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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A MORAL EVALUATION OF NATIONALISM: COLLECTIVE CHOICE, LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM

by

TOM ENDERS

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled A MORAL EVALUATION OF NATIONALISM: COLLECTIVE CHOICE, LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM submitted by TOM ENDERS in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

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Abstract

George Grant writes that the only nationalism morally worthwhile pursuing was conservative; if there is a liberal nationalism it is disrespectful both of any intrinsic worth that man has, and of non-human nature. Other writers condemn nationalism in general because they claim it is disrespectful of tradition; overestimates man's ability to control his own destiny; imposes uncompromising and unrealistic principles on the pragmatic business of political life; promotes intolerance, aggression or isolationism; denies liberty; demands conformity and so on. Even defenders often say that extreme forms of nationalism produce such results; sometimes they say, though, that nationalism is generally worthy of approbation because it reflects a desire to participate in "modernization" and the Western way of life.

The conclusion of this essay is that nationalism is necessarily political and, consequently, concerned with something more than economic advancement. Nationalism is an idea - distinguishable from patriotism, chauvinism, imperialism and the like - of a general principle of a right of political communities not just to be autonomous, but to "determine themselves" as well. This idea is related to the desire of individuals to participate in the way they are ruled - by formal political processes *and* by the values or political culture of the community. It follows that at least one form of what has been considered to be liberalism *may* align itself with this idea, meaning, though, that nationalism is necessarily linked with it; it also follows that conservatism and nationalism are antithetical, and that if the understandings of man and politics contained in nationalism are correct, then nationalism, liberal nationalism, is morally worthwhile.

Preface

One of the things that struck me most when I first read Lament for a Nation was George Grant's claim that liberalism and nationalism are not compatible whereas conservatism and nationalism are - although both conservatism and nationalism are increasingly impossible in our day. After reading more of his writings it became clear to me that his claim actually is, more specifically, that the only morally defensible nationalism is a traditional conservative one, even if his own arguments should require him to qualify such a statement.

I sensed that Grant was on to something, whether or not his conclusions were valid. After all, if Canadian nationalists simply wish to place Canadians in influential positions in a continental culture which we share with the United States, and if Quebec nationalists simply wish to participate in American commerce and culture in a separate language, is the pursuit of nationalist policies by Canadians or Quebecois morally worthwhile? Especially if political institutions are restricted to dealing with internal matters of limited importance? There are, of course, other arguments concerning the morality of *any* nationalism, arguments which portray it as inherently intolerant, exclusionist, aggressive, irrationally emotional and violent. Are they at all correct?

I wished to think through Grant's main claim, and the claims of those others, to come to my own conclusions concerning the morality of liberal and conservative nationalisms, and of nationalism in general. I undertook to define rigorously and better understand what nationalism, liberalism and conservatism are in order to do this.

I concluded that the critics who say that nationalism and "collectivism" coincide, and that these together produce national aggression, imperialism, totalitarianism, racism, militarism and so on, are wrong. The various phenomena they discuss are distinct. If any of them are somehow causally linked, these critics provide scant evidence - logical or historical - to demonstrate how.

I found that much of the problem is that the litany of evil characteristics attributed to nationalism are often attributed first to the idea of collective political decision-making, and then to nationalism as a type of purposive community political activity. Many critics oppose

nationalism, then, on what are conservative and libertarian grounds: on the grounds that man ought not to try to interfere with the natural course of events in the one instance, and on the grounds that there is no such thing as the common good (apart from an addition of individual interests) that ought to be pursued politically in the other instance. But, I argue, politics is necessarily and legitimately a collective enterprise (which is not, of course, to say that all collective decisions are just or wise.)

Nationalism is a principle, an idea concerning the right of peoples with common political values to rule themselves. It does not focus only on political means, however, as ways of life can be greatly affected informally as well as formally (i.e. institutionally). This should not lead us, though, to conclude that it is inherently totalitarian or imperialistic culturally, or undemocratic or aggressive. Nationalism is simply the articulation of the notion that *all* peoples should be able to choose their rulers and purposively control those influences which shape their character.

We might think that a conservative may be an advocate of a romantic type of nationalism. I concluded otherwise. The conservative is more properly considered to be a promoter of a kind of patriotism. I question how strong a theoretical commitment to universal rights, and to purposive political action by the community as a whole for the whole, even in defense of non-rationally selected ends, a conservative can have.

It is a form of liberal nationalism which is most consistent with the spirit of the idea of nationalism, and most moral on at least one of the two main grounds Grant offers for evaluating nationalism: it is a form which promotes self-determination not only of nations but also of the individuals composing them, and is therefore respectful of the value of the individual.

I regret that I have not considered other questions, such as those relating to the position on nationalism socialists (should) take. That particular omission is due to a lack of time, and due to the priority attached to liberalism and conservatism in Grant's arguments.

I begin in chapter one by looking at Grant's arguments, some of which are provocative in their comprehensiveness and unity, and others which are so in their unfinished

quality, especially in relation to the nature of nationalism. I then proceed to try to define, explain and evaluate nationalism in general: in chapter two I examine nationalism as an idea or principle that man uses to direct an aspect of political life; in chapter three I consider nationalism as religious or other sentiment which is a rejection or endorsement of "modernization" and something other than a concern with the political values of nations; and then in chapter four I demonstrate a) that nationalism is not guilty of crimes by association with various other isms because it is indeed distinct from them, and b) that nationalism is actually commendable because self-rule, a rational collective process which can be claimed as a right, is inherently preferable to either "cultural anarchy" or foreign rule. I attempt in chapters five and six to come to grasp with the nature of liberal and conservative political philosophies, and explain why a form of liberal self-rule would be preferable to a conservative one, and why it is, in fact, more compatible with the idea of nationalism. Finally, I use the conclusion to try to bring together the most major issues which I address, and to relate my various findings to the stands taken by Grant, who was the catalyst for this project.

Since this is a moral evaluation of nationalism I should make it clear that I am concerned with alternatives, that is, with different ideas which could produce different outcomes. I am not interested in historical trends or forces, unless they are ones which can be directed or controlled by the promotion of ideas. Therefore, if the advocacy of certain principles should cause certain behaviours rooted in the non-rational side of man, I will be interested in them. If thoughts and actions coincide in history in a non-causal fashion but are somehow inherently compatible, I will be interested in them. But if ideas and actions which are incompatible issue from the same persons, I will not look to the combination of these for explanations of either.

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I. On Grant on Nationalism

Although few people studiously reflect upon the nature of nationalism, and its correspondence with the main political philosophies or ideologies, there is a discernible common wisdom concerning such matters. Whatever support liberals have historically given to nationalist movements, nationalism is inherently incompatible with liberalism, it is thought, because liberalism embraces a notion of the rights of men which ought to be respected universally; it disparages differentiating between men on the basis of colour, language, religion or nationality. Liberalism posits that men should be free to deal with whomever they wish in order to advance theif own interests as long as they do not unacceptably harm others. Liberalism stands in opposition to government interference with liberties; it opposes protectionism of various sorts. Conservatism, on the other hand, it has been thought, seeks to preserve and promote the order and interests of the community which has come to exist through a slow process of evolution. Conservatism attempts to conserve the beliefs, traditions, and the very distinctiveness of the community. Socialism is straightforwardly nonnationalistic, having as its goal the collective enhancement of the condition of workers everywhere.

George Grant does not deviate far from such views. He does qualify and add to them, however. He argues that liberalism is antagonistic towards nationalism, for example, because it exalts autonomous reason and the will, and pushes aside any public proclamations of moral and spiritual views. Many people accept this assessment as accurate. And they approve. If we are reasonable, they think, then we will shun nationalism and welcome other peoples, and interaction with them, in all spheres of life. Grant differs with this line of thought, contending that nationalism, based on some instinctive feeling rooted in the (positive) passions, and on a spiritual intuition, promotes the good of the members of a society; their good is tied to the distinctiveness, and to the appropriateness of the outlooks of their community.

Now even though Grant maintains that nationalism must ally itself with conservatism in order to advance particular identities, he does not say that nationalism is completely incompatible with liberalism - only that nationalism which is worth pursuing is incompatible.

The irony is that Grant condemns liberalism for the same reason that others denounce nationalism, namely, that it encourages man to think that he can direct his own future. This gives us reason to question Grant's conceptualization of nationalism. And to ponder to just what degree he is a fatalist, and to what extent his moral evaluation of ideologies rests on a sense that man should be content to act as a spectator. There is no doubt that he employs as his primary criterion for evaluation the extent to which an ideology respects "nature" or eternal verities. The critical point, however, is whether acting to control our lives necessarily means ignoring given or somehow morally defensible standards. Grant, in any event, maintains that control is largely an illusion. Technology, and in some way "history," control us.

A. On Grant on nationalism in a technological age

If the objective is to consider the possibility, desirability or undesirability, and nature of nationalism in the forms which it may take in the future, then a decision to look at the work of George Parkin Grant may appear questionable. Grant, in response to a question in 1977 about the survival of Canada, replies that "the universalizing and homogenizing power in a technological society is very great. That is the central fact of our destiny. It is for that reason that I have turned in my own work from thinking about the details of Canadian life to the nature of technological society. That is the big question."[1] It is even debatable, moreover, whether Grant has ever been preoccupied with anything but the nature of technological society and its presuppositions concerning freedom and truth - at least in his published writings. This would even apply to his nationalist lament. In the opening pages of that essay he laments the necessity of Canada's disappearance because Canada is what had claimed his political allegiance[2], not because the hope of building and maintaining a distinct society on the northern portion of the continent was significant - it was insignificant "in the endless ebb and flow of nature."[3] He concludes that work by commenting that he does not know whether or not "it is good that Canada should disappear." But he adds that: "If the universal and homogeneous state would be a tyranny, then the disappearance of even this indigenous culture

can be seen as the removal of a minor barrier on the road to that tyranny."[4] And it appears clear, in Lament and elsewhere, that he does think that such a state would be a tyranny. Still, the suspicion looms that Grant here is regretting the approaching tyranny rather than lamenting the passing nation and the nationalism that might have sustained it. It might seem, after all, that Grant could welcome membership in the continental nation if it were not a tyranny, or if it were as, or more, traditionally conservative than Canada is on its own.

It is obvious, though, that Grant does not view the United States as traditionally conservative as the Canada of the past, and that he sees Canada's absorption into the empire as the consequence of the spirit of our technological age, which has as a goal the attainment of the universal and homogeneous state. (Grant tells us that the word "universal" "implies a world-wide state, which would eliminate the curse of war among nations; 'homogeneous' means that all men would be equal, and war among classes would be eliminated."[5]) Yet the universal, homogeneous state could be realized within nations still maintaining some degree of formal political sovereignty; sub-universal states could retain the independence to act in areas of significance insufficient to make them truly distinctive. Indeed, Grant states that western civilization "is now universal."[6] We might conclude, then, that national sovereignty, which still is very much in evidence, is not Grant's preferred vehicle for a successful defense of particular ways of thought and of life. Thus, by looking at the general line of Grant's arguments, both in relation to nationalism and in relation to technological liberalism, and by noting his declining interest in nationalism, which was never strong, we could conclude that nationalism does not and never had an important role to play in his philosophy. Or we might argue that what he was advocating was not nationalism in the sense that that term is or should be understood.[7] But we may only be able to do so by ignoring important parts of his writings. For Grant does seem to directly argue the merits of nationalism; a largely but not completely non-rational nationalism, that is, and when he is not so arguing, his on-going critique of tradition-, contemplation- and virtue-destroying liberal capitalism implies that if universalism is undesirable, then not-universalism must be preferable. This does not explain, however, whether not-universalism must take the form or any particular form of nationalism

- a rather large issue, which Grant does address. How adequately and successfully is one of the main questions that his writings present.

B. Grant's defense of nationalism

When Grant explains in Lament for a Nation that he is lamenting the passing of the entity which had claimed his political allegiance he prefaces this remark by the brief cryptic comment that "some form of political loyalty is part of the good life."[8] You can find an elaboration of this idea, albeit a briefly adumbrated one, in Grant's essay "Canadian Fate and Imperialism." He responds there to critics of Lament who claimed that he could not see the possibilities for human excellence in modern society because of his nostalgic attachment to the Canada of the past with its once strong ties to the British empire. He says that he does:

> ... regret the disappearance of indigenous traditions, including my own. It is true that no particularism can adequately incarnate the good. But is it not also true that only through some particular roots, however partial, can human beings first grasp what is good and it is the juice of such roots which for most men sustain their partaking in a more universal good?[9]

The claim Grant makes, therefore, is not that the good is best known through British traditions, but rather that it is best known through indigenous traditions which arise out of and are suited for particular circumstances. This is why Grant argues in 1951, for example, that European traditions are not transportable to Canada as is. Europeans coming to teach in Canadian departments of Philosophy must carry on their work "within a context of Canadian teaching impregnated with our history and the form of our institutions and ideals."[10]

Grant means by "the good" simply that which is eternal and which is not created by man, that is that which exists and is true regardless of how man conceives it or fails to conceive it. "Nature" is a word which could be substituted for "the good" in Grant's discourse. "God" is another. The notion of love or charity ought to be included, perhaps.[11] But just what is the nature of the political association through which Grant maintains we are to know the good?

The difficulty arises largely because Grant neglects to discuss what he means by the term "nation." We can presume, however, that he considers the nation to be the unit with its

own values and traditions of the sort which he considers to be important. We obtain a further insight into the characteristics of the entity which he wishes to see protected and to flourish when he criticizes individuals such as John Diefenbaker and Grattan O'Leary for holding views of nationalism which are only romantic. He comments that "a nation does not remain a nation only because it has roots in the past. Memory is never enough to guarantee that a nation can articulate itself in the present. There must be a thrust of intention into the future." Consider also that which he adds in a footnote: "National articulation is a process through which human beings form and re-form themselves into a society to act historically. This process coheres around the intention realized in the action."[12] These remarks, in conjunction with another statement, constitute Grant's only (somewhat precise) definition of nationalism that I have seen. That other statement is his explanation that he was attracted to nationalism "as a governmental means of preserving and allowing to expand certain traditions that were different from those of the United States."[13]

The curious thing about these comments is their resemblance to the liberal ideas which he had held but claims to disavow (as I shall discuss more fully later). The notion of articulation of the nation in order to act historically sounds very much like the doctrine of progress and a product of reason. But Grant's "thrust of intention" still seems to depend to some very significant extent on that which has been inherited. His nationalism is both backward and forward looking as well as something which must be "saleable" to the community. Now this leads to the conundrum which Grant presents: "Nationalism can only be asserted successfully by an identification with technological advance," he says, "but technological advance entails the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism."[14] The spirit of technology, he often argues, places all modern men in the position of subject, acting on all of what is found in nature as indifferent stuff, that is as malleable object with no inherent essence which ought to be respected. Nationalism (or is patriotism the better word?) cannot be experienced by a being with such a way of thinking, incapable as he is of acknowledging (if not feeling?) any natural attachments, especially to anything that is truly larger or greater than himself. This is especially true for North

Americans, he says, because we have only known that which we have made, and not anything which has made us. The new continent "could not be ours in the way that the old had been," he states, "also because the very intractibility, immensity and extremes of the new land required that its meeting with mastering Europeans be a battle of subjugation. And after that battle we had no long history of living with the land before the arrival of the new forms of conquest which came with industrialism."[15]

Now it may seem easy enough to take issue with this assertion. We can probably readily recall examples of what we could call American nationalism, Quebec nationalism, and nationalism in other technologically advanced nations, some of which, at least, are likely to find future expression. Grant, however, does not assert in the particular words of the conundrum under consideration here that technological advance leads to the disappearance of nationalism, but rather that it entails "the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism." Clearly the implication is that you can still have nationalism, but not with substance. And this substance, according to Grant, arises out of something indigenous.[16]

It is not surprising, therefore, to see Grant recognizing the existence of a Canadian nationalism which he dismisses as "phony." There is "at a shallow level," he says, "a lot of phony Canadian nationalism which is simply imitation Americanism. If they have Portnoy's Complaint, we have Duddy Kravitz. We'll have movies and universities just like their movies and universities, etc. etc."[17] Nationalism which promotes that which is not distinctive or indigenous is not nationalism at all, to put it another way. A true nationalism must promote fundamental differences.

At one point Grant describes as an "extremely difficult question" the matter of "whether the qualities common to technological empires are more fundamental than their differences."[18] There is little doubt, though, that Grant considers all societies committed to technological advance to be essentially the same (in that which they consider important). "The one best means," he writes, "must after all be the same in Chicago, Hamilton, and Dusseldorf. How much difference can there be between societies whose faith in 'the one best

means' transcends even communist and capitalist differences?"[19]

This argument assumes that material objects will be used to serve basically the same purposes everywhere, and that all men can be made to adapt to the same relations of production - as if differences in attitudes about authority and participation in decision-making, and differences in the importance of economic production in various peoples' lives were ultimately dissoluble or unimportant. Such assumptions dealing with enormously large and complex questions are debatable. Their veracity, in fact, is central to any evaluation of Grant's claims concerning the nature of particular political creeds and their relationship to a meaningful nationalism.

Grant's central argument in Lament for a Nation is that substantive nationalism, that is nationalism which is morally defensible, is increasingly less possible in an age of liberalism which is wedded with technology. In his words: "In this century, many men have known that the choice between internationalism and nationalism is the same choice as that between liberalism and conservatism."[20] And since conservatism is not "a viable political ideology in our era"[21] there really is no choice to make. But there is, after all, a choice - however temporary - to be made. Grant's account of modernity includes specific reference to one form of nationalism which may survive; it allows for the existence of another. The first is nationalism as ideology. The second is nationalism of nations protecting themselves from other peoples more - or less - advanced technologically than they are. Then again, these two nationalisms may actually be only one.

Ideology is, in Grant's view, a condemnable modern phenomenon, which expands the role of philosophy to include the role which had once been assigned to religion:

> Ideologies make public the modern denial that reverence is the matrix of human nobility; but as surrogate religions they slip reverence in. It is, however, reverence for something not truly worthy of reverence, such as the state, the race, the multitude, the nation. Those of us who are Jews or Christians would say they are idolatrous in the worst sense of the word. On the other side, they claim to be rational, scientific and philosophic, and therefore to be giving knowledge of what is happening, when in fact they do not. In this sense they are destructive of common sense and moderation - the two great protectors of the health of the political realm.[22]

Ideologies, therefore, would have us love our own because it is our own, it would seem. Their purpose is to exalt as a final end that with which we first identify. There is no desire to attempt to transcend the particular.

Grant leaves little doubt that he considers modern liberalism to be an ideology. As such it may be compatible with an ideological nationalism, I would presume. But, to Grant, it is certain that liberalism is antithetical to nationalism in any substantive form. Thus the argument that substantive nationalism is not possible may simply be the argument that liberalism is not substantive.

C. On Grant on liberalism

Grant, in brief, considers modern liberalism to be advocacy of the liberation of the selfish passions and the will, the will predominating. He is not an opponent of liberalism as he defines it "in its generic form," which, he says:

> ...is surely something that all decent men accept as good - 'conservatives' included. In so far as the word 'liberalism' is used to describe the belief that political liberty is a central human good, it is difficult for me to consider as sane those who would deny that they are liberals. There can be sane argument concerning how far political liberty can be achieved in particular times and places, but not concerning whether it is a central human good.[23]

Unfortunately Grant does not elaborate upon this kind of liberalism which is not as universally espoused as he thinks. It is clear, nonetheless, why he does not. He maintains that only the modern English-speaking world variant of liberalism is relevant for the present and will be for the future.

Grant does not take issue with "the great founders of our liberalism" for their belief "that the choices of all its members should have influence in the governing of the society" - and its production.[24] He does take issue with them, however, concerning their conception of justice, which they thought "was neither a natural nor supernatural virtue, but arose from the calculations necessary to our acceptance of the social contract."[25] The liberal notion of social contract, as the basis for legitimate political rule, was predicated upon a rejection of metaphysical (or teleological) conceptions of man and society as principles to govern the conduct of public affairs, in other words.

Grant credits Locke with retaining in his state of nature at least a tenuous link with the way things are in nature, knowledge of which causes men to contract with one another for the purpose of comfortable self-preservation. The alternative is death.[26] But, Grant says, this tenuous hold could not survive the acceptance of the new way of thought which had created the impetus for the introduction of the notion of the social contract in the first place.

The new way of thinking about nature has its roots, in Grant's view, in the Judaeo-Christian idea of history, which is a vision of history as the realm in which God acts out His will in a series of unique events culminating in a final purpose. Man no longer sees time as a collection of non-unique events mirroring, in changing appearances, eternal truths or forms. Evil is to be overcome in and through time. What happens in the world matters. The idea of progress is not only born, it replaces the idea of natural law.[27] Protestantism in particular becomes obsessed with a detached practicality. Its adherents, and those influenced by their approach (all men in western civilization, essentially) come to see nature as something to be used, not respected. Although this perspective originates in religion, it only develops to its mature state in interaction with the new science. Science, in its English community, brings forth empiricism and utilitarian views; it influences and is influenced by Protestantism.[28]

The result is not simply an objectification of non-human nature, it is also the outward-inward distinction which causes us to see people as objects[29] - and which causes us to see technology itself as something external, as well as art, music, religion and sexuality, which ought to serve as links with "what is."[30]

Grant rejects liberalism and modern science because he claims that their hopeful outlook is detached from any idea of making manifest the goodness that inheres in nature. Treating non-human nature as neutral it also cannot recognize the existence of an essential human nature or of natural moral laws which govern human behaviour.

Does this logically follow, and whether or not it does, has it historically followed? Grant does not explicitly produce an argument in detail to show any logical necessity (beyond his comments on the outward-inner distinction); he does affirm that liberal thought has in

fact taken this direction. He points specifically to Kant, who he says turned around the tradition in positing evil as the creation of man's will, and more generally severed the will from constraints of nature, proclaiming the will's autonomy.[31] It matters little, Grant says, that Kant attempted to retain some cognition of a givenness in the order of things - this may, in fact, have smoothed the way for acceptance of his ideas.[32]

The key point, however, is that Kant, teaching that the good will is the only good without qualification, "took the contractarian teaching of Hobbes and Locke which was based on the passions of nature and founded it rather on the freedom of human beings to legislate a timeless rational morality which quite transcended nature."[33]

Nonetheless, Grant asserts that justice at least remains a given in Kant's theory; "reason commands us to the faith that justice is what we are finally fitted for."[34] John Rawls, who often appeals to the ideas of Kant, though, does not recognize any inherent ontological status of human beings. Grant says that: "According to Rawls, rationality is analytical instrumentality; freedom means that we cannot avoid choices. This is different from Kant's account of our free moral self-legislation as participation in the very form of reason itself."[35]

Rawls' version of the social contract, the one in which no teleological assumptions of any kind are allowed to remain, and which is based purely on "analytic" abstract rational calculations of self-interest - at least according to Grant, is the version which Grant considers to mirror the state of liberal thinking in our day.[36] This version, in that it equates self-interest with "the primary goods," is, in Grant's opinion, "hard to distinguish from the utilitarian account of pleasure." It provides a concept of justice defined in terms of the "cosy pleasures" alone.[37]

It might be questioned whether this is a fair representation of Rawls' conception of justice because Rawls in fact takes issue with utilitarianism for failing to give priority to "common sense precepts of justice and notions of natural right."[38] But *if* Rawls is concerned only about distribution of goods, Grant may have a point - concerning Rawls, at least.

Grant defines liberalism, in any event, as the "set of beliefs which proceed from the central assumption that man's essence is his freedom and therefore that what chiefly concerns man in this life is to shape the world as we want it."[39] This definition would seem to fit most closely that which Grant refers to as either "modern liberalism" or "American liberalism," yet it is consistent with the account Grant gives of even the first social contract theorists. They may have had some pious beliefs which they wished to retain as part of their theories, but they could only do so at the cost of inconsistency.

We are left wondering, nonetheless, how completely Grant differs from liberals. Is he really arguing for the authority of traditions? His answer is a qualified yes. He says that:

> ... as what is handed over is a confusion of truth and falsity, remembering is clearly not self-sufficient. Any tradition, even if it be the vehicle by which perfection itself is brought to us, leaves us with the task of appropriating from it, by means of loving and thinking, that which it has carried to us. Individuals, even with the help of their presently faltering institutions, can grasp no more than very small segments of what is there.[40]

Does this constitute an argument for evaluation of tradition by individuals? Of tradition as passed along by social institutions? It may be, instead, an argument for rejuvenated traditional institutions.

Yet Grant does value liberal political institutions. His argument, in fact, is not only that technological liberalism creates philosophical tyranny, or represses philosophy, but also that it creates political tyranny - that of the universal, homogeneous state. He does not conjure up the image of a worldwide dictatorship led by one man in order to warn of this sort of tyranny. Instead, he strongly implies that our western democracies, even with their formal political freedoms, are so far from the democratic ideal that they are already tyrannies. Two main factors have contributed to creating this situation, in his estimation - the elimination of discussion of the ends of political life from public debate, and the establishment of massive, impersonal, centralized administrative organizations necessary to operate the machinery of technological society.

Grant maintains that the liberal state has sold itself to the public, in large part, as the pluralist state. By relegating religious and cultural values to the private sphere it has created the illusion of tolerating them, provided that they do not interfere with one another. It claims

that it does not interfere with, or favour any of them itself, because it is morally neutral. But the liberal state in fact is monistic, or monolithic, in its assertion of what constitutes excellence - "the pursuit of technological efficiency is the chief purpose for which the community exists."[41] Art, entertainment, and politics itself cannot have attributed to them any relatedness to the meaning of things. All that remains for public debate are questions about the best means for advancing technological progress; politics is about administration. (These thoughts of Grant's recall comments about the need for political parties in office to forget their ideological leanings and the need for them to supply "good government" instead. They also recall claims by various parties that their leaders can provide the best management of the economy.) Members of the public consequently lose interest in politics except as the domain responsible for the continued flow of consumer goods. There is little incentive to actually become involved, except to assure the election of the best administrators, or to gain the pleasure of power, perhaps. "The old individualism of capitalism, the frontier and Protestantism," in North America, he maintains, "becomes the demanded right to one's idiosyncratic wants taken as outside any obligation to the community which provides them."[42]

"What is central to this new experience and what distinguishes it from living in the old small town and rural worlds," Grant writes in 1961, "is that the individual is at one and the same time more dependent on big institutions and yet less organically related to them... The institutions which control us are so powerful and so impersonal that individuals come to believe that there is no point in trying to influence them..."[43]

Loss of effective participation in politics would not seem to concern Grant as much as another consequence of the perception of the political as the realm in which desires for objects are provided for in as convenient a manner as possible. The rights and even the very existence of individuals may be deemed expendable if convenience requires it, Grant argues forcefully. This might seem to be a misplaced concern in an age in which appeals for the protection of rights are very frequently made - and frequently heeded. Many have taken to heart so profoundly the notion that rights inhere in living things that they attribute them to

non-human beings, even to plants in some cases. But there are arguments to suggest the contrary - that the respecting of rights, even while their existence becomes more and more unquestioned, is increasingly conditional. Grant's prime example is the liberalization of abortion laws. He, and Sheila Grant, argue that the number of abortions increases while "medical necessities decrease."[44] Partially legalizing euthanasia could trigger the same dynamic process.[45] There is nothing about man, in views such as Rawls', according to Grant, which would dictate that there are certain things which are absolutely impermissable to do to man; there is always room for compromise and negotiation. Convenience can justify just about anything.[46]

Grant's arguments also suggest a plausible account of liberal empires which are liberal at home and not so liberal abroad. They see technological progress, and commercial and political liberties as inexorably related. The people at home accept the presuppositions underlying this understanding, the three components having arisen more or less in unison. Many colonials do not, and need to be forced to accept this truth if they cannot see it on their own. Of course this may only be an explanation for home consumption - there really is no inconsistency in failing to respect the rights of foreigners since these peoples have no inherent worth (no people does), nor are they participants in the empire's social contract of convenience. If it is in the interests of the empire to use force, there is no reason not to.[47]

Grant undoubtedly presents a sweeping condemnation of both secularism and liberalism, blaming them for the greatest injustices of recent centuries, the current one in particular. Whether he adequately distinguishes between them, and whether he too liberally assigns blame to them for the world's problems, are points which require much discussion, and in the final analysis much knowledge of world history. His thoughts on liberalism and the notion of social contract deserve careful consideration, nonetheless.[48]

Having examined Grant's dissection of liberalism I am in a position to point out more fully how nationalism may be compatible as well as incompatible with it, in his view. He does not rely heavily on the notion that leaders infused with the spirit of liberalism will pursue

policies designed to and certain to assure the freedom and equality of all individuals no matter where they live on the globe. His argument is not, in other words, that leaders will faithfully try to and will successfully implement the goal of creating the universal (i.e. worldwide) homogeneous state. They are more likely to treat outsiders violently, or at least as objects of interests, than they are to treat them altruistically. Grant's fear, then, is actually of empires - of countries which may rule the world in their own interests - whether or not they promote themselves as good for the individuals subjected.[49]

Even if liberals speak out on behalf of the individual, liberalism for Grant cannot promote in fact anything other than freedom itself, or freedom of man from nature, in other words. In order to conquer and control nature society actually subsumes the individual. Grant says that "the greater ability of collective than of individual purposes to be sustained against accidents [of chance] is one of the reasons why, in an age given over to making the future, we all more and more truly exist in the collective, and less and less pursue purposes which transcend it."[50]

Still, there is no suggestion that there will be harmony among men in their pursuit of collective purposes. There will be, and "is political conflict in the world because there are certain situations which some human beings want to change or preserve, while others want to prevent such changing or preserving or want to carry them out through different means." [51] Men will continue to differ about the details of administration, he is saying, even if they no longer have the question of the common good upon which to disagree. Grant does not draw out the implication that nations will assert their independence in order to administer the progress of technology in the manner in which they best see fit. Is not the implication there, though? Peoples will wish to have control over the apparatuses of technology if they think that it will be to their economic advantage - without necessarily wishing to retain or build a "significantly" different type of society. This nationalism, if it should be called that, would occur, of course, within the context of liberal ideology. Nationalism can no longer align itself with any other ideology in Grant's view.

Even though Grant suggests that this liberal nationalism is becoming the only nationalism possible, he does say that conservative nationalism - and a nationalism in response to it - is still a phenomenon which will be observed for some time yet. He realizes that different nations assuredly will not "advance" to the final stage of liberal thinking on the basis for political life (the Rawlsian social contract) all at the same time. The United States, for example, can base its nationalism "on the civil rights of individuals" while a country such as Canada can (or could) rest its self-perception on the archaic notion of collective rights as well as on individual ones.[52]

Nationalism in the name of individualism is not an absurdity if individualism needs the nation to protect it from less progressive regimes. Nonetheless, this justification of nationalism will eventually disappear in time as the less liberal states inevitably progress. This is, in essence, the conclusion that must be drawn from Grant's discussion of Gaullist nationalism, the harnessing of "the nationalist spirit to technological planning," and the insistence "internationally that there are limits to the western 'alliance'." Such nationalism, as conservative as it may be at some point, cannot hope to remain conservative if it embraces technology, and consequently this form of nationalism cannot hope to retain what is distinctive.[53]

D. On Grant on conservatism and nationalism

Grant holds the view that modern conservatism, especially the American variant, is basically a form of liberalism. This is, in part, due to the demands of necessity. Practical conservatives have faced a dilemma: "If they are not committed to a dynamic technology, they cannot hope to make any popular appeal. If they are so committed, they cannot hope to be conservatives."[54] So they have adopted the course of defending "whatever structure of power is at any moment necessary to technological change." They provide external force to maintain external order. "They are not conservatives in the sense of being the custodians of something that is not subject to change."[55]

American conservatives, Grant says:

> ... are old-fashioned liberals. They stand for the freedom of the individual to use his property as he wishes, and for a limited government which must keep out of the marketplace. Their concentration on freedom from governmental interference has more to do with nineteenth-century liberalism than with traditional conservatism, which asserts the right of the community to restrain freedom in the name of the common good. [56]

Grant does allow for the possibility that American conservatism does retain, minimally, more content than modern liberalism, having arisen out of the first wave of modern political philosophy. The thinkers of the first wave did retain some notion of an essential human nature, unlike the later ones who, "believing that man's essence was his freedom... advocated the progressive mastery through that freedom of human and non-human nature."[57] The content retained, however, is usually only retained for the purpose of convenience - the convenience of legitimizing capitalism.

We must conclude, then, that when Grant says that only conservatism is compatible with nationalism he is saying two things. Modern conservatism (which he does not take to be real conservatism) is no more compatible with nationalism than liberalism is (it can be compatible in the same ways); it is traditional conservatism which is compatible with the meaningful nationalism which he favours.

This traditional conservatism is not easily described, by Grant's own admission. He says that the British conservatism which Canada inherited "is less a clear view of existence than an appeal to an ill-defined past... It was an inchoate desire to build... a society with a greater sense of order and restraint than freedom-loving republicanism would allow."[58]

This certainly highlights an important distinction. Grant's conservatism, unlike liberalism, is concerned with conserving and feeling rather than with creating and willing - or theorizing.

E. On Grant on socialism and nationalism

If traditional conservatism is required for nationalism to be meaningful or to have purpose, and if liberalism can only support nationalisms which have no concern with, and in fact obliterate real distinctiveness, then what is there to be said about socialism and nationalism? Grant contends that socialists have nothing unique to say in this context. There are only two views possible - the conservative view which recognizes teleological ends of man and society, and the good of restricting "freedom" for the sake of the common interest; and the liberal view which sees "freedom" as the essence of man, who is the master of nature.

Grant suggests that socialism, while wrong about greed, being right about the existence of a given human nature, it ought to have recognized itself "as an essentially conservative force."[59]

There is no suggestion by Grant that Marx saw particularism (i.e. the existence and preservation of distinct societies) as a means through which the human good, or happiness[60] could or ought to be realized. And as it is difficult to see Grant extending his claim that Marxist socialism is in one sense conservative to a claim that it must be in others, there is no reason to suspect that Grant would wish to define socialism as inherently related to nationalism. Grant might wish to say that socialists ought to be nationalistic in order to gain a victory over corporation capitalism in a particular geographic areas, but that would appear to be as far as he could go. He does say, in fact, that "clearly at its heart Marxism is a universalist and not a nationalist doctrine..."[61]

This analysis seems to be consistent with Grant's comments on the Canadian situation. He says that: "After 1940, nationalism had to go hand in hand with some measure of socialism. Only nationalism could provide the political incentive for planning; only planning could restrain the victory of continentalism."[62]

This is a most intriguing remark. Grant is saying that a nationalism of planning was possible - even necessary - even though he says it no longer is in Canada. Even if it were still possible, though, he would presumably not endorse it.

The nationalism which Grant supports is conservative. Must that nationalism be a collection of ad hoc governmental policies, with heavy reliance on non-governmental developments for its success? Apparently. Yet the suspicion remains that Grant is uncomfortable with conservatism's lack of a future vision, and the lack of a means to implement one if it had one. Recall his remarks concerning romantic nationalism.

Perhaps Grant ought to be considered an advocate of socialism as he says it ought to be. There are two problems with that. The first is that he may (although he may not) oppose planning and the faith in man's reason it entails. The second is that he is not truly an egalitarian "in the full sense." He does not want an homogeneous society in which the excellences are, to him, so devoid of intellectual and spiritual content that they are accessible to all. Or so it would seem. He does appear to favour a class structure, however benevolent it might be.

Whether Grant is a conservative-socialist or a conservative, or whether he ought to re-define conservatism to allow for a greater role for non-contemplative, non-passive reason is a matter not easily resolved. It does present some problems for evaluating his assertions concerning nationalism and political philosophies. If, for example, he were to allow such a greater role, he might have to take a more generous view towards liberalism and liberal-socialism, and concede that they could be compatible with nationalisms of substance.

Grant does not concede, however, that successful socialist nationalism overall can be meaningful. He says that "Castroism" or "leftist" nationalism is still possible, but only "in a less-developed society in which the majority of citizens desires industrialism and believes that this is being prevented by anti-nationalist forces from the capitalist empire."[63] Like "Gaullism" Grant would have to see this form of nationalism as ultimately homogenizing, entailing a commitment to technological progress as it does.

F. Grant's philosophy of history

What, we may well ask now, does Grant's meaningful nationalism look like? Is it a traditionally conservative one which rejects technology, yet also rejects purposive action which could curtail or contain technology? In short, yes. And that is why it is not possible. But Grant equivocates.

Grant paints the picture of a creature (man) who did not create nature but constantly re-creates, or re-orders it, including that part of nature which is his perception of himself, which *is* in an important sense himself. So we are left wondering to what extent Grant thinks that man can control human events. He states bluntly that: "We do not know how unlimited are the potentialities of our drive to create ourselves and the world as we want it." [64] Thus we ought to be safe in thinking that there is a great deal of latitude, in the final analysis, for man to shape his own nature, even if there are limits beyond which he cannot go. Man can even cast off his attachment to non-universal roots?

But ability to do something does not logically necessitate the existence of conscious control over that ability. The vast majority of men are not and never have been free, Grant asserts, in the sense that they can think beyond the assumptions of their age.

"The decisions of western men over many centuries," Grant says, "have made our world too ineluctably what it is for there to be any facile exit."[65] Consider also that the discoveries of "the modern science of nature" have been made; they cannot be discounted. They have had an enormous impact on our thought. We cannot go back.[66] Our thoughts and actions do not necessarily have the effects in history which we mean for them to have, anyway.[67] It is not surprising, then, that Grant presents himself at times as something of a fatalist.

To debate whether the idea of technological progress and mastery "should dominate the future would be like debating whether water should run downhill," he says.[68] So: "There is not much that anybody can do to stop this tyranny from being; one simply has to live through it."[69]

Grant would apparently like to fashion himself an optimistic fatalist, nonetheless. "It would be the height of pessimism to believe that our society could go on in its present directions without bringing down upon itself catastrophe," he writes, "for it would imply that the nature of things does not bring forth human excellence." [70] (Grant defines human excellence as "the realization in people of the various virtues necessary to the achievement of these two purposes." These are the "two purposes to human existence: to live together well in communities and to think."[71]) Grant's argument must be that painful consequences are desirable because they punish man for failing to respect some essential order which is somehow good in itself, without reference to the good for man (unless man depends on the well-being, or uninterrupted operation, of nature for his own well-being.)

Grant thus awaits catastrophe - perhaps the revolt of nature[72], perhaps war[73], perhaps an act of God.[74]

Still, Grant does not say that man will have to or should await the coming of another world, nor does he look to the day when man will simply contemplate the world as it is without hope of overcoming the evils of life. He applauds the successes of technology over disease, overwork and scarcity.[75] So he must want man to call upon nature to serve him without thinking that he is its master. He wants to retain simultaneously the hope and charity of Christianity and the contemplation of Greek thought. He wants to see charity thought *within* contemplation.

Charity become mastery, it would seem for Grant, will prevail until that catastrophe. He does not thereby conclude that practical, meaningful measures are doomed to fail in the meantime. He plainly maintains that small victories are possible; battles can be won even if the war is increasingly out of hand.

But we need to be precise about that which constitutes a victory for Grant. In his view the good, more than anything else, is knowing the good. The good is not, as we pointed out earlier, changing the world fundamentally. Nor, on the other hand, is the good or that which is worthy of pursuit, acceptance of the way things are. A qualification is required. Philosophy to Grant is the mental or spiritual union with what is, a measuring of traditions

against intuitions of the eternal."[76] The social conditions of life are not "what is;" they are the temporary conditions through which we see, or are prevented from seeing the good. Thus Grant says that: "Our political and economic institutions have a function which is largely negative - they exist to prevent bad things happening: the schools and universities and churches have the positive role, they exist to stimulate the good."[77] Therefore the search for meaning entails removing inhibiting social conditions, and promoting associations for the mutual pursuit of the good, as well as individual contemplation. Victories can be won in treating the welfare of others, and others themselves, as ends.

Grant's view, then, may be that some people can be encouraged to see other human beings as inherently valuable, some particular actions can be carried out, others prevented. This war can be ended, that hunger can be alleviated. There will be more war, more hunger, more injustice in their place, but some curtailment of these is more worthwhile than none.

Grant says that he "would never want to say anything to turn anybody away from what appears to them a practical immediacy, and such immediacies as war and pollution, Canadian independence and [the state of our?] cities are obvious."[78] He tells those of the New Left, (speaking "as a Canadian nationalist and as a conservative"[79]), that we cannot expect to change the nature of our society, yet "we must not throw up our hands. We must define our possible areas of influence with the most careful clarity."[80] Still, it is difficult to see in which areas, if any, Grant thinks active measures to produce meaningful results will succeed. He himself certainly devotes little attention to specifying what they might be. The suspicion always lurks that Grant thinks that the will, which man does not create, must exist to some extent first before measures can be implemented to seek and further the public pursuit of the good - something of a "catch 22" situation. Even though Grant is not hopeful about a way out he does leave room for some small successes, however. After all, if the good exists, can it ever be completely suppressed? His answer is no: "I am sure that we can say there is such a thing as eternal justice. There are therefore going to be those revolts, and I think one should rejoice in them. There are going to be revolts against the tendency towards the universal and homogeneous state which is run by administration."[81] These revolts, however, cannot be

rationally organized in order to produce victory - is not this one of the major thrusts of his argument?

