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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

POLITICAL STABILITY IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA:

CONSOCIATIONALISM VERSUS CONTROL

by

(C) DONALD ANTHONY ZADRAVEC

B.A. Simon Fraser University, 1982

A thesis

submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts.

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

(Spring), (1986)

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ISBN 0-315-30175-9

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Political Stability in Communist Yugoslavia:
Consociationalism versus Control

Master of Arts

1986

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APPROVAL PAGE

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Political Stability in Communist Yugoslavia: Consociationalism versus Control, submitted by Donald Anthony Zadavec in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

.....
Supervisor

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.....

Date

March 12 1986

DEDICATION

For their love and support, this thesis is dedicated
to my parents, Antony and Anna Zadravec.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is based on the premise that the actions of the political elite are pivotal in the establishment of a stable political environment. Through their actions, political elites shape the nature of political events in a country. As such, this thesis using the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a case study has sought to account for the presence of a stable political situation in the country. Yugoslavia, with its deeply rooted ethnic cleavages, and corresponding economic disparities, is perhaps one of the most difficult countries in Europe to govern.

During the forty years that the Communist Party has ruled Yugoslavia, the country has undergone major political transformations. Communist Yugoslavia has been a Stalinist state, in which the population was totally subservient to the quasi-monolithic Communist Party, and a relatively decentralized political state, where ethnic nationalism threatened the existence of Yugoslavia. Presently, the political leadership is trying to maintain an equilibrium between the Stalinism of the late forties and early fifties, and the almost anarchistic liberalism of the late sixties and early seventies. As a result, present day Yugoslavia is a quasi-decentralized authoritarian country in which all major ethnic groups have some voice in the decision-making process.

This study has sought to explain the presence of a stable political environment in Yugoslavia through the use of Arend Lijphart's model of consociationalism and Ian Lustick's "control" paradigm. Both of these theories are founded on the belief that pluralistic states (countries with major societal cleavages) can be successfully governed. The "control" model is based on the concept that stability can result through a policy of domination by one sector of society over another. On the other hand, the theory of consociationalism espouses the view that major groups within a state can cooperate to achieve a consensus on how the country should be governed. Yugoslavia, as one of the more dynamic communist states, serves as an excellent subject on which to test these two models.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Jeremy Paltiel for his assistance. His timely comments and criticism were invaluable in the preparation of this thesis.

I would also like to thank Bruce Langford for proof-reading and commenting on this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL STABILITY IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA:

AN INTRODUCTION

The repercussions of World War One were instrumental in reshaping the political boundaries of Europe. One of the new states that emerged after this restructuring was Yugoslavia, which incorporated under a single political umbrella a host of various nationalities.¹ The most abundant and politically significant were the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Within this country of divergent groups and interests, it is of little surprise to note the emergence of ethnicity as such a controversial element in the political and socioeconomic fabric of inter and postwar Yugoslavia.

During the interwar period, the ethnic cleavage served to undermine the legitimacy of the state.² This was essentially due to the fact that the major participants had different perceptions of the role and purpose of the Yugoslav state. Serbian participation was based on the notion that Yugoslavia was in effect an extension of pre-World War One Serbia. On the other hand, the Croats and the Slovenes felt Yugoslavia would be an equal union that would protect the southern Slavs from foreign domination. With the presence of these two diametrically opposed views, the political situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated rapidly. The Serb leadership for the most

part remained intransigent and refused to surrender its leading status within the Yugoslav state.³ The Croats and their main spokesperson Stjepan Radic, head of the Croatian Peasant Party, were reluctant to take an active role in a state that they felt was dominated by the Serbs for the benefit of the Serbs.⁴ Regardless of whether it was because of Serbian chauvinism or Croatian militancy, the end result was political turmoil.⁵

Although Yugoslavia existed as a political entity in the twenties and thirties, at best its existence was tenuous and insecure, with ethnic cleavages posing a continual threat to the country's survival. This lack of ethnic harmony manifested itself with the outbreak of World War Two. Instead of presenting a united national front against the Germans, ethnically opposed, regionally based movements emerged. Indeed, it might be argued that World War Two brought not only external conflict to Yugoslavia, but civil war as well.

In retrospect, it is clear that the major pitfall that beset the interwar Yugoslav state was that there was not any consensus among the country's major groups on how the country should operate.⁶ In addition, to make matters even more difficult, there was no true national party in the country. The vast majority of the parties in Yugoslavia during that period were territorially based and relied on ethnic support for their success. The major exception to the aforementioned was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,

which was formed in 1919, but outlawed in 1921 after being accused of attempting to assassinate the Regent Alexander and the Premier Pasic. Even though the party enjoyed a legal existence for only two years, the Communists did manage to acquire considerable electoral support, demonstrated by the fact that the party was the third largest in the country having won fifty-eight seats in the election of 1920.⁷

The Yugoslav Communists, while having representation and support from all the nationalities, were in the early years dominated and controlled by the Serbian/Orthodox faction of the party. An examination of the election results of 1920 bears this out. Of the fifty-eight members that the party had elected in that year, forty-four were Serbs, four were Montenegrins, six were Slovenes, three were Croats, and one was a Macedonian.⁸ In addition, according to party archives, the party's membership which stood at about 69,000 at the end of 1920 was overwhelmingly of Serbian/Orthodox descent.⁹

This Serbian dominance had an impact on the party's nationalities policies, in that the Yugoslav Communists downplayed the importance of the ethnic variable in the political sphere. The reason for such a policy is a matter of some debate. Shoup believes that the Serbian faction, which had control of the party, refused to emphasize national differences because it would weaken the notion of class solidarity.¹⁰ Conversely, Tomasic argues that due to

this Serbian dominance in the party, the Communists refused to give credence to the existence of national differences that posed a threat to the idea of the Yugoslav state.¹¹ Commenting on the Serb leadership of the Communist Party, Tomasic states:

These people had identified themselves with the Serb national ideals and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia under Serb leadership.¹²

While both analysts make convincing cases, it was probably the combination of the above factors that determined the party's stance on the national question.

The reluctance or inability of the Communist Party to recognize the political and cultural rights of all the Yugoslav nationalities led the party into conflict with the Communist International, led by Joseph Stalin. However, following pressure from the Communist International, and some internal squabbling, the Yugoslav Communists chose to adopt the Stalinist line on the national question.¹³ The essence of Stalin's view on the national question, as put forth in his work entitled Marxism And The National Question, is that the principle of self-determination should be granted to all nations.¹⁴ Writing in 1913 Stalin stated:

The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.¹⁵

This is the doctrine that the Yugoslav Communists have basically adhered to since adopting it in the late twenties. It is important to remember that this right of self-determination means that the nation has the opportunity and not the obligation to secede. As will be demonstrated, this caveat had important ramifications after 1945 for the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav state.

This belief in the equality of Yugoslav nations was a pivotal factor that enabled the Communist Partisan fighters to achieve victory during World War Two. However, in addition, there were other factors that proved to be beneficial to the Communists in their struggle to attain power. Most notable were: (i) Participation in the Spanish Civil War, which gave the Communists and the Partisan troops experience in guerilla warfare. (ii) The 1937 accession to power of Tito and the resulting end of factionalism in the party. This in turn made the Communists a more united and disciplined party. (iii) The multinational composition of the Partisan troops served as a drawing card to bring more members from all the Yugoslav nationalities into the party. With regard to this last factor, it should be pointed out that the Partisans, like their main opponents for power, the Chetniks, were predominately of Serbian origin.¹⁶ Of the twenty-seven Partisan divisions in existence in 1943 (with each division consisting of about 3,500 men) fifteen were made up of

Serbians.¹⁷ However, unlike the Chetniks, the Partisans had significant representation from the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Bosnian Moslems.¹⁸

Consequently, because of these factors and the resulting success, the Communists as early as 1943 saw themselves as the future rulers of Yugoslavia. In that year AVNOJ (the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia) proclaimed itself to be the supreme legislative and executive body of Yugoslavia. By the end of 1945, the Communists had succeeded in quashing all the opposition forces and had established themselves as the unquestioned rulers of the Yugoslav state.

Despite the fact that Yugoslavia underwent a political revolution from 1941-1945, the victorious Communist Party, under the leadership of Joseph Broz Tito, still faced the problem that had beset the monarchist government of the interwar period. This was the issue of trying to construct a politically unified state from this diverse and potentially hostile populace. To the credit of the Yugoslav Communists, the country -- judging by the lack of political violence and longevity of the regime -- has been relatively internally stable since 1945.¹⁹ In fact, as early as 1948, the Yugoslav Communists believed the national question had been remedied. In a speech in Ljubljana in November of 1948 Tito stated:

... I am not speaking of the national question because it is supposed to be tense in our country in one form or another. No, the national question has

been solved in our country, and very well at that, to the general satisfaction of all our peoples.²⁰

Nevertheless, as Pedro Ramet astutely points out:

This claim can be understood in either of two ways: (1) that nationalism, as politicized ethnicity, has been by and large eliminated; or (2) that institutionalized patterns of cooperation and mutual accommodation have become a stable part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist excesses to be contained, defused or even by-passed.²¹

The Yugoslavian Communists in the process of governing have successfully used each approach. The resulting stability and subsequent political existence is perhaps Yugoslavia's, and the League of Communists' greatest accomplishment.

Indeed, one must not underestimate the role that the Communist elite has played in preserving this stability.²²

The League of Communists in its vanguard role undoubtedly occupies a pivotal position in Yugoslav society. As such, the decisions that the League makes have a profound impact on the country. Moreover, it is only necessary to examine the findings of various studies over the last few years to realize the prominent role assumed by elites in the moderation of political conflict and the maintenance of stability within fragmented societies.

One of the most influential theories pertaining to elite behaviour and interaction is Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism. Initially formulated in 1968, Lijphart's theory has gone a long way towards explaining the presence of stability in deeply divided societies.

According to Lijphart, the essential characteristic of the theory is that there is a "deliberate joint effort by elites to stabilize the system."²³ While the consociational theory has generally been accepted, critics have castigated it for being too elitist, and of ignoring such factors as mass citizen behavior. Yet, with the rise of nationalism in the modern world, it is apparent that the liberal and radical theories of modernization and political development have lost some of their credibility. As Elaine Burgess points out: "there are factors resulting from development and modernization that facilitate the dramatic rise in ethnicity."²⁴ Consociationalism, unlike modernization theory, recognizes that ethnicity exists in modern societies. In addition, consociationalism offers a means of governing ethnically diverse pluralistic societies.

One critique of consociationalism, however, does merit consideration. Brian Barry, while conceding the importance of elite participation, has serious reservations concerning elite bargaining.²⁵ Barry contends that consociational theorists over-emphasize cooperative behavior, thereby ignoring coercive actions that may contribute to stability.²⁶ Building on the work of Barry, Ian Lustick adds that intergroup control or domination can be useful in explaining stability in deeply divided societies.²⁷

A "control" model is appropriate to the extent that stability in a vertically segmented society is the result of the

sustained manipulation of subordinate segment(s) by a superordinate segment.²⁸

He cites as examples of "control" situations South Africa, black/white relations in the southern United States before World War Two, and the Russians relationship with the other nationalities in the Soviet Union.

Thus, while Lustick accepts the utility of elite action, his "control" theory may be viewed as an alternative approach to consociationalism. The fundamental difference between the two models revolves around elite action; consociationalism stresses elite cooperation, "control" theory is distinguished by the effective exertion of power by one group over another. Clearly the advantage of the "control" model lies in its ability to explain the presence of stability in situations where the consociational theory cannot. Moreover, by comparing "control" with consociationalism, one can determine what type of elite actions are present in a particular state.*

Undoubtedly Yugoslavia, with its partly open political system and its religious, linguistic and cultural differences, presents an excellent subject for testing these two models. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the fact that the Yugoslav Communists have used different approaches in dealing with the national question gives even more cause to test the consociational and "control" models on Yugoslavia. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to apply the consociational and "control" models to Yugoslavia as a means of determining how (either through

consociational or "control" practices or a combination of the two) the Yugoslav political elite have been able to maintain domestic stability. This thesis does not propose to criticize the elites for their actions. Other works have already been written with the aforementioned in mind.²⁹ Instead, this thesis will look at the actions of the elite in order to account for the existence of stability in post World War Two Yugoslavia.

As a means of accomplishing the above, it will be necessary to examine the following issues. First, a more detailed analysis of the consociational and "control" paradigms will be undertaken. Secondly, this thesis will undertake a historical examination of elite representation by ethnic groups during the Communist period of rule. For the purposes of this thesis, the following groups will be deemed as elites: officer corps of the army, members of the League of Communists, and high level bureaucrats and elected representatives at both the republican and national levels. As will be demonstrated, each of these groups occupies a pivotal position in the Yugoslav political scene.

Yet, because of the disparity between rhetoric and reality -- between de jure and de facto -- elite representation can only point to the general direction of the model in use. The reason elite representation is only an indicator of consociationalism is due to the possibility that within such an elite coercion may occur, whereby one

or more group(s) dominate the decision-making process. In order to by-pass this potential for rhetoric, it will be necessary to determine if means existed by which consociational type actions could take place. This will require analyzing these additional issues. First, it will be necessary to look at the structure and role of the Yugoslav League of Communists within the context of the Yugoslav political system. As the leading force in the country's politics, the League of Communists, through its actions, should help verify which model was in use.

Furthermore, this thesis will undertake to examine the various Yugoslav constitutions, an examination that will endeavor to determine if channels of communication were available and were exercised in accordance to either the consociational or "control" models. While Karl Loewenstein has branded all socialist constitutions as "semantic camouflage,"³⁰ in the Yugoslav instance such is not the case. In looking at socialist constitutions, one should not apply the same criteria to them as is applied to western constitutions. In the western view constitutions put forth the rules of the game, such as the powers of the various institutions and the means by which control over these institutions changes from one party to another.³¹ In a one party state such does not occur, in that ultimate authority lies with the party. However, socialist constitutions should not be seen as irrelevant documents. The constitutional variable is significant in socialist

countries, and especially in Yugoslavia,

because it describes the legal relationship between various subcultures, defines the legally permissible toleration of diversity of opinion, and provides a framework for the organizational structure of the party.³²

The fact that Yugoslavia has adopted four constitutions since 1945, and brought forth numerous constitutional amendments, indicates strongly that the Yugoslav political leadership places considerable value on these documents. As will be shown through the course of this study, constitutionalism has emerged to be an important factor in dealing with the national question.

Therefore, by examining the various Yugoslav constitutions, in both the theoretical and practical senses, along with analyzing the role of the League of Communists and surveying elite representation, one should be able to prove which model(s) have been used and which model is presently in use.³³

For the most part, this thesis will follow a chronological scheme. The study will be broken down into five periods: 1946-1952; 1953-1962; 1963-1973; 1974-1979 and 1980 to the present. While categorizing Yugoslav politics into time periods is a difficult and controversial task, these periods, though occasionally overlapping, were chosen because they represent particular governmental patterns in the history of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Each of the first four periods coincides

with the establishment of a new constitution. As a result, armed with a new constitution, each of the first four eras should signal a new governmental strategy, or at least a refinement of previous policy, towards the maintenance of a stable political system. The last period, 1980 to the present, though not a new constitutional era per se, is quite different from the 1974-1979 period. With the death of Tito in May of 1980, Yugoslavia lost its most important political figure. His presence, without question, served as a stabilizing factor. Therefore, although constitutionally there were not many alterations, Tito's absence forces one to treat the post-Titoist period as being a separate and distinct era.

CHAPTER II

CONSOCIATIONALISM AND CONTROL: A COMPARISON

Prior to testing the consociational and "control" models on Yugoslavia, it is necessary to analyze in greater detail the general principles that surround each of the theories. By doing so, one should be able to determine the suitability of each of the models as a means of accounting for the presence of political stability in post World War Two Yugoslavia. First, Lijphart's model of consociational democracy was formulated in order to explain the existence of a stable political system in Holland; a country that is characterized by deep religious and class cleavages.¹ Lijphart then developed his consociational model into a general theory, which he believed offered a promising method for attaining democracy and a fair amount of political unity in states with societal cleavages.² Thus, consociationalism was seen as a means of bringing stability to plural type societies.³

As previously stated, the key aspect of the consociational theory revolves around the actions of elites, who representing various units interact at the national level to arrive at decisions. Clearly, in order for the model to function, elites must be willing to work together and be committed to sustaining the system. To enable the elites to cooperate and maintain stability certain criteria must be adhered to. These are: (1) grand

coalition, which necessitates that political leaders of all significant segments participate in governing the state; (2) mutual veto, which ensures that each segment have a complete guarantee of political protection; (3) proportionality or parity, which is primarily used in allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources, such as subsidies; (4) segmental autonomy and federalism, which entails minority rule: rule by a segment over itself on matters that are strictly the concern of the minority.⁴

These four characteristics can be considered as the indices of consociationalism, in that a plural society must follow these principles if it is to be deemed consociational. Essentially these characteristics are self-explanatory. The first three ensure that all major segments have a significant say in the governing of the state. On the other hand, the last characteristic, segmental autonomy, is used as a means of decreasing the burden on elites at the national level. By giving the various segments of the state the right to decide their own affairs on matters of a local interest, it reduces the chance for conflict at the national level. The existence of federal boundaries within the state is a means by which segmental autonomy may be granted.⁵ While in theory segmental autonomy is conducive to consociationalism, it may in fact work against the consociational model.

Nordlinger states:

The combination of territorially distinctive segments and federalism's grant of partial autonomy sometimes provides additional impetus to demands for greater autonomy; when the centrally-situated or centralist-orientated conflict group refuses these demands, secession and civil war may follow.⁶

Moreover, in this same light, the existence of autonomous segments within a plural society may serve as a breeding ground for elites who oppose the status-quo. Although Lijphart acknowledges the existence of this potential pitfall, he does not see secession as undermining the validity of his theory.⁷ Rather secession is a way of dealing with the tensions that may exist in a plural society. Therefore, the existence of segmental autonomy, while a necessary feature of the consociational model, does have the potential to breakup a consociational state.

The aforementioned principles are the cornerstones of the consociational theory. There are, however, other factors that play a role in consociational type politics. Basically Lijphart has chosen to call these other factors favorable conditions.⁸ These factors, though helpful, do not account for the success or failure of consociational type practices. Thus, these factors may be viewed as being conducive and beneficial to the practice of consociationalism.

Lijphart has identified a number factors as being favorable to consociationalism. What follows is a synopsis of these factors.⁹ First, if a multiple balance of power

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exists among the segments of a plural society, no one segment should be able to dominate the decision making process. Secondly, the existence of a multiparty system, where the parties are based on segments, allows the parties to act as the political representatives of the segments. This is conducive to consociationalism because it ensures that all significant segments will have a political voice. Thirdly, the size of the state also has an impact on consociationalism, in that a small state is viewed as being more favorable for the establishment of consociational type practices. In a small state, elites are likely to know each other on a personal level; this will often cause them to adhere to cooperative rather than conflictual politics. In addition, because a small state is more likely to feel threatened by other powers than a large state would be, the political elite in a small state would tend to draw closer together in the face of an external threat. Fourthly, the existence of a tradition of elite accommodation is also conducive to consociationalism. If the elites of a plural society cooperated in previous times, then future cooperation is more likely.

The other major factor that can be beneficial in bringing forth and sustaining consociational type practices is the cleavages that exist in a plural society. The nature, the number, the interrelationship, the countervailing effects of overarching loyalties, and the manner in which segmental cleavages link with party system

cleavages all have an impact on consociationalism. If the cleavages that exist in a plural society are of an equal intensity they are not likely to crosscut. If this results in the creation of an all-minority situation, without too many minorities, it will favor consociationalism because one group will not be able to dominate decision-making. On the other hand, if cleavages are not of equal intensity they are likely to crosscut. This crosscutting is beneficial to consociationalism because it reduces the number of segments that have to be dealt with on the national level. For example, country A consists of two major religious groups and three language groups that crosscut. However, the religious cleavage in this country is not as important as the language cleavage. Consequently, when decisions are made, except those that have an impact on religion, the concern lies in satisfying the country's language groups. This means rather than having to have agreement from six groups, as would be the case if the cleavages were of equal intensity, only the approval of three groups is required.

With regards to the existence of overarching loyalties: they can act as a means of unifying a society and also moderating its cleavages. Nationalism is one such overarching loyalty. If the leaders of a plural society are bound by the feeling of nationalism towards their country, they are more likely to adopt a more conciliatory attitude when dealing with one another. Obviously such an

action is beneficial to consociationalism.

Lastly, the nature of the country's party system has an impact on its cleavages and in turn on consociational practices. Due to the fact that political parties bring segmental cleavages into the political arena, the relationship of the party system cleavages with the other cleavages is of some relevance. If the party system is based on class and the society has class and religious cleavages, it is more likely that in the political arena class will take precedence over religion. This is beneficial to consociationalism if the religious cleavage is not of prime importance. However, if the two cleavages are of equal intensity, then the religious cleavage will pose a threat to a consociational state. Therefore, in order to prevent such an event from materializing it is necessary to institutionalize the cleavage; to give it a political voice. If this cannot be done through the party system then the disaffected segment should be given a political voice through an advisory board or some sort of institutional means.

Undoubtedly it would be a surprise to find that a particular state had all the conditions present that Lijphart deems as favorable for consociational democracy. In the Yugoslav case some of these favorable conditions are present. First, Yugoslavia, consisting of a number of ethnic groups none of which form a majority of the population, has a multiple balance of power among its

segments. Therefore, in line with consociational theory, no group should be able to dominate the decision-making process.

Secondly, Yugoslavia's size, particularly as it relates to the threat of foreign domination, should provide an incentive for the Yugoslav leadership to maintain internal solidarity. Yugoslavia's geo-strategic position makes it a country that is coveted both by the East and West. In addition, Yugoslavia contains considerable numbers of Hungarians, Albanians and Macedonians whose presence in the country might lead to irredentist claims by Yugoslavia's neighbors.¹⁰

The only other factor that is conducive to consociationalism that is present in Yugoslavia relates to the nature of the country's cleavage. As Yugoslavia's cleavage is based on the ethnic variable, the interests and concerns of the ethnic segments vary according to the issue at hand. Consequently, a particular group may agree with another ethnic group on a certain issue. However, on another issue the former may disagree with the latter, and in turn be in agreement with one of the other groups. As a result, one would not expect to see certain groups always in agreement with one another on all issues. Rather, it would be expected that as the issue varied, so too would the interests of the ethnic segments. This should have a two-fold impact. First, it would theoretically prevent one group from dominating decision-making in that it would

require the support of other groups to have its decisions adhered to. Secondly, with the existence of these varied interests, it would encourage interaction between the various elites. This type of interaction is conducive to consociationalism because it increases the chances for cooperation.

The favorable conditions that are not present in Yugoslavia relate for the most part to the democratic aspect of consociational democracy. Although Yugoslavia is not a democracy based on the western notion of free multiparty elections, the country should not be viewed as being unsuitable for consociationalism. According to Daalder, and correctly so:

... just as there may be democracies that are and others that are not consociational, so consociational societies need not be democratic, though some are.¹¹

Thus, considering the aforementioned and taking into account the fact that Yugoslavia has some of the conditions that are favorable for consociationalism, one is justified in concluding that the country is an appropriate subject for testing the consociational model "on."

The democratic aspect of consociationalism, particularly as it relates to the political representation of all significant segments, is an issue of some contention. As mentioned previously, Barry sees consociationalism as being potentially anti-democratic. He points out that rival politicians may come together and

suppress dissent as a means of facilitating consociationalism.¹² In addition, Barry states that in some countries using consociational devices, there is co-optation and suppression of information, in order to minimize the possibility that those outside the elite will have enough ammunition to stir up trouble against negotiated agreements.¹³ Undoubtedly Barry raises a valid issue. If elites conspire to block access to the political arena, they are violating consociational theory. It is more than likely that if the elites are engaging in such a practice, they are doing so as a means of preventing a particular segment from having a political voice.

Another potential pitfall that Barry sees in consociational theory relates to the issue of ethnicity. He believes that cleavages based on ethnicity are more likely to be resistant to consociational management.¹⁴ Ethnic conflict is a conflict of solidarity groups rather than organized groups as is the case for religious and class conflict. Ethnic groups, according to Barry,

do not need organization to work up a riot or a pogrom so long as they have some way of recognizing who belongs to which group.¹⁵

Unlike religion or class, ethnicity is more visibly identifiable through cultural traits or physical appearance.

Furthermore, ethnic groups are not identified by their loyalty to a particular leader.¹⁶ Therefore, ethnic support is much harder to maintain than class or religious

support. Ethnic leaders engaged in consociational practices cannot be sure that the decisions they reach will be widely supported by the various ethnic groups. It should be remembered that membership in an ethnic group is based primarily on birth. There are no particular tenets that an ethnic group adheres to. Therefore, the perception on what is best for a particular ethnic group will vary from person to person.

On the other hand, the interests of a religious or a class group are more easily identifiable than that of an ethnic group. An individual supports a religious or a class group because he perceives that his interests are best served by that group. A religious or a class group is identified by the tenets and policies it adheres to. These tenets and policies are the pivotal factors that determine the stance of the group's leaders. Thus, one would expect to see more internal solidarity within religious and class segments than within an ethnic segment. Consequently, ethnic leaders have greater difficulty in sustaining the support of their members than religious or class leaders do.

While these two criticisms of consociationalism are not the only ones, they are the most relevant to the topic at hand.¹⁷ As Yugoslavia's cleavage is based on ethnicity coupled with the fact that it is a one-party state, there is an increased likelihood that some type of manipulative techniques might be used in order to suppress certain

ethnic groups. Obviously, in the Yugoslav instance the elite is going to prevent the entry into the elite strata of those whose views are separatist or nationalist in flavor regardless of ethnic origin. However, this is not of primary concern. Rather our concern lies with the possibility that the elite may limit or restrict the membership of some ethnic groups that are interested in working within the Yugoslav political system, but whose presence at the elite level might be perceived by other elites as a threat to the status-quo.

Thus, one has a potential situation where there are segmented subcultures without elite coalescence. According to Lijphart's typology such a country would be unstable.¹⁸

FIGURE I
A TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

		Structure of Society	
		Homogeneous	Plural
Elite Behaviour	Coalescent	Depoliticized	Consociational
		Democracy	Democracy
	Adversarial	Centripetal	Centrifugal
		Democracy	Democracy

However, such is not necessarily the case, as evidenced by Lustick's "control" paradigm. His theory of "control" is based on the premise that plural societies can be stable without coalescent behavior by segmental elites. Like the theory of consociationalism, "control" has been developed to apply to all plural societies. As noted previously, Lustick's "control" paradigm, developed in response to the consociational model, is based on the idea that manipulative techniques can also account for stability in deeply divided societies. Yet, one should not construe "control" theory as being totalitarian in nature. Unlike totalitarianism, which refuses to acknowledge the existence of segmental cleavages, "control" recognizes the existence of these segments. Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the "control" theory is to compare it with consociationalism. Lustick has compared the two models on seven key points.

FIGURE II

CONSOCIATIONALISM VERSUS CONTROL

	The criterion that effectively governs the authoritative allocation of resources.
Consociation	The common denominator of the interests of the segments as perceived and articulated by the respective elites.
Control	The interest of the superordinate segment as perceived and articulated by its elite is preminent.

Basis of the linkage between the sub-units or segments.

Consociation

Relations between units are based on trades, bargains, compromises and involves political and material exchanges.

Control

Linkages are penetrative in character, with the superordinate segment extracting property, political support, labor, etc., while delivering to the subordinate segment what it sees fit.

The importance of bargaining.

Consociation

Hard bargaining is a necessary fact of political life. Bargains -- haggled, struck and kept -- are signs that consociationalism is operating effectively.

Control

Bargaining is a sign that the system of control, as a means by which stability is maintained, has broken down.

The role of the official regime, represented by the civil service, bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies, the courts, the public educational system, and the armed forces.

Consociation

The official regime translates decisions reached between sub-unit elites into legislation and effective administrative procedures, and enforcement without discrimination.

Control

The official regime is the legal and administrative instrument of the superordinate segment. The bureaucratic apparatus is staffed by the superordinate segment and predominately makes decisions that favor the superordinate unit at the expense of the subordinate segment(s).

The type of normative justification for the continuation of the political order likely to be espoused publicly -- but more important privately -- by the regime's officials is closely linked to the differential role of the official regime.

Consociation

Emphasis is put on the common welfare of the sub-units and the chaotic consequences that could result for each of the units if the consociational practices fail.

Control

Legitimacy of the system is proclaimed by an elaborated and well-articulated group-specific ideology; specific to the history and perceived interests of the superordinate sub-units.

The character of the central specific problem that faces the sub-unit elites.

Consociation

The problem is symmetrical in character for each sub-unit: elites must strike bargains that do not jeopardize integrity of the system as a whole, on terms that can be enforced within the sub-units being represented.

Control

The problem is asymmetrical in character in that the superordinate group's main problem is devising cost-effective techniques of manipulation. For the subordinate elites (if they exist) the main problem is to devise policies which best cope with the situation at hand.

Visual metaphor that describes each system.

Consociation

A delicately but securely balanced scale.

Control

A puppeteer manipulating his stringed puppet.

Source: Adapted from Ian Lustick, "Stability In Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, (April 1979), pp. 330-332.

By comparing the two models as Lustick has done, one can clearly see that "control" theory is quite different from consociational theory. More importantly the existence of the "control" model enables one to have a better understanding of the consociational model, in that "control" helps to establish the conceptual boundaries of the consociational approach.¹⁹ The existence of the "control" model clearly restricts the consociational model to situations when cooperation among the segmental elites is present. This can be quite useful particularly in situations where both types of elite action are in practice. As Lustick points out, "one society can contain both kinds of relationships between different sets of groups."²⁰ It would, therefore, be erroneous to label such a political system as a whole as being either controlled or consociated.

Not only is "control" useful as a means of adding clarity to consociational theory, "control" as a theoretical concept has considerable value. First, it can help explain the absence of effective politicization on the part of a specific segment within a plural society. If manipulative measures are successfully employed against a particular segment, then it will be difficult if not impossible for the suppressed segment to become politically

organized. Second, the "control" model demonstrates that the failure of plural states to adhere to consociational techniques does not result in violence and instability.

"Control," though based on manipulation, does not imply coercive techniques. According to Lustick:

There are likely to be many different kinds of control systems; they may involve different mixes of coercive and noncoercive techniques; emerge under particular social-structural, ideological, economic or political conditions, have different implications for the political and social evolution of their societies; and be more or less attractive as prescriptive models.²¹

The "control" theory, as put forth by Lustick, is a distinct theoretical concept that offers an alternative and successful way of governing a plural society.

Even though Yugoslavia has characteristics that make it favorable for both the consociational and "control" models, it is interesting and important to note that Lustick believes Yugoslavia cannot be explained through either of the two models.²² Instead, Lustick describes Yugoslavia as an umpire regime.²³ The term umpire is taken from F.G. Bailey who described it as being individual(s) in charge of a political system that had no group to maintain and whose sole task was to preserve the structure of rules that regulated political competition.²⁴ Thus, such individuals were like umpires at a baseball game, whose sole task is to enforce the rules impartially. This concept of an umpire, though intriguing, is not appropriate for the Yugoslav case. Yugoslavia cannot be considered an

umpire regime because of the fact that the members of the elite come from the sub-units. With political decision-making being a zero-sum game there will always be some groups, regardless of the decisions that are made, who will feel unjustly treated. The fact that all the competitors will not view the umpire as being impartial surely throws into question the ability of the umpire to maintain his position. Consequently, in the Yugoslav case, it is not impartiality as manifested through the actions of an umpire leadership that maintains stability. Rather it is through the use of either cooperative or coercive methods, as put forth in the consociational and "control" models respectively, that accounts for stability. The remainder of this thesis is addressed to the task of determining which model(s) can best account for political stability in Communist Yugoslavia.

CHAPTER III

1946-1952: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PHASE

Beginning with an analysis of the 1946-1952 era, it is apparent that Yugoslav political elites have been willing to alter the structure of the political system as a means of ensuring political stability. The constitution of January 31, 1946, is a clear example of the willingness of the Yugoslav regime to rearrange the country's political institutions. This 1946 constitution was a watershed document in the political history of Yugoslavia in that it gave legal recognition to the existence of federalism in the country. The federal principle was initially put forth as part of the AVNOJ resolution of 1943. Therefore, the 1946 constitution, in effect gave de jure recognition to an existing form of government.

The establishment of federalism in Yugoslavia entailed creating six republics, one autonomous region and one autonomous province. The six republics were Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first five republics were based on ethnic boundaries with each indigenous nationality forming the majority of the republics' population.¹ The remaining republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a multi-ethnic territory with sizeable numbers of Serbs, Croats and Moslems.² It should be pointed out, however, that officially the Moslems were not identified as a separate ethnic group during this

period. Moreover, due to the geographic position of Bosnia-Hercegovina, it was economically linked more with Croatia. As a result, the Moslems tended to identify more with the Croats than the Serbs. Thus, the Croats identified Bosnia-Hercegovina as their own because of economic and geographical ties. On the other hand, the Serbs lay claim to this area because of the existence of a large Serb populace in the territory coupled with the fact that Serbia had entered World War One because of Bosnia-Hercegovina. By establishing Bosnia-Hercegovina as a separate entity the Yugoslav government prevented the possibility of dispute over this territory between the Serbs and Croats.

The decision to create the autonomous region of Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohija) and the autonomous province of Vojvodina also revolved around the issue of ethnicity. These two autonomous units were part of the republic of Serbia. However, as two-thirds of Kosmet's population consisted of Albanians and twenty-five percent of Vojvodina's population was Magyar in origin, full inclusion in the Serbian republic would have endangered the rights of these non-Serbian groups, and perhaps caused international tensions.³ Moreover, because of Kosmet's lack of economic development and Vojvodina's relative economic prosperity, total incorporation into Serbia might have led to the development of economic tensions in the republic. Another issue relating to the establishment of these units,

specifically Kosmet, concerns the fact that up to 1948 Albania was a Yugoslav satellite. Consequently, according to Frankel, Kosmet's autonomous status "was a preparatory step for the expected incorporation of Albania into Yugoslavia."⁴ Perhaps had this taken place, the Kosmet region would have been granted republican status.

This concept of autonomous units was borrowed from the Soviet Union and resulted in the Yugoslav regime granting these two territories special privileges, but also special duties in administering their affairs.⁵ For the most part these two units were of equal status. However, as Vojvodina had its own parliament and supreme court -- while Kosmet only had an assembly of local government and no supreme court -- the former was deemed a province, the latter a region. Each territory was given the right to use its main languages for official purposes. Other than the above, the autonomy that existed was generally superficial. The units executed rather than made policy decisions and as a result what authority Kosmet and Vojvodina enjoyed was delegated from the federal administration or the Serbian republican government.

This lack of any significant independence from the Serbian republic for Kosmet and Vojvodina is not surprising. It must be remembered that the Serbs saw these territories as historically belonging to them. Thus, the Communist leadership found it difficult to grant full republican status to these territories. By granting

autonomous status to these units, but keeping them part of the Serbian republic, the government hoped to satisfy both the Serbs and the non-Serbs of these two areas. In addition, the creation of these autonomous units can be seen as an attempt by the Communist leadership to curtail Serbian dominance and thus avoid the problems of the interwar period. On the other hand, the failure to create republics of these two areas can also be seen as pandering to the interests of the Serbs. This is a view held by Peselj, who believes:

The establishment of the Autonomous Vojvodina and the Kosovo-Metohijan Region within the Republic of Serbia was another concession to the Serbian Communists, who have considered these territories as integral parts of Serbia in a broader sense, but in view of the general principles of the Communist doctrine could not go so far as to maintain their exclusively or even predominantly Serbian character.⁶

Peselj's belief that the creation of these two units was a concession to Serbian Communists does hold some validity, particularly in the case of Kosmet and its predominantly Albanian population.

Nevertheless, for the most part the creation of federal boundaries in Yugoslavia was a task well performed by the Communist leadership. The majority of the country's important ethnic groups were recognized and given status through the creation of these federal borders.⁷ Yet, the failure to create a republic for the country's Albanian population contradicted the Yugoslav Communist policy of

recognizing nationality groups. It must be remembered that the Albanians in Yugoslavia were larger in number than the Montenegrins, but it was the Montenegrins who enjoyed republican status. As a result, the decision not to grant republican status to Kosmet may be viewed as an indication that the regime did use "control" type techniques. Obviously this is an issue that will be more fully examined in the course of this study.

The implementation of federal principles in Yugoslavia can be attributed to a number of factors. First, according to R.V. Burks federalism in Yugoslavia was but the first step to the development of a Balkan federation.⁸ The idea of a Balkan federation was not new to Balkan Marxists, having been discussed several years prior to the outbreak of World War One.

Secondly, and of more direct importance, federalism was seen as the best way to ameliorate the ethnic hostilities that had proved to be so damaging to the rulers of the interwar period. By giving republican status to the majority of the country's ethnic groups, the Communist leadership hoped that the major nationalities would be more willing to participate in the Yugoslav state.

Thirdly, Yugoslavia's relationship with the Soviet Union also influenced the development of federalism, particularly as it related to the manner in which it operated in Yugoslavia during this period. Up to the period prior to 1948, the Yugoslav Communists were very

loyal and praiseworthy of Stalin and the Soviet system, so much so that one analyst described it as "only slightly less than religious adulation."⁹ In addition, the fact that the Soviet Union was also a multi-ethnic state, further served to shape the nature of Yugoslav federalism. It is, therefore, not surprising that the first post World War Two constitution adopted in Yugoslavia was almost a carbon copy of Stalin's 1936 Soviet document. At the time, Edvard Kardelj, a top government official and party theorist stated:

For us the model was the Soviet Constitution, since the Soviet federation is the most positive example of the solution of relations between peoples in the history of mankind.¹⁰

Due to this close relationship with the Soviet Union, the 1946 Yugoslav constitution, like its 1936 Soviet counterpart, established a highly centralized system of government. Furthermore, political and economic circumstances dictated that this 1946 constitution be of a central nature. The Marxian emphasis on the unity of powers lead to a rejection on the separation of powers, as is the norm in a federal situation. As well, as Yugoslavia was in the process of reconstruction after enduring severe hardship during the war, strong central government and rigidly controlled planning were required. For a time, included in this central planning was the collectivization of agriculture.¹¹ Yugoslav officials readily admitted the presence of a strong central government. Aleksander Jovanovic, under-secretary in the Secretariat wrote:

The structure of government as laid by the constitution of 1946 was characteristic of a centralist system. This was due to the nature of the task that faced the country and primarily to the need for vigorous state intervention in eliminating the political and economic vestiges of the former capitalist system and in the creation of a sound basis for rapid socialist development.¹²

In terms of the topic under analysis, this statement serves as an indicator of "control" politics. Whether such was the case will be discussed later in this chapter.

In spite of the centralization that existed, there were provisions within the constitution that should have given the republics, and in turn the major nationalities, considerable political power, including the right of self-determination. Article I of the 1946 constitution stated:

The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state.¹³

However, while the right of self-determination appeared to be constitutionally guaranteed, such was not the case.

Hondius after thoroughly examining the issue of self-determination, as discussed by the Communist leadership during World War Two, and as put forth in the 1946 constitution, came to the conclusion that the member states did not have the right to secede from the Yugoslav federation.¹⁴ Commenting on the inability of the republics

to secede from the federation, Hondius wrote:

The denial was based on the fact that the Constitution mentioned the right of separation only in connection with the peoples which had created Yugoslavia, and not in connection with the member-states composing the Federation. In other words, at the moment of establishment of the Yugoslav State, the founding peoples were fully free to decide their fate and they possessed the right not only to unite, but also to separate. By uniting, they voluntarily renounced the right of separation.¹⁵

Pash in his study of Yugoslav political institutions came to the same conclusion as Hondius. Pash states:

... the 1946 Constitution of Yugoslavia implies that having the right to secede the republics elected instead to unite and form a federal state.¹⁶

Thus, it appears that the inclusion of self-determination provision in the 1946 constitution was little more than a token gesture. Taking the aforementioned into consideration, perhaps the only reason for enshrining self-determination in the constitution was due to the fact that this document was based on the 1936 Soviet constitution, which explicitly recognized the right of secession.

The fact that self-determination was not officially guaranteed to the Yugoslav republics, while appearing to be constitutionally ensured, is not of great surprise, particularly when one takes into account the nature of Yugoslav federalism. Historically federations have been formed between loosely related or independent states. Yet,

with regards to Yugoslavia such was not the case. Rather in the Yugoslav federal scheme, the republics were creatures of the federal government. As none of the republics had been sovereign prior to federalization, the republics owed their existence to the federal government.¹⁷ This becomes evident through Article I of the 1946 constitution which describes Yugoslavia as a union of peoples and not states. Therefore, it was not until federalization took place that the areas that comprised Yugoslavia attained state or republican status.

