. 43; see, also, Chapter Three.

[21]Hirschman, op. cit., pp. 98-119.

[22]E. Ahiram, "Distribution of Income in Trinidad-Tobago and a Comparison with Distribution of Income in Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1958):6.

[23]Ibid.

[24]See G.E. Cumper, "Incomes of Upper 2.5 percent and 8.5 percent of Income Tax Payers in relation to National Income, Jamaica, 1951-65," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 20, No. 4, June 1971:362-8.

[25]See H. O'Flaherty, "Jamaica's Foreign Debt Crisis." In Lawrence G. Franko, et al. (eds.), Developing Country Debt (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 142.

[26]Demas, The Political Economy ..., op. cit., p. 23, and Ahiram, op. cit.

[27]Ahiram, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[28]Wolf Scott quoted in Adam Kuper, Changing Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers, 1976), p. 35.

[29]See Demas, The Political Economy ..., op. cit., p. 15.

[30]Jefferson, op. cit., p. 283.

[31]See W. Arthur Lewis, "The Industrialization of the British West Indies," Caribbean Economic Review Vol. 11, No. 1 (May 1950).

[32]See Chapter Four; and, also, Irene Hawkins, The Changing Face of the Caribbean (Bridgetown, Barbados: The Cedar Press, 1976), p. 229.

[33]Martin Ira Glassner, "CARICOM and the Future of the Caribbean." In Cary S. Elbow (ed.), International Aspects of Development in Latin America: Geographical Perspectives (Muncie, Indiana: GLAG, 1977), pp. 111-118.

[33]The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, 4 October 1982, p. 1.

[34]S.B. Jones-Hendrickson, "A Transformation Process in the Caribbean" in Vincent R. McDonald (ed.), The Caribbean Issues of Emergence ... (Washington, D.C.: University of America, Inc., 1980), pp. 60-94.

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[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid.

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[51]Hawkins, op. cit., p. 209.

[52]The Daily Gleaner, 9 October 1969. Cited in Richard Hart, "Jamaica and Self-Determination 1660-1962," Race Vol. 13, No. 3 (January 1972):291.

[53]Berberoglu, op. cit., p. 346.

[54]Keith and Girling, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[55]Lewis, op. cit., p. 28.

[56]The notion of development through the export of manufactures is part of the official development plans of Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, among others.

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[60]Ibid.

[61]Toh, op. cit., p. 370.

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[63]Fernandez, op. cit., p. 14.

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[65]See the Jamaica Labour Party Manifesto, Change Without Chaos, Kingston, Jamaica, 1980.

[66]Fernandez, op. cit., p. 15.

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[71]See Sherry Keith, "An Historical Overview of the State and Education Policy in Jamaica," Latin American Perspectives Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1978):50.

[72]Demas, "Is the Present Approach to Economic Development Planning Relevant ..." op. cit., p. 135.

[73]Adlith Brown, "Planning as a Political Activity: Some Aspects of the Jamaican Experience," Social and Economic Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 (1978):1-14.

[74]Ibid., p. 1.

[75]Jay R. Mandle, "The Politics of Self-Reliant Development," Monthly Review Vol. 32, No. 11 (April 1980):18.

[76]Thomas, "From Colony to State Capitalism ...," op. cit., pp. 4-6.

[77]This point is supported by Courtney N. Blackman, "The Balance-of-Payments Crisis in the Caribbean: Which Way Out?" in Vincent R. McDonald, (ed.), op. cit., p. 35.

[78]Dudley Seers quoted in K. Boodhoo, "The Multinational Corporations ..." In R. Millet & W.M. Will (eds.), The Restless Caribbean ... (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980):63.

[79]Thomas, "From Colony to State Capitalism ..." op. cit., p. 5.

[80]M.K. Bacchus, "Education for Development in Underdeveloped Countries," Comparative Education Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1981):221.

[81]Wignaraja, op. cit., p. 11.

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'If elected I shall do everything in my power . . . to make effective by law the following:

1. Representation in the Imperial Parliament or a larger modicum of self government for Jamaica.
2. Protection of native labour.
3. A minimum wage for the labouring and working classes of the island.
4. A law to protect the working and labouring classes of the country by insurance against accidents, sickness and death, caused during employment.
5. A law to compel the employment of not less than 60 per cent of native labour in all industrial, agricultural and commercial activities engaged in, in this island.
6. The expansion and improvement of city, town or urban areas without the incumbrance or restraint of private proprietorship.
7. An 8 hour working day throughout Jamaica.
8. A law to encourage the promotion of native industries.
9. Land reform.
*10. The compulsory improvement of urban areas from which large profits are made by trusts, corporations, combines or companies.
11. A Jamaica University and Polytechnic.
12. The establishing of a Government High School in the capital town of each parish for the supply of free secondary education. Attached to the said High School to be a night continuation school to facilitate those desiring to study at night for the advance of their education.
13. A public library in the capital town of each parish.
14. A National Opera House with an Academy of Music and Art.
15. Prison reform.
16. Legal and judicial reform.
17. The appointment of official court stenographers to take the official notes of all court proceedings in the Supreme Court, Resident Magistrate Courts and Petty Session Courts of the island.
18. The creation by law of a Legal Aid Department to render advice and protection to such persons who may not be able to have themselves properly represented and protected in courts of law.
19. A law for the imprisonment of any person who by duress or undue influence would force another person to vote in any public election against his will, because of obligation of employment or otherwise.
20. The granting to the townships of Montego Bay and Port Antonio the corporate rights of cities.
21. A law to empower the Government to secure a loan of three million or more pounds from the Imperial Government or otherwise to be used by the Government under the management of a department of the director of Agriculture in developing the crown lands of the island, agriculturally and otherwise with the object of supplying employment for our surplus unemployed population and to find employment for stranded Jamaicans abroad, and that the Government purchase such ships as are necessary from time to time to facilitate the marketing of the produce gathered from those crown lands and at the same time conveniently offering an opportunity to other producers to ship and market their produce.

*The original Tenth Plank, to impeach unfair judges, was summarily removed from Garvey's political party's platform following his period of imprisonment.

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22. The beautifying and creating of the Kingston Race Course into a National Park similar to Hyde Park in London.
23. The establishment by the Government of an electrical system to supply cheap electricity to such growing and prospering centres as are necessary.
24. A law to establish clinical centres from which trained nurses are to be sent out to visit the homes in rural districts and to teach and demonstrate sanitary and better health methods in the care of home and family.
25. A law to empower the Parochial Board of each Parish to undertake under the direction of the Central Government the building of model sanitary homes for the peasantry by the system of easy payment to cover a period of from 10 to 20 years.
26. A law to prevent criminal profiteering in the sale of lands in urban and suburban areas to the detriment of the expansion of healthy home life for citizens of moderate means--profiteering such as indulged in, in lower St. Andrew by heartless land sharks.

..... Marcus Garvey
-Candidate for Election to Legislative Council
to represent the Parish of St. Andrew.