G. Questions Grant raises

Grant's writings related to nationalism and universalism leave us with many questions. Is his analysis of technology and meaning adequate? His concern with the objectification of nature has some merit, as we can see upon an even cursory consideration of our treatment of the physical environment. Perhaps objectifying non-human nature leads to an inclination to objectify elements of human nature as well. Is this necessarily so, though? Has not man qua man always employed some form of technology?

Many people have asserted and continue to assert that there surely is something which ought to be recognized as human nature, and that there are human qualities which, when developed as fully as possible, represent the fulfillment of the individual. Is it really realistic to fear a future in which this is not recognized?

There are reasons why such a fear may be well founded. Man is changing his attitudes towards the psychological and physical differences between the sexes, for example. Psychological differences are now often seen as mere products of socialization. Masculine and feminine traits, and maternal and paternal instincts are considered to be inhibiting, rather than functional. The same attitudes are evident in relation to physical differences. Male pregnancy may be a great thing, some may think - there are no non-physical considerations which are necessarily to be taken into account. (This is not to say that some attitudes are not purely conventional, *some* certainly are.) Consider also the research into the ways in which the brain can be manipulated. Whatever can be done may well be done.

If the trend is indeed to fewer moral restraints, however, is secular liberalism to blame? And even if it is, should this be equated with liberalism as an articulated political philosophy? Is the liberal creed truly responsible for an homogenizing universalism?

Grant does not emphasize any impetus to universalism in liberalism as a moral imperative, or as a logical outcome of the doctrine of liberalism. To the extent that he does

see universalism as more than a merely practical consequence of liberalism in some parts of the world, though, he does need to account for it. This impetus may well be based in a humanistic, quasi-religious or religious sense of mission. If it is, then liberalism may not be so deplorably malevolent - both in its advocacy of universalism and in its coupling with nationalism. Grant could still employ the rejoinder that liberal nationalism does not seek to preserve any significant distinctiveness. But would it follow that liberalism could not advocate universalism in some domains and particularisms in others? Perhaps. Still, any admission that liberalism need not be allied uniquely with analytic, instrumental reason may open the door to the possibility that it may accommodate passions and intuitions other than those which ought to be manifested uniformly throughout the world. Or would it still fail to recognize the importance of nature in and beyond man, a phenomenon necessarily and desirably very variable?

Is conservatism truly good for man? Does socialism have anything unique to say in the context of nationalism? Are particular cultures necessary for the maintenance of religious or moral values which promote the good of mankind or for the maintenance of some kind of belief in a given human essence?

Grant discusses the meaninglessness and violence of modern life, yet he makes little (no?) mention of violent acts by - and disrespect shown between - members of groups who feel very strong attachments to their collectivities. Can Grant successfully ignore these groups as linguistic, racial or religious communities or nations whose peoples have succumbed to ideological rather than traditional or philosophical perspectives on life?

Would Grant be better advised to support patriotism (if he does not)? Or is the association of nationalism with extremism and of patriotism with moderation unwarranted? What is the difference between them?

Grant clearly presents an important challenge to nationalists to enucleate what good purposes, if any, their nationalisms serve - and a challenge to anti-nationalists, internationalists or universalists to consider whether anything important is lost in a world based on the McDonalds-Holiday Inn "no surprises" formula - a world in which everything is

the same everywhere. Implicit in this challenge is another challenge to both sides - to consider the wisdom of, and possibilities of or limits to, consciously directing fundamental change.

Grant, of course, favours the answers provided by a traditionally conservative nationalism. Should he, should we favour some other kind of nationalism, or any form of nationalism at all?

1 Conversation with George Grant, in George Grant in Process (Toronto: Anansi, 1978), p. 14.

2 Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), pp. 4, 5.

3 Ibid, p. 6.

4 Ibid, p. 96.

5 Ibid., p. 53.

6 Grant, Technology and Empire (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969), p. 77.

7 See George Grant in Process, p. 47, where John Muggeridge, making one of the more bizarre claims of this sort, says that "in the end Grant is not a nationalist. He is not after power for a particular class. He does not see national independence as a means of collective self-advancement.... It is Grant's yearning for a homeland, not his desire for power which is behind his Loyalism."; and p. 170, where William Christian makes a similar claim, employing a more common understanding of nationalism. Christian says that Grant is not "in any commonly understood sense a Canadian nationalist.... Grant is well aware of the necessity of appealing at first to sentiment and prejudice, and it is by so doing that he starts his readers on their progress" - but he then, according to Christian, diverges from that approach.

8 Lament, p. 4.

9 Technology and Empire, pp. 68-69.

10 Grant, "Philosophy," in Royal Commission Studies (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), p.

126.

11 Grant explains on the CBC radio program Ideas (September 1986) that his coming to know God was an affirmation that "beyond time and space there is order... That is what one means by God, isn't it? That ultimately the world is not a maniacal chaos."

12 Grant, Lament, p. 12. Grant advises the reader to see Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics , pp. 37 et seq.

13 George Grant in Process, p. 21.

14 Lament, p. 76.

15 Technology and Empire, p. 17.

16 Grant makes a passing reference in "The Morals of Modern Technology," Canadian Forum, October 1986, p. 15 to "the good of heterogeneity, which in its most profound past form was autochthonous."

17 Grant in Process, p. 14.

18 Technology and Empire, p. 76.

19 Lament, p. ix.

20 Ibid., p. 86.

21 Ibid ., p. 66.

22 Grant, "Ideology in Modern Empires," in Perspectives of Empire, edited by Flint & Williams (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 195-196. See also Grant, English-Speaking Justice (Sackville, N.B.: Mount Allison University, 1978), p. 55.

23 English-Speaking Justice, p. 4. Grant makes a similar comment in the foreward which he wrote for a book by James and Robert Laxer. He expresses the wish that they "had more clearly distinguished American liberal ideology from what is true about political liberty for all sane people." (The Liberal Idea of Canada, Toronto, 1977, p. 12)

24 English-Speaking Justice, pp. 10, 11.

25 Ibid., p. 11.

26 Ibid., pp. 18, 19.

27 See Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age (Vancouver: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1966), chapter IV.

28 See Technology and Empire, pp. 21, 23, 32.

29 Time as History, p. 19. See also pp. 2-3.

30 See: Philosophy in the Mass Age, pp. 8, 110; Technology and Empire, p. 133; and "The Morals of Modern Technology," where he states that: "When we represent technology to ourselves as an array of neutral instruments, invented by human beings and under human control, we are expressing a kind of common sense, but it is a common sense from within the very technology we are attempting to represent." (p. 17) Cars and computers, for example, "can exist only in societies in which there are large corporate institutions. The ways computers

can be used are limited to those situations. In this sense computers are not neutral instruments but instruments that exclude certain forms of community and permit others." (p. 15) (See also, in relation to this point, Grant's comments in Great Societies and Quiet Revolutions (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1967), p. 75 and "An Ethic of Community," in Social Purpose for Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 7-8.) In addition, he says here that societies with cars tend to resemble each other (he does not elaborate upon this), and that the use of computers requires facts to be abstracted, classified, stored and transmitted as "information" - an inherently homogenizing process entailing an account of nature as manipulable objects. Language also requires facts to be processed as information; presumably Grant sees a qualitative difference (between computers and language).

31 Grant in Process., pp.106, 107.

32 English-Speaking Justice, p. 84.

33 Ibid., p. 29.

34 Ibid., p. 27.

35 Ibid., p. 34.

36 Ibid., p. 14.

37 Ibid., pp. 48-50.

38 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 28.

39 Technology and Empire, p. 114 (footnote).

40 Time as History, p. 51.

41 Technology and Empire, p. 129. For other references to pluralism see Technology and Empire, p. 26; Lament, p. 57.

42 Technology and Empire, p. 39.

43 "An Ethic of Community," pp. 7-8.

44 Sheila and George Grant, "Abortion and Rights: The Value of Political Freedom," in The Right to Birth, edited by Fairweather & Gentles (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1976), p. 7.

45 Ibid., p. 10. Although we might take such arguments to be extreme and alarmist slippery slope posturing, we may be well advised to consider the increasingly open acceptance of talk about euthanasia, the citings of financial and "life-style" reasons to justify abortion, and the recourse made to arguments about the costs of keeping murderers in prison to support calls for the restoration of capital punishment. ("Liberal" thinkers often favour easy access to abortions and oppose state executions. Public opinion may be more consistent in often favouring both.)

46 See Grant in Process, p. 42.

47 See: English-Speaking Justice, pp. 8-9 and accompanying footnote pp.98-100; and Technology and Empire, p. 75.

48 Grant says that the "dominating modern faith has many different expressions of itself. Some of these formulations put forward a rather low and superficial view of what it is to be human," but: "These formulations must not lead to the Hermeneutical error of judging the truth of the faith from the crassness of a particular formulation." (Technology and Empire, p. 29, footnote #4.) Despite such comments it is obvious that Grant holds the liberal-technological view, today's public religion, to be liberalism in its essence unfolded. Hopefully this presentation of Grant's views on liberalism has already demonstrated this.

49 Grant says in "A Critique of the New Left," in Canada and Radical Social Change, edited by Dimitrios Roussopoulos (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1973), p. 61, that "our greatest obligation as Canadians is to work for a country which is not simply a satellite of any empire."
Consider also his comments in Grant in Process (p. 103): "I am sure that the world-wide universal state would be a tyranny. To whom am I asked to give loyalty in this world-wide community? When it comes down to it, I am asked to give loyalty to one of the great empires. That I won't do. They should be balanced off, one against the other."

50 Time as History, p. 12.

51 "Ideology in Modern Empires," p. 190.

52 Lament, p. 22.

53 Ibid., pp. 45-46, 47, 67.

54 Ibid., pp. 66-67.

55 Ibid., p. 67. See also Technology and Empire, p. 30.

56 Lament, p. 64.

57 Ibid., p. 61.

58 Lament, p. 70.

59 Ibid., p. 59 footnote. See also pp. 55-56, and Time as History, p. 19.

60 Grant equates the human good with happiness, Lament, p. 56.

61 Grant, "Nationalism and Rationality," in Canadian Forum, January 1971, p. 337.

62 Lament, p. 15. Incidentally, Grant says that socialist leaders in Canada have "had no understanding of the dependence of socialism and nationalism in the Canadian setting. Their confused optimism is seen in the fact that they have generally acted as if they were 'left-wing' allies of the Liberal party." (Lament, p. 75. See also p. 55.)

63 Ibid., p. 45.

64 Technology and Empire, p. 142.

65 Ibid., p. 132.

66 See: English-Speaking Justice, p. 94; Time as History, p. 52.

67 See, for example: Philosophy in the Mass Age, p. 43; Lament, p. 44.

68 Great Societies, p. 73.

69 Ibid., p. 76.

70 Lament, p. xii.

71 Great Societies, p. 73.

72 Technology and Empire, p. 142.

73 "An Ethic of Community," p. 13. Grant says here that the movement to greater technological mastery "can only be stopped by war."

74 Grant, "The Uses of Freedom," Queen's Quarterly, winter 1955-56, p. 526.

75 See, for example: "The Uses of Freedom," p. 526; Lament, p. 94; Philosophy in the Mass Age, p. 26.

76 "Philosophy," in Royal Commission Studies, p. 119.

77 "The Minds of Men in the Atomic Age," in Canadian Political Thought, edited by H.D. Forbes (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 287.

78 Grant, "Tradition and Revolution," in Canadian Forum, April-May 1970, p. 93.

79 "A Critique of the New Left," p. 55.

80 Ibid., p. 61.

81 Grant in Process, p. 144.

II. Nationalism as a Principle

George Grant is not very precise in his treatment of the concept of nationalism. He suggests on one occasion that he considers it to be a political means intended to gain or retain self-rule for the purpose of furthering a distinctive way of life. (Since he disassociates himself from any notion that man might direct history he presumably is endorsing a limited concept of self-determination, one which entails keeping history on its course.) But he seems to suggest more often that nationalism is the feeling or attachment which creates the desire to use such political means, a feeling which he maintains, incidentally, is increasingly impossible to feel. Which does he consider it to be? Which should we consider it to be? Should we consider it to be something else? Does it have different forms?

Everyone, it seems, has a different answer to the question: what is nationalism? I wish to suggest that this is not because this is such a complex phenomenon but, rather, largely because those who define it often attempt to bring too much in under their umbrella: they fail to see the separate existence of a number of things which are found in discussions about the directions polities should take and the ends which they should pursue, things which are not necessarily related at all.

I will argue that the term "nationalism" has been applied to the idea or doctrine that nations, as a general principle, have a right to self-determination. This idea is based upon an understanding of man as a being who by nature lives in political communities and who, in part, learns political values through them, but who also, by reason and actions, and by collective choice, determines what these collective values will be. The idea of nationalism, therefore, is not merely an idea of autonomy but also one of *self-determination*, and one of the self-determination of *nations*, i.e. the members of political communities in a collective capacity, but who, as individuals, also choose of which communities they are to be members (the option of choosing to belong to none not truly existing). This idea, I will conclude, is logically and morally supportable.[1]

Would anyone argue that the expression of opinions calling for self-rule independent of outside interference is not an example of nationalism? I think not. The question for some

is whether this nationalism is part of anything else which controls it, and whether it contains the seeds for actions and the actions themselves which are unrelated to the rational pursuit of political independence. But if we examine some of the most excoriating attacks on nationalism, even when focussing on creeds of ascribed membership in nations, we will see that they are attacks against advocacy of a principle of self-determination. Efforts to distinguish between "good" and "bad" or western and romantic nationalism are ultimately subordinated; nationalism per se is attacked. Which is to say that critics often take aim at the very idea of self-governance by a people and not at the ways in which it would govern itself. That is, they only appear to object primarily to doctrines of attributed national characteristics; their real objection is either to the idea of a right or principle of self-rule or to the very idea of "national" collective decision-making and of nationalism as an instance of it. There are, of course, other critics and supporters - but it is significant that criticism which is so influential is actually first criticism of something other than nationalism. And that it is criticism which fails, as I intend to show in this chapter.

Could it be, however, that nationalism really is something other than a principle of national self-determination? I will specifically address this question in the two chapters which follow.

A. Origins of the word and phenomenon

We can trace the word nation (which obviously predates the word nationalism) back to "the Latin words nasci (to be born) and nation (belonging together because of place of birth)..." [2] We can subsequently follow the development of its usage through the centuries; it was used in reference to various groups from about the thirteenth century on. These included university student groups at Paris, Aberdeen and Prague, Roman Catholic great councils representatives, animals, monks, physicians and so on, until the 17th and 18th centuries when the word was applied to that segment of the population politically and socially conscious, property owners perhaps.[3] The French Revolution marked a turning point. The people as a whole, that is the non-ruling classes, demanded that they be recognized as constituting the

nation, thus ending the distinction between the nation and the people.

We can see that early usages usually made reference to self-conscious groups in a position to or prone to speak on their own behalves, and that these groups were often (and increasingly) united by something other than ties of blood. Many will insist, though, that the most significant step was the extension of the term to apply to all of the people in a given place. They will say that it was at this point that the word acquired its broad connotation which it has had in modern times, and that this is central to the significance of the term today.

The fact is that more and more people did become socially or culturally, and politically conscious and active as the modern age developed. The printing press was invented, more and more was written for the masses to read, life became more industrialized and urban, education was opened up, military conscription introduced, and the role of government expanded in economic and social welfare matters. Obviously the people were increasingly affected by political decisions and became more aware of them, if not active in influencing the making of them as well.

The nation becomes a more inclusive concept, it has been further argued, because the culture of the elite becomes more particularized with the breakdown of the universal culture - due, in large part, to the Reformation and the decline of the use of Latin.[4] The elites and intelligentsia pay increasing attention to vernacular languages and local cultures. There is something of a meeting of the few with the many.

It is also argued that culture itself became more important. And thus you have social mobility theories to explain why people began to consider their culture to be much more meaningful, and why it became a newly significant bond uniting all parts of the community.

Yet, as elaborate and convincing as they may be, explanations of the social, cultural and political moves made which brought the masses more fully into the life of "the nation" do not tell us so much about a qualitative change as they do about a quantitative one. The "nation" which they leave us with is a collection of people with a consciousness of itself, heightened by all or some of the following: ties of language, religion, traditions, projects for

the future, and a sensing, to some extent, that the well-being of the individual depends on the well-being of the community. Such "nations" surely existed prior to the modern period. They may have had fewer members, excluding the lower classses living amongst them from any claim of belonging; they sometimes included everyone in their midsts (excepting only "foreigners") however. They may have considered themselves a "people" rather than a nation, but they were only a nation with a different name.[5]

The existence of "nations" and self-consciousness on the part of their members, and the desire to preserve or defend them, and measures to actually to do so, are not truly uniquely modern phenomena, even though the extent of national consciousness is something new. Should the desire, and the steps taken, to protect or enhance the pre-modern nations be considered a kind of nationalism, then, despite the fact that the word nationalism had no such connotation at the time? Should we assume, in other words, that the word nationalism as we know it (like the word nation) can be wisely used to refer back to something to which the word did not apply when it had a previous meaning? Or does the new meaning of the word accompany the coming-into-being of something which did not exist before?

Anthony D. Smith reports that the term nationalism was first employed to refer to "a union to defend the common interests of the compatriots of one of the four 'nationes' among the Leipzig professors!" Leipzig University, he says, had been "founded in 1409 after a religious and scholastic dispute at Prague involving Bohemian and non-Bohemian 'nationes'."[6] But the word may have been first used in a modern sense, in relation to the nation as a people (although the original meaning is not in essence obliterated) in 1798. Anti-Jacobin French priest Augustin Barruel wrote about "the revolutionary nature of that new ideology, nationalisme (then still commonly called patriotisme); he saw that it meant to overthrow legitimate governments whose claim to authority was based on divine ordination and/or hereditary rights; he linked it with the, to him, terrible spirit of freemasonry and enlightenment, rooted in egoism."[7]

Barruel would appear to have been among those who were critical of the new confidence in the power of reason, and the belief that man can actively participate in shaping

his future, or history. He, or they, may have been responding to something which was indeed new, that is, an assertion, an idea, a principle stating that man can and ought to consciously control his national destinies, and that man could claim he has a right to do so. Is it true, though, that men had never maintained before that a people ought to be able to take steps to enable it to direct its own affairs? It would seem that some men had, but had they considered this as something to which all peoples were equally entitled as a general principle? I do not know. The relevant consideration, however, is that a significant number of men began to speak of this "right" which is still recognized by us today in association with the word nationalism.

B. Typologies of nationalism

A number of writers have perceived that the doctrine of nationalism has come to advocate two very distinct programs of action, one democratic in nature, dependent upon the idea that men should choose their own rulers, and the other authoritarian, prescribing that men who are born into particular nations should be governed by, and in the interests of, the nation.

Hans Kohn is one of the more well-known formulators of such a two-fold typology. He speaks of a constitutionally-based nationalism which is based on a sharing of values which are expressed politically and may be held by anyone wishing to hold them. Membership in the nation, on this view, is not acquired due to the possession of natural attributes; it is acquired by sharing common values. These are learned and expressed through political norms and institutions. The nation does not exist apart from the political community.

Kohn conceptualizes this kind of nationalism as the rational nationalism of the West. This nationalism, he says, was "the product of social and political factors," justified "in a rational societal conception"; it held the community together "by the will of its members" or some obligation of contract.[1] This is, or was, primarily a Western phenomenon as "in England and in France, in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, in the United States and in the British dominions, the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political occurence; it was

preceded by the formation of the future national state, or, as in the case of the United States, coincided with it. Outside the Western world," in contrast, Kohn adds, "in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia... nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern - not primarily to transform it into a people's state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands."[9]

One criticism that ought to be taken seriously is the claim that this dichotomy fails to take into consideration nationalism in the developing world, something qualitatively different. Such nationalism may be considered to be unlike romantic or eastern nationalism in that no nation exists on which to base the nationalism - there is no natural grouping, only the amalgam of peoples united by "artificial" colonial boundaries. Religion, culture, language and race do not unite. The individual does not achieve a sense of identity by considering himself as a part of the whole. This nationalism is also unlike the "western" variety because it is not based upon a rational, individual rights, citizen participation, constitutional-law conception of society. Rule is usually authoritarian.

We might choose to cite evidence of individuals in developing countries conducting their own philological, cultural and historical research in an effort to discover some natural common bonds - and then we might choose to consider their nationalism as romantic. We could, on the other hand, assert that the essence of western nationalism is not concerned so much with democratic ideals and the extent of participation as it is with the notion of union and membership through some sort of political ideal or values, whatever they may be. Of course, in either case nomenclature could be a problem, but one that is easily resolved. We could easily drop references to west, east, democracy and so on. Or, if we prefer, we could simply recognize the existence of a third qualitatively distinct category, although specifying with clarity what content it has might be a difficult and ultimately unnecessary challenge. The utility of Anthony D. Smith's third version - an "activist", "creative" or achievement nationalism, for example, is not readily apparent. Is there really something worthy of the name of nationalism which does not "assume the existence of entities with ascribed characteristics, civil associations or historical organisms, to which the individual is related"?[10]

Smith's refashioning of Kohn's categories is more helpful. He labels them the "voluntarist" and "organic" ideal-types. "In the 'voluntarist' version," he says:

> ... you are free to enter into and opt out of any national unit, and fulfil your obligations in return for the enjoyment of national rights. The nation-state is conceived in the image of a civil association founded by a (primordial or recent) contract; it has unmediated membership and a rational-conventional basis. Nationality is mainly a question of subjective consciousness.[11]

According to the 'organic' version, Smith says:

> The individual has no meaning apart from the community of birth. Individuality is predicated of the group. The individual can realise himself through it alone. It has a life history, it is self-generating and self-sufficient, a seamless, mystic entity, ascertainable through objective characteristics - of history, religion, language and customs. Nations are 'natural' wholes... the individual is primarily distinguishable in terms of his nationality, and only secondarily by social and personal traits. [12]

We might be inclined to applaud such distinctions. There is a rational nationalism on the one hand, and an instinctive, passion and prejudice-based nationalism on the other. Insufficient thought leads to such a conclusion. Both types of nationalism (if, indeed, both are types of nationalism) are expressions of an abstract idea. Howard Aster makes this point when he contrasts communitarian nationalism (or "communitarianism") with "ideational nationalism." The latter, he says, is an invention, an idea, a product of instrumental reasoning, a result of man's new-found pride in his ability to create his own destiny, an ideology. The implication is assuredly that he sees little essential difference between the "western" and "eastern" types. Presumably they both engage in envisioning an ideal of the nation and set out to remake the world (or a part of it) in its image.

Does Howard Aster offer a realistic, desireable alternative? His communitarianism is:

> ... the natural extension of shared meanings, values and symbols from a given group or association of people to their successive generations and the maintenance of the structural characteristics of the original group to its generative descendents.... The critical feature of this view of nationalism is that the feeling, emotional identification or sense of belonging can only emerge from a slow process of organic growth and natural structural extension.[13]

It cannot be consciously cultivated. Or should not be? Or maybe, if it is, it only appears to be successfully cultivated and must be something else?

This type of thinking reflects a very passive attitude toward life, surprisingly, even in the face of decisions and actions ("forces") which threaten and at times destroy the

community so conceived. It might, at best it would seem, exhort governments to structually maintain decision-making institutions, and let them change only by a process of slow evolution, in addition to possibly exhorting them to establish "national" or federal institutions to maintain a group of autonomous communities, and to deal with foreign affairs. This government would be a sort of overseer of a community of communities.

Anyone holding such a communitarian view must see the sense of belonging as the product of very few factors. It does not call upon the community to actively assimilate, alter or select elements of change. Old symbols, means of communicating and ways of doing things will do. New ones, and the conscious political or non-political activities of community members or outsiders, impose no new outlooks in a natural way, or if they do, they just must be accepted. Then again, if the new or different are perceived to be "foreign" or "alien" they may presumably be rejected as such. And then this nationalism comes to resemble the romantic type. But whether romantic or not, Aster's nationalism is essentially conservative, and as such more an example of patriotism than of nationalism, as any so-called conservative nationalism must be, as we shall see.

Aster's comments serve to clarify two distinct approaches, one nationalist, one not: one in which a national culture is to be consciously cultivated; the other in which culture is to be left to develop spontaneously (if we do not consider that to be a denial of the essence of culture!) This suggests, furthermore, that there may be two sorts of villains: those who coldly, deliberately, mechanically set out to mold individuals to fit in with an actual culture, but abstracted and idealized, and those who do the same, but differ in trying to fit in individuals with a culture they wish to originate. Thus the scorn which is directed at those attempting to create a national culture or identity where none is thought to exist. These latter individuals are likely to be placed in the category of rational nationalists.

Perhaps those out to create a culture or identity ought to be ridiculed. The notion is on a par with the idea of writing a book without first having something to say. The means is confused for the end. (The object ought to be, instead, to communicate or concretise an idea or ideal.) But this is what we would expect of rational nationalists. Or would we? Whereas

the romantic nationalist would see culture as an end in itself, the rational nationalist would be unconcerned with "cultural matters," we might think. But this may not be so because he (the rational nationalist) sees, he contemplates the relatedness of things, their causes and effects, and usefulness for one another. An idea which makes no contact with human experience is not of much use. An idea, or Reason, he might say "is not so impotent as to bring about only the ideal, the ought, and to remain in an existence outside of reality - who knows where - as something peculiar in the heads of a few people."[14] At least he might say so if Hegel had not already done so. But consider, too, that it may not be irrational to wish to arrange the non-rational determinants of our behaviour to produce logically desired results. Is it not *very* rational to plan to keep certain temptations at a minimum or to educate individuals of their consequences or to introduce persons to more worthwhile alternatives? If people decide that they wish to make political decisions together, to live within certain geographic frontiers, is it not rational to introduce activities which will draw them together in areas of non-overtly political activity, areas which may well strengthen or defeat political will?

Well, is this then *the* main difference between rational and romantic nationalism? They both place a high value on intentional furthering of some culture or other; but the one employs it as a means, the other takes it to be an end? Culture is a concern of both, reason and political ideas are only a preoccupation of one?

The distinction is not so readily observed in the practical affairs of men. Nations which have been hailed as champions of politics-first nationalism have shown little aversion to exaltations of symbols representing that which they feel they themselves are naturally a part. They exalt political ideas and accomplishments in all fields as *their* ideas and accomplishments, they develop legends with which they identify and they admire heroes, so it would seem, because they are their own, not because of universal ideas which they embody; they claim superiority of language, culture and way of life with pride and passion - not reason - and they claim as their own those born in the nation or fellow nationals anywhere, no matter where in the world they live. They may restrict the highest office in the land to the native-born; and they cannot live without a head of state to symbolize the nation - the nation

must be represented by one or more persons'. Western nationalism apparently can be messianic too.

So some may argue that it is quite easy to begin with a western nationalism but after the state has existed for a while there will be a tendency for that nationalism to become more romantic. But is it right to say that what some individuals, or what some groups of people do, necessarily tells us what is important to know about an idea because some of them have at some time espoused it? Might they not stray or act inconsistently? Secondly, we need to ask what the nature of an idea is. Does it change over time, and if it does, can we say that the idea is an entity with which man controls his world or must we then say that it itself is controlled or determined? I cannot answer this question here, of course, although I will say that it strikes me as obvious that any idea that supposedly changes and renounces some of its earlier components is no longer the same idea but a different one. The important thing here, in any event, is that nationalism as a principle or idea of (a right of) self-determination is a constant one. Any argument claiming that this constant in fact leads to or is part of other ideas would need to be more rigorously argued than I have ever seen it argued. More on this later. Suffice it for now to suggest that there may be something to be said for Aster's uniting of the two supposedly different types of nationalism, as well as for distinguishing between them, and between them and "communitarianism."

C. Fanciful nationalism

It is significant that the person who is probably the most noted philosophic critic and analyst of nationalism, Elie Kedourie, takes the route of claiming that romantic nationalism is the logical or at least historical outcome of the advocacy of a principle of self-determination. Yet he also seems to recognize the existence of a non-romantic variety of nationalism which he does not argue evolves into something else. He nonetheless rejects both because he rejects the collective identification or proclamation of a common good, and the conscious pursuit of it, when the public interest is as well as when it is not said to include national independence. He opposes appeals to principle in politics.

This might not appear to be the case when he endorses "the Whig theory of nationality." He says that in this doctrine "what is important is that men are able to decide freely who their rulers shall be, to keep control over their actions, and to guard the rights of the citizens from their encroachments."[15] Kedourie adds that on this theory, as Mill implies, identification of groups of individuals on non-political criteria, prior to the decision who should be included in the self-governing unit, can be considered. But: "This theory assumes not so much that humanity ought to be divided into national, sovereign states, as that people who are alike in many things stand a better chance of making a success of representative government."[16] Besides, a corollary of this view stipulates that the state is not to be confined to one nationality; it is enriched by the presence of an admixture of them. This, Kedourie maintains, is something which "a true nationalist" could never say. And consequently this doctrine is not properly considered a nationalist one. Kedourie, nonetheless, does not embrace the idea that members of a "multi-national" state ought to take measures to determine their own destiny. He repudiates not only what he calls nationalism but any idea of a principle of self-rule. Kedourie, in fact, objects to the elevation of the role of the will and to the notion of autonomy - which are linked to national wills, spirits or characters - and which pervert politics by making it the arena of competing principles rather than interests. Kedourie, in other words, links the idea of national autonomy to notions of given ends or given conceptions of nations to which individuals are required to conform. He thinks, presumably, that nations cannot (or can no longer) pursue independence without proposing such notions.

He claims that Kant started the evolution of the idea of nationalism by postulating that in order to act morally, we must legislate our own morals, we must determine ourselves.[17] Fichte comes next, providing an answer to Kant's epistemological problem of comprehending the existence of "things-in-themselves." He proposes, Kedourie says, that the world and all of nature are "the product of a universal consciousness, an Ego which embraces everything within itself, and of which everything that happens is a manifestation."[18] "A particular consequence of this view," Kedourie says, "is that the whole is prior to, more important and greater than all its parts."[19] The individual, in order to be free, to realize himself, must

identify himself with the whole.[20]

Kedourie says that Herder contributes a new element "which combined with the idea of self-determination, of individual fulfilment through absorption in the state, and of struggle, as the essential process both in nature and history, to produce the doctrine of nationalism as we now know it." [21] This element is an attributing of worth to preceding ages and their accomplishments, not as mere preparations for the excellences of the present but for their own intrinsic value; it is also a praising of diversity in the present. Herder, Kedourie says, calls on states to cultivate their unique qualities and to avoid the risk of identity loss which could result from the mixing of nationalities. Schleiermacher, too, insists that God has bestowed on each nation a special character, and task to perform.[22] The result of such thinking, which is advanced by Fichte as well, is the new emphasis on language as a distinguishing feature, and its transformation "into a political issue for which men are ready to kill and exterminate each other."[23] The invention of the doctrine of nationalism is consequently completed, Kedourie concludes, "by literary men who had never exercised power, and appreciated little the necessities and obligations incidental to intercourse between states."[24] (And so those advocating nationalism as a principle necessarily see it in relation to natural linguistic groups?)

Kedourie's completed doctrine of nationalism is very much characterized by two things: the will and the natural existence of nations. Consider, though, that he differentiates nationalism from tribalism by pointing out that the tribesman "is such by virtue of his birth, not by virtue of self-determination. He is usually unaware that the destiny of man is progressive, and that he can fulfil this destiny by merging his will into the will of the tribe."[25] Is Kedourie saying, then, that natural membership in the nation is not crucial, but rather the will to realize something is?

Minogue claims that: "Renan's conclusion that the nation was ultimately based upon will was, in nationalist terms, a definitional defeat" - as "Nationalist doctrine usually argues that the state is based upon consent, but that the basis of the nation must be that it is a *natural* community."[26] Kedourie, too, speaks (repeatedly) about the importance nationalists

give to the naturalness of individual nations and the "fact" that the human race is naturally divided into separate groups by one criterion or another. He even defines nationalism as a doctrine which "holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government."[27] But note well that Kedourie clearly does not favour self-determination according to any criterion as a matter of principle. He argues in favour of frontiers established according to the dictates of power because that is how they are in fact established, according to him, regardless of the rhetoric used to justify them. In his words:

> Frontiers are established by power, and maintained by the constant and known readiness to defend them by arms. It is absurd to think that professors of linguistics and collectors of folklore can do the work of statesmen and soldiers.... academic enquiries are used by conflicting interests to bolster their claims, and their results prevail only to the extent that somebody has the power to make them prevail.... Academic research does not add a jot or a tittle to the capacity for ruling, and to pretend otherwise is to hide with equivocation what is a very clear matter.[28]

Even though Kedourie takes aim at "romanticists" here he is making the general point that borders are creations of power struggles, the results of the confrontations of competing interests; they are accomodations of some sort (i.e. determined by actions based on the estimation by each side of the other side's power) in the final analysis. It is folly to think that plebiscites ought to determine political frontiers. Why should a plebiscite be held once and for all (so to speak), and not regularly like elections, giving a population a chance to change its allegiances as well as its government? Can a vote definitively represent the will of the people or merely reflect the relative strength of "conflicting propaganda or pressures or inducements" on a given day? What do you do about "mixed areas"?[29] Presumably if you give a people the right to establish its own government, how can you not give each group living among them the right to self-determination?

Kedourie's views on political frontiers are really no different than his view of the entire political process. He sees politics as purely the world of the practical, the domain in which actions are justified by interest, expediency, and "the necessities of the case."[30] It is not a world in which theologians and philosophers ought to meddle. The civil order, to closely

paraphrase Kedourie, is ultimately incompatible with philosophical speculation.[31] One works out a balance among interests (unless prevented from doing so by indiscrete philosophers and imperceptive masses who are deceived through the mass distribution of the words of these philosophers); the other deals with first (i.e. unnegotiable) principles. [32]

Now one has to wonder just what people with conflicting interests compromise on in the give and take of politics. Is it merely their interests, or is it instead the principles which they see supporting their interests, or even the principles which they see supporting the interests of all of society? This is, of course, an enormous question. Suffice it for now to say that surely some if not all people are able to compromise interests with an awareness that principles are relevant to their particular cases. Someone opposing the establishment of a garbage dump near his neighbourhood, for example, might consider trade-offs, but always with the idea in mind that consideration of such things as rights, obligations and fairness is relevant. To suggest that the application of principles cannot be compromised but that interests can is really most peculiar. To suggest, moreover, that nationalists are rigid, inflexible ideologues who necessarily shun compromise to the point of martyrdom and murder is bizarre. Consistency would require the assertion that *any* belief or adherence to *any* principles affecting real-life activities is just as likely to produce violence and chaos. Of course, people advocating principles give priority to different ones in different circumstances; they may also employ principles as guides to reason or utility and not as rules to be followed unthinkingly without exception, in any case.

To argue that political principles, like other principles, can be compromised, though, may be to let Kedourie base the discussion too much on his own terms. Is compromise always or necessarily a good thing? To say that it is is to give it an endorsement which is much too sweeping. Politics may in large part be the art of the possible but that which is possible is certainly in large measure determined by people believing in, and arguing for, and winning converts to particular points of view.

Smith counters that Kedourie's argument assumes:

> ... that the age preceding nationalism knew nothing of principles, and that its conflicts were simply motivated by gain - territorial, economic or political. This will

> hardly do for the Wars of Religion in the 16th and and early 17th centuries. Nor for the Crusades, and the subsequent resistance to the Turks' encroachments in Eastern Europe.... In the pre-classical ancient world, most wars were undertaken to increase the gods' power... It is merely the *content* of the principles invoked that has dramatically changed.[33]

Kedourie might reply that that is precisely his point, that political principles have subsequently provided the content. But it would be most strange if we were to say that politics could be about anything except political principles, somehow envisioned, in any age.

Kedourie castigates the French revolutionairies for introducing a particular new principle, which was, he says, "to subvert all international relations as hitherto known,"[34] that is, the principle of self-determination which produced two main consequences: the domestic instability of states which could indefinitely produce changing configurations of nations, and the questioning of the legitimacy of any government which did not derive its sovereignty from the nation - meaning that agreements with illegitimate governments need not be considered binding. The problem with this argument is that it presupposes a harmony among states before then which did not exist. Did all governments before then always regard each other government as legitimate, and never as illegitimate on any grounds which would lead to disputes and wars between them? And even if so, was there something inherent in their relations that would ensure that such an harmonious arrangement would continue? Is there something particularly nefarious in self-rule, in any event, that precludes it as a just basis for a dispute between states?

The curious thing is that Kedourie does recognize the need of a society to enunciate and perpetuate its collective values. His vehicle of preference for accomplishing this is tradition - assisted by education.[35] Kedourie might well be asked if those taught to conform to tradition are any more free than those taught to conform to some national will. The key point, though, is that Kedourie does not appreciate that people might in some way *establish* rather than conform to the national will. He consequently fails to consider that there is merit in people doing things for themselves collectively in the political realm. But there may be such merit because people in other circumstances are unfamiliar with and/or unconcerned about the needs of another group and the most appropriate solutions to their problems; their interests

may conflict, in any event. Or it may be simply because by doing something for yourself you are living your own life and not being dependent on others, leaving to them to develop all of their human capacities but not striving to do so yourself. This, of course, is not the last word. You could say that autonomy means that every single individual ought to be totally self-sufficient, which it realistically cannot mean. But surely many would say that it ought to include political participation, that is, participation in decision-making by the community, since the community is governed by some rules. Kedourie has little use even for this. He writes elsewhere that democracy "entails nothing about participation." Democracy - something he favours - presumably requires only that the rule of governors is approved of by the governed, and that the rules must not limit inappropriately the extent of the private sphere.[36]

Consider, too, that Kedourie concludes his influential book with the comment that the real criterion for judging a regime "is whether the new rulers are less corrupt and grasping, or more just and merciful, or whether there is no change at all, but the corruption, the greed, and the tyranny merely find victims other than those of the departed rulers."[37] He leaves no doubt that he thinks there is no reason to believe that self-rule will be more likely to be more just and less tyrannous, or that it may be inherently so in any way. The tenor of his position is that it is pernicious to even think that it is.

I think that this may show why Kedourie so completely dismisses the idea of national self-determination: he cannot imagine the masses participating rationally in politics. And thus he considers a focus on youth, death and violence to be intrical parts of nationalism.[38] When the masses - or anyone else for that matter - get principles and abstract notions into their heads, they depart from the real world of politics which, it would seem, is based on power, might, and balancing of interests, things which only those who neglect principle can appreciate.

Kedourie's objection, and that of other writers such as Minogue, then, might not be that nationalism is of the "eastern" variety but rather that talk of principles is a product of a flight of fancy and impractical (to say the least.) Yet they more or less equate eastern

nationalism and nationalism. And thus they argue the absurdity of a principle of self-determination, and of political participation, from the absurdity they detect in romantic ideals. They argue, for example, that notions of cultural or national (or "racial") purity are not consonant with reality. Distinctive natural attributes, if they exist, are too difficult to discern, with our level of scientific knowledge, to base any judgments upon with any certainty that they may be valid. Besides, language and culture are living, changing things, the products of a wide variety of internal and external influences. It is folly to try to go back to some "objective" original. There is no reliable way of doing so. Imaginary criteria must be invented. You cannot say, for example, that one language is a dialect, another a language in itself, without irresolvable dispute. Kedourie, for example, says that "German nationalists claimed that Dutch is really a dialect of German and Holland ought therefore to be part of the German nation. Contrariwise, Ukrainian separatists argued that they were entitled to a state on their own, because their language is different from Russian..."[39] and so on. Academic research cannot settle such claims. But even agreement on what constitutes a particular language does not assure the end of disputes. Confrontation can then arise over issues such as whether all speakers of one language should unite politically, whether only one language should be spoken in a nation, and what should be done with minorities. Should they be forcibly assimilated or expelled? And what about those who speak the right language but are not of the right nationality? Nazi Germans had "objective" criteria to determine who were Germans, but even went beyond these to try to determine who was German in spirit too.[40]

These writers point out, moreover, that any attempt to trace back ancestry to a pure type is fraught with difficulty in itself. Are not all "races" we know of amalgams of other races? And when we can go back no further is this not just due to the fact that we lack the requisite historical knowledge? Besides, information about physical properties is only information about physical properties.[41] Any idea of natural frontiers is equally fanciful. Few communities have uniform geography. What differences in terrain and waterways there are are sometimes obstacles and sometimes complements to the use of the natural resources at a community's disposal. It is certain, in any event, that communities have surmounted what at

one time were barriers but did not remain so, due to technology.

Is the introduction of principles into political life, into national political life, hereby discredited? Because some of those promoting a view of their nation argue that it has natural characteristics, does it follow that any views of a nation as a whole must be equally irrational (if views of natural national traits are indeed necessarily irrational)? Even if so, would it be a consequence that all principles concerning methods for governing nations (e.g. those stipulating that nations ought to rule themselves) are invalid propositions?

