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RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

by

FREDDIE A.S. ZUFFEREY

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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ABSTRACT

This thesis concerns itself with the analysis of the rural development process in Zambia. It aims essentially at pointing out what are believed to be the major rural development problems in the country and suggests a rural strategy that may enhance the participation of the rural masses in self-sustaining development.

The exploration of the rural development efforts in Zambia reveals a fundamental problem of economic dualism reinforced by regional disparities. From early colonial time, this situation, which kept the subsistence areas in isolation from the prosperous industrial sector of the Copperbelt, has persisted and the efforts of the new government do not seem to find a satisfactory solution to this fundamental problem.

The colonial government essentially promoted the development of the rich mineral resources of the Copperbelt. Modern infrastructure developed in the industrial sector after the railway was extended from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to the copper mines of Katanga (Shaba-Zaire). The colonial government also encouraged commercial agriculture by white settlers. The best fertile and tsetse free areas between Livingstone and the Copperbelt (The Line of Rail sector) were declared "Crown-land" and became agricultural areas reserved for European agriculture. Most rural development efforts and colonial investments were directed

toward establishing a prosperous white industrial enclave, dissociated from the welfare of the subsistence sector. The colonial regime did not feel it necessary to improve traditional farming practices or marketing facilities. The African peasants, confined to native reserves, were deliberately restricted to subsistence agriculture and made to provide a supply of cheap unskilled farm manpower for commercial agriculture.

Despite the new government's determination to reduce regional disparities and the socialist orientation promoted by the United National Independent Party (UNIP) in the new national ideology of Humanism, the heavy colonial legacy compelled the new government to compromise with foreign economic powers and maintain much of the same administrative structure as under colonial rule. New planning and rural development strategies faced great difficulties. The general neglect of the subsistence areas combined with the lack of education frustrated the new development venture from its early stage. More significantly, the ambivalence of the national ideology, and the lack of political will of the leadership and the failure to integrate the rural masses in the development of the country prevented the new government from establishing a dynamic interaction between public policies and the aspirations of the rural populations. It still remains to be proved by both the Zambian government and UNIP that their rural development precepts are consistent with their actual development practices.

Among several fundamental lessons, the rural development literature points to the necessity to direct rural development planning and strategies to the full growth of rural people as persons and to the improvement of the whole pattern of rural life. The full personal development of rural people in their environment, however, requires their willingness and confidence to do something for themselves, as well as the consistent political and financial support of the leadership. Thus, the combination of adequate rural participation to motivate the masses and political will to support rural aspirations, appears to be a fundamental prerequisite to the rural development process. While rural participation can develop to a large extent by applying rationally the extension and community development processes, the raising of the political-will among business and political elites to an adequate level remains perhaps the most fundamental problem rural development faces in the Third World today.

Elements of solution to this crucial problem may arise from current cultural ideologies emerging throughout the African continent and from the Chinese rural development strategy. More likely, rural development in Zambia will emerge from the active involvement of the rural masses in their own self-sustaining development. A rural cadre strategy, consistent with traditional culture and values, appears promising but, just like any other strategy, it cannot skirt the political barriers dividing the needs of

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the subsistence populations from the political commitment of the leadership.

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I. INTRODUCTION--ZAMBIA GENERAL DESCRIPTION

A. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Despite its vast raw material and mineral resources, Africa remains one of the poorest continents on earth. In 1972, the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) identified 18 African countries among the 29 least developed nations in the world.[1] At first, there appear to be several reasons for the perpetuation of underdevelopment in Africa.

The soil fertility is greatly diminished by the combination of intense rain falls and annual bush fires. The heavy rains cause serious leaching and wash away humus and mineral elements. The swollen rivers are hard to control, low lands remain flooded for months and are difficult to drain. In the dry season the soil hardens, water is scarce and erosion is further enhanced by the systematic burning of the dry vegetation.[2]

The African peasant is also dependent on poor technology. For a long time storage techniques were virtually unknown in Africa and the few crude tools used in agriculture did not allow the peasant to settle and farm continuously in one area. In particular, low nutritional standards, poor livestock and lack of farm input have seriously contributed to the agricultural underdevelopment of Africa.[3] The combination of poor soil, nutrition and technology resulted in a vicious circle whereby underfed

people cultivated unfertilized land, and thus produced only low yields for an ever growing population.[4]

In turn, agricultural underdevelopment inhibited industrial development and the lack of industrial expansion generated a second vicious circle. The lack of technological development restricted the source of energy to manpower; it perpetuated traditional methods of cultivation which contributed to low yields and poor income, and thus reduced the buying power for future industrial products.[5]

However, environmental conditions, poor records in agriculture and industry do not fully explain nor excuse underdevelopment in Africa. A great deal of it can be traced in the history of European contact with Africa. Dumont claims that

> no one knows where Africa civilization would be today if it had been able to follow a normal development in peaceful contact with European techniques... If the Europeans had traded with the Africans on an equal basis, they would have brought them in exchange for African products, carts and wheels, material which could increase production.[6]

Dumont's further comment that "men alone are responsible for the economic backwardness of Africa," is quite to the point. A brief look at history shows that the European contact with Africa was traumatic from the earliest years. In order to establish a commercial monopoly, the Portuguese in the 15th. century explored the East-African coast, ravaged and ruined a number of flourishing trading ports: Malindi, Mombassa, Mogadishu, Bravo and others.[7]

Following the Portuguese, a number of other European nations soon joined the pillage of Africa and hunted slaves in western and central Africa. The demand for slaves dramatically increased as overwork and insufficient food raised their mortality to an appalling rate.

The colonial period followed the same pattern. In a more subtle way, however, it institutionalized that development-underdevelopment relationship, which logically prepared the way for the present world dominated by transnational corporations and western capital. Ultimately the colonial period did not benefit the colonized populations despite the strong conviction of numerous settlers who were convinced of the need to "develop" those "wild backward countries".

Undoubtedly, the exploitation of labour and land does generate socio-economic progress, provided the fruit of such an operation remain in the exploited area. But the essential purpose of colonialism was rather to

> repatriate the profits to the so called 'mother country'. From an African view point, that amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus produced by African labour out of African resources. It meant the development of Europe out of the same dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped.[8]

The basic expropriation tactic involved the introduction of cash-crops for export or the cultivation of a single crop. Many countries were forced to cultivate a single commercial crop or other new crops to satisfy the increasing demand of

the metropolis. In this way, Tanzania's agricultural production shifted from millet to sisal; Ghana produced cotton instead of yams and Gambia peanuts instead of rice; Uganda became a major producer of cotton, Benin a producer of palm-oil and Liberia a producer of rubber.[9] The imposition of monocultures on countries that were once self-sufficient in food not only disrupted the traditional balance between man and nature, but seriously deteriorated the terms of trade. Gradually the colonies became less able to buy manufactured goods. In 1939 already most African countries could only buy 60 per cent of the manufactured goods they could have bought between 1870 and 1880.[10] The colony-metropolis relationship, in which the periphery sold its primary produce to the centre at give away prices in order to purchase manufactures, still is a key dynamic of underdevelopment throughout the Third World today.

The cultural legacy of the colonial period equally contributed to perpetuate underdevelopment in Africa. Basic education is still lacking throughout most rural African areas and the imported educational system in operation in most countries does not offer the type of skills required by over 75 per cent of the African population. In addition, a whole frame work of western values has been co-opted with that kind of education. High value is granted to academic standards, status and white collar jobs, but little consideration is given to farming, vocational and manual skills. As a result, not only agriculture is despised but

the educational system still produces a large number of "unemployed hopefuls".[11]

If much of Africa's underdevelopment resulted from European intervention, another large part of the blame can be attributed to the elite classes governing the independent African states. In most of these new states, independence meant sudden access to absolute power. Few African leaders, however, were adequately prepared to administer that power for the benefit of their country as a whole. For many it concretely meant having free hand to unruled personal reward. Dumont's biting observation that

> far-sighted Presidents and ministers build up savings accounts for their old age in Swiss banks, and their wives buy villas on the lake of Geneva[12]

is as pertinent today as it ever was.

This practice, unfortunately, not only affects the leaders themselves, but tends to become endemic among the political elite, the bureaucratic elite, trade union leaders, owners and managers of large business, organized ethnic associations, the military, the large farmers and landowners, and, representatives of foreign trading and manufacturing concerns. These interest-groups, contends Elliott,

> manipulate processes of selection in order to limit the risk of downward mobility for themselves and to ensure that the structures that benefit them are adequately served with appropriate manpower. The avenues of upward mobility...are highly competitive entry points that are biased in favour of selected groups... The feature that gives [these structures]

> both their own legitimacy and the function of legitimization of those who successfully pass through them, is, precisely, that, despite the biases, some do pass through them... To survive the structure [allows] sufficient genuine upward mobility to preserve that confidence and that legitimacy.[13]

Three crucial processes reinforce the privileged position of the interest-groups and all perpetuate the overall process of poverty-enrichment. The process of selection determines socio-economic status. Intra-group competition determines who has control over resources, and inter-group competition determines how resources are divided among groups.[14]

Given the ecological conditions, the past history and the adverse impact of the colonial legacy in Africa, the efforts to promote rural development on the African continent encountered serious obstacles. Most of the time these rural development bottlenecks seemed to arise from a "lack of access to resources, uneven distribution of product, economic stagnation, high birth rates, unemployment and lack of purchasing power", all of which are "the result of socio-economic structures and institutions."[15] Rural development problems may also arise from political difficulties, questions of policy, of political patronage, of administrative capacity and, sometimes, of religion.[16]

Over the last two decades most Third World governments, anxious to improve rural development, followed the advice of economists and began shifting economic resources rather than altering the socio-political structures. Thus, economic plans became the characteristic medium of development. The

rationale for those plans was to mobilize economic resources and use them in projects securing the highest economic growth returns. As a result, the socio-political processes have proved resistent to change, public cooperation and political will.

Schumacher proposed "intermediate technology" and "rural industrialization" based on small-scale manufacturing as possible strategies to offset the damaging effects of capital-intensive industry.[17] Both these strategies encountered severe criticisms. A poor country, many economists believed, cannot afford to divert scarce resources from investment in maximum production, in order to select an ineffective technology or meet the needs of social welfare. The application of most efficient technologies to agriculture and industry was believed to necessarily maximize employment and social well-being. By the end of the last decade, however, the rural development experience swung the argument in favour of Schumacher's thesis. The divergences of means for relieving unemployment from means of maximizing economic growth became inescapable. It now seemed wiser to accept a slower growth rate in one direction in order to make progress in the other.

In the 1950s, comprehensive community development programs were primarily designed to energize and help rural people participate in their own development, and promote agriculture. The comprehensive approach of these programs considerably improved the agricultural production and

developed effective new patterns of operation. However, they proved to be unwieldy and very difficult to implement because of the wide range of components that had to be implemented simultaneously and the lack of agreed priorities among those components.[18]

Gradually this rather ambitious approach to rural development was abandoned in favour of new concepts such as Integrated Rural Development (IRD) -- a multidisciplinary approach to development which involves a large number of disparate activities, regrouped in complementary and interacting systems. The IRD concept does not place the entire rural development process under one sole administration, but orchestrates the whole spectrum of individual and complementary projects for the most effective service of the overall rural development objectives. In this approach rural development is taken in the broad sense and is concerned with rural people as persons. It addresses the total pattern of rural life and considers economic development and agriculture as important components, but not as prior conditions or ultimate goals of development.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM IN ZAMBIA

Zambia, like most former colonies, has suffered from colonial influence and from the particular ecological conditions of the central African environment. The fundamental bottleneck of Zambia's development, however, appears to stem from a problem of acute economic dualism

which developed under the influence of British rule. From the early days, the British appear to have been primarily interested in extracting the rich copper ore and various other mineral resources of the Copperbelt,[19] while colonial agriculture seems to have developed only in as far as the general welfare of the white community was affected.

The new independent government, feeling the pressure of the long neglect of the subsistence sector on the national economy and the increasing problem of the rural-urban gap, undertook to stamp out the regional disparities and to promote justice and equality for all Zambian citizens by adopting the guiding philosophy of Humanism--the Zambian version of socialism. The new MAN-centered ideology, based on traditional mutual-aid values and extended family principles, was to develop a national spirit of self-reliance and cooperation in the new classless society. One of the central thrusts of the new ideology was to raise the level of development in the subsistent areas by mobilizing the grass-roots in decision-making, planning and implementation of their own development.

The new independent government, confident in the flourishing copper economy, remained convinced, at independence, that the future development of Zambia lay in industrial development. Consequently, most post-independent development efforts produced a one-commodity economy based on copper with little rural diversification. It soon became apparent that such an economy was very vulnerable, being

extremely dependent upon foreign economic powers and upon fluctuations in copper prices.

Meanwhile, the development of land and agricultural resources, which constitute the large part of renewable resources in the country remained virtually neglected because the rural areas were expected to develop from the surpluses generated from industrial development. Even though the economic crisis of 1973-1974, due to sharp decrease in copper prices, pushed the Zambian government to boost agricultural development, the strategies and resources applied proved inadequate. Most rural development efforts appeared more as immediate palliative solutions to urgent problems rather than efforts to attack the root causes of underdevelopment.

Despite numerous promises, the new government has not yet succeeded in reaching its objectives; the rural-urban gap and the economic disparities have become more acute problems than under colonial rule. A closer look at a comparison between the mining and agricultural sector in 1970, as in Table 1.1, illustrates the difference in output between industry and agriculture still persisting six years after independence. Not only did the mining sector provide 40.9 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 98.5 per cent of the nation's export value, but it also provided roughly three-quarters of Government revenue since independence, compared with a negligeable contribution from agriculture.

COMPARISON OF THE MINING AND AGRICULTURAL SECTORS IN 1970

	Mining	Agriculture
% of Gross Domestic Product (1969)	40.9%	6.8%
% of Exports by value	98.5%	0.5%
% of Wage Earners	14.0%	10.1%
Average African wage (excluding self-employed)	K1,453	K348

Source: Economic Report 1971
See also Lombard, C.S. & A.H.C. Tweedie, Agriculture in Zambia Since Independence, Lusaka: National Educational Company of Zambia Limited, 1974, p. 2.

Similarly the agricultural performance in the overall economy has consistently decreased since 1967. This can be observed by the minor role agriculture plays in Zambian trade. While the total agricultural imports between 1967 and 1970 increased from K 25.8 million to K 37.5 million, the agricultural exports decreased from K 14.2 to K 3.4 million.[23] Conversely, the agricultural exports hold the smallest share of the national exports and never reached more than 2.4 per cent of the 1965 total exports.[20]

Besides the considerable imbalance between agriculture and industry, there is also a sharp dichotomy existing between the different classes of farmers. At independence (1964), some 1,200 to 1,300 commercial farmers, virtually all non Zambian by birth, produced between 70 and 80 per cent of the gross output of the agricultural sector.[21]

Moreover, while mixed farming was common in the sector of the Line of Rail, small farmers were essentially producing cotton and groundnuts and the remainder of the rural sector was barely subsistent.

A closer look at various earnings, reproduced in table 1.2, illustrates perhaps more vividly the rural-urban inequalities and the sharp disparities within the rural sector itself. Even though rural incomes in real terms are often difficult to evaluate, since generally the rural people have a substantial income which is not easily measurable, the Cabinet Office and other surveys seem to indicate that income disparity between peasant-farmers and wage-earners is increasing persistently. While income growth in real terms for the peasant-farmer was estimated at only 3 per cent from 1964 to 1970, the urban wage-earner scored a 52 per cent increase for the same period. According to Cox, et al., the division of income in Zambia is one of the most unequal in the world. While a 5 per cent elite monopolized as much as 37 per cent of the gross national income, 60 per cent of the total population had to get by with only 27 per cent.[23]

This imbalance between the industrial and agricultural sector has generated an increasing migration toward the major urban centres. The last census of 1969 revealed dramatic population movements toward the urbanised Central and Copperbelt provinces between 1963 and 1969. After allowing for the natural population increase of 16 per cent,

Table 1.2

Income Disparities in Zambia 1970

	Approximate Total Nº	Approximate Annual Earnings Kwacha[22]	Increase in Real Terms 1964-1970 per cent
Peasant farmer	800,000	145	3
Farmer with cash crops	25,000	---	10
Large-scale commercial farmer (mainly expatriates)	450	8,000 max.	--
Agricultural Labourer	350,000	350	2
Urban wage earner outside mines	270,000	640	52
mineworker	50,000	1,300	35
Expatriate employee outside mines	22,000	4,170	25
employee copper mines	6,000	7,600	16

Sources: REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, Cabinet Office 1969.

the population of the Copperbelt and Central Provinces increased by 34 per cent and 24 per cent respectively, while the population of the Northern and Luapula Provinces decreased by 20 per cent and 21 per cent.[24]

The 1969 census also confirmed that internal migrations were economically motivated. In 1969, 1,112,000 people over 15 years of age were reported to be seeking employment: 41 per cent in urban provinces, 59 per cent in rural provinces. On the other hand only 319,000 wage employment opportunities

were recorded for the same period: 73 per cent in urban areas and only 27 per cent in rural areas. In the industrial sector the supply and demand ratio in terms of wage employment came up to 51:100 in the urbanized areas, while in the rural provinces the wage employment ratio reached only 15:100. Furthermore, 65 per cent of all wage income opportunities in rural areas were located in the public sector.[25]

Income disparities, internal migrations and the negligeable contribution of agriculture in the national economy all seem to underline the high priority currently given to the development of the industrial sector and the little expectation government has of the subsistence areas.

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THESIS

The author of this thesis contends that none of the past or recent rural development strategies have ever tackled the fundamental rural development problem of Zambia because they did not seem to involve the rural masses in the planning and implementation of their own development. Despite the socialist rhetoric of Humanism and countless promises, the new leadership appears to give only little leverage to the fundamental development principle of participation by rural masses. Most development efforts seem to have only little impact on the development of the rural areas.

This study argues that if Zambia wants to reduce

migrations and bridge the gap between agriculture and industry, development policies must concentrate on rural development. Prior to sole industrial growth, self-sustaining development of the rural masses must become the central objective of Zambian government in its endeavour to develop the nation.

The promotion of a satisfactory level of rural willingness, must take place through the provision of adequate mechanisms of decentralization of power and the establishment of a new participatory structure in order to enable the grass-roots to have real input and control over their own development. It is argued that in Zambia this level of rural willingness can only be reached if genuine attitudes of self-reliance prevail and if the image and expectations of the actual government will change in the mind of the subsistence populations.

In this perspective, this thesis addresses itself primarily to the agricultural, administrative and institutional components of rural development and dwells on the aspects of decentralization and rural participation. It explores what are considered crucial obstacles to development in the past and present Zambian rural development efforts. It reviews various concepts and rural development strategies throughout the world, distills fundamental principles of the rural development process and synthesizes them in the conclusions with special reference to the Zambian situation.

D. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS

In essence then, this work, in the light of past rural development efforts and current literature, aims at four major objectives:

1. first, it will attempt to point out the main problems of Zambian rural development strategies in the past;
2. to explore the literature and underline strategies based on rural community development experiences in LDCs throughout the world;
3. to extract components from various programs and processes which appear indispensable to the implementation of a rural development program;
4. finally, to suggest a rural community development framework for promoting balanced development in Zambia.

E. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS

The essential limitation of this thesis lies in the comprehensive nature of rural development itself. Even though rural development concentrates on developing the rural areas, it encompasses a whole gamut of components, all equally necessary to the rural development process. Thus, as such, this work does not do justice to all the other industrial and economic implications or to the Zambian foreign policies which bear equally on Zambia's development. The study of these implications are considered beyond the scope of this thesis.

F. PLAN OF THE THESIS

The second Chapter first explores the various ecological factors that affect the agricultural potential of the rural areas. Then, after a brief description of the most significant agricultural systems, it explores the various factors and policies that have affected agricultural production and rural development in the pre-colonial and the colonial periods.

The third chapter evaluates the rural development performance of the new independent Zambian government under its guiding philosophy of Humanism. Two major National Development Plans are selected and analysed with respect to their impact on the development of the rural areas.

While chapter four analyses a selection of major development problem areas against the objectives of Humanism, chapter five describes and evaluates the most significant rural development efforts of the new independent government.

The sixth chapter explores various strategies and concepts involved in rural development throughout the world and tries to bring out the essential elements necessary to the rural development process. Chapter seven logically draws a synthesis of the essential conditions and elements necessary for the operation of a rural development program.

Finally, chapter eight draws general conclusions and gives basic recommendations for the improvement of

agricultural production and suggests a model of rural participation.

G. INFORMATION SOURCES

The statistical data used in this work are essentially drawn from library research. No recent field trip was made to Zambia to collect statistical data on rural development performance. Rather, most of the information was obtained from published sources.

An exploration of a number of practical rural development efforts and case studies equally contributed to balance the writer's understanding of the rural development process and helped him assess more objectively the performance of various rural development strategies currently applied throughout the African continent and the developing world in general.

The writer's own involvement in rural development work throughout the subsistence sector of Northern Zambia has provided him with a first hand insight in the problems of the rural areas. His views however, have been balanced by an extensive investigation of numerous Zambian government documents, studies and a considerable amount of Zambian material drawn from journals and periodicals.

The writer's prime interest in rural community development and rural participation led him to explore more comprehensive views and recent concepts of rural development. Various experts' perceptions and a substantial

amount of notes and discussions on the new concept of integrated rural development proved very helpful in understanding the complexity of the rural development process.

Most of the data used in this work, including statistical ones, have not been used to support an evidence, but are rather utilized in an explanatory way or in a descriptive manner to sustain a community development perspective. Although these data are from reliable sources some of them are five years old and may not reflect exactly the current Zambian situation. More recent and systematic observations of the current operations would provide a sharper picture. But, for time and financial reasons, it has been impossible for the writer to return to Zambia. Furthermore, this material is used according to subjective criteria which may reveal the community development biases of the author, and their application is likely influenced by his African experience.

H. MAJOR SOURCES

Since 1964, a great wealth of literature has been written on the development of the copper industry in Central Africa. There are however, very few authoritative studies which profess to deal with the rural development of the subsistent sector or the aspect of rural participation in Zambian development.

As with any research work, however, certain books and

articles have been found to be of greater usefulness than others. Two works the writer found particularly helpful in the analysis of the pre-colonial and colonial period are William Allen's The African Husbandman and J.A. Hellen's Rural Economic Development in Zambia. Both provide a good historical analysis of the early Zambian development efforts and a good understanding of the various problems encountered.

A.T. Mosher's Thinking about Rural Development and Uma Lele's The Design of Rural Development have proven very useful in the exploration of the concepts and strategies of rural development. Lele's work has proved particularly helpful because it provides a sharp analysis of a wide range of various programs in different countries. These two works form, in some respect, the touchstone for the author's understanding of rural development.

These are only a few of many books and articles which have served the writer's research and conclusions in this thesis. Studies such as D.J. Dodge's Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia and Ann Seidman's Alternative Development in Zambia have provided the basic profile of the economic performance, while Patrick Ollawa's Rural Development Policies and Performance in Zambia and Joachim Luhring's Political and Administrative Aspects of Rural Development in Zambia have generated provoking thoughts about the institutional and administrative frame-work.

I. THE WRITER

The author's interest in rural development first began when he served as a missionary priest in Northern Zambia from 1970 to 1976. At that time, he was immersed in the complex issues of community organization, grass-root cooperatives and basic rural development efforts among the rural populations of the Northern Province.

Since that time, he has been consistently interested in the study of rural participation, grass-root institution building and rural community development processes. It, therefore, occurred to him that a thesis exploring various rural development concepts and strategies, and tackling the intricate rural development problem of the Zambian subsistent sector would be quite appropriate and challenging.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I

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3. Ibid., pp. 28-28.
4. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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9. [redacted]ood First, Beyond the Myth of Scarcity", Editorial, New Internationalist, no: 55 (September 1977), p. 8.
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18. I[redacted]d., p. 25.
19. S[redacted]ap p. 29.
20. Lombard, C.S. & A,H.C. Tweedie, Agriculture in Zambia

Since Independence, Lusaka: National Educational Company of Zambia Ltd., 1974, p. 90.

21. Ibid., p. 55 and 52.

22. The Kwacha is the Zambian national currency and was equivalent to US $ 1.50 in 1970.

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24. Lombard, C. & A. Tweedie, op. cit., p. 2.

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II. PRE-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Geographically, Zambia lies between 8°10' and 17°50' parallels of southerly latitude and 22° and 33°30' meridians across the Great Plateau of southern Africa. The country covers an area of 290'586 square miles (739'557 square kilometers) and most of it reaches over 1000 meters in altitude. This plateau rises in the north towards the Mbala Plateau and in the east towards the East African Highlands in Malawi. In the east the border country rises to a maximum elevation of 2'100 m. The greatest contrasts are found in the Zambesi and the Lwangwa valleys which lie below 600 m. Their confluence which marks the frontier with Mozambique is the lowest point in the territory with only 314 m. As compared with other adjacent countries like Tanzania, which has an altitude range of 6000 m., Zambia has less than 2000 m. Consequently, Zambia has less variety in rainfall, vegetation and settlement associated with the broader landscape range of her neighbouring countries.[1] In addition, old erosion in the Zambesi river basin and its major tributaries, -- the Kafue and the Lwangwa-- has formed abrupt escarpments which have created significant communication barriers at all times.

Climatic Conditions

Among the geographic factors, critical is the rainfall pattern in the Zambian environment.

ZAMBIA


ZAMBIA
Provincial boundaries
International boundaries
Railways
Railways planned or under construction
TANZANIA
ZAIRE
ANGOLA
MALAWI
MOZAMBIQUE
ZIMBABWE (RHODESIA)
BOTSWANA
NAMIBIA (SOUTHWEST AFRICA)
Indian Ocean
Mbeya Province
NORTHERN PROVINCE
LUAPULA PROVINCE
EASTERN PROVINCE
COPPERBELT PROVINCE
CENTRAL PROVINCE
SOUTHERN PROVINCE
NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE
WESTERN PROVINCE
BAROTSELAND
SHABA
Mbala
Kasama
Serenje
Ndola
Kitwe
Lumumbashi
Lusaka
Kafue
Livingstone
Wankie
Salisbury
Blantyre
Beira
Lilongwe
Chipata
Njika Plateau
Tanzam Railway
Pipeline
Luangwa River
Gt North Road
Gt East Road
Gt West Road
Luangwa River Bridge
Cabora Bassa Dam
Zambezi River
Kafue Dam and River
Kariba Dam
Kafue River
Benguela Railway
to Nacala
to Bulawayo and South Africa

Map 2.2. Mean Annual Rainfall



Source: Hellen, J. A. op. cit. p. 33.

The climate is characterized by heavy seasonal rainfall lasting from October to February. Rainfall, being subject to orographical features is more abundant over the northern and eastern high grounds than the low regions of the south and south-west. The rainfall throughout the country, as illustrated in map 2.2, is very unevenly distributed. The 40 inch moisture level, generally accepted as the ideal boundary between the two major vegetation types (lime-accumulating and lime-deficient soils), is only met on the Northern Plateau and around the Congo-basin area. The upper Zambesi valley, the entire Barotseland, the southern, central and north-western parts of the country, which account for approximately for 50 per cent of the total area, fall below the 40 inch moisture level.

Agricultural Production Potential

If one excepts the small enclaves of fertile "upper valley soils" and those rich in mineral resources, which have both been declared "crown land" as shown in Map 2.3, the agricultural production potential of the country shows a rather low profile.

Map 2.3. Agricultural Production Potential and Natural Regions



Source: Hellen, J. A. op. cit. p. 125.

In addition, agriculture has to face the crucial problem of the widespread tsetse fly which infests nearly half the country. Map 2.4 indicates that, except for the Line of Rail sector extending from Livingstone to the Copperbelt, the Barotseland and the lobe northwestward, the tsetse fly infest virtually all the rest of the country. This situation has severe implications for the development

of the rural

Map 2.4. Distribution of Cattle and Zones of Tsetse Fly Infestation



Source: Hellen, J. A. op. cit. p. 119.

areas. Not only do the north-east and north-western areas have to go without animal protein in their diet, but the use of animal traction and fertilizer is absent.

This geographic overview, therefore, indicates that, despite the apparent uniform features of the African Plateau in general, the Zambian territory lacks a geographical unity. Zambia faces major communication problems rising from natural and unnatural barriers. While the long Kafue-Lwangwa escarpment isolates the Eastern Province from the northern areas, the Zairean Shaba Province protrudes in the heart of the country and causes major north-south communication problems in the western part of the country.

The ecological conditions indicate that the moisture level is adequate in only half the country and the poor soil texture combined with the tsetse fly infestation impose severe constraints on the agricultural development of the subsistent sector.

B. THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD

Both geographic and ecological factors influenced to a great extent the patterns of cultivation and the social organization of human settlements in the societies of what is now Zambia. Historical factors, however, were interconnected with the natural conditions and equally played a significant role in perpetuating underdevelopment in south central Africa.

