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LIVED MEANING AND DIALOGICAL SEMIOGENETICS:  
AN INTERSUBJECTIVE-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH  
TO THE GENESIS OF MEANING

by

MIKIO FUJITA

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy.

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

Edmonton, Alberta  
Spring 1992



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
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
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
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
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
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Dedicated

To the Memory of  
Nagato Fujita (1923--1984)

## ABSTRACT

In this thesis, *Lived meaning* is defined as meaning that is actually felt in our experiences. Through a research approach called *dialogical semiogenetics*, the study explored how this lived meaning emerges.

In part 1, the following three methodological orientations of semiogenetics are explicated through an examination of the notions of *lived experience* and *lifeworld*:

- 1) to regard the constitution of meaning from an *intersubjective perspective*;
- 2) to acknowledge the *multiplicity and the historicity of lifeworlds* of different individuals and societies;
- 3) to recognize *meaning and experience as equiprimordial*, as articulations of the world--each unable to be derived from the other.

Next, related notions such as *meaning systems*, *apothegms*, and *social and personal lifeworlds* are introduced and reformulated; and three levels of semiogenetic analyses are explored. From the intersubjective-evolutionary perspective, all meaning systems and apothegms have origins in concrete and contextual lived meanings at some points in human (pre)history.

Part 2 of this dissertation starts the semiogenetic analysis at the macroscopic level to identify and illustrate such apothegms, or higher-order meaning systems, of how we feel, think, or act. The meaning systems of body, language, domestication, writing, and religion are analyzed as apothegms of premodern origins in human (pre)history.

Next, the Enlightenment-Scientific, the Romantic-Historical, and the Critical-Emancipatory apothegms are explicated.

Part 3 of the study provides examples of semiogenetic analysis at the microscopic level, recapturing the genesis and development of lived meaning. The first example concerns the lived meaning of the mountain hike. It illustrates the various dimensions of the contextuality of the lived meaning. The second example, of a girl's experience of reading a book, highlights the genesis of lived meaning. The third example, of mountain climbing of a child with her parents, emphasize the pedagogical aspect in the intersubjective constitution of lived meaning.

As a summary, a conceptual framework of semiogenetics is added. Semiogenetics is an attempt to see each concrete lived meaning in its particular contextuality and, at the same time, to relate it to the diverse lived meanings and meaning systems that have emerged in the entire human history.

## Preface

This study of lived meaning took a long time to take the present shape. I would like to show how I have come to conceive of the topic of lived meaning.

About 15 years ago, I became interested in the topic of human motivation and interest. I studied psychological theories such as achievement motivation, intrinsic motivation, intellectual curiosity, and attribution, and also the time-honoured notions of emotion and will. Perhaps without being explicitly aware then, I was looking for a concept of psychological force or mechanism that would explain any sort of human interest in general.

During my graduate study at the University of Tokyo, I was introduced to phenomenology and came to consider the human experience as the constitution of the world. Consciousness is understood as intentional and not simply a reflection of the outer world in phenomenology. The world as we experience it is not simply there for everyone to see, but the world appears to us as we constitute it, whether this "we" is the transcendental ego as Husserl thought, or the living, embodied self as Merleau-Ponty depicted.

The human phenomenon of being interested in something was now formulated as the question of the meaning of this experience. I learned theories of meaning formation and meaning-giving in phenomenology. However, Husserl seemed to treat meanings as idealities of concepts from the perspective of the transcendental consciousness, and Schutz seemed to take the retrospective regard of reflection over past action as

the agent of meaning giving. There are many insights in Merleau-Ponty but no systematic description of meaning.

My topic emerged as that of lived meaning in a paper published in 1982. At this point I was perhaps vaguely thinking that *lived meaning* is a special mode of meaning in experience. I did not question, or feel the need to describe, the constitution of experience or meaning itself.

With such an orientation, I started my Ph.D. programme in 1983 at the University of Alberta with the hope of developing a theory of lived meaning within the scope of traditional phenomenology represented by Husserl, Schutz, and Merleau-Ponty. As my work continued, I came to realize the three points that had been previously unclear to me and that changed the orientation of my research accordingly.

First, I came to recognize that the style of lived meaning is different depending on the nature of the object of meaning, or more precisely, according to the world in which lived meaning emerges. For example, my lived meaning of a painting is different from my lived meaning of a political event. Because there are myriads of different things and events, it might seem that there are as many different and unique lived meanings as things and events, objects and ideas. But the numerous lived meanings in religious experience, for instance, are qualitatively different from also numerous lived meanings in the aesthetic world or in the political world. By attending to this difference of the worlds in which a lived meaning takes place, it seemed possible to articulate the unmanageable multitudes of different lived meanings into a manageable theory. I had been familiar already with relevant articulations of the

world by Schutz (1967; 1970; 1974) and Spranger (1922). The problem remained, however, as to how to evaluate different theories and identify the different worlds which they termed the *regions of reality*, and the *forms of life*.

Second, I came to believe that the style or form of lived meaning is different according to the difference in the experiencer. Perhaps my prolonged stay in Canada, and my encounters with many people with various backgrounds, encouraged me to think that lived meaning of a same object can be radically different depending on which society the experiencer has come from, depending on the background against which the lived meaning emerges. The multitudes of lived meanings can be better understood through the social and historical background that one carries. Yet, if this recognition was received with the historicist resignation that each society has its own unique style of experiences, it might have rendered a general theory of lived meaning impossible. Instead of a theory of lived meaning, my study could have ended up with a particular pattern of lived meanings in a group of people or an individual, specific to time and place.

The same difficulty could have happened in the developmental direction. I knew that the mode or style of lived meanings in children are different from that in adults. This is obvious to people who live and interact with children everyday, even though traditional phenomenology did not acknowledge this dimension. But my interest was not in the specialness of the world of a particular age-group or a developmental stage. Rather, I was interested in how to establish a theory of lived

meaning itself that is obviously different according to the developmental stage, without falling into the relativistic descriptions about the particularities of those differences.

Third, I have come to consider the lifeworld in a pluralistic sense. This means two things. On the one hand, I think the real lifeworlds are undoubtedly different according to many factors such as the particular styles of lived meanings in the different worlds, or the social background or the developmental stage in which the subject is situated. The Husserlian notion of the universal and transcendental subject no longer seemed tenable to me. This is basically a logical consequence of the above two points. On the other hand, I have come to consider the lifeworld of a person, or almost any person to be precise, as heterogeneous. Instead of having a homogeneous and consistent structure, a lifeworld seems to consist of radically different and incompatible layers or realms of meaning. For example, I can react bodily sexually, religiously, aesthetically, or economically to a painting.

The present dissertation is an attempt to formulate an answer to present of the meaning of lived meaning. My argument in a nutshell goes as follows. While each lifeworld is different and unique, the incompatible layers in the person's lifeworld can be roughly identified. Each of these layers provide a unique perspective on how we feel, think, and act meaningfully--how we make sense of the world. We can also identify the different and incompatible layers in the shared lifeworld of a group of persons, or the layers in the lifeworld of a society. We commonly call this shared lifeworld of a society *culture*. Now a layer in the social lifeworld



and a corresponding layer in an individual's lifeworld may be alike and compatible, because the latter is the product of learning of the individual in the society, while this learning process is realized through various contingent encounters with other persons in the society. This is commonly called a person's life history. What is uniquely different at one level can be similar at another level of analysis. When we look at individual persons and experiences, then each layer in the personal lifeworld is unique. But a person rarely learns all the layers available in the culture. Therefore, the layers contained in a social lifeworld usually function as the upper limit of the individual lifeworlds of the members of the society. In other words, culture serves as the stock of these layers, some of which are learned by the members of the society and are accommodated in individual lifeworlds. I call these layers of social and individual lifeworlds *meaning systems*. This holds true for adults and children, unless they happen to belong to those few individuals who creatively give rise to truly new meaning systems that had been non-existent in their society. The social lifeworld and the individual lifeworld change: the former historically and the latter developmentally. Yet the change in either case is not haphazard or conceptually unmanageable if they are studied from an evolutionary perspective.

There are various meaning systems depending on the ways we feel, think and act. Some meaning systems are similar, close, or akin to each other, while others are incompatible and unrelated meaning systems. The compatible and proximate meaning systems form meta-meaning systems which I would like to call *apothegms*. The myriads of

lived meanings can be seen to be the result of the evolution of human meaning. From the anthropological perspective, apothegms can be identified as meta-meaning systems which have emerged in the human history and which still have strong bearings on how we make sense of the world. Apothegms and the layers of meaning in the lifeworld of a particular society stand in a similar relation to the divisions between the meaning systems of a society and those of an individual in the society. Apothegms serve as the upper limit of the meta-meaning systems of any society. From the anthropological perspective, all the different ways and modes of meaning can be seen as a huge evolutionary process of human meaning.

My answer to the question of lived meaning is a research approach which I call *semiogenetics*, a study of the genesis and development of meaning, the process I call *semiogenesis* for short. At its macroscopic level of analysis semiogenetics strives to articulate the evolution of apothegms, the meta-meaning systems that have anthropological relevance, that is the possibility to influence the ways of making sense of all the people once it becomes a part of their lifeworlds. Instead of relying on an ontology proposed by one of the famous thinkers, semiogenetics needs to identify and describe higher order meaning systems. At its microscopic level of analysis, semiogenetics is concerned with, and tries to understand and describe lived meaning in the smallest example in its uniqueness and concreteness. At its mesoscopic level of analysis, semiogenetics endeavors to understand

and describe the lived meanings of a group of people and the meaning systems in the shared lifeworld.

The thrust of semiogenetics, if there is any, is the attempt to see the emergence and development of a concrete and unique lived meaning of an individual or society in relation to other lived meanings against the background of the tapestry of the evolution of human meaning. From the semiogenetic standpoint, the goal of understanding lived meaning, such as a work of art, a person, a thought, a social institution, a realm of meaning, a historical event, a society, or whatever trace of human experience and meaning, is tantamount to see the particular and unique form in which the evolution of human meaning has been condensed, sedimented, selectively accommodated, localized, and realized.

Edmonton, March 1992

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## **Introduction**

### **1. Lived Meaning**

Antoine de Saint-Exupéry tells us an episode we might witness everyday in a playground, at school, or at home.

"Look at my battleship!!" shouts a seven-year-old captain who aligned three pebbles in front of him. A man sitting beside the boy says powerlessly, "What a nice ship." But he who is dried up in the heart is not seeing the ship. (de Saint-Exupéry, 1958, p.551)

What is this seven-year-old boy experiencing? What is the boy seeing which the person who is "dried-up in the heart" is not seeing? What creates this difference in perception? How will this adult be able to understand the boy's experience? How can we better understand the experience of other persons? And what is required to understand an other person pedagogically? These are the issues that center around the question I wish to pursue in this dissertation: What is lived meaning? and how can we better understand it?

Note the subtle but crucial difference between the boy's experience and the man's experience of the three pebbles. What are commonplace and worthless pebbles in the adult's eyes may be the bow, the bridge, and the guns for the boy. The ship may be fighting the giant waves in the middle of a deadly gale or it may be gliding peacefully in a tropical bay. The boy is excited about his battleship. He would perhaps tell us such things and many more, if we were his friends. And what would he feel if somebody kicked the pebbles away, accidentally or



purposefully? Surely he would get sad or angry, for they are not just stones. To the boy, they *mean* something; they are more than just plain pebbles. And we could feel his loss if we knew what it all means to him. I would like to call what the boy is experiencing *lived meaning*.

To the grown-up man in the story, however, the pebbles are just pebbles. They don't mean much to him. Perhaps this man is kinder than some other adults who are insensitive or careless about lived meanings. At least he does not say, "Stop this nonsense, kid." Perhaps he knows that the boy is excited about the imaginary ship. The man is intellectually grasping the meaning of the ship in the boy's experience. But he is not really seeing the ship. Unlike the boy, in this man there is no *lived meaning* of a battleship.

Am I able to see the ship as the boy does? I am not sure if I can. And I am not sure if seeing the ship in the same manner as the boy does is the only way of having a lived meaning of the stones/battleship. But I do not doubt that there is lived meaning of the battleship in the boy and not in the man in the episode.

When my daughter was two years old, she had a special towel blanket without which she could not go to sleep--that shabby, shaggy, and worn-out blanket with its original design of yellow squirrels no longer distinguishable from the once-white ground which had also turned yellowish. She would cuddle it softly and endlessly, feel it lightly with her lips, and hold it between certain fingers in a very special way. The

blanket even had a name, Mon-mon Chan<sup>1</sup>. This may be a simple case of what child psychology textbooks tell us as *pet formation*. It was certainly inconvenient, as all parents know, especially when my wife and I proposed to wash it or to replace it with a new one because it was dirty in the adults' eyes. Nevertheless, it seems indubitable that *that* towel blanket was meaningful to my daughter in a very special way, although I do not know even now what exactly the blanket meant to her. My wife and I treated the blanket with care and "respect" because it was so special to our daughter. It was irreplaceable because of my daughter's lived meaning of it. A few years later, when she was about to go to her friend's house for a sleep-over, I asked her if she had put Mon-mon Chan, then a small hand towel after a few regenerations, into her bag. She told me smilingly that she did not need it with her that night but she might want it when she came home.

There are myriads of similar examples in our everyday lives and these are the kind of meanings which I wish to know in each concrete occasion when I am with children and friends. And I wish to know how lived meanings emerge in our experiences.

I would like to call them *lived meanings*<sup>2</sup> because they are actually "lived through" rather than simply thought about and also because they touch on experienced meaningfulness. "Experiential meaning" comes close as any other name for lived meaning, but it lacks the sense of

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<sup>1</sup> An original Japanese expression meaning something like "Snuggly cuddly"

<sup>2</sup> I have been trying to elaborate the notion of lived meaning for some time. See Fujita, 1985, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1989, and 1991.

livedness. For instance, the experience of the adult who could not see the battleship as the boy did in the first example has a certain meaning. It may be called an experiential meaning but not a lived meaning in the sense just distinguished.

Lived meanings are experiential; they seem different from other meanings such as dictionary definitions of words, idealities that guarantee the identity of sentences and literary work, and essences of art works, all of which seem at first to be residing outside of the process of a person's experience. Yet, it must be reminded that *not* all experiential meanings are lived meanings.

## **2. Structure of the Dissertation**

In this dissertation, I would like to explore the notion of lived meaning, how it emerges, how we can better understand it, and other related questions regarding the topic of lived meaning. The dissertation is composed of three parts and a summary. Preparatory reflections about the notion of lived meaning, and about the appropriate research approach, which will be named semiogenetics, are given in part 1. In Part 2, several higher order meaning systems that have emerged in human history are inquired into with respect to their origins. This is also a beginning of the semiogenetic analysis at its macroscopic level. In Part 3, descriptions of a few concrete cases of lived meaning are attempted. This part is an example of semiogenetic analysis at its microscopic level. As a summary, I include a conceptual framework of the notion of lived meaning.

Parts 1, 2, and 3 are the traces of my reflections on the question of lived meaning. These traces converge in the semiogenetic notion outlined in the summary. After the introduction, the three parts can be read independently in any order. The reader who wants a quick overview of the notion is advised to read the summary first and then come back to the three different paths which will recur in the notion.

## **Part 1. Lived Meaning and Semiogenetics**

In this part the notion of lived meaning and the approach to better understand it will be elaborated. First, the notions of lived experience and lifeworld, elaborated by Dilthey and Husserl respectively, both of which have a marked significance in human science research today, are examined in relation to the notion of lived meaning. Through this examination, a clearer understanding of lived meaning, and some directions in theorizing about it, are anticipated to be obtained.

Second, various forms of lived meaning are illustrated in the hope that its multiplicity may not be neglected in the attempt to conceptualize it. Also, some aspects of lived meaning such as its relation to the lifeworld and temporality are thematized.

Third, through a reflection on the pedagogical relation, the requirements of a pedagogically oriented understanding of lived meaning are elaborated. Here, the intersubjective constitution of lived meaning and the intersubjective understanding of lived meaning will be discussed.

Fourth, an outline will be presented of semiogenetics, the research approach to understand and develop a theory of lived meaning.

## 1. The Discovery of the Lived World

It was primarily through the works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1921; 1957; 1958; 1976) and Edmund Husserl (1970) that we have come to understand that the human world, as it is experienced, is different from the world which has been construed by the natural sciences since the Enlightenment. During the nineteenth century, prior to Dilthey and Husserl, there had been many questions and doubts as to the universality of scientific methods, especially when these methods and principles were applied indiscriminately to the social world. Criticism from many quarters appeared in various forms: Romantic movements in art, literature, and music that favoured passion, imagination, and emotion over reason, intellect, and order; the discovery of history as a discipline with its own principles; the evolutionary views about natural history and social developments that would replace static and timeless views of the world; and the often irrationalist philosophies that put priority upon organic forces, will, and the eventuality of life instead of upon mechanical forces, reason, and scientific causality. However, it is largely due to Dilthey and Husserl that we have come to understand the social world as a distinct world of its own requiring a set of different approaches to understand it. As if to synthesize the century-long attempts of criticisms of and revolts from the natural scientific world views, Dilthey conceived *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences) with its own epistemology, while Husserl developed phenomenology as a method to study the pre-

scientific world in which we live.<sup>1</sup> And it was also Dilthey who defined the notion of "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*) and "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*), both of which have a direct import to the topic of lived meaning.

At the basis of Dilthey's notion of human sciences, there was the recognition of the primacy of life: there is nothing behind or beyond life that we live. "Life is the prius of thought" (Dilthey, 1957, p.5). Life is not a construct of thinking; on the contrary, life is the very source and ground out of which thinking emerges. It was a clear formulation of the century-long challenges against the Kantian view of the world as the construct of the transcendental subject, against the scientific view of the human experience as the functioning of pure and practical reason, or against the pervasive Enlightenment view of the world as a set of natural and universal laws. The primacy of life meant, for Dilthey and his contemporaries, the discovery of the real human world with structures of its own that are different from the structures construed by natural scientific methods. Life cannot be reduced to a set of laws and schemes, be they logical, psychological, sociological, or biological. The human lived world is full of laughter and tears, aspirations and endeavors, tragedies and comedies, conflicts and happenings. And the life of a person or a society, the experiences of people, and their cultural works and social institutions, are markedly unique, in sharp contrast with the

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<sup>1</sup> This mood was also shared by Heinrich Rickert, who proposed "cultural sciences" (*Kulturwissenschaften*) in opposition to Dilthey, on the premise that culture is the ground instead of the personal experience. The relation between the person and the culture or society will be discussed in 2.2, in this Part 1.

anonymous atoms and molecules of natural sciences. If we do not understand the uniqueness of a person, an art work, or a society, we do not understand them at all. In contrast with the *nomothetic* natural sciences that attempt at establishing general laws of replaceable things or repeatable processes through observation and measurement, Dilthey conceived his human sciences as *idiographic*, i.e., attempting to understand the uniqueness of a person, culture, or society through intuitive, imaginative, historical, and empathic understanding.

Envisioning such a rich, colorful, and eventful world, Dilthey said, "No real blood runs in the veins of the knowing subject which Locke, Hume, and Kant constructed" (1921. p.xviii). And behind this ode for life, we might recollect Goethe's dictum that "all theory is grey; green are the trees of life." Human sciences, different sort of disciplines from previous grey theories, were given the task of finding the proper way to approach this green life without withering or killing it.

### 1.1. Lived Experience

"Lived experience" (*Erlebnis*), a key term in many of the qualitative research approaches today, came to be used widely only in the 1870's when many biographers were trying to understand and describe the lives and works of artists and novelists, musicians and politicians, and scientists and philosophers, from the perspective of life<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> "Dilthey was the first to give a conceptual function to the word [Erlebnis] that was soon to become so popular and so closely connected with such an obvious value that many European languages took it over as a loan word. But it is



It was Dilthey who first employed the term *Erlebnis* with the special import that can be still felt today. Lived experience was, according to Dilthey, the fundamental unit of the rich human life, the unit of any human experience.

First, lived experience is characterized by immediacy, vividness, or presentness, in which there is no separation between the subject and the object. If I am experiencing a beautiful natural scenery, the total "impression" simply occurs: there is no separation of this "impression" into the "I" which "has" the impression and the "object" of which the impression is (Dilthey, 1976, p.233). There is no distinction between the "content" of an awareness and the "possessor" of this content<sup>1</sup>. Lived experience is what emerges with vividness and immediacy out of the stream of life and is accompanied by the pervasive quality of feeling (*Gefühl*) (Dilthey, 1958, p.231).

Second, lived experience is a unit as a whole; it has already an articulated structure. It is not the working of single "faculty" of mind such as thinking, willing, or emotion, nor is it the influx of sensations. "Every lived experience is complexly compounded" (Dilthey, 1957, p.373). Dilthey gives an example of one lived experience of a painting which encompasses his several visits to an art gallery. The duration of one experience can stretch over time and also allows intermissions. The

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reasonable to assume that what actually happened in the life of the language was simply underlined in Dilthey's use of the term" (Gadamer, 1975, p.56).

<sup>1</sup> This is close to the notion of "physiognomic perception" (E. Straus, 1966)

exact interpretation of the painting changes through time and through his discussions with his friends who have also seen the painting. Although the "content" in each phase of his lived experience may change, his lived experience of the painting retains a unity. Going beyond the faculty psychology which had separated thinking, emotion and willing, Dilthey says, "in lived experience the processes of the whole mind work together" (1957, p.172).

Third, Dilthey's notion of lived experience always had the sense of lasting importance and significance. Although this aspect may not have been recognized by Dilthey himself, it is clearer in another derivation *das Erlebte*. It is the meaning that the word "experience" carries when we say "it was quite an experience!" Lived meaning is what can be remembered vividly, even in the future, with its impact and import, even though the precise interpretation of the original experience may change through time. Thus, lived experience is a vivid and immediate unit of lasting meaning in experience before the schisms into subject and object. It is a lasting meaning yet it is not a concept (Gadamer, 1975, p.60). As such, Dilthey's notion of lived experience is very close to the notion of meaning or meaningfulness. Yet, it is clear that not all experiences are lived experience. Lived experience is, we might say, special experience endowed with meaning.

But then, how is an experience endowed with meaning? And what is the agent of this meaning endowment? Is it the subject, the experiencer? Is it reflection, the backward consciousness of the subject over its past experiences? Or is it something else?

Unfortunately, Dilthey did not question how an ordinary experience develops into a special experience endowed with meaning, that is, lived experience. Rather, his contribution lies in that, by conceiving lived experience as always meaningful almost by definition, and by conceiving the human lived world as composed of such meaningful experiences, he envisioned the lived world as always rich in its flavor, color, and meaning before the scientific attitudes split it into subject and object. The pre-objective world was conceived as if it were already a rich and beautiful "secret flower garden" that scientism did not and could not know how to fathom. And this is the realm for the human sciences to explore, without destroying its original vividness and flavor.

## 1.2. Lifeworld

To Husserl, as well, the pre-objective world became the richest realm to be recovered. His phenomenology, with its methods of *epochés*, to bracket not only the constructs of science but also taken-for-granted notions in everyday life, was given the task of explicating this world. The early Husserl was more concerned with the static phenomenology which starts with the analysis of the primary perception in the originary field prior to the functioning of language and scientific concepts, the analysis of which he thought would reveal the structure of experience and life. Much later in his *Crisis* of 1927, Husserl approached the richness of the pre-objective world, which he called lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*). This lifeworld was to be the ultimate rockbottom, or the ground of all human activities out of which all science and philosophy emerged.

We have two different things: life-world and objective-scientific world... The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is "grounded" in the self-evidence of the life-world. The latter is pregiven to the scientific worker, or the working community, as ground; yet, as they build upon this, what is built is something new, something different. If we cease being immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we scientists are, after all, human beings and as such are among the components of the life-world which always exists for us, ever pregiven; and thus all of science is pulled, along with us, into the--merely "subjective-relative"--life-world. (Husserl, 1970, p.130)

The promised richness of the lifeworld in the sense of *our* daily lives was accomplished subsequently in many phenomenological works, by Martin Heidegger's analysis of various modes of *Dasein*, by Alfred Schutz's analysis (1967, 1975) of the structure of the lifeworld, by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of perception (1962), by Eugène Minkowski's work on lived time (1970), and by Friedrich Bollnow's study of lived space (1963). In these and other works, the promised goal of phenomenology to describe the pre-objective world has come to bear fruit. And in the Diltheyan pedigree, Spranger's articulation of the structure of life (1922) and Cassirer's articulation of culture (1944) are good examples of fresh and vivid descriptions.

### 1.3.1. First Aporia: Intersubjectivity

However, as the pre-objective world is more and more described, some *aporias* have also appeared. One of them is the question of

intersubjectivity, the question of how we understand other persons and how we are understood by them, or the question of how we are open to other beings like ourselves. The notion of intersubjectivity became extremely puzzling, especially in phenomenology which takes perception as the primary model. Merleau-Ponty described the Being-for-other as a fundamental dimension of perceiving and experiencing subject, stretching the outreach of the fundamental premise of phenomenology which takes perception as the fundamental model. Alfred Schutz in his earlier writing shelved the question of the constitution of the other person on the shoulder of phenomenological philosophy.

We shall start out by simply accepting the existence of the social world as it is always accepted in the attitude of the natural standpoint.... We shall, therefore, be bypassing a whole nest of problems whose significance and difficulty were pointed out by Husserl in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.... The question of the "meaning" of the "Thou" can be answered by carrying out the analysis which he posited in that work. (Schutz, 1967, p.97)

But later Schutz was explicitly aware of the fundamental shortcoming of the phenomenology based on the *perception model*.

Husserl's attempt to account for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity in terms of operations of the consciousness of the transcendental ego has not succeeded. It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental

sphere, but is rather a datum [givenness] (*Gegebenheit*) of the life-world. (Schutz, 1970, p.82)<sup>1</sup>

Ricoeur also made a self-criticism on his work on the voluntary and the involuntary (Ricoeur, 1966) in a similar line. His own work was:

very much subjectivistic and almost solipsistic. The work only showed a solitary person although the person was embodied and in the world... Everything begins when one will meets another will. (Ricoeur, 1978, p.241)

Today, no one would perhaps attempt to derive intersubjectivity from the Husserlian notion of transcendental subjectivity. Yet, granted that we may be ontologically open to others, the question still remains as to how this ontological openness develops into concrete understanding of other persons around us. This question will be pursued further in chapter 3 (part 1), in an effort to start a theory of lived meaning from a intersubjective perspective. Here, the inherent difficulty of the perception model in understanding other persons' experience is noted.

### 1.3.2. Second Aporia: Plurality of Lifeworlds

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<sup>1</sup> He also says: "the concept of relevances and their interdependencies [which he undertook to explore in a perception-model phenomenology] will have to be revised completely as soon as the concept of intersubjectivity is introduced." (Schutz, 1970, p.74)

The second aporia is the question of plurality of lifeworlds. It is a special feature of the notion of the lifeworld it is presumed timeless and universal.

Science is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure, both historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world of life, pregiven as *existing for all in common*. (Husserl, 1970, p.121. Italics added.)

Since the notion of lifeworld is conceived as the ultimate horizon for anyone, any time, and any place, it retains the trans-temporal/spatial character. The Husserlian lifeworld thus seems to return to abstractness just as his transcendental subject acquires a universal and a-historical character. The lifeworld is, after all, not the actual world of me or you or anybody, just as the transcendental subject cannot be identified with me, you, or any other concrete person. Because the lifeworld is conceived as the unchangeable "rock-bottom" reality from which the sciences and everyday perception is derived and against which they can be finally measured, *the* lifeworld becomes an abstract realm where transcendental subject functions.

In the more existential development of Heidegger's phenomenology, the primacy of language, and the regulative aspect that language exercises in the formation of experience, brings the notion of the lifeworld down to the actual world of lived experience. With Gadamer, the power of tradition that functions as a medium in which a text and a reader are immersed plays a central role. For him there is no

way of standing outside of the power of tradition. In other words, any understanding is guided by a pre-understanding which is given in the belonging to a tradition. Ricoeur was most adamant in the recognition that there is the world of a text, the world which is independent of the experience and meaning of the writer, and which is independent of the experience and understanding of the reader.

In the more direct Diltheyan line, the so-called history of ideas (an awkward rendering of Dilthey's *Geistesgeschichte*) is most notable in the works of Cassirer in the English-speaking world. The historicity of the pre-objective world became clearer through numerous accounts of the incommensurable systems of life and thought in different ages. Further, ethnographic monographs have shown the life ways and structures of different societies, large and small, from modern to tribal. Historical psychology and social history<sup>1</sup> too have shown different conceptions (as well as realities) of childhood in history. More recent semiological and semiotic studies have attempted to capture the meanings and structures of such elusive phenomena as fashion, cuisine, and life styles.

In addition, in the twentieth century, we have increasingly become aware of different worlds of the rich and the poor, of the majority and minorities, of men and women, and of the dominant and the dominated. For us, and much more so for Dilthey and Husserl, the existence of different worlds have become the reality.

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<sup>1</sup> For Example, see van den Berg (1975) and Philippe Ariés (1962).



What these seemingly disparate movements, that have developed mostly after Dilthey and Husserl, seem to point to is the questionability of their premise as to the unicity or homogeneity of the pre-objective world. In the century after them, we have come to recognize the diversity and heterogeneity, the irreducibility and incommensurability, of various subworlds, societies, cultures, and life styles. We are becoming aware of the relative boundness of experience, even within the pre-objective, pre-scientific world. The lifeworld can no longer be taken as one, homogeneous, trans-historical, trans-social world--like a sort of "the secret flower garden" in a fairy tale which is not yet contaminated by scientism--nor as the solid rockbottom foundation on which one can ground all theorizing. Rather, the way a concrete person, not an abstract transcendental subject, makes sense of things and events in the pre-objective world is already bound, colored, and delineated<sup>1</sup> by that which goes beyond the boundary of the individual subject in the pre-objective world. Not only at the level of scientific and conceptual constructs that Dilthey and Husserl were critical of, but also at the very level of the pre-conceptual and pre-objective life, the lifeworld of a person seems to be

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<sup>1</sup> These transpersonal powers that bind a person in the person's pre-conceptual world do not affect the person in a deterministic manner of the rigorous natural laws. As hermeneutics has shown, the binding forces derive their binding power partly from the person's belongingness to them; in a sense the person bound is an accomplice to the boundness. And as Gadamer has shown, we cannot escape from being an accomplice, or be entirely free of tradition.

already bound, formed, or shaped by various conditions that transcend the person.

The way we feel, think, and act, the way we make sense of the world, or the way the world so appears to us, is already conditioned. What conditions the very way we make sense of the world may be language, the very way in which we come to be conscious of something, the way we name this something, or the way things and events are given as such already articulated from other things and events. It may be tradition or history, the inherited way which makes me not only think but also act and talk in everyday life in the manner particular to the tradition to which I belong: the way we greet our friends, the way we eat, drink, sleep, work, play, sing or dance. And there may be some more binding forces. A person has grown up in such and other binding and shaping forces and, because these forces are part and parcel of the person, they condition the mode of the person's pre-objective experiences. As a phenomenologist recently remarked, there is "genesis and development of meaning *already at work* in the life-world."

What is overlooked [in the phenomenological literature] ... is the various forms of insight and signification that are already operative within the texture and flow of originary experience. These significations are admittedly prephilosophical and prescientific but not, therefore, devoid of knowledge-bearing comprehensions. In the performance of everyday speech, in the production and use of tools and utensils, in the handshake and in the embrace, in laughing and crying, in the poetics of the dance, in the rituals of etiquette and religion, in the planning of affairs of households and economy, and in the posture of

silence, comprehension of self and world is already at work.  
(Schrag, 1980, p.63.)

What is going on in the experience of a person in the pre-objective world seems to be an interdependence or a dialectic relationship between the personal and the transpersonal. *In the midst of the most particularly personal experience, there seems to be already a dialectic between the personal and the transpersonal.* What is primordial may neither be the lived experience *per se* (as Dilthey took it for the "building block" of human sciences) within the subject who is free to constitute his or her world independent of external forces, nor is it the constellation of mere transpersonal forces independent of the participation of the subject. What is primordial seems to be the primary relation between the personal and the transpersonal even at the level of pre-objective, pre-reflective, pre-scientific life<sup>1</sup>.

At any rate, the presupposed homogeneity of the pre-conceptual world has become more and more dubitable; its conception as a homogeneous world seems more and more a legacy of absolutism and universalism, the legacy of the fear of being without a "rockbottom"

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<sup>1</sup> Dilthey later elaborated on the structural relationship (*Zusammenhang*) of experience with larger contexts such as the person's life history, the culture of which the person is a member, and ultimately human history. He called this "reflected experience" (*Lebenserfahrung*). I do not know whether he recognized the workings of such larger contexts at the pre-objective, pre-reflective level of experience.

foundation. Perhaps we are living in different lifeworlds. Even if a unitary lifeworld as the ultimate possible horizon of those relatively different worlds is theoretically conceivable, the practical question remains open as to how we make sense of the different worlds of adults and children, men and women, majorities and minorities, and so on. Many researchers are already using the word "lifeworlds" in the plural form, often without the awareness that the word had been coined by Husserl originally as the universal singular.

The second aporia suggests that it is no longer possible to hold on to Husserlian notion of the lifeworld. In theorizing lived meaning, it is necessary to start with a radical recognition of the plurality of lifeworlds. A strategy to cope with this plurality will be elaborated in 4.1. (part 1). And the transpersonal, that which binds the personal in the pre-objective, pre-reflective lifeworld of a person, will be reformulated as the notion of meaning system and apothegm in chapter 4.

### 1.3.3 Third Aporia: Experience and Meaning

The third aporia is concerned with the relation between experience and meaning. As Gadamer pointed out, the lived experience is characterized as always meaningful. Many examples Dilthey gave in his works range from the experience of the loss of a beloved person, a visit to an art gallery, to his own anxiety in his ability to achieve the work he initiated: the founding of a human science through a critique of historical reason. All these examples are humane and they resonate with

our minds. But are all experiences meaningful? Are all experiences lived experiences? Are there not experiences that are *not* meaningful?

In one sense every experience is meaningful. Even the meaninglessness of routine work, the wretched and most demeaning situation, the fruitless effort, and sheer boredom and ennui, have a place in a person's world, which is always meaningfully constituted. Without such a horizon of meanings, the life of a person would be an unarticulated chaos. Without such articulation even meaninglessness would not be experienced as meaningless. The experiencer can explicate the meaning of a particular experience against the background of the person's various relationships, which ultimately refer to the person's world. The meaning of any experience can be explicitated against the background of the person's lifeworld, understood not as *the* universal lifeworld but as the personally unique lifeworld. This sense of meaning is named *explicability* in reference to the person's world: what can be explained is meaningful.

However, this sense of meaning, or, better, this layer of meaning as the explicability of experience, is different from the sense of meaningfulness that Dilthey tried to capture by his term "lived experience." What is explicable does not necessarily have the sense of positive vividness, immediacy, or a lasting importance or significance for the subject, to which Dilthey was also referring. What is to be explicated may not be always meaningless.

Thus, in Dilthey's notion of lived experience, both of these two layers of meaning, or two senses of meaning, seem to co-exist without

clearly being articulated. To perform a sympathetic reading, I think Dilthey's intention was to get at the second sense of meaning: the meaningfulness as important, essential, relevant to the person. Let us then call this sense of meaning *personal relevance*. In order to intuitively differentiate the explicability and the personal relevance in the notion of lived experience, we could ask: "How is it that I feel that only some of my experience is meaningful whereas you say that all experience is meaningful?"

All experiences are meaningful in the sense that they are explicable against the backdrop of the articulative structure of the person's lifeworld. Yet, only some of these experiences are personally relevant or significant to the person, when they are lived or when they are personally interpreted. Already in the lived world, there seems to be not only vividly accentuated and clearly demarcated experiences but also relatively insignificant and "half-baked" experiences. Even when we go back to the "original" world of life which is prior to the distortion by the conceptual constructs and retrospective reflections, there seem to be also personally irrelevant, insignificant, or meaningless experiences to which Dilthey perhaps did not pay sufficient attention.

However, it must be reminded that we do not know the process in which an experience becomes lived experience. We do not know how an explicable experience becomes also relevant. Is there a special process in which an experience is given a special mode of livedness and relevance? Or am I trying to distinguish one thing from another thing that is equally problematic or primordial?

If experience in general is always meaningfully constituted, in the sense that all experiences are somehow explicable irrespective of whether they are personally relevant or significant, the working of meaning, whether it is lived or not, whether the subject is aware of it or not, is always present in all experiences. In other words, if an experience is to emerge, there needs to be a meaning; if a meaning is to occur, there needs to be an emergence of experience in the strong sense of lived experience. Experience cannot occur without a certain meaningful structure, nor can meaning form without being experienced.

This suggests that we cannot derive meaning from experience as already given, nor experience from meaning as pregiven. We can conceptualize neither experience nor meaning one without the other. It suggests that *experience and meaning are equiprimordial*: we cannot derive one from the other. Thus, the proper question is "How does meaning and experience emerge?" or "How does experience emerge and is experienced as it is by the experiencer?" A satisfactory theory of lived meaning, therefore, needs to answer the question of the emergence of meaning and experience from an integrated perspective.

We seem to be facing a much broader question now than anticipated at the outset. The equiprimordiality of meaning and experience does not allow us to define lived meaning as a special type, case or mode of meaning, as if the notion of meaning is already clear. Dilthey's notion of lived experience no longer seems to be a self-evident building block of our lives and therefore the starting point of the human science approach.

We may briefly speculate here on the reasons why such confusion of lived experience and personally significant experience occurred in Dilthey. One reason may be the romanticization of life, i.e., the rosy picture of the pre-scientific and pre-objective world as full of life only if the scientific conceptualization of it is somehow removed. It may have belittled the harsher, drier aspects of routine life. This romanticization which exerted a strong influence in the nineteenth century, would severely be challenged by the brutal realities in the course of the two World Wars.

Second, many of those insignificant, irrelevant lived experiences do not emerge in the consciousness as experience and they may be forgotten or repressed in Dilthey as much as in anybody.

Third, last but most significantly, Dilthey's (and many other people's) identification of lived experience and personal relevance may have derived from the fact that he was interested primarily in the "high cultures" of human history and not so much in the demeaning and meaningless experiences that the culturally, economically or politically deprived persons must endure. The experiences of social alienation have been exposed mainly by Marxists, but the Marxist mode of making sense of the world was incompatible with the romanticist perspective. An incompatibility of different ways of making sense of the world will be discussed further in part 2.

#### 1.4. Directions of a Theory of Lived Meaning



We seem to be facing a much broader and heavier task now than we had initially envisioned. I thought that an examination of the notions of lived experience and lifeworld would help me in theorizing lived meaning. Instead, my reading about these notions revealed untenable aporias inherent in them.

These aporias suggest that a theory of lived meaning should stand in an intersubjective perspective, that it should acknowledge the multiplicity of lifeworlds, and that it should regard meaning and experience as equiprimordial. How can I satisfy these heavy requirements in developing a theory of lived meaning?

But a few aspects about lived meaning have become clear through the examination of the two related notions experience and meaning, even though it gave me more questions to reflect on. Let me recapitulate here what has become clear.

Lived meaning is explicable but it is already there in experience as it is, even before it is explicated, or regardless of whether it will be explicated or not. We can speak of my daughter's lived meaning of her Mon-mon Chan even though her lived meaning was neither explicit for me nor for her. I respected her lived meaning without knowing exactly what it was.

This explication of lived meaning can be done by the experiencer, who was my daughter, or by the observer such as myself. This means that lived meaning can be made explicit retrospectively by the experiencer or the observer, or simultaneously by the observer.

However, the explication is a different process from the original constitution of lived meaning. In this point, many previous philosophers of consciousness seems to have mistakenly rendered consciousness of the subject in retrospect as the agent of meaning-giving.

Lived meaning is also different from personal relevance *per se*. Lived meaning can be, and in many cases is, felt relevant by the experiencer in retrospect. Yet some lived meanings, especially those of children, are transitory and they may not be realized as relevant at the time of experiencing. The growth of lived meaning sometimes takes time.

What is this lived meaning? How does it develop and die? In what relationship does lived meaning stand with other meanings such as essences of objectified expressions and subjective intentions? How can an educator better understand lived meaning in children in the direction that would help the development of the lived meaning?

By viewing the three aporias above I have a better sense of direction of my inquiry of lived meaning. If lived meaning is to be conceptualized, the inquiry needs different presuppositions from those held by Dilthey or Husserl. It needs to start with intersubjectivity rather than with a solitary subject, be it a transcendental ego or an embodied subject. It also needs to meet the multiplicity of lifeworlds rather than a supposedly universal lifeworld. Further, it needs to encompass the emergence of meaning or experience. Such a theory is needed in the human sciences and only such a theory can go beyond the aporias that are clinging to the notions of lived experience and lifeworld.

## 2. Multiplicity of Lived Meaning

In this chapter I wish to come closer to concrete and everyday examples of the various forms of lived meanings in our lives so that we may be reminded of the multiplicity of lived meanings. For a while let me bracket the heady argument and try to see many more examples of lived meaning around us.

### 2.1. The boy's battleship

Let us take another look at the example of the seven-year-old captain of the battleship. One might ask if this lived meaning is just a childish phenomenon, just a product of imagination and whim, from which children will eventually graduate, and thus which is not much worth pondering upon. This is a question from a traditional and still influential view of meaning. According to this view, meaning would have to do with truth, beauty, or morality, which is independent of children, irrespective of whether they understand it or not. I am very skeptical about this view of meaning, for it would see no meaningfulness in the three stones of the boy or in my daughter's blanket. Let us bracket this view of meaning and examine the lived meaning of the boy.

To this seven-year-old captain, the three stones may be, respectively, the bow of his battleship that cuts through the crushing waves of a roaring ocean, the guns that are firing a volley at an enemy battleship with their very final round of ammunition, and the forecastle deck where the captain stands and watches the course of the battle

among so many dead corpses. Or these three stones are a battleship which has been recently rigged and repainted, and which is now gliding peacefully in a beautiful, sunny, tropical bay. One cannot know exactly the content of the boy's lived meaning at the moment unless perhaps one talks and plays with him. To be able to talk and play battleship with him presupposes that the adult understands the presence of the ship at least to a certain extent and is also interested in it. And in the course of the talk and play with the adult, the exact content of the boy's lived meaning will inevitably change from moment to moment. Therefore, the adult's knowledge of the exact content of the lived meaning cannot be static or final, if it is attuned to the changes of lived meaning in the boy. Even in the boy himself, his lived meaning may be changing and growing, as he tells about it to the adult. Only after the first stone became the bow, other stones became the guns and the deck. Lived meaning is growing as if alive by itself. And the boy's lived meaning will grow if he adds more stones to fill in the details of his ship. Yet the lived meaning is also transitory; when the boy becomes hungry and wants to go home, the ship's significance may perish at least for the moment.

But the problem is that many of us are not really seeing the boy's battleship even when we say with a good intention, "What a beautiful battleship!" Perhaps we are too tired, dried up in the heart, too busy with other "important" things, or too preoccupied to even listen-- insensitive and unresponsive to the lived meaning of children, of other adults, and of ourselves. Can we really "see" the battleship?

Perhaps no one can know the boy's lived meaning unless one talks and plays, spends time, and interacts with him. To be able to talk and play battleship with the boy, the adult needs to recognize the presence of the battleship in the boy's experience and also be interested in it. If we took the boy's battleship as another case of childish imagination, then we would not be able to really listen to the boy. To be concretely sensitive, the lived meaning of the boy needs to emerge as an interesting question in the experience of the adult. And the more time and care the adult devotes, the better the adult understands the lived meaning.

Lived meaning takes shape when it is understood and given an expression. It is often ignored. But there are some people who are sensitive to the lived meaning of children and of adults. In the presence of persons who are good at listening, our lived meaning seems to grow.

## 2.2. Various forms of Lived Meaning

We know that there are countless numbers of meanings like these two examples.<sup>1</sup> Lived meaning is always experiential, real, unlike other meanings such as dictionary definitions of words, idealities that guarantee the identity of sentences and literary work, and essences of art works, all of which seem to reside outside of the process of a person's experience.

### Things

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<sup>1</sup> See Rochberg-Halton, 1986, pp. 168-188.

