St. Stephen's College

I Am Happy

The Hermeneutics of Happiness Through

An Existential Heuristic

by

Neil Alan Soggie

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of St Stephen's College

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SPIRITUALITY

Fall, 2016
Edmonton, Alberta

Dedication Page

To Those Who Desire Happiness

בוט וא יכ יתעדי

חומשל־מא יכ מב

וייחב בוט תושעלו

לכאיש מדאה־לכ מגו

בוט הארו התשו

תתמ ולמע־לכב

איה מיהלא:

רשא־לכ יכ יתעדי

אוה מיהלאה השעי

וילע מלועל היהי

ונממו חיסוהל וא

מיהלאהו ערגל וא

וינפלמ ואריש השע:

Ecclesiastes 3:12-14 (NIV)

12 I know that there is nothing better for people than to be happy and to do good while
they live. 13 That each of them may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all their toil—
this is the gift of God. 14 I know that everything God does will endure forever; nothing can
be added to it and nothing taken from it. God does it so that people will fear him.

ABSTRACT

At the heart of this thesis was one simple question, “What is the essence of my happiness?” This question was explored, with the guidance of the problem solving steps outlined in Heuristic research. I employed insights from my interests in classical psychology and existential phenomenology to further refine this process. The conclusion I arrived at was surprisingly simple; where the essence of my happiness is a combination of caring intentionality and living out a positive meaning. I discovered that it was a layered process of engaging the world and discovering meaning, while simultaneously being present in the moment, being spurred on by love in the positive meaning discovered. The result of this inquiry led me to describe the essence of my happiness through a formula that states, intentionality plus (a positive) meaning equals happiness (I+M = H). This theorem does not minimize the complex nature of happiness, but rather, provides a simple rubric when dealing with the complex paradoxes inherent with the phenomena of my happiness. In recognizing these paradoxes, I then explored the many ways that the Pauline notions of faith, hope, and love work to solve the classical barriers to experiencing happiness. This thesis concludes with some of my reflections upon ways this theorem may be applied to psychotherapy.

Key Words: Hermeneutic, heuristic, existential, happiness, phenomenology, spirituality, psychotherapy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Reo Leslie, and the St Stephen's Faculty and Staff for their help, guidance and leadership.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One

Introduction 1

Importance of the Study 2

The Topic: Happiness 3

Correlated Topics: Faith 6

Correlated Topics: Hope 8

Correlated Topics: Love 9

Phenomenology 9

Intentionality 10

Summary 12

Chapter Two

Psychology 13

Positive Psychology and Flow 13

A Model from Neuroscience 20

Terror Management Theory 26

Summary 30

Chapter Three

The Existential Experience 32

Hegel 33

Kierkegaard 46

Husserl 53

Sartre 58

Heidegger 62

Summary 69

Chapter Four

Historical Models of Happiness 71

Ancient Models of Happiness 71

Classical Psychological Paradigms 85

Happiness Companions 98

Summary 114

Chapter Five

Research 117

Phenomenology 117

Hermeneutical and Existential Phenomenology 119

Heuristic Research 123

Validity of Research 123

Results 125

Summary 150

Chapter Six

Discussion, Conclusion, and Implications 152

Discussion 152

Conclusion 162

Implications 163

References 165

Appendix A: Definition of Terms 174

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Throughout my life I have worked to help people; beginning in ministry and continuing with a career in counselling and psychotherapy. I have dealt with people in extreme poverty, pain, trauma, grief, on the edge of death, and in despair. I have also spent a decade researching suicide and suicidal ideation. In all of these experiences there was one obvious question that I failed to ask, "What is the essence of being happy?" This thesis represents my effort to deal with this, most basic, question. I invite you on this journey of discovery.

At the heart of this thesis, is one simple question, "What is the essence of my happiness?" From my initial inquiry, I arrived at a simple principle of happiness. The formula I discovered does not minimize the complex nature of happiness, but rather provides a guiding rubric for dealing with its apparent complexity. I also explored the many ways that the Pauline notions of faith, hope, and love work to solve the classical barriers to experiencing happiness. This is not to suggest that assent to any particular Christian doctrine will guarantee happiness. Rather, given my own Western cultural and Lutheran heritage, these concepts are implicit within my own worldview and comprise something of my own thought structure. I therefore choose to explore these pillars of my worldview, as they form a path of meaning to my own happiness experience. In order to translate my own personal experience to the wider world, the final chapter will include reflections as to how one may apply the lessons I learned to an understanding of psychotherapy.

Importance of the Study

While this study is hermeneutical and personal, the principles may be generalizable. In addition, the fact that I am also a psychotherapist means that the meanings I have gleaned about happiness, will undoubtedly find their way into my practice. This is significant since a healthy happiness is an implicit concern and perhaps even a goal of psychotherapy. In December of 2008, the distinguished psychiatrist Irvin Yalom was asked the question, "What is happiness?" Yalom's response:

> I know that's a big word right now … because there must be twenty new books out on happiness. Well, Schopenhauer's definition of happiness was the absence of misery, absence of pain and that's not a bad definition for me … I, like most therapists … really work to try to remove pain from people. I don't think I need to tell them about how to be happy. But that's not entirely true … for example, I was working with a patient yesterday and I spent much of the hour looking [at] if there was a time that he felt harmony with other people (let's go back to those times), or who can he think of, with whom he felt wonderfully happy and harmonious in their relationship, and this was a really very good session. (Mitropoulos, 2008)

I believe that Yalom does a good job at highlighting the importance of happiness as a desirable state within people and implies that it is part of the goal of psychotherapy. In Yalom's (1998) earlier writings, he defined happiness (so far as he defined happiness in 2008) as one of the primary goals of therapy: "The primary task in therapy is the … relief of anguish" (p. 134). At times, as Yalom points out, a client does not have a clear understanding of what happiness even means, or how to achieve it. A client may have

grown up hearing sayings like *life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness*, and this mantra may even have become part of an internal narrative without much understanding given to the very nature of happiness.

The Topic: Happiness

I intuitively thought I knew what happiness was, but was surprised to find it difficult to define. I grew up following the definition of happiness as being lucky or receiving a favourable reward or fortune. Happiness was, I thought, a simple concept. Yet the closer I came to taking hold of happiness, the more I found it to be complex, elusive, and multi-layered.

The ancients, like Aristotle, acknowledged the compound nature of happiness; equating it with the experience of well-being that comes from a life engaged with the worlds of ideas and objects (Vanier, 2001). Others suggested that there are higher and lower forms of happiness. For some philosophers, the lower forms consist of taking advantage of immediate, intense, and narrow experiences. In contrast, the higher forms of happiness are derived from the pervasive, enduring, and deep experiences of life (Spitzer, Bernhoft, & De Blasi, 2000).

As I reflected upon this, I perceived that people have a hard time finding happiness; and even upon finding it, the shallow happiness quickly devolves into boredom. In some ways, this may be because people living in a technological culture have bought into the idea that external circumstances frame and dictate the essence of one's experience of happiness. This narrow indulgence of consumerism happiness may mean that people, all too often, feel dissatisfied with life. People may have done what

they were told—pursued happiness— only it does not seem to work, for their satisfaction is temporary. After pursuing happiness and rarely finding it, society appears to be increasingly turning to the psychotherapeutic profession to ameliorate this cycle of emptiness.

For myself then, there is the tremendous burden to help clients find true happiness. The dilemma is that happiness is not a prey that can be trapped through tracking; it cannot be ferreted from its hiding place, nor captured through pursuit. Happiness is something that forms on its own accord. It materializes only when its ingredients are present. Like an ethereal ghost of mythology, it rises from the mist of experience and seems to disappear just as quickly, seemingly immune to labours to secure it. Yet, I suspected that happiness may not be as mysterious as it first appeared. It may be of the same nature as what Hegel noted of art—a convergence of meaning, creation, and sensation (Stace, 1955). The secret, I thought, is that happiness transpires in experience, when there is a belief context for making meaning, an attitude of hope in the midst of circumstances, and a caring, intentional way of living out this belief and hope within the world.

Within the current Western understanding of happiness, I saw an emphasis upon enjoying pleasures and finding release from pain (Burns & Hart, 1970). Of course the nature of happiness is never as uncomplicated as simple pleasure. Within the area of positive psychology, the view of happiness is made up of, “pleasure and gratification, strength and virtue and finally, the lasting fulfillment of both meaning and purpose” (Seligman, 2002, p. xxi).

I also explored the notion of happiness through the lens of key existential philosophers. As existential philosophy is known as a depressing philosophy obsessed with ideas of alienation, suffering, and death it does seem a strange place to explore happiness. However, upon further reflection it becomes clear that these philosophers were simply grappling with the complex paradoxes of existence, and so frame their discussions in terms of the negative. Yet, I found, each has a take upon how existence relates to happiness (either in its presence or absence). I began first with Hegel's ideas of aesthetics and explored the components of his highest forms of aesthetic expression. This then led to Kierkegaard's reactions to Hegelian thought, and his notions about the paradoxical nature of the experience of happiness.

Kierkegaard's existential ideas are carried on in the traditions of Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. Of course, I also examined Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, as it had an influence upon the two existential thinkers. I then explored Jean Paul Sartre's ideas of meaning, emotion, consciousness, formation of the self, and self-deception. With Heidegger, the focus was on his seminal work, *Being and Time*, delineating his synthesis of intentionality and meaning within human experience. This Heideggerian rubric then helped me explore authenticity, leading to a more complete reflection on human happiness.

What the existential thinkers revealed to me was that happiness is a complex phenomenon, full of paradox. This threw into question whether or not I even knew what happiness was. For as Rothert and Zielinskn (1976) have noted, the concept of happiness that established itself across Europe in the 18th century had no room for anything but pleasure. Mill (2000) conceded that hedonism is a key part of the understanding of

happiness in the Western world, but he also highlighted that it is more complex, noting that Christian elements are required to fully grasp a full sense of happiness, as interpreted through the western worldview. In light of the models put forth by the existential philosophers, and as a result of my exploration, I also chose to examine the Christian (Pauline) triad of faith, hope and love, as key ingredients in, or correlated topics of, happiness.

Correlated Topics: Faith

Phenomenological research carried out by Ourania Marcandonatou has highlighted that the sense of *connectedness* is integral to happiness. For the co-researchers in one project, connectedness was the lynch-pin, expressed as a mystical experience of feeling connected with nature, people, the universe, Spirit, and God. This positive experience expressed itself with feelings of love and happiness (Marcandonatou, 1998). Within this research, it appears that there is a link between what can generically be called *faith*, and the experience of happiness.

The best way to understand the link between faith and happiness is to look at the very etymology of the word happiness. If we go back to the early Greek, for example, we can see that terms for happiness, such as, *eudoimonia*, *makaria*, or *eutuxia, are* generally related to some experience of the divine or of some grand divine scheme. The roots of these terms can be translated as *having a good spirit*, an *act of a divine being*, *good fortune*, or sometimes even *chance* or *fate* (Liddel & Scott, 1996). Indeed, according to Rothert and Zielinskn (1976), these terms carried with them an explicitly religious tone that denoted a person enjoying the blessings of a sympathetic deity. As such, the ancient

Greek terms for happiness implied a positive relationship with the divine and a state of blessedness of the individual. With such terms meaning having a good relationship with the divine, it is logical that I should consider the issue of faith as an integral part of the experience of happiness. Finally, McMahon (2010) highlights the fact that Plato, (Socrates), and Aristotle all characterize pure and mature happiness only in reference to the divine, forever tying the concept of happiness and divinity together within western culture.

When examining the root of the English word *happy,* something similar appears, but with a slightly different angle, denoting an ordering of things, a context for understanding and experiencing. The root word for happy, *hap*, is understood to have entered Middle English as a derivative of the Old Norse term for chance, fortune, and good luck, along with its precursor, *haeplic,* which carried an even deeper meaning relating to an ordering of things (Onions, 1969). As such, the English word *happy* is etymologically related to the idea of things being ordered in a divine fashion (Klein, 1966).

As more of the phenomenon of human happiness comes into view, we will examine the role that faith plays in human happiness. From what is evident initially, happiness has a range of meaning that can encompass ideas like: having a good relationship with the divine, experiencing an ordering of things as desired by the divine, and finally, receiving the good fortune of blessings from the divine. In all of this, is the sense that there is a meta-context of reality that is larger than our understanding, yet personally interested in our welfare.

When examining such a perspective as the role of faith in happiness, there is an endless supply of ways to frame this, as definitions of faith itself are as varied as are people. In order to narrow this discussion somewhat, we will limit its discussion to the range of faith dominant in the western European context, namely the traditional Christian view and understanding of faith. In so doing, we do not deny the value of other perspectives of faith, but as a matter of necessity simply choose this, as it is the dominant historical influence on my own personal life.

Correlated Topics: Hope

My choice of career is closely linked to hope, as well as happiness (Yalom, 1998). According to the protocol research of Patricia A. Qualls (1998), when people are moved to effect change it is tied closely with hope, a desire to project into the future intentionally for something better than what already exists. It is the core of what helps a person to affect change and engage the world. In general, hope has always been associated with happiness.

In western philosophy, hope and happiness are consistently tied together, and so it does seem logical to include it within this discussion. Even when happiness is viewed as hedonism, the theme of hope is present; for pleasure is fleeting and hard to achieve, while pains are ever-near. There is always a hope for future pleasures, as Hobbes (1985) notes, "…felicity is a continual progression of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former being still but the way to the later" (p. 160). As such, most of the pursuit that one engages in is a means to procure future pleasures that are hoped for, since "a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained … but … he

cannot assure the power and means to live well … without the acquisition of more." (Hobbes, p. 161). Here it may be seen that, even at the lowest understanding of happiness— hedonism—hope is a central theme.

Correlated Topics: Love

I believe that happiness is more than just a feeling, and trust that it transcends the objective circumstances of life. Further, I believe that to understand the nature of happiness one must understand it from the places where happiness is revealed, and the place where this occurs most clearly is in the presence of love. Loving relationships, after all, are the situations in which most people will confess to experiencing happiness (Marcandonatou, 1998), so to consider love as a related topic of happiness seems a logical approach.

Love is about relating, and existential philosophy has shown that the traditional distinction between subject and object is a serious fallacy. People are not apart from the world, they are in the world. Therefore, to cast happiness as merely an attitude of subject to object is, at best, a half-truth. A better and more honest expression is to say that love involves a positive attitude of the subject toward the object, which is also to have the same attitude back toward the subject. Hence the dictum: Love thy neighbour as thyself. Of course, to truly understand the nature of being and happiness, one must begin with the basics of phenomenology and intentionality, for this is the foundation for most existential understanding, and my own personal experiences (Krell, 2009).

Phenomenology

I chose to examine happiness from the general perspective of hermeneutical existential phenomenological psychology. It is therefore important to understand what exactly phenomenology is and how it leads to a better understanding of the human experience.

The discussion of phenomenology is best understood by beginning with Descartes' pursuit of truth and knowledge, moving from doubt of everything which was not he as the one thinking. By this method Descartes arrived at the one experience he could not doubt—his own thought, the *cogito*, which remained certain in all experiences. In the midst of this, Descartes framed his whole method on the dualistic perspective of the universe, which later led to the split of the philosophical schools of idealism and realism (Spiegelberg, 1972).

Phenomenology is a response to this rather rigid dualism, understanding that thought is an interaction between the subject and the object. That is, every thought is *of* something. This means that there is an *intentional* nature to consciousness itself; therefore Descartes' cogito and dualism are superseded by a new way of conceiving existence and knowledge. Through further elaboration of this intentional nature, Edmund Husserl formulated the systematic method of inquiry that we now know as Phenomenology (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990).

Intentionality

For Husserl, the world—as it is experienced as itself to the apprehending cogito—is to be understood through the process of *epoche'* (which is, essentially, the bracketing of assumptions). In this, Husserl starts with the certainty of the cogito as Descartes did, and if he had stopped with this he would have fallen into the solipsism that came to define

Descartes. Yet Husserl concluded that *the there* is a tier of understanding, where the natural world is apprehended through the cogito and that cogito is formed by interaction with the world. Husserl employed the phenomenological method in search of the very essences of the cogito and the psychic life, where we are fundamentally reduced to an entity of intentionality.

In its simplest form, intentionality is the world of meanings that arises from the interaction and tension between the self and the world. The first distinction to be made with intentionality concerns the apprehending attribute of consciousness (the *cogito*) and the object of consciousness (the *cogitatum)*. For Husserl, conscious thought is always towards something; therefore consciousness is always a mindfulness of something and not an entity in and of itself separate from the world (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990).

This idea of intentionality becomes very important when one wants to understand an aspect of the psychic life, such as happiness. For as happiness is always tied to an intentional relationship, I began to see that intentionality is an essential part of the make-up of happiness. Further, since intentionality is an active engaging, rather than a passive recording process, I concluded that there must be an active component to the constitutive entity known as happiness.

Tied in with intentionality is also the unity of the psychic life as being intentional yet unitary and divisible. That is, while being human in the world is one unitary whole with every part relating to every other part, one can still conceive of and distinguish an infinite number of particular entities that form the constant backdrop of consciousness. So while I can conceive of something like happiness as being a whole, I can also

distinguish between different types and levels of happiness, and the particular cogitatum to which happiness is connected (Spiegelberg, 1972).

Summary

To be clear, this composition is a personal investigation into my own experience of happiness. Yet, I hope that the essences I find resonate with you, and are therefore generalizable and personable. My view is that this work is an investigation of the tapestry of happiness, giving special attention to the pattern of intentionality and meaning, as well as the threads of faith, hope, and love. In the following pages I will examine the nature of happiness through what psychology calls *Flow* (Chapter Two). This chapter will also examine neuroscience research on the experiences that are considered counter to happiness, in an attempt to better understand the mechanisms at work in happiness. I will then explore the existential essence of human existence, intentionality, and discover this common component in all the threads that bring about happiness (Chapter Three). Two meta-clinical psychological models will then be examined to help gain insight into happiness (Chapter Four). Other historical models will also be explored to better frame the discussion. This will set the stage for my own personal hermeneutical exploration into happiness (Chapter Five); formulating a synthetic coherent narrative of happiness. Within the concluding chapter (Chapter Six), I will explore some therapeutic implications of the discovered formula for happiness; as well as possibilities for future study.

CHAPTER TWO

PSYCHOLOGY

Within this chapter I will examine happiness from three perspectives. The first is from the realm of positive psychology, and the exploration and definition of the phenomenon known as *Flow*. The second is from the realm of affective neuroscience and the meaning structures related to depressive and anxiety spectrum disorders. The third model within this chapter is that of Terror Management Theory, and its management of meaning within a cultural meaning system.

Positive Psychology and Flow

Happiness according to Peterson and Van Dulmen (2007), can be separated into a number of time related states of either fleeting pleasure or long-lasting satisfaction. The former is a temporary gratification that originates in sensation and has an external locus. In contrast, the longer-lasting happiness arises from an absorption into the context from the inner meanings lived out by the individual. This, according to Csikszentmihalyi (1991), is a state of engagement that is referred to as *Flow*, and is a key part of long-term satisfaction.

According to Csikszentmihalyi (1991) achievement of the state of flow, which is a pleasurable state of gratification that is fuelled from inward outwardly. It is a difficult yet learned skill of human existence. Flow is, in essence, the skill of immersing one-self within the situation and being in tune with, in step with, or being, *in the zone*, to use athletic vocabulary. Within this state the person's conscious power and sensory attention are fully caught up in the present activity and the self essentially fuses with the situation, being drawn in by the situation. This immersion does take a fair amount of motivation, and often a meaning behind it in order to provide the motivation that the person requires to choose to engage. It also requires that the person not draw away in fear, but become intentionally tangled into the situation in order to affect what is going on.

In essence, flow is a psychological state of complete focused immersion in an activity. As an optimal psychological state, flow represents those moments when everything comes together for the person performing a task or engaged in an activity. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) described two different levels of flow as micro and macro flow experiences. Micro flow experiences were proposed to fit the pattern of everyday life, whereas macro flow was reserved for experiences associated with higher levels of complexity and demand on the participant.

In order to narrow down and clarify the macro flow experience for this inquiry, it is important to break flow down into the nine dimensions conceptualized by Csikszentmihalyi (1990). These nine dimensions are: challenge-skill balance, action-awareness merging, clear goals, unambiguous feedback, concentration on the task-at-hand, sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, time transformation, and autotelic experience. Considered together, these dimensions represent the optimal psychological

state of flow; singly they signify conceptual elements of this state. It is therefore important to define each element within the flow experience.

Within flow challenges are opportunities for advanced towards goals. Skills are the capacities that an individual possesses to produce desired outcomes. Essential to the challenge-skill balance is that the perception of challenge and skills drives the equation. This means an individual's beliefs, or confidence regarding what the person is able to do in a situation, is more important than what the individual's objective skill levels might be. Challenges can be defined in a personal way, separate from any structures of the activity. It is the perception of the defined challenge that is critical to flow occurring (Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003). An operationalized statement that defines the challenge-skill balance, according to Jackson, Elkund, and Martin is, "I am challenged, but I believe my skills will allow me to meet the challenge" (2010, p. 69).

When people are asked what it feels like to be in flow, they often refer to a sense of effortlessness and spontaneity. This is what is often referred to as action-awareness margining (Sinnamon, Moran, & O'Connell, 2012). This is the feelings of automatic performance, through a rehearsed routine, that enables the individual to process subconsciously and pay full attention to his/her actions. The unity of consciousness apparent in this flow dimension illustrates the idea of growth in complexity that results from flow experiences. Jackson et al. characterize this component of flow with the statement, "I make the correct movements without thinking about trying to do so" (2010, p. 69).

Goals are a necessary part of achieving something worthwhile in any endeavour. The focus that goals provide to actions also means that they are an integral component of

the flow experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). The structure of pre-set actions allows more attention to be focused on immediate tasks. Personal goals can also be set and continually monitored against a backdrop of in-built goals for action. An operational definition for the concept of clear goals is "I know clearly what I want to do" (Jackson et al., 2010, p. 69).

Closely associated with clear goals then, is unambiguous feedback. Paying attention to feedback is a necessary step in determining whether one is on track toward goals that have been set (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Feedback can come from a range of external sources, including the environment in which the action is occurring. It is not necessary to always be positive for flow to be experienced. A statement that Jackson et al. (2010) uses to typify this element of flow is, "It is really clear to me how my performance is going" (p. 62).

One of the clearest indications of flow is one's total focus in the present on a specific task being performed. There are no extraneous thoughts and the distractibility that often accompanies involvement on any task is absent. This means there is a present-centered focus, where flow resides in the present moment, rather than in the past or future (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). The concentration experience in flow is complete, spontaneous, and intense; characterized by Jackson et al (2010) as, "My attention is entirely focused on what I am doing" (p. 62).

A sense of control is also an element of the flow experience. This empowering feeling frees the individual from the fear of failure or performance anxiety. This sense of control, much like the challenge-skill relationship, requires a delicate balance (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). As challenge does not exist where there is total and absolute

control; it is a constant trade off of the attention required and the challenge needed, that a sense of control exists. An operationalized statement of a sense of control within flow is, "I have a sense of control over what I am doing" (Jackson et al., 2010, p. 69).

A transformation of time is also a component of the flow experience, though one that is least reported as a flow dimension (Jackson et al., 2010). It is the experience of time stopping or slowing significantly. At times it is a sense that time passes more quickly than anticipated (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). This sensation comes out through the intensity of focus, contributing to a perception of time slowing. Jackson et al. typifies this dimension with the statement, "Time seems to alter (either slows down or speeds up)" (2010, p. 69).

People live surrounded by evaluations of how they are doing. When attention is pulled away from this concern for evaluation, flow becomes possible. When an individual is no longer concerned with what others think of him/her, if only for a moment, self-consciousness has been lost (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). According to Jackson et al. this dimension of flow can be operationalized with the experiential statement, "I am not concerned with what others may think of me" (2010, p. 69).

The final dimension of flow is the autotelic experience (from the Greek: *Auto* = self & *telos* = goal). Flow has such an enjoyable sensation that it becomes a state that is sought after, a secondary goal within the task at hand. Since flow itself occurs with immersion in an experience, the autotelic component typically occurs after the task; it is upon completing the activity, upon reflection, that the autotelic aspect of flow is realized (Baumann & Scheffer, 2011). According to Jackson et al (2010 this element of flow can by typified with the statement, "I really enjoyed the experience" (p. 69).

What often happens, according to Csikszentmihalyi (1991), is that even though the situation may require some level of discomfort, the meaning behind the action allows for motivation despite this discomfort. In essence then, the person is choosing to forgo a hedonistic immediate sensory gratification for the sake of engagement within the context. This means that individuals will often choose flow, resulting in a longer and more lasting state of happiness than does the shorter term gratification that results from avoiding this psychological flow.

This idea fits well with Peterson and van Dulmen (2007), as well as Seligman's (2002) assessment that there is a learned component to emotions. This, for Seligman, means that there is learning through experience as a portion of happiness, what he calls Learned Optimism. For Peterson and van Dulmen the reality of this motivation goes all the way down to the neurochemical level. They hypothesize that the serontenergic and noradenaline systems work to a positive effect within an individual to provide a positive assessment and optimistic outlook of the situation. This then combines with the oxytocin and opioid related systems that help an individual to build strong social bonds, and be comfortable in a hopeful and helpful social environment.

Of course there is a clear distinction between immediate gratification happiness as well as destructive happiness, as opposed to a longer term helpful constructive happiness that is made by these researchers. The notion that a criminal, who deviously plans to commit a crime, may experience happiness in the execution of devious acts is rejected. Even though he may experience the function of similar biological systems, it cannot be considered as this high quality of happiness. The quality of the happiness is different, in

the minds of these positive psychology researchers at least, clearly linked with support and movement towards wellbeing, either of the self or others.

In order to better understand happiness from the perspective of positive psychology we must take a moment to understand that human beings live within a temporal context. This temporal context means that there is a constant meaning making process going on within the person, drawing upon meanings of the past, making present assessments, and working towards some hoped future. This is the key to happiness according to Csikszentmihalyi, for it is the way that an authentic human being supports the well-being of the self and the environment or community within which the individual lives. There is a subjective experience and interpretation which is valued by the means and content of memory. This allows the experience of flow within the present moment, as the person is able to engage fully within the environment. Of course, a key part of this ability to engage is a sense of optimism and hope; seeking to impact the world and a general faith that things will ultimately work out for good (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991).

This engagement requires both the lower functions of the brain, as well as higher cognition ability of planning for a positive intervention. This leads to understanding a happy way of living as being divided into key themes of hope, virtues, and stable supports. Within the theme of hope are the positive emotions of confidence and trust, or what some might call faith. Within the theme of virtues are the positive human choice/ character traits of strength, love, and willingness to help. Within the theme of stable supports are the positive environmental factors like strong family, peer support, stable society etc. Each positive theme can both build upon and support the others to enable the experience of living in flow, although it does not guarantee it.

Hope does seem to be a huge part of the positive psychology model of happiness and as such warrants further discussion. As one of the core themes within happiness, it has a tremendous bearing, not only on motivation but also on the potential for engagement. In addition, it appears to be essential for an enduring happiness that does not fade when external circumstances are not ideal for experiencing happiness (Snyder, 2000).

Hope seems to be absolutely essential for happiness, at least when taken from the authentic flow perspective, because it acts as a positive motivational state that impacts an individual's sense of agency, goal planning, effortful engagement and hardiness in the face of trouble. According to Lopez, Snyder, and Magyar-Moe (2004) hope may be conceived of as both a goal oriented force, a motivational initiate and engagement sustainer. It is therefore viewed to be essential at every stage of the experience of happiness.

Hope seems to be the core of agency and energizes the thinking that involves the effort and determination to achieve goals. It provides the meaning behind the motivation, not necessarily the means to achieve the goal itself, rather the motivation to find the means. As a mutually supporting lynch-pin within the happiness mechanism, it provides positive expectation of success which in turn promotes the energetic search for means of goal attainment. This in turn maintains effort needed to progress towards the goal. The alternative of hope then is hopelessness, and with that comes a lack of motivation, and a withdrawal from engagement. As we will now examine, withdrawal is the death knell to the experience of lasting happiness and the start of depression and anxiety (Lopez et al. 2004).

A Model from Neuroscience

Within the flow model of positive psychology, one can see that happiness is engrossment within the context, supported by positive memories and hope for the future. This section will now look at the other side, and how withdrawal and disengagement can lead to sadness, depression, and anxiety. In doing so, we will examine what modern neuroscience has to say about the issue of affect and the nature of it as it presents itself in a scientific meaning model. As neuroscience is generally interested with the negative, this section must look at how the opposite of happiness, namely depression and anxiety disorders are understood.