Clearly there are matters which concern nations as wholes. It makes no sense to speak of a national community which is merely a diversity of professions, religions, cultures, ancestries, worldviews, etc. which are not in *some* way united. Still, writers such as Kedourie and Minogue try to rule out the conscious pursuit of collective goals, including self-determination, which are not, oddly enough, the goals of only parts of the community. They rule out principles as guides for the community as a whole, even though some common understandings are undeniably necessary, I would assert, for there to be a community, and can and should be stated in the form of governing principles which people should act upon. They do agree, however, that nationalism is a principle, and that is sufficient to note for now. It will remain to be seen whether nationalism is essentially or primarily "romantic."

D. Libertarian anti-nationalism

Kedourie, we have seen, does not deny that there is a common good or a community interest. He rejects arguments, however, that man should seek to consciously determine it. (This, we shall see later, potentially makes him an exponent of conservatism.) Some other writers, such as Minogue and Shafer, though, argue that the very conception of a common good is fantastical. And therefore they repudiate the principle of nationalism, which is inherently related to collective decision-making, and any positive role for government (often in the same breath.) This assessment is not stated in overt laissez-faire or libertarian terms but the approach is one that is strongly hinted at from time to time, in Minogue's book on nationalism, for example.

Minogue establishes a clear dichotomy between individuality and private interests on the one hand, and the national interest or will on the other. Addressing the question of whether fascism or totalitarian nationalism are "proper forms" of nationalism, he remarks that "if we were to take nationalist rhetoric seriously, we should have to conclude that it seems to be demanding the conditions of a totalitarian state in which nothing is in principle taken as private and beyond political recognition in the interest of the nation."[42] The argument he develops is one in favour of individuality unhindered by the apparatus of the state. Further evidence of this is to be found in his analysis of the work of Rousseau. Rousseau, he says, is a socialist who "hates individualism,"[43] expounding a version of the social contract which "is not an expedient by which men pursue more efficiently the same private interests which moved them in a state of nature." Rousseau promotes, Minogue says, a vision of society in which people sense that they are part of a community, a community whose public good they are to will. This means willing the community to conform to an ideal, attempting to make it something it is not, and likely cannot be. The result according to Minogue is very likely to be "only frustration, especially in a modern world wherein there are too many moulders and not enough characters suitable for moulding."[44]

Minogue develops his argument further when discussing nationalism as a means chosen by a people to modernize economically. He comments that:

> The central vice is to believe that national development is a matter of national *will*; but a modern economy is built up by thousands of individuals pursuing personal rather than national politics; national development... is a by-product of individual endeavour. National development by will leads to events like the Russian collectivisation of agriculture in 1930, or the Chinese Great Leap Forward, attempts to annihilate time which frequently cause further delay. An associated vice is a disposition to take the plan for the achievement.

And another vice is "a disposition to concentrate upon symbols: the passion for a steelworks, the empty Boeing 707 on scheduled flights for the national airline, the skyscrapers in the desert."[45] It does not occur to him that he is citing efforts gone awry rather than those efforts which have responded to legitimate needs - or that some "inefficiency" can be justified on other than economic grounds. It probably does not occur to him, either, that seemingly individual achievements are often made possible by the collective gathering or creation of

material and intellectual resources, or that individual and private efforts may not always be socially beneficial.

Boyd Shafer has a similar outlook; he also also remonstrates against the notion, which he takes to be central to nationalism, that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.[46] He, also, moreover, attributes a significant place to Rousseau's general will in the spread of this idea.[47] His own conclusion is that "the state is not a mystical abstraction or force above and beyond the societies and individuals who constitute it, except in the fanciful minds that so will it. The state is whatever historical processes, and the individuals (or elites, if you will) who constitute it, make it. It has no being of its own, can create nothing of its own."[48]

Shafer's understanding of the state is further revealed when he expresses amazement that the nation-state should consider it to be its duty to provide weather forecasts (or even to assure that they are provided?)[49]; when he states that national government intervened in a matter of private property when it abolished slavery (although it is possible that he is referring to the slave-owners' perception and not his own - but this is far from certain)[50]; but his view is perhaps most evident when he points out that national governments, and not a Church or international organization, gave individuals the right to vote.[51] So, as with Minogue, we see a complete opposing of private to public interests and the atomistic view of the individual, that is, a view of the individual as self-sufficient at least apart from the political process.

E. Weaknesses in opposition to nationalism as collective choice

The "anti-collectivists" fail to realize that the nation is not only (or necessarily) a juridical institution but a community of values which is not something new. Furthermore, just as the values of the individual are not totally innate, or learned beyond the influence of the political society, so too are private interests made possible only by the community in which they are pursued. Surely Minogue, Shafer and others would not want to suggest that in the complex industrial age especially that private interests could be pursued without shared values dictating the bounds of what is acceptable, be they simply social norms, government

regulations or laws - or without the infrastructure of exchange (currency), transportation, communication and so on. The question of how active a role government should take in running the economy, for example, is quite a different consideration. Even a decision to minimize the role of "the state" is one which must be supported by the political values of the society at large. Nonetheless, to suggest that the state (as formal institution) should be reduced to the role of night watchman is certainly unrealistic (an example of mythical thinking?) in an age of complex interdependence and large institutions truly controlled by no single individuals, and by no means all individuals.

Someone might reply that none of this shows that the general interest is more than the sum of individual interests. Perhaps this is so. But it is to suggest that individual interests may be indirect as well as direct ones, and it is to suggest that individual interests may meet in some common ones. It is the interest of everyone in the community what kind of education your child receives, and whether your factory pollutes the air. This is not to say, though, that the state must educate him or in a narrowly specified manner or that your factory cannot operate unless it is 100% clean; it is to say that the community has a stake regardless of the decision it reaches - it is still a community decision, even if the decision is to leave such matters to the individuals directly involved.

I conclude, therefore, that there are community or collective goods and that it is rational to wish to have a say in them. Consequently, criticism of nationalism as a principle of self-determination (which I have shown it to be, although I have not yet shown it to be only that) cannot be sustained if it amounts to an assertion that there is no national interest other than that of imagined national characteristics about which to be concerned. It may not always be easy, of course, to distinguish between informed and imaginary ideas of what constitutes the national interest since both sets are sets of ideas, but this is no excuse for denying self-rule for if it were, we could only act when we could claim absolute knowledge and did not have to evaluate ideas - unless we said that we should not govern ourselves using ideas, a matter for later consideration. As is the related criticism of nationalism as a principle of political participation which includes participation of the incapable masses. Leaving aside

for the moment those two considerations, though, it is evident that nationalism should not be rejected on either grounds of "realism" or "liberty."

1 I thank professors Pocklington, Owram and Carmichael for recommending that I clarify in this paragraph what I mean by "nations" and what I think to be the relationship between the individual and the nation in nationalism. I had simply said originally that the idea is that "nations have a right to self-determination."

2 Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 13.

3 Ibid., p. 14; Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 29.

4 See, for example, Carlton Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 30-37.

5 Naturally, we could point to tribal groups at any time in history, although many would argue that real differences have existed and do exist between these peoples and "national" communities. But we can also point to various ancient peoples. Undoubtedly there is much controversy over how much "national" sentiment or consciousness existed among ancient peoples, and how comparable it was to that which we mean by the same terms today. There does seem to be sufficient evidence, nonetheless, to state that the Persians, Carthaginians, Romans, Egyptians, Hittites, Mittanians, Babylonians as well as the Greeks, Jews and other groups "not based primarily on kinship ties like 'tribes'" did "at one point or another" resist foreign rule "to preserve their religo-cultural heritage," and their political autarchy, or to extend their rule or "that of their gods" over other groups. (Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 163.)

We can see, too, that different peoples did see themselves as distinct groups in the period between the fall of the Romans and the French Revolution. See Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 99, 111, 130, 145, concerning Cola di Rienzo,

Ulrich von Hutten, and Francis I, and the Italians, German and French respectively.

6 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 167.

7 Kamenka, "Political Nationalism," in Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, edited by E. Kamenka (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1973), p. 8.

8 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 331.

9 Ibid., p. 329.

10 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 198-199.

11 Ibid., p. 198. Smith notes in a footnote (p. 324) that Binder gives a good account of this distinction in The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East(1964). He also advises the reader to cf. F. Hertz's Nationality in History and Politics (London, 1944).

12 Ibid., p. 198.

13 Howard Aster, "Nationalism and Communitarianism," in Nationalism, Technology and the Future of Canada, edited by Wallace Gagne (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), p. 60.

14 Hegel, Reason in History (Indianapolis: Bob-Merrill, 1979), p. 11.

15 Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966), p. 131.

16 Ibid., p. 132.

17 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 29, 32.

18 Ibid., p. 36.

19 Ibid., p. 37.

20 Ibid., p. 38.

21 Ibid., p. 54.

22 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

23 Ibid., p. 70.

24 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

25 Ibid., p. 75.

26 Minogue, Nationalism (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1967), p. 11.

27 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 9.

28 Ibid., p. 125.

29 See Ibid., pp. 81, 126.

30 Ibid., p. 50.

31 Ibid ., p. 104.

32 Minogue is in partial agreement with Kedourie on this point. His decisive word on the matter seems to come when he distinguishes between politics and philosophy. Philosophy, he says, is concerned with questions which in principle have right and wrong answers. Politics is about the indeterminate. "Should the franchise be extended to all adults?" he asks. "Ought strikes to be permitted in wartime? No doubt there are factual issues involved in discussing these questions," he answers, "but they can never be reduced to issues of truth. Politics is a matter of conflicting interests, demands and guesses. Compromise is the usual result of negotiation; in philosophy it is generally a sign of confusion." (Minogue, Nationalism, pp. 36-37.)

33 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 13.

34 Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 15-16.

35 He speaks of the purpose of education being "to transmit knowledge, traditional wisdom, and the ways devised by a society for attending to the common concerns." Kedourie, Nationalism, pp 83-84.

36 Peter Steinfels cites these and other remarks by Kedourie in response to the findings of the well-known Trilateral Commission studying "The Crisis of Democracy." See Steinfels, The Neoconservatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 270, 271.

37 Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 140.

38 Ibid., pp. 85-89.

39 Ibid., p. 123.

40 See Alexander J. Groth, Major Ideologies: An Interpretative Survey of Democracy, Socialism and Nationalism (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1971), pp. 102-103.

41 Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, p. 326.

42 Minogue, Nationalism, p. 16.

43 Ibid., pp.39-40.

44 Ibid., p. 42.

45 Ibid., pp 131-132.

46 Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, p. 20.

47 Ibid. See, for example, pp. 63, 133.

48 Ibid., p. 329.

49 Ibid., p. 240.

50 Ibid., p. 234.

51 Ibid., p. 235.

III. Nationalism, Sentiment and Modernization

Is it possible to examine nationalism without discussing a rational idea of national self-determination? Some writers on nationalism see it as an idea - in part - which is only a reflection of a reality which is not the product of conscious, rational choice, however much its exponents may perceive it to be a determinant of history; some simply see it as an emotional response to the historically-determined process of "modernization." These writers evaluate nationalism as either a rational or irrational response to the process, that is, as a response which is praiseworthy or condemnable on the basis of its acceptance or rejection of modernization, or of universal religious truth. We need to ask whether these commentators do evaluate what in fact ought to be considered as nationalism in addition to considering the merits of their arguments on their own terms.

I conclude that attempts to equate nationalism with national sentiment, religious or non-religious, and attempts to explain nationalism as a rejection of or a yearning to participate in modernity, deny essential features of the idea, such as its formulation as a right and its legitimate concern with the political values of communities, and therefore fail to adequately identify, explain or evaluate nationalism. Any account of nationalism must provide for the idea unless nationalism is simultaneously a number of distinct phenomena - which I shall argue in the next chapter is a complication we should and can easily avoid.

A. Nationalism as religious sentiment

Some writers see nationalism as a substitute for religion in the modern age. They take the point of view (which Kedourie briefly touches upon in non-emphatic agreement) that nationalism is an expression of religious sentiment or yearning, filling the void left by the decline or rejection of theistic religion. Man, according to this line of thought, has an innate need to devote himself to some spiritual causal agent, a Being whose existence helps him to make sense out of human fortunes and misfortunes, and out of non-human life as well, a Being who gives man a purpose, namely that of serving him. His greatness pales the idiosyncratic whims of man. He is a source of emotional warmth and security, and

immortality. In the words of Hans Kohn:

> In the new age nationalism, taking the place of religion... fulfills one great task - giving meaning to man's life and justifying his noble and ignoble passions before himself and history, lifting him above the loneliness and futilities of his days, and endowing the order and power of government, without which no society can exist, with the majesty of true authority.[1]

Nationalism supplies, he says, "that emotional warmth, that intimacy of union which religion had provided"; it re-unites "the emotional and the political forms of men's lives..."[2]

Carlton Hayes also deals with nationalism as a new religion, as something calling into play:

> ... not simply the will, but the intellect, the imagination, and the emotions. The intellect constructs a speculative theology or mythology of nationalism. The imagination builds an unseen world around the eternal past and the everlasting future of one's nationality. The emotions arouse a joy and ecstasy in the contemplation of the national god who is all-good and all-protecting, a longing for his favors, a thankfulness for his benefits, a fear of offending him, and feelings of awe and reverence at the immensity of his power and wisdom...[3]

Various writers point out that since the time of the French Revolution nationalists have made conscious efforts to propagate their doctrine specifically as a new - and better - religion, and the masses have demonstrated their acceptance of this new teaching by "religiously" practising its rites and by moulding their actions according to this new sentiment which has been so encouraged.

It should be obvious that a certain value judgment underlies the nationalism-as-religion thesis, namely, that the nation should not be believed in: either because religious-type belief is irrational or because it should adhere to something other than the nation. In the latter case, the argument sometimes is that moral values should be addressed by the moral authority of the people - the Church - and not by political actors. In both cases, there is an assumption that men should not identify the nation as the source of anything but a small portion of their well-being.

The problem with this model is that religious and national consciousness and sentiment have often been very conspicuously linked, and have not been two elements in a zero-sum equation. National frameworks have often shaped not only religious practices but thinking as well, and if this is the case, then religious feeling cannot explain national feeling.

not as well as national feeling can explain the religious. Prior to the spread of the universal religions religion was truly "national," that is, the product and possession of separate political communities. Even during the years in which the sacred authority was deemed to be superior to the secular realm it is debatable whether the geographic areas of church authority constituted polities in a sense more than they disregarded them (the earthly domains of men). If, as Shafer suggests, the Church provided law and order, ensured liberties, and met many of the same needs that the state would meet, should we not consider it to have operated as a state (if it were, indeed, not one)?[4]

It is interesting, in fact, to reflect upon the question of how separate the religious and political realms have ever been - if we consider basic conceptions of justice and morality. Any stable, harmonious society has, at least until modern times, required an accommodation between if not a compatibility of political and religious values among a majority of the population, especially in systems which are democratic and responsive to the people.

It is indeed no secret that politics and religion are often mixed. It should similarly be admitted that moral issues still do confront legislators continually, and that their decisions often reflect, and to some extent create the general consensus of the community by establishing practices which come to be accepted. It is, in fact, unavoidable that the political realm will produce decisions with moral import. The moral cannot be disassociated from the political. It is most appropriate, then, that the political community should act to promote certain moral values. To assign a moral role to the political association, or to recognize that it has one, is not to worship the nation or to argue that it, or government, is the source of moral or religious truth.

To feel an attachment to the nation, moreover, because it is seen to be a provider, is not necessarily to attribute more to it than logically can be. The national political community simply is responsible for much of our material and non-material wellfare, and has become more responsible for it in recent centuries, not because it has taken over tasks it previously did not have, but because the community (and by "community" here I do not mean "the state") has expanded the number of things which it does.

Now if nationalism causes people to respond to, or is a response to the nation as a creator, organizer or distributor of political values and goods nationalism is not inherently "other-worldly" at all. Perhaps some of the proponents of the nationalism-as-religion thesis are simply re-stating the empiricist claim that only "direct" proof of relatedness can qualify as actual proof, all else, including notions of a "providential" community, count only as examples of irrationality. Some other exponents are theists, of course. Their argument only differs in suggesting that there is a non-empirical reality, but one that is separate from this world. They still see attention to some collective entity such as the political community, as irrational. They might have taken the Kedourian route and said that concern for the nation is due to misguided ideas propogated by over-imaginative intellectuals: they seem to choose instead to reduce such concern to a matter of ill-informed sentiment. The result seems to be the same - a denial that a desire to preserve or create distinct ways of (national) life can have as its object meaningful actions on behalf of something which really exists.

B. Nationalism as irrational sentiment

There are some writers who provide an alternative or additional approach and come to the same conclusion - that concern for a nation cannot be rational and therefore such concern must be the product of passions uncontrolled or gone astray, although in this case nationalism is reduced to a sentiment which need not be considered religious in nature.

This approach is predicated upon the notion that what is rational is acceptance of what is natural and good, namely, "modernity" or the pursuit of technology and industrialization and the political way of life which has accompanied its rise in the West. Social, economic and political situations naturally evolve in response to evolving needs; the rational thing to do is to accept what happens (which is not considered to be the purposively selected route of any particular interests or nations or empires.)

Boyd Shafer, who as we have seen thinks that the idea of national autonomy is a mistaken or mythical idea, also considers nationalism to be a sentiment, an irrational feeling of attachment. He offers several possible maladjustment hypotheses to explain different

manifestations of nationalism. He notes that in war, which was been between nations since the 18th century, "individuals could find vent for pent-up emotions of many kinds."[5] He notes that those "who are frustrated or have had traumatic experiences... tend to blame 'others' easily and quickly; and most individuals, the normal and the abnormal, especially in wartime but also in their 'normal' pursuits, are sometimes frustrated and the victims of traumatic experience, and find comfort, perhaps pleasure, in release of pent-up emotion in anger and hate." They blame the foreign devil, perhaps providing us with "the modern version of the age-old belief in demons."[6] Shafer also throws out the possibility that unloved children will be more inclined to have nationalist prejudices.[7]

He concurs, then, with the observation that nationalism "is not rationalism, and its devotees will practice its rites without counting the costs." This comment might be directed toward African nationalists in particular for seeking to set up independent states without the economic or human resources necessary to make them viable.[8] But how to explain this irrationality? Shafer does not say that these peoples are merely mistaken in their judgments; he suggests that they (and nationalists in general) are acting from instinct, emotions, feelings and passions which are maladjusted. They are conscious of and loyal to something (a nation) which does not truly exist. Psychological analysis, consequently, and not examination of thought, including thought given to the ways to act upon and further the political values of nations, is required. Whereas at some earlier point nation-states may have been logical units, interaction between peoples then being limited, he maintains that the same can no longer be said. Technology, especially in the form of the threat of nuclear war, has made national sovereignty obsolete.[9]

Louis Snyder, who surveys literature on nationalism from a number of different disciplines, takes an approach similar to Shafer's. Although he makes a distinction between "good" and "evil" forms of nationalism, he still seems to wish to equate almost all of nationalism today with the "evil" or non-Western variety which has "stressed the collective power of a closed society"; it became "the focal point for individual and group fears, anxieties, frustrations, and aggressions. This type of nationalism," he says, "is the result of

one of the most powerful emotions - blind, unreasoning fear. It is the fruit of mental and moral confusion and of maladjustments between thinking and action."[10]

The individual seeks security in something external to him, not outgrowing the need for authoritative guidance; the abnormally hostile yet socially attuned individual directs his hostility where he can - at the foreigner; he seeks to assuage his anxiety due to the complexity of life or the threat of external (i.e. large, unfamiliar, uncontrollable) forces by making the nation secure; he compensates for his own feelings of inferiority by not only identifying with the nation but also by insisting on its superiority - and consequently on its expansion. These are the types of assertions that Snyder, and others sharing similar views, make.

There are times when Snyder discusses the neurotic behaviour of nations[11] instead of that of individuals. Still, the focus is often on that which individuals advocate, and when it is not, the analysis of national conduct does follow a similar pattern. There are overcompensations, delusions and failures to accurately judge respective amounts of power - there is a detachment from reality, in other words. Evidence of this can be found in war situations, in, as Orwell noted, calls for self-determination in one part of the world and denial of it in your own empire[12]; and in the demands of economic nationalists who maintain that national economies "must be constructed on the basis of special endowments and capabilities, but at the same time... have refused to accept fully as a matter of common sense the corollary of freedom of international trade."[13] These points of view are questionable; they are mentioned here to illustrate Snyder's point of view - namely that one kind (the predominant kind?) of nationalism is deviant.

It is significant that Snyder looks not only at what nationalists say about the idea of nations and nationalism but also at anything else they say or do which he considers to be relevant. Nationalism is, in his mind, therefore, not something which can be discerned from what men advocate; it is, rather, the collection of words and deeds emanating from a feeling. Consider his comment that religions "in their dogmas at least, preach tolerance,, but nationalism rewards hostility and aggression."[14] This reveals a double standard. He does not say that nationalism preaches hositility or that religions reward tolerance; nationalism, and not

religion, is to be judged according to a criterion larger than the doctrine itself. The product of thought, the idea itself, is subordinate.

Why does Snyder subordinate the idea? It may be that the idea of self-rule is implausible to him. What is plausible, what is rational, presumably, is that which is well-adjusted. It is non-aggressive, it is not focussing in the political realm on language and culture and other irrelevancies, it is contentment with the amount of power actually enjoyed (not some greater amount lusted after); it is not comparative or feeling threatened when real threats do not exist; it is recognizing where security, freedom and one's welfare truly are to be found - increasingly in the world as well as in the national communities.[15]

C. Natural vs. purposive "nationalism"

Snyder's approach, it turns out, has much in common with that of Karl Deutsch - more than merely the hope that nationalism can be better understood and its future more accurately predicted by quantifying the various social forces which converge to entice individuals to identify their welfare with that of a particular group. They both think that man ought to employ reason to recognize (not determine) with which association of individuals their interests lie, the size of this association being established by long-term trends and forces which no individual or set of individuals can consciously alter or create.

Deutsch differs from Snyder in assigning a legitimate role to culture in nationalism, although this may be due to the approach Deutsch takes in defining a culture as something larger than a linguistic-ethnic entity. Deutsch, moreover, contends that it is a simple fact (about which it would be pointless to moralize given it is a fact?) that culture becomes much more important in the modern age.

According to Deutsch: "Behind the spreading of national consciousness there was at work perhaps a deeper change" than that taking place in the context of other values, and that was "a new *value* assigned to people *as they are*". The Industrial Revolution, he says, "produced repeated changes in the importance of different crafts and skills... it became rather clear that people were more important than habits, skills, or positions."[16] Nationalism could

also possibly be correlated "with a decrease in the deference paid to internationally standardized culture patterns..."[17] Charles Taylor says something very similar.[18]

This idea is developed further by Ernest Gellner, who states that in modern societies the structure of the society and traditional roles no longer give individuals a sense of identity and purpose. When people communicate they do not do so through their given positions: "when interlocutors and contexts are all unfamiliar, the message itself must become intelligible - it is no longer understood, as was the case in traditional societies, before it was even articulated - and those who communicate must speak the same language, in some sense or other."[19] Men consequently perceive their own identities in their "cultures," Gellner says, which is something they carry with them in their "whole style of conduct and expression," no longer finding it in a social niche.[20] But this is not to place Gellner's outlook on nationalism in agreement with Deutsch. (We shall see why shortly.)

Now Deutsch says that nationalism is "a predisposition to pay far more attention to messages about one's own people, or to messages from its members, than to messages from or about any other people."[21] This may be productive for the individual, up to a point, enabling him to become more socially upwardly-mobile - by speaking "the same language" as those in a position to distribute rewards of one kind or another. The inference, though, is that the modern world itself continually produces new information and challenges to which each culture must provide adequate responses and adjustments. To insist on keeping a culture static is not just to fail to reach accommodations with other cultures, as it once was; it is now a matter of refusing to participate in a project of all of man, which in the natural course of events will lead to new and larger loyalties and attachments as patterns of social communication expand.

There is in Deutsch's work a certain affinity with Ortega's remark that: "Nationalism is always an effort in a direction opposite to that of the principle which creates nations. The former is exclusive in tendency, the latter inclusive."[22]

Both Deutsch and Ortega seem to say that man's use of technology enables him to transcend what were once boundaries. To freeze the new boundaries is neither possible nor

desirable if technology continues to expand. New, larger associations should be able to provide the identity and security man seeks in the culture of the collectivity which he sees as his own.

There is, then, agreement between Deutsch and Ortega, and Snyder as well, concerning the manner in which national sentiment should expand - as a product of a natural process of expanding social communication or interaction networks (although Ortega does not give this product or process the name of nationalism and the other two do.) Whatever it is called it certainly has the character of something passive; it is not something that man creates through his thoughts or purposive actions. Now all three agree that conscious efforts to counter the process constitute a form of nationalism, an undesirable, harmful one. Deutsch does allow that groups of men will refuse to transfer loyalties to ever larger associations because of the uneven income distribution among countries of the world,[23] meaning that the poorer nations will resist greater integration until they begin to industrialize and share in the world's wealth on a more equal footing. Deutsch condemns, however, the nationalism which is determined not merely to control universal "cultural" influences but also to exclude them.

Deutsch equates this exclusionary outlook with the aggrandizement of the will. Will, he says, "is the ability to inhibit, partially or wholly, any further learning.... The symbols of extreme will are hardness, imperviousness, inaccessibility to any information or consideration that might interfere with the relentless pursuit of the once chosen goal or of a course of action once embarked upon."[24] Reiterating the ideas that societies should be open to outside influences, Deutsch contends that such isolationism can become social suicide, entailing the loss of traditions and institutions, "the loss of self-determination... the destruction of the nation."[25] Deutsch cites as an example of a culture "not particularly interested in survival" the "long frozen culture of ancient Sparta."[26]

Those arguing that nationalists are maladjusted or that a nation is suicidal in cutting off the oxygen of external influences are arguing from a presupposition that whatever is dominant in one part of the world should be dominant nearby, or everywhere. They seem to be arguing, in fact, that the "mental health" of a nation today consists of accepting western technological society as a complete package. It is irrelevant that nationalists may only exclude

some types of information or influences. What is is what is good. This may be so but it may be that the social vision of the west, if there is such an indivisible entity, is not the best one for mankind, or that no single one is or will be best for all peoples and places. To say that there is such a single entity is, in this case, to do two things: to assert that questions about political values are not valid questions or do not belong on agendas of nations; and to assert that there is no inherent worth in nations deciding for themselves which ways of life they are to live.

You may interject to ask whether this suffices as a response to those who believe that the arts speak a universal language, and who conclude, consequently, that culture should not be controlled at all but left to deliver its messages spontaneously wherever and however it can.

I cannot respond definitively. I do not know the whole answer. I would venture to say, however, that it seems that there are different levels of art and culture. Some works speak to all people, some speak only to those to whom the context is familiar and meaningful. Can there be any doubt, though, that all works are created in some particular environment, and that it is legitimate for a people to ensure that it sees a reflection of its own values through some of those which entertain and inform its members? It may be the nature of creativity to be spontaneous, not purposive, yet is it not a great part of culture to cultivate an appreciation of it and to create opportunities for its expression? (But we should also take care not to define "culture" in too narrow a fashion.)

Nationalism may well be a rejection of the uninhibited evolution of global culture. I can hardly find this objectionable given that it need not mean a shutting out of all outside influences nor disinterest in sharing with other cultures, especially since any evolving world culture is only ever partially spontaneous in nature: it is always in part the product of human intentions and choice.

A somewhat different argument is that the nation is an artificial creation, imposing uniformity on the natural sources of inspiration which are the regions and their cultures. I shall address this issue later.

The nationalism-as-irrational-rejection-of-modernity thesis, in any event, does contain a recognition of nationalism as a principle of self-determination which it only sees as rooted in irrational sentiment because it includes the assessment that the passive acceptance of historical trends is (ironically, I must say) rational.

D. Nationalism as proper response to modernization

There is another discernible group of views on nationalism which does not differ greatly from the preceding set of views in which a process of "modernization" is seen as desirable. In this case, though, nationalism - and not only "the right kind" - is seen as essentially a rational (i.e. reasoned), active process of seeking membership and recognition in the modern world community. Now observers of this nationalism may recognize another sort, a pre-modern nationalism of traditional societies, but they consider this to be so qualitatively different that it can and should be dismissed from discussions of nationalism in the modern world. This is, according to John Plamenatz, a mere national consciousness, a pride in a distinctive cultural identity which does not entail a desire to preserve or enhance this distinctiveness in order to be seen as a worthy and independent participant in a cosmopolitan culture. This is, in the words of Anthony Smith, the "weak case" of "ethnocentric" nationalism "which characterised the ancient (and medieval) world" and in which "the 'nation' was assumed to be the centre of the world, and alone significant - while round about the 'nations of the world', heathen and barbarian, formed the undifferentiated chorus in the background."[27]

There is much evidence to suggest that this is the case - much of the rhetoric of nationalists speaks to the role their particular nations do, can or should play in the progress or welfare of all mankind. You might even assert that German Naziism and Italian Fascism were linked to nationalisms arising from defeat in war or disappointment in victory, from humiliation or from the fact of being disregarded.[28] The Germans and Italians wanted respect and a prominent role to play on the world stage. We can look to their declarations of war to see that they wished to justify their actions, and themselves, in terms of values common to

the western world at least.[29] Of course, if we say that they were not sincere and that, even if they were, their visions of the world did not recognize the roles of other peoples or the true nature of modern civilization, then we can question their commitment to the progress or welfare of the heterogeneous human race. But we can also question whether Naziism and Fascism were in fact forms of nationalism.

Many of those widely reputed as nationalists have expressed hopes that their nations may make better the lot of mankind. There are those who have believed that their nations have been called upon by God to lead other nations to true belief, and to transform the world into something more pleasing to Him.[30] There have also been those who have considered it the mission of their nation to lead men in establishing liberty or some other political good, such as some of the French Revolutionaries, Mazzini,[31] the German Klopstock,[32] and the Czech Palacky.[33] Others have said that certain peoples (i.e. their own) should take up their duty to bring their high standards of civilization and/or political development to the rest of the world. Among these are the Chinese Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Japanese Watsuyi Tetsuro,[34] the French historian Michelet, poet and novelist Victor Hugo, Clemenceau, the Russians Danilevsky and Dostoyevsky,[35] and undoubtedly many more, including proponents of Empire in Britain, and advocates of a world leadership role for the United States. But others still have simply claimed that each [illegible] simply offer its own contribution, the nations of the world creating a common [illegible] knowledge; Herder is an example.[36]

Obviously the line [illegible] those working for the good of mankind and those seeking to remake the world in the image of one particular nation can become hazy. The distinction between ethnocentric and outward-looking (or participating-in-world) nationalism is not so clear, after all. Note more importantly, however, that many recognized as nationalists have desired to offer to the world, not impose their nations' contributions in which they take pride as *accomplishments* of their own nations. Note, too, that these contributions have been diverse in nature, not simply contributions to a monistic world project.

We might also observe that certain nationalisms have little to do with the seeking of world influence - because they seek answers to apply in a particular context and/or because

they seek only to secure a say in the determination of solutions to world issues which affect them; they may simply seek to protect their own interests. The response to this may be that whatever they say, nationalists are in fact *today* jockeying for position in a universally recognized and self-determining world culture. Nationalism deserving of the name today is, from this one perspective, the nationalism of the modern secular world whose peoples share a belief in progress; the world in which all ideas are subjected "to the tests of reason and observation," a world in which "a new type of education" "replaces precedent and myth and custom by the habit of critical enquiry, technical efficiency and professional expertise."[37]

I shall take Smith, Plamenatz and Gellner to be representative of this approach. They to varying degrees take nationalism to be a rejection of tradition and a liberation of the individual. They see nationalism not as a substitute for religion and custom but rather as an overcoming of them as man moves from myth and superstition and primitive instincts to reason and technology. Nationalism may confer "dignity and solidarity" and resolve "the crises of authority, identity, scarcity and meaning" which occur as a result of dissatisfaction with traditional answers[38] but that is not to say that nationalism is a religion, according to them. Nationalism, as Smith says, addresses new problems:

> ... especially those of development; and further, its answers, if not as all-embracing as those of the older world-images, make up for this lack of comprehensive sweep and profundity by an immediacy and potency which is admirably adapted to the this-worldly orientations and concerns of the present age.[39]

Nationalism, consequently, is seen as a freeing of the individual from the constraints of the old ways. Nationalist rule may be even more dictatorial and oppressive politically than the rule it replaces, yet, Plamenatz affirms, the new order which developing world nationalists:

> ... strive to establish offers new kinds of opportunity and destroys old types of authority. It gives to the individual a wider choice of occupations, and it weakens the hold of the family over him.... He is encouraged to be ambitious, to see himself as the maker of his own career, his own place in society.... He learns that explanations vary, and that some are better than others. The very idea that men can deliberately change their ways of doing and thinking is liberating, even where the initiators of the change are harsh and oppressive. [40]

The question must be asked, why must any society adopt the ethos of the modern world? The answer, supposedly, is simple: "The weaker and poorer, the unwesternised peoples

could not have cut themselves off from outside influences.... These peoples have all been either invaded or intruded upon; they have had to choose between submission and imitation, and they have chosen to imitate," Plamenatz says.[41]

And yet, on this view, nationalism does not mean simply embracing a universal culture; it means retaining or creating a particular national sub-culture. And this sub-culture has much the same form as the traditional culture. Language, ethnicity, customs, perhaps even religion are salient. They are, in fact, more important that they were in pre-modern society, as noted previously (in reference to positions taken by Deutsch and Gellner). And this is even spoken of approvingly (although not by Deutsch and others sharing the views discussed in the previous section). This is because they are seen as essentially meaningless in themselves; unlike in the past they are mere conveniences, vehicles for differentiating populations. They do not have anything unique to say about life in general - for themselves or for mankind.

Gellner says that: "The self-image of nationalism involves the stress of folk, folklore, popular culture, etc. In fact, nationalism becomes important precisely when these things become artificial. Genuine peasants or tribesmen, however proficient at folk-dancing, do not generally make good nationalists."[42] Nationalism is called upon when industrialization or the effects of modernization are felt unevenly and this causes unhappiness because the new ways are desired. "This," Gellner tells us, "is where culture, pigmentation, etc. become important: they provide means of exclusion for the benefit of the privileged, and a means of identification, etc., for the underprivileged." The important thing is not so much who is alike or "the awakening of nations to self-consciousness"; it is, instead, identifying adversaries and the unifying of those who see the same foe hindering their interests or who are jointly excluded by them.[43] Concern for local culture is "more or less spurious."[44]

Nationality on this view is thus something selected on a pragmatic basis. "Men do not in general become nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality, atavistic or not, well-based or myth-founded," Gellner says; "they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recognised."[45] And so individuals can change nationality

without much difficulty.

Many, many people, in fact, learn new languages and adopt new cultures - when moving to new lands of opportunity or when trying to advance in mixed societies without changing locations. But is it accurate to state that *this* illustrates what nationalism is? Is nationalism a concern with using culture for material gain? Is it not, instead, linked with a concern for promoting or preserving a way of life, rather than with the shopping around for one, or latching onto one because it promises greater financial return? On the view being considered here, moral and political values, and ideas used to change or maintain social arrangements to be in accord with them, are largely ignored. The unfolding of the modern, scientific world is taken as a given. Ideas and activities are produced by the actual amount of progress along the continuum of "progress." Ideas may contribute to the direction of some actions but do not alter the general pattern. Ideas reflect more than they determine social circumstances.

E. Hayes' evolved idea of nationalism

Carlton J. Hayes, whose work on nationalism is very influential, primarily due to his formulation of "integral nationalism," does something similar (to what the previous writers do) in a book in which he proposes to treat nationalism "as a body of doctrines, as a political philosophy, and to discuss the successive schools of nationalist thought which have had important popular followings."[46] He ends up discussing various types of nationalism which he categorizes according to the type of behaviour he perceives to be associated with them. He does not simply say that ideas change, reflecting circumstance; he takes nationalism to be the behaviour or something underlying it as much as an ideology or philosophy, if not considerably more so.

Hayes traces what he considers to be the evolution of nationalism from the humanitarian to Jacobin, traditional, liberal and finally to integral form.

The final form produces policies which place national interests and the preservation of the integrity of the nation, of its character, above all else. They seek increasing power and

dominance in the world, and the sacrifice of the individual and his liberties to the higher good of the nation, something greater than the sum of its parts.

The writings of integral nationalism theorists, such as Maurras, Taine, and Barres, were of no small account in causing its rise, according to Hayes. But liberal and traditional nationalisms, and Auguste Comte, who proclaimed force as the basis of political organization, played major roles as well in bringing it about.[47] Yet it was not a matter of various ideas coming together to produce a new idea. For, in Hayes' account, ideas and events combined to bring about something other than an articulated vision. Hayes states explicitly that he does not derive "the teachings of integral nationalism... from the study of a few theorists but, rather, from the observation of hard cold facts in the contemporary world."[48] Considered along with his statement that the philosophers of nationalism (not just of the "integral" form) "did not make its vogue... They merely expressed and gave some emphasis and guidance to it,"[49] it would appear that he is treating nationalism as something of the sort of a moving principle which is made manifest, not in the articulation of ideas as much as in the nature of actions. And these actions exhibit an acceptance of a particular fundamental understanding of national life. It is by and large historically determined.

The merit of Hayes' position is that it points out the interaction of ideas and the concrete world of experience. The most questionable aspect is his treatment of nationalism here as a unity of ideas and practices at any given time, however inconsistent they may be. Perh[illegible] objection could be removed by the dropping of labels when they no longer apply. W[illegible] Hayes h[illegible] to say about "liberal nationalism," for example, could possibly be made acceptable if he were to no longer refer to it as such when it is no longer liberal. But is he talking about something that remains in fact the same thing but takes on a new form, reflecting a spirit or general disposition perhaps? Or is he talking about quite different things? about competing ideas? about ideas and unrelated passions and actions?

F. Denial of an idea

Hayes, like Kedourie, has taken the idea of national self-determination and observed a succession of ideas with which it has been coupled, that is, a number of ideas which have been espoused simultaneously by historical actors. He may have succeeded in identifying their thoughts, and actions, and the religious nature of some of their sentiments (in another work, noted earlier) but what he - like Kedourie - does not do is to show that these additional ideas and behaviours have anything inherently to do with the notion of national self-rule.

The same can be said about the nationalism-as-favourable-response-to-modernization theorists. They may look to some advocates of national independence who indeed wish to be recognized on the world stage but fail to appreciate that neither a desire to be recognized nor a desire to improve material standards of living means that interest in "development" is all that nationalism is concerned with, or even that it is primarily concerned with economic growth. Nationalism, as I shall argue more fully in the next chapter, does entail a concern with political values and autonomy - not as mere means, but as ends.

When a provincial premier delights in the opportunity to act on the federal stage he does not, of necessity, exhibit a desire to make his province more like the most powerful province or provinces. He may well wish simply to impress his own voters and defend their own interests - as the citizens of his province perceive them. Similarly, national leaders seeking recognition for their nations on the world stage may have no desire for integration or lessened independence in the long term.

Attempts to portray the idea of self-rule (let alone the idea of a right to self-rule) as an articulation of a passively felt need due to evolving historical circumstances do not succeed. Linkages between the idea and sentiments, religious or otherwise, fail to establish the dependence of the former on the latter. It is even conceivable (although unlikely) that someone supporting the idea of nationalism would feel no sentiment toward his own or any other nation. And thus critiques of nationalism (as a principle of self-determination) as a proper or improper expression of historically-determined sentiments and psychological needs miss the mark. If nationalism is not derived from such passions, then, we perhaps can no

longer say that it is susceptible to the dangers of the passions uncontrolled, such as aggression and expansionism. But is not advocacy of self-rule tied to such things as patriotism, chauvinism, racism, imperialism, and militarism? Perhaps this idea should not be treated separately, but only as a part of nationalism. Or maybe nationalism should, after all, be considered to be something other than the idea, something such as national sentiment, from which the idea may or may not arise.

I will argue in the next chapter that nationalism is indeed a principle of self-determination (of moral and political values, or otherwise put, of ways of life) which is a rational response to the rational desire of political communities to control their own destinies.

1 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 574-575.

2 Ibid., p. 188.

3 Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 164.

4 Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 345.

5 Ibid., p. 352.

6 Ibid., pp. 354-355.

7 Ibid., p. 194.

8 See Ibid., pp. 281, 301.

9 See Ibid., pp. 369-370.

10 Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 197.

11 Ibid., pp. 96-98.

12 Ibid., p. 99.

13 Ibid., p. 134.

14 Ibid., p. 103.

15 See Ibid., p. 198.

16 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966), p. 179. Italics in original.

17 Ibid., p. 180.

18 Charles Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have to Become States?" in Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (Montreal: Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), pp. 22-24.

19 Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), p. 155.

20 Ibid., p. 157.

21 Deutsch, Politics and Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 80.

22 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1960), p. 183.