Many things around us have meaning. Some are very important and special, even irreplaceable. To many people, family photographs of their children and grandchildren, or photographs of their parents and grandparents, taken on days long gone by, and now hung on the wall or placed on the furniture, are very special. They are often irreplaceably valuable to older people. The people taken in the photograph, whether dead or alive now, young or old then, speak to us, letting us feel that they are somehow still with us as part of our lives, as part of our very being, reminding us the continuity of life with its ups and downs, its days of joys and sorrows. Even the occasions of taking those photographs may be memorable to us; they may have been taken during a long family trip to a faraway place, or at a studio, or in the yard of the house where we lived thirty years ago. Can you recognize the little tree which is now taller than the top of the house? Or the pictures may have been taken many years ago of our great grandparents whom we have never met and they were simply handed down to us. Then, we may have no knowledge of when and where the photographs were taken; we only know, because our parents told us time and again, that those stiff figures gazing squarely at the camera and at us are our own great grand parents. Whoever the people in those special photographs are, they are speaking to us and watching us; and we may speak to them from time to time in time of happiness or hardship.

Some pieces of old furniture have similar meaning in our lives. Even when they have lost their utility and function, we cannot easily throw them away, perhaps because they were made by our fathers'

hands, or given by special people on special occasions. Such old furniture is full of history and meaning.

When I was a child living with my parents, there used be a special cedar tree which was planted for me in front of their house where my mother is living alone now. Before it was finally planted there to grow, the tree had been dug up and replanted twice when my family moved from one place to another. It was a very special cedar tree for me, different from any other cedar tree in the world because it was part of my life history. My father and I picked up a few cedar seeds thirty years ago in a park, brought them home, put them in a soft soil in a pot, and watered them. A few seedlings sprouted next year and we planted them in the soil. One of them was given to a neighbor who also brought it to a far place when they moved years later. I do not know how that tree is growing now. My tree grew and grew. Every spring I trimmed off its lower branches, as a gardener would do, until years later when it was finally blown down one day during a strong typhoon about ten years ago. I could not put the tree back straight up because the tree's roots extended to the gas pipe under the ground and the tree was simply too big then. I had to cut off the fallen trunk that was blocking the driveway. When I was sawing it, I felt the peculiar sadness which I did not really understand at that time. When the tree was cut down, I sawed off its branches and peeled of its barks, leaving the white trunk, without knowing what to do with it. I could not throw it away, so it should be still lying at the side of my parents' house. Years after the cedar tree was gone, when I was living somewhere else, I felt that something was

definitely lacking in my parents' house when I visited them. I did not think about it at the time. Some time later, I realized that what was lacking was the cedar tree which had been watching me beside the porch, as if it had been someone who sees me off in the morning and welcomes me back home in the evening.

All of us have many things that are meaningful like the old family photographs or my cedar tree. It can be a pet, a book, a stone, a plant, or a phrase; it can be almost anything. Many people talk to pets and grow with them. Even an inanimate stone can be an object of such meanings: some people, whether children or adults, stroke and speak to their special stones and regain equanimity through them. To some people, special books to which they return time and again are the source of their energy. Paintings, letters, clothes, bank books, cars, houses, musical instruments--almost anything can be the carrier of lived meaning, even if each of us feels meaningfulness of them differently. There are lived meanings of things like these and many more.

### Past events

Some events in the past may be meaningful, not only then but also now. Trips, first loves, changes in the career, wedding, births of children, loss of a beloved person--almost all of us have some memorable events without which we would have been different from what we are now. What is meaningful to one person may not be so to another person. To other people the events which are personally meaningful can be wide-reaching social phenomena such as the Second World War or the



Vietnam War, or very trifling matters for other persons such as the death of a pet. Whatever the scale of the event may be, the specialness of such meaningful events are irrevocable.

We might think that a person *has* his or her life history and that such meaningful events in the past are contained in it. According to this popular interpretation about the past and about temporality, our past is there somewhere. But it may be the various experiences of lived meaning which are the base and material of our life history. Without memorable and meaningful events, the time past does not congeal into life history, just like blank years in curriculum vitae. It is not that there is the past as a sort of container and the lived meanings of past events are contained in it. Rather, it may be the lived meanings of past events that articulate the past for us.

There has been no time in my personal life history that lacked meaningful experiences. However, when memories emerge or occur to us, as if by their own accord, then it is the meaning of events that penetrates us. Sometimes we are assaulted by the memories of real or imaginary disasters in our lives, and we may curse, or feel sweat in the hands. Happy or painful, glad or sad, the meanings of these events have shaped what we are now. It would need a good deal of unlearning if we wished to be freed from the grip of the meanings of past events.

### Future Events.

Not only past events but also anticipated events in the future can become very meaningful. The plan to go to a movie theatre, concert,

sports game, restaurant, or on a trip abroad is not simply a neutral agenda in the calendar. The meaning of such outings may enliven our lives long before the actual occasions. As the summer holidays approach, many children in school will be restless and unable to wait for the vacation trips, camps, and other activities. More seriously, plans of examinations, career changes, marriage, new projects, and all other plans will affect our lives in eager anticipation or maybe anxiety.

The present may be meaningful in itself on rare fortunate occasions. The replete present is probably not without future anticipations and past memories, but it can be full and replete with meaningfulness in itself. The moments of our absorption in creative work, of climax in sexual intercourse, or of playing sports can be examples of such meaningfulness of the present event. Or such meaningfulness may be experienced during moments of conversation with a friend, or sitting alone without doing anything particular. Yet usually such moments of meaningfulness in the present do not last long.

### People

We seldom call people meaningful but we certainly feel that our relationships with certain people are meaningful. For most of us--who fall short of being the holiest of holy persons, whose personal concerns reach out to all members of humanity and perhaps beyond--some people are more meaningful than others. We like some people and not others. Such articulation of persons is very intricate. I prefer to talk with this person and not that person about this topic. I prefer to do this with that

person but not others. This kind of choice and preference about persons in our daily lives relate to the lived meanings we may associate with these persons.

Or to be more direct, most of the humanity is an abstract category for most of us, an entity without lived quality. Most people may hold no meaning whatsoever to each of us.

### Events, things, people: Experience

In our experience, the meaning of an event, an object, or a person cannot be easily separated and classified. An object may be meaningful because it was given by a special person on a special occasion in my life. It is usually difficult to separate the giver, the occasion, and the present itself. The watch on my wrist may be a thing in itself, but it has a special meaning because it was given to me by a special person on a special occasion many years ago. But, whether it is about an event, object, or person (or a combination of these), what is meaningful to me is always somehow related to my having experienced it. Without my having experienced it, the meaningfulness is not there for me, even if it is for some other people.

But the reverse of this is not true. What I have experienced or what I am experiencing is seldom meaningful. The meaningful events, objects, and persons appear important against the background of other events, objects, and persons that are not meaningful at all. If every event, object, and person has equally strong meaningfulness, even though their contents may vary, then nothing might have special impact

over others. Relatively meaningless experiences may be serving as the backdrop against which those special moments may stand out in relief.

Lived meaning is personal: my lived meaning is based on my experiences and rooted in my life-history, or rather, such meanings in the past have shaped me in this particular manner.

### Negative Meaning and Positive Meaning

So far we have seen mostly positive meanings, the memorable, dear, important, cherished meanings. However, there are also negative lived meaning. A grave mistake, a public blunder, a lost love, or the death of a beloved one has very strong meaning too. We may forget, or try to forget, them but most of those experiences come back to us unaware. A big failure in my career, or a grave mistake in the important choices in my life, has actually shaped me into what I am now, whether I like it or not.

Further, to a criminal, the first initiation into the world of theft is meaningful, whether it is with bitterness, pride, or resentment. The lived meaning of the drug to an addicted person is so strong that it will sooner or later swallow many other aspects of his or her life. But there seems to be no reason to reject such addiction from the realm of meaning from the beginning. Under more or less socially acceptable forms, some lives seem to be similarly addicted to money, power, sex, sports, or other idols. The judgment of whether a particular lived meaning is healthy or unhealthy, good or bad, needs to be determined upon closer examination of the particular context.

And there seems to be no convincing reason to limit the objects of lived meaning within the range of accepted values in the society. Lived meaning is deeply related to the process of personal valuation but it is not the socialization into socially accepted values. Necrophiliac and coprophiliac persons have preferences in the object of their sexual lived meaning different from what many others desire. But it cannot be doubted that lived meanings also emerges in these cases.

All these forms are lived meaning. Whether a form of lived meaning is healthy to the growth of the particular person can be discussed in a different context. And what forms of lived meaning are detrimental and instrumental can also be discussed.

Looking at various forms of lived meaning has shown at least two things. First, what becomes meaningful to a particular person, can be explicated against the person's lifeworld. And each person's lifeworld is unique. Therefore, disagreements about the meaning of a same object may occur among individuals.

Second, even within an individual's lifeworld, there are discrepancies among the ways things appear meaningful to us. A life is not necessarily homogeneous; it is heterogeneously compounded of different ways of making sense.

### 2.3. Lived Meaning through Time

Many objects around me have some sort of meaning. They were given, made, or bought at a certain time and place under a particular circumstance. They were given because other people thought I liked

them and I accepted them with different feelings of thankfulness or annoyance. Most of the things around me were bought usually with some amount of consideration, as to its usefulness and price, after comparison with other things. Many things turned to be not useful as I had hoped but there are some which have contributed unexpected usefulness.

Objects and events all have meaning to me, even though the specific meanings of those things and events are all unique and different from each other. Some of them are more meaningful to me than others. Then, how does meaningfulness to me emerge if every object and event has its own meaning? In other words, how is one thing more meaningful than others when they are all at least potentially meaningful?

An answer to this question can be found in the fact that some things and events are part of myself and others are not really part of myself. What is meaningful to me depends on what sort of experiences I have had and what I want to do from now. Personal meaningfulness can be understood in terms of my past and future both of which make up my present self. What a person experiences as meaningful can be accounted for in terms of the person's self, where his or her past and future converge. The meaningfulness of an event, object, or person is not in the notion of lived meaning. The meaningfulness has to do with the relatedness of the object with the entirety of what the person is, that is, the person's lifeworld.

A distinction seems to be called for. Every thing or event has meaning in the sense that its meaning can be explicated. The meaning or

event may be clear in my awareness or relatively explicated, i.e., just lived through. Whether it is explicated in my awareness or just felt, an object or event can have different degrees of importance, relevance, or significance. The meaning of an object or event can be clear and important, unclear and important, clear and unimportant, or unclear and unimportant. Each lived meaning has, therefore, two dimensions: explicability and personal relevance.

### Transitoriness of Lived Meaning

Meaningfulness of a thing or an event changes in the course of time. The special towel blanket which my four-year-old daughter could not seem to do without even for a day, had made way for other toys and things. It no longer had the almost magical meaning for her as it once did. As she grew older, gaining more experiences, as my daughter's self developed and evolved, and as her world has taken on a more articulated and richer structure, the towel blanket inevitably changed its original meaning.

This happens to everybody. The book, or the piece of music or art, that one admired so much in one's youth, has lost its charm in most cases as we grow older. As time goes by, we lose respect in many of our childhood heroes and role models. Friends and lovers come and go in our lives. With the loss of meaning in such toys and stories, childlike impressionability and youthful idealism also wither in most of us. It is most evident when we look at the toys which used be the favorites of our children but now tucked away in a box in storage. Here is a touch of

genuine loss in this transitoriness of lived meaning. Yet it is also an evidence of the growth of our children. Just like the running shoes that they outgrew, a lived meaning may have to be outgrown for the child to grow.

But this transitoriness may and must be seen also in a more positive light. Without those old toys and heroes gradually forgotten by children, they cannot meet new things and people, they cannot gain new experiences. I would be really worried if the meaning of my daughter's special blanket did not change until she is in her teens. So that we may find new meaningfulness, the meanings of things and events need to change. In order to grow, old toys, books, and heroes need to make way for new ones.

A personal world in which lived meanings of things and events do not change would be a frozen world, without time and growth. I would wonder if lived meaning is possible in such world at all. The fact that our meaningfulness of a object, person, or event changes, the fact that lived meaning changes, should not be understood as the whimsicalness of our passion or as the transitoriness of life, but rather as the very necessity for our personal growth. What changes through time is not only particular meanings but the lifeworld of each person. Because of the change of my daughter's lifeworld, her Mon-mon Chan lost its previous magical quality. The personal lifeworld changes as the person grows.

Meaningfulness of an object seems to emerge and wither, then, in relation to one's growth. Lived meaning of a thing or event felt by a person needs to be understood with regard to the person's life history.



The change of a personal lifeworld is the person's life history. A lifeworld thus understood is a vertical section of the life history which is changing and growing.

#### 2.4. Lived Meaning for Various People

Meaningfulness of a thing or event can be shared to some extent by a group of people. To the members of the Sherlock Holmes Society, the meaning of the famous detective and his exploits are much more significantly felt and shared than it is in other people. And the meaning is, to a certain extent, shared by the members in their conversations and the events and publications organized by the society. The meaning of Jesus Christ is special among Christians and it is shared among them even if this sharing quality has been eroded by conflicting denominations, in a similar sense the meaning of Muhammad is shared among the Moslems. The meaning of money is very strong among business-minded people, whereas in other people there are other dominant forms of meaning, such as political power, knowledge, religion, and art.

The meanings of Sherlock Holmes or Jesus Christ are actually composed of many occasions of lived meanings that are experienced individually and concretely, each in its particular context. There are two notable aspects about these meanings. First, similar and affiliate meanings do make up higher order meanings. This structuring occurs, not by some function outside of meaning, but because of the nature of meaning itself. Meaning is such structuring, in whose function similar things are put together, different things are sorted out, and similar items

make up a higher order of meaning. Meaning is the articulation of the world, or at least of part of it.

Second, the higher order meanings can be shared by many persons because they have a detached distance from particular contexts in which concrete lived meanings have occurred. To become a member of the Friends of the Holmes Society or the Church of Christ, there are countless ways an individual has come to "see" Holmes or Christ. The particular contingency of the context may be very important to a person. Yet different routes can lead to the same goal.

As we take a global perspective, we find that different groups of people experience different sorts of lived meanings. Totems, ancestry worship, personified gods, impersonal abstract gods, status, cattle, land, bank books, traditional wisdom, science, and almost anything imaginable have different meanings in different societies.

If we look at different times, we see different meanings at work. The meanings of Gothic cathedrals are different from the meanings of modern functional high rise buildings. The meaning of Gothic cathedrals experienced by those who built them and their contemporaries is perhaps different from their meaning experienced by us as well as from the meaning of sky scrapers to us. If seen from the perspective of a private person, as we are doing now in this chapter, it is truly amazing to find so many similar meanings being shared by so many people in a society .

We can see such changes in taste, ways of life, worldviews, in the shift in the history of art, music, architecture, clothing, and so on. Just as our personal worlds grow and change, so do collective cultures in their

history. A culture, a shared world of a group of people, is no less concrete than the personal world of each of us.

We may conceive of the shared lifeworld of a group of persons, or of a society. Just as a personal world is not made of homogeneous ways of making sense that are compatible with each other, neither is the shared lifeworld homogeneously or uniformly structured. This means that we have personal lifeworlds and socially shared lifeworlds, both of which are unique, changeable, and heterogeneous.

But how are personal lifeworlds and shared lifeworlds related? There have been many theoretical attempts to either construct a society as an aggregate of individuals or reduce an individual into one of many forged replicas with an inevitable imprint of a society. These are simpler models which start with the assumption of an individual fully equipped to make sense of the world in the former case, or which start with the assumption of the priority of society over the individual. From the beginning, they have put up an unbridgeable dichotomy of society and individual, which corresponds to the dichotomy of socio-historical objectivism and ahistorical subjectivism.

What is important is to recognize the dialectics between society and individual. On the one hand, an individual is born into a socio-historically shaped society and grows up in it, accommodating much of the particular ways of life, and the socio-historically transmitted worldview, in short, its particular culture. The individual's personal world develops in interaction with the culture, and the individual world bears the marked imprint of the society. On the other hand, the culture of a

society is a creation of individual efforts and labour, a product of many personal lived meanings, that is in principle open to change according to individual contributions in the forms of addition and skepticism, challenge and defence, introduction of new elements from other societies. From the perspective of culture, culture is maintained through being enlivened, revitalized, enriched, and modified by individual worlds. From the point of the individual world, it became what it is through having accommodated many parts of the particular surrounding culture.

To use the notion of lifeworld, particularized and no longer Husserlian, there is a dialectic between the personal lifeworld and the social lifeworld, and the very medium of this dialectic is meaning, which is neither exclusively individual nor exclusively social, rather it is both personal and transpersonal at the same time. And a lifeworld, be it personal or social, is unique if closely examined, is changeable or has history, and is heterogeneously composed with incompatible ways of meaning.

Thus a person's lived meaning is better understood against the backdrop of the person's life history and of the socio-historical culture to which the person belongs. In other words, an instance of lived meaning needs to be interpreted not only in terms of its direct situational background but also with regard to its life-historical and socio-historical dimensions. To understand a concrete case of lived meaning situationally, life-historically, and socio-historically is perhaps an unending process which might seem an inconvenient methodological flaw. For to understand a person's lived meaning would necessitate our

knowledge of his or her personal history and global history. Certainly there is no end to this process of interpretation. Yet, it seems also true that each lived meaning is possible only against the background of such personal and global growth.

Each instance of lived meaning is unique and needs to be concretely and situationally interpreted as to its situational context. What we need is a theory which helps us to understand each instance of myriads of lived meanings without forgetting its relation to other forms of meaning. Such a theory therefore needs to have a broad perspective which encompasses the entirety of the diverse forms of lived meaning, and it requires a heuristic value which gives insight into the nature of each concrete case of lived meaning.

### 3. Pedagogical Understanding of Lived Meaning

In this chapter I wish to focus on the nature of understanding of lived meaning from an intersubjective perspective. Both the understanding and the constitution of lived meaning are deeply and peculiarly related if seen from the dialogical or intersubjective model of lived meaning.

#### 3.1. Intersubjective Constitution and Epistemology of Lived Meaning

Lived meaning is not just out there independent of being understood. It is there only for the person who can see it. Then, what sort of knowing is the adult's sensitive awareness of the child's lived meaning? It seems that such knowledge is very different from the type of knowing which is characterized by the perception of external objects. External objects are already "out there," as if independent of the act of perceiving.

First, lived meaning is ever-changing. Let us come back to the initial example once again. The battleship might acquire further details with the addition of other pebbles. Or, the stones might suddenly change into a castle. And it might be forgotten altogether if nobody heeds his battleship or by the time the boy gets home hungry. The object of sensitive awareness is not the usual sort of object that is fixed or repeatable; on the contrary, concrete lived meaning itself is changing from moment to moment. Lived meaning is therefore also *living* meaning seen from the standpoint of meaning itself.

Second, the boy's lived meaning might change in the course of talk and play with the adult. For example, if we are to ask the boy where the battleship's escorts are, the boy might smile to us and arrange some more pebbles along the original three. And if we are to make our own battleship beside his battleship to play with him, then his lived meaning would inevitably expand and grow. There seems to be a vicious circle here: to understand the lived meaning of the child we need to play and talk with the child; and by our talk and play we change the child's lived meaning. If we do not interact with the child, we cannot know what the child's lived meaning is; if we do, we affect it and change it.

Is it possible, then, to understand a concrete lived meaning which is not a fixed object and which might change by our act of asking? How can we make sense of this type of understanding? It would seem an impossible task if we were caught up in the perception model of understanding. In this model the ideal of understanding something is to attain an image of the object as accurate as possible without disturbing it, or to gain a law or formula which can predict its outcome. Yet viewed from a different angle of dialogue, the understanding of lived meaning which changes its original mode, occur frequently in everyday life. Suppose my friend drops by when I am tired of work and says, "Go for a coffee?" I say "Yes" and we head for the lounge. Whereas the initial phase of my experience might have been a vague sense of tiredness without a definite plan to go to the lounge, the lived meaning now emerges by my friend's question and it takes a more definite shape. Dialogue has such an invitational and formative power on our lived

meaning. By being questioned, lived meaning becomes explicit as a response to this question. But by becoming explicit, it must be noted, lived meaning changes from its initial mode.

We know many examples like this. My lived meaning is often unclear even to myself. For example, I talk to my friend about my research project, and she responds to me. Listening to what she says, I exclaim, "That's what I mean!" because my friend's comments let me see what I had in mind and what I was unable to express myself. Or I might come to see what I meant through my effort to make my friend understand it. Only after being understood in an appropriate manner and expressed in dialogue, my lived meaning becomes clear to me as well as to my friend.

Many of us need such dialogical relationships in which our unexpressed lived meanings gradually take shape through being understood, questioned, and challenged by other persons. Only when we do not have such a dialogical partner, we need to abide by the sort of internalized dialogue which is called thinking. This is merely a substitute from an intersubjective perspective. Yet, because the wide-spread dichotomy of subject and object has a strong grip on us, or perhaps because we have become used to this substitute mode of dialogue, we may have forgotten the original intersubjective field. Understanding lived meaning, which appeared as a mysterious paradox when viewed from the *perception model of knowing*, has no mystery when viewed from the *dialogue model of understanding*.



In this dialogue model of understanding, which we need to develop here, it does not matter very much if a person's lived meaning is modified by the questions and invitations from another person who is trying to understand it. The boy's lived meaning of the battleship would grow and expand if the adult asks questions about the deadly broadside volley, the gale, and the dead bodies scattered around the captain. The boy's lived meaning would certainly expand if the adult placed a few stones alongside the boy's battleship and started the final combat. Then the boy's lived meaning and the adult's lived meaning would reflect and support each other, and they would be reflected and supported in the other. The two lived meanings that was separate previously would grow together, each being in need of the other, and they will become "our" lived meaning for both the boy and the adult. Each participant in this dialogical interaction gains in this process that could not have been achieved alone.

Intersubjective understanding of lived meaning is such a concerned, careful dialogue, in which the original lived meaning is further co-constituted. Understanding of lived meaning and further co-constitution of lived meaning are inseparable in the intersubjective perspective. This growth and expansion of lived meaning is not an imposition of a ready-made meaning from outside, nor is it a creation *ex nihilo* of lived meaning by and within the subject.

To use a metaphor of language, lived meaning is the voiceless voice, unheard cry, speechless words, shapeless expressions, that is growing in the experience of a person. Lived meaning is the nascent, not

yet fully grown, amorphous meaning that emerges and will die or develop in the pre-conceptual, pre-objective, pre-theoretical, lived world of a person. It may not have taken a definite shape especially in its initial phase.

Lived meaning is the sort of meaning of which, when expressed in a right manner, the person would say, "That's what I mean!" It is the sort of meaning about which, if expressed in a wrong way, the person would say, "That's not what I mean."

Lived meaning is what is important, significant, relevant, dear to the life of the person. It is personally relevant. It is usually accompanied by the vibration of the entire person; it is the entirety of cognition and emotion, a fresh contact with the world.

Lived meaning is in a perpetual change: it grows, expands, changes, withers, and dies. The lived meaning of a thing, event, concept, scenery does not stay the same: as one takes a different perspective of another person, as one changes the future expectations and past memories, as one's social situation changes, as one grows older, the lived meaning changes accordingly. It is transitory. It is in the process rather than in the product

Dialogue is the soil of lived meaning; for, without anyone to listen to, who would care to express one's lived meaning? Lived meaning can sprout in such an intersubjective field. Lived meaning emerges to be open to others and to be shared perhaps not now but perhaps later. Dialogue, the process of listening, expressing, questioning, is necessary for lived meaning to develop and take shape. Lived meaning grows as a

response to such an invitation and question. Even when the lived meaning has already taken a certain form in a person, dialogue is necessary for another person to understand it. Such a dialogue will affect the initial lived meaning and change it. This modification of one person's lived meaning into "our" lived meaning of two persons is the co-constitution of lived meaning. Dialogue seems to be the medium and the soil of lived meaning.

### 3.2. Pedagogical Understanding of Lived Meaning

From an intersubjective perspective, the purpose of understanding lived meaning is to further the growth of lived meaning so that the participants in this intersubjective and dialogical field may share the lived meaning by making it "ours" for them, and also so that this "our" lived meaning will reach a height where neither of the participants could have reached alone. In this perspective, understanding of lived meaning and growing are inseparable. The participation in the intersubjective co-constitution and co-formation of a richer lived meaning is more important than two separate processes of the private constitution of lived meaning in the subject and the observer's non-interactive and accurate perception of lived meaning in the subject.

Yet a pedagogical understanding of lived meaning requires more than intersubjective understanding and co-development of lived meaning. There is an asymmetrical relation between an adult and a child. What makes an intersubjective understanding *also* pedagogical needs to be clarified.

To pedagogically understand a lived meaning is to listen to the voiceless voice, speechless speech, to see this shapeless and amorphous expressions, to attune oneself to the child's lived meaning by engaging one's existence, as if one is witnessing a true creation, like an advance payment of trust, by being a sounding board, as if building, finding its expression together.

To pedagogically understand lived meaning, the teacher needs to be attuned to the child at the level of what is yet to be said, written drawn, accomplished, in short, what is yet to be expressed. Even if the teacher does not yet know the lived meaning of the child, it must be respected as a treasure to be. The worst thing in pedagogical and intersubjective understanding is to bulldoze the budding lived meanings.

There is no "complete" understanding of lived meanings of the child. Because the lived meaning is always in the process of change and development, and because it is not yet "fixed" in words, music, art forms, and activities, to understand it is different from understanding fixed, objectified, stable entities. As lived meaning itself is in the constant process of change and development, understanding of lived meaning is also in such a constant process, co-constituting it to grow.

Even a partial understanding is an encouragement to the child. The mixture of partial understanding and partial misunderstanding is better than no understanding. Besides, the child will show our misunderstanding if we remain in the intersubjective field. As long as dialogue continues, the teacher's partial misunderstanding can be an occasion to express the child's lived meaning in a more precise manner.

Because there is someone who is listening to and waiting<sup>1</sup> for the words to come forth, because there is someone who wants to see what the child draws, the child's lived meaning takes shape in speech or in drawing. Because there is the teacher by whom the child wishes to be understood, someone whom the child wants to share his or her lived meaning with, the child seeks a better expression of one's lived meaning. If the child feels that no one would care to hear, see, and wait, the child would not endeavor to find a better expression. Expression of lived meaning presupposes an intersubjectivity of understanding and listening persons.

The teacher's understanding itself can be lived, as opposed to just thought of, constructed, and construed. In such a moment, the lived meaning of a child becomes also the lived meaning of the teacher, and this lived meaning of the teacher is felt by the child in turn, so that the child's lived meaning of the next moment would be grounded by the teacher's lived meaning, and this new phase of the child's lived meaning is also reciprocated. In such mirroring, the horizons of the child and the educator are fused, and the lived meaning grows to a new phase which becomes theirs rather than the child's or the teacher's. In such a moment of fusion of horizons it is difficult to identify what part of the new lived meaning is the original lived meaning of the child and what part is the contribution of the teacher. Such an identification of "who contributed what" is not important or possible. What is important is the quality of lived meaning that emerged newly and shared by the child.

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<sup>1</sup> See Fujita, 1982 and 1985.

Whether an understanding of lived meaning of the child by the teacher is really pedagogical or not, must be examined by the quality of this shared lived meaning that has grown in the intersubjective field. If the adult's participation enabled the lived meaning to grow in the intersubjective field to a height which had not been reached by the child alone, then the adult's interaction was pedagogical. Yet this is a heavy requirement. In rushing to lead the child to a "height," the teacher may forget the intersubjective co-constitution of lived meaning and resort to imposition of meaning from the outside. Or the teacher may emphasize the intersubjective atmosphere too much with the result that the shared lived meaning does not really reach any height.

### 3.3. Pedagogic Relation

#### "How can I relate to this child?"

In our daily lives, we do not question how we can better understand a lived meaning in a general manner. Even though we are already exercising such understanding in our daily lives, understanding lived meaning of other people is an activity we seldom reflect on thematically. Yet, even in this natural attitude of our daily lives, there are occasions we ask this question about particular children. Why do we ask such questions? What is happening in those occasions?

This question occurs to me especially when I am facing "difficult" children--autistic children, introverted children, or children with backgrounds differing from mine. Though well-intended, my words may slip somewhere, beside, beyond, or in front of this and that particular

child, and they never seem to reach the right place. I feel frustrated at my being unable to reach the child, at the child's not responding to me--at our being unable to communicate.

The question "How can I relate to this child?" also sometimes occurs to me even when I am facing "normal" children. Perhaps not as often as with "difficult" children, but definitely sometimes, when this boy is starting to act in defiance to me, or when that girl has suddenly withdrawn to her private world, I wonder how I can relate to them, sometimes in frustration, sometimes in despair .

The question "How can I relate to this person?" occurs to me even with my family members and best friends whom I have known for years. It happens when they appear to me quite differently from what I have expected them to be, when they are incomprehensible to me, when they do not listen to me.

To relate to this person, I need to relate something to the person. There are usually some touchy areas in a person that I do not want to talk about. And there are things that a person does not understand. The difficulty of communication might result from the specialness of the topic about which I try to relate. There are difficult things to tell. Or, the difficulty may have arisen, not because of the difficulty of the things I wish to relate, but because of the relationship between the person and me. Then the very intersubjectivity which is taken-for-granted in my natural, daily attitude is broken, at least temporarily. I would not be able to know which is the case until I talk about it with the person when the relation comes back again.

Fortunately, we are usually saved from such questions in our everyday lives when everything seems to go as usual. We do not constantly ask "How can I relate to this person?" Instead, we are already somehow relating with the other person without asking how. Much of our everyday communication is dependent on what is already at work in our presumed intersubjectivity. A question emerges when this ongoing communication bogs down. Too much reflection would break down the natural flow of communication. I am not reflecting all the time if I am standing in a pedagogical relationship with my child. A person who is too introspective makes a poor communicator. It would be a bad teacher if I am constantly reflecting how to relate to this or that child. Rather, a good teacher would invite a child into some sort of participation in the class before he or she has time to reflect on the question.

Yet, the fact we are not usually bothered with this question in our daily, practical lives does not change the fundamental importance of the communicative relationship. The fact that the mode of relationship only emerges as a question when the relationship is difficult to achieve only shows that in everyday life we largely take the relationship for granted. Rather it points to the recognition of the primacy of the pedagogical relation that is taken-for-granted in our daily pedagogical lives. If such a relation does not exist, nothing educational can happen.

### What is a pedagogic relation?

The pedagogic relation on the ground of which pedagogy is possible may be understood as a meeting point of various conditions and



factors. The teacher brings his or her knowledge of a subject matter, his or her understanding of a particular topic to the class, his or her concrete understanding of this or that child at the moment as to their comprehension of and interest in the topic, his or her understanding of the children's perception of the teacher his- or herself and the mood of the class, and so on. Further, the teacher also brings into the pedagogic relation a tacit evaluation, or ways of making sense of the world, about the topic (is it important to the teacher?), about the children's achievement of the topic (does the teacher care if they understand?), about schooling (is it just a matter of playing a game?), or about study itself (is study ultimately a means to get something else such as a job, praise, reward, or a step on the ladder?), and about many more. In a concrete pedagogical situation, the teacher also conveys her sense about how much he or she likes children and teaching, whom she likes and dislikes among them, and how enjoyable the task of teaching is. These and other factors are conveyed even when the teacher is not explicitly aware of them, even against the teacher's conscious intention, through the teacher's gestures, ways of expression and evaluation--through the teacher's entire being. Aware or not, the teacher brings these various ways of making sense of the world into a pedagogical situation.

From the other side, the children bring into the pedagogic relation their various ways of making sense of the world, such as their sense of the topic in front of them, how they perceive their teacher and other children, their sense of what it is to be a child in relation to their teachers and parents, their sense of what it is to grow up, and so on. Aware or not,

the children bring all these ways of making sense of the world into a pedagogical situation.

A pedagogical situation is therefore a meeting point of so many different ways of making sense of the world. It is a meeting point of lifeworlds with different ways of making sense. In our natural, everyday attitude, we are presupposing an intersubjectivity even though the lifeworlds and the ways of making sense of the world that we bring into a pedagogical situation are various. And only when this presumed intersubjectivity is broken, we ask how we can relate to this or that child. In the natural, everyday attitude, the breach of the presumed intersubjectivity is recognized when there is a serious discrepancy between the ways we make sense of the world and the ways children make sense of the world.

Yet, examined more closely, the ways we make sense of the world are all different. And, in the practical attitude, we only deal with this or that case which needs to be seriously attended.

### What can a pedagogic study contribute?

One cannot become more sensitive just by an act of will. To be able to be more sensitive and responsive to the pedagogic relation, one needs to know at least implicitly what to attend to. What one needs to attend to and to be attuned to is the child's personal experience, the emerging lived meaning that changes from moment to moment in response to the minute changes in the child. A pedagogically oriented

study is required to thematize the emergence of lived meaning against the background of a lifeworld.

If an understanding is always an understanding of meaning of something, then education is fundamentally involved in the transaction of meanings. Education daily deals with inherited knowledge and meaning so that they will be revitalized in children. Pedagogical theorizing of lived meaning also must give attention to the relationship between inherited meanings, the entirety of culture as the stock of available meanings, that may appear as if already there independently of the particular child, and the personal, lived, revitalized meanings in children.

In a practical, every day attitude, a teacher is already busy trying to understand the experience of this or that child who needs most attention, whose ways of making sense of the world seem most puzzling.

#### 3.4. Pedagogical Requirements in Theorizing about Lived Meaning

Theorizing can always take a number of possible directions. In the case of lived meaning, there may be many ways to theorize about it. For example it is conceptually possible to develop a theory of meaning from the standpoint of language, history, concept, essence, transcendental subjectivity, or the solipsistic subject. It is quite possible to theorize about one of these mode of meaning as fundamental and others as its derivatives or variations. Then lived meaning will be subjugated as the experiential form of such meaning, as an application. But if we take a pedagogical stance, there are some requirements made on the theorizing that occurs in the particularities of education

First, a theory of personal meaning of children is necessary if it has a bearing on a better understanding of concrete pedagogic relations. The starting point of such a theory is the transitory yet potentially creative meanings of concrete children we find around us. This theory needs to make sense of the incredibly multifarious and highly diverse modes of lived meaning in its scope. And in order not to be blind to the transactions outside of the here and now of the pedagogical relation, it must have a scope wide enough to relate the here and now to various factors and movements in the wider society, its history, different forms of culture, and developmental stages of a child. The theorizing must be for children above all, yet it is also for fully grown-up rational adults.

The theories of meaning that take the children's understanding and expression of meanings as basic reproduction and implantation of the meanings that have been already produced somewhere else have little bearings on the better understanding of the transitory meanings of children and its potentially creative aspects. The views that do not attend to the process of emergent meaning in concrete children--concrete children have bodies that are fat or thin, tall or short, minds that are dull or smart, kind or mean, humorous or sober, all sorts of preferences and talents that are artistic or athletic, academic or congenial, all sorts of family backgrounds, and so on--does not contribute to a better understanding of the pedagogical relationship. For example, the Heideggerian philosophy of language as the primary locus of meaning cannot be of much help here. For even if "language speaks of itself through itself," a theory of language that is not interested in

understanding why authentic language emerges in this particular child and not in that particular child, or that is not interested in searching how to help the authentic language emerge in that child, is not pedagogically relevant--quite apart from the question whether such a theory makes a coherent whole in areas outside education.

The theory needs to start from the perspective of individual children, their lifeworlds, and their life histories, yet these must be related to the wider, transpersonal, and social powers that bind their lived meanings.

Second, a pedagogical study of meaning must focus on the meaning at the level of what is meant, what is yet to be expressed, formulated, or done and not only at the level of what is actually said, done, expressed, or acted. This requirement arises from the experientially evident fact that children are the beings that are in need of help of a teacher or adult in expressing their meaning. Nobody is born with the capacity to express what they mean in language and conduct. This would be as unnatural, from an intersubjective perspective, as a person expressing lived meaning for oneself. We must learn this capacity in our childhood. And almost by definition, children are the beings who are in the process of learning to express their meanings to an ever greater extent. Teachers and adults have the pedagogical responsibility of not taking as absolute what they have expressed, and of helping them to formulate and express more fully their own personal meanings.

This pedagogical awareness is good not only for children but also for adults. Even the adult, a professional scientist, philosopher, or artist

also needs such pedagogical or dialogical relationship in which their unexpressed lived meaning gradually takes shape through being understood, questioned, and tested by other persons. Of course, in the adult, the final responsibility of expressing in a certain form may lie in the person him- or herself.

The expression of children's lived meaning is usually unstable, transitory, and easily discouraged. It needs encouragement and help in order to be expressed. The teacher's understanding of this lived meaning is different from the observer's understanding from a distance at the already shaped object. Teacher's understanding is participatory and co-creative. The criterion of a good understanding of lived meaning is different in the teacher who is committed to the process and in the observer who is viewing a process but without participating in it. Accordingly, the criterion of a good theory is different depending on whether it for the teacher or for the observer.

Third, to build a theory for the development of lived meaning in children, the general feature toward the loss of meaning in the larger society, and therefore in children and adults, must be taken into account. It is not possible to deal adequately with this topic here as to its reasons and causes, yet the intrusion of such trend in theorizing about lived meaning should be avoided. Some manifestations of such trend directly involved in the theorizing process would be technologization and compartmentalization of knowledge; specialization of intellectual labour without understanding of areas wider than one's specialty; ensuing elite-lay dichotomy; and instrumentalization of everyday life. To counter this

trend, an interdisciplinary, synthetic, participatory, and process-oriented theorizing activity is necessary, although it may be only one step towards the realization of meaningfulness in the lives of children, for which pedagogy is responsible. There may be little that a theory can do, yet the theory must have a scope wide enough to give an account of the general loss of meaning.

The model of the pedagogic development of lived meaning is dialogue. It is an asymmetrical dialogue in which only the teacher has the responsibility to understand the lived meaning of the child. Yet this dialogue does not arise in the vacuum. In order for the dialogue to take place, not in a passive waiting for mere chances but in a more active hope, it must also be rooted in the concrete child's situations.

#### 4. Outlines for Semiogenetics

I have articulated various aspects of lived meaning and I have sought directions and requirements in an pedagogically-oriented theory of lived meaning. In this chapter, I would like to pull these insights together and attempt to formulate a theory of lived meaning.

By examining the notions of lived experience and lifeworld in chapter 1, I suggested three directions to take for a theory of lived meaning. They were:

- 1) to start the theory from an intersubjective perspective,
- 2) to acknowledge the multiplicity of lifeworlds, and their historicity, and,
- 3) to regard meaning and experience as equiprimordial.

Further, I noted that in the pre-scientific, everyday lifeworld, the layers of transpersonal meanings are already at work, in conjunction with the personal and unique contextuality of the concrete situation of emerging lived meaning.

In addition, three requirements were clarified in 3.4, so that the theory of lived meaning shall be pedagogical. They were:

- 1) to capture the uniqueness of particular lived meanings in their concrete situations,
- 2) to be able to see the nascent meaning which is yet to be expressed in children, and,
- 3) to have a scope wide enough to account for social meanings, especially the loss of meaning in the society.



By regarding meaning and experience as equiprimordial, as in direction 3, the question of the emergence of lived meaning is brought to a more general question of the emergence of experience and meaning. The emergence of experience always relates to meaning, at least with respect to its explicability against the background of the experiencer's world. And the emergence of experience with meaning, i.e., the emergence of meaningful experience, is lived meaning.

Therefore, the expression "emergence of lived meaning" will be used also for "emergence of meaningful experience" and for "emergence of experiential meaning." To abbreviate the expression, a new term *semiogenesis* has been used to refer to this "emergence of lived meaning." And *semiogenetics* is the name for the research approach to this semiogenesis.

#### 4.1. Recapitulation of Terms

##### 4.1.1. Lived Meaning

A *lived meaning* is an experiential meaning, or a meaningful experience. It is explicable against the person's lifeworld and it is also relevant to the person who experiences it.

Seen from the intersubjective perspective, as suggested in direction 1, semiogenesis is a response to invitations from other persons in the intersubjective field (see 3.1). The intersubjective contribution is doublefold: in direct and indirect ways.

The other person in the intersubjective field, i.e., in the direct environment of a semiogenesis, brings his or her ways of making sense

the world into it. Even as a spectator, as in the example of the boy with three pebbles, the other person contributes to the semiogenesis of the battleship.

Indirectly, other persons contribute to a semiogenesis by way of the person's life history. A life history, seen from an intersubjective perspective, is the trace of past encounters with other persons. The meanings that have been shared with other persons are "sedimented" in the person's ways of making sense of the world. These meaning systems make up a lifeworld, against which lived meaning emerges. Therefore, other persons whom the person may have encountered in the past are indirectly contributing to any particular semiogenesis.

Each lived meaning is unique especially if its contextual contingencies are closely examined. But as we take a global perspective, as I did in 2.4., many lived meanings appear similar or at least related to each other.

For example, the shapes, weights, textures, and the configuration of the three pebbles, and the ground, the time, and the adult--the contingencies of the particular situation--were all important to the boy's semiogenesis. Yet, this lived meaning can be comparable with other children's lived meaning who experience a battleship over three, four, five, or any number of stones, or of any other objects, for that matter. The boy's lived meaning is unique: yet it is similar to the lived meaning of a spaceship in a boy around us who shows us a block of wood which he lifted up in his hand.

Understanding of lived meaning, seen from an intersubjective perspective as shown in 3.1, is its further co-constitution. It is a process in which "his" or "her" lived meaning becomes "our" lived meaning.

And as shown in 3.3, whether or not this understanding as co-constitution is pedagogical, depends on the quality of the lived meaning which has become "ours," especially the quality for the child.

#### 4.1.2. Personal Lifeworld

Lived meaning emerges against the person's lifeworld, the taken-for-granted world of everyday life, which has always and already some kind of structure. It is therefore necessary to explicate a lived meaning against the person's lifeworld, as shown in 2.2.

By acknowledging the multiplicity of lifeworlds, as suggested in direction 2, semiogenetics starts theorizing with the *personal lifeworld*. In this perspective, each lifeworld is unique. And each lifeworld changes, or has history. Lifeworld is a vertical section of life history, as shown in 2.3. From an intersubjective perspective, a life history is a course of past encounters with other persons in which various lived meanings has emerged intersubjectively.

#### 4.1.3. Meaning System

A *meaning system* is a way, mode, or style, of how a person feels, thinks, or acts. It is a habituated way of how a person makes sense of the world and articulates it. For example I feel, think, and act, or make sense of the world, differently in churches, schools, markets, or museums.

As habituated ways of making sense of the world, meaning systems have been "sedimented" in, and are part of the personal lifeworld. A lifeworld is a "stock" of these different meaning systems.

When a particular lived meaning emerges, a relevant meaning system, or a combination of relevant meaning systems, is at work in the lifeworld. Which meaning systems would be relevant for a particular semiogenesis is dependent on the situation. Yet a particular situation cannot "choose" a meaning system or meaning systems that have not been "sedimented" in the lifeworld. For example, a totally unknown object does not elicit any lived meaning, mainly because there is no way to make sense of it in the person's lifeworld. It will be simply unnoticed as such.

Meaning systems make up a loose hierarchical structure in the personal lifeworld. Similar and proximate meaning systems consolidate each other and make up higher order meaning systems. The ways I make sense of the world in dealing with bank accounts, securities, stocks and so on, consolidate each other to comprise a higher order meaning system which can be called my economic attitude.

Meaning systems, i.e., the ways we feel, think, and act, have this nature to combine and separate themselves, through identity and difference, through similarity and contrast. It seems one of the very natures of meaning to articulate, to make a structure. The reason why I chose a peculiar name for a meaning system is because the systems notion fits with this nature of meaning to make hierarchical structures with higher- and lower order meanings. One is separated into many and

many are gathered into one by the functioning of meaning through identity and difference, similarity and contrast.

There are multiple meaning systems that are mutually incompatible. The way I make sense of stocks is quite different from the way I make sense of friendship. And within the meaning system of stocks, there are many lower order meaning systems of the stocks of this company, that company, and so on. Within the meaning system of friendship, there are countless lower order meaning systems of friendship with this person, that person, and so on.

On account of the loose hierarchical nature of meaning systems, these countless number of meaning systems make up several highest-order meaning systems that are incompatible with each other. What we call religious, economic, aesthetic, political, and scientific attitudes are examples of incompatible, highest-order meaning systems. These incompatible, highest-order meaning systems are given the name of *apothegms*<sup>1</sup>.

When a lifeworld changes, the change can be explicated by the change, which include addition, disappearance, modification, consolidation, erosion, and rearrangement, of meaning systems and apothegms.