Until very recently there was no coherent model for understanding all depression and anxiety disorders, except with the old Freudian models that had been largely rejected by modern neuroscience. This all changed with the presentation of McNaughton & Corr's (2004) article that summarizes their proposed two-dimensional approach to understanding depression and anxiety, by incorporating the meaning matrix of defensive direction and defensive distance. In essence, these researchers have noted that people suffering from affective disorders will withdraw from engagement (intentional effort filled expressions of personal meaning in the world). The effect is that there is a stunted level of expression of intentionality or meaning in engaged being, and that tied in with this the matrix of faith, hope, and love is weak. The way that they present this is fascinating, for it portrays a glimpse of the nature and meaning behind the absence of happiness.

What one can see first of all is that these negative affective disorders are complex. These affective experiences have a meaning that is deep seated, automatic, and integrated within one another. Finally, the components of engagement and a positive meaning are

lacking within these affective disorders. In all, what I am struck by, is the level of correlation between this ground breaking model that has arisen with affective neuroscience, and the models of being described by existentialists.

In essence, what this defensive model portrays is that the structures of the brain each engaged automatically and spontaneously in the evaluation of the environment. This evaluation process makes up consciousness on the pre-reflective level through a simple meaning model of threat evaluation. The neural architecture then operates with two parallel systems: 1. Escape/approach systems; 2. A grading of defensive distance that influences the neural level that controls the behaviour. What this means is that caudal to rostral structures are simultaneously involved in this model, with smaller defensive distances mapping away from the pre-frontal cortex down toward the periaqueductal grey.

In presenting this two dimensional prototype of depression and anxiety, neuroscience highlights a number of key points from a revised version of the *Behavioral Inhibition System* (BIS) model (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) that provides the foundation by which we can better understand the McNaughton and Corr (2004) double faceted approach:

1. Fear and anxiety are distinct yet simultaneous systems, with fear moving the creature from danger, and anxiety allowing a risk assessment and movement toward the danger.

2. Various anxiety disorders can be mapped to have neural distinctions: Panic/periaqueductal grey; phobia/hypothalamus & amygdala; anxiety/amygdala & septo-hippocampal; and obsession/cingulated.

3. Fear and anxiety are distributed across a number of neural structures.

4. There is the concurrent activation of fear and approach systems.

5. The septo-hippocampal system is very important, as the memory system provides alternative choices to the situation, and the hippocampus helps choose the appropriate response.

In presenting these key points McNaughton and Corr (2004) then clarify their constructs of fear and anxiety, highlighting the point that there is evidence for a functional distinction between fear and anxiety. McNaughton and Corr propose that anxiety functions as a Behavioral Approach System (BAS). This BAS system is hypothesized to operate with the distinctive types of positive - reward and negative-punishment. The critical factor, is that fear is involved in active avoidance whereas anxiety is involved in risk assessment (including cautious approach behavior or passive avoidance). This model reframes our understanding of fear and anxiety into two asymmetrical systems that control what are defined as *defensive direction*.

The second key component then is *defensive distance*, where the assessment of threat is a cognitive construct of intensity. As such, there is an amount of individual difference in the assessment of defensive distance (McNaughton & Corr, 2004). When superimposed with defensive direction (the anxiety/ approach or fear/avoidance systems), we can see that defensive distance is a regulator of what dominant neural structure will be involved and what symptoms are expressed: A. Fear/ Avoidance + low defensive distance = explosive attack/ panic. B. Anxiety + low defensive distance = Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)/defensive quiescence.

In order to fully understand the full range of affective disorders then, McNaughton and Corr (2004) add the dimension of perceived potential of avoidability. With this one can see that where the aversive consequence is perceived as unavoidable and where it is approached with a lack of defensive distance, the result (McNaughton and Corr are tentative) is depression. The difference between panic and depression then is one of which competing system has greater strength in the given situation. Here, the neuroscientists suggest that when the conflict between the approach and avoidance system is equal, where there is a simple fear/ avoidance vs. anxiety/ approach conflict, fear/ avoidance tends to win out.

When McNaughton and Corr (2004) then overlay their matrix of defensive direction and defensive distance, the neural mapping of distinct systems shows that rostral structures are involved with great defensive distance. As that distance shrinks the neural reaction moves to successively more caudal structures, and these structures are controlled by the two asymmetrical systems of defensive approach/ anxiety and defensive avoidance/ fear. The resulting behaviour then can be understood by the activation of these systems.

In terms of affective pathology, the interaction between defensive direction and distance allow the symptoms to be explained by a number of understandable processes. For example, it may be that the individual is having normal adaptive reaction to his/her context or an adaptive reaction with maladaptive intensity (either via excessive sensitivity or excessive activation by related systems). The great value of the McNaughton and Corr (2004) paradigm is that it provides a logical model that incorporates both biological and

cognitive components, while also explaining the variability of the effectiveness of various drugs on these disorders.

This sheds light on why different disorders then require different drugs for treatment, as each depends upon a different part of the brain, with movement from rostral regions occurring as defensive distance shrinks. Even more significant, in my view at least, is that it sheds light on why there exists the broad effectiveness of serotonin related pharmaceuticals for both anxiety and depressive disorders (by 5HT innervating the entire defense system). Further, as defensive direction also influences the specific neural structures activated, this can explain why there is differential effects of SSRIs between anxiety and depression (as 5HT has independent effects in different areas of the brain).

In essence then, McNaughton and Corr (2004) display a coherent model of affective disorders through two interrelated dimensions. The first dimension is the idea of defensive direction which is categorized by two distinct (though interrelated) systems. The first system is that of fear, which modulates reactions of escape from a situation and defensive avoidance. The second system controls anxiety, by modulating risk assessment and defensive approach. The second dimension is that of perceived defensive distance, regulating the hierarchical level of neural functioning within the given system (rostral to caudal levels).

Within the fear system, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is associated with the prefrontal-ventral stream and anterior cingulate while lower defensive distance is associated with more caudal structures, such as the periaqueductal gray (Panic). Within the anxiety system more complex anxiety, like social anxiety, is associated with an extended defensive distance. GAD risk assessment and defensive quiescence is

associated with the medial-hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray respectively. Of course the different levels of each system, and the two systems as a whole, are deeply interrelated to allocate parallel functions and speedy switching of control.

In the end, the two dimensional neuropsychology of defense paradigm provides a coherent picture of affective disorders that seems to fit with experimental data. While the theory is presented in a very simplified form and does not discuss the intricacies of integration between the two systems of defensive direction or defensive levels, it does still have merit. What this model suggests is that clinical anxiety and depression are the result of fear and anxiety and withdrawal from the environment. Therefore, there is a lack of hope and disengagement with the environment, the exact opposite of what positive psychologists find in happiness. On the intuitive level, it is obvious that sadness is the opposite of happiness. What I find gratifying, is that it is so clearly expressed within this model. The trouble is that fear and anxiety occur on every level, including the levels of deepest human thought, so one must recognize this and identify ways of waylaying this as a barrier to happiness. Within this, I see a real and tangible role for the Pauline triad of faith, hope, and love. It is here then, that I see a need to discuss how our deepest fears and terrors are managed through cultural and worldview constructs. This brings us to the realm of Terror Management Theory.

Terror Management Theory

Fear and anxiety are ever present assessments within human existence, yet the human mind is not simply drawing out levels of assessments about the immediate environment. The blessing and curse of the massive capacity of the human mind is that it recognizes that it is mortal, and so there is the ever-present awareness of one's ultimate non-being.

There is a plethora of research in experimental psychology, particularly in the area of Terror Management Theory:

> Here's one for the annals of counterintuitive findings: When asked to contemplate the occasion of their own demise, people become happier than usual, instead of sadder, according to a new study in the November issue of *Psychological Science.* Researchers say it's a kind of psychological immune response — faced with thoughts of our own death, our brains automatically cope with the conscious feelings of distress by non-consciously seeking out and triggering happy feelings, a mechanism that scientists theorize helps protect us from permanent depression or paralyzing despair. It might explain the shift toward more positive emotions and thought processes as people age and approach death, and the preternaturally positive outlook that some terminally ill patients seem to muster. Though it looks a lot like old-fashioned denial, that's not the case, says lead author Nathan DeWall. It's not that "'I know I'm going to die, what's going on here," says DeWall. "I think what's happening is that people are really unaware of [their own resilience]" — whereas, with denying behavior, people usually know they're engaging in it — "so, when people are exposed to serious threats, such as when they consider their own death, which is about as serious as it gets, people are coping, but they're completely unaware of it" (Song, 2007).

Terror Management Theory is based upon the works of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker. It is the idea that culture and the meaning that culture creates in the lives of people is designed to mediate our fear of death. In essence, people develop cultural worldviews through group constructions of reality that serves to reduce the

overwhelming terror resulting from an awareness of death (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004).

According to Solomon et al. (2004), culture reduces anxiety by providing its members with a meaning of belonging and value within a meaningful cosmos. Meaning is derived from a social worldview that offers an account of existence from ultimate origins to ultimate demise, forming either a symbolic or literal sense of immortality:

> Symbolic immortality can be obtained by perceiving oneself as part of a culture that endures beyond one's lifetime, or by creating visible testaments to one's existence in the form of great works of art or science, impressive buildings or monuments, amassing great fortunes or vast properties, and having children. Literal immortality is procured via the various afterlives promised by almost all organized religions … All cultural worldviews thus provide their constituents with a sense of enduring meaning and a basis for perceiving oneself to be a person of worth within the world of meaning to which one subscribes. By meeting or exceeding individualized internalized standards of value, norms, and social roles derived from the culture, people qualify for death transcendence and hence can maintain psychological equanimity despite their knowledge of their own mortality. For TMT, self-esteem consists of the belief that one is a person of value in a world of meaning, and the primary function of self-esteem is to buffer anxiety, especially anxiety engendered by the uniquely human awareness of death (p. 16-17).

According to Cozzolino (2006), it is the unique human attribute that enables one to think of the past and to imagine the future, both of which help one to exist and to

function successfully in the present. This intelligence makes up what is often called faith and hope, a belief and a desire for something future oriented. This intelligence, however also leads to a very costly dilemma; the ability to conceive of the seemingly unimaginable, also renders humanaity uniquely aware of their own non-existence. Hence faith and hope draw upon the considerable cognitive abilities of the human mind to deal with this possibly overwhelming terror. This requires that the person draw upon the support of the meaning of cultural worldviews (which are inextricably linked with hope and faith). The result is that when faced with mortality salience, people can fall back upon their worldview in order to deal with this terror (Song, 2007).

Thus, it is clear that culture and its anthropological correlate in faith or worldview construction, which important for mood regulation. As one may see from the neuroscience model of affective disorders, fear and anxiety play a significant role within the meaning making portion. Hence it is clear that the mechanisms that can be used to deal with these fears and anxieties will be important in dealing with not only negative emotional states, but in the promotion of positive states. As Boden and Berenbaum (2010) point out there is an intricate link between affect and belief that must always be taken into account, thus in our continued research we will need to keep issues of belief within the forefront of our inquiry into the nature of happiness:

> We have developed three empirically derived premises that characterize the bidirectional relations between affect and belief. First, the need to make sense of experience and the need to regulate affect drive the feedback loop through which affect and belief influence each other, thereby leading to belief evolution. Second, changes in affect arousal and valence/ type influence belief content and

conviction. Third, changes in belief content and conviction influence affect arousal and valence/ type (p. 227).

Summary

What I draw from these theories is that a good portion of happiness has to do with engagement. There is an internal meaning that one brings to the context, and the person is immersed, loses track of time, and may become oblivious to things around them. This experience, known as Flow, is such a deep engagement with what you are doing that you are unaware of your surroundings and seemingly become part of the activity. Having flow in life is considered a source of both immediate pleasure and overall well-being, which is a key ingredient in long-lasting happiness.

Another key to happiness appears to be hope. Hope is not some mere passive emotion, for it contains essential ingredients that work together with all levels of mental functioning, from goal setting to producing energy. I appears to me that people who are hopeful and have optimistic outlooks are more likely to be able to think more clearly and rationally than those who look for the worst to happen. It is often the attitude of "can and will" versus "can't and will not try" that effects the engagement, and with lack of engagement there is no flow.

What I also see is the negative side of affect, depression and anxiety, are part of the assessment system. Fear and anxiety are powerful factors that can be major barriers to

hope. Within this, even the ultimate awareness of one's own mortality can have a significant impact on how a person functions and the attitude that one takes towards a situation. There is however a way of dealing with fear and anxiety (including the anxiety of death) that is found within cultural worldview development. Here, faith becomes important as it provides a buffering to death inspired fear and anxiety that is latent within human existence. In summary, it is clear that engagement, hope, and a worldview perspective that deals with death (ie. faith) are important aspects of happiness. Within the next chapter, will be explored the nature of existence from the perspective of existential philosophers, for they will no doubt have a deep insight into the experience of existence.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE

It has been said that "Existentialism is the philosophy that makes life possible" (Panza & Gale, 2008, p. 9). Though not comprehensive, this statement points to the reason why existentialism is the realm of philosophy that can shed light on happiness. There is much in the world that people crave, things such as meaning and an orderly worldview. To experience the absence of these things is to experience anxiety and nothingness. This nothingness is the reason why many brand existentialism as the dark and depressing philosophy, yet it is in the dealing with this nothingness that one may find the nature of being. So, as existentialism deals with being, it stands to reason that it should shed some light upon what it means to, "Be happy."

A hallmark of existentialism is that it gives emotions and feelings a place that is considered important when understanding questions of meaning and existence. For the existentialist, the falsity of objectivity makes little sense, since human existence is an active participation of contingency, facticity, and choice. There is little incentive to favour reason due to the nature of human existence, so the affective feeling state of the individual takes its rightful place in the search of the structures of life. These moods

reveal deeper truths about what it essentially means to be human. Now usually the feeling that is focused upon is one of anxiety, the unsettling feeling of people, and the notion that nothingness lies as our foundation of existence. Existentialism is a philosophy that allows feelings, emotions, and the affective realm a place at the table of every human's search for significance. Within this chapter will be an exploration of some of the key existential figures in order to gain an appreciation of their understanding of the structures that make for a significant, authentic, and, perhaps, a somewhat happy life.

Hegel

Existential philosophy makes clear that context is a large part of the equation. In dealing with the existential perspective it is important to begin slightly before the beginning of the modern movement, to have a sense of the context. While one might wish to start with Descartes, or Kant, it seems prudent to begin with Hegel. There are three reasons for this; firstly Hegel was a modern figure that delineated and then brought together the study of human experience into an integrated whole. Secondly, Hegel dealt with the human struggle for meaning and its expression. Unlike Descartes' rationalism, Hegel recognized a more complex nature of human experience. Thirdly, Hegel had a specific impact upon Kierkegaard, and much of Kierkegaard's writings were a reaction to Hegel, resulting in Kierkegaard's existential bent. Both Hegel and Kierkegaard seem to agree on the general nature of happiness, as a unified experience.

In order to have a sense of Hegel's philosophy as it may relate to affect, we will begin by recognizing that aesthetics are very much an affective activity. There is very little that is purely rational or empirical within our sense of beauty, art, and aesthetics. That being the case, we can draw a tentative line between Hegel's philosophy of

aesthetics and a positive affective experience within the range of general happiness. All of this of course consists as part of Hegel's moment of the life in the absolute. That is, the human connection with the deeper meanings that make up existence, of which people can share significance and experience comfort and joy.

Within Hegel's overall idealism is the integration of existence throughout history; being something that is personal, yet connected with all of history. This personal and historical experience is expressed, for Hegel, within aesthetics and turns into an absolute philosophy insofar as the history of philosophy is brought to synthesis within his own philosophy. Hegel summarizes this in his lectures on *The History of Philosophy*, "In the true system of philosophy nothing is lost; all principles are preserved, since philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms. This concrete idea is … earnest work to become objective to itself, to know itself" (Hegel, 1979, p. 40).

What we can see within Hegel then, is the emergence of an idea that the human enterprise is something that is affective, intellectual, engaged, and developmentally progressing through history. It is not just individuals struggling for connection and significance, dealing with inevitable demise and meaning in activity. It is an enterprise that is played out on the level of the entire human race throughout history. Hence, in order to come closer to what people all long for, one must move closer to a full integration of meaning, symbolism, and personal engagement in order to fill this emotional and intellectual longing that can bring a moment of happiness.

What we can see within Hegel is the pull to integration of intellect, meaning/ symbol/ logos, engagement and the affective response; a call that signifies the unification of these components. For Hegel a mature system is one that is not separated, it is the

integration of art (the affective experience), of faith and of philosophy in human lived experience on both the micro and macro levels. As we see with DeGray's (2011) analysis of Hegel's philosophical *moments,* the Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit come together in one complete form; mediating the others creating an absolute syllogism of the system, he writes, "Hegel is … in a philosophical position to show how the three sciences of Logic, Nature, and Spirit, mediate the others … to form one complete Circle of circles" (p. 31). The key thing to note here is that each component of human existence and understanding mediates with the others. This provides a key clue for the later exploration of the nature of human happiness. For as Hegel makes clear, the fullness of existence and philosophy is found in this absolute syllogism, where one component exists only in the presence of others, and mediates the others.

The overarching theme of a dialectical integration within Hegel's philosophy can then be brought to bear on his philosophy of Aesthetics, which is arguably the most affective of his works. When we apply this integration theme to his Aesthetics we see Hegel giving a glimpse into the nature of a positive affective experience. Of course Hegel grapples with it in terms of a means of dealing with existence and the notion of non-existence, death, and the affective component is not explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless we can acknowledge that art, and beauty in art, is something of an affective experience and can thereby be applied as an exploration of happiness.

Art, for Hegel, was a moment of the absolute spirit, where form meets sensation and sensation meets idea. A person's need for art is a fundamental and affective component of existence as a person, no less than the need for religion and philosophy, for it is rooted in one's capacity to copy the self and thereby know the self. As we explore

Hegel's Aesthetics, for in all its forms and phases, I wish to highlight that it expresses itself within the human experience. In Hegel's analysis we shall see how beauty in art, and its affective corollary of happiness, is made up of the two key components: moving towards something (in form), and holding a meaning (however mysterious or specific it may be). For Hegel the striking factor is that this is developed throughout the course of history into clearer and clearer forms, until the absolute moment of the apex of art is found with Christian art; providing personal engagement and meaning. This, I find to be significant in my own exploration of my personal experience of happiness.

For Hegel, art is a sign of humanity seeking an inner harmony through engagement with the world, sensual appreciation of the world, and the embrace of a unifying narrative or meaning that brings significance to life. As we have already seen Hegel saw the absolute moments as a convergence, and art is certainly an expression of this convergence. God's breath into humanity can be experienced in the convergence of art, religion, and philosophy. On a cursory level, each is interested in influencing humanity through its basic psychological needs of creativity, proper behaviour, and a story that gives explanation to guide our sense of meaning. Hegel might say that each discipline expresses and feeds these needs in its own way, but is most powerful in the human experience when they merge. This convergence of significance allows the person to experience a reality beyond the strength of any one of these disciplines alone (Paolucci, 1979).

Hegel sees this convergence as an expression of all of human endeavor. Whether saint, sage, or poet, all people long to experience the ultimate reality that the symbolic represents. This, for Hegel, means that art which is simply symbolic reaches beyond its

ability to carry meaning. Symbolic art may point to the ultimate reality; however it is akin to an arrow that directs us to the other side of a locked door. Symbolic art falls short, because it does not provide a person access to the *experience* of the ultimate reality (Hegel, 1979).

In my own quest, I perceive this Hegelian moment as a recognition of deep mystery and spirituality within my own human spirit. Yet, depth alone leaves me lacking, and does not fully allow me to engage the world or bring happiness. This symbolic life, simply points me in a direction and helps me recognize my need for the transcendent. I therefore need more insight to bring me to closer understanding of the essence of my happiness.

In getting back to Hegel, what this means is that beauty, true artistic beauty, is not something that is simply apprehended by the senses. It is something that springs from the human need to express, to create, and convey the ultimate reality within the narratives that spring forth in the mind of its observers. It is a here that we see the spiritual and meaning aspect of Hegel's view of the beauty of the arts. In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel reveals that the greatest form of beauty is that which originates within the psyche, and is then expressed for others to encounter and experience. The beauty of art belongs primarily to the mind, and it is through the mind that truth is experienced. Hegel considers art to be a spiritual endeavor for art springs from the psyche, and through art the divine is experienced by the mind. Art is mystical and catholic (in the sense of being universal), originating from supra-cultural human impulses and allowing people to finally be fully human (Hegel, 1979, p. 2), "Man's need for art, no less than his need for religion and philosophy, is rooted in his capacity to mirror himself in thought."

Transcendence is also something that is essential in this human experience, for it is something that affords value to art and thereby reflects it to the self; through its creative acts of forming and experiencing, a person becomes more than a single, temporal being. This is a great gift to humanity, for as he says in *The Doctrine of Being* (Stace, 1955, p. 135), "Being is the first category … the highest possible abstraction … equivalent to nothing. We [must] think of anything as having this or that … size, shape, colour, weight etc."

Through the spiritual act of reshaping external things a person can reduplicate his own consciousness, and transform the implicit psyche into an explicit copy. This form of copying, for Hegel, is far higher than the imitation form of art that seeks to imitate nature with technical perfection. It is the intentionality of the experience of the mind put into engagement with the world, making for a fuller human experience of being. With true art, Hegel argues, the self is expressed through the whole significance of life, and allows it to exist and be experienced by others explicitly. Therefore, art is not simply the beauty of form and color, for that is something that falls far short of real art. True art then is a spontaneous eruption within the person. It is in the in-between experience of the sensuous stimuli and the inner spirituality, struggling as opposites, and then uniting within the person to create a union with a meaning greater than either one alone (Paolucci, 1979) .

Hegel clarifies for us that objectively we think of the world within a trifurcation of art, religion, and philosophy. Often people view these as separate disciplines in their own right, with their own value, and call upon different people with different skills to both support, and experience them. In contrast to this common sense view, Hegel calls for an existential union of these disciplines to be bound together by the psyche. Within

this trinity of art, religion and philosophy, the mind apprehends the divine for a brief moment. The grasping of the divine is the sum of three key ingredients, first through the senses of color, form, and sound experiencing the distal stimulus. Next, through the proximal formation of the imagination, and thirdly through the full intra-psychic narrative that comes like a flood in aid of the imagination, giving humanity a glimpse into the absolute mind. As Hegel (1979, p. 7) says in his lectures on Aesthetics, "The first is an immediate and for that reason sensuous knowing … the second form is imaginative or pictorial … and the third and last is the free thinking of the absolute mind."

In view of this tripod of experiencing a connection with the universal aspect of humanity and the cosmos, I see a connection with Christ message. Our senses moved by the distal stirring of *The Word made flesh*, our imagination lighted by the *Holy Spirit*, and the account of the character of God filling and forming within our minds. This process is personal because it occurs within the person, so the encounter with the Trinity cannot help but be a personal one, yet one that is dependent upon the community that acts as the representative of Christ. Through this community, the divine can be experienced again and again, as it provides the sensual prodding that moves a person to this experience. Here Hegel (1979, p. 8) notes that, "He (God) is as spirit manifests itself to religious consciousness as the Trinity of Persons which is for itself nevertheless One. Here we have essentiality, universality, and particularity in reconciled unity; and such unity along constitutes the concrete."

So we see that for Hegel, art (and by implication our own affective experience as art is essentially a reflection of the person's being) is an existential experience of union with something greater than the self. To find this experience, or to stir it in others, one

needs not only skill, but also an ultimate meaning or value, and the form to convey that absolute value, or idea. In essence then Art is a lived world experience of the divine, both in its creation, and its experience (a reciprocal experience of being in, with, and for the celestial).As Hegel notes (Stace, 1955, p. 446), "If … the human mind is adequately to apprehend the Absolute in sensuous form, which is the demand of spirit … it must rise above nature … it must create objects of beauty for itself." Of course, not all art achieves this great and high existential truth, so Hegel describes art by its lower forms, or stages, as symbolic, classical, and romantic: "*Symbolic* art seeks the perfect unity of form and content that *Classical* art finds and *Romantic* art transcends." (Paolucci, 1979, pp. 11).

The first of these, symbolic art, is the form of art which has not quite found the balance that creates this divin*e* experience. It is the form where the idea is present, but has not found its distal expression that can carry the experience to spark this within the mind of the patron. The idea then is foreign to the artistic expression. Within this there are situations where such art is appropriate, for example in the expression of God in the Jewish or Islamic traditions, or the awareness of the absolute Brahma, where the idea is indeed formless. Another notion that is a natural subject of symbolic art is that of non-being, specifically death. No one can claim to have truly experienced death, until one experiences its immutable and personal grasp (Paolucci, 1979).

Death is likely then the grandest or at least most pervasive theme of symbolic art throughout history. One has only to think of the phoenix, falling into non-being, only to arise again from the smoldering ashes. Indeed the theme of death being expressed in symbolic art really does form the first known stage of art, as it was the primary mode used by ancient Egyptian artisans. The pyramids, more than just a burial place, were a

symbol to convey the fear of non-being and ultimately the hope of being reborn. According to Hegel, the riddle of the Sphynx is where the best and worst qualities of symbolic art can be found (Stace, 1955).

The Sphynx expresses both the success and the failure of symbolic art. The expression of its infinite meaning will remain forever unutterable and ungraspable. Unfortunately as it was something that was likely ungraspable to begin with it only serves to point out the absurdity of much of human experience. It serves to remind us of our impotence against death, our ignorance in understanding the workings of the cosmos, and the reality that we in many ways do not even know ourselves. True there is beauty within the object of the Sphynx, but its mystery confounds a full appreciation of the sensuous object, as human minds are locked in the futile attempt to grasp the immensity of one's own inadequacy. As such, the symbolic art has both positive and negative aspects; it is positive and successful in pointing out something that is beyond our immediate human experience, but negative in that we will never apprehend it, experience it, or be with it through the form presented (Paolucci, 1979) .

As the power of the human mind longs to grasp the fullness of eternal existence, the symbolic is too distant, according to Hegel. The next phase of art then, brings the lofty to within the grasp of the psyche, to be in its existence. Here we find a unity of meaning and shape that coincides with the true concept of the beautiful; Hegel calls this unity *Classical Art*. The union of content and form to bring into being a free self-encapsulated existence is the essence of *Classical Art*. The fullness of idea and expression which symbolic art sought to capture the classical expresses clearly. Within classical art the numinous, the spirit, the notion, the idea, determines the shape. Since this

spirit is one that arises first within humanity, the expression finds its form by returning to humanity. As such, the human form is encapsulated by this union of idea and shape, as an expression of the absolute. The idea framed by personal legacy or national faith, idealized within the human body (Paolucci, 1979).

The Greeks are essentially the source of classical art, drawing its inspiration from as far back as the Homeric gods, struggling against the Titans. The context therefore of this art is a clear well-defined pantheon of gods that express the art, just as the art expresses the powers of the gods. Having adopted the spiritual for its content, and finding its expression in the human form, the Greeks were able to define their gods. There was nothing that was alien within their deities, and as totally identified with humanity man himself was absorbed into the spirituality of the image. As such classical art can be seen as something in-between the symbolic and the sublime, able to connect to the higher, but lacking something.

Within the individualized peripheral shapes of the Greek gods there is still lacking the inner world of the psyche. If we feel piously spirited in their presence, we know that what we experience is essentially within us. As such, the *Classical* does fall short of the *Romantic*, where the infinite along with honest subjectivity can coexist within an interaction with the object. Romantic art, like its predecessors is defined by the mixture of the various elements of form, significance, and subjective experience. In the Symbolic, art strives to give form to the spiritual ether that it never seems to grasp. Within the Classical, the form holds primacy and though beautiful, the balance is opposite to the Symbolic, leaving the significance and meaning lacking. Within any art the true

numinous cannot be directly portrayed in objective form, that is why Romantic art does away with unanimity of the divine and human.

Romantic art then starts not with form as the Classical art does, but with Christianity. It is here that the union of human and divine is recreated into something that is infused with subjective, personal consciousness. That is, Christianity is a personal experience where one is not only engaging the art, but with one's own existence, relationship with God, and redemption. For romantic art it is not a vague symbol of an ethereal imagination, it is an inner awareness that has fact in the self, and springs out of the finite and contingent core of our existence. Within this recreation of the human and divine in Christ we then have the form of humanity as the appearance of God it is the union of our own finitude, with the infinite (Stace, 1955).

