

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

University of Alberta

The Limits and Potential of Civic Nationalism:
The Case of the Scottish National Party

by

Paul Hunter Hamilton



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 2000



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-59595-1

Canada

University of Alberta

Library Release Form

Name of Author: Paul Hunter Hamilton

Name of Thesis: The Limits and Potential of Civic Nationalism: The Case of the
Scottish National Party

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Year this Degree Granted: 2000

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.




27 Friar's Court
St. Catharines, Ontario
L2N-6B4

OCT. 2, 2000


UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled: **The Limits and Potential of Civic Nationalism: The Case of the Scottish National Party** submitted by **Paul Hunter Hamilton** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.




Dr. L. Adkin (Supervisor)




Dr. I. Urquhart (Committee Chair)



Dr. Y. Abu-Laban



Dr. F. Judson



Dr. G. Laxer, Department of Sociology



Dr. Vincent Della Salla, Carleton University

September 29/2000
Date

ABSTRACT

Nationalism, justifiably, has been vilified for its chauvinistic, atavistic and exclusionary characteristics. Overlooked by many observers is the potential of national to serve as a foundation for collective action which may then be used for progressive political purposes. This thesis examines the potential of the civic-nationalist discourse of the Scottish National party to serve as a non-ethnic, non-exclusionary social movement for the enhancement of Scottish democracy and sovereignty. Issues of sovereignty, identity and sovereignty are examined through an analysis of the official discourse of the party. The three areas examined are critical features of a nationalist party's discourse. A thorough examination of each yields the evidence on which to draw conclusions about the limits and potential of civic nationalism for providing the foundation for local resistance to neo-liberal globalization. The discussion of sovereignty considers the impact of economic globalization and Scotland's membership in the European Union. The volatility of the global oil market and the mobility of financial capital constitute threats to the objectives of the Scottish National Party's social policy agenda. The European Union also threatens to intrude upon Scottish sovereignty by reducing the scope for independent policy-making by a Scottish government. Identity is examined in order to determine the commitment of the Scottish National party to a non-ethnic, non-exclusive conception of political community. The party has made a determined effort to transcend societal cleavages of gender, race, religion and sexual identity within the limitations of the party's broad commitment to liberal values of equality. Finally, the extent to which the Scottish National Party's civic nationalism can create the conditions for a robust and renewed Scottish democracy is analyzed. The party's commitment to a written constitution, as well as electoral reform contains the promise of remedying the democratic deficit with which Scotland has had to deal with in the United Kingdom.

DEDICATION

To my parents, who sacrificed so much for their children.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

There is only one author attached to this thesis, but I can thank a number of people whose invaluable assistance made this project possible. My parents sacrificed so much to enable me to pursue graduate studies and patiently waited for me to finish. My sister and brother-in-law were behind me too. I couldn't have completed without their support.

My supervisor, Laurie Adkin, was patient and attentive. She is a supervisor's supervisor. I have learned a great deal from her over these years. In tough times she was an understanding friend and this thesis could never have been completed without her remarkable tenacity and attention to detail.

Gratitude is also extended to the members of my committee, particularly Gord Laxer and Fred Judson, who patiently read drafts and made constructive criticisms. They offered encouragement when needed and pushed me when I needed to be. Also, I should thank Ian Urquhart who has gone beyond the call of duty as Graduate Chair.

I must also thank various members of the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Union For Civil Liberties, Cynog Dafis of Plaid Cymru, A. Sivanandan, and Tim Ewart of the Equality Network for submitting to interviews with a Canadian stranger. The thesis is stronger for their contribution. Whatever the views of those interviewed, they are dedicated to the betterment of their respective societies.

I want to acknowledge the many friends I met in Alberta. I didn't know a soul when I arrived on a bus so many years ago and I am much richer for having met so many fine people. I am delighted to call Francis Abiew, Tom Butko, Pat Daley, Paul Gecelowsky, Rob Groves, Terry and Kealy Kading, Darin Nesbitt, Dimitri Panopolis, Marc Poulin, and Pat and Kimmy Impero Wilson lifelong friends. In their own way, each made my doctoral experience more pleasant.

Finally, I should acknowledge the Faculty of Graduate Studies for travel assistance I was awarded for two trips to the UK. Also, I want to thank Elizabeth McGregor for her generous gift and Rob MacGregor for his computer wizardry.

Table of Contents

<u>Part One</u>	
Introduction	1
Chapter Outline	7
1 Civic Nationalism and Collective Action	10
Nationalism: Some Definitions	12
Civic Nationalism, State Sovereignty and Globalization	18
Democratic Responses to Neo-liberal Globalization	30
Civic Nationalism and Irreducible Pluralism	48
Conclusion	54
2 Methodology	56
The Scottish Case	57
Research Methods and Design	63
Analyzing the Discourse of the SNP	66
Conclusion	77
3 The Development of Political Nationalism In Scotland	79
After Union	82
The SNP and Its Antecedents	89
Conclusion	101
<u>Part Two</u>	
4 The Political Economy of Scottish Nationalism	103
Sovereignty and Economic Nationalism:	
SNP Oil Policy	106
Post-Independence Economic Policy	127
Economic Models: Eire? Norway?	130
5 The Turn Towards Europe	137
Independence in Europe: Myth and Reality	154
Scotland in Post-Maastricht Europe	176
What is Sovereignty For?	183
Conclusion	187

Part Three

6 Scottish Identities and the SNP	189
Scottish Identity and the SNP	190
Feminism and Nationalism	198
Gay and Lesbian Scotland	217
Regional Cleavage	221
Ethnicity, Religion and National Identity	227
Sectarian Divisions	241
Societal Cleavage and the SNP	243
Class and Nationalism	246
A Peculiar Nationalism	249
7 Independence: A Prerequisite for Scottish Democracy?	253
British Democracy	255
Devolutionary Politics	260
Devolution	261
Devolution Since 1979	266
The SNP Critique of British Politics	275
The 1998 Scotland Act	278
Democracy and Independence	280
Conclusion	282
Conclusion	288
References	305
Appendix A	330

List of Tables

Table	Page
1 Interviews	74
2 National Identity in Scotland, 1992 (percent)	93
3 Support for Party by Class (percent)	97
4 Electoral Performance of the Scottish National Party 1945-1997	101
5 Liquid Fuel Production and Consumption in Petajoules (1995)	110
6 Oil Prices \$US/barrel 1960-1995 (1990 constant)	112
7 National Identity by Party Preference (June 1994) (percent)	194
8 Support for Constitutional Options by Gender (Scotland 1997)	201
9 Women Candidates in General Elections, 1970-1997 (Scotland)	209
10 Racial Incidents Reported to Scottish Police Forces, 1988-1993	236
11 Percentage Voting for Political Parties by Religion (1992 and 1979)	245
12 Powers Devolved to Holyrood	272
13 1997 Scottish Referendum Result	274
14 Constitutional Option by Self Declared Partisanship, Nov. 1997.	274
15 Seat Breakdown at Holyrood, 1999	279
16 National Identity by Country (UK)	285

Maps

1	Scotland	6
2	1997 Scottish General Election Results	100
3	1994 European Election Results	139
4	1975 EEC Referendum Results	144
5	Gas and Oil Fields	171
6	Employment Volatility in Oil Sector	172
7	Manufacturing Employment	173
8	Minority Representation in Scottish Police Forces	235
9	1997 Devolution Referendum Results	273

Introduction

Nationalist movements in Western democracies are in a process of transition. Scholarship has been ambivalent about the potential for nationalism to adhere to fundamental democratic principles in light of the numerous human tragedies fostered by atavistic nationalism over the course of the century. Yet, the 'micro-nationalisms' of Western Europe have held considerable appeal for me. Like biblical Davids, they have struggled for recognition and autonomy for particular communities. Against enormous odds, indigenous minority cultures have sought to carve a space within which the legacy of generations might be permitted to survive and perhaps even recapture a degree of previously held autonomy and self-determination.¹ Recent examples of such renaissance can be seen in France, Spain, and in Wales, where bilingual education and mass media have revived Welsh. These struggles seem quite distinct from the nationalisms which have been so often vilified, justly, by liberals and socialists alike. I agree with the view expressed by Balibar and Wallerstein (1991, 45) that: "we have no right whatever to equate the nationalism of the dominant with that of the dominated, the nationalism of liberation with the nationalism of conquest" and we must attend to "the oppressive potentialities contained within every nationalism." Nationalism is an umbrella term for a variety of political agendas. Any analysis must be sensitive to this.

Contrary to the expectations of modernization theorists who dominated comparative political science in the 1960s, expressions of cultural-territorial distinctiveness persist in the very states which were held to be the midwives of technocratic modernization. In the face of the proliferation of sameness, itself a by-product of the export of Anglo-American cultural and economic imperialism (now referred to as globalization), expressions of resistance make themselves heard. This

¹ I am not referring here to transplanted minorities whether immigrants or refugees who are also beset with conflicting desires to maintain cherished traditions while adopting cultural features of their adopted homelands. I am considering peoples who live in a territory long considered their "native" land.

resistance is diverse. In indigenous communities in Australasia and in North and South America, native peoples seek to redress the injustices of the past with various amalgams of indigenous traditions and modern, institutional remedies. In a number of West European states and in Canada, territorial minorities have sought to achieve degrees of self-determination through violent means (ETA in Spain) and via more conventional tactics such as consociationalism, federalism and political parties advocating independence.²

What complicates these phenomena and adds to their salience is a number of structural and social trends which both create opportunity structures for such movements and call into question the notion of homogeneous collectivities struggling for autonomy. The first such trend is commonly referred to as globalization. This homogenizing phenomenon has a variety of definitions. It is a discourse of the neo-liberal right which cajoles governments to curtail public spending and regulation in order to attract capital investment. The term also refers to the tendency toward integrated and intermeshed multi-national enterprises (MNEs) and international financial institutions with ever growing financial power over sovereign national governments. This trend has been accentuated by the demise of the last great financial regulatory system, Bretton Woods, and the tendency for multinational blocs of states to facilitate capital mobility (the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 1988; the Single European Act, 1985).

Thus globalization refers, in economic terms, to the greater permeability of boundaries and the relegation of decision-making to the rule of the market, both of which are preceded by the ascendance of political parties of the right. These parties have tended to adhere to the neo-liberal view that the market's logic is 'natural', scorn

² Resistance to globalization can be reactionary also. This is evident among Islamic fundamentalists and nativist movements, such as those in Western Europe, which seek to seal their societies from external contamination, and to restore a somewhat dubious *status quo ante*.

policy alternatives to structural adjustment policies, and have rather successfully converted large portions of the Western public to the "cult of impotence", in the words of one critic (McQuaig 1997). With the consent of most governments in the West, the power of capital to dictate or impose 'prior restraint' on public policy has been enhanced. These trends seem to foreshadow the decline of the sovereign state. Moreover, certain problems--such as environmental pollution, seem to surpass the policy-making capacity of individual states, requiring no less than concerted, internationally coordinated efforts to solve them.

Accompanying these challenges to state authority and competence are changes within states which undermine long-standing assumptions about liberal democracy. The persistence with which people cling to distinctive cultures belies the myths of assimilation and 'melting-pot' views of contemporary Western polities. The last centuries have witnessed mass-migration in the form of government-sponsored immigration policies as well as illegal immigrants and refugees. Britain is not immune to such trends and, indeed, it has always been a multi-national state, though not always recognized as such. Now even the constituent nations of the UK are experiencing ethno-demographic change as a result, particularly, of new Commonwealth immigration in the post-World War II era. Race politics in Britain have made clear that the liberal-democratic notion of the universal person, with each member of the polity enjoying equal status in law, has not been realized because of exclusivist politics and societal prejudices. No longer are national/territorial or religious identities the only ones seeking recognition within states. Other identities are emerging and reemerging in the forms of gender, sexuality, race and ethnicity. Such movements add to the diversity of British politics and challenge notions of a universal citizen as well as the left-right political schema and class reductionism in political analysis.

Nationalists by necessity view the acquisition of the state (particularly, the nation state) as the focus of political struggle. There are alternative liberationist

approaches which, while also focused on state power (e.g. Marxism) seek to construct non-national collective identities. Feminism views gender as the focus of explanation of domination and oppression. National-belonging is only one way of constructing collective identity and mobilizing collective action. As a strategy of resistance to neo-liberal globalization, or of democratization, nationalism shares the field with these and other identities and discourses.

Thus, the challenge facing nationalist movements today is three-fold. First, statehood --the achievement of which is the *raison d'être* of nationalists-- is undergoing transformation and hence the aims of nationalists must be reconciled with these changes. The second challenge concerns the irreducible pluralism of contemporary societies. Nationalist doctrine both needs to adapt to its changing international environment and to assert an agenda consistent with changes in its domestic context. This is not to assert that nationalist thinking is irreconcilable with such realities; nationalism can change to incorporate structural change and to enhance a party's electoral competitiveness and ideological vigor. This is not a straightforward process and will necessarily be rife with *cul-de-sacs* and confusion. The third challenge is intertwined with the first two and concerns the democratizing potential of statehood bearing in mind the conditions suggested above. Democratic values and institutions must be vigorous and strong enough to resist external threats to autonomy and also nurture a non-exclusive sense of community to sustain democratic practice.


These questions come into stark relief in the case of Scotland, a multicultural society experiencing continental integration alongside demands for independence from the UK. The question addressed in this thesis is whether an independent Scottish state, given the domestic institutions and foreign commitments envisaged by the Scottish National Party (SNP), would advance the democratic struggles of Scotland's social movements, or enhance the meaning of citizenship. That is, will citizens of an independent Scotland (see Map 1) be able to participate more meaningfully in the

decisions which affect their lives? What restrictions will such factors as Scotland's membership in the EU, or the contemporary nature of the world economy, place upon the exercise of popular sovereignty? Accepting the reality of these constraints, is the civic nationalist "social project" still a step forward in terms of the democratization of economic and political decision-making?

In examining the SNP's evolution over the last three decades, one sees both problems and promise. The party has not shied away from the complexity of the issues which bedevil contemporary politics. On the other hand, I argue that there are some serious hurdles over which the party must cross. These hurdles are inherent in both the syncretic ideology of civic nationalism, and in the nature of international and domestic political and economic constraints.

Civic nationalisms, as found in Québec, Catalonia, Wales and elsewhere, call for the achievement of various forms of autonomy in order to increase the effectiveness of local governance and policy-making, enhance democracy and, in some cases, protect minority cultures. An examination of the Scottish case and its primary nationalist organization, the Scottish National Party, allows for an evaluation of the validity of such claims and the extent to which they may be realized given the changing environment of state sovereignty.

I identify three domains of vital interest to civic nationalists (sovereignty, identity and democracy) and examine the potential ethical and practical political issues which emerge from the SNP's avowed goal of Scottish independence. Important questions emerge from such an examination which transcend the particulars of the Scottish case, giving the analysis heuristic value for further research on civic nationalism generally. I will argue that Scottish nationalism, as articulated by the SNP, is a progressive movement which, on balance, represents a step forward for the democratization of government in Scotland. However, the analysis will also show that independence will not be unproblematic as a number of crucial issues emerge with



Source: (Scottish Office 1993, 9-10)

regard to the irreducible pluralism of Scottish society, the impediments to meaningful state sovereignty, and the variety of models of democracy which arise in the discussion of a future Scottish state.

For the most part, scholarship on the SNP has focused upon explanations of the emergence of the party or the nature of its electoral support. Rather than accounting for these phenomena I am interested in the potential and limitations of civic nationalism in the context of globalization and internal pluralism. For example, can the SNP build a truly inclusive democracy and avoid engaging in ethnic exclusion? How will limitations on sovereignty affect the conduct of politics in Scotland and the policy options available?

The political struggle of the SNP has begun to bear fruit. Since 1974 the party has emerged as a powerful force in Scottish politics and the political discourse of British politics has changed with this development. The SNP's current status as the second party of Scotland and the creation of a Scottish assembly, makes Scottish independence and the questions which emerge from this discussion particularly salient. This thesis advances research on civic nationalism by asking how the SNP is adapting to contemporary changes in global politics (independence and regionalist movements concurrent with supra-national political and economic integration).

Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Civic Nationalism and Collective Action, reviews theories of nationalism and distinguishes civic nationalism from other manifestations of nationalism. I examine the relationship of nationalism to liberal-democratic values and collective action. These questions have prompted a sizable literature in recent years as civic nationalism's salience in a number of liberal democracies has increased. The fundamental question here is: How does civic nationalism constitute a strategy of resistance to neo-liberal globalization? In what ways does civic nationalism constitute a strategy of democratization and of collective action oriented toward the achievement of

these goals? In the Scottish case, what arguments have been made for or against such a linkage of nationalism with a social-democratic project?³

Chapter Two, Methodology, lays out the methodological framework to be used in examining the questions set out in Chapter One.

Chapter Three The Development of Political Nationalism in Scotland, establishes the civic-nationalist character of the SNP.

Chapter Four, The Political Economy of Scottish Nationalism, analyses conceptions of sovereignty which emerge in SNP discourse and argues that the independence project is compromised by the limits imposed by European integration, capital mobility and dependence on oil resources. This is not to imply that the state is no longer the primary organizing structure for human affairs. Rather, this view acknowledges that states vary in their capacity to maintain a meaningful degree of autonomy. There are important constraints on small state sovereignty. At the same time, I bring skepticism to my analysis of that body of literature which, in recent years, has prematurely pronounced the death of the state.

Chapter Five, The Turn Toward Europe, critically evaluates the SNP's discourse on European integration. European integration provides the nationalists with a ready response to the charge that they are 'separatists,' but integration also threatens to compromise key elements of SNP policy.⁴

³ How do we categorize the SNP ideologically? The diversity within the party has led many scholars at different times to associate the party with varying ideological positions. Nairn describes the party as bourgeois; a party of modernization (with nationalism as a central feature of modern bourgeois politics) eager to acquire statehood and the institutions fit for a modern democracy (Nairn 1997, 189). Keating acknowledges the ideological shifts within the party over the decades, but suggests that it is a social democratic party (1996a, 184). The Party describes itself as: "a moderate, left-of-centre political party committed to the establishment of an independent Scottish Parliament" (SNP 1995). It is difficult to capture the precise nature of the party in a single label but we can characterize the party as modernizing (republican influences, advocacy of legal-institutional and constitutional development), left (support for public ownership on a pragmatic basis, greater levels of social spending than its rivals), and with an intense focus on improving the quality of life for Scots.

⁴ In contemporary British political discourse, Plaid Cymru and the SNP are 'separatist' because they advocate exiting the UK and "going it alone". Separatism is a

Chapter Six, *Scottish Identities and Civic Nationalism*, undertakes an analysis of the meaning of national identity in the discourse of the SNP. The SNP has dispensed with ethnic symbolism since the departure of prominent cultural-romanticists from the party. The party has, since the mid-sixties, focused on issues of economics and democracy. A problem remains however: There is an assumed 'Scottishness' in the party's discourse which may not accurately acknowledge the real diversity of Scottish society with its cleavages of gender, class, ethnicity, region and religion. The party faces an important dilemma. Nationalist parties without an emotive appeal to culture are rarely successful electorally and the party's inability to match its October 1974 peak (30.4 percent of the Scottish vote) may indicate the limitations of a nationalist party which fails to articulate a sense of ethnic, linguistic, or cultural identity. On the other hand, if the SNP actively promotes a particular image of Scots and Scotland, it may alienate sections of the public and confirm the Labour Party's argument that the SNP is made up of xenophobes. In this chapter I will look at the tensions which exist between other identities and nationalism and show how the SNP has attempted to link its independence project to these.

Chapter Seven, *Independence: Prerequisite for Scottish Democracy ?*, considers how the SNP's critique of British political institutions is linked to the project of national independence. I evaluate the party's proposals for democratic governance in Scotland and compare these with the institutional limitations of the devolution option.

term which has acquired an unsavory tone with the violent nationalist outbursts of the 1990s in the Balkans and elsewhere. By aligning the cause of Scottish independence so closely to the project of European integration Scottish nationalists clearly show themselves to be seekers of autonomy within the structures of cooperation and integration in the EU. The SNP leadership is much more enthusiastic about European integration than its counterparts in the Conservative and Labour parties (Ray 1999, 305).

Chapter 1

Civic Nationalism and Collective Action

The aims of this chapter are to examine approaches to understanding nationalism, and to explicate the central features of civic-nationalism which make this political discourse a potential tool for revitalizing democratic politics in a climate of diminished autonomy in the wake of economic globalization and continental integration. I critically examine the theoretical literature on civic nationalism, and argue that civic nationalism can provide a basis for collective action in the interest of achieving democracy and resistance to external threats to popular sovereignty. Whether this potential can be achieved is largely dependent on the contextual realities in which a nascent, independent state finds itself. Scotland is an especially illuminating case study since it is and will continue to be part of one of the most advanced projects of integration in history in the form of the European Union. This integration project involves the creation of supra-national institutions as well as the potential for a pan-European civil society and identity. Domestically, Scotland is also a complex society rife with cleavages of class, gender, ethnicity/race, lifestyle, and region. These features of Scotland pose a challenge to civic nationalist efforts to encourage solidarity in the political community as well as to establish democratic institutions and defend popular sovereignty in the face of global market forces.

The analysis pursued throughout the thesis benefits from previous analyses of Scottish nationalism and civic nationalism respectively but departs from these in important ways. Major studies of Scottish nationalism have focused on the history of the party generally, and the sources of SNP support (Brand 1978; Finlay 1994). Others have tried to explain the nature of Scottish nationalism and/or the late development of this nationalism (Nairn 1981; Paterson 1994; Hechter 1975). Levy (1990) has examined the development of the SNP as a 'third party' and explained policy shifts in the party according to the dynamic of the Scottish party system. More recently, Keating

(1996) has compared Scottish nationalism with nationalism in Québec and Catalonia, analyzing these movements as 'nation-building' projects. This thesis departs from the above cited works by asking the following questions about civic nationalism and, specifically, the project of the SNP: Is civic nationalism simply the territorially-defined version of local anti-capitalist and democratic struggles? What are the risks, or limits, of appeals to national identity as the basis for such a social project? Has class discourse been rendered less effective as a mobilizing discourse by the nature of capitalist development in the late twentieth century, and what is its continuing relevance to civic nationalism--if any? Can civic nationalism--via its democratization discourse--come to "represent" the interests of diverse subordinated groups, such as women and ethnic minorities? Does it, in other words, offer them any grounds for identifying their interests with those of the nationalist project?

The major works on Scottish nationalism have rarely, if at all, considered the diversity of Scottish society as a whole and have tended to ignore competing visions of Scottish society and instead present debates over Scottish independence as problematic at the level of constitutional questions or partisan politics. Less attention has been paid to the perspectives of ethnic/racial minorities, gays/lesbians and women. There exist studies of all of these groups, but their relationship to the civic nationalist project of the SNP has not been the subject of in-depth analysis. There has been much more attention paid to the questions of sovereignty and democracy in Scotland, but again, fewer studies have focused specifically on the discourse of the SNP as it relates to these matters. In other words, the complexity and problematic nature of contemporary democracy and sovereignty have been examined in detail, but not in specific relation to the discourse of the SNP. The thesis bridges analyses of contemporary sovereignty and democracy to an analysis of the SNP's discourse. I examine the discourse of the party and use this to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this particular variant of civic nationalism as a discourse of democratization. By soliciting and presenting the

perspectives of other relevant political actors I subject the civic nationalism of the SNP to considerable scrutiny and raise questions about the ability of civic nationalism to act as a democratizing and inclusive discourse. By combining analyses of the discourse of the SNP concerning sovereignty, inclusiveness and democracy I have synthesized elements not brought together before.

Nationalism: Some Definitions

Nationalism has attracted intense scrutiny in recent years as a result of the emergence of nationalist politics in a variety of political contexts. Of course, for the last two centuries, the phenomenon has been the subject of a bewildering number and variety of studies. Not the least important issue for students of nationalism is its definition. A necessarily general description is offered by Hutchinson and Smith (1994 4):

Nationalism was, first of all, a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty. The people must be liberated--that is, free from any external constraint; they must determine their own destiny and be masters in their own house; they must control their own resources; they must obey only their own 'inner' voice. But that entailed fraternity. The people must be united; they must dissolve all internal divisions; they must be gathered together in a single public culture. But which culture and what territory? Only a homeland that was 'theirs' by historic right, the land of their forebears; only a culture that was 'theirs' as a heritage, passed down the generations, and therefore an expression of their authentic identity.

This definition tells us nothing about the contextual factors which will determine the particular character of a given nationalist movement. It does aim to identify the central features of all nationalist discourse: "autonomy, unity and identity" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 5). One might ask, however, whether or not the dissolution of "all internal divisions" (in the words of Hutchinson and Smith above) is an essential feature of *all* nationalist movements. As I will argue later in this chapter and in chapter 6, it may be possible to construct a pluralistic community around shared democratic values without having to shed other important or occasionally salient identities.

Even on these features nationalists differ considerably. Scholarship has attempted to impose order on the study of nationalism by identifying several broad

categories. Scholars differ in their understanding of the emergence or genesis of nationalism. Some, like Geertz, see nationalism as a primordial latent trait of social groups. Others, like Smith (1971) agree that nationalism is an old phenomenon but also one molded by contextual and social factors rather than rooted in a yet-to-be-identified biological-genetic template. Others locate nationalism's roots in modernity and emphasize the agency of elites in fostering nationalism. In these accounts nationalism is viewed as explicitly socially-constructed and modern (Kedourie 1960). That is, nationalism is a product of eighteenth century Europe and is, according to Gellner (1997, 59), an artifact of a state-building process in Europe in which elites needed to inculcate a state-religion of sorts to fill the political vacuum left by aristocracy-ending revolution and the reformation. Nationalism is transmitted through social institutions which establish national languages, symbols and myths permitting the consolidation of the modern nation-state.

It is also important to note that nationalism does not, according to Smith (1971, 21), "furnish a complete theory of social change or political action." He argues that:

The doctrine leaves open the form of the self-determination as well as the content of the expression of national individuality. And that is what has endowed nationalism with its tantalizing amorphousness, its doctrinal sketchiness and the multifarious nature of the movements' activities and goals (Smith 1971, 23-4).

The view that nationalism constitutes a distinct ideology is undermined by the variety of its manifestations. As a number of scholars have noted, nationalism is too 'thin' to be described as an ideology, as it has no coherent core and hence is often treated with disdain by intellectuals (Laxer 1992, 6-7). There are no great works espousing nationalism which succeed in transcending the particular circumstances of a particular national question, and hence there is no universal vision. Many nationalisms in history have denied the right of other nations to exist (Nazism) and so we cannot even point to a basic principle (i.e., freedom for all nations) animating nationalist thought. Sociologically, we can point to central features of nationalist movements, but,

as an *ideological* construct nationalism is more like a scavenger--selectively mining established 'isms' and, in turn, giving them a nationalistic sheen. We may speak of the ideology of a nationalist party or movement, whether it is anti-colonial, republican or Marxist, but we cannot speak of nationalism as a general phenomenon in terms of its ideological characteristics. Anderson (1991, 5) observes that "unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers." This intellectual poverty is particularly interesting to Anderson who notes how curious this fact is alongside the power of nationalism both historically, and in the contemporary world.

Not all scholars agree with this view. Keane (1994, 174-5) has likened nationalism to an ideology, arguing that, "like other ideologies, nationalism is an upwardly mobile, power hungry and potentially dominating form of language game which makes falsely universal claims." This characterization seems accurate enough but does not really describe an *ideological* position so much as the universal manner in which such movements have asserted their claims. Any political movement can be aggressive and power hungry but this does not tell us anything substantial about its ideology.

Freeden (1998, 750) argues that nationalism is really an embellishment of "fuller" ideologies that offer a "reasonably broad, if not comprehensive, range of answers to the political questions that societies generate." National identities and myths are attached to or integrated with ideologies which, in addition to their political content, offer an account of human nature and the nature of social relations. In the case of civic nationalism, Freeden (1998, 755) argues that:

[M]any theorists of nationalism attach a positive understanding of national identity to the desire to encourage the growth of liberty, whether through the wish to throw off the shackles of tyrannical regimes and to enable a population to rule itself-- an aspiration voiced by J.S. Mill and Mazzini-- or as a valuable form of patriotism as the love of one's people. But in many such cases the promotion of nationhood is merely a means to the enhancement of liberty and a range of humanist enlightenment values. Nationalism is a subservient and partial component of broader ideologies .

Freedden's observations also serve to warn against the error of false nominalism. Whether a nationalism is 'liberal' or 'civic' should be determined by careful analysis of the nationalism in question, in particular its political discourse, and not simply the nationalist's self-description.

Civic nationalism is a concept which traces its origins to Renan's concept of the "daily plebiscite" (Couture et al 1998, 2). For Renan, civic nationalism requires the voluntary and active identification of members of a community with their respective nation-state. The term nation-state is critical because there is no nation, for civic nationalists, without the legal and territorial container in which the community is found. In contrast, ethnic nationalism requires no state at all for members to identify with. You are a member of a nation because of your linguistic, religious, ethnic heritage. Thus, we might find people identified as 'German' regardless of whether they live in Austria, Germany or Switzerland. The primary source of identity (again, for the ethnic nationalist) is ethnic affinity.

Civic nationalism differs primarily because membership is defined by territory; by residency. This does not imply that civic nationalism is never assimilative, indeed, the usual examples of archetypal civic nationalist states are France and the USA. Both states contain various minorities but these are subsumed within an official nationalism which stresses constitutional patriotism. To be sure, groups within both societies chafe under this assimilation (for example, native Americans in the USA and Corsicans in France) but it is possible, if not desirable, for a Basque person to 'become' French in a way that it may be difficult to 'become' German.

Civic nationalism should be considered to be more than "a voluntary association of individuals" as Renan's definition suggests (Couture et al 1998, 2). Viewed in broader historical perspective civic nationalism should be seen as encouraging a "strong and consciously classical emphasis on civic virtue and solidarity" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 6). Implicit in the definition of civic nationalism employed here is a sense

of solidarity which binds a community--a common patriotism which has the potential to provide a bond of mutual respect deriving from common political principles (democracy, sacrifice, mutual regard). Moreover, core political principles may be manifested in the array of institutions and policies which redistribute resources and bind a political community through participation in the provision of essential social services.⁵

The literature on nationalism continues, for the most part, to deal dichotomously with two types of nationalism. The civic variety is taken to be the 'good' nationalism and, in principle, free of the atavistic, irrational features associated with the romantic, organic or ethnic variety. As such, civic nationalism is voluntaristic, and its ranks are open to all. The latter is ascriptive, immutable and closed to outsiders. Still, considerable latitude for local variation exists within the two models. Ethnic exclusivist nationalisms may focus on different attributes of the nation (say, language at the exclusion of 'racial' markers). A civic nationalism may be underpinned by a shared sense of history or sense of geographical rootedness. The variety of nationalisms underscores the importance of agency in determining the character of the nationalism. As Weber (1963, 172) argues:

In the sense of using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may extract from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus the concept belongs in the sphere of values. Yet there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or about what concerted action should result from such solidarity .

⁵ Ethnic kinship is not the only way of inculcating social solidarity. Universal social services within a state may be understood as bureaucratically complex mechanisms for redistributing resources. This description is utilitarian and technocratic. It is also conceivable to view social programs as an expression of social solidarity; an expression of basic values of solidarity which transcends ethnic membership. Membership in a political community may even be defined by the ethos of entitlement and universal access; a principle to be protected and of which members may be proud. This is the sense of institutionally rooted pride and common values which might characterize civic nationalism.

Weber suggests that the solidarity of one group is conditional upon the existence of groups somehow viewed as different or perhaps threatening. Therefore a religiously informed nationalism is constructed partly against the religious beliefs of outsiders (pagans, heathens, and the like). Serbs and Croats share the same language but cleave between Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. Others, like the citizens of Luxembourg, are, as Weber (1963, 23) puts it, "nationally unawakened peoples." The agency, or lack thereof, which leaves Luxembourgian nationalism 'asleep' (Weber could have added the dormant nationalism of pre-World War I Scotland) also encourages a search for the authentic, for ancient heroes/heroines and myths of common descent. This is the perspective which argues for the important roles of voluntarism and leadership in fostering nationalism. Against whom do civic-nationalists construct their solidarity?

It must be borne in mind that identities do not arise out of whole cloth, but are rather patched together from previous conceptions of group identity. Emerging identities are better thought of as syncretisms of previous identities. In the case of civic-nationalism the specific form of the enemy may vary from place to place: political-institutional arrangements which may have functioned well in the past but now act to diminish the quality of civic life and democracy for a particular community; or economically or politically subordinate status within a geo-political relationship. The first example reflects the Scottish case fairly well. The civic-nationalist movement in Scotland seeks to remedy the deleterious consequences of union with a nation (England) whose state is perceived to be in decline and having a substantial democratic deficit. The second case may be exemplified by anglophone Left nationalism in Canada, especially prominent after WWII, which constructed an enemy--a burgeoning, at times imperialist superpower-- in the form of the USA which, while protecting Canada from one external threat during the cold war, seemed also to subordinate Canada's independence and divergent policy options. The enemy then, is a political-institutional

or economic relationship, rather than another "group" *per se*. In the Scottish case the 'Enemy' is Westminster rule, which prevents Scotland from achieving its full potential in all spheres of life. At any given time the SNP may direct its attacks against whichever government is in place at the time, but the real enemy is the British state.

Civic-Nationalism, State Sovereignty and Globalization

Nationalism surprised social scientists merely by persisting in the face of modernization. Predictions that class politics would remain the dominant cleavage in developed societies (Lipset and Rokkan 1970) have not been borne out, and, in fact, a plethora of subaltern identities compete to mobilize citizens. New cleavages seem to have emerged which challenge simplistic left-right ideological scales, advancing previously marginalized agendas for social change. At the same time, nationalism represents a renewed movement challenging established states. For Pakulski this pastiche is marked by

an increasing fusion and interpenetration of political and cultural spheres, and the decoupling of political conflicts and cleavages from the old structural class divisions. The main symptoms of these changes are a progressive decline in class voting or political dealignment, an erosion of support for the major milieu parties, and the rise of new political forces, including the ecopax (ecological and peace), the civil, human and minority rights and the feminist social movements (Pakulski quoted in Grüber 1997, 140).

This melange is sometimes viewed as a marker of the emergent 'post-modern' character of western societies where expressions of "incredulity at meta-narratives" (Lyotard 1984) result in a fragmentation of political agendas and ever decreasing spheres of solidarity based on cleavages of gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, religion, ecology and combinations thereof.⁶ If this trend is truly the marker of a new

⁶ Postmodern is an adjective frequently used in comparative politics to describe novel syntheses of contradictory social trends. It has been used to define the Canadian Reform Party's new populism (Sigurdson 1994), to characterize the European New Right (Betz 1992) and the politics of multi-cultural states (McLellan and Richmond 1994). 'Postmodern' refers to a stage of "the development of technology and organization"; 'postmodernity' is the institutional embodiment of this phase; 'postmodernism' refers to cultural movements in literature, art and, architecture which react against previous forms of representation.

epoch in social and political life in liberal democracies then we might ponder the extent to which any kind of collective action can succeed in welding together disparate elements of a political community in order to maintain, and enhance, democratic life and institutions. There is a risk of such a society collapsing into a Babel-like cacophony of incomprehensible solitudes, each seeking to enhance its power and influence at the expense of a basic, shared sense of mutual regard, and solidarity based on fundamental principles of justice or democracy.

This characterization of contemporary western society, if accurate, would not necessarily connote crisis if it were not for the contemporaneous phenomenon often identified as globalization. Domestic politics operates on the assumption (in liberal democracies, at any rate) that public policy is a mediated reflection of the interests and values of the electorate. This idealized and flawed characterization is challenged by the power of markets to limit state autonomy by punishing policy-makers determined to make policy "out of step" with the interests of trans-national capital. Hirsch (1997, 41) argues that globalization should not be viewed as a natural evolutionary step in the development of capitalism but rather as a "decisive political strategy aimed at the restructuring of post-war capitalism in terms of its economic, social and political dimensions." Asserting the naturalness of market driven priorities undermines the power of states to chart alternative courses of economic development.

The critical consequence for this study is that the nation-state remains the only democratically accountable locus of political life and no alternative set of institutions is ready to fill the vacuum created by diminished sovereignty.⁷ Globalization has altered

The term post-modernism is difficult to define but represents a synthesis of modernity and the crisis of the hallmarks of modernity in the realms of politics, science, technology, art and communication. Assumptions underpinning the belief in progress and the hegemony of grand narratives are corroded and are replaced by numerous micro-narratives. On one hand, this is a liberating trend rife with potential for the creative impulse. On the other hand, there is the potential for a bewildering proliferation of post-Nietzschean nihilism. Benko (1997, 7) identifies the cultural break--between modernity and postmodernity-- occurring in 1968.

⁷ This discussion is focused on the developed liberal-democratic states. Clearly,

the conditions for democratic governance. This informal surrender of sovereignty is celebrated, on one hand, by the neo-right, which foresees the dismantling of archaic barriers to trade and accumulation, and lamented, on the other hand, by left nationalists who see the trend as unfettered, destructive capitalism. It is necessary to examine globalization's challenge to the state at this point, because of its implications for the civic-nationalist project. Is civic nationalism a flawed, unworkable effort in light of the above-mentioned trends, or is it a potential solution--a bulwark--which can act to enhance solidarity and expand the scope for autonomous policy-making.

F. H. Hinsley (1966, 1) argues that sovereignty is "the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the community." The concept is a difficult one, much like other foundational concepts such as 'democracy', 'legitimacy', or 'authority'. Sovereignty is further complicated by its trans-historical usages as well as its two dimensions: The term refers to the location of sovereignty within a political community as well as the status a state enjoys internationally (Hinsley, 158). For Ruggie, sovereignty is the "institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains" (Barkin and Cronin 1994, 107). The exercise of power is as old as human communities and exists in all spheres of human life and institutions. Sovereignty, however, has certain particular characteristics.⁸ First, it is recognized most clearly as the condition which defines actors in international relations (Walker and Mendlovitz 1994, 4). Secondly, it must be recognized as a historical and cultural product of European history (Badie and Birnbaum 1982). It is both a legal and a normative (resting on legitimation) concept. State-building brought with it the notion of citizenship and the recognition of the state as the legitimate authority over a given

things are far worse in the developing world.

⁸ Sovereignty is a quality exercised by the modern nation-state. It transcends the possession of mere power by commanding recognition by others via legal norms. Empires of the past certainly enjoyed power and dominance over huge territories but this should not be viewed as the possession of sovereignty *per se*. Empires did not have fixed borders recognized by others. Frontiers marked the boundaries between empires and neighboring peoples.

territory and population, maintaining a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within that territory (Weber 1963, 78). This regime can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) when states sought to diminish the destabilizing effects of religious conflicts upon neighboring states during the Reformation.

Currently, sovereignty is the subject of a vigorous discussion. One contribution to this discussion informs us that:

Despite persistent attempts to reify the state as an eternal presence in human affairs, and despite continuing appeals to national identity and the principle of nonintervention, questions about both the meaning and significance of state sovereignty are again firmly on political and scholarly agendas (Walker and Mendlovitz 1990, 2).

Scholars agree on one fundamental point: the state is now subject to a variety of challenges to its status both as an analytical unit of analysis and as the premier political unit in human affairs. In addition, normative questions emerge: What is the political status of "humanity"? Who are "we" (Walker and Mendlovitz 1990, 6) ?

In the 15th century, Europe was a patchwork quilt of approximately 500 duchies and principalities (Camilleri 1990, 14). The secular sovereign state is a product of the social and cultural transformations of the 16th century. Throughout Europe, societal trends diminished the power of religion. The Renaissance, the rise of science, and religious schism weakened the authority of the Church. These trends crystallized with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück) which ended the wars of religion, entrenching the sovereign, secular state in Europe.⁹

⁹ Hoppe (1998, 22) notes that Germany was, in the last half of the seventeenth century, composed of 234 countries, 51 free cities and 1,500 manors. Over time, the state emerged, at least partly, in response to economic growth, the establishment of standing armies, the centralization of power in monarchies and tax collection. Britain proves exceptional in the state-building process in a number of ways. In 1534 the Act of Supremacy ended the Roman Church's ability to exert jurisdiction and mete out punishment alongside the English Crown. This precedes the Treaty of Westphalia by more than a century. Westphalia did not create the sovereign state so much as eliminate the competing power of the Church. England had exited from the authority of the Church earlier on. This secularization varied widely in form and timing. In Italy, the severing of ties to the Catholic Church would not be formalized until the Lateran Treaties of 1929, which established the Vatican as an independent state. In Germany the *kulturkampf* ("struggle for culture") in the 1870s, saw the newly united German

This Westphalian state has undergone important changes over the centuries. The most noteworthy is the rapid expansion in the competencies of the state. Beginning with Bismarck's Germany, and reaching its ultimate expression in the command economies of post-World War II Eastern Europe, the state blurred the earlier boundaries between state and society. The growth of bureaucracies administering income transfers and collecting statistics permitted the welfare state to approach the "technocracy" predicted by Weber. Wallace (1994, 58) argues that the zenith of the liberal democratic welfare state was reached during the period 1945-68. The state's legitimacy was based upon, partly, its ability to provide economic and physical security as well as its ability to inculcate a sense of 'nation-ness'.

The state system, exemplified by institutions such as the United Nations, has remained more or less the dominant organizing principle for international relations, but, this status is threatened. Sovereignty has become less comprehensible as it has become dispersed. Ultimately, we must appreciate the socially indeterminate nature of the concept. As Barkin and Cronin (1994, 109) remind us: "It is often not appreciated that sovereignty is a social concept, and like all social institutions its location is subject to changing interpretations." We should expect, then, that changes in the nature and perception of sovereignty will be reflected in the ideology of a political party concerned primarily with the achievement of sovereignty.

Current views of the future of the state tend to either boldly assert its demise or to see its current retreat as not unprecedented. Krasner (1988, 1996) has argued that the state is resilient and that compromised sovereignty is hardly a new development. In the absence of alternative forms of political organization (which carry enormous implementation risks) and in the face of continuity rather than transformation in the state system, Krasner views the 'end of Westphalia' thesis as "historically myopic" (1996,

state struggle to regulate and diminish the influence of the Catholic Church. The Peace of Westphalia established the supremacy of the secular state, but the timing of the manifestation of this institutional form differed from place to place.

115). While useful as an analytic point of departure, the Westphalian system is an ideal type which inconsistently conforms to reality.

Cerny (1996, 617) is inclined to view recent developments ('globalization') as part of a "fundamental transformation." With regard to nationalist movements, Cerny (1996, 632) predicts that such movements will look increasingly at political jurisdictions other than the nation-state to satisfy their aspirations. This is already occurring at the European level where nationalists (including the SNP) look toward the European Union (EU) as a source of external security which may also provide considerable autonomy within a quasi-federal state.

The status of the state remains of interest precisely because the challenges to state autonomy are less familiar today. These include not only the presence of regional and global hegemony which bluntly limit or absorb the autonomy of their neighbors but, also, a dispersal of powers once central to the state. Part of this dispersal of sovereignty has occurred through inter-governmental treaties creating regional trading blocs. Another more amorphous trend has emerged in the form of globalization. Waters defines globalization very broadly as, "a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people are increasingly aware that they are receding (Waters 1995, 3)."¹⁰

Frequently globalization is explicitly or implicitly treated as a unilinear process of Westernization in the cultural, economic and political spheres of social life. Waters (1995, 62) suggests that globalization marks an end to isolation or "the systematic interrelationship of all the individual social ties that are established on the planet." This implies that there is no "source" from which globalization flows, but rather that the awareness of a locality's place in the world leads to subsequent alterations of cultural,

¹⁰ Waters (1995, 2) notes that the term "globalization" appeared only recently in sociological scholarship. He found that, as of February 1994, only 34 items in the Library of Congress contained the term in its title, and none of these were published prior to 1987.

economic and political practices. The phenomenon has attracted considerable interest in recent years even among the public at large. We may well be on the verge of a *Pax McDonaldica* in which difference is severed from space. New information technology and a neo-liberal international regime have served to localize the global by diminishing the real and perceived importance of borders and reducing the temporal and spatial distances of communities, in turn, threatening to reduce or obliterate cultural distinctiveness. Barber (1994, 6) sees a dialectical relationship between the homogenizing tendencies of global commercial capitalism (with its western consumer ethic) and the disintegrative force he calls *Jihad* : those forces -- national, religious or otherwise -- which resist homogenization in the name of local traditions. The consequences of this dialectic are to be seen everywhere and need to be taken seriously, not least of all by social scientists.¹¹

The recent boom in scholarship on all aspects of the globalization phenomenon provides arguments for a variety of interpretations with perhaps the most accurate one proposing caution. The primary unit of analysis in the study of international relations (the state) is, depending on the commentator, terminally ill (Horsman and Marshall 1995) or, at the very least, undergoing profound transformations (McLellan and Richmond 1994). Others, like Weiss (1997, 3) reject the "myth of the powerless state" and argue that reports of the demise of the state are "fundamentally misleading." This latter argument emphasizes the important role that states have played in establishing intergovernmental regimes of trade, regulation and currency valuation. It rejects the view that the contemporary era of neo-liberal globalization is a manifestation of some inevitable evolution of capitalism. The state is not dead and economic and political integration are not new; *plus ça change ?*

¹¹ The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games epitomized this dialectic. Every competitor was draped in a national flag (many of which did not exist in 1992) while viewers were invited to share in an orgy of consumerism which will probably set the benchmark by which similar phenomena will be judged in future.

Some argue that the changes ushered in by globalization differ in character from previous instances of societal change because of their technical character. Technology speeds economic transactions especially as these concern finance. Kobrin (1998, 362) observes that: "An international system of production (Fordism) is being replaced by a complex web of interlaced global electronic networks." Reaching back to Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society*, Kobrin (1998, 367) anticipates a future "neo-medievalism" whose borders are "diffuse, shifting and permeable." Technology enhances this ambiguity and decreases the salience of states. The Internet is a signpost alerting us to the decreasing salience of territorial politics. Overlapping authority (much as in medieval European times with Pope, Emperor, lord etc.) obscures sovereignty. This process will be enhanced further with political integration (as with the EU) (Kobrin 1998, 370). Kobrin cautions, however, that these changes do not imply the demise of the state but its metamorphosis. What will emerge from this opaque chrysalis is unclear.

Changes in global, financial transactions are also held to present an insurmountable challenge to sovereignty and democracy,¹² although Helleiner (1998) takes the position that mobile capital and new forms of money ("store value devices") may, in fact, enhance state power. No state in history has been able to successfully regulate international currency flows. Mercantile Europe was unsuccessful at regulating precious metals and the zenith of currency flow control, the 1930s, was "rarely fully effective" (Helleiner 1998, 389). The current sense of powerlessness, however, from which states are supposedly suffering, reflects more the passivity of governments in an era of neo-liberal ascendancy than it does an empirically measurable decline in available policy (Helleiner 1998, 390). Such governments have encouraged deregulation of financial controls. Tellingly, the British government of Margaret Thatcher, while hostile as a rule to European integration,

¹² This is not new. State theorists have long debated the role of the state in protecting or nurturing domestic capital. Is the state a neutral arbiter (liberals)? An instrumental advancer of capitalist interests (Milliband)? What is different in globalization scholarship is the attention to rootless capital not focused on a particular state but promiscuously seeking favorable conditions for its own reproduction.

wholeheartedly supported the Single European Act (1986), which eliminated non-tariff barriers to trade, deregulated capital flows further, and allowed for more mergers in the financial and insurance industries.¹³ Helleiner concludes that states, when inclined, *can* regulate markets.

States have driven globalization and integration but these developments cannot be reversed, rather they must be managed in a way consistent with the demands facing humanity today. Clinging to the Westphalian model can exacerbate the problems of environmental degradation and disproportionate market power by preventing the formation of international institutions empowered to regulate the activities of international markets and global environmental problems. Local autonomy might better be secured in the web of agreements and policies which reassert the political over the market. That is, political action --in the form of international or transnational communication and agreements--might restrain the democracy-eroding effects of unregulated market power. New institutional structures at the international level could enhance the power of citizens over markets by channeling pluralistic, collective action to effectively combat the negative consequences of globalization. In recent years local resistance to economic globalization has occurred in light of economic dislocation in Mexico (1994 Peso crisis), Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Renewed interest in policy instruments for reasserting sovereignty is evident.¹⁴

So far though, it can be argued that it has been the neo-liberal agenda which has been advanced most by supra-national organizations. This characterizes aspects of the EU, although this need not be a permanent condition, and is also true of the various trade and economic organizations (World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and

¹³ Governments give freedom of capital movement but they can also take it away. In 1988 the Basel Accord "introduced a common set of regulatory standards for international banks across the G-10 countries (Helleiner 1998, 392)."

¹⁴ The Canadian federal parliament recently voted to examine the potential of the Tobin tax for reducing speculative pools of currency. This tax would take advantage of high technology to trace and tax flows of speculative "hot money". The motion (239) was introduced in Parliament by Lorne Nystrom MP (NDP-Regina Qu'Appelle) in March 1999, and is now at the committee stage.

World Bank, for example). Trade blocs further erode autonomy as witnessed with the North American Free Trade Agreement (at least in the cases of Canada and Mexico). The accountability of dispute adjudicating officials is questionable, and the demands of the market conflict with cultural concerns, as we see with the Canadian concern to protect the country's magazine industry. Elite driven, technocratic versions of integration are frequently at odds with democratic values and it is this conflict which is at the heart of debates over European integration. Crouch and Marquand (1995, 18) argue that "in the clumsy, opaque, profederal system we have now, too much power lies with the interlocking technocracies of the Council, the Commission and the great private sector corporations with an effective lobbying presence in Brussels, and too little with elected politicians." There is some promise in projects like the EU, with its enormous capacity for good, but this promise is far from being realized.¹⁵

I will return to this subject as it affects Scotland in chapter 4. For the moment the key point is that both the international economic regulatory regime and contemporary states (in different degrees and rates of speed) have been undergoing an important transition. These changes have important implications for emerging states, particularly small ones like Scotland. It is important to analyze how nationalists intend to meet these challenges and what alternatives exist.

Democracy and its forms are also connected intimately with state sovereignty and globalization. This is so fundamental as to escape the scrutiny of democratic theory which is usually focused upon internal processes of democracy. Held (1996, 336) argues:

¹⁵ We must not ignore the important role that the EU has had in providing a space for the consolidation of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Furthermore the EU might play an important role in encouraging democracy in potential members in the east. Recently, as reported in the Globe and Mail in a news brief on 12 July 1999, Slovakia's House of Deputies passed a bill to improve language rights of minorities. This bill was essential for Slovakia to attain priority status for their application to join the EU.

Change is presumed to occur via mechanisms "built in", as it were, to the very structure of a given society and governing its development. The world putatively "out-side" the nation-state-- the dynamics of the world economy, the rapid growth of transnational links and major changes to the nature of international law, for example-- has barely been examined, and its implications for democracy have not been thought out at all by democratic theorists.

The focus on the internal determinants of democratic practice must be broadened to include international determinants of domestic political life. In other words, both internal and external factors must be considered in any analysis of contemporary democracy. The "congruence" or "symmetry", as Held (1996, 338) describes it, between electorates and decision-making, is called into question as decisions are taken, or removed from domestic electorates and procedures of accountability. The basic liberal-democratic notion of consent is tested in supranational bodies like the EU where decisions are made without accountability and where democratic institutions are largely ineffective. The doctrine of popular sovereignty seems to lose its meaning as fewer areas of public policy are determined by informed, active and efficacious citizens.

Perhaps though, this is an idealistic view. It might be objected that many features of British governance (like those of the EU) fail to meet even a modest version of democracy. Perhaps, but one cannot fault the British system of democracy with its unwritten constitution, quasi non-governmental organizations and archaic aristocratic features (Monarchy and House of Lords) and simultaneously ignore Europe's democratic deficit. A collective movement for fundamental constitutional change, like the SNP, must reconcile the goals of popular sovereignty (against Britain's parliamentary version) with the institutional problems evident in the EU. Nor is European integration the only threat to Scottish democracy. As multiple developments in economic, political, military, scientific and cultural spheres merge international and domestic politics, unforeseen problems will arise.

Another challenge to democratic collective action on the part of a political community concerns the sheer diversity of contemporary societies. Is collective action possible in an era of irreducible pluralism? The erosion of religious observance in the

West and the fragmentation of the working-class has diminished, arguably, two formerly persistent grounds for collective identity. What we have now in the West is more of a cacophony of voices without the benefit of the solidaristic bonds which can help a project of collective action achieve success. It might be argued that the "pastiche" culture which has emerged is all to the good and enhances individual liberty and self-actualization. This argument should be taken seriously but it is undermined by the tendency for fragmented societies to passively suffer the negative consequences of deregulated markets and the power and influence of the neo-liberal agenda. A project of social change capable of asserting the democratic demands of a diverse society needs to inculcate the kind of solidarity necessary for collective action while respecting the variety of identities present in contemporary society.

It would be easy to be somewhat skeptical about the prospects of democratic collective action when citizens "feel less and less connected to each other and their governments, and at the very moment when the restructuring of the global economic and political order is forcing crucial choices upon all societies" (Sullivan 1995, 20). Economic globalization produces fragmentation in societies as adaptable cosmopolitans form trans-national links and prosper while most of society labors at the margins, insecure and resentful of the elite who have led them to their vulnerable position.¹⁶ Globalization leads, in Sullivan's words, to a "secession of the successful" from their states whose declining capacity to act leaves their citizens increasingly vulnerable to market forces (1995, 22). Sullivan suggests that "the effort to uphold and sustain the ethics of solidarity, with its implication of equal dignity within an inclusive polity that aims to equalize life-chances for all citizens, will require a new emphasis upon the development of forms and understanding of politics which I will call democratic civic community" (1995, 23).

¹⁶ Greenfeld (1992, 98-9) traces the term "cosmopolitan" to the era of the French *philosophes* who sought fame beyond the confines of the nation-state in the "republic of letters".

It might be argued that civic nationalism is the discourse necessary to secure a democratic inclusive community prepared to work in concert to resist the decline of social welfare standards and the corrosion of democracy brought on by the challenges to sovereignty noted previously. Nationalist discourse, however, has been rejected as a counter-hegemonic strategy of collective action by Marxists, anarchists, and feminists, among others and is strikingly absent from (post-structuralist) radical democratization theory (Mouffe 1993; Woodcock 1973). In the following section I examine the import of these critiques for civic nationalism as a political discourse aimed at restoring the conditions for democratic citizenship.

Democratic Responses to Neo-liberal Globalization: Civic Nationalism, Liberalism, Marxism, Anarchism, Feminism

Civic nationalism has received considerable attention in recent years as scholars come to grips with the moral ambiguity of nationalism. Lacking an ideological core peculiar to itself nationalism presents a number of different faces. Some argue that all nationalisms share the same fatal, homogenizing flaw and that the apparent democratic nature of civic nationalism is like the proverbial "wolf in sheep's clothing". Others argue that any nationalism is a distraction from the urgent need for class-based politics in search of social justice or fundamental political transformation.

Liberalism and Civic Nationalism

Civic societies reject myths of common descent and emphasize territory and adherence to a particular set of values, as the prime criteria of national membership (Keating 1996a, 6). As such, civic movements may lack a certain kind of emotive appeal (i.e. based on ethnicity or blood-belonging). This absent ethnicity may limit the appeal of a nationalist movement while at the same time avoiding exclusion within a multi-ethnic political community. Ultimately, nationalists seeking autonomy or outright separatism in liberal democracies are unlikely to have much choice in choosing the civic

route.¹⁷ Political programs based upon ascriptive racial or ethnic bases tend to be of marginal significance electorally and even illegal in some societies. Liberal societies, whatever their faults, have nurtured an intolerance of communal political movements. This is starkly evident in Scotland where any remotely ethnic reference by Scottish nationalists is seized upon and decried by ardent unionists. Of course, liberal societies also permit private vices. Racism remains strong in Scotland and elsewhere. My point is that at the level of political institutions and organizations, such views are barely tolerated and have never been electorally successful.¹⁸

Civic nationalism recognizes the importance of individual autonomy while also recognizing the contextual and social nature of human needs.¹⁹ The adoption of the civic mode does not occur in the absence of a national culture; cultural attributes are subordinate to the adherence of a political community to basic democratic values stressing the inclusion of all. As Keating argues: "It is not the existence of language and culture policies which determine whether a nationalism is ethnic or civic, but the uses made of language and culture, whether to build a civic nation or to practice ethnic exclusion" (1996a, 10). Societies which seek to protect vulnerable languages and cultural practices may not necessarily employ a chauvinistic, defensive posture. An analogy here is environmental conservation, whose motive is to protect the conditions

¹⁷ There is a "profound ambiguity" in relations between liberalism and nationalism (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 47). Liberalism is individualistic, seeking to expand the private sphere against the intrusions of the public. Liberal-nationalism is, on the face of it, a contradiction. Nationalism is a doctrine concerned with the fate of collectivities. I address this more carefully in chapter 6.

¹⁸ This may be overstated. There are racist and authoritarian political parties in liberal-democracies which have been electorally successful in recent years, including the French National Front. In Austria, Belgium and Germany similar parties operate. Also, historically, political parties have often adopted 'nativist' postures. Variation in the electoral success of such parties will reflect contextual differences (electoral systems, party-system type, legal proscriptions against such parties).

¹⁹ Civic nationalism cannot claim to monopolize this recognition of individual embeddedness. Arguably social democracy does this too. Civic nationalist discourse contains an explicit connection to territory but no obvious commitment to social democratic norms. In other words, civic nationalism is not necessarily social-democratic in orientation, although the SNP clearly is.

for diversity. Individuals can enjoy their national identity and its attributes without politicizing it. It is when the defense of language and culture is held as a higher value than individual rights that a nationalism takes on a collectivist-ethnic character.²⁰ Civic nationalism may contain ethnic elements, but these must be consistent with individual rights (that is non-exclusive). But, civic nationalism can, ideally, make a claim to recognize the contextual nature of social life. Recognizing the embeddedness of the individual in one's society does not require a surrender of individuality. A fine balance is required to preserve individual rights as well as to recognize the social features of life which make one human. However, the emphasis on liberal values of individual liberty remains in tension with the formation of collective solidarity/identity. Civic nationalism, despite its liberal character, differs from liberal nationalism in its emphasis on community and territory. Civic nationalist discourse seeks to protect permanent minorities from governments seeking to impose an agenda alien to values held by a community. This is particularly obvious in the responses of Scottish and Welsh nationalists to the policies of consecutive Conservative UK governments. A collective "we" can be harnessed in periods of crisis without relying on an ethnic consciousness. Moreover, the 'we' does not transcend the boundaries of the territory in question. Civic nationalist movements are not pan-nationalist movements which seek to unite a particular cultural group (i.e. pan-Slavism or pan-German nationalisms). Civic

²⁰ There is some difficulty in characterizing Québec's nationalist movement. Trudeau condemned the extension of language rights to a community (francophones in Québec) and supported instead individual language rights enshrined in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Section 16). In Québec, Levesque's government (1976-85) had previously introduced Bill 101 which would make French the preeminent language in Québec. The subordinate status of English in Québec remains despite the Charter because of the provisions of Section 33, which permits provincial governments to legislate "notwithstanding" the provisions of sections 2 and 7 to 15. This demonstrates the tension between collective and individual rights, more apparent in disputes between culturally distinct political communities and their leaders. Hence, Québec's language laws complicate the characterization of the *Parti Québécois* as either civic or ethnic in its orientation. Perhaps we should be cautious of dichotomous categories and recognize that nationalist movements will occupy spaces on a continuum between the ideals of civic and ethnic.

nationalism rests on adherence to a set of basic values and is connected to a defined territory.

Historically, liberal-nationalism has been associated with national movements seeking to unite territories in pursuit of a nation-building project. This was particularly true of Hungary in 1848-9, as well as Italy and Germany in the latter half of the 19th century. In Germany, "*Deutschland über alles*" referred to the primacy of Germany over Saarland or Saxony (Michener 1993, xi). Nationalists wanted to pull people from their provincial loyalties in favor of a German state. Cultural nationalism based on racialist ideology would emerge eventually but, at least initially, German nationalism during and immediately following the Napoleonic occupation was essentially liberal. It was pan-nationalist and imperialist in its attempt to incorporate all German speakers from Austria, Germany and Prussia.

Keating (1996a, xii) has attempted to counter the "hostile and patronizing" view of the recent resurgence of nationalism in the developed West. Instead, Keating suggests that these nationalisms may act as "a mechanism for problem solving," enhancing democracy and increasing social solidarity. Nationalist movements in Catalonia, Québec, and Scotland are, in this view, "nation building projects" and ones which do not need to fan the flames of ethnic exclusivity to achieve identity (Keating, 1996a, xii). Keating focuses less on particular parties like the SNP than on civic nationalist movements in general, and does not seek to provide "a comprehensive theory of nationalism"; rather he seeks to explain how these movements have come to represent a mechanism for coping with dilemmas which emerge from modernization and changes in social relations (1996a, 1-2).

Nationalism "mediates between the individual and the collective" (Keating 1996a, 10). Nationalism does not abstract the individual from his or her social context as do libertarian models of society. On the other hand civic nationalism does not sink the individual into an ethnic pool which obscures and obliterates difference. Keating

(1996a, 13) sees civic nationalism as particularly well suited to providing social cohesion without the cost of exclusion and resulting societal instability. In multi-cultural and multi-national societies a civic nationalism is much better equipped to absorb new immigrants and accommodate the collective needs of minority communities than an ethnic nationalism. This is possible when ethnic/national identity is muted in political discourse and subordinate to a superordinate civic culture which transcends the emotive appeals of ethnicity. Societies without a strong civic consciousness will tolerate extremes of economic inequality internally and elites will not forego the benefits of international economic regimes even at the cost of reducing the standard of living of their poorer fellow-citizens.

Laxer (1992; 1995; 1999; 2000) has pointed out that two broad perspectives on social life have shaped scholarly views of nationalism: a liberal one and a leftist one. On the one hand many liberals have viewed ethnic nationalism as regressive and reactionary— as a reaction against development and modernization. Along with religion, ethnic nationalism would be submerged or extinguished as rational liberal-democratic worldviews came to dominate. In Eastern Europe and Asia, Marxist "hyper-rationalism"²¹ would perform the same task of extirpating pre-modern forms of political mobilization, leaving functional categories of class as the last expression of conflict in society. Yet, this century has witnessed the opposite trend. State socialism failed to extinguish religious and nationalist-flavored political movements in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the West, non-class 'identity politics' is more vigorously assertive now than in many decades. Class remains important as a cleavage in politics, but class is decentred by other cleavages: gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, among others.

Schwarzmantel (1992) has argued that the apparent opposition of nationalism and socialism varies according to the definition of nationalism which is employed and

²¹ This term is used by Stokes (1993).

the way in which the concept 'nation' is understood. In the case of socialism, social divisions are horizontal and correspond to class divisions. In nationalist accounts, society is divided vertically between people of different nations. The second difference between nationalism and socialism concerns the social bases on which such movements rely. Socialists have sought to defend the working classes and nationalists have sought to build the nation-state by advancing the interests of the "nation".

It is, perhaps, an oversimplification to point to a dominant *Marxist* perspective on nationalism. Breuilly (1994, 407) has identified some important features of Marxist thought on nationalism which should receive general assent. First, nationalism is viewed as the means by which the state legitimizes inequality in the nascent capitalist states of 18th century Europe. Class hegemony is obscured via appeals to mythical ties of blood or ethnicity. Imperialism--also a phenomenon of interest in Marxist thought--serves to alleviate class-conflict in the imperialist state by securing wealth by exploitative means in other parts of the world. This subordinates nationalism in service of the interests of class-compromise. There are important exceptions to this generalization. Otto Bauer (1881-1938) was head of the Austrian Social Democratic Party and his observations on the Austro-Hungarian empire informed his writing on nationalism. Bauer sought to reconcile the desire of small nations to achieve independence with the contrary trend toward large state formation under socialism. Federalism would secure national autonomy while not impairing the path to socialism and internationalism. For the most part however, Marxist theoreticians have been ambivalent about nationalism, sometimes distinguishing, as Bauer does, between bourgeois nationalism in the interest of imperialist jingoism and the nationalism of oppressed "national communities" (Bauer 1995, 190).

Has the Left failed to understand nationalism? Laxer (1992, 14-15) argues that the Left has never formulated a coherent theory of nationalism because Marxism anticipated the ultimate demise of nationalism in favor of the primacy of class conflict.

Another student of nationalism has more bluntly opined that "nationalism and Marxism are philosophically incompatible" (Connor 1984, 1). Of course, Marx and Engels did write about nationalism, but their support for it was linked to a tactical goal: the removal of feudal structures of rule. In keeping with the stages theory of historical materialism, anything which hastened the shift from feudalism to capitalism could be supported, hence Marx's support for the independence movements of Poland and Ireland. At the 1864 inaugural address to the First International, Marx himself condemned "the shameless approval, demonstrative sympathy or idiotic indifference with which Europe's upper classes observed Russia's conquest of the Caucasian fastnesses and her murder of heroic Poland" (Moynihan 1994, 111). For the most part, however, Marx and Engels viewed national movements for independence as contingent on their articulation to class struggle. Coakley (1992,4) observes that:

On the one hand, Marx strongly endorsed the struggles of the Irish and the Poles; on the other, he dismissed the nationalist demands of the other East European Slav nationalities, making an exception only of those of the Ottoman Empire, whose progress was being held back by primitive imperial structures. These inconsistencies were taken even further by Engels, who denounced the retrogressive role of the Slavs of Austria and who distinguished between such peoples as the Czechs and Ukrainians, dismissed as 'ethnic trash', and nations which played a progressive role, such as the Hungarians, the Poles and the Irish.

For Lenin, bourgeois nationalism was necessarily imperialist and thus he condemned Great-Russian nationalism, but looked more favorably upon the nationalism of the Ukrainian proletariat (Lenin 1995, 210). One detects in Lenin's writings an insistence on the right to self-determination, in the context of autocratic European empires and his theory of imperialism. Lenin argued that: "In order to be able to fight successfully against exploitation, the proletariat must be free of nationalism, must be absolutely neutral, so to speak, in the struggle for supremacy that is going on among the bourgeoisie of the various nations" (Lenin 1995, 212). The task of revolutionaries was to evaluate "every national demand, every national separation, from the angle of the class struggle of the workers" (1995, 210).

Other than support for certain anti-colonial or anti-feudal movements, the Left has generally opposed nationalism. Conquest (cited in Moynihan 1993, 109) observes that "[f]rom Lenin's point of view, as from Marx's, international proletarian interests were the central issue, and nationalism a temporary distraction." In practice, however, many Marxist-inspired movements in the developing world have taken on a nationalist character. Hobsbawm comments that "Marxist movements and states have tended to become national not only in form but in substance, i.e., nationalist" (Hobsbawm quoted in Anderson 1991, 2). In 1937, the Chinese Communist party, to cite one example, launched a nationalist appeal to the Chinese people.

We know that in order to transform the glorious future into a new China, independent, free, and happy, all our fellow countrymen, every single, zealous descendant of Huang-ti²² must determinedly and relentlessly participate in the concerted struggle (Connor 1994, 37).

For Hobsbawm, the inherent incompatibility of socialism and nationalism assumed by historians has achieved canonical status. He argues, however, that the reality is more complicated. Commenting on the age of nationalism in the fifty years prior to 1914, he argues that:

. . . contrary to common assumptions, the various principles on which the political appeal to the masses were based -- notably the class appeal of the socialists, the confessional appeal of religious denominations and the appeal of nationality were not mutually exclusive. There was not even a sharp line distinguishing one from the other, even in the case when both sides tended to insist on an, as it were, ex-officio incompatibility: religion and godless socialism. Men and women did not choose collective identification as they choose shoes, knowing that they could only put on one pair at a time. They had, and still have, several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality, and are simultaneously concerned with various aspects of life, any of which may at any one time be foremost in their minds, as occasion suggests (1991, 123).

