Toward a Cosmopolitan Minded Post-Secondary Ethics Education

by

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Abstract

Tools to think about and interact with the emergence of new levels of interconnectivity and complexity in the post-secondary ethics classroom are necessary. The question explored in this study concerns what relevance cosmopolitanism has as an educational response to this need. Contemporary criticisms of classical cosmopolitanism are used to analyze ethics education in a Canadian polytechnic. One goal of cosmopolitan minded education is to help students struggle with the balance between obligations that result from particular circumstances and moral responsibility to the larger global community. A cosmopolitan theoretical framework is applied as both a research and pedagogical tool to be engaged in efforts to fulfill this goal.

A qualitative case study method was used to examine how a cosmopolitan minded approach can be used to transform the learning contexts of ethics education in a Canadian polytechnic institute. Analysis of institutional, program, and course level documentation provided context and was enriched by data gathered through student focus groups as well as interviews with faculty and administration. General recommendations include the application of a pluriversal, dialogical process of learning that sees students engage in agonistic dialogue regarding the ethical question of what it means to live a good life and the moral question of what responsibilities this entails. The study reveals the regulatory nature of much applied ethics education and offers an alternative process as imagined through a cosmopolitan vantage point.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, ethics education, moral education, applied ethics, higher education

Preface

This thesis is an original work by David L Schmaus. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name "Cosmopolitan Minded Post-Secondary Ethics Education", No. Pro00034277, November 27, 2012.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

When approached to develop and teach an Ethics and Society course for a polytechnic degree program I accepted without hesitation. The task was intriguing and seemed straightforward enough: introduce students to the ethical frameworks of deontology, consequentialism, contractarianism, and virtue, and have them apply these frameworks to moral problems to deepen their understanding. The task of developing the course was aided by the plethora of existing curricula and resources that followed this approach. Development of the course happened in relative isolation and a trial run with students was eagerly anticipated. The first offering resulted in excellent feedback from students and, besides a running conversation with one student over the distinction between ethics and religion, the course met with few challenges. I was even somewhat self-congratulatory on what I considered the innovations of introducing a global perspective to the course through an engagement with the Earth Charter (Bosselmann & Engel, 2010), and an introduction to corporate social responsibility for future managers and executives in the class. Self-congratulations were short lived. In subsequent offerings of the course, it became evident that my initial perception of ethics did not take into account the complexity of the different belief systems, cultures, ways of knowing, and worldviews in the class. Reflection on my teaching practice led to a host of unanswered questions about the legitimacy of the approaches I had chosen; when developing the ethics course I had not considered some fundamental questions. Is it the role of post-secondary institutions to teach morality and ethics? If the answer to this question is yes, then what is it that should be taught? Should students be introduced to ethical frameworks through the writings of philosophers such as Aristotle, Mill, and Kant? Does such an approach impose a secular individualist perspective on students? What is behind the return to ethics in higher education?

What do we mean when using the terms ethics and morality? What role does power play in shaping the ethics curriculum? What about ethics from a feminine perspective? What about ethics from other cultural perspectives and ways of knowing, many of which are held by the students in a globalized classroom? Is there a framework through which the teaching of ethics can be approached that will help illuminate answers to these questions?

Focus of the Study

The focus of this study was to examine the practice of post-secondary ethics education from a cosmopolitan perspective. Cosmopolitanism is an ancient idea that has enjoyed renewed interest in the past two decades (Kleingeld & Brown, 2006; Rovisco & Nowicka, 2011; Delanty, 2012). Hansen (2011) describes cosmopolitanism as constituting "an orientation in which people learn to balance reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known" (p. 1). It is the notion of striking a balance, tempered by a reflective approach that makes a cosmopolitan perspective an attractive one for reflecting on curriculum and practice. The research interest that guided this study is the task of applying a cosmopolitan perspective to post-secondary ethics education to re-examine its goals and objectives, justifications, curriculum, and pedagogy. It is worth noting that cosmopolitanism is used as a term that stands for something distinct from global citizenship. Global citizenship education is widely studied (See Shultz, Abdi & Richardson, 2011) and shares many interests with cosmopolitanism, but cosmopolitanism can be described more as a state of mind distinct from the discussion of an ideal and otherwise achievable citizenship that is the domain of global citizenship studies. The Ethics and Society course mentioned above was used as the focal point for a case study examining post-secondary ethics education from a cosmopolitan perspective. The study began with a document analysis centering on the course outline and included documentation regarding required institutional and

program outcomes and artefacts such as assignments and learning materials. This institutional, program, and course level documentation was used to apply a cosmopolitan perspective to topics such as the role of a post-secondary institution in teaching ethics. The application of a cosmopolitan lens to the review of course outlines, assignments, and other teaching materials provides insight into some of the questions raised above resulting in opportunities for innovation in outcomes, curriculum, and pedagogy. Student feedback was solicited through focus groups with students who completed the Ethics and Society course. They were asked to reflect on their experience in previous instances of the course. Their reflections resulted in new insights used to propose curriculum and pedagogical innovations.

It is to be expected that the impacts of proposed changes to outcomes, curriculum, and pedagogy are enhanced if administration and faculty buy in. A second phase of the study implemented interviews with administration and faculty to solicit feedback and critique of current practices. An interview with program leadership explored the perceived role and importance of ethics curriculum at the post-secondary level. Interviews with faculty who teach the Ethics and Society class, or closely related classes involving ethics, were conducted to incorporate other perspectives into the research. A reflexive methodology (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) was used throughout to add depth to reflection and uncover potential blind spots arising from my own limited perspective. A reflexive researcher understands knowledge generation to involve interpretation which necessitates reflection on the role of the researcher as research instrument (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) and co-constructor of knowledge. Interpretation is shaped by a variety of factors including the cultural, social, political, gender, and other tendencies of the researcher. Research is understood to be influenced by, and have an influence on, the researcher, participants, and readers (Creswell, 2013). A reflexive methodology involves

consideration of the position of the researcher and the application of a variety of techniques and frameworks to help balance and inform this position. The combination of document analysis, focus groups with students, interviews with leadership, and interviews with faculty, helped to ensure broad coverage of the many issues raised regarding teaching ethics in the complex milieu of a modern institution of higher learning.

Purpose of the Study

My role as an instructor and leader in a degree program at a Canadian polytechnic has provided much opportunity for reflection regarding the aims and purposes of post-secondary education. Nowhere is this truer than in the context of ethics education. The pressures and opportunities of globalization, the commodification of post-secondary education, the uncritical trust in instructional technology as an efficient facilitator of learning, and the top-down imposition of policy and curriculum are all examples of the challenges faced. Educators need frames of reference to engage with the challenges posed by educating in a globalized world and cosmopolitanism is one such frame of reference. In an interesting work on "cosmopolitanism as education," Hansen (2011) describes how "[c]osmopolitanism is an orientation through which people can respond, rather than merely react, to the complex and sometimes intense pressures of globalization. A cosmopolitan outlook positions people to sustain their integrity and continuity through the vicissitudes of unpredictable change" (pp. xiiv-xiv). The purpose of this study is to apply a cosmopolitan perspective to the challenge of planning and teaching ethics curriculum in a post-secondary setting. Cosmopolitanism is not a solution to be applied to the challenge of globalization; it is a perspective from which to respond in open and creative ways. The cosmopolitan challenge of being "open reflectively to the larger world, while remaining loyal reflectively to local concerns, commitments, and values," (Hansen, 2011, p. xiii) is an intriguing

position from which to explore the potential outcomes, curriculum, and pedagogy of ethics education. It is what these outcomes, curricular suggestions, and pedagogical approaches as imagined from a cosmopolitan perspective may be that intrigues me and drives this study.

Context of the Study

What does it mean to live an ethical human life? It is through reflection on the practice of engaging post-secondary students with this question that this study has its origins. The teaching and learning of practical ethics in post-secondary education is a relatively recent phenomenon. Callahan and Bok (1980) published the first comprehensive analysis of practical ethics and laid the groundwork for its study as part of post-secondary curriculum. Highly publicized corporate scandals have contributed to the requirement of an applied business ethics course in many business schools (AACSB Ethics Education Task Force, 2004). Trends such as advances in healthcare technology and the ethical dilemmas that arise, decreasing public trust of political leaders, and the demand for professional ethicists have all challenged post-secondary institutions to expand the scope of their practical ethics offerings (Elliott, 2007). Practical ethics courses focus on issues specific to a given field, concentrate on themes in moral philosophy, or strike a balance between the two. Many of these courses developed out of departments of philosophy or religion in modern universities with a strong emphasis on Western moral philosophies (Elliott, 2007). Different ethical lenses, represented by specific philosophers, are often presented to the student as frameworks to analyze ethical problems. The utilitarianism of Bentham (1789/2000), and Mill (1863/2001); the deontological tradition of Kant (1785/2005); and the contractarianism of Rawls (2005) are examples. More inclusive courses may include virtue ethics, non-European (non-Western) ethics, or feminist ethics but rarely are themes outside of these perspectives

considered. The approach to ethics education described above often leaves students with little opportunity to explore a more cosmopolitan approach to ethics.

Before exploring ethics education from a cosmopolitan perspective, it must be established that ethics education is part of the mission of polytechnic institutions in Canada. The mission statements of many higher learning institutions are based on the triad mission of teaching, research, and public service (Scott, 2006). Polytechnics add to this a more focused set of aims. Polytechnics Canada (2014) describes itself as "a national alliance of Canada's leading research-intensive, publicly-funded colleges and institutes of technology" (para.1) with a strong focus on applied research with commercial applications. With a focus on industry specific practical skills, applied research, and a globally competitive workforce, there may seem to be little room for the pursuit of ethics education in the polytechnic curriculum. An historical perspective is useful in exploring how the present state was reached.

Scott (2006) explores the history of higher education in the West through pre-nation state, nation-state, and globalization stages. This analysis identifies six transformations in the mission of higher education institutions (p. 3). Common to all of these six missions is the theme of service. Higher education institutions are "designed to provide … teaching, research and a host of other academic services to the church, governments, individuals, public, and in the future, perhaps, the world" (Scott, 2006, p. 3). While the theme of service is common throughout the history of higher education in the West, the types of service, and the stakeholders to be served have varied. Scott (2006) outlines six historical missions of the university including the teaching mission in Medieval Scholastic universities; the professional mission of the late Middle Ages; the nationalization mission of early modernity; the democratization mission of early American higher education; the research mission of Humboltian Germany; and the public service mission

of modern universities (pp. 5-6). Also of interest to this study is the emergence of an internationalization mission in a globalizing, postmodern world (Scott, 2006). Polytechnics are closely tied to the democratizing mission of early American higher education which also saw the rise of the agricultural and mechanical colleges (A & M) and a shift to industrial pragmatics. Developments in the late 20th and early 21st century have seen an increased focus on globalization and what Aronowitz (1998) describes as "the program of 'neoliberalism,' the doctrine according to which we have no choice but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global market" (p. 7). In contrast, strongly influenced by the humanist and liberal arts traditions arising out of the Italian Renaissance and flourishing in the modern era, "liberal education continues to emphasize values and cultural appreciation over vocational skills" (Scott, 2006, p. 14). Challenges to a universal notion of humanity (Todd, 2009) and the unitary human subject (Badiou, 2002; Braidotti, 2013) serve to further complicate the issue. The dramatically divergent nature of these visions of education leads to an oft repeated question: What are universities for?

The question of what universities, and all institutes of higher education, are for is central to determining the role of ethics education. The question, as stated by Kiss and Euben (2006) is, "should colleges and universities try to teach ethics and promote civic responsibility?" (p. 57). The answer given by former Harvard University president Derek Bok and others in the *President's declaration on the civic responsibility of higher education* is a resounding yes (Campus Compact, 2007). Kiss and Euben (2006) agree and defend the importance for students of cultivating the capacity for moral reasoning, becoming more reflective about moral issues, defending a personal moral judgement, and becoming more self-critical in their higher learning experience. On the other hand, Mearsheimer (1997) declares teaching morality as a distinct non-

aim of the University of Chicago in his *Aims of Education* address to students in which he states that the University "makes little effort to provide you with moral guidance. Indeed, it is a remarkably amoral institution. I would say the same thing, by the way, about all other major colleges and universities in this country" (Teaching Morality Section, para. 1). Fish (2003) also denies that the university mission includes cultivating moral and social responsibility. Fish (2006) argues that the university is an academic institution as opposed to a moral one and warns that education should aim at academic outcomes and not political and moral indoctrination. Murphy (2006) warns that "attempts to use schools for moral and civic education almost always corrupt the appropriate moral purpose of academic education: to inculcate the intellectual virtues" (p. 162). The amorality of the university is an impossibility that will be returned to later but the warnings of the importance of guarding against indoctrination are to be taken seriously.

This first glimpse of the debate surrounding moral education leads to interesting responses and further questions. Spelman (2006) observes that whether ethics is explicitly taught or integrated into the higher education curriculum, human beings are inherently "ethical animals" whose lives are permeated with ethical experiences. Our actions betray our beliefs and values, whether we are explicitly aware of them or not. The moral sphere is present in human activity, whether it is acknowledged or not, which is what makes the notion of an "amoral" university an oxymoron. Decisions regarding curriculum and pedagogy are inherently ethical decisions. The position from which this research is pursued is that ethics education ought to provide the opportunity for students to shed light on their ethical and moral blind spots and develop experience and strategies for engaging with moral questions, and potentially antagonisms, in a reflexive way. The pursuit of these goals should protect against indoctrination and dogmatism. The aims of moral education are to catalyze moral reflection and not to indoctrinate students into

a particular worldview. Ethics education is not moral training; it aims at an increased capacity for moral reflection through exposure to different methods and worldviews. Many questions arise. To what extent and in what way should this happen? What should the scope of ethical education be? Is ethical education aimed at becoming a more moral person or a person educated about morality (Spelman, 2006)? Is there a difference between an education in morality and an education in ethics?

A recent response to the challenge of teaching ethics in higher education is the emergence of the field of applied ethics. Applied ethics has developed in medicine, business, and the professional disciplines in general, largely in response to the ethical concerns over the applications of technology and a growing awareness of questionable ethical behavior in the business world (Newton, 1998). Haws's (2001) meta-analysis of ethics instruction in undergraduate engineering programs identifies six common approaches to applied engineering ethics including a focus on the professional code of ethics, an emphasis on humanist readings, a grounding in ethical theory, the use of ethical problem solving heuristics, the use of case studies, and service learning (p. 224). Haws (2001) reveals that the ethics curriculum in engineering is largely integrated across the curriculum into capstone courses, senior professional practice courses, and applied courses focussing on the impact of the professional in the social arena. Junior courses such as "Technology and Society" and "Values of Professionals" (p. 224) are also noted to contain sections on ethics and few stand-alone ethics courses are mentioned. The potential Western bias of ethics education was mentioned above. Also of concern is the apparent lack of theoretical grounding of any sort in much ethical education in engineering programs. Haws (2001) notes that "a majority of the 42 papers made no reference to grounding students in ethical theory (probably the greatest single weakness in engineering ethics instruction). Four

papers made reference to both Kant and Mill (interestingly, neither was introduced without reference to the other). Two references were made to what is basically virtue ethics. Two references were made to Christian, or Judeo-Christian values" (p. 225). Haws (2001) mentions the importance of *divergent* thinking, "considering options and impacts beyond the narrow realm of engineering, engaging in unfettered discourses with non-engineers, and considering the ethical perspectives of virtue, rights, justice and care, as well as utility" (p. 223). The ability of students to apply *divergent* thinking, the ability to see the outcomes of professional practice through the perspective of those outside of the profession, and the development of a vocabulary through which ethical issues may be engaged are three of the outcomes of ethics education emphasized by Haws (2001). With these outcomes in mind, Haws (2001) questions the ability of any of the six approaches to ethics education mentioned above to serve as a stand-alone practice. This analysis highlights themes prevalent in applied ethics across many disciplines and emphasizes the importance of having clear aims in mind through which approaches to ethical education may be critiqued.

Another example of the emphasis on applied ethics in education comes from the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). The AACSB Ethics Education Task Force (2004) states:

> From the undergraduate to the master's and doctoral levels, business schools must encourage students to develop a deep understanding of the myriad challenges surrounding corporate responsibility and corporate governance; provide them with tools for recognizing and responding to ethical issues, both personally and organizationally; and engage them at an individual level through analyses of both positive and negative examples of everyday conduct in business. (p. 9)

Again, the question remains as to how this task should be approached. Hartman and Werhane (2009) explain that the AACSB does not speak to this question and that the task is approached in a variety of ways including stand-alone ethics courses, an integration of ethics across the curriculum, a combination of these approaches, or alternative deliveries such as their own modular approach. The analysis of Hartman and Werhane (2009) highlights one of the primary challenges that an ethics educator and curriculum developer has: the balancing of meaningful ethical education within the constraints of institutional and governing body mandates.

Hartman and Hartman (2004) describe the ensuing dilemmas faced by educators and the debate between ethics as a stand-alone course as opposed to an ethics across the curriculum approach. According to Hartman and Hartman (2004) those in favor of a stand-alone course in ethics have had the better of the debate (p. 171). Arguments that support the teaching of ethics as a stand-alone course include the increased likelihood of a dedicated and competent ethics faculty teaching ethics and a solid foundation on which students can engage with ethical issues. Hartman and Hartman (2004) argue that, "without a foundational acquaintance with ethical concepts, principles and methods … classroom discussions in courses across the curriculum will be superficial and probably ineffective" (p. 172). The ability to grapple with questions such as "Why should I be moral?" and "Who's to say what's right or wrong?" are dependent on the course time being available to adequately address the question, and the faculty's preparation in dealing with questions of these sorts (Hartman & Hartman, 2004, p. 172). It is my position going forward that ethics education should be taught through the mechanism of a stand-alone ethics course to serve as a foundation for the ethical problems that will arise throughout the curriculum. A question that remains is what the stated outcomes of this course ought to be. It should be mentioned at this point that an institutional constraint that this study operates under is a mandate

to develop curriculum in line with the principles of Outcome Based Education (OBE). The institutional mandate describes the principles of OBE in the following way:

> At the heart of OBE pedagogy is the belief that the conditions enabling teaching and learning success can be created. Spady identifies four OBE principles to guide program and course development (Spady, 1994, p. 10).

> 1.   Articulating Learning Intentions: Clarity of Focus
>
> What do we want students to know, understand, and be able to do?

> 2.   Building For Diversity: Expanded Opportunity: Since not all learners can learn the same thing in the same way at the same time, what opportunities can we provide all students? If given relevant opportunities, most students can achieve high standards (CELT, 2012).

> 3.   Setting Appropriate Standards: High Expectations: Since successful learning promotes more successful learning (CELT, 2012), what are high, challenging standards of performance for encouraging students to engage deeply in what they are learning?

> 4.   Readying Learners for the Real World: Design Down: What are the clearly explained high-level learning outcomes that students are to achieve by the end of the program (CELT, 2012) (Institutional Document 1)

This study explores educational outcomes for ethics education as part of the institutional mandate within which the case being studied is expected to operate.

The curriculum and pedagogy of applied ethics courses has matured since the late 1970s and early 1980s resurgence of ethics in higher learning. In response to concerns over the

indoctrination of students in ethics instruction, the Hastings Center (See Callahan & Bok, 1980) described five goals of teaching applied ethics including a stimulation of the moral imagination, recognition of ethical issues, encouraging a sense of moral obligation, the development of analytical skills, and an increasing sense of tolerance (Elliot, 2007, p. 39). Callahan (1980), one of the researchers involved in the Hastings Center report, stresses that creating a change in the moral behavior of students is at best a dubious goal and should not be a stated outcome of an ethics course. Elliot (2007) echoes the conclusion by stating that, "[e]ven if the field [of ethics education] had been initially developed on the belief that such courses could create a better world or more ethical professionals, it is safe to say that the experiment has failed. Regardless of all the ethics courses taught, there are still those individuals who knowingly choose to do the wrong thing" (p. 39). To complicate matters further, many of the participants in ethics classes are pre-professional and will not be faced with the professional ethical dilemmas discussed in class until much later in their career. Where do these complications leave the instructor or course developer of an ethics course that requires explicit course outcomes? Elliott (2007) builds on the Hastings Center (Callahan & Bok, 1980) goals to describe some potential student competencies resulting from a course in practical ethics. If the moral imagination is stimulated by an ethics course the student can be expected to have a heightened sense of care about what is happening in particular situations and have a feeling of a call to action. A recognition of ethical issues ought to result in the student being able to delineate ethical from legal, prudential, and religious dilemmas. A heightened sense of care ought to result in students becoming more familiar with their own ethical agency and reflecting on what they have the power and the responsibility to enact. Critical thinking and analysis of moral arguments as well as the ability to defend personal conclusions on sound premises is another potential outcome of ethical education (pp. 41-42).

Elliott (2007) sums up the teaching goals of practical ethics courses as first established by the Hastings Center report and developed over the following decades; he summarizes and enhances the Hastings Center recommendations by stating that courses in practical ethics should:

1. Help students become aware of the values they use in determining how they do behave, and how they should behave, toward people and toward other subjects of moral worth. Help them identify relevant role-related responsibilities and help them compare and contrast their own personal values with those of the profession or other role expectations.

2. Raise students' consciousness concerning occasions for ethical discussions. Create opportunities for them to differentiate the moral sphere from other decision-making spheres such as law, economics, personal opinion, and religion.

3. Give students practice in analyzing tough philosophical concepts such as confidentiality, privacy, justice, deception, promise keeping, moral causality, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness. Teach them the difference between moral permissibility and moral requirement and the difference between minimal and ideal ethical choices.

4. Introduce students to the finest relevant writings on ethical theories, problems, and processes for analysis that are available from the philosophical traditions, the area of ethical concern, and other sources.

5. Teach them a process for systematic moral analysis that includes techniques for developing creative alternatives for dealing with ethical concerns.

6. Above all, plan activities that require students and teachers to be self-aware, self-reflective, and self-critical. (pp. 42-43)

This description of what an applied ethics course ought to accomplish provides a snapshot of what is considered good practice in applied ethics.

It remains to be established that ethics education is part of the mission of polytechnic institutions in Canada. Eleven colleges and technical institutes belong to Polytechnics Canada including: Algonquin College of Applied Arts and Technology, British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT), Conestoga Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning, George Brown College, Humber College Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning, Northern Alberta Institute of Technology (NAIT), Red River College, SAIT Polytechnic, Saskatchewan Polytechnic, Seneca College, and Sheridan Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning (Polytechnics Canada, 2014). Excerpts from the stated missions and visions of these institutions support the inclusion of an ethics course. BCIT (2013) includes in its mission "providing high quality technical and professional education and training that supports our graduates as practitioners and as citizens" (para. 2). One of NAIT's (2011) guiding principles is to "[e]xemplify corporate social responsibility and ethical practices." SAIT Polytechnic (2007) demonstrates the importance of establishing guiding ethical principles as is evident in its code of ethics. Sheridan College (2013) "is committed to creating and sustaining an environment that supports the dignity, self-esteem and fair treatment of everyone in our community" (para. 2). Humber (2013) professes a value of respect "by acknowledging the dignity and contribution of each individual in our diverse community through fair, ethical and courteous actions and communications" (para. 6). Add to these the common theme of a commitment to educating for so called real world situations, which one can assume will involve real ethical problems, and the

case for ethics education in polytechnic institutions is established. With the establishment of a case for ethics education, and a guide to best practices in practical ethics, attention can be turned to the research questions driving this study.

Beck and Sznaider (2006) describe a "global transformation of modernity" in which "'the light of the great cultural problems has moved on' from a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook" (p. 2). The modern social world is characterized by an interconnectivity and interdependence that is unprecedented in human history. Rizvi (2009) describes an emerging global connectivity where "goods, capital, technologies, people, knowledge, images, crime, beliefs, fashions and desires all readily flow across territorial boundaries" (p. 258). Local communities and classrooms are influenced by global networks of intermingling ideologies, communication systems, religious systems, political outlooks, economic systems, and epistemologies. These processes result in local transformations and social disruptions that are not always recognized as global in origin. Tools to think about and interact with the emergence of these new levels of complexity in the social world are necessary. Interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity raise both educational challenges and opportunities. Beck and Sznaider (2006) call on the humanities and social sciences to "get ready for a transformation of their own positions and conceptual equipment – that is, to take cosmopolitanism as a research agenda seriously and raise some of the key conceptual, methodological, empirical and normative issues that the cosmopolitanization of reality poses" (p. 2). Despite the renewed interest in cosmopolitanism, Hansen (2010) states, "I am not aware of a single published study that has fused a systematic framing of the cosmopolitan with field-based inquiry on educational practice" (p. 10). How then, can the cosmopolitan tradition inform the interests of ethics education in a globalized classroom environment?

Research Questions

In examining the gap in field-based research that applies a cosmopolitan framework to educational practice, this research intends to answer the following three questions:

1. How can a cosmopolitan minded approach be used to transform the learning contexts of ethics education at a Canadian polytechnic institute?

2. What supports (ideas, policies, processes, pedagogies) are needed for the integration of cosmopolitan learning into the teaching of ethics to polytechnic post-secondary students?

3. How is the introduction of cosmopolitan learning into an ethics curriculum understood and received by administration, faculty, and students at a Canadian polytechnic institute?

Pursuing this research with these questions as guides results in recommendations impacting the theory and practice of ethics education. Attention will be turned to an engagement with the literature on cosmopolitanism and supporting theory in the next chapter.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Exploring Cosmopolitanism

The nature of cosmopolitanism is contested and there is a need to explore its multiple interpretations in order to investigate their significance for cosmopolitan minded education. Defining cosmopolitanism is notoriously difficult. Kleingeld and Brown (2006) claim that "the nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, …do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated" (para.1). Despite this unitive claim of a shared community, Mendieta (2009) observes that the various strands that make up cosmopolitan discourse are a "veritable ruins of a tower of Babel" (p. 241). Hansen (2010) describes a variety of qualifiers used by scholars such as "'actually existing' and 'rooted' cosmopolitanism to 'discrepant,' 'environmental,' 'layered,' 'realistic,' 'aesthetic,' 'embedded,' 'postcolonial,' 'situated,' 'banal,' 'abject,' and 'vernacular' cosmopolitanism" (p. 152). Add to this "'strong' and 'weak,' 'thick' and 'thin,' or 'strict' and 'moderate'" (p. 152) and we have some idea of the variety of conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism in existence. There have also been a variety of charges levelled against cosmopolitanism including: "naive utopianism, political aloofness, uncritical universalism, moral rootlessness, disguised ethnocentrism, and elitist aestheticism" (Hansen, 2010, p. 151). On the contrary, Delanty (2009) states that the true "significance of cosmopolitanism is that it offers a critical approach to global issues and a way of looking at modernity beyond the limits of Eurocentrism" (p. ix). Cosmopolitanism rarely fails to generate passionate discussion.

Why Cosmopolitanism

Attention is now turned to a question that is crucial to this study: Why cosmopolitanism? Hansen (2011) provides a compelling description of cosmopolitanism as education that helps to

answer this question. Cosmopolitanism offers the resources necessary to engage with the trials and prospects of globalization. Importantly, while offering a moral perspective, cosmopolitanism is not a tool for promoting a particular set of interests. Hansen (2011) describes cosmopolitanism as "the human capacity to be open reflectively to the larger world, while remaining loyal reflectively to local concerns, commitments, and values" (p. xiii). Cosmopolitanism has a long history as a response to globalization and the increasing intensity of global trade, communication, media, and human movement has resulted in an intensification of cosmopolitanism as an orientation to deal with these trends. It is an orientation that empowers individuals and communities to respond to global trends rather than being passively influenced by them. In this sense, a cosmopolitan perspective increases agency. Cosmopolitanism is adaptable, time tested, and it embraces the languages of possibility and hope (Giroux, 2011; Hansen, 2011).

From an educational perspective, cosmopolitanism can be a philosophy of education that helps guide educators through turbulent times. A common impact of globalization is a less homogenous, more international classroom. A cosmopolitan lens can help to explore how the larger world is already present in the classroom and the curriculum. Diversity in the classroom is one obvious result but the impact of global media, popular culture, common sense (doxa), dominating value sets, and educational policy can all be explored through a cosmopolitan lens to help reveal the presence of the world in the classroom. Ignoring these effects will not diminish their influence and reflection through a cosmopolitan lens has the potential to generate more appropriate responses. The notion of cosmopolitanism as education (Hansen, 2011) will contribute to envisioning a cosmopolitan discourse appropriate to the task. As has been noted,

cosmopolitanism is often a contentious topic. The challenge of conceptualizing cosmopolitanism is served by providing an historical context from which to proceed.

A Short History of Cosmopolitanism

An historical examination of cosmopolitan themes runs the risk of characterizing cosmopolitanism as a Western tradition (a problematic term to be certain). Cosmopolitan motifs can be identified in a variety of cultural artifacts including the Hindu Upanishads, the Analects of Confucius, and Islamic traditions (Hansen, 2010). The cosmopolitan imagination arose with the civilizations of the Axial Age (Jaspers, 1951). Delanty (2009) points to cosmopolitan norms in civilizations with universalistic principles such as the Greek, Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, and Christian traditions. In the context of language and culture, he notes that "a universalistic culture such as that of Latin was only one universalism and can be contrasted with other universalistic languages such as Sanskrit, Arabic and Chinese. As world religions, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism established the basic preconditions for Asian cultures to create dynamic and hybrid societies in which cosmopolitanism could take root" (p. 27). Though cosmopolitan themes can be identified in these varied traditions, Hansen (2011) notes that "[p]hilosopical traditions which originate in the Mediterranean world have rendered the cosmopolitan idea in its most extended forms" (p. 6) and it is with these traditions that this brief history is concerned.

According to the account of Diogenes Laertius (1925), the origin of the term cosmopolitan may be traced to Diogenes of Sinope (Diogenes the Cynic): "Asked where he came from, he said, 'I am a citizen of the world [kosmopolitês]'" (p. 65). What is to be made of this brief quote? It is not surprising that Diogenes did not consider himself to owe particular allegiance to Sinope; he was apparently exiled from Sinope early in his life and later took up residence in Athens. He became an outspoken critic of Greek excesses, going so far as to chastise

Plato and Alexander the Great in person. Establishing Diogenes as an exile, turned philosopher and social critic, helps to explain his position as a self-proclaimed cosmopolitan. His position is a challenge to Plato's understanding of citizenship as identification with, and allegiance to, a specific polis or city. By denouncing allegiance to the Polis, Diogenes establishes an early expression of cosmopolitanism as social criticism and world citizenship. Diogenes and the Cynics viewed the polis as contrary to nature (Hansen, 2014; Bogue, 2012). The polis emphasizes difference such as class, gender, rank, and citizenship, and institutionalizes their management (Bogue, 2012). The example of nature provides the norm, and the vision of Diogenes living like a dog (in Greek the root for Cynic, *Kynikos*, derives from the root *kuon*, or dog; Hansen, 2014) in the streets is an embodied example of the Cynic pursuit of freedom and self-efficiency and the beginning of a natural law tradition (Bogue, 2012). For the Cynic, the polis is guilty of a pretentious attention to difference that leads to dominator hierarchies evident within the polis. Diogenes mocked local practice, the things that set Athenians apart, and chose instead to declare allegiance to the cosmos. What can be retained from Diogenes and the Cynic origins of cosmopolitanism? A willful and belligerent insistence on thinking for oneself, a critical questioning of custom, and the tendency to see oneself as a member of a moral community larger than that inherited from particular circumstances (Hansen, 2014).

Greek and Roman cosmopolitanism. Rather than an outright rejection of the polis the Stoics proposed a new polis, the cosmos, as a political community based on virtue. Nussbaum (1996) describes Stoic recognition of all humans as fellow citizens and a sense of belonging to this larger moral community. She expands this notion as follows:

The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up
local identifications, which can be a source of great richness in life. They suggest

that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by

a series of concentric circles. The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the

immediate family, then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or

local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen – and we can easily add

to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender,

or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a

whole. (p. 9)

The task of the Stoic world citizen is to draw the outer circles toward the center in an effort to

recognize all human beings as fellow citizens. The question of who it is that stands at the center

of this concentric circle, and the liberal tendency to encircle the self as the first act of defining a

subject, will be returned to later in the study.

It is useful to reflect on this Stoic philosophy through an historical lens. Stoic philosophy

flourished at a time when the Greek imagination was encountering a larger political community

and world. The decline of the polis as a result of the rise of Hellenism after the conquests of

Alexander the Great provides an interesting tension between a universalizing Greek language

and a pluralistic encounter with other cultures. Delanty (2009) observes that Hellenism was "an

early form of globalization, that greatly promoted cosmopolitanism as a political and moral

philosophy leading it to be easily taken up by Roman and later Christian thinkers" (p. 23). The

later transition from Roman republic to Empire is another historical era that reveals an encounter

between a narrow republican norm and an expanding contact with the world. This expanding

contact with the world helped support Stoic notions of civic education for world citizenship.

While the Stoic notion of cosmopolitan citizenship is appealing, its foundations are less

satisfying for modern sensibilities. Van Hooft (2009) describes how, from the Stoics, "we have

acquired the idea of cosmopolitanism as a stance of personal virtue grounded in a metaphysical conception of human beings as all equally under the sway of a universal moral order ordained by the gods" (p. 16). It was not until the beginning of the modern era that cosmopolitanism would be reinvigorated in a substantial way.

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. The rise of capitalism and global trade, European empire building, global exploration, an emphasis on reason, and the French and American Revolutions' ideal of human rights are all factors that contributed to the resurgence of cosmopolitanism during the Enlightenment (Kleingeld & Brown, 2006). Modernity's break from the past and a teleological sense of unlimited possibilities for the future is a strong theme in enlightenment cosmopolitanism. Delanty (2009) distinguishes three main manifestations of cosmopolitanism in the modern age: 1) the political and moral unity of humanity, 2) an individualistic culture based on science, literature and travel, and 3) cultural encounters with Asian thought. Kant promoted an international law to regulate states and a cosmopolitan law based on the rights of individuals such as the right to hospitality (Kant, Waldron, Kleingeld, Doyle, & Wood, trans. 2006). A new sense of world openness was cultivated based on a notion of human rights and a universal morality based on reason that extended beyond the nation state. Kant views the human being as a rational being, capable of applying reason to the moral domain. From a cosmopolitan perspective his key insight is the second formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end" (Kant, 1785/2005). The universal respect for human beings is an integral part of cosmopolitanism worth preserving (Derrida, 2001; Nussbaum, 1996). Kantian cosmopolitanism took on a more political and cultural flavour that made it an integral part of the movement of

modernity where cosmopolitanism and nationalism co-existed peacefully as political philosophies (Delanty, 2009). Many of the criticisms levelled at cosmopolitanism arise from this period as well. The much criticized idea of the cosmopolitan traveler who is at home everywhere and committed nowhere has its origins in this time of expanded world travel. An indication of colonial and imperial overtones can be gleaned from Mignolo's (2011) characterization of enlightenment cosmopolitanism: "Western civilization was marching to civilize the world, and cosmopolitanism was its creed" (p. 337). Kant's ethnocentric views are also often pointed to in cosmopolitan criticisms (van Gorkom, 2008; Eze, 1997), and any attempt to use cosmopolitanism as a research lens will need to deal with this inability to see beyond European citizenship.

Traces of Kant can be found throughout this study, from his pre-constructivist epistemology (Kant & Meiklejohn, 1787/2009), through his rational duty based ethics (Kant, 1785/2005), to his search for principles that support cosmopolitan political institutions and rights of hospitality for individuals (Kant, et al., trans. 2006). Especially important in the context of this study is how Kant's intentions reflect his 18th-century enlightenment worldview, and how this relates to the current state of affairs in the global community. Kant's 18th-century vision was of a yet to be realized cosmopolitanism of the future (Fine, 2011). From a cosmopolitan perspective, Kant emphasizes "the importance of the political self-determination of individuals as citizens of republican or liberal states" (Kleingeld, 2012, p. 197). As such, Kant's notion of how to promote global justice is to promote the development of these states. This teleological vision imagined a global political order of republican states, as well as citizens of these states who understood themselves as members of a global cosmopolitan community based on reason (Kleingeld, 2012). Kant's 18th century was a time of fledgling liberal states. Doyle (2006) lists only select Swiss

cantons, the French Republic, and the United States as part of the liberal community prior to 1800. Kant et al. (trans. 2006) lays out preliminary articles with the teleological aim of achieving perpetual peace through the spread of republican, market based states, joined together in a voluntary cosmopolitan legal community. Delanty (2009) observes, "Kant's vision of a cosmopolitan republic and other conceptions of international law were all part of a cultural turn towards a broadening of vision beyond the narrow worldview of *ancient régime* loyalties which still dominated the Westphalian inter-state system established in 1648" (p. 35). Limiting critical engagement with Kant's philosophy to his republicanism would be to overlook a much deeper flaw. Eze (1997) points out a "scholarly forgetfulness" (p. 103) that tends to evade Kant's views on race. Kant's (1798/1996) anthropology focuses on the "human being as a moral agent" (Eze, 1997, p. 106). The teleology at work here views the individual as capable of cultivating humanity, and the moral agency that is its essence, in a struggle against incivility and crudeness (Eze, 1997). "Humanity is clearly demarcated away from and against the natural state and elevated to a level where it has necessarily to construct in freedom its own culture. For Kant, it is this radical autonomy that defines the worth, the dignity, and therefore the essence of humanity" (Eze, 1997, p. 112). A teleological view such as Kant's proposes an essential human nature, in this case the perfectibility of the human being as a rational moral agent, and envisions a role for education in helping the student move closer to this essence. For Kant, the unquestioned model for what is universally to be considered human is expressed in the ideal of the European (Eze, 1997). Kant's racism renders enlightenment cosmopolitanism problematic; an equal moral status of all human beings cannot be foreclosed by racist notions that exclude those who do not embody Kant's European ideal. By limiting humanity to a Eurocentric ideal, the enlightenment mindset dehumanizes and externalizes based on archaic racial notions. Those left outside these

dehumanizing boundaries are rendered invisible and the universal address of the cosmopolitan ideal is bounded along racial lines.

From the vantage point of the future that Kant attempted to imagine, how does his cosmopolitan vision stand up? The decline of enlightenment cosmopolitanism is closely linked to a rise in nationalism. The wedge that emerged between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, "was the transformation of nationalism into a territorial ideology to which became associated an exclusivist notion of peoplehood that was at odds with the cosmopolitan ideal" (Delanty, 2009, p. 43). An extreme form of nationalism, combined with neoliberal doctrines such as the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992) and Margaret Thatcher's ideological proclamation that "there is no alternative" (McMurtry, 2002, p. 8) has resulted in a world order considerably different than what Kant envisioned. The global market has emerged as a so-called cosmopolitan discourse partly inspired by Kant while at the same time inverting many of the values expressed in Kant's vision (McMurtry, 2002). A variety of contemporary cosmopolitan discourses have emerged in response. Encounters with critical theory, postmodernism, and decolonialism have also had transformative impacts that will be discussed later in the study.