Unlike the gods of classic art, the God of romantic art is self-knowing, benevolent, and the human embodiment is an act of love for humanity. More than that, the universal God suffered as we suffered, struggled as we struggled, and even died at our hands. Such a God is accessible to us, and is able to connect with our emotional self, so it is no longer just an idea of God, but a full feeling of God. As such, art's task moves from expressing beauty through some idealized form, to beauty in its very essence of human existence in hope beyond our own finitude (Paolucci, 1979).

What I take from Hegel is that the highest form of the life is engaged and experienced; and not just any experience, but that of being loved. Love then infuses the content of my subjective life. The form of engagement in the world being a *means to convey that love* and transform it into a feeling. The experience, bringing with it comfort against our deepest existential fears. The engagement is a vessel not only of some low

form of love, but of ultimate love, divine love, expressed in human form, in the personhood of Christ. God then is present within my personal engagement in the world, and with him the message of my own redemption. It is something that beckons for my entire being to experience, both mind, and body. For me then, happiness is a feeling of a spiritual union with God; something that Hegel says is found in romantic art. As Hegel notes, "Only as feeling can man's spiritual union with God enter art, and, as feeling, it is most beautifully pictured in Mary's love of her child" (1977, p. 43).

At this point, I can see a convergence forming as I follow Hegel's thought. I see positive affect (happiness) associated with art (as intentionality and meaning), but also faith, and love. I can also see a glimmer of hope within this, as this basis of love is primarily directed towards waylaying those deepest fears that haunt me, for I am loved. As the love is divine love, the involvement is with infinite subjectivity, becoming the impetus of a well of love to spring up with myself. I then move beyond experience to the intentionality within love, disinterested with the self, and oriented to the service of the other.

It is here that my sense of happiness resonates with Hegel's view of romantic Christian art. For such a love is not found in classical art, so romantic art is infinitely higher as it redefines the human-divine union, and then draws us into a place of inner subjectivity that allows us to have the courage to move out and serve something beyond ourselves (Paolucci, 1979). At the conclusion of Hegel's exposition of Aesthetics, he concludes that the Poetic arts draw us into ourselves and out again, so that we may know ourselves better. As such it expresses the highest form of art, using the landscape of the mind as its source and its canvas, and means of interpretation. Imagination is its

substance, not limited by stone, or paint, or instrument, it can go wherever the imagination can go, liberating us from the content and forms of the finite. Dramatic poetry mixed with the Christian message of divine love can therefore bring us into the very presence of the absolute in a sensory fashion that is unheard of with the other arts. It transfers the logos of love into the sensual, and once apprehended in the mind back into the meaning of all experiences of being and non-being; it is here that we finally know the *essence of beauty and of art*. Hegel sees all of this, and his exposition of the arts as a whole, as an exposition of happiness in a sense.

Of course Hegel does not frame his discussion in terms of a simple happiness, but as a deep abiding happiness beyond circumstances that unifies us with the eternal within our finite human experience. As Hegel (1977) notes at the conclusion of his exposition on the arts:

> In art we have to do, not with some plaything, however agreeable or useful, but with the liberation of the mind from the content and forms of the finitude, with the presence and reconciliation of the absolute in the sensory and phenomenal, with an unfolding of truth that is not limited … it is the best compensation for life's tedious trials and the bitter labors … I permit myself to hope – and it is my final wish – that a higher, indestructible bond of beauty and truth may now be forged which will keep us firmly united now and forever (p. 200).

As we have seen, Hegel views reality and human experience as a unity of many aspects, meanings, and intentionality together. This is the main lesson I draw from Hegel, as a means to clarify my own experience of happiness. For me, this unity is best

expressed in religious terms like love, and faith; both of which seem to make up much of the idea of the person as self.

Kierkegaard

This complex work of Hegel and his ideas of integration and moment then bring us to Soren Kierkegaard. With much of his writing being a response to Hegel, Kierkegaard began a movement toward the existential ways of thinking, with his *The Concept of Anxiety* influencing Heidegger and his explanation of anxiety and freedom influencing Sartre. What we shall see within this brief discussion of Kiekegaard, is that while he did not deal with happiness directly as a goal, he does provide a developmental model that brings us to a deep sense of being that might be characterized as a divine joy.

Within Soren Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* is an investigation into the subjectivity of truth, and into the veracity of subjectivity. This examination displays the alliance of subjectivity, faith, and happiness and guides me through the process that brings these aspects together within human experience. Within this investigation, he shows how objective truth diverges from subjective human truth as people experience it, and how objectivity differs from subjectivity. Through describing how objective truth may be an outer truth, and how subjective truth may be an inner truth, Kierkegaard distinguishes between speculative philosophy as a mode of reasoning (seeking objective truth), and how faith (seeking subjective truth) is the more honest human experience of truth. This observation helps me to become more comfortable with faith being essential in my own reality; that happiness is not necessarily simply

something defined by the objective, but is part of the authentic and mature being of a person living in faith.

In exploring Kierkegaard's contribution to my exploration of happiness I was mindful that Kierkegaard often deals with the issue of emotion and faith in the negative. Yet this negativity gives a hint into how and why people develop, and the role anxiety (as a counter to happiness) plays in this development. Kierkegaard's exposition on *The Concept of Anxiety* (1981), identifying emotional disequilibrium with the original sinful state and its integration with our existence shows that we have an innate sense that life as it is experienced it is not the way it was meant to be:

> The present work has set as its task the psychological treatment of the concept of "anxiety," but in such a way that it constantly keeps in mind and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin. Sin, however, is no subject for psychological concern, and only by submitting to the service of a misplaced brilliance could it be dealt with psychologically.... Thus when sin is brought into esthetics, the mood becomes either light-minded or melancholy, for the category in which sin lies is contradiction, and this is either comic or tragic.... If sin is dealt with in metaphysics, the mood becomes that of dialectical uniformity and disinterestedness, which ponder sin as something that cannot withstand the scrutiny of thought.... If sin is dealt with in psychology, the mood becomes that of persistent observation.... Sin does not properly belong in any science, but it is the subject of a sermon, in which the single individual speaks as the single individual to the single individual (p. 14).

For Kierkegaard, faith is a key part of happiness; yet happiness itself is not something that is devoid from anxiety or even misery, but is a complex confluence of faith and hope and intentionality. In his working out of this idea he moves through a reflection on the features of existence, that they may be objective or subjective. For the objective thinker finds truth by approximation, while the subjective thinker finds truth by appropriation. According to Kierkegaard, faith cannot be arrived at by approximation, or by an effort to quantify. Faith can only be attained by an appropriation or acceptance of the condition of uncertainty. Thus, faith requires a leap from disbelief to belief, a choice that is profound and personal. Faith is a condition of objective uncertainty in which a person affirms his own subjectivity and in the midst of this a person can experience a new kind of happiness.

According to Kierkegaard, faith is a subjective, personal, passionate intention in attaining eternal happiness, and is only found through the leap of faith. There is, for Kierkegaard a syllogism of subjectivity affirmation, faith, and happiness that emerges. True, this happiness is not an absence of anxiety, but the recognition of it, and the willingness to move forward into the unknown with the hope and trust of attaining something greater. Faith is a category of decision-making in which an individual confronts an "either-or" situation, either accepting or rejecting this reality of subjectivity within being. For Kierkegaard this faith is part of the experience of happiness, but so is hope and love (Kierkegaard, 2006):

> If there were no eternal consciousness in a human being, if underlying everything there were only a wild, fermenting force writhing in dark passions that produced everything great and insignificant, if a bottomless, insatiable emptiness lurked

> beneath everything, what would life be then but despair? If such were the case, if there were no sacred bond that tied humankind together, if one generation after another rose like leaves in a forest, if one generation succeeded another like the singing of birds in the forest, if the human race passed through the world as a ship through the sea, as the wind through the desert, a thoughtless and futile activity, if an eternal oblivion always hungrily lay in wait for its prey and there were no power strong enough to snatch it away – then how empty and hopeless life would be! But that is why it is not so, and as God created man and woman, so he fashioned the hero and the poet or orator. The latter can do nothing that the former does, he can only admire, love, and rejoice in the hero. Yet he too is happy, no less than the former, for the hero is so to speak his better nature with which he is infatuated yet delighted that it is after all not himself, that his love can be admiration (p. 12).

Kierkegaard sees human experience as complex, and the moment of happiness is tied in with the full complexity of truth (much like Hegel's understanding), yet he explains that truth itself is a paradox, in that it is objectivity defined as subjectivity, and in that the out-ward-ness of objectivity is also the inwardness of subjectivity. Truth may be objectively defined as a passionate inwardness, which may change in depth or intensity according to the experience of the subjective thinker. Inwardness is an ethical infinity in which the individual may find eternal happiness. Although truth may be appropriated by faith, faith must be surrendered in order to be objective. Thus, Kierkegaard admits that truth may be defined from either an objective or subjective point of view. Kierkegaard does not deny that speculative thinking may be useful to explain

matters about which it is not necessary to have faith. However, questions about matters of faith (or questions about whether to have faith) must be answered subjectively (Kierkegaard, 2006):

> Faith is therefore no esthetic emotion but something much higher, precisely because it presupposes resignation; it is not a spontaneous inclination of the heart but the paradox of existence … The act of resigning does not require faith, but what I gain in resignation is my eternal consciousness … For whenever something finite gets beyond my control, I starve myself until I make the movement, for my eternal consciousness is my love of God, and for me that is higher than anything. The act of resigning does not require faith, but to get the least bit more than my eternal consciousness does require faith, for this is the paradox …. By faith I do not renounce anything; on the contrary, by faith I receive everything, exactly in the sense in which it is said that one who has faith like a mustard seed can move mountains. A purely human courage is required to renounce the whole of temporality in order to gain the eternal, but this I gain and never in all eternity can renounce without self-contradiction. But it takes a paradoxical and humble courage next to grasp the whole of temporality by virtue of the absurd, and this is the courage of faith. By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac (p. 40-41).

What I draw from Kierkegaard is that to know the truth of personal existence and happiness is to be aware of uncertainty and paradox. Truth is not an abstract set of relations, nor is happiness an immutable state of being. Both are found in the existence of the subjective, and is more passionately appropriated as the subjective experience

progresses from simple engagement to a faith infused existence. The subjective experience is always in a state of becoming. In this then, happiness can be found in the security of faith, being loved by God, but is always laced with anxiety; for happiness is a state of being, and being is a process of becoming, and is thus a state of uncertainty.

Yet Kierkegaard has more to say about this, for Kierkegaard defines three stages of existence and the modes within each that lead to a level of happiness: 1) the aesthetic, 2) the ethical, and 3) the religious. The aesthetic stage is a stage in which the individual is interested in pleasure and enjoyment. The aesthetic stage is not characterized by the passionate engagement and personal commitment which are characteristic of the higher stages of existence. Within this we can understand Kierkegaard as delineating (on the periphery at least) the nature of happiness and the barriers to happiness at each level of development. Within the aesthetic stage, there is the first realization of the self in the nature of the self and the object, but satisfaction and happiness is tied very much to the fickle relation with objects.

The ethical stage is a higher stage of personal commitment that requires consciousness to pull itself out of the immediacy and begin to relate with the eternal. Here the self comes to see the self as having a unique inner life and that with choice comes responsibility for ones actions. Yet the shortcoming of the ethical domain is that the subject reacts to a point of dissatisfaction with the finite and community setting, and is also marred by guilt of those things done or left undone. Hence, happiness can be found in doing-good but there is a realization that one is also sinful and that these good acts are inadequate.

Kierkegaard argues that the religious stage is the highest stage of subjectivity, and thereby the best context for mature (and eternal) happiness. While this may be true, the religious person understands that suffering is inherent to the religious experience and thereby suffering and happiness may coexist within life's experience. While the aesthete considers suffering to be something accidental and the absence of happiness, the religious person understands that suffering is an essential aspect of his or her own existence and not mutually exclusive with happiness. This is the paradox of faith, that in the process of attaining eternal happiness, the subjective individual is able to understand the meaning of suffering. In the process of discovering subjective truth, the individual becomes more aware of his or her own objective uncertainty, yet happiness may still exist in this presence (Kierkegaard, 2006):

> Let us then consider in a little more detail the distress and anxiety in the paradox of faith. The tragic hero resigns himself in order to express the universal; the knight of faith resigns the universal in order to become the single individual … the knight of faith knows that it is inspiring to surrender oneself to the universal, that it takes courage for this, but that there is also a security in it, precisely because it is for the universal … For he knows it is a lonely trail he treads and that he accomplishes nothing for the universal but is himself only be tried and tested (p. 66-67).

So Kierkegaard points me toward the idea that faith may be a key ingredient to a mature happiness that understands the reality of suffering. What I see is that Hegel and Kierkegaard agree that modernity is suffering from an illness and requires something to make it healthy and happy. Both agree that this cure is found in a confluence of meaning

and interaction between the inner self, the external, and eternal. It is an engagement that is full of meaning and that this meaning is best expressed within Christianity; as such the themes of faith, hope, and love continually infiltrate their unity structures of being (Taylor, 1980). Yet, it is also a paradox that is not easily understood (Kierkegaard, 2006):

> Either there is an absolute duty to God and if there be such a thing, it is the paradox described, that the single individual as the particular is higher than the universal and as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute – or else faith has never existed because it has always existed (p. 71).

Within this complex integration, one thing is sure; the happiness is internal, complex, and subjective (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 32), "Christianity is spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity; subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite personally interested passion for one's eternal happiness."

Husserl

Another place where I draw understanding of about my happiness is from Husserl. Clearly any existential exploration of happiness would be incomplete without a look at Husserl's phenomenology. In order to understand the phenomenon of happiness, I had to examine some key aspects of Husserlian thought. While Husserl did not wrestle with happiness specifically, his method of understanding being and consciousness is essential for my inquiry. This section will explore three essential areas of Edmund Husserl's thought: the nature of consciousness as intention, our own self-awareness of experience through the other, and inter-subjectivity via intentionality (Spiegelberg, 1972).

Husserl was originally reliant, for his ideas, upon Franz Brentano. Brentano, who described intentionality in particular, as reference to the object, appears never to have

fully realized the power of his insight into intentionality. Husserl seizes and develops upon Brentano's idea of the intentionality of consciousness, adding components of directionality, and constitution. That is, intentional acts involve directionality to something, of something, for something. This simple fact points to the very simple but important principle that at the base of our being is the fact that people are oriented outward, to what is other than ourselves, and this provides the basis of the inner life. This of course also means that one's inner life is intimately connected with the outer world, and specifically to one's orientation toward it. This directionality then points out the constitutional nature of the human consciousness (Husserl, 1970).

Husserl's principle of the constitutional nature of human consciousness is a natural outshoot of the directionality of intentionality, in that the being of the self can only make sense in relation to the other. To put it another way, a person's conscious being is constituted only through the active involvement with the world. This understanding of consciousness draws us into a new way of relating to reality. Subject and world meet and relate in experience, and is directly linked with the self in experience, creating the idea of a life-world. Within all of this, it becomes clear that if one are going to understand the being of a person, let alone the nature of being happy, one cannot ignore the intentional nature of human consciousness, as Husserl says (1970):

> How is the life of the soul, which is through and through a life of consciousness, the intentional life of the ego, which has objects of which it is conscious, deals with them through knowing, valuing … how is it supposed to be seriously investigated if intentionality is overlooked? (p. 75).

From this I understand that if the inner life of a person is to be positive, there must be an active positive engagement with the outer world. To put it another way, a loving, caring intentionality in engagement of the outer-world will make up the constituent parts that construct consciousness itself (presumably in a positive manner), and constitute the inner experience of the individual. This simple principle is profound, for it points to a directional and intentional component within human affect; that is, external rather than internal, yet constitutes something of the internal and subjective. This reality is to some extent, what Husserl refers to in his work on the *Crisis of European Science* as the life-world (Husserl, 1970):

> We ourselves will be drawn out into an interior transformation, in which the long felt but continually hidden dimension of the transcendental comes truly to expression, to direct experience for us. Disclosed in its infinity, the experiential ground immediately turns into the fertile field (p. 103).

This clarifies something of the nature of consciousness as intention, and moves one to look at one's own self-awareness of experience through the other, and inter-subjectivity via intentionality.

In terms of gaining one's own self-awareness as a being, and being able to reflect on one's being, the interacting with the world, Husserl's method of phenomenological epoche reveals the world and the self as intending the world (Husserl, 1973) :

> The epoche can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which apprehend myself purely; as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and precisely as it is for me.

> Anything belonging to the world, any spatio-temporal being, exists for me – that is to say, is accepted by me – in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it … By my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting, I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and from me. If I put myself above all this life and refrain from doing any believing that takes the world straightforwardly as existing – if I direct my regard exclusively to this life itself, as consciousness of the world – I thereby acquire myself (p. 21).

Yet this is not the sum of Husserl's thought, for one is not simply acquiring one's self, but others are acquiring me, and I am acquiring others acquiring me as the other. So there is the dimension of intersubjectivity that becomes an essential part of one's being. Within this, a critical thing to be mindful of, from my perspective at least, is the evaluation of the self by the other as perceived by the self of the other. This complex web means that one is not simply reliant for the self upon one's intentionality to the outside world, but of the intentionality of the other to the self as perceived by self. That is to say, we are dependent in our being on the love and care expressed by the other. Hence, we are intentional, but also intersubjective by this intentionality creating a common world. When we live in this common world it allows me to regard *WE* as part of *ME* making the constitution of my experience a single system of interlocking *intentionalities* that affords each self a perspective on things that I alone could never constitute. Yet this in no way detracts from either the strength of the I or the WE as part of my lived-world (Husserl, 1970):

> Each one has his perceptions, his presentations, his harmonious experiences, devaluation of his certainties into mere possibilities, doubts, questions, illusions. But in living with one another each one can take part in the life of the others. Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized (p. 163).

Hence, my happy constitution and experience of being happy within my own consciousness must necessarily be a complex web of me being intentional to the world, but also of the others experienced within the world expressing value of me as part of their world, as apprehended by me. As part of this is the value and care in my intention to the world, normally expressed in terms of care or love, and that this too makes up some constituent part of my experience of being happy; for the subjective is dependent upon the transcendental ego and the external. In all of this, this experience grows from intentional acts involve directionality to something, of something, for something.

As is evident then, while Husserl himself is not specifically concerned with the affective experience of happiness, his phenomenological understanding of consciousness provides an invaluable rubric for understanding myself and the experiences of my happiness. It is clear, that my being is intrinsically intentional, so any experience that I have must be a constitution of the intentionality expressed by me and experienced by me to the world and from the world. Intentionality is the key; and the nature and quality of this intentionality will undoubtedly play a role in my being, including my affective experiences of the self being in the world.

If I were to venture to summarize my lessons from Hegel, Kierkegaard and Husserl, I would say that my experience of happiness is a leap of faith, where the love I experience in being loved by God, defines my sense of safety. This then allows me move into the world with love. This experience grows from the divine as the initial prime mover in salvation. In so doing, I can respond with intentional acts involving engagement in the world. In so far as this engagement grows from meaning and is infused with intentionality of love to something, of something, for something, I experience happiness.

Sartre

As Kierkegaard responded to Hegel, Jean-Paul Sartre responds to Husserl. Within *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre outlines his philosophical objections to Husserl's ideas, specifically as they relate to intersubjectivity, for Sartre felt that Husserl's approach led to solipsism. Later, in *Being and Nothingness* he repeats this Husserlian ideal, arguing that it leads to isolation of the ego (Sartre, 1992):

> In spite of these undeniable advantages Husserl's theory does not seem to us perceptibly different from Kant's. This is due to the fact that while my empirical Ego is not any more sure that the Other's, Husserl has retained the transcendental subject, which is radically distinct from the Ego and which strongly resembles the Kantian subject. Now what ought to be demonstrated is that it is not the parallelism of the empirical Egos which throws doubt on the person but that of the transcendental subjects. This is because actually the Other is never that empirical person who is encountered in my experience; he is transcendental subject to whom this person by nature refers. Thus the true problem is that of the connection of transcendent subjects who are beyond experiences (p. 233).

As we can see, Sartre's objection to Husserl is not necessarily that people apprehend the Other, but that this is where Husserl ends. For Sartre, it is also imperative for people to acknowledge the actual existence of the Other, and move away from an entirely ego-centric view of understanding the existence of the Other (Sartre, 1992):

> The only reality which remains is therefore that of my intention; the Other is the empty noema which corresponds to my directing toward the Other, to the extent that he appears concretely in my experience. He is an ensemble of operations of unification and of the constitution of my experience so that he appears as a transcendental concept (p. 235).

Having highlighted Sartre's assertion that the existence of the Other through purely the transcendental ego will fail to reveal the fullness of the Other in his otherness, we see that Sartre sees the Other as an important concept within the being of a person. There are of course a number of other key concepts that we must be mindful of with Sartre, as they relate to an understanding of the nature of being happy.

For Sartre, the mind connects with the being of the thing itself, and consciousness develops out of this as either pre-reflective or reflective consciousness. Within *Being and Nothingness* I see that human beings as consciousness exists as for-itself, while material objects function as being-in-itself. Though distinct, consciousness and object are never-the-less related and linked by their difference of being. The self-awareness of consciousness is dependent upon its consciousness of intentional objects. The *for-itself* is related to the *being-in-itself* by the very act of being conscious of it. In its directedness toward its object, the *for-itself* is conscious of itself as not being the object of which it is

conscious. At the identical time, the act disconnects consciousness and its object setting consciousness free.

As I understand emotion by way of Sartre, it begins with a consciousness that is pre-reflectively aware as conscious subject. Emotion is consciousness that has an intentionality of itself as dis-unified from the object of its intentionality, making it both dependent upon the external, yet also independent of the external object. It is here that Sartre reveals how the inner world, the subjective (as Kierkegaard describes it), can reflect upon itself and put itself "inside its own being" (Sartre, 1992, p. 153). Hence, theoretically at least, happiness within a person could be something that is not directly linked with the hedonistic circumstances of the moment, but rather arise from a pre-reflective and reflective intentionality within consciousness itself, apart from circumstance. This complicated exposition of Sartre's consciousness is essential idea for me to keep in mind as I explore the nature of happiness. For it helps me remember that my consciousness and mood are formed, in part at least, by my interactions with the world around me.

Sartre takes this pre-reflective and reflective disunity within consciousness and describes it as *interrogation*, where the consciousness inflects the world of the in-itself with possibility. This brings up the idea of what is hoped for, as things not-yet-existent, as well as the imaginative, fanciful, and magical. This allows the consciousness to escape the situation by being in itself, and it is here that one finds the nothingness that Sartre explores. What one can note here is that part of the escaping from the situation is this being in the self of consciousness, where nothingness exists, but also hope.

Yet, as with other existential philosophers, Sartre focuses rather on the anxiety and anguish of existence when dealing with this form of consciousness. For with this consciousness disunity comes freedom and possibility, and free from determination we discover in our moments of reflective awareness that our possibilities do not cause our behavior or emotion. This ultimate freedom then leads to the anguish of ultimate responsibility, where "I am in anguish precisely because any conduct on my part is only possible … [it is] anguish in the face of the future" (Sartre, 1992, p. 32).

In the face of this anguish Sartre points out that most of us tend to flee from this uncertainty and responsibility within consciousness (Sartre, 1992): "We flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without an Other or as a thing." (p. 43). This structure of consciousness then makes possibility possible, as well as hope, and yet causes anguish, while also being the pre-condition of *bad faith* where we tell ourselves that we are not free.

Unlike Kierkegaard however, Sartre does not take the leap of faith, and does not embrace the hope found within this faith. Rather, Sartre wishes to reject faith and embrace the anguish as a matter of fact. This embrace of the anguish of freedom certainly is not a complete negative, as it reveals the difficulty of freedom, and the responsibility that consciousness itself has for consciousness. This is positive in as much as it keeps Sartre honest, but it does leave him in the quandary of rejecting all possibility of hope beyond the consciousness of the self. This position held by Sartre is that anything that detracts from the anguish is a fleeing, when indeed the gift of consciousness that creates it, may also be the legitimate approach for dealing with it. Whatever the case may be, Sartre's (1992) position is clear:

> I must think of it constantly in order to take care not to think of it …. This means that anguish, the intentional aim of anguish, and a flight from anguish toward reassuring myths must all be given in the unity of the same consciousness (p. 43).

Further, Sartre (1992) sees faith in a God as the ultimate in absurdity, leaving the wound of anguish to never heal, and with this rejection of faith openly acknowledges rejection of happiness itself:

> Thus this perpetually absent being which haunts the for-itself is itself fixed in the in-itself. It is the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself … it takes on the name of God. Is not God a being who is what he is … in that he is all positivity and the foundation of the world … and at the same time a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not … in that he is self-consciousness and the necessary foundation of himself? The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore, by nature is an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state (p. 140).

Despite Sartre's rejection of happiness, he can teach me much about being happy through his exposition of consciousness. It is this duplicity of consciousness that I believe is the key to understanding emotion within Sartre, being the source of happiness, but also of in-authenticity and bad-faith. The main lesson I draw from Sartre, is that the nature of my conscious experience of happiness is a building up of layers of pre-reflective choices. That is, consciousness means that the pre-reflective consciousness is complicit in dividing up myself and my experience, I am both lover and loved, deceiver and deceived,

full of anguish and at the same moment happy on a different level. This, is immense value to myself, and Sartre's greatest gift to my investigation on happiness.

Heidegger

Heidegger's phenomenology in *Being and Time* takes its point as focusing on an account of the everyday familiarity of being in the everyday experience, and the everyday environment. Such things, Heidegger maintains, are not firstly objects of perception, but things that people are to relate to, and the setting and grounding for one's being and existence. One exists in a type of relating to the context, and the ways that one can relate either translate into an inauthentic being, or an authentic being. Now, it is true that Heidegger does not speak explicitly about happiness in *Being and Time*, so at first glance it may be hard to connect Heidegger with happiness at all. However, when we recognize that the kind of happiness which Heidegger views as valuable is the deepest kind of happiness that a human can experience, in an authentic being, it becomes clear that Heidegger actually has a lot to say on the subject (King, 2009).

For Heidegger, the issue is one of practicality, where we do not simply experience the world and others as objects, but give value, meaning, and a level of proximity to the environment. That means that everything is evaluated in an intentional and automatic way, not simply as a being, but as a being for me. The Dasein[1] of being then is something that is already immediately dwelling among things, and there is no longer need for talk about objective and subjective. In other words, people do not for the most part take things

[1] A term used by Martin Heidegger to denote Being, or more specifically, the unified nature of Being. It is a being that is "in the world".

in the environment to be simple objects at all. Instead, people give valuation and assessment of their availability and this is done automatically and pre-reflectively, and this forms the basis of understanding the nature being (Heidegger, 1962):

> What we encounter as closest to us … is the room; and we encounter it not as something "between four walls" in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the "arrangement" emerges, and it is in this that any individual item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered … in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-strucutre known as such even in the using … In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinate itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become and the more unveiled it is encountered as that which it is – as equipment … If we look at things just theoretically, we can get along with understanding availability. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific thingly character (p. 98).

In *Being and Time* Heidegger details his notion of accessibility of things in our everyday functional environment by way of criticizing traditional epistemological assumptions concerning the immanence of mentality and the indirectness of perceptual experience. For Heidegger, our being is framed in the actual relation we have to the

world and is contained in the idea of our most simple experiences of it, as found in our practical everyday activities (Heidegger, 1962):

> Being is not a property that Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man is and then has, by way of an extra, a relation of being toward the world – a world with which he occasionally provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never proximally an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a relationship towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is (p. 84).

This quote gives us a key insight into Heidegger's thought process as it relates to happiness. Our very being is tied up in the relationship we have with our environment and is inseparable from it. As such, happiness of being can best be described, from Heidegger's perspective, as *fittingness*, where we are actively engaged in the world. It is a meeting that supports our full immersion and intentional engagement in Dasein (as though we could ever avoid Dasein), hence living within an authentic existence, as Matthew King (2009) notes in his book *Heidegger and Happiness*.

As such, we can see that intentionality is a key part of what Heidegger has in mind for the general theme of happiness. Yet, like Hegel and those that followed him, existence is never one isolated thing, so too for Heidegger an experience of happiness would not simply be intentionality, but is also attached with meaning. Of course, intentionality and meaning are not separated, but form together in one's engagement. So one does not simply take things in one's practical environment to be actual or occurent,

rather one takes them to be available, and does so not by means of a reflective act of consciousness, but simply automatically take them up. This automatic engagement of intentionality is the basis not simply for consciousness (as Sartre would say) but for meaning in general, specifically what it means for me (Heidegger, 1962):

> If we look at things just theoretically, we can get along without understanding availability. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific thingly character (p. 98).