Emergence of new lived meanings changes the lifeworld by way of leaving a new meaning system. This is not a one-to-one

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<sup>1</sup> I borrowed this term from Harry Garfinkel at the University of Alberta. However, the "subjectivization" of the notion is my responsibility.

correspondence between a lived meaning and a meaning system. Nor is it an automatic imprinting of a new meaning system in the lifeworld by a lived meaning. Yet, lived meanings, i.e., the concrete occasions of articulating the world, induces the person to articulate the world in a particular way which the person has not done previously. Articulation has such a durable character. Even after the lived meaning is no longer lived, such way of articulating the world remains with the lifeworld. And the existing meaning systems are the remains and traces of the ways of articulating the world left by previous lived meanings.

#### 4.1.4. Social Lifeworld

So far we have limited our description of lived meanings, meaning systems, apothegms, and lifeworlds within the person. Yet, if we see different societies from a larger perspective as I suggested in 2.4, the notion of the socially shared lifeworld is necessary. This is not a regression to the Husserlian notion of *the* universal lifeworld.

From an intersubjective perspective, a *social lifeworld* is the taken-for-granted world shared by the members of a society. A society is possible only if its members have an intersubjectively shared world--and this is the social lifeworld.

Society comes in various sizes. There are small groups such as a pair of lovers, a family, and a circle of close friends. There are larger groups such as the children in a classroom in school, a local bridge club, the tough kids on the block, and a country and golf club. There are still larger groups such as the members of a political party, and the

subscribers of a certain national newspaper. Also there are large societies such as a district, a nation, a linguistic community, and a country. Further we can speak of the ancient society, the medieval society, and the modern society. Ultimately there is a human community as the largest society not conceivable with human members. Here I exclude animal communities of which humans are members and the organic community of living things on the earth, and so forth.

From an intersubjective perspective, each society is unique, just as each person is unique, if closely examined. And each of the socially shared lifeworlds is unique, just as each personal lifeworld is unique. A social lifeworld is a vertical section of the growing social history, or tradition, just as a personal lifeworld is a section of the growing personal history.

There are countless number of meaning systems in a social lifeworld. Yet these meaning systems form a structure, a loose bundle of incompatible apothegms which lower order meaning systems comprise. In a social lifeworld, as well as in a personal lifeworld, these meaning systems relate and sort themselves out, through identity and difference, through similarity and contrast. The structuredness, the available meaning systems and apothegms, and the richness of each meaning system, vary in different societies.

#### 4.2. Dialectic between the Social and the Personal

Each lived meaning is unique if it is closely observed. Yet, similar and shared meaning systems are found in the lifeworlds of the members

of a society. This is because lived meanings are concrete occasions of articulating the world and they are the different routes to arrive at this articulation, i.e., a meaning system.

In other words, a lived meaning is context dependent, whereas a meaning system is one step removed from the contextual contingencies. And the higher the order of a meaning system, the more it is removed from the concrete context. At the same time, a lived meaning can be shared only by the others in the direct situation of the intersubjective constitution. For example, the lived meaning of the bonus check I received just before Christmas of 1980 was unique and it was shared by the person in the intersubjective field at the time. Yet the sense of receiving a bonus check before Christmas have been felt by millions of people.

There is a give-and-take, or a dialectic, between the social lifeworld and the personal lifeworld especially with regards to their meanings systems. From the side of the society, a social lifeworld functions as the "stock" of the meaning systems available for its members. Some meaning systems in a social lifeworld are learned by its members through intersubjective semiogenesis in concrete occasions and these meaning systems become part of the lifeworlds of its members. The society does not automatically "mold" the ways of thinking, feeling, and action of its members. Yet, the members who grow up in it will pick up the meaning systems available in the society in the intersubjective semiogenesis with other persons, who are also members of the society. The meaning systems in a social world functions as the soil for the



emergence of meaning systems in the personal lifeworld of its member. The social lifeworld plays a role which is both formative and constricting on the personal lifeworld.

From the side of individuals, the lived meaning of a person, i.e., a new articulation of the world and a possible ensuing change in the meaning systems in the personal lifeworld, can modify the social lifeworld, if the meaning system is really new in the society and if it is learned by the members of the society through concrete lived meanings. Each of the meaning systems in a social lifeworld have been formed through such individual endeavors and concrete lived meanings. Personal lifeworlds can modify a social lifeworld through lived meanings and meaning systems.

#### 4.3. Strategy for the Multiplicity of Lifeworlds

Once we reject the Husserlian assumption of the unicity, homogeneity, or universality of *the* lifeworld, and once we start from the assumption that there are different lifeworlds, we seem to be confronted with the question of how to make sense of the seemingly unmanageable multiplicity of lifeworlds, as we have glimpsed in chapter 2.

The most thorough-going relativism would proclaim the uniqueness of each lifeworld, the uniqueness of the horizon of experiences in each person. It is true that each lifeworld corresponds to the unique life-history of each individual, which is a history of lived experiences that are also unique. This thorough-going relativism would

be useful, if our purpose of research is to understand the uniqueness of a person in the form of a case study.

Yet, if we want to understand and describe a shared lifeworld, the transpersonal powers already at work, in the constitution of the personal lived experience, this thorough-going relativism would have difficulty in accounting for the trans-personal. To make sense of the plurality of lifeworlds and modes of lived meaning, however, there have been two alternative strategies available. One is ontological, and the other historical.

#### 4.3.1. The Ontological Approach

The ontological exposition of lifeworlds would articulate the entire scope of possible human experiences and beings into several distinct realms of life, for example, such as art, science, religion, politics, and so on. This is the basic strategy taken by Eduard Spranger (1922), by Ernst Cassirer (1944), and, more recently, by Philip Phenix (1964).

Spranger provided six ideal types as forms of life (*Lebensformen*): the theoretical, the economic, the aesthetic, the moral, the political, and the religious. Each lifeform is characterized by its distinct way of feeling thinking, evaluating and acting, in short, by its distinct way of making sense of the world. Without claiming to be exhaustive, Cassirer articulated distinct spheres of being human: myth and religion, language, art, history, and science. Phenix proposed, as a grounding of educational curriculum, six types of knowledge: symbolism (ordinary language, mathematics, and nondiscursive symbolic forms); empirics (physical

science, biology, psychology, and social science); aesthetics (music, visual arts, arts of movement, and literature); synoetics (personal knowledge); ethics (moral knowledge); and synoptics (history, religion, and philosophy). Also Alfred Schutz (1974) proposed the finite provinces of meaning such as the worlds of everyday life, of dreams, of science, and of religious experience.

In each case the realms or forms of life with their corresponding modes of meaning creation is shown from the author's personal ontology which differs, of course, from other persons. At present I do not possess such an all-encompassing ontology from which I can view questions of lived meaning. Neither do I know a reliable ontology which was developed by other persons. Rather I see a plurality of ontologies with different articulations and emphases, just as I saw plurality in theories about meaning.

It may be the case that these ontological expositions of the different lifeworlds are the reflection of the actual lifeworlds shared by the theorist and the readers who approve the particular exposition, rather than the true description of the lifeworlds that are there for everybody. In other words, the ontological theory is merely reflecting the incompatible meaning systems in the theorist's own lifeworld.

On the one hand, reading these ontological expositions, I can see the distinctive realms of meaning-formation, the candidates for the trans-personal meaning systems which condition the emergence of a particular lived meaning. I can readily agree that we make sense of the world differently according to the realms of meaning. Appreciation of an

art work is different from its evaluation in economic terms or the politics of its criticism may involve.

On the other hand, however, I am aware of the danger of such ontologies, however famous their proponents may have been. Rather, such ontological expositions must be regarded as a reflection of the meaning systems in the theorist's lifeworld.

#### 4.3.2. Historical Approach

The second alternative to understand the plurality of interpretations of meaning is the historical approach. To historical consciousness, each distinctive age of a society as a whole, being made up of thousands of anonymous people and binding them in turn, appears with its distinctive style of feeling, thinking, evaluation, acting, production and so forth. The people in a society share a great deal of ways of making sense among themselves that with those in a different society remote in time and place. It is a historian's task to thematize a certain historical society limited in space and time, and in distinction from other ones. Thus we have the pictures of historical societies and we come to know the "minds" of the classical Greeks, the Romans, the medieval people, and so on. A successful historical exposition lets us breathe the flavor of a particular age or society. By understanding such a *Zeitgeist*, we become able to feel how the people in the age or society must have acted, thought, felt, believed, in short, how they made sense of the world.

This basic approach is shared by ethnographers who study particular contemporary societies, by biographers who describe the lives

of particular individuals, and by clinical psychologists whose work is in case studies. In each case, the purpose of such understanding is to grasp the uniqueness of a particular person or society in its fullness.

As we come to know more and more about different societies, however, we have come to distinguish as many *Zeitgeists* as the number of different societies. And often the relationships between them, continuity and change, difference and similarities, become blurred precisely because the historicist-relativist approach aims at the description of the uniqueness of the society or age in question.

The realms of making sense in one society may closely resemble others. Some meaning systems are common in many societies.

#### 4.3.3. Anthropological-Evolutionary Approach

At the level of society, we can speak of a lifeworld, more or less shared by many of its members. There have been myriads of lifeworlds in the human history. The lifeworld of a society is, however, not homogeneous, not tidily ordered, its parts being compatible or replaceable with other parts. Rather, from the beginning, a lifeworld is full of different ways of making senses; it is made of plural meaning systems that are relatively autonomous and mutually incompatible. Among those myriads of meaning systems, some have proximities and affinities with each other, in contrast with still others. These meaning systems that are closely related to each other form apothegms that are still more relatively autonomous and unchanging through time than each of the meaning systems. For example, the lifeworld of many

contemporary, industrialized, Western societies includes such apothegms of politics, economics, science, art, religion and others which Spranger and Cassirer described, whereas in a premodern society these may not be clearly demarcated. Therefore, we can envision a lifeworld with these different ways of making sense of the world. A lifeworld appears, also in this anthropological perspective, with incompatible apothegms.

Each of these apothegms are not the ontological and unchanging conditions of life. From the perspective of human history, each of them emerged in different time. Prior to this emergence, there had been no such apothegms in the lifeworld of any society. The difference of the lifeworlds of the modern society and of the premodern society can be made clear by the difference of these apothegms. And after its emergence, an apothegm has been generally modified because of the emergence of newer apothegms.

Also each meaning system has also emerged at a certain point in human history, even though it may be difficult to pinpoint the exact date of emergence, either because it belongs to the long-forgotten human prehistory or because we simply do not know.

Meaning systems and apothegms emerge, diffuse, change, or die, in short, they evolve. Meaning systems and apothegms in one society can be transferred to another. Within one society, they must be learned by the next generation if they are to survive. Both in extra- and intra-societal diffusion, a meaning system or an apothegm can be modified to "suit the need" of a new place or time.

The lifeworlds of various societies in the human history are not the starting points of such an approach. Rather, the difference of lifeworlds must be shown in light of these apothegms. The meaning systems are the starting points of coping with the multiplicity of lifeworlds and ways of making sense. And the meaning systems, as well as apothegms evolve.

For example, writing and reading, a worthy candidate as an apothegm that have anthropological impact on the way we now make sense of the world, has been said to have emerged about 6,000 years ago in Mesopotamia in human history. The exact date and place of the emergence of writing is not very important here. This writing has been passed on in many other societies, and modified to suit the local needs, and this process of global diffusion is still going on. Once a society becomes literate, this society comes to make sense of the world in a different manner than it previously did<sup>1</sup>. It is still part of the way we make sense of the world. The apothegm of writing in Mesopotamia may have been closely associated with meaning systems of book-keeping, arithmetic, religious ceremonies, and laws. Yet in the course of history, this apothegm of writing has changed its ancient character, in corresponding to the emergence of newer meta-meaning systems such as religion, science, and others. An apothegm also evolves. The meaning systems and the apothegms comprise the evolution of human meaning.

At an individual's level, a person's lifeworld evolves, beginning with the birth of the person, and throughout the course of the person's life

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<sup>1</sup> See, Ong (1982) and Goody (1986, 1987).

history. The lifeworld of a person changes as he or she grows older and gains experience. The lifeworld of a person is full of meaning systems that the person has learned. And the meaning systems that have mutual proximities and affinities form clusters in the lifeworld. These clusters comprise apothegms at the individual level.

A person can acquire a meaning system by learning it from others in the society, or, on very rare occasions, create it. But almost all the meaning systems are accommodated from culture through the person's encounters and dialogues with other people. Society can be conceived at various levels. If we imagine a very small society, it is possible for a person to represent all the meaning systems shared in the society in the personal lifeworld. However, in a larger society, it is impossible for any one to embody all the social meaning systems in the personal lifeworld. Yet, as a whole of millions of people, we can still speak of meaning systems. Apothegms of a social lifeworld are often embodied by intelligent and cultured adults in the society.

In the children's lifeworlds, the meaning systems and apothegms are in the process of forming. To learn a meaning system, however, requires learning in concrete and unique situations. Children cannot just learn meaning systems. The meaning systems must be "lived," learned through concrete situations.

Each lived meaning is concrete and unique. Yet, if we abstract it from the concrete situation of its emergence, and if we heed only its "content," the meaning system to which the lived meaning is closely related has been already there in the culture, or in the social lifeworld.



This does not deprecate the value of lived meaning. From the children's perspective every lived meaning is a challenge and discovery. And the meaning systems "in the stock" of culture are then concretely relived and re-enlivened by the learner and passed on with the possibility of modifications.

#### 4.4. Reflection on Articulation

In 2.4, while I briefly noted the different forms of meaningfulness in people in different societies, I described the functioning of meaning as articulation of the world. I also noted that the inherent working of similar and affiliate meanings consolidate with each other to make a higher order meaning under which these meanings form a hierarchical structure. Meaning seems to have much to do with articulation and structure.

It seems necessary now to attend to the notion of articulation which will appear often in what follows. An act of articulation and the resulting product of articulated structure shows the diversity of the reality or its aspect by exemplifying, typifying, emphasizing differences, or, in a sense, by a good exaggeration. Without such articulation we cannot appreciate the diversity of the reality although we might implicitly sense the diversity without much knowledge of the content of the diversity.

A good example is the rainbow. We say, depending on the culture in which we have been brought up, that there are six or seven colors in it, although the change of color (and the wave length of the light) is actually more continuous. The exact number is not important here. The actual rainbow is not a set of six strips of different colors pasted together. Yet,

the extent of the change of color is fairly well grasped by the demonstration by the six colors than when we only know that there are many colors in it. By knowing that a rainbow has red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and purple, one can get a fair picture of the rainbow, a much better grasp than the knowledge of mere multiplicity. And the articulation into six, or for that matter, seven or five, is sufficient for everyday understanding. It is a better picture than a coarser set of just red, yellow and blue. An articulation into, say, twenty-four colors is not more useful or exact. A good articulation has such a fictitious character, so that we can better understand the diversity of a reality with accentuating some of its parts. It does not mean, however, that any articulation can be acceptable, or that anything is as good as another since it is a lie. An example of a false articulation of the color of rainbow would be a set of black, red, yellow, and white. An incomplete one is that of red, orange, yellow, blue (the violet side is comparatively unarticulated than the red side), or that of red, orange, yellow, yellow green, green, pine green, blue green, blue, blue-violet, and violet (green area unduly articulated). A good articulation may be fictitious, but it must help us grasp the reality better.

Articulation is a heuristic that shows the diversity of the reality. As such human attempts at a better articulation is always in the process of making. And the reality may not "consist" of those articulated parts. We articulate what appears in our lives into a world with the help of meanings.

The example of the rainbow was an articulation of the continuous reality which is not articulated in itself. In many cases, however, the reality itself has articulated structures. Rain, snow, and hail are discontinuous in reality. What we do is to give different names to the explicitly articulated aspects of reality. In this realm we naturally believe that the reality is made up of those object-names precisely because the articulated structure of the reality and the articulated structure in language happens to coincide to a good extent. We are amazed to learn that the Eskimos use twenty different words for what we just call snow, but this arises out of the nature of their everyday life in which the conditions of the snow play a vital role on their lives. Different forms of snow have vital meanings on their lives and therefore they are articulated with corresponding names.

To take another example from history, a historical epoch as such the medieval world or the ancient world, is a product of articulating activities exercised by a community (or communities) of historians. With a good articulation one can come to sense vividly the atmosphere of an epoch. Without articulation into such epochs, one can hardly have the sense of the content of diversity. Semiogenetics, which is concerned with the genesis and development of lived meaning, will borrow the historical articulations relevant to its own topic. There are always contending articulations and names within any discipline; but semiogenetics cannot be much involved in the disputes within a discipline. It would borrow a better articulation, when it finds one. I think this is sufficient if the use of an articulation is a heuristic device to show

the diversity in a more comprehensible way. Accordingly, these articulated epochs and stages cannot substitute the reality. But the final understanding of the uniqueness of the lived meaning of a particular child in the midst of diversity of the reality lies in the hand of the teacher or the parent who is in the direct intersubjective field. A theory of lived meaning for its development in the child cannot and should not carry this critical role in substitution of teachers. Articulations are not a set of boxes into which concrete children are thrown into for easier management.

We are going to face many articulations, structures and types in what follows. But it is very important not to forget that the articulations are heuristic, a good and necessary lie, in order to better understand the diversity of reality. Out of such forgetfulness, on the one hand, arises the rigidification of reality in which articulated structure is substituted for the real. It would be a fetishism of the type. Out of the fear of such rigidification, on the other hand, there arises a myopic phobia of any structuring and articulation, which would not trust anything but a "pure intuition."

Articulation is not just a strategy in semiogenetic analysis. The word "articulation" derives from the Latin word *articulus*, a diminutive form of *artus*, meaning a joint especially in the limbs. This sense is retained in the anatomical or botanical usage of the word. Compared with inarticulate animals such as jellyfish and octopuses, the joints in articulate animals allow a greater power with the combination of appropriate muscles, for instance an ant can carry a heavy load three

times as heavy as itself. And it is due to the joints in our limbs that we humans can run, lift heavy objects, jump, and throw. But there are drawbacks to becoming articulate with joints. Unlike an octopus, we cannot bend our elbows and knees but in one direction. The force applied to the joint from a wrong direction would easily snap it off or sprain it. We can no longer escape through a small opening to freedom, like a captured octopus does through a small hole in the side of a boat. Articulation in its anatomical sense is already a double-edged sword. It enables both power and constriction.

Emergence of meaning is similar to the emergence of articles in the sense of joints. If we have learned to see the rainbow in six colors, children can come to image the rainbow better than when they saw just pretty colors. By learning to see the rainbow in six colors, however, they cannot see it otherwise until they learn a new way to see it. All our meanings give us both power and confinement. Perhaps it is the price we have to pay in becoming articulate in the symbolic sense of the word. A meaning, which is a way to see and constitute the world, gives us both the power to grasp the world better and the confinement it ensues. In order to go beyond the limits of the confinement, we have developed more meanings and we have become more articulate. Yet each articulation, each meaning, endows not only freedom but also constriction.

#### 4.5. Three Levels of Semiogenetic Analysis

##### 4.5.1. Macroscopic level

The notion of lived meaning already presupposes the working of meaning systems already operative at the level of the pre-scientific world. If a person's lifeworld is already immersed and embedded in the transpersonal meaning systems, then our first task would question what these transpersonal meaning systems are. And if there are countless numbers of different meaning systems, we need to articulate them somehow into a manageable diversity. There are many layers of such transpersonal meaning systems that "shape" the personal meaning.

As one direction of semiogenetic analysis conceived in the anthropological evolutionary perspective, there is the task to identify and describe the largest meaning systems, the apothegms, which still affect our way of making sense of the world, after having appeared in the human history at a certain period of time. These apothegms must have such anthropological relevance and impact.

In part 2 of this dissertation, some of these apothegms that are still alive and influential--and that are therefore shaping and binding our lifeworlds today--will be reviewed. It is not possible or necessary to know all the meaning systems that have appeared in history, but it is indispensable for an evolutionary theory of meaning to identify certain fundamentally different meaning systems. I cannot but feel here the long reach of Dilthey, for whom the history of ideas (*Geistesgeschichte*) and the comparative method were the main approaches of his human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*).

As another direction of semiogenetic approach in its macroscopic level, the developmental direction is conceived, even though it will not be

included in this dissertation. A child's lived meaning is delineated by, not only the meaning systems in the surrounding adults' social lifeworld, but also by the level of individual maturity of the child. There is a "developmental" path in which children are born, cry and smile, walk and talk and play, go to school and learn to write, go through basically scientific education, make friends and love, find a job, and so on. The necessity of an articulation in this direction is based on the everyday fact that a baby's lifeworld, an infant's, an adolescent's, and an adult's life worlds are different. They are interested in different things and they can do different things.

Although there are human wonders such as crying and smiling, a human baby's lifeworld at earlier months has much in common with that of animals. There is a continuity, as well as drastic change, between humans and animals, and between human and pre-human ancestors. Gradually the various apothegms such as body and language are learned through concrete occasions of semiogenesis, and the personal lifeworld undergoes qualitative changes. This developmental orientation can be articulated from a dialogical or intersubjective perspective.

Yet, it must be noted that this developmental path is not universal. What is taken-for-granted as a "normal" development is (in a hunter-gatherer society, in a domesticated society, in the medieval society, and so on) dependent on the kinds of apothegms and meaning systems that are developmental tasks in each of these large-scale societies on an anthropological scale. And these developmental tasks, the course of learning them, and the lived meanings in learning them will be the

curriculum of the society. Semiogenic analysis in its macroscopic level can contribute in these direction.

However, at this macroscopic level of analysis, the lived meaning of a particular person in a particular lifeworld at a particular developmental stage may appear deterministic or schematic. There might be a few misunderstandings.

First, the lived meaning of a particular person in a particular lifeworld might be misunderstood as a constraint on human freedom. The meaning systems including apothegms are the soil for children's lifeworlds to grow up with. They are constricting as well as formative. Only in such soil of the inherited meaning systems and a loose bundle of apothegms, the disorderly order, grows concrete lived meaning. Without acknowledging such social and developmental conditions, one would drift into a blind idealism of human freedom. Lived meaning is both creative and conditioned at the same time.

Second, to reach a more "developed" stage is not good or better in itself from a semiogenetic perspective. Lived meaning of a baby is as precious as that of a youth or an adult. Lived meaning of an autistic child is as precious as that of a "normal" child, even though special attention must be paid to the development of the autistic child. A meaning system with an older origin in human history is not "inferior" to or "out-dated" compared to that with a newer origin. It may not be impossible to introduce a new meaning system with an intent to "accelerate" the development, because lived meanings are constituted intersubjectively. Yet "rushing up the ladder" always leaves a reaction.



The same can be said of apothegms. A recently developed apothegm is not nobler or better than those with of older origin. Semiogenetics does not dictate what apothegms and meaning systems are desirable in a particular situation. The participants in the particular concrete situation are to clarify the meaning systems, and which new ones to introduce into the situation. Dialogical semiogenetics is designed only to help clarify the unmanageable multitudinousness into an articulate multiplicity. To repeat, semiogenetics is not to be used as a tool for a developmental race either at the social level or at the individual level.

#### 4.5.2. Microscopic level

At the microscopic end of semiogenetics, the genesis and development of a particular lived meaning, its minute changes of the lived meaning of a child or of an adult, can be described. The process of understanding the child's lived meaning is also a development of the lived meaning in the teacher. In part 3 of this dissertation, phenomenologically oriented descriptions of lived meanings, with its minute changes and its backgrounds are described.

#### 4.5.3. Mesoscopic level

Various monographs of particular cultures have reported their accounts. These have been produced by ethnographical and sociological research of the culture, of a certain community, school, family, peer groups, or any other particular group of people. Semiotic understanding

of a particular fashion, life style, way of speech, also belong to this level of analysis.

Yet, when an analysis at this level is attempted, it must be related to the apothegms and meaning systems that are sharable with other groups of people. And these meaning systems will provide a ground on which different groups, which these ethnographic reports describe, can be compared and related.

The range of mesoscopic studies of the transpersonal aspects of lived meaning can vary: the cultures of various social groups, historical eras, and spatial settings, and meaning systems particular to children with special problems and handicaps would yield infinite number of monographic studies. The scope of a mesoscopic analysis depends on the size of the particular society under investigation.

Also the individual direction is conceivable and various biographical and life-historical studies belong to this level of analysis. The present dissertation does not include descriptions at this level.

Semiogenetics as a collective endeavor of many researchers will be possible to give a fuller account of the changing meaning systems in the course of entire human history. It will be able to give a fuller picture of the development of lived meanings of children in the modern society.

Within the scope of this dissertation, it is not my purpose to give a monographic account of one particular lived meaning, one particular meaning system, one particular personal, or one particular social lifeworld. My intention is to delineate a research approach called semiogenetics as a whole, which would help us better understand lived

meanings in concrete situations and which, at the same time, would do theoretical justice to the complexities of lived meaning.

I believe that semiogenetics can encourage better understanding of the concrete lived meaning of this or that particular child. By being shown the diversity of the lived meaning in an articulate manner, one can get more flexible criteria for what lived meaning is and what is important to listen to.

Semiogenetics, which is dedicated to the study of meanings at the individual and social level, is dialogical and evolutionary. As a programme to understand the complexity of children's lived meaning, it also incorporates many approaches and theories that have been developed separately. Theorizing of meaning is an act of making sense of what has been said about meaning.

## **PART 2. Meaning Systems in the Anthropological Perspective**

Where does meaning come from? What is the source of meaning? What is the agent of meaning? There was a time when these questions were answered in direct reference to gods. As the etymology of the word "enthusiasm" shows, powerful excitements and uncommon experiences were interpreted as being possessed by a god. As long as the society held such an interpretation, the persons in their enthusiastic states might have actually felt the union with a god: they might have really "heard" and "seen" the god. As the beginning stanzas of *Iliad* attest, Homer prayed to Muse for "divine wings" to give life and spirit to what he was about to tell. And during successful invocations of the poem, the poet might have felt that he was actually uplifted and carried by the help of her divine wings. And in the poet's extraordinary performances, the audience might have sensed the goddess' help.

We can no longer entertain such an unequivocal answer to the question of meaning in our present-day society. To the question where meanings originate, not only god but also intuition, nature, reason, experience, imagination, feeling, history, society, and so on, may be given as answers--though not with as much confidence as the Greek poet once held. Perhaps we have too many answers. Having sedimented over centuries, various interpretations about what meaning is and where it originates, seem like a heap of "god-terms," a unmanageable multiplicity of opinions. This unmanageable multiplicity breeds our resignation and obscurity about the question of meaning.

To go one step ahead of this relativity of god-terms, beyond the obscure resignation about the question of meaning, is one of the aims of semiogenetic analysis. In the idea of semiogenetics, we acknowledged the multiplicity of our lifeworlds. Further, we acknowledged the existence of incompatible ways of making sense of the world, the plurality of apothegms, in our lifeworlds. Then our task now is to identify what these apothegms actually are.

The anthropological-evolutionary approach elaborated in 4.1.3 in part 1 suggests that any meaning system, including apothegms, has originated at some point in time and place in human history and then diffused so widely that it became part of the lifeworlds of many people today. If we look for these apothegms at their origins in human history, we would be able to articulate the apothegms, the very ways of how we make sense of the world, the higher order meaning systems that are incompatible in our lifeworlds today.

I would like to start the semiogenetic analysis, in this part 2, from an anthropological perspective with a hope to identify at least some of the apothegms that have anthropological relevance. In chapter 1, the apothegms of body, language, domestication, writing, and religion, will be shown at their emergence in the (pre)human history.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are descriptions of three apothegms with modern origin, namely, the Enlightenment-Scientific, the Romantic-Historical, and the Critical-Emancipatory meaning systems. There is a short review with some remarks at the end of part 2.

These apothegms that are described in this dissertation are not exhaustive, and their illustration may be sketchy. The identification of apothegms and their characterization may be elaborated and refined, in the long run, by the intersubjective effort by many researchers from as many different backgrounds. This scheme presented here is meant only as a sounding board for this semiogenetic analysis at its macroscopic level.

## 1. Meaning Systems of Premodern Origin

As apothegms of premodern origins in the human history, I would like to articulate body, language, domestication, and writing. The choice of these apothegms are far from new. Many thinkers, including those referred to in part 1, have noted these fundamental ways we make sense of the world, either as realms of meaning from the ontological perspective, or as different *Zeitgeisten* from the historicist perspective. My thrust is to ground these fundamental layers of sense making as apothegms in our lifeworlds, at the same time seeing these apothegms in their evolutionary process with origins and diffusions through concrete lived meanings in the human history.

At this macroscopic level of analysis, the concrete emergence of lived meanings will not be depicted. It will be a task for microscopic analysis as shown in part 3. Yet, the apothegms soon to be articulated are what comprise lifeworlds against which lived meanings emerge and against which lived meanings can be explicated.

Meaning structures associated with body, language, domestication, and writing, as well as other apothegms, are not conceived here as the transcendental or ubiquitous human universals, as the ontological approach would have them (4.3.1., part 1). Rather, I wish to show that they have emerged in our long history, that they have been learned and modified, diffused and changed, and that they still need to be learned in order to form the layers of the learner's lifeworld.

A few cautionary remarks are necessary. First, a meaning system at any level with a newer origin is not in itself better, stronger, or nobler than, or superior to, that with an older origin. Nor does a new meaning system simply replace existing meaning systems. The first view implies a developmentalist fallacy, which (having originated in the Enlightenment) still binds some of us, and which will be discussed in the next chapter. The second view contains a historicist fallacy, which will be discussed in chapter 3. Rather, the emergence of a new meaning system certainly modifies existing meaning systems, yet earlier systems usually survive in a modified form. The emergence of a new meaning system is to be seen, therefore, as a diversification; and the entire change of meaning systems brought about by the emergence of a meaning system as the evolution of human meaning.

Second, even though the expression of "diffusion," "learning," or "attainment" of a meaning system may be used at this macroscopic level of analysis, no one can actually learn a meaning system as such. What is simply called "learning" at this macroscopic analysis is always a very complex process if examined at the microscopic level of its contextuality. It will suffice here to say that this "learning" involves many concrete lived meanings. Even though the personal drama in "learning" a meaning system may be abstracted or overlooked at this macroscopic level, we must not take the process of learning as an automatic process of diffusion or as a deterministic conditioning of the personal by the social.

Third, because we inevitably carry our particular cultural backgrounds in which we have been raised, we need to be careful about



the biases that we bring into the identification and illustration of meaning systems and apothegms. We need to "bracket" our likes and dislikes of certain meaning systems as much as possible and attempt to see them from an anthropological perspective. As touched on in the introduction to this part, this can be achieved better in the intersubjective efforts of many researchers from different backgrounds.

Fourth, an apothegm will be shown through a group of related meaning systems, the ways how we feel, think, and act. It must be noted that these meaning systems also emerged at different times in human history. Therefore, the exact time of emergence of an apothegm cannot be pinpointed. Yet, at the macroscopic level of analysis, it is sufficient to say that an apothegm appeared some time along the emergences of these meaning systems as their higher order system. It must be also noted that apothegms are not constant, they evolve with the emergence of new meaning systems.

### 1.1. Body<sup>1</sup>

One of the basic ways that we make sense of the world is what I would like to call the meaning system of body, or the bodily apothegm. This meaning system has been with us since our prehuman days, and will remain with us for as long as we have flesh. Let me show how the bodily apothegm is at work through a simple example.

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<sup>1</sup> The role of body was reclaimed in the phenomenological tradition by Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Richard Zaner (1964). Recently its role in cognition was described by Johnson (1987).

When I am walking in a dark, deserted street at night, suddenly a huge silhouette looms around the corner of the next block. My body gets tense, no longer relaxed as before. The body is already making sense of the possible danger and preparing itself for it. The body senses what is dangerous and what is safe. It articulates the world in terms of danger and safety, and prepares itself even before our consciousness does.

The fact that the body articulates the world before, and much stronger than, our consciousness does, is also clear in our bodily feelings when we are about to fight in a wrestling or boxing game, in a street brawl, or in a serious argument. The pulse goes up, the muscles tighten, and the facial features also get tense. The bodily tension occurs not only before fighting but also in many other cases, for example, prior to a public presentation in front of a large and unfamiliar audience, where many people feel uneasy. And this uneasiness is bodily: it is a natural reaction of the body in an environment which seems threatening, dangerous, unfamiliar, or outright hostile.

Actually animals are far better than humans at this articulation of the world into safe or dangerous space. Deers and gazelles, rabbits and zebras are very sensitive and quick in reacting to the slightest signs of dangerous predators. Also fish are quick to discern what is dangerous and what is not, what is eatable and what is not: an instantaneous decision whether to flee or to stay<sup>1</sup>. It is no wonder they are good at it;

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<sup>1</sup> Animals do articulate their worlds and therefore we can speak of their lived meaning. About the worlds of animals, see von Uexküll (1921), a classic, and Griffin (1984).

their survival depends on how sharp and responding they are in this meaning system.

We share a meaning system of the body, whether instinctive or learned, with animals, at least to some extent. For example, we make sense of the world fundamentally in bipolar terms. The world appears to us as well as to animals either as a dangerous, unfamiliar, or threatening place, or as a safe, familiar, or relaxing place. One of the dimensions of the bodily meaning system is therefore the polarity of safety and danger.

We may be able to expand the areas of safety and to refine the demarcation line between the safe and the dangerous zones through experience and training. And in the human world of today, it is not sheer muscular power that is dangerous. We can learn what we should be weary of and what we need not to fear. Certainly we do not have to be a shy yearling all our lives. Yet this learning about safety and danger seems to be a matter of expanding the safe area, and not a matter of removing the polarity of safety and danger altogether. The articulation of the world into safe and unsafe space persists until the end of our lives.

The body also recognizes power and attraction in other bodies. Other bodies appear to us as powerful or powerless, or as attractive or repulsive. In our human case, many criteria other than physical power or physical attractiveness in other bodies are now relevant. The manifestation of power has changed and proliferated in the course of history: physical power, spiritual and magical power, birthright, status, money, intellectual power, creative power, political power, and so on. Yet, whatever form it may take, the meaning system of power has a

place in many modes of lived meaning today as long as there is competition. Power can be felt not only in relation with other fellow human beings but also with other animals and things. But at the bottom of this recognition of power seems to lie the bodily articulation of the world in this dimension of powerfulness and powerlessness.

Also there are many forms of human attractiveness. But the body articulates the world in this dimension also with non-human beings, and, conversely, animals do the same with humans. Animals, just like humans, seem to like some individuals more than others. We know this most readily if we have pets. Our beloved dogs seem to return our love. Without the help of the linguistic meaning system, your dog wags its tail when it sees you. Dogs recognize you with joy even after long years of separation<sup>1</sup>. Selective likes and dislikes of other individuals therefore seem to have been with us since our pre-primate days.

Another important dimension of bodily sense-making is the mother-child relationship in humans as well as in most of the mammalian species. For the mother, the baby appears as requesting love and care. The mother pours her love not only to her own babies but also to other small and dependent beings. And it is not only the mothers who feel this request from the babies. Many people, young or old, male or female, can learn to cherish and hold dear in what is small, depending and babyish.

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<sup>1</sup> One of the most moving parts in the entire story of *Odyssey* has close bearings on this meaning system. When Odysseus returned the home island of Ithake, nobody else recognized him but his dog.

This way of making sense of the world seems to have been with us since our mammalian origin. Strong bonding is formed between the mammalian mother and her babies who, after long period in her womb, still needs a long period of feeding. Some animal documentaries and stories of motherly love, and cases of self-sacrifice, seem so humane and move us to tears, because they touch on this meaning system that we share with animals. It is not important here whether the love between the mother and her child is a survival mechanism, a learned behavior, or an innate instinct in the mammalian species. What is important is that our bodies, and therefore we, pick out some beings as needing care and love and attach ourselves exclusively, sometimes to the extent of self-sacrifice.

Although there are sometimes human mothers who abandon or abuse their babies, this does not contradict that there exists a meaning system of love, most notably between mother and her babies, at work in most of us. And some of us have a wider range of people to offer our exclusive love than others have. And some people have longer-lasting love than others.

One of the most salient facial features of the primates is that their two eyes are placed side by side on the flat face. This is why monkeys look like humans, compared with rabbits and horses whose eyes are located on both sides of their heads. Some predators such as lions, tigers and wolves do have flatter faces than herbivores. The reason is usually sought in the need to measure distance by stereoscopic vision. Primates living in the woods need to measure the distance from one branch to

another before they leap. This might sound too physiological to have any bearings on our ways of making sense of the world. Yet it influences on a critical aspect of our sense-making. With this stereoscopic vision which enables distance perception, the priority has shifted to the vision over other senses. We are, by far, a visual animal and our world became primarily a visual one with the sense of distance. For us, things appear far or near in this world.

This also means, however, that the human auditory sense became secondary to vision and that the olfactory and tactile senses are usable only in short distance, usually in private space. We make sense of the world primarily through our sight, and other senses have become confined to more private space.

When human ancestors came out of the woods onto the plains a few million years ago in Africa, with a flat face and keen, stereoscopic vision, and other bodily meaning systems, the biggest locomotional change was that they started walking, a process toward bipedalism which may have taken more than a million years. The world must have appeared differently to the animal who could walk in the erect posture. Monkeys do climb up and down the tree and bears stand up to leave their claw marks on the barks of trees. Yet being able to walk and work continuously in the upright position has something very special about the human way of making sense of the world. We distinguish things not only in terms of their sizes in two dimensional space but also in the perpendicular dimension of up and down. Not only in its physical sense but also in its figurative and locomotional senses, this up-and-down

became the scales of so many things and activities in our everyday lives of today<sup>1</sup>.

Bipedalism allows the freedom of hands. Unlike those of other primates, human thumbs work from the opposite direction of the fingers and this allows holding things with finesse. We are not only visually oriented, flat-faced bipeds, but also the most manipulative animal that can use and make tools. Accompanying with the hand-and-eye coordination develops attention and concentration. Without selective attention<sup>2</sup>, it seems impossible to make a tool. If they did not use and make tools, our ancestors could not have survived without the natural endowment of claws, teeth, or fast legs. Without tools, we cannot survive for a day, then or now. The things in our world are articulated in the dimension of manipulation, usable or not, fixable or not, requiring attention or requiring no attention.

Ancient tools have developed from stone knives and spears, bows and arrows into the huge and complex machinery of today. Tools are extensions of our bodies, and therefore extensions of ourselves. But at

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<sup>1</sup> Mark Johnson (1987) has shown that the meanings in such expressions such as "we kicked him out of the club" (p.36) and "she backed out of her moral obligations" (p.37) are supported and grounded in our bodily locomotional ability to go in and out. He also analyzed such bodily movements of up-down, near-far, left-right, front-back, and toward-away from, and proposed the notion of "non-propositional image schemata" which constrain our mode of meaning. It is notable that prepositions reflect such fundamental modes of our body movement.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Wilson (1988, pp.19-21) argues the role of attention in the intersubjective dimension

the base of producing or operating any tool is the hand-eye coordination. Compared to our feet or nose, our hands make sense of the world by touching, sorting, arranging, manipulating, making, and pointing to things. We make sense of the world by our hands. And especially with the use of hands, we start making sense of our action in the world in terms of our skill, adeptness, and efficiency.

Our bodies, especially our faces, express our emotion which has also roots in the body<sup>1</sup>. Animals have bodily signs that shows their emotion; they do not conceal it. Many people can sense the basic emotions such as fear, intimidation, satisfaction, and pain in the animals they like. To be precise, the expression "read the body language" of animals is not correct. The emotions of animals are not "written," nor are they expressed in "language." But it remains true that our bodies have been able to make out the emotions of other bodies since long before the emergence of writing or language. This way of making sense is with us even today, as body language, even if our ability to "read" it has perhaps much deteriorated with the emergence of language.

I have sketched only a part of the bodily apothegm, a higher order meaning system which consist of subordinate meaning systems that I have illustrated so far. But it may be enough to show that we make sense of the world with our body and that there is a certain cluster of the ways of making sense of the world, even without any other meaning systems

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<sup>1</sup> I do not know when our human ancestors started laughing and crying, the bodily expressions of emotion only in the humans. As an example of hermeneutics of non-verbal expressions, see Plessner (1970).



or apothegms. The bodily apothegm has been with us since our prehistory and is functioning today even if it has been modified since then.

For us to be able to use the body, in other words, for the bodily meaning system to become operative, it takes time of training. The bodily meaning system, like any other meaning system, has evolved both in human (pre)history and in the developmental life-history. It took more than a million years for our ancestors to become bipedal walkers. It takes our children now a year or more to be able to walk. To be able to grasp an object coordinating sight and hands is a difficult task for a baby of a few months old. And it takes a lifetime or more to perfect or innovate a skill, whether it is throwing a spear at a fleeing animal or making a fine stone knife. The evolution of a meaning system is an endless process. Certainly there are some areas that have become less important in this evolutionary process of the species or the individual, such as the auditory, olifactory, and tactile senses that have been superceded by the visual sense, or the feet that was as adept as hands in chimpanzees and in babies. These are examples of what we had lost in the emergence of our human bodily apothegm. The emergence and establishment of a meaning system is an articulation of meaning, which contains both positive and negative aspects. Throwing a spear may be another skill which deteriorated in most of us today, which is an example of the changing relevance of a bodily skill with a tool. The meaning system of the body itself is changing in the human history. Yet there is a totally different kind of meanings at work once they emerged. Let us see it in the next section.

## 1.2. Language

With the emergence of oral language, which also must have taken a long time, our world has become symbolic. The use of language in our making sense of the world is so familiar to us that it has become difficult to recognizing the existence of other meaning systems. Perhaps no one can precisely know when the oral language, as we know it today, emerged. Obviously, it took a million years or more, a process of which we know very little. Perhaps it is enough here to note that *Homo sapiens sapiens*, the Cromagnon man of somewhere about 40,000 years ago, was said to be speaking a basic language as much as we do now. Even though little is known about the emergence and development of language, we can still say something about the particular ways of making sense once language is learned and used.

With the emergence of language, everything in the world has, or essentially is able to have a name. With the use of a name, what does not exist in the immediate perceptual field can be evoked into the symbolic world with a quasi-presence. This quasi-presence was at times felt as supernatural to many of our ancestors.<sup>1</sup> Magic basically seems to consist of this evocative power of names. While it seems possible now to explain magic as a confusion or inarticulateness of the real and the unreal, it is certainly difficult to imagine how language and its evocative power were actually felt by our ancestors. In children who start to

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<sup>1</sup> We may well recall here the beginning of the Gospel according to John.

speak, we can observe a similar magical stage, in which names play a very important role. At any rate, to think magically, language is necessary. Things, events, and people can have names. Even if we do not feel the supernatural power in language, we are still memorizing names and words today. Our world is full of names and words now.

Language allows us more than just names. It enabled our human ancestors to make exact plans for the future project such as a large scale hunt. It allowed to specify who does what exactly where and when for what purpose. The use of language must have given rise to a highly organized team of hunters, who could coordinate individual actions according to an over-all plan, a true menace to the animals, compared with a group of previous hunters who had had to rely on gestures and customs to communicate their intentions. Perhaps intentions and plans themselves, thinking for the future and our sense of future itself, are due to the emergence of language. Planning for the future has been with us since then. Even today, we keep thinking about future actions. Aimless wandering, for example, is now an extraordinary activity. Language changed our world by inserting into life the sense of future<sup>1</sup>.

Not only the future but also the past emerged with language<sup>2</sup>. Past events can be told as a narrative<sup>3</sup>. A successful hunt can be not

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<sup>1</sup> The price we had to pay is the fact we could no longer live like *The Lilies and the Bird*, as Kiekegaard (1941) advocated.

<sup>2</sup> Animals do have memories and these memories seem automatically selected on relevant occasions. However, without the language to organize and "tag" these

only enacted but narrated. Stories that one has heard can be retold. Stories can accumulate in an individual as well as in a society. These narratives in an individual form the awareness of the self as the continuous core of the past activities. And those that are shared by a number of people form the identity of the group. Whether stored in an individual or shared by a group of persons, the narrative form encourages the ordering of the past. Past events are given points of reference in the narrative and therefore with the help of language in terms of how far back they happened.

Animals certainly have memories of places, foods, enemies, and friends. For example, an animal may remember certain past experiences of danger or reward associated with a particular object or situation. Memories are thus in or with the object. Yet without the help of the language, the memories of these past experiences in animals cannot be actively recalled into the consciousness as quasi-presence; rather they assail the animal as if our nightmares assail us in dreams. Making use of language, we can now arrange past events in the temporal order. Any event, in turn, can be given a specific reference point on this temporal scale. With language our world is ordered and arranged, temporalized.