This vertical relationship that existed between the republics and the federal government becomes evident when one examines the institutional structure of the Yugoslav state as put forth in the 1946 constitution.¹⁸ Institutionally the Yugoslav system was constructed in a manner which gave representation to the major national groups at the federal level. There were two chambers within the Federal Assembly: a Federal Council and a Council of Nationalities. The Federal Council was elected by the people on a proportional basis, with one deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants.¹⁹ The Council of Nationalities, which was the republican voice at the federal level, consisted of 215 members. Each republic sent thirty members, the autonomous province of Vojvodina sent twenty and Kosmet sent fifteen.²⁰ With regards to the Council of Nationalities, the citizens had an indirect part in the election of delegates. The voters elected deputies at the

republican level. In turn these republican deputies elected from among themselves the members who represented each of the republics in the Council of Nationalities.

These two federal chambers elected from within their own ranks a Presidium, which acted as the collective headship of the state. The Presidium consisted of a President, six Vice-Presidents (theoretically one for each republic) and thirty delegates.²¹ The number of delegates was later reduced to provide greater efficiency. The bicameral Federal Chamber also selected a Cabinet, or Council of Ministers.²² This Cabinet consisted of a Premier, two Vice-Premiers and about twenty cabinet ministers.

On the surface, institutionally it appeared that the republics had a major voice in the affairs of the state. Reality, however, proved otherwise. First, all of the key powers were in possession of the federal leadership. Even though the republics had control of residual powers, it was the federal government which held significant authority. Article 44 of the 1946 constitution gave the federal government control of the following important areas of jurisdiction: changing the constitution, admission of new republics, international relations, foreign trade, questions of war and peace, national defense, national communication, economic planning, budgeting, monetary and credit system, and trade of national importance.²³ With such jurisdictional powers, the federal government extended

1
its control into all facets of Yugoslav life, be it of an economic, social or political nature.

Secondly, because the federal government enjoyed this massive legislative authority, little authority was left to the republics. The republics were administratively subordinate to the federal government, only having the power to initiate legislation in the less significant areas of governmental administration.²⁴ Not only did the lack of legislative authority hamper the republics, the lack of tradition and experience in governing further served to decrease their powers vis-a-vis those of the federal government.²⁵ This idea as put forth by Hondius appears to overstate the case, in that it was the lack of authority as opposed to lack of experience which was the pivotal factor that accounted for the weakness of the republican governments. The jurisdictional weakness of the republics was further demonstrated when one realizes that constitutions of the republics had to be in line with that of the federal government.²⁶ Therefore, there was little opportunity for the republics to develop legislation, especially economic, which would have been of concern to a particular region of the country.

Yet, in spite of this legislative dominance on the part of the federal government, one would have thought that with the existence of the Council of Nationalities, the republics would have had a voice in federal affairs. But with the Federal Assembly meeting for only two weeks a

year, the Council (from a republican perspective) did not have the desired impact. The Council of Nationalities, and the Federal Assembly as a whole, lost its role as a legislative body. Seroka in his study of the policy-making role of the Federal assembly determined that from 1946-1953 the body had no involvement in terms of policy initiation, formulation or implementation.²⁷ These tasks were assumed by the executive branches of the Yugoslav government, the Presidium and the Cabinet. As a result, the Federal Assembly became a ratifier of legislation as opposed to a tool for creation. In practice, the Federal Assembly, including the Council of Nationalities, was little more than a rubber stamp for the executive. Thus, as Whitehorn states in regards to the Council of Nationalities:

Such a body clearly could not articulate the aspirations of the 'nations' nor protect the interests of the multitude of 'national minorities'.²⁸

It would, therefore, appear that the decision to hold assembly meetings for only two weeks out of the entire year was part of this policy of central dominance.

To make matters more difficult for the republics, the two executive bodies, the Presidium and the Cabinet, had a considerable amount of authority. The Presidium had the power to order new elections, interpret federal law and issue decrees, which theoretically subjected to approval from the Federal Assembly was in practice foreordained.²⁹ The Cabinet, which was constitutionally the highest

administrative and executive organ, had the power to apply and execute federal laws.³⁰ The Cabinet performed this function through its various ministries. However, the key bodies that enabled the Cabinet to perform its tasks were the Federal Planning Commission and the Federal Control Commission. The former enabled the Cabinet to control the economic life of the country.³¹ On the other hand, the latter body made sure that all of the programs that had been introduced were being properly implemented.³²

Although the Cabinet was constitutionally responsible to the Federal Assembly, the infrequency of Assembly meetings shifted the responsibility to the Presidium. Yet, with the overlapping memberships of party members in the Presidium and the Cabinet, the two bodies operated synchronously.³³ This overlap is illustrated by the positions that Tito held. Tito, in addition to being head of the Communist Party, was Premier of the Cabinet, Minister of National Defense, member of the Presidium and member of the Federal Assembly. Therefore, the Cabinet and the Presidium, though separate and distinct bodies constitutionally, were in actual practice almost one body.

The republics were further weakened by the lack of an independent constitutional court. The task on ruling on the legality of legislation was in the hands of the Presidium.³⁴ Clearly this put a damper on republican sovereignty. As Shillinglaw points out, there was no judicial guarantee independent of the legislature that

would ensure that rights were observed in practice as they were in the constitution.³⁵ Therefore, it was legally possible for the Presidium or the Cabinet to issue a decree that was unconstitutional without fear that the decree would be annulled.

In effect, while constitutionally Yugoslavia was a federal state, in actual practice it was a fairly centralized state in the period from 1946-1952. The Presidium and the Cabinet assumed the legislative, the executive and a portion of the judicial functions of government. While federalism existed in name, such was not the case in practice. As Byrg points out:

Federalization of the state apparatus did not mean, however, federalization of political power within that state.³⁶

Yet, compared to the unitarist interwar period, federalism, no matter how limited, was an improvement. The fact that ethnic groups were recognized and given status helped, according to Shoup, satisfy important psychological needs.³⁷ However, relative to other federal states, Yugoslavia was quite centralized.

Although the republics lacked an effective voice in the political system, one would have thought that because of the multinational structure of Yugoslavia the Communist leadership would have made sure that the key government posts were proportionately distributed. According to the limited data that is available, the principle of proportionality was not adhered to. Rather, as the

following charts indicate, certain ethnic groups were overrepresented relative to the size of their population.

TABLE I
NATIONALITY OF PERSONS OCCUPYING LEADING
GOVERNMENT POSTS

		No.	% of posts	% of population 1948
Government of February 1, 1946	Serbs	8	38	42
	Croats*	4	19	24
	Slovenes	2	9	9
	Yugoslavs**	1	5	na
	Montenegrins	1	5	3
	Macedonians	1	5	5
	Unknown	4	19	-
Government of October 22, 1949	Serbs	11	44	42
	Croats*	4	16	24
	Slovenes	3	12	9
	Montenegrins	2	8	3
	Macedonians	2	8	5
	Yugoslavs**	2	8	na
	Unknown	1	4	-

* Including Tito

** Yugoslavs are probably Moslems, but may be of other nationality as well (for example, Serbs from Croatia).

Source: Adapted from Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 266, 274. Population statistics are cited by Shoup from Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslaviije, Savezni Zavod za Stastitiku, "Konacni rezultati popisa stanovnistva od 15 marta 1948 godine," Vol. IX: Stanovnistvo po narodnosti, p. xiv.

This data does not specify which posts various individuals held. As well, the data is somewhat incomplete because of the existence of the "unknown" variable.

Consequently, with regard to the government of February 1,

1946, one cannot accurately determine if certain key groups -- namely the Croats and Serbs -- were under or over-represented. Nevertheless, some interesting information is present. First, it is clear that in both of the governments, the Montenegrins were overrepresented. Secondly, it is also clear that in both administrations the Croats were underrepresented. Thirdly, it appears that both the Albanians and the Magyars, while given autonomous status, did not have individuals within the upper echelons of the government. Fourthly, the Serbs, while having a fairly equitable share of government posts relative to their population, had by far the largest percentage of government posts. This fact along with the fact that the Montenegrins were overrepresented undoubtedly worked to the advantage of both the Serbs and Montenegrins. It must be remembered that culturally the Serbs and the Montenegrins are very close. Therefore, it would be quite likely that the Serbs and Montenegrins could reach a compromise in an easier fashion than, for example, the Serbs and the Slovenes. In turn, this would give the Serbs a majority of the positions. In a highly centralized state such a situation was advantageous for the Serbs.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, it is clear that this type of distribution of governmental posts was not conducive to the practice of consociationalism. Therefore, the distribution of these governmental posts may serve as an indicator of "control" technique. This is

further reinforced by the fact that Yugoslavia was quite centralized in this era. Without the existence of any significant republican autonomy, coupled with the lack of proportional representation in key government posts, certain Yugoslav groups -- namely the Croats, Albanians, Magyars and perhaps the Slovenes and Macedonians -- were in a position that caused them to be subject to "control"-type practices.

Moreover, the decision of the Communist leadership to retain Belgrade as the capital of Yugoslavia was an additional factor that served to lessen the political voice of non-Serbian nationalities. With the existence of a centralized system, Belgrade was the focal point of all administrative and political authority, as well as economic and financial power. Obviously this was of advantage to the Serbs in that they would be the most likely to fill important administrative and political positions. Although there are no statistics available to verify this claim, two factors give credence to the aforementioned claim. First, due to the cultural and language barrier, groups such as the Slovenes, Albanians, Magyars and perhaps the Macedonians and Croatians would have found it difficult to function within key administrative posts. Secondly, as touched upon earlier, the fact that the largest group within the Communist Party was the Serbs undoubtedly gave this group an inside track in acquiring key government posts.

The structure of Yugoslav government under the 1946 constitution and the distribution of key government posts points to a "control" situation, with the Serbs and possibly the Montenegrins doing the controlling. However, because of the existence of centralization within the confines of a one party state, one is forced to look beyond the governmental structure in order to fully substantiate if "control" was being practiced. As the decisions the government made were determined by the Communist Party, an examination of the structure and role of the party should fully verify if "control" was being used.

Yet, if the party was the key decision-making body in Yugoslavia at this time, one is left to wonder what the purpose of the 1946 constitution, and the elaborate structure it purported to uphold, was? Pash appears to answer this question when he writes: "that the formal constitution is but a reflection of the underlying forces molding the shape of the community."³⁸ The party in its vanguard role obviously performed the function of shaping the community. Therefore, it follows that the Communist Party -- in the name of the proletariat -- shaped this constitution. As has been shown, while the constitution did offer the republics some autonomy, for the most part the document was in favor of the central administration. Thus, it follows that there would be a connection between the centralization of the government and the structure of the party. It would be unlikely for the party to put forth

a centralized constitution, if the party itself was not centralized.

Like the government and its institutions, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia also appears to have been quite a centralized organization in this initial period under study. Yet, just as the government institutions had paid attention to the existence of multinationalism by establishing federalism, so too did the Communist Party. The national party made sure that all the republics had their own Communist parties. As a result, republican Communist parties were created in Serbia in 1946 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro in 1948-49, to complement already existing republican parties in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. However, the republican parties, like republican governments, did not have a significant voice in the actual decision-making process. Instead, because of the hierarchical nature of the Yugoslav Communist Party, decisions were made at the centre by the Central Committee and the Politburo. The ethnic composition of these two units was much like the government in that proportionality was not adhered to.

TABLE II
NATIONALITY OF PERSONS OCCUPYING LEADING
PARTY POSTS

		No.	% of posts
Party Central Committee 1948	Serbs	25	40
	Croats	12*	19
	Slovenes	8	13
	Montenegrins	10	16
	Macedonians	5	8
	Yugoslavs	1	2
	Unknown	2	3
Party Politburo, 1948	Serbs	3	33
	Croats	2*	22
	Slovenes	2	22
	Montenegrins	2	22

* Includes Tito

Source: Adapted from Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 275.

The above information shows that certain major ethnic groups were not proportionately represented. Within the Central Committee, the most obvious cases of underrepresentation were the Albanians and the Magyars; neither group was represented. In addition, these two groups lacked representation in the Politburo. The Macedonians were also underrepresented in this organ. The remaining groups were for the most part proportionately represented in both of these party organs. The glaring exception to the above were the Montenegrins, who were overrepresented in both the Central Committee and the Politburo. This overrepresentation coupled with the sheer size of the

Serbian contingent gave these two groups a majority of the representation in the Central Committee and the Politburo. While it is unlikely that these groups would oppose Tito, and attempt to force through decisions that he was against, such representation at the elite level can hardly be viewed as being conducive to consociationalism. Therefore, in terms of the distribution of posts in the party, there is further evidence to support the existence of "control" type practices.

Furthermore, the manner in which the party maintained dominance over the Yugoslav state also adds support to the claim that "control" was in use during this era. The Politburo and the Central Committee, especially the former, were the quintessential decision-making organs in Yugoslavia. The decisions made at the apex of the party determined the manner in which the country operated. At the heart of the system of Politburo and Central Committee dominance was the concept of democratic centralism. Aleksandar Rankovic, the then head of the secret police, best defined the concept and its impact on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia when he stated:

Our party is built on the principle of democratic centralism, which means that it has entailed and still entails the principle that officials from the lower organizations to the higher organizations are elected, and that there are periodic accountings by the lower echelons to the party organization, with the principle of leadership from one center and with the obedience of the lesser to the higher organs, and with the principles

of obedience of the minority to the majority with strict party discipline, etc.³⁹

By enforcing this concept of democratic centralism, the Communist leadership was assured that the decisions made at the top would be adhered to by all members of the party. In turn, party members at the lower echelons made sure the decisions were properly carried out.

The system of central dominance was further reinforced by a number of factors. First, as discussed previously, party members occupied all key government posts and were thus able to ensure that party policy became government policy. Often key party members would hold key government posts, either within the Presidium or the Cabinet. Under such a system of interlocking directorates there was a close connection between the government and the Communist Party.

Secondly, the party also employed its members to intervene in government and economic affairs. Consisting of about 5,000 individuals, this apparatus was almost a second government, performing tasks that were the responsibility of state organs.⁴⁰ This second bureaucracy for the most part consisted of people with little education or knowledge of administrative affairs. Undoubtedly this situation led to mismanagement and put a strain on the country's fragile economy. Yet, the presence of this second bureaucracy demonstrated the party's concern for maintaining strict control of the country.

The third factor that proved valuable in ensuring adherence to decisions made by the party's leadership was the existence of the People's Front. Initially the People's Front was an organization consisting of several parties from the interwar period -- Democratic, Socialist, Republican and Agrarian parties from Serbia and the Croat Peasant Party -- that had agreed to work with the Communists. However, the Communists soon gained control of this organization. With a membership of seven million in 1948, the People's Front was of extreme importance to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.⁴¹ While all the members of the People's Front were not Communists, the fact that the Communist Party controlled the organization prevented the enunciation of dissenting views. In effect this organization transmitted party doctrines and performed duties that the party desired. Perhaps the most important duty the People's Front performed initially was that of providing the Communist leadership with a ready and able work force that was available to help rebuild the country after the war.

The fourth factor that benefited the Communist leadership in its ability to maintain strict control over the country was the existence of the secret police. O.Z.N.A. (Odeljenje Zastite Naroda or Department for the Protection of People) was an organization consisting of old-guard Communists and was led by Aleksander Rankovic, a Serb and at that time one of Tito's closest colleagues.

O.Z.N.A.'s main task was to ensure that "collaborators" and

dissenting non-communist officials were dealt with. Collaborators were, as Hoffman and Neal point out, practically any individuals who the Communist leadership did not like or those who did not actively fight alongside the Partisans.⁴² Adherence to this view on part of the leadership led to the arrests of both the guilty and the innocent. In 1949 Rankovic admitted that forty-nine percent of arrests were unjustified and that twenty-three percent were for non-political crimes or crimes of minor significance.⁴³ It is also interesting to note that Rankovic blamed the courts for converting minor crimes into political crimes.⁴⁴ Yet, as O.Z.N.A. often acted as police, judge, jury and prosecutor, this claim lacks credibility. While O.Z.N.A. changed its name to U.D.B. (Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti or State Security Administration) in 1948, it still remained an instrument of terror under the control of Rankovic.

Assisting the secret police in maintaining this police state was the Yugoslav army. The Yugoslav army was a creation of the Communist Party and was thus closely linked with the party. In 1948 ninety-four percent of the commanding personnel of the army were members of the Communist Party.⁴⁵ In addition, three percent of the Central Committee in 1948 consisted of military people.⁴⁶ Although the army was primarily responsible for external security, it undoubtedly was also used for domestic security. In their quest to satisfy the leadership of the

party, these two groups -- especially the secret police -- were not immune from using repression. With wartime enemies, namely the Serbian Chetniks and Croatian Ustase, still roaming the countryside after the war, coupled with the widespread search for "collaborators," individuals from all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were subjected to arrest. However, it appears that certain groups were subjected to more arrests, violence and persecution than others. The Albanians, for one, were forced to endure extreme repression. Commenting on the treatment of the Albanians by the Yugoslav authorities, Shoup writes:

The Communists were guilty of extreme measures which at times differed little from those employed by the occupation authorities during the war.⁴⁷

Even though the Albanians in Yugoslavia responded unfavourably to the presence of the Communists, the response by the party only served to exacerbate the situation. As well, Yugoslavia's Magyar population was forced to endure repressive actions. According to reports, 30,000 Hungarians were executed or imprisoned after the Communists came to power in Yugoslavia.⁴⁸

Another group that was subjected to repression was the Catholic Church. As the Catholic Church was vehemently anti-Communist, it was not surprising that it ran into conflict with Yugoslav authorities. the Church was accused by the party of conspiring with the Fascists during the war. The most celebrated case that resulted from these charges was the arrest and imprisonment of the Archbishop

of Zagreb, Alois Stepinac. Although there appeared to be some validity to the leadership's claims, the Communists also used questionable evidence to convict the Archbishop. Due to the fact that the majority of Yugoslavia's Catholics were Croats and Slovenes, this repression of the Church took on nationalist overtones. This persecution of the Catholic Church was seen by the Slovenes and the Croats, particularly the latter, as an attack on the cultural identity of these two nations. As the Catholic Church was a focal point of the lives of many Croats and Slovenes, the persecution of the Church amounted to a persecution of the Croatian and Slovene peoples.

On the other hand, the country's other significant religious organization, the Serbian Orthodox Church was able to reach an accord with the Communist leadership. One does not wish to imply that the Serbian Orthodox Church was in full agreement with the Yugoslav Communist leadership. Like the Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church had its priests imprisoned and its churches closed. However, on a relative basis, the Serbian Orthodox Church fared better than the Catholic Church in its dealings with the Communist Party. In part, this can be attributed to the different roles and structures of the two churches. Religion in Serbia was not as important as it was in Croatia.⁴⁹ Therefore, it follows that the actions of the Orthodox Church would not be as closely monitored as they were in the Catholic areas of Croatia and Slovenia.

Secondly, the Catholic Church, with its headquarters outside of Yugoslavia, was more difficult to control and seen as a bigger threat than the Serbian Orthodox Church. As well, the Serbian Church had a tradition of accommodating itself with different governments. Thirdly, the Orthodox Serbian clergy cooperated early on with the Communists, even having priests in the Partisan forces.⁵⁰ Thus, it was easier for the Serbian clergy to reach an understanding with the Communists than it was for the Catholic clergy.

In addition, the fact that the Communist Party as a whole, and especially the organs of persecution, the army and the secret police, were numerically dominated by the Serbs, also helps account for the repression that the Catholic Church endured.

TABLE III

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE YUGOSLAV
COMMUNIST PARTY, 1949-1950*

Republic	No.	% of Members (rounded)
Serbia	167,025	43
Croatia	85,748	22
Slovenia	37,959	10
Bosnia-Hercegovina	54,150	14
Macedonia	27,029	7
Montenegro	16,425	4

* Figures exclude Party members in the army. In 1952 there were 140,193 such members.

Source: Adapted from Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 269.

Although the above data are of republican rather than ethnic composition, one can deduce that the Serbs -- with forty-two percent of the population in 1948 -- were over-represented. It must be remembered that there are sizeable Serbian populations in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to the harsh and often brutal treatment that these Serbs outside of Serbia proper received from the Croat leadership during the war, these Serbs were attracted to the Communist Party.

This overrepresentation of the Serbs within the general membership of the Communist Party was also present within the Yugoslav army, specifically the officer corps. Moreover, and not surprisingly, the cultural brothers of the Serbs, the Montenegrins were also overrepresented.⁵¹

TABLE IV

NATIONALITY OF OFFICER CORPS 1946
(percentages, rounded)

Nationality	
Serb	51.0
Croat	22.7
Slav Muslim*	1.9
Slovene	9.7
Albanian	**
Macedonian	3.6
Montenegrin	9.2
Hungarian	**
Other	1.9**

* "Muslim" was not a recognized group in 1948; this was the percentage of the "undeclared" group, mainly Slav Muslims.

**Includes Hungarians and Albanians.

Source: Adapted from A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch. Rand Paper No. P-6070. (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1978), p. 19.

With regards to the secret police, while there are not data available on the ethnic composition of this group, there is reason to believe that this group was also dominated by the Serbs. As mentioned previously, the force was headed by a Serb, Rankovic, and consisted of old-guard Communists. As these old Communists had a significant Serbian element, one can be sure that the secret police was well represented with this Serbian element.

Due to this preponderance of Serbs within these various organs, one is not surprised that the Catholic Church was subjected to repression. Undoubtedly the Serbs outside of Serbia proper who suffered under Croat rule in World War Two did not look favourably towards the Croats. Even though the Communist Party preached "Brotherhood and Unity," hostility between the national groups was inevitable. As the Catholic Church was a symbol of Slovene and Croatian identity, repression of the Catholic Church was seen as a way of nipping nationalism. In the case of Croatia, the persecution of the Catholic Church was a means of retribution for Croatia's actions in the war.

Though the Communists came to power because of their stand on the national question, all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were not treated equally. It is apparent that the Serbs, with the assistance of the Montenegrins, occupied a preeminent role in Yugoslavia. The Serbs were well entrenched within the bureaucracy, the party and its other agencies.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav leadership downplayed the existence of a leading nation. Tito stated:

We reject all theories about a ruling nation, no matter how much bigger some of our nations are than those in the smallest republics.⁵²

Yet, with the Serbs being overrepresented in the key areas of power, it is apparent that there was a leading nation in Yugoslavia in this period. The Serbs were perhaps not as dominant as they had been in the interwar period, but as McVicker points out, the Serbs paid the most to partake in Communist Yugoslavia.⁵³ Besides, it should be remembered that during the interwar period most of Yugoslavia's nationalities were not even recognized. Therefore, none of the other groups had anything to surrender and thus had everything to gain. What gains the other nationalities acquired obviously came at the expense of the Serbs. The Serbs, however, did not surrender enough power so as to put the various nationalities on a par with one another. Moreover, the fact that political power emanated from the centre further served to strengthen the position of the Serbs.

The existence of etatism in Yugoslavia undoubtedly enable the Communist leadership to retain a tight grip over the country. In a pejorative sense, Zalar has classified Yugoslavia as a prerogative state.⁵⁴ Under such a prerogative system violence and arbitrariness are unchecked by any type of legal guarantees.⁵⁵ As well, it is difficult to distinguish the state from the party.⁵⁶

It is clear that following the accession to power of the Communists, Yugoslavia was a prerogative state.

In regard to the topic under analysis, the existence of state socialism or the prerogative state violates the consociational principles of mutual veto and segmental autonomy. However, the existence of etatism does not impact on the two other features of consociationalism, namely government by grand coalition and proportionality. Nevertheless, in the Yugoslav case, these two provisions were also not adhered to. Granted, as Bridge points out, the fact that ethnicity was used as a means of representation shows signs of consociationalism.⁵⁷ In reality, consociationalism, if it existed, only involved the Serbs and the Montenegrins. With regard to the other nationalities, the Yugoslav leadership was not comprised of representatives of all the significant national groups. In addition to the above, proportionality within the government and the party was not followed. Obviously this violates consociational theory. Even if proportionality had been adopted it may not have prevented Serbian domination. As the Serbs were by a considerable margin numerically superior, the principle of equality -- specifically within the party executive -- should have been adhered to.

Thus, the failure to adhere to consociational principles within both the government and the party can be viewed as a sign of "control" politics. Moreover, the fact

that coercive techniques were used more frequently against certain groups reinforces this claim that "control"-type actions were taking place. Two groups that were undoubtedly subjected to "control" were the Albanians and the Magyars. Neither of these groups was represented within the elite structure of the government or the party. Granted, the fact that these two groups had mother countries outside of Yugoslavia, and in turn were viewed as national minorities may account for this lack of representation. Nevertheless, regardless of the reasoning, this lack of representation meant that these two groups were subjected to the whims of the leadership. The remaining groups that were subjected to "control" were the Slovenes, Croats and Macedonians. However, as these two groups had some representation, the amount of "control" exercised over them was not as great as over the Albanians or the Magyars. Although the Slovenes, Croats and Macedonians were represented within the key bodies of power, they lacked the representation to be on a par with the Serbs.

The "control" situation that existed in Yugoslavia is not exactly of the type as put forth in Lustick's model; nor would one expect it to be. "Control" systems are likely to vary in style and degree.⁵⁸ In Yugoslavia, the "control" situation was unique; being distinguished by three factors. First, a policy of autonomy for the national cultures was encouraged. Although limited by

ideological factors, cultural autonomy did enable national groups to maintain their native languages and thus sustain their cultural uniqueness. Secondly, emphasis was placed on alleviating regional economic disparities through a policy of state accumulation and redistribution.⁵⁹ The greatest economic discrepancies were between the north, Croatia, Vojvodina and Slovenia, and the south, Serbia, Macedonia; Montenegro and Kosmet. While the Croats, Slovenes and Magyars might have viewed this policy as being manipulative, it was adopted for the benefit of the poorer regions as a whole, and not just Serbia.⁶⁰

Thirdly, and most importantly, while there was a strong element of ethnic "control" in Yugoslavia, the "control" situation actually entailed the party's dominance over society. It must be remembered that the Communist Party in Yugoslavia was a tightly knit organization. Party leadership was not determined by any sort of ethnic criteria. Political leaders did not represent particular ethnic groups. Instead, those that held key positions in the party and the government attained their status through participation in the Partisan war effort. Due to the fact that the Serbs, especially those Serbs outside of Serbia proper, and the Montenegrins were the two most dominant groups in the party, they in turn benefited the most from the "control" situation.

With the "control" scenario in Yugoslavia entailing

the dominance of the party over the masses, the apparently contradictory policy whereby the Serbs possessed the majority of the key posts of power in Yugoslavia, but did not manipulate the other nationalities solely for Serbian interest can be better understood. As one of the contributing factors in the Communists' rise to power was the stand against Serbian unitarism, the Serbs could not expect to enjoy the type of hegemony they had during the interwar period. Even though the Serbs controlled the majority of political posts, the fact that "control" was exercised by a political organization that adhered to the slogan of "Brotherhood and Unity" meant that the Serbs could not totally disregard the other nationalities. For this to have taken place, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia would have had to been comprised of just Serbs and Montenegrins.

In addition, the party's stand on the national question is an important factor in explaining why some attention was placed on ensuring limited cultural autonomy for all the major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. In the eyes of the Yugoslav Communists, national differences were a result of economic inequalities. In a 1949 speech Tito stated:

There cannot be a correct solution to the nationalities' problem while one Republic is backward and another advances at the cost of another nationality, while economic inequity [sic] persists. Therefore, we have

provided in our constitution that all nationalities, all Republics, should develop uniformly.⁶¹

Thus, the policy of cultural autonomy was supposed to be little more than a stop-gap measure. Once economic inequalities disappeared, the national question would be solved. The cultural identities of each of the nationalities were to be replaced by class solidarity.

The unique nature of the "control" situation in Yugoslavia, with the party being the one exercising dominance, along with the party's belief in attaining statewide economic equality, prevented the development of a full-scale ethnically based "control" situation. Nevertheless, the possession of these various government and party posts did put the Serbs in a preeminent position in Yugoslavia. The fact that the Serbs in conjunction with the Montenegrins were able to acquire and maintain a majority of important posts demonstrates the ethnic flavor of the Yugoslav "control" situation. The lack of other ethnically based "control" techniques, such as a group-specific ideology, is due to the fact that the Communist Party in Yugoslavia was not ethnically homogeneous. This, however, does not negate the existence of "control" in Yugoslavia in this period. The lack of elite representation for certain groups, and underrepresentation of others, along with total societal command by the party, clearly points to the existence of a "control" situation in the country. As has been shown, in Yugoslavia's case, this

involved "control" by the Communist Party, with a strong element of ethnic -- Serbian and Montenegrin -- "control" within the party.

CHAPTER IV

1953-1962: IN QUEST OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALISM

During the 1953-1962 period, significant changes were made in the Yugoslav political system. The catalyst for these changes was the Tito/Stalin split of 1948, in which the Yugoslavs were accused of ideological deviation, and in turn expelled from the Cominform. In reality, the expulsion resulted from Stalin's fear that Tito had become too prominent within the Balkan region, thereby posing a threat to Soviet hegemony within Eastern Europe. Initially the Yugoslav leadership tried to defend itself from the Soviet accusations of ideological heresy.¹ However, after being economically and ideologically cut adrift, the Yugoslav leadership began to criticize the Soviet Union, charging the Soviets with being deviationists.²

Wrapped in an economic straitjacket, the Yugoslav leadership began to make overtures towards the United States. The Americans responded with a generous program of financial aid.³ As well, Yugoslavia's political braintrust had to create its own brand of socialism. The new system of social democracy or Titoism theoretically began in 1950 with the introduction of the law on self-management.⁴ However, the various aspects of Titoism did not come to fruition until after the Sixth Congress of the League of Communists in November of 1952, and the promulgation of the Constitutional Law in January 1953.

The introduction of Titoism had an impact on elite attitudes and actions towards the nationalities issue. While this revolution from above led to numerous changes in Yugoslavia, the most significant ones in terms of elite behavior towards the nationalities issue were: (1) the introduction of self-management principles; (2) the relaxation of totalitarianism; (3) the emphasis on creating Yugoslav nationalism.

The establishment of self-management in Yugoslavia entailed giving the workers control of the operation of economic enterprises. While the enterprises remained as social property, workers were given the opportunity to make certain decisions relating to the enterprise.

The firm was free to plan its production and sell its products on the market, within the framework of a centrally determined macro-economic preference scale imposed by what became a regulative instead of directive economic bureaucracy.⁶

The macroeconomic strategies were determined by the central administration through its control of investment funds. In theory, the central government had approximately thirty-five percent of the investment capital under its control.⁷ However, as the federal government allocated capital to the local and republican governments, the central administration undoubtedly set the investment priorities. In addition, the party through its control of the unions and through the establishment of economic chambers was able to exert pressure on enterprises.⁸

Nevertheless, during this period, market measures did have an impact on Yugoslavia. In terms of the nationalities issue, two factors resulting from economic decentralization were important. First, because of the emphasis on economic growth and economic feasibility, investments showed a better return in the advanced areas. As a result, regional inequality increased.⁹ As these regional inequities were based on ethnic divisions, the issue took on nationalist overtones. Although the federal government increased funding to the underdeveloped regions under the social plan for 1957-1961, the underdeveloped regions did not utilize the aid effectively. Prestige projects such as steel mills, chemical and electronic plants were built without considering factors like the lack of proper transportation and insufficient supplies of capable labour. Part of the blame lay with the republics through their ineffective use of funds. The majority of the blame can be put on the federal government. The central administration encouraged each nation to develop a strong industrial base so as not to be exploited by economically advanced systems. Consequently, there were problems such as have been described above.

Secondly, this emphasis on securing a strong industrial base for each of the republics led to the growth of particularism. This has been defined "as the pursuit of narrow local, or republic policies at the expense of the welfare of the country as a whole."¹⁰ Particularism led to

the duplication of industries and the establishment of restrictive trade practices between the republics. This republican economic autarky did not bode well for the general economic welfare of the country. Moreover, as will be discussed later, the emergence of economic regionalism in Yugoslavia had important ramifications for the party, which in turn impacted on elite attitudes towards the nationalities issue.

The second major feature of Titoism that had an impact on the nationalities issue in this era was the abatement of totalitarian practices. With the shift away from the Soviet Union coupled with closer ties with the West, the Yugoslav leadership began to move away from a policy of intimidation and moved towards a policy of persuasion. Consequently, one saw a relative increase in the amount of freedom Yugoslavia's citizens enjoyed.¹¹ This was not the type of freedom that is associated with western type systems, namely multiparty politics and a free press. But the liberalization process in Yugoslavia did result in, among other things, greater independence for the courts, greater religious freedoms and the ending of arbitrary arrests by the secret police. In addition, there was an increase in cultural freedoms. As a result of this liberalization process and the introduction of some market principles into the economy, there was a resurgence of national consciousness among the various Yugoslav ethnic groups. In turn, in the middle fifties, the regime

partially reversed the liberalization process.

Nevertheless, Yugoslav citizens in 1958 enjoyed greater freedom than they did in 1948.

The third issue arising out of Titoism which had an impact on elite attitudes towards the national question was the policy of "Yugoslavianism." With the introduction of economic decentralization and the partial liberalization of totalitarianism, the regime needed some non-coercive bond to unite the people.¹² This led the regime to put forth the idea of the existence of a Yugoslav nation. The leadership placed emphasis on the unity of the Yugoslav people through their common class struggle.¹³ In addition, cultural exchanges were encouraged whereby artists, writers and performers of the various nationalities exchanged ideas. As well, under the Novi Sad agreement of 1954 the language and culture of the Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins were deemed to be one with only local differences existing. Even minority children were forced to take certain classes with their Serb-Croat counterparts. Essentially the leadership hoped to make Yugoslavia like Bosnia-Hercegovina, namely a melting pot state.

The effect that these three aspects of Titoism had on elite attitudes and actions towards the nationalities issue can be determined through an analysis of the changes that were brought forth within the structure and role of the government and the party in this period. In turn, one will

also be able to determine if "control" practices were still being followed in Yugoslavia.

The basis of the governmental structure in the 1953-1962 period was determined by the Constitutional Law of January 13, 1953. Technically the Constitutional Law amended the 1946 constitution. However, as there were 115 amendments put forth under the Constitutional Law, this document for all intents and purposes was a new constitution. According to one of Yugoslavia's top former political theoreticians Edvard Kardelj, the government structure under the 1953 constitution was based on the following principles:

... socialism, the leading role of the working class, social self-government, equal personal rights, decentralization of executive functions, unified social and political system, equality of rights and peoples, democratism, revolutionary sincerity and alertness.¹³

Nowhere in Kardelj's statement does one see any specific mention of the role of the nationalities in the new system. Rather, emphasis is placed on the relationship of the individual with the socialist state. As a result, under the 1953 constitution, there is a shift in the nature of Yugoslav federalism from an emphasis on the nationalities to an emphasis on the working class. This "polyvalent federalism"¹⁴ saw the local council or, as it was known after 1955, the commune replace the republics as the main competing power base to the federal government.

While the 1953 constitution did not deal at any great

length with the power of the republics, the power of the republics did actually increase in this era. According to Shoup:

... it was characteristic of the new period that, as some of the more dogmatic aspects of the Stalinist federal theory were abandoned, the substantive rights of the republics tended to grow, often through informal practices not recognized in the constitution.¹⁵

As five of the six republics had an indigenous group form the majority of the population in the republic, any growth of republican power can be seen as a decrease in "control"-type practices. Moreover, the emergence of the local councils as a significant power base had an impact on the nationalities issue. The local councils had authority in the management of social services and had a voice in determining the wage structure and product levels of economic enterprises. Thus, according to Pash, charges of hegemony on the part of Belgrade became less valid.¹⁶ As the Serbs were the most dominant group in the federal administrative structure, the emergence of local councils also served to decrease "control"-type practices.

Nevertheless, despite these changes, the federal government still maintained its preeminent position. As Cohen and Warwick state:

The reality of Yugoslav federalism during this period consisted more of a devolution of administrative personnel and functional responsibilities for policy implementation, rather than a genuine de-concentration of power on important matters.¹⁷

If power remained at the centre following the 1953 constitution, one is left to wonder what was the purpose in introducing changes that emphasized the power of the working class. According to Dragnich, and correctly so:

In short, the political-administrative changes sought two things simultaneously: effective party guidance of the nations decentralized economic activities, and the accomplishment of this purpose without undermining the party's authority or without making it appear that everything was decided at the center.¹⁸

The attempt by the political centre to maintain its dominant position becomes apparent when one examines the structure of the Yugoslav government under the 1953 constitution. As the working class was theoretically the key political variable in Yugoslavia at this time, the constitution was constructed in a manner so as to give this group a major voice in the affairs of the state. Workers were represented at the federal level through the Council of Producers. This body in conjunction with the Federal Council was theoretically responsible for constitutional amendments, the federal budget and social plan, finances and economic matters in general, and issues regarding labour and social insurance.¹⁹ As well, the Council of Producers and the Federal Council elected the federal executive and members of various federal committees and commissions.²⁰

The Council of Producers was indirectly elected by the producers in economic enterprises and agricultural cooperatives and by craftsmen acting through chambers of

handicraft, on the basis of one representative for every seventy thousand economic producers.²¹ Obviously, this criterion for the selection of representatives discriminated against the country's peasants, the majority of whom were not in cooperatives.²² Yet, in terms of ethnic representation, the Council of Producers, for the most part, adhered to the principle of proportionality.

TABLE V

NATIONALITY OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF PRODUCERS, 1960

Nationality	No. of Deputies	% of Deputies
Serbs	101	46.8
Croats	51	23.6
Slovenes	25	11.6
Macedonians	12	5.6
Montenegrins	7	3.2
Others (6 Albanians, 5 Hungarians, 9 undeclared)	20	9.2

Source: Adapted from Harold Pash, The Yugoslav Nationality Problem and its Influence on the Development of Political and Socio-Economic Institutions. Dissertation: New School for Social Research, 1968, p. 287. Cited from Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 1, No. 2, (September 1960), p. 14.

Although the major ethnic groups were for the most part proportionately represented in the Council of Producers, this body did not exercise any significant authority. As will be shown throughout the course of this chapter, real political power was located elsewhere.

The other major legislative organ was the Federal Council. This body, in addition to having the powers that

it shared with the Council of Producers, had sole legislative authority on laws and decisions which were not related to social insurance, the national economy or the electoral duties of the People's Assembly.²³ The Federal Council was elected on the basis of one representative for every sixty thousand residents.²⁴ Moreover, the Federal Council included seventy members who were elected by the six republics and the two autonomous units. Each of the republics sent ten delegates, with the remainder provided by Vojvodina (six), and Kosmet (four).²⁵

This seventy-member group was a remnant of the Council of Nationalities, which had formed one-half of the Federal Assembly under the previous constitution. With the emergence of the working class as the main element in Yugoslav federalism, the Council of Nationalities was replaced by the Council of Producers. Nevertheless, constitutionally the seventy-member group that sat in the Federal Council had the right to convene as the Council of Nationalities when issues arose involving constitutional changes, the economic plan or questions which affected the status of the republics.²⁶ Furthermore, if these members did not agree with the remainder of the Federal Council, the Council would be dissolved.²⁷ However, not only was the Federal Council never dissolved, these seventy members rarely convened as the Council of Nationalities. According to Kardelj, the Council of Nationalities was retained for only formal purposes.²⁸ Yet, as mentioned previously, this

apparent reduction of republican power at the federal level was offset by the general liberalization process.²⁹

Relative to the previous constitutional era, the Yugoslav legislature assumed a more prominent role in the affairs of the state. The fact that the legislature met on a regular basis enabled the deputies to become more active in the political arena. In addition, the formation of various legislative committees also served to increase the input of the Federal Assembly in the governing of the country. The greatest amount of input from the legislature came in the area of policy formulation. However, its role has been described as at best weak.³⁰ Nevertheless, compared to the previous period, this was a marked improvement. In terms of policy initiation and policy implementation, the Federal Assembly continued to have no impact.³¹ Thus, while there was an increase in legislative authority in this era, the Federal Assembly's primary role was to give legitimacy to legislation brought forth by the executive.

The fact that the bulk of governmental authority remained in the hands of the executive helps account for the general adherence to the principle of proportionality in the Federal Assembly. As in the Council of Producers, the various major ethnic groups were proportionately represented in the Federal Council. The existence of a quasi Council of Nationalities within the Federal Council helped achieve this type of representation.

TABLE VI

NATIONALITY OF MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL, 1960

Nationality	No. of Deputies	% of Deputies
Serbs	153	41.2
Croats	79	21.3
Slovenes	36	9.7
Macedonians	29	7.9
Montenegrins	26	7.0
Others (2 Turks, 12 Albanians, 23 undeclared Yugoslavs, and one each Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian, and Romanian)		

Source: Adapted from Pash, p. 286. Cited from Yugoslav Survey, Vol. I, No. 2 (September 1960), p. 143.

