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MUSIC AND THE EDUCATION OF THE EMOTIONS

by

(C) JOAN PECOVER

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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(SIGNED) J. Pecover

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

6716-86 St.

Edmonton, Alta

T6E 2Y1

DATED August 11 1986

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Supervisor

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External Examiner

Date.....May 12, 1976.....

DEDICATION

To my mother

ABSTRACT

There are many ways of listening to music. This study concerns the way of listening to music in which one feels the emotion indicated by the music's sounds and rhythms. This way of listening is shown to be the source of a valuable learning experience, one that results in an increased understanding of human affective qualities: It is argued that emotions felt listening to music are intentional; their object is the music, which is symbolic of various simple and complex affective qualities. For example, "sad" music is symbolic of those things which in life are saddening. The discussion of imagination shows that we draw together these saddening things and restructure our understanding of sadness through experiencing sadness. Understanding of the emotions, it is argued, is the result of a creative mental act. It is an insight that may not necessarily be stated propositionally. Understanding entails the ability to conceptualize and interrelate emotions and the experiences that give rise to those emotions. Such education of the emotions through listening to music is shown to be achieved in at least two ways: (a) by emphasizing in imagination aspects of experience that fit the symbolism (and de-emphasizing others), one is enabled to feel what he might not otherwise feel without the symbolism of the music; (b) by experiencing the emotion symbolized, one is able, through imagination, to relate this feeling similar feelings of others, to similar affective experiences

of others, and, no less important, to affective experiences of one's own life as a whole. The study shows that, to attain this goal in the schooling of children, an increased emphasis on listening to music with an affective response based on the symbolism involved would be necessary.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The importance of music in our culture is not accounted for by its being enjoyable, relaxing or even cathartic.

There would seem to be some recognition in the adult world that music plays an important part in our cultural heritage and in the current social life of the community. Classical musicians and composers are respected as providers of something that is more than ordinary, something perhaps that only an elite few can truly appreciate. The folk music of a given ethnic group is treasured because it represents an aspect of culture peculiar to that group. Contemporary popular music, jazz, blues, rock, country-western or whatever form lends itself to composition and improvisation in performance at a given time, draws adults in enormous crowds, particularly young adults. Possibly this form of music is seen by those who enjoy it as just that: enjoyment, entertainment, escape from the serious business of living; but even here we have the protest songs of the sixties, jazz guitarist John Mc Laughlin writing in 1982, Blues for Lech Walesa, attesting to a more than trivial intent by the artists; and what could be more serious than love songs? The fact is that for adults, music is valued highly; it is seen as having an importance to a culture that permeates all

aspects of that culture, that is perhaps totally indicative of the character of the culture and is at least as essential as many other aspects of it. Governments and moralists worry over the kind of music to which citizens listen; in capitalist societies, businesses rise and fall around records, electronic equipment, and concert touring; in the Soviet Union, musicians and composers are among the most highly paid. A socially ambitious person attends the opera or the symphony; an activist attends folk festivals. Music helps us shop, arouses us to patriotism, puts us to sleep.

Yet when adults set out curricula for school children, the importance they themselves give to music is not reflected in what they prescribe. Certainly music is not given the importance of history, science or mathematics. Even though a significant part of their culture lies in its music, children are not apt to learn much more than this fact either in a Social Studies class or a music class, and unquestionably there will be little or no continuity of either a historical kind or of increasing musical complexity (in elementary schools at least), for music is thought to be a kind of play activity for young children, a way of getting rid of pent up energy in order to concentrate on "essential" learning. When it is not seen as a play activity, music is geared mostly to socialization: membership in the school choir or band or participation in a Christmas concert serves many purposes (like discipline, social interchange, experience in competition) almost none of which have much to

do with music.

Music curricula often are lacking in continuity; their aims are apt to be vague and not borne out by the content taught; music is perceived as important in the curriculum by music educators and hardly anyone else; students learn that they should like classical music but don't, that their teachers see something to be wrong with popular music but can't say what it is, or worse, perhaps, students learn (by omission) that young children should like Sesame Street songs, adolescents "Top Forty", and old folks Beethoven's Eroica Symphony. It is all a matter of taste, isn't it? But as they become adults, some students, at least, begin to see that they are limited in their knowledge; they see that although they have always found some music important, there is a whole world of which they are ignorant. They are ignorant technically; like semi-literates, they simply do not understand the meaning of the sounds they hear. More than that, with the bigotry of the ignorant, they do not allow themselves to respond to what they can understand when the style is unfamiliar. Classical music is "above" them, ethnic music is "not theirs", country or blues is "below" them, that is, unless they have some good reason for broadening their understanding. Then adults take music appreciation classes, learn to play instruments or sing, sometimes for social reasons, but often just because they feel a personal need. Such a need would seem to be based on the importance of music for them personally, an importance

not based on social or financial advancement, but on some deep-rooted satisfaction music provides. The satisfaction of playing an instrument or singing may be the satisfaction of self-expression or of achievement. Enjoying listening to music is quite another matter; this satisfaction is our concern.

I wish to argue that listening to music and feeling the emotion indicated by its sounds and rhythms is the source of a valuable learning experience, one that results in an increased understanding of human affective qualities. Three other ways of finding music satisfying to listen to are common: simple enjoyment of sound (as one enjoys colors in a kaleidoscope), admiration for excellence, and pleasure in the familiar. But the way that is significant for the argument that one increases one's understanding of human affective nature by listening to music is the experience of being moved by the sound structures themselves, i.e., their symbolism. I shall have nothing further to say about simple enjoyment of sound, except that such a reaction is surely rare: sounds are quickly interpreted as exciting, soothing or perhaps cheering, and become part of the experience that results in increased understanding of human affectivity.

Suppose I am sitting in a concert hall listening to James Galway and a chamber orchestra perform his arrangement of Vivaldi's The Seasons. I am enjoying the performance, like those others with me who fill the auditorium. But there are many ways of enjoying music, and not all of us share the

same enjoyment; it may even be possible that no two people are responding in precisely the same way. I may be amazed, for example, at the rapidity of Galway's finger technique ("So many notes, they almost sound like two players"). As a flute player, I may wonder at his breathing technique ("When does he ever take a breath?"). I may know that the movement now in progress represents winter and marvel at how rapid sequences of notes, played with separate bows in the strings and double tonguing on the flute, manage to create the effect of a storm, or I may look instead to the way the movements fit together to form a whole structure that maintains interest and leads the listener inevitably to what follows. All these reactions are of admiration for performer or composer.

Another way of enjoying music is to listen for the familiar. I may have very little concern for who the soloist or orchestra is, but there may be a particular moment or series of moments for which I wait with anticipation every time I hear the work. There may be several reasons for such anticipation. One might be a prior knowledge of the difficulty of the section. I would then wait with the same apprehension I would have watching a high-jumper or weight-lifter trying for a record, but this seems unusual even for a fellow musician. I might simply find these moments "beautiful" no matter how often I heard the work. To some, there is no explanation for what is "beautiful." But surely at the very least what is meant is an admiration for

the way the sounds and rhythms are put together; probably more than this, they are construed by the listener as exciting, sad, tender, passionate, tranquil, cheerful, etc.

Another reason for enjoying a familiar moment in a work is pleasure in association with past experience. If I heard The Seasons as a child and it brings back happy memories, or if the "Winter" movement was a favorite of an old flame, I may look forward to the work, or parts of it, because when I hear the music I can recapture something of a happy time now past. Sometimes such a reaction has little to do with the music itself, as in these examples. But often, familiar music is enjoyed because it is easy to respond to. It is easier to feel happy listening to happy music that I know, and to draw together all kinds of happy images and experiences, than to do the same thing listening to unfamiliar music. Something in the music causes us to relate the sounds we hear to emotions felt in life. It may be that we instinctively respond to certain patterns of sound in given ways; or we may be conditioned by our culture to respond in prescribed ways to patterns of sound.

Having looked at the reactions of admiration and pleasure in the familiar as ways of enjoying music, it must be said that by far the most likely way to enjoy music is to be moved by it, to be excited - to sway or tap one's foot; to feel sad to the point of tears; to relax and bask in the tranquility evoked by the patterns of sounds. Here again we may relate the sounds to imaginary and real experience; here

again, there are those who see no purpose to examining their reactions. But as with the analysis of literary devices like symbolism, simile or hyperbole, the experience need not be ruined. Finding reasons for the experience is a different activity from the experience itself. Certain aspects of music are obvious candidates for evoking feeling: a slow pulsing beat, or a faster one with syncopation; a major or minor key; rapid sequences of notes or slow progressions of chords; full orchestration, light orchestration; use of brass or strings; complex unresolved chords or simple harmony. Sitting in the concert hall listening to The Seasons, I will be affected slightly differently by the tone of the flute than by that of the violin; I will not be lulled to sleep but shaken awake by the "scrubbing" of the bows of the stringed instruments; I will feel joy, not loneliness in the Spring movement.

What is suggested is that either by nature or culture or perhaps both, we react to certain sounds and rhythms with feeling, and that composers (and performers) deliberately use these devices in order to evoke feeling. The same is true for jazz, rock, or liturgical music.

We have seen that enjoying familiar sounds may entail relating the musical sounds to our own experience. When it does, we relate the emotion suggested by the music to the emotion in our experience. The enjoyment of a well-known happy tune involves assuming a mood related to the music's cues in harmony, melody, and rhythm. In this key aspect,

then, enjoying the familiar is identical to being moved by the sounds. Thus there are two main ways of enjoying music: to be impressed by the skill of the composer or performer and to be moved by the music itself. The feeling of admiration is easiest to understand; it is something that we experience in many facets of our lives, and in many entertainments: sports, circuses, shows of the 'Incredible but True' type. We are truly amazed by marathoners, weight lifters, trapeze artists, jugglers, those who can solve complicated mathematical problems faster than a computer. To admire a job well done is estimable, but not only is such a feeling to be found in many areas in life besides listening to music, it also seems not to account for the importance of music in the life of any individual or group; something else would do as well. It would seem to be music's deliberate evocation of feelings rather than simple admiration that accounts for its importance. When we are moved by music, something happens to us that is important to our individual well-being and to our development as a society.

Let us consider what it is that happens when we are moved by music. There are, first of all, physical sensations: I may tap my foot or sway a bit, or fight an urge to dance in the aisle; I may smile, feel a tightening in my throat, or shed a tear or two; more obscurely, I may feel a stirring in the pit of my stomach, or a prickling up my spine. At this point I am aware of being happy or sad or excited, tense or relaxed, and aware too that the cause is

in the music, in the pattern of sounds I hear. I may then simply allow myself to be carried along from excitement to tranquility to sadness with the flow of the music, feeling various physical sensations to be emotional symptoms, even if subconsciously. However, my mind may wander to or deliberately seek out mental images that fit the feeling conveyed by the music. I may picture a vast desert landscape or a view from a mountain top, or thundering hooves of horses, or the clamor of battle; then again I may remember a recent sadness, or the happy time I spent with a favorite cousin, or the mustiness of a cellar in summer. All these will be derived from cues in the music. With my imagined scenes, I may feel physical sensations like cold and emotions like fear. I draw together memories and imagined experiences with affective qualities similar to what I hear in the music. I am apt to categorize: "This is similar to the way I felt last year"; "this must be how Phyllis felt when she was waiting for news of her son"; "this is what sadness is; what I once called sadness I now realize was only melencholy". In relating one feeling to another, and to other facets of my experience, I compare, I rank, I conclude, i.e., I give structure to my affective experience in relation to my life. In a television interview ("Portraits", CBC, January 13, 1983), the opera singer Teresa Stratas was asked whether, like one of the characters she portrays, she thought that love had a bitter taste. Her answer was that she might only now be learning what love is

and that she would let the interviewer know. In other words, what had seemed to be love did not count as love now; not only that, but she did not think that she had yet discovered the full scope of feelings of love. That love has a bitter taste is a judgment; it is gained from experiencing a complex emotion, perhaps in several manifestations, perhaps only once; what one has learned grows and changes through structuring or conceptualizing the instances of this feeling. This is not to say that we do not discuss our feelings; we do, usually through the evocative language indicated - language that attempts to recapture the same feeling in the listener. It is, after all, through such discussion that we have some indication that our emotions are not totally private, individual, and unique but are similar to those of others.

This is the learning activity - the experience of emotion while listening to music, the concomitant drawing together of affective experience, and the giving of structure to the affective aspect of our lives - that I hold to be important but neglected educationally. Three aspects of this experience deserve comment. One is its partly personal, partly universal nature. My understanding of an emotion may not be your understanding, yet my understanding may grow to encompass both conceptualizations. The second aspect is that what one has learned often lies at the verges of consciousness until a later life experience or another listening experience brings it into focus. This is unlike

some other learning activities, where what is learned is immediately available and only later slips into the background of consciousness. A third aspect of the learning achievement that takes place when feeling an emotion listening to music is that even when fully focused in consciousness, it is difficult to articulate. In general, emotions resist description. When we can use words, a considerable number of our descriptions are of physical manifestations of the emotion, while many others are metaphorical. Of fear: my palms sweated, my heart pounded, yet I felt rooted to the ground. Facial and other bodily movements (mime), as well as pictures or music, are often used instead of words to make affective experience clear. Here another of Stratas' comments is appropriate. Sometimes, she said, she has a feeling that cannot be put into words, but is perfectly expressed by music. Thus, an affective learning experience (which may take place listening to music) may be utterly inexpressible in words but communicable through music or some other medium.

It follows that the result of the learning activity to be discussed in these pages is not something that can be achieved equally well by explanation. In the first place, understanding of an emotion may not be communicable through words. In the second place, the experience of the emotion is required for the drawing together of affective experience that results in the structuring and re-structuring of that emotion's place in one's own life and for the relating of

one's own feelings to those of others. Explanatory sentences are not the ideal medium for the drawing together of affective qualities; what is required is a learning situation where imagination is used in the presence of affective symbolism (such as music). The outcome, then, will be an improved comprehension of one's own affective nature and that of others; it is a realization of human strengths and frailties, an appreciation that we are not alone in our feelings, that the "human condition" affects us all. A narrow ego-centric view is replaced by a wider, more complex understanding.

Several questions arise from this interpretation of the experience of listening ot music with emotion. First, there is a predilection on the part of music lovers for a pure reaction, that is, that it should be unsullied by imagined or remembered visual imagery. When such is the case, the question of what does cause the listener's emotion becomes crucial. How can we be sad, and not be sad about something? We are not sad about the music unless it is badly performed, and that is a different matter. Do we then only imagine that we are sad? This in turn raises questions about the nature of imagination: surely imagining is not the same as pretending. It would seem to be the mark of an ignorant but snobbish concert goer to pretend to be moved by music. It has already been suggested that feelings evoked listening to music are real and that they do have some connection with life experience. Then the question is what part imagination

plays in the learning experience that occurs listening to music. These questions all require considerable exploration, which will be undertaken in the chapters on Emotion, Imagination, and Symbolism respectively.

But the prime question is what good it does us to be moved by music, for if music is important because it moves us, then being moved must itself have some worth. The claim is that by responding to music appropriately, we achieve a particularly important kind of learning through the experience of emotion in a context outside life experience. The concept of 'Understanding' and its relation to the education of the emotions' is discussed in Chapter Five; it focuses the references that are made to this claim throughout earlier chapters.

By the concluding chapter, it should be clear that there should be no disparity between the attitudes to music of adults themselves and adults as educators of children. Listening to and being moved by music will be seen to be a worthwhile learning activity, an activity that should be an essential part of the education of all children.

NOTES

1 Clearly, persons, not parts or aspects of persons, may be educated. But the use of the phrase 'education of the emotions' or 'to educate the emotions' is common. Therefore, these expressions and other similar ones will be used to indicate a learning activity that primarily develops the emotional aspect of human beings.

CHAPTER 2

Emotion and Music

The Nature of Emotion

It is important to be clear about the meaning of emotion. Considerable confusion exists in literature on the subject. Such writing can be divided roughly into attempts to distinguish the term from other similar terms such as mood, feeling, passion, attitude or sentiment,[1] and discussions that center on qualities that seemingly are common to all these terms, for the authors do not distinguish between them in any systematic fashion.[2] For the position that listening to music provides understanding of emotion, no commonly made distinction between emotion and other words in the same family would seem to be relevant; however, in considering the characteristics which all these states of mind hold in common, it is necessary to consider some of the distinctions that are usually made between emotion and its relatives. The significant aspects of emotion (and similar terms) will then be seen to consist of the following: emotion is characterized by bodily sensations varying in intensity from weak to strong and in duration from short to long; emotions require an object and are intentional; beliefs about the object of the emotion

determine the character of the emotion (e.g., fear or anger).

(i) Attempts to Distinguish Emotion From Other Similar Terms According to Duration, Intensity, and the Necessity of an Object

A common but misguided distinction made between emotion and other states is that emotions are temporary and somewhat violent upheavals. The implication is that we are not always or even often in an emotional state of mind. This is implicit in Sartre's notion of emotion as the transformation of the world from a rational to a magical structure, with consequent modification of our behavior. For Sartre, emotion is a way of apprehending the world' (as terrifying, gloomy, joyful) which takes over when normal ways of understanding fail us. Like paths with holes and barriers in a slot machine, the paths of our lives are filled with hazards, and when we can no longer face these hazards we transform our world from mere objects to sets of qualities:' to use Sartre's other analogy, when the fox cannot reach the grapes, he sees them as disgusting.' Thus we abandon responsibility in a crisis by crying hysterically, or, and this is more difficult to accept, we hope to transform a desired object which "yields itself little by little" (a returning loved one) into an "instantaneous totality" by the magical behavior of joy.' The behavior of emotion is magical because it does not deal with the world in legitimate ways: it is ineffectual. In transforming physical objects so that

they have within them an affective texture of horrible, for example, the world becomes for us not so much as we would like it to be, but as we need it to be, given that we cannot cope with it otherwise.

Sartre cannot be criticized on the grounds that we do not transform our world according to our states of mind; it could indeed be argued that every object or event in our lives has an affective significance. But Sartre's psychological interpretation of the purpose of emotions, while fascinating, seems far-fetched, for some emotional states do involve rational decision, and do result in effective action. Joseph Fell uses the example of revulsion for a roach, which might lead to the very rational decision to kill it, in case "it might invade my bed", and to the studied choice of the most effective weapon to use.[7]

For Sartre, it is only at the point where I can no longer cope that I draw upon the magical transformation by emotion, that I actively impose a way of seeing on persons, things, and their relation to me. But this seems less likely than that what goes on in the world can cause us to react with laughter, tears, or the lashing out of fists, quite apart from any (unacknowledged) desire to evade reality. As Fell says, emotions often give rise to quite rationally thought out actions, and as we shall see, as well seem to be chosen by a person according to their appropriateness to the situation. Sartre does not appear to leave room for this sort of intentionality. He views emotion strictly as a way

out, a kind of wishful thinking. In this sense, although he would like to see emotion as a deliberate human activity, his examples tend toward a behavioristic view. Man, automatically it would seem, brings emotion into play much as the porcupine instinctively uses his quills, for defence against perceived obstacles in his path. At times both may be quite ineffective, but emotion it would seem, must always be so.

Emotions for Sartre are limited to those crisis conditions where we abandon rationality; emotions therefore are temporary and intense conditions. Less extreme states Sartre classifies as "delicate" and "weak" emotions, the delicate emotion being a response to "a disaster dimly seen, while the weak emotion is a response to mild crises directly encountered."[8] But these instances are still crises; they do not refer to those ordinary balanced states that we find ourselves in most of the time. Joy, for example, more often means to us "the sense of balance, harmony, adaptation, that is the successful resolution of conflict."[9] Sartre does not deny that we can experience joy as a stable condition, but this he calls a sentiment or feeling, not an emotion.

To reserve the term 'emotion' for only those intense states in which we abandon our ordinary ways of responding seems an arbitrary move; the same is true for limiting the word to only temporary mental states. The latter is William Alston's position in his well-known essay "Emotion and Feeling".[10] But surely sadness can slip gradually into

melancholy, joy prolonged is euphoria, ecstasy may diffuse into contentment, or anger solidify into hatred. The temporary becomes the long-term, what is a violent upheaval becomes a stable condition, and as well, "we may be said to exhibit a particular emotion . . . over a span of time which includes but is not limited to the times . . . when we are actually experiencing it."[11] At exactly what point does emotion become something else (Sartre's sentiment, for example)? Or is emotion somehow included in more permanent states (Alston's attitudes)? And if so, how does one determine what part of the attitude of jealousy, for example, is the emotion of anger?

Roger Scruton's analysis is more convincing.[12] He allows for a kind of sliding scale, where passions, the most turbulent and least rational, merge into emotions, which themselves at some point are scarcely distinguishable from attitudes; attitudes at their opposite extreme come close to beliefs, the most rational and calm of the four categories. Belief does not disappear when attitudes and then emotion are found to exist, but is simply less and less apparent.[13] Nevertheless, the usefulness of distinguishing the word 'emotion' by the intensity or duration of the state, from near-relatives like sentiment, passion or attitude is not at all established, particularly with reference to whatever it is we experience when we listen to music. We shed tears, or smile, or tap our feet, and whether we call this evidence of an attitude, an emotion, or a sentiment hardly seems

material.

The term 'feeling', I would argue, also means the same as 'emotion', at least for purposes of our discussion. We are, of course, here discussing sensations that we label with emotion words like 'anger' or 'joy', rather than sensations of heat, cold or physical pain. Where authors distinguish between emotion and feeling, they seem to do so on the basis that feeling refers to a bodily sensation, and probably a cognition of that sensation; emotion, on the other hand, is necessarily brought about by an assessment of a state of affairs in the world. With feeling, these authors claim, one has certain sensations and thus claims to feel a certain way; he could thus feel angry without any state of affairs in the world bringing about that feeling; such bodily sensations might simply be the result of the administration of a drug.'[4] Thus, it is said, feelings need have no objects, whereas emotions require objects. A person who merely has the sensations of an angry person, is not himself necessarily angry; nothing has provided reason for his anger, either in fact or in his imagination. What is more, one feeling differs very little from another in its physical symptoms. Indignation and annoyance'[5] are similar enough that without reference to the objects of such feelings (which, it is argued, are not a necessary condition), it would be difficult to describe each in order to distinguish one from the other. Therefore, it is concluded, an emotion cannot be the same thing as a feeling.

But is it possible to <u>feel</u> angry due to some chemical stimulus, i.e., without having any reason for my anger, and not <u>be</u> angry? I might not be able to specify exactly what I perceive to be the cause, but I know that in various situations I react with anger. I kick the chair as I pass, I make a mental note to call the painter to complain about the color of the paint on the walls; I speak sharply to my best friend. I do not just feel angry, I am angry; that is to say that I know what it is to be angry from past experience, and my cognition of what I experience now is a cognition that I am angry, not merely a cognition of a set of physical symptoms. If I stop to think what might be the reason for my anger, since I seem to be lashing out at anyone and everything, I can think of nothing specific. Those who would separate feeling from emotion would argue that I cannot say with truth that I am angry (I just feel angry). But the physical feeling of flushing, of increased heart beat, or any other symptom, is not always labelled with an 'emotion' word like 'anger', and until it is, it is just a physical sensation. So when we speak of a feeling of anger, we are surely speaking of more than physical sensations: a feeling in this sense has a built-in judgment about a perceived state of affairs, the object of the feeling, or whatever it is that I perceive to be angering. In any case, although it might be logically possible to have an angry feeling (the bodily sensations of an angry person) without being angry, it is hard to conceive of a real situation in which these

conditions would apply. Even in a drug-induced state, the subject perceives various things to be the object of his feeling. Cases such as the manic depressive, who suffers from a chemical imbalance, the person who takes chemicals for pleasure, or the one whose mood is altered by alcohol, are examples where behavior suggests that the subject perceives something to be the object of his feeling, whether or not he is correct; it is this perception, after all, which counts. The chair, the paint, my friend, are the objects of my (drug-induced) anger, whether or not I can offer a sensible reason for their being so. The discussion to follow of Roger Scruton's analysis of the object(s) for emotion, should make this point clearer, but it does seem possible to argue that there is no such thing as an objectless feeling, if we are speaking of feelings of anger or feelings of joy, rather than feelings of flushing or sweaty palms.

After rejecting other positions, Alston defines emotion as a complex of evaluation, bodily upset, and sensation.'' 'Upset' has already been rejected as a characteristic of emotion, and it seems reasonable that feelings cannot be distinguished from emotions in this way, because a feeling, like an emotion, can be intense, weak, transitory,'' persistent, or gradually changing. This seems correct simply because this is the way we talk about all bodily sensations, those of heat and cold, as well as those of anger and joy. Emotion, then, has not been shown to differ from feeling: on

evaluating a situation in a certain way, we react with sensations called equally correctly emotions or feelings. Thus far, both emotion and feeling have been seen to be characterized by "bodily sensations . . . arising from a perceptual evaluation of something"[1] to use Alston's definition of an emotional state, omitting what he would not allow to be omitted but which we have already rejected, the condition of disturbance.