Also, with the emergence of language, we can tell others what we are sensing in the world. Instead of pointing to the beautiful dawn, awesome mountains, or a great herd of bisons to be hunted, we can now

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memories, it seems impossible to retrieve these memories voluntarily. Is this the reason why animals do not spend time in reminiscence?

<sup>3</sup> For the structures of narrative, see Toolan (1988).

speak about it. Our ancestors started expressing what they felt, sensed, and thought. And conversely, those expressions that were learned through language, have enhanced and shaped the ways of their feeling, thinking, and acting. This has been the same with us since then. I wonder how poor and inarticulate my world would be if I had not learned the ways to feel it, sense it, or act in it through language. Yet there is a drawback to this. Instead of perceiving a particular scenery in its specialness, we start making sense of it linguistically, that is too often through commonplace expressions that we have learned somewhere. It has become difficult to see the scenery with its freshness and its concreteness,<sup>1</sup> that is with the use of language which also has the tendency to generalize, typify, and compare.

Self is also a linguistic construction. Language allows each person a name, something special and uniquely exclusive to the person. Also with the narrative form which was enabled by language, past events and experiences, future hopes and plans, can be woven into a whole.

What we have seen above is tantamount to saying that language also enables the emergence of consciousness. Pre-linguistic ancestors as well as animals have awareness. Yet for awareness to become consciousness, language is necessary. If the most important function consciousness plays is thinking, then this thinking is an internal dialogue

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<sup>1</sup> Merleau-Ponty remarked about the difficulty we face in seeing things with "nacent words".

mediated by language. Consciousness is perhaps not so much an internal or inner world as an internalized dialogue<sup>1</sup>.

One of the most overt changes in the human world that took place with the emergence of language is that speaking with each other became the most common and frequent activity. We started chatting, quarrelling, arguing, and discussing. The most frequent activities of interpersonal relationship changed to speaking from the bodily activities such as hitting and patting, and back scratching and teeth baring. These bodily functions are not entirely replaced by linguistic intercourse but they have been superceded and have lost their previous exclusive importance. Bodily personal intercourse has been pushed into the enclave of the more private sphere. Language also permits precise orders of do's and don'ts, to keep out of a place, to keep off somebody, and to leave something alone. Language has become the main medium of communication.

Songs sung with words became available. Rhythmic dance with percussion can be accompanied by words. Story tellers and shamans who are good at storytelling and narrating and who can recollect vast amounts of past deeds emerge. The communal past is established through the stories of heroes and villains. The sense of belonging to the clan, identification of self through this linguistic construction, becomes available. The stock of stories would include neighboring bands to make

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<sup>1</sup> For notions of internal and overt dialogue, and of reasoning-for-oneself and communication-with-others, see Vygotsky (1986).

a synthetic mythology. Language can situate a person in the community and can situate this community in a larger whole.

In the narrative has emerged the after-world where the dead are regarded to go and reside. This after-world is also a linguistic construction. Without language, what cannot be experienced directly cannot be brought into a topic of deliberation. If the earlier Neanderthal man had the notion of the after-world, as suggested from their burial remains, then they needed to have a symbolic world, whether vocal or gestural. And if we fear death, it is since this meaning systems took hold.

Language includes basic numbers and counting activities. Measurement of quantity becomes available with abstract words and concepts such as numbers. Elementary adding and subtracting are embedded in language. And if we cannot help recognizing numbers of objects in our experiences, it is since this meaning system has become part of our lifeworlds.

Language permits questioning and explaining. Questions of who, what where, and when elicit names. The questions of why and how elicit answers of explanation. The question of "Did you ...?" forces the answerer the precise choice between yes or no on the deed that one did. The definite answers encourage the past and our experiences in general to become more precise.

It takes time to become able to think, feel, and act with the use of language. Like bodily locomotion, language must be learned in order to become an operative meaning system in the personal lifeworld. Learning and refining language, just as well as the learning of the bodily meaning

system, is an endless process. Just like the world of the body and its extension, the symbolic world can grow with more and more articulation if there is a need. Learning a language has now become a large part of growing up in the community which has a linguistic meaning system already in its social lifeworld. Without such a linguistic community, learning a language, or even inventing it is impossible by oneself, as in the cases of "natural" children who grew up in the wilderness. Also, there seems to be a threshold age after which compensatory language education does not work very well. We can understand this better if we remember that learning a language is fundamentally a process in which are involved not only what we usually understand as linguistic proficiency but also the very emergence of self and consciousness.

Becoming linguistic is not a blessing without drawbacks. These drawbacks include much more than our cantankerous orders and glib talks. We have lost our bodily ability to feel other persons' feelings. We are not sure of other people's feelings unless they tell us. We cannot usually keep on running until we drop because we are fearful of our exhaustion, whereas other animals can run until they drop. Further, our lifeworlds, which has the layer of language to make sense of the world, can become complacent. Unless contested, we can happily go on believing what we have been told, sharing illusions and insights with others. We can go on believing that what we feel and express is ours without recognizing that most of our experiences themselves are socially imposed. It has become extremely difficult to become aware of this cultural baggage.



### 1.3. Domestication (Settlement and Agriculture)<sup>1</sup>

By this rather unusual term, I understand the emergence of a complex of new sedentary lifestyles, of which the agricultural production and the house are its two most salient features. But these overt features are part of a configuration of meanings which I call the domestic apothegm. With domestication begins the sense of ownership of land, the yield, and the cattle that one has worked on over a period of time. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau already saw it 250 years ago, our ancestors have developed the sense of "right" over the product and the domain of their labour, and we still carry this sense of ownership today. Admittedly there were objects which belonged exclusively to a person in the hunting-gathering society. Weapons, domestic utensils, and clothes were perhaps thought to belong exclusively to someone. Yet, what belonged to someone were limited to these objects which could be carried from one camp to another.

With the emergence of the agricultural field which takes years to break, irrigate, and fertilize, to leave the place is not a sensible choice to make. The people are now bonded to a particular piece of land. The houses were built and humans became bound to them. And they started living in houses, a mode of living which has become "natural" to most of us. A house with its permanent structure of walls and roofs allows

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<sup>1</sup> I owe the notion of domestication to Peter Wilson (1988), a notion which includes changes of modes not only of the economic production but also of living, that again includes feeling, thinking, acting, and therefore meaning.

privacy. Previously everything was there to see for the members of the band, but now activities in the house are hidden from other people. With the emergence of the house, our world articulated into public and private spaces, an articulation which had not existed previously.

With the beginnings of the domesticated lifestyle, things can be stored and accumulated in the house, much more so than in the hunter-gatherer society where everything must be carried on the endless journey. Things in the private space of the house can be hidden and saved from the eyes of other people. Domesticated people started possession and accumulation, which is a taken-for-granted way of life for many of us today.

A house has an exterior and an interior. The exterior of the house can be kept clean or even decorated, irrespective of its interior condition. We come to know that other people cannot see the reality of the interior, the inner space of my private world, and conversely that I can not know the inner world of others. We are becoming conscious of other people's eyes and aware that the exterior can be adomed. Façade, clothing, and make-ups have origins here with the articulation of inner and outer space, private and public space. In addition to the ritual make-ups to honor or evade spirits of the past, we have now make-ups to look better in the eyes of other persons. It would not be too far-fetched if we trace the beginning of telling conscious and purposeful lies and the birth of the "seeming person."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A notion developed, in contrast to the "being person," by Martin Buber.

Also the tomb for the dead appeared as the house for the living emerged. Whereas the dead bodies were left, buried or not, with mourning at the campsite or on the way of their journey in the hunter-gatherer society, the dead are buried in the permanent tomb which can be built to reflect the power and prestige, if any, of the dead in this world.

I may have been a bit harsh on the domestication process. But houses brought about a different articulation of lived space. The house, however simple it may be, has sleeping, working, and cooking quarters, bath/toilet and eating spots, and entrance and storing space. It has, in a word, a structure, or it is one of the important sense of our notion of structure itself.<sup>1</sup> The space becomes structured and this has a tremendous effect on our perception of space in general. The world is articulated according to the model of the house, or the world already appears to us with such articulated structure. Or we learn the sense of structure through being brought up in the house.

With agriculture and cattle raising, emerged the sense of private ownership. Especially in the concentrated labour of grain farming, in which more work--such as breaking the land, planting seeds, weeding, and watering--yields more crop, the hard-working morality, typical of the

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<sup>1</sup> To Wilson (p.58-67), house is the basis of social structure, geometry, and symbolic thought, and it is also the mediator of body and cosmos. The way we make sense of a house with various rooms and furniture according to the human purposes, order, and values was taken as an example of the "objective spirit" by Dilthey .

agricultural society, emerges. Working hard and long, which did not mean much in the hunting society, becomes now a virtue.

Also saving becomes a virtue. Saving a part of this year's crop as seeds for planting next year's crop is an axiom of agricultural survival. And grain is fit to save, compared with meat which rots quickly. Saving and thriftiness become a way of life.

Without the necessity to carry them all the time, tools and the material to make them can become large and complex in the settled condition. Domesticated people showed accelerated innovations in technology of weaving, pottery, and metallurgy.

The farm land needs many regulation to be arranged with one's neighbors about the boundaries and water, especially where irrigation is employed. The places suitable for grain farming are more concentrated than the hunting grounds. Population density rises in such prime lands. Farming intensifies the conflicts to get a better place. With the growing regulations, the development of agriculture leads to a large scale society with concentrated population. It was necessary to regulate daily lives of the members to keep down the internal conflicts of the society by explicit rules and orders and by implicit customs and precedents. It was also necessary to develop solidarity among the numerous members of the society by way of myths and religions, festivals and fairs, markets and wars. What was spontaneous in the bands of hunter-gatherers became the means to promote the sense of belonging. Stronger sense of belonging to the society was thus formed, as well as many in-groups and

out-groups at various levels. All of these point to the emergence of political economy.

It is also in this meaning system that marriage as "wed-lock" appeared. Nothing has perhaps put a stronger impact on human love, sexuality, and family than this. The bond between man and woman becomes fixed so that the offsprings of this union can rightfully take over the land which was previously owned by the pair or the man. The sociological function of such a bonding is to clarify the line of inheritance and thereby reducing the cause of possible social disruption. The judgment between legitimate and illegitimate children, which made little difference previously, became a grave matter. What was a loose and open-ended bond based on emotion between man and woman now became regarded as closed. Often this bond is locked by religious or political authority.

Agricultural people are locked in the society as well as in land. This was the price they had to pay in return for a more stable access to food. In the band of hunter-gatherers, one can opt to quit and leave the band and join another one if one is strongly dissatisfied with somebody or something in the former band. The persons who leave one band can take all their belongings and skills with them. Starting their lives all over again in a new band is not so disadvantageous if a new band is found easily. At least there is always an open exit in the band of hunter-gatherers. However, with the emergence of agriculture, the farmers are locked to the field. But with the beginning of domestication, their world is closed now. They cannot carry their fields and their savings from their society.

It marked a closure similar to what took place with the emergence of the family.

With the emergence of political economy and the accumulation of wealth appears the phenomenon of systematic raids and warfare. Generally speaking, hunters did not kill each other inside or outside of their band. Apart from possible personal grudges, there were no reasons to kill people. Hunters killed animals to provide meat for the members of the band. But the concentration of grain and other goods provides an enticement for raiding and war. The defending settlers produced many legends of atrocities of the raiders and tended to become suspicious of, or even downright xenophobic of strangers, while the raiders cherished the big plunders and despised the settlers.

To become domesticated for a group of hunters takes time. If it is forced, the process is often unsuccessful even now. The children born into the domesticated society, incorporate the inherent structure of the house and the living environment in their growth as the model of their sense of structure, tidiness, and order in their worlds.

I am not going to elaborate the changes and modifications of these meaning systems. Yet these meaning systems comprise the domestic apothegm, which is part of the lifeworld of many of us today.

#### 1.4. Writing<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The literacy hypothesis in the form currently proposed tends to emphasize the role of alphabets (see, Goody, 1986, 1987, and Ong, 1982). Here, writing

With the emergence of writing, we have come to make sense of the world in a still different manner than previously. The origin of writing about 6,000-9,000 years ago was based on some important prerequisite conditions. Where writing first appeared, whether in the Mesopotamian cities or elsewhere, the domestication process had gone through a thorough development and the societies were already large in size and complex in structure. The lifeworld of these Mesopotamian societies was structured in terms of city and farmlands, of politico-religious powers and social stratification, of large-scale networks of exchange and transportation.

The first clay tablets with writing incised on them are found in the temples or royal courts.<sup>1</sup> The content of writing was determined mainly by those in power who brought kinds and amounts of goods to account. Writing was used for the book-keeping purpose. It enabled a storage of information the size of which far exceeding the memory of a living person. If tools emerged first as the extension of our body, writing started as the extension of our brain. It must be noted in passing that the need to write and keep books existed on the side of the power, whether it was religious or secular, and not on the side of the peasantry.<sup>2</sup>

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includes pictograms, syllabaries, and alphabets, and their possible impacts on the different modes of sense-making will not be elaborated.

<sup>1</sup> We skip the first forms of pictograms used as signs of private ownership.

<sup>2</sup> Self-sufficient peasantry does not need writing as we know from the vast number of Russian and Chinese peasants in the nineteenth century.

Writing brought about the means not only for information storage and retrieval, but also for an indirect communication. Outside the direct face-to-face situation, we can communicate with each other once we know how to read and write, whether the content of writing is a personal letter or a public proclamation. The literacy apothegms enables a vast expansion of the world, even if it is an indirect one, with a set of peculiar features. Also the symbolic world as the things and events that are written, relatively independent of the world about which is written, can become quasi-real, much more so than the oral language, because it can last for a long time.

The emergence of writing tends to reinforce the structuring and fixation of the world.<sup>1</sup> In what is written down, internal contradictions appear more salient than in speaking, simply because writing and reading synchronize the two sentences that have been uttered at different times and enable us to compare them. Whether in Greek mythology or in the Hammlabian Code, contradictions can be weeded out.

Writing and reading are linear activities, whichever direction letters are written. Writing prompts us to have beginnings and endings. It also encourages us to present ideas in the various order such as from easy to the difficult, from the fundamental to the trivial, or from the general to the particular. The ordering may be according to the temporal structure from the old to the new, or to the spatial structure from here to

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<sup>1</sup> The literacy hypothesis tends to emphasize the role of alphabets especially in this direction.



there. Here the sense of order and arrangement becomes highly important.

With the emergence of writing, we not only write more systematically than we speak, but also think, feel, and act more systematically. The emergence of writing has added another way of making sense of the world. Once we learn to write and read, the very way of making sense of the world receives a qualitative change that is peculiar to the literate person.

Also, writing tends to clarify truth from false. Whereas in the non-literate world, the argument of "I said so. No, you didn't." can go on endlessly, the evidence upon which truth or falsehood can be judged is left in the written world. Oaths, treaties, and contracts have more binding power when they are put in a written form.

The space is also structured along the line of city and country. Large farmlands need places of exchange. Networks of transportations over land and sea are formed. With the development of exchange appears its medium, in various forms such as shells and copper, but eventually money. Money is more readily stockable and portable, and less perishable, than other media of exchange. It is here that money becomes important. If some of us think that the world moves according to money, then this way of making sense of the world has become possible only after the emergence of this meaning system.

One example of how the literate meaning system works on the seemingly unrelated parts of life can be seen in the ownership of farming land. The sense of the right ownership is solidified if it is being recorded

in writing. There can be a recourse to the written documents, in principle, whenever the ownership is challenged by force or error.

It needs a training to become able to read and write, to become literate. In the course of human history, this is the beginning of the school. Oral language can be learned in the "natural" setting. But training of writing needs a school. Learning to become literate depends on many factors. First, there needs the reading material, the books, and opportunities to practice reading. Second, learners need a teacher who has learned how to read and write. Third, the society surrounding a student, be it a family, religious order, or the community, is able to feed the youngster during the period of learning. Fourth, there must be a need, a job, for a literate person in the society, whether in the royal bureaucracy or in the religious order. Without these supporting conditions writing can not be learned or taught.

With the institutionalization of school begins its function of social selection. Usually a literate person in the past had possible links with power because few people could enjoy the supporting conditions. And those privileged ones naturally tend to occupy occupations in the upper stratum of a society. Yet schooling meant and still means not only becoming literate but also becoming selected. The elementary schools of today seem to be serve the first function, whereas the entire school system, especially its post-secondary sector, is fulfilling the latter function of social selection.

## 1.5. Religion

The meaning system before the beginning of the modern age can be called the theocentric system or the mythico-religious system (Cassirer, 1944, pp.72-108). It is possible to delve into details of such subsystems such as Platonic essentialism, Aristotelian classificatory science, Democritean atomism, Stoic asceticism, primitive Christianity, Augustinian orthodoxy, Thomist incorporation of Aristotelianism, and others. Yet the Christian Middle Ages possessed common features which would mark this age in comparison with the Classical and the Modern Ages.

It is worth noting that the people who lived in the Middle Ages did not have a clear sense that they were living in an age different from the earlier period. There was a sense of division between the pagan era and the Christian era. But to them, the world seems to have a shorter history, or better, they did not have the sense of history as a sequence of different worlds. Their world appeared to them unchanging, perhaps in the order of thousands of years since Creation according to the Bible. Although they may have distinguished older pagan darkness from the Christian light, Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, were as relevant as Plotinus and Augustine, Abelard and Thomas Aquinas in the educated minds, whereas pre-Christian myths and customs such as Celtic and German myths, Scandinavian sagas and Slavic folklores, were overlaid with Christian rites and liturgies in the everyday world. The people in the medieval age were living in one undifferentiated world in the historical sense. The very name "Middle Ages" was an invention by the people in the Renaissance who felt radical strangeness with the long period that

separated their own time and the classical age with which they identified.<sup>1</sup> If not as much as "Dark Ages," the appellation "Middle Ages" itself was born out of such value judgment. In contrast with the modern people who have the sense that they are living in a period that is different from the previous world and for whom the previous ages are essentially alien and irrelevant, the medieval people were breathing the atmosphere which they thought the ancients had been breathing.

The medieval-religious apothegm can be best characterized as the static harmony filled with hierarchy which ultimately derives from God. There was hierarchy, the sense of qualitative difference, everywhere one looks; from the the seventh heaven through the sublunar sphere to the earth, from man through animals and plants to inorganic things, from royalties and aristocracy through various free and common persons to serfs and slaves, and above all from God and angels through humans to organisms and dead matters. The qualitative difference between classes in a hierarchy is absolute. Yet the world is familiar to humans as long as they keep their own places in it. To the medieval persons, the birds sang and the flowers bloomed in the glory of God to which all human conducts were believed to be in consonance after all.

Various forms of culture were taken as one or at least serving to the single whole. Learning was considered as one: philosophy, including sciences, was wedded to and grounded by theology. Painting, sculpture, music, literature, drama and other art forms dealt with mostly religious

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<sup>1</sup> See Bullock, 1985, pp.14-16.

themes, and they were in many cases part of religious buildings, ceremonies, and festivals.

As Christianity superseded the demythologizing culture of the classic Greco-Roman world, mythical themes were revived from both Christian and non-Christian sources. Especially at the level of everyday activities conducted in the society where myth is much alive, the world is "open" to the medieval people through ciphers and mystery.

The World "speaks" to man, and to understand its language he needs only to know the myths and decipher the symbols. Through the myths and symbols of the Moon man grasps the mysterious solidarity among temporality, birth, death and resurrection, sexuality, fertility, rain, vegetation, and so on. The World is no longer an opaque mass of objects arbitrarily thrown together, it is a living Cosmos, articulated and meaningful. In the last analysis, the World reveals itself as language. It speaks to man through its own mode of being, through its structures and its rhythms. (Eliade, 1963, p.141)

Not only the world is open, but also we are open to the world. The man in the mythical world,

feels that he too is "looked at" and understood by the World. It is not only the game animal that looks at him and understands him (very often the animal allows itself to be caught because it knows the man is hungry), but also the rock or the tree or the river. Each has its "history" to tell him, advice to give him. (Eliade, 1963, p.143)

In spite of all the wars and plagues, the Inquisition and witch hunting, famines and exploitations, the mythico-religious world of the Middle Ages is the world whose objects "speak" about their origins to us. There was a sort of basic communication among organic objects, plants, animals, and humans. It is a familiar, real, significant and meaningful world. In this world, myth reveals models of human conduct in it, reminds us of grandiose events of the Creation and thereafter, recounts heroic deeds of our ancestral heroes and saints, enables us to reenact this sacred history in a symbolic participation, and thus gives a meaning to the world and to ourselves.<sup>1</sup>

This is the meaning system of the Middle Age whose participants felt continuity, rather than discontinuity, with the Classical Age. The Renaissance can be seen as the completion of such synthesis of the Middle and Classical Ages, rather than the direct challenge to the theocentric meaning system, even though it was the Renaissance and the Reformation which prepared the modern outlook of the world and the people.

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<sup>1</sup> See Eliade, 1963, pp.139-145.

## 2. Enlightenment-Scientific Apotheism

As the medieval order of the Occidental world became increasingly eroded, by the expansion of commerce accompanying new geographical discoveries, by the breakdown of catholic unity of Christianity through the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, by the new interests in learning and art which collectively called as the Renaissance, and by the emergence of "absolute" nation states. The theologically based interpretations of the mediaeval age about the world, humans and nature could not remain unquestioned, as it had been over a millennium. Admittedly the Renaissance humanism did not dispose of the notion of Christian God; on the contrary, Erasmus and Melanchiton, Thomas More and Galileo Galilei, Michelangelo and Da Vinci, were all religious men. Yet in the writings of Machiavelli and Giordano Bruno, or more conspicuously in the paintings of Renaissance artists who chose more and more secular themes, we can feel the change of an overall orientation, a "new nerve,"<sup>1</sup> characterized by the assertion of humanity in contrast to their previous subjugation to God, with the beginning of anthropocentrism as against theocentrism in the Occidental World. This shift is a long process which is still at work today.

It is in the age of the Enlightenment in which one definite higher order meaning system crystalized. This is the apotheism of science, in close relation to, but with some important distinction from, what we understand by natural science today. The Enlightenment proposed a

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<sup>1</sup> See Peter Gay, 1969, p.6.

cluster of meaning systems, which are alive now. Basically as a merger of Continental European rationalism and British empiricism, but still embedded in the tradition of earlier theocentric concepts in many respects, the Enlightenment reached its climax in the days of Newton and Locke, Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. While the exact beginning of the Enlightenment is impossible to pinpoint, let us understand it here broadly, including both rationalism and empiricism, as its earlier stage. The beginning of the age is thus sought in the time of Galilei, Descartes, Bacon, and Hobbes. After it reached its climax in the mid-eighteenth century in the person of Newton, it would face successive criticisms and doubts from within the confine of the enlightenment and from without, from several sources of intellectual, artistic and other movements which would form another apothegm in the nineteenth century, the apothegm we will see in the next chapter. As we will see, Kant is the last great thinker to pull together loose ends of the Enlightenment meaning systems in a grand synthesis, yet at the same time, he is one of the principal persons, perhaps against his own will, who paved the way for the next meaning system.

Today we might answer to the question "What is Meaning?" or "Where does it come from?" by using such words as essence, truth, nature, quality, structure, law, order, or and other kind of "skeletal" entity that has an eternal validity. We may say that meanings reside in things and events, that we do not make them and we only find them. Whether immanent in the things themselves or transcendent beyond the world of matter and appearance, the idealities, orderliness, lawfulness of things,



events, or the world, in short, what transcends the transitoriness of the things in this hither world is referred to.

Also we might answer to the question "what is meaning?" by using such words as thinking, observation, scientific methods, and reason, the way to arrive at true knowledge. Then, meanings are supposed to reside in the process of our thinking as the way to arrive at truth. Meaning would be the opposite of falling into illusions and getting duped by superstitions and ungrounded tradition.

Both types of interpretation of meaning were formed in the age of the Enlightenment, and they are still with us, having firmly settled into our modern lifeworlds. For many of the Enlightenment thinkers, these two types of answers were felt not so contradictory as they may seem to us today. There have been fascinating arguments about the sources and forms of meaning using sometimes different concepts and words, and at other times the same words with a different sense.

It is difficult today to imagine the jubilation and certitude of the Enlightenment thinkers when they embraced Newtonian physics: the movement of all things on earth and in heaven are represented in mathematical formulae. D'Alembert, one of the chief exponents of the age, in fact rejoiced:

Natural science from day to day accumulates new riches. Geometry, by extending its limits, has borne its torch into the regions of physical science which lay nearest at hand. The true system of the world has been recognized. (cited by Cassirer, 1968, p.46)

The pride of the Enlightenment lies in the awareness that they have, finally and for the first time in history, found that they are now in possession of a systematic description of the things and events in the world, together with a sure method with which they can proceed in understanding the world. It lies in Science, they thought, more specifically, in the kind of natural science represented by Newtonian classical physics. The procedures of physics or analytical geometry, as they were sometimes called, appeared to Newton's contemporaries as science, experimental or natural philosophy (as Newton called of his method), or, more simply, as knowledge. It must be noted that Enlightenment thinkers saw no discrepancy between philosophy and science.

## 2. 1. Nature

The reason why the Newtonian system entertained such a pervasive and excited acceptance must be seen against the background of the Enlighteners' winning battle against the previous theological doctrines of the universe. The change of the sense of the word "nature" is very much helpful here to understand this context. In the Thomist doctrine that had synthesized Christian and Aristotelian views, nature meant what was "communicated to us through sense perception and its supplementary processes of logical judgment and inference, of the discursive use of the understanding." "The realm of nature" was contrasted with "the realm of grace" where understanding "is accessible only through the power of revelation" (Cassirer, 1968, pp.39,40). Far

from being confined within what we understand today as the physical world, "the realm of nature" meant the entire universe including human society and culture, all of which had been created by God. Even though they were contrasted epistemologically, the realm of nature overlapped ontologically with the other realm of grace. The distinction lay mainly in the ways we understand them. As such, one could speak of natural knowledge not only of the physical world but also of natural knowledge of law, state, and religion. There was not a clear recognition about the different methods necessary for understanding different fields of what we would today call the physical and the human worlds. Under this Thomist and scholastic system, which had attempted to harmonize both nature and grace, or both knowledge and revelation, reason was the servant of revelation, natural law having been merely a point of departure for divine law, and philosophy the handmaid of theology.

In the Renaissance era, nature came to be increasingly liberated from its subordination from grace, and was given an independent status of its own. As Giordano Bruno said, "Nature is nothing but a force implanted in things and the law by which all entities proceed along their proper paths" (Cassirer, 1968, p.44). Apart from its origin in the divine creation, nature had gradually come to be seen as a self-sufficient world with its own regularities and laws.

It is in the Enlightenment that the notion of nature took another important step. Nature was now understood not only as a self-sufficient world which moves according to its own regularities, but also as a world which moves according to mathematically formulated laws. This was

glimpsed by Galileo, who saw the stars in the sky first with the use of his telescope.

The book of nature cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures. (Galilei, quoted in Dijksterhuis, 1986, p.362)

Galileo is still using the metaphor here of "the book of nature" (*Liber naturae*), which had been popular since the middle ages, in which the divine plan of Creation, the "great chain of Being," was supposed to have been written. Yet its language, for Galileo, is mathematics; and with mathematical (meaning geometrical) knowledge he felt that the secrets of Creation would be revealed to him.

For Kepler, geometry was understood as coeval with, or even prior to God, since it is the law even God must follow in creating the universe.<sup>1</sup> For Kepler, God was no longer the arbitrate law giver but a subject to the natural law which preceded Him in time or rank.

For Descartes, who bridged geometry and algebra by the Cartesian coordinates which enabled the representation of geometrical figures by mathematical functions, the universe became the infinite extension in three dimensions. The medieval metaphor of the universe as a set of multiple yet finite spheres (remember the woodcut of celestial spheres where a philosopher-scientist is sticking his head out of the

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<sup>1</sup> See Koestler, 1968, p.535.

sublunar sphere and watching further) is now shattered.<sup>1</sup> And in his system, extension is at the same time body or matter, that are different in substance from ego or God, whose essence lies in thinking.

The nature of matter, or body considered in general, consists not in its being something which is hard or heavy or colored, or which affects the senses in any way, but simply in its being something which is extended in length, breadth and depth. (Descartes, 1985, p. 224)

There were two things involved in his system: the ontologization of mathematics, namely, the basic notion that the universe is mathematically made; and the substantiation of the "primary" qualities, in Descartes' case, of length, breadth and depth, and the ensuing devaluation of other "secondary" senses. We shall see the latter aspect again. The first aspect, the ontologization of mathematics, gathered more and more approval with the success of Newtonian physics. Mathematical predictability, whether of falling bodies on the earth or of celestial bodies in the sky, was brought about by the Newtonian formula of gravity, led to the general belief that the universe, or nature, is not only

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<sup>1</sup> "The whole universe of corporeal substance has no limits to its extension. For no matter where we imagine the boundaries to be, there are always some indefinitely extended spaces beyond them, which we not only imagine but also perceive to be imaginable in a true fashion, that is, real. (Descartes, 1985, p.232.)

"decipherable" mathematically but also "made" mathematically.<sup>1</sup> This is the ontologization of mathematics.

The ontologization of mathematics concurred with the mechanization of the world, especially when the world was conceived as having been created or made from outside. There was no notion that the universe or nature itself was developing or growing by itself. Thus, the universe was frequently understood by the metaphor of a gigantic, eternal clock, which was once created but needs no maintenance. Clocks were perhaps the most technological advance machinery at the time, and the universe itself was understood with recourse to it.

For Newton, this tendency toward complete mathematization and mechanization was not personally desirable. He believed that the agent who "carries" the gravitational force was God. Newton even speculated in the power of God for the reason why the universe does not coagulate into a ball by gravitation (Koestler, 1968, p.536). The metaphysical residue in Newton makes a marked contrast with his contemporary, Leibniz. Leibniz's God was the "God on the Sabbath Day,"<sup>2</sup> who, having done all what he had to do needed no further intervention with the created world. In this sense, Leibniz was "more Newtonian" than Newton. We may see an irony in such an independent journey of a

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<sup>1</sup> The worship of numbers and the degradation of others remains the backbone of scientism and modern positivism. "To the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; Modern positivism writes it off as literature." (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1986, p.16)

<sup>2</sup> See Koyré, 1957, p.240.

meaning system in spite of the hopes and intentions its principal founder. But this seems to be almost a "fate" of any meaning system. In the process of sharing and diffusion, the original lived meanings are modified to form a more readily sharable meaning system.

Space lost progressively its attributive or substantial character; from the ultimate stuff which the world was made of (the substantial space of Descartes) or the attribute of God, the frame of his presence and action (the space of Newton), it became more and more the void of the atomist, neither substance nor accident, the infinite, uncreated nothingness, the frame of the absence of all being; consequently also of God's. (Koyré, 1957, p.275)

Another aspect in the formation of this meaning system is the devaluation of "secondary" qualities mentioned earlier. Its beginning can be found also already in Galileo.

To excite us in tastes, odors, and sound I believe that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements. I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions would remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds. The latter, I believe, are nothing but names when separated from living beings. (Galilei, *Il Saggiatore*, quoted in Koestler, 1968, p.476)

In other words, only external shapes, numbers, and movements were regarded as real; taste, smells, sounds, and other qualities were regarded as mere "name," which means, illusion.

Descartes furthered this schism of the primary and the secondary qualities. For him, as for Galileo, only shape, size and motion are taken to be the real attributes immanent in matter. And he tried to prove that "secondary qualities" (sensations of external objects such as touch, taste, smell, sound; "internal sensations" such as various emotional states; and "natural" appetites) were derivatives of the first qualities.<sup>1</sup>

This devaluation and debasement of felt qualities is quite remarkable, and the degraded notion of felt qualities basically remains in Locke's psychology down to even today. Many scientifically-minded people would trust numbers instead of the felt qualities. But why did such depreciation happen? Is it because Descartes and Newton's sensations and emotions were mechanical derivatives of the first qualities, as their theories suggest? Or is there another reason? Perhaps what they thought really real, and what they were after, was the sure knowledge of nature. For them, the model to arrive at sure knowledge was mathematics; in addition, nature itself was regarded as being mathematical. And what was mathematically measurable at the time was shape, mass, and motion. Through this epistemological requirement needed a new ontology, in which only quantity is real and quality illusion.

This ontologization of quantity is part and parcel of the mathematization and mechanization of the world. It meant the dismissal from scientific and philosophic thought,

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<sup>1</sup> See Descartes, 1985, pp.280-285.



all the consideration based on value, perfection, harmony, meaning, and air, because these concepts, from now on merely subjective, cannot have a place in the new ontology. (Koyré, 1965, p.7)

The Newtonian system started walking on its own, perhaps against Newton's own intentions. In this Newtonian system, the notions of structure, laws, regularity, order and above all nature, as the embodiment of these networks, have become the sources of meaning. Or better put, these notions denoting a structure which is deemed to exist independent of our experiences, as "out there," have become the model of meaning itself. In this basic idea, meanings would be understood as existing already out there in nature; we do not make them, and we only find them.

The nature thus conceived is static, in equilibrium, already perfected because it was God's creation, as the majority of the Enlightenment thinkers believed.

Laplace who, a hundred years after Newton, brought the New Cosmology to its final perfection, told Napoleon, who asked him about the role of God in his System of the World: "Sire, je n'ai pas eu besoin de cette hypothèse." (Koyré, 1957, p.276)

The subsequent development in physics made it clear that the primary qualities, once supposed to be "ultimate," "original," "immanent,"

"irreducible," do not exist substantively.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand the "secondary qualities" can now be measured. For the heirs of the scientific meaning system, only what can be measured is real. The ontologization of mathematics and the devaluation of the secondary qualities, or the attitude to see quantity as real and quality illusion, has deep roots in our fundamental ways of making sense of the world.

In the age of the Enlightenment, there had not yet occurred the bifurcation between science and philosophy. As the title of Newton's book *Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis* suggests, mathematics and philosophy were still in league with each other, putting up a common front against metaphysics.

And it was Blaise Pascal, who was perhaps the most sensitive among the Enlightenment scientists who foresaw the future of scientific meaning system, according to the model of Newtonian physics or even Descartes' initial conception. As I shall argue in the next chapter, Pascal keenly detected a particular lack in this way of meaning creation. He named this lack as "esprit fin," in contrast with "esprit géométrique," which is perhaps a more elegant way to refer to the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm.

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<sup>1</sup> "Each of the 'ultimate' and 'irreducible' primary qualities of the world of physics proved in its turn to be an illusion. The hard atoms of matter went up in fireworks; the concepts of substance, force, of effects determined by causes, and ultimately the very framework of space and time turned out to be as illusory as the 'tastes, odours, and colours' which Galileo had treated so contemptuously." (Koestler, 1968, p.540.)

## 2.2. Reason

There are views today that would attribute the sources of meaning to mind, intellect, cognition, thinking, reason, innate ideas, or logos. If we take one of these notions which denotes rationality, this attribution of meaning is of the making of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm left an indelible imprint on such views.

The conception of the eternal idea and essence, the notion of *logos*, and the doctrine of eternal and transmigrating soul can be traced back to ancient Greek thought. The Platonic doctrine of true knowledge asserted that what philosophy seeks is true knowledge (*episteme*) which was contrasted with mere opinion (*doxa*) and with practical knowledge (*phronesis*). Perhaps drawing upon the Parmenidean doctrine of being, which is eternal, perfect, and intangible to human senses, and also upon the Pythagorean doctrine of the immortal soul, Plato established a theory of ideas according to which knowing is equated with "reminiscence" of perfect and unchanging ideas in the soul itself.

If Plato was speaking against the background of relativism and agnosticism of Greek sophists in the fourth century B.C., Descartes was also combatting the general epistemological cynicism and pyrrhonism widespread around the early seventeenth-century France, which extended from the elegant and tolerant scepticism of Montaigne to the remainder of scholasticism Descartes had found intolerable in his school days.

While deeply Christian, and retaining the hope for the ontological proof of the existence of God, as Spinoza, Leibniz, and others were, Descartes puts the "ego," the indubitable substance which survived his universal doubt, at the foundation of his system. In the paragraph following the famous one which contains the famous "cogito ergo sum", he asks what is this "I" in "I am thinking, therefore I exist."

From this I knew *I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think*, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this "I"--that is, the soul by which I am what I am--is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist. (Descartes, 1985, p.127. Italics added)

In other words, this "ego" is nothing but a thinking subject, which is a substance because it exists in and by itself, apart from my bodily presence, which belongs to another realm of extension and matter. This "I" is separated from dogmas, customs, and tradition, and also severed from the society and other persons. It is an ethereal and solitary subject with a determination to doubt everything, except for the italicized proposition in the quote.

For Descartes, ego, soul, reason, mind, and thought were names for the selfsame thing: a set of clear and distinct ideas, the set of true knowledge, that was implanted by God. What is usually referred to as the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter, soul and body, is actually Cartesianism which developed after Descartes. For Descartes, there

were three substances: soul, body, and God; or mind, matter, and God. Rationality as the set of clear and distinct ideas, the mark of soul or mind, was for Descartes a gift of divine origin. Rationality was guaranteed by the perfectness, goodness, and infallibility of God. Just as the infinite space of *res extensa*, where any body can be spatially located in the Cartesian coordinates, is a reality which is embedded in geometrical rationality, the soul in the immaterial domain of *res cogitensa* is embedded in the same type of geometrical and axiomatic rationality. For Descartes, "the 'archetypal intellect' of God was thus the link between soul and body, thinking and being, between truth and reality."<sup>1</sup>

Of course, as we know very well now, the notion of soul or mind, or the notion of reason and thinking, can be severed from Cartesian doctrine of God as the mediator between mind and matter, thinking and being, and can be maintained as an independent doctrine. And this is precisely what happened in what we call Cartesian dichotomy of body and soul, matter and mind. Just like Newtonian classical physics which outgrew Newton's personal metaphysics, Cartesian dualism grew into a coherent doctrine of mind, perhaps in spite of Descartes' own metaphysics.

The same argument can be made with the realm of matter, extension, or body, which are the same thing in Descartes. By giving the world of matter an independent status, although subordinating it to the world of soul or mind, Descartes nonetheless contributed also to the

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<sup>1</sup> See Cassirer, 1968, p.95.

development of materialism. The Cartesian realm of matter or extension, once liberated from his personal premise of God as the mediator of the two domains, and of geometrical orderliness, can be easily turned into a coherent theory of space and matter, perhaps not an atomistic view of bodies in the emptiness but a sort of field theory of space.

The notion of reason underwent a shift of emphasis in the eighteenth century, in concurrence with the rise of empiricism. Reason, which had been regarded primarily as a set of clear and distinct ideas by Descartes, was now conceived as an activity of the mind to arrive at the regularities which was supposed to exist in nature and which can be represented, for instance, by Newtonian physics.

It is no longer the sum total of "innate ideas" given prior to all experience, which reveal the absolute essence of things. Reason is now looked upon rather as an acquisition than a heritage. It is not the treasury of the mind in which the truth like a minted coin lies store; it is rather the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and determination of truth. This determination is the seed and the indispensable presupposition of all real certainty. The whole eighteenth century understands reason in this sense; not as a sound body of knowledge, principles, truths, but as a kind of energy, a force which is fully comprehensible only in its agency and effects. What reason is, and what it can do, can never be known by its results but only by its function. (Cassirer, 1968, p.13)

John Locke questioned the sources of ideas in sensation and reflection. Sensation as the sensed datum and reflection as the reflected sensation are, for Locke, substantive and are actually "moving about" in

the mind. Together they would become ideas--knowledge of true relations of things. Even though he argues that he would not be concerned with substance and locus of mind, his model is clear. The process of knowing or thinking is, to Locke, nothing but the perception of the connection or agreement, and the disagreement or repulsion of any of our ideas. Just like bodies in perpetual motion in the Newtonian universe that are pulled by gravitation, Lockean sensations and reflections were thought to be pulling (and pushing) each other in the mind. And the perception of such motions of ideas is the process of knowing. It is amazing to see a same way of making sense of the world at work in a conception of the universe and in the conception of the mind.

Knowledge worthy of its name, for Locke and many others, is conceptual; it is the perception of true relations of things. Sensations, or what is sensed in sensation, are only raw data, until they are "processed" by reflection. If we were to value reflection, not the sensations, as the agent of meaning creation, we might be treading in the Lockean tradition. Yet Locke did not question how reflection works on sensation.

Locke also inherited the distinction of the primary and the secondary qualities. On the one hand, size, shape, number, and motion were regarded as primary qualities that were immanent in the objects themselves. These qualities were supposed to exist in things even when there is nobody to perceive them. On the other hand, the secondary qualities such as color, sound, taste, smell and others were regarded as not immanent in the things themselves. The secondary qualities were supposed to be merely psychological or perceptual effects made on the

primary qualities. The secondary qualities are, therefore, not much different and almost indistinguishable from illusions or whims. One of the characteristics of the Enlightenment, whether in Descartes or Locke, whether in rationalists or empiricists, was this distinction between the primary and secondary qualities.

Experience is split into two separate domains: the immediate and qualitative, on the one hand, and on the other the quantitative dimensions that enter into the calculation of physics. (Barret, 1986, p. 99)

The notion of Reason, as well as that of Nature, were liberated in the high Enlightenment without recourse to a transcendent being, which had been given the role to bridge nature and human knowing.

The Enlightenment proclaimed the pure principle of immanence both for nature and for knowledge. Both must be understood in terms of their own essence, and this is no dark, mysterious "something," impenetrable to intellect: this essence consists rather in principles which are perfectly accessible to the mind since the mind is able to educe them from itself and to enunciate them systematically (Cassirer, 1968, p.45).

This happy marriage of Nature and Reason is precisely what made Enlightenment thinkers so euphoric. For them, Nature would surrender its secrets completely through our activities of observation, measurement, inference, and logical operation, in short, Reason--and Reason is the "natural" faculty with which we understand Nature. Nature was immanent regularities and Reason was the function to find



them; yet at the same time, Reason was inherent in human Nature. This mutual reinforcement between Nature and Reason had a similar effect as an unconditional guarantee between the two. The logic here would be similar to the one in the following: "What you see is real, it is Nature; what is really seeing in your seeing is also real, it is Reason, provided that you follow the method of Newton."

Reason was not just an abstract functioning in understanding the Nature of the things in the world. Much more was involved in its Enlightenment conception of Reason. Reason was thought by many to have been somehow "implanted" in each individual. It is in you, me, and everyone: it is what you, I, and everyone already possess and exercise every day. It is the same, in principle, in us all, although some may use it better than others, and some may not have "developed" it as much as others. Reason was now taken as the model of human experience per excellence; or, better put, Reason represented what the Enlightenment would have human experience to be. Viewing from a vantage point of hindsight, one may say that the "Enlightenment had defended the concepts of reason and experience without carefully distinguishing or identifying them."<sup>1</sup>

Then, what is the function of reason at the most general level ?

[Its] most important function consists in its power to bind and dissolve. It dissolves everything merely factual, all simple data of experience, and everything believed on the evidence of

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<sup>1</sup> See Solomon, 1979, p.118.

revelation, tradition and authority; and it does not rest content until it has analyzed all these things into their simplest component parts and into their last elements of belief and opinion. Following this work of dissolution begins the work of construction. Reason cannot stop with the dispersed parts; it has to build from them a new structure, a true whole. But since reason creates this whole and fits the parts together according to its own rule, it gains complete knowledge of the structure of its product. Reason understands this structure because it can reproduce it in its totality and in the ordered sequence of its individual elements. Only in the twofold intellectual movement can the concept of reason be fully characterized, namely, as a concept of agency, not being. (Cassirer, 1968, p.13)

While such a notion of the realistic presence and egalitarian distribution of Reason may be striking to their contemporaries as well as to ourselves of today, Enlightenment thinkers thought that not only the faculty of knowing but, in fact, all other mental faculties, such as emotion and willing, interests and values, were basically the same in everybody in any place and time. They even thought that the ultimate purpose of Man<sup>1</sup> is the same everywhere, although this ultimate end, such as food, shelter, and happiness might appear in different ways according to local colors. But their primary concern lay, not in local variance and particularities, but in general notions such as Humanity and Mankind.