The Traditional Agricultural Systems

History seems to reveal that the experience of the African peasant has taught him how to adapt his cropping methods to his environment. Allan observed that

> The traditional land-use systems of Africa are adapted to the limitations of their environments, as any viable system of agriculture must be...As communities of men changed... to an increasing dependence on hoe cultivation, they acquired a working knowledge of the soils they used and a means of recognizing and distinguishing them... All the cultivating people did acquire... a large body of unwritten knowledge ...The shifting cultivator has an understanding of his environment suited to his needs. He can rate the fertility of a piece of land and its suitability for one or other of his crops by the vegetation which covers it and by the physical characteristics of the soil and he can assess the 'staying' power of a soil, the number of seasons for which it can be cropped with satisfactory results and the number of seasons for which it must be

> rested before such results can be obtained again...In many cases his knowledge is precise and remarkably complete.[2]

It appears that in pre-colonial times the various agricultural systems in south central Africa developed successfully in most areas. Among the Bemba and other tribes of the current north and north-western Zambia the shifting cultivation system was predominant. Shifting cultivation is usually known as the "citemene" system. The citemene (from the Bemba verb "ukutema," to cut) is a

> system in which an area is pollarded and the cut wood is gathered in the center of a clearing, stacked and allowed to dry; it is burnt just before the rains break. With the first rains seeds (usually millet or sorghum) are broadcast in the ash, and the crops receive little attention until harvest.[3]

For two or three years following, the same garden is planted with mixed crops(beans, ground nuts, sweet potatoes) and then abandoned for a new spot. Depending on the kind of vegetation in the area, the resting period may last as long as 25 to 30 years.

The citemene system appears to have been the best adapted cultivation system in the woodlands of the northern plateau. Allan concludes that the citemene system

> is a device evolved by hoe-cultivating people who, migrated into this region of the Congo-Zambesi watershed, a device to ensure high yields (and what is even more important in a subsistence economy, reliable crops) from land much of which would fall within the Partial Cultivation or Uncultivable category for a simple system of shifting hoe-cultivation. The Bemba, according to their account, were formerly hoe-cultivators in Lubaland,

who learned "citemene" practices when they came into the woodlands they now occupy.[4]

Other tribes such as the Mambwe in the north-east imported their cultivation methods when they entered the country. In the Mambwe area "grass-mound" cultivation is predominant. The Mambwe were able to use their own cultivation patterns in the grassland of their new home, but, as they moved south, into a woodland region of poor leached soils they adopted the "citemene" system.[5]

In contrast, other groups, particularly the Lozi of Barotseland (south west) were able to build on already existing skills. The Lozi moved from the Angola-Zaire regions in the 17th century and their agriculture suggests that they may have originated in a similar grassland environment 250 miles north of the present capital.

The Lozi nation, essentially pastoral, developed a mixed economy and a complex agricultural system. They used their local resources to their best advantage. They manufactured tools from iron ore found in the swamps and developed local village crafts.[6] Gann notes that their well-integrated economy explained their strength and power.

> The Lozi Kingdom was held together by a system of exchange based on tribute in which each tribe participated with some specialized products. The complex economy needed men with different skills to keep it going. The Barotse valley, besides, was not densely populated. So the Lozi made no attempt to export labour and instead tried to attract more, either by devastating raids on the neighbours or by enforcing tribute of children, or by encouraging voluntary immigration and assimilating new-comers into the tribe.[7]

Their agricultural systems, like the others, varied according to the ecological conditions of the area and the cultural traditions of the various tribes. In the Lozi regions alone, four distinct agricultural systems were used. In the northern woodlands millet and cassava were produced by shifting cultivation practices. The central plains were more appropriate to grass-land cultivation. In the southern woodlands slash and burn practices and inter-planting of millet with legumes were more customary.[8]

Cattle have always been an important possession for the Lozi and are still highly valued for their manure which is used in the great variety of gardens they plant; Near the rivers maize clay-gardens (sitapa) are planted on the rich clay loams as floods recede in June. These are vulnerable because of the unpredictable height of the floodwaters. Mounds (lizulu) and ridges (litonge) are two other types of gardens which rise in the flooded plains like small islands. Other raised-bed types of gardens (mukomena) are formed on watershed plains and are constructed by mixing the clayey subsoil with the sandier topsoil. Another unique garden culture (sinshanjo) utilizes the seepage peat found along the swamps, where gardens are constructed by draining canals and burning the grass. In these gardens heavy crops of maize and sweet potatoes are usually obtained. Finally, at the edge of the sandy slope area the matema gardens -- a variation of the northern woodlands system-- produce millet

and cassava.[9]

All three systems described above indicate that the African peasant is not divorced from his environment but rather accomodates and integrates himself into it. The best adaptation on the infertile woodland has been the citemene system. It did not produce, however, much more food than for subsistence requirement. The plateau tribes supplemented it with hunting and fishing and, later, with tribute from the slave trade. The Lozi, in contrast, illustrate how under a wide range of drainage conditions traditional African peasants developed a highly complex socio-economic society. Depending on intensive manpower, they also developed an elaborated tribute-labour system and even practised transhumance as an adaptation to the ecological conditions.

Factors Affecting Traditional Agriculture

The relatively harmonious integration of the traditional peasant in his environment has been gradually disturbed by a series of factors affecting traditional agriculture.

a) The Introduction of New Crops

Before even colonial rule was imposed on eastern and central Africa two crops, largely cultivated in coastal countries, reached the central African areas. Cassava penetrated eastward from the western coast (Angola) into central Africa and maize westward from the eastern coast (Mozambique) along the Zambesi valley. Those two crops have had a major impact on the traditional food-growing patterns

throughout the country. Their cultivation essentially encouraged the development of agricultural barter trade in the central African regions. Cassava soon became the staple crop of the populations living in the wetter parts of the country- the north-western areas and the Luapula Province. The cultivation of cassava encouraged the formation of larger population settlements as well as their relative permanence because the production of this new crop allowed a profitable use of the land after only a rest of about six years.

In contrast, the citemene cultivation of finger-millet in the northern Bemba woodlands necessitated the laying of land fallow for periods of 30 to 35 years and required constant movements of small population settlements. Thus, this type of agriculture was not adapted to support dense populations and the Bemba had gradually to supplement their food production with agriculture tribute paid by the Lozi and other tribes in exchange for slaves and other barter commodities.[9]

In a similar way, the cultivation of maize in the eastern regions soon provided sufficient basic staple food to enable the eastern tribes to cultivate other crops for trade. Among the Senga, tobacco and colourful weaved cloth became prized barter articles; the Ambo were known for their rice and chickens;[10] the Lozi, as already mentioned, had long based their economy on trade. In fact the exchange of commodities with the woodland areas laid the basis for their

prosperous development and their relationships with neighbouring tribes.

b) The Slave-Trade

The nineteenth century brought further constaints on traditional agriculture. In this period, essentially dominated by the trade in ivory and slaves, the population had to provide food for an increasing number of hungry caravans with a reduced agricultural labour decimated by the slave-traders.

On the other hand, the slave-trade, despite reducing the agricultural labour-force, opened new markets for food and increased barter trade. Many more people could exchange their agricultural products for cash or other commodities. Furthermore, not all slaves were directly exported overseas, but a number of them were exchanged with the neighbouring tribes, particularly by the Bemba.

Observations

When considering the major events of the pre-colonial period with regard to agriculture, it appears that, initially, the traditional systems were relatively well adapted to the variety of environmental conditions and ecological factors of the country. The introduction of new crops-- cassava and maize-- began to modify the settlement patterns of traditional society and impose agricultural constaints on the citemene system of the northern woodlands. Later, even though the slave trade encouraged barter trade, it considerably reduced the agricultural labour-force, while

increased the food demand on traditional systems of production. In addition, the combination of poor soils, infestations of locusts, disease, droughts and famine sweeping across the northern plateau in the 19th century, adversely affected the agricultural production of the northern areas. As the result of both ecological and historical factors some tribes, particularly those living in the swamps, were drawn into barter in order to obtain essential construction commodities (timber and clay), while the northern tribes relied on the uniform conditions of their woodlands and continued to live their traditional life of subsistence agriculture.

C. THE COLONIAL PERIOD

At the end of the nineteenth century an important trade expansion movement took place from the east and south. In 1900 the British South Africa Company (BSA), subject to the power of the British Crown, administered what became in 1924 "British Central Africa".[11] In the influence of the colonial regime one finds perhaps the most significant causes and effects of underdevelopment in central Africa up to present times. The interest in the rich mineral resources and the influence of the early white settlers shaped the colonial pattern of development in British Central Africa.

In order to open the exploitation of Northern Rhodesian copper resources, the BSA arranged and signed a series of treaties with the local chiefs so as to dispose of the

Copperbelt land areas. In compensation it was agreed, under a Northern Rhodesia Order in Council (1911), that the BSA would provide the natives with other land suitable for their domestic purposes.[12]

In 1930, the Colonial Office expropriated 8 million acres of land for European farmers, 71 million were given to the African farmers and 105 million were declared game reserves and forest land. The best fertile land and tsetse free areas between Livingstone and the Copperbelt (the Line of Rail sector[19]) were declared "Crown Land" and, thereby, became agricultural areas reserved for commercial agriculture.[13]

In contrast, the African farmers were deliberately restricted to subsistence agriculture. The Colonial Office established "native reserves" to keep the African farmers off the "white" agricultural land areas.[14] The subsistence areas, which were found to offer a limited market for consumers goods,[15] were made to provide a reserve of unskilled farm

The expansion of the BSA drew an increasing number of white settlers into the country. By 1921 it was reported that 714 European farmers had settled along the Line of Rail and in the Eastern Province, near the BSA headquarters.[16] In March of the same year, the number of white settlers grew to 3634 as against an African population of 983,539.[17] An increasing number of European settlers considered that they ought to have a greater share in the government of the

country and decided to separate and have their own legislative council in Northern Rhodesia. In the process, however, these settlers behaved as if they were at home. They took increasing power in the government of the host-country and the Africans had virtually no voice in public affairs.[18] The following comment from a typical settler in Northern Rhodesia illustrates the spirit of participation at that time:

> To subordinate the interests of civilized Britons to the development of alien races, whose capability of substancial further advancement has not been demonstrated appears to be contrary to natural law.[19]

The Early British Policies

From the earliest stage of their intervention, the British applied the theory of "indirect rule" in Africa. In contrast to other colonial powers, who tried to reinforce the link between their colonies and the metropolis, the British adopted another conception epitomized by Sir Frederick Lugard in his book The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922). His philosophy proclaimed that

> for two or three generations we can show the Negro what we are: then we shall be asked to go away. Then we shall leave the land to those it belongs to, with the feeling that they have better business friends in us.[20]

Thus, the British would stay as long as they could and eventually retire gracefully, but "keeping their trade after the flag had been lowered." Implicit in the "Lugard

Doctrine" was the essence of indirect rule which, officially, was to guide the Africans towards running their own affairs. In reality however, indirect rule, under the pretense of giving the Africans responsibility and autonomy, was aiming at maximizing the benefits of the white population and the metropolis at the expense of the Territories. All early British policies seem to give evidence of the dual mandate of indirect rule in British Central Africa.

a) The Native Reserves and Chieftainships

In order to better manage and administer the rural sector the British decided to "organize" the country by grouping the subsistent populations into natives reserves without giving much consideration to the traditional agricultural practices and social systems existing in the Territory. In reality, such a policy aimed at having a tighter control over the rural populations and a more effective collection of taxes in the reserves.

To that effect, faithful to the principle of indirect rule, the local chiefs, who from time immemorial had precise boundaries, were given the responsibility of new arbitrary areas. Most of them "controlled" only the villages listed in their tax registers and their authority was restricted to that of servile tax collectors.

The results of such a policy were disastrous. Since there was no mechanism to prevent people from moving out of their villages, gradually the villages disintegrated and

split into small traditional family groups.[21] The BSA company observed in one of its reports that

> wherever European influence is established, the power of the native chiefs becomes absolutely nominal and in many cases his people scatter about the country in small communities of one or more families recognizing in a small degree their tribal obligations.[22]

More serious was the impact of such a policy on land resources. Considering the relatively low agricultural potential of the territorial soil in the subsistence sector, the sudden concentration of population on reserves caused food production to deteriorate. Allan estimates, for example, that the Lamba reserve land could support only 18 or 19 people per square mile. In the 1940s, however, that reserve had to support 44 people per square mile, or twice the population which its agricultural potential could sustain.[23] Other reserves, such as the Mushiri Reserve, suffered from artificial crisis. Mushiri was bordered by great areas of unused Crown land restricted for European use.

The native reserve policy not only shattered the production capacity of the reserves but the whole movement into the reserves

> resulted in extreme maldistribution of the population followed by rapid breakdown of the system of food production. [By the 1940s], much of the land was in an advanced stage of degeneration and becoming increasingly precarious.[24]

b) Market Control and Quota Policies

The world depression of the 1930s brought drastic changes in industrial production. Nearly all the Northern Rhodesian and Congolese mines had to close down causing a decreasing demand for food, but an increasing supply. Not only did European farmers become anxious about low domestic consumption and export demand, but they also felt threatened by the rising volume of African production and sales. The British policies enforced at that time were equally designed to protect the white community and further reinforced the regional disparities and the imbalance between European and African agriculture.

The Africans had steadily increased their maize production and near the European farms some had adopted better agricultural techniques. Their production increased from 30,000 to 100,000 bags between 1930 and 1935 and became competitive.

As an answer to the African threat the Colonial Office introduced a market control system designed to provide for quotas in the internal market and to maintain the domestic price level of maize. This was the introduction of government-set prices based on cost of production which has had far reaching impact on pricing and marketing policies in Zambia up to present times.[25]

The quota system was very biased in favour of the European producers. In his analysis of the "Maize Subcommittee Report (1935)" Dodge notes that

> The market was divided into an internal pool and an external pool. African producers were allocated 1/4 of the internal pool and the European 3/4. The internal quota for the African producers was determined by computing...the average ratio of African-grown grain sold to private traders to the combined total of African and European sales.[26]

This policy was working strongly in favour of the European farmers since not only were African sales growing faster than European sales, but also the percentage of European-grown grain exports was not subtracted from European sales when determining the internal quotas. Furthermore, the traders in African-grown grain had virtually no export facilities as compared with the European traders.

The other fallacy of such a policy came from the fact that European produce-price was calculated by averaging the higher internal sale price and the lower export price, thereby benefiting the European farmers once more. In 1936 for example, while the European producers received an average of K.O. 78 per 200-pound bag of maize, the African producers received only K.O. 50.[27]

The rationale for having the consumer prices subsidized by government or for keeping the internal prices below the cost of imported maize rested on the view that Northern Rhodesia had to have a cheap supply of food for her African labour. The fact that the employers had to provide rations to their employees also contributed to keep the farm-labour price rather low. As a result, this policy prevented both European and African producers to receive as much as they

would have under free market conditions. Ultimately, it benifited only the employers of African labour.[28]

In essence, the early British policies have had the most disastrous effect on the food production balance and traditional life in general. The imposition of indirect rule and native reserves shattered all traditional agricultural and social systems in the country and generated frequent food shortages, massive discontent and passive resistence among the rural populations. The early market control and quota policies favoured the Line of Rail sector and European agriculture, and the subsidization of consumer prices further consolidated the establishment of rural disparity between the Line of Rail and the subsistence sector.

The post World War II Period

After World War II the financial position of the British government greatly improved, and only then was more spent on agricultural development in the African colonies.

After general consultation initiated by the Colonial Office it was decided to expand extension services and make agriculture the basis of rural development.[29] G.F. Clay in his 1945 Memorandum on Postwar Development Planning in Northern Rhodesia summarized the proposal of a new policy concerning the relationship between European and African agriculture. In his Memorandum Clay proposed greater rural diversification in which African agriculture would complement European production. While African producers would satisfy the internal demand for staples, the European

would concentrate on livestock and cash-crops, which required higher technology, knowledge and capital not available to Africans.

Since at that time the country was producing only 40 per cent of the demand for wheat, 16 percent of that for dairy produce and 60 per cent of the demand for meat, the committee working at the Report on the Development of the European Farming Industry (in 1946) suggested, along the same lines as the Clay report, that agricultural development should move away from the copper economy and become more diversified. In their view a sound agricultural industry

> can be achieved only by means of a coordinated system of internal price stabilization of farm produce based on long term estimates of supply and demand, the control of marketing and the provision of financial assistance in whatever direction this is found to be necessary.[30]

The most striking aspect of these two reports is their extraordinary similarity to plans drawn up in the post-independence period. As Dodge pertinently observes, "they could have been written in 1975-1976 instead of 1945-1946".[31]

a) The Colonial Development Plans.

Despite the sound recommendations of the two preliminary reports to diversify agriculture and move away from the sole copper economy, the two major colonial development plans remained vague and gave little indication of the government's priorities.

The 1947 Ten Year Development Plan, which became known as the Federal Development Plan when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland was created in 1953, proposed the provision of bare essentials of social and economic services required by all sections of the community. It encouraged the development of natural and potential assets of the Territory and promised to assist the African populations in their own development under their Native Authorities.[32] The objectives of this plan, however, remained very broad and neither means, strategies, nor areas of priority were ever clearly defined in order to reach the stated objectives.

More indicative of government's concern were the capital expenditure figures shown in Table 2.1. Even though the percentage of capital expenditure for agriculture, rural development and economic development was reasonably high in the 1947 plan, the 1953 version shows a serious drop in rural development priorities. Only 1.4 per cent was allocated to agriculture instead of 6.1 per cent; only 2 per cent went to rural development instead of 11.7 per cent; and economic development dropped from 3.9 per cent to 0.7 per cent. In contrast, building and public works rose from 10.1 per cent to 25.2 per cent, and European education from 1.9 per cent to 8.4 per cent. Therefore, even though total expenditures increased from K 26 million to K 104.02 million between 1947 and 1953, the amount spent on agriculture, rural and economic development decreased by K 1.44 million.

The capital expenditure for the period of 1957-1961

Table 2.1

PROPOSED EXPENDITURE UNDER THE TEN-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN: 1947-1957

	1947 Version		1953 Version	
	K Million	% of allocated total	K Million	% of allocated total
European Education	0.50	1.9	8.52	8.4
Agriculture	1.56	6.1	1.44	1.4
Rural Development	3.00	11.7	2.00	2.0
Economic Development	1.00	3.9	0.68	0.7
Building & Public Works	2.60	10.01	25.50	25.2
.....				
ALLOCATED TOTAL	26.66	100.0	104.02	100.0

(Source: Dodge, op.cit., p. 20)

followed the same allocation pattern. Out of a total allocation of K 243.5 million, 68 per cent was allocated to railway and power development, and only 8 per cent was spent on rural and agricultural development combined.[33]

Similarly, the data compiled by Baldwin in Table 2.2 for the 1947-1961 period confirm government's greater concern for the development of urban industrial infrastructure as compared to the low priority given to agriculture and rural development.

While 45 per cent of the total capital allocation for that period was allocated to public works and communications, agriculture, forestry and veterinary, rural development, land and natural resources combined were

Table 2.2

PUBLIC ANNUAL INVESTMENTS FOR 1947-1961 PERIOD

	K Million	%
African Housing	23.4	8.1
European Housing	16.6	5.8
Loans to Local Authorities	31.2	10.8
Power and Water	77.2	26.9
Communications	51.8	18.00
Agriculture, Forestry and Veterinary	9.6	3.3
Rural Development	7.0	2.4
Land & Natural Resources	1.2	0.4

Source: Baldwin, A., op. cit., p.p. 199-200.

allocated only 6.1 per cent. Furthermore, Baldwin points out that the large expenditure on power and communication was spent along the Line of Rail and that 25 per cent of the total housing and loan expenditures were spent in the urban sector. In contrast, only 2.4 per cent and 3.3 per cent respectively were spent on rural development and agriculture.[34]

The progressive decrease of capital expenditures on agriculture and rural development indicates that the colonial government's priorities were clearly oriented toward urban industrial development and the development of the Line of Rail. The little expenditure allocated to those sectors leads one to doubt the colonial government's

determination to provide the essentials of social and economic services needed by all sections of the community. The colonial plans were not likely designed to assist the African populations in their own development and one can legitimately suspect that the development of the natural potential assets of the Territory were restricted only to the mineral resources of the Copperbelt.

b) The Colonial Rural Development Efforts

Even though the amount of capital expenditure allocated for the development of the subsistent sector was quasi-insignificant in comparison with that allocated to urban industrial development and the Line of Rail, it still was considerably more than that which was allocated by the BSA which was virtually non-existant. Furthermore, the colonial government realized that in order to induce change in the traditional agricultural systems, the improvement of African agriculture required skills in new techniques, and material and economic resources which were beyond the reach of most African farmers.[35] Thus, several farming schemes were launched to modify traditional agriculture and increase its productivity.

(i) The African Improved Farmer Scheme

This program was designed to modify the traditional agricultural systems through economic incentive strategies. The traditional peasants who decided to become improved farmers were re-located in the Line of Rail sector and provided with special marketing services. In 1950 the Maize

Control Board established permanent rural depots for the improved farmers and appointed a permanent buying officer for the sector. In return, the improved farmers were to adopt new techniques proposed by the Department of Agriculture and reach a reasonable level of production.

The strategy used to attract improved farmers was essentially economic. In 1946 it was reported that improved farmers were paid K 2.20 per bag of maize against K 1.80 for the unimproved farmers. The difference went to build up a fund used to stabilize prices and to finance erosion control.[36]

The overall performance of this program did benefit the farmers involved. Because of its biased policy, however, it benefited only a few privileged farmers and, from a national point of view, did not stimulate significant improvement. Moreover, in some cases unimproved farmers produced a higher average yield per acre than the improved ones.[37]

(ii) The Peasant Farming Scheme

In 1948 the colonial government attempted to clear new land by establishing settlements of volunteer peasants provided with enough capital to buy oxen and basic farming equipment. The rationale of the Peasant Farming Scheme was expressed by the Department of Agriculture as being an attempt to

> establish permanent African communities on a tenent-farming basis, the Native Authority being the land-lord under the enlightened supervision of the Provincial administration and the Department of Agriculture.[38]

The Peasant Farming Program, like the first scheme, did not prove very successful. Stumping was costly; some volunteers in the new settlements were unfamiliar with cattle farming and in some other areas bad climatic conditions contributed to low yields. As a result, the farmers tended to cultivate more land than they could manage; they had difficulty embracing new techniques in a rather short time; extension services were too limited; and, almost invariably, they started with heavy debts.[39]

(iii) Intensive Rural Development Program

With the growing unemployment in the urban centers the colonial government felt that intensive programs would strengthen the economy and slow down the increasing migration to the industrialized sector. The Intensive Rural Development Program was largely financed by the copper companies and intended above all to develop the Northern and Luapula provinces. This program was designed to give an intensive agricultural training to African farmers and demonstrate modern farming practices. Each scheme included grazing land and a group farm on which the trainees were expected to spend one or two training seasons before moving [illegible] farm settlements.

[illegible]ive schemes offered different forms of [illegible]ment Areas Training Centres taught construction skills, health, or sewing. It was assumed that trainees would in turn spread their knowledge in their

respective areas.[40]

This was the way colonial government was hoping to displace the traditional citemene system of agriculture and establish modern townships in the countryside aimed at attracting and holding a population that had grown accustomed to town-life.

However, all of these schemes proved once more unsuccessful. The two main reasons appear to have been inadequate funding and poor preliminary research into their feasibility. Furthermore, the qualified Area Development participants, who were expected to function as extension agents in their respective villages, faced resistence and misunderstanding and were held up to ridicule by their fellow villagers because the community at large had not been sensitized to those innovations.

c) Marketing, Agricultural Credit and Pricing Policies

Colonial marketing, credit and pricing policies reinforced the early policy of market control and commercial agriculture. Because it was more profitable to provide marketing facilities for large-scale agricultural production, government now provided marketing facilities and statutory boards only in the Line of Rail provinces.[41]

The same type of policy applied for credit allocation. Only commercial farmers could receive credit from the Land Bank, a government statutory agency, because they were the only ones who could produce titles and fixed assets as security for loans. Furthermore, when government decided to

provide credit for the establishment of research stations credit was allocated only in the more developed areas of the Line of Rail.

Similarly, pricing policies were restricted to subsidizing the marketing agencies for the differentials they realized in selling products at low consumer prices and to compensate them for expenses they incurred in purchasing agricultural produce from the farmers. In this way, government was securing an abundant food supply in the European areas. In contrast, the government-set prices for the remote areas were designed to make each subsistent region self-sufficient in food. When an incentive price had generated enough surplus government reduced the price to local producers.[42] As a result, generalized stagnation in agricultural production spread among the remote areas.

d) Observations

After World War II the colonial government, determined to expand the development of its Territories, introduced major development plans, rural development schemes, and new marketing, agricultural credit and pricing policies in the colonies. More funds were allocated to the development of the subsistence areas and considerable efforts were devoted to improve traditonal agriculture by implementing peasant farmer schemes and intensive rural development programs.

Despite the good intentions of colonial government the vague objectives of the plans, the progressive decrease of capital allocated to rural development and the provision of

seriously hindered the development of the subsistence sector. They rather alienated the African farmers from commercial agriculture and reinforced the early policies of market control. The development of African agriculture was too much conceived in terms of imposing British agricultural methods without adequate preliminary training, research and resources. Most colonial efforts were based on the widespread assumption that the African was not willing and receptive to learn "good" agriculture, and appeared to have been launched to keep the subsistent populations self-sufficient in food and prevent migrations and high unemployment in the industrial sector.

This policy of separate treatment for European and African agriculture combined with limited expenditure in the subsistence sector considerably hampered the development of African agriculture and reinforced the establishment of economic dualism through-out the country.

Summary

The geographic conditions and the Zambian historical experience under British rule point out the major development problems the new Zambian government had to resolve at independence (1964).

Geographically Zambia is not a uniform country but is divided by deep escarpments, swamps and seasonal floods which cause enormous communication and transportation problems between the north and eastern regions. In addition,

sole 40 mile road crossing the Shaba Province in Zaire. The increasing harrasment of Zambian traffic by the Zairean army and police render the north-south communications even more problematic.

The general soil texture shows a poor profile; rainfall is unevenly distributed; and most subsistence areas are infested with tsetse fly.

Besides poor communications and soil infertility, which considerably contributed to limited agricultural output in the northern woodlands, historical factors appear to have further perpetuated traditional practices and underdevelopment over the northern areas. The fact that the Bemba were above all warriors and supplemented their subsistent agriculture with trading slaves and other commodities did not enhance agricultural development in the northern regions, but perpetuated the citemene system even up to the present time.

More important, however, was the negative impact British policies had in the traditional and social systems of the country. The colonial interference in traditional agriculture not only upset the balance among the various agricultural systems but generated the development of a more acute imbalance of its own- the industrial versus the subsistence sector. Expropriation of land, native reserves and later colonial policies further reinforced the regional disparities between the Line of Rail and the subsistence

federal concerns did not threaten the old dualism initiated by the white settlers. Federal government stood for development by the non-African minority and private enterprise rather than by state planning.

The foundations for agriculture were laid on policies that promoted the creation of a class of improved farmers cultivating on commercial scale and producing the necessary cash-crops for agricultural industry.[43] British policies never fostered rural development beyond the piece-meal level which resulted in a situation, at independence, where the state of agriculture was a serious problem.

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III. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ZAMBIAN EXPERIENCE SINCE INDEPENDENCE, 1964

Until independence all development policies were virtually dictated by British rule; the natives had little input (if any) in planning the development of their country. In October, 1964, Northern Rhodesia became officially the new Democratic Republic of Zambia. National independence was to be a turning point in the future of the new nation. The United National Independence Party (UNIP) under the chairmanship of Kenneth Kaunda, the new president, was determined to "stamp out the sad exploitation of the peasants" along socialist lines adopted by the new independent government.[1]

One urgent goal of the new government was to put an end to ad hoc development practices and to use new planning techniques designed to reduce regional disparities and promote a harmonious development in the whole country. National development efforts, however, had to be guided by a set of principles defined in a national ideology. Humanism became the national guide on the road to Zambian socialism and appeared to be a promising doctrine promoting greater justice and equality for all.

A. ZAMBIAN HUMANISM AS A GUIDING PHILOSOPHY

President Kaunda's Humanism rests on the "high valuation of MAN and respect of human dignity" --a tradition which, according to him, "should not be lost in new Africa". For Kaunda,

> African Society has always been man-centered. Indeed this is how it should be, otherwise why is a house built?...Why build a factory?...For what else would there be need to grow food?...The simple and yet difficult answer is MAN. Simple in the sense that it is clear, all human activity centres around MAN. Difficult too, because man has not yet understood his own importance. And yet we can say.... that the African way of life with its many problems has less set backs towards an achievement of an ideal society. We in Zambia intend to do everything in our power to keep our society Man-centered. For it is in this, that what we might describe as African civilization is embodied and indeed if modern Africa has anything to contribute to this troubled world, it is in this direction that it should.[2]

The ideology of Humanism intends to regenerate three lost components of traditional society, and promote those past values to the rest of the world. Humanism first underlines the "mutual-aid" characteristic of traditional society designed to satisfy the basic human needs of all the members. Traditionally, most resources were communally owned and almost any activity was done on a team-work basis under the leadership and jurisdiction of the chiefs. Human needs were the supreme criterion of behavior; individualism was, at that time, strongly discouraged.