Alston's reservations about his definition of emotion could also be further arguments against conflating emotion and feeling. First, a person may have an emotion without the feelings associated with that emotion, and second, some emotions do not in fact appear to have objects. In other words, one may be angry without having angry feelings, and one may have some emotion such as a "'nameless dread', a vague apprehension of impending disaster."[2]

The former is an interesting situation psychologically, but need not concern us here, as what is of interest is the emotions which <u>do</u> arise, and of which we are aware when listening to music, not those which are hidden or denied, and surely not the unusual case of the self-deceived, who claims to be angry or sad or joyful without having one of the sensations normally associated with these states; for we cannot gain understanding of emotions of which we do not recognize the existence, or of emotions which are clearly wrongly claimed. The person who claims to be saddened by sad music, but who sits placidly and contentedly in his chair is

a doubtful candidate for learning of emotion through its experience. In other words, without any of the sensations of a given emotion (the feeling), one cannot be said to experience that emotion, at least in such a way as to learn from the experience. The second objection is answered by the argument that seemingly objectless emotions (like seemingly objectless feelings) do have objects, and that these objects, rather than not being definable, are simply very complex objects, objects which encompass many events, ideas or beliefs. Such an object of dread might be something like fear of the future and all that is included in one's beliefs about what the future holds. A nameless dread is not objectless simply because the subject cannot express the object of his dread propositionally. As I have indicated in Chapter 1, an understanding of emotions may be difficult or impossible to express in words. Again, Roger Scruton's account of the multi-faceted nature of the object of emotion should make this more clear.

In conclusion, it must be assumed that emotion words (such as 'anger', 'joy', 'fear', 'shame', 'resignation') refer to states of mind similar, if not totally identical, to words identifying feelings, sentiments, passions, affections, or moods: that is, they refer to bodily sensations arising from a perception; they may be intense or weak, temporary or long-lasting. In what follows, emotion and feeling will be used interchangeably; if a somewhat extended period of time is what is being discussed, 'mood'

or 'state of mind' will be used.

(ii) The Object of Emotion

The object of emotion may be understood in many different ways. Roger Scruton distinguishes four kinds of objects of emotion: the real or material object, the notional object, the formal object, and the intentional object. His example is a man who reacts with fear to a goat: the real object of fear is the goat; the notional object is the description under which the man sees the goat (it is the devil come to carry him off); the formal object is the perceived property which is relevant to his emotion: it is harmful and he is afraid of whatever is harmful; the intentional object is determined by his beliefs, which may be stated propositionally. It is beliefs which determine the notional (and formal) objects and "for every belief that a man has, there is an intentional object which is the proposition believed."[20]

The real object of emotion is a thing, person, or event. It is what the subject perceives, most obviously what he sees, but also hears, or feels, or even smells. It might seem from Scruton's example of the goat seen as the devil that the notional object is some kind of hallucination about the real object, but this is not so in most cases. A rock is seen differently by a geologist and a sculptor. One looks at it as a mineral with a particular history of development; the other considers its surface for color and pattern and its texture for ease of sculpting. Each way of seeing could

be an object for emotion although it need not be. And take, for another example, a face pressed against my window: if I momentarily see the face as ghost-like, or take it for a trespasser, then my notion of the object varies somewhat from its simple material substance. But even here, although a mistake or a flight of fancy is involved, there is no hallucination. Then there is a somewhat different situation, where the notional object is what it is, not due to error, but due to the subject's symbolic or animistic interpretation of the thing he sees. For a thirteenth century peasant, a goat might well take on the semblance of the devil under certain circumstances. A forest, as in Walt Disney's Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, might, while remaining a forest, seem to grasp and tear at the subject; two pieces of wood arranged at 90° angles to each other might be invested with any or all the significance attached to the Christian cross. These are not mistaken interpretations; they are part of what the object means to the subject, in much the same way that a rock has a different meaning for the geologist and the sculptor. Descriptions under which different people see a material object are not always the same. A chair, while remaining a chair, might yet be described as 'Early American', 'tall', 'old', or 'always in the way.' The notional object of an emotion, therefore, covers descriptions of the object that seem correct to the subject. In seeing the object under this description, the subject gives it certain qualities, such as

maddening, harmful, saddening, ugly, admirable, fascinating, reassuring and so on. These features constitute the formal object for emotion.

The formal object seems straight forward enough. What must be emphasized, however, is that the emotion felt by the subject is not always identical with the quality he sees the object to possess. To see the goat as harmful (or to see the devil carrying one off as harmful) means that one will feel fear probably, but not necessarily; certain persons might feel exhilaration. A pathetic look on someone's face might evoke pity, but could evoke distain. Cruelty does not make the observer of the act feel cruel, but indignant. Thus, it is as well to think of sounds we hear in music as being saddening, that is, as having a quality that makes us feel sad, rather than having a sad quality, to which we may respond in any one of a number of ways. Whatever the quality of the object of a given emotion is labelled, the main point is that it is judged to be evocative of a particular emotion. Whatever the quality of the goat may be called, it is the object of fear; whatever the quality of a look on someone's face, it arouses pity; whether the quality of a given act is named cruelty or something else, what is important is that it arouses indignation; and whatever we call a given quality in music, it is the fact that it excites, saddens, calms, or cheers that is of interest. Such a distinction should make it possible to avoid some of the pitfalls of merely attaching a quality to an object, as when

one talks about sad or happy music, without consideration of its effect on the subject.

There is, of course, the question of the appropriateness of the subject's emotion: is it a fitting response to the perceived quality or qualities in the object? The appropriateness of an emotion to its object will be discussed further in the section on intentionality. It is one's beliefs that determine the feeling with which he will react to a given situation. It is one's beliefs about supernatural beings, their powers and human nature that determine, in the first place, whether one sees a goat as harmful, and secondly, whether that harmfulness is an object of fear. Beliefs can be stated propositionally; the intentional object of an emotion is the proposition believed - the statement of the belief which determines the way the subject responds emotionally. Scruton has little further to say on this point.

The four objects of emotion are not to be separated; they are simply aspects of, or ways of looking at, the cause for a given emotion. It does not really seem possible, either, that one or more of these aspects could be missing from a given object for emotion. From the context of Scruton's writing, it would appear that a person must have beliefs which cause him to react with a particular emotion; that is, that his emotion must have an intentional object, and although he does not say so, it is difficult to conceive of something being the object for an emotion without

possessing for the subject a particular quality that gives rise to the emotion. Thus, both formal and intentional objects are necessarily present. The notional object might seem to be identical to the material object in some cases, but whereas the real object seems to include the total physical entity, the notional object is the particular way the subject sees the object that gives rise to an emotion. For the sculptor, it might be the hardness of the rock; for the geologist, the geographical location of that particular mineral. Thus, the object for emotion must have a notional aspect as well, for one does not consider the material object in totality when reacting with a particular emotion. In normal circumstances, it goes without saying that there must be a real, material object. Some thing or things must form the physical entity that causes the emotion. It might, however, be the case that no real object exists at all; the subject simply imagines the face at the window, or the goat, or musical sounds. It could be argued that as long as the subject takes one of these things for something real, then for the subject's emotion there is a real object. But this situation need not worry us, for we are concerned with real sounds organized in the form of music, real sounds that can provide understanding of the emotions through their experience, and here all four aspects of the object of emotion are present. The music is the real object; the description under which the subject "sees" the music is the notional object (it is slow and loud with much dissonance);

the quality of the music is the formal object (it is pompous and this makes the subject laugh); the propositional statement of those beliefs held by the subject which cause him to see certain things as amusing and others as serious is the intentional object.

What then of the drug induced state, where we kick chairs, hate the color of the walls, snap at old friends, and where, as we have seen, there yet appears to be some kind of object for whatever feeling exists? Using Scruton's analysis, it does not seem so strange that there could be an object for the feeling. The real or material object of my drug-induced anger would be the chair, the wall, or my friend; the notional object, the way I perceive each as hindering my progress, ugly in color, or rude in behavior; the formal object would be the quality of being irritating; and the intentional object, propositions stating beliefs I hold which determine my seeing the notional objects as I do. These could be of many kinds relating to many facets of my past life. A belief about the basic hostility of the external world would be an example of an intentional object. Presumably, drugs do not, of themselves, change one's beliefs, although beliefs can be altered with the assistance of drugs. In either case, beliefs are still present, and it is these that determine the notional and formal objects of emotion. Notice that although the material objects of my anger are disparate, the formal object is the same; and the intentional objects, while quite possibly multiple, all

contribute to the same anger. Thus, it would seem that an artificially induced emotion has all four aspects of an object for emotion. Or in other words, even when induced by drugs, a given feeling such as anger clearly has an object.

As for the drug itself, it is not the object for emotion, as we are not angry with (or about) the drug. We are, however, made angry by the drug. Rather than being the object of emotion, it is the cause of the emotion. A confusion could arise because, under normal circumstances, the object of emotion is also the cause. John's perception of the goat (as the devil, as frightening, as a manifestation of beliefs about what is frightening) is not only the object of his fear, it is also the cause of his fear. The goat is an <u>object</u> of fear because he has judged it to be so according to his beliefs about what is frightening, as we shall see in the section titled "Intentionality". It is a <u>cause</u> of fear because, as a direct result of his beliefs (justified or not), he is afraid. On the other hand, a drug-induced emotion has an object that is disparate from its cause: the objects of my anger, as previously noted, are various things - chairs, walls, friends - all judged angering; but the cause in this situation, is something (the drug) that artificially exaggerates certain of my normally held beliefs about what is angering, such as a belief about whether the world is basically hostile. It would be somewhat strange in this situation to declare that my perception of chair, wall, and friend <u>cause</u> my anger, but not strange to

say that they are the object of my anger (they anger me). Another similiar example may be clearer: a hallucinogenic drug causes the subject to see beautiful shapes or colors; he is very, very happy. The object for his happiness is the fantasized shapes, or colors or faces or sunshine in the room; these are what he judges to be cheering. But, if he is a regular drug-user, he knows that his euphoric state is caused by something other than fantastic shapes or colors, faces or sunshine; it is caused by the drug. If he is unaware that he has been given a drug, he may wonder why he is cheered by these things as he never was before, but he nonetheless judges them cheering. His emotion has an object, but the cause, to him, at least, is not known. Therefore, in the untypical situation of a drug-induced emotion, there are physical sensations which are the result of a judgment about an object, but which are caused by something other than the object of the emotion.

The nameless dread that seems to have no object is more difficult to explain in terms of Scruton's four objects of emotion. Can one feel dread without dreading anything? What seems more likely is that one simply is not able to say what he dreads. This would be the case when what is dreaded is so complex that it is not epitomized in one material object. Fear of the future entails the imagining of many possibilities; these possibilities are the only candidates for a real object of emotion. If this can be admitted, then the notional and formal objects become fairly obvious.

Various imagined future events involve suffering and death (the notional object), and these are to be dreaded (the formal object). The intentional object of such a state of mind is more easily accepted. Many beliefs enter into a generalized dread, including the possibly universal belief that what is not known is to be feared. Other beliefs influencing a 'nameless dread' could be belief in a punishing God, belief that humans will destroy themselves ultimately with nuclear weapons, misused technology or in some other way, belief that human nature is basically evil. Still, there are those who would insist that there is an essentially human characteristic that is simply dread, not dread of anything in particular, even so abstract an object as 'the future', and it is difficult to argue against such an assumption. But like the hallucinatory state where one imagines that he hears or sees something that causes his emotion, the case of nameless dread does not fit the experience of listening to music, and thus is not our concern, for the sounds are a very real object for emotion. If, however, the music is thought to symbolize some abstract thing like emptiness or confusion, then it is quite possible that a nameless dread could have as it's real object the sounds of the music; as its notional object it could have a description of the sounds as, let us say, widely spaced in time, containing large intervals, sudden changes of rhythm or dissonant chords. The first two often indicate emptiness and the latter two confusion; emptiness and confusion might

well be dread-causing (the formal object). Again, whatever beliefs one has concerning what is to be dreaded are the intentional object. In this situation, even when the emotion is called a nameless dread, all four aspects of the object for such an emotion are present.

Scruton's notion of the multi-faceted object for emotion makes it clear that something more than simple stimulus-response is involved in having an emotion. In the formal and intentional objects, we see that a judgment based on beliefs is integral to emotion. This intentionality requires further discussion.

(iii) Intentionality

The concession that emotions have objects, whether conscious, unconscious, simple or complex, means that emotion is intentional, involving the evaluation of the object as conducive to a particular emotional reaction. It should be made clear that this use of 'intentional' does not mean deliberately chosen in the sense that Joseph Fell uses 'intentional' when criticizing Sartre's theory of emotion. Using the example of animals and infants, as well as Sartre's own example of the face at the window, he argues that an emotion need not be deliberately chosen by us, whether to transform the world or not, and when it is, at just such times do we claim that the emotion is a sham.[2] And no doubt it is true that all of us have surprised ourselves by laughing or crying when we had no "intention" of doing so; in fact, we may truly not know what made us

react as we did; but reflection usually provides an answer, an answer that shows we have assessed or read a situation in a particular way.

In the sense of being about something, an emotion must certainly be said to be intentional. Not until I apprehend something as frightening will I feel fear. The face pressed against the window is judged by me to be frightening because of beliefs that I hold about what is normal in the world. Facial features have a particular form; when they are distorted, they suggest physical agony or intense anger or extreme fright. If I see such a distortion of features, I at the very least realize that something is not the way it usually is (faces do not normally appear at my window and certainly not with flattened noses), and the distortion is of a kind that has always signalled something unpleasant. Some would even claim that in effect, the emotion is the judgment of its object (something judged frightening, frightens; something seen as laughable makes us laugh).[22]

"In regarding the affectant the way we do, we manifest our beliefs, attitudes, and various states of mind and body,"[23] G.D. Marshall claims. It is not that we simply choose on a particular occasion to regard a person, incident or object in a way that is conducive to the evocation of an emotion, as Sartre would have it, but that "in regarding a particular thing as we do, we bring to bear on it the beliefs and attitudes we already have."[24] The intentionality is in relating what we perceive to a particular set of

beliefs. Alston argues that a situation may appear the same to two people (dangerous), but one may react with fear and one may not; however, here the beliefs are not the same (the evaluation of a situation as dangerous might not entail fear but excitement or pleasure as appropriate, depending on beliefs about danger itself), or this is a case where one person has an inappropriate emotion (he should be afraid but is not).

The notion of the appropriateness of an emotion, of "knowing what to feel" is treated by Scruton by contrasting Elpenor's plea for mourning in Homer's Odyssey with a poem by Emily Dickinson, which describes the "awful leisure" following death, a leisure that is essentially an emotional vacuum. Death is a situation, in our society at least, he says, in which we are often uncertain about what to feel. But it is possible and desirable to educate an emotion because emotion involves both understanding and activity; a man ignorant of the art of emotion, he claims, is a man who is in a significant way confused. We must learn to see the world in terms that invite emotion rather than any other way; we must see people as lovable, pitiable or hateful rather than as physiological or chemical structures, and be aware of recognized patterns of appropriate behavior. A child, in this way, is taught not only to avoid fire but to fear it.[28] "To participate in a common culture is therefore . . . to be gifted with a certainty which the uprooted, alienated, and disenchanted may not have had, and may not

want to have."[16]

Scruton's interpretation of the intentionality of emotion should prove useful in understanding the argument that music can educate the emotions. However, there is something uncongenial about the contention that one can somehow help oneself from having an "inappropriate" emotion. Errol Bedford, for example, wishes to distinguish judgments about how one ought to react from judgments about the feelings themselves. You can say to a person that he ought to be ashamed, but you can't condemn whatever other feeling he might have.[17] In other words, Bedford thinks that one is not responsible for the actual physical manifestations of an emotion. Like G.D. Marshall, he would agree that justifiable anger at one person might spill over into unjustifiable anger at everyone.[18] These things, the argument goes, are beyond rational control, and therefore beyond criticism. But these emotional reactions still involve judgments, though incorrect (in one, the situation is not assessed as evocative of shame, and in the other the material object of anger is wrongly extended from one person to many), and this is Scruton's point. To be unafraid of a deadly snake is to have made a bad judgment; this is why Scruton claims the emotions are educable, for the snake must be perceived as something to be feared. To be afraid of the face at the window, therefore, when all the indications are that by experience and tradition this is something that could cause fear (it is not normal and its grotesqueness is of a kind

that says 'frightening' - the formal object) would be a reasonable educated judgment, even though the object of fear, the material object according to Scruton's analysis, may be an old friend paying an unexpected call, perfectly harmless.

The fact that it is a judgment does not affect the spontaneity of the emotion. This fact often seems problematic: such judgments do often seem to be below the level of consciousness; certainly they frequently are not expressible in words. Witness the face at the window. I see it and I am afraid. I do not appear to deliberately register certain aspects of the face as fearsome and others as not: I simply react. This is the case with many moral judgments as well, however. Since the beliefs I hold are the reason for seeing an act in a particular way, it is not necessary that I trot out all my beliefs about any matter in order to judge whether an action is good or bad; my beliefs are simply there, and I am able to say without hesitation that I approve or disapprove of the act. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the same holds true for emotions. A situation is judged frightening; my beliefs that cause this assessment are not necessarily consciously brought to mind. For some feelings, and thus for some judgments, there is no single word, and for others (tranquility is an example) the bodily sensations are describable mainly in terms of what they are <u>not</u>. This adds to the problem of verbalizing such judgments. On the other hand, many emotions are slow in

developing and the thought process involved in the judgment is recognized by the subject as it occurs. Such might be the case when one sees a snake. If one is unused to snakes, it may take a certain amount of thought and time before one realizes that what is moving through the grass is a threat to one's life. Then there are situations where one claims afterward, "I didn't know whether to laugh or cry." A choice is made and one is usually aware of making the choice. It is possible therefore to be aware that one is making a judgment, but it is equally possible not to have this awareness at the time the judgment is made, or at least not to be able to express it in words. Thus, lack of awareness of having made a judgment does not affect intentionality.

However, after any experience, it is always possible to reflect on one's emotion, and realize why one acted in a particular manner. It would appear, then, that in our awareness of the very act of feeling we are learning of emotion; still, without the cognitive processes of comparison and evaluation of what we feel, such an achievement is minimal.

(iv) Conclusion

Emotions have objects. They are thus intentional and show a cognitive process at work. This does not mean that the process or the feelings themselves are always expressible in words. Reflection on emotion is also a cognitive process but cannot be construed as emotion proper, as can the bodily states that are evidence of judgment

resulting from our beliefs. But it is reflection on emotion that enables us to talk about it, and thus makes us aware that emotion is not a private inner state even when its bodily symptoms are not externally apparent. It is reflection on emotion that enables us to state propositionally the beliefs on which our emotion judgments are made.

Defining emotion as a bodily sensation arising from the perceptual evaluation of something, we may begin to relate 'having an emotion' to listening to music.

Emotion and Music

It is now possible to give a more systematic account of the experience of emotion when listening to music, using Scruton's classification of the objects of emotion as well as Dewey's concept of experience. Let us look again at what happens when we listen to 'sad' music. We feel sad, yes, and what does that entail? We may sigh periodically, our throats may tighten slightly, tears may well up in our eyes. These reactions are similar to, if milder than, those we experience in life. Were we reading a novel, or watching a play, the reaction is easier to understand: the heroine is dying. On the other hand, emotions felt listening to music, though inextricably tied to the composition itself, are not attached to any life situation, even the fictitious ones of literature. But what is it that we cry for when the heroine dies in fiction? The loss to the living, the irony of fate whereby she never knew the hero loved her, happiness cut

short by death, or the injustice that someone who did not want or deserve to live was given life, while someone who loved life was denied it, perhaps. To weep for the injustices and ironies of life itself (to have judged thus is to have assessed formal and intentional objects of the emotion) is just as possible when listening to music as when reading a novel or watching a play, but in music, the experience of emotion unfettered to the pseudo-life situations of literature and representational painting allows the listener to reflect on the experience of the emotion itself and on the generalized formal objects of the emotion.

John Dewey insists that experience has both an active and passive component.[29] He emphasizes particularly the active part of experience, since in both art and education there is a tendency to regard the one who experiences as a passive recipient. On the contrary, Dewey claims, in the active component of experience, "perception replaces bare recognition. There is an act of reconstructive doing and the consciousness becomes fresh and alive."[30] Such is the case when we see a person in a new way. "Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy"[31] because "to perceive, a beholder must <u>create</u> his own experience."[32] Now this is enough like the description of the intentionality of emotion, even as seen by Sartre, for us to interpret Dewey's statements to mean that in any experience, we actively bring to bear our

held beliefs on a passive recognition of a situation, choosing to interpret it one way or another, but always "the perceived object or scene is emotionally pervaded throughout."[11] Clearly, an experience as described by Dewey provides learning beyond itself, for what is experienced is then brought to bear on each new experience.[12] Were it not so, one criterion for its being an experience would be lacking, and no learning would have taken place. Thus in the experience of art, as with any other experience, a requirement is the evaluation of the experience and the placing of it in the scheme of other past experience. Giving it such a place means judgments are made that modify or confirm beliefs already held, and such belief systems are then used in subsequent judgments.

When listening to sad music, then, our experience is first of recognition: recognition that we hear sounds organized in a particular way. This passive aspect of the experience is enhanced by its active counterpart, perception: it is in perception that we bring to bear on the present moment our past experience, organized into beliefs, making the judgment evidenced by the emotion of sadness which we feel; this sadness is thrown back on our past experience and beliefs, modifying or expanding our understanding; that the experience of listening to music has refreshed, changed or enlarged our understanding is apparent when we reflect on the feelings later. Although we may not be conscious of the means by which we judge the music to be

sad, our sadness does have an object: the real or material object is the music, the sounds themselves; the notional object is a description of the music - how we "see" the music, and this might well be in metaphorical terms, like heavy, oppressive or dark or as a description of a life experience, real or fantasized; the formal object is the quality such music has for us - in this case the quality of being saddening; finally and probably the most important, the intentional object is the beliefs we hold from our past experience that affect our judgment of sadness, beliefs which may be stated propositionally.

Such beliefs are first of the kind that postulate that minor keys, slow tempi, full chords, or minimal melodic movement all indicate sadness; these however scarcely go beyond the recognition phase of experience. More important are beliefs about what is saddening in everyday living, some of which derive from purely personal encounters, and others which are common to all life, or at least to a particular society. These are what we actively bring to bear on listening experience, in order that passive recognition may become a personally created experience. An example is death; the deaths of the young and the good, in our society at least, are seen to be unfair or ironic, examples of the injustices that occur in life. Because we see such deaths in this way, we are saddened as we would not be at the death of someone evil or very old. Thus in the actual experience of everyday living, the material object of our sadness is a

particular death; the notional object is our description of that death in terms that indicate the unfairness of the loss ("the best people are taken from us"); the formal object is the quality such irony or unfairness has for us - it saddens us; the intentional object is our beliefs about injustice.

Ultimately then, when we listen to sad music, the intentional object(s) of our sadness are the same beliefs that are the intentional objects of life experiences that we see as saddening. Music could be said to symbolize for us life's sadness. The concept of music as symbolism is explored in Chapter Four. All that is clear at this point is that we do have emotional experience in a context removed from life experience (as in listening to music), and that the intentional objects of such experiences are the same objects as the intentional objects of life experiences that evoke the same emotions.

It now becomes necessary to consider two opposing theories of art, the expressionist and the formalist, for while expressionists claim that the prime function of art is involved with emotional experience, formalists, with equal ardor, deny that this is so.

(i) Tolstoy and the Expression Theory

Neither the aspect of Tolstoy's theory which concerns elitism among the upper classes nor his attack on the political and religious orthodoxy of nineteenth century Russia need be of concern here, although both of these strongly color his argument that the arts are especially

suited to the transmission of feelings. What is of importance is his picture of the artist as someone who experiences emotion and communicates it through the medium of color, sound or words to someone else, the latter being "infected" by the same feeling. It is not, he says, a matter of doing something like yawning and causing another to yawn too. Certain deliberate things are done in order to infect the other person; moreover, like the boy who cried wolf, the artist must actually possess the feeling (fear) in order to transmit it to the person who is to be infected, although the cause of such a feeling (seeing a wolf) may be imagined. Crucial is the distinction between actually seeing a wolf and being afraid. What the artist actually possesses is fear; the experience itself may be imagined, or remembered from the past.[35] The emotions of the artist may be weak or strong, trivial or significant,[36] but it is the strength of the infection[37] and the importance we give to the feelings transmitted[38] that determine the quality of the art. In fact, Tolstoy would say that only those feelings that we deem important are called art, when the term is used as an accolade. He also insists that the person listening to a story, like the person viewing a painting, or hearing a symphony, must experience the same feeling as the artist:

> Every work of art causes the receiver to enter into a certain kind of relationship, both with him who produced or is producing the art and with all those who, simultaneously, previously, or subsequently,

receive the same artistic impression.'' Thus the arts become a force that unites mankind.'' This is a sweeping conclusion, which may be justifiable but not quite as stated by Tolstoy. What some critics have subsequently emphasized is whether the artist must necessarily possess the feeling and the percipient experience precisely the same feeling or indeed any feeling at all. Whether music, or any art, can provide understanding of the emotions through their experience does not hinge on what feelings the artist may or may not have had; however, the answer to this question does depend on whether the listener experiences or is merely cognizant of the feeling expressed in the work, as later expressionists like Langer hold. It would also seem to be of some relevance that Tolstoy sees art as a deliberate communication of feeling from one person to another rather than as a spontaneous outpouring, for a spontaneous outpouring does not require another person to participate in the experience of the emotion. This question is discussed in section (iii) to follow in this chapter.