The engagement that is automatic and within the world then is not simply intentionality with, or external action but the two bound together. Meaning then is formed and given expression simultaneously, for it is not simply meaning first, for this is simply an unfilled hope, it is when intentionality is put to action in the world that meaning truly emerges. It is a meaning that is meaningful because it relates to me, it is my meaning, and adds to my being. It is here that being becomes authentic, where one does not simply withdraw from existence, but engages it with care and meaning to enact meaning and intentionality. It is not something theoretical, but something practical and part of living life, and Heidegger could not be clearer on this point (Heidegger, 1962):

> Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignment of the in-order-to. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection. Practical behavior is not atheoretical in the sense of sightlessness. The way it differs from theoretical behavior does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behavior one observes, while in practical behavior one acts, and that

> action must empty theoretical cognition if it is to not remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight … The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.
>
> The work to be produced, as the "towards – which" of such things … but the work to be produced is not merely usable for something. The production itself is of something … The work produced refers not only to the "towards-which" of its usability and the "whereof" of which it consists … it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it and wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he "is" there along with it as the work assignment … Thus along with the work, we encounter not only entitites ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's kind of Being-entitites for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the time ours (p. 99-101).

For Heidegger, happiness is an authentic being, and this authentic being is something that combines both intentionality as in active engagement in the world, and a meaning context. Yet this is not the end of the matter, for it also ought to be flavored with the type of meaning and engagement that takes others in consideration, and this forms the level of maturity and the depth of happiness and authenticity (Heidegger, 1962):

> So Being-with and the facticity[2] of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence together of several subjects. Yet Being along among many does not mean that with regard to their Being they are merely present-at-hand there

[2] Within Heidegger, the term "facticity" refers to the brute facts of life. One's concrete historical situation.

alongside us. Even in our Being among them they are there with us; …. Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is Being towards entities encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern but rather of solicitude … There is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead in his existential potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his care but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a what with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.

Solicitude proves to be a state of Dasein's being – one which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up with its Being towards the world of its concern, and likewise with its authentic Being towards itself. Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in such Being. A Being-with-one=-another which arises from one's doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each

> in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.
>
> Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude – that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates. It brings numerous mixed forms to maturity (p. 157-159).

Within all of this Heidegger clarifies that this authentic and happy existence is not one that is simply intentionality enacted within a context of meaning. It is also something that is haunted by the call of love, specifically Storge' or, as Heidegger put is, *to Care*. This call, by our conscience comes from Being, it churns up issues of God (faith) and of anxiety of the Being for its own Being towards death (a hope). While Heidegger leaves the full dogma of this confluence of components open, the fact remains that Heidegger phenomenologically acknowledges that all are present within this realm of our struggle for authenticity (Heidegger, 1962).

Summary

What has become clear to me through the examination of these models is that intentionality and meaning both play a significant role in the being of happiness. From the flow and neuropsychology models is the idea of automatic meaning assessment (risk / threat assessment) and intentionality in being is affirmed. It also makes clear that there is a great deal of variability of experience and meaning that can lead to depression or anxiety, or happiness. What we learned from Hegel is that there is a complex system of being where happiness can be experienced by engaging the world, and going within and

then out of the self, with a meaningful interaction with the absolute. From Kierkegaard, we discovered that if things are simply objective then they are meaningless, and there is no context for happiness. Therefore, happiness requires a leap to the subjective, and from there to embrace the world through the being of the mature religious person of faith. From Husserl we learned that people operate by intentionality and that being derives from this intentionality, so one must be moving to something, in idea and affect. This is then clarified and picked up by Sartre, who describes the pre-reflective development of conscious reflective experience. With Heidegger we learned that this intentionality is an engagement; and that to have an authentic, and happy being, one must be concerned with care in one's being. The next chapter we will explore historical models and how this adds to my understanding of happiness.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL MODELS OF HAPPINESS

Within this chapter I explore a number of historical models of happiness. This was done to help identify trends across the millennia about happiness, and also to explore the historical influences on my own thinking. I believe this is important, as it will help to clarify how the complexity of happiness intertwines with many correlates.

Ancient Models of Happiness

Happiness, it seems, was a goal in the lives of the ancient writers of wisdom literature, and this is particularly true of the theistic wisdom traditions of the West. We will now take some time to explore some classic works, as well as Hebrew and Greek texts of Judeo-Christian scripture to discover how they view happiness. Of course, to discuss the full range of literature is far too broad of an effort, so this section will limit its discussion to the book of Ecclesiastes/ Qoheleth, Platonic works, and Christian New Testament literature.

Wisdom Literature

Within the book of Qoheleth we have a broad contextualization of human life and a discussion of the nature of happiness. What is particularly interesting about this ancient book is its emphasis upon the very modern existential notions of facticity and intentionality, for each is considered a key part of the context of the human experience. Of course, the themes of faith, hope, and love provide the frame for intentionality to be

expressed within our facticity, and this is considered to be the best that we can hope for—an occasion of happiness (Fredericks, 1991).

In the first few chapters of Qoheleth, the author frames the scope of the human experience and our common facticity within a rhythm of life, where every certain action of intentionality has its right time. The key issue, according to this introduction, is to discern the appropriate timing of a particular task so that it is in accordance with the rhythm of life and our facticity. Following this broad observation, the author then looks at his particular life and the personal meaning of his existence by stepping back and seeking to find objective uniqueness that makes him, and his life, special.

This personal deconstruction yields the frightening revelations that he can find nothing unique (only repeats of what has already been done) and that even prestige and wealth do not bring relief from this truth. This revelation brings up the fact of our common fate: death, and its ability to shatter our externally supported personal narrative and sense of identity. The conclusion is that since death swallows up life, success, wealth, and even wisdom, there is no real occasion for happiness in life. The thematic question of 1:3 asks what profit there is for a person to toil, and it is answered over the next several chapters by a resounding response, "There is none" (Fox, 1988 & 1999).

Yet, in the midst of this deconstruction of life and its bleak conclusion, there is a small personal ray of hope to be found within intentionality. While the facticity of our life cannot be changed, in that we were born into a circumstance and we are doomed to die, there is the recognition that we can find meaning in the small things of life. Despite the fact that the author notes that the great heroic things of life are of no ultimate reward, the small personal, loving, saintly actions of life do have a reward that is intrinsic. So,

surviving the dark reflection that typifies much of the book is the answer that enjoying engagement with the world (enjoyment of toil) is what is good for humanity.

This may not be, on the surface at least, the deep, intellectual answer that we were hoping for, but it does seem to answer the question of happiness, at least partially. While human achievement, material possessions, career, and prestige become mere vapors because of death, the personal experiences of engaging and enjoying what we do have a meaning and value that is personal (for me). What is good in life, then, is the personal engagement experiences where intentionality is expressed in love, for these are things that are present and personal. It is when we attempt to understand life and achievements in a wider frame that we fail to do so and are overwhelmed with the feeling of the absurd.

In chapter 3 of Qoheleth reveals the truth that human experience is personal, so there is nothing better than to personally enjoy and literally do good in one's personal actions in life. The meaning of this conclusion seems to be that a person cannot avoid toil, suffering, or death (our facticity), but we can engage the good and enjoy it. The emphasis of Qoheleth here is upon two things: that a life is one's own, and that it is limited. So the best option we have is to do what is good and make the best of our circumstances.

In a broad sense, chapter 3 gives us a picture of the good life of faith and of love: God is present and sovereign over the cosmos; humans are unable to grasp what God does; and a life of enjoying doing what is good is the good life. To put it another way, Qoheleth recommends that the good life embraces the enjoyment of personal experience along with a fear of God, where we realize that we are unable to grasp or control what God does (our freedom is framed by our facticity). The way we are to cope with life,

then, is to rely upon God (and our immutable relationship with the divine), seeing as we are not-so-powerful residents of the cosmos (faith), and enjoy our personal choices to engage in goodness (love).

This combination seems to leave out the concept of hope within human experience, but this conclusion would be deceiving, for hope is constantly implicated within the whole scheme of life set out within Qoheleth. This is seen most clearly in chapter 12 where the teacher admonishes the reader to "remember God in the days of your youth," thereby admonishing a lifetime dedicated to faith and love, recognizing the limits of life and of our knowledge of it. It is here that the hope is implied that when all things fade, when death and time wipes away our existence and our legacy, three things remain: God, God's mysterious ways, and God's relationship with us (to whom we are personally accountable). The implication, there is hope in God even when our minds cannot grasp it.

The words that conclude the teacher's discussion of human life and happiness point strongly to mystery of God and our accountable relationships for the life we have chosen to live (12:13–14):

> Now all has been heard; here is the conclusion of the matter: Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. For God will bring every deed into judgment, including every hidden thing, whether it is good or evil.

This conclusion of the matter provides a counter-balance for the entire despair of the rest of the book, and at times it may be lost on the casual reader. Yet the call to fear God is so closely associated with a theology of divine omnipotence and freedom that for some historical commentators it is indeed the conclusion of the matter, and a call to an

intentional life engaged in the world, under the cosmology of God's sovereignty. Even the fourth-century Latin theologian Jerome found this conclusion to be the ray of hope (found in our immutable relationship with God) that binds together an intentional life of love and engagement, with faith in the sovereignty of God (Ginsburg, 1961):

> [other fourth century critics] say that, among other writings of Solomon which are obsolete and forgotten, this book ought to be obliterated, because it asserts that all the creatures of God are vain, and regards the whole as nothing, and prefers eating and drinking and transient pleasures before all things. [Yet] from this paragraph [on the conclusion of the matter] it deserves the dignity that it should be placed among the number of the divine volumes, in which it condenses the whole of its discussion, summing up the whole enumeration, as it were, and says that the end of its discourse is very easily heard, having nothing difficult in it, namely, that we should fear God and keep his commandments (p. 15).

What I personally find so meaningful is how it is expressed in chapter 3, where the teacher says, "There is nothing better for people than to be happy and to do good while they live. That each may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all their toil – this is the gift of God." Here, I see the observation that our experiences of meaning derive from intentionality, unconcealment of meaning through engagement with the world, and care of the world. Happiness does not come from ultimate objective meaning of life, rather, such quests simply frustrate. Rather, meaning and happiness both come from engagement, and a recognition of the limits of our existence. In so doing, we can perceive that we must rely upon the divine and the love of the divine, the faithfulness of the divine, for our hope ultimately rests with the divine. As the teacher continues in this

chapter, "I know that everything God does will endure forever; nothing can be added to it and nothing taken from it." What I draw from the teacher is that we simply ought to know our limited place in the cosmos, order to appreciate the level of engagement where meaning and happiness may be found.

Greek Literature

The dark tones of Qoheleth are echoed in ancient Greek literature; as far back as Herodotus and Euripides there was the pessimistic moan that because we are doomed and mortal we are not happy. In the case of these early fatalistic sentiments, the fact that the gods withheld immortality and thereby doomed humanity to the grave (a loss of hope for the future) meant that, as living beings, we are unhappy because we are aware of our ultimate demise. Yet this fatalistic pall that was thrown over happiness was pulled aside when Socrates redirected the question of happiness (McMahon, 2010).

Within Plato's *Euthydemus*, Socrates takes the longing for happiness to be self-evident, and so simply poses the question, "How can we be happy?" Socrates takes as a given the fact that happiness is to be tied up with desire (McMahon, 2010). Within Plato's *Symposium*, the idea of desire is tied up with sensuality in the discussion of *Eros*. Despite its pretense for focus on sensuality, sexuality, and desire, Plato extends the definition of happiness to be the force that motivates all of us (the idea that Freud so keenly picked up on in his groundbreaking work). In essence, then, *The Symposium* is not about the platonic love (so far as we typically understand that phrase, which is a watered down Renaissance idea of Plato's concept of love), but rather, how to go about finding happiness.

Within *The Symposium*, many of the earlier speakers portray love as a god, one portrays him as the most ancient, and another as very young, setting up a scene for Socrates to disagree with them all. Socrates then proceeds to share the secrets of love by noting that love is not a god but a mediator between the gods and mortals. Socrates also points out that there is only one love, not many, but it can be put to many different uses (Waterfield, 1994).

The most unusual speech, of course, is that of Aristophanes as he talks about people in their original nature as having 4 legs and 4 arms, two faces and being round. In response to the growing power of people, the gods cut people in two, dooming them to wander searching for the "other half". This image is not surprising, given Aristophanes penchant for satirical and creative play of images and language. Aristophanes' speech is a satire on romantic love and the elusive nature of true happiness. It is then a reflection upon the unsatisfactory position of sex being a source of true happiness, with it being the prime motivator for so much of what we do (Waterfield, 1994). This is reflected in modern times by Freud's notion of the *Id* and libidinal forces.

In Aristophanes' speech, having set up his very satirical context for discussing love, he then gets down to the real content of his speech—happiness (Waterfield, 1994):

> We human beings will never attain happiness unless we find perfect love, unless each comes across the love of our lives and thereby recover our original nature. In the context of this ideal, it necessarily follows that in our present circumstances the best thing is to get as close to the ideal as possible, and one can do this by finding the person who is his heart's delight. If we want to praise the god who is responsible for our finding this person, it is Love we should praise. It is Love

> who, for the time being, provides us with the inestimable benefit of guiding us towards our complement and, for the future, holds out the ultimate assurance – that if we conduct ourselves with due reverence towards the gods, then he will restore us to our original nature, healed and blessed with perfect happiness (p. 30).

Socrates' speech on love marks the pinnacle of understanding Eros, and after a short dialectic he began to share of an encounter he had with a woman who showed him the secrets of love. In this we begin to see a path toward happiness, in the interconnection between love and faith (Waterfield, 1994):

> There's an account of Love which I heard from a woman called Diotima … an expert in love, as well as in a large number of other areas too. On the issue that love is attractive or repulsive she pointed out that if one isn't attractive it does not mean repulsive (just as lack of knowledge isn't the same thing as ignorance). Instead Love occupies a middle-ground just as belief occupies the middle-ground between knowledge and ignorance. As such Love occupies a middle-ground between the gods and mortals.
>
> They translate and carry messages from men to gods and from gods to men…. They fill the remaining space, and so make the universe an interconnected whole … because her parents are Plenty and Poverty, Love … is a vagrant, with tough, dry skin and no shoes on his feet … He takes after his mother in having need as a constant companion. From his father, however, he gets his ingenuity in going after things of beauty and value, his courage, impetuosity, and energy, his skill at hunting, his desire for knowledge, his resourcefulness, and his lifelong pursuit of

> education. … Love is bound, therefore, to love knowledge, and anyone who loves knowledge is bound to fall between knowledge and ignorance (the place of true belief) (p. 41).

Socrates does not stop there, however, but points out that Diotima, his wise teacher, shared that Love is a creative and a driving force (Waterfield, 1994):

> The same goes for Love. Basically, it's always the case that the desire for good and for happiness is everyone's dominant, deceitful love. But there are a wide variety of ways of expressing this love, and those who follow other routes – for instance, business, sport, or philosophy – aren't said to be in love (p. 47).

Here we see that Socrates ties happiness to love and faith, for he notes that Eros is a mediator with the divine. Further, Socrates highlights the fact that hope is a key part of happiness, for one needs hope even in the face of one's own mortality in order to find happiness. As he points out in *The Symposium* (as well as Plato's *Phaedrus*), we shouldn't be surprised to hear that any creature with a mortal nature does all it can to achieve immortality and live forever. Usually, this hope in the face of mortality is expressed by attaching happiness with progeny, as our prime resource for symbolic immortality is through reproduction. Yet within this he also highlights that we often seek happiness through other venues, like hope for success or fame (Waterfield, 1994):

> It is immortality which makes this devotion, which is love, a universal feature. … You can see the sample principle at work in men's lives too … [just] consider how horribly people behave when they're under the influence of love of prestige

> and they long to store up fame immortal forever. Look how they're even more willing to face danger for the sake of fame than they are for their children; look how they spend money, endure any kind of hardship, sacrifice their lives … the point is, they're in love with immortality (p. 51).

Having noted something of the idea of terror management theory, Socrates then recounts how Diotima summarized happiness in life, moving through faith, hope, and love, redefining itself through the maturation processes of life. Within Socrates' account it is clear that, by happiness, Socrates (and by implication, then, Plato) has something lofty, grand, and profound in mind—a deep, powerful, abiding happiness beyond mere enjoyment or satisfaction of the senses (Waterfield, 1994):

> The proper way to go about this business … is for someone to start as a young man by focusing on physical beauty and initially – this depends on whether his guide is giving him proper guidance – to love just one person's body and to give birth in that medium to beautiful reasoning. He should realize next that the beauty of any one body hardly differs from that of any other body, and that if it's physical beauty he's after, it's very foolish of him not to regard the beauty of all bodies as absolutely identical … The next stage is for him to value mental beauty so much more than physical beauty that even if someone is almost entirely lacking the bloom of youth, but still has an attractive mind, that's enough to kindle his love and affection, and that's all he needs … he'll perceive it in itself and by itself, constant and eternal, and he'll see that every other beautiful object somehow partakes of it, but in such a way that their coming to be and ceasing to

> be don't increase or diminish it at all, and it remains entirely unaffected … what else could make life worth living? (p. 53).

If anyone was to doubt that Socrates ties together the triad of faith, hope, and love in the bundle we know as happiness, a look at Plato's *Phaedrus* should dispel all doubt. Within *Phaedrus* Socrates recounts how the divine nurtures love into full bloom within the individual toward a full experience of happiness (Hamilton, 1973):

> A nature comparable to his own particular divinity, and when he lights upon such a one he devotes himself to personal imitation of his god and at the same time attempts to persuade and train his beloved to the best of his power to walk in the ways of that god and to mould himself upon him. There is no room for jealousy or mean spite; his whole effort is concentrated upon leading the object of his love into the closest possible conformity with himself and with the god he worships. This is the aspiration of the true lover, and this, if he succeeds in gaining his object in the way I describe, is the glorious and happy initiation which befalls the beloved (p. 61).

So we see that Plato is very much a supporter of the notions of faith in the divine, love as an action of intentionality, and both as a prerequisite of happiness, all tied together with hope in life after death. This then brings us to the structure of Christian happiness, for as Johnson (1949) notes:

> Plato … holds that the soul is immortal in its own right … and because of its kinship with the eternal it partakes in their eternity …. The essential thing is that Plato, a thinker who in his intellectual power has never been surpassed, saw in the hope of a hereafter not the result of ignorance or wishful thinking, but the

> conclusion of the highest exercise of reason. Seen in this light Plato was an ally of Christianity, a schoolmaster or tutor to lead us to Christ (p. 17-18).

The one key difference is that Christianity (historical theological Christianity, at least) does not spiritualize hope beyond death but looks forward to the redemption of the body, complete in our essential identity, just as Jesus the Christ rose from the dead. This provides the essential concreteness of intentionality to the mixture of faith, hope, and love that forms the context for the true experience of happiness.

Christian Literature

The theme of engaging life and relying upon a relationship with God through the destruction of all else in one's own personal death is a theme that follows through into Christianity. Indeed, it can be argued that this is the crux of the Christian gospels, for as Johnson (1949) notes, the Gospel has two foci: the Passion of the Christ and the Resurrection of the Christ. Within Christian literature, then, we see faith and hope tied together in the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. 15:17), "If Christ has not been raised, your faith is vain."

This theme is connected with love by Jesus himself (Matt. 22:37–39) when he sums up the law as "Love the Lord with all your heart … and your neighbor as yourself." Yet it is when Jesus explicitly connects this theme of love with happiness that we see its real importance to our discussion. In Jesus' Beatitudes, we have a description that sounds very much like the despair of Qoheleth intermingled with the words of happiness. Phrases like (Matt. 5), "Blessed are those who mourn" can literally be translated as: "Happy, those who cry/mourn"; "Happy, those that hunger and thirst for righteousness." Within these words, the theme of happiness being present within the process of engaging in life

is brought to the fore in a stark and dramatic way. Indeed, a literal translation of the last portion of the beatitudes brings home the point that Christian happiness was to be found in living out the intentional intertwining of faith in God, hope in the resurrection, and love for God and our neighbor, despite circumstances (Matt. 5:11–12):

> Happy are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of me. Rejoice and be glad, because great is your reward, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you.

Within this teaching of Jesus there is the clear indication that a relationship with the divine helps us to be happy despite the external and objective circumstances of life. Yet how is this possible with the view of death? The answer is implied in Qoheleth and clarified when Jesus connects his own actions with this structure of happiness by saying, "I am the way; follow me." It is here that faith, and love for others, meets the hope that comes even in the face of death (Mk. 8:34–35): "If one would come after me, let them deny the self and take up the cross and follow me. For whoever would save life will lose it; and whoever loses life for my sake and the good news, will save it." Jesus is issuing a call to love to the point of death, and it is here that hope comes in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead.

With the death and resurrection of Jesus, Christian literature highlights a hope that is beyond that previously shown in either Qoheleth or Plato's writings. Happiness, then, is made accessible through the hope found in the resurrection, as Johnson (1949) states it so eloquently:

> The darkest shadow that lies across the path of mortal and sinful men is the fear of death and judgment. In the Cross and Resurrection of Christ and the indwelling of

> the Spirit this twofold fear is removed. Perfect love casts out fear. More positively Christianity not only gives its firm support to belief in a future life, but lifts the veil so that we may see something of its nature. The light we are permitted to see centered upon the Risen Christ, and our hope is the hope of fellowship with him. The crowning reward of the Christian is expressed in the words of the beloved disciple: "We know that when he is manifested, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is" (1 John 3:2). Philosophy says, "We hope"; the Christian Apostle dares to say, "We know." The Resurrection is a star of hope to man who "thinks he was not made to die"; it encourages the humblest believer to declare, "My sun sets to rise again." The deepest longing and hopes of men … once more, we must repeat, the Resurrection … is the answer to the longings and questionings of the human spirit as well as the support of the undying hope of the Christian (p. 19).

Within all of this I am beginning to see that reliance upon the faithful love of God, and the promise of the resurrection, waylays the death anxiety issue. In my own experience, this then leaves only engagement and the meaning that I am loved as first steps towards experiencing real present happiness. This adds yet another layer to my understanding of happiness, and further guides me towards its essence.

Having outlined some of the main historical Western views of happiness, it is now important to move to the modern era and frame the discussion within psychological theories that have influenced me. The following section will explore the ways of framing what it means to be human and how we can understand the very nature and existential structure of human happiness.

Classical Psychological Paradigms

Embarking on a more modern exposition of happiness, we will look through the lens of modern psychology. In order to gather an understanding of this phenomenon, we will need to look at two of the major schools that bring light to happiness. These, of course, are the schools of psychoanalysis and existential psychiatry. In order to narrow the focus, we will explore the primary perspectives of one key theorist in each school: namely, Sigmund Freud for the school of psychoanalysis, and Viktor Frankl for the school of logotherapy (one of the many existential psychotherapeutic views). Of course, in order to truly understand each theorist we must begin with the source and foundation of knowledge that each uses and the basic anthropology that guides their inquiry. As such, we begin with Sigmund Freud and his epistemology and anthropology.

Psychoanalytics: Freud's epistemology and anthropology

According to Collins (1977), there are a number of epistemological issues that can be tied to Freud's legacy within psychology. While these core structures are largely ignored, it is important to examine them; for they have profound implications for how we understand the human experience. While everyone admits that, ultimately, an unbiased scientific study of the psychology of human beings is an admirable goal, it is largely an unattainable one. In the field of psychology, we are dealing with thinking, feeling, choosing individuals, and we ourselves are the same, with our own values, prejudices, beliefs, and presuppositions. In light of this, it is essential to examine the philosophical

presuppositions that play themselves out in Freudian psychology's anthropology and ultimate methodology.

Empiricism is likely the most widely accepted and firmly held presupposition in all of psychology (Collins, 1977). Early psychologists, like Wundt, concluded that physics and other established natural sciences were characterized by the objective examination of observable fact discovered through experimentation. While Freud himself did not highlight empiricism within his studies, he does continually draw upon the general authority of empirical science in pronouncing his *facts* of the human psyche. This is likely a remnant of his initial hopeful identity as a research scientist, a career he forsook for medicine (likely due to the quota for ethnic Jews that limited his opportunities in his preferred field) (Berry, 2000).

Of course, like every approach, there is a weakness to positivism/empiricism and the modeling of psychology upon the physical sciences. The assumption is that accurate and complete observation is possible. The very act of making an empirical observation changes the data and makes it in some respect biased and abnormal. Since to assume that there is no truth of interpretation other than empirical *fact* is to make a non-empirical leap of faith—faith in the comprehensiveness of a method that simply cannot grasp all of the intricacies of a human-being.

Tied closely with this assumption is the determinism that was very much a part of Freud's view of the world. This view held that all human behavior is determined by a prior cause with no consideration for personal will, freedom, and choice. We can clearly see Freud buying into this fatalistic determinism as he outlines the dynamic forces that form myriad of psychopathology of which he wrote. He pointed primarily to the

childhood experiences that destined some of his patients to a life of psychic suffering (Berry, 2000; Heller, 2005).

Along with these previous presuppositions is the principle of reductionism (Collins, 1977). Here we see Freud and his followers subdividing the human experience into reduced and divided units. This makes perfect sense, again a remnant of Freud's unfulfilled longing to be a research scientist. Closely related to this view is the outlook that human behavior and other phenomena can be seen as *nothing but* something simpler. To a great extent, what is concluded about reductionism is, like the other presuppositions, a matter of personal preference and opinion rather than fact or truth. To a large extent, the presuppositions of empirical determinism and reductionism framed and influenced both how and what Freud studied as well as the meanings he drew from his clinical experiences (Heller, 2005).

Finally, the last main presupposition which influenced Freud, and subsequently, psychoanalytic psychology, was the position of naturalism (Collins, 1977). This is the view that there is no God (or at least no deity of consequence), that humanity is alone and sovereign in the earth and possibly the universe. Naturalism declares that human destiny lies in our own hands and that all behavior, without exception, results from the operation of natural forces that scientists seek to understand and possibly control. This leads to the stereotypical modern definition of psychology as *describing, understanding, and manipulating human behavior.*

It is from these epistemological basics that Freud works and formulates his understanding of happiness. For Freud, the notion of human functioning as a higher level experience is something that can be reduced to sexuality and the naturalistic function of

psychodynamic drives. Freud had a number of groundbreaking theories relating to sexuality and sexual development, and these theories became central to psychoanalysis as a science (Berry, 2000). These theories are outlined, for the most part, in his book, *Three Essays on Sexuality* published in 1905. However, Freud was very broad in his use of the term sex, and when it relates to neurosis Freud generally used it as a term connected to what he saw as being improper (Storr, 1989).

As Freud explored the issue of sexuality further, he discovered that neurotic problems and perversions were often caused by early childhood sexual experiences. Freud also pointed out that neurotics often showed great resistance to any mention of sex and that often their sexual urges were very strongly repressed. This led Freud to hypothesize that the unacceptability of sexual experiences in early life caused conflict within the individual, and as the person tried to find ways to live with this conflict, or overcome it, neuroticism developed (Berry, 2000).

According to Freud, childhood and puberty are fraught with sexual pitfalls and one false step along the way can lead to any number of problems in later life. These problems may be related to the child's earliest relationships. It is only later diverted away by incest taboos. The child can get stuck at any stage in the sexual development process (known as fixation). Repression of sexual urges may lead to perversion. Very often, the sexual urges find an outlet in another, non-sexual field, a process known as sublimation (Heller, 2005).

All of this led Freud to revamp his scheme of the psyche in his 1923 work, *The Ego and the Id*. This was very different from the model he proposed in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where he divided the mind into three separate systems: conscious,

preconscious, and unconscious. However, this consciousness system did not fit with his emerging understanding of the mind as a place of unremitting sexual conflict. In this new theory, he concludes that the mind can be broken down into three independent structures forever at war: Id, ego, and superego (Berry, 2000; Gay, 1989).

The id is completely submerged in the unconscious, is very primitive *(the it)*, and is governed by the *pleasure principle*. The ego represents the reason and common sense of a person working diligently to arbitrate the blind demands of the id and the restrictions that the external world imposes. It helps us to survive by obeying the *reality principle* and relying on the power of secondary process thought (sensible, logical thinking about the consequences). Whereas the id is totally unconscious, the ego is partly conscious. Consciously, the ego then helps a person to function rationally and make wise decisions. Unconsciously, the ego helps a person cope, through defense mechanisms, with the inevitable conflicts that arise in daily life (Heller, 2005; Gay, 1989).