Hobsbawm's remarks serve to remind us that the contradictions which inhabit the world of theory may not be at all perceived by people. There is no prima facie case for denying civic nationalism a role as a progressive movement which can struggle for equality and democracy. Agency is critical in utilizing existing forms of social

²² The first Emperor of China.

organization within the structural constraints of time and place. In Scotland, in the 1990s, the SNP seemed to be an expression of the desire for greater democracy and self-determination via the vehicle of civic nationalism. Why, though, did demands for greater democracy and equality get expressed through the SNP, rather than through some other movement?

The experience of social democratic practice in Britain this century may provide a partial answer. One critic charges that the Left has lost ground because "its earlier postwar success took too exclusively 'realist' and technical a direction, robbing it of both its spirited supporters and its moral vision" (Sullivan 1995, 23). Given the Labour party's modernizing parliamentarist orientations, many who otherwise might have supported the traditional Left, moved on to forge new political movements less electorally fixated and with anti-hierarchical tendencies. The European Green parties are clearly an outcome of this phenomenon. The SNP appeals to an identifiable community and points to ways in which this community has been disadvantaged by the political status quo. Furthermore, the SNP is a very decentralized political party with ample room for dissent and membership control. In this sense, the party has positioned itself as a defender of community, but also as an organization with room for internal dissent and membership involvement.

Now this does not imply that defectors from the Left or people interested in social justice or social democracy need to turn to civic nationalism to act collectively. But, it is undeniable that a number of civic nationalist parties (Plaid Cymru, the Scottish National Party) attract support from those who could be described as left or left-of-center. On the other hand, there are substantial limits to the ability of any nationalism, even civic-nationalism, to attract the support of those whose primary focus of identity is not exclusively, or at all, focused upon the nation.

Must solidarity be pursued through the conception of 'the nation'? Anarchist George Woodcock asked this question in the early 1970s as he watched Canadian

leftists debate economic nationalist arguments for resisting what was then viewed as US imperialism (perhaps an earlier version of the term globalization). Woodcock (1973, 1-3) is very critical of nationalism and particularly of the Canadian Left's dalliance with nationalism. Unlike Laxer (1992) who refers to France's "revolutionary patriotism," Woodcock sees this as a revolution betrayed. The slogans of the French revolution were undermined by conscription, the rise of the *fonctionnaires*, and the subsequent imperialist turn by republican France. Leftist support for Polish independence in the mid-nineteenth century is questionable, in Woodcock's view, because of the "aristocratic reactionaries" who led the movement for Polish independence. Things worsened by WW I when socialist parties throughout Europe supported their nations rather than internationalist principles. Only the Libertarian-Left maintained a principled stand against nationalism and the "cult of the nation" (Woodcock 1973, 3). Instead of nationalism, Woodcock advocates localism and "a post-national world of co-operation, consensus, and participation" (Woodcock 1973, 6). In his condemnation Woodcock is true to the anarchist tradition which has consistently expressed an abhorrence of nationalism. As Bookchin (1993, 16-7) points out, Left-Libertarian thinkers have long condemned all nationalisms. Proudhon, opposed to the nationalist movements of Hungary, Italy and Poland, stated that: "I will never put devotion to my country before the rights of Man" (Ibid.). Bakunin argued that: "we should place human, universal justice above all national interests. And we should once and for all time abandon the false principle of nationality, invented of late by the despots of France, Russia, and Prussia for the purpose of crushing the sovereign principle of liberty" (Ibid.).

One can only wonder how Woodcock might have viewed the regional/peripheral movements for autonomy in Western Europe and North America. It seems reasonable that his anarchism would have precluded any high praise for such movements, and yet there are a number of elements common to his view of the ideal political community and that proposed by, for instance, the nationalist parties of Scotland and Wales. These

parties seek deeper democracy, reject ethnic chauvinism and have a clear internationalist vision of the future. Both Plaid Cymru and the SNP embrace a combination of national identity (in Keane's sense²³) and an emphasis on territorial autonomy which might not have offended Woodcock, who rejected the politicization of culture and not cultural distinctiveness itself. On the other hand, Woodcock maintained a deep suspicion of what he viewed as the centralizing tendencies of the Left and might have raised this concern with regard to the Welsh and Scottish movements because of their left-of-center discourses.²⁴

One theme which emerges from the above discussion is the general disdain toward ethnic nationalism as expressed, generally, speaking, by liberalism and Marxism. Classic liberals-- from Hobbes (Gauthier 1969), who viewed nationalism as a threat to peace, to Adam Smith (1976), who saw nationalist reaction as an impediment to natural growth and the spread of capitalism and affluence--have predicted the demise of nations

²³ For Keane (1994, 171-2) national identity is a prerequisite for the creation and strengthening of citizenship and democracy. National identity "infuses citizens with a sense of purposefulness, confidence and dignity by encouraging them to feel at home". Furthermore:

. . . whatever is strange is not automatically feared; whatever diversity exists within the nation is more or less accepted as one of its constitutive features. The borders between a national identity and its 'neighboring' identities (of class, gender, religion, race, for example) are vaguely defined and its security police and border guards are unreliable and tolerant. . . . This tolerance of difference is possible precisely because nationhood equips members of a nation with a sense of belonging and a security in themselves and in each other: they can say 'we' and 'you' without feeling that their 'I', their sense of self, is slipping from their possession.

²⁴ On the other hand civic nationalism might be viewed as the midwife of a return to smaller, more democratic political structures. Political theorists such as Aristotle saw the idealized, small *polis* as the ideal participatory democracy (albeit one restricted to male property holders) (Juviler and Stroschein 1999, 437). Dahl and Tufte (1973, 1) suggest that: "[T]o an Athenian democrat at the time of Pericles, the Netherlands--a "small country"--would seem a gigantic empire, fit only for despotic emperors and slavish citizens." For the ancient Greeks smaller polities encouraged familiarity among citizens, self-sufficiency, and hence autonomy. It has been argued that smaller democracies provide more opportunities for citizen participation and encourage both greater interest in a politics that is immediate, and efficacious attitudes toward such politics (Dahl and Tufte 1973, 13-15). I will return to the strengths and weaknesses of these views of "smallness" in the concluding chapter.

and nationalisms along with the growing interdependency among states and receding nationally-erected barriers to commerce.²⁵ Laxer argues that we are now witnessing the fruition of neo-liberal efforts to decentre the state and sever its relationship to communities (1992, 1).

The Left, on the other hand, has failed to come to grips with "the national question" having spent its formative years building a corpus of work largely condemning nationalism. Laxer (1992, 4) argues that the primary means of combating the agenda of the new-right is to enhance "the sovereignty of socially transforming democratic communities" to keep mobile capital in check and preserve/deepen democracy. Laxer argues that some form of "revolutionary patriotism" or inclusive nationalism is necessary to combat the forces of globalization. By pointing to popular resistance to the Maastricht Treaty and left-nationalist opposition to continentalism in Canada, Laxer (1992, 9) is clearly identifying a potentially powerful mode of collective action which can resist the neo-liberal erosion of democracy and sovereignty. This view differs from that of Keating (1996a, 33) for whom the new economic regime and trend toward mobile capital and deregulation represent new challenges to which emerging states must, in essence, adapt rather than resist.

One consequence of change in the state's capacity to resist the internationalization of the economy is a bifurcation of political communities between the highly-skilled service sector (business and high technology workers), who appreciate the opportunities provided by increasingly porous national borders, and less-skilled workers, who push in vain for some kind of protectionism to protect vulnerable job sectors. Such efforts are, for Keating, in vain because "national protectionism is less and less available as an instrument with which to manage class conflicts and promote social

²⁵ In *Wealth of Nations*, Smith (1976, 201) discusses the "unreasonableness of restraints" on trade which serve to stifle wealth production and accumulation. Gauthier (1969, 208) points out that, for Hobbes, international relations resembles the state of nature of individual humans with "essentially subjective and selfish" nations endangering peace and stability in order to advance their particular interests.

integration" (Keating 1996a, 33). States are, in Keating's words, "obliged" to "detach economic management from broader social and political considerations" (Keating 1996a, 33).

In any event, the relationship between the categories of nation and class is discursively constructed and may take different forms. Nationalism's ideological malleability makes it easily adaptable to the specific features of a given society. As class identity has ceased to organize political life as it did in the 19th and early 20th centuries, perhaps Marxist views regarding nationalism also need to be revised.

Laxer (1992) argues that, since nationalism is here to stay, the Left must reconcile with nationalism and embrace those nationalisms which are compatible with democracy, sovereignty and territorial conceptions of citizenship. Old prejudices die hard, however, and this reconciliation may not be easy. The Canadian case is instructive. Over the past three decades the Canadian left has "divided on issues around foreign ownership, economic dependency, international unions, junior partnership with imperialism and solidarity with the American left" (Laxer 1992, 9). Internally, Canada is an archetypal case of internal fragmentation most notably evident in the Québec nationalist movement. A strong nationalist response to the trend toward American continental dominance might serve to enhance the stature and legitimacy of Québec nationalists. A solution for the Canadian left remains elusive.

Keane (1994) offers a possible analytical bridge between nationalism and cosmopolitan ideals in the form of a distinction between national identity and nationalism. Cosmopolitanism should be contrasted with nationalism. As Keane (1994, 181) has argued, cosmopolitanism is the opposite of nationalism but not of national identity. In fact, a secure sense of national identity might be viewed as the prerequisite, not only of cosmopolitanism, but of democracy. Like religious belief, national identity is not necessarily exclusive or intolerant. National identity does not, in itself, posit a

hierarchy of nations, but may foster a pluralist view of other identities. Keane defines this "ideal-typical" worldview as:

a particular form of collective identity in which, despite their routine lack of physical contact people consider themselves bound together because they speak a language or a dialect of a common language; inhabit or are closely familiar with a defined territory and experience its ecosystem with some affection; and because they share a variety of customs, including a measure of memories of the historical past, which is consequently experienced in the present tense as pride in the nation's achievements and, where necessary an obligation to feel ashamed of the nation's failing (1994, 171) .

National identity, as opposed to nationalism, permits, in Keane's view, vague borders between national and other identities (of class, gender, religion etc.) and creates the preconditions for disagreement and toleration. It must be emphasized that this conception is an ideal-type but one which permits the theoretical possibility of a national conception of political community that stops short of the regressive tendencies of nationalism.

Keane holds a less positive view of the revolutionary nationalism of the French revolution than Laxer (1992), arguing that the leaders of this revolution, in their zeal to make the nation the singular source of sovereignty, created the framework for the first "nationalist dictatorship of the modern world" (Keane 1994, 173). In this case the emancipatory possibilities of national identity succumbed to the pathology of nationalism and in the process harmed the prospects of democracy. Democracy may be undermined by nationalism in Keane's view: "If democracy is a continuous struggle against simplification of the world, then nationalism is a continuous struggle to undo complexity, a will not to know certain matters, a chosen ignorance, not the ignorance of innocence" (Keane 1994, 176). Keane's thesis is that democracy is best served by regarding national identity as "a legitimate but limited form of life" (1994, 178). This stance requires that demands for national self-determination be constrained in favor of a restrained national identity which cultivates pluralism and respect for other identities.

How might this goal be accomplished? In the European context, Keane (1994, 178-181) suggests that four trends can serve to limit the dangerous potential of

nationalism while also permitting people to enjoy their national identities. These are: 1) dispersed or deemphasized national sovereignty in favor of dispersal of power at local, regional and supra-national levels; 2) legal guarantees of national identity enforced by treaties;²⁶ 3) the fostering of other forms of collective identity to diminish the singular appeal and salience of nationalism; 4) the emergence of a neo-cosmopolitan society based on respect and cooperation. I will briefly discuss each of Keane's four trends in relation to the character of contemporary civic nationalist movements.

Keating recognizes the extent to which contemporary civic nationalists appreciate the need for and desirability of the dispersal of powers (which Keane refers to in his first point). This is particularly evident in Catalonia, Québec, and Scotland where a portion of the electorate "are ahead of constitutional experts in realizing the limitations of traditional categories and are searching for some new formula to express their national identity, in a world in which those categories have lost much of their meaning" (1996a, xi). Grüber (1997, 128) also recognizes this tendency. Grüber divides nationalism into three broad categories: pre-modern, modern and post-modern. The first category refers to nationalisms seeking modernization and statehood. These correspond to many of the nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and their struggle against the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Soviet empires. Premodern nationalist discourses are often weighted with ethnic symbolism. The second category consists of the modern state nationalism of France, the US and other established states in which nationalism is not ethnically rooted but rather committed to the territorial conceptions of both

²⁶ For example, see the Geneva Conventions (1929). Another example is found in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man (1948). Keane (1994, 180) points to the Badinter (named after a former French Minister of Justice and President of France's Constitutional Court) proposals which would make EU recognition of Yugoslavian successor states dependent on the guarantees of the political rights of national minorities. This is an especially interesting move as it focuses on persons and not territories. The proposals do not seek to secure the rights of a minority by securing for them a state of their own but rather seeks to protect persons regardless of the territory they live in. This is an especially important conception considering the complexity of ethnic distribution in the Balkans.

citizenship and sovereignty. The final and most recent category is the post-modern nationalisms which are found at the regional level within modern states of the developed West. These are the movements which corrode the assumptions of modernization approaches to the study of cleavages in modern politics and present scholars of nationalism with numerous contradictions and paradoxes. According to Grüber these movements "try to reorganize the modern nation-state for the sake of more substantial local and regional autonomies" (1997, 144). Grüber argues further that these movements are "well aware of the impacts of globalization on traditional forms of state sovereignty and they do not really consider the chances of total independence" (1997, 144). Finally, while post-modern national movements contain both ethnic and civic elements, post-modern nationalism tends "to be more civic than ethnic" (Grüber 1997, 145). Again, contemporary civic-nationalists reject absolutist conceptions of sovereignty and therefore meet Keane's first suggestion for avoiding nationalism's dangerous potential. Moreover, the emphasis on civic forms of identity, as Keane recommends in points three and four, may reduce the likelihood of nationalism taking on an ethnic character.

A number of civic-territorial movements in Europe see Europe as an attractive means for maintaining economic links, asserting influence and reassuring nervous electorates who fear the dangers of 'go-it alone' separatism. Mattei Dogan (1993) has found that national identity among young people has diminished alongside advances toward supra-national European structures of governance. The attraction of supra-national governance is weakened, however, by critiques of the undemocratic and market-driven character of European integration. Still, for the goal of limiting the destructive power of European nationalism (much in evidence this century) European union is a laudable project.

Legal guarantees of the preservation of vulnerable cultures and of the exercise of national customs have not been entirely effective. For example, the Badinter proposals

have been rendered ineffective by civil war in Bosnia and Croatia. This may simply be a matter of inadequate enforcement by international observers. In the case of Europe, integration may permit the use of political leverage to consolidate newly democratizing states as occurred with Portugal and Spain when they entered the EC. Keane (1994, 180) argues that recognizing successor states on the condition that they, in turn, respect the rights of 'their' ethnic minorities would reduce the destabilizing proliferation of demands for self-determination while strengthening democracy and pluralism in these societies. Protecting minority rights would reduce ethnic conflict and political instability by reducing unrealistic demands for statehood.²⁷

The third trend which Keane thinks will retard the growth of nationalism is the growth of plural identities. This seems compatible with civic nationalism in that civic nationalists advocate a territorial conception of membership alongside a basic loyalty to a set of democratic principles held in esteem by civil society. This does not rule out the co-existence of sub-national identities; however, one problem with the advocacy of civic identification is that it may take the form of what Hirsch (1997, 48) calls "welfare chauvinism," in which nation-state containers provide the bases for a global system of apartheid: communities enjoying developed economies may jealously guard their welfare states from the demands for global redistribution of wealth on the part of less-developed states. This is, arguably, a rather base form of social solidarity but perhaps a predictable one if the worst portraits of globalization are accurate. Again, the nature of the solidaristic bonds which might emerge in a new civic-nationalist orientated society remains a matter for speculation, although the discourse of the actors seeking independence should provide sign-posts.

The final factor constraining the growth of regressive nationalism is the development of an international civil society. This argument is, as Keane (1994, 181)

²⁷ There are about 6000 extant languages in the world. Obviously, the principle of cultural-political congruency in the form of nation-states is impossible.

admits, the most unconvincing of the four. Scholars have long debated the likelihood of the transcendence of national borders and the creation of an international civil society. This is especially evident in the case of European studies where debates have centered on the possibility of a European as opposed to a Portuguese or Swedish citizen. Howe (1995) has essentially taken the position "build the institutions and they will come." That is, eventually the socializing effects of supra-national institutions, in Europe, will alter public conceptions of their political identity. On the other hand, Anthony Smith argues that the basic prerequisites for such a society (a single party system, mass media) cannot be acquired because of linguistic diversity and varying historical experiences. Howe may well be right, however, as frequent contact and interchanges among Europeans--especially young ones--are making a European identity more attractive and sensible. On the other hand this tendency may be offset in some places (Scotland, Catalonia) by movements for regional autonomy. Keane is probably correct in arguing that an international civil society would reduce the likelihood of strong nationalism, but the emergence of such a society must be viewed as a distant possibility.

It is important to bear in mind that while a healthy sense of national identity might limit the appeal of nasty nationalisms in a given society the bases for effective popular sovereignty are subject to constant pressure by the workings of global capitalism. Laxer sees civic nationalism as a potential bulwark against the democracy-eroding power of mobile capitalism. The defense of political decision-making against markets requires a strong civil society with a meaningful degree of sovereignty. The extent to which this resistance to economic globalization is possible will depend on how successfully collective action can be mobilized and must be examined in more detail. For now, it seems plausible to suggest that strong civil societies with solidaristic bonds (based on shared values) are more likely to be able to act collectively to resist diminutions in national sovereignty. National sovereignty is linked to democracy in that, theoretically, policy is the (mediated) will of the people. Democratic legitimacy requires

that the will of the electorate not be trumped by private interests. The argument here is about state capacities to represent local priorities and interests by regulating the activities, terms of access, etc., of foreign firms and investors (as well as "domestic" ones, of course). It is when an international trade and financial regime established by MNCs, financial capital and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) takes precedence over the democratically-expressed will of local communities, that "popular sovereignty" is seen to be negated.

The skepticism with which civic nationalism has been greeted by the left is well-intentioned and represents a sensitive political immune system which seeks to prevent the atrocities of the past, but this response curtails effective, solidarity-building movements which could expand the bounds of societal autonomy by acting to combat the erosion of the power of politics by the market. Couture et al, argue that liberal-nationalism can be both cosmopolitan *and* rooted:

We, like Miller, Tamir and Ware, would like to make the case for a liberal nationalism that is fully compatible with a universalistic and internationalist cosmopolitan outlook and is, as well, compatible with a socialism which is a form of cosmopolitanism and internationalism. But a plausible cosmopolitanism will inescapably be a *rooted* cosmopolitanism (Couture et al 1998, 580).

Civic Nationalism and Irreducible Pluralism

Most of the discussion thus far has ignored the complexity of identity in liberal democratic societies. An array of social subjects exists and can no longer be reduced to socio-economic or class position. Habermas (1992), among others, argues for the necessity of solidaristic bonds to be created in order for political communities to function, while avoiding the homogenization of identities. Institutional and legal measures striking a balance between solidarity and pluralism will never succeed to the satisfaction of all, but such efforts can be made and democracy improved. The concept of 'democracy' I employ here refers to liberal democracy and its associated norms. Bader (1997, 787) has outlined the basic characteristics of liberal democracy. It includes a "disposition and commitment" to, respectively: civility over violence in decision-

making, tolerance of (and equal rights for) individuals, public debate, narrowing the gap between democratic principles and practice, transparent democratic procedures, opportunities for political participation and political competition. These characteristics are incompatible with the kind of ethnic nationalism which asserts a unitary political will over individual or group interests, subordinating individual freedoms. Keane (1994, 181) observes this phenomenon in Croatia where in the words of Slavenka Drakulic: "Nationalism has been forced on people like an ill-fitting shirt. You may feel that the sleeves are too short and the collar too tight. You might not like the color, and the cloth may itch. But you wear it because there is no other. No one is allowed not to be Croatian."

It may be argued that the new social movements--particularly those which emerged in the post-WWII era--have created a new sense of "peoplehood" for women, non-Whites and gays/lesbians (Walker 1998, 506). This is very interesting in that such movements, while creating bonds of solidarity and giving expression to cultural mores, cannot be said to have a territorial "homeland." This does not diminish the import of such groups but does serve to sever the intimate connection between territory and group identity. The struggles for citizenship rights and autonomy on the part of these groups are not fundamentally different from those of ethnic minorities seeking autonomy or statehood. Laws based on an assumed "universal citizen" can discriminate against minorities, especially when homophobia is a central feature of the dominant culture. Jhappan (1996, 40) has argued that people are constituted by multiple identities which shift from context to context from the foreground to the background and back again. Women experience oppression in patriarchal contexts as do gays and lesbians, but may find it difficult to pin down which social identity is being targeted for marginalization at any given moment. Both identities share a characterization as "Other" by the discourses of nationalists or fundamentalist religious organizations and their adherents. Nationalist movements have the potential to threaten gays/lesbians by delegitimizing attempts to

build non-ethnic/state centered forms of community and instead entrenching an "aristocracy of difference" (Walker 1998, 547). Indeed, nationalism can deepen or provide legitimation for such forms of domination as homophobia and misogyny (as evident in ethnic purity or religious fundamentalist discourses). Ignoring or marginalizing other kinds of identity maintains oppression. In extreme cases, liberation may seem like a hollow term for those not included in the project of national independence; that is, their life chances are unaffected by the struggles for independence since the source of their oppression is firmly rooted in their society. A contemporary example, if an extreme one, might be the "liberation" of Afghanistan, won by fundamentalist guerrillas, who, in the post-Soviet period, have ushered in an especially oppressive regime in which women are deprived of virtually all meaningful rights. Post-colonial Africa has not yet succeeded in eliminating many forms of the oppression of women, with the ongoing practice of female "circumcision" only the most obvious one. Numerous claims and demands for liberation exist in all societies, but often only privileged ones (like national liberation) are prioritized.

Walby (1992, 89) correctly poses a number of challenging questions to students of nationalism:

Are women as committed to national/ethnic/'racial' projects as men? Is their project the same one as men's? Do women's nationalist/ethnic/'racial' and other large-scale social projects have the same, or more global, or more local boundaries than those of men?

Feminist students of nationalism are concerned with notions of citizenship and the important relationship of gender to "ethnic, national and 'race' relations" (Walby, 96). From a post-structuralist feminist perspective, identities are multiple, intersecting and are deconstructed to erode comfortable assumptions about social roles. For instance, there is no "woman's" experience but rather experiences. The multiple identities each person has makes it difficult or nearly impossible to speak authoritatively about what constitutes any given subject. Identities of gender, nation and class are social

constructions and assumptions about these subjects must be regarded as provisional and open to alteration (Jhappan 1996, 20).

There are, however, nationalists who share these objectives. Plaid Cymru parliamentarian Dafydd Elis Thomas (1991, 62) asks fundamental questions about Welsh identity:

What I am saying is that the very notion of an identity, of a conceptual or even felt sameness of experience, is no longer, if it ever was, a useful category for writing about political and ethical issues, whether in the area of culture or anywhere else. What is Welsh identity? I am uncertain though I know there are a lot of them. What is the Welsh experience? Again there are many of them, and they are still going on.

The same questions may be asked of Scottish or Canadian identity. There are in reality multiple identities. Bhavnani (1993, 37) points out that she is "not simply a woman, nor black, nor a university academic, nor Indian." These categories overlap and can change in relation to each other. Identity might be preferably viewed as an activity, or constant process of self-creation within social constructs rather than as a fixed immutable feature of human beings. Viewed from this perspective one recognizes the contestable nature of any one identity and the fact that the identification of difference often serves political interests. In the case of nationalism generally, there is a clear prioritizing of the nation as the appropriate focus for political activity and loyalty. State institutions are, in effect, the agents of nationalist discourse and make policy with a national community in mind. This does not necessarily mean brutal oppression or apartheid-like exclusion, but a subtle diminution of other collective claims, which can be heard so long as they do not threaten the primary identification with the nation-state. This relates to Held's argument about solidarity as a necessary feature of democratically-robust, autonomous societies. Solidarity, in the civic-nationalist view, is secured by instilling a sense of national belonging amongst all members of society.²⁸ If one group is threatened with

²⁸ Former Canadian Prime Minister John Turner, quoted in an article "Use nationalism to fight globalism, Turner says" published in the Globe and Mail on 1 April 1999, has stressed the need for Canadians to get involved in "reviving our sense of nationalism" because "in a fragmented, decentralized country like Canada, and our

the loss of autonomy or culture then the whole community will experience uncertainty and unease. The society, as an old cliché goes, is only as strong as its most vulnerable members. Civic nationalism need not be domineering and exclusive. It is a question of forging the solidaristic links appropriate to democracy without adopting implicitly exclusionary practices. It is entirely plausible moreover, for civic-nationalism to be compatible with the basic norms of liberal democracy and for such a consciousness to accentuate the functioning of liberal democracy. Moreover, the development of a healthy political community characterized by the absence of extreme social deprivation and inequality, opportunities for the exercise of political activity and a commitment to the value of social good over market values, is enhanced by a sense of community which transcends the particularities of ethnic or religious attachments (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). Civic nationalism rejects the implicit assumption that a community simply *has*, a priori, either an ethnic or a strong civic orientation. Rather, culture and institutional practices are created over generations, but at the same time are subject to change--occasionally, to fundamental change. By channeling political behavior and beliefs into a set of institutions and their accompanying political culture, we can see how a new state might make serious efforts to instill a civic, rather than an ethnic, foundation for political identity, which would then be (at least potentially) free of the flaws of ethnic nationalism, permitting the consent and bonding necessary for community solidarity. This potential would be even stronger and more robust in circumstances where the state in question already has institutions (sports teams, legal system, education system, functional organizations such as unions) through which non-ethnic bonds of community are inculcated. In fact, the transition to independence in such a society might be eased with an explicit endorsement of the civic brand of nationalism, thereby reducing the fears of minorities.

muted patriotism, our failure to stand up and assert ourselves as Canadians, I believe that we as Canadians are more vulnerable than most countries to these forces of globalism."

Critics of nationalism as a means for building solidarity tend to focus on ethnic expressions of nationalism as if there were no civic variant. Vincent (1997, 286) argues that nationalism requires the ranking of social organizations (unions, churches, clubs, etc.) with the nation as paramount. Further, nation-states tend to be composed of multiple national groups; therefore, nationalism creates a tension between these groups.²⁹ The rise of universal concepts such as human rights further reduce the appeal of civic nationalism as we can not justify special duties to our co-nationals and ignore the rights of our fellow humans. Why should we prioritize national loyalties above others? Should we not resist any surrender to the now defunct nation-state conception of political organization and embrace a more humanist version of human organization however undeveloped such a system might seem?

Considerable attention has been paid to democracy and citizenship and the relationship between these (Benhabib 1992; Kymlicka 1989; Young 1996; Mouffe 1993) Here I argue that civic nationalism is compatible with both liberal-democratic and communitarian conceptions of citizenship. In this version humans are seen not as atomistic creatures who have formed societies via allegorical versions of social contract (McCormick, 1994). Rather, members of a society form affective attachments to each other via their institutions and political practices. These kinds of ties can be (and have been) enhanced by cooperation in state-building exercises such as the welfare state. Collective identities and rights are recognized, contrary to neo-liberal conceptions of society and citizenship.

²⁹ Mayerfeld (1998, 561) distinguishes between "defensive solidarity" where individuals organize to protect themselves from oppression (for example, the American civil rights movement) and assertive group identity which necessarily inculcates a sense of distinction, self-aggrandizement, and an irrational submergence into a pool of national consciousness. National identity becomes valued for its own sake for both individuals and the institutional vehicles which advance the cause of the 'nation'. The presence of assertive nationalism makes aggressive conduct more likely and hence it should be avoided, even in its civic guise.

At the same time, liberal-democratic values and institutions protect individual rights and pluralism. Historically, we have examples of civic nationalist discourses which have been committed to the protection and recognition of sub-national identities, and the advancement of equality struggles. I am thinking here of Gandhi's Indian National Congress which sought to reform the Indian caste system, end child marriage and improve women's political and economic status, and the African National Congress which eschewed any racial/ethnic component in its struggle against apartheid.³⁰

Conclusion

Nationalism is a socio-political phenomenon at once too diverse and too conceptually simple to be described as an ideology. Its numerous morphologies therefore preclude simplistic and moralistic judgments as to its character. This chapter has examined the arguments regarding the potential for civic-nationalism to act as the discursive basis for community solidarity in the face of external threats. These threats can be understood as: 1) the oppressive rule by a majority over a minority within a state, or; 2) the erosion of sovereignty or liberal-democratic governance by the mobile, unaccountable forces of capitalism. The potential of nationalist movements to secure the political space necessary to rehabilitate democracy hinges most critically upon the self-identification of the nationalism adopted. Democracy will be undermined by reactionary ethnic nationalism (or its religious corollary) because ethnic nationalism violates basic principles of equality and individual rights in favor of exclusive collective ones. But civic

³⁰ The 1994 South African constitution included constitutional protection for gays and lesbians. The constitution (Republic of South Africa 2000), amended May 8, 1996, contains Section 9 which states :

(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.

nationalism articulates democratic principles, including pluralism, to conceptions of community. Therefore, its slogan might be expressed as: "Solidarity not homogeneity."

The Scottish case allows us to examine the questions raised above about civic nationalism, sovereignty, pluralism and democracy for the following reasons:

1) The SNP is a civic-nationalist movement. This case is made and explained in chapters 2 and 3.

2) As a vehicle for defending the popular sovereignty of a community against the depredations of a global neo-liberal institutional regime and its key players, civic nationalism's potential and limitations may be assessed in light of the discourse of Scottish nationalists, on the one hand, and by an analysis of the global economic and institutional environment in which its goals must be realized, on the other hand.

3) Scotland is a multi-cultural society with a plethora of social movements concerning gender, race, regionalism, religion and sexual orientation. This environment permits an examination of the strength of the SNP's civic orientation, and ability to incorporate and advance the struggles of various subordinated groups within Scottish society.

4) Scotland will soon be enjoying a new degree of autonomy from the UK state (in the form of a new Assembly) and is also closely integrated with the European Union. These developments permit an analysis and evaluation of the consequences of supra-national institutions for the SNP's commitment to fuller, more meaningful democracy in Scotland.

Chapter 2

Methodology

In this chapter I propose a method for addressing several questions which emerge from the previous chapter's discussion. The questions are: Is civic nationalism a strategy of resistance to neo-liberal globalization? Is the achievement of statehood the means by which to secure meaningful sovereignty in an era of international and supranational integration? If so, can such movements achieve the goals of meaningful sovereignty and democracy without recourse to exclusionary nationalism? Can local distinctiveness (cultural and institutional) be protected without creating an "Other" ? Must such a movement of collective action be constructed around a nationalist discourse? What factors determine in which cases civic nationalism may advance the goals of equality, deeper democracy and self-determination?

These questions apply to that category of nationalist movements (usually in the form of political parties) generally considered civic nationalist. The term 'civic nationalism' is an ideal type and hence no political actor will exemplify this abstraction perfectly. The following parties are usually categorized as civic in nature: The Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru (Wales), Parti Québécois (Québec) and Convergència i Unió and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalonia). This list is not exhaustive but represents the better known and most prominent cases of contemporary sub-state civic nationalism. These vary in some important ways. First, these parties emphasize cultural identity to varying degrees. The SNP eschews any kind of ethnic appeal, adopting instead a more territorial understanding of Scottish identity. Plaid Cymru ("the Party of Wales") has always presented itself as one of the defenders of Welsh culture, especially language, but never in a reactionary or exclusionary way. Instead this is a party which seeks to defend the language and to promote it via state institutions. The Parti Québécois (PQ) is certainly an ardent defender and promoter of the French language. This has led to the view popular in English Canada that the PQ is ethnically

exclusionary and chauvinistic. Certainly there are anglophones and allophones in Québec who would assert this. But, as in the Welsh case, protection of the language alone is not intended as an exclusionary policy (even though the practical consequences of such policies may support such a characterization). Instead, the cultural element of the PQ's agenda is just part of a broader project designed to gain independence from a state viewed as incapable of accommodating the aspirations of many Quebecers for cultural and political autonomy. Catalan nationalists, while keen to protect the Catalan language, are not fixated on this goal. Instead, the protection and promotion of Catalan culture is part of a larger project concerned with acquiring autonomy for effective policy-making and for preserving local distinctiveness.

What differentiates these actors from ethnic-exclusionary ones is their multi-faceted agenda. They are not intent on securing ethnic "purity" within their boundaries (although some members may occasionally voice racist and exclusionary views). Instead, these parties share a basic interest in creating a space for their respective nations (defined by territorial membership) where they will be free to build independent states appropriate to their aspirations and following the institutional configurations of their choosing.

The Scottish Case

Small nations are like corks in the sea. They are the first indicators of the way currents are flowing, and that the tide is turning. We have argued in this book that larger states may have more geo-political power, but they are often poor indicators of political and social change. Larger states are also creations and expressions of older certainties which are themselves eroding (McCrone et al, 1991, 215).

The Scottish case allows us to examine the central questions posed in this work. First, there is no question of an autarkic political project--either in the discourse of the SNP or in the prevailing climate of "globalization." The SNP supports continued membership in the EU, which raises questions about the ways in which such a commitment will qualify the sovereign powers of an independent Scottish state. While Québec, too, is part of a broad continentalist project, NAFTA remains a primarily

economic institution (with political implications) without the pooling of sovereignty implied by the extensive merging of political functions in the form of the EU (judicial, executive, legislative, etc.). European integration has sparked a vigorous debate about the appropriate venues for political decision-making and democratic deliberations. These debates mirror those within the UK about the appropriate ways of dealing with demands for greater autonomy by Scots and others. It is in the midst of these developments in Britain and Europe that an analysis of Scottish nationalism becomes interesting and instructive heuristically for studying the phenomena of civic nationalism and globalization in general. For if these trends are truly global then we should expect all nationalist movements to have to address the paradoxes and contradictions which intrude on questions of 'independence' and the nature of political community and citizenship.

The SNP also faces important decisions regarding the future direction of economic development in an independent Scottish state. The alternatives--which are again constrained by global economic forces--have significant implications for the kind of social democratic values and priorities which the party has espoused since the 1970s, and hence, for the equality goals of civic nationalism as a project of democratization. An analysis of the SNP's positions on the EU and economic development models is revealing of the party's understanding of the nature and limits of sovereignty for a small, industrialized state in the era of globalization. At the same time, a political economy analysis of SNP policy, the Scottish economy, and EU policies, provides a context for assessing the likely success--as well as the limitations--of the SNP's sovereigntist objectives. To some extent, the limits to state sovereignty created by the current global economic order confront all civic nationalist movements (and may partially explain the impetus behind such movements). Does the Scottish case suggest that civic nationalism can, nevertheless, recapture important terrain in the struggle for local self-determination? Under what circumstances might civic nationalism fulfill this role?

Second, the Scottish case allows us to examine the problematic nature of nationalist identity for liberal-democratic, civic nationalists. Scotland is a diverse community in which issues of identity assert themselves on the political agenda in the form of struggles against racism, political centralization, patriarchy, heterosexism, and other forms of religious and ethnic chauvinism. To what extent has the civic nationalist discourse of the SNP been inclusive of such non-national identities and struggles? What stakes in the civic nationalist project has the SNP been able to construct for such social subjects as women, gays and lesbians, and racial minorities? Again, does the Scottish case suggest the conditions under which civic nationalism may be a pluralist, inclusive strategy of democratization for diverse subordinated groups? Does it help to identify unavoidable conflicts between any form of nationalism and the emancipatory goals of such groups?

Third, the SNP makes the civic nationalist claim that political independence is a necessary condition for the enhancement of a particular community's participation in political decision-making; no other arrangement will suffice. This claim is also made by the Parti Québécois. Federalism is not viewed by these parties as an optimal or adequate arrangement for the realization of cultural or political aspirations. For the SNP, the case for independence was strengthened by the specific characteristics of the unitary British state and the effects of the Thatcher governments on Scotland. In light of the reforms enacted by the current (New) Labour government, has the SNP's case for independence been weakened? Or do the specificities of the British state and Scotland's position within it continue to underpin a strong--and possibly unique (among civic nationalist movements)--case for political independence?

The methods used to investigate these questions are detailed below. First, however, it is necessary to establish the grounds for the characterization of the Scottish National Party as a civic nationalist party.

There is general agreement that the SNP constitutes a case of civic nationalism. First, it endorses a non-ethnic conception of citizenship. Leader Alex Salmond (1993, 58) is unambiguous on this point.

The SNP's constitutional proposals are crystal clear: all those resident in Scotland at the time of independence will be entitled to full citizenship. All those who were born in Scotland at the time of independence will be entitled to full citizenship. All those who were born in Scotland, but are temporarily out of the country, will also be entitled to full citizenship.

Unlike the British state, with its lack of effective legal protection for minorities and its blatantly racist two-tier citizenship under the British Nationality Act, there will be no distinctions made in the new Scotland on the basis of ethnic origin. Indeed, the written constitution will contain a Bill of Rights, superior to any other law, specifically outlawing any form of discrimination on grounds such as racial origin, religion or sex.

No country will offer better legal protection for the rights of minorities than will an independent Scotland. My message to all those living in Scotland, no matter where they were born, is this: you will be welcome in an independent Scotland and will be entitled to full citizenship as a right on an equal basis with all other citizens.

Secondly, the SNP advances no ethnic/religious/linguistic agenda which might exclude certain groups in Scottish society. Thirdly, it endorses democratic procedures and institutions which are clearly liberal-democratic. This is further evident in the SNP's endorsement of a Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties and in constitutional checks on any future Scottish Parliament via judicial review.

The discourse of the SNP is distinct from that of the Labour party in its commitment to Scottish statehood. The nationalism espoused by the SNP is a civic nationalism which joins its Western counterparts by, as Tom Nairn observed in "Journey into new Unionism," in the Scotsman on 24 May 1995 :

defining their ambitions in terms of constitutions rather than blood myths--democratically, rather than through a supposed cosanguinity or common culture. . . This more political style of nationalism emphasizes choice, equality and differentiation--a future yet to be attained, the nation yet unmade.

The literature is virtually unanimous on this point. The SNP is clearly a civic nationalist movement, having long ago eschewed ethnic symbolism in favor of sober economic and democratic arguments for Scottish independence.

But the SNP's commitment to civic nationalism is also viewed by some as a flaw impeding the party's electoral ascendancy (Newman 1992). Appeals to ethnic symbols and ethnic Others have a track record of "success" in recent history. A recent example was the party's efforts to capitalize on the success of the film *Braveheart*, a portrayal of the life of William Wallace. The film enjoyed remarkable success in Scotland.³¹ According to Michael Paterson, in an article, "SNP picks fruits of Braveheart campaign," published in the *Herald* (Glasgow) on 4 October 1995, the SNP capitalized on this success with the distribution (in movie lineups as well as households) of a leaflet on the economics of independence entitled *Bravehearts and wise heads*. The title seems deliberately chosen to showcase the sober nature of the SNP's discourse which celebrates the achievements of a Scottish patriot while providing the contemporary argument for independence in rational, pragmatic terms. The point here is that Scotland is as replete with historically prominent, politically useful figures as any country but the primary party asserting a nationalist discourse has tended to avoid the exploitation of such symbols. The Braveheart campaign was a rare and brief foray into Scotland's historical heritage for the purposes of political mobilization.

Despite the temptation, the party has chosen to marginalize ethnicity. Part of this stems from the now dominant social democratic faction of the party, which, since 1981, has set the tone for the party's evolution. An examination of the '79 Group's' *The Case For Left Wing Nationalism* (Maxwell 1979, 1) readily demonstrates the party's commitment to civic nationalism.³²

³¹ *Braveheart* was the fifth largest grossing film in the UK in 1995. Scottish movie goers purchased 28 percent of tickets sold in contrast to their usual share of 8 percent (Edensor 1997, 135).

³² The '79 group was a "ginger group" (a sub-party organization) which advocated ways of revitalizing the SNP following the disappointing decline in electoral support following the 1979 general election. There was a sense that the party had too slavishly devoted itself to independence hence limiting its support and relevance to Scottish political life. The group advocated a movement to the political left and the adoption of a class analysis alongside the party's civic nationalism.

The case for left-wing nationalism has been asserted more than argued. This pamphlet seeks to correct the balance. It argues that the only nationalism with a serious chance of winning and keeping the level of electoral support required to carry Scotland to independence is a nationalism which, disregarding romantic concepts of nationhood, builds its appeal on an unsentimental view of the social and economic interests of the Scottish people.

I am not suggesting that the SNP is a party of immutably civic-minded, social democrats. This description fits the contemporary party very well, but political parties develop, decline and alter programs due to internal and external factors. It is not the minutiae of party policy which will determine the character of a party's ideology, but rather the overall civic ethos which has guided the party throughout its lifespan. As Drucker (in Ware 1996, 20) observes: "By the ethos of the party I have in mind what an earlier age might have called the spirit of the party; its traditions and habits, its feel." Whatever the utility of the term "ethos", the absence of sufficient data on rank-and-file SNP members' attitudes or policy preferences prevents establishing the depth/homogeneity of the party's ethos. Instead, what is analyzed here is the official discourse of the party leadership. This discourse is a left-of-center, civic nationalist one. Whether this will continue to be the dominant discourse of the party leadership will depend on the strength of the left within the SNP to influence the direction of the party.

Policy shifts are important and must be considered when characterizing the SNP's discourse. As Hobsbawm observes: "National identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgment this is the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today" (1991, 11). One can see the party shifting to accommodate new opportunities/challenges to its civic nationalism (the shift in EU policy is an excellent example). Such a change might be interpreted as an expression of cosmopolitanism, of seeking greater trade and cooperation and a shrugging off of the cloak of insularity with which the party might have been associated at the time of the 1975 referendum on the Common Market. The general goal of Scottish independence has always been the central goal of the SNP, but the means by which to achieve this goal

have changed partly in response to changing international political and economic trends and how the opportunities and constraints associated with these changes have been interpreted by political actors.

Research Methods and Design

In order to address the questions raised at the beginning of the chapter I have made use of a number of approaches including: discourse analysis, political economy, and institutional analysis. Here I discuss the focus on three key realms of nationalist discourse, and the methodological approaches employed to analyzing these discourses.

Each of the questions raised by the Scottish case represents three analytically distinct realms of particular importance to civic nationalism. The qualifier "analytically distinct" is important because each realm can affect the others in important ways. For instance, democracy and sovereignty are linked because sovereign decision-making powers, ideally, reflect the priorities of national governments mandated by their respective electorates. As sovereignty is compromised, so too is democracy. Still, for purposes of clarity, each of the three realms is treated in separate chapters (Chapters Four and Five deal with sovereignty).

Within each chapter the discourse of the SNP is analyzed to understand the portrait painted by the party of the challenges to its civic nationalism and how these challenges will be met. Discourse theory has become a prominent approach in many disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, but is less utilized in political science. However, some recent work illustrates the diverse ways in which discourse analysis may be used to investigate political phenomena. Giordano (2000) studies the Lega Nord's 'Padanian' discourse in order to reconstruct the creation of a hitherto unheardof political identity ('Padanian'). Jahn and Henn (2000) examine the party manifestos and television debates of three social democratic parties (British, German, Swedish) during recent elections. In their study, Jahn and Henn undertake a content analysis of these discourses in order to identify factors which help explain changes in ideological orientation. Jensen

(1989, 237) conducts an analysis of the policy discourses which regulate women's sexuality in France and the United States and argues that distinct "hegemonic social paradigms" explain the variations in "patterns of gender relations." These three examples demonstrate the variety of possible uses of discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis is concerned not only with the structure of language use (especially in psychology) but also, and importantly here, with acts of communication and argumentation. In chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven, I engage in an analysis of the discourse of the SNP to understand and explain how the party has tried to reconcile the challenges raised by contradictions which can emerge between the civic nationalist agenda and persistent and salient questions surrounding the changing nature of state sovereignty, national and other identities, and the nature and organization of democratic institutions.

A discourse approach is an effective way to analyze an organization's struggle with these issues. Discourse refers to the verbal, written and symbolic actions by which actors or subjects seek to create or impose meaning on the social world. As Van Dijk (1997, 3) argues, we continually construct ourselves and our social reality within prior social contexts and through our social roles (for instance, as party leaders or strategists). Each utterance is a social action, although it will differ in important ways. Some speech acts are spontaneous, such as exchanges in debate, others are deliberative and carefully structured (speeches presented to public audiences, manifestos, policy documents, and campaign themes and symbols). The utility of discourse analysis lies partly in its appreciation of the dynamic and constantly shifting expressive domain. In other words, discourse analysis sees the political domain as one in which discourses shift over time in response to other discursive acts.

In the sub-field of political theory one can see the influence of Michel Foucault. Foucault argued that sets of presuppositions (epistemes) "elevate perception to the level of objective knowledge" and hence become invisible ways of exerting power by

normalizing certain practices and taxonomies, and deviantizing others (Simons 1995, 4). Discourses articulate knowledge and act to govern what is intelligible, and what is deviant. Politics enters Foucault's conception at a micro-social level when subjects attempt to resist systems of domination and the ways in which they are subjectified. At a macro-social level one can see politics operating at the level of institutions and establishing the boundaries of political debate. In essence, politics becomes a struggle over the "true"; over what may be spoken or expressed discursively.

The above discussion may imply some kind of anarchic amorphism lacking structure. This perception may explain the relative dearth of discourse analysis in comparative political science. This initial view, is, I think, in need of clarification. Discourses do operate and emerge dynamically but they do not do so in the absence of structures of cognition and knowledge. Discourse is the product of agency (we must allow for ingenuity and innovation), but it is also guided by existing hierarchies of discourse which we might refer to as "knowledges". Knowledges (or paradigms) gain ascendancy at least partly because of the power of those articulating the particular discourse. Hence, in most political communities, the inter-class disparity permits the wealthier and more powerful minority largely to control much of the information-dispensing channels in society. Other discourses counter the assumptions of the ruling class, but these are relatively silent and marginalized compared to the dominant discourses disseminated by mass media and public institutions. In science, discourse is regulated by the professional status and social networks of those commanding assent from those who lack specialized technical knowledge. Hence, discourses abound, but some have more power, influence and authority than others.

Of course paradigms do shift. Discourses are made, remade, and emerge to challenge the status quo. In the realm of partisan politics, where essentially contested concepts (e.g., democracy) abound, researchers are able to witness and analyze the nature, content and revision of evolving discourses. Such analysis is particularly

appropriate for the study of nationalism, as nationalism itself is a shape-shifting political project actively at work reinventing tradition, history and articulating discursive elements in different ways in order to strategically outmaneuver competing actors. Moreover, the ideologies of groups are reproduced discursively, not in the sense of cloning, but in that of adapting discourse in concert with, or in resistance to, structural change.

Van Dijk (1997, 7-11) argues that there are several dimensions of which the researcher needs to be aware. Discourse is goal oriented and purposeful. Its analysis requires perspective because verbal and symbolic acts must not be taken at face value. Moreover, discourse always needs to be interpreted within specific contexts. Discursive acts must be "read" in the context of a social or institutional environment. Finally, we must consider the identity of the actor(s) articulating the discourse. Attention to all of these features of discourse help to better understand its meanings and analyze changes in its character.

Analyzing the Discourse of the SNP

I have argued that discourse is a fundamental constitutive feature of politics. Not only does discourse construct the political world but it does so unceasingly via conversation, interviews, debates, campaign posters, and research papers and other forms. The dynamism evident here suggests that the formation of public policy is a relatively fluid process, responding to many elements at play in the "universe of discourse". Rather than seeing parties as rational actors seeking to 'sell' a standardized coherent product to consumers (voters), I suggest that party discourses are always in flux, frequently contradictory and confusing. These discourses frame and construct the political world. For example, a given election campaign may be dominated by a single issue because of the agenda-setting powers of party leaders. In short, partisan discourse can set agendas or be captive to them. Close attention to a party's discourse can help the researcher track the development of a political party and the ways that a party attempts to mold its discourse to reconcile its programmatic ethos to structural change. This is a

constantly occurring project. It is also a vastly complicated one. It occurs at many levels within a party but does not occur only within the party organization. Parties respond to mass media, emergent political events and to competing political discourses.

The sheer complexity of the processes described above requires some delineation of the analysis constructed here. I have first divided the discourse of the SNP into three conceptual spheres. Chapters Four and Five deal with sovereignty, Chapter Six deals with identity, and Chapter Seven deals with democracy. I have already (Chapter One) explained the importance of these realms for civic nationalist discourse. Here I describe how the analysis will be conducted in each of these chapters.

The basic aim of the SNP is the achievement of political sovereignty. In Chapters Four and Five, I reconstruct and characterize the discourse of the SNP to determine what the nature of the SNP's discourse regarding sovereignty is and how has this changed in the period under investigation (1970-2000). A political economy analysis is required to identify the impediments which may emerge to this quest for meaningful sovereignty. Do these undermine the proposition that civic nationalism may act to resist the negative features of neo-liberal globalization?

To answer the first question I turned to a large body of SNP 'texts' in the form of published speeches, reports of the SNP's research department, party manifestos, website material, interviews with office holders within the party, and media reports from The Herald (Glasgow), The Scotsman (Edinburgh), and The Scotsman's Sunday edition Scotland on Sunday.

Some of the SNP material was gathered from the National Library of Scotland. This included campaign literature and research reports, primarily from the 1970s, that were not available from the party's headquarters. The party's head office in Edinburgh was very cooperative and research reports were made available as well as the contact numbers of office holders within the party's Executive. More recently I was able to

contact party office holders and former candidates via email. All of this material has been called upon in order to construct a reasonably accurate portrait of party discourse.

To answer the questions raised above regarding the political economy of sovereignty I chose to focus on two critical features of the discourse of the SNP: oil and membership in the European Union. These are critical in my view because they have prominently featured in SNP campaign and research material during the period covered. Of course, these issues have been more prominent at some times than others. But, generally speaking, these are the most relevant issues with respect to the economic bases for meaningful sovereignty. The large North Sea oil discoveries of the late 1960s and early 1970s altered the terrain of Scottish politics by offering a solution to the viability (regarding economic resources) problem which had plagued Scottish nationalists. With a large oil supply, the argument went, independence was viable.

The ability of a new state to make autonomous economic and social policy choices depends critically on the degree to which an economy can develop with a minimal amount of pressure from international forces. In the case of Scotland, a serious problem presents itself with regard to oil production. In SNP discourse oil is generally portrayed as the means by which to achieve the various kinds of social policies to remedy Scottish social problems and support relatively generous (by UK standards) social programs. In Chapter Four I follow SNP discourse on the subject of oil to determine how prominently oil revenues figure as a means to support social programs. These aspirations are critically analyzed from the perspectives of environmental scarcity (How much oil remains?) and through comparative examination of the historical and contemporary experiences of a number of petro-states. This analysis permits conclusions regarding the wisdom of an economic model predicated--at least in large part-- on both the supply of oil and the stability of international oil prices/markets. The Norwegian experience with oil wealth is examined to derive possible lessons for the projected experience of a new Scottish state (also, the SNP have often suggested that

Norway is a possible economic model for independent Scotland). This political economy analysis calls into question the application or adoption of a Norwegian model of development for Scotland and in doing so raises questions about the SNP's seeming reliance on oil revenue as a central feature of future economic development. I also examine the Irish model, one more recently applauded in SNP literature. The Irish model seems to imply a leap from an agriculturally-dominated economy to a high-technology one funded partly by European regional grants and by a competitive tax regime designed to attract firms. However, the Irish model raises questions regarding the SNP's promised social policies, which might be hard to finance under the tax regime adopted in Ireland.

Chapter Five deals with the questions for sovereignty which emerge from the ongoing project of European integration. The European Union has been a central feature of the SNP's discourse since the 1980s when the party turned from skepticism to support for integration and its perceived benefits for Scotland. There are obvious questions which can be raised regarding sovereignty here, but I have focused on whether democratic politics and the policy autonomy desired by the SNP can be attained within the framework of the European Union and whether this is the only option. In order to do this I attempt to explain how and why the SNP altered its policies on European integration. I then consider whether integration is likely to remedy the democratic deficit and the absence of self-rule which serve as central criticisms of the UK in SNP discourse. To answer the question regarding the extent to which the EU will reduce, or fail to address, the democratic deficit, I have counterposed the demands and aspirations of the SNP regarding self-governance and democracy against the institutional anatomy of the EU and the treaties that bind member states.

This analysis is balanced by an appreciation of the complexity of the European project. It is clear that there are positive and negative aspects to integration, the relative balance of which must be weighed by the respective electorates affected. However there

are enough centralizing consequences associated with integration that the SNP's goals of democracy and independence for Scotland may be in some ways compromised. To address the question of integration and its consequences for sovereignty and democracy, I have conducted an analysis of the treaties, laws and institutions which compose the EU. I then present the SNP's policies on these to show the party's perspective on the EU. Then, drawing on a body of literature which is critical of European-level democracy, I suggest reasons to be skeptical of the SNP's generally positive discourse on the EU. I have examined the recent experiences of advanced welfare states and the consequences of EU entry on their respective societies. Also, I have cited expert reports to the UK Foreign Affairs committee which asked difficult questions regarding the centralizing and democracy-threatening potential of the Maastricht Treaty and particularly the single currency.

Questions were posed to office holders in the SNP in interviews regarding the potential threat to sovereignty presented by economic globalization and membership in the EU to understand how the party and its members reconciled these problems with their stated ideals. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in June 1994 with Gil Paterson (then Spokesperson on Administration and Finance), Paul Scott (historian and long-time member of the Party's National Executive Council), Kevin Pringle (SNP Research Officer), and Kenny MacAskill (SNP National Treasurer). In these interviews I asked whether the project of independence would not be unduly compromised with Scotland as an independent member of the EU, and whether the pressures of globalization would compromise Scottish autonomy and social policy. I also analyzed relevant SNP texts, especially research reports and European election manifestos. After having characterized the SNP's discourse on matters related to sovereignty I was then able to draw some conclusions regarding the extent to which the SNP has adequately addressed the threats to Scottish sovereignty posed by certain aspects of EU membership.

The next realm of discourse examined was that concerning national identity. I sought to characterize the party's understanding of the nature of Scottish identity and the extent to which this image was consistent with the characterization of civic nationalism as an inclusive discourse free of chauvinism. To characterize the party's understanding of contemporary Scottish identity I searched for the use of ethnic 'markers' such as references to 'Scottish' traits such as language, religion, ethnicity in the literature of the party. Moreover, I needed to examine the extent to which the SNP's civic nationalism is able to incorporate or articulate the democratic struggles of women and gays/lesbians in Scotland. To do this interviews were conducted to ascertain the extent to which the SNP was able to incorporate other identities within the larger territorial one. I interviewed Christine Creech (then a member of the party's National executive council and now SNP Member of Scottish Parliament (MSP)), Abdul Khan (a Glasgow Housing officer and local government candidate for the SNP), Roseanne Cunningham (MP and MSP, SNP) and Fiona Muir (Convenor of the Aberdeen Anderson Branch of the SNP).

To further characterize and analyze the discourse of the SNP on identity, I canvassed the views of other political actors. I sought the views of representatives of relevant organizations concerned with the democratic struggles of women, ethnic minorities, gays/lesbians, and consulted Internet resources of the Highlands and Islands Alliance,³³ ENGENDER (a Scottish feminist organization), and the Commission for Racial Equality (UK). I conducted face-to-face interviews with A. Sivanandan of the British Race Relations Institute and one of his research associates. Internet correspondence was conducted with Tim Hopkins of the Equality Network (Gays, Lesbians and Transgendered) and with Alice Brown (ENGENDER). These resources were useful in determining the perspective of political agents with expertise and influence in Scottish political life. These perspectives permitted me to ask: How do

³³ The Highlands and Islands Alliance is a political party which contested the 1999 Scottish Parliament elections in the Orkney and Shetland Islands. It seeks maximum autonomy for the Islands.

these actors view the SNP discourse on identity? Was its version of civic nationalism compatible with these other struggles for democracy? What steps has the SNP taken to include the disparate movements and identities which make up contemporary Scotland?

In order to address the questions regarding SNP policy on issues of gender, ethnicity/race, region etc., I examined policy statements by the party leadership, key debates on gender inclusive policies (candidate selection), and the formation of 'ginger groups' concerned with the unique circumstances of "New Scots". In addition, a thorough search was made for published research on issues of gender, sexuality and race in Scotland. This analysis permitted an accurate assessment of the party's stance on these issues and the ability of civic nationalism to deal with difference.

In Chapter Seven I examined the party's discourse on the renewal of democracy in Scotland. My first task was to contrast the institutions of contemporary British democracy with the SNP's proposals for democracy in an independent Scotland. More specifically I examine the debates surrounding devolution in the 1970s and 1990s. I compare the devolution bills introduced by British governments in the 1970s and 1990s and contrast these proposals for institutional reform with the institutional structures the SNP envisages for an independent Scotland. This analysis was supported with evidence of the debate in the media, party literature, and through interviews and Internet correspondence. I interviewed Carolyn Ewart of the Scottish Campaign for Civil Liberties for her assessment of the constitutional consequences of independence for individual rights. Interviews with veterans of the 1979 referendum campaign revealed the basis of the antipathy of many in the SNP toward the proposed devolution legislation of 1997. Christine Creech and Kenny MacAskill spoke at a forum during the SNP's 1995 conference at Perth (which I attended), urging members to reject any constitutional solution short of independence. This position, while not shared by the party leadership as a whole, has considerable support within the party and, while the party supported and worked for the 'Yes' side in the 1997 referendum, the critique of devolution remains a

central plank in the platform of the party. Moreover, I compared and contrasted the SNP discourse with that of the Labour Party in order to determine the nature of the disagreement between the discourse of reform as articulated by the Labour Party and that of independence as articulated by the SNP. By examining the debates on devolution I was able to pose the question: Is independence a prerequisite for meaningful democracy in Scotland?

Whenever possible, I sought to verify claims by drawing on at least three sources. When several sources agree upon the substance of a speech act, assertion, the nature of an event, or a characterization, then we have reasonable evidence of the validity of the description. This type of research is found particularly in historical research where data are limited or impossible to access. In political science, triangulation (Yin 1993) can be used to gauge the legitimacy of interpretations of the actions of political agents. When one triangulates, one consults multiple sources of evidence in order to see whether various accounts converge. In this study, organizations concerned with, for instance, civil liberties, were contacted to solicit their views as to whether the SNP's stated policies would serve to deepen democracy in an independent Scotland, as the party claims. The accuracy of the description is enhanced when triangulation is possible. Of course, not all will agree with the characterization of any given text or speech act. Differences of interpretation are to be expected when contested issues are the subject of analysis. Fortunately, one can learn from an analysis of differences of interpretation also.

Denzin (1978, 295) has identified four forms of triangulation: data, investigator, theory and methodological. Data and methodological triangulation have been employed in the thesis. Data triangulation involves the solicitation of the perspectives of multiple and different political actors. In this case, interviews with SNP members were complemented, where possible, with interviews with appropriate civic organizations. For example, in addition to correspondence with SNP MP Roseanne Cunningham, I also

solicited the views of the Equality Network, Scotland's primary Gay Rights organization. Rather than relying on the interpretation and perspective of one person regarding SNP policy, I was able to incorporate the evaluations of SNP policy by attentive observers with my own interviews of SNP spokespersons (Table One).

Table1
Interviews

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>
Cynog Dafis	MP (Plaid Cymru) Ceredigion and Pembroke North	18 May 1994	London
Kevin Pringle	Research Officer (SNP)	13 June 1994	Edinburgh
David Manson	Federation of Student Nationalists (SNP)	16 June 1994	Edinburgh
Paul Scott	Vice-Convenor (SNP)	17 June 1994	Edinburgh
Christine Creech	National Executive Committee, European Candidate (SNP) 1994	21 June 1994	Edinburgh
Kenny MacAskill	Treasurer, National Executive Committee, 1997 General Election Candidate (SNP)	20 June 1994	Edinburgh
Abdul Khan	Race and Housing Officer, Local Election SNP candidate	6 July 1994	Glasgow
Gil Paterson	Vice-Convenor Administration (SNP)	4 July 1994	Bonny Briggs
A. Sivanandan	Director of the Institute for Race Relations	16 May 1994	London
"Lizzy"*	Researcher, Institute for Race Relations	16 May 1994	London
Carole Ewart	Scottish Union for Civil Liberties	6 July 1994	Glasgow

Niki Kortvelyessy	British Green Party	7 July 1994	London
Roseanne Cunningham	MP Perth SNP	24 February 1999	Internet
Tim Hopkins	Equality Network Coordinator Lesbian, Bisexual Gay, and Transgender Group Edinburgh	25 January 1999 4 May 1999	Internet
Chas Booth	Scottish Green Party Volunteer	26 January 1999	Internet
David Stevenson	SNP Candidate Glasgow-Woodside (1964) Edinburgh East (1970) European Candidate, Lothians (1979, 1984)	8-9 February 1999 28 July 1999	Internet
Russell Horn	Chair, Stirling University Scottish Nationalist Association.	16 May 1998 13 August 1999	Internet
Alice Brown	ENGENDER	13 March 1999	Internet
Fiona Muir	Convenor, Aberdeen Anderson Branch, SNP	17 June 1999	Internet

* Requested anonymity.

I have also engaged in methodological triangulation by incorporating a wide variety of sources for SNP discourse. In addition to interviews I have accumulated a wide selection of party manifestos, research documents and direct observation (Annual Conference 1995). These materials represent the SNP's discourse over a three decade period and provide sufficient material for analysis of the party's discourse.

Those SNP members selected for interviews were, for the most part, long-term SNP activists with lengthy periods of service in the party and similarly long historical

memories. When examining the changing position of the party regarding European integration, for instance, I wanted to inquire about the nature of the 1975 Common Market referendum and the attitude of the party toward this issue. In this case I corresponded with David Stevenson who, in addition to standing as a candidate for the 1979 and 1984 European elections for the SNP, campaigned against the Common Market. Again, this helped to contextualize the stated position of the SNP regarding the Common Market referendum in order to better understand why the party turned from an opponent to an enthusiastic supporter of integration. What accounts for the relatively swift turn in policy toward the EU? To be sure, political parties act pragmatically (to capture votes) but they also act in response to change in the structural and discursive environment in the process of interpreting their environment. Agency is constantly in contestation with social structure.

Sources chosen for developing this portrait of the SNP were also selected for several pragmatic reasons.³⁴ Higher officials of the SNP were selected for face-to-face interviews as these persons are likely to be best acquainted with the scope and detail of SNP policy and are also more likely to have considerable influence over the direction of the party. Such persons represent the public face of the SNP; their importance is magnified by their considerable media attention. This is a somewhat elitist perspective, but I think a fair and plausible one. The leadership of the party frequently articulates the discourse of the party. This is not to diminish the import of the rank-and-file party membership, but reflects the fact that the majority of party literature, research and speeches is composed and constructed by the organizational elite of the party. An

³⁴ Face to face interviews were conducted in the summer of 1994. Overtures were made to many members of the SNP but a by-election in East Monklands meant that many of those contacted were busy with this campaign. In addition, certain members contacted were on vacation. The goal of the field work was to interview as many members of the party (at the leadership level) as possible within the above constraints. Other organizations were contacted and some of these responded and were willing to be interviewed. Further attempts to solicit the views of SNP leaders and other organizations were carried out over the Internet. Again, not all of those contacted responded.

obvious methodological problem emerges when one asserts that the ethos of a political party is equivalent to the views of a party's leadership because important differences over policy are obscured by focussing on the leadership. The SNP's organizational structure affords opportunities for member/constituency branch input most notably at the party's annual conference. The National Council (NC) reflects branch interests in so far as these branches nominate candidates for the NC (Levy 1990, 11). The fact that members and local branches have opportunities to influence the composition of executive may reduce the gap which might be expected between elite and the party membership. Still, changes in the electoral fortunes of the party in 1974 created another gap between party officers and the influential and somewhat independent Parliamentary group. As the party's electoral success grew, so too, did differences between elite factions within the party.

The SNP is a broad church and the history of the party attests to the diversity of perspectives among the organizational elite of the party. There have also been periods where leadership positions seemed at odds with those of the membership. The point here is to caution against conflating the policy preferences of the leadership of the party with those of member/supporters generally.

Conclusion

The thesis is both descriptive and interpretive. It describes the content of SNP civic nationalist discourse in three distinct realms of politics and subjects these to scrutiny based on empirical data as well as the perspectives of other relevant political actors. The SNP is interpreted as representing a democratizing and potentially autonomy-enhancing political project. Civic nationalism is not the only tool available to achieve these ends, but, in the case of Scotland, it is the most salient alternative to the status quo. Real limitations constrain the SNP's discourse of renewal, but no more so than other political projects.

Mitchell and Bernauer (1998, 25) argue that an important task for those who undertake case studies is in achieving a degree of external validity: Are the propositions of the case under investigation relevant for the study of similar cases? It might be argued that Scotland is in the vanguard of those sub-state nationalisms which are adopting discourses of interdependence and constitutional citizenship appropriate to the era of the seeming transformation of the Westphalian state. In this sense Scottish nationalism may signal a future of small, vigorous democracies combining where necessary with others to enhance economic and other policy. This case study draws attention to the important challenges which face small states seeking to establish their own space in the world.

Chapter 3

The Development of Political Nationalism in Scotland

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the civic nature of Scottish nationalism generally and that of the SNP in particular. This account will also explain the development of the party and the nature of its civic appeal. Scotland is unique among European countries in that it did not experience a mass-based nationalist movement in the 'age of European nationalism' from 1789 to 1914. According to Paterson (1994), Scottish nationalism failed to thrive at this time in part because of the unique constitutional history of the United Kingdom as a whole. Scotland was united (not absorbed) with England and gradually the Parliaments were joined. Following a transition period marked by the last land battle in British history (1745) Scotland within the UK entered a period of unprecedented prosperity.³⁵

This particular instance of Scottish exceptionalism is worth examining further because this exceptionalism has made the SNP the kind of political party that it is today. The Act of Union (1707) occurred in the context of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13). This war saw a titanic struggle between the two superpowers of the day: England and France. This war made Union especially important for England as it would reduce the likelihood of invasion from the North, by either the French or French-supported Jacobite supporters of the Stuart dynasty (Devine 1999, 17).³⁶ Devine states that, by the early 18th century "many influential [English] politicians and the Monarch herself, Queen Anne, now regarded a parliamentary union with the Scots as essential for the future stability of the revolutionary settlement of 1688 and the security of the two

³⁵ The history of relations between England and Scotland is rather like that between Russia and Ukraine. From the establishment of the House of Canmore (which ruled Scotland from 1057 to 1290) the countries were closely intertwined in war and peace. In the late 13th century Edward the First was the de facto ruler of Scotland until 1297 with the uprising led by William Wallace. This uprising permitted Robert the Bruce to be crowned King who led a successful campaign for Scottish independence from 1307 to 1328. Nationalists commemorate these events to this day.

³⁶ Jacobite comes from the Latin (Jacobus) name for James and designates those who supported James VII's (of the Stuart dynasty) claim to the throne.

kingdoms" (1999, 3). On the opposite side supporters of Scottish independence realized that Union would ensure the consolidation of the Revolutionary settlement of 1688-9 and therefore extinguish the Stuart cause. Some Scottish Protestants viewed union with England as a potent step toward resolving the religious question in Scottish affairs.³⁷ In England, Union was viewed as an issue of security, but also one which would forestall the possibility that Queen Anne's Catholic half-brother might become the claimant to the Scottish throne instead of the Hanoverian Protestant dynasty that was to be adopted by England and Wales (Colley 1992, 11).