The traditional community was also an "accepting community" which did not take account of failures in absolute terms. Inept and incapable people were equally part

of the community life and social qualities were more important than individual achievement. While the success-failure syndrome developed with the age of individualism, traditional society did not value its people for what they could achieve, but rather for their presence (not their achievement).

Finally, traditional society was an "inclusive society". The extended family involved a wider web of inter-relationships and a higher degree of responsibility than the industrial society in which the family circle has become a self-entire universe, often preventing the acceptance of broader commitments. The Zambian Humanist, thus, contends that the extended family provides for social security in accordance with natural patterns of personal relationships rather than as the product of institutions. The extended family can also provide for extensive knowledge and experience but, above all, it develops attitudes towards human beings that go far beyond the sole function of social organization.[3]

In comparison with the colonial ideology, based on racial superiority which justified a quasi-complete political and economic monopoly, Humanism endeavours to preserve values of the past, to embody convictions which developed during the struggle for independence and to adapt these principles as a means of orientation to future problems.

Consequently, white racial superiority, white minority

rule and economic organization to the benefit the whites and foreign companies were clearly rejected. Humanism, however, found it more difficult to decide what other values and principles from the colonial past were to be discarded.

Fundamental Elements of Humanism

In order to inject Humanism into the life of the nation, several elements were considered of critical importance by the Zambian leadership:

a) The Role of the Party and the National Leaders

In the eyes of the new government the party was to play the most significant role in the consolidation of the national ideology. The party's important role was to establish a true socialist state and transform Zambia into a country where equality and respect of human dignity prevailed. More particularly the party had to detect and eliminate all capitalist tendencies characterized by individual privileges or inequalities among the citizens, and encourage hard work, self-reliance and cooperative efforts which were the basis of the new Zambian way of life.[4]

Kaunda called on government leaders in particular to abandon capitalist practices and privileges incompatible with the declared principles of Humanism. Discipline, responsibility and service to the people were the fundamental qualities expected from the national leadership. Great emphasis was placed on cooperation between party members and leaders in all walks of life. This was a key

element for the establishment of a true humanist state.

b) Rural Development and Agriculture

Rural devleopment was another key element underlined by the national ideology. Kaunda himself, in both public addresses at Mulungushi (1968) and Matero (1969), proclaimed that

> The philosophy of Humanism, leads us to place the major emphasis in the years up to 1980 on the development of the rural areas. This is because rural development offers to the masses of our people, both those who are now without jobs and those who are coming of age in ever increasing numbers in the years up to 1980, the best prospect of earning a decent living...It will be our duty to make sure that these opportunities are sufficiently attractive and are well understood by our people and supported by the necessary services...In the period ahead we must concentrate and direct our efforts to those projects in areas which are likely to bring maximum benefit to the greatest number of people in the rural areas.... In other words, comrades, from now on our priority is Rural Development... Our endeavour must be to make the increases in rural incomes self-sustaining.[5]

Rural development, according to Kaunda, involved the direct agricultural production by all members of local families through the use of labour-intensive techniques. Thus, rural development aimed at raising the agricultural production of small family farms with the help of services provided by government.[6]

The thrust of Humanism was to make the agricultural sector as productive and profitable as the mining industry. In order to implement this agricultural revolution the general participation of government, cooperatives, commercial farms and ordinary village units was

indispensable. Ideally, every village in Zambia and every individual within it was to become productive on the land as well as in secondary industry based on agriculture.

It was thus decided that, under the new direction of the party, the villages were to organize "productivity councils" in order to promote village production. The cooperative farms, individually owned, were encouraged to share their equipment and marketing facilities, while state ranches and state farms (the former European properties) remained government's prerogative. Government kept those properties because it considered them a potential element for the provision of extension services to new farmers and cooperative unions, and ideal demonstration centers for farming practices.

c) The Cooperatives

Successful organization of peoples' cooperatives was another important element for the development of Humanism in Zambia. Cooperatives, in the eyes of government, were expected to play a comprehensive role in many areas of Zambian development. If properly organized they could provide more job opportunities for school leavers both in the countryside and in urban centres. They were considered as having a considerable potential to bridge the economic gap between rural and urban workers. Finally, they could become an effective form of economic organization to the development of human resources and one of the best economic and political forces for the building of the nation. The

rationale for the cooperative movement was based on traditional values of common work and mutual-aid which were both basic characteristics of ancient Zambian way of life.[7]

d) Rural Participation

Another important lever necessary for the consolidation of Humanism was the mobilization and the participation of the grass-roots. It was strongly felt by the leadership that the country suffered from four immediate develpment problems: hunger, poverty, ignorance and disease. The interest of government only in the economic life of the country was not sufficient. According to Kaunda

> All our people must be brought into this... I do not want, even in economic terms, the government of Zambia to think of people as if they were mere pawns in the game. I want them to participate fully in everything we are planning and doing... To be effective we must think in terms of smallest unit of our social and politican organization-- the village.[8]

Thus, "villages" and "sections" became officially the grass-root development units in rural areas and in towns respectively. The villages, first, had to be regrouped to form clusters of about twelve villages located on suitable land. Then each productivity council, under the guidance of the party, was to encourage development from below and ensure that, whatever the plans were, they were people's plans. After having tasted the mutual-aid flavour of the new society these clusters of villages were expected to settle into cooperative societies.

e) Decentralization Structure

The new government was well aware that the mobilization and the participation of the grass-roots required better decentralization apparatus. Thus, in 1968, four administrative committees were established in order to ensure direct contact between the policy-making Cabinet, the provinces and the villages.

In every province, a Provincial Development Committee was established under the chairmanship of the Minister of State. The committee membership included all assistants to the Minister, the political assistants, the regional secretaries, the rural council chairmen and the provincial and district heads of civil service. The membership of some of these committees could reach the impressive number of one hundred members.

The major role of the provincial committees was to provide an administrative link between the districts and the central administration. More specifically, they were to check on infrastructural needs and available funds to enable the district to effect their plans.

The District Development Committees were the administrative structures working in close cooperation with the ward development committees. The essential function of district development committees was to enhance the agricultural development of the district, allocate production targets, and review the needs of the farmers such as loans and marketing facilities.

The Ward Development Committees had basically the same functions in their ward as the district committees had in the district. Their objectives were to provide an efficient administration to the villagers in the ward and to supervise the work of the village productivity councils. Furthermore, the ward development committees were to work out priorities and harmonize them with government's objectives in order to achieve maximum advantage from the implementation of projects conducted under their own management and those under government control.[9]

Finally, great expectation was placed on the Village Development Committees. Generally speaking, these committees were considered responsible for

> promotion and development of facilities for the betterment of villagers' social, cultural, economic and political lives and to create awareness among the villagers towards those ends.[10]

This gigantic task included planning, and growth and development of the village, promoting the spirit of unity among the villagers, encouraging agricultural production, organizing cooperatives and marketing, encouraging inter-village commerce, developing village industry and raising the general level of education in the village.

The close collaboration of these four committees was to meet the official aspiration for national decentralization--a key factor Humanism brought into play in its pursuit of rural integration and balanced economy.

f) Economic Independence

Humanism also held that being a republic had to be synonymous with reaching economic independence. Without economic independence "it was difficult", according to Kaunda, "to make the nationhood a continued reality".[11] Patriotism and the dedication of the pre-independence era were proposed as adequate means to achieve economic independence. But, beyond self-sacrifice and patriotism, "hard-work...brain to work out new master plans" and better distribution of indigenous caliber manpower were most important.[12]

More concrete steps, however, were suggested along the lines of giving the industrial workers better representation on the board of directors and greater participation in management.

Economic independence also involved the limitation on the earnings of Zambian entrepreneurs in order to prevent the rise of a "small selfish group able to develop their business using their privileges to build themselves the kind of life in which they can exploit others".[13] Thus, it was suggested that the taxation of individual incomes be raised in order to assist the poorer segments of the population, and that taxes on luxury items and accomodation be imposed.

Ultimately, Kaunda believed that it was possible to do as much by moral incentives as by economic ones.

B. DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING STRUCTURES ADOPTED BY ZAMBIA

After independence, Zambian government's growing concern was to intensify rural development efforts, reduce regional disparities and bridge the rural-urban gap. The wide range of development areas adressed under those major objectives influenced the new government to adopt national planning strategies. Thus, the development structures were embodied in two national development plans- The First National Development Plan (FNDP) implemented from 1966 to 1970, and the Second National Development Plan (SNDP) for the 1972-1976 period.

The First National Development Plan

FNDP intended to diversify the economy away from the sole copper economy, increase employment and personal income in the rural areas, decrease the dependence on imports, raise the genreal level of education, and develop a wide range of technical, executive, professional and management skills in the population.

However, the official priority given to a more balanced development showed only slight evidence in the planned public investments under FNDP.

Table 3.1 shows that out of a total of K 563.7 million, only K 87 million were allocated to agriculture and land, out of which only K 69 million went for crops and livestock. Thus, only 12.2 per cent was invested directly in crop and livestock development. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of the crops and livestock budget was invested in economic

Table 3.1

PLANNED PUBLIC INVESTMENT UNDER FNDP 1966-1970

Sector	Km.	%
Infrastructure and Transports Subtotal	215.7	38.3
Agriculture and Lands		
Crops and Livestock	69.0	12.2
Subtotal	87.1	15.4
Industry and Mining Subtotal	121.0	21.4
Social Infrastructure Subtotal	120.1	18.1
Other Subtotal	37.9	6.7
TOTAL	563.7	100

Source: Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning FNDP, July 1966.[14]

infrastructure and state-supported projects such as state ranches and special purpose production schemes. All together, these direct projects were allocated 22 per cent of the total crops and livestock budget.[15] In total, almost 82 per cent of the rural investments were received by the Line of Rail provinces and urban areas.[16]

Besides the poor expenditure allocated to the development of the rural sector, the amount of input allocated to provincial and district budgets was given in function of their previous preformances. Thus, the slow-working administration of most rural areas was

constantly penalized. This necessarily had a negative effect on the development of the rural areas.

Under FNDP, the planning procedures were highly centralized in Lusaka, the capital. The rural authorities were supervised by a special local government officer under the supervision of the Ministry of Local Government. The District Secretary was responsible to both the district and provincial government, and the province was directly placed under the responsibility of the Minister of State. This rather rigid vertical structure caused, in itself, a great deal of frustration in the lower levels of administration. But small local authorities, which were generally much less efficient than those in large urban centers, were also overshadowed by provincial and district government on the one hand, and by the Ministry of Local Government on the other.

More crucial perhaps was the difficulty of local authorities to retain suitable competent staff in the rural areas. The frequent turnover in staff did not allow for much continuity or promote better efficiency. Adding to these difficulties, long delays in the payment of salaries to staff in remote areas and growing inefficiency of civil servants, reflected in corruption and irresponsible utilization of public funds, seriously impaired the implementation of the new plan.

The Second National Development Plan

SNDP presented objectives similar to those of FNDP and

rural development appeared as a "matter of life and death". The major objectives of SNDP were

> to improve the rural standards of living and to create a self-reliant and progressive rural society;
> to create in the rural areas new employment and income opportunities and to improve those infrastructural services related to increased rural productivity, in order to counteract migration to the urban areas;
> To increase the contribution of the sector of the GDP and to promote the diversification of the economy;
> To develop self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and to reduce the growing dependence on imports of higher value commodities;
> To improve nutritional standards by means of increased production and consumption of protein and protective food for local rural consumption, rather than merely as cash crops.[17]

SNDP underlined several essential procedures to reach those objectives. It stressed the importance of maintaining consistent and coordinated policies and of diminishing the allocation of resources to most promising areas of development in order to make optimum use of those resources in less productive sectors. It also emphasized production priorities related to the nation's needs and the maintenence of fair prices for agricultural products. SNDP equally aimed at improving extension, marketing, processing, storage, input supply and credit services to the agricultural sector, and encouraged long-term development of family farms as the basic unit of production, supported by viable marketing and supply cooperatives. Finally, it proposed to create intensive development zones in rural areas as a solution to internal migrations.[18]

Despite the impressive objectives and the array of policies put foreward by SNDP, its performance was rather disconcerting. As many observed, its emphasis on rural development and on the expansion of agricultural production as a top priority showed little evidence when considering the investment expenditures recorded in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

TOTAL INVESTMENT OUTLAY 1972 - 1976

	Km	%.(*)	% FNDP (1st. Plan)
Rural Sector	151.5	7.79	15.4
Industry and Mining	655.0	34.48	21.4
Public Sector & Housing	918.0	45.15	38.3
TOTAL	1956.4		

Source: African Development, March 1972, p. 28.
(*) These percentages are taken from P. OLLAWA, op. cit., p. 5.

Despite an increase in total expenditure of K 1392,7 million over the first plan, the percentage of investment in the rural sector under SNDP dropped from 15.4 per cent to 7.79 per cent, while the public sector and the mining industry combined totalized nearly 80 per cent of the total capital investment.

A look at capital expenditure by province, as recorded in Table 3.3 shows perhaps more clearly the position of disadvantage the rural provinces had in comparision with the urban sector and the Line of Rail. The difference between

Table 3.3

DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN THE SNDP

Province	Population 1969 (Thousands)	...Planned... Total (K.m)	per Capita K	...Actual... Total (K m)	per Capita K	% of Actual Capital Planned
Three line of-rail provinces*	2,073	389.1	188	539.4	260	141
Two urbanized provinces**	1,565	296.4	188	448.0	286	152
Rural provinces	2,595	269.6	104	211.9	82	79
Zambia totals	4,160	564.2	136	658.9	158	116

*Southern, Central and Copperbelt.
**Central and Copperbelt.

Source: (SNDP), p. 167. (in T.M. Shaw, Dependence and Underdevelopment Athens, 1976, p. 27).

the planned expenditure and the amount actually allocated shows indeed where government priorities lay.

In the two urbanized provinces totaling less than one third of the total population in 1969, a per capita expenditure of K286 was allocated instead of 188, as originally planned. In contrast, the rural provinces which totaled more than 50 per cent of the total population received a per capita allocation of only K 82 instead of K 104, as originally planned. In this deal the rural provinces ended up receiving 3 1/2 times less per capita than the urbanized provinces and 3 times less than those of the Line

of Rail.

Despite the highly normative goals of better quality of life and improvement of social justice, these data suggest that SNDP, like the first plan, was biased toward public works and industrial development. Thus, the rural areas remained one of the most neglected sectors of Zambia's economic development. Both plans patently failed to fulfill their promises of agricultural improvement. There were conceivably sound economic and political reasons to concentrate on the economic infrastructure, considering the urgent necessity to establish new lines of communication independent from Rhodesia and South Africa. Nevertheless, the fact that economic and social investments were distributed very unevenly between the urban and the rural sectors, which prevented the integration of the rural areas in the commercialized market economy.

As in the previous plan, the dispersed and unorganized rural populations continued to have little bargaining power and still received lower income and fewer services than the urban dwellers. The disparity between the subsistence sector and the Line of Rail, inherited from colonial times, persisted in spite of the Zambian government's new planning strategies.

It appears that the failure of the new planning to meet the priorities granted to rural development and agriculture lay above all in the wrong assumptions underlying the national development plans. It was too widely assumed that

massive investment would necessarily generate increased incomes and market for food supplies and consumers goods, and that industrial development would play an important role in preventing expansion of imports of consumers goods as opposed to capital goods or raw material.[19] As a result, low priority was granted to agriculture because the agricultural sector was expected to have the slowest growth rate among all other sectors of the economy.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III

1. Kaunda, Kenneth, (1967) Humanism in Zambia, Lusaka: Zambia Information Service, 1967, p. 7.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
4. Ibid., p. 23.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Kaunda, Kenneth, (1969) Towards Complete Independence, Lusaka: Zambia Information Service, August 11th. 1969, p. 25-26.
8. Kaunda, K., (1967), op. cit., p. 31.
9. Republic of Zambia, Zambia Information Service, Village Productivity and Ward Development Committee, A Pocket Manual, Lusaka: 1971. See also Brooks, E.E., "Village Productivity and Social Development", International Social Work, 17, 1 (1974) pp. 35-41.
10. Ibid., pp. 35-41.
11. Kaunda, K., (1969) op. cit., p. 49.
12. Ibid., p. 50.
13. Ibid., p. 60.
14. See Dodge, D.J., op. cit., p. 56.
15. Ibid., p. 57.
16. Luhring, Joachim, (1975b) "Political and Administrative Aspects of Rural Development in Zambia", Africa Spectrum, 10, 2(1975) p. 149.
17. Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, Second National Development Plan, January 1972-1976. Lusaka: Government Publications, 1971, p. 61.
18. Republic of Zambia, Ministry of National Planning and National Guidance, First National Development Plan, 1966-1970, Lusaka: Government

Publications, 1965, p. 33.

19. Ibid., p. 33.

IV. A REVIEW OF SELECTED STRATEGIES CONTRIBUTING TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

Under the umbrella of the national development plans various schemes and strategies were initiated by the Zambian government in order to boost agriculture and improve development in the rural sector. Despite the poor success of the new planning, further exploration of the major rural development efforts adopted under the new plans may give a sharper picture of the problems involved in Zambia.

More efficient spatial planning of the rural areas was considered as a major development goal under FNDP. To that end two types of rural settlement schemes were launched in the rural sector. Agricultural credit and the development of cooperatives were expected to play equally significant roles in the rural areas. With the growing concern about the lack of progress in the subsistence sector, SNDP placed greater emphasis on the establishment of intensive development zones. More recently, in 1976, a National Cooperative Development Plan and the Zambian National Service have been the latest strategies addressing the unemployment crisis and the poor agricultural output of the subsistence sector.

A. THE RURAL SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

Under the first plan two basic spatial approaches to rural development were taken. The first concentrated on the provision of extension services throughout the country. The services included roads, shops, clinics, community

development projects, cooperatives and advisory services. The second type allocated funds and limited staff to "Major Schemes" for which specific areas had been chosen in relation to intensive production of basic foodstuffs.

Even though the settlement scheme strategy offered a considerable potential for the development of the rural areas, it encountered severe problems caused by the uneven population distribution in the countryside. The 1969 population census showed an average population density of 14 inhabitants per square mile, but the lowest density in the rural areas was as sparse as 5 per sq. mile, and 57 per cent of the total area contained only 9 per cent of the total population.[1]

As a result, the settlement schemes suffered from a lack of infrastructural facilities and it was far beyond government's means to provide infrastructural input to such large numbers of villages and tiny hamlets scattered throughout the country.[2]

B. PROVISION OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT

Provision of credit to farmers was another effort to support agriculture. In 1967 the Land and Agriculture Bank--the formal credit institution--was absorbed by the Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ), which was set up to deliver credit to Zambian farmers only. It was hoped that this amalgamation would provide more constant credit flow for agricultural credit. Unfortunately, bad debts started to

accumulate and since 1968 few statistics have been disclosed. In 1970 the government dissolved COZ and the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) purchased accumulated debts of K 22 million for only K 0.7 million, i.e., at three per cent for a 97 per cent writeoff.[2]

The AFC, in turn, tended to support the commercial farmers more than the small peasants. In 1972 it was reported that the AFC issued 11 million Kwachas in loans out of which only three million went to small farmers.[3] Similarly, the Cattle Finance Company Ltd., a subsidiary of the Rural Development Corporation, issued credit loans in 1967 for K 2.8 million. It was reported that all the 220 borrowers were commercial farmers on State land.[4]

The great problem facing credit agencies stemmed from the high cost of servicing small agricultural loans as well as from the insecurity resulting from collapse of land value. Financially the agricultural credit has been a failure and the credit worthiness of a large number of small farmers has been impaired.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVES

At independence cooperatives already had a long history in Zambia. Ever since the first cooperative was formed in 1914 the producer marketing cooperatives outnumbered the consumer and thrift cooperatives. While the European producers shifted toward statutory boards, the colonial government saw in the marketing cooperatives an adequate

medium to organize the African farmers.

The new government and UNIP strongly emphasized the necessity for economic and social development. Revitalized cooperative societies were considered to be adequate participatory structures and strategic mobilizational agents for the improvement of industry, commerce and commercial farming. The unemployed were called upon by the president to form themselves into cooperatives societies and to put their skills to work on agricultural and constuction projects. "The money is there", claimed Kaunda, "and the know - how is there, you can form cooperative societies anywhere in Zambia and we shall assist you in getting on".[5] Ten or more people could in fact organize, apply for registration and obtain government loans. Furthermore, new members no longer had to subscribe to share capital prior to registration. This was believed to be more equitable, since it would give the same opportunity to any Zambian citizen. Finally, the sum of 14 million Kwachas was spent directly on the cooperative movement between 1964 and 1969.

As a result a variety of cooperatives sprang up before the movement itself had time to establish an adequate institutional frame-work to assist them effectively. Five months after Kaunda's speech the government had received 2,000 applications for registration with financial aid requests; five years later, 53,000 members grouped in 1,280 cooperatives were officially registered.[6]

The Farming Cooperatives

The farming cooperatives dominated all the others. By June 1970, out of 1,280 cooperatives, 805 were agricultural producer cooperatives.[7] Farming cooperatives, however, soon ran into serious difficulties. The remoteness and poor road network, the heavy bureaucracy of the marketing agencies, and the lack of coordinated service delivery had a frustrating impact on the farming cooperatives. The process of providing credit and services took place in a most devastating way. This is vividly recorded by an example in Kasumpa village:

> the loan of one cooperative was approved in October and that of another in mid-November. The rain began in mid-November, which meant that the fields were unploughed at the time of the onset of the rains. While the seeds and fertilizers arrived on December 10th, the tractor did not arrive until January 8th. Even then, the tractor ran short of fuel and failed to complete ploughing the acreage for which it had been contracted. The result for one cooperative was, instead of the 50 acres which it had planned to plant, it in fact planted 7; and of the K 165 that was realized from sales produce, K 50.48 was applied to interest and the remainder to principle of an outstanding loan debt of K 3105. The farmers were left with nothing for their effort.[8]

Many administrative problems also contributed to the downfall of the cooperatives. The very efforts to "revitalize" the cooperatives were the cause of many problems. Government departments were not prepared to supervise and assist the cooperatives. There were very few skilled managers to guide them and most of the time mismanagement, thefts, conflicting advice, poor bookkeeping

and budgeting paralysed the whole enterprise. Moreover, other key personnel within the bureaucracy, some of them British civil servants, did not share Kaunda's view on cooperative farming and managed to undermine the whole program.[9]

The downfall of the farming cooperatives, however, came when government decided to credit the sale of cooperative production towards the repayment of their loan debts.[10] The result was that the money from sales remained in the credit agency and the farmers received no money from the marketing of their harvest. Consequently, they were not able to reinvest in farm-implements and pay back the loans they secured.

Finally, the simultaneous encouragement of state and private large-scale farms and family farming created a division between medium and small capitalist farmers who were salaried on the one hand, and the peasants and landless labourers on the other. Furthermore, as state and private farmers dominated production, they undercut the markets of family farms at local level. Private institutions, for example, preferred to contract with bulk suppliers because bulk purchase simplified their purchasing and prices were lower. Moreover, large-scale farms had their own transport and, thus, the institutions also saved on transport cost.

The Building Cooperatives

In 1970, 128 cooperatives entered the building industry under the coordinating organization of the Federation of

Building Cooperatives, officially registered in 1968.[11]

The building cooperatives also faced problems. They found increasing difficulties in obtaining materials and efficient foremen, and were further hampered by the lack of accounting and surveying services and their inability to prepare tenders.[12] Because of these numerous problems the building cooperatives usually had to abandon their projects altogether. This created a lack of confidence and a negative image of the cooperatives among the population and within the government itself.

> "Building cooperatives", exclaimed Simon Kapwepwe, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government in 1967, "which were our magic wand that was to solve the manpower problem, have not only failed to complete the projects which they tried but went broke despite being given all the financial assistance".[13]

Producer Marketing Cooperatives

As agricultural production was increasing and expatriate businesses restricted by government, producer marketing cooperatives were expected to play a more significant role in the agricultural sector. The government believed that those cooperatives would transport, process and market the crops of all farmers in their area and assure better returns from farm produce. In addition, they would also provide agricultural requisites to those who were not organized cooperatively.[14]

The marketing cooperatives encountered mismanagement problems resulting from regulations on trade of controlled

crops. These regulations gave no margin for the cooperatives to trade and, consequently, they ceased operations.[15] Their activities became restricted to electing committees and holding general meetings.

The other major difficulty arose from the conflicting role they were to play in relation to the marketing boards. The relationship between the Grain Marketing Board, the Agricultural Rural Marketing Board, the National Marketing Board and the cooperatives had never been clearly established. A working party set up in 1966 to examine marketing problems suggested that the marketing cooperatives equally had a role to play in marketing local produce, but it never clarified what that role ought to be.[16] Thus, a great deal of overlap resulted in marketing between the boards and the cooperatives.

The effectiveness of the marketing cooperatives was undermined, finally, by the fact that most of them dealt with individual farmers instead of offering their services to primary societies.[17]

In short, except for two of them, the Poultry and Eggs Marketing Union (CPEMU) and the Namwala Cooperative Marketing Union (NCMU), the performance of the marketing cooperatives relied heavily on government overdrafts for their operations, and government controlled their activities through working committees.[18] According to the Auditor General's Report of 1969, the overdraft of the Eastern Province Cooperative Marketing Union (EPCMA)--the largest

cooperative-- stood at K 1,027,551 in February, 1969.[19]

Credit Unions

In October 1970 The Credit Union and Savings Association of Zambia (CUSA-Zambia) was formed as a national federation of credit unions including six societies. This idea was introduced after independence by the Roman Catholic Church. Study groups were formed in different provinces and the first credit union was registered in November, 1976. The Zambian government encouraged savings, better use of credit and cooperative work. The official establishment of CUSA gave hope that the movement would grow successfully.

However, the credit union enterprise was a mixed success. Many of them faced the same problems as the farming cooperatives. Lack of training and poor administration were the major drawbacks in their establishment. The successful ones owed their achievements more to the personal credibility and dedication of the few missionaries involved than to government assistance. Many others discontinued because the most affluent members of local communities (teachers, local businessmen) did not identify themselves with the local peasants and preferred to extend their own businesses by investing in land or other commodities, rather than support the local communities by placing their money in the local unions.

D. THE INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT ZONES (IDZ)

In 1969 Kaunda, anxious to boost agricultural progress, declared that a new approach was necessary. As a response to his claim the IDZ strategy was adopted and pursued under SNDP.

This strategy, also known as the "concentrated", "integrated" and "package" approach, had already been tried in Kenya, Malawi, Ethiopia and especially in India for a number of years. It generally considers the socio-economic structures of a given area and focuses on linkages of local and regional activities.[20]

Kaunda had high expectations of this new strategy because he believed the national conditions were, at that time, favourable to a rapid expansion of economic activities in the country.

The IDZ program objectives can be summarized as follows:

> short-term objective: to develop a selected area in each province in a rapid and coordinated manner;
> medium-term objective: to encourage spread-effects from the selected area by (a) gaining experience and improvements in decentralized administration, and (b) distributing innovative and beneficial 'package programs' to a wider area;
> long-term objective: to act as an instrument of persistent regional economic and social progress.[21]

The implementation of such a program had wide implications. It required more effective methods of investment, credit and farming. The improvement of communications, transport and marketing facilities was

equally necessary, and soil conservation methods had to be promoted in order to compensate for intensive cultivation and cattle breeding. The development of non-farming activities and employment opportunities in the rural areas was envisaged by the development of small-scale industries: house building, production of local furniture and farm implements, and agricultural processing.

The IDZ program selected one district or corresponding area in each province which offered the best agricultural potential in relation to population density, and equally considered the existing administrative structure and the economic services of the area.

Looking at the practical outcome of IDZ, not much can be found of what Kaunda called "a revolutionary approach to development". For over five years no clearcut organization of the IDZ was adopted. Thus, officials were not sure of what their positions were in the program. Later, some research was conducted in selected zones; other zones were agreed upon by the various levels of government; and some expatriate staff worked in the Eastern and Northern Provinces. But, as yet, no investment has been allocated successfully to any area, staffing in the zones is still very inadequate, and virtually no evaluable project has gotten off the ground. Even though IDZ might show some progress in the Eastern Province, the projects in the other provinces are still in a most rudimentary phase.