Contemporary cosmopolitanism. Contemporary cosmopolitanism has been described as, "a) a sociocultural condition; b) a kind of philosophy or world-view; c) a political project towards building transnational institutions; d) a political project for recognizing multiple identities; e) an attitudinal or dispositional orientation; and/or f) a mode of practice or competence" (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002, p. 9). Kleingeld and Brown (2006) outline a practical way to think about cosmopolitanism in the contemporary world by highlighting moral, political, cultural, and economic conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism. *Political cosmopolitanism* is characterized by concepts of global citizenship and transnational institutions devoted to global

justice (Benhabib, 2006; Brock and Brighouse, 2005). Held (2006) presents eight principles upon which a political cosmopolitanism is built: "(1) equal worth and dignity; (2) active agency; (3) personal responsibility and accountability; (4) consent; (5) collective decision-making about public matters through voting procedures; (6) inclusiveness and subsidiarity; (7) avoidance of serious harm; and (8) sustainability" (p. 12). These principles lead to the formulation of a cosmopolitan law that often includes proposals for global democracy (Held, 2006; Archibugi, 2003). As an aid to understanding political cosmopolitanism from a global citizenship and educational perspective, Shultz (2007) outlines three main approaches to global citizenship. The first approach is that of the "neoliberal global citizen" (p. 250). The neoliberal global citizen views education as of primary importance in gaining access to market opportunities and promoting market expansion. Economic participation on a global scale is the desired outcome. This conceptualization of global citizenship is clearly connected with *economic cosmopolitanism*. Rizvi (2009) describes this position as the belief that cosmopolitanism emerges naturally from a free market economy in which borders become less significant and individual freedom and travel play a prominent role. The individual, free trade, competition, efficiency, and growth are all central themes from this point of view. "The idea of cosmopolitanism based on these neoliberal premises thus suggests that the market, as a single global sphere of free trade, has the potential to promote greater intercultural understanding and peace" (Rizvi, 2009, p. 259). Hansen (2011) on the other hand characterizes economic cosmopolitanism as a critique of neo-liberal premises and cites Sen (1999) and Nussbaum's (2011) work on the capabilities approach as examples of cosmopolitan alternatives.

Another approach to global citizenship is that of the radical global citizen. This citizen seeks to draw attention to the role that structures such as the Bretton Woods institutions play in

perpetuating global inequalities. The radical global citizen assumes a critical approach to global economic and political structures and explores ways to disrupt unjust structures through acts of citizenship at both the local and global levels. A third type of global citizen outlined by Shultz (2007) is the transformationalist global citizen. The uneven impacts of globalization are recognized but an understanding of interdependence at a deeper level is sought. Socioeconomic divisions cut across national boundaries creating new opportunities to build solidarity globally. Through a process of coalition building across traditional boundaries, citizenship activity is aimed at challenging structures and practices that perpetuate marginalization (p. 256).

Moral cosmopolitanism was re-invigorated as a contemporary topic by Nussbaum's (1996) essay on patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum advocates for an education that cultivates a sense of world citizenship in students. By invoking Stoic cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum advances four arguments in favour of cosmopolitan education:

1. Through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves.

2. We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation.

3. We recognize moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real and that otherwise would go unrecognized.

4. We make a consistent and coherent argument based on distinctions we are prepared to defend. (Nussbaum, 1996, pp. 11-14)

Nussbaum does not rule out allegiances to the local but does promote the idea that we have moral obligations to the community of human beings first, and are situated in a particular country second. Her suggestions for education would loosen the attachment students have to artificial boundaries such as the nation state and, in Stoic fashion, expand the concentric circles of care to

encompass all of humanity. Nussbaum also invokes Kant in describing reason and moral capacity as fundamental to humanity and as attributes to which we owe allegiance. From this "strong cosmopolitan" perspective, students may be citizens of a particular country, but they ought to recognize their moral obligations to all of humanity. Nussbaum's invocation of the individual at the center of the Stoic notion of concentric circles of care, combined with a Kantian understanding of the individual endowed with the defining human characteristic of reason gives rise to a universalism based on a universal human subject that is problematic. Appiah (2005) takes a more rooted approach to moral cosmopolitanism than does Nussbaum. He makes an interesting distinction between the ethical life and the moral life. "Here, the distinction between the ethical and the moral corresponds to 'thick' relations – which invoke a community founded in a shared past or 'collective memory' – and 'thin' relations which we have with strangers, and which are stipulatively entailed by a shared humanity" (p. 230). Appiah's approach helps to reconcile what is often viewed as cosmopolitan universalism with partiality to the local; an idea that will help to clarify the meaning of ethics and morals later in the study.

Cultural cosmopolitanism attempts to avoid the extremes of homogenization of communities and parochialism by encouraging a reflexive approach to intercultural encounters. Cultural cosmopolitans balance "allegiance to the values in local culture and to the values in intercultural borrowing, exchange and fusion" (Hansen, 2010, p. 154). The realities of transnational social movements, transcultural lifestyles, global communications, and consumerism can lead to a disorienting state of cultural fluidity. Cultural cosmopolitans embrace the dynamic and changing nature of culture as an opening for positive transformation both locally and globally. Waldron (2003) describes the interdependent nature of the human social world by outlining a history of migration, intercultural exchange of ideas, and trade that

contradicts the ideas of distinct societies, cultures and territories. Human cultures have been in contact for millennia. A cosmopolitan minded education helps students to understand these intercultural exchanges and appreciate the historical and arbitrary nature of the boundaries that characterize their lives.

Critical Cosmopolitanism

Delanty (2009) describes a cosmopolitan imagination that "occurs when and wherever new relations between Self, Other and World develop in openness" (p. 53). His work provides the framework for a cosmopolitan critical social theory. Delanty's (2009) approach offers the "foundations for a new conception of immanent transcendence; it is one that lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan imagination in so far that this is a way of viewing the world in terms of its immanent possibilities for self-transformation and which can be realized only by taking the cosmopolitan perspective of the Other as well as global principles of justice" (p. 3). As opposed to the often criticized cosmopolitanism from above, this contemporary development implies a cosmopolitanism from within. Engagement with a cosmopolitan discourse has the potential to create spaces for students, teachers, administrators, and legislators to step outside of their own hegemonic discourses and view the world from a more inclusive perspective. Critical cosmopolitanism emphasizes "the capacity for self-problematization and new ways of seeing the world that result when diverse peoples experience common problems" (Delanty, 2009, p. ix). Encounters between "Self, Other and World," developed from a position of world openness, have transformative possibilities. The individual is transformed from within, and the culture is transformed from within, through engagement and dialogue with new ideas and common problems. Creating opportunities for the emergence of cosmopolitanism from within is a key goal of cosmopolitan learning and education.

If, as Delanty (2009) suggests, a cosmopolitan imagination is required to deal with these common problems, under what conditions can the cosmopolitan imagination emerge? Critical cosmopolitanism offers a theoretical stance to address the normative and methodological issues arising from globalization and to cultivate cosmopolitan imagination (p. 2). Methodologically it "offers both a critical-normative stand point and an empirical-analytical account of social trends" (p. 2). From an educational perspective, critical cosmopolitanism provides tools to analyze the transformations in subjectivity created by encounters between Self, Other and World (Delanty, 2009). This approach describes cosmopolitanism as a new conception of social reality rather than a set of principles or a political project. It answers many of the criticisms levelled at cosmopolitanism as an ideal by conceiving cosmopolitanism as a social reality of the modern world. Cosmopolitanism is seen as a dynamic process rather than an identity. It can arise anywhere and at any time with an encounter between the local and the global; between Self, Other, and World (Delanty, 2009, p. 13). Critical cosmopolitanism views the social world more as a set of loosely bounded relational fields as opposed to bounded, societal notions of nation, culture, and territory. The social world can be seen as a field of tensions in which different perspectives and orientations interact dialogically. The educational implications for creating spaces in which contentious moral issues are engaged are intriguing.

Applying a Contemporary Conceptualization of Cosmopolitanism to Education

Rizvi (2009) suggests that cosmopolitanism is a useful educational tool if we interpret it "not so much as a universal moral principle, not a prescription recommending a particular form of political configuration – nor indeed a transnational life-style but a mode of learning about, and ethically engaging with, new social formations" (p. 254). Cosmopolitan learning encourages students to develop a deeper understanding of their own socially constructed identities with an

effort to explore how these identities are influenced through interaction with the rest of the world. The increased interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity of the social world makes interpreting these relationalities an important learning task. Creating spaces for inter-subjective deliberation helps students explore their situatedness in this complex social world. A reflexive world openness can be described as an orientation to the world that neither retreats into parochialism nor rushes to adopt the culture of the Other. Such encounters create spaces for self-problematization and critical self-understanding that have transformative potential. Delanty (2009) describes the intersubjectivity of cosmopolitan learning spaces where "shifts in understanding …arise when both Self and Other are transformed" (p. 11). Creating such spaces for cosmopolitan shifts in self-understanding through education democratizes cosmopolitanism and contests the claim that cosmopolitanism is elitist. Hansen's (2010) description of cosmopolitanism as "the capacity to fuse reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known" (p. 153) helps the student explore, learn from, and be influenced by cosmopolitan encounters while remaining prudent about adopting new ideas. The tension created by the encounter of the local and the global, Self, Other, and World; the encounter between conflicting ideas and concepts; and the goal of intersubjective dialogue and engagement results in a cosmopolitan learning space.

Cosmopolitanism as Education

A central tenet of cosmopolitanism as education is that it is possible to live a better life as a result of seeing the world in a different way. Hansen (2011) explains that "cosmopolitanism holds out the prospect of a different life, even as people subscribe to values to which they have long adhered" (p. 1). Cosmopolitanism as education goes beyond toleration of diversity to actively trying to learn from others. Education happens at the level of the individual, and when

viewed through a cosmopolitan lens, explores the possibility of a better life through an open engagement with others combined with a respect for particular ways of life. The ends of cosmopolitan education are paradoxically transformative and conservative at the same time. It is not necessarily about changing beliefs, or abandoning the values that have been the result of a lifetime's worth of experience. It can however encourage exploration of the human capacity to value and the human search for meaning while remaining mindful of the vast variety of ways of valuing and cultivating meaning. Hansen (2011) points out that "cosmopolitanism is not synonymous with universalism…that local is not synonymous with parochialism" and cosmopolitanism as education is concerned with an edifying tension between new and known (p. 2).

Hansen (2011) uses an interesting trope in suggesting "that cosmopolitan minded education assists people in moving closer and closer *apart* and further and further *together*" (p. 3). Closeness, in this sense, is not achieved through a reductive homogenization of values but through a better understanding of the worldviews of others and the resulting identification of what it is that makes each a unique subject. It is the recognition of our uniqueness through an encounter with others that brings us closer and closer apart. Hansen's (2011) notion of reflective loyalty to the known is closely related to the process of growing close and closer apart. By recognizing their distinctiveness as persons through interactions with other unique persons, it is possible for the individual to reflect on the sources of their distinctiveness. Self-reflection, and in the process, self-problematization, are an integral part of cosmopolitanism as education.

Cosmopolitanism as education is also concerned with moving further and further together. Through a group engagement with ethical and moral themes a class will come to share common questions and concerns. Such a group engagement is bound to be messy at times, when

conflicting worldviews and value systems lead to what may seem to be incommensurable disagreements. This messiness is also a hallmark of cosmopolitan minded education. This complexity is part of what will help students develop deeper understandings of self, particular affiliations, and the broader community "in the very process of shaping humane and fulfilling ways of interaction" (Hansen, 2011, p. 5). Helping students to imagine and implement ways of moving beyond individualism and toward relationality will be a goal of any cosmopolitan minded approach to education. Hansen's (2011) interpretation of current scholarship on cosmopolitanism (See Rovisco & Nowicka, 2011) concludes that it is not focused on meta-narratives involving humanism, liberalism, or multiculturalism, but is focused on "what a person and community are in the present moment, juxtaposed with what they might become through a reflective response to new influence fused with a reflective appreciation of their roots and values" (p. 8). Values play an important role in ethics education.

Values pre-exist the cosmopolitan educational encounter and the goals of such an approach to education do not necessitate an abandonment of these values. Values are assumed to be continuous, but not fixed, and the possibility of transformation, not in the sense of radical change, but in the sense of "incremental reconfiguration" is considered a possibility (Hansen, 2011, p. 8). As students become "closer and closer apart" the value differences that emerge, commensurable or not, are to be used as learning opportunities that go beyond mere tolerance. Difference and pluralism are recognized by a cosmopolitan perspective at both the individual and group level. Importantly, "from a cosmopolitan perspective, purity and fixity of identity are impossible, given the unpreventable porosity of cultures and individuals to influence from the larger world" (Hansen, 2011, p. 9). The importance of culture and belief to individuals is recognized, as is the threat to individual and cultural integrity posed by a relentless external

influence. A cosmopolitan perspective is as much about maintaining individual and cultural integrity through a thoughtful response to external influence as it is about value transformation. A cosmopolitan minded approach recognizes that, while values may manifest in an almost infinite variety, there are shared human capacities to think, to communicate, to learn, to love, that can be cultivated (Hansen, 2011; Appiah, 2005). Hansen (2011) notes that these shared capacities can be cultivated while different values are held which can result in communication and negotiation in the face of conflict as opposed to isolation and retreat to dogmatism. Such dialogue is likely to be fraught with anxiety and frustration as well as excitement and satisfaction. This antagonism need not be considered a negative. Mouffe (2000a) recognizes "the dimension of antagonism that the pluralism of values entails and its ineradicable character" (p. 13). She posits a form of "agonistic pluralism," a struggle between in which "the aim of democratic politics is to construct the 'them' in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but an 'adversary', i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question" (p. 13). Agonism, the struggle between adversaries, is not something to be avoided, in fact it is to be engaged with in democratic ways that envision the other as a worthy adversary to be respected. Mouffe (2000a) explains that "[a] well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions" (p. 16). It is reasonable to believe that a well-functioning morality calls for a similar clash of ethical worldviews and the emergent agonistic pluralism that results.

What is it about this approach to education that is cosmopolitan? It is recognition of the porosity and permeability of individuals and of cultures to the constant barrage of external influence. It is being reflective about the influences that inform one's current values and the influences that can transform them as well. It is not about eliminating the borders within which

human subjects make their meaning; it is about recognizing the porosity of these borders and responding with integrity.

What is meant by Cosmopolitan Minded?

The term cosmopolitan minded may appear to be a cop out; a pretext to seizing that which is deemed good within cosmopolitanism while maintaining a comfortable distance so as to dodge criticisms aimed at one who maintains a fidelity to the cosmopolitan creed. I will expand on what is meant by cosmopolitan minded to clarify my position.

Robbins (1998) describes cosmopolitanisms as being "plural and particular" (p. 2) meaning that there is no one definitive cosmopolitanism that can be defined but there are multiple cosmopolitanisms that are defined by their actually existing conditions in particular places. The ethics classroom is one such location where students with a multitude of worldviews are gathered in one place to interact and exchange ideas. These worldviews consist of legitimate, but partial knowledge (Andreotti, 2011), constructed through forces both external and internal, conscious and unconscious. Robbins (1998) notes that "[i]t is frightening to think how little progress has been made in turning invisibly determining and often exploitative connections into conscious and self-critical ones, how far we remain from mastering the sorts of allegiance, ethics, and action that might go with our complex and multiple belonging" (p. 3). The observable fact of occupying a classroom characterized by pluralism attests to the complex and multiple belonging that is a part of the life of students both where they study and where they work. These cosmopolitan conditions of multiple belonging stretch the boundaries of the moral sphere to include multiple ways of being and it is under such conditions that students are called on to grapple with moral problems. Rather than attempt to provide a definitive definition of cosmopolitanism, this study engages with the actually existing cosmopolitanism of the post-

secondary ethics classroom, one concrete case of a multitude of cosmopolitanisms that exist. Woodward and Skrbis (2012) argue for a way of performing cosmopolitanism that "allows researchers to conceive cosmopolitanism as an emergent and dynamic dimension of social life valuing openness which is based in sets of cultural practices bounded by temporal, spatial and material structures" (pp. 127-128). The post-secondary ethics classroom is an excellent example of this type of bounded space where multiple differences exist. Gunn (2013) develops the case for a pragmatic cosmopolitanism that "asks what it would take ethically to transform the necessity of living together, which we cannot escape, into the possibility of living together well, which we dare not abandon" (p. viii). A cosmopolitan minded approach embodies this sort of pragmatism and fits well with the aims and outcomes of post-secondary ethics education.

Cosmopolitics as a Discourse for Ethics Education.

The concept of cosmopolitanism described thus far can be summarized as the ability to reflectively distance oneself from cultural affiliation (Anderson, 1998), express an interest in the culture of others (Appiah, 2006), and endorse some notion of universal community (Nussbaum, 1996). Latour (2004) forces the cosmopolitan scholar to question the usefulness of cosmopolitanism as a signifier of any worth. Latour (2004) problematizes the assumption that "nature, the world, the cosmos, is simply there; and since humans share basic characteristics, our view of the world is, at baseline, the same everywhere" (p. 453). Such a view is a basic assumption of the cosmopolitanism of Beck (2006), Kant (1785/2005), and the Stoics and reveals a deeply ethnocentric blind spot in these cosmopolitan visions. What these visions fail to realize is that "whenever cosmopolitanism has been tried out, from Alexandria to the United Nations, it has been during the great periods of complete confidence in the ability of reason, and later, science to know *the one* cosmos whose existence and solid certainty could then prop up all

efforts to build the world metropolis of which we are all too happy to be citizens" (Latour, 2004, p. 453). It is the postmodern predicament of a recognition of the uncertainty of this one cosmos that leads Latour (2004) to favor cosmopolitics over cosmopolitanism. In Latour's (2004) vision of cosmopolitics (see also Stengers, 1997) cosmos takes on a vastly expanded meaning that embraces entities other than the human, in turn expanding the scope of the impact of the political. By problematizing the notion of one cosmos out there, Latour (2004) draws attention to an observation important to cosmopolitanism: "…attachments are not defined solely by their expansion and shrinkage along a line between universalism and particularism. We should perhaps explore another dimension, perpendicular to the first – a gradient running from 'naturalism' to 'constructivism'" (pp. 456-457). The tension that he draws our attention to is that between finding ways to inhabit the same world and how this "'same world' can be slowly composed" (pp. 457). Latour suggests an approach to peacemaking and, by extension, to ethics that can accommodate a variety of attachments to other worldviews including those inhabited by divinities, and calls on us to pursue the following question with others: "Through what sort of test do you render possible the distinction between good and bad attachments?" (pp. 457-458). This "pluriversal" approach does not limit answers to those that fit with a Western naturalistic science based on reason. Importantly, it does not rule out the eventual achievement of agreement based on reason; what it calls into question is the assumed starting point. A constructivist, as opposed to a naturalist, approach emerges as a potential basis for engagement.

Latour (2004) summarizes the principles of constructivism in the following way: "The realities to which humans are attached are dependent on [a] series of mediations: these realities and their mediations are composed of heterogeneous ingredients and have histories" (p. 458). The heterogeneous ingredients that compose realities and their mediators may be shared, more or

less, by individuals and groups, but no two are exactly the same. Latour continues his description of constructivism by adding that the more mediations involved in a reality, the more real it is; differing interpretations of reality must be considered with caution; and a warning that realities can fail and are subject to maintenance and repair (p. 459). "Constructivism is the attitude of those who make things and are capable of telling good from bad fabrications, who want to compare their goods with those of others so that the standards of their own products improve" (Latour, 2004, p. 461). A constructivist approach to ethics education, one that recognizes the pluriversal variety of attachments, is based on the desire to compare goods to improve the standards of the products of those involved. These observations provide excellent insight into a fresh approach to ethics education but call into question a cosmopolitanism based on naturalistic assumptions. Where does this leave the cosmopolitan scholar? It is necessary to turn a critical lens upon cosmopolitanism itself to investigate anti-cosmopolitan objections and to conceptualize cosmopolitanism in a way that is useful for research and practice in ethics education.

It was noted earlier that cosmopolitanism has been accused of naïve utopianism, political aloofness, uncritical universalism, moral rootlessness, disguised ethnocentrism (Eurocentrism), and elitist aestheticism (Hansen, 2010, p. 151). It was suggested that many of these criticisms arise in response to cosmopolitanism envisioned as a project of modernity in search of universals and absolute foundations. It must be granted that cosmopolitanism has been conceived in just such a way by many theorists and the account given thus far does little to challenge this Eurocentric approach. "The politics of Eurocentered cosmopolitanism is no different from the politics of banks and corporations: they have the good solution for you, your family, your life and the future of all. You have just to sign and follow the rules, to be saved and developed"

(Mignolo, 2011, p. 333). The limitations of such approaches can be attributed to the incompleteness of the modern vision (Santos, 2014) and a reimagining of cosmopolitanism from a postmodern perspective provides some insight. Both a postmodern and an ethical framework are provided through the work of Bauman (1993).

A postmodern perspective can be envisioned as the result of modernity reaching a stage of self-critical, self-problematizing awareness (Bauman, 1993, p. 2). Bauman (1993) suggests that through self-problematization "a radically novel understanding of moral phenomenon has been opened" (p. 2). Postmodernism is concerned with removing the "mask of illusions" (p. 3) and suggests an abandonment of the search for universals and absolute foundations. "The moral thought and practice of modernity was animated by a belief in the possibility of a *non-ambivalent, non-aporetic* ethical code" (Bauman, 1993, p. 9). The modern project sought to replace diversity with uniformity and to eliminate ambivalence by replacing it with a coherent, complete, rational order. Bauman (1993) describes a tendency of legislators to strive for a universal set of laws that extended over a sovereign area, and the tendency of philosophers to strive for a universal set of ethical laws that applied to all human beings and that reason would recognize as obligatory (p. 8). A postmodern perspective can be understood as a denial of this possibility.

> The foolproof – universal and unshakeably founded – ethical code will never be found; having singed our fingers once too often, we know now what we did not know then, when we embarked on this journey of exploration: that a non-aporetic, non-ambivalent morality, an ethics that is universal and 'objectively founded,' is an impossibility; perhaps also an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. (Bauman, 1993, p. 10)

Modernity views the untidiness of the world as a temporary problem that is sure to be overcome through the application of reason. A postmodern lens suggests that the untidiness is here to stay, that to be a human being among other human beings is to live in a world of uncertainty and ambivalence. The moral dilemmas that one is faced with will always be there and our actions can be both right and wrong at the same time. Actions that are economically sensible, socially sensible, educationally sensible, or morally sensible will not always be in harmony. This untidiness is part of the moral dilemma and learning to live with moral ambivalence and aporia is part of learning to be a moral agent. These insights into the impossibility of a universal ethic must inform a cosmopolitan minded educational perspective. Todd (2009) provides another point of view that problematizes modern visions of cosmopolitanism.

Todd (2009) observes "tensions operating within cosmopolitanism which come about through its double commitment both to universal rights and to respect for cultural diversity and pluralism" (p. 24). Cosmopolitan revivals based upon classical models "base their views on appeals to universal humanity, rights, and/or world citizenship, taking these (in varying degrees) as fundamental to the project of working toward a more just, harmonious, and peaceful world order" (p. 25). These revivals are rightly criticized for harboring a masked ethnocentrism. Bauman (1993) observes that "modern societies practice moral parochialism under the mask of promoting universal ethics" (p. 14). A politically motivated universality is but a thinly veiled application of institutional power to "usurp ethical authority" (p. 14). The moral agency of the individual is replaced by an ethical code that recognizes an institutional power as the guardian of moral truth. Cosmopolitanism is often promoted as just such a guardian of universal norms that, if followed, is the long awaited answer to the untidiness of the world. Todd (2009) envisions a cosmopolitanism that recognizes harmony and consensus are not necessarily achievable. This

cosmopolitan vision is a response to pluralism and globalization with post-colonial and post-structural influences. Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, and Chakrabarty (2002) provide a notion of this cosmopolitan sentiment:

> Cosmopolitanism is not some known entity existing in the world, with a clear genealogy from the Stoics to Immanuel Kant, that simply awaits more detailed description at the hands of scholarship . . . Cosmopolitanism may instead be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to do. (p. 1)

This focus on plurality and the recognition that cosmopolitan notions will be contingent upon the time and place of their imagining helps to free cosmopolitanism from its Eurocentric past. Todd (2009) observes:

> What this does is force our hand into assuming that the very meaning of freedom and rationality are independent of the very values, discourses, languages and ways of life that comprise human difference in the first place. The issue for cosmopolitanism… is how to reconcile its attachments to global 'universals,' such as human rights, with its commitment to respect and value the 'particulars' represented through diverse cultures and individuals. (p. 35)

> Todd (2009) imagines education as a "site of response to human difference" (p. 20) in which we face our humanity rather than cultivate it. Ethical education helps us face the responsibility that comes from relations to others and cosmopolitanism challenges the artificial

boundaries that deny responsibility to others. She suggests that, "the respect, dignity, and freedom which have become signifiers of humanity are not bred from within, but from the relation to the disturbing and provocative event of being confronted by another person" (p. 20). This provocation is ripe with educational potential. Humanist inspired education proceeds from an assumption that it is possible to pre-define a human ideal that is to be cultivated. The question of how to respond to human difference calls for a creative exploration of what it means to be human rather than an already established notion that risks leaving some out and considered less than human. Lévinas (1990) points to a crisis in humanism based on its inability to counter the inhumanity of the last century (p. 279). Biesta (2006) expands by noting "the fact that many of these inhumanities were actually based on and motivated by a particular definition of what it means to be human" (Biesta, 2006, p. 5). In positing a norm of what it means to be human, a humanist project sets up the possibility of exclusion of those who do not meet the standard. Biesta (2006) explains that humanism pre-determines what it means to be human and sets the educational agenda for the child or newcomer without giving them the opportunity to self-determine who they are and who they may want to become (p. 7). Human beings are viewed as instances of an essence that are closer to, or further from the mark, rather than unique individuals in the process of coming into presence in the world. It is important for this study to explore the question of whether the same can be said of the ethics curriculum: Is the idea of what the student must become contained in the course outline? If the answer is yes the course can be said to be a humanist project that envisions education as a method of socialization, "…as a process of the insertion of newcomers into a pre-existing order of modern reason" (Biesta, 2006, p. 7). The humanistic project of defining a human essence presumably goes hand in hand with the ability to define what the essence of human ethical behaviour is. This universalizing of what it means to be

ethical can be seen in the ethics projects of philosophers such as Kant, Mill, and Rawls. If we follow an intersubjective turn that does not try to define human essence, or the essence of ethical behaviour, but rather explores where the unique human "comes into presence" ethically, new approaches to ethical education may arise. In the realm of ethics education there are obviously competing claims regarding what it means to live a good human life and the question of humanity is of utmost importance. This study is guided by Biesta's (2006) philosophy of education, quoted here at length:

> I argue that we should not approach education from the point of view of an educator trying to produce or release something. Instead I argue that we should focus on the ways in which the new beginning of each and every individual can come 'into presence.'… we can only come into presence in a world populated by others who are not like us. The 'world,' understood as a world of plurality and difference, is not only the *necessary* condition under which human beings can come into presence; it is at the very same time a *troubling* condition, one that makes education an inherently *difficult* process. The role of the educator in all this is not that of a technician or a midwife, but has to be understood in terms of a responsibility for the 'coming into the world' of unique, singular beings, and a responsibility for the world as a world of plurality and difference" (pp. 9-10).

This is a good starting point for education in ethical decision making. The goal is not to socialize students into the use of established decision making models but to help them "come into presence" as "unique, singular beings," aware of the societal, familial, and cultural influences of their ethical and moral beliefs and alive with a sense of "responsibility for the world as a world of plurality and difference" (Biesta, 2006, pp. 9-10). This approach to education recognizes that

we "come into presence" in spaces occupied by others, in spaces characterized by difference, plurality, and relationality. The way to relate to each other in such spaces is through a relationship of responsibility that is manifest in unique ways by unique individuals. Biesta (2006) expresses a mantra for a cosmopolitan approach to ethics: "The most important question for us today is no longer how we can rationally master the natural and social world. The most important question today is how we can respond responsibly to, and how we can live peacefully with what and with whom is other" (p. 15).

What, then, can we consider a cosmopolitan educational agenda? It is an ethical and political imaginary, shaped by the time and place of its imagining, that explores how unique humans "comes into presence" in the midst of a tension between an attachment to global responsibilities, and a respect for the particularity of diverse cultures and individuals. This imaginary presents an aporia. Todd (2009) recognizes an impossibility at the core of cosmopolitanism: "[I]ts call for a universal right of humanity as hospitality and the attention to human pluralism together pose themselves as unending and irresolvable puzzles to be faced" (p. 42). The koan that is cosmopolitanism involves wrestling with the fault lines between the universal and the particular. Todd (2009) poses what may perhaps be the most important cosmopolitan question for education: "How might we make a relation to the other, and to alterity more generally, in ways that do not fall back into the traps of modernist assumptions of humanity?" (p. 47). Such a question does not ignore history and does not underestimate our capacity for violence and hatred. It helps to ensure that the complexity that makes up human pluralism is not masked by dialogue about universal human rights and gets to deeper issues of the conditions of freedom, justice, dignity, and responsibility. Todd (2009) suggests that "the real potential of education lies in its capacities to provoke insights that help youth live well with

ambiguity and dilemma, where freedom, justice, and responsibility cannot be dictated at them, but are tough decisions that must be made in everyday living" (p. 67).

Cosmopolitanism from the Margins

A cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education must consider Mignolo's (2010) deeply challenging critique. Dominating discourses such as positivism, free market economics, and proselytizing missions have been used to set up dominator hierarchies capable of recognizing that all humans are ontologically equal but claiming an epistemological inferiority in an Other. This colonial difference is used to justify imperial projects in the guise of civilizing missions (Mignolo, 2010). The labelling of an Other as not quite human creates a space for decolonial cosmopolitanism. Mignolo (2010) reminds us that "cosmopolitanism can only work if there is no master global design, but a global agreement in which no one will rule without being ruled" (p. 127). Educational practices that create spaces for deliberation at these margins are cosmopolitan in nature. Mignolo (2011) further problematizes cosmopolitanism by declaring it "Eurocentered from its inception" (p. 329). Once again, an historical perspective provides insight.

Mignolo (2000) describes two types of cosmopolitan narratives that are especially contentious: managerial cosmopolitanism as evident in a Christian global design, nineteenth-century imperialism, and neoliberal globalization, as well as emancipatory cosmopolitanism as demonstrated by Kant or Marx (pp. 722-723). In response, Mignolo (2000) re-imagines a critical cosmopolitanism from the perspective of coloniality. He describes three narratives that characterize the West. The first narrative is spacio-temporal, has its origins in ancient Greece, and imagines a directional history of the West proceeding through the Northwestern Mediterranean and into the North Atlantic region. Many descriptions of cosmopolitanism,

including the description found in this chapter, follow such a narrative beginning with Diogenes, continuing with the Stoics, revitalized by Kant, and again relevant in Western scholarship. Mignolo's (2000) description of the second narrative of the West has its origins in the Renaissance and "the expansion of capitalism through the Atlantic commercial circuit" (p. 722). The third narrative is that of Modernity, located in Northern Europe, with origins in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. His critique of cosmopolitanism begins with the second narrative and the "Orbis Universalis"(Orbis Christianus) (p. 725) of the Spanish empire and Portuguese colonial pursuits.

Mignolo (2000) describes "the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit in the sixteenth century that linked the Spanish Crown with capitalist entrepreneurs from Genoa, with Christian missionaries, with Amerindian elites, and with African slaves" (p. 725). In this first cosmopolitan project of modernity/coloniality, "cosmopolitanism faced the difficulties of dealing with pagans, infidels, and barbarians" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 739). The challenge of managing vast colonies resulted in a managerial cosmopolitanism and what he describes as the colonial matrix of power. The technologies of control that form this matrix of power include the control of subjectivities, authority, economy, and knowledge (Mignolo, 2010). An exteriority was created with the Christian on the inside and the barbarian on the outside. The dilemma of the pagan Other lead to the establishment of a colonial difference. "The colonial difference was mainly and foremost epistemological. That is, by recognizing equality by birth and by natural law, Spaniards and barbarians are ontologically equals. However, epistemically, barbarians are not yet ready to govern themselves according to the standards established by human law" (Mignolo, 2010, p. 122). This colonial difference was used to justify the colonization of the Americas under the guise of a cosmopolitan project.

Political and religious upheavals in Europe led to a new order in which the Orbis Christianus lost its power to unite. With the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the nation state and church emerged as the new organizing principle in Europe. The exteriority of the pagan was replaced by the exterior category of the foreigner. In this second cosmopolitan project of modernity/coloniality, "cosmopolitanism faced the difficulties of communities without states and the dangers of the foreigners that, at that point in time, were the foreigners at the edge of the Europe of nations" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 739). This is the phase of secular cosmopolitanism, the civilizing mission of the British Empire, French and German colonialism, and the cosmopolitan philosophy of Immanual Kant. Mignolo (2010) explains that "Kant's cosmopolitanism was cast under the implicit assumptions that, beyond the heart of Europe was the land of those who had to be brought into civilization and, in the South of Europe, the Latin and Catholic countries, some of them—like Spain and Portugal—too close to the Moors and with mixed blood" (p. 123). With this new perspective we see the emergence of the imperial difference and the relegation of everything that preceded the new era into the pre-modern. This new age of modernity and the Enlightenment is also the beginning of a new phase of Eurocentrism.

Further political upheavals and world war are the cause of a third cosmopolitan project characterized by U.S. imperialism and human rights where "communists replaced pagans and infidels, barbarians and foreigners, as the difficulties of cosmopolitan society were reassessed" (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 739-740). Mignolo (2010) explains that "if we jump from the era of European 'cosmopolitan' modernity and the civilizing mission (with England and France leading the way) to a post-modern world guided by 'globalism,' we have the sketch of the continuity and diachronic accumulation of the rhetoric of modernity (salvation, conviviality, prosperity, and freedom) and its darker side, the logic of coloniality (discrimination, racism, domination,

unilateralism, exploitation)" (p. 123). Globalism can be understood as the neo-liberal ideology championing the spread of free market economics globally (Steger, 2006). The idea of human rights that is so often appealed to by the cosmopolitan is described by Mignolo (2000) as a means of protecting Western interests against the threat of communism and later to a foundational concept in the spread of global capitalism. The discourses of theology, philosophy, and economics are recognizable in these three cosmopolitan projects.

> Religious exclusion, national exclusion, ideological exclusion, and ethnic exclusion have several elements in common: first, the identification of frontiers and exteriority; second, the racial component in the making of the frontier as colonial difference (linked to religion in the first instance and to nationalism in the second); and third, the ideological component in the remaking of the imperial difference during the third historical stage (liberalism versus socialism within the modern/ colonial world). (Mignolo, 2000, p. 740)

Mignolo (2010) explains that Orbis Christianus, secular approaches to cosmopolitanism, and neoliberal globalism are different manifestations of the colonial matrix of power and "the many faces of cosmo-polis" (p. 121).

This devastating critique of cosmopolitanism leaves the cosmopolitan scholar searching for conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism that are not simply new manifestations of the colonial matrix of power. Is a de-colonial cosmopolitanism possible? The articulation of a cosmopolitan project from an interior, mono-logical point of view (uni-versal), which demonizes those on the exterior, is not cosmopolitanism worthy of the name. The control of subjectivities through the epistemic violence of colonial difference is a tendency of cosmopolitan projects that a

cosmopolitan framework must be vigilant against. Mignolo's (2000) argument for epistemic

diversality as a de-colonial cosmopolitan perspective is worth quoting at length:

> Epistemic diversality shall be the ground for political and ethical cosmopolitan
>
> projects. In other words, diversity as a universal project (that is, diversality) shall
>
> be the aim instead of longing for a new abstract universal and rehearsing a new
>
> universality grounded in the "true" Greek or Enlightenment legacy. Diversality as
>
> the horizon of critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism presupposes border thinking
>
> or border epistemology grounded on the critique of all possible fundamentalism
>
> (Western and non-Western, national and religious, neoliberal and neosocialist)
>
> and on the faith in accumulation at any cost that sustains capitalist organizations
>
> of the economy. Since diversality (or diversity as a universal project) emerges
>
> from the experience of coloniality of power and the colonial difference, it cannot
>
> be reduced to a new form of cultural relativism but should be thought out as new
>
> forms of projecting and imagining, ethically and politically, from subaltern
>
> perspectives. (Mignolo, 2000, p. 742)

As marginalized voices enter the cosmopolitan conversation through an epistemology of border

thinking, thinking from the margins, the "hegemonic imaginary" is disrupted "from the

perspectives of people in subaltern positions" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 736) and a de-colonial

cosmopolitanism emerges. "De-colonial cosmopolitanism dwells in the borders, in exteriority, in

the colonial difference. While cosmopolitanism, in its different versions (Orbis Christianus,

globalism), were concocted and enacted in and from the 'center' (that is, in the heart of Western

imperial countries and histories), de-colonial cosmopolitanism is a proposal from the 'margins'"

(Mignolo, 2010, p. 125). Santos (2014) expands on Mignolo's critique in ways that are particularly important in an educational context.

Subaltern Cosmopolitanism

Santos (2014) makes an interesting observation regarding the loss of nouns that the critical tradition can claim as its own. Nouns such as socialism, class struggle, communism, and revolution have been replaced with adjectives attached to the nouns belonging to the dominant liberal position. Democracy becomes deliberative democracy from a critical perspective; development becomes sustainable development; and human rights becomes positive human rights. For Santos (2014), "[t]he same happens with cosmopolitanism, which ends up being called subaltern, oppositional, insurgent, or rooted cosmopolitanism" (p. 33). This use of hegemonic nouns, cosmopolitanism included, in counter-hegemonic ways characterizes critical theory's application of what Santos (2014) calls "conceptual franchising" (p. 34). Santos (2014) reminds the critical theorist that "the efficacy of the counterhegemonic use of hegemonic concepts or tools depends on the consciousness of such limits" (p. 34). It is with an awareness of these limits that I set out to explore the potential of an insurgent cosmopolitanism as a counter-hegemonic educational discourse.

With Todd (2009) we encountered the tensions that arise within cosmopolitanism through its commitment to both universal rights and pluralism. The "fault lines" (Todd, 2009, p. 23) that divide modernity are overshadowed by what Santos (2014) refers to as "abyssal thinking" (p. 118). Santos (2014) identifies "the most fundamental problem confronting us […] in the first decades of the twenty-first century. This problem is the failure to acknowledge the permanence of an abyssal line dividing metropolitan from colonial societies decades after the end of historical colonialism" (pp. 70-71). Mignolo (2010) makes it clear that cosmopolitan theorizing generally

takes place on this side of the abyssal line, the side of the dominant, metropolitan society. Is a post-abyssal cosmopolitanism possible? Santos (2014) describes a resurgent colonialism in the form of neoliberal capitalism: "the return of the colonial and the return of the colonizer" (p. 125) as well as a countermovement, "subaltern cosmopolitanism" (p. 125). In response to the question of who needs cosmopolitanism, Santos (2014) describes the tenets of a subaltern cosmopolitanism:

> [W]hoever is a victim of intolerance and discrimination needs tolerance; whoever is denied basic human dignity needs a community of human beings; whoever is a non-citizen needs world citizenship in any given community or nation. In sum, those socially excluded victims of the hegemonic conception of cosmopolitanism need a different type of cosmopolitanism. Subaltern cosmopolitanism is therefore an oppositional variety. Just as neoliberal globalization does not recognize any alternative form of globalization, so cosmopolitanism without adjectives denies its own particularity. Subaltern, oppositional cosmopolitanism is the cultural and political form of counter hegemonic globalization. It is the name of the emancipatory projects whose claims and criteria of social inclusion reach beyond the horizons of global capitalism. (p. 135, note 44)

A subaltern cosmopolitanism requires an understanding of the partial nature of, the incompleteness of, any particular way of knowing. The subaltern cosmopolitan is called on to adopt an epistemological stance that is aware of the immense blind spots that are a part of any way of knowing the world. No way of knowing the world exhausts all the possibilities that exist in any given situation. The epistemological consequences of subaltern cosmopolitanism will be explored further in chapter 3.