As the Federal Assembly lacked significant political power, the presence of proportionality in this body is of little value in determining whether elites were adhering to "control" or consociational type practices. The presence of proportional representation in the Federal Assembly appeared to be part of the policy of Yugoslavianism. By ensuring that the major groups were proportionately represented the leadership was trying to put forth the concept of unity. However, the failure to grant the Federal Assembly any major power tends to substantiate the claim that the purpose of these political changes was to maintain central control without making it appear that the centre was in command.³²

Therefore, in order to help determine if "control" was still being practiced, it is necessary to examine the

nature of executive power in this era. Under the 1953 constitution, the executive was comprised of a President, Tito, and a Federal Executive Council. The President was chairman of the Federal Executive Council, supreme commander of the armed forces and in charge of ceremonial functions, such as appointing ambassadors, signing treaties and receiving foreign representatives.³³ The Federal Executive Council consisted of thirty-plus members who were elected from the Federal Assembly and the six chairmen from the republican Executive Councils.³⁴ Constitutionally the Federal Executive Council was empowered to enforce the laws of the Federal Assembly and generally supervise the affairs of the federal government. Furthermore, the executive could issue decrees, regulations and rules that the Federal Assembly could approve. In that Yugoslavia was a one-party state with a vertical chain of command, such approval was a formality. Consequently, the executive also initiated the majority of legislation that was passed by the Federal Assembly. However, as mentioned previously, due to the existence of various Federal Assembly commissions and committees, there was some input from the Assembly.

The Federal Executive Committee was clearly a powerful body. Yet, initially this body was constitutionally restricted to strictly political matters. Administrative duties, which under the 1946 Constitution had been carried out by the executive through the auspices of the Cabinet,

were in the possession of state secretariats. Five state secretariats were established, encompassing Defense, Internal Affairs, National Economy, Foreign Affairs, and Budget and State Administration. These five state secretariats were constitutionally independent from the Federal Executive Council. However, as the executive appointed and removed key personnel within the state secretariats, the Federal Executive Council was able to exercise considerable control over the administration. In addition, the Federal Executive Council had its own administrative apparatus. This often led to an overlap of responsibility and in turn resulted in bureaucratic inefficiency. Due to this overlap, along with the reemphasis on centralization after the Djilas affair, an administrative reorganization took place in 1956. The secretariats that were in the Federal Executive Council were organized within the federal administration and became responsible for the whole administrative system. These secretariats made sure that executive policies were carried out on all levels that were within the jurisdiction of the federal government. As a result, the five state secretariats lost much of their importance and were restricted to administrative duties within the Federal Executive Council.

Nevertheless, despite this resurgence of administrative control by the executive, the Federal Executive Council did not enjoy as much power as the

previous executive had under the 1946 constitution. In part this was due to the growth in status of the Federal Assembly. In large part it was due to the impact of self-management. With the introduction of self-management, the power of local and republican governments grew. As mentioned previously, the establishment of self-management enabled the communes to assume services pertaining to the local community and to oversee the operation of economic enterprises located in the local area. Increased status for the republics also resulted from the introduction of some market principles into the economy. As Pash points out:

Economic competition became ethnic competition and once again people began to look to the one political subdivision capable of protecting their particular interests.³⁵

It was the republics that were left to perform the above task. In addition, republican power increased because of the fact that the 1953 constitution clearly defined the jurisdictional areas of each level of government.³⁶

While the Federal Executive Council did not enjoy the powers of its predecessor, the executive still remained a very powerful political body. Therefore its ethnic composition should help in indicating if "control"-type practices were in use.

TABLE VII
NATIONALITY OF PERSONS OCCUPYING LEADING
GOVERNMENT POSTS

		No.	% of posts (rounded)	% of population 1953 (rounded)
Federal Executive Committee January 31, 1954	Serbs	9	38	42
	Croats	4*	17	24
	Slovenes	6	25	9
	Macedonians	3	12	5
	Yugoslavs	1	4	6
	Unknown	1	4	-
Federal Executive Committee Spring, 1958	Serbs	16	47	42
	Croats	5*	15	24
	Slovenes	6	18	9
	Macedonians	3	9	5
	Montenegrins	4	12	3

*Includes Tito

Source: Adapted from Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 274. Population data from Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Stanovništvo po starosti, polu i narodnosti," in Shoup, p. 267.

Clearly the nature of ethnic representation in the Federal Executive Council points to the continued adherence to "control"-type politics. The Albanians and the Magyars as before were not even represented in the executive. The Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians, while being represented and in some cases overrepresented, did not have the numbers to compete with the Serb/Montenegrins alliance. As mentioned previously, it is important to remember that in the case of Yugoslavia, proportionality does not guarantee consociationalism. Due to the numerical superiority of the Serbs, equality of distribution had to be followed in order

for consociational type politics to take place.

Nevertheless, as in the previous constitutional era, the presence of "control" in the federal government does not fully substantiate the existence of "control" politics. In this period, there was a great degree of overlap between the party and the government. For example, of the thirty-five members of the Federal Executive Council in July 1956, thirty-two were members of the party and its Central Committee, and seven of these were members of the party's Executive Committee.³⁷

Thus, in order to fully substantiate if "control" was in use, one must examine the structure of the party in this era. The Yugoslav Communist Party, like the institutions of government, underwent a number of surface changes. Most notable was the change in name from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. This new title represented the shift in the nature of Communist rule in Yugoslavia from a command-oriented organization to an ideological guiding force. As well, this change in title served to distinguish the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Soviet-controlled parties. This new role for the Yugoslav Communists was spelled out at the party's Sixth Congress in November of 1952.

The Congress considers that, as a result of the development of social relations in the direction of ever more democratic forms of rule, the basic duty and role of Communists is political and ideological work in educating the masses... The League of Communists is not and cannot be the

direct operative manager and commander
in economic, state, or social life.³⁸

In essence, the Yugoslav Communist leadership was altering the role of the party so as to make it more compatible with the changes that had occurred since the split with the Soviet Union and with the changes that were planned with the previously discussed Constitutional Law of 1953.

According to one analyst of Yugoslav affairs, this new role allowed the party to serve society rather than control and administer it.³⁹

Obviously, this decision whereby the League of Communists would use persuasion as opposed to coercion to sustain socialism led to a number of organizational alterations in the party.⁴⁰ In terms of the topic under analysis, the most significant change revolved around reducing the impact of the League of Communists in the day-to-day affairs of the state. Basically this led to two major changes. First, party cells within government and social organizations were dissolved. In addition, party organs at the republican and local level were given greater autonomy. Although territorial organs were established to replace the dissolved cells in government, the net effect of this liberalization was a dramatic decrease in the size of the party apparatus.⁴¹ Rankovic stated that by mid-1953 there were only 369 fulltime party functionaries.⁴² For example, in Macedonia the number of people in the party apparatus dropped from 643 in 1949 to forty-two in 1953; in Slovenia the number of party workers decreased from 660 in

the summer of 1950 to sixteen in 1954.⁴³ Secondly, with the decrease in the size and scope of the party's apparatus, members of the party would educate the masses to try and increase their socialist consciousness.⁴⁴ In turn, it was hoped that the masses with their increased consciousness would take a greater interest in the affairs of the state.

The emphasis on decentralizing, de-etatizing, democratizing and debureaucratizing the party was supposed to take place without stripping the party of its leading role in society. Tito believed that the role of the League of Communists would not decrease, but rather increase with the aforementioned changes.⁴⁵ In spite of this transformation in party ideology, democratic centralism was still the order of the day. It is clearly apparent that the leadership believed that the Yugoslav citizens had developed enough socialist consciousness to allow for these alterations to occur.

However, in actual practice, these changes led to serious organization problems in the party. With the lower levels of the party having increased autonomy from the leadership, confusion arose on the precise role of the League of Communists. Some members stressed the ideological role of the party at the expense of its other organizational activities. These members believed that the League of Communists had begun the process of withering away. On the other hand, certain members ignored the

various reforms and continued to operate in a command-oriented fashion.

This lack of agreement on the role of the party obviously worried the leadership. From the perspective of the leadership, particularly troublesome were those Communists who believed that the socialist consciousness of the masses, as opposed to party pressure, should determine the course of events in the country. Although this group was in the minority, the Central Committee convened in June of 1953 and issued a decree that reasserted the leading role of the League of Communists. The Brioni Plenum, as the meeting came to be known, had the immediate impact of tightening party discipline. In addition, it also led to the expulsion of a number of members from the party who were deemed unreliable.⁴⁶

Rather than stabilizing the party, the immediate result of the Brioni Plenum was to bring forth a new political crisis involving one of the League of Communists' leading members, Milovan Djilas. Djilas, a Montenegrin, member of the party's Executive Committee, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and a leading theorist, criticized the decision to tighten party discipline. He believed that socialist ideals were firmly implanted in the minds of the Yugoslav populace. Thus, he felt that the primary role of the party involved ideological discussion. As a result, in a series of articles printed in late 1953 and early 1954, Djilas criticized the party for its

bureaucratism and called for its dissolution.⁴⁷

Undoubtedly the majority of the leadership did not look favorably towards the writings of Djilas. Consequently, he was removed from his various positions and eventually resigned from the party in April of 1954. The expulsion of Djilas undoubtedly shook the League of Communists, as evidenced by the decline in membership and the general lack of enthusiasm for the party.⁴⁸ Yet, perhaps the more important ramification of this affair was that the leadership by expelling Djilas came to admit that the population lacked socialist consciousness. McVicker writes:

The embarrassing thing about Djilas' claim that Yugoslav socialization had reached the stage at which the Party no longer needed to rule was that this point now had to be denied by the regime. His critics had to argue that most of the population was not really behind the government. They also had to admit that the government depended upon coercion to maintain its rule and to carry out its programs.⁴⁹

By the mid-1950's it was apparent that the League of Communists had serious problems of morale. Consequently, in the spring of 1956, measures were taken to end this stagnation. Most notable was the emphasis on soliciting new members and reintroducing party cells into government and other social organizations. These measures, particularly the latter, were not meant to end the program of liberalization that had been put forth at the Sixth Congress. Nevertheless, the changes of 1956 coupled with

the changes that were introduced because of the Brioni Plenum, led many local party bodies and functionaries to resort to Stalinist-type practices, such as arbitrary intervention into the affairs of government and enterprises. This in turn led to further expulsions from the League of Communists.

It is clear that from the time of the Sixth Congress until the Seventh Congress of April 1958 the League of Communists was in the midst of experimentation. There was a realization that the party could no longer impose dictatorial rule within a system that emphasized decentralization. Yet, the leadership of the party also realized that they could not allow the type of autonomy that almost led to anarchy after the Sixth Congress. As a result, at the Seventh Congress, the leadership reasserted the ideas that had been put forth at the Sixth Congress.⁵⁰ However, the leadership also made sure that the rank and file realized that the machinery of government was to remain in the hands of those who were aware of the ideological nuances of Titoism.⁵¹ In order to insure that the rank and file adhered to Titoist ideas, the leadership began to make extensive use of functionaries. In essence, the leadership favored a less command oriented society. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the leadership felt inclined to use functionaries to achieve this goal.

Thus, while the League of Communists had undergone changes that transformed it from a totalitarian to an

authoritarian party, it was a change initiated by the leadership. Obviously such factors as the reduced presence of the party in various organizations, the increase in autonomy of the lower levels of the party and the emergence of some market principles combined to strip the leadership of some of its power.

However, the fact the leadership brought forth these changes clearly indicates that this group was still the most important decision-making body in Yugoslavia. Therefore, its composition should serve as a key indicator in determining if "control" practices were still in existence.

TABLE VIII

NATIONALITY OF PERSONS OCCUPYING LEADING

<u>PARTY POSTS</u>		No.	% of posts (rounded)
Party Central Committee 1953	Serbs	38	35
	Croats*	23	21
	Slovenes	17	16
	Montenegrins	12	11
	Macedonians	10	9
	Hungarians	1	1
	Yugoslavs	3	3
	Albanians	1	1
	Bulgarians	1	1
	Unknown	3	3
Party Central Committee 1958	Serbs	43	32
	Croats*	30	22
	Slovenes	21	16
	Montenegrins	14	10
	Macedonians	14	10
	Yugoslavs	5	4
	Albanians	2	2
	Hungarians	1	1
	Bulgarians	1	1
	Unknown	4	3

Party Executive Committee 1953	Serbs	3	23
	Croats*	4	31
	Slovenes	3	23
	Montenegrins	2	15
	Macedonians	1	8
Party Executive Committee 1958	Serbs	4	27
	Croats*	4	27
	Slovenes	3	20
	Montenegrins	3	20
	Macedonians	1	9

*Includes Tito.

Source: Adapted from Shoup. Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 275.

The ethnic composition of the party elite in Yugoslavia during this second constitutional period is for the most part indicative of a "control" situation. The Albanians and the Magyars were underrepresented in the Central Committee and lacked any representation in the Executive Committee. As well, the Slovenes and the Macedonians were also underrepresented in these two bodies. The Croats were underrepresented in the Central Committee, but were well represented and in one instance overrepresented in the Executive Committee. However, this numerical presence of the Croats in the Executive Committee does not mean that this group was engaged in consociational politics with the Serb/Montenegrin alliance. As is readily apparent, there was no institutionalized pattern to insure equal representation for each of the groups within the Executive. Thus, this Croat presence is more of an anomaly rather than a deliberate attempt to achieve political

parity with the Serbs. As will be demonstrated through the remainder of this chapter, the Croats, along with the Slovenes, Macedonians, Albanians and the Magyars continued to be subjected to "control"-type politics.

There were a number of ways in which "control" manifested itself in this period. Some of the methods were almost identical to those which took place in the previously analyzed 1946-1952 period. Therefore, it is not necessary to go into a detailed explanation of these methods. However, a brief analysis is in order.

First, the organs of state security, the army and the secret police, were used to keep those individuals or groups who posed a threat to the state -- real or imagined -- in check. Obviously the liberalization process of this era led to a decrease in repressive politics. As the Yugoslav leadership had criticized the Soviets for their brand of communism and its totalitarian underpinnings, it was difficult for the Yugoslav political elite to publicly approve the use of repression. However, tacit approval was undoubtedly given. This was particularly true in the period of the middle to late fifties when the trend towards liberalization was partially reversed. Improving relations with the Soviet Union, the Hungarian revolution, and the impact of the Djilas crisis were important events that contributed to the curtailment of liberalism.

As well, in this period the state security apparatus continued to be dominated by the Serb/Montenegrin

coalition.⁵² This in turn had a bearing on the use of "control"-type techniques. While there is little doubt that individuals from all ethnic groups were subjected to harassment and arrest -- particularly in the middle to late fifties -- it is clear that certain groups were singled out as enemies of the state. One of these groups was the Albanians, who according to evidence gathered by Shoup, "had felt the full force of the brutal methods of the secret police."⁵³ The other major group that was singled out was the Catholic Church. Hoffman and Neal, in their study on Yugoslavia, point out that High Roman Catholic Churchmen complained that there were threats by party officials against village priests.⁵⁴ As mentioned previously, any attack on the Catholic Church amounted to an attack on the Slovene and particularly the Croatian ethnic group. Obviously, neither the Albanians or the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia were ardent supporters of Yugoslav communism. However, the treatment that these two groups received from a secret police force that was dominated by old-guard Serbian/Montenegrin Communists only led the Albanians and the Catholic Church to further distrust and dislike Yugoslav communism. The subjugation of these two groups by the secret police is a clear example of "control"-type politics. In fairness to the secret police, it should be pointed out that generally the use of repressive-type actions in this period was considerably less than that of the previous period. Even when the trend

to liberalization was temporarily halted the secret police was not as dominant as it had previously been. This, however, was of little interest to those who continued to endure repression at the hands of the state security system.

Secondly, as in the previous era, the composition of the League of Communists is in itself a further example of "control."

TABLE IX
NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS
OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1957

	No.	%	% of population 1953
Total	686,387	100	100
Serbs	374,329	54.5	41.7
Croats	130,662	19.0	23.5
Slovenes	53,730	7.7	8.7
Macedonians	43,206	6.4	5.2
Montenegrins	46,108	6.7	2.1
Albanians	16,727	2.4	4.5
Hungarians	7,469	1.1	3.0
Bulgarians	2,062	0.3	0.4
Italians	672	0.1	0.2
Czechs & Slovaks	1,346	0.2	0.7
Rumanians	934	0.1	0.4
Remaining nationalities	10,142	1.5	0.7

Source: Adapted from Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 270. Cited from Jugoslovenski Pregled (July-August, 1964), p. 294.

It is not surprising that the Serbs were the largest ethnic group within the League of Communists. However, as the above chart indicates, both the Serbs and the Montenegrins

were overrepresented in the general membership of the party. The overrepresentation of these two groups was due to previously discussed historical circumstances that led these two groups into the ranks of the Communists. The numerical superiority of the Serbs and the overrepresentation of the Montenegrins served to put these two groups, especially the former, into an advantageous position. Although the introduction of self-management led to an overall decrease in party power, membership in the party still entailed enjoying a preeminent position within Yugoslav society. For example, members of the League of Communists who lost their administrative posts with the advent of self-management were often appointed the directors of new enterprises that had been established.⁵⁵ Undoubtedly the party served as a personnel pool from which individuals were drawn for key jobs. It, therefore, follows that the Serbs, with the largest percentage of the party membership, acquired the greatest number of important and desirable jobs.

Thirdly, "control"-type politics were also present in the Yugoslav economic system. Despite the introduction of self-management, the Yugoslav political leadership continued to play a large role in the economic affairs of the state. Due to the League of Communists' sincere interest in attaining economic parity between the republics and the provinces, poorer regions were provided with grants-in-aid. This type of aid enabled the poorer

republics to improve programs relating to health, education and culture. In itself such a program does not necessarily constitute "control." However, the fact that Montenegro recorded the highest per capita budgetary expenses during most of the 1950's clearly indicates that this republic used political influence to obtain aid.⁵⁶ While Montenegro was one of the country's poorest regions, there were other areas, namely Kosmet and Macedonia, that were in a similar economic position. Yet, they did not receive the amount of aid that Montenegro did.⁵⁷

With the impact of the previously discussed factors of emphasizing economic profitability and the presence of economic mismanagement in the less developed areas, the poorer regions of Yugoslavia began to lag behind the more developed northern areas of the country. The central apparatus through its significant control of investment funds continued to assist the poorer regions. In one sense, the central administration had no alternative but to assist these less developed regions. The emphasis on industrialization had obviously benefited the northern areas of the country, namely Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina. The manner in which the central administration continually aided the poor regions smacked of "control" politics to those who resided in the more developed regions. Investment for the development of industry in the less developed regions often came from the profits that efficient industry earned in the more developed regions.

Yet, due to mismanagement and lack of expertise, investment in the less developed regions did not have the desired results. In effect, therefore, the more developed regions were forced to invest capital without receiving any return. With the presence of some market principles, such economic investment did not sit well with the more developed regions. Moreover, it prevented the northern regions from attaining their full economic potential.

The fact that these regions' funds were invested in the less developed areas does not necessarily mean that "control" was present. However, as the Serbs with the assistance of the Montenegrins dominated the decision-making process, there is a good indication that "control" was being practiced. From the perspective of Serbia proper, aid to the underdeveloped regions was a policy that could be supported or opposed, in that depending on one's view Serbia was the richest of the poorest or the poorest of the richest regions. However, as the central leadership controlled a substantial portion of investment funds, the leadership was capable of influencing the economies of the republics. For example, in between the years 1953 - 1964 Montenegro experienced the highest annual increase in social product in Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ Clearly this republic used its political strength as a means of acquiring more than its fair share of investment funds from the federal administration. Obviously this control over investment funds, particularly as it pertained to Croatia and

Slovenia, was conducive to maintaining Serbian/Montenegrin political dominance. As the primary advocate of economic and political centralism was Aleksander Rankovic, who among other things was head of the secret police and de facto head of the Serbian faction of the League of Communists, one can clearly see that there was a correlation between the activities of the secret police with the presence of the central administration in economic affairs and the lofty status of the Serb/Montenegrin elites in Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, the fact that disapproval was voiced by those party members from Croatia and Slovenia over the issue of economic assistance, shows that "control" was not as strong as it had previously been. Clearly the process of economic liberalization was having an impact on the party. As Comisso points out: the party organization by providing "transmission belts" not only enabled the party to bring the policies of various enterprises more in line with broader social goals, but it also served to bring many pluralistic influences into the party.⁵⁹ In turn, in the early sixties, there was a great deal of internal feuding regarding the presence of the party in the state's economy. Consequently, in 1961, economic reforms were brought forth that served to increase the autonomy of the enterprise. However, despite the changes, the central administration still played an important role in the economy.⁶⁰

The final means by which "control" manifested itself

in this period was through the previously discussed policy known as Yugoslavianism. This policy, encouraging the development of Yugoslav nationalism, was in vogue from approximately the early fifties to the early sixties, and was at its high point following the Seventh Congress of April 1958. The development of Yugoslav socialist consciousness was not supposed to lead to the demise of the existing nationalities. Rather Yugoslavianism was to lead to the unity of all working peoples of all nationalities through the "assertion of their common interests on the basis of socialist relations."⁶¹

However, as Shoup points out:

... many persons in the cultural field had the gravest doubts over the new policy, fearing that it would lead to Serbian cultural domination or the compulsory adoption of a new integral Yugoslav culture.⁶²

From the perspective of the non-Serbian nationalities, one can obviously understand this fear. While the program of Yugoslavianism may not have been a deliberate attempt to promote Serbian cultural domination, the fact that the Serbs were the largest ethnic group in the country coupled with the fact that they were disproportionately represented within the key positions of power would have made it difficult for the non-Serbian groups to sustain their heritage. For example, in keeping with the spirit of the 1954 Novi Sad agreement, a unified orthography was published in 1960 in both the Serbian and Croatian dialects and Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. Yet, because of the

numerical superiority of the Serbs, the Serbian variant was more prevalent in official circles. According to Spalatin:

Croats were annoyed by mass media, federal and military publications which spread the Serbian variant in Croatian lands.⁶³

The policy of Yugoslavianism was very similar to Lustick's concept of a group-specific ideology. Had the policy been adhered to for a longer period of time, there would have been little if any difference between Yugoslav culture and Serbian culture.

In actual practice, the policy of Yugoslavianism only lasted for about ten years. With the growth of economic nationalism in the republics and the developing schism in the party over the program of liberalism, the concept of Yugoslavianism was abandoned. Basically it appears that those groups which were forced to endure this "control" technique were successfully able to voice their opposition to the policy. The fact that this program was scrapped serves as another indicator that "control" was not as strong as it had been previously.

Yet consociationalism was not present. At that particular point in Yugoslavia's political development, there was no mutual veto, little proportional representation, little segmental autonomy, and only a trace of grand coalition government. In one sense, consociational techniques were less prevalent in this period than in the 1946-1952 period. With the emphasis on worker representation, there were fewer institutional

channels present that were based on ethnic representation.

On the whole, however, "control" techniques were less prominent than in the earlier period analyzed. The advent of some market principles, and the general process of liberalization served to strip the party of some of its power. Naturally, with the decrease in the importance of the party came a decrease in "control" techniques. Thus, as the Serb/Montenegrin alliance relied on the party, there was also a decrease in ethnically based "control" politics. In turn, it becomes apparent why Rankovic and his supporters were against increased liberalization. In the Yugoslav case, liberalization had an impact on the use and presence of "control"-type politics. If one was to distinguish the 1953-1962 period from the previous period, the point of differentiation revolves around the role of the party. The party in this second period was, according to Zaninovich, more institutionalized in that the goals pursued by the League and those expressed by the Yugoslav citizenry were converging.⁶⁴ Therefore, it follows that there would be some sort of decrease in both party and in turn ethnically based "control" politics.

CHAPTER V

1963-1973: THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS

If the 1953-1962 era was the transitional period from Stalinism to Titoism, then the 1963-1973 period can be viewed as the era in which Titoism was institutionalized. As Titoism was a revolt against Stalinism, it follows that the former would not be as omnipotent as the latter. Due to its more liberal nature vis-a-vis Stalinism, Titoism as a system was subjected to greater dynamics. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 1963-1973 period was one of great change both within the institutions of government and the party. In turn, as will be seen through the course of this chapter, these changes that occurred had a dramatic impact on elite attitudes and actions towards the nationalities issue.

The initial impetus for change in this era, and which led to the 1963 constitution, stemmed from the events that had transpired during the 1953-1962 period. With the implementation of self-management, economic liberalism grew. This in turn led to the emergence of republican/ethnic regionalism. The presence of a more liberal economy coupled with the appearance of regionalism led to demands for increased economic and particularly political autonomy. The call for increased autonomy was undoubtedly led by the liberals of the north. Support for liberalism would also have come from those in the south who had

benefited from self-management, namely party members whose status derived from their positions within enterprises. As will be shown, the 1963 constitution sought to satisfy these claims. In addition, there were other events in this 1963-1973 period that had an impact on the structure and role of the government and the League of Communists.¹ The three most significant events that occurred were: (1) the advent of market socialism in 1965; (2) the downfall of Aleksander Rankovic in 1966; (3) the Croat uprising of 1971. By analyzing the aforementioned three events, one will be better able to understand the changes that took place in the government and the party.

The economic reform of July 1965 was brought forth as a means of improving the economic fortunes of the country. As mentioned earlier, while some market principles were in existence prior to 1965, the central administration still played a major role in economic affairs. Economic decisions, particularly as they pertained to the southern areas of the country, were often determined by political as opposed to economic criteria. However, in the early sixties, as aid from the United States began to decrease, the government of Yugoslavia realized it could no longer afford to maintain a quasi-etatist policy. The drop in aid led to the disappearance of import surpluses. As a result, the country began to feel the effects of inflation and balance of payments problems. Therefore, economic decisions could not be made because of political criteria.

alone. As Denitch points out:

The country is too poor to be able to provide sufficiently massive injections to funds and resources to industrialize the underdeveloped regions at a more rapid rate.²

This policy of assisting the underdeveloped regions was not only detrimental to the developed regions, it also meant that the overall economic growth of the country was being sacrificed because of political decisions.

The reforms of 1965 were implemented as a means of reversing this trend. Market socialism was to replace the visible hand of the state with the invisible hand of the market.³ Essentially the leadership hoped that this would improve economic efficiency and productivity. This in turn meant that self-managed enterprises would be expected to produce more at less cost. It should be pointed out that these reforms were primarily implemented to increase industrial output. The Yugoslav agricultural community was not dramatically affected by these reforms. With a vast majority of farmland in private hands, farmers were already operating within the guidelines of a free market.

These economic reforms were very detailed and far-reaching.⁴ However, for the purposes of this thesis it is only necessary to analyze the most significant features of the reforms. First, as part of the process of decentralizing economic decision-making, the economic reforms gave the socialist enterprises the power and right to operate at their own free will. Workers were given

increased powers in deciding the fate of the enterprise. Factors such as labour costs, raw material expenditures, and level of productivity were all in the hands of the workers. The enterprise was allowed to retain seventy percent of all funds earned.⁵ The remainder went for various taxes. This was a marked change from the pre-1965 period when the majority of profits went to the central administration.

The second major change that market socialism brought forth dealt with the right of an enterprise to hold shares in other enterprises. By doing this, the leadership hoped that capital would be distributed to the less developed areas. (Capital was a scarce resource in Yugoslavia.) As a result, by allowing this type of investment, the leadership was trying to encourage economic integration. There was a belief that the more prosperous enterprises, located mainly in Croatia and Slovenia, would use some of their profits to further the economic growth of the less developed regions. The basis for such a view may be attributed to the belief that the less developed areas would prove to be attractive to enterprises seeking investment opportunities.

The third major change involved the devaluation of the Yugoslav dinar from 750 to 1250 dinars to the dollar and the elimination of import quotas and export subsidies. The purpose of this policy was to improve Yugoslavia's balance of payments by making Yugoslav products more competitive on

the international market. In addition, by reducing import quotas from twenty-three to eleven percent,⁶ the leadership hoped to facilitate economic productivity. By allowing more foreign goods into the country, domestic production would have to increase in order to be competitive.

It should not be assumed that the central administration had totally removed itself from economic activity. Rather, with the establishment of market socialism, the state would still develop the broad economic plan. However, the task of implementation was legally transferred to the individual enterprises. In spite of the emphasis on the free-market, the central administration had the power -- if not the right -- to subsidize unprofitable enterprises.⁷

From the perspective of the leadership, the introduction of market socialism did have some positive results. For example, from 1969 to 1973, the average growth rate was 6.6 percent.⁸ In addition, there was an increase in the availability of consumer goods.⁹ With the opening up of Yugoslavia's border to foreign goods and capital, consumer goods that had been hard to obtain became more abundant.

Nevertheless, despite the hopes of the leadership, the 1965 economic reform failed to have the desired results. Inflation and unemployment both increased after the introduction of market socialism. This in itself is not surprising, in that with the devaluation of the dinar,

imported goods became more expensive. Conversely, the devalued dinar led to an increase in exports. Although this helped the country's balance of payments problems, it also caused an increase in prices for these domestically produced goods for Yugoslav consumers. This devaluation of the dinar and its ramifications coupled with the remnants of the high growth period of the fifties caused prices to rise 32.8 percent during the first year of the reform.¹⁰ Moreover, as a market oriented economy is more streamlined than a centrally controlled economy, one saw an increase in unemployment after 1965. For example, in 1967, one-eighth of the Yugoslav work force was unemployed.¹¹ This problem was partially solved through the exodus of workers to western Europe, mainly West Germany.

Furthermore, the introduction of market socialism did not lead to the type of inter-republican investment that the leadership had hoped for. The profitable enterprises of the more developed areas did little investing in the less developed republics. In 1968 for example, only two percent of all enterprise reinvestment was of an inter-republican nature. Thirteen percent involved reinvestment between enterprises in different communes of the same republic. The remaining eighty-five percent involved transactions between enterprises in the same commune.¹² As a result, it is apparent that the market model did not stimulate the development of economic equality. Rather market socialism served to increase economic inequities

between the regions.

Clearly a market system is not conducive to the development of an egalitarian society. It is important to remember that despite the various political and economic changes the leadership brought forth, it still adhered to its goal of creating socialist equality. In turn, economic equality would lead to greater unity and the demise of ethnic nationalism. However, with the advent of the market model, financial decision-makers made choices according to economic and not political criteria. Therefore, there was bound to be a clash between this new economic elite and the old guard political elite. As Milenkovitch points out:

The concentration of economic power in the hands of financial institutions, the managerial elite, and the foreign wholesale and retail trading enterprises was uncomfortably reminiscent of capitalist economies and troublesome for a socialist state.¹³

As the market model failed to achieve the goals that the leadership had desired, the party elite found it necessary to try and control the activities of the enterprises. The League of Communists reverted to this policy as a means of keeping these institutions' behavior in accord with general party policy. As is evident, the economic goals of the League of Communists were not always compatible with those of a free market.

The League of Communists used both discreet and indiscreet tactics to try and maintain some control over enterprises. Although the party's role within the

enterprise is not easy to determine, in that each firm has a different relationship with the League of Communists, generalizations can be made. One method that the party used to maintain authority over the enterprise was to use the media, particularly the print media, as a means of letting certain enterprises know that the party was displeased with their activities.¹⁴ Party displeasure usually revolved around the policies and actions of enterprise directors. Many enterprise officials were technical experts, whose primary concern was with increasing productivity and profits. Such goals did not always sit well with party officials because increased productivity usually results in increased unemployment. As a result, the party hoped public censure might convince these officials to adhere to the party's wishes.

The other method that the party used to try and maintain control over the activities of the enterprise was somewhat more discreet. Due to the rapid economic growth and modernization that took place during the fifties, Yugoslavia's economy changed. In the sixties, and particularly after 1965, directors of the enterprise were chosen more on their technical expertise than party affiliation. Nevertheless, the more a director of an enterprise maintained an amiable relationship with the League of Communists, the better off he was personally. In order for a director to be dismissed the approval of the party at the republican or provincial level was required.¹⁵

Therefore, the director often relied more on the support of the party hierarchy than from workers inside the enterprise. In addition, the director also had considerable influence over the selection of individuals for key management posts. As a result, management tended to be more responsive to the wishes of the director than the workers of the enterprise. Therefore, in reality, while market socialism entailed decentralizing decision-making in the enterprise, decisions were often made in an oligarchical fashion.

The lack of decentralization tended to usurp the powers of the workers. The workers that were most affected by the lack of decentralization were those who were members of the League of Communists.¹⁶ These workers had the theoretical right to vote on policies for the enterprise. Yet, because of the presence of hierarchy, party members at the enterprise level would often adhere to the party line, as opposed to voting according to the needs of the enterprise.

All enterprises were not subjected to this type of party interference. Many enterprises did have a considerable amount of autonomy. However, if a true market system had been in operation, all enterprises would have enjoyed the same autonomy. The enterprises that were under some type of party control were more than likely those enterprises that were not economically viable. If the party did not put political pressure on these enterprises,

and offer financial assistance, many more of the unprofitable enterprises would have been streamlined or even closed down. As a result, while the reforms of July 1965 officially removed the party and the government from the affairs of the enterprise, in practice the League of Communists continued to exert some pressure over various enterprises. Carter best summarized the situation when she wrote:

... the relative weakness of the party inside the enterprise could be directly related to the comparative importance of party committees at higher levels in selection of directors and in maintaining general oversight of the efficiency of enterprises in their jurisdiction.¹⁷

While the League of Communists still had a certain amount of authority over the enterprise, it was nowhere near that of the previous era. The fact that enterprises retained a vast majority of their funds undoubtedly served to increase the autonomy that they enjoyed. In addition, the fact that the party had to make use of the media to try to persuade enterprise directors is a clear indication that its authority over the enterprises had decreased.

Though market socialism was an economic failure in terms of attaining the goals of the party leadership, market-type economics received great support from certain groups, specifically the Croats, Slovenes and Magyars. Undoubtedly there were individuals within the less developed areas who also supported the concept of market socialism; perhaps basing their view on the belief that the

market model would benefit the poorer regions of the country. However, statistics clearly indicate that market socialism was of primary benefit to the well developed areas of Yugoslavia.

TABLE X
RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE DIFFERENTIALS IN
PER CAPITA INCOME (1952-1971) NEW DINARS

	Per capita income	1952 Diff. from nat'l avg.	% of nat'l avg.	Per capita income	1971 Diff. from nat'l avg.	% of nat'l avg.
Yugoslavia	513	0	100	6,969	0	100
Bosnia						
-Hercegovina	391	-122	76	4,622	-2,347	66
Montenegro	281	-232	55	4,126	-2,483	59
Croatia	554	+41	108	8,738	+1,769	125
Macedonia	330	-183	64	4,492	-2,477	64
Slovenia	987	+473	192	13,138	+6,349	191
All Serbia	422	-91	82	6,361	-608	91
Serbia proper	454	-59	88	6,810	-159	98
Vojvodina	431	-82	84	7,751	+782	111
Kosovo-Metohija	227	-286	44	2,286	-4,683	33

Source: Adapted from Nicholas R. Lang, "The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3 (April 1975), p. 314. Derived from Statisticki Bilten, No. 744 (October 1972).

The economic ramifications of market socialism were felt within the political arena. Those individuals who saw the reforms as a threat to the party's authority strongly opposed the 1965 economic reforms. Not surprisingly, the primary opponent of the economic reform was Aleksandar Rankovic. On the other hand, however, those individuals who benefited from the introduction of market socialism

came to desire a political status that they felt was congruent with their newly acquired economic status. The primary advocates to this policy were the Croats. Thus, market socialism can be seen as a pivotal factor in the development of the Rankovic affair and the Croat crisis.

The resignation of Aleksandar Rankovic in July of 1966, as a result of market socialism, saw the downfall of one of Yugoslavia's most powerful political figures. As chief of the secret police, organizational secretariat of the League of Communists and Vice-President of the country, Rankovic held considerable political authority.¹⁸

Portraying himself as a loyal Titoist, Rankovic had been given a free reign in commanding the secret police. In turn, he used police records to influence the selection of personnel for government and party posts.¹⁹ This role as head of the secret police coupled with his other positions within the political system enabled Rankovic to exert a considerable amount of influence over the appointment of personnel.

Undoubtedly the primary benefactors of Rankovic's power, and in turn his most ardent supporters, were the old guard Communists, whose status within the party and society was based on their war effort. The majority of these individuals held their posts because of their loyalty to Rankovic and the party, as opposed to technical competence. Rusinow best described these old style Partisans when he wrote:

They are usually men of simple background, uneducated or half-educated, often from socially primitive communities, who find it intellectually and emotionally difficult to either comprehend the modern, technological and industrial society they themselves did much to create or the modern, often technocratic, socialist entrepreneurs, economists, and scientists, with what the West calls "middle-class values" that this emerging society has generated.²⁰

From the perspective of this conservative faction, economic liberalism was undoubtedly a threat. Clearly, economic liberalism and its ramifications were not compatible with the aspirations of Rankovic and his supporters. These people relied on the party for their status. With the emphasis of economic decision-making being shifted from the League of Communists and the government to the enterprises, party and government operations could be streamlined. As a result, many middle-level positions in the party and the government were to become redundant. More often than not, these were the positions that the old-guard Communists held.

Consequently, as soon as the reforms were introduced, Rankovic and his supporters mounted a concerted effort to sabotage economic liberalism. Those loyal to Rankovic continued to operate as if the 1965 economic reform had not taken place. The most effective opposition to the reform came from Serbia, where Rankovic had established control over both the republican Executive Council and Central Committee. Therefore, even those Serbs who favored

economic reform were forced to comply with Rankovic's demands. In addition, economic reform was hindered in those areas in which the secret police was at its strongest; namely Kosmet, Macedonia and Montenegro. Moreover, Rankovic and his supporters used their positions of power to siphon-off investment funds that belonged to individual enterprises, and in turn placed them in federal investment in Serbia.²¹ Even though Rankovic was not able to totally block the implementation of economic reform, his actions did cause economic problems.

The remainder of the leadership eventually became aware of Rankovic's activities. As a result, in June of 1966, an investigation was ordered into the affairs of the secret police. The committee made its findings known at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee on the island of Brioni in July of 1966. Not only was the secret police found guilty of sabotaging the economic reforms, they were also accused of placing microphones in the residences of Tito and other members of the Central Committee.²² Confronted with this evidence, Rankovic had little alternative but to resign. In addition, the secret police was reduced in size and was forced to curtail some of its activities.²³ Despite the serious nature of Rankovic's actions, he was not sent to prison or even tried. Perhaps this was due to the presence of the liberal trend in Yugoslav society. However, the more likely reason was due to the leadership's desire to maintain order. Had Rankovic

been imprisoned; his supporters, particularly the Serbs, might have rebelled. This latter explanation seems more plausible, especially when one takes into consideration the fact that the leadership appointed a Serb to every post from which a Serb had been expelled. Thus, in the case of Rankovic, a Serb -- Koca Popovic -- was appointed Vice-President of the country. This idea that the leadership tried to placate the Serbs is further supported by the decision to offer funding for various projects, including the construction of the Bar railroad route.²⁴ Undoubtedly, the leadership of the League of Communists tried to compensate the Serbs for the expulsion of Rankovic.

The political downfall of Rankovic is viewed by some analysts as an attempt by the remainder of the party leadership to find a scapegoat for the country's economic problems.²⁵ However, such is not the case. As Rankovic was deliberately blocking the reforms, and thus preventing full implementation, the reforms could not be judged as a success or failure. Only after Rankovic was expelled were the reforms fully implemented. Nevertheless, there were reasons for the leadership to try and get rid of Rankovic. It must be remembered that Rankovic, while heir apparent to Tito, was not a popular figure outside of his own republic.²⁶ Opposition to Rankovic becoming the leader of the country was based on the belief that his accession would open the door to a new form of Serbian hegemony and

lead to a return to Stalinist or quasi-Stalinist practices which Rankovic seemed to favor.²⁷ As a result, the accession of Rankovic could have proved to be politically damaging to the League of Communists. It was, therefore, in the interest of the party as a whole to prevent Rankovic from acquiring the reins of power.

Judging by Rankovic's actions, it is apparent that prior to his resignation, he was in the midst of orchestrating some type of coup. Not only had Rankovic been trying to sabotage the economic reform through various means, he had also established close ties with the Soviet ambassador and Soviet intelligence.²⁸ Therefore, in addition to disagreeing with internal policy, Rankovic, according to one member of the Yugoslav Central Committee, "was shaping a line of foreign policy different from that of the party and the government."²⁹ These types of actions by Rankovic serve to indicate that he was preparing to assume power. The fact that he was spying on other members of the party, coupled with his courting of the Soviet Union, would lead one to believe that Rankovic was preparing to take over the reins of power while Tito was still at the helm. As a result, the party took the opportunity to expel a member whose views and actions were in conflict with the remainder of the leadership, including Tito.