### 2.3. Humanity, Man, and the Universal

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<sup>1</sup> This mono-gender noun is kept intentionally with a capital to retain its flavour of the Enlightenment.

The thrust of the Enlightenment and the scientific spirit was not limited within the boundary of what we understand now as physical sciences. Or rather, such boundary did not exist then. If the rational nature of the world, whatever this exactly meant to each of the Enlightenment thinkers, were to be accepted, then tradition, convention, or authority which has been taken-for-granted in the human and social world would not be able to escape examinations based on the principle of reason.

In the area of law, justice, and state, it was Hugo Grotius who first established the notion of natural law, reviving the Platonic doctrine of the "idea of the good," to curb the authorities of both the Church and the State, from a completely different standpoint.

The propositions of natural law would retain their validity even if one were to assume there was no God or that the Deity was not concerned with human things. (Grotius, in Cassirer, 1968, p. 240)

It is a clear statement with reference to the priority of natural law over the authority of religion in the field of law.

Grotius' approach to understand the social world is in close parallel to Galileo's approach to understand the physical world. Each of them assumed the existence of a "book" which is rationally consistent and "written" in the style of axiomatic propositions, exemplified by Euclid's, a book according to which the world, physical or social, had been created<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See Cassirer, 1968, pp.240-242.

Here again, we can find the same way of making sense of the world, an apothegm at work in its two seemingly different realms.

In *The Spirit of Laws*, Montesquieu examined various forms of government in the past and in his contemporary societies. He classified them into republic, aristocracy, monarchy, and despotism, and tried to find the "principles" that were deemed to guide each of the "ideal types" from within. He wanted to get at the "essence" of each type. Montesquieu had two aspects. On the one hand, he loved factual details and particular episodes; they were sifted and classified for the sake of extracting the laws or ideal essences they were supposed to exemplify. Facts, anecdotes, and references are important; yet what is important for Montesquieu is, not the mere aggregate of these details, but the essential structure, which is timeless and immaterial, behind and beyond all the factual details. The essential structure may be shown only through certain arrangement of factual details; and in turn the factual details may receive their true value, no longer as isolated incidents, but as examples of the "higher" rationality and in relation to other incidents. What appears to a spectator to be a tangle of accidents, a heap of multitudinous facts, take shape and make sense, as we penetrate into the chaos of social world, as if the chaos revealed the principles according to which it articulates itself. In this sense, Montesquieu was coming to be aware of the hermeneutic relationship of the whole and its parts. This is new; this is what distinguishes him from the atomistic theorists of the Enlightenment and this is what the next apothegm would inherit from him. We will see more about it in the next chapter.

On the other hand, Montesquieu's system was static; the ideal types having no history. Societies and governments may come and go; but the ideal types are deemed to remain identical. What Montesquieu wished to do was to contribute to the creation of a new moral and social order through advancement of knowledge, which was a widespread attitude in the Enlightenment. For example, Montesquieu traced connection between the forms of government, laws of a country, its climate, soil, and other factors. Physical factors undoubtedly influence the form of government; yet this is not determined or unidirectional. He talks of good and bad legislators. Bad legislators submit to unfavorable factors such as climate and soil; good legislators know these conditions and act on them, by alleviating them and compensating them. The knowledge Montesquieu proposes to found is the knowledge usable by these legislators. He wanted his theory to be of use in the task of establishing a better form of government.

From the tripartite system of government in the modern democracy and the notions of natural and "inalienable" human rights, to the freedom of belief, thought, and speech to the right of property, much of our daily lives is conducted today according to the ways of thinking, feeling, and action, the meaning systems the emergence of which Montesquieu and Locke contributed. If there were an incident in which we were robbed of any of these rights, and if we were to feel and think that we were unjustly treated and the situation should be amended, instead of just feeling anger, resentment, fate, or bad luck in the incident, then this very way of our feeling, thinking, and action is enabled by the

meaning systems Montesquieu, Locke, and others were consolidating. The Enlightenment thinkers were admittedly scientist-philosophers as they claimed themselves to be; yet they were not the scientist or the philosopher in today's sense. Unlike their latter-day descendants who seem to have been withdrawn into their specialty for whatever reason, the founders of the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm believed and enacted that advancement of knowledge brings about happiness in life, a better social order.

Even aesthetics was also preoccupied with the search for eternal laws in the days of the Enlightenment. The ideal in what is now called as the neo-classical era in the art history, the contemporary of the Enlightenment, was the imitation (*mimesis*) of the ideals of nature, the ideals achieved, they thought, by the Greek and Roman artists.

As there are universal and inviolable laws of nature, so there must be laws of the same kind and of the same importance for the imitation of nature. And finally all these partial laws must fit into and be subordinate to one simple principle. (Batteaux, *The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle*, in Cassirer, 1968, p. 280)

Nothing is beautiful but the true. Truth and beauty, reason and nature, are now but different expressions for the same thing, for one and the same inviolable order of being, different aspects of which are revealed in natural science and in art. The artist cannot compete with the creation of nature, he cannot breathe real life into his forms unless he knows the laws of this order, and unless he is completely imbued with these laws. (Le Bossu, in Cassirer, 1968, p.281)

We can see the same way of making sense of the world, by searching eternal laws and structures, spreading into many areas, of aesthetics, ethics, psychology, economics, jurisprudence, and political science, as well as natural sciences. And this is the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm.

#### 2.4. Enlightenment-Scientific Apothegm

There is evidence of a search for the universal in many achievements of the Enlightenment. Opposing xenophobia and religious intolerance, the Enlightenment thinkers spoke of universal and cosmopolitan notions of Man to cover the entire scope of human beings. Out of such general notions of human mental faculties, psychology was born as a branch of science. And due to such a neutral notion of man, which the Church could never tolerate because of its defiance to the doctrine of original sin, a new impetus that regarded education as a real possibility came into perspective. Man was no longer a sinful creature whose redemption, after all, required the intervention of a supernatural being. The perfectibility of Man<sup>1</sup> and society came to be discussed. It must be noted that many of the Enlightenment thinkers actually believed in such universal notions as real; the general was meaningful to them.

The Enlighteners looked at the world from outside, as if they were spectators with supreme intellects. They viewed physical or human

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<sup>1</sup> See Passmore, 1970.

nature, and tried to make sense of it as if it were composed of and moving according to its own laws. They sought for such laws in mathematical functions or, if it was impossible, in axiomatic propositions. To many of the Enlighteners who entertained the belief in God, such laws were thought to be the blueprints of the Creation. Enlightenment scholars in general had a static image of the world. In this view, the world is in equilibrium, it does not develop or evolve. Whatever changes is unreason, because reason is essentially perfect and unchanging. It is the world of being, in comparison to becoming.

Space was identified with the realm of geometry, time with the continuity of number. The world that people had thought themselves living in--a world rich with color and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with gladness, love, and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and creative ideals--was crowded now into minute corners in the brains of scattered organic beings. The really important world outside was a world, hard, cold, colorless, silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity. The world of qualities as immediately perceived by man became just a curious and quite minor effect of that infinite machine beyond. (Koestler, 1968, p. 549)

The Enlighteners did not feel the dichotomies between being and reason, between experience and thinking, between the physical nature and the human world, between knowledge and life, between thinking and feeling. Yet what they did was to split the world into two as well as to split



human experience into two. Only the quantifiable were taken as real and all else as unreal.<sup>1</sup>

In one "positive" respect, this system constitutes a careful check against fantastic or fanatic metaphysics, definitely a healthy critical glance compared to myths and illusions. The critical spirit worked very well then as well as today in many areas of natural science and in a vast realms of everyday activities. Historically it "woke us up" from the mythico-religious metaphysics and ontology. But Scientism established itself precisely when it held that there is no limit to the applicability of this system and that it exhausts the reality at large. By this, this meaning system is positing an ontology, establishing itself as a powerful apothegm.

It would be a mistake to understand the change of the representations of the world from the medieval to the scientific as merely a transition of world pictures. The spirit of the Enlightenment science lies in that the leading thinkers no longer take the authoritative and traditional views uncritically. What they demanded was an empirical evidence and the process to arrive at the views from evidence. The transition from the

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<sup>1</sup> Koyré says that the Enlightenment science "broke down the barriers that separated the heavens and the earth .... and it united and unified the universe. ... [However] it did this by substituting for our world of quality and sense perception, the world in which we live, and love, and die, another world -- the world of quantity, of reified geometry, a world in which, though there is place for everything, there is no place for man. Thus the world of science -- the real world -- became estranged and utterly divorced from the world of life, which science has been unable to explain -- not even explain away by calling it 'subjective'." (Koyré, 1965, p.23)

prescientific to scientific views is not a substitution of one world picture with another. Besides, the transition occurred not in a vacuum but in the midst of the felt constriction by the authoritative views. Perhaps the healthy spirit of science is epitomized best in Spinoza's words: "I would rather find the answer myself than to receive it from God." *Meaning has become the discovery of Nature by Man*, no longer the revelation of eternal truth from God. Even if meaning lies already there in nature and we only need to find it, we are the active agents in the discovery of knowledge, and no longer the passive recipients of knowledge.

Rather than physical prowess, glib verbosity, political power, or devotion to the supernatural, knowledge is now taken as the only path of reaching meaning. Instead of relying on the authority of wise men or the holy scriptures, this knowledge is achieved only through research by the rational and scientific method of quantification and measurement. And knowledge lies in obtaining laws and regularities of nature which exists out there, independent of our wishes or sorrows. By gaining knowledge, humanity in general would be able to regulate nature and society for the better.

It is not difficult today to find successors of this meaning system. All the studies that take for granted the existence of universal laws in the objective world fall under this category. Even in social and human sciences, a study which treats the object of its inquiry as independently existent of the researcher, a study which presumes that the researcher's attitude does not affect the fundamental nature of the object under study, is in the extension of the Enlightenment scientism. Even if the object of

study is human emotion or a certain society, a study which presumes the independent reality of the object of study from the mode of research and researcher, bears the mark of the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm. And its chief tool is quantification and measurement.

The Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm itself has evolved since. The evolution will not be described in this dissertation, yet it can be seen as a sequence of paradigm shifts.<sup>1</sup>

But a danger that is inherent in such a universalistic way of making sense of the world must be also pointed out. Suppose a person or a group of persons did not fit in the picture of the universalistically conceived Humanity or Man. Suppose that a person or group could not follow, or actively resisted the reasoning of the representatives of Enlightenment science. Then, within the scope of Enlightenment thinking, the person or the group would be regarded as irrational, lacking something of the ubiquitously acknowledged Humanity. The notion of Reason is pervaded by a sort of arrogance or non-negotiability. It implies that "I" possess the truth of Nature, I arrived at the truth by the use of Reason, I represent Reason; therefore, anybody who contradicts me is the enemy of Reason. The Terror of Robespierre did not happen accidentally in the course of the French Revolution: it is the typical style of the universalistic argument concretized. Further, "Reason was advantageous to the bourgeoisie, presenting itself as universal but in fact proving most favorable to a singular class of aspiring young men" (Solomon, 1979, p. 42). While this

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<sup>1</sup> See Kuhn, 1970 and Cohen, 1985.

aspect remained invisible until ideology critique was possible, it is the important aspect of the notion of Reason as well as of the Enlightenment way of thinking.

In addition, we might see another basic conception, behind all universal terms such as Reason, Nature, Humanity, Law, and Mankind, a conception which is still alive and powerful even today, a conception markedly crystalized to a degree which is rarely seen in other epochs. It is the conviction that:

One set of universal and unalterable principles governed the world for theist, deist, and atheist, for optimist and pessimists, puritans, primitives and believers in progress and the richest fruits of science and culture; these laws governed inanimate and animate nature, facts and events, means and ends, private life and public, all societies, epochs and civilizations. Thinkers might differ about what these laws were, or how to discover them, or who were qualified to expound them; that these laws were real, and could be known, whether with certainty, or only probability, remained the central dogma of the entire Enlightenment (Berlin, 1981, pp. 3,4).

In such an overall climate, to understand a concrete person or a particular experience did not emerge as a question. Rather than the meaning that is characteristic of you or me, the general make-up of Man was argued in terms of the mind's faculties of Reason, Emotion, and Willing. The distance between you and me, the difference and relatedness, did not come into focus at all behind the inclusive notion of Humanity. The Enlighteners thought rather that, if they could achieve

general concepts of what is Man according to this approach, there would be no need for such particularistic inquiries. Even in the sphere of aesthetics, what was then in vogue was classicism with its principles of imitation of Nature, or the ideal beauty which was believed to have been achieved by the ancient Greeks.

In a universe thus constructed, the question of meaning would get a special framing. In this system meaning is the nature or "essence" of things which is immanent in things themselves or the world itself. Even though this essence or nature is to be found, and not made, by the functioning of Reason, it is perfectly understood and reproduced by reason, since reason is also part of nature. And this nature, or essence, can be disclosed by the physical science method because nature's laws are "written" in such language. The question of the emergence of experience or meaning would be framed in questions as "What general conditions yield such a particular experience?" or as "What laws govern all forms of experience?" Lived meaning would perhaps be conceptualized as a function of physiological, psychological, and sociological factors that are objectively determinable. Lived or not-lived meaning would be taken to be already there in the experience. It is hidden yet it can be discovered. And once discovered, it should be the same in everyone. The main goal of science was to reach a true understanding of these regularities<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> This is the reason natural sciences and disciplines modeled after them were called "nomothetic".

In education it would be thus wide off the real thrust of science if we were giving a scientific world view to children as another authoritative version of the world. Substituting scientific facts with catechisms, scientists with priests as law givers, would amount to another mystification. The value of science lies in the critical attempt to check the various views handed down to us according to the empirical evidence that can be corroborated by any person. Science does not lie in getting the final answer in a mysterious way but lies in checking the systematic process to arrive at an answer under the supposition that every question has ultimately an unequivocal answer.

Excursus: Kant<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Before Kant

The subsequent radicalization of sense empiricism, which ran through Berkeley to Hume in the British empiricist tradition, questioned the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Among all the possible human experiences, Locke gave those in the quantifiable world of physics the true status and the non-quantifiable world a subordinate one. The primary qualities were therefore substantive; they were immanent attributes of things in themselves.

Then it was Berkeley's turn to deprive the primary qualities of their privileged status and to remove the boundary of the primary and the secondary. Because for him there existed no substance. Substance came to be understood as sense perceptions, without distinction into sensation and reflection. *Esse est percipi*: Being is what is being perceived. Some may object that there would be no world if everybody happens to be asleep. To this question Berkeley gave two possible answers: either take God as the omniscient perceiver of the constant existence of objects, which was adopted by Berkeley himself; or, give up the access to substance, objects, or things-in-themselves, altogether, as Kant would do later.

Finally it was Hume's "tough-minded" empiricism that took experience and functioning of mind as sense "impressions," which were

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<sup>1</sup> This section on Kant is unproportionally detailed. The reader who want a quick view of three apothegms are be referred to the next chapter on the Romantic-Historical apothegm first and come back to this section later.

atomistic and discrete, to include perception and reflection, thereby removing the rather mystical character in the notion of reflection. For Hume, the mind was still external to body, and the self became a heap of perceptions, or of atomistic percepts, which were supposed to be making associations by themselves in the void which is mind.

This view of the mind, as an empty space passively vulnerable to the intrusion of impressions and helpless to their arbitrary associations, was the end result of the British empiricist tradition. The function of human mind came to be seen as essentially determined, without activity or spontaneity of its own. There would be no room for rationality in mind. What was taken as scientific knowledge would be degraded into mere contingent knowledge, conditioned and determined by the contingencies that have produced experiences in scientists. In this scheme of the mind, reason can no longer be regarded as inherent in human nature. It is an irony that the endeavors to seek certain knowledge ended in skepticism about the possibility to arrive at any sure knowledge. This skepticism would radically trouble Kant as we will see in the next section.

Another problem which would trouble Kant and the next generation of people is the question of morality. Both for theists and atheists in the Enlightenment, morality was approached from the viewpoint of eternal human nature. But what is human nature? Is it self-interest against each other, "war on everybody else" as Hobbes had it, or is love of other persons part of the human nature as Shaftesbury and Adam Smith thought? This was very important because the notion of



nature was the most accepted one in the Enlightenment attitude. Yet how can we determine the human nature?

Adam Smith showed two attitudes to this question. As a theorist of classical economics, he supposed human nature to be self-interested. Following the Hobbesian view of selfish human nature, and at the same time following Mandeville's optimistic observation that "private vice turns into public good" his notion of the market system is a function of infinitesimal addition and subtraction of selfishness, the profit drive, into the direction of the general good. The calculative and selfish human beings participate in the market system, which works as a whole into the direction of desirable equilibrium.

However, as a moral philosopher, he could not reduce moral sentiment to self-interest. As part of human nature, love of self and love of others are contradictory. It is this tradition of moral philosophy in Shaftesbury and the Cambridge Platonists who had the awareness of a vague sphere of human existence which is regionally different from the natural or experimental philosophy. Hume was interested in establishing moral science,<sup>1</sup> yet even he does not even imagine that the realm of human existence may be qualitatively different from the realm of nature, or that two different realms require two different approaches for us to understand them.

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<sup>1</sup> This moral science became one of the sources of the conception of German *Geisteswissenschaften*.

What Hume questioned was the rationality of human action and motivation. Hume thinks we are moved to action more by passions, fear of pain and projection of pleasure, and less by reason which is the relations of ideas. Perhaps reason might give advice to passions as to its availability, the best means, the risks involved, etc., yet it is passion which is the main drive for human action. "Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of" (Hume, 1978, p.470).

To Hume reason was an instrument for detecting relations among ideas. In our experience of things in nature our impressions and ideas of them are ordered. But there is no guarantee that this order corresponds to the "real" order of things in themselves. There is no evidence to believe that reason and nature are parallel. What Hume questioned was the basic presupposition of the entire Enlightenment: the mysterious union of reason and nature.

As regards meaning, which had been identified with rational knowledge of nature in the Enlightenment, Kant inherited two different ways to understand it from his predecessors. First, from Humean skepticism about the attainment of sure knowledge, meaning as scientific knowledge would be questioned of its groundedness in reason. Meanings would be merely ungrounded impressions that might appear true and useful but which have nothing to do with rationality. Meanings as scientific knowledge would therefore be only what appears true.

Second, from Scottish moralists and Cambridge Platonists, Kant inherited the notion that scientific knowledge may not be the only mode of our feeling, thinking, and action, i.e., our way to make sense of the

world. There may be another mode of making sense of the world. More specifically, there is a scientific way of making sense of the objects in the natural world, and there is also another, different way of making sense of the moral and religious world, both of which were the same to him. This would suggest that for Kant there should be two different types of meaning formation.

## 2. Worlds of Kant

Kant is the founder of a theory, known as the Kant-Laplace hypothesis, about the formation of the solar system. It was already known at the time of Newton that the six planets and their satellites move in the same direction and that, more surprisingly, their orbits lie on almost the same plane. Newton did not question why this extraordinary coincidence exists but relegated this orderliness to the perfection in the work of God. He seems to have felt no need to explain the orderliness, perhaps because his universe was fundamentally static. He felt no problem in seeing God's manifestation in the observable universe, because his universe, as he personally conceived, was not entirely severed from theological legacies inherited from the previous age.

The same orderliness appeared to Kant in a different way. In such an extraordinary orderliness, he did not see a manifestation of divine perfection but a question which needed explanation in terms of the physical world. This is not because he was non-religious but because to him the natural order was separate from the human order of morality and religion. In the difference between Newton and Kant, we can see

changing views of being. In Kant, the physical world no longer touches on the moral world, and vice versa. And the physical world is coming to be seen from a historical perspective of genesis and formation. The two orders of the physical and the moral worlds, with their respective structures, were what Kant endeavored to make sense.

As we have seen earlier, the joy and pride of the Enlightenment rested on the happy marriage of Nature and Reason. And it also rested on an ontological assumption "that the whole of Being is pervaded through and through with mathematical law and, thanks to that, is really accessible to human knowledge" (Cassirer, 1950, p.2). Following Hume's skepticism, Kant problematized the ontological assumption of the harmony between reason and nature. He pushed the logic of the Enlightenment to the end, so to speak, and, by so doing, made room for the dichotomy of Reason and Passion. Science and Art, the rift which will be of central importance in the coming epoch and down to our days, the rift which is today still felt as unbridgeable. Let me show how he did it.

The major concern of philosophy before Kant was to question what Nature is, what are its facts and laws of the world. Philosophers also asked how they could arrive at such findings and how to tell that such findings correspond to reality. As its epistemological approach, some favoured the Cartesian rationalism, a system of propositions deduced from undoubtable axioms as in Euclidean geometry, while many others chose the empiricist strategy, starting with facts attained in the observation and measurement and gradually generalizing them into laws. As we have seen, both approaches were used by empiricists and

rationalists, and they concurred to establish science of the physical world.

The question of experience, or the question of mind in relation to its objects, was based on the assumption of the receptivity of mind into which external objects directly transport sense data ("sensation" in Locke, "perception" in Berkeley, "Impression" in Hume); or on the assumption of implanted rationality of mind which was supposed to enable a predetermined harmony between thoughts and external objects. Mind was understood *either* as a passive receptor of external stimuli, a receptor in which blind associations of inner and outer sensations make still more blind associations; *or*, a system of reason which is supposed to light up the objects in the external world so that they could take distinct shapes, a mysterious organ perhaps with a divine origin. In the former case its capacity to gain valid and necessary knowledge such as in mathematics and physics would be disclaimed. In the latter case, its capacity would be "embedded" in the mind itself so that the mind and nature of things would find each other in a predetermined harmony.

But there is one common feature which was presumed by many of both empiricists and rationalists before Kant. It is the conviction that:

there actually is a reality of things which the mind has to take into account and copy. ... Thus, although taken separately they may be thought in contrast to each other, their unity remains: both start with a specific assertion about reality--about the nature of things or of the soul--and derive as consequences from there all further propositions. (Cassirer, 1981, p.145)

It is the conviction that there is such a reality, an objective world, outside of us and independent of our understanding of it.

Now this conviction was to be radically questioned by Kant.

"How do we know that our (supposed) knowledge corresponds to the world?" With Kant, however, the question is rejected, and its inverse is raised instead: if we compose the objects of our experience through the use of our concepts, then *what must these objects be like?* In other words, what *are* these concepts? The question of the truth of our beliefs in corresponding to "external" reality is no longer intelligible. The world is what is constituted by us--constituted necessarily as a world outside of us, but not therefore outside of our experience. (Solomon, 1979, p. 122)

This is Kant's Copernican Revolution. Nature and Reason, which supported each other in the Enlightenment, were divorced now. Kant now takes the stance that reason is what constitutes the world and its nature. The previous dual world of subject and object, a happy and innocent marriage of Reason and Nature, is brought into the single world of Experience in which subject and object interplay, yet also in which both subject and object become dependent on this experience. The very notion of the self-sufficiency of the objective reality or of the universal reason is now rejected.

Kant described this single world through the analysis of the fundamental principles, or categories in his terminology, which enable Man to constitute the world as it is. To him, these categories were transcendental, or in other words, unchangeable and universal to all

experiences of all people, any time at any place. Precisely here, we can note the legacy, or the culmination of the Enlightenment notion of Reason, although the Kantian version gave it more power: the power of constitution. The agent of the functioning of such categories, called Transcendental Subject, is not a person like you or me, but an abstract and self-sufficient entity which is relegated a logical potential to reconstruct the world and itself without any help. The first push of God in the Newtonian system is no longer necessary<sup>1</sup>.

However, Kant also felt that there were two radically different kinds of experience. To him, experience is surely not exhausted by pure reason which produces scientific knowledge. He wanted especially to give an account of the kind of religion and morality in which he was raised, and which was excluded altogether from the realm of pure reason. What he did was to propose a "dual world" view in the universe, this time not a pair of Nature and Reason which he synthesized into Experience, but two kinds of experience and their correlate worlds:

first, the world of science and nature, or the phenomenal world, which is constituted through the categories of understanding [or Reason] so as to yield knowledge; and second, the world of action and faith, or the noumenal world, which lies outside the categories and therefore beyond the realm of knowledge. (Solomon,1979, p.128)

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<sup>1</sup> This is why the Critique of Pure Reason was read even by natural scientists throughout the nineteenth century. See Gadamer, 1985.

This is not the same step back to the duality of Nature and Reason. It was a step that functioned as a reclamation of the notions of god, religion, freedom of will, immortality of the soul--all those traditional notions that suffered from the hard blows from the Enlightenment, from the blows of associationist psychology, materialist views of Man, or the happy pair of Nature and Reason itself which claimed universality as a pair. By "giving room to" the realm of noumenon, in which moral and religious (they were the same for Kant) actions take place, with transcendental principles of ideas of god, human freedom, and eternal soul, he protected those traditional notions from the onslaught of Scientism.

For Kant, small-town bourgeois morality and duty received universal justification; the Christian faith whose millenium-old foundations he had utterly destroyed he nevertheless defended as rationally necessary and universally valid. No other philosopher has ever defended bourgeois ideals so profoundly, or, as Marx once said, "whitewashed" them so thoroughly. (Solomon, 1979, p. 135)

Kant is sanctioning not only the Pure Reason of noumenon in the moral and religious order of noumenon but also the Understanding of phenomenon of the physical world. On the one hand, it is a liberation for Science, as if it finally started walking on its own legs. On the other hand, it is a reclamation of the traditional, religious values. Science and morality can be happy and separate, as long as these two worlds are kept apart and one party does not transgress into the other party's boundary.



With this Kantian conception of the dual world, natural scientists would not be criticized by theologians for the moral or religious consequences their theories might accrue, and vice versa. Now we have two sets of making sense of the world, which in turn constitute two distinct ontological spheres. As such, Kant is a knot: behind him there are empiricism and rationalism, and in front of him there are scientism and idealism.

However, the real thrust of Kantian conception of experience lies in that the world can be understood as the correlate of the subjective acts of knowing. In other words, Kant's thrust in simplest terms would be that the world appears to us in consonant with the ways the subject looks at this world. In terms of meaning, after Kant's mighty justification, it became gradually accepted that there are two worlds, of the natural and the moral, and that there are two ways of making sense, namely the scientific rationality and the religious morality. Further, with the notion of Experience, in which subjects and objects interplay, and which has a transcendental structure, the idea of the meaning as articulation of the world became available. Admittedly meaning would emerge in the constitution of the world by the transcendental subject. And what this subjectivity really is remains ambiguous. Yet the following notion became available that our world is a constituted world, not an empty space in which sensations and impression of external objects freely interplay, but a constituted world with already some kind of structure. Our impressions or sensations of external objects are not "raw data" but

"processed data," processed against the background of this constituted world.<sup>1</sup>

Kant saw the common assumption of empiricism and rationalism and founded the transcendental framework in which mind and matter, reason and nature, are synthesized in the analysis of experience. In experience subject and object meet, but according to transcendental principles. Also, Kant separated the two realms of experience: morality and cognition; or Pure Reason or Understanding of phenomena and Practical Reason of noumena. But these are a synthesis of debates argued over the entire Enlightenment.

Yet Kant made another totally new thrust in the *Critique of Judgement*, in which notions of purposiveness without purpose is explicated in art and organism. Judgement, for Kant, is

a faculty of thinking the particular as being contained in the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given the Judgement which subsumes the particular under it is *determinant*. If, however, the particular is given, to which Judgement is to find the universal, then it is merely reflective. (*Critique of Judgement*, 179, quoted in Kömer, p.176)

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<sup>1</sup> It is only a matter of terminology, if we call this world the lifeworld in the Husserlian sense. In Kant, as in other transcendentalists to come later, this subject must have a universal status. It is a requirement which tasks the theory which would arrive at the one correct representation of the world, and which is not a semiogenetic requirement.

For Kant, this Judgement is a faculty which lies halfway between Understanding and Reason. It is referred to the function to see the universal in the particular, or the unification of the both in individual appearances. He takes examples first in aesthetic experiences. Judgement<sup>1</sup> in appreciating an art work is not the scientific understanding which starts from recognition of parts and generalizes into a universal law; nor is it the ethical functioning of mind which starts from intuition of general principles and deduces individual cases. Aesthetic appreciation, for Kant, is to see the picture, not as the sum composed of its parts, but as a representative of the beautiful in general. But the beautiful in general, unlike the ethical, is not a set of principles for Kant. Therefore, Kant needed to go outside of the rigorous transcendental framework of Understanding and Reason and tried to look for explicating "relative" relations between the general and the individual, or, in his terminology, the universal and the particular. There may be room for argument with Kant here.<sup>2</sup>

For Kant, what is beautiful is not a replica, mimesis, of external objects that are already beautiful; in this case, beauty would be the quality of the objects themselves. Nor is the beautiful an exemplification of unchanging, universal principles, like ethical and religious principles.

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<sup>1</sup> Reflective Judgement, in Kant's own terminology.

<sup>2</sup> We shall later return to Kant's argument: When I call something beautiful, I am making a claim that the object is not only beautiful for me but for everybody. (*Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §7)

What is beautiful in a work of art, especially in that of a genius, seemed to Kant, an exemplification of a whole, which is universal yet which grows, nourishing on the great works of geniuses. For Kant, the beautiful is found in the self-formative process, through the dialectic between individual art works of geniuses and the general whole of the beautiful. He seems to be developing the notion of the world of becoming, which is different from the worlds of being, the natural and the moral worlds he had envisioned before.

Where empirical observation perceives but things separated by space and time, where for it the world fragments into a manifold of unrelated parts, aesthetic intuition discerns that interpenetration of formative forces on which the possibility of the beautiful and the possibility of life equally rest; for the phenomenon of beauty and that of life both are comprised and enfolded in the single underlying phenomenon of creation. (Cassirer, 1981, pp.278-279)

This notion of "purposiveness without purpose" became important for Kant. "A totality is called 'purposive' when in it there exists a structure such that every part not only stands adjacent to the next but its special import is dependent on the other" (Cassirer, 1981, p.287). It almost sounds like the hermeneutic relation between the whole and its part. Such purposiveness can of course be the result of the intended purpose of the creator of the totality as in the case of tools and artifacts. But, unlike tools and artifacts, art does not exist, according to Kant, for something other than art. Yet we can sense such a unity of the whole in art. The aesthetic purposiveness of art may be closely related to the Idea

of art; yet it does not serve the interest of the artist or the connoisseur or any other purpose.

In a similar manner Kant found this "purposiveness without purpose" in the organism, especially in its development. The biological purposiveness of organisms was seen in the fact that the organism is not for the purpose for anything but for itself. It grows, moves, and heals by itself, reproduces offspring, and dies. The purpose of the development of the organism lies in the organism itself, according to Kant, and in nothing else. Organism is seen, like an art work, as an example of purposiveness without purpose, as guided by self-formative principles.

The realm of purposiveness without purpose is the teleological world, in contrast to the mechanical world. In the teleological world, organisms have their own ends in themselves. Toward this end an organism develops as if by itself, certainly not as the result of mechanical causes from outside. "A machine has solely motive power, whereas an organized being possesses inherent formative power" (Cassirer, 1981, p.337). A machine operates in the mechanical-causal principle, whereas an organism moves and develops according to the inner-purposive principle.

What Kant was exploring in the *Critique of Judgement* is clearly out of the boundary of the Enlightenment meaning system. The Enlightenment meaning system is alien to such an inner-purposive principle. The notions Kant explored in his *Critique of Judgement*, such as purposiveness, ends, entelechy, teleology, organism, development, self

formative process, and inner-purposive principle, will be directly taken by the Romantic meaning system which I shall discuss next.

In addition to the separation of two worlds of the natural and the moral, Kant elaborated the notion of the world of becoming. And this is the world of art and life, the world in which purposiveness without purpose is at work. This would be the world of art and culture, *Bildung* and self-realization, the rich world to be explored in the next apothegm.

### 3. Romantic-Historical Apotheism

What challenged, and is still challenging, the Enlightenment-Scientific apotheism, I would like to call the Romantic-Historical apotheism. By this I mean the extensive movement in many areas of human activities such as philosophy, science, art, music, literature, and politics. The most salient representatives of this movement are the historical Romanticism which emerged toward the late eighteenth century and flourished in the first half of the nineteenth and the historicism in the latter half, both of which found a receptive soil in Germany. The apotheism emerged in the configuration of many people such as Rousseau, Kant, and Vico as precursors; Goethe, Schiller, Heine, and Hölderlin; Wordsworth, Byron, and Shelley; Beethoven, Schubert, Chopin, Berlioz, and Liszt; Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Herder, the Humboldt brothers, and Ranke; and most of the novelist in the first half of the nineteenth century. In this dissertation, I can only depict this apotheism in its formation in the same period and will not elaborate its later development and ramifications such as realism, symbolism, and impressionism in art and literature; *Lebensphilosophie* of Nietzsche and Bergson, Hermeneutic tradition of Dilthey through Gadamer, and the widespread nationalist political movements throughout the world.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the extent of this apotheism and the related meaning systems in it, see Berlin, 1979; Gadamer, 1975, pp.153-234.

The Romantic-Historical apothegm is by no means limited to what is commonly called Romanticism and Historicism. The meaning system is at work in various forms of intellectual, artistic, and cultural movements and theories proposed in the nineteenth century and onwards. It is detectable, for example, not only in the reclamation of passion and emotion over intellect and calculation, and the sense of history as the organic development, but also in the subjectivism as against objectivism, relativism as against absolutism, particularism as against universalism, holism as against atomism, organicism as against mechanism, and voluntarism as against determinism as well as in the recognition of becoming and time over being and timeless space, in the yearning for the past as distinct from the present, and in the fascination with the particular as against the general.

But the Romantic-Historical apothegm brought about, first of all, the awareness of art as a separate life form from science, gave rise to the various historical studies of the different languages, religions, and cultures, and gave an indelible impact to ethnographic, anthropological and interpretive disciplines. The new paradigms in natural science since the nineteenth century such as geology, thermodynamics, evolutionary theory, natural history, and ecological and ethnographic studies influenced, and were influenced by, this pervasive apothegm. Many different ways of making sense of the world in various areas of culture formed an apothegm in a profound challenge to the Enlightenment. And this apothegm is still with us today, just as the Enlightenment system is with us, both of them comprising parts of the modern consciousness--the



lifeworld of the modern person. If we enjoy mountain climbing and hiking, or when we enter into a romantic love relationship, then the Romantic-Historical apothegm is at work in the emergence of such lived meanings.<sup>1</sup> And this apothegm can sometimes be found even at the cutting edge in some areas of contemporary sciences, for example, in animal ethology, ecological studies, interpretive and qualitative approaches in the human and social sciences. Whereas the most representative cultural product of the Enlightenment was natural science modeled after the Newtonian physics, the two representatives of this apothegm are art and history. And the rift between natural science and the humanities is still with us since the nineteenth century, in most of the universities today.

Just like the main notions of the Enlightenment had roots in the medieval notions of Nature and Reason, the roots of this Romantic-Historical apothegm may be found in the age of Enlightenment, in Rousseau's antipathy of the refined, intellectual, and cosmopolitan life styles of Voltaire and of the *Encyclopédistes*, in the aspect of enjoying anecdotal details in Vico, and in the Kantian philosophy of which I spoke in the last section. These persons had dual faces, as the champion of the Enlightenment and as the harbingers of the Romantic-Historical apothegm. And we cannot forget the *Sturm und Drang* movement which

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<sup>1</sup> Coleridge describes this in his letter to Sara Hutchinson. See, Coleridge, 1956, p.841. Earlier, the poet Thomas Gray was more ambivalent: he repeated the older view of mountains as mere barrier on November 7, 1739; yet in his letter to his mother he expresses the beauty of them. See Gray, 1925, pp.42-45.

produced such literary geniuses as Goethe, Schiller and Heine. Vico's conception of an historical "new science" was rediscovered by Herder in the late eighteenth century, and there was the revival of religion in the forms of pietism and mysticism, and Pascal's notion of *esprit de finesse*. Yet these notions and attitudes, which had been rather peripheral and scattered in the Enlightenment, now consolidated each other to form a Romantic-Historical apothegm.

I must also note a reactive character which was clinging to the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of Romanticism. First, Romanticism blossomed neither in France nor in England, the main theaters of the Enlightenment, but in Germany which was then anything but a loose ethno-linguistic community composed of some kingdoms and three thousand duchies and principalities. Although Germany had been under the historic sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire, it was "not holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire," as Voltaire once quipped. In the late eighteenth century and in the first half of the nineteenth, Germany was markedly a backward nation in terms of social, economic, and political systems compared to France or England, with a strong aspiration for a national unity especially after the downfall of Napoleon. In Germany, there were monarchs who took up and propagated the ideas of the Enlightenment, whereas in France it was the bourgeoisie in the struggle against the "tyranny" of the monarchy. Thus, "much of the energy that might have supported the Enlightenment bypassed it and went directly into romanticism" (Solomon, 1979, p.113).

Second, Romanticism was first of all an aesthetic and moral movement in reaction to the rational attitudes of science, which is the gem of the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm. Although it had some impact on and from some paradigms in natural science, Romanticism did not take shape as a new paradigm in natural science, nor did it provide a different sort of natural science. On the contrary, Romantic-Historical apothegm took shape as anti-Scientism in many cases, as a revolt against the Enlightenment. In addition, the actual Romantic movement was partly allied with the nostalgia of the previous theological system in its combat with natural science. Finally, the representative political stance of the Romantic-Historical apothegm tended to root, at least in many cases, in the conservative or the nationalist camp, being skeptical about the Enlightenment optimism regarding the progress of humanity through advancement of reason and science.

However, the true thrust of the Romantic-Historical apothegm, can be found, first, in the powerful movement in the aesthetic consciousness that pervaded art, music, and literature, and, second, in the new sense of history with a organistic view of society. And if the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm endeavored to arrive at general laws and principles with which to understand the world, Romantic-Historical apothegm endeavored to discover the concrete and unique.

### 3.1. Art as Reclamation of Feeling

It is not the Romantics who found feeling and emotions for the first time in history. Feeling has always had a certain place in any

psychological ideas in history. Plato used the metaphor of a charioteer, who represented reason, reigning two wild horses, representing emotion and will. Medieval schoolmen subordinated passion to contemplation but left room for faith--a phenomenon that involves not just intellect but all human faculties plus an extra-human function. Even the Enlightenment thinkers did not forget feeling and emotion. Yet the fundamental climate of the Enlightenment took only a secondary glance at the realm of feeling, morality, and aesthetics, for the scientists and the *philosophes* were generally skeptical about the aspects of reality which could not be put in numbers. As shown earlier, the aspects relating to human sensibility, feeling, and taste were lumped as the secondary qualities that were not much different from illusions. Emotion and feeling were subjugated under the triumphant reason or they were viewed as unnecessary or even detrimental to the proper use of reason.

In the mid-eighteenth century, the primacy of feeling was already called for. Unlike Descartes and Locke, David Hume, whose overall temperament and approach belonged deeply to the Enlightenment-Scientific, recognized in 1739 the priority of passion over reason.<sup>1</sup> What the Romantics did was a reclamation of feeling. They wanted to reclaim the wholeness of human experience that would include emotional, volitional as well as intellectual aspects, the wholeness that had been peculiarly lost, they thought, in the Enlightenment notions of Man. They

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<sup>1</sup> "Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." (Hume, 1969, p.462.)

placed priority on feeling and emotion over reason and thinking. Wherever their stances were in this spectrum, all of the Romantics could not tolerate the subordination of emotion and will to intellect, of aesthetics and morality by scientific reason. They did not subscribe to the Enlightenment preoccupation with Reason as the representative of what makes human.

It started in aesthetics. In the French classicism of the Enlightenment, aesthetics did not have different principles from science: its main preoccupation of geometry and perspective was perfectly scientific. As we saw earlier, it was believed that there were objective principles and laws that make up a "good" art. Some sought for those principles in Nature; then "good" art would be the imitation of Nature which was taken as ontologically rational. Others sought for them in the classical art of ancient Greeks: then "good" art would be a recapitulation of the eternal aesthetic principles that were believed to have been embodied in these classical models. The pervasive assumption was that those principles exist, have existed, and will hold in the future, governing the creative process of the artist.

With the subjectivization of the aesthetic started with Kant, art is now liberated from the burden of search for such objective and eternal principles, though at the cost of its claim to truth value. Although Kant personally believed that there were standards of good taste and good sense which he wanted to defend, "nature and art, truth and beauty, remain divorced; they cannot be reduced to one and the same denominator" (Cassirer, 1945, p.85).

In the Romantic period, however, a great art work came to be considered as a creation of genius, who was the representative figure of mankind. Unlike the scientist who obtains laws of the objective world by demonstrable process that starts with sense data, mediated by measurement, and culminates in generalized laws, the genius is believed to express the inner, subjective world, a super-rational world of feelings and intuitions. In addition to the born capacity, genius is supposed to have developed it through the personal experiences. A life of a genius, and what forms genius, they thought, are not the cool, rational process of observation, calculation and logical operation, but a "hot" process of real experiences, full of love and despair, struggles and conflicts, blood and sweat, laughter and crying. As Goethe made Mephistopheles say, "All theory is grey; Green is the tree of life." The yearning for life and experience, a craze for personal experience, can be clearly heard in Herder's words: "I am not here to think, but to be, feel, live! Heart! Warmth! Blood! Humanity! Life! French reasoning is pale and ghostly" (cited in Berlin, 1981, p. 14).

The emphasis of feeling and emotion was also clear in music. Most of what is now called as classical music, except for Bach and Handel, are actually part of what makes the Romantic-Historical apothegm. No longer merely the background music in the court dinners and dances, the music of Mozart, Beethoven and the musicians after them are trying to face squarely with their audience with their internal development of emotions. Beethoven and Liszt show the pride and power that they were no longer an accessory to the dignitaries, but

contributing to human culture through music. It was not only the emotion of the musicians but also that of the audience that mattered. When Chopin and Liszt performed, there was often an hysteria of shrieks, faints, and fits, which is not imaginable with earlier music.<sup>1</sup> Chopin is also the prime example who could express subtle shades of moods of joy and sorrow, tenderness and fervor, ennui and hesitation in his piano pieces that were played in many bourgeois families with the newly invented *pianoforte*.

Perhaps such subtle moods and emotions themselves may have emerged in this apothegm. In contrast to the sober and moderated relationship between man and woman in the Enlightenment era, in which the background of both parties such as birth, wealth, title, and intellect were coolly calculated, the romantic love may be characterized by the explosion of passion, the purity of the adoration of the other, and the total absorption in love itself. This contrast of two types of love is the central theme, of Jane Austen's intellectually cool novels; and the description of the latter with its typical intensity is the theme of Brontë sisters. In short, feeling is more important than property in the romantic love.

And what the novels, which would proliferate in the nineteenth century, write about is essentially this romantic love in its many forms and possibilities. It is impossible to say whether novels fermented, or reflected, actual romantic love. Both of them emerged at the same time,

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<sup>1</sup> We may find such impacts either in the modern "pop" music of the Beatles and Elvis Presley, and in the much older music which was not separated from dance and magic.

consolidating each other, and contributing to the sea change of our making sense of the world. The literature and love since the nineteenth century take on a markedly modern feature which can be readily shared by the some of us today.

Parallel with such a strong emphasis on the emotion, there emerged a sense of self-realization through such emotional experiences. The genius is supposed to need a dramatic and often tragic situation which challenges and strengthens the born capacity. The romantic love also needed such constriction. The romantic sensibility cannot grow in the flat and monotonous life of the scientist. Such total commitment, rather than the disinterested calculation, was regarded as having an educative function on the character of a person, the process of *Bildung*. To overcome an adverse situation, predicament and plight, was thought to have the value of *Bildung* which would leave a mark of wisdom and power in the Artist, the journeyman of life. The notion of lived experience (*Erleben*) is one of the late products in this meaning system.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.2. History as Living Tradition

For the Enlightenment thinkers, the differences in various groups of people were not very important; the difference in opinion could be dealt with after they have found "the" Human Nature. Difference, plurality, and heterogeneity were of secondary concern, or taken as errors resulting from human imperfection in the use of universal reason.

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<sup>1</sup> See Gadamer, 1975, pp.55-63.



Many of them were professedly cosmopolitan and derided the attachment to a particular cultural tradition as provincialism, as a legacy of olden times. Some of them, such as Condorcet and d'Holbach, conceived the universal history as a progress of Humanity, the process in which different societies play a certain role in a certain period. But their primary interest is in the history of Humanity in general and not in the destiny of a particular society.