The Act of Union was made attractive by providing Scottish entrepreneurs with access to English markets. Devine (1999, 24) observes that Scotland enjoyed great increases in exports of cattle, linen and tobacco in the period from 1741-52. Freedom of trade with the colonies and with England increased these exports as did British tariff walls. The expanding British empire benefited Scots enormously through political patronage and career opportunities. By the 1750s one in four regimental officers in the British army were Scots (Devine 1999, 25). This represents another continuity of Scottish history. Just as 'Europe' today represents an attractive source of external security for Scottish nationalists; so, too, did Britain in 1707 for the Scottish elite. International relations scholars refer from time to time to the "binding principle" where small states align themselves with major powers to exert influence and protect their interests. Scotland is an example of this *par excellence*, in that Scottish elites identified their interests with those of the Empire.

The Act of Union, its motivations and consequences, remain controversial. For nationalists today it represents the sellout by the Scottish nobility of Scottish national interests. Despite the varied perspectives on this it is clear that union provided the

³⁷ Initially the Scottish Kirk opposed union for fear that Bishops would be imposed on the Church from England. In response to these fears, and to silence dissent against the proposed Union, the Scottish parliament passed the Act of Security of the Church of Scotland in November 1706 to protect the historic rights of the Church (Devine, 1999, 12).

Scottish economy with substantial benefits. First, Scottish manufacturers who survived the transition brought about by the Act of Union benefited enormously from access to the UK economy. In addition, Scotland and Scots enjoyed the benefits of the empire. From political patronage to participation in mercantilist ventures abroad, Scots were well represented. The economic effects of Union served to dampen potential bases for nationalist expression. This is not intended to suggest that nationalism cannot arise from non-economic sources but rather that the economic benefits of Union were sufficiently attractive to blunt nationalist inclinations. Negative and positive inducements made Union attractive and necessary for the Scottish elite. Scott (1995, 56-57), no reluctant critic of the Act, points out that the 1705 Aliens Act enacted by the English Parliament promised to shut out Scottish labor and goods from England. The nobility, many of whom had inherited land in England through marriage, would have lost these properties. Elites had plenty of incentive to acquiesce to Union.

It is of no small import that the Union merged two predominantly Protestant nations. The Catholic church went into steep decline in Scotland from the early 18th century onwards. By 1755 it was estimated that there were only 16,500 practising Roman Catholics in Scotland scattered over the shires of Banff, Aberdeen, Inverness, and Argyll (Mackie 1964, 294). An 1891 survey estimated that only 8.1 percent of the population of Scotland was Catholic (McCrone 1992, 101). These figures do not deny the importance of religious cleavage in Scottish society, particularly following the arrival of thousands of Catholic Irish immigrants in Scotland in the 19th and 20th centuries. Yet the reformation was successful in Britain in a way not seen in Continental Europe. Even today, 'Lutheran' Germany remains steadfastly Catholic in the South. Presbyterian Scotland merged well with Protestant England, and with Protestantism's valorization of the ethic of capitalism, free trade, thrift and entrepreneurialism. There was also a lingering threat posed by the counter-Reformation evident in the late 17th century in Ireland, and in 1746 with the defeat of the Jacobite uprising at Culloden. The defeat of

Bonnie Prince Charlie (Charles Edward Stuart, son of James III) was followed, in 1815, by the Highland clearances and this process, along with emigration, further undermined the Catholic Church in Scotland. The ascendancy of Protestantism in Scotland was aided by nationalist mobilization in opposition to an 'other'. For Colley (1996), Britishness was made possible by the presence of an external threat (French, Catholic, despotic). After the fall of the *ancien regime* the threat became radical republicanism, which was contrasted with the class compromise that had preserved the British establishment. With remarkable speed the Scots became British (North Britons) by virtue of a shared siege mentality against Continental radicalism. As would occur so many times, Scottish nationalism's growth was preempted by seemingly graver concerns.

After Union

Hanham (1969, 17-18) observes that in the 18th century two trends emerged to change Scottish society. One was a population shift from rural to urban areas. The second was a transformation of a cultural nature in which the traditional enmity between lowland and highland was replaced by a 'cult of the highlands'. The literature of this era was dominated by the figure of Sir Walter Scott, whose books celebrated the idyllic and romantic in Scottish culture.

After the Act of Union, Scottish intellectuals and writers sought to fulfill their artistic ambitions in London. As Brand (1978, 92) points out, Gaelic and Scots quickly declined as the literati of the nation abandoned their native tongues to gain access to the opportunities available in English. For Nairn (1981) this slow reorientation of the native Scottish intelligentsia to English habit and custom prevented Scotland from developing a vibrant nationalism in the 19th century as had so many of its European neighbors. The dominant literature of the day instead acted as a comforting, dull and nostalgic alternative to social criticism (Brand 1978, 94-5). With the defeat of the last Jacobite uprising at Culloden in 1745, British hegemony was assured. The Kilt, banned from

1747 to 1782, reappeared in a tamer fashion along with other symbols of 'North Britain' (Levin 1995). Scottish writers embraced the Kailyard (cabbage garden), that literary genre fostered by Scott, which took on a provincial and parochial character. The Kailyard reinvented Scottish society by avoiding attention to social problems and the life experiences of the majority of urban Scots, focusing instead on the charming and the timeless. The extent and success of this reinvention of tradition is astonishing. The Kilt took its place in the regiments of the British armies, Kings and Queens came from London to experience the quaint charms of rural Scotland, and Scottish writers moved south to attract the patronage of the Royal court.

Why did culture fail to serve as the template for the development of political nationalism in Scotland, when it might be argued that in fact it is folk-culture, adopted by nationalist elites, which serves as the basis for nationalist movements? Hroch (1993, 16) argues that in Central and Eastern Europe, members of non-dominant ethnic groups had no political education and could not appeal to concepts of rights. Much more tangible and immediate are the ethnic markers available to all as a basis of common purpose. The vernacular of the oppressed becomes the language of liberation and serves to distinguish the oppressed from the alien oppressors. This phenomenon did not occur in Scotland after 1707. Why not?

The answer to the above lies in the motive of the Scottish elite for seeking Union. Scotland was poor and lost trading opportunities in Europe after the Reformation (Paterson 1994, 28). Pragmatic arguments won the day because of the economic integration which had been going on between England and Scotland for some time. In addition, Presbyterians sought Union to protect Protestant Scotland, especially since Scots had suffered a great deal of religious persecution during the reign of Charles I (1629-40). The Union's guarantees for the preservation of Scottish institutions reduced opposition to Union, and, it must be pointed out, we are discussing *union*, in a strictly legal sense, and not conquest. The preconditions which made cultural

distinctiveness an available template for nationalist revolt were largely absent in Scotland. Even the often celebrated Jacobite rebellion of 1745 was led by Charles, raised in Italy, with scarce knowledge of Scottish custom and unable to speak Gaelic (Kennedy 1995, 37-52). Moreover, Charles' ambitions were hardly Scottish, as he wanted to take the throne in London and restore Catholicism to a united Britain.

Stephen Maxwell (1979, 5), a leading member of the SNP's '79 Group, has addressed the idiosyncratic nationalist experience in Scotland.

The history of 19th century Europe supplied many examples of societies, politically and culturally dependent, setting out to reconstruct a national identity from a cultural and linguistic base. In some cases, Norway and Czechoslovakia for example, the linguistic base had itself to be reconstructed by the labours of philologists and antiquarians. In different historical circumstances Scotland, herself one of the principal sources of the literary romanticism which fed 19th century cultural nationalism, might have followed a similar road to national revival. But Scotland, unlike no other of Europe's "sub-merged" nations, had to face a double ordeal. Its status as a junior partner in The Empire exposed the already attenuated sense of Scottish nationality to the full glamour of the British Ideal at the zenith of its prestige. Simultaneously, the massive dislocation caused by industrialization struck at the social base of Scottish cultural identity. It is not surprising that under such a battering Scottish nationality retreated to the twilight regions of the imagination where subsequent mutations bred the deformities of the Kailyard and the Great Tartan Monster. Thus Scotland's cultural identity had been devastated even before its exposure in the 20th century to the standardizing impact of the mass media.

Few events in Scottish history stir contemporary passions quite so vigorously as the 1707 Act of Union. This treaty united the parliaments of England and Scotland much as the Union of the Crowns brought both countries under the same monarch in 1603. For nationalist historians (Scott 1995), 1707 marks the subordination of the Scottish people, the loss of independence and the beginning of centuries of foreign domination. Other observers point out that class collusion between Scottish and English elites preserved Scottish elite privilege and institutions while disinheriting the population at large.³⁸ Nairn (1999) bluntly describes post-1707 national identity as "half lobotomized, half in deep freeze." The differing positions on this event notwithstanding,

³⁸ Attention to 'common folk' among historians is a relatively new phenomenon. Unfortunately little is known of the state of Scottish public opinion regarding the Act of Union.

the Act did have consequences for Scotland which remain important features of Scottish politics today.

The Act of Union preserved three distinctive elements of Scottish society, sometimes called the "Three pillars". The first of these is the Kirk--the Scottish national church. The Presbyterian church, in the absence of an interventionist welfare state, was the foundation of Scottish society. The Church's importance accounted for the ease with which the effective annexation of Scotland proceeded.

The legal system is "based on the Roman law of continental Europe rather than the case law of the English system: Scots lawyers like to think of the law as being based on first principles as much as on legal precedent" (Brown et al 1996, 2). English law, consolidated with parliamentary sovereignty, prevailed, but had to be 'translated' into Scots law. This remains the case today.

Finally, the Scottish education system remains a source of distinctiveness and a powerful segment of Scottish civil society. Scottish education is typically broader in scope than that of England and an undergraduate degree takes longer to complete.³⁹

The preservation of these central institutions provided the foundation for a strong civil society. McCrone (1992) has argued that, despite the merger with England, Scotland retained its distinctiveness. This is very similar to the situation which occurred in Québec. The church and legal system were permitted to survive and preserved elements of Québécois culture. Unlike Québec, however, Scotland does not enjoy a federal relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom. The survival of the three pillars of Scottish civil society tends to limit nationalist appeals since the unitary state has not eroded these central institutions.

³⁹ It may be a legacy of the Scottish enlightenment that Scottish undergraduate degrees require a broader scope of subjects than the more specialized English degree. Also, the typical Scottish university degree takes four years to complete rather than the standard three years in England and Wales. Scottish education is also said to be more egalitarian with a broader social mix entering universities each year compared with England and Wales.

Sharpe (1985, 93) points out that the UK state has undertaken to preempt nationalist mobilization in Scotland via "unobtrusive" devolution. The Union Jack is an amalgam of the flags of England, Scotland and Wales. Scotland is overrepresented in Westminster (72 seats) despite years of net population loss. The Scottish Office, which now constitutes the largest department in the government, was established in 1872. More symbolically, Scottish sports teams compete separately from the UK's.⁴⁰ Also, there are many Scottish military units in the British armed forces.

Net emigration in the 18th and 19th centuries also served as a safety valve, acting as an avenue for the economically disadvantaged. This helped to moderate unemployment and blunt discontent which might have been exploited by nationalists. National-- as opposed to provincial-- identity, was retarded by other factors as well. British history and historians portrayed the Scots as a kind of 'rescued people'. McCreadie (1991, 40-1) argues that this history portrayed Scots as a backward and poor people whose salvation was the Act of Union and the benefits of empire. As so frequently happens a dominant power promoted its own hegemony by nurturing a sense of inferiority amongst the subject people. The active discouragement and repression of native languages served to limit the use of Scots and Gaelic to isolated regions and as a vernacular rather than as a medium for either education or artistic expression. Cultural matters suffered after the Union of the Crowns (1603) when the patronage of the court for the arts (in Scotland) ceased, and artists, poets, and musicians moved south to London (Daiches 1964, 11). More importantly for the development of political nationalism, no nationalist intelligentsia articulated an independence vision for Scotland.⁴¹ Without such political actors and by depending on the British Empire for

⁴⁰ The four constituent nations of the UK compete separately in World Cup soccer and at the Commonwealth games where each team competes under its own flag and national anthem.

⁴¹ According to Paterson (1994, 65) Scottish nationalist expressions differed from those of Continental Europe in the 19th century in several important ways. First, cultural distinctiveness, found especially in romantic literature of Scott and others, was viewed by most politicians as a private matter, unrelated to the form of the state. Also, the

economic growth it is little wonder that Scotland lacked any serious nationalist expression until the end of the 19th century and even then this movement was primarily concerned with seeking home rule and not independence. From the 1880s to the 1920s 'nationalism' was confined to Home Rule movements taking their cue from Ireland. Taken together these measures have helped to preserve a sense of Scottish identity while discouraging Scottish nationalism, and, in a limited fashion, instilling a sense of Britishness. In one view: "Because England was regarded as the fount of reason and a bulwark of Protestantism, emulating the country became the major preoccupation of Scottish politicians, whether local or national" (Brown 1996, 6).

There had always been a core of intellectuals and cultural figures supporting cultural renaissance in Scotland and a return to statehood. However these voices were rarely heard by the public at large. Nationalism remained off the political agenda in Scotland because it served no pressing need. The primary concerns in Scottish politics in the first half of the 20th century were the economic struggle of the working class and the fight to extend the franchise. These battles were interpreted not by nationalist, but by class discourses.

The twentieth century might, in a legislative history, one day be called the devolution century. There have been close to two dozen bills proposing home rule for Scotland; none of these has passed. Frustrated aspirations combined with a sense of a declining empire slowly made nationalist politics more tenable to some Scots (still a minority of course). The conclusion of the First World war saw the emergence of new military powers in the new Soviet Union, Japan and the United States. Britain began to recognize the self-determination of many of its colonies, including Canada (Dominion Act, 1931). These dispensations of autonomy and independence would serve to make the message of Scottish nationalists even more palatable in decades to come.

Enlightenment tradition stressed universality and progress. Thus, the adoption of superior English norms was viewed as a natural social development. Official nationalism found room for a strong Scottish identity compatible with Union and empire building.

Home rule had, between 1880 and 1920, been the subject of considerable debate (Brand 1978, 39). It is generally agreed that Home Rule would have been granted to Scotland and Wales had not war and depression pushed constitutional reform from the agenda. Home Rule as a policy had emerged from the Irish experience and reflected the political clout of the then thriving Liberal party. Gladstone had endorsed Home Rule as a means to solve the 'Irish question' and advocated it 'all round' for the various nations of Britain. The Liberal party introduced legislation in 1884 to establish the Scottish Office. Despite this, the lukewarm enthusiasm with which Scottish Home Rule was met by successive British governments encouraged the genesis of a number of organizations. From 1885 to 1906 the ruling Conservative party's opposition to Irish Home rule extended to opposition to similar treatment of Scotland. By 1918 the Liberal party was effectively destroyed from within and hopes for Home Rule temporarily dashed.

Labour had never placed a high priority on Home Rule although prominent Scottish members had endorsed it (Keir Hardie). English Labourites were largely indifferent and the strain of socialism dominant at the beginning of this century focused keenly on societal transformation and the reduction of disparity. Some Scottish socialists, like Glasgow-Gorbals MP, George Buchanan, introduced Home Rule bills, but the governments of the day viewed it as a low priority and such bills died of neglect rather than outright hostility.⁴²

Home Rule then suffered from the demise of the Liberal party and from the ascension of the Labour party, which for the most part viewed devolutionary proposals as a distraction. Brand (1978, 46) argues that the tenor of British politics changed with a steady diminution in Britain's status as a world power from the beginning of the century. This change had important implications for Scotland's position in the Union. The Boer war demonstrated the extent to which the Empire had declined. Later, the First

⁴² Between 1889 and 1927 there were 14 Home Rule Bills and Motions introduced into parliament. All were defeated (Brand 1978, 43).

World war weakened Britain but more importantly changed British political culture. As in Germany, a new generation of writers and artists reflected the *ennui* of a society demoralized by war and frustrated by their political elites.⁴³ The First World war was intended, at least partly, to resolve the political status of smaller nations. The aftermath of the Great war served to make more palatable other forms of political organization.

The primary beneficiary of the discontent outlined above was the Labour party. The primary political cleavage became that of class. Union struggles and the talent of the Labour party's politicians served to marginalize Scottish nationalism as a political force in Scotland. Brand (1978, 171) observes that Labour had not only the talents of politicians like Ramsay MacDonald and Keir Hardie but also could rely on the organizational resources of the trade unions. Only when the dominance of class cleavage seemed to fade during the 1960's could the SNP hope to become a force in Scottish politics.

The Scottish National Party and Its Antecedents

Complementing the rise of formal political organizations seeking Home Rule was a kind of cultural renaissance in Scottish literary circles. The two spheres frequently overlapped and a number of writers of this era were actively involved in politics. Part of the blame for the factional and fragmented nature of the Scottish national movements may be attributed in some part to these intellectuals. Webb (1977, 47) observes that:

The skill of the intellectual is his ability to categorise, rearrange and manipulate concepts into a coherent and often persuasive format. A political party needs such persons for they provide a creative element. But the dominance of intellectuals usually means that there is no "party line," the love of debate and dispute taking precedence over the need to present a united front.⁴⁴

⁴³ Almond and Verba (1965) found that Britons shared a political culture of deference which fostered a "civic culture". British political history suggests that this culture of deference has been less prevalent than behavioralist political scientists contend.

⁴⁴ W. Oliver Brown, a founding member of the National Party of Scotland remarked, "I bitterly regret the day when I compromised the unity of my party by admitting a second member" (Webb 1977, 54).

Perhaps it was the legacy of the Kailyard which encouraged the reactionary turn taken by writers and activists in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The first chair of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), John Stuart Blackie, was influenced by German nationalists like Herder (Hanham 1969, 40). Blackie argued for Scots pronunciation, admired Highland culture and criticized English influences in education. The SHRA's objective was to "Foster the National sentiment of Scotland, and to maintain her national rights and honour" (Hanham 1969, 120). In addition to the SHRA a number of publications promoted Scottish culture. Thomas Wannliss was the anti-English publisher of *The Thistle* from 1909 to 1918, joined by *Scottish Patriot*, a culturally oriented journal, and Stuart Erskine's *Gyth na Bliadhna* (Hanham 1969, 122-123). Erskine spent much of his life attempting to revive Gaelic and usher in a Celtic revival. In 1914 he wrote:

The Celtic culture takes its rise from the soil of Scotland, and bears the indelible impress of the collective genius of the nation. To the anglicizing tendencies of the new feudalism it opposes a body of beliefs and aspirations which are drawn from the purest native sources. . . Hitherto, what is called the Celtic renaissance has been confined to the Gaelic-speaking parts of the Kingdom. It is now time for that movement to descend from the hills, and to endeavor to interest the English-speaking Celt of the plains in the manners of his pre-feudalized forefathers (Hanham 1969, 125).

Erskine was not alone in his concern for language, custom, and nation. Similar voices were heard on the left. Keir Hardie, founder of the Scottish Parliamentary Labour Party, agreed that national customs were "part of our very being" and as such needed protection through the existence of a national parliament (Hanham 1969, 83).

The SHRA was an important organization but shared the fate of the British Liberal party (all Liberal MPs were members) as the SHRA had always been closely linked with it prior to 1914. After the first world war the organization relied more on the Labour party and trade union support.⁴⁵ The SHRA's *modus operandi* was to organize and stir public opinion with the hope of influencing Scottish members of Parliament to

⁴⁵ Such was the link to organized labour that some Conservative supporters of Home Rule refused to speak at SHRA meetings (Brand 1978, 178).

sponsor Home Rule bills. The SHRA's leadership was eager to represent the full spectrum of Scottish society and carefully avoided appeals to partisan politics.

For all of its efforts the SHRA was a relatively conservative organization seeking control over Scottish affairs by a Scottish assembly. As I will argue, there is continuity in this element of Scottish history; the patience and reasonableness of autonomy-seeking organizations made it possible for successive governments to ignore their demands. Time and time again MPs sponsored bills which languished at the committee stage. By the end of the 1920s R. E. Muirhead, leader of SHRA, despaired of the lobbying approach and in 1925 encouraged the membership of SHRA to approve the creation of a national party. The membership rejected this motion and by the end of the 1920's Muirhead left the SHRA to stand as a candidate in a general election. In the absence of his leadership, the organization collapsed.

The Great Depression stimulated considerable discontent in Scotland and created an atmosphere conducive for the growth of nationalism. The SNP was not, for the most part, the beneficiary of this political discontent. Webb (1977, 77) comments:

It was not apparent to most people that nationalism had any ready solution for the troubles that beset Scotland, while the Labour party had a coherent policy and promised to aid the most disadvantaged in society. Many of the early nationalists, although perturbed by the economic state of Scotland, were in the main motivated by a fear for Scottish culture which they saw as being increasingly anglicized. But the survival of a Scottish dialect means little to an unemployed factory worker when others are promising more work or unemployment benefits. It is noticeable that since its early days as a political party the cultural content of the SNP program has become less obvious, and the emphasis upon economic and social matters greater. The nationalist political party, which began by stressing on every occasion the unique cultural identity of the Scottish people, now assumes it. No longer does it need to be stressed, but merely mobilized from time to time.

The Depression marks the end of cultural nationalism as a politically salient force. Webb (1977, 115) argues that the party deemphasized culture in order to shrug off any idealist or romantic image, preferring to present the nationalist argument as a sober political and economic one. Ethnic or cultural content was not rooted out; cultural symbols and myths are employed for emotive effect; but in matters of policy, cultural

matters have been minimized. In a sense then, this shift represents a transition from cultural nationalism to a more deliberate *political* nationalism. Scottish nationalism would now assert an alternative constitutional future, and cease ruminating on a mythical, idealized past.

From 1942-- after the party split over conscription and WWII--until 1960, the party's fortunes fell considerably. The party entered a period of isolation. After having purged the party of those, like John MacCormick, who supported cross-party alliances for the goal of an elected Assembly, the SNP enjoyed internal unity in the midst of popular neglect. This status can be accounted for by two post-1945 developments. First, the Atlee government brought great changes to the organization and administration of public life. Administrative devolution and new government/private initiatives created a climate of economic expectation. Second, the Scottish Covenant Movement had attracted 2 million signatures on behalf of its campaign to acquire a Scottish Assembly. Although this movement would ultimately fail in the early 1950s, its initial effect was to sap support from the SNP and marginalize its political presence.⁴⁶ At a time when neither the Labour nor the Conservative parties were interested in devolution, the Covenant movement served as a lightning rod for those inclined toward constitutional change.

Nor have appeals to linguistic based ethnic identity been very successful in Scotland in the 20th century. First, unlike Wales, Scotland lacks a widely-used separate language. Gaelic survives in isolated parts of Scotland and is probably spoken by no more than 65,000 people (McLeod 1997, 106).⁴⁷ For the vast majority of the population, language lacks salience as a political issue. Similarly the common tradition

⁴⁶ Levitt (1998, 34) argues that the Covenant was unable to change the landscape of Scottish politics because it was run by 'outsiders' who had little electoral impact. It was unsuccessful at long-term mobilization for specific policy goals. If there had been no Covenant movement there might have been greater support for the only political party advocating change to the constitutional status quo.

⁴⁷ Beresford (1985, 52) argues that the SNP was slow to develop policy to support Gaelic. The party set up a Gaelic secretariat in 1968 and only in 1974 was a policy adopted which would see Gaelic offered in all Scottish schools. For comparison, there are 500,000 speakers of Welsh (McLeod 1997, 106).

of Protestantism between Scotland and England hinders the use of religion as a resource for mobilizing national sentiment.

A recent court case in the UK, reported in a column by Jeffrey Simpson, "The Scots know how to tangle ethnic identity with nationhood," published in the Globe and Mail on 4 March 1997, concerned the charge by three discharged Scottish flight attendants that they had been fired because they were Scots. The industrial tribunal dismissed the case, arguing that Scots could not be viewed as a separate ethnic group and thereby qualify for protection under the 1976 Race Relations Act. The tribunal presiding over the case argued that Scots and English are of the same racial stock and therefore discrimination could not be based on ethnicity. This case clearly demonstrates the contestable nature of ethnic identity. For most Scots, however, distinct ethnic identity is a non-issue, with over 90 percent expressing varying degrees of Scottishness (see Table 2). This may not have a political expression, but the sense of Scottish distinctiveness is overwhelming. This does little to inform academic disputes as to the *sources* of group distinctiveness but does confirm the presence of something approximating an ethnic consciousness among Scots.

Table 2
National Identity In Scotland, 1992 (Percent)

Scottish not British	19
Scottish more than British	40
Equally	33
British more than Scottish	3
British not Scottish	3
None, don't know	1

Source: J. Brand *et al* (1993) cited in Keating (1996, 237).

The popular culture of the Kailyard is at least mildly embarrassing to most Scots and, as discussed above, was quite useless in fomenting a nationalist, or any other, critical discourse in Scotland. The Scottish historian, T. C. Smout (1994, 109) argues: "The point to be made here is that, in popular culture, Scottish history today appears as the stuff of heritage industry, colourful and episodic, but basically not serious. It is a poor foundation on which to identify a Scottish Nation with a confident and empowered state."

The SNP has chosen to emphasize the incompetence and neglect of the British state in its literature, but has not appealed to anti-Englishness.⁴⁸ Nairn (1981) and others have expressed the view that the absence of an explicit concern with culture on the part of the public and the lack of a threat of cultural submergence can be traced to a well-understood and widely-held sense of Scottish identity in Scotland. This is an example of what Billig (1995) refers to as "banal nationalism"; this nationalism is implicit, inarticulate and second-nature. Its power, for McCrone, lies in its capacity to routinize political orientations. In Scotland, football, the military, and the three pillars of Scottish society--the Church of Scotland, the legal and education systems--have served to remind Scots that they are Scots. Nairn (1981) traces the genesis of nationalism in Scottish politics to the discovery of oil, the rapaciousness of international finance and oil companies, and the concomitant 'uneven development'. Nationalism, for Nairn, was mobilized by activists in response to the intrusion of international capital.

The SNP's electoral history following the second world war may be characterized as: sporadic successes up to 1970; the explosive growth of the early 1970s; and the subsequent return to modest and sporadic success in the 1980s.

May 1945 marked the party's first electoral victory, in the Motherwell by-election. Dr. Robert McIntyre, still an active figure in the party, had held this seat for

⁴⁸ This does not imply that anti-English sentiment is not found in Scottish society as a whole (see Chapter 6).

only two months when Labour swept into power in June of 1945. Still, this victory in the Labour heartland helped sustain hope for electoral success and provided the party with a great deal of attention.

Despite the party's modest resources and political profile it managed to grow considerably in the 1960s and 1970s. The party had more branch organizations than either Labour or the Conservative party in the mid-1970s (Brand 1978, 269).⁴⁹ In the Conservative and Labour parties, memberships have been organized along electoral boundaries. SNP branches exist wherever 20 paid members of the party gather to represent a community (whether a village or a city).⁵⁰ This reflects a commitment to grassroots organizing by the party. This is also a pragmatic response to a highly heterogeneous membership which, in the 1960s-70s, occupied a broad ideological spectrum and contained those interested in independence alone as well as those (primarily of a social democratic hue) who placed independence within a broader set of political objectives viewed as unachievable in the UK.

In 1970 the party won its first seat in a general election. Cooler heads might have reacted with concern that the party's first seat was the isolated constituency of Western Isles, confirming perhaps, that the SNP was a party of highland romanticism. In fact the party became increasingly technocratic, with patriotic songs confined to the pubs during party conferences. The SNP began and continues to conduct itself as the party of pragmatists. The battle for independence, it seems, will be won with charts, diagrams and analysis supporting the practical and prudent case for independence.

⁴⁹ The Conservative *and* Unionist Party in Scotland is really a cadre party rather than a mass one meaning that the organization is primarily evident during election campaigns and is hierarchical and elite driven.

⁵⁰ In May of 1962 the SNP had 18 branches with 867 members (Brand 1978, 269). In 1971 the party had 518 branches and approximately 125,000 members (Brand 1978, 270). By comparison, the British Labour overall has experienced a steady decline in membership. In the early 1950s the party had one million members in the UK overall, by the end of the 1980s this figure had declined to 300,000 (Ware 1996, 88)

As time has gone on, the SNP electorate has changed considerably. A few general remarks can be made. First the party's support has shifted to the left since the 1970s. Secondly, the party has tended to attract younger members of the new-middle class.⁵¹ The party has tended to walk an electoral tightrope, avoiding appealing to any particular segment of Scottish society exclusively. In the 1960s and 1970s SNP gains at the ballot box tended to come at the expense of the Conservatives, but in recent years the primary source of defectors to the SNP has been the Labour party. This trend should not be exaggerated, however; Labour currently holds 56 seats of 72 in Scotland and remains the dominant party in polls. Levy (1995, 296) observes that the SNP has shifted between a social-democratic platform and a more centrist position on the political spectrum. The 1970s saw the most public and acrimonious manifestation of the left-right debate, when the centrist majority in the leadership expelled the more socialist elements. Yet, commenting on the SNP and Plaid Cymru, Levy (1995, 296) observes that: "In 1992, both the SNP and Plaid Cymru (hereafter Plaid) could be described as socialist parties which also happened to be nationalist. It would have been difficult to make the same judgment in 1979."

The socialist positioning of the SNP today can be attributed to the shift in ideological positions by the two main political parties to the right and the subsequent ascendancy to the leadership of socialists within the SNP. The post-1970s move to the left on the part of the SNP is part of a strategic attempt to gain needed support in the central belt of Scotland and has yielded results. An ICM poll taken in February 1998 showed the SNP to be the second most popular choice among Glasgow voters (29

⁵¹ This might also reflect the general phenomenon of dealignment (Beer 1982; Alt 1984); new voters are much less likely to hold durable partisan attachments in an era of declining union membership and social mobility.

Younger Scots seem more comfortable with radical constitutional change. A System 3 poll undertaken in May 1998, reported in an article by Iain Martin, "Young voters shift to SNP," and published in Scotland on Sunday on 15 June 1998, showed that 73% of 18-24 year olds and 61% of 25 to 34 years olds (sample size 1,045) favored independence in Europe.

percent of respondents) for an upcoming local election (McCrone 1998, 149). This area has traditionally supported Labour but is one in which the SNP has made inroads in by-elections and local elections. Table 3 indicates that the party has managed to maintain the support of a substantial portion of manual workers. These figures remain lower than those of Labour but manual workers support the SNP in higher numbers than they do the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats.

Table 3

Support for party by class (percent)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1992</u>
Conservative	Non-manual	31	46	45	34	34
	Manual	20	28	19	15	18
Labour	Non-manual	26	24	22	32	29
	Manual	44	47	61	54	
Liberals+	Non-manual	9	11	23	9	14
	Manual	7	8	9	5	8
SNP	Non-manual	29	18	9	22	21
	Manual	26	14	10	24	26

Source: Brown et al 1996, 151. By voting intention.
+ Liberals include Liberal, Liberal/SDP Alliance, Liberal-Democrat.

October 1974 represents the high water mark of SNP support since its founding in 1932. Having captured eleven seats, the party was viewed as a force to be reckoned with. Its presence forced the Labour government to pass a devolution bill (subject to referendum) in 1978. This bill ultimately failed to meet the threshold criterion necessary for adoption but managed to bring constitutional politics to the foreground in the 1970s. However, the 1970s ended on a sour note for the SNP. The party proceeded to tear itself apart both ideologically and through nasty personal attacks blaming various leaders for the referendum result and the failure to capitalize on this result in the 1979 general election. With Thatcher's victory the constitution faded as an issue, and the struggle against neo-conservative fundamentalism began.

Only in the mid-eighties did the party factions manage to reconcile. Expelled members of the '79 group returned and now effectively run the party. Jim Sillars, a Labour defector, won Glasgow-Govan in a 1988 by-election. (Following the defeat of the 1976 Devolution Bill, Jim Sillars (Labour MP, South Ayrshire) had resigned from the Labour Party.) He embarked upon a remarkable political journey which took him from the Labour party to the Scottish Labour Party (SLP) and finally to the SNP (eventually Sillars would leave party politics altogether). What is fascinating is how Sillars' evolving political career converged with the development of the SNP. Sillars was convinced, in light of the centralizing tendencies inherent in UK governance as well as the EEC, that a Scottish Assembly was an essential political counterweight (1986, 59). His newly created SLP favored maximum devolution within the UK.


For Sillars the defection from the Labour party brought a great deal of personal grief and essentially ended a promising political career. However, his defection also brought benefits. In his own words, upon "escaping from the party's taboos and the limitations on thought imposed by trying to fit into what the English majority would accept, the intellect became free to roam, question, probe and consider all options on every issue" (Sillars 1986, 60). For Sillars the options became increasingly clear. How, he asked, could Scotland be rid of nuclear bases when the final decision lay with the English majority (1986, 62)? The best option available was maximal autonomy, a divorce in which oil sharing would be viewed as "civilized and prudent" (1986, 63). The devolution debacle entrenched Sillars in this position. The 40 percent amendment to the Scotland and Wales Bill was especially insulting in light of the 1975 EEC Referendum which, while also involving a transfer of sovereignty, required only a simple majority. The ensuing campaign in 1979 and the defeat of the Bill caused Sillars further anguish until the electoral annihilation of his SLP in the 1979 General Election led him to again reconsider his political options.

Sillars had regarded the SNP with suspicion as "much of what the SNP leadership said was a denial of the validity of a socialist reading of Scottish history and the need for Socialist solutions" (1986, 76). Happily for Sillars, the '79 ginger group had formed by this time and promised to tackle the divide between class and nationalist politics. In April 1980, Sillars joined the SNP and much of the party's serious intellectual maturation and electoral consolidation can be traced to the force of his ideas and personality. It would be Sillars who would rejuvenate the party, introducing the 'Independence in Europe' policy which would prove so successful. The party's expectations for the 1992 election were dashed, yet polls have indicated unprecedented support for constitutional change in Scotland.⁵²

Levy (1995, 304) argues that support for the SNP is "now quite diffuse both geographically and demographically." With few exceptions it has tended to receive at least 10 percent of the vote in each constituency. Table 4 shows the performance of the party at General elections. Map 2 provides a detailed constituency profile of the SNP's 1997 General election performance. Data from the early seventies to the early nineties (Table 3) indicate that the SNP has spanned class distinctions. This is consistent with the tendency for Scots to view themselves as distinct from other Britons. Support for the party transcended class distinctions with no clear class orientation to supporters.

⁵² The SNP conducted the 1992 campaign under the premature slogan "Free by '93". This goal was not achieved but subsequent performances at by-elections provided hope in the period before the 1997 election. Currently the SNP has 6 seats in Angus, Banff & Buchan, Galloway and Upper Nithsdale, Moray, Perth, and Tayside (see Map Two).

1997 General Election Results by Constituency in Scotland.



Source: (*The Times* May 4, 1997)

Table 4
Electoral Performance of the Scottish National Party

Year	Seats fought	Percentage of vote in seats fought	Percentage of total Scottish vote (seats won)
1945	8	7.6	1.2
1950	3	7.4	0.4
1951	2	12.2	0.3
1955	2	14.5	0.5
1959	5	11.4	0.8
1964	15	11.4	0.8
1966	23	14.1	5
1970	65	12.2	11.4 (1)
1974 (Feb.)	70	22.1	21.9 (7)
1974 (Oct.)	71	30.4	30.4 (11)
1979	71	17.3	17.3 (2)
1983	72	11.6	11.6 (2)
1987	71	14.2	14.2 (3)
1992	72	21.5	21.5 (3)
1997	72	21.9	21.9 (6)

Sources: McCrone 1992, 152; Brown *et al* 1996, 8.

Conclusion

The SNP is clearly a civic nationalist party in that the conception of Scottishness is clearly a territorial and voluntaristic one rather than one based on some combination of "race," language, religion and the like. It has attempted to appeal to all segments of

Scottish society in its efforts to secure independence. Many observers have noted the absence of a politically salient Scottish culture. Breuilly (1994, 323) argues that:

Even if there was a sense of cultural identity it appears to have had no political relevance until the 1960s and has had only an implicit reference in SNP propaganda. It is in any case difficult to specify the content of this silent culture. Many cultural features, for example dialect, exist elsewhere, including English regions. Gaelic has played no role in modern Scottish nationalism, where English was established as the principal language through much of the country in the medieval period, unlike the Welsh language in Welsh nationalism. The absence of a powerful cultural nationalist movement since the nineteenth century has meant that there is no distinctively Scottish literature or art. Hugh MacDiarmid stands out as much because of his isolation as because of his ability. Most of the Scottish 'traditions' in which tourists delight are the product of the of the first 'tourists', English Victorians; they were kept sentimental and harmless and were celebrated only after the societies of the Highlands which inspired them had been safely destroyed.

The SNP has persisted despite lengthy periods of electoral failure and has only been able to exert a salient presence in Scottish politics since the 1970s. The goal of independence now seems realistic, and hence the question of whether independence can ameliorate the problems associated with the *status quo* is more relevant than ever. The historical and social context of Scotland's political system has provided fertile ground for a civic rather than an ethnic nationalism. The task now turns to analyzing the SNP's responses to the challenge of independence. Whether the party can create the kind of solidarity necessary for a united stance in favor of a kind of constitutional patriotism or rooted cosmopolitanism in the face of mobile capital and supra-national integration remain important questions to which I now turn.

Chapter 4

The Political Economy of Scottish Nationalism

Nationalists seek their own *polis* and consider sovereignty the pinnacle of collective citizenship within the community of nations. Nationalists take, as natural, the view that all identifiable communities have a self-evident right to 'freedom'; 'independence'; or 'sovereignty'. In this chapter, I critically examine the Scottish National Party's conceptions of sovereignty as well as challenges to this project. In an era of globalization (economic, cultural and political), one cannot take for granted platitudes about the freedom of nations or states. Articles of faith regarding the sanctity of state autonomy persist uncomfortably alongside mobile financial capital, increasing awareness of the interdependence of economies and ecosystems, and declining state competence in relation to vexing socio-economic problems. Today, sovereignty is marked by serious limitations with which the SNP must grapple. The civic nationalism of the SNP is a flexible doctrine determined to make the case for the independence of Scotland within the limits imposed by the obligations of membership in the European Union (EU). The SNP's case for independence is based on two themes: the greater effectiveness of policy making in smaller states, and the enhanced economic opportunities available to a self-governing Scotland.

Few, if any, political jurisdictions, currently or historically, can be seen to have held complete autarchic and unfettered sovereignty. I am not claiming that the SNP holds this view either. Rather, there are, in my view, novel and weighty impediments to political autonomy brought on by market forces (that is, private and unaccountable forces) sheltered by their power and fluid structure. The debate over independence in Scotland has been conducted primarily at the level of emotion, grievance and a sense that independence will provide a speedy solution to a long-term problem. My aim is to broaden the debate in order to weigh often ignored realities.

Nationalism, however defined, must contain two central elements. First, nationalists must claim to speak for an identifiable community upon which they wish to confer citizenship. Citizenship here refers to that bundle of rights and privileges enjoyed by the members of a particular community. The other element dealt with here is that of sovereignty, that is, the rights and privileges conferred upon a political community within the existing state system. This status permits states to enter into treaties with other state 'actors' and, among other things, maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a particular territory.

In the case of the SNP, the commitment to independence must be reconciled with the challenges facing the Westphalian state. Any civic nationalist movement faces the task of making its sovereigntist program realizable within a given (though not immutable) international framework of rules and institutions. My intention is to analyze SNP policy and discourse regarding sovereignty in order to evaluate the ability of such a program to serve as a solidarity-building form of community defense, and template for democratic renewal in the 21st century. Two obvious but essential questions are posed: What is sovereignty for? Can a degree of sovereignty necessary for meaningful autonomy be had by small states at the end of the 20th century?

The chapter examines the evolution of the discourse of the SNP regarding the political economy of sovereignty as manifested in oil politics. On the basis of this analysis, I will argue that the SNP has had some difficulty in confronting the challenges to sovereignty which may reduce the scope of decision-making in an independent Scottish state and therefore reduce the civic-nationalist project's ability to provide democratic renewal and self-determination. The past is indeed a prison: the party's fundamental demand for sovereignty is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength in that appeals based on historical precedent and grievance have a great deal of political influence (particularly when history appears to repeat itself) but it is a

weakness in that the imagined nation-state of Scotland belongs to an era in which sovereign states enjoyed a greater measure of self-determination. Here I cast doubt on the simplistic equation which sees oil revenues bankrolling an extensive Scottish welfare state. Instead, the extent to which SNP economic goals can be attained in an independent state will depend on the ability of Scotland to diversify the economy and encourage a national consensus on the proper model for economic development.

McLean (1970, 370) has called nationalism "flexible and protean." The Scottish National Party to which McLean refers has exemplified these very characteristics. While the period from 1945 to 1959 represented a hiatus for the party in terms of policy innovation, one sees substantive changes arising as events salient to Scotland emerged. The evolution of the SNP can be traced through its responses to emergent issues such as oil discovery or European integration. The task, then, is to examine the party's positions on these matters in relation to the content of sovereignty.

The party was founded in April of 1934 in response to the failure of Scotland to achieve Home Rule as Ireland had done. The party had numerous antecedents, primarily cultural ones, emphasizing a Gaelic renaissance (Scots National League) and other groups concerned with the promotion of Scottish literature (Scottish National Movement). The SNP Constitution states that the Party's objective is: "The restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish government whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered into with other nations in order to further international cooperation and world peace" (Quoted in Brand 1978, 305). This formal, rather general, statement of principle has, in the author's view, obscured potentially serious obstacles to securing such a level of sovereignty. This can be seen quite readily in the debates and campaigns surrounding oil resources.

Sovereignty and Economic Nationalism: SNP Oil Policy

In October 1970, British Petroleum made a commercial petroleum strike in the North Sea 110 miles northeast of Aberdeen. This helped deflate a powerful and long-standing argument of the unionist parties: that Scotland was too poor to go it alone. This was particularly important psychologically because the following year Upper Clyde Shipbuilders went bankrupt at a cost of 6000 jobs (Baur 1988, 1348). More than a shutdown, this event signaled the end of the era of shipbuilding.

Five giant oil fields were found in all, accounting for 31 per cent of UK oil reserves, and these were expected to employ as many as 40,000 people (Baur 1988, 1348). The SNP was presented with an enormous political opportunity. Rather than pressing on with a campaign against British membership in the EEC, the party immediately put oil at the top of the agenda. The National Council approved then-leader Gordon Wilson's three steps to independence (Marr 1992, 132). These were: 1) attain a devolved Scottish assembly; 2) take control of the newly found oil reserves and; 3) achieve 'freedom' for Scotland. By September 1972, the party had adopted two slogans: 'It's Scotland's Oil' and 'Rich Scots or Poor Britons'. The party could now point to an issue of vital importance to Scotland and claim to be the legitimate defender of the interests of the nation. As Levy argues, the SNP's position changed the politics of oil (Levy 1990). Whereas the Conservative and Labour parties fought over the private/public ownership dimension, the SNP claimed the nationalist one. The emphasis upon Scottish sovereignty distinguishes the SNP position from that of the mainstream parties. The Conservatives viewed oil as a magnet for investment; Labour viewed it as a vehicle for enhancement of the welfare state; while the SNP viewed oil as the currency with which the prize, statehood, could be purchased. In the period between the elections of 1970 and February 1974, oil preoccupied the SNP.

However, events outside the UK and political concerns within confronted the nationalists and forced a reappraisal of the 'oil campaign'.

It is interesting to note how much the oil issue changed the discourse of the SNP. A substantive economic study, commissioned by the SNP in 1969, identified the problems with Scotland's economy, as well as potential solutions to these problems. Economist David Simpson argued that the case for independence was not subordinate to economic arguments, but that this case was made easier by the mismanagement of the Scottish economy by the UK government. Interestingly, not one comment is made about oil (even the potential of oil resources which might have been assumed at that time). The case for independence was based on three primary types of economic mismanagement on the part of the UK: demand mismanagement in the form of deflationary measures, which may have been appropriate to South-east England, but which had a negative effect on employment in Scotland; secondly, long-term neglect of the Scottish economy in the form of the absence of long-term planning; thirdly, the mismanagement of the public sector and the absence of democratic control of nationalized industry (Simpson 1969, 5-8).

To some degree then, an economic argument for independence had already been made before the oil campaign. But there can be no doubt that the oil campaign strengthened the economic case for independence as well as popular support for independence generally. By the 1970s, oil was a standard feature in SNP literature. In *It's Time*. . . , the SNP's supplement to the October 1974 election manifesto, oil takes center stage. The party clearly identifies the dangers of remaining within the UK as long as management of the oil resource remains in the hands of the Westminster government (SNP 1974, 3).

London Governments, whether Labour or Tory, or a coalition of English parties, need to exploit Scotland's oil with the greatest possible speed in order to reduce the United Kingdom's balance of payments deficit. But the London "smash and grab" of Scotland's oil is causing the maximum of social and environmental damage while bringing the minimum of economic benefit. Scottish industry is not being given time to equip itself to take advantage of

the industrial opportunities: the jobs generated by the construction boom will be short-lived, leaving Scotland's unemployment problem as bad after the oil has been exhausted as before its discovery.

Rather than take its place as one of the most "prosperous places in the world" Scotland must stand by and watch the UK government use the resource to stabilize its own faltering economy at the expense of the long-term development of Scotland. This situation would be remedied by independence (SNP 1974, 3).

A Scottish Government, by contrast, would control the oil companies' operations, to insure the development of the oil at a rate which suits Scotland's interests, not those of London, the Common Market or the USA. A production rate of 50 million tons annually would meet Scotland's own need for oil-- some twelve million tons per year-- while leaving a generous surplus for export to England and elsewhere. Scottish firms would have time to establish a stake in the oil industry, thereby providing secure long-term employment.

The revenues provided by oil would also finance investment in Scottish infrastructure, pay for higher pensions, and fund development projects in the Third World.

One can forgive the SNP its preoccupation with oil when one looks at the value of oil production in the North sea. In British fields, the Department of Energy estimated the value of production to be £6.75 million *daily* (SNP 1977, 72). Another pamphlet (SNP 1977b, 2) warns that:

The choice for Scotland has become even more urgent. The discovery of massive oil-fields in the Scottish sector of the Continental Shelf has given us a unique opportunity. If we fail to grasp this, then future generations of Scots will look back in despair and anger at the great chance which was missed. If this present generation of Scots have [sic] the spirit to take control of what by right is theirs, we can rapidly overcome the bitter legacy of poverty, inequality, unemployment, emigration and cultural neglect. Scotland can face a new future with renewed dignity and confidence.

According to the SNP, nationalist pressure in Scotland did secure the siting of the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) headquarters in Glasgow. But, these were considered to be "trivial, token gestures" (SNP 1978, 6). The SNP's minimum demand for the period from 1980-83 was a third of annual revenues (estimated at £1,000 million) from the Scottish sector of the North Sea, to be invested in Scotland.

With this share, Scotland could address "the back-log of vital investment in schools, hospitals, housing and welfare" (SNP 1978, 7). The regulation of the oil industry would be increased, and the Petroleum Revenue Tax raised from 45 percent to 75 percent (SNP 1978, 7). In addition, the rate of oil extraction would be reduced to maximize oil and gas revenues and extend the life of the resource. Work permits would also be introduced to decrease the number of non-Scottish personnel to 20 percent of the total workforce. A Scottish National Oil Company would be established to take over the Scottish share of the BNOG.

Developments outside Scotland contributed to ambivalence within the SNP regarding the oil campaign. Levy (1990, 49-53) observes that the production cuts and price rises implemented by OPEC actually hurt the nationalists as their policy on oil became linked to that of the unpopular oil cartel. The party was viewed as appealing to the greed of voters.⁵³ The oil campaign, referred to by Levy as "this autarchic neo-OPEC position," ended after the February 1974 election. SNP MPs requested that this provocative sloganeering stop with the advent of rather close ties between Labour and SNP MPs at Westminster. In any event, oil would soon fade somewhat from the agenda of the SNP as the promise of devolution attracted its earnest attention.

The oil campaign presented an enormous opportunity for the SNP. The campaign for statehood had rested on arguments regarding the right of Scots to reassume self-determination, as well as an assemblage of economic arguments as outlined above. With oil, the SNP was able to present a convincing case to Scottish voters regarding the economic viability of a Scottish state. On the other hand, new

⁵³ The SNP seemed out of touch with the public at large. Despite the SNP's determination to own outright the lion's share of the North Sea finds the public seemed to view the issue quite differently. Five polls conducted by the Scotsman in 1975 indicated that a majority of Scots thought the oil should be used to benefit all of Britain. A December 1975 poll showed that a majority did not even think that the oil belonged to Scotland. In fact, close to half of self-identified SNP voters supported sharing the oil with the rest of Britain (Lee 1976, 314).

problems associated with oil booms and primary commodity dependence entered the debate and cast a shadow over the crude oil windfall.

The vigor with which the SNP had grasped oil reflects the persistence of the viability problem: Could an independent Scotland survive economically? Oil was viewed as the answer to the SNP's most vociferous critics.⁵⁴ On the surface, the argument is compelling: enormous oil deposits in a Scottish sector of the North Sea might be expected to provide the necessary resources for the rehabilitation of the Scottish economy as a whole. Just as oil had enriched the producer states of the Middle East, the North Sea deposits would enrich Scotland. As the table below shows, North Sea production is less than UK liquid fuel consumption. The SNP argument is based on the massive export possibilities which would arise with the massive difference between Scottish domestic consumption and total liquid fuel production.

Table 5

Liquid Fuel Production and Consumption in Petajoules* (1995)

	<u>Production</u>	<u>Domestic Consumption</u>
Norway	5,991	905
UK	5,181	9,080

* Petajoule= 163,400 "UN Standard" barrels of oil.

Liquid fuels refer to both oil and gas.

Source: The World Resources Institute et al 1998, 332.

The argument that North Sea oil would bankroll a prosperous and rejuvenated Scottish economy was shadowed by basic elements of the political economy of oil, particularly in the early 1970s and later. An oil-dependent Scotland would be

⁵⁴ Oil would do more than improve living standards and infrastructure. The Party's manifesto for the February 1974 election suggested that, "an independent Scotland, with visibly improving living standards and fairer shares for all can expect a high degree of industrial harmony" (Burnett 1975, 116).

different from other single-commodity, dependent states in degree rather than in kind. Oil prices have fluctuated considerably in the last two decades. Kubursi and Mansur (1994, 320) point out that oil was priced at \$5 (US) a barrel in 1970, peaked at \$50 during the Iranian revolution, and plummeted to \$22 following the Gulf War. On 25 April 1998, the Toronto Star reported that oil prices fell to their lowest level, US\$ 13.75 per barrel, since 1965, in March of 1998. According to a report in the Economist, published on 5 March 1999, oil remains cheaper today, in real terms, than it was in 1973.

These fluctuations have been the rule, rather than the exception, historically. From the First World War until 1960, the "seven sisters" exerted considerable control over the oil market (Sampson 1975).⁵⁵ Initially these companies purchased unlimited concessions from relatively weak governments and, at whim, unilaterally altered purchase prices with scant regard for the national interests of their supplier states. With the creation of OPEC in 1960, this omnipotence was substantially reduced, while the oil-producing countries maintained solidarity. But, as Kubursi and Mansur (1994, 320) point out, OPEC is a political, rather than an economic, association, and as such its rivalries and differing paths to development led to serious disputes over pricing policy. The critical importance and economic value of oil is belied by its instability as a marketable resource. Risky to find, expensive to extract, and ultra-sensitive to political instability, oil is less a blessing than it initially appears. Even the supply of North Sea oil is not assured. Harvie (1994, 2) argues that "Annual production rising to a second peak in the mid-1990s at around 110 million tons (one ton of oil equals 7.5 barrels) will eat into about 1900 million tons in reserves; this would give around 17 years life to the North Sea, with supply dwindling away in the second decade of the new millennium."

⁵⁵ The name "seven sisters" refers to the seven dominant oil companies: Exxon, Mobil, Gulf, Texaco, Standard Oil, British Petroleum and Royal Dutch/Shell (Burgess 1975).

Oil certainly had a lucrative promise. By 1984, total revenues peaked at £20,000 million (Pike 1996, 56). Direct and spin-off employment reached close to 100,000 in the UK. From oil rig construction yards to the hospitality industry, Northeast Scotland experienced an economic boom. As Pike (1996, 56) argues persuasively, however, "this prosperity was tenuous." Two factors served to make North Sea oil production a precarious enterprise. The first was the political volatility which emerged as oil states began to flex their new-found muscle in order to maintain maximum oil prices by nationalizing oil concessions. Furthermore, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut production to punish the West for its support of Israel in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Oil prices went up 600 percent in the wake of this decision (Pike 1996, 57). Further price rises occurred with the Iran-Iraq war.

Table 6

Oil Prices \$US/barrel (1990 constant)

1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
7.87	6.57	4.82	23.0	51.2	39.6	22.8	18.9	17.8	15.8	14.4	14.4
			8		2		5		4		1

Source: The World Resources Institute et al 1998, 332.

The result of this price leap was that oil companies took on risks that otherwise would not have been considered. The North Sea with its hostile environment, and the inherent risks associated with oil exploration had made it an unattractive prospect for the oil companies. By the early seventies, the financial risks were comparatively reduced. As is so often the case however, unintended consequences emerged from this decision. Oil markets became more, rather than less,

volatile with the declining ability of OPEC to regulate production and, hence, prices. Total OPEC exports in 1973 were 30 million barrels/day but fell to 15 million barrels/day by 1985 (Pike 59, 1993). Non-OPEC sources exported 1.4 million barrels/day in 1973 and as much as 5.66 million barrels/day by 1985 (Ibid., 59).⁵⁶ The North Sea helped make up the shortfall in exports caused by OPEC regulation. Volatility in the oil market increased in 1985 when OPEC aborted the quota system which had been an integral part of the OPEC agreement. Production in the mid-1980s rose and oil prices fell to \$8/barrel. Prices recovered (\$18/barrel) with a renewed attempt at quotas in December 1986. The impact of deregulation on oil production and prices hurt all involved in oil production globally. Hard-hit were the producers and communities dependent on oil revenues in the North Sea. In one year (1985-86) oil revenues fell 50 percent from £20 billion to £9.295 billion (Pike 1996, 61). Revenue shortfalls had a spin-off effect on all areas of the oil economy of Scotland. Boomtowns experienced waves of bankruptcies and platform yards closed. Unemployment increased and housing prices collapsed.⁵⁷ In tandem with lower oil prices came the depletion of the fields themselves. Pike (1996, 65) argues that North Sea oil did not decline because of prices, but because of depletion of the concessions themselves.

At this point, it may be instructive to briefly examine the impact of oil discovery on Norway, a state which SNP literature frequently compares with Scotland. In the early sixties, oil companies secured exploration rights in the North Sea from both Norway and the UK (Nelsen 1992, 314-5). Neither state was prepared to expend the resources necessary for exploration themselves, and turned to various

⁵⁶ Of this total, 2 million barrels a day came from the North Sea.

⁵⁷ Northeast Scotland did indeed experience rapid development but that was followed by rapid decline in the late 1980s. In Grampian region oil-related employment fell from 52,000 in mid-1985 to under 41,000 in 1987 (Pike 1996, 67). Over this same period Scottish bankruptcies increased by over 270 percent, much of this in the Northeast.

oil companies for this purpose.⁵⁸ The two states differed, however, in the manner in which the resource was subsequently developed. As the two states were competitors for offshore investment, there was an incentive for the respective governments to avoid overregulation of the companies. In addition, Britain, unlike Norway, had reasons to develop the resource quickly in order to secure cheap petroleum, and address a chronic balance of payments crisis. Critically, the British government was unwilling to create an "onerous licensing system" in the North Sea, as this would set a precedent for British petroleum interests abroad (Nelsen 1992, 315). Norway had no such concerns, and was prepared to bargain with societal interests fully in mind. Furthermore, there was a consensus in Norway regarding state involvement (via a national oil company) and on the regulation of production, a consensus which was absent in Britain. In the 1970s, domestic pressures led to greater and greater involvement of the Norwegian state in the production and regulation of petroleum resources. This was also true in the UK when the Labour government was elected in October 1974. In 1975 the BNOG was created to manage the resource. Norwegian and British policies diverged in the 1980s. As oil prices dropped, Norway reduced the number of licenses for exploration and reduced production.⁵⁹ Norway could do this because domestic fuel demand was a tiny proportion of production. On the other hand, Britain could not halt production in the face of lower prices because of

⁵⁸ Harvie (1994, 134) notes that it was estimated that it would cost £300-350 million to develop the Forties field. The actual cost (with inflation) was £800 by 1976.

⁵⁹ Three of the companies exploiting Norway's oil resources are Norwegian: Statoil (est. 1972) is a public corporation while Hydro and Saga are private enterprises. Statoil is 100 percent publicly owned and produces revenues of approximately \$US 950 million per year. The revenue accruing from oil is staggering. In 1995 the government earned \$3.85 billion from taxes and duties on oil production and export (Norway Online Information Service 1999). Statoil accounted for 41.86 % of Norway's total oil production in 1995 (International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1997, 293).

For comparison's sake, OPEC produced an average of 25.8 billion barrels per day in 1996 compared with Europe's 6.8 (International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1997, 329).

domestic demand (Nelsen 1992, 322). Under Thatcher, Britain refused to intervene in the oil sector, even in the interest of increasing world oil prices by reducing supply. Nelsen (1992, 322) argues that this decision was sensible in light of Britain's small export to domestic consumption ratio. Unlike Norway, which exports most of its production, most British production is consumed domestically. Also, Britain feared alienating allies by cooperating with OPEC production strategies. By 1986, BNOG was sold as part of the Conservative government's privatization policy. Regulation was further diluted to attract greater investment in the British North Sea.

The British case serves to underline the initial conditions which might limit the scope of a Scottish state to enjoy the benefits of oil revenues. These are discussed further on, but for now we consider the impact of oil on Norway which has faced far less pressure for hasty exploitation of its oil resources, and which has used the resources much more carefully than has the UK. The argument here is that viewing Scotland and Norway as similar cases is tempting on the surface, but the underlying and important difference is that Scotland would inherit a depleted oil province. In addition, we can see that even Norway, so fortuitously blessed by nature, has experienced economic troubles of its own after the oil-boom.

Miljan (1981, 16-20) points out several structural problems encountered by Norway. Like Scotland, it has an open economy closely integrated with Western Europe.⁶⁰ With this comes dependency on the oil-sensitive economies of Western Europe for markets for Norwegian goods. Such sensitivity places Norway in a difficult position vis à-vis oil prices. As a small producer aiming to maximize profits

⁶⁰ According to an article "When Asia sneezes can Scotland avoid catching a cold?," by Stephen Boyle and published in Scotland on Sunday on 11 January 1998, Scotland exports proportionately more goods and services than the rest of the UK, accounting for 11.9 percent of UK manufactured exports in 1996. Recent economic dislocation in Asia may have a disproportionately negative effect on Scotland. Devalued Asian currencies have put a Hyundai semi-conductor plant, scheduled to open in Dumferline, on indefinite hold. Indeed, a report by the Scottish Office (2000) blames the seemingly permanent delay of the plant on over capacity in the semi-conductor market.

to underwrite development, Norway is extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the world oil market. Secondly, as an OECD member, Norway is always under pressure to join the International Energy Agency (IEA) in which Norway's oil policies would come under pressure to increase production to lower prices and alleviate shortages.⁶¹ The IEA emerged in response to the oil shocks of the early seventies. Ausland (1979, 35) argues that the aim of the IEA was to flatten OPEC and secure oil supplies for the West. To do so, the IEA set the following goals: 1) Accumulate oil supplies; 2) Gather information on oil; and 3) Increase production and total share of petroleum in the event of emergency (Ausland 1979, 34). The IEA wanted to subsume the independent energy policies of allies to the overall aims of US foreign policy. A 1977 joint report by the OECD and IEA commented on Norwegian ambivalence to the aims of the IEA. According to Ausland (1979, 46) the report argued that the "deferral of the production of a cost-competitive reserve creates a requirement for another consumer country to develop a more costly reserve or to import additional oil, which not only 'beggars thy neighbor' but fails to contribute to the lowering of a common economic and political risk."

In short, Norway's energy policies would be constrained by closer international ties to allies. As an associate member, rather than a full member of the IEA, Norway has managed to maintain a degree of autonomous control over oil policy, but other problems have also become evident.⁶² Since WWII, the Norwegian economy has been characterized by its extensive dependence on a few economic

⁶¹ It should probably be noted that OPEC membership was never considered by Norway ("impossible" in the words of one Norwegian official (Ausland 1979, 30). Also, OPEC regulations limit membership to 'developing' countries.

⁶² Further constraint comes from EEC regulations. A staff article, "Rules on offshore oil supply market 'threaten new jobs'," published in the *Times* (London) on 31 May 1975, reported that, "Although the government had made it clear that Britain would control the supply of her energy resources, such as North Sea oil, part of the price of remaining in the EEC was that she would not be able to sell the oil more cheaply in Britain than in the other EEC countries." Preferential oil pricing to favor industry in a newly independent Scotland would presumably be similarly regulated.

sectors (percent in brackets): mining and manufacturing (40), oil (33), services (25) (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2000).⁶³ This mirrors the Scottish situation very well, although, in recent years, electronics and whiskey have become important exports for Scotland (Brown 1996, 74).⁶⁴ Miljan (1981, 20) points out that: "It may be argued that by 1980 Norway had become something of a prisoner of its petroleum industry; to service its capital investment debt and the infrastructure of the petroleum industry it must discover more oil and produce it."

Norway, of course, is an independent and sovereign state but is otherwise very similar to Scotland in population, economics, and natural endowments.⁶⁵ The Norwegian case is instructive because it shows, to some extent, the realities of resource dependence.⁶⁶ Like Canada, Norway is described as an "export enclave economy" relying mainly upon the export of raw materials and semi-finished products for export (Fagerberg et al 1990, 70). The political and economic instability fostered by OPEC helped raise the share of oil in Norwegian exports from 0.1 percent to 35 percent between 1972 and 1980 (Fagerberg et al 1990, 71). The explosion in oil exports had important economic consequences in the 1970s with rises in disposable

⁶³ 50 percent of exports from services is composed of shipbuilding.

⁶⁴ Scotland's economy has diversified somewhat in recent years. Still, 50 percent of the UK's exports of agricultural, fishing and forestry products come from Scotland (Scottish Office 2000). Most Scottish exports (63 percent) go to EU states. Firms in Scotland now produce 28 percent of the European Union's personal computers and 65 percent of Automated Teller Machines (Scottish Office 2000).

⁶⁵ Comparing Scotland's economy to other countries is complicated by the fact that revenue from the United Kingdom Continental Shelf is calculated separately from Scottish economic statistics. Hence, all considerations of Scotland's post-independence economy depend on important assumptions about the share of the UKCS which will go to Scotland, the assumed price of oil, tax rates, and the rate of extraction. One respected profile (assuming 1996 oil prices with an 80 percent share of the continental shelf) found that Scotland would have a GDP per capita of £12,996. This figure is slightly higher than the rest of the UK's but well below Norway's £21,964 (Scottish Office 2000).

⁶⁶ Norway is the seventh largest oil-producer in the world. In 1997 it was the world's second largest exporter. Petroleum and gas compose 15 percent of GDP compared with industrial production's 11 percent (Norway Online Information Service 1999). Norwegian exports in the 1980s are said to be partly responsible for world market price declines (Karl 1997, 31).

income and an expansion in public services. However, the high value of the *krone* stagnated manufacturing, and, by the late 1970s, currency devaluation and a full wage freeze were the Labour government's response to this structural crisis.

Through the 1980s, the growth of both oil production, and of oil's share of Norwegian exports (36.2 percent in 1985), continued unabated (Fagerberg et al, 76). Oil altered the political landscape in Norway and, in 1983, the center-right government sought to deregulate the economy and abandon Keynesian management strategies. In 1984-85 the government deregulated banking and insurance, lifted foreign exchange controls and abolished government control of interest rates. Fagerberg *et al* argue that Norwegian economic autonomy was compromised by the problem of overproduction of oil (1990, 81). Unlike OPEC members who attempted to regulate and restrict production in the interest of long-term national interests, Norway was caught in webs of obligation to allies and could not restrict production without antagonizing the US, the International Energy Agency or pro-Israeli elements within the government.

Deregulation of the economy and volatile oil markets in 1986 led to the loss of Norway's current account surplus. In addition, settlements with workers involving shorter working hours and pay increases reduced international confidence when these measures were accompanied by falling oil prices. In essence, the Norwegian economy has increasingly been subject less to the political priorities of Norwegians than to those of outsiders. A recent study comments that: "Since the early 1970's the size and velocity of short-term capital flows in the world economy have exploded beyond all recognition, making it very difficult for any country with a mixed economy to insulate itself from their impact (Fagerberg et al 1990, 82). These commentators argue that increased integration into the post-Fordist world economy effectively led to the dismantling of the 'Norwegian model': a Keynesian welfare state dependent on resource extraction.

The Norwegian case is unique among oil-producing states. It is true that it has had to deal with the peculiar problems which beset commodity rich economies, but a number of factors will determine the nature of the impact of oil booms on a given economy. In *The Paradox of Plenty*, Terry Lynn Karl examines the impact of oil booms on petro-states, and concludes that oil-booms can have an extremely negative, destructive impact on an economy. Initially oil-booms are viewed as an opportunity to "sow the petroleum"; redirect capital into public spending and infrastructure (Karl 1997, 3). In fact, many petroleum exporting states found themselves woefully unprepared for the negative externalities associated with oil-booms. Countries like Mexico and Venezuela found themselves more indebted and dependent than before oil was discovered. "Dutch disease", the term covering the distorting effects of commodity booms on other sectors of the economy is partly to blame for the paradox of oil producers with ever worsening economic circumstances. Karl argues that oil-booms overheat economies because the first reaction of governments is to spend oil revenue, which, in turn, drives demand and consumption in the private sphere with a subsequent rise in inflation and a decline in exporting sectors of the economy (Karl 1997, 27-29). These problems worsened when oil dependent economies borrowed on the assumption that oil revenues would remain stable (which they have not), thereby increasing debt. In 1987, Venezuela's debt to GNP ratio was 65.3 percent, while Nigeria's was 112.8 percent (Karl 1997, 29).

Norway's experience differed in important ways from the experiences of developing oil economies. Still, it experienced economic problems as a result of the oil-boom. By 1975, Norway had the largest external debt of any OECD member state (Karl 1997, 214). This debt was repaid by 1983 but does show how quickly distortion and commodity-price instability can affect an economy. A clear symptom of "Dutch disease" was the marked decline in the agricultural sector which fell from 6 to 4 percent of GDP, as well as the decline in manufacturing from 20 to 15 percent of

GDP (Karl 1997, 214). The pressures of inflation, wage increases and public spending pushed the Krone value up thereby hurting the export of agricultural and manufactured goods. However, Norway has been able to reduce the negative consequences of its oil-boom. It has controlled production to maximize the life of the resource, and its wealth before oil permitted the Norwegian state to negotiate with foreign companies in a slow, deliberate and well-informed manner in order to reach terms favorable to Norway.⁶⁷ The near absence of corruption has also ensured that the terms of agreement with the oil companies were equitable and served the interests of Norwegians.

The current economic status of Norway and its highly developed welfare state have made oil revenues less disruptive to the Norwegian economy than we might anticipate being the case in Scotland.⁶⁸ Scotland's declining shipbuilding, heavy industry and manufacturing sectors are indicators of an economy undergoing structural change. Had all oil revenues been channeled into this economy in the 1970s, matters might be different. Now it seems unrealistic to expect oil revenue to miraculously transform Scotland. This is especially so in light of the fact that oil reserves are already in decline. Unlike Norway, an independent Scotland would not be negotiating (over licensing, extraction rates etc.) with oil companies from a position of strength; rather, it would deal with these companies urgently, needing access to revenue to build the institutions of an independent state. Furthermore, with each passing year, the attractiveness of the North Sea deposits is reduced by the added expense which is incurred in exploiting depleted fields.