Furthermore, the World Bank, in 1974, submitted a

report on IDZ in the Eastern Province involving management and organizational projects estimated to cost K 7.5 million. Of this amount, K 4.28 million were supposed to be provided by foreign sources.[22] This heavy capital investment indicates that the previous ideas of self-reliance and full use of local manpower through labour-intensive techniques have lost their importance.

In short, besides relying heavily on capital investment, the IDZ treated agricultural progress as a technological rather than an organizational problem, and gave too little attention to administrative bottlenecks and evaluation of projects.[23]

E. THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN (NCDP)

More recently, in June 1975, a new National Cooperative Development Plan (NCDP) was accepted by the Department of cooperatives. It is expected there will be 200 multi-purpose primary societies in Zambia and eight multipurpose cooperative unions, one in each province, to which these primary societies will be affiliated. In 1977 cooperative unions were working in four provinces. A joint effort between district cooperative officers and the cooperative wings is primarily directed towards information and education work, and considerable attention is given to feasibility and viability studies.

Characteristic of NCDP are the Investment Revolving Funds given from an investment fund to which the government

contributes initially. Loans are issued only after a study of the ability of the society to repay. They bear a low interest rate and run from 7 to 10 years. The Block Credit System, which is created with contributions from the government and other donors or from an arrangement between unions, makes primary societies responsible for covering loans from defaulters. Finally, the new plan includes a single channel marketing system, whereby a union applies, also on behalf of its affiliated societies, to a marketing board agent in the province. In this way, the system is contained; the farmer sells his crops to the primary society in the area which in turn sells them to the union.[24]

The current NCDP, despite its emphasis on education work, information and feasibility studies, revolving funds, and block credit system, will still have to face conflicting pricing and marketing policies which tend to support the consumers rather than small farmers. Unless the Zambian government modifies its pricing and marketing policies, the cooperative enterprise will still remain marginal and divorced from the national economy. Prior to the establishment of cooperatives, it appears necessary to verify not only that they can increase the value of production but also that this economic advantage will benefit the members.

Another weakness of NCDP is the assumption that a five year rolling plan, revised each year in the light of experience, will raise the rate of development according to

the wishes of the people, and promote self-reliance. In reality, it appears that the NCDP represents more the recommendations of the Cooperative Research Planning Team, composed of Zambian cooperative officers and Swedish expatriate contract-workers, rather than the wishes of the rural people. The NCDP reflects "top-down" planning and implies that success depends on a series of plans, systems and routines which can be modified in the light of the "experience" of each province. True cooperative experience, on the contrary, relies on both effective planning and simultaneous action. If cooperatives are to remain faithful to their principles, their benefit must stem from practical and proved successful experience, rather than from the experiencial plans of a planning team.

In other words, NCDP plans and organizes multipurpose cooperatives and then tries to persuade the farmers to join them, instead of offering means and alternatives or encouraging the peasantry to organize themselves into cooperatives in order to better meet their own needs.

A similar criticism can be raised with regard to education and training. A basic principle well established in the cooperative movement is the necessity of education prior to the establishment of the cooperative and the need for continuing training afterwards. NCDP, however, appears more anxious to set the cooperative process in motion and organize "cooperative wings" in all provinces in order to establish the physical and administrative structure, rather

than start with a comprehensive program of education and training.

Moreover, since multi-purpose cooperatives face rapid and changing environments, they require a type of organization that emphasizes decentralization of decision-making, adaptability and innovativeness.[25] Even though decentralization at all levels has been crucial in the Zambian cooperative enterprise, NCDP still appears to give priority to increased production and to more efficient management for higher productivity over genuine decentralization. The fundamental fallacy of this approach lies in the assumption that development is generated from a change in adoption-behavior rather than through enlightened motivation.

It appears, in conclusion, that cooperatives obey fundamental principles necessary for their good functioning. The cooperatives require proper education and training, sufficient capital and sound economic principles and competent and adequate supervision. Above all, cooperatives need to be supported by appropriate policy objectives.[26] Consequently, unless this "golden rule" is scrupulously followed, and unless the Zambian government reviews current pricing and marketing policies, decentralization and participation mechanisms as well as "top-down" planning strategies, the cooperative venture will likely remain handicapped.

The new plan faces the same difficulties. It still

remains to be shown that both the unions and the societies are well run, that they are capable of successfully developing mutual trust and cooperative education in their membership, and that they are able to deal with all controlled crops in the provinces. Ultimately, the NCDP will be implemented only at a rate acceptable to the farmers themselves.[27]

F. The Zambian National Service (ZNS)

In 1975 a rural reconstruction program, known as the Zambian National Service, spearheaded a new venture in rural development. The rural-urban disparities which had led to large scale migrations, high unemployment and economic paralysis called for radical changes. Thus, the government established Rural Reconstruction Centres in all 52 districts of the country. Every district was to become a centre for agricultural training and agro-industrial development.

Under this scheme 42,000 people were to be recruited each year. They were to receive initial military training for three months and the other 33 months were to be spent initiating the recruits in various agricultural skills ranging from agricultural production to animal husbandry. After their training, these people were to resettle in cooperatives and remain under the supervision of ZNS until they had given proof of their viability and self-reliance.

The rationale for this reconstruction program was to teach the young urban population- more particularly the

school dropouts- the art of systematic farming. It was felt that, while these new farmers were able to make a decent living in the countryside, the enterprise would, at the same time, raise the country's agricultural production.

The military training was specifically designed to improve the discipline among the recruits. From 1976 it was decided that all school leavers and secondary school students alike should be registered to undergo 20 months of rural reconstruction training before entering University or any other institutions of higher education. This training, according to President Kaunda, was designed to remove the "white collar job mania" among the youngsters. Trainees were expected to build their own houses and were not paid during their training, but were expected to "benefit from their invaluable rural experience."[28]

This rural reconstruction scheme, however, came as a surprise to many and had the appearance of a radical revolution. A closer look seems to indicate that ZNS was promulgated without much exploration of its feasibility. Rather, it was assumed that sudden action to maximize rural development would strike a positive response among the population, thereby generating the voluntary mobilization of resources on which the program was dependent for its success.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the recruits admitted to the reconstruction camps did not know what was expected from them, nor why they were brought there in the

first place. Many deserted, thinking that rural reconstruction centres were military camps.[29] Others were expecting to earn a salary for their service, contrary to the directives of the party and the government.[30] In addition, the general public hardly supported the new scheme. Thus, despite the large sum of K 17.5 million invested in it, the scheme achieved little because very few Zambian understood the purpose and objectives of the rural reconstruction centres.

These rural development efforts carried out under the new plans did not promote the development of the rural sector despite the real potential of some strategies applied. The widely scattered rural settlements throughout the country with poor infrastructure, lack of transport facilities and inadequate delivery of services have been major handicaps for most programs attempted in the subsistence sector. More crucial, still, have been the lack of planning and research, poor training of staff and rural population in general, and the structural deficiencies that have underlined most rural development policies. Decentralization, agricultural production, setting of commodity prices, just like the ZNS and the IDZ, are all open to the same criticism; they all equally contributed to fragmentary and inconsequential rural development.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV

1. Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, Census of Population and Housing, 1969, Lusaka, Government Printer, 1969, p. 5.

2. Lombard, C. & A. Tweedie, op. cit., p. 78.

3. Ibid., p. 78.

4. Ibid., p. 79.

5. From the President's Address at the Chifubu Rally, January, 17th 1965, quoted in Lombard, C.S., The Growth of Cooperatives in Zambia, Lusaka: Manchester University Press, 1971. p. 18.

6. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

7. Ibid., p. 22.

8. Bates, R.H. (1975) "Rural Development in Kasumpa Village, Zambia," Journal of African Studies, 2, 3(1975) p. 346.

9. Nadeau, E.G., "Prospects for Agricultural Cooperatives in Zambia". Land Tenure Newsletter, 51 (January-March 1976), pp. 26-30.

10. Bates, R.H. (1975) op. cit., p. 347.

11. Lombard, C.S., op. cit., p. 22.

12. Ibid., p. 22.

13. Ibid., p. 22. In 1967, the total loans given by the government amounted to K 1.9 million.

14. Ibid., p. 26.

15. Holmberg, Arne, "Agricultural Cooperatives in Zambia", Year Book of Agricultural Cooperation, Oxford: Plunkett Foundation for Cooperative Studies, 1976, pp. 145-151.

16. Dodge, D.J., op. cit., p. 88.

17. Ollawa, Patrick, Rural Development Policies and Performance in Zambia, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, Occasional Papers, no: 9, January 1977, p. 22.

18. Lombard, C.S., op. cit., p. 28.

19. Ibid., p. 28.

20. Luhring, J. (1975a) op. cit., p. 23.

21. Ibid., p. 23.

22. Ibid., p. 25.

23. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

24. Holmberg, A., op. cit., pp. 145-151.

25. Nadeau, E.G., op. cit., p. 28.

26. Youngjohns, B.A., Cooperative Organization, An Introduction, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1975, 1977, 1978, p. 26.

27. Holmberg, A., op. cit., p. 151.

28. "Zambia, Essential Facts", Editorial, African Development, (November, 1975) p. 249.

29. From The Times of Zambia, February 16th, 1976, quoted in Ollawa, P., op. cit., p. 17.

30. From The Sunday Times, September 14, 1975, ibid., p. 17.

V. AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM AREAS

The development planning and procedures of the new government did not reach the major objectives of the national ideology, but rather demonstrated the wide gap existing between precept and practice. The neglect of the subsistence areas, the lack of education and the inefficient provision of government services have been major constraints on the implementation of Humanism and development policies. However, the little bargaining power of the masses within an overcentralized administrative apparatus has perhaps had the most negative impact on rural development, and the ambiguity of the party's role and of the ideology itself are probably at the root of the development problem in Zambia.

A. GENERAL NEGLECT OF THE RURAL SECTOR

The general features of the current subsistence sector show acute symptoms of long isolation and neglect. Besides the critical spatial imbalance caused by migration toward the Line of Rail and the industrial sector, and staggering income disparity between subsistent farmers and industrial workers, most rural peasants are still widely scattered all over the rural areas. They live in small itinerant kin-groups that subdivide according to soil fertility or intra-group social conflicts. Even now, a large number of these settlements are inaccessible by car or bicycle and are completely cut off from service facilities and marketing

outlets.

The Zambian Manpower Study carried out in 1969 showed that among the subsistence population three fifths of the rural men and over four fifths of the rural women had never been to school.[1] At the present time, very few peasants are able to keep written records of purchases and sale of produce. Moreover, inaccessibility, lack of transport and markets, and lack of credit make the application of improved methods of cultivation virtually impossible.

In those areas some children walk up to ten hours with their weekly supply of "food" and beddings before reaching their schools. Furthermore, their school facilities are minimal and their educational opportunities limited to grade IV. Beyond that level, the children who have parents able to finance boarding school and travelling expenses to higher institutions are few.

Reports on health and nutrition also suggest that there has been a increase in nutritional deficiency since Independence. According to Luhring, the caloric intake of the average peasant was found sufficient to sustain him for only five hours of light work per day and only three to four days per week. It can be taken for granted that "about 70 per cent of the Zambian population live on the brink of existence."[2]

The general picture of the remote areas is one of neglect and isolation. This is felt by the limited amount of people able to sustain physical efforts and the limited

educational services and health facilities available to them. This situation reinforces the feeling of helplessness among the subsistence populations which results, most of the time, in interminable beer parties- the predominant recreational activity in the remote rural sector.[3]

B. IRRELEVANCE OF EDUCATION

Under the first plan, education, an important objective of the plan, increased considerably. Mwanakatwe reported that in 1963, on the eve of independence, there were only 7,000 secondary school pupils, but five years later in 1968, the number of secondary school students had grown to 56,000.[4] Similarly, Mateijko reported that for the same year there were 7,000 pupils in Form III (the third year of high school) and 4,500 in Form IV and Form V. In 1971, however, Form III had increased to 13,000 and Form VI and V totalled 15,000 students.[5]

In contrast, there were only 3 trade schools for the whole country in 1967 and only 291 students graduated that year. Likewise, agricultural training was rather new in Zambia and, according to Lombard and Tweedie, in 1972, the first agricultural graduate had yet to emerge from the University of Zambia. In 1970 4 students were in their third year, five in their second year and twenty in their first year. It was estimated, however, that only 4 per cent of all university students between 1971 and 1980 would graduate in agriculture.[6]

The fact that interest in education grew faster than the provision of educational facilities was a major constraint on the implementation of the plans. Thus, in 1968, the government had to reduce secondary school admittance to only 35 per cent of the total number of applicants. Furthermore, the rising cost and the financial implications for continuing this policy were considerable and threatened to go well beyond government resources.[7] As a result, most educational facilities developed in the urban centres which were considered areas of priority because of their high populations and the lower cost involved in providing educational facilities. Meanwhile, the remote areas were deprived of basic facilities and schooling material.

On the other hand, the educational system inherited from colonial times had created patterns of well-being, sophistication and culture which had had their appeal among the better educated segments of the population. These patterns not only outgrew the modest local possibilities, but reinforced the taste for upward mobility to the point that very few parents wanted their children to become tradesmen or farmers.

Above all, the Zambian school curricula were blueprints of the British educational system and delivered Cambridge Diplomas and Certificates which did not provide the necessary skills to become farmers. Thus, their very academic emphasis was hardly conducive to the overall

development of the country.

C. INADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES

National development has equally been impaired by the poor quality of marketing, advisory and regulatory government services to the rural areas.

The lack of storage facilities, little expert management and poor synchronization in the delivery of farm requisites have been major constraints on marketing services. Inadequate infrastructure and lack of transportation greatly increased the transportation cost of crops to marketing points, and caused considerable wastages of unpurchased agricultural produce. Not only were rural depots scarce, but their inappropriate location often prevented the development of good linkages between production and market points. In addition, the limited manpower and resources rendered the operation of the storage facilities most ineffective thus adding to NAMBOARD'S financial losses. Furthermore, the lack of synchronization in the delivery of fertilizers, seeds and agricultural inputs discouraged the rural peasants to increase agricultural production and generated widespread reluctance to invest new capital in agricultural commodities that might be wasted.[8]

Marketing also faced considerable problems due to the geographic situation of the country. Because it is landlocked, Zambia faces high transportation costs for

imports and frequent port congestion in neighbouring countries which prevent the farmers from receiving agricultural supplies on time. On the other hand, unpredictable political events may further accentuate import problems. Examples of this were the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia and the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique which closed the railway routes to Lobito and Beira respectively. All of these factors force the price of imports upward and compel the government to divert large sums of money into subsidies in order to keep the prices within the reach of the small farmers and to stabilize the price of agricultural products.[9]

Advisory services faced similar transportation problems resulting from poor infrastructure in the countryside. In addition, the number of vehicles was very limited and even more scarce were the funds allocated to maintain the available ones on the road. These shortages considerably restricted the access to the remote settlements and curtailed the commodity demonstrations in the remote areas.

More crucial was the limited manpower and the quality of training of most extension agents. The majority of staff was of urban origin and had received training which was far too academic to be of real help in the subsistance areas. Not only were extension staff divorced from the rural environment by their own personal background, but also they underrated the capabilities of the peasants and were prejudiced against the rural dwellers. This general attitude

of "functionarism" combined with poor transportation conditions and limited resources encouraged both senior and field-workers to spend most of their time in their offices.[10]

NAMBOARD, ever since its creation from the amalgamation of the Grain Marketing Board and the Agricultural Rural Marketing Board in 1969, has had a monopoly on purchase, sales, imports, exports and storage of maize throughout the country. It has also had a monopoly on distribution and sale of agricultural inputs and farming requisites, including seeds, in competition with the commercial sector.[11] It virtually became the sole legal regulatory body on food production and marketing in the country.

NAMBOARD'S performance, however, was greatly constrained by its rapid growth with too little expert top management and diffuse operations countrywide. NAMBOARD'S handling and marketing costs, for example, were excessive. For 1975 those costs have been estimated at K 2.00 per 90 kg bag of maize or almost 40 per cent of the producer price and at K 40 per ton of imported fertilizer or nearly 30 per cent of the landed cost.[12]

The major reason for NAMBOARD'S poor performance, however, was the government's failure to provide an institutional environment within which the board could function. A profit motive and sufficient managerial freedom ought to be given in order to promote the development of initiative and skills necessary for successful board

operations.[13] These conditions have virtually never been met. Never did the government clearly formulate NAMBOARD'S objectives. Neither the board nor the Ministry of Agriculture were quite sure of what NAMBOARD was to achieve, and excessive government control allowed little incentive to emulate a competitive model.

Consequently, NAMBOARD gradually came to depend on government subsidies. But despite its reluctance to inject funds into NAMBOARD, the Ministry of Agriculture failed

> to discover whether the increasing subsidies [were] necessitated by NAMBOARD'S inefficiency, or because the government set uneconomic buying and selling prices in order to keep urban food prices low and encourage farmers in remote areas.[14]

Thus, it appears that the government's failure to provide well-defined goals with a matching set of operational criteria and sufficient managerial freedom greatly contributed to stifle NAMBOARD'S operations. This failure directly contradicts the proclamations of Humanism which from its inception was to make production, distribution and marketing efficient.

D. INADEQUATE DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS

Decentralization was perhaps the effort that implied the largest changes in the new administrative structure under Humanism. Great expectations were placed in the new "decentralized" apparatus and it was estimated that 25,000 Village Development Councils were to be set up to boost

rural development. In reality, experience has shown that these new institutions emerged under very difficult conditions and, in October 1976, less than half were in existence.[15]

The main changes in the decentralization reforms of 1968-69 were limited, in reality, to the installment of cabinet ministers and permanent secretaries in each provincial headquarters and to the posting of district governors as political heads of each district government. Cabinet ministers and district governors became respectively chairmen of Provincial and District Development Committees. Although permanent secretaries gained some control over capital expenditures, the administrative reforms amounted to only partial decentralization. The decisions of the Provincial Development Committees had to be approved both by the provincial cabinet ministers and the national ministries, not to mention the fact that the departments themselves looked for direction to Lusaka for almost any decision. Consequently, this dualistic structure became a major constraint on the implementation of rural development projects, and communication at all levels of administration remained unwaveringly hierarchical.

The Provincial and District Development Committees, essentially designed to represent provincial recommendations and grievances to the Central Committee in Lusaka, achieved little success in their role as coordinating bodies. The Cabinet Office's working party reported in 1972 that

Provincial Development Committees were becoming the antithesis of determined agents of coordinated development.[16] The difficulties of these committees were due in part to the large number of members sitting on them. More significant, however, was the lack of provision for meaningful legislative and executive powers and the lack of clear guidelines which led the committees to disillusionment and frustration.

As for the District Development Committees, they were probably in even poorer shape. They lacked strong participation of local interest groups and were not effective links between the villages and the provincial levels of administration. Some others were almost entirely composed of civil servants who were visibly not interested in the problems of the wards or villages. Furthermore, the working party reported that "we have found no example of a District Development Committee decision because there is absolutely nothing that the committee is empowered to decide".[17] So one can conclude that, in contradiction with policy of decentralization, nothing was changed much since 1966.

At the grass-root level the VDCs and the WDCs did have some influence in generating policy discussions and giving information and ideas to the rural population and local institutions. However, the danger of politico-economic exclusion of the rural areas was perpetuated by the tacit coalition of government officials, the rising number of

rural capitalists, the well-to-do peasants, and other capitalist interests.

Another crucial factor working against the WDCs and the VDCs was the poor training of the local leaders in the content of the new policies. The level of their administrative skills was too low and their range too narrow to provide adequate leadership. The village "headmen" who were chosen to lead the VDCs were usually elderly people and poorly educated. Furthermore, they played a controversial role. Most of the local chiefs, still representing the traditional authority, were considered as allies of colonial power, whereas government officials looked upon them as symbols of tribal society to be transformed into new Zambian society. On the other hand, experience revealed that without the local chief's support most development efforts were doomed to failure because chiefs still commanded the loyalty of most of their people.

The third difficulty resided in the poor general training of the local population itself. Local people were even less prepared for decentralization than their headmen, and no basic preparatory technical skills--necessary for a minimum of community self-reliance-- were ever developed at village level. Furthermore, the government's failure to provide the villages with the small subsidies indispensable to any simple community activity paralysed the development of the local communities.[18]

The overall decentralization efforts were further

obstructed by the serious lack of coordination at both departmental and administrative levels. Too often department officials made contrary statements and disappointed the farmers with numerous promises which never materialized. In one district, Tailor reports, a water development program was promoted separately by the Departments of Community Development, Water Affairs, Agriculture, Education and Rural Council. Each department started the same program without mutual consultation. As a result, not only were staff resources wasted but confusion arose among the population.[19] The grass-root development committees in particular were loaded with uncoordinated specialists and contradictory information, and no common program easy and simple enough for the people to understand, was ever designed for the local communities.[20]

In the final analysis, the new decentralized system achieved little because the executive authority remained too strongly centralized in Lusaka and generally failed to delegate its powers from the centre to the field. The cabinet ministers had no responsibility to justify their position. The district governors had little control over the development departments in the districts, and the Provincial Development Committees became "talking shops" unable to coordinate development activities because they had virtually no executive or decision-making power with regard to the development of the provinces. Finally, tremendous shortages of competent staff played a crucial role in the poor success

of the new decentralization efforts.[21]

E. LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

Since 1972 the UNIP has been the only legal political party. This has had serious implications in the area of rural participation and integration. Not only was UNIP to become the main vehicle of Humanism, but the party members were to be the most active agents for the political, social and economic success of the grass-roots by ensuring optimum agricultural production and equitable distribution of wealth in the best interest of the Zambian people.

For several reasons, however, UNIP has not yet succeeded in organizing the socio-economic development of the masses. UNIP's failure at mobilization was due, first, to a tremendous loss of manpower at independence. Many dynamic leaders moved upward in the civil service or served in other parliamentary tasks. As a result, UNIP became a bureaucratic association of urban group interests, thereby deflecting the members from their own ideology and causing them to lose contact with the rural masses.[22]

Secondly, UNIP faced considerable difficulties caused by inadequate training of agricultural staff. There were hardly any militant party members educated in government agricultural policies living in the villages. Even more scarce were party members trained in new agricultural skills, extension, community development and rural animation methods.

Thirdly, financial shortages made it impossible for UNIP to support an adequate central staff to run the mobilization program. In 1970, for example, the central staff of UNIP consisted of only a few officials helped by less than 200 full-time personnel, poorly paid and educated, in comparison with more than 51,000 civil servants.[23]

Last, but not least, UNIP discovered that rural mobilization for economic progress had far deeper implications than superficial mobilization. Short of adequate personnel and resources, the party functionaries became gradually more involved in selling party membership cards and organizing votes and rallies than in working towards genuine rural mobilization. Mobilization for agitational purposes required a lot less knowledge and energy than the promotion of numerous skills and hard work required for rural development.

The root cause of UNIP's problem, however, appears to go well beyond training, personnel and resource shortages; it seems to point to the fundamental contradiction underlying the whole post-independent period- the conflict resulting from the fundamental objectives of Humanism and the vested interests of a small powerful business and political elite. The implementation of Humanism requires an all-encompassing task that runs against the interests and influence of the civil servants. Thus, in cases of conflict, civil servants tend to leave out exclude politicians from access to information and can virtually exclude the local

development committees.[24] However, the government's tendency to encourage the civil servants to become party members, leads one to doubt UNIP's priorities.

> ...it still rests upon UNIP to disprove convincingly the main suspicion that it is essentially a tribal party (party of Bemba for the Bemba); that it represents a party which tends to suppress controversial views instead of integrating them; that it is a party of a small urban bourgeois group preventing broad participation and devolution of power.[25]

F. THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF HUMANISM

The ambiguity of UNIP's priorities and its apparent alliance with the central administration calls for a further exploration of Humanism itself.

The coordinated interaction between the mobilisation of resources and the political structures involves basically the choice of adequate means to reach the desired goals. Choice logically determines the appropriate strategies to reach the stated objectives. In other words, the choice of development strategies cannot be ethically neutral.

Roberts's model, as illustrated in the diagram below, suggests that the choice of development strategies depends ultimately on the "social philosophy" of the political leaders who exercise power.[26] In his view the development process starts with a state of tension arising out of problems or goals related to the quality of life. Most of these tensions result from forces engendered by the relationship between people, institutions and physical

environment.



Figure 1: Environment of Community Development

The "social philosophy" is defined as being the main political and social ideas which are inherent in the behavior of these people and groups in society who exercise power and enjoy authority. The "social structure" represents the complex of existing institutions and their roles in shaping the lives of people in society. The relationship between social philosophy and social structure influences the way people perceive their environment, their personal development and the resources available to them. The social structure reflects the ends the social philosophy sets out for the society and its members, and provides the structural context in which development takes place. The relationship between these components thus involves the interaction between the individual and society, i.e. the people's capacity for self-actualization by making responsible choices on the one hand, and the kind of political regime best suited to allow and encourage self-actualization on the

other. Consequently, the relationship between social philosophy and social structure affects immediately the kinds of opportunities for human development.

In this model, the basic "needs" required for human development include the broad categories of "social needs" (arising from social changes caused by movement of population, changes in family relationship, mobility of people and changes in age distribution); "cultureal needs" (arising from the meeting of different cultures and tensions between traditional and industrial society); "psychological needs" (arising from the individual's necessity to reach a satisfactory level of education for local participation in the government process); "economic needs" (arising from the individual's necessity to acquire adequate training for occupations at all levels of skills); and, "education needs" (arising from adults who need continuing education to fulfil their personal development).

The implication of this is that human development, which includes a wide range of political, social and educational needs, grows in function of the social structure and value system of existing holders of power. Inequality in any of these opportunities is, in itself, an indicator of need for social change.

"Resources" are essentially directed to three major groupings: "human resources" (the ability of people to do things and help others to learn and do things); "material resources" (financial, physical and natural); and,

"organizational resources" (the amalgamation of human resources, voluntary work and other resources, considered as means to influence separate individuals to put themselves collectively in a position of power to influcence others). Just like needs, which usually reflect a lack of resources, these resources can be realized only if they are recognized by the social philosophy and reflected in the social structure.

In the middle of these four components stands the individual, from whom stems a need and who can be a resource. The extent to which it is he, and not the collectivity or other privileged groups, who is the central point of reference in the development process, is a crucial factor in choosing and applying different strategies of change. Even though both people's needs and their rising aspirations invluence the social philosophy and the kind of institutions emerging through time, the opportunities available to them to develop themselves and participate in society are ultimately influenced by the prevailing social philosophy and social structure in society.

If in Zambia ecological factors played an important role in the underdevelopment of the country, the development strategies adopted under the FNDP and SNDP appear to have been based on the strong assumption that economic development was the ultimate answer to unbalanced growth. The fact that the strategies seem to defeat their very ideology reveals a radical opposition between the central

values of Humanism and the operational strategies adopted. Several factors may have contributed to the inconsistency between humanist values and the strategies chosen.

Historical Factors

During the period of nationalist struggle the Zambian leaders had little contact with marxist-leninist theories of scientific socialism or with the practical experiences of other socialist countries. Humanism was indeed conceived in the very early post-independent period in a country almost entirely under foreign economic control and in a society situated in a very difficult geographic location. Zambia shared boundaries with all four unliberated states of Southern Africa and depended on them for access to sea, imports and manpower. Thus, Zambia remained outside the major African trends of thought and did not benefit from mutual familiarity and cross-fertilization of ideas which could have helped Humanism strike a better balance between ideological principles and practical implementation.[27]

Furthermore, Zambia was deliberately steered away from socialism by the widespread colonial notion that socialism destroys religious observance and, more significantly, by the fact that the Northern Rhodesian economy was immediately dependent upon western skilled manpower, technology and markets. Thus, the Zambian leaders feared antagonizing the west by moving too directly towards a Zambian version of socialism. This resulted in widespread ignorance of the ideological content of socialism and general

misunderstanding of the nature and direction of imperialism, social forces, and persisting underdevelopment of the former colonies in developing countries.[28]

As a result of colonial influence, Zambia, as many other countries in Africa, did not develop an autonomous "intelligentsia", i.e., a group of motivated people endowed with appropriate analytical skills and social values to wrestle with the problems Africa faced in the world. Kandeke, for example, suggests that an intelligentsia, indigenous in origin and ideas, self-confident yet humble, independent yet committed, is necessary for the development of Zambia. In this view, Humanism is both the product of such an intellectualism and the stimulus for the development of such a group in Zambian society. Only an autonomous intelligentsia will be able to make choices among the various aspects of the colonial legacy because the intellectual elites are best equipped to perceive problems more clearly and formulate better alternatives for the development of African societies. Intellectuals only can facilitate changes and yet preserve national identities, for they are the only ones able to act "as the moral drum-beat of this social progress".[29]

It appears, therefore, that Zambian Humanism is an ideology in its infancy which, as such, could still be expected to grow. Whether it will be embraced by other nations or discarded, Humanism remains a stepping stone on the long road to the indigenization of African thought in

the contemporary world because it will push the African intellectual elites to create new world views.