An issue of even greater importance that arose out of Rankovic's dismissal was the battle between the liberal and

the conservative elements of the party. Burks believes, and correctly so, that there are two Yugoslavias: a developed north and a developing south.³⁰ As the south relied on economic assistance from the federal government, while the north did not, conventional thought would hold that most conservatives would be in the south and most liberals in the north. This is a view that both Pash and Shoup adhere to when analyzing the Rankovic affair. Commenting on Rankovic's opposition to the reform Pash writes:

The dispute was essentially between the underdeveloped areas where the conservative factions had its base of power and the more advanced areas which demanded greater extension of free market policies.³¹

Similarly, Shoup believes that Rankovic was able to convince the underdeveloped republic that reform was a threat to their future development and thus turned the issue of reform into an economic struggle between the conservative southeast and the progressive northwest.³² Obviously, these analysts are making generalized statements in that there were undoubtedly some supporters of Rankovic who resided in the developed areas of the country. Conversely, not all the opponents of Rankovic resided in the north.

In the Rankovic case, however, the north/liberal versus south/conservative did not come into play. Rather the split over the economic reform was essentially between the Serb/Montenegrin element and the remaining ethnic

groups. This is a view that is held by both Carter and Ramet. Carter believes that the presence of republican nationalism and the attitudes and beliefs of party members within a republic are important factors that are overlooked in the analysis of the Rankovic case.³³ Likewise Ramet points out that the desire to maximize republican autonomy led to the formation of a national liberal coalition composed of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, with Vojvodina as an associate partner.³⁴ One could also include Bosnia-Hercegovina in this group because of the fact that the Moslem community in the republic desired autonomy to better protect its cultural distinctiveness.³⁵ As well, there is little doubt that the Albanians in Kosmet also favored economic reform, perhaps for no other reason than the belief that reform would lessen repression in the region. Even though the Albanians relied on the federal assistance, they probably desired an increase in autonomy. Clearly, the support of economic liberalism, especially among the oppressed regions of the south, was linked to the "control" type policies that these groups endured. In addition, it should also be remembered that economic liberalism was designed to benefit the country as a whole, and not just the developed regions. Thus, there also may have been a genuine belief among some people in the south that economic liberalism would be of benefit to their region.

Regardless of the region, the expulsion of Rankovic was undoubtedly a victory for the liberal forces in the

government and the party. This liberal victory was in fact a revolution, because it challenged the existing political establishment and replaced it with another.³⁶ Nowhere is the ascendancy of liberalism more evident than in the dismissal of Rankovic. Only ten years earlier, "Djilas had been sent to prison for challenging that which Rankovic defended: political centralism."³⁷ Obviously, the expulsion of Rankovic signified the beginning of a new course in Yugoslavia's political development.

The third event that had an effect on the structure and role of the government and the party was the Croat crisis of 1971.³⁸ The growth of liberalism after the demise of Rankovic was the pivotal factor that led to the Croat uprising. As will be discussed in greater detail, the ascendancy of liberal ideas resulted in a number of structural changes in both the government and the party. As a result, republican institutions at both the government and party level assumed a more prominent role in the Yugoslav political system. The political emergence of the republics coupled with the increased economic powers of the enterprises led to the formation of interest groups. However, as Klein points out:

In this type of free-wheeling economy and political system, interest groups tended to amalgamate their positions not along class lines, as had been hoped for, but increasingly along ethnic lines. Interest aggregation thus became a function of revived ethnic identification.³⁹

Therefore, and somewhat paradoxically, the decentralization

of economic and political decision-making revived the old Balkan malaise of parochialism.⁴⁰

Ethnic groups in Yugoslavia became primarily concerned with securing their interests. Little regard was given to the impact that such a policy would have on the remainder of the country. This ethnocentric outlook was best exemplified by the Serb/Montenegrin alliance from the period of 1945-1966. With the downfall of Rankovic, these two groups -- particularly the Serbs -- lost their preeminent status in Yugoslavia. As a result, the remaining ethnic groups became more assertive and began to pressure the central administration for a change. The most demanding and vocal group were the Croats.

The three individuals who played the key role in formulating and presenting the demands of the Croatian republic were: Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, President of the Croatian League of Communists; Pero Pirker, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Croatian League of Communists; Mika Tripalo, member of the federal collective state Presidency and Croatia's representative on the Executive Bureau of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. While the liberal faction headed by these three individuals did not enjoy the support of all of the members of the Croatian League of Communists, the liberal element did have considerable public support for its policies.⁴¹ In an effort to increase its support and strengthen its power vis-a-vis the central administration,

the liberal faction in Croatia began to court individuals and groups outside of the party, specifically nationalist oriented intellectuals and cultural organizations. It was this coalition of liberals and nationalists, who in the quest for increased political and economic autonomy for Croatia, reawakened nationalism among the masses. Clearly, the nationalist revival in Croatia was initiated by the elite.

Croatia's desire for economic and political power was undoubtedly tied to the perception that the Croats have always seen themselves as being second class citizens in Yugoslavia. Gary Bertsch argues that Croatians were frustrated because of the difference between value expectations and value capabilities.⁴² Croatians have seemed to view their republic as having all the prerequisites to enable its citizens to be economically productive and politically equal to the other ethnic groups in the country. However, as Bertsch points out, Croatian citizens also felt that the capabilities of Croatia within the confines of the Yugoslav state were low.⁴³ This "relative deprivation"⁴⁴ resulted in the desire for greater autonomy and also served to increase Croatian national sentiment.

On the other hand, Suvar⁴⁵ and Horvat⁴⁶ in their works both put forth the idea that the process of modernization caused the nationalities to reconsolidate themselves. While the process of industrialization did have some impact

in the resurgence of nationalism, Suvar and Horvat both fail to give any significant attention to the concept that the maltreatment of the Croats may have resulted in the revival of nationalism. It must be remembered that while the Croats were the second largest national group in the country, they were forced to endure a lowly political status in the country. Moreover, Croatia's close proximity to the relatively prosperous areas of northern Italy, Austria and Slovenia also served to reinforce the belief among the Croat populace that they were economically and politically shackled by the Serbian dominated political elite. It was this frustration that existed among the Croatian masses that the liberal element of the Croatian League of Communists used to try to increase the autonomy of the republic.

The initial outburst of Croatian nationalism was seen as early as 1967. In March of that year Croatian linguists issued a decree that declared the language of the Croats was different from that of the Serbs or the Montenegrins.⁴⁷ This declaration was issued in response to the publication of a supposedly unified standard Serbo/Croat Montenegrin dictionary. As the dictionary excluded or relegated common Croatian expressions to the status of a local dialect, while representing the Serbian variant as the standard; the Croats felt angered and betrayed. Though the Croatian declaration was termed chauvinistic by the political elite in Belgrade, its enunciation did serve as a de facto

repudiation of the 1954 Novi Sad language agreement.⁴⁸ During the period of the Croat nationalist revival, cultural groups -- particularly Matica Hrvatska -- pushed for the official recognition of Croatian as a separate and distinct language.

The first sign of nationalist activity among the Croatian League of Communists did not occur until January of 1970. At that time, the Tenth Session of the Croatian Central Committee was convened to discuss the accusation levied against it by Milos Zanko. A man of Serbian descent, Zanko was a representative from Croatia in the Chamber of Nationalities and Vice-President of the Federal Parliament in Belgrade. In a series of articles published in the Belgrade party daily Borba, Zanko criticized the growth of nationalist activities in Croatia, especially those of Matica Hrvatska, and castigated the Croat leadership for failing to suppress nationalism.⁴⁹ In response, the Croat leadership charged Zanko with plotting with the forces of unitarism and centralism against the Croat leaders, and in turn deprived him of all government and party posts. This measure by the Croatian Central Committee clearly demonstrated that the republics were a political force of some importance. However, as Lendvai astutely points out:

The real significance of Zankos' deposition lay in the fact that the Croat party for the first time since the war came forward as a defender of legitimate Croat interests.⁵⁰

To the Croat masses, the action of the republican Central Committee served to verify the belief that Belgrade domination was preventing Croatia from attaining its full potential.

After the Tenth Session of the Croatian Central Committee, the Croat leadership, specifically the troika of Kucar, Pirker, and Tripalo, became more adamant in the pursuit of republican interests. The primary areas where the leadership sought change were in the economic and political arenas. Politically, the leadership sought an increase in republican autonomy and a larger voice for all republics in the decision-making process at the federal level. In this quest, the Croat leadership was undoubtedly supported by liberal elements in all the republics, especially Macedonia and Slovenia.

Economically, the Croats expressed a number of concerns.⁵¹ Probably the one of greatest concern revolved around the fact that enterprises were only allowed to retain seven to ten percent of foreign earnings.⁵² The remaining ninety to ninety-three percent was turned over to the banks which gave the enterprises dinars in return. As a result, enterprises were forced to purchase foreign currency at a higher cost to buy foreign goods. This was particularly troublesome for the Croats for two reasons. First, because of Croatia's tourist appeal and general level of economic development, the republic earned upwards of fifty percent of the country's foreign currency.⁵³

Secondly, the banking establishment, which controlled the credit system, was centered in Belgrade. In 1969 for example, Belgrade-based banks controlled 81.3 percent of foreign credits in Yugoslavia, while Croatian based banks controlled less than twelve percent.⁵⁴ Therefore, it is not surprising that the Croats felt exploited by Belgrade.

Croatia's desire for greater economic autonomy during the period of the early seventies was undoubtedly subjected to criticism. From the perspective of the central administration, Croatia's desire for increased economic clout was difficult to comprehend. It must be remembered that relative to the other republics, Croatia was economically well off. Therefore, it was difficult for the leadership to increase Croatia's economic status while the southern regions of the country languished in poverty. Denitch⁵⁵ and Singleton⁵⁶ both point out that the development of the Croatian economy was financed by funds generated in other republics. Federal funds played an important role in the establishment of the tourist industry in Croatia. Thus, while the Croats were forced to endure certain economic disadvantages through their membership in the Yugoslav federation, they also had received certain benefits.

However, from the viewpoint of Croatian nationalists, the fact that forces outside of the republic were in control of the financial infrastructure relegated the republic to a colonial-type status.⁵⁷ Obviously, one's

view towards the plight of Croatia in the Yugoslav federation is shaped by the perspective that one adopts towards the situation. From the interests of Croatia, the region was subjected to exploitation. On the other hand, from the view of Yugoslavia's other regions, Croatia was economically prosperous.

While Kucar, Tripalo and Pirker waged the struggle to increase Croatia's political and economic status, Croatia itself was in the midst of a national renaissance. Orchestrated by Matica Hrvatska, the nationalist revival involved an emphasis on anything Croatian. Literary magazines began to be published in all Croatian cities; old political figures, such as Radic, were honoured; patriotic songs about the Croatian homeland were revived. Probably the best example of the nationalist resurgence was seen through the increase in membership for Matica Hrvatska. From November of 1970 until the end of 1971, Matica's membership increased from 2,323 to about 41,000.⁵⁸

The liberal element of the leadership in Croatia made no attempt to curb this nationalist activity. In fact, judging from statements made by the likes of Kucar, the liberal element supported Croatian nationalism. In April of 1971 Kucar stated:

A certain nationalist enthusiasm which we meet in our own ranks, in the League of Communists, and in our society, an enthusiasm which undoubtedly represents a very positive and significant sociopolitical phenomenon, is a big moving force toward a quicker and more

successful solution of our accumulated political and economic problems.⁵⁹

Statements such as the aforementioned served to establish a link between the liberal element in the Croatian League of Communists and Croatian nationalists. Moreover, this de facto political approval of nationalist activity in the Croatian republic led the other republics, namely Macedonia and Slovenia, that had supported Croatia in its struggle with the central administration to adopt a more conciliatory approach. Consequently, according to Rusinow, the Croatian loss of external allies served to increase the popularity of the leadership among the Croat masses, which in turn changed the leadership from a movement primarily based on class to one on nationalism.⁶⁰

The Croatian leadership's hardline approach appeared to be reaping some benefits. In 1971 constitutional reforms (which will be discussed in greater detail) were implemented which served to increase republican autonomy. However, as the central administration did not act on Croatia's demands for economic change, the 1971 constitutional reforms failed to satisfy the Croat leadership.

This failure to bring forth desired economic changes led to further outbreaks of nationalism among the masses. As well, Matica Hrvatska, buoyed by its increase in membership, began to take an increasingly active role in the political arena. For example, in November of 1971, Matica presented a submission on draft amendments to the

Croatian constitution.⁶¹ In its report Matica made a number of recommendations; particularly controversial were those pertaining to national defense. Matica called for greater republican control over defense policy and for the adoption of Croatian as the official language of armed forces stationed in the republic.⁶²

Such demands clearly imply that Matica Hrvatska envisioned a new status for Croatia. However, there was no public call for secession. Yet, as Schoplin correctly states in his analysis of Matica's demands:

... they showed no understanding of the impact of their claims on the other nations and republics in Yugoslavia, which tended to favor a more cohesively organized state than Croats.⁶³

In addition, one must keep in mind that there were undoubtedly elements in Matica Hrvatska that desired a sovereign Croatian state. As well, there was a good possibility that Matica had established links with emigre Croatian forces.⁶⁴

This nationalist activity of Matica was an issue of great concern to those forces which viewed nationalism as a threat. The greatest amount of concern was expressed by those members of the Croatian League of Communists, who were not as liberally and nationalist oriented as the Kucar, Tripalo, and Pirker trio. This opposing faction consisted of political conservatives, such as Jakov Blazevic and even political liberals of non-nationalist persuasion, such as Vladimir Bakaric. This so called

unitarist faction, while numerically superior to the liberal group, did not control enough of the key political posts in the Croatian League of Communists.⁶⁵ The key area in which the unitarist faction lacked power was in communication. The liberal element had control of the republican party's communication channels, both internal and external. The group of unitarists had petitioned Tito to intervene in the affairs of Croatia in the early half of 1971. Tito, perhaps believing that the liberal element could be pressured into curbing nationalist excesses, only threatened to take action. The threat of intervention did not have the desired results.

On the contrary, on November 22, 1971, Zagreb university students went on strike. The student walkout had a two-fold purpose. First, as the students and Matica Hrvatska were aware that the unitarists had been in contact with Tito, the strike was a means of demonstrating support for the liberal element. Secondly, the strike was staged to protest federal policies pertaining to various political, economic, military and linguistic issues discussed earlier. Within a few days the strike had spread to other universities in the republic and had led to the walkout of approximately 30,000 students.


In actuality, this strike was the beginning of the end for the Croatian liberal leadership. The strike demonstrated that the Croatian leadership had lost control over the non-party nationalist forces. Moreover, the

liberals, while condemning the actions of the strikers, did agree with the motives of the students.⁶⁶ As a result, on December 1, 1971, Tito convened a meeting of the presidia of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the League of Communists of Croatia. In this meeting Tito did not dismiss the liberal element. He did, however, express a lack of confidence in their ability to re-establish unity in the republic. Tito stated:

I must say and I shall say it tomorrow [at the Presidium meeting] that I do not stand behind your policies because you have not justified the trust that I sought from you.⁶⁷

Although the liberal faction of the Croatian League of Communists did attempt to retain power, it did not have the support of the majority in the Croatian party. Consequently, in early December of 1971 Kucar, Tripalo and Pirker along with other liberal members resigned.

The inability of the liberals in the Croatian League of Communists to control the nationalists was a pivotal factor leading to Kucar's, Tripalo's and Pirker's resignation. In addition, the demise of the liberals can be attributed to two other factors. First, due to the liberals reliance on mass support, the Croatian League of Communists tried to keep the public informed of its actions, particularly those that pertained to dealing with the central administration. With this mass public support, the liberal politicians in Yugoslavia adhered to a policy of intransigence in dealings with the federal government.



As Burg points out, this effectively destroyed the decision-making capabilities of the central party organs.⁶⁸ Secondly, the fact that the Croatian party leaders were in conflict with the central leadership over the issue of nationalism and other previously discussed issues meant that the republican leaders were not following general policy directives of the centre. Thus, by not adhering to central directives, the Croatian leaders contravened the principle of democratic centralism.⁶⁹ Therefore, taking all the aforementioned factors into consideration, it is not surprising that the Croatian liberals were toppled.

Following the resignation of the liberals from the government and the party, Tito with the assistance of the secret and local police carried out a purge. Literally tens of thousands of people were deprived of their party memberships.⁷⁰ In the upper strata of the party 741 members lost their posts and were expelled from the party.⁷¹ Tito's clampdown was not limited just to the party. In addition, Matica Hrvatska was shut down, and according to some sources, 17,000 Croats were rounded up because of their nationalist activity, with 11,800 of these receiving prison terms.⁷² Moreover, to undercut the support of the liberals and the nationalists, Tito gave in to some of their demands. In January of 1972 there were changes made by the central government which allowed export firms to retain twenty percent of foreign exchange earnings and tourist enterprises could retain forty-five percent.⁷³

This amounted to between a 100 to almost 400 percent increase in the amount of foreign currency that could be retained.

This intervention into the affairs of Croatia has been viewed by one analyst as Tito's use of Brezhnev's doctrine of Limited Sovereignty.⁷⁴ Tito's intervention into Croatia perhaps prevented Brezhnev from using the doctrine of Limited Sovereignty on the Yugoslav state as a whole. From the perspective of the Yugoslav leadership, Croatian liberalism and especially nationalism was a threat. Intervention was, therefore, a necessity. However, from the perspective of Croatian nationalists, this intervention and subsequent purge "convinced the Croatian youth and the people at large that they were occupied by a foreign power."⁷⁵

Tito's clampdown on activities in Croatia was followed by the purge of political liberals in Serbia, Vojvodina, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosmet. The purge of the liberals in the other regions of the country was carried out during the 1972-1973 period. As a result, it is clear that Tito and other political elites at the federal level desired a tightening up of party discipline and a reaffirmation of the leading role of the League of Communists. Tito gave a clear indication of the desire to reassert the leading role of the League of Communists in December of 1971. In a speech dealing with the Croatian situation Tito stated:

We are faced with the question of how we should strengthen our socialist community. It is obvious that we shall primarily strengthen it by strengthening the League of Communists through correct action.⁷⁶

Yet, as will be shown through the course of this study, the re-emphasis on party dominance did not mean a return to the political climate of the fifties or early sixties. Despite the demise of the liberals, many of the changes that they helped bring forth remained.

These three issues that have been analyzed (the 1965 economic reform, the downfall of Rankovic and the Croatian crisis) had a profound impact on Yugoslavia. As such, these events played an important role in shaping and determining the role of the government and the party in this period. However, prior to analyzing the changes that resulted in the government and the League of Communists in the latter half of the sixties and early seventies, it is necessary to look at the key features of the 1963 constitution, particularly those that pertained to the nationalities issue.

Following years of debate and research, Yugoslavia's third constitutional era began on April 7, 1963.⁷⁷ With the introduction of self-management in the fifties, Yugoslav society lost its monolithic character. The League of Communists openly acknowledged that there were ethnic, ideological, regional and technological differences within Yugoslav society. The 1953 constitution, while a revolutionary document, was biased in favor of the central

administration and could not effectively deal with the plurality of interests that existed. In essence, therefore, the 1963 constitution sought to deal with the dynamic nature of Yugoslavia. Pash, commenting on the 1963 constitution, wrote:

It strives to delineate political relationships in a heterogenous country so that the diverse element can be coordinated into a smoothly functioning constitutional system of inter-related and integrated communities united by a common socialist system.⁷⁸

Buoyed by the initial success of self-management, the 1963 constitution was constructed in a manner that continued along with the process of decentralization. As a result, it was a fairly liberal document, representing the views of individuals such as Kardelj and Bakaric. The conservative element, led by Rankovic, did not actively participate in the constitutional process. To the conservatives, whose power was based on their control of the party apparatus, constitution making was a harmless game.⁷⁹ As long as the conservative element was able to place its people into the key areas, the constitution was of secondary importance. However, as will become evident, the demise of the conservatives changed the situation.

The liberal nature of the constitution is evident through the emphasis on mass participation, which of course is a basic tenet of the self-management ideology. Citizens were endowed with the right if not the duty to determine the course of socio-economic events in the country.⁸⁰ In

addition, citizens were also granted a number of rights, which theoretically gave them unrestricted freedom of expression and action.⁸¹ Quite obviously those actions which were detrimental to others and contravened the laws of the land were illegal. This emphasis on the rights of the individual led to a somewhat paradoxical situation, because the Yugoslavs had developed a political ideology that tried to reconcile total societal direction with local and individual autonomy.⁸² Nevertheless, despite the contradiction, the leadership continued to adhere to the system of self-management. The adherence to this apparently contradictory policy may be due to the belief among the leadership that Yugoslav citizens had reached the degree of political socialization that would allow the system to operate smoothly.⁸³

With the emphasis on the citizen as a consumer/producer, Yugoslav federalism continued to be based on functional units. Yet, the fact that the 1963 constitution was a fairly liberal document had positive repercussions on the nationalities issue. There were provisions in the constitution that served to increase the role of the republics and the status of the nationalities in the federation. Some of the provisions of the 1963 constitution were less significant than others. For example, under the 1963 constitution, the right of self-determination and secession was mentioned.

The peoples of Yugoslavia on the basis of the right of every people to self-determination, including the right of secession...⁸⁴

Unlike the 1946 constitution, where citizens had used up the right of self-determination through participation in the process of unification, the 1963 constitution allowed for secession. Djordjević, a top constitutional expert and a moving force behind the 1963 constitution stated:

The new Constitution, which makes voluntariness and legal equality the bases of the Federation... does not modify in any way the constitutional right which the Republic has to leave the Federation.⁸⁵

Obviously, even though the republics did have the right to secede, none of them would ever attempt to do so. Nevertheless, the fact that it is granted as a theoretical right to the republics in itself demonstrates a new approach to the nationalities issue.

One of the other features that had an impact on the nationalities issue was the official ending of the policy of Yugoslavianism.⁸⁶ Under the 1963 constitution, "Nationality was something to be cultivated instead of liquidated."⁸⁷ The peoples of Yugoslavia were constitutionally guaranteed the freedom to express their nationality and culture.⁸⁸ As well, citizens had the right to receive school instruction in their own language, regardless of the region they resided in.⁸⁹ This was important for those groups, who while comprising a significant portion of a region's population, were not in

the majority. Thus, Albanians in Macedonia and Magyars in Vojvodina were legally entitled to receive schooling in their native tongue. This provision also aided the multitude of minorities in the country, such as the Italians, Slovaks and Bulgarians.

The greatest impact on the rights of the major nationalities resulted through an increase in republican powers. The 1963 constitution raised that status of the republics vis-a-vis the federal government. As Djordjevic points out:

The Constitution was based on the idea that the Federation and the Republics were communities with an independent though mutually associated existence.⁹⁰

The 1946 and 1953 constitutions had regulated the internal organization of the republics. The 1963 constitution allowed the republics to adopt their own constitutions. However, there were general provision that had to be adhered to.⁹¹ In practice, republican constitutions were similar to each other and to that of the federal government. Nevertheless, the ability of the republics to adopt their own constitutions was an evolutionary step.

In addition, the republics were given considerable legislative competence. The republics shared power with the federal government in developing and administering legislation pertaining to natural resources, social planning, internal affairs, and the economic system.⁹² The republics, however, could only legislate in those areas if the federal government failed to act or authorized the

republics to "regulate certain questions in a different manner in its own law."⁹³ Republican governments also had the right to act in areas that pertained to sustaining the "basic unity of the social and political system."⁹⁴ Moreover, the republics had a voice in drafting legislation in those areas that could only be administered on a nation-wide basis.⁹⁵ Legislation concerned with social insurance, basic freedoms, customs, money, the administration of justice, national defense, foreign affairs was delegated to the federal government. However, if federal laws were lacking in a particular area or if the republics were authorized by the federation, the republics could enact legislation in the aforementioned areas.

While the status of the republics was upgraded, it is interesting to note that residual powers were in the possession of the communes.⁹⁶ Basically the commune was concerned with fulfilling the basic needs of citizens, their local economic concerns and local infrastructure.⁹⁷ In line with increased status of the republics, the communes were under the control of the republics.⁹⁸

The increased legislative competence of the republics coupled with their growing importance as economic representatives made the republics more politically and economically important than they had ever been.

The special importance of the Republic derived from its sociological role as a historic community of people, culture, language and 'way of life.'⁹⁹

This new status for the republics was obviously of benefit

to those nationalities that had languished under a "control"-type of situation.

The 1963 constitution also had an impact on Yugoslavia's two autonomous regions, particularly Kosmet, which was upgraded from a region to a province. The major ramification of this change was that Kosmet after 1963 had a provincial assembly such as Vojvodina already had. While both Kosmet and Vojvodina remained politically inferior to the republics, the fact that ethnic diversity was constitutionally recognized and encouraged was a positive ramification for the Magyars and the Albanians.

Despite the changes that the 1963 constitution brought forth, the federal government was still the key governmental body in the country. As mentioned previously, the federal government retained control over policies of nation-wide concern. Therefore, the institutional structure of the federal government should serve to indicate if "control" was in use. Institutionally, the 1963 constitution altered the nature of the Federal Assembly. The bicameral system that had existed under the 1953 constitution was replaced by a five-chamber system. The five chambers were: the Federal Chamber, the Economic Chamber, the Chamber of Education and Culture, the Chamber of Social Welfare and Health, and the Organizational and Political Chamber.¹⁰⁰ Each Chamber consisted of 120 individuals who were elected on an indirect basis by the constituents they represented.¹⁰¹

While there were five chambers, the system for the most part operated in a bicameral manner. The Federal Chamber in conjunction with one of the other chambers were required to approve legislation. The participation of one of the four other chambers was dependent on the particular issue under discussion. For example, if legislation pertaining to economics and finance was being discussed, then the approval of both the Federal Chamber and the Economic Chamber were required before legislation could be enacted. There were, however, occasions when the approval of all the chambers was required. This occurred when the President and the Vice-President of the country were to be elected and also for the election of the President and Vice-President of the Federal Assembly.¹⁰² Theoretically, as Zaninovich points out, the legislature was constructed in a manner that established interest groups as functional representatives in order to institutionalize potential disputes in the system.¹⁰³

In addition, to these five chambers, there was a Chamber of Nationalities consisting of seventy members (ten from each republic and five from each province) elected by the respective republican and provincial assemblies.¹⁰⁴ The Chamber of Nationalities was part of the Federal Chamber and could convene as a separate body when issues arose pertaining to constitutional amendments or to the quality of the nations or the republics.¹⁰⁵ However, from the leadership's view, these powers were unlikely to be

used. In a 1964 speech to the Federal Assembly, Kardelj as its President stated:

in the practice of the Federal Assembly to date, none of its decisions have been at variance with the constitutional rights of the republics and therefore the Chamber of Nationalities has no need to convene in order to deliberate on problems of this kind. I believe that it will have no need to do so in the future either. The mere presence of the Chamber of Nationalities is a guarantee that every proposal before being submitted to the Assembly for final deliberation, is thoroughly examined beforehand from the standpoint of whether it is in accordance with the constitution and the constitutional rights of the peoples and republics.¹⁰⁶

Kardelj's claim that republican interests were always considered in the drafting of legislation is somewhat dubious because it would be difficult to satisfy all the republics at the same time.

Nevertheless, there were provisions for the operation of the Assembly system that were of direct benefit to the republics and the nationalities. First, under the 1963 constitution the principle of rotation was introduced, whereby most federal officials were restricted to four years in office.¹⁰⁷ In addition to deprofessionalizing the institutions of government, this rotation principle reduced the likelihood of one-man hegemony "and, by implication, one-nation dominance."¹⁰⁸

Secondly, there was an increase in the power of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive. The Federal Assembly assumed a much more prominent role in the governing of the country. The Federal Assembly was performing tasks that

under the previous constitution were executed by the Federal Executive Council. For example, in the period from 1963-1967/68, the Federal Assembly made decisions and adopted laws on 993 issues, while the Federal Executive Council made 805 such decisions.¹⁰⁹

The emergence of the Federal Assembly as an important political body meant that deputy posts were of significance. As the Federal Assembly consisted of 670 members, all the major nationalities were guaranteed some representation. This was obviously of benefit to those groups which were forced to endure "control" politics.

TABLE XI

COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE, 1963

	Federal Chamber	Other Chamber
Serbia	70	50
(Serbia Proper)	(42)	(32)
(Vojvodina)	(17)	(11)
(Kosmet)	(11)	(5)
Croatia	37	27
Bosnia-Hercegovina	31	21
Slovenia	20	10
Macedonia	19	9
Montenegro	13	3
	190	120 x four chambers = 480

Source: Adapted from Hondius, p. 291.

While the above table is of territorial rather than ethnic representation, there is little doubt that in those republics where one group formed the majority of the population this group also had the majority of the deputy posts that the republic had in the Federal Assembly. With

regard to the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is difficult to assert if there was a proportional distribution of deputy posts. One would expect that the Serbs would have been slightly overrepresented. Likewise, one would expect that there would have been an overrepresentation of Serbs among deputies from Vojvodina and Kosmet. This overrepresentation was due to the fact that Serbs are more likely to be members of the League of Communists.¹¹⁰

Quite understandably, the Federal Executive Council lost status with the implementation of the 1963 constitution. The basic purpose of the Federal Executive Council was not altered by the 1963 constitution. The Executive Council was still responsible for the execution of federal policy.¹¹¹ However, with the Federal Assembly assuming a greater legislative role, the Executive Council was not as significant as it previously was. Nevertheless, the Executive Council was still a key governmental body. It had the power to propose and implement legislation in those areas where the federal government had jurisdiction.¹¹² In addition, the Federal Executive Council continued to supervise the activities of the federal administration. Constitutionally the federal administration was an autonomous body. Yet, as the President of the Federal Executive Council had the authority to nominate or recommend federal secretariats and other administrative officers for their posts -- subject to

the approval of the Federal Assembly -- the Executive Council undoubtedly had considerable influence over the bureaucracy.¹¹³

The Executive Council was composed of a President; Vice-President, elected by the Federal Assembly; and a number of Federal Assembly deputies, who were selected by their peers.¹¹⁴ In addition, ex-officio membership was given to other individuals, including the Presidents of the six republican Executive Councils.¹¹⁵ This enabled the republics to have direct access to federal policy making. In turn, as Whitehorn points out:

This remained an important guarantee to the nationalities given the persistent importance of federal legislation.¹¹⁶

With regard to the ethnic composition of the Federal Executive Council, available data, though incomplete indicates that the Serbs were not as numerically dominant as previously.

TABLE XII
NATIONALITY OF PERSONS OCCUPYING LEADING
GOVERNMENT POSTS

		No.	% of posts (rounded)	% of population (rounded) 1961
Federal Executive Committee, 1963	Serbs	10	26	42
	Croats	8	21	23
	Slovenes	5	13	9
	Macedonians	6	16	6
	Montenegrins	3	8	3

Source: Adapted from Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 274. Population data is from Statisticki godisnjak SFRJ, 1964, p. 84 in Shoup, p. 268.

The high number of unknowns may be due to the fact that under the 1963 constitution individuals did not have to state their nationality.¹¹⁷ Regardless of the unknown variable, it is clear that the Croats and the Macedonians had greater representation than previously on the Executive Council. This increase in representation for these groups coupled with republican presence on the Executive Council was undoubtedly of benefit to all the major national groups, especially the Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians. However, the major non-Slavic groups -- the Albanians and the Magyars -- lacked such representation.

There were two other major changes that the 1963 constitution brought forth. First, the position of President of the Republic was altered to "do justice to Tito's exceptional position and exempt him from the vagaries of Yugoslav politics."¹¹⁸ Under the 1963 constitution, Tito was President for life and retained his previous duties, such as representing the state, promulgating laws and commanding the armed forces.¹¹⁹ However, he was no longer chairman of the Federal Executive Council or a deputy in the Federal Assembly. As well, the position of Vice-President of the Republic was created. The Vice-President, who was Rankovic, exercised the powers of the President when Tito was abroad or when Tito chose to delegate certain duties to the Vice-President. According to Hondius:

The main reason for creation of the vice-presidency was to be sought in the

realm of personalities: the need to balance Kardelj (President of the Federal Assembly) and Rankovic (Vice-President).¹²⁰

The other major change that the 1963 constitution brought forth was that a constitutional court was established.¹²¹ This court's primary purpose was to make sure that constitutional principles were followed.¹²² It was up to this court to determine if legislation was constitutional. If the court decided that a piece of federal legislation had contravened the constitution, the court had the authority to order the legislation changed. Conversely, the same held true for the republics or communes. Quite obviously the existence of a constitutional court was of benefit to the republics. Although the court seemed to primarily deal with human and self-government rights, the presence of this court offered the republics a means of redress in the event that the federal government intruded into republican jurisdiction.¹²³

Clearly this era is noted for the attempt of the leadership to make use of constitutionalism or legality in governing the country. The growth in power of the republics, the communes and the Federal Assembly coupled with the creation of the constitutional court signifies this emphasis on constitutionalism. However, due to the authority that Rankovic exercised over the party and the secret police, the law in theory was not always the same as the law in action. The repression of the Albanians and the

sabotage of the 1965 economic reforms are examples of the illegal activities that the Rankovic faction was engaged in. With the downfall of Rankovic, the full impact of political and economic liberalism began to be felt. As Warwick and Cohen point out:

Collectively, these developments may be termed a new strategy of pluralist socialism, which among other things legitimized the recognition and political expression of divergent ethnic and regional interests.¹²⁴

This de facto recognition of pluralism led to increased emphasis on constitutionalism. In the period from 1967-1971 there were a number of constitutional amendments brought forth that had major repercussions for the political system. The demise of Rankovic, the emergence of political elites who favored increased republican autonomy, and the liberalization of Yugoslav society were the general factors that caused constitutional change. The specific event that brought forth the first series of amendments in 1967 was the decision of Bosnia-Hercegovina to convene a meeting of the Chamber of Nationalities. The republic's representatives in the Federal Chamber called this meeting as a means of seeking redress over a decision made by the federal administrative agency pertaining to the allocation of funds for under-developed regions. As the allocation of such funds was of direct concern to the republics, the leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina was legally entitled to seek a meeting of the Chamber of Nationalities.¹²⁵ As this republic was multi-

ethnic, this decision was not seen by the leadership of the country as being nationalist motivated.

Upon meeting, the Chamber of Nationalities came to the conclusion that the action of the federal administrative agency was proper. More importantly, however, this Chamber established a committee to examine the possibility of bringing forth constitutional changes that would make the federal structure more in line with the increased importance of republics. As a result, in April of 1967 the amendments were implemented. There were four key changes that occurred. First, in light of the Rankovic affair, the organs of state security were under the joint control of the republics and the federal government. Secondly, the position of Vice-President of the Republic was abolished, with the duties being assumed by the President of the Federal Assembly. Thirdly, the six chairmen of the republican Executive Councils were no longer ex-officio members of the Federal Executive Council. The reason for this change was because of the fact that these individuals had a dual loyalty, which obviously made it difficult for them to make decisions. Fourthly, and most importantly, the powers of the Chamber of Nationalities were expanded. This Chamber discussed a greater variety of issues and was to meet as a separate body to consider "all affairs which under the Constitution fall within the independent jurisdiction of the Federal Chamber."¹²⁶ However, the Chamber of Nationalities looked at the affairs from a

viewpoint pertaining to the equality of the republics and nationalities. In addition, the number of members required to initiate discussion of legislation was lowered from ten to five. This was of benefit to the autonomous provinces, which were only entitled to send five members to the Chamber of Nationalities. Although still a part of the Federal Chamber, the Chamber of Nationalities had emerged to be a semi-autonomous body. Clearly these amendments were of benefit to the republics and the provinces. This alteration of the federal structure, which introduced territorial federalism into government institutions, served to increase the power of the republics and provinces.

The amendments of April 1967 were followed by another set of amendments in December of 1968. There were two key changes brought forth by the 1968 amendments. First, Yugoslavia's two autonomous provinces were given the right to establish their own constitutions. As well, national minorities, such as the Albanians and the Magyars were granted the opportunity to use their native language in public institutions. However, the two provinces still remained a part of the republic of Serbia.¹²⁷ This increase in provincial rights was in large part due to the Albanian riots in the fall of 1968. With the downfall of Rankovic, the Albanians became more aggressive in their quest for change. The Albanians desired greater rights, including republican status for Kosmet. Some elements of the Albanian community in Yugoslavia desired secession of

Kosmet and in turn political unity with Albania. As the Soviet Union had invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, the Yugoslavia leadership did not desire a similar event. In order to present a picture of unity and stability, in the face of a potential Soviet threat, the Yugoslav leadership partially acquiesced to Albanian demands by increasing provincial rights.

The second major change that was brought forth by the 1968 amendments resulted in an increase in power for the Chamber of Nationalities. While the 1967 amendments had raised the status of the Chamber of Nationalities, it was still only one of six chambers having just seventy deputies in an assembly system with 620 members. As a result, the Chamber of Nationalities could not "influence the federal executive and administrative agencies in the implementation of Assembly decisions."¹²⁸ In December of 1968 the Chamber of Nationalities was made into a fully independent body. It replaced the Federal Chamber, which was shelved as a part of the amendments, as the chamber of greatest importance.¹²⁹ The Chamber of Nationalities had to approve all federal legislation.¹³⁰ In addition, the number of deputies was increased from seventy to 140, with each republic sending twenty delegates and the provinces ten each. One can safely assert that after the implementation of the 1968 amendments territorialism was as important, if not more important, than functionalism as a means of representation in the Yugoslav federal system.

This increase in the power of the Chamber of Nationalities had a major impact on the nationalities issue. As Cohen points out:

After a long period of benign neglect and various ineffectual holding actions to contain nationality problems, the new position of the Chamber of Nationalities as the pivot of the federal legislative process fully legitimized the expression of regional and ethnic interests within the political system.¹³¹

The decision to institutionalize ethnicity represented a dramatic turnabout in the leadership's perception of the national question in Yugoslavia. Fifteen years earlier the leadership was confident enough that national differences had been solved to the extent that it was thought possible to construct a Yugoslav nationality. After 1968 the Yugoslav leadership, while still adhering to the view that national differences would disappear once social and economic equality was achieved, publicly acknowledged the existence of the ethnic variable within the political system. The liberalization of Yugoslav society brought about by the economic reforms had served to reawaken national consciousness among Yugoslavia's major ethnic groups. It was impossible for the central administration to ignore the ethnic variable, particularly because of the fact that the republics had emerged to be key players in the country's economic system.

However, the decision to institutionalize the nationalities issue did not have the desired results.

Rather than the hoped for situation in which ethnic

grievances would be accommodated by the institutional structure, the net result was a growth in ethnic factionalism. Republican political elites, most notably those in Croatia and Slovenia, adopted an ethnocentric intransigent attitude. This in turn made decision-making at the federal level at best difficult, at worst impossible. the leadership of the League of Communists, in line with the liberalization trend that had swept the country, chose a policy that made the party more of an ideological guiding force, as opposed to a policy of direct intervention.

As a result, in June of 1971 a series of constitutional amendments were brought forth.¹³² These amendments had a major impact on the country, prompting one analyst to refer to the amendments as a new constitution.¹³³ The amendments not only dealt with the nationalities issue. They dealt with the system of self-management as well. The 1971 amendments served to increase the rights of the workers in the enterprise. Workers were given increased control over the allocation of funds for personal income, investment, welfare and social funds.¹³⁴

The most important amendments that were brought forth in 1971 were those that dealt with the federal structure and in turn the nationalities issue. The powers of the federal government were dramatically curtailed after the implementation of the reforms, being limited to those areas in which unity was a necessity. This included areas such

as national defense, the monetary system, foreign policy, basic self-government rights etc.¹³⁵ However, a system of consultation was established which served to give the republics and the provinces a voice with respect to the following areas of jurisdiction:

the money system and money issue; the foreign exchange system, external trade, and credit relations with other countries; tariff and non-tariff protective measures; social control of prices and goods and services; crediting accelerated development in economically underdeveloped Republics and Autonomous Provinces; the determination of the revenue of socio-political communities...; [and] the system, sources and total volume of funds for financing the federation.¹³⁶

In order to facilitate interregional bargaining, there was a provision to establish interrepublican committees. The Federal Executive Committee was required to have the approval of the republics and the provinces prior to having the legislation presented to the Federal Assembly. This move towards consensual decision-making, as Rusinow points out, in effect recognized the veto right of each unit in the federation over issues that were of importance to them.¹³⁷

Another change that occurred in the federal structure was the creation of a collective state Presidency. This Presidency was empowered to appoint important officials, to supervise the activities of the federal government, to put forth legislation to the Federal Assembly, and to delay government acts from coming into effect.¹³⁸ This

collective Presidency, while not replacing either the Federal Executive Council or the President of the Republic, assumed some of the duties of each and in effect became a "superexecutive."¹³⁹

The collective Presidency had a two-fold purpose. First, as Tito was in his late seventies, he decided that it was time to make some sort of preparations for his succession.¹⁴⁰ The decision to develop a collective state Presidency was undoubtedly due to the Rankovic affair and its aftermath, which among other things resulted in the regime's acceptance of ethnicity as a political variable. As every political figure in Yugoslavia, except Tito, was identified by his or her ethnic background, Tito probably felt that no one person could replace him. By orchestrating his own succession, Tito effectively circumscribed the capacity of a few members of the central party secretariat to control the succession process through their power over cadres.¹⁴¹ In turn, this would prevent one individual from emerging as Tito's successor.