23 Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 191.

24 Ibid., pp. 177, 182.

25 Ibid., p. 184.

26 Ibid., pp. 160-161. Deutsch also points to Nazi Germany, where the will was lauded - in

the propaganda film "The Triumph of the Will," and in the selection of der blanke Wille as a topic in Nazi poetry, and of Wille und Macht as "the title of the official organ of the Hitler Youth Movement." Ibid., p. 182.

27 Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 159-160.

28 See Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, edited by Eugene Kamenka (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1973), p. 29.

29 See Leonard Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 213-220.

30 Luis de Leon, for example, proclaimed in the 1500s that the Spanish, whether or not fortuitously, were a predestined people; Cromwell declared in the mid-1600s that the English were "a people that have had a stamp upon their from God"; New England colonists called their land the new Israel, and considered themselves a Chosen People; the Second Inaugural Address of the United States on March 4th, 1805 stated that God had "led our forefathers, as Israel of old, from their native land, and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life." (Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, pp. 153, 176, 269, 309.) Mazzini and Dostoyevsky made similar claims. (See Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, p. 315.)

31 See: Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, pp. 252, 315; Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, p. 155.

32 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 419.

33 Ibid., p. 560.

34 Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, p. 287.

35 Ibid., p. 155.

36 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 441.

37 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 87-88. Although Smith does not agree completely with modernization theories, he does seem to agree in general with the assertion that the modern world forms an identifiable whole which is qualitatively different from the more diverse traditional times and places.

38 Ibid., p. 107.

39 Ibid., p. 108.

40 Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," p. 35.

41 Ibid., p. 34.

42 Gellner, Thought and Change, p. 162.

43 Ibid., p. 168.

44 Ibid., p. 171.

45 Ibid., p. 160.

46 Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, p. vi.

47 Ibid., pp. 171-173.

48 Ibid., p. 166.

49 Ibid., p. 290.

IV. Nationalism in general: A Moral Evaluation

We have seen that nationalism is often thought to be either unreasonable, illogical and/or inappropriate, that is, evidence of psychological maladjustment, on the one hand, or evidence of a rational realization of where one's interests lie in a monolithic modern world on the other. Sometimes the remedy proposed (if one is needed) is more realism, a more pragmatic, compromising approach, one dwelling on real and identifiable concrete interests. Other times it is more scientific reason, the overcoming of indigenous cultures and religions, and the acceptance of the modern way of life. And still other times it is at least strongly implied that nationalism should be defeated by a return to universal religious or humanitarian values.

Some of the positions are clearly influenced by preoccupations: with wars which have been seen to be nationalist, such as the Two World Wars; with the threat of a global nuclear holocaust; or with the proliferation of nation-states and of independence movements seeking the establishment of even more states, even though their economic viability seems questionable. Nationalism is presumed to be, in such cases, something bad, and generally new and to be put behind us. It may or may not be seen as pervasive.

Those writing favourably about nationalism (at least those discussed here) tend to see nationalism as widespread; they pay little attention to the alleged horrors which do or allegedly threaten to accompany it. They seem to think that the world is progressing on the whole; there is little to do except to find our place in it, whether or not that means actively seeking to preserve distinctive nationalities. But none of these writers attaches any true significance to distinctiveness. And so the nationalism they support is one of the two kinds of liberal nationalism which Grant thinks is (or allows to be) still possible.

I argued in my discussion of the positions taken by Minogue, Shafer and Kedourie that they are mistaken in their assertions about the nature of politics. The political association is not merely a forum for the settlement of competing private claims or the centre of power which can be captured by ideologues who fool themselves into thinking that the people's resources can be made to serve some mythical entity which exists above all private interests.

The political association is the means used to arrive at and provide the institutional structure for ensuring the orderly following of a consensus of social values; it provides the framework permitting the pursuit of private interests. It may be that some people wield political power thinking that they are serving the interests which are not those of concrete individuals; it is also certainly true that the interests of private parties are sometimes mediated without their resolution being a direct concern of the community as a whole. And it is undeniable that much of politics has little to do with attempts to persuade citizens of the reasonableness of keeping or adopting standards of justice or the need to act in accordance with them. Yet man is undeniably a rational political animal in the sense which Aristotle outlines (whether or not he is only or primarily that is not at issue here); man does use speech to indicate "what is right and what is wrong," what is good and evil, just and unjust. He does need law and morals if he is to be civilized, if he is to be man, that is.[1] And so it is at the very least possible that discussion of the fundamental rules of a society will include talk of preserving or changing those rules, and debate about to whom positive law incorporating those rules should apply. Now we have seen that at least a part of nationalism is treated as the doctrine that nations have a right to determine their own destinies. Some critics and proponents have attempted to portray the doctrine as incomplete until it is declared that they must determine themselves in accord with something that is pre-determined, such as the national "will" (i.e. character) or even modernity. These attempts have been shown to be unsuccessful, however.

Nationalism is more a pre-occupation with autonomy (which Kedourie does not recognize as having any value) than with whatever we might mean by the will. Nationalism supposes that 1) there is something good about people doing things for themselves, in being autonomous and 2) being autonomous may involve identifying yourself with others who face similar challenges and with whom you work out agreed bases for response to them rather than with groups of dissimilar others whose responses are inappropriate to the context.

If someone should counter that nationalism is concerned with autonomy of the will, that is, with a fixation on the blind pursuit of goals etched in stone, it should be sufficient to point out that the concept of the will need not be opposed to reason but may even recognize

it. Will has to do with a determination to make happen unimpeded by irrelevancies. The quality of the goal (which is not at all necessarily pre-determined) may be questioned, of course, but this is not a problem peculiar to either the notion of will or of autonomy.

Nationalism is concerned, when all is said and done, with the rational calculation of means to ensure self-determination itself and the preservation or creation of a rationally determined self-definition, however consciously articulated it may or may not be.

A. Nationalism and patriotism

If nationalism is an idea, a product of the rational mind, can we limit it to that? Is some emotional attachment, is some sense of loyalty a part of nationalism if not nationalism in its fullest sense? Or do we not even have to be a member of a nation seeking to maintain or increase self-rule in order to be a nationalist? There are those who affirm that not only do we have to be nationally self-conscious but we must feel patriotic as well in order to qualify as a nationalist. Carlton Hayes defines nationalism "as a fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality."[2] Other writers would seem to concur when they use the words nationalism and patriotism interchangeably, taking the two phenomena to be almost if not exactly identical in our day.[3] I would object instantly that patriotism need not include the assertion of a doctrine of autonomy, even when patriots are nationally conscious. But can someone be nationalistic without being patriotic? How dependent is nationalism on patriotism? To answer these questions we must say what patriotism is.

Patriotism is very often defined as love of one's country. This seemingly simple definition is problematic. What is one's country? What does loving one's country mean?

Hans Kohn claims that the meaning of patriotism changed - in the eighteenth century. He says that patriotism had become love of fatherland as "an ideal rather than a geographic concept," an ideal of liberty, enlightenment and good government. Then in France and in the United States the word gained the new implications of national exclusiveness and "thinking in common."[4] Now it seems to me that whether or not patriotism came to have these implications, and whether or not it had become to some persons love of an ideal, he is really

talking about quite a different phenomenon than the one which he agrees preceded it,[3] and one that is quite different from the phenomenon which we know today. It does not make sense, consequently, to remove love of place from the notion of patriotism. If it did, then an individual or a group of persons could be patriotic by adhering to an idea which they could take anywhere. But we do not and cannot call a willingly self-exiled person, who leaves his country for reasons other than fear, a patriot. Now take the person who remains in his land and dislikes his government. He, if he is patriotic, either obeys it anyway because it has developed out of the land from which he also comes and therefore considers it preferable to foreign rule or he opposes it because it is not worthy of the land and the people which it governs. A person who loves his native - or adopted - country, therefore, cannot simply love the soil and be indifferent to its government - but that does not mean that feelings on government are more important. Similarly, patriotism is not primarily about people, for if it were then patriots could surrender land as long as they had somewhere else to go. Is it not patriotism, love of country, that keeps an Ian Smith in Zimbabwe and Palestinians and Israelis committed to particular patches of land?

If patriotism is love of a place (and of the people and institutions which belong with it), how does this natural emotion manifest itself? References are often made to pride which is taken in places, in the accomplishments of fellow citizens, and in institutions; and to loyality to the constitution and a willingness to act to preserve, even unto death, the country and its way of life. If we accept these (or something similar to them) as features of patriotism, as we should, we may suspect that there is little to distinguish it from nationalism.[4] Hayes suggests that training people to love and become loyal to unfamiliar national places and persons, as well as those familiar ones, is all that it takes to convert patriotic feline loyalty to places and canine loyalty to persons into nationalism.[5] If it were not for my insistance that nationalism is an idea in the form of a principle could I agree?

There are reasons better and worse for claiming that even if patriotism were construed as a principle it should still be distinguished from nationalism. The worse ones belong to those who wish to praise patriotism as benign and noble and castigate nationalism - implicitly or

explicitly - as the embodiment of prejudice, paranoia, hatred and aggression.

Kedourie says that patriotism is "affection for one's country, or one's group, loyalty to its institutions, and zeal for its defence..." Those who recommend loyalty to British or American institutions, for the most part, should not be considered nationalists, consequently, but patriots (if not xenophobes.)[7] Crick makes the same argument in relation to the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and other countries.[8] Now if we say being loyal means being obedient to the edicts of those controlling our country's institutions, especially in interaction with other countries, if we say along with Stephen Decatur "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country right or wrong,"[9] then we will not be talking about nationalism but possibly about patriotism (possibly, because I would again wish to argue that true patriotism may involve rejecting the decisions of our rulers). But if we take the concept of loyalty to mean that the people of a nation ought to work to ensure that they determine the nature of their institutions in the future, and so should every people, then we pass into the domain of nationalism.

Interestingly enough, if we do take patriotism to include a kind of blind obedience, requiring us to go along with the state of affairs as they are bequeathed to us, as Minogue seems to do when he says that nationalists, unlike patriots, do not love their country but their visions of what they would like it to be,[10] then it becomes the patriot who is the one exacting conformity from the individual citizen, and who also rails against the intrusion of foreign influences. This would contradict the claim that nationalism "is inspired by opposition or aversion to persons and things which are strange or unintelligible."[11]

I hesitate to accept such a perspective on patriotism, however. If it basically consists of a love of place, and of the people and institutions which seem to belong there, then that love should be large enough to allow for the use of reason to help decide what is beneficial for the country. Indeed, patriotism would seem to include the obligation on the part of all those capable of reasoning to see that common decisions are good for the land and its people. But this hardly separates patriotism from nationalism. A nationalist would rightly maintain that all of the individuals composing a people governing itself are responsible for the existence of

the values which they share and the manner in which they are expressed in action.

Where, then, do the differences lie? A nationalist, valuing distinctiveness of peoples, would also value different lands and traditions which have created that distinctiveness. Although his emphasis would be different, therefore (being placed on human values rather than on places) he would still be a patriot as well, in all likelihood. Someone might wish to interject that I am missing the most obvious difference. Patriots love their country. Nationalists seek autonomy for their nation. A country is not a nation. But however often this is true, it often is not. In fact, it is only true if we define "country" as the area which is ruled by a set of sovereign legal-political institutions. If we think of a country as its people as well, then the distinction fades. Besides, those seeking to establish or preserve the autonomy of a nation desire to make or keep the boundaries of the nation and its fatherland and those of the country or "state" congruous. This may not be reassuring to those who would say that nationalism poses its greatest threats when combined with patriotism.[12] The point here, though, is that the expression of nationalism is almost inevitably linked to love of some fatherland.

It is important to note, nonetheless, that patriotism is essentially an emotion, nationalism an idea, a principle of self-determination. A patriot need not be a nationalist, quite possibly not giving rational reflection to matters which may bear upon the ability of a people to govern itself, and perhaps not valuing independence, or valuing it but not seeing it as something to be claimed as a matter of principle by all peoples.

There is a more fundamental difference as well. Patriotism is to be found in the individual and in his actions in relation to the demands placed upon him by the country or state. It would make no sense to speak of the patriotism of a government measure or of any step taken by an institution. True, there may be "patriotic" organizations but only inasmuch as they encourage patriotism in individuals. An individual may be nationalistic in his actions, on the other hand, seeking to influence the degree of autonomy of his nation through them, but this is relatively inconsequential in comparison to the effect that he would seek through community, that is, political decisions. A government measure is properly designated

nationalist in itself if it is designed to promote self-rule. This separation of nationalism from the individual contributes to its more abstract, rational character.

B. The rational and political nature of nationalism

When we treat nationalism as a religious sentiment, or as an answer to other emotional or psychological needs, we seem to deny its rational content. We treat it as a sentiment or emotion, and therefore as something more intrinsically linked to feelings of loyalty and consciousness of membership than to thought out plans of action pertaining to self-rule. Consciousness of membership may be a prerequisite of any desire to preserve or obtain the autonomy of a particular nation and its distinctive character and of the steps envisioned to do so, but consciousness can be present without any such accompanying desire - or any recognition of a general principle of self-determination.

A person may feel loyal, as well, but not sense any need for the nation to assert autonomy or distinctiveness - or that they are worthwhile in themselves.

The mere cognizance of a national identity, somehow defined, and an almost automatic concomitant sense of loyalty vaguely defined, if at all, may constitute nationalism according to some but this hardly seems a useful approach as this would make virtually everyone in the world a nationalist, at least everyone who has any interest in political affairs. The concept, then, would tell us nothing about the nature of the ideology or philosophy which might be a peculiarly modern and certainly is a non-universal phenomenon. Besides, it would seem much more appropriate to speak of ethnic sentiment when "national sentiment" is referred to. Is not the connotation of the latter that individuals feel an attachment to a group they are born into, whereas we are born into ethnic groups but we choose to enter or decide to remain as members of a nation? Nationalism involves reasoning; it is not just sentiment. In fact, it makes sense to say that it is not sentiment at all.

Should we also say then that Aster's evolutionary, traditional, communitarian nationalism and Deutsch's nationalism which is a product of expanding social communications networks are not examples of nationalism? That would be a fair conclusion.

Is this to say that nationalism is an articulated ideology or can we accept the idea of a general disposition which is from time to time captured in its essence by reasoned out programs of action? Nationalism must include, I would suggest, a judgment of what is conducive to self-rule as well as the awareness of the need to assert it in order to obtain or maintain it, and the estimation of it as valuable as a general principle. Any mere disposition to assert the need or desirability of autonomous rule, a kind of protective reflex or instinct, however much it may occasion the working out of ways to implement a principle, is only potential nationalism (if that) until it is applied. Something else becomes clear here. Nationalism inevitably involves evaluating consequences of actions which may affect autonomy in one way or another but that concern with autonomy is also a concern with control for the sake of control and for the sake of values the control will incorporate: nationalism is inherently political.

Say that I think or am disposed to feel that I and those whom I consider my fellow nationals ought to make our own decisions in matters likely to affect the bonds which link us, define us and are important to us. A non-national buyer makes a bid to buy the utility company which provides us with service. I oppose the takeover. In order for my opposition to be classified as nationalistic I must reason that a utility company takeover by an outsider will be an important impeding factor in our ability to direct our society. If I were simply to say that I think that the profits to be made should remain within the nation I have not made a nationalistic claim. People always vie for the economic advantage of some group to which they feel they belong, whether a class, a regional collectivity, a nation or people. But they do not always assert that *control* should remain in the hands of one (or several or many) of their own. They may be very happy with others making the decisions, or with a process of making decisions in which they play a partial or even subordinate role, as long as they feel that they are maximizing the benefits which they receive.

What if both parties claim to value economic prosperity above all else? Then they may not belong to different nations. But it would be a mistake to think that that is an economic outlook alone or even primarily, for such thinking must involve a conception of the welfare

of the individual and community mentally, culturally and perhaps spiritually in those monetary terms; it cannot deny that it is providing an answer to what well-being is. It would be no assertion of nationalism to insist on equal economic treatment within a political community - or within the context of two separate countries - if that is all that is at stake.

An illustration: Western Canadians seeking equitable treatment from "Eastern" Canada are not behaving nationalistically, even if they want Western control of economic activity - unless they also wish to pursue different basic values as well. This does not mean that they need to be separatists in order to be nationalists, but only that they wish to leave only non-fundamental (social and political) decisions to the federal (or "confederal") level of government and society. If there is a desire to establish the rules of the game for economic activity in the region this may well be a step towards nationhood but it might not be. Setting the rules, though, is a step above control of the implementation of them.

We can say similar things about those seeking economic benefits across "national" boundaries. A mere assessment that ownership of a company on one side of the frontier will benefit more those on the same side is not a judgment that different values ought to be asserted. An evaluation of a prospective foreign owner as someone who brings with him other values, or obligations to institutions embodying different values, is, of course, another matter. Still, this in itself may not be a nationalist perspective, not even when a positive assessment is made of one's own values, and a negative one of the foreign values. The nationalist will maintain that it is desirable that his country have its own values which in practice will mean they will be in some way different. (How different, though, is an open question for now.) Although that is not to say that the nationalist will find it desirable that anyone's values be bad, he will obviously desire that his nation's be good, good at least in being its own, but very possibly good in a more transcendent sense as well.

Nationalism is concerned, then, with the sharing of political values. The fact that someone wishes to participate in the life of the political community should be sufficient to qualify him to help determine what those values are, provided that he agrees to abide by the general consensus even when it does not correspond with his own views on non-fundamental

matters. If there are different factions desiring different sets of ground rules, then it should be apparent that there is no single nation.

Traditional peoples have apparently tended to place more importance on common birth but this may be only superficially correct. It is the fact that those with common ancestries have passed on their social learning that has often been more significant. There has often been little problem with members of what are considered to be different races joining with other ones in political life and in inter-marriage when they have embraced similar outlooks. The fact of race correspondingly diminishes in importance as physical and psychical mobility increases. When mobility increases, and values are shared but membership in the nation is considered closed to "outsiders" then we are not dealing with nationalism but racism.

Native peoples in Canada, for example, may understandably reject intrusions of the white population which holds different views. When they reject participation in "their" affairs by persons educated solely in their native ways but of different birth, then they are practicing racism. Of course, the case of someone having been raised in another community but proclaiming an affinity with native culture is much more problematic.

Membership in a nation (as opposed to a race), therefore, depends upon a sharing of basic values. Those who live in a polity without sharing them cannot be said to be a member of that nation, although they may be a member of another one. Values change, of course, and consequently the nation today is not what it was or will be, nor strictly speaking does the membership remain the same. The key point to remember about nationalism is that it entails an attempt by some of those adhering to common values to ensure that control of formal - and informal - institutions remains in the hands of those with similar basic views.

C. Nationalism and democracy

Nationalism would seem, then, to be neither inherently democratic or undemocratic. There is no requirement that the majority rules or that each voice counts as much as any other one (which amounts to the same thing). The concern is with an idea, the need to protect or enhance a conception of a group of fundamental values, regardless of the

percentage of people holding it, in a given political unit - although by definition everyone belonging to the nation adheres to those values, whether passively or actively. Obviously the more people looking upon nationalist measures favourably the greater their viability, but that is largely irrelevant. There is no prerequisite that those sharing views participate in the selection of rulers or rules, nor is there any stipulation to the contrary- that they do not participate. There is, nonetheless, an implicit understanding that rule should not be merely by fellow nationals nominally called such but by those valuing the nation's basic principles. Nationalism is democratic to that extent within the particular national community, meaning that the people who hold the values defining the nation at a given time are those who will determine which ones they will be in the future through the independent institutions they seek to maintain (whether or not through the process of voting.) This presumes, incidentally, that the nation is an idea, not something natural - for if it were, then what the people thought would not matter. Only "the truth" would count.

But, you might ask, are not the fact of reserving membership in the nation to those sharing certain values, and the steps taken to promote a culture and unity, denials of both individual liberty and democracy? Should we not recognize some merit in the positions taken by Lord Acton, Hayes, and others which reflect concern about the uniformity which nationalists seek to impose on their countries? Should we not concede at least that: "If nationality does something to prevent the reduction of the whole world to a drab sameness, then nationalism does much more within a nationality to overlay local colour with its own dull greyness"?[13]

Let us remember first that the result of a lack of agreement upon basic rules by persons occupying the same territory ensures chaos and not liberty. Second, democracy entails the making of decisions in common which are to apply to everyone (if only to the extent of securing agreement to not interfere with measures affecting others only.) Third, the existence of agreement on some matters in no way necessitates that there must be agreement on a great many or all matters. Fourth, one of the issues on which there may (must?) be agreement is the nature of participation in decision-making: are only those who agree on the basic rules or

on almost all rules to be permitted a say? The parameters of dissent to be tolerated are different in different democracies. We can see, as a result, that the polity for which nationalists desire self-rule may be more or less liberal, democratic or uniform. The requirement for participation may be as minimal as a desire to share in decision-making with a particular group of individuals (although having the desire may reflect some affinity in pre-existing outlooks. Having an interest in utilizing the same material resources, on the other hand, may not suffice.)

D. Nationalism is not narrowly cultural

Nationalism is inherently and fundamentally political, embracing distinctiveness at the level of basic political principles and insisting upon autonomous decision-making power at that same level. Nationalism involves preserving (and perhaps preserving by changing in some ways) distinct ways of life. It is clearly not about culture for culture's sake if we employ the word culture in a narrow sense. Nationalism is not concerned with folkdances, legends, indigenous literature and cooking and so on if all that these things are is something definable within themselves. Music or cooking is of no interest to the nationalist if they only have things to say about music or cooking. For if it were, then autonomous rule would only be sought, if at all, as a means to protect something that could also be protected through other means, given appropriate circumstances. In fact, the choice of political autonomy would indicate that there is something more important at stake. It would also indicate a rejection of the rules of the game which were not its own. Is nationalism all about culture, then, on a broader plane? Could not someone say that a given culture could exist and its members even seek independence without that culture embodying distinct ideals? My first inclination would be to respond that the entity in question does not constitute a nation. If you reject this assertion then you cannot affirm that political autonomy is a good in itself. For autonomy cannot be valued as such unless it is inseparable from the idea of establishing one's own fundamental principles. Autonomy separated from that idea is not autonomy but dependence on some other entity which does establish the political values of a community.

Nationalism, therefore, is concerned with self-rule and certain primary values. Self-rule is fundamentally a political concept, something to be attained and exercised through formal decision-making and implementing bodies, and informally as well. The informal means may or may not be authoritative, they may or may not seem more political than "cultural" or vice versa. Perhaps it would be best to consider them part of the "political culture." It is clear, though, that cultural features which have little or nothing to do with judgments of right and wrong, good and bad, the nature of justice and just rule and so on are only peripherally related to nationalism if at all. Consequently requests for cultural measures without demands for control of the decision-making process cannot be considered to be part of nationalism. Moreover, demands for control merely to ensure that measures are taken hardly seem likely to be made unless there is a desire to protect or promote something distinctive. If that something distinctive does not represent a different way of life, if autonomy is only sought as a means to ensure measures are taken to further this rather empty culture, then the efforts are likely to be in vain anyway since those who do control political factors related to fundamental values are more likely to successfully propagate their "culture" in the narrow sense. Nationalism, in any event, to be seen as a principle, which it is, and not just as ad hocery, needs to say what is good in one instance is good in other similar instances - it cannot merely be a means. But should we say, then, that someone advocating a non-distinct culture (non-distinct in terms of fundamental values) is mistaken about some things but still a nationalist? If this person sees culture as *just* a way to distinguish groups of individuals who are behind or ahead in the same game, then his concern is with economic advancement and not with the overall welfare of the nation, as pointed out a short time ago. If this person is interested in preserving or enhancing the "non-distinct" culture for its own sake, as a matter of principle, as difficult as this may be to imagine, if this person were to consider autonomy important concerning cultural matters embodying second-order principles, and could not see the effect of primary values on "culture" and secondary values, and if this culture is not merely ascriptive (for if it were we would be talking about racism instead) then he and I would disagree on what constitutes a nation and on what is necessary to sustain one. I could

call him a promoter of ethnicity, perhaps, but not a nationalist.

A certain degree of confusion may exist because some writers use two different concepts of nationhood simultaneously. Charles Taylor, for example, writes about the question of whether nations ought to become states. Implicit in the question is the notion that nations are linguistic-cultural or shall we say "ethnic" entities. In the same article that he asks this question, however, he discusses the seventeenth-century appearance of rights-talk and this in relation to the political expression of linguistically-defined nations, that is, note well, nations defined by language "in the broadest sense."[14] As soon as we talk of broadly-defined linguistic groups, I would suggest, we are talking about communities with their own political values, whether or not they have formal independence. Nations have always been political entities, in other words, and not just "cultural" groups (and because this is so, the answer to his question becomes very simple.)

Those such as John Plamenatz who say that nationalism is "primarily a cultural phenomenon"[15] are only correct if they mean that portion of culture involved concerns political values, one of which is self-rule. To assert that nationalism has always been cultural but only occasionally political is essentially incorrect. This misapprehension is probably based on the assumption that groups have sought, or thinkers have advocated, something less than complete political autonomy, whereas in fact nationalists see autonomy in certain areas as absolutely necessary even if they see autonomy in others as inconsequential. Political autonomy is the focus.[16]

E. Why distinct cultures?

Does the possibility exist that nationalism may be political without being cultural? I have been explaining that nationalism, in my view, represents a concern with certain values which are cultural in a sense. Aside from these, nationalism is disinterested in cultural matters - at least as a matter of principle. But this is not to dismiss traits which are not inherently political. As I mentioned earlier, "culture" does play a significant role for many nationalisms which would seem to be nationalisms of ideas alone. For ideas, for most people at least, do

not exist apart from the world but in it, in concrete situations and entities. Language, religion, customs, art, literature, music and so on may not only embody ideas but make them (seem) real. These may be shaped to some degree by climate, location, geographical features and so on; they are also shaped by men's chosen responses to the natural environment. Of course, a very large portion of culture is a product of the social environment, which is an additional reason why there will continue to be a diversity of cultures. (The social as well as natural environment is varied, in addition, producing a variety of ideas on the desirability of preserving distinct cultures.)

While it may be true that, as Deutsch says, "The lower the level of equipment and technology, the greater is the power of the different soils and countries over their populations,"[17] yet it may be inconceivable, at least to the nationalist, after reflection upon the matter, that a uniform level of technology in the world would remove all differences. People are partially shaped by their pasts, and even when these become more uniform, they will still make many (most?) decisions in smaller than global groups, and consequently perpetuate distinctiveness. This may be due to several causes: the insignificance of certain decisions for distant persons, such as a decision to build a particular bridge in New Brunswick which will clearly affect nearby residents more than distant ones, whatever the environmental stakes; the sheer impossibility of being informed about every issue everywhere; and certainly the human proclivity to find security and happiness in associating with persons that you can feel you know in a somewhat intimate manner.

The human being, moreover, cherishes not only the familiar but also the distinctive. Whereas man is something of a conformist he also wants to be different. This may be because he wants to be noticed. He has pride. But whether or not he *wants* very much to be different, he certainly notices if not that he is different, then certainly that others are.

F. Aggression: a violation of the nationalist principle

The allegation is often repeated: claims to and of distinctiveness and superiority are closely related. This seems essentially correct, but incomplete. True, it is unlikely that you will have a distinctive way of life which you take to be worth having without thinking that alternatives are inferior - or else you would choose one of them. Yet to feel or think that yours is superior does not automatically entail the judgment that others are inferior *for their context*, or that you should impose your way on them even if they are.

It is appropriate here to take up a number of criticisms based on assumptions that claims to "cultural" distinctiveness lead to conflict, assumptions which are really without foundation. (This in turn will lead us to take up ancillary points which are really rather major ones in their own right - how objective nationalists are, and how objective or rational nationalism is.)

Comments linking nationalism and "aggression and domination" are not uncommon.[18] The point is also made at times, though, that nationalists are inconsistent, preaching the value of autonomy for themselves while denying it to others in practice.[19] This charge, however, should not be construed to show that nationalism includes both the principle of self-rule and a motivation for aggression but rather that the practice of some individuals is a denial of the principle of nationalism which they espoused. The very nature of this contradiction lies not within the one principle but in the incompatability of some actions with it. Consequently assailing aggression is not condemning nationalism here, but perhaps even praising it as the standard for judgment. Aggression belongs more properly to the phenomenon of imperialism, something understandable as a distinct idea which is incompatible with nationalism. "Nationalist imperialism," as it will become more clear, would be a contradiction in terms.

A key component of nationalism is the notion of autonomy in the areas of establishing and employing fundamental principles. In order to adopt this idea as a principle you must take a global perspective, you must reason out that self-determination is a good thing in general. There are undoubtedly people who do analyze human affairs in a detached manner and conclude that self-determination is not a good thing. The point here is not that

nationalists will be the only ones taking a detached view but that they will be among them. They could not argue for autonomy as a principle if they did not. And if they do not argue for it as a principle they are simply not nationalists, that is, advocates of the right of nations to self-rule. For to claim a right as a nation (and not a particular nation!) is to recognize it as a right of any nation.[20] Consequently, if they do argue for it as a principle, they cannot favour domination. Now what if a country should claim the right to incorporate areas outside of it peopled by persons of the same nationality? If the attempt is made from outside these areas, and especially if against their peoples' will, then clearly this cannot be included under the notion of self-determination. Individuals must determine to which people they belong. Since nationalism is a principle, then, an idea which requires a rational and to some degree detached look at human affairs, it cannot be maintained as a good for some arbitrarily selected individuals, but not for others.

I do not mean to overlook the problem of what we might call "passive aggression." This problem, discussed by David Copp, is one of peoples claiming their right to rule themselves, and incorporating within this right a claim to the various resources that they feel are necessary to self-government, leaving, at the same time, one-time partners in government to rule themselves without adequate resources.[21] This problem may not be a great one, however, if the separate parties agree to continue some economic association. What if they do not? Then perhaps the economically more powerful party should be judged on the basis of rejecting association, rather than for exercising its right to self-rule. If it is the weaker party that has opted for separation then it may have itself to blame, or it still may be able to blame the other party, but obviously not for pursuing its own independence.

G. Other isms

If neither nationalism nor patriotism necessarily seeks unthinking devotion to a country or nation, and neither is inherently xenophobic or aggressive, then how do we account for all the animosities and wars between peoples? Although Louis Snyder unjustifiably implies that nationalism and power, aggression, and the imposition of one's way of life on other

peoples are inextricably linked, he does point towards an answer. Affirming that patriotism "is by nature defensive, both culturally and militarily," he concedes that "the character of patriotism" is so ambivalent "that it can easily be used to justify aggression."[22] Extreme patriotism becomes chauvinism or jingoism. These are:

> ... respectively, French and British terms denoting the belief, policy, or practice of a vainglorious, exaggered patriotism, which boasts of the country's preparedness to fight and supports a bellicose policy in foreign affairs.... Designed to appeal to the emotions, most chauvinistic and jingoistic boasts and threats are used as propagandistic devices to organize heightened group tensions so that they can be used instantly for attack or defense.[23]

Jingoism or chauvinism - extreme patriotism, that is - is a love felt so strongly that its proponents lose any sense of objective perspective. This may simply take the form of smugness and unjustified pride, due to insecurity, or some other reason, or it may be expressed in undeserved claims to a right or duty to interfere in the affairs of other countries. If the motivation for interference should be self-interest rather than a sense of superiority, then we should contemplate use of the label "imperialism," although admittedly the line between them may not always be easily discerned. Similarly, colonialism and imperialism may not always be readily distinguished. There is, nonetheless, logic in employing two different terms. Colonialism involves the colonizing of foreign lands, the sending out of one's own citizens for the purposes of peopling and ruling colonies, probably but not necessarily for the benefit of the metropole. Imperialism is simply domination of either the political, social or economic life by and for the benefit of foreign parties. It may be useful, as well, to consider militarism to constitute yet another phenomenon, namely, the exaltation of the military way of life and the advocacy of a strong role for armies in the conduct of decision-making and implementation and in the resolution of issues which would normally be considered to have a civilian character. (This helps to contrast nationalism - which as a doctrine, a principle, is more likely to be advocated in conjunction with "political solutions" to international problems - with military solutions based on an understanding of politics as the domain of contending, often violently contending interests.)

We should come to the conclusion that we do not accidentally have such a collection of ism-concepts. They are not superfluous. They describe separable phenomena which are not

inevitable outgrowths of one another. Granted, although strictly speaking nationalism need not be wedded to patriotism, it is seldom found without it. Still, patriotism does not cause nationalism. Nationalism does not cause imperialism or militarism. Nationalism and imperialism are incompatible, in fact. Likewise, racism and nationalism are actually contrary concepts. Even "racialism," if we define that as a live and let live, non-discriminatory sort of racism, is something quite apart from nationalism. For nationalism is about ideas and values which people actually have, not about any which may be ascribed to them because of birth, as I have argued here.

H. Illustrations of the various isms

It may be helpful to briefly discuss a few examples to illustrate these distinctions that I am making.

1. An army invades another country in order to reunite a people divided by an arguably artificial boundary. If the people in the invaded country do not wish to be "re-united" then we may well have a case of imperialism, and certainly one of militarism. If the justification is based on nationality according to birth, then this is racism. If the persons to be "liberated" do wish to be united or "re-united," then *their* actions taken to ensure this would be nationalistic, but those of the invading army could not be, since they would be designed to do something for other persons. Nationalism is inseparable from the notion of people acting for themselves.

2. A person flees or leaves in an unharried manner his country in order to escape from persecution, military duty, or taxes, or simply in order to pursue a higher standard of living elsewhere. Or he buys a cheaper foreign product when a domestic alternative is available. It would be strange to label this person "un-nationalistic" or disloyal to his nation, because membership in a nation is ultimately a matter of choice. This person may well be considered unpatriotic, the more so the less sacrifice his remaining (or purchasing of the local product) would entail, and the more he was obligated to his country for his accumulated assets - material and non-material - due to education, other social services, or high wage standards,

for example.

3. A person drafted into the army to fight a foreign war, not threatening the independence of his country, serves regardless of his own evaluation of the justness of that war. The draftee is obviously either mistakenly patriotic (not employing his reason to decide what the good of his country objectively would dictate he should do) or he is chauvinistic, placing the prestige of victory for his country (or avoidance of loss of face) above consideration of the factors relevant to the morality of the conflict.

4. Someone attributes certain features to all members of his or another nationality, and asserts that those individuals who claim the name but do not possess those features are not true members of it. If the assertion is that all real nationals are born with those features, then this is a form of racism. If the features are unrelated to political values (or to the worth of a person), then this may simply constitute nationality-prejudice or stereotyping, but not nationalism. If the features are related to such values, then we have potentially a more accurate assessment of whether someone actually belongs to a nation or nationality - but this is still not nationalism. Merely classifying individuals as members or not-members can be done without any appeal for autonomy. Besides, nationalism entails self-rule, and presumably, therefore, chosen and not ascribed membership in a nation.

5. Someone wishes to restrict immigration of members of a specific nationality to his country. This is likely an example of racism, as this person may well insist that members of this nationality cannot adapt to "our way of life" - the implication being that they are genetically incapable of adapting. If this person should argue, however, that an influx of these immigrants should be managed so that only so many should be allowed in at a time so that they adapt to more than they alter the type of society here, then he may be properly identified as expressing nationalist concerns (although control, and not alteration is the main issue, and so additional complications to this simplified argument ought to be considered).

6. A person opposes the hiring of a police chief from another country, he opposes a foreign takeover of a company, or he opposes foreigners playing on his sports teams. If the concern, again, is with "national" or "cultural" baggage, then this may well be (conditionally) a

nationalist one. The concern would seem to be more valid the greater the number of foreign nationals concerned, and the less valid (as a nationalist one) the greater the number of individuals in question take up permanent residency and occupy themselves with the good of their new communities, and not their old ones. (Non-resident owners, of course, show little commitment to a community, comparatively speaking - by being non-resident, and in other ways as well.) Rejection of "foreigners" simply because they are foreigners may be xenophobia, racism or chauvinism.

7. A person takes pride in the accomplishments of someone born in his country but raised and/or educated elsewhere, or in those of someone born to parents (or one parent) of the same nationality but never a citizen of the same country. This would be an example, in the former case, of a sort of pseudo-racism, attaching importance to birth rather than to interaction with the community or shared ideas, or perhaps an example of jingoism, seeing a positive reflection on the conditions provided by a country when in fact there is no reflection of any kind. The latter case would be an example of a kind of racism once again, if this person were merely attributing membership without evidence of a sharing of fundamental ideas, or it could be an example of national consciousness, but not nationalism, if he could supply such evidence.

8. A person buys a Canadian record and cheers for the members of a national sports team in international competition because they are Canadian. If this person's intention is to help encourage Canadians to do things for themselves, to develop opportunities for people supported by and committed to improving a distinct society, then he is behaving nationalistically. If it is a matter of pride in one's own, then he is behaving patriotically, and if his emotions cause him to lose his ability to objectively assess the abilities of persons and the fairness of referees or commentators or award-givers then he acts chauvinistically.

9. A government establishes policies requiring broadcast outlets or film distributors to meet quotas for domestic content or the government sets limits on the amount of investment or on the numbers of foreigners on boards of directors in an industry. If the objectives are to obtain or maintain domestic control, and not to exclude anything simply because it is foreign, then

surely we are identifying something which very much approximates nationalism in its truest or purest form. This is provided, of course, that control is not merely to ensure equal participation in a non-distinct society (which it almost by definition cannot be), but to promote a distinct way of life.

I. The need for clearly-specified definitions

When we judge nationalism we should judge it for what it is, namely an idea in the form of a principle that peoples with common basic political values, whether expressed through formal political activity or through economic or "cultural" activity, ought to, and ought to be able to rule themselves, and to not exclude but *control* rather than have imposed on them change occasioned by the influence of other peoples. Now I am sure than I have not convinced every reader that I have accurately described this doctrine of the self-determination of nations. What I would ask of any dissenter is that he concede that when he includes such ideas and behaviours as those which could be called totalitarian, racist, jingoistic, imperialistic or militaristic in his definition of nationalism he should not label as nationalistic any appeals for autonomy which do not entail such ideas or behaviours. Clearly calls for measures to obtain or retain self-rule and the measures themselves need not logically, or in practice, lead to such evils. Of course, I would consider it preferable that he would see that that is all that nationalism consists of; it is simply a theory of self-rule and quite complete without any such falsely attributed "essential" components.

If someone would still wish to maintain, on the other hand, that national consciousness and nationalism are the same things, either because they are identical, or because national consciousness inevitably leads to a jealous guarding of or a demand for political autonomy, then I would reiterate that nationalism would be a very inconsequential concept, failing to distinguish between two very different phenomena - a widespread type of identification and a non-universally espoused doctrine of self-rule. And I would dispute the claim of causality. Since the term "nationalism" is used in a variety of ways, as much as I feel it should not be, however, the need for any author or speaker on the subject to make clear

the intent of his usage of it should be quite apparent.

J. Nationalism as a cause of war

You would be mistaken if you now think that I have passed judgment on nationalism and found it to be praiseworthy on the basis of what I have argued here so far. I have only committed myself to the position that nationalism is understandable if outside control inappropriate to national circumstances is thought to exist, and to the claim that nationalism is not guilty of the many crimes of which it has been accused. It is not, I have maintained, akin to racism, chauvinism or imperialism. But have I thereby dismissed perhaps the more serious and most frequent charge issued in denunciations of nationalism, namely that it causes war? Even defenders of nationalism often concede that "extreme" nationalism or "the wrong kind" of it causes war. And since both defenders and critics readily admit, as they must, that wars were fought long before the introduction of nationalism, the accusation is all the more striking. Surely it merits special attention, then.[24]

I have already argued that nationalism and aggression or domination are incompatible. The point needs to be made again in this context. There was no naivety on the part of Herder, Mazzini and other early nationalists when they saw nationalism as an idea which could prevent wars.[25] For surely if you say that each people has a right to self-determination then you eliminate a major justification for war, the claim that another people should be ruled or the claim that other considerations should over-ride any desire for autonomy. Unfortunately there are many reasons given for fighting wars, and other reasons not given, all providing incentives to battle all the same - but none of which can be consistently equated with a forcing of a people to be free, whatever the aggressors may say.

It cannot be denied that some measures to obtain freedom will be more severe than others, so that when the resistance to demands for autonomy is greater, the measures taken may become more violent. And consequently nationalism may, in this sense, cause war, although it may be more accurate to state that oppression is more responsible and the response to it less so. (It may be a different matter, however, if the majority of the

population in whose name violence is used does not support either the means or the goals of the persons employing violence.) If a policeman shoots a man because he is black, or if an employer refuses to hire a francophone in a predominantly francophone city because he does not speak English, then the groups to which they belong can hardly be said to be instigating unrest by responding collectively. There is, at any rate, a much larger justification for the employment of violent means when peaceable ones are denied to the oppressed groups.

Nationalism can be said to cause violence and war if its proponents choose to exercise more force than the situation calls for, but before concluding that they are we should examine the possiblity that racism or chauvinisim, or violently inclined individuals looking for a cause (meaning excüse), are responsible instead.