A supporter of or authority over the ego is the superego, or conscience, emerging at the end of the Oedipus complex. Essentially, Freud hypothesized that we had to obey our parents or get punished. According to Freud, as a person matures, he/she is identified with his/her parents, and they essentially become a "little voice" within the self, forming the conscience (Collins, 1977; Gay, 1989).

To look at this meta-theory more in-depth, we can begin with Freud's pleasure principle and the economic hypothesis, with its charge and discharge metaphors. With the libido, Freud attempted to explain both normal development and pathology in terms of energetic permutations and displacements, consciousness, and unconsciousness. They have a meaning, but the meaning is ultimately to be found in the neurons and not in

personal choice and creation. Though Freud considers biology and psychology separate, most scholars see the definite dependence that Freud had upon neurobiology (which is logical, given his medical training) (Berry, 2000; Heller, 2005).

Along with Freud's pleasure principle is the *thanatos* drive (his theory of the death instinct). In tune with his meta-theory, Freud attempted to explain everything from aggression to the pursuit of pain and the existence of regressive tendencies. In this we again see the drive theory/economic hypothesis as the hallmark of Freudian meta-theory (Cannon, 1991).

According to Freud's eventual anthropology, we are driven by sexual drives and conflicts. As the three psychic agencies of id, ego, and super-ego jockey for position, inevitably conflict arises that we are forever trying to resolve. Freud's analogy, borrowed from Plato's description of the person, is that the id is the ignoble horse, strong and powerful, and our ego is the charioteer, hopefully directing the horse. The more in control the charioteer—the ego—the healthier the person (Cannon, 1991; Gay, 1989; Hamilton, 1973).

Existential: Frankl's epistemology and anthropology

Existential psychology begins with a different set of premises, the result of a different order of inquiry than Freudian psychodynamics. Freudian psychology seeks to establish a natural science hypothesis about the workings of the human psyche (such as the Freudian concept of libido). The main trouble is that such a force is really a metaphysical first principle, something too broad to be scientifically revealing and too vague to explain anything (Collins, 1977; Cannon, 1991). Existential psychology begins with the very

nature of the experience of being, and this leads to a different dimension for understanding humanity— not as an object but as an experience.

In order to fully understand existential psychology, it is important to understand the general principles of existential phenomenological philosophy. Foundational to existential psychology, phenomenology seeks to discover ontological structures within human experience, essentially what it means *to be* human (Spiegelberg, 1972). It does not seek to discover laws hidden behind the experience, but rather, what is in the experience itself, including intentionality and meaning. Thus, for the existential perspective (the progeny of phenomenology), the key to understanding humanity is not a Freudian sexual libido hidden deep within but intentionality consciously lived in experience, that is, the very experience of being human (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990).

Viktor Frankl is but one representative of the general school (or, more accurately, a founder of one of the schools) of existential psychology (Cooper, 2003). When looking at Viktor Frankl's epistemology and anthropology, we can recognize that a key theme of existential psychology is that a person's reality exists (to a greater or lesser extent) as a choice of its being, and this choice, expressing itself in behavior, falls into the general categories of creating and possessing (doing and having) (Cannon, 1991; Frankl, 1986). Existential psychology of Frankl's day, therefore, was in contrast to the conventional Freudian psychology, where psychodynamic psychology views the individual as nothing more than a pile of intersecting drives (Collins, 1977).

Existential philosophy in general, following the lead of people like Martin Heidegger and J. P. Sartre, does not see personality to be adequately explained by Freudian theories. Rather, existential thought sees an individual as a totality of intention,

indicating his fundamental choice of being (hence, Heidegger's description of being human as *Dasein*) (Heidegger, 1962). A person's actions, thus, over time form a facticity of being that is at its core a concrete choice of being. Each action is a choice (on one level or another); therefore the key thing that an existential psychoanalyst is searching for is the irreducible fact *of the for-itself's contingent choice of being* (Hollier, 1993).

The very epistemology of existential phenomenology assumes a partnership between consciousness and world, a relationship that is intentional in that consciousness arises as a consciousness of something in the world—real, imagined, or remembered. Part of this philosophical framework is phenomenological ontology, which strives to clarify *Being*. This existential phenomenology then gives rise to a general philosophy of psychology that is significantly different from Freudian psychology on such issues as the nature of consciousness, or the psyche. Yet, despite some fundamental disagreements, existential psychoanalysis would be inconceivable without Freud's invention of psychoanalysis as a foundational step of the *talking cure*, as Frankl himself notes (Frankl, 1986).

While Frankl himself operates with a pragmatic recognition of the conscious and unconscious, it is important to note that the general existential interpretation (following J. P. Sartre) is somewhat different. Within Sartre's existential philosophy, the analysand in psychotherapy gains knowledge of pre-reflective choices (a subtle difference from consciousness of unconscious tendencies). Yet, according to Sartre, pre-reflective choices cannot be found by direct reflection; rather, one must look at everyday acts and discover the meaning, the intending of the act, for our acts will inform us of our intentions. We can then understand a pattern of intending and come to know the self. However, we are afraid

of what we will find in the self, so we do not want to see the self, and so we deceive the self into perpetuating a chosen myth (i.e. I am a good person, etc.). Such self-deception is possible because of the chasm between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. Although the same person spontaneously acts and reflectively conceives of those actions, the two acts of consciousness are separated by the same nothingness which separates consciousness from objects in the world. In other words, it is only by *not being* my past spontaneous self that I can reflectively conceive that self. *Bad faith* is the term that J. P. Sartre uses for this reflectively lying to oneself about the nature of reality and one's own intentions (Sartre, 1992).

Therefore, for Sartre and subsequent existential philosophers and psychologists, consciousness is desire for a future fullness (a hope) but this desire discovers itself outside in the world rather than in the recesses of the self (or in some innate Freudian drives). Also, this desire is not primarily sexual in nature like the libido (although it can incorporate sexuality). It is a desire of *being* rather than a desire for pleasure or cessation of tensions. Hope and happiness, then, are inextricably linked with the intentionality of being. It is an ontological desire which is acted out in the world through the intentionality that is consciousness. There is no need for a reductionistic system, for consciousness discovers itself in the world and happiness is hope finding itself in consciousness through the range of human activities.

All of this naturally has profound implications for existential psychotherapy, including some general practices that seem to pertain to so much of the discipline (Hollier, 1993):

A. Hope for the future as meaning replaces the need for a Freudian will to pleasure and becomes as important as the past as a ground for contemporary choices. As for the future, existential therapists attempt to interpret present acts not only in terms of past choices but also in terms of future meanings.

B. The existential therapist not only examines the client's project in terms of its past, present, and future but also attempts to grasp the client's relationship to time and space; this is an ontological concern which has no equal in Freudian psychoanalysis.

C. A therapist adopting Sartre's view of consciousness would not regard therapy as a technique for making the unconscious conscious but rather as a way to focus a healing reflection on a client's previously distorted or unidentified pre-reflective experience. It should be noted that this is not a feature of Frankl's meta-theory of psychology, but it does have a profound effect upon more modern theorists like Ernesto Spinelli.

D. The existential therapist regards relations with others as deriving from a person's discovery of the other person (as a subject who sees and names me). As such, others, especially the original powerful others, figure in an individual's fundamental project as means to establishing a self as value. It is these reflected appraisals which must be purged from meta-reflection on a reflective process, which a client has learned from them, about how to see the self.

E. The body is important in existential psychotherapy, as it is the base of intentionality and should be regarded as a way of living one's life in the world.

The existentialist therapist attempts to explore with the client all those modes of living the body as a subject (and as an object). Importantly, within this is that one chooses one's way of living one's body.

F. The existential psychotherapist is not satisfied with general medical nosology but prefers to see the client's world in terms of a concrete and uniquely rich individual world.

G. The therapist does not investigate the client's psychic structures, as in Freudian psychoanalysis, but rather the ways in which this person lives the three fundamental structures of being: Being-in-itself, Being-for-itself, and Being-for-others. Being-in-itself, such as what is the client's basic way of living his/her relationship with objects in this world? Being-for-others, like the client's way of living his life with others. Being-for-itself in the reflective and prereflective modes of how the client has a relationship with the self.

It is clear that existential philosophy provides a very broad basis from which existential psychotherapists can work. In the case of Frankl, while he intuitively follows many of the themes of general existential philosophy, the impact of Freud still weighs upon him. In some senses this is a pragmatic reality, because one cannot rightly talk about psychology without some reference to Freud and his theories. Frankl, in a sense, then, is incorporating some broad ideas from existential phenomenology, European psychiatry, and his own clinical and life experience to formulate a new theory. The theory was clearly sound (for Frankl refined it in the most intense and difficult context imaginable), that an individual is oriented towards creating meaning; the *will to meaning*, according to Frankl, has actual survival value (Frankl, 1986).

This *will to meaning* was not simply some abstract theory but a survival tool for its creator. Frankl personally used this strategy to survive his own hellish experiences, stating, "I succeeded somehow in rising above the situation, above the sufferings of the moment, and I observed them as if they were already of the past" (Frankl, 1986, p. xi). This personal awareness set the stage for Frankl to feel comfortable engaging in issues of meaning within his psychiatric profession.

In doing therapy, then, Frankl begins with recognizing that the client is not simply a naturalistic reduction of biology/ soma but is also mental; yet this is not the sum, for the client is also spiritual. Within each person there is a will to meaning, and this will is the most human of the three dimensions of a person. It is therefore essential to keep in mind the whole existence of a person; for to ignore the spiritual is to have the therapist being complicit in perpetuating what often afflicts clients: the *existential frustration* or *noogenic neurosis* (Frankl, 1986).

This meaning, for Frankl, is part of the whole picture of happiness, for its use in the therapeutic setting is essentially helping the patient to find the courage to face the unfixable sufferings of life with grace and dignity. The essence of Frankl's logotherapeutic approach, then, is in helping people to discover meaning within life. This comes about, according to Frankl, in three forms: Creative values (achieving a task, doing something); Experiential values (experiencing the beauty in something or someone); or Attitudinal values (choosing one's orientation to the way that the world deals with you and the suffering experienced therein). As Frankl points out, "Logotherapy is ultimately education toward responsibility; the patient must push forward independently toward the concrete meaning of his own existence" (Frankl, 1986,

p. xxii). Frankl places this in the form of a formula: suffering minus meaning equals despair (S-M=D). The goal, for Frankl, is to reveal meaning, to help the patient escape despair.

Frankl wishes to be clear as to the context and role that logotherapy has to play within the larger practice of psychotherapy proper. The essential lesson of psychoanalysis—that what is hidden must be brought to awareness in order to be dealt with and managed—is essential for all psychotherapy. In this sense, however, Frankl prefers the terms of Freud (unconscious and conscious) to Sartre (pre-reflective and reflective). Frankl's great contribution to psychology is found in his counter to the weaknesses of naturalistic reductionism and determinism. With a more *Dasein* perspective, an emphasis upon the spiritual and meaning dimensional level, he provides the counterweight that can balance out professional practice dominated by Freud. Frankl stated that "Each is right about the side of reality that it sees; but only both sides together can produce a rounded picture of the psychic life" (Frankl, 1986, p. 7).

So we see that Freud was interested in the dimensions of biology and psychology, following the epistemology of reductionism, determinism, empiricism, and mechanistic determinism with a view of humanity as a complex of drives. Frankl, on the other hand, was influenced by the notions of choice, intentionality, and the higher dimensions of human existence like the noological and the theological.

Recognizing these dimensional differences of perspective between these two psychological heavy-weights, we will now explore the ways in which Freud and Frankl understand happiness. Within this exploration we shall see how their respective epistemologies guide their understanding of happiness.

Happiness Companions

In investigating the whole concept of happiness, we have seen that the historical perspectives seem to always incorporate the themes of faith, love, and hope. As we shall see, these themes are also reflected within the theories of Freud and Frankl. Yet with each theorist beginning with a very different epistemology, their interpretations of the observed phenomenon lead to very different conclusions about happiness (in both its nature and meaning as a therapeutic goal).

Faith in Freud and Frankl

To understand Freud's view of faith one has only to look at his epistemology to have a good sense as to the orientation he took to faith. Yet despite being a declared atheist that embraced (openly, at least) only the natural world, faith expressed in an ethnic and cultural way formed much of his self-concept. His sense of being a Jew was very powerful and important to him and in many ways formed and guided much of his relationships with friends and colleagues (Storr, 1989).

Yet, in his academic work, he continually strove to distance himself from ideas of faith and sought to be viewed as an atheistic naturalistic scientific researcher. In his early works on psychopathology, for example, Freud is openly questioning the very foundational statements of Jewish scripture (i.e. Genesis) and transforming their meaning by means of reductionism and naturalism. Freud's works like *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*; *Totem and Taboo*; and *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practice* carry within them the strong theme that the concept of deity is a human fantasy and religious rituals are obsessive neurotic acts (Gay, 1989; Heller, 2005; Storr, 1989).

In Freud's view, religion is derived from the *Oedipus Complex* and the whole concept of a deity is the projection of the father-figure. Freud argued that the unresolved oedipal experience projects its psychic influence onto the belief structure of the individual. Therefore a child's sense of helplessness (in comparison to that of the all-powerful father) creates a deeply held fear that is later transferred to a heavenly father (Gay, 1989; Heller, 2005).

The one writing where Freud clearly expresses the issues of faith and happiness is in his work *Civilization and its Discontent.* Here we see the natural outcome of his epistemological basis and the historical context of Freud caught between repressive Victorianism and a society that was increasingly hostile to Jews (Gay, 1989):

> Happiness, in the reduced sense in which we recognize it as possible, is a problem of the economies of the individual's libido. There is no golden rule which applies to everyone: every man must find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved … Religion restricts … [the] play of choice and adaptation, since it imposes equally on everyone its own path to the acquisition of happiness and protection from suffering. Its technique consists in depressing the value of life and distorting the picture of the real world in a delusional manner – which presupposes an intimidation of intelligence. At this price, by forcibly fixing them in a state of psychical infantilism and by them into a mass-delusion, religion succeeds in sparing many people an individual neurosis. But hardly anything more…. And even if we proceed from it to the problem of why it is so hard for men to be happy, there seems no … prospect of learning anything new. We have given the answer already by pointing to the three sources from which our

> suffering comes: the superior power of nature, the feebleness of our own bodies and the inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human being in the family, the state and society. … We shall never completely master nature; and our bodily organism, itself a part of that nature, will always remain a transient structure with a limited capacity for adaptation and achievement (pp. 734-735).

Freud consistently returns to his *Oedipal* framework for understanding the presence of a God concept in the human experience. This resurfaces with his discussion of the case of the Wolf Man; his pseudonymous work on Leonardo's Moses sculpture; and in most other discussion that involved the notion of trust in God. With this insistence upon rejecting these deeply held beliefs as *nothing but* projections of psychic conflicts, Freud is without a higher framework for happiness and meaning (as he himself confesses) (Gay, 1989). The logical progression then, is to reduce all of human functioning to the pleasure principle and psychic conflict, which leaves Freud without any apparent context for experiencing happiness other than sexual pleasure. This type of rigidity is part of the reason why Jung and others soon began to distance themselves from Freud's theories.

People like Jung, James, etc. took a starkly different view of faith, seeing it as an authentic part of human experience and essential to a healthy psyche. Frankl, like Jung, considered the religious and mystical aspects of human experience not to be the sign of a neurosis but rather an essential part of human experience and mental health. Indeed, Frankl viewed faith as part of the uniquely human dimension of existence that is a counter to the noogenic neurosis of meaninglessness that infected a modern society, which accepted as its basis the doctrines of reductionism and naturalism (Frankl, 1986).

There is no doubt that faith plays an important role in the therapeutic view of Frankl. Faith, for Frankl, was essential in life and in therapy. Yet to understand the nature of this faith as it relates to happiness one must begin with the nature of one's own conscience. For with Frankl, conscience and faith are inextricably linked and both are essential to understanding the nature of happiness. As Frankl points out, if we were to extend the existential analysis of conscience to its fullest point we would be confronted with a very significant finding: the transcendental quality of conscience. True, there is human freedom, but all freedom has a *freedom from what* and a *freedom to what* component. For humanity the "freedom from …" is that we do not have the overpowering instinctual drives that control so much of animal behavior. Similarly, the "freedom to …" is the human responsibility to have a conscience and to live by that conscience. For Frankl (2000), these can be best summarized by Maria von Ebner-Eschenbach's words: "Be the master of your will and the servant of your conscience" (p. 59).

Yet one cannot willingly be a servant of one's conscience until one truly appreciates the high and transcendental nature of the human conscience. In addition, a person can only be a servant when one actively engages with the conscience, not just blindly listening to and occasionally ignoring it. That is to say, to have a dialogue rather than monologue with one's conscience. In order to understand the human conscience, one must be mindful that it is the human wisdom that takes in one's entire spectrum of experience and is, therefore, of a much wider perspective than just one's active conscious thoughts. In this direction, Frankl (2000) makes the point that the conscience is not just immanent but transcendent:

> It is like the human navel, which would appear meaningless if it were taken as an isolated phenomenon; the navel can only be understood in the context of the prenatal history, for it points beyond the individual to his origin in his mother. It is the same with conscience; it can only be fully understood as a phenomenon pointing to its own transcending origin (p. 60).

For Frankl, we cannot ontologically understand such a human phenomenon as conscience unless we reach back to its transcendent origin. Conscience is fully comprehended only against the background of a trans-human dimension as our spiritual unconscious and as the key to disclosing to us the essential transcendence of the spiritual unconscious. Therefore, if conscience is the voice to our conscious self of transcendence, then conscience itself is transcendent, for it flows from the transcendent (Frankl, 1975).

In many ways the conscience is our own personal call from God to live a life of responsibility. The conscience, then, for Frankl, is something that goes far beyond a function within the psychological dynamics of the individual. Further, it is something that is not merely a projection of the self into a religious frame. Conscience truly is a person's connection with God and can therefore be rightly called faith. As Frankl (2000) notes, just as drives and instincts cannot repress themselves, so, too, the self cannot be responsible only to itself. The self requires that it be responsible to something else, for only then does the lawgiver speak towards responsibility. Hence, the conscience must be transcendental.

In this, Frankl believes that conscience truly is of God and we must never imagine that our conscience is the source of God. For even the very theological idea of God points out that it is transcendent and not of an immanent source (Frankl, 1986):

> For theology God is not a father image, but rather the father is an image of God. In this view the father is not the model of divinity, but on the contrary, God is the model of paternity. Biographically and biologically the father is first; theologically however God is first. Psychologically the relationship between the child and his father is prior to the relationship between man and God; theologically however my natural father and in a sense my creator, is but the first representative of a super-natural father and creator of the universe (p. 65).

As Frankl (2000) notes, conscience is a way of apprehending the spiritual make-up of the pre-reflective (the unconscious). Happiness, then, exists simultaneously with the themes of responsibility, conscience, and love, which is the personal action oriented expression of this. Within this, the conscience is a means for helping one to understand the self and one's spiritual core.

What is clear is that Frankl very much believes in the interconnection between conscience and the unconscious (or perhaps more accurately the unity of the pre-reflective and reflective) and the role of faith in this interconnection. With this interrelationship there is the logical therapeutic progression that dreams will expose something of the conscience processes that a client can draw from. It is a means, through free association, of tapping the wisdom that is already present within the self, guiding the self in love, concern, and spirituality. In simple terms, Frankl considers a happy life to be an authentic existence, and faith is a central part of this authentic life. For Frankl, the only genuine faith and religion is one that is existential, where a person is not somehow driven to it but where he/she commits to it in a deliberate choosing.

For Frankl, faith is an essential part of a person's *weltanschauung* (worldview). It is in this expanded and robust *weltanschauung*, bolstered by faith, that a person experiences a spiritual anchor and a feeling of security that is inconceivable from any other corner of the human experience. It is in this worldview that happiness finds its place in life, for it grows out of this unconditional trust in ultimate meaning and an unconditional faith in ultimate being. Such faith gives rise to happiness and is ultimately best expressed by Frankl when he quotes from the book of Habakkuk (1988):

> Although the fig tree shall not blossom neither shall fruit be in the vines; the labor of the olive shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat; the flock shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls: Yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will find joy in the God of my salvation (p. 156-157).

Hope in Freud and Frankl

Hope for Freud, especially hope that springs from faith, is something that is a clear self-deception. Such hope is an Oedipal complex that is at the core of a mass neurosis. Indeed, in Freud's naturalistic schema there is little room for a concept such as hope, for all of human existence can be reduced to the conflicts of various drives (Gay, 1989). Yet this schema does bring Freud to a very difficult position, for while he prefers to avoid religion, when faced with the problem of hope and the meaning of life he is forced to acknowledge the need for religion (Gay):

> The question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one. Some of those who have asked it have added that if it should turn out that life has no purpose, it would lose all value for them. But this threat alters nothing. It looks,

> on the contrary, as though one had a right to dismiss the question, for it seems to derive from the human presumptuousness, many other manifestations of which are already familiar to us … Once again, only religion can answer the question of the purpose of life. One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with a religious system (pp. 728–729).

Freud freely acknowledges that his epistemology does not allow for an adequate view of hope, and so he prefers not to deal with hope. Rather, Freud deals with happiness as a drive toward pleasure and its satisfaction of these instinctual urges:

> We will therefore turn to the less ambitious question of what men themselves show in their behavior to be the purpose and intention of their lives … the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start (Gay, 1989, p. 729).

In stark contrast to Freud's perspective, Frankl (1988) held that faith and hope were partners (as Freud freely acknowledges and therefore avoided) and a source of some mental wellness. For Frankl (1988), a person needs a core pillar of existence as a strong idea, some central belief that holds a person on course (something to trust and something to hope for); an ideal to live up to. Frankl (1988) quotes Albert Einstein saying, "The man who regards his life as meaningless is not merely unhappy but hardly fit for life." Frankl makes the point that life is not only intentional but must transcend the self—towards something higher than oneself. This transcendence must move use from being-for-itself to being-for-others, an otherness; for it is in that moving out of oneself toward another where

one really can exist and thrive. To remain in oneself completely is to avoid life. Being human means being engaged, better yet, entangled in a situation.

Frankl (1988) clarifies how hope must be intentional and active, for our every thought is the result of a tension between two things, ideas, values, etc.; so to exist is to be in the tension between the other and the self. Even in our idea world and our sense of self there is the tension between the "I am" and the "I ought" (and for Sartre, fleeing from this tension results in Bad Faith), reality and ideal, the present and that which is hoped for, mere existing and meaning. For Frankl, being a mentally healthy human means living in the field of tension established between what is now and what is hoped for but requires effort to materialize. It is a tension between ideals and values, so existence is not authentic until people live in hope and move to transcend themselves.

For Frankl, self-transcendence and hope are personal, tying in closely with personal ideals and the experience of personal meaning, for ideals and meaning are personal, subjective, and relative. That is, hope relates to a specific person, in a specific context, at a specific time. The meaning of hope for one person compared to another differs from moment to moment because we are all unique. It is the uniqueness that is important when understanding meaning (it is what really defines the term "relative" when speaking of meaning). No meaning is exactly the same for two people, just like no person can replace another; the uniqueness of each one is part of the meaning making process and a personal hope (Frankl, 1988).

In Frankl's view, hope is not simply an abstract concept but something that is enacted in every situation of life. He suggests that in human experience there are drives (which push a person) and values (which pull him). It is up to each person to discover and

> accept the value of each situation and to rank and choose the values of each situation responsibly. This reminds us that the very nature of values is to rank the importance of one thing over another, so in ranking what is important in each situation a person can make the responsible choice. It is here that hope finds its footing in life. It is here that meaning is experienced. As such, each person must be mindful of his/her perspective and that of others, for this is how we will relate and understand the objective world. In looking through different perspectives as people relate to others, they transcend themselves toward meanings which are something other than themselves—that which is hoped for (Frankl, 1988).

Part of Frankl's understanding of hope flows from the perspective of freedom and the ability of a person to intentionally transcend beyond the self. To begin, Frankl points out that man is open to the world (*Welt*) in contrast to being bound to an environment (*Umwelt*). This makes man unique and makes man free. Man, rather than being framed entirely by environment, is hoping for, reaching out for, and apprehending the world. It is an active encountering with the meanings to be found therein. For Frankl, this is an important thing to understand, as it frames a different anthropology to that of Freud.

Frankl holds that hope is a central component to what it means to be human; man

> is going out towards something beyond himself, as opposed to the ultimate motivational theories of Freud's libido. For Frankl, Freud's theory of people—as centrally operating out of the pleasure principle—does not fully express what a person is. It leaves out something extremely important in the potentiality and even the fundamental nature of man as a meaning creating being. Frankl believes people live with intentionality and purpose, and that purpose is to give meaning to life. An individual has a need to create

values, and that this values creating is a native, innate, primary direction within every person.

Taking into account that every person is primarily a *will to meaning* then translates into some important insights for understanding happiness. First among these is the reality that the pleasure principle itself is self-defeating, as the pursuit of happiness is what thwarts it. Frankl also notes that the self-defeating nature of the pursuit of happiness is also the cause of much sexual neurosis, for the very hyper-intention and hyper-reflection causes neurotic behavior and an innate dissatisfaction with one's love/sexual life (Frankl, 1986).

This is the case because human pleasure must always be the result of engagement toward a goal (something hoped for) and attainment of the goal constitutes a reason for happiness. As such, happiness cannot be pursued in itself but must ensue, automatically and spontaneously. To the extent to which a client makes happiness the objective of his/her motivation, happiness is made the object of attention. But precisely by so doing is the reason for happiness lost, as the client disengages in that which actually gives rise to it, and happiness fades away. Frankl (1988) gives a personal example to make his point about happiness:

> If any of my twenty-three books has become a success it has been that book which I initially planned to publish anonymously. Only after I had completed the manuscript was I persuaded by friends to let the publisher put my name on the book. Is it not remarkable that precisely that book which I wrote under the conviction that it would not, that it could not, bring in success and fame, precisely this book actually became a success. (p. 35)

The main point is that people are drawn to make meaning—and this is done by engaging in and working towards what is hoped for (other than happiness itself)—and the pleasure (or happiness) must happen spontaneously. As such, one key tenet of Frankl's logotherapy that must be remembered is that happiness (something that everyone in therapy wants) must ensue from a life of meaning making. This meaning making flows naturally from the well-spring of faith that gives hope even in the midst of the bleakest of circumstances. Here we must focus on finding and fulfilling meaning and purpose, for only in so doing will we have the ability to live a life of happiness.

Frankl (1988) gives a biblical example to drive home this point. In the story of Solomon, God invites Solomon to ask for a wish and, after a long deliberation, Solomon asks for the ability to become a wise judge for his people. God's reply: *Since you did not ask for fame and fortune but for wisdom, I will give you wisdom beyond the measure of any other man, PLUS fame, fortune, and power.* Happiness, then, flows from a hope that is grounded in faith and lived out intentionally within the world.

This then brings up the theme of love, for no simple intentionality will do—it must be a positive, responsible, intentional engaging with the world through which happiness begins to flow.

Love in Freud and Frankl

Freud's psychological writings on love are usually dealt with in a rather indirect way, though when he does come around to discussing the topic it flows directly from his overall theory of psychodynamics. The central thesis of Freud's view of love is that it is a byproduct of the sexual drive of the libido. The core type of love, then, is romantic love, where the love-object is the central focus, with the goal of sexual pleasure. All other

types of love (friendship, family ties, abstract ideas of love) are simply displacements of the normal object of sexual desire. Love, for Freud, is a very selfish creature where the libido and psychosexual development converge and result in various levels of repression, displacement, and deflection (Santas, 1988).

A direct expression of his concept of love came in 1921, with the publication of: *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego:*

> Libido is an expression taken from the theory of emotion. We call by that name the energy … of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word "love". The nucleus of what we mean … consists in … sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this – what in any case has a share in the name of "love" (Santas, 1988, pp. 117–118).