There are also serious economic concerns. According to Harvie (1994, 185), an independent Scotland would see the value of its currency rise with the huge oil-

⁶⁷ At the time of the discovery of oil at Ekofisk in 1969, Norway had the seventh highest *per-capita* GNP among the OECD countries (Galenson 1986, 1).

⁶⁸ In 1970 Norway had the lowest income inequality (Gini index .307) of any other OECD country (Galenson 1986, 5).

induced balance of payments. This, in turn, would price Scottish exports out of world markets. In response to these concerns, the SNP promised to slow oil extraction, but this would lead to unemployment within the oil sector. In 1978 Perthshire East SNP MP Douglas Crawford argued that an independent Scotland would not have "to overemphasize production for export" or, in other words, Scotland's export revenues would come mainly from oil and this would mediate the impact of an overvalued Scottish currency on other exports (Harvie 1994, 194). Since the 1970s nationalists envisioned a Swiss or Austrian model in which oil would instead underwrite the expansion of a technical tertiary sector and support a viable economy.⁶⁹ Yet Harvie (1994, 124) wondered: "Would a post-industrial world have much need of Switzerlands? And what if, before Scotland's Detroit were tidied away, the price of oil were to fall? The notion of a cosy little autarky living by international trade was less than beguiling." Indeed, Mercer (1978, 124) estimated in 1978 that the Scottish share of the North Sea oil fields had a production life of about thirty years in total. In addition, the environmental conditions of the North Sea make oil very expensive to extract. This expense requires a minimum barrel price and a sufficient scale of production in order to maintain profits. Scottish Office (2000) forecasts suggest that capital expenditure by oil companies and exploration firms will decline from 6 billion pounds (1999/2000) to half of this by 2003-2004.

An independent Scotland might find itself uncomfortably dependent on a volatile oil market, and the foreign investment necessary to extract oil. In its rush to

⁶⁹ The model referred to here is that elaborated by Peter Katzenstein: small European states with an aggressive export sector, a state "back-the-winners" policy on firms and a primarily service-sector economy. See (Katzenstein 1985).

Alex Salmond, quoted in article "Scottish nationalist insists he's not a separatist" published in the Globe and Mail on 5 May 1999 argued that:

By far, the most successful formula for growth and success is a small country within a large trading block. Twenty five of the world's top economies per head are in that position. The arguments for it include flexibility, rapid decision making, quick on the feet social consensus, when it can be got. All of these Scotland has.

prove the benefits of independence a Scottish government might not exercise the patience witnessed in the Norwegian case.⁷⁰ As the price of oil continues to decline there may also be fewer companies eager to develop potential fields as others decline. The SNP has recognized the power of these corporations. In April of 1974, leader William Wolfe stated that the SNP had "recognized the valuable skills and functions of the oil companies and are prepared to allow them to earn post-tax capital profits appropriate to capital" (Burnett 1975, 115). By the mid-seventies, 60 percent of capital investment in North Sea oil extraction was North American. More than half of the output (56 percent) was controlled by foreign corporations.

Whatever the economic implications of oil dependency in an independent Scottish state, there is a more compelling and limiting condition to which all states relying on non-renewable resource revenues must attend. Recent predictions of the sustainability of oil resources suggest that radical change in energy use will be forced upon the planet before too long. Geologist Craig Bond Hatfield has predicted conservatively that oil reserves will be completely depleted by 2057 (1997, 121). In the ten year period between 1985 and 1995, world oil consumption increased from 59.7 million barrels per day to 69 million barrels per day. Increasing demand from newly-industrializing economies⁷¹ and declines in Russian and US fields have been met by increases in production in the Gulf states and slight increases in North Sea and Latin American oil production. The exhaustion of the resource may even occur sooner if consumption rates continue to climb and if, as Hatfield suspects, estimates

⁷⁰ Nelsen (1992, 315) argues that the British state sacrificed long-term interests in order to attract foreign investment and exploit newly discovered oil resources. Plagued by a longstanding balance-of-payments crisis and a need for petroleum, the UK lured private companies with the promise of low levels of regulation. Nelsen argues that "these interests--which were not present in Norway--made British officials far more eager to speed up the exploration process--implying less government interference--than Norwegian policy-makers."

⁷¹ Since 1985 petroleum use has grown by 30 percent in Latin America, 40 percent in Africa and 50 percent in Asia (Hatfield 1997, 121).

of reserves are exaggerated; OPEC nations exaggerate reserves in order to boost permitted production (Campbell and Laherrere 1998, 79).

Geologists Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrere argue that Hatfield's estimates are, in fact, conservative. Their analysis indicates that global oil reserves will decline by 2010 (1998, 79). Eighty percent of oil fields currently exploited were found before 1973. The annual average oil discovered in the 1990s is only one-third of the annual total drained from fields. More money spent on oil discovery will be in vain: "there is only so much crude oil in the world, and the industry has found about 90 percent of it" (1998, 81). These projections are based upon a technique developed by Shell geologist M. King Hubbert which accurately predicted the production peak (1970) which occurred in the US 'lower 48'. The peak of North sea production in Norwegian and Scottish/British waters will occur in 2000-2001. Oil extraction will decline after this, until exhaustion, by 2015.

Some nationalists might prefer to 'go it alone' regardless of the reliability of oil revenues. What of Scots as a whole? Are they prepared to accept the potential economic instability brought on by the dreaded 'Dutch disease'? Even if they are, what would the SNP propose to float the Scottish welfare state with after the projected exhaustion of the oil fields? Norway has already accumulated a substantial 'rainy day' fund but successive British governments have used North Sea oil to mask structural economic decline.⁷² Through no fault of its own, a Scottish state would inherit a resource near the end of its life span.

⁷² Norway created the State Petroleum Fund in 1990. It is heavily invested in foreign markets. Prior to the creation of the fund, oil revenues ended up in general revenues (Europa World Yearbook 1998, Vol.II).

An article, "SNP backs oil fund to protect revenue," published in Scotland on Sunday on 7 February 1999, reported that the SNP would also set up an oil fund based on the Norwegian model. This would reduce immediate funding for social programs because the money would be treated as a long-term asset stabilizing the impact of oil and gas price fluctuations.

The SNP appealed to the nation with promises of wealth and 'freedom' and, in the end, it seems that oil might not secure either. In the 1970s, oil served as a convenient tool to assuage the fears of the majority of Scots not supportive of independence.⁷³ There is a danger, however, in using such claims about resource extraction for political advantage, as Waterman (1974, 13) commented:

Now it might be supposed that little harm is done by permitting the inhabitants of politically sovereign states to indulge in the illusion of economic sovereignty. Apart from the moral objection to falsehood, however, there are at least two other reasons why it may be better to face the truth. In the first place, it may be politically dangerous for a government to adopt a policy it is unable to implement. In the second, a refusal to acknowledge explicitly that certain fashionable policy prescriptions are inappropriate may darken counsel possibilities.

It seems counter-intuitive to regret or fear the revenue windfall that comes with resource wealth. Norway experienced economic dislocation in the form of the "Dutch disease" but this distortion was muted by the developed, competent and otherwise wealthy Norwegian state. Unlike the developing states mentioned previously, Norway had a less urgent need to develop oil resources according to the needs of oil companies. Rather, Norway carefully planned oil extraction and production to serve the interests of Norwegians.

Any conclusions about the consequences of oil-production for the Scottish economy are necessarily speculative. Oil remains central to the SNP's political economy of sovereignty, since oil revenues, at least partly, underpin the SNP's economic predictions. There are reasons, however, to question whether the Norwegian model can be reproduced in Scotland. On the positive side we should note that states and governments learn. Norway learned what *not* to do from watching developing oil economies. Scotland could also avoid the mistakes of the past in its oil development.

⁷³ A poll in The Scotsman (Edinburgh) and published on 13 May 1974 indicated that only 18 percent of respondents supported the independence position of the SNP.

The SNP has proposed continuity in taxation regimes following the independence of Scotland. That is, the party proposes "a basically unchanged taxation system for the North Sea industry" (SNP 1992c, 8).⁷⁴ In addition, the party would enhance "incentives for the development of ancillary hydrocarbon deposits, in order to maximize recovery from the North Sea province" (SNP 1992c, 8). The party's argument remains that oil and gas revenues will "give Scottish industry access to one of the cheapest energy bases in Europe, with all the competitive benefits that would follow" (SNP 1995d, iii).⁷⁵ The cost of remaining in the UK is the use of oil and gas revenues for British interests, rather than Scottish ones.⁷⁶ Adding insult to injury for the SNP is that many refining plants, such as those for gas, are located in England, denying Scots employment opportunities (SNP 1995d, iii).⁷⁷ Scottish resources generate job opportunities outside of Scotland. The SNP has accused successive Westminster governments of mismanagement in the form of burdensome taxes on exploration and appraisal activities under Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont (SNP 1993c, 2). These taxes will reduce the number of wells drilled, as well as the employment opportunities associated with such activity. The 1997 election

⁷⁴ The current taxation regime is designed to "secure an appropriate share of profits for the nation while offering stable, attractive and economically sound investment conditions to the oil industry" (UK 2000). There are three principle transfers from oil producers to the UK government. The first are royalties which are levied as a conditions of license. Royalties constitute 12.5 percent of the landed value of offshore oil. Royalties were waived after 31 March 1982. The Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) was introduced by the 1975 Oil Taxation Act and was designed to apply to the most profitable fields. The 1993 Finance Act reformed the PRT to encourage investment reducing taxes on existing fields and abolishing the PRT for fields licensed after March 1993. Fields exploited after 1993 are subject only to the Corporation Tax, one of the lowest in the world at 30 percent (UK 2000).

⁷⁵ Certain SNP oil policies are similar to those implemented by Venezuela and other developing petro-states. The party advocates the reduction of VAT on fuel to 5 percent from 8 percent (SNP 1995d, 11).

⁷⁶ Labour's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healy, has stated that "It would have been impossible for Britain to have survived without North Sea oil. Without it, Britain would have been bankrupt before 1983" (Healy quoted in SNP 1993c, 2).

⁷⁷ Even worse, in 1993 gasoline was more expensive in Scotland than anywhere else in the UK. In Aberdeen, dubbed the Houston of Europe because of its proximity to the North Sea oil province, unleaded gasoline cost £2.35/gallon. In faraway Portsmouth (England), it was £2.18 (SNP 1993/94, 8).

manifesto, *What Scotland Needs Now!*, commits the party to maintaining "all existing obligations to oil and gas operators, and [despite its criticisms of UK government policy] the SNP envisages no substantive change in the taxation regime so that there can be a clear, stable and continuing climate for the oil industry" (1997a, 19). There is no intention on the part of the SNP to nationalize either the gas or oil industries. The 1997 General election manifesto suggests that the gas network be jointly owned by all companies with interests in gas production and supply. Alternative energy sources will be invested in and nuclear power plants will be decommissioned at the end of their lives (SNP 1999, 215). For the moment, oil and gas reserves remain integral to the SNP's independence project and the SNP will press "for an oil and gas taxation regime which encourages the industry" (Ibid.).

In the event of independence, Scotland's would be a vulnerable economy. It is relatively heavily export dependent, and has experienced a painful and incomplete transition from a heavy industrial economy to a tertiary one. The problem is that the timing of independence is not necessarily going to occur when the economy is robust enough to sustain the social-democratic state envisioned by SNP policy-makers. There is no question that Scotland could be an independent state. The question is the extent to which the autonomy of Scottish policy-makers will be constrained by the agenda of foreign corporations, and faceless capital flows. On a more positive note we might view Scottish statehood as an important step toward taking a community out of an inequitable, structurally injurious, and managerially-inept post-Imperial UK. This is the SNP's argument: that Scotland could not be any worse off than it is today. As argued previously, conclusions regarding the Scottish economy must necessarily be speculative and, in any event, the decision will not be made by social scientists but by the Scottish electorate. There are, in my view, substantial concerns about the desirability of an export-dependent economy but these concerns must be tempered by the consequences the *status quo*, as well as the aspirations of the Scottish electorate.

Post-Independence Economic Policy

Oil remains a critical lynchpin of the SNP's vision of the economy of an independent Scotland. The party's 1995 document *Towards a Better Scotland*, outlines the economic case for independence and the aims of the party on matters of public spending and taxation. The priorities outlined in this document include: full employment, investment in education, public and public-private partnership investment to develop a high-quality Scottish infrastructure, an export focused economic strategy, and "providing reassurance to the public and business community that the SNP will create a stable and prosperous economy, committing the SNP to a more competitive corporate tax regime than that prevailing south of the Border [sic], which is a major market and competitor for Scottish business" (SNP 1995e, 3). These priorities suggest the Celtic Tiger model exemplified by Eire.

Full employment ⁷⁸ would be partly achieved by the creation of 116,500 jobs in the four years following independence (Ibid. 4). This increase would be achieved with skills training for youth and the unemployed, infrastructure investment, increased funding for the Scottish Tourist Board, and structural support for the fishing industry. Social spending would be increased in many areas of life. Pensions would be increased incrementally to match European norms. Moreover, Cold Climate Allowances would subsidize energy expenses for the elderly. The responsibility for financing public housing would be transferred to the central government from the local level. An SNP government would build 11,200 new homes and refurbish 10,000 others (Ibid. 4).

The SNP's spending program will be paid for in five key ways (Ibid. 14). The largest share of revenue will come from taxation derived from income taxes and

⁷⁸ This document defines full employment as at or under 5 percent unemployment. At the time of the document's release, unemployment in Scotland was approximately 7.9 percent.

savings from reduced demand on unemployment benefits with the full-employment policy. North Sea revenues will compose the next largest portion (about 25 percent of the total budget). These are followed by corporate taxes, defense savings⁷⁹ and the assumed positive impact of independence on the economy. Moreover, the SNP, in the 1999 Scottish Parliament campaign, resisted the temptation to maintain current tax rates. The *Scotland Act* (1998) permits the Parliament to vary income tax by 3 pence on the pound without Westminster's consent. The SNP vowed to increase the basic tax rate by 1 pence, while Labour promised no additional taxes. One Labour advertisement, published in Scotland on Sunday on 28 March 1999, warned that "the SNP's divorce means more tax." The SNP's response was that the penny tax would be "for Scotland," demonstrating the party's commitment to income redistribution via public spending. Promised in the Party's 1999 Scottish parliament election manifesto, *Scotland's Party*, is a variety of spending commitments. The manifesto proclaims that "we will devote this penny--Scotland's penny--to education, health and housing" (SNP 1999, 2). Forecasted revenues from Scotland's penny would permit £690 million in additional funding for health care, the abolition of student fees, computer access for all children, and the abolition of tolls on bridges, among other things (SNP 1999, 4).

Social development in an SNP governed Scotland will first require "full control over economic, fiscal and monetary policy" (Ibid. 11). The SNP claims that an independent Scotland would be the 7th richest country in the world (GDP/capita) (Ibid. 11). The SNP's plan for economic and social development is predicated on a combination of investment in high-growth industry, industrial and export diversification, and investment in education and skills development.

⁷⁹ For example, at least £125 million would be saved by Scotland's exit from the Trident missile program (SNP 1995, 14).

Given these policy objectives, the temptation to increase public spending and increase oil exploration and production would be great. If this occurs, the consequences for other sectors of the Scottish economy, especially the export market, could be negative, as a rising Scottish pound priced other Scottish exports out of their markets. But, as the Norwegian case instructs us, the economic problems generated by oil-booms are not insoluble nor are they inevitable. It is therefore difficult to predetermine the consequences of independence for the Scottish economy with respect to petroleum production.

Certainly though, one must express some caution, as the fate of the civic-nationalist project hinges partly on the extent to which Scotland can secure an economy capable of providing the kinds of equality-enhancing policy instruments advocated by the party. There can be no doubt that a number of factors make the SNP's oil optimism suspect: First, the resource is past its half-life and remaining oil will be more, rather than less, expensive to extract and therefore less attractive for foreign trans-national corporations (TNCs) to exploit. Would Scottish voters support a rise in taxes necessary to finance a Scottish equivalent of Statoil in light of the turmoil associated with oil prices? If the answer to this question is no, then we might expect that Scotland would have to bargain from a position of relative weakness compared with Norway in the mid-sixties because a Scottish government would have to rely on negotiating good terms with TNCs who alone possess the capital and technology to exploit the resource. We should not dismiss the potential importance of oil for underwriting a future Scottish state, but neither should we be blind to potential problems. As argued in Chapter One, the civic nationalist project in Scotland is vulnerable to potential imbalance between the power of a Scottish state and the TNCs. The democratic renewal promised by the SNP is dependent first of all upon the ability of a Scottish state to make policy in the interests of all Scots. To some extent, the Norwegians have been able to do this but it is questionable to insist that

Scotland will enjoy similarly fortuitous circumstances. The oil issue has served the SNP electorally in that it has assuaged the fears of those who feared that independence would lead to penury, and a reduced standard of living.

Economic Models: Eire? Norway?

The discussion above indicates that the SNP has been influenced by models of economic development found in several European states. In the early 1990s the party seemed to look to the social-democratic models manifested in the "top shelf" Scandinavian states. More recently, SNP literature has begun to refer to the "Celtic Tiger" model of Eire. The Irish economy boomed in the 1990s. From 1993-98 Ireland's economy was the fastest growing one in the OECD (Allen 1999, 31). Accompanying this growth, however, is an evident "lack of social solidarity reflected in, and exacerbated by, increasing income inequality" (Riain 2000, 185).⁸⁰ In an article published in Scotland on Sunday on 24 October 1999, Rob Stokes notes that: "BMW's and holiday villas have been among the fruits of higher pay and bonuses enjoyed by bosses who have simultaneously preached wage restraint. Rapidly inflating asset prices for houses have created a wealthy new elite, at least on paper, but have started to put properties out of reach for those left behind." In a pattern undergone by similar advanced industrial societies, Ireland has seen the growth of a sizable service sector and with this a sizable middle class. But, accompanying this transition is the persistent presence of an underclass which has yet to benefit from the 1990s boom. Inequality has been obscured by the Irish state's corporatist character which purports to address inequality and marginalization by bringing social partners together. In practice, Irish productivity gains have been achieved without concomitant wage gains for the workforce. Between 1980 and 1995 industrial productivity

⁸⁰ Riain (2000, 181) notes that the average wage for the top ten percent in Ireland was 195 percent of the median income in 1987, but rose to 224 percent of median income by 1994.

increased by 402 percent while wages increased only 128 percent (Allen 1999, 43). Overall economic growth in Ireland has not increased capital intensity, that is, net capital stock per employee, indicating an outflow of domestic capital (Ibid. 44). Taxes are lower than in the rest of Europe but the proportion of tax revenue paid by employees is about 90 percent (Ibid. 47). The price of competitive corporate taxes to lure investment to Ireland has been paid by the working people of Ireland.

There is no doubt that the transformation of the Irish economy is nothing short of remarkable. In response to a devastating recession during the mid-1980s the Irish government drew up policies of fiscal restraint and wage demand moderation. O'Hearn (2000, 73) observes that these policies bore fruit by 1994. Since 1995 growth rates have averaged 7 to 8 percent annually. Official unemployment figures fell from 17 percent in 1993 to 7.5 percent in 1998 (Ibid. 75).

Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973. It had been part of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement (1965) but the EEC held out the promise (one delivered) of higher agricultural prices for Irish farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Lee 1995, 462). Policy papers produced by civil servants in 1972 encouraged joining the EEC based partly on an interpretation of national interest consistent with the pooling or sharing of sovereignty entailed by membership (Ibid. 463). Membership was enthusiastically supported in a referendum (83 percent in favor), but joining the EEC marked a watershed in Irish socio-economic development. The pattern described above--competing via tax regime for external investment--began in earnest as traditional industries began to fail in the face of European competition. Successive Irish governments have since searched for external investment to increase employment. Even farmers, whose incomes doubled between 1970-1978 saw income declines following CAP mandated reductions in agricultural prices in 1979 (Ibid. 491). Membership "exposed" the Irish economy to external competition which in turn ushered in structural changes to the Irish economy. These

changes are now touted as a "miracle" by those neglecting to consider the massive flow of profits from Ireland by foreign enterprises, and the widening inequalities within Irish society. Among the costs incurred by the Celtic tiger have been falling incomes for the poorest decile of Irish society and relatively small growth in incomes for the second, third and fourth poorest deciles of the population (1 percent annually between 1987 and 1995) (O'Hearn 2000, 78). Prior to the most recent boom, Ireland had the highest level of wage inequality in the EU and this gap has widened over the 1990s. Ireland's success at creating/attracting new jobs hides the fact that half of the jobs are in the non-unionized, casual service sector (Ibid. 79). Part time and contractual jobs have increased considerably distorting the impact of lower unemployment figures (Ibid. 80). The Celtic tiger is also remarkably dependent upon foreign corporations for investment. In the late 1990s 80 to 85 percent of fixed capital investment was owned by foreign (mainly American) firms (Ibid. 73).

Despite its social-democratic political orientation the SNP has viewed the apparent Irish success story with envy. The party's manifesto for the 1999 European elections links Irish economic success to European integration. "Through membership of the European Union, and the access to the European market and to European Structural funds which it brings, Ireland has become the 'tiger' economy of Europe, outstripping Scotland--under the Union--in terms of growth, attracting more than half of all software investment coming from Europe in 1994 and 40 percent of US total foreign hi-tech investment over the past two decades" (SNP 1999, 2). Other commentators point out that it is less independence that brought prosperity to Ireland than conformity to the norms of market capitalism. In an article, "Tartan cub must heed Celtic Tiger," by columnist Magnus Linklater and published in Scotland on Sunday on 25 May 1999, the argument is made that:

It was only when Ireland conformed to the disciplines imposed on it by outside competition and the demands of the EU that it managed to lick its economy into shape. It used the funding to help its industries compete in the Single Market and depend less on the state. It built a strong education system.

It drew on the knowledge and skills of the multinationals and their inward investment to develop its own indigenous industries. And it encouraged a new consensus within Irish society, a confidence that everyone, at last, knew more or less where they were going.

The tenor of Linklater's piece belies the real social polarities created by the "social partnership" model of Irish economic development, which renders class conflict invisible or reduces it by national consensus-building. National level economic statistics mask inequality and this model is at odds with a project designed to improve the lot of all Scots. Competing with the "Celtic Tiger", not to mention other poorer member states of the EU, for foreign investment seems incompatible with the social policy aims of the SNP.⁸¹ Already, representatives of the business sector in Scotland warn of the dangers of independence, fearing policies hostile to capital accumulation. Lord Simpson of Dunkeld, head of GEC⁸² (General Electric Company), and quoted in an article by Iain Martin and Rob Stokes, "GEC boss joins attack against independence," published in Scotland on Sunday on 24 January 1999, argued that "what businesses in Scotland need is economic strength and stability. A devolved parliament gives us a much better chance of creating the environment we need to succeed. That's why I oppose plans for independence." Financial institutions have also weighed in on the subject of tax increases. Clydesdale Bank issued a press release, quoted in an article "Financial chiefs say no to SNP's Tartan Tax policy," by Rob Stokes and published in Scotland on Sunday 21 March 1999, stating that the Scottish Parliament "should not, by implementing its tax raising powers, place an additional burden on businesses." The need to attract investment and the policy priorities of indigenous business interests will put pressure on the SNP to join in the competition to reduce corporate taxes.

⁸¹ O' Hearn cites a 1999 study by the United Nations Development Programme which "found Ireland to have the second worst relative poverty rate in the developed world and the worst absolute poverty rates" (2000, 92).

⁸² The GEC is not related to the American firm of the same name.

Despite the strides toward greater integration in Europe since the mid-1980s especially, the problem of tax competition remains and could threaten the ability of an independent Scotland to build the kind of welfare state envisioned by the SNP. Dehejia and Genschel (1999, 403) argue that international cooperation on tax policy is conspicuously absent, even in the EU. Despite statements of intent by EU members in 1988 and 1989, no progress has been made to prevent tax competition, leading to varying rates among member states. Attempts by individual states, like Germany, to maintain a national withholding tax on capital led to capital flight in 1989 (after which the tax was abolished) and again in 1993 (abolished again). Even the advent of the single currency has not increased progress on tax competition. In December 1997 a non-binding "code of conduct" was signed but no serious intervention on this matter has been entertained (Ibid. 414). Part of the problem among member states is the divergent interests between those in favor of regulation of capital flows within the EU (Italy) and those (like the UK) which fear that a common withholding tax would see capital flight from the EU to North America and Japan (Ibid. 413).⁸³

One component of the "Irish model" is the need for small states to lure investment with tax rates favorable to business. This in turn can, as it does in Eire (no withholding tax, decreasing tax rate on bonds), increase the tax burden on working citizens who, in effect, subsidize industry (Dehejia and Genschel 1999, 415). On the other hand, an independent Scotland might find itself regulating itself out of external investment which, of course, is needed for economic diversification and to achieve the goal of full employment.

Could a Scottish state compensate for this Darwinian state of affairs by intervening in the economy via nationalization? This seems unlikely for two reasons.

⁸³ Neither Eire nor the UK levies withholding taxes on non-resident interest income (savings). Both tax interest accrued on bonds with the Irish rate at 27 percent and the UK rate at 25 percent. These rates are subject to a variety of exemptions (Dehejia and Genschel 1999, 415).

First, the British (Scottish?) oil province is now quite mature having been under exploitation for over thirty years. Private industry is well-entrenched, especially after the 1980s era of retrenchment and privatization.⁸⁴ The province is well explored, and as mentioned previously, is the most expensive and inhospitable oil province in the world.⁸⁵ If oil prices are high, then the oil companies will be inclined to accept greater regulation and taxation. However, in the event of downturns in the oil market, as was the case in 1986 especially, an independent Scottish state will find its bargaining powers reduced.

Norway has coped with the power of private corporations and the economic dislocation of oil in key ways. It has insisted on a slow rate of extraction, both to minimize the effects on the currency and to maintain the life of the resource. Norway has also enjoyed a societal consensus on the manner of oil exploitation by bringing together the interests of industry, environmentalists and the fishing sector (Nelsen 1992, 321). Since Norway had developed hydroelectric power after WWI there was less urgency to oil negotiations with private industry and less demand for rapid extraction limiting the externalities which arose from oil development elsewhere.⁸⁶ In the UK economic concerns and the desire for energy self-sufficiency pushed policy-makers to relinquish state intervention in the industry, especially in the 1980s. The result of these divergent positions is that much of Norway's oil province remains unexplored, especially in the far North. The UK, and by implication the Scottish

⁸⁴ The British National Oil Corporation was established in 1972 and dismantled in 1986 (Harvie 1994, 5).

⁸⁵ In 1983, with oil prices at 30\$ a barrel, the North Sea oil production cost was US\$ 1.50 per barrel, while the Saudi Arabian cost was 5 cents a barrel (Harvie 1994, 134).

⁸⁶ The slow versus rapid extraction debate is more complicated than it seems. The enormous cost of exploration and material investment pressures producers to recoup these costs via rapid extraction to secure short term financial objectives at the risk of exhausting a non-renewable energy source and keeping prices artificially low. On the other hand, slow extraction means less revenue for social spending and earnings are outstripped by the depreciation of oil rigs and other equipment (not to forget maintenance costs and ultimate replacement of equipment).

province, is well explored and most of the resource has been extracted with little long-term benefit to Scotland. This is not, of course, the fault of the SNP, but it alters the equations with regard to long term revenues. Without intervention in the form of a national oil corporation, Scotland will have to deal with well-entrenched private corporations which may be inclined to move their rigs to more hospitable venues in the event of an unfriendly Scottish government's "intrusion" into the oil business.

Civic nationalism may play a role in creating a social consensus about the best interests of Scottish society and in including the segments of society which have clear interests in the pattern of resource extraction. If the SNP wishes to follow a Norwegian rather than an Irish economic model it will need to encourage those democratizing institutional changes (discussed in Chapter Seven) which encourage the greatest amount of societal deliberation and consensus. If a balance can be struck between a Scottish government and oil companies on the extraction of oil, and if the revenues from this resource can be streamed toward the goals of the SNP (including full employment) then perhaps the negative features of the Irish model can be avoided. The outcome--that is, the economic model pursued--will also be determined by other factors such as the character of the EU's economic development and the extent to which internal democracy and external sovereignty (used to pursue the national interest) are nurtured and protected. Civic nationalism may act as a means to inculcate the value of sacrifice so that some elements of Scottish society do not leave the rest behind to pursue economic prosperity at the expense of the society as a whole. This is the kind of solidarity that a civic nationalism can encourage and which will be necessary if small states are going to pursue economic policies out of step with the ethos of contemporary capitalism.

Chapter 5

The Turn Towards Europe

The current enthusiasm with which the SNP regards the European Union is a relatively new phenomenon. It is instructive to analyze the reasons for the party's reversal on Europe from its initial opposition to integration in the 1975 referendum, to the Sillars-inspired embrace of Europe in the mid-1980s. This development has important implications for the SNP's independence project, as well as the civic-nationalist intent to enhance democracy and autonomy. This chapter will examine the changing view of Europe on the part of the SNP and critically assess the claims of the party. I also compare the SNP's position on Europe to that of its arch-rival, the Labour Party, in order to assess the claims of civic-nationalists regarding popular sovereignty.

As with the SNP and the Conservative party, Labour's view on European integration has undergone substantial change in the last decade. Daniels (1998) argues that domestic considerations, the integration process and intra-party factionalism all contributed to this reevaluation. From the early 1950s to 1966, the party opposed entrance into the EC. After 1966, the party decided to apply for membership, but was blocked by President de Gaulle.⁸⁷ It would be the Conservatives under Ted Heath who would lead Britain into Europe in 1971.

Labour then took the position that it would, upon election to government, renegotiate the terms of entry to the EC. After winning the February 1974 election, Harold Wilson renegotiated terms of entry, and submitted the terms of membership to referendum. A large majority of the public favored membership, and confirmed Britain's place in Europe.

⁸⁷ De Gaulle thought that Britain was too closely linked to the US to be a suitable EC member. This perspective was likely cemented by the Nassau Agreement of 1962 in which the American government agreed to provide the UK, but not France, with Polaris missiles (Hearl 1994, 519).

The Labour party itself was seriously divided on Europe. With the election of Michael Foot to the leadership of the party in 1980, the party took on a reversal in policy and advocated exit from the EC. Such were the divisions within the party that a pro-European faction formed the Social Democratic Party in 1981. The party became further solidified in its opposition to Europe and, in 1983, adopted a strong, anti-EC policy that would see a future Labour government withdraw from the EC.


In fairness, all British parties have had difficulty reconciling EC membership, coming--as it does--alongside Britain's reduced international presence. Early opposition to Europe in the major parties was concerned with the diminution of links to the Commonwealth, and to the United States. For Labour, there was the additional fear that the EC would be dominated by governments of the center-right and, hence, be hostile to the Keynesian economic policies favored by Labour (Daniels 1998, 74). Labour's later turn to Europe was a consequence--at least partly--of disastrous election defeats in the 1980s which led to demands for policy change.

After the election of Neil Kinnock in 1983, Labour reevaluated a swath of party policy. The current 'New Labour' was born at this time. The Party's European policy shifted to one of reforming the institutions of Europe (Daniels 1998, 75). Fortuitously, the late 1980s saw the emergence of serious divisions within the Conservative party on Europe--between the 'wets', who supported European integration in all dimensions, and the Euroskeptics, who appreciated the tariff dismantling consequences of the SEA more than the political and social elements of the Maastricht treaty.⁸⁸ Labour could now claim to have the constructive policy on Europe and used the European elections to hammer the government on domestic and European issues (see Map 3 for 1994 European election results).⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Thatcher's speech at Bruges in 1988 signaled the emergence of a serious gap in European policy between the Conservative party and the other parties of Britain. The speech also served to isolate Thatcher, and Britain, from Europe.

⁸⁹ In the 1999 Scottish European Parliament elections, the SNP received 27.17 percent of the vote (two seats). Scotland has eight seats in the European Parliament.

Map 3



Source: (*The Scotsman* June 14, 1994)

Labour's position on European integration seems quite similar to that of the SNP. There are, however, some important distinctions to be made. First, Labour, despite its criticism of Conservative Euroskeptics, has its own cohort of Euroskeptics eager to protect *British* Parliamentary sovereignty.⁹⁰ Both major parties guard sovereignty zealously, specifically because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament is not subordinate to any constitutional safeguards and, hence, the wholesale adoption of European legislation since 1972 is viewed with some alarm.⁹¹ Integration in Europe suits Labour for the *economic* benefits which could accrue to Britain, and in the late 1990s, Europe's prudent and cautious economic policies fall very much in line with "fiscally-responsible" 'New Labour'. The Blair government has opted out of Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) but has closely conformed to the economic criteria for entry.⁹² The emphasis on British autonomy has enabled Labour to outflank the Conservative party which has attempted to present itself as the defender of British sovereignty. Clearly, this emphasis on maintaining both British unity, and European integration is the starkest distinction between Labour and the SNP on Europe.

The implications of Labour's *British* orientation are that North Sea oil and fishing grounds might be used as leverage at the EU. This leaves the SNP able to claim that the absence of independence reduces crucial national resources to

⁹⁰ Gamble and Kelly (2000, 3) analyze survey data showing the extent of this Euroscepticism among Labour MPs. Data from 1996 show that 29 percent of Labour MPs agreed that "A single currency as set out in the Maastricht Treaty will institutionalize neo-liberal economic policy in Britain." Moreover, 42 percent agreed that "Britain should never permit its monetary policy to be determined by a European Central Bank."

⁹¹ In a variety of areas, European law takes precedence over British law. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is preserved by having European law passed as British legislation by Parliament.

⁹² Economic and Monetary Union is part of the TEU as an addition to Article 109 of the Treaty of Rome. The criteria are: inflation rates within 1.5 percent and interest rates within 2 percent of the three best performing members; budget deficits no more than 3 percent of GDP per year and debt of no more than 60 percent of GDP; no devaluation within the exchange rate mechanism for at least two years (Bainbridge 1998, 91; 253).

bargaining chips for the UK as a whole. Since the SNP views Scottish interests as fundamentally at odds with those of British unionism, we have an important political divide. Labour can correctly argue that Britain has the power to bring Scottish interests to the table, but this requires the political will to do so. It is by no means assured that the UK government would put Scottish interests above pressing "British" ones.

Labour's ideological shift over the course of the last decade has led to abandonment of the Alternative Economic Strategy of the early 1980s (Daniels 1998, 83). This shift mirrors the party's reappraisal of European integration. As European parties abandoned Keynesian policies so, too, has British Labour, and a new commitment to economic integration and convergence is clear. The TUC has also abandoned much of its Euro-skepticism following Delors' 1998 address to the TUC in which a commitment to 'social Europe' was made. When compared with the state of union strength in Conservative Britain, Europe appeared to hold promise for the protection of trade union interests.

Since 1984, the SNP has advocated 'Independence In Europe'. Gallagher (1991, 14) observes that this slogan serves as a compromise between 'go it alone' separatism and ties to the centralized state. It serves as an interesting contrast to Labour Shadow Scottish Secretary Donald Dewar's slogan 'Independence in the UK'. Both slogans are sensitive to sustained scrutiny but it is the SNP's stance that will be examined here. To do so, we begin with the SNP's earliest position on the EEC.

Douglas (1995, 95), in his biography of the first SNP member of Parliament (Dr. Robert McIntyre, who was elected in Hamilton in a May 1945 by-election), observes that, in the late 1950s to the mid-60s, the SNP had paid little attention to European integration. In May 1967, the SNP drafted a letter and sent it out to members of the EEC, warning member states that an independent Scotland might not honor British treaty obligations. While it is not clear how such action might have

been undertaken, it demonstrates the suspicion and hostility with which the Community was regarded. The hostility arose from two primary grievances. The first was that Scotland had not been consulted and had not consented to such an important step. With the current SNP view on European integration in mind, it is remarkable that then leader William Wolfe (1973, 139) could make statements like this one at a meeting in Paisley in 1970.

The SNP delegation which went to Brussels has confirmed our view that it is the aim of the Common Market to establish political domination of the whole of Western Europe and to tolerate no deviation from this line. The Common Marketeers of today are as much doctrinaire centralists as their opposite numbers in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Wolfe's description makes perfect sense in light of the SNP's hostility to the domination of Scotland within the British state. That the party would adopt the anti-centralist rhetoric employed by Wolfe seems consistent with the aim of national independence and self-determination. That the party would, within a decade and a half, reverse this strong opposition seems curious unless we consider the sensitivity of the party's elites, and the Scottish public, to new political possibilities which have emerged with globalization.

With de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, the path to British entry was now open and, following lengthy negotiations, Britain entered the Common Market in 1973. The Labour government elected in October 1974 wanted a mandate to renegotiate terms with the Common Market and called a referendum. During the 1975 referendum campaign, the SNP slogan was 'No--On Anyone Else's Terms' (Harvie 1994, 190).

The SNP's second objection to membership revealed an appeal to class interests. Wolfe argued that the Common Market (as it was referred to in the UK) was "encouraging the exploitation of labour, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to lose their identity and migrate for the sake of a form of so-called progress, which has its roots in inequality and greed" (Marr 1992, 133). The SNP resolved that, whatever

the outcome of the 1975 referendum, another referendum would be held following independence to determine Scotland's position in the EEC.

Opposition to the European integration should not be construed as stemming from some kind of isolationist stance, but rather from the manner in which the European project was developing. In correspondence with the author, David Stevenson, SNP candidate in both the 1979 and 1984 European campaigns recalled:


I used always to give my letterheading address as "... Scotland, Europe". To emphasise that Scotland is a European country rather than a region of England or Britain.

This became awkward during the EEC entry debate. I took part in the 'against' campaign, working along with a similar Norwegian campaign, in the 1970's debate, but on the basis of "No Voice, No Entry". I had long favoured and argued for some form of European Union, but one with Scotland as such as a member (and I hoped that Brittany, Catalonia, etc. would also be members).

On June 5, 1975, the UK voted on whether to remain within the EEC (See Map 4). A majority (67.2 percent) voted yes, and a majority in both Wales and Scotland supported remaining in the EEC (King 1977, 130). From the vantage point of 1994, the alliance campaigning for exit from the EEC was a curious one. Labour was seriously split, with seven cabinet ministers expressing difficulties with an integrated Europe, among them Tony Benn and Michael Foot. They were joined on the right by Enoch Powell, who was concerned with the consequences of membership for British sovereignty. Of the coalition, King (1977, 138) observes that: "All of the anti-Europeans suffered a severe loss of political credibility. Enoch Powell faded even further into the political background. The Scottish and Welsh nationalists were seen to have been rebuffed by the Scottish and Welsh people".

In 1976, the SNP's National Assembly adopted the proposals of a draft entitled *The Context of Independence*. The document ambitiously recommends courting the Common Market, England, Nordic Europe and North America in order to expand trade opportunities, as well as to strengthen the autonomy of a Scottish

Map 4



Source: (King 1977, 146)

state. The document also endorsed an Association of States of the British Isles which would serve as a consultative forum for matters of mutual concern. An Assembly made up of delegates from the respective parliaments would meet twice a year. The aim of this body would be to enhance national interest through cooperation and to preserve socio-economic links throughout the UK. The dominant mood within the party was not isolationist but rather struck a pragmatic balance between the demand for trade opportunities for Scottish exports, and the desire for meaningful autonomy.

A resolution passed at the 1975 Annual Conference of the party confirmed this perspective (Scottish National Party, Annual National Conference, May 1975 Agenda, quoted in Baxter-Moore 1992, 8).

While welcoming international moves to reduce tariff barriers, the SNP opposes membership of the EEC for political and economic reasons. The SNP would favor an independent Scotland negotiating an agreement with the EEC similar to that negotiated by Norway, encouraging trade but maintaining genuine sovereignty .

The party's ambivalence toward Europe was also evident in the Parliamentary group's behavior. SNP MPs consistently voted against further integration, voting against British membership in the European monetary system, and against direct elections to the European Parliament (Baxter-Moore 1992, 9).⁹³

The reconsideration of the Common Market was completed with the arrival of Jim Sillars as a member of the SNP.⁹⁴ Jim Sillars (quoted in Marr 1992, 190) attacked "the myth that the Scots can be led to independence in some sort of Tartan trance, which makes them conveniently blind to economic and social realities".

⁹³ A 1982 survey suggested that only a minority (28 percent) of party activists favored an independent Scotland remaining part of the EC. Compare this to 42 percent who wanted to retain membership in NATO, and 65 percent who favored continued membership in the Commonwealth (Baxter-Moore 1992, 9).

⁹⁴ Sillars' defection to the SNP from Labour was a remarkable turning point for the party. In addition to steering the party toward a pro-European policy, he is also credited with shifting the party to the Left. Kenny MacAskill states that the formation of the left-of-center '79 group and the arrival of Sillars were pivotal in making the SNP more palatable to socialists, as the party had previously been seen as "not left wing enough" (Interview, Edinburgh 1994).

Moderates like Sillars viewed the European opportunity as one which would allow Scotland to "rediscover its old Europeanism from the pre-union centuries". In addition, "Europe also enabled the SNP to produce that mysterious mixture, an internationalist nationalism" (Marr 1992, 190). Marr (Ibid. 190) recognizes the importance that Europe holds for SNP moderates: "As with the old British empire, the new Europe offered the prospects of a self-governed Scotland that was also securely inside a bigger entity. So, even if independence no longer meant what it used to mean, it did not mean isolation either."

After the 1983 election in which the party's share of the Scottish vote fell to 12 percent, SNP Chair Gordon Wilson delivered a paper proposing three changes in policy. One of these was the adoption of a pro-EEC policy with Scotland as a full member (Baxter-Moore 1992, 10).⁹⁵ Reaction to Wilson's paper was mixed but a policy review ensued. The 1983 Conference of the SNP overwhelmingly supported the resolution that: "An SNP government would approach negotiations with the Common market in a positive manner, willing to recommend membership unless our negotiating team were [sic] unable to secure . . . guarantees of protection of vital Scottish interests " (Baxter-Moore 1992, 11).

The party fought the 1984 European Elections on a pro-European platform, emphasizing the benefits (veto on the Council of Ministers, doubled representation in the European Parliament) which would come from independent Scottish membership in the EC.⁹⁶ The SNP's 1984 European Election manifesto presented the SNP as "Scotland's Voice in Europe." Still, lingering wariness remained about the Common

⁹⁵ The other two proposed changes were a reversal of the party's anti-NATO stance and a less doctrinaire approach to independence (or, open-mindedness to devolutionary stepping stones to independence).

⁹⁶ The assurance of a veto no longer holds water, however, as subsequent treaties moved more areas of policy into qualified-majority voting procedures at the expense of unanimity ones (especially the SEA, Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam). The SNP notes that: "As the qualified majority system illustrates, the very structure of the EU gives disproportionate power to the small nations (SNP 1996c, 2).

Market. In March 1984, Gordon Wilson, then MP and Chair of the SNP, recognized common concerns about the EC but, like the party itself, seemed resigned to these (SNP 1984, ii).

The Common Market has many critics--but it is here to stay, and it is making more and more of the decisions which affect all our lives. We have to live with it--and improve it. It is a body which seeks cooperation rather than conflict amongst European states, unquestionably a desirable aim in itself.

Many of the fears that the Common Market would become a superstate have been eased by experience. Far from becoming a new European despotism where bureaucracy triumphed over national rights, the enlarging of the Community in recent years has diluted some of the dangers of centralism. The bigger it gets, the looser it becomes.

In other words, the SNP's evaluation of integration was not quite free of reservations, but in the messy forum of electoral politics the party had chosen to work for the benefits of integration, rather than focus on Europe's deficiencies. The benefits of Europe now became an important part of the discourse of the party. Self-government within the EEC was essential because:

Without self-government, Scotland's bargain in the Common Market is not nearly as good as it could be. Throughout the United Kingdom's negotiations to join, Scotland's national interests were flagrantly ignored by London politicians. No attempt was made to ensure that Scotland's position on the perimeter of Europe was alleviated by the provision of subsidies which would have allowed our goods to reach mass markets without penalty of high transport costs. The fact is, Scotland does get more from the EEC than it pays in--but it could get so much more (SNP 1984, 1).

The SNP also committed itself to the advancement of accountable and democratic governance, rejecting the creation of a "unitary European state" (SNP 1984 3).

In 1988, 'Independence in Europe' became a central feature of the SNP's political discourse. At the party's conference that year the party voted 8: 1 in favor of the policy (Marr, 193). An independent Scotland firmly grounded in the EC was looked upon with great expectation.

In June 1989, Jim Sillars, by this time MP for Glasgow-Govan and Vice-President of the SNP, circulated a document entitled *Independence in Europe*. In contrast to Labour charges that the SNP's turn to Europe was merely cynical

opportunism, Sillars (1989, 2) points out tracts from the 1972 Hansard where, as a Labour MP, he argued that

I am convinced that as time develops and the full importance of the EEC decision comes to be realized, the Scottish people will ultimately demand and get their just entitlement--independent representation in the EEC. It would be to the benefit of all if the Scottish Labour movement led them to that goal.

By 1988, the party pulled "away the bits and pieces of doubt from the policy" of 'Independence in Europe' and adopted permanent membership in the EU, inseparable from the goal of independence (Sillars 1986). The result, for the SNP, has been a fairly coherent and persuasive counter-argument to the charge that the SNP is a party committed to isolationism.⁹⁷

The Labour Party has had to argue that the SNP is trading power for status (Sillars 1989, 44). It argues that Scotland would lack the clout of the UK in negotiations with the EU, and that the UK is best able to protect Scottish interests in the areas of oil production, fisheries and agriculture. The SNP response has been that any constitutional arrangement short of independence makes Scotland a province, unable to assert its influence as do Ireland or Denmark.⁹⁸

Independence presents serious difficulties also. Sillars argues that Scotland, as a region of the UK, has been unable to withstand the corporate and governmental centralizing tendencies of the UK free-market but, European centralization will be yet more powerful and difficult to manage for an independent Scottish state. The Single European Act (SEA) will enhance the centralization of economic power and decision-making with more mergers and takeovers. The balance is provided by the

⁹⁷ Small states can benefit from integration or alliance with powerful neighbors. They tend, in these circumstances, to spend less on defense as a proportion of GDP. For example, consider the relationship between Japan and the United States after 1945 (Lind 1994, 93).

⁹⁸ The current Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, when in opposition, spoke of a 'Bavarian' solution to the Scottish question (1989, 26). For Sillars this would merely confirm Scotland's provincial status and further isolate it from European concerns.

transformation of Scots from lobbyists to decision-makers within the institutions of the EC. In addition, member states maintain the right to veto legislation which assails their vital national interests. That this is done infrequently does not terminate the right. The Luxembourg compromise⁹⁹ of 1966 secured the principle of veto where vital interests are at stake. The Treaty on European Union requires unanimity on a range of issues such as asylum, immigration, tax harmonization, social security, land use and the EU budget system (SNP 1992d, 25). Small state status may also be enhanced by the brokerage politics of the EU; members will sacrifice certain interests in order to gain cooperation on other matters.

In Britain, Section 13 of the Industry Act of 1975 provides an interesting example of the need for member veto (Sillars 1989, 13). This section gives the British Secretary of State for Industry and Trade exclusive authority to veto any merger or takeover of manufacturing viewed as contrary to the interest of the UK. The SEA does not affect the status of this legislation. More importantly, such a provision provides a Scottish government (indeed, any member state) with the means to protect the economy from unwanted centralization. For example, Sillars suggests that if the EC decided to reduce steel production, then a Scottish government could use the veto citing Scottish dependence on steel production (1989, 18).

In Sillars' view, Europe is valuable for more than its economic and political benefits. Aside from the tangible benefits of independence, there is a deeper core issue: self-respect. One gets the clear impression that this is central for the SNP. Sillars argues that independence in Europe would "lift us into a different league, calling for the production and use of skills long buried in our provincial soil" (1989, 21).

⁹⁹ This precedent was inspired by the "empty chair" crisis of 1965-66 when de Gaulle pulled his minister from the Council of Ministers after EEC President Hallstein proposed increasing revenues transferred from member states to the EEC. This was viewed as an unwarranted intrusion into French sovereignty.

However, dissent remained within the party throughout the 1990s on the question of Europe. One critique (made by the nicknamed "Albanian faction") was based on a rather "rigid and absolutist conception of sovereignty" which feared the imposition of rule from Brussels and the desire to protect Scottish independence (Baxter-Moore 1992, 14). The other critique, elaborated further on, was a leftist-informed concern about the concentration of capital and economic power in the EC, without corresponding democratic accountability.

SNP literature now stresses that independence within Europe would still give Scotland power over domestic areas denied it within the UK, in particular, control over the raising of revenue, expenditure, public ownership and social security (SNP 1993c, 1). In contrast to its current status, the party seeks recognition of Scotland's 'national' rather than 'regional' status, proclaiming that the "establishment of new, independent states is at the very forefront of progressive developments in Europe" (SNP 1993c, 2). Membership in Europe ("pooled sovereignty") is seen to enhance small state sovereignty while constraining that of large states. This leveling effect would assure Scotland of the optimal benefits of European integration. It argues that: "Scotland has zero sovereignty at the present time. Whatever the implications for the UK, European integration cannot diminish Scottish sovereignty! With independence in Europe, Scottish sovereignty will be *infinitely* increased" (Italics mine) (SNP 1993d, 6).

The literature of the SNP depicts Scotland as a small nation not unlike the "top shelf" European states of Scandinavia. One background paper argues that: "small Member States have influence way out of proportion to their size or economic importance" (SNP 1992d, 1). Furthermore:

Small states also benefit from the six-monthly rotating Presidency of the Community. Member States use the Presidency to set the agenda for EC development during their six-month period. In 1991, one of the most important years in the Community's history, two small member states--Luxembourg in the first six months, and then the Netherlands--held the Presidency of the Community. In this capacity, they were responsible for

preparing the Draft Treaties on Economic and monetary Union and political Union--a position of enormous influence (SNP 1993c, 6).

The SNP articulates a position characterized curiously as 'internationalist nationalism'. This tradition is viewed as consistent with Scotland's once close ties to Europe, particularly France, and the optimal position for a small state. Party leader Alex Salmond (Salmond 1993) characterized the SNP's EU stance as, "in keeping with the Scots internationalist traditions to see this new European stage as one on which we can express our individual talents and hopefully our national and collective talents."

Similar views were expressed by party members in interviews. Gil Paterson, the party's spokesperson on finance and administration, holds that one, "can't be an internationalist until you have become a nationalist. We Scots are basically non-people, we don't exist."¹⁰⁰ The solution to this predicament is for Scotland to gain independent status. Longtime party member and historian Paul Scott sees historical consistency in the shared sovereignty of the EU. The Scottish notion of popular sovereignty resembles the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the Maastricht treaty. The principle states that decisions ought, whenever possible, to be made at the most immediate level: local, regional, national or European. In an interview (June 1994 Edinburgh) Scott recognized this development.

In the modern world, as you say, with the development of multi-national corporations of enormous wealth and power, international treaties and organizations, there is the sense that no country is sovereign and that's all right., a kind of return to history and we're quite happy with that. A return to our historical roots.

For Scott, as with many in the SNP, the regaining of sovereignty is merely restoration of that which should never have been bargained away. At the same time however there is an understanding that sovereignty cannot be absolute. Scott (Interview June

¹⁰⁰ Gil Paterson, SNP spokesperson on Administration and Finance, interviewed by author, July 1, 1994, BonnyBriggs.

1994, Edinburgh) suggests that the SNP's nuanced view of sovereignty is a reflection of the Scottish historical experience.

The Scottish experience accounts for this. Until the 1600s, when Scotland was an independent state, Scotland had a rather complicated idea of sovereignty; it lay with people. But, the practice was divided sovereignty between the state and church. That sovereignty is divided has been central to the Scottish experience for centuries. Since union sovereignty was lost completely. We have no recent experience with complete sovereignty. Also, as part of our historical experience we have no problem associating with other European countries. We have had the experience of pooling sovereignty to resist a powerful neighbor.

Scott is quite confident that the EU can muster the power and authority necessary to curb the anti-social consequences of centralized, mobile, anonymous capital. This view was echoed by Kenny MacAskill, SNP treasurer and general election candidate (Interview, Edinburgh June 1994).

The SNP in the early 80s saw Europe as an economic union and so the more traditional view of sovereignty prevailed. Since 1984 the party has looked to the new millennium. The SNP now accepts that shared sovereignty is a fact of life. We've got nothing to lose. MNCs do rule the roost in Europe as in the North American situation but Scotland is a relatively wealthy country with North Sea oil--more gas than oil now that oil's running down. I don't deny difficulties, but we'll work with European Social Democrats to enhance the Social Chapter of Maastricht.

Another SNP member, research officer Kevin Pringle, described his conversion to the nationalist terms of independence from the UK (Interview Edinburgh June 1994). In 1986, a number of African states boycotted the Commonwealth games in Edinburgh to protest the British government's policies regarding sanctions against South Africa. Pringle recalls: "It occurred to me that Scotland had a very different political culture from that which reigned, and reigns, in London. With our own identity in the world we wouldn't have pursued the same kind of policy as Thatcher". Pringle observed that sovereignty had an instrumental, as well as a symbolic, value. Not only could a Scottish government support sanctions against South Africa but the Scottish tradition of sovereignty made Scotland, unlike England, open to European integration. Without a tradition of parliamentary supremacy to lose, Scotland could more easily adapt to a confederal EU.

In SNP literature the argument is clear that Scotland would not only adapt to the EU, but flourish. On the other hand, "Labour and the Liberal Democrats are fully committed to the old, discredited state structures. Both would relegate Scotland to a region of Europe, with no power to shape our future". As an independent member state, Scotland would enjoy a number of advantages such as a currency independent of the British pound. This would be true with either a separate Scottish currency or, more likely, the adoption of the Euro. SNP literature cites numerous economic and political advantages to be had with independence in Europe. For example, as the EU purchases 61 percent of Scottish manufactured exports, a Scottish government would use its seat on the Council of Ministers to lobby on behalf of Scottish industry, and seek out further trading opportunities (SNP 1993c, 3). The status quo injures Scotland in many ways as this passage shows (SNP 1993c, 6):

Fishing is a clear example of the neglect of Scottish interests in Europe. The fishing industry is ten times more important to the Scottish economy than to the UK as a whole, supporting 30,000 jobs in Scotland. But because fishing is marginal to the British economy, UK ministers do not press the industry's interests during meetings of EC fisheries ministers. Scotland's fishing industry suffers badly from a lack of a direct Scottish voice within the community.

Scottish waters are central to the Community's Common Fisheries Policy. Yet Luxembourg, with a smaller population than Edinburgh and without a coastline, has a greater say over this vital Scottish industry than the Scottish people.

The above passage, alongside Scott's earlier remarks, is evidence of a substantial compromise on the part of the SNP--an impressive one in light of the party's previous opposition to the Common Market. The post-1984 SNP has "turned" to Europe for a number of reasons. One cannot deny the powerful counter argument that Europe provides against the so-often wielded "separatist" charge. The scaremongering indulged in by the Conservative and Labour parties continues unabated,¹⁰¹ and intensified in the lead-up to the Scottish Parliament elections on

¹⁰¹ There could be no starker distinction than that between the SNP's current stance on Europe, and that of the Conservative party. Against suspicion and xenophobia, the SNP presents hope and a determination to cooperate with Europe.

May 6, 1999.¹⁰² The Independence in Europe platform is a strategic response to the charge of separatism. More importantly, however, the adoption of a pro-European policy is an important landmark in the development of the SNP. The turn to Europe implicitly and explicitly recognizes the changing state system and the emergence of new loci of political activity and influence. However sophisticated the party's thinking on these matters is, though, one may reasonably question whether European integration will serve the interests of Scottish autonomy and democracy.

Independence in Europe: Myth and Reality

The SNP appears to have made substantial gains with the 'Independence in Europe' campaign. The party has been able to utilize this to fend off the old charge of 'autarky,' and has made great use of Europe to assure Scots of a solid, and prosperous

The Conservative party had argued, in the late 1980s, that Scotland would be ejected from the EU in the event of separation, and would then have to reapply for entry behind other states. This claim has been laid to rest. As Paul Scott (1992, 42) has pointed out, a number of experts have denied the Conservative claim. Eamonn Gallagher, a former Director General of the European Commission, has stated that: "In my view, there could be no sustainable legal or political objection to separate Scottish membership of the European Community (Scott 1992, 43)." Furthermore, the 1978 Vienna Convention on successor states in respect of Treaties has some bearing on this matter. Section 34 (1) (a) clearly states that successor states must abide by treaties in force at the time of succession.

Both Conservative and Labour arguments against the 'Independence in Europe' position are, for Sillars, based on manipulative fear-mongering. He writes:

The whole thrust of their propaganda effort against Scottish independence has been to lower Scottish aspirations and proclaim the impossibility of Scotland getting any recognition of any vote for self-determination. It is a process deliberately designed to undermine self-confidence, to create a fear laden people open to easy manipulation (1989, 37).

In fact, the best that the Conservatives had been able to do, aside from counting on the complacency of the electorate, was to issue dire predictions regarding the inevitable chaos that would result from independence. That, and sentimental attachment to Union, is all that remains of the Conservative party's rationale for the status quo.

¹⁰² In an April 30 speech, reported in an article, "Scottish nationalists have Blair worried," published in the Globe and Mail on 1 May 1999, Prime Minister Blair warned the Scottish electorate that, "Their [SNP] divorce plans mean higher taxes, job losses and businesses chased away."

economic future. This strategy has the veneer of paradox, but is actually not an uncommon one among other nationalist movements in the West. In Québec and Catalonia particularly, support for continental integration is quite high among nationalists and non-nationalists alike.¹⁰³ Martin (1995, 22) argues that what he calls "free trade nationalism" bypasses the choice between "zero-sum nationalism and impassive cosmopolitanism". Québécois nationalists supported a carefully negotiated Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), seeing these agreements as enhancing Québec economic autonomy from the Canadian state. Both the federalist Liberals and the sovereigntist *Parti Québécois* (PQ) supported (excepting internal dissent in each party) free trade.

Why does support for free trade seem paradoxical when espoused by a regional-nationalist movement for independence? In the case of Québec, free trade was, and is, supported by the PQ even though the agreement was negotiated, and signed by the Canadian federal government (similarly, Scotland's entry into the EEC was a result of British intentions and negotiations). The PQ's support for free trade was linked to the Meech Lake Accord (Merrett 1996, 250-255). The Meech Lake Accord was designed to decentralize the Canadian federation by providing greater autonomy to the provinces. This document was accompanied by negotiations on free trade which would enhance decentralization, for example, by cuts in transfer payments, and "offloading" or devolving powers to the provinces. This suited the agenda of the PQ leadership who saw Québec's power enhanced at the expense of the federal government. The PQ of Parizeau was no longer the social democratic party of

¹⁰³ Fifty-eight percent of Quebecers supported the NAFTA compared with only 46 percent in Canada overall (Martin 1995, 4). Some care is required here. It is among the elite of the nationalist movement that one finds greatest support for continentalism. One study indicates that mass level data show similar levels of public opposition to free trade in Québec as found in the rest of Canada (Bashevkin 1991, 172-173).

Levesque; the new leadership was quite eager to accept the neo-liberal agenda implemented by the Free Trade Agreement (Merrett 1996, 253).¹⁰⁴

The FTA and the NAFTA have further compromised already vulnerable and tenuous Canadian sovereignty. Canada has passed laws to accommodate the interests of the American pharmaceutical industry (Bill C-22 in 1988)¹⁰⁵ and faces threats to the cultural industries (Bill C-58, for example, permits Canadian firms to advertise in magazines printed outside of Canada, though sold in Canada, draining revenue from the Canadian magazine industry). These compromises are not explicitly political but legal; Canada has entered into an agreement and must fulfill its treaty obligations. We do not have, as yet, the North American equivalent of a Court of Justice or Council of Ministers but the consequences of FTA and NAFTA have real consequences for the autonomy of Canadian policy-making.¹⁰⁶ Nationalism is typically associated with protectionism, and yet we see nationalists in Québec endorsing free-trade--despite higher unemployment than its neighbor, Ontario, and a higher proportion of workers in vulnerable economic sectors like textiles (Martin 7, 1995). Part of the explanation for the advocacy of free-trade on the part of the PQ is its view that continentalism will provide markets for Québec exports. As FTA and NAFTA do not constitute a formal

¹⁰⁴ One observer, writing in the early 1970s, commented on the distinction between the Liberals and PQ. The characterization seems dubious now.

As we all know man does not live by equalization payments and capital investment alone. There is the soul which must be nurtured and up to now the PQ more than any other party has managed to distill into a political expression the spiritual meaning of what it is to be Québécois. The Liberal answer to this is the concept of 'cultural sovereignty,' a sort of bastard son of *maître chez nous* and a distant relative of *égalité ou indépendance*. It means Maria Chapdelaine can live forever so long as we render to David Rockefeller the things that are Chase Manhattan's (Hubert Blauch quoted in Cameron 1974, 136).

¹⁰⁵ Bill C-22 extended the monopoly held by pharmaceutical firms over patents from four to ten years.

¹⁰⁶ The Anglo-Left in Canada, while sympathetic to economic/civic nationalism, must, by now, be very ambivalent about nationalism when prescriptions to accommodate nationalist demands in Québec have resulted in the weakening of the federal government and the reduction of welfare and service standards throughout the federation.

political union, these are seen as autonomy-enhancing agreements which have the effect of reducing Québec's dependence on investment and trade within Canada.

In the Scottish case however, the European Union is very clearly a political project. It initially had the function of reducing the production of war materials (coal and steel) but is now a fully developed quasi-state. The SNP supports this European integration project (with the usual internal dissent). The view of SNP President and MEP (Western Isles and Highlands), Winnie Ewing, quoted in an article by Robbie Dinwoodie, "Salmond plea for open party," published in the Herald on 25 September 1995, is typical: "We are bound in a partnership which has opted out from European social policy. The UK is a banana monarchy where our cheap labour is meant to attract industry, which still seems to prefer setting up in Ireland." Full national representation in Europe is seen as the means to escape from economic mismanagement in Britain, and an opportunity for greater economic self-direction and development. Further, Europe's institutions promise influence at the highest levels of policy making.

One former European candidate for the SNP, David Stevenson, recently expressed the ambivalence which characterizes many Scots' view of European integration:

I have always favoured a European union, provided it was based on those nations which identify themselves as such, including Scotland, with membership being voluntary-- everyone wanting to be in. Also I have always wished it to be co-operative with the rest of the world. It should not be seeking prosperity or dominance at the expense of other parts of the world.

The European Union which we got seemed to me more centralist and more based on existing imperial powers than I wished, but it does appear, perhaps more than I originally thought, to offer at least chances of change and progress towards what I would wish.

Winnie Ewing, a friend whom I admire, but do not always agree with, has emphasised in the European Parliament it is worth arguing a case, people are open to persuasion, a good case can be heard and acted on-- unlike the London Parliament where party leaders decide how their followers will vote, and argument and discussion serve only to let off steam/give a false

impression of democracy (not her words, but my understanding of what she meant).¹⁰⁷

The above quotation demonstrates the commitment on the part of the SNP to enhancing Scottish influence and democracy through available political institutions. This determination reflects the experimental, flexible and innovative approaches that civic-nationalists can utilize to achieve their goals. There are, however, worrying signs that the EU may fail to provide an independent Scottish state with the autonomy the SNP desires.

Sociologist, and former SNP member (now Labour), Isobel Lindsay has argued that the party's EU policy is, in fact, "an escape into a utopia in which strong influence could be wielded and generous regional grants received, where great changes could be achieved without much being changed" (quoted in Marr 1992, 192-3). Lindsay (1992, 84-101) has articulated a rather damning indictment of the party's European policy, and her insights are worth some consideration. She is critical of the SNP's criticisms of the UK's democratic deficit while it simultaneously welcomes European integration, despite its accompanying democratic deficit. The European Union represents an acceleration of both bureaucratic and economic centralization. Gavin McCrone (1993, 16) concurs, pointing out that the Single European Act (SEA) permits the trans-national movement of financial capital. McCrone argues that one must expect mergers in the financial service sectors within Europe and that this will certainly negatively affect Scotland's financial industry. Furthering the economic integration of the EU is the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and proposals for monetary union contained within the Maastricht Treaty. McCrone observes that: "Monetary union is however a very major step, since it involves a more substantial transfer of economic sovereignty from the national to the European level than any of the other common policies which have been introduced since the Community was

¹⁰⁷ Internet correspondence, February 1999.

founded" (1993, 16). Such centralization will require the services of a central bank to coordinate the money supply, and by implication, control over member states' fiscal policies. McCrone (Ibid. 19) further points out that member states would be forced to conform to the same "monetary and fiscal disciplines". There is little reason to view this particular centralizing trend as either benevolent or sensitive to minority peoples' distinctiveness, or democratic aspirations.

Lindsay (1992, 91) argues that the 'Independence in Europe' slogan is rather superficial. Lindsay argues that in its enthusiasm for Europe, the SNP is, in fact, following "a political agenda dictated by the interests of multi-national capital" (Ibid.. 94). Party activists protest this perspective, arguing that "things couldn't be worse than they are now" and that Europe will be an improvement both democratically and economically. Lindsay (Ibid.. 95) is not appeased:

Independent membership of an increasingly integrationist EC is more striking for its continuity than as a radical departure. Once the merit of independence as opposed to a domestic legislature is seen as primarily a better way of exerting influence on the EC, then the argument becomes a balance-sheet, not a principle, not part of a broader democratic ideology.

Lindsay points to a critical point. The merit of the Independence in Europe policy is its relative improvement upon current Scottish influence in Europe, but, this assumes that Westminster will be run by a government insensitive to Scottish needs and aspirations. In the event of a UK government eager to incorporate Scottish interests in some kind of federal structure, the 'Independence in Europe' argument loses its default attraction. The 1979-97 era made European integration a more attractive option when a mandateless government seemed determined to ignore Scottish interests. Europe's deficiencies were less visible in contrast to those of successive Conservative governments. On the other hand, one cannot help but wonder if Scotland's voice will echo more loudly in Brussels than it does now in London. The SNP case for Europe pivots on the argument that Scotland will be able to choose the areas in which it cooperates with the EU, and pools or surrenders sovereignty.

Lindsay argues that: "Even in the areas in which the veto technically continues, it has now become obviously a mythical power" (Lindsay 1991, 95). How could the SNP spend 15 years criticizing the Conservative government's two-track Europe, and then turn and demand to either veto or opt out of some area of European affairs? In the brokerage politics of the EU, Scotland will have to sacrifice in some areas in order to benefit from others.

Bateman (1994) discusses jurisdictional concerns over Scottish fishing zones which are said to contain 80 percent of EU fish stocks.¹⁰⁸ Over the last several years, Spain and Portugal have lobbied for access to Scottish waters for their fishing fleets. These waters had been barred to their fleets by the EU as a conservation measure. The two countries lobbied for access by 1996. Such an 'adjustment' required only a majority vote in the Council of Ministers and, having far less influence than the Iberians, Scotland suffered a serious setback on a matter of critical importance for local fishing communities (particularly in light of the Iberians' conservation record). First of all, Scotland has no vote on the Council of Ministers; Britain does. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is determined by the Council of Ministers on recommendations from the European Commission.¹⁰⁹ The Council of Ministers represents the executives of the member states while the Commission is appointed by each of the member states. There is no direct link between the interests of the fishing communities and policy makers. Lobbyists for Scottish fishing interests are countered by the presence of multi-national organizations in Europe who control the continental fishing industry. As fishing is relatively unimportant to the UK as a whole the

¹⁰⁸ Fishing policy in the EU is predicated on two principles: the single market in agricultural products and the nature of fishery ecology; fish may spawn in one territory, mature in another and migrate seasonally. It is difficult then to assert national ownership (Wright 1996, 27).