The nationalism-causes-war-thesis sometimes take a specific form which should also be addressed since a response to it may only have been implicit thus far. This formulation posits that with the mass means of communication and transportation, and with the greater interaction between the individual and the state in modern times, national (or perhaps nation-state) consciousness has become more universal and sharply felt. Consequently national hatreds have arisen for the first times and/or intensified. It is possible for the masses to be led to participate in war, and because the masses participate they become even more nationally conscious and confrontational. Struggles become battles "not against certain actions or policies of the enemy, but against the people itself."[26] War has become total, or mass warfare. But, as before, to say that a people is nationally conscious, hates another people, and calls for or supports nationalist measures, is to say three separate things. National consciousness is not nationalism: hatred of a people obviously requires consciousness but is not consciousness; it is due to or arises from consciousness and something else, such as racism or jingoism, or even possibly nationalism if the hatred is directed against oppressors. Nationalism is, I repeat, a doctrine of self-determination; it is not concerned with exaggerated claims of superiority or with international reputations and saving face and so on - those are elements of jingoism or chauvinism.

We should keep two things in mind. First, there are many alternative explanations of war which would remain plausible even if nationalism were to disappear forever. Nationalism may well have a subordinate or non-existent role alongside imperialism, jingoism, economic competition, and religious and ideological disputes between adversaries. Second, the possibility exists that when nationalism is a significant contributing factor in the outbreak of war, it may not be the case that nationalism has not been properly contained. War might be justified.

K. Is nationalism morally good or bad in itself?

My preceding remarks make it clear that I consider the claim that nationalism causes war to be a rarely yet occasionally valid assertion which a reflective nationalist should concede only conditionally with great reservation. I am still not prepared to endorse nationalism unreservedly on the basis of what I have said so far, however. Allow me to make a concession which I have been holding back in order to refrain from diminishing the force of earlier arguments, and which was actually irrelevant in any case. Nationalism is concerned with the autonomy of nations and their fundamental principles; it does not declare what those principles should be. And therefore nations - and particular nationalists - may deny the existence of higher principles, they may affirm a particular relationship of the individual to the state including a subordinate one, and they may assert any number of other things which we may or may not find repugnant.

This raises the possibility that the two-fold typology of nationalism may accurately capture the phenomenon. But I hesitate to agree that it does. For I have insisted that nations are, first of all, political units, i.e., communities united by shared values. It does not matter much whether they acquire formal institutions before or after they become political societies. If the assertion is that nations seeking statehood are generally described by racial criteria, it does not become axiomatic that all such nations are, nor is it inconceivable that states can become racist after existing for a time. Nor is it necessarily true that a racist nation will be a dictatorship or a non-racist one a democracy. There is nothing about the pursuit of statehood or the fact of having it that dictates such things. Racist views may lead to the pursuit of

statehood in some particular instances but that can hardly lead to any sweeping indictments. Existing states, conversely, may undertake racist programs, but then it would seem much more appropriate to speak of racism pure and simple, and not of nationalism at all! I reiterate: a principle of national self-determination logically must recognize the right of everyone to say to which nation they belong: to fail to recognize this right is to deny some nations the right to self-determination. Or so it would seem to me. But the people of a nation might agree that the character of their nation is given by nature, and so the typology is not without some merit.

It appears that given the various contents that can be given to the principles of nations with which nationalism is concerned, we may sometimes wish to say that nationalism is a good thing and other times not. Just like a car or intelligence, it depends on what it is used for. But this reasoning may be faulty. That is if we hold that a principle which fails to distinguish between the types of uses to which it can be put cannot ever be a good thing in itself, especially considering the possible logical dispensibility of nationalism (a person may oppose the domination or gradual assimilation of one people by another in a particular instance without being a nationalist.) The problem may be, in other words, that a nationalist will affirm that self-determination is a good thing as a general rule. He would be supportive of the attitude reflected in Philipine senator Manuel Quezon's 1926 declaration that: "We would prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by Americans."[27] If a people governs itself badly, or makes any kind of wrong decision which affects no-one else, then that is its mistake to make, he would say. This does not mean that for a nationalist other peoples cannot pressure a government to act more morally correctly. It does mean that outsiders should not control the political process in another nation. But it should be remembered that nationalism is a principle and few principles are ever espoused with the idea in mind that no possibility of exceptions should ever be admitted. We think, generally, that it is good for a child (or adult) to cross the street or to go swimming without someone else holding on to him. We change our opinion rapidly, however, if it becomes obvious that he cannot do so safely. But we should recognize that it may be much more presumptuous on our

part to say that a whole, rather large collection of persons cannot govern itself than it is to say that one individual cannot.

The question of whether or not nationalism is morally good or justifiable ultimately may rest not alone on the question of whether self-government is good but also on the question of the desirability of the plethora of nations. But the nationalist need not be committed to the perpetuation of a multitude of peoples. He may very well favour larger and fewer nation-states, provided that the peoples within them on their own volition merge with or integrate themselves into larger units. The opposite of nationalism may not be universalism, after all, but imperialism instead - or imperialism in the guise of universalism. It is really quite inconceivable that a nationalist would or should desire a diminution of the number of states to a very small number, however, valuing as he does distinctiveness. And often fearing universal tyranny. To decide the morality of nationalism may require a judgment of the validity of this fear, in addition to an assessment of the worth of national self-determination - although the fear and the idea may well converge.

Different ideologies point to different answers to questions concerning self-rule and universalism. This, in fact, returns us to that highly intriguing question which Grant poses: is traditional conservatism the only ideology (or comprehensive political philosophy) which is compatible with meaningful nationalism? That is, is it the only one compatible with a nationalism in which political and moral values which are not universal in form are neither unimportant nor considered to be matters of subjective preference? A careful examination of conservatism, and of liberalism, should show if his assessments are correct, and if the particular form of nationalism which might align with either is morally supportable or condemnable on other grounds as well - including those advanced by other writers on nationalism.

1 Aristotle, The Politics (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 28-29.

2 Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 2.

3 Cf. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 8 (dictionary definition no. 4); Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 128; Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1972), p. 136.

4 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, pp. 456-457.

5 Ibid., p. 206.

6 Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, pp. 9-10.

7 Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966), pp. 73-74.

8 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1964), pp. 76, 85, 86.

9 Cited by Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, p. 147.

10 Minogue, Nationalism (London: B.T. Batsford, 1967), pp. 24, 66.

11 H.M. Chadwick, cited by Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 288 (footnote).

12 See, for example, Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 254.

13 Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 258; Lord Acton, "Nationality and Liberty," in Modern Political Thought, edited by William Ebenstein (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960), p. 747; Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 83; Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 52 (response to Hayes' remarks above), 86, 276-277.

14 Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have to Become States?" in Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (Montreal: Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), p. 24.

15 Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, edited by E. Kamenka (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 25.

16 A.D. Smith makes a point similar to mine about the essentially political character of nationalism - or at least about the inseparability of political implications from claims for cultural autonomy. See Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 172.

17 Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication , p. 175.

18 See, for example, Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, pp. 4, 148.

19 Cf. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 144.

20 I had appended to this sentence the phrase "barring disqualifying circumstances." Professor D. Owram raised the objection that this is precisely the stipulation which some nations employ to deny self-determination to other nations. I should not have included the phrase because it is not truly part of the nationalist outlook. It may be part of the outlook of those who wish to deny the validity of the generality of the nationalist principle.

21 Cf. David Copp, "Do Nations Have the Right of Self-determination," in Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, p. 79.

22 See Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, pp. 148, 151.

23 Ibid., p. 149.

24 See: Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 170, where he refers to mass war; Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, pp. 179, 182.

25 See, for example, Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, pp. 70-71, 77; and Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, pp. 32, 159; Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, p. 179.

26 Crick, In Defence of Politics, p. 87.

27 Cited by Shafer, Faces of Nationalism, p. 281.

V. Liberalism

Does a liberal consider anything to be of absolute or great importance in political life which is not merely a matter of consent? Is the fixed content of liberalism, if any exists, compatible with the fixed content of nationalism? Is liberalism compatible, in other words, with Grant's "meaningful" nationalism? Or is it compatible with nationalism in any other way, which may or may not be morally desirable?

The answers to these questions depend on the kind of liberalism to which we choose to refer. Careful consideration of the premises upon which a liberal theory is built and of the ends it is designed to serve will demonstrate that there is no single liberal ideology; various creeds which have some valid claim to the label of liberalism cannot be reduced to a single set of common defining characteristics. Liberalism as "ideology," a doctrine of class interest and capitalism, is ambivalent toward nationalism, using or discarding it (or a pseudo-nationalism) to further class ends. Libertarian and pluralist liberalism are generally incompatible with nationalism but may also be opposed to counter-nationalistic policies, eschewing as they do any furthering of the public good (not narrowly defined) by political means. Hedonist-utilitarian liberalism is provisionally compatible. It depends on what in a particular situation advances the greatest happiness. Social progress-oriented liberalism may but need not be favourable to nationalism - as a means - possibly seeing international competition as a route to progress. Finally, inherent rights, or personal-development liberalism is most closely related to nationalism in principle, although there is some ambivalence here too. Generally, however, because this liberalism promotes political participation as an end, it requires a democratic framework for which national self-rule may be a prerequisite. This last form of liberalism is most deserving of the name, in any event, although this does not remove the logic of employing the term for other somehow liberal views.

A. Grant and liberalism

We have already looked at one probing analysis of the nature of liberalism, that provided by George Grant. Briefly summarized, he maintains that modern liberalism, which is liberalism unfolded, is the ideology maintaining that man's essence is his freedom. Freedom is the use of instrumental reason guided only by autonomous will, the will's autonomy consisting in its independence from all but self-imposed standards. These standards appear to be no standards at all; they are, in fact, merely the free expression of the selfish passions. Man is consequently unconcerned about anything but himself and his own pleasure. All other persons to an individual are just stuff to use for his own convenience, as is non-human nature. (Apparently the individual does not realize that his disrespect for human nature is disrespect for something in which he shares.) Grant treats liberalism, then, as an ideology maintaining that man's essence is his freedom from and over nature. Individuals' humanity and even their lives are sacrificed in pursuit of this freedom. Consequently liberty is collective, not individual; it belongs to man the species, the conqueror of "what is."

There are three problems (at least) with Grant's definition of liberalism. He discusses liberalism at times as if it were identical to secularism. Liberalism need not be secular. Also, other very distinct ideologies could be secular. Secondly, Grant's rejection of "liberalism" may itself be an example of a type of liberalism, at least in its individualistic orientation. He says that one ought to love "one's own" and others as a means to know the good. Yet at times Grant would apparently have us love others and act charitably towards them without benefit accruing back to ourselves - because of the inherent worth of other human beings.

Thirdly, and most importantly, Grant seems by and large to deal with liberalism as a force, or as a description of the ethos of the age, that is, as an unalterable fact. All his talk about liberal theory seems to be talk about a rationalization, a justification, or an articulation of what is happening independently of the influence of ideas, which is essentially almost everything. It would be pointless to morally assess such a phenomenon, as there would be no-one to hold responsible for its occurance. We might perceive that Grant does not morally evaluate liberalism, except to say that it is bad for man now and what good will come out of

it is something that we cannot foresee. Yet as long as Grant sees another standard against which to measure liberalism, it cannot be doubted that according to his own arguments moral assessment is possible, and further, that the possibility of thinking outside of the dominant mode of thought of our time allows for the possibility of acting counter to it as well. We can consequently be held accountable not only for disapproving or approving of liberalism, but for acting or not acting in accord with it. The inevitability of liberalism, and hence the validity of its use as a descriptive term of an autonomous, not consciously-guided historical movement can, therefore, be brought into question.

B. Defining liberalism

I think that there would be little argument that liberalism is a political ideology. It consists of generalizations about the natures and objectives of man and politics; it is a comprehensive theory explaining and prescribing political behaviour; it is a worldview. There is assuredly disagreement about the nature of those generalizations, however. Are they disguised expressions of self-interest? Are they well-intentioned yet narrowly-based claims? Or do they say something valid about political life in general, even if they do not capture the whole truth?

There are undoubtedly numerous ways in which to evaluate an ideology. One may be to consider the ends advocated, such as material progress, and then to reject or provisionally accept the philosophy according to our prior estimation of the value of the goals. Another may be to look first at the premises employed, consider their validity, and then possibly change our minds about which goals we ought to pursue. In either case, consistency between premises and ends, as well as with means, would be important. It may be, however, that a certain set of premises will be compatible with a variety of ends or that a single goal can be supported by a number of different premise collections, and then inconsistency in one part of the equation will not necessarily invalidate the major emphases of the outlook. I would suggest, then, that we examine all of the major components (premises, means and ends) of an ideology but focus on the special importance it or its adherents give to any of these. Which

is or are stated with the most emphasis and are least likely to be changed when logic or experience necessitates alteration? More specifically, in the context of liberalism, what status does liberty have? Is it seen to be important because of the nature of man, because of its utility as a means, and/or as an objective in itself in some sense?

I would suggest that an ideology is most appropriately considered to be a liberal one if liberty is postulated as one or more of the following: an inherent component of human nature, an indispensible means or an ultimate objective.

Could we alternatively, however, consider the role of liberality as a defining characteristic? Leo Strauss suggests that the term "liberal" should be used as it originally was - in reference to the practice of the virtue of liberality, which is generosity in giving and generally indifference to material goods and money. What we know as liberalism today, though, is a doctrine opposed to conservatism. Conservatism is actually quite compatible with a concern with liberality and liberal education, which looks to provide all the virtues. Consequently, we should designate the opposite of conservatism by using another name, one which reflects its "opposite posture toward change"; we should call it progressivism, Strauss suggests.[1]

But is what we know as liberalism signficant mainly as a stance toward change and permanence? Is it concerned mainly with denying that anything is given and worth knowing and preserving for its intrinsic value? Is it an affirmation that man's essence is his absolute freedom? We should first examine its main tenets more closely before deciding that this is the kind of liberty with which it is exclusively or preponderantly associated. (We will also need to ask whether conservatism should be seen primarily as a narrow perspective on change.)

I conclude that liberty does enjoy a role but not the same role in at least six ideological positions which attach some significance to it, and that we ought, therefore, to consider these as separate political worldviews, which can only all be referred to as liberal with varying degrees of justification. They are not all truly equally liberal, in other words, but because each has been associated with liberalism, I shall include them in my analysis. I think, nonetheless, that there is no single liberal perspective which unites them.

Others have, of course, discerned (wrongly, I believe) the existence of a united liberalism. They may say, for example, that according to liberal doctrine, 'the political is confined to one segment of life, that in which coercive force is employed, the domain of chains, we might say. Its function may be to ensure the well-ordered operation of the rest of social life, in those spheres in which the important things take place - in economics, "social," cultural and religious life.

There is no notion that the political is the realm of freedom. Freedom consists of the equal right to participate in making political decisions about the affairs of the real world of society, in controlling and holding accountable those who do, or in engaging in activities beyond the purview of the political. If the practice of so-called liberal democracies either prior to or subsequent to the achievement of universal suffrage is an indication, then not much is required to connote participation. Nevertheless, there is agreement that self-rule is a fundamental principle, if not the defining one, of liberal democracy. Minority rights, majority rule. Just what is left to the individual, and why, is unclear; what is more important is that from which he is exempted, namely an ascribed role and a condition of subjection. He must, nonetheless, give at least tacit consent to the rule of himself by others. And the rule of others must not be arbitrary. It must be limited by a constitution and by the rule of law. But almost any sort of government could qualify as liberal, then: it only need make no claim to natural, traditional, or divine right to rule; any reasonably plausible explication of tacit consent will do. Remember, Mussolini may have had popular support. And rule of law can be rule of oppressive law.

Is liberalism not so liberal then? Or does it need to be defined more narrowly, or in some other way? I will now attempt to show why I think that it has been, and ought to be defined in at least six different ways, and why I think that one of these has the greatest claim to the name - precisely because it does not depend on a social-political (or "society"-"government") distinction.

C. Class-interest liberal "ideology"

There is a number of writers who treat liberalism as a generally unified body of thought (although they may allow for some exceptions), one which functions as a justification for or rationalization of private-enterprise capitalism. Their critique functions best against those who maintain atomistic premises, and promote the means of free-enterprise and the goal of the well-being of capitalists (in the guise of the common good) but act inconsistently with that goal, sacrificing liberties in practice but not in theory to further their ends. Their critique functions best, that is, as an attack on practices, not theory. Those who have worked out liberal doctrines, as a matter of fact, generally do not advocate all of that which such critics insist they do: liberal writers have goals other than capitalist well-being and, therefore, are prepared, presumably, to alter the means (including freedom of enterprise) if necessary, although *not* in unison, as their goals do differ (which is largely why I think that they are analytically distinct). The critique, nonetheless, may possibly succeed in pointing out that the premises of individualist contract theories of man and political society do not rule out private-enterprise capitalism even if they do not necessarily rule it in.

Those who maintain this interpretation of liberalism basically begin with the claim that economic interests of classes are a given and determine political ideas which are consciously or unconsciously formulated to support them. Thus C.B. Macpherson accuses Hobbes of beginning with a self-interest bourgeois model of society - as a given reality and a given good - and of wittingly or unwittingly working backwards from there to construct a picture of atomistic man and his relations with one another in order to produce a rationale for it. Ellen Wood, similarly, maintains that liberal writers, beginning with a particular conception of political life (as the good political life), adjust their views of the nature of man and of epistemology to coincide with that conception.[2]

Macpherson, Wood, and many others assert that the liberal view of man is essentially a generalized description of bourgeois man, one who is self-centered, accumulative, competitive and exploitive, and who treats his fellow men as commodities; a being who sees society as well as government as external to him, and as something to go along with or

manipulate according to his self-perceived interests. This bourgeois man is an opponent of arbitrary government, i.e., a government that supports arbitrarily special interests which are not called upon to prove themselves in the market; he is a supporter of government which rules by consent - of capitalists, and of others convinced by them to further capitalists' well-being and not to interfere with rights conceived to benefit them.

Critics of this position - which they attribute to Hobbes, Locke and a number of others - assert that it includes a concern for liberty but only a self-interested one. Toleration is preached in the religious sphere: this may be out of concern for the interference with the accumulation of wealth caused by religious quarrels.[3] Freedom of enterprise, as well, is advocated; the laws of the marketplace are to be supreme. And everything is justified by the reputed furthering of the common good. Profits create jobs, for example.

Political liberty, however, is not valued highly. What matters most is not who decides or how but what they decide. Hobbes, it might be argued (as it has been by John Plamenatz, although not from the perspective of the critics under consideration here), was actually being coy in positing a social contract, as evidenced by his "quiet" recognition of governments by conquest as equally legitimate. The motive for obedience is not one's own consent, but rather the success of the sovereign in serving self-interests. This is similarly true, perhaps, of the English utilitarians (who owe their theory to Hobbes?); they even more openly than Hobbes dismiss the notion of a social contract.[4]

The reality, the critics say, is that liberty is but a provisional and limited means. It is advocated only to further class interests. Even commitment to the free market is tentative. When business interests suffer the means will change, not the real or stated end.

The question arises: should we even call this a liberal ideology if the commitment to liberty is so conditional? Harold Laski points out that some proponents of liberalism and capitalism turned their backs on the former and embraced fascism instead.[5] But surely this cannot lead us to say that liberalism contains the seeds of fascism, let alone that liberalism is fascist. Logically, then, this ideology should be known as something other than liberal. Many academics want to classify this class-interest based capitalist pseudo-ideology as liberal,

nonetheless, and, consequently, since it contains some (albeit weak) link with a notion of liberty, I have conceded to consider it here. I wish to qualify my concession further, however.

First, it would make most sense to condemn those who act according to non-liberal principles but continue to use the rhetoric of liberalism, but in that case actions, not liberal ideology, ought to be the target. More importantly, many known as liberals have not embraced all of the premises, or the ends, of the "liberal-capitalist ideology."

Mill recognizes that voluntary engagements might not be binding because of fraud, mistake or misinformation[6] - or treachery or force.[7] Leonard Hobhouse notes that some measure of equality is necessary for a contract to be entered into freely.[8] T.H. Green addresses the subject as well, notably in his essay "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract."[9] And Hobbes and Locke both express reservations about the conduct of businessmen, as apparently even Adam Smith did. Perhaps we would not want to take this as evidence that their theories do not justify the capitalist system, or should I say the unregulated operation of the capitalist system for the benefit of capitalists, even though Laslett seems to so take it in the case of Locke.[10] It is reason, nonetheless, to consider the possibility that they were not inconsistent; they may have been fully aware of the implications of their positions and found them in line with their thoughts on the particular men they observed. Consider, too, that there were many areas of economic activity which did not yet confront the makers and analysts of public policy when the "classical liberals" were writing. They may well have favoured regulation of the automobile, railways, electronic communication, atomic energy, etc. had they lived in this century, as Harry Girvetz suggests.[11] (Conversely, the proponents of considerable regulation today would have had much less to want to regulate earlier in the industrial age.)

It should be clear, then, that not all liberal thought has always supported the same ends - real or proclaimed - even in the writings of the authors most identified with capitalist liberalism, as we shall see more fully as we consider the next strand of liberalism.

D. Individualist libertarian liberalism

Hobbes and Locke, I wish to argue, are not "capitalist liberals" but are, instead, *libertarians*. That is to say, they do not make the means (i.e. the nature of the political measures to be undertaken) dependent upon the end of the furthering of either the public well-being or that of capitalists. They do not look to any positive consequences; they look to the negative objective of maintaining peace and order among individuals, allowing them to preserve (and increase) their property. They look to the guaranteeing of the liberty of enjoying one's possessions without coercion, except that which is necessary for impeding coercion.

Murray N. Rothbard, self-professed libertarian, proclaims that the libertarian "position holds that violence must be strictly limited to defending the freedom of individuals, their rights to person and property against violent interference by others." This freedom "is the highest *political* end."[12] If we may take this to be a definition of libertarianism then it makes sense to classify both Hobbes and Locke as libertarians.

Does it make sense, though, to fuse the positions of Hobbes and Locke? Hobbes is clearly attempting to establish a basis for absolute sovereignty; Locke is seeking to limit the power of government. Hobbes makes the establishment of government a matter of mere convenience for self-centered beings who recognize no obligation toward others except as it is in their interest to do so; Locke exhorts men to respect the equal inherent rights of others to preserve themselves.

Even if we would want to morally distinguish between them, or between "the utilitarian-emotivist-hedonic" and "the Aristotelian-Lockean natural rights" wings of libertarianism,[13] however, it should be evident that their political philosophies are very similar. According to both Hobbes and Locke the individual has no *political* obligations except those which relate to the keeping of the peace, and those which each individual expressly assumes. Majority rule is not legitimate for the purposes of advancing the common good perceived as anything but the maintenance of peace.

Are Hobbes and Locke truly advocates of such minimal government? Hobbes posits absolute power for the sovereign only in preserving "the safety" of his subjects. They retain extensive rights - to govern their own body, enjoy air, water, motion, the way to travel "and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well."[14] A parallel list is entailed in the liberty to disobey, which exists if the subject is told not to resist force, to abstain from food, air, medicine or anything else without which he cannot live, liberty existing so long as the End of sovereignty is not frustrated.[15] This is a very extensive exemption from any obligation to obey the coercive power of the sovereign, but note that the end of the commonwealth is nothing but the peace and defence of all, as Hobbes says repeatedly.[16]

Hobbes maintains, indeed, that without peace there is no industry, agriculture, navigation, commodious building, knowledge of the earth, arts or society.[17] It is one thing, though, to require men to contribute to efforts occasioning such results, and quite another to merely insist that men contribute to what is necessary for the maintenance of conditions which make them possible.

Locke similarly commits the individual to obey the political sovereign only insofar as he (or it) performs the function of preserving property or the "lives, liberties and possessions" of men.[18]

Liberty, defined as absence of coercion, except that necessary to prevent coercion, is the goal. No other public good is to be pursued except voluntarily. Note the obverse implication of this statement, however. Coercion is justified for the "right" purposes. It is not intrinsically important politically that subjects come to understand or shape them. And since there are likely few or no non-defensive purposes, subjects actually need no great amount of political knowledge; they conceivably may have no real need to participate.

In both Hobbes' and Locke's states of nature each individual has a legitimate right over the actions of all others without their consent. In political society that right only disappears with the mutual agreement to surrender it. Those who do not or cannot, and those who reclaim the right for themselves (whether or not legitimately) remain in or re-enter the state of nature vis-a-vis those who are living according to the arrangements of a contract, viz.

they can act against one another without consent to accomplish the same purposes contracts serve. Thus although Hobbes asserts that those who do not consent are not obliged, he also asserts that they are liable to the sanctions of those who do covenant.[19] Similarly, Locke maintains that those who do not follow reason and enter the contract, i.e. who do not renounce force, remain subject to force - from the community without their consent. Consent, then, is not the key; the key is the obligation to submit to the amount of (potential or latent) force necessary to discourage the actual use of force.

More importantly, when this perspective requires consent it is for the public pursuit of any further purpose. This is not consent to go along with the majority decision of which means to use to use to obtain goals for which there is a general consensus. This is consent to contribute from the resources which one owns or controls - which basically precludes much public activity. The community good, such as it may exist, is to be left in private hands. The danger is that it will only be pursued by those who, if and when they think about it, may not have the will or resources. The greater danger is that harms to the community, and to its members, will be allowed when they ought not to be.

Frank Meyer, in "In Defense of Freedom," writes "... freedom can exist at no lesser price than the danger of damnation; and if freedom is indeed the essence of man's being, that which distinguishes him from the beasts, he must be free to choose his worst as well as his best end. Unless he can choose his worst, he cannot *choose* his best.[20]

This might mean, for example, that if people were starving in your community, you should rely on private actions to feed them; if insufficient numbers of charitable acts are performed, that may be regrettable, but that is the price that we have to pay for freedom. Forced charity deserves no moral praise and therefore it should not exist. Is it not true, though, that forced charity may have no moral value for the forced individual *but* it would have moral value on the community level. That is what the libertarian misses.

The libertarian basically opposes positive community action, and thus whether affirming the private nature of morality or positing the non-existence of selflessness, surrenders the well-being of individuals. This is not to argue that no decisions should be left

to the individual to make and act upon as individuals; it is to say that some decisions ought to be judged to be of importance for the community to act as a whole.

A great practical danger is that the libertarian will, in his abhorence of coercion by government (which he sees as the most obvious kind?), deny government sufficient means to prevent coercion except in its most direct, physical manifestations. He will lean in fact, and perhaps in theory, to anarchism, seeking only, and possibly failing, to keep the peace defined in a very narrow way.[21]

The question of the use of reason in politics also becomes rather incidental since the realm of the political is greatly restricted. Not only is rule by divine right, or prescription, largely ruled out, rule according to reason is all but denied as well.

However much this ideology minimizes the collective use of reason, denies importance to the notion of consent, and fails to allow for public concern for the individual, it does focus on liberty of a kind (definable in terms of peace and absence of coercion) and therefore it can be considered a liberal outlook. But it should certainly not be considered to be *the* liberal outlook. We have seen that it differs from "capitalist liberalism" mainly in articulating no positive public good, and in steadfastly opposing much government activity as inherently objectionable. It differs from some other "liberal" perspectives for the same, as well as for additional reasons, although it has much in common with one other such perspective which might even be considered to be a sub-form of libertarianism.

E. Pluralist liberalism

Although the pluralist model may not often be thought of as part of the libertarian tradition there are good reasons to suggest that it ought to be. There is a focus on interests, that is on goods sought which are not sought by, nor concern all members of the community. There is no exhortation to put the needs of the whole before those of the sub-group, only an injunction to do what is minimally necessary to allow each to engage in its own more important pursuits. There is really no common good to pursue as a final or elevated end.

Each group or each individual represented by one or more groups is to concern himself or itself with and pursue his or its own interest. It is not just a matter, then, of having members of your group participate in decision-making and making "your" issues the subject of debate for society to consider in the context of the whole; it is a matter of capturing control of political power proportionate to your own self-estimated importance to the community, if not simply a grab at as much power and influence as you can amass, in order to protect or advance your own interests. And thus we see the model take shape in which the values of negotiation and compromise play a preponderant role. They even reach the status of an end, along with peace and security.

Naturally, negotiation and compromise take place in the pursuit of a common good defined in any manner and enforced by a sovereign authority. But when there is no question of the good for all, then there will be a focus on distribution; appeals to any qualitative improvement of the political community as a whole will be out of order. I agree largely with Grant, therefore, on the nature of pluralism. By denying articulated public goals and focussing on aportioning of goods, political pluralism does set up "development" or material and technological accomplishment as the actual goal, probably because men, in general, can agree that they like "creature comforts." Still, it is conceivable that within the pluralist model the objectives of the more powerful groups, whatever they may be, may impose themselves on society. At least they may temporarily succeed in attracting public resources to them.

Herein may lie an important distinction between this perspective and the preceding one. The pluralist may accept the idea that his group should agree to support "public" purposes which are not its own in the expectation that the time will come when its special interests will be served, or perhaps he will simply concede that he has no choice. He may (like Laski?[11]) conclude that all talk of a common good is only self-interested talk; the objective is to make sure your segment of society gets its fair share. This may point to another difference: the pluralist will not see membership in groups or collectivites as coercive whereas the "pure" libertarian may, depending upon the extent of his abhorence of and his diligence in finding sources of coercion (which ironically, however, may lead him to support increased

government activity of certain sorts.) This should not lead us to confuse his outlook with that of seemingly-pluralist conservative thinkers, however, nor to obscure the similarity of his and the libertarians's perspectives: they both deny the existence of an objective, positive common good.

The pluralist does not concede that the political association is designed to promote some positive, given end. He does see it primarily as a convenience for the purpose of mediating between isolated interests who only have as a given common interest the keeping of the peace. (And thus he can be considered to be a liberal for the same reasons as any libertarian can.)

What is positively enacted is a matter for negotiation and compromise, then. What is to be negotiated and compromised are not competing views of the common good, but interests. The parties involved are to remain essentially unchanged by the implementation of common decisions.

Writers like Watkins and Havelock salute a vision of political society in which men are to be taken as they come, and say this constitutes a tolerant humanism.[23] Whether or not they consider themselves to be pluralists, this idea fits in well with the pluralist point of view. The irony is that relying on non-political segments of society to define the good life, the advocates of political (which is to be distinguished from "cultural") pluralism subject everyone to a contest of brute force. This is a contest in which, as Robert Paul Wolff points out, the non-conforming individual especially is given little consideration.[24] This is true both in the case of corporatist-pluralism (in which each person is assigned to membership in one and only one group) and in the case of non-corporatist pluralism (in which individuals belong to as many groups as they choose). The manner of reaching decisions is not based on the persuasiveness of particular positions; decisions are made according to the amount of clout, and how much inconvenience or harm each group can inflict. And so we see companies exacting concessions by threats against the community and wage-earners receiving rates of pay according to how well organized and powerful they are. And when normal channels prove unproductive, resorts to violence tend to bring quicker, more responsive results: even though

violence is supposedly excluded as a legitimate means by the premises of this kind of community, yet it is in a way sanctioned by them. Of course, as this is a model, it will never correspond completely with the way men actually act. In fact, inasmuch as it is a flawed description of (and not just prescription for) political life it may differ greatly, although it will accurately describe the way men act when their behaviour is motivated by the sort of thinking it advocates.

Is it not the case that the life of a political community is necessarily governed by some shared assumptions or principles, even if they are of the nature that: 1. compromise and peace take precedence over most or all other considerations, or 2. universal aspirations should be lowered to include as many existing, if not all existing judgments of what is worthwhile pursuing, or 3. simply the understanding reached that whatever anyone wants is as worthwhile as what anyone else wants - the no-standard standard? Is it not true, though, that wherever there are no consciously held and operative principles there is either no community or a community based on instinct alone, which hardly qualifies as a human or civilized one? (This thought is inspired by, if not a restatement of, Wolff's discussion of objects of decision.[25]) The conservative admittedly has his own response to this question, as we shall see in the following chapter.

My claim is that when someone like Havelock rues the influence of Plato which he says remains with us in his day, evident in the naive public desire for leaders who are statesmen rather than practical politicians,[26] he overstates his case, and in fact supports mine. The public clamour is a demonstration of the natural rational desire and necessity of pursuing common goals consistent with knowable fundamental principles - the framework which allows the structure to stand. Political life is not simply an adjustment of empirically-observable inherently-unrelated interests, even if many politicians see their route to success as appealing to the largest and/or greatest numbers of constituencies possible. Of course, those remarks can be directed toward proponents of individualist libertarianism as well. I see few differences between the two points of view except those which I have noted.

I had thought that a major difference is that pluralists generally repudiate the idea of political sovereignty whereas an Hobbes does not. But given that an Hobbesian state is a limited state, that is, sovereign in "negative" areas, and given that Locke is much concerned with restricting discretionary powers of political authority, I do not see that much of a discrepancy exists between the libertarian and pluralist views.

The pluralist and the libertarian both endorse the minimal state. The pluralist state, though, may be "less minimal."

There are those, nonetheless, who see the pluralist-negotiation-compromise model as the guarantor of the free pursuit of self-interest. And consequently we should recognize this as a form of liberalism, however flawed its treatment of liberty.

F. Hedonist-utilitarian liberalism

I have identified two or possibly three distinct forms of what may be called liberalism. Although an hedonist utilitarianism (with the individual as the basic unit of analysis), such as that of John Stuart Mill (and of James Mill and Bentham), is not always distinguished from them, it seems to me that it ought to be, because the end it promotes is not material well-being per se, or "liberty" (or mere "peace"). The end is pleasure.

I suspect that the concept of utility, in this case, is empiricist, that is, conceived because it is "scientifically" applicable to the world of our physical senses. Whether this be to remove religious and philosophical quarrels from political debate or to preclude abstract issues (such as notions of objective justice, social justice, spiritual fulfilment, the good life, rights etc.) from public consideration, I am not sure - although both may be true.

To equate the public good and pleasure, in any case, presents dangers. If we reduce the good life to the pursuit of pleasurable sensations and the avoidance of painful ones, we may be reducing it to something no higher than that which animals can experience. In fact, Mill, who wishes to avoid this difficulty, still wishes to add together his lower and higher pleasures, providing us with good reason to ask why quantity of the lower cannot make up for the quantity of the latter.

Mill himself states that "a being of higher faculties" would not surrender what he has, however much he might be suffering, in exchange for "the most complete satisfaction of all the desires" which the fool, dunce or rascal has, because of his pride, love of liberty and personal independence, or sense of dignity.[27] He thus brings into question his credentials as a hedonist utilitarian.

If Mill's or anyone else's political goal is the maximization of pleasure, though, there is another possibility to consider. The pursuit of the greatest amount of happiness may well take us far beyond the minimum state.

I can detect no theoretical impediment to a utilitarian advocating majority rule, nor to his surrendering liberty. Might not someone derive more pleasure from activities in which he may be forced to partake, if not from the pleasure of his anger at being denied his routine anesthetized pleasures? This utilitarianism may be quite compatible, moreover, with the most extreme notion of the paternalistic welfare state. By providing everyone with a minimum of goods (which constantly rises perhaps) and security, the goal of maximizing pleasure might be met. Who can say that providing for oneself will provide more happiness in either the short or long run? Some may even find having to make choices painful, or at least not pleasant.[28] Spoon-feeding or the provision of all-encompassing safety nets may well minimize pain. Similarly, some restraints on liberty may well increase productivity and its concomitant pleasure, or decrease crime and its pain.

This utilitarian's objective may be "good," not democratic or minimal or democratic minimal government. He might wish to see political participation as useful, but not as an inalienable right; he may well be open to suggestions that it may be increased and decreased as circumstances warrant.

I do suspect that this form of utilitarianism is democratic to the extent that it may allow the people to determine what satisfies their desires. And in respecting individuals in counting each as one. But denying the existence of inherent rights - political and non-political - it leaves open the door for sacrificing the well-being or interests of some individuals for the benefit of more people. But to say that rights may be sacrificed might be too simplistic. Is it

not more likely that rights would be sacrificed for something else, and less likely that some rights of some would be sacrificed for more of others? The point of having a doctrine of utility, after all, may be to establish a single supreme goal for the community, which would mean the worth of all actions ultimately could be subordinated to it (or, if you prefer, measured in terms of it). Some utilitarian outlook may be able to incorporate a notion of inalienable rights, however. But I am not aware of how this could be done; the view that I am considering here, in any case, does not incorporate one.

Now, admittedly, this utilitarian outlook entails the idea that we are to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers, and therefore we would only ever place in jeopardy the "rights" or the well-being of a necessarily small number of individuals. But in order to promote this idea, this utilitarian must find a way for the individual to see the happiness of others as his own. One way of doing this is by devising an expandable social sentiment, as J. S. Mill does.

There are problems with this perspective. If a person depends on sentiment to motivate him to help and/or not harm others, then he will not likely care much about the well-being of others whom he cannot see, be they inhabitants of geographically distant places (or near but unfrequented places, for that matter) or members of generations not yet born. Consider also that sentiment can be vicious as well as benevolent, especially, it would seem, when it is of a social nature (i.e. when it is encouraged by social approval). Should reason not control and extend beyond sentiment? Should we not depend on "objective" commitment (i.e. non-favouritism) first if our goal is the good of all (which goal even Mill would have to admit is set or perceived by reason in the first place)?

The irony is that the expanding social sentiment argument, which may in large measure be designed to preclude state coercion (especially - but not only - when employed by libertarians), actually entails a decrease in liberty, that is, when it depends on the idea that as wants increase men will increasingly *depend* on the selfish interests and actions of one another (even if seemingly disinterested) to satisfy them.[29] Liberty may be surrendered in political and non-political areas of life, therefore. Freedom may simply be a means, then, and not a goal.

This is even more true according to another ideological perspective, which may or may not deserve the name of utilitarianism, as we shall see presently.

G. Social progress liberalism

Some persons do advocate freedom, largely freedom from government coercion, in order to further some end other than the well-being of capitalists, peace, "liberty" or pleasure; an end which is not understood as equally beneficial to all, or even necessarily to a majority of persons now living, or yet to live. They may wish to advance "mankind" or material wealth or the conquest of nature or a number of other things as ends.

The attainment of ever higher pleasures, or stages of civilization, may well require the sacrificing of the pleasures, or interests, of some, even of the many for the benefit of the few now and the many later - or for the few later as well, if no end to progress is envisaged! Take this example. The well-being of the many may be neglected over infinite numbers of generations in order that more and more of nature on earth, and ever-increasing parts of space may be conquered. Progress can come to be seen as an end in itself, in the way the advancement of society can be.

It is indisputable that material and other forms of progress are advocated by many as means to higher learning and culture, health, reduction of suffering, the elimination of war etc. This means that "progress" for them is *not* "the" goal; they will not consider other means as necessarily inferior. They will not channel resources all in one direction, or take conquest to be a good in itself. Are there not those who take conquest to be the end, though? Those who will consider man's essence to be his freedom - from human and non-human nature?

I do not know enough about the "Chicago School" in particular or "New Right" economic thinkers in general to say anything conclusive about them (if I may take the liberty of discussing together ideas that I perceive they share.) Frankly, I suspect that, in general, their talk of "choice" or liberty is sincere, but that their apparent pre-occupation with "efficiency" is exaggerated. If a less "free" nation were to gain industrially by paternalistic ideas and practices, proving that very extensive "liberty" may not be the most productive

economic arrangement, I doubt that they would lessen their calls for decreasing government or "corporate" coercion. But if they really do think that "efficiency" matters most, they may be prepared to advocate liberty only on a conditional basis. (Is it not evident, in either case, that they are prepared to tolerate great numbers of "losers" for the sake of "liberty" or progress of some kind? And that since a considerable - even if minority - percentage of these losers are or would be capitalists, we cannot call them "capitalist liberalist"?) It is conceivable, then, that certain efficiency and productivity-obsessed economists, and their followers, and social Darwinists of various stripes, may be the best examples of proponents of this outlook.

John Stuart Mill says in On Liberty that silencing the expression of opinion of any individual is unacceptable because in doing so we run the risk of "robbing the human race"[30]; later he comments that we ought not injure "the interests of one another" because we owe a return to *society* for the benefit of living in it - not because we owe it to others as human beings.[31] And in Utilitarianism in the same breath that he says that everyone is to count as one, he says there may be limits to this maxim, albeit strictly construed. Then he adds that everyone has a right to equal treatment, *unless* social expediency dictates otherwise.[32]

We should note that Mill does favour progress as the conquering of nature in order to benefit mankind universally, in his essay on nature - if not in specific passages, then in overall tone. There are indications of this in his arguments that man should correct, mitigate or control the hurtful agencies of nature, such as storms, disease and selfishness.[33] (These arguments do much to bring into question the awe in which persons like George Grant regard nature in itself.)

We could say the same thing, too, if it is true, as Acton asserts, that On Liberty is a work designed to persuade those of limited capacities to allow the flourishing of the talents of those with greater potential.[34] Why do I cite Mill, then?