Where does this leave the quest for a cosmopolitan minded approach to post-secondary ethics education? As Mignolo (2000) describes, the ground of an ethical cosmopolitan project is epistemic diversality. How can multiple ways of imagining the "good life" be included in the study of ethics without succumbing to relativism? How can "new forms of projecting and imaging, ethically and politically, from subaltern perspectives" (p. 742) be introduced into ethics education? Is such an approach compatible with the expectation of students, faculty, and administration in a polytechnic institute? The aims of an education in ethics in the context of a polytechnic institution in Canada and from a pluriversal cosmopolitan perspective will be explored to begin to answer these questions.

Complexity and Uncertainty in Ethics Education

The genesis of this study was described earlier as the result of reflection on the task of teaching ethics in a context characterized by rich diversity and value pluralism. The presentation of Western philosophers as representatives of the pinnacle of thought on ethics was seen as a troubling approach to ethics education that ignored the potential of other traditions to contribute to the learning experience. A search for a more cosmopolitan minded approach was sought. Conditions that add to the complexity experienced by students include dramatic demographic shifts, the accelerating speed of technological innovation, the focus on terror and violence in the media, economic inequality and instability, and challenges to former cultural certainties (Gunn, 2013). Complexity exists outside of these contemporary issues as well: "There are as many differences, say between a Chinese peasant and a young Norwegian professional as between myself and anybody at all, including myself. …As many, but also, then, *neither more nor less*" (Badiou, 2002, p. 26). To help provide some basis from which to make sense of this complexity it is necessary to examine what is meant by the word ethics in ethics education.

The "actually existing cosmopolitanism" (Malcomson, 1998) manifest in the ethics classroom exposes students to value pluralism in the moral domain. The facts of value pluralism, and the existence of true moral dilemmas, may lead to moral relativism. Why is this a problem? Lukes (2008) makes an important observation about moral relativism: "Its message is not, as its advocates typically say, *tolerance* but rather *abstention* - denial of 'our' right to judge the beliefs and practices of others, which goes together with the corollary they seldom mention: denial of 'their' right to judge 'ours'" (pp. 151-152). The message hidden in the 'who am I to judge' mantra is 'who are they to judge me!' This abstention from judging loses its appeal in actually existing cosmopolitan situations such as the modern classroom or workplace. The responsibilities that attend a role of leader, teacher, or manager involve evaluating consequences of decisions for everyone involved, including minorities and the dispossessed (Warnock, 2006). The decisions that are made in such public situations require justifications that go beyond the relativist's refusal to engage with pluralistic value systems. There is an important distinction here to be made between interior and exterior, private and public, when it comes to the moral domain. "We must distinguish, though not absolutely, public from private morality. …the relation between private morality, the dictates of conscience, if one may put it so, and a public policy that is democratically acceptable, seen widely to be decent, is a subtle and complicated interrelation" (Warnock, 2006, p. 24). Warnock (2006) describes the interplay between the public and the private as the realm of articulation and justification of moral principles. The role of the articulation of moral principles in education will be returned to, but first, it is necessary to turn our attention to the distinction that can be made between the ethical and the moral due to its ability to inform the distinction between the private and the public realms of ethics. This will be followed by a radical questioning of what ethics means through the work of Badiou (2002).

Ethics and Morals

What does it mean to be moral? What does it mean to be ethical? Is there a difference?

Some clarity must be established around what is meant by the ethical and the moral.

Etymologically there is little to distinguish these two words; ethics derives from the Greek *ethos*

often translated as character, custom, or habit. The Greek sense of the word relates to the guiding

principles that epitomize a community such as a polis. Moral derives from the Latin *mores:* the

behaviors that are deemed correct by a society. Ethos and mores are often seen as equivalent in

meaning but there is precedence in the philosophical tradition for distinguishing between the

ethical and the moral. Scanlon (1998) describes a "fragmentation of the moral" that includes a

narrow sense of the word as "what we owe to each other" and a much broader sense of good and

bad behaviors that go beyond this sense of something owed to another (pp. 171-173). Williams

(2006) suggests that the Latin origin of the word moral contains a sense of social expectation as

opposed to the Greek which emphasizes individual character. He proposes that the ethical

subsumes the moral: "the word 'morality' has by now taken on a more distinctive content, and I

am going to suggest that morality should be understood as a particular development of the

ethical" (p. 6). Morality is a "peculiar institution …a particular variety of ethical thought"

characterized by "moral obligation" (p. 174). According to Williams (2006), "moral obligation is

expressed in one especially important kind of deliberative conclusion – a conclusion that is

directed toward what to do, governed by moral reasons, and concerned with a particular

situation" (pp. 174-175).

The moral domain has often been characterized as containing a dualism between the rules

that describe right and wrong action and the ends that are seen as good and worth pursuing: the

right and the good (Durkheim, 2002). Appiah (2005) adopts an interesting distinction between

the ethical life and the moral life. For Appiah, the ethical life takes place amongst family, the

community one is born into, and the nation's laws one abides by. These are the immediate

building blocks from which one builds a good life. The ethical life is relative, the moral life is

universal and concerned with the Other. The moral life requires one to consider 'thin' relations

as part of the ethical life. Can one be considered to be living a good life without moral

consideration of the Other? Both Appiah (2005) and Lukes (2008) note that this distinction

between the moral and the ethical derives from Hegel's distinction between *Moralitat* and

Sittlichkeit and a narrow sense of the moral deriving from Kant. Lukes (2008) further explicates

the distinction:

> In this view, morality denotes something that is both more severe and more
>
> abstract; and it is seen as applying anywhere and everywhere. It directs the
>
> attention to the duties or obligations I have to other human beings viewed, from
>
> the standpoint of justice, as possessors of rights. The ethical, by contrast refers to
>
> the values and ideals that inhere in one or another specific way of life-and these
>
> will, of course, be multiple and sometimes mutually incompatible. (p. 135)

Ethics can be viewed as the project of living a good life, while morals can be viewed as

normative restraints on that project. Moral principles "pose a *test* that ways of life-embodying

values and norm-governed practices-must pass to be acceptable: the test of being justifiable to all

involved in and affected by them. If your way of life fails the test, it violates the minimal

standards of the universal core of morality" (Lukes, 2008, pp. 143-144).Williams (2006) also

views the narrow moral domain as setting the bar against which one can interrogate one's ethical

vision of the good life. If one's notion of the good life violates some moral principle that impacts

another's ethical vision, it must be accounted for. Morality is a minimum standard that must be included in one's ethical vision.

Dworkin (2011) is perhaps the best know contemporary advocate for "the distinction between ethics, which is the study of how to live well, and morality, which is the study of how we must treat other people" (p. 12). For Dworkin (2011), much of the ethical responsibility that we have is met by taking personal responsibility for our lives as they are lived in particular circumstances. Ethical responsibility does not require impartiality between ourselves and others except in circumstances where this impartiality is part of a role played (i.e., police officer, political representative). By taking personal responsibility for the project of making a good life, human beings take responsibility for living with dignity; for living lives of value and meaning (Dworkin, 2011). This ethical responsibility is supplemented by, and closely related to, moral responsibility. Dworkin's (2011) response is to closely tie morality to the ethics of dignity described above. Morality has a limiting effect on the actions that we can take by asking questions such as: "When must someone who properly values his own dignity aid others? Why must he not harm them? How and why does he incur special responsibilities to some of them through deliberate acts like promising and also through relationships with them that are often involuntary?" (p. 14). Distinguishing between the ethical life and the moral life is useful when considering ethics education but it is not a convention followed by all who write on ethics and morality and can be a source of confusion. For the most part, the words ethics and morality are used interchangeably by the scholars cited in this study. The above distinctions are made when it comes to analyzing the content of a cosmopolitan minded education in ethics. One goal of cosmopolitan minded education is to help students struggle with the balance between ethical obligations to visions aimed at making something of value of their life and the moral obligations

they may have to other people attempting the same. Ethics education tends to focus on the moral domain (Barrow, 2007) and less frequently explores the question of what it means to live a Good life in a more open way. For a radical vision of what it might mean to imagine ethics as the positive effort to make something of value of life we turn our attention to the work of Alain Badiou (2002).

Badiou's Positive Vision of Ethics

Badiou (2002) begins his investigation of ethics with a polemic against the contemporary "return to ethics" (p. 2) as nihilistic and ultimately conservative of the status quo. If contemporary ethics is "conservatism with a good conscience" (p. 3), it is through the discourse of human rights imagined as liberties that it is in its most recognizable form. For Badiou (2002), contemporary ethics is based on the assumption of the existence of a universal human subject that is the possessor of naturally occurring rights and liberties. The role of ethics in this system is to ensure that these rights are upheld and that individual liberties are protected. The assumption of a universally recognizable human subject leads to an ethics of a priori imperatives: "a consensual law-making concerning human beings in general, their needs, their lives, and their deaths – and, by extension, the self-evident, universal demarcation of evil, of what is incompatible with the human essence" (Badiou, 2002, p. 6). The Kantian foundation of such an approach to ethics is obvious.

The contemporary revival of interest in ethics focuses primarily on applied ethics (Elliott, 2007), what Badiou (2002) describes as "a vague way of regulating our commentary on historical situations (the ethics of human rights), technico-scientific situations (medical ethics, bio-ethics), 'social' situations (the ethics of being-together), media situations (the ethics of communication), and so on" (p. 2). Business ethics, a discourse regulating commentary on the

business world, is another obvious example. Badiou (2002) describes how this regulation limits what can be said about a topic and amounts to a nihilistic denial of the ability of human intelligence. He denounces the contemporary "theme of ethics and of human rights [as] compatible with the self-satisfied egoism of the affluent West, with advertising, and with service rendered to the powers that be" (p. 7). Badiou (2002) makes a crucial point about a negative ethics based on evil: "…if our only agenda is an ethical engagement against an Evil we recognize a priori, how are we to envisage any transformation of the way things are?" (p. 14). As opposed to this conservatism he proposes a radically new meaning for the word ethics that is characterized by multiple 'truths' and embedded in particular situations.

To work with Badiou's ethics it is necessary to explore the concepts of *subject*, *event*, *being*, *fidelity*, and *truth*. Rather than the abstract subject that is imagined as a victim of a consensual understanding of evil, Badiou (2002) imagines a subject as called into being in response to *a truth* that emerges in a particular situation. A *subject* is composed when something happens that cannot be accounted for by a current way of understanding. The unaccounted for happening is referred to by Badiou (2002) as an *event* which "compels us to decide a *new* way of being" (p. 41). The new way of being is a commitment, a *fidelity* to the truth process that compels one to view the situation from the point of view of the truth that reveals the void of the previous situation, that which is not imaginable or conceivable from within the situation. Badiou (2002) calls "'truth' (*a* truth) the real process of a fidelity to an event: that which this fidelity *produces* in the situation" (p. 42). A subject in this case is the one with fidelity to a truth process, "the one who bears the process of truth" (Badiou, 2002, p. 43). The subject is not imagined negatively, as a victim in need of protection from evil, but positively, as the bearer of a truth process. How is ethics imagined in such a situation? For Badiou, human beings have the

potential for Good through engagement in truth processes. It is only due to the existence of this Good that Evil, the distortion of a Good, exists. For Badiou (2002), Evil exists in the three forms of *simulacrum* or *terror, betrayal,* and *disaster*.

A process of truth, a break with a previous situation, emerging from the void of that situation, puncturing "a hole" in the previous situation, is the source of the potential for evil. The void of a situation is that which is unimaginable from within the situation, the situation and its understandings are incomplete and cannot account for the emergent truth. The void is a blind spot of a situation, by definition that which cannot be seen from within the situation. To believe that a truth that emerges within a situation is the fulfillment of the situation rather than the void of the situation results in *terror*; to fail in one's *fidelity* to an event is *betrayal*; and to mistake a truth for the Truth, for total power, is *disaster* (Badiou, 2002). Badiou (2002) proposes principles to help understand this positive ethical approach. The human being is to be understood by their "affirmative thought, by the singular truths of which [they] are capable" (p. 16). It is through a "positive capability for Good" (p. 16) and the possibilities that this opens that Evil is to be understood. For Badiou, there is not a general ethics that applies to all situations, but rather, "ethics of processes by which we treat the possibilities of a situation" (p. 16). A rule of maximum possibility is grounded in particular situations and demands the subject to be faithful to the maximum limit of the affirmative human possibility of the situation. It is the imperative to "keep going!" that summarizes Badiou's ethics and Evil only exists insofar as it appears as a *simulacrum* of truth through terror, one's fidelity to the truth event crumbles, or a truth is mistaken for the absolute truth.

Badiou's (2002) critique of rights based ethics has potential as a tool to help transform the learning contexts of ethics education in a positive way. More challenging is his critique of the

ethics of alterity as epitomized by Lévinas (1994). The origins of this study, in a sensitivity to matters of cultural difference and the Other, is an example of an ethics of alterity on the ground. Badiou (2002) rejects this ethics based on recognition of an Other as a form of culturalism, a fascination with the diversity of morals, values, and beliefs that amounts to little more than a restatement of the obvious. Against this fascination, Badiou (2002) suggests "genuine thought should affirm the following principle: since differences are what there is, and since every truth is the coming-to-be of that which is not yet, so differences are then precisely what truths depose, or render insignificant" (p. 27). For Badiou (2002), "[e]very modern collective configuration involves people from everywhere, who have their different ways of eating and speaking, who wear different sorts of head gear, follow different religions, have complex and varied relations to sexuality, prefer authority or disorder, and such is the way of the world" (p. 27). In short, every modern collective configuration embodies an actually existing cosmopolitanism and there are an infinite variety of such embodiments. The ethics that Badiou proposes is paradoxically cosmopolitan minded by recognizing the ubiquitous condition of difference; an ethic of truths is "indifferent to differences" (p. 27). Badiou (2002) postulates a capacity for all human beings, our capacity for truths, the realization of which happens under the universal names of "science, love, politics or art" (p. 28). By being indifferent to differences and postulating a universal human capacity for truths, Badiou (2003) grounds ethics in particular truths that have a universal address; "[A truth] is offered to all, or addressed to everyone, without a condition of belonging being able to limit this offer, or this address" (p. 14). Badiou's (2002) ethic of truths is imagined as the operation of truth processes that bring "*some* truths into the world" (p. 28). These truths emerge through the effort of four subjective types corresponding to the names listed above: the

"political, scientific, artistic, and amourous" (p. 28). It is the coexistence of these different

subjective types that is the aim of Badiou's ethics.

Badiou (2002) denies the validity of a general ethics by suggesting that an ethic of truths

only arises in the particular situation of the coming into existence of a truth process. Teaching

Kant, Mill, Aristotle, and Rawls is an attempt to capture ethics in general, so if "there is no ethics

in general" (Badiou, 2002, p. 16) what is to be taught in an Ethics and Society class? For Badiou

(2005) "'education' (save in its oppressive or perverted expressions) has never meant anything

but this: to arrange the forms of knowledge in such a way that some truth may come to pierce a

hole in them" (Badiou, 2005, p. 9). Peterson (2010) probes what the oppressive or perverted

expressions of education may be according to Badiou's thought and locates them in part in the

"ethics of necessity" that is integral to a culture of "consensus" (p. 160). A culture of consensus

reduces education to the dissemination of the knowledge that is consensually deemed relevant to

the economic necessities of the time. Truth-processes that 'pierce a hole' in this consensus are

precluded by the dissemination of pre-determined consensual 'truth.' What room is there in

education for a quest for truth when that truth is already laid out in pre-defined outcomes arrived

at through an ethics of necessity? The teaching of a general ethics, through a curriculum that is

predefined by the moral philosophers of the Western tradition, forfeits truth processes through

dissemination of a settled cannon of moral frameworks. Ontologically, the truth is predetermined

by consensus; epistemologically, the truth is already known and waiting to be disseminated

through education. The Kantian based ethics of (negative) human rights is an example of an

ethics of necessity that identifies the consensual evils that must not be inflicted on human beings.

The negative starting point of such an ethic, evil and the things that must not be done in order to

avoid it, lends itself particularly well to a neoliberal agenda. Rather than viewing the will as capable of realizing unique possibilities, Badiou (2007) explains:

> What is being inflicted on us today, on the contrary, is the conviction that the will, dominated by a suffocating reality principle whose distillate is the economy, should behave with extraordinary circumspection-lest it expose the world to grave disasters. There is a 'nature of things' and violence must not be done to it. Basically, the spontaneous philosophy of our 'modernizing' propaganda is Aristotelian: Let the nature of things manifest its proper ends. We must not do, but be: laissez-faire. (p. 99)

As we have seen, part of Badiou's critique of an ethics based on a consensus of Evil is that it does not allow for anything new to come into the world, it is essentially conservative of the established order. There is an epistemological challenge to be addressed when engaging with Badiou. For Badiou, the *state* of a situation consists of a static set of knowledges, an ideology, defined by and serving the interests of "those who dominate and govern the situation" (Hallward, 2002, p. ix). The epistemological domination of the *state* of a situation for Badiou is totalizing and admits of no other way of knowing. For Badiou, truth is an infinite set characterized by a multiple of multiples (Trott, 2011). Individuals are trapped in subsets of understanding shaped by power in which knowing is limited to ideology. A truth process represents breaking through ideology to a larger understanding of truth. Badiou refers to the understandings, the knowledge formations that occur during an *event,* as truths rather the knowledge (Earley, 2014). In other words, knowledge formation is a political act for Badiou; knowledge (truth) is only realized through breaks with ideology. Can this political bias in Badiou's epistemology be reconciled with a work that claims to advocate an ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2007)?

For Badiou, "we place ourselves under the sign of the question of truth even as we recognize that it can never be the object of a self-sufficient or complete demonstration" (Hallward & Badiou, 2002, p. 120). Here we are reminded of Latour's (2004) problematization of the assumption that the truth of the world exists out there, and, because of shared characteristics, all humans ought to be able to understand this world in the same way. Badiou's universalization of truth need not exclude his work from use in a work that champions pluriversality. In Badiou's philosophy there are truth processes, plural, and any reification of a truth process into the Truth results in a simulacrum and terror. He conceives "of a truth not as a pre-given transcendent norm, in the name of which we are supposed to act, but as a *production*" (Hallward & Badiou, 2002, p. 116). The conditions of the production involve deliberation between the actors involved in a truth procedure (Hallward & Badiou, 2002). I take this to mean that, though a truth process in Badiou is universal in its address, it is partial in its understanding due to the particularity and limited access to truth of its participants. As long as one is aware of the political and therefore partial nature of Badiou's project, such a notion is at least uncomfortably compatible with the notion of an ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2007) that supports this study.

An Iterative Development of the Notion of Cosmopolitan Minded

At some point it is necessary to focus on the cosmopolitan circumstances as they exist in particular situations. Hansen (2014) summarizes the descriptors many theorists have used to describe cosmopolitanism as: "actually existing" (Malcolmson, 1998), "rooted" (Appiah, 2005), "on the ground" (Hansen, 2010), "situated" (Baynes, 2007; Healy, 2011), and I would add "from below" (Kurasawa, 2004), and "subaltern" (Santos, 2014). These immanent expressions of cosmopolitanism emphasize creative engagement with real problems and issues in actually

existing situations. This on the ground cosmopolitanism remains indifferent to difference in its recognition of respect for all persons. On the other hand, difference is the milieu within which it manifests and a concern with and for the Other is an integral part of its coming into being. It is here that a cosmopolitan minded approach proceeds with caution regarding Badiou's call for indifference to difference. Badiou would likely protest and draw our attention to the fact that indifference to difference recognizes the multiple worldviews and infinite variety that exist and constitute any given situation. His defense of his approach to ethics would emphasize that it is only by breaking through these conditions and realizing something new that a truth exists and it is in this way that a being that is subject to the truth is indifferent to difference. As an approach to the creative imagining of new ethical possibilities Badiou's call for an indifference to difference is attractive. As an approach to an education in morality that encourages students to engage with difference as a way to interrogate the partial nature of their particular worldviews and question their blind spots, it needs supplementation. From the perspective of a truth, emergent from the Void of a situation, indifference to difference is natural; from the perspective of a classroom that strives to create conditions for the possible emergence of truths, engagement with difference is required. A cosmopolitan minded approach is comfortable retaining some of the indifference to difference expressed in the Cynic, and Kantian notions of cosmopolitanism but is in need of new ideas to supplement these universalizing notions. Universal appeals inevitably ignore difference as opposed to seeking new ways to engage with otherness (Todd, 2009) and often remain on this side of the abyssal line described by Santos (2014). We will return to these supplements later in the chapter, but first, let us examine in more detail, how a cosmopolitan minded approach can work with the notion of indifference to difference.

Equality as a Bridge between the Universal and the Particular

The work of Badiou (2002) and Rancière (1991) both promote an axiom of equality (Barbour, 2010). This is not necessarily a functional equality but an equality of intelligence, the ability to think and be captured by a truth. Equality is not sought; it is practiced as part of an axiomatic assumption (Barbour, 2010). An educational application of Badiou's work will practice equality through an indifference to difference. Barbour (2010) elucidates the meaning of indifference to difference:

> …no position within a given situation is capable of transcending that situation
> such that it might be able to categorize the infinite difference that constitute it in
> any meaningful fashion. For Badiou infinite difference is the banal ontological
> condition of any situation, or any given set. If a set is made smaller, or larger, it
> still contains the same measure of difference, namely infinite difference.
> Therefore a situation or a set is not radically challenged or changed by the
> invocation of difference. On the contrary, it can only be challenged by something
> that is unknown and yet within the situation itself, or from what Badiou calls 'the
> Void'. (p. 255)

An event is a sudden shedding of light on this blind spot that exists within a situation, it is a realization of that which was previously unrecognized and invisible. "The equality of intelligences implies an equal capacity for any subject within a situation to be seized by an event that emanates from the Void" (Barbour, 2010, p. 255). Indifference to difference is not a denial of difference, "[f]or Badiou, what is equal and universal properly traverses differences rather than simply annulling, collapsing, or dialectically fusing them" (Barbour, 2010, p. 256). One is indifferent to difference because it is not difference but equality that matters, equality that

recognizes the capacity for every person to be seized through the event that emerges from the Void of the previously unimaginable. These themes are elucidated through a deeper engagement with Rancière.

The examples of Kant, Mill, and Aristotle as somehow representing correct ways of thinking about ethics, in contrast to the immature ways to which students are accustomed, sets up a "myth of pedagogy" (Rancière, 1991) that assumes all that is needed to enlighten ignorant students is an explication of the proven way to approach ethics. The myth of pedagogy, "the parable of a world divided into knowing minds and ignorant ones, ripe minds and immature ones, the capable and the incapable, the intelligent and the stupid" (Rancière, 1991, p. 6) was the source of the unease experienced that is part of the genesis of this study. The diversity in the classroom was the catalyst that brought the unease to the surface. Rancière (1991) provides ideas to help overcome the stultification that such an approach produces: the emancipation available through an assumption of the equality of human intelligence.

Rancière (1991) tells the story of Joseph Jacotot, a teacher exiled from France, who was able to teach Flemish speaking students in Holland to read and write French by having them engage with a bilingual version of *Télémaque*. Through this experience, Jacotot was able to proclaim that the uneducated were able to teach themselves, without the aid of a teacher explicating to them, and that teachers were able to teach that which they were ignorant of (Rancière, 2010). Jacotot's role in the student's learning was to oblige the intelligence inherent in the student to exercise itself, and this role did not require any formal knowledge of what was being learned. The "ignorant schoolmaster" is the one who teaches, who is a means for another to acquire knowledge, without actually transmitting knowledge (Rancière, 2010). It is not the role of the teacher's intelligence to act as intermediary between knowledge and the ignorance of

the student. It is the role of the teacher's authority, the will of the teacher, to set the student on

the path to realizing a capacity that is already there. Rancière (2010) describes that act of

explanation as "an end in itself, the infinite verification of a fundamental axiom: the axiom of

inequality. To explain something to one who is ignorant is, first and foremost, to explain that

which would not be understood if it were not explained. It is to demonstrate an incapacity" (p. 3).

Reducing the gap between the expert teacher and the ignorant student is to reduce but at the same

time confirm inequality. The act of explication confirms the "progress" of reducing inequality

while simultaneously demonstrating the unbridgeable gap between the teacher and student. The

progress made is akin to the progress made toward the finish line by always bridging half the

distance. The assumption of inequality of intelligence sets up the impossibility of equality, the

impossibility of ever reaching the finish line. In this way, the logic of explanation is a social

logic in which the social order is reproduced (Rancière, 2010). Jacotot names this pedagogical

approach that starts with the assumption of inequality and sets up the conditions for its

reproduction, stultification; one of the paradoxes of a *progressive* educator.

The ignorant schoolmaster suggests a different assumption: "equality as an axiom to be

verified" (Rancière, 2010, p. 5). Here is an idea relevant to the actually existing cosmopolitan

conditions experienced in the post-secondary classroom. The equalizing assumption is the

assumption of the equality of intelligence that exists within every student. "The ignorant

schoolmaster – that is to say one who is ignorant of inequality – addresses him or herself to the

ignorant person not from the point of view of the person's ignorance but of the person's

knowledge; the one who is supposedly ignorant in fact already understands innumerable things"

(Rancière, 2010, p. 5). These innumerable things have been learned through the intellectual

powers of observation, comparison, and verification that already exist in the student's

intelligence. It is the teacher's will, not his or her intelligence, that does not allow the student to be satisfied with what is known, but wills them to apply their intelligence to know more. The teacher does not allow the student to foreclose their learning, to act out inequality, but instead pushes the student to realize their already existing intellectual capacity for equality. Rancière (2010) names this pedagogical logic, that works under the assumption of equality and seeks its verification, "intellectual emancipation" (p. 6). Emancipation happens in the context of the individual's intelligence being guided by itself alone in response to the catalyst of a will. Rancière (1991) describes a human as a will that is served by an intelligence. It is the will that compels the intelligence to its work and herein lies the role of the emancipated schoolmaster. The teacher's role is to make the student aware of their own intellectual power, introducing them to their own intellectual subject, "participating in the power common to intellectual beings" (Rancière, 1991, p. 33). The emancipated student is compelled to apply their own intelligence to the effort to break free from arbitrary constraints imposed by the teacher. Jacotot issued a command to his Flemish students to apply their intelligence to the bilingual translation of *Télémaque* in order to learn the French language. It was a command of the teacher's will that could only be fulfilled through the effort of the student's intelligence. "The master is he who encloses an intelligence in the arbitrary circle from which it can only break out by becoming necessary to itself" (Rancière, 1991, p. 15). How can this notion of intellectual emancipation be used to inform ethics education? The axiom of equality emancipates and the question becomes by what means can the moral intelligence of the student be revealed to itself? Rancière's (1991) presentation of Jacotot's experiments in intellectual emancipation has little to tell us of the content of an education in morality, but it has much to say regarding the form.

The student of ethics and morality already has something that can be used as a comparison (Rancière, 1991), something to relate to the task at hand, whether that something is wrestling with a moral problem in the past, or the application of the intelligence to some other learning task. The role of the teacher becomes to ask questions that verify for the student their own intelligence in the moral domain. The teacher interrogates, asks questions to help manifest intelligence, and verifies; checks to make sure that sustained attention has been applied to the problem at hand. The ethic that applies in this situation is that of recognizing the intelligence in another person and the tool at hand is speaking, the public disclosure of an individual's intelligence. Dialogue between individuals who recognize each other as equals is the platform for the ethic, the content is the individual's reflection on the ethical question of what it means to live a good life. The teacher cannot capture the meaning of a good life and explicate it to students without stultifying. How can one teach *the good life*, the life well lived, when there is such rich diversity in the ways of interpreting the question? As Jacotot demonstrates, one can teach what one does not know (Rancière, 1991), based on the principle that "everyone is of equal intelligence" (p. 101). The task is to will the student to the conclusion that their intelligence is equal to the task, that there exists in them a capacity for ethical intelligence equal to that of any other. Equality of intelligence "is the belief that we can all speak with one another (the equality of every speaking being) and can together and separately construct worthwhile lives and run our affairs" (May, 2007, p. 27). In an Ethics and Society class the arbitrary circle that the teacher draws around the student, to help them manifest their intelligence, is the question: "What does it mean to live a good life?" Devising a curriculum that contains the answer in the form of the Western classics is an exercise in power, of domination. The exercise of this power denies the student's equal intellectual capacity to determine the answer for

themselves (May, 2007). Starting from an assumption of the student's equal ability to answer the question affirms a belief in their intelligence, in its ability to answer the question of what it means to live a good life. The public articulation of what it means to live a good life as determined by one's own intelligence is the coming into being of a moral agent in a moral community of equals. Dialogue with others reveals that we each have access to truth in slightly different ways and seek to express and interpret it through language. To force a student to a specific truth is to oppress, to subordinate their intelligence to a preconceived notion of what they ought to know. We have slightly different orbits around truth (Rancière, 1991) and a "coincidence of orbits" (p. 59) forced through explication results in stultification. In the ethics classroom, in the interrogation of what it means to live a good life, we are not in search of a "coincidence of intelligences… but in the reciprocal recognition of reasonable wills" (Rancière, 1991, p. 96). Reciprocal recognition of equality does not entail a retreat to relativism. The role of the listener in the dialogue about the good life is to verify the reasonableness of the position. The listener's attentiveness to another, whom they recognize as an intellectual subject with the capacity to understand and be understood, sets up the ethical space for the moral agent to come into being. The challenge of speaking one's ethical truth, in a way understandable to another, represents another constraint to be broken free from through the application of intelligence. The ground for a non-foundational ethics lies "in a principle–the presupposition of equality–that can ground and justify … only to the extent to which it is accepted by those alongside whom and against whom one struggles" (May, 2007, pp. 33-34). The application of intelligence to the question of the good life, and the public speaking of the truths arrived at, represent an approach to ethics education relevant to actually existing cosmopolitan conditions.

Badiou and Rancière provide sound guidance when it comes to the role of equality in teaching ethics, but what can be said about an education in morality? For Badiou (2002) much of modern ethics is "synonymous with morality, or–as Kant would say–with practical reason (as distinguished from theoretical reason)" (p. 2). Badiou's ethics, as outlined above, leaves no room for an education in morality. A major question that emerges regarding Badiou's ethics is how one is to differentiate a truth procedure from a simulacrum. An ethic of truths that is purely positive does little to inform one of how to go about evaluating the truth process itself. How is one to judge the soundness of one's own truth process or the truth process of others? Badiou (2002) is against leaving "the question of Evil to a consensual judgement of opinion" (p. 63) but as his example of the Nazi political program's ability to pose as a truth process demonstrates, simulacra have the ability to delude. The positive ethics of Badiou can also be accused of providing little guidance for moral problems other than "keep going!" By what principles are students to exercise their judgement in day-to-day moral problems? One would assume that blind adherence to what seems to be a truth process in a particular situation is not to be encouraged; some sort of critical faculty ought to be applied. Rancière would likely be more receptive to an education in morality, but only if it was not an explication of a pre-determined moral code. An education in morality, for Rancière, would have to be based on the principle of the equality of intelligence and rely on the student's capacity to discover moral principles. If an exploration of the question of the Good can be applied to ethics education, is there a form of education in morality that can be reconciled with such an approach?

An Education in Morality

How is the student in search of an understanding of the moral domain to proceed? Barrow (2007) points out that moral education is concerned with developing an understanding of the moral domain.

> If we focus on the nature of morality itself and the nature of moral education, as
>
> distinct from moral training, moral conditioning, or moral indoctrination, we see
>
> that there is less difficulty with moral education than has often been thought – not
>
> less difficulty in terms of determining effective means or guaranteeing success,
>
> but less difficulty in terms of determining what it is appropriate to do, regardless
>
> of how effective it may prove to be in respect of producing a more moral society.
>
> (Barrow, 2007, p. 173)

The first goal of an education in morality is to have students understand the nature of morality and to do this they must grapple with the following questions: What does morality involve?; What are the grounds for being moral?; and, What are the advantages of being moral? (Barrow, 2007). The first stage of an education in morality then is overcoming confusion about the nature and meaning of morality. Paul and Elder (2013) propose that students will need to explore the "pathological dispositions inherent in egocentric thought" (p. 7) including: overcoming the problem of pseudo-ethics, social convention (conventional thinking), religion (theological thinking), politics (ideological thinking), and law (legal thinking). Barrow (2007) affirms that "morality is not to be confused with law, religion, prudence, social value, custom, or mere efficacy" (p. 174). An education in morality is tasked with having students differentiate morality from other manners of thinking that are often confused with morals "to overcome the problem of pseudoethics" (Paul & Elder, 2013, p. 9). The critique of social convention, religious practices,

politics, and the law posing as a moral code is to be part of this procedure. This differentiation of the moral sphere from social, religious, political, and legal spheres is often a contentious and difficult affair but crucial to forming a self-reflective approach to ethics. Differentiating the moral sphere from the other modes of thinking allows for a discussion of moral principles. Barrow (2007) describes the moral sphere as follows:

…a set of first-order high-level abstract principles that should ideally govern all human interaction at all times and places, although, of course, in practice they cannot. They are the principles of freedom, fairness, well-being, respect, and truth. We know these to be desirable, as we may put it, by intuition or self-evidently. These principles are inherently, intrinsically, or in themselves good. (Barrow, 2007, p. 174)

Paul and Elder (2013) point to the development of a set of secondary ethical principles that can be derived from first level principles. Having students apply their intelligence to identifying first order and second order principles will be part of an education in morality. The first-order principles of freedom, fairness, well-being, respect, and truth are an interesting place to begin an exploration of moral principles but should not be seen as a presentation of the final truth on the matter. An approach that remains true to the axiom of equality will encourage students to define these principles on their own and dialogue about their reasonableness with interlocutors such as classmates, texts, stories, and other sources of self-reflective material. The reflexiveness required to distinguish between the ethical and the moral, and the task of distinguishing between the moral domain and the domains of social convention, prudence, politics, and law is where this work begins. There is significant room for overlap between these domains in a student's examination of ethics, a good life, but considerably less overlap in the examination of morals,

what is owed to others. The language used by Barrow does raise some alarm bells. He refers to showing students the importance of second-order principles which sounds dangerously close to an axiom of inequality that Rancière (1991) warns against. The examples given also seem to fall victim to Badiou's (2002) warning against the conservative nature of an ethics that relies on a consensual understanding of evil and the moves to protect against it. This is to be conceded and it is hoped that the juxtaposition of the positive nature of imagining a good life, and the negative nature of potentially restraining the actions taken in pursuit of this good life in recognition of the equality of others results in a creative tension that has the potential to overcome the status quo. The identification of second-order moral principles also reveals their contingent nature and the student may be faced with the need to break a second-order rule when such rules come into conflict. Barrow (2007) describes the importance of having students understand the nature of second-order principles and the fact that they often come into conflict. Methods to weigh the claims of competing demands and the potential impossibility of finding a right answer are an integral part of an education in morality (Barrow, 2007). An understanding that such situations will arise will help students to discover that this does not mean there is no objectivity in moral decision making.

The importance of a moral supplement to the ethics of Badiou is evident in Barrow's (2007) approach to moral education. The dialogue, reflection, and critical thinking that occurs when applying moral principles and considering the consequences of actions are tools that can help students evaluate the validity of the truth claims that underlie their notion of the good life. Fidelity to these truths ought to be tempered by reflection and critical awareness. "Whether one should remain loyal on a particular occasion can only be determined by one who has a good idea

of what counts as loyalty and of what being loyal or not being so will lead to in a given instance" (Barrow, 2007, p. 175).

Barrow (2007) proposes the next step in a moral education as learning that "a moral person, a person of integrity, acts in accordance with these principles for their own sake, not for praise, from fear, or under compulsion, and regardless of apparent or real personal advantage" (p. 174). In other words, moral conduct is voluntarily engaged in and guided by a commitment to moral principles. Of course, recognizing the value and reasonableness of a moral principle does not always translate to moral behavior but it can reasonably be assumed that the probability of moral behavior is greater with this knowledge than without. Barrow (2007) advises compassion in observing that human beings are subject to temptation, greed, and fear, and that an education in morality is no guarantee of moral behavior. How is it that students can grapple with this observation of moral transgression and establish a fidelity to moral agency? Paul and Elder's (2013) approach to ethical reason provides some insight.

Paul & Elder (2013) describe the role of a critical approach to ethical reasoning as highlighting two kinds of acts: "those which enhance the well-being of others – that warrant our praise – and those that harm or diminish the well-being of others – and thus warrant our criticism" (p. 4). A critical approach to moral reasoning is necessary because of our natural "tendency toward egotism, prejudice, self-justification, and self-deception . . . exacerbated by powerful sociocentric cultural influences" (Paul & Elder, 2013, p. 4). According to Paul and Elder (2013), it is only through a "systematic cultivation of fair-mindedness, honesty, integrity, self-knowledge, and deep concern for the welfare of others" (p. 4) that these tendencies can be overcome. If our natural tendency is to focus almost exclusively on ourselves and those that are close to us, and this is one of the main causes of immoral behaviour, a problem for ethics

education becomes how to see situations from the perspective of others in order to shed light on the blind spots created by our own situatedness in particular positions. "To develop as ethical reasoners, we must take a new stand towards ourselves. We must come to recognize the ideas through which we see and experience the world. We must become the master of our own ideas. We must learn how to think with alternative ideas, and within alternative 'world views'" (Paul & Elder, 2013, p. 19). This preoccupation with the Other may seem to run counter to Badiou's ethics. Again, this is a matter of perspective. From the standpoint of a truth with a universal address, difference is not relevant. From the perspective of a student struggling to make sense of the moral domain, attention to difference can play a crucial role. How do we move beyond our personal egocentrism and our social ideology (our conservatism) to a more worldcentric point of view? This is the task of education in general but the ethics classroom hosts intriguing possibilities to help expose our prejudices, biases, and socially constructed 'truths'. Hansen's (2011) cosmopolitan challenge of being "open reflectively to the larger world, while remaining loyal reflectively to local concerns, commitments, and values," (p. xiii) describes this challenge well. To achieve a reflective loyalty to the known one must cultivate self-knowledge and overcome egocentrism. In addition to a natural self-centeredness, our national compatriots, faith community, or ethnic group are other examples of those who are more immediate and tangible than others. There are few groups who value other individuals or groups with the same value as their own and therefore feel less compulsion to act morally toward outsiders. For this reason, Paul & Elder (2013) propose that "ethically motivated persons must learn the art of self- and social-critique, of ethical self-examination. They must recognize the pervasive everyday pitfalls of ethical judgment: moral intolerance, self-deception, and uncritical conformity" (p. 5). The art

of ethical self-examination provides a moral supplement to an ethic of truths. More needs to be said regarding the ethical spaces that are conducive to such a practice.