Problems of Content

It is also true, on the other hand, that Zambia is not yet a fully humanist society nor can the irreversability of her humanistic features be purely assumed. Experience has revealed that Humanism faces considerable problems of interpretation and content.

The Ministry of Planning and National Guidance, for one, sees in Humanism the preservation of traditional values. This interpretation runs into the problem already ident[illegible] of choosing which values to accept and which to [illegible]ne further wonders what criteria does Humanism use [illegible] of conflict between traditional values themselves (f[illegible]xample between the centralized authority of the Lozi and [illegible]he village self-government of the Tonga). More sig[illegible]ficantly still, which traditional values are viable in urb[illegible]n industrialized society? Is the promotion of self-reliance a wise choice in a modern economy characterized by high division of labour and by excessive growth of state-provided social services? Traditional values alone, thus, do not appear to be effective guides to modern problems.

Others consider Humanism as a reformed version of capitalism. Meebelo, for example, argues that Humanism is different from both capitalism and socialism. It is felt that [illegible]controlled capitalism, understood as being the

economic system by which ownership of wealth, production and distribution of goods, and reward of labour are entrusted to, and effected by private enterprise, led to increasing inequalities and unbalanced growth in the country. Similarly, socialism, understood as an order of society in which the means of production distribution and exhange are to be owned in common, and in which the state sheds its coercive functions, appears to reduce individual freedom and development. Humanism, acording to this interpretation, must, therefore, differ from capitalism because capitalism is an organized exploitation of man by man, but Humanism must also differ from socialism since, in a communist society, the ideology is not the servant of man but its master. Considering that Humanism claims to be a man-centered ideology, it can be neither of them, but must find a happy compromise between capitalism and socialism.

Humanism however, accepts a mixed economy based on free enterprise with much of the means of production found under private ownership. Fortman, contrasting Tanzania's Arusha Declaration and Zambia's Mulungushi economic reforms points out the significant difference between Tanzania which does not believe in private enterprise and Zambia which believes in controllable private enterprise.[30] President Kaunda not only recognizes the importance of private initiative, but welcomes foreign captial,[31] provided it leads to fair profit - not exploitation.

The encouragement of private enterprise under Zambian

Humanism is bound to face the same problems of capitalism itself. One wonders how the exploitation of man by man can be eliminated under capitalism, even when reformed, and even more, how can a state in a mixed economy "control" capitalism. More fundamentally, can even capitalism be reformed at all? So far, not many ex-colonies (if any) have found a satisfactory solution to their development in following the capitalist route[32] and one certainly doubts whether Zambia will ever be able to control capitalism.

The third interpretation of Humanism underlines traditional "socialist" elements of the ideology. Kandeke and the other proponents of this interpretation argue that the pre-capitalist non-exploitative element was the best aspect of traditional African society. Unfortunately, this traditional characteristic, in their view, is lost in most LDCs, since most industrial economies follow a capitalist pattern or some other kind of socialism. Thus, according to this interpretation, the contemporary equivalent of traditional non-exploitative characteristic (Humanism), will only be found in a new form of "Socialism" adapted to the African context.[33]

Evidently, if Zambia wants to direct effectively the future of her people and avoid all kinds of distortions in her development, she has to define more clearly which of these various interpretations corresponds to the reality of her values and ideology. So far, Humanism deals at length with values, goals, "institutional reality", but never seems

preoccupied with giving a sound critique of the state of Zambian society, even though this could enhance the acceptance of new goals and values. Zambian Humanism has never probed the urgent questions of international exploitation, such as neo-colonialism and imperialism, nor those of domestic exploitation, class conflicts, and struggle among racial groups all of which appear to be central factors contributing to unbalanced development in the country.

Problems of Opposition

Finally, Humanism faces serious problems of opposition at both national and international levels. These are probably the most patent and the most urgent problems facing the Zambian ideology. While Kaunda highlights the socialist content of the ideology, anti-socialist groups inside and outside Zambia simultaneously dispute the socialist implications of Humanism and give it a capitalist gloss in their own interest.

The new African capital-owning bourgeoisie, entrenched in commercial farming and public works, dislikes the committment of Humanism against exploitation and inequality. It also opposes decentralization and workers' participation because all of these measures run counter to their private interests. Moreover, certain civil servants and parastatal agency officers participate indirectly in the private sector through relatives and friends, not to mention army officers, mainly trained in capitalist states, and politicians, who

are also deeply involved in numerous private sectoral activities.

Similarly, the European and Asian groups-- the resident bourgeois elements-- who suffered considerable restrictions in their economic undertaking after the economic reforms of 1968, create alliances with the new indigenous bourgeoisie to quietly sabotage certain objectives of Humanism "via non-cooperation in localization, corruption of state officials over citizenship, and possibly even financial support for dissident political elements".[34]

The most serious problem of opposition, however, arises from the large multinational corporations which operate in Zambia. Their strength comes from their transnational character which allows them to mobilize opposition at international level, while remaining perfectly attuned to the domestic policies of the country.

Until 1970, the Anglo American Corporation Group (ZAMANGLO) and the Roan Selection Trust Group (RST) controlled the mining industry. They produced respectively 52 per cent and 48 per cent of the national copper production which accounted for 60 per cent of government revenues in royalties and taxes.[35] After 1970, although Zambian Government owned 51 per cent in the shares in the mining sector, the trans-national corporation still could export a surplus of K 200 million per annum or 20 per cent of the GNP through generous compensations and profitable management contracts granted by government.[36] This

considerable power gave the corporations enough self-confidence to oppose Humanism in the areas running against their interests. Both the value implications of Humanism and the national economic policies were equally unwelcomed by the multinationals. Thus, they used their

> links with western monetary markets, their relations with shipping firms and their vital role of supply of skilled foreign manpower to compel Government to slow down on the further translation of Humanism into practice. In particular, effective workers' participation, humanist management practices and significant income redistribution may all be delayed.[37]

Without the early consolidation of humanist management practices, workers' participation, and income redistribution, a solid working class could not develop to counteract anti-humanist forces. The new Zambian bourgeoisie, on the other hand, continued to grow from various kinds of coalitions between multinationals, reactionary western interests and other domestic bourgeois elements.

G. CONCLUDING SUMMARY

Both planning procedures and development efforts implemented by the new Zambian government have followed development patterns similar to those implemented during the colonial period. Despite the central thrust of Humanism to lead Zambia to self-reliance and its strong emphasis on the development of the subsistence sector, rural participation and appropriate decentralization structures, the national

ideology failed to meet the popular apirations of the rural masses. Three central factors appear to have consistently hindered the post-independence development venture.

All self-help schemes appear to indicate that the rural populations never understood the real implications of self-reliance. Self-help enterprise, in the eyes of the rural peasants, is rather conceived in terms of receiving all facilities from government including a salary. This dependence-expectation is all the more pervasive as one penetrates into the remote areas where government is not only held responsible for all socio-economic ills of the masses, but is expected to use power and resources to solve them.[38] As a result, people feel extremely reluctant to contribute to the realization of self-help programs.

This fundamental attitude of dependence also demonstrates the mis-conception the peasants have of the nature of government and of the purpose of its services. The consistent misuse of government subsidies, the frequent trading of farm requisites across the Zairean border and the recurrent difficulty of repaying loans, clearly point to the importance of attitudinal change among the rural populations with regard to government and development services. Unless the rural people perfectly understand the national objectives and the purpose of the services involved, government will continue to face great difficulties in winning the support of the rural masses, and additional development resources will continue to defeat their purpose.

The second crucial factor which bears immediately on attitudinal change in the peasantry appears to be the consistent lack of rural participation underlying the whole rural development venture in Zambia. Despite Kaunda's solemn proclamations to involve all people in planning and implementing the development of the nation, Humanism failed to create a vital link between the participation of the masses in rural development and the production of a self-reliant society. Rural development is too often equated with agricultural production increase in which the peasant becomes a mere cog in the production machinery without being able to express other vital needs necessary to rural welfare. Self-reliance, thus, appears more as the imposition of agricultural production targets on the peasantry in order to double agricultural exports than as the provision of mechanisms necessary to mobilize local resources and achieve the development of the subsistence sector.

Finally, the consistent application of ad hoc policies delivered as political declarations to satisfy divergent psychological expectations prevents Humanism from implementing long-lasting solutions to the various aspects of rural development. In this policy-making process, the primacy of politics ultimately determines the choice of development strategies and the kind of policies to be implemented. As a result, rural development efforts only reflect sporadic attempts to solve immediate problems instead of following long-term development objectives.

This problem-solving process has been described by Hirschman as the "motivation-outruns-understanding style" which is characterized by the tendency of motivation to pull ahead of understanding. This process is typical of most "societies anxious to attack a variety of problems regardless of whether their resources, abilities and attitudes are in harmony with the task they are undertaking".[39] Most certainly Zambia belongs to this group of countries which emphasize their revolution of expectations and show a strong desire to solve all problems of economic, social and political backwardness as rapidly as possible. Unfortunately, the lag of understanding behind motivation generates many mistakes, misunderstanding, and difficulties resulting in a far more frustrating path to development. The desire to maximize the central political objectives by dramatic political declarations does not seem to mobilize automatically all the required resources to achieve them.

This problem-solving style has underlined most development policies and rural development efforts of the Zambian government. This was well illustrated by the cooperative movement and, more recently, by ZNS which came as unexpected remedies to urgent problems with not much preparation or commitment on the part of the national leaders.

It appears, therefore, that, if Zambia is to develop more successfully, she has to look for a better integrated

development strategy, instead of relying on piece-meal approaches with trickledown effects. Above all, Zambia needs to coordinate the interrelationship between the mobilization of the developmental resources and the political and administrative structures of the country.[40] Zambia has to put an end to

> the gulf [existing] between precept and practice,... between endless planning and inadequate execution, on the one hand, and on the other, the tendency to misuse the provincial, district and village participation more or less as a means to gain support for decisions already taken or prepared at central level.[41]

The propagation of ideals and "lofty goals" is not sufficient to generate rural development, even when accompanied by substantial capital investments. Long-term planning, decentralization with effective participation of the masses as well as better access and distribution of resources appear to be urgent focal points in the aspiration to reduce the rural-urban gap. These, however, will largely depend on the political will of the leaders, a better definition of their ideology and value-system, and on the design of policies that match intention with performance.

The provision of technical and extension services and control over financial allocation are all vital factors of rural development, but successful programs of planned change require the willingness of the masses to take up the challenge of improving their socio-economic conditions and their readiness to undertake local projects for the desired

changes. The Zambian masses will reach this degree of willigness only when their attitudes toward self-reliance will prevail and when their image and expectations of government will have changed.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER V

1. Republic of Zambia, Development Division, Office of the Vice-President, Report on Zambian Manpower, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1969, pp. 5 - 8.

2. Luhring, J. (1975a) op. cit., p. 15.

3. In the writer's experience, the combination of social and customary beer parties in the region of Mulobola village (Northern Province) have consistently been a major difficulty to meet and work with the village authorities and the local population. Each beer party lasts usually for a few days and welcomes all villagers and passers-by. Considering that each villager in turn gives every year several beer parties in his own village and attends numerous other beer parties in the neighbouring villages, a good number of people are spending most of their time going from beer-pot to beer-pot.

4. Mwanakatwe, J.M. (1967) "The Progress in Education in Zambia since Independence", OPTIMA, 17 (December 1967) pp. 159-160.

5. Mateijko, Aleksander, The Upgrading of the Zambians, Meerut: Sashna Prakashan, 1976, p. 11.

6. Lombard, C. & A. Tweedie, op. cit., p. 73.

7. Mwanakatwe, J.M. (1968) The Growth of Education in Zambia Since Independence, Lusaka: Oxford University Press, pp. 5-6.

8. Ollawa, P., op. cit., p. 18.

9. Ibid., p. 17.

10. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

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Past development strategies have had little global impact on the overall development of Zambia. Migration and unemployment continue to increase, and the gap between the industrialized and the subsistence sector has further widened. The rural masses are further disillusioned with the numerous unfulfilled promises of Humanism and the lack of bargaining power given under the new decentralized structures. As a result, not only did the situation of the subsistence areas remain unchanged, but the attitude of dependency of the rural peasants has persisted, and embitterment and hostility against the regime have intensified.

It appears, therefore, that Zambia ought to give cental priority to the development of the subsistence sector and search for means and strategies which will encourage the masses to become their own agents of development so as to enhance the development of the whole country.

An exploration of the various programs and strategies attempted throughout the world may bring elements of solution to the Zambian situation. A closer look at the implications of extension education and rural community development strategies, which received only little consideration under the new government plans, could disclose a real potential for rural participation and self-reliance in the subsistence sector.

A. EARLY EFFORTS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The early rural development projects of the 1920s were highly concerned with the rural people as persons and focussed on the total pattern of rural life. The economic component of development was undoubtedly important, but did not appear as a prior condition to rural development.

In India

In India, Tagore and Gandhi directed their development efforts towards a total pattern of rural life and work. While Tagore's goal was to induce villages to self-help, mutual help, community action and cooperation, Gandhi's ultimate aim was to improve the inner-man and develop a sounder morality. In Gandhi's view, self-help and cooperation strategies were merely intermediate steps necessary to remove the pressing socio-economic problems on the path to the moral and spiritual development, which was the ultimate requirement to fulfill any other secular activity.[1]

Similarly, a number of missionaries at that time based various rural development programs on the assumption that individuals could only develop in correlation with the growth of the total rural culture. Hatch conducted a very influential project developed by the YMCA, based on the principle of working with the poorest. Successful work with the poor, assumed Hatch, would prompt the more affluent to

embrace the same improvements, whereas working with the well-to-do people would only widen the gap between the poor and the rich. Likewise, the noteworthy India Village Service developed by William and Wiser concentrated on training multipurpose "teachers" whose responsibility was to facilitate the availability of resources to people, while acquiring new knowledge and skills necessary to harness all existing resources in the area.

These projects described above have been among the most influential in the effort to improve agriculture and the quality of rural life in the 1920s. However, those projects remained rather "private" and isolated attempts to improve the rural standards.

In Africa

The early rural development efforts in Africa go back to the colonial period. Broadly speaking, two predominant approaches developed on the African continent depending on the interests and the administrative style of the British or the French colonies.

a) The British Approach

The early British efforts were essentially oriented toward maximizing the exploitation of the Territorial resources while minimizing the cost of the operation. To facilitate the process the British based their strategy on the philosophy of "indirect rule" as a means to promote self-reliance at grass-root level. Self-help became an excellent means to cater for the subsistent needs of the

native populations with minimal cost. More important, however, the running of the African affairs by the Africans themselves, under the supervision of the colonial government, became a powerful means of control over the country and an excellent medium for imposing the cultivation of export-crops in increasing demand by the metropolis.

The development efforts of that period were rather selfish. The organization of local government, communal responsibility and self-help became indirect means to maximize the metropolitan benefits.

b) The French Approach

The French, in contrast, developed a relationship with the natives that remained strictly a colonial one, even though some degree of interaction took place between the two worlds essentially for market reasons. Hence, the efforts to organize the economic and social life in the colonies was characterised by direct rule and by direct measures enforced to stimulate production and consumption. The programs of this period, such as cooperatives, distribution and marketing networks, and development of export crops, were all directed towards these ends. Only later did the colonial government tend to gradually take a more active part in the socio-economic matters, with marked effects on rural development and education.[3]

Both the British and the French approaches generated well-known strategies widely used later in rural development, namely, community development (CD) in British

territories and "Animation" in the French colonies.

Unlike CD which concentrated on self-help, local government and communal responsibility, "Animation" remained under central government control, while designed to allow peasants, workers and leaders to play their part. "Animation" was less concerned with local communities and their capacity for self-help than with the ability to work hand in hand with national institutions for the benefit of the whole program. Furthermore, "Animation" was not designed for the grass-roots alone, as was the early CD, but reached from the bottom right to the highest levels of decision-making.

Conversely, the early CD, which was often concerned with social and communal kinds of objectives (mass education, self-help schemes, etc.), had one advantage over "Animation" which, because it was so intimately linked to the technical and economic institutions, was forced to strike an uneasy balance between time usually required for educational work and the pressing demands for economic growth.

In both cases the effects of the colonial period has influenced the development of further institutions and policies up to the present time. While the former British colonies tend to lack efficient intermediate levels in their government apparatus, the former French colonies suffer from overcentralization of ponderous institutions taken over from colonial administrations.[4]

In Latin America

The early significant development efforts in Latin America were those sponsored by 16 Latin American governments in cooperation with the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA). Those programs started as early as 1942.

In contrast with the comprehensive and integrated approaches of most other colonial governments, the IIAA preferred to operate simultaneously independent programs in the field of education, agriculture and health. Although these programs were not strictly called rural development, their combined results were broader than agriculture or education alone; they were improving the general conditions of the rural poor.

The interesting feature of those "simultaneous programs" was that there was neither integration of education, health or agriculture in any country, nor was there any overall Country Director to coordinate these programs. Yet, the simultaneous implementation of the set of programs was quite effective. Thus, the question arises as to whether development programs necessarily need to be centrally administered, as in the comprehensive approach, or whether the simultaneous implementation of various programs conducted under separate administration would not bring similar results.

These early rural development efforts suggest that, first, the development challenge of any given period of time

depends on the tasks of those living in it. Secondly, the tasks facing the developers vary with the changes occurring over time. Finally, development is inescapably related to the value-judgments used by the developers to interpret those changes and to design new development objectives and strategies.

While the early African development programs tended to be more comprehensive, the Latin American Approach applied a combination of simultaneous programs. The early Indian projects, on the other hand, were small and conducted under private auspices. However, all these small private projects shared the common characteristic of directing their efforts towards the welfare of individual rural persons, with recognition that the whole fabric of rural life had to be modified if persons were to benefit from it. The other significant element to be considered in those private projects was that agriculture was seen as a component (not necessarily the most important one) of the total environment.[5]

B. POST-WORLD WAR II EFFORTS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

National Extension Programs

At the beginning of the century a movement began in the US which became known as the "Cooperative Extension Service". According to Mosher, the term "extension" came from the British practice of having one educational program within the university walls and another away from campus

which was described with the term "extension" as a qualifying adjective of "education".[6] This term was appropriate to what was happening in the US since the new extension service was administered through the Land-Grant Colleges of agriculture. In the beginning, extension was essentially concerned with the improvement of agriculture and adopted the characteristic educational techniques of farm visits, demonstrations, farm tours, farmers' participation, etc.

In the 1920s, both rural interest and the extension method developed considerably and the Land-Grant Colleges included Home Economics (another interest in teaching and research). Eventually, extension also moved into the field of rural community organization. As for methods, an early addition was the introduction of Young Farmers Clubs (4-H clubs) and the promotion of organizations for farmers (Farm Bureau), through which extension services operated.

Three facts remain difficult to dispute about extension as developed in the US, and as recommended to other countries:

1. In the beginning, extension was conceived as being a form of education;
2. As time went by, the evolution of extension services in the United States was through the process of each of them doing what apparently needed to be done in its state without too dogmatic an insistence that it refuse any functions not wholly educational;
3. When extension was recommended to other countries, it usually was in the form in which the individual adviser involved had had recent experience of it in the United States.[7]

After World War II, the success of US extension in a respectable number of states inspired many developing countries to establish their extension programs with the help of the US. These attempts, however, have met only mixed success because the US concentrated essentially on transferring their "methods" and "forms" of extension to countries which had very different educational and administrative structures.

While US extension rested on the tripartite responsibility -- teaching, research and extension -- of the Land-Grant colleges, most developing countries already had ministries of agriculture, health and education. Some others had agricultural colleges, but their program was rather academic, without extensive involvement in research or extension. The large majority of the population was illiterate and the voluntary organizations of farmers non-existent. Under such circumstances, so different from those in the US, the question rose as to whether the idea of extension was at all beneficial to the development of other countries.

Besides the fact that agriculture extension in the US varied considerably from state to state, extension came to realize the necessity of many other processes in order to reach its objectives in developing countries. The US extension took for granted a number of important conditions such as literacy, roads, banks, marketing facilities, disease and pest control which were non-existent in other

countries. It was also discovered that the technical cooperation workers operating in vocational schools, soil conservation or other areas were frequently more successful than extension agents because they did not have the US "dogmas" of what extension was or should be.

On the other hand, Wilson pointed out that the study of the "forms" of extension without understanding the "essence" led only to confusion and, according to him, to too great an extent the "forms" were taken abroad instead of the "essence".[8] Thus, if extension is to contribute to other countries it is primarily through its "essence" rather than through its "forms".

This "essence" is one element of primary importance in a development program and is perceived as being an out-of-school education process:

1. working with rural people along those lines of their current interest and need which are closely related to gaining a livelihood, improving the physical level of living, and fostering community welfare;
2. utilizing particular teaching techniques;
3. conducted with the aid of certain supporting activites; and,
4. carried within a distinctive spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.[9]

The extension process is primarily an educational process for and with the rural people, which follows their interests and needs, and closely relates to improving their livelihood, welfare and level of living. It is made up of teaching activities and supporting operations, and requires an atmosphere of mutual trust, helpfulness and respect on the part of both extension agents and people.

The National Programs of Community Development

In Asia in general, given the problems arising from high population increase, past administrative system geared to maintain of law and order and collect revenues, and emergence of powerful nationalist forces consequent upon World War II, the first priority was to establish new mechanisms of communication between government and population. Thus, several Asian countries translated their development needs into national community development programs.

India offers perhaps the best known example in Asia of concentrated and sustained effort in establishing national CD. Her large programs have been the object of numerous studies and have been the source of inspiration to many less developed countries. In India, as in most other Asian countries, communications between goverment and population were important in order to bring among people an increased awareness of their rights and responsibilities, to convert the British law and order pattern of administration into a welfare and development-oriented system, and to allocate more effectively resources and services. It was equally essential to decentralize the central functions and power to the lower administrative echelons, to build institutions at grass-root level that could motivate the masses into identifying themselves with the national efforts, to coordinate the technical services, and to promote a development-oriented local leadership.

While governmental administration became the first stage of development, a "multi-purpose change-agent", representing at village level all the developmental departments of government, was viewed as essential in promoting directed change. This official was operating in 5 to 10 villages and was under the supervision of the "block" administration -- a new created unit of 100-200 villages considered as a sufficiently viable area for economic development. The "block" development officer, in turn, related to the district development officer for matters of development and coordinated the advice and services at block level, just as the Village Level Worker (WLW) worked with the panchayats.[10] Initially, sponsored by Ford Foundation, India established 5, 256 CD "blocks" between 1952 and 1965, and launched a nationwide decentralization (panchayati raj system introducing three-tiered local government) in order to provide the country with a democratic development structure in which administrative services and people would participate as partners.

In addition, the Indian CD program developed a large number of women's institutions (mahila samities), youth clubs and a vast network of training institutions for various levels of CD workers.

In the same way, the Philippines has had since 1956 a national CD program -- the Presidential Assistance for Community Development (PACD). This program assisted the organization and operations of the barrio (the local

government councils), by training workers for local planning and development programs. Each municipal CD worker had three barrio workers under his supervision, each of whom was responsible for the program supervision in three rural barrios. Provincial CD councils gradually introduced higher-level technical personnel in CD and concentrated on increasing the agricultural production.

National CD programs, however, despite remarkable achievements, had limitations. Those large national programs were widely criticized in the 1950s for not raising more rapidly the agricultural production. Such criticisms were not always justified, since, from the beginning, program planners had forseen that higher productivity could only be expected at later stages of the program implementation. Many of these criticisms were due to the application of criteria that were different from those used at the onset of the program.[11]

In India, it was also felt that, because of the rapid expansion of the program, the initial ratio of one VLW for ten villages was too thin. This dilution of resources along with the burden of agricultural services placed on the VLW was believed to be responsible for the failure of the desired popular participation in development.[12] On the other hand, those comprehensive programs were rather ambitious and proved to be particularly unwieldy to implement. Many conflicts arose from the lack of agreed priorities among the various development components of the program. The

administration was integrated, centralized and often authoritative. It placed too much emphasis on agricultural growth and lost, in the process, the stimulation of the locally chosen group activities. In addition, the common practice of applying too easily for financial grants reduced the development of local resources and stifled the development of local potential. Finally, the CD programs developed into complex bureaucratic structures which involved little effort to promote new social and legal structures, land tenure and distribution mechanisms.[13]

The new era of the large scale CD programs, introduced by the two Pilot Projects of Etawah (1948) and Allahabad (1952), in India, initially emphasized rural development with program components ranging from preventive health care to rural industry, village roads, drain improvements, etc. Their primary emphasis, however, was on agricultural development. In this, the CD program differed from the former private projects and marked the beginning of a shift from rural towards agricultural development. The heavy reliance on specialists and the integration of all program components under a single formal administrative structure considerably boosted the agricultural production.

In contrast with the private projects, however, the CD programs have shown that the mobilization and participation of the rural masses, as well as the attempt to respond to their felt needs was difficult to accomplish under a centralized and authoritative administration, no matter how

efficient this might be.

Moreover, the concentration on one component (agriculture), tended to generate a lopsided development in favour of those who could benefit from agricultural increase, and to give lower priority to other development components and local potential which were equally necessary for balanced development.

In other words, the developmental experience of the 1950s in Asia, suggests that a balanced rural development must consider all components involved as equally important, and, to be successful, rural development ought to provide for favourable conditions that will allow each component to expand simultaneously and in harmony with the others. Similarly, the US extension experience indicated that education methods which proved efficient under a given set of circumstances could lose a great deal of their effectiveness under different conditions. It also demonstrated that agricultural development, so strongly emphasized under the extension programs needed, in other countries, to be combined with a variety of other processes.

The most invaluable lesson drawn from the extension programs overseas, however, is probably the central role attributed to the "essence" of the extension process as opp[illegible] the "forms". This, together with rural CD, are [illegible]wo key processes, which, if wisely combined [illegible]elopmental components, can untangle the [illegible]ems related to the mobilization and the

participation of the masses in their development.

C. PROGRAM EMPHASIS IN RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

In many countries comprehensive development programs have been encouraged by combining the extension process with other important processes of development. The importance of the different aspects of rural culture for raising the level of rural living, the close collaboration of all public programs and the financial stringency which influenced the choice of a single rural development staff, were major considerations in favour of organizing comprehensive programs. These considerations gave rise to a variety of programs commonly called CD.

By and large the advocates of CD find two major inadequacies in extension education. For one, they feel that extension education deals too restrictively with agriculture and home economics, whereas in LDCs these practices are intimately interwoven with all other areas of life. Thus, in their eyes, a single comprehensive program, which deals with all the problems of rural life appears more relevant. This, however, is not a criticism of extension education as a process, but of its subject-matter scope. The other is that extension education, which deals primarily with individuals or interest groups, does not present alternatives to communities or to social organizations as a whole. Thus, this approach, addressed to individuals or selected groups in countries where cultural and social systems are highly

group-centered. is almost bound to fail.

Hence, the difference between rural CD and extension lies in the great emphasis CD places on social groups and on group action. While extension education focuses on changes by individuals, CD is more concerned with the whole community, develops new patterns of group activity and social organization or concentrates on the homogeneity of a region as a whole.

Rural CD is currently understood as being a combination of the following four processes:

1. Multi-subject-matter extension education;
2. Aided self-help projects;
3. Institution or organization building;
4. Comprehensive regional development.[14]

These CD processes arose from the fact that rural welfare and agricultural development involved a number of requirements that could only be met by group organization or group activity. In addition, the move from a traditional to a more progressive way of life required new forms of decision-making and social organization.

The difference between those processes grows out of the distinct emphasis each gives to those previous considerations.

The Multi-subject-matter Extension Education

Broadly speaking, this CD process emphasizes a variety of requirements necessary for agricultural and rural development, and the need for decision-making at community

level. It essentially uses education combined with capital and organizational facilities.

The only difference between this CD process and the extension process arises from the fact that the "multi-subject-matter" process has to introduce different changes along with the extension process, according to the various cultural and economic settings found in other societies.

In contrast with extension education in the US, the multi-subject-matter extension education in LDCs has to, first, "'create' (as distinct from servicing) an individual willingness and eagerness on the part of the rural people to try new methods and to develop new patterns of living". While initially US extension education essentially consisted of trips and demonstrations within a demarcated region, multi-subject-matter extension education had to concentrate on stimulating confidence in change.

US extension education had no difficulty in communicating with the farmers, but the multi-subject-matter workers had to face tremendous problems of illiteracy, lack of transport and poor road network before reaching the rural populations. US extension education, in particular, was more preoccupied with enhancing the farmers' personal income than in increasing the agricultural production and the general level of rural life in the region and the country as a whole.

Secondly, there was "the need for creating (as distinct

from merely utilizing) a professional staff with attitudes and abilities that are a particular blend of technical competence, scientific outlook and personal confidence in and concern for people."

From the staff point of view, US extension could count on well trained extension workers. Even though a number of them were not specialized in extension education, they all had university training in agriculture or home economics. This higher level of knowledge gave them a better understanding of the technical problems involved in agricultural production and helped them develop more scientific attitudes with regard to agriculture.