¹⁰⁹ The "original six" members of the EEC adopted a Common Fisheries Policy at the time of application by Denmark, Ireland, and the UK in the knowledge that these applicants had rich fishing grounds. To enter the Community the applicants had to accept the primacy of European law over fisheries (Wright 1996, 29).

government was willing to concede to the access demands of the EU. This (the vote on fishing) has nothing to do with the European parliament; it is an executive decision of the British government and the other members on the Council of Ministers. However, even if Scotland had been an independent member of the EU, the outcome may not have been different. Since the day-to-day management of the CFP is subject to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), it seems unlikely that an independent Scotland's vote would be able to strictly exclude a degree of access to the Scottish fishery (Wright 1996, 37).¹¹⁰ The only options would be to renegotiate the CFP (a move not likely to be in the interest of other members states), a European court challenge, or, exit the EU altogether--an option contrary to the basic ethos evident in the contemporary discourse of the SNP.¹¹¹ The party's 1992 booklet, *Scotland: A European Nation*, declares that, upon entry to the EU: "All our existing legal, economic and social agreements will remain in place, with no disruption whatsoever" (SNP 1992e, 16).

Gray (1997) observes that the new Multi-annual Guidance Program (MAGP) does little to reduce the grievances of British and Irish fishing communities. Quota

¹¹⁰ Neither the Labour party nor the Liberal-Democrats would repatriate the CFP. The SNP promises not to abandon fishing interests. This would be difficult. Veto is not an option in the CFP. The only options are legal challenges to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or, influencing other members to overturn CFP policies in the Council of Ministers (See Wright 1996, 37).

¹¹¹ The SNP is committed to maintaining the right of veto in the Council of Ministers (SNP, 1996). From 1966--after the Luxembourg compromise which created an informal precedent recognizing the threat of veto in defense of vital national interests--to the mid-1980s, the threat of veto forced compromise in decision making in the Council of Ministers. By the time of the SEA (1984), and ever since, more areas of decision making have been undertaken with simple and qualified majority procedures. Nugent (1991, 122) argues that members increasingly feared that progress on integration would be retarded by the procrastination and delay wrought by frequent vetoes. Unanimity procedures, subject to veto, would become increasingly difficult as the union came to expand from the 'original six' to the current 15, and likely twenty within the next decade. Governments insisting on delaying legislation viewed as compromising 'national interests' may find themselves isolated and lose leverage on other policy areas. Resistance to proposed legislation is more likely to be manifested in brokerage politics than in vetoes. Politically, Scotland could not enjoy the benefits of integration while simultaneously interminably 'opting out' of European policy.

hopping, when other member states' nationals buy out British licenses (from British fishing boat owners) and quotas, has also posed a serious problem as these boats tend not to hire local fishers, and their owners do not live and spend in the locality, or inject money into the local economy.¹¹² Also, British (presumably Scottish) decisions on fishing quotas are taken on a supra-national level and limit the scope of domestic policy-makers to determine sustainable quotas and fishing methods. Organizations such as the Scottish Fishermen's Federation (SFF) are very concerned with destructive methods of fishing, such as industrial fishing (which catches and wastes non-target species), conducted by the Danes particularly, and beam trawling, a Dutch practice where the ocean floor is raked by weighted nets destroying the ocean floor (Gray 1997, 152). In 2002, existing fishing agreements will be renegotiated and will almost certainly open British waters entirely to the fleets of other member states. If Scotland wants the benefits of regional development funding, free access to European markets, the security of membership in the EU, and use of the single currency it will need to cooperate. In the case of fishing, cooperation and acceptance of the basic treaty obligations will require some reciprocity. Scotland will not be able to 'use' the EU at its convenience if it expects to enjoy the benefits of membership.

What this example demonstrates is that Scots can suffer inside or outside the UK in relation to the EU. As fishing is such an unimportant concern for the rest of the UK, Scotland can expect little active concern on the part of most of the UK's European representatives (on the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament).¹¹³

¹¹² A strict system of vessel registration and licensing, to prevent quota hopping, could be challenged as a violation of the Treaty of Rome's elimination of discrimination of the basis of nationality. Fish products are (considered agricultural products) subject to common market rules under Article 38 EEC (Bainbridge 1998, 416)

¹¹³ In 1972 prospective applicants to the EC were presented with the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Norway's referendum result that year (53.5 percent opposed) was partly determined by opposition to the CFP. Wright (1996) argues that rising discontent on the part of the Scottish fishing sector helped sway undecided Norwegians to the 'No' side in the 1994 referendum on Norwegian membership in the EU (52.2 percent opposed).

On the other hand, as an independent member, it would wield only three of the 79 weighted votes on the Council of Ministers and only 3 percent of the seats (sixteen, up from its current eight) in the European parliament.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, influence in European affairs will only be as effective as the institutions of the EU. Delegates to the SNP's 1995 conference in Perth raised serious doubts regarding the EU, particularly the single currency administered by a central bank. The SNP is clearly not--as it has criticized the Conservatives for being--in favor of Europe *à la carte*, but as integration proceeds, and more policy domains are surrendered to Europe, the shortcomings of integration may seem more salient than the benefits.¹¹⁵ The SNP would argue that the current status of Scotland is intolerable, but one might argue that a reformed British constitution would have the added benefit of strengthening the voice of Scotland (as well as Wales) in the EU. Some kind of asymmetrical federalism, in which Scotland has more autonomy than other regions of the UK, would permit Scotland to have a greater voice in European affairs. Bateman (1994, 14) points out that it has been suggested that responsibility for fishing (a peripheral interest for the UK generally) could be transferred to the Scottish Office, although, with a Scottish Parliament, this might be easily devolved and permit Scottish representatives to meet and negotiate fishing (and other Scottish concerns) in Brussels, perhaps following consultations with Westminster. Asymmetrical federalism would also have the salutary benefit of not requiring unneeded and unwanted regional devolution within England itself. A written

¹¹⁴ Since 1979, MEPs have been elected directly by the electorates of the member states. Despite representation in the European Parliament (EP) the interests of Scotland are hampered by the prior problem of the "democratic deficit" resulting from the general weakness of the EP compared with the Council of Ministers and the Commission.

¹¹⁵ The Tindemans report on European institutions observed that the number of regulations (according to the Treaty of Rome regulations are binding in their entirety and applicable in all member states) have increased from 1,517 in 1973 to 7, 367 in 1993 (Van Tuyll van Serookerken 1996, 49-50).

constitution would further structure the right of Scottish governments to make their interests known at the UK and European levels.

The issue of national vetoes over areas of critical national interests deserves some consideration. The argument presented by Sillars in the late 1980s, and by the SNP over the last decade, has been that: "Many decisions in the Council of Ministers--the EC's ultimate lawmaking body--have to be taken by unanimous agreement of all the member states. Thus every country effectively has the right of veto on many matters. An independent Scotland, wishing to make a positive contribution towards Europe would want to make use of that power only very rarely--but we would have the right to do so if our vital national interests were at stake" (SNP 1992e, 7). The provisions within the EU for the use of veto are limited (especially when compared to the two-tier system employed by the UN where security council members enjoy a right of veto over all areas of decision-making) (Bainbridge 1998). In fact, the variable geometry model, where member states opt out of spheres of EU activity (for example, the Major government and the Social Contract of the Treaty on European Union) seems the more likely course, especially with expansion of the EU (Bainbridge 1998, 508). The threat of veto in the past has often served to discourage the use of vetoes and has encouraged consensus forms of decision-making since the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. Since that time, more and more areas of policy have been subject to QMV procedures, essentially eliminating the use of the veto.¹¹⁶ The SNP has expressed support for QMV arguing that it provides small states with

¹¹⁶ Under Qualified Majority Voting member states' votes are weighted by population as follows: Austria 4, Belgium 5, UK 10, Denmark 3, Finland 3, France 10, Germany 10, Greece 5, Ireland 3, Italy 10, Luxembourg 2, Netherlands 5, Portugal 5, Spain 8, Sweden 4. A qualified majority, with the current member state complement of 15, is 62 of 87 total votes meaning that 26 votes can block proposed legislation.

Legislative acts related to the single market are voted on by QMV. The following areas are now decided by QMV: free movement of workers, recognition of credentials, the internal market, public health, consumer protection, competition, transport, environment, development cooperation, the European Social Fund, and the Regional Development Fund (George 1996, 23).

considerable influence, and yet this assumes that a group of small member states will share common policy positions. The SNP pledges to "treat fishing as a top priority" and "safeguard the future of our fishing communities" (SNP 1996). The SNP wants to fundamentally reform the CFP, and replace it with "the basis of a new agreement being the implementation of the subsidiarity principle in fishing policy" (Ibid.). These are commitments which an independent Scottish state may have to compromise upon in order to exert influence in other areas of European policy. This is the case because for all its federalist pretensions the EU retains a strong intergovernmental element which implies that brokerage politics will continue to influence policy making.

There remain, within the SNP, serious concerns about the European project. At the SNP's annual conference in Perth in 1995, doubts about Europe were voiced. John Mason, a party delegate from Glasgow, articulated this latent ambivalence in an article by Peter MacMahon, "Doubts emerge over policy on Europe," published in the Scotsman on 22 September 1995:

We're in the SNP because we do not want other countries making decisions for us, whether [these decisions are made] in London or Brussels would suggest that going into the single currency is going too far. One of the key things about sovereignty is having control over your own currency.

Nevertheless, Alex Neil (Policy vice-convenor) reflected the view of the leadership and the majority of delegates, stating that the party would continue to support the single currency. The party's stance on Europe prompted its Energy spokesperson, Nicola Sturgeon, quoted in an article, "Doubts emerge over policy on Europe," by Peter MacMahon in the Scotsman on 22 September 1995, to admonish the 1995 conference and warn that: "Europe is our flagship policy. It is far too important to be dealt with by a mish-mash of statements which leave us facing different directions at once. Euro-skeptics also haunt the SNP quite publicly, with prominent members like Stephen Maxwell observing, in a letter to the Scotsman on 3 October 1995, "Swing away from Maastricht," that SNP Euro-skeptics have "challenged the consistency of the SNP's support for European economic union with the SNP's desire for a strong

Scottish government capable of using Scotland's asset base to support national reconstruction."

The European Union is often criticized for its "democratic deficit" (Chrysochoou 1999; Martin and Ross 1999; Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995; Kiernan 1997; Davidson 1997).¹¹⁷ Despite reforms in the late 1970s and mid-eighties, the European Parliament has also been widely criticized as an ineffective talking shop, impotent against the agenda of the Council of Ministers, and the European Commission (Boyce 1993; Wallace and Smith 1995). In July 1993, the UK National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty), in its memorandum to the UK's European Communities Committee, called for a transparent and accountable European Union. It concluded that:

There is a democratic deficit at both the community and national levels which is particularly serious in the field of intergovernmental cooperation; the European Parliament cannot control the Council, while most national parliaments have so far failed to devise means of making their governments more accountable for actions agreed at the Community level (Liberty, 576).

Liberty's report argued that the 1988 Toussaint report on the 'democratic deficit' has inspired only limited efforts in the Treaty on European Union to address the trend whereby member states lose powers without analogous powers being given to the European Parliament (Liberty, 573). More recent attempts at reform to the democratic deficit have enhanced the powers of the EP. Most notably, the Treaty of Amsterdam has strengthened the EP's power by extending the codecision procedure (Dinan 1999, 40). Moreover, in September 1998, Wim Duisenberg and other members of the European Central Bank's (ECB) executive board appeared before the EP monetary subcommittee to address questions regarding the transparency and legitimacy of the

¹¹⁷ The perception that the EU is undemocratic undermines the prospects of enhancing that democracy because the perception that the European Parliament is too weak is cited by 25 percent of non-voters as reason for abstaining from EU elections (European Commission 1999, 82). Eurobarometer conducts regular surveys of public opinion and polls 1000 people per country (except Luxembourg where 500 are surveyed, and the UK where 300 Northern Ireland residents are included with the rest of the UK's 1000).

ECB policy making. Dinan describes the exchange as cordial, but also notes that Duisenberg's determination to restrict access to ECB policy discussions clashes with the EP's demands for greater accountability and public scrutiny (Dinan 1999, 58). While progress has been achieved with the Treaty of Amsterdam in improving the EU's democratic practice, critics remain unappeased. Toulemon observes that:

The increasing involvement of the European Parliament in the EU's legislative work and the publication of the Council's voting records (though not its deliberations) incontestably represent progress. But Europe remains largely the privileged reserve of politicians, diplomats, high-ranking officials, top management and experts of all sorts who, all taken together, fall badly short of meeting the expectations of the ordinary man and woman on the 'Clapham omnibus' or, for that matter, the Brussels tram (1998, 116).

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997. It is not readily associated with any great project as previous treaties have been (for instance, the SEA with the Single European Market, or the Maastricht Treaty with the common currency) (Nugent 1999, 80-81). The Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified with far less controversy than the Maastricht Treaty, and arguably with less public debate (only Denmark and Ireland held referenda on it). The Treaty came into force in May 1999 and enhances the strength of the European Parliament by providing the EP with greater input into legislation and greater independence from the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Where proposals are sent to conciliation committees for amendment, both Parliament and the Commission must approve. In the past only qualified majority votes by Parliament could thwart the will of the Commission (Nugent 1999, 88). Moreover, a number of other institutional changes were agreed to. The EP has now been capped at 700 members regardless of the number of member states. Also, the Commission President must be approved by Parliament.

Important changes have also been made with regard to decision-making procedures. Twelve new areas of policy will now be governed by QMV. Among these are: employment guidelines, social exclusion, free movement of persons, public health, equal opportunities, customs cooperation and research and technological

development (European Commission 1997, 22). While the changes to strengthen the role of Parliament are to be welcomed there is still the concern that national sovereignty and hence, policy development and national government legitimacy will be further diminished with QMV. QMV may, as the SNP argues, enhance small state power and influence but this is likely only where issues are shared in common with many small member states. In matters where one or two small states try to stem the tide, or stake out an independent position, there may be less advantage to QMV. The changes brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam contribute to a reduction in the democratic deficit while others effectively reduce national sovereignty further, and by implication undermine national-level democracy.

European integration has been the subject of considerable criticism. Galtung (1994) has pointed out the historical continuity of the EU with previous European empires. The doctrine *acquis communautaire* requires new members to accede to the treaty obligations existing at the moment of entry.¹¹⁸ This limits an independent Scottish state's room to maneuver, a tolerable development, perhaps, if the only options considered are the *status quo*, or integration with the current structure of European governance.

The SNP, citing Ireland's apparent transformation over the last two decades, may consider political subordination an acceptable price to pay for economic rejuvenation via EU regional funding. The reality may be at odds with this judgment. One commentator suggests that: "To the extent that regional and social policies continue to be subordinated to the needs of capital and so to competition and industrial objectives, the European Union will fail to reduce regional disparities

¹¹⁸ Article 8 of the recent Treaty of Amsterdam stipulates that the Schengen agreement "must be accepted in full by all States candidates for admission." If a member is found to be in violation of a treaty the Council may "suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of this treaty to the Member state in question, including the voting rights of the representative of that Member state in the council" (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article F.1.2).

across the continent and may exacerbate patterns of uneven development" (Danson 1997, 15). Baxter-Moore (1992, 27) suggests that "the party will have to recognize, to a greater extent than has hitherto been the case, that there may well be a fundamental tension between the kind of nationalism espoused by the SNP and the kind of European Community envisaged by the progenitors of the Single European Act" (that is, the vision led by the interests of large corporations and finance capital). Dyson (1999, 198) argues that recently elected social democratic governments in France and Germany have had to conform to "a reigning economic policy paradigm that privileged central bankers. EMU [European Monetary Union] had itself played a key role in institutionalizing that paradigm." The paradigm referred to emphasizes the importance of price stability and central bank independence. This is important for the Scottish case as the SNP is determined to prepare for Scottish adoption of the single currency. The party's policy paper, *Towards the Scottish Parliament*, states that:

Irrespective of whether the UK joins the European Single Currency in the near future, there will be a need to ensure that Scotland's businesses are prepared for it being introduced by 11 member states of the EU. In particular Scotland's exporters and financial service industries will have to be geared up for dealing with the EURO (SNP 1998b, 3).

The SNP seems to regard the single currency as a potential problem of adjustment for industry and commerce; it is insufficiently concerned with the consequences of meeting the convergence criteria for entering Stage III EMU in the first place. The document further states that:

We will set up a Currency Advisory Board, comprising economists, trades unionist [sic], industrialists, financiers and MSPs of all parties. The Commission will research in detail the implications of a European Single Currency for each major sector of commerce and industry in Scotland. It will make recommendations on what actions should be taken to prepare Scotland for possible entry into the Euro, either as an independent country or as part of the UK (Ibid.).

The risk entailed with the adoption of the single currency is that the social agenda of the SNP will be at odds with the neo-liberal ethos of the EU.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Dyson (1999, 200) argues that the neo-liberal paradigm of the EU became


Moreover, the 'bidding war' for external investment has intensified with the opening up of East European economies. Until the early 1970s, Scotland (and Wales) benefited from industrial policies in the form of nationalization which took the place of external investment and absent indigenous capital. The ascendancy of neo-liberal policies since the 1979 General election and the dismantling of anti-competitive trade barriers by the EU have served to devastate Scottish industry (Danson 1997, 17). Employment in manufacturing has decreased substantially (see Map 7) and service sector employment is generally non-unionized and often part-time. Also, Map 6 shows considerable employment volatility in the oil sector. Danson (1997, 16-17) argues that the much lauded European funding--via the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund, intended to ameliorate the adjustment costs of integration--actually does little to alleviate underdevelopment. These funds are designed to improve infrastructure to attract investment, rather than to transform the peripheral economy. Nationalists argue that an independent government will be able to attract investment on its own terms and use oil revenues for structural transformation (see Map 5 for gas and oil fields). This would be a happy result indeed, but one dependent on sustainable, dependable oil revenues and the ability to resist the temptation to accept external investment at any cost.

Is subsidiarity the key to protecting national and regional autonomy within the EU? Article 3b of the TEU enshrines the principle of subsidiarity:

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community (TEU, 3b, paragraph 2).


especially evident following the Delors report of 1989. The report itself was drafted by a committee composed of the heads of central banks of the member states. The document clearly stresses the issues of European Central Bank independence and price stability.

Map 5




Source: (Harvie 1994, 365)

Map 6



Source: (Scottish Office 1994/95, 84)

Map 7



Source: (Scottish Office 1995, 5)

In 1992 and 1993 expert witnesses called before the UK's Foreign Affairs Committee and the Committee on the European Communities disparaged the efficacy of subsidiarity and warned that the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) was a centralizing document replete with implications for member state autonomy and democratic accountability.

Trevor Hartley, Professor of Law at the London School of Economics, suggests that the subsidiarity principle (as described in the TEU) has no 'bite'--that, in fact, there are no institutional means for adjudicating Community/subcommunity jurisdictional disagreements (1992, 49). The lack of any proposed institutional remedies, say, a committee like the French *Conseil constitutionnel*, indicates a lack of commitment to the oft-cited subsidiarity principle. Even if such a measure were considered, the body would be "vigorously opposed by the European Court", which, Hartley argues, is determined to maintain judicial monopoly (1992, 214).¹²⁰ Martin Howe also doubts the commitment of the Community's governing institutions to subsidiarity. He wonders if it is merely lip-service designed to reduce the difficulties of ratification in certain member states (notably, France and Denmark) (Howe 1992, 218). The principle is so vague as to defy predictable and dependable judicial interpretation. As a legal barrier it is "virtually ineffective as a limitation on future overcentralizing measures of the Community institutions" (Howe 1992, 223).

Phillip Allot, in his written memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, made the following point:

Such things (*federalism, fixed-exchange rates, social policy*) would be a matter for intense debate within the internal political system of each member state. The fact that they now have to be dealt with at the EC level does not mean that they have suddenly become technical matters, or matters to be resolved by diplomatic bargaining. No executive branch of government, least of all the British government, can claim that whatever view of such matters that it chooses to call a 'British interest' has been sufficiently authorized, or

¹²⁰ The European Court of Justice is composed of 15 judges (one from each member state). There is no appeal to the court's judgments and dissenting judgments are not recorded (Bainbridge 1998, 107).

will be sufficiently validated, by national elections or by executive-orchestrated simple-majority votes in the national parliament (1992, 217).

Allot proceeded to condemn the EC's Council of Ministers for its secrecy and lack of political legitimacy, calling it "more of a cabal than a cabinet" (1992, 217).

In his appearance at the Foreign Affairs Committee (UK) hearings on Maastricht, Peter Ludlow, Director of the Centre of European Policy Studies, stated that Maastricht was a document which pushed Europe closer to federalism. This tendency is strengthened by the centralization of certain, heretofore intergovernmental matters such as foreign policy, in which the EU would formulate an EU-wide foreign policy binding members of the European Council of Ministers (the primary intergovernmental branch of European government).

Centralization is apparent in other areas of integration as well. Ludlow's response to a question on the single currency and centralization is revealing.

Do you see the setting up of the Central Bank and a single currency as pushing the Community towards becoming a centralised United States of Europe?

(Mr. Ludlow) Karl-Otto Pohl, the president of the Bundesbank, made no secret of the fact that, if you were going to have monetary union--I think I quote exactly--federalism in this case would be of a highly centralised character; in other words, you cannot divide monetary policy if you are going to have as the most important aim of this monetary union, price stability. The short answer to your question is, yes, if we have a central bank there is one central authority and nobody else will get a look in, which does not mean to say we cannot through our participation as the UK, as France, or whatever, have influence on its policy. But it is bound to be a central single decision-making body. . . So the short answer is yes (Ludlow 1992, 92).

If European integration served the purpose of consolidating and preserving European democracy in the decades following WWII, it now seems to be undermining democracy (Martin and Ross 1999). The EMU's Central Banking system is independent of the political institutions of Europe and is committed, first and foremost, to price stability. The convergence criteria for entry into EMU were so stringent that member states aiming to enter the first round of EMU had to abandon these objectives in order to combat the unemployment associated with the recession of the mid-nineties (Martin and Ross 1999, 174). In short, the "social market model"

pursued by many states over the last few decades will no longer be a policy option. Fear of inflation will lead the Central bank to accept a "natural" level of unemployment and restrict the capacities of member states to use monetary policies to reduce unemployment (primarily, via lower interest rates which stimulate growth).

The image of the EU as a benign, if irritating, technocratic regulatory institution is increasingly belied by the important areas of policy over which it will eventually exercise competence. In the decades to come the EU will certainly have a common foreign policy and a standing army. These developments have outstripped the EU's democratic legitimacy as it remains criticized for its lack of democracy and opaque decision-making procedures.¹²¹

Scotland in Post-Maastricht Europe

The ongoing process of European integration demonstrates the contradictions of civic nationalism in the late 20th century. The EU is electoral 'gold' in the sense that it serves, at first glance, as a powerful argument in support of the economic viability of a Scottish state and the improvements in living standards which would result from fundamental constitutional change. A more critical analysis, however, raises serious questions about the limits inherent in the "Independence In Europe" policy. If the British political system has prevented Scotland from developing as prosperously as it should, or excluded Scots from decision-making (discussed in Chapter 7) then the SNP's policies should provide a remedy to these problems. However, SNP's claims about independence within the EU can be challenged. This

¹²¹ The sheer apathy of European publics toward the EU is evidence of the lack of societal penetration of "European-ness." Of 265 million eligible voters, only 145 million Europeans voted in the 1994 elections to the European Parliament (Bainbridge 1998, 207). In Britain, turnout has been very low: 32 percent in 1979, 32.6 percent in 1984, 36.3 percent in 1989, 6.4 percent in 1994 and 24 percent in 1999 (Bainbridge 1998, 209). In fact, turnout in some countries exaggerates interest in European-level politics because countries like Belgium have compulsory voting laws.

does not imply that the current constitutional arrangement should be accepted uncritically; nor does this conclusion imply that independence is impossible or undesirable. Rather, it suggests that all options must be evaluated skeptically and soberly.

Fundamental changes in the organization of political and economic life have changed the debate over Scottish sovereignty. Scotland exists in a web of associations, treaties and organizations. All features of sovereign states once considered fundamental are now challenged. These changes may be welcomed by internationalists who celebrate cross-border cooperation in research, cultural projects, and environmental regulation. There is even the promise that such interdependence may reduce the risk of war. Another, darker perspective emphasizes the centralizing tendencies of the European Union which are designed to improve the environment for capital mobility and accumulation. The provisions of the Single European Act, Maastricht's monetary union, and fiscal policy harmonization, may reduce the latitude afforded any social democratic administration in an independent Scotland. Is it possible that social welfare spending will approach the lowest common denominator as states are forced to conform to the fiscal aspirations of a central European bank committed to neo-liberal economics?

Characterizing the socio-economic nature of the EU is the subject of great debate. Neill Nugent (1999, 44) observes that the nature of the Treaties of Rome (1957) has led many to conclude that European integration has been guided by an ideology of "free-market, liberal, non-interventionist capitalism." Nugent cautions against easy acceptance of this view in light of the enormous centralized infrastructure required to coordinate intervention and management of competition policy. Moreover, the Common Agricultural Policy, social policy, and the common transport policies were all designed to prevent the dislocation which was expected if these areas of European life were exposed to free-market forces. Finally, Nugent

points out that few Christian Democratic and Social Democratic governments of member states would have acquiesced to the unrestrained law of the free-market (1999, 45).

Bearing Nugent's caution in mind, it is still legitimate to question the extent to which the contemporary EU is driven by neo-liberal goals.¹²² The recent experiences of small social-democratic states which joined the EU are instructive for predicting the consequences of Scottish independence within the EU. Austria and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. Austria was among the first 11 member states to adopt the euro. In Austria, it was anticipated that accession would improve the economy generally, but also strengthen the hands of employers' associations as social welfare policies were restricted and realigned (Tálos and Badelt 1999, 351). Post-accession developments show that the consequences for Austria and its social policies are far from clear-cut. Part of the reason for the muted impact of the EU on Austrian social policy was the fact that Austria had, for years, been altering elements of legislation to conform to EU norms. Measuring *up* to EU standards in a variety of areas of policy was easy as Austria already had substantial regulation and policy in labour relations and social security and these tended to exceed EU norms.

The negative relative consequences of integration were felt with the introduction of "austerity packages" with the 1995 and 1996 Austrian budgets (Tálos and Badelt 1999, 353). In order to qualify for the first round of EMU, debt and deficit reductions were targeted. External scrutiny pushed the Austrian government to

¹²² The difficulty of characterizing the EU is made more difficult by the presence, within EU treaties, of Articles expressing possibly conflicting goals. For instance, Hardy and Adnett point out that Article 127 of the Treaty of Amsterdam requires Community policies to consider the objective of high levels of employment when developing policy. Later, Article 137 requires that social policy not hinder the development of small and medium-sized businesses. These authors conclude: "How the continued commitment to strengthening the social rights of EU employees is to be reconciled with the increased entrepreneurial freedom implied by this apparent championing of more flexible labor markets remains to be resolved (Hardy and Adnett 1999, 127).

undertake serious budget cuts. Approximately two-thirds of the savings required to meet EMU debt/deficit targets were achieved in spending cuts (rather than tax rises). Among the areas targeted for cuts were unemployment benefits, family and maternity allowances, and reform to early retirement rules. Tálos and Badelt (1999, 355) observe that, despite these cuts, there has been no change in the strategic aims of social policy. Still, for those who lost income support, considerable sacrifice was required to adjust to EU demands. The elderly, single-mothers and the unemployed clearly paid a disproportionate share of the price of acquiring the single currency.

Why then did Austria undertake sacrifices to enter the EU? Bieler (2000, 224) argues that the main advocate for membership was the powerful Austrian Federation of Industrialists. This organization, concerned with barriers to exports in the form of EU tariff barriers, actively lobbied the government to apply for membership. Bieler further suggests that the "neo-liberal restructuring of Austria's production system was the social purpose behind EU membership" (2000, 223).

Sweden's experience in adapting to membership in the EU is also instructive. Budget cuts and rising unemployment --from under 2 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 1995--have inspired a debate on the degree to which EU entry is responsible (Gould 1999, 166). Gould suggests that a number of key features of the Swedish model are disappearing: gender equality, progressive drug policy, and full employment.¹²³ The degree to which these changes have been the result of EU membership is uncertain. Gender equality, found in Sweden more than in most other member states, has been compromised as budget cuts designed to ease Sweden's entry to EMU (in anticipation of joining EMU) have affected the public sector--a source of well-paying jobs for

¹²³ Entry into the European Union also compromises the Scandinavian tradition of open government. In Scandinavian states citizens typically have greater access to policy-making and administration than do citizens of most states. This is especially true in comparison to the opaque nature of EU decisionmaking, especially in the Council of Ministers. As huge areas of public policy are shifted to the European level this openness is threatened (Grønbech-Jensen 1998).

many women (Gould 1999, 166). Social welfare spending has been reduced with the government's efforts to meet the EMU convergence criteria. Accompanying this effort has been privatization, user fees for medical services, and layoffs among medical personnel (Gould 1999, 166).

Economic and Monetary union is not merely an economic policy unrelated to issues of democratic governance. Martin and Ross (1999) argue that EMU will deepen the democratic deficit of the EU. It will also have immediate and painful consequences for Europeans.¹²⁴ It is argued that: "As is now clear, EMU was constructed to have severely restrictive economic effects. If EMU operates as designed, it condemns Europe to continuing high levels of unemployment, which are currently around 11 percent" (Martin and Ross 1999, 171). This trend operates alongside, or in conflict with, other visions of European integration, principally that articulated by Jacques Delors, who frequently spoke during his tenure as President of the Commission of a "social market" where economic decisions would not be made solely on the basis of market instruments (Ibid. 172). In short, the European social democratic model, one broadly similar to that endorsed by the SNP, is threatened by another model, one in which the market is ascendant. This model, according to Martin and Ross (1999), emerged in the 1970s with new efforts to further and deepen integration. So, while social democratic governments used national policy instruments to ameliorate the consequences of recession in the 1970s, European level policy makers moved toward the construction of a single market. Two contradictory trends in the integration process can now be discerned. One is the Europe of

¹²⁴ Who supports EMU? According to Jabko, "Commission officials progressively realized that, while the political constituency liable to support EMU *per se* remained elusive, there was a clear constituency for monetary orthodoxy. It was made up of national politicians who favored a leaner state and/or a leaner public budget, national central banks and finance ministry officials, members of the business community, especially in the financial sector, and, more generally, all actors or social groups who conceived a political, bureaucratic, or economic interest in the provision of fiscally conservative policies (1999, 486).

unfettered trade--the Europe of the Single European Act. The other, the Europe of the Social Charter (1989) and of regional development funding.¹²⁵ Only in the wake of EMU does the first, market-orientated model seem poised to erode the social Europe envisioned by Delors. Martin and Ross (Ibid. 173) argue that the European Central Bank will have price stability as its primary goal and therefore all other economic goals will be secondary.

In their rush to meet the convergence criteria, member states cut budgets during the recessionary 1990s. Such cuts reflected long-term economic and monetary policy because these budgetary targets were made "quasi-permanent" by member states at the 1996 Dublin summit and subsequently enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam (Ibid. 174). Ominously, Martin and Ross conclude that:

If EMU operates as the rules say it should, it institutionalizes a macroeconomic policy regime that locks Europe into a high unemployment trap. This will, in turn, remove the fundamental condition for a sustainable relationship between the European model's welfare state commitments and the tax base for meeting them: near to full employment.

Whether European welfare states are changing due to forces external to the EU or whether domestic factors have played an important role, the convergence criteria have played a role in reorienting domestic economic and social policy. At the very least one may argue that the EU presents very different future possibilities depending on the complex interaction of social forces in the European political arena.

The SNP is committed to Scottish entry into Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). On 9 October 1999 the National Executive of the SNP voted to participate in an event supporting the adoption of the single currency, alongside Labour's Donald Dewar. Alex Salmond, quoted in an article "Salmond and Dewar in secret talks over euro," by Iain Martin and published in Scotland on Sunday on 10 October 1999, explained that: "We're taking part because we're pro-European and pro-single

¹²⁵ Kluth (1998, 69) points out that the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (the Social Charter) has "no binding effect" and this "seriously constrains" its ability to protect workers.

currency. But it's disappointing that it's [the event] not a more positive statement in favor of the single currency from Britain in Europe" [the umbrella group organizing the rally].

Entrance into stage three of EMU will require a Scottish government to match the minimal convergence criteria, effectively limiting the use of Keynesian economic policies (particularly deficit spending) for moderating recessionary trends. EMU will require, of course, a central bank which will maintain exclusive control over monetary policy, including interest rates and borrowing limits (McCrone 1993, 18-19). The SNP opposes the current narrow band of discretionary tax-raising powers ceded to the new Scottish parliament by the UK, but an independent Scotland would also find itself beholden to an external authority on Scottish monetary policy. As Bell and Dow argue, with regard to the convergence criteria: "The same conditions would also face an independent Scotland and it would have to choose whether it was willing to accept them. It is unlikely that Scotland would be permitted a special deal in which it could choose which of the conditions to accept. To the extent that the Maastricht plan is acted upon, therefore, a 'Scotland in Europe' scenario would involve constraints on fiscal policy, exchange rate policy and monetary probity" (Bell and Dow 1995, 49). In essence, we are seeing the Europeanization of politics and policy among all the EU member states.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ The public seems indifferent to this Europeanization of daily life. A poll taken by The Scotsman just before the June 1994 European Elections indicated that 52 percent of the public would cast their vote on the basis of Scottish issues and 24 percent on the basis of British ones (Lynch 1994, 49). The idea of European politics remains elusive as the EU lacks a party system or supranational media. The Scottish public, at the time of the June 1994 European election seemed ambivalent about the integration process. One poll found 39 percent support for the single currency (up from 12 percent in a 1992 poll) and 83 percent support for a referendum on the single currency, and support for increased power for national parliaments within the EU (Lynch 1994, 50). Eurobarometer polling conducted in the spring of 1999 showed that Britons, Danes, and Swedes were the least satisfied with democracy in the EU (European Commission 1999, 7). Respondents were asked if they were satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the EU. Only 19 percent of Swedes, 30 percent of Danes and 32 percent of Britons expressed satisfaction.

In law the EU has an important impact upon the domestic legislation of member states. J.M. Thomson (1995, 32), Glasgow University Professor of Law, concludes that:

It will be clear, therefore, that EC law can have an important impact on the domestic laws of member states. It is a new *source* of domestic law which is either directly effective or must be incorporated into the law of a member state. Moreover, reform of domestic law must take into account the EC dimension, in order that existing law conforms to EC law or that any proposed reform does not impinge upon principles of EC law.

For example, European regulations have reduced the "flexibility, informality and discretion" in the application of regulatory regimes, which have characterized British environmental policy (Macleod 1997, 138). Even if European policy is seen as more progressive or appropriate by environmentalists it can alienate member states if applied as a dictat. It seems reasonable to assume that European-level regulation will exercise similar constraints on any future Scottish government.

What is Sovereignty for?

This chapter argues that for all the slogans of 'independence', 'freedom', and 'sovereignty', two critical issues have been lost. What kind of political sovereignty is possible in the 21st century? The nation-state is undergoing transformation. Few now believe that the nation-state, alone, can remedy the most serious problems besetting its territory and population. While pronouncements of the end of the nation-state are premature, it is getting harder to argue that governments can make policy without regard either to treaties, monetary institutions or trans-national corporations. The SNP is right to point out the defects of union with Great Britain, but seems relatively unconcerned about similar democratic deficits present in the European Union. At present, the EU lacks democratic accountability and the treaty privileges EU law over domestic law where these conflict in areas of EU competence.

A second and perhaps more critical question is of a political nature. Is sovereignty or self-determination for individuals, communities or states? One commentator captured the essence of this concern:

I consider the debate (on devolution) to have been undertaken overwhelmingly in self-interested, narrow, cosmetic terms that mask the heart of the matter: who shall control the lives of the people, who shall exercise power and who shall run the economy? There has been little or no attempt, even within the Labour party, far less within other parties of a non-socialist nature like the SNP, to discuss this crucial issue in terms of socialist perspective and principle (Gow 1975, 60).

For Gow, an Edinburgh-based assembly or even a separate Scottish state would do little to bring real democracy to a Scotland dominated by indigenous and foreign capital. Independence might benefit the Scottish capitalist class, but little would change for the Scottish public as a whole. Gow (1975, 109) starkly contrasts meaningful devolution involving "full financial control vested in the people and managed for them by their representatives" with "a huge, agglomerated world of intersecting state, international and corporate interests." It is true that the SNP has tended to identify social and economic problems arising from the mismanagement of the autocratic British state, while failing to address the inequities and structural problems emerging from capitalist relations and the discipline of the market. This stems from the party's social democratic ideological orientation. Capitalism is viewed as a legitimate economic system which must be regulated and channeled to alleviate negative externalities. This orientation is particularly evident in the party's attitude toward Europe which is very uncritical about the contradictory nature of the integration project, particularly with Stage III of EMU. The party intends to improve upon the governmental provision of public services and social investment but only insofar as such measures are not opposed by private capitalist interests. The SNP is not an anti-capitalist party and this basic orientation limits the extent to which the party can endorse radical alterations of the capitalist nature of Scottish society. While acknowledging the potent powers of the global market and supra-national political institutions, it is clear that governments can and do make choices. In the case of the SNP it could be argued that the party has chosen cooperation and influence over the

terms of European integration and the globalized economy as the strategy for securing and maintaining Scottish "interests".

The civic-nationalist project of the SNP makes an explicitly class-based discourse untenable. The party is committed to representing the interests of all Scots. Instead of a class-based discourse, the party uses the terminology of nationalism, assuring potential voters that it will assert/protect 'Scottish' interests in negotiating with international oil companies and in the political structures of the EU. In this way, civic-nationalism certainly aspires to act as the protector of the nation. Unfortunately, the political community of Scotland may not be sufficiently powerful to combat already evident trends, which see a steady shift of power from national governments to international regimes and external market forces. If civic nationalism is to realize the potential suggested in chapter one (for enhancing democracy and standards of living) the elements within the SNP which support equality in the face of market forces and sovereignty in the face of European integration must more assertively make their case within the party. Earlier, there was at least sustained debate within the SNP about the merits of EU membership. The opposition to the Common Market reflected, partly, the SNP's view that Scotland should not be brought into the Market without the consent of the Scottish public. The party was also concerned with the negative consequences of European centralization. By the early 1980's, the party had become an enthusiastic supporter of the EU, foreseeing a place for an independent Scotland within a vigorous and occasionally beneficent Europe. Like oil, Europe has become a fixture of political campaigns, promising economic development with increased influence on the political institutions of the Union. Yet, the oil campaign and European Union also reveal the tenuous nature of sovereignty as I have argued in this chapter. The SNP is not alone in confronting the contradictions of sovereignty, but the nature of nationalist ideology makes it more vulnerable than most parties to criticisms of sovereigntist claims.

The SNP's European problem is essentially this: While it tries to extricate Scotland from the UK and into the European Union, events change the political equation. Europe is changing rapidly and soon it will have twenty members and undergo further deepening integration. There is also the difficulty of appeasing those sectors of Scottish society which may welcome further integration (financial services) and those which fear it (fishing). Rejection of the EU could be damaging electorally as the SNP would seem to confirm the view of those who charge that the SNP is a separatist and isolationist party. Euroscepticism (particularly among the Conservatives) has been the subject of ridicule by the SNP and there seems to be a reluctance to adopt a more critical posture. Indeed, one searches in vain for any critical perspectives on Europe in SNP literature and research.

The options for Scotland are three: Status quo, and either independence within or without Europe. Independence outside the EU seems not to be an option, as so much of Scottish exports go to Western Europe. One option which I have not explored lies in the potential of new member states to steer the EU in a more democratic and socially concerned direction. Some argue that the accession of new members in the 1990s provides an opportunity to change institutional procedures to bring these more in line with democratic practices in Scandinavia.¹²⁷ Also, the

¹²⁷ Laursen and Olesen (2000, 88) observe that Scandinavian politicians have, perhaps idealistically, seen an opportunity to influence Europe ideologically. At the Nordic Council's Europe Conference in 1996, Gro Harlem Brundtland argued that:

Within this field [of ideological debate] Europe recognizes the Nordic priorities given to job creation, environmental issues, transparency, equal rights. Therefore, when it is possible this mutual Nordic approach should translate into specific proposals and initiatives. When possible Norden--and here I include EFTA countries like Norway and Iceland--should forward their views jointly.

Prior to the recent debacle of the conservative-far right coalition, Austria has had a modest impact on the direction of the EU also. It has joined France and Sweden in stressing the importance of employment, employee rights and during Austria's presidency it held informal ministerial conferences on social policy and "women's issues" (Tálos and Badelt 1999, 352).

adoption of the single currency is not compulsory and states which fear the potential for monetarist orthodoxy by the ECB can avoid this constraint on policy by staying out of Stage III EMU. However, whatever potential lies in this middle course it is not one heard in the discourse of the SNP. The SNP has not publicly proposed the strategy of pushing the "social Europe" model in cooperation with those states in favor of strong social welfare policies and transparent democratic institutions (Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland). Independence in Europe but outside the euro is not the "Europe a la carte" version of Europe advanced by British Conservatives who seek a free-market Europe without the social policies associated with the modern welfare state. In this "social" version of integration, Scotland would accept (as it must) the *acquis communautaire* (this does not apply to stage three EMU) but would seek to shape, in concert with allies, the nature of the EU itself.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the SNP has eschewed absolutist notions of state sovereignty. The party endorses the sharing or pooling of sovereignty within the European Union. The Party also endorses moves toward a Common Foreign and Security policy, and the adoption of the single currency and the huge body of European law and regulation. These are not the decisions of a party committed to an absolutist version of national sovereignty based on 19th century assumptions regarding the sanctity of the state-based international system. The SNP is an excellent example of a neo-nationalism which is comfortable at the local, regional, national and supranational levels of governance, ready to act to protect and promote national interests within the complex webs of authority and power Scotland will find itself in. Within contemporary constraints and limits, the SNP has attempted to 'solve' the problem of subordination in the UK and the periodic economic stagnation which has resulted from an inability to apply available policy instruments to Scottish needs. The integration of Scotland into the EU is viewed, by the SNP, as the means to accept the

inevitable integration process while at the same time lobbying (via European institutions) for Scottish interests. Smaller states can wield some influence over these affairs and share in the economic benefits which accrue from this supranational project (They view Eire as an exemplary case).

My argument is that the costs or benefits of independence (compared to the status quo) cannot be predicted by deductive calculation. Rather, values will determine what sacrifices will be acceptable in the process of achieving independence. It is certain, however, that the SNP is determined to adapt and take advantage of European integration to enhance Scottish influence and economic benefit in an era of change and uncertainty. But if the party's positions commit Scotland to a broader European capitalist project, while diminishing Scottish policy independence, then the argument examined in Chapter one--that civic-nationalism might act as a territorially-based project to resist the neo-conservative, market-orientated economic agenda--has to be treated with skepticism.

Chapter 6

Scottish Identities and the SNP

The definition of a nation is when people believe themselves a nation, and by that test Scotland is clearly a nation. But it is quite reasonable to have a multi-layered identity.

-Alex Salmond 26 April 1999

Students of Scottish politics frequently express surprise at the dearth of ethnic consciousness exhibited by the Scottish National Party (SNP). There is no doubt that Scots have a sense of Scottish identity but it is a moderate, measured confidence in a distinct society with institutional and historical commonalities. It is a nationalism, in the words of Andrew Welsh, MP and Vice-President of the SNP, which, "tempered by a belief in humanity and the worth of every human being allows us to reform society at home and share our nation's wealth and vision with the wider world" (Welsh 1994). Scottish nationalism is found in a variety of forms throughout Scottish society, all of which share a certain degree of vagueness. This nationalism is an excellent example of a "banal nationalism" where the elements of nationalism are so taken for granted that they may be hard to articulate (Billig 1995). Unlike other nationalisms such as that of Wales, where language (and, by implication, culture) is the primary focus of nationalist discourse and distinctiveness, Scottish nationalists make do with a much more subtle and slippery self-portrait based on an amalgam of distinct institutions and shared sense of history.

This chapter examines the implications of this absent ethnic element. This absence is critical to explaining the party's civic nationalist discourse. The SNP must avoid appeals to any particular societal cleavage, both for electoral reasons and because of the nature of the civic nationalist project itself. Despite the presence in Scotland of gender discrimination, racism, and religious sectarianism, the SNP has quite admirably avoided capitalizing on ethnic identity, and party members and leaders frequently speak out against exclusionary practices. As Hague points out (1994, 147), the SNP's

electoral advertising projects a modern, vibrant society and avoids appeals to kitsch or cultural caricatures: "Their broadcasts disregard the past and concentrate on the freedom and glory of future separatism". Author Joy Hendry (1992, 6-7) complains that the SNP has, indeed, paid too little attention to cultural identity:

The SNP as an organ has at times adopted a very anti-cultural mood, putting on the blinkers and saying that what matters is professional politics and economics. Faced with the Thatcher phenomenon, I understand that there is considerable pressure for the SNP to be recognized as a mature, efficient, credible, political party. But you don't need, in doing that, to reject all cultural input or concern as romantic or pie-in-the-sky, when it is in fact the genuine fundamental of not only Scottish but all true nationalism. At one point the Scots Independent [SI] published an audience survey which insisted that there was too much kulchur in SI, and in the party, and what was needed was mair politics. I remember with some fondness a vitriolically aggressive article in said paper which castigated me and Alan Bold and others as East Coastie Cult Nats [Sic]!

In fact, such strenuous objections to exclusionary politics forms a fundamental element of civic nationalism. In chapter one, I argued that solidaristic bonds of community are essential for resistance against undemocratic, market forces. These bonds, however, can be oppressive to individuals when they are based on ethnic exclusionary ties. The balance which civic nationalists seek to strike is one which nurtures a sense of community without homogenizing the whole community. The challenge is to recognize difference while at the same time building a community of basic, shared values. Extreme individualism leads to community breakdown and isolation, but an appropriate set of values which anchors democratic institutions and mutual respect may create the civic bonds necessary for democracy and autonomy. The problem is, how do civic nationalists deal with difference? Do different identities become absorbed by, or become subordinate to, a national identity? Is it possible to forge a common identity without erasing differences?

Scottish Identity and The SNP

Before examining the SNP's perspectives on identity it is necessary to examine the evolution of Scottish identity as seen in the literature and politics of Scotland. This contextualizes the current menu of identity choices available to the SNP. The SNP

employs symbols from time to time, emphasizing their "Scottishness". The best example is the party logo, the Thistle, a symbol reminiscent of the Scottish countryside. Another was prominent during the 1997 election campaign, when the party capitalized on the popularity of the film *Braveheart*, with volunteers passing out SNP literature at theater queues. Generally speaking though, the party is better known for its economic and political analysis than for appeals to cultural romanticism. As I shall show, the relative dearth of cultural appeals is due to the history and development of Scottish society and its cleavages of class, ethnicity, gender, lifestyle, region, and religion.

Scottish history is one of invasion, settlement and assimilation. Mackie (1970) and Prebble (1981) speak of the "four peoples thesis". Scotland is the result of the interaction between the Picts, Angles, Scots and Britons. The Picts were the first inhabitants commented upon by historians of Roman campaigns in Scotland. The Picts were so called because of their extensive tattoos and body art. "Britons" refers to the large group of Celtic speaking tribes inhabiting the island at the time of Roman conquest. The Angles arrived from central Europe and occupied southern Scotland and northern England. Finally, the Scots (or Scotti) came from Ireland.

Rome did not completely conquer Scotland. This was partly due to a decided lack of interest in northern Britain with its rocky, barren soil. Mackie (1970) suggests that the first important factor in the separate development of Scotland and Britain was a result of the Romanization of Britain and the lack of this influence in Scotland. Mackie (1970, 20) compares the decision of Rome not to occupy Scotland but to pacify the southern part of the country with the British Raj's reluctant decision to merely subdue restive peoples in Pakistan, viewing the country as not worth the effort or expense.

The dark ages which followed the disintegration of the Roman empire witnessed the spread of Christianity and the birth of a united Scotland. In 1034, Duncan was crowned king of Scotland which was a merger of the territories held by the Picts and the Scots. Centuries of raids from the Norse also served to unify the country

with the Picts and Scots uniting to defend against Danes and others. The raids of the Norse also distracted the Britons and prevented them from absorbing Scotland as they would Wales in 1536. The 1266 Treaty of Perth shaped the contemporary borders of Scotland. With this treaty, Norway ceded control over all of Scotland save the Orkney and Shetland Islands. Many Norse remained and added their cultural distinctiveness to these islands.¹²⁸

The complexity of Scottish cultural history has not always been acknowledged by its historians. History has often been the servant of ideological vision. Mason (1992, 50) argues that "neither nationalism as an ideology nor nations as a focus of culture were created *ex nihilo*." Instead, the national *mythomoteur* explains and legitimizes a sense of uniqueness and distinction (Mason 1992, 51). Unlike most contemporary historians who date the existence of a Scottish Kingdom from 1034, the Scottish historian Fordun traced Scottish descent back to the Greek prince Gathelus, and dated the founding of the Scottish kingdom to the year 330 BC by Fergus. In his view, Scotland had an independent and continuous existence after this date. Such myths provided Scots with genealogy as well as a racial/royal history (Mason 1992, 54) but ignored the discontinuity and ethnic diversity which marked Scotland.

Kidd (1995,46) argues that the lack of a widespread nationalist ideology in 19th century Scotland stems not only from the absorption of Scottish elites within the political-administrative structure of the British Empire, but also from the sheer diversity of national visions:

Nineteenth-century Scotland did nurture a fringe of nationalist subcultures, but these were mutually incoherent--a Babel of romantic neo-Jacobitism, die-hard Presbyterian orthodoxy, legalistic vindications of Scottish rights within the Union and . . . a renewed pride in Gaelic Scotland, inspired by the insights of Aryan philology.

¹²⁸ Mackie (1970, 55) points out that there is no clan system in Orkney or Shetland. This is one of a number of distinctive features which mark these islands today.

The emphasis on the institutional and political features of 'Scottishness' makes the civic nationalism of the SNP capable of acting as an inclusive movement. Gaelic is a language in decline; recent attempts to revive it in popular media and a recent resurgence in Gaelic literature and culture have failed to halt the steady, century-long decline in the number of Gaelic speakers. At the turn of the century, 6.76 percent of Scots spoke Gaelic but, by the 1991 Census, only 1.78 percent did (Rogerson and Gloyer, 1995, 47). The trend is hastened by the age of this population (32.1 percent over 60 years of age) and by the far smaller number of those who can read and write the language (0.6 percent of the population). Gaelic has been a primarily oral language and therefore its economic and political 'power' is limited.

Without a dominant cultural basis (for example, in the form of a separate language or religion), Scotland's national identity has tended to be expressed in an affirmation of the three pillars of Scottish society: The Church of Scotland and the legal and educational systems. The Union of 1707 was lauded by the Scottish press on the occasion of its centenary (Forsyth, 1997, 6) but, at the same time, Scotland's political and social elite (primarily in the church, educational and legal professions) debated remedies for what was viewed as a creeping process of Anglicization. There was nothing inherently contradictory about maintaining both an Imperial and Scottish identity so long as the two supported each other. But, with attempts to homogenize the institutions of the UK, a process which has continued well into this century, Scottish elites questioned the assimilationist cost of participation in empire.¹²⁹ Also, support for the empire and, presumably, imperial identification, declined by the First World War. As Finlay (1997, 19) has pointed out, Scottish enthusiasm for empire was a middle-class phenomenon linked to the military¹³⁰ and economic expansionism. The former

¹²⁹ Scotland experimented with its own imperial adventure in 1698. A colony was founded in Darien (in what is now Panama) by the Company of Scotland, but was quickly abandoned due to natural disaster and Spanish hostility. The eagerness with which elites embraced Union is partly attributed to this failure.

¹³⁰ Scottish regiments have achieved considerable fame over the last two centuries.

British empire is replete with the legacy of Scots, who, through their military, administrative or political activity, enjoyed considerable influence as part of the British imperial project. Change came with the Reform Act of 1918 which brought the working-class into the electorate. The Liberal party was replaced in Scotland by the Labour party whose interests were more domestic than Imperial. A discourse of class sought to detach the loyalty of the working class from British imperialism. Still, until the formation of the SNP in 1932, Scottish nationalism was devolutionist and unionist at heart. As Forsyth has observed, "Proto-nationalists were always scrupulous in maintaining their unionist credentials" (Forsyth 1997, 10).

Table 7
National Identity by party preference (June 1994) (Percent)

x First	Con.	Lab.	Lib-Dem.	SNP	All
Scottish	21	44	20	46	40
Scot/ Brit.	43	32	43	27	33
Scot/Euro.	5	9	7	18	10
Brit./Euro.	11	4	13	1	5
Scot/Brit./ Euro.	18	10	14	8	11
Sample Size	78	360	89	240	1001

Source: Brown et al (1996): 211.

Today Scots still express ambivalence about their British identity even though the benefits of Empire have largely disappeared. The results of an ICM/Scotsman poll from June 1994 (Table 7) show remarkable diversity among Scots in their self-reported national identity, with a third still identifying themselves as equally British and Scottish. This does not imply, necessarily, a lack of Scottish national identity but, rather, that this identity is not necessarily viewed as incompatible with others. Also

The regiments are: *Black Watch, Gordon Highlanders, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, Highland Light Infantry, Royal Scots, King's Own Scottish Borderers, Cameronians, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Royal Scots Greys, Scots Guards, Coldstream Guards.*

clear from Table 7 is that national identity is not the exclusive property of the SNP. A plurality of self-identified Labour voters identify themselves as Scottish first.

It is interesting to note the propensity of supporters of the Left (Labour and the SNP) to express a Scottish first identity. This may be a product of recent political history. Britain was electorally polarized in the 1980s, and for most of the 1990s, as England elected successive Tory governments, while Scotland (and Wales) tended to vote for other parties (especially Labour). This polarity was further evident in the tendency for Conservative governments to use Scotland as a kind of policy laboratory; the poll tax was implemented first in Scotland. It is frequently argued that Scotland is a different place with a unique political culture in which values of communalism and social justice find greater support.¹³¹ We might explain the propensity of Left voters to express a Scottish identity as a product of a sense that these values are under threat by a government elected by a non-Scottish majority. In the British context, a left political orientation and a Scottish identity act as mutually reinforcing cleavages.

Christine Creech, member of the SNP's National Executive Council and MSP, argues that, in Scotland, all political parties are influenced by a political culture that is more socialist in orientation than it is in England:

The Labour party in Scotland is a different animal. It's a different animal that can't behave like a different animal. There's more of the old socialism in them than in the English Labour party. They're definitely different. The Tory party in Scotland is different from the Tory party in England. We're [Scots] much more left. The whole country is to the left. . . I think its because of the

¹³¹ Is Scotland different? This question implies that Scottish political culture is distinct from others in the UK. Brown *et al* (1996, 144) suggest that the anti-Conservative orientation said to characterize Scottish political culture is evident in "a fairly unbroken tradition of Scottish radicalism" evident in the activities of the Highland Land League, Red Clydeside, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and opposition to the poll tax. In addition the Communist party has tended to do better in Scotland than most of Britain. Scottish Conservatism has tended to be much more communitarian than that of England, especially in the 1980s (McCrone 1992, 158). The decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party since WWII, and its annihilation in 1997, has led many to conclude that its Scottish political culture is distinctive. This communitarian ethos also contains a nationalist element as the attacks on Scottish institutions in the 1980s were viewed, to some extent, as an attack on Scotland itself (McCrone 1992, 172).

way our society has developed. [Because of] our landscape, people had to rely on each other. More of a sense of community spirit which makes for more social democracy (Interview, Edinburgh June 1994).

If Creech's evaluation is correct, then we might expect that the solidaristic bonds necessary for a vital democratic polity capable of resisting external threats to autonomy are well rooted in Scottish society. Its synthesis with a socialist political culture may explain why nationalism is viewed as an acceptable means of achieving a left vision of politics. Nationalism is viewed by many on the left as a prerequisite for exiting the UK and thereby electing governments capable of implementing a 'Scottish' agenda.

Oxford tutor and former Convenor of the London Branch of the SNP, Dr. Bob Purdie (1998, 2), elaborates the argument that socialism must necessarily be expressed, in the Scottish case at any rate, via nationalism.

In today's UK the principal democratic task is the elimination of the absolutist core of the British constitution. That constitution hands a government which has won the support of a minority of the electorate, all of the powers once held by an absolutist monarch. We need full political democracy--a bill of rights, a fair electoral system, and as much self-government at the level of communities as can be achieved. All of this underpinned and guaranteed by a written constitution.

So an immediate, and therefore socialist, task is to gain for communities the right to govern themselves. We can best pursue socialism within communities, because the bonds of mutual support will best develop within that context. The idea of class has only ever become concrete for working people within a working class community. The South Wales valleys, the east end of London, the tenements of Clydeside, have produced socialists because they are strong, close knit, caring communities, And internationalism is most effective when it is rooted in strong communities which reach out to each other. That is why I am a Scottish Nationalist as well as a socialist. My socialism began with the radical democratic ideas I learned from Burns, and the ethical values of the gospels, which I learned within a nation deeply imbued with Christianity. In democratic struggle socialism ceases to be abstract. It comes alive in the minds and hearts of human beings who are striving to create a truly human society.

Purdie's version of Scottish socialism emphasizes the importance of community bonds for the purpose of enhancing democracy and internationalism. The argument for Scottish nationalism, in this view, is that the smaller the polity, the greater the potential for direct democracy.

The SNP, until recently, seemed to accept the myth of a homogeneous Scotland in that it had little to say about the non-class cleavages which have marked Scottish society. The party has largely ignored, to the extent it can, issues of racism, religious sectarianism and the increasing salience of gender politics. The party has always been wary of being linked to any particular group at the expense of support from other ones. Electorally, it is prudent to avoid linking Scottishness with Protestantism or a particular region. At the level of political doctrine, opportunistic appeals to any single cleavage would violate the spirit of the civic nationalist project which seeks to build solidarity on the basis of values and not ethnic or religious markers. Unfortunately, party competition has, on occasion, been inescapably aligned with religious sectarianism as the East-Monklands by-election of 1994 showed (discussed further on). Confronting the problems of exclusionary politics has helped the party shed the image of chauvinistic separatists placed upon them by their Labour and Tory opponents.

Scholars of nationalism have often viewed nationalist projects as inherently homogenizing and exclusive. In considering the struggle for nation, Richard Handler (1995, 29) observes that: "Internal diversity of region, gender, ethnicity and class may be recognized--even celebrated as indicative of the nation's complexity and rich heritage. However, in nationalist ideology internal diversity is always encompassed by national homogeneity."

But is this necessarily so? An SNP publication from 1968 argues that a "common purpose" exists which transcends any sub-national conflicts or identities: "The National Party stands for the nation; all sections, all people in it, welded in a common purpose, devoted, dedicated to the social and economic improvement of all" (1968, 25). But does this national common purpose subsume or obscure hierarchies and interests within the "Scottish nation"? To evaluate the ability of the SNP's civic nationalism to adopt or include the struggles of other political agents, we must examine, in more detail, other cleavages and identities in Scottish society and the degree to which

these can be addressed by the SNP in a non-reductionist manner. The identities/struggles to be addressed--in relation to the national project--include those of feminists, gays and lesbians, racial/ethnic minorities, regional minorities and religious minorities.

Feminism and Nationalism

A recent and welcome addition to scholarship on nationalist politics has sought to understand the relationships between gender and nationalism. Much of the work on Scottish nationalism has failed to consider the differing interests and societal positions of women and how these relate to the nationalist movement as a whole. Part of the reason for this is that, as Walby (1992, 90) argues, men have been the main articulators of nationalist discourse and, as such, have falsely universalized the citizenship experiences of women and men. Not surprisingly, then, neither the possibility nor the evidence that women may have less interest or stake in nationalism has often been addressed by nationalist movements. And yet, it is precisely these differences which have helped create and sustain the nation-state. True argues that: "Unequal gender relations were created by historical and cultural practices that constitute male-masculine and female-feminine as mutually exclusive gendered identities, that, in part, sustain the nation-state system. Despite the critical participation of women in nationalist projects, their contributions are rendered invisible, or are selectively recognized (as in the bearing of sons to fight for the nation)" (1993, 76). Gillis argues that, for example, while citizenship has been constructed as gender-neutral, many symbols of the nation (war memorials etc.) are gendered.

Recent scholarship has examined the absence (and invisibility) of women in both historical narrative generally and in nationalist texts more specifically. In the Scottish case, this is important, as the exclusion of women further mystifies history, and progressive nationalist movements risk reproducing established social forms while altering the formal political apparatus of the UK. Eager to demonstrate the

distinctiveness of the female experience, Brown (1997) argues that in many areas of policy relevant to the nationalist struggle, Scottish men and women differ considerably in their political preferences (Table 8).¹³² Women seem to be more conservative about the independence option. This may reflect the different life experiences of women who may stand to lose more than men in an environment of economic and political insecurity.

Women in Scotland achieved economic and political citizenship later than did men and therefore may be suspicious of the potential to lose some of the hard won gains of the struggle for citizenship rights. Fundamental political change--such as that which comes with territorial dismemberment-- can radically alter social and political life and women must be vigilant to maintain their citizenship rights. Brown (1996, 176-7) argues that the women's organizations took a very different approach to constitutional change in the 1980s and 1990s, than they did in the 1970s devolution debates. Some in the women's movement saw the devolution debate as irrelevant to the daily struggles of women, while others saw in devolution the opportunity to increase women's representation in formal political structures (Brown 1996, 177). More recently women's organizations have been much more attentive to the constitutional debates of the 1980s and 1990s. This shift of focus occurred for a number of reasons. Brown (1996 177-80) argues that Thatcherism, debates on the representativeness of leadership in unions and local government, frustration with the Westminster political system and a sense of urgency brought on by negotiations in civic organizations about the structure of a Scottish Parliament, drew the attention of women to constitutional issues.

¹³² An article in the Globe and Mail, "Québec voters divided along gender lines," by Richard Mackie and published on 20 June 1997, reported the results of a Québec poll (conducted by Léger and Léger, Journal de Montréal and the Globe and Mail), which indicated that women were less likely to support independence than men (43 percent of women compared to 52 percent of men). One pollster suggested that women are more concerned about the stability of the economy and more cautious about radical changes.

The deregulation of the labor market and cuts in services presided over by Thatcher proved that it was not enough to have women in high office for gender equality to be advanced. Feminists could not afford to leave the political field to reactionary politicians regardless of their sex. At the same time, extra-parliamentary action alone could not protect women's interests; hence, a vigorous effort to secure places for feminist women in civic institutions, and in the embryonic Scottish parliament began. The combination of frustration with the British *status quo* and the representative possibilities inherent in the proposed Scottish parliament led to a much greater organized women's presence in constitutional issues in the 1980s-1990s than in the past.

Still, overall, women seem more supportive of reform of the UK constitution than they do for outright separation. More than half of women surveyed in 1997 (52.5 percent) supported a Scottish Assembly within the UK, but men tended to favor both "Independence in Europe" and "Total independence" more than women (Table 8). Is this because women identify less with "Scottishness" than men? Not so, argues Brown (1997, 42), who suggests instead that while women tend to view themselves as "Scottish" more than British, in greater proportions than men do, women interpret their "Scottishness" differently, that is, distinctive from masculinist conceptions of national identity.¹³³

¹³³ Scots are often thought to be more conservative on issues of gender compared to their English counterparts (MacInnes 1998, 108). The imagery and iconography of Scottish history is very 'male' with images of tartanry and war, and later, working-class images of strikes.

Table 8
Support for Constitutional Options by Gender (percent)

<u>Option</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Scottish assembly	46.1	52.5
Independence in Europe	20.7	14.1
Total independence	7.2	4.3

Source: Brown 1997, 42.

Scholarship needs to take seriously the different life experiences and relations to power experienced by the genders. The problem for scholars to explain is the exclusion of gender differences in most treatments of the 'national' question. Why do women express different preferences on constitutional reform? Do these differences emerge from deeply-rooted political practices which have submerged the female within the male political experience? And, if so, what consequences for politics (nationalist, in this case) emerge?

Recent investigations relating gender to nationalist struggles in the British Isles provide some insights into the submergence of gender issues within nationalist ones. Galligan (1997, 46) points out that after 1922, Ireland was, for women, no different than before, save for the accent of the male power holders. In addition to the masculinized nationalist struggle, a conservative Catholic church hierarchy served to confine women to the private world of the home. The tacit acceptance of the principle of subsidiarity granted the church a great deal of latitude to oversee the functioning of private and social life.

The leadership of the Irish nationalists was also very conservative and committed to a maintenance of the patriarchal *status quo* in the Free State. Women faced exclusion from the public sector by nationalists who viewed public service employment as the perks of veterans of the struggle against the UK (Galligan 1997, 47). Political

activity on the part of women was also viewed dimly by the leadership who felt that such activity would lead to the neglect of home and family. Indeed, the 1937 Irish constitution stated that the home was the proper place for women and in turn the home was viewed as the bedrock of Irish society.¹³⁴ Drawing on Benedict Anderson, Galligan (1997, 52) observes that "Feminist imagination was repressed in the early years of the state in favour of a Catholic, nationalist male view".

Nationalism and violence remain central features of Northern Ireland's unhappy political environment. Feminist struggles are ongoing but are also inextricably linked to other struggles and, as a result, are complicated by these. Roulston (1997) points out that the nationalist struggle tends to occupy the energy of most people in Northern Ireland and this struggle tends to color all others. Feminists in Northern Ireland have been involved in a variety of ways, particularly in trying--with limited success--to include issues of class and gender in discussions about the future of the territory.

The case of Ulster is useful for illustrating the complexity which emerges from multiple, politically salient identities. According to Roulston (1997, 57), when the suffragette movement in Ireland suggested that 'votes for women' be attached to any Home Rule bill, "Many nationalist women--and men--opposed this demand because they rejected the legitimacy of the state that which could grant it"(Ibid. 1997, 57). Thus, there is no necessary convergence between such political struggles as nationalism and gender equality.

Following the division of Ireland, important differences emerged in the political relationship of women within nationalist movements. In Northern Ireland the national question remained unresolved and this served to hinder the development of feminist organization (among others, like class). As in the southern state, Ulster was dominated

¹³⁴ See articles 41.1.1 and 41.2.1 of the 1937 Irish Constitution. 41.2.2 states that: "The state shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home" (Galligan 1997, 50).

by conservatives and only in the late 1960s was this challenged by new extra-parliamentary movements built upon feminist and socialist principles. Such organizations blossomed but were also fragmented by the constitutional question. Women's groups have been divided by communalism, with Loyalist and Republican groups active on similar issues (prisoner's rights) but divided by the dominant cleavage (Roulston 1997, 63). In the realm of electoral politics, Irish women remain woefully underrepresented at the local, UK and EU levels. Even by the meager standards set by the rest of the UK and Ireland, Ulster stands apart. The argument is that women's progress, as persons and as political agents, has suffered as a result of the dominant nationalist conflict.

The history of Scottish nationalism shares much in common with its Irish counterparts in its marginalization of women. Breitenbach (1997, 83) points out that Hugh MacDiarmid, an early romantic Scottish nationalist, consigned women to the extreme margins of history. Women of historical import, for MacDiarmid, were rare in Scottish history.¹³⁵ Feminist scholarship has sought to uncover the silent sisters of Scottish history and recast the male-constructed narratives which have, to now, dominated the field. As in the rest of the British Isles, complex webs of culture, institutions and power kept women out of sight politically. Scottish histories, as a result, tend to focus on the military struggles against the English in earlier times and by male workers against capital in more recent periods. These histories are, for Breitenbach, "partial, incomplete, distorted" and in need of reappraisal.