Secondly, the collective Presidency was established as a means by which to further institutionalize regional/ethnic concerns. As a result, its membership of twenty-two plus Tito was constructed in a manner so as to give each of the major ethnic groups some representation. Each group sent three delegates, including the President of its Assembly. The provinces sent the President of their respective Assemblies and one additional member each.¹⁴²

TABLE XIII
COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL PRESIDENCY BY
REPUBLIC AND NATIONALITY

Republic	No. of members	Nationality of members
Bosnia-Hercegovina	3	1 Serb, 1 Croat, 1 Muslim
Croatia	3	2 Croats, 1 Serb
Macedonia	3	3 Macedonians
Montenegro	3	3 Montenegrins
Slovenia	3	3 Slovenes
Serbia	3	3 Serbs
Vojvodina	2	1 Hungarians, 1 Serb
Kosovo	2	2 Albanians

Source: Adapted from Bogdan Dentich, The Legitimation of a Revolution The Yugoslav Case (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 108. Cited from Radio Free Europe Research, no. 26 (June 1972).

However, members of the collective Presidency were not supposed to act like the deputies in the Chamber of Nationalities and pursue republican or provincial interests. Tito stated the collective Presidency would be composed of

people who... will not be republican advocates [republikanci] higher up. They will be the best people from the republics, in whom you will have trust. They will have to be an independent factor which will resolve problems and not, as representative of the republics, listen to what will come from them [the republics].¹⁴³

By establishing this collective Presidency, Tito appeared to be trying to loosen the grip that the republics had established over the federation. In an insightful bit of analysis, Burg points out:

However, creation of a collective state Presidency would reduce regional control over the exercise of central power only if its members ceased to act as representatives of regional interests, and this appeared unlikely.¹⁴⁴

The events that transpired in Croatia in 1971 serve as a clear indicator that some members of the collective Presidency continued to operate as republican advocates.

The constitutional amendments that were brought forth in between 1967-1971 resulted in a number of changes. First, the powers of the government were increased to the point that constitutional principles were of great political importance.¹⁴⁵ In line with the new status of the government was the increased importance of the Federal Assembly as a legislative body. Seroka has categorized the Federal Assembly as having a moderate impact on the initiation and formulation of policy from 1963-1974.¹⁴⁶ This was a marked improvement relative to the two previous eras. As in the previous periods, the Federal Assembly did not have any influence over what is basically an executive function, policy implementation. The third change that resulted was that the powers of the republics and even those of the provinces were increased. The net effect was that power emanated from the republics and the federation in turn became a child of the republics. Yugoslavia, according to some analysts, had shifted from being a federal state to being a confederal state.¹⁴⁷

In terms of the topic under analysis, the amendments introduced in this period led to the development of a

consociational-type situation. Government institutions were structured so as to ensure parity in representation in the Federal Executive Council, the constitutional court and as mentioned the collective Presidency. Even though the various organs of administration were dominated by the Serbs as a percentage of overall employees, in terms of the composition of the leadership of the federal administration, a system of proportionality was being followed.¹⁴⁸ As the capital was located in Belgrade it was difficult to attain parity within the federal bureaucracy. Nevertheless, there were other provisions that were of a consociational nature. The existence of a de facto veto for the regions was one. Secondly, the revamped Chamber of Nationalities allowed for the expression of regional/ethnic grievances.

Yet, because of the fact that there were considerable numbers of Serbs in areas outside of Serbia proper, namely Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosmet and Vojvodina, there is a potential that "control"-type policies were still in use. The growth of regional autonomy was of little value to the other ethnic groups residing in these areas if the Serbs were the dominant group within the regional political elite structure. In all these four regions the Serbs were overrepresented within the legislative and government elite. However, in the case of Croatia, where the Serbs in 1971 accounted for 14.2 percent of the population and comprised 21.5 percent of the legislative and government

personnel, such was not the case.¹⁴⁹ As the Croats were in the vast majority in the region, this Serb overrepresentation did not enable the Serbs to dominate decision-making in the republic. Likewise in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Serbs in 1971 comprised 37.3 percent of the population and had possession of 43.3 percent of legislative and government posts, overrepresentation of the Serbs did not mean domination by the Serbs.¹⁵⁰ While the Croats and the Moslems were both slightly underrepresented, relative to the size of their respective populations, not one of the three major groups held a majority.¹⁵¹ Due to the republic's multi-ethnic composition, it was imperative that decision-making be of a consensual nature.

The situation in the two provinces was somewhat different than in the aforementioned two republics. In Vojvodina the Serbs by numbers alone were in a dominant position. In 1971 the Serbs with 55.8 percent of the population in the province held 63.4 percent of the legislative and government posts.¹⁵² On the other hand, the Hungarians with 21.7 percent of the population held 12.4 percent of the legislative and government positions.¹⁵³ However, with the emphasis on ensuring the rights of the minorities, the Magyars had a political voice in the affairs of the province. The lack of proportional representation for the Magyars within the governmental and legislative structure was not due to the presence of some type of coercive action on the part of the Serbian

majority. Cohen points out that the underrepresentation of the Hungarians within the elite structure is somewhat of a surprise in that there was an explicit use of ethnic criteria in recruiting minorities to the elite positions.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps the underrepresentation of the Magyars within the political structure can be attributed to this group's relative economic well-being.¹⁵⁵ As the Magyars had relative economic prosperity coupled with the existence of legislation that protected the minorities, they may not have had any major reason that would have caused them to desire political power. The fact that the rights of the Magyar minority in Vojvodina were protected made the political atmosphere in the province of the type one would expect to see in a consociational-type situation.

In Kosmet one had an entirely different situation. The Serbs, with only 18.4 percent of the population in 1971, held 33.5 percent of the legislative and government posts.¹⁵⁶ The Serbs cultural cousins, the Montenegrins comprising just 2.5 percent of the provinces population held 11.5 percent of the government posts.¹⁵⁷ This put the Serb/Montenegrin alliance on an almost equal footing with the Albanians, who with 73.7 percent of the population controlled only 48.8 percent of the government and legislative posts. While it is true that the Albanians had 62.4 percent of the party and mass organization positions,¹⁵⁸ at this particular period in Yugoslavia's

history legislative and government posts were of greater political significance.

In such a situation the Serbs with the assistance of the Montenegrins were able to exercise far more influence over political events in the province than one would expect. Moreover, in terms of overall elite composition in the region, the Serb/Montenegrin group held 56.9 percent of the posts, while the Albanians held 34.5 percent.¹⁵⁹ Thus, the majority of the individuals who held managerial posts, technical positions and the like were of a Serb/Montenegrin background. In effect, the Serb/Montenegrin group formed the upper class in Kosmet, with the Albanians forming the lower class. In an area such as Kosmet, where economic development lags behind the remainder of the country, this situation -- as one shall see -- led to serious problems in the region.

Although the 1967-1971 amendments brought consociational features within reach of most ethnic groups in the country, the end result was not consociational-type politics. Basically the hardline approach of the Croatian leadership, namely the liberal element, prevented the development of consociational-type politics. The infrastructure existed; what was lacking were political elites who were willing to play by the rules of the game. As will be discussed in greater detail, it was only after the League of Communists took a direct role in the affairs of the state that consociational politics resulted.

While the governmental structure became a key political variable in the years following the 1963 constitution, and especially in the years in between 1967-1971, one cannot ignore the League of Communists. While the party had a reduced role in the political arena, the League of Communists was still an important political body. Through an analysis of the major changes that took place in the party in this period, one should be able to attain a better understanding on how consociational politics came into existence.

Just as the role and structure of government was affected by the events that were analyzed earlier in this chapter, so too was the League of Communists. The process of liberalization that took place in this period had major repercussions for the League of Communists. Decisions made by the League of Communists at its Eighth Congress in December of 1964, which among other things led to the recognition of the existence of ethnic particularism and the approval of the development of a market economy, served to increase the power of the liberal element in the party. It was the Eighth Congress that therefore "marked the effective if still qualified ascendancy of the liberal coalition"¹⁶⁰ in Yugoslav politics. The full ascendancy of liberalism did not come into fruition until the downfall of Rankovic.

Nevertheless, in this period after the introduction of the 1963 constitution and prior to the purge of Rankovic,

the liberals were in the process of entrenching themselves within the League. This is evident through an examination of the membership of the League of Communists in this period. The largest percentage of members in 1964 were of a white collar background.¹⁶¹ This technocratic group was also making its presence felt within the elite structure of the party. For example, 86.7 percent of the new members of the Central Committee elected at the Eighth Congress possessed a higher education.¹⁶² The emergence of this technocratic/political elite was abetted by the adherence to the principle of rotation. As well, the decision to separate the functions of government from the functions of the party meant that one could not hold a key position simultaneously in the government and the party. Thus, at the Eighth Congress, forty-four members of the previous Central Committee were dropped.¹⁶³

This trend towards liberalism reached into the upper echelons of the League of Communists. The proponents of liberalism at the top levels of the party hierarchy, Bakarić and Kardelj, were successful in convincing Tito to accept their ideas. As a result, four of the six new members of the enlarged nineteen member Executive Committee were associated with the reform movement and were thus viewed as being liberals.¹⁶⁴

Nevertheless, the emphasis on political liberalism did not lead to an equitable distribution of posts in the Executive Committee. Nor did it lead to the adoption of

the principle of proportionality in the distribution of posts in the Central Committee.

TABLE XIV
NATIONALITY OF PERSONS OCCUPYING LEADING

		<u>PARTY POSTS</u>	
		No.	% of posts (rounded)
Party Central Committee 1964	Serbs	57	37
	Croats	28	18
	Slovenes	24	16
	Montenegrins	18	12
	Macedonians	16	10
	Hungarians	2	1
	Yugoslavs*	1	1
	Albanians	4	3
	Others	1	1
Party Executive Committee 1964	Unknown	4	3
	Serbs	6	32
	Croats	4	21
	Slovenes	3	16
	Montenegrins	4	21
	Macedonians	2	11

* The category of Moslem not considered as an ethnic identity in leadership statistics until 1969. Moslems opted for the category of Serb, Croat or Yugoslav. However, with the abandonment of the policy of Yugoslavianism, the term Yugoslav was frowned upon.

Sources: Data on the Central Committee adapted from Lenard Cohen, "Partisans, Professionals, and Proletarians: Elite Change in Yugoslavia 1952-1978," Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 1979), p. 478.

Data on the Executive Committee adapted from Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), p. 172.

However, the fact that there was greater segmental autonomy coupled with the presence of more liberally oriented elites within the League of Communists, Serb/Montenegrin dominance

within the elite structure of the party should have been negated. Yet, with Rankovic exercising considerable authority in the party, liberalism -- as one has seen -- did not immediately take hold. Quite obviously the presence of technocratic liberals, whose decisions were based on such factors as efficiency and rationality as opposed to ideology, was not favorably viewed by Rankovic and his cohorts. As has been shown, Rankovic and his supporters were initially successful in sabotaging the implementation of political and economic reforms.

With the demise of Rankovic the full impact of liberalism was felt not only with the general populace, but also within the confines of the League of Communists. Through the 1966-1972 period there were a number of internal alterations which occurred in the party. Obviously one cannot examine all the changes that took place.¹⁶⁵ For the purposes of this study, the three most important changes that transpired in the party were: an increase in rights for individual party members; the devolution of power to other institutions, namely the government;¹⁶⁶ and the federalization of the League of Communists.

First, the decision to increase the rights of individual party members was undoubtedly tied to the introduction in 1963 of self-management into all walks of Yugoslav life. As such, it was somewhat contradictory for the League of Communists to remain hierarchically

structured, while almost every other institution encouraged individuals to actively participate. As a result, at the Eighth Congress, individual party members were encouraged to take a more active role in the affairs of the League of Communists. However, increased rights of party members did not come into full play until after the July 1966 Brioni Plenum. After this period, there was a greater willingness for individual party members to criticize the activities of the League. Criticism did not mean a verbal attack on party policy.. Rather, the most common means with which to voice public disapproval with the party was to resign from it. Adopted in 1964, the right of resignation came into prominence in the period after Brioni.¹⁶⁷

In 1969, the League of Communists brought forth changes which further served to increase the rights of individual party members. Those in the League of Communists were allowed to retain their own opinions, even when decisions were made with which they did not agree. Nevertheless, as Carter points out, "discipline in action was necessary although discipline in thought could not be imposed."¹⁶⁸ As well, at the Ninth Congress in 1969 policy review was implemented and there was a dramatic increase in policy input from delegates. During the Ninth Congress, about 200 amendments were submitted, of which a number were accepted.¹⁶⁹ Compared to the Eighth Congress, when only two amendments were introduced and one accepted,¹⁷⁰ this was a remarkable improvement.

This growth in rights for individual party members, particularly in terms of the opportunity to question and even criticize party policy, undoubtedly posed a threat to the concept of democratic centralism. As discussed earlier, democratic centralism enabled the party leadership to maintain unity and ensure implementation of their decisions. After the Ninth Congress, members were still expected to adhere to democratic centralism; majority decisions were still binding on all members. However, it is clear that this increase in the rights of individual party members had served to weaken the centralist aspect of democratic centralism. Republican oriented elites, such as those in Croatia, openly disregarded democratic centralism. While the central party reasserted itself in late 1971 and early 1972 on the basis of democratic centralism, it is apparent that liberalism had an impact on party organization.

Secondly, and in line with this liberal trend, was the devolution of political power to the government, both at the republican and federal levels. Theoretically the League of Communists was a separate body from the government. However, as all members of the government were members of the League of Communists, it is obvious that there was a very close relationship between these two organizations. The party would not intentionally allow the government, at either the federal or republican/provincial levels, to implement policies that the leadership of the

League of Communists opposed. Nevertheless, in this period, the government as an institution did emerge to be a relatively independent body.

There were essentially two factors that were pivotal in the emergence of the government as a body of significant political importance. First, following the Rankovic fiasco, the party brain trust decided to adhere to the goal that was initially adopted at the Sixth Congress. Thus, the League of Communists became more of an ideological guiding force, as opposed to a coercive political body. In turn, and as previously discussed, the decision whereby individuals (except Tito) could not hold key positions in both the party and government served to formally separate the party from the government. This led to the rise of the technocrats, who, as stated beforehand, were more inclined to make decisions based on non-ideological criteria. With the decline of the democratic centralism, these technocrats were able to operate with considerable independence from the party.

The second factor that was of significance in the growth in power of the government was the paralysis that occurred in decision-making at the elite level of the League of Communists. The creation of the Executive Bureau at the Ninth Congress led to organizational chaos within the party. The Executive Bureau was composed of fifteen individuals, two from each republic, one from each province and the President of the League of Communists, Tito. This

body, as the permanent governing organization of the League of Communists, was established to reintegrate authority in the party and to put a stop to centrifugal tendencies that had developed.¹⁷¹ However, the Executive Bureau failed to produce the desired results. Burg points out that the failure of this body as a political decision-making body was because of the following:

The role envisaged for the new Executive Bureau varied from republic to republic and, as a result, so did the nature of the members selected to serve on it.¹⁷²

The republics sent individuals of varying political stature, who had limited experience working with each other.¹⁷³ Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina both sent their party Presidents and Secretaries. Macedonia chose to send its party President and another individual who had spent his political career at the federal level. Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia for the most part selected individuals who were associated with the federal as opposed to the republican party apparatus.¹⁷⁴ With these types of backgrounds and lack of previous association, these individuals did not act in a conciliatory manner. Moreover, the fact that individuals were nominated by their respective regions meant that primary allegiance was to the republic as opposed to the Executive Bureau of which they were members.

As a result, it was left to the government to become the primary decision-making body. It was not that the

government emerged as a totally independent body, free of party influence. The fact that government members were also party members meant that leadership of the League of Communists could exercise some influence over legislative and executive personnel. Nevertheless, the inability of the Executive Bureau to reach a consensus on major issues that confronted the country meant that party elites were primarily engaged in internal polemics and thus could not exercise as much control over the activities of party members in the government. Thus, the emergence of the government, particularly at the federal level, as a key decision-making body was not one of choice, but of necessity. The initial intention to centralize authority through the creation of the Executive Bureau did not materialize. In fact, and somewhat paradoxically, the establishment of the Executive Bureau led to a further transfer of power from the League of Communists to the government. The creation of the collective Presidency in 1971 coupled with the earlier constitutional amendments strongly indicates that the government was made into an important political body, especially in dealing with the nationalities issue.

The third major change that took place within the League of Communists was the federalization of the party. This path towards federalization involved a series of steps. The initial step took place in October 1966 with the reorganization of the party's leading bodies. The

Executive Committee was reduced in size from nineteen to eleven members.¹⁷⁵ As well, a new body of thirty-five members known as the Presidium was established. These two bodies were empowered to perform the same duties that the pre-October 1966 Executive Committee had done. The eleven-man Executive Committee was made into a purely administrative body. Its policy formulation function was transferred to the Presidium. Obviously, this weakening of the Executive Committee was part of a deliberate attempt to diffuse political power and prevent one individual from acquiring too much authority, as had been the case with Rankovic. Tito clearly implied this when in response to the Rankovic affair he stated:

What happened was that we shared our functions among a small circle. To Marko we gave much: the personnel sector, the State Security Service, the courts and public prosecutor's office, and even more, for we had full confidence in him. And that was our mistake.¹⁷⁶

Moreover, the composition of the Presidium was such that it was the most important decision-making body in the League of Communists. All the members of the pre-October 1966 Executive Committee, except Rankovic, were members of the Presidium and so were fifteen key members of the Central Committee and the President of the party, Tito.¹⁷⁷

This reorganization of the leading bodies of the party did not mean that the League of Communists had become federalized. Both bodies were responsible for their actions to the Central Committee and thus there was no

republican control over the Presidium or the Executive Committee. Nonetheless, there were two provisions that indicate that ethnically based federalism was becoming politically significant. The distribution of posts in these two bodies was based on a prearranged agreement that ensured representation for all the major groups, including the Albanians and the Magyars. As well, regional representation in these two institutions was of a proportional nature, with the less populated republics being somewhat overrepresented.

TABLE XV
REPRESENTATION BY REPUBLIC IN THE PRESIDUM
AND THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Republic	No.	% of posts (rounded)
Serbia	11*	24
Croatia	9	20
Slovenia	7	15
Bosnia-Herzegovina	7	15
Macedonia	6	13
Montenegro	6	13

* Of the eleven posts allotted to Serbia, two were to be divided between Kosmet and Vojvodina.

Source: Steven Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 34.

While the above chart is of republican as opposed to ethnic representation, one can safely assert that in those republics where one group formed the vast majority of the

population this group also held the bulk of the positions in these two bodies. After the revelations of Rankovic's actions, it was imperative that the party downplay any signs of Serbian hegemony.¹⁷⁸

In 1969 there was a further restructuring of the League of Communists. As touched upon earlier, the Executive Bureau was created and replaced the Executive Committee. The Central Committee was also abolished and its duties were assumed in part by the Presidium, which was increased in size from thirty-five to forty-nine members. In order to ensure that the rank-and-file had a voice in the party in between congresses, a conference of 50-300 members was to meet annually. In turn, the Presidium became the conference's executive and policy-making body. However, members of the Presidium were appointed by and responsible to the various republican parties. Just like in the Executive Bureau, membership in the Presidium was based on a system that ensured equal representation for the indigenous Slavic nationalities. As a result, each of the republics had seven representatives, while the provinces had three members each.

Of these two bodies, the Executive Bureau should have been the more dominant. Yet, as is evident, the Executive Bureau proved to be an ineffective institution. The Presidium, in turn, became the more important of the two. However, with the emergence of the government as a key decision-making body, the Presidium was also relegated to

somewhat of a secondary status.

This federalization of the League of Communists was facilitated by the republican parties. A key step in this process was the decision to allow republican parties to hold their congresses prior to that of the League of Communists. First tried prior to the Ninth Congress, this enabled the republics to formulate their own policies and to select representatives for the central bodies of the party. In itself this was not a revolutionary step. The Soviet Union had already adopted such a policy. However, in a period marked by the decline of democratic centralism and the emergence of republican oriented elites, this decision, while federalizing the party also reduced the effectiveness of the party as a decision-making authority.

The federalization of the League of Communists in 1969 also served to mark the appearance of consociational-type features in the party. However, while there was an infrastructure that was conducive to consociational-type politics in the League of Communists, the initial result was conflict as opposed to compromise. The appearance of consociational features in the federal government in 1971, after it was tried in the party, indicates that consociationalism was originally a failure in the League of Communists. In fact, the attempt to bring consociational features into the party led to the League of Communists losing its leading role in Yugoslav society. The internal instability that resulted when consensus could not be

reached in the elite sectors of the party coupled with the impact of political and economic liberalism had made the League of Communists but one of several forces competing for the public's attention.

However, the League of Communists had a close relationship with an organization that none of the republican parties or governments or even the federal government had, and that was the army. Aside from Tito himself, the Yugoslav People's Army was the institution most associated with the Yugoslav state. The army was also least affected by the process of liberalization that had swept the country in the 1960's. This is not to say that liberal reforms totally by-passed the army. A percentage of army conscripts were stationed in their own native territory. As well, the army adopted the goal of fully proportional national representation within its officer corps.¹⁷⁹ Probably the most significant impact that liberalism had on the army was with the establishment of All People's Defense or Total National Defense in 1969.¹⁸⁰ With the creation of civilian territorial defense units, the republics had some input into military affairs. As well, there existed a defense institution that was independent of the military. Nevertheless, on a relative basis, the army was not as affected by the nationalities issue or the liberal reforms. The army remained a hierarchically organized disciplined institution. Yet, as Dean astutely points out:

The conventional image of the Army as the only "all-Yugoslav" institution must not, however, be understood to mean that it embodies a political (or ethnic) consensus. Rather its peculiar strengths have made it more able to submerge or transcend political differences that would not be so restrained in the Party or in the wider society.¹⁸¹

While the army itself did not directly participate in the crackdown on liberals and nationalists in Croatia in late 1971 and early 1972, it is clear that Tito used the League of Communists' link with the army as a tool to attain order. Tito readily admitted his willingness to rely on the army. On December 22, 1971, he stated:

The task of our Army is not merely to defend the territorial integrity of our country, but also to defend our socialism when we see that it is in danger and cannot be defended by other means.¹⁸²

There is little doubt that the army was ready to assist Tito if called upon. In a survey conducted in 1971, fifty-four percent of the officer corps regarded nationalism as the major threat to the country.¹⁸³ It is, therefore, not surprising that Tito held an unusually large number of meetings with senior military figures in the period prior to the crackdown on the liberals in Croatia.¹⁸⁴

On the other hand, had Tito chosen not to act there may have been a possibility that the army would have intervened on its own accord. In April of 1971 a leading general said that only in a situation where there was a threat to the constitutional order would the army become

involved in the internal affairs of the state.¹⁸⁵ It must be remembered that one of the demands that Croatia made was concerned with increasing republican input over defense policy. Nonetheless, due to the army's loyalty to Tito, it was unlikely that the army would have intervened without first acquiring the approval of the leadership of the League of Communists. Yet, the army's willingness to assist Tito was undoubtedly a factor of major importance in the party's decision to intervene into the affairs of Croatia. Moreover, and as will be discussed in greater detail, since the party's intervention in December of 1971, the army has emerged to be an important body within the country's political structure.

As touched upon previously, the party's effort to reassert its authority began with the purge of Croatian liberals and nationalists and was followed by the purge of liberals in other republics and provinces. Yet, this purge of the political liberals, particularly those in Serbia, served to demonstrate the extent to which the concept of democratic centralism had been weakened. In October of 1972, the Executive Bureau under the leadership of Tito issued a letter calling for greater party discipline. In the letter Tito stated:

We have never believed that organized democratic institutions in the state and society represent separation or disassociation of the League of Communists from obligations and the responsibility to act as an ideological political force in an organized manner;... Communists in all

institutions should implement the
LCY policy.¹⁸⁶

The fact that this letter was issued to the various party organizations without being approved by the Presidium, in itself indicates that political decentralists were in possession of key party posts.

The greatest opposition to this call for a return to democratic centralism came from the Serbian League of Communists. This is not to say that all those within the Serbian faction opposed Tito's call for greater party discipline. There were those within the Serbian party whose view of the Serbian party leadership and its work was even more critical than that of Tito.¹⁸⁷ As the key positions within the Serbian party were in the hands of the liberals, opposition to Tito's letter was strong. The President of the Serbian League of Communists, at the time, Marko Nikezic and its Secretary, Latinka Perovic, were both of the liberal persuasion.

In response to this opposition Tito gently reminded the Serbian leadership that he had recourse to outside support if it was needed.¹⁸⁸

This threat obviously had the desired results in that the Serbian leadership resigned. In turn, liberals and technocrats in other positions of importance in the Serbian League of Communists were purged. By the end of February 1973, approximately 300 individuals had resigned or were expelled from leading posts in the party and other leading organizations in Serbia.¹⁸⁹

This expulsion of the liberals in Croatia and Serbia coupled with the purge of liberals in other areas of the country led to the emergence of some new political elites. In describing these individuals Johnson writes:

They were relatively inexperienced political unknowns, some of whom seemed to lack the personal leadership capabilities of their predecessors. 190

Obviously this decision to bring in relative political unknowns was a calculated effort by Tito to maintain discipline in the party. By bringing in individuals who owed their political success to Tito, there would be less of an opportunity for these people to build up a personal following, such as enjoyed by the likes of Kucar, Tripalo and Pirker.

In the process of trying to reassert the authority of the party, Tito also brought forth institutional changes which served to strengthen the Executive Bureau. The Bureau was reduced in size from fifteen to nine members, with each region choosing one representative and Tito being the ninth. Each member of the Bureau was assigned a specific policy area, as opposed to the practice that existed beforehand in which each member rotated to a different post every other month. This change enabled members of the Bureau to become familiarized with specific areas. As well, the position of Secretary of the Executive Bureau was to rotate annually instead of monthly. In turn, these changes led to greater internal organization and allowed members to be more assertive when making decisions.

In characterizing this 1963-1973 period in terms of the two paradigms under discussion, one can make the following claims: First, up to the period of Rankovic's fall from power, "control" was still being practiced. After his demise there was a gradual breakdown of "control" techniques in all areas except Kosmet. The riots of 1968 in Kosmet, however, demonstrated that "control" in that region was not as strong as it had once been. The disintegration of "control" culminated with the Ninth Congress, where the party was federalized and consociational features were institutionalized. Following the Ninth Congress the major features associated with consociationalism were in place in Yugoslavia, namely grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and mutual veto. However, as is evident, consociational politics did not result either in the party or the government.

While the initial attempt at consociationalism failed, the party had little choice but to abandon "control." With the growth of economic liberalism and the resulting economic regionalism, the leadership of the League of Communists had to officially recognize and try to institutionalize the representatives of regionalism. Though difficult to verify, one tends to believe that had the party not shifted away from "control," even more serious problems would have occurred. Those republics that were under a "control" situation, and particularly those that had economic resources, began to assert themselves in

the middle sixties. In Yugoslavia, there was a correlation between economic prosperity and the desire for increased political status.

Although the attempt to bring forth consociationalism failed, fault was to be found with the participants and not the institutional structure. Those appointed to represent their regions, either because they lacked experience in consensual decision-making or totally lacked trust in each other, became involved in conflict. As a result, the party was forced to reassert central authority through emphasis on stricter adherence to the concept of democratic centralism. Whether this reassertion of party authority and discipline meant abandoning the consociational strategy will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

1974-1979: TITOIST CONFEDERALISM

The 1963-1973 period, while an era in which Titoism emerged as a unique political system, also demonstrated that Titoism as a system was based on ambivalence. As a result, the 1974-1979 period was noted for the attempt of the political leadership to attain an equilibrium between the authoritarian centralism that existed up to the fall of Rankovic and the decentralist, almost anarchic, period that existed from 1969-1971. In order to facilitate this change, the League of Communists' leadership decided that the party should assume a more prominent role in Yugoslav society. In turn, there was greater stress on the concept of democratic centralism. However, contrary to popular opinion, this did not lead to a return to Leninist practices that had been in vogue in the early years of communist rule in Yugoslavia.¹ Rather, as argued by others, most notably Ross Johnson, the 1974-1979 period can be categorized as being quasi-Leninist.² As will be shown through the course of this chapter, many of the liberally oriented decentralist features that were brought forth in the sixties and early seventies remained. The presence of market socialism, a confederal political structure and religious and cultural freedoms were features that served to demonstrate that command-style politics were not re-established.

Nevertheless, in order to prevent the recurrence of the political situation that existed in the early seventies, the party took a more active role in determining who assumed positions of authority. The intent was to prevent the liberals, the technocrats and the nationalists, who in the eyes of Tito were the cause of political turmoil, from reemerging on the scene. Simply put, the central leadership desired to allow societal autonomy, but only to the extent that it did not pose a threat to the party's power or the state's infrastructure.

Obviously this had repercussions on the nationalities issue. The League of Communists' more active role was in part designed to prevent outbursts of regionalism or nationalism. Through the course of analyzing the key changes that occurred in the government and the party in this period, one should be able to determine what impact quasi-Leninist political practices had on the consociational-type system that had developed in the late sixties and early seventies.

The reemergence of the League of Communists, as stated previously, started in 1972. However, constitutionally the process did not begin until 1974. In February of 1974, the country's fourth constitution in twenty-eight years and world's longest was promulgated. The major reason for bringing forth a new constitution was to legally reassert the party's leading role, while at the same time attaining an equilibrium between conservatism and liberalism. As

well, the 1974 constitution sought to refine the procedures for succession that were brought forth in 1971. As this was an attempt at "pragmatic consolidation,"³ the 1974 constitution did not alter the division of powers between the federal government and the component regions. Instead of changing the rules of the game, the constitution was designed in such a manner so as to enable the party to have a greater voice in determining who the players were.

One of the primary means in which the above was accomplished was through the development of a new electoral procedure known as the delegate system. Based on indirect voter participation, the delegate system was complex to the point that it probably confused most Yugoslav voters. Under the new system the Yugoslav electorate voted in the following three categories: as members of an economic enterprise or BOAL (Basic Organ of Associated Labour); as citizens; as members of sociopolitical communities, such as the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, trade unions, etc. The voters elected delegates from these three categories. In turn, the delegates from the three categories elected another set of delegates based on the same system of functional representation. This second set of delegates served as delegates to the 501 local communes or as members of the eight tricameral republican and provincial assemblies. In addition, the delegates at the communal level elected the delegates for the Federal Chamber. While on the other hand, each republic and

province had its delegates select the members of the Chamber of Republics and Autonomous Provinces.

The system was designed to deprofessionalize politics and make political office more accessible to the average Yugoslav citizen. Members of the various assemblies were expected to retain their regular jobs. Moreover, delegates were expected to represent the views of those who elected them and were thus subjected to recall. In theory, this would prevent the recurrence of the elite orchestrated crisis of the early seventies. As well, because of the pyramidal nature of the electoral system, political extremists from both ends of the spectrum were unlikely to assume positions of authority.⁴

The delegate system also enabled the party leadership to attain more control over the electoral process. The party-controlled Socialist Alliance nominated the initial set of delegates. However, the fact that over 700,000 delegates served on various posts in 1975⁵ made it difficult for the League's leadership to influence elections at the first phase. It was much easier for the leadership to exercise influence over the selection of delegates in the second, third and fourth stages.

This move to strengthen the party's role was also felt within other bodies. Membership in workers' councils was restricted to non-management and non-technical personnel.⁶ The party wanted to prevent those individuals who were seen as posing a threat from acquiring positions of importance.

As well, bureaucratic posts, while still determined by technical merit, also had political criteria. An individual holding a key bureaucratic post had to be both technically and ideologically competent.

The stress in increasing the League of Communists' status in the country resulted in the party taking a direct role in the affairs of the federal government. Through an analysis of the key features of the 1974 constitution one will be able to see how the party reestablished this link with the federal government. However, this direct role for the party did not entail the abandoning of the policy of ethnic pluralism. Ethnic groups, be they Slavic or non-Slavic and regardless of size, were enshrined with cultural rights.⁷ As the 1974 constitution did not alter the balance of power between the central government and the republican and provincial governments, the regional governments, along with the communal governments, retained control over matters of a local concern. On the other hand, the federal government held jurisdiction in those areas that were of national concern, such as foreign affairs, defense, the unity of the economic market, the maintenance of self-management, etc.⁸ In order to ensure that constitutional provisions were upheld, the position of the constitutional court was maintained.

In line with the constitutional amendments brought forth in the late sixties and early seventies, the 1974 constitution was designed so as to ensure that the

republics and provinces -- and in turn the major ethnic groups -- were the key groups that determined federal policy. The structure of the federal government was such that all the republics were equally represented in the legislature. The provinces, on the other hand, were each allotted one-third fewer deputies than the republics. As a result, while the electorate selected the first set of delegates on a functional basis, representation at the federal level was based on territorial units. This held true for all the key bodies at the federal level, namely the Federal Assembly, the Federal Executive Council and the collective state Presidency.

The Yugoslav Federal Assembly, while bicameral in form, for the most part operated in a unicameral manner. The Chamber of Republics and Provinces, consisting of eighty-eight members (twelve from each republic and eight from each province) was empowered to deal with those issues that were most susceptible to inter-regional dispute. Constitutionally, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces was responsible for, among other things, the adoption of the social plan; the formulation of fiscal, federal monetary, foreign exchange, tariff, trade, market and price policies; formulation of policy for crediting accelerated development of the less developed regions; determination of budget and the system and sources for financing the federation; and approving most international treaties.⁹ In the aforementioned areas, each republican and provincial

delegation had to give approval before legislation could be passed.¹⁰ As the delegations were appointed by the eight regions and were subject to regional control, each republic and province had veto power. However, in order to prevent the right of veto from paralyzing decision-making, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces had power to invoke temporary measures.¹¹ In such instances the approval of two-thirds of the delegates was required.¹² As well, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces did not require the approval of all delegations when dealing with issues pertaining to non-regional concern. These mostly administrative concerns required the approval of a simple majority of the delegates in attendance.¹³

On the other hand, the Federal Chamber, consisting of 220 delegates (thirty for each republic and twenty for each province) had a much more restricted role than its counterpart. The most significant areas over which the Federal Chamber had jurisdiction were the following: adopting the federal budget and yearly balance sheets; the alteration of Yugoslavia's international boundaries; ratifying international treaties; fundamental organization of federal agencies, supervising the constitutional court and the federal judicial systems; and formulating federal statutes and policies to implement decisions in the above areas.¹⁴ Even though this Chamber was based on territorial representation, it was not an important body in the amelioration of inter-regional dispute. The scope of the

Chamber's works, as evident from above, was such that it did not deal with issues that were of great concern to the regions. As well, unlike the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, decisions in the Federal Chamber were arrived at through a majority vote at sessions that were attended by a majority of the delegates.¹⁵ In addition to the above responsibilities, the Federal Chamber in conjunction with the Chamber of Republics and Provinces elected the President and Vice-President of the Assembly and the President and members of the Federal Executive Council.¹⁶

To assist in the facilitation of decision-making, each of the chambers established a series of committees. The committees operated in the same manner as each of the respective chambers. Therefore, in the case of the committees established by the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, representation was based on the parity principle for the republics and corresponding representation for the provinces. The right of veto was also present within the committees. All the committees that were established by the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and dealt with issues of an inter-regional nature needed the approval of all eight delegations before a decision could be approved. Committees created by the Federal Chamber operated under the same rules of procedure as the Federal Chamber. Thus, although voting in these committees was based on the majority principle, dissenting members could have their views noted within reports presented by the committee.

While decisions made by the committees of both Chambers were not binding on delegates, the presence of committees should have served to improve decision-making in the Federal Assembly.

In practice, the Federal Assembly was not as powerful or as independent as the post-1966 Federal Assembly. There were several reasons for this. First, the size of the Federal Assembly was cut with the introduction of the 1974 constitution. The number of federal legislators was reduced from 620 to 308. Secondly, due to the leadership's desire to deprofessionalize politics, there was an increase in the number of delegates who were not schooled in the political process.¹⁷ Thirdly, and as will be discussed in greater detail, both the collective state Presidency and the Federal Executive Council had increased powers and were more organized than they had been in the previous eight or so years. Fourthly, and most importantly, the delegate system served to increase the party's power over individual legislators.

Despite these factors, the legislature was active in addressing issues of inter-regional dispute. Seroka in his analysis of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly has characterized the legislature as having a strong policy formulation role and a weak policy implementation and initiation role in the period since the introduction of the 1974 constitution.¹⁸ On a relative basis, the power of the legislature had increased in terms of its policy implementation and

formulation roles.¹⁹ Yet, as the party exercised control over legislators through the delegate system, the party was also able to exercise a considerable amount of control over the policy process.²⁰ There were, however, instances where the legislature did become embroiled in inter-regional disputes.²¹ For example, in 1977 the federal government had a budget surplus of about 200 million dollars. The finance committee was unable to reach an accord on how the money should be administered. An agreement was eventually reached after a protracted period of discussion. Such disputes were the exception as opposed to the rule. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that in spite of the leadership's desire to reassert party authority, there was not a return to the Leninist practices of the late forties and early fifties when the federal government was totally subservient to the party.

Turning to the executive level of the federal government, one can see that the 1974 constitution served to increase the powers of the Federal Executive Council. Among the Council's most important duties were: proposing to the Federal Assembly formulation of internal and foreign policy; introducing federal bills, draft regulations and draft enactments to the Federal Assembly; and introducing proposals for the determination of the total volume of expenditure for the Federal Budget.²² This body, consisting of a President, one or more Vice-Presidents, and a number of members, was also based on the parity principle

for the republics and corresponding representation for the provinces.²³

The Federal Executive Council, however, was designed to be free from regional pressures. According to the 1974 constitution:

Members of the Federal Executive Council and officials in federal, administrative agencies and federal organizations shall be responsible for the execution of policy and the enforcement of statutes, other regulations and enactments exclusively to federal agencies, and in the performance of their function may not receive directives or orders from the agencies and officials of other socio-political communities, nor may they follow such directives and/or orders.²⁴

Yet, as Burg points out, the Federal Executive Council and its committees and commissions were organizations in which inter-regional bargaining did occur.²⁵ The most important of these bodies was the Coordinating Commission. Based on the principle of regional parity, this commission made decisions for the entire Federal Executive Council on certain issues and carried out preliminary discussions of important issues. This body was much like an inner-cabinet, and according to one analyst was the Federal Executive Council's central decision-making body.²⁶

Although the veto principle did not exist within the Federal Executive Council or its bodies, the fact that all the major ethnic groups were for the most part equally represented was conducive to the practice of consociational politics.²⁷

Besides the councils and committees established by the legislature and the executive, there were federal councils that existed.²⁸ These councils were designed so as to enable the representatives of organizations that cut across regional borders to have a voice in the preparation of federal policies. It allowed particular groups, such as chambers of commerce, whose interests would often cross regional boundaries, to have a political voice. As a result, representation in the federal councils was on a trans-regional and regional basis. Socio-political leaders of the regions and the federation along with representatives of trans-regional organizations were able to meet to discuss federal policy. This corporatist mode of consultation could have had an impact on inter-regional bargaining. By making use of these councils, the leadership was institutionalizing cross-cutting cleavages, which potentially could have served to lessen the intensity of regional disputes.

Potentially, the most important federal governmental decision-making body was the collective state Presidency. In order to increase the effectiveness and political stature of this body, the 1974 constitution made a number of changes within the structure of the Presidency. The Presidency was reduced in size from twenty-three to nine members. Each region was entitled to one representative; the remaining position was held by the President of the League of Communists.²⁹ During the period from 1974 until

the death of Tito in May of 1980 the Presidency was comprised of the following individuals: Tito, President of the League of Communists; Edvard Kardelj and Sergej Kraigher, Slovenia; (Kraigher replaced Kardelj in June 1979, upon the death of the latter) Vladimir Bakaric, Croatia; Petar Stambolic, Serbia; Cvijetin Mijatovic, Bosnia-Hercegovina; Lazar Kolisevski, Macedonia; Vidoje Zarhovic, Montenegro; Stevan Doronjski, Vojvodina; and Fadil Hodza, Kosme. The President of the Presidency was Tito. The post of Vice-President was to rotate annually among the eight regions. The order of rotation was as follows: Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo.³⁰

The decision to include the President of the League of Communists in the state Presidency demonstrates the party's increased and direct role in the affairs of the government. According to Kardelj:

By making this a constitutional principle, we are in fact recognising a reality of our society, namely that the leading ideological and political role of the League of Communists is an essential factor of stability and cohesion in our society.³¹

As a part of establishing this direct link between the party and the government, most of the other members of the state Presidency were also members of the Presidium.³² Obviously this served to increase the power of the state Presidency.