Dissensus

An approach to ethics education that encourages students to apply their intelligence toward grappling with the question of what it means to live a good life, and critically reflect on what this vision might mean for others tasked with the same, will inevitably lead to dissensus. Not everyone is going to agree. Of course, dissensus implies an Other. How does this recognition of an Other reconcile with Badiou's indifference to difference? Not well. Badiou criticizes the ethics of alterity as epitomized by Lévinas (1994). For Badiou, this ethics that prioritizes the Other over the Same requires an experience of the Other as Altogether-Other, and the bridging of the gap between the Altogether Other and oneself as the ethical act. An Altogether-Other requires a pure alterity, "…*carried by a principle of alterity* which transcends mere finite experience" (Badiou, 2002, p. 22) and which is not guaranteed in human to human interaction. In this sense, the Other is a stand in for the Altogether-Other, the name for God in Lévinas's ethics. Badiou accuses Lévinas of using the word ethics as a signifier for the religious, "a category of pious discourse" (p. 23) which disqualifies it from consideration as ethics at all. Badiou (2002) sums up his critique of human rights based ethics, and the ethics of the Other with the following: "The problem is that the 'respect for differences' and the ethics of human rights do seem to define an *identity*! And that as a result, the respect for differences applies only to those differences that are reasonably consistent with this identity (which, after all, is nothing other than the identity of the wealthy – albeit visibly declining – 'West'" (p. 24). If respect for difference requires that the difference be bridged by the Other becoming more like me, then Badiou has a point, but an ethics of the Other need not be based on such an assumption. A respect for

difference that recognizes that dissensus is an integral part of such respect, that dialogue does not preclude fidelity to a particular position, and that the conditions that require such an engagement may actually produce a situation for new truths to emerge, may be the educational space for true ethical creativity. Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry (OSDE) is an initiative that "offers educators a set of principles and procedures for the creation of 'safe spaces of enquiry' that should work as accessible entry points for learners into issues of social and global justice and collective responsibilities" (Andreotti, 2011, p. 191). OSDE is based on a postcolonial approach and focuses on processes aimed at having students learn to live with dissensus in ethical ways. Andreotti (2011) expands on the OSDE philosophy:

> The OSDE initiative suggests that engaging with complexity, uncertainty, ambivalence, multiplicity, and interdependence, and learning to question and engage with different epistemologies may help participants see themselves as integral to (rather than "heading") the world (both as part of problems and of solutions) and this, perhaps, may prevent the reproduction of mechanisms that generate or maintain hegemonic ethnocentrism and relationships based on epistemic violences. (p. 192)

Such a space is concerned with learning to live well together. It is not an imposition of a predetermined cosmopolitan ethic and it does not require a cosmopolitan identity to participate; rather, it is interested in the process of self-transformation through an engagement with difference and the self-reflection that such engagement will induce (Andreotti, 2011). OSDE sets up principles and procedures that enable a teacher to create the type of space required for dialogue around ethics and morals that does not require consensus or the re-articulation of explicated norms. The first principle proposed, "that every knowledge brought to an 'open space'

is valid and legitimate knowledge constructed in a specific context" (Andreotti, 2011, p. 197) fits well with Rancière's assumption of equality of intelligence. The shape of the intelligence that a student brings to a classroom was constructed in particular circumstances and has been influenced by a multitude of different forces, both internal, and external. The knowledges they bring to the class are legitimate in the context in which they were shaped and thus are to be recognized and respected. Because knowledge is constructed in a particular context, which differs for everyone, it is partial and incomplete, the second principle of adult inquiry in OSDE. Without the ability to interact with others, through dialogue, text, film, etc., we lack the knowledge available from another's perspective. A recognition of the incomplete nature of our own knowledge leads to an openness to the knowledge of others. Recognition that knowledge is constructed in limited, particular circumstances also leads to the third principle of adult inquiry in OSDE: that all such knowledge is subject to question (Andreotti, 2011). Especially important in a situation characterized by dissensus: "this kind of questioning does not aim toward consensus or dialectical resolution of contradictions— on the contrary, it aims to increase the capacity of participants to hold multiple views in tension (without resolution) and to engage with complexity, uncertainty, ambivalence, and multiplicity and to relate to each other beyond the need for cognitive resolutions" (Andreotti, 2011, p. 198). It is the attempt to understand different views and hold them in tension, to relate to each other beyond the need for consensus, that defines critical engagement. The OSDE framework provides specific procedures and facilitation techniques to help a teacher integrate these principles into the classroom and create spaces that are conducive to education in situations characterized by complexity and diversity.

This chapter outlines an attempt to understand and contribute to both cosmopolitan and moral discourse by engaging with relevant theory. A reflexive methodology was applied by

engaging with cosmopolitan discourse through decolonial, critical, and hermeneutic lenses. Mignolo (2010) warns the cosmopolitan scholar of the "dark side" of modernity and how cosmopolitan projects have often been guilty of justifying imperialism in the name of civilizing missions. Any cosmopolitan minded study is informed by Mignolo's call for a decolonial cosmopolitanism and Santos's (2014) notion of subaltern cosmopolitanism. Delanty (2009) describes critical cosmopolitanism's emphasis on the process of self problematization through encounters between Self, Other, and World. Critical cosmopolitanism informs the necessity of creating social spaces for such encounters to occur. Ethical spaces for dialogue and enquiry create the conditions where moral principles can be contested in agonistic ways and knowledge can be arranged in ways for new truths to pierce a hole in them (Badiou, 2002). The assumption of the equality of intelligence (Rancière, 1991) applies in such spaces and sets up the conditions for students to engage with the question of what it means to live a good life and what responsibilities they have toward others attempting to do the same.

Chapter 3 – Empirical Research Orientations of the Study

This study involves topics that are both difficult to quantify and, as has been demonstrated in the discussions of cosmopolitanism and ethics, difficult to define. The study of cosmopolitanism, education, and ethics requires a methodology capable of rigour in a world characterized by complexity and uncertainty. The qualitative methodology outlined below strives for practical and thought provoking results in the context of a dynamic post-secondary education setting.

Conducting Qualitative Research

Education is a world subject to many influences. The ability of a qualitative approach to take into account a wide variety of perspectives, to apply interdisciplinary knowledge, to acknowledge the role of values in interpretation of the world, and to challenge the researcher to recognize the impact of their own position in the world, make it a sound choice for educational research (Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006). Denzin and Lincoln (2011) describe the current moment in qualitative research as "concerned with moral discourse, with the development of sacred textualities" (p. 3). Creswell (2013) provides a definition of qualitative research that adequately describes the approach taken here:

> Qualitative research begins with assumptions and the use of
> interpretive/theoretical frameworks that inform the study of research problems
> addressing the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human
> problem. To study this problem, qualitative researchers use an emerging
> qualitative approach to inquiry, the collection of data in a natural setting sensitive
> to the people and places under study, and data analysis that is both inductive and

deductive and establishes patterns or themes. The final written report or

presentation includes the voices of participants, the reflexivity of the researcher, a

complex description and interpretation of the problem, and its contribution to the

literature or a call for change. (p. 44)

Qualitative inquiry recognizes that there are multiple ways of being in the world and views

qualitative approaches as particularly suited to research involving the social contexts in which

these multiple ways of being are present (Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006). This is particularly relevant

in a contemporary climate that privileges so call evidence based, scientific approaches to

research (Torrance, 2011). The nature of qualitative research encourages multiple ways of

inquiry, including evidence based inquiry, but rejects the notion that there is any single right way

of doing educational research (Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006). Qualitative research is concerned with

meaning (Erickson, 2011), diverse perspectives, epistemologies, and disciplines, as well as the

acknowledgement of the role of values in interpretation and the positionality of the researcher

(Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006). It is important "to provide alternatives to the arrogance of positivist

reductionism with a radical humility, a fallibilism, an awareness of the complexity of our task"

(Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006, p. 4). This is especially relevant in the context of a study exploring

ethics education that is often characterized by the same hyper-rationalism of the positivist

tradition. As Kincheloe and Tobin (2006) note, the qualitative tradition strives for more inclusive

notions of reason and knowledge production that acknowledges the complexity of the social

world. Qualitative research strives to study the world in context to understand the complexity of

lived experience (Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006). This includes the multiple contexts that represent

the lived experiences of the students, faculty, and administration that are involved in post-

secondary ethics education. What is it that gives the knowledge generated here meaning? It is the

positionality that I bring to interpretation, the positions and understandings of the research participants, and the interrelationships between the human beings and the different components that make up the case of ethics education investigated by this study. It is a qualitative approach that is best suited to guide a study involving the amount of complexity and diversity evident in post-secondary ethics education. The philosophical assumptions, interpretive and theoretical frameworks, data collection methods, and approach that delineate the methodology of this project are described below.

Philosophical Assumptions

Creswell (2013) describes the philosophical assumptions that guide research as "beliefs about ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (what counts as knowledge and how knowledge claims are justified), axiology (the role of values in research), and methodology (the process of research)" (p. 20). I prefer Kincheloe and Tobin's (2006) description of the ontological domain, "the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of being in the world" (p. 5) to Creswell's (2013) "nature of reality" (p. 20). The ontological framework that guides this study is the assumption that to be in the world, from a human perspective, is to be in relationship with, in interconnection with, other entities (Kincheloe & Tobin, 2006). It is through interaction with these other entities, especially other humans that make up our close social sphere, that the truth about our being in the world, the nature of our reality, is socially negotiated. The social construction of ways of being in the world represents a relativist ontology that recognizes the influence of factors such as race, gender, religion, culture, and geo-political location in one's concept of reality. For Kincheloe and Tobin (2006):

> To be human is to be in relation to… And, importantly, for those engaging in educational research, we understand that to be human is to possess the power to

change, to be smarter than we now are, to engage in praxis – transformative action informed by the insights gained from our inquiry. (p. 6)

This power to transform our ways of being in the world is a central assumption of this study. The ability to deconstruct, and reconstruct, our social realities through dialogue, co-construction through consensus (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), and sometimes through dissensus (Mouffe, 2000b), is an ontological assumption central to a cosmopolitan approach.

The epistemological position that results from the ontology described above is a belief in the ability of people with alternative ways of knowing to develop an increasing sophistication of knowledge through dialogic co-construction and re-construction (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). This study has its origins in an intuition that current forms of ethics education in post-secondary settings are not only blind to, but potentially hostile to, alternative ways of knowing. It was not until my encounter with Mignolo's (2000) critique of cosmopolitanism that I began to seriously reflect on how deeply embedded in a liberal humanist paradigm I was as an educational practitioner. This realization drives my effort to approach this study from a perspective that recognizes the potential of epistemological pluralism in post-secondary settings. Andreotti, Ahenakew, and Cooper (2011) use the work of Santos (2007) to "illustrate epistemological pluralism based on the transitional 'general epistemology of the impossibility of general epistemologies' proposed by Santos and applied in a higher education context" (p. 45). Santos (2007) describes Modern, Western thinking as "abyssal thinking" (p. 45; See also Santos, 2014). By this he means that the social world is divided into two realms distinguished as "this side of the line" and "the other side of the line" (p. 45). Based on an epistemological difference, "what most fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility of the co-presence of the two sides of the line" (p. 45). The other side of the line, those who utilize ways of knowing

that are unrecognized by the Western paradigm, is reduced to non-existence based on an assumed epistemological inferiority. The so called paradigm wars between qualitative and quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) take place on this side of the line (Santos, 2007). "On the other side of the line, there is no real knowledge; there are beliefs, opinions, intuitive or subjective understandings, which, at the most, may become objects of raw materials for scientific enquiry" (Santos, 2007, p. 47). This situation sheds light on the intuition described earlier regarding the current ethics curriculum being blind, and potentially hostile to, other ways of knowing. This study attempts to be open to other ways of knowing, both in its approach and in its recommendations, while recognizing "the problems of translations across the abyss" (Andreotti, Ahenakew, & Cooper, 2011, p. 43). Santos's (2007) subaltern cosmopolitanism has important implications for epistemology. Santos (2007) describes subaltern cosmopolitanism as being distinguished by a "deep sense of incompleteness" (p. 64), a recognition that no one way of knowing has a monopoly on knowing or access to complete Truth. "Post-abyssal thinking stems thus from the idea that the diversity of the world is inexhaustible and that such diversity still lacks an adequate epistemology" (Santos, 2007, p. 65). Santos (2007) proposes an "ecology of knowledges" based on "the recognition of the plurality of heterogeneous knowledges (one of them being modern science) and on the sustained and dynamic interconnections between them without compromising their autonomy. The ecology of knowledge is founded on the idea that knowledge is inter-knowledge" (p. 66). Pedagogically important, an ecology of knowledges recognizes the necessity of learning to unlearn (see Tlostanova & Mignolo, 2012) and that "gaining certain forms of knowledge may involve forgetting others and in the end, becoming ignorant of them" (Santos, 2007, p. 69). The epistemological assumptions that follow suggest that the most effective way to access multiple ways of knowing is by gathering subjective

evidence through a variety of participants in the field (Creswell, 2013). Creswell (2013) describes the motivation to engage with participants as motivated by the desire to know through the "subjective experiences of people" (p. 20). The methodology described below combines this motivation to engage with participants with document analysis in an effort to build a multi-perspectival understanding of the case in question.

An ecology of knowledges, as proposed by Santos (2007), has ontological implications that I am comfortable with as a researcher. As a human being I believe that my access to knowledge about what is real is characterized by incompleteness. At best, I can know and present a partial and incomplete representation of reality. Santos (2007) explains, "[f]or an ecology of knowledges, knowledge-as-intervention-in-reality is the measure of realism, not knowledge-as-a-representation-of-reality" (p. 70). This pragmatic approach to the real suits both the needs of this study and my own philosophical assumptions well. The desired, real world, outcome of this research is to motivate an intervention in the practice of ethics education at the post-secondary level.

Interpretive and Theoretical Frameworks

The cosmopolitan theory that serves as a framework for this study has been discussed at length in Chapter Two as has the supporting theory of Rancière (1991), Badiou (2002), and Andreotti (2011). The cosmopolitan theoretical framework is informed by the decolonial perspectives of Mignolo (2011), and Santos (2007; 2014). This theoretical framework is supported by interpretive frameworks that serve to deepen the reflexivity of the research. Of the interpretive frameworks outlined by Creswell (2013), social constructivism most closely describes the framework guiding this study. The philosophical beliefs that correspond to this framework include the ontological position that "multiple realities are constructed through lived

experiences and interaction with others" (Creswell, 2013, p. 36). The epistemological beliefs driving this study include the belief that "reality is co-constructed between the researcher and the researched and shaped by individual experiences" (Creswell, 2013, p. 36) which is consistent with Santos's (2007) ecology of knowledges. Without the participation of students and faculty, the only reality expressed through the study would be my own. The social constructivism framework indicates the "use of an inductive method of emergent ideas […] obtained through methods such as interviewing, observing, and analysis of texts" (Creswell, 2013, p. 36).

Simply stating that a social constructivism interpretive framework is used in this study seems to say too little. To claim that different realities are constructed in particular circumstances and from different perspectives is to say nothing about how the different perspectives influence our understanding of the world. The insights of critical pedagogy help to elucidate the influence of power on knowledge. Ghosh and Abdi (2013) explain:

> Truth is based on different ways of knowing, made more complex as a result of differences in human experience. The function of knowledge is to lead one towards freedom, and that can only happen when it increases awareness of the hidden aspects of power; that is when it deliberately diffuses and accords emancipatory knowledge. (p. 22)

A grounding belief that drives this study is that the purpose of newly constructed knowledge, especial in the domain of ethics and morals, ought to be to help transform the lives of students by challenging the taken for granted knowledge that underlies their personal and social lives. Critical pedagogy introduces a perspective that strives for "self-conscious awareness" (Ghosh & Abdi, 2013, p. 23) which impacts methodology: "student experiences and their historical, social,

and cultural conditions must be viewed as primary sources of knowledge if they are to be subjects, and involved in the production of educational process" (Ghosh & Abdi, 2013, p. 23). This approach is especially important in the context of a study using cosmopolitanism as a theoretical framework. It has been demonstrated that some cosmopolitan discourses have integrated a Eurocentric metanarrative and a critical pedagogy will help to protect against a universalizing epistemology that presumes to speak for all.

Critical Hermeneutics and Cosmopolitanism

The connection between cosmopolitanism, hermeneutics, and education needs further elucidation. According to Gadamer (1979), "the best definition for hermeneutics is: to let what is alienated by the character of the written word or by the character of being distantiated by cultural or historical distances speak again. This is hermeneutics: to let what seems to be far and alienated speak again" (p. 83). Gadamer's hermeneutics strive to bring the far near and, in the process of doing so, let it speak in a new voice. Gallagher (1992) points out the connection between hermeneutics and education and the importance of interpretation to teaching and learning. He notes that the interpreter "is defined by his or her own historical epoch, society and culture, educational background, linguistic ability, familiarity with a subject matter, and purpose or practical interests" (p. 5). A text is conditioned "by its age, the culture in which it was produced. The language and talent of the author who produced it, and the author's intent" (p. 5). Reader, text, and meaning intermingle in a dynamic way that encourages the emergence of new meaning via interpretation. Interpretations serve as connections between the nodes of author, text, meaning, interpreter and the larger societal influences intertwined with these nodes. From a cosmopolitan perspective, hermeneutics may be used as a methodology to study the factors that separate a text and the position of the reader. The word "text", in this context, should

be interpreted in an inclusive way. Hermeneutics has expanded beyond the textual to include interpretation of non-textual realms of communication and social existence. Human experience is expressed through language and it is by expressing meaning through language that encounters between Self, Other, and World are given voice. These encounters present themselves as a type of text calling for interpretation.

Gallagher (1992) outlines the four contemporary approaches to hermeneutics as conservative, moderate, radical, and critical (p. 9). The approaches most in tune with a cosmopolitan approach are the moderate as represented by theorists such as Gadamer, and the critical, including radical influences in the critical approach, as represented by Habermas. The moderate approach to hermeneutics recognizes the embeddedness of the interpreter in a social position that influences and limits the scope of interpretation possible. Despite these limits, some access to meaning is admitted and "a 'fusion of horizons,' a creative communication between reader and text" (Gallagher, 1992, p. 9) is possible. Gadamer outlines a hermeneutical practice that recognizes the bias brought to an interpretive situation by the interpreter. The interpreter is called upon to be reflective in practice by considering how their own prejudices are influencing their interpretation. This self-problematization is an important part of cosmopolitan education as outlined by contemporary theorists (Delanty, 2009; Hansen, 2010, 2011; Rizvi, 2009).

A critical approach to hermeneutics has an emancipatory and transformative center of gravity. Its aim is to identify and disrupt false consciousness through interpretation. "For Habermas, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics remains limited insofar as it fails to recognize or deal with extralinguistic elements that shape ideology and misshape the contours of communication" (Gallagher, 1992, p. 18). The extra-linguistic influences of power, in both the political-economic and psychoanalytic sense, must be considered in any interpretation. Gallagher

(1992) sums up the themes of the Gadamer-Habermas debate and its relation to education as follows:

> Those who take the critical approach to education will insist upon the power of reflection to break up structures of power and authority in educational processes and institutions. Those who take an approach to educational theory consistent with a moderate hermeneutics will insist that structures of power and authority are inevitably embedded in education experience. (p. 19)

A sympathy for both a critical and a hermeneutical approach is advisable in cosmopolitan education. A critical hermeneutics will encourage the curriculum developer and student to take a self-reflective approach to encounters between Self, Other and World, with an eye towards how issues of power and authority are at play in this encounter.

It is not difficult to see the hermeneutic nature of a cosmopolitan approach. Schleiermacher's universality of misunderstanding calls for "the need for a way of creatively engaging that which one does not understand" (Smith, 2010, p. 3) addressed through a dialectic, a dialogical relationship between that which is understood and that which is not. The dialogue that needs to take place is the dialogue between one's own lived experience and the lived experience of an Other. Smith (2010) states that "hermeneutics holds promise for a new conversation among the world's people regarding our shared future" (p. 4). This is exactly the conversation that cosmopolitan education is interested in. Smith (1991) asks how the hermeneutic tradition can "inform the interests of curriculum, research and pedagogy" (p. 194). Further exploration reveals critical hermeneutics as a tool useful for both interpreting cosmopolitanism and as a method of cosmopolitan learning. Kinsella (2006) explains that "a

hermeneutic approach (a) seeks understanding rather than explanation; (b) acknowledges the situated location of interpretation; (c) recognizes the role of language and historicity in interpretation; (d) views inquiry as conversation; and (e) is comfortable with ambiguity" (p. 3). An exploration of these themes reveals the relevance of the hermeneutic approach for cosmopolitan learning. First, cosmopolitan learning seeks understanding in the context of the encounter between Self, Other and World. Such encounters provide spaces to explore the context of the life of the student and to question hidden assumptions. The cosmopolitan learning space supports a fusion of the horizons of a particular past and the horizon of the present. An opportunity to explore and interpret the world of the Other is also present in this space. In forming a cosmopolitan perspective a student participates in the hermeneutic circle. Each new encounter between Self, Other and World (Delanty, 2009) and between the known and the new (Hansen, 2011) provides an opportunity to become familiar with a cosmopolitan part in an ongoing effort to understand a more inclusive whole. The situated location of the interpreter reminds the cosmopolitan inquirer that each individual questions from a unique, and partial, perspective, and this location influences the understanding developed. The acknowledgement of this situatedness enables the cosmopolitan inquirer to be self-reflective and to be open to difference. Mutual understanding does not imply homogeneity and agreement.

Diatopical Hermeneutics

Santos (2002) outlines a diatopical hermeneutics appropriate for cross-cultural dialogue. Moving beyond inter-knowledge, an exchange between different knowledges, to inter-cultural exchange, Santos (2002) describes the interlocutors in such exchanges as possessing strong *topoi* – "the overarching rhetorical commonplaces of a given culture" (p. 47). These *topoi* may not be mutually understandable resulting in barriers to exchange. Santos (2002) proposes a "diatopical

hermeneutics as the basis for cross-cultural conversation" (p. 47). For Santos (2002) the *topoi* of any given culture is incomplete, as is the culture that supports it. This incompleteness is invisible from within the culture, it is a void (Badiou, 2002) that exists for the given culture. "The objective of a diatopical hermeneutics is, therefore, not to achieve completeness – that being an unachievable goal – but, on the contrary, to raise the consciousness of reciprocal incompleteness to its possible maximum by engaging in the dialogue, as it were with one foot in one culture and the other in another" (Santos, 2002, p. 48). The type of knowledge produced by such exchanges is compatible with Rancière's (1991) assumption of equality: "it requires the production of a collective and participatory knowledge based on equal cognitive and emotional exchanges, a knowledge-as-emancipation rather than a knowledge-as-regulation" (Santos, 2002, p. 48). A diatopical hermeneutics for cross-cultural exchange adds a decolonial hermeneutic perspective both to the research undertaken as part of this case study, and as a perspective for educational exchanges in the ethical domain.

Outline of the Research Orientation

Reflectiveness and Reflexivity

The qualities of reflectiveness and reflexivity have been mentioned several times in the preceding pages and are an important part of this study. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) state that "in reflective empirical research the centre of gravity is shifted from the handling of empirical material towards, as far as possible, a consideration of the perceptual cognitive, theoretical, linguistic, (inter)textual, political and cultural circumstances that form the backdrop to – as well as impregnate - . . . interpretations" (p. 9). Critical self- awareness and a mindfulness of the existence of blind spots and taken-for-granted assumptions are crucial elements of reflection. Reflection turns the attention inward to the learner/researcher and the influence of cultural

tradition, language, community, society in general, and all the complexity of subjectivity that coalesce into a worldview. This worldview enables interpretation but also results in blind spots, naivety, and unconscious restraints. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) call for "reflexive interpretation" in qualitative research that involves systematic reflection on several levels and endows interpretation with a deeper quality. They identify four areas of interpretation that are important to reflective research: engagement with empirical data, hermeneutics, critical theory, and postmodernism (p. 11). These elements point to reflective spaces through which the researcher can approach the research question. Each of these elements contributes to the rigour of research in a unique way. The systematic and logical interaction with empirical data provides techniques and research procedures to help guide a study. In Alvesson and Sköldberg's (2009) reflexive methodology, hermeneutics is a key form of reflection since "method cannot be disengaged from theory and other elements of pre-understanding, since assumptions and notions in some sense determine interpretation and representations of the object of study" (p. 11). Research is also recognized to have a political and ethical aspect that can either contribute to reproduction or challenge existing social conditions. The impossibility of a politically neutral position highlights the important contribution of critical theory perspectives for reflexivity. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) round out the elements of reflexive research by drawing attention to the "problem of representation and authority" (p. 11) and the importance of a postmodern (poststructural) lens for reflexive methodology. While there may be philosophical incommensurability between the four approaches outlined, they are presented as different perspectives through which a researcher can be endowed with a more reflexive character. An attempt to implement a reflexive approach was assumed throughout this study.

The preceding pages have provided an historical context for the exploration of cosmopolitanism as a tool for educational research and practice. Encounters between cosmopolitanism, critical theory, hermeneutics, postmodernism, and postcolonialism have resulted in the emergence of interesting new conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism. Beck and Sznaider (2006) call for a cosmopolitan turn in the humanities and social sciences. Their call to reorient sociology from a "methodological nationalism" to a "methodological cosmopolitanism" has significance for educational research. Delanty (2009) has developed what he describes as a critical cosmopolitanism capable of responding to the challenges of globalization. Cosmopolitanism is also hermeneutic by nature. Rizvi (2009) describes cosmopolitan education and learning as involving "a critical hermeneutical politics, a particular way of learning about cultural encounters and about sources of conflict – and to imagine alternative futures" (p. 263). This study is based on a reflexive exploration of some of these developments in search of a cosmopolitan discourse relevant to educational research and practice.

The Case Study Approach

The question of how a cosmopolitan minded approach can be used to reimagine ethics education at a Canadian polytechnic institute was approached through a case study method. A singular case study of one instance of an Ethics and Society course at a Canadian Polytechnic served as the focus for the case of post-secondary ethics education. Stake (2008) describes the "conceptual responsibilities" of the case study researcher including:

a. Bounding the case, conceptualizing the object of study;

b. Selecting phenomena, themes, or issues (i.e., the research questions to emphasize);

c. Seeking patterns of data to develop the issues;

    d.   Triangulating key observations and bases for interpretation;

    e.   Selecting alternative interpretations to pursue; and

    f.   Developing assertions or generalizations about the case. (p. 141)

Bounding the Case

The Ethics and Society classroom is a bounded system, delineated primarily by its course outline, and consisting of parts including curriculum, evaluation, and pedagogical approaches. The system is embedded in a context which includes a program, an institution, provincial education policy, and opinions regarding ethics education. Stake (2008) differentiates between intrinsic and instrumental interest in cases. A case is pursued for intrinsic interest "if the study is undertaken because, first and last, one wants a better understanding of this particular case" (p. 121). A case is described as an instrumental case study if it is pursued "mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization" (p. 123). The case study in question is primarily intrinsic in nature, interested in this particular case, with some instrumental elements including a possibility of generalizable findings. Generalizability is not the main concern. This case study is organized around the issue of the potential marginalization of various worldviews, epistemologies, and notions of subjectivity in an internationalized Ethics and Society classroom. The focus of the study is the result of the application of a cosmopolitan minded educational framework to the course in question. It is up to the reader to determine if the context shares significant features and may be generalizable to their own situation.

A scholarly context is provided through a review of literature regarding the ends of post-secondary ethics education, and the mission of a polytechnic institution. Various groups also make up the context of the case including program administration, faculty, program advisory committees, and students. It is worth describing various student subgroups characterized by

classifications such as age, cultural group, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, employment status, educational level, and religious affiliation. This case was chosen because of its opportunity for learning. There was no other case that I, as the researcher, could garner greater access to documents, staff, time, and resources than this one. The issue of researching at one's own institution will be addressed later in the chapter.

Seeking Patterns of Data to Develop Issues

The cosmopolitan minded educational framework to be applied in this study builds on Hansen's (2011) interplay between a reflective loyalty to the known, balanced by a reflective openness to the new. There are four primary components to this framework: reflection, the known, the new, and interchange between the known and new. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) state that "[r]reflection means thinking about the conditions for what one is doing, investigating the way in which the theoretical, cultural and political context of individual and intellectual involvement affects interaction with whatever is being researched, often in ways that are difficult to become conscious of" (p. 269). If one replaces the word "researched" with "studied" in the above sentence it is not difficult to conceptualize reflection in education. Reflection in an educational context involves contemplation of the political, cultural, and social contexts that influence the educational setting. It is difficult to become conscious of how our lived context influences what can be learned and how things are perceived but the engagement of students in such an effort is key to what reflection means in the context of this study. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) provide a meta-theoretical framework for reflection that incorporates different philosophical positions and modes of thought including empiricism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and postmodernism as a method of encouraging reflection from different perspectives. They describe the process of reflecting from these multiple perspectives as "reflexive

interpretation, …the open play of reflection across various levels of interpretation" (p. 271). This reflexivity, in combination with the notion of a cosmopolitan minded approach, was used as a *reflexive cosmopolitan* framework which engaged with empirical materials, interpretation, critical, postcolonial, and postmodern perspectives as a multidimensional lens. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) emphasize four levels of interpretation that they propose ought to be "played off against each other" (p. 272) to encourage reflexivity. In table format, the levels can be understood as follows:

Aspect/level	Focus
Interaction with empirical material	Accounts in interviews, observations of situations and other empirical materials
Interpretation	Underlying meanings
Critical interpretation	Ideology, power, social reproduction
Reflection on text production and language use	Own text, claims to authority, selectivity of the voices represented in the text
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 273)	

This reflexive methodology has been used as a means of envisioning a cosmopolitan framework suitable for use in educational settings. It was also used as a way to formulate the recommendations that result from the application of the cosmopolitan lens to the case study of the Ethics and Society class. The reflexive framework also has intriguing implications for pedagogy that influenced the construction of recommendations. A cosmopolitan minded ethics education takes into account multiple levels of interpretation and contemplates ways to engage students in reflexivity regarding their own ethical lives.

Triangulation

The primary aim of this study is to optimize understanding of the case, not to generalize from it. The guidance provided by the scholarly research questions helped to focus, delineate and keep the project in scope in order to optimize understanding. The course outline anchored the document review as the primary representation of the Ethics and Society course that focuses this case in textual form. Questions about participant interpretations of the course were engaged with various stakeholders to ensure that triangulation of descriptions and interpretations strengthened credibility (Stake, 1995). "Triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation" (Stake, 2008, p. 133). In addition to the student focus groups, other participants that were invited to be a part of this research included program administration at the polytechnic institute where the Ethics and Society course is offered. Faculty who teach the course, or a similar course, in the degree programs offered at the polytechnic were also invited to participate in the study. Answers to the questions of how the introduction of cosmopolitan learning into an ethics curriculum is understood and received by administration and faculty were pursued through semi-structured interviews. This engagement also helped answer the question of what supports are needed to integrate cosmopolitan learning into the teaching of ethics to polytechnic post-secondary students. To summarize, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) promote a reflexive methodology to deepen interpretive research. This study applied a variant of this approach that emphasizes interpretations and multi-layered reflections at the beginning of the project, as is evident in the preceding material on cosmopolitanism, and toward the end of the project to deepen the anticipated recommendations. Reflexive methodologies were applied to the case in question to help generate curricular and pedagogical innovation. The result is a set of

recommendations regarding curriculum and pedagogy in ethics education, and a re-imagining of ethics education from the perspective of a reflexive cosmopolitan discourse.

Methods Used

  Document analysis. After an engagement with the literature on cosmopolitanism and moral education, the study continued at the empirical level with a reflexive analysis of the documents that are specific to the case being studied. Document analysis was implemented as part of a reflexive methodology concerned with interacting with institutional, program, and course level documents, and meeting minutes from Program Advisory Committee (PAC) meetings. Bowen (2009) describes document analysis as "particularly applicable to qualitative case studies" (p. 29). The triangulation role that it plays is especially important in qualitative research. Bowen (2009) outlines five functions that documents provide to a qualitative methodology including: providing context for the study, generation of new questions, providing data to supplement interviews, monitoring change, and corroborative triangulation. The documents described below are not cited in an effort to protect the privacy of the study participants. Institutional documents examined for the study include guides to the institution's academic model, annual reports, an institutional planning source, the institution website, and community reports. At the program level, the program website was accessed as well as documents including a program mapping report, the program course map, and informational documents such as brochures and marketing materials. These documents were analyzed mindful of the position of the document producers as promoters of their program's merits. At the course level the documents examined include the course textbook (Desjardins, 2014), the course outline and syllabus, as well as a variety of documents available on the course learning management system (Moodle) site such as assignments and section descriptions.

Perakyla (2008) explains that often "qualitative researchers who use written texts as their materials do not try to follow any predefined protocol in executing their analysis. By reading and rereading their empirical materials, they try to pin down their key themes and, thereby to draw a picture of the presuppositions and meanings that constitute the cultural world of which the textual material is a specimen" (p. 352). Documents were initially analyzed for content to help provide institutional, program, and course context and a description of the culture that the case is embedded in. The documents were returned to later in the study as part of the thematic analysis that was conducted through interview and focus group data described below. This combination of content and thematic analysis (Bowen, 2009) served to deepen my understanding of the case in question and the relationship between the faculty and student interview data and the case context.

Student focus groups. Initial interpretation focused on the Ethics and Society course that is at the heart of the case being studied. Questions such as what the current course goals and outcomes are, and what role the course plays within departmental and institutional goals were pursued. An interplay between the empirical evidence in the form of course documentation and the conceptual framework provided by cosmopolitanism was experimented with to explore the question of how a cosmopolitan minded approach can be used to re-imagine ethics education. It should be kept in mind that the perceived issue that is at the genesis of this study is the potential marginalization of various worldviews in an internationalized Ethics and Society classroom. Latour's (2004) work highlights that it is important to consider that the issue at hand may be framed differently by those for whom it is assumed to be a problem. For this reason two focus groups were conducted to garner a student perspective on a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education. All students (416) who have participated in the Ethics and Society class since

the program start date were invited to participate in the focus groups. Twenty-seven students responded to the email invitation and participated in the study. Participants were limited to students who have completed the course to help ameliorate some of the ethical issues involved with research involving students in one's own program or class. Student focus groups were conducted using an Ethics Café based on the World Café methodology (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). The choice of the World Café methodology is justified by both the interpretive and epistemological frameworks of this study. As previously described, hermeneutic inquiry involves an effort to understand, a conversational approach to enquiry, and a recognition of the role that the situated location of the researcher plays in interpretation (Kinsella, 2006). Smith's (2010) description of the hermeneutic promise of new conversations amongst the people of the world also serves as a reminder of the importance of dialogue in hermeneutic inquiry. In recognition of this importance a method of dialogic engagement with and between the participants of the study was sought resulting in the adoption of the World Café process. Epistemologically, the use of the World Café is an attempt to recognize multiple ways of knowing and the importance of dialogue as a method of engagement between people holding different worldviews. Brown (2002) describes how "[t]he World Café process has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to foster authentic conversation and knowledge sharing among people of varied backgrounds – even if they have never met or had formal dialogue training" (p. 1). The people holding varied backgrounds in this study include the researcher and the participants. A World Café process includes the possibility of dialogue between the researcher and individual participants, the researcher and a group of participants, and between participants themselves; both one-on-one and in groups. These rich conversations were captured on digital recordings and through participant note taking for later analysis as described below.

The plan for implementing the Ethics Café, based on methods outlined by Brown (2002), and Vogt, Brown, and Isaacs (2003), is outlined below.

Planning the Ethics Café.

Clarifying the purpose. The purpose of the World Café was to provide a student perspective in the attempt to answer the research questions posed and to probe some of the assumptions driving the study. The rich dialogue generated through the World Café process provided data to investigate this perspective through an analysis of the conversations between the researcher and participants as well as between participants themselves.

Create a hospitable space. A classroom at the institution offering the Ethics and Society course was used to host the café. The room had movable tables that allowed for stations to be set up to host groups of 4-5 participants comfortably. Table cloths covered the table and a variety of writing instruments were dispersed around the table. Flip chart "place mats" and large index cards were in abundance at each table and participants were encouraged to record their musings and insights on these place mats. Group conversations were recorded (audio) and transcribed for analysis. The timing of the sessions was from 4:00 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on Wednesday, January 30, 2013, and noon to 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, February 2, 2013. The timing of the café was scheduled to work with evening class start times of 6:00 p.m.. Due to the timing, lunch and refreshments were provided during the gathering.

Explore questions that matter. The research questions guiding this study were presented to students. One of the assumptions driving this study is that the ethics course that is the focus of this study does not take into account the complexity of the different belief systems, cultures, and

worldviews in the class. The questions outlined below helped to explore if this assumption is supported by student perceptions of the course.

Design of the café. The Café proceeded according to the instructions found in The World Café (2008), including: 1) Four or five participants were seated at each table in conversation clusters; and, 2) Three progressive rounds of dialogue of approximately 20 minutes each were used with a follow up whole group conversation. Conversation opening questions for the three different tables consisted of the following:

Main Question (Table 1)

How did the Ethics and Society (E&S) class encourage you to reflect on the cultural, religious, familial and social roots of your ethical values and beliefs?

Helper Questions

How do culture, religion, family and social location impact our ethical values and beliefs?

What did the E&S class suggest about the roots of ethical values and beliefs?

How did the E&S class encourage you to reflect on the roots of your own ethical values and beliefs?

How did the E&S class encourage you to integrate these ethical roots into your learning?

Main Question (Table 2)

How did the Ethics and Society (E&S) class encourage you to engage with ethical values and beliefs that are not shared by your own worldview?

Helper Questions

What ethical values did you encounter in the course?

Who might have different values? Why?

How closely did the values in the course match with values that you hold?

How did the E&S class encourage you to engage with ethical worldviews that you

had not previously encountered?

Main Question (Table 3)

How did the Ethics and Society (E&S) class help you to develop the skills

necessary to deal with ethical diversity and the conflicts that may arise from such

diversity?

Helper Questions

What skills are necessary to deal with ethical issues and particularly issues where

there are conflicts?

What skills did you use in the course to deal with ethical diversity and conflict?

How did the E&S class encourage you to exchange ideas with ethical worldviews

that you had not previously encountered?

The process was introduced and an informal discussion regarding the reasons for the research

and ethics considerations were discussed. Three digital audio recording devices were used to

capture conversations; one at each table where a Café question was being engaged with. The

recordings were transcribed using *Express Scribe* transcription software and later exported into

Microsoft Word documents for analysis. Group discussions were captured by the recording

devices and likewise transcribed. Café documents were read through to review the data and then

re-read line by line. Notes regarding potential themes and interesting ideas were compiled

resulting in 22 thematic documents containing quotes and material from the Café data. Once

these thematic memos were recorded attention was turned to gathering data from faculty through interviews.

Faculty interviews. All faculty who teach the Ethics and Society course, or a closely related course at the institution serving as the focus of the case study, were invited to participate. Six of the seven faculty invited chose to participant in the study and took part in semi-structured interviews using the following questions as potential discussion points:

Engagement

1. What was the most engaging part of the course for you?

2. What was the least engaging part of the course for you?

Exploration

3. What opportunities are students given to reflect on their personal values and beliefs?

4. What opportunities are students given to reflect on the values and beliefs of others?

5. Do you feel that the ethics course helps students be more reflective? If so, in what ways?

6. Are these reflections important in the study of ethics?

7. The Ethics and Society course being studied approaches ethics through the lenses of philosophers such as Kant, Mill, Rawls, and Aristotle. Are there any curricular or pedagogical innovations necessary to adapt to the increasingly international and intercultural composition of the classroom?

a. What is it about the course that you would most want to preserve?

b. Is there anything about the course that you would like to change?

Exit

8. Is there anything else that you would like to say about the ethics course that you teach as part of the degree program?

Interviews were captured via digital audio recording and transcribed using *Express Scribe* transcription software. Interview documents were handled in a manner similar to the focus group data. Notes regarding potential themes and interesting ideas were compiled resulting in 15 thematic documents containing quotes and material from the interview data. Once these thematic memos were recorded the themes were compared with focus groups themes to search for similarities and differences. Focus group and interview themes and data were finally compiled into the seven themes covered in detail in Chapter 4: 1) a concern over complexity and uncertainty in the moral domain; 2) the need for a response to relativism; 3) individualism in ethical thinking; 4) a need for clarity regarding what is required of an education in morality; 5) the role of criticality in moral education; 6) the importance of reflexivity and openness; and 7) the significance of creating ethical spaces to facilitate learning.