¹³⁵ The offending poem is also MacDiarmid's best known, *A Drunk man Looks at the Thistle*. English scholar Aileen Christianson remarks that while she finds the poem entertaining and powerful she is also "irritated by a sense of exclusion; by its unshakable assumption that to be Scottish is to be male" (Christianson 1993, 126).

In a 1980 interview, MacDiarmid complained That: "Scottish women of any historical interest are historically rare. . . Our leading Scotswomen have been . . . almost entirely destitute of exceptional endowments of any sort" (Breitenbach 1997, 83).

Cultural institutions like the Scottish Protestant churches also served to push women to the margins. The founder of the Presbyterian Church, John Knox, was baldly misogynist, castigating women as naturally "weak, frail, impatient, feeble and foolish" (Macdonald 1991, 78). The Kirk, the Church of Scotland, was formally more democratic than its Catholic counterpart because of local congregational control over Church affairs and elections to the hierarchy of the church. However, it was blatantly sexist and exclusionary in that women could not ascend to positions of authority or to the clergy. The Church legislated over the private lives of women and children in the absence of a welfare state, particularly in the realms of sexual misconduct and illegitimacy. In effect, the Church complemented and reinforced the gender division enforced in other spheres of Scottish society. In 1990, 70 percent of Church members were female while most of the positions of authority continued to be occupied by men (Orr Macdonald 1991, 93).¹³⁶

Breitenbach (1997, 89) argues that women in Scotland are, in fact, twice insulted. They are marginalized in relation to men in Scotland and, again, in relation to English women (in the sense that English women do not suffer from their status as members of a permanent minority within the UK); the national question is ignored by mainstream British feminism. Again, as in the Irish cases, divided loyalties complicate feminist politics. Women share much in the way of experience and yet are very heterogeneous. Both feminism and nationalism offer certain things to women but are frequently incompatible. Nationalisms often iconize women and their bodies in the service of the 'nation' and nationalists are concerned with the proliferation of the group and, hence, control over the female body emerges as a political priority exercised

¹³⁶ These figures need to be kept in perspective though, as the Church seems to be waning in influence. The Church of Scotland lost 19,000 members last year, and one journalist has forecast that the Church will become socially extinct by 2030 (Bell 1998, 9).

through the use of "indigenous cultural" practices (say, inheritance and marriage practices) or via religion (rules regarding sex, bans on abortion).¹³⁷

Entrenched socio-cultural practices at least partially account for the dearth of women involved in formal politics. It must be pointed out, however, that new social movements with their less hierarchical and flexible nature have tended to be the sites of more female participation. Galloway and Robertson (1991, 5) argue that: "while women are seriously under-represented in representative democracy, they are enormously engaged in participative democracy". While this is not the forum to discuss the debates surrounding essentialist views which argue that women, by nature, favor particular political styles, I would suggest that Scottish women, like their counterparts elsewhere, experience similar constraints on their political activism which are less imposing in extra-parliamentary organizations. In the Scottish case, *A Woman's Claim of Right for Scotland* was organized in 1990 to participate in the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC). This organization emerged in response to the general impression among feminists that the evolutionary progress, expected after the 1928 extension of the franchise, had failed to occur (Lindsay 1991, 7).¹³⁸

Women are poorly represented in decision-making bodies. Only 12 MPs (16.6 percent) of the 72 sitting Scottish MPs were women, following the 1997 election. This compares quite poorly with legislatures in Western Europe (Roddick in Brown 1991,

¹³⁷ It is women who must bear the lion's share of the burden of raising more children for the sake of the nation. According to an article, "Chill Out and Have More Children" by Tim Hunter and published in *Scotland on Sunday* on 22 February 1998, the Scottish Office sees no possibility of emulating a recent Icelandic policy which would provide generous benefits in the hope of reversing the low birthrate in that country. Such benefits, combined, offset total tax payments. This kind of policy would be *ultra vires* for the Scottish Assembly as Westminster controls benefit expenditure. However, an independent Scottish state could introduce other policies designed to raise the birthrate.

The discourse of France's National Front is replete with references to women's role in preserving the nation. Women are "essential" and "noble." Their primary role is that of reproduction (Simmons 1996, 246).

¹³⁸ Women over 30 were enfranchised in 1918, those over 21 in 1928.

4).¹³⁹ There is more than just the vagaries of individual electoral systems at work here. The Canadian situation may be instructive; as Bashevkin (1993) has persuasively argued, political parties systematically discriminate against female candidates, a phenomenon evident in Putnam's law of increasing disproportion: the higher one goes in political elites the fewer women are represented. Women predominate at lower levels of party organization (such as constituency secretaries) but face barriers to moving up within political party organizations. As of 1998, 5 of the 32 Scottish local authorities had female leaders and only 22.4 percent of councilors were women (Webb 1997, 140). While the figures for local government are somewhat encouraging, Sharp (1991) states that Scotland has one of the worst records in Western Europe for women's participation in government.

The SCC was established to discuss the institutional makeup of an expected Scottish assembly. The SCC is composed of representatives of trade unions, the business community, Churches, and local authorities as well as the Liberal democrats, Labour, Communists and the Greens. Women were represented through the Scottish Convention of Women. Many have argued that the sorry state of women's participation in Scottish politics would be remedied through the localizing effect of a Scottish assembly which would lessen the obstacles to Scottish women's participation in politics by reducing the magnitude of the problem of balancing family commitments with the demands of travel and frequent absences. A Parliament in Edinburgh reduces these burdens considerably. In addition a proposal by the Scottish Trades Union Congress would assure women 50 percent representation in a Scottish parliament. This motion was also accepted by the 1990 Labour party conference. Despite this, Lindsay (1991,

¹³⁹ According to an article by Alice Brown, "New Parliament Offers hope of equal representation," published in Scotland on Sunday on 16 April 1995, the proportion of women MPs from Scotland is among the worst in Western Europe. In 1995 8.3 percent of Scottish MPs were women compared with: Scandinavia (40 percent), Netherlands (30 percent), Germany (26 percent) and UK (9.5 percent). Only 23 women have served as Scottish MPs since 1918.

10) comments that "No matter what lip service is paid on the surface, significant traces of chauvinism have not disappeared from Scottish political life". Still, Lindsay is confident that a Scottish Assembly may yet produce a body most radical in the world as regards women's representation.

In 1994 the Scottish Constitutional Convention proposed a voluntary scheme for the anticipated Scottish Parliament in which 40 percent of representatives would be female. The goal was a non-binding commitment by the main political parties to actively seek to reach this representative threshold. Further discussion produced an electoral contract which committed the Liberal-democrats and Labour parties to the principle of gender equality among representatives to the Scottish Parliament. The means by which this goal was reached was to be determined by the parties (Judge 1999,191). In the months prior to the May 1999 election to the Scottish Parliament the Scottish Secretary, Donald Dewar, was advised that selection processes for candidates which favored women would be subject to legal challenge, specifically under the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act and the 1976 European Directive on equality (Ibid. 192).¹⁴⁰ In anticipation of legal challenge the Labour government introduced legislation to exempt the selection procedures for the first Scottish election from the 1975 Sex Equality Act. This attempt was defeated and parties were left to find other means to address gender equality. The SNP, not involved in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, eschewed formal means to ensure equal representation. In 1998 the party convened and narrowly rejected a proposal to introduce "zipping" (alternating men and women on the regional list of candidates). One delegate, Fiona Muir (internet correspondence, 28 June 1999), convenor of the Aberdeen-Anderson Branch, described the debate as "acrimonious", and while the leadership of the party supported the resolution, the delegates overall

¹⁴⁰ These concerns were based on the Jepson decision of January 1996 which ruled that Labour's selection procedures for the 1997 General election were illegal. Peter Jepson had sought and selection in a constituency with an all-female short list and launched legal action (Judge 1999, 192).

(especially the group Young Scots for Independence) rejected any form of "positive discrimination". On reflection, Muir (who opposed the resolution) states that: "I can state that from the point of view of the SNP now, the issue [of zipping] has been put behind us, with no lasting splits or recriminations. We have an excellent team of men AND [Sic] women representing the party and their constituents".

Of course, women face difficulties outside of the issue of representation. In the UK in general and Scotland in particular, considerable disparity exists between men and women. Brown (1994) argues that despite legislation to achieve equal pay and prevent discrimination, women in Scotland still suffer from political, economic and social disadvantage. Women make up the majority of those living in poverty in Scotland : 96 percent of single parents on income support and 67 percent of people on retirement pensions. In 1993, women earned 71 percent of the male average wage. The majority of the female workforce is found in the lower-paid non-unionized service sector of the economy. In education, housing and responsibility for children, women also experience considerable disadvantage. Domestic violence against women represents at least 25 percent of all violent crime in Scotland (Engender, 1997).

The SNP, like most (all?) political parties in the UK, has been dominated by masculine norms. Of the 71 candidates in the 1987 general election, 66 were male and five female. In the 1989 European parliament elections, only one of the eight candidates was a woman. This situation had improved somewhat by the 1999 European elections where four of the eight candidates were women (two men won seats). Women's representation improves somewhat as one moves from the European and national level to Regional and District levels. In the 1988 District council elections, 23.3 percent of candidates were women and in the 1990 Regional Council elections 21 percent were women (all figures Brown 1991, 1-2)

Table 9
Women Candidates in General Elections (Scotland)
 (Percent in bracket)

	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Labour</u>	<u>Lib.-Dem.</u>	<u>SNP</u>
1970	2 (2.7)	3 (4.1)	---	10 (13.8)
Feb. 1974	5 (6.9)	5 (6.9)	---	8 (11.1)
Oct. 1974	5 (6.9)	7 (9.7)	---	8 (11.1)
1979	4 (5.5)	4 (5.5)	---	6 (8.3)
1983	7 (9.7)	3 (4.1)	---	9 (12.5)
1987	12 (16.6)	3 (4.1)	---	6 (9.7)*
1992	11 (15.2)	6 (8.3)	22 (30.5)	15 (20.8)
1997	11 (15.2)	15 (20.8)	17 (23.6)	16 (22.2)

Sources: Burness (1994); SNP (1977)

* The SNP did not field a candidate in Orkney & Shetland due to an electoral pact with Shetland and Orkney Movements.

The SNP has had a reputation as a party with strong female electoral representation. In fact, from 1931-1967 only one woman, Mary Dott, ran for the party (in the 1947 Edinburgh-east by-election). As Table 9 shows though, great strides were made between 1967-1970 with the party fielding more female candidates in 1970 than the other parties combined.¹⁴¹ Despite appearances however, the SNP seems to feature many of the characteristics of other male-dominated political parties. Prominent women members tend to be professionals without families, reinforcing the reality that political life excludes women by virtue of their parental roles (Burness 1994, 144). In 1994 women in SNP positions were represented in the following proportions: National Council (44 percent), Senior Office bearers (17 percent) (Burness 1994, 146). As of

¹⁴¹ Of the twenty most winnable constituencies for the SNP in the 1997 general election, women were candidates in 5.

1998, 9 of the 20 members of the SNP's "Scottish Cabinet" were women. Generally speaking, the party has tended to oppose gender quotas for elections, and has viewed women's rights as part of human rights (Burness 1994, 145). The formation of *Women's Forum* within the SNP encountered resistance when it was proposed in the 1980s and still has a limited role. The Forum, unlike the trade union group, sends no delegates to the party's annual conference, National Council or National executive meetings. According to Fiona Hyslop (now MSP-Lothians list) the Women's Forum met only once a year as of 1991, but the intention was to have more frequent meetings in future. Regarding the position of women in the party Hyslop (1991, 34) had this to say:

In the SNP we have a lot of women at the bottom and we have significant numbers of women at the top. What we are looking for is more women in 'middle management'. I think it [women's underrepresentation] is changing, because we are getting new women coming into the party. The interesting point for us is that it [pressure for change] is not necessarily coming from the top down, but rather it is coming from demand. People are wanting more women involved and constituencies are wanting women to stand. We have a situation where we do not have a formal rule of one woman for every selection meeting, but it is tending to happen in practice. It is something that is coming from the constituencies themselves instead of being imposed.

There is little difference between SNP voters and Labour supporters on the issue of remedying gender inequality. In a recent survey, 65 percent of Labour voters, and 68 percent of SNP voters, believed that equal opportunities for women had not gone far enough (Brand et al 1994, 623). The Party leadership has professed concern about the status of women in its ranks. Burness cites a 1992 report to the party's National Council which warned that: "If the SNP continues to present far more men than women as its elected representatives . . . we ourselves are adding to the presentation of politics as a man's world (sic)" (1994, 146).

If the SNP project is to be truly emancipatory and an improvement for Scots, fundamental changes are necessary to address the patriarchal nature of Scottish society. Sharp (1991, 42) argues: "It would appear that before we can have greater democracy

in our political institutions we may need greater democracy in the home." Responsibility for care of the elderly, and of children too, often falls on the shoulders of women while housework, too, remains the preserve of women. Formal political change is a necessary but insufficient condition for improvement of the lives of Scottish women. As Scots, they are often denied the political voice which male elites demand from the UK.

In my conversations with women members of the SNP, there were wry comments about the domineering and 'old-fashioned' ways of older men within the party but this fact tended not to tarnish the national question which was viewed distinctly from that of the gender divide.¹⁴² Author Joy Hendry draws a connection between the male experience of subordination (as part of the British state) and the double subordination experienced by women in Scotland.

Scotland has been a very male country, especially since the Reformation. John Knox's distrust of the "monstrous regiment" has done much to shape attitudes to women . . . We are a strong breed, and have always been, but we have been confined.

My theory is all about the aspiration to power, a public voice or platform. If Scotsmen are disadvantaged by being held at arms length from political and social power, and bearing in mind the compensatory devices brought into play by such situations, Scotswomen are doubly inhibited --first of all by all the inhibitions which operate on women everywhere in the world, and secondly by all the inhibitions which come from being Scottish, with all the personal and psychological problems that brings.

The seeming urgency of certain causes can lead to hidden, unquestioned subordinations. Hendry draws our attention to the danger in an earnest, hierarchy-producing national identity which obscures non-national identities and their concerns. Recent improvements in both representation and policy-making important for women suggest that this is not the case with the SNP. In interviews male and female leaders of the party defended the party against charges of sexism and insisted that women had

¹⁴² Cohen (1997, 101) has summarized this attitude as follows: "I have so strongly vested my personal interests in those of the nation that it would be a contradiction in terms to suggest that the national interest could be at odds with my personal self-interest." This might account for the puzzled looks with which my interview questions about gender/nation tensions were greeted by nationalists.

every opportunity that men had to rise within the ranks of the party. One prominent member of the SNP's National Executive Council (and now member of the Scottish Parliament), Christine Creech took the liberal position that the existing rules do not discriminate against women at all:

If they practised bias it was in favour of women. I have never been disadvantaged; if anything I've been unfairly advantaged. I say unfairly because I think you should progress as individuals. I've never campaigned for women's rights. There are a lot of other disadvantaged groups; I want to see disadvantage ironed out period.

This idea of the Labour party--to give so many seats to women--does the women no favors. In east-Monklands [June 1994 by-election] three women are running [Conservative, Labour and SNP] because they're good--not because they're women (Interview with author, June 1994).

This protestation rings somewhat hollow, however, when one considers the variety of barriers to full participation by women in a political system marked by hostility and competition-- a system indifferent to the demands of family life and child care and to the reality that it is women who predominantly undertake these roles. In short, the political system, not to mention society generally, as one academic observer remarked, is characterized by "things that put women off" (Brown, June 1994, Edinburgh).

Recent political developments need to be considered in relation to female representation in Scottish politics. There is a case for optimism for feminists in the aftermath of the Scottish Parliament elections. Scotland now ranks third among the world's national legislatures in the percentage of women members of the legislature. According to Engender,¹⁴³ Scotland ranks behind Sweden (42.7 percent) and Denmark (37.4 percent), with a total of 37.2 percent (Engender 1999). This increase in female representation can be attributed to the determination of certain political parties to achieve gender balance in the Parliament. The Labour party has formally moved to accentuate

¹⁴³ *Engender* is a non-governmental organization which advances the interests of women through education and political action. It produces research and maintains a website for networking. It has active local branches in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Fife, and Glasgow.

female representation while the SNP has relied more upon local constituency branches to take the initiative to secure female candidates. The gender breakdown of the Scottish parliament by party is as follows (male: female): Labour (28:28), Liberal-Democrats (14:3), SNP (19:16), Conservatives (16:2). The single Green, Scottish Socialist, and independent MSPs are male.

The high proportion of female members is cause for optimism because of the substantial powers wielded by the Scottish Parliament, especially with regard to the interests of women. Engender (1999) sees great potential for the Parliament. Scotland has one of the lowest levels of preschool childcare provision in Europe and this keeps women from participating in education and the workplace to the extent that they might.¹⁴⁴ With power over this area of education policy, the Scottish Parliament will be able to increase the number of places for children. With power over the implementation of the National Health service in Scotland the Parliament will have the discretion to enhance the level of family planning and funding to combat heart disease and breast cancer (Engender 1997, 33). At the SNP's 1998 Conference in Inverness (September 1998) Kay Ullrich argued that women have suffered from the imposition of prescription charges. The anti-breast cancer drug, Tamoxifen, for example, must be taken for 5 years at substantial expense. This is an example of the practical impact of Westminster centralism on Scottish women. Ullrich points out that:

It is not as if the government is not aware of this, after all for years in opposition the Labour party has called for a review of prescription charges. But in spite of this and in spite of the evidence presented by the BMA (British Medical Association), and many other organizations New Labour simply claims that prescription charges were considered part of the 'comprehensive spending review' and, you've guessed it, no change is going to be made. . . . As this party's Health and Social Policy spokesperson I can assure you that our health

¹⁴⁴ In 1990 a study by the European Commission (1990) presented data from the late 1980s showing that the UK (along with Ireland and Luxembourg) had the fewest publicly funded places for children under three. The UK (tied with Portugal) had the fewest places for children aged three to school age. Data from 1996 presented by Engender (1997) suggest that only 2 percent of children under three in the UK have access to publicly funded childcare. In Scotland, just under 3 percent of children aged five to nine had access to quality childcare.

policy will include an urgent review of prescription charges. We have to ensure that no one's health is put at risk through an inability to pay for a prescription (sic) (Engender 1999).¹⁴⁵

The Parliament will also have power over Family law which may help women who have been abandoned by a spouse. Parliament will also be able to enact measures to improve women's access to affordable housing, shelters, improve public safety and provide job training. In short, the Parliament will be empowered to bring many practical improvements to women's daily lives.

This potential is contingent on the extent of feminist representation which would push the new parliament to use its powers to legislate for matters of particular concern to women. Alice Brown, in an article, "New Parliament offers hope of equal representation," published in Scotland on Sunday on 16 April 1995, sums up this hope for a different kind of legislature arguing that:

The vision of a Scottish parliament, radically different from Westminster, has acted as a mobilising force for women in Scotland who have seized the opportunity to make their own contribution to the constitutional debate. They have argued for a new type of parliament which is open and accessible, has hours compatible with family life, has procedures and rules that encourage participation and debate, which acknowledges the experience and contribution of women, and is responsive and accountable to the needs of Scottish society.

Women have argued for equal representation in the belief that, with an equal number of men and women, a different kind of democracy will be fostered. Equal representation, therefore, is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving a better democratic system which is representative of, and accountable to, all the people of Scotland.

The establishment of the Scottish parliament should be viewed as an improvement in the practice of politics and democracy for women in Scotland. Of course, this potential may or may not be realized, depending on the actual priorities of the Parliament's governments. Engender sees devolution as a positive step which will enhance the quality of women's lives because Holyrood will be accessible, maintain sensible hours (avoiding late nights), sensitive to the family obligations of members,

¹⁴⁵ Ulrich was speaking before the 1999 Scottish Parliament election. Still, little has changed regarding prescription charges. In April 2000 prescription charges increased again by 10 pence to £6 (National Health Service 2000).

and because of efforts to secure more women in the assembly, making it more likely to address women's concerns (Engender 1999).¹⁴⁶ However, Kay Ullrich of the SNP fears that the powers of the parliament are still too limited to effectively deal with issues of importance to women (as the issue of Prescription charges shows). At the same time, Labour has benefited electorally from the introduction of the Parliament, and its concerted effort to achieve equal gender representation may have attracted more women to the party.

In correspondence (Internet, February 1999), I asked MSP Roseanna Cunningham (SNP-Perth) whether Labour was the electoral vehicle for Scottish feminists:

Well, it is certainly the way Labour would like to portray it although frankly they are up against reality on this one. They made great play of the fact that they introduced a gender balance mechanism for candidate selection for the Scottish Parliament and the SNP chose not to do so. In the view of the majority of SNP activists it was unnecessary to do so, since we had a history of judging people on merit not sex unlike the Labour party. In the event, it turned out to be an accurate assessment and the likely make-up of the SNP Parliamentary will be about 40 percent women--which is about what the Labour will achieve too.

Because the main part of the constitutional debate centres around the economic strengths and/or weaknesses of Scotland's position vis-à-vis the Union, it has to be said that much of the argument can veer off into pretty abstruse statistical arguments. It is the area the media want to cover most; it is obviously one of major importance and it is an argument we want to win. So I suppose in that sense, it may sometimes seem as if we are only focused on the bigger picture and not on the reality of people's lives.

It is not a charge I would accept. At present [February 1999], the SNP controls three of Scotland's councils, with responsibility for education and social work, housing, environmental health, etc.; and our three Councils consistently appear in the top ten on any performance levels, when assessed by the Audit Commission. Women in those areas have direct experience of how good SNP control can be for them.

As mentioned previously, the SNP itself voted at its 1998 Conference against "zipping" (whereby lists would alternate in descending order between male and female

¹⁴⁶ Engender strongly supported the 50/50 campaign to secure equal representation for men and women. As discussed before, this goal could not pass legal challenges and parties were left to determine their own levels of female representation. Brown (1999, 49) notes that the new Assembly's Standing Orders and Procedures recognize Scottish school holidays and require that Parliamentary business be conducted to accommodate family obligations.

candidates). Like Cunningham, delegate Fiona Muir (who opposed the motion), took a liberal view, arguing that other means of ensuring acceptable levels of female representation must be pursued.

What would zipping have done to promote the many able women in the party who did NOT put their names forward (for the list) in the first place? Is anyone looking at how we can get more women to put their names forward in the first place? Is anyone looking at how we can get more women to put themselves forward as local candidates next year? Are branches doing all they can to put themselves forward as local government candidates next year? Are branches doing all they can to make meetings/worknights family friendly? These are issues which need to be addressed in order to increase the political activity of women at a grass roots level, something which I think is an important step in persuading more women to put themselves forward as parliamentary candidates.

I don't look forward to the day when we pass policies based on whether the Labour party is going to approve or not. At the end of the day, the SNP will select candidates of calibre, and a good proportion of these will be women. This I believe, based on conversations with family and workmates as well as other SNP members, will prove more popular with the voting public than imposed quotas/gender balance measures (Internet correspondence, 17 June 1999).

Thus the SNP, while professing support for gender equality, has essentially, adopted the view that positive discrimination contradicts liberal-individualist principles. Its preference for non-mandatory types of "encouragement" for female candidates parallels the policy adopted by the Conservative party. Still, the party managed to elect 16 women to Holyrood; 43 percent of its MSPs.

Can nationalism be sufficiently inclusive to improve the daily lives of women while dealing with the seemingly more exciting business of nation-building? There is no clear answer to the question. University of Edinburgh political scientist Alice Brown (Internet correspondence, March 1999) argues that the Scottish Women's movements have different perspectives on the constitutional question, and no fruitful generalizations are available.

There has been broad support within the women's movement for constitutional change and the possibility that this offers for the representation of women as MSPs in the new Scottish parliament and the representation of women's interests through other mechanisms of engaging with the new legislature. E.g., there is a Women in Scotland Forum which was established in 1997 which is making input into policy at the Scottish Office and hopes to continue such a role in the new parliament.

The point I am making is that there has been little focus on the independence versus home rule (devolved parliament) options from a gender perspective. Women across the political divide see a Scottish Parliament – independent of Westminster or devolved from Westminster – as an opportunity for them.

Of course, if you speak to women in the SNP or those who vote nationalist, then they will also argue that an independent parliament in Scotland would be even better for women and others than a devolved one. However, it is not an issue that has been hotly debated in the Scottish women's movement. We have tended to focus on things on which we agree and which unite as wide a range of women as possible while respecting and recognizing that there will be different perspectives on independence/devolution.

Brown is correct to point out the great diversity within Scottish political parties on the appropriate means to address gender imbalances in representation. The picture which emerges from the above discussion is a diversity of approaches to enhancing the citizenship experiences of women. The SNP does seem to have the potential to act as a vehicle for Scottish women to improve their lives via greater participation in a "closer" government. The question of whether or not women see the SNP as a vehicle for their liberation is complicated by the absence of a single perspective on the question. The diversity among women makes the question difficult to answer. However, feminists' ambivalence may be partially explained by the fact that the SNP has not gone beyond liberal approaches to remedying women's absence from political institutions and their general experience of inequality. These fundamental differences of experience (between men and women) have not yet been addressed seriously as evident in the absence of deliberate attempts to ensure women's equal participation in the structures of the party and as candidates for public office.

Gay and Lesbian Scotland

Scholarly analysis of the relationship between national and 'queer' cultural identities is relatively new. Attention to this particular subculture is important because sexual identity has been viewed as a poor cousin to "more primary" identities such as national ones, and, because as a non-spatial, culturally shifting identity, sexual orientation provides a fundamental challenge to homogenizing nationalist self-

construction by existing outside the basic framework of the nation-state (Stychin 1997). Such identities undermine claims that either territory or ethnicity are necessary prerequisites to building political community. Stychin's analysis of the discourse of Québécois nationalism suggests that, while gays and lesbians achieved protection from discrimination in 1977 with *Parti Québécois* (PQ) enacted legislation, there is still a tension between the amorphous and evolving identity in 'queer culture' and the more formal territorial/linguistic conception of citizenship on the part of the PQ.¹⁴⁷ Québec's new modernizing nationalism, freed of church domination, is much more inclusive of other identities and is therefore able to permit a space for non-spatial identities, albeit encapsulated within an overarching national identity.

In 1990, as reported on 5 November 1990 in Gay Scotland "News," the SNP, under current leader Alex Salmond, adopted a "comprehensive policy in favour of lesbians and gays." Tim Hopkins of the Equality Network¹⁴⁸ (one of Scotland's two Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered equality organizations) has had considerable experience dealing with the main Scottish political parties. Hopkins (Internet correspondence, January 1999) stated that:

The SNP have been very helpful to us at Westminster in supporting our pro-equality amendments to a couple of government Bills over the past two years. We hope that they will be equally helpful at Holyrood (The Scottish Parliament). It remains to be seen however. Although they mostly seem to be pro-equality, they have a minority of high-profile members who are not helpful, ranging from the somewhat unhelpful journalist, Dorothy Grace-Elder, to the

¹⁴⁷ Stychin (1997, 15) also points out the remarkable pluralism among Québec's gay/lesbian communities: "There is no single lesbian or gay "stance" on Québec separatism. After all, lesbians and gays come from all of the linguistic, class, political, and cultural communities of Québec, and no doubt those identities in large measure inform views on the separatist aspirations of the PQ."

An article, "Québec gays, lesbians celebrate status recognition," by Campbell Clark, and published in the National Post on 12 June 1999, reports that Québec's National Assembly, on 10 June 1999, passed a law giving same-sex couples the same status as heterosexual common-law marriages. Québec is the first province to do this.

¹⁴⁸ The *Equality Network* was founded in January 1997. Its primary concern was to lobby for an amendment to the Scotland Act to extend the definition of equal opportunities in that Act to include sexual orientation.

downright homophobic Jim Sillars, who writes homophobic articles in the tabloid press.¹⁴⁹

On the whole, most people would probably rate them second of the four parties for support for LGBT equality. First would be the Liberal-Democrats, then the SNP, then Labour and last the Conservatives.¹⁵⁰

Hopkins' rather high opinion of the SNP was influenced, in part, by the active work of one MP in particular:

Their likely Home Affairs shadow minister, Roseanna Cunningham, is a strong supporter of equality and has pledged, if the SNP are elected to power in May, to ensure an equal age of consent, repeal the homophobic section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, and start a review to look at same-gender partnership recognition in Scotland.¹⁵¹

Cunningham (Internet correspondence February 1999) herself had this to say about her, and the SNP's, support for the equalization of the age of consent:¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Even if this characterization of Sillars is accurate, his current influence on the SNP is negligible. Indeed, he has been a vociferous critic of the SNP's positions on both devolution and European integration.

¹⁵⁰ To the best of my knowledge, Sillars is no longer a member of the SNP having made a career out of criticizing the party on various aspects of policy. Hopkins is probably assuming that Sillars is still a member based on his high profile position in the party in the 1980s.

¹⁵¹ Section 28/2A of the Local Government Act (1988) prohibits the "promotion" of homosexuality via publicly funded festivals, helplines, advertising, or educational programs (Clark and Dunphy 1995, 86-87). The opening paragraph of the Local Government Act 1988 proclaims that one of the purposes of the legislation is to "prohibit the promotion of homosexuality by local authorities" (Scottish Office 2000). Section 28/2A, which elaborates upon the above intention, states:

Section 28/2 A- (1) A local authority shall not :

a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality.

b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship (Equality Network 2000).

¹⁵² The age of consent issue for gay men has been the primary focus of gay political activity in the 1990s. Persistent lobbying persuaded the House of Commons to vote to reduce the age of consent from 21 to 18 in February 1994 (Clark and Dunphy 1995, 84). As reported in an article "Government pledges to win fight with Lords on gay age of consent," published in *The Scotsman* on 15 April 1999, the Blair government, in June of 1998, introduced a bill which reduced the age of consent to 16. This bill failed in the House of Lords. The Government has responded by employing the Parliament Act, which would force the legislation through the House of Lords. The House of Lords is granted a 12 month delaying period, and so the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act should be passed in early 2000. Currently, a bill is being reviewed in

It has been long-standing SNP policy to support the equalisation of the age of consent (since about 1989, I think). We didn't pass the policy in isolation--it was part of a policy for youth which included a commitment to lowering the voting age to 16 as well. I suppose it comes out of the basically civil rights orientated approach of the party to a number of relatively emotive issues--race, gender, gay rights, transsexual rights etc. The SNP is the only party to have had a transsexual candidate standing for election--without comment internally I may add, although needless to say the tabloids did themselves no favour .

How does the SNP's commitment to equality on the basis of sexual orientation compare with that of other political parties? Hopkins (Correspondence May 1999) describes the Conservatives' record on LGBT equality as "dismal." The Equality Network mailed copies of the LGBT manifesto, *Equality at Holyrood* to candidates standing for election to Scottish Parliament.¹⁵³ No Conservative candidate responded to the document. Labour is broadly in favor of equality, with speculation that the current Labour government will also remove the ban on gays and lesbians in the military.¹⁵⁴ According to Hopkins, 90 percent of Scottish Labour MPs support an equal age of consent and the Labour party explicitly endorses equality on the basis of sexual orientation in its Holyrood manifesto (Internet interview, 4 May 1999).

The Liberal-Democratic party endorses equality on the basis of sexual orientation. As for the SNP (Holyrood Manifesto, 1999):

The SNP will put equality at the heart of government. There will be a Parliamentary Committee on Equality supported by Commissioners with responsibility for particular groups in society, such as women, ethnic minorities, children and young people, disabled people, elderly people, gays and lesbians. A key role will be to consult with communities.

parliament to eliminate the voting rights of the hereditary peers of the House of Lords, and a Royal Commission is studying further reforms to that body.

¹⁵³ This manifesto was prepared for the Scottish Parliament election held 6 May 1999.

¹⁵⁴ According to an article, "Britain quietly says it's time to adopt a bill of rights," by Sarah Lyall and published in the New York Times on 3 October 1999, four Britons dismissed from the British military because they are gay had to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg for redress. The court agreed that the four plaintiffs had suffered the UK government's violation of their right to privacy. In October 2000 Britain will incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law making appeals to the European court unnecessary in future. Citizens have been able to appeal to this court since 1966 but legal aid was not available.

The SNP, uninvited, requested details of the Equality Network's Holyrood manifesto. Only the SNP issued a public statement on the issue of sexual equality. The SNP issued party policy guides on the subject to all candidates. The SNP, as yet, has no policy on same-sex marriage but is preparing to address this.

What emerges from the above discussion is that the SNP is serious about including the most marginalized elements of Scottish society. This is especially impressive in light of the fact that it is electorally risky to take on, in an assertive manner, the interests of a community which has endured a kind of approved bigotry for so long. What is striking about the comments by Cunningham is the casual and self-evident connection she makes between civil rights struggles as a whole, and those of the Scottish gay community. This is a clear example of the SNP's sincere efforts to act in the interests of all Scots.

Regional Cleavage

Proponents of both separate Scottish statehood and even modest devolutionary proposals have had to confront a persistent degree of regionalism within Scotland. This regional diversity is compounded by reinforcing characteristics ranging from economic land-use (oil in the North-west, agriculture in the South) to cultural-historical distinctiveness (the northern islands). This cleavage is typically manifested in suspicion of the potentially centralizing aims of an autonomous Scottish Assembly or government.¹⁵⁵ At least 50 percent of the population of Scotland live either alongside or at either end of the 40 kilometer stretch of highway connecting Edinburgh and

¹⁵⁵ Scottish elections surveys show relatively little difference between "outlying rural" Scotland and the rest of the country on attitudes toward Scottish independence or devolution. However, these surveys mask regionalism in the Orkney and Shetland Islands because "outlying rural" includes the Western Isles, the rural Highlands and the rural areas bordering England, thus homogenizing rather distinctive areas (Brown *et al* 1996, 158-9). Shetland and Orkney have, for the last century, voted for various incarnations of the Liberal party, in effect, excluding them from government throughout this century.

Glasgow. This would seriously imbalance any assembly in favor of urbanites in the central belt. Charles Kennedy (1989, 90) Liberal-Democrat MP for Ross, Cromarty and Skye bluntly expressed this fear of those living outside central Scotland in 1989.¹⁵⁶

Indeed this fear can be expressed in even more barbed political fashion: What is the point, such a Scot may enquire, of swapping an apparently remote Tory dominated Westminster system for socialist control dominated through the Labour party of the central belt?¹⁵⁷

The prospect of a "socialist" administration is cause for fear among fishing communities in northern Scotland. John Goodland (1993, 53), Secretary of the Shetland Fishermen's Association, argues that fishing communities are the least likely to support the Labour party and that if it were not for the middle-class vote, Labour would get no votes at all in these communities. The explanation for the hostility toward centralization, and the Labour party generally, is the perception that working-class fishers can only suffer from further regulation of their industry. Shetland is the most fisheries dependent place in the EU with 80 percent of all non-oil exports composed of either fish or fish products (Goodland 1995, 49). Much of the support for the Orkney and Shetland Movements in the 1987 General election came from the fishing industry (Goodland 1995, 53).

In recent history there existed a Highland-Lowland divide which was reinforced not only by geography, but also cultural and political distinctiveness. Lowland Scots

¹⁵⁶ Russell Horn of the Stirling University Scottish Nationalist Association (Internet correspondence with author, 16 May 1998) confessed his concern that the proportional representation system proposed by the SNP for an independent Scotland would not help the islanders since they would fail (even if supporting the same autonomist candidate) to rise above even a tiny electoral threshold (the population of Orkney and Shetland constitute about 1.5 percent of the Scottish population). This would also be true under the half constituency/half list system of the Scottish Parliament. The inability to elect an autonomist party candidate could exacerbate regional tensions.

¹⁵⁷ It might be objected that Kennedy's remarks are coloured by partisan purposes. This is a valid point but must also be tempered by the fact that the Liberal-Democrats have held a virtual electoral monopoly over Orkney and Shetland. For the May 1999 Scottish Parliamentary election the Orkneys and Shetlands were split into separate constituencies, both of which were easily won by the Liberal-Democrats.

felt more in common with their English neighbors and were deeply influenced by the Reformation.¹⁵⁸ In contrast, the highlands remained insulated from the Reformation until the catastrophe of the clearances. The 17th century saw the gradual penetration of an Anglo-Lowland state into highland life, threatening the clan system and its leaders. The ferocious destruction of Highland society in the aftermath of the failed 1745 rebellion was undertaken by both England and Lowland Scotland. Once the clearances ended highland resistance, the tokens of Highland culture could safely be revived as *Scottish*. With urbanization and modernization, Highland Scotland's population has dwindled. In 1800, half of all Scots lived in the Highlands and Islands but, by 1914, only 9 percent of Scots resided here (Férmendez-Armesto 1997, 44). From 1745 the highlands were "saturated with vast amounts of sustained Presbyterian propaganda" and "incorporated into an imperial master-class by university education and enrollment in the service of the state (Férmendez-Armesto 1997, 45)." It was only later that safe national symbols (that is, depoliticized for the English-dominated state) were revived in the form of bagpipes, kilts, and tartans.¹⁵⁹

The northern islands of Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles are home to about 64,000 people (just over 1 percent of the Scottish population). Since the early 1960s support has mounted for greater autonomy for these islands and their inhabitants have zealously guarded their autonomy from government centralization (Macartney, 1984). For example, in 1962, a Royal Commission recommended a merger of the Police forces of Orkney and Shetland with two mainland forces. A 1963 White paper suggested the amalgamation of a number of distinct, local authorities. In 1967, the

¹⁵⁸ The 19th century witnessed the rise of peculiar "teutonist" ethnologies which viewed the Highlands and their inhabitants as backward, inferior Celts in contrast to the "Germanic" lowlanders with their corresponding industriousness and civility (Kidd 1995). The twentieth century, however, has witnessed the explicitly civic nationalism characterized by the SNP.

¹⁵⁹ The tartan was, in fact, banned from 1747 to 1782 by the Act of Indemnity. Those who dared wear a tartan pattern were liable to 6 months imprisonment for their first offence and second time violators received transportation to a colony for 7 years.

Water board recommended a merger of several separate smaller boards. All of these attempts were resisted by the local governments with considerable support from the public. Regardless, the Water boards were amalgamated in 1967 and the subsequent visit of the then Secretary of State, Willie Ross, generated protests. At one point, protesters demanded to see Ross' passport and Viking-costume clad protesters carried signs saying "Back to Denmark" (Macartney 1984, 10).¹⁶⁰

Orcadian novelist George Mackay Brown (1988, 310) testifies to the strength and persistence of historical grievance in his reflections on Orkney and Shetland's historical relationship with Scotland:

Those who think of poor old Scotland and the oppressions it had to suffer through, might pause for a little to think how the lands and peoples of Orkney and Shetland suffered under the predatory Scots who sat in all the high seats of the islands since 1468. The ancient laws, speech, coinage, and land usage were perverted. The independent farmers were quickly reduced to little more than serfdom. Two illegitimate royal Stewarts, Robert and Patrick, squeezed the vintage to the uttermost drop. In a very short time one of the great medieval earldoms of Europe became a small poor country on the outer northern fringe of Scotland.

Nor has the SNP been immune from the criticisms and suspicions of Islanders. Cohen (1997, 97) describes an exchange between Islanders and two SNP candidates in Whalsay, Shetland on 28 June 1975 at which the prospective SNP candidate for the next general election, Howie Firth (an Orcadian), with then sitting MP George Reid (Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire) were jeered by an unreceptive gathering. At this time the SNP was experiencing its greatest electoral success, partly on the strength of its oil campaign. Shetland was undergoing profound social and economic transformation as the frenzied activities of foreign oil and construction companies inundated the islands. The SNP meeting convened and George Reid expressed the view that it could only be in Scotland's best interests to become independent and control its own destiny. The crowd seemed to see things differently and the position that the oil of

¹⁶⁰ "Back to Denmark" reflects the sense of ethnic distinctiveness of Islanders many of whom have Nordic surnames and do not see themselves as Scots. The slogan is a humorous way of underlining the Orcadian historical links to Scandinavia.

the North sea was Scotland's (and not Shetland's) met with indignant frustration. A woman from a fishing family asked, "If dere wis a SNP government in Eedinbur, what proportion o'da oil revenue wid we get fae da oil i'da East Shetland basin?" Reid replied, "One percent." At this point the crowd "hooted with derision." Reid failed to recognize that his commonsense and unexamined view, that the SNP was best suited to represent the interests of Scots, was in need of revision in light of the legitimate concerns of the Islanders for their future in an independent Scotland. In other words, Shetland could be viewed as a distinctive political community with interests and aspirations independent of those of either Scotland or the SNP. Reid's reckoning that 1 percent of oil revenues should go to Shetland is no more defensible, perhaps less so, than the UK's claims on North Sea oil. Since the islands are bearing the social and economic dislocation associated with the oil economy why should they not get a greater share of the revenues?

It is not only the boom economy of oil that has made salient the regional dimension in Scottish politics. Shetland and the Western Isles voted against the Common market and, in 1997, Shetland and Orkney (along with Ayr and Upper Nithsdale in the south) showed the weakest support for a Scottish assembly with tax-raising powers.¹⁶¹ In 1977, the Shetland Movement was formed, followed by the Orkney movement. In their submissions to the Royal Commission on the Islands (the Montgomery Commission) in 1981, both demanded vertical (an assembly) and horizontal (control over services like hydro) expansions of jurisdiction.¹⁶² These

¹⁶¹ An article, "The birth of a nation," published in Scotland on Sunday on 14 September 1997 reported turnout figures for regions of Scotland. Voter turnout was lower in the Islands than in Scotland overall (60.4 percent overall compared to Orkney's 53.5 percent, and Shetland with 51.5 percent). Only 57.3 percent of Orcadians voted for a Scottish Parliament compared with the Scottish average of 74.3 percent. In Shetland, 62.4 percent voted for the assembly. On the question of tax raising powers for the assembly, fewer than half of Orcadians voted to permit this (47.4 percent) while just over half of Shetlanders approved (51.6 percent). Overall, 63.5 percent of Scots voted for tax raising powers.

¹⁶² The Montgomery commission was promised by the Conservatives during the 1979 devolution campaign to the Islanders to determine their status *vis-a-vis* any

movements remained neutral on the question of either devolution or independence for Scotland save for when either possibility would compromise Islanders' autonomy. However, following overtures from the SNP after the 1987 General election, the autonomy movements of both Shetland and Orkney disbanded, with many members joining the SNP (Cohen 1997, 98).

A slight renaissance of political regionalism was witnessed in the elections for the Scottish parliament on 6 May 1999. According to an article, "Wallace's secure kingdom" published in the Herald on 8 May 1999, The Highlands and Islands Alliance (HIA), while faring poorly with only 1.29 percent of the second ballot list vote, demonstrated that a small core of alienated regionalists remain. The HIA (HIA, 1999) claims to be "a new, radical, community driven party focusing on the issues which matter to the Highlands and Islands of Scotland". The Charter of the HIA clearly expresses a local, populist grievance against political centralization: "We have a vision of the Highlands and Islands where it is communities that control the way land is used, communities that tell politicians what they need—not the other way round. A society where healthcare, transport, and other basic necessities don't cost an arm or a leg and don't get scarcer and poorer the further you travel from Edinburgh" (HIA 1999). Further: "We have a vision where the once silenced Highlands and Islands pioneer a new democracy for the whole of Scotland. Rule by QUANGO is unacceptable, rule by Westminster or Edinburgh is inadequate, having a say every 5 years is not enough" (HIA 1999).

Whatever electoral support the HIA enjoys, the distinctively unenthusiastic response of Islanders to recent referendums seems to confirm a distinct set of attitudes towards constitutional questions. In the three referenda (Common Market, and the 1979 and 1997 devolution campaigns) the northern Islands resisted the tide voting against the proposed or created assembly. This commission was promised whatever the outcome of the referendum. Labour also promised a commission. The Commission rejected the proposals of the Island Movements which included an elected assembly for the islands (Macartney 1984, 19).

Common market, in 1997 the Islands showed the least enthusiasm for the establishment of a Scottish parliament. An independent Scotland will need to take into account the unique position of remote Islands and will need to entertain institutional means of securing the active and efficacious participation of residents. The HIA has advocated an assembly of councilors, MPs, MSPs, and MEPs from the remote regions, who will put aside partisan attachments for regular meetings to discuss issues of importance to these regions (HIA 1999). Such meetings would also appoint a watchdog committee to advocate on behalf of Highland and Island residents. There are other models available for granting a degree of autonomy to distinct regions. The relationship of the Faroe Islands to Denmark might be a model. Since 1948 these islands have enjoyed Home Rule within the Kingdom of Denmark (Olafsson 1984).

The Highlands and Islands Alliance is not an especially important force in Scottish politics. Arguably, the cause of autonomy/independence is shared by a minority of island residents, and yet, the regional cleavage again provides an opportunity to examine the civic nationalism of the SNP. Tyranny of the majority is a serious problem to be avoided by democracies. The islanders constitute about the same proportion of the Scottish population as ethnic/racial minorities and their particular interests must be considered in independence scenarios.

Ethnicity, Religion and National Identity

Prior to the beginning of the 18th century most migrants to Scotland were invaders or adventurers (Mann 1992, 10). The first major wave of economic migrants arrived from Ireland in the early 18th century. Spurred by opportunity in Scotland and natural disasters such as the Potato Blight, the number of Irish immigrants and their descendants had increased to 300,000, or 11 percent of the population, by 1851 (Maan 1992, 17). These newcomers settled primarily in the area of Glasgow and were met with widespread bigotry by an overwhelmingly Protestant population. This bigotry was

encouraged partly by the Church of Scotland, which saw the influx of Catholics as a threat.

Other immigrants arrived from Europe, notably Jews, Italians and East Europeans. These groups have been readily assimilated for the most part. Immigration from the New Commonwealth countries was relatively small until after 1945. According to Maan (1992), these new settlers (and their descendants) now number approximately 50,000 (about 1 percent of the population). For the most part, this wave of immigrants has come from the Indian subcontinent. More recent data indicate the presence of about 62,000 Asians and their British-born descendants in Scotland (Bailey, Bowes and Sim 1995). Of these, the largest single group (21,192) are Pakistanis from the Lyallpur region of Pakistan.

Before WWII, most Asians arrived as part of the crews of Glasgow-based shipping lines and settled in Glasgow. Others arrived to work in the jute mills of Dundee while another significant number were students at Scottish universities. Asian Scots have repeated a settlement pattern undergone by previous immigrant communities. Like their Jewish and Chinese predecessors, Asians initially took the least desirable work and were economically marginalised. More recently, trends show a move toward self-employment and professionalism (Bailey *et al* 1995, 37). As a whole, Pakistani Scots tend to have a greater number of residents per household (at 4.75 they are double the Scottish average). They are also younger, with almost 40 percent of Pakistanis between the ages of 1-15 years of age. These statistics are important because they portray a community which is growing both in numbers and economic clout.

In addition to their economic clout, Pakistani Scots add a wrinkle to the complex fabric of Scottish identity. Saeed *et al* (1999) provide data that show that in the midst of the crisis of identity which has occurred in Scotland over the last few decades an interesting and important assertion of Pakistani identity has been complicating

questions of Scottish identity generally. In a survey of 14-17 year old Scottish-Pakistani students, Saeed et al (1999, 830) found that when respondents ranked identities and their individual relevance, a robust sense of religious and ethnic identity was evident.¹⁶³ Given the choice among Muslim, Pakistani, Black, Scottish, British and Asian, almost all (97 percent) identified themselves as Muslim and about half (46 percent) selected Pakistani. Lower figures were found for Scottish (22 percent) and British (9 percent). When permitted to identify ethnicity using bicultural terms a less stark picture emerges. The top two categories into which respondents grouped themselves were Scottish Pakistani and Scottish-Muslim (22 and 19 percent respectively) (Ibid., 836). The relevance of these findings is that there is a sense among a sizable percentage of Pakistani Scots that dual identities are possible. That almost half the sample could qualify their religious and ethnic heritage with their place of birth/residency implies that there is already an ongoing movement towards a pluralistic society in which identity is not part of a zero sum game of mutually exclusive loyalties. That these Scots can mix their various identities is also important for the civic nationalist project of the SNP. The SNP has constructed a Scottish national identity which recognizes internal diversity in the territory of Scotland while also claiming a European identity. This is precisely what civic nationalism must do: create solidarity without demanding exclusive cultural fidelity. Part of the SNP's role over the last few decades has been to articulate a more fluid, explicitly territorial sense of identity to fill a vacuum left by the erosion of Britishness and imperial identities in Scotland, a process which accelerated during the prolonged period of Conservative governance between 1979 and 1997. This period witnessed a drift between the political aspirations and self-consciousness of Scots as England seemed to move toward a neo-liberal ethos.

¹⁶³ However, such identities do not translate into marked political identifications. An analysis of the 1999 Scottish election could find no statistically significant correlation between ethnic minority and party support/constituency because of the relatively small numbers of ethnic minorities in individual constituencies.

For some time, Scots have taken pride in the apparent invisibility of racism in Scotland. Miles and Dunlop (1986, 25) point out that the urban race riots which afflicted Britain in the 1980s had no counterparts in Scotland, leading the Scottish media to view these disturbances as an *English* problem. However, according to an article by Kamal Ahmed, "Housing and jobs set minorities apart," published in Scotland on Sunday on 16 October 1994, a 1994 report of the Scottish Ethnic Minorities Research Unit concluded that non-whites suffered from higher unemployment rates (14 percent) than whites (10 percent) and live in more overcrowded housing; 10 percent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi homes are described as overcrowded compared with 1 percent in the white community. A study of Scotland's 16,000 strong Chinese community (Bailey, Bowes, and Sim 1994) also found higher than average rates of overcrowding compared to the Scottish average.

Scotland has long been viewed as less racist than the rest of the UK, partly because racism tends to be more low key. The racism found in Scotland is the story of thousands of less obvious, but equally injurious affronts to the dignity of members of minorities in Scotland. For instance, an article, "Scots' firms' race bias," published in the Daily Record on 2 June 1994 pointed out that black and Asian women earn less than their white colleagues and have a jobless rate double that of white women. In an article entitled "Lang faces race law row," published in the Scotsman on 30 June 1994, the Commission for Racial Equality estimated that, in 1993, there were at least 14,000 unreported incidents of racial harassment in Scotland, an increase of 9 percent since 1992.

"Lizzy", researcher and writer with the Institute For Race Relations (IRR),¹⁶⁴ in London, suggests that Scotland is merely lagging behind England in the political salience of race relations.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with a subject who preferred to remain anonymous, May 16, 1994, London. The Institute for Race Relations (IRR), the first of its kind in Western Europe, was founded in 1956, and is a non-partisan institute mandated to conduct research on

You're going into a debate that you had here [England] 20 or 30 years ago. The tendency is to think that there isn't a problem with racism. They [the Scots] see themselves as victims of English racism. They don't like to believe that they can be racist as well.

On the first of these points, it is evident that there is a degree of anti-English sentiment lingering in the collective consciousness, if only in jokes and folklore. Nairn (1998, 7) comments that:

There is of course antagonism towards "England" among Scots (though far less towards English individuals). It has been there since long before the Union, after which it settled down into a sort of steady-state grumbling, a "chip on the shoulder" due to the structural inequality which opposes 80 percent of "Great Britain" to (now) less than 10 percent. What they (Scots) most wanted was the one thing that (Great Britain) could never supply--*collective* recognition and equality. They needed some kind of federalism, but found that they had signed up to an intensifying unitarism--to a historical over-centralism which attained its climax only in the Thatcher years. How could some ill-feeling fail to arise from that? But the England being blamed here is the British state, and the individuals who get its rough edge are almost invariably those identifiable with the ruling *moeurs*--i.e., "upper class," "snooty," and so on.

This depiction of Scottish anti-Anglo sentiment might be criticized in light of some recent events. One recent incident was recounted in an article entitled "A very Scottish death," by Katie Grant and published in the *Spectator* on 30 May 1998. On 22 November 1997 in Balerno (outside of Edinburgh), a 19 year old student was beaten to death by three youths, apparently because they had mistakenly assumed he was English. Grant argues that anti-Englishness, never entirely absent from Scottish nationalist consciousness, is behind a variety of trends from job discrimination against English-accented Scottish residents as well as attacks upon English-owned holiday homes in Highland Scotland. Grant accuses both Scottish Labour and the SNP of exploiting anti-English sentiments in the guise of class antagonism. Hatred of Margaret Thatcher has devolved into bigotry against England and the English in general.

However, there is little evidence for widespread anti-English bigotry in Scotland. Nairn has described histrionic reports of the rise of anti-Englishness as

race and racism.

"twaddle". Indeed, sociologist David McCrone concludes from survey data that 83 percent of Scots (among all ages, social classes, and gender) have no dislike of the English (quoted in Nairn 1998, 6). The SNP's Alex Salmond has stressed that: "The SNP has a huge responsibility to articulate Scottish independence in a way that is pro-Scottish and not anti-English" (Salmond 1998, 15).

Kenny MacAskill, SNP Treasurer, when asked about anti-Englishness within the SNP responded that "most people I know in the SNP don't have a problem with English people, but with Scottish people. The problem isn't Basildon or Birmingham, it's right here" (Interview with author). This exemplifies the self-reproach which is so often exhibited by SNP members. It is a frustration born of a sense of opportunities lost, not of a sense of superiority or hatred. MacAskill's point is that Scotland has not achieved independence because of Scots. There have been plenty of opportunities to vote for greater independence, but Scots have not done so.

"Lizzy" expressed three main concerns about the nationalism of the SNP. While acknowledging that the SNP is clearly not a racist exclusionary party like the British National Party, there was a sense of dismay at the silence of the party on Scotland's role in British colonialism. Lizzy acknowledges, however, that the SNP has "made the right noises" and attracted the sympathy and support of Scottish 'blacks' by steadfastly maintaining the civic nature of SNP nationalism.¹⁶⁵ The party's embrace of Europe is less encouraging to Lizzy, who views "the European project" as "so right-wing." A. Sivanandan (Director, IRR) concurred, arguing that, in moving-- even hesitantly-- toward European integration, Britain is adopting "Common market nationalism" which is the result of the negative leveling, and lowest common denominator policies on refugees, immigration and citizenship rights. I have already discussed Germany's 'blood' citizenship conception but, elsewhere in Europe (particularly in France),

¹⁶⁵ A. Sivanandan defines the designation 'Black' as uniquely British and refers to all those non-whites regardless of their origin (primarily, the Caribbean or the Indian subcontinent) (Interview with author, 16 May 1994, London).

restrictive policies on citizenship acquisition and outward hostility to immigration on the part of the far-right mean that the ultimate nature of European citizenship remains contested.

Some have feared the onset of a "Fortress Europe" in the aftermath of the extensive efforts at accelerated European integration since the SEA (1986) and Maastricht treaties. Immigrants, non-European ethnic minorities, asylum seekers and refugees (combined these form 2.3 percent of the European Union's population) will not necessarily enjoy the benefits offered by the free movement of labor in post-1992 Europe (Kofman 1995, 128). The British Commission for Racial Equality has expressed concern regarding the leveling down result of policy harmonization on immigration policy. Other European states have very restrictive forms of legal policy regarding protection for racial minorities. Italy restricts the application of racial legislation to citizens only. The Social Charter covers workers, but does not deal with issues of race, creating a two (or more) tier system of European residents (Ibid., 129). The trend in Western Europe has been toward steadily more restrictive policies on immigration,¹⁶⁶ a trend likely to be crystallized in the form of EU level policy on immigration. If prevailing trends toward harmonization continue then it is reasonable to expect that an independent Scottish state might be forced to comply with immigration/entrance procedures far more illiberal and exclusionary than desired by Scotland.

Despite the ubiquity of the 'non-racist Scotland' myth among Scottish whites, problems of bigotry are readily apparent. It is true that the British National Party (BNP) has not been particularly successful in Scotland,¹⁶⁷ but the reasons are not necessarily

¹⁶⁶ In the British case the 1971 Immigration Act terminated the right of entry extended to those from former British colonies. Deportations have increased since this time as the right of appeal against decisions on entrance to the UK was eliminated. In 1987 the Carriers Liability Act imposed fines on commercial carriers permitting passengers without documents on their craft, leading, potentially, to a climate of suspicion regarding non-European passengers (Baimbridge et al 1994, 422).

¹⁶⁷ As reported in an article "Racism: the unspoken truth," by Neil Mackay and

linked with a particular trait of tolerance in Scottish society. In fact the BNP is decidedly hostile to Scottish nationalism as articulated by the SNP. A 1991 edition of the BNP's organ, *Spearhead*, states that:


We are British nationalists rather than English or Scottish nationalists although our British nationalism allows for the splendour of the distinct traditions that go to make up our kingdom and the richness in diversity that gives it so much colour and produces from it a particularly wide range of national genius.

It's OK for the Scottish to have their cultural artifacts--tartan, haggis, kilts and, above all, the military tattoo-- that makes them such a quaint part of British heritage. But if it's political control of their resources that they're after, then it's "hands off the Union pal" (BNP quoted in Campaign Against Racism and Fascism 1992).

SNP supporters are clearly not compatriots of the racist right. Still we must not assume that racism is absent from Scottish society. Miles and Dunlop deflate this popular view of a non-racist Scotland by pointing out that Scots were instrumental in the worst excesses of British imperialism in all its racist guises (1986, 25). In addition, as we shall see shortly, Scotland continues to suffer from religious bigotry. These authors suggest that the racist activities directed against the Asian community in Scotland have been less pronounced than elsewhere in Britain because Asians have tended to occupy the *petit bourgeois* strata and, therefore, have not represented a threat to working class Scots. On the other hand, the non-white population has not been particularly well integrated into the police forces. As Map 8 shows, in the Scottish case the police have far fewer minority officers than would be expected considering the minority proportion of the population. One implication of this underrepresentation might be the number and severity of police brutality cases against Asian Scots. In an article by Severin Carrell, "Policeman suspended after student wins race attack case," published in the Scotsman on 22 September 1995, one particularly vicious case of police brutality was described. In November 1991 Mohammed Aamer Anwar, a Glasgow University engineering student, was brutally beaten by police after being

Dani Garavelli, and published in Scotland on Sunday on 18 October 1998, the BNP candidate ran a candidate in Glasgow-Polllokshields in the 1997 general election. The candidate received too few votes to reclaim his deposit.

Map 8



Source: (*The Scotsman* September 22, 1995)

apprehended for posting bills during a student demonstration. Anwar was awarded £4,200 in compensation in September 1995. That same month, Anwar appeared at the SNP Conference in Perth to address party members on the problem of police brutality.

By the 1970s the myth of a non-racist Scotland was being seriously challenged. More recently, however, Asian Scots have faced considerable racial harassment. A revealing study of housing problems encountered by Asians in Glasgow indicated that verbal and physical intimidation and assaults are a daily reality for many (Bowes, McCluskey, and Sim 1990). This survey of 341 tenants on public estates found that 11 percent of respondents had experienced neighborhood harassment while 36 percent reported that a family member had experienced threats and abusive behavior (74).

Cant and Kelly (1995, 19) present data gathered by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) for the period 1988-93 (Table 10).

Table 10

Racial Incidents Reported to Scottish Police Forces

	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>
Total	299	376	636	678	663	724

Source: Cant and Kelly (1995, 19)

According to Martin Verity of the CRE: "All the statistics [regarding racist incidents] show that the situation is just as bad in Scotland as it is in England" (CRE 1997, 9). Between January and November 1997 the CRE in Scotland received 328 reports of racial discrimination. In 1995 police reported 832 instances of racial harassment (Ibid.).

The SNP has made serious efforts to reach out to the Asian community in Scotland with the 1995 launch of 'New Scots for Independence'. The founding members of the organization expressed their enthusiasm for Scottish independence. As reported by J. Ruogvie, in the Scotsman on 22 September 1995, in an article "Natural for Asians to join up, group says," Bashir Ahmad argued that:

Their (SNP) policies can give us a voice where we can represent ourselves and portray our needs and requirements. . . Many of us, our fathers and grandfathers, have experienced the struggle for independence. The struggle against colonialism was won in country after country but here in Scotland it still goes on and it is not surprising people like me are interested in the SNP.

This perspective does not, however, discount the presence of racism in Scotland. In fact, Maan (1992, 203) places the blame for the perpetuation of the myth of tolerant Scotland with the first generation of Asian immigrants who submitted to the indignities of racism in order to avoid trouble. This view was also expressed by Abdul Khan (Interview, Glasgow June 1994), an officer with the Housing Equality Action Unit in Glasgow and local candidate for the SNP, who blamed older generations of Asians for fostering racism by ingratiating themselves to their "white masters".¹⁶⁸ The Scottish-born descendants of this older, submissive generation will not tolerate this bigotry and, thus, the myth of Scottish tolerance is decaying. Recent violent attacks on Asians in Dundee have brought a generational conflict to the fore in which young Asian activists have angrily rejected the quiet submission of older members of the community. One young woman, quoted in an article by J. Kemp and V. Chanin, "Tide of anger confronts race hate," published in Scotland on Sunday on 11 September 1994, observed: "The elders find it shocking that a young woman is speaking up and making demands. But just because I am a woman and a Muslim does not mean I can't speak for myself."

Only with the ascendance of the social-democratic, Salmond-led faction of the 1990s has serious attention been paid by the SNP to ethnic minorities within Scotland. In forming *Scots Asians for Independence* (SAI), with about 500 members, the SNP advances both the party's electoral fortunes and presents a different face from the 'atavistic separatist' tag so often placed on the party by Labour. In a 1995 press release regarding the formation of the new group, Salmond observed that:

¹⁶⁸ Interview by author, Glasgow, 9 July 1994.

This very welcome development is an important part of building a winning coalition for Independence in Scotland. I am delighted at the forming of this grouping, and am confident that it will lead to increased support for Scottish Independence among the Asian community in Scotland. This step further illustrates that the Labour party does not have a monopoly of votes among the Scottish Asians, with significant and growing support for the SNP and Independence (SNP Press Release 21 September 1995).

The SNP's annual conference at Perth carried a motion congratulating the founders of SAI, seeing this development as a means to "achieve our vision of a multi-cultural nation which guarantees the rights and privileges of all its citizens." Furthermore, the 1995 party conference acclaimed Resolution 46 (introduced by Glasgow-Maryhill Branch) which resolved that:

Conference utterly repudiates and condemns the attitude that the colour of one's skin, or the geographic origin or the beliefs of religion and conscience of any person can form any legitimate basis, political, economic, social or personal for discrimination in any form whatever in our society.

Conference further condemns the activities of pseudo fascist and racist organizations such as the so-called "Combat 18", as well as any person or organization connected with activities and statements designed to stir up and exploit prejudice and generate fear in pursuit of political, economic and social ends.

Conference therefore calls for effective and continuing action from the authorities in Scotland to use the present powers of the police and local councils to combat racism and discrimination wherever it is found.

The party's most recent constitutional statement on racism outlines basic principles (Policy Handbook March 1993d): that diversity is a source of enrichment and that bigotry is incompatible with a just society. On matters of policy it deals with issues such as housing discrimination, education (religious and second-language instruction where appropriate), employment targets to be set for public bodies, greater police training and recruitment. Funding for the Commission for Racial Equality would be raised to add to that body's effectiveness.

The party's efforts to dispel charges of exclusion seem to be paying dividends.¹⁶⁹ In a letter to the Herald, "Smear that sums up British nationalism,"

¹⁶⁹ The Scottish Labour party is no longer invulnerable to charges of exclusion based on race. Quoted in an article, "Labour list sparks Holyrood race row," by Jason Allardyce and published in Scotland on Sunday on 21 June 1998, the Commission for Racial Equality's Scottish commissioner, Dr. Moussa Jogie expressed disappointment

published on 28 September 1995, Bashir Ahmad (Convenor, Scots Asians for Independence), argues that: "My colleagues and I joined the SNP because we identify with Scotland and her democratic rights. There are many different identities in Scotland but what we all share is our stake in Scottish society." The extent to which new Scots have embraced the SNP is a testimonial to the broad non-racial appeal of the civic nationalist project. Kaukab Stewart, a Pakistani-born member of the SNP, was the party's (unsuccessful) candidate for the constituency of Glasgow Anniesland in the 1999 Scottish Parliament election.¹⁷⁰ Stewart joined the SNP in 1995 despite her wariness of nationalism. Previous racial harassment in England had led her family to move to Scotland. Quoted in an article, "The challenger," by Jeremy Hodges and published in Scotland on Sunday's Spectrum on 7 February 1999, Stewart recalls: "I had a lot of friends in the SNP and shared a lot of their philosophy. But because of the Scottishness of the party, and being brought up in England, I had this sort of doubt". On the other hand, Stewart precluded membership in the Labour party because she "wanted to be a socialist", and viewed New Labour as having abandoned these principles. (Ibid.). Furthermore, Stewart resists the "separatist" label Labour has pinned to the SNP. "I say: what's wrong with being separate rather than being dictated to? Separate from policies that don't work up here? Separate from being a guinea pig for things like the poll tax" (Stewart, 1999, 15)?"

It appears that the devolved parliament delivered by New Labour will not be able to act to reduce racism in Scotland. In his article, "Parliament 'needs race law powers,'" published in Scotland on Sunday on 8 February 1998, Sir Herman Ouseley, Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, has argued that the reservation of powers

that the Labour party had failed to nominate all but one of the Asian candidates who stepped forward to claim Labour nominations. Many of those rejected were experienced local councilors, prompting "senior Labour figures" to warn that this exclusion would accelerate the defection of Asians to the SNP, as there is a sense that their Labour votes can be taken for granted.

¹⁷⁰ The SNP nominated another non-white candidate to the party list for the proportional regional vote.

to reduce racist discrimination and promote equal opportunities will result in a continuance of the status quo where Westminster has failed to deal with the problem of racial discrimination in an adequate manner. Ouseley's concerns were welcomed by the SNP, which advocated the strengthening of the Parliament's power on racial discrimination and equal opportunities. The Scottish Trades Unions Congress (STUC) has also backed a strengthening of these powers. In response, the Labour government's Home Secretary has emphasized the need for consistency across Britain in the area of race relations. The Labour government's White Paper (HMSO 1997, 8) is clear: the Commission for Racial Equality and the Equal Opportunities Commission will remain accountable to the UK Parliament, although the Scottish Parliament will be able to invite reports, before committee, from such bodies. Therefore, ethnic minorities will be forced, with few organizational resources, to lobby Westminster from Scotland rather than focusing attention on the Scottish Parliament. This seems an unnecessarily circuitous way of dealing with local (that is, Scottish) racial problems. Selma Rehman, of the Black women's group Meridian, is pessimistic about the consequences of devolution for racial equality: "I don't think that devolution will make a great difference to Black people, not at the moment anyway. In fact it will be a fight to ensure that race issues are not treated as add-ons to other policies" (CRE 1997, 8). Responsibility for an important area of public policy should be directed by the local (in this case, national level) to enable dialogue between the communities most affected by racism and policy makers. Moreover, the particularities of discrimination in Scotland arguably require a more locally-sensitive approach to the elimination of discrimination, particularly as regards the Catholic community of Irish descent.

The SNP has made serious efforts to recognize the multi-ethnic character of contemporary society, and, in keeping with its explicitly civic character, has made an effort to include all Scots in its various campaigns and literature. Furthermore, the party has succeeded in including "new Scots" as candidates and party activists. In articulating

this civic vision of Scottish citizenship, the party has assertively taken nationalism away from those who would use a nationalist agenda to advance an ethnic grievance. The failure of groups such as Settler Watch and the British National Party to take root in Scottish politics shows the extent to which the SNP's nationalism has won.