Art, then, for Tolstoy, as Vincent Tomas points out in his introduction to <u>What is Art</u>?, is not for pleasure, entertainment, or the depiction of reality, although it can be used for these and many other purposes, but "the function it is uniquely fitted to perform is that of <u>educating the feelings of men</u>"'' Tolstoy's position, as it refers to the relationship between artist and percipient, composer and

listener, would seem to be consistent with the concept of experience and art as outlined in the previous pages. But it is this claimed overall function of art, education of the feelings, as well as the necessity or depth of the feelings of the percipient, and the "conscious communication by external signs"[42] of the artist's feelings that is the basis of formalist criticism.

(ii) Hanslick and Formalism

Hanslick's argument against music as primarily a purveyor of feeling was written only fifteen years prior to Tolstoy's defence of roughly the same position. Both arguments are colored by situations that existed in their own societies, the orthodoxy of church and state in Tolstoy's Russia, and the radicalism of that particular brand of romanticism espoused by popularly esteemed composers like Wagner in Hanslick's Germany. Thus much of what Hanslick has to say is directed against the concept of representation in music, particularly the representation of feeling, which he saw to be characteristic of such composers. This concern, unlike Tolstoy's concern with elitism and orthodoxy, has a more direct relevance to the position that music provides understanding of the emotions through their experience. Hanslick's argument is somewhat more complex than Tolstoy's; therefore, his reasons for denying that the purpose of music is to arouse emotion - and that (therefore) its subject matter is emotion - must be considered in some detail. Hanslick claims that the purpose

of music cannot be to excite pleasurable emotions, for a beautiful composition exists whether or not there is anyone to hear it, and whether or not the listener is affected at all by what he hears; "although the beautiful exists for the gratification of the observer, it is independent of him."[13]

Neither is music about emotion. A rose is sweet, but its subject is not sweetness; a forest is cool and shady but a forest does not represent coolness or shadiness.[14] The Mozart g minor Symphony does not represent the four phases of a love affair[15] nor is the subject of the Adagio of Beethoven's F Major Quartet (op. 18, no. 1) the grave scene in Romeo and Juliet.[16] Music may convey whisper and clamor, but not the whispering of love nor the clamor of combatants. Love and anger are beyond its province.[17] An adagio suggests "the ideas of gentleness and concord in the abstract." We [wrongly] tend to translate these indefinite ideas into definite ones.[18] What music can do is represent the dynamic part of feelings: slowness, strength, weakness, and the aforementioned whisper or clamor.[19]

Apart from the dynamic aspect of music (its varying tempi and intensity of sound), all other associations that we make with feeling are what Hanslick calls symbolical. By this, he apparently means that the emotional content we give to various sounds is purely arbitrary. "Sounds, like colors, are originally associated in our minds with certain symbolical meanings, which produce their effects independently of, and antecedently to any design of art."[20]

But, he says, we cannot assume that either sounds or colors as used in art represent anything definite: red is not always joy, white innocence, nor Ab Major romantic,'' and therefore we are misguided in assigning an emotive meaning to a work by means of the symbols we read there.

Whether or not the purpose of music is to produce emotion, the fact is that we do experience emotion listening to music. It is the educational worth of this experience that I wish to defend. Therefore Hanslick's arguments regarding the subject of music must be investigated. If the analysis of the experience of listening to music and its intentionality is correct, Hanslick is right in saying that gentleness and concord are presented to us in the abstract, but he is wrong in saying that music cannot convey love or anger. What, essentially, about love or anger, is different in nature from gentleness and concord? As we have seen, the devices of composers which create the effects of whisper or clamor (the notional object) are interpreted by us as evocative of an emotion (the formal object), and these emotions may well be love, gentleness, concord or anger. Hanslick is also correct in saying that the "stories" of music are not its real subject, but he falls short in not realizing that although a composer may intend to represent a battle, that even though the listener may actually relate a battle to what he hears, this is only the notional object of his assessment of the sounds; beyond this is the quality such a perception has for him (the quality of being exciting

or horrifying, i.e., the formal object), and the beliefs he holds which determine his reaction (the intentional object). In other words, the subject of the music is all these things for the listener, whatever the intention of the composer.

As for the claim that we cannot give affective meaning to a musical work by reading its symbols because symbols in art have no fixed meaning, this argument is a common one. But a symbol in art, as in life, is not simply a sign. Symbols have networks of meaning, and the meaning in one situation, among one set of objects, is different from that in another situation. A tree bending to the wind in semi-darkness does not have the same meaning as the same tree drenched in the heat of the mid-day sun. Neither does the color red, nor a particular tonality mean anything significant apart from the context in which it is used. Even if what music is "about" is no more than musical themes, as Hanslick claims, these themes can themselves be "about" emotion by their symbolic nature: that is, they are perceived to possess qualities evocative of a particular emotion. Symbolism will be treated more fully in Chapter Four.

Having argued that music is not about emotion, nor intended to evoke emotion, Hanslick delivers his coup de grace to the expressionist theory: much music cannot be construed to express feeling at all. The Bach fugues are a case in point. These wonderful monuments to intellectual genius were not written to communicate feeling, nor, he

says, is this the effect they have on the listener. This being the case, he concludes, "if large departments of art . . . have to be passed over for the sake of a theory, it may be concluded that such a theory is false."[12] But Bach's fugues being brilliant intellectual structures does not preclude their having an emotional component as well. And of course, Bach's fugues do affect our emotions; examples are the anxious excitement of the fugue in c# minor and the gentle, refined gaiety of the fugue in Ab Major from The Well-Tempered Clavier; and who would deny the building grandeur of the organ fugue in d minor? The question then becomes whether the listener should experience such an effect, or whether something in him is lacking if he does. Hanslick believes the latter to be true:

> Music loosens the feet or the heart as wine loosens the tongue. But such victories only testify to the weakness of the vanquished. To be the slave of unreasoning, undirected, and purposeless feelings, ignited by a power which is out of all proportion to our will and intellect, is not worthy of the human mind.[13]

Instead of being carried away by music, the act of listening is a "voluntary and pure act of comtemplation" wherein the listener follows the creative mind of the composer, sometimes seeing his expectations of what is to come fulfilled, sometimes being agreeably mistaken. As Chapter One indicates, this is indeed one way of listening to music

with pleasure. It is not the way that is the subject of these chapters, i.e., that listening to music with emotion provides an understanding of emotion.

For Hanslick, music is a language, but "it is a language we speak and understand, but which we are unable to translate."[14] This is why, he says, we are compelled to speak of music in dry technical terms, or poetic metaphors. Some of these metaphors are of an emotional nature, but some are not: words like 'sweet', 'fresh', 'cloudy', and 'cold' are equally appropriate to a passage of music. It is possible to argue against Hanslick that such words are also metaphorical in an affective way, that the evocation of sensations of smell, sight and taste leads to emotions that are associated with those sensations metaphorically ('cloudy' can symbolize confusion or misunderstanding or the lessening of good humor), and thus help to describe the emotion. However Hanslick has a better argument against emotion-oriented description at his disposal. From his position it would be possible to argue that all verbal attempts to explain what goes on in a musical composition must fail because music is an untranslatable language. But he cannot use this, as much of the power of his argument against music being principally emotional derives from his ability to show how ridiculous some of the descriptions are. "Maidenly modesty", "the transitoriness of youth", "the four phases of an amour" are easily shown at best to trivialize the meaning of the work they are intended to describe.

Incredible numbers of program note descriptions or composer's accounts of their own work are equally pretentious and equally conducive to misunderstanding the music, if not to its rejection by the listener. But this criticism is against the description associated with the music, which Hanslick himself says must necessarily be an inadequate explanation of either its subject or its primary purpose.

The failure of such a verbal description to indicate what music is about does not mean that music is not about anything except sounds. If one can detect in Beethoven's symphonies impetuousness, struggle, longing, defiance and strength[55] as Hanslick asserts, one is detecting feelings, or the symbolization of feelings. What else? True, the question of whether, why and when the composer had these feelings is not important, and to attach such mental states either to the composer or to some hypothetical character like "youth" is fatal. It is the states of mind themselves that are important, and Hanslick is correct in asserting that these come unattached, entirely free from worldly associations.[56] The listener is left free to associate what he takes to be, for example, saddening in life with the 'sad' music, and whether he should do this or not, he does. In Chapter 3, I shall show that this activity leads to an increased understanding of emotion and is thus desirable rather than the opposite.

In sum, Hanslick has shown that representation of specific persons and events is impossible and slightly ridiculous in the medium of music, and that verbal descriptions of what music is about are equally unproductive, but he has failed to show that music is only about sounds and their ordering, for in admitting that music does arouse feelings, he must be content to argue only that it should not do so; his examples show only that labelling with words is dangerous, when, as he himself claims, the language of music is untranslatable. Whether music is about emotion, and whether it is intended to arouse emotion are not really questions of concern to the thesis that listening to music provides understanding of emotion. Even if it could be shown that the intent of every composer was to obtain an emotional response, or that every composer searched his own experience deliberately for feelings to depict through the medium of sound, this would not prove one way or the other that music is a source of understanding of the emotions to the listener through their experience. In order to show that this is so, the focus must be on the listener, not the composer.

(iii) The Necessity of the Listener's Emotion

Formalists and expressionists agree that listeners do experience sadness when listening to sad music, at least some of the time. Questions of whether such a feeling is desirable when listening to music, or whether this sadness is the same as sadness occasioned by real events troubles

both schools of thought. It is of course possible to listen to music and not feel anything at all. It is possible to recognize that the mood of a passage of music is sad, but not feel sadness. This fact has led O.K. Bouwsma to the conclusion that to say music is sad means that "it has some of the characteristics of people who are sad. It will be slow, not tripping; it will be low not tinkling."[9] This is an interesting way of dealing with the phenomenon of certain sounds and rhythms being recognized, but not felt, to be characteristic of a given range of feelings. The notion is close to what Hanslick calls the dynamic aspect of music, its tensions and releases. But to understand the meaning of a passage of music in this way, to recognize it as sad, is to demonstrate theoretical knowledge; one's understanding can be stated propositionally. The emotional aspect of such recognition would be pleasure in success in identifying the mood of the selection, plus perhaps delight in the excellence of the rendition.

John Hospers believes that more difficulties exist with the claim that one does feel the emotion that is in the music than the claim that one simply recognizes that such a feeling characterizes the particular selection. Somehow we know that the feeling that is aroused is not real, he thinks. Watching a play, no one is apt to attack the villain, and in music, the very fact that no event is specifically portrayed, makes it impossible that our sadness has a real cause. It is not, he says, the sadness of life

that we feel. In listening to music, sadness may be a happy experience, whereas in life it is of course, sad. Therefore the sadness must be imaginary, or as Bouwsma says, simply recognized; the music is thought of as sad."[1] But using Scruton's four kinds of objects for emotion, we have seen that music (the real object) is interpreted by the listener as having certain qualities (the formal object) that produce emotion. Music, in other words, stands for, or symbolizes what is saddening, gladdening, exciting, or calming in life situations, where, after all, emotion terms originated. Music can be the material object for a given emotion, but the beliefs of the listener, largely about life itself, are what determine his interpreting the music as he does. The music is not just sad, but saddening. The listener does not just recognize a successful attempt by the composer to duplicate characteristics of sad people, he judges slow and low sounds as saddening, tripping and tinkling sounds as evocative of joy. His judgment is shown in his own sadness or joy. Against Hospers, John Nolt argues that sadness in real life is not necessarily to be avoided. We all know those who are moved to tears who would want to repeat the experience. Further, life's sadnesses can have a cathartic effect; in a sense we achieve a kind of release in sadness that we might wish to prolong, "and though the sadness evoked by a work of art is seldom as intense as the more notable sadness in life, it does not seem qualitatively different."[2] To this might be added that the phenomenon of

sad music making one happy seems a most unlikely occurrence, unless of course we are again referring to the delight one might have in the excellence of the composition or performance. Whatever the effect of listening to Richard Strauss' Four Last Songs, for example, it could never be happiness. Even without knowing the words, it is apparent that this music has to do with a profound and almost tranquil resignation to the inevitability of sadness-causing incidents in life, such as loss due to death, absence, or rift in friendship. This is what one feels when one listens to the music, or something close to it within the limits of personal experience (and here, of course, the inadequacy of language to describe the feeling is all too apparent). If a person were feeling light of heart, or if he wished to be cheered up, he would simply avoid listening to such music. The pleasure of this experience, if such it can be called, is the same release or catharsis described by Nolt. Of course, as we have seen, the object and the emotion are bound together; the music itself and what the listener feels upon hearing it cannot be separated. Not just any response will do.

In conclusion, when we listen to sad music, we are sad for those things that cause sadness. We do not pretend that we are sad; we do not imagine that we are sad. Our sadness has an object. It is ostensibly the music, but on a deeper level, it is life's injustices and ironies, chosen by us from our own perception of reality. The music is a medium

through which we may experience sadness indirectly, and reflect on the experience. The same holds true for other emotions. If we do not experience the emotion, we do not achieve the understanding of emotion described in Chapter One.

It may well be true that one can listen to music taking pleasure only in the organization of the melodies, harmonies, and rhythms; still, the learning with which we are concerned, the understanding that relates to the joys and sorrows of the human condition is not found in this appreciation of musical form. The listener must experience the feeling that is symbolized by the music; that is, he must be able to relate the formal object as disclosed by the music to the formal object of the same emotion in actual experience, and in so doing re-feel what he has felt at some time in his own life. This re-feeling, or experiential remembering results in what Richard Wollheim calls mental connectedness. Such mental connectedness gives unity to an individual life, while at the same time modifying it.'' It is here, in experiencing and re-experiencing feelings, the objects of which are located in perceptions about the human condition, that self understanding and social understanding of a particularly important kind are to be found. Imagination plays an important part, but not perhaps what one might expect (it is not that the feelings themselves are imagined). The next chapter is concerned with the role of imagination, that of relating musical experience to life

experience and the reverse..

NOTES

1 An example is William Alston, "Emotion and Feeling", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1. ed. Paul Edwards, (New YOrk: Collier - Macmillan, 1969)

2 An example of the second division is John Dewey in Art as Experience, (New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958)

3 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, trans. Bernard Frectman, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p.52.

4 ibid. pp. 57 - 58.

5 ibid. pp. 61 - 62.

6 ibid. pp. 66 - 69.

7 Joseph P. Fell III, Emotion in the Thought of Sartre, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965) p.141.

8 ibid. p.27.

9 ibid. p.137.

10 Alston, p.479, col.2.

11 Patricia Greenspan, "A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion", Explaining Emotions, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 229.

12 Interestingly, Scruton calls jealousy an emotion, not an attitude.

13 Roger Scruton, "Attitudes, Beliefs and Reasons", Morality and Moral Reasoning, ed. John Casey, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971), p.31.

14 Alston, p.485, col.2.

15 Alston, p.485, col.1, and Errol Bedford, "Emotions", Essays in Philosophical Psychology, ed. Donald F. Gustafson, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1964), p.79.

16 Alston, p.482, col.2.

17 A content or tranquil feeling could be as short-lived as an angry or fearful feeling.

18 Alston, p.485, col.2.

19 ibid. p.485, col.2.

20 Scruton, pp.40 - 41.

21 Fell, p.183, p.184, p.205, p.207, p.213.

22 Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice", Explaining Emotions, p.257.

23 G.D. Marshall, "On Being Affected", Mind LXXVII, no. 306 (April, 1968). p.257.

24 ibid. p.255.

25 Roger Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", Explaining Emotions, pp. 523-530.

26 ibid. p.530.

27 Bedford, p.92.

28 Marshall, p.244.

29 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p.335.

30 Dewey, Art as Experience, p.52.

31 ibid. p.53.

32 ibid. p.54.

33 ibid. p.53.

34 Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), pp.340-341.

35 Leo N. Tolstoy, What is Art? trans. Aylmer Maude, (Indianapolis, N.Y.: The Bobbs - Merrill Co., Inc., 1960), p.50.

36 ibid. p.51.

37 ibid. p.140.

38 ibid. p.181.

39 ibid. p.49.

40 ibid. p.51, p.150, p.172, for example.

41 ibid. p.xi, emphasis added.

42 ibid. p.51.

43 Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music, (London: Novello, Ewer & Co., 1891), p.19.

44 ibid. p.11.

45 ibid. p.82.

46 ibid. p.85 (footnote).

47 ibid. p.33.

48 ibid. p.36.

49 ibid. p.37.

50 ibid. p.120.

51 ibid. p.39.

52 ibid. p.43.

53 ibid. p.129.

54 ibid. pp. 134-135.

55 ibid. p.88.

56 ibid. p.26.

57 O.K. Bouwsma, "The Expression Theory of Art", Aesthetics and Language, ed. William Elton, (Oxford: Basil, Blackwell, 1970), p.99.

58 John Hospers, "The Concept of Expression", Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, ed. John Hospers, (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp.150-154.

59 John Nolt, "Expression and Emotion", British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 21, no. 2, Spring, 1981, p.145.

60 ibid. p.147.

61 Richard Wollheim, "On Persons and Their Lives", Explaining Emotions, p.304, p.308, p.313.

CHAPTER 3

Imagination and Music

The Nature of Imagination

The concept of imagination has four aspects that are relevant to the experience of listening to music. One is the aspect of image-making, whether visual, aural, tactile or olefactory. To imagine something is to produce a mental image of it; this is as true of imagining that involves some kind of conceptualization as it is of imagining events or people. Secondly, imagining something means being affected by what is imagined in some manner. To merely remember that a person's appearance includes certain details is not the same as imagining that person. In the image are qualities that affect us, as the actual person affects us. But imagining is related to remembering, as it is to conceptualizing and pretending. A third aspect of imagination is the suspension of belief. In normal instances of imagining, we do not believe in the reality of what we imagine. Generally the act of imagining entails playing with images, trying them out, dismissing one and calling to mind another.' Finally, imagination is linked to creativity. 'Imaginative' and 'creative' are synonymous terms in some instances. For example, the poet, painter, or composer is

thought of as someone who is possessed with a superior imagination to others; it is his imagination that enables him to create original work. Our interest is not in the person who writes music, but it will be seen, nevertheless, that a listener, as well as a composer, is imaginative in the sense of being creative.

These four aspects of imagination (image-making, affectivity, suspension of belief and creativity) will be considered in the first part of this chapter. However, image-making is not given a separate section.[2] Its nature should become evident through the discussion in the other sections. First to be considered is affectivity. Reality and the suspension of belief are treated in two sections: Memory, and Belief, Pretense and Deception. Another section is devoted to the relation between imagination and conceptualization or the structuring of ideas and beliefs. Finally, the notion of creativity is considered. In the second part of the chapter, imagination is related to the act of listening to music.

(i) Affectivity

An image has an affective quality, at the very least a quality of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Whatever we bring to mind, whether a scene, a person, or an event, is "colored" by our beliefs about whatever it is we are imagining; whatever it is is judged beautiful, frightening, friendly, boring, etc., just as its real counterpart is. This is probably more true of images that we bring to mind

based on a real person or a real incident than it is of a fantasy image or one where we are simply told, "Imagine a duck," or "Imagine a horrible monster." But even here, our beliefs about what is horrible and monstrous and what quality a duck has for us (funny, or majestic, perhaps) mean that the image has an affective aspect. Sartre has contributed to the concept of imagination an increased awareness of the affective nature of imagery. In particular, he shows how the quality an image has for us may become faint or be lost altogether, yet may be recaptured through art. It is not each detail of the image that gives it its affective quality, but particular details and combinations of details which may be emphasized in various forms of art. Thus quantity and exactness of detail is not what gives an image its affectivity.

One of Sartre's examples is that of the comparison of mental image, portrait (or photograph) and caricature: it is in the caricature that we are able most fully to imagine "the absent Peter." It may be, he says, that in the mental image "a certain feeling of sympathy and pleasantness" will not come, in the portrait external traits are captured but not Peter's expression, yet in the caricature, seemingly the least "true" to life, his vitality is "clearly present."[3] The other example, that of the Maurice Chevalier imitator, is even more telling. The reason we "see" Chevalier in the presence of the female imitator is that she has captured the "meaning" of Chevalier, the affective quality he has for the

observer. None of the hints she gives us, like the straw hat, work in themselves, but together, such signs, including facial expressions, can synthesize into the "essence" of Chevalier.[4] It is imagination which performs this task. Therefore, although imagination may first produce a mental image, it may well be a picture, a caricature, an imitation (or perhaps music?) that provides the stimulus for a better mental image, that is, clearer in the sense of possessing the expressive quality of what is imagined.

(ii) Memory

Memory and imagination have been separated by philosophers, usually according to whether one (memory) is more vivid than the other, or whether one provides a truer picture than the other (again memory is the winner).[5] Either of these distinctions seems wrong, the first because it is purely arbitrary (any dim mental image might be labelled a case of imagination, whereas any vivid image is memory), and the second, because in any case of memory, the accuracy of the recollection must always be suspect. The recollections of witnesses to an accident show that inaccuracy of detail is common, and moreover, that what is significant and therefore vivid in the memory of one, is not the same thing that is important to another. Whereas one witness may be sure that the color of the car was green, another may be equally sure it was brown; the inordinate speed of the vehicle may impress one witness, but the pedestrian's lack of caution may impress another with a consequent altered

memory of the situation. It seems unlikely that any witness remembers absolutely everything that he saw or heard at the time. Thus, memory should not be distinguished from imagination either by vividness or accuracy. But one use of the word 'memory' can be distinguished from imagination because it does not involve images. Simply remembering <u>that</u> something occurred as opposed to Wollheim's "experientially" remembering' is a case in point. The former, obviously, need not involve any image of the situation, but such a memory seems minimal, only a base for the latter, which implies a re-living of the past event. Experiential remembering surely would involve mental images and in the re-living of experience, it is most likely that some details will be exaggerated and some forgotten, that some will be clear and some extremely hazy. In fact, there are memories where we are never sure that what we remember is real or whether the passage of time has not added certain information and deleted other. Therefore, except where we merely assent to the claim that an incident occurred in the past, without any attempt to recapture details, it would seem futile to try to distinguish memory from imagination. To imagine someone or something from one's past is essentially the same as experientially remembering that person or thing.

Of course, one may also imagine what has not occurred but might, or one may imagine something non-existent, like a unicorn; but here imagination is based on what we know to be true in our world of perception. To imagine that a

late-arriving relative has been involved in a highway accident means that on the basis of our experience, we expect that certain things can happen and we picture these things. To imagine a unicorn means thinking of something horse-like with a horn in the middle of its forehead. These details (horse, horn, forehead) are images we already have, and of course, there is the possibility that we have had unicorns described to us or have seen pictures. Memory then forms the basis for imaginings about what is not "real". We believe in the reality of these memories that are, as it were, the ingredients of a fantasy image, but we do not believe in the reality of the fantasy itself. We simply hold it before our minds, as if entertaining the possibility of its existence in fact.

(iii) Belief, Pretense and Deception

We have seen that memory can be mistaken; it is also quite possible to imagine all sorts of things in the present to be true that are not. Of a schizophrenic who believes he is God or John Lennon or Hamlet, we use the expression "It's not true; he's only imagining it." This use of the word 'imagination' is derivative; Scruton for one points this out, for, he notes, belief is precisely what is not required for imagination in its usual sense (except, as we have seen, for the memory part of imagination). You can ask a person to imagine that elves live under toadstools, but you cannot ask him to believe that this is true. We can, by an effort of will, imagine something to be the case that we do not

believe to be true.' In the usual sense, to imagine something is more like holding it before the mind, entertaining its possibilities and its plausibility. "In imagination, one is engaging in speculation."

Certainly when we are experiencing works of art, belief is not usual when imagining. People do not usually leap onto the stage to save the heroine from the villain; we are not deceived, and the actor playing the role is not deceived. If Olivier really believed he was Hamlet, he would not be able to consciously modify his voice to fit the hall, to turn his body just enough that he seems to be talking quietly to Ophelia, but is really projecting to the last row of seats. If Olivier believed he was Hamlet when he left the theatre, he would be committed to a mental institution.

Does Olivier then <u>pretend</u> to be Hamlet? If so, what does pretending to be such a person require? Is it moving as Hamlet moves, speaking as he would speak, using the facial muscles that he would use on hearing of the death of Ophelia? Or must he as well feel as Hamlet would feel? Is his feeling pretended or real? The traditional answer would be that in pretense, gesture and speech but no feeling is involved; yet as Robert C. Solomon points out, "there is no better way to choose to have an emotion than to decide to pretend one has it." Pretense and reality can become difficult to distinguish. Children playing "wolves" are pretending, but sometimes the situation seems real enough that a child cries or shies away from the darker corners of

the room. One suspects that if one were to ask an actor, he would reply that, whereas it would be highly desirable to feel as Hamlet would feel, this is not always possible, depending perhaps on what the actor had for dinner, or whether he had just received distracting news - good or bad - such as, for example, that he had been appointed director for the next production. To imagine that one is Hamlet would involve at the best of times having a state of mind similar to, if less intense than, that of the real Hamlet, should he exist. But even if the actor were unable to feel the emotions he should feel, but could, through gesture, voice and facial expression, cause the audience to react as though the person on the stage were truly sad, or confused, or hating, the actor would be successful. Similarly, a musician may be unable to feel happy when playing happy music, but may, by physical movements with fingers, tongue or breath, make sounds that convey happiness to the audience. A musician playing happy music, Olivier playing Hamlet or my granddaughter playing "wolves" may either pretend feelings (by using the appropriate physical actions) or really have them when imagining. In the latter case, the emotion is real and the situation imagined. But the audience for either the music, the drama or the game does not pretend. As observers of the game of "wolves", we understand the game's full significance in so far as we are able to feel "the fears, excitement, and tensions which the game generates."[10] If this is true of "pretending" games, it is the more so in the

experience of drama. In imagining himself to be Hamlet, the actor produces an emotional response in the audience. The audience, for its part, may imagine itself to be at court in the castle of Elsinore, it may imagine that Olivier is Hamlet, but the feelings or states of mind such imaginings cause are real.