Ethical Considerations

Tobin (2006) emphasizes the importance of the question of how one's presence, as a researcher visiting the field, can potentially alter the structure of the field and the agency of the participants (pp. 28-29). This observation raises key issues when researching one's own institution (Mercer, 2007; Coughlan & Brannick, 2010). As researchers turn their attention to their own institutions a distinction can be made between the insider, someone with privileged access to particular knowledge and information (Merton, 1972), and the outsider, a non-member

of this privileged group (Mercer, 2007). Coghlan and Brannick (2010) use the term "'complete member' to refer to being a full member of your organization and wanting to remain a member within a desired career path when the research is completed" (p. 101). It is this notion of a "complete member" that I have in mind when using the term insider (See also, Adler & Adler, 1987). Rather than a distinct dichotomy between an insider and an outsider, Mercer (2007) identifies a continuum between the two poles:

> Some features of the researcher's identity, such as his or her gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation are innate and unchanging; other features, such as age, are innate but evolving. These features provide one dimension to the insider/outsider continuum. Other dimensions are provided by the time and place of the research (at both a micro and a macro-level); the power relationships within which the researcher and the researched co-exist; the personalities of the researcher and specific informants; and even the precise topic under discussion. (p. 4)

My own history as an instructor and administrator in the institution in which my research takes place spans 17 years. This makes the relationship with the institution and many of the respondents in the research of a relatively close nature and moves my position on the insider/outsider continuum toward the insider, complete member pole. The collaborative leadership style that I have tried to cultivate over the years helped to alleviate some of the power relationships with those under my supervision and the relationships that I have developed with those who are my senior in the institutional hierarchy seemed to have the same flattening of power relations. That being said, power relations between myself, students, peers, junior faculty, and management needed to be managed and posed a threat in the form of potential interview bias based on power. One faculty member under my direction supervision was eliminated as a

potential participant under the recommendation of the Research Ethics Board reviewers. To ease matters further, the topic of ethics education is not considered a high risk topic and the consequences of a respondent's opinion is not likely to be perceived as dire. My role as a program administrator and instructor does result in a power relation with students. To manage this relationship, research was conducted with students who had already completed the Ethics and Society course being studied. Students in the focus groups were fully informed of their right to withdraw without consequence at any time. To help minimize respondent bias, interviews and focus groups focused on the issue of strategies to respond to the issue of post-secondary ethics education in the context of an internationalized classroom. The focus groups were conducted under the premise of research into ethics curriculum and questions focused on student experiences in the Ethics and Society class, as well as suggestions for improvement, to help minimize the temptation for students to say what they thought I might want them to say.

There are both pros and cons to insider research (Mercer, 2007; Trowler, 2011). Brannick and Coghlan (2007) conclude that insider research "is not problematic in itself" (p. 72) as long as it is approached with awareness of the challenges:

> [R]esearchers, through a process of reflexivity, need to be aware of the strengths and limits of their preunderstanding so that they can use their experiential and theoretical knowledge to reframe their understanding of situations in which they are close. They need to attend to the demands that both roles–organizational roles and the researcher role–make on them. They need to consider the impact of organization politics on the process of inquiry, who the major players are, and how they can be engaged in the process. (p. 72)

Mercer (2007) describes the "outsider doctrine" that identifies the outsider as the only one in a position to achieve objectivity in research due to "the appropriate degree of distance and detachment from the subjects of the research" (p. 5). On the contrary, the "insider doctrine" proposes that the outsider does not have the level of socialization required to fully understand the subjects and groups in question (Mercer, 2007). The continuum between insider and outsider yields a position where "there are no overwhelming advantages to being an insider or an outsider. Each position has advantages and disadvantages, though these will take on slightly different weights depending on the particular circumstances and purposes of the research" (Hammersley, 1993, p. 219) On the positive side, pursuing insider research can increase access to data and respondents, better emic accounts may result, and one's cultural literacy can aid interpretation. "In short, you are empowered to offer a thick description (Geertz, 1973) of lived realities, of the hermeneutics of everyday life" (Trowler, 2011, para. 4). Pre-understanding (Coughlan & Brannick, 2010), the knowledge of the organization, in both its informal and formal aspects, gives the insider researcher a uniquely informed position from which to proceed. On the downside, the enculturation that has taken place over years of exposure to institutional norms can create blind spots that influence research results. Personal and institutional anonymity may be difficult to protect when pursuing insider research (Trowler, 2011). The citation of institutional documents, interview contexts that lead to identification of the respondent, and unconscious details that emerge in the report all threaten anonymity. Respondents were informed that strategies to encourage institutional anonymity will be pursued to help protect against these dangers. This makes the protection of personal identity even more important. Suggestions to alleviate concerns over protection of privacy and power issues suggested by Trowler (2011) include: presentation of drafts of data gathered to respondents to allow for self-checking for

anonymity, having an independent third-party review drafts for threats to identity, and a transparent intent to alter details that can identify the institution. Further strategies to deal with the many ethical issues arising in insider research were pursued through a formal research ethics proposal that was reviewed by both the University of Alberta and the research ethics board at the research site. In an effort to protect institutional identity all institutional and program documents are referred to by document number rather than by appropriate APA citation techniques. A cross reference of these citations is on record with the researcher. Participant names were replaced with alpha-numeric codes such as STUDENT A1 or STUDENT B16 where the A designates the first focus group (January 30, 2013) and B designates the second focus group held (February 2, 2013). The numeric reference was used in an Excel spreadsheet to create a cross-reference whereby the researcher can identify actual participant names. These codes are then replaced with first name pseudonyms which appear in all caps in the text to enhance readability (e.g., . DERRIK). A similar method was used with faculty where they are referred to as FACULTY A, FACULTY B, etc., cross-referenced in an excel spreadsheet accessible by the researcher, and replaced with pseudonyms in the text. Faculty pseudonyms are preceded by the honorific Dr. (e.g., Dr. Burns). Program administrators are documented as faculty to help protect their identity.

Limitations

Multiple, and potentially incompatible, notions of subjectivity are at play in this work. From the enlightenment perspective of Kant, and the analytic tradition of Barrow (2007), the human subject is an autonomous, rational agent, able to apply reason and ethical principles in the pursuit of solutions to ethical problems. On the contrary, Biesta (2006) draws on Levinas to imagine the ethical subject that comes into being through a relationship of responsibility to another. The subject in this case is not imagined to pre-exist relationship as an autonomous,

independent agent, but is called into being by an encounter with another. To further complicate matters, Santos (2014) draws our attention to excluded subjects, those declared subhuman through colonial domination. The application of reason and ethical principles, as well as the awareness of social and institutional structures that oppress, are not foreclosed by the notion of the coming into presence of a unique subject (Biesta, 2006). While this study is sympathetic to Biesta's (2006) notion of subjectivity, the coming "into the world as a unique, singular being" (pp. 49-50), no attempt is made to reconcile these competing notions of subjectivity.

Discourse as an Analytical Tool

The presence of a variety of discourses will often be referred to in the chapters that follow. Dryzek (2006) describes a "clash of discourses" evident in conflicts across the globe but also notes that "discourses can engage" and that there are "democratic possibilities" (p. 1) in this engagement. The idea of constructive discourse is a particularly useful one in an age of cosmopolitanization. As described by Dryzek (2006):

> A discourse is a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with a framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgements, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions, and intentions. It provides basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements, and disagreements. Its language enables individuals who subscribe to it to compile the bits of information they receive into coherent accounts organized around storylines that can be shared in intersubjectively meaningful ways. (p. 1)

Dryzek's description of discourse suggests the usefulness of outlining a cosmopolitan discourse for educational research. Such a discourse would provide the "concepts, categories, and ideas" to serve as a framework through which educational issues can be analyzed.

Conclusion

This study has its origins in reflection upon the globalization of the post-secondary ethics classroom. As a response to the suspected moral parochialism of the current ethics curriculum, an examination of the practice of post-secondary ethics education from a cosmopolitan perspective was proposed. The cosmopolitan perspective to be applied has evolved from its pre-modern and modern roots into a pluriversal approach recognizing the tension between notions of the particular and the universal, the natural and the constructed (Latour, 2004).Cosmopolitan minded ethics education will strive to create spaces for students to come into presence, not into a pre-existing order, but as a process of exploring who they are as ethical beings and who they may want to become. The cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education views the globalization of the classroom as fulfilling an idyllic condition for coming into the world as an ethical being. The globalized classroom presents the potential to live an enriched ethical life as a result of seeing the world in a different way. The tensions that arise in the process will help the student become comfortable with agonism and the vibrant clash between adversaries that may result. Paradoxically, the potential for students to become more comfortable with ambivalence may result from the experience of the discomfort of confrontation with another worldview. This case study sought ways to transform the learning contexts of ethics education as an exploration of the open question of how to live an ethical life in a world of plurality and difference. Attention is now turned to the data gathered through the methods described above.

Chapter 4 – Findings

The exploration of what it means to live a good life is both a personal passion and a professional practice. In an effort to balance my own personal interest in this topic it was necessary to find ways to expose my own blind spots, taken for granted assumptions, and hegemonic ways of thinking as much as possible in pursuing this study. Engagement with relevant literature, document analysis, and interaction with students and faculty all helped to expand my understanding of ethics and ethics education. An examination of the role of ethics education in post-secondary settings was conducted in chapter one and it was concluded that one of the ways an ethics education should be approached is through a stand-alone course. The institutional setting, the role the course plays in the program in question, and the course content, are all important in exploring the context of the case in question and were the focus of a thorough document analysis. Interview data provided by faculty served to further clarify the role the course is expected to play in the program context, identified expectations of program administration, and provided a deeper understanding of the course curriculum, and pedagogical approaches used to achieve stated course outcomes. Faculty also provided feedback regarding cosmopolitan minded ethics education and the role it might play in polytechnic education. Finally, student focus groups provided valuable data regarding student reflections on their experiences in the Ethics and Society course as well as recommendations for future innovation. Data resulting from the document analysis is reviewed first to provide context and is followed by a discussion of the themes that emerged from this analysis in combination with the interview and focus group data.

Document Analysis

  The institutional context. A review of institutional documentation including community reports, academic regulations, web based materials, and a comprehensive institutional plan was completed to provide context for the study. To help protect the privacy of study participants, the institutional data has been coded and treated like interview data. As such, citations to specific institutional documents have been omitted and replaced with generic in-text citations such as (Institutional Document 1). The setting for the case study is a polytechnic institute and member of Polytechnics Canada (Polytechnics Canada, 2014). Institutional documentation indicates a strong emphasis on practical skills combined with strong institutional value statements and the influence of an increasingly global demographic of stakeholders.

  The comprehensive institutional plan for the post-secondary that is the host of this case study overwhelmingly supports education with a focus on practical skills that respond to labour market needs, especially in the areas of business, the trades, applied science and technology, and healthcare (Institutional Document 2). Terms that are used to describe institutional activities include: applied education, technical training, technology-based, hands-on, pragmatic, employer-driven, and real-world. This pragmatic approach is reported to serve the needs of a variety of stakeholders including: industry, learners, and society in the province and beyond. An emphasis on high demand practical skills, technical training, and applied training relevant to industry is evident in all institutional documents. To facilitate this mandate, program advisory committees (PAC) are formed to help ensure the needs of industry are a high priority in academic decision making. Program advisory committees consist of members from business and industry, government and non-governmental organizations, and other potential employers who engage with faculty and leadership to help identify outcomes that graduates need to master to be industry

ready. These outcomes shape curriculum development through an outcomes based education approach (CELT, 2012).

The makeup of the advisory committees indicates a stakeholder group that is not limited to industrial needs. Despite the strong emphasis on employers and industry, the institute acknowledges its obligation to society and societal needs. Though it is difficult to establish from institutional documentation, it can be presumed that societal needs are something beyond mere economic needs. A strong value theme that hints at what these societal needs may be runs throughout the institutional level documentation. A declared institutional goal is to provide an "applied education with a human touch" (Institute Document 4). The human touch is represented by institutional values including respect, collaboration, celebration, support, and accountability that are meant to define how staff interact with other stakeholders including industry, students, and each other. Institutional promises to students include preparation for meaningful careers, high quality instruction in practical disciplines, and a safe environment where diversity is supported. Documentation also reflects the impact of changing demographics on institutional direction. The institute reports international student participation from 76 countries and alumni activity in 84 international locations (Institutional Document 3). The comprehensive institutional plan recognizes the need for programming that supports diverse populations and is responsive to the needs of both a global student population and the impacts of globalization on the local population.

The program context. The program that is the focus of the case being studied responds to the institutional mandate by offering a baccalaureate degree that is "in direct response to demand from industry for leading-edge technologists who have the technical theory, innovative skills, and ethical and social awareness required for sustainable industry, and for critical thinking

practitioners who are able to address technological challenges in today's economy" (Program Document 1). This document was produced with the participation of the program advisory committee (PAC) and the language used specifically indicates ethical and social awareness, sustainability, and critical thinking as skills in demand from industry. What, on the surface, can seem to be a corporate driven agenda quickly reveals some of the social skills that are in demand by industry and by the governmental and non-governmental representatives on the PAC. Program outcomes are identified through a program mapping process that involves consultation with stakeholders including the program advisory committee, faculty, and program administration. The program level outcomes that are reported in the context of this study are as follows:

1. Create solutions to industry problems through applied research, critical thinking, and creative problem solving.

2. Manage the use of technology to maximize organizational advantage.

3. Practice effective leadership skills to meet organizational needs.

4. Demonstrate ethically and socially responsible practices.

   (Program Document 2)

Program documentation mentions the increasingly technological and international setting that students are required to function in and the importance of global perspectives on the ethical, social, environmental, and business issues that they will be faced with. The program states the importance of critical thinking in developing the awareness and skills necessary to function effectively in a workplace characterized by change. Program advisory committee (PAC) meeting minutes indicate solid support for an ethical and social responsibility component of the program.

The graduate profile, developed in conjunction with the PAC, explicitly mentions a global

perspective, social, and ethical responsibility:

> Graduates of the program help organizations gain competitive advantage by
>
> optimizing the use of technological tools and processes. The program adds a layer
>
> of management and leadership expertise to the technical skills gained in a prior
>
> two year diploma, and prepares graduates to step into team and leadership roles in
>
> areas such as project management, health care, productivity enhancement, and
>
> sustainability. The program adds a layer of management and leadership in an
>
> increasingly technological and international setting; graduates are prepared with a
>
> global perspective on the social, ethical, environmental, and business issues that
>
> are vital to organizational success. (Program Document 2)

The need for critical thinking and analytical skills as well as an emphasis on the importance of

communication skills in diverse settings is repeatedly mentioned by industry advisors as of key

importance for graduates to be successful in the workplace (Source: PAC Meeting Minutes). On

the surface, the language being used here is consistent with the cosmopolitan minded ethics

themes outlined above. Global perspectives, social awareness, critical thinking, and

communication are all themes that have been explored as contributing to a cosmopolitan minded

education in ethics. Other aspects of the language indicate an advocacy of the neo-liberal global

citizenship aimed at economic participation on a global scale as described by Shultz (2007).

Language such as helping organizations gain competitive advantage, management and

technology in international settings, ethical issues vital to organizational success, and success in

the workplace, all support this conclusion. This evidence of a neoliberal agenda at work leads us

back to the question of what education is for. Biesta (2010) provides an interesting framework to

assign in the effort to understand the agenda present in both the development and delivery of the course. He begins by suggesting that education performs three primary functions referred to as "qualification, socialization and subjectification" (p. 19). The graduate profile quoted above reveals a clear example of the qualification function of the program in question. Graduates are said to be prepared to step into various roles in technological fields upon graduation based on the management and leadership skills gained in the program. Preparing students for employment is an obvious function of a publically funded post-secondary institution.

Program documentation also provides evidence of a socialization function that is played within the program of studies. Global perspectives on social, ethical, environmental, and business issues serve to socialize the student into the world of the global economy. Critical thinking, analysis, and communication skills also serve a socializing function and help introduce the student into the social order of business and management. Analysis of the course content below also reveals that the curriculum that is present likely plays a strong socializing role. But what of subjectification? By subjectification, Biesta (2010) means "the process of becoming a subject" (p. 21). Biesta (2010) describes subjectification as playing a role that is somewhat opposite to that of socialization. Through the process of becoming a subject, the student exercises independence from the social order. An important theme to keep in mind in the context of an Ethics and Society course is "the kind of subjectivity – or kinds of subjectivity – that are made possible as a result of particular educational arrangements and configurations" (Biesta, 2010, p. 21). The notion of a subject coming into being obviously questions the predefined, universal human subject explored earlier through the work of Badiou (2002). The institutional and program level documentation contain no evidence to support the conclusion that this is an important part of the Ethics and Society course as it stands. An examination of the specific

course that is the focus of this case study yields some clarity on what is meant by terms such as global perspective, ethical, social, environmental, business issues, and critical thinking, and what this may imply for the kinds of subjectivity made possible.

The course context. The themes of the Ethics and Society course under study are revealed through the course outcomes as stated on the course outline: personal ethics, social ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, globalization, and preparation for professional careers are all addressed. A closer look at these outcomes and the curriculum used to achieve them provide the starting point for a deep understanding of the case in question.

Personal ethics is addressed most clearly in one outcome of the course:

Outcome: Compose a personal ethical paradigm that integrates social and historical perspectives and current theories/best practices with personal convictions. (Program Document 3)

Creating a personal code of ethics is a common task in ethics courses that often involves identifying and committing to ethical principles and applying decision making models to ethical problems (Howard & Korver, 2008). The course outline implies that students are to develop their code of ethics by using the theories examined in class as a source of self-reflection. Another course outcome reveals what these theories are:

Outcome: Examine and evaluate ethical theories and practices from historical and modern perspectives.

The following concepts, skills, and issues are used to support this Outcome:

- Analyze and evaluate Aristotelian, utilitarian, and relativist ethics.
- Categorize and critique contemporary approaches to moral and ethical problems.

- Distinguish and evaluate moral behaviours from teleological and deontological perspectives. (Program Document 3)

Access to the Moodle site (an online learning management system) for the Ethics and Society course was granted and course materials found there provide insight into the ethical theories and practices used in the course. According to the online version of the course students are promised the following: "We will examine the major schools of ethical thought in the philosophical tradition of the West. This will give us the tools necessary to examine some of the most pressing business questions of the day" (Course Moodle Site: Introduction – Moral Reasoning). The course goes on to study Aristotle, Kant, and Mill as representatives of the virtue, deontological, and utilitarian approaches to ethics, and focuses primarily on the deontological and utilitarian philosophies as the source of the tools necessary to examine the pressing questions described above (Course Moodle Site: Compare and Contrast the Ethical Theories of Aristotle, Kant, and Mill). Later assignments introduce the contractarian ethics of John Rawls and the Baird Decision Model (EthicsGame, 2009). This model exemplifies the approach of the Ethics and Society course in general by providing different lenses through which ethical issues can be examined including:

Rights & Responsibilities Lens: Be honest and responsibly carry out your duties *(Deontology: Immanuel Kant).*

Relationships Lens: Be fair and consider those with no power *(Justice Theories: John Rawls).*

Reputation Lens: Be compassionate and virtuous *(Virtue Ethics: Aristotle and Alasdair MacIntyre).*

Results Lens: Be respectful as you do good and benefit others *(Utilitarianism:*

John Stuart Mill). (EthicsGame, 2009, p. 1)

These lenses provide the toolkit of ethical perspectives through which the remaining course

outcomes are approached. These course outcomes are listed here for context:

Outcome: Evaluate ethical issues in the workplace and individual behaviours and

perspectives relating to these issues.

Outcome: Research and discuss key ethical issues related to the development and

management of business, industry, and technology; their complex inter-

relationships; and the global environmental impact of these issues in terms of a

global economy. (Program Document 3)

The textbook used to support the course is specifically an introduction to business ethics text

(DesJardins, 2014), and the outcomes described above can be seen to be heavily influenced by

the text. Chapters on corporate social responsibility, a liberal perspective on the meaning of

work, rights and responsibilities, and diversity are the focus of much of the applied business

focus of the course (DesJardins, 2014; Course Moodle Site). The text is supplemented with a

variety of material in what appears to be an effort at enhancing a human rights and global

perspective. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as provincial human rights

legislation is used as reference material for students to identify and analyze violations of human

rights. Material suggested to help inform case studies include articles on Talisman Oil's

international ethical challenges (Idahosa, 2002; Kobrin, 2004), readings on global sustainability

(Edwards & Orr, 2005), and the Earth Charter (Bosselmann & Engel, 2010). Human rights as

established by the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* appear to be accepted as a given in

the course context and there is no evidence in course documentation or data gathered from interviews or focus groups that indicate reflection on the human rights discourse.

An example of how a business ethics case is typically dealt with in class may be illuminating. A preliminary observation can be made around how the notion of business ethics can limit the scope of ethical questions that are considered appropriate. Cases that are addressed in the course text book (Desjardins, 2014) include the LIBOR scandal, a case of fraudulent reporting of financial data; a case involving executive bonuses; Walmart's business practices; corporate culture at Goldman Sachs; privacy of electronic files at work; workplace conflicts of interest; subprime mortgage lending; and, sustainable business practices. A committee member asks "the question of whether in fact ethics is possible within a business program organized around fairly severe and strict capitalist determinations" (D. Smith, personal communication, September 25, 2014). A cursory glance at the case topics outlined above suggests that it is possible for an instructor of this business ethics class to focus on topics that are entirely within the bounds dictated by capitalist formations. In fact, an instructor who sees their primary objective as preparing students for competitive advantage may feel an obligation, even an ethical imperative, to stay within these formations. More will be said regarding recommendations for big question cases and challenges to dominant discourses in the final chapter. To help the reader understand the type of case that is addressed, and the manner in which it is addressed, a sample gleaned from course materials is provided in Appendix A.

Interview and Focus Group Data

Interviews with program faculty and focus groups with students who had completed the Ethics and Society course in question provide data from the perspective of those directly affected by the course. As a reminder: student feedback is coded with an alphanumeric code such as

STUDENT A1 or STUDENT B16. An alpha code of A indicates that the student participated in focus group 1, and a B indicates that they participated in focus group 2. These codes have been replaced in what follows with pseudonyms to help make the document more readable and a cross-reference can be found in Appendix B. Faculty are referred to with pseudonyms in the text to enhance readability. The high level themes that emerged from the data include: 1) a concern over complexity and uncertainty in the moral domain; 2) the need for a response to relativism; 3) the prevalence of individualism and autonomy; 4) a need for clarity regarding what is required of an education in morality; 5) the role of criticality in moral education; 6) the importance of reflexivity and openness; and 7) the significance of creating ethical spaces to facilitate learning.

Complexity and Uncertainty

A theme that was common to both faculty and students was the complexity and uncertainty surrounding moral issues. The classroom setting is characterized by difference, diversity, and pluralism. Students identified a wide variety of sources of difference including religion, gender, ethnicity, upbringing, generation, economic, and marital status. It cannot be assumed that culture is the only source of difference; human relations are characterized by similarity and difference and the pluralistic nature of the classroom is not the only source of difference, it simply adds to the complexity. Participants stated the importance of being able to deal with difference and diversity in their careers and described how an ethics course contributes to this. SUNAN described working for a corporation of 4300 employees from 100 or more different countries and how "*understanding diversity and how to deal with ethical issues that are raised because of that is really important.*" Moral problems that arise on job sites such as these happen in a context that involves a wide variety of worldviews and value systems. Participants reported that corporate culture itself is often the closest thing to a homogenous cultural context

that exists on a job site and students who plan to take on leadership roles need the concepts and skills necessary to navigate these contentious waters. This observation is also supported by data gathered in Program Advisory Committee documentation. Students warned about antagonistic discussions that arise when topics such as culture and religion come up on the job and in the classroom. Participants describe situations where "sore spots" were hit or confrontations occurred when discussions got heated. The existence of conflict in the classroom gives rise to the need to consider tools to help facilitate contentious discussions, and deal with dissensus; issues to be discussed in the section regarding creating ethical spaces.

Faculty describe how a major source of frustration for students is leaving a course or lesson with more questions than they arrived with. Students may initially think that a course in ethics will provide clear direction for action but often find that clear cut answers are elusive. Dr. Taylor described starting every semester by informing students that they are likely to have more questions than answers when they finish the course. Students are informed that one of the goals of the course is not necessarily how to make the right decision but to problematize the decision making process. Students are to become aware of the assumptions that they make in evaluating moral problems, of the impact of perspectives on their decision making, and the influence of bias. Dr. Styles takes a similar approach towards problematizing student's decision making process, a clear indication of the importance of critical thinking to the class. From a faculty perspective, having students learn to live with complexity and find ways to function in complex moral domains without the certainty of clear cut solutions may be one of the most important aspects of the course: living with uncertainty, complexity, and change is a trait of the private and professional worlds that students are expected to function in. The evidence described below

indicates that students often retreat to a position of moral relativism in response to uncertainty in the moral domain.

Relativism

Moral relativism, the idea that the authority of moral principles is relative to place and time, is a topic of concern to many moral philosophers (Barrow, 2007). Lukes (2008) observes that relativism often arises in the company of diversity and value conflict and evidence to support this position arose in discussions with students. Confusion over the lack of clearly right or wrong responses to situations seems to plague students and risks shaking their confidence in moral decision making in general. The discussion over the lack of clear-cut answers to many moral problems and the struggle students have with this manifest in questions and responses in both the personal and corporate worlds that participants are involved in. Questions that arose for participants include the following:

> "*This is my personal ethic but who am I to say it is right or wrong*?" (WILLIAM).
>
> "*...just because I think it is wrong and the rest of the country thinks it right, how is it fair for me to justify, judge them when they are judging me*?" (AHMAD).
>
> "*What makes my views right and theirs wrong*?" (HEATHER)
>
> "*Why should I interfere*?" (AHMAD).

The presence of value pluralism also seemed to trouble students as reflected in the following questions:

> "*Is there one ethic for everyone, or each culture is different*?" (KWASI).
>
> "*Why did I see it so differently . . . why did I have such strong feelings*?" (HEATHER).
>
> "*If I was brought up in the same situation as somebody else who sees things differently would I see it that way? What would influence that*?" (HEATHER).

"*Did I just turn out this way because of religion, family, social roots*?" (HEATHER).

"*Where do you draw the line*?" (AHMAD).

The passages above reveal a paradox between finding the right answer and the existence of multiple right answers that is inherent in the approach to ethics education revealed through the data. What is of particular importance is the uncertainty that students express over these questions even after completing an ethics course. When individuals encounter difference and pluralism the responses are varied as evident in data gathered from the focus groups. In some cases the response seems to favor a stance of moral relativism. SUNAN concluded that morality is all based on one's value system and that these value systems can be consciously or unconsciously manipulated and changed depending on the aim that is being pursued. Establishing easily manipulated value systems as the foundation for moral decision making leaves morality on shaky ground. SUNAN elaborates how the course helped to "*open your eyes just to see how other people see things because ethics isn't something that is black and white, it's personal*." This approach seems to equate the moral with the subjective and leaves no room for moral objectivity in decision making. WILLIAM described how there is no black and white in ethics and how it is a "*mish-mash of everything.*" WILLIAM laments: "*it's just, there's no right or wrong.*" SASHA described the purpose of the Ethics and Society course as making one aware of other perspectives but agreed that there is no right or wrong, only different points of view. CARL describes experiences in other countries where behaviors that would normally not be accepted in his perspective are taken for granted, leading him to conclude that, "*Just because in Canada or Alberta we have an ethic that we think is normal, that might not be normal somewhere else.*" The unspoken assumption here is that what is normal is ethical and that the foundation for ethics is what is normal in a particular context. What is normal for me is right.

This provides evidence of the ubiquity of individualism in student attitudes which will be explored in more detail below. In the extreme, such a foundation can lead to an avoidance of moral decision making altogether. One participant sums this up as follows: "*With this course, ... if you know that there is going to be an issue, you know to not bring it up . . . respecting their values and culture as well as your own, so it is a win win*" (DERRIK). One is left wondering how win is defined here. Shying away from discord is not likely to yield a moral win of any kind.

Other participants seem to have arrived at more balanced conclusions. TAMRA described spending a lot of time thinking about what is right and wrong and being able to "s*tep back a little*." The notion of stepping back, of establishing a critical distance and reflexivity regarding moral problems, is an encouraging result. Like many other participants, TAMRA identified that there are not necessarily black and white solutions to moral problems, but came to a different conclusion than that expressed by others: *"...there is a scale and sometimes it can be more right and less wrong, it might be right in some situations and not in others and as a* [diverse] *culture I think that that is why we are so difficult*." Other participants also concluded that moral decision making is not necessarily about picking the one right solution but is more about picking the best solution at the time. Understanding the issue from other people's perspective is essential to this ability. DERRIK described becoming more reflexive in the face of diversity: "*... [The class] had an impact on me, […] it helped me identify that you can't make snap decisions on your own personal ethics, because somebody else does something. You have to try and see where they are coming from, what may be their core values, and how they were raised, their culture, their religion, before you can really make a judgement. And until you can do that, you can't really*

[form] *an opinion on their ethics*." The position here is not that an opinion on another's ethics cannot be made, but that it should only be made after proper understanding and reflection.

Participant responses also indicate stronger opinions that leaned toward the belief that, despite evidence of cultural relativism, there is something universal and objective about the ethical domain. "*I think there have to be absolutes, otherwise we can justify pretty much anything we do*" (VIDAL). Specific examples such as slavery and human rights were put forth as examples of scenarios where a right and wrong ought to apply regardless of cultural values (Focus Group 2). Business situations where relativism is not an appropriate response were also presented by participants. The fact that bribery, whether it is acceptable in the field or not, is not accepted by a company code of conduct, "*implies there is a right and a wrong outside of local ethics, so in other words . . . we establish a right and wrong that transcends* [time and place]" (CARL).

Faculty acknowledged moral relativism as a concern. Dr. Averill described how students are often uncomfortable with challenges to their value system and tend to retreat to comfortable ways of thinking and relativism. Students were observed to respond to moral problems with assumptions, beliefs, feelings of powerlessness, and trepidation. "*It's a lack of understanding, maybe misunderstanding – misconception about anything that's not in their immediate dominant realm. And then, they just scapegoat it. Oh, it's just relative, that's the way they do things here. Rather than engaging with things critically and I think there's room to do more*" (Dr. Averill). The common theme of relativism that emerged in the student focus groups seems to support Dr. Averill's conclusions. On a more pragmatic note, a specific risk to moral decision making described by faculty is the misuse of moral language to justify morally questionable decisions when a relativistic belief that there is no right or wrong outside of personal preference prevails.

Dr. Taylor describes how the terms ethics or morals are often heard in the context of a justification for one's questionable actions: "… *that's what I'm always afraid of, is ethics* [ethical language] *being used to rationalize propaganda*?" Students equipped with the language of ethics may be better able to justify morally problematic actions in the cloak of ethical language. When this ethical rhetoric is combined with a belief that what is right is what I believe is right, obvious moral complications can arise. What has emerged from the data is the need to specifically address moral relativism and provide students with the opportunity to deeply engage with the case for and against such a stance.

Individualism

It is not surprising to find individualism as a theme on the mind of students and faculty involved in ethics education. Even the name of the course that focuses this case study, Ethics and Society, hints at a tension between the ethical, as involving the actions of individuals, and society in general. The ideas of humanity, human rights, democracy, and citizenship that are a natural part of a humanistic approach to ethics can serve to obscure the complexity and dissensus that are evident in human pluralism (Todd, 2009). Student comments such as: Who am I to judge, Why should I interfere?; What make my views right?; Why did I turn out this way?: Why do I see things this way?; reveal a strong sense of individualism. This individualism is deeply rooted in a secular humanist worldview and can obscure relationality as an important ethical consideration (Braidotti, 2006). Describing his use of the ethical frameworks that were presented in the ethics course, AHMAD states: "*I took the parts that I liked and I told myself that as long as at the end of the day it doesn't affect other people what I do is between* [me] *and myself so it doesn't matter*". GERARD expresses a similar sentiment: "O*ne of the important things you can do is you can build your own personal code of ethics so it may not be what is wrong out there in*

the world it is what is right and wrong for me and recognizing that." GERARD mentions a personal code of ethics reflecting the centrality of the personal ethical paradigm exercise that is a key component of the Ethics and Society course and is mentioned repeatedly by students and faculty alike. JULIA describes the personal ethics paradigm assignment as one of the first things that is completed in class and a source of repeated reflection and revision. Dr. Styles mentions the importance of a "*notion of personal ethics*" and how "*from that a personal moral compass evolves through reflection, writing and discussion.*" When asked what was indispensable to the ethics course, Dr. Burns responded: "*I think some form of personal ethics statement, however that gets structured, I think is important because I think that kind of self-reflection is important.*" Dr. Burns's response hints at what seems to be the underlying motivation for this focus on personal ethics codes: reflexivity. Dr. Burns expands: "*I think if I would try to pinpoint the most important part of the ethics course, I think the most important component is deconstructing those preconceived notions. Getting the students to a point where they are actually analyzing their own decision making process. I think that if they do that by the end of the course then probably you would have been successful.*" Dr. Burns sees the personal ethics paradigm assignment as a means of having students deconstruct their pre-determined values and reflect on whether they are analyzing the source and significance of these values. He worries about students depending on authority rather than self-reflection and the danger of an uncritical application of received tradition in the ethical realm. Describing the unreflexive student, Dr. Burns states: "*they'll almost always say that my family, my church, my community has taught me the ethics that I use every day and that is a little too simplistic because they are not actually challenging themselves to really analyze the decisions they are making. What they are doing is they are simply superimposing a paradigm that's established.*" Here we see the familiar tension between the

individual and the collective. By focusing on personal ethics, ethics at the individual level,

faculty seem to be striving for some level of self-reflexivity regarding the source and impact of

received values on ethical decision making. If this reflexivity is not achieved the exercise risks

reinforcing an individualistic approach to ethical decision making that lacks a sense of the social

impact of these decisions.

The Content and Expectations of an Education in Morality

Documentation shows that the Ethics and Society course supports both the institutional

and program mandates and is valued by industry as indicated through program advisory

committee minutes. This is offered as an observation and not as an uncritical acceptance of this

support as being unproblematic in itself. Interviews with administration and faculty as well as

focus groups with students corroborate the need and justification for the course. The data

gathered also provides insights into what faculty and students understand to be the aims and

objectives of delivering and receiving an education in ethics. Important subthemes that emerged

regarding the content and expectations of an education in morality include the importance of

moral principles and frameworks, critical thinking, perspective taking, and opportunities for self-

discovery.

Moral principles. Faculty were asked specifically about what parts of the Ethics and

Society course they felt were indispensable and most in need of preservation. Without exception,

the responses indicated that the identification and investigation of moral principles were essential

to an Ethics and Society course but opinions as to the best means of doing this varied. For one

group of faculty, an approach emphasizing the history of moral ideas and moral theory is to be

recommended. Dr. Styles communicated that a "*survey of time line, history of thought, ideas,*

and some dichotomies [such as] *the notion of reason and faith*" are essential to the course. Dr.

Burns expressed doubt about an ethics course having an impact on students' day to day behavior. Instead, "*We can give them the tools, we can give them the theories, we can give them the frameworks, and we can encourage them to use those frameworks when they make their ethical decisions. We talk about Aristotle and a little about Plato, we talk about John Stuart Mill, and Rawls, and WD Ross*." Of course, Kant is included in the discussion as well. Reflecting on the apparent Western bias of the frameworks, Dr. Burns stated, "*we are in the West and you know, to some extent, that is where our orientation has to be ... you are in the West and you're going to have a Western perspective*." Dr. Styles agreed with the importance of a Western perspective: "*I think ethics needs to be seen as having a philosophy base and that is essentially the evolution of thought, ...it has to be Western because, ... that's the essence of how business is done here. This is North America, and I think it's [incumbent] on us as a Western-based institution to give the students what they need to function here*." Noting the gender and species bias of the course content, Dr. Averill describes some innovation: "*We had a little bit of feminism and I threw in a little bit of environmentalism just from my own point of view*," but describes the course content as coming from a "*very Western, white, upper class, male, European point of view*."

The Ethics and Society course is described by all faculty as coming from a so called Western perspective but an understanding of the history of ethics and an understanding of Western ethical theory was not identified as the outcome of primary importance by any. The results of a philosophical approach that seem most important to faculty are an exploration of core moral principles, a multi-perspective approach, the interrogation of ideas, self-reflection, and critical thinking. Dr. Taylor described the "*heart of the course*" as the "*core principles*" and "*the multiple perspective approach, the dialectic approach, in other words the perpetual questioning and revisiting of decisions. Those core principles can't be tinkered* [with]. *... you start tinkering*

with those, you're not really teaching an ethics course anymore." Dr. Taylor also mentioned

outcomes that are not specifically moral in nature such as the "*ability to communicate openly the*

reasoning behind your decisions." This was said to "*set the ground work for really strong*

interrogation of ideas, and for principles, and applications, as you move forward.… And I think

if it's done well, it can be a completely disruptive course. And I think disruptive in a very positive

way." The ultimate goal of the program was described as "*to bring forward that group of leaders*

out of these courses that are willing to challenge authority in a critical, thoughtful, articulate

way" and it was stated that the Ethics and Society course provided the foundation from which

this goal may be realized. This opportunity for disruption is informed by Badiou (2002). As we

have seen, an ethics that prioritizes evil over good and seeks ways to preserve the fragile subject

from harm is conservative by nature. Opportunities to disrupt this conservatism, to hold open

positive alternative possibilities in ethics, that challenge authority and tradition in "*critical,*

thoughtful, articulate" ways, ought to be pursued in an Ethics and Society class.

Faculty use a variety of methods including case study approaches (Dr. Burns), the Baird

Ethical Lens Inventory (Dr. Gomez), and an introduction to the theoretical frameworks of major

Western philosophers (all). Faculty were unanimous in expressing the need to apply an ethical

decision making process at some point in the course to bridge the gap between theory and

practice. When participants were asked about the impact that the ethics course had on them,

responses indicated a general appreciation for the philosophical approach. Participants often

reported that the class was the first time they were exposed to a systematic investigation of

ethics: "*I* [had] *no firm references before this class for any of the ethics we discussed*"

(GERARD). The introduction of philosophical frameworks such as deontology, utilitarianism,

and virtue ethics introduced a language and common understanding that structured discussions.

"*I liked how* [Dr. Averill] A *went through all the different ethical frameworks and read a little about each one so we were able to define it using a word*" (SAMIR). Classroom experiences of the ethical frameworks include recollection of being presented with moral problems and being asked to investigate these from the perspective of particular ethical frameworks such as deontology, or utilitarianism (Focus Group 1). Participants described how the language itself fades from memory if not used but the frameworks themselves remained accessible when needed. "*Once the class is done I think you start to fall back into your life, ...but I think what you learned is always there and ... when you are confronted with an ethical situation then you start thinking about the class and what you learned*" (WILLIAM).

A generally favorable reception to the ethical frameworks used in the class in question was not without its challenges. The responses of many participants indicate a lingering confusion over the intent of introducing these frameworks. Many seem to think that they were to use the frameworks to identify their own moral orientation and use the tools specific to this orientation to evaluate moral problems. "*I found out what to call my ethical beliefs, ...what categories they fit under, ...by taking the class I was able to identify where I would fit*" (PAULO)**.** This seems to be a common struggle: "*If you try to categorize each person under one system you have to either take all of its values and all of its negativities or you have to be multi-disciplined right . . . then how do you define yourself*?" (PAULO). This type of response seems to indicate that some participants view the ethical lenses as categories or exclusive frameworks from which to make decisions rather than lenses to supplement decision making and shed light on different moral problems. "*One thing I learned from the class was what I am. I had ethical values but now I think that I have ethical values that relate closely to this framework*" (AHMAD). On the other hand, some participants expressed a more reflective lesson learned from exposure to different

ethical frameworks. They were able to recognize the strength of having a variety of frameworks to examine an issue and expressed concern with being pigeonholed into one category. They would resist statements such as "I am a utilitarian" in favor of applying different lenses to moral problems to see what insights could be gained. "*I . . . came away with . . . tools of how I should consider different situations. . . . I didn't really come away saying I need to think like this, I came away with tools saying these will help me make the best decision that I can, . . . in a variety of situations with a variety of . . . people from all over the world*" (LARS). This type of attitude is more reflective of what one would hope a student of Ethics and Society would come away from a course with, but, based on student feedback, the mark has been missed in many cases.