It is highly plausible that someone sharing his premises discounting natural rights, would want to see man's creations prosper and progress without the benefits being shared by all, or the greatest numbers imaginable. But is not liberty for all, as a means, but an emphatically asserted means, a key element of this outlook? Indeed it is. The point is that it is

not forwarded because the need or desirability for it arises out of the nature of man, but out of the nature of the goal. The objective makes the means dependent, i.e. subject to revision when empirical evidence may suggest that revision is needed.

Mill, in any event, does not advocate this outlook. He advocates either the hedonist utilitarian argument in which fellow human beings are useful to one another but not inherently valuable or, alternatively, the proposition that men should be concerned that others develop their moral and intellectual capacities because these capacities are valuable to their possessors.

Mill is not known as a major proponent of the latter, probably because he only took it up some of the time. But his contribution will be noted along with those other thinkers who provide the most solid theoretical ground for collective concern for human development, cessation of oppression, respect for inherent rights and liberty as a thing owing to a person. It is to them that I now turn.

H. Personal autonomy/human rights liberalism

I have discussed five ideologies here which have been taken by some or many to be liberal ideologies. Whereas it may be a common perception that all those who have been known to be liberals have maintained that in order for authority to be legitimate it must be consented to by all those over whom it is exercised, this is not the case. That phantom philosopher, the liberal capitalist, the hedonist utilitarian, and the social progress liberal, can easily accommodate restrictions on political liberties within their outlooks. The libertarian and pluralist, nonetheless, do commence their analyses with individual agents who agree to come together to further their private interests. They can speak about social contracts and consent. But consent may not actually be required: those who do not give their consent to the rule consented to by others do not stand in a relationship of authority to it, but are nonetheless legitimately ruled by it, in the eyes of the consenters. The refrainers are simply non-actors and non-factors in *their* equation of legitimacy. Rather than providing the basis for legitimate authority over an entire community this would prepare, instead, the grounds for potentially

unlimited numbers of authority centers, legitimate unto themselves. This problem is overcome by the notion of tacit consent, the idea that each person accepting the benefits of living under a particular regime (i.e. simply living under it) implicitly consents to abide by its rules. Hobbes and Locke both rely on this manoeuvre. The problem with this step is that it overcompensates. It includes everyone in a society. If you participate at all in the life of a community you are declared to be in agreement with whatever political decisions govern it. Consent is thus rendered a very weak notion: if you are within the reach of someone capable of enforcing his or its edicts upon you, you are, in fact, declared to have consented to them. Non-consent simply means non-participation or complete non-involvement.

Upon further examination we can see that any notion of consent actually plays a minimal role in consent theory. Why should someone be entitled to the claim that only he can justify rule over himself? Presumably because, whether or not justice and obligation can exist other than by convention and agreement, men will not believe that other men can regulate such things impartially unless they select and control these men themselves. But that, in reality, turns out to be the objective - rule which is excercised impartially, and not for private gain. It does not matter to Hobbes, Locke or Mill the utilitarian, in the final analysis, how impartial rule is established, if it is accepted by a majority. Rule is only a means to a further end and it is the end which requires it to be impartial. (If consent theorists were truly serious about self-rule they would not be able to introduce the idea of majority rule - without an additional premise, namely, consent to majority rule.) Consent consequently becomes something hypothetical - what men would do (i.e. agree to) *if* they were to act "rationally" or reasonably or according to the dictates of nature. Emphasize the verb to act.

This consent theory operates quite well, then, without the idea of independent thought, or knowledgeable participation, and therefore without recognition of inherent rights arising from the possibility of autonomous or self-rule. There is no room for the encouragement of excellence, only the idea of doing less well or better what conduces to your long-term self-interest, and maybe the contributing of different, but not inherently excellent ideas.

The pluralist may be an exception in making the positive goals of those operating the formal political machinery of the community (a group more or less like any other, with its own interests to pursue) dependent upon the consent of the various contracting parties. But the pluralist still has no concern that consent be informed consent, or that it be sought at all if particular parties do not demand explicitly that their views be taken into consideration.

Rousseau, Kant, T.H. Green and Mill (the non-utilitarian J.S. Mill) point to an alternative, a view in which it is of political importance that the individual develop his capacities for understanding and contributing to the good of all.

Rousseau hinges much of his political theory on the compassion of men in society, *and* on their ability to will the general will: he sees social *feeling* as an evil as well as a good. He sees individual men as distinct beings, in other words, as ends in themselves, and not only as appendages of expanded self-interest.

How can man be bound by the schackles of law and political rule yet obey only himself? Whereas this may seem to be the main question which he addresses in his political writings, it may be more accurate to state that he attempts to demonstrate, whether or not successfully, that each man has an inherent worth which it is the duty of the community to enhance or develop, or at least refrain from hindering (meaning that it is also required to remove hindrances). While expressing slight concern for the concept of rights, he says much to provide a basis for them. The consent he postulates is to be given by willing and/or thinking beings; it is not the mere acquiesence with what is necessary for the maintenance of peace and order, or the acquisition of "happiness" or the march of progress.

Rousseau, indeed, does speak of possession of sensibility rather than of reason, as the basis for compassion, and thereby places animals on an equal footing with man, in one respect: they are also to be spared avoidable pain. But this, ultimately, is not the complete foundation for the obligation he assigns to men towards one another. It is significant, though, as a recognition of each being as valuable in himself. This may be the point of his absurd exaggeration of the possibility of independent existence. Surely he could not have held that mating men and women, and then the child and his mother, have no feeling or interest in one

another once their immediate usefulness has elapsed.[35] But he could have, and does suggest, that each individual has his or her own life to live. Recall, too, that his account of compassion is not self-interested.

Rousseau says that "obedience to self-prescribed law is liberty."[36] If he had stopped at that point, then he could have maintained that each should or could merely insist that all should do what is in their own interest. Rousseau, of course, does not do this. He insists, rather, that each should will the good of all, and that in so doing, man attains moral freedom. This is not a call to complete altruism for the collective good is to be something that is good for each. A large element of altruism does exist, though; it consists of the requirement that none is to give himself - or any particular individual or group of individuals - preference, in political as well as non-political life, I presume. But this is not just a prohibition; it is a requirement to participate.

Rousseau rejects representative democracy because he concludes that to have others make decisions for you is slavery, even if you do not disagree with the decisions or benefit from them in some way. If man merely follows the life of ease and refrains from partaking in the determination of the laws of the land he is not realizing all that of which he is (morally?) capable as a human being. The goal, then, is neither peace at all costs nor licentiousness.[37] This hardly seems to be a dated message without application in our complex world.

Now, the community cannot agree to anything whatsoever and correctly regard itself as free. The political association, for Rousseau, must pursue those endeavours which are to enhance human liberty, that is, self-reliance and moral freedom. He does say yes to some arts and no to luxury and dependence on others.[38] He does not often suggest that there is excellence to be achieved other than in following nature and in having a good will toward others; he does not often suggest that knowledge, reason or any arts are to be developed for their intrinsic value - but he does comment that true pleasure is absorption in a thing itself.[39] He does perceive the state, nonetheless, as a vehicle for the attainment of excellence as he usually sees it. He would assuredly agree with Aristotle's claim that a state is more than a pact for mutual protection or trade which is unconcerned with the quality of citizens.[40]

While we can say that Rousseau is not preoccupied with furthering reason he does introduce a concept of the general will which can be (best?) participated in at a rational level. Still, we should not restrict it to being simply another manifestation of "ethical rationalism" (as I understand this term as used by Watkins.)[41] We can will something to happen after rational deliberation but we can also will something because of our charitable feelings towards others. Rousseau realizes this. He comments that few can reason their way to virtue.[42] And so he devises a civic religion, which seems to be a visceral level expression of good (i.e. the general) will, and conceives measures to foster patriotism (which is really no different than his civic religion?).[43] Note, though, that Rousseau recognizes that there are limits to the extent to which individuals can be led. He does say that men can and should be forced to be free, but by this only means that they shall be forced to concur with the will that is general, and in which they participate. If someone does not participate in the formation of the general will to begin with, he can hardly be forced to do so, or to be free by concurring with it when he is not part of it. Whether or not Rousseau ever says so explicitly, it is absurd to suggest that anyone could be forced to be autonomous. (To be encouraged, e.g. through education, is something else.) Once someone has made up his mind, so to speak, to be dependent, there may be little that can be done to change this; Rousseau recognizes that the state can only act in accordance with the people's wishes. It is only through education of opinions, not law, that you can govern passions.

Rousseau does employ the notion of tacit consent.[44] But this consent must be more substantial than Hobbes' or Locke's. It must involve feeling if not thinking the general will to qualify as consent in Rousseauan terms. What about those who do not think or feel the general will? I assume that they must adhere to the laws of the land if they benefit from them and do not deny their willingness to abide by them. These persons, however, would not be free, and, moreover, would be a liability to the community in the sense of holding back what they could, and ought to contribute to it.

His is not a radically egalitarian doctrine in every respect (he favours civic inequalities coinciding with natural inequalities[45]); it is, nonetheless, radically individualistic (in one

sense) and humanitarian. Each person is to be treated as an end, as a fellow species-member, an end given by nature, and by man's own nature as a sentient being who is also capable of human growth.

There is an easily recognizable affinity between Rousseau's general will and Kant's categorical imperative that we are to will our maxims to be universal laws.[46] This imperative is identical, Kant says, with the exhortation that we are to act so that every rational being is an end in your maxim.[47] Man is an end, he has dignity, Kant says, then, in possessing this a priori rational capacity to give universal laws, independent of empirical considerations and inclination.[48]

Kant differs from Rousseau in not attributing intrinsic worth to a person other than for his possession of the faculty of reason. They both agree, though, in saying that it is of concern to each (at least to those who can reason) that the others in the community develop their capacity to will universal laws or the general will. Note, moreover, that Kant, like Rousseau, does not leave the consensus of the community an open category. Must a good will will something that is good, then?

Kant rules out suicide as a rational solution to the problem of facing a life with more pain than satisfaction; he also says that a rational man could not want to refrain from developing all of his faculties for the purposes for which they were designed.[49] Not just anything can be the object of the will, therefore. Kant recognizes, nonetheless, that willing the good of others is desirable in itself. Doing good is not enough. Perhaps this is because we cannot truly appreciate what good ends are unless we seek to participate in the articulation and selection of them.

T. H. Green expresses ideas similar to those of Rousseau and Kant. He writes that "freedom in all the forms of doing what one will with one's own, is valuable only as a means to an end. That end is what I call freedom in the positive sense: in other words, the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common good."[50] Now his common or social good may seem to be the making by "the citizens as a body" of "the most and best" of the individual citizens.[51] This "best" is consciousness or rational awareness of success in

making or having our natural inclinations or "natural impulses" correspond with what is good. (It is not freedom from passion, in other words, but knowledge of a fusion of the objects of things desired by the passions and what is good. This freedom is not, then, simply action in agreement with good ends, but awareness that one willingly does so act, that one chooses them, I presume.) A free man enlists his natural passions "in the service of some great public cause" or with the intent, simply, of educating his family, perhaps.[52] This circle is not closed, however. What is the good that it is good to will and to know? Perhaps it is sharing concern for the well-being of others in the community, the harmonious arrangement of the community allowing for the good of its members now and in the future, oneness with "truth" or perceptions of "perfection" or perfect ideals. Whatever the case, Green's point surely seems to be that the best for one man is neither to simply do as he wishes, nor to do what is "good" but to know that one is willingly doing what is good, which must mean that dependency on others, especially for the articulation of moral and intellectual insights, and the performance of actions in which they are embodied, cannot be best.

You may wish to ask why the community should be concerned with individuals willing or choosing the good for all. Why could it not, instead, simply exist to serve the development of each for himself? The answer may be that it could, but it may be that this would require either an impossible degree of altruism, or, conversely, an impossibly great degree of harmony of isolated self-interest. The answer instead, or additionally, may be that the good does include (that is *include*, not consist entirely of) the rational or political and moral development of all, and that people do know this to some degree.

You may subsequently wish to point out that in some societies moral and intellectual development is not a preoccupation of the community as a whole; it is largely left to private or voluntary associations. This may be true, but we should ask whether the process has been sanctioned by the community, and if it has not, whether there really is a community, or perhaps more to the point, a well-functioning community. Be that as it may, can there be any doubt that, whether solely for self-betterment or the betterment of others or all, participation in the moral, political and intellectual areas of human activity, which we may have to concede

necessarily involve non-individual endeavours, is preferable to passivity? To the living of life utilizing the products of the imagination, the culture, arts and sciences which others have infused with their own understandings of the world, understandings most relevant to their own experiences?

It is possible that our own decisions may be inferior to those which someone else may impose, but unless ours are destructive of our ability to make decisions, that can hardly qualify as a reason to justify interference. Is it not true that we learn by making mistakes? And that learning and knowing is good, whereas depending on the perpetual interest, wisdom and benevolence of another is ultimately impractical if not immoral? We should want others to be able to make their own decisions, and in this liberal view, this can be accomplished by acting, however paradoxical it might seem, to establish and accomplish community goals, in addition to seeking our own individual good.

These goals certainly would not always be achieved through political action, although political decisions might be necessary to allow them to be achieved. These goals undoubtedly would be accomplished at various levels, as Green suggests, that is, in pursuing causes of various sorts, affecting various numbers of individuals.

Regardless of the particular reason for wanting "inner freedom" for others, the desire for it with which this kind of liberalism is concerned, plainly makes this liberalism the one most committed to liberty as a political end in itself, which cannot be sacrificed to any other political purpose. It also clearly attaches the most importance to the value of each individual human life; each man is an end.

I would be remiss not to note that John Stuart Mill sometimes becomes an advocate of this kind of liberalism, although he does not always share Rousseau's optimism about man's inherent goodness or his critique of ills induced by social advance. Even if Mill speaks at times about the need to encourage individuality for the social good it produces, at other times (even if in the same breath) he presents it as a good in itself. In just a few pages of his chapter on individuality he remarks that individual spontaneity has intrinsic worth, human nature is a tree, faculties are given to us to be cultivated, and not only the best, but most

persons should cultivate their individuality.[53] He also speaks of the need for political development, even if it is accomplished at the cost of better results that would have been produced by government. Now even if he treats this as a matter of development, and not of liberty, and foresees greater long-term results, there seems to be sufficient ground for the suspicion that he is not merely looking to the habituation of *acting* from "public or semi-public motives."[54]

Perhaps Mill thinks that such motives will produce the most useful results overall, but his argument would need another step to guarantee this - the assuring of competence on the part of those acting. Does he leave out this step because he sees good in the motives themselves?

Curiously enough Mill elsewhere comments that motives are publicly insignificant, intentions matter; motives only count in "our moral estimation of the agent," which is, in turn, based on our assessment of the likelihood that his character will or will not produce useful actions.[55] He does seem anxious to avoid attributing any inherent worth to character or personality or individual identity. But he does not always succeed. Is his insistence that social and political coercion can only be justified in some of those instances where other regarding actions are involved really carry much weight as a purely utilitarian argument, for example? Whatever the answer to this question, he does seem to be attracted to the position that the development of individual personality is a good in itself on at least some occasions.

We can now conclude that Grant's critique of liberalism as a doctrine which denies inherent worth to human beings is not applicable to all kinds of liberalism. Perhaps equally important, however, will be the forthcoming observation that conservatism only values individuals conditionally. This will become evident in the next chapter, perhaps most clearly in an examination of diverging perspectives on the nature of rights.

I. A composite liberal?

Now that I have distinguished among what may be taken to be six distinct forms of liberalism, I cannot help but think that I may be challenged, nonetheless, to say either which the quintessential liberal position is, or to say what they have in common. I think that it is basically unhelpful to consider these six ideologies all to be species of one genus. When we so consider them it becomes easy for us to attribute the premises, means or objectives of one to another or to all of them, even if inappropriate to do so. It may make life easier in a way to group together various political philosophies as anarchist, liberal, conservative or socialist, or just as variants of liberalism and conservatism, to reduce them, that is, to forms of a very few political outlooks, but to do so is to fail to appreciate significant nuances, and to attempt to render compatible what is not. I consequently think that it would probably be best to speak of political capitalism, libertarianism, pluralism, utilitarianism and so on, and not try to suggest that these are all "liberal" perspectives. The role and importance of liberty in each of these varies too much for that.

I must add that there are indeed similarities. They reject claims to rule based upon tradition or revelation; they reject privilege and arbitrary government. But is it enough to consider as one various positions on the basis of negative agreement, especially since others may reject some or all of the same things? Well, then, what do they agree upon? They generally maintain that there should be the rule of law and constitutional government; they may hold that man can use reason to improve his well-being, that individual persons can be made better citizens by education and criminal rehabilitation, that reform and experiment can be useful and so on. But does *this* give us reason to call all those who agree on such things liberals? Do not non-liberals (i.e. persons with very divergent views) agree with some or all of these positions?

Those who have been known as liberals disagree on a very wide range of key issues, such as: is man ultimately self-interested, driven by passions or sentiment or reason; is man co-operative or competitive, morally good or morally bad by nature? What is the importance of material progress? Of property rights? Of freedom of enterprise? Are there inalienable

natural rights? Is justice a matter of utility or convention? Is liberty meer absence of physical coercion? Is the democratic vote a right?

I maintain that it is logical to group together bodies of thought which are logically consistent in their treatment of fundamental questions, the most fundamental of which concern the nature of man, of the political association, and of ends to be achieved. There is too much disagreement on these questions to treat all "liberals" as advocates of essentially the same philosophies who simply have minor disagreements on means or other details.

Why am I dealing with these distinct four, five, or six ideologies together in this chapter? Primarily because they have been, separately and collectively, dealt with as liberal views. It was my objective to sort out what we ought to say about them first in relation to the concept of liberty (how liberal logically - not historically - are they?), and then I conclude that it is essential to consider each of them apart; it will not do to discuss them as one, especially here, since they entail differing responses to the idea of national self-determination.

J. Liberalism and nationalism

There is no doubt that some of those who have been known or who today are known as liberals have not infrequently supported nationalist causes. J.S. Mill spoke favourably of the sentiment of nationality as a basis for self-government[56]; Adam Smith wrote that nature designed love of country to be useful to all of mankind, and authored a classic work on the wealth of *nations*, as others have noted[57]; Bentham made similar remarks.[58] Liberals sided with those seeking national self-determination in the Europe of the 1830s and 1840s.[59] They have sided and continue to side with colonial subjects seeking the right to rule themselves in Africa and elsewhere. It is also well known, however, that some liberals have been or are ardent foes of nationalism. P.E. Trudeau is one of them. Are the many "liberal" nationalists inconsistent in their views?

Liberalism, in very general terms, is compatible with nationalism. Both entail a recognition that man does determine at least a part of his own destiny in the realm of human affairs through the employment of his faculty of choice, and that he can and should,

therefore, exercise choice in the political realm.

To say, beyond this, whether a form of liberalism is compatible with nationalism, we really need to look at two questions: is it compatible with nationalism as a means and/or is it compatible as an end? Undoubtedly many theories of political life include mention of the need and obligation to maintain the state. The seldom asked question is whether it is necessary to keep the state as it is, or is it permissible, possibly even desirable to expand or lessen its size (i.e. the number of its members), by becoming part of another state, for example. For usually the imperative of obligation borders on the tautological: fulfill your obligation to the state, or do not belong to it.

The capitalist liberal may very conceivably declare that the nation ought to protect its own from encroachment of others. The local chamber of commerce may strike up a shop-locally campaign; by extension, businesses could plead with fellow citizens to buy nationally. Have not the spokesmen for major North American automakers at times suggested that "we" should support "our own"?

Note two things. Since the capitalist may consider the well-being of business to be the greatest good, or the necessary condition for any other good, there is no room for any sort of "nationalism" which would restrict the activity of indigenous business. This nationalism is undeniably self-interested; it is not the sort of economic nationalism which is ultimately political, even though it may employ political means. It is essentially, then, not nationalism, but more truly the economic hijacking of the state.

The second thing logically follows. This "nationalism" will only be advocated as an expedient. When the aspiring entrepreneurs conclude that they no longer need the assistance of the state in order to be successful, they will repudiate it. Confident of making their own way, they will show disinterest in the plight of others who cannot; they will renounce any assertions that they have any obligation to preserve the (economic or non-economic) integrity of the community. Their anti-nationalist rhetoric may then focus on their confidence and the nationalist fear of competing - although this need not be uniquely a liberal capitalist argument.

The libertarian liberal has a similarly weak commitment to the nation. The end which he sees political life serving is the guaranteeing of liberty - or safety from physical harm, and the maintenance of peace and order.

Locke says that mankind is one community; it is only due to corruption and the viciousness of degenerate men that man has need for smaller than universal associations. A multiplicity of states is needed to ensure peace - not among states but between individuals.[60] Given the need for collective pursuit of self-preservation by "small groups" of men, then, it is not surprising to hear the libertarian say that the state ought to take measures to protect itself. Hobbes says, for example, that the soyereign is to control foreign trade since private persons may furnish the enemy or hurt the commonwealth by importing pleasing, but noxious or unprofitable goods.[61] But with a limited collective goal, the objects about which there may be concern must be limited in number too. If experience shows that any particular item may be traded without harm coming to the peace of the community, or if it shows that any kind of activity may be engaged in similarly without such harm, then there can be no justification for state action.

We have seen that libertarianism may be quite compatible with capitalism on a fundamental level; it is also possible that the pre-occupation with trade and commerce that leads to a capitalist's vested interest in peace in many instances (although certainly not all, as war - and trade wars or political embargoes on trade of any kind - can increase demand for weapons and replacement goods) will ally the two and make them common enemies of nationalism.

It is quite imaginable, in any event, that the members of a Hobbesian state will see that they can find peace in something other than the state into which they are born or to which they emigrate. The sovereign always retains the right to command allegiance assisting in his preservation and the perpetuation of his rule; the subject, nonetheless, can always seek peace where he may find it.

I should remark that the libertarian may be a limited nationalist; he may because he does value peace and some notion of consent, and presumably supports the principle of

self-determination for peoples who live beyond, and do not threaten his boundaries. Rule by outsiders, even if unaccompanied by physical violence, may seem to constitute war, that is coercion through the threat of physical force. The libertarian, however, sees only negative government as legitimate government (unless, that is, everyone affected in any way by a "positive" decision agrees to it.) Consequently he will not oppose the alterations made to ways of life by non-indigenous, non-governmental agencies. He will, indeed, usually oppose positive government measures to prevent or counteract them, unless, again, all citizens in the jurisdiction concerned agree to them. The libertarian will see universalism as a desirable thing in principle if it means peace because peace is a prerequisite for the pursuit of other goals (which are private); peace (or "liberty") is the only goal that is a legitimate justification for political rule without unanimous consent.

Even if the libertarian should consider men to be unalike because of language, culture, religion, political values or nationality, and not as essentially the same, he will consider them to be what they are prior to or outside of the political realm. He will not countenance political efforts to maintain or advance the status of any of these without explicit consent, which means, in fact, that they cannot be the objects of political decision, for if there were unanimous *explicit* consent, there would presumably be no reason for taking such measures. The libertarian, then, has very limited use for nationalism.

The pluralist finds himself in much the same position. He cannot agree that the community as a whole should consciously pursue any positive goals except those which are not explicitly opposed by any major segment of the population. He may, however, conceivably endorse measures to block outside influences which may erode the pluralist nature of the nation. I cannot imagine what these might be, though, unless these "influences" involve surrender of formal political sovereignty. Still, he may promote seemingly nationalist economic measures as well, given a general agreement on the pursuit of economic growth as a goal. But his general opposition to government activity would be paramount in most instances - "protectionist" measures would need to have wide support. They would need to be seen as non-detrimental to major groups, such as consumers. The solution, of course, would probably

be a compromise.

Now the pluralist as well as the libertarian may be seen to be nationalist in another way - a negative way. They would reject positive state action committing the community to a position of greater dependence on another nation, or some kind of other of "internationalism" or universalism (meaning a diminished sovereignty of the parts of the community.) The libertarians, then, could be seen as defensive nationalists inasmuch as they would oppose some anti-nationalist measures, their true preference being a kind of state neutrality, nonetheless.

The hedonist-utilitarian liberal has both less and more reason to support nationalism, although in the final analysis he may have to be a universalist. He insists that all men are truly alike, possessing the same capacity to feel pleasure and pain. There would seem to be no fundamental reason, therefore, to favour the well-being of fellow nationals over that of anyone else, or to see that well-being as something different. But this utilitarian has more reason to support nationalism because he may see it as temporarily useful to ensure that the greatest numbers of individuals will be happy. He may, consequently, wish to look to the consequences of each major governmental and non-governmental initiative to see what the effects will be. Should a country grow export crops? The answer would be no if it means poverty or starvation for the masses who are living today. Should a state eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade? That would depend upon the numbers who would be made worse and better off and to what degree. It would not depend solely on some "global" figure such as the gross national product or the trade deficit or surplus. This liberal, all the same, has no basis upon which to favour the perpetual existence of a multiplicity of nations. It is conceivable that for him once all the world has modernized, the need for national boundaries will have disappeared; there may have arisen, in fact, a need for them to disappear so that all persons can share in and participate in creating the triumphs of technology. Goods, capital and labour should be unrestrictedly mobile.

Now it is possible that even in a completely "developed" world there will be a need for nations in this liberal's view because there may never be universal fairness in distribution. He may make this the goal for which he strives, though, and therefore might not embrace

nationalism as anything but an expedient to be eventually done away with, if and when possible.

Might not the hedonist-utilitarian champion diversity as a necessary means if not as a goal in itself in some sense? He may well do so. The important thing to note is that this diversity is the sort to be found among individuals. The universal state could well include diversity of this kind, even if it were of a "bland" variety such as diversity of opinion, disposition, travel-destination or colour preference, that is, a diversity of ideas and behaviours not dependent upon geography, tradition, language, culture or the like.

The social progress liberal, on the other hand, might have little difficulty in championing diversity of nations as an always needed or always helpful aid to progress. It would not matter to him whether or not all men are or are not "basically" the same since their individual development or happiness is not his objective. He could tolerate or promote different levels of happiness between nations if it were "useful." Then again, he might wish to see all nations achieve the same level of advancement or modernization because useful, and would therefore accept "self-determination" as the means for a greater and more widespread "development" of society, such as Smith, Plamenatz, Deutsch and others suggest. Which means, though, that he either envisions a universal technological society eventually without distinct nations or one with nations that are only distinct in contributing different elements to the global project. He might, then, support even the idea that people should choose their own rulers while stipulating that this recommendation should only apply to those peoples considered capable of governing themselves, i.e. those which are already at an advanced stage. And then questions of self-determination and independence become subordinated to other concerns. Colonialism and imperialism become provisionally acceptable if not required. Mill himself makes comments of this nature. He says that the superior (i.e. more advanced) party should govern the inferior, even if the latter is more powerful, until the inferior comes of age.[62] The danger is, of course, that notions such as coming of age, advancement and development may be relative, and may mean different things to different peoples. A "backward" state which merits outside rule can become more advanced than the mature state

which once claimed the right to rule others and yet remain "backward" in comparison to now further advanced countries. Mill should have perceived this difficulty, arguing as he did that the contents of certain terms do not remain static.

The social progress liberal, then, can take at least three different stands on nationalism: 1. he can favour nationalism which promotes differences on a wide range of issues and levels, promoting universal [illegible]on-universal progress, however he might wish to define it; 2. he can favour nationalism which ensures competition of ideas and methods among nations all playing the same game of material progress; or 3. he can (in conjunction with the last position) oppose "backward" nationalism and in the process justify colonialism and imperialism.

Regrettably from the standpoint of simplicity the final form of liberalism - human rights or personal development liberalism - does not embody a single stance on nationalism either. The position of the person advocating this liberalism will depend in part on his views on the nature of the agent who is man, and on his views on competition. If he says that man is essentially the same everywhere, that who he is is not determined by or by necessity expressed by traditions, language, culture etc., if he sees attention paid to such "externalities" as conflict-producing and as an inhibition of man's natural brotherhood or compassion, then he will oppose nationalism in the long run at least, as Kant seems to in his essay on a universal history.[63] But it must be noted that the idea of world federalism is not incompatible with nationalism. Rousseau, for example, makes nationalist arguments for small self-sufficient states while speaking favourably of federalism.[64] He also writes as a proponent of world federalism.[65]

If the human rights liberal sees the various "external" characteristics as neutral in themselves, then he may favour nationalism if he maintains that a diversity of such attributes will help men to feel secure or will, through interaction between them, spur men to a greater respect for individuals with distinct outlooks and contributions to make, and if he believes that through competition (undoubtedly amiable and well-intentioned competition) men will challenge one another as members of nations. If he should say that man is who he is because

of, or must express his humanity through his interaction with nature, traditions, culture, and nationality then he assuredly will support nationalism.

Perhaps you will wish to interject, as Minogue undoubtedly would,[66] to protest that a liberal cannot attribute such importance to differences between individuals; liberalism recognizes only "generic" man stripped of such "incidental" if not imagined traits. First, note that to say that all men have intrinsic worth for whatever reason is not to say something incompatible with an assertion that this worth may be expressed or supplemented by the possession of non-universal characteristics. If you wish to say that this is not liberal note that it is consistent with this last kind of liberalism which is very much a liberal doctrine in positing liberty of thought, mind and will for each individual, and in rejecting the paternalism of religious and secular authority.

This liberal, I surmise, in any event, could also support nationalism of a defensive kind. While not necessarily saying that there are such things as nations, he could support measures by groups targeted as such by others. If, for example, he witnessed discrimination against individuals because of their perceived membership in a nation or race preventing them from being self-sufficient or from developing their potentialities, then he could champion their collective action to counteract this discrimination as long as it existed.

More importantly, though, we should also note that this liberal, regardless of his stand on generic man, values political participation. Given that it may be impossible for everyone to fully participate directly in the resolution of global matters, the weight of numbers not allowing this, and given that it may not be desirable to resolve globally what may be seen as "local" matters, then it follows that there ought to be smaller political units as well in which men can exercise their political talents to the degree to which they are capable, or so this liberal could argue.

Rousseau, interestingly, seems to argue that political participation depends on the possession of a national character.[67] This could be because he perceives that men will not wish to take part in governing themselves unless they see that those with whom they would share the making of laws have traits in common with them, traits which cannot be universal because

they can only have meaning close to their origins. He maintains, in fact, that there are differences between peoples due to different climates, geography and traditions; there is usually no need to invent them. This, incidentally, does not mean that he favours economic specialization (which would make him an opponent of economic nationalism). He favours agricultural self-sufficiency[68]; he also subordinates maximization of the use of natural resources to the regulation of men's lives. Better to make bad use of fields than of men, he says.[69]

Rousseau also explicitly links liberty and patriotism, calling love of country and of liberty a single thing, and explaining that love of country is love of law and liberty.[70] It is also interesting to note that Hobhouse states that national and personal freedom are from the same root.[71]

K. Some concluding remarks on liberalism and nationalism

The preceding demonstrates that some forms of liberalism are indeed compatible with nationalism, contrary to a not uncommon perception. Grant, as I indicated, does not say that liberalism and nationalism are incompatible; he says that liberalism and meaningful or morally supportable nationalism are alien to one another. We are now in a position to say whether or not this is correct. The easiest answer is to say that that will depend upon your views of the various forms of liberalism. We can say, however, that it is the personal autonomy and development, or human rights liberal who perceives the individual as a moral agent who is who he is in large measure because of his political nature. It would have to follow that since he sees the individual as the vehicle for and the end or objective of morality, that his position is the most "meaningful" or moral of any of these liberal ideologies, if morality involves collective concern for the well-being of all individuals. (This is not to say that all of the other ones are "immoral"; they either posit an inegalitarian or relativistic morality, or in effect disassociate morality from the political realm.) Using Grant's criteria, therefore, there is at least one form of liberal nationalism which is worthwhile by not making its main aim whatever man decides he wants, or material progress. Grant might dispute whether this form

of liberalism is possible but his contention surely must not be that it cannot be advocated, only that it cannot be successfully implemented or even be influential, an argument based on the premise that man cannot now, even if he once could, consciously determine at least a portion of his own history. To maintain that he does not, I repeat, is to leave our well-being to some considerable extent to those who realize that their conscious decisions necessarily have an impact on human affairs, and to those who do not realize this, as well as to those who do not act particularly purposively.

To summarize, then, I conclude that since there is no single liberal ideology it would be impossible to state precisely to what extent liberalism and nationalism are compatible in general, except to say that both see man as at least a partial creator of his own destiny, that is, as a rational being in some sense. But we can draw few other general conclusions. Neither a liberal nor a nationalist need be or not be an individualist or a "collectivist" (understood as someone who asserts the existence of a collective reality beyond the sum of the parts of a society). Neither is always for or against capitalism or material progress. Each may or may not hold that life is always worth preserving at (almost) all costs.

A liberal, in fine, then, may or may not be a nationalist. He may be an imperialist but in that case he would not be a nationalist. (It is inconceivable, incidentally, that he would be a racist, chauvinist or militarist.) But to determine whether he is or can be a nationalist requires an examination of the components of his ideology which he does not share with all liberals.

The next challenge is to determine whether Grant is correct in asserting that conservatism, in its true (or best) form, is the only political outlook compatible with morally defensible nationalism.

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2 Ellen Wood, Mind and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 2-4.

3 Harold Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism (London: Unwin Books, 1962), p. 87.

4 See John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 14, 67.

5 Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism, p. 160.

6 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism in Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, edited by H. B. Acton (London: Dent, 1984), p. 59.

7 Mill, On Liberty in Ibid., p. 163.

8 Hobhouse, L.T., Liberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 47, 50.

9 T.H. Green, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," in The Political Theory of T.H. Green, edited by John R. Rodman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), pp. 43-74.

10 Peter Laslett, Introduction to Locke's Two Treatises of Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 56-57, 118-120.

11 Harry K. Girvetz, From Wealth to Welfare (The Evolution of Liberalism) (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1950), p. 196.

12 Murray Rothbard, "Frank S. Meyer: The Fusionist as Libertarian Manque," in Freedom

and Virtue, edited by George W. Carey (Lanham, M.D.: University Press of America), pp. 93-94. Italics in original.

13 Ibid., p. 97.

14 Hobbes, Leviathan (Middlesex England: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 212.

15 Ibid., p. 269.

16 See Ibid., pp. 232, 235, 240, 241, 249, and 254, for example.

17 Ibid., p. 186.

18 See Locke, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 348, 352, 373, 398, 403-406, 421, 429.

19 Hobbes says that violators of the law who are not parties to the covenant may be subject to evil consequences which are simply designated "hostilities" rather than "punishments." See Leviathan, chapter 28, especially p. 260.

20 Cited by Rothbard, "Meyer: The Fusionist as Libertarian Manque," p. 93. Italics in original.

21 Cf. Russell Kirk, "Libertarians: The Chirping Sectaries," in Freedom and Virtue: The Conservative/Libertarian Debate, p. 123; and John P. East, "Conservatism and Libertarianism: Vital Complements," in Ibid., p. 86.

22 Laski writes favourably about pluralism and against sovereignty in Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty. See Michael Curtis, The Great Political Theories II (New York: Avon Books,

1962), pp. 370, 383, 384.

23 See, for example: Eric Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (London: Camelot Press Ltd., 1957), pp. 123, 296; Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 269, 349.

24 Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 149.

25 Ibid., pp. 89-92, 118-119.

26 Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, pp. 157, 166-167.

27 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 9.

28 If some do find pleasure in making decisions they may not find in it the same amount of pleasure as others do, which is something a universal granting or recognition of liberty cannot take into account, but which a utilitarian should, or so argues D. A. Lloyd Thomas. See Thomas, "Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Ethics, April 1980, pp. 319-334.

29 Cf. Plamenatz's comments concerning Halevy and Mandeville in his The English Utilitarians p. 49.

30 Mill, On Liberty, p. 85.

31 Ibid., p. 143.

32 Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 65-66.

33 Mill, "Nature," in Three Essays on Religion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 19-21, 32, 46, 49.

34 Acton, editor of Mill's Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, footnote #29, p. 463.

35 Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, edited by Lester Crocker (New York: Pocket Books, 1967), pp. 212, 255.

36 Rousseau, Social Contract, in Ibid., p. 23.

37 See: Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 155; Social Contract, pp. 23, 88.

38 See Rousseau, Constitutional Project for Corsica, in Rousseau: Political Writings, edited by F. Watkins (Edinburgh: T. Nelson & Sons, 1953), p. 311.

39 Ibid., p. 325.

40 Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T.A. Sinclair (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 119.

41 F. Watkins, Introduction to Rousseau: Political Writings, p. xxiii. See also: Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West, pp. 103-104.

42 Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 204.

43 See: Rousseau, Social Contract, pp. 145-147; Rousseau, Considerations on the Government

of Poland, in Rousseau: Political Writings, pp. 162-176, 179, 244.

44 Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 113.

45 Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 246.

46 Immanuel Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), pp. 18, 39.

47 Ibid., p. 56.

48 Ibid., pp. 14, 16, 56, 58-59.

49 Ibid., pp. 39-41. See also p. 83.

50 T.H. Green, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," in The Political Theory of T.H. Green, edited by John Rodman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 53.

51 Ibid., p. 52.

52 T.H. Green, "On the Different Senses of Freedom," in Works of Thomas Hill Green, edited by R.L. Nettleship (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1900), p. 327.

53 Mill, On Liberty, pp. 124, 127, 130 and 135.

54 See: Ibid., p. 179.

55 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 19 fn.

56 Mill, "On Nationality," in Considerations on Representative Government, p. 392

57 See: Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 72; Hayes, Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 245.

58 See Hayes, Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, pp. 128-130.

59 See: Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 70-71.

60 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, p. 397.

61 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 299.

62 Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, pp. 395-396.

63 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant's Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 41-53.

64 Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, pp. 181-183.

65 Cf. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 257-258.

66 K.R. Minogue, The Liberal Mind (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1963) See, for example, pp. 61, 154.

67 See Rousseau, Constitutional Project for Corsica, p. 293.

68 Ibid., p. 283.

69 Ibid., p. 309.

70 Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, pp. 244, 176.

71 Hobhouse, Liberalism, p. 72.

VI. Conservatism

Since I have insisted that there really are a number of different liberal ideologies or philosophies you may wonder how many different kinds of conservatism I will wish to say that there are. I perceive only two as I see little variation in fundamental premises and objectives in the purportedly conservative writings that I have read. And some that I have seen show a greater correspondence with other ideologies than with any politically servicable use of the notion of conservation. So is the case with the so-called conservatives who do speak loudly in favour of equality and individuals' innate right to liberty: these persons may be better thought of as "ideological liberals" or "libertarians" although there may be some affinity in their views with conservatism.

I conclude that the main conservative views advanced are either articulated in opposition to "rationalism" and in support of "nature," tradition and continuity, or are "ideologically" espoused with the purpose of using "conservative" sentiment in the service of elites. There may be some difficulty in distinguishing between the two as the former is also elitist. Much less effort is required to ascertain the radically individualistic libertarian postulates of "the new right."

The conservative, I shall show, is in favour of a limited nationalism. He opposes direct, purposive attacks on what he feels is central to his way of life. He will insist, on the other hand, believing that man collectively ought not to try to *direct* his own affairs, that man should try to keep them on course. If a society "naturally" evolves in a certain direction, even if his way of life should change, he should simply help things along. This is because he, the conservative, distrusts reason, even if he believes that it should play an important role in political life. He consequently sanctions spontaneity, passion and patriotism. Even when he limits this to a defence of the positive or noble passions, though, the conservative fails to realize that man can err as much, if not more, in following them as he can in pursuing good intentions, rationally thought-out. Apart from this, it is possible to judge conservatism on the basis of its justification of inequality, privilege, hierarchy, political authority (and a concomitant denial of political freedom), and ethnocentrism.

I do not conclude that Grant unequivocally holds conservative political views. His political thinking is predominantly conservative, nonetheless, and therefore subject to many of the criticisms which I shall direct at conservatism, and by extension, at conservative nationalism.

How can I say that there are only one or two conservatisms when conservatives differ among themselves on so many different levels? They differ about the role of religion and of the concept of natural law in politics, about the propriety of government intervention in the economy, the welfare state, the desirability of material progress, the advisability of rapid non-political change, the rate and direction of political change if any is to take place, the subordination to or independence of associations from the control of the political sovereign, the role of authority, the degree of independence of the local community, and about numerous other issues. From what I have been able to ascertain, though, these differences are in many instances much more minor than they may at first seem. There exists much agreement on the nature of man and politics, and consequently differences about means can fairly readily be narrowed if not reconciled.

A. More than a stance toward change

You may recall that Grant speaks about two kinds of conservatism - traditional and modern. The former, he says, entails a recognition of a divine sanction of political authority, and an appreciation of nature, of the fallibility of man and of the importance of humility, among other things. The latter is mainly a stance toward change. So, according to Grant, the modern conservative provides for order and guides the "progress" of whatever regime may exist (which happens to be the modern liberal regime).