There is no question of being deceived when experiencing art. In reacting with emotion to drama, we are not deceived by the pretense of the actors, Neither are we self-deceived. Like the actor, we imagine, but do not believe, that the scene and events are real. Similarly, when we look at a painting or read a novel, we are caught up in the situation depicted but we are not deceived into thinking it is real. What is real is our emotional reaction to the imagined situation. The same will be seen to be true when listening to music. The performer does not deceive us, but with our own imagination, we obtain a real emotional reaction. However, the latter case depends on further analysis of the concept of imagination for adequate explanation.

(iv) Mental Imagery as Structure-Giving

Hume claimed, "Nothing is more dangerous to reason than flights of the imagination."[1] But Hume also realized that the mind's ability to form images results in something productive that is not a falsification of the truth nor mere fantasy. It is through imagination that we interpret our experience.[2] Because we group together particular images

and call them by the same name - dog, cat, etc., when we hear the name of one of these concepts, we are then able to picture all the aspects that apply to it. When I hear the word 'cat', I may form a mental image of my own cat or various other cats I have seen; I may even form images of what would not count as a cat. Hume also made reference to our ability to look at a present object and relate it to a general category such as cat, but did not go further.

This task was left to Kant, who showed that imagination is charged with the organizing of particular impressions into general categories, where Hume had simply accepted that habit or custom allowed us to do this. He also distinguished the reproductive tasks of imagination (fitting an object into a general category) from its productive function, a function he believed was common to all men: this productive task is simply the ability to organize any impressions into objects to be distinguished from other objects around them, not merely to recognize these objects as forming a continuity with others of their kind.[3] Thus to recognize a rhododendron bush as exactly that because I have one at home, and to picture various rhododendron bushes when the name is mentioned is using imagination reproductively, but to be able to see any set of impressions as an object - as a rhododendron bush, or the garden spade beside it, or grass, or loam, and to relate any object to any other object is using imagination productively.[4]

In reproductive imagining, it is fairly obvious that memory plays a part. In recognizing a rhododendron bush or a cat as such, I must remember at least one other object that counts as a rhododendron or a cat. Although I may form images of hypothetical bushes or cats, I must have a memory of something real that I know to be one of these objects. I must also believe this image to be a true image. In productive imagination, memory can play a part also. If one brings together single sense impressions to form an object like a bush, it seems reasonable that several single objects may be organized in similar fashion into one form: the rhododendron bush, the grass, the trees, the surrounding fence and gate are seen together as 'garden.' This leads to the further step of uniting remembered disparate details into a form by bringing them together in an image, or possibly uniting some remembered data with some presently perceived data. A simple example might be choosing carpet while remembering (experientially) the furniture one saw in one store and the drapes from another and the shape of the room in which these items might at some time rest. Here again, belief in the accuracy or truth of what is remembered is necessary. However, in forming an image that juxtaposes such remembered details, we are merely speculating on the possibility that they may be combined in such a way and we may imagine several different possibilities (perhaps we 'try out' in our image, furniture of several different types); we do not believe in the reality of the form we have created in

imagination (a future living room), merely its possible actualization.

Productive imagination seems to have a corollary in aesthetics. Kant believes that here concepts like man, bush, garden or living room are set aside, and either do not enter at all into the imaginative activity, or are not applied. A set of marks may be formed by imagination into a pattern; this is like forming a set of received impressions into various objects such as bushes, spades, grass, soil. The difference is that I am free to conceive of the marks in any way I choose, whereas the concepts of bush, spade, grass and soil must enter into my interpretation of ordinary perceptions. With a portrait, a concept is of course present, the concept of a face, but the viewer is permitted, not compelled, to see the canvas as a face.' In ordinary perception, however, he must, if he knows bushes, spades and faces, recognize what he sees as these objects and not confuse them.

This 'seeing as' is important to later philosophers like Wittgenstein and Scruton, the latter of whom derives an aesthetic theory from the notion that is quite different from that of Kant. Scruton's theory entails the view that art is symbolic, a view which may have originated with Coleridge and the Romantics. Coleridge believed that a mental image somehow stands for a universal or general thing as well as the particular thing of which it is the form or image. Imagination has the power to make an image, to make

us see that image as universally significant, and as well to induce deep feelings in the presence of the image.'' In the case of Coleridge, the feelings are of love or fear. For Wordsworth, however, the image simply evokes emotions; the mental image, like its counterpart in the world, is the object of emotion. Analysing the emoti[illegible] also comes to understand the object as something [illegible], not just particular significance. "The emotio[illegible] seeing' of the image . . . is iden[illegible]th 'seeing' the truth, not now only about the ima[illegible], but about it as a representative thin[illegible] We learn universal truths from particular cases, and we realize that a case is a significant (symbolic) case if we can see it as a form; that is, we recognize a certain object as representative of a class of objects, no longer merely of the class of cat, but as an object for emotion, as expressing the ultimate nature of the world.'' This is why we think of poets as imaginative. They are able to realize the natural symbolism of things in the world. The feeling engendered by an image may be more powerful than the feeling in the presence of the real object; this of course has implications for the experience of works of art.

Imagination then has come to be seen as a way of giving sense, continuity and structure to our world. Because we can bring to mind absent objects, we can judge whether present objects belong to the same form. We know that this form has a continuity with other present and absent objects of the

same kind. Imagination enables us to relate new information to old information, and thus create a new image. In relating objects through imagination, we experience their affective qualities, which may be more apparent or powerful when the object is absent. Imagination not only creates mental images, but enables us to see these images as universally significant through its power of making relations. Imagination enables us to be moved by these images, which have symbolic significance, not only because they stand as analogues for something that is not there, but because they reach beyond the absent particular thing to its universal qualities. Imagination can 'play with' images. It can place images together and compare them with a present object; it is in this way that an object or a mental image is seen to be connected with others, where its greater than particular significance is discovered, where, indeed, creativity lies.

(v) Creativity

Arthur Koestler's The Act of Creation emphasizes that "the creative act is not an act of creation in the sense of the Old Testament. It does not create something out of nothing; it uncovers, selects, reshuffles, combines, synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, faculties, skills."[1] His book provides many examples - from science, art, humor and the animal world - to show that, in the creative process, the mind is operating on more than one plane. A situation or idea is perceived in at least two frames of reference (or matrices) where normally the

connection would not be apparent between the two. Once the idea is perceived to be applicable in both frames, a problem is solved or an original statement is made. Three examples serve to show in sufficient detail this approach, which seems to have a strong connection with imagination as it has been delineated so far. The first is the example of Archimedes,[20] who was asked to determine whether the tyrant's crown was pure gold. He knew the specific weight of gold and realized that if he could measure the crown's volume, he would be able to determine whether or not it was adulterated with silver. He also knew that when he took a bath the water level rose according to how much of his own body was submerged. It was by combining both situations that Archimedes realized this simple way of measuring the volume of solids.

Another example is Gutenberg,[21] the discoverer of the printing press. By combining the idea of a seal or coin with the principle of the wine press, he was able to solve the problem of making clear multiple copies of the Bible. Sultan,[22] the chimpanzee, already understood the use of a bamboo pole as a tool for reaching something beyond arm's length. When he saw a tree, he immediately related the live branch to the pole he had used previously, broke it off and used it as he had used the pole.

When Sultan, Gutenberg, or Archimedes thought along a single plane, they were bound to a particular way of viewing a situation. When chance circumstances and their own

"ripeness" allowed them to play with seemingly incompatible ideas, they could see the connections between two or more planes, they were freed to juxtapose one idea on the other, and to see how one might provide new insight into the other. This would seem to be derivative from Kant's productive function of imagination: particular forms are compared, relationships perceived, generalizations made. It is imagination that enabled Archimedes to set the image of the absent crown against the present perception of his body in the bath. It is imagination that enabled Gutenberg to bring to mind the image of metal seals set into an apparatus like the wine press he was watching; and it is imagination that made Sultan see in the branch of the tree something similar to the absent pole he usually used to extend his reach. Imagination is partly, as we have seen, the making of connections. When people make connections that have not been made previously (or of which they have not known previously), we call them imaginative.

Koestler relates his notion of creativity to the artist, but our concern is not with the creator of works of art; it is with the audience's imaginative activity as it affects the gaining of knowledge of emotion through its experience while listening to music. If Sultan, the chimpanzee, can be creative, then ordinary people who experience works of art can be creative too. Or should they be? In order to answer this question, we must take a short detour via the different sorts of imaginative activities of

a person who listens to music and is emotionally affected. In doing so, what must be kept in mind is that in the form of consciousness called imagining, we create images and play with them, sometimes holding two frames of reference before our minds at the same time. The images we create have an affective aspect; they are not just particular things, but their affective meaning enables us to see them as symbols or analogues for universal truths.

Imagination and Listening to Music

Even Hanslick, that classic opponent of music as a purveyor of feeling, admits that music does give rise to an emotional response which is somehow intertwined with imagined scenes and stories; his argument is rather that this should not be, that those of us affected emotionally by music, and, he implies, those who create mental images when listening, might just as well take ether or chloroform to reach such a dreamlike state.[23] He argues that something must be wrong with saying that one loves to listen to music and just let his mind wander, for surely an aesthetic experience depends on the exclusion of other matters. If imagination has a place in the experience, it must be in the simple drawing together of sounds past and present in order to construct mentally what the composer has created on paper.[24] I hope to show that some aspects of the object for emotion when listening to music are closely linked to imagining, and therefore that some kinds of what normally would be called day-dreaming have an important function in

the experience that music provides.

[redacted]t only some kinds: the kinds of musings to which I am prone when listening to a concert vary from speculation as to whether an occupant of the third desk of first violins dyes his hair, or some last minute planning for the post-concert party I am giving, through closing my eyes to see pink elephants dancing or knights in armor battling, all the way to visualizing my own real experience that fits the mood of the music, a sad or happy or exciting event either presently in progress or remembered [redacted] the past and brought vividly to focus in this wa[redacted] the state of the violinist's hair or my concerns about my party have nothing whatsoever to do with the music. It may be that I am relaxed in a way I could not be when colleagues and friends impose their conversation upon me, but the music itself is not the cause of my musings. On the other hand, the re-experiencing of a part of my life as sad or happy or exciting because I am listening to a certain kind of music is directly connected with what I am hearing. It seems clear that music I take to be sad can evoke in me memories of a lost love, or that music that is light-hearted can make me smile to myself over a pleasant flirtation, but that the opposite is not the case. Images of dancing pink elephants or a medieval battle are also based on what I take to be the mood of the music, unless of course I am totally oblivious to its affective aspect. It is sometimes claimed that feelings held when listening to music do not have an object, that, unlike life

itself, there is nothing in music that could be cause or reason for emotion.[12] But the object of an emotion may be seen in many different ways. Four of these, set out by Scruton in an article about emotion,[13] were outlined in Chapter 2. Since the article does not pertain to art, it is not to be assumed that he would make a connection between the object of ordinary experiences of emotion and the object of emotions experienced when listening to music, although there would seem to be a direct relation between what he calls "double intentionality" in the experience of an art object, and his notion of the material and formal objects of emotion.[14]

Let us return to these four ways of describing the object of emotion:

1. The real or material object. If John is afraid, the object of his fear is that of which he is afraid - in Scruton's example, a goat.
2. The notional object. This is the description under which the subject sees the real object of his emotion, the real object as he believes it to be - John sees the goat as the devil come to carry him off. This description forms his explanation of his fear.
3. The formal object. This is a kind of thing; it is defined by the intentionality of the emotion. The object of the emotion is judged to have a quality that is evocative of the emotion it produces - John sees the devil coming to carry him off as a harmful kind of

thing; he is therefore afraid.

4. The intentional object: Intentional objects are propositions, statements of beliefs. Although Scruton does not give an example, it would seem that a belief in the existence of the devil, a belief that the devil can enter living creatures, or a belief that goats kill humans would be, for our goat-fearer, the sort of beliefs that would cause him to see the goat as the devil, or the goat as harmful. Scruton points out that the term 'intentional object' is often used to refer to the notional object as well, but that the two are not to be confused. It would also seem that although beliefs should have the potential of being expressed propositionally, they need not be, at least not by the person who holds the beliefs.

It follows that in listening to music, the real object for emotion is the sounds, their pitch and rhythms, their harmonies, melodies and tempi. The notional object, the description under which the listener "sees" the real object, could be a description of the sounds as "heavy" or "loud" or "slow" but also could be the image he creates while listening: a battle, a day in the country, the heat of summer, or the faint breathing of the dying. Let us explore the latter case (image-making) first.

(i) Image-making and the Notional Object

Just as for John the goat is the devil, for the listener the music is fighting, a pastoral scene, a dying

man. The formal object is the quality for the listener of the musical sounds and his mental images, as the goat (and the devil) are harmful, so the music (and the mental images it evokes) are exciting, calming, or saddening.

If images form the notional object, it may be, and one suspects most often is, suggested to the listener by program notes or by the composer's description of his music. We already know, in other words, that William Walton wrote music to go with the depiction of the Battle of Agincourt in the motion picture version of Shakespeare's Henry V, that Beethoven and Vivaldi indicate what each movement of the Pastoral Symphony and The Seasons is to represent, and that Richard Strauss' Death and Transfiguration opens with a musical depiction of faint breathing. Mentally visualizing the battle of Agincourt, a day in the country or the bedside of a dying man may well convey to us an affective quality that we might otherwise miss. On the other hand, precisely because we are caught up in making mental images when listening to music, we may miss the formal object for emotion. Someone trying to hear the gasps of a dying man in the opening measures of Strauss' Death and Transfiguration might become stuck on that level, might not be able to hear the theme as saddening or tender, peaceful or resigned.

But it is not the quality the composer intended or the quality the critic tells me the music possesses that determines my emotion when listening to music; it is the quality the music has for me that counts. The formal object

for emotion in general is the kind of thing the subject takes the object to be (John takes the goat to be harmful). This means that one's judgment may change with experience, and that some music, like some literature, lends itself to many hearings. It also means that we not only use images to help find the formal object from the sounds themselves, but that the affective quality, once found, may itself give rise to mental imagery. When we derive our mental imagery from the music itself rather than from verbal hints given by others, the image, because it is already connected with what we hear in the music, is necessarily about the same thing; it has the same formal object. Presuming an appropriate judgment, we simply would not make mental images based on what we hear that are contrary to what is in the music: slow music would not produce an image of a bustling marketplace, for example. We have, then, two kinds of experience of real and notional objects: in the first, someone tells us or hints to us what kinds of images we might create that, along with the sounds themselves, cause us to judge the affective nature of the object and experience it more fully; in the second, the music itself, the real object, indicates a formal object for emotion, and we are free to extend and intensify the experience of this object with mental images based on the same formal object.

What then of images from our own lives that come to us when we are listening to music? Whereas it is easy to see that fictitious images like pastoral scenes form the

notional object for our feelings, the function of images from our personal world does not emerge so clearly. Let us take a simple example: I am listening to sad music; the death of a good friend is brought to mind; I see her again, not as she was in her last illness, but as she looked twenty years ago when we discussed babies and marriage problems; I see her at a birthday party when we were children; I go over a silly quarrel that kept us apart for years; I realize the extent and depth of my loss, and I am sad. But I do not think that the music is about the death of my friend in the way that I might think it is about a battle, a day in the country, or an episode in the life of the composer. I do, however, create my image as I would create the kind of fantasy image where I derive images from the formal object of the music; the difference is that one image is from real experience, while the other is invented. But is there not more to it than that?

Suppose that the sadness I feel from the sad music instead makes me think of a person very much alive and equally dear to me, perhaps one of my children, and I invent in my mind the occasion of that child's death by some tragic misfortune, realizing in so-doing what the loss would mean to me. Here we have an instance of imagination that, although based on reality, is primarily fictional. It is more obvious now that such a mental image is not just a visual aid, a way of enhancing the affective quality of the music. The relating of music to personal experience, even

where it is possible experience as opposed to actual experience, would seem to be a way of exploring, coming to terms with, understanding more fully, circumstances I take to be saddening, and beliefs I hold about saddening things.

The image of my dead friend and the image of the possible death of someone else that is close to me trigger an extension of meaning beyond themselves to those beliefs which result in a situation being judged saddening. They might include the following: the belief that death in itself is somehow unfair or wrong, involving as it does loss to the living and the deprivation of life's pleasures to the deceased; beliefs about personal ties in general, and their loss through absence, death or quarreling; beliefs about consideration for others and feelings of guilt for kindnesses undone; beliefs about human qualities that make us judge others as good or funny or lovable and make us regret the loss or destruction of such qualities; beliefs about the usefulness of life: a life cut short before its time or a life gone wrong ("What a waste of a life!" We say.) These beliefs, stated propositionally, form the intentional object of my emotion; but it is not necessary that I myself be able to articulate these beliefs, as has already been emphasized.

Such beliefs may be the result of highly personal life experience; perhaps they are culturally imposed, or they may be universal, a part of being alive and human. But certainly it is true that we often are taken by surprise by our

emotional response to situations. We receive word of a serious disappointment and find ourselves laughing; we suffer what Emily Dickinson called that "awful leisure" following death, where we cannot react in any appropriate way.[1] Yet how many times does the appropriate reaction later come to us while listening to music? This would seem to be because we are at last able to see the situation clearly in imagination, to dwell on this event and that person, judging them according to our beliefs about what is saddening or what is to be taken lightly, and possibly modifying our beliefs as a result.

(ii) Universals and the Notional Object

It must be admitted, however, that many of us do not have mental images of the sort just described; we do, however, react emotionally to the music we hear. In other words, our emotion has a real object (the music) and a formal object (we take the music to be saddening, for example), but the notional object is equivalent to some aspect of the real object, rather than an image. We hear music as music and as sad music, but we do not take it to represent any event or thing (we hear "slow" and "heavy" sounds and interpret them as saddening, but not as any particular saddening thing). This is like saying that John sees a goat and takes it to be something harmful, but that he does not think it is the devil come to carry him off. Yet people who do not see elephants dancing or absent loved ones must be emotional about something, something, that is, more

than the sounds themselves - unless they are badly played.

Now a response to music involving image-making may divert attention from the patterns of sounds; seemingly a strictly affective response does not. As we have seen, the music itself is apparently the reason for such a response, i.e., those aspects of the music that we take to stand for particular affective qualities. Yet when we watch a motion picture or a play where we are moved by the affective quality of the plot line or characters, it would be strange not to make the connection with real events and people. If we feel sad for the heroine, it is because we know something of sadness and of love from our personal lives. We relate what we know to what is in the drama. When we watch the end of a love affair on stage or screen, are we not sad for universally human situations, for the end of all love affairs, for partings, for the vagaries of life that bring people together and thrust them apart again? The object of our emotion is certain truths that exist in life, not just in the theatre. Sad drama and sad music are called sad because they are related to life's sadnesses. We acquire the meaning for sadness from life; it is not just some label attached arbitrarily and without consideration for its other uses. The same is true for words like happy and exciting. If we allow that music can be called sad or happy or exciting, then surely we must allow for a connection to be made by the listener with life's sadnesses, happinesses or excitements. Music itself is not saddening, any more than an onion is

saddening. When we cry listening to music, it is not only because we "see" the music under a certain description (the notional object) which we interpret to have a saddening quality (the formal object), but that we see this description as symbolic of certain beliefs we hold about life itself. Thus, when the notional object is unspecific, when it is not an image of a specific situation but a conceptualization of saddening things, we are sad for what is universally saddening, for what we often call the human condition, the injustices and ironies of life that affect us all (the intentional object). The difference between an onion making us cry and music making us cry is that the fumes of the onion themselves are responsible for our tears; with music, this is not the case: the sounds are not physically responsible for the tears.

We begin to see that a person who does not imagine a sad story or picture his own life experiences, but who is still sad when listening to sad music is, even so, imagining. In drawing saddening things together, in recognizing their common elements, in deriving certain truths about life or human nature, we may say, using Kant's terminology, that imagination is being used in a productive way. The same is true when we project into our life-based images, possibilities that may or may not occur in the future; or when we, thinking visually, compare several of our experiences, which, while different, have a similar formal object; or again, when we suddenly understand from

our own imaginings, what the experience of someone else was like and how he must have felt. We are increasing our understanding, deepening or modifying the beliefs we hold that form the intentional object for emotion. When we create fantasies that act as notional objects to enhance our experience of the formal object, we are using imagination in a way that is closer to mere whimsy. But however bizarre, these fantasies must be based on our knowledge of reality; moreover, it would seem that one would be unlikely to stop at such fancies: the experience of the formal object for emotion (its saddening quality) must almost inevitably lead to images related to life itself and thus to the intentional object of our emotion. The person who always thinks of dancing ostriches when hearing Ponchielli's Dance of the Hours or who always visualizes the death of his best friend when hearing Brahms' Alto Rhapsody is using imagination only in a reproductive way. He is recognizing the continuous existence of music and image as members of a particular form, just as one recognizes the same bush as a rhododendron each time he sees it.

But when one hears music that is new to him, and recognizes it as an analogue for a familiar universal quality, or when one relates familiar music to an aspect of life that previously he has not recognized to be of the same kind, he is using imagination productively. By connecting two or more disparate planes through music, he has gained understanding that he previously lacked. This is creativity

as much as a composer's or artist's endeavors are creativity, and perform an important function in human understanding.

Imagination and Understanding

Richard Wollheim, in searching for wholeness and meaning in the life of the individual, for the unity in life that one can choose to have, as opposed to what one must have, finds the answer in what he calls mental connectedness. Mental connectedness means the joining of experiences through one's life, "experientially" remembering (which for Wollheim means re-feeling) and connecting those experiences with present ones, which in turn will affect experiences in the future:

> A person's life is a meaningful life, a life that is of a piece, just insofar as at successive moments he is under the due influence of the past. His life exhibits pattern or wholeness to the degree to which the influence of the past, as it bundles up his life through the instrumentality of mental connectedness, is neither excessive nor insufficient.[2]

Imagination then can provide the continuity or wholeness in our personal lives for which we so often search. To understand and be guided by the chains of events that have formed our lives is an important learning achievement. We have seen that the mental images we create in remembering our past are in essence affective. The understanding we gain from such images is self-understanding

with a strong affective component, and in listening to music, when one is emotionally affected, it is specifically the personal affective component of an experience that we hold before our minds, seeing it as related to various other experiences according to the way it affects us as individuals.

Yet it would appear that in gaining understanding of sadness for example, we learn not just of our personal private sadness but the sadness common to us all. In the first place, we have reason to believe that sadness is much the same thing for everyone, simply because we can discuss our feelings. Secondly, imagination enables us to relate what we know of others to our own feelings. Knowing what we, ourselves, feel, we can imagine ourselves in the position another is in; this is empathy. But because we can know as well; the character, beliefs and values of another, when we imagine what that person is undergoing, we experience what he would likely feel, not necessarily what we would feel. This is what traditionally has been called sympathy and what Lawrence Blum labels compassion.[30]

Blum believes that compassion requires, besides imagination, a concern for another's good, for, he says, imagining how the other feels is compatible with malice and mere intellectual curiosity.[31] This seems somewhat doubtful, given the affective nature of the imagined: in imagining another's circumstances, do we not feel as he would feel? Judgments about whether the person ought to feel as he does,

or whether he deserves his condition have nothing to do with the emotion that is felt as a result of imagining the other's position. What is necessary, however, is to regard others as fully human. Then "the other person's suffering (though not necessarily the particular afflicting condition) is seen as the kind of thing that could happen to anyone."[2] Without this regard, it would be impossible to put oneself in the place of another.

Thus, through imagination, we are able to learn something of other people, surely an important part of the world outside ourselves. It is through imagination that we know what it is like to be in situations we have never experienced. The two, self-understanding and the understanding of others that can become compassion, seem to be the results of precisely the kinds of imagining activities that occur while listening to music. Music may be thought of as a catalyst. Although unlike literature and representational art in not being tied to a life situation created by the artist, music is like the painting, poem, play and any mental images that art evokes, in standing as an analogue for something of greater than particular or individual significance. "In a word," Sartre says, "the function of the image [and of art] is symbolic."[3] To explore these symbols which are objects of emotion is our next task.

NOTES

1 When we say of someone that he imagines he is being followed, we mean that he is self-deceived, that he is deluded, that he believes something to be real that he should not in fact believe to be real. This, then, is a special use of the word 'imagine'. Another special use of the word 'imagine' is its common use as a synonym for 'expect' as in "I imagine he will be here shortly."

2 A common philosophical argument centers on the nature of mental images: are they separate from, similar to, or identical to those of perception? Is there even such an entity as an image? Such questions have no bearing on the question of whether understanding of emotion is gained listening to music; therefore arguments concerning these issues are not investigated here.

3 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of the Imagination, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp.22-23.

4 ibid. pp.38-39.

5 Hume makes these distinctions, described in Mary Warnock, Imagination, (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), p.15.

6 Richard Wollheim, "On Persons and Their Lives", Explaining

Emotions, ed., Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p.306.