The notion of business ethics. The context of the Ethics and Society course is a management program and a large part of the course focuses on so called business ethics. Faculty were divided on whether this applied business focus is appropriate. Dr. Taylor was passionate in his response:

> *What the hell is business ethics, how's it distinguished from* [Ethics and Society].
> *…The core principles aren't different … I would argue … sometimes the business culture tries to obfuscate ethical questions by claiming there's a business ethics. I just don't think there is. I think if anything … by calling something business ethics you're actually doing it a disservice.*

Dr. Styles saw little use in teaching ethics in a "*narrowly defined or labeled* [way]*, …as in medical ethics, or bus driver ethics, or photography ethics, or marketing ethics; the common denominator is still issues of decision making.*" For him, the notion of business ethics must still focus on the key skill of making moral decisions. Dr. Burns has a somewhat divergent opinion: "[*I*]*t's an ethics course but it is more specifically a course on business ethics and that implies*

certain boundaries; ...we are looking at ethics in business; ...we have to keep that business focus

first and foremost. We have a lot of examples, case studies, models that we can talk about that

put business decisions into an ethical framework. We can talk about Enron or WorldCom, all

those things that failed, all those companies that failed and analyze where they went wrong." Dr.

Gomez describes a curriculum that is "*narrowly focused on workplace ethics, very business*

focussed, on employee responsibilities, or ethics around whistleblowing." While he sees merit in

these topics as case studies it is the actual ethical decision making that is the focus of the course.

Dr. Taylor reiterates his position of the potential downside of a business ethics focus: "*...unless*

you have a business ethics course that is willing to admit that socialism is a viable alternative to

a mercantile culture, I don't really think you have a course. I think you have propaganda at

some point." Here again we see opportunity for disruption. Questions of the role that business

plays and how this contributes to, or detracts from, a good life are legitimate ethical topics if

approached through a critical lens. Ways of examining ethics and moral decision making that are

flexible enough to meet the needs of future leaders and managers without closing down the

possibility for new discovery are needed.

Self discovery. Faculty were unanimous in expressing opportunity for self-discovery and

self-reflection as key components to the Ethics and Society course. Dr. Styles described a

primary goal of the course as "*the opportunity for discovery and I mean self-discovery,*

fundamentally." Contributing factors include "*the notion of personal ethics, moral compass*

development, and being conscious of decisions, ... not doing things on the basis of habit, ...[and]

the notion of reflective practice." Dr. Burns agreed that self-reflection and the analysis of

decision making processes was of primary importance. Dr. Taylor sums up emergent themes:

"*Really, at the end, this becomes a course about critical thinking, reflexivity,* [and]

understanding the negotiation that goes into ethical decision making." Here we see support for

the self-problematization called for from both a postmodern perspective (Bauman, 1993), and a

critical cosmopolitan perspective (Delanty, 2009). Faculty described the importance of the

course in challenging the kind of thinking that students become accustomed to in diploma level

courses. Prior to entering the degree program students are generally involved in hands-on

technical training that engages their problem solving abilities but does little to stimulate self-

reflection (Dr. Averill). The Ethics and Society course provides opportunities for students to see

issues from a variety of perspectives and, through reflection, to shed light on what may be blind

spots in their current way of seeing things. In responding to the question of why the Ethics and

Society course is a required, core course in the program, Dr. Zhou responded: "*The ethics course*

is one of those foundational courses that forces [students] *to think. It's one of those 'I don't know*

what I don't know' [situations]*, it is sort of opening up that awareness.*" Several faculty

commented on the importance of the Ethics and Society course in the context of the degree

program. Dr. Taylor commented that "*It's probably the most valuable course you guys teach. ...*

[It serves to] *set the foundation for everything else, I really believe that. I believe that you get*

them thinking, you get them willing to ask questions, and you get them willing to challenge

assumptions and authority."

The importance of moral principles and frameworks, critical thinking, perspective taking,

and opportunities for self-discovery were common themes that interview and focus group

participants discussed but a variety of concerns are evident. The use of a Western framework

focussing on Aristotle, Mill, and Kant, with some instances of Rawls, JD Ross, and Noddings

being introduced as the primary way to expose students to ethical decision making frameworks

was common. Despite this commonality there seems to be little reflection or agreement on how

these frameworks are to be applied to the personal and professional lives of the students. It seems that a history of philosophy approach is commonly adopted without reflection on what the intended outcomes of the course are. Outcomes seem to indicate that understanding and applying these frameworks are what is important but a clear understanding of the role and aims of moral education has not been expressed. The question was posed earlier in this study: What room is there in education for a quest for truth when that truth is already laid out in pre-defined outcomes arrived at through an 'ethics of necessity?' If an unreflective adoption of the explication and application of Western moral philosophy is pursued, the opportunity for new truths to emerge is encumbered. An equally troubling issue that emerged from the data is the students' tendency to essentialize the frameworks they are introduced to and closely identify with one or another framework without critically interrogating the problems that may arise from such an approach.

Criticality

Critical thinking was a theme that both faculty and students indicated as an essential part of the Ethics and Society course. Dr. Zhou indicates that some of the key outcomes of the course are thinking critically about decisions, analyzing moral problems from different perspectives, and making decisions based on not just economics but also environmental, sustainability, ethical, and global considerations. The language used here reflects the triple bottom line thinking, an inclusion of people, and planet, along with profit in business decisions (Elkington, 1999), that seems to be common to many courses in the host program. "*Decisions can be made based on cost; they can also be made based on environmental impact; they can be made on sustainability impacts; they can be made on how it's going to affect the community. So what we want the students to take away is, as they make these decisions, how did they take all of those things into consideration?*" (Dr. Zhou). The student's ability to think critically and take into account a

variety of perspectives and communicate across these perspectives are important outcomes of the program.

Dr. Taylor describes critical thinking as a key component of the Ethics and Society course and as one of the keys to ethical decision making in and of itself. Dr. Averill expressed a desire for the course to move away from a technical examination of Western philosophers into a more personal examination of why ethics is relevant. She believes that a moral framework is important but a formal review of specific philosophers is not the best way to internalize such a framework. Alternative ways to internalize and apply ethical frameworks is important "*so that they can become critical thinkers because* [morally challenging] *situations are not going to happen like they do in class*" (Dr. Averill).The importance of critical thinking to the course is a common theme expressed by a majority of those interviewed but there is little detail in what is meant by critical thinking. Critical thinking as self-reflection, as dialectic, and as reasoning through ethical problems are mentioned but there is a lack of clarity and consistency regarding critical thinking and its role in the course. Clarity regarding what is meant by critical thinking and how this relates to and supports moral decision making is needed.

Participants also identified critical thinking as an essential part of the Ethics and Society class. They expressed agreement over the need for critical thinking but, like faculty, did not clearly articulate what was meant by the term. Examples of the application of critical thinking included evaluating information sources: "*you have to engage in critical thinking . . . it's the same with the news, somebody owns that newspaper . . . they have an agenda, they are not going to tell you the truth, you have to get your information from different people and decide for yourself what's right and what's wrong*" (TAMRA). TAMRA explained that "*a major theme ... was critical thinking. We really learned that you can't take things at face value.*" Participants

seem to understand critical thinking as "deciding for yourself" and "not taking things at face value." TAMRA described critical thinking as follows: "*…in terms of ethics, … we've all grown up in either a society or family unit that has told us 'this is right and this is wrong' and that's what you believe. …*[A]*s you grow up, and you learn, and you face challenges or people from different cultures, you realize that maybe not everything is as black and white as you had thought it to be and you kind of need to ask questions*." These notions serve as further examples of participants tending to think in individualistic terms. Critical thinking understood as deciding for oneself clearly does not take into account the importance of thinking critically together. A relational approach to critical thinking, an approach that involves dialogue and critical debate, may be necessary to help students reflect on their own culturally and traditionally established blind spots. The use of reasoned reflection when faced with challenges to one's worldview was discussed as both an effective tool and an outcome of the course. Reflexivity is closely related to critical thinking but emerged as a theme in its own right.

Reflexivity

Self-reflection is the most commonly mentioned aspect of critical thinking arising in the interviews with faculty. Dr. Styles describes one of the most interesting aspects of teaching the ethics course as "*seeing changes in awareness. Seeing changes in that not everybody thinks the way that I do*." He doesn't want students to regurgitate ethical theory but rather, "*…as much as possible to learn to think, to challenge, to question and reflect on these issues*." Students should be able to identify their assumptions and ask questions about their source. As mentioned, one tool used to accomplish this in the context of the course is a personal ethics paradigm exercise. Dr. Gomez describes the development of a personal ethics paradigm as the most engaging part of the course, a time when students speak and write from their own background and life experiences

and have a chance to reflect on the source of their values and ethical worldview. He describes the personal ethical paradigm as allowing students to "*start where they're at*" and explore their understanding of right and wrong and the source of this understanding. This is a starting point for reflection. Dr. Zhou describes having students become aware of their belief system and its sources, as well as viewing this belief system through other lenses, as a critical part of the Ethics and Society course. He identifies questions as essential to having students evaluate their own behavior and the behavior of others, "[*t*]*o pause and say 'ok, why am I doing what I am doing?' and, 'is there a different way of looking at it?*'"

Student input indicated that the Ethics and Society course enabled reflection on the source of ethical values and their influence on ethical decision making. Students were able to identify a variety of sources of ethical values including parents; family; friends; peer group; society including political, legal, and socio-economic influences; education; culture; and religion. Questions over whether ethical values were natural as opposed to constructed and the importance of self-reflection in an expanded ethical awareness were also discussed (Focus Group 2). Of all the sources of ethical values discussed, the family was the source that received most attention. For SUNAN, the biggest thing that came out of the course was "*that it is all based on our value system.*" The course "*really makes you think about where your ethical values come from and how you use them to make decisions.*" This notion of a value system that is the result of one's upbringing being the source of determining right and wrong actions was reflected in many participants' comments. Supporting comments include: "*A real foundation tends to be family, … you know how you are brought up basically and . . . you also have a large foundation from your friends*" (PAULO). The notion of parental, family, and peer influence on ethical value formation describes an ethical value system that is relatively non-reflective. The ethical values formed

through familial association are not necessarily questioned yet still operate as the guiding principles that inform all judgements of right and wrong. Opportunities for self-reflection regarding these value sources were encountered in the context of the Ethics and Society course. One participant described reflecting on whether the source of ethical values are natural or truly constructed within the familial context of "*growing up*": "*it really made me reflect on whether or not … I am ethical because it is who I am as a person or if I think I am ethical because it is how I was brought up… it really made me question if my ethical roots are because I am a balanced person or because, you know, my parents were balanced people, and how much of that has been ingrained in me*" (TAMRA). Such reflections indicate a preliminary reflectiveness regarding the source of ethical values leading to deeper analysis on the part of the student. They also indicate an understanding of the relational nature of ethics and how values are constructed through interaction with larger societal units and not simply self-created by an individual.

For other participants "*society dictates what's … ethical*" (WILLIAM). Societal influences on ethical decision making that were discussed included the political, the legal, and the socio-economic. The influence of cultural and societal values on a particular country's legal system was mentioned and some debate over the relation between ethics and law was generated. National boundaries were not seen as the only boundaries that result in divergent value systems. "*Income level, education level, and education level of your peers, parents, and social group*" (HEATHER) were also seen as important value sources. Participants recognized that a diversity of value sources, combined with an endless variety of circumstances that individuals find themselves in, results in a value pluralism that is a challenge to ethical decision making. Another factor contributing to value pluralism that was identified by participants was religion. Participants expressed some frustration and confusion over differentiating the religious domain

and the ethical domain (KWASI). The general tendency of participants seemed to be a comfort level discussing issues of ethics but a hesitancy to discuss religious issues. Personal communication with participants outside of the context of the focus group reveal that some hesitate to discuss religion because they do not want to be identified by their peers as belonging to a particular religious group. The relationship between ethics and religion, or whether they are separate domains at all, seemed to be an area of interest and concern for students but was also a topic causing some trepidation.

Participants described how reflecting on the source of moral values helped them to understand why their values differ from those of others and cultivate an understanding of difference based on this. Differences were described as different lenses of perceiving the world and it was expressed that understanding how these lenses were formed helped to cultivate a deeper knowledge of others. "*Being able to understand where these values* [come from]*, you can understand better how other people work, or how other people will behave in a different situation knowing that there are different lenses of perceiving the world. Doesn't mean that you will understand everybody but at least you will be open to* [thinking] *in a certain way that will allow you to understand this position*" (VIDAL). This reflection on understanding others was complemented by a reflection on how participants understand themselves: "*One of the big things I got from this course* [was]*…, we kind of grow up and we have these ethics of 'this is the right thing to believe.' After this course … I was able to kind of step back and say . . . 'just because it is there because somebody instilled that into you doesn't mean it's right'*" (LARS). Support for deeper reflection in future courses was also expressed: "*I think we spent a lot of time saying, what are your values and your ethics and … not why. I think if we took some time to examine*

why they are maybe we would have gotten a little bit more of a deeper reflection and … a little bit more understanding about other people" (TAMRA).

The aforementioned assignment that required students to create a personal ethical paradigm was confirmed by many participants as the beginning of a process of reflection regarding the source and soundness of their value systems. For VIDAL, the Ethics and Society class provided an opportunity for reflection on his values and how they influence his interactions with those who have different values. The reflection made him realize that he has "*a responsibility to everybody else in the world*" and made him consider how to relate to other humans and the environment. "*It made me realize we are all connected*" (VIDAL). Self-reflection was not as comfortable for all participants: PAULO elaborates: "*…your ethical base is something that is very important to you and when that gets questioned, I mean it really digs down to those sort of base emotions.*" PAULO admits that this is a productive tension that is likely to be repeated in the "real world." The realization that there are right ways and wrong ways of doing things, but the distinction is not clear cut when one's values are challenged by others, is seen as a positive outcome that has pragmatic results. It was noted that no matter how self-reflective one was, it can often be observed that people justify breaches in their own professed values. Having a better moral vocabulary and access to the insights of a wide variety of ethical frameworks is of little practical value if it does not have an influence on behavior. In the words of one participant, "*…when you report on your own ethics, sometimes you can be a bit fuzzy …and you make … white lies in business, to justify to yourself.*" The process of self-reflection can lead to self-deception if pursued on its own. Group feeling on the process was summarized as follows: "*What you are saying is that you can explore your own values but if you are just self-reporting you may not be getting anywhere? If you are exposed to other values you*

have something to compare to, as a benchmark, …you have to actually publicize your views and

that sets a different bar, a different standard and a different conversation to bounce ideas off of"

(Facilitator summary of Focus Group 2). BURK noted that without deep reflection and

interaction with others we may be prone to "*confirmation bias,*" the process of selectively

finding facts and opinions that support one's own point of view. Students are pointing out the

importance of going beyond an inward gazing individualism when discussing ethical issues and

engaging with others as a way to expand one's vision. Generally, participants seemed to think

that the Ethics and Society class did promote self-reflection but that any insights from this self-

reflection were easily overlooked without tools such as dialogue, critical thinking, and the

concept of integrity. In this context, the necessity of openness to other ways of thinking and

perceiving the world emerged as an important theme.

Openness

Open-mindedness has been identified as an important aspect of the critical thinking

required of ethics education by students, faculty, and theory (Hare, 2011). In the context of this

study, open-mindedness can be seen as striving to avoid bias, a willingness to revise one's prior

conclusions (fallibility), recognition of the partial nature of one's knowledge, and the recognition

that unwanted or unwished for conclusions may be reached through inquiry. Openness and

dialogue were identified by faculty as especially important considering the global milieu of the

classroom and the world that students live in. If approached with an open mind, value pluralism

in the classroom allows for interesting content to emerge from a cultural perspective. Dr. Gomez

describes how "*we got into some pretty lively discussions, and you could tell people were*

speaking from their cultural backgrounds and it was cosmopolitan." Dr. Parodi described how,

through dialogue, students were "*able to understand different groups, minority groups better.*

...where they're coming from and why they do the things that they do". Dr. Burns explained the engagement arising from diversity: "*I think the most engaging thing is that there are so many different perspectives culturally and from religious points of view and so on.*" Without openness to different perspectives and ways to engage in dialogue these learning opportunities may be lost. Openness is admittedly an ideal that is to be sought in the classroom but sought in much the same spirit as moral behavior is. A classroom experience can be seen as equipping a student with the intellectual knowledge of what it means to be open, as well as some tools to practice openness, but there are no guarantees that this knowledge, or these tools, will actually be applied to the task of being open-minded.

Participant comments were informative regarding openness. Openness was described as understanding spurred by an interest in new ideas; as a means to compare and contrast new ideas with one's own values and beliefs; and as a source of reflection when confronted with new ideas. While all three descriptions of openness can be considered desirable it is openness as a source of reflection that implies the greatest depth of thinking. Many participants described a greater depth of understanding of other worldviews as a result of the Ethics and Society course. One participant described a better understanding of the source of other's values as providing a foundation for understanding how they work and behave in different situations and the value of "*knowing that there are different lenses of perceiving the world.* [This] *doesn't mean that you will understand everybody but at least you will be open to ..., you will think in a certain way that will allow you to understand this position*" (VIDAL). Other participants experienced similar results: "*I found that this course in a sense made me ... more receptive, open-minded for one, but at the same time just question what* [I was] *being exposed to and to have more of a critical mind*" (BURK). "[The Ethics and Society course] *forces you to learn to respect the other points of view,*

and makes you be more open minded towards other people's perspective . . ." (SASHA). Other participants described being able to compare new ideas to their existing values and beliefs to aid in reflection and gain greater clarity. "*When you understand you can compare what you believe or what you are seeing and what you know; then it will be easier to understand other people ... why they are doing these things and how they believe in these things*" (KWASI). One participant describes her experience thus: "*You are more calm to a different perspective; you start respecting other people and you understand that they have rights. ...You don't have to take it personally. ... you kind of open* [a space] *for yourself*" (LANA). Participants described their experiences with openness in a variety of ways: "*to be open minded and try to always look at the situation from the other side and also the other perspective*" (ZAYD); "*you can compare what you believe and this will* [help] *you to understand people more*" (KWASI). "*For me the big thing I took from the course was just the ability to take that step back and try and see the other person's perspective and maybe not agree with it but at least understand what they are saying and be able to say I understand that's how you feel, but I feel this way. We can agree to disagree but ...maybe there's some commonality here and let's move forward from there*" (WILLIAM).

While many other participants shared similar comments regarding how the course helped them to be more open to other points of view and to develop an understanding of their positions this was not a comfortable process for all. One participant particularly expressed the discomfort felt through encounters with other worldviews: "*You know your own point of view but you are willing to know another point of view ...We say we have to be open-minded . . . but the ethics course for me wasn't so good*" (MARIA). As seen previously, this open-mindedness towards another perspective, if not combined with critical thinking and reflection, may lead to relativism or absolutism. An understanding of what it means to be open, without relinquishing one's ability

to evaluate one's own behavior as well as the behavior of others is necessary in the context of education in morality.

While understanding of other points of view and using these points of view to compare, contrast, and evaluate one's own point of view, were the most common themes mentioned by participants, a few discussed a potentially deeper reflection that occurred as a result of class participation. As students of the class they describe being able to step back from their positions and achieve at least a certain amount of objectivity. "*I think what it did for me was allow me to take a step back and say, you know maybe my values are not the be all and end all of a situation and try to get yourself into their shoes and see what they are thinking before you make a decision*" (DERRIK). Openness to the possibility that one's values may not be "*the be all and end all of a situation*" is a complement to reflexive practice. This position indicates that a student is not necessarily abandoning their value system but is willing to step back and consider other possibilities. It is a step away from dogmatism and towards an open and critical inquiry into the source and substance of values.

Common ground. A subtheme related to reflexivity and openness that emerged from the focus group was the search for a common ground between participants in the ethics course. Many statements suggest that there is common ground to be found in the class: "*Most people are from different cultures but in the end there is some common ground*" (KWASI); "*even different cultures, different religion, there is something common we can work from*" (KWASI). Participants repeatedly mentioned the golden rule as a common ground between different worldviews: "*it really comes down to . . . treat others as you want to be treated*" (DERRIK). Fairness also emerged as a common value that is shared across many boundaries: "*some people say fairness could be one of the values that could be used by everyone*" (ZAYD). Questions that

students struggled with include: "*…are there any universal values that should be set for everyone?*" (ZAYD); *"...how can I respect this person or their views while still having my own*" (DERRIK); "*how do you come together to make something work*" (WILLIAM) when faced with divergent worldviews. Establishing spaces for open-minded dialogue and dissensus will be an integral part of any cosmopolitan minded approach.

Ethical Spaces

Reflection on what kind of space needs to be created for openness and dialogue around moral issues is important due to the many opportunities and risks of the course identified by faculty. Dr. Taylor describes a possible classroom scenario where students from a variety of belief systems: Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, agnostic, and atheist, are "*at each other. ...you're going to have Marxists in there, you have all these pots starting to boil, which is incredibly valuable, but is our ..., post-secondary system designed to handle that?*" In a situation like this, dialogue is about shedding light on partial truths and when asked if something like that is asking too much of an ethics class, Dr. Taylor responded, "*No, no, in theory no, in practice it would be fun, it would be dangerous. ...you have to have a facilitator rather than an instructor then, and the facilitator has to be on game all the time. ... part of the ethical questioning is interrogation of authority, interrogation of bias, interrogation of ... cultural structures, historical structures of thought.*" This type of interrogation can be disruptive and put people at risk. Dr. Averill described instances of verbal "*attacking of the people who had really clearly fallen below the class standard.*" Dr. Parodi described the passion that is evident in the classroom when issues such as gender arise. A classroom that encourages openness, dialogue, and reflexivity is likely to also experience dissensus between students and must be equipped to handle this dissensus. An exploration of frameworks to encourage and manage such rich learning environments is needed.

One interesting theme that emerged as a response to this challenge is the need to create spaces conducive to constructive dialogue. Dr. Taylor explained how "*curriculum within that course has to create space… for everybody's voice to be heard, everybody's voice to be validated, and at the same time everybody's voice to be criticized.*" One barrier to this space, as described by Dr. Taylor may be the perceived role of the faculty as expert and author. Another barrier may be the physical space itself. Dr. Averill mentions the necessity of such a space to handle groups, including movable desks, appropriate technological support, access to film and other teaching tools. The notion of creating spaces in the classroom where moral problems, frameworks, and principles can emerge is interesting. How can spaces be created that allow for these moral structures to emerge from a variety of perspectives? How can a space be created that allows for safe and constructive dialogue around these principles be created? The Ethics Café that was used as the organizing principle for student focus groups in this study is one potential answer to this question. Another possibility, similar in ways to the World Café foundation, is Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry (Andreotti, 2011) to be explored further in later chapters.

Communication. An interesting thread emerged in the conversation that is related to the different ethical themes discussed above and that is the question of what competencies and tools are needed, both in the class and in the field, to encourage engagement with moral themes. The primary competencies mentioned by participants were openness, as discussed above, and communication. Participants also made some suggestions regarding what tools were used in the classroom that were particularly helpful. One aspect of the Ethics and Society class that participants identified as helping them to communicate regarding ethical issues is the language of ethics. The introduction of different ethical frameworks, philosophies, and principles helped students to acquire the language to engage others in moral dialogue. Being able to identify

consequentialist themes, duty based themes, themes of justice, or virtue, allowed them to understand each other better and put their own thoughts into words. It is evident that this language is not sufficient to cultivate good communication. "*I think that if you are not communicating well there's a chance that what you have said is going to be … interpreted the wrong way and may become an ethical issue*" (SUNAN). Participants also mentioned the importance of listening skills. "[the course] *not only taught you how to speak and think about what you're saying* [how to] *really step back . . . and listen, and learn how to proactively listen so you can understand why there is this cultural difference, why there's difference in the values, why we are just going to end up just butting heads*" (WILLIAM). The importance of cultivating effective communication skills in a technological age was summed up by one participant: "*you can't text your way out of an ethical issue in the real world*" (WILLIAM). Any consideration of the creation of ethical spaces needs to consider the importance of communication.

Tools Needed

Participants were able to identify what they believed were the most effective tools that were a part of the Ethics and Society course in addition to making some recommendations for tools they believed could further benefit the course. Based on the discussion above it is not surprising to find that tools to help improve and facilitate communication were recommended. Students identified dialogue as one of the most enriching practices that happened in the class and suggested ways to help improve this practice. It was suggested that team building and trust building exercises were necessary early in the course to help establish an environment conducive to dialogue: One begins by "*building that trust by doing activities and then you can start engaging*" (DERRIK). The need for trust building and setting the stage for dialogue is evident. One method identified that helps facilitate communication building is small group work: "*when*

you first come into a class and you don't know everybody talking to the entire classroom can be really intimidating. Breaking it up into small groups like this you get to know people, it feels safer" (TAMRA). Engagement and empathy on the part of the student was identified as a position that contributes to what is learned in class: "*you have to engage and talk . . . open minded ...we need empathy . . . empathy for the other side*" (BEN). These are both positions that are encouraged through effective listening skills which appears as a technique that may need to be taught to enhance communication in the class.

Summary of Findings

The Ethics and Society classroom is characterized by complexity and uncertainty, partly as a result of diversity in the classroom, partly as a result of the cosmopolitan nature of the world we live in, and partly because of the nature of the moral domain. Faculty are concerned by, and student data confirms, the prevalence of a retreat to moral relativism in the face of this diversity. On the opposite extreme a form of absolutism, a dogmatic belief in one's received tradition, is another possible reaction to this complexity. A strong emphasis on the Western philosophical tradition is evident in both the course content and in the highly individualistic interpretations that many students express when reflecting on their participation in the course. In the context of an education in morality, the notion of what such an education consists of is a necessary first step in managing complexity. A clear understanding of what the reasonable expectations of an education in morality are can help to provide the foundations that are necessary to overcome extreme reactions on the part of students. Critical thinking as a skill to be cultivated and as an essential part of moral reasoning is identified as one of these foundations. A clear conception of what critical thinking means in this context and how it can be implemented is necessary. The importance of a reflexive and open-minded approach to an education in morality in a

cosmopolitan classroom was identified but, as with critical thinking, a clear conception of what these terms mean and how they can be implemented are necessary. Once these preliminary reflections on the ends and contents of an education in morality have been addressed the means of doing so arises. The creation of ethical spaces that recognize multiple ways of knowing, where student voices can be heard, reflected upon, criticized, and potentially revised is a challenge that faces the educator interested in such ends. Chapter five turns to an analysis of these themes.

Chapter 5 – Analysis

A Cosmopolitan Minded Analysis

As an educator interested in a worldcentric approach to ethics education, I have found cosmopolitanism to be an attractive theoretical framework. The move beyond the confines of a national agenda and into a sense of world belonging is enticing not only as a theoretical position but as an educational outcome as well. As a proclaimed reflexive researcher I find it necessary to reflect on this theoretical framework as the first step in conducting a cosmopolitan minded analysis. As we have seen in previous chapters, cosmopolitanism is not without its challenges. The tension of a dual commitment to universal human rights and respect for diversity is fraught with contradiction that threatens the notion of cosmopolitanism itself (Todd, 2009). The analysis of course documentation, supported by student and faculty data, reveals that the theoretical approach favored by the Ethics and Society course being studied heavily favors universalistic, Neo-Kantian models with a strong emphasis on human rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The problem is not that, as originally imagined, a cosmopolitan perspective is not being applied; the problem is that the cosmopolitan perspective being applied is one dimensional and pays too little attention to multi-faceted, embodied subjectivities, grounded in relationality. To prioritize universal human rights and the notion of a universal human subject is to risk prioritizing evil and a narrow conception of what it means to be human (Badiou, 2002). To prioritize pluralism and diversity is to risk relativism and the ability to judge the justness of one's own position and the actions of others. Before conducting a cosmopolitan minded analysis it is necessary to analyze a simple question: Is cosmopolitanism still a useful idea? (Braidotti, Hanafin, & Blaagaard, 2013).

The classical cosmopolitanism that dominates the ethics curriculum through the influence of Kant is a form of humanism that imagines a universal human subject expected to appear and behave suspiciously like the white, European, able-bodied male that is often its champion (Braidotti, 2013). The history of colonialism that establishes this ideal man, and the dominating hierarchies that support him, to fulfill the civilizing mission of bringing enlightened reason and economics to the somehow less than human masses deals another blow to the cosmopolitan sympathizer (Mignolo, 2011). From yet another perspective, Harvey (2009) illuminates the synergy between the new cosmopolitanism, often pointing to the European Union as a shining cosmopolitan example, and a totalizing neoliberal economic agenda that it originally sets out to critique. Institutional, program, and course level documentation indicate that the neoliberal agenda is strongly supported by the Ethics and Society course that focuses this case study. A resurgent neoliberal agenda, evident in the austerity measures introduced as a response to the world economic crisis, "have rendered the ideal of belonging to a harmonious global community of cosmopolitan citizens naïve at best, at worst simply futile" (Braidotti et al., 2013, p. 1). The doubt cast on this ideal is not a fatal blow to cosmopolitanism. Two things can be stated about cosmopolitanism with confidence: 1) the idea is robust, attested to by its 2500 year history; and 2) it is not limited to the ideal of a global community of cosmopolitan citizens (Braidotti et al., 2013). The world is caught in the paradox of increasing global fragmentation combined with a complex interdependence on a scale never before seen. These actually existing cosmopolitan conditions require thoughtful responses and the longing for a response that can be described as cosmopolitan remains. In the context of this study, the response to actually existing conditions in an ethics classroom, is referred to as cosmopolitan minded in recognition both of the dissensus of

what the word cosmopolitanism means, and the simultaneous longing for a response that can never the less be considered cosmopolitan in nature.

This study has prompted a re-imagination of cosmopolitanism, attempting to retain those elements that are most constructive to a cosmopolitan minded approach to post-secondary ethics education while moving beyond a strictly classical model. Braidotti et al. (2013) describe the context of dissenting perspectives in contemporary cosmopolitan discourse:

> The basic tension that all of these perspectives address is that between the universalistic, rationalist Neo-Kantian transcendental cosmopolitan models, on the one hand, and the multi-faceted, affective cosmopolitics of embodied subjectivities grounded in diversity and radical relationality, on the other. (p. 2)

The ethics classroom is one of the places where actually existing cosmopolitan conditions are "immanent to the material conditions of global interdependence" (Braidotti et al., 2013, p. 2). This vision of an immanent cosmopolitanism acknowledges the strong critique of Neo-Kantian perspectives as seen in Mignolo (2011), Badiou (2002), Santos (2014), and Todd (2009), while recognizing that there is much that is useful to be retained from this tradition. What is to be retained, primarily embodied in moral principles as outlined by Barrow (2007), is supported with an "affective cosmopolitics of immanent embodied subjectivities" (Braidotti et al., 2013, p. 2). Badiou (2002) provided the primary critique of the Kantian legacy in ethics as summarized in chapter 2. The Kantian notion of a universal human subject, defined by reason, and able to apply that reason to the construction of a moral universalism designed to protect against evil is the classical cosmopolitan vision and champion of conservatism that Badiou argues against. This vision of the rational, universal human subject, that is the bearer of human rights in the form of

liberties, does not allow for the emergence of new possibilities; it focuses on the transcendent at the expense of the immanent. Resistance to this notion of a cosmopolitan universality that essentializes what it means to be human has taken the form of Marxist critiques of the role of economics in creating class hierarchies, feminist critiques of the masculine bias of humanism, and postcolonial critiques of the Eurocentric bias of this so called universal human subject (Braidotti et al., 2013). Braidotti et al. (2013) call for a cosmopolitanism that is "concerned with specificity rather than generality, groundedness rather than abstractness, engagement rather than distance, and interaction rather than reflection" (p. 3). As an aid in imagining this grounded approach to ethics education an analysis of the role of human rights in ethics education as revealed by this case study follows.

Dialogue on Human Rights

The review of course documentation revealed a strong human rights theme throughout the Ethics and Society course that provides focus for this case study. The interrogation of rights and responsibilities in the workplace, supported by material such the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provincial human rights legislation, and related sections in a business ethics text book (Desjardins, 2014) plays a significant role in the course curriculum. The integral function that the notion of human rights plays in the ethics curriculum requires a theoretical perspective on human rights as a necessary part of data analysis.

Todd (2009) describes the notion of human rights as incomplete and in need of continual critique, especially regarding the exclusions that are committed in the name of humanity (p. 54). Derrida (2001) critiques human rights constructs in order to interrogate the notions of the human subject inherent in these constructs. This interrogation in no way denies the need for human rights.

We must (*il faut*) more than ever stand on the side of human rights. We need (*il faut*) human rights. We are in need of them and they are in need, for there is always a lack, a shortfall, a falling short, an insufficiency; human rights are never sufficient. Which alone suffices to remind us that they are not natural. They have a history – one that is recent, complex, and unfinished. From the French Revolution and the first Declarations right up through the declaration following World War II, human rights have been continually enriched, refined, clarified, and defined (women's rights, children's rights, the right to work, rights to education, human rights beyond 'human rights and citizens' rights, and so on). To take this historicity and this perfectibility into account in an affirmative way we must never prohibit the most radical questioning possible of all the concepts at work here. (Derrida, 2003, pp. 132-133)

The observation that human rights are incomplete and subject to enrichment and refinement applies also to cosmopolitanism. Conceptualizations of the human subject and humanity that are intertwined with contemporary human rights discourse are likewise prevalent in cosmopolitan discourse. Todd (2009) asks how we can envision humanity in more inclusive ways without forswearing human rights in the process. This is also the task that confronts the cosmopolitan minded educator. The universality of human rights, based on a unitary vision of the human subject, serves to exclude those who are seen as missing the mark set by the ideal. Todd (2009) explains that "a critical commitment to rights emanates from a concern for particular others that are excluded in the name of this universality" (p. 55). A cosmopolitan minded approach to education ought to have a critical commitment to rights with a particular concern for those who may be excluded by dominant discourses. In the ethics classroom this involves a

questioning of who and what is excluded through the dominance of a Western theoretical

discourse. In a vein similar to that taken by Todd regarding rights, the problem becomes how we

can envision ethics education in more inclusive ways without forswearing the contributions made

by the history of moral philosophy? Lévinas (1994) outlines an approach to rights that focuses on

relationality rather than individualism. It is in the encounter with an Other that responsibility

emerges. Todd (2009) explains that this approach "gestures to the idea that rights are born in this

proximal encounter instead of being located in a conception of my own autonomous freedom"

(p. 63). Rights in this way are born of co-responsibility rather than ego-entitlement. The idea of

freedom, so often mentioned in tandem with human rights, arises when "the I escapes the

entrapment of its own limitations by encountering and welcoming the other as other. …Our

capacity to exceed ourselves – therein lies our capacity for freedom" (Todd, 2009, p. 63). Ethics

and morals have a critical role to play in such a system of rights. Ethics is the right of each and

every human being to be, the moral life is the responsibility we all bear in defending this right

for all. Todd (2009) endorses "educating for the other's right to be" (p. 64). Rather than teaching

moral decision making matrices, an ethics education that strives to empower another's right to be

will search for ways to renew and expand the boundaries of justice and the scope of moral

concern beyond the borders established by ego-centric and ethno-centric concern. Todd (2009)

advocates for a form of human rights education, and by association ethics education, that moves

away from deducing appropriate action from principles and toward an emphasis on

communicative practice. As a component of communicative practice, moral principles are not a

priori phenomena waiting to be discovered by the practitioner, but are open, fluid, and take form

through dialogue. A grounded, engaged, and interactive cosmopolitanism describes an approach

appropriate to an ethics classroom and this is the type of cosmopolitan minded approach recommended below.

The idea of ethics education as communicative practice is supported by data gathered from faculty interviews and student focus groups. Recall from Chapter Four, Dr. Taylor's call for a space in the ethics classroom where everyone's voice can be heard, validated, and critiqued. The same faculty member questioned whether our post-secondary system is designed to handle the conflict that is bound to arise in such a classroom. Student focus group data (SUNAN), as well as program advisory committee documentation, attest to the importance of being able to handle diversity and pluralism in the professional lives of students. Future leaders need the tools and experience to deal with contestation in the moral domain and the ethics classroom provides the opportunity to build the conceptual and language tools necessary for the task. The analysis that follows engages with themes emerging from student and faculty data using the cosmopolitan minded theoretical framework outlined above.

Toward a Comfort with Uncertainty: Beyond Universalism and Relativism

Students and faculty involved in ethics education describe an environment characterized by complexity and uncertainty that often leads to moral relativism. Students are reported to be frustrated by a curriculum that leaves them with no clear direction or answers in the moral domain. I interpret this frustration to be a manifestation of the "fault lines of a divided modernity" (Todd, 2009, p. 23) that struggles with the dual commitment to universal truths about humanity which are expected to lead to certainties, and the commitment to plurality that brings into conflict different cultural understandings and leads to divergent conclusions. Students and faculty are caught up in the ambivalence that results from the dual commitment to universality and particularity as well as their resulting philosophical commitments: universalism and

relativism. It is not uncertainty that I propose needs to be overcome, it is the comfort with uncertainty required of both students and faculty that needs to be the focus of change. Santos (2002) describes a key premise of a subaltern cosmopolitan approach: "it is imperative to transcend the debate on universalism and cultural relativism" (p. 46). The document review in Chapter four identifies the universalistic approach to ethics as embodied in Kant, Mill, and Rawls as playing a dominant role in post-secondary ethics education. Student doubt regarding this approach is evident in the data. WILLIAM asks "*who am I to say it is right or wrong?*"; AHMAD worries about how it is fair for him to judge the actions of others; and HEATHER wonders "*what makes my views right and theirs wrong*". These are questions that linger for them after taking a course based on universalistic principles. They are left wondering "*where do you draw the line?*" (AHMAD). The relativist conclusion that many arrive at is that "*ethics isn't something that is black and white, it's personal*" (SUNAN). I agree that ethics is not black and white but do not share the student's opinion that it is something that is strictly personal. I share Santos's (2002) desire to transcend the focus on universalism and relativism with an approach to ethics education that helps students become more comfortable with uncertainty while at the same time feeling empowered by their ability and obligation to judge their own actions and the actions of others regarding their moral worthiness (Todd, 2009). The ethics classroom is a place where individuals with multiple ways of seeing the world are gathered in one place to share ideas and learn to live together. This space and its conditions constitute an actually existing cosmopolitanism. As a first step toward outlining a cosmopolitan minded approach that responds to the issue of relativism, a distinction between ethics and morals is made. Ethics is imagined to be concerned with the question of what it means to live a Good life. This question will undoubtedly be answered in a multitude of different ways based on the differences that exist

between people and their ways of life. The moral involves consideration of constraints that may be necessary to allow others the best chance of living a version of the Good life that may be in disharmony, or incommensurable, with one's own. The moral does involve the Other and involves principles that no longer allow one to be completely indifferent to difference. Barrow's (2007) approach to moral education offers some help in understanding student frustration by emphasizing that moral problems do not always have clear cut solutions. The relativist makes the critical observation that any one individual is privy to a limited insight into the moral domain and because of the limited nature of our insight we can make no absolute claims to certainty. The breakdown in the relativist position is the jump from the observation of uncertainty in the moral domain to the conclusion that there is no moral truth (Barrow, 2007). The fact of a degree of moral uncertainty does demand openness to other articulations of what it means to be moral, but we need not assume that this uncertainty means that moral judgments are relative and arbitrary. Barrow (2007) presents a compelling vision of moral education that embraces uncertainty without abandoning the idea of defensible moral conclusions.