Sectarian Divisions

Scotland also remains divided by religion. In 1995, 730,835, or 14 percent of Scots, identified themselves as Catholics (Hunter 1997, 1336). For the most part, the Catholic population is concentrated in the Western Isles, which were less affected by the Reformation, and in the urban, industrialized area around Glasgow. As mentioned above, Irish Catholics were met with extreme racism and even violence. Revisionist accounts of religious division (Hanham 1969, 19) view sectarianism as "only a reminder of past rancour." Some of the Irish migrants were Ulster Protestants, who brought with them the ceremonies and politics of Ireland, thereby heightening anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment. Legislation such as the 1918 Education Act provided for the creation of separate schools for Catholics and Protestants (Miles and Dunlop 1986, 28) and the formalization of the sectarian divide.¹⁷¹ This divide is also celebrated each July 12 as Protestant or Orange marchers celebrate the victory of the Protestant King

¹⁷¹ Two caveats here. First, it might be argued, as MacGarry (1995,133-34) has, that "good fences make good neighbors" and that separate schools along religious cleavages merely formalize sectarian divisions. Looked at this way then, we might see the arrow of causality differently; separate 'pillars' are artifacts rather than progenitors of sectarianism. But, when religious cleavage is reinforced, as it is in the West-Central Scottish case, by ethnicity (most Catholics at the turn of the century were Irish immigrants) segregation may well create a sectarian divide that was absent previously. A cautious perspective might argue that segregation is a marker of a divided society but not necessarily a seed for future ethno-religious turmoil. Like a rip-tide, such disturbances require a number of antecedents of which institutional segregation along religious or other lines is only one of a number of necessary conditions.

Sandy Edwards of the Humanist Society of Scotland, in an article, "Why schools should shake off shackles from the past," published in Scotland on Sunday on 2 April 1995, argues that segregated education encourages sectarianism because housing tends to be clustered around the catchment areas of particular schools giving these neighborhoods a denominational character. Also, schools become identified as Catholic or Protestant, permitting subtle employment discrimination.

William of Orange against Catholic forces at the Battle of the Boyne. Similarly, 'Green' republican marchers celebrate the Easter rising of Dublin in 1916 and other dates of importance to the Irish republican cause. The majority of Scots, particularly those in Western Scotland, feel that these marches fan the fires of sectarianism and should be banned.¹⁷²

Such tensions were fully evident during the by-election campaign in Monklands-East in west central Scotland in June 1994. This seat was vacated by the death of John Smith, then leader of the Labour party. As media attention to the by-election increased, allegations of spending bias by the local district council came to light. The two largest towns in the constituency are Airdrie, which is primarily Protestant, and Coatbridge, which is primarily Catholic. Allegations were that the all-Catholic Labour council-members (17 in all) had preferentially spent in Coatbridge at the expense of Airdrie. The campaign quickly degenerated into a war of smears by the main combatants, the SNP and the Labour party. In an article in the *Guardian* "Struggle for power reopens old wounds," by Erlend Clouston and published on 2 July 1994, Labour activists accused the SNP of informing voters in Protestant areas that Labour's candidate was Catholic, while the SNP alleged that Labour activists had warned Catholic voters that Catholic town employees would face dismissal in the event of an SNP victory.¹⁷³ The campaign saw a level of bitterness and division, always present between the SNP and Labour, reach new highs. In the end, Labour won by under a

¹⁷² In an article by Denis Campbell, "Another silly season of orange and green," and published in *Scotland on Sunday* on 28 May 1995, a 1995 survey conducted by *Scotland on Sunday* is cited. It found that 64 percent of Scots as a whole felt that these marches encouraged religious intolerance. In the West, this figure rose to 72 percent. Overall, 57 percent of Scots thought that these marches should be banned (Sample size not provided).

¹⁷³ Such accusations did not serve the SNP well as they have strived to stay above sectarian appeals and yet historically the party has always attracted more support from Protestants than Catholics. According to a poll (sample size 614) of 35 enumeration districts in East-Monklands conducted between 22-25 June 1994 and reported in the *Scotsman* in an article, "Sectarianism a big issue for Monklands voters, says poll," published on 28 June 1994, 82 percent of Catholics supported Labour in East-Monklands while 65 percent of Protestants support the SNP.

thousand votes in an air of hostility and suspicion, leading Jim Wallace, Liberal-Democrat (Orkney-Shetland), quoted in an article "Labour rely on apathy for an easy life," by Iain MacWhirter and published in Scotland on Sunday on 3 July 1994, to remark that all parties had lost the by-election and not just those that had lost their deposits. The SNP had not initiated the sectarian rancour in the Monklands-East by-election but rather defended itself against the false accusations leveled by the Labour party. In fact, the Herald used an editorial, "Time to investigate," published on 2 July 1994, to apologize to the SNP for accusing them of "playing the Orange card" and accepted that the "official SNP campaign strenuously avoided this question."

Societal Cleavage and the SNP

In some respects the analysis thus far suggests a paradox. Nationalism is usually portrayed as tied up with ethnicity and culture. One would expect a 'nationalist' party to have a clear understanding of what that nation is. On the other hand, explicit appeals to any segment of society would undermine the SNP's claim to speak for all the Scottish people. The current tendency toward inclusion is evident in this excerpt from a speech by George Reid, former MP, on the Thatcher era:

It was a direct negation of the whole Scottish tradition: a tradition built on the Commonwealth of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the Calvinists, the social concern of the Catholics, the humanity of much of the Labour movement, the civic nationalism of today (Reid 1995).

During the controversy surrounding the Monklands East by-election columnist Joyce McMillan argued in a column, "When two tribes go to war in a political vacuum," published in Scotland on Sunday on 3 July 1994, that:

On the SNP side, it is possible that some elements in the independence movement-- although not in the party-- do regard their cause as a crusade for a "Protestant Scotland", in which case, Alex Salmond, seems a leader eminently capable of smashing that idea out of the park. The message for him is simple: that if the SNP wants to avoid the deadly 'touch' of sectarian politics, as he put it yesterday, then avoiding sectarianism in the negative sense may no longer be enough; the party must now be seen building positive links with all Scotland's religious communities, shaking off any supporters who object.

Such is the potential for ethnic conflict and religious sectarianism that Alex Salmond has addressed the question in a manner hitherto unseen in the SNP. In a 1995 interview Salmond demonstrated the commitment of the party to reduce and combat these problems. When asked about Welsh Labour MP Kim Howells' charge that nationalism is akin to fascism, Salmond responded:

It's such a silly point. It's only worth a moment's notice in that this person is the constitutional spokesperson for the Labour Party. . . What we have tried to do is flush these arguments out. . . This has been a deliberate target. . . Traditionally the SNP response to this, apart from denying it, was to hope that the argument wouldn't be raised, that somehow, if we didn't say anything about it, that often unspoken belief would just go away. Recently we have employed a much more pro-active stance in dealing with that with New Scots for Independence.

These (racism and sectarianism) are all areas in Scottish society where people are capable of having fears about the process of independence and our tactic has been, instead of sheltering from these arguments to drag them into the open (Salmond quoted in Fee 1995).

In fact, the SNP has made a determined effort to attract more Catholic supporters. In 1998, as reported in an article "SNP bids to woo Labour's Catholic voters," by Jason Allardyce and Iain Martin and published in Scotland on Sunday on 20 September 1998, the party committed itself to denominational education where there is a demand for it. For some time it has been argued that there was a tendency for Catholic Scots to support the Labour party and less frequently for the SNP. In fact, a shift has occurred in the voting preferences of Catholics toward the SNP (Table 11).

Table 11**Percentage voting for political parties by religion, 1992 (1979)**

<u>Party</u>	<u>No religion</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Other</u>
Did not vote	20 (17)	18 (13)	11 (10)	16 (10)
Conservative	15 (22)	6 (10)	30 (39)	24 (42)
Labour	31 (38)	53 (67)	27 (24)	27 (36)
Lib.Democrat	9 (7)	7 (2)	9 (10)	12 (7)
SNP	23 (15)	16 (7)	20 (15)	18 (NA)
Other	1 (2)	NA (1)	3 (3)	4 (7)
n=	235 (218)	148 (88)	477 (392)	97 (31)

Source: Bennie et al (1997, 114)

There has been a steady shift among the Catholic electorate to the point where the profile of their party preference, while still disproportionately for Labour, has begun to resemble that of Scots as a whole. A greater proportion (16 percent) now support the SNP compared with only 7 percent in 1979. Catholics are also more likely to consider themselves Scottish (70 percent) than Protestants and are more likely than Protestants to support constitutional change (Bennie et al 1997, 118). In light of these data it seems religious differences do not preclude either support for the SNP or for constitutional change generally.

The politically charged cleavages of ethnicity, race and religion remain a problem for the SNP as the party is frequently accused of harboring exclusivist sentiments. Salmond tackled this problem again in response to a question regarding a hypothetical independent state:

Fee: How will we Scots live together after Independence, given the current vituperation by us of our opponents, and, of course vice versa?
Salmond: Despite our submerged status I have always regarded Scotland as a remarkably cohesive nation. One of the duties of the SNP as a national party is to strengthen that cohesiveness. For example, I have made a number of speeches in the past year attacking religious

sectarianism in Scottish society-- and incidentally I have been (remarkably) the only Scottish politician to do so!

In those speeches I have tackled the issue of working together for the future-- indeed one of those speeches was called "The Making of the Foundations". I have outlined the ways in which we need to add new badges of identity to sit alongside the old, and to use new symbols and new hopes to unite the nation.

This year in my conference speech I intend to take this theme further, and to talk about racism in Scotland and the way in which we should be tackling it, and building a multi-cultural state which outlaws discrimination and encourages participation.

After independence I am sure we will have a flourishing democracy, with real political debate. One of the tragedies of the present situation is that democracy is absent from our country and political debate is often sterile and stereotyped. A new democracy in Scotland will greatly assist its unity as an independent country (Fee 1995).

Salmond mentions here the need for "new badges of identity" which will help to unite the nations. This clearly speaks to a view of community building which sees values and issues as paramount and readily adoptable as opposed to ascriptive markers of ethnic exclusivist nationalisms. At the level of policy the SNP has made great strides in recognizing various societal cleavages and has taken steps to address the concerns of these minorities. The citizenship policy of the party is that all residents of Scotland will be entitled to full citizenship regardless of national/ethnic origin. No law concerning citizenship may be "discriminatory on any grounds as sex, race colour, religion, personal beliefs, status or sexual orientation (SNP Constitution)."

Class and Nationalism

Like all advanced capitalist societies, Scotland is divided by class. Generally speaking, the Scottish working class, as represented by the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) has taken a muted but supportive position on the issue of devolution while eschewing independence. Part of this stems, no doubt, from the internationalist intentions of the founders of the British labor movements and of the Labour party. Moreover, the SNP has historically avoided class-based appeals in the interest of national unity. Only in the last 15 years has a determined attempt to link class politics with nationalism emerged within the SNP.

The overtures to the Scottish working-class were largely the result of the intellectual renewal which came with the '79 group. Jim Sillars' defection to the SNP from the Labour party in the early 1980s also injected a much-needed degree of intellectual content into the party's discourse. For Sillars, the primary problem was identifying the root of Scotland's problems. This was already identified within the SNP and by intellectuals like Tom Nairn (1981) as Scotland's political and economic subordination to the UK state. The second problem--a more difficult one--was to articulate a discourse which reconciled the tensions present between class and nationalist politics. Nationalism has long been anathema to Socialists who, before WWI, foresaw transnational solidarity among workers (who--as Marx and Engels succinctly observed in *The Communist Manifesto*--had no country) (Dahbour and Ishay 1995, 181).

Utopian internationalism had to be abandoned, according to Sillars. Global governance is highly unlikely and therefore nations must acquire the necessary degree of autonomy in order to exert a positive influence on world affairs. Nationalism may be dangerous, seductive and carry within it regressive, chauvinistic elements but:

On the other hand there is evidence that when a nation does no more than assert the economic, social and cultural integrity of a distinctive group of people, insists that while they are no better than anyone else, they are no worse: insists upon a full entitlement to exercise freedom of judgment in both external policies and contributes constructively to the world's life, it presents dangers to none. This is the twentieth-century position of Scandinavian nationalism (Sillars 1986, 89).

Sillars acknowledged the presence within the SNP of a "traditionalist group" whose rhetoric has, from time to time, exhibited a degree of anti-English anglophobia (1986, 91). Still, he asked opponents of nationalism to recognize that this reactive nationalism is a by-product of the overwhelming political domination and anglicization of Scotland. The "sometimes ridiculous and sometimes ugly utterances" of

traditionalists¹⁷⁴ within the SNP must be contrasted with that of the predominant (Social democratic-Salmondite) wing of the SNP:

There is another progressive element, first formalised by the '79 group and still developing, whose members have avoided the swampland of grudge. They are as much aware of anglicisation as any traditionalist but realise that in an unequal union where there has been a dramatic difference in population and power between Scotland and England, the larger would always threaten to overwhelm the smaller.

There is in this school the understanding that there has been no English malice in the process, just the unconscious thrusting upon others of the culture, outlook and policy of the numerically stronger nation for whose principal benefit the whole constitutional set-up was engineered (Sillars 1986, 92).

In response, he says:

What is emerging is an active and progressive nationalism, not ugly, not born of a desire to do down anyone else, but with a wish to free the energies and attributes of the Scottish people so that they can engage not only on the reconstruction of our own society but on the problems that keep the vast mass of humanity in a miserable existence (Sillars 1986, 95).

In the left-nationalist Scottish newspaper *Liberation*, Stewart Hosie (SNP, Vice Convenor for Youth Affairs) argued that Scottish socialists should vote for the SNP because only independence in Europe can introduce real subsidiarity to Scotland (1994, 11). Furthermore:

It is also the case, and this should be of importance to socialists, that capital now operates at a European level. To counteract capital, at this point in history, requires the protection that only the laws [of] a state can provide. This means within the European context, it is essential that the European Union has the ability to act like a state to introduce and enforce, trans-European laws to limit the excesses of capital. . . The Labour party pays lip service to this idea with their public support of the European Social Charter. But they, with their abandonment of socialism and adherence to the policies of the free market would not press within the EU for those, measures which are actually needed by workers throughout the union. . . To ask socialists to join the SNP is not the only answer. The traditions of many socialists would prohibit that as would the constraints of a mass social democratic party, however progressive. But campaigning for Independence through the mechanisms of building support and votes for the SNP ought to be a priority, however conditionally that support is given.

¹⁷⁴ At the SNP's 1995 national conference in Perth the author observed the embarrassment of Party officials who, during a membership question period, fielded a complaint from an elderly woman from the Highlands who urged the party to take a strong stand against "white settlers."

The clear thread in Hosie's argument is that support for the nationalist cause will strengthen the socialist struggle against capitalism. This underlines the SNP's appeal to the Scottish working class. Referring to the Scottish working class, Stephen Maxwell (a prominent member of the SNP's '79 group) argued that:

Certainly no other class has such an overwhelming interest in breaking out of the decaying political and economic system of post-imperial Britain. The cycle of Britain's industrialization and deindustrialization has exacted a higher price, socially, economically and culturally, from the Scottish working class than any other section of the native British working class (1981, 6).

Maxwell clearly states that a nationalist party should not seek the support of the urban working class alone, instead:

A clear commitment to the public sector should prove attractive to elements of the public sector middle class. And, building on the existing strengths of the nationalist case, the SNP's platform should embrace land and agricultural policies attractive to the rural working class, policies on the EEC and on fishing communities, policies on energy attractive to conservationists of the anti-nuclear movement, policies on social issues attractive to the women's movement and to a range of welfare dependants such as old age pensioners and single parents (Ibid.).

Left nationalists have been critical of the Scottish Trades Union Congress's consistent support for Labour, pointing out that the SNP campaigned vigorously to keep the Ravenscraig steel plant open with its thousands of direct and spinoff jobs (Liberation 1994, 13). From this perspective the SNP ought to be supported by organized labor, not least of all because: "The SNP policies on Full Employment, minimum wage, establishment of wages councils, the right to membership of a trade union for all, public ownership of public utilities, and opposition to racism are all totally in line with STUC policy" (Ibid.). It is clear that the SNP has made great efforts to attach workers' interests and organizations to its national project .

A Peculiar Nationalism

At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the absence of a substantial ethnic content in the SNP's discourse--in the form of defense of a culture under threat--was a strength for the SNP in that it would enable the party's discourse to be much

more assertively inclusive. This is clearly distinct however from the parochial defensiveness of nationalist parties like France's *Front National* (FN), which incorporates with its nationalism an inherent duality between those who sustain French (European?) civilization and those 'others' who threaten it (African immigrants). In contrast to the stand of the FN, the SNP seems to embrace cosmopolitanism; the party welcomes reestablishing Scotland's (independent) place in the community of nations. This enthusiasm is accompanied by a recognition and acceptance of the multi-cultural nature of contemporary Scotland. Regarding the EU, SNP members seem to see their fellow Europeans as neighbors rather than—as is the case within other political parties (especially the Conservatives)—as threats to British sovereignty, as unwieldy bureaucrats and inefficient, ineffective economic managers.

The nationalism of the SNP well represents Sawyers' "Celtic perspective" which, in contrast to "narrow nationalism", is "confident and forward looking" rather than "insular and provincial" (1994, 16). The absence of a strong ethnic character is at once a strength and a weakness. Ethnic-nationalist parties such as the *Vlaams Bloc* in Flanders can employ a repertoire of cultural referents in their appeals to the electorate.¹⁷⁵ In Scotland, such symbols are harder to use because so much of Scottish history and experience is contested. Even the Act of Union (1707) is controversial; it is depicted as either a sell-out by Scottish elites or a necessary compromise to achieve economic prosperity and a share of empire.

In each of the above subsections I have shown how the SNP has attempted to include and adapt to the particular concerns and life experiences of particular groups in

¹⁷⁵ Belgium and Canada/Québec are, of course, liberal-democracies in which ethnic political parties exist and compete electorally. Liberal-democratic societies often permit such parties to exist and operate but, generally speaking, explicit appeals on the basis of ethnicity limit such parties' appeal. Remarks by Jacques Parizeau following the narrow federalist victory in the October 1995 Québec referendum were roundly criticized even within the PQ itself. Parizeau blamed "money and the ethnic vote" for the narrow victory of the Federalist campaign. This inflamed tensions between nationalists and minorities fearful of second-class status in an independent Québec.

Scottish society. In the case of religious and ethnic minorities, the SNP has endorsed funding for parochial schools and set up groups within the party to address the particular concerns of these groups. In addition, the party has molded the independence project in such a way as to address the concerns of women and minorities (via commitments to strengthening legislation against racial and sexual discrimination in an independent state). Progress on appropriate representativeness within the party has not yet matched the commitments made in the party's literature. Part of the problem is that commitments to equality are easily made, but there is no detailed policy to achieve these goals aside from encouraging meritorious candidates.¹⁷⁶ With regard to gays and lesbians, the party is committed to the representation and consideration of the interests of these minorities. Efforts to assuage the fears of regionalists in Northern Scotland have been piecemeal, but we might expect that granting a reasonable degree of decentralization might satisfy the demands of these communities.¹⁷⁷ The party has also developed a discourse which seems to recognize the struggle of the working class, but, the party's embrace of the EU and especially EMU introduces a degree of ambiguity to the party's commitment to workers. The potential of the SNP to act as a solidarity-building organization, to improve democratic practice in Scotland, and resist autonomy-reducing market forces, is apparent, although the process of inclusion and democracy-

¹⁷⁶ The SNP's 1997 General election manifesto committed the party to a "single chamber parliament elected by proportional representation which is modern in character and which in gender, ethnic origin, and geographical representation accurately mirrors Scottish society as whole" (1997, 8). There are no details in this document on how this will be achieved. However, a 1995 party document, *Citizens not Subjects*, advocates proportional representation with an additional member component to achieve representativeness (SNP 1995, 7).

¹⁷⁷ In its 1999 Scottish parliamentary election manifesto the SNP committed to the decentralization of government departments. A department of Resources and Rural Affairs would be located jointly in the Highlands and south of the country. Moreover, local government bodies will be given the "power of general competence" to introduce initiatives free from interference from the central government (SNP 1999, 30). The rights and responsibilities of local government will be entrenched in a written constitution (1997, 8).

building can never be complete and is vulnerable to the economic globalization described in chapter four.

The party professes to support equality rights for racial minorities and gays/lesbians, but has adopted a liberal approach to the problem of underrepresentation. In liberal discourse, equality implies same treatment. In fact though, feminists and others may hold that only the acknowledgment of difference and skepticism regarding universal views of citizenship can actually encourage equality based on an appreciation of the life experiences and power relations in Scottish society. Whether a nationalist program, even a civic one, can adequately embrace this more complicated way of viewing Scottish society remains to be seen.

Whether independence will further the struggles of diverse groups in Scotland for equality and recognition is difficult to determine. The actual policies and constitutional framework of an independent Scotland are unknown, and we can only evaluate the statements and commitments of the SNP on these matters. Whether a future Scottish government can deliver equality for all citizens of Scotland will be determined, in part, by the composition of a future Scottish government and the social forces which struggle on behalf of, and in concert with, various social movements.

Chapter 7

Independence: A Prerequisite for Scottish Democracy?

Examples of the bad government which Scotland has endured at Tory hands include the imposition of the Poll Tax, the gerrymandering of Scottish local government and the removal of Scotland's water from democratic control. All of these policies have been forced on the Scottish people, against our will, by a government which we did not elect (SNP News release 12 January 1995).

Ultimately, the aims of the Scottish National Party will have their greatest impact upon the political community of Scotland. The democratic and constitutional proposals of the party are the strongest justifications for the SNP's ultimate goal: independence. In Chapter six I examined the ways in which the SNP has attempted to act as an inclusive civic nationalist movement with the goal of defining the Scottish political community in such a way as to include all citizens regardless of gender, ethnicity, class, religion, sexuality or regional attachment. Having defined this community, the party then must set out its objectives for providing a remedy to the contemporary "democratic deficit" integral to the institutional status quo. In this chapter, I will compare the SNP's proposals for institutional reforms to those of the Labour Party--quasi-federalism--and the Unionism clung to by the Conservative party. Chapters four and five considered the external factors which might constrain democratic practice in an independent Scotland. Here I consider the political consequences of independence for the internal functioning of Scottish political institutions. These internal changes would radically alter the practice of democratic politics in Scotland in ways partly foreshadowed by the Labour government's constitutional reforms, and in the workings of the new Scottish Parliament; however, independence would *fundamentally* alter the institutional and constitutional environment, arguably enhancing Scottish democracy. In short, independence would transfer sovereignty from

Westminster to a Scottish Parliament, and hence make representation more direct, or, bring political decision-making closer to the citizens of Scotland.

This claim stems from an assumption about the nature of democratic practice. The closer the symmetry between the elected and the electors, the more legitimate and effective the political regime. As discussed in chapter one, scholars (Stewart 1996; Bogdanor 1999) see decentralization of governance as an important feature of legitimate and vigorous democracy. This position is a familiar one, and is well summed up by Bogdanor who, in his recent book on devolution, argues that: "The demand that government be made more responsive and less remote, that its scale be smaller, may be seen as the reassertion of a human imperative against the dominant economic and technological forces of the age" (1999, 297). The sentiment captured by Schumacher's phrase "small is beautiful," initially referring to the scale of economic and technological activity, has a ready counterpart in the realm of politics (Schumacher 1974). The symmetry between size and democracy is not perfect by any means. Consider the 'state's rights' movement in the US, which masked racist public policy with protests against the federal government's interventions in applying civil rights policy in certain southern states. Smallness is no guarantee of democratic depth and active participation in one's community. It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. The appropriate size of a polity is one consideration among the other critical factors such as political institutions and the government itself.

It would seem an uncontroversial assertion that democracy is enhanced by institutions which are not remote. The devolving, federalizing or outright dismemberment of a state, under appropriate conditions may provide the framework for renewed democracy where a citizenry has, in principle, access to important political institutions. In the last chapter I suggested that women, for instance, might benefit from this decentralization as local political structures are better able to accommodate family responsibilities which all too often remain the responsibility of women (in addition to

their participation in the workforce). More women might be encouraged to participate in elections, and provide their society with access to ideas and energies previously absent from political life if the distance to the legislature were reduced as much as practical.

Participation should be viewed as a necessary and positive resource for democratic politics. Where major decisions are made at more local levels it seems likely that interest and efficacy will increase and hence motivate greater participation in the political process. Greater participation makes for better decision making and adds to government legitimacy. Contemporary politics in Scotland has nurtured a kind of apathy among the public because important decisions have been made in London (often by governments Scots did not elect), and increasingly in Europe (in a system not only remote but characterized as undemocratic). In many respects the SNP's democratic discourse has the potential to renew Scottish democracy by enhancing local power and autonomy and hence responding to the demands of Scottish society.

The SNP's vision of a democratic Scotland departs radically from the Westminster model and represents the institutional means by which Scotland's democratic ethos will be rejuvenated in order to develop a just and cohesive society. Before examining the party's proposals for Scottish democracy we need to examine the defects of contemporary British politics.

British Democracy

The rise of a new cycle of extra-parliamentary social movements since the 1970s represents one symptom of a general malaise in British politics. The election victory of the Labour party in 1997 ensured that much discussed constitutional reforms would at least be considered, and possibly undertaken, considering public disaffection with the practice of British democracy.¹⁷⁸ The lengthy rule of the Conservative party,

¹⁷⁸ Pinkney (1997, 344) reports that among Britons generally, cynicism about politics has increased. The percentage of those agreeing that people have no say in what the government does increased from 15 percent in 1973 to 30 percent in 1994. In 1973,

which departed from the Butskellian consensus, exhibited a key problem of Britain's electoral system with one party ruling with less than half of the popular vote, and enacting policies in places like Scotland without any mandate to do so. The legacy of the Conservative years has inspired an ambitious program of constitutional change. Among the targets of Labour reform are: proportional representation (PR) elections to Scottish and Welsh Assemblies (May 1999), a Northern Irish Assembly elected by proportional Single Transferable voting (STV), proposals for regional government in England, PR for the June 1999 European elections, introduction into domestic law of the European Convention on Human Rights, establishment of the Jenkins commission on electoral reform which recommended a variation on PR, an elected Mayor for London with an Assembly, looser Westminster control over local government, freedom of information legislation,¹⁷⁹ and reform of the QUANGO (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization) structures (Beetham and Wier 1999, 137).

Pilkington (1997, 237-260) outlines the primary areas where reformers see room for substantive change. The House of Lords and the absence of a codified Bill of Rights are two particularly stark examples. The House of Lords, composed of 1200 peers, is an unelected chamber of sober second thought. In practice, the House of Lords suffers from an absence of accountability. Of the members, 760 are hereditary peers who pass their position to male heirs through primogeniture. Women members, 79 in all, are life peers. The House is overwhelmingly conservative in both formal party affiliation (480 accept the Tory whip) and socially. The chamber suffers from many of the flaws which appointed upper chambers elsewhere exhibit (e.g. Canada) with poor attendance and a deficit of accountability. From 1992-93, for example, the House of

49 percent thought that government could be improved "quite a lot" or "a great deal"; in 1994 the figure was 74 percent.

¹⁷⁹ According to an article by Ian Bell, in the *Scotsman* published on 26 May 1999, Home Secretary Jack Straw's Freedom of Information Act contains 21 exemptions including one which would keep secret "information likely to prejudice relations between the UK government and those in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland".

Lords passed 1,674 amendments to 28 government bills underscoring the perception of democratic unaccountability.

The two major reformist parties--Labour and the Liberal Democrats--have long advocated changes to the House of Lords. For a time (1977-87) Labour advocated a unicameral legislature but, since 1987, the party has endorsed a second chamber although one substantially different from the current one. During the period from 1987-1992 Labour initiated the Policy Review in which shadow ministers visited communities around Britain to solicit views on Labour policy (Driver and Martell 1998, 15). One of the many areas of policy which was shaped by this initiative was that on the House of Lords. In 1995 the party adopted the policy of an elected second chamber (by PR), but by 1996 the party foresaw the problem of creating a democratically legitimate and powerful counterbalance to the House of Commons, and instead endorsed a longer period of reform tackling membership criteria first (by eliminating hereditary peers), and democratic legitimacy in the future (How will these members be elected?) (Ibid. 151). The abolition of the hereditary peerage would be a first step in a process of incremental reform to the House of Lords. Legislation introduced in Parliament in January 1999 would strip hereditary peers of their right to vote in the House of Lords.

Regarding the centralization of power in the executive, the SNP's first MP elected in a general election has argued that:

In recent times the power of decision-making by backbench Members has been steadily eroded. Nowadays power rests with the Cabinet (a process accelerated by Margaret Thatcher), multinational companies, Whitehall, and increasingly, the EEC Commission. A Member's contribution to the process of law-making is minute, if not non-existent. Even amendments to legislation (unless government sponsored) are rarely accepted (Stewart 1994).

Britain is vulnerable to many of the trends evident in other Western democracies particularly, as Stewart notes, with the centralization of power within the executive and the increasingly evident impotence of back bench MPS. This trend has been enhanced

by Blair's style of governance, as well; according to Leys (1996), the Labour Party has become beholden to pollsters, consultants, and think tanks. The power of the backbencher is not likely to become a priority for the Blair government which has steadily centralized power in the hands of Blair and his key advisors.¹⁸⁰

The second primary target of reform has been the absence of a codified Bill of Rights. Non-partisan groups such as Charter '88 and Liberty have long demanded a parcel of reforms which include a Freedom of Information Act, a Bill of Rights, and devolution. Britain is a rare exception among liberal-democracies in its lack of a Bill of Rights. The 1689 Bill of Rights was concerned with the transfer of power from the Monarch to Parliament. This was a consequence of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty (*vis-à-vis* the judiciary and the Crown) which has been the dominant formal political principle underlying British democracy. The 1994 *Criminal Justice and Public Order Act* is a perfect example of a law which, interpreted broadly, could be used to severely curtail mass protest.¹⁸¹ More startlingly for international observers is the abolition, by the Bill, of a right to silence such as that protected by the 5th amendment of the United States Constitution. As discussed in chapter five, the European Bill of Rights (1950) is available for appeals by British citizens but this is difficult and expensive. Until 1997 no UK government would commit to incorporating this Bill into British law. Britain's democracy has functioned because of the strength of conventional constraints on government behavior, although many would claim that the Conservative governments from 1979-97 departed from these conventions by

¹⁸⁰ The SNP would deal with the problem of executive centralization by establishing a People's Assembly which would "involve representatives from the business community, trade unions and the voluntary sector as well as civic Scotland. Legislation should be scrutinised by the whole of civic society and this mechanism will fulfill that aim" (SNP 1999, 29).

¹⁸¹ This bill's aim was to end impromptu gatherings of 'new age travelers', bands of youth who travel from place to place setting up portable accommodations at festivals, etc. The bill permits peace officers to charge such gatherings with 'aggravated trespass'.

abolishing local venues of dissent (the Greater London Council in April 1986), and by imposing fundamental changes without a popular mandate.

For Pinkney (1997, 346), a democratic order consists of four central elements: a conception of citizenship (a robust democratic version in which active participation in one's society is actively encouraged rather than a legal-minimalist one), opportunities for public participation, accessible political structures, and system legitimacy. On each of these dimensions Scots have legitimate complaints. The emergence of unelected QUANGOs which run public boards, as well as service cuts and single-tier local authorities have centralized political decision making and decreased the "surface area" of government in the UK.¹⁸² That is, much of public policy has been contracted or centralized, leaving fewer avenues of public input and review. Recent years have also witnessed the increased influence and power of thinktanks, politicians, and bureaucracies (Pinkney 1997, 350).¹⁸³ Successive Conservative governments have surrendered more and more decision-making to the private sector, and reduced democratic accountability. This trend is exacerbated by the electoral fact that most Scots never voted for the Conservative governments of 1979-97. The sheer scope of the democratic deficit has helped maintain and perhaps increase demands for a retooling of the current constitutional framework of the UK. I now turn to some alternative perspectives on rehabilitating British/Scottish democracy.

¹⁸² The Local Government (Scotland) Bill came into effect in November 1994. The Bill outlined the elimination of three island councils, nine regions, and 53 districts. These bodies would be replaced by 32 single tier local authorities by April 1996 (Fairley 1995, 35).

¹⁸³ The sheer volume of law passed each parliamentary session is staggering. According to an article by Madsen Pirie, "Mother of rubber stamps," published in Scotland on Sunday on 8 March 1998, most of this new law is never debated and often is formulated outside of Parliament by Ministries and councils ('statutory instruments'). In 1970, 4, 880 pages of law were passed without comment in Parliament and by 1994 this total rose to 10,130 pages. As of March 1998 the Labour government employed 728 'negative statutory instruments' to formulate law and debate was held on only three of these. This is dwarfed by the volume of legislation emanating from Brussels which treaty obliges the UK to accept.

Devolutionary Politics

Britain was among the last West European states to devolve jurisdictional powers on a territorial basis. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Belgium, Italy, Spain and Switzerland attempted to address regional/nationalist grievances by adapting their respective constitutions. In Switzerland, the *Rassemblement Jurassien*, a Francophone minority party in Canton Bern, successfully campaigned to acquire a new Canton, Jura. In 1979 a considerable majority of voters in Catalonia and Euzkadi gave their approval to a Constitution which provided substantive autonomy to regional governments. These changes gathered steam in the 1970s with the opportunity structure provided by the increasingly powerful EC framework with its particular attention to regions in Europe (Kolossoff and Trevish 1997, 523).

In Britain, the practice of territorial governance contrasts starkly with Continental trends. Over the years of the Thatcher era, power has effectively become concentrated in the hands of the Conservative party, business, the City and, in Tory ideology, "consumers."¹⁸⁴ Democratic control, imperfectly expressed in large public utilities created in the era of the post-war consensus, has passed at fire-sale prices into the welcoming arms of the private sector. With this, democratic decision making has also been vanquished with collective goods owned and managed by private hands. Local governments, which harried the Thatcher project, were extinguished in London and elsewhere, and proliferating, unaccountable, quasi non-governmental organizations now operate basic utilities. While the reforms of the Thatcher and Major governments have had consequences for all of Britain, Scotland has suffered particularly badly. Thatcherism was driven by neo-liberal values and expressed in initiatives toward privatization, and the contraction of the Keynesian welfare state. This process affected

¹⁸⁴ Thatcher's oft quoted remark that "there is no such thing as society" must be one of the most bald and accurate reflections of the current expressions of neo-right thinking. Similarly, center-left discourses now identify 'stakeholders' and 'investment' as integral aspects of government concern.

Scotland far more negatively than it did England. McCrone points out, for example, that the "politicisation" of housing had a greater impact in Scotland where far more people than in the rest of the UK lived in public housing (McCrone 1992, 169). In 1988, 41 percent of Scottish housing was publicly owned, compared with 31 percent in England (Dickson 1988, 361). The 1980s saw a broad sweep of closures of nationalized industries (automotive, coal mines, shipping) by a government determined to reduce the economic role of the British state. Between 1979-81 Scotland lost 20 percent of its manufacturing jobs (Aitken quoted in Brown *et al* 1996, 73). Keating reports that the Strathclyde region, home to most Scots, lost a fifth of all its jobs between 1979 and 1985 (1996, 212). High interest rates, a central feature of monetarist economic policy, deterred capital investment, and further accelerated the deindustrialization of Scotland with the subsequent social costs associated with mass unemployment (Brown *et al* 1996, 80).

The debate in Scotland, surrounding the UK's democratic deficit, is best examined via the devolution debates of the last three decades. Devolution has raised serious and fundamental issues about democratic governance. It is in the debates on the subject that the contrast between the civic-nationalism of the SNP and the reform-unionist position of its rivals, particularly the Labour party, emerges. In this chapter I focus primarily on the debates of the 1990s, for a brief account of the devolutionary debates of the 1970s see Appendix A.

Devolution

Devolution here refers specifically to statutory measures designed to shift policy development and implementation to lower tiers of government. Devolution should not be confused with federalism which constitutionally distributes the powers of national and subnational units. As Livingston (1968, 20) observes:

the powers of the central government are devolved upon the subordinate bodies in such a way that both central and regional units are thenceforth endowed with certain powers and functions of which neither can be deprived by

the other. This is to say that the central government's functions cannot be assumed by the local governments, or the local governments' by the central. Each is placed in relation to the other in a position of autonomy; neither is subordinate and each may exercise within its sphere the full extent of its powers.

In the case of the UK, the *statutory* proviso is critical, since devolution, in the UK context, does not involve any alteration of the constitutional organization of the government and hence cannot be considered a form of federalism. Westminster remains fully sovereign—a point clearly emphasized in the July 1997 White Paper, *Scotland's Parliament*, drafted by the Labour government. That document unequivocally states that the UK parliament "is and will remain sovereign in all matters" (1997, x). Thus, devolution must be distinguished from federalism, in which the constitutionally-entrenched areas of jurisdiction enjoyed by subnational units cannot be changed unilaterally. In the UK, subnational assemblies exist at the pleasure of Westminster in keeping with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

One must distinguish this particular style of devolution from some others which have been observed in liberal democracies over the past two decades. As mentioned above, Belgium, Spain and Switzerland have all amended their constitutions to accommodate the demands of territorial minorities. In the United States and Britain however, neo-liberal governments have, over the 1990s, embarked on administrative devolution on the pretext of peeling back the centralized, bureaucratic state. The Reagan administration introduced policies to curtail and reverse fiscal centralization in the guise of greater state autonomy and space for policy innovation. Devolution is clearly not *only* a policy designed to enhance democratic legitimacy.

In Britain the state was reduced in scope and size, in the 1979-97 period, without any compensatory increase in democratic accountability. The Thatcher and Major governments may indeed be credited with making the weaknesses of British democracy especially salient. The mandateless economic restructuring of Scotland and Wales served to enhance the position of nationalists, who could argue that union could

no longer serve the interests of the periphery, thereby making constitutional change attractive to the electorate.

The devolution proposed since the 1960s involves the substantial redistribution of legislative latitude to Scotland and Wales. These proposals, bills, and White Papers can be viewed as occupying the middle-ground between constitutional entrenchment (a necessary violation of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty), and mere administrative reorganization. The debate around Home Rule for Scotland was resuscitated in the late 1960s with the rise in electoral profile of the SNP. Prior to this, Labour had supported devolution in a rather vague manner without making it a priority.

From the perspective of 1999, the lengthy—almost tortuous—national soul-searching which took place in Scotland over the various devolution Bills seems curious indeed.¹⁸⁵ On 11 September 1997 voters overwhelmingly approved the establishment of a Scottish Assembly, to be established in Edinburgh, as well as an additional proposition to give such an assembly tax-raising powers. The sheer dullness of the campaign, virtually halted during the mourning period for Diana, Princess of Wales, contrasted sharply with the apocalyptic and acrimonious climate which surrounded the 1979 Referendum, and the five year inter-and intra-party conflict which preceded it.

For Levy, devolution helps to demonstrate the difficulties faced by parties who must attend to electoral strategy as a whole as well as internal organizational constraints (1990 59). For the SNP, devolution should have been a no-lose proposition. It would act as an additional forum for its views, as a means to allay fears that Scots could not govern themselves, and, eventually, as a kind of slippery-slope toward independence. Many neo-institutionalists see institutions as crucibles of preference formation in which

¹⁸⁵ Curious in that Scots have long favored constitutional change in the form of a devolved assembly. In 1947 a poll showed Scots overwhelmingly (76 percent) in favor of devolution, in 1979 a majority voted for the then Labour government's devolution bill (Mitchell *et al* 1998, 166). This majority failed to achieve the required threshold of 40 percent of the entire electorate. For a short history of the devolution debates of the 1970s see Appendix A.

political actors, absorbing the institutional culture of, say, an assembly, will inevitably demand greater and greater fiscal and policy-making authority. This view is reflected in the statement by Donald Stewart, parliamentary leader of the SNP in the 1970-74 Parliament, who compared getting an Assembly to pushing a boulder up a hill with it running down the opposite side to independence (Quoted in Dalyell 1977, 256).

It is over the constitutional question where the SNP's policies fall into starkest contrast with its opponents. I will here outline the devolution issue as it has unfolded over the last three decades and then proceed to draw out the most contentious issues as they affect Scottish democracy.

The UK is neither a federal nor a unitary state (Pilkington, 1997, 269). It has some features of a federal state in the form of territorially circumscribed government offices (the Scottish Office is the largest single department). Paterson (1994) has argued that Scotland has, since 1885, experienced *de facto* federalism but this assertion must be qualified in that federalism is a spectrum, and if the statement is accurate it must be said that this federalism is a particularly centralized one, weighted in favor of the central government. From a Canadian perspective it is difficult to view the UK, even technically, as a federal state.¹⁸⁶

On the other hand, the UK is not, by origin, a unitary state either, as the current Parliament is an amalgam of previous assemblies in Wales (1543), Scotland (1707) and Ireland (1800). There has been a measure of administrative devolution, in the forms of the Scottish Office, the Westminster committee system with the Scottish Grand committee (all Scottish MPs) reviewing legislation for Scotland, and the Scottish Affairs Committee (formed in 1979). The reforms sketched above nuance the often assumed strict unitary nature of the Westminster system leading one commentator to argue that, "Scotland has had as much scope for national distinctiveness as many other

¹⁸⁶ Federal states ought to be viewed as occupying positions on a spectrum with some (Switzerland and Canada) as particularly decentralized while others tend to lean in favor of the central government (Australia, Germany).

small nations--especially those embedded in federations--because Scotland [after 1910] had its own welfare state bureaucracy" (Paterson, 1994, 103). There is no doubt that many institutional structures exist to accommodate Scottish distinctiveness within the UK, but none of these were able to satisfy demands for greater autonomy through devolution, or, of course, for independence. I turn now to the devolution debates to highlight the deficiencies of British democracy and to sketch the SNP's alternative vision for Scotland.

Levy (1990,85) presents the devolution debate of the 1970s as problematic because of the intra-party strife it generated. This is very important, and that strife haunted the SNP for years to come. Below the surface, though, one detects a critical problem for civic-nationalists. How can nationalist aspirations to autonomy best be met?

The SNP is not the defender of a culture under threat (as, for instance, the *Parti Québécois* or *Plaid Cymru* might present themselves). The quest for autonomy is a combination of ambitions ranging from effective, local economic management to democratic accountability. Perhaps independence and its trappings represent something of a political fetish. In the early 1970s, most Scots supported devolutionary measures (unspecified ones), but few ranked the realization of devolution as particularly important. As Levy (1990, 58) points out, support for independence hovers around the 20 percent mark--below support for the SNP itself.

Keating (1996, xi) wonders if, in fact, the people may be ahead of the politicians and the constitutional experts in that their aspirations for autonomy do not necessarily conform to already existing political agendas. He suggests that people may hold political views which are superficially contradictory, but that, under scrutiny, exhibit considerable internal consistency. As discussed in chapter six, Scots of all political stripes have no difficulty expressing a sense of Scottishness, and yet this does not imply support for any particular constitutional option. Also, a sizable number of

those who advocate independence have no difficulty in accepting statehood within a larger political unit (the European Union).¹⁸⁷ An additional problem with devolution in particular is that it had never truly been presented without the taint of cynical electioneering.

I now turn to the devolutionary reprise of the 1990s to see how the parties' positions have altered, and how the nature of the debate has changed since the March 1, 1979 Referendum.

Devolution Since 1979

The SNP suffered severely in the aftermath of the devolution debates of the 1970s. Within the party, serious introspection led to accusations and counter-accusations on the wisdom of officially, but only halfheartedly supporting the minority Labour government's flawed Bill and, by doing so, contributing to its failure. Within the party the endemic tension between fundamentalists and gradualists emerged publicly, and the party seemed in danger of self-destructing.

This schism is important to examine because it colored SNP internal politics and policy for much of the 1980s and 1990s. Mitchell (1988) argues that too many commentators, especially in the media, have painted this primary division as a left-right one. In fact, the schism is between those who will accept an intermediary political settlement leading to independence (an Assembly within the UK), and those for whom compromise is anathema. The party leadership has been dominated for the last decade by gradualists, with a core of fundamentalists hosting forums at party conferences and decrying any diversion from full sovereignty. From the spring of 1979 to the early 1980s, fundamentalists formed the party leadership, and the '79 Group formed the primary gradualist ginger group within the party, committed to exploring a number of

¹⁸⁷ The 1992 Scottish Election Survey found 43 percent in favor of Scottish independence within the EU (Brown et al, 1996, 155).

paths to eventual independence. This group advocated policies infused with social-democratic ideals. The leaders of this period were also social democrats but, in a resolution passed at the party's 1979 Conference at Dundee, refused to deal with any "assemblies, devolution, or meaningful talks" regarding devolution (Mitchell, 1988, 475). Despite the hard line taken, David Stevenson, a veteran campaigner, suggests that: "After the 1979 debacle some in the SNP did not want any more to do with devolution, but I believe that most saw an elected Scottish Parliament as being better than none" (Internet correspondence, 28 July 1999). Indeed, between 1983 and 1984, the party was able to return to something of a consensus with resolutions regarding the formation of a Constitutional Convention. These conferences also affirmed the party's commitment to European integration and unilateral disarmament.

The SNP had campaigned for the YES side in the 1979 referendum campaign, although not without dissent from within the party. As late as 1995, Former deputy leader of the SNP, Jim Fairlie, in a guest editorial, "No to a union of opposites," published in Scotland on Sunday on 1 October 1995, argued that devolution is "just another cul-de-sac." Fairlie is especially critical of the view, now in vogue among many in the SNP, that "independence is a process not an event." In Fairlie's view, the SNP leadership is confusing the issue.

The irony of this debate is that the traditional wing of the SNP and the Labour party both recognize that devolution and independence are not different degrees of the same thing, that Labour's devolution scheme is aimed at strengthening the Union. They will set up the agenda and draw up the rules accordingly.

Jim Sillars has weighed in from the sidelines, firing salvos at the SNP leadership for its active support of Labour Party policy. He outlined the basic differences between devolution and independence in a guest editorial, "No nation for nationalists," published in Scotland on Sunday on 31 May 1998, taking much the same line as Fairlie:

Make no mistake, devolution and independence are opposites. The former will drive the political focus in Scotland to internal issues, marginalise and weaken us in the unitary state of which we are still a member, and push us

away from participation in the wider, bigger issues of foreign affairs, world events, economic policy, and social policy responses to the effects of global issues.

Independence takes us into a different league from that and from the present. It takes us to full responsibility, gives us scope for economic policy, allows us to shape social policy in our own moral framework, makes us equal to all others in international law, and a full participant in world issues .

Critics notwithstanding, there has been a steady relaxation of hostility to devolution evident amongst the SNP leadership over the last decade, reflecting the ascendancy of the gradualists like Alex Salmond. At the 1995 Annual Conference in Perth, Salmond, quoted in an article by R. Dinwoodie and K. Sinclair, "Salmond rallies faithful," in the Herald on 23 September 1995, spoke of the need for "pragmatism and iron self-discipline" at a time when Scotland seemed on the verge of fundamental change. Rather than attacking the principle of a devolved assembly itself, Salmond chose instead to ridicule its meager funding arrangements. On the other hand, fundamentalist members of the ginger group, *The New Politics for Independence*, argued that the party needed to strongly criticize devolution in order to distance itself from the Labour party's proposals.

Devolution is complicated by the peculiarities of the British constitution. Parliament is regarded as the only legitimate source of sovereignty and hence any assembly would be subordinate to it. Essentially, such a body would exist at the mercy of the government of the day. Like Stormont, the Northern Irish assembly that was abolished in 1972, the proposed assemblies could be subject to interference and even dissolution.¹⁸⁸ One needs only to recall the fate of the Greater London Council, a victim of the Conservative government's centralization agenda.

Other critics weighed in on devolution. In 1977, Tam Dalyell raised the now infamous 'West Lothian question' named after the constituency he represented in Scotland's east-central belt. Dalyell (1977) has argued that a Scottish assembly would

¹⁸⁸ Stormont was abolished on 30 March 1972 when the Northern Ireland constitution was set aside, and legislative functions were transferred to Westminster.

undermine democracy in the UK because Scottish MPs would maintain their number in Westminster and that these same MPs would be voting on matters of British concern. However, on matters devolved to Scotland, English, Ulster, and Welsh MPs would be excluded from the decision making process. In the 1990s, the 'West Lothian Question' has continued to haunt Scottish politics and discussions of devolution--much as 'distinct society' has become an emotive feature of contemporary Canadian constitutional politics. Dalyell's 1977 polemic *Devolution: The Breakup of Britain* did not address the democratic concerns of pro-devolutionists, but rather, attempted to show the flaws of devolution.¹⁸⁹ It is undemocratic for Scottish MPs at Westminster to vote on matters relevant only to English affairs, while English MPs are prevented from voting on Scottish affairs. For Dalyell, the SNP's electoral successes in the 1970s were the result of protest on the part of Scots against economic mismanagement. Better and more effective economic policy, not a burgeoning and unneeded regional bureaucracy, was the preferred solution.

For Chris MacLean, a prominent SNP member, devolution has little to offer (1988). Devolution recognizes implicitly the sovereignty of Westminster while the independence view recognizes the Scottish people as the legitimate holders of sovereignty. MacLean also opposed the "self-appointed" structure of organizations such as the Scottish Constitutional Convention and instead proposes constituent assemblies elected by the public at large (1988, 114). He argued that the debate in Scotland needed to be expanded. The two options offered by the three main Unionist parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal-Democrat) range from the *status quo* to an assembly in Edinburgh with varying degrees of power. The SNP refused to participate in the Convention in 1989 because it was to have 8 percent of the delegates, while enjoying 32 percent support in the polls. The Convention's partisan participants were to

¹⁸⁹ In 1977 Dalyell was MP for the Scottish constituency of West Lothian and a member of the European Parliament. He is currently MP for the Scottish constituency of Linlithgow.

be proportionate to the results (percent vote) of the 1987 election which, for the SNP, was a distortion of its support in Scotland in 1989. The SNP wanted direct elections to any Convention, and a multi-option referendum following its deliberations. MacClean viewed the constitutional options starkly :

The truth however unpalatable, is that there is no soft option. The Convention, like the Scottish people as a whole, will have to face up to the hard choice on the issue of sovereignty. Either you accept that Mrs. Thatcher and the English parliament have a veto over Scottish aspirations, or you do not. There is no middle way (1988, 118).

Similar views are expressed in *The New Politics for Independence*, a publication produced by anti-devolutionists within the SNP. They are concerned that the current leadership is insufficiently committed to the slogan *Independence-Nothing Less!* Anti-devolutionists feared that a referendum on devolution campaign would split the party, as it did in 1979, between those who view devolution as a hopeless diversion, and those 'gradualists' who applaud any transfer of democratic procedures. The purpose of the group is to encourage the leadership to hold to independence as the only acceptable option for Scotland. In the event, no party split has become evident and the party's support for devolution is viewed by most members as a sensible way to attain further autonomy on the way to full independence.

Another concern was that the SNP would be viewed as obstructionist and marginalized from the workings of a new Parliament rather than acting in good faith to make use of the Parliament to promote the independence option.

Christine Creech, member of the National Executive council, commented critically on the proliferation of civic groups supporting devolution:

Let's see, we've had Common Cause, Artists for Independence, Scotland United and the Convention. All at best useless talk shops and at worst vehicles to clothe Labour's betrayal of Scotland in respectability. Yet poll after poll demonstrates substantial support for independence and so Labour talks big while it thinks small. And you can't think much smaller than the putative Parliament/Assembly (Creech 1995, 7).

For Creech, the Assembly proposed by devolutionists is designed to preserve the Union, and its dependence on block grants or assigned revenues is testimony to this.

Alex Salmond, quoted in an article by Peter MacMahon, "Salmond shuns 'the pure way,'" published in the Scotsman on 20 September 1995, maintains a much more pragmatic, and open-minded view of devolution:

But still we're being pragmatic about political developments. Far better than the total pragmatism of the Seventies or the other extreme which would be to say it's that and that alone, nothing else will do at any time whatsoever.

I actually think that would be a good opportunity—not the best way to get independence perhaps, but a perfectly legitimate development—to get to independence through devolution; it's a perfectly valid way. People say, isn't that a bit sneaky, but it's not, because you can only get to independence when people vote for it.

So long as the Conservative Party remained in power, devolution remained the policy preserve of the Scottish political parties, as well as the passion of a number of civic organizations. Jones (1997) outlines the political nightmare which faced the Labour Party's executive when it adopted devolution as a central policy in 1996. In a policy reversal, the party announced that a Labour victory would not be a sufficient condition for the creation of a Scottish assembly. Instead, a referendum would be required, in the view of Labour, to legitimate devolution. This despite the deluge of polling data which has shown strong and consistent support for such constitutional change in Scotland. The referendum would differ from the one in 1979 in that a simple majority of voters would be enough and there would be two questions. The first would ask whether the electorate supported the establishment of an assembly. The second would ask whether or not such an assembly should have tax-raising authority. Critical here was the second question as it is symptomatic of the fundamental issue surrounding devolution. The assembly had been roundly criticized for its lack of substance and even questioning tax-raising powers resuscitates old criticisms of devolution.

Moreover, the referendum was not a multi-option one including independence. Critics pointed out that the 1997 electoral victory of Labour was, in fact, a mandate for the implementation of devolution. From Kinnock onward, Labour had promised constitutional reform within the first year of a Labour government. Only when Labour

obtained a large majority in May 1997's general election did the possibility arise that Scotland (and Northern Ireland and Wales) might receive legislative assemblies.

The 1997 White Paper, *Scotland's Parliament*, was Labour's reformist offering to Scotland.¹⁹⁰ The paper proposed a division of powers with a number reserved to Westminster (see Table 12). The White Paper was supported overwhelmingly in Scotland in a referendum on 11 September 1997 (see Map 9, Table 13), and offered a number of changes to Scottish governance.

Table 12


Scottish Assembly Powers	Powers Reserved to UK
Health	Constitution (e.g. electoral law)
Education and training	Foreign policy (EU matters)
Local government, housing	Defence and national security
Economic development and transport	Fiscal, economic and monetary system.
Law and home affairs	Common markets for UK goods
Environment	Employment legislation
Agriculture, fisheries, forestry	Social security
Sport, arts	Transport safety and regulation.
Research and statistics	
Social work	

Source: The Scottish Office 1997, ix-x. The Scotland Act (1998) does not explicitly enumerate the Scottish parliament's powers; instead, it details those reserved to Westminster.

The White Paper was not legislation. Unlike the 1979 referendum, the Scottish electorate did not vote on a bill; nor was any electoral threshold imposed. The referendum passed by simple majority. Furthermore, a second question was placed on the ballot which would determine whether there was support for any assembly having tax-raising powers (up to 3p on the pound). As Table 13 indicates, both questions received majority support in all ridings, with the lowest approvals--especially on the second question--in the extreme Southwest and the Northern Islands (see Map 9).

¹⁹⁰ The government is also pursuing the following: An elected mayor for London, new Freedom of Information legislation, a Welsh Assembly (with fewer powers than the Scottish one) and the incorporation into British law of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Map 9



Source: (*The Scotsman* September 14, 1997)

Table 13
1997 Scottish Referendum Result

Support a Scottish parliament?	
YES	74.3
NO	25.7
Support Tax-Raising Powers	
YES	63.3
NO	38.1
Turnout	60.2

Source: J. Mitchell *et al* (1998, 179)

It is worth examining a key feature of the White Paper. The document is unambiguous on the central issue: "The UK parliament is and will remain sovereign" (Scottish Office 1997, x). The introductory comments by Prime Minister Blair insist that Scotland is a "proud historic nation in the United Kingdom." Secretary of State for Scotland Donald Dewar, himself a Scot, states that "Scotland will remain firmly a part of the United Kingdom" (vii).

Table 14 gives a sense of the distribution of support, by political party, for the main constitutional options.

Table 14
Constitutional Option By Self Declared Partisanship, November 1997
(Percentage of voters)

<u>Option</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Cons.</u>	<u>Labour</u>	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>SNP</u>
Statehood	33	8	29	13	66
Devolution	45	35	55	55	32
Pre-1997	18	54	13	30	2
Status Quo					

Source: System Three poll in J. Mitchell *et al* 1998, 173

The table confirms the now widely held view that the main division in Scottish constitutional politics is not between supporters of the *status quo* (marginalized by the Conservatives' absolute exclusion from political office at the European and Scottish constituency levels) and devolutionists, but between those who favor devolution (45 percent) and those favoring independence (33 percent). Not surprisingly, either, is the fact that many SNP supporters appear content with some form of devolution, and a sizable portion of Labour partisans seem comfortable with independence. This cautions the observer from oversimplifying the party division on the constitutional question, and alerts us to the diversity of views held within the parties.

The SNP Critique of British Politics

Reflecting on the record of the British government since 1945, Kevin Pringle, then research officer for the SNP, offered a view typical among nationalists.

The British state is not necessary for the improvement of people's lives. Perhaps it was benign in 1945; they set up the National Health Service, Social Services—a hangover of the war—sacrifice for the common good. I'm skeptical if the benign side is available today. The British state impedes progress (Interview Edinburgh, June 1994).

Scots on the whole have suffered more from the privatization of industry and utilities than have others because a greater proportion of Scots have been employed in the public sector. Scotland has tended to have a higher per capita number of employees in health and education, concentrated in nursing and teaching (McCrone 1992, 169). The national coal mines once provided employment for many, but have steadily shrunk in number from 187 in 1945 to 2 in the 1990s (McCrone et al 1996, 72).¹⁹¹ A commitment to public intervention, often said to distinguish Scots from their southern neighbor, is evident in this excerpt from a speech by the former Labour leader of Edinburgh district council, Alec Wood, quoted in an article by Peter MacMahon, "Leaders play down swing to the Left," published in the Scotsman on 22 September 1995. Wood argued that: "Scottish people are committed to a co-operative society. We

¹⁹¹ The remaining mines are Longannet and Monktonhall Colliery.

should be taking back these utilities and former public industries, and we will. By making this pledge we can take over the high ground Labour has deserted."

The enthusiasm for government intervention is part of a larger package of policy commitments which place the party firmly to the left of New Labour. In the words of then SNP Treasury spokesperson, John Swinney (*Ibid.*):¹⁹²

It's not that Scotland can't afford to leave the Union. Scotland can't afford to remain in the Union . . . same on Labour, they've shifted to the Right, they've deserted pensioners, the unemployed, those in need of quality housing and service -- all in pursuit of Tory votes in the south of England.

The 1995 SNP conference at Perth demonstrated a firm commitment to community and equality without demonstrating any kind of reactionary chauvinism. Conference backed measures to ensure full employment, a social security system guaranteeing no poverty, and a realistic minimum wage. One-time East Monklands by-election candidate, Kay Ullrich, affirmed this in a resolution to the 1995 party Conference, quoted in an article by R. Dinwoodie and Keith Sinclair, "Vision for a fair and just Scotland," published in the *Herald* 23 September 1995. She stated that:

Even in a nation of full employment, which we envisage, provision must be made for those who are unable to take up employment . . . If people require support--short term or long term-- we will by the second term of a Scottish government introduce a basic income below which no person will be allowed to fall. . . [Policies are] . . . about using Scotland's wealth to create prosperity and social justice.

The achievement of this vision for Scotland will require all the tools and resources that the contemporary state can gather--resources unavailable even with devolution.

It might be argued that the revival of the SNP in the 1990s can be explained largely by the salience of Scotland's minority status within the UK during the Conservative era. There is no doubt that the breaking of the Butskellian consensus followed by radical structural changes to the economy under Thatcher, likely made

¹⁹² John Swinney is now an MSP and Deputy Leader of the SNP with the SNP's shadow cabinet portfolios of Enterprise and Lifelong Learning.

nationalism more attractive to Scots. A slightly longer term view might argue (Nairn 1981) that the British state had been in a state of advanced sclerosis regardless of the Thatcher era, and that the impetus for both Home Rule and independence merely intensified during the rule of the Conservative party. The deindustrialization of Scotland was accelerated by Thatcher but was underway before her 1979 election victory. Scotland's constitutional and economic position within the UK was, and is, the fundamental problem for Scottish nationalists. The enemy for Scottish nationalists is the UK, not the English, as Scotland is always at risk from the policies adopted by governments of any partisan stripe which rely on English electoral support, and may at any time rescind devolution or adopt policy contrary to the interest of Scots. Bogdanor (1999, 124) argues that, until the late 1960s, Labour and Conservative governments were able to "secure Scotland's interests" via economic progress.¹⁹³ By 1979, the combination of political centralization and economic stagnation had created disillusion with Labour, which often translated into SNP support for those unwilling to vote Conservative.

For the SNP, devolution is now viewed as a welcome step toward independence, but must not be confused with a radical constitutional alteration of Westminster government and its democratic shortcomings. Independence, with a written constitution, is the *prerequisite* for the attainment of meaningful democracy for Scotland. Independence alone will not ensure democratic governance; it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the invigoration of democracy. In the SNP's view, social movements committed to meaningful democracy and greater access to policy makers should endorse the decentralizing tendencies evident in civic nationalist doctrine.

¹⁹³ Electoral data support Bogdanor's argument. He points out that between 1945 and 1959 the party with a majority in the UK generally, also had a majority within Scotland (excepting 1951 when the two major parties had equal support in Scotland) (Bogdanor 1999, 117).

The 1998 Scotland Act

The divergent perspectives on the constitutional question in Scotland are further evident in the critiques of the 1998 Scotland Act (introduced to Parliament in December 1998). In essence, the Act transfers those areas administered by the Scottish Office to the legislative competency of a Scottish parliament. Unlike the detailed enumeration of powers found in the 1978 Scotland Act, the 1998 Act lists those powers reserved to Westminster (constitution, external affairs, social services, defence, fiscal and monetary policy, transport, employment) but does not exhaustively list those powers devolved to Holyrood (Scotland's Parliament).

Elections to Holyrood were held on 6 May 1999 (see Table 15) and Scotland's first Parliament in almost 300 years will be led by a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. For the SNP the election may have marked an end to the decades long internal bloodletting over devolution. According to an article by David Scott, "We're all fundamentalists now," published in the Scotsman Online 10 April 1999, one SNP MSP, Margo McDonald, feels that the SNP is solidly united in the wake of devolution. In other words, the devolved Parliament is a fact, and the SNP can now proceed to argue the merits of independence. Alex Salmond signaled a kind of *détente* with fundamentalists within the party by appointing Kenny MacAskill to the shadow cabinet post of Transport/Environment. In an article by Alison Hardie, "Salmond bars foes from key shadow posts," published in Scotsman Online on 27 May 1999, Salmond commented that:

The party is united. The question that was debated within the party before the election was about whether devolution was a road to independence. Now we have decided on our positive approach to the Scottish parliament by a substantial majority, the question no longer applies.

The party is united in its critique of the extent to which Holyrood is subordinate to Westminster.

Table 15
Seat Breakdown at Holyrood

Party	Constituency seat	Regional list (Total)
Labour	53	3 (56)
Liberal Democrat	12	5 (17)
SNP	7	28 (35)
Conservative	0	18 (18)
Other*	1	2 (3)

* Includes one Independent, one Green, and one Scottish Socialist.

Source: *Who's Who in the Scottish Parliament* Election supplement published in Scotland on Sunday 16 May 1999.

Much acrimony ensued following the June 1999 comments of Labour's First Minister (Scotland), Donald Dewar, quoted in an article by Robert Tait, "Dewar is accused of toeing the line from London," published in Scotsman Online on 10 June 1999. Dewar stated that: "Following devolution, the Westminster Parliament will retain its competence to legislate about all matters. That will include matters within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. In a devolved system it could not be otherwise." This comment has provoked consternation among the SNP with shadow rural affairs spokesperson, Alisdair Morgan, arguing that: "The UK government should not legislate on devolved matters. That's precisely why they are devolved matters--because it's our job to legislate on them" (Ibid.). However, the text of the 1998 Scotland Act is unambiguous: "This section [on legislation] does not affect the power of the Parliament of the UK to make laws for Scotland "(Section 28 (7)). Enoch Powell's observation that "power devolved is power retained," remains timely (Quoted in Marr 1992, 122).

This is not the only area of concern for the SNP. The plan to establish a Scottish presence in Brussels (as Catalonia has done), is flawed in the eyes of the SNP

because there is a built-in assumption of a harmony of interests between Scotland and the UK.¹⁹⁴ External affairs spokesperson George Reid, quoted in an article by Alison Hardie, "Brussels to get Scottish 'Embassy,'" published in the Scotsman Online 10 February 1999, argues that:

The SNP want the office to act as Scotland's eyes and ears in the EU, promoting Scottish interests such as fishing, agriculture, and industry at the earliest stages of decisionmaking (Sic).

New Labour wants London as Scotland's gatekeeper. Lurking behind Mr. Dewar's announcement is a Byzantine structure of inter-departmental concordats, lead committee *ad hoc* agreements all intended to ensure that Scotland follows the Whitehall line (Sic).

An editorial, "Europe's danger for devolution," published in the Scotsman Online 22 June 1999, argues that the policies of the Scottish executive will only be heard in Brussels when they coincide with the position of the UK. This will lead eventually to a situation where the expressed wishes of Scots, via Holyrood elections, will not be expressed in a meaningful way. The essential issue, whether the voice of the sovereign Scottish public will be heard, remains unsettled. Hence, the problem of the Scottish democratic deficit remains.

Democracy and Independence

For the SNP, democracy and independence are inextricably intertwined goals. In a 1993 speech at Grangemouth, leader Alex Salmond (1993, 58) described a renewed Scotland after independence.

Never again will we have a government imposed on us by the voters of the South of England -- and never again will there be politicians in St. Andrew's House ruling this country without consent like colonial governor generals. Chris Patten, currently supervising the sun setting on the imperial link with Hong Kong, is apparently fond of describing himself as the last of the real governor generals. In fact the last of the kind is sitting in Old St. Andrew's House, his position an offence to all he surveys.

Salmond continues:

¹⁹⁴ In 1982 the *Patronat Català Pro Europa* was founded to represent the Catalan government in Brussels. Since Spain's entry into the EC in 1986, this institution tries to influence both Spanish and EU policy, as well as to promote Catalan industry and tourism (Keating 1996, 157).

One of the worst hypocrisies of the Westminster model is its portrayal of itself as a model of democracy. No one in Scotland who has endured the unelected dictatorship of the last 14 years would believe such nonsense; yet many at Westminster still peddle the myth apparently in all sobriety and oblivious to the hilarity it provokes among other Europeans.

One of the many advantages of independence is that it will allow Scots to ditch the mediaeval practices and antidemocratic conventions of the Westminster club and create a modern European democracy prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We will have a single-chamber Parliament elected for fixed terms under proportional representation, with all citizens over the age of 16 having the right to vote.

Citizen involvement will not cease with periodic elections. Salmond envisions public participation in the committee process of legislative review and the right of citizens to initiate referenda. These proposals reflect the basic argument of the SNP: that sovereignty lies with the people and not parliament. This is no small distinction. All measures of administrative devolution proposed by the Labour party will operate within the framework of a sovereign Westminster parliament. Westminster cannot bind future parliaments, and the current constitution will grant Scotland only administrative autonomy. Salmond, in an SNP press release 9 January 1995, suggested that devolution is less reform than a desperate attempt to preserve the union.

The rhetoric used to appeal to Scottish sentiment may sound nationalist, but the reality practised by the Labour leadership is Unionist to the core. Labour leaders no longer argue about Scotland's Claim of Right and the national case for a parliament. They talk instead of devolution as a way to rescue the sinking ship of the Union, just as John Major argues for no change in order to protect the British state. Labour and Tory are thus the two faces of Unionism north and south of the Border.

Paterson (1994) has argued that the UK has *de facto* federalism, but this argument is weak in the absence of constitutional measures to entrench a division of powers. It is also true that federal states are not ossified arrangements, but change in a federation requires considerable popular support. Amending formulas make formalized federations capable of evolution. Multi-national states like the UK are trapped like an *ancien regime* in practices and institutions (radical in their day) which no longer satisfy current democratic demands.

Democratic renewal is a stalwart theme in SNP literature. In 1962, *The SNP and You* stated that: "An SNP democrat believes in the progressive development of national and local government, and other institutions, towards the greatest possible diffusion of democratic powers (Wolfe 1973, 57). In 1965, a Paisley Branch resolution was passed by the National Conference which stated that: "In the belief that hereditary life titles are superfluous in modern society, this Conference of the Scottish National Party calls for the abolition of these titles" (Wolfe 1973, 68). The party also approved the adoption of the Single Transferable vote.