7 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974), pp.95-96. Also, "Imagination", The Politics of Culture and Other Essays, (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1981), p.67.

8 Scruton, Art and Imagination, p.98.

9 Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice", Explaining Emotions, p.270.

10 David Novitz, "Fiction, Imagination, and Emotion", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Spring, 1980, vol. xxxviii, no.3, p.280.

11 A.R. Manser, "Imagination", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4., ed. Paul Edwards, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company Inc. and The Free Press, 1972), p.136, col.2.

12 Warnock, p.18.

13 ibid. p.30.

14 ibid. p.31.

15 Roger Scruton, Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.85.

16 Warnock, p.82.

17 ibid. p.116.

18 ibid. p.70.

19 Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1966) p.119.

20 ibid. p.105.

21 ibid. p.123.

22 ibid. p.125.

23 Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music, (London: Novello, Ewer & Co., 1891), pp.123-128.

24 ibid. pp.135-136.

25 ibid. p.163.

26 Roger Scruton, "Attitudes, Beliefs and Reasons", Morality

and Moral Reasoning, ed. John Casey, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1971), pp.40-41.

27 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination, p.231 ff.

28 Roger Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", Explaining Emotions, p. 523, quoting Emily Dickinson.

29 Wollheim, p.311.

30 Lawrence Blum, "Compassion", Explaining Emotions, p.510.

31 ibid. p.511.

32 ibid. p.511.

33 Sartre, The Psychology of the Imagination, p.138.

CHAPTER 4

The Symbolism of Music

The Nature of Symbolism

In the Oxford Pocket Dictionary, a symbol is defined as a "thing generally regarded as typifying, representing, or recalling something" and as a "mark or character taken as a conventional sign of some object, idea, process, etc." That these two particular definitions are given in a small dictionary, which would omit the more obscure uses of the word, is significant. While similar, these definitions point to two disparate ways of thinking about a symbol. What they share is the view of an object or mark as possessing a meaning beyond itself, as standing for some other concrete object or abstract notion. However, when a symbol is a conventional sign, its meaning is, at the outset, definite and specific. The symbols at a street intersection have clear meanings that cannot be misinterpreted once that meaning is learned. They do not have more than one meaning. Green means proceed, red means stop. The raised hand says, "don't walk", the striding figure says "walk." Some conventional signs, however, possess, besides their basic, definite, undebatable meaning, extensions beyond that. For example, the cross is the symbol of the Christian church;

but beyond that, it symbolizes martyrdom, life after death, a comfort for believers, and a host of other associated ideas, feelings, events and objects. A flag is the symbol of the country it represents, but is, as well, to citizens of that country, a symbol of freedom (or repression in certain circumstances), the country's beauty (although nothing in the flag suggests topography) or shared values among one's "own kind" (often noticed by the returning traveller). Another point: the cross, stylized though it may be, bears a resemblance to the instrument of death that indirectly caused the Christian religion to come into being; however, most flags are merely strips of color, so it must be said that in some cases the symbolism is arbitrarily chosen. Thus, it is not true that, where a thing becomes a symbol for something else, it necessarily possesses some intrinsic quality that makes it suitable to become a symbol for that other thing.

The other way of describing a symbol, as a "thing generally regarded as typifying, representing, or recalling something" seems to indicate a broader interpretation and it is true that, while standing for something beyond itself, the symbol often has several equally valid interpretations, or may stand for different things in different contexts. An example is the color white, which at one time may stand for innocence, at another cleanliness, at still another intellectual or spiritual enlightenment, and yet another fear or death. A tree can symbolize many things as well: the

passing of time, change itself, life and death, re-birth, or simply nature as opposed to technology. Some of these references are connected but no reference is basic or preferred, as would seem to be the case with conventional signs like the flag or the cross.

Of course, a considerable grey area exists. It might be said that the flag symbolizes a whole network of ideas associated with the country it represents, none of which has precedence over any other. It might equally be claimed that a tree has one basic reference, nature, and that the others are instances of this one symbolism. When we discuss the symbols that make up our language, whether they are the letters of the alphabet or words themselves, the claim is sometimes made that, rather than each mark having a single reference, multiple references exist for each symbol: the letter o, for example, sometimes refers to an o sound and sometimes to an u, and when used with the letter u, it has a different sound for 'would', 'out', or 'thought'. Also, words have several meanings; the context determines which is the correct one. But in the case of words and alphabet letters, not just any reference will do among the choices: there is one correct one. This is worth keeping in mind, for it is a similar symbolism to that of the notes on a musical staff: there is only one correct meaning for each note in a particular series. But as we shall see, this is not the only symbolism of music.

Symbols, then, sometimes have a single basic "correct" reference (traffic signals), sometimes have such a basic reference plus "satellite" references (flags), but sometimes refer to a whole network of other objects, events, feelings and ideas (the tree). They are sometimes natural, themselves possessing certain characteristics of whatever they symbolize (the cross), but sometimes are chosen arbitrarily (flags, numbers, alphabet letters). A symbol also has a publicly accepted reference, whether that reference is a simple single reference or a range of associated ones. Except perhaps in psychoanalysis, we are not apt to think in terms of symbols that have reference only to private individual experience. For example, a tree might mean unemployment to some individual who had sat looking at a tree after a long day of job-hunting; ever after, seeing a tree of that kind might symbolize his despair at the time. But for no one else would it have this particular extended meaning. A symbol does not have to be conventional in the sense that a traffic signal is conventional, but there does have to be some publicly understood sense of its meaning or range of meanings.

Symbolism in the Literary and Visual Arts

Symbolism is used extensively in literature, and not just in the conventional signs that constitute the letters of the English alphabet and the words themselves, which are the "marks or characters" of the dictionary definition. The same is true in painting. Lines and colors are not used

merely to symbolize objects in nature. Sometimes in these arts, symbols are chosen which have a fairly conventional reference, the basic specific meaning we have discussed. William Blake, Marc Chagall, and Salvador Dali are obvious cases in point in paintings. Blake and Chagall most often use religious symbolism and Dali sometimes chooses symbols for their ironic effect (he gives the symbolic objects he paints a significance that is opposite to their conventional meaning).' Tennessee Williams, in the play, A Streetcar Named Desire, uses a similar device, giving his main character the name Blanche (white); her long warm baths form a significant part of the action; she is usually dressed in pale colors or white. These symbols would conventionally suggest purity, but in the case of Blanche Dubois, what we gradually realize is that this is a woman who cannot be pure, least of all in her own eyes. Symbolism is used ironically, although the reference is conventional. But in these cases, although there is a conventional reference, in none is the meaning limited to one very narrow interpretation. These are not street signs or characters in a language, to be interpreted in only one correct way.

Probably more of the symbols that are used in literature and visual art are of the type that do not have one core reference, but can refer to a number of things, which or how many depending on the individual who interprets them. Colors do not always have the definite significance that white has in A Streetcar Named Desire. In The Execution

of Lady Jane Gray, Delaroche paints the victim's skin and clothing an almost glowing white. In this case, while the white color might symbolize her innocence, it seems to have a wider, equally valid range of representation. For one thing, it indicates her importance in rank in comparison to the other figures in the painting; it reinforces the indication that here is an end to suffering, a resignation to the inevitability of her death; it may also indicate fear. Similarly, shapes are symbolic. The curved lines of her slumping body in contrast to her straight outstretched arms are a sign to the percipient of her helplessness and reluctance. In Picasso's Guernica, distorted shapes and angular lines are used to symbolize disharmony. Some would argue that these cases are not symbols, that they are simply instances of the artist achieving an effect, colors and shapes being the means by which he achieves it. But if the color white is generally accepted as representing something more than a pigment with particular light-reflecting capacities, and if lines (curved or angular) can be taken as more than a mark on the canvas, then these colors and lines are symbolic, not just of an object (and of course this is not the case either in the most abstract art) but of other things and qualities that object may in turn represent. They are generally understood to typify, represent or recall something, and that something may have many aspects. Examples from literature are easier to admit as symbolic when there is no single core reference. In Lord of the

Flies, Golding introduces a dead parachutist, whose figure is raised and lowered as the wind catches his chute on the ground. The dead man is included in the action not merely for the purpose of intensifying the suspense. He represents the last of the civilization that the boys knew; he represents, at the same time, pagan worship and the need to fear and sacrifice to the unknown; he represents evil, death, and the decay of civilization. No one of these references is the correct or central one, but all are generally regarded as being what the figure signifies.

Symbolism in Music

It should be noted that many symbols have an affective aspect (what they symbolize affects one emotionally), from the simple symbolism of the flag to the more complex symbols used in the arts. But if various arts often use symbols with an affective quality in order to evoke emotion, the art of music seems virtually to depend on symbolism for this purpose; that is to say, most, if not all the sounds and silences we hear as music, as compared to, for example, door chimes or car horns, refer to something affective. Even where composers set out to exemplify a bird call, a stream becoming a river, a pastoral scene - even a color or shape, there would seem to be representation of something beyond an event or object, some quality that evokes emotion. The following section should make this clearer. It includes a brief outline of theories of John Hospers, Nelson Goodman, Susanne Langer and Roger Scruton as they relate to

symbolism, and an example of sound symbolism that is not music.

Music does make us happy or sad, excited or tranquil. There is nothing in the sounds themselves that could cause this reaction; otherwise door chimes or car horns (of a reasonably pleasant timbre) would have the same effect. Hanslick's argument in The Beautiful in Music makes this abundantly clear. Of course, certain qualities like slow or fast pulsing rhythm, tension and release, change and stability seem to correspond to human behavior, and become involved with the emotions that surround this behavior, as Hanslick, and later, Susanne Langer, indicate. But it is because we interpret the sounds as having to do with emotion that they make us excited or calm, happy or sad. The same is true of sounds in music that imitate sounds in nature like the sea or bird song. It is our interpretation of these sounds as exciting or cheering that gives us the emotion. In both cases, we hear the sounds as representative of something other than themselves and in both cases, what the sounds are thought to stand for is not just the physical properties of the natural or human object, but their affective quality, the feelings that are associated with them.

Like the cross, these examples of symbolism have a strong core meaning with surrounding associated meanings of many kinds. Bird song is used to represent Spring, nature, awakening, tranquility, cheer or may be used ironically, as

is Blanche's name in Streetcar Named Desire, to emphasize an opposite mood, like loneliness, sleep, or death. It may be that because these sounds possess some of the qualities that they represent (a slow or fast pulsing beat is the same whether performed by tympani or the human heart, and two larks or two flutes imitating larks make much the same sound) that we respond naturally to their affective quality. In other words, we do not seem to have to think deliberately of heartbeats or birds to be excited or cheered by a fast pulse or a bird-like flute sound in music. But whether it is nature or habit, the affective aspect of the symbolism seems to stand independently from the representational aspect; it is the affective aspect that is of interest. In what follows, symbols that possess some of the qualities of what they symbolize will be called natural symbols.

Some sounds affect us emotionally quite apart from any obvious connection with human traits or phenomena of nature. Our response may be acquired through common experience or education with others who, in general, have come to regard the sounds as having the same significance that we give them. Again, this significance is an affective significance: the sounds are interpreted as representing something beyond themselves, that something being an affective quality. An example is the 'sad' minor key, which we tend to associate with a less cheerful quality than the major. Like natural symbols, some of these culturally determined symbols have a very strong central core meaning (such is the case with the

minor key, which invariably signals a darker mood than an equivalent melody in a major key). But also like natural symbols, surrounding the core meaning may be a whole spectrum of qualities. A minor tonality may symbolize a quality anywhere from the profoundly sad to the grotesquely teasing (as in the "Frere Jacques" theme heard in the minor key in Mahler's First Symphony). When symbols acquire a meaning that is relatively definite, such as the minor key, but is not attached to a human trait or natural phenomenon, we shall refer to such symbols as conventional symbols.

However, neither natural or conventional symbols are the most common in music. In most music, such references are few and scattered at wide distances throughout the work; only the tempo constantly provides the kind of definite reference we have been discussing. Otherwise the sounds, structured into rhythmic and harmonic patterns, have the kind of symbolism that allows for many interpretations. No single interpretation is preferred, and one person may at different times feel somewhat differently on hearing the same piece of music. Different individuals may differ as well: the opening of the Scherzo from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony might on one hearing seem suspenseful, giving the listener a feeling of expectancy or tension; yet on another occasion, the same movement opening might possess a quality of inevitability, the listener being thrust along in a helpless surge of (symbolic) motion in sound; at still another time, he might simply participate in the

light-hearted joviality of those opening phrases. Neither feelings of expectancy, suspense, helplessness, or joviality are singly what the sounds in their rhythmic structure symbolize. All are there; all are possible emotions for the listener; none contradict the others. It would be difficult to think of a segment of music that did not have either natural, conventional or most often, and probably most importantly, symbolism with no single central reference but wide extensibility of meaning. This is worth pointing out, because there are those who, when writing about music, imply that a symbol must be of the natural or conventional variety, or worse, that it must have one single reference for which it acts as a sign, like the traffic signal. As it can be easily shown that music is not essentially these types of symbolism, these authors argue either that music is not symbolic, or that its symbolism is of a kind that is peculiar to the arts.

(i) John Hospers

Hospers indicates that a symbol must be used according to consistent rules. This, he says, does not fit with music and painting, where a given sound or color does not always mean the same thing.[2] Therefore, the arts cannot be symbolic. The sounds of the sea in Debussy's La Mer may equally be heard by someone who does not know the title to be "a railway train rushing through a tunnel" or "the frenzied dance of goblins".[3] Hospers' objection to Debussy's La Mer being seen as symbolic is answered by the notion of

the multiple nature of the object of emotion discussed in the previous two chapters. It is not the "picture" that the composer has "painted" with sound that forms the complete object of emotion. The rush of a railway train or the rush of sea waves or a frenzied dance are all notional objects for whatever emotion the listener feels. The listener could be as incorrect in his imagery as the man who thinks a goat is the devil come to carry him off. But we must not forget the formal object, the quality the music has for the listener, and this is similar in all cases: it is not tranquil, but rushing or frenzied and this affects the listener in a particular way. Thus in Hospers' own examples, the music could be symbolic of a quality, and while a range of possiblities exists, what the listener takes the music to represent is not merely a matter of "subjective fancy" as Hospers would have it.

(ii) Nelson Goodman

Goodman may seem to treat the symbol as though it must have a single specific meaning. This is apparently the case in his detailed account of notationality, where, he shows, each character has a specific reference, whether that character is a letter of the alphabet, a number, or a musical note.

The criteria for a notational system are complex; it is not pertinent here to describe each in detail, but it is clear that each character in the notational system of music (the score) symbolizes a separate thing, and these things

are sounds and rhythms, not feelings.' But Goodman does not want to deny the connection of the arts with feelings. Nor does he want to relegate the feelings involved to mere satisfaction with excellence in performance. Here he introduces the notion of exemplification. The arts, he claims, are exemplificational rather than denotative; they show rather than tell,' express rather that represent.' Exemplification is "possession plus reference"' (the symbol itself possesses the quality to which it refers: a sample of yellow cloth is itself yellow). Exemplification includes expression, but in expression the exemplification is metaphorical. Thus, while a piece of music may exemplify rhythmic patterns, it may also exemplify metaphorically peace, pomp, or passion (music that expresses peace possesses a peaceful quality, but only metaphorically).' This metaphorical possession is gained by habit and habits differ widely with time and place.'' Thus by habit, sounds and rhythms come to symbolize human feelings. When discussing metaphorical exemplification, Goodman obviously is talking about the sounds themselves as they are combined in melody, harmony, various dynamic intensities and rhythmic patterns, not the notation symbols.

Metaphor, he explains, involves the transfer of a term or set of terms habitually associated with one realm to that of another realm. It is the second realm that is the metaphorical one.'' To use a simple example, when a new building is described as "a maze", the extension of

maze-like qualities to the building is metaphorical. A maze, by definition, is a puzzle intended to frustrate direction sense. When this key characteristic is applied to a building, which of course has many other aspects, there has been a transfer of realm. Similarly, a person and music may be alike in possessing sadness ("the music is sad"), but this term, habitually applied to humans, is extended to the realm of sounds and rhythms.

Goodman's use of the concept "metaphor" is not the usual one. In comparing a building to a maze, we concentrate on, and thus draw together and emphasize certain of the building's characteristics that we take to be similar to those definitive of a maze. In comparing music to a human characteristic such as sadness, we would then emphasize certain aspects of the music that are like the human quality. In the usual use of metaphor (building/maze), there are definitive characteristics of the one (the maze) which, when applied to the other realm (the building), necessarily draw attention to similar qualities which also exist in the second realm, although the latter may have several other characteristics as well (the building may have many windows, bright carpets, wide halls, large offices, etc.). But in music, except in what we have called natural symbols (a slow steady rhythm literally sounds like a slow plodding footstep), there is nothing in the sounds to correspond to a definitive human affective trait: characteristics of human sadness (tears, sighs, etc.) do not appear in sad music

along with other characteristics, which we then ignore in favor of the "sad" ones because of the metaphor. Moreover, even natural similarities (rhythm and footsteps) have no necessary connection with emotion. It has already been established that although a network of meanings exist for what we have been calling a symbol in music, no one reference can be established out of context. Goodman's interpretation of metaphor, read this way, leads Bouwsma's generalization that sad music is called that because it has some of the characteristics of people who are sad,"[12] and is subject to the same criticism, namely that the comparison between sad people and sad music is recognized but not felt. This, as we have seen, is not what Goodman wants.

It is more common to think of metaphor, symbol, synecdoche, etc. as all being different ways of using language in a non-denotative way, rather than, as Goodman suggests, metaphor and synecdoche (the yellow cloth example) being ways of using symbols. But perhaps it is not necessary to accept or reject Goodman's "metaphorical exemplification" in accepting his position regarding the affective symbolism of music. He clearly wishes to distinguish symbols which may be said to represent affective qualities from those which do not. He sees notes and rests as symbolic only of sounds and silences of varying lengths, but the sounds and silences themselves as symbolic of qualities which give rise to emotions on the part of the listener. A simpler way of

accounting for the affective symbolism of music is to admit that here, as elsewhere, symbols can have multiple references. To use Goodman's own examples, a swatch of yellow cloth may symbolize not only the whole bolt of the material, but also its "sunny" cheering quality; a piece of music may exemplify a rhythmic pattern and the emotional quality of that pattern (peace perhaps); both may exemplify other things as well.

(iii) Susanne Langer

Langer sees music as symbolic of forms of feeling having to do with the passing of time. Thus a particular pattern of notes indicates speed, a different sort arrest, and still another sort conflict. This, on the surface, means that she sees a symbol as having one reference only. However, the effect of her theory is that the reference is almost totally undefined. This is because she thinks that each total work of art is a single unique symbol. Music, like all the arts, is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling,'[3] but in particular, those aspects of human feeling that have to do with the passing of time,'[4] an original form given to human feeling - its tensions and resolutions, its rhythmic changes - by the composer.

> The tonal structures we call "music" bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling - growth and attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy

> la[illegible] - not joy and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either or both - the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. .. Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.'[5]

The symbol and object symbolized then, share the same logical form; music and feeling possess a common morphology having to do with the concept of time. Music shares with life itself a rhythmic character;[6] it also creates by illusion something that in life is real, i.e., the passing of time.[7] "The symbolic power of music lies in the fact that it creates a pattern of tensions and resolutions .. the fabric of musical tensions is temporal."[8] The composer does not express symptomatically feelings that beset him, but instead gives symbolic expression to "the forms of sentience as he understands them."[9] Sad and happy interpretations of the same composition are possible, Langer says, because both may possess a similar form. "What music can reflect is only the morphology of feeling."[20]

The music symbol, according to Langer, lacks not only assigned denotative meaning but also definite connotation. Since the factor of conventional reference is totally absent, music cannot have meaning, but instead possesses "import", which is "the pattern of sentience - the pattern of life itself, as it is felt and directly known."[21] If a network or spectrum of references generally agreed on were accepted as the import of the symbolism in music, Langer's

explanation would be highly acceptable, for music cannot have reference in the way that the other arts can. Its saddening quality is not attached to the fate of the heroine, as in a novel, or the carnage of war, as in a picture. It necessarily refers to sadness in general - to personal sadness and to saddening things in the world. We recognize the saddening quality of the work by feeling sad; we make a judgment based on the symbolism in the music.

But Langer's answer is different, for what we recognize in music, she believes, is a form, not a saddening quality. The import of this form is understood by the "basic intellectual act of intuition."[22] This is somewhat mysterious, for the explanation given, based on Croce and Cassirer, is simply that the import of the work is seen <u>in toto</u> first, and the complexities of the piece gradually revealed.[23] This does not explain how we know what is revealed. She does comment that familiarity with the symbols affects understanding, but how does one account for the work that may be interpreted as either happy or sad? If indeed, one hears only "tensions and releases, growth and attenuation, speed and arrest" the connection with happy or sad feeling is very ambivalent. On the other hand, if one is hearing "terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses", happy and sad music surely could not have the same morphology. Langer's explanation suggests that tones and rhythms possess a similarity in their physical being to temporal things: simply put, the spacing of sounds

may be close together or far apart like the events in our lives. Seemingly, we naturally form the connection between sound and time. This in turn becomes involved with feeling. In the cases of excitement and calm, feeling has something to do with the hurry and deliberation of our temporal lives; and sadness, happiness, fear and despair do parade through our lives like the themes of a musical composition. What we recognize in music is patterns of tension and release similar to those in our affective lives.

Langer denies however that music communicates or evokes emotion.[24] The cause of her insistence seems to be in her definition of the symbol as an instrument of thought. She concludes that a work of art "formulate(s) our conceptions of visual, factual and audible reality together . . . gives us forms of imagination and forms of feeling inseparably [and] clarifies and organizes intuition itself."[25] Like Hanslick, she suggests that the actual emotion aroused by the work is exhilaration inspired by the perception of good art.[26] But her theory offers no good reason to deny to the listener the actual experience of any emotion that might be symbolized by the work. Indeed, if our analysis in previous chapters is correct, the experience of emotion, while it may not always be present, is necessary to the very clarification and organization of feeling that Langer suggests.

Langer's concept of each complete work as a single symbol, indivisible into smaller units, has been the focus

of considerable criticism. What can an individual work symbolize as a whole? Her answer is the morphology of a unique state of mind, characterized by a certain pattern of tensions and releases of tension, of virtual movement and rest, of a temporality specific to this feeling and no other. On the other hand, a composition loses some depth of meaning by such an interpretation, for it is reduced to a complex of increases and decreases, exciting because they are excellently conceived. On the other hand, such an interpretation does account for a complexity in a work of art analogous to the complexity of feelings. It seems simpler, however, and closer to a correct description, to allow for separate symbols, for example symbols of joy and symbols of sadness, together giving a bitter-sweet effect, with the total work revealing complex affective qualities rather than itself being a single symbol. Such an interpretation of the symbolism in music would allow for each symbol to possess multiple references, but would also be specific enough that the sounds would refer to something less nebulous than feelings associated with time passing.

Langer's explanation of the connection between feeling and the sounds of music as well as her assertion that the whole work is a single symbol means that for the listener what is perceived is a form or shape, the shape of a unique (but nameless) feeling as understood and given form by the composer. But surely we must be more specific than this when we speak of symbolism. A large work like a symphony or Mass,

may be representative of many states of mind - submission, ecstasy, confusion, and sadness for example, and the possibility should exist for distinguishing one from the other, at least in a general way. Langer's theory, while declaring the uniqueness of each musical work, does not offer any means of determining what each symbolizes, other than that they all represent (or present in her words) the morphology of passing time. More important, she denies what is simply a fact, that listeners feel sadness listening to sad music, excitement listening to exciting music, tranquility listening to tranquil music, not always but often enough that this is an important facet of the experience of listening to music.

(iv) Roger Scruton

Scruton does not use the term 'symbol' in the sense of having one specific reference. He takes symbolizing to be like reminding, or calling to mind, or evoking,[27] a sense close to the first of the two cited at the beginning of this chapter. In art, the symbol is an object (the art object), which corresponds to a state of mind, and this correspondence is "a matter of evocation, not of reference."[28] This is similar to Goodman's description (symbolization in expression is of qualities rather than things and this is done by exemplification) but probably the only similarity.

The necessary conditions for an art object being a symbol of a certain state of mind are laid out by Scruton as

follows:

A. The subject must be able to call the feeling in question to mind at will. It is knowledge by acquaintance, he says, which the subject may not be able to describe in words.

B. The feeling should be called to mind by the work of art.

C. It is necessary to have perceived the work itself.

D. If one sees a as a symbol of b, one will react in some way toward b as result of perceiving a.

E. Double intentionality: the subject's attitude is directed toward what is symbolized, but also toward the work.

F. What the subject learns must be experienced by him in the presence of the work and only from that experience.[2]

Points A, B, and C serve to make clear that to be a symbol of a feeling, a work of art must itself be capable of evoking that feeling in the percipient. A description of the work will not do, and the work must not produce its effect by chance association with some pleasant or unpleasant experience from the percipient's life. Point F refers to knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge of affective experience by acquaintance with the experience. The feeling that one experiences is what is important to the knowledge gained, although one may realize that other interpretations are possible. This is similar to seeing an aspect (I may see a shape as a duck while realizing that it may also be seen as

a rabbit). One's emotion while listening to music may be justified, explained and defended in terms of the work itself. In points D and E, Scruton seems to be referring to the same notion that he elaborates in his discussion of the multiple objects of emotion in "Attitudes, Beliefs, and Reasons."[30] In the work of art, the colors, words, or sounds themselves correspond to the real or material object for a given feeling, but the subject's feeling is also toward the quality that the object has for him (what the work symbolizes). This corresponds to the formal object of an emotion. Thus, the object of an emotion when listening to music is the sounds themselves, but is also what is symbolized by the sounds, a given state of mind. Both are intentional, thus "double intentionality."