In order to further increase the authority of the

state Presidency, members of this body were constitutionally prohibited from holding any other self-managing, public or other social function, except in socio-political organizations.³³ By ending the presence of those individuals who were directly linked with the regions, the 1974 constitution decreased the likelihood that the state Presidency would become involved in the type of inter-regional disputes that paralyzed the body when it was first created in 1971. This is not to say that the Presidency would ignore the regions. The rules of the state Presidency require that its members

constantly and regularly be informed about conditions in the country and particularly about inter-nationality relations and relations between the republics and the autonomous provinces.³⁴

As a result, members were not only expected to be cognizant of their particular region's interests, but they were also expected to take into consideration the interests of the country as a whole.

Consequently, decision-making in this body was of a consultative and collegial nature. Depending on the issue, decisions were legally supposed to be arrived at either by a simple or two-thirds majority.³⁵ In actual practice, however, unanimity was required.³⁶ Undoubtedly, this ensured that all regions had an equal voice and equal authority in this body.

The powers of the state Presidency were such that the decisions it made were of importance in shaping the course

of political events in the country. The major function of the state Presidency was to "realize the equality of the nations and the nationalities"³⁷ and "to achieve adjustments of the common interests"³⁸ of the eight regions. In order to facilitate the aforementioned, the Presidency was among other things entitled to the following powers: proposing to the Federal Assembly the adoption of internal and foreign policy; draw up plans for the use of the armed forces; issue and pass decrees on questions falling within the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly during a state of war or in the event of the immediate danger of war; and dissolve the Federal Assembly if the legislature failed to endorse a proposal of the Presidency.³⁹ Undoubtedly the powers of the Presidency were quite extensive and potentially omnipotent. Probably the most significant power of the Presidency was the one that allowed it to suspend and dissolve the legislature.⁴⁰ The fact that the provision has never been used serves to demonstrate that the Presidency and the Federal Assembly had established a cordial working relationship. The Presidency did not use its authority to force adherence to a policy. Rather this body tried to facilitate compromise between the regions. However, through its power to propose policy, the Presidency was able to determine the agenda of the Federal Assembly. By doing so, the Presidency was steering the legislature away from counter-productive conflictual behavior and thereby encouraging consociational

decision-making.⁴¹

The state Presidency operated as a nine-person body for most of the period prior to the death of Tito. However, in the months preceding Tito's death, the Presidency was increased in size to fifteen members. In reality, though the Presidency was comprised of fourteen members, with Tito being quite ill it is doubtful that he participated in meetings. Additional positions on the Presidency were allocated for: the President of the Yugoslav Assembly, Dragoslav Markovic (Serb); the Prime Minister or President of the Federal Executive Council, Veselin Djuranovic (Montenegrin); the Secretary of the Presidium, Dusan Dragosavac (a Serb from Croatia); the Defense Minister, General of the Army Nikola Ljubicic (Serb); the Minister for Internal Affairs, General Franjo Herljevic (a Croat from Bosnia); the Foreign Minister, Josip Vrhovec (Croat); and the Chairman of the Presidium, Stevan Doronjski (Serb).⁴² Doronjski was already a member of the Presidency as the representative from Vojvodina.

The inclusion of these other members enabled the Serbs to control six of the fourteen posts, eight if one includes the Montenegrins. Thus, George and Patricia Klein in their analysis of the increased size of the Presidency state:

It obviously conformed more closely to the genuine power relationships in the country, rather than formal constitutional formula of national representation.⁴³

However, such is not necessarily the case. The decision to bring in these additional members is probably linked to the

desire of the leadership to show unity in a situation where opponents of the regime might have sought to exploit the illness of Tito. Membership of these other individuals was based on the positions they held. This is demonstrated by the fact that Doronjski was included as Chairman of the Presidium, even though he was already a member of the Presidency. As the Presidency adhered to the concept of collective leadership and decision-making, numerical superiority was not as significant as in the earlier decades.

The preceding pages have given the general outline of the governmental structure as established by the 1974 constitution. Judging by the ethnic composition of these bodies, coupled with the powers that the various bodies had, one might conclude that consociational-type politics were being practiced.

However, as was illustrated in the previous chapter, the development of consociational politics included all major ethnic groups, except the Albanians. Despite the advent of a more liberalized and decentralized political system, the Albanians of Kosmet remained under the control of the Serbian/Montenegrin political elite of the province. Yet, in the period since the introduction of the 1974 constitution, the percentage of Albanians comprising the state elite in Kosmet had risen quite noticeably.

TABLE XVI

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KOSOVO'S STATE ELITE, 1980

	% of Total Population (1971) of Province	% of State Elite
Serbs	18.4	18.5
Montenegrins	2.5	3.7
Albanians	73.7	70.4
Muslims	2.1	3.7
Others	3.2	-
Unknown	0.1	3.7

Source: Adapted from Lenard Cohen, "Regional Elites in Socialist Yugoslavia: Changing Patterns of Recruitment and Composition," in Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia, edited by T.H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 124.

In addition, the Albanians of Kosmet received considerable assistance from the federation to maintain their culture and improve their economic plight. In the cultural arena, the Yugoslav leadership, unlike previous years, encouraged the expression of the Albanian culture. For example, while from the years 1945 to 1962 6,680,000 copies of 1,026 different books were published in the Albanian language in Yugoslavia, in the period from 1977 to 1980 10,856,000 copies of 1,479 titles were published in Albanian.⁴⁴ Likewise in the economic arena, the province of Kosmet received a disproportionate amount of financial assistance from the federation. In the 1971-1975 period, Kosmet received forty percent of the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Regions. However, the province continued to lag behind the remainder

of the country in terms of economic well being. For example, Kosmet's per-capita income slipped from forty-eight percent of the Yugoslav average in 1954 to just under twenty-eight percent in 1980.⁴⁶ Factors such as a high birthrate, low labour productivity, lack of northern investment and general economic mismanagement were at the heart of the region's economic problems.⁴⁷ As will be examined in the next chapter, the lack of economic equality served to negate much of the stability that was brought forth by allowing the Albanians to be part of the consociational bargain in Yugoslavia.

Having established that consociational features existed within the governmental structure, it is necessary to examine the major changes that took place in the League of Communists in this period. In the 1974-1979 period, the party was not as dominant as when it first came to power. Yet, as has been demonstrated, the leadership of the League of Communists reestablished a direct link between itself and the federal government. Moreover, with the introduction of the delegate system, greater emphasis was placed on party loyalty. This in turn served to increase the importance of the concept of democratic centralism. As a result, the party was able to reestablish its preeminent status in the country. Therefore, the decisions made by the party leadership were more important than in the preceding years. Consequently, in order to determine if consociational practices were present in the party, it is

necessary to determine who participated in party decision-making, along with the means by which the League arrived at its decisions.

The initial step in the reemergence of the League of Communists occurred with the purge of the Croatian League of Communists in late 1971. The institutionalization of this change did not take place until 1974. The 1974 constitution was a major step that signified the party's move to reassert itself. / The other major step was the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists held in May 1974. The Tenth Congress reiterated the demands for greater party unity and increasing its significance in Yugoslav society. The desire to increase the importance of the party is seen through the rise in party membership in the years since the Croat crisis.⁴⁸

The clearest example of the party's desire to increase its authority is given by an analysis of the personnel who occupied key posts with the party. Perhaps the body that best represents the party's move to reassert its authority is the Central Committee. This body, which formally disappeared in the late sixties, was resurrected at the Tenth Congress. The Central Committee was still theoretically responsible for approving the decisions of the party's executive. In addition, the Central Committee was to act as the voice of the membership of the League during the time between congresses. The most important function of the Central Committee was not its operational

duty. Rather the real significance of this body is seen through its representative function.

It is an assembly of the representatives of the key political, economic, social, and cultural institutions and social forces, to which the top party leadership periodically reports on its activities and from which it draws its main executive personnel. The composition of the Central Committee, therefore reflects to a substantial degree the model of the socio-political hierarchy which the LCY leadership considers appropriate at the time it is selected.⁴⁹

One must remember that the 1974 constitution incorporated key features of the amendments brought forth in the turbulent era of the late sixties and early seventies. Therefore, while the institutional features are important in explaining the presence of political stability in the 1974-1979 era, a substantial amount of credit must be given to the people who occupied important government and party posts.

Through an examination of the composition of the Central Committee, it becomes apparent that the leadership placed emphasis on having people who would follow central directives occupy important political posts. Separate studies carried out by Cohen,⁵⁰ as well as Miller and Merrill,⁵¹ came to the above conclusion. One of the most telltale signs that adherence to party discipline and party loyalty were criteria for attaining key political posts is demonstrated through the increase in the percentage of holders of the 1941 Partisan Medal in the Central Committee during the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses. (The holders of

the Partisan Medal of 1941 are individuals who joined the national liberation struggle in its infancy in 1941.) This group, which was undoubtedly loyal to Tito, held 29.7 percent of the posts on the Central Committee elected at the Tenth Congress and forty percent of the posts on the Central Committee elected at the Eleventh Congress.⁵² One does not wish to imply that the leadership only relied on so-called old-guard Communists in the quest to reassert the party's authority. In addition, and as mentioned earlier, political neophytes were also coopted into the party during this period.⁵³

While there was greater emphasis placed on the concept of democratic centralism, there was not a return to the one-nation dominance that had existed up to 1966. Membership in the 166 person Central Committee was based on the concept that existed in the federal government, namely republican parity and corresponding provincial representation. Each republic was allotted twenty positions on the Central Committee. The provinces were entitled to fifteen positions each. As well, Tito, as President of the League of Communists, was a member of the Central Committee. In addition, fifteen posts in the Central Committee were specifically set aside for the Yugoslav army.⁵⁴

This distribution of posts did not mean that the major ethnic groups were equally represented on the Central Committee. As there were significant numbers of Serbs

outside of Serbia proper, along with the fact that the Serbs and the Montenegrins occupied the majority of officer posts in the army meant that the Serbs were numerically the largest ethnic group in the Central Committee.

TABLE XVII
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES
OF 1974 AND 1978

Nationality	1974		1978	
	No.	%	No.	%
Serb	45	27.3	49	29.7
Croats	24	14.5	22	13.3
Slovenes	22	13.3	22	13.3
Macedonians	18	10.9	18	10.9
Montenegrins	22	13.3	20	12.1
Albanians	13	7.9	14	8.5
Moslem Slavs	11	6.7	8	4.8
"Yugoslavs"	2	1.2	6	3.6
Hungarians	4	2.4	3	1.8
Other	3	1.8	3	1.8
Unknown	1	0.6	0	0.0

Source: Adapted from Robert F. Miller and E. Vance Merrill, "Yugoslav central committee membership: what the figures show," Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (May 1979), p. 75.

However, as is evident from the above table, the Serbs were no longer as dominant as they had previously been in this body. Groups such as the Albanians and the Magyars, which in previous times lacked representation in the Central Committee, were represented. Clearly this decrease in Serbian representation and increase in Hungarian and especially Albanian representation on the Central Committee serves as another indicator that all the major ethnic

groups had a voice in the political system.

At the executive level of the party, the concept of republican parity and corresponding provincial representation was adopted. As well, just as in the Central Committee, the military was represented on the Presidium. Both the forty-eight person Presidium elected at the Tenth Congress and the twenty-four person Presidium elected at the Eleventh Congress were based on this formula. For example, the twenty-four member Presidium was comprised of three members from each republic, two members from each province, one member from the military and Tito. As in the Central Committee, the Serbs were numerically the largest group in the Presidium. Of the twenty-four members, eight were Serbs, four were Croats, three were Slovenes, three were Macedonians, three were Montenegrins, two were Albanians and one was a Muslim.⁵⁵

However, this numerical prominence for the Serbs did not mean that the Serbs were dominant in the decision-making process in the Presidium. According to the rules of procedure for the executive:

The Presidium is a collective, democratic, and political body in which all members have equal rights and responsibilities for its entire work in all areas of its activities.⁵⁶

There were provisions which allowed the Presidium to make decisions when a majority of members, thirteen, were in attendance, by majority vote, seven.⁵⁷ With the potential for inter-ethnic dispute being quite high in Yugoslavia, it

would seem unlikely that the Presidium would have often made use of that provision. As will become evident, the party's executive bodies operated in a consultative and consensual fashion.

With the emphasis on democratic centralism, the Presidium along with the Executive Committee were undoubtedly two of the most important decision-making bodies in the country. The Presidium performed the policy-making function. The Executive Committee, on the other hand, was empowered to supervise and ensure the execution of the Presidium's decisions. Due to the stricter adherence to democratic centralism, one would suspect that the Executive Committee was the superior of the two bodies. This arrangement was in existence up to the time of the June 1978 Eleventh Congress. At the Eleventh Congress, the Executive Committee was formally eliminated. In its place were nine Executive Secretaries, one from each region and one from the army. The Executive Secretaries were each responsible for specific areas of work, but were limited to operational work in the carrying out of policy.⁵⁸ These Executive Secretaries, while members of the Central Committee, were not members of the Presidium. Thus, unlike the Executive Committee members, members of the Executive Secretariat were politically subordinate to the Presidium. This elimination of the Executive Committee served to make the Presidium both a policy-making and policy-executing body.

Nevertheless, this increase in power for the Presidium did not make it into a type of Politburo organization that had ruled the country in previous decades. There are several factors that serve to indicate that the consensual consultative decision-making strategy was not abandoned. First, the regional parties along with the military representatives nominated the individuals who would represent them on the central party organs. For example, members of the Presidium were appointed through a process of consultation between the President of the League, Tito, and the regional presidiums and military representatives. In addition, the President of each of the regional central committees, by virtue of his or her office, was a member of the central Presidium. Thus, by enabling the regions to control regional cadre appointments, the League of Communists was transformed into a confederal organization.

Secondly, the Presidium in its decision-making activity met with key representatives in the country. Meetings were held with regional party leaderships, military representatives and members of the Federal Assembly. Such consultation had a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it enabled the Presidium to make the regional organizations cognizant of the views of the central leadership. On the other hand, these meetings allowed the regional and military organizations to make the central leadership aware of regional and military concerns.

Thirdly, in order to ensure that individual members of

the Presidium did not dominate the decision-making process, a rotating chairmanship of the Presidium was established in November of 1978. The chairman

according to the agreement and authorization of the president of the LCY and in cooperation with the secretary and members of the Presidium prepares and calls meetings of this organ. In the absence of the president of the LCY he presides over [on rukovodi] the sessions of the Presidium... The chairman and secretary of the Presidium maintain constant contact with the president of the LCY, inform him about all important questions of interest for the work of the Presidium, as well as the results of the work of sessions in which the president of the LCY did not participate.⁵⁹

Previously these functions had been performed exclusively by the secretary. With the introduction of the post of chairman, the secretary of the Presidium was oriented more towards the execution of decisions made by the Presidium.⁶⁰ Quite obviously the powers of the secretary were reduced by the presence of a chairman. Moreover, secretarial powers were further reduced with the introduction of the rotation principle to the position of secretary.

These changes within the executive level of the central party were orchestrated by Tito to prevent one individual from assuming the reigns of power. The person most affected by the changes was the Slovene Stane Dolanc. As secretary of the Executive Committee from 1974-1978 and secretary of the Presidium after 1978, Dolanc was institutionally the most powerful individual after Tito. However, his status derived from his party post as opposed

to his personal authority or public support. Potentially the only individual who could have replaced Tito was the Slovene Edvard Kardelj. Kardelj, unlike Dolanc, did not require Tito's support to maintain his status. Due to failing health Kardelj was unable to take an active political role. At the time these changes were being made in late 1978, Kardelj was fighting a losing bout with cancer. His death in early 1979 put an end to the possibility that one individual would replace Tito.

Although collective rule was established at the pinnacle of the party structure, the League's powers vis-a-vis the regional parties increased in this period. This can mainly be attributed to the increased emphasis on democratic centralism. Nevertheless, the fact that those occupying key posts within the League of Communists were appointed by the regions, serves to demonstrate that the regional parties were important political organizations. Therefore, in order to substantiate whether a consociational situation existed, one must determine if representation within the regional elite structure was based on regional ethnic proportionality. As pointed out in the previous chapter, this for the most part was indeed the case.⁶¹

The glaring exception was in Kosmet, where the Serbs and the Montenegrins were overrepresented in the party elite. However, in the period since the introduction of the 1974 constitution, the percentage of Albanians

comprising the party elite rose noticeably. In 1980 Albanians made up sixty-five percent of the political elite in Kosmet; the Serbs twenty percent; the Montenegrins ten percent, and the Muslims five percent.⁶² This was a marked improvement from 1971 when the Serb/Montenegrin alliance controlled the majority of elite positions within the Kosovo League of Communists. This gave the Albanians greater control over the League of Communists of Kosovo. This is demonstrated by the increased Albanian representation in the Central Committee and the fact Albanians represented Kosmet on the Presidency and the Presidium. Therefore, taking into consideration that the Albanians controlled the large majority of government and party posts in the region, along with the fact that the region received generous financial assistance from the federation leads one to conclude that the Albanians were made part of the consociational bargain in Yugoslavia.

As touched upon previously, in addition to ensuring that all the major ethnic groups had a voice in the political process political representation was also given to the army. Undoubtedly this was a reward for the loyalty that the army showed during the Croat crisis of 1971. At first glance this decision whereby the army was given direct representation on the Presidium and the Central Committee, along with control of security related posts, may be viewed as a threat to the consociational bargain. This is especially so when one takes into account the fact

that the army hierarchy consisted primarily of Serbs and Montenegrins.⁶³

However, this direct presence of the army in the party did not adversely impact on the practice of consociational politics in Yugoslavia. Despite Serbian and Montenegrin overrepresentation, the army was no longer a pro-Serbian organization. As Ross Johnson has pointed out: "the Yugoslav military is clearly aware of the sensitivity of the national issue."⁶⁴ Therefore, in a politically fragile state such as Yugoslavia, it would have been damaging for the army to adopt a pro-Serbian attitude. Through its role as the protectorate of the Yugoslav state, the army developed into a pro-Yugoslav body. It had a vested interest in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state. As a result, the army had the potential to serve as an instrument for extending domestic integration in the country.⁶⁵

Yet, this alliance between the League of Communists and the army, did not mean that the army determined party policy. On the contrary, the army remained under the control of the party, and faithfully supported the party leadership.⁶⁶ While the army had the means to wrestle power from the party, this was an unlikely scenario. It must be remembered, that since the Croat affair, the army's role has become to some extent institutionalized.⁶⁷ Therefore, it was given a stake in the operation of the state. As well, as R.V. Burks argues, it would seem

unlikely that the army could have better managed the complex affairs of the state than the party.⁶⁸ As a result, this presence of the army in the central institutions of the League of Communists made the military into a countervailing force against excessive regional demands. Though a praetorian solution was unlikely, the army's participation in the decision-making process made regional representatives realize that there was limits to regional demands. In effect, therefore, the presence of the military in the party may have served to facilitate consociational-type bargaining.

It is quite clear that the consociational features that were initially developed in the late sixties and early seventies were refined in the 1974-1979 period. However, unlike the early seventies, consociational politics appear to have been successfully practiced. Granted, without direct access to the decision-makers, it is impossible to absolutely be certain if consociational bargaining was occurring. (The relative strength of an individual within a group such as the Presidency or the Presidium -- where details of the decision-making process are confidential -- is difficult to determine.) Nevertheless, the fact that an elaborate decision-making process was created with the introduction of the 1974 constitution, serves to indicate that consultation and consensus were key elements that were incorporated in the process of establishing and implementing policy.

With greater emphasis on democratic centralism in this period, critics might tend to view the elaborate decision-making features as little more than window dressing. However, one is inclined to agree with Bertsch who points out that the complexity and detail present in the 1974 constitution may be indicative of a movement towards constitutionalism.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the move towards democratic centralism did not mean that the other institutions, like the federal and regional governments and the regional parties, ceased to be important political actors. As has been shown, these organizations still had a significant role in the political process. The reassertion of the authority of the League of Communists meant that the central leadership played a leading role in Yugoslav society. However, according to party statutes, this leading role was based on flexibility.⁷⁰

For the most part, the party leadership determined the broad outlines of policy. The Federal Assembly, the Federal Executive Council, the state Presidency and the various inter-regional committees were arenas in which details over a specific policy were arrived at.⁷¹ Yet, through the process of consulting these bodies, the Presidium was able to keep the members of these bodies informed of the leadership's views. Thus, it is apparent that the leadership of the League of Communists had an important role to play in determining federal policies.

The extensive powers that the Presidium possessed did

not negate the existence of consociationalism. As pointed out earlier, the Presidium consisted of representatives appointed by the regions. In effect, therefore, there was an elite cartel of regional representatives occupying posts at the political centre and making decisions on issues of national concern. This type of decision-making is probably the most fundamental and important feature of the consociational theory. Unquestionably, the presence of Tito on the political scene abetted the practice of consociationalism in Yugoslavia. Commenting on Tito's role

Burg writes:

His presence ensured that, were inter-regional negotiations within the party leadership itself to result in deadlock over an issue on which a decision could not be postponed, there was a legitimate and, if need be, authoritarian alternative means of decision making.⁷²

As a result, the true test for consociationalism in Yugoslavia occurred when Tito was no longer on the political scene.

CHAPTER VII

POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA: TITOISM WITHOUT TITO

The process of consultative and consensual decision-making that was institutionalized in the 1974-1979 period was only workable if the participants did not make excessive demands on the system. Regional representatives could not adopt totally ethnocentric, regionalistic attitudes when dealing with one another. The League of Communists' leadership, through reliance on Tito's personal prestige, along with the use of the delegate system and democratic centralism, was able to minimize the likelihood of an elite-orchestrated crisis, such as took place in 1971. With the death of Tito in May 1980, a key factor contributing to political stability was gone. Obviously Tito, as President of the League of Communists and President of the state Presidency, was a powerful figure. His presence ensured that key features of Titoism remained in practice. However, as has been shown, the Yugoslav political system was designed so as to prevent any one individual from replacing Tito. Thus, the transfer of power in Yugoslavia was based on a "non-Leninist succession."¹ Therefore, Tito's death meant that the collective leadership was left to practice Titoism without Tito.

As in previous periods, the actions of the Yugoslav leadership in the post-Tito era have been tempered by

certain events in the country. For the purposes of this thesis, the two most significant events that have transpired in the decade of the eighties in Yugoslavia are: the reappearance of ethnic tensions, particularly in Kosmet, and escalating economic problems.² In light of these two issues, this chapter will examine how collective leadership has operated since 1979.³

In order to better understand the nature of collective rule in post-Titoist Yugoslavia, it is necessary to briefly analyze the state of ethnic affairs in the country and assess Yugoslavia's economic situation. Since the death of Tito, the state of ethnic affairs in Yugoslavia has taken a turn for the worse. The most serious outbreak of ethnic hostilities occurred in March and April of 1981 when portions of Yugoslavia's Albanian population rioted and clashed with police.⁴ Scores of people were injured, and there were also instances when deaths resulted.⁵ The initial outbreak of rioting took place at the university in Pristina, where 2,000 students protested the quality of food and living conditions at the university. Demonstrations soon spread to include the population at large and took on nationalist overtones. Protestors demanded republican status for Kosmet and in some cases the right to secede. While looting and rioting was at first confined to the province of Kosmet, Albanians in Montenegro and Macedonia also clashed with the authorities.

The Yugoslav leadership responded by closing the

university, imposing a curfew, and declaring a state of emergency. About 2,000 individuals were arrested of which 1,600 received prison terms.⁶ Most of those sentenced received short terms: less than a year. However, 400 individuals received prison terms ranging from one to fifteen years.⁷ This crackdown by the Yugoslav leadership served to quell the disturbances.

Nevertheless, in terms of addressing the root of the problem -- economic underdevelopment -- the Yugoslav leadership skirted the issue. It must be remembered that the province of Kosmet is Yugoslavia's poorest region. In 1979, for example, Kosmet's per capita income was 795 American dollars, which was about thirty percent of the national average and approximately one-seventh that of Slovenia.⁸ Moreover, job prospects for the 10,000 or so yearly graduates of the university in Pristina were poor.⁹ In one sense, the leadership had no choice but to downplay the importance of the economic issue in the riots by the Albanians. Had the leadership admitted that economic underdevelopment was a key factor in the insurrection, the Yugoslav leadership in effect would have admitted that the policy of providing economic assistance for Kosmet had been a failure.

In addition to downplaying the economic aspect of the demonstrations, the leadership refused to grant Kosmet republican status. This was not a surprise, especially when one takes into consideration the fact that the Serbs


have historical and emotional links with the region. Republican status was not granted to Kosmet during the euphoric period when the Communists first came to power on a platform of "brotherhood and unity." Therefore, it is not a surprise that republican status was not granted in 1981, a time when some Albanians were demanding unity with the state of Albania. From the perspective of the Yugoslav leadership, republican status for Kosmet was the first step towards secession. As well, republican status for Kosmet might have opened a Pandora's Box of demands by other ethnic groups demanding greater autonomy, such as Serbians in Croatia.¹⁰ Thus, it was important that the leadership not cave in to the political demands made by the Albanians. Moreover, under the 1974 constitution, there is no significant difference in status between a republic and a province. Both have equal autonomy over their own affairs. The most noticeable difference lies in the fact that the two autonomous provinces are part of the Serbian republic. Therefore, while Albanians are legally politically equal to the other major ethnic groups, psychologically the Albanians may feel politically inferior. This perceived political inferiority was reinforced by the weak economic status of Kosmet. As a result,

one may question whether republican status alone would solve the national question unless it was accompanied by a radical reappraisal of the economic and social development of the area. As long as wide diversities in living

standards continue to exist between the different regions in Yugoslavia, any instance of economic discrimination is likely to be turned into a national issue.¹¹

The outbreak of nationalist discontent by the Albanians was exacerbated by the presence of consociationalism. With the adherence to segmental autonomy, consociationalism has encouraged the development of Albanian culture in Yugoslavia. In itself this should not have negative repercussions. However, as Baskin points out, consociationalism "has led to non-optimal use of scarce resources..."¹³ Through the policy of encouraging ethnic equality, there has been a tendency to duplicate resources. Furthermore, and as mentioned previously, this has led to economic mismanagement. For example, investment has been used for projects of national pride, such as a luxury hotel, as opposed to projects more suitable for the region's economy. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, consociationalism in the case of the Albanians residing in Yugoslavia has had an unsettling impact to a certain degree. Perhaps the lesson that the Albanian riots of 1981 offers is that political equality without economic equality can be destabilizing. In an area of economic underdevelopment such as Kosmet, consociationalism's emphasis on political equality serves to increase the desire for economic well-being.

In itself this is not a surprising result. It must be remembered that until the downfall of Rankovic, Albanian



society was relatively closed. Due to the policy of oppression applied against the Albanian population of Yugoslavia, they were effectively cut off from the remainder of Yugoslavia. Therefore, it was not until political decentralization and the resulting political liberalization that took hold in the late sixties that the Albanians became aware of their poor economic status relative to the other regions in Yugoslavia.

As has been demonstrated, the leadership's response to the crisis was to downplay the importance of the economic variable. Instead, the riots were seen as being caused by a handful of nationalists and irredentists. Blame was also placed on the government of Albania for supporting the demonstrators. In addition, criticism was levelled on the local party leadership for being too lax and for failing to keep Belgrade informed of the situation. Clearly the Yugoslav authorities were using the Albanian government and Kosmet party officials as scapegoats. As a result, it was not a surprise when the leadership of the League of Communists of Kosmet was purged and military presence in the region was increased.

While these actions on the part of the Yugoslav leadership violated the consociational principle of segmental autonomy, it did not lead to the exclusion of the Albanians from taking part in the consociational bargain. Albanians still represent Kosmet on the Presidium and the state Presidency.¹⁴ As well, the region continues to play

an active role in the affairs of the state. In addition, Kosmet continues to receive considerable economic assistance from the federal administration. In the 1981-1985 period it was estimated that Kosmet's share in the federal fund resources would amount to 42.5 percent.¹⁵

Yet, while stability has returned to the province of Kosmet, it is at best precarious.¹⁶ The country lacks the economic resources to provide for the amount of aid that Kosmet requires. On the other hand, a return to "control" practices based on Rankovic-type repression is not feasible. As the Albanians have enjoyed relative freedom since 1966, it is unlikely that they would be willing to surrender the powers they possess. In addition, the Yugoslav leadership cannot continue to ignore the call for republican status for Kosmet, especially when one takes into consideration that the Serbs and the Montenegrins are leaving the province. At the time of the 1981 census it was determined that there were 18,172 fewer Serbs and 4,680 fewer Montenegrins in Kosmet as compared to 1971.¹⁷ However, with Kosmet's problems being largely economic, republican status would not alter the economic situation. In fact, it could create further problems, because by solving this political sore spot, greater attention could be placed on economic concerns. The only real hope for stability in Kosmet lies in providing economic opportunity for Albanians, thereby giving them a greater stake in the Yugoslav system. As well, the central leadership must hope that the presence of Albanian elites in the upper strata of

the League of Communists and the federal government will act as a counterweight against those who are opposed to Yugoslav communism and/or favor Kosmet's political unification with Albania.

The state of ethnic affairs in Kosmet is probably the most serious that faces the post-Titoist administration. However, ethnic nationalism has also surfaced in other areas of the country. Ethnic nationalism has been demonstrated by the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Moslems. Clearly the growth in ethnic tension has proved worrisome to the Yugoslav leadership.

In the case of the Serbs, the ethnocentric revival can in large part be attributed to the situation in Kosmet. The Serbs have come to feel threatened by the anti-Serbian backlash in Kosmet. Thus, there is an increase in Serbian nationalism among the general population of Serbs. For example, religious celebrations are being held with greater frequency and are better attended, books on national themes concerning Serbian history have become best sellers, and Serbian youth are quick to demonstrate their national feelings through songs and national symbols.¹⁸

Croatian nationalism has primarily been a result of a feeling of anti-Serbianism. Croats are once again starting to feel demographically threatened by the Serbs.¹⁹ This is primarily due to the influx of Serbs into Croatia from Kosmet. In addition, the Catholic Church, as the bastion of Croatian nationalism, continues to play an active role

in upholding Croatian cultural traditions. As well, while the liberals and nationalists who were purged in 1971 are no longer politically powerful, their ideas are still popular among the Croatian masses.

Slovene nationalism has primarily been due to the influx of workers from Yugoslavia's less developed regions. The Slovenes see these Gastarbeiter as posing a threat to Slovene culture. Between the years 1976-1982, the percentage of Slovenes who felt that immigrants threatened Slovene culture and language rose from thirty-two to forty-four percent.²⁰ Slovene nationalism, however, has not been as blatant and severe as that of other ethnic groups. Instead, Slovene nationalism has entailed expressing concern about the impact that the non-Slovene workers will have on the region. As of yet, Slovene nationalism has not resulted in massive show of popular discontent.

The most interesting case of nationalism that has emerged has been among the Bosnian Moslems.²¹ The Yugoslav leadership encouraged the development of a Bosnian Moslem identity by allowing Moslems to receive religious education and build mosques. As well, the leadership approved the existence of a Moslem identity by allowing an individual to declare himself to be an ethnic Moslem. Bosnian Moslems used this opportunity to undergo an Islamic reawakening. Close contacts have been established between Bosnian Moslems and the Arab world. Bosnian Moslems have been allowed to study at Arab universities and have received

financial aid from friendly Arab states to help in the construction of mosques. Recently, Yugoslav officials have expressed concern over the activities of the Bosnian Moslems. Bosnian Moslem religious leaders have been accused of falling for a form of Khomeini-style fundamentalism and for wishing to turn Bosnia-Hercegovina into an exclusive fatherland of the Moslems.²² The leadership's fear of Bosnian Moslem nationalism may be due to the potential for the emergence of an Islamic bloc in Yugoslavia encompassing Bosnian Moslems and Albanians in the south of the country. A more likely reason for fearing Bosnian Moslem nationalism is that there is the potential that the Moslems in Bosnia might coalesce with Croats in the region and in Croatia.²³ Undoubtedly, this would be a formidable group who would be seen as being a threat to the Serbs, particularly those Serbs who reside in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The concern with the resurgence of ethnic nationalism on part of the Yugoslav leadership has been slightly offset by the fact that the census of 1981 shows that there has been a marked increase in the percentage of individuals declaring themselves to be Yugoslavs.²⁴ This is a positive sign for the leadership because it indicates that a Yugoslav consciousness is slowly developing. Nevertheless, the presence of ethnic nationalism is of major concern to the leadership. As a result, in the period since 1979, there has been a noticeable crackdown on nationalist activity. Individuals associated with nationalist activity

have been criticized by the party and in some cases imprisoned. Clearly the party leadership has moved to prevent the outbreak of ethnic hostilities. Yet, as will become apparent, this has not resulted in the abandonment of the consociational bargain.

The presence of ethnic tensions in the post-Titoist period has been to a large extent exacerbated because of the economic malaise present in the Yugoslav economy. Like most countries, Yugoslavia has been forced to endure difficult economic times in the decade of the eighties.²⁵ Yugoslavia's economic difficulties have been largely brought about by the fact that economic decisions are determined by political as opposed to economic rationales. Thus, the country's economic malady is primarily a result of

The inability or unwillingness of the leadership to adjust traditional modes of behavior to the requirements of a modern industrial state.²⁶

Essentially the political leadership is fearful that the bringing forth of economic changes will lead to dire political consequences. This is a legitimate fear, particularly when one considers that should economic rationality be introduced many enterprises, especially those in the underdeveloped regions, would be forced to shut down. While in the long term the country would be better off economically, the immediate result would include a worsening of ethnic affairs.

Nevertheless, the failure of the government and the

party to take measures has resulted in problems. First, Yugoslavia has accrued a massive foreign debt of over twenty-four billion dollars.²⁷ Vast sums are borrowed to prop up sagging enterprises. However, with these enterprises unable to make a profit, the regime must borrow further funds to keep them afloat. The foreign debt situation has been made worse because of Yugoslavia's reliance on foreign currency earnings from its citizens working abroad. With the downturn in the European economy, there has been a decrease in this type of currency. As well, with the Yugoslav economy being in poor shape, it is unlikely that foreign workers are saving as much money in Yugoslav banks as they had in previous years. Consequently, for the first eight months of 1982, foreign currency remittance was eight percent or 360 million dollars lower than the administration had projected.²⁸

Secondly, the general economic situation in the country is unhealthy. With the authorities bailing out unprofitable enterprises, inflation has skyrocketed. In 1981 for example, inflation was running at fifty percent annually.²⁹ Obviously this has led to a decrease in the standard of living for most Yugoslav citizens. Secondly, with workers in profitable enterprises seeing profits being used to service the foreign debt and prop up unfeasible enterprises, dissension in the workplace has been on the rise.³⁰ Worker morale and productivity have become quite low in the country. Strikes and absenteeism have increased to serious levels. It has been estimated

that the average Yugoslav worker works "only three hours and six minutes each day."³¹ In addition, corruption and black market practices have become widespread. This in turn has resulted in shortages of commodities. Together all these events have had a debilitating impact on the state of ethnic affairs in Yugoslavia. Each ethnic group is apt to blame another group for the country's economic problems. As Yugoslavia's economic problems have had a varying degree of impact on the different regions, individual ethnic groups -- for example, the Albanians -- have shown their displeasure towards the regime.

The presence of the consociational bargain has to some extent added to Yugoslavia's economic woes. With the Chamber of Republics and Provinces having authority over economic legislation, regional leaders have considerable power over the economy. This has had a negative impact on the economy in that each region makes economic decisions based primarily on its own needs. As a result, enterprises are created to employ local individuals. Little emphasis is placed on economic viability. Perhaps the best example of the quasi-autarkic outlook that exists within the regions is demonstrated by the previously discussed lack of inter-regional investment in Yugoslavia.

Quite clearly those at the political centre face a major task in dealing with the country's economic problems. As Burg points out:

In Yugoslavia it is made more difficult by the fact that actions intended to relieve these problems must not only be

effective but must also be equitable in their impact on the various regions and nationalities if they are not to give rise to potentially explosive conflicts.³²

While decisions pertaining to the economy are reached, it is a slow process. The slow pace of economic decision-making is brought about by the fact that those at the political centre, such as the Federal Executive Council, the Presidency and the Presidium are regional representatives, who must consider national and regional interests. Moreover, even among these individuals there is no consensus on what path the Yugoslav economy should take. Those from the developed regions are in favor of market-type economic practices. On the other hand, those from the underdeveloped regions are in favor of a more centralized economy, with the authorities assuming more control over the economy. The end result of these two dichotomous views is that Yugoslavia has a heavily subsidized quasi-market economy. Nevertheless, despite this paradox, economic decisions are reached by those at the political centre. For example, a decision was reached over providing assistance to the underdeveloped regions for the years 1981-1985.³³ Undoubtedly this decision required that both factions in the discussion had to compromise so as to enable an agreement to be reached.

However, in order for those at the political centre to seriously tackle Yugoslavia's economic problems, not only will they have to reach an accord on what path the economy should take; in addition, the political centre has to re-

acquire more control over economic planning from the regions. This would not entail abandoning the market strategy. Rather it would involve closer cooperation between federal authorities, regional authorities and the enterprises. Under the present situation, the regional authorities possess too much of the economic jurisdiction as evidenced by the lack of a unified economic plan. While economic problem solving is a difficult task, especially when performed by non-economists, it would seem that if the economic malaise in Yugoslavia is to be properly addressed more economic power must go to those at the political centre. In turn, those at the political centre must be willing to make decisions, which while economically necessary may be politically unpopular.

Although the ethnic and economic problems that face the Yugoslav authorities are not the only issues of concern, they have had the greatest bearing in shaping the nature of political rule in Yugoslavia. This fact becomes clearly evident when one examines how the consociational bargain has operated since the death of Tito. In the post-Tito era, the political infrastructure has not been fundamentally changed. However, there were a series of constitutional amendments that were implemented in early 1981 that did impact on the structure of the political system.³⁴ Basically the amendments were designed so as to ensure that the provisions of collective rule would be adhered to. The concept of collective rule was supported by all the regions.

Nevertheless, there was one major issue of contention and that pertained to the length of duty and the powers of the Prime Minister of the Federal Executive Council and his or her ministers. This issue was of importance because if the Prime Minister's tenure and powers were reduced, the Federal Executive Council as a centralizing institution would be weakened. The real significance of this dispute lies in the fact that this issue has served to demonstrate that local concerns override all other considerations in determining the policy stance of each region. The crucial point of contention was whether the Prime Minister should be elected for two or four years, and whether an individual serving a two-year term had the right to be reelected. As well, there was disagreement on whether the Prime Minister should appoint the Cabinet, and if the members of the Federal Executive Council could sit for more than one term.

For the most part, the dispute was between the regions of the liberal developed north and the regions of the underdeveloped conservative south.³⁵ The developed regions were in favor of a strong Federal Executive Council, thus supporting a four-year term of office for members of the executive. The reason for desiring a strong Federal Executive Council probably lies in the belief that the presence of a strong executive was conducive to a stable political system. On the other hand, the underdeveloped regions favored the shorter term of office for the cabinet.³⁶ At first glance, it appears that this

decision in which the underdeveloped regions were in favor of the two year term of office indicates that these regions were encouraging political decentralization. However, such is not the case. It must be remembered that the presence of a strong central administration contributes to the welfare of the underdeveloped regions, who rely on funds transferred by the central government. Therefore, by favoring the two-year term, with no right to reelection, the underdeveloped regions hoped to subject the Federal Executive Council to greater political pressure, thereby enhancing the bargaining position of the southern regions during negotiations over aid and development policies.³⁷

As Burg insightfully points out:

Such an explanation of the positions taken by these leaderships is entirely consistent with the more conservative political character usually attributed to them.³⁸

With each region firmly committed to its position, it was impossible for the constitutional commission to reach a decision. Due to the stalemate between the regions, the Presidium had to take a direct role in the issue. In January of 1981, the Presidium proposed to the constitutional commission that a four-year mandate be adopted for the Prime Minister and other members of the cabinet. Shortly afterwards an agreement was reached whereby the Prime Minister would serve a four-year term, but was prohibited from reelection, and members of the Cabinet would also serve a four-year term, but could be re-

elected for an additional term. As well, it was also agreed that the Prime Minister and members of the Federal Executive Council would be selected by the Socialist Alliance, a euphemism for the Presidium.