In keeping with this theme of a rather naturalistic, low, and deterministic view, Freud wrote eloquently in his work *Civilization and its discontent* about love:

> The taboo-observances were the first right or law. The communal life of human beings had therefore, a two-fold foundation: the compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity, and the power of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object – the woman … Man's discovery that sexual (genital) love afforded him the strongest experiences of satisfaction, and in fact provided him with the prototype of all happiness, must have suggested to him that he should continue to seek the satisfaction of happiness in his life along the path of sexual relations and that he should make genital eroticism the central point of his life. We went on to say that in doing so he made himself dependent in a most dangerous way on a portion of the external

> world, namely, his chosen love-object, and exposed himself to extreme suffering if he should be rejected by that object or should lose it through unfaithfulness or death … a small minority are enabled by their constitution to find happiness, in spite of everything, along the path of love. But far-reaching mental changes in the function of love are necessary before this can happen. These people make themselves independent of their object's acquiescence by displacing what they mainly value from being loved on to loving; they protect themselves against the loss of the object by directing their love, not to single objects but to all men alike; and they avoid the uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim (Gay, 1989, pp. 743–744).

Within this we have a glimmer of Freud moving towards a transcendent type of love, even connecting it with faith, but in the end Freud brings it back to a simple psychodynamic economy.

> What we have recognized as one of the techniques for fulfilling the pleasure principle has often been brought into connection with religion; this connection may lie in the remote regions where the distinction between the ego and objects or between objects themselves is neglected (Gay, 1989, p. 744).

There have been a great many contributions to the understanding of the human experience from modern psychology. However, all of the drive theories that seem to dominate our understanding of humanity leave out one of the most important features. In contrast to this reductionism of the concept of love, Frankl takes a dimensionally

different approach. This feature, according to Frankl, is the missing frame that makes logotherapy distinctive: the feature of the human need for self-transcendence. In essence, Frankl was saying that people need to love (in the higher forms) in order to be truly happy. It is here that Frankl (2000) interprets the need for self-transcendence, flirting himself with the language of a drive by calling it the "will to meaning."

For Frankl, love is a positive intentional engagement in the world, and it is an experience that is seriously lacking in the modern world. Frankl was particularly struck by the global struggle that societies seem to face in expressing their will to meaning and an inability to engage and commit to a task in love. According to Frankl (1988 & 2000), the *noogenic neurosis* or existential vacuum mainly manifests itself in boredom and apathy, whereas meaning flows from faith and hope acting itself out in engagement. While boredom is indicative of a loss of interest in the world, apathy betrays a lack of the initiative to do something in the world, to change something in the world. Love, expressed as a will to meaning, is the counter to this.

According to Frankl, a higher form of self-transcending love is the core of human experience, where there is meaning to life under any conditions, even the worst conceivable ones. Meaning may be squeezed out even from suffering, and that is the very reason why life remains potentially meaningful in spite of everything and why happiness is always available (Frankl, 1975).

Part of the difficulty that Frankl finds in life is that we often fail to engage this intentionality of love and thus fail to become active in the meaning making process. Often we are so inexperienced in our meaning making processes that we get caught looking for that overall meaning of life, even though it is something that can never be

partially apprehended until our last breath (if at all). This misdirected seeking of meaning can then only add to our existential frustration, leading to Camus's (1991) conclusion that life is absurd. We hit a wall that is the upper limits of human comprehension, and while we long to break down this wall, it holds fast. This formula, or law of meaning, as Frankl (2000) calls it, is that the more comprehensive the meaning, the less we are able to comprehend it. As such, if we are seeking an ultimate meaning for all of humanity, let alone our own life, it is by this law incomprehensible. The key to experiencing meaning, then, is to commit to love in the small regular choices of life, where meanings that we can apprehend spring forth. It is from these smaller pieces of engagement that happiness flows. In a sense, then, love is essential in meaning making, and love is a caring act of intentionality.

It is within this general framework that Frankl (2000) points out that self-transcending love is part of the meaning making process and core to human existence:

> It turns out that there are three avenues that lead up to meaning fulfillment: First, doing a deed or creating a work; second, experiencing something or encountering someone; in other words, meaning can be found not only in work but also in love … The third avenue: Facing a fate we cannot change, we are called upon to make the best of it by rising above ourselves and growing beyond ourselves, in a world, by changing ourselves … Meaning may be squeezed out even from suffering, and that is the very reason why life remains potentially meaningful in spite of everything (pp. 141–142).

Frankl (1986) points out that this love does not live in isolation but is something that is lived out in choosing to engage the world, to commit to something greater than the self, and to work for the welfare of it:

> Self-transcendence … denotes the fact that human existence always points, and is directed, toward something other than oneself; or rather, toward something or someone other than oneself, namely, toward meanings to fulfill, or toward other human beings to encounter lovingly. And only to the extent to which a human being lives out his self-transcendence is he really becoming human and actualizing himself. This always reminds me of the fact that the eye's visual capacity to perceive the surrounding world, ironically, is contingent on its incapacity to perceive itself, to see anything of itself. Whenever the eye sees anything of itself its function is impaired … likewise man is human to the extent that he overlooks and forgets himself by giving himself to a cause to serve or another person to love. By being immersed … in love, we are transcending ourselves, and thereby actualizing ourselves (p. 294).

Summary

The historical models of happiness all seem to connect faith, hope, and love to the experience of human happiness. When we look at classical psychology, we see this triad remains, but that varying epistemologies dictate how well a specific school can deal with the experience of happiness. As we have seen, Freud and Frankl vary significantly on their epistemology, and this has a profound effect upon how they understand people and the human experience, including what it means to be happy. While Freud viewed psychology as something to be based upon a reductionistic naturalism and a mechanical

determinism; Frankl notes that the human experience is broad and knowledge of it must come from a variety of sources.

It is clear that Freud's assumptions limit the ability of psychoanalysis to handle the nature of human happiness. In contrast, Frankl clearly chooses a broader view, including the possibility of God. This forms a world of intrinsic meaning, accountability, and possibility for Frankl and creates a worldview that frames happiness.

Frankl's frame for happiness is within the experience of meaning making and clearly placed within the triad of faith, hope, and love. Firstly, he points out that the person of religion already has the means at his disposal to live within and discover meaning in life (and find the meaning of his life). What Frankl points out for all people is that we accept limits on our apprehension of such things because we are finite beings.

Overall, what I draw from these models is that we ought to limit our query about the meaning of life to the meaning of *my* life. Yet in faith a person has access to a super-meaning within which to place a personal meaning. However, we should not begin with a great meta-question such as what is the purpose of the universe, for the problem is one we cannot grasp. As it says in the book of Job, God asked Job to explain how he (God) made the earth and the universe … and Job replied by *covering his mouth*. True, we long for a super-meaning or overarching narrative of the universe, for our minds require its existence, while at the same time it is to our minds impenetrable.

Humanity, then, (and myself specifically) cannot be satisfied by pleasure alone, for death shows this to be empty. There must be a value such that it lies outside of the self, and when we experience this, happiness that is beyond mere pleasure emerges. Happiness is something that arises from an intentional service to something outside the

self. Unlike pleasure, happiness is never an end in itself; it springs spontaneously from the forgetting of oneself in the other. According to Kierkegaard, the door to happiness opens outward. It follows, then, that anyone who tries to pull in to open the door simply shuts it more firmly. So it becomes clear to me, that happiness emerges in the occasion of intentionality of love, for as faith brings hope in every circumstance and a context for meaning, so love is the positive engagement of existence through which happiness can emerge.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH

Within this chapter is the record of my own first-person experience of working through the hermeneutics of happiness. My exploration into happiness followed the interpretation of personal experience through the general theme of phenomenology, by way of the existential and hermeneutic streams, using the heuristic problem solving steps within a hermeneutic framework. This approach weaved a hermeneutical tapestry from several different, but related, research threads into a coherent interpretational narrative. This procedure followed a systematic personal reflection and incubation process towards the synthesis of a comprehensive personal narrative about the nature and experience of my happiness.

Phenomenology

In order to fully appreciate this general phenomenological approach we must begin with Edmund Husserl, who sought to use his way of knowing, called *phenomenology,* to understand reality by moving back to *the things themselves* as they are presented to one's consciousness (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). For Husserl, the key to moving towards the actual experience is by means of the *phenomenological reduction*, where our natural attitude of interacting with the world is narrowed to what is essential in the experience. This narrowing of attention involves the suspension, or bracketing, of our pre-existing beliefs about the experience. Drawing upon the Greek term *epoche*', Husserl formed the idea of *phenomenological epoche',* which is essentially the same idea as bracketing or

phenomenological reduction (Husserl used all three terms interchangeably) (Stewart & Mickunas).

In Husserl's work *Cartesian Mediations* (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), he engages the idea of consciousness, arguing that there is not a division in our experience, that we (I = *ego*) are inconceivable apart from our conscious life (*cogito*), and that there is no conscious life apart from the content of consciousness (*cogitatum*) (the distal world). Husserl sums up this idea as: *ego-cogito-cogitatum.* Following this logic, Husserl argued that the activity of consciousness (noesis) was to be found in meaning, not in a subject-object dualism, making consciousness the possibility of experiencing both (Stewart & Mickunas).

Consciousness for Husserl was what he called the *transcendental*, which in his specialized language meant the conditions within which experience is possible. Within this experience there are both *immanence* (a belief in the same stream of experience) and *transcendence* (the stream of experience in the spatial-temporal sense) levels (Stewart & Michunas, 1974). The knowing of something is to grasp its essence in this intermingling of the immanence and transcendence.

The *eidos* is the term that Husserl used for this *in between* experience of the essence of both the structure (transcendence) and meaning (immanence) of the world. The step beyond this idea, known as *eidetic reduction*, is where Husserl's closest associates seem to pull away from his teachings (possibly because they felt it smacked of Hegel's Idealism). According to Husserl, people operate through *eidetic reduction*, where consciousness starts with the prototype that arises from experience with the world (*the eidos "essence" of the thing*) and then creates variations of the eidetic to correlate with

the transcendence experience. The prototype, then, is the product of what Husserl called the *categorical intuition*, which organizes the information from the senses into the prototype categories from which consciousness draws (Stewart & Michunas, 1974).

It is here that eidetic reduction meets intentionality. Husserl points out that the ego always orients itself toward its intended object, with both meaning and experience mixed together with intention. Therefore, the human consciousness constitutes a unity out of the multitude of impressions holding onto its essence via eidetic reduction. Consciousness is therefore the body, the meaning, the idea, the object, and the intentionality of the ego (Vernon, 2005). This, for Husserl, forms the idea of the *lived world*, a constructed idea world in which we engage experience and make meaning from it (Stewart & Michanus, 1974).

The inseparability of consciousness, for Husserl, was likely drawn from his main intellectual influence, Franz Brentano. Brentano's key idea is that of *intentionality*, where the action of thought toward something is the key of consciousness. Husserl picks up this idea and vastly expands it into *intentionality being the essence of consciousness*. Consciousness cannot be viewed as a thing separate, closed off by itself, or empty, but rather it is a dynamic interaction with the objects of its intention, infusing them with meaning (Sadler, 1969).

Hermeneutical and Existential Phenomenology

While Husserl envisioned the role of phenomenology to be that of describing the lived world, existential phenomenology insisted that the observer cannot be separate from the

world. Hermeneutical and existential phenomenologists like Husserl's student Martin Heidegger followed the line of intentionality of consciousness, transforming the notion of a lived-world into *being-in-the-world* (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). Heidegger also felt that Husserl's notions were too limiting because they ignored the human experiences of death, isolation, and anxiety. It was in this line of broad thought that phenomenology took on a hermeneutical and existential hew. Phenomenology becomes hermeneutical when its method is taken to be interpretive rather than purely descriptive. This slant is clear in the work of Heidegger, who believed that all description is always already interpretation.

As an extension to phenomenology, this hermeneutical and existential movement began with Heidegger's struggles with the idea of *Being* and eventually came to be concerned with human actions and meaning in life. Within his very early works Heidegger explored topics of *Being*, like his 1914 work on Duns Scotus's *Doctrine of Categories*, which was a common expression for the *Being* of beings. Within this work, and others of the same period, he reflected upon the problem of meaning, where objectivity only has meaning for a *subject who judges*. Later, in a lecture (1915) on the concept of time, he used this basic idea and contrasted it with the historical development of the idea of time. In so doing, Heidegger had laid out the two great themes and approaches that would dominate his early intellectual writings: the historical interpretation and the concept of time melded with his continual quest to understand the nature of being (Krell, 2009).

This quest is what Heidegger termed the *existential analytic*, where every being had to work out its own being within the world. The truly groundbreaking notion was that

the question of the meaning of being, asked phenomenologically, must naturally begin with the nature of the question presenting itself to the investigator. Therefore, the analysis of the being that raised the question of being concerning its being was the foundation for inquiry into the meaning of being in general. For Heidegger, humanity is always aware of its own being, however undefined this may be, and it is always framed as being in the world. Therefore Heidegger called the being of this questioner *Dasein* (existence or being in the world). Within this one word Heidegger did away with attempts to break down being into categories or schemas, and he argued instead that it is the totality of our interrelationships with the world that forms the meaning of being (Krell, 2009).

In more philosophical terms, this idea put forth by Heidegger is that *Dasein* is the being in the world, the place of openness where beings reveal themselves in innumerable ways, coming out of concealment for a moment, and then disappearing again into obscurity. It is fundamentally different from various predecessors, like the writings of Karl Jaspers, specifically his *Psychology of Worldviews.* While Heidegger noted the value of Jaspers's appeal to situations, he pointed out that Jaspers was limited by his use of preexisting schemas like *spirit, totality, life.* For Heidegger, these forms limited our understanding, and so he pushed for a hermeneutical understanding of *Dasein*, paying special attention to the problem of interpretation (Krell, 2009).

To put it yet another way, *Dasein* is rooted in the everyday world and the manifold relations that emerge and disappear between people and things. In a sense, then, *Dasein* is a caring about what is happening and what will happen, giving it a temporal edge. *Dasein* involves itself in all number of plans, always ahead of itself, and most greatly of all figuring out how to relate to those things over which it has no control. In a

sense, Heidegger speaks of *Dasein* as a *thrownness*—of being thrown into a factual context in life. There is also the notion of intentionality, that it projects itself into the future and is hopeful (but not certain) of a particular outcome. Yet it also comes from somewhere, having a past and a context as well as a living in the present (Krell, 2009).

Heidegger (1962) points out that *Dasein* is intentional and whole in its experience:

> When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character; but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows (p. 89).

Heuristic Research

While this work is hermeneutic in nature, I adapted the problem solving steps developed by Clark Moustakas (1990) known as *Heuristic Analysis,* specifically the question distillation process. This was an excellent choice as it provided a guided process of allowing the personal experience and insights of the researcher to clarify the essence of the phenomenon (Moustakas). This required that I live the question until the question reveals something of its essential nature. This heuristic process followed six stages.

In keeping with Heidegger's belief that we must start with the nature of the question itself, I divided the process up into three phases to categorize the six stages

outlined by Moustakas. The *Question Phase* is the first phase of this research process. The opening stage is *Initial Engagement*, which normally stimulates the interest in a question. Secondly, the *Immersion Stage* facilitates my familiarity with the question; in this way, I become aware to all the potentials of the experience (Moustakas, 1990).

The *Intuition Phase* initiates with the transition to stage three in the process, the *Incubation Stage*. Here I moved back from a concentrated contemplation of the question. The intention of retreat, according to Moustakas (1990), is to allow the inner workings of intuition to reach their full potential (what Husserl vaguely referred to as *categorical intuition*). This then allowed movement to the stage of *Illumination*, where the potentialities of the experience emerge.

The *Clarifying Phase* begins with the stage of *Explication*, where the various levels of meaning are presented to consciousness and can be formed into an awareness of feelings, thoughts, beliefs, and judgments. The sixth and final stage is the stage of *Creative Synthesis*, where the illumination of the question occurs as a personal subjective narrative (Moustakas, 1990).

Validity of Research

In most contexts, research is considered to be the analysis of the objective observable variable, its action, and its effect on some dependent quantifiable variable. Such research is certainly valuable, but its premise and practice, with its usual emphasis on the generation of statistically significant findings, can easily obscure the humanness of the experience. This thesis follows the rationalist and hermeneutical phenomenological method of knowing (rather than empiricism), looking for the nature of the personal experience of happiness. As Willig and Billin (2012) note:

> Hermeneutic phenomenology belongs to the interpretative strand of phenomenology. This means that as a method of qualitative data analysis it seeks to capture and portray the quality and texture of … experience and to explore its meanings and significance … All forms of interpretative phenomenology take the view that interpretation is both desirable and inevitable; desirable because it serves to amplify the meanings contained in accounts of experience, and inevitable because understanding of an account cannot take place without us making some preliminary assumptions about its meanings (p. 123).

This hermeneutically and existentially informed research project used the Moustakas Heuristic steps, which are structural and personal, bridging in between more mainstream experimental research and a pure Husserlian approach (though obviously much closer to Husserl). As such, the essences of happiness are sought out within myself, who has been living the problem. In the final analysis, then, as Moustakas (1990) points out, the validity of the findings of the heuristic problem solving process must be the determination of the researcher alone, in this case, me. That is, in the end, the following analysis is my experience and is true, at least for myself.

This allows the research to reach its interpretative function, for as Willig and Billin highlight (2012):

> The purpose of phenomenological inquiry is to make us "see" something in a manner that enriches our understanding of experience, not just cognitively but also emotionally … [This then has] implications for the experience of spirituality and meaning making (p. 124).

Nonetheless there will always be those that are concerned about the validity and reliability of psychological research. However the debate of how these principles apply to qualitative research in general is not clear; or even whether they can be applied. As Spencer and Ritchie (2012) highlight that the issue of validity and reliability in qualitative research is an ongoing debate; and that in practice we ought to view such things in broader and more flexible terms rather than apply prescriptive rules. Therefore it may be best to drop the terms of validity and reliability altogether for this type of research, or at least simply consider validity in terms of contribution and credibility.

Results

Within this section of the chapter, I went through the hermeneutical process using the heuristic steps, to expose the nature of my experience of happiness. The first step began with, what Heidegger called the essential first step of asking, clarifying, and understanding the question. This exploration involved my own personal engagement in the question while also reflecting upon the insights provided from history. The first cycle in this process was the time of reflection, where the question was clarified, as research is always a re-searching and an improvement of understanding. The second phase in this exploration process was that of incubation, where my own experiences and the wisdom shared by the great minds of existentialism and psychology are allowed to mature and organize apart from conscious awareness. Then comes the final phase, where what has been organized within the pre-reflective self is drawn forth and synthesized into a clear paradigm of my own happiness.

I began by reflecting on the fact that Heidegger made clear in his term *Dasein* that, in understanding a human's being, the person's concern, context, process, and

presence must remain undivided. The question, asked hermeneutically and phenomenologically, must begin with the nature of the question presenting itself to the investigator. As such, the following section is an account of my experience, highlighting the key points that mark the journey toward the final paradigm.

The opening stage within the Question Formation phase was the stage of *Initial Engagement*, which normally stimulates the interest in a question. For me, the initial engagement in the question came as I read the works of Heidegger while also struggling with the affective component of the nature of Being. At this time I had only a task before me—to answer a question—without knowing what that question was. In engaging this question I kept coming back to my own happiness, and I realized that I was happy in the midst of this rather frustrating intellectual exercise. This brought me to the first thoughts about what being happy really means and what it takes to be happy. A few of my journaling thoughts about happiness are rooted in the everyday:

> "Friends, and relaxing makes me happy."
>
> "Sunshine, hang out outside, when my team wins, small animals, friends, chilling, doing good at video games; that is where happiness is found."
>
> "What makes me happy is basically doing anything really. If there is nothing legitimately wrong with me I am legitimately happy … Now what do I mean by happy, are there different types of happiness? Not really for me, at least today … I don't really categorize it. Happiness is general contentment and feeling about oneself and things around me."

In first thinking about happiness, I was initially drawn by Heidegger's perspective that *Dasein* is the being in the world, the place of openness where beings reveal

themselves in innumerable ways, coming out of concealment for an instant, and then fading again into obscurity. Happiness, it seemed to me, was something like that, in that it is part of being in the world in a personal way. As such, Heidegger's perspective presented the possibility to think of happiness in a way that is not naturally available to me. For me, I tended to think of happiness as being something that I was dependent upon in a relationship or situation ("He/she makes me happy" we say in conversation); or when thinking of some past success I usually found myself smiling, a sign of happiness.

In keeping this in mind, I was initially drawn to the possibility of the experience of happiness being rooted in the everyday world and the manifold relations that emerge and disappear between people and things. In a sense, then, happiness appeared to be associated with a caring about what is happening and what will happen, giving it a temporal edge and leading me to a sense of hope and love as related to being happy. Happiness, in my experience, flowed from my myriad plans for the future, always ahead of itself. Happiness, came often when I was immersed in figuring out how to relate to those things over which I have no control. Within my journaling thoughts, I reflected upon the following:

> What makes me happy is … that at times I have been the happiest in my life … has been when I have been helping other people, people less fortunate than myself. I find that at times I have been the least happy are when I am self-absorbed and thinking only about my own life and problems needs, desires. It is strange because that is how a lot of people live their lives, pursuing happiness by buying things. I am happiest helping someone.
>
> I think there are different types of happiness …. There is elation … something like marriage or new friendship or relationship when you feel excited

> and motivated to do something new for a new season, that is a kind of happiness that wears off after a while when you get into the grind and groove, things get old. Like owning a new car is fun for a while, but after you still have to pay to have it fixed. There is a more permanent happiness that is described as peace. Peace with yourself, peace with the world, peace with society which is hard to achieve but if you can get yourself to a point where you are not cynical and naive all the time you are in a good place.

This initial interest in the question, especially as framed through the lens of Heidegger's *Dasein*, brought me to the *Immersion Stage,* where I began to develop a familiarity with the question; in this way, I slowly became somewhat aware of how vast and also how immanent that happiness is. In a sense, I wanted to approach happiness, not as bound or defined by a specific situation or relationship, but as a way of relating in the midst of the *thrownness* of the context of life.

Happiness, it became apparent to me, must therefore be seen within the notion of intentionality and contingency; that is, it is experienced when I project myself into the future and I am hopeful for (though perhaps not entirely certain of) a particular outcome. As my journaling thoughts express, "To pursue and complete a goal and the feeling of fulfilling it is a positive feeling and moves you towards happiness. It is more the working toward the goal that the happiness is really experienced." Happiness as an experience of intentionality must therefore come from somewhere, having a past and a context as well as a happiness experience in the present (always pre-reflective, though sometimes reflective). It is here that I began to see the dimensional shift of context to its greatest expanse (best expressed in theology) making it clear that faith is an integral ingredient of happiness. In essence, then, as I followed Heidegger's lead, I discovered that my being

happy emerges from a context caught in a caring, meaningful intentionality. In this, the experience of being happy, emerging into the present is an existential act, and its occurrence is pre-reflective. As my journaling thoughts express, "I think knowing that there is something there (like faith in God) pushing you on and taking care of you is an integral part of happiness, because you know that you are safe somewhere."

When I direct myself towards something and engage it, happiness does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated. Rather, my primary kind of *being happy* is such that it is always 'outside' alongside me and the entity I am engaging; being happy is an intermediary and arbitrator which I encounter and which belongs to a world already discovered. As my journaling thoughts express, "To be a success and reach a set goal … To feel successful in your pursuit and to feel comfortable and at peace with where you are at?" "There is the happiness of love or friends hanging out etc. … To be content in your surroundings and not require anything more."

When I am engaged in the world, for the care and wellbeing of something, I may be suffering at the moment but I always look back on that moment with a smile. This makes it clear that happiness surfaces in an engagement outside of the self in the care of something; in this, then, I see love as its essential feature. Of course, there is not any inner sphere abandoned when happiness dwells alongside the entity to be known. Happiness is a Being-outside alongside the object, yet also inside, pre-reflective, and only occasionally reflective (or conscious, if I decide to use Freudian language). Happiness is itself inside as a Being-in-the-world which knows and encounters the world. My journaling put it this way, "There is always an opportunity even in bad times, it may not the way you wanted to discover or find the good things, but you are still about to discover

something about life and that is a happy surprise in life." To this I reflect, that one of the hardest times of my life was when I suffered a season ending football injury that spurred me to make a desperate change in life. At the time I was miserable, but in reflecting back, due to the choices made that day I met amazing people that have blessed my life every day since.

The constituent parts and unified wholeness of *Dasein* did a great service to help me understand the question of happiness and reveal its intentional nature. It also helped to clarify why there is such a complex integration within ancient literature on the issue of happiness. For all of existence is tied together and happiness as an experience of intentionality is part of this whole, and this reveals part of the truth set out by Qoheleth. I was now beginning to see why Qoheleth is such a dark and pessimistic book even while it has the best advice on what it takes to experience the good life, the happy life.

Qoheleth speaks so often of death because death is the ultimate challenge of the good and happy life, for one must project oneself into it, the place of non-being by non-relating. Death, then, is a possibility of Being that *Dasein*, as we typically experience it, cannot surmount or fathom and as such struggles to relate with. One might say that Death is, as *Dasein's* end, in the Being of this entity towards its end. So it would seem, at a cursory glance, that death awareness and happiness cannot exist in the same person, as say so many ancient Greek writers.

However, such a conclusion is drawn from the viewpoint of Being with death as a barrier, a horizon, and not in some greater context of faith or belief. As Heidegger himself said, the reason why we must be a being toward death is because we are creatures of limited scope (Heidegger, 1962, p. 303): "Being-towards-death is grounded in care. Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, has in every case already been delivered over to

its death." As such, then, it can be rightly said that *Death frames Being*, distinguishing what it is from non-being (Krell, 2009). Yet Qoheleth points beyond our limited scope, to an additional hope in a being that is not limited. The phrase in chapter 12 of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes), "Remember God in the days of your youth" points to hope in a relationship of that which is defined as unbounded possibility. This then provides me with an avenue to continue to move forward towards my untransferable death, in love, living within a faith-expanded hope that gives me the capacity to move toward a horizon beyond the ridge of my limited existence, which is defined by death.

This then concluded the second stage of my first phase of heuristic research, as I was beginning to form how faith, hope, and love work together in intentionality to give rise to the being of my happiness.

The *Intuition Phase* commenced with the transition to stage three in the process, which is the *incubation* stage. Here I withdrew from conscious reflective deliberation on the subject for an incubation of the question. The intent of retreat, according to Moustakas (1990), is to allow the inner workings of intuition to reach their full potential. The *incubation* stage was unexpectedly strenuous for me, as it required the fortitude to be patient, with my practical side longing to push ahead with analysis.

The next stage was that of *illumination,* where the possibilities of the experience emerged from the ideas that arose within the incubation stage. Within this stage the themes of intentionality as faith, hope, and love came to the fore; yet it was of a level of clarity that incorporated my own theological, psychological, and philosophical training and insight.

The *Clarifying Phase* began with the stage of *explication*, the stage where the various levels of meaning are presented to consciousness and can be formed into an

awareness of feelings, thoughts, beliefs, and judgments. At this stage, the nature of intentionality in faith, hope, and love was made explicit. In seeking to make this notion plain, it became clear that faith is not a passive belief, but a way of engaging the context of my facticity.

The very intentionality of faith stresses my necessary involvement in the world; not in a pietistic way necessarily. Rather, simply that as a human being that desires to be authentically human, I cannot avoid involvement in the world. Yet, in my experience at least, a healthy Christian anthropology and theology of God is only found when one genuinely encounters the world (in contrast to the inward focused ascetic view of spirituality). It is a faith that Kierkegaard speaks of so clearly in his work *Fear and Trembling*, addressing the paradox of faith being here and other-worldly, living in the absurd. It is not an easy faith but a faith that takes a lifetime to perfect and is the highest of human achievements. Not that I claim I have such a mature faith, but I do see how it can help in this overall movement toward authenticity and deeper, fuller happiness.
I believe that faith is the highest form of being human, faith as intentionality then means a person is only a person who knows the world when in relationship. Hence, faith is expressed in love and forms the in-between sphere where genuine relationships develop in intimate, honest dialogue and care.

This notion is reminiscent of Kierkegaard, Frankl, and Buber, as the person over against you is encountered as a being who addresses you as a whole, calling you to participate in the being of the other. In this we have what Buber called the, *I-Thou*, where the Thou is the whole being of the other. It is the, *I* and the *Thou* creating a between, which is neither outside nor inside—this is the paradox of true faith (so says Kierkegaard)

and where God himself resides. It is not favoring the inner or the outer but the between. To create the situations under which a dialogic moment might occur, the *I* ought to attend to presence, create the space for the other to enter in, and become present. It is here, that I most clearly began to realize why I enjoy being a psychotherapist. Not in a sense of enjoying wading through the muck of a person's personal life, but in the sense of a deep happiness that is present in the room when I am fully present with another person. Of course, the difficult part of this relational dialogic nature of intentionality (especially in faith) is found in committing the self to the dialogic process, engaging with what takes place as opposed to attempting to control it.