In contrast, most extension agents in LDCs grew up in cities because the educational facilities in the countryside were scarce. They received a rather formal training, entirely divorced from applied farming practices. This caused them to disregard the traditional values of the countryside. They became outsiders and objects of suspicion to the rural peasants rather than the catalytic elements in their midst.

Third, the multi-subject-matter extension education had also to deal with the absence of the Land-Grant college system with its tripartite responsibility for teaching, research and extension. Even if LDCs had such a college system, it would not have provided a sufficient basis to the multi-subject-matter process because the range of subjects covered by such an education is far broader than the one

covered in agriculture and home economics alone. Most LDCs established, instead, a series of ministries with representatives at each level of the country. Consequently, in addition to the problem of research and staff, multi-subject-matter extension education faces the difficult task of securing aid from officials of the various ministries who tend to compete with others.

Finally, the absence of facilities for securing the agricultural requisites and other materials necessary for the improvement of rural life was another major difference from the US setting. Experience showed that a very close coordination between extension education and the provision of farming supplies was imperative for successful agricultural production. Some programs found a solution to this problem by giving the responsibility of providing farm inputs and farm training to the same agency.

These four major differences show that multi-subject-matter extension education, in contrast with US extension, includes a much wider spectrum of activities and processes, and requires, to be functional, a larger number of staff, competent in or at least aware of a wider range of skills. More particularly, it requires far more personal contact and empathy as well as a comprehensive perception of the whole development process.

This CD process has been widely criticised for placing impossible requirements on the varied technical competences of the field agents. However, it must be underlined that in

any one time, only a limited number of subjects can be taught. Thus, the CD agent need not be a walking encyclopedia of all possible subjects included in the program, but he must be competent in only few specific practice changes. His specific task in which he needs expert competence is his ability to encourage people to recognize alternatives and make choices. This explains why the field agent in this CD process has been described as a "jack of all trades, but master of ONE". His specific job is to be an "effective teacher, a sensitive perceiver of community opinion and psychological reactions, and a skillful participant in, and guide of community discussion".[15]

Aided Self-Help Projects

This CD process specifically deals with changes that require group decision and group action. The objective of this CD type is to improve rural welfare by completing self-help projects, increasing self-confidence and local initiative, and establishing new forms of social organization resulting from the emulative effects in the community.

Taylor is probably the person who most clearly described this type of CD:

> Community development, as a term, came into existence out of the experiences of agencies and governments which were attempting to render maximum available technical assistance to masses of people who live in local rural communities in underdeveloped countries. Its sole contribution to programs of technical assistance is that of effectively involving local groups in helping to carry out local improvements projects. Confusion about this method of the joint efforts of technical

> specialists and the organized efforts of local groups would probably be quickly dispelled if the more descriptive, but more cumbersome term "technically aided, locally organized self-help" were used.[16]

In Taylor's view, this CD process involves a cycle of four major steps:

"The first step in CD is the systematic discussion of common felt needs by the members of the community." At grass-root level such discussions are generally unsystematic, unorganized, mere gossip or complaints. Only when discussions are systematic, holds Taylor, even among only a few representatives, is the analysis of important felt needs accomplished.

The second step in CD is a "systematic planning to carry out the first self-help undertaking that has been selected by the community". Systematic planning selects a first project which is feasible and compatible with the resources and means of the community. It also involves talent, labour and often material and financial resources of individuals in the community. This step establishes a realistic and responsible confrontation among the community members. It stimulates the mobilization in the community and its determination to do something for itself so that small initial accomplishments may strengthen the local initiative, self-confidence and responsibility of the community.

The third step "is the almost complete mobilization and harnessing of physical, economic and social potentialities of local community groups." Once a community group works on

a project, which, if completed will yield benefits for the whole community, the mildly interested and even the more skeptical start contributing to its successful completion.

Unfortunately, some national leaders, who witness such CD activities local communities, jump to the conclusion that this process can be used to start a nationwide CD program, supported by community prizes or other mass incentives. Many of such experiences, however, show that there is no substitute for the two first steps and the fourth one is seldom taken as the result of propaganda and competition.

Finally, the fourth step promotes self-actualization by raising the level of aspiration and determination to undertake additional CD improvements projects. According to Taylor, until this step is taken, the universal problem of how to get a community to desire and make improvements is not solved. In reality, many community organizations promoted from outside never reach this level of involvement. Two major reasons can prevent community groups from taking this final step: for one, other improvements which need to be undertaken may now be within the competence of the group. The other is that every human group having accomplished a worthwhile undertaking tends to seek out and do other things to feed its group-pride. It is only out of cumulative experiences - successful and unsuccessful -- that CD procedures can be stated.

In this CD process one observes that, first, Aided Self-Help involves three processes: education, investments

and organization. Education is of an informal type, the "out-of-school" type or extension education, which involves group discussions, organization of local resources and conferring with the authorities. Secondly, Aided Self-Help involves investments. The fact that the community can resort to expensive materials and financial assistance on request to government is a powerful incentive. On the other hand, most governments support those projects because their financial resources can rarely meet the cost of building all infrastructural facilities needed on a conventional basis. Finally, the organization involved in Aided Self-Help includes a "systematic" discussion of local felt needs and the harnessing of the local resources.

Secondly, this CD process relates predominantly to the physical construction of public works and normally requires a joint group activity or a uniform group response. It is a very valuable process for influencing rural welfare and for establishing and stimulating efficient community organization. In addition, because of its flexibility and its ad hoc form of organization, subject to trial and error, this process may pave the way for future formal organizations that will likely be more appropriate to their task.

On the other hand, Aided Self-Help does not touch many individual problems of choice-making in farm or individual operations. Thus, as any developmental process, Aided-Self-Help alone is not going to generate automatically

rural welfare, but constitutes an effective process to be used with others in overall rural development strategies.

Institutions or Organization Building

The third variety of CD is the process of establishing formal organizations to foster or service rural development. As in Aided Self-Help, this CD process concentrates on community organization. The difference is that it begins with formal organization. Typical institutions of this type are the cooperatives which need formal organizational structure before they can operate. This type of local organization takes the same first step as the Aided Self-Help process. Then, instead of selecting a specific project, the second step organizes a society to tackle this need or all needs together. Beyond this point, a flurry of organizations can develop, largely conditioned by local cultural factors.

The rationale for this process is based on the premise that local organizations are necessary ingredients for rural development, and that they are more effective when they secure the cooperation of the people through a democratic process. The notion of democracy, however, is not well known to many rural people and the practice of it is even less familiar. Thus, before those organizations can successfully operate, they require the development of a whole set of new attitudes and skills, which almost invariably involves drastic changes in behavior toward authority and government. This can be a long-term goal in itself, since organizations,

which expect the members to base their decisions upon the welfare or goals of the society, may encounter different ethnical loyalties or very rigid types of status.

Consequently, this type of CD usually requires a long period of trial and error before finding a workable form for the institution. But once they run effectively, local organizations can contribute significantly to rural welfare through the various community activities they administer and, perhaps more, through the "contribution to each person's feeling of significance gained through having a meaningful part in local organization". This is one of the intangible "spiritual" components of rural welfare.[17]

Comprehensive Regional Development

This fourth CD process is somewhat inspired from the former national CD programs. However, a similar usage does not have necessarily a similar significance. Comprehensive Regional Development is the case "where a regional program is developed to meet any of the rural development needs of a naturally or culturally unified, but distinct area, like a particular river basin".

"Community" here extends from the local level to the sociological concept of a group bound by social interest in a well delimited area. This CD process deals with "regions" which usually include many tangled issues. The problem may rise from private and common land-ownership patterns coexisting in the area, from a lack of social capital and infrastructure, or from a strong traditional social

influence that stifles the adoption of any innovation, unless a large number of people get simultaneously involved in the change process. In other words, this CD process is useful in "regions" that require a comprehensive program to generate any sort of development in the area.

Comprehensive Regional Development is analogus to the three previous CD processes in the sense that it looks at the interrelated problems of a community of interest as a whole. But it differs from the others in the fact that it implies the operation of several joint development activities including the involvement of government.

In the western world, Area Development, promoted in the USA around the 1960s, is one of the best examples of comprehensive regional development. The Appalachian and Southern Cotton Belt regions were lagging even in a period of rapid economic growth. Gradually, many people migrated to the major metropolitan centres and demonstrated a greater desire to have a voice in the decisions concerning their lives. In order to meet those emerging problems, all levels of US government began to design programs fostering the economic development of depressed regions, the eradication of poverty and the participation of the rural populations in decisions that affected their lives.[18]

Besides providing public capital for the stimulation of private investments in those areas, the Areas Development Act of 1961 delegated the responsibility of determining how to spend public funds to both public officials and

representatives of private groups in the area- business, agriculture and the like. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 sponsored community-action organizations responsible for the allocation of capital. Here also, the control over expenditure was based on the common decision of public and private bodies. These organizations were required by law to have a board, one third of which was to be composed by the "poor", while the officials occupied another third and the other citizens the remaining third.

As individual towns and counties proved to be inadequate bases for anti-poverty programs, multi-community-action organizations were encouraged in order to give sufficient scope to new programs and priority was given to groups willing to work together across the country boundaries. Later, in 1965, US government encouraged the formation of multi-county public-private organizations and fostered federal and state cooperation. These legislations generated a variety of programs built on multi-county organizations, federal-state cooperation and public-private involvement. These organizations had control over the investments allocated and contributed to the establishment of a variety of institutions ranging from comprehensive health councils, regional crime councils to district for resource conservation and development, model-cities agencies, etc.

The Area Development process brought significant progress in the non-metropolitan areas and contributed to

maintain a better population balance between urban and non-metropolitan areas. The out-migration rate fell from 5 million in the 1950s to 2.5 million in the 1960s. Area Development also contributed to increase non-farm jobs in non-metropolitan areas by 37.5 per cent for the period between 1962 and 1968, as compared with 23.6 per cent for the urban areas.[19] In addition some depressed areas attracted much developmental attention due to the effective use of the federal and state development tools available. Lastly, successful development efforts concentrated on the total environment and the comprehensive improvement of many communities services, as opposed to one or two community facilities.

On the other hand, the Area Development Process in the US discovered that it was nearly impossible to bring the desired changes by public capital alone. Thus, most public development programs attempted to create mechanisms through which government, at all levels, could trigger the necessary private investments to support Area Development. Those public programs, however, have not been very successful in attracting the necessary invesments because town banks generally invested less funds than city banks. As a result, there was an outflow of capital from the non-metropolitan areas which needed it most. Furthermore, the presidents of those banks, who were in their sixties or older, were more accustomed to deal with agriculture than industry and generally preferred security to economic venture.

Other difficulties also arose from considerable confusion among governmental units as both local government and state attempted to solve local problems. There was a great deal of overlap, conflict and duplication resulting from the adaptation of old agencies to new problems. Finally, local farm organizations were frequently in direct opposition to the Chamber of Commerce because of the old farm antipathy toward business and industrial development. It was feared, at least in the early stages, that growth would mean competition and would increase the cost of hired labour.

Summary

The exploration of the predominant rural community development processes highlights the fundamental role of extension education and CD in the rural development process. The requirements for rural development are numerous. They include the many services and facilities necessary for a progressive choice-making agriculture; a wide range of positive attitudes with regard to agricultural development, rural population and national welfare; the many aspects of non-economic rural welfare; and, the numerous processes involved in the adequate organization of rural communities. In this wide range of developmental activities, while US extension education essentially focused on agriculture and home economics, the multi-subject matter extension education programs practiced abroad chose their subject matter among a wider range of interest of rural people and frequently

combined the provision of agricultural requisites (sometimes the production of credit) with extension education. Both aided self-help and institution-building are concerned with the organization of communities for rural development. The former, however, emphasizes ad hoc organization for specific projects and generally involves an investment element, while the latter begins by setting up formal organizations. Finally, comprehensive regional development combines many governmental activities, all administered together, in the interest of a region. Thus, while one kind of CD is a single CD process, other CD programs combine several other processes.

The core of extension and rural community development processes, however, is to help people develop confidence in themselves and their fellow citizens by making choices and using better knowledge as a tool towards a more satisfying life. Extension and CD agents do this by pointing to alternatives, encouraging new experiments, working with the communities and helping them meet group problems, and by showing their confidence in the rural population, while people develop new attitudes, skills and new types of cooperative activities indispensable to a progressive society.[20]

D. THE DEVELOPMENT TREND OF THE 1960s

In the 1960s, rural development was no longer to occur only through the means of agricultural production, but was to take place indirectly through the improvement of the economy. Many government leaders subscribed to larger economic plans which became the typical vehicle of development and the "indispensable passport to foreign aid, the touchstone of rationality and efficiency".[21]

This concept rested on the premises that the general mobilization of economic resources broken down into sectoral programs was going to generate development. Those resources deployed according to cost-benefit analysis criteria were expected to ensure optimal effect on economic growth. Thus, agriculture, rural welfare and development in general were immediately dependent on capital investments. The key strategy was to shift economic resources according to "priorities" determined by the economic plan rather than alter or move frontally the socio-political structures which equally perpetuated underdevelopment. In retrospect it is evident that the economic approach of the 1960s with its economic programs and stages, and its heavy reliance on technology, industrialization and capital investment, was too optimistic.

After 1964, the rural development pendulum swung from the economic means of growth towards non-economic obstacles generated by this approach. The lag in agriculture combined with demographic pressures and increasing political

instability influenced the development trend to include in the concept of development an institutional setting and a time-lag dimension. Economic input did not reach the expected agricultural production targets. More attention, therefore, was to be given to socio-political factors.

> "When these strategic non-economic factors have been ignored", observed Meier, "the implementation of policies designed to remove the economic barriers has remained limited, for, regardless of the economic logic of the development plans, its success in gaining popular support and participation must depend on attitudes, values and institutions".[22]

Along these lines more recent development efforts developed.

E. RECENT STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Among many comprehensive rural development projects undertaken in LDCs, the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) intends to illustrate a comprehensive rural development strategy implemented in Africa. Several other rural development experts have equally contributed to formulate a global understanding of the rural development process by underlining the necessity to include in it a wide variety of changes and strategies necessary to improve self-sustaining communities. More recently, the concept of integrated rural development (IRD) emerged from five Regional Consultations held throughout the world as a new policy to correct imbalances between the regional, sectoral and social dimensions of the rural development process.

The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU)

In order to accelerate economic development, Ethiopia

adopted an integrated rural development strategy in which scarce resources were concentrated in well defined geographical areas in the form of package projects.

CADU, established in 1967, covers an area of 10,000 square km. and a population of 400,000 inhabitants. The objectives of the program were essentially designed to achieve socio-economic development and improve employment opportunties. The program was particularly intended to give great attention to small farmers and stressed research training and transferability of resources.[23]

Improved seeds, fertilizers, credit and marketing facilities contributed to expand the production from 23,700 to 51,000 hectares and the average wheat yields increased from 10 to 21 quintals per hectare, bringing a net revenue of Eth. $126 per hectare. Research efforts resulted in the development of high yielding wheat varieties and labour-intensive farm implements. Extension methods and demonstrations were practiced on model farmers' plots. The marketing strategies involved purchase and storage projects encouraging the stabilization of grain prices and the development of incentives for farmers. Additional efforts were made on water resource surveys, soil conservation, rural health, feeder roads and extension programs for women.

CADU made considerable efforts to extend development to low-income subsistent populations regardless of the variety of the development components involved in it. A large part of its success is attributed to the provision made to employ

staff on a contract basis. This allows promotion and salaries to be based on performance rather than on tenure. CADU also developed amiable working relations between a highly motivated Ethiopian staff and their expatriate counterparts. Their success was attributed to the meaningful jobs that CADU provided and to the high quality of leadership at all levels. In addition, CADU also provided in-service training for many of its staff which further consolidated good relations, competence and success.

On the other hand, CADU faced a number of problems. It first suffered from a "top-down" approach which gave little room for indigenous participation in planning and implementation. At times the program stifled or duplicated activities already existing in the governmental structure. Secondly, in the adopted approach of "learning-by-doing" the monitoring of performance received too little attention and not enough flexibility was allowed for modifications and program replicability. Although flexibility was recognized in principle, in practice the program was frustrated by its inability to adapt to changing circumstances because it tended to be too resource-intensive to be replicable on a wide scale. Thirdly, the training of field staff has not been adequate relative to the manpower needs, and the supply of trained extension staff throughout the country is one major constraint to expansion. Low technical staff competence and poor incentive systems remain severe problems for the improvement of the program's overall performance. In

addition, the training in the cooperatives was not job-oriented. The lack of practical training and trading skills in particular, was a major source of frustration along with the lack of organization, leadership and entrepreneurial capability. Such abilities are recognized difficult to acquire and to be a long-term task.

Finally, CADU also faced the problem of providing a low-cost marketing service. Even with intensive marketing facilities, the marketing cost amounted to more than twice that of private traders. Marketing faced numerous difficulties related to the determination of the levels of guaranteed minimum prices and the implementation of the minimum price.[24] The nature of the national market and the unpredictability of the grain board operations made it extremely difficult for the marketing experts to determine the project's price policy and predict prices.

Broadly speaking, CADU, despite its considerable production achievements, has not proved very successful in mobilizing the masses and raising their participation because of a too rigid performance monitoring system largely influenced by top-down planning strategies.

Two Experts' Perception of the Rural Development Process

After the food crisis of the 1960s, the disillusionment of the Green Revolution, the poor success of the economic approach and the lopsided development that resulted from mechanization and industrialization, several experts found it necessary to reconsider the concept of rural development

in terms of a more global definition.

a/ Arthur Mosher

In Mosher's perception rural development appears to be a trend in the technologies, organizations, activities, and values of a society that:

1. increases the opportunities of all its rural people for vigourous health, broadening mental horizons, increasing knowledge and skills, and expanding opportunities to participate both constructively and pleasurably in the activities of their culture;
2. progressively provides more effective means for adjusting as peacefully as possible the conflicts and injustices that invariably arise as technological and other cultural changes take place;
3. maintains or progressively approaches an optimum balance between each rural person's opportunities for freely chosen self-expression and the corporate needs of the culture in which he lives; and
4. increasingly brings all present and potential farm land into its most effective use.[25]

This definition "identifies strategic changes through the whole fabric of a total culture as the factors leading to development".[26] The terms technologies, organizations, activities and values are not mutually exclusive but rather indicate the wide variety of changes involved. This definition also underlines the types of opportunities for persons and the importance of the implicit economic opportunities as ways to increase full participation in the activities of one's culture. It recognizes that conflicts of interest and even temporary injustices are inherent in the development process, but considers the rectifications of those constraints as an explicit component of development itself.

Mosher further stresses the constant effectiveness of agriculture. Given the current population pressures, it is urgent that all farmland be used productively. Moreover, agriculture not only raises rural incomes but can enhance other employment opportunities, expand public services and transfer of payments. Finally, this definition points to the importance of safeguarding an ecological balance. There is a great need to increase our knowledge on how to dispose of harmful wastes, to know what is irreparable and what is not, and what is damage and what is merely change.

b) Uma Lele

Along the same lines Lele perceives rural development as

> improving living standards of the mass of low-income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining.[27]

This apparently simple definition has three important implications:

1. Improving the living standard of the masses requires mobilization and allocation of resources so as to reach a desirable balance over time between welfare and productive services available to the subsistence rural sector.
2. The productive and social services should be allocated in such a way as the mass gets the benefits.
3. Making the process self-sustaining requires the proper skills and institutional climate as well as the implementing of the existing resources for continued development and progress.[28]

Implicit in this definition is the crucial role expected to be played by the national policies, administrative systems and decentralized government structures.

At the national level, there is a critical need for clear policies in land tenure systems, commodity pricing and marketing systems, wages and interest rate structures, etc., as prerequisites to rural development.

Proper administrative structure is equally essential for effective implementation of projects. Thus, adequate machinery needs to be created with the proper mix of centralization, i.e., decentralization of administrative services conducive to rural development.

Finally, more scope for institutional pluralism must be provided in order to minimize the bureaucratic problems and to avoid bottlenecks. The distribution of responsibility for rural development must be "normalized", i.e., must be shared among the official and semi-autonomous governmental structures, the private, commercial and traditional institutions, and among the different elective bodies.

Integrated Rural Development (IRD), a More Recent Concept

In addition to the disillusionment of the 1960s, the 1970s saw the most severe and widespread food crisis known since the 1940s. In 1974 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported the increasing anxiety of the past previous years facing the existence of a more profound and persistent food problem. The continuing deprivation of hundreds of million people left them hungry and unable to realize a normal life.[29] Bhattacharji reports that, despite the Green Revolution, the rate of growth in food production fell from 0.7 per cent per capita between 1952/1962 to minus

0.7 per cent for 1970/1974.[30]

Not only did the non-involvement of the rural population in that revolution partially explain the decline in per capita production, but it also generated considerable social tensions worsening rural poverty. When adding to this the problems of demographic pressure, the future development prospects appear rather dim unless new approaches and programs can meet those urgent problems.

The paradoxical fact of accelerated economic growth coexisting with the gradual worsening texture of rural life, raises questions about the relevance of traditional strategies. The suspicion that economic growth was not synonymous with social development was reinforced in the 1970s and the opinion gained ground that

> ...technical, economic and social factors are closely interrelated. Such factors as increased social justice, participation of the people, eradication of absolute poverty, changes in the power structure are not simply 'good things' to be pursued after economic growth has been achieved, -- they are basic requirements for setting economic development in motion.[31]

It is worthwhile underlining that factors, which were traditionally considered to be in conflict, are currently held to be requirements of development. Economic considerations are no longer the only basis for development, nor is the rest of society determined by it. A greater emphasis is placed on the vital influence the socio-political components have at every point on economic development.

It follows, therefore, that an agriculture-based economy cannot grow into an industrial one without simultaneously adjusting the attitudes of its people and its institutions. Streeten developed this perception to almost an extreme conclusion. "Development", he explains, "requires not so much the study of economic forces within social and political constraints, as the study of political and psychological forces within the economic limits".[32] The development of both rural and industrial sectors "returns to its unavoidable crux in the necessity to compromise between the marginally compatible ends and means of political integration, social stability, employment and economic growth".[33]

Thus, an integrated approach, dealing simultaneously with various aspects of rural well-being as well as with the administration of mutually supporting development policies appears necessary to promote genuine rural development.

The rationale of IRD developed from the apparent need to integrate a wide range of development components. Beside the increasing awareness of regional disparities and socio-economic constraints, technical requirements are considered necessary to the agricultural productivity in the rural areas since poverty and food shortages are directly linked to the insufficient utilization of local potential. Furthermore, the issue of development has considerably broadened; the expectations of the rural poor have changed and need to be met. Besides income and food supply, the

rural poor expects better social services, participation in decision-making and access to resources. Consequently, the degree of satisfaction of the rural poor has serious implications on rural development and will ultimately determine their motivations and mobilization. An integrated approach is also more likely to keep a balance between economic growth and population growth which invariably affect each other. Both, therefore, ought to be components of the same framework. Finally, an integrated approach can provide for a better "timing" between the various phases of the development process. Not only can technical and institutional capacities be put to work all at once, but essential development components such as health, education and technology only contribute to development in a favourable socio-economic environment. When implemented under inappropriate conditions (timing), these development components can bring more harm than good.[34]

a) Towards a Definition of Integrated Rural Development

The last FAO Inter-Regional Symposium on Integrated Rural Development held in Berlin (Sept. 1977) summed the major findings of five Expert Consultations held respectively in Colombo (Oct. 1975), Jakarta (Dec. 1975), Nairobi (Oct. 1976), Lome and Bogata (Dec. 1976).

All five Regional Consultations on IRD held so far throughout the world have treated it in an uneven manner. The Colombo Consultation defined IRD as

> a concept and an approach to planned changes in rural areas. It is based on the assumption that

> economic and social progress are mutually reinforcing, requiring that all natural technical, economic, social and institutional interrelationships, and their changes are taken into account and that they are combined in such a way as to serve the well-being of man and social integration as ultimate goal.[35]

In this sense production increase and social improvement are not exclusive, but mutually reinforcing.

The Nairobi Consultation -- after pointing out the very inadequate support of the past development strategies to rural areas and the deterioration in quality of rural life resulting from it -- stressed the use of inherent leadership in traditional societies and the ethno-scientific goals of IRD, more particularly, the use of indigenous systems of knowledge. The session also included the various qualitative and administrative goals of IRD ranging from income distribution and employment to self-reliance, welfare and service efficiency.[36]

The Jakarta Consultation echoes very much the same feeling when it recorded that IRD is expected to

> generate and release the energy of the rural people expecially the poor, so that they can realize their full potential and, thus, increase their capacity as well as commitment to develop, organize and govern themselves towards the attainment of a higher quality life for the individual and the entire community.[37]

In contrast, the Bogata Consultation, which wanted priority to be given to the formulation of a formal concept of IRD did not record what they meant by it. Similarly, the Lome Consultation did not take any clear-cut position on the

issue. Its consensus was that "so far, no standard definition of IRD existed".[38] Its merit, however, was to point out the heavy responsibility the respective governments have in tailoring their own concepts and frameworks to their own needs, adopting efficient strategies and designing meaningful objectives for their own country.

These many views indicate the wide recognition of the interaction of the social and economic factors in the pursuit of a better quality life for the rural populations. Ensminger, in addition, brought a new important element missing in most formulations, namely, the heavy political content of IRD. He points out how little clarity political leaders have about the kind of society they want to emerge out of and from development. The kind of economic, cultural and political society each country wants to emerge out of development should be the foremost political issue among all LDCs. "Only when this question is posed and answered, will IRD emerge as one of the most promising alternatives for adoption and the formulation of policies and development strategies for the future".[39] This political dimension was included in the formulation of the IRD concept in the last Berlin Symposium.

In Zaman's words, the IRD concept is currently understood as being a concept with

> heavy political content. Thus, the concept goes beyond management strategy or redressal of rural poverty... IRD is a policy to (i) narrow the gap between urban-rural life and (ii) reduce disparity between various income groups. The expectation is

> that those at the bottom of the ladder with sharply limited opportunity to realize their potential and minimum share in the decision-making process, make substantial gains on both counts so that the stratification would be less vertical, more flexible with wider options for an ever increasing number and an egalitarian and homogeneous society would emerge, without the risk of violent eruption, it would be economically more productive and, thereby, ensure better quality of life for most people.[40]

b) The Essence and Components of IRD

In Leupolt's view the essence of IRD is to correct the imbalances existing between the regional, social and sectoral dimensions of the rural development process and to provide for the necessary requirements which allow constant differentiation (specialization), functional integration and human adaptation to take place.[41]

Leupolt points out that remote "regions" have often been neglected. Little infrastructure and facilities were provided and the administrative and educational facilities were developed to a lesser degree. Thus, urban-industrial development had generally little impact in those areas since necessary preconditions such as capital, knowledge, income distribution, and other inputs were missing.

The "social" dimension of the rural poor has not much scope to expand beyond the subsistence level. Even though these people may be fully integrated in the community, they hardly have real opportunities to improve their living standards, particularly in situations where large landowners depend on the rural poor to exploit their land. In more progressive regions landowners tend to shift from

share-cropping systems to ownership systems by using advanced technology and, thus, dismiss their former workers. This process only worsens the income-distribution pattern and decreases the effective demand of the rural masses. Integration from a higher authority level is, therefore, necessary to absorb the dismissed labour-force and to generate a more adequate structural change in the economic activities.

Finally, a sound IRD approach requires a "sectoral" balance in the composition of the economy. Because the secondary and tertiary sectors produce an economic impact of their own, they are not attracted to areas where agricultural output and demand for non-agricultural goods have not sufficiently developed. As Wilkening rightly observed:

> the problem of planned change in rural areas is just as much, if not more, a problem of integration of the many local and professional interests at all levels than of knowing that changes should be made or of having the facilities for making them. Until the problem of integration is solved, special interests, factions and agency disputes will block the progress of the best programs.[42]

In essence, Leupolt considers IRD as a concept which keeps the three dimensions of development -- regional, social and structural -- in balance and thinks in terms of four categories:

1. Objectives of IRD as a common denominator,
2. the macro-economic policy framework, power-structure and socio-economic values.
3. the physical, technical and economic

interrelationships at the level of production (micro-economic or project level).

4. the administrative and institutional framework, or bridging element of instrumental nature to transfer policy objectives into action and behavioral patterns of the people of the productive micro-sphere.

In his model, as visualized in the diagram below, the objectives become the central issue of IRD planning. If the ultimate goal of development is to "improve the well-being of man", then, it is commonly accepted that five long-term objectives ought to be pursued: productive and remunerative employment; access to resources and services; equitable distribution of material and non-material benefits; participation and mobilization of people; and, rational resource management.