With all four authors, it should be apparent that it is combinations of sounds and silences that are being discussed in terms of their possible affective symbolism, not single tones. Since these groups of sounds do not always have the same meaning, Hospers concludes that they cannot be symbolic. Goodman does not think that sounds in music always have the same meaning. His notion of metaphorical exemplification allows for a multiplicity of meanings. Langer thinks that sounds, or more accurately patterns of sound, have specific references having to do with time passing - quickly or slowly, evenly or in bursts of activity - and that the way in which these are combined makes each work a single unique symbol, but a symbol having to do with

aspects of time and its associated feelings. Scruton allows for multiple interpretations of what a given sequence of sounds symbolizes. Just as in seeing a drawing as a duck one time and a rabbit another, a group of sounds and silences may symbolize at one time one affective quality to the listener, who realizes that these same sounds may symbolize something different at another time or to another person.

Of those who allow that music is symbolic, Goodman sees the symbolism as developing through tradition, Langer sees it as being a natural symbolism and Scruton would undoubtedly allow both, Langer denies to the listener any emotion but that of exhilaration. Goodman and Scruton both indicate that the affective quality must be felt by the listener, Scruton by implication in his necessary conditions for an art object being a symbol of a state of mind, and Goodman by direct statement, "Emotional numbness disables here as definitely if not as completely as blindness or deafness . . . Indeed emotions must be felt if they are to be used cognitively."[31] Hospers as well, believes that the listener is emotionally affected by what he hears: "When the hearing of music evokes in us a certain emotion, we can often recognize, even though we have not experienced just this emotion before, that it is a deep and human emotion, and true-to some feeling we have had or might have."[32] But of course, Hospers does not think music is symbolic.

Having accepted that music allows for a range of publicly recognized references, that an object that is a

symbol may itself possess qualities that exist in what is symbolized (a heart-beat or a bird-song) but may on the other hand be chosen through habit or tradition (minor keys are not as light-hearted as major keys), that a symbol may be of an affective quality as well as of an event, object or idea, then Scruton's explanation of music as symbol comes closest to fitting the description.

(v) Signals and Music

In order to better understand the place of symbolism of affective qualities that occurs in music, let us consider a very obvious counter-example, the symbolism of the bo'sun's pipe in naval drill. In the latter case, we have patterns of sounds and silences such as occur in music, but we would not call them music. A long single note followed by a quick upward glissando to a higher pitch means to come to attention; the same long note followed by a quick downward glissando to a lower pitch means to stand easy; the following rhythm means lunch:

Other signals have specific meanings as well. They are conventional signs in the way that traffic signals are signs. Their symbolism has been established arbitrarily and maintained by habit; there are established rules for meaning; only one interpretation is correct for each signal. Affective qualities of the thing symbolized are not part of the symbolism.

Compare this example with music: in music, whereas each note that is written has reference to a specific pitch and duration of sound, a particular pattern, such as the patterns outlined above, does not (in music) refer to anything specific or consistent. But depending on the tempo and surrounding material, such a rhythm surely has some reference to an affective quality. Take the second theme of the Scherzo movement from Beethoven's Symphony no. 5

which is almost identical rhythmically with the bo'sun's lunch call. No one would run out to eat on hearing these notes, nor is there any other specific message, and yet it is heard as jovial, suspenseful, light-hearted or other related affective qualities, as has been pointed out. Suppose Bach's well-known tune beginning

(Third 'Cello Suite) instead opened with a triplet rhythm like the lunch call.

What would be changed in the character of the music? I suggest that it would lack some of the dignity of the

original. A triplet rhythm is sometimes compared to, indeed is often used with, skipping or dancing, actions less dignified, perhaps, and more light-hearted than a steady motion from left to right foot as in walking or running. In that case, the rhythm itself does possess certain properties that lead us to think of it as symbolic of a human quality, but only in the context of music, not in the signal of the bo'sun's pipe.''

Still, there must be many more patterns of sounds that we hear as sad or cheerful for no other reason than that custom has decreed such an interpretation. We have already mentioned the minor key. Another is the use of a wide interval between notes in a melody, which is almost always poignant. Some examples:

"The Moon is a Harsh Mistress" - Jimmy Webb

"Beim Schlafengehen" (Four Last Songs) - Richard Strauss

Sonatine for Flute and Piano - Dutilleux



"Somewhere" (West Side Story) - Leonard Bernstein

Natural symbolism is not apparent here. Goodman quotes Aldous Huxley on his experience of listening to solemn Indian music, "To my Western ears it sounded more cheerful than the dance that followed it."[3]

To be music, sounds must be symbolic of affective qualities; they are not sign-like, with specific rules of reference allowing only one correct use. Both conventional and natural symbolism occur in music, but such symbols must also symbolize an affective aspect.

Richard Strauss' Four Last Songs

What follows is an example of an affective experience listening to music. It should serve to show how music acts symbolically to create emotion and understanding of emotion in the listener.

The Four Last Songs for soprano and orchestra by Richard Strauss have always moved me deeply. Long before I read a translation of the German text or a critic's

interpretation of the significance of the songs, the mood or "import" (Langer's term) was unmistakable, and must be equally so to other listeners. That the feeling is complex there is no doubt; that it resists description in words is even more certain. I choose this work as an example of being moved (and thus learning of emotion) from listening to music because of these factors (the songs are obviously moving and, as subsequent paragraphs show, they resist description) and also for the following reasons:

1. Although no prior knowledge of the composer's intention is needed to experience these songs emotionally, the fact that these are songs, not pure music, means that reading the text is a way of verifying that one's reaction is not "wrong".
2. Strauss is a composer who does not hesitate to use conventional symbolism (patterns of sound which have come to represent a single c nite thing above others) and natural symbolism (sounds which are chosen because they actually possess the same qualities - usually aural - as what they represent, and thus also refer to one thing above others). These kinds of symbolism are what cause problems in discussions of symbolism of affective qualities. By considering them here, it should be possible to show that such symbolism need not be problematic.
3. It is an example of music that personally affected me before I had ever considered whether emotions required

objects or had ever thought of music as symbolic; therefore, the example is not contrived to fit a preferred notion concerning emotion and music, or the symbolism of music.

We find that the affective quality of the music is, while independent of the composer's intention, still congruent with it. The text would seem to indicate that the composer's choice of sounds is based on a shared understanding of these sounds among listeners; in other words, that they have a symbolism that is general and unspecific but commonly understood. It is also true that whatever conventional and natural symbolism is used by Strauss, it serves a greater purpose than the simple imitation of such things as soaring or bird sounds. Scruton's notion of the multi-faceted object for emotion and his criteria for symbolism in art serve to explain whatever increase in understanding is mine after listening to this work.

How do I feel when I listen to the Four Last Songs? Not always the same. As the music progresses, my mood changes and develops. Although these songs may not have been written to be sung as a cycle, they work well as a single entity, so one does not begin anew from a neutral stance with each song. As one song leads naturally into the other, so does one's state of mind gradually shade into another as the work progresses. The first song I find somewhat saddening, but at the end I am not so much sad as expectant. Both the first

and the second songs are somehow less personal than the third song, except for the poignant last stanza in the second with its peaceful concluding horn solo. It is during the violin interlude part way through the third song that, invariably, a catch comes to my throat. This feeling is next to impossible to put into words; possibly it is some kind of searching, longing feeling, but it is at the same time a feeling of peace or security. By the fourth song, I am fully involved with the sounds of the music. I am infinitely sad, but tranquilly sad if this is possible.

It is the sounds of the music that I first take to be saddening or otherwise, but when I realize the subject of the poems on which these sound patterns are based, my feeling is modified or made more specific. As the jacket notes on my recording say, "All are concerned with approaching death in various metaphors: night, rest, autumn, re-birth in spring."[38] The first two songs are about re-birth (Spring), and the lingering of life at its end (September); they have no personal involvement. But in the third, the singer voices a personal yearning to "soar on widespread wings to live in night's magical sphere more profoundly, more variously." Finally, in the last song (In the Glow of Evening), the singer asks a companion with whom he/she has "walked hand in hand, . . . through sorrow and through joy" to "rest now from wandering".

If music has the kind of symbolism we have claimed, a range of interpretations is possible but not just any one

will do. Clearly, my reaction to the music is compatible with the subject of the lyrics.

A song, after all, must have words or it would not be a song, but instead some composition in which the voice acts as another orchestral instrument. But the emotional import does not depend solely on the words or on knowing what the music is "about" in sense of being about Spring, September, or even death. Let us see how this is so by using Scruton's multiple facets of the object of emotion. Again, it should be pointed out that Scruton does not insist that these are the only ways of perceiving the object for an emotion, but seeing the object for emotion in at least these ways allows us to account for music's providing an object for emotion, which intuitively, it seems to do.

(i) The Object of the Emotion

We are concerned with what happens when a listener, in this case myself, feels something when listening to music, here Richard Strauss' Four Last Songs. Therefore we must begin with the emotion. In general, I find myself in a serious mood. It is definitely a sad mood, but is, all in all, a good feeling, perhaps peaceful or resigned, a resolution of anxiety. This feeling must necessarily have an object, we have claimed. It must be about something, something that appears to me to be the reason for feeling the way I do. I do not pretend to feel this way; the feeling is real. Although imagination plays a part in the experience, it is not that I imagine the feeling that I

have. All this should be clear from the preceding chapters.

The obstensible (real or material) object of my emotion is the sounds themselves. Some of these have a high frequency of vibration, some are of a low frequency. In some cases, many sounds occur within the space of a single unit of time, in other cases very few or none. Sometimes several sounds are heard at one time, sometimes only one sound occurs alone. If there is any characteristic that is predominant, it would seem to be that of wide intervals between subsequent sounds, even in the vocal part; which normally would avoid leaps wider than sixths,[30] but in which wide leaps occur quite frequently in these songs. It is true, as well, that the tempi are all rather slow (fewer notes occur within a given period of time). Of the sections of the work already mentioned, the horn solo at the end of the second song contains two wide intervals, both a falling and a rising sixth;[31] the violin solo in the third song (repeated later by the voice) contains a pattern that repeats four times with rising pitch (the first five notes of the Db major scale);[32] when repeated by the voice, the words are "and my soul, unguarded, would soar"; the beginning of the violin solo is accompanied by pizzicato lower strings with the addition of only bassoon, bass clarinet and horns;[33] in the opening of the fourth song, the upper instruments move no faster than eighth notes and the lower ones hold sustained chords;[40] at the bar before letter D in this song, two flutes trill in thirds in a rising

sequence (the words one bar later translate "only two larks climbing in the sky".[41] It is noteworthy that the trills end just before the words "in this loneliness");[42] finally, as the last words of the song are heard ("is this perhaps - death?"), we hear the horn, violas and English horn playing the same melody that occurs in Strauss' orchestral work Death and Transfiguration,[43] and in the last seven bars, two piccolos trill in thirds, this time on a single note.[44]

These sounds, then, are examples of what constitutes the real object for my emotions. Notional and formal objects overlap enough that they may be considered together. The notional object, it should be recalled, is what I take those sounds to "be". For example, slow tempi I take to have a certain dignified aspect. The formal object is the quality the sounds have for me. In the instance of slow tempi, the dignified aspect of the sounds puts me in a serious state of mind. The sequence of sounds rising in pitch I take, as most do (for this is conventional symbolism), to signify the same thing as an increase in height spatially, but the quality this sequence has for me is a yearning quality. Similarly, the trilling flutes obviously symbolize bird song (natural symbolism) but the affective quality for me is that of intensifying a lonely feeling, for here the symbolism is used ironically (it is used to accent the opposite mood to what bird-song usually suggests). Pizzicato celli and bass sound heavy and solid (the notional object); the quality they have for me is that of stability or security against

the soaring, yearning quality of the violin (the formal object). The poignancy of wide intervals has been noted; they may be perceived as stretching or reaching upward and falling backward. The poignancy is the formal object and the reaching or falling is the notional object. But it is not really necessary to have formed the interpretation of the sounds as reaching or falling in order to hear them as poignant. Similarly, the allusion to the "transfiguration" theme need not be recognized in order to hear this sequence as calming, and the two flutes need not be heard as the song of a lark in order to determine the contrast between this cheering sound and the over-all lonely quality. The two piccolos trilling on a single pitch might be heard as part of the dying away of the music, as the final twittering of the lark, or as the end of struggle in life as the larks end their climbing. But again, this notional object is not necessary to hearing the last bars as sad or lonely or calm. In other words, the notional object can be metaphorical interpretations of the sounds or imagined pictures and may differ considerably between listeners, particularly if they do not know what the music is "about" (as, in Hospers' example, La Mer may be interpreted as being a train rushing through a tunnel or a frenzied dance of goblins), or it may be so generalized as to be about anything that has the affective quality that is the formal object.

We have seen, however, in the previous chapter that one very important kind of notional object is a description

arising from one's own affective experience. In judging the Four Last Songs to have the quality they do, I relate this quality to my own experiences that have the same affective quality for me. Thus, listening to the work fifteen years ago when I had not read the lyrics and when I was not very familiar with death, but was, even so, familiar with certain other aspects of life experience, such as abandoning an insoluble life situation, or losing someone close, not by death but by absence or the end of a friendship, or realizing that some aspects of life are not as important as they once were, and thus being willing to abandon them, I yet took the music to be saddening but calming (the formal object); my life experiences up to that time formed the notional object for my emotion. Now that I am that many years closer to my own inevitable death, now that I have watched a few members of an older generation come to terms with the end of life, the notional object of my emotion when I listen to the music is both kinds of life experience. But it is not always in a specific form of just this day and that happening. I may think about endings in general in life, of understanding that some things do not matter and others cannot be helped, of realizing that endings in human relations bring an end to stress as well as an end to pleasure. All these are part of the object of my feelings as well. They are the universalized description of my particular life experiences and of those of others which, through imagination, I have related to my own.

The intentional object of my emotion when listening to the Four Last Songs is my beliefs about what is saddening or calming, what is worth my concern and what is not, what is uplifting and what is stressful. The intentional object of my emotion may be my beliefs about death, but need not be; it is my beliefs, stated propositionally, about those emotions that may be involved with death, but may be involved with other endings as well.

(ii) The Learning Experience

The learning experience for me of listening to this composition should be fairly apparent. When I first listened to the music, by re-feeling the emotions associated with various relevant life experiences, and by relating to each other the affective aspect of these events, I gave a meaning or structure to them; at the very least, I brought them to consciousness and looked at them, not dispassionately, but with all the emotions that surrounded them, yet at a step removed from the actual experience. I probably made generalizations that modified my beliefs. Throughout the intervening years, the music changed somewhat in meaning for me as my own experience and my knowledge of the experience of others expanded. By the present time, I unite all these experiences when I listen to the music, but in a rather abstract way. I no longer think of this or that particular segment of my life fifteen years ago; nor do I think very specifically about anyone's death; but I do think about acceptance and endings in a general sort of way, and I do

think about my life right now in relation to these things. I believe that my understanding has grown through the experience of the rather complicated feelings generated through listening to Strauss' last composition; I believe that the structure that I have given to what has happened in my life has been influenced by listening to this music.

(iii) The Work as Symbolic

The experience of listening to Strauss' Four Last Songs meets Scruton's criteria for the work's being a symbol of a certain complex state of mind. This cannot be proven in the way that scientific or mathematical claims are. While I can give some verification that the emotion I feel when listening is appropriate, and what was intended by the composer, by referring to the lyrics of the song, I cannot show, except by protesting that I am honest, that I feel as I do only when hearing this work and not by hearing an analysis of it, or that I have learned something from hearing this work about my own emotions and those of others that I would learn only from it.

However, if my honesty may be assumed, then it is worthwhile to review the six criteria with the Strauss work in mind:

A. The sad serene feeling may be brought to mind or re-experienced; it is difficult to describe.

B. It is this music that makes me feel this way, not just any piece of music, or some other phenomenon.

C. I could not have obtained the same experience

second-hand. If I had not heard the work, I would not feel precisely this feeling. (Although remembering or hearing in imagination the sounds of the music may bring the feeling to mind, describing the sounds does not.)

D. Hearing these sounds as symbolic of death or other endings in life experience means that I will react in some way towards what they symbolize, in this case with what for want of better description I have called sadness/serenity.

E. This attitude is toward all the aspects of the object of my emotion, not just the music but the affective quality that it symbolizes.

F. What I have learned through imagination by relating my own experiences to each other, and what I have learned of others' affective experience, I have learned in the presence of the work from the experience of the work.

My experience also shows that in music, symbolism of even the conventional and natural kind has extensibility of meaning that is affective. Thus even the rising sequence (soaring), the trilling flutes (the lark), and the allusion to another work by the same composer are not included purely so that the listener may recognize them, but to contribute to the affective symbolism.

(iv) The Correctness of the Emotion and the Value of the Work

It seems probable that my reaction to the Four Last Songs is a "correct" one. If the symbolism of the music is a

range of possible meanings, then my emotion is within this range, whether or not I realize that the music is about death. Is there then such a thing as an incorrect emotion based on the sounds of the music? A typical incorrect emotion would be the giggle of the eleven-year-old who has never heard an opera singer, or the sneer of the opera goer who is unfamiliar with the way a blues singer "belts out" a song. It would also be the reaction of Aldous Huxley, previously quoted, who thought that the "solemn" Indian music sounded more cheerful than the dance music which followed. In all these instances, there is a lack of familiarity with the style of the music. But given familiarity with the style, is it possible, or even worth worrying about, that one could have the "wrong" emotion when listening to music? Two possibilities come to mind. One is that a listener might find a work like Strauss' Four Last Songs jolly and light-hearted (supposing he did not understand the words), or the first movement of the G Major Flute Concerto by Mozart profoundly saddening. Somehow, this does not seem even remotely possible. There are too many cues given to even the slightly informed listener, such as slow or fast tempi. If he does not react to these cues, a more likely situation is no emotional involvement at all rather than an emotion that is opposite to what the music symbolizes. Such a listener will be puzzled but not wrong in his feelings. The other possibility is more difficult: suppose I no longer feel as I once did when listening to the

Strauss work; or suppose a musicologist points out to me various inadequacies of the work that ought to make me realize that it is banal or trite or sentimental, but I am still as deeply moved as the first time I heard the composition; or what if I am now moved by a work that I had heard previously and by which I was previously unaffected? Which reaction is the correct one?

Here it must be admitted that, in terms of gaining understanding of the emotions, there is no one correct reaction in the sense of being proper for every person and every person's learning experience. Several reactions are possible. As Scruton points out, one interpretation may affect a listener even though he realizes others are possible. We have said that there is unlikely to be an emotional response to music that is the opposite to what the music conveys. Either there is a response or not; if not due to a lack of understanding of the music's symbolism, the absence of response is caused by the power of the symbolism being exhausted for that particular listener. Like a metaphor that becomes part of everyday vocabulary, music's symbolism can lose its effectiveness. It may be that some music has such a wealth of extended meanings through its symbolism that it can never become trite for any given listener. What does seem to be the case, however, is that we tire of certain music that at one time seemed very moving, or become excited by music that up to that point held no emotional interest, and that some music will always affect

us, whether or not we rationally know if it is "good" music. It must be concluded that for understanding of emotion through its experience, the correct response - if it could be called that - is the response of an emotion based on the symbolism of the music, not on puzzlement, boredom or mere technical interest.

But it would not seem desirable that one remain "stuck" in his reactions to music: being moved by only one kind of music, whether opera or Sousa marches or jazz would seem to limit emotional response in much the same way as limited life experience limits emotional response, and would thus inhibit understanding of the emotions based on their experience. I may be truly stirred by martial music, but the feelings I have cannot at all compare with those that I have listening to Strauss' Four Last Songs. On the other hand, I am not going to experience the solid, cheering quality of Semper Fidelis when I lose myself in Strauss. Nothing further will be said about assessing value in music. The value for the individual listener, as far as understanding the emotions is concerned, is the power of the music to evoke feeling. We now turn to the education of the emotions.

NOTES

1 This device is used in music as well.

2 John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 29-61.

3 ibid. p.47.

4 ibid. p.49. It should be noted that Hospers' explanation of natural symbolism does not include hurry and rest, or tension and release but is limited to such imitations as the sound of the cuckoo, a thunderstorm, the movement of the sea or a swan.

5 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1976), for example, see pp. 182-183.

6 ibid. p.253.

7 ibid. p.52.

8 ibid. p.53.

9 ibid. p.86, p.91.

10 ibid. p.89.

11 ibid. p.74, p.71.

12 See Chapter 2, note 57.

13 Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p.40.

14 ibid. p. 105 ff.

15 ibid. p.27.

16 ibid. p.126.

17 ibid. p.109.

18 ibid. p.372.

19 ibid. p.28.

20 Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, (Toronto: A Mentor Book, The New American Library, 1951), p.202.

21 Langer, Feeling and Form, p.31.

22 ibid. p.375.

23 ibid. p.379.

24 ibid. p.28, p.380, [illegible] and p. 397. Also Philosophy in a New Key, p.185.

25 Langer, Feeling and Form, p.397.

26 ibid. p.395.

27 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974), p.216.

28 ibid. p.219. He does not, however, appear to be claiming that the complete work is one single symbol of one state of mind.

29 ibid. pp.231 ff.

30 Roger Scruton, "Attitudes, Beliefs, and Reasons", Morality and Moral Reasoning, ed. John Casey, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971), pp.40-41.

31 Goodman, Languages of Art, p.248.

32 Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts, p.195.

33 It might be argued that pitched notes are what is lacking for an affective symbolization in the bo'sun's signal. It is true that melodic intervals in music can be symbolic of affective qualities (see examples in paragraph to follow). In a signal or sign, they are not, as the old army lunch call should show:

But distinctions begin to be blurred, for Taps and The Last Post definitely have affective associations similar to those of the flag.

34 ibid. quoting Aldous Huxley, pp.89-90.

35 Richard Strauss, Four Last Songs, soprano Elizabeth Schwarzkopf and the Berlin Radio Symphony Orchestra, conductor George Szell. Jacket notes and English translation of lyrics anonymous.

36 Richard Strauss, Four Last Songs, (London: Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers Ltd. Hawkes Pocket Scores, 1950) See for example p.34, 4 and 3 bars before B, and p. 28, 7 and 6 bars before E.



37 ibid. p.32.

38 ibid. p.38 and p.40.



39 ibid. p.37.


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40 ibid.


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41 ibid. p.49.



42 ibid. p.51.



43 ibid. p.54.


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44 ibid. p.55.



CHAPTER 5

Understanding and the Education of the Emotions

The learning activity that has been described in the previous chapters may be summed up as follows:

1. The listener hears sounds.
2. He takes these sounds to be symbolic of an affective quality.
3. Heard this way, the sounds form an object for emotion.
4. As an object for emotion, the sounds are related by the listener to those things in life experience that he believes to have the affective quality symbolized by the sounds. These may range from personal experience to a generalized notion of what he takes to have that affective quality (if the sounds are saddening, for example, then he will relate this quality to personal experience or to general concepts such as injustice).
5. If these sounds are an object of emotion for a given listener, he experiences that emotion.
6. Imagination plays a part in any or all of these ways:
   a. The listener re-experiences incidents from his past life.
   b. He imagines possible future experiences.
   c. He imagines what the experience of others must be.
   d. He fantasizes about totally unlikely incidents (like

participating in the Battle of Waterloo).

e. He relates various experiences to each other, ranking, structuring, and otherwise giving a modified meaning to his previous notion of a given emotion.

Of imagining activities (a) through (e), (d) is probably of least significance apart from its relation to universal human experiences like war and death. Activities (a) and (b) are important in learning of others' affective experience, but it is in (e) that the listener creatively gives form to what he has learned.

7. In imagining, the listener may well bring into focus experiences and ways of combining experiences of which he was previously only subsidiarily aware.

8. Besides the experience of an emotion and the act of imagining, the listener also reflects on his feelings. Such reflection is clearly necessary for the imagining activity (e) above. Emotion, imagination, and reflection may occur concurrently during listening; it also would seem correct to say that reflection would be highly likely to continue following a profound listening experience, but that emotion and imagining might also occur.

9. It is quite possible that some, if not all, of what is learned cannot be expressed propositionally, or that only at a later time is one fully aware of what has been learned.

Something has been achieved as a result of this learning activity, something important to human beings and therefore worth being given the attention of education. The importance has to do with learning of the affective nature of humanity. Understanding seems the most reasonable term to describe the learning that takes place during the experience of emotion while listening to music, for although 'understanding' may not be a precisely accurate term for describing the learning that occurs, the word has associations that suggest it is not synonymous with knowledge. One may know names and dates of historical events but not understand their relevance or significance. One may know multiplication tables but not understand the number theory that gives rise to them. Thus, intuitively, 'understanding' seems the more suitable term to describe a full awareness of an emotion, its physical manifestation, its causes, its place in the scheme of one's other experiences, its relation to other feelings, etc. J. M. Moravcsik has provided an explanation of 'understanding' that in most respects fits this learning achievement.