The stigma of belonging to a certain cultural tradition seems easiest to be renounced if the tradition one belongs to happens to be that of the dominant at the time. And by renouncing or forgetting one's indebtedness to the dominant but still particular tradition, one can be easily led into believing that what is valid for oneself is also valid for everybody. Universalistic thinking falls easily to absolutism.

It was in Herder that we could hear the healthy proclamation of one's identity as well as the challenge to the hypocrisy of the liberally-intentioned universals. I have already quoted Herder's words: "I am not here to think, but to be, feel, live! Heart! Warmth! Blood! Humanity! Life! French reasoning is pale and ghostly." We may have noted the last part of this quotation. In this we can note the clear message of the Romantic age: a healthy self-assertion of one's own cultural tradition, in his case German, which, he must have thought, was not pale or ghostly.

In the new apothegm, to acknowledge the power of tradition is not to be ashamed of, as the Enlightenment philosophers would have thought. The tradition that shapes each of us is not an entity one can analyze and dissect into its parts and then reassemble. Life will be killed in this

process of dissection and the result of reassembling would be a heap of dead parts. Neither can tradition be reduced to a set of unalterable principles. The tradition has its own life, an inner force and an inner rhythm of ups and downs, so to speak, as if it were a living organism. The turns and choices that a certain tradition has taken in the critical moments of its history are the very essence of this tradition. It cannot be grasped by the Enlightenment Reason; it must be *felt* from within, by belonging to it, or by having been brought up in it, to be properly understood. Description of a tradition from an outsider's point of view, however accurate it may be, somehow renders it flat and dull, and finally kills the life and energy inherent in it. Outsider's point of view cannot describe the life of tradition.

With Herder, who "found" Vico, we come to face a different sense of history: history as a living force, not simply a succession of events. The true carriers of history are societies or cultures but never Humanity. To understand history, then, requires a totally different mode of inquiry from that of the science of the Enlightenment. It is:

to understand what men made of the world in which they found themselves, what they demanded of it, what their felt needs, aims, ideals were. ... To do this one must possess imaginative power of a high degree, such as artists, and in particular, novelists require. (Berlin, 1981, pp. 105,106)

It is the capacity which Vico called "fantasia" and which Herder called "empathy". For example, it is the capacity:

to imagine "what it must have been like" to think, feel, act in Homeric Greece, in the Rome of the Twelve Tables, in Phoenician colonies given to human sacrifice, or in cultures less remote or exotic but still requiring suspension of the most deep-lying assumptions of the inquirer's own civilization. (Berlin, 1981, p. 117)

The discovery of the *Volk*, enthusiastic nostalgia in the Germanic Middle Age, collection of folklores and ballads, philological and lexicographical scholarship, by Humbolt and the Grimm brothers--all of these point to the new forms and sources of meaning in the counter-Enlightenment.

It must be noted that Herder was not an ethnocentrist. With a fundamental conception of the "plurality of incommensurable cultures" (Berlin, 1981, p. 12), Herder came to think that:

the language of so-called primitives is not an imperfect rendering of what later generations will express more accurately: it embodies its own unique vision of the world, which can be grasped, but not translated totally into the language of another culture. One culture is not a less perfect version of another: winter is not a rudimentary spring; summer is not an undeveloped autumn. (Berlin, 1981, p. 108)

In the Romantic-Historical apothegm, the learning of one's own tradition was understood to have a formative effect for the *Bildung* of the person. Its purpose is not the satisfaction of one's intellectual curiosity, but a discovery of one's own roots, which is an essential part of self-realization. Instead of being a rational, cosmopolitan scientist in the

Enlightenment, the Romantic person was supposed to be rooted in tradition. To become such a person, one must find one's true identity by learning of tradition. And by being learned by many such individuals, the tradition is enlivened.

### 3.3. Romantic-Historical Apothegm

Lived meaning is closely related to understanding and knowing. After all, making sense cannot be severed from the product or the process of knowing, even though the knowing meant here is used in a much broader sense than the usual notion of conceptual and intellectual knowing.

But the kind of knowledge obtained here is important. About the knowing which is representative of Romanticism, especially of Herder, Isaiah Berlin again gives us a superb description.

This is the sort of knowing which participants in an activity claim to possess as against mere observers; the knowledge of the actors, as against that of the audience, of the "inside" story as opposed to that obtained from some "outside" vantage point; knowledge by "direct acquaintance" with my "inner" state or by sympathetic insight into those of other, which may be obtained by a high degree of imaginative power; the knowledge that is involved when a work of the imagination or of social diagnosis or a work of criticism or scholarship or history is described not as correct or incorrect, skilful or inept, a success or a failure, but as profound or shallow, realistic or unrealistic, perceptive or stupid, alive or dead." (1981, p. 117)

It is the knowledge of participants; but the inquirer did neither actually participate in the historical event in a different age nor is he another person. More precisely, what is gained is an imaginative knowledge of the inquirer who has been familiarized to a particular culture or society so much so that he feels he is qualified to speak about it on its behalf of it, or for the sake of it. The inquirer is not just applying general principles that are supposed to cover the person or the society; neither is the inquirer building his description from the bottom up starting only from historical documents and materials available and at hand of the inquirer. Rather, the inquirer is exercising a subtle and sometimes daring imagination, consulting sometimes with the more general characteristics and sometimes with available data. The knowledge gained here is:

"more like the knowledge we claim of a good friend, or of his character, of his ways of thought and action, the intuitive senses of personality or feeling or ideas" (1981, p. 105).

This type of knowledge is not the quantified image of the external reality to predict or control its movements. I can speak about my close friend for hours on end, even though I have never measured his height, weight, IQ, or other quantifiable variables. Yet simply because he is my friend, having talked and done much together, I can describe to other people who may not know him what he is like, what he would do in a given situation.

The goal of this type of knowledge becomes also clear. I know my friend already and I have knowledge about him. But this knowledge is a

by-product of our friendship and my knowledge about him would grow, perhaps without an end, as long as we keep our friendship. Knowledge itself is not the goal. The reason why I talk about him to others is not that I want to show them that I am in command of his actions by my knowledge, but that I want other persons to know him, to become friends with him. Therefore, I am not going to talk about him to persons who would utilize this knowledge for their advantage.

The knowledge about a historical event, character, or society has the same nature and the same goal. The Romantic-Historical knowledge of tradition is not for the sake of obtaining general laws governing an object of study. It is an introduction of the object of study to other persons who may enjoy fruitful friendship with it.

Such an introduction needs good story telling in that it shows the inner worlds of the person or the society. It must evoke emotions such as hopes and fears, joys and sorrows. It must be a story, not in the sense of concoctions, lies, or illusions, but a story which enables the quasi-presence of another person or society. History is, after all, "story," (as in French). And to be able to tell a good story, to be a good introducer, one must familiarize oneself with the object of study and with one's audience.

We must also be aware of the possible shortcomings and dangers in such way of making sense in the Romantic-Historical apothegm. One concerns the issue of historical relativism and another the issue of nationalism.

Relativism is the awareness that there is a unique measure, a center of gravity, in each society or person which has its own value, and

which cannot or should not be used against an other. It is a recognition of individuality and uniqueness that developed in reaction to the Enlightenment fascination with the universal. It is also a recognition of pluralism, since there are more than one tradition in the world. I have shown how this notion developed with a "healthy" self-assertion of one's own tradition, especially in the case of Herder. To be different and proud is a healthy sign in the Romantic-Historical apothegm.

But, how many traditions are there? In other words, are there infinite numbers of incommensurable tradition? How are we able to "understand" them if they are "incommensurable?" The assertion of one's own tradition in the dominant atmosphere of universalism is perhaps healthy and natural. But then how are we going to make sense of different traditions each of which asserts its own uniqueness? If there is no effort to understand other traditions, either out of epistemological cynicism or out of temperamental disdain, the learning of one's own tradition may fall into a blind assertion of one's own tradition in disregard of others.

There are also some other difficulties. One is the problem of "empathy" and "*Verstehen*." The enormous, and actually unlimited, responsibility required to be qualified to talk about other persons or societies on their behalf daunts the student. There is no guarantee that the student is not "reading" or "putting in" too much. Besides, it is more likely that two different researchers on a same topic might come up with two "incommensurable" interpretations. Each interpretation is perspectival, which means that I talk about my friend from the

perspective of my friendship and others do the same from their perspectives.

Another problem is not just a matter of academic research. To a newly born awareness of cultural identity, among nations and within a nation, between classes and sexes, wherever inequality and domination exist among groups, the study of one's own cultural tradition can be achieved only in studying other traditions which have dominated or influenced one's own. We need to remember that the Romantic-Historical apothegm established in Germany has been under French cultural and political hegemony. Such a study has the value of *Bildung*: one enriches oneself through the study of one's own and other traditions. To find and assert one's cultural identity in opposition to a dominant meaning system, to reclaim and re-find the layer of one's own tradition that has been buried under the dominant one has a rejuvenating power looked at a plateau that is above the opposition. It happened, for example, in German Romanticism against the French Enlightenment, Russian and East European nationalism in the nineteenth century and down to the present, the nationalism in the former European colonies in Africa and Asia, and nationalism in the satellite countries of Super Powers; class consciousness in the early Marxist movement; various minority and feminist movements.

The Romantic-Historical apothegms is like a youth who wants to be independent and different, often rebelling against the "establishment,"



and at the same time yearning to be recognized by it.<sup>1</sup> But the Romantic meaning system did not offer a clear vision of the acceptable relationship between the dominant and the subjugated, between the majority and the minority, between the establishment and the newly rising. Its thrust was the equality and tolerance of the different, acceptance of heterogeneity. The vision about what to do with this heterogeneity may not exist in the Romantic system. Is "reconciliation" of the heterogenous possible, or is disharmony and conflict a perpetual condition of man? Of course, this is an issue that is not addressed by the proponents of Romanticism.

The new meaning system of Romanticism did not, however, annihilate the previous meaning system of the Enlightenment, just like the Enlightenment thinking put a period to its predecessor, the theological system of meaning. Rather a new paradigm set up new realms of history and art, within the territory which was indiscriminately covered by the ideal of Science. And it does not mean that the Enlightenment urges to set up a universal scale of progress (in which all societies and times could fit in) gave way once and for all to the Romantic tendency towards relativistic historiography of cultures. Within the discipline of history, the tension would remain as the problem of understanding and explanation. Rather, within the Romantic-Historical apothegm, a schism between

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<sup>1</sup> There seems more to the inherent "youthlike" characteristics in the Romantic meaning system. It is interesting to note that the Romantic-Historical meaning system emerged at about the same time as the emergence of the youth as a distinct generational category.

research and science began--a schism that we are painfully aware today:

The special and unique versus the repetitive and the universal, the concrete versus the abstract, perpetual movement versus rest, the inner versus the outer, quality versus quantity, vulture-bound versus timeless principles, mental strife and self-transformation as a permanent condition versus the possibility (and desirability) of peace, order, final harmony and the satisfaction of all rational human wishes--these are some of the aspects of the contrast. (Berlin, 1981, p. 109)

Some of today's research approaches derive in this Romantic-Historical apothegm. Various ethnographical approaches, interviews to understand a different world, and the discipline of history itself, all owe something to Romanticism. The Romantic spirit lies in the attempt to understand a world "from within," or as close as it is lived by the participants in the world. The rich hermeneutic notion of "understanding" (*Verstehen*) of the wholeness of experience is one of its fruits; it is the opposite of knowing "from the outside"--the operation which consists of reducing the whole into parts and explain the whole from them.

Romanticism seems to have found a realm of human existence and activity that the Enlightenment science could not do justice to. It is a realm that necessitates familiarity, imagination, and sympathetic feeling to be understood at all. It deals with human existence that eludes the boundary of the intellectual and empirical correlative of the world as thought and inferred, and the subject as the agent of knowing. Lived

meaning would consist of being felt and really lived through rather than of being thought of.

#### 4. Critical-Emancipatory Apotheism

The third modern meaning system, the scope of which is at least potentially as profound and pervasive as the Enlightenment-Scientific and the Romantic-Historical meaning systems, is the emancipatory meaning system which took a definite form in Marxism. In relation to the question of lived meaning, this apotheism offered a totally new perspective, with such central notions as alienation and ideology, emancipation and social praxis.

Admittedly, emancipation is not the monopoly of Marxism, nor is Marxism the first movement in human history to propagate emancipation. Rebellion of the oppressed people can be traced back to many peasant uprisings in the medieval ages, and slave revolts like Spartacus in antiquity. And the utopian ideals about the morally just society may be traced back to Thomas More and Campanella, and to Plato and to parts of the religious corpus. Yet, it is Marxism that offered a totally different meaning system of emancipation from human alienation by drastic social reconstructions. Recently many former Marxist countries have shed their communism and are trying to introduce the free market system. Yet many vocabularies and corresponding ways of thinking and feeling are already part of today's world, for instance in the notions of the welfare state and progressive taxation, at least as a fundamental modification of the free economy conceptualized in the Enlightenment-Scientific apotheism.

It must be noted that the Emancipatory meaning system emerged in a social environment which was rapidly changing its outlook. The steam engine, invented and developed in the late eighteenth century, became the main power source replacing wind and water powers. The factories, now with smoke-belching chimneys, moved from the countryside where wind and water abounded, to coastal cities where the labour power concentrated and the coal was easily available. The railroad, an object of curiosity in the first half of the nineteenth century, rapidly expanded in the latter half to develop national and international networks in industrialized countries. Department stores, the first of which appeared in London in 1831, proliferated in every metropolitan city. Industrialization and urbanization accelerated: the change of landscape was visible in the city as well as in the country. And the labour in factories and mines took on a new aspect. The introduction of steam-powered machinery which could operate around the clock but still needed human attendance, compelled the laborers to work in shifts, so that there would be no need to shut down the furnace. Eighty work hours a week was not uncommon and the working conditions were brutal. Women and children were recruited as an unskilled labour force with minimum wages. Modern slums began to appear in industrial quarters of the city. It was the time of the great expansion of capitalism. The rich became richer still and the poor poorer. The polarization of society into two classes was more than evident, and the distance between them widened.

Marxist communism is often understood as a synthesis of three sources: German Idealism, French socialism, and British political economics. Perhaps we could add the Jewish-Christian eschatological notion of history and sense of social justice. An apothegm is always a bundle of many meaning systems. And the emancipatory apothegm itself may not be identical with Marx's corpus.

What this Emancipatory apothegm provided seems primarily a social and political consciousness, an awareness to see the social world in terms of systematic oppression, while the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm provided the view to see the natural world in terms of its unchanging laws; and the Romantic-Historical apothegm created the human and artistic world in terms of the intuitive sensibility. Yet this is true only as a first approximation.

The Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm, much more than the intellectualist and calculative world of the present day positivists, did have its corpus of social and aesthetic theories as we have seen earlier. The laissez-faire market economy was thought to balance out all the private vices and self-interests in the long run. The notions of natural human rights over life and property, freedom of speech and faith, equality of all people before the law, division of power in the government system, and the trust in rational argument and parliamentary democracy, epitomized in the Declaration of Human Rights in French Revolution and in the American Declaration of Independence, are also part of the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm and also part of the social lifeworld of a modern society. Underneath such ways of making sense of the world,

we can detect the fundamental conceptions of reason and nature. Even in religion, this meaning system is exemplified in the Unitarians or the Robespèrian religion of the Highest Being.

In the Romantic-Historical apothegm, not only are there new conceptions of art and history, but also political, epistemological, and religious theories and practice. Politically the thrust of this apothegm is found in the raised awareness of the tradition, an organic and living whole in which its members become themselves. The history of a society must be narrated, extolled, and re-enlivened by its members to flourish; and in this process the members of the tradition realize their identity. It is one example of the hermeneutic circle: the whole gives its parts significance, the parts render meaning to the whole. In the actual history, the political side of the Romantic-Historical apothegm materialized in the form of nationalism. From the German unification movement in the nineteenth century, it spread to many East European countries, and eventually to the whole world. When this meaning system emerged in a region, it had an explosive power. It is necessary not to view nationalism with prejudice. The raised awareness in one's roots, identity, and belongingness is not a "problem" at all. Perhaps, the sense of one's identity in belonging to a group is healthy, especially if the group is a traumatized one, whether it is nationality, color, sex, or whatever source of prejudice. Of course the political side of this Romantic-Historical apothegm can degenerate into a chauvinism with the sense of one's own superiority over all others, just like the scientific side of the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm can deteriorate into a narrow-minded positivism and scientism.

What Marx tried to do was to coordinate two realms of nature and history in a new way. His articulation of the social reality into base and superstructure can now be understood as an ontological scheme in order to synthesize into a single coherent whole two realms that have radically different characteristics. The base is rather a mechanical world in which various forces are functioning in a deterministic manner: the laws governing such forces are conceived as timeless, objective laws, like those conceived in the Enlightenment-Scientific meaning system. In contrast, the superstructure such as customs, laws, culture, social relations, and consciousness has history. The superstructure is thought to "develop" in a monolinear succession with the grand finale of the universal human emancipation, like the self-actualization of the Absolute Spirit in Hegel.<sup>1</sup>

Marx related the two realms of nature and history, base and superstructure, or being and consciousness, dialectically, which means a two-way relationship. Yet it is not a symmetrical relation. It is the side of the base, its modes and means of production, that finally determines the form of its superstructure, that is, the social political and spiritual forms of life; and not vice versa.

What is really new in the human history is the sense of oneself as a political being, an agent of social change for the better.

#### 4.1. Ideology and False Consciousness

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<sup>1</sup> See White, 1973, p.286.



The coinage of the term "ideology" is ascribed to Destutt de Tracy at the end of the eighteenth century. At first ideology meant simply a proposed study of ideas, language and meaning through logical, psychological and anthropological approaches in the tradition of the *Encyclopédistes* in the Enlightenment. Today, the term carries another special sense similar to "lie" or "falsification," which is largely due to Napoléon. He called "*idéologues*" a group of *philosophes* such as Destutt, Cabanis, Volney, and Daunou, who criticized his imperial scheme in the post-Revolutionary France. As a result, ideology became a term with negative connotations such as doctrinaire, unrealistic, and theoretical, in opposition to flexible, realistic, or practical.<sup>1</sup>

But it was due to the Marxist reformulation that the term "ideology" has come to be a major topic in social theory and practice. As is often the case with a new important notion, the term was not given an unequivocal, explicit formulation. Rather it became the title of the book *German Ideology*, in which it meant:

a false consciousness or an obfuscated mental process in which men do not understand the forces that actually guide their thinking, but imagine it to be wholly governed by logic and intellectual influences.... Ideology is the sum total of ideas relating, first and foremost, to social life--opinions on philosophy, religion, economics, history, law, utopias of all kind, political and economic programmes--which appear to exist in its own right in the minds of who hold them.... These ideas are in fact governed by laws of their own; they are characterized

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<sup>1</sup> See Manheim, n.d., p.72.

by the subject's unawareness of their social origin in social conditions and of the part they play in maintaining or altering those conditions. (Kolakowski, 1978, vol.1, p. 154)

Ideology and false consciousness, as a pair notion, refer to the deformation of reality. Whereas ideology refers to the deformed *noema* of reality, false consciousness refers to its *noesis* whose characteristics are:

1) believing that thought is independent [of] other forms of human activity; 2) ascribing consciousness the role of efficient cause in social life and identifying social change with a change in the way of thinking about it; and 3) ascribing absolute validity to one's own opinions, which in fact are always conditioned by a given epoch and class membership. (Szacki, 1979, p. 148)

The most famous example of false consciousness is Bourgeois ideology, the bourgeois belief that the capitalist economic system is the best or the ultimate one. And the Bourgeois ideology,

presents itself as an *anonymous discourse* on the social, a discourse in which the universal speaks of itself. Whatever support it may draw from religion and traditional world-view, bourgeois ideology is governed by the ideal of *positive knowledge* and calls into question the reference to "another world." Bourgeois ideology is structured by a division between "ideas" and a supposed "real"; the "other place" of religious and mythical conception is effaced, but the ideology refers to itself only via the *transcendence of ideas*. The text of ideology ... is written in capital letters: Humanity, Progress, Science, Property, the Family. These ideas imply an opposition between

the subject who speaks and establishes itself in accordance with the rule laid down by the idea, and the "other" (autrui) who has no access to the rule and is thereby deprived of the dignity of the subject. The opposition is expressed in a series of dichotomies: worker/bourgeois, savage/civilized, mad/normal, child/adult. Across these dichotomies emerges a "natural being" whose image underpins the affirmation of a society above nature. (Thompson, 1984, p. 26)

Bourgeois ideology is the very nature of the ways of making sense of the world in the Enlightenment-Scientific meaning system we have described. Ideology, Marxists argue, reflects the modes of life of the social group involved. Bourgeois ideology reflects the vested interests of the bourgeoisies, precisely because they are unaware of the very process in which their thought is formed by their interest. Marxism takes the view that the knowledge that a person or group of persons holds is, in the final analysis, dictated by the particular interest involved: being defines consciousness. Ideology will become the cover vocabulary for the entire superstructure of consciousness that is delineated by the infrastructure of the social world, in which production relation is given the place of the final ground in the Marxist doctrine.

False consciousness is not factual Eros or intentional lies. It has to do, not with scientific knowledge about physical nature, but primarily with interpretations of the social world. The subjects suffering from false consciousness believe in the correctness and validity of their interpretations about the social reality; yet their view are beclouded by their vested interests they have in the social world.

Alienation means the subjugation of man by his own works, which have assumed the guise of independent things. The commodity character of products and their expression in money form has the effect that the social process of exchange is regulated by factors operating independently of human will, after the fashion of natural law. Alienation gives rise to private property and to political institutions. (Kolakowski, 1978, vol.1, p. 178)

False consciousness is not particular to the capitalist society; it also exists in slave, feudal and other societies for the length of human history, except perhaps in the prophesied communist society. The origin of such false consciousness and human alienation is, according to Marxism, in social division of labour.

[T]he very fact that there had emerged, within society, specialized groups of thinkers, separation of mental work from manual work, and finally separation of theory from practice marked the beginning of the domination of false consciousness. (Szacki, 1979, pp. 160,161)

Here, we cannot examine the Marxist emancipatory programme which starts with the abolition of division of labour and private property. Nonetheless we can find in Marxism a strong and new view which has not existed in previous meaning systems.

First, the ideological nature of our lived meaning is put into question. For example, in the notion of natural human rights in the Enlightenment, there is the "inalienable" right of property. To the propertied people, their right over "their" property appears natural; they

would protect their property from being taken away without receiving some sort of payment in return. They would "naturally" make laws that protect private properties, declaring the right of *property natura*, eternal, and inalienable, maintain police force to enforce these laws, teach the dispossessed that the right of property is sacred, and believe in the doctrine of the universality of property rights. Thus the property right has come to be seen as a "natural" right written in the form of natural laws. And most of us in today's world believe in property right: when robbed of property, we feel anger or sadness. Theft of our property is a meaningful event: and the meaningfulness is at least partly constituted by the way we feel, think, and act with regard to property. But the Marxist meaning system would cast doubt on the "naturalness" of the notion of property right. Is the property right really indisputable and inalienable in all cases? Is it really "natural" that some people can have the "right" over a huge property which they cannot possibly use, while many others are excluded from it? In the same manner, we can question our own felt meaning when our property was taken away. Is the lived meaning of being robbed of our property the same to anyone, any time, and any place? The answer would be, no! Because people who have different or little sense of property would, in the event of theft, not feel the same way as we would. At least part of the lived meaning of theft seems to have an ideological origin.

Then, lived meaning, we feel is different depending on class and other interest we have in the social world, and according to the ideology we have. Marxism would explain the plurality of different forms of

meanings and views from the interests they represent. Such a strategy has a strong critical, debunking, and unmasking power. It question is if the meaning we feel is not the justification of what we have and what we are.

With the emergence of Marxist meaning system, we can no longer be naive about ideology which certainly includes lived meaning and its corresponding modes of social existence. We are now critical, not only in the Kantian sense of how a certain knowledge is constituted epistemologically, but also in the emancipatory sense of how knowledge or thought conceals the social relations from which it emerged. Of course the same critical awareness can be now applied to Marxist communism, which seems to have exempted itself. After Marx, such exemption has been removed.

The analysis of thought and ideas in terms of ideologies is much too wide in its application and much too important a weapon to become the permanent monopoly of any one party. Nothing was to prevent the opponents of Marxism from availing themselves of the weapon and applying it to Marxism itself. (Manheim, n.d., p. 75)

What happened in the formation of the Newtonian universe happens here. The thrust of Marxism in the ideology critique, the approach to examine a certain view, behavior, or meaning in terms of the interests it serves, was shared by many others to become part of an emancipatory meaning system. This critical attitude has become part of the lifeworlds of many people and can be shared by anyone in principle,

against any view which includes Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist types of communism. It is a logical consequence of a meaning system that it may go beyond the private hope and expectation of its founders when it becomes shared by many. Even the Marxist view may be another version of ideology which only reflects the interest of the alleged proletarian class; the communist ideology may be representing the interest of the communist party. The Newtonian universe does not need God (its attentive caretaker), in spite of Newton's personal faith in God; Marxist ideology critique cannot exemplify communism, in spite of Marx's personal faith in it.

But if we wish to keep the real thrust of the ideology critique, it must be reminded that it is for the emancipation of people under oppression and domination.

[A]n expression is ideological only in so far as it serves to sustain relations of domination. To analyze ideology, therefore, one must analyze the social-historical conditions in which ideological expressions are produced and received, conditions which include the relations of domination which these expressions serve to sustain. (Thompson, 1984, p. 198)

As an emancipatory meaning system, the critical attitude towards any kind of domination and oppression, of workers, of the poor, of women, of the "abnormal," of the deprived, and of any kind of the weak and the subjugated.

Also the emancipatory meaning system provides an attitude to look for the causes of the alienation of our consciousness, the "loss" of

meaning included, in the actual social relations. And it endeavors to change them. Meaninglessness may be forgotten or consoled but never "righted" without changing the social reality which causes it. All attempts to restore meaning in life without critically looking into the alienating social relations would lead to self-deception and concealment.

#### 4.2. Knowledge and Praxis

The goal of the Marxist analysis also lies on a plateau different from the knowledge sought in the Enlightenment-Scientific or the Romantic-Historical apothegm. In the Enlightenment, the goal of inquiry is to arrive at general laws that govern the reality, be they inherent in or transcendent of nature. The inquirer needs to observe carefully various facts that the reality discloses. With experiments and logical operations, and with the hope of quantification above all, the scientist can further disclose the reality. But the reality is conceived to exist independently of the inquiry, independent of the method one employs. The knowledge to be obtained is like a picture, a blue-print, or a formula, of the external reality which lies in the distance and moves according to its laws, quite apart from the observer-scientist. With such blue-prints and formulae, scientists can predict not only the future of a natural phenomenon, but also the outcome of human operations in nature. This approach certainly has great potentials for human control over nature and reality. Yet, at the same time, the world becomes removed from us, getting sober, mechanical heaps of things. In this conception of nature, animals no longer talk to humans, birds no longer sing, and stars no longer give us



signs. Not only nature but the entire universe becomes uncannily silent, no longer friendly or menacing, but just neutral, distant, and uncommunicative. Scientists are after truth; but the truth has become neutral and formal. The mediation between the observed object and the observing subject, is the belief in the rationality of a universe that embraces both subject and object.

In Romanticism, however, the goal in understanding of a culture or text is to arrive at the world of the actors in the historical events and other cultures or the world of the personal world of the artist, poet, and author. Truth is still the goal of this meaning system. Yet the way to reach truth is different from that of science. History, art, text, and human experience are not tangible as natural objects are and they resisted to be tested experimentally. To understand art, history, or human experience, a certain sensitivity and perceptiveness seem to be required. Furthermore, what is understood must be expressed not in formulae and propositions, but rather in narratives and depiction. Not only the epistemology to attain truth, but also the very nature of the truth, are radically different in the Romantic-Historical apothegm. If narrative and poetry is expression in the temporal dimension, art is an expression in the spatial dimension. In understanding art or history, and in expressing the truth which flows out from this understanding, something more than intellect and calculation is necessary. Admittedly the object to be understood is also supposed to be somewhere out there, even if in the historical past or in the imaginary aesthetic world. Yet knowledge in the Romantic-Historical apothegm removes distance between the artistic or

historical object of inquiry and the inquirer who attempts to understand it. In empathy and sympathy, in intuition and sensibility, there is no distance between what is to be understood and the inquirer. The knowledge is more like becoming friends with the object of understanding. Or, in the sense of *Bildung*, the student feels elevated after the process of surrendering oneself to tradition and then coming up with a newly enriched self, knowledge is glorification of tradition and ennoblement self at the same time. Truth is no longer an image in the mirror reflecting objective reality, but the power that supports the inquirer by participating in the tradition<sup>1</sup>, and by re-enlivening it. Knowledge in the Romantic-Historical apothegm is formative of the self.

In the Critical-Emancipatory apothegm, however, what is sought is not just knowledge in the inquirer, whether it is scientific or formative, but a change in the social reality which surrounds the inquirer. As stated in the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, what is sought is not just a change in the head or heart of the inquirer, but a real change in the social world, the world which could be reconstructed for the better. The very way to make sense of the social world is important in the Critical-Emancipatory apothegm.

In the premodern meaning systems, the unjust aspects of the social world were felt as bad luck or fate, as unchangeable. People tended to take the whole of the social and natural worlds, as there was no

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<sup>1</sup> Bollnow (1975) has developed a theory of double-faced truth, which he called contesting truth and supportive truth.

clear distinction between them, as it is. Taboos and rituals were observed, and sacrifices given, sufferings endured. One did not quest one's "station in life"; instead one yearned for salvation after life. It was the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm that changed our view of the social world. On the one hand, the social world was viewed similarly to the natural world, with its eternal laws governing the movement of its parts; on the other hand, the social world was thought to be in the process of progress and perfection. The social world is regarded now as imperfect; there is much room for improvement and betterment. Yet this Enlightenmenters believed that they have already found the means for improvement, namely reason. The social world, still indistinguishable from the natural world ontologically and epistemologically, needs rational improvements on the ills which are supposed derive from human ignorance of prescientific times. The romantic-Historical apothegm found the human world, in distinction with the natural world, in terms of its epistemology and ontology. High cultural achievements in the past were glorified, and tradition enlivened. The apothegm also tended to see the human tragedy sympathetically in the struggle of the oppressed people, in the agony of unrecognized artistic geniuses, and in the sorrows of heroes and heroines whose power had waned. Yet, apart from the rather unplanned explosion of national and regional independence from "tyranny," it had little political agenda. In this meaning system, oppression and alienation are seen as human ills and the systematic nature of oppression embedded in the social life is not identified.

The Critical-Emancipatory meaning system views the social world in a totally different light. Or the notion of the social world, a grand stage in which human eschatology is being played, emerges (White, 1973). The ills of the social world were tangibly and actually aggravating in the age of industrial revolution in an accelerated pace. The actors in the drama are no longer pawns and puppets manipulated by God or natural laws but real human beings who can build their own fate, agents who can change the society. Such agents are committed, not in the sense of Christian charity, Kantian duty, the Romantic sympathy, but in the sense of the responsibility to the greater number of people in the world.

The role of inquirer and that of inquiry itself is also characteristic. To be able to free oneself from the dominant ideology and false consciousness, the inquirer must stand on the side of the working class or the oppressed. For the true knowledge worthy of its name in the emancipatory meaning system is what contributes to the emancipation of all human beings from alienation and false consciousness. What servers in the sustainment of alienation and oppression cannot true knowledge. One could question if the proletariat is the only carrier of the human history. One might question whether such a class is not an abstract entity. But the point here is that a previously unknown notion of knowledge, truth, and inquiry, emerged in the Critical-Emancipatory apothegm.

It problematizes knowledge about something and knowledge for something, whether this something is the lives of workers or the lives of children. The real *raison d'être* of social inquiry is to be in the service of

the human emancipation. It is different from the natural inquiry, even if Marxism tended to blur this distinction in the unfortunate attempt to become "scientific". The social inquiry is linked to praxis, which is:

a type of action which involves taking others into account and regarding them as autonomous beings capable of developing their own autonomy. *Praxis* draws upon knowledge, but the latter is always fragmentary and provisional; nor is this merely a negative limitation, for it is the condition of possibility of bringing about something which is *new*. (Thompson, 1984, p. 19)

The value of social inquiry in the Critical-Emancipatory apothegm lies ultimately in its potential towards the emancipation of the oppressed group of humanity, and further, of the humanity. Meaning lies in the commitment in this cause. Meaning can only be attained when one is an agent of social change.

The human and social world is not determined by objective regularities; at least part of these regularities have been made by humans in the past and therefore changeable by humans. The socio-historical construction of the social reality, and its implied changeability, is precisely what the ideologically biased inquiry conceals and tries as natural, transcendental, universal, or unchangeable.

History is seen no longer as a dead accumulation of completed events in the past or an organic living tradition. According to the commitment into the future held by the agent of social change, the past appears differently. The past must be rewritten according to the project

one holds. The past cannot be the same to the people who cherish status quo and to the people who aspire to have fundamental changes in the present regime.

Knowledge is meaningful ultimately only when it is ultimately incorporated in social change. A research is not just *about* a certain social phenomenon, but *for* its change for the better. The knowledge to be gained is inseparable from such commitment. The Critical-Emancipatory apothegm brings knowledge, morality, and praxis together.

#### 4.3. Critical-Emancipatory Apothegm

The socialist movement have seen the spectacular ramification, rise, and fall in the century since Marx and Engels. From the old-time anarchism and syndicalism, the economic revisionism of the Second International, to the party vanguardism of Lenin and the Third International, Stalinist and Maoist forms of one-state socialism, Trotskyite permanent revolution, the Frankfurt School and the Western Marxism, and finally, at the time of writing, the ousting of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern Europe. It is impossible to foresee the development of the socialism.

Yet with these historical movements of socialism emerged a way to make sense of the world, especially of the social world as we have seen, which has become part of the lifeworlds of some people, if not of everyone, and which can be shared in the anthropological perspective. Let me show its implication to the question of meaning.

The question of lived meaning was hidden behind the quest for scientific knowledge in the Enlightenment-Scientific apothegm. The attention was drawn to reason, nature, science, and intellect, which find natural laws in the world. The Romantics reclaimed the vivacity of life, the fullness of experience, the richness in the lives of creative individuals, and the lives in remote times and places, through empathic re-living and intuitive interpretation. At the same time, the Romantic-Historical apothegm drew our attention to the aspects of our everyday lives, with the notions of lived experience and lifeworld.

The existentialist movement in the twentieth century in literature, drama, art, and philosophy, which focused its attention to the absurdity and meaninglessness of life, was basically an extension of the Romantic movement, devoid of the hope of fulfillment in life. The yearning for fullness in life was there, yet the existentialists in the twentieth century no longer held the belief in *Bildung* through cultivation of aesthetic and historical sensitivity as the Romantics in the nineteenth century would have. Existentialism appears, from the vantage point of today, a Romanticism in despair, looking for sources of authentic life in private projection of future action.

From the emancipatory viewpoint, it is the phenomenon of meaninglessness in work and life, which needs to be understood first. The meaninglessness is neither a private disease which one can cure by cultivation of aesthetic sensibility or by identifying with tradition, nor is it a permanent human predicament as the existentialists would have it. Boredom, ennui, meaninglessness are now seen, not due to a lack of

something substantial within the individual, which might be called energy, motivation, will power, *élan vital*, and so forth, but due to the structural and systematic social relations surrounding the individual.

Further, meaninglessness may not always be, from the emancipatory viewpoint, a disease which the person must somehow cure, but rather a necessary moment in which the person must confront the social reality. Becoming aware of meaninglessness and alienation may be the sincere step toward the recognition of the possibility and responsibility of becoming a committed agent of social change.

Saying this does not mean that the question of lived meaning has evaporated into the commitment for social change. Such a commitment is, or can be, only part of the various modes of making sense of the world, the various meaning systems in our lifeworlds. The danger of historical Marxism is to neglect or belittle other modes of making sense. Consider this example about a priest who extolled the Romantic appreciation of nature and literature:

the Sunday walks of an inhabitant of a small provincial town who childishly wonders at the cuckoo laying its egg in another bird's nest, at tears being designed to keep the surface of the eyes moist, and so on, and finally trembles with reverence as he recites Klopstock's Ode to Spring to his children. There is no question, of course, of modern sciences, which, with modern industry, have revolutionized the whole of nature and put an end to man's childish attitude towards nature as well as other forms of childishness ... For the rest, it would be desirable that Bavaria's sluggish peasant economy, the ground on which priest and Daumers likewise grow, should at least be plowed up



by modern cultivation and modern machines. (Marx and Engels, *The Religion of the New Age*, cited in Balbus, 1982, p.277)

And Marxism misunderstood what we have seen as the Romantic-Historical meaning system as *petit bourgeois* consciousness, the result of which was the "unsolved" nationalist movements in and around the Soviet Union now.

## 5. Rejoinder to part 2

In the previous four chapters, I have identified and illustrated some apothegms, the fundamental ways of making sense of the world, the incompatible higher order meaning systems. More specifically, I have touched on the apothegms of body, language, domestication, and religion, which have premodern origins in the human history, and also three modern apothegms of the Enlightenment-Science, the Romantic-Historical, and the Critical-Emancipatory. I do not claim to have listed all the apothegms in human history, yet I feel that there are only a few more apothegms to be added.

The apothegms of body and spoken language have been diffused among all contemporary societies and they are incorporated into the social lifeworlds of all societies. Of course these must be learned by the new generation in any society. Other apothegms are in the process of global diffusion. The domestic apothegm has been diffused among almost all contemporary societies except for a few isolated one. The literate and the religious apothegms have covered more than half of the world now. Other modern apothegms are being spread, but the degree of settlement of these apothegms vary from the superficial acceptance to the real incorporation into the lifeworlds.

In actual daily lives of today, many of these meaning systems have survived and they comprise our personal lifeworlds in a very complex and disordered manner. For example, one can believe in the progress of reason in natural science and technology while being skeptical about

progress in the social world, hoping for a more equitable world while holding on to traditional values, wishing for the welfare of people in general while secretly aspiring to be better off than neighbors, and so on. It is of course impossible to list up all the possible combinations of apothegms and their lower order meaning systems. With each society, a mesoscopic level of analysis is necessary.

However, there is one aspect that needs our attention at the conclusion of this part. I mean the question of the relation among the apothegms in modern lifeworlds.

In direct opposition to the pluralistic acknowledgement of the incompatible apothegms, as semiogenetics does, each of the modern apothegms have claimed their monopoly of the lifeworld. They claimed that they were the newest, the best, and the only true ways of making sense of the world, and that the previous ones were out-dated, insufficient, or wrong. This attitude, especially observable in the religious apothegm and the three modern ones, needs be examined. Although these meaning systems are diverse, they share this common attitude. It is what Robert Solomon provocatively called the "transcendental pretense." It is "a priori [or in plain English, dogmatic] dismissal of anyone holding views different from one's own" (Solomon, 1979, p. 8).

In this dissertation, I admitted the plurality of incompatible apothegms only passively on the ground that many lifeworlds show such plurality. Yet more is necessary to bring about the productive and active

pluralism of apothegms in the lifeworlds. The notion of apothegmatic pluralism needs to be elaborated from a dialogical prospective.

### **Part 3. Pedagogy of Lived Meaning**

In part I, I developed the central theme of my thesis: What is lived meaning? By examining the related notions of lived experience and lifeworld, which had been elaborated earlier by Dilthey and Husserl respectively, the question of meaning emerged: How does meaning come into being? I outlined semiogenetics, a research approach to better understand the multifarious forms of lived meaning.

In part 2, as an example of semiogenetic approach at its macroscopic level, I set out to illustrate large-scale meaning systems that emerged in human history. In this study, three modern meaning systems emerged while the meaning systems which originated earlier were touched on. It is hoped that the thrust of semiogenetic analysis at its macroscopic level has become clear.

In part 3, three illustrations of semiogenetic analysis at its microscopic level will be given.

First, drawing upon my experience of hiking in the mountains, I ask: "How does a lived meaning of a spectacular view from the summit of a mountain become possible?" The conditions that enabled the emergence of the lived meaning are sought in the personal, intersubjective, life-historical, and social-cultural dimensions.

Second, the lived meaning of a nine-year-old girl when she reads a book is examined. The conditions which enable the emergence of the lived meaning are explored, and the meaning systems relevant to the

emergence are discussed. Finally, the emerging process of the lived meaning is described according to its temporal structure.

Third, an example of lived meaning which has emerged in a more pedagogical environment is shown. In each case the emergence of lived meaning is depicted and the meaning systems which condition as well as enable the emergence of lived meaning are clarified. Throughout this next part, the pedagogical significance of lived meaning is explored.

## 1. Lived Meaning and Meaning Systems: The Mountain Hike

### 1.1. Spectacle from the Summit: Physiognomy for the Embodied Self

I am walking in the mountains. They are not particularly high or difficult to climb. I am hiking along paths many people have perhaps walked before. I know how many hours it would take to get to the summit from having read a guide book, and I have a map, water and some food.

Walking up the mountain in the forest is fun. There is little physical exertion and the air is cool and moist. I know some of the trees and plants, insects and birds; I see animals only on rare occasions. Dead and fallen trees, half-decayed leaves, stones and pebbles. I see the sky and other mountains through the trees. There are so many things to see. Even the familiar trees and plants I know very well come in all sizes and shapes, sometimes with different mosses and fungi. Even the ants carrying their food and eggs are never the same. I am not seeing many other things. If I did, I would be transfixed on this spot trying to see the ants march and find insects in the fallen tree trunk and I would not be able to reach the mountain top. Inside the forest the various forms of life and their activities are enjoyable in themselves and I think of reaching the goal only occasionally.

Going up higher, the forest line is below me now. I am exposed to sunshine walking on rocky path. The vegetation becomes dwarfed and scarce and the fauna is poor. I seldom go up to a completely rocky summit devoid of any vegetation. But the focus of our sight would be put

on things far away once we climb out of the forest line. The other mountains, sky, the mountain above whose summit I cannot see, and inevitably, the path ahead of me. The sight has become monotonous because each step forward does not offer new things to see. The things far away look the same even if we make more progress. I start talking to myself, remembering things past, my friends faces, and other hikes and climbs, occasionally coming out of this half-reverie when there are interesting rocks on the path, new layers of rock bed, and especially fossils.

Climbing a mountain makes me thirsty and tired especially in the tendons of my lower legs. I remember the boots which gave me terrible pain years ago. Monotonous scenery makes me think of how long it would take to reach the top and whether I should stop and rest for a while or going back down without further climbing.

Finally I reach the top of the mountain. The view is superb. Even though it is a low mountain, not as well known as others. The scenery is radically different: now I can see the other side of the mountain. I am now looking down on its slope rather than looking up as I have been doing for some hours. I sit down on a rock and drink some water, more liberally than before since I know the route going down and how many hours it will take. There is a sense of accomplishment; not a grandiose conquest but a pleasant feeling of a task done, at least for the moment. The sore and tiredness in the legs no longer worry me; they become a pleasant fatigue.



The spectacular view I experience is very special. It becomes the climactic focus of lived meaning of the climb. It is not the view itself, detached from my being there, which makes it so special. Photographs of the same scenery taken by somebody else are a poor substitute: photographs can not carry the breeze and smell of air. But even if I stood on the same spot at the top of the mountain, the view would not be the same if I was carried up there by a helicopter. The bodily awareness such as the soreness and tiredness in the legs, and the satisfied thirst are part of what makes the view so spectacular. The sense of accomplishment over hours of work is also a part of it. Further, the birds and insects, plants and trees, the fossils I picked up and put in my backpack, my vacillation about continuing climbing or going back down, all of these things and events are "speaking" while hidden in the specialness of the scenery.

The lived meaning of the spectacle is supported by such complex configuration of things and events, that is its particular contextuality. It would be difficult to analyze its "factors" and perhaps even silly to do so since such an analysis would destroy its specialness. Yet we must do it. Certainly, there was the contribution from the objective and external side of the situation. The lakes and the green meadows down below, the sky above and the clouds so near, the mountains on the other side but not so far away, the altitude and cleaner air, are the obvious factors in the objective side of the situation. A magnificent, beautiful, and sublime spectacle would elicit strong lived meaning, whereas commonplace view would not give such an impression. The physical fatigue and thirst are of

the internal and bodily dimension which contributed to the emergence of the experience of the spectacular view. The appropriate amount of fatigue would probably enhance the beauty of the scenery, just as some hunger enhances the taste of the meal. The sense of accomplishment would be perhaps much greater if I were the first one to see the prospect, even apart from the expectation of acclaim from other people. Sunday hikers like me are fortunately saved from the possible intrusion of such vanity simply because none will ever applaud them over climbing the mountain many people can. The sense of personal accomplishment over the climb is set against the backdrops of the hope and expectation I had had before and during climbing this particular peak, and the memory of so many things I felt including my vacillation about going back is also part of the experience of view. They may be classified as psychological awareness or as temporal awareness, in any case of the inner and subjective dimension.