The salient characteristic of IRD lies in the harmonious interaction of its components: the "Political-Economic" framework, the "Administrative-Institutional" framework, and "the Physical-Technical" framework. The political-economic framework gives the overall direction of the development process. It designs the overall economic and resource management policies, and takes the necessary political stands and socio-economic values which favour the overall objectives.

The public administration imbued with sound political and socio-economic philosophy works through the institutions to achieve technical and social progress serving the overall objectives which require a harmonious structure at all

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT: OBJECTIVES, COMPONENTS, INTERRELATIONS



Source: Leupolt, Manfred, " Key Issues of Integrated Rural Development ", Rome: FAO- WS/F3189, 1975, p.19.

Figure 2

levels.

Observations

The recent efforts and definitions of rural development indicate a strong shift toward a more comprehensive approach to rural development with particular emphasis on the welfare and the development of the individual as a "person". These approaches involve a wide range of social, political and economic components that reach far beyond the rather simplistic concept of the 1960s, essentially based on economic master plans.

Almost paradoxically the current rural development concepts underline similar criteria as those of the early development efforts by stressing the comprehensive nature of the rural development process and the welfare of the whole MAN. The recent concepts, however, are enriched with the considerable experience of the 1950s and the 1960s and no longer suggest private and isolated efforts. Rather, the welfare of man must be tackled on a comprehensive scale because of the complex interaction among all development components that affect the development of man.

Thus, in Mosher's concept, the development of person must include physical and mental welfare, skill and employment opportunities, the possibility of self-expression within the corporate needs attached to a given culture, and a number of other conditions allowing for individual and corporate adjustments to conflicting situations.

Lele, on the other hand, emphasizes more the essential

conditions for improving the living standards of the rural poor. Not only must rural development address itself to all components involved in the welfare of the rural poor, but, if it has to be self-sustaining, the complex network of policies, institutions, administration and services must equally be directed to serve the same ends.

Along these lines IRD can be understood as

> a series of mutually supporting (interrelated) agricultural and non-agricultural activities oriented towards a stated objective. It involves the progression of rural subsystems and their interaction leading to desired improvements in the rural system as a whole.[43]

It follows, therefore, that IRD needs not only a multidisciplinary approach and multisectoral operations, but also a multidisciplinary understanding, since it basically operates within the tripartite field of economics, sociology and administration/organization.[44]

The concept of IRD suggests that one can work from various directions toward the same end. Partial systems such as wider distribution, agricultural mechanization, population control, etc., may arise from different problems, but the further they develop, the more they will resemble each other because of approaching a common set of cause-effect relationships and interdependence, assuming however, that the solutions adopted are in harmony with the general objectives of equity, participation and social justice.

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VII. ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS: A SYNTHESIS

A review of the rural development process from an international perspective points to the complex nature of rural development and to the wide range of activities necessary to improve the quality of life among the rural masses. This chapter distills the exploration of chapter VI and underlines fundamental elements that appear indispensable to the implementation of an effective rural development program. Broadly speaking, successful rural development appears to be immediately related to the balanced interaction of natural variables, social environment, and political and institutional arrangements existing in any given society.

A. EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Climatic conditions, soils and irrigation potential are among the crucial factors that affect the agricultural production. Given the important role agriculture plays in providing subsistence and income to the rural areas, the implementation of a rural development program requires first and foremost a thorough knowledge of the local agricultural potential and the kind of crops best suited to each geographical location.

The improvement of agricultural potential, however, is largely determined by both individual and institutional factors. Problems of land tenure often restrict wide fertile

areas to a few privileged large-scale farmers, leaving the majority of the peasantry either with inhospitable land or completely landless. Since one of the major objectives of rural development is to increase the agricultural potential of the rural peasants in their own environment, agricultural improvements may not afford the time necessary to implement institutional land tenure reforms. Rather, rural development efforts may have to start improving farming conditions among the peasantry by promoting the optimum use of their own land under appropriate technologies or by initiating rural works which provide additional employment opportunities to the landless. Opportunities for building local infrastructure, water control and management may be equally important to enhance the development of traditional agriculture and master the environment.

Effective exploitation of natural resources likewise depends on applied research and appropriate technology. The stagnation of agriculture in many rural development programs was more often due to the failure of agricultural science to develop and promote suitable technologies than to factors easily attributed to traditional rural life. Furthermore, in countries where advisory services have been established, researchers tend to work in central places, far from the scene of practical application of their work, and are inclined to deal in highly technical terms with a selective world of new ideas and techniques which appear rather extravagant to the practical-minded peasants. Experience,

rather, indicates that, if research services are to be fruitful in subsistence areas, they should lay out experiments in regions where problems exist and where both advisers and farmers can observe the results. Moreover, the researchers ought to give less importance to research experiments conducted abroad, and concentrate on collecting and summarizing fragmentary local experiment results in order to master more effectively the local environment and promote technologies appropriate to local skills and needs.[1]

B. THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The sociocultural factors have often been overlooked or inadequately considered in implementing rural development programs. Often the anthropological background is too easily assumed and this leads to severe bottlenecks in the rural development process. The non-involvement of Chilalo's local government, for example, is explained to a considerable extent by the opposition of the past landlord dominated power structure to mass-oriented rural development. The CADU's strategy faced numerous problems because it failed to consider differences in land-tenure patterns, tenancy rates and interests of the local elites. Furthermore, in some cases CADU's technological inputs could not be managed by the peasants because of the observance of numerous holidays called by the Coptic Orthodox Church.[2] Numerous similar examples can be drawn from a variety of other projects, but, suffice to say that the need for a systematic analysis of

social conditions must be emphasized. The socio-cultural factors are part of the real feature of the terrain on which the program is expected to operate.[3]

C. INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION

The success of rural development programs equally fosters high quality coordination between the various institutional bodies involved at every administrative and implementation level. Program effectiveness appears to depend a great deal on the quality of coordination and cooperation between research, general education and regulatory bodies providing resources and facilities.

The Regulatory Bodies

Effective coordination within the government apparatus itself, is perhaps the first factor bearing immediately on the success of a development program. Many programs have been considerably impaired by conflicting values and goals within central government administrations. As a result of those divergences the provision of inputs and services to the peasants often took place in a most uncoordinated manner because ministries, departments and private agencies tended to pursue different objectives or to compete with each other for various political and economic reasons instead.

In turn, the lack of coordination within the central apparatus invariably affected the quality of coordination at local administrative levels. Poor support and information about new directives combined with uncoordinated provision

of resources discouraged local institutions from participating actively in programs and implementing new policies in unfavourable socio-cultural settings. In addition, rural developers often developed their own project criteria with heavy emphasis on financial and administrative autonomy. This reinforced the incompatibility between the central government apparatus and the institutional machinery at lower levels.[4] Consequently, the lack of coordination among the regulatory bodies not only paralysed the implementation of many programs, but resulted in a lack of trust at the grass-root level.

The current trend suggests that the function of coordination be given to a specific organization created from the various bodies involved in that particular task. Old government bodies, such as Ministries of Agriculture, tend to play a somewhat conservative role and are used to dealing with agricultural productivity in a manner which conflicts with the integrated rural development approach, since what is ultimately at stake is the "willingness of the political leadership to accept the need for, and the political cost of what are, in reality, totally revolutionary changes."[5]

Research, Education and Extension

The need for institutional coordination, however, goes beyond the level of regulatory bodies. The coordination of research, extension and education appears to be a key factor to the success of a rural development program. As already

mentioned, research and advisory services are interdependent and play a vital role in the adoption of new technologies and agricultural innovations. Yet, the activities of advisory services will remain futile without a minimum amount of knowledge and education enabling the rural dwellers to absorb and adapt the information received. Thus, research, extension and education should work closely together and develop in harmonious proportions since all three pursue the same goal of strengthening the technical, economical and social basis of the rural farming communities. However, their mission will only be fulfilled if they act with coordination and cooperation.

Consequently, every effort ought to be made to integrate the various activities of each discipline, and all three ought to be familiar with the philosophy, aims and programs of the other. While the advisory services bring invaluable contribution to vocational education and research, teachers may fruitfully partake in regional experimentations and perform minor advisory tasks.[6]

D. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

The low level of knowledge and training is among the greatest constraints on the expansion of rural services in Africa in general. It is widely acknowledged that agricultural development is indispensable to rural development. Agricultural development, however, requires education, and education alone cannot precipitate the

dynamic process of rural development without other complementary forces. Once agriculture is under way, the process spreads to other sectors of the economy and increased farm incomes generate new demands for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes. Then, craftsmen and small shop-keepers feel the stimulus of this process near the market-towns which become major growth points for a broader self-sustaining variety of rural development activities. Out of this new process, new technologies penetrate the area and foster greater specialization and division of labour in the economy. If other conditions are right, these hub-towns possibly become important commercial, administrative and cultural centres for the surrounding agricultural areas, and bridge the gap between villages and the modern outside world. Thus, new types of jobs and tasks arise calling for new skills and knowledge to deal with new services and technologies unfamiliar to the area.[7]

There is no formula to achieve the kind of education needed to promote rural development, nor is there any standard formula to achieve rural development in all situations. However, past rural development programs suggest that three areas are particularly crucial to their successful implementation, namely, the promotion of general education among the individuals concerned, the educational support of the local leaders and the training of professional workers.

Ideally, general education should provide for basic

literacy and numeric knowledge among the rural dwellers; and primarily develop ways of thinking about things rather than concentrate on merely teaching a body of knowledge and skills. This is not to say that these latter are not necessary, but comparatively they are straight forward. The promotion of attitudes and knowledge necessary to improve family and community life ought to be the fundamental concern of general education. This implies that primary schools and education in general must be part of a socio-economic plan which makes agricultural activities attractive and creates sympathetic general opinion to back the progressive objectives of education.[8]

General education may well be beyond the scope of a specific rural development project. Nevertheless, too many programs failed to provide the rural population with clear information about the objectives, reasons and possible benefits of their enterprise. More crucial still, few of them devoted enought time to analysing traditional attitudes and winning the confidence and collaboration of the rural farmers before they were actually implemented. As a result, they faced considerable misunderstanding and resistance from the rural populations.

Similarly, particular attention to the local leaders appears mandatory for successful program implementation. Since local leaders are generally influential members in the rural communities, they can significantly contribute to the adoption of innovations in the rural areas. It is wise,

therefore, not only to involve them in the planning and implementation of the program, but to provide them with the basic skills required to fulfill their functions at local level.

Finally, rural development programs must aim at training sufficient professional workers. CADU, for example, concentrated on field-staff training but never met its manpower needs, and the short supply of extension staff still remains a major constraint on rural development expansion in Ethiopia.

Consequently, it appears that rural development programs in Africa have to allocate substantial investments to education and manpower training, and aim at the widest possible number of rural dwellers, even if it is not the easiest way of realizing economic growth in the short-run. On the other hand, rural development programs ought to devote considerable efforts to improving the content of training and making it relevant to specific rural development needs.[9]

E. INCENTIVE INPUTS AND CHANNELS

Pricing and marketing policies have had a substantial adverse effect on the performance of rural development programs. Marketing and low food-crop prices have often discouraged the expansion of food-crop production and encouraged that of cash crops. Often, when food had to be imported, producer prices were purposely kept low, thus

discouraging an increase in domestic production. At times, when programs generated marketed surpluses, pricing and marketing efforts became very inconsistent with the national objectives and produced a series of crises. Furthermore, these kinds of policies required substantial subsidies for marketing operations which resulted in diversion of scarce administrative resources, away from long-term development objectives in order to solve short-term crises caused by the disposal of marketed surpluses.

Prices and marketing policies have also been aggravated by the poor performance of the marketing boards or marketing cooperatives in handling the increased marketable surpluses. In addition, little attention has generally been given to private local trading and to the development of markets in the rural areas. As a result, many programs failed to increase the food availability in non-program areas.

Consequently, if rural development programs are to be successful in providing food and income to the rural poor; they ought to secure a broad geographical coverage of services so as to improve the marketing system, including the traditional trade channels which already play an important role in rural life. They should also develop the rural infrastructure, particularly roads and storage facilities.[10]

F. RURAL EMPLOYMENT

Rural employment has often been constrained by policies encouraging the employment capacity of large-scale private land holdings. Agriculture must indeed generate profits in order to maintain the production, cover risks and losses and continue to reinvest. With increasing population pressures on land, however, a poverty-oriented approach is in contrast with operating large agricultural entreprises, since a high level of employment cannot be maintained over long periods of time.

Conversely, promoting employment through capital-intensive development, will not likely have the necessary labour-absorption capacity. Consequently, an employment generating initiative by the individuals themselves is likely more appropriate, provided it gives them access to means of production, know-how and incentives, and develops basic infrastructure supporting the production process.[11] Thus, sound interaction and mutually supportive activities among the industrial and agricultural sectors appear to be essential conditions to the success of a rural development program.

G. THE ROLE OF WOMEN

Agricultural extension programs have often overlooked the important role women play as contributors to food crop production and farming. This is essentially due to the fact that the planners, usually western-oriented, consider

women's place to be in the house and not in the field. It appears that, while agricultural extension programs are essentially oriented towards domestic science and home economics, there is an urgent need to promote more strictly economic functions among women, particularly by fostering improvements in the production of food crops. A rural development program must address itself as much to women as to men, since in traditional societies, the labour activities are generally well demarcated by custom an women provide generally the family food support.[12]

On the other hand, most training programs have been insufficient and often irrelevant, not only because they did not consider the role of women in African society, but also because the material used in demonstrations (plastic baby doll, plastic bathtubs, disposable diapers, etc...) were not available to most participants.

H. DECENTRALIZATION AND REGIONAL PLANNING

Past rural development programs equally indicate that broad-based rural development cannot only be a matter of central government alone, but local initiative, local planning and responsive institutional and administrative systems are also mandatory to guide and monitor government's implementations. In most cases decentralization implies drastic reforms in regional planning and local administration. Far more responsibility must be delegated to the lower administrative levels and to the grass-roots in

order to effectively reach the individual farmers. Decentralization ought to foster both the articulation of the grass-root organizations' needs in the power structure and the efficiency of the indigenous administrative systems.

Consequently, the success of a program also depends on how well articulated and integrated the grass-roots' needs are in the overall planning and administrative system. Until intermediate planning bodies and administrative institutions can be autonomous, the government may have to fulfill the role of coordination on its own, but gradually responsibility and authority must be shared according to the growing administrative capacity of the grass-roots. This can be achieved by promoting both development administration and local leadership through peoples' organizations.[13]

I. IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

One valuable contribution of the concept of integrated rural development is the strong emphasis it places on the political dimension of rural development. Most governments stress the importance of equitable access and distribution of resources and the necessity to involve every citizen in the planning and the building of their strong new nation. However, very few national leaders, as yet, have succeeded in formulating and promoting clear philosophical and political principles indispensable to guiding their national development enterprise. Many still wonder what kind of economic, cultural and political society should emerge from

their newly independent nation.

As a result, many programs and rural development strategies become counter productive because of the incoherent ideological and political setting in which they are made to operate. All too often, in the hope of raising social benefits, options are made in favour of "top-down" planning strategies, banking on capital investment and centralized administration, without realizing that this approach frustrates indigenous institutions, fails to develop the local potential and defeats the aspirations of the rural masses. On the other hand, governments call for peoples' initiative and rural involvement but are not always aware that the rural response rests on well designed long-term strategies fostered by the central leadership, and on the diffusion of clear objectives consistently supported by sufficient political-will, confidence building and resource inputs. "It is the striving towards self-reliance and local level planning of motivated people with perhaps minor inflow of outside technology of investment capital which matters."[14] Self-reliance of motivated people, however, only thrives on well-defined ideological principles and overt political support of the leaders.

A review of the past rural development experience indicates that rural development in any country includes a wide variety of elements. To develop the rural areas does not simply mean increasing the agricultural production, although this is an important factor. But, the improvement

of social and economic facilities, the promotion of a better participation of the rural people in national political and economic matters, and the establishment of a coordinated administration are fundamental objectives that cannot be overriden by short-term economic goals.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER VII

1. Vervelde, G.J., "Relationship Between Agricultural Research and Extention" in Borton, R.E. (Ed.), Getting Agriculture Moving, Selected Readings, Vol. 1, New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1966, pp. 345-346.

2. Cohen, J.M., "Effects of the Green Revolution Strategies on Tenents and Small-Scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia", Journal of Development Areas, 9 (April 1975) pp. 335-358.

3. US Agency for International Development, Project Assistance, Handbook 3, Washington D.C.: 1974, Appendix 5A.

4. Ahmad, Y.J., op. cit., p. 133.

5. Idib., p. 129.

6. Vervelde, G., op. cit., pp. 345-347.

7. Coombs, P. & A. Manzoor, Attacking Rural Poverty, How Non-Formal Education Can Help, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 15.

8. Griffiths, V.L., "General Educational Needs for Agricultural Development", in Borton R.E. (Ed.), op. cit., p. 295.

9. Mosher, A., op. cit., pp. 182-183.

10. Ibid., pp. 181-182.

11. Leupolt, M. (1977), "Integrated Rural Development: Key Elements to an Integrated Rural Development Strategy", Sociologia Ruralis, 17, 1-2 (1977) pp. 20-21.

12. Lele, U., op. cit., pp. 76-78 and 167-168.

13. Leupolt, M. (1977), op. cit., p. 24.

14. Ibid., p. 15.

VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

A. A FUNDAMENTAL LESSON FROM RURAL DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

If a rural development program needs to include a good number of essential elements to set in motion the rural development process, the review of rural development literature consistently underlines the necessity to put all these elements to work for the full development of persons and the improvement of the whole fabric of rural life. Both the early efforts in India and Mosher's definition point to the importance of directing rural development efforts towards the development of full participation and personal development in one's culture.

Full participation and personal development, however, require the willingness of the rural people to adopt new attitudes and develop confidence in making better choices for the impnovement of their living conditions. One persistent danger underlying most rural development efforts has been the eagerness to implement programs ahead of people's motivations and understanding. This approach usually resulted in rural frustration, passive resistence and wastage of resources and services. Thus, successful development seems to indicate that the various components involved in the rural development process must not only develop in parallel with the creation of new patterns of rural living, but must enhance new attitudes and behavioral changes in the rural life they intend to improve, if full

personal development is ever to be reached. This is perhaps the most significant contribution of the extension and community development processes which guide the rural development process towards meeting local needs, while promoting the behavioral changes necessary to adopt innovations. In this sense, the "essence" of extension and CD lies at the very core of the development process.

Even though other rural development experts, such as Lele, stress the importance of designing national policies, administrative and decentralized structures that support self-sustaining rural development, they all concur in the belief that securing productive services and balanced rural welfare must ultimately benefit the masses. In Lele's perspective, rural development becomes self-sustaining if a proper institutional climate is created, and if both skills and existing resources are used for sustained development and progress.

The creation of an institutional climate and the use of skills and resources for the progress of the rural masses, however, implies two fundamental pre-conditions indispensable to generate self-sustaining rural development. First, clear national development policies are imperative to guide the self-sustaining progress of the rural masses. Second, if the administrative services are to become conducive to self-sustaining rural development, the administrative structure requires enough flexibility to make room for decentralizaiton, institutional pluralism and

shared responsibility with the various governmental and private institutions involved in the development process.

Both these conditions, in turn, point to a more fundamental prerequisite which appears to be the ground basis of the development process, namely, the political will of the leadership tomake the right choices and adopt related strategies that will foster and support an institutional and administrative climate fabourable to self-sustaining development. Both Robert's and Leupolt's models present the political dimension of development as being the fundamental support of the development process. In this sense, both models concur with the Chinese approach, which long based rural development and welfare on the effective political power ensured to the masses.

Robert's Model

Robert's model highlights the important role of the "social philosophy" which ultimately determines the development of both the individual and the society.[1] The political and social ends of the people in power is reflected in the "social structure" which provides the structural context shaping the lives of the people in society.

The complex of existing institutions involved in the social structure emerging under a given social philosophy influences, in turn, the kinds of needs to be fulfilled. If for example, the social philosophy adopts an economic model, the development tendency will generally be to impose on to

people needs expressed elsewhere in order to meet a higher production and consumption of goods, instead of permitting people to develop their own awareness of what it is that they need. It is a common experience that under the pressure of agencies and government administrations, which often seek for immediate action and measurable results, people's needs are frequently assumed. If on the other hand, the social philosophy is determined to first meet the basic development needs of the people, as described earlier, a social structure more appropriate to meet those needs is likely to emerge.

Similarly, the development of human, material and organizational resoureces is ultimately determined by the social philosophy. Just as with needs in any development situation, the judgement of what are resources and what are not cannot be purely assumed. Not only do many cultural traditions value progress and success differently from societies abiding by work ethics and material wealth, but considerable human resources and abilities lie in the community itself. The tendency to consider problems of social change and power in terms of financial resources and control over such resources can paralyse local development potential and influence premature courses of action which lead the development process to more frustrating paths. Thus, both needs and resources have to be considered in the light of the aims and values of the society concerned and not of those assumed by outsiders. Ultimately, the

development of resources will depend on how the social philosophy defines both needs and resources, and on its degree of motivation to establish an adequate social structure that will fulfill those needs and secure the resources necessary to meet them.

Leupolt's Model

Leupolt's model of integrated rural development underlines in a similar manner the importance of the political-economic frame-work in the development process. In order to coordinate and integrate the performance of the administrative and technical frame-works, the overall political decisions, economic policies and resource management must all favour the development objectives in harmony with the socio-economic values of a given society. Only when the macro-economic policy frame-work, power structure and socio-economic values are coordinated to give the overall direction to the development process, can the public administration make most effective use of the institutions to achieve social and technical progress. This model, like the previous one, points to the heavy political content of development and both suggest that this political dimension is the fundamental precondition indispensable to the development process.

In reality, very few countries have yet succeeded in developing adequate social philosophies or integrated macro political-economic frame-works powerful enough to guide their national development and to commit their people to

change within the parameters of the socio-economic values of their country. Aziz, for example, contends that presently only twelve to fifteen countries adequately meet the political requirements for rural development.[2] China is likely the only country so far that developed a unique approach in which "the right task, policy and style of work invariably conform with the demands of the masses at a given time and place."[3]

The Chinese Experience

It is becoming well acknowledged that China's successful development is based on the primacy of its socialist ideology guided by the principles referred to as the Theory of Contradictions and the Mass Line. Tang pointed out that:

> The strategy of communism... is contained in its theory... In the Marxist concept of knowledge, principles and practices are inseparably united. Theory is the instrument for transforming principles into practice, and for using practice to formulate principles....This theory, in turn is of practical service because it provides rules to eliminate erroneous ways and determine new conditions.[4]

Mao's application of the the Theory of Contradictions to the Chinese situation has not only contributed to single out Chinese communism from other communist nations, but has served to improve a wide range of social and economic relations between the individual, state and Chinese nation.

> The theory of contradiction has been put to three practical uses. First, it has been used for analysis... of the dialectical conception of Chinese society... Second, it serves as a basis of

> behavioral norms, particularly in groups settings such as thought reform - the juxtaposition of individual group through struggle which sharpens contradictions to a point of polarization leading to a dialectical resolution. Third, the Theory of contradictions has been used as an approach to create and use organization.[5]

The Mass Line approach, based on the two core elements of the Leninist concept of "democratic centralism", served to resolve the contradictions between "democracy", as being the impulses coming from the masses, and "centralism", as being those coming from the leadership. The Mass Line adopts two methods: the first is to "combine the general and the particular", the second "to unite the leadership with the masses".[6] China soon felt that the use of only top-down administrative power could not consolidate the system, but promoting only volition and freedom without using a strong administration to organize effective means of action would degenerate into laissez-faire.[7]

Thus, in China, correct leadership must come from the masses and return to the masses following four distinct steps: "perception" (perceiving the views and needs of the masses); "summarization" (synthesizing the information for the local party committee); "authorization" (acknowledging the reports, issues and concerns of the masses); and, "implementation" (going to the masses with explanation and propaganda to transform their perceptions and activities).[8]

This outlines the basic features of Chinese interpretation of the Theory of Contradictions and their approach to resolving contradictions by means of the Mass

Line strategy.[9]

China not only applied these fundamental principles to political contradictions, but her development experience shows that, from the very outset, its development objectives of building a progressive economy, achieving sustained growth in agricultural and industrial production, and generating full employment and equitable distribution, are embedded in the overall political and social philosophy. Chairman Mao's writings concentrate on the relationship between political, social and economic forces and underline that the welfare of the masses can only be ensured if the masses have effective political power. Similarly, economic and technical growth, unless it is subservient to the political ideology, will be counter productive because it will lead to the exploitation of the poorer segments of the population. Mao was quite explicit on the principle that:

> the realtionship between redness and expertness, between politics and work is the unity of two opposites... Those who pay no attention to ideology and politics and are busy with their work all day long will become economists and technicians who have gone astray and are dangerous. Ideological work and political work guarantee the accomplishment of economic work and technical work and they serve the economic foundation. Ideology and politics are also the supreme commander and the soul. As long as we are a bit slack with ideological work and political work, economic work and technical work will surely go astray.[10]

Rural development implemented under those principles brought surprising results in China. The most striking aspect of the Chinese experience is probably the ability of

Chinese people to adopt the concept of basic needs as the main pillar of their development policy long before it became fashionable in the West. In the inherent conflict between equality and freedom, China opted for equality versus freedom because, without this option, the objective of meeting everyone's needs could not be accomplished. This concept implies the imposition of a "social minimum" for the underprivileged and a "social maximum" to prevent increase of consumption beyond prescribed limits. As a result, Chinese people do not have full freedom of consumption and occupational activities because the good of society is considered more important than individual preferences.

These constraints on free consumption and free mobility, however, do not deny individual freedom in China. The freedom of expression is surprisingly high and, within given social units, the individual has increasing possibility for vertical and horizontal movements.

With "politics in command" China has succeded in creating an egalitarian society in which no segment of the population are privileged, but no one's basic needs are left unfulfilled. There is no unemployment and income disparities are narrower than in most other countries. China achieved technical progress without destroying the natural environment and without uncontrolled urbanization. Even if this achievement met considerable difficulties and popular misconceptions, China has not sacrificed the individual, but developed a judicious blend of material and non-material

incentives. The whole system focuses on man, his motivations and well-being, but only after the society has been re-organized in a manner that it minimizes exploitation of one group by the other.[11]

If the previous considerations are accurate, rural development in Zambia seems to have fallen short of several ingredients necessary to generate effective rural development in the country. Most significantly, Zambia appears to lack an integrated macro political-economic frame-work and a sound social philosophy which are necessary preconditions to set the development process in motion and to organize the masses into a national self-reliant movement. The ambiguity of the national ideology consistently undermines what is believed to be the foundation of the development process.

The interest of the rising bourgeoisie in perpetuating the old economic dualism through transnational alliances with multinational corporations and foreign interests has distorted the fundamental goals of Humanism to the advantage of the economic and political elites who paid only lip-service to new governmental reforms. Thus, most targets set under Zambian Humanism have remained at the level of ideals and their implementation appears more remote than ever.

From its inception, Zambian Humanism emphasized fundamental qualities of traditional life on which the new society was to thrive. Man-centeredness, mutual aid,

tolerance of all individuals and close social ties of the extended-family system were all invaluable components of traditional life which had a real potential for building a new ideology. Indeed, up to present time, many of those traditional characteristics still govern the rural life in the most remote areas of Zambia.

Zambian Humanism, however, despite its reliance on genuine traditional principles, soon faced considerable problems. As previously analysed in chapter V, Zambian Humanism developed in isolation of the other major socialist trends, faced crucial problems of definition and content, and met considerable opposition from the capital-owning bourgeoisie and the transnational corporations. The anti-socialist influence of the colonial regime and the strong dependence upon western skilled manpower, technology and markets, appear to have been two central factors that have prevented Zambia to develop a genuine ideology. Because of her foreign economic and technical dependence, Zambia feared antagonizing western influence by proclaiming overtly her socialist orientation. This led Zambian Humanism to compromise with western values and include alien elements in her philosophy which are almost contradictory to socialist principles. This is likely the reason why Zambian Humanism ("socialism") encourages private enterprise (capitalism) and tries to resolve the dilemma by suggesting a "controllable" mixed economy.

This fundamental contradiction influenced Zambian

Humanism to become more permissive toward social inequalities and multinational corporations. The need for self-reliance proclaimed since independence and the rhetoric on agricultural development have not stopped underdevelopment. The participatory democracy and the one party system concern primarily the economic and political elite groups and the labour union leaders, while the poor have been excluded from both influence and affluence. Likewise, the national declarations of self-management and participation remain under the control of the multinational companies, which continue to dictate the product of development, the industrial strategies and the methods of production in the country.[12]

It appears, therefore, that sound rural development in Zambia must first model a strong "political-economic" frame-work based on a clearly defined ideology and develop a social philosophy relevant to the needs of the country. Zambian Humanism needs to be rethought in the light of other philosophies more representative of the African genius, and elements of the Chinese experience, in particular, provide remarkable lessons in relating politics to socio-economic development.