Understanding

Before turning to Moravcsik's analysis, however, there are two common uses of the word 'understand' that should be pointed out because they do not form part of the meaning with which we are concerned. One is the use of the word to mean a belief that is less than certain. When we use such expressions as "I understand that the postal rates are going

up" or "I understand that the building was locked earlier than usual", we mean that although we are fairly certain that what we way is the case, we are not positive. Usually the implication is that someone has told us authoritatively, but that we do not know first-hand. The second use is as a synonym for simple comprehension. In this use, one says, "I understand French", or asks, "Do you understand what it is I want you to do?" or complains, "I have read three articles on 'understanding' and I don't understand any of them". The first use (less than certain belief) seems definitely a special case. The second suggests that the verbs 'to know' and 'to understand' are sometimes interchangeable (as in the second example, "Do you know/understand what it is that I want you to do?") and sometimes actually switch meaning ("I know French" suggests a thoroughness, depth and breadth in what has been learned that is not present in "I understand French", which is simple comprehension). 'Understanding', as used by Moravcsik, and as used to describe what is achieved listening to music with emotion, is neither simple comprehension nor synonymous with knowledge.

(i) Moravcsik's Interpretation of Understanding

What then is 'understanding' apart from being something more than simple comprehension? Moravcsik points to several aspects of understanding that show it to differ significantly from knowledge:

1. Understanding is "a state of mind in which a conceptualization . . . yields the insight that unites

our knowledge . . .".[1] It is difficult to think of knowledge as a state of mind,[2] and conceptualization, insight and uniting are all acts that do not always apply to having knowledge per se.

2. Whereas we either know or do not know, and what we claim to know is either true or not true, explanations, which yield understanding "are assessed more in terms of adequacy, insightfulness, or completeness - terms that admit of degrees . . . truth . . . turns out not to be an 'all-or-nothing' affair."[3] And understanding itself, in Moravcsik's scheme, admits of degrees, for while his analysis is that of complete understanding, he says, it still accounts for those "situations in which students have moments of insight."[4]
3. Although we can both understand and know proofs, theories, languages, sentences, people, paintings and situations, we can know but not claim to understand an individual mountain, street or tree.[5]

We shall return to these three aspects of understanding when we attempt to determine whether Moravcsik's analysis of understanding, which is presented in terms of understanding proofs, theories, etc., applies to emotions. But first his main argument: in skeleton, it is that "the concept of understanding cannot be reduced to a combination of knowing that, knowing how, and knowledge by acquaintence [sic] . . . [but] involves a non-propositional component."[6] He fleshes out his claim by describing two related forms of

understanding, the understanding that is linked to explanations (the analysis of an entity) and understanding that is linked to insights (a conceptualization). The second type, which he illustrates with the understanding of proofs and sentences, is extended to cover the understanding of persons and artistic objects.

The ability to explain means 'understanding what' and 'understanding why'; this understanding (which is the understanding of the nature of an entity) requires propositional knowledge but, Moravcsik notes, of a special kind, "knowledge of propositions expressing essential structure."[7] This means delineating not only the essential constituents of an entity, but the structure binding together these constituents, its functioning, its causal antecedents and causal power.[8] But although this kind of understanding ("I understand what X is") can be reduced to a special kind of propositional knowledge, the kind of understanding indicated by the grammatical construction "I understand X" can not.

To say "I understand X" when X is a concept of a general or abstract nature means conceptualization or representation has occurred, this being a matter of imagining, of "seeing it as"; it is a non-propositional insight that may vary from person to person[9] but "the structures conceptualized in non-propositional form are analogous to the ones explicated propositionally in terms of essential structures."[10] Thus understanding a sentence is

not the same thing as understanding what a given sentence is (i.e., its nature, as in the previous paragraph). While one may know a lot about a proof or a sentence, it is quite possible that he does not understand either. What will be lacking when one does not understand a proof is the ability to "see the significance of the proof, its consequences, alternative ways of proving the same conclusions, or . . intuitions concerning . . violations of [the rules]."[11] In the case of a sentence, similar evidence of lack of understanding can be seen, particularly where violation of rules is not recognized, or where the agent cannot substitute to preserve the essential structure. But when the insight described is in place, Moravcsik claims, we postulate understanding as "the underlying factor for the varieties of know-how and propositional knowledge"[12] involved in knowing the premisses of an argument and how to apply the proof, or the elements of the sentence and how to produce the sentence.[13] Moreover, propositional knowledge is not only not sufficient for such understanding, it is not necessary either. "As long as the agent has the required non-propositional representation in his head, . . . a propositional analysis . . . is not required, and in most cases, it is not available to the competent agent."[14] Understanding, then, involves conceptualization or representation of that entity of which knowledge of essential propositions gives an analysis;[15] conceptualization yields the insight that unites our

knowledge of rules, application, etc.'' Understanding is a matter of "seeing the larger complexes, with their ingredients interrelated in a certain way."'' Moravcsik believes his notion of understanding is applicable to understanding human beings. In place of intuition that a rule has been violated, he substitutes the analogous "sensitivity to having made an inappropriate response, or having misjudged some gesture or thought of the person . . ."'' To explain the phenomenon of claiming to understand a person but not a tree, he points to human rationality, of which understanding is an essential ingredient. "Thus in attempting to understand persons, we turn understanding back on itself."'' I am not at all sure that it is his own understanding to which we turn when we attempt to understand another person, and that means that I do not have a clear answer to why we can understand an individual person and not an individual tree. But if it is possible to understand a person, surely it is possible to understand an aspect of a person such as his affective nature or his separate emotional responses. Let us see, then, whether understanding an emotion fits Moravcsik's notion of understanding.

(ii) Understanding an Emotion

Understanding sadness would sometimes be a matter of being able to answer "what" and "why" q[illegible] in other words to be able to explain the nature o[illegible]adness: in Moravcsik's terms, understanding what sadness is, as opposed to understanding sadness. Such understanding would entail

being able to explain the constituents of sadness in terms of physical manifestations (tears) and inner feelings (a heaviness); it might entail descriptions of typical behavior in various situations when one is sad (a forced light-heartedness when with happy people, perhaps). The structure of sadness, that which binds the essential constituents together, would be explained in terms of those things that relate sad behaviors to each other - similarities in behaviors, but also in the objects of sadness like injustices, losses or suffering. The function of sadness could be described in many ways: psychologically, sociologically (as in Roger Scruton's analysis of 'learning what to feel', to be outlined later in this chapter) or even physiologically. To describe the emotion's causal antecedents and powers, one must have knowledge of the sorts of things that are objects for sadness and of the effects that sadness has on future personal experience and activities involving others. It is not clear that explaining the structure of sadness would not entail explanations of constituents, causal antecedents and powers as well, for the special propositional knowledge in an explanation <u>is</u> the knowledge of essential structure.[20] But this is enough to show that one could have understanding of an emotion that would enable one to answer "what" and "why" questions, that such an explanation would show sadness to have a different essential structure from an emotion like happiness and a similar essential structure to some other emotions

like nostalgia (which would have something in common with happiness as well).

But understanding sadness (not just the nature of sadness, i.e. what it is), is more than being able to answer what and why questions. It is like understanding a proof in that it involves a personal insight which need not entail propositional knowledge. Sadness is seen a certain way by the agent; it is thought to have certain characteristics ranked and arranged in particular ways that are not always, or even often, possible to explain propositionally; it also forms part of the way the agent structures his whole life experience. The descriptions of sadness in Chapter Four (The Symbolism of Music) as related to Strauss' Four Last Songs are these kinds of conceptualization, i.e., propositional descriptions which are only partially effective, and which need not be available at all to the agent in order to have the understanding in question. Another example is the different ways of conceptualizing love: "love has a bitter taste",[21] "a boy who kills cannot love",[22] "the characteristic cunning of true love",[23] and so on. Here it is clearly seen that one person's representation or conceptualization may be different from that of another, although in this case, the differences may be due to the agent's partial understanding (but understanding admits of degrees in Moravcsik's scheme). To see love or sadness in one of a number of different ways does not preclude the realization that the emotion can be conceptualized

differently, nor the ability to do this at another time. I might conceptualize love in such a way that its "bitter taste", although I know it to exist, is scarcely evident in my conceptualization. Yet at some other time, "the bitter taste of love" might be central. "Seeing as" is here like the duck/rabbit analogy that Scruton uses to show the place of imagination in judging art as an object for emotion.[24] The realization that an emotion like sadness or love may be conceptualized in different ways and being able to do so is analogous to the understanding shown in realizing alternative ways of arriving at the same conclusion in a proof.

When one understands proofs and sentences, Moravcsik says, there exists an intuition that enables one to see when rules have been broken. There are no rules that govern the understanding of an emotion, but in understanding a person according to Moravcsik, one has an intuition of having misjudged a gesture or made an inappropriate response, and the same would be true of having misjudged an emotion in another person. One could also realize that he had misjudged his own feelings, and that would include their significance, causal lineage or powers. However, any of these characteristics of understanding need not be known in such a way that one could state them propositionally. When one can do this, one has made the analysis that is, as Moravcsik claims, parallel to conceptualization. Thus one could understand an emotion in much the same way as Moravcsik

describes understanding a proof or a person.

(iii)Understanding, and Listening to Music with Emotion

The first thing to note is that the kind of understanding that enables one to give explanations (analysis requiring propositional knowledge of essential structures) is a kind of understanding that, although it could be the result of a creative mental act by the agent, could also be the result of having the matter in question explained by someone else. The latter is not the kind of understanding that is relevant to the learning achievement that takes place as a result of listening to music, as should be amply clear. In fact, the kind of learning that takes place as described in the preceding chapters is in direct contrast to learning by description or explanation, even though there can be an element of propositional knowledge in the achievement. On the other hand, the kind of understanding that involves conceptualization very accurately describes the experience outlined. Of course the mere hearing of sounds is not understanding, but from the moment they are judged symbolic of a particular affective quality, the agent is beginning to structure the constituents of the emotion, giving significance here, changing a previous conceptualization there, making predictions and interpreting the past. An analysis that would enable one to explain the understanding of an emotion may take place in reflection on the experience, but the understanding is none the less there, whether or not it can

ever be stated propositionally.

The learning achievement under consideration in these chapters, as we have been seen, may be partial. Unlike knowledge, which one either has or does not have, the achievement we are discussing changes by expanding and deepening - it grows - and while one way of conceptualizing may be recognized by the agent as valid, he himself may conceptualize the emotion differently. Grounds for judging the learning achievement are the adequacy, insightfulness and completeness that Moravcsik indicates are the grounds for judging explanations, rather than truth, "the 'all or nothing' affair" that is the criterion for theoretical knowledge. Therefore, if one were able to explain propositionally what one understood about emotion after listening to music, one's explanation would be judged in terms of adequacy, insightfulness and completeness rather than on any other grounds.

What is not accounted for in Moravcsik's explication of 'understanding' as we have outlined it so far, is the necessity for experiencing an emotion in order to learn the sorts of things we have indicated. Moravcsik, however, seems to be referring to a similar phenomenon when he speaks of the sort of understanding one has of a friend, where one cannot describe the person but must simply say "come and meet him/her",[28] as no generalizations serve to account for the uniqueness of the individual as conceptualized by the agent. Thus we come to understand this person only by

experiencing him/her, and further (although Moravcsik does not say this), only through our experiencing this person do we understand the friend's (the agent's) attitude or reaction. Similarly, only in experiencing an emotion like sadness or love are we able to understand it, for explanations and generalizations cannot account for the emotion. Equally we cannot understand the reactions of others to saddening things without ever having been sad. For Moravcsik, this special understanding is unlike understanding a proof or understanding a person in the usual sense in that explanations and generalizations do not serve to develop understanding. But in the case of emotion, although it is true that explanations and generalizations do not adequately communicate the experience of emotion, one is enabled to generalize on the basis of experience or in other words extend his personal experience to that of others, and this is what is accomplished by using imagination when listening to music with emotion. Moravcsik's notion does not account for this aspect of the learning achievement we are discussing.

Moravcsik concludes his analysis of understanding by showing that experiencing a work of art is much like experiencing an individual person, someone's friend whom one must meet in order to understand. As we have indicated in Chapter Four, one of the criteria Scruton uses for an art work being symbolic of an affective quality is that the emotion must be evoked by that work and not by a description

of it. To further elaborate what Moravcsik says about art would confuse the issue here, but he does make a highly significant statement about emotion. It is this:

> It [a play or novel] forces us to chart maps of emotion, attitudes, and types of thoughts over seas untouched by our own everyday experience. . . The point of understanding [the character of] Oedipus is . . to form a conception whose basic elements (shame, horror, despair over that which is not completely within our control, etc.) are indeed represented in our experience but in totally different forms of manifestation.''

This describes precisely the learning achievement that has to do with the universalized affective experience we have indicated is so important.

(iv) Conclusion

If Moravcsik's analysis of understanding is valid, by stretching his explanation only as much as he does to accommodate the understanding of people, we can make it fit the understanding of emotions. This interpretation would enable us to call the learning achievement that is the result of the activity described at the outset of this chapter 'understanding'. Although the fit is not perfect, 'understanding' seems to be a concept that will not lead the reader to a misunderstanding of the argument in these chapters, which is that listening to music with emotion provides an important sort of learning having to do with the

human condition in it affective aspect.

The Education of the Emotions

We may now focus on the education of the emotions. Through the learning activity described, the listener finds that he has clarified his own feelings by comparing and contrasting them with other feelings he may have had, or the feelings of other people as they have been described to him. He may reflect on the intentional object for these feelings and his beliefs may be modified, his sympathy for others intensified. In all, his understanding has increased as a result of the experience. This is particularly obvious in the case where a person has not responded appropriately during a life experience, but feels the appropriate emotion when listening to music. The loss of someone through death is the most common example, but it is possible to think of a "happy" experience that was not properly enjoyed at the time (perhaps because of anxiety about another matter) but which returns in one's imagination when listening to music, and is then a truly happy event. Here it may be said that the listener has "learned what to feel". This notion requires further investigation.

(i) Knowing What to Feel

Scruton considers knowing what to feel to be practical knowledge, similar to knowing what to do. It well may be, he argues, that knowing what to do means knowing what to feel.[2] While theoretical reasoning produces knowledge of what to think and believe, practical reasoning produces

knowledge of what to do and feel.[28] All knowledge involves "a subjective state, an objective rightness, and some nonaccidental relation between the two."[29] For theoretical knowledge, the subjective state is certainty in belief, the objective rightness is truth and the relationship between the two is, it would seem, the deliberate aim for truth.[30] For practical knowledge, again the subjective state is certainty, but certainty of what to do and feel. The crucial aspect of truth in theoretical knowledge is that it indicates a success: one is successful in that he aimed to be right and succeeded in being right. The analogue for success in belief where practical knowledge is concerned is success in action or emotion, and this is revealed in the happiness that is the result. Such happiness must be deliberately sought; the subjective state of certainty in what to do and feel is related to success in a behavior's or feeling's producing happiness by one's having deliberately aimed at happiness in choosing that behavior or feeling (happiness is evidence that one is right in the same way that truth is evidence that one is right).[31] But happiness is, in this sense, a kind of satisfaction in exercising morality;[32] it is the guiltlessness that results from knowing what is expected and reacting in that way; one may suffer externally, as when someone loved dies,[33] but will not be a victim of the guilt of confused feelings (or behavior).[34]

We have already referred to Scruton's two contrasting examples, the one a poem by Emily Dickinson, in which she uses the phrase "awful leisure" to describe the situation in which "one knows what grief is but, being overcome by disaster, grief seems impossible: relief, indeed, seems easier";[3] the other from Homer's Odyssey, where Elpenor describes the mourning ceremonies that will be performed for him. In the former example, the bereaved do not know what to feel, but in the latter example, the common culture prescribes certain attitudes and behaviors and the emotions that accompany them. Note also this example of not knowing what to feel from a much lighter field of literature:

> Dr. Steiner tried to feel pity and knew that he felt fear. But he was fully conscious only of repugnance. . . Suddenly he was seized with an intolerable need to giggle.[4]

No doubt we all can think of occasions when we knew what we should feel but could not manage to really feel it, or when, in truth, we really did not know what to feel, when laughter and tears were equally possible.

One may know what to do in the sense of knowing what should be done without being able to do it, not due to lack of skill but due to a confused approach to the task. Of such a person we say, "He doesn't know what he's doing in that job." Scruton's example is a politician or administrator.[5] Similarly, knowing what to feel involves not only an understanding of what one should feel but also being able to

feel it."[8] All emotion involves understanding and activity - nothing important is left when these are removed; this, Scruton says, is widely accepted. Therefore it is possible to educate an emotion to the extent that one can educate understanding and activity. What is meant by this is that one's understanding of the intentional object for emotion may be increased, i.e., that one's beliefs about what is proper cause for a given emotion may be changed or clarified, and that the actual activity of feeling may be, as it were refined. As R.W. Hepburn explains, the task of educating the emotions "will be concerned . . . with ousting vague and imprecise or crude emotions with more specific, appropriate and discriminating ones; with preventing emotional experience from stagnating - replacing jaded and repetitive habit-emotions with fresh and keen emotions, coupled logically to new individualized ways of seeing."[9]

Imagination is used in both educating the understanding and activity of feeling. "Imagine yourself in [a given] situation," Scruton asks; "how would you, how must you, then feel about your life and circumstances?"[10] In answering this question, one will feel from his imagined situation a given emotion and, from his understanding of how he feels, choose attitudes, behaviors and associated emotions that are justified by his deliberate aim for happiness, or perhaps more correctly, a satisfactory state of being. In this way, imagining can educate the understanding of what one should feel. One may also train oneself or another in activities

(mental and physical) appropriate to a particular emotion, according to one's understanding of that emotion. Thus, one learns that fire is to be avoided but also to be feared; that one should repair wrong-doing and also feel remorse; that one should recognize a particular act as an insult and also feel the appropriate reaction to that insult.'' This is done by using the imagination to deliberately form a picture that emphasizes certain preferred aspects to the exclusion of others. It is "not a matter of choosing to believe something (whatever that means) but rather of choosing to give it emphasis."[12] Presumably it would work this way: I would choose to emphasize in my image the pain of being burned or the destructive power of fire, rather than its cheery glow; I would emphasize the ridiculous aspect of the posturing of the man who insulted me rather than its threatening side, if I wanted to persuade myself that he was not to be taken seriously. I would, in Scruton's own more complex example, deliberately aim at an attitude by training myself to be angry with those who despised such an attitude.

Scruton's idea that one may acquire an attitude by practising it is reminiscent of Robert Solomon's comment that the best way to feel a particular emotion is to pretend that one has it. It should also be kept in mind that for Scruton, an attitude is not something different in kind from an emotion; in fact, an attitude in some cases is scarcely distiguishable from an emotion, for between turbulent passion and totally calm and rational belief come, on the

one hand emotions, and on the other attitudes, side by side. As we have seen, for Scruton, practising an attitude is a matter of practising an activity as well, due to emotion and action being linked together. This is not very difficult to understand, for often emotions do involve various actions: fear may entail running, anger may involve throwing something or stamping one's foot. What Scruton is saying here, however, is that going through the action may produce the feeling that goes with such actions, so that we might say of the actor who does not feel the emotions of the character he portrays, that by going through the actions of such a person, he may well develop the feeling he does not originally possess. The purpose of the funeral rite for Elpenor in the Odyssey is just that: by performing certain ritual acts, Odysseus will be able to feel the grief that these acts represent. Some of the acts are, no doubt, outward manifestations of the state of mind, perhaps ritual wailing, but others are customs chosen arbitrarily or simply evolved through time. In other words, the funeral ceremony is symbolic - a symbol or symbols - some natural and some not, for the emotion of grief. Scruton comments, "A practice that tells one what to do solely and exclusively on the occasion of such a death is a practice that takes its meaning from the emotion of grief."[43] As well, such a ritual act as a funeral ceremony serves to render his feeling objective, part of his participation in a common lot; it is a part of a continuing activity in a public and objective

world and ceases to be a private anxiety to be borne by himself alone."[4]

However, practising the activity associated with an emotion with the resulting acquisition of the emotion itself would have to entail an object for the emotion. It is not simply pretending over and over again to be angry by ritually reproducing gestures and facial expressions characteristic of such anger. We have argued that a rapid heartbeat or sweaty palms do not in themselves constitute a feeling in the sense of an emotion, that there must be an object such that a particular kind of judgment is made. Yet here Scruton almost seems to be implying that the object for the emotion will somehow be judged as such (and thus the emotion felt) by reproducing the physical symptoms. But this may not be the case; for Scruton, education of the emotions in the sense of knowing what to feel is a matter of understanding as well as activity. Intentional understanding colors the activity from the beginning: the person knows from his society and his already present personal understanding what he should - but perhaps cannot - feel in a particular situation; in participating in ritual behavior (behavior associated with a particular emotion whether in public ceremony or not), the participant associates his behavior with his beliefs about what he should feel. He emphasizes chosen details and experiences that fit these beliefs. Moreover, if he, as Scruton suggests, in the course of a publicly understood ritual relates his experience to

those of others, then the experience and his beliefs about that experience are broadened, universalized. Elpenor's funeral rite is a symbol of loss through death; it takes its meaning from the emotion of grief. Someone unable to feel as he should feel after Elpenor's death, in participating in this ceremony is enabled, not only to feel grief, but to bring together and give some structure to his own and his society's beliefs about what is cause for grief. And it would seem quite feasible for this to occur through the emphasis on certain aspects of Elpenor's character and life, since these are chosen from beliefs already held. Even the person who already feels sadness on the death of Elpenor understands his sadness better and relates it to other sadnesses through this experience: the feeling becomes universalized rather than private; his knowledge of what to feel is increased. A funeral rite is chosen, Scruton says, "as a work of art might be chosen, as the appropriate sign of ends that cannot all be clearly stated, and which are not, in any real sense pursued, . . . We have here an instance of practical knowledge, of the ability to achieve order where there might have been chaos."[15]

In the experience of listening to music, there is indeed something very similar to what Scruton describes. What differs is the element of participation that seems to be present in the funeral rite. But the activity of "practising" feeling an emotion is quite possible where one is an audience or an observer. In fact, it is likely that

many parts of the funeral ritual for Elpenor were to be watched or heard by the mourners. Certainly that is the case in contemporary Western rites. But as long as people experience the ceremony as symbolic of the emotion that is appropriate to the occasion, they may practise the emphasis in imagination of certain qualities of the deceased, with the result of eventually participating in the appropriate feeling. Scruton himself makes a more direct connection between art and knowledge of what to feel in a paragraph discussing architecture. "It is," he says, "possible that our enjoyment of the work will involve us in thoughts about other things." For example, he says, a funeral monument refers to, or is reminiscent of things that are not described, things like grief, or eternity or transcience, "or to something one knows not what."[4] (Notice that the theme of one's inability to describe his knowledge is present with both the art work and the ceremonial rite.) The implication is that one is experiencing "something one knows not what" because the work is an analogue for that state of mind; that one holds certain universal aspects of life before the mind (transcience, eternity), ignoring others and feels the affective qualities that they imply, perhaps envisioning future possible events or actual past events.

"The ability to participate imaginatively in future experience is one of the aims of aesthetic education," Scruton claims.[5] Here he connects aesthetic taste to the practical knowledge of knowing what it will be like to

fulfil one's aim, a form of knowledge which, he says, is intrinsically practical and also incipiently aesthetic. But we do not need to accept or investigate this part of his argument to follow the train of thought which suggests that knowledge of what to feel in future life experiences may result from an activity like listening to music, participating in a funeral rite or looking at a monument. It is done through imagination, where various objects for the same emotion are compared (life experiences, real or hypothetical), where the relevant affective quality in such imagined experiences is emphasized to the exclusion of other aspects or other affective qualities, where one envisions future situations and the way one should feel in such situations in order to be happy. (One's grief makes one happy in this sense, because it leads to an orderly, fulfilled life where one does not suffer either guilt or confusion about his actions or feelings. In so doing, one will choose courage and friendliness over cowardice and hostility because the satisfactions they make possible are intrinsically desirable.)[11]

The notion that one may, by visualizing possible situations and possible relevant emotions, come to some decision as to what to aim for in order to achieve happiness, lends itself to criticism on the grounds of whether happiness, even as described by Scruton, is a desirable end. What one may visualize is the derision of friends on one's taking a courageous stand against the

majority of one's society, and therefore choose an opposite action and feeling. Happiness, according to Scruton, seems to lie in the acceptance of the mores of one's society and the ability to react to events in ways condoned by that society.[9] We do not need to go so far from our own society as that strange culture where "a child dumped on the ground is seized and eaten by a leopard [and] the mother is delighted; [and where] an old woman falls down the mountain side because she is blind so a crowd gathers to laugh at her distress."[10] (Should we, living in such a society, then be delighted or laugh in such situations?) Even our modern, very loosely structured culture provides examples of appropriate behavior or feeling which, if ignored or flouted, would be considered worthy of censure by others, but which due consideration could show to be morally wrong. Yet imagining situations in the light of our beliefs about those situations is the saving grace of Scruton's notion, for this enables us to see that true happiness (or in this case, self-respect) may lie in going against the conventions of society. Thus, if the condition of moving within a common culture is excluded, the notion of the education of intentional understanding in the realm of emotions is still valid.