This acceptance of a four-year term for the Prime Minister has undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of a stronger central administration. The Federal Executive Council has come to assume a prominent role in the decision-making process. In part, this can be attributed to design. The Federal Executive Council is constitutionally empowered to be a body for formulating compromise solutions on issues of inter-regional dispute. As well, the demise of the Federal Assembly as a legislative institution has been a contributing factor in increased status of the Federal Executive Council. The Federal Assembly has not operated according to plan. The Federal Assembly often becomes entailed in lengthy and tiresome debate, with delegates, especially those in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, operating as unified ethno/regional units. As a result, decision-making has become quite slow, to the point that the Federal Executive Council has had to intervene in order to have legislation passed. In a four-year period, from 1979 through 1982, the Federal Executive Council had to issue twenty emergency decrees, as against cases involving 125 laws, twenty-six decisions, and twenty conclusions where emergency procedures were not needed.³⁹ Clearly this relatively

frequent use of emergency decrees by the Federal Executive Council demonstrates the extent to which ethnocentrism has taken hold among delegates in the Federal Assembly. In turn, it also shows the importance of the Federal Executive Council as a political body. This institution, headed by the Croatian Milka Planinc, is probably the most significant institution in the day-to-day governing of Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

The other major state institution, the Presidency, has undergone changes since the death of Tito. The first is that the position of President of the Presidency now rotates among the eight regional representatives. As a result, the person occupying the presidential post has the formal powers of head of state. However, this is not to imply that the particular individual is as powerful as was Tito. Another change that has gradually come into being in this period is that there is no longer an overlap in membership between the state Presidency and the Presidium. The previous situation had served to make the Presidency into a more powerful body. With the separation between the party executive and the state executive came the end of any possibility that the Presidency would evolve into a Politburo-type organization.

Nevertheless, the state Presidency continues to perform an important political function, namely attenuating key political disputes. Its role lies not as an authoritative body imposing its will on the country.

Instead, the state Presidency serves as a mediating body, facilitating inter-regional bargaining. It encourages the regional representatives to find a solution to their differences. Clearly this body is facilitating consociational-type decision-making in Yugoslavia.

The state Presidency has little choice but to act in such a manner. If this body became directly involved in conflicts, it would be difficult to conceal the various differences that exist among its members.⁴¹ The credibility of the state Presidency comes in part from the fact that it shows public unity. It cannot, therefore, afford to publicly disclose that disagreement exists between its members; secrecy must be maintained. In addition, if the state Presidency became involved too frequently, even minor conflicts could have the potential to be politically destabilizing.⁴² However, if the assembly system gets further bogged down by regional chauvinism, executive organs such as the Federal Executive Council and the state Presidency may have to take a more direct role in solving major policy conflicts.

Turning to the League of Communists, it is apparent that collective decision-making has been successfully implemented in the party. Ethnic pluralism continues to be recognized by the League of Communists, as evidenced by the fact that both the Central Committee and the Presidium continue to operate on the principle of regional parity and corresponding provincial and military representation.

TABLE XVIII
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF 1982

Nationality	No.	%
Serbs	52	31.9
Croats	22	13.5
Moslems	8	4.9
Slovenes	22	13.5
Albanians	13	8.0
Macedonians	18	11.0
Montenegrins	19	11.7
Hungarians	3	1.8
"Yugoslavs"	4	2.4

Source: Adapted from Robert F. Miller, "The 12th Congress Of The League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia The Succession Process Continues," Australian Outlook, Vol. 36, No. 3, (December 1982), p. 14.
Cited from Borba, June 30, 1982.

TABLE XIX
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE PRESIDIUM
OF 1984

Nationality	No.	%
Serbs	8	35
Croats	3	13
Slovenes	3	13
Macedonians	3	13
Montenegrins	3	13
Albanians	2	9
Moslems	1	4

Source: Adapted from Richard F. Staar, (ed.). 1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 403.

Moreover, in order to make sure that those in the Central Committee and the Presidium do not become entrenched in their positions, the rotation provision has been adhered

to. As a result, just over fifty-eight percent of those in the Central Committee elected at the Twelfth Congress were new members.⁴³ Likewise, only seven of the twenty-three members of the Presidium elected at the Twelfth Congress had been members of the previously elected Presidium.⁴⁴

Even though the Serbs comprise the largest percentage of the membership in the Central Committee and the Presidium, this does not, as previously stated, imply Serbian domination. It must be remembered that the Yugoslav political system, while authoritarian in nature, is relatively decentralized. Over time the political system has come to be based not just on ethnicity, but regionalism as well. For example, a Serb from Bosnia-Herzegovina sitting on the Presidium or the Central Committee would not necessarily have the same concerns and interests as a Serb from Serbia holding a similar position.

In order to ensure that consociational-type decision-making continues to operate, the powers of the President of the League of Communists have been altered. The title of Chairman of the Presidium was changed to that of President of the Presidium. Therefore, theoretically the person occupying the post of President of the Presidium assumes the position that Tito previously held. However, the person who is President of the Presidium does not enjoy the powers that Tito had as head of the party. Aside from representing the League of Communists on the state Presidency, the President of the Presidium has the same

powers as had the chairman, namely presiding over meetings of the Presidium. Moreover, with the post of party President rotating annually among the regions, it is difficult for one individual to become more prominent and in turn more powerful than the other members of the Presidium. The powers that Tito possessed as President of the League of Communists have for the most part been assumed collectively by the Presidium. Therefore, the Presidium has de facto become the highest body of political authority in the country. The fact that it is a collective body, which makes its decisions on a consensual basis, serves to demonstrate the existence of consociationalism in Yugoslavia.

While the Presidium is the most authoritative political body in the country, the fact that Tito is no longer a member of this body has served to weaken it vis-a-vis the regions. This is evident from the greater role that the regions and the army now have in determining the composition of the Presidium. While Tito was alive, he appointed members of the Presidium after consulting with the regions and the army. However, due to the power that Tito had, undoubtedly he had the final word in selecting representatives for the Presidium. Under the present system, there is a special committee which, in consultation with the regions and the army, determines the composition of the Presidium. Without the presence of one authoritative central leader, the regional leaderships have

less reason to worry that their autonomy will be encroached upon.⁴⁵

In addition, with Tito no longer on the political scene, there has been greater discussion in the party on what role it should assume.⁴⁶ The political liberals desire greater democratization both within society and the party itself. On the other hand, the political conservatives favor greater party control and a reduction in the powers of the federal units. In between these two groups, there is a third group of political moderates. This third group, who consider themselves loyal Titoists, are in favor of maintaining the status quo. Due to this lack of agreement in the party, some Yugoslav analysts have expressed the fear that the country might become another Lebanon.⁴⁷ However, the fact that there is public discussion over the role of the party, may serve as an indicator of the resiliency of the Yugoslav system.

This resiliency has been demonstrated by those at the political centre. It must be remembered that with Tito's absence, an important bond uniting those at the political centre has disappeared. Therefore, members of the Presidium are without doubt subjected to greater regional pressures. Nevertheless, the presence of a relatively stable political system indicates that those at the top of the political hierarchy are committed to the preservation of the Yugoslav state. Clearly this type of commitment is essential if consociational politics are to function successfully.

In order to ensure that political stability remains, the collective leadership has imposed more authoritarian political practices. As was mentioned earlier, there has been a crackdown on ethnic nationalists. As well, any group who questions the principles of the Yugoslav system, self-management and non-alignment, is subject to condemnation and suppression. As a result, anti-communist organizations, anti-Titoist communists, and intellectuals engaged in criticism of the regime have experienced repression. Yet, such actions by the authorities do not negate the existence of consociationalism.⁴⁸ By repressing perceived political enemies the Yugoslav leadership has essentially sought to limit who participates in political decision-making. However, the fact this decision was made on a collective basis by the representative of the ethno/regional units in the country indicates that the consociational bargain is present.

The reemergence of more authoritarian politics in Yugoslavia does not imply that the party has become subservient to the army. While the army undoubtedly favors a more authoritarian unitary system, the army has not forced the hand of the League of Communists. If the party were under the control of the army, it would be unlikely that the federal units would enjoy as much autonomy. In fact, even greater political authoritarianism would exist. This has obviously not occurred. Instead the army, while perhaps unhappy with the autonomy that the regions enjoy,

has remained loyal to the leadership of the League of Communists.⁴⁹ Judging by the army's previous actions, it is likely to remain loyal in the future.

On the other hand, the reemergence of more authoritarian politics, as is evident, has not resulted in the curtailment of regional autonomy. The regional administrations still retain authority over their own state affairs. Therefore, segmental autonomy does exist. Probably the best example of the autonomy that the regions possess is the previously discussed issue of economic decentralization. While the presence of a decentralized economic system, and in turn a lack of central control, is a primary cause of Yugoslavia's economic problems, it also shows that the regions are powerful political entities. The presence of relatively autonomous regions in Yugoslavia is evidence of the confederal nature of the League of Communists. Therefore, the move to limit political pluralism has only been applied to groups perceived as being enemies of the Yugoslav system.

This reappearance of a somewhat more authoritarian and repressive political approach by Yugoslavia's political elite has been accompanied by a more realistic approach to the ethnic issue in Yugoslavia. Gone is the idealism of the forties and fifties, when it was thought that ethnic differences would immediately dissipate once economic equality was attained. While this is still a goal of the party, it has been tempered by the reality of events. As

was discussed in the introductory chapter, industrialization and economic growth can increase ethnic awareness. Dolanc, one of Yugoslavia's most important political figures, in an interview related to the situation in Kosmet, exemplified this more realistic approach when he stated:

We are a multi-national country, and at the same time economically underdeveloped. Differences among our republics, and provinces, do exist. Regrettably the boundaries of development and underdevelopment coincide with nationality boundaries. The fact is that a pluralism of interests exists which must be coordinated constantly, patiently and on a long term basis. All this constantly forces us to a political reality. And it will force us tomorrow and the day after tomorrow until we achieve the level of development that will enable us to have a really complete economic equality and prevent any kind of nationalist manifestations ... the Yugoslav communist party always had as one of its strategic tasks the solution of the national problem... It is a process which will last a long time.⁵⁰

In order that the problems confronting Yugoslavia be seriously addressed, this type of realistic attitude will have to be followed by realistic political actions on the part of the collective leadership. Granted this might entail making unpopular decisions. However, failure to do so may in the long run only exacerbate the country's problems.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA

In the final analysis, it is quite clear that the nature of political rule in Yugoslavia has changed during the forty years the Communist Party has held power. Initially, the party was a tightly organized, hierarchically structured institution based on the principle of democratic centralism, whose members were united through their participation in the war effort. This belief in hierarchical rule was demonstrated by the way the party ruled the country. Decisions were made by the Communist elite, without significant regard devoted to the plural (multi-ethnic) nature of Yugoslav society.

In its early days of Communist Party rule, Yugoslavia was basically a totalitarian state under the authority of the party. The adherence to democratic centralism was a key factor in the establishment of a "control"-type situation by the party. However, as is evident, within this party "control" there was also a strong element of ethnic "control." Even though the Communist Party was an all-Yugoslav body, it must be remembered that the Serbs, especially those outside of Serbia proper, and the Montenegrins were the two most dominant groups within the party. The ethnic "control" is best exemplified through the dominant position enjoyed by the Serbs and the Montenegrins in the secret police and the army.

With the break with the Soviet Union, and the introduction of self-management, along with various constitutional changes "control"-type politics were somewhat weakened during the fifties and early sixties. Nevertheless, "control" did not end until the leader of reactionary politics in Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Rankovic and his associates were purged in 1966. The demise of conservative "control" politics led to the appearance of political liberalism. As well, it marked the appearance of consociational structures in both the government and the League of Communists. However, the initial experimentation with political liberalism and consociationalism failed.

The resulting crackdown on the political liberals did not lead to the abandonment of the consociational structures that had been developed. Instead, as was evidenced by the 1974-1979 period, the political structure fundamentally remained the same; only the actors were changed. The consociational decision-making apparatus that was initially established in the late sixties and early seventies, and refined in 1974, has remained intact. In spite of problems, such as the Albanian crises and lagging economic fortunes, along with the reappearance of some authoritarian features in Yugoslav society, consociational politics continues to be practiced by the nine organizations that make up the League of Communists.

Undoubtedly there are lessons to be learned from the experience that the Yugoslav Communists have had in

governing a multi-ethnic state. First, the Yugoslav experience indicates that "control" politics are difficult to sustain when economic development occurs within those groups that are under a "control" situation. This was demonstrated in the middle to late sixties when the newly emerging technocratic middle class in Croatia and Slovenia, and to a lesser extent in other regions, demanded a political voice to match their economic status. The demise of Rankovic signified a victory for those ethnic groups -- namely the Slovenes, Croatians, Magyars, Bosnian Moslems, Macedonians, and to a lesser extent the Albanians -- which had suffered the greatest under the combination of party and ethnic "control."

Secondly, the Yugoslav case exemplifies one of the primary features of the "control" paradigm, namely that a country can simultaneously have both "control" and consociational features. In the case of Yugoslavia, this occurred during the late sixties when all the regions and major ethnic groups, except the Albanians of Kosmet, were made part of the consociational bargain.

The third lesson that Yugoslavia offers is that if consociational politics are to function certain conditions must exist. The Croat crisis of 1971 shows that the League of Communists and eight regional organizations must be internally disciplined, and the party must be able to implement limitations on the behavior of social institutions.¹ Clearly the Croat crisis made the Yugoslav

leadership realize inter-regional disputes had the potential to acquire ethnic flavor, and in turn lead to a potentially destabilizing situation.

Fourthly, the Yugoslav case demonstrates that consociational politics can function within the confines of an authoritarian state. Even though the experiment with political liberalism ended over a decade ago, consociational politics have remained. Increased authoritarianism since 1971 has not led to the disappearance of the veto power, segmental autonomy, proportionality or political rule by a grand coalition. Granted all this occurs within a single party system. Nevertheless, within the League of Communists, there is a collection of relatively coequal, coalescing oligarchs, who each represent a significant sector of the plural society, and who must bargain with one another to obtain rewards or avoid sanctions for their constituency.² Without doubt, this type of elite interaction demonstrates the presence of consociational politics in Yugoslavia.

The fifth and potentially most important lesson derived from the Yugoslav case is that in order for consociational politics to function in the desired manner and promote political stability, political equality must be accompanied by relative economic equality. The outbreak of demonstrations and riots by Yugoslav Albanians is an example of the aforementioned. Thus, if political stability is to remain, and if consociational politics are

to function, those making political decisions must try to alleviate ethnically based economic inequality.

To conclude, both the "control" and consociational models do offer plausible means by which to explain the presence of political stability in plural societies.

Neither paradigm offers a finite solution to the myriad of problems that the leaders face in governing ethnically plural states. By its very nature the consociational model, with its emphasis on power sharing and decentralization, is more desirable than the "control" model. However, both models demonstrate that plural (in Yugoslavia's case multi-ethnic) states can be politically stable. This thesis has been based on that belief.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Upon its creation in 1918, Yugoslavia had within its borders the following groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Albanians, Bosnian Moslems, Magyars and Germans. In addition, there was a smattering of Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Turks, Gypsies, Poles, Russians, Jews, Italians, and Ukrainians which also resided in Yugoslavia. Officially, however, only the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were recognized.

2. For a good insight into the interwar period in Yugoslavia see either Wayne S. Vucinich "Interwar Yugoslavia," in Contemporary Yugoslavia, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 3-58, or Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 201-280.

3. Statistics provided from Rothschild's work clearly demonstrate this Serbian dominance. In the military arena 161 of the 165 generals were Serbs. The Croats and Slovenes provided two each. In various government ministries, key bureaucratic posts were occupied by the Serbs. For example in 1939 the Serbian contingents among senior bureaucratic posts were as follows: (a) Office of the Premier, 13 of 13; (b) Royal (Regency) Court, 30 of 31; (c) Ministry of the Interior 113 of 127; (d) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 180 of 219; (e) Ministry of Education, 150 of 156; (f) Justice Ministry, 116 of 137; (g) Transportation Ministry, 15 of 26; (h) State Mortgage Bank, 196 of 200. Rothschild pp. 278-279.

4. The general view of the interwar period is that the Serbs controlled Yugoslavia in order to further their own self-interests. Alex N. Dragnich in a recently published revisionist work on this period puts forth a different view. He argues that the major reason the Serbs dominated the political scene was due to the unwillingness of the Croats to participate, except under their own terms. In addition, Dragnich believes that the Serbs lack of experience in governing a multinational state, as opposed to self-interest, was a factor contributing to Serbian dominance. For further details see Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).

5. During the 1920's and 1930's Yugoslavia was beset by a number of political crises, which included the shooting and subsequent death of Radic in 1928; the

suspension of parliament and the proclamation of a Royal Dictatorship in 1929; and the assassination of the Yugoslav monarch Alexander in 1934.

6. It should be pointed out that in 1939 an agreement was signed between Vlado Macek, head of the Croatian Peasant Party, and Dragisa Cvetkovic the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia. This sporazum (agreement) made Croatia into a separate administrative region and transferred a certain amount of local authority to local administrators. However, by this time hostilities were high between the Serbs and Croats. Moreover, with the onslaught of the war and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, this agreement proved to be of little consequence.

7. Rothschild, p. 215.

8. D.A. Tomasic, "The New Class And Nationalism," Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. 1, (1960), p. 58.

9. ibid, p. 58. Cited from Istorijski Arhiv Komunisticke Partije Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1949), Vol. II, p. 27.

10. Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 23.

11. Tomasic, p. 58.

12. ibid, p. 58.

13. For the best account of the national question and the Yugoslav Communist Party's approach to it during the interwar period refer to Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question.

14. Joseph Stalin, "Marxism And The National Question," (1913), in Joseph Stalin, Marxism And The National And Colonial Question (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 18.

15. ibid, p. 19.

16. Nevertheless, while both groups were of Serb origin, the Chetniks consisted primarily of Serbs from Serbia. On the other hand, the Serbs in the Partisan forces were primarily Serbs who resided out of Serbia proper.

17. R.V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 122.

18. *ibid*, p. 126.

19. As is apparent, the term political stability, for the purposes of this paper, will be viewed through two factors, namely the absence of violence and the longevity of Communist rule in Yugoslavia. It should be pointed out, however that the concept of political stability is multi-faceted. Hurwitz states that political stability somehow means the absence of violence, and of structural change, along with the presence of effective decision-making, legitimacy, and governmental longevity. Yet, as he points out there is lack of agreement on the precise meanings of these terms. For further information refer to Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (April 1973), pp. 449-463.

20. Josip Broz Tito, "Josip Broz Tito on the National Question," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 19, No. 2, (May 1978), p. 13.

21. Pedro Ramet, Inter-republican Relations in Contemporary Yugoslavia (Dissertation, U.C.L.A. 1981), p. 12.

22. For the purposes of this thesis the term elite will be synonymous with the term ruling class. As such, elites will be viewed as having power in general as opposed to just political power. For a further description of the term elite and the ambiguity that surrounds it refer to Paolo Zannoni, "The Concept Of Elite," European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 6, (1978), pp. 1-30.

23. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, (January 1969), p. 213.

24. M. Elaine Burgess, "The resurgence of ethnicity: myth or reality?" Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, (July 1978), p. 278. According to Burgess the factors that facilitate ethnicity are: (1) migration which is mainly induced by changing labour markets, nation building and doctrinal disputes; (2) communication and education, which makes it possible to spread news about ethnic symbols, conflicts, rhetoric and goals; (3) centralization and alienation, which are the results of modernization, often lead people to search for communal affiliations. For a further explanation refer to Burgess, pp. 278-280.

The Yugoslav economist Branko Horvat puts forth a message similar to Burgess. However, unlike Burgess, Horvat believes that national exclusiveness is not a necessary result of rapid economic development. Rather he sees it as resulting from the haphazard manner with which industrialization was implemented in Yugoslavia. For

further details refer to Branko Horvat, "Nationalism And Nationality," translated by Helen M. Kramer, in International Journal of Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring, 1972), pp. 19-46.

25. Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 4, (October 1979), pp. 477-506.

26. *ibid*, p. 500.

27. Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, (April 1979), pp. 325-344.

28. *ibid*, p. 330.

29. For a more critical view of Yugoslav elites refer either to Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism In Contemporary Europe (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1978), or Nenad Popovic, Yugoslavia: The New Class in Crisis (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968).

30. Fritz Hondius, The Yugoslav Community Of Nations (The Hague: Mouton & Co. N.V. Publishers, 1968), p. 137. Quoted from Karl Loewenstein, "Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age," Constitutions and Constitutional Trends since World War II (New York: 1951).

31. Adam Roberts, "Yugoslavia: the constitution and the succession," World Today, Vol. 34, No. 4, (April 1978), p. 136.

32. Barbara Jancar, "The Case For A Loyal Opposition Under Communism: Czechoslovakia And Yugoslavia," Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Summer 1968), p. 430.

33. By looking at the various Yugoslav constitutions in the practical as well as theoretical sense, one should be able to determine how closely the Communist Party adhered to constitutional principles.

CHAPTER II

1. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

2. See either Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," or Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977).

3. By plural type societies one is referring to states that have deep divisions based on ethnicity, class, language, religion, etc.

4. For a more detailed explanation of these four functions refer to Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 25-52.

5. In addition to federalism, there are other ways in which segmental autonomy can be encouraged. These include: granting segments the right to make their own decisions on certain issues and providing funds to a segment to carry out certain programs that may be of specific interest to them. For example, a country that has a language cleavage may choose to allocate funds to the various language segments for education. By doing so, the central government is giving each of the segments control over education and in turn allowing each segment to sustain its language.

6. Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation In Divided Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper in International Affairs, 1972), p. 23.

7. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 44-45.

8. *ibid*, p. 53.

9. For a detailed explanation of these factors refer to Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 53-104.

10. Macedonia, located in the southeast corner of Yugoslavia, is looked upon by Bulgaria as being an area that should belong to the Bulgarians. As a result, Bulgaria is reluctant to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Macedonian ethnic group, choosing instead to see the Macedonians as being of a Bulgarian heritage.

11. Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 4, (July 1974), p. 617.

12. Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," p. 500.

13. *ibid*, p. 483.

14. *ibid*, p. 502.

15. *ibid*, p. 502.

16. *ibid*, p. 502.

17. For critiques of consociational theory refer to Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers," European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 3, No. 4, (December 1975), pp. 393-412; Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," pp. 604-621; Jeffrey Obler, Jurg Steiner and Guido Dierickx, Decision-Making in Smaller Democracies: The Consociational "Burden" (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977); and Jurg Steiner "Review Article: The Consociational Theory and Beyond," Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, (April 1981), 339-354.

18. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 106.

19. Jurg Steiner has gone even farther than Lustick in terms of classifying elite actions. While Lustick identifies two modes, consociational and control, Steiner has identified four modes: (1) decision by competition, (2) decision by amicable agreement, (3) decision by interpretation, and (4) decision by repression. for further explanation refer to Steiner, "Review Article: The Consociational Theory and Beyond," pp. 339-354.

20. Lustick, p. 335.

21. *ibid*, pp. 333-334.

22. *ibid*, p. 335.

23. *ibid*, p. 335.

24. F.G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 30-33, and pp. 132-140.

CHAPTER III

1. The breakdown of the percentage of these indigenous populations for these five republics, according to 1948 data, was as follows: Serbs in Serbia, including Kosmet and Vojvodina, seventy-four percent; Croats in Croatia seventy-nine percent; Slovenes in Slovenia ninety-seven percent; Montenegrins in Montenegro ninety-one percent; Macedonians in Macedonia sixty-nine percent. Derived from Shoup, Communism and the National Question, p. 265. Cited from Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslaviije, Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Konacni rezultati popisa stanovnistva od 15 marta 1948 godine," Vol. 14: Stanovnistvo po narodnosti, p. xiv.

2. *ibid*, p. 265. The breakdown of the population for Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1948 was as follows: Serbs forty-four percent, Croats twenty-four percent, Moslems thirty-one percent, others one percent.

3. The population statistics are from 1953 and are cited from M. George Zaninovich, The Development Of Socialist Yugoslavia (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 171. Cited from: Savezni Zavod za statistiku, Demografska statistiku, 1959 (Beograd: 1962), p. 26.

4. Joseph Frankel, "Federalism in Yugoslavia," American Political Science Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, (June 1955), p. 424.

5. For more details on autonomous units in Yugoslavia refer to Hondius, The Yugoslav Community of Nations, pp. 158-160.

6. Branko M. Peslj, "Contemporary Croatia In the Yugoslav Federation: Its Constitutional Status And Socio-Economic Position," Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. 2, (1961), p. 91.

7. The Moslems, though not a distinct ethnic group in terms of language, were distinct because of their religion. However, the Yugoslav authorities chose not to recognize the Moslems as a separate group.

8. R.V. Burks, The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia Rand Report No. P-4761. (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1971), p. 4.

9. M. George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, p. 46.

10. Hondius, p. 137. Quoted from Ivo Krbek, Narodna Republika Hrvatske U FRNJ (Zagreb: 1948), p. 8.

11. However, due to the resistance put up by the peasants and the resulting scarcity of foodstuffs, collectivization was abandoned in the early fifties. It must be remembered that it was the practical problems of collectivization in Yugoslavia and not ideological criticism of the Soviet Union that caused the leadership to discontinue collectivizing farmland. This is demonstrated by the fact that while almost all other features of Stalinism had been castigated immediately after the break with the Soviet Union, the virtues of collective farming were being espoused even after 1948.

12. Aleksander Jovanovic, The Social and Political System in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Medunarodna Politika, 1966), p. 14.

13. Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Washington D.C.: Embassy of the FPRY, 1946), p. 5.

14. Hondius, pp. 141-144.

15. *ibid*, p. 144.

16. Harold Pash, The Yugoslav Nationality Problem And Its Influence On The Development Of Political And SocioEconomic Institutions, (Dissertation, New School For Social Research 1968), pp. 257-258.

17. While Croatia was made into an independent state during World War II, in reality it was a German puppet. Moreover, the remaining sections of Yugoslavia were either under German control or divided between the occupying powers.

18. For a more detailed analysis of the 1946 constitution refer to Hondius, pp. 137-167; Pash, pp. 247-269; Michael Petrovich, "The Central Government of Yugoslavia," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 4, (December 1947), pp. 504-530.

19. Article 53, Constitution FPRY 1946.

20. *ibid*, Article 54.

21. *ibid*, Article 73.

22. *ibid*, Article 77.

23. *ibid*, Article 44.

24. *ibid*, Article 44.

25. Hondius, p. 151.

26. Article 11, Constitution FPRY 1946.

27. Jim Seroka, "The Policy-Making Roles Of The Yugoslav Federal Assembly: Changes, Trends And Implications," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol 37, No. 3, (September 1984), pp. 363-378.

28. Alan J. Whitehorn, "Yugoslav Constitutional Developments: An Expression Of Growing Nationality Rights And Powers," East European Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Fall 1975), p. 346.

29. Pash, pp. 263-264.

30. Article 77, Constitution of FPRY 1946.

31. *ibid*, Article 85.
32. *ibid*, Article 85.
33. Pash, p. 263.
34. Article 74, Constitution of FPRY 1946.
35. Thomas Shillinglaw, "The Development Of constitutional Review In Yugoslavia," East European Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1970), p. 374.
36. Steven L. Burg, "Ethnic Conflict and the Federalization of Socialist Yugoslavia: The Serb-Croat Conflict," Publius, Vol. 7, No. 4, (Fall 1977), p. 120.
37. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 119.
38. Pash, p. 260.
39. *ibid*, p. 139. Quoted from Aleksander Rankovic, Izvestaj, V. Kongres, O Organizacionom Radu (Beograd: 1948), p. 220.
40. Paul Shoup, "The Limits of Party Control: The Yugoslav Case," in Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity and Diversity in One Party States, edited by Andrew C. Janos. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 181.
41. George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia And The New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1962), p. 85.
42. *ibid*, p. 91.
43. *ibid*, p. 92.
44. *ibid*, p. 92. Cited from Aleksander Rankovic, "Za Dalje Jacanje Pravosudja i Zakonitosti," Komunist, No. 2, (March-May 1951).
45. Josip Broz Tito, Selected Speeches And Articles 1941-1961 (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1963), p. 78.
46. A. Ross Johnson, The Role Of The Military In Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch Rand Paper No. P.6070. (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1978), p. 16.
47. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 104.

48. Andrew Ludanyi, Titoist Integration of Yugoslavia: The Partisan Myth & the Hungarians of the Vojvodina 1945-1975, Polity, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Winter 1979), p. 237.

49. Hoffman and Neal, p. 93.

50. *ibid*, p. 93.

51. It must be remembered that historically military roles came easily to the Serbs and the Montenegrins. Serbs have had a long history of repression and revolt.

52. Josip Broz Tito, "Josip Broz Tito on the National Question," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 19, No. 2, (May 1978), p. 15.

53. Charles P. McVicker, Titoism: Pattern for International Communism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 43.

54. Charles Zalar, Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 134.

55. *ibid*, p. 134. Cited from Ernest Frankel, The Dual State: a Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Translated from the German by E.A. Shils, in collaboration with Edith Lowenstein and Klaus Knorr; New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 154.

56. *ibid*, p. 134. Cited from Frankel, p. 154.

57. Susan Bridge, "Some Causes Of Political Change In Modern Yugoslavia," in Ethnic Conflict In The Western World, edited by Milton-J. Esman (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 348-349.

58. Refer to footnote No. 21 Chapter II.

59. For further details on regional economic inequality in Yugoslavia refer to Nicholas R. Lang, "The Dialectics Of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3, (April 1975), pp. 309-335.

60. It is interesting to note that while the Kosmet region was underdeveloped, it was not designated to receive any special assistance under the five year plan of 1947-1951.

61. Joseph Frankel, "Communism And The National Question In Yugoslavia," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XV. No. 1, (April 1954), p. 55. Quoted from

V. Smilevski, "Review of the Development of the Macedonian National Problem," Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1950), p. 108.

CHAPTER IV

1. At the Fifth Congress in July of 1948 Tito portrayed Yugoslavia as being loyal to the Communist movement as a means of repudiating Stalin's charges. For more information refer to Tito, Selected Speeches And Articles 1941-1961, pp. 85-96.

2. For a detailed analysis of Yugoslavia's attitude towards the Soviet Union following the expulsion from the Cominform refer to Ross Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953 (Cambridge: Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1972), pp. 98-121.

3. American assistance to Yugoslavia was quite substantial. According to Rusinow, by the end of 1955 the United States had contributed 598.5 million dollars in economic aid and 588.5 million in military aid. Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), p. 46.

4. The term Titoism is somewhat of a misnomer in that Tito was not much of a theoretician leaving this task to others, most notably the Slovene Edvard Kardelj. For a detailed description of the theoretical aspects of Titoism refer to any of the following: Hoffman and Neal, pp. 155-173; McVicker, pp. 245-304; Neal, Titoism in Action, pp. 15-33 or Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology, pp. 143-220.

5. The other features of Titoism that are of interest are the policies pertaining to the abandonment of collectivization of agriculture, national communism, the withering away of the state, and co-existence. For the most detailed description of the above issues refer to Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology, pp. 143-158, 176-196; and Hoffman and Neal, pp. 155-173, 265-298.

6. Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology, p. 165.

7. Hoffman and Neal, p. 250. Cited from Yugoslav Investment Bank, Belgrade, 1959.

8. Economic chambers were self-governing organizations to which enterprises of similar economic activity were members. Although these economic chambers were theoretically separate from government circles, the

administration used the chambers to insure that enterprises followed general policies of the government.

9. According to available data the annual average percentage increase of the social product was 8.3 in Yugoslavia in between the years 1953-1964. For the developed regions of Yugoslavia, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina and Serbia proper the figure was 8.4. On the other hand, the figures for the underdeveloped regions of Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosmet was 8.1. Therefore in each year between 1953-1964 the underdeveloped regions were falling further behind the developed regions. This was particularly true for the areas of Kosmet, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. Figures are from Mary B. Gregory, "Regional Economic Development In Yugoslavia," Soviet Studies, Vol XXV, No. 2, (October 1973), p. 223. Cited from Statisticki Godisnjak S.F.R. Jugoslavije, 1970.

10. Lang, p. 319.

11. However, one group of individuals that was definitely excluded from the liberalization process were those Yugoslavs that sided with Stalin in 1948. Following the split with the Soviet Union, pro-Stalinist Yugoslavs were subjected to extreme repression, including liquidation.

12. It must be remembered that the Yugoslav leadership was fearful of the foreign threat, namely the Soviet Union. Therefore it was important that the Yugoslav leadership show that the country was united. Yugoslavianism was supposed to be the program that demonstrated this unity.

13. Neal, Titoism in Action, pp. 90-91. Quoted from Edvard Kardelj, "The New Social and Political system of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Union of Jurists' Associations of Yugoslavia, 1953), p. 12.

14. Polyvalent federalism according to Jovan Djordjevic is a process whereby the basis of federalism shifts from territorially based communities to functionally based communities. For a more detailed explanation refer to Jovan Djordjevic, "Remarks on the Yugoslav Model of Federalism," Publius, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Spring 1975), pp. 77-88.

15. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 187.

16. Pash, p. 270.

17. Lenard Cohen and Paul Warwick, Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic: The Yugoslav Experience (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 74.

18. Alex Dragnich, "Recent Political Developments In Yugoslavia," Journal of Politics, Vol 20, No. 1, (February 1958), p. 119.

19. Zalar, p. 202. Cited from Articles 34-35, 38, The Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Beograd: Union of Jurists Associations of Yugoslavia, 1960). Hereafter referred to as the Constitutional Law of 1953.

20. ibid, p. 202. Cited from Article 36, Constitutional Law of 1953.

21. ibid, p. 203. Cited from Article 28, Constitutional Law of 1953.

22. Approximately sixty percent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture of some form. Yet, as the following chart indicates, peasants were greatly under-represented within the Federal Council of Producers.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COUNCIL OF PRODUCERS, 1954

	Industry	Agriculture	Total
Serbia	44	30	74
Croatia	35	14	49
Slovenia	18	4	22
Bosnia-Hercegovina	25	12	37
Macedonia	10	5	15
Montenegro	3	2	5

Source: McVicker, p. 162. Cited from Leon Gerskovic, "The System of Producers" Councils in Yugoslavia," International Labour Review, (January 1955), p. 47.

23. Zalar, p. 202. cited from Article 37, Constitutional Law of 1953.

24. ibid, pp. 200-201. Cited from Article 25, Constitutional Law of 1953.

25. ibid, p. 201. Cited from Articles 26-27, Constitutional Law of 1953.

26. Hoffman and Neal, p. 216.

27. ibid, p. 216.

28. Pash, p. 283. Cited from Edvard Kardelj, The New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Union of Jurists' Associational of Yugoslavia, 1953), pp. 25-26.

29. A reduction in republican powers occurred through various constitutional changes, such as removing the right of self-determination from the constitution. However, as the right of self-determination had been more of a theoretical than actual right, a reduction of this sort was of little consequence to the republics.

30. Seroka, "The Policy Making Roles of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly," p. 373.

31. *ibid*, pp. 372, 374.

32. One is referring to the claim made by Dragnich on page 65 of this study.

33. Pash, p. 289. Cited from Articles 71-78, Constitutional Law of 1953.

34. *ibid*, p. 289. Cited from Articles 79-89, Constitutional Law of 1953.

35. *ibid*, p. 295.

36. *ibid*, p. 285. Article 9 of the 1953 Constitutional Law defined the relationship, the roles and the rights of the three levels of government.

37. *ibid*, p. 290.

38. Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology, p. 203. Quoted from "Rezolucija Sestog Kongresa KPJ o zadacima i ulozi Saveza Komunisti Jugoslavije," Komunist, Vol. 5, Nos. 5-6, (September-December 1952), p. 1-8, at 7-8.

39. M. George Zaninovich, "Yugoslav Party Evolution: Moving beyond Institutionalization," in Authoritarian Politics In Modern Society, edited by Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 492.

40. For a description of the various structural changes that occurred in the party refer to Neal, Titoism in Action, pp. 34-81.

41. Territorial organs were not as effective in maintaining the type of dominance that the party desired because of the fact that the lower echelons of the party were uninterested in participating in these territorial

organs. The lack of interest was due to a number of factors, namely varying levels of education and lack of agreement of whose interests the territorial organs were supposed to represent. Unlike the party cells that had existed within the government and other organizations, such as the newspaper industry or retail enterprises, territorial organizations consisted of members from all organizations, be they government and or non-government.

42. Paul Shoup, "Problems Of Party Reform In Yugoslavia," American Slavic And East European Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, (October 1959), p. 340. Cited from Komunist, No. 4, (April 1954), pp. 279-280.

43. *ibid*, p. 340.

44. Educating the masses was both an ideological and political task. Ideologically, it involved developing an interest for participation in the economic, political and social life of the state. Politically, it entailed the involvement of party members in various organizations as a means of influencing their actions.

45. Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology, p. 204. Cited from Josip Broz Tito, Govori i clanci (Zagreb: 1959), 7: 284.

46. In the two years following the Brioni Plenum, 1954 and 1955, 273,464 were expelled from the party, while only 136,887 were added. Hoffman and Neal, p. 186. Cited from Borba, March 15, 1956.

47. For a brief but valuable analysis of the Djilas incidence refer to Hoffman and Neal, pp. 187-199.

48. From January of 1954 to July of 1956 party membership dropped from 700,030 to 635,984. Hoffman and Neal, p. 197. Cited from Komunist, No. 4, (April 1954), p. 267 and Komunist, Nos. 11-12, (1956), p. 14.

49. McVicker, p. 283.

50. For proceedings of the Seventh Congress refer to Yugoslavia's Way: The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Translated by Stoyan Pribechevich. (New York: All Nations Press, 1958).

51. Pash, p. 149.

52. Although figures are unavailable of the composition of the secret police and the upper echelons of the military it would be surprising to see that Serbs and Montenegrins suffered a dramatic drop in membership in this period as compared to the 1946-1952 period.

53. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 217.

54. Hoffman and Neal, p. 404.

55. Paul Shoup, "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia," in The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 331.

56. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 231.

57. See footnote 9 Chapter IV for average annual growth of the social product, which serves as an indicator of federal assistance to the less developed regions.

58. Montenegro's annual average increase was 10.4 percent, which was two percentage points higher than the country as a whole. Cited from Gregory, p. 223. As cited from Statisticki Godisnjak S.F.R. Jugoslavije, 1970. For annual average increase in social product for Yugoslavia's other regions refer to note number 9, Chapter IV, pages 256-257 of this thesis.

59. Ellen Turkish Comisso, Workers' Control Under Plan And Market (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 53.

60. The 1961 economic reform served to give the enterprise an increased share of the enterprise earnings among personal income, investment funds and collective consumption. As well, the reform served to transform banks into profit making enterprises as opposed to disbursement agents for the government agencies. However, the central administration still maintained considerable control over the economy through the use of investment funding.

61. Yugoslavia's Way, p. 193.

62. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 197.

63. Cristopher Spalatin, "Language and Politics In Yugoslavia in the light of events which happened from March 17, 1967, to March 14, 1969," Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. XI,-XII, (1970-1971), p. 85.

64. Zaninovich, "Yugoslav Party Evolution: Moving beyond Institutionalization," p. 497.

CHAPTER V

1. There were essentially four other events in this period that had repercussions for the Yugoslav political system. These were: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Albanian riots, the Slovene road building crisis, and the purge of political liberals in all regions of the country.

2. Bogdan Denitch, The Legitimation of a Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 145.

3. It should be pointed out that Yugoslavia lacks a true market system because of the lack of private property rights. For further information on the lack of a true market in Yugoslavia refer to James A. Dorn, "Markets, True And False: The Case Of Yugoslavia," Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 243-268.

4. For a detailed analysis of the 1965 economic reforms refer either to Joel B. Dirlam and James L. Plummer, An Introduction to the Yugoslav Economy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1973), or Comisso, chapter 4.

5. Rudolf Bicanic, "Economics Of Socialism In A Developed Country," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4, (July 1966), p. 638.

6. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 178.

7. Lang, p. 328.

8. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1977), p. 342.

9. For example in between the years 1961-1968 the number of automobiles per 1,000 people increased from 4.1 to 22. In the same period the number of televisions per 1,000 people increased from 3.3 to 65. Cited from Dirlam and Plummer, p. 156.

10. N. Popovic, p. 173.

11. Woodford McClellan, "Postwar Political evolution," in Contemporary Yugoslavia, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 149.

12. Lang, p. 326..

13. Deborah D. Milenkovitch, "The Case of Yugoslavia," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 67, (1977), p. 56.

14. Dirlam and Plummer, p. 53.

15. April Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 240.

16. According to a study undertaken by Verba and Shabad, League of Communist members participate in workers' councils at a higher rate than non-League members. For further information refer to Sidney Verba and Goldie Shabad, "Workers' Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience," American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, (March 1978), pp. 80-96.

17. Carter, p. 241.

18. Under the 1963 constitution the office of Vice-President of the Republic was created.

19. Carter, p. 18.

20. Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: 1966," American Universities Field Staff Report Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XIII, No. 6, (July 1966), p. 6.