Zambia who like China claims to be a man-centered society, appears in contrast to have grown in total isolation from the rural masses. Thus, if Zambia wants to meet the popular aspirations, she has to re-evaluate Humanism in function of the interests and needs of the rural

masses, and re-define and implement political principles that will guide and sustain their development. If central leaders do not succeed in creating a sweeping ideology, they could, according to the Chinese experience, embrace two important prerequisites necessary to rural development: first, to be a group of people genuinely concerned with the interests of the masses; second, to practice equitable distribution of rural resources. Without these two political prerequisites no long-term rural development strategy can successfully be devised or implemented to irradicate poverty or meet the basic needs of the rural dwellers.

B. POLITICAL IDEAL AS A PREREQUISITE

It is commonly felt, that the source of both individual and corporate power is immediately correlated to the degree of economic and political influence one has in a given society. Marx and Seers, however, underline a third dimension of power that may significantly influence the choice of more ethical and self-reliant strategies. Power, according to Seers, does not depend only on economic and political influence, but "cultural" forces equally shape the way people perceive their needs. Included in this "cultural" dimension, are both the basic human need of "citizenship" of a nation that is truly economically and politically independent, and the national capacity to "negotiate" with foreign powers and cope with the cultural impact of their innovations.[13] In Seers' view, these appear to be two

important prerequisites necessary to support self-reliant development.

African Cultural Ideologies

For the past fifteen years, several cultural ideologies emerging throughout the African continent appear to support Seers' perspective by emphasizing African nationalism and unity.

The theme of "Negritude", coined by the poet Aime Cesaire from the West Indies and widely developed by Senghor in Senegal, is not the defense of skin or colour, but rather

> the awareness, defense and development of African and cultural values... It is democracy quickened by the sense of communion and brotherhood between men... Negritude then, is a part of Africanity. It is made of human warmth... It is the sum-total of the values of civilization of the African world. It is not racialism, it is culture.[14]

Another current ideology is the theme of "African Personality" which promotes the search for new values, foundations and African identity. Almost every proponent of African Personality has his own image and definition of it. The place where it fit best is in the realm of the arts. Of this, Mphahelele tells us that African artist dealing with

> African themes, rhythms and idioms... cannot but express African Personality. He can't help doing so because, after all, it is really a search for his own personality, for the truth about himself. But, if he thinks of African personality as a battle cry, its bound to throw him into a stance, an attitude and his art will suffer... We are not going to help our artist by rattling tin-cans of the African Personality about his ears... Every artist in the world, African or not, must go through the agony of purging his art of imitations and false notes before

he strikes an individual medium.[15]

If African Personality is best depicted by the artist one wonders, however, by what means the many millions of Africans who are not artists can search "for the truth about themselves" and attain a security for their existence. Furthermore, African Personality has become a very scattered field in which some imagine that being black is a mystique, a virtue they should be proud of; in Ghana one used to see signs reading "Black Stars"; and, it has become a common place to hear of "Black Power" in the United States.

Yet, it must be granted that the awareness of being "b[illegible] gives many people a point of reference, identity and [illegible]nsciousness. On the other hand, however, blackness [illegible]s a myth which does not make entire justice to all the [illegible] African people that are "brown" and not "black" and to a[illegible] other cultures that cannot be reduced to the narrow c[illegible]egory of "Black Africa".

Finally, "Pan Africanism" and the movement for "African Unity" is one of the most dynamic areas of ideological activities in Africa. Nkrumah, in Ghana, was the most outspoken champion of African Unity which reached its climax in the establishment of the Organization for African Unity in Addis Abbaba in 1963. Other heads of state, however, while supporting Nkrumah's ideal, advocated a more gradual approach to it. Senghor considered African Unity as secondary to other African values. He claimed that "We want (fi[illegible]) to liberate ourselves politically so that we can

properly express our Negritude, our real black values."[16]

Nyerere, another advocate of African Unity, feels that "it has to come by agreement, agreement between equals". His motto remains "socialism", which he and many other African leaders believe to be rooted in the past-- in the traditional society which produced the present one. Modern African Socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of society as the extension of the basic family unit.[17]

Although the extent to which the average African identifies himself with these ideologies remains questionable, all of these political movements point to a progress being made in the rising African consciousness. Even if this progress is still in search of new identity and security, it could influence the pride of political leaders and the national elites towards building a new independent home-land around a more meaningful national way of life based on the resurgence of their own traditional and cultural values.

Seers' "cultural" dimension of power, however, appears to reach well beyond merely raising the national consciousness in order to meet intrinsic objectives. If "cultural" independence is put as a condition to development itself, then all objectives that may enhance national citizenship and self-reliance equally become conditions to national development. It is conceivable that cultural factors may promote a stronger national identity based on

greater consciousness of a common cultural heritage and more extensive awareness of national human resource development potential. This regenerated nationalism could counterbalance the personal interests of a privileged group which directly undermine the integrity of the national community. If the leaders considered these community ties not only as elements of national pride, but as fundamental requirements of national development, then, the objectives of equitable distribution of resources, integration and welfare of the masses, and political and administrative reforms would likely be directed towards the consolidation of national independence instead of remaining mere palliative solutions to urgent development problems.

Conversely, the pursuit of individual interests by a small privileged group would be likely more reduced by the common aspirations of a cohesive national entity than in a society composed of a variety of groups divided by tribalism, conflicting interests and unequal development opportunities. In a nation strengthened by solid bounds of national consciousness, the ruling elites would be stimulated to meet the aspirations of the national community by fear of general opposition, rather than take advantage of internal divisions to pursue their private interests.

It is hoped, therefore, that such a meaningful nationalism may one day develop in Zambia and motivate the leadership to make more ethical choices to meet the needs and aspirations of the rural masses, and include them in the

building of a self-reliant nation. Even though this objective may still be very remote, it is hoped that the lessons of the Chinese experience and the rising aspirations of African nations towards African independence and unity may provide Zambia with a new set of fundamental values and priorities that could significantly contribute to meeting her initial objectives.

C. RURAL DEVELOPMENT: OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Assuming that a new development orientation takes place along the lines of the political pre-requisites suggested above, the effort of national self-reliance necessarily implies several critical choices and institutional reforms in order to establish a long-term rural development strategy for Zambia.

Research and Planning

Agricultural research is one of the most urgent needs Zambia must fulfill in order to generate rural development in the subsistence areas. Not only is research insufficient, but a great deal more funds, trained personnel and equipment facilities must be provided. This makes it all the more important that staff, finances and facilities be organized with maximum effectiveness in order to avoid duplication and ensure that research concentrates on finding solutions to the most urgent problems.

Effective use of limited research resources calls for the establishment of a strong central research station in

the country at which a team of specialists, trained in various disciplines, work in cooperation with regional stations established in the various provinces to cope with wide differences in physical and climatic conditions.

In the meantime, in order to meet the urgent need for agricultural development, a group of senior researchers with a few competent extension workers could be sent to the subsistence areas to make basic surveys and determine the differences between successful and unsuccessful farmers working under similar conditions.

It must be underlined that both research and practical experimentation must be guided by the fundamental principle of meeting the felt needs of the farmers. With the solution to some of their most pressing problems, the peasants' confidence in extension and research workers may be enhanced, and their receptivity to new ideas and techniques increased. Similarly, when researchers and extension staff see the results of their efforts welcomed by the local farmers, they will likely gain self-confidence and pride in their experimentation.[18]

Financial Control

The implementation of a long-term development strategy would also require that the Zambian government exercise far closer control over industrial, trading and financial institutions, and ensure the implementation of a financial plan designed to capture all investable surpluses essential to the productive sector.

Government would first need to control the decisions of the basic industries in order to ensure the development of new projects and expand older ones in harmony with long-term objectives. This could involve a cut in short-term market opportunities, and new investments in more appropriate industries serving the overall objectives. It is a well known fact that the breweries, for example, are the most profitable industry of the Industrial Development Corporation Limited (INDECO), the largest parastatal of Zambia. Instead of allocating large investments in that manufacturing sector, long-term considerations would rather suggest investment in projects producing farm-implements, equipment machinery or construction materials.

Government ought equally to take effective control over the import-export and wholesale trading institutions in order to reduce the dependence on imports and increase domestic production. The current use of import licences and exchange control for achieving these objectives appears difficult to enforce. Treating as private firms the large Consumer Buying Corporation, the Zambia O.K. Bazaars and the Mwaiseni chains, in which government owns the majority of shares, appears to be an inadequate use of ownership leverage for which the government has already paid in the form of compensation. It was revealed that Zambian government acquired 61 per cent of the Consumer Buying Corporation, 51 per cent of ZOK, Morwison, Mwaiseni, Zambesi, and 100 per cent of General Pharmaceutical and

Zambia National Distributioh. All these firms were handling 15 per cent of total imports and one third of the total consumers goods imports. Considering that half of the nation's imports consists of items for the mining and manufacturing industry in which government owns the majority of shares through parastatals, the consistent import increase over the years suggests that government has not exercised, as yet, its potential control effectively.[19]

Finally, an overall financial plan would have to govern all financial institutions in order to allocate investable surpluses to essential productive sectors of the plan. This would imply, among others measures, the use of tax policies as an integral tool of the financial Plan, rather than applying taxes to cover only expenditures of social and economic infrastructure. Furthermore, the commercial banks, which provide the major part of the credit for the productive sectors, should be made to serve national priorities, and the Central Bank should regulate the economy not through "credit squeezes" which tend to paralyse the small private firms, but in accordance with new national investment objectives.

Effective control over decisions and financial operations of the industrial, trading and financial institutions could give Zambian Government considerably more freedom to plan and expand development programs in the subsistence areas. More significantly, financial control could enable Zambian government to redirect a considerable

amount of financial surpluses, presently invested in manufacture and industry, to the development of the rural sector.

Agricultural Production Policies

National self-reliance would equally give priority to the development of the subsistence areas. Not only the provision of applied research, credit and farming requisites would become major concerns of national self-reliant development, but the provision of adequate advisory services would have a central priority. In addition, a modification of current pricing policies and marketing facilities could significantly contribute to agricultural development in the subsistence sector.

a) Advisory Services

The previous chapters have already pointed out that shortages and poor quality of services stifled many rural development programs. The extension workers, who are always on the scene, involved with all hazards, frustrations and hesitations of the farmers need practical solutions that fit into the pattern of agricultural life as a whole, since "ideal" solutions often promoted by researchers rarely bring radical changes in the socio-economic structures of traditional rural life. This points once more to the necessity of coordination between research, education and advisory services.

In collaboration with research and education, advisory services could carry out a certain amount of local and

regional experimentations on pilot farms, demonstration farms or other field plots in order to observe, demonstrate, experiment and collect data on local situations. The total of these activities may be called regional experimentation if not research, and should involve, as much as possible, the participation of existing farmers' organizations. In each district there should be at least a few advisory technicians, familiarized with experimental work and provided with the necessary facilities such as transport vehicles and other basic equipment.[20]

b) Pricing Policies

A modification of pricing policies could considerably contribute to increase agricultural production if a consistent criterion were used. By setting the producer price on the basis of world prices, Zambian government could have a more effective leverage on pricing policies and facilitate the establishment of a more efficient interregional allocation of production. World prices could become the relevent import-export parity price, after being adjusted to transportation, processing and handling expenses.[21] On this basis crop prices, being flexible, could become adjustable upward and downward according to crop forcasting reports, help equalize incomes regionally, and stabilize the farmers' income.

c) Marketing Facilities

The pricing policies could be combined with the provision of marketing facilities in each district.

NAMBOARD's performance has been rather unsatisfactory for the various reasons already discussed above. Thus, wide decentralization of marketing facilities at district level could contribute to reduce the risk to cash crop production and secure a minimum income to small farmers. To that effect, significant improvements could be reached by organizing a better depot network in the districts. Depots ought to be well distributed. The transportation cost could then be based on the distance from the depots to the district centres.

Furthermore, the monopoly on crop purchases by MANBOARD should be abolished. The Marketing Unions should be made to compete with NAMBOARD and both NAMBOARD and Unions ought to be in competition with private traders over crop purchases. This could encourage private traders to emerge and decrease the high demand presently placed on NAMBOARD.

All of these previous suggestions would apparently bring immediate improvements in the subsistence sector and appear as logical priority requirements for development conducted under national self-reliance principles. Despite their real value, however, these improvements still remain partial solutions to the fundamental rural development problem of Zambia. The effective participation of the rural masses supported by socio-economic improvements in the rural areas must become a desirable improvement per se, before any other development strategy may operate successfully.

So far, a good number of strategies have been attempted

in Zambia. Intensive Development Zones, cooperatives and the Zambian National Service, all have considerable potential for rural development, but proved unsuccessful because of excessive "top-down" planning and dependence on government resources, and inadequate provision of advisory services. More significantly, past rural development strategies in Zambia did not operate on self-reliant principles and failed to incorporate the masses in the formulation and implementation of development strategies.

In Leupolt's terminology this syndrome indicates that the rural development efforts in Zambia remained at the level of the "physical-technical" frame-work or at the level of the "administrative-institutional" one. These efforts, however, never were guided by a sound macro "political-economic" frame-work -- the predominent element of the development process. As a result, no clear direction was ever provided to the rural development process and most rural development efforts remained inconsequential, uncoordinated or conflicting with the socio-economic values of the rural masses.

A New Decentralization for Rural Participation

In the event of government's determination to define its social philosophy in relation to the needs of the rural masses, a sound interaction would have to take place between the central government (securing financial and technical aid), the political leadership (providing inspiration and direction), and the people (executing local controls). To

that effect, new decentralization reforms, leadership and rural participatory institutions ought to be designed.

New decentralization efforts must aim at gradual devolution of decision-making power to the masses and promotion of local rural authorities truly representative of the grass-roots. Full responsibility must be given to new district councils to prepare the development budgets of their own district and assure their complete execution. New district councils would likely represent the district population's needs better than a foreign district governor, appointed to administer the district in the name of UNIP.

Decentralization equally calls for wide dispersal of rural development services and facilities throughout the subsistence areas. Among the many facilities required, new decentralization efforts must aim at providing research and advisory services, health facilities, rural community development services, farming requisites and marketing facilities in every district.

Essential to this decentralization approach is the coordination among both ministries and departments and the private institutions involved at local level. The various governmental bodies responsible for agricultural and rural development ought, in a joint effort, to coordinate both their policies and the delivery of services to the rural areas, and devolve part of their responsibility to cooperatives, and Ward and Village Development Committees in accordance with their administrative capacity. Conversely,

adequate mechanisms must be designed to allow the private institutions to voice their needs in the delivery system. This approach to decentralization thus calls for a new type of leadership and greater bargaining power of the rural masses in the overall power structure.

a) New Leadership Structure

In order to establish closer contact between government and the masses, the provincial tiers of government could be abolished and the district become the basic administrative unit directly related to Lusaka. New district authorities such as "District Councils" could be elected for a given period of time by majority vote of all Ward Development Committees represented in the district. In turn, Ward Development Committee slates would be proposed by the Village Development Committees and ratified by the vote of the ward community at large, while Village Development Committees would be elected by their respective village communities. The essential criteria for election at all levels would consider the leadership qualities of the candidates, their committment and sense of responsibility toward the community, their skills and their performance in production and administrative capacity. The essential difference between this decentalization structure and the current one lies in the promotion of local authorities acquiring a real responsibility in their own area, while controlled and ratified by the masses according to the performance and the ability of the candidates.

The central control, on the other hand, would concentrate on promoting maximum self-reliance and participation in each district in accordance with the national policies and objectives. Part of its responsibility would include the regular checking (as distinct from controlling) of the financial operations and budget balances of each district. The major task of central control, however, would be to assure the coordination of local plans with the national goals and aspirations of the central leadership.

b) A Rural Participation Strategy

To be successful, rural participation efforts in the subsistence areas of Zambia must penetrate the closed circle of village society and induce the idea among the rural population that man has it in his power to alter his environment and improve the quality of rural life. The pursuit of this objective, however, must avoid alienating the rural peasant from his traditional society. Rather, the decisions to accept change and have a voice in the local affairs must be made according to the rules of the existing society, and not by an outside agency. Thus, in order to trigger the participation of the rural masses, it is felt that the establishment of "rural cadres" could significantly enhance the involvement of the grass-roots in the development objectives of the leadership.

Experience seems to indicate that the cadre approach has been more successful in countries that were subject to

to se[illegible]l socio-economic systems with substantial [illegible]andho[illegible]s concentrated in the hands of landlord elites, [illegible] in [illegible]ntries that have a general scarcity of available [illegible]nd [illegible] relation to the size of their labour force. Co[illegible]ies like North Korea, North Vietnam and areas co[illegible]olled by the National Liberation Forces in Sou[illegible]-Vietnam illustrate this case by having successfully ado[illegible]ed important aspects of the Chinese cadre approach.[22]

[illegible]n the opinion of this writer, however, a radical reform of Zambian Humanism along the lines of genuine socialism, national self-reliance and African nationalism, as sugg[illegible]sted above, could provide the preconditions neces[illegible] to the adoption of a rural cadre strategy. It is also a fundamental assumption of this writer that planned social-change calls for initial raising of consciousness and transforming of social structures from within society before reaching any enduring improvement in human conditions.

The Village Level Worker (VLW) in India, working as an "external" change-agent faced considerable difficulties in his mandate to bring comprehensive development to the villages. Coming from "outside" he often had an urban orientation; he considered the village as a place of work and did not occupy an "internal" position in the power structure. Hence, he failed to gain the trust of the villagers and the wide socio-cultural gap between VLWs and peasants kept him remote from "internal" rural life.[23]

In the "internal" approach, by contrast, the rural

cadre is local, more easily accepted by the rural people, and is not expected to extend changes to the people or to bring them new things. His role is rather one of a leader guiding his own people in the process of changing themselves. Thus, in African society, where the sense of belonging is considerably reinforced by the ties of kin, an "internal" cadre approach appears, therefore, more appropriate to effect change.

c) The Rural Cadre in Zambia

Under political principles clearly re-defined, the rural cadres could become significant agents of cultural and social change in rural Zambia. The essential role of the rural cadre is to develop an awareness of the rural development potential existing in the village community and to foster sufficient self-reliance and cooperation among the villagers to adopt and implement innovative ideas in the local villages. Since the technical level of the rural villages is extremely low, there is a great deal to do in each community that requires no extensive training or specialized skills, once the village accepts the idea of change. Thus, rural cadres are primarily conceived as multi-subject-matter extension agents promoting primarily enthusiasm and participation among the rural populations and guiding them along the lines laid out by the political leadership. Their leadership style concentrates on the extension education process which presupposes an intimate relationship with the local population, yet always

responsive to higher policy.

(i) Recruitment

Since the objective of rural participation necessarily implies the penetration of the national political principles to the social structures of the grass-roots villages, recruitment policies ought to call upon working members of the rural communities, who are familiar with the local customs and the social and environmental problems of their area. Thus, recruitment policies have to give special attention to both male and female people dedicated to change and who share the work with common people. Moreover, in a society where age determines status, recruits should be between 25 and 40 years of age in order to command respect in the community. Older members are likely more reluctant to accept new ideas.

Experience of African rural life also suggests that when the decision-making process involves the entire community, and every individual is given the opportunity to bring foreward his views, the significance and the bearing of decisions is considerably reinforced. It is thus advisable that the community have some input in the recruitment of rural cadres and their selection be approved by the entire community in which the cadre is expected to work. To that end, a member of each WDC, adequately informed and prepared by the district council, should set out on tour in his ward and, with the collaboration of each local VDC,

explain to each village the role of rural cadres in their community. After his explanation, one cadre should be chosen in each community by the villagers, in the absence of any representative of the administration; for it is essential that the candidate be trusted by his fellow-villagers.

(ii) Training

The chosen candidates would then undergo one month training at the Boma (district capital) between March and June, when there is little work to do in the fields. Simple "cadre centres" could be built with the financial help of the district. These facilities ought to remain deliberately rudimentary and easy to be locally built so that the peasants would not feel too out of place. Simple sanitary facilities and other appropriate technology could be added to help motivate the trainees to introduce them in their own villages.

The training of rural cadres would be carried out by the best suited member of the District Council, or could be delegated to another Director (ex-school teacher) chosen by the district council, provided he shows a good understanding of the workings of politics and village society in the area. Although the Director is the only administrator of the program, he would work in close collaboration with the advisory, health and rural community development specialists attached to the district under the overall patronage of the district council authorities.

The training of rural cadres would basically cover

three major fields: political training, subject-matter training, and training in consciousness raising and need assessment techniques. Political training could begin with the basic explanation of the past and present nature of government and its relation to the villages. Strong emphasis must be placed on new philosophical and political principles and on the latest policies and rural development strategies adopted by the central leadership. This academic training could include an in-depth study of regulations, directives and resolutions of central government as well as their immediate implications for the grass-roots. Occasionally, guest speakers could be invited among the members of the political leadership to hold conferences with the rural cadres, and, in the evening, the trainees could discuss the speakers' ideas with the Director in a form of dialogue very much in the African tradition of the palaver.

Subject-matter training could start with the study of the economic situation and rural development problems of the district with specific focus on the trainees' area. In this field of training, the collaboration of district specialists would become most invaluable to point out new ideas, techniques and appropriate strategies necessary to promote small community projects in the villages. While advisory specialists could conduct demonstrations on basic agricultural practices, simple irrigation works, well construction, etc., other health specialists could teach the cadres basic elements of hygiene and preventive medicine.

After this basic training, the role of the specialists would essentially be to follow-up the work of the cadres in their community. Once a village has decided to undertake a community project, the cadre submits it to the appropriate specialist, and deliberates with him over the implications, requirements and strategies best suited to implement this project in his community. The role of the specialists is thus essentially conceived as being one of an adviser to the district council, and one of non-formal teacher at grass-root level--using the cadres to reach the villagers.

Finally, with the collaboration of rural community development specialists, a substantial part of the training would concentrate on various methods necessary to raise rural consciousness and participation among the peasantry. Such methods could include efficient use of basic media, posters and sketching techniques. Rural theatre and role playing, which are already a natural art form in African culture, can be powerful communication media. Study-groups and community evaluation meetings organized to compare and evaluate progress and problems of various community tasks equally have a dynamic effect on rural participation and consciousness raising. The effectiveness of the rural cadre also depends a great deal on his ability to rally the uniting elements of his community around his leadership in order to win the more reluctant ones.

On the other hand, a rural cadre ought to be proficient in perceiving and investigating the social conditions and

the local potential of his community. Thus, the rural cadres ought to be provided with basic need assessment techniques. An in depth historical research on the background of the area concerned through systematic study of books and articles relevant to the area could provide the preliminary basis to assess its needs. This study, however, ought to be supplemented by additional information gathered from peoples' knowledge in the community and complemented by a further analysis of past rural development efforts carried out in the area. Furthermore, the rural cadres ought to develop a reasonable perception of the resources existing in his area. If the subsistence areas need the technical and financial support of government, a good number of activities can be initiated by coordinating resources already existing in the communities. In his training, thus, the rural cadre should develop the ability to assess and undertake what is possible at local level and perceive what other input may be necessary from outside. These assessment qualities could be developed by the systematic study of cases pertinent to the trainees and relevant to their area, and by the provision of a balanced mix of theoretical principles and concrete applications in the field.

The overall cadre training approach must be adapted to the slow pace of village life. Lectures must be understandable in terms of reference of the farmers, and the use of evening discussions must be emphasized, since it is the most important part of the daily routine and comes at

the time when most villagers would be palavering in the village place.[25]

After this initial training, both political knowledge and cadre-work methods must be regularly updated. Regular sessions must be organized to enable the cadres to adjust to further development in national policies and share their experience with that of other fellow cadres.

(iii) The Work of the Rural Cadre

After his initial training, the rural cadre returns to his village in which he becomes the catalytic agent of self-reliance and rural participation in his community. Being not only a member, but also one publically recommended by the community, he would be expected, in return, to provide elements of solution to the problems of his community. In most part of the subsistence areas the direct contact of the rural cadre with the peasantry would be the sole means of understanding correctly new objectives and policies formulated at central level. Rural cadres thus would have a crucial influence on the penetration of new ideological principles and other fundamental resolutions of the leadership to the grass-roots. An essential part of the rural cadre's work would be to organize village meetings in his area in order to teach people in meaningful terms all the implications of national principles and resolutions.

After assessing the needs, problems and resources of his community, he would deliberate with his fellow-villagers regarding alternatives to immediate problems and suggest new

ideas and technologies experienced during his training. Change, however, is generally not welcomed for its own sake, but must be initially restricted to areas where quickly visible progress is possible.

The most significant part of his work, however, would revolve around the creation of an active participation of the community in local organizations that may develop under his guidance, such as peasants associations, women's associations, youth clubs, etc. He would stimulate active rural participation by emphasizing normative rather than coercive appeals and by underlining the real potential of self-reliance and mutual work.

(iv) Channels of Operation

The role of the rural cadres would be incomplete without mentioning the importance of the political channels of operations. There is no need to hypothesize here, in detail, a possible party structure for an Zambia. Suffice to say that unless the central government maintains a high degree of ideological unity at all levels of leadership and administration, ideological distortions will likely reappear and the role of the rural cadres be impaired. Thus, the new reformed party as well as the ministries, districts councils and local organizations must all adhere to the same basic principles promoted by the central leadership.

Furthermore, the various advisory, health and CD specialists play an important role in this development strategy. Because of their skills and technical knowledge,

these specialists are, on the one hand, expected to use their talent to provide technical advice to the district councils in accordance with the objectives of their respective ministries and the specific development problems of the particular district they serve. On the other hand, their regular involvement with training and follow-up of the rural cadres would assure, at village level, the effective implementation of plans and stragegies adopted by the district councils.

Finally, the rural cadre, who is an ex-officio member of the VDC, interacts with the various specialists attached to the district for training and technical advice, and with the district council for political training and administrative purposes.

In order to reach maximum efficiency and high level of incentive among the rural cadres, this strategy requires tight coordination and collaboration of all the various bodies involved. Particularly vital is the coordination of training, administration and advisory services at district level. The effective training of rural cadres presupposes, on the one hand, a strong coordination between district council, Ward and Village Development Committee administrations, and close callaboration between the Director and the various advisory specialists on the other. Moreover, both administration and field-staff operations must work in concert with each other if the rural development needs of the district are to be met effectively.

Finally, a strong ideological drive must permeate the overall grass-root administration in order to enlighten the leadership of the district councils and provide abundant source of political motivation for the rural cadres. Poor collaboration and coordination and lack of political support at these various levels are likely to be the most crucial factors affecting the success of this strategy and the incentive and performance of the rural cadres.

The cadre approach is clearly a socialist phenomenon but since it is the official desire of Zambia to abide by socialist principles, it is not inconceivable that with a radical reform of Humanism the rural cadre strategy may have a significant impact on rural participation. Very few countries, so far, in which a well-entrenched elite defends its privileges, have succeeded in incorporating the rural masses in the national development process. It is hoped that it is not too late yet for Zambia to launch intense and well directed popular movements in order to meet her initial objectives of socialism and self-reliance, thereby providing the preconditions necessary to the emergence of a rural cadre approach.

Concluding Statement

The author in this thesis has tried to investigate the rural development efforts and potentials in Zambia, and has aimed at disclosing the central bottlenecks of her rural development efforts. This study reveals that the poor success of Zambia's rural development efforts results in

part from adverse colonial development policies and their implications on the new Zambian government. While the colonial government devoted most of its efforts to the development of the mineral resources of the Copperbelt, the rural development efforts fostered economic dualism, regional disparities and classes among farmers. The different treatment of improved farmers and subsistence peasants, the application of "top-down" policies and the lack of participation of the subsistence populations in rural development generated a fundamental attitude of dependence among the peasants which considerably hampered the adoption of innovations in the countryside.

Despite the new government's determination to stamp out the regional disparities and embrace national self-reliance, Zambia's dependency upon foreign technology, skilled manpower and markets compelled the new government to maintain policies and administration akin to colonial ones, and to compromise with foreign economic powers. The radical opposition between the stated political aspirations of the new leadership and the actual development practices implemented under the new government has been the major problem the author faced in his study. African ideologies currently emerging throughout the African continent may bring elements of solution to this crucial problem. More likely, rural development improvements will emerge from self-sustaining development of the rural masses in the distant villages.

A cadre approach, consistent with the patterns of traditional culture, offers great potential in introducing innovations to the subsistence areas of Zambia. But, to be effective, this approach needs the support and commitment of the leadership, good coordination with the technical agencies, proper training of cadres and careful introduction of this strategy in the villages.

The fundamental problem remains; how to motivate prosperous elites, who live so remote from the living conditions of the rural masses, to take a more sympathetic attitude towards the development of the poorer sections of their country. A cadre approach to rural participation is promising but, just like any other strategy, it cannot skirt those political barriers. A great deal still remains to be engineered to bridge motivation and commitment of political leaders with the neglected rural masses.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER VIII

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