The idea of practising an emotion is uncongenial on many grounds: it suggests an inauthenticity for any reaction we might have to insults, death, poisonous snakes, winning a lottery or the return of an absent friend; it suggests that

training [illegible] equivalent to educating, for this is how the activity aspect of knowledge of an emotion is seemingly acquired. But both these reservations are answered by the realization that activity and intentional understanding work together - that one affects the other and vice versa. It is one's understanding that the snake is harmful that affects one's ability to be afraid; it is the act of fearing (emphasizing the snake's harmful qualities) that affects our understanding of the snake as harmful. However, the success of practising an emotion, when one knows [illegible] one should feel but cannot, is questionable empirically. Why can I never, no matter how many funerals I attend, grieve for the deceased in the authentic way that I can months later when I think of some small incident or go to some place where I shall no longer see that person? But when I do feel what I could not feel at a funeral, it seems to be because I do the sort of imagining that Scruton indicates: I emphasize the saddening aspects of my memories of the one who has died. Thus it must be emphasized that it is not the practising of the outward manifestations of fear or grief or anger that is the key, but the repetition, by an effort of will, of chosen imagined affective aspects of the object of the emotion we should have. The activity that helps us learn what to feel is primarily the mental activity of imagining.

Thus through the imagining of possible situations, one modifies or clarifies his beliefs. This is the education of the understanding of what one should feel. Beliefs form the

intentional object for emotion, so that when images reflecting beliefs are concentrated in a ritual activity such as a funeral rite, the emotion itself is modified or refined through its experience. This is the education of the activity aspect of feeling. Scruton would no doubt allow that during a ritual activity, one might also visualize possible situations asking oneself, as he says, "How would [I] . . then feel about [my] life and circumstances?" In fact this seems a most likely occasion for this sort of imagining. This means that the ritual activity serves not only to educate the activity of feeling but also the understanding of what to feel. With this slight modification, the educational process that Scruton describes now closely parallels the learning activity and achievement that takes place when one listens to music with emotion. All that is required is the substitution of the act of listening to music for the ritual ceremony (funeral, wedding, thanksgiving, etc.). The listener hears the music as symbolic of an affective quality (just as the funeral is symbolic of affective qualities associated with a death); he draws together in imagination, situations which evoke that affective quality and experiences the appropriate emotion (the education of the activity of feeling); he visualizes possibilities and inevitabilities in his own life and that of other human beings, and in so doing answers for himself the question of how he would or must feel in those circumstances (the education of the understanding aspect of

how to feel). The result of this conceptualising is understanding in Moravcsik's sense of the understanding [illegible] friend, a friend who cannot be described in such a way [illegible] he may be understood by propositional explanation. It [illegible] through experiencing the emotion directly that one's conceptualization of it itself and the way it fits into other aspects of one's life is developed, just as it is through actually experiencing the friend that one's understanding of him is developed.

The education of the emotions through listening to music thus may be seen as a spiraling process: understanding, emotion, imagination, conceptualization, increased understanding, refined emotion, imagination, new conceptualization, further understanding. Prior to listening to a piece of music, one has an understanding, a conceptualization of a particular emotion not only of its physical symptoms but of its place in one's personal structure of human events (its importance, under what circumstances it is the appropriate reaction, etc.). This understanding is brought to bear when one interprets the object of emotion (in this case the music): this understanding forms the intentional object of the emotion. The agent experiences the emotion and imagines in the various ways indicated. In that act, and subsequently upon reflection, he is conceptualizing and thus adjusting or changing his previous conceptualization. The result is a learning achievement, an increased or refined understanding.

This new understanding affects subsequent interpretation of the object of emotion, and therefore, the feeling itself is refined; it is a "fresh, keen emotion". The activity of feeling the emotion has been educated. Again through imagining and feeling together, one acts mentally to reconceptualize, and increased understanding is the result.

Learning what to feel, in the imaginative act of choosing what to aim for and thus choosing what feelings to value, involves a self-consciousness that might not be apparent in simply choosing certain ends and deciding on the means to achieve those ends, for in imagining what it would be like to be in given situation, we must be aware of our own reactions - as individuals, as members of a culture and as human beings. To understand a snake as being an object of fear rather than a challenge to one's own aggressive urges (and thus not an object of fear at all, but of a kind of excited happiness in the possibility of vanquishing a rather small foe) or to see the fallen blind woman as an object of pity rather than of laughter, requires this kind of self-consciousness.

Iris Murdoch's notion of "attention .. a just and loving, gaze directed at an 'individual' reality"[1] turns a similar consciousness to others - as individuals, as members of a common culture, as fellow human beings. Both Murdoch and Scruton see such consciousness as lying at the root of moral choice. Neither believes in the validity of the empty, arbitrary, totally private decision that the existentialists

emphasize. Both insist on the exercise of imagination in what is rather a slow piecemeal process of gradually increasing understanding.[12]

(ii) Self-understanding

The place of imagination in the education of the emotions becomes more and more apparent. We have seen that imagination is essential to learning what to feel. Supposing, however, that one has a fairly strong sense of what to feel and is in fact able to react with appropriate feeling to various experiences (this may well be the rule rather than the exception), the understanding that one might expect to gain from experiencing emotion while listening to music is of two kinds, understanding of oneself and understanding of others. Self-understanding itself divides into two kinds: the first is quite basic; it is the clarification of emotional experience. The second is perhaps more complex, being the connecting and structuring of one's experience into a meaningful whole, the "order where there might have been chaos."

Music stands as an analogue for feeling, much as ceremonial rites do. In listening to music, we re-experience in imagination certain events in our lives that are the "real" reason for whatever emotion we feel when experiencing the symbol of that affective event and other similar events. Because we are one step removed from the original situation, we may concentrate on certain aspects of it, minimizing or excluding others that are extraneous to the feeling. In

re-experiencing emotions in the context of listening to music, they are "no longer dark and impenetrable powers; they become, as it were, transparent,"[53] for the less one understands one's feelings, the more one is their prey; and experiencing emotion through music or other art helps to correct the impoverishment that is the result of "the tyranny of a few repetitive, blinkering, undiscriminating emotions."[54]

The other way that listening to music develops self-understanding may be seen in the way that, as a symbol, it allows us to relate several experiences of the same emotion. As well, seemingly dissimilar experiences may be connected, for the symbolism in art may unite them at some deeper emotional level of meaning.[55] Reference has already been made to Wollheim's notion of mental connectedness and its effect on a person's success in achieving a sense of wholeness in his life. Experientially remembering, for Wollheim, means re-experiencing what has happened in the past, including its affective aspect. Such a memory has its effect on present experience, influencing our interpretation of its affective aspect, and the present experience is onwardly transmitted to future experience in similar fashion. In subsequent returning to memories of past experience, the affective aspect may be altered by the later experiences, but all are bound together into a kind of pattern or form that can be changed and modified but is, as Wollheim says, "of a piece."[56] An example of such

structuring of experience is in the description of listening to Strauss' Four Last Songs over a period of several years. Through the experience of listening to this music, various personal experiences are brought together, the one influencing the other and a universalized idea of what is symbolized in the music is formed through personal experience (in this instance, loss through death or other endings in relationships). As new life experiences occur, they become part of an ever-changing pattern that we have given to our understanding of an emotion; we are thus prevented from looking at our affective experiences in a merely habitual way.[57] Wollheim comments that when one has no conscious knowledge of the past influencing him, he is actually being influenced unduly by the past because he has no control over it.[58] Thus listening to music can make conscious our structuring of our lives, a process which takes place through imagination, by the connecting of experientially remembered affective experiences.

(iii) Understanding the Feelings of Others

Tolstoy believes that art unites mankind. "Every art causes those to whom the artist's feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the artist and also with all who receive the same impression."[59] Such a statement is compatible with the thesis that music provides a valuable learning achievement through the experience of emotion, an achievement that is an understanding of man's affective nature. Emotion, as we have seen, is a public phenomenon

that is discussed in some manner among individuals, and the emotions of one person in our experience may be compared with those of another in another experience. Monroe Beardsley interprets this position to mean simply this, "If two people listen to the same music .. in so far as they have learned to make similar responses, they share an experience. All shared experience helps to bring people together in mutual respect."[6] But there is much more to the position than would appear from Beardsley's interpretation. Certainly, if you and I attend the same performance and are moved in much the same way, we will feel that we have shared an experience. The same would be true if we watched the same football game or drove the same icy highway. But the mutual understanding or sympathy that is gained from listening to music is not merely the sharing of the experience of the music. In fact, we may not listen to the same music at all. Yet you might find you understand me better because you have experienced emotion while listening to music, and I, listening to something quite different, might find that the sounds have given me, through their symbolic nature, an understanding of an aspect of you that I had not, until this time appreciated. It is not that we necessarily understand the same quality in each other, so much as that we understand each other better in an all-over way.

Let us return to the example of sad music: sad music is the focus for my emotion of sadness; all sorts of saddening experiences from my life may parade through my imagination

as the notional object for my emotion; but I may also imagine experiences that have not, but might possibly occur in my life, or experiences that I know to have occurred in your life; I may relate my own experiences to each other in a way that I never have before, but I may also relate your experiences to mine or to sadness itself, because by imagining your situation, I emphasize its particular affective quality and thus practise the feeling of sadness associated with it. By imagining possible situations and newly realizing how I would feel should such a situation occur, I am gaining an understanding of how those who have already experienced such a situation must feel. I am beginning to develop a universal picture of sadness that relates not just to my own personal experience but to those of all men everywhere. With such a sympathetic view of my fellows, ~~it~~ seems unlikely that I could exist comfortably in that strange society where people gather to laugh at an old blind woman who has fallen, for I would understand in a more than academic way what it would be to be weak and confused, to feel alone and to suffer the scorn of others. But I would also know from understanding the feelings of others, when indignation for someone's plight, when anger at lack of concern, when scorn for callousness would be my emotion. Understanding the feelings of others means not only that I react sympathetically, but that I react appropriately according to my understanding of the feeling of the other. And from an understanding of this reaction as well, I

further develop the form I have begun to create, the form that is a universalized picture of sadness, and which now begins to merge into other feelings like anger and scorn. A quotation by Jacob Bronowski sums up this kind of understanding of emotion:

> Every human personality is unique, but it is unique because it contains within itself a special arrangement of all those things that we all share. And what a work of art does is catch some single opening, some facet of the kaleidoscope, which acts as a door .. We understand not just this person and that person but the whole human predicament.''

(iv)Summary

The education of the emotions involves both understanding and activity. This occurs in the following manner:

1. By imagining possible situations and the resultant feelings associated with those situations, one develops a sense of what one should aim for (what one should feel) in order to attain happiness or self-respect or a fulfilled life: this requires both a self-consciousness and a similar attention to the feelings of others.
2. By selective imagining, that is, by emphasizing certain aspects of memories and hypothetical situations, one may 'practise' feeling.
3. One's practice of feeling influences what one's reaction will be to an imagined situation where one is

determining one's aims, but one's beliefs that come out of such imagined situations will also determine the selection of details of events that are emphasized when one imagines the kind of experiences that involve the practice of an emotion.

4. A symbolic object for emotion allows one to experience feelings in just such a selective way, to imagine possible situations and the experiences of others, thus bringing together instances of an emotion in one's mind. This facilitates the drawing together, structuring, and generalizing that take place in conceptualizing feelings. Music is such a symbolic object.
5. The result of education of both the understanding and activity of feeling is self-understanding in the form of clarification and structuring of one's own emotions, and understanding of others in the form of sympathy as well as an appropriate emotion towards a given behavior on the part of others. Such understanding may be partly determined by one's social mores, but is also an individual matter and a matter of universal life experiences like birth and death.

NOTES

1 J. M. Moravcsik, "Understanding", Dialectica 33 (1979) p.207.

2 But 'knowing' could be seen this way. Interesting, if not significant to this discussion, that in English, we have infinitive verbs 'to know' and 'to understand', each with a present participle and gerund, but although we have a noun 'knowledge' corresponding to the verb 'know', there is no corresponding noun for the verb 'understand'.

3 Moravcsik, "Understanding", p. 203, emphasis added.

4 ibid. p. 209.

5 ibid. pp. 201-202.

6 ibid. p. 201.

7 ibid. p. 205.

8 ibid. p. 206.

9 ibid. p. 207. This is interestingly close to Scruton's use of "seeing as". See note 24.

10 ibid. p. 203.

11 ibid. p. 207.

12 ibid. p. 207.

13 ibid. p. 206 and 208.

14 ibid. p. 209.

15 ibid. p. 205.

16 ibid. p. 207.

17 ibid. p. 210.

18 ibid. p. 211.

19 ibid. p. 211.

20 ibid. p. 205

21 C.B.C. interview with Theresa Stratas (see Chapter 1).

22 Stephen Sondheim, lyrics, West Side Story, (Music by Leonard Bernstein).

23 Iris Murdoch. The Sacred and Profane Love Machine.

24 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1974) p. 208 ff.

25 Moravcsik, "Understanding", p. 212.

26 Moravcsik, "Understanding", pp. 212-213.

27 Roger Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", Explaining Emotions, ed. Amelie Oksenburg Rorty, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 529.

28 Scruton, Art and Imagination, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974) p. 240.

29 Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 523.

30 ibid. p. 530.

31 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1979), p. 240, and "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p.530.

32 Roger Scruton, "Reason and Happiness", Nature and

Conduct, ed. R.S. Peters, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures VIII (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975), p.160.

33 Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 531.

34 ibid. p. 524 and p. 525.

35 ibid. p. 523.

36 P. D. James, A Mind to Murder, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), p. 17.

37 Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 520.

38 ibid. p. 524.

39 R.W. Hepburn, "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion," Education and the Development of Reason, ed. R.F. Deardon, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972), p. 485.

40 Scruton, "Reason and Happiness", p. 160.

41 Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common

Culture", p. 524 and p. 525.

42 Scruton, "Reason and Happiness", p. 156.

43 Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 529.

44 ibid. p. 529.

45 Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 536.

46 Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture, p. 187.

47 ibid. p. 243.

48 Scruton, "Reason and Happiness", p. 156.

49 See Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture, p. 246, and "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 531.

50 Anthony Storr in The Observer quoted by Christopher Cherry, "Agreement, Objectivity, and the Sentiment of Humanity in Morals", Nature and Conduct, p. 83.

51 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, (London: Routledge

& Kegan Paul, 1970) p. 34.

52 See ibid. p. 37, and Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture, p. 46, and "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", p. 534.

53 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 147.

54 Hepburn, "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion", p. 488.

55 Jerome Bruner, On Knowing, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), p.63.

56 Richard Wollheim, "On Persons and Their Lives", Explaining Emotions, ed. Amelie Oksenburg Rorty, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p.307.

57 Hepburn, "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion", p.485.

58 ibid. p. 314.

59 Leo N. Tolstoy, What Is Art?, trans. Aylmer Maude, (Indianapolis: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1960), p.149.

60 Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1958), p.575.

61 J. Bronowski, The Visionary Eye, ed. Piero E. Ariotti in collaboration with Rita Bronowski, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p.122.

CHAPTER 6

Schooling and the Education of the Emotions

The opening chapter suggests that the approach to the teaching of music followed in schools is at odds with the approach to music taken by adults. The suggestion is that, as adults, we find some significance in music that we do not pass on to children, but instead struggle ourselves to understand with varying degrees of success. This significance of music that we ourselves have missed experiencing as children is its symbolism of affective qualities. What we seek is a broad human understanding, of ourselves and others, derived from the understanding of human emotion. This understanding consists in the experience of emotion and reflection on the experience, both of which may be obtained in the presence of the symbol of that emotion (music). Chapter Five indicates that the emotions are educable, that if such an education is deliberately acquired, a good way to acquire it is through the experience of listening to music.

A person whose emotions are cultivated through education is no more a finished product than is a person whose rationality is cultivated through education. The education of the emotions is an ongoing process: understanding increases; it is broadened and deepened. A

person whose emotions are educated is someone who knows how to feel and who, by imagining the circumstances of others, can feel what others feel. He is someone who can respond increasingly appropriately to the situations he encounters in life, and who can understand why others respond as they do. A person who is educated emotionally is familiar with this own feelings in such a way that he is not their victim. He is increasingly able to understand his feelings, relating one feeling to another and all to the life experiences that are his.

How is such an education achieved in the classroom? Specific techniques cannot be described here. But surely a haphazard approach is not indicated. Neither is the present emphasis on music performance, although preformance is important. Essential is an environment conducive to emotion. Where showing emotion or talking about it is thought "silly", little progress can be made. Secondly, more listening to music with less visual stimulation would seem to be in order. When our vision is directed towards specific images, as in Walt Disney's Fantasia, the imagination is used differently. Although understanding of emotion may be the result of such a visual/aural experience, it is possible to become so absorbed in the pictures or stories that the relation between any emotion associated with the music-story and personal life experience is not explored. In other words, children need the chance to develop their imaginations in order to develop understanding of emotion.

If such development of the imagination begins with imagining fantasy pictures, it would seem that the step must soon be taken to that of emphasizing the affective quality that the music symbolizes. The teacher, instead of asking, "What do you think of when you listen to this music?" must say, "How does this music make you feel?" To do this, some understanding of the symbolism of the sounds must be present. If the answer to the first question is, "It makes me think of the hockey game last night," when the music is obviously slow and dreamy, then either the hockey game was particularly dull, or the student does not understand the symbolism of the music. It is the shared meaning of a symbol that counts, and this probably comes about by talking about the feelings that the music evokes, in spite of the difficulty in articulating the experience. One other way of coming to understand the affective meaning of music at a very basic level is to move to music. Of course, one suspects that there is enough natural symbolism present that school-aged children are not apt to mistake lullabies for marches, but the act of listening for an affective quality rather than imagining just anything at all does require encouragement. With more mature students, it might be possible to talk about the affective qualities of the music in much the same fashion as the experience of Strauss' Four Last Songs was analysed in Chapter Five. Just as analysing a poem does not necessarily ruin the poem for future reading, neither would analysing the affective qualities of a piece

of music necessarily ruin it for future listening. However, the difficulty is the same in both cases: the problem of expressing feelings in words tends to result in the trivializing of the experience.

A wide variety of music is necessary for listening: not just symphonic music, not just currently popular music, not just simple music. Short excerpts of complex music are just as suitable as "children's songs". Music that can be understood on a very shallow level may later be understood at a deeper level. This is a part of the education of the emotions, as we saw in the examples of the Four Last Songs. Whatever the kind of music, in order to gain education of the emotions, the music must be understood as an object for emotion; i.e., it must be judged saddening, cheering, exciting, etc. But this does not mean that all listening to music must be for the sole purpose of evoking and educating the emotions. At present, however, very little listening to music is done at all, and the emphasis is not apt to be of the sort just described.

Emphasis in school music programs tends to be on performance; a tangential effect of training on a musical instrument or singing in a choir may be the experience of the emotions symbolized by the music one is performing, but this is not necessarily the case. We have noted that the actor in a play may pretend, in fact that some pretense is necessary in order to maintain technical control over the effect he wishes to achieve and that a performer of music

must have the same control. What must be emphasized in teaching children to play musical instruments or sing is the effect they are trying to create in the audience, whether it is excitement or tranquility, joy or sadness. This effect is attained by technical mastery of the music being performed, but technical mastery of the notes, tone and rhythm is not enough in itself. It is how these are used that makes a performance affective. Many teachers of instrumental and choral music stress the use of technical excellence to communicate affective qualities in preformance, but probably just as many do not.

To change the approach in this regard is a matter of a change in teacher training, but to introduce more listening to music in the music classroom is a much more difficult task. The traditional attitude of viewing music as a "frill" subject and of concentrating on concerts and performance competitions will not be changed without changing the outlook of principals, parents, and other staff members, not to mention the students themselves. To listen to music in a classroom in the way that one reads a book or watches a film is an almost unimaginable situation. It is possible to integrate a small amount of listening into a choral music or band class, but it is difficult because of the pacing of the lesson, which is of more importance in this situation than in the teaching of a mathematics or Social Studies class due to the strong "training" component. Again, emphasis on a listening program in music courses in Faculties of Education

would facilitate a change.

Is the current performance approach to teaching music necessarily wrong? Could not learning of emotion by listening to music and learning to perform music go together? Yes, if we are saying that performance and listening are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that listening is not simply a way of enhancing performance skills. However, along with the emphasis on performance is the motive of socialization. A school band or a school operetta production serves as a small scale model for certain ideals prevalent in our society. The first is the motive of competition. One competes for prestigious positions and defends them, sometimes by dubious means, against all comers. The second is the emphasis on success by standards that are publicly measurable: the virtuoso technique, the smooth production, etc. To be seen to be a "star" in the group is as important as being a star. Since such behaviour is not only prevalent in our society but favored by large segments of it, it might be claimed that the attitude to performance in school music programs serves well to adapt students to the society in which they will function. But self-serving individualism is, in all repects, counter to the kind of socialization based on human understanding that is the subject of these chapters: through the experience of listening to music with emotion one better understands not only oneself as an individual but also others and one's relation to others; and in learning to feel

as one should feel, consideration of others is essential in determining what, ultimately, will result in happiness. Thus the current prevalent attitudes to performance in school music classes cannot co-exist with the educational aims of listening to music outlined here. The norm should be co-operation, not competition, treating others as friends rather than rivals, appreciation of the failures and successes of others and an expectation of like treatment from them (a situation that is in fact the case in the best school programs). As far as performance itself is concerned, emphasis should be on the communication of affective qualities to the audience. Technical prowess should not be an end in itself, but a means to the end of evoking emotion through the music, so that the audience participates in the learning activity that results in understanding emotions through their experience. Competition for position in bands and lead roles in operettas cannot be abandoned; it is the only way to assure an enjoyable quality of performance, i.e., one that evokes emotion without the distraction of wrong notes and out-of tune playing or singing. But the criteria for choosing will not be simply technical virtuosity, but the ability to use this to affect an audience. It will, as well, include an ability to work with others as a group, to blend with their sounds in order to create the best over-all affective performance (such an understanding of others may well be the result of the kind of learning achievement that comes from listening to music).

The task of the teacher, school, staff and parents in the production of concerts and the preparation for festivals is no different; it should be to create something that will affect the audience, not by amazing them with feats of skill, but by using that skill to move them, thus increasing their understanding of emotion. If such an approach is used in the performance of music, it need not conflict with the important learning experience gained from listening to music, an experience which is now almost totally absent from music programs.

As for the attitude among some educators that music (and the other arts) are a mere diversion from the "important" subjects, a relief from the serious business of learning, this position cannot be accepted if it is believed that listening to music provides an important learning achievement, i.e. the understanding of emotion through its experience. Learning through listening to music can be fun, and so can any other learning activity, but it is not on that account to be trivialized.

But is there any good reason to educate the emotions by listening to music, or, for that matter, to educate the emotions at all? The first part of the question is fairly simple: imagined experience is much easier and less painful than actual experience. More can be experienced in imagination than could ever occur in a lifetime, and without the irreversibility of actual experience. One can learn what one should feel and do in a given situation without actually

making the mistakes of reacting in a way that one might regret. Music is a facilitator of the act of imagining much as a ritual ceremony is.

But why educate the emotions at all? In a society where all life seems to hang in a precarious balance, perhaps one should steel oneself against any sort of emotion. Tender feelings make one vulnerable, anger [illegible] someone in a responsible position could trigger the end of civilization, however justified such anger might be. Yet it is precisely because of the desperate plight of our civilization that it is imperative we not be the victims of our own little-understood emotions, and at the risk of being vulnerable to the insensitivity of others, it is increasingly necessary to be able understand their feelings and why they react as they do in particular situations. At a time when Europeans had little contact with their fellow human beings in Africa, Asia, or North America, they could afford (although at the expense of the indigenous people) to view them as exotic creatures with few of the sensitivities they themselve possessed. To see others as much like ourselves, with similar feelings and similar causes for those feelings is to begin to understand how to co-exist with other races, nationalities, and those who differ mentally or physically from the norm in our own culture. It is not just a matter of sympathy, or of excusing unacceptable behaviour; it is a matter of learning the appropriate emotional response. To react quickly with

indignation to instances of callous or cruel behavior is as important as feeling sympathy for the victim. In sum, education of the emotions, involving as it does the pursuit of personal and universal happiness through the understanding of one's own affective nature, the affective nature of others, and what emotions are appropriate in what situations, is an important part of moral education.

Particularly with the notion of learning what to feel, the dreaded word 'indoctrination' threatens an ideal of humanization through music. Probably the picture that comes to most minds is the blind fervor of Nazi youth, raised on stirring martial music. With music, the truth of what is presented is not at issue. If the music evokes feelings of pride, courage or camaraderie, it is as true as those emotions are "true". The question is when are such feelings appropriate, and the answer, which is an explanation of the intentional object for emotion, is a statement based on one's beliefs about what is worthy of proud and courageous acts, and who is a worthy comrade. Music, of itself, cannot indoctrinate but it can give emphasis to chosen beliefs through the listener's practising the emotions associated with those beliefs. It is therefore a dangerous tool indeed in the hands of the indoctrinator.

All that has been said here indicates a position for music as promoter of autonomy, as a significant, perhaps essential way in which each of us can, through imagination, understand ourselves as human beings, and thus our human

condition. Because of its danger in the hands of the indoctrinator, or even the commercial manipulator (witness the music carefully chosen for supermarkets), it is important that educators stress the students' personal exploration of the intentional objects for their emotions held while listening to music, and that they neither impose a narrow range of music literature nor their own beliefs on their students.

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