As such, love in faith is the key to true relating. Here again, I was brought back to my professional choices of ministry and psychotherapy. For the most part, people do not know what I do, the pay is atrocious for the training required, so why do I do it? In part, I find it meaningful and happiness of a sort, accompanies it. It arises as a relation between I and Thou, and is not a relation of subject-to-object. Hence, it became clear to me that part of the role of love in my happiness is found in the intentionality and the care attitude I take to the other. In this I-Thou relationship, happiness is experienced in a pre-reflective manner, as I experience Thou in the other's unity of being. That is, I take it as a given that I am safe (on some level, mostly drawn from my faith in God), that I can engage, and that meanings can be discovered. In this then, happiness emerges from deep within layers of my own consciousness. Hence, I consider it pre-reflective. It is not something I think is necessarily making me happy at the time, but afterwards I reflect back on the experience, and smile. I think that is where love is so important.

Love exists in this as an intentionality of the I-Thou. It begins with God loving me, and in that safety I find the small nuggets of courage to engage a frightening world and frightening people, to attempt to help them put away despair. So, love is certainly important in the context of my happiness, in which subjects (me and the other) share this unity of being and it is within that harmony of being that happiness is pre-reflectively experienced. Love is also a relation in which I and Thou share a sense of caring, respect, commitment, and responsibility. In this there is not I taken within itself, so we must either exist in an I-It relationship or a I-Thou relationship. I believe it is love that defines the essential character of my ability to engage in the I-Thou relationship, and thereby move the process of engagement forward. It is therefore clear to me that love is intentional and relational, and that faith is a descriptor of the ultimate I-Thou relationship. Both of which are essential components of my context of happiness. But, as I see it, these are not necessarily the essences of my happiness.

What is evident to me within this, is that the way I relate defines me as a person, frames my being and my happiness, and is also something related to the eternal. So, in this way, faith is an integral part of my happiness experience. For God, too, is not out there or within creation but in the between space of relating, and it is there that I can encounter God. To nurture this I-Thou relationship with the eternal, with God, I must choose to be open to the idea of such a relationship, but not aggressively chase it as a finished goal. The pursuit of such a relation creates qualities associated with it and so would prevent an authentic relationship or context for happiness, limiting it to I-It. Yet, by being open to the I-Thou, God will eventually be revealed, and my own theological training extends this to say that God is already present in our very being of openness, the

one making it possible. This gives light to something of happiness, for it would appear that it, too, is something that must not be pursued, but that which we ought to be open to.

Within all of this is the question of death, and how I can experience happiness in view of my mortality, on this there was the issue of both death of a loved one, and my own death. In both contexts I believe the key to happiness in the face of death was expressed as the *I-Thou* relationship being the key, with faith the lynch-pin.

As I showed previously in the discussion of Qoheleth, hope springs from faith (specifically faith in God and the faithfulness of a loving God); faith, too, is part of the intentionality of the whole experience of the eternal I-Thou relationship between the self and God. If I am honest, God is a universal relation which is the foundation for all other forms of my happiness. If I have a real I-Thou relation with God, then I will have a real I-Thou relation with the world. Now, here I am speaking in ideal terms, recognizing of course that I will never reach this ideal on my own.

So faith is both context and relationship— hope gives courage (in spite of death) in the relationship, and love gives the direction to (and is of) the relationship of positive intentionality in the world. All of this allows for the occurrence of happiness in these relationships, where happiness is experienced pre-reflectively. The conscious reflective experience of happiness, therefore, is experienced only upon reflection of one's state in the midst of the intentionality of life. In this way it is right to say that I am happy before I am ever aware, on the reflective level, that I am being happy.

To further clarify this, I must be mindful of the active intentionality of caring for something or someone, which is essentially the intentionality of love. As such, my happiness comes within the bodily experience when love is experienced personally, for it is something that is never given to an outside observer but arises through an empathic

intentional process of engagement. I see this notion as reflective of Scheler's theory of inter-subjectivity. However, there are a number of constituent parts that make up this whole of my happiness: for example, the constitution of this empathy. The role of inter-subjectivity must begin with *fellow-feeling,* for I would undermine my own existence if I lived strictly within a system of formalized values. Rather, the fluidity of love, empathy, and benevolence are required, guided by a concern for relationship. Hence, value (and by implication, morality itself) is found in fellow-feeling, which reveals the fact that emotional intentionality has positive ethical value. To do what is good, then, is to experience happiness, for as Qoheleth suggested, this is the whole duty of man. In all of this I can see that my happiness is very much an integrated Dasein experience and that happiness exists within true relationship, for a sorrow shared is a sorrow halved; a joy shared is a joy doubled. To put it another way, I cannot be truly, fully, and completely happy, or fully human, until I love intentionally and live within love.

With the explication complete, it was time to proceed to the sixth and final stage of heuristic analysis: *creative synthesis*. At this point, I drew upon the full heuristic process to organize an understanding of the issue into a full interpretive narrative (Moustakas, 1990). It must be noted that this is my own creative synthesis of the essences that the phenomenological process presented to my consciousness, though I will certainly use outside sources as I see fit. To put it simply, I see happiness as intentionality plus positive meaning equaling happiness. The sum of this entire project then can be expressed as a simple mathematical formula of my happiness: I+M=H.

Happiness, as I see it and experience it, seems to swirl around the truth of intentionality of being and specifically around the intentionality of love (as Frankl

seemed to define it). It is in the intentionality of love that I have a hand in creating happiness. I cannot control happiness, but the love is part of the positive meaning I am able to bring to my being in the world. This gives the meaning that is unconcealed through my intentionality with the world, at least a hint of positivity. It seems to be then, happiness cannot be the goal, but only a byproduct. In my experience happiness is the very paradigm of human self-transcendence. It is an intentionality that forms a key aspect of the experience of being human, and it appears essential for me being happy. I think this may be universal, for happiness is intentional because people are aware only when it is an awareness of something. Hence, I/ we not only become happy through this, but it is also the means to our awareness of the experience of being happy.

If I could bring in a flashbulb memory for a moment, this reminds me of a conversation I had with an Oxford Professor of psychiatry who was doing research on SSRI's. Her research focused on the fact that when SSRI's were given, tiny changes could be observed in the pre-reflective interpretation of participants. A small reduction of danger and distance was presumably made, resulting in a shift towards positive intentionality within the mind. Based upon this research, it would seem that successful pharmacological treatment of depression and anxiety are in lines with what I am speaking of in terms of the pre-reflective intentional and positive meaning nature of happiness. At any rate, it is clear to me that the two models connect together logically.

Getting back to my essences of happiness, this intentionality that I see as an essence, hold love and hope as inextricably linked into a oneness of the positivity of intentionality and meaning. What I am conscious of, or what I intend, is always something that is an object of intention. Further, faith is tied into this oneness by me

looking outside myself for values and meanings to discover, and this provides context of understanding and purpose to my life. As Frankl (1975) notes in *The Unconscious God*, this is most certainly true "Faith, hope, and love … are … intentional acts … directed to intentional referents" (p. 14). Hence, I see faith, hope, and love as clarification of the formula of I+M = H. They are the positivity that adds a double-meaning to the plus sign in the formula.

In this oneness of faith, hope, and love it is clear that happiness is a subjective and pre-reflective experience that grows out of love towards the object/subject of my intentionality. This love is not an ownership, but an encountering of the other, keeping the other as the object of the intentionality. To make love the object itself is to not act with love as intentionality, for it would devolve from an intentional act of love into manipulation. This also points out that happiness is intentional, for to be merely subjective is to be swept away by Freudian drives, whereas a loving intentionality is guided by the well-being of the other.

If I may now shift to speak in more generalizable terms, it is my hope is that you can resonate with my experience of happiness, and the essence of happiness in its expression of I+M=H. I will assume that this is true. I would therefore like to explore some universal implications of this formula.

One thing that seems clear is that this intentionality rises from our very being as physical bodies, and it is in this interaction with our bodies that happiness forms. It is therefore helpful to engage in an existential analysis of the body, for it is at the level of the bodily intentional engagement with the world that meanings and our very being is found. According to an existential (in line with Sartre) understanding of the body, it is a very complex interplay of being as for-itself, for-others, and also in-itself, all

simultaneously totally consciousness and body, for the two cannot be separated. Yet there is an order within the body as being-for-itself and being-for-others. First, there is the body as our past, and secondly, our attempts to objectify the other, which inevitably leads to objectification of ourselves. Hence, the body is ontologically a being-for-others while also a being-for-itself (and an object of knowledge for ourselves and others) (Sartre, 1992). As such, it makes sense, that happiness is, in a sense, a state of being we were created to *be* within.

The body-for-itself is the concrete source of our intentionality, the point of reference and origin of meaning I must be engaged in, defining our state of being. This forms our facticity as a perspective, a history and a context. The world arises for me in a particular way because the body-for-me is my immediate past, from which my concrete possibilities arise; it is the body, then, that distinguishes my day-dreams from my concrete possibilities and ever-present choices. So too then, it is my body that makes faith in something beyond me a requirement of my authentic being. The body is my primary facticity and therefore my primary way of being my contingency-necessity. It is the very way I *exist* and *be*, being as bodily intentionality then is the foundation of my own being, for I never truly apprehend the primary contingency of the body in its brute form. Indeed, my body, as my very finitude, means that I must always be in some particular way of being, and I am not able to choose my being "all at once" because of my facticity (Catalano, 1980). As such, caring engagement is required to experience the state of being happy. I cannot be happy by simply conjuring it up in my head. There is bodily engagement required—a pre-reflective enacting of love or being loved that is essential to happiness—yet it is only upon reflection that I am surprised by the truth that I am actually being happy.

To restate it differently, this happiness comes about through the apprehension of the world, being in the world, and engaging in the care of the world. Our apprehension and engagement is through the body, largely pre-reflective as it surpasses itself toward the future. It is both an object and an active being, looking to fulfill a myriad of potentials, essentially of changing its current facticity in some way, in a sense living towards something hoped for. Thus the body is, in this pre-reflective cogito of possibility, the context for all, and it is best described as existing by engaging (Catalano, 1980).

The body is essential in happiness because it is also a being-for-others, related to the other by an internal mutual relation that enables me to know myself (in a limited way). Yet the concrete body of the other is not my primary manifestation of the other, for it is through the interplay of the self and other as both object and subject that the other's existence is revealed to me. The other's body, then, is the other's past and becomes the facticity of the other's transcendence, with the other projecting the other's contingencies and own future attempts to fulfill new concrete facticities. Yet my knowledge of this is only a limited probability, because I project his/her body (in terms of the objective future of the world) in terms of my own future. The other's body is therefore meaningful as a being for the other (Sartre, 1992). To love the other, therefore, in a sense adds something to my own existence as my relationship with the other creates something of me in the present. This adds another layer to the depth of my experience of happiness as it is known reflectively.

There is also my body as being-known-by-the-other, so happiness can be experienced by also being the object of someone else's love. In the first dimension our bodies exist as facticity, in the second dimension we use body as object and subject, and in the third ontological dimension we exist as being known by others. As such, even

being the recipient of the love of another contributes something to our existence and meaning, and happiness can well up from this. Since consciousness is primarily being-for-itself and the body is the way that consciousness exists, it is therefore in the in-between space of relating that we become aware that we have an outer self. From this then we can discover that this is different from being-for-itself, which is the inner-self. Yet the lack of fullness of knowledge of the other of the self means that outward does fail in some way, and our own outwardness escapes us to some extent. This forms something of our being as humans and reminds me that I am limited.

Thus, in the end love is being as it was meant to be: active care for the existence of another. As being-for-itself fails in fullness, by contrast, love is the direction that aims at the ideal, overcoming this failure, and thereby makes existence significant and meaningful. In love, therefore, the self seeks to gain a full acknowledgement of my facticity and being (as by God) as I was meant to be. So it may even be said that faith and hope are essential components of love.

Again, it is clear that love as an object, just as happiness as an object, is self-defeating because intentionality defines happiness. This differentiates happiness as an experience of intentional love from that of happiness or love as a goal. Just as someone cannot grasp faith, hope, or love by going after them as a goal, so, too, happiness cannot be grasped as an object to have but is received through the confluence of intentionality of all three key ingredients. Happiness, then, is the living of the experience of the self for the wellbeing and service of the other. By forgetting the self, the lover enters a spiritual realm of faith and hope, and happiness is the most natural of by-products because this is how we are fully human.

Within my journaling, this combination was often expressed as being in the experience of faith as bringing a context for happiness, through being the object of divine love:

> "Sometimes we take God's love for granted. But when we are sad, we can be reminded of God's love and that picks me up."
>
> "In everyday life that is deep idea, that I am loved. I would need to stop and think on how I feel and it would help me direct my thoughts to happiness because of it but it would take effort."
>
> Ultimately, because there have been times when I have tried to do it on my own in my own way and I fail. Therefore I get down on myself because I feel like I have failed God and I can lose my self-image and have major self-image issues thinking that I was a piece of dirt. It came out of my mouth so often. Knowing that God loves me not on the basis of my obedience frees me so that because Jesus was somebody … as a Christian I am free to be nobody and still be of value. From a guy I heard once, the only people that get better are the ones who realize that their right standing with God does not rely on them getting better. It is a wonderful paradox that is the key to happiness. That the only way is that we don't have to be perfect for God to love us, and while as he loves us he can begin to perfect us. To me that is ultimately freeing and to know when I have failed I am free to come back to him. It does mean there won't be discipline but always with love as a motivation and restoration as the ultimate goal.

This means, therefore, that happiness is neither bound nor necessarily defined by some external context but may exist in even the most difficult of contexts. We see this as faith moves one beyond the limits of the situation and hope makes that limitless

possibility of life and harmony one's own. Love then activates the intentionality of experience, and happiness dwells in this in-between space, not drawn from within the person or from the context. This has profound implications for a person being able to experience happiness and suffering simultaneously, not in a pathological but a positive way.

Of course, happiness in suffering means that happiness looks very different as the hue of that in-between space of intentionality changes, but it is, nevertheless, happiness experienced. One can imagine, for example, that pain may be a sign of something of the context not being what it ought to be. The attitude of hope, strengthened by faith and enacted by love in this context, means that happiness is experienced in the attitude that one takes toward the suffering.

This then ties in with passion and shows us that happiness can surely be experienced in purposeful suffering. In contrast to the purposeless suffering described by Freud, where we suffer from a drive of will to pleasure (as suffering from love), we can engage in suffering willingly. We may, for the sake of some cause or loved one, endure suffering in an intentional act of care and love, as Frankl suggests. This means that we may approach any context and be able to experience happiness.

It is here that I wish to re-statement my belief about happiness and then to move on to what I see as the best narrative of happiness, not in my own words but in those of others. My statement of happiness is: Happy are those living out their faith, hope, and love as a life of caring intentionality in positive meaning; that is, intentionality plus meaning equals happiness (I+M = H). This then brings me to what I have only recently discovered to be the most profound and joy-filled teaching in the history of humanity (in so far as it relates to my own first-person experience of happiness): the Beatitudes of

Jesus. In clarifying the principles found within the beatitudes I hope to make it clear how the ingredients of love, hope, and faith work together within my being to make happiness possible.

We can see at the very outset of the Beatitudes recorded in the Gospel of Matthew 5:1–12 that there is a great importance to be placed upon them. I believe that it is more than coincidental that there is a reference to the mountain setting, as this is a scene psychologically connected with Old Testament revelation moments (Moriah, Horeb/Sinai, and Zion, to name just a few). It is here that Jesus began to teach the people, and it is here that I believe we have the best expression of happiness.

"Happy are the poor in spirit" is how Jesus begins, using the Greek root word *Makar* to highlight the happiness condition that the individual is experiencing. It is interesting to note that it is the very being of the person that is happy, as the term *Makarios* is referring to the person rather than an emotion or condition. It is not the situation that is blessed or happy but the being of the person is experiencing happiness, despite the condition of the context. According to this first statement of Jesus, even the poor, the beggar, and the oppressed are able to experience this being of happiness, suggesting that it is something that surpasses superficial context and feelings.

"Happy are those who mourn" builds upon this initial idea of happiness, as the Greek term *Penthountes* is derived from those that are sad because of some great loss or as a result of being deeply wronged. When one looks closer, one sees that there is implicit within this a sense of hope, even in the midst of the deepest of lamentations and a grief that cannot be contained. The hope comes from the source that Qoheleth claims is the ultimate hope in the midst of the many wrongs that we experience in life—God. Here the phrase "they shall be comforted" is derived from the word that is typically associated

with Holy Spirit theology, the Comforter, the *Paraclete*. In this, then, it becomes clear that the happiness does not flow from the mourning for being wronged but from the future comfort that is promised to those who suffer from current sorrow. It is happiness, even in spite of the wrongs experienced, because hope is ever-present.

"Happy are the meek" is a concept that again requires some reflection to understand. This essentially Greek concept of meekness makes for a slightly different meaning than the previous verse. The reference is to living out an attitude, virtue, or stance toward a circumstance. In the face of a condition of powerlessness there is the ability to hope for something better. Very much like the previous statement, this verse suggests that the situation will be changed and that its change is certain. The hope can be found, and the reward will be a tangible one—inheriting the earth—denoting power and ownership (the opposite of the current condition of powerlessness).

"Happy are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness" logically follows the verse about taking a proper attitude in the context of suffering. Here happiness is seen to spring directly from the direction one takes in one's intentional efforts. At the very core of one's being is hunger and thirst, and in this context it is active seeking of what is good and right and supportive of life. This can be restated fairly easily as an active type of love that is intentionally enacted as regularly and insistently as are the bodily functions of hunger pangs and thirst. It is a desire that, in this life, will never be fully satisfied; so again there is the direction towards a hope, undoubtedly an eschatological hope. Here in the Beatitudes, the description is not only of this intention being satisfied eschatologically but also an imagery of being gorged, stuffed full in the new kingdom.

"Happy are the merciful" is a clear step up from the previous verse, for it builds upon the teaching of the minor prophet Hosea (6:6), where mercy is an intentional act of

love and a central responsibility of those who follow God. It is important here to note that this is not in reference to an attitude or an intellectual assent but must be (according to rabbinic tradition) something that is active and concrete. This act ties back very clearly to the eschatological hope that God's actions will be merciful, and therein happiness is a possibility.

"Happy are the pure in heart" comes to the very core of the being of the person. A person who is focused on merciful acts and loving attitudes for others is upon a path that sets one up for happiness. Purity of heart means not just an inner disposition that brings forth external appearances (as opposed to one who is concerned only with the external visible actions). The very motivation is one of the welfare, care, love, and promoting the wellbeing of the other, with no concern for one's personal rewards and happiness. Losing the self in the love for the service of something or someone other than the self is a way of life from which happiness erupts spontaneously. This is expressed as knowing God and being known by God, seeing God and being seen by God—truly the ultimate I-Thou relationship.

"Happy are the peacemakers" follows as a natural extension of pure in heart, where the smallest deeds of love and mercy are given equal status with the mighty deeds of the highest political leaders. Given the admonition to love the enemy, the idea of making peace is something that is to be extended to the farthest reaches of human relationships. It is a call to be an active agent of peace, helping everything to be in its divine order, doing what it was meant to do for the good of all. Hope again exposes itself within this call to be sons of God, linking the act of love with an eschatological hope in something that God assures us to be true.

"Happy are the persecuted" makes this eschatological hope as explicit as possible, when it promises the *kingdom of the heavens*. The implication of this saying harkens back to the previous sayings of hungering and thirsting for righteousness. The idea here is to take the stance of an attitude of perseverance that is carried by the eschatological hope. Within this, the word "falsely" affirms that we cannot dismiss this persecution as some punishment for wrong-doing. Finally, the phrase "for my sake" ties this whole experience to hope in the bodily resurrection of the Christ, the assurance of the first fruits of an eschatological promise that allows our Dasein a possibility beyond death.

So we see that within the Beatitudes we have a clear expression of what the experience of happiness truly is: an experience that arises out of the intentional living out of love in the context of faith, bolstered by hope. Therefore, I believe that the most perfect statement possible of what true happiness actually is can be seen clearly in Young's Literal Translation of this ancient teaching:

> And having seen the multitudes, he went up to the mount, and he having sat down, his disciples came to him, and having opened his mouth, he was teaching them, saying:
>
> Happy the poor in spirit—because theirs is the reign of the heavens.
>
> Happy the mourning—because they shall be comforted.
>
> Happy the meek—because they shall inherit the land.
>
> Happy those hungering and thirsting for righteousness—because they shall be filled.
>
> Happy the kind—because they shall find kindness.
>
> Happy the clean in heart—because they shall see God.
>
> Happy the peacemakers—because they shall be called Sons of God.

> Happy those persecuted for righteousness' sake—because theirs is the reign of the heavens.
>
> Happy are ye whenever they may reproach you, and may persecute you, and may say any evil thing against you falsely for my sake.

Here is the secret that Jesus lays out, which I believe is the key to happiness (and Frankl affirms this): these people are not looking for happiness. They are too busy helping people, comforting people, loving people, living out the love that God has for the world. It is in that losing themselves that the luck, the blessedness, the happiness, comes. They may be poor in spirit, mourning, spending themselves being peace-makers, or being treated unfairly, but it is then that happiness happens. The very intentional nature of happiness means that it cannot be pursued or captured—it must ensue from engagement with the world. It is to be found in love and in hope. Now, of course, Jesus is also referring to the ultimate happiness to be found when God's love is fulfilled, but even here and now, this is how happiness happens. For the eschatological hope takes away the sting of death, that great barrier to the happiness of so many, both ancient and modern.

In the end, then, happiness, like life, is a poetic experience, and so I believe that it is best expressed as poetry (as Camus, 1991, noted in the *Myth of Sisyphus* about all knowledge). Within this, I have chosen what I believe is an excellent expression of my experience of happiness, where happiness is something found in-between the lines of life, with faith, hope, and love working out in the structure intentionality and meaning. It is best expressed by Karl Johann Philip Spitta's poem *O Happy House* (Bryant, 1968, p. 363):

> O happy house! Where thou art loved the best,
>
> Dear Friend and Saviour of our race,

Where never comes such welcome, honored Guest,

Where none can ever fill thy place;

Where every heart goes forth to meet thee,

Where every ear attends thy word,

Where every lip with blessing greets thee,

Where all are waiting on their Lord.

O happy house! Where man and wife in heart

In faith, and hope are one,

That neither life nor death can ever part

The holy union here begun;

Where both are sharing one salvation,

And live before thee, Lord, always,

In gladness or in tribulation,

In happy or in evil days.

O happy house! Whose little ones are given

Early to thee, in faith and prayer, -

To thee, their Friend, who from the heights of heaven

Guards them with more than mother's care.

O happy house! Where little voices

Their glad hosannas love to raise,

And childhood's lisping tongue rejoices

To bring new songs of love and praise.

O happy house! And happy servitude!

Where all alike one Master own;

Where daily duty, in thy strength pursued,

Is never hard nor toilsome known;

Where each one serves thee, meek and lowly,

Whatever thine appointment be,

Till common tasks seem great and holy,

When they are done as unto thee.

O happy house! Where thou art not forgot

When joy is flowing full and free;

O happy house! Where every wound is brought,

Physician, Comforter, to thee.

Until at last, earth's day's work ended,

All meet thee at that home above,

From whence thou camest, where thou hast ascended,

Thy heaven of glory and of love!

Summary

My exploration into the nature of my happiness clearly exposes the key existential structure to be intentionality plus meaning, with the key ingredients of faith, hope, and love fused together a positive intentionality of an engaged life. In this I believe that it is reflective of the mind of Frankl and his understanding of happiness and human existence. This means that a healthy existence, so far as it has not been irrationally distorted, is always directed to something or someone other than itself, be it a meaning to fulfill or another human being to encounter lovingly. Frankl termed this way of human existence as self-transcendence, and its byproduct is happiness.

It has become clear that we must forget the self in order to find the happiness of the self. The more we forget the self, giving the self to a cause or another person, the more human, happy, and satisfied we are. The more we are immersed and absorbed in something or someone other than the self, the more we really become who we were meant to be, and therein we experience happiness. By way of analogy, one has only to look at an athlete who, absorbed in the game itself and thereby forgetting the self, experiences happiness. Equally, by virtue of the self-transcendent quality of the human reality, the happiness of a person is most tangible when one forgets about oneself in service, being concerned for the other in love.

In this view we see that the mature individual moves on a human level that is a confluence of faith, hope, and love, at least that is true for me. The human level precludes the mere use of others. On the human level, one person does not use the other to seek happiness but encounters the other in his/her wholeness and internal value, and thereby happiness comes passively and secondarily. Much like Martin Buber's I-Thou relationship, where the one recognizes the full humanness of the other. Then happiness comes, following behind what can only be described as a living love. As we have seen, this truth is expressed in the teachings of the Beatitudes, the highest expression of the intentionality of happiness itself. As intentionality is our being, being happy is intentionality plus meaning.

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

In this chapter I present a discussion of the findings as well as some possible conclusions and implications for this study. What has become clear is that the existential perspective does have a lot to contribute to the understanding of happiness. It is also clear that the entire approach of naturalism and reductionism are counter to understanding the nature of this most affective of experiences, lending credence to the existential notion of complexity and wholeness in understanding human experience.

Discussion

To understand happiness it is best to move beyond the reductionism of Freud and embrace the *Dasein* of Heidegger. We can understand that such human experiences cannot be reduced to a simple drive, nor can they be broken down into a *nothing but* statement. The *Dasein* reminds us that sometimes in order to understand something we must look at the whole being of a person and the phenomenon of the experience. Just as *Dasein* is relational, so is happiness, for there is a relational bearing in the world which structures the various modalities that form the mixture of the key ingredients of happiness.

What this personal hermeneutical inquiry brings to light is something to which various ancient writers through the millennia have hinted: that happiness is a complex, whole phenomenon that interacts with all of existence. Within this we see that happiness is a spontaneous state of being that occurs in the dynamically oriented concern for

another. It is an openness and orientation toward possibilities. It is a full *weltanschauung* where you are free to abide in the presence of, and care for the wellness of, another. It can be said, then, that happiness is, in some fashion, love.

Yet this is not all that this exploration has revealed, for happiness has an intentional and temporal aspect to it as well. It organizes itself in an existential time and with a unique frame of reference. It has a special kind of intentionality that leads it to run ahead of itself into its future. The present is not a separate period of time but is constituted by the future and the past mixed together in a unified whole. The key is that the future holds within it something better than the present state or that it points to a wholeness that is presently lacking in one's life. It is a circle of hoping for what is beyond, trusting in the absurdity of true faith, and still living in the here and now. This wholeness allows the person to be not only in the present but also psychologically existing in the future, interacting with all times of past, present, and future simultaneously in order to make meaning of the current circumstances. This is the authentic temporal self that is part of the *Dasein* experience and is something that allows for the eruption of the being of happiness. Happiness, then, is to some extent, hope.

Finally, for me at least, this existential temporality stands over and beyond standards of the present and its limitations. For me happiness is best experienced in a spiritual, personal unified temporality, where love seems eternal. I can then imagine that love is eternal in a way that is beyond my comprehension. The truth of this expansive unity calls for symbols like heaven and God in order for me to have something intentional to move towards, for the truly infinite is too large to grasp. It is here, in the company of hope and love; that God brings a special presence that connects with eternity.

No longer am I detached from others —lost, afraid, hurting, and alone. My experience of happiness is within a transcendent presence that is sharing in the hurting and suffering of others, yet surpasses all of it. It is what Kierkegaard referred to as the paradox of God: the eternal God in my presence, a God-with-us moment that forms and binds together my whole being. Happiness, then, for me is coexistent with faith - partially a faith of my belief, but more so the faithfulness of God in my existence.

With this understanding it is important to suggest some practical approaches that might aid in the nurturing of happiness. We have already seen that it is something that is complex, and something that arises indirectly and not from seeking happiness itself. What is needed is ways to engage the pre-reflective portion of consciousness from which happiness seems to swell up spontaneously. Within this we may be able to actively engage the components that bring about wellness, hardiness, and happiness.

Subliminal Existential Therapy

A creative way of approaching the issue of client happiness and incorporating it into therapy is through the use of the specific hypnotherapeutic technique of Subliminal Therapy (with an existential twist). Like any hypnotherapy, it is important to educate the client a little about the true nature of hypnosis; that a hypnotic trance is in fact a natural state and that the client is always in control. Once that is done, there are a few basic assumptions that must be clarified as to how subliminal existential therapy is different from other hypnotherapies.