Grant makes a serious error. He fails to see that these two conservatisms are essentially one. There is no outlook which embraces only a position on change to which it is appropriate to apply the political label of conservatism. More and less rigorously laissez-faire conservatives share a common understanding of the world. (This is to leave aside for now any discussion of "ideological" and so-called "libertarian conservatives".)

Samuel P. Huntington, in an impressively ar[illegible] but flawed article, makes a similar mistake, failing to appreciate that conservatism today is more than simply a desire to prevent quick change and to preserve relatively intact the status quo. He says that there are three theories of conservatism, only one of which is valid. He identifies these as the aristocratic, autonomous and situational theories. The first identifies conservatism "as the ideology of a single specific and unique historical movement: the reaction of the feudal-aristocratic-agrarian classes to the French Revolution, liberalism, and the rise of the bourgeoisie at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth century." The second holds that conservatism "is an autonomous system of ideas which are generally valid. It is defined in terms of universal values such as justice, order, balance, moderation." And the third "views conservatism as the ideology arising out of a distinct but recurring type of historical situation in which a fundamental challenge is directed at established institutions and in which the supporters of those institutions employ the conservative ideology in their defense."[1] Huntington concludes that conservatism "does not ask ultimate questions and hence does not give final answers. But it does remind men of the institutional prerequisites of social order. And when these prerequisites are threatened, conservatism is not only appropriate, it is essential."[2]

Huntington's argument does not work for two reasons. First, there is little reason to say that a go-slow approach or an opposition to any change belong to a distinct political outlook. But if there is one, what does it say about *any* political phenomenon which political philosophies it might complement do not? Surely a non-revolutionary liberalism does not need to have appended to it an explicit but separate philosophy of order and change. Nor does a revolutionary socialism need to articulate beyond the tenets of its doctrine that revolution is no longer needed once the day is won. Whatever can be unique about being cautious to preserve gains made?

Huntington provides the answer to this last question, revealing the other reason that his argument does not work. The conservative approach incorporates a number of premises which are distinct and point to the kind of change that man should allow and prevent, and

which also point, consequently, to the nature of the political order itself. That is, all three of his conservatisms, he says, share some ideas which together constitute what he calls the conservative position; these are generally Burkean and incompatible with liberalism and socialism as well as with other ideologies. The conservative believes, as Burke did, Huntington says, that society grows slowly, naturally and organically; prudence and habit are better guides than reason and abstraction; rights are derived from duties, that is, from the performance of obligations to the community; and men are unequal, meaning that hierarchy is necessary.[3] Conservatism, then, does have some distinct things to say about "the character of institutions." And to say that Burke's conservatism was compatible with liberalism, for example,[4] is quite a mistake, showing a lack of appreciation of the inherent position towards "freedom of enterprise" in conservatism. Burke was a conservative and as one, a supporter of private enterprise; he was not "conservative" about "liberal" institutions. Huntington's position, and any others similar to it, ignore some key elements of conservatism.

Modern conservatism is not merely a defence of the status quo. It prescribes reverence for existing social and political structures, but *only* for those which have evolved; it also includes a rejection of egalitarianism and an approbation of classes, distinctions, privilege and elite rule as well as of the institutions of the family and private property. It supports, in short, the conservation of a natural order which is deemed to be natural by the fact of its existence over a period of time, as if man could not subvert nature or act "unnaturally" or unwisely over extended periods. Modern conservatism, then, is very much like the older variant; they are, in fact, essentially the same. The unity of the conservatives' own position is also often revealed through their identification of their seemingly many opponents (primarily rationalists, utopians, liberals and socialists) as a single foe.

B. Conservatives on reason and principles

The conservative sees the rationalist or idealist as someone who cannot appreciate the proper role of reason. Knowledge, in effect, presents itself to us. Even in natural science, sometime conservative Michael Oakeshott suggests, the advances in knowledge do not come

from technical rules or formulas, but from received insights and luck.[5] Science proceeds, moreover, he says, by a process incorporating other intangibles which cannot be written down. It is in very large part tradition and knack, in other words. Oakeshott, and others who follow his lead, such as Scruton, say that theoretical knowledge can only be a partial representation of reality and because it is partial it is a mistake (a liberal or rationalist or utopian mistake) to treat it as the whole. This is especially so in the case of human affairs which are infinitely more complex than laboratory experiments.

Some conservative writers extend their claim even further and insist that to choose ends or "effects" beyond activities in which we are already engaged is to delude ourselves. It is to choose goals we only imagine. What makes sense, or is "rational," can only be defined according to ends already given. We cannot play soccer well by trying to figure out the best strategy for downhill skiing. We can only say what rational conduct on the highway is by looking at the way of life in a particular place in which driving a certain way makes sense - presumably because there is an established system.[6]

Oakeshott contends that the rationalist's argument that we select the criterion of rationality of an activity, before we act, that we judge it according to predetermined ends which we think it ought to serve, and then evaluate it according to its success in achieving those ends, is a mistaken argument. He says:

> ... it is impossible even to project a purpose for activity in advance of the activity itself. Not only is his participation in the concrete activity which is involved in the solution of this sort of problem the source of his power to *solve* his particular problem and is the spring of the activity which goes to solve it, but also it is his participation in this concrete activity which presents the problem itself.[7]

I cannot see that we can only choose within activities we have not placed ourselves. Oakeshott's argument really seems to be a denial of free will and an insistence that historical determinism is true. I am not convinced. Cannot someone playing soccer wish to play basketball, introduce basketball to his country, invent it if it does not exist, or perhaps if it does, draw parallels and learn from them since both games may be versions of a universal, i.e. games, or competitive activity? Similarly, is it rational to follow a highway system which may be long-established but leads to consistently high levels of fuel inefficiency and

injury-accidents?

The conservative contends that *no* "abstract" ideal will be as good or beneficial as the traditional or proven way of doing things. Any such abstract ideal can be known in advance to be flawed. This is, as before, the conservative will say, because man's ideas can only capture part of the reality of human interaction. Any attempt to direct human affairs will inevitably have unintended consequences.[8] But inasmuch as the rationalist will be able to influence events, the argument may continue, he will impose his preoccupation on the rest of society to its detriment. The liberal, Scruton maintains, "finds himself always constrained to endorse (whether wittingly or no) the habits and predilections of a particular way of life - the way of life of the emancipated urban intellectual."[9] Or, in Oakeshott's words, for "such people": "To govern is to turn a private dream into a public and compulsory manner of living."[10]

The conservative concern here, then, is that the rationalist, by ignoring or trying to destroy traditions, myths, prejudices, cultural and racial differences, differences between the sexes and so on, shows that he is living in another world, not the real one in which these elements of the lives of flesh and blood human beings make life in common meaningful and enjoyable, or even possible. These differences, Scruton says (as we have heard Minogue say before), are precisely what provide individuals with their identities. Without them men are truly "alienated" in the most important way. "For what remains of freedom when there is no self-conception, and how can there be self-conception in a world that is seen only in abstract terms?" he asks.[11]

Edmund Burke pointed out that the rationalist will do the same thing as the harshest conqueror: he will destroy everything distinctive about a country: "in religion, in polity, in laws, and in manners..."[12] He will destroy, as well, all opinions and prejudices and as many instincts which support government as he can; he will reduce obedience to a matter of force.[13] He will try to govern by simple principles whereas "the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity..." [14] He will, in short, govern badly.

The rationalist or idealist, moreover, will be prone to perfectionism. He will, according to the conservative, be frustrated when unsuccessful, and violent. He will be heartless. He will not settle for small gains, they are of no interest to him, as Burke says.[15] He will be so convinced of his cause, and his methods, that he will find no price to pay too high; any consequences of his actions are justified, Kendall argues.[16]

The conservative, so clearly opposed to the violent fanaticism of the rationalist-idealist, obviously sees himself in the sharpest of contrasts. He prides himself on his ability and inclination to compromise, be moderate, and act prudently. Oakeshott boasts that:

> The man of this disposition understands it to be the business of a government not to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed upon, but to inject into the activities of already too passionate man an ingredient of moderation: to restrain, to deflate, to pacify and to reconcile: not to stoke the fires of desire, but to damp them down. And all this, not because passion is vice and moderation virtue, but because moderation is indispensable if passionate men are to escape being locked in an encounter of mutual frustration.[17]

Burke speaks of compromise and moderation as well- as a check on arbitrary power. He writes that the existence of opposed and conflicting interests:

> ... render deliberation a matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all change a subject of *compromise*, which naturally begs moderation; they produce *temperaments*, preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude, unqualified reformations; and rendering all the headlong exertions of arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable.[18]

A mystery presents itself at this stage of our discussion. If the conservative is so pragmatic, if he says that he rejects the abstract idealism of the rationalist, the liberal and socialist; if he can explain, as Kirk does, that the conservative outlook can be summed up in the declaration that "for the conservative, politics is the art of the possible, not the art of the ideal"[19]; if Oakeshott can write that "the intimations of government are to be found in ritual, not in religion or philosophy; in the enjoyment of orderly and peaceable behaviour, not in the search for truth or perfection"[20]; if all these things represent conservatism, as I am confident they do, then how does another picture of the conservative fit in? That is the picture of the inflexible man of moral principle, the man of unyielding precepts, the uncompromising foe of materialism, communism and whatever else? Is the answer that the conservative's only

unbending principle is his opposition to unbending principle?

The answer does not lie in a distinction between abstraction and principle. Kirk points out that Burke "did not abjure general ideas; he distinguished between 'abstraction' (or a priori notions divorced from a nation's history and necessities) and 'principle' (or sound general ideas derived from a knowledge of human nature and of the past)."[21] Does a conservative, then, only generalize within concrete, non-universal circumstances? Hardly. If a principle is shown to be applicable in certain circumstances only, but the principle is true wherever those circumstances arise, then you have not demonstrated that this kind of universal is not one, or that it is blind to circumstances. Besides, the conservative does make universal claims, about man's capacity to reason among others. Furthermore, he does deal in abstractions. After all, can a "principle" fail to be an abstraction, that is, a generalization held to be true apart from immediate unique appearances. No rationalist, or at least not all rationalists, should be accused of a priorism, in any event. The rationalist may base his generalizations on what experience has presented to his reason, rather than simply to his physical senses, and it could be this which distinguishes him from the conservative and empiricist.

In the end we see that the conservative's position differs in that when he discusses principles, many but not all of which he may wish to say are applicable in more limited circumstances than his opponents', he is going to say that they are known in a different manner. The rationalist will say he can know truths using his reason; the conservative will say that he cannot know rationally, or even empirically, what is true, as an individual. His claim must be that he can know truths or principles by knowing that others know them. Knowledge to him is a collective entity. How does the collectivity know what it does? By experiencing and expressing in a number of ways the same experiences. In myth, through habit, by carrying on traditions. Tradition and continuity, these are enormous words in the conservative's vocabulary.

C. Knowledge through tradition

The conservative sees traditions as important for two main reasons. He doubts the wisdom of any single individual. "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason," Burke says, "because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages."[22]

The conservative does not embrace all traditions, however. Surely not those of torture, Scruton points out. Traditions must be successful, mould the identity of persons holding them, and provide meaning to the acts emerging from them.[23] They unite a people and make it what it is.

To question the traditions that form the basis of a society would be, the conservative may think, to question its very existence. That is why Kendall says that the Athenians cannot tolerate Socrates. To do so, to treat all questions as open questions, is to allow the question of whether their way of life is worth preserving. If you admit that that might be an open question, I suppose you are saying, with the support of Oakeshott, Scruton and others, that is to go outside of society for some standard against which to measure it, and therefore to begin to dissolve it, or at least the identities (the human existence?) of its members.[24]

Indeed, Burke says that society:

> ... is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are dead, and those who are to be born.[25]

How, then, can one generation question a common inheritance on behalf of preceding and forthcoming ones? It would be presumptuous for it to do so, would it not? Of course, the conservative does wish to distinguish between worthy and unworthy traditions. The answer must be, therefore, that traditional authority will decide.

D. Education

The conservative emphasis on tradition - and authority - is apparent in his attitude towards education. Malcolm Muggeridge says that "education is a stupendous fraud perpetrated by the liberal mind on a bemused public, and calculated, not just to reduce juvenile delinquency, but positively to increase it, being itself a source of this very thing..."[26] This is a typical conservative view, but it should be noted that it reflects a rejection of a kind of education, not all forms of it. It is a rejection of the method of education the conservative sees as "value-free": the method of presenting facts, facts and more facts with the expectation that all crime, and all individual and group hostilities will vanish if only people were to know the facts about one another. What should be taught, then, and who should decide what this is?

Burke says that if "a prudent man were obliged to make a choice of what errors and excesses of enthusiasm he would condemn or bear, perhaps he would think the superstition which builds, to be more tolerable than that which demolishes - that which adorns a country, than that which deforms it - that which endows, than that which plunders..."[27] But Burke precedes this remark with the comment that superstition "is the religion of feeble minds." Does this mean that there are two sets of understandings? one for the feeble, another for the prudent and religious? It would seem that one group of men is to be acknowledged as knowing or coming closer to knowing the truth, a group which is then entitled to determine what is taught. The conservative is an elitist. And this informs his view of the role of the intellect in education.

The conservative view of education does not include teaching independence of thought, and the "objective" presentation of facts, at least not in the areas of philosophy or religion, history and politics. The conservative wishes to transmit values, to form "character," to train students to adopt habitually the mores of the society. Education for an individual, Oakeshott says, is "an initiation into the moral and intellectual habits and achievements of his society, an entry into the partnership between present and past, a sharing of concrete knowledge..."[28]

Consider, too, the words of Irving Babbitt, who says that: "The basis for right conduct is not reasoning but experience, and experience much wider than that of the individual, the secure possession of which can result only from the early acquisition of right habits."[29]

The conservative's lack of respect for the intellect, especially in the many, should not be taken as an endorsement of the full and free expression of all of the passions, though. This is one of the reasons why he believes that his kind of education is important. Education is to form character, perpetuate society, teach skills, and constrain some of human nature.

E. Human nature

The conservative sees that man is a being who is much driven by passions - selfish and selfless; that he has a number of inclinations - religious or philosophical, social and solitary; and that he possesses certain needs - for security, victory, recognition, to own, and so on, all in all, in a nature which is for the most part non-rational.

Kendall, for example, writes about "the stone-wall of innate and ineradicable human viciousness" against which "the best-laid schemes for perpetual peace will, soon or late, smash themselves"; he also writes about the big superpower showdown, "a war rendered unavoidable by diametrically-opposed views" which arise precisely out of man's :

> ... noblest aspirations - the aspiration to understand, the aspiration to penetrate the meaning of the universe in which he lives, the aspiration to distinguish between the good and the bad, the true and the false, the beautiful and the ugly, the aspiration to *identify* himself with the good, the true, and the beautiful, the aspiration, finally, to sacrifice himself, to give the last full measure of devotion, in order that the good should prevail.[30]

Is it not the heartless, violent, uncompromising "abstractionist" who Burke condemns in his Reflections, though? Is not this person, who is also reincarnated as "the rationalist," "the liberal," or "the idealist," the one who believes that there are common grounds upon which men can agree, or at least agree to disagree peacefully, and co-exist? To be fair, different conservatives do make different distinctions. Some will differentiate between Jacobin and human rights liberals and soft, comfort-seeking jellyfish liberals. Others will see all liberals, socialists, and revolutionaries as infused with the same inflexible utopian faith in

absolute abstract ideals avowedly knowable by each man's reason, and which cannot be compromised according to its adherents. Regardless of what he thinks of his opponents, though, the conservative will, in the end, maintain that conflict will be necessary, and violent, and that to partake in it on behalf of the right principles is noble and good.

The conservative, then, does believe that the ignoble passions, or ignoble expressions of them or of the intellect gone astray, do need to be held in check, if not defeated. He has no confidence in the natural goodness of man, his passions or his reason. Human nature is inherently flawed but it can be controlled to a degree.

F. Historical change

Reason, the conservative believes, can accomplish limited goals; it acts as a controller, a corrector, an a posteriori judge. Enmeshed in this view - that man should not attempt to consciously determine his own individual or collective destiny - would seem to be the premise that he *cannot*, except in minor detail.

Burke says that tried and proven old "establishments" "are the results of various necessities and expediences. They are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn from them."[31] He thereby returns us to the idea that human affairs contain and presumably proceed according to their own inherent principles or patterns; man cannot dictate a workable let alone optimum direction for them. Man's knowledge, and his potential for knowledge about himself and his activities, is limited. Reliance on his own plans and conscious efforts is unwise and dangerous; this seems to be the conservative message.

I see conservatism, then, as the articulation of a position exhorting man to be wary of any grand designs and projects, and the view that wisdom entails allowing the natural course of events to proceed; it is a desire to conserve the natural order.

It seems to me that conservative writers oppose "unnatural" change and similarly "unnatural" rates of change, meaning that they are suspicious of change or the rate of it which seems to be superimposed on an activity or institution, especially if done so for "external" purposes. In Oakeshott's words, the conservative "believes that the more closely an

innovation resembles growth (that is, the more clearly it is intimated in and not merely imposed upon the situation) the less likely it is to result in a preponderance of loss."[32] The conservative does not maintain that traditions do not change; it is the error of the rationalist to believe that they do not, Oakeshott says.[33] It might also seem to be the error of some conservatives, though. Huntington approvingly says that conservatism "is the articulate, systematic, theoretical resistance to change."[34]

Hearnshaw, on the other hand, maintains that reform is of conservatism's "very essence." He says that: "No persons are less true to the conservative genius than the reactionaries or 'diehards' who resist all alteration whatsoever without ever inquiring into the causes that have led to its demand."[35]

I should have to side with Hearnshaw on this point. Again, to oppose change because it is change is hardly to enunciate a *political* outlook. The least politically informed or reflective person can hold such a view; any person with some political knowledge must [redacted] of a particular state of affairs to oppose any change at all - he must consider the situation the best one possible, and furthermore, he must have confidence in man's ability to prevent change. I would suggest that the political conservative has no more confidence in this ability than he does in his ability to impose change.

The conservative's attitude can be best summed up as a "doctrine of organic evolution" to use Hearnshaw's words.[36] Change occurs naturally; history unfolds. Reason is to be used to correct deviations or perversions. Presumably this is what Burke has in mind when he comments that: "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation."[37] Change, consequently, is and is not actually change. It is growth, the fulfilling of the pre-determined. Change guided by wisdom is to make something more like it is. (A conservative, consequently, may be a "romantic" even if not a "reactionary" one, it would seem.)

Society is seen, therefore, as a living, growing organism, an organism composed of complementary parts, each with its own function, an organism that is constantly invigorated by the addition of new cells as the old and weak ones die off. Public policy, then, as

Oakeshott, Hearnshaw, Kendall and Disraeli say, is "to realize more fully the intimations of... existing society"[38]; it is to assure that new development takes place "along the old lines of progress"[39]; it is to make a way of life "itself at its very best"[40]; and policy makers are to appeal to old, not new principles for the former have caused past success, and are the guarantor of future prosperity.[41]

No individual is wise, no group of living individuals is wise, Burke says, as "the multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation, but the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it always acts right."[42]

He also comments that the universal Patron "in all things eminently favours and protects the race of man."[43] Assuredly other conservatives, whether or not theistic, are similarly laudatory of man as a species and of his history. It turns out that the critic of the liberal or rational optimism in the goodness of man is quite an optimist himself. He differs, though, in speaking of man collectively, over time, as if somehow we cannot say that man's accomplishments and failures are the products of distinct actions and decisions.

The conservative is something of a fatalist. As a result his viewpoint may be appropriately considered a "philosophy" rather than an ideology since he accepts "philosophically" the world the way it is without wishing to change it. (Perhaps this should entitle us to classify conservatism as a "disposition" instead, as Oakeshott would have it.[44] For to follow inclinations and preferences is not to philosophize, is it?) Yes, the conservative may not think or feel that the world is at any specific time what it "really is," but he cannot go far in his criticism of existing flaws without jeopardizing his entire position. He may even have to insist that we lack the wisdom to know just what is and is not imperfect: apparent imperfections now may be for the long-term good. All of which may create the appearance of leaving him logically impotent to counteract actions by others motivated by other understandings of the world. Oakeshott appropriately, then, states that "a question such as, Was the French Revolution a mistake? is a non-historical question."[45]

G. Religion and natural law

The conservative is necessarily a fatalist to some large extent; he is not necessarily "religious" or a believer in natural law. But to say that he is not, or to counter that he is, however, is not particularly productive, because doing so misses the main point. And that is that the various conservative positions on politics are in general agreement that moral relativism is an unacceptable stance, and secondly, that the communal instinct of the individual, the moral instinct or nature of the community, and the natural operations of the various "forces" of society are all beneficient.

Huntington, in disagreement with Alfred Cobban and Leo Strauss, asserts that Burke "did not judge the British constitution by a standard transcending it"; and he also claims that: "The efforts of contemporary publicists such as Russell Kirk to appear conservative and yet at the same time to espouse a universal natural law are manifestly inconsistent."[46]

Burke's views on religion cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to his philosophy, nor as in opposition to his thoughts on internal standards. Burke says that man has a prerogative "to be in a great degree a creature of his own making" but quickly adds that when man rules over man (as he should, some men having better natures), then man is to act in trust, accountable "to one great master, author and founder of society."[47] How is man to know if he is faithful to this trust? By judging whether or not he has respected the traditions of his society, presumably. This would be a universal truth.

Can there be any doubt, as well, that the conservative would have to maintain the existence of a "providential" order of tradition and religion or natural-law directed societies? That is, that man is no more to purposively direct the world of international affairs than he is to impose his will on internal social developments? The point is, then, that the conservative, whether or not starting from a pseudo-relativist position, is bound to postulate the existence of a natural order or course of events which man is to subject himself for his own (collective) good.

H. Freedom and democracy

The conservative, we have seen, does not think that men individually, or even collectively at a given time, are wise enough to consciously shape society for the better. The conservative, consequently, has a particular perspective on human freedom. He is in favour of it, to be sure, but as he defines it. He sees freedom, on the one hand, as the absence of intrusions into a way of life by those who try to impose their ideas: freedom is the absence of disrespect for the natural evolution of traditions, customs, institutions, etc. The conservative, conversely, also sees freedom as the participation in of sharing of the culture and customs and so on of a society. He may well conceive freedom in other senses but it is this one which he considers most important and worth preserving. It is a liberty wedded with or experienced in conjunction with order, as Kristol and Scruton maintain.[1] How can you value something (i.e. freedom), Scruton asks, unless you have learned the values of a society first?

Upon reflection you may note that the conservative's negative and postive views of freedom are actually parts of one view, giving priority to the role of traditions and the idea of continuity. It should not be surprising, then, that the conservative is not a "democrat," that is, that he does not favour rule of the majority of the moment.

If you wish to interject that a liberal need not be a "democrat," or that he may advocate something called "liberal democracy," consider that this means that the liberal either believes that the individual ought to merit his participation in the communal decision-making process, or that he as an individual has rights upon which the community may not impinge. The conservative, though, wishes to limit democracy on other grounds. He may wish to allow some to participate in government on an hereditary basis, or an ex officio one; he may wish to protect the "rights" of minorities which are not conferred or "recognized" by society; he distrusts majority "opinion" whether or not it is "qualified" because it may not adequately take into account the spirit of the existing constitution.

Some conservatives may not be openly anti-democratic because it may simply be more practical to advocate the form of representative democracy which is only an illusion of democracy. Some conservatives are frank enough, however, to unabashedly oppose

democracy.

Scruton downplays the importance of voting, saying that an electorate may choose a Hitler; that the Upper House is needed to protect views and interests, the advocacy of which will not win elections; and that the judiciary ought to be superior to Parliament, providing a brake on changes inconsistent with the constitution and precedent.[49]

Burke expresses a similar thought, less extraordinary perhaps because voiced in a less "democratic" age. He says that the elected representative is to give preference to his constitutents' interests but not their judgment, flattery not being his role.[50] He says the majority "is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority," more cruel than those of "a cruel prince."[51] He maintains that parliament has no right "whatever to violate property, to overrule prescription," or to impose a fictitious currency.[52]

Kendall demonstrates the same lack of confidence in truly democratic institutions. He maintains that the alternative to government by force or violence is government by discussion and debate, which is only possible among a people with the right habits which take time to develop; there must also be elite rule and popular acceptance of such rule.[53] Again, the message is the same: the will of the many should never, not even indirectly carry the day, if this will is the will of the day only; no efforts should be made to change this as the many will never be able to see the broader picture and this, indeed, is not regrettable because political participation in decision-making is not a good in itself, nor are the decisions of the greatest numbers possible ever to be counted upon as superior because of the volume of those making them.

The conservative may support participation in government by most individuals and may reject "the encroachments of arbitrary, unconstituted power," but as Scruton points out, this is not democracy.[54] Participation can be of an advisory nature only; limiting power is not the same thing as sharing it: Scruton must be thinking along these lines.

I. Inequality, elite rule, and privileges

Perhaps the greatest fear the conservative has of true democracy is that it will inevitably lead to the promotion of egalitarianism and the denial of privilege. The conservative cannot accept this because to him society cannot operate without ranks and privileges; they are part of the natural order. This is a theme repeated again and again by conservative writers: notions of the equality of man are mistaken and harmful. In Kendall's words, the conservative cannot tolerate the destruction of "those meaningful distinctions of rank, of privilege, of wealth, of prestige and position that any decent society develops and builds into itself as it grows toward achievement of the purposes that called it into being as a society..."[55] Society is a complex organism composed of many parts, each with its own function; it is folly to try to equate them, and even worse folly to try to remove the differences among them. The conservative wishes to stress that there is virtue in all conditions; the civil order benefits both the humble and the exalted, as Burke says.[56] Or, as Santayana says, the mediocre should be allowed to experience the happiness of mediocrity; to deny them this, the conservative would add, would be to needlessly cause frustration, resentment and social unrest.

To promote the dignity of each profession and position, however, is not to offer an explanation why dissimilar undertakings, equally virtuous, should be unequally rewarded in wealth and influence. The conservative's response is that an hierarchical order is both necessary and just. What it is first of all, though, is natural. There will always be those who lead and have more (they lead because they have more and have more because they lead, it seems). You can try to level society, Burke says, but you can never succeed; the most you can do is to invert the pyramid. Levellers set "up in the air what the solidity of the structure requires to be on the ground."[57]

Equality is a chimera, in other words. Inequality is natural, and necessary. Why necessary? Why is it not simply a curse? The conservative will likely say that a limited number of persons is able to appreciate the need to respect traditions and the "constitution," only a few are wise and can be trusted to act with and within the powers properly allowed to government. Kristol, for example, says that only a small religious, philosophical, or political

elite can know a priori what will constitute a good life for the common people (although they may not be able to know their preferences in commodities.)[59]

Now the conservative does not maintain that the most powerful or the wealthiest always do or should rule. He does maintain that there are certain classes of men who, by their nature, ought to be wealthy, powerful and attain political office, and usually do - if no-one interferes with the natural course of things. Consequently, while not all conservatives use the terminology of "a natural aristocracy" (which is "the soul to the body, without which the man does not exist"[60]), they all seem to imply the existence of such an elite. Their insistence on the natural, beneficial character of inequality entails recognition of this aristocracy.

It sould be noted that this aristocracy is not exactly a "meritocracy." Burke says that the qualification for governing should not be blood or titles but virtue and wisdom. But if virtue and wisdom may be "actual or presumptive"[61] it may be expected to accompany certain ranks attained and inherited, may it not? Burke speaks out on behalf of the nobility, "honoured and even privileged by the laws, opinions, and inveterate usages of our country, growing out of the prejudice of ages..."[62]

The conservative not only maintains that unequal entitlements (to position, wealth etc.) are natural and just, but also that unequal privileges are as well. Now obviously no-one can be entitled to, or in any narrow sense of the word "merit" a privilege. A privilege, indeed, is a privilege in being unearned. How, then, can a privilege be justified? In much the same way that unequal status can be. A person is allotted privileges on the basis of the position he holds, and not because of his own worth or even for his benefit alone. The Queen, an ambassador for a cause or any group of people, a vistor, a scholarship winner, or the one-thousandth customer of a business may have goods or other benefices bestowed upon him or her because of who he or she represents or because of what they are expected to do but have not done.

Kendall says that people should get ahead on account of their inherited status, inherited wealth, moral desert and originality; there should not be a preoccupation with "merit" (which is giving someone what they hire you to give them - which is most fitting for

bureaucratization but not creativity or freedom.)[63] Similarly, Burke says that the experiencing of success disproportionate to endeavour is no cause for a grievance in this life; consolation is to be taken "in the final proportions of eternal justice."[64] Only so much can be obtained by labour. What is obtained, then, is often a privilege or a share in privileges. Privileges are functional. They are unequal simply because they are privileges (not everyone is "entitled" to them), and because they accompany "natural" and "traditional" inequalities.

Do all conservatives share such views? I cannot say for certain, having, of course, limited knowledge of all of the views of all self-proclaimed or logically identifiable conservatives. I can say, however, that they fit in with a body of views which form a comprehensive whole, views which I have not yet seen a conservative deny when his own arguments have been consistent. This body of views includes outlooks on rationality, education, historical change, freedom, democracy and inequality.

J. Property

The conservative is a defender of inequalities and privileges: this includes those related to the ownership of property, which he takes he be a matter of natural inequality. It is interesting to note, here again, the same justification. The right to own property is not based on individual merit or contribution alone, although that may constitute part of the justification.[65] It is based, instead, primarily on the ideas of possession and continuity. Possession is a trust, a responsiblity and not an inalienable right. If there is a right to property it belongs to the community, but it is to be exercised by the individual, unless or until he demonstrates his unworthiness. Three reasons why this is so seem implicit in the conservative's outlook. First, the conservative may say that the individual is entitled to exercise (not claim) this right because he has had it and has acted on the expectation that he will continue to have it, as have those before him. Second, and more important, the conservative conceives the individual in terms of the community, and the community in terms of its individuals (although not just those living), and both in terms of "property" such as language, culture, traditions and history. Third is the consideration that the individual is the

means of transmitting the common inheritance along with institutions.

Scruton, for example, says that property is a means for the continuity of a human society and therefore cannot be horded by the individual at the expense of its survival (a merchant has no "indefeasible right to throw his grain into the seas"[66]; and that property is a means for the individual to satisfy his "*rational* need... to see himself as part of something lasting..."[67] Private property, then, which is the bastion of inequality, serves the community; it is also a guarantee against the concentration of power (and its concomitant interruption of the natural course of things.) As Burke says, the struggle to preserve belongings provides security against injustice and despotism, and helps to preserve the community "in a settled state."[68]

The strength of the conservative's commitment to private property is evident in Oakeshott's proclamation that the right of property is more important than the right to speak freely.[69] And in More's statement that: "To the civilized man the rights of property are more important than the right to life."[70]

K. The family and private associations

It might not necessarily follow logically that the conservative would want to link the notions of property and family, but he almost invariably does. He not only sees both as means for joining generations but also the family as a means for the transmission of property. Because he sees it as the most natural to wish to pass on property to those whom we are closest emotionally and "naturally"? I suspect so. Scruton says that: "Private property is added to, and reinforces, the primary social bond. It is for some such reason that conservatives have seen the family and private property as institutions which stand or fall together."[71]

The conservative also sees the family as an instrument for initiating the individual in what is, and teaching him to respect the past, and the established institutions of authority. Robert Nisbet puts it this way: "Let us have no nonsense about love and unremitting devotion... it is not love - least of all sexual passion - that the family has been built around

historically, but, rather, duty and obligation."[72] This, I think, is too coldly analytic, for the argument must recognize that things such as duty and obligation cannot be *felt* if they are imposed by force. Besides, what need would there be for the family if that were the case? The significant thing is that the conservative wishes to proscribe and teach roles in the family and in society. This automatically entails inequality of a kind, or differentiation at least.

Absent from the conservative's discussion of the family seems to be much concern with developing complete and autonomous personalities. In fact, he appears to favour the learning and appreciation of dependence, and of responsibility for those who are dependent on us, in a never-ending chain of natural emotion and authority tying together generations, and perpetuating the elements of community such as language, custom, and religion.

The conservative is attracted to "the family" in large measure because he sees it as natural, hierarchical and orderly, and based upon sentiment. This is significant politically partly because his ideal community may simply be the family writ large. Just as he dislikes "imposed" organization and likes actions in concert with emotional ties and the recognition of inherited responsibilities in the activities of the family, he does in society at large as well. And thus he looks first to voluntary (i.e. spontaneous or traditional) associations to perform works of good will or charity.

I do not wish to suggest that all non-conservatives will deny the importance of developing and strengthening non-rational social ties between citizens which cause them to wish to help out each other in times of need. The significant thing is the conservative's apparent distate for the non-spontaneous.[73]

We should also note that the conservative may emphasize the objectives of the voluntary associations he favours as much as he does their voluntary character. He would favour, I would imagine, the establishment of an organization to save the family farm and oppose one set up to promote an ideal of social justice. He would, nonetheless, I suspect, actually prefer spontaneous community activity to that which is "rationally" organized. Still, we should keep in mind that the conservative does see a role for government, especially if citizens fail privately to do what ought to be done for the perceived good of the community.

L. The welfare state

Those calling themselves conservatives have indeed supported so-called welfare-state measures, in apparent opposition to their preference for voluntarism. Would it be unfair to inquire, though, whether these individuals have responded to what they considered to be the concern if not the consensus of the community, rather than perceiving a cause which they wished to see the community recognize and act upon? The conservative, as we have seen, conceives an unequal social hierarchy as a key component of the common good; the lower as well as the higher ranks are needed and must be sustained. The conservative, consequently, may support welfare measures to keep all segments of society as contributing members. He may also be so bold as to suggest that the community needs its ruling classes and that such welfare measures protect *them*, not just their direct beneficiaries. Scruton is, typically, this bold. He writes:

> ... the Factory Acts, the legalization of trade unions, even the welfare state, were either Conservative inventions, or made possible by conservative forces that had long been struggling to bring such things into being.... Naturally these processes of adaptation served also to consolidate the interest of a ruling class. For social continuity was the motive.[74]

Now there is little doubt that some conservatives are very reticent in their support of welfare measures. I would suggest, however, that no conservative qua conservative could say that the welfare of a segment of the community is not the concern of the whole. He might favour private support of the poor, but could not disavow the means of "public" support when the former is not forthcoming. The conservative, on the other hand, also qua conservative, would be concerned about gradual transitions from corrective interventions in the marketplace to the assumption of responsibilities for co-ordinating and providing basic services which some do not seem to be able to provide for themselves. The conservative, that is, wishes to be vigilant against purposive efforts to select the direction of the society: he opposes ideas such as central planning and industrial strategies. In short, the conservative will support some welfare measures (and some conservatives more than others), while watching to ensure that they do not become usurpations of the natural course of things. This means that he will generally support private operation and control of the economy, although not

necessarily "free enterprise" or "capitalism" - depending on how they are defined.

The conservative, however much he may see government as an instrument of promoting the general good, then, is cautious about and wary of "too much" government. And thus an apparent affinity with the libertarian outlook. But is there really something which we should call conservative libertarianism?

M. Free-enterprise and libertarianism

To the libertarian, let us recall, the prevention of coercion is the only legitimate use of coercion by government. So fearful is he of the possible abuse of this function that he opposes government action to prevent indirect coercion or less-than-readily-apparent coercion; he assumes the individual or group to be capable of recognizing and resisting all forms of coercion unless proven otherwise. He stresses the notion of consent, and certainly not majority rule or any national consensus which is to be perpetuated by a process of socialization (unless it is a consensus on libertarian values, perhaps.)

Now conservative views clearly seemed aligned with the idea of a negative state, but I would suggest that there is a difference. Whereas the libertarian is concerned with interference with "liberty," the conservative is interested in using the state to prevent deviations from "nature" which men often instigate using their "liberty." The conservative does not support the view that legitimacy arises from the consent of the (living) governed. Nature prescribes government's role, which is to counteract man's meddlesome tendencies. When government fulfills its role individuals become better men and better citizens, although government is not to seek, itself, to define "better" or to make men so. Government must have this end in view, nonetheless; it does not strive merely to keep the peace.

The conservative favours a limited role for government, then, but not as limited as the libertarian. He does attach importance to the community as a whole, which does serve recognizable ends. He does not, moreover, wish to limit authority in those spheres in which he believes it to be legitimately held - he does not wish it to be limited by "democratic" devices, whereas he will wish it to be limited by tradition and precedent. He does not see power (i.e.

"coercion") as the problem. Someone may say that surely many conservatives are worried about power per se, and favour a competitive marketplace and an especially limited economic role for government. But are they conservatives?

Some conservatives do not see "laissez-faire" capitalism as natural; none, I would venture, see "freedom of enterprise" as a right. They may recognize the existence of "natural economic forces" while at the same time seeing the "rule of the marketplace" or "consumer sovereignty" as essentially an interference with the natural order. Why? Perhaps because it is too "immediate" or erratic, too trendy, too materialistic (i.e. "artificial"), too egalitarian. Conservatives, then, caught between opposition to government operation of the economy, and opposition to the free marketplace, often settle for government guidance of the economy.

Scruton argues that conservatives "have until recently always realized" that the interference of the state "in the market process" is "a social and economic necessity" in order to restrain "uncontrollable forces" that would cause great fluctuations in wealth, and to fix material expectations - through a stable common currency, for example.[75] Scruton's "interventionism" is not quite as "purposive" as it might sound; he never counsels imposing alien ideas upon an activity. In this case he may consider the market process to have its own tendencies which speculators, quick-buck artists and the like derail. I surmise. I know, though, that he opposes the nationalization of floundering industries in order to save jobs. He favours, on the other hand, government provision of "public services."[76] He does support, then, some notion of the free operation of natural economic forces.

Burke, similarly, seems to tolerate the free market as a necessary component of a successfully operating economy. Do not disturb "the natural course of things," allow servile, degrading "unwholesome and pestiferous occupations" to produce luxury goods, and reap the benefits of the distribution of "the surplus product of the soil." But Burke concedes that this "is a subject on which I have often reflected," revealing that he is uncertain, as well he should be because his arguments in favour of a ruling elite suppose a corrective role for political rulers."

This returns us to the central point: the conservative may well wish to limit the power of government for the same reason he will wish to limit the power of any and every segment of society, that is, in order to maintain tradition, ensure continuity, and allow for the preservation of the natural order, including natural change. His objective is not freedom from any of these, and therefore not freedom to choose or from constraint; his objective actually is the coercion of "the natural," if you will, meaning coercion of but also through those destined to rule.

Oakeshott's views are more problematic. He writes in a true liberal libertarian vein: He seems to wish to restrict the role of government to preventing coercion. Writing as an "English libertarian" he says that normally "to perform its office (which is to prevent coercion) our government requires to wield only a power greater than that which is concentrated in any one other centre of power on any particular occasion."[78] Writing as a conservative he says that government "is not concerned with moral right and wrong, it is not designed to make men good or even better.... its business is to keep its subjects at peace with one another in the activities in which they have chosen to seek their happiness."[79] He says he is suspicious of rulers "whose utterances are tied to generalities like 'the public good' or 'social justice'..."[80] But, again, this is the same man who criticizes "technical" thinking and who urges respect for the past and recognition that our wisdom of the moment will always be very much incomplete.

Now Oakeshott also asserts that "it is not at all inconsistent to be conservative in respect of government and radical in respect of almost every other activity."[81] Does this mean that he approves of the use of reason overriding tradition in non-governmental spheres? Does he think that "society" is that independent of politics that the latter could remain unafflicted by reason-driven change in the former? But most important, does not confining "conservatism" to the realm of government, especially very limited government, betray a preoccupation with something other than conservative values in politics? After all, politics can hardly be considered an isolated sphere with aims internal to its formal processes. Governors plainly have a greater role than bossing around bureaucrats, who in turn have a greater role

than making politicians happy by obeying (or seeming to obey) them. Oakeshott gives his readers reason to suspect that his political aim is freedom from authority rather than respect for traditions and concern for continuity.

Some other conservatives, or at least some others often identified as conservatives, appear much more overtly concerned with freedom. Do they retain enough of the conservative outlook to warrant the label? Do they integrate it with other ideas in a consistent fashion? Or do they contribute other insights which should cause me to reconsider my conceptualization of conservatism?

Milton Friedman, who along with F.A. Hayek, may be considered to be representative of so-called laissez-faire conservatism, is undoubtedly opposed to government coercion. The key to understanding his position is recognizing that this is due to a pre-occupation with choice. The only constraints that he wishes to place on "freedom" are those necessary to allow for "freedom." He recognizes no other political public goal - not utility, economic prosperity, tradition, or the preservation of any particular way of life or any components of one. His views, then, are highly compatible with the libertarian outlook, and differ in no significant way which I can discern. He says, for example, that the free man "recognizes no national goal except as it is the consensus of the goals that the citizens severally serve."[12]

Friedman even warns businesses to refrain from accepting such pernicious ideas as "social responsibility" and the need to aid charitable causes.[13] Is the objective the better fulfillment of public ends by the invisible hand of self-interest, or is it, instead, the freedom of owners and shareholders to place their earnings where they will?