These are only some of the "factors" in the context which contributed to the emergence of lived meaning of my hiking. These factors, however, cover only a few hours of the climb, perhaps except for my hope to climb the mountain which I could have had for a long time. Such an analysis of the experience, with its outer and inner factors, is certainly convenient in distinguishing the myriad of things and events which contribute to the emergence of lived meaning. But it falls short of the richness of lived meaning, that is prior to the dichotomies into subjective and objective, internal and external, body and mind, action and thinking. Even if we say that the lived meaning is a primordial unity

before such traditional dichotomies creep in, this sounds rather hollow compared to the lived meaning of the view from the mountain top. And even if we say that this person is not a solitary thinking ego, but an embodied self, which is capable of thinking and feeling, hoping and despairing, acting and planning, and which is open to the outer world of ants and bees, pebbles and fossils, brooks and mushrooms, something more seems lacking.

What seems lacking in this example is another person--it is an excursion of a solitary person. It is rather rare and unnatural even for adults to climb mountains alone, not to speak of children. Some of us may wish sometimes to climb a mountain alone. In such a case, however, what we really wish is to be alone in addition to climbing the mountain. Then, let me remove this unnaturalness and examine a case which might show us the intersubjective dimension.

## 1.2. Climbing with a Friend: The Intersubjective Dimension

I remember hiking with my old friend. Rivers, ponds, rocks, trees, plants, flowers, insects, birds, and the path. The climbing with my friend is different because we share what each of us see. We talk with one another about what I see, find, think, and feel, about the rocks and trees, plants and animals, about the objects in the immediate surrounding and about our "inner reaction" to those objects. Also we share, to a certain extent, about our past events and future hopes. Of course, I do not tell him everything which comes to my mind. There are many topics that I feel uncomfortable to talk about with him and he has his preference of

topics. He is also considerate. We have developed such knowledge of each other through our long friendship. And there also are many moments of solitary thinking in which my friend is kept off from my thinking even though I am aware I am with him. I like friends with whom I can be silent at times, when I wish to be, without embarrassment, and vice versa. The fatigue and exhaustion are easily communicated between us. His fatigue is "our" fatigue now in the sense that his fatigue matters to our climbing; and so is mine. We seriously discuss about the weather in the near future, especially when it is uncertain or ominous. We discuss whether we can keep climbing, drop our pace, or we should go back at all, when our fatigue or the weather appears a problem. It is assuring to have a person with me who can make decisions with me and who can help me in time of a possible accident.

The view from the top is enhanced now, not only by both outer and inner factors I discussed in the previous example, but certainly also by the presence of my friend. The view is *our* lived meaning rather than, and much more than, the sum of his solitary lived meaning plus my solitary lived meaning. Our lived meaning became possible, not only by the things and events in the objective dimension and the awareness of two solitary ego's in the subjective dimension, but also by the contribution of our being together, the inter-subjectivity which pervades my friend and myself. Compared to the reality of this intersubjectivity, my consciousness in the previous example appears to be a make-shift dialogue between I and me, between two split selves in myself. I come to notice much more things in the direct surroundings because he tells me

what I may not have noticed and also because my awareness itself gets keener through our mutual showing and conversation. We have come to see many things from shared perspectives, of which Gadamer would say the fusion of horizons,

Perhaps, years or even decades later, we may still be talking about our lived meaning of the view from the summit. Yet, the meaning of our experience of the climb may change. If the friend happens to die shortly after the climb, the experience would be "frozen" and be remembered as such. But living friends may come and go. The meaning of the climb might diminish if I have forgotten about the friend, or I have had a more spectacular experience with someone else. It would be embarrassing to be reminded of the withering of my lived meaning of the climb when, for example, we should come across with each other years later and if he still talks about "our" experience with enthusiasm. Or the lived meaning of the spectacle, which have been submerged in other experiences, might re-emerge when I find myself climbing a mountain in the company of an incessant chatterer or an unpleasant group. Then I will certainly remember and miss my good friend and *our* lived meaning. In such a way, lived meaning might wither or grow in a much more complex way if the original experience was a shared experience.

I do not wish to be involved here in the complex argument about the priority of perspectives between the solitary and the intersubjective. However, the intersubjective perspective seems to be more in accord with the everyday reality of adults and children. Adults tend to climb mountains more often in the company of friends and so do children

usually with adults. Further, even when I climb the mountain by myself, this can be theoretically treated as an extreme case in which the subject has to dialogue with itself. The subjective perspective is an extreme case of the intersubjective perspective in which the other person is temporary absent and therefore the subject needs to split itself to whereas, starting from the solitary perspective, the intersubjective constitution of lived meaning will remain a difficult puzzle.

### 1.3. The Life-historical Dimension: Father to Son

When I climbed the mountain, whether by myself or with my friend, it was not the first time for me to go climbing or hiking. I have gone climbing and hiking many times since my childhood and I was already an avid hiker before I started the particular climb. If it was an absolutely first experience, because I had lived and stayed in a flat land all my life without any knowledge of the mountains, the experience would have been totally different. Chances are that I would have found the experience totally disorienting or I would not have ventured to climb a mountain from the start. Even if I happened to have a friend whom I trusted and who could initiate me into the mountain climbing as a guide, the experience would be totally different. Almost all the trees and plants, insects and animals would have appeared strange; I would have no understanding of why people want to go climbing and hiking where there is no practical value conceivable.

Even if I do not remember exactly when I started hiking, I know that my father took me hiking and walking in the mountains, forests and

parks. On countless occasions my father took me to parks to see and feed fish and birds, to parks and to botanical gardens in Tokyo, and to mountains for skiing and hiking. Going to the mountains with my father was set in the general inclination toward nature. I was four or five years old when he took me to a ski resort. I have a vague recollection of hiking up to a little mountain with my father when I was in the second or the third grade. Since that time, I went hiking and mountain climbing with my friends and sometimes by myself. Sometimes the emphasis was on camping or fossil collecting rather than hiking itself. Sometimes I climbed relatively high mountains with heavy equipments and serious-minded friends. On other occasions I enjoyed excursion in low hills and forests. From a time, I do not remember exactly when, I started reading books of mountaineering written by other people. Mt. Everest, Mt. Matterhorn, and the North Wall of Mt. Eiger became familiar names in my imagination. At least for a certain period in my childhood and youth, I wanted to become an expert mountain climber--a dream never come true. And the geological field trips from my junior high school had stimulated me into the fascinating study of geology. I learned to identify the names of most of the common rocks and how they were formed. I learned with fascination how mountains and valleys were shaped, how continents moved. I remember serious field trips from the university and light-hearted fossil hunting that did not require reports. All these bits of my personal history, and countless others, have a bearing on the lived meaning of the climb illustrated above.

If I were to pick out the most important source of influence out of many, it would be my father, which might have started all of the above. I have only a vague recollection now about my first hiking with him into a mountain. But I think I was carrying a backpack with water and food inside, and the indispensable map as any hiker should and a compass which I did not know how to use it then. My father always brought the best large-scale map available of the area and taught me how to read it. He taught me names and stories of plants and animals as we went along and how to read clouds and find brooks. It was his fascination and delight as a hiker and naturalist which kindled a similar interest in me.

There are some other people whom I met in my life and who have influenced my lived meaning of climbing and hiking in the mountain. There was the science teacher in my junior high school who, not so much as his personal influence but rather through the geological field trip he organized, touched off my interest in the history of the Earth. Of course there was a prior interest in archaeology inspired, among other things, by the trip my family and friends had taken to a famous paleolithic habitation site and by reading several books on the prehistory of Japan.

There are countless other sources of influence in the emergence of the lived meaning of hiking and the view from the summit. Some of them are certainly more relevant than others in the experience. For example, if the mountain I was hiking would have had abundant exposures of rock layers which contained fossils, or if I had hit upon such specimens, then my past experiences of geological field trips, museums, and books would have been much more important than they were in a simple hiking. If the



climb had contained substantial rock climbing, the little experience I had in rock climbing or the books I read of the expert climbers would have been more relevant than they actually were.

The sum total of my past experiences do not mechanically "determine" my lived meaning. The present situation of the lived meaning, or its contextual contingencies, "selects" relevant ways of making sense of them from my life history as sources of the present lived meaning. The past does not automatically determine the present. The present selects only certain past aspects of my life history as relevant background just as the fossils and rock layers might have called for the geological field trips I have had in the past. However, it is also certain that the present situation cannot choose from what I have not experienced as the background of the present lived meaning. The present cannot be what it is now from what is outside of my life history. In this sense, my life history limits what can be the sources of the present lived meaning, even though this life history is not a rigid and unchangeable chronicle but rather a loose and Protean network of past lived experiences. My life history is a "stock" of available threads with which the lived meaning weave a pattern, which again becomes part of the tapestry of my life history.

On the one hand, past lived experiences combine themselves as a meaning system, when a lived meaning emerges, as a sort of network and define the present situation as it is. On the other hand, the present situation, with our orientation into the future, selects the relevant past lived experiences, out of the stock of all the past lived experiences, into

the network. Such past lived experiences are enlivened in the present by becoming the sources and parts of the present lived meaning. There is no priority of the past over the present, nor of the present over the past. There is an inter-dependence of temporality, an interlocking of the past and the present. On some occasions, the newness in the present situation may challenge some of past experiences. Personal history contributes to the emergence of lived meaning, yet it is also open to revising and rewriting in the new light of lived meaning.

The lived meaning of hiking and the view from the mountain top seems to have become possible only through the medium of so many people I have met, whose own lived meaning touched off my own. Even if I was alone on the mountain top, the lived meaning I experienced became possible through my own past experiences and the people I have met in my life history. A single moment of my lived meaning is actually a tip of the ice berg which is my life history. Lived meaning is therefore better understood with respect not only to its present situation but also to the person's life history. Yet the life history is not the conglomeration of "objective" and unchanging facts but a transitory relation of some of past lived meanings, the relevance of which is also affected by the present situation.

Personal history, as a dimension and the background of the present lived meaning, is nonetheless my lived meanings in the past. And my lived meanings, when they emerged, became possible through the contribution of other people and their lived meanings. In this sense my

personal history is also my encounters with other persons and their lived meanings.

#### 1.4. The Romantic Apotheism: The Socio-Historical Dimension

Why and how did my father become interested in hiking and mountain climbing? He took up mountain climbing on rock and ice as a passion when he was in a university before the Second World War and he had been skiing since his youth in the late 1930's before the War started. He was a member of mountain climbing club in his high school and university.

Mountain climbing, however, had a definite European touch in those days, and it was rather an expensive and fashionable sports for mainly the sons of the well-to-do. Since the opening of Japan to foreigners in the 1868, Europeans staying in Japan climbed high mountains in central Japan, named them the Japan Alps, whose name is still used today, developed the still prestigious summer resort of Karuizawa and others, introduced mountain climbing as a sports to the Japanese. A small number of Japanese people had climbed mountains before the Europeans came, but they did so for other reasons such as lumbering, mining, hunting, and religious training. Mountain climbing had had a different meaning in the minds of the Japanese.

I am not sure how much of my father's love of mountain climbing was affected by this traditional notion of the mountain. Of course to my father, the mountains meant slightly different things than to an European, especially his general notion of nature supporting life, transcending ups

and downs of states and economies, the notion, to be exact, originated in ninth century China.

But in the main, mountain climbing which was imported into Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, as well as golf, tennis, rugby and soccer, meant something European to my father and his generation. Skiing was also a more recent import to Japan from Austria, Switzerland, and Germany in the 1920's. Mountain climbing in the late 1930's must have appeared under such aura to my father and many other young people in Japan. It was not only a private experience but already a social phenomenon.

So there are a few generations of mountain climbers in Japan who did climbing as an European sports. Though I have no direct knowledge at the moment as to who introduced and pioneered mountain climbing and skiing in Japan, it is certain that there had been such people, whether European or Japanese, or perhaps both. It is possible to trace the famous pioneers in Japanese mountain climbing and skiing even if it is practically impossible how their passions trickled down to my father.

Just as my lived meaning of the prospect from the summit was enabled by my life-historical experiences of mountain climbing and hiking with other people, among whom my father occupies an important position, so was my father's interest in mountain climbing enabled by his life-historical contacts with other people of whom I have little direct knowledge. And if we trace the influences a few generations before my father, we find that mountain climbing was imported from Europe.

We know that mountain climbing as a sports was imported in Japan from Europe. But it does not mean that Europeans had been climbing mountains as a sports from time immemorial. Admittedly people lived in the Alps and the Pyrennées for many centuries and they climbed up and down the mountain paths. Hannibal and Napoleon crossed the Alps, but the mountains were a barrier as they were for so many ordinary people for many long centuries. But people from other areas did not care to visit those mountains, not to say climb them, as we do now. The mountains were merely a barrier, a place to be avoided and detoured if possible. That was what the mountains had meant to many people before the interest in mountain climbing emerged.

It was in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century when the mountains began to acquire a new meaning. Many people began to visit and stay in the mountains. First among them was the poet Wordsworth, with his love of picturesque Yorkshire natural landscape, visited the French Alps in 1790. The painter Turner visited Alps in 1902. Shelley, with Mary Godwin and her half-sister Jane and leaving his wife Harriet and children in London, visited the Alps in 1814. He met Byron there, who would start living in Switzerland in 1816.

The love of mountains, of outdoor life, of creatures in nature, and of vacationing in the countryside are all closely related to each other in that they share an attitude away from the artificial, intellectual, rational, mechanized, bourgeois culture of the city. They are a part of what we named as the Romantic-Historicist meaning system. Walking in the mountains and fields, as Beethoven loved to do, and swimming in the sea,

as Byron swam across the Bosphorous Strait, made sense in this meaning system. These practices would have certainly appeared as incomprehensible insanity in the preceding Enlightenment-Scientific meaning system.

If the lived meaning of hiking and the view from the summit was "shaped" by, or had roots in, my past experiences and in my encounters with other persons, then the lived meanings of the people I have met had been shaped by the still past experiences of those people and the lived meanings of still other people, whom *they* had met, but who are mostly unknown to me. There are countless past experiences and people affecting my lived meanings in the first order. And each of these people had, before they met me, had had life histories full of countless experiences and encounters with still other people. Therefore, the number of lived meanings indirectly affecting my present lived meaning in the second order is immense. And I can not recall these lived meanings experienced by people I do not know directly. Theoretically, however, we can imagine the lived meanings affecting a lived meaning in the third order, fourth order, and so on.

If we trace the sources of a lived meaning in the second, third, and further orders, we come to face enormous numbers of people in the past and their lived meanings. We cannot possibly know their concrete personalities and experiences. What we face now is a more anonymous and general way of making sense, a particular attitude to feel, think, and behave in the world, a peculiar way to constitute this world. The worn paths in the mountains somehow remind us of, and make concrete, the

anonymous way of making sense. And this particular way of making sense is what I called a meaning system.

My particular lived meaning of the view from the summit has sources in, among many things, my father's lived meaning of climbing mountains. But as we traced back the source of the love of mountains beyond my father's lived meaning, we have seen a socio-historical attitude shared by many people: the meaning system of the love of mountains.

There are countless number of meaning systems. Some are more general and shared by many people; some are more local and particular to a limited number of persons. A meaning system has a differing degree of generality. The meaning system of hiking is much more general than the meaning system of climbing, say, the Mont-Blanc. Also, some meaning systems have affinities to each other. The love of hiking in the mountains is closely related to the love of bathing in the sea in many persons' lifeworlds. By paying attention to their affinities to each other, we can articulate the infinite number of meaning systems into the most general meaning systems illustrated in part 2.

## 2. Genesis of Lived Meaning:

### *Asuka and The Lord of the Rings*

In the previous chapter, I discussed how my lived meanings emerged and what is involved in it. Now let us look at how a lived meaning in another person emerges. I am pedagogically interested in the emergence of lived meaning in my daughter. First, let me show the situation where lived meaning emerges, and the background against which it emerged. Then, I would like to describe the internal and temporal structuring in this lived meaning.

#### 2.1. Dimensions of Lived Meaning

This summer my nine-year-old daughter Asuka was fascinated by *The Lord of the Rings*. She woke up in the morning and read until her parents were up and breakfast was ready. She read in the backseat of the car, she read in restaurants until the food was served, she read in the backyard in the afternoon, on the couch when it got darker or chillier outside, and in her bed until she fell asleep. She read the book wherever and whenever she could. She told me about the funny parts she liked, read me aloud the parts she thought I liked while I was driving, and asked me hundreds of questions such as "What do elves look like?" "Are there any wizards other than Gandalf and Saruman?" "How far is Mordor from the Mount of Doom and why did Frodo go to Mordor instead of heading directly to the Mount of Doom?" "What will Strider become and do at the end of the story?" Also she was terribly afraid of Gollum. She literally shuddered whenever he appeared in the book.



Sometimes she skipped reading such parts entirely. She had been scared of him since she read *The Hobbit* last year.

She enjoyed reading *The Hobbit* during the summer and autumn last year. At first she started reading my pocket-size paperback. Worried about her eyesight, I bought her a beautiful black hardcover edition with Smaug, the dragon, engraved in gold on the cover and with some color illustrations inside. She read it over and over again. She told me silly Hobbit verses. Asuka and I often talked about the Hobbits, dwarfs, elves, wizards, dragons, and many other creatures that appeared in the book. Also she watched a short animation video of *The Hobbit* a few times at her friend's house and at home. She said the video version was different from the "true" story in this and that. Because she liked the story so much, I lent her my copy of *The Lord of the Rings* last year. It was a heavy big book, a three-volumes-in-one, and somehow she did not finish reading the book.

Now in Asuka's life, *The Lord of the Rings* has no doubt an important meaning. But what exactly Asuka's lived meaning is, is difficult to tell. I felt and knew that the story was very important and fascinating to her, that I was attuned to her lived meaning of the book. But to describe her lived meaning is another matter. It is like this with any case of lived meaning even though we felt we knew it very well.

Let me start with the obvious. Asuka is certainly interested in the book as a physical thing. She is now reading the story in three separate paperback volumes with smaller print than the one I lent her before. The small paperback is perhaps easier to handle in a bed and to carry around

than the big, heavy hardcover. She would love to look at illustrations. But unfortunately the books have no illustrations except some maps. The small print does not seem to bother her as much as it does her father who is near-sighted and has known its inconveniences much more than Asuka does. These conditions may not seem important at first for the emergence of her lived meaning, but they are nonetheless part of what has rendered it possible. For if the book contained good illustrations, her lived meaning may have been visually more enhanced; if they were repulsive to her, Asuka may have rejected the book from the start, however good the text is. If Asuka had not been used to reading fairly thick paperbacks in small print, she may have been overpowered by the book and she may not have turned the first page over at all.

Language is also important. Asuka would not even try to read the book in its Japanese translation because she is more at home in English than in Japanese, having started going to school in Japan only a year ago. And she would not have tried to read the French version, even though she had been going to a French immersion school for four years. Asuka was brought up in a predominantly English-speaking environment in Canada. It was fortunate for her to pick up the book written in English from my bookshelf at the beginning of this summer. Otherwise her lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* would not have emerged at all. It is certainly not just English that matters here. The reason why she did not read *The Lord of the Rings* when I lent her my big book last winter may have been the level of difficulty and complexity of the language used in it for her at the time. It is full of big and archaic words that a nine-year-old

does not encounter very often and it abounds in long and meandering sentences. Even though she could handle them in *The Hobbit*, last year she could not keep up with the level of language in *The Lord of the Rings*. But this summer she could. Come to think of it now, some books she read before this summer, such as *The Cold Moon*, *Redwall*, and others, may have helped Asuka to prepare for the particular tone of language and lengthy sentences in *The Lord of the Rings*.

Let me examine the direct environment when Asuka was reading the book: where and when she read, and who were around her. She chose cozy, quiet places to read: in the bed room, the backyard, or the couch in the living room. The backseat of the car may not be as cozy and quiet as she may have wished, but it was a place where nobody will likely to pry into. When did she read? Basically when she had a free time when there was nothing better to do. She preferred to play with her friends in the house or in the playground, to go to a swimming pool or an amusement park, or for a bike ride, or to go horseback riding. But again she brought the book with her in the car in case it took too long to get there. Restaurants may not be a quiet and private place, but certainly she had nothing to do until the food came, and she knew her parents would allow her to read. Actually it was her parents who used to bring her books, pens and paper, or a small toy, when she was much younger, whenever there was a chance of waiting in a restaurant, a movie theatre, or a doctor's clinic. And who were with her when she was reading? She read by herself in a bedroom, in the couch, or in the living room. She also read while her parents were nearby but doing something else such as

driving, cooking, doing the dishes and laundry. On several occasions, when I was reading a book in the backyard, Asuka came out, sat in the next deck chair, and started reading *The Lord of the Rings*. I recollect now that I felt at the time how much Asuka had grown. She was able to read the book with some friends of hers while they got tired of playing together, but not with Lenore, who did not like reading herself and could not let Asuka alone even for a short while. On the one hand, at first Asuka could not read by herself the parts of the book where Gollum appeared. She wanted her parents to be with her, "just in case" as she would say. When she came to me or Chizuko suddenly out of nowhere, we looked at each other because we knew her fear, and let Asuka read. On the other hand, it was amusing, to see Asuka telling her much older friends about the fearful creature, Gollum, as if she was testing to see how afraid they would be. To be able to read the book, Asuka needed a more or less cozy, quiet and private place, free time when there was no big agenda. Definitely nobody was to bother her reading and sometimes she needed someone whom she could trust to protect her in case the story got too scary.

There was perhaps another reason why she enjoyed *The Lord of the Rings* so much, a reason which contributed to her lived meaning. Chizuko and I like reading and I am sure Asuka had seen us reading quite often. I had become interested in fantasy novels written in English since I started choosing books for her some years ago. I read most of the books before I gave them to her. It is amazing how much Asuka and I shared favorite genres of reading, such as animal ethology, natural

history of the earth, life forms and the universe, animal stories and fairy fantasy rather than robot SF, and funny imaginative nonsense. Asuka's favorite authors were Jane Goodall, Michael Ende, Roald Dahl, Ursula Le Guin, and of course C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien. They are my favorite authors, too. It is again amazing to find my favorite authors in her list. But of course, almost all her books were bought by me and given to her. She borrowed some books from the school and the public libraries, but among them were many books which belonged to the same genre. About those books I had enjoyed reading previously, I had much conversation with Asuka. But when she borrowed a *Babysitters Club* book from school, I had nothing to say about it simply because I had not read one before. Or perhaps there was a tacit preference of books in me. If neither Chizuko nor I had liked fantasy but if we had liked romance instead, perhaps Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* would have perhaps never emerged or would have not been possible, at least at this point in her life. My preference in the books was taken up by Asuka. Of course I did not give her every book I liked. I gave her only the books which I thought were good for her and which she might be able to enjoy at the particular point in her life. But my preference in the books I gave her, my preference in the topics of our conversation was seen in Asuka's preference. In this case, Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* was "infected" by mine.

Did I intend this? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that I wanted Asuka to come to like the *Narnian* stories and *The Hobbit* rather than *Archies* and *Babysitters Club*. No, in the sense that I wanted to make

her enjoy C.S. Lewis or Tolkien. I only gave her books which I thought she might enjoy.

These are some of the direct conditions that have rendered Asuka's lived meaning possible. But there are many other conditions without which Asuka's lived meaning was impossible to emerge. For example, *The Lord of the Rings* would not have been written, if Tolkien did not have the imagination, interest, and fascination in the story he was creating. The story must have been an important part of his life and we could speak of his lived meaning even though I do not know him personally. We know that he began telling the story of *The Hobbit* to his own children. So we can imagine Tolkien's children asking their father for more story, perhaps after supper or before going to bed. If Tolkien's children had not been interested in his story telling, Tolkien might have been too discouraged to write *The Hobbit* and therefore *The Lord of the Rings* at all. It was Tolkien's lived meaning which made the book possible but Tolkien's lived meaning was, at least partially and at least in the beginning, strengthened and supported by his children's lived meaning. Tolkien's lived meaning of the story itself originated in the intersubjective field of J.R.R. Tolkien and his children. Further, there have been millions of readers of Tolkien who enjoyed his writing in their different ways, who are anonymous to me but without whom the publisher of the book would have stopped printing the book. In this sense, Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* became possible because of her father's lived meaning and Tolkien's lived meaning,

Tolkien's children's lived meaning, and countless other readers' lived meaning.

How did my lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* emerge? I did not take it up from my parents as Asuka did. It was perhaps only about five years ago when I first read *The Hobbit*. When I was a child, *The Hobbit*, *The Lord of the Rings*, or the *Narnia* stories had not been translated into Japanese, and there was no way I could read them in English at the time. The books were translated and published in Japan about 15 years ago. And at about that time one of my friends in Japan told me about *The Lord of the Rings*. He seemed to enjoy the book in Japanese translation but I did not go to buy a copy, perhaps because I was too busy then, and also because I preferred mystery to fantasy at the time. So my friend's lived meaning of the *The Lord of the Rings* did not spread to me even if there was a chance then. Rather, my lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* was a direct consequence of that of the *Narnia* stories I read a few years earlier and the book review about the children's literature.

How did Tolkien conceive the story? What contributed to his lived meaning of the story? Among many things we find in his *History of the Middle Earth* of which includes *The Hobbit* and *The Lord of the Ring*, the most salient feature is its kinship with the Norse and German Myth. Its main characters are dwarfs, elves, wizards, and men; the main nomenclature are Scandinavian, Irish, and Scottish places and characters. It is different from the world of Greek myth where gods and heroes interact, or from the *Narnian Chronicle*, which resembles a

medieval Christian world where faith in the absolute being, be it Aslan or Christ, saves troubles in the world and then judiciously be rewarded. Asuka had some familiarity with Greek, Norse, and Judeo-Christian mythologies already then, which may be another reason why she could go into *The Lord of the Rings*.

Also we might wonder here what enabled Tolkien to write *The Lord of the Rings*, and what rendered Tolkien's lived meaning possible while he was writing the long story. The revival of the mythologies and folktales against the predominant scientization and technologization of the society, the resurrection of imagination instead of reason, was the conspicuous feature of the Romantic-Historical meaning system that I have sketched in Chapter 2, Part 2. Tolkien's *History of the Middle Earth* has a closest affinity to this meaning system. While the Grimm Brothers and Hans Christian Andersen took themes from mainly West European folktales and developed them into stories for their contemporary young readers and their mothers, Tolkien gleaned themes from Norse and German mythologies and created a new mythology of his own. Precisely because this mythology does not claim to be closely related to any particular race or culture, and because it has little kinship with Christianity compared with the *Narnian Chronicles*, it has the possibility of becoming the myth of any person. In this sense, *The Lord of the Rings*, rooted most strongly in the Romantic-Historical meaning system, is a work in its mature phase. Without the tendency to glorify one particular tradition, without that regrettable tendency shared by some works in the meaning system, *The Lord of the Rings* opened a new style



in the genre of contemporary fantasy literature and thereby enriching the meaning system itself.

I also note, as a piece of literary episode, that Tolkien was in a "productive competition" with C.S. Lewis. After publishing *The Hobbit* in 1938, Tolkien continued writing bits and pieces which were intended to form the *History of the Middle Earth* as a whole, but he did not complete *the Lord of the Rings* until Lewis poured out the books of *Narnian Chronicles*, from Tolkien's point of view, rather quickly and easily. If we were researching the lived meaning of Tolkien himself, this biographical factor will be very important. Yet for the constitution of Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings*, it has only a minor significance. For Asuka, *The Lord of the Rings* was a complete work, whether it was written hurriedly or slowly, or with a particular rival in mind.

We can speculate on other conditions that enabled Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings*. If writing was yet to be invented, a story like *The Lord of the Rings*, if it existed perhaps in the form of a myth of the ancestors, must be told and listened to to be appreciated. The story would naturally change according to the moods and whims of the storyteller, and the listener of the story could not take off, to play and have snacks for instance, in the middle of storytelling. If there was no meaning system which accompanied the development of writing, and if Asuka heard the story, perhaps in a communal setting, her lived meaning would be very different. Further, we can imagine the long period in human history when spoken language as we use it now had not been developed. It is obvious that, without the meaning system which was

enabled by the emergence of language, any story, not to speak of *The Lord of the Rings*, was impossible.

Am I going too far? Am I now arguing with the same logic as in the proposition that Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* would not have been possible if human species had not evolved from the primate? if dinosaurs had not died out 65 million years ago? or, if there had been no Big Bang?--therefore these must be conditions of Asuka's lived meaning? It is true that the Big Ban, the dinosaur extinction, the evolution of human species, and innumerable conditions have made our present existence possible, including Asuka's existence and her lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings*. However, the task of finding these conditions applicable to all human existence belongs to a different kind of inquiry, of which findings the human sciences need to be sensitive to and rely on. So we can disregard these as conditions for Asuka's, or for that matter anyone's, lived meaning. Then are all events in human history relevant to the formation of Asuka's lived meaning? Yes, but some are more relevant than others in differing degrees. The size of Cleopatra's nose may have been relevant to Anthony, Julius Caesar, or Shakespeare, or to the readers, actors and spectators of Shakespeare's play, but not to Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* .

Then why did I say that the meaning systems of language, writing, myth and religion, and the Romantic-Historical are relevant to Asuka's lived meaning? It is because they were fundamental layers of meanings systems which contributed to the emergence of Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* in an fundamental sense.

Because she was able to use language, make sense of the world by way of language, unlike the baby she had been several years ago, she felt, thought, acted, and imagined in the world of story. As the story unfolded before her, within her, and around her, she cried, rejoiced, feared, anticipated, and despaired--in short, she *lived* in the world of story. Such a mode of making sense of the world may be too obvious to be properly understood. If we take language as the transcendental or universal condition on which all other meanings are dependent, as some philosophers have had done, two important facts will be hidden behind this assumption. First, the pre-linguistic, bodily mode of making sense of the world, which is habituated by the babies before the acquisition of language and also by the (pre)humans and animals before the emergence of language. Not only in these pre-linguistic beings but also in ourselves, this meaning system of the body is still at work (Johnson, 1987). Second, if we take language as the universal given, we tend to forget that human language itself had a history, and we face difficulties understanding the process of how this universal gradually developed. The meaning system of language emerged and developed in the human history, even though we may not know its precise origins and diffusion, and it was doubtlessly passed down, with changes and modifications, to us. It is still alive as a layer of making sense of the world in many of us, excluding pre-linguistic babies and exceptional cases of people who lost or did not acquire language. A meaning system, a distinct mode of sense-making in a person's lifeworld, is the result of this person's learning process as well as the result of the long process of diffusion in the

anthropological scale. To take language as a universal given would belittle the human drama of all these people concerned.

In this sense, the meaning system of language is essential in the emergence of Asuka's lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings*. The facts that the particular book Asuka read was written in English and that she understands English, are important for the actual emergence of her lived meaning. However, if we see from the perspective of the content of her lived meaning, it will be clear that these facts belong to its contingent factors. For, a similar lived meaning can and do emerge in millions of children and adults in the world in many different languages which have translations of the book. But in each case of these similar lived meaning, we will find contributions from the meaning system which was enabled by the emergence of language.

Then why is the meaning system of *written* language important for the emergence of Asuka's lived meaning? It is of course important in a contingent sense. Unable to read, the book would mean nothing to her. But is there not an essential feature which belongs to the meaning system enabled by writing and which also shapes Asuka's lived meaning? Because Asuka can read now, she can make sense of a story even if it is not directly told her. She can feel and think in the silent world of written language. Unlike my story told to Asuka, which changes rather freely according to my own mood, Asuka's moods, and the contingent necessities such as "Bed time, now," the written story is fixed and enduring. It can be read after interruptions at the reader's leisure. It has a linear structure, starting from the beginning and ends at the end. It

discourages having two conflicting versions about one same event, because these two versions can be easily contrasted synchronically just by opening the relevant pages, tablets, or rolls. But above all, written manuscripts place and presume a certain distance between the reader and the author. Asuka is reading the long book as a story independent of its author without any knowledge of Tolkien.

What about the mythico-religious and the Romantic-Historical meaning systems? Do they have distinctive mode of making sense of the world in Asuka's lived meaning? I have already touched on the influence of the Romantic-Historical at work in Tolkien's lived meaning, which has little religious tone, in creating his stories. But what about Asuka's lived meaning?

Perhaps at present in Asuka's lifeworld, the mythico-religious, the Enlightenment-scientific, and the Romantic-Historical meaning systems have not clearly articulated themselves. As she reads the story, she is living in a world where prayers are answered, where magic spells can transform things and course of events, where intricate tools fascinate the kings and queens as well as her, and where history and folklore overlap. Asuka does not confuse this world of imagination now with the reality she shares with people around her. Yet the boundary between the imaginary world the *The Lord of the Rings* and her everyday world is so uncertain that Gollum could pop out of the story to scare her<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> If printing had not been invented, Asuka's lived meaning was impossible. Although in this circumstance the story was unlikely to have been written, we can still suppose a similar story was written on a manuscript. Still, for a person

Because Asuka's lifeworld, at this particular point in her life history and in this particular culture which surrounds her personal lifeworld, shows such sort of articulation or inarticulation. Even if the mythico-religious, the Enlightenment-Scientific, and the Romantic-Historical meaning systems are available in her surrounding social lifeworld, and these are essentially sharable for any person in the society, yet, the process of learning them takes time and experiences. The meaning systems in the adults' social lifeworld cannot be automatically "imprinted" onto the personal lifeworlds of children. A child is in the process of learning and acquiring these features in his or her surrounding culture through concrete lived meanings. For that matter, adults are doing the same. Asuka must have acquired these meaning systems as a prerequisite of her lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings*. Those meaning systems are not some events that just passed by in her life

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to appreciate the story, it would be necessary to be a member of a very small circle of persons who have access to that original manuscript or its hand-written copies. The manuscript would be more precious and have sacred aura, and would be likely to be kept out of reach of children. The invention of printing and the ensuing spread of printed books which enabled Asuka's lived meaning was important in the sense they achieved easy access to the book in the objective dimension. For example, if Asuka could gain access to a beautifully decorated manuscript, like a copy of medieval Bible, Asuka would have been spell-bound by it. Printing and the spread of books is not as important as the emergence of language or writing. Reading prints does not require a separate learning process from reading hand writing, as bodily coordination, spoken language, and writing, does. A meaning system requires a learning process of its own.

history. With the acquisition of these meaning systems such as language and writing, though it is difficult to pinpoint their beginnings and ends, Asuka's lifeworld underwent qualitative changes, her life matured to a newer stage. I believe that also in this personal development we can see the nature of lived meaning as the evolving process of meaning systems.

There are contingent conditions that are particular to Asuka's lived meaning and her life history such as being introduced to the book by me. But to a child, introduction to the world of *The Lord of the Rings* by someone who enjoyed it is not a situation particular only to Asuka. It can happen to any child. A child can even pick it up in a library without any help or suggestion from adults. Does it mean that a child does not need introduction to *The Lord of the Rings*, or any other book for that matter, through the encounter with another person who is also interested in it? Is the intersubjective dimension unnecessary in the emergence of lived meaning? Could it mean that if a child already likes books, if given sufficient environment such as free time, a comfortable place to read, and the book, she would certainly enjoy the book and the lived meaning emerge? Let us see in closer detail what Asuka's lived meaning was like and what would be missing in the lived meaning of a solitary reader.

## 2.2. Emergence of Lived Meaning

Lived meaning can be seen as a fixed structure with its own network of relationships already established. It can be seen also as an emergence, i.e., a growing network of such relationships. It is convenient to see it as a fixed structure when its relationships with other meanings are considered. It is necessary to see it as a growing network especially

when its internal relationships are to be described. If a lived meaning is shown as a fixed structure, we are looking back at it as a past event. If a lived meaning is shown as an emergence, we need to look at it in the "present participle."

Lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* does not form in one stroke. It has emerged and changed through time. Although it is impossible to trace all the minute changes, we may try to capture the process in its temporality.

While a lived meaning is conditioned by external contingencies and events in the dimensions mentioned above and also by meaning systems available in the surrounding culture, it has also its own growing history, which is best understood through the description of its internal and temporal structure. This internal structure strengthens, changes, and modifies the lived meaning. Lived meaning is conditioned by life-history, it also forms her growing life-history.

Before Asuka started reading the book, the memory of *The Hobbit* that she has read before and the memory of its video version was in the horizon of her lifeworld. Against the background of all the stories she had read, listened to, and made up herself, Bilbo Baggins appeared to her as an already familiar character. We do not know how much Asuka recollected thematically and intentionally the story of *The Hobbit*, but the memory was without doubt in her horizons, with relevant parts ready to present themselves in the foreground out of the stock of her memory. The memory of the fact that she gave up reading the book last year was also in her horizon, yet this memory is not tinted, I hope, with a traumatic



sense of failure. If her parents had told her then, "Why don't you finish it before reading another book? We will not buy you any more books if you don't read what you have now," Asuka may have felt differently.

The direct reason why she started reading the story seems contingent. At the beginning of the summer vacation, Asuka had finished what she was reading and she just picked up the first volume of *The Lord of the Ring* whose title she already knew from a bookshelf in the living room. Maybe she felt that the paperback edition in her hands was smaller than the big volume which contains three books and which was in the bookcase with a sliding glass in front in her room.

Now, she opens the first page. Asuka chuckles at funny passages about the joint birthday when Bilbo turned the happy age of eleventy-one and Frodo thirty-three, the age a hobbit comes of age after the long irresponsible tweens. Asuka comes to me smiling and asks, "Daddy, do you know what eleventy-one is?" I say, "Eleventy? What is it, Asuka?" "See, it's like seventy, eighty, ninety, and then eleventy." "Then what comes after eleventy-nine, Asuka?" "Twelve-ty." "Twelve-ty? I would call it twelfty. Wouldn't you?" Asuka goes back to the couch skipping while saying to herself, "Eleventy, twelfty, thirteenty, green tea, high noon tea, ..."

When the story comes to the passage of the magical ring, Asuka must have remembered that in *The Hobbit* the ring was picked up by Bilbo in the depth of the darkest cave where Gollum lived, and that it had magical power to make its wearer invisible, and that it had a long obscure history before Gollum. Asuka asks me suddenly in the car while I am

driving home from a swim, "Daddy, is Gollum going to come again in this story?" I guess instantly that Asuka is reading the part where Bilbo is toying the ring with the thought that he is going to disappear by its magical power at the end of the big joint-birthday party for Frodo and himself. I tell her, "Yes, Asuka." "Does he come often, daddy, does he?" "Yes." "What does he do, does he kill Bilbo or something?" I try to sound like Gandalf, as I did when I read her *The Hobbit* last year on several occasions, and say in a deep, slow voice, "He has a role to play in the story, Asuka, until the very end." Asuka shudders a little and looks at me rather seriously and say, "I hate Gollum."

While she reads, Asuka imagines the future parts of the story with expectations and fear, and, by asking me questions, gets "sneak previews" about them. She also likes Sam Gamgee's funny way of speaking. She reads aloud the funny parts to me or Chizuko, hoping to share the fun with other people. Sometimes Asuka tries Hobbit talk in a high, nasal, and cute voice, and I speak wizard talk, both of us making up impromptu conversations.

In this manner, Asuka is reading on and her lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* grows. Of course many interruptions occur. She goes to swim, plays with her friends, goes shopping with me, talks and plays with me, talks with her grand mother, has meals and snacks, goes to washroom, watches TV, and goes to bed. In those instances, her lived meaning is held at bay, and her priority shifts to something else. Yet, whenever she opens the book again, she can enter the world of the story. As she reads, the memory of the earlier parts is connected to the part she

is reading currently. Her past expectations and fear she felt while she was reading an earlier part are sometimes fulfilled, sometimes they turn out to be the contrary, and sometimes they are kept in further suspense. The suspended expectations and fears she feels about what is going to happen to Bilbo, Frodo, Mery, Pippin, Gandalf, Strider, and other characters she likes, keeps her reading on. Sometimes, when the suspense is too much for her to bear, she can't help asking me questions. Through my usually indicative and somewhat mystified answers in wizard talk, she peeps into the future. And, of course, some parts that seem too dull, difficult, or irrelevant -- the parts she cannot make sense at the moment--are skipped.

Her puzzlement at the part she is reading now induces her to go back to the earlier part which she may have skipped before. She may be able now to make sense of what was previously irrelevant, and she can weave the threads she lost into her growing lived meaning. And by her imagination, by asking me questions, or simply by "peaking" into the later part of the book, she projects the future of the story and tries to get the entire story. And in this way, her lived meaning grows, as Dilthey once noted, its parts achieving myriads of relatedness with each other and with the entire story as a whole, and the whole giving a proper sense to each of its parts.

Concurrently, the sense of the story in its whole is acquired in relation to other stories. The lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* is closely related to, as a sequel of, that of *The Hobbit*. The lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* is achieved by breathing the atmospher

particular world which is different from, say that of *Narnian Chronicles*, and by noting this difference even if the difference may not be thematically questioned or analyzed.

Sometimes Asuka says, "Why can't Bilbo hide the ring?" "Why didn't Gandalf carry the ring and fly to the Mount of Doom and dump it in the Crack of Doom?" By asking such questions, she is exploring possible courses of action that are different from what "actually" happened in the story. She also tells me, "I would go here instead of there," "I would do this instead of that." Then she is re-living the characters in the story in particular situations, wondering what she would do and at the same time evaluating their judgments.

Sometimes Asuka asks me who I like best in the story, who is the wisest, bravest, or strongest of all, or if I could proceed in a pitch-dark tunnel that is getting narrower, wetter and hotter, as Frodo or Bilbo did. Then she is thinking of what she would do if she were in their shoes, and she wants to know what I would do. I tell her what I feel and we have many conversations. Through such conversation, Asuka's growing lived meaning is intertwined with my lived meaning, through difference and sameness, through unity and diversity.

Lived meaning can grow without end. In future, Asuka's lived meaning of the book will certainly change as she grows. The change will occur by reading different stories, by meeting different people, by doing different things, in short, by taking different perspectives. Then the lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* will be recalled, modified, or enriched.

Or it might wither in the shadow of a more captivating and more important story to Asuka.

Even if Asuka's lived meaning of *the Lord of the Rings* is still growing, it is highly unlikely in the future that she can recall where and when she read the story, what kind of questions she asked me, what kind of conversations we had about Gandalf, Gollum, Bilbo, Frodo, and other characters in the book, or why she started reading it in the first place. These relate to the particular contextuality of the emerging process of lived meaning. Naturally we tend to forget the emerging process, the genesis of lived meaning. What she retains in the future will be the "content," or "skeleton," instead of the lived meaning in its freshness, or, put differently, the residue of meaning that is cut off from the entirety of the emerging lived meaning with concrete contingencies in the intersubjective and life-historical dimensions. We may nostalgically recall in the future the emotion accompanying the emerging lived meaning, which is a concrete and particular process in which all those seemingly contingent factors matter. Yet, the lived meaning will never be re-lived in the same way.

But, if a situation in the future allows, the memory of the lived meaning will be recalled, and the residue of the lived meaning will be re-enlivened in a new setting, weaving different threads into the tapestry of lived meaning.

The meaning of the book may be recalled in future situations where she must think what true courage is--the weakest and least endowed creature like Frodo and Sam carrying the heaviest burden of all

and pursued by the most dangerous enemies imaginable--and her memory of the lived meaning may be woven into her actions. Or, Asuka may someday write a story, paint a picture, or compose a poetry, reawakening the lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings* which started this summer, by re-enlivening it, modifying it, or expanding it. Or, at a certain point in her future, Asuka might impart her lived meaning of *The Lord of the Rings*, or any other book, to her children as a parent or as a teacher. The lived meaning will be disseminated in this way.

### **3. Pedagogy of Lived Meaning: Climbing with Asuka**

A few years ago, my wife, Asuka, and I went for a hiking. I chose a hiking course with a short steep climb suitable for Asuka, prepared necessary equipments, water and snacks. On the day we parked our car at the beginning of the hiking course. I already know some features of this hiking course because I had consulted with friends, and have already even seen the photographs of the "view from the summit" in a guide book.