Frustration arises in the ethics classroom when the exercise of moral judgment is unable to provide clear answers. The result is often the assumption that moral judgment then is just a matter of preference and if certainty is not achievable then "who am I to interfere?" Barrow's (2007) approach to moral education emphasizes the fact that moral dilemmas are often encountered where there is no clear solution; we simply cannot say for certain what the right thing to do is. These aporia may arise when there are disagreements over facts, which is not necessarily a moral issue, but they also arise when moral principles clash and there is no way of prioritizing one principle over another. This inability of moral theory to give precise direction is a result of the circumstances of a particular case and not an indictment of moral theory as a

whole. The lack of unequivocal direction for action in one case does not eliminate the possibility for clear moral decisions in other circumstances and ought not to lead to a conclusion of relativism.

Students of moral philosophy are also often frustrated by cases when what seems right to do does not seem to be a good thing to do. Barrow's approach to moral education distinguishes between acts that can be considered good and acts that can be considered justified. Alarm bells go off as we consider the possibility of an education in morality becoming an education in moral rhetoric that allows people to justify acts of questionable moral integrity. What distinguishes moral rhetoric from moral justification is an appeal to moral principles and defense through public dialogue and debate. Barrow (2007) states that "the distinction between this (an act that is intrinsically bad or wrong but justified by the context) and an act that is inherently right is so important that it should be marked by distinct language, so I shall refer to the former as a justified act and only the latter as a right or good act" (p. 48). By pointing out that justified acts are not always good acts, Barrow (2007) outlines a pragmatic moral philosophy that recognizes real world dilemmas and the challenging choices that they require. This recognition of the complexity of moral decision making is a key outcome of an education in morality that can open students to the possibility of moral truth without succumbing to the comfort of dogmatism or the skepticism of relativism that the data indicates is common. Students benefit from understanding that there are circumstances where real dilemmas arise in the moral domain and that these circumstances don't foreclose the possibility for confidence in moral decisions in other cases. This understanding may help students to explain their uncertainty but I believe that to transform that uncertainty into an asset something more is required.

From Uncertainty to Incompleteness

Uncertainty in the moral domain need not lead to moral relativism. TAMRA described solutions to moral problems that are "*more right and less wrong.*" Some participants expressed confidence in applying the best solution available at a given point in time, even though this may not be the best solution overall, and the importance of the input of other people in arriving at this solution. What I believe these participants are describing are the limits to our decision making abilities imposed by the incompleteness of our knowledge. Santos's (2014) notion of an "ecology of knowledges," mentioned in Chapter three, plays an illuminating role in the transition from uncertainty to incompleteness. Santos (2014) describes "epistemologies of the South [that] are built on two main procedures: ecologies of knowledges and intercultural translation" (p. 188). Both of these procedures contribute to making sense of the data gathered from study participants. From the point of view of the ecology of knowledges, "all knowledges have internal and external limits" (Santos, 2014, p. 189). Internal limits to a knowledge system arise from what is not yet known, but may at some point be known, from within the particular knowledge system. External limits to a knowledge system arise from what is not yet known, and is rendered unknowable from within the system. Student participants express frustration with uncertainty in the moral domain, the lack of clearly right and wrong answers that are available to them through the tools provided by their studies. My analysis of this dilemma indicates that what students are experiencing as uncertainty results from the external limits that result from a hegemonic application of the Western philosophic tradition to moral problems. The application of utilitarian, deontologic, and contractarian logic to moral problems does not yield certain answers to all moral problems. My contention is that this uncertainty is a result of the incompleteness of these ways of knowing. In the context of human rights, Santos (2002) claims that "to raise the

consciousness of cultural incompleteness to its possible maximum is one of the most crucial tasks in the construction of a multicultural conception of human rights" (p. 47). In a similar vein, my claim is that raising the consciousness of the incompleteness of any given moral framework to the maximum possible level is a crucial outcome in a cosmopolitan conception of ethics. As revealed by the data in Chapter four, both students and faculty express an appreciation of the application of the Western philosophical frameworks to moral problems. An ecology of knowledges approach does not require abandoning these frameworks; what it does require is a recognition of the incompleteness of the knowledge available through these frameworks and a call for dialogue with other ways of knowing.

The application and defense of a strictly Western framework reveals an epistemological dominance in the Ethics and Society course as described by faculty. Justification for the application of Western frameworks is primarily geopolitical; we are here in North America and students need to learn how things are done here. This defense reveals a strong bias toward socialization and qualification as the desired ends of the Ethics and Society class. It is assumed that students need to learn a particular way of thinking about ethics. The subjectification of the student (Biesta, 2010), the coming into being of an ethical subject, seems to be secondary. Different ways of knowing are marginalized in favor of the specific frameworks of deontology and utilitarianism. To be fair, faculty have made an effort to introduce different frameworks into the course but these seem to be supplements to the dominant themes gleaned from Western philosophy. What happens to student's ethical experiences and intuitions that do not fit into the Western frameworks? A curricular and pedagogical question that arises is how space can be made in the classroom for different ways of knowing; epistemologies that don't necessarily fit with the dominant Western philosophies (Santos, 2014). How can epistemological pluralism be

recognized and integrated into the ethics classroom? An approach to ethics education that incorporates a strictly Western ethical framework risks what Peterson (2010) describes as an oppressive or perverted expression of education located in an ethics of necessity that serves a culture of consensus. If the silencing of other ways of seeing the world is seen as in the best interest of the economic necessities of the time it is deemed as acceptable. Recall PAULO's statements: "*I found out what to call my ethical beliefs,* […] *I was able to identify where I would fit.*" AHMAD also describes learning where they fit, "*I think that I have ethical values that relate closely to this framework.*" How can ethics education be transformed from an exercise in seeing where one fits in a predefined ethical framework to a critical examination of these frameworks and their incomplete nature? Mignolo (2010) encourages border thinking (See Chapter two) to interrogate the rhetoric of modernity that postulates a universal human subject, progress, development, and individualism as guiding principles. The dark side of this rhetoric of modernity is the tendency to view anything that falls short of these ideals as inferior and in need of the enlightenment of a humanistic education. Those who live by a different logic are labelled primitive or underdeveloped and are pushed beyond the borders of what is considered legitimate. Any approach to ethics education that sets up a hierarchy of intelligence in which the instructor's role is to explicate the truth about ethics to an unknowing group of students suffers from the "myth of pedagogy" (Rancière, 1991). This myth of pedagogy is enacted through the curricular choices that are made by faculty; Kant, Mill, Aristotle, and Rawls are imposed as the material from which the student is to learn what is right and wrong, good and evil. The student is assumed to be capable of only an immature judgment of right and wrong, good and evil and must be guided, through the Western classics of moral philosophy, to a mature vision of the ethical. One of the primary tasks of the teacher of an ethics class is to will the student to the realization that

their own intelligence is equal to the task of answering the query: What does it mean to live a good life? The cosmopolitan minded approach to such a task is to proceed using Rancière's axiom of the equality of intelligence and to search for signs that confirm the axiom. It is the authority and will of the teacher as manifest in the curriculum and pedagogy applied, not their content expertise that best serves this purpose. Pursuing answers to the question of the Good life, in dialogue with other intelligences that are equal to the task, sets the stage for a cosmopolitan minded education in ethics. The intellectual emancipation called for by Rancière (1991) requires an appropriate epistemological pluralism. Without an epistemic pluralist approach such as an ecology of knowledges, the educational institution becomes the guardian of the line between acceptable forms of thinking about ethics, reason in the forms promoted by the Western canon (Kant, Mill, Rawls), and other ways of imaging a good life. If this is the role the institution assumes, that makes me, as an instructor, a border guard between this side of the abyssal line and the other. Santos (2014) reminds those playing the role of border guard that "the understanding of the world by far exceeds the West's understanding of the world" (p. 164). This understanding represents the first crucial step in the transition from discomfort with uncertainty to awareness of epistemological incompleteness. The principles and processes of Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry (OSDE) (Andreotti, 2011) provide tools that support such an approach.

OSDE principles and processes help the teacher to set up a space for discussion of ethics and morals that does not require a predetermined system or code and that does not require consensus. Self-transformation of understanding, through the application of the equal intelligence of each participant, is the goal. The principles of the legitimacy of the knowledge that students already possess, recognition of the partial nature of this knowledge, and an openness to question the origins and relevance of this knowledge form the basis for a critical

engagement with one's own moral principles and those of others. The work of Andreotti (2011) will be returned to later in this chapter as a response to the need for frameworks open to epistemic pluralism. The recommendations in Chapter six also offer ideas on how a Western ethical framework can be integrated alongside other epistemological frameworks in the pursuit of answers to the question of what it means to live a good life.

The Reflexivity Required of Incompleteness

The process of raising the consciousness of the incompleteness of any particular understanding of ethics as a crucial outcome of a cosmopolitan approach to ethics education is in harmony with the importance of criticality and reflexivity as expressed by both student and faculty participants. Dr. Burns describes the importance of "*deconstructing ... preconceived notions*," analyzing the impact of received values, and problematizing the decision making process as markers of a successful ethics education. Dr. Taylor identifies critical thinking, reflexivity, and the negotiation involved in ethical decision making as the key factors for an ethics class along with the willingness to challenge assumptions and authority. Dr. Zhou describes ethics education as an opportunity to explore situations that open up an awareness expressed as "*I don't know what I don't know.*" New truths emerge from the void that exists in one's way of knowing (Badiou, 2002). The illumination of such blind spots is contingent on the ability to admit to the incompleteness of one's received understanding. Santos's (2014) summary of ecologies of knowledges is in harmony with these observations: "At the core of ecologies of knowledges is the idea that different types of knowledge are incomplete in different ways and that raising the consciousness of such reciprocal incompleteness (rather than looking for completeness) will be a precondition for achieving cognitive justice" (p. 212). Knowledge as a means of intervention in the world as opposed to a description of the world is a cornerstone of

Santos's (2014) ecology of knowledges. From the point of view of ethics, knowledge as a means of intervention draws attention to the incompleteness of any specific form of knowledge and reflection on the incomplete nature of one's received knowledges regarding ways to intervene in the world is a form of reflexivity described by faculty above. I propose that an ethics education involves students developing an understanding of the incompleteness of their knowledge of the moral domain and developing strategies to broaden this understanding. Santos (2014) makes a statement that succinctly describes the type of reflexivity I believe faculty desire from ethics education: "Since no single type of knowledge can account for all possible interventions in the world, all knowledges are incomplete in different ways" (p. 201). Establishing a consciousness of incompleteness of one's own received tradition, as well as the frameworks taught in the course, as opposed to a quest for certainty in the ethical domain becomes the aim of an ethics education based on ecologies of knowledges. As forms of ethical knowledge, the ethical frameworks that are examined in an ethics course are to be understood as incomplete in different ways. This is an internal incompleteness evident in the form of ethics education revealed by faculty and student participants. As seen above, students often interpret the frameworks as a type of matching game where they identify the framework that they most closely identify with and claim it as their own in statements such as "I am a utilitarian." An understanding of the incompleteness of each framework will help to achieve outcomes similar to that expressed by LARS: "*I didn't really come away saying I need to think like this, I came away with tools saying these will help me make the best decision that I can.*" This outcome addresses the internal incompleteness that is evident in the current approach to ethics education revealed by participants. It does little to address the external incompleteness that may exist in ethical

interventions that are not evident to the Western philosophical tradition. As revealed on several occasions, it is a sense of this external incompleteness that is the origin of this study.

Towards a Dialogical Response to Incompleteness

Students and faculty identified open-mindedness and dialogue as crucial aspects of ethics education but were not clear on what this meant. Hare (2011) defines open-mindedness as "an intellectual virtue that reveals itself in a willingness to form and revise our ideas in the light of a critical review of evidence and argument that strives to meet the elusive ideals of objectivity and impartiality" (p. 9). Closed-mindedness is evident in efforts to seek reasons to support conclusions that are dogmatically held and considered settled (Hare, 2011). The tension between open-mindedness and absolutism is clear. Any inquiry that restricts itself to gathering evidence to support an already existing belief that is held to be absolutely true is not open-minded inquiry. The connections between open-mindedness and criticality are also evident. Criticality involves consideration of evidence that calls into question currently held beliefs in a spirit of fallibility, the understanding that what one currently believes is, at the least, not the entire picture, and, at worst, may be completely wrong. "If open-mindedness is to flourish, a concern for truth is vital but it must be understood to mean a commitment to doing our best to establish whether or not a certain belief is indeed true" (Hare, 2011, p. 12). I would add that it must also be understood that even beliefs judged to be true are incomplete and partial. Faculty describe dynamic discussions involving different perspectives in a spirit of fallibility and openness as some of the most engaging parts of ethics education. Students describe becoming more open-minded through their encounters with other worldviews and developing respect for other cultures and ways of life. Participants identify the creation of spaces that are favorable to such discussions, as well as communication skills, as key requirements for the emergence of these rich exchanges. Santos's

(2014) notion of intercultural translation is informative in analyzing what such a space might entail:

> [I]ntercultural translation consists of searching for isomorphic concerns and underlying assumptions among cultures, identifying differences and similarities, and developing, whenever appropriate, new hybrid forms of cultural understanding and intercommunication that may be useful in favoring interactions and strengthening alliances among social movements fighting, in different cultural contexts, against capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy and for social justice, human dignity, or human decency. (p. 212)

Ecologies of knowledges and intercultural translation provide procedures that understand that no one form of knowledge or framework for practice can provide certain guidance in the moral domain. The intersubjective approach suggested answers to two major themes identified by participants: moral judgement in the midst of complexity and uncertainty, and individualism.

Moral Judgement in the Midst of Complexity and Uncertainty.

It is especially important to point out that what is meant by incompleteness and open-mindedness in the context of this study and in the context of the classroom that it investigates is not a "tolerant indifference in the face of disagreement" (Hare, 2011, p. 15). The open-mindedness through intersubjectivity promoted here is openness to possibility. This does not rule out the possibility that others may be wrong, either wholly or in part, and judgment of their beliefs and positions is not ruled out. An unquestioned tolerance of another's position, no matter how indefensible it may seem, is a retreat to a "who am I to say" relativism and counter to a genuine pursuit of ethical understanding. "If open-mindedness is to flourish, we need to remain

clear about the nature of the ideal: receptiveness to ideas must include the critical appraisal of evidence and argument to determine what is worthy of belief" (Hare, 2011, p. 15). As Lukes (2008) observes, without this critical appraisal one is at the risk of moving beyond tolerance to "abstention" (p. 151), the denial of anyone's right to judge the ethical beliefs and moral practices of others. Open-mindedness requires a certain comfort with uncertainty but it is not an uncertainty that paralyzes judgment and action. One is encouraged to take a position and act upon it while being open to convincing evidence either for or against such a position. Uncertainty need not lead to paralyzing doubt; it should lead to a constant effort to improve and revise what is already confidently known. An ecologies of knowledges approach to ethics education, part of the subaltern cosmopolitanism outlined by Santos (2014), does not mean succumbing to relativism or a lack of a hierarchy of knowledge, "it consists of granting 'equality of opportunity' to the different kinds of knowledge involved in ever broader epistemological arguments with a view to maximizing the respective contributions toward building 'another possible world,' that is to say a more just, democratic society" (p. 190).

Achieving Balance between Individualism and Relationality

The predominance of a liberal democratic worldview is evident in course documentation as well as faculty and student data. It became clear that this liberal democratic framework was also the worldview that dominated my own perspective as a researcher; at least early in the study. I interpret this tendency to be the result of the dominant worldview in which the Ethics and Society course was developed. Robinson (2010) describes a liberal cosmopolitan approach to political theory "consisting mainly of deontological liberal and liberal contractualist accounts of justice" (p. 131). Add to this the utilitarian approach imagined by the liberal thinker John Stuart Mill and an account of normative theory that is "almost completely dominated by liberal

approaches" (Robinson, 2010, p. 131) is formed. The end of the Cold War further contributed to the legitimization of liberalism in international politics and solidified its hegemony in normative theory. It is not surprising therefore to see evidence of a dominant liberal consensus characterized by individual autonomy in course documentation, student focus groups, and faculty interviews. Robinson (2010) explains that "liberal ideas of individual (state) autonomy, agency and contractarianism have always been at the heart of both the contemporary international system and the theories through which it is constituted" (p. 133). These theories include the reinforcement of autonomy and agency as manifest in deontological, contractarian, and utilitarian ethical theory. An approach to ethics education that relies solely on these theories reinforces the status quo and includes an uncritical adoption of liberal theory. This is specifically what Badiou (2002) criticizes as "conservatism with a good conscience" (p. 3). Course documentation reveals the use of a human rights discourse in the Ethics and Society course in the case under study. The a priori ability to delineate Evil is of primary importance to the ethics of human rights and Good is defined in regard to the ability to protect against what is consensually regarded as Evil. Badiou (2002) details the presuppositions of the rights based approach: 1) There exists a universal human subject who both suffers evil and is the judge of when and how this evil must be resisted; 2) Good is defined on the basis of Evil; and 3) human rights (and Good) are defined negatively as "rights to non-Evil" (p. 9). This critique is important to the cosmopolitan scholar due to the central role that human rights have played in contemporary cosmopolitan discourse. Todd (2009) notes the importance of thinking critically about what we mean by human rights: "To believe in rights unquestioningly …elides the very issue of their historical formation and puts at risk our ability to engage fully with what rights attempt to rectify – that is, human injustice" (p. 52). Badiou's (2002) critique is not addressed at human rights

directly, but at the historically situated notion of a universal human subject that is the bearer of these rights. It is the individual human subject that is imagined as possessing the right to non-Evil. In this negative conception of ethics the human subject is that which is recognized as a victim. An ethics education fulfilled under these assumptions is not concerned with the coming into being of a subject, the subject pre-exists in a universally recognizable way. Instead, it is interested in explaining the maxims by which evil is recognized. The universal subject that is only capable of recognizing others and itself as potential victims of evil reduces the subject to a flesh and blood (mortal) animal, concerned with the preservation of its corporeality. This preoccupation with evil also limits the subject to a negative ethics leaving no ground to creatively imagine a positive way forward. "The ethical conception of man, besides the fact that its foundation is either biological (images of victims) or 'Western' (the self-satisfaction of the armed benefactor) prohibits every broad, positive vision of possibilities" (Badiou, 2002, p. 14). The paradox of such an ethics is that it serves the status quo; it essentializes the subject as a potential victim of Evil and precludes a vision of the Good as a positive, creative potential. Such a vision limits the role of ethics to the imagination of the human as a mortal animal, a "being-for-death" and shuts down the possibility of the human as "something other than a mortal being" (Badiou, 2002, p. 12). Badiou (2002) proposes that if human rights exist, they ought to be the rights of the Immortal in the human, that which emerges when the human being affirms themselves as "someone who runs counter to the temptation of wanting-to-be-an-animal to which circumstances may expose him" (p. 12).The right in this case is the right to be something other than an animal. A move away from the application of moral frameworks based on the Kantian notion of rights as embodied in various human rights documents, and toward a more grounded,

dialogical approach to ethics education, requires careful attention be paid to the type of space conducive to such an approach.

The Approach: Creating Cosmopolitan Ethical Spaces.

Dr. Taylor supports a dialogical approach but warns that "*it would be dangerous*." What is the nature of this dangerous pedagogy? Radical democratic theorists such as Mouffe (2005) and Rancière (1995) recognize the importance of antagonism in democracy (Todd, 2009). Reflection on their work reveals how conflict in the classroom contributes to the creation of ethical spaces. Todd (2009) examines the educational potential of an engagement with radical democratic theory. Conflict is likely to arise in a classroom engaged in dialogue around different visions of what it means to live a good life. Both students and faculty need tools to help acknowledge this conflict and facilitate it in such a way that it becomes an integral part of an ethics education. What Todd (2009) refers to as "passionate commitments" (p. 103) are likely to play a significant role in student's initial conception of ethics. This is confirmed by faculty and students in their references to "sore spots," "verbal attacks," and conflict arising during classroom discussions. An approach that seeks to minimize or eliminate the antagonism that arises when these passionate commitments come into contact with each other will not prepare students for the antagonism that is bound to arise in social situations characterized by pluralism and difference such as work. Mouffe (2008) proposes a "multipolar" approach in which the ontological condition of the subject is understood to be characterized by plurality and difference from other subjects (Todd, 2009). The starting point is recognition of the actually existing, multi-polar, and pluralistic nature of subjects as opposed to a shared humanity. Dissensus is bound to arise in such a multi-polar community and Mouffe (2000b) shifts the focus from enemy to legitimate adversary with her notion of "agonistic pluralism." Mouffe (2000b) argues that "a

democratic society requires a debate about possible alternatives" (p. 31), including a debate around ethical alternatives to what it means to live a good life, and "conflictual consensus" (p. 121) regarding the meaning of moral principles such as freedom and fairness. Moral principles can be arrived at as a "shared symbolic" that serve as the common bond for an ethics classroom (Mouffe, 2008). Without this shared symbolic the moral sphere is at risk of breaking down (Kane, 2010).

Dissensus: Towards a Dangerous Pedagogy

Todd (2009) proposes the intriguing idea of an ethics of alterity: "conceived in terms of 'interruption' such an ethics lies at the heart of the transformational moment through which antagonism becomes agonism, through which equality as conflict appears" (p. 112). This moment of interruption is the point where moral discourse emerges. The space that we strive to create in the cosmopolitan ethics classroom is the potentially transformative ethical space that emerges when people with different points of view engage in agonistic struggle. This is a space of difficulty: "…the difficulties of judgment itself [are] a central part of any cosmopolitan outlook, acknowledging that it is precisely the difficulties to be countenanced in adjudicating between rights and particular contexts where the heart of cosmopolitan thought truly can be found" (Todd, 2009, p. 139). Transforming engagement between differing views of the good life from antagonism to agonism is a key challenge, and the key moment, for the ethics educator. This is a dangerous space in many ways and a pedagogy that is prepared to enter this space is a dangerous pedagogy. What makes this space dangerous? Critical self-reflection can involve dis-identification, described by Braidotti (2013) as involving "the loss of cherished habits of thought and representation, which can also produce fear, sense of insecurity and nostalgia" (p. 19). One of the risks of a transformative education is the anxiety and resistance that such threats to

personal identity can invoke. For this reason the creation of ethical spaces that take into account

the risk and trepidation that accompany critical self-reflection in the ethical domain are

necessary. This is also a space where the completeness of worldviews is being challenged; it is a

space where power is being interrogated and called on to justify the structures that support it.

These structures are being questioned and challenged in ways that threaten to interrupt, to

disrupt, individual and group doxa. The transformational moment lies at the border between

ethics and morality. Like all borders, it is a place of tension and potential conflict. Todd (2009)

describes the challenge for teachers as taking "responsibility for creating the best possible limit

situations through which passionate perspectives find legitimate outlines" (p. 114). The ethical

space created is a space that must be approached with an assumption of equality. The goal of

dialogue for students in an ethical space is not to win the argument but to engage with others

whose positions may be recognized as different but legitimate: "it is at this point of disjuncture,

where hospitality appears, however fleeting, as a trace of the ethical in the specific relationships

between students" (Todd, 2009, p. 115). Faculty interviews support the creation of spaces that

"get students thinking," get them asking questions, challenging assumptions and authority, as

well as challenging historically structured thought. Students attest to the discomfort of having

their passionate attachments challenged and the risks of confrontation that arrive in these

situations. Antagonism arises naturally in the ethics classroom and what is needed is a way to

transform this moment into an agonistic moment. The space appearing at the border between

ethics and morals, between antagonism and agonistic pluralism, at the point of disjuncture where

hospitality appears (Todd, 2009), is the ethical space where education as interruption can occur.

Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry (OSDE) (Andreotti, 2011) provides a set of principles

and procedures that can help the ethics educator create the limit situations where passionate

perspectives, and multiple ways of knowing, can find outlines that are legitimated through agonistic contestation with others (Todd, 2009).

OSDE principles help establish an equality between those holding rival positions and agonistic contestation can be approached from this attitude of equality (Andreotti, 2011). This approach emphasizes that how students relate to each other in dialogue is as important as what they learn from each other. Students and faculty emphasize the importance of creating safe spaces for ethical discussions guided by principles of interaction and communication. The ability to engage in productive conversations in such spaces on matters of ethics and morals that avoid the extremes of relativism and dogmatism is an important aim of ethics education. The OSDE methodology aims to equip learners to deal with the complexity and uncertainty that characterize the ethics classroom. OSDE proposes a set of basic principles, a set of procedures, and facilitation guidelines to help create spaces that lower the barriers to student participation (Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice, 2010). The proposed principles, procedures, and guidelines are recommended as resources to help facilitators develop curriculum and create spaces for ethical dialogue and enquiry. The professional development resource pack published by the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (2010) is an excellent starting point for this development. The creation of ethical spaces becomes the platform from which an exploration of what it means to live an ethical and moral life is approached.

The Content and Expectations of Ethics Education

The need for clarity regarding the content and expectations of ethics education was a theme that emerged from the data. There are likely as many approaches to ethics education imaginable as there are worldviews. The incredible variety of worldviews that provide the context for the modern world render it impossible to explicate the one correct way to educate for

ethical and moral understanding. The outline of ethics education that appears below results from the coming together of the data and theory that make up this case study. Strong support for a moral principle based approach to ethics education was expressed by both faculty and students. Barrow (2007) outlines a strong principle based approach appropriate to these needs. For Dr. Taylor, "*Those core principles can't be tinkered* [with]. *... you start tinkering with those, you're not really teaching an ethics course anymore*." My analysis concludes that a principle based approach to moral decision making is enhanced by a preliminary investigation of ethics, the notion of what it takes to live a good life.

   Imagining the good life. An Ethics and Society course should include a positive approach to ethics, an examination of the question of what it means to live a good life, as well as a negative approach examining the constraints that a shared symbolic (Mouffe, 2008) of moral principles implies for such a life. Document analysis of the Ethics and Society course in question reveals that, for the most part, a negative approach that assumes a universal human subject bound by universal moral principles is implemented. Data indicates that the dominance of a Western perspective in the course is justified as by a socialization function; "it's how business is done here." By beginning the study of ethics with an exploration of the good life, a positive and affirmative starting point is introduced. The student is empowered and imagined as something more than a potential victim of evil and creative openings for the emergence of something new are created. Subjectification, the coming into being of a unique subject (Biesta, 2010), is recognized as a legitimate aim of education through such a process. The implementation of this positive approach to ethics is best supported through an assumption of the equality of intelligences (Rancière, 1991). The teacher/instructor is to begin with an assumption of ignorance; they do not know the answer of what it means to live a good life for the student. As

such, the teacher is asked to teach that which is unknown to them (Rancière, 1991). The teacher's role is to oblige the student to examine what it means to live a good life under the assumption that the student has the capacity to answer the query without explication. The starting point for the student is immanence. The student starts where they are at, making use of the multitude of indwelling capacities, intelligences, and lived experiences to formulate a first iteration of an answer to the question of what it means to live a good life. The student is seen as a becoming subject involved in a relational process of discovering what is possible. Ethics is not imagined as an attempt to measure up to the transcendent universal of an a priori human subject but as a creative process of exploring what is possible as an ethical agent that is yet to be imagined.

How are these approaches cosmopolitan minded? Braidotti (2013) suggests that "cosmopolitanism can only remain relevant by undergoing a radical mutation" (p. 8). The mutation that she describes fits well with a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education. A pan-human vision that establishes a critical distance with universalism and that acknowledges the atrocities committed in the name of a negative cosmopolitanism is called for. The hierarchy of difference, as an instance of establishing difference from the norm of Eurocentric humanism, is to be rejected in the search for non-hierarchical forms of cosmopolitanism. In place of the humanist vision of a unitary human subjectivity, Braidotti (2013) views the subject as "a complex singularity, an affective assemblage and a relational vitalist entity" (p. 15). Much of the work of exploring this nomadic theory and its implications for ethics education remain to be done and constitute a recommendation for further research emerging from this study. For the purposes of this study, Braidotti's (2006) exploration of nomadic ethics embodies an approach to ethics as an alternative to the essentializing humanist tradition while avoiding the pitfalls of

relativism and nihilism. The subject, embodied in the ethics classroom, is emergent, a becoming

subject, that is understood as an affective and relational entity existing in interdependence with

all of Life. The ethics of a becoming subject is concerned with potentialities and the question of

what is possible. As an entity concerned with its own sustainability as a creative part of a larger

whole, the non-unitary subject is engaged with transformative and sustainable praxis. The

starting point of the nomadic subject's exploration of possibilities is a cartography that takes into

account the space and time of the subject position (Braidotti, 2013). Starting where one is at risks

remaining stuck in narcissistic self-indulgence without the reflective intervention of an

interlocutor. The geopolitical and epistemic position of the subject is generally not apparent to

itself. Only through engagement with others is the subjective position requiring critical reflection

revealed. Becoming accountable for one's historical position requires moving beyond self-

interested narratives and into relational praxis aimed at sustainable futures. "The fact that 'we'

are in *this* together needs to be qualified by the recognition of the structural differences that

compose the complex context of the global condition" (Braidotti, 2013, p. 17). Critical self-

reflection on one's geopolitical, historical, and narrative position in these structural differences is

a crucial next-step to starting where one is at.

Critiquing the good life. A first iteration of what it means to live a good life is likely to

be less reflective than it could be. Student data supports the notion that one's initial vision of a

good life is built upon foundations received from sources such as family, tradition, religion, and

other narratives, and as a result, is an incomplete and often unreflective vision. Kupperman

(2006) interrogates what it means to live a good life by critiquing responses that have been

proposed throughout history. Recall from Chapter two that, in the context of this study, an

exploration of the good life begins in the domain of ethics, and may be characterized by the

particular concerns of individuals in unique circumstances. The infinite variety of such circumstances inevitably leads to a multitude of answers to the question of what it means to lead a good life. Kupperman (2006) provides examples of "myths about the good life" that lend themselves to critique in the ethics classroom. The pursuit of comfort and pleasure (Hedonism), the pursuit of happiness, the hegemony of reason, and the nature and role of virtue, are potential answers to the question of what it means to live a good life that lend themselves to productive critique. An attractive feature of the approach that Kupperman (2006) takes to exploring the good life is the inclusion of material from different traditions and sources including the Bhagavad Gita, Buddhism, psychology, and evolutionary theory. Kupperman's (2006) assumption, an assumption shared by this study, is that everyone stands to benefit from a deeper reflection, and critical examination of the good life. Unreflexive notions of the good life determined by the incompleteness of social convention, familial norms, influences from culture, or religion may or may not survive a critical examination, but such examination may result in a clearer comprehension of what has value and why. Another attractive aspect of this approach is that students are challenged to think through problems and apply their intelligence to the task at hand. There are no explications to be provided by a teacher eager to stultify (Rancière, 1991) the student's intelligence. An axiom of equality is inherent in the pedagogical approach of having students grapple with the question of what it means to live a good life and support their conclusions through argument and dialogue with others in the class, and with resources that they freely engage with. A predetermined formula for the good life is not presented. Students must arrive at tentative conclusions through the application of the intelligence that they already possess while being challenged by the will of the teacher to expose their conclusions to critical reflection and public disclosure.

The process of engaging in critical self-reflection regarding one's vision of the good life through dialogue and enquiry with others will take full advantage of the agonistic ethical spaces described above. Arguing with legitimate adversaries in an environment where disagreement is recognized as not only normal but encouraged as a sign of healthy democratic dissensus creates the conditions for students to move beyond a retreat to the relativism that is so evident in faculty and student data. Thinking critically together, relationally, with the other as a source of insight into cultural and conventional blind spots provides an opportunity for students to experience an environment where individualism is not necessarily the norm. A space where students are encouraged to be open-minded without giving up the ability to judge what is just provides an opportunity to build the communication and intellectual skills to lead in conditions of complexity and uncertainty. Faculty observe that there is room to do more. Critical reflection through dialogue provides opportunity for students to increase awareness of bias, assumptions, and perspectives on ethical decision making. It is a space to problematize ethical decision making and expand awareness of the multipolar nature of the ethical world. The creation of ethical spaces for dialogue regarding the good life is imagined as an affirmative and visionary approach to ethics that encourages creativity and the emergence of new ways of living together. The history of utopian ideals reveals a need to temper such affirmative visions with a strong sense of responsibility. The positive ethics of a becoming, non-unitary subjectivity are enhanced through the integration of an education in morality.

Living good lives together (Relationality). While the investigation of what it means to live a good life may include religious, political, and/or cultural themes, the investigation of morality requires an understanding of how these realms are distinguished and interrelated. Barrow (2006) identifies the need to call attention "to the distinctions between the morally

serious and the morally trivial or the non-moral, between moral and non-moral questions about moral issues, and between dilemmas and problems" (p. 5). If students are going to enquire into the moral consequences of living their own version of the good life they need to be able to make these distinctions. Mouffe (2000b; 2008) calls for a conflictual consensus, a shared symbolic, that arises through agonistic contestation. Any set of moral principles that is to serve as a shared symbolic will have to arise through dialogue and argumentation and is not assumed to preexist such dialogue. That said, this dialogue has a history that can be used as a point of continuation in the classroom. Students will need to understand what distinguishes a moral principle from other types of principles, and arrive at conflictual consensus of what these principles may be.

To help students understand the nature of morality it is necessary to distinguish it from related domains such as the law, social convention, and religion. A critical thinking approach to morality such as that outlined by Paul and Elder (2013) is one example of a means to introduce these distinctions into the ethics class. Confusion over moral decision making can also be mediated by distinguishing between morally right actions and morally justifiable actions. Barrow (2006) is a resource that will help to introduce students to this important distinction. Barrow's (2007) approach to an education in morality through the exploration of moral principles is also one example of a way that the moral domain can be investigated using moral philosophy as a support to, rather than as the primary means of ethics education. Keeping with Rancière's (1991) axiom of equality, these moral principles are not to be explicated but are to be investigated and adopted after critical reflection and dialogue on the part of the student. Using moral principles such as freedom, fairness, respect for persons, truth, and wellbeing as starting points for dialogue and enquiry is a means of exploring morality without explicating what moral principles a student ought to adopt (Barrow, 2007). As mentioned, faculty interviewed unanimously support the

introduction of moral principles into the ethics education. The principles recommended above have obvious connections to moral philosophy but need not be identified with a particular Western philosopher. If a faculty member wishes to introduce particular moral philosophers into the curriculum there is opportunity to do so within an approach that emphasizes principles and agonistic contestation over what they should be and what they should mean. These principles are also intertwined with many themes that are bound to arise in discussions of the good life and provide an interesting way to further explore some of these themes. The interdependence of an ethical concept such as happiness and the moral principle of wellbeing provide ground for very productive dialogue and enquiry. One of the benefits of using a principle based approach as opposed to an ethical framework approach that emphasizes Western moral philosophy is that it avoids the problem that students expressed over deciding which framework to identify with. Rather than identifying as a utilitarian or a deontologist a student can explore the legitimacy of the moral principles of well-being and respect for persons and how they often come into conflict. A communicative approach to ethics will involve students in situations where such principles do conflict and actions need to be justified based on a prioritization of one principle over another. An approach to moral contestation that emphasizes communicative principles and procedures can be implemented in a business environment without foreclosing ethical dialogue. Business topics can be introduced as case studies to be contested if faculty feel it is important to focus the course with such material. Alternatively, the emphasis on communicative practice and the realization of ethical spaces need not involve business topics to realize important ethical and moral outcomes. The following descriptions provide some ideas on how moral principles can be engaged in the ethics classroom dedicated to dialogue between equals.

Moral Principles in Ethics Education

  Fairness. Barrow (2007) argues for fairness as a moral consideration. As such, it is sometimes justifiable to be unfair, but morality requires that such breaches in fairness be justified by reference to another moral principle. Words closely related to fairness include justice, equality, and impartiality but Barrow (2007) chooses fairness as a more inclusive descriptor. Fairness as justice is a tie to the society aspect of Ethics and Society. "[A]lthough one might believe in the universality of a principle like justice, its enactment is only possible in the encounter with concrete reality" (Todd, 2009, p. 71). There is no predetermination of what is fair. What is fair emerges through a communicative process within a particular situation. The communicative practice, and the relations that are cultivated in the practice, are the ethical tools that are necessary to empower the principles. Ethics education should strive "so that justice is revealed as a potentiality, a promise one makes to another that must be striven for beyond the letter of the law" (Todd, 2009, p. 63). There is not one justice, or one way to be fair. "It is not that there is a plurality of justices, but that there is a justice of pluralities" (Todd, 2009, p. 72). Fairness is not to be predetermined in the abstract and then used to determine fair practice, but instead, is to emerge through a reflexive use of the idea of fairness in relation to the particular circumstance that is being questioned.

  Respect for persons. Respect for persons is closely related to justice and in fact both can be interrogated through a critical look at human rights and who they exclude. There is an obvious tie to Kantian ethics which limits the domain of respect to other autonomous and rational subjects. Who is left out? What is the consequence? Respect for which persons? Faculty who are interested in introducing students to the history of moral philosophy will find opportunity to

introduce deontological positions here including Kant's categorical imperative to respect all human beings as ends in themselves.

Well-being. For Paul and Elder (2013), the ability of our actions to have either a positive or negative impact on the well-being of others is a central concern for ethics. Barrow (2007) highlights well-being as one of five moral principles that are widely shared across cultural and epistemological boundaries. One would expect dialogue regarding the value of ideas such as happiness, well-being, and hedonistic pleasure to emerge during an examination of ethics education. It is surprising to find that well-being or happiness was mentioned only once in all of the data from student focus groups. This could be a result of the specific questions addressed through the Ethics café method but there was opportunity for free discussion in these sessions. It would seem that this is not a topic students connect with ethics. It seems reasonable that the notion of well-being ought to be a part of ethical discussion and such discussion yields many opportunities for ethics education. What constitutes well-being from different points of view, how important well-being is for ethical decision making, and the impact of one's vision of the good life on one's own well-being and the well-being of others are important topics. The moral principle of well-being also provides an opportunity for the teacher concerned with a history of moral ideas to introduce consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism as well as the ethics of care. The methods outlined in the recommendations in Chapter six incorporate the moral principle of well-being into post-secondary ethics education.

Freedom. Todd's (2009) notion of freedom as our capacity to exceed ourselves by escaping our own partial understandings through a welcoming of the other is worth repeating here. Freedom is often mentioned in tandem with human rights and the emancipation of the individual. Introducing freedom as a moral principle creates opportunities to critically engage

with individualism. Students can contemplate how freedom is valued but not fully realized. Questions to be engaged with include: How are we not free? How are others not free? What are our responsibilities regarding freedom? Are we free to pursue a vision of the Good Life? Under what constraints? How are these justified? Todd (2009) provides further guidance on how the notion of freedom can be conceptualized for the classroom: "Freedom is not about telling others how they should live, but engaging in communicative process that focuses attention on the many faces of freedom within rights-based societies" (p. 69). Uncritically accepting a value set as absolute regulates what can be thought. The notion of freedom in this context ought to be posed as a question regarding how we can free our minds from regulated truth and open the value-sets underlying this truth to critical self-reflection. Freedom is a natural tie to the Society/Political aspect of an education in ethics.

Truth. An interesting challenge for the ethics classroom is how to investigate truth while respecting epistemological pluralism. There are endless possibilities for discussing what truth is and how it is to be approached. Again, a communicative approach is aimed at having the student arrive at and defend their own vision of truth in dialogue with a variety of interlocutors who will agonistically contest that vision through epistemic diversality. Santos's (2014) description of diatopical hermeneutics, the call for an encounter between different topoi in an effort to be more informed, is helpful here. The epistemological pluralism of an ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2014) recognizes that all knowledge is incomplete and access to the truth is both internally and externally limited by the knowledge system being used. From the perspectives of ethics and morals "knowledge-as-intervention-in-reality" is a better measure of truth than "knowledge-as-a-representation-of-reality" (Santos, 2007, p. 70). This framework may help take students from a "who am I to say" perspective to a more critical examination of whether their ethical vision or

moral intervention makes sense and how it can be improved through dialogue and enquiry with others.