The only thing which Friedman seems interested in conserving, in the end, is "free choice" and the order or peace which is necessary for it. He is correct, consequently, when he calls himself a liberal[14] but he should be more precise and call himself a libertarian.

Hayek, who also calls himself a liberal, should also call himself a libertarian. He says that a person is free if "he can expect to shape his course of action in accordance with his present intentions"[15] that is, if he is not coerced. According to his conception of good government, therefore, political life does not have as an end participation in determining

political goals but simply the precluding of any goal other than the prevention of direct, immediate coercion. This is evident in his dismissal of the importance of political liberty. "I can have no sympathy with the anti-democratic strain of conservatism," he says, but then, without sensing his inconsistency, adds: "It is not who governs but what government is entitled to do that seems to me the essential problem."[16] But this should be expected from a man who says that "full personal liberty" has nothing to do with having the right to vote, and who says that "a slave will not become free if he obtains merely the right to vote..."[17] As if a vote, or the combined vote of slaves would mean nothing. His view must be, simply, that since government ought to be very much restricted, there is not much value in having input into its decisions.

Hayek may seem to have a goal for society, after all, however. He explains that individual initiative makes progress possible.[18] But what are the problems for which gradual solutions will be found?[19] I do not know Hayek's answer. Can it be anything other, though, than that the market should decide which problems ought to be addressed? There can be no conscious community determination of which problems demand priority attention (and for which community action is, in any event, unthinkable)? Never mind that the pursuit of individual gain, as quickly as possible, leads to the catering to certain kinds of tastes, which leads to the creation of certain kinds of problems and to the neglect of others. All will be well in the end.

Hayek's views, then, at least those with which I am so far acquainted, are very much in conformity with Friedman's. They show an extremely radical individualism which is very "present-oriented," an individualism which denies any notions of collective origins of identities, problems and solutions, and which rejects the idea that the past or the future should place constraints on individual behaviour, except as the individual should judge at any moment that he does act. He shares some common objectives with the conservative, such as the prevention of ambitious purposive social and economic planning, but this should not lead anyone to think that he, or the other "neo-classical liberal economic thinkers," arrive at their concern for individual freedom from the same premises.

Other members of the "new right," other "neo-classicals," are, to my knowledge, even less conservative than Friedman and Hayek. This may simply be my impression due to their pre-occupation with "that all important sphere, economics," as Green calls it.[90] Knowing their views on a range of non-economic subjects would be unlikely to alter my opinion, however, because they underpin their arguments with a single proposition: that the most important objective is to ensure that all individuals are free to act as they wish at any given time to the greatest extent possible.

Should we speak, though, of "ideological" conservatives rather than (or as well as) of conservatives and libertarians? There are undoubtedly those who do use conservative rhetoric to hide their real aims which include privilege for the sake of the privileged. But we should not overlook the strong belief in private economic initiative which all conservatives share with greater and lesser numbers of qualifications. They unite, naturally, conservative non-economic values with this belief. This, I think, explains the frustration of some who criticize conservative politicians in office for not diminishing enough government activity. Some Conservative politicians may be truly conservative, even if others are simply libertarians using the most convenient vehicle available. Many seemingly libertarian conservatives are in favour of the traditional family, and against pornography and more-or-less absolute freedom of the press etc. They are not conservatives simply because they wish to preserve the privileged economic positions of those who now have economic power, or because they believe in "liberty" before all else.

I do not wish to downplay the existence of "ideological" conservatives. I simply wish to suggest that many of those seeking to advance their own good as the good of others are better thought of as "ideological" libertarians (if that is not redundant terminology).

N. Rights and obligations

The conservative unites the themes of rights and obligations, and often makes the former dependent upon the latter: they are contingent. Our neo-classicist speaks of rights which exist, period. We should not overlook the kinds of rights in question, however. The

neo-classicist, i.e. one kind of libertarian, will claim rights which are strictly negative: e.g. to freedom of speech, voluntary association and assembly, to act without interference in private affairs (as he conceives them), etc. The conservative may deny these and offer instead proportional rights (proportional to ability, station, contribution and so on), rights such as to political participation, a share in the material resources of the community, to education, to "fair" treatment as a member of a minority and so on. The libertarian, in contrast, shies away from anything that might involve redistribution.

The conservative conception of rights begins with the premise that individuals are creations of their societies. Individual rights are earned, consequently, by meeting social obligations. Do I have a right to free speech, someone may ask the conservative. He will respond: yes, you are entitled to this freedom as we now understand it in this place if you use your abilities to think and speak to contribute to the furthering of the ends of the community, or at least if you have not spoken out, damagingly, against them.[91]

The conservative believes that rights are granted and defined by the community, over time. Rights arise basically because they are found to serve its purpose, which above all else is its perpetuation (although this is not to say that the conservative does not have reasons for desiring its continuity). These rights are recognized in practice before they are in "fact" or are articulated in law, if ever. You are, in essence, entitled to do whatever the law does not forbid (as Scruton points out[92]), for the law forbids what is opposed to the public interest. But the conservative might not say that we have a right to do what is simply not opposed to the public interest; we only have a *right* to do what is in its interest. Neutral actions cannot be the proper subject of crimes or rights.

Now when Burke speaks of "the *real* rights" of all men, he talks about form mainly, and not content. He talks about a right to justice, to fruits of one's own industry, to a fair portion of society's benefits and so on, but not about who may claim them, or to which degree, which is presumably "to be settled by convention" as is any right to share a degree of political power.[93]

In conservatism, then, there may be no recognition of an inviolable private sphere. Individuals are who they are because of their circumstances. Their behaviour, as well, is seen as part of the social environment molding fellow and future citizens. The conservative, therefore, will favour censorship, for example, for moral reasons. We have, Scruton says, an obligation to be ruled.[94]

The important thing to note is that, as with principles, the conservative wishes to leave the particular details and applications of rights to specific societies. Thus he will back property rights, inheritance rights, the right to privileges and so on, but will not try, in fact will resist, attempts to apply them according to universal standards.

The conservative in dealing with rights as with other issues subordinates the individual to the claims and demands of his society, for which the individual is as much an instrument as an end.

This is in sharp contrast with Hayek, who says that the individual has an unlimited right to question moral beliefs,[95] and Friedman, who recoils at the suggestion that the individual ought to serve his country, rather than individual interests of those now living (or perhaps the individual interests of those who will follow as well?).[96]

O. Summarizing elements of conservatism

The conservative, to sum up, unites a number of themes: the need to counteract excessive claims for rationality in politics, the need to preserve the natural order which includes its own seeds of change, inequality, private property, the value of the family, tradition, continuity, inheritance, private (not "free") enterprise, and contingent rights. It makes no sense to follow Kendall's advice to include only uniquely conservative stands as elements of the outlook.[97] In fact, conservative writers seem particularly adept at claiming unique insights for their position which are not unique; they fail to detect nuances in the arguments they oppose. An inherent fault? Perhaps. The conservative outlook does appear to be, after all, a reaction against the advocacy of rationalism (including liberalism and socialism) and not always a clearly-considered response to ideas; too often it focuses on

actions of individuals whether or not these are consistent with their principles. This may be the result of a belief that principles are wholly contained in actions. It is unfair, in any event, to say that only the conservative shows respect for tradition, considers the possible to be limited by circumstance, is for moderation, tolerance, and prudence, and values anything other than "mere life." It is also unfair to suggest that proponents of equality of opportunity want to give people the opportunity to become something they manifestly cannot, and that the non-conservative wants rights respected whether or not it is possible. Remove these objections and the conservative still has much to say, nonetheless, that distinguishes his viewpoint.

P. Conservatism and nationalism

We are now in a position to examine the conservative perspective on nationalism. It will be necessary to also look along the way at the conservative outlook on patriotism, racism, imperialism, colonialism and militarism. We will see that a conservative idea which recurs throughout is that the natural should prevail, what is "imposed 'by reason" should not. Continuity is of utmost importance.

Now the conservative is certain to be, first of all, a "patriot" and a supporter of patriotism. He maintains that the individual is part of a link in a chain. The past has created him, he will help to create the future. The past is not, of course, a universal past, but a particular past - particular to a particular place with its own natural (geographic) features and its own traditions of human interactions and institutions. So his is an emotional or passionate attachment to the land, its people and its history. He loves his country, then, because he feels that it belongs to him. Still, Oakeshott is expressing part of the conservative point of view when he says that the conservative is disposed to patriotism because he is primarily disposed to the familiar, not the useful.[98] But there is another element, namely that the conservative senses that he belongs to his country and that he owes the fact of his existence to it, as Scruton affirms.[99]

The conservative has no use, only scorn, for a manufactured patriotism. You cannot proceed by a method of rational calculation to instill a sense of devotion and loyalty. Hence the response by Burke and others to the spectacles and civic feasts and the like of the revolutionaries of France, which they saw as "mere tricks."[100]

A similar conservative criticism is directed at rationalists' attempt to create political unity through the establishment of strong "central" governments. This returns us to an earlier question: what is the "natural" size of a political community to which the individual owes primary - or total - allegiance, and which factors determine this? It would appear that conservatives provide two widely divergent answers; I suggest that there is only one.

Some conservatives argue that the essence of social and cultural life originates in "the region," some say the "local" community, some may even narrow it down to the neighbourhood.[101] And thus they argue in favour of local or regional political autonomy and decentralization. Then there are those, on the other hand, who consider "local" government to be a mere delegation of authority by the national government which retains the right to revoke it.[102] Burke would appear to be on this side when he claims that national government is to have representation from the various parts of the country, but those representatives are to use their judgment to always decide impartially what is in the interests of the whole.[103]

The two positions may well be compatible. The conservative is in favour of diversity. He often speaks of the dissimilarity of circumstances and of the variety of elements or forces which constitute the social order, and of the variety of human roles which serve necessary functions in the hierarchy of the community. It is very conceivable that he will want to allow a functional autonomy (but not independence) to those managing levels of activities which do not effect the whole. If people have a greater feel for what should be done on a more local level, a greater familiarity or understanding, then they should make decisions on a more local level. But if there is a larger community, one which is united by linguistic, cultural, religious-moral and political values, then those values, and the traditions in which they are embodied, take precedence, he will say. Local decisions cannot run at cross-purposes with these. The whole, the entity at which the parts aim in serving their functions, and in making

their contributions, comes first. The parts, that is the included localities as well as the ranks and classes of individuals within the country, the nation, owe their character, their identities to the greater unit just as the individual does. We may then be able to make sense out of the stand which Burke and others take, *denying* a right to self-determination.[104] The parts are determined by the natural order of things. If they are to become separate or part of another land it should not be through a process of conscious decision. Political decisions, as always, should follow, not create the direction of human affairs.

I suspect that when Kendall and some other conservatives speak about states' - or provincial - rights, they either are not speaking precisely or clearly enough. If they mean that individuals truly do owe their primary allegiance to the larger country as a whole, but some concerns are generally without bearing on national values and traditions and the national way of life, then they should say so. But if they support "local" government rights because they think that there are distinct "local" ways of life, and which ought to command primary loyalty (as anyone arguing for state control of education and civil rights does, I would suspect[105]) then they ought to say that. That, quite simply, would be an admission that they think that each state or province actually should be considered independent, a separate country. The great discrepancy in sizes of countries may indicate that the larger ones are not naturally-sized units. Canada and the United States may simply be too big! Of course, any acceptance by a conservative of the right to secede is such an admission. (A problem these conservatives may fail to consider is that "local" boundaries can be "imposed" too, so that some living within them may *feel* part of a unit larger or smaller than the state or province in question.)

The conservative can, of course, support local government rights within a "federation" or confederation. He cannot, however, support a notion of federalism which includes a recognition of sovereign central powers (unless he recognizes no sovereign local powers.) He cannot recognize, in principle, more than one corporate community. For how can his organism, the natural state, have two heads and move simultaneously in two directions? The conservative can, however, counsel alliances which are designed to protect or

strengthen his state's body. He can within alliances (whether called alliances, federations or anything else) always continue to pursue his own purposes. Can these include expansion?

One of the problems which arises from the conservative position is the possibility that it may entail ensuring the permanence of existing boundaries, or of the boundaries the conservative thinks ought to exist. For if there is an obligation to perpetuate the past, that is the history, traditions, attributes etc. of every society, then changes to adapt to global or internal circumstances, or to pursue new objectives, are precluded. A conservative may say that he recognizes that as an organism the state does not continue on forever: it does die. But the conservative would seem to base his outlook on the desirability of maintaining the vitality of an already established way of life - making it more like it is, as we said before (which has to make you wonder how a conservative thinks any community ever legitimately began, or at least how a legitimate diversity of communities came about - unless he has a supernatural explanation or an explanation which includes independent occurances of evolution from animal forms of life in diverse locations.) Nonetheless, the conservative does perceive a natural process, of which he approves, in which societies are born, live and die. Just as he sees the individual in a role in the service of something greater than himself, subservient to it, and obligated to perform the duties of his role in order to receive benefits from it, the conservative sees nations performing a role in history. Those not performing their role, or assuming destructive roles, deserve to be, and naturally are taken over or destroyed. Some nations, like some individuals, moreover, are weaker, or play more servile roles, and are to be ruled or assimilated by the stronger. The death of particular individuals or nations can be warranted. The conservative's objective, let us recall, is not the preservation of particular lives, or of as many lives as possible (although it may include preservation of the species). His goal is the glory and greatness of his own society as part of the natural order. If this requires the conquering of other lands, in accord with the appropriate status of other lands, so be it. There is the hint of a rule of the strongest, limited (however paradoxical it might seem) by the need to respect nature.

It is as if the individual, generally limited in his ability to know ultimate purposes, is always to fight for his own country, and not for some universal "cause," and then nature - or God - will ensure that in the end the right sides have won.

Honour, glory, nobility and the like are the greatest treasures of the conservative, and they are attached to the success of his society. He does not choose his goals; they have chosen him in giving him life. The greatest victory is not for an ideal, because he can know none; he can only know what is given him which contains higher goods than he can understand. The highest form of recognition, then, is that of his country, especially if it comes from those properly in authority; the greatest source of satisfaction, and verification of having done good, is not to be found from within oneself. Militarism plainly meshes well with such an outlook, as does jingoism or chauvinism. I venture to say that little or nothing needs to be added to demonstrate an affinity with colonialism and imperialism as well.

The conservative will clearly also be a cautious advocate of immigration, if he is one at all. For he is convinced that any individual is the product of his society, more than he can ever be considered as an adaptable member of a universal species; the conservative sees human attributes as a social creation in each instance which cannot be easily undone if it all. He is likely, therefore, to favour young immigrants. But how far will he take his concern for cultural homogeneity? Will he discriminate on the basis of skin colour? Very likely, I imagine, for he may find colour as an easily discernable indicator of who is naturally unlike him. Will he discriminate among those of the same colour as him? Perhaps. He will probably feel most comfortable with those who are most similar to him - in physical attributes, in eating habits, mannerisms, accent and so on. Values and beliefs may be of lesser importance because they can be more easily misrepresented. In fine, birth outside of a society need not exclude entry, although colour might. If there is a natural uneasiness toward the unfamiliar, after all, it may exist for a purpose.

The conservative generally finds agreeable prejudices and preferences. It is all part of his world in which he sees persons as fillers of roles and kinds. Whether or not successfully, he may attempt to explain his position as does Scruton, who suggests that seeing and treating

someone as different is not the same thing as showing hatred, nor is acting upon "a desire for the company of one's kind" providing sufficient grounds upon which to be condemned as "racist."[106]

The conservative may be a racist in a benign sense of the word, then, and if he is (or if he is in a hateful sense) then claims he would make for the autonomy of his society would be more properly called racist than nationalist. Still, although it is true that the conservative does not believe in conscious "self-determination" for any individual, there still remains the option for him to accept as members of his "nation" or society those individuals who "naturally" become a part of it, other than through birth. The "nation" for the conservative may be made up of those who feel and believe they are part of the nation (rather than those who think and will their membership). Thus we may still be able to speak of conservative nationalism; when the conservative wishes to preserve his national way of life he may not simply wish to preserve the purity of the stock.

The conservative undoubtedly objects to the "rational" imposition of means as well as ends on what should be a naturally evolving and functioning entity - the political community. Oakeshott, for example, condemns the purposiveness of nationalism (as well as of social planning, church unity, the world state, federalism etc.).[107] Remember, however, that the conservative is not a complete fatalist. He allows for, even requires the loyal subject to act to keep his society faithful to its "true" or natural traditions and directions. As a result, there is a logical necessity that he be a "nationalist," or at least undertake what may appear to be nationalist steps when he senses that the way of life of his nation is threatened.

We should be careful, however, because we may be better advised to speak of patriotism, instead. It is only when the conservative wishes to enunciate some general principle that we should consider his interest in perpetuating a way of life to belong potentially to nationalism. It is as difficult to see the conservative promoting an inherent right of nations to self-determination as it is to envision him advocating rational choice of nationality. He may conceivably, however, support a general principle that each nation is to look after its own concerns. This could preclude one nation from interfering with the internal affairs of another;

it might not preclude, however, one nation from pursuing its own interests to the detriment of another nation's ability to control its own destiny. Nation A, that is, would not meddle in nation B's affairs, unless it considered B's affairs to somehow also be its own. This is, again, because each people naturally does and should concern itself with its corporate good. This would rule out benevolent interventionism (but not benevolence) and sometimes rule in imperialism and some forms of colonialism. The conservative principle, then, would seem to be only a weak approximation to the actual nationalist principle of the right of nations to self-determination.

Something else, however, is also missing from the conservative's potential commitment to nationalism. Nationalism is not only the idea of a right of nations, meaning of collectivities of persons sharing fundamental values, it is, as well, the right *to self-determination.* The notion of self-determination includes the idea that peoples are able to and should control the elements of the environment which influence and shape those values in addition to selecting (and possibly also creating) those values through a process of rational collective debate and articulation. The conservative may agree with the nationalist concern for control and rational debate and articulation (even if only at an elite level), but he may well insist that reasoning individuals in a collectivity are wrong about the values that they think are theirs, and wrong about the nature of the nation to which they belong. And thus a conservative may say that some separatists are wrong to wish to secede, even if they can win a referendum, for example. A full supporter of the idea of nationalism could not say this (although he might concede that a single vote on a single day may not be the best way to discern a people's will.)

The conservative would presumably wish to see changes in political jurisdictions evolve. And to let them evolve if they were evolving naturally. And so whereas he might allow for individuals to blend into a society, he would not likely wish to see groups seek independence, unless he considered them to be nations already in fact, although not in law - although this is problematic because of his respect for customary law. He would not want to see nation-states act very consciously and purposively to preserve their independence for that

could well be against nature. And therefore, the conservative, again, would not warrant the label of nationalist except in a very qualified way.

The conservative, though, will act to preserve given (not necessarily static) ways of life. Is this not in agreement with nationalism? I suggest that it usually is not. A patriot will be very much concerned with preserving his country's identity because it is a given, and because it is that of *his* country, not that of *a* country, whereas a nationalist may seek to obtain or preserve independence for his nation, in part because it is his nation, of his own people's making, but with the understanding that he is entitled to do so because it is *a* nation.

The conservative, then, is much more likely to be a proponent of patriotism than of nationalism. When he comes to the defense of his way of life, he will respond emotively. He will focus on the flag, the hereditary monarchy, heroes, ceremonies, the legends of the military, and so on. He will be very reluctant to look for indirect chains of causality, perhaps doubting that he can determine what they are, or simply failing to appreciate that they exist. Nisbet, for example, quite astoundingly, says that the existence of transnational political and economic authorities harmonizes quite nicely with the "localism" which he advocates.[108] The list of adversaries he cites includes national industries, trade unions and universities, which he indicates have been centralizing, standardizing, and eliminating diversity.[109] This does not merely reflect his judgment of a particular time. Even though he says that at times central government has been a means for liberation from oppressive ties "of caste, occupation, and church" he is underestimating the indirect changes that economic activity can effect apart from any respect (or disrespect) business and industries show for specific, readily-identifiable local sensitivities.[110]

Other conservatives are more prepared, however, to see different elements as contributing to the erosion of a way of life. The anti-materialist (or anti-commercial) position of Kristol, Santayana and Grant is an example. Grant, of course, thinks that it is too late. (Although he may think that it always was - i.e. history never could have been made to take another path - he does hint now and again that maybe things could have been different.) But maybe these men are exceptions, venturing into that forbidden land of "rationality." The

conservative mind seems to appreciate the existence of diversity but not the interrelatedness of so much that man does.[111]

It seems, in short, that the conservative will focus on that which causes a spontaneous emotional response, and the "rational" nationalist on the ideas, plans, and causal links he may perceive. The conservative, in other words, will accept "fate" much more readily. He will likely be a patriot *rather than* a nationalist.

The quasi-conservative libertarian, assuredly will have no sympathy for either kind of nationalism. He has no interest in the survival of any kind of society, just the continuation of guarantees of non-coercion by government and corporate bodies of any description. Hayek quite naturally relates nationalism to "collectivism"[112]; Friedman can envision no reason to give preference to a fellow national in commercial transactions.[113] Self-sufficiency, self-determination - such notions cannot enter their thoughts unless, perhaps, in opposition to anti-libertarian states and doctrines (e.g. "socialism" and communism).

1 Samuel Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology", American Political Science Review, 1958, in Gould & Truitt, Political Ideologies (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 146.

2 Ibid., p. 163.

3 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

4 Ibid., pp. 152, 153.

5 See Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1967), pp. 8, 24, 29-30, 103.

6 See Oakeshott's example, Ibid., pp. 109-110.

7 Ibid., p. 99. Italics in original.

8 See Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, pp. 172, 185. Also cf. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 118, and F.A. Hayek's ideas discussed by David G. Green in his The New Right (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), p. 126.

9 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1980), p. 120.

10 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 186. See also pp. 2, 35, 188.

11 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 190. See also: George Santayana, "The Irony of Liberalism" in The Portable Conservative Reader, edited by Russell Kirk (New York: The

Viking Press, 1982), p. 474; and Willmoore Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, edited by Nellie D. Kendall (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), p. 631.

12 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 226.

13 Ibid., p. 274.

14 Ibid., p. 73.

15 Ibid., p. 76.

16 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 583. See also F.J.C. Hearnshaw, "The Principles of Conservatism" in Political Ideologies, edited by Gould & Truitt, p. 140.

17 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 192.

18 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 40-41. Italics in original.

19 Russell Kirk, The Portable Conservative Reader, p. xviii.

20 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 188.

21 Kirk, Introduction to The Portable Conservative Reader, p. xviii.

22 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 105.

23 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 42.

24 See Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 166.

25 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 117.

26 Malcolm Muggeridge, "The Great Liberal Death Wish," in The Portable Conservative Reader, p. 622.

27 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 106-107.

28 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 32.

29 Irving Babbitt, "Burke and the Moral Imagination," in The Portable Conservative Reader, p. 459.

30 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, pp. 591-593. Italics in original.

31 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 213.

32 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 172.

33 Ibid., pp. 4, 31.

34 Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," p. 151.

35 F.J.C. Hearnshaw, "The Principles of Conservatism," pp. 140-141.

36 Ibid., p. 141.

37 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 23. Purposive change, he also says, should be implemented in order to preserve. Ibid., p. 306.

38 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 49.

39 Hearnshaw, "The Principles of Conservatism," p. 139.

40 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 166. See also p. 565.

41 Ibid., p. 67; Disraeli, "Utilitarian Follies," in The Portable Conservative Reader, p. 225.

42 Burke, Speech on Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons, 1782, cited by Eccleshall in Political Ideologies, edited by Eccleshall, Geoghegan, Jay & Wilford (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1984), p.99.

43 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 176.

44 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 168.

45 Ibid., p. 100.

46 Huntington, "Conservatism as Ideology," p. 150 fn.

47 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 112.

48 See Kristol, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Nihilism," in The Portable Conservative Reader, p. 643; Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, pp. 72, 120.

49 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, pp. 56, 63.

50 Burke, Speech to the citizens of Bristol, 1774, in Political Ideologies, edited by Gould and Truitt, p. 137.

51 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 153.

52 Ibid., p. 187.

53 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, 591.

54 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 56.

55 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 570.

56 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 43.

57 Santayana, "The Irony of Liberalism," p. 476. See also: Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, pp. 579-580; Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 157.

58 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 57-58.

59 Kristol, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Nihilism," p. 631.

60 Burke, Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, 1791, in Political Ideologies, edited by Gould and Truitt, pp. 135-136.

61 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 59.

62 Ibid., p. 170.

63 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 607.

64 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 303.

65 See, for example, Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 45.

66 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 74.

67 Ibid., p. 130.

68 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 170.

69 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 44.

70 Paul Elmer More, "Property and Law," in The Portable Conservative Reader, p. 442. Also p. 445.

71 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 101.

72 Nisbet, "The Restoration of Authority," in The Portable Conservative Reader, p. 672.

73 One relevant source is Kendall's "The Future of Individual Initiative in America," pp. 594-608 in Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, especially pp. 603-604.

74 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 117.

75 Ibid., p. 96.

76 Ibid., pp. 110-111.

77 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 198. Some conservatives plainly consider the conscious pursuit of wealth as an end in itself to be, if not unnatural, then constitutive of the bad side of man's nature. Santayana argues that having many possessions makes one a slave to them (See Santayana, "The Irony of Liberalism," pp. 468, 475); Kristol speaks about overriding the free market which is usually to be tolerated, when the need arises (See Kristol, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Nihilism," p. 632). Not a few others berate materialism.

78 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 42.

79 Ibid., p. 189.

80 Ibid., p. 191.

81 Ibid., p. 195.

82 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 2.

83 Ibid., pp. 133-136.

84 Ibid., p. 5.

85 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 13.

86 Ibid., p. 403.

87 Ibid., pp. 13-14, 20.

88 See David Green, The New Right, p.125.

89 Cf. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p. 404.

90 Green, The New Right, p. 138.

91 Cf. Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, "The People vs. Socrates Revisited," pp. 149-167 (especially pp. 165-167); pp. 586-587.

92 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 18.

93 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France p. 70.

94 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 16.

95 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p. 405.

96 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 1-2.

97 Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 38.

98 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 177.

99 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 32.

100 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 235.

101 See Nisbet, "The Restoration of Authority," p. 683.

102 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 162.

103 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 231; speech to the citizens of Bristol, 1774, in Political Ideologies, edited by Gould and Truitt, p. 137.

104 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 279.

105 See Kendall, Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum, p. 572.

106 Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, p. 68.

107 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics , p. 6.

108 Nisbet, "The Restoration of Authority," p. 682.

109 Ibid., pp. 677-678.

110 Ibid., p. 704.

111 This is evident, in part, in a penchant to see complex issues in simple moral terms. The way moral values are or are not taught may well be a part of the problems of drug abuse and family violence, for example, but only a part.

112 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p. 405.

113 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 129.

Conclusion

Nationalism, in its truest sense, is morally defensible according to one criterion set out by George Grant. It does respect persons as rational beings who collectively choose their political values or at least the actions through which they are expressed. It recognizes the articulation of political ideas as valuable. It values political participation in the ways in which nations are to be governed and in determining the directions in which they are to go. Nationalism, then, is most appropriately considered to belong to the particular form of liberalism which is concerned with rights and participation in politics. So not only is there a form of liberal nationalism, nationalism basically is liberal, and it (liberal nationalism, or nationalism simply) is moral in treating individuals as more than mere conveniences. It is morally supportable, moreover, in being a general principle, applicable to all nations, and inherently incompatible with imperialism, colonialism, authoritarianism, and the like.

What we might wish to call conservative nationalism is at most a principle that nations should act to preserve and enhance their given ways of life. This is essentially an aspect of patriotism, which does not preclude interference with other people's affairs. It is also not moral in only respecting persons as ends; it subordinates them to the perpetuation of a community mainly defined in terms of its past. Those who, like Kedourie, oppose nationalism because it is romantic, should actually condemn their preferred alternative as well, then. So-called traditional nationalism - or conservative patriotism, really - requires the individual to conform to the past as well, only in the one case the past is known through elite interpretation of traditions, which are to be learned, whereas in the other one the intelligentsia, perhaps, discerns what the people are to will (to learn, that is). Granted, however, the difference between will and tradition is very significant to Kedourie.

Now the conservative may very well confine himself to the teaching of changing traditions, but the implication is the same. He will likely resist any attempts of the community to somehow control change in the identity of the nation. Why? Because he really does dislike guiding plans for the whole, and, consequently, he may be only a qualified patriot and an unqualified anti-nationalist.

Is this conservative stance a more moral one because it accepts the world the way it is, and natural changes to it, which nonetheless do not disturb eternal verities? Is the nationalist committed to the so-called liberal stance that man's essence is his freedom?

We can and need to say at times that certain results are the products of conscious decisions; conscious decisions should correct or improve upon them. The problem with leaving human affairs to take "their natural course" is that the "natural course" has very often been chosen. The arms race, pollution, the creation of ghettos, these have not just "happened." We may, of course, be unable to identify many causes of events in human affairs, but we can be much more certain in some cases than others. We can make sure our efforts do not have undesired consequences more in some cases than others. And in some cases risking some undesired consequences is more justified that settling for the status quo.

A point of clarification: the conservative is not a libertarian or an anarchist. While his reverence for "nature" may incline him to inactivity, he will still favour piecemeal government activity to counteract what he sees as interference with the natural order. There are two main problems with this. First, his approach is piecemeal, which means that he will not try with any degree of vigour to counteract the larger currents running through public affairs. He is prone to treat symptoms rather than causes. He may not even admit that some evils are evils (simply not trusting our temporal reason to judge whether something actually will be good or bad in the long run), or, when he does admit that they are, he may fear that acting may produce still greater evils. This all leads to the conclusion that he will reject any grand or large-scale schemes, leaving much the way it has become. The second problem is contained within or suggested by the first, namely, that the conservative has a bias positively (and not in default) in favour of the status quo. If something has lasted a long time, he will say, then there is a good possibility that it ought to continue to exist, even if others see it as a social or moral problem. (Consider various forms of inequality and prejudice.) Conversely, he will say that among options, good ones will be among those which have existed - in practice, not theory - for some time. He rejects innovation, then, when it is to be produced by reason rather than by natural inclination. He could never say, "I dream things that never

were, and ask why not" because he has seen some of the things which have existed and he wants *them* to continue. He will also stress, however, that some things have existed naturally whereas others have been forced to exist. All of this is to say that he wants a hierarchical society and will also tolerate much which does not form particular parts of his image of society, but which he will not agree should be counteracted because he does prefer to see things procede "naturally."

The irony is that very often today conservationists are not conservatives, and that conservatives are not conservationists. It may be conservatives who see man as "naturally" master of nature. Then again, conservation requires much thought and planning.

The general conservative outlook which I have been sketching is one which dictates the conservative position on issues related to nationalism, including those concerning technology and particularism. The conservative, we may deduce, may wish to constrain economic activity and technological change which dissolves ways of life. He may, on the other hand, see them as natural. It is possible, then, that according to *conservative* precepts, technology might take us to the universal, if not homogeneous state. (The conservative may *let* the universal state come about; the liberal who sees progress as the end of social and political life - and who is only one kind of liberal - *may* attempt to bring it about.)

Grant is ambivalent. He sees technology as man's assertion that he can be and is master over nature; he also sees man's development of technology as a natural process which man cannot control. His conclusion then amounts to the assessment that man could control his control over nature, but he no longer can. Mastery is now his destiny; universal man valuing only material progress (i.e. physical comfort) is more and more a reality. We may be doomed to world peace with numbness. Peace through bland conformity. Unless or until there is "the catastrophe."

I do not believe that the peace Grant fears will arrive. I am either too optimistic or too pessimistic. I think that Kendall is correct; man will always differ on the nature of the good, and he will always see something as good and not just pleasant. There will remain questions of justice and power. Peoples will remain divided geographically, too. Not all

physical and non-physical distances and differences can be bridged. Ways of life will clash. They may clash less often or less violently if they are the products of thought and passion, and not just passion alone, however.

A further word on technology and the pursuit of material wealth. Grant has not convinced me that these necessarily embody or represent a disrespect for moral values, and a mere pre-occupation with pleasure and comfort. First, even choosing between different pleasures and comforts (and surely there will always be at least those decisions to make) requires valuing some more than others. These choices, I believe, can never be reduced entirely to choices of selfish convenience. Noble and generous motives and prescient insights will always intervene to some extent. The extent to which they may not may be due to the silencing of reason as well as of the selfless sentiments reason can appeal to. Second, process entails values. We always choose to do things in particular ways. We assign different amounts and kinds of responsibilities and rewards to different persons. There are always various kinds of distribution. And questions of justice which are not matters of distribution. Third, if we ever surrendered ourselves totally to the conquering of nature, we would stop living. We need "inefficiencies." Conquering nature is work. Work is only a means, usually. And so is soft pleasure-seeking. But however much of the time they are means for any individual, there are other things in life. Now, the given (i.e. nature) is often disrespected. But the point - one which Grant seems to overlook - is that moral values, including "given" ones, can be respected *through* the use of technology. The changes technology makes may only be to the world of appearances. Or, conversely, it may be a question of which "givens" - those pursued through the re-ordering of the physical world or the essential forms of nature - should be respected at any given time. In either case, even in a relatively completely industrialized world, at least some meaningful differences would remain, and hence, some nations would continue to exist. (Of course, this is *not* to say that any possible world would be as good as any other possible world. It is to say that instrumental reason does not necessarily overwhelm our ability to reason about moral values.)

Nationalism, I conclude, does not incorporate any particular stand concerning the use of non-human nature. It is concerned with values people choose, or choose to recognize and act upon. Whether or not through technology would not seem central. Nationalism certainly does entail, however, an absence of "respect" for the natural course of human events. And hence, the most we might wish to say is that it affirms that at least a part of man's essence is his moral freedom, his freedom to choose among worse and better alternatives. The nationalist may or may not conclude that man is to will his values, he may or may not be a relativist. (It is worth considering, too, that a relativist need not be a subjectivist.) He will, in any event, value political participation.

This leads me to a final word on Grant. He, in the end, appears to be a liberal thinker with conservative passions. He considers political participation to be too obviously a good to merit much discussion, but asserts that man cannot have much influence on his destiny. He is a nationalist in intellectual inclination, then, thinking along the lines of advocating a right of each nation to self-determination, while a patriot of conservative sentiments, feeling the primacy of given traditions. He might have attempted a synthesis, such as favouring nationalism when peoples choose to define themselves according to absolute, especially religious values and traditions, but he cannot accept that they might not do so, or that they could espouse objective values in other ways, and consequently, he cannot let himself fully be a nationalist. His morally worthwhile nationalism, if he had thought one possible, would only have been a conservative flavoured one, in any event. It would have been primarily liberal, as any nationalism must be. Conservatism is essentially incompatible with nationalism.

Along with the conservative anti-nationalist argument, another of the more forceful arguments against nationalism is the libertarian one that decisions about values should not be made at the community level because there is no good apart from the addition of individual interests.

Nationalism is conforming in establishing national values and policies within them, and rightfully so, I think, because political communities do exist, communities in which actions are taken, and decisions made affecting the whole, within a facilitating framework

providing the means of operation of the whole (such as laws and norms). This framework is not the addition of or adoption of any complete approaches of individual actors. It is the taking of elements from here and there to create a community synthesis, or consensus, if you will. Consider that much which affects individual lives is the product of conscious choices by individuals which affect great numbers of other individuals, other individuals who ought to have more of an option than take it or leave it, or simply take it or leave. An alternative is some form of collective choice, namely formal or informal political decision-making. This allows for a collecting and weighing of viewpoints and pieces of information necessary to make knowledgeable decisions, and ones which take the concerns of the most parties possible into account (how well, of course, depends on the procedures followed).

I reject, therefore, the assertion that there is only individual self-interest, and this precludes collective action by the majority, for example. This is a claim pernicious in the extreme. It is obviously not true: workers choose their jobs, when they have a choice, according to a variety of criteria including social usefulness; employees and businessmen often do try to help the people they deal with, without giving the "profitability" of their actions a thought; people obey laws much of the time when they could not be caught disobeying them; politicians and holders of various positions of responsibility frequently consider what their duties dictate that they should do, apart from fear of being held accountable for deviations and so on. Ask anyone what in his objective opinion someone would and should do in a situation about which you can generalize and virtually everyone will be able to do so. This is not to say that self-interest is not a consideration, nor to say that it should not be one. It is to say that if we denigrate objectivity and altruism and selfless concern for others' personal development and autonomy, we will make selfish self-interest more acceptable and perhaps more necessary, not only in dealings between individuals but also between nations. It is to educate anti-social rather than social sentiment, and it is to dismember the general will which is the mark of human political life in communities.

There are, nonetheless, many writers on nationalism who deny that there is such a thing, truly, as the community or national interest. And thus, when they see references to the

common good with which nationalists are concerned, they neglect to see the rational content of the advocacy of the self-determination principle. They then look to the individual alone, and search for uncontrolled or maladjusted passions and sentiment. They do not allow for nationalism's abstract reality.

There are other reasons why nationalism is sometimes seen to be something else before it is considered to be a principle. One is the view that man's collective political values are actually established by history, or by social forces: to try to contain or direct values is sheer folly, and certainly not rational. (This is, of course, to overlook the moral content of collective actions - and inaction.) Another is the view that modernization precludes moral and political values from the realm of politics and government, and, therefore, talk about them and about "culture" is simply instrumental to the end of obtaining a greater share of the wealth. (This is not a view that Grant has expressed explicitly about technological society, to my knowledge, but he might well consistently adopt it.) And yet another is the lack of clarity in the use of words. When some speak of nationalism they really mean national sentiment or national consciousness or national patriotism or chauvinism or imperialism or a number of other things which they actually should treat as distinct and as distinct from an idea of a right to national self-determination.

Nationalism is, in short, about national political values, and the right of each nation to determine them. It is very much moral, given that the individual is moral and acts morally in large measure through his political community. He also, however, can act immorally or unwisely through it, and therefore nationalism cannot be said to be good without qualification.

An enormous remaining question concerns the accuracy of the various claims of causality which nationalists will make. Foreign control of political institutions clearly prevents self-rule. General foreign control of economic policy, and economic power, does as well. But what contributes to subtle denials of self-control in particular areas which are significant for self-determination? Is energy self-sufficiency important? Is control of retail practices more important than control of manufacturing? Is television content less important than the point

of origin of textbooks? Does packaging matter? What are the thresholds? Is it justifiable to attempt to control "culture" for those who do not reflect upon its content? For immigrants?

There is much skepticism in English Canada concerning some but not every kind of nationalist measure. Is this opposition to the principles, the particular judgments or to the conception of the nation at which they are directed? It may be that opponents of "the Toronto literrati" are in favour of steps to strengthen their own "regional" society. English-Canada may not be a nation; it may be part of a larger one, one by itself, or more than one. But these are matters beyond the scope of this undertaking. As are questions concerning socialism and nationalism. They will await another day.

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6708R	6740R	6778R	6801R	6805R	6810R	6817R	6830R	6838R	6852R	6855R	6857R	6862R	6871R
6875R	6889R	6902R	6924R	6934R	6970R	7006R	7012R	7016R	7019R	7027R	7041R	7081R	7089R
7075R	7089R	7100R	7110R	7118R	7123R	7145R	7149R	7172R	7184R	7197R	7205R	7211R	7219R
7230R	7240R	7273R	7310R	7391R	7400R	7422R	7440R	7448R	7448R	7485R	7492R	7494R	7504R
7512R	7524R	7528R	7536R	7538R	7588R	7627R	7637R	7652R	7662R	7678R	7680R	7692R	7733R
7737R	7744R	7757R	7762R	7770R	7785R	7812R	7822R	7844R	8037R	8040R	8047R	8052R	8078R
8078R													

Cross Reference Table bytes = 4748

Storage Used (Pages)	Before INIT	After INIT	After PROLOG	After RUN	After CLEAN
	38	98	98	208	93

CPU Time Used (Seconds)	INIT	PROLOG	RUN	CLEAN	Total
	0.075	0.001	15.687	0.105	15.868

23:43:34 T=15.838 RC=0

ENPE_ _ 826584_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 826584_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 826584_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 826584_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 826584_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 826584_ _ ENPE

Job number 826584 University of Alberta Computing Service (System UN238) 23:43:12 MDT Wed Oct 12/88

User: ENPE Project: POA1

Submitted at 20:15:50 Wed Oct 12/88
Signed on at 23:43:12 Wed Oct 12/88
Signed off at 23:43:34 Wed Oct 12/88
Last signon at 19:39:26 Wed Oct 12/88
Batch,Deferred,Internal/Teaching,Research

Elapsed time	.366	minutes		
CPU time used	16.001	seconds	$.53	
CPU storage VMI	49.867	page-min.	$.55	
Wait storage VMI	.254	page-hr.		
Cards read	8713			
Lines printed	39129			
Pages printed	717			$12.19
Images printed	720			$4.32
Disk I/O	525		$.04	
Approximate cost of this run:			$1.12	$16.51
Disk storage charge	1001	page-hr.	$.04	
Approximate remaining balance:			$22.09	$12.32

Disk space remaining: 7 pages.