Asuka is unaware of what is waiting in front of her at the top of a ridge. She does not know how many hours it will take to get there. She does not even wonder if she can get there. She is not aware of the possible danger of bears, thunder, rain, or drop of temperature. She may have seen me packing rain gear, warm clothes, emergency food, a map, and so on into my backpack, but she really did not why they are necessary. She is just excited about going hiking with her parents on a beautiful day. She is responding to the invitation in the intersubjective field around her.

It is natural to be a six-year-old to be just happy and free of anxiety. After all it is not her who decided to go hiking up to the top of the particular ridge. She was invited to go hiking. Actually she does not really know what hiking is. She has strolled and walked in the city and in the country, in parks and on hills, but she has never done hiking before. Her parents said, "Asuka, let's go hiking. There will be a beautiful view at the top." Perhaps she could not imagine what kind of spectacle this

beautiful view might be. But she sensed the excitement and inviting smiles in parents and said, "OK. Let's go!" with an enthusiasm. Her parents had seldom disappointed her, especially when they smiled to her like that and invited her to come with them. She sensed something good, a part of the world that is new to her, waiting for her.

Asuka, Chizuko, and I enjoy walking in the forest. The path is not steep, and it is soft with fallen leaves to tread on. The air is cool and moist in the trees' shade. We talk about the squirrels and birds, flowers and insects, as we see them. There are animal tracks and droppings, funnily shaped stones and clouds, slippery and wet roots, all sorts of vines and leaves and fungi, all of which provide us with good topics to talk about. We are perhaps more talkative now than usual, excited, light-hearted, enjoying the walk. I wish this walk continued all the way up to the top of the ridge but I also know there will be a long and steep climb soon. I want Asuka to enjoy the beautiful world as much as possible. I decided to stop and rest at a place not far from the end of the forest line.

After several minutes of rest, we start climbing again. We come out of the forest line rather suddenly, and there are dwarfed trees and small plants now. Freed from the big trees and their leaves, we can now enjoy the sunshine and also wonder at the view of mountains on the other side of the mountain we are climbing. At least for a while. And we talk about this change. The path is rocky and the steep climb begins. The sun now feels hot, our breathing quickens, and my stretched tendons started to sore. Physical fatigue or pain tend to shrink one's world into worries only of one's body. Even though Asuka has not complained yet, I can see



her walking in strain. Chizuko's face is pinkish from exercising. I know from my experience that the first 15 minutes of climbing are always arduous until the body is acclimatized to the climb. Asuka is now silent. I say, "It's a tough climb, isn't it?" She gives me a curt "Ya." I set the pace a little slower. And I tell her that the climb is going to get better soon and that the first 10 or 15 minutes are most tiring. I wonder if I should explain about the acclimatization of the body to the task. No, perhaps it is not necessary to a six-year-old. I will tell her if she asks why the climb will get better or why I know it. But she doesn't.

I point to the tiny, inconspicuous flowers and mosses alongside the rocky path and talk about them, trying to draw her attention from the tiredness of the body. I talk about clouds above the mountains on the other side and the rocks around us. My talkativeness now is intentional, different from the natural talkativeness minutes ago. Asuka is less talkative than usual and gives me only short answers. She is tired. Fortunately we cannot see the top of the ridge which is our goal. If she could see it, the distance might feel longer. Maybe it is sometimes a good thing that one cannot see one's goal. At least at this stage. And Asuka does not even know what the goal of this climb is. Her parents only told her that there is a wonderful view at the top and invited her to this climb. I do not think if Asuka cared very much about the goal. She followed us in a puppy-like trust. I notice I am not as tired as I expected when this steep climb began, perhaps because my attention is not drawn to my body but to Asuka and Chizuko, and also because I am climbing more slowly than I would climb by myself or with my friends.

Asuka started talking about Garfield. Good, even if its' Garfield, here's at least something she wants to talk about! Only a few questions prompt her stories of Garfield: how he hates exercise, how much he loves lasagna, how he treats Odie, the dog, and how silly Jon is. I am more interested in listening to Asuka enthusiastically talk about Garfield now than I usually am at home. At home I gave her only short answers when she told me about Garfield and I did not know until now that Asuka liked Garfield so much. I learn a lot about Garfield not so much because I like him as because Asuka likes him.

I feel that the first arduous climb is almost over. I do not know if it is because the 15 minutes have passed or because Asuka has found a favorite topic to talk about. We are climbing at a steady pace and in a high spirit. Looking back and down at our parked car so small we see how far we have climbed up.

Once we find the right pace and the right mood, the climb becomes automatic, like a slow walk in the street. I do not need to force myself in providing topics to talk about. But I feel much more relaxed now. We talk what we want to talk, and we are silent when we wish to be. Talking and silence are spontaneous. But there are so many things to talk about and we seem to never run out of topics! Asuka asks Chizuko and me what we did when we were children, where we went, what we liked to do and eat, who were our best friends, etc. Half an hour ago, when all three of us were still on the way to the parking lot at the foothill, we were almost silent, each of us thinking or doing separately, even though we had

much time to talk. We are "more" together now, climbing the mountain in the vast space, than we were earlier in a confined space of a car.

Even though our spirits are high, our bodies get tired. I decided to take a break every 20 minutes or so. Asuka does not know the importance of pacing and having rests. It will be years when she understands this. She does not know how to take those rests. We sit down and she gets a small amount of water during a rest. She wants more. But I tell her a lot of water will tire her quickly. I feel she does not understand the explanation but I remain firm. It is amazing to see children recover quickly. After a minute, Asuka cannot stay sitting still.

We start climbing again. After repeating this cycle of climb and rest, we have come to the steepest part of the climb. The path is full of fallen stones. The sun scorches us. We are all sweating. Asuka says she is tired. She needs encouragement. I show her a landmark and promise her to take a rest once we get there. It is necessary in a long demanding journey to have many short-term goals and achieve it one by one. Asuka certainly does not know this. I wonder when or if she recognizes this. Until she can set goals and start walking on her own, she needs somebody to set her pace. But I wonder if I were a hypocrite? Am I trying to teach her what, even though I know I should, I do not always practice? I am not a perfect person but know how to set a pace; and she needs a pace-setter. Is this a sufficient reason for my setting her pace and limiting her water?

But it is not the right moment to ponder these questions. Asuka needs encouragement and I tell her how fine she is doing in spite of the

steep climb. I take rests more often now. A little snacks and a little more water would not hurt now if they can keep her spirits up. We might be forced to turn back any moment and the climb should be enjoyed by Asuka even if did not reach the top. So we set the pace more slowly trying to be open to the things around us as much as possible. We need to resist to be drawn solely to the goal of reaching the summit. Even though I thought Asuka could make it to the top in this hiking course, I may be wrong. And it is a common obsession with adults to reach a summit. Perhaps reaching a goal itself does not mean much for children. The nature of the experience of reaching a goal, the nature of semiogenesis itself, is more important. I want to keep her experience of this climb as joyful as possible even if we turned back in the midway.

While I am wondering in these thoughts, we reach the coll. The climb is not as steep as before and we can see the top of the ridge not far away from us. We can make it. Our pace inevitably quickens. And the wind is refreshingly cool and drying our wet shirts. Finally we reach the top. And there, far down on the other side of the ridge, we can see a huge glacier spreading in front of us, the glacier which was not visible or existent before. And there is a beautiful small lake filled with emerald water some distance away from the bottom of the glacier. And all the mountains beyond the glacier. We jump on the spot and shout with joy, over the beautiful scenery and over our effort, in our lived meaning.

We sit down and Asuka takes snacks. Fruits and cookies, and a pack of her favorite juice. Chizuko put a light jacket on Asuka. It is chilly up her once the exertion is gone and the sweat dried. Asuka is content

and looks at the view while munching on the cookies. Asuka's lived meaning is constituted with these cookies, too. Refreshed, we explore the unexpectedly flat area at the top of the ridge. A tiny pika is looking at us from between rocks. Asuka is instantly absorbed in playing with it.

We spent an hour at the top of the ridge. Perhaps we stayed there too long. On the way back, we saw rapidly building dark clouds so near from us, and we had to run. We were afraid of getting hit by a thunder. I carried Asuka on piggy-back and trotted down until we reached the forest line where we felt safe.

## Summary: Conceptual Framework for a Dialogical Notion of Lived Meaning

As a summary to this thesis, I would like to show briefly a conceptual framework of the notion of lived meaning. First, the premises of semiogenetics and the basic notions of lived meaning, lifeworld, meaning systems and apothegms will be reiterated. Second, the genesis, growth, and modification of lived meaning will be illustrated through three channels: by focusing on a meaning, by focusing on a person, and by focusing on the culture. I hope that this summary will serve to present a conceptual framework to my meandering journey towards a better understanding of lived meaning.

Through an examination of the notions of lived experience and lifeworld in part 1 of this thesis, the following three methodological orientations have been elaborated:

- 1) to regard the constitution of meaning from *an intersubjective perspective*, instead of from any form of the subjective or the objective perspective;
- 2) to acknowledge the *multiplicity of lifeworlds* of different people living in a society, and of people living in various place and time; and, to acknowledge the *historicity of lifeworlds*, i.e., that a lifeworld changes with the passage of time;
- 3) to regard *meaning and experience as equiprimordial*, as articulation of the world, without deriving one from another, as if we know already what experience is and how it emerges.

## **Lived Meaning**

Lived meaning is a name for the meaning which emerges, and is felt in our experience. Compared with the meanings of words found in a dictionary, a lived meaning may be vague or clear. The notion of lived meaning covers a much wider extent of human experiences. For example, we can speak of lived meanings of a child's imagination, a non-verbal message from another person, my bodily awareness in a situation, or a piece of art, music, or novel. Each lived meaning is unique. To use the initial example, the lived meaning of the battleship in the seven-year old boy was unique. The notion of lived meaning covers any human experience that is experienced as meaningful. This is a consequence of the third methodological orientation mentioned above.

The notion of lived meaning is tantamount to the notion of lived experience, if the aspect of personal relevance is kept in the latter. To study the emergence of lived meaning is the same as studying the emergence of lived experience. Yet we know as little about the emergence of experience as about that of meaning. It is not possible to derive the notion of lived meaning from the notions of meaning or of experience as if these are already known.

Lived meaning is a nascent or emerging articulation of the world. Lived meaning makes sense of the world; or the world makes sense to us in lived meaning. Lived meaning is always about the world, at least about a part of the world. Even my bodily sense of danger "tells" me about the situation. Lived meaning contains such a noematic aspect, or a content or information about the particular part of the world. Also lived meaning

has a noetic content. In the lived meaning of a dangerous place, my body and emotion are prepared for the possible danger. Lived meaning is never flat, objective information. It may have a cognitive content; yet it is more than mere cognition. In lived meaning, we are connected to the world by making sense of it.

We can ask what a particular lived meaning is like: inquiring into the whatness of lived meaning, as well as how a particular lived meaning has emerged, and is constituted. In the former, the whatness of the *semiosis* is studied statically by what can be called a *semiography*. In the latter, we are inquiring into the genesis of lived meaning, or *semiogenesis* in short, dynamically or in its formation. The study of semiogenesis is given the name of *semiogenetics*, and the task of the static semiography is included in it.

### **Meaning System and Lifeworld**

A *meaning system* is a name for a way, mode, or style of how a person feels, thinks, or acts. It is a habituated mode of making sense of the world in a certain way. The experience of the articulation of the world through my lived meanings leaves a trace, a particular pattern, mode, or taste, in the way I make sense of the world. Through lived meaning of something, it appears nothing but as it is. An articulation is an emergence of a node in the world. Once a node is formed, it stays until it is later forgotten, modified by other nodes, or removed by an unlearning process. A way of making sense of the world thus solidified and habituated is a meaning system. A meaning system emerges through



lived meanings, even though the relation between a meaning system and a lived meaning is not a one-to-one correspondence.

Various meaning systems, i.e., ways of making sense of the world, are "sedimented" or habituated in my *lifeworld*, here understood as the entirety of what is taken-for-granted, the outreach of what can be there, or what is pre-given in my daily life. In distinction with the Husserlian notion of *the* universal lifeworld, which, while being the ground of the scientific attitude and yet which is concealed or distorted by the scientific or by the reflective attitudes, the semiogenetic notion of lifeworld is not conceived as a universal. On the contrary, my lifeworld is unique, different from yours, as I am different from you. Further, my lifeworld at present is different from my lifeworld in my childhood; and so is yours. This is the consequence of the second methodological orientation derived in part 1.

### **Intersubjective Constitution of Lived Meaning**

Lived meaning is intersubjectively constituted. This is a first premise drawn from the methodological orientations elaborated in part 1. Because of this premise, semiogenetics presently becomes *dialogical semiogenetics*. There are two aspects to the premise of the intersubjective constitution.

1) Lived meaning is constituted in the presence of other persons. My lived meaning takes shape as such, partly depending on who I am with at the moment. My lived meaning needs to become explicit and clear, if I want to communicate what I feel, think, or act to other persons

around me in the intersubjective field, and if they are waiting to know what I feel, think, or act. If there is not such a communicative intersubjectivity around me for whatever reason, my lived meaning may not need to become explicit and clear; it may have to be concealed and disguised in such a situation. Yet, this is a distorted intersubjective field and cannot be the starting point of dialogical semiogenetics.

Often, for a lived meaning to emerge, the presence of the other person's understanding is necessary as well as formative. This is the direct contribution of intersubjectivity in the form of encounter with an other person or more persons who are in one's direct intersubjective field. To use the initial example given in the Introduction, the boy's battleship may have emerged perhaps because he felt that the adult could see it too.

Differently put, lived meaning is not only felt within the subject, but also it is basically open to other persons in the intersubjective field. Lived meaning is certainly a new, relevant articulation of the world to the subject, but it can be seen, from the semiogenetic standpoint, also as a response and invitation to other persons in the intersubjective field surrounding the subject.

2) A lived meaning occurs as a new articulation of the world, yet the world had been already somehow articulated prior to this new articulation. A lived meaning never emerges in a vacuum. And only such an articulated whole can be called a world. My lifeworld, i.e., the background against which a particular lived meaning occurs and develops, is a product of my life history, in which my past lived meanings

are "stored" in some kind of structure. Therefore, my lifeworld reflects my past encounters with other people, i.e., my learning process of meaning systems socially and culturally available to me. Even though all of my past encounters with other persons may not be relevant to the emergence of a particular lived meaning, they nonetheless have contributed to the realization of my lifeworld as it is. This is the indirect contribution of intersubjectivity through my past encounters with other persons who may not be in the direct intersubjective field of a particular lived meaning. For the boy's lived meaning to emerge, he must have learned to see a battleship as an embodiment of glory and power through his many encounters with other people, prior to the actual emergence of the lived meaning.

### **Personal Lifeworld and Meaning Systems**

The lifeworld, against which lived meaning emerges, consists of different ways or modes of sense-making, or "layers" of sense-making if we continue with the metaphor of sedimentation. Each layer or mode of sense-making (the way how a person feels, thinks, or acts in the world) was given the name of *meaning system*. A lived meaning emerges against the background of a person's unique lifeworld, with at least one meaning system, but usually some, that has been sedimented and is presently at work in the person's lifeworld, preparing a particular mode of sense-making instead of others. If the three stones of the boy did not touch something in his heart in a special way, they would have remained as ordinary pebbles as they were for the adult. Or, if other meaning

system had been at work, the pebbles would have been used in ducks and drakes.

Often I make sense of the world differently according to the nature of an object, event, or situation. I make sense of the world differently in a church, a school, a museum, a concert hall, a market, or a stock exchange. So do many other people. It may seem that these objects and events dictate a mode of meaning instead of others. Yet, other people may make sense of a same object or event differently. In addition, I could make sense of an object through multiple modes of making sense. For example, I may make sense of a piece of art sensuously, religiously, aesthetically, or commercially. Therefore, objects, events, or situations do not necessarily dictate the mode or modes of my making sense of the world. They are not the determinants of meaning systems.

When something appears meaningful to me, there is always at least one of the meaning systems in my lifeworld at work. For example, when I see a painting, I make sense of it bodily or sensually, religiously, scientifically, or economically, depending on the context. Sometimes several of these meanings systems may be at work simultaneously.

About the various meaning systems in a lifeworld, there are two points to be emphasized.

a) Similar and proximate meaning systems make up higher order meaning systems. I make sense of the world basically in the same manner when I am dealing with my bank accounts, securities, insurances, and investments, each of them consolidating what might be called as a higher order meanings system of the economic attitude in my

lifeworld. There is such a hierarchical structure among meaning systems in my and other persons' lifeworlds. This is the reason why I chose the term "system," which might be too structured a name for a way, style, or mode of how a person feels, thinks, or acts, yet which allows the hierarchy of higher and lower orders.

b) Nonetheless, a lifeworld as a whole is not usually a logically integrated structure. At least, many modern lifeworlds are not coherently structured by a single hierarchy. The different ways of making sense of a painting is a good example of the incompatibility of those higher order meaning systems in my lifeworld. Also, I behave in a bank in a manner totally different from when I am in a church or a concert hall. Many people change their manner of sense-making in a similar fashion. This incompatibility of various meaning systems makes a lifeworld dynamic, full of wavers and vacillations, with internal contradictions and strife.

Therefore, a lifeworld is like a loose bundle of higher order meaning systems, each of which are internally more or less structured, yet each of which are incompatible with other higher order meaning systems. A new term "apothegm" is introduced to refer to these higher order meaning systems.

The overall structuredness of a lifeworld, allowing for the incompatibility of its apothegms, varies individually in the following three respects.

a) What are incompatible apothegms in many other people's lifeworlds may not be articulated, or distinguished in a particular person's

lifeworld. For instance, there are persons in whose lifeworld making sense of a painting aesthetically and economically are not quite distinguished. Or, conversely, what is a whole of an apothegm for many other people may be incompatible in a personal lifeworld. For instance, there may be persons who see a contradiction of incompatible meaning systems within what is vaguely a scientific apothegm. This refers to the different articulations in various lifeworlds.

b) What apothegms there are in a lifeworld differs between a child and an adult, depending largely on the developmental abilities. Also, what apothegms there are in a lifeworld differs socially, for example, between a medieval person and a modern person, depending on the availability of apothegms. We will see the social availability of meaning systems later. These differences refer to the number of apothegms in a lifeworld. The richness of meaning systems in an lifeworld can vary, regardless of the number of different apothegms. Even with one or two apothegms in a lifeworld, a person can have a coherent lifeworld in which many meaning systems are closely integrated. The less complex lifeworlds of our prehistoric ancestors or our children, in terms of the number of apothegms in the person's lifeworld, can be more integrated than the lifeworlds of sophisticated persons with many apothegms.

c) Which apothegms are dominant over others may vary. A single apothegm may have a virtual monopoly over the lifeworld, in which case a coherent structure is achieved. One or a few apothegms may dominate other apothegms in the lifeworld. Or, many apothegms can be found in opposition to each other.

A lifeworld grows and changes with the passage of time. My lifeworld, thus conceived, is a vertical section of my life history, which has incorporated many lived meanings, one by one. And in my life history, different meaning systems, the various ways or modes of making sense of the world, have been learned, discarded, sorted out, structured, and reshuffled, and presented themselves in a loose bundle of apothegms.

### **Social Lifeworld and Meaning Systems**

In quite a similar manner, we can conceive of the lifeworld of a society, society being understood here as a group of people with shared ways of feeling, thinking, acting, or shared meaning systems. The logic may sound circular here, but a congregation of people cannot be called a society without such shared ways of making sense of the world.

A society comes in various sizes. A very small intimate group such as a pair of two lovers, a family, or a small circle of friends; a larger group such as a Sherlock Holmes Society or a local chess club; a still larger group such as the subscribers of a certain national newspaper or the members of a political party; and a still larger group such as a nation or a country, are all examples of societies. Further, we can speak of the ancients and the moderns as different societies, and ultimately we can refer to the largest society of persons which is humanity in its historical entirety. Basically we could conceive of animal society or the society of plants and animals, both societies of which include humans for certainly there are shared meaning systems among them, but now these are excluded. To each society of a differing size, the social lifeworld can be

conceived. It is the lifeworld that is more or less shared by the members of the society and it is roughly the same as the notion of culture understood in the sense of lifeways.

Each society is unique if we observe it closely enough. And in each society, there are ways of making sense of the world, the meaning systems, that are more or less shared by the members of the society. And the affiliate meaning systems make a higher order meaning systems, presenting a hierarchical structure, yet with incompatible apothegms. In a few societies, such as a church or a business company, meaning systems in their lifeworlds may be fairly integrated into a coherent whole, under the monopoly of one apothegm, or under the domination of one apothegm over others. The structuredness of meaning systems, and the "stock" of apothegms and meaning systems, in the shared lifeworld differs from one society to another.

Yet some societies are similar if we take a more distanced perspective. Many pairs of loves, families, and chess clubs, and some political parties and nations are similar, if they share many meaning systems in common.

Further, a social lifeworld has a history, like a personal lifeworld. The meaning systems in the shared lifeworld of a society changes, grows, or withers, with the passage of time. A social lifeworld is a vertical section of the history of the society, a vertical section of its cultural tradition and history.

### **Dialectic between Social Lifeworld and Personal Lifeworld.**



Each personal lifeworld is unique and different from others if it is closely observed at a microscopic level of analysis. Yet, similar and shared meaning systems are found in the lifeworlds of the members of a society. The higher the order of a meaning system is, the more readily shared it is by the members.

There is a give and take, or a dialectic, between the personal lifeworld and the social lifeworld. On the one hand, the lived meaning of an individual, i.e., a change in a person's lifeworld, can modify the social lifeworld, if the new meaning is really new in the social lifeworld and if it is shared by the members of the society. On the other hand, the social lifeworlds have shaped and conditioned a person's lifeworld, indirectly at least through its formation, if they have been learned by the person in his or her life history. Therefore, there is a dialectic between a social lifeworld and a personal lifeworld.

From an intersubjective perspective, neither the social lifeworld nor the personal lifeworld comes first as the ground for the other. And from a semiogenetic perspective, it is meaning systems that are given and taken as the medium of the dialectic. Meaning systems are the common denominators, or the "building blocks" of both society and individual. Meaning systems are what connect the social lifeworld and the personal lifeworld. Lived meanings are the embodiment or concretization of these meaning systems in individual persons.

### **Priority of Meaning over Society and Person**

So far, I have tried to delineate the notions of lived meaning, meaning system, apothegm, and lifeworld, tacitly presuming the notions of the society and the person. Yet from the perspective of dialogical semiogenetics, our very sense of the society or of the person itself emerged in human history. Meaning is the very medium of the dialectic between the social and the personal. Our senses of the social and the personal are two of the many products in the evolution of human meaning. The choice to explain what is new through what is familiar is not to be confused with the dependence of the new on the familiar.

Therefore, semiogenetics must make sense of the myriads of lived meanings and meaning systems themselves, by somehow articulating them in a comprehensible form. Prior to semiogenetics, there have been basically two approaches to the articulation of human meanings. One is relativist, the other ontological.

The relativists give up the attempt to articulate the multitudes of human meanings. Instead, they endeavor to describe particular forms of meaning. Historicists who took a negative stance against the easy generalization of humanity in the Enlightenment belong to this category. At present, ethnographers of a particular society, historians of a particular place and time, and psychologists doing case studies belong to this relativist and particularist approach. Researchers of a particular form of meaning, such as language, economy, law, science and so forth also belong to the particularist camp in a slightly different sense.

The entirety of the multitudes of human meanings have been studied in the ontological approach. The incompatibility of such

apothegms reflect the basic notion that there are finite realms in the lifeworld, the notion common to the ontological expositions by Cassirer (myth and religion, language, art, history, and science), by Spranger (*Lebensformen* of theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, and power-oriented attitudes), by Schutz (multiple realities of the everyday lifeworld, of the world of dreams, of the world of science, the world of religious experience), and by Habermas (technical-instrumental, hermeneutic-practical, critical-emancipatory cognitive interests). Even if the ontological approach cannot decide on what realms of meaning there are, their basic point that there are incompatible realms of meaning, or incompatible apothegms in our vocabulary, is common with semiogenetics.

Yet dialogical semiogenetics parts with the ontological approach precisely when ontologists claim that the realms of meaning are pervasive across space and time, across individuals and the society. Dialogical semiogenetics takes the stance that these realms of meaning, or apothegms, are what emerged in the history of countless human actions. Each of the apothegms emerged at a certain point in human history, and that the lifeworld of a person or a society prior to the historical emergence of the particular apothegm is different from the lifeworld which incorporated the apothegm after its emergence in the human history. Simply put, semiogenetics claims that a lifeworld of a modern person is different from a Cromagnon man, a person in antiquity, or a medieval person. A lifeworld itself, be it personal or social, is a product in the history of human meaning.

**The multitude of lived meanings as the evolution of human meaning which can be described in terms of meaning systems.**

The starting ground for dialogical semiogenetics in the attempt to articulate all forms of meaning is, therefore, the largest group of people conceivable, that is, the human society which has a few million years of (pre-)history. Higher order meaning systems in the lifeworlds of many people of the present and the past can be analyzed. Apothegms is the name for these ways or modes of making sense of the world at the anthropological, macroscopic level.

In part 2 of this dissertation, I have identified and illustrated the apothegms of body, language, domestication, writing, and religion which emerged before the modern age. These apothegms are now shared by many of the adult population of the world today, and therefore incorporated in their lifeworlds. Yet it must be noted that there have been countless number of our ancestors to whom these bodily and linguistic apothegms in the present forms were not part of their lifeworlds. The apothegms of writing and world religions are still in the process of societal diffusion today. One-third or one-fourth of world adult population is without literacy, and missionaries are converting people in many regions. Further, we must remember that the bodily and linguistic meaning systems, as well as other meaning systems, must be learned by children in any society if these meaning systems are to be part of their lifeworld. Being born in a linguistic society is not enough. Growing up in

a linguistic society, therefore learning the language, is necessary to be able to make sense of the world linguistically.

It must be emphasized that a lifeworld with more apothegms is not better or nobler than that with fewer apothegms. The lifeworld of a baby or a child is not inferior to that of an adult. The lifeworld of an illiterate person is not inferior to that of a literate person. By the same token, a meaning system with a newer origin in the human history is not more powerful, better, or nobler in itself than a meaning system with an older origin.

Also in part 2, I have identified and illustrated three apothegms with more recent origins: the Enlightenment-Scientific, the Romantic-Historical, and the Critical-Emancipatory meaning systems. From an anthropological perspective of today, they are in the process of worldwide diffusion, that is, they are being tried, modified, and accepted in many societies in the world.

The section cut perpendicularly to the evolving process of meaning shows the lifeworld at the given moment of a society or of a person. Therefore, the evolving process of the lifeworld of a society is the cultural history of the society. In this formulation, we can analyze the development of any society of any size in terms of the meaning systems in its shared lifeworld in motion. And the evolving process of the lifeworld of a person is the life history of the person, starting with the newborn baby's world of little articulation or individuality, through the course of gradual articulation of the meaning systems of body, language, and so forth, into a fully developed and unique lifeworld.

In this semiogenetic approach, the lifeworld of a society or a person, can be historically grasped from the integrated perspective of meaning systems. This conception is grounded in the fact that there is a give and take between the society and the person. The social lifeworld or the personal lifeworld is not a derivative of, or pre-given to the other. In this semiogenetic approach, they are seen as salient crystallizations, so to speak, in the evolution of human meanings.

### **The Life of Meaning**

#### *1. The life of a meaning seen from the perspective of meaning itself.*

A meaning, whether it is bodily, linguistic, religious, scientific, or of whatever sort, whether lived or not lived, is an articulation of the world. When a new meaning emerges, it takes form as a lived meaning in a concrete person in a particular situation. The person who experiences a lived meaning already has a lifeworld with heterogeneous meaning systems which have been formed in the life history of the person. A new lived meaning emerges, therefore, against the background of an already articulated structure that is the personal lifeworld.

Any human meaning, whether lived or dead, whether known or unknown to a particular person, emerged as lived meaning at first. Let me use an example of words. Each word we use was "invented" by someone in the human history. In the cases of recent technical terms, we can trace the person who "coined" them. About the many words with older origin, we can only know approximately when they were began to be used. But it remains true that each word was made by

somebody. For the person who made a new word, it was necessary to express something new, whether it was an object, an event, or a mode of experience itself, something which had not been properly articulated in the vocabulary in the personal lifeworld as well as in the social lifeworld surrounding the person. The new word was necessary to refer to the new mode of experience. And it had a personal, lived meaning for the person who coined it, even if we may or can not know exactly what this lived meaning was like to its originator. The same is true with any other forms of meaning, whether it is a phrase, a new fashion in clothing or make-up, a new way to cook food, or any other. A new lived meaning is a change in the person's lifeworld, whether the change is small or big.

The lived meaning which emerged in a particular person under a concrete situation can be shared. A private lived meaning can become a shared lived meaning of other persons. The private articulation of the world can be communicated to others, because we live in the world together and therefore we more or less share the world. A new way to make sense of the world is expressed through a small gesture of a hand, a new phrase of words, a choice of colors in clothing, or other objectified forms of meaning. And by sharing these objectified forms of meaning, and by learning, living, or internalizing them, other people can share the lived meaning which was originally private. A shared lived meaning may have been differently modified into the personal lifeworlds if closely observed.

The origin of a lived meaning may be in the already shared intersubjective lifeworld of a group of persons from the start. For

example, a technical notion may emerge in the very dialogue between researchers. Or a new mode in fashion may originate, not in the lifeworld of a solitary designer, but in a shared lifeworld of designers. As the example of "going for coffee" with a friend, many of my lived meanings originate in such intersubjective contexts.

And there may be plural origins that are independent from each other. Yet the process of diffusion starting from a lived meaning in a smaller number of people into a lived meaning of many people, and therefore meaning systems that stay share basically the same process.

Admittedly there is a great variety in the process of sharing. Sometimes this sharing process may take a great deal of time and effort, if the original lived meaning is very complex and radically new to the lifeworlds of the people who learn it. A new notion in science or philosophy is a good example, and such a technical notion may have only limited currency within a small group of people after all. Sometimes the sharing process may be almost automatic and may need little effort. A new word which captures the feeling of many people, a new word which "fits" the way of feeling, thought, or action of many people, can become an instant vogue on a great many people's lips.

Whatever its speed, ease, or currency may be, the process of sharing is essentially a diffusion of objectified meanings through lived meanings in countless individuals. In the notion of diffusion, inter-individual learning, inter-generational learning, inter-societal learning are included. Diffusion may sound like a mechanical and automatic process, a flow of meaning from one person to another, or from one society to



another. It is because we are looking at them now from the standpoint of meanings.

However, if seen from the perspective of the learner, as in the next section, the same process of sharing must be understood as a process of exploration, trial and error, and evaluation--a human drama full of challenges and achievements. To truly understand a technical term, years of study and devotion may be necessary. However trivial a new meaning may seem to us now, there may have been many human lives sacrificed in the process, for example, behind the diffusion of a technique to make a special stone knife from one band to another, or behind the diffusion of grain farming from one village to another. It must be strongly noted that the process called diffusion has such a side of human drama if seen from the perspective of the person. We shall come back to this perspective in the next section and keep observing the life of meaning from the perspective of meaning itself.

Out of millions of new lived meanings, only a few can become shared meanings of a society at a higher order. Some others are shared only within smaller groups of people. And many are soon to be forgotten. But with the meanings which are shared in a larger society, and which have been incorporated well into the social lifeworld, there is always a process of intra-societal diffusion. Basically it is the process in which what was freakish previously becomes now a familiar landscape of the social lifeworld in other people's lifeworlds, and therefore in the socially shared lifeworlds. And in this process similar and affiliate meaning systems are consolidated to form a meaning system of a higher order.

And such a new meaning system of a higher order usually have conflicts with meaning systems with older origin.

In the process in which bathing in the sea or lake, not for the sake of physical or spiritual cleansing, but for fun and health, became a part of our daily lives, the meaning system of bathing for fun had to emerge, and be consolidated with other meaning systems of hiking, traveling, exercising, and so forth, all of which make up a part of the Romantic-Historical apothegm shown in Part 2. A loose bundle of such a higher order meaning system that we may call as rediscovery of nature had been shared by more and more people, including my family as shown in Part 3, in the process of the diffusion of this meaning system. It had to fight with the older way of making sense of the world in which people looked at nature as an empty space or as a storage of materials.

A new meaning system must survive these challenges and contests with the existing meaning systems in order to establish itself in a larger social world. Only a few new meaning systems can survive in this process. Many others, whose *raison d'être* is not experienced in the socially shared lifeworld, will be forgotten as transitory fads, as freakish tastes, as academic lingo, or simply as out-dated trash. Even if there is a time lag as in the many examples of persistent superstitions, out-dated ways of making sense will be challenged and modified soon or later in the intersubjective field of meaning.

In a sense, a socially shared meaning system is always in the process of diffusion because it is being learned by the younger generations. In a modern society which has a school system, this intra-

societal and inter-generational diffusion of already established meaning systems is carried out in a more or less planned and intentional manner in schools, as well as in an unintentional manner inside and outside schools. This distinction corresponds to the notions of explicit or overt curriculum, and those of implicit or hidden curriculum.

And some people may not really internalize or "live" parts of socially shared meanings. These meaning systems may remain imitated or bought, borrowed at a superficial level, not really settling in the lifeworld as a new meaning system in such persons. This can happen in the social lifeworld. We can distinguish the superficial reception and the real incorporation of a meaning system, and intermediate degrees of learning, in both of the personal and the social lifeworlds.

Seen from the standpoint of the human society, diffusion of meanings from one society to another is abundant. From a way to use the body, a new word or notion, a particular technique in painting, and a series of progression of chords in music, to a system of law or government, a business practice, and an institution such as school or university, there are ample examples of inter-societal diffusion. Or rather, it is these inter-societal learnings and diffusion of meaning systems that forms the human society.

A meaning which originated in a particular person's lived meaning can become a part of the human meaning. Cartesian dualism of mind and body, Newtonian conception of the universe, are part of the lifeworlds of the educated adults in the present world. Yet, these ways of making sense of the world were not part of the lifeworlds of medieval persons,

however they learned they may have been. Of course there are countless steps of sharing in this process and at each step there is a possibility of modification of meaning.

*2. The life of meaning seen from the perspective of the experiencer.*

Seen from the perspective of the meaning itself as I offered in the last section, the lives of persons who lived it and expressed it first or the lives of those who learned it and diffused it can be overlooked. The origin of the meaning, its diffusion and modifications, and its role in the lifeworlds of contemporary people appear more important in that perspective. Especially with the meaning systems which have prehistoric origins, it is impossible now to rediscover the lives of individuals who had contributed to their emergence and diffusion. The human drama of individuals, for example, who first started walking erect, speaking, using fire, living in houses, writing, and other activities, that are common human properties now can be reconstructed only in our imagination.

Yet with the styles and modes of making sense of the world that have recent origins, we know more about the personal sides of the people who created them. We saw some of these figures in the analysis of meaning systems with modern origins in part 2. Further, from our own experiences, we know something about the individual side of the emergence of lived meaning, even though most of our lived meanings may be trivial, having little relevance as seen from an anthropological frame.

The boy who saw a battleship in the three pebbles has changed from his former lifeworld with little articulation in his babyhood, and it will change further as he grows. The personal lifeworld is evolving just as a social lifeworld is always evolving. The boy's lifeworld is a summary of his past experiences, or his past lived meanings, that have emerged through his various encounters with other persons until the present. What was not lived in the past, what was of little relevance to his life then, has been forgotten and leaves no trace in his lifeworld. The personal lifeworld is a vertical section of his life history, or better, a projection of his life history on to the plane of the present.

The lifeworld of a boy is delineated by the lifeworlds of the societies in which the boy grew up. His life history consists of selective discoveries of available meaning systems in the lifeworld of his surrounding societies. What he discovered and achieved, such as walking and speaking, may have been a feature of the human lifeworld for a million years. But to the boy, the process of learning to walk and speak, is a challenge--these are explorations, trial and errors, and achievements, as his parents or any parents would know. It is full of particular and contingent experiences that he has had with his parents, siblings, and people around him. Each meaning system which originated a million years ago, and which has been shared by so many people, is learned in a very particular context which is unique only to the boy. It is a unique process which belongs only to himself. Even his brother has experienced a unique and different journey, in learning to walk and speak. No person's learning process is the same with another person's.

Growing up is an intersubjective process which is made possible by the contribution of other people, who happen to walk with feet and speak with mouths. The ways other people around him make sense of the world delineates the child's meaning systems and lifeworld. The stock of intersubjectively or socially available meaning systems delimit, as well as form, what can be the particular meaning systems in the boy's lifeworld.

The young person can belong to multiple societies. The boy perhaps knows how to behave differently in church, in school, in front of his parents, and in front of his friends. In each situation, he behaves and makes sense of the world differently. The multiple societies have fostered in him different meaning systems. It is a part of growing up to have heterogeneous parts in the lifeworld. He may have already felt the budding discrepancies between these different ways of making sense in his lifeworld, when he slipped into speaking improperly to a parent, to a teacher, or to a friend.

About the boy's life history, we know almost nothing. Yet it is certain that the boy has learned the battleship as an exemplification, as a cynosure of power and glory, in his life history. A battleship was perhaps an embodiment of glory and power for many people in the boy's society before the end of the Second World War. Today a boy like him would probably say, "Look at my spaceship!" instead, or his battleship is already a spaceship.

The lived meaning of the battleship emerged against the background of his lifeworld, which is a vertical section of his life history. Yet it emerged in the situation full of contingencies. First, there were

three pebbles in the scene. Without them, the lived meaning of the battleship may have never occurred to the boy. Or, it may have emerged whether they were three pebbles, three seashells, or three coins. He may have seen the battleship any way provided that there was a group of objects which reminded him of a battleship. Second, there was the adult even though he could not see the battleship. Without the adult, the boy may not have said, "Look at my battleship." Perhaps the boy expected that his lived meaning would be shared by the adult. If the adult had been a detestable person that the boy hated or feared, he certainly would not have invited the adult to share his lived meaning. Or, with hate and fear in the boy, his lived meaning of the battleship might have never emerged from the beginning. The adult must have been a person who appears to encourage the boy. These are contingencies, which contributed to the emergence of the lived meaning, and which served as the concrete context of its emergence.

The lived meaning of the battleship of the boy is real to him. Perhaps his parents and teachers may be more satisfied if he, at the age of seven, started spelling words correctly or doing a simple addition in the sand. To many adults, these schoolish activities may seem more important than imagining a battleship with three pebbles. But to the child, the matter appears different. To the boy, what is lived now is more real and important than what may become necessary in the future. And to the boy it does not matter much whether his lived meaning has an anthropological uniqueness or originality. Personal explorations and discoveries initiated on one's own are much more interesting and fulfilling

than the meanings with anthropological importance from adults' point of view, if they are irrelevant to the boy in the present context.

To reduce the emergence of lived meaning into the model of imposition and inculcation, implantation and indoctrination, of meanings from outside by whatever means, would be to neglect this personal side involved.

The more need there is to implant meanings that have been made by somebody else, which seem irrelevant to the learner, and without the encouragement of other persons, the less possibility there is for a particular socially available meaning to become lived by the learner. Then, the learning process often becomes just a means, not an end in itself. The learner becomes content to pretend to have learned the meanings, without living them or without "really" learning them. The more people we have around us have forgotten lived meanings, the more eroded our lives will be, deprived of lived meanings, and ultimately, deprived of meaning at all.

### *3. The life of meaning seen from the perspective of the social lifeworld.*

Each society has an articulated lifeworld that is shared by its members. And it has history, the cultural tradition. In its shared lifeworld are meaning systems which have emerged through individual lived meaning and have been shared by its members. Individuals contribute to the society through emergence of new lived meanings. The social lifeworld functions as a "storage" of meaning systems from which an individual can learn in the process of growing up. Some meaning



systems are learned by many individuals in the society and they are revitalized as tradition. Some meaning systems are challenged, criticized, and modified. Some other meaning systems are forgotten.

From the standpoint of the society, the meaning systems that are available to an individual who grows up in it works in a double sense: it works formatively as well as constructively, in any case as an upper limit of the individual. Yet there is a possibility that the individual may contribute to the social lifeworld with new meaning systems which are articulations of the world that have emerged through concrete lived meanings. From the standpoint of the society, the reproduction, modification, or ossification of meaning systems may appear more important than the concrete and particular lived meanings in individuals. Yet without lived meanings in the individuals, the reproduction and modification of meaning systems are impossible.

A person can belong to multiple societies. A person may grow up in many different societies. And a society may profit from a new member who is also a member of another society. Such a person may introduce to the former society different meaning systems that have been available in the lifeworld of the latter society. Inter-societal borrowings and learnings occur through such persons' affiliations and intersocietal movements.

### **Semiogenesis: Emergence of Lived Meaning**

Each case of lived meaning in a person his or her concrete and particular situation is unique. No one's lived meaning is exactly the same

as another person's. If the goal of our enquiry is to better understand this child or that situation, we need to look at the phenomena closely one by one. In this microscopic analysis, the generalities extracted from the macroscopic analyses cannot "replace" endeavors of explicating the concrete, particular case. Yet, there seems to be common themes and threads which can be seen in, and which may have contributed to the emergence of, many concrete lived meanings. Various lived meanings that are concrete and unique may be different routes to arrive at meaning systems that are shared in social lifeworlds.

It is the hope of semiogenetics to integrate in its research scope both the common threads and the contingent particularities of lived meaning. Semiogenetics is interested in lived meaning in the concrete, the here and now, as well as in its myriad meaning systems at work which, in each concrete case, condition and give form to the emerging lived meaning.

In each case of an emergence of lived meaning, we will find meaning systems at work, in an individual's personal lifeworld and in the intersubjective social lifeworld, and also in the contingencies of the situation. Lived meanings are nodes of evolution of human meaning.

### **Semiogenetics as Semiogenetically Reflected**

We may well look back now at the meaning systems which enabled the notion of lived meaning and the conception of semiogenetics in my lifeworld. As shown in part 1, the notion of lived meaning was developed through my reading of Dilthey's notion of lived experience and

Husserl's notion of lifeworld, among others, both of which are central in the human sciences approach, and both of which are available in my surrounding societies. After years of effort I learned them, lived them, and modified them. The notion of meaning systems is also based on the anthropological and cultural perspectives, having modified the ontological premises in Spranger, Schutz, and Habermas. Dialogical semiogenetics is a research approach intended to bridge the realm of history and culture and the realm of the unique and concrete, because I was not satisfied with either historicist-particularist and ontological-universalist approaches. It owes the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition the sensitivity to the concrete and unique and the power to describe and interpret it. It owes the historical and anthropological tradition the width and depth of scope which enables us to see what is shared and what is unique. And Semiogenetics is evolutionary. It tries to grasp myriads of meanings in human societies as an evolution of meaning; it tries to grasp myriads of lived meanings in a person also as an evolution of meaning. Multitudes and multitudes of meanings are not only different from each other but also somehow related to each other. To try to articulate this "somehow-ness," the relations through difference and identity, through diversity and unity, and through change and continuity, is the goal of dialogical semiogenetics.

From the perspective of a semiogenetic approach, to understand a society, a historical event, a "realm of life," a social institution, a philosophical thought, a person, a work of art, or a transitory experience, is to see it against the background of the myriad of meanings in human

history, as a thread being woven into the tapestry of evolution of meaning.

Helping and guiding the emergence of lived meaning in students and the young is the task of pedagogy. A teacher's sensitive understanding of students lived meanings enriches their growth. Every lived meaning is unique. It is a mystery which is taking place every day. Yet so many lived meanings are related to each other. I hope the semiogenetic approach can contribute to a better understanding of lived meaning.

As a whole, semiogenetics is an attempt to see each concrete lived meaning in its particular contextuality, at the same time, relating it to the diverse lived meanings and meaning systems that have emerged in the entire human history. Even the "dead" meanings that appeared as irrelevant at the initial stage of inquiry now can be seen "once alive," having been lived by some people in the past and then forgotten, even though the particular contexts are not known, as they were sedimented in culture, the socially shared lifeworld of a society. By attending to the intersubjective nature of the constitution of lived meaning, and by attending to the dialectic between the individual learning of socially shared meaning systems and the social "sedimentation" of meaning systems that have emerged in individuals' lifeworlds, semiogenetics has begun, I hope and believe, to relate lived meanings and the socially shared meanings from a single, evolutionary perspective.

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