The five principles outlined above are obvious first level, or high level principles that are subject to interpretation. They serve as a reasonable place to being dialogue around first order principles and a starting point for reasoning about second order principles.

> [B]y reasoning from first-order principles we can be more specific and show students that there are a number of more particular second-order principles that generally speaking hold good, although they are not absolute: keep promises, be loyal, cultivate friendship, speak out in defence of the good, show tolerance, defend freedom of speech, do not steal or cheat, and avoid using people as means by, for example, kidnapping, raping, or mugging them, but also by taking advantage of them in more domestic settings such as failing to return what you have borrowed, ignoring them, or failing to come to their aid. The goodness of second-order principles can be recognized in some cases by reference to first-order principles and in some cases by reference to consequences. (Barrow, 2007, p. 174)

An education in morality focusing on contestation regarding moral principles fulfills the second half of the proposition expressed earlier: An Ethics and Society course should include a positive approach to ethics, an examination of the question of what it means to live a good life, as well as a negative approach examining the constraints that a shared symbolic (Mouffe, 2008) of moral principles implies for such a life. The integration of the positive and negative approaches outlined above can be integrated in many different and interesting ways.

Todd (2009) addresses the question of how principles such as freedom, justice, and responsibility can be engaged in an effort to enhance our lives. How can these principles be explored and applied to the project of living a Good Life without the stultifying explication of a pre-determined definition of what they are and how they can be applied? Faculty and student support for the introduction and application of philosophical concepts can be met by having students grapple with the principles of freedom, justice, responsibility for well-being, respect for persons, and how they apply to the on the ground challenges of living a moral life. As such the emphasis should not be on the principles themselves as much as on the communicative process of negotiating their meaning and application. An interrogation of how concepts such as freedom and justice have been used to oppress will help students reflect on the problem of sectarian aims being pursued in the name of so called universal principles. One way of approaching such conversations is through discourse ethics as imagined by Habermas (1996). In Habermas's (1996) view, interlocutors ought to present their "truth claims" to others through dialogue in an attempt to justify their position and reach consensus: "A justified truth claim should allow its proponent to defend it with reasons against the objections of possible opponents; in the end she should be able to gain the rationally motivated agreement of the interpretation community as a whole" (p. 14). The goal of deliberation in discourse ethics is to reach consensus through reasoned dialogue. Todd (2009) acknowledges that, in a time of increased diversity in the classroom, deliberative dialogue aimed at consensus building aligns well with what is traditionally understood as a cosmopolitan agenda. The problem with an approach that aims at consensus is that dissensus is seen as a problem to be overcome. Barrow (2007) points out that some moral problems are true dilemmas that render consensus unlikely if not impossible. Discourse ethics as an approach leads to problems in other ways as well: "first, it fails to engage

rationality as itself a contested political concept; and secondly, it tends to narrow the scope of democracy to include only those who are willing (or able) to adjust to the stipulated understanding of rationality on offer here" (Todd, 2009, p. 101). This approach is subject to the same critique aimed at Kant's notion of the rational human subject; those falling outside the ideal view of rationalism are excluded. Todd (2009) acknowledges a dilemma that confronts a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education: "namely the difficulty in *judging what is just* in the context of an increasingly divergent public-and classroom-discourse about values, rights, and equality" (p. 140). As attested to by faculty and student participants, the challenge for the ethics educator is creating spaces where this difficulty can be experienced and engaged with. The classroom is a microcosm where the difficulty of judging what is just can be practiced and the challenging task of extending this practice to the macrocosmic world is undertaken. Herein lies the best description of the task of imagining a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics. The approach outlined above is concerned with creating spaces where the difficulty of judging what is just in a multipolar world can be experienced and engaged with.

What of encouraging students to live moral lives? Barrow (2006) notes that the answer to the question of what reasons can be given for living a moral life is: none. Motivating students to live a moral life is not a reasonable outcome to expect from an Ethics and Society course. By following the recommendations above students may be motivated to live differently but only if they see the intrinsic value in doing so. An approach to an education in morality that respects Rancière's (1991) axiom of equality is satisfied with the notion that each student is capable of answering the question of whether to live a good and moral life on their own. The role of a class such as Ethics and Society is to help them clarify and critically examine their response to this task.

Educating for the Good Life

The document analysis reveals a requirement on the part of the institute hosting the

Ethics and Society class to define learning outcomes prior to course delivery. This section

addresses the question of the outcomes and purpose of ethics education. The question of the

purpose and aims of ethics education is embedded in the question of the purpose of education in

general. Biesta (2010) observes that the question of good education is often displaced by

questions about effectiveness and efficiency. The obsession with the quality of processes

displaces the question of what these processes should be for. Chapter two set out to establish the

case for ethics education in post-secondary institutions and stated that what remained to be

explored were the appropriate outcomes. But what about the idea of educational outcomes itself?

Outcomes based education is a recent development in response to the perceived need to measure

educational efficiency and effectiveness (Biesta, 2010). Biesta (2010) questions not only the

technical validity of whether we are able to adequately measure educational outcomes, but the

normative validity of what we are measuring:

> This has to do with the question of whether we are indeed measuring what we
>
> value, or whether we are just measuring what we can easily measure and thus end
>
> up valuing what we (can) measure. (p. 13)

The important question for an ethics class based on stated course outcomes is whether the

outcomes describe what we really value, or whether, as Biesta proposes, they describe only what

we can easily measure. It is straightforward to measure whether a student has clearly described

Kant's categorical imperative, Mill's notion of the superior quality of some experiences over

others, or Aristotle's notion of the golden mean. It is another to question the value of doing so,

both in terms of what is expected from the course, and from the perspective of who is likely to

take the course. If what we really value in ethics education is something that is not pre-determined, and is based on an assumption of the equality of the student's intelligence in determining this for themselves, how can this emergent outcome be stated ahead of time? The themes in ethics education and moral principles that appear above can be seen as a rough outline of potential outcomes for a cosmopolitan minded ethics education. It is left to the reader to decide whether this is a reasonable request or not.

The question of how a cosmopolitan minded approach can be used to transform the learning contexts of ethics education in a Canadian post-secondary institution, what supports are needed to realize such an education, and student and faculty input into this education are analyzed above. The analysis indicates that safe places for dialogue and enquiry need to be established assuming the actually existing, multi-polar, and pluralistic nature of subjects and the knowledge they bring to the classroom. These are spaces where curriculum and pedagogy can strive for disruptive moments; moments of transformation from antagonism to agonism occurring on the communicative borders between ethics and morals. The stage is set for these transformational moments beginning with an exploration of what it means to live a good life. Positive openings for the emergence of something new are created when students are recognized as capable of imagining new ways of being in the world. Dialogue and enquiry with others regarding visions of the good life provide the content for agonism and contestation. The process of engaging in critical self-reflection regarding these visions is realized in the agonistic ethical spaces described above. Opportunities to build the communication and intellectual skills necessary to thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty are manifest. This enquiry is to be balanced with a negotiated but incomplete set of moral principles that empower the subject to deal with moral problems and act as a set of constraints. The first order moral principles of

freedom, fairness, respect for persons, truth, and wellbeing are suggested as the starting point for dialogue aimed at a conflictual consensus on what moral principles may be used to justify moral decisions. Ethical spaces implement a communicative approach to ethics to engage students with the moral principles and situations where clear cut answers are not evident. The outcomes of such an approach are not easily pre-determined and there is a risk to such an approach. The payoff for the risk is the potential for something completely new to arise in the context of a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education.

Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations

When initially developing an Ethics and Society course for a polytechnic degree program, my assumptions were that what was required was an explication of the frameworks of deontology and consequentialism, with virtue ethics added for breadth of coverage. It seemed reasonable to approach these frameworks through the moral philosophy of their most recognizable philosophers: Kant, Mill, and Aristotle. The text book chosen (DesJardins, 2014) reinforced this approach by focusing on the same three traditions in moral philosophy, and applying these to a variety of topics relevant to managers including: corporate social responsibility, a liberal model of work, rights and responsibilities in the work place, as well as progressive topics such as diversity in the workplace, universal human rights, and sustainability. The program advisory committee was supportive, program leadership was pleased, and students and faculty seemed content. When faced by students in the classroom there seemed to be a disconnect. The Eurocentric, androcentric approach seemed to be narrow minded at best, and potentially oppressive. These reservations, combined with a research interest in contemporary cosmopolitanism, led to this study and an investigation into how a cosmopolitan minded approach can be used to transform the learning contexts of ethics education in a Canadian post-secondary institution.

The study began with an investigation into whether ethics education can be justified in a post-secondary setting. Kiss and Euben (2006) support an education aimed at developing the capacity for moral reasoning, reflection about moral issues, defending personal moral judgments, and the self-critique involved in defending these judgments. Fish (2006) and Murphy (2006) contest this view by arguing that the university ought to pursue intellectual ends and not moral or political indoctrination. This study agrees with the need to avoid moral indoctrination but takes

the position that post-secondary education ought to include the opportunity to critically examine ethical and moral blind spots and engage in agonistic struggle over ethical visions of the good life and questions of moral responsibility. Ethics education is not envisioned as moral training but instead as a relational process examining what it means to live a good life, and what responsibilities one has in view of the fact that other human beings are engaged with vastly different visions. An exposure to, and recognition of, the complexity and uncertainty of the moral domain is part of this ethics education. Cosmopolitan discourse was engaged with as a means of re-imagining ethics education in a more inclusive way.

The Theoretical Base

This study did not attempt to essentialize cosmopolitanism through definition. It responds to actually existing cosmopolitan conditions by invoking educational spaces that challenge students to balance a reflexive commitment to universal principles such as human rights with a recognition of the vast variety of ways life is legitimately lived in these conditions. A history of the idea of cosmopolitanism provides context to the study. Kant's (1785/2005) enlightenment cosmopolitanism, based on the notion of hospitality, and consistent with modernity's teleological vision of progress and the universality of the human subject, mark the resurgence of cosmopolitanism in the modern world. Nussbaum's (1996) description of the Stoic idea of concentric circles of affiliation, beginning with the self, and expanding outward to eventually encompass humanity as a whole, marks a commonly accepted reintroduction of the cosmopolitan idea into contemporary discourse.

The self-problematization characteristic of postmodern ethics (Bauman, 1993) calls the universality of enlightenment cosmopolitanism into question. Bauman (1993) points out that modernity shuns diversity in favor of a uniform and rational order by championing a universal

human subject. Characteristics of this universal human subject include autonomy, individuality, a natural right to liberty, and freedom. The tendency of this ideal man to make decisions based on rational self-interest fits well with a neoliberal, market agenda (Rizvi, 2009). Educating for such an ideal includes preparing students to be globally aware in an effort to gain access to global markets (Shultz, 2007). A review of institutional documentation and program minutes made it apparent that this neoliberal cosmopolitanism is encouraged by program advisory committees and institutional management. Alternatives that emerge from within the liberal tradition, including Sen (1999) and Nussbaum's (2011) work on the capabilities approach, fail to escape the liberal humanist attitude of individualism. Appiah's (2006) approach to cosmopolitan ethics recognizes that thick relations such as family and community take legitimate precedence over thin relations that transcend these borders, but still relies on the liberal notion of a shared humanity to make a case for cosmopolitanism.

Essentialist notions of an ideal, naturally occurring, human subject are challenged by Latour (2004). His constructivist approach aims at finding new ways to inhabit a common world that is slowly composed through interaction between otherwise incommensurable worldviews. This "pluriversal" approach seeks to find ways of living together that move beyond the requirements of the hegemony of reason. Reason is not denied as an important tool in such a project, but it is questioned as a necessary starting point. A constructivist cosmopolitics (Latour, 2004) seeks to bring together visions of the good life that have origins in divergent worldviews to be compared in a common attempt to improve the standards of their diverse projects from within.

Todd (2009) observes the "fault lines" (p. 23) of modernity that manifest in contemporary cosmopolitanism's tension between a commitment to the universal principles expressed through

human rights discourse and a respect for diversity and pluralism. Todd (2009) describes educational sites that respond to human difference as the real challenge of the cosmopolitan educator. Biesta (2006) is worth re-citing as an expression of this challenge: "The most important question for us today is no longer how we can rationally master the natural and social world. The most important question today is how we can respond responsibly to, and how we can live peacefully with what and with whom is other" (p. 15). A cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education strives to create educational spaces where unique beings can "come into presence" (Biesta, 2006, p. 33) in the midst of agonistic struggle (Mouffe, 2000b) over what it means to live a good life, and what living such a life demands of us in the form of responsibility to others.

What started as a rethinking of ethics education through a cosmopolitan lens ended up including a rethinking of cosmopolitanism itself. My original attraction to cosmopolitanism was the sense of worldliness that it seemed to promote. The possibility of solidarity and belonging beyond the traditional boundaries of family, community, and country is an enticing prospect. Contemporary cosmopolitanism is committed to global justice and world citizenship but at the same time recognizes value pluralism and multiple ways of being in the world (Todd, 2009). The dual commitment to universal principles such as human rights, and the validity of the diverse ways of living that exist in the world sets up an aporetic tension in contemporary cosmopolitanism. The struggle between the universal and the particular is not easy to reconcile. The notion of all human beings belonging to a single community and the affiliated call on education to cultivate this community seems to be a reasonable response to diversity in the classroom (Kleingeld & Brown, 2006). I admit to being surprised by the resistance that my initial efforts to champion this ideal met with on the part of colleagues. I was aware of the notion that

cosmopolitanism was a form of Eurocentrism, but at this point it was difficult to self-identify an attachment to an uncritical universalism in my own thought. Through further reflection it became apparent that the Ethics and Society course was based in an uncritical liberal humanism that also permeated my own worldview.

I would like to take time to reflect on my own journey of engagement with cosmopolitanism and its usefulness as an educational discourse. Kleingeld (2012) describes a progression of thinking often found in contemporary cosmopolitanism: begin from the position that asserts the equal moral status of all human beings; observe that there are people elsewhere on the planet that are suffering and need our assistance; and conclude that we should make a stronger moral effort on behalf of distant strangers. This narrative has the marks of what can be considered the positive qualities of pluralism, tolerance, and inclusion. Deeper reflection reveals serious flaws in this line of thought. Jefferess (2012) points out that if cosmopolitan moral commitments are imagined as responsibility *for*, rather than responsibility *with* others, it is an incomplete and dangerous view. The effort to "'make a better world' *for* rather than *with* others" (Jefferess, 2012, p. 29) brings to mind the colonial overtones of what Mignolo (2011) describes as the Western world's civilizing mission legitimized by a cosmopolitan creed. A deeper look at the uncritical nature of the cosmopolitan position criticized by Kleinfeld (2012) above reflects many of the turning points in my own exploration of cosmopolitanism as an educational discourse.

What can be said of the position that asserts the equal moral status of all human beings? I have pointed out earlier in the paper that cosmopolitanism rarely fails to generate passionate dialogue and it is the universalism at the heart of the notion of an equal moral status of all human beings that is often the catalyst. As Wright (2012) explains, "every cosmopolitanism necessarily

asserts a bond linking all human beings that may therefore be termed 'universal'" (p. 50). To add to the complexity, postmodern and postcolonial critiques have exposed the Eurocentric bias of contemporary universalism and the violences committed under its banner. "Claims of privileged access to transcendent Truths – be they religious, scientific, economic or political – have legitimated all imperial projects, from ancient Rome to the British Empire and beyond" (Wright, 2012, p. 50). Eurocentric universality is epistemically uni-vocal. In the educational realm this can materialize as an attempt to cultivate humanity in students in order to bring them closer to the imagined ideal. Specific ethics education applications include the attempt to make students more rational in their ethical decision making and have them employ decision making tools such as Kant's categorical imperative or Mill's utilitarian framework. A pedagogical challenge arises: How can one create educational spaces that allow for a response to difference, that allow us to engage with our humanity in all its many faces, as opposed to cultivating a predetermined, Eurocentric vision of what it means to be human (Todd, 2009)? This question was addressed through the research questions posed by this study.

What can be said of the position asserting that there are people elsewhere on the planet that are suffering and in need of our assistance? There is no doubt that people suffer, and that we are often in a position to be able to do something about our own suffering and potentially that of others. The position that an Other needs our assistance can morph into a dominator hierarchy that imagines an Other as a victim, unable to help themselves due to an epistemic inferiority. Such a position assumes an epistemically superior worldview that is somehow in 'our' possession and imagines a need on the part of an Other created by this divide. Without critical reflection, the symptoms of deep structures of violence can be glossed over as a need in others, and the supposed epistemic superiority can escape problematization as the potential cause. In a critical

examination of the political aspects of benevolence, Jefferess (2012) reminds us that "individuals are not connected to others simply through a discourse of affiliation – or an imagined global community – but through economic and political structures that allow some to have more access and opportunities than others not only to employment, fresh water or material goods but to speaking and acting" (p. 39). Viewing others as in need of our assistance risks overlooking the economic and political structures that contribute to the causes of the suffering in question.

What can be said of the conclusion that we should make a stronger moral effort on behalf of distant strangers? By focusing on distant strangers, the problem in question is assumed to be 'over there'. Such a position pre-empts critical self-reflection regarding one's own role in potential causes while avoiding the question of what is happening 'here' that is problematic. Identifying an Other who needs our help establishes that Other as an object in need of our benevolence rather than a relational subject; a subject with whom we can strive together for more just social conditions (Jefferess, 2012).

My understanding of the relation between cosmopolitanism and education took on its current form most notably through an engagement with the work of Sharon Todd. Todd (2009) points out that one of the primary challenges posed by actual cosmopolitan conditions is the difficulty of "judging what is just" (p. 140) through moral discourse in a pluralistic context characterized by divergent views of what it means to live a good life. This difficulty pre-exists the classroom and in dealing with the difficulty of judgment, ethics education can be seen as an integral part of a cosmopolitan education "as opposed to being the vehicle through which a cosmopolitan ethic is implanted" (Todd, 2009, p. 140). Navigating through the difficulty of arriving at morally sound judgments in actually existing cosmopolitan conditions becomes the focus of a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education. The challenge becomes creating

educational sites that help students exercise judgment in the context of human difference; sites where students can think beyond themselves to reach morally justifiable conclusions. A cosmopolitan space where "thinking cosmopolitan," and "facing humanity and all the imperfections this entails" (Todd, 2009, p. 140) describes some of the characteristics of such a site. A cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education will seek to free students from universalistic scripts of what it means to be human; create spaces for students to think cosmopolitan, to think beyond themselves, and exercise their intellect and judgment in a setting characterized by agonistic pluralism.

The need to supplement cosmopolitan discourse with theory on ethics and moral education was evident. Badiou (2002) provided an intriguing critique of the notion of the universal human subject and human rights that are the foundation of contemporary ethics. With a focus on human rights, ethics plays a role that is conservative of the status quo in that it forecloses any opportunity to imagine a new vision of the Good. An a priori delineation of Evil, understood as that which threatens the well-being and liberty of the human subject, becomes the exclusive obsession of contemporary ethics. For Badiou (2002), applied ethics topics such as business ethics serve to further regulate what can be discussed in the name of ethics, and denies the opportunity for truth processes, fidelity to previously unrecognized truths, to emerge. The use of a history of moral philosophy to teach ethics represents the attempt to arrive at a general ethics that Badiou (2002) rejects. Badiou (2005) encourages the alternative aim of arranging ethical and moral knowledge in such ways that allow some previously unrecognized truth "to pierce a hole in them" (p. 9).

This study assigns the task of arranging knowledge about ethics and morals to the ignorant schoolmaster (Rancière, 1991). A hierarchy of intelligence in which faculty have moral

knowledge, and students require their expertise to fill this gap in themselves, is denied. Instead, faculty are encouraged to use their authority to will the intelligence inherent in the student to exercise itself. Dialogue between equals, focused on what it means to live a good life, is the platform on which the task is to be launched. An agnostic pluralism that encourages contestation and deliberation over opposing views of the good life will add dimensions of criticality and self-problematization, as will an attempt to reach some shared understanding regarding the moral principles that can help to govern agonistic relations.

Andreotti (2011) outlines principles and processes that can aid the ethics educator in creating ethical spaces, through Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry, consistent with a commitment to epistemological pluralism (Santos, 2014). Every knowledge brought to the classroom is acknowledged as valid and legitimate in the context in which it was established. Because this context is limited, the knowledge produced there is also recognized as partial and incomplete. Knowledge that is partial and incomplete is open to question and the pedagogical procedures outlined in OSDE provide sound guidance to undertake the questioning process. The principles and procedures described by Andreotti (2011), combined with the theory of Todd (2009), Badiou (2002), and Rancière (1991), provide the ground from which this study emerges.

The Research

Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) identify four areas of interpretation that are important to reflective research: engagement with empirical data, hermeneutics, critical theory, and postmodernism (p. 11). Critical self- awareness and a mindfulness of the existence of blind spots and taken-for-granted assumptions are crucial elements of a reflexive methodology. This reflection revealed a strong humanist tendency that influenced my understanding of cosmopolitanism and the initial development of the course in question. An interaction with

empirical data including course documents and the people closely involved with the case in question was pursued. Students, faculty, and administration all have significant roles to play in such a project. These stakeholders were engaged through focus groups and interviews to help inform the recommendations that emerged from the study. Students and faculty alike described complexity and uncertainty in the classroom as sources of frustration and concern. The application of particular ethical frameworks such as Kant's categorical imperative or the Utilitarian mantra of the greatest good for the greatest number does not often yield clear guidance for action. The frustration faced by students when there seems to be no clear solution to a moral problem often leads to a retreat into relativism. If a solution cannot be easily reached students often resort to a position of "who am I to judge?" Another comfortable fallback position seems to be a retreat to dogmatic defense of a received tradition. Dogmatism and relativism are disappointing outcomes for an education in ethics. Faculty and students alike express the importance of critical thinking in the effort to overcome these responses. Critical self-reflection and the creation of spaces that encourage this were called for by participants.

One explanation for the tendency of students to retreat to a relativist position is the difficult and potentially disruptive nature of reflecting on the sources of one's value system. An approach to ethics education that engages with agonistic pluralism (Mouffe, 2000b) can be described as a dangerous pedagogy: "It is the very movement, instability, and unpredictability in agonistic encounters that is at issue here" (Todd, 2009, p. 106). The recommendations included in this study represent a cosmopolitan minded response to the challenge of creating agonistic spaces for students to engage with the difficult task of judging what is just.

Recommendations

The first requirement and recommendation of a cosmopolitan minded ethics education is the establishment of ethical spaces for enquiry that recognize the pluriversal nature of the answer to what it means to live a good life. Recognition of multiple legitimate ways of being and knowing in the world is essential to this ethical space. Any conceptualization of a human ideal purged of imperfection establishes a platform from which the less than human can be imagined and persecuted, oppressed, or destroyed. Such conceptualizations ignore the situated nature of their conceptualization and the inevitably ethnocentric bias and incompleteness of the ideal. The notion of an ideal human also establishes the primacy of the individual, the ability of each subject to incarnate the ideal, and the location of blame to be assigned when efforts fall short. This creates a situation where actual people are not seen in their own context but measured in comparison to an ideal. The ethics education envisioned in this study does not strive to cultivate a predetermined vision of humanity but instead seeks to create spaces where multiple visions of what it means to live a good life can emerge and be critically engaged with. Todd (2009) calls for a vision of humanity that faces both the positive and negative potentialities within the human. Facing humanity rather than cultivating humanity becomes the objective. An ethics education that faces humanity does not explicate what it means to be human but rather treats this issue of what it means to live a good life as a problem to be solved; a problem that, due to the pluralistic nature of human communities is bound to have a multitude of legitimate answers.

The task of facing humanity leads to the second recommendation: to begin with an exploration of the multiple different answers to what it means to live a good life. Students are to begin where they are at by exploring their own vision of a good life. This is a visioning exercise where students are to draw on what already exists within them to publically declare an initial

position on the good life. Critical self-reflection regarding the sources of these visions create

positive openings for the emergence of something new. The third recommendation made in the

study involves dialogue and enquiry with others regarding visions of the good life in a space of

agonistic contention. It is in these spaces that students develop the openness, communication,

and intellectual tools that they will carry with them into the world. Complexity and uncertainty

are to be understood as the milieu of morally agonistic contestation and the skills developed to

handle this agonism can contribute to an easing of the frustration caused by this uncertainty.

The fourth recommendation of the study is closely related to enhancing communication

and thinking skills in the moral domain. A set of moral principles based on Barrow's (2007)

approach to moral education is proposed including: freedom, fairness, respect for persons, truth,

and wellbeing. These principles are not to be understood as a priori, universally true, moral

principles but rather starting points for an agonistic struggle in search of a conflictual consensus

(Mouffe, 2000b) on what moral principles are appropriately applied to the attempt to justify

moral decisions. The ethics education proposed here is based on a communicative approach in

which moral principles are negotiated in an effort to find ways to live together given the

multitude of actually existing answers to the question of what it means to live a good life. The

outcome that is hoped for is the potential for something new to emerge in the context of a

cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education. I propose that a cosmopolitan discourse can

be used to respond to this challenge through what is characterized here as both a difficult and

dangerous pedagogy.

This study recommends the public articulation of one's vision of what it means to live a

good life as decided through the application of one's own reflective intelligence. This involves

engaging in dialogue regarding this vision with others who may have different visions with an

open-mindedness that aims for illumination rather than the need to be right or defend the

position. It is reasonable to ask how this might be restricted by the polytechnic environment. The

language of competitive advantage, organizational success, success in the workplace, and

management in international settings indicates that neo-liberal value sets are embodied by the

institutional mandate and worldviews of its members. These structures threaten to subordinate

the intelligence of students to preconceived notions of what they ought to know, or indeed, what

is knowable in the ethical domain. Is ethics education actually possible within what seems to be

such a predetermined value set? McMurtry (2002) warns that "critical investigation of actually

regulating norms of surrounding rule are methodologically ruled out by known disciplines,

including moral philosophy" (p. xvi). Moral philosophy can serve the ends of strict capitalist

formations, and foreclose meaningful discussion of alternative visions of a good life if the ethical

assumptions of regulating norms are not made explicit.

A Difficult and Dangerous Pedagogy

The context of this case study is a management degree program in a Canadian

polytechnic. The graduates of this program are likely to assume positions in industry that ask

them to assume leadership roles in companies with regulating norms that can be considered neo-

liberal. If the ethics education that is pursued in these conditions is to do more than serve strict

capitalist formations it must be asked: Is it possible to question neo-liberal values in a

polytechnic environment that imagines the real world as defined by industry? "Normalized

inhabitants of market capitalist society presuppose its ruling values as the inherent structure of

'the real world'. What opens it to question or exposes its destructive consequences disturbs the

very foundations of collectively conditioned thought and emotion" (McMurtry, 2002, p. xvi).

The pedagogy required is difficult for a variety of reasons. It is difficult to judge what is just in

pluralistic environments (Todd, 2009), it is difficult to think beyond value-sets that regulate (McMurtry, 2002), and it is difficult not to stultify the intelligence of students by predetermining what they should know (Rancière, 1991). It is also difficult to create spaces where students can feel safe enough to take the risks necessary to engage with this challenging pedagogy (Andreotti, 2011). The pedagogy required is dangerous for a variety of reasons. It is disrupting to question the foundations of a collective mind-set and moral identities can be threated when their underlying value-sets are exposed (McMurtry, 2002). Agonism in the classroom is also dangerous because it takes place on uncertain ground and may have unpredictable results (Mouffe, 2000b; Todd, 2009). McMurtry (2002) warns that "whatever obstructs universal rule by for-profit corporations and transnational financial institutions is marked and pursued for extinction" (p. 20). Obviously a pedagogy that questions the value set that drives significant corporate sponsors runs the risk of alienating these sponsors. What alienates sponsors that are willing to contribute hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars is likely to raise the ire of institutional administration and bring negative attention to the supposed perpetrator of said alienation. The dangerous pedagogue risks being marked for extinction by institutional administration, by industry, or by other entities threatened by a critical perspective. Personally, I view these as risks that are taken on as part of the responsibility of a critical educator. These are risks that anyone interested in introducing a dangerous pedagogy ought to consider but I contend they are trivial compared to the alternative.

What of the risk of not pursuing a dangerous pedagogy that is willing to question capitalist fundamentalisms in higher education? An interest in global ethics led me to cosmopolitanism; an encounter with a global market ethic led me to interrogate my own value assumptions. Evaluating issues from within a received value set without critically engaging with

those values limits one to "*system-deciding values* [which] select for what is consistent with their principles of preference" (McMurtry, 2002, p. 35) and is blind to, or actively aggressive toward, alternatives. Few would question the value of interrogating prejudice, dogma, or superstition to reveal the restrictive mind-set that underwrites them, unless it applies to their own unrecognized meta-principles. McMurtry (2002) describes meta-principles as "the underlying, organizing order of what we also call *group-think* – the lockstep of instituted mental habit which is indifferent to the life-destructions it prescribes, and which silently regulates virtually every endogenous catastrophe of human history" (p. 48). The defining question for a difficult and dangerous pedagogy is outlined:

> The hardest question to pose within normalised life-blindness is one of reflective diagnosis. Just what *are* the constituting principles of the ruling order one lives within which are so presupposed that their catastrophic effects are blinkered out as 'necessary'? How can such questions make it through the blocking operations of the ruling value-set of the group-mind? (McMurtry, 2002, p. 48)

Without engaging with the principles of the ruling order, catastrophic effects are accepted as necessary sacrifices. Engagement with works such as Perkins's (2006) exposure of the value system that drives unfettered capitalism, or Klein's (2014) account of the life-threatening role capitalism is playing in the climate crisis, can go some way toward helping students see through constituting principles of the neoliberal capitalist order if they are approached with an open, reflective mind. It is not difficult to see the danger of not pursuing a critical reflective alternative to the catastrophic necessities envisioned by neoliberal group-mind. The following case demonstrates how cosmopolitanism itself can be used as a topic that enables a difficult and

dangerous pedagogy and can be juxtaposed against the example of current practice presented in Appendix A.

Neoliberal economics can be thought of as one form of economic cosmopolitanism. As Rizvi (2009) has explained, a cosmopolitanism based on the neoliberal value-set imagines unregulated capitalism and free trade as having the potential to be economically liberating, to support greater understanding between cultures, and promote peace. Students in a polytechnic environment may relate to neoliberal global citizenship as a concept (Shultz, 2007), viewing education as an opportunity to increase their marketable skill sets and competitiveness in a global economy. An approach to ethics that encourages critical self-reflection asks students to consider what the "socially regulating value-sets" (McMurtry, 2002, p. xv) are that support their worldview, culture, and action in the world. The questions available to engage students with are numerous. What is the dominating discourse evident in neoliberal global citizenship? What is pre-supposed as the Good in such a neoliberal view that assumes global capitalism as a given? How does this compare to your own vision of what it means to live a Good life? McMurtry (2002) describes neoliberalism as "the universal value-set of the corporate fundamentalism which re-regulates societies across the globe" (McMurtry, 2002. p. 10). What is the regulating value-set that ironically promotes de-regulation as a founding principle? Perkins (2006) describes the system as driven "by a concept that has become accepted as gospel: the idea that all economic growth benefits humankind and that the greater the growth, the more widespread the benefits. This belief also has a corollary: that those people who excel at stoking the fires of economic growth should be exalted and rewarded, while those born at the fringes are available for exploitation" (p. xv). As mentioned, questioning such a dominating value-set can be dangerous. When challenged, the dominant discourse can turn into a fanatic mindset. McMurtry

(2002) explains the danger: "[for] the fanatic mindset, the organizing principle of judgment is to rule out any reality that does not conform to it" (p. 5). The default moral judgment becomes: "What we do is good, and what opposes us is evil" (p. 29). This is not the outcome that a cosmopolitan minded approach to ethics education is interested in.

Jefferess (2012) describes cosmopolitanism as "an ethical philosophy that is concerned with understanding the role of the individual in the work of transforming ideologies and structures that produce and maintain inequality and injustice" (p. 29). Students may consider how tolerant and liberal discourses of development, freedom and democracy, and humanitarian missions: "are in truth regulated beneath their consciousness and communications by a *meta-programme of 'genocidal presuppositions'*" (McMurtry, 2002, p. 47). The notion of responsibility in such discourses is limited to a notion of being responsible *for* making the world a better place by spreading the ideology of the market, rather than being responsible *with* others by engaging in dialogue about how the world can be imagined differently (Jefferess, 2012). The pedagogical strategies outlined in this study help support the cosmopolitan minded educator through the difficult task of evaluating mind-sets, meta-principles, group-think, and their supporting identities.

Jefferess (2012) proposes an "unsettling" pedagogy in which a student becomes not just "discomforted but that this unsettlement can be translated into new knowledge and attitudes, with the expectation that this will foster an ideological and material transformation" (pp. 42-43). Students can grapple with unsettling issues by considering difficult questions. Jefferess (2012) provides an interesting reflection for students in an Ethics and Society class: "If 'we' were to carefully look in our cell phones and computers, our coffee and tea cups, our pantries and our closets, or our gas tanks, we would find that 'our' convenience continues to be largely dependent

on 'their' exploitation. Global poverty is not distant; it is a part of everyone's daily existence" (p. 37). How is global poverty part of your daily existence? This question represents the type of unsettling, difficult, and dangerous reflection that students can engage with in Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry (Andreotti, 2011). There are many such questions. Perkins (2004) asks a cosmopolitan question relevant to a Canadian context:

> How do you rise up against a system that appears to provide you with your home
>
> and car, food and clothes, electricity and health care – even when you know that
>
> the system also creates a world where twenty-four thousand people starve to death
>
> each day and millions more hate you, or at least hate the policies made by
>
> representatives you elected. (p. 256)

The answer to this question will be different for everyone. The acts that result are potentially cosmopolitan acts of global citizenship.

Contribution to the Literature

Contribution to ethics education. Much of the literature on ethics education reviewed for this study focuses on the resurgence in practical ethics since the 1980's (Callahan & Bok, 1980, Elliott, 2007). One of the contributions made to the literature by this research is to reveal the regulatory nature of applied discourses such as business ethics and offer an alternative vision of ethics education through a cosmopolitan lens. The type of ethics education recommended in this study is compatible with epistemic diversality and does not seek to pre-determine the frameworks and visions of the good life that a student ought to learn. By combining an assumption of the equality of the intelligence present within each student, and established procedures for engaging in dialogue and enquiry in the classroom, this study provides ideas for

innovation in curriculum and pedagogy in ethics education in the context of the cosmopolitan conditions of the classroom. I believe the recommendations made are applicable to the post-secondary polytechnic setting that grounds this case study. Readers are left to determine their relevance in other post-secondary settings and beyond.

Contribution to cosmopolitan discourse. The analysis of cosmopolitanism as an educational framework that is presented in this study contributes to the discourse on cosmopolitanism as education. Of the dissenting perspectives on cosmopolitan discourse outlined by Braidotti (2013), this study fully supports the insights of a cosmopolitanism from below, grounded in subjectivities that are in the process of coming into the world in new, and as yet undefined, ways. A cosmopolitan educational discourse that fails to move beyond neo-Kantian universality reproduces the status quo and is in danger of perpetuating past injustices. The reflexivity required of a cosmopolitan scholar is demonstrated in part through this study and awaits further investigation.

Recommendations for Further Research

1. The search for ways to embrace a difficult and dangerous pedagogy is my primary concern at the moment. An intriguing research agenda exists in the exploration and pursuit of pedagogical innovations to support ethics education in settings that are dominated by a neoliberal discourse.

2. The problems created by a conceptualization of a universal human subject for ethics education are revealed by this study. Another phase in the continuing work of reimagining post-secondary ethics education can be pursued through the work of Braidotti's (2006) nomadic ethics. As mentioned in the study, Braidotti (2013) views the subject as "a complex singularity, an affective assemblage and a relational vitalist entity"

(p. 15). This Deleuzean influenced notion of a nomadic subject imagined as a complex singularity has the potential to yield new insights into ethics education.

3. A research agenda that explores posthuman notions of technological others and the ethical implications of technology is particularly relevant in a polytechnic setting. A non-unitary notion of the subject calls for analysis of the web of relations that make up the subject, including non-human relations such as technology. How does technology reconstitute the subject and what ethical implications does this have?

4. Explore the efficacy of online technologies in ethics education. A theme that arose in discussions with students was the difference between the online and face to face educational experiences. The institutional demand to offer ethics education online calls for research into whether the recommendations made in this study can be realized in an online environment.

Parting Thoughts

The process of exploring how a cosmopolitan minded approach can be used to re-imagine post-secondary ethics education has provided opportunity for much self-reflection. Education is a process that may begin in a classroom but potentially continues long after the initial ideas and disruptions are introduced. I was shocked to realize that ideas that had been introduced through coursework in the early years of my studies didn't ripen until much later in the dissertation writing process. The dominance of liberal humanism in my own thought acted as a veil that hid many assumptions and biases, even after I declared a reflexive methodology. Thankfully some insight did emerge through the opportunity of researching and completing this study. It is my hope that some of these insights are useful for other practitioners in the field of ethics education.

At the very least, they have helped to open my eyes to some of the intricacies of the difficult and dangerous task of education.

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Appendix A

The following options are listed as appropriate topics for students in the Ethics course to pursue as a group case study:

Listed below are the general topics, one of which you may use as the basis for your much narrower case study:

- The ethics of industry-specific marketing strategies, which might include but is by no means limited to one of the following: marketing to the pre-teen demographic; pharmaceuticals and life-style marketing; the marketing or labeling of genetically-modified foods.

- The ethics of (inter)national security which might include but is by no means limited to one of the following: body scans and "enhanced pat downs" at airports; laptop searches; ID chips or RFID tags on children; censoring of video games.

- Technology and personal identity, which might include: privacy and cloud/quantum computing; issues surrounding screening/interview procedures; the use of Facebook, Twitter or other social media in a professional setting; the use of multiple identities online; the ethics of government regulation of Net content; issues of Net neutrality; or cyber-bullying.

- Technology, DNA, and bioengineering, which might include but is by no means limited to one of the following: population biobanks; genetic testing in the workplace; genome mapping and patent control. Alternatively, you might want to consider such an issue as India's recent

attempt to offer cash bonuses as a strategy to slow its national birthrate.

(Course Document 1: Moodle site)

Students are provided with a sample methodology for approaching a case study. Ironically, the

teaching notes that accompany the case were produced by Arthur Andersen & Co (1992b), the

accounting firm disgraced for its role in the 2001 Enron scandal. Students are to identify a

specific case that falls within the general topics outlined above and analyze it using the following

case study questioning method:

What are the relevant facts?

What are the Ethical Issues?

Who are the primary stakeholders?

What are the possible alternatives?

What are the ethics of the alternatives?

1. Utilitarian

2. Theory of rights

3. Theory of Justice

4. Conflict between theories

What are the practical constraints?

What actions should be taken? (Arthur Andersen & Co, 1992b, p. 1)

Arthur Andersen & Co. (1992a, 1992b) provide a sample of how a case may be

approached using this method.

Appendix B

Cross reference for randomly generated pseudonyms.

A1	Paulo
A3	Alexio
A4	Kwasi
A5	Adam
A6	Gerard
A7	Samir
A8	Maria
A9	Sasha
A11	Lana
A12	Ranjit
B1	William
B2	Vidal
B3	Anan
B4	Heather
B5	Tanya
B6	Marshal
B7	Tamra
B8	Burk
B9	Lars
B10	Ahmad
B11	Elly
B12	Julia
B13	Derrik
B14	Zayd
B15	Sunan
B16	Carl
B17	Ben