To begin it is important to recognize that subliminal therapy accepts certain assumptions about how the psychic structure of the client works. The first is that we have

conscious or reflective awareness of only a very small part of our total mental functioning. Most of our mental capacity, as well as our mental functioning takes place in the pre-reflective or unconscious realm of the mind. In addition, this pre-reflective intelligence is something that we tend not to recognize as being us, though it truly is (Yager, 2011).

Subliminal Therapy also asserts that this pre-conscious portion is not a unified whole, but rather fragmented into a great many parts. Each part is primarily concerned with its own responsibilities and so has limited awareness of what is going on in the external world, except how it simplistically interprets the situation. It is important to be mindful that these pre-reflective parts are shaped by experiences and are working in the interest of helping and supporting the person, even though their adaptive behaviors may be overall detrimental. In other words, the pre-reflective has good intentions to care for the individual.

Another key assumption is that we as individuals only have the power to influence, rather than command, the pre-conscious parts in specifically desired ways. This, according to Yager (2011) is done by first recognizing their existence, with the help of the therapist establishing communication with the pre-reflective, and finally educating the pre-reflective about current realities, needs, and values thereby persuading the pre-reflective self to respond in more effective ways.

As Yager (2011) describes Subliminal Therapy, the therapist persuades patients to allow their pre-reflective (or unconscious if you prefer Freudian language) minds to work in a logical, sequential process, through the guidance of the therapist and self-guided by the client. Yager suggests that this can be done by first establishing communication with

the pre-reflective through a simple means looking for simple answers (as the pre-reflective is only capable of simplistic responses). For the sake of our discussion I will use the term, "Pre-client" to refer to this pre-reflective portion of the psyche treating it as an individual that communicates with the many parts of the pre-reflective consciousness.

One way that Yager suggests that we can communicate with the pre-reflective consciousness is by having the client to imagine a chalkboard (if it is an older client) or a computer screen (if it is a younger client). The pre-client is then asked to write on this board to communicate with the client. Within the client's imagination then the client communicates with the pre-client and communicates the answers to the therapist (Yager, 2011):

> Once the therapist has instructed the patient as to his or her role during the procedure of ST, the therapist guides the patient to begin direct, purposeful interactions with Centrum [the pre-client]. Having the goal(s) to be addressed, and having established communication with Centrum [Yager's name for the pre-client], the sequence of questions and requests to Centrum follows a logical, decision-tree format (p. 23).

To an uninformed observer the technique here seems strange as the therapist appears to be talking to a different individual; yet the patient understands, appreciates, and easily accommodates this new format and will often fall into a hypnotic trance (hence Subliminal Therapy's categorization under the umbrella of hypnotherapy). The practice of this type of therapy then formally begins with the therapist posing questions in a direct, concrete, and simple format. Consistently prefacing each question with the name given to the client's pre-reflective consciousness; in this case "Pre-client".

You can then ask the pre-client simple questions like, “Pre-client, do you believe you understand why you felt so depressed?” To these questions the answer is usually a “yes” or “no”; Yager notes that pre-client responses that come from conscious opinion are generally lengthy and elaborate, whereas pre-client responses are simple. As such it is essential for the client to only report the words that appear on the chalk-board, so that the therapist can communicate with the pre-client:

> Fortunately, most responses of conscious opinion are easily detected. If the response is “It says …,” or “There’s a Yes and a No,” the answer is surely from Centrum [the pre-client]. On the other hand, if the response is “I think so” or is more than a few words in length, odds are it is not (Yager, 2011, p. 25).

A typical therapy session may look something like this, with the therapist posing a question, “Pre-client, are you aware of your conscious concern about this problem?” If the answer is, “No”, after requesting the Pre-client to listen, ask the patient to verbalize the concern. This is repeated until the Pre-client answers with a, “Yes”. Then the conversation can continue, “Pre-client, are you willing to cooperate, to do some work as I guide you and teach you how, to eliminate this problem?” Again, work with the Pre-client until Pre-client answers with a, “Yes”. “Pre-client, do you have the ability to look at memories of events that have happened in the past?” “Pre-client, do you have the ability to communicate with other parts of the mind?”(Yager, 2011).

From this point, the therapist would explore the issue that seems to be disturbing the client’s happiness. Within this rubric and the basics of this project some various issues that can be addressed are, fear of death, fear of isolation, fear of rejection, sources of anxiety, reasons why the person withdraws from engagement. It would also be

educating the Pre-client in matters of love, faith, hope, intentionality, and meaning. The client would be essential in this, with the therapist as the guide, the client sharing his/her understanding and logical beliefs with the Pre-client. While it seems like an unusual technique it is, as one can readily see, a creative way of dealing with the whole client, not just the reflective parts of the self. As such, one can use this approach, in addition to traditional behavioral analysis of existence and the clarification of sedimented meanings within the pre-reflective self. What is clear is that the client's happiness is not to be the ultimate goal, but rather being and existing in a meaningful, engaging way. Once this is achieved the happiness does appear to present itself.

Narrative Existential Therapy

The prominent existential psychotherapist Ernesto Spinelli has a wonderful term he uses for his existential therapy model, "Worlding". By this Spinelli means that we exist in an intentional, dynamic, and ever-changing experience of lived out meaning. This term is important because it helps us to distinguish the act of living as a meaning-making process, from the cognitive reflection of this meaning, what we typically call a "Worldview." The worldview is a static artificial structure that we create based upon our reflection and only an incomplete shadow of the comprehensive *worlding* that we experience within existence. This is important to recognize because, according to Spinelli (2007), "Ultimately, existential psychotherapy seeks to allow clients the means to diminish the gap or dissonance between their maintained worldview and their experience of worlding (p. 87).

Spinelli (2007) outlines three phases of existential psychotherapy, with the first phase being the co-creation of a *therapy world*. This therapy world permits an inter-

relational condition where therapist and client can interact, so that the therapist can assist the client to honestly describe experiences and explicate tensions:

> Phase one of existential psychotherapy is most clearly identified with the co-creation between client and therapist of an experientially accessible and partially communicable therapy world. This therapy world provides the boundaries and rules through which a novel, if temporary, worldview emerges for the client which can be examined, compared to and contrasted with the client's wider world worldview … Thus, two people agree to investigate the worldview adopted by one of them (p. 99).

The second phase of therapy is a fuller exploration of this therapy world. This will inevitably require in-depth descriptions of experiences, and intense investigation of dispositional stances that maintain the client's worldview. This will naturally bring out tensions that exist within the client, and these are clarified and worked out within the therapeutic relationship. A key part of this phase, is what Spinelli calls, *Un-knowing*, where the uncertainties and implicit hidden tensions within the client's worldview are explored. Within this phase the otherness of the therapist provides an intimate companion to stand beside the client in this exploration process (Spinelli, 2007).

I believe this structural approach to existential psychotherapy serves the cause of happiness well. It begins with an I-Focus, then You-Focus and the We-Focused ways of being as client and therapist explore these constructed worlds (which make up the first few phases). It is my view that this relational nature of each phase, along with the worldview exploration makes the perfect context for exploring issues of intentionality

and meaning, faith, hope, and love. What is particularly good about Spinelli's structural approach is the final focus phase: They-Focused (Spinelli, 2007).

This brings us to the third phase which looks at not simply describing, but rephrasing and reworking some alternative stances within the client's wider world view. This is where the They-Focused portion becomes really important. This stage in essence bridges the therapy world and the client's wider world, where the therapy world reduces as the wider world view changes (Spinelli, 2007):

> In general, the They-focused realm of encounter concerns itself with the client's experience of how those who make up his or her wider world of "others" (extending beyond the other who is the existential psychotherapist) experience theor own inter-relational realms in response to the client's way of relating to them. They-focused inquiry challenges the client to consider the various facets of relatedness between the client and these others as the client imagines *they* experience and interpret them. Further, They-focused inquiry challenges the client to consider the impact of his or her inter-relational stance toward others in terms of its impact upon the inter-relations between one other or a group of others and a different other or group of others (p. 180).

This They-Focused realm of encounter serves to acknowledge the presence of others and the importance of others, while also supporting the significance of the client. This significance assists the client to re-interpret and re-engage in living within his/her wider worldview and worlding with a more meaningful and intentionally loving focus. This coupled by the explicit stance of the therapist to punctuate the relatedness dimension of worlding reinforces the importance of caring engagement within the client's existence.

In essence, this helps the client to not only evaluate and gain will-power through the recognition of his/her choices, it helps the client to move toward self-transcendence. All of this provides the place where the experience of happiness can start to take hold within the worlding of the client. Of course one cannot rightly speak of self transcendence and happiness without giving due thought to Viktor Frankl, whom will provide the conclusion to our discussion.

Logotherapy

We have discussed Viktor Frankl and his approaches to psychotherapy at great length within this project. It is now important, as we near the conclusion of this thesis, to give Frankl himself a word about happiness, and the role of living within meaning:

> The truth is that as the struggle for survival has subsided, the question has emerged: survival for what? Ever more people today have the means to live, but no meaning to live for.
>
> On the other hand, we see people being happy under adverse, even dire, conditions. Let me quote from a letter I received from Cleve W., who wrote it when he was Number 049246 in an American state prison: "Here in prison … there are more and more blissful opportunities to serve and grow. I'm really happier now than I've ever been." Notice: happier than ever – in prison!
>
> Or let me take up a letter that I recently received from a Danish family doctor: "For half a year my very dear father was seriously ill with cancer. The last three months of his life he lived in my house – looked after by my beloved wife and myself. What I really want to tell you is that those three months were the most blessed time in the lives of my wife and me. Being a doctor and a nurse, of

> course, we had the resources to cope with everything, but I shall never in my life forget all the evenings when I read him sentences from your book. He knew for three months that his illness was fatal … but he never gave a complaint. Until his last evening I kept telling him how happy we were that we could experience this clost contact for those last weeks, and how poor we would have been if he had just died from a heart attack lasting a few seconds. Now I have not only read about these things, I have experienced them, so I can only hope that I shall be able to meet fate the same way my father did." Again, someone is happy in the face of tragedy and in spite of suffering – but in view of meaning! Truly, there is a healing in meaning (Frankl, 1978, p. 21-22).

Conclusions

In the end the conclusions are to be found within my own personal experience and whether they are true for my own subjective reality. True, the specific content of my own worldview may not resonate for all, but I am convinced that the structural principles of happiness will. What I find is that within the words of Qoheleth and the Beatitudes, the theme of happiness emerging within the process of engaging in life is brought to the forefront in a dramatic way. Indeed, a literal translation of the last portion of the Beatitudes brings home the point that a happiness may to be found in living out an intentionality, even in suffering. This may then be interpreted, as I do (with an orthodox Christian framework), as the intentional intertwining of faith in God, hope in the resurrection, and love for God and our neighbor, despite circumstances.

Within my inquiry I find the unambiguous indication that a connection with the divine helps me to be happy despite the factual conditions of my days. In the resurrection

promise of the traditional Christian faith, I can experience that faith and love for others meets the hope that comes even in the face of death. Jesus, then, is shown to be a prophet and messiah to quell my existential terror and bring to my existence the possibility of happiness, for he is issuing a call to love to the point of death; calling for engagement and intentionality in existence, yet all the while providing a hope that comes in the resurrection from the dead, as is the core of my worldview. I find it profoundly powerful that, with the death and resurrection of Jesus, Christian literature highlights a hope that is beyond that previously shown in either Qoheleth or Plato's writings. Happiness, for me then, is made accessible through the hope found in the resurrection as the intentional engagement of love (built upon the faithfulness of God) opens the gates of happiness to my very being.

Implications

All of this naturally has profound implications for human existence and for psychotherapy, which includes some general practices that seem to pertain to so much of the discipline (Hollier, 1993):

1. Hope for the future as meaning replaces the need for a Freudian will to pleasure.
2. A therapist must be open to issues of faith, for they play an important role in providing context for the client to formulate an experience of happiness in life.
3. The existential therapist will regard happiness as a passive experience of intentional living and engaging in the world. Therefore the therapist recognizes that it is not something that can be pursued, even through the most stringent

therapeutic practice, but that must ensue from the in-between space of meaning and actions within the person's life.

4. The high level of faith and its importance in being human ought be recognized. True faith is the living paradox between ultimate hope and ultimate love—always hoping, to the point of absurdity, and loving with purpose for that which is present.
5. To get happiness one must first forget about it; then happiness will come as a by-product in pursuing meaningful activities and contributing love to relationships.

In all of this we may see that the goal of happiness in either life or therapy must be replaced with a striving to live an engaged life, a good life, a life of love and care. Only then will the existential happening of being happy ever reveal itself to our experience. A theme in every therapeutic relationship might then be: I + M = H (Intentionality plus Meaning equals Happiness).

References

Bakker, A. B. (2005). Flow among music teachers and their students: The crossover of peak experiences. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 72*, 400-414.

Baumann, N., & Scheffer, D. (2011). Seeking flow in the achievement domain: The achievement flow motive behind flow experience. *Motivation and Emotion, 35*(1), 267-284.

Berry, R. (2000). *Freud: A beginner' guide*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Boden, M. T., & Berenbaum, H. (2010). The bidirectional relations between affect and belief. *Review of General Psychology, 14,* 227-239.

Brulde, B. (2007). Happiness theories of the good life. *Journal of happiness studies, 8,* 15–49.

Bryant, A. (Ed.). (1968). *Sourcebook of poetry*. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel.

Burns, J. H., & Hart, H. L. (Eds.). (1970). *Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation*. London: Athlone Press.

Camus, A. (1991). *The myth of Sisyphus and other essays*. New York: Vintage Books.

Cannon, B. (1991). *Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existentialist challenge*. Kansas City: University Press of Kansas.

Carli, M., Delle Fave, A., & Massimini, F. (1988). The quality of experience in the flow channels: Comparison of Italian and U.S. students. In M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), *Optimal experience* (pp. 280-306). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Catalano, J. S. (1980). *A commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chapin, M., & Boykin, R. (2010). Integrating positive psychology techniques into Rehabilitation Counselor Education. *Rehabilitation Education, 24* (1), 25-34.

Collins, G. (1977). *Rebuilding Psychology*. London: Coverdale House.

Cooper, M. (2003). *Existential therapies*. London: Sage.

Cozzolino, P. J. (2006). Death contemplation, growth, and defense: Converging evidence of dual-existential systems? *Psychological Inquiry, 17*(4), 278-287.

Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1982). Towards a psychology of optimal experience, in L. Wheeler (Ed.). *Review of personality and social psychology* (pp.13-36).Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). *Flow: the psychology of optimal experience.* New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). *Finding Flow: The psychology of engagement with everyday life.* New York, NY: Basic Books.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). *Beyond boredom and anxiety*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Hunter, J. (2003). Happiness in everyday life: The uses of experience sampling. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, *4*(2), 185 – 199.

Degray, R. (2011). G.W.F. Hegel and the Outcome of Classical German Idealism: An Essay and Bibliography on Hegel in the English Language. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section A. Humanities and Social Sciences*.

Dowling, M., Cooney, A. (2012). Research approaches related to phenomenology: Negotiating a complex landscape. *Nurse Researcher, 20*(2), 21-27.

Elliott, R., Fischer, C., Rennie, D. (1999). Evolving guidelines for publication for qualitative research studies in psychology and related fields. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38*, 215-229.

Finlay, L. (2009). Debating phenomenological research methods. *Phenomenology and Practice*, *3* (1), 6-25.

Fox, M. V. (1988). Aging and death in Qoheleth 12. *Journal for the study of the Old Testament, 42,* 55–77.

Fox, M. V. (1999). *A time to tear down and a time to build up: A rereading of Ecclesiastes*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Frankl, V. (1975). *The Unconscious God*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Frankl, V. (1978). *The unheard cry for meaning: Psychotherapy and humanism*. New York: Touchstone.

Frankl, V. (1988). *The will to meaning: Foundations and applications of logotherapy*. New York: Penguin Books.

Frankl, V. (2000). *Man's search for ultimate meaning*. New York: Basic Books.

Frankl, V. (1986). *The Doctor and the Soul*. New York: Vintage Books.

Fredericks, D. C. (1991). Life's storms and structural unity in Qoheleth 11:1–12:8. *Journal for the study of the Old Testament, 52,* 95–114.

Gary, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (2000). *The neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system*. Oxford: Oxford.

Gay, P. (Ed.). (1989). *The Freud reader*. London: Norton.

Gottman, J. M. (1993). A theory of marital dissolution and stability. *Journal of Family Psychology, 7,* 57-75.

Gottman, J. M. (1994). *What predicts divorce? The relationship between marital process and marital outcomes.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Hamilton, W. (1973). *Plato: Phaedrus and the seventh and eight letters*. New York: Penguin.

Hegel, G. W.F (1983). *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. New Jersey: Humanities.

Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. New York: Harper & Row.

Heller, S. (2005). *Freud: A to Z*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Hobbes, T. (1985). *Leviathan*. New York: Penguin.

Hollier, H. (1993). *Sartre and Psychology*. New Jersey: Humanities Press.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University.

Husserl, E. (1973). *Cartesian Meditations*. The Hague: Martinus Nijoff.

Hutt, C. H., Scott, J., & King, M. (1983). A phenomenological study of supervisee' positive and negative experiences in supervision. *Psychotherapy: Theory, research, and practice. 20* (1), 118-123.

Jackson, S., Eklund, B., & Martin, A. (2010). The FLOW manual: The manual for the Flow Scales. Menlo Park, CA.: Mind Garden.

Johnson, W. H. (1949). The keystone of the arch. *Theology Today, 6*(1), 12-24.

Kierkegaard, S. (1981). *The Concept of Anxiety*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Kierkegaard, S. (1992). *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Kierkegaard, S. (2006). *Fear and Trembling*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

King, M. (2009). *Heidegger and Happiness*. New York: Continuum.

Klein, E. (Ed.). (1966). *A comprehensive etymological dictionary of the English language*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Krell, D. F. (Ed.). (2009). *Basic writings: Martin Heidegger - revised and expanded edition*. London: Routledge.

Langdridge, D. (2007). *Phenomenological Psychology: Theory, research, and method.* London, UK: Pearson.

Larson, L. M., Daniels, J. A. (1998). Review of the counseling self-efficacy literature. *Counseling Psychologist, 26*, 179-218.

Levitt, D. H. (2001). Active listening and counselor self-efficacy: Emphasis on one microskill in beginning counselor training. *The Clinical Supervisor, 20*(2), 101-115.

Liddel, H., & Scott, R. (Eds.). (1996). *Greek - English Lexicon*. New York: Oxford Press.

Linley, P.A., Joseph, S. (Ed.). (2004). *Positive psychology in practice*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.

Loganbill, C., Hardy, E., & Delworth, U. (1982). Supervision: A conceptual model. *Counselling Psychologist, 10*, 3-42.

Marcandonatou, O. (1998). The experience of being silent. In R. Valle (Ed.), *Phenomenological inquiry in psychology* (pp. 309–320). New York: Plenum.

Maslow, A. (1968). *Toward a psychology of being.* Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.

McCaslin, M., Scott, K. (2003). The Five-Question method for framing a qualitative research study. *The Qualitative Report 8*(3), 447-461.

McMahon, D. M. (2010). What does the ideal of happiness mean? *Social research, 77*(2), 469–490.

McNaughton, N., & Corr, P. J. (2004). The two-dimensional neuropsychology of defense: fear/anxiety and defensive distance. *Neuroscience and Behavioral Reviews, 28,* 285-305.

Menninger, W. (1990). Anxiety in the psychotherapist. *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 54,* 232-246.

Mill, J. S. (2000). *Utilitarianism*. Toronto: Broadview Press.

Miller, G. (2001). Finding happiness for ourselves and our clients. *Journal of Counseling and Development, 79*, 382-384.

Milton, M. (2004). Being a fighter. *Existential Analysis, 15*(1), 116–30.

Mitropoulos, L. (2008, December). *Dec, 2008, Irvin Yalom*. Retrieved October 3, 2010, from http://www.radioart.gr/index.php/passages/85-irvin-yalom-dec08

Miville, M. L., Redway, J. A., & Hernandez, E. (2011). Microskills, trainee competence, and therapy outcomes: Learning to work in circles. *The Counselling Psychologist, 39,* 897-906.

Moustakas, C. (1990). *Heuristic research: Design, methodology, and applications*. London, UK: Sage.

Moustakas, C. (1994). *Phenomenological research methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Onions, C. T. (Ed.). (1969). *Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Panza, C., & Gale, G. (2008). *Existentialism for dummies*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley.

Paolucci, H. (1979). *Hegel: on the Arts*. New York: F Ungar.

Peterson, C., & Van Dulmen, A. O. (Eds.). (2007). *Oxford handbook of methods in positive psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Qualls, P. A. (1998). On Being with suffering. In R. Valle (Ed.), *Phenomenological inquiry in psychology* (pp. 335-357). New York: Plenum.

Reid, K., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2005). Exploring the lived experience. *The Psychologist, 18*, 20–23.

Ridley, C. R., Mollen, D., & Kelly, S. M. (2011). Beyond microskills: Toward a model of counseling competence. *The Counseling Psychologist. 20*(10), 1-40.

Rogatko, T. P. (2009). The influence of flow on positive affect in college students. *Journal of Happiness Studies, 10*, 133-148.

Rothert, E., & Zielinskn, D. (Eds.). (1976). *A translation of Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz's Analysis of Happiness*. Warsaw: Polish Scientific.

Sadler, W. A. (1969). *Existence and love: A new approach in existential phenomenology*. New York: Charles Schribner's Sons.

Santas, G. (1988). *Plato and Freud: Two theories of love*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Sartre, J. P. (1992). *Being and Nothingness*. New York: Washington Square Press.

Seidman, I. E. (1991). *Interviewing as Qualitative Research*. New York, NY: Teacher's College Press.

Seligman, M.E. P. (2002). *Authentic happiness: Using the new positive psychology to realize your potential for lasting fulfillment*. New York: Free Press.

Shernoff, Csikszentmihalyi, Shneider, & Shernoff, E. S. (2003). Student engagement in high school classrooms from the perspective of flow theory. *School Psychology Quarterly, 18* (2), 158-176.

Sinnamon, S., Moran, A., & O'Connell, M. (2012). Flow among musicians: Measuing peak experiences of student performers. *Journal of Research in Music Education*, *60* (1), 6-25.

Smith, J., Jarman, M. & Osborn, M. (1999). Doing interpretive phenomenological analysis. In: M. Murray & Chamberlain, K. (Eds.), *Qualitative Health Psychology* (pp. 218–240). London: Sage.

Snyder, C. R. (2000). The past and possible futures of hope. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology: Special Issue: Classical Sources of Human Strength: A Psychological Analysis, 19*(1), 11-28.

Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). The cultural animal: Twenty years of Terror Management Theory and research. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, T. Pyszczynski (Ed.), *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology* (pp. 13-34). New York: The Guilford Press.

Song, S. (2007). Are we happier facing death? *Time, Tuesday*(Oct. 30.), .

Spencer, L., & Ritchie, J. (2012). In pursuit of quality. In D. Harper & A.R. Thompson (Eds.), *Qualitative research methods in mental health and psychotherapy; A guide for students and practitioners* (pp. 228-240). New York, NY: Wiley.

Spiegelberg, H. (1972). *Phenomenology in psychology and psychiatry: A historical introduction*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Spinelli, E. (2007). *Practicing existential therapy*. London: Sage.

Spitzer, R. J., Bernhoft, R. A., & De Blasi, C. E. (2000). *Healing the culture: A common sense of happiness, freedom and the life issues*. San Francisco: Ignatius.

Stace, W. T. (1955). *The Philosophy of Hegel*. New York: Dover.

Stewart, D., & Mickunas, A. (1974). *Exploring phenomenology: A guide to the field and its literature* (2nd ed.). Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Stoltenberg, C. D., McNeill, B., Delworth, U. (1998). *IDM Supervision*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Storr, A. (1989). *Freud: A very short introduction*. New York: Oxford.

Sumner, L. W. (1996). *Welfare, happiness, and ethics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Taylor, M. (Ed.). (1980). *Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard*. San Francisco: University of California.

Vanier, J. (2001). *Made for happiness: Discovering the meaning of life with Aristotle*. Toronto: House of Anansi.

Waterfield, R. (Ed.). (1994). *Plato's Symposium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Welman, J. C., & Kruger, S. J. (1999). *Research methodology for the business and administrative sciences.* Johannesburg, South Africa: International Thompson.

Willig, C., & Billin, A. (2012). Existentialist-Informed Hermeneutic Phenomenology. In D.Harper & A.R. Thompson (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Mental Health and Psychotherapy: A Guide for Students and Practitioners* (pp. 123-140). New York, NY: Wiley.

Yager, E. K. (2011). *Subliminal Theraphy: Using the mind to heal*. Bethel, CT: Crown House.

Yalom, I. (1998). *The Yalom Reader*. New York: Basic Books.

Appendix A

Definition of Terms

Cogito

The present active thought of an individual. Within the framework of Edmund Husserl, the thought is formed by the mind/body moving toward something. Therefore the thought is not something generated exclusively in the mind but must always be towards something.

Cogitatum

The consciousness of an individual, according to Brentano's Intentionality and Husserl's Phenomenology, is made up of the cogito (the thought) and the cogitatum, which is the actual content of that thought, its subject matter.

Consciousness

Within Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the consciousness is that part of the mental psychic apparatus that an individual is aware of and can reflect upon.

Conscience

Frankl's notion of conscience is a spiritual mechanism possessed by every human being for detecting the transcendent meaning that comes from beyond himself or herself and his or her situation, which enables him or her to make the one right choice in that moment.

Dasein

A term used by Martin Heidegger to denote Being, or more specifically, the unified nature of Being. According to Being and Time, Dasein is in its Being and has this very Being as an issue.

Eidos

A Greek term meaning form or shape, so within the field of phenomenology it is the form or shape of an idea, and within classical philosophy it may refer to the ideal forms of an idea.

Epoché

A term that indicates the suspension of the judgment of some experience or idea. This was picked up by Edmund Husserl to form the foundational condition for understanding the human experience.

Facticity

The term to indicate the objective facts of a person's existence, which Heidegger used to indicate the thrownness of existence—that we are "thrown into the world" with a history, context, and culture that are not of our choosing.

Faith

A term to indicate the strong belief in the trustworthiness of some person, thing, or idea. Within this study, the emphasis is upon a Christian faith, which can be seen as a trust in

the promises of God on the part of the person, a system of beliefs and doctrines, and loyalty, allegiance, and commitment to this trust and/or belief.

Flow

A state of conscious absorption with the environment by the individual, drawing on and creative narrative and meaning while in engagement with the external world.

Hope

A term that refers to looking forward with confidence and expectation to the future; also a spiritual virtue defined as a search and longing toward a future good.

Immanent

A term to refer to the residing of something within the person or inherent to the being of the person.

Intentionality

A term to refer to the phenomenological basis of being as being directed toward a subject or an object, something inherent in the make-up of ideas, thoughts, and consciousness itself.

Makar

The Greek root of the ancient Greek term (Makarios) *μακάριος* meaning blessed or happy.

Mythopoeic

A term that means creating of myths, which the psychologist Carl Jung used to refer to the innate natural propensity of people to make a story about an experience (story = meaning).

Noesis

A term to refer to the functioning of the intellect. It is the mental activity of the forming of ideas, especially as they pertain to ideal forms of thought.

Phaedrus

The title of a story written by Plato, where Socrates runs into an individual named Phaedrus who reads a speech written by Lysias on the subject of love.

Qoheleth

The Hebrew term for *Teacher/ Preacher* refers to the biblical book traditionally taught to be the product of the philosophizing of King Solomon. The Latin translation of the term Qoheleth is Ecclesiastes, which is the traditional Protestant name for the book.

Solipsism

A term to refer to an extreme form of subjective idealism, which considers only the thinking subjects to be real beyond doubt, with all other objects declared to exist only in the consciousness of the individual.

Symposium

A work by Plato that gives an account of the discussion of the nature of Love by many of Athens' leading intellectuals, including Socrates and the playwright Aristophanes.

Unconscious

Within Freudian Psychoanalytic theory, this is the portion of the psychic apparatus (the mind) operating well outside the attention of the conscious mind and beyond personal awareness.

Resurrection

The term refers to the reanimation of dead humans and is a central doctrine of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In biblical literature, it typically refers to the literal coming back to life of biologically dead corpses by divine power.