21. McClellan, p. 150.

22. It is interesting to note that the discovery that microphones had been placed in Tito's residence was made by the army.

23. Following the purge of Rankovic, the secret police was to be confined to activities that pertained to the class enemy and threats from abroad. In order to make sure that the secret police did not have the power it had while Rankovic was at the helm, parliamentary commissions were created to oversee the work of the internal affairs secretariats.

24. The construction of the Belgrade to Bar railroad was one of Yugoslavia's most controversial and expensive economic undertakings. Bar, a Montenegrin port located on Yugoslavia's southwest coast was far removed from the country's northern industrial markets. This port could only be of use if there was a rail connection. However, as there were ports in the Croatian cities of Sibenik, Split and Zadar, the construction of the railway was seen as being economically unfeasible. Primary concern was expressed by the Croats, who felt that the construction of a railway would cut into the markets of the ports located in Croatia. While the railway has been built and been of

benefit to the southern areas of the country, the fact that the railway took thirteen years to complete and involved extensive tunneling tends to point out that it was more than just economic factors that prompted the leadership to approve the project.

25. Two analysts that are sympathetic towards Rankovic are: Steven K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London: Benn, 1971), pp. 309-312, and Nenad V. Petrovic, "The Fall Of Aleksander Rankovic," Study Centre for Yugoslav Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 6, (1967), pp. 531-551.

26. Nenad Popovic, a former top bureaucratic official in various agencies for the Yugoslav administration, in his book points out that while Tito favored Kardelj as Vice-President he chose Rankovic because Rankovic appeared to be more capable of handling the responsibility of leading the state. For more details refer to Popovic, p. 67.

27. Shoup, "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia," pp. 331-332.

28. Paul Lendvai, Eagles in Cobwebs (London: Macdonald, 1970), pp. 160-161.

29. *ibid*, p. 161. Cited from Borba, July 2-3, and October 6, 1966 and from personal information Lendvai acquired while interviewing unnamed members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav party and members of the Central Committee of the republican parties in Croatia and Slovenia.

30. Burks, The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia, p. iv.

31. Pash, p. 176.

32. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 257.

33. Carter, p. 19.

34. Ramet, Inter-republican Relations in Contemporary Yugoslavia, pp. 230-231.

35. Carter, p. 19.

36. Rusinow, "Yugoslavia, 1966," p. 7.

37. Hondius, p. 323.

38. A great deal of literature has been produced on the Croatian crisis of 1971. From the perspective of Croatian nationalists refer to Ivo Omrcanin, Zagreb:

Croatian Spring (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1976). Omracanin's basic premise is that the Croats were in the process of attempting to gain their independence and sovereignty. As such, Omracanin is very critical of Tito's decision to intervene into the affairs of Croatia, to the point that he views Tito as being a traitor.

For a more analytical and less emotional view of affairs in Croatia refer to any of the following: Dennison Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia," 4 Volumes: American Universities Field Staff Southeast Europe Series, Vol. 19, Nos. 4-7, (1972); Steven Burg, Conflict and Cohesion In Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 100-160; Pedro Ramet, Inter-republican Relations in Contemporary Yugoslavia, pp. 248-323.

39. George Klein, "Workers Self-Management And The Politics Of Ethnic Nationalism In Yugoslavia," Nationalities Papers, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 9-10.

40. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Yugoslav Succession Crisis In Perspective," World Affairs, Vol. 135, No. 2, (Fall 1972), p. 103. K.F. Cviic in his article looks at the Croat Crisis from a historical perspective, pointing out that each major group in Yugoslavia has at one time or another had nationalist aspirations. It is the existence of this latent nationalism and thus the lack of a common historical experience that serves to divide the Yugoslav populace. For more details refer to K.F. Cviic, "The Missing Historical Dimension In Yugoslavia," International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 3, (July 1972), pp. 414-423.

41. The primary opponents of liberalism in the Croatian League of Communists were the Serbs. Serbian party members in Croatia derived their status from membership in the League of Communists. As liberalism entailed increasing the powers of the republic vis-a-vis the federation, Serbian party members probably felt that the Croat majority would force them from their positions of authority in the Croatian League of Communists.

42. Gary K. Bartsch, "The Revival of Nationalisms," Problems of Communism, Vol. 22, No. 6, (November-December 1973), p. 11.

43. *ibid*, p. 12.

44. *ibid*, p. 11.

45. Stipe Suvar, "Marginal Notes On The Nationalities Question," translated by Helen M. Kramer, in International Journal of Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring 1972), pp. 47-77. Suvar in his work appears to be very critical

of forces who used nationalism for their own benefits. Quite probably, Suvar is referring to the liberal elements in the Croatian League of Communists. Refer to Suvar, pp. 62-63 for further details.

46. Horvat, pp. 19-46.

47. For a detailed analysis of the language dispute in Croatia refer to Spalatin, pp. 83-104.

48. It is interesting to note that many of the same individuals who had signed the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement were also parties to the 1967 Croatian Declaration.

49. Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 103. Cited from Borba, November 17-21, 1969.

50. Paul Lendvai, "National Tensions in Yugoslavia," Conflict Studies, No. 25, (August 1972), p. 8.

51. Croatian economic concerns primarily revolved around the belief that the republic was being economically exploited by the Serbs. Sime Djodan argues that the location of financial power in Belgrade was leading to Croatia's economic impoverishment. For further details refer to Sime Djodan, "The Evolution Of The Economic System Of Yugoslavia And The Economic Position Of Croatia," translated by Jakov Bacic, in Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. 14, (1973), pp. 3-102.

52. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Yugoslavia At The Crossroads," Orbis, Vol. XVI, No. 2, (Summer 1972), p. 384.

53. Ramet, Inter-republican Relations in Contemporary Yugoslavia, p. 250. Cited from Sime Djodan, "Gdje dr Stipe Suva 'pronalazi' nacionalizam, a gdje ga ne vidi," in Kolo, Vol. 7, No. 7, (July 1969), p. 703.

54. ibid, p. 250.

55. Denitch, p. 196.

56. Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1976), p. 226.

57. N.L. Karlovic, "Croatia And Its Future: Internal Colonialism Or Independence?" Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. 22, (1981), pp. 49-113.

58. Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 121.

59. Larrabee, p. 386. Quoted from Vjesnik, April 11, 1974.

60. Dennison Rusinow, "Crisis In Croatia Part II," American Universities Field Staff Reports Southeast Europe Series, Vol. 19, No. 5, (September 1972), p. 14.

61. George Schopflin, "The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism," Survey, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Winter 1973), p. 143. Cited from Tanjug, November 19, 1971.

62. *ibid*, p. 143.

63. *ibid*, p. 143.

64. Rubinstein, "The Yugoslav Succession Crisis In Perspective," p. 112. Lendvai "National Tensions in Yugoslavia," p. 13.

65. In describing Bakaric as a unitarist one does wish to imply that he favored a powerful central administration. Bakaric was in fact one of the leading proponents of liberalism in Yugoslavia. However, when the Croatian troika got involved with nationalist forces, Bakaric favored central intervention. Thus, in describing him as a unitarist, one is only referring to the Croat crisis.

In differentiating between liberals or decentralists as opposed to unitarists or conservatives perhaps Ramet offers the clearest examples of both. First, liberals in Yugoslavia are those who favor the following: decentralization or the deepening of federalism; profitability in investments; open society with respect given to human rights; loose party supervision of societal affairs; party pluralism; the placing of priorities on the requirements of one's own republic. Obviously, someone of the liberal persuasion would not have to agree with all these views. However, to be deemed a liberal, a majority of the stands would have to be favored.

On the other hand, a unitarist would be someone who would approve of the majority of the following policies: strong central government or party; using investments to attain political goals, such as regional equality; less open society, with tighter societal controls; strong party control of all socio-political organizations; democratic centralism; priority of the needs of the federal party over individual federal units regardless of the situation.

Cited from Ramet, Inter-republican Relations in Contemporary Yugoslavia, p. 219.

66. Dennison Rusinow, "Crisis In Croatia Part IV," American Universities Field Staff Reports Southeast Europe Series, Vol. 19, No. 7, (September 1972), p. 14.

67. *ibid*, p. 24.

68. Burg, "Ethnic Conflict and the Federalization of Socialist Yugoslavia: The Serbo-Croat Conflict," p. 137.

69. As is discussed in greater detail in the latter portions of this chapter, the concept of democratic centralism was severely weakened. However, it was never totally abandoned.

70. Ramet, Inter-republican Relations in Contemporary Yugoslavia, p. 314. Cited from New York Times May 23, 1974.

71. *ibid*, p. 314.

72. *ibid*, p. 315. Cited from Croatian National Congress, Violations of Human and National Rights of the Croatian People in Yugoslavia (New York: HNV, 1980).

73. Rubinstein, "The Yugoslav Succession Crisis in Perspective," p. 109.

74. Cynthia W. Frey, "Yugoslav Nationalisms and the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty," East European Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, (Winter 1976), pp. 427-457; and Vol. 11, No. 1, (Spring 1977), pp. 79-108.

75. Bogdan Radista, "Nationalism In Croatia Since 1964," in Nationalism in the U.S.S.R. & Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev & Kosygin, edited by George W. Simmonds. (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1976), p. 466.

76. Tito, "Josip Broz Tito on the National Question," p. 30.

77. For an extensive and excellent analysis of the 1963 constitution refer to Hondius, pp. 244-313; or Pash, pp. 314-339.

78. Pash, p. 314.

79. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 155-156.

80. Article 34 of the Constitution Of The Socialist Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia," in Constitutions Of The Communist Party-States, edited by Jan F. Triska. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968). Hereafter this document will be referred to as the 1963 Constitution.

81. *ibid*, Article 34.

82. Pash, p. 308.

83. This view would have been held by political liberals, such as Kardelj.

84. Part I Basic Principles, 1963 Constitution.

85. Hondius, p. 251. Quoted from Jovan Djordjevic, Novi ustavni sistem, (Belgrade: 1964), p. 366.

86. The policy of Yugoslavianism can be seen as ended as early as 1961. In that year, Moslems were allowed to declare themselves as a national group.

87. Hondius, p. 250.

88. Articles 42 and 43, 1963 Constitution.

89. *ibid*, Article 44.

90. Hondius, p. 254. Quoted from Jovan Djordjevic, "The Socialist Federation and the Republic," New Yugoslav Law, (1963) 1-3, p. 12.

91. In drafting republican constitutions, the republics had to observe criteria, such as equality of citizens, elected representation of the working people, judicial protection of constitutional rights, and principles of rotation election and referendum. For more details refer to Articles 108-112 of the 1963 Constitution.

92. Article 108, 1963 Constitution.

93. *ibid*, Article 119.

94. *ibid*, Article 120.

95. *ibid*, Article 113.

96. *ibid*, Article 96.

97. *ibid*, Articles 96-104.

98. *ibid*, Article 97. This article gave the republics the right to determine the territories of the communes. In effect, the republics were empowered to dismantle and or create communes.

99. Hondius, p. 262.

100. Article 165, 1963 Constitution.

101. *ibid*, Article 166.

102. *ibid*, Article 164.

103. Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, p. 117.

104. Article 166, 1963 Constitution.

105. *ibid*, Articles 190-192.

106. Cohen, "Conflict Management," p. 130. Quoted from Edvard Kardelj, "Organizacija i metodi rada savezne skupstine" (Belgrade: Sekretarijat informativnu sluzbu savezne skupstine, 1965), p. 39.

107. Article 172, 1963 Constitution. Under article 172 the assembly could extend the term of federal deputies, as was the case in the spring of 1973 when the scheduled elections were canceled.

108. Whitehorn, p. 349.

109. When compared to the previous period from 1958-1963 this was a marked improvement. In the 1958-1963 period the Federal Executive Council made 1,085 of the decisions, while the legislature made 435. Cited from Cohen, "Conflict Management," p. 128. As cited from Dokumentacija Savezne skupstina (1953-1968).

110. The same would be true for Croatia. However, the Croats would have held the vast majority of the positions.

111. Article 225, 1963 Constitution.

112. *ibid*, Article 225.

113. *ibid*, Article 236.

114. *ibid*, Article 226.

115. *ibid*, Article 226.

116. Whitehorn, p. 349.

117. Article 41, 1963 Constitution.

118. Hondius, pp. 291-292.

119. Articles 214-224, 1963 Constitution.

120. Hondius, p. 293.

121. For a detailed analysis of the Constitutional Court, refer to Thomas Shillinglaw, "The Development of Constitutional Review In Yugoslavia," East European Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 369-388.

122. The functions of the Constitutional Court are spelled out in articles 241-251 of the 1963 Constitution.

123. In its first two years of operation 3,007 cases were filed. Hondius, p. 300. Cited from Saopstenja (Ustav Sud Jugoslavije (Belgrade: 1966), p. 5.

124. Cohen and Warwick, p. 77.

125. Article 190, 1963 Constitution.

126. Quoted by Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 67.

127. *ibid*, p. 74. Cited from Federal Assembly Information Service, The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1969), amendments VII, XVIII, XIX.

128. Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 75. Quoted from "Constitutional Changes in Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey, 10, (August 1969), p. 10.

129. The Federal Chamber was replaced by the Socio-Political Chamber.

130. *ibid*, p. 75. Cited from "Constitutional Changes in Yugoslavia," amendments, VIII, IX.

131. Cohen, "Conflict Management And Political Institutionalization," p. 132,

132. A comprehensive examination of the 1971 amendments is present in the following: Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 188-216 or Burks, "The National Problem," pp. 31-38.

133. Singleton, Twentieth Century Yugoslavia, p. 268.

134. *ibid*, pp. 269-271.

135. Cited in Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 205.

136. Quoted in Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 205.

137. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 285.

138. Cited in Paul Shoup, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," Problems of Communism, Vol 21, No. 1, (January-February 1972), p. 26.

139. *ibid*, p. 126.

140. The succession issue in Yugoslavia is covered by Myron Rush, How Communist States Change Their Rulers (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 223-249.

141. William Zimmerman, "The Tito Succession and the Evolution of Yugoslav Politics," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 9, Nos. 1 and 2, (Spring/Summer 1976), p. 71.

142. The decision to allot three delegates to each republic appears to be tied to the multi-national condition present in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With each republic having had three delegates each major ethnic group within the Bosnian republic would have been represented.

143. Quoted in Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 118.

144. *ibid*, p. 118.

145. Fisk in his article points to four characteristics which are useful in accounting for the existence of constitutionalism in Yugoslavia in this period. These are: government pluralism (ie. federalism and decentralization); self-government; the assembly system; and a constitutional court. For further details refer to Winston M. Fisk, "The Constitutionalism Movement in Yugoslavia: A Preliminary Survey," Slavic Review, (June 1971), Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 277-297.

146. Seroka, "The Policy-Making Roles Of The Yugoslav Federal Assembly," pp. 372-373.

147. Bertsch, "The Revival of Nationalisms," p. 3.

148. See Denitch, pp. 108-111 for details.

149. Lenard Cohen, "Balkan Consociationalism: Ethnic Representation And Ethnic Distance In The Yugoslav Elite," in At The Brink Of War And Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich. (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), p. 37. Cited from Popis Stanovništva i stanova 1971. Stanovništvo. Ekonomske Karakteristike I Deo, (ukupno i aktivno stanovništvo) Rezultati po republikama i pokrajinama, Knjiga III, (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1974), pp. 68-112.

150. *ibid*, p. 38.

151. *ibid*, p. 38.

152. *ibid*, p. 40.

153. *ibid*, p. 40.

154. *ibid*, p. 36.

155. The region of Vojvodina ranks in the upper half when it comes to the issue of per capita income. See p. 99 of this thesis for details.

156. Cohen, "Balkan Consociationalism," p. 41. Cited from Popis Stanovništva i stanovan 1971.

157. *ibid*, p. 41.

158. *ibid*, p. 41.

159. *ibid*, p. 41.

160. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 166.

161. Just over thirty-five percent of the party members at the time of the Eighth Congress were white collar. By white-collar one is referring to engineers and technicians, workers in health, education and culture, managerial personnel and administrative staff. Refer to Carter, p. 260 for exact social breakdown of party membership.

162. Lenard Cohen, "Partisans, Professionals, and Proletarians: Elite Change in Yugoslavia, 1952-1978," Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 21, No. 4, (December 1979), p. 474.

163. Pash, p. 343.

164. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 172.

165. For a detailed analysis of the changes that were brought forth in the League of Communists see Carter.

166. Political power also devolved to the Socialist Alliance. The Alliance was given increased authority in areas such as the nomination of candidates for elective office. However, as top party officials were also members of the key Alliance bodies, the Alliance unlike the republican parties, remained firmly under the control of the League of Communists.

167. See Appendix I for details.

168. Carter, p. 77. Cited from Borba, March 13, 1969.

169. Carter, p. 79.

170. *ibid*, pp. 79-80.

171. Phyllis Auty, "The Ninth Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists," World Today, vol. 25, No. 6, (June 1969), pp. 266-267.

172. Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, pp. 79-80.

173. In practice the Executive Bureau was elected by the Presidium. However, the republics selected the representatives for the Presidium from which the members of the Executive Bureau came from.

174. The only exception was Slovenia which sent as one of its representatives Stane Dolanc, who at the time was a relatively unknown political figure. He, however, later became the Secretary of the Executive Bureau in 1972.

175. Of the eleven members four were Serbs, two were Slovenes, one was Croatian, one was Macedonian and one was Montenegrin. The nationality of the other member was not determined. Cited from Pash, p. 192.

176. ibid, p. 193. Quoted from Fifth Plenum Meeting of the Central Committee of the LCY, YPV, No. 16, Nov. 7, 1966, p. 9.

177. Under the reorganization that took place in 1966 Tito's title as Secretary General of the party was changed to President.

178. It appears that the party made a deliberate attempt to downplay Serbian prominence. The only area where this failed to occur was in Kosmet.

179. This goal was difficult to reach in that as late as 1971 the officer corp of the Yugoslav army was predominately Serbian; 60.5 percent of the officers were Serbs. While the next highest group was the Croats with 14 percent. Cited from Denitch, p. 114. As cited from Radio Free Europe Research, No. 12 (April 1972).

180. Territorial defense was established in 1969 as a means to mobilize the population for a potential invasion from the east. As the Soviets had invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, there was a concern among the Yugoslav leadership that a similar fate might befall Yugoslavia. These civilian defense units were comprised of small-factory units, company size local units and well-equipped mobile units. For detailed analysis see either A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito The Washington Papers, No. 16, (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 43-50; Robert W. Dean, "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia, 1971-1975," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 3, No. 1, (November 1976), pp. 24-28.

181. Dean, p. 22.
182. Ibid, p. 53. Quoted from Radio Zagreb. December 22, 1971; also Borba, December 20, 1971.
183. Robin Alison Remington, "Armed Forces And Society In Yugoslavia," in Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives, edited by Catherine McArdle-Kelleher. (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 176. Cited from NIN, June 20, 1971.
184. A. Ross Johnson, The Role Of The Military In Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch, p. 13.
185. Remington, p. 177. Miskovic to Narodna Armija (April 22, 1972).
186. Zimmerman, "The Tito Succession," p. 74. Quoted from Tanjug October 18, 1972 as translated by FBIS, Daily Report, No. 203 (October 18, 1972), p. 110.
187. Burg, Conflict And Cohesion, p. 174.
188. ibid, p. 175. In making reference to this outside support Tito was probably referring to the army. He had made similar reference prior to the crackdown on events in Croatia.
189. ibid, p. 178. Cited from Emil Rojc, et al., (eds.), Deseti Kongres SKJ: Dokumenti. (Beograd: Komust, 1974), p. 386.
190. Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, p. 21.

CHAPTER VI

1. There are several analysts who argue that there was a return to Leninist practices. for example, Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia's Return To Leninism: Notes on the Tenth Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists," American Universities Field Staff Report Southeast European Series, Vol. XXI, No. 1, (June 1974), pp. 1-13; Zimmerman, pp. 62-79; K.F. Cvild, "Turning the Clock Back in Yugoslavia," World Today, Vol. 30, No. 25, (May 1974), pp. 206-213; Mark Baskin, National in Form Nationalist in Content: Some Consequences of Consociationalism in Yugoslavia. Prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 20, September 2, 1984, p. 2.

2. Ross Johnson, "Is Yugoslavia Leninist?" Studies In Comparative Communism Vol. X, No. 4, (Winter 1977), pp. 3-411; Johnson, Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito, pp. 19-30; Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 180-187; Jacob Walkin, "Yugoslavia After the Tenth Party Congress," Survey, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Winter 1976), pp. 55-73.

One analyst goes so far as to argue that the League of Communists was unable to reassert its leading role in the country. According to R.V. Burks, the League of Communists pretends to play a leading role and in reality shares power with the republican parties, the federal system and the institutions of self-management. For further details see R.V. Burks, "Problems Facing the Yugoslav Communist Movement: A Comment," in Innovation in Communist Systems, edited by Andrew Gyorgy and James A. Kuhlman. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 99-104.

3. Cohen and Warwick, p. 146.

4. James Seroka, "Legislative Recruitment and Political Change in Yugoslavia," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, (February 1979), p. 112.

5. Singleton, Twentieth Century Yugoslavia, p. 275.

6. Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslav Domestic Developments On The Eve of the 1978 Party Congress," American Universities Field Staff Report Southeast European Series, No. 25, (1978), p. 14.

7. Articles 170-171 of The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Dragoljub, Djurovic, et al., editors. Translated by Marko Pavicic. (Belgrade: The Secretary of the Federal Assembly Information Service, 1974). Hereafter referred to as the 1974 constitution. For an analysis of contemporary Yugoslav nationality policy refer to Thaddeus Z. Gasinski, "The National Minority Policy Of Today's Yugoslavia," Nationalities Papers, Vol. VIII, No. 1, (Spring 1977), pp. 29-52.

8. Article 281, 1974 Constitution.

9. ibid, Article 286.

10. ibid, Article 295.

11. ibid, Article 286.

12. ibid, Article 295.

13. ibid, Article 295.

14. ibid, Article 285.

15. *ibid*, Article 294.
16. *ibid*, Article 288.
17. James Seroka, "The Party, National Crises, And Legislative Behavior In Socialist Yugoslavia," East European Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, (March 1984), p. 78.
18. Seroka, "The Policy-Making Roles Of The Yugoslav Federal Assembly," pp. 372-374.
19. *ibid*, pp. 372-374. The policy initiation role of the Federal Assembly did not increase in this era because of the fact that the Federal Executive Council was better organized and therefore more powerful than it had previously been.
20. Seroka, "The Party, National Crises, And Legislative Behavior In Socialist Yugoslavia," p. 88.
21. For further details see Seroka, "The Party, National Crises, And Legislative Behavior In Socialist Yugoslavia," pp. 85-87.
22. Article 347, 1974 Constitution.
23. *ibid*, Article 348.
24. *ibid*, Article 362.
25. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 246.
26. *ibid*, p. 247.
27. According to the 1974 Constitution, the Federal Executive Council made its decisions by a majority vote of all council members in attendance. See Article 353, 1974 Constitution.
28. The federal councils, of which there were four, were joint organs of the Federal Executive Council, the state Presidency, and other organs and organizations on the level of the federation. These councils were designed as means to harmonize positions between the various bodies. for further details see Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 247-250.
29. Article 321, 1974 Constitution. The members of the Presidency were selected by secret ballot by the Assemblies of the Republics and the Assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces.

30. Slobodan Stankovic, The End of the Tito Era (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 57. Cited from Sluzbeni List. July 8, 1971.

31. Quoted in Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, p. 327.

32. Neither Kraigher from Slovenia or Kolisevski from Macedonia were members of the Presidium. Following changes introduced on June 28, 1979, only four persons, Bakarić, Croatia; Stambolic, Serbia; Doronjski, Vojvodina; and Hodza, Kosmet were members of both the Presidency and the Presidium.

33. Article 326, 1974 Constitution.

34. Quoted in Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 245.

35. *ibid*, p. 244. Cited from Sluzbeni List, 31 No. 12 (March 7, 1975), p. 275.

36. *ibid*, p. 244. Burg in the course of his study interviewed an adviser to the Presidency. According to this adviser, the principle of work of the Presidency is that without a complete agreement there can be no decision.

37. Article 313, 1974 Constitution.

38. *ibid*, Article 313.

39. *ibid*, Articles 314-320.

40. The procedure involved in dissolving the legislature was quite detailed. The legislature could be dissolved if it failed to endorse a motion or proposal of the Presidency. If it failed to do so, a time limit of up to six months could be used to reconcile views. If the time limit was over and no agreement was reached, the issues in question could be again placed on agenda for discussion. Even after fresh debate no agreement was reached then the Assembly would be dissolved, and the tenure of the Presidency would be terminated. However, until the time a new Assembly was elected, members of the Presidency would remain in office. For further details see Article 319, 1974 Constitution.

41. Seroka, "The Party, National Crises, And Legislative Behavior In Socialist Yugoslavia," p. 80.

42. Stankovic, The End of the Tito Era, pp. 55-56.

43. George and Patricia Klein, "Nationalism Vs. Ideology The Pivot Of Balkan Politics," in The Politics Of Ethnicity In Eastern Europe, edited by George Klein and

Milan J. Reban. (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1981), p. 273.

44. Mark Baskin, National in Form Nationalist in Content, p. 11. Cited from Koca Joncic, "Narodnosti u Jugoslaviji," Nacioalno Pitanje I Socijalizam, p. 475.

45. Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," Problems of Communism, Vol. 32, No. 2, (March/April 1983), p. 65. Cited from The Policy and Results of the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo (Belgrade: Secretariat of Information, n.d.), pp. 34-35.

46. Baskin, "National in Form Nationalist in Content," p. 31.

47. Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," pp. 65-67.

48. See Appendix I for details on party membership.

49. Robert F. Miller and E. Vance Merrill, "Yugoslav central committee memberships: what the figures show," Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 1, (May 1979), p. 71.

50. Cohen, "Partisans, Professionals and Proletarians," pp. 462-468.

51. Miller and Merrill, pp. 71-81.

52. *ibid*, p. 75.

53. Of the delegates at the Tenth Congress, ninety percent had never participated in a League of Communists' Congress, and just over sixteen percent had participated in a republican party Congress. For further details refer to Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 182-184.

54. Although there were fifteen posts allotted to the military, at the Tenth Congress there were actually twenty-one individuals from the military elected to the Central Committee. The additional six members were representatives elected by regional parties.

55. Stankovic, The End of the Tito Era, p. 65.

56. *ibid*, p. 27. Quoted from Komunist, November 10, 1978, special supplement.

57. Cited in Stankovic, The End of the Tito Era, p. 73.

58. Quoted in Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 315.

59. *ibid*, p. 319. Quoted from Politika, (Belgrade), November 10, 1978.

60. *ibid*, p. 320. Cited from Politika, (Belgrade), November 10, 1978.

61. See pp. 142-145 of this thesis for details.

62. Lenard Cohen, "Regional Elites in Socialist Yugoslavia: Changing Patterns of Recruitment and Composition," in Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia, edited by T.H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 124.

63. Precise data on the composition of the officer corps of the army in this period is unavailable. However, it seems unlikely that there would have been much change from the previous era in which the Serbs and the Montenegrins formed the majority of the officer corps. It must be remembered that historically the Serbs and Montenegrins have been attracted to military careers. According to one analyst one reason why the army is dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins is because the army still applies the same rules and regulations as the Serbian Royal Army of interwar Yugoslavia. For details see Drago Chas Sporer, "Politics And nationalism Within The Yugoslav People's Army," Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. 20, (1979), pp. 118-131.

64. Johnson, "The Role Of The Military In Communist Yugoslavia," p. 20.

65. Dean, p. 22.

66. For details see Dean, pp. 43-51.

67. Roberts, p. 145.

68. Burks, "Problems Facing the Yugoslav Communist Movement: A Comment," p. 104.

69. Gary K. Bertsch, "Yugoslavia: The Eleventh Congress, the Constitution and the Succession," Government and Opposition, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Winter 1979), p. 109.

70. Cited in Bertsch, "Yugoslavia: The Eleventh Congress, the Constitution and the Succession," p. 98.

71. For detailed analysis of the policy-making process in Yugoslavia refer to Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 242-300; and Ramet, pp. 170-200.

72. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 300.

CHAPTER VII

1. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslavia: The Non-Leninist Succession," World Affairs, Vol. 142, No. 4, (Spring 1980), p. 282. A Leninist succession would entail an unregularized transfer of power from the deceased or deposed leader to a successor, who in most instances emerged from a group of the former leader's key associates through control of the central party apparatus. Clearly in Yugoslavia's case this has not taken place.

2. Undoubtedly there are other issues that have confronted the Yugoslav leadership. These include: Yugoslavia's role in the non-aligned movement; increased potential for Soviet inspired subversion and emigre nationalist activity. For an analysis of the various emigre nationalist groups see Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia And The Threat Of Internal And External Discontents," Orbis, Vol. 28, No. 1, (Spring 1984), pp. 115-121. For an examination of Croatian emigre nationalist forces refer to Stephen Clissold, "Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence and Terrorism," Conflict Studies, No. 103, (January 1979), pp. 1-21.

3. While Tito died in May of 1980, he was quite ill in the months prior to his death. Following his death it was disclosed that the state Presidency and the Presidium had been functioning on their own during Tito's illness. Cited in Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 324-235; as cited from Politika (May 14, 1980).

4. For more details of the riots by Yugoslavia's Albanian population refer to: Elez Biberaj, "Kosovo: The Struggle for Recognition," Conflict Studies, No. 137/138, (1982), pp. 23-43; Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," pp. 61-74; Patrick F.R. Artisien and R.A. Howells, "Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo riots," World Today, Vol. 37, No. 11, (November 1981), pp. 419-427; Steven K. Pavlowitch, "Kosovo: An Analysis of Yugoslavia's Albanian Problem," Conflict Studies, No. 137/138 (1982), pp. 7-21; Pedro Ramet, "Problems Of Albanian Nationalism In Yugoslavia," Orbis, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Summer 1981), pp. 369-388; and Viktor Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," Problems of Communism, Vol. 32, No. 2, (March/April 1983), pp. 47-60.

5. The number of deaths that resulted because of the riots is unclear. Most reports put the number of deaths at between nine and eleven dead. However, Biberaj in his article cites sources reporting that up to 1,000 people died. See Biberaj, p. 35.

6. Cited in Pavlowitch, "Kosovo: An Analysis of Yugoslavia's Albanian Problem," p. 14.

7. *ibid*, p. 14.

8. Artisien and Howells, p. 420. Cited from Borba, (February 12, 1980).

9. Basically, there are three reasons why the employment prospects for Albanian university graduates are poor. First, Kosmet lacks the resources to employ all these individuals. Secondly, the recession in western Europe reduced the number of jobs that were available to Yugoslavia's Albanians. Thirdly, due to the fact that the language of business in Yugoslavia is Serbo/Croatian, employment prospects for Albanians in other regions of Yugoslavia, particularly in the developed regions, are poor.

10. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Yugoslavia's Mounting Difficulties," Orbis, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Summer 1981), p. 288.

11. F.R. Patrick Artisien, "Albanian Nationalism And Yugoslav Socialism: The Case Of Kosovo," Co-existence, Vol. 16, No. 1, (April 1979), p. 185.

12. Baskin, National in Form Nationalist in Content, p. 19.

13. *ibid*, p. 19.

14. As of 1984, Kosmet's representative on the State Presidency was Sinan Hasani, and the representatives on the Party Presidium were Ali Sukrija and Ilijaz Kurtesi.

15. Biberaj, p. 40. Cited from Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1657 GMT, (November 24, 1981).

16. Since the riots of 1981, the Yugoslav administration has kept a close watch on the situation in Kosmet. In 1984 the authorities uncovered two illegal nationalist organizations, which embraced 152 individuals. While arrests resulted, the fact that such organizations are being uncovered demonstrates that the situation is far from resolved.

17. Cited in Ramet, "Problems Of Albanian Nationalism In Yugoslavia," p. 383.

18. Zdenko Antic, "The Danger Of Increasing Serbian Nationalism," RFE Research Papers Background Report, 63, Yugoslavia, (March 24, 1983), p. 3.

19. Ramet, "Yugoslavia And The Threat Of Internal And External Discontents," p. 113. Cited from Nova Hrvatska, (November 7, 1982).

20. *ibid*, p. 112-113. Cited from NIN, January 31, 1982.

21. For more details refer to K.F. Cviic, "Yugoslavia's Moslem Problem," World Today, Vol. 36, No. 3, (March 1980), pp. 108-112.

22. *ibid*, p. 111. Cited from Borba, May 11, 1978.

23. *ibid*, p. 112.

24. Refer to Appendix II for details.

25. For a critical and detailed examination of Yugoslavia's economic fortunes in the post-Tito era refer to Ivan Botic, "1982 Status Report: Yugoslavia's Troubled Economy," in Yugoslavia in crisis (New York: Croatian National Congress, 1983), pp. 9-33.

26. Rubinstein, "Yugoslavia's Mounting Difficulties," p. 290.

27. Botic, p. 11. This figure as put forth by Botic is undoubtedly a conservative figure, especially when one takes into consideration that the Yugoslav authorities are reluctant to reveal the size of the country's foreign debt. Revelation might serve to undermine the image of Yugoslavia's leadership.

28. *ibid*, p. 23. Cited from Danas, July 27, 1982.

29. *ibid*, p. 17. Cited from Danas, July 20, 1982.

30. In order to provide funds to pay workers and cover other expenses, the federal government has levied all sorts of ad hoc taxes. This subsidization of unprofitable enterprises has had a net effect of transferring funds from the profitable enterprises to the losing enterprises.

31. Slobodan Stankovic, "Is Centralization In Yugoslavia Possible?" RFE Research Papers Background Report, Yugoslavia, No. 262, (November 15, 1983), p. 4. Quoted from Vjesnik. July 19, 1983.

32. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 336.

33. Under the agreement reached between the regions, the underdeveloped regions were to annually receive 1.83 percent of the social product. This figure of 1.83 percent represents a slight reduction from a figure of 1.97 that was allotted for the 1976-1980 period. For details pertaining to the 1981-1985 agreement refer to Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 341-342.

34. For details on the other amendments refer to Stankovic, The End of the Tito Era, pp. 115-118.

35. The exception was Macedonia, which sided with the northern regions and favored a four year mandate.

36. The positions taken by the various regional leaderships are reflected almost exactly in the amendments each adopted for its own constitution. Slovenia, Macedonia, and Serbia chose to adopt the four-year term of office for the premiers of their republican executive councils and prohibited reelection. Croatia and Vojvodina adopted a two-year term, but permitting reelection for one additional two-year term. Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosmet adopted a two-year term, with reelection prohibited. Cited from Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 334-335.

37. *ibid*, p. 334.

38. *ibid*, p. 334.

39. Robert F. Miller, "The 12th Congress Of The League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia: The Succession Process Continues," Australian Outlook, Vol. 36, No. 3, (December 1982), p. 13.

40. Yet, according to one analyst, the fact that a woman has been made Prime Minister can be viewed as a downgrading in status of the Federal Executive Council. Miller points out that because Planinc is a woman she is not likely to be taken very seriously by the more (male) chauvinistic cadres of the southern republics. Miller bases his view on information provided to him by numerous informed commentators in Belgrade in June of 1982. Cited from Miller, pp. 13, 18.

41. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 328.

42. *ibid*, p. 328.

43. Miller, p. 14. Cited from Borba, June 30, 1982.

44. Slobodan Stankovic, "The Aftermath Of The Yugoslav Party Congress," RFE Research Papers Background Report, Yugoslavia, No. 150, (July 20, 1982), p. 8.

45. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, p. 327. Cited from Politika, June 13, 14, 1980 and Komunist, June 20, 1980.

46. For more details refer to Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia's Debate Over Democratization," Survey, Vol. 25, No. 3, (Summer 1980), pp. 43-48; and Pedro Ramet, "Political Struggle and Institutional Reorganization in

Yugoslavia," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 2, (September 1984), 289-301.

47. Dusan Biber, a Zagreb historian, stated in October of 1982 that if the atmosphere of disunity continued Yugoslavia would turn into a second Lebanon. Cited in Slobodan Stanković, "Threat Of A 'Big Stick' Regime In Yugoslavia," RFE Research Papers Background Report, Yugoslavia, No. 268, (November 25, 1983), p. 2.

48. See note number 13, chapter II, page 20 of this thesis for details of the potentially repressive nature of consociationalism.

49. For an example of the army's view towards regionalism in Yugoslavia see Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Defense Minister Calls The Army The 'Backbone Of The System'" RFE Research Papers Background Report, Yugoslavia, No. 91, (April 28, 1983), pp. 4-5.

50. Cohen and Warwick, pp. 160-161. Quoted from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (April 13, 1981), p. 19.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Burg, "Ethnic Conflict and the Federalization of Socialist Yugoslavia: The Serbo-Croat Conflict," p. 141.

2. Joseph Richard Goldman, "Consociational Authoritarian Politics And The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution: A Preliminary Note," East European Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, (June 1985), pp. 245-246.

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APPENDIX I

PURGES IN LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA,

1959-1980

Year	New Admissions	Expulsions	Voluntary Resignations	Total Number of Members
1959	103,093	14,416	see note	935,856
1960	96,176	13,425	see note	1,006,285
1961	67,548	14,975	see note	1,035,003
1962	26,735	22,655	see note	1,018,331
1963	39,362	15,320	see note	1,019,013
1964	41,403	10,626	2,273	1,031,634
1965	51,398	12,878	5,762	1,046,202
1966	39,928	13,488	7,640	1,046,018
1967	33,986	11,195	11,182	1,013,500
1968	175,293	14,235	13,363	1,146,084
1969	152,000	11,176	9,447	1,111,628
1970	32,500	-----	92,601 -----	1,049,184
1971	47,606	n.a.	8,993	1,025,476
1972	58,262	12,941	14,449	1,009,953
1973	109,150	9,443	5,694	1,076,711
1974	152,673	n.a.	19,134	1,192,641
1975	110,377	n.a.	n.a.	1,302,843
1976	105,724	n.a.	n.a.	ca. 1,400,000
1980	199,446	-----	108,724 -----	2,041,272

Source: Adapted from Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes In Eastern Europe, 4th ed. (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982), p. 2. Cited from Belgrade radio, 24, January 1970, Borba, 19 March 1970, Druga Konferencija SKJ (Belgrade: 1972); Cetvrta Konferencija SKJ: Dokumenti (Belgrade, 1974); Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1975; Komunist 3, June 1971, 28 September 1972, 3 March and 16 June 1975, 25 October 1976, RFE. Yugoslav Background Report, No. 8 (20 June 1981), p. 2.

Notes: Until 1964, members who resigned of their own free will were listed together with those expelled.

The 1970 and 1980 figures include both expulsions and voluntary resignations.

APPENDIX II

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE YUGOSLAV POPULATION

1971, 1981

	Number of Inhabitants		%		1981/ 1971 index
	1971	1981	1971	1981	
Total Population	20,522,972	22,427,585	100.0	100.0	109.2
Croats	4,526,782	4,428,043	22.1	19.8	97.8
Macedonians	1,194,784	1,341,598	5.8	6.0	112.3
Montenegrins	508,843	579,943	2.5	2.6	109.6
Moslems	1,729,932	1,999,890	8.4	8.9	111.6
Serbs	8,143,246	8,140,507	39.7	36.3	99.9
Slovenes	1,678,032	1,753,571	8.2	7.8	104.5
Albanians	1,309,523	1,730,879	6.4	7.7	132.1
Bulgarians	58,627	36,189	0.3	0.2	61.7
Czechs	24,620	19,624	0.1	0.1	79.7
Germans	12,785	8,712	0.1	0.0	68.1
Hungarians	477,374	426,867	2.3	1.9	89.4
Italians	21,791	15,132	0.1	0.1	69.4
Poles	3,033	3,043	0.0	0.0	100.3
Romanies	78,485	168,197	0.4	0.7	214.3
Rumanians	58,570	54,955	0.3	0.2	93.8
Russians	7,427	4,467	0.0	0.0	60.1
Ruthenians	24,640	23,268	0.1	0.1	94.5
Slovaks	83,656	80,334	0.4	0.4	96.0
Turks	127,920	101,291	0.6	0.5	79.2
Ukrainians	13,972	12,813	0.1	0.1	91.7
Wallachians	21,990	32,071	0.1	0.1	145.8
Other	28,949	22,074	0.1	0.1	76.2
Did not state nationality in accordance with Article 170 of the SFRY Constitution					
	32,774	46,701	0.2	0.2	142.4
Declared themselves					
Yugoslavs	273,077	1,219,024	1.3	5.4	446.4
State a regional origin					
	15,002	25,730	0.1	0.1	171.5
Unknown	67,138	153,545	0.3	0.7	228.7

Source: Ruza Petrovic, "The National Composition of the Population," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 24, No. 3, (August 1983), pp. 21-34. Cited from Statisticki bilten, No. 1295, Federal Bureau of Statistics.