According to the SNP, the workings of the Westminster system and the realities of politics in a state dominated by an English majority mean that no serious or beneficial alteration of the Union will be sufficient for meeting the demands of the Scottish public. In reality, the democratic deficit in Scotland has increased with the establishment of 'efficiency' in political life under the Conservative governments of the last 18 years. QUANGOs and decentralization via the market of services have exacerbated the crisis of democracy. The move to the center-right by Labour promises to maintain many of these aspects of the Conservative era.

Conclusion

Given the nature of the British political system, a sovereign Scotland is a strong argument for the SNP. The interconnected relationships between the globalization of economic life and domestic politics begin to come into view. From the point of view of domestic politics in Scotland, the difference between the options of reform, on the one hand, and independence, on the other, reflect more than differences of degree in political change. Instead these options are distinguished in kind. Scottish nationalists welcome moves to modernize the UK constitution and other political institutions such as the electoral system. In the Scottish case, though, the SNP's civic project has more fundamental changes in mind, including the restoration of popular sovereignty where the distance between the governed and the governors is reduced and legitimated by the

mandate delivered by the members of the political community of Scotland, not subject to veto by the, at times, distinctive priorities of Westminster. The discrepancy between the electoral preferences of Scots generally and those of English voters are placed in stark relief by a few electoral facts from recent political history. The 1987 Conservative victory was the third Conservative victory in a row and, tellingly, the third electoral defeat for the Conservatives in Scotland (McLean 1999, 149). On five occasions since 1955, governments were elected without popular mandate from Scotland (Ibid.).

For much of Scotland's recent political history, its interests have been ignored in the face of the policy priorities of neo-conservative governments supported by voters outside Scotland. Modernization of the UK's political institutions is therefore not a remedy for Scotland's democratic deficit. PR can lead to a tyranny of the majority in a multi-national state where the balance of population is weighted heavily in favor of a dominant nation (as is the case with England in the UK). Scotland has often suffered the fate of a perpetual minority.

Thatcher centralized power in the Cabinet to the detriment of its legislature. Carolyn Ewart, of the Scottish Council on Civil Liberties, feels that one important and welcome consequence of political independence for Scotland would be the establishment of a Bill of Rights and a codified constitution which would protect Scots from intrusive governments which try to circumscribe civil and political rights (Interview Glasgow, 6 July 1994).

One might argue that the current sweep of constitutional changes ushered in by the Labour government might sufficiently assuage these democratic demands. Others argue, though, that the core problem of British democracy remains untouched. Beetham and Weir (1999, 129) argue that:

Effectively, neither MPs nor judges can prise open the executive's secretive conduct of public affairs or hold it properly to account. So the British political executive is both powerful and generally free of effective political restraint and legal supervision. Its huge, broadly unchecked powers create the worst problems for democracy in Britain, and so far Labour's constitutional reforms have failed to address them.

Moreover, the package of constitutional reforms requires that Scottish representation at Westminster be reduced from 72 MPs to 57, and this reduction will also see the corresponding decline in constituencies in Scotland with the resulting loss of 15 constituency MSPs and 15 list members by the end of the Scottish Parliament's second term (Hazell and Sinclair 1999, 163).

In conclusion, the three main strains of thought that mark debate on the constitution are: the unionist position represented by the Conservative party among others; the gradualist position, which has been represented by the various civic organizations such as the Scottish Claim of Right and the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly joined by the Labour and Liberal-Democratic parties; and finally, the independence position as articulated by the SNP. Unrepentant Unionism is associated with a rather celebratory appraisal of the UK's political institutions. Supporters of the Act of Union appeal to a shared historical experience and the stability of British democracy as a solid foundation for the continued partnership of the nations of Britain. If anything, British Unionism is unreflective and popularly evident only among the Loyalists in Northern Ireland. International sporting events, particularly in football and rugby, are replete with the flags of the nations of Britain, and few Union Jacks are seen. In the absence of war and empire, Unionism is a rather empty and shallow perspective on the UK. As Table 16 demonstrates, this weak unionism is reflected among the British public as a whole.

Table 16
Percentage National identity by country (1992)
(x=Scottish/Welsh/English)

<u>Identity</u>	<u>Scotland</u>	<u>Wales</u>	<u>England</u>
x not British	37	28	16
More x than British	27	20	12
Both x and British	25	30	43
More British than x	4	7	10
British not x	6	14	15
None of these	2	1	3
Sample size	1664	656	5057

Source: Brown et al (1996, 203).

These data suggest that there are very weak attachments between citizens and 'Britishness'. Brown et al (1996, 204) suggest that Britons are citizens with no name; there are no UKanians. The term 'Briton' excludes those in Northern Ireland while 'English' reflects the dominance of only one of the sub-national communities. The 1707 Union preserved those facets of Scottish society which made the survival of a distinctive sense of Scottishness possible. In Wales, language has served a similar purpose. For Scots generally, whatever weak sense of Britishness percolated into Scottish life has never usurped a sense of Scottishness and seems to be on the wane. Paradoxically, Scots' sense of constituting an *ethnie* is similarly weak, even within the SNP, the self-appointed voice of "the Scottish people".

The SNP advances a persuasive case for independence by linking it to the often cited democratic deficit in British politics. The essential argument advances the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and is based upon the view that the citizens of Scotland constitute a distinct political community-- one defined by social democratic values. Power belongs to the people of Scotland but this right is distorted in the current structures of governance in Britain. One might also argue that societal development has

been stunted as well, because most Scots have never wielded power over most decisions affecting their lives. In a multi-national state unbalanced in favor of a large majority this is a predictable situation (in the absence of, at least, a more radical form of federalism).

The tangible result has been a disheartened political community grown cynical and lacking efficacy in existing institutions. To be sure, the current political system was tolerable when Scottish interests were consistent, broadly, with the project of Empire and when they were consistent with the benefits of the welfare state. Now, in the absence of this project, what remains are the negative features of Union. The demise of the post-war cross party consensus (1949-1979) enabled Thatcher to "establish a scarcely challengeable personal ascendancy over the whole apparatus of the state" (MacCormick 1988, 103). Law Professor and SNP MEP (elected June 1999) Neil MacCormick, suggests that fears of the ascendancy of an undemocratic turn in British politics is not a hypothetical problem but a real one.

Local government when found inconvenient has been swept away without inquiry or commission or any attempt to establish a consensus. Local taxation in a new form has been thrust upon us, and in Scotland this was initially done without thought that such a thing, done without local popular mandate and otherwise than as part of a uniform UK scheme, was contrary probably to the letter and certainly to the spirit of the Articles of Union increasingly recognised in popular scholarship as the true fundamental constitution of the United Kingdom as a constitutional union (1988, 103-4).

Much of the SNP's case for independence as a prerequisite for greater democracy in Scotland is contingent on the maintenance of the status quo in the British constitution. It is possible, however, that Britain could radically alter its constitution to provide many of the democratic innovations which the SNP supports. The problem with this view is that it rests on the desire of the British political parties to accept such change and entertain a constitutionally entrenched federal structure with adequate means for Scotland to resist mandateless change directed from a central government. The only way to avoid this problem would be for a British government to create an asymmetrical and decentralized federation, an option which lacks the support of any major political

party and a solution for which there is little enthusiasm among the British public as a whole. Devolution resting on the pleasure of Westminster governments, or independence, seem to be the only realistic choices available. It seems that to protect Scottish democracy in future, independence is the optimal choice (I complicate this argument in the conclusion).

The SNP has given up on the UK. It remains to be seen if Scots will do the same. Perhaps the majority will be satisfied with the new Parliament. For the SNP, it seems clear that nothing short of independence will suffice for the realization of a democratic, sovereign political community. The civic nature of the SNP's nationalism is unambiguous here, with its support for PR, cross-party cooperation, and a written constitution. As such, the SNP presents a compelling constitutional alternative.

Conclusion

In the last three decades political scientists have turned their attention to the renaissance of sub-state nationalism in the West. It was the West, the vanguard of modernity, where such phenomena were thought least likely to emerge. One distinguishing feature of a number of these national movements has been their civic character.¹⁹⁵ These are movements which seek to achieve greater autonomy, while also actively voicing their support for inclusiveness of minorities within their respective territories. Here I will turn my attention to the comparative theoretical implications of the preceding analysis of the SNP to determine if my findings are unique to the Scottish case.

I will compare the SNP with two of the best known cases of civic nationalism: Québec's Parti Québécois (PQ) and Wales' Plaid Cymru (PC). These three parties are not the only sub-state civic nationalist parties but they are the ones with which I am most familiar.

Both the PQ and PC have important cultural protectionist elements in their respective discourses, but this does not disqualify their designation with the qualifier 'civic' nationalist. The PQ's aims are the protection of the French language and culture which it sees as under threat in a sea of anglophones in North America. This protectionist stance does not represent a chauvinistic imposition of a language on minorities within Québec, but rather language policies favoring French in public spaces in Québec are designed to protect a vital defining feature of francophone Quebecers' identity.

It would be wrong, however, to view the PQ as a party solely concerned with cultural identity. The PQ, founded in 1968, represented the political voice of a social

¹⁹⁵ This is an ideal type. In reality, nationalist movements exist on a continuum which is ever open to change. The antecedents of the SNP employed an ethnic discourse. In Québec, the PQ has from time to time emphasized ethnic factors more in its discourse.

upheaval (the Quiet Revolution) which preceded the party's emergence-- a transformation of Québec from a religious, provincial place to a modern, industrial, and secular society. Accompanying the concern with francophone identity came a desire to alter the political settlement in Canada in order to accommodate the aspirations of a new generation of Quebeckers for political autonomy (*maîtres chez nous*). The Canadian state was viewed as inadequate and incapable of permitting fulfillment of the needs of Québec. In this respect, Québécois nationalism, like those of Scotland and Wales, acts as a modernizing force-- a means of attaining economic development goals.

In Wales, PC has long been associated with the struggle to preserve the Welsh language. Founded in 1925, PC is the oldest of the three political parties considered here. Wales has experienced intense assimilationist pressures over the last five centuries and only northern Wales retains a substantial number of people for whom Welsh is the mother tongue. It was the precipitous decline of the Welsh language during the 20th century that has made PC a persistent, if small player, in Welsh politics. Indeed, the party's persistence has led to a number of policy measures which have served to halt and even push back the decline of Welsh. Bilingual signs, bilingual education and a rising number of bilingual Welsh are the fruits of PC's efforts.

Like the PQ, PC is not entirely absorbed by concerns regarding cultural identity. The goals of the party have moderated from independence for Wales to autonomy within a Europe of regions. This abandonment of the commitment to independence reflects a mix of the pragmatic and the ideal. The leadership of PC stresses the practical necessity of international cooperation to achieve the goals articulated by the party. PC is committed to European integration and the principle of subsidiarity. What emerges is a commitment to local democracy and policy formulation alongside a commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation with the international community in areas such as economic development and environmental protection. Of

the three parties examined here, PC stands out as the least committed to anything more than autonomy and constitutional reform to the status quo.

Having briefly sketched PC and the PQ, I now want to evaluate the findings of the thesis and relate these to the central questions raised in chapter two. After doing so I then return to the comparative findings of the thesis.

The SNP's is not an autarkic political project. On the contrary, as we have seen in chapters four and five, the SNP is committed to "independence in Europe," including adoption of the single currency (even though social movements, trade unions and parties of the left have contested the criteria for the latter). Also, implicit in the project of the SNP is the prospect of a small industrialized state "exposed" to the globalizing international economy. Since meaningful sovereignty (or autonomy) is a critical corollary of democracy, I have posed serious questions regarding the tensions which may emerge between the stated egalitarian discourse of the SNP and the forces which may serve to constrain or deform this discourse.

Civic nationalism in all three cases examined here represents a resistance to real and perceived threats to local autonomy. Civic nationalism is a discourse of resistance, seeking to reframe political debate by proposing constitutional and institutional alternatives to the status quo. A central weakness of the SNP's discourse on autonomy is evident in its uncritical perspective on the negative consequences of both economic globalization and European integration. This undeveloped critique stems from the immediate and resented intrusions on autonomy by the British state, which crowd out speculative concerns regarding continental integration and exposure to economic globalization. In the Scottish case, the 17 year long experience of neo-conservative rule, during which Scotland was effectively excluded from expressing its voice in government, has made the quest for independence in Europe more urgent than ever before. The combination of centralized rule by a dominant nation (England) with the

neo-conservative agenda of successive Conservative governments made the status quo so intolerable that voices questioning the SNP's stated alternative have been muted.

In its eagerness to lead Scotland from this unhappy situation (one not sufficiently improved by Blair's 'New Labour' government or devolution), the SNP has made a case for a modified independence within the EU. Also, the SNP has expressed admiration for a 'Scandinavian' model of economic development, and more recently has expressed interest in the achievements of the Celtic Tiger's (Eire) economic transformation. From a political economy perspective one can evaluate the potential consequences of the adoption of either economic model and determine the degree to which such models are compatible with the stated objectives of the SNP.

The SNP is a social-democratic political party seeing a role for the state in economic development as well as intervention in the economy via the welfare state to achieve a degree of inter-class equality. One model for achieving these goals is evident in the advocacy of a Scandinavian model of development, typically embodied by Norway. Norway, independent since 1905, has developed one of the most egalitarian societies in Europe (if not the world). Sharing basic similarities with Scotland in terms of population size, abundant natural resources, and democratic traditions, Norway became an especially attractive economic model for the SNP with the great oil discoveries of the 1960s.

The discourse of the SNP suggested a new Scotland, one unencumbered by the economic priorities of England and free to use petro-wealth to develop a Scandinavian-style welfare state and to use incoming capital to rejuvenate Scottish industry and infrastructure. This is an assertive discourse, one that scorns the Scottish inferiority complex instilled by a perceived dependency on the Britain for investment and economic prosperity. The "boom discourse" turned a resource windfall into an opportunity to advance a nationalist project based on a sense of opportunity lost, then found. SNP discourse warned that the good fortune bestowed by nature would be

mismanaged or squandered by the UK in order to support a declining economy and an outmoded determination to preserve international status. Oil filled an important gap in the discourse of the SNP by providing the means to support an independent Scotland and as such has become a central element in SNP discourse.

This "boom discourse" was subject to scrutiny in chapter four. I take the conservative position that one should assume that oil is an unstable resource, subject to prices swings, and requiring the active participation of private corporations for its extraction. Moreover, the long-term viability of the resource can be questioned. I have chosen to be conservative in this analysis because, although we cannot know with certainty the future price of oil, or the consequences of massive capital infusion from oil extraction for a small state, historical evidence demonstrates the problems of commodity dependence for petro-states. I also question the wisdom of modeling Scotland after Norway. Norway has been independent for a century and was able to pursue a locally-appropriate extraction policy based on the interests of the country. Scotland could be entering into independence at the end of the life of the North Sea oil province. This is a problem because the party itself sees oil revenues as a critical source of capital for its social agenda. My deliberately pessimistic approach to the party's discourse on oil is designed to signal a potential source of difficulty in achieving the egalitarian society proposed by the party.

The other economic model of interest to the SNP appears relatively recently in SNP discourse. In the last five years commentators have expressed approval of the radical transformation of the Irish economy from a primarily agricultural base to one based on high-tech exports. A competitive tax regime has attracted firms to Ireland creating numerous jobs. However, accompanying this economic transformation are rising housing prices, gated communities, and "relative deprivation" (Allen 1999, 32). The Irish model challenges "egalitarianism within the society and economy" (Ó Rian 2000, 187). By favorably commenting on the Irish model the SNP has unwittingly,

perhaps, approved a developmental model which may be secured at the expense of social exclusion and the erosion of the ethos of community which seems to characterize, generally, the SNP's vision of an independent Scottish state.

One laudable feature of the SNP's civic nationalism is the social solidarity which is manifested in strengthened welfare commitments and the determination to secure full employment. These goals, conservatively assuming that oil revenues will not be adequate to sustain these, will require a Scottish state to impose a tax regime less minimalist than that extant in Ireland. If this path is taken it may subject Scotland to investment outflow to locations which impose less onerous tax obligations on firms. On the other hand, the SNP may decide to out compete neighbors for investment and reduce taxes, shifting the burden away from firms and onto workers and middle-class income earners. At a macro-economic level the latter option may improve certain economic statistics but would be realized at the expense of the social solidarity which makes the SNP's discourse attractive in the first place. This is not an inevitable scenario, but one suggested by the apparent approval of the SNP for the great strides taken by the Irish Republic.

Another intrusion on Scottish autonomy is evident in the European Union. I have argued that the European Union contains tensions between "social Europe" and "market Europe" (exemplified by the Single European Act). With the initiation of the single currency, however, Europe promises to have a greater impact on domestic policy autonomy than previously admitted by the SNP. The SNP sees Europe as a means by which smaller states may exert influence and gain access to markets. On the other hand, the democratic deficit may isolate European institutions from electorates and reduce the policy latitude of member states. With the establishment of the European Central Bank, public accountability and local autonomy are jeopardized.

The strength of civic nationalism is its malleable and adaptive nature. The embracing of European integration in the mid-eighties showed that the SNP's

nationalism was prepared to accept international cooperation and pooled sovereignty. As mentioned above, smaller states are said to benefit from their enhanced status as members of a powerful political and economic union. As Europe contains elements of both neo-liberal and social agendas, it may be possible that the influence of small states with deep traditions of social welfare will be able to steer the EU in ways consistent with this social ethos.

The promise of “social” Europe may also serve to prevent a “race to the bottom” in which states compete to attract investment via fiscal policy. International cooperation may be the best way for states to assert autonomy in social policy, and in the case of Europe may help to secure minimum standards of social welfare provision. This is the optimistic scenario. The economic model adopted by an independent Scottish state may well depend mainly on the nature of the European project. If democracy remains stunted at the EU level, and if the goals of market Europe remain high priorities, then the prospect of a social-democratic and autonomous Scotland is uncertain.

With regard to sovereignty the Scottish case most resembles those of Québec and Wales. In the case of Québec, the PQ has long supported continental integration. Similarly, PC has also long advocated integration in a regional Europe with a strong institutionalized version of subsidiarity. How can we account for this apparent contradiction between a desire for autonomy and support for economic, and in the case of PC and the SNP, political integration?

In an obvious sense, the decision to embrace continental integration is an expression of autonomy. It is the assertion of civic nationalist parties which have decided that such integration is in the best interests of their respective states. As parties of the right and center have increasingly chosen to expose their populations to a neo-liberal market ethos one could argue that there is little civic nationalist parties could do

which would exacerbate this problem.¹⁹⁶ The difference between the European cases (Scotland and Wales) and Québec is the nature of the integration process. As NAFTA remains a primarily economic project, it carries no corresponding political institutions. Both PC and the SNP can make an argument that they will be able to influence the political, and hence economic, nature of the EU. In this case these parties would lead their respective communities out of a fundamentally neo-liberal, centralized state and would join a project which contains elements of a social democracy. In short, they can exchange the relative certainty of neo-liberal governance in the UK for the possibility of a more social democratically leaning EU. Again, as I have indicated, I remain skeptical, but recognize the possibility of social Europe.

The Québec case differs in the extreme asymmetry of the NAFTA. Québec would be the smallest member of this agreement and hence the least powerful member in the absence of political/institutional structures to alleviate this asymmetry. This is less of a problem with the EU where the relative power of large states can, strictly speaking, be countered by the combined votes of smaller members on the Council of Ministers. Local self-determination is most likely to be achieved when accompanied by institutional means for pooling the powers of small states. This is possible in Europe, but is as yet not possible with NAFTA.

The promise of civic nationalism lies in its potential for the creation of a broad intra-state consensus on the fundamental obligations of the state to society. Neo-liberal governments improve macro-economic performance at the cost of subjecting their communities to the discipline of the market. This is neither inevitable nor desirable. A civic-nationalist party has the potential for constructing a social coalition, for a more equitable division of social responsibility, or socially controlled enterprise which

¹⁹⁶ The election of Blair's Labour government in 1997 has not altered the neo-liberal foundations of British social policy. For an analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the Blair government and its continuity with that of the previous four Conservative governments see Sheldrick (2000).

maintains some sense of commitment to a community. The absence of loyalty to place is a central feature of the era of economic globalization, but need not be. However, to reassert autonomy over public policy in the interest of a community, civic nationalists can no longer cling to outmoded and idealized visions of the Westphalian state. The pooling of sovereignty evident in the evolving EU contains the potential for internationally coordinated policies to constrain multi-national enterprise and reassert the priorities of the community over those of the unrestrained market. A world of micro-states might well be vulnerable to the power of the market, but this power might also be tamed via democratically accountable, decentralized coalitions of small states. As the Westphalian model is transformed (rather than buried) from within and without, the political imagination required to deliver on the promise of civic nationalism will become available.

The assertion that autonomy will enhance local self-determination in the three cases examined here must be qualified. Scotland and Wales are uniquely positioned within a generally neo-liberal orientated state, but are also members of the EU, a set of institutions which has the potential for advancing a challenge to the threat of unrestrained capitalism. Whether the EU can serve this function depends very much on the institutional structures which shape EU policy and the ideological orientations of member state governments. Democratic reform to enhance public input into the future development of the EU coupled with a concerted effort by states with social-democratic traditions to mold social policy, might enhance the likelihood of a "social Europe" and hence complement the efforts of PC and the SNP to achieve maximal meaningful autonomy. Québec does not yet have access to a similar "shell" to protect its small economy from globalizing economic forces. The PQ's commitment to NAFTA may ultimately undermine the autonomist project of Québec nationalists by making Québec more vulnerable to the priorities of neo-liberalism.

I have discussed the diversity of Scottish society and the tensions which exist around Scottish identity. This is a problem for all Scottish political parties, but because the SNP is an explicitly civic nationalist party, tensions surrounding issues of identity are especially salient. Formally, the SNP recognizes Scottish diversity and has sought to avoid appeals to any particular segment of Scottish society. For some this recognition and acceptance of multiple identities seems peculiar, especially for a nationalist political party. This reaction is a product of modernity; it reflects the reification of the nation-state as the superordinate locus of identity and loyalty. This assumption, reflected in both scholarship and political life, is itself wearing thin under the corrosive weathering of internal and international trends which heighten the profile of new social movements as well as the supranational institutions which permit identification as Europeans (all citizens of EU states now carry EU rather than national passports) or, even more inclusively, as humans in whom international treaties and declarations invest certain inalienable rights.

The salience of multiple identities was not peculiar to our ancestors. Elkins (1995, 235) asks us to :

Think of a bishop, a lord, a peasant, and a craftsman in Europe sometime during 1400-1500 (depending on which area of Europe). Suppose one were to pose this choice to them: you must each choose one and only one community to which all loyalty will be owed and whose identity will be the central concept around which a hierarchy of your identities will coalesce. How puzzled they would have been! What could one mean by this? Why would you have to exalt one community and degrade the others?

Civic nationalism does not exalt the nation in some irrational fashion. To be sure, the rhetoric of nationalism is evident in the discourse of all three parties looked at here. The difference however is that behind this rhetoric is an agnostic vision of identity capable (in theory) of incorporating and uniting disparate groups within a political community on a narrow set of loyalties to basic constitutional principles and political values. This minimalism is marked by the term 'civic nationalist' implying nationalism

based on individual assent to basic principles without any prior ascriptive qualifier for membership.

A problem which emerges in any civic nationalist project will be the universal assumptions regarding citizenship which underpin citizenship in all liberal-democratic societies. This is evident in the SNP's liberal prescriptions for gender equality. The SNP seems to hold the view (based on the party's objections to formal commitments to gender equality for election candidates) that formal rules to secure equal representation represent a challenge to assumptions about equal rights. This position suggests that the party holds a one-dimensional view of citizenship in which difference is erased in the liberal spirit of equality. But, under certain conditions equal treatment can lead to unequal consequences. This is why the party's stated objectives regarding gender equality ring somewhat hollow in the absence of deliberate policies to attain equal representation for women in the party, and in politics generally. There is no reason to believe that Scottish independence will lead to a fundamental alteration to the patriarchal nature of Scottish society nor the consequences which emerge from this. Scottish independence may improve certain aspects of women's lives but fundamental transformation in the direction of gender equality is not obviously indicated.

I do not question the possibility of multiple non-hierarchical identities, but rather raise the prospect of irreconcilable tensions between identities under certain circumstances. The case where these are most obvious exists in Québec where two communities (First Nations people and Québécois) express a discourse of national distinctiveness and press claims for autonomy against the Canadian state. In this case, the competing claims for autonomy are in direct conflict as both natives and Québec nationalists feel entitled to the same territory. Civic nationalism cannot reconcile this fundamental conflict because Québécois nationalism is assimilationist and many First Nations' peoples wish to pursue their own political destiny through a new relationship with the Canadian, not the Québec state. Québec nationalism is exclusionary per se but

rather places a high cost on non-francophone Quebecers (assimilation) who wish to join the national project.

This is less of a problem for Scottish nationalism. Scottishness is so loosely defined that belonging imposes little cost on most residents of Scotland. The SNP is unique in advancing a nationalist agenda which lacks an explicitly ethnic character. The party has framed its discourse in technocratic economic terms and also within a discourse of democratic renewal. This provides the SNP's civic nationalism with the flexibility to incorporate the struggles of non-national struggles. All nationalists espouse a vision of community. This discourse implies a kind of extended family, a kin group which shares certain commonalities. In the civic case, appeals to community are based on a sense of common purpose (to achieve social justice, autonomy etc.) which is less potentially oppressive since such an identification does not necessarily preclude other loyalties or participation in movements to secure equality for minorities. But as we see in the case of Québec not all struggles for the protection of community are compatible with the dominant nationalist project as these (in the case of First Nations peoples) undermine the objectives of the PQ. There is a real sense that the struggle for autonomy and cultural authenticity pursued by natives is subordinate to the aspirations of Québécois nationalists. This is especially evident in the marginalization of native aspirations in the debates surrounding Québec independence (also in the subordination of native interests in favor of mega-projects in James Bay). There is also the persistent problem of the claims of concentrated minorities like anglophones and allophones who do not see their interests advanced by Québécois nationalism.

Welsh nationalism resembles Scottish nationalism much more in that the cultural protectionist objectives of PC are so minimalist that they hardly constitute an imposition on the majority anglophone population. This accounts for the democratizing and internationalist discourse of PC, especially evident in recent decades. Welsh nationalism is inclusive because it does not require assimilation to Welsh culture but

seeks merely the institutional means and public space necessary to preserve the language. There is no claim of privileged status for the indigenous culture.

The absence of a strong ethnic/cultural flavor to the discourse of the SNP has been identified as a weakness. It has been argued that technocratic arguments for independence are bloodless and uninspiring. This view is incorrect, in my view, because the discourse of the SNP is idealist and focused in large part on the lost opportunities resulting from membership in a declining state with a serious democratic deficit. Appeals to protect values and communities, not from cultural assimilation, but from relative deprivation and unaccountable government have a strong appeal and from time to time become effective mobilizers of citizens. Such consciousness has been evident in protests against the poll tax in Scotland in the late 1980s, the establishment of coalitions for constitutional reform, and the vigorous debate regarding Scotland's future constitutional reform. These are evidence of a society engaged in an explicitly political and value-based debate regarding its future. The contribution of various social movements to these debates has further invigorated the quality of Scottish political discourse. This vigor has also served to force the SNP to expand and deepen its thinking regarding the nature of Scottish society and the contribution of civic nationalism to securing the preconditions for pluralism, respect for difference and basic, core values underlying this pluralism. The expansive and inclusive overtures made by the SNP to minorities permit one to be optimistic about the potential of civic nationalism for incorporating diverse struggles for equality and recognition in Scottish society. As mentioned above, civic nationalism does not necessarily imply the elimination of deep forms of bigotry and exclusion (patriarchy, for example). In this sense civic nationalism is no panacea and the ambivalence of Scottish feminists regarding the SNP's project reflects skepticism about the extent to which statehood will fundamentally alter rooted societal inequalities. I would argue that civic nationalism may improve the conditions for combating inequality (which, in any case, is an

unremitting struggle). The SNP would do well to make civic nationalism valuable to women and minorities. In doing so it will be able to enhance the electoral chances of achieving independence. Civic nationalism can never be completely free from the prejudices of the society from which it emerges. However, the deliberate construction of discourse permits the reframing of civic nationalism to incorporate all struggles within Scottish society. Values-based nationalism, free of ethnic ascriptive traits, is most amenable to coalition-building, and the particular features of Scottish history and politics makes it an exemplary case of the potential of civic nationalism to advance an inclusive strategy of democratization.

Generally speaking, civic nationalism will more likely be able to co-opt sections of the working class and adopt a discourse of social-democracy when there is a strong tradition of working-class organization without a complementary political party. In Britain the modernization process undertaken by the Labour party is long complete. Having now shed its remaining traditional social-democratic orientation the party has reduced the tendency for working-class voters in Scotland to vote Labour. All the while, over the last two decades, the SNP has presented itself as the protector of "Scottish" interests, but in doing so it also represented the interests of working-class voters by attacking the Conservative government's policies. By default, and by presenting a nationalist-flavored social-democratic programme, the SNP has been able to mount a challenge to the Labour party's once solid Scottish vote. Hence, it can be argued that civic nationalism can act to protect and advance the interests of political communities by stressing the bonds of community. When the party opposed the privatization of water in the early 1990s, it was not selfishly trying to deprive outsiders of Scottish water, but rather framed the issue in terms of the long-term interests of the Scottish community. One can see some potential, as yet unfulfilled, for Plaid Cymru to make electoral advances on the left of the Labour party. Part of the lag may be the residual loyalty of Labour voters, but another reason might be the tendency for PC's

cultural objectives to obscure other areas of policy. This is not a problem for the SNP, as there is no cultural discourse to crowd out its democratizing and modernizing discourse. Québec politics, on the other hand is so marked by constitutional questions that a class discourse is muted. It is telling that the best indicators of support for the PQ are age (the young are more nationalist), language (more francophones support the PQ), and identity (Québécois identifiers vote more for the PQ) (Keating 1996a, 83). Cultural factors are more prominent than class ones and the current PQ does seem to be particularly social-democratic with recent budgetary cuts and showdowns with public sector unions. Civic nationalism will not always act to protect communities from the unrestrained market, but under certain conditions civic nationalist parties may become, if only by default, defenders of the working-class within a more expansive discourse of community.

While the case for civic nationalism's potential for securing meaningful autonomy and inclusivity must be qualified it represents an improvement on the status quo; the case for its potential to enhance democratic accountability seems very strong. This is especially so in the two British cases. Despite recent reforms to British democratic institutions, there remains an underlying democratic deficit in Scotland and Wales. The establishment of regional assemblies has not altered this judgment as parliamentary sovereignty remains fully entrenched and hence consigns the Scottish and Welsh electorates to perpetual minority status within the UK because of the population asymmetry between England and the other regions of the country. This continued asymmetry ensures the continued ascendancy of English priorities which, as we have seen, diverge in important respects from those of Scotland and Wales generally. This was especially evident under successive Conservative governments, but the continuity of the neo-liberal policies of the Conservatives under 'New Labour' underscores the democratic price paid by continued membership of Scotland and Wales in the UK. This distinguishes these cases from that of Québec since Canada's decentralized federal

structure and history of formal and informal consociationalism have provided Québec with considerably more democratic voice in Canada's political institutions than has ever been the case for Scotland and Wales in the UK. Of course, this is cold comfort to the PQ, which is unappeased by Canada's federal structure and still perceives Québec's position as subordinate to the priorities of the Canadian federation as a whole.

The nature of the British state and the asymmetry of political voice in British politics constitutes a persuasive argument in favor of autonomy (the stated goal of PC) and the independence goal of the SNP. The democratic deficit is so stark in the UK that the case for civic nationalism's democratizing potential is especially persuasive. Even the negative aspects of EU democracy have not undermined the civic nationalist case against the status quo. In SNP discourse, the EU represents a contingent future, but Britain represents a moribund past, an unredeemable relic of the imperial age. Constitutional reform, piecemeal and seemingly stalled now, is unlikely to alter the verdict of the SNP on the UK.

Is the case for civic nationalism context dependent? This is a difficult question because it does not sufficiently consider the subjectivity implicit in the construction of civic nationalist discourse. Québécois nationalists feel that the aspirations of their political community have been held back by the Canadian state. There are no objective political formulae available to determine the validity of claims for autonomy. But, having said this, the cases of Scotland and Wales are far less ambiguous and seem poised to improve the functioning of democracy in these communities.

This thesis has embraced the complexity of the discourse of the SNP in order to critically evaluate the potential of civic nationalism for enhancing democracy and autonomy without resort to exclusivity. By employing a synthesis of discourse analysis, political economy and institutional analysis I have provided a critical and balanced assessment of the stated claims of the SNP to act as a democracy-enhancing alternative to the status quo. The analysis undertaken permits a fuller appreciation of the

conflicts which underscore civic nationalism. The thesis goes beyond considerations of electoral strategy, internal party conflict, and the origins of civic nationalism and instead seeks to evaluate the claims of the SNP itself. In this respect this thesis moves the study of civic nationalism beyond discussions of the genesis of such movements and the factors which determine their electoral success. Instead, civic nationalism is viewed as a social project in which a discourse of resistance is asserted challenging assumptions about the nature and future conduct of politics. It is an ongoing process guided by the eclectic political imaginations of those challenging political orthodoxy. For this reason, civic nationalist voices will continue to assert alternative political futures.

References

- Adnett, Nick and Stephen Hardy. 1999. "Entrepreneurial Freedom Versus Employee Rights: The Acquired Rights Directive and EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam," Journal of European Social Policy 9:2 (May): 127-137.
- Alonso, William. 1995. "Citizenship, Nationality and Other Identities," Journal of International Affairs 48: 2: 585-99.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities London: Verso.
- Anderson, Roger. 1998. "Oil Production in the 21st Century," Scientific American (March): 86-91.
- Andrew, Caroline. 1995. "Ethnicities, Citizenship and Feminisms: Theorizing the Political Practices of Intersectionality," Ethnic and Nationalist Politics 1: 64-81.
- Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. 1994. "Women and the Nation State," in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 312-14.
- Arshad, Rowena and Murkami McCrum. 1989. "Black Women, White Scotland," The Scottish Government Yearbook, eds. Alice Brown and David McCrone. Edinburgh: Unit For the Study of Government in Scotland: 207-227
- Ashcroft, B. 1998. "The Economic Possibilities For a Scottish Parliament," Regional Studies 32: 175-97.
- Ausland, John C. 1979. Norway, Oil and Foreign Policy. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Axtmann, Roland. 1996. Liberal Democracy Into the Twenty-First Century: Globalization, Integration and the Nation-state. Manchester: Manchester U. Press.
- Bader, Veit. 1997. "The Cultural Conditions of Transnational Citizenship: On the Interpenetration of Political and Ethnic Cultures," Political Theory 25 (December): 771-813.
- Badie, Bertrand and Pierre Birnbaum. 1983. The Sociology of the State. trans. by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Badie, Bertrand. 1989. "Comparative Analysis in Political Science: Requiem or Resurrection?," Political Studies 37: 340-51.
- Badie, Bertrand. 1992. "Comparative Analysis and Historical Sociology," International Social Science Journal (August): 319-27.
- Bailey, Nick, Alison Bowes and Duncan Sim. 1995. "Pakistanis in Scotland: Census Data and Research Issues," Scottish Geographical Magazine 111: 36-45.
- Bailey, Nick, Alison Bowes, and Duncan Sim. 1994. "The Chinese Community in Scotland," Scottish Geographical Magazine 110: 66-75.
- Baimbridge, Mark, Brian Burkitt and Marie Macey. 1994. "The Maastricht Treaty: Exacerbating Racism in Europe?," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17 (July): 420-441.

- Bainbridge, Timothy. 1998. The Penguin Guide to the European Union. London: Penguin.
- Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1991. Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities . London: Routledge.
- Barber, Benjamin. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine.
- Barkin, Samuel J. and Bruce Cronin. 1994. "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48 (Winter):107-129.
- Barrow, Clyde W. 1993. Critical Theories of the State . Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Barth, Fred ed. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Bashevkin, S. 1991. True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- Bashevkin, Sylvia. 1993. Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Bateman, Derek. 1994. "The Beggars Banquet: Scotland's Place in Europe," Scottish Affairs (Spring): 7-14.
- Bateson, Mary Catherine.1990. "Beyond Sovereignty: An Emerging Global Civilization," in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community in R. B. J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz, eds.: 145-158.
- Bauer, Otto. 1995. "The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy," in O. Dahbour and M.R. Ishay, eds.: 183-91.
- Baur, Chris. 1988. "Neptune's Black Gold" The Sunday Mail Story of Scotland 4: 1348-51.
- Baxter-Moore, Nick. 1992. "Independence in Europe? Scottish Nationalism and European Integration," Unpublished. Presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, PEI, May 31-June 2.
- Beer, S. 1982. Britain Against Itself. New York: Norton.
- Beiner, Ronald. 1995 "Why Citizenship Constitutes a Theoretical Problem in the Last Decade of the 20th Century," in Theorizing Citizenship Ronald Beiner ed.. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Bell, David and Sheila Dow. 1995. "Economic Policy Options For A Scottish Parliament," Scottish Affairs 13 (Autumn): 42-67.
- Beloff, Lord. 1998. "Amery on the Constitution: Britain and the European Union," Government and Opposition 33 (Spring): 167-82.

- Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge.
- Benko, Georges and Ulf Strohmayer eds. 1997. Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bennie, Lynn, Jack Brand and James Mitchell. 1997. How Scotland Votes: Scottish Parties and Elections. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Berresford-Ellis, Peter. 1985. The Celtic Revolution. Y Lolfa: Talybont.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1991. "Political Conflict in the Post-Modern Age: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe," Current Politics and Economics of Europe 1: 67-83.
- Beveridge, Craig and Ronald Turnbull. 1989. The Eclipse of Scottish Culture. Edinburgh: Polygon.
- Bhavnani, Kum-Kum. 1993. "Towards a Multi-cultural Europe?: 'Race', Nation and Identity in 1992 and Beyond," Feminist Review 45 (Autumn): 30-45.
- Bieler, Andreas. 2000. "Globalization and the 1995 EU Enlargement: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective," Current Politics and Economics of Europe 9:2: 215-230.
- Blommaert, Jan and Jef Verschuen. 1998. Debating Diversity: Analysing the Discourse of Tolerance. London: Routledge.
- Bogdanor, Vernon. 1979. Devolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bogdanor, Vernon. 1999. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bookchin, Murray. 1993. "Nationalism and the 'National Question'," Society and Nature 2: 8-36.
- Bowes, Alison M., Jacqui McCluskey and Duncan F. Sim. 1990. "Racism and Harassment of Asians in Glasgow," Ethnic and Racial Studies 13: 73-91.
- Boyce, Brigitte. 1993. "The Democratic Deficit of the European Community," Parliamentary Affairs 46 (October): 458-77.
- Brand, Jack A. 1985. "Nationalism and the Noncolonial Periphery," eds. Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski New Nationalisms of the Developed West. Allen and Unwin: Boston: 277-93.
- Brand, Jack. 1986. "Political Parties and the Referendum on National Sovereignty; The 1979 Scottish Referendum on Devolution," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 13: 31-48.
- Brand, Jack. 1987. "National Consciousness and Voting in Scotland," Ethnic and Racial Studies 10: 334-348.
- Brand, Jack. 1978. The National Movement in Scotland. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Brand, Jack. 1993. "Scotland and the Politics of Devolution: A Patchy Past, A Hazy Future," Parliamentary Affairs 46 (January): 38-48.
- Brechon, Pierre and Subrata Kumar Mitra. 1992. "The National Front in France: The Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement," Comparative Politics 25 (October): 63-82.
- Breitenbach, Esther. 1997. "'Curiously Rare'? Scottish Women of Interest," Scottish Affairs 18 (Winter): 82-94.
- Breton, Raymond. 1988. "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies 11 (January): 85-102.
- Breuilly, John. 1993. "Nationalism and the State," in ed. Michener, R. Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism. St. Paul: Paragon House.: vii-xiii.
- Breuilly, John. 1994. Nationalism and the State 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Brown, Alice and Yvonne Galligan. 1993. "Changing the Political Agenda for Women in the Republic of Ireland and in Scotland," West European Politics 16 (April): 165-189.
- Brown, Alice, David McCrone and Lindsay Paterson. 1996. Politics and Society in Scotland. London: Macmillan Press.
- Brown, Alice, ed. 1991. "Introduction," Women in Scottish Politics (November 1990 Conference). Edinburgh: Unit For the Study of Government in Scotland:1-4.
- Brown, Alice. 1994. Lecture. "Women In Scottish Politics," Talk at Diplomats Course, Pollock Halls of Residence, Edinburgh University June 27-July 1.
- Brown, Alice. 1994. "The Position of Women in Scottish Society," Unpublished paper .
- Brown, Alice. 1997. "Introduction," Scottish Affairs 18 (Winter): 41-44.
- Bruce, Steve. 1988. "Sectarianism in Scotland: A Contemporary Assessment and Explanation," Scottish Government Yearbook. Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland: 150-65.
- Burness, Catriona. 1994. "Drunk Women Don't look at Thistles: Women and the SNP, 1934-94," Scotlands 2: 131-54.
- Burnett, Ray. 1975. "Socialists and the SNP," in G. Brown ed.: 108-124.
- Burnier, DeLysa. 1994. "Constructing Political Reality: Language, Symbols, and Meaning in Politics. A Review Essay," Political Research Quarterly 47 (March): 239-254.
- Butt-Philip, Alan. 1975. The Welsh Question: Nationalism in Welsh Politics, 1945-1970 . University of Wales Press: Cardiff.
- Byrne, Paul. 1997. Social Movements in Britain . London: Routledge.

- Cameron, David. 1974. Nationalism, Self-Determination and the Quebec Question. Toronto: Macmillan.
- Camilleri, Joseph A. 1990. "Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World," in Walker and Mendlovitz eds.: 13-44.
- Campaign Against Racism and Facism. 1992. "Scotland: A Progressive Nationalism?," Campaign Against Racism and Facism No. 9 (July/August): 8-9.
- Campbell, Colin J. and Jean H. Laberrère. 1998. "The End of Cheap Oil," Scientific American (March): 78-83.
- Cant, Bob and Elinor Kelly. 1995. "Why is There a Need For Racial Equality in Scotland?," Scottish Affairs 12: 9-26.
- Carty, Tony and Alexander McCall Smith eds. 1978. Power and Manoeuvrability: The International Implications of an Independent Scotland. Edinburgh: Q Press.
- Cerny, Philip G. 1996. "Globalization and Other Stories: The Search For a New Paradigm for International Relations," International Journal: 617-637.
- Chabot, Christian. 1999. Understanding the Euro. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Chrysochoou, Dimitris. 1996. "Europe's Could-Be Demos: Recasting the Debate," West European Politics 10: 4: 787-801.
- Chrysochoou, Dimitris. 1999. "A Normative Theory of the Euro -Polity," Current Politics and Economics of Europe 8: 4: 413-427.
- Coakley, John ed. 1992. The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements: The Contemporary West European Experience. Sage: London.
- Coakley, John. 1992. "The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements and Explanations of Nationalism: A Review," in Coakley ed..
- Coates, Crispin. 1998. "Spanish Regionalism and the European Union," Parliamentary Affairs 51(April): 259-71.
- Cohen, Anthony. 1997. "Nationalism and Social Identity: Who Owns the Interests of Scotland?," Scottish Affairs 18 (Winter): 95-107.
- Colley, Linda. 1992. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. London: Vintage.
- Commission of the European Communities. 1990. Childcare in the European Communities, 1985-1990 Directorate General Information, Communication, Culture. Women's Information Service.
- Commission on Racial Equality. 1997. "New Scotland, New Scots?," Connections 4: 8-9.
- Connolly, William E. 1983. The Terms of Political Discourse. Second ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Connor, Walker. 1984. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton U. Press.
- Connor, Walker. 1990. "When is a Nation?," Ethnic and Racial Studies 13 (January): 92-103.
- Conquest, Robert. 1991. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York: Viking Penguin.
- Conversi, Daniele. 1995. "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1 (Spring): 73-85.
- Conversi, Daniele. 1990. "Language or race?: The Choice of Core Values in the Development of Catalan and Basque Nationalisms," Ethnic and Racial Studies 13: 50-70.
- Couture, Jocelyne, Kai Nielson and Michel Seymour eds.. 1998. Rethinking Nationalism. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
- Cox, Robert. 1994. "Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy," Political Economy and the Changing Global Order R. Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds. New York: St. Martin's.: 45-59.
- Criddle, Byron, 1978. "Scotland, the EEC and Devolution," in Martin Kolinsky ed. and assisted by D.S. Bell. 44-69.
- Crouch, Colin and David Marquand. 1995. "Reinventing Collective Action," in Crouch and Marquand eds.: 5-19.
- Crouch, Colin and David Marquand, eds. 1995. Reinventing Collective Action: From the Local to The Global. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Curthoys, Ann. 1993. "Feminism, Citizenship and National Identity," Feminist Review 44: 19-38.
- Dahbour, Omar and Micheline R. Ishay, eds. 1995. The Nationalism Reader. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. and Edward E. Tufte. 1973. Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck eds. 1984. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dalyell, Tam. 1977. Devolution: The End of Britain? London: Johnathan Cape.
- Daniels, Philip. 1998. "From Hostility to 'Constructive Engagement': The Europeanisation of the Labour Party," West European Politics 21(January): 72-96.
- Danson, Mike. 1997. "Scotland and Wales in Europe," in R. Macdonald and Huw Thomas eds.: 14-31.

- Davidson, Alastair. 1997. "Regional Politics: The European Union and Citizenship," Citizenship Studies. 1: 33-55.
- Davidson, Fiona M. 1996. "The Fall and Rise of the SNP Since 1983: Analysis of a Regional Party," Scottish Geographical Magazine 112: 11-19.
- Dehejia, Vivek H. and Phillip Genschel. 1999. "Tax Competition in the European Union," Politics and Society 27: 403-430.
- Denver, David and Iain MacAllister. 1999. "The Scottish Parliament Elections 1999: An Analysis of the Results," Scottish Affairs 28: 10-31.
- Devine, T.M. 1999. The Scottish Nation: 1700-2000. London: Penguin.
- Dickson, A.D.R. 1988. "The Peculiarities of the Scottish: National Culture and Political Action," Political Quarterly 59: 358-368.
- Dickson, John W. and Stephen White. 1980. "Individual Beliefs and Political Allegiance: The Case of a Nationalist Party," in Parsler, Ron ed..
- Dickson, Tony. 1980. "Class and Nationalism in Scotland," in ed. Parsler, Ron.
- Dinan, Desmond. 1999. "Governance and Institutions: A Transitional Year," in The European Union: Annual Review 1998/99. Geoffrey Edwards and Georg Wiessala eds.. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dodd, Nigel. 1995. "Money and the Nation State: Contested Boundaries of Monetary Sovereignty in Geopolitics," International Sociology 10 (June): 139-53.
- Dogan, Mattei. 1993. "Comparing the Decline of Nationalisms in Western Europe: The Generational Dynamic," International Social Science Journal 136: 177-98.
- Douglas, Dick. 1995. At the Helm: The Life and Times of Dr. Robert D. McIntyre. Banffshire: NPMI Publications.
- Douglas, Neville. 1993. "Amorphous Peoples Will Not Succeed: A Lesson for 'the North'," Political Geography 12: 156-60.
- Dunn, John. 1994. "Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State?," Political Studies Vol. XLII: 3-16.
- Dyson, Kenneth. 1999. "Benign or Malevolent Leviathan? Social Democratic Governments in a Neo-Liberal Euro Era," Political Quarterly Vol. 70, No. 2: 195-209.
- Eagles, Munro. 1985. "The Neglected Regional Dimension in Scottish Ethnic Nationalism," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 12: 65-80.
- Edelman, Murray. 1967. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Edensor, Tim. 1997. "Reading Braveheart: Representing and Contesting Scottish Identity," Scottish Affairs 21: 135-118.

- Edwards, Owen Dudley. 1988. A Claim of Right For Scotland. Edinburgh: Polygon Press .
- Electronic Herald. 2000. [<http://www.theherald.co.uk/>] Issue 1143. August 24, 2000.
- Eley, Geoff. 1992. "Culture, Britain, and Europe," Journal of British Studies 31 (October): 390-414.
- Elkins, David. 1995. Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in The Twenty-First Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Eller, Jack Davis and Reed M. Coughlan. 1993. "The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments," Ethnic and Racial Studies 16 (April): 183-202.
- Engender. 2000. [<http://www.engender.org.uk>]
- Equality Network. 2000. [<http://www.diversity.org.uk/equality/section28/wording.pdf>]
- European Commission. 1999. Eurobarometer 51: Public Opinion in the European Union. Brussels: Office for Official Publications for the European Communities.
- European Commission. 1997. Questions and Answers on the Treaty of Amsterdam . Brussels: Directorate General X.
- Evans, Peter. 1997. "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization". World Politics 50 (October): 62-87.
- Fagerberg, Jan, Ådne Cappelen, Lars Mjosest and Rune Skarstein. 1990. "The Decline of Social Democratic State Capitalism in Norway," New Left Review (181): 70-89.
- Fairley, John. 1995. "The Changing Politics of Local Government in Scotland," Scottish Affairs 10:35-46.
- Fee, Kenneth. 1995. "On the Run-up to the 1995 National Conference--An Interview with Alec Salmond MP, " Scots Independent September 1995: 6-7.
- Fernández-Armesto, Felipe ed. 1997. The Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe. London: Times Books.
- Finlay, Richard. 1991. "Nationalism, Race, Religion and the Irish Question in Inter-war Scotland," The Innes Review XLII (Spring): 46-67.
- Finlay, Richard. 1997. "The Rise and Fall of Popular Imperialism in Scotland, 1850-1950," Scottish Geographical Magazine 113 : 13-21.
- Finlay, Richard. 1994. Independent and Free: Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish National Party, 1918-1945 . Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd.
- Forsyth, David S. 1997. "Empire and Union: Imperial and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Scotland," Scottish Geographical Magazine 113: 6-12.
- Francis, John and Norman Swan. 1973. Scotland In Turmoil. Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press.

- Freeden, Michael. 1998. "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?," Political Studies XLVI: 748-765.
- Galenson, Walter. 1986. A Welfare State Strikes Oil: the Norwegian Experience. Lanham MD: University Press of America.
- Gallagher, Tom. 1991. "The SNP Faces the 1990's," in Nationalism in the Nineties. Tom Gallagher ed.. Edinburgh: Polygon: 9-82.
- Galligan, Yvonne. 1997. "Women and National Identity In the Republic of Ireland," Scottish Affairs 8 (Winter): 45-53.
- Galloway, Kathy and Judith Robertson. 1991. "Introduction: A Woman's Claim of Right for Scotland," The Woman's Claim of Right in Scotland ed.: 1-6.
- Galtung, Johan. 1994. "The Emerging European Supernationalism," International Journal of Sociology (Summer): 148-65.
- Gamble, Andrew and Gavin Kelly. 2000. "The British Labour Party and Monetary Union," West European Politics 23: 1 (January): 1-25.
- Gauthier, David P. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1963. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest For Modernity in Asia and Africa. Clifford Geertz ed. Free Press: New York: 105-57.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1997. Nationalism. New York: New York University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
- George, Stephen. 1996. Politics and Policy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Giordano, Benito. 2000. "Italian Regionalism or 'Padanian' Nationalism--The Political Project of the Lega Nord in Italian Politics," Political Geography 19: 445-471.
- Gillis, John R. 1994. "Introduction," in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. John R. Gillis ed.. Princeton University Press: New Jersey.
- Goulbourne, Harry. 1991. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gould, Arthur. 1999. "The Erosion of the Welfare State: Swedish Social Policy and the EU," Journal of European Social Policy 9: 2 (May 1999): 165-74.
- Gould, Stephen Jay. 1977. Ever Since Darwin: Reflections on Natural History. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Gow, David. 1975. "Devolution and Democracy," in G. Brown ed.: 58-68.
- Gray, Tim. 1997. "The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union," Environmental Politics 6: 150-58.

- Greenfeld, Leah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Groenendijk, Kees. 1997. "Regulating Ethnic Immigration: The Case of the *Aussiedler* " New Community 23: 461-82.
- Gronbech-Jensen, Carston. 1998. "The Scandinavian Tradition of Open Government and the EU: Problems of Compatibility," Journal of European Public Policy 5: 1: 185-99.
- Gruber, Karoly. 1997. "The Contemporary Ethnonationalist Renaissance in Europe and Its Implications for a Theory of Nationalism," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 3: 128-51.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1992. "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International. 12: 1-19.
- Hadfield, Brigid. 1997. "*Scotland's Parliament: A Northern Ireland Perspective on the White Paper*," Public Law (Winter): 660-71.
- Hague, Euan. 1994. "Scotland as a Place: An Analysis of the SNP's 1992 Party Political Broadcasts," Scottish Geographical Magazine 110: 140-49.
- Hanby, Victor. 1980. "Current Scottish Nationalism," in Capitalism, Class and Politics in Scotland. R. Parsler ed.. Westmead: Gower.
- Handler, Richard. "Is Identity a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept," in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity John R. Gillis ed.: 27-39.
- Hanham, H. J. 1969. Scottish Nationalism. London: Faber and Faber.
- Hartley, Trevor. 1996. "Subsidiarity and the Maastricht Agreement," Memorandum to Foreign Affairs Committee, October 12, 1992 in Preparations For the Ratification by Member States of the European Communities of the Treaty on European Union. Library Division of the European Court of Justice of the European Communities. Luxembourg: 212-14.
- Harvey, J. and L. Bather. 1982. The British Constitution and Politics. London: Macmillan.
- Harvie, Chris. 1988. "Put Scotland First ?," The Sunday Mail Story of Scotland 4: 1376-1379.
- Harvie, Chris. 1988. "Scotland's English Problem," in Edwards ed.: 126-31.
- Harvie, Chris. 1994. Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994. London: Routledge Books.
- Harvie, Chris. 1994. Fool's Gold: The Story of North Sea Oil. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Hatfield, Craig Bond. 1997. "Oil Back on the Global Agenda," Nature (May 8): 121.

- Hearl, Derek. 1994. "Britain and Europe Since 1945," Parliamentary Affairs 47 (October): 516-31.
- Hechter, Michael. 1975. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Held, David. 1996. Models of Democracy 2nd ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Helleiner, Eric. 1998. "Electronic Money: A Challenge to the Sovereign State," Journal of International Affairs 51 (Spring): 387-409.
- Hendry, Joy. 1992. "Flourishing Under the Burden of Nationhood," Seventh Annual Donaldson Lecture. Scottish National Party Annual Conference, September.
- Henig, Stanley. 1997. The Uniting of Europe. London: Routledge.
- Hersh, Marion. 1991. "Women in Campaigning Groups in Central Scotland," The Women's Claim of Right in Scotland ed.: 102-34.
- Highlands and Islands Alliance. June 1999. [<http://hia.org.uk/index.htm>]
- Hinsley, F. H. 1966. Sovereignty. London: C. A. Watts.
- Hirsch, Joachim. 1997. "Globalization of Capital, Nation-States and Democracy," Studies in Political Economy 54: 39-58.
- Hirst, Paul. 1997. "The Global Economy--Myths and Realities," International Affairs 73: 409-425.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. 1991. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. 1998. "The Western State as Paradigm," Society 35: 21-25.
- Horsman, Mathew and Andrew Marshall. 1995. After the Nation-State. London: Harper Collins.
- Howe, Martin. 1996. "Subsidiarity: How to Make It Work," Memorandum to Foreign Affairs Committee, October 12, 1992," in Preparations For the Ratification by Member States of the European Communities of the Treaty on European Union. Library Division of the European Court of Justice of the European Communities. Luxembourg: 217-24.
- Howe, Paul. 1995. "A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings," Journal of Common Market Studies 33: 1: 27-46.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 1993. "From National Movement to the fully-formed nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe," New Left Review 198 (March/April): 3-20.
- Hunter, Brian ed. 1997. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1997-98. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hyslop, Fiona. 1991. "The Scottish National Party," in Brown ed..

- Ignatieff, Michael. 1994. Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Inglehart, R. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. 1981. "Postmaterialism in an Environment of Insecurity," American Political Science Review 75: 880-900.
- Jacobs, Francis. 1989. West European Political Parties. Harlow, Essex: Longman International Reference.
- James, Paul. 1991. "The Janus Faces of History: Cleaving Marxist Theories of Nation and Nationalism," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 18: 13-24.
- Jabko, Nicolas. 1999. "In The Name of the Market: How the European Commission Paved the Way for Monetary Union," Journal of European Public Policy 6: 3 (September): 475-95.
- Jensen, Jane. 1989. "Paradigms and Political Discourse: Protective Legislation in France and the United States Before 1914," Canadian Journal of Political Science XXII: 2: 235-258.
- Jhappan, Radha. 1996. "Race And Gender Essentialism," Studies in Political Economy 51: 15-64.
- Jones, J. Barry. 1984. "Labour Party Doctrine and Devolution: The Welsh Experience," Ethnic and Racial Studies 7: 182-93.
- Jones, Merfyn R. 1992. "Beyond Identity? The Reconstruction of the Welsh," Journal Of British Studies 31 (October): 330-357.
- Joppke, Christian. 1999. "How Immigration Is Changing Citizenship," Ethnic and Racial Studies 22: 4.
- Judge, David. 1999. Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain. London: Routledge.
- Juviler, Peter and Sherrill Stroschein. 1999. "Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community," Political Science Quarterly 114: 3: 435-53.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty, Oil Booms and Petro States. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kauppi, Mark V. 1982. "The Decline of the Scottish National Party, 1977-81: Political and Organizational Factors," Ethnic and Racial Studies 5: 326-48.
- Kauppi, Mark Veblen. 1980. "Scottish Nationalism: A Conceptual Approach," unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado.

- Keane, John. 1994. "Nation, Nationalism and Citizens in Europe," International Social Science Journal 46: 169-84.
- Keating, Michael and David Bleiman. 1979. Labour and Scottish Nationalism. London: MacMillan.
- Keating, Michael, and Barry Jones. 1991. "Scotland and Wales: Peripheral Assertion and European Integration," Parliamentary Affairs 44: 3: 311-324.
- Keating, Michael. 1988. State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Keating, Michael. 1996b. "Scotland in the UK: A Dissolving Union?," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 2: 232-257.
- Keating, Michael. 1996a. Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Kedourie, E. 1960. Nationalism. London: Hutchinson.
- Kellas, James G. 1989. The Scottish Political System. Cambridge University Press.
- Kellas, James. 1991. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: MacMillan.
- Kennedy, Charles. 1989. "The Highland Question," in A Claim of Right For Scotland. Owen Dudley Edwards ed. Edinburgh: Polygon: 86-92.
- Kidd, Colin. 1995. "Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish Nationalist Inhibition, 1780-1880," The Scottish Historical Review LXXIV (April): 45-68.
- Kiernan, Annabel K. 1997. "Citizenship--The Real Democratic Deficit of the European Union?," Citizenship Studies. 1: 3: 323-334.
- King, Anthony. 1977. Britain Says Yes: The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market. Washington: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Kobrin, Stephen. 1998. "Back to the Future: Neo-Medievalism and the Post-Modern Digital World Economy," Journal of International Affairs 51 (Spring): 361-86.
- Kofman, Eleonore. 1995. "Citizenship For Some But Not For Others: Spaces of Citizenship in Contemporary Europe," Political Geography 14: 121-137.
- Kolinsky, Martin. 1978. Divided Loyalties. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kolossov, Vladimir and Andrei Treivish. 1998. "The Political Geography of European Minorities: Past and Future," Political Geography 17: 527-34.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1988. "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (April): 66-94.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1995/1996. "Compromising Westphalia," International Security 20 (Winter): 115-151.

- Krieger, Joel. 2000. "Egalitarian Social Movements in Western Europe: Can They Survive Globalization and the EMU?," International Studies Review 1: 3: 69-86.
- Kubursi, A.A. and S. Mansur. 1994. "Middle Eastern Oil," Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. New York: St. Martin's Press: 313-29.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Laursen, Johnny N. and Thorsten B. Olesen. 2000. "A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Independence of Denmark's Nordic and European Policies, 1945-1998," Contemporary European History 9:1: 59-92.
- Laxer, Gordon. 1999. "The Return of Nationalism," Unpublished manuscript.
- Laxer, Gordon. 2000. "Surviving the Americanizing New Right," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 37: 1: 55-75.
- Laxer, Gordon. 1995. "Social Solidarity, Democracy and Global Capitalism," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 32: 3: 287-313.
- Laxer, Gordon. 1992. "Nationalism, the Left and Globalization," Paper presented to the "Political Economy, Nationalism and Sovereignty session" of the Political Economy section at the Canadian Political Science Association Meetings in Charlottetown, May 31.
- Lee, J. J. 1989. Ireland: 1912-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leicester, Graham. 1996. "Fundamentals For A New Scotland Act: The Constitution Unit's Report on Scotland," Scottish Affairs 16 (Summer): 1-6.
- Levin, Michael D. 1995. "Understanding Ethnicity," Queen's Quarterly (Summer): 71-84.
- Levitt, Ian. 1998. "Britain, The Scottish Covenant Movement and Devolution, 1946-50," Scottish Affairs 22: 33-52.
- Levy, Roger. 1986. "The Search for a Rational Strategy: The Scottish National Party and Devolution, 1974-1979," Political Studies 34: 236-48.
- Levy, Roger. 1990. Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.
- Leys, Colin. 1996. "The British Labour Party's Transition From Socialism to Capitalism," in The Socialist Register: 1996: 7-32.
- Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties). 1996. "Written Memorandum to UK Select European Communities Committee, July 14, 1993," in Preparations For the Ratification by Member States of the European Communities of the Treaty on European Union. Library Division European Court of Justice of the European Communities. Luxembourg: 573-576.
- Lightfoot, Simon. 1997. "An Employment Union for Europe? The Role of the Swedish Government," Politics 17: 2: 109-115.

- Lind, Michael. 1994. "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," Foreign Affairs (May/June): 87-99.
- Lindsay, Isobel. 1991. "The SNP and the Lure of Europe," in Nationalism in the Nineties. Tom Gallagher ed.. Edinburgh: Polygon: 84-101
- Lindsay, Isobel. "Constitutional Change and the Gender Deficit," in The Woman's Claim of Right in Scotland ed: 7-13.
- Lipset, S.M. and Stein Rokkan. 1970. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments . S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan eds.. New York: Free Press: 1-67.
- Livingston, W. S. "A Note on the Nature of Federalism," in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality . P. Meekison ed. Toronto: Methuen.
- Ludlow, Peter. 1996. "Comments to Foreign Affairs Committee, February 19, 1992," in Preparations For the Ratification by Member States of the European Communities of the Treaty on European Union . Library Division of the European Court of Justice of the European Communities. Luxembourg: 90-92.
- Lynch, Peter. 1995. "From Red to Green: The Political Strategy of Plaid Cymru in the 1980's and 1990's," Regional & Federal Studies 5 (Summer): 197-210.
- Lynch, Peter. 1995b. "The Scottish National Party and the European Parliament," Scottish Affairs No.12 (Summer): 87-100.
- Lynch, Peter. 1996. "The Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1992-95," Scottish Affairs 15 (Spring): 1-16.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Maan, Bashir. 1992. The New Scots: The Story of Asians in Scotland . Edinburgh: John Donaldson Publishers.
- Macartney, Allan. 1984. "The Scottish Islands Debate," in Islands of Europe Allan Macartney ed.. Edinburgh: Unit For the Study of Government in Scotland: 7-24.
- MacCormick, Neil. 1988. "Unrepentant Gradualism," in Edwards ed..
- Macdonald, Lesley Orr. 1991. "Women in the Scottish Churches," The Women's Claim of Right in Scotland ed.: 77-94.
- Macdonald, R. and Huw Thomas. 1997. Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- MacInnes. 1998. "The Myth of the Macho Scotsman: Attitudes to Gender, Work, and the Family in the UK, Ireland and Europe," Scottish Affairs 23:108-23.
- Mackay Brown, George . 1988. "The View From Orkney," The Sunday Mail Story of Scotland. No. 12: 309-311.

- Mackie, J. D. 1970. A History of Scotland . Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Maclean, Chris. 1988. "Claim of Right or Cap in Hand?," in Edwards ed.: 110-18.
- Macwhirter, Iain. 1992. "The Political Year in Westminster: October 1990-July 1991," in The Scottish Government Yearbook Lindsay Paterson and David McCrone eds. Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland: 15-35.
- Madgwick, Peter and Richard Rose eds. 1982. The Territorial Dimension in United Kingdom Politics. London: MacMillan Press.
- Mansbach, Richard W. 1973. "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Profile," Comparative Politics (January): 185-210.
- Marr, Andrew. 1992. The Battle For Scotland. London: Penguin.
- Martin, Andrew and George Ross. 1999. "Europe's Monetary Union: Creating a Democratic Deficit?," Current History (April): 171-175.
- Martin, Pierre. 1995. "When Nationalism Meets Continentalism: The Politics of Free Trade in Quebec," Regional and Federal Studies 5: 1-27.
- Mason, Roger. 1992. "Chivalry and Citizenship: Aspects of National Identity in Renaissance Scotland," in People and Power in Scotland: Essays in Honour of T.C. Smout Roger Mason and Norman Macdougall eds. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd..
- Maxwell, Stephen. 1988. "Scotland's Claim of Right," in Edwards ed. : 119-25.
- Mayerfield, Jamie. 1998. "The Myth of Benign Group Identity: A Critique of Liberal Nationalism," Polity 30 (Summer): 555-578.
- McAllister, Ian. 1981. "Party Organization and Minority Nationalism: A Comparative Study in the United Kingdom," European Journal of Political Research 9: 237-56.
- McClellan, Iain. 1970. "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party," Political Studies 18 (Fall): 357-72.
- McCreadie, Robert. 1991. "Scottish Identity and the Constitution," in National Identities Oxford: Blackwell: 38-56.
- McCrone, David and Frank Bechhofer. 1993. "The Scotland-England Divide: Politics and Locality in Britain," Political Studies XLI: 96-107.
- McCrone, David, Angela Morris and Richard Kiely. 1995. Scotland the Brand: The Making of Scottish Heritage. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- McCrone, David. 1984. "Explaining Nationalism: The Scottish Experience," Ethnic and Racial Studies 7: 129-137.
- McCrone, David. 1981. "Explaining Nationalism: The Scottish Experience," in After The Referenda: The Future of Ethnic Nationalism in Britain and Canada. Anthony Richmond ed., Report of a Joint International Seminar Held at the University

College of North Wales, Bangor: York University Institute for Behavioral Research, November 5-9.

- McCrone, David. 1992. Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation. London: Routledge Books.
- McCrone, Gavin. 1993. "The Scottish Economy and European Integration," Scottish Affairs 4 (Summer): 5-22.
- McGarry, John. 1995. "Explaining Ethnonationalism: The Flaws in Western Thinking," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1: 121-42.
- McLellan, Janet and Anthony H. Richmond. 1994. "Multiculturalism in Crisis: A Postmodern Perspective on Canada," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17 (October): 662-683.
- McLeod, Wilson. 1997. "Official Status for Gaelic: Prospects and Problems," Scottish Affairs 21: 95-117.
- McQuaig, Linda. 1997. The Cult of Impotence. Viking: Toronto.
- Mercer, John. 1978. Scotland: The Devolution of Power. London: John Calder.
- Merrett, Christopher. 1996. Free Trade: Neither Free Nor About Trade. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Meyer, J. W., John Boli, George Thomas and Francis O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (July): 144-81.
- Michener, Roger. 1993. "Introductory Note," Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism. Roger Michener ed..St. Paul: Paragon House.: vii-xiii.
- Midwinter, Arthur. 1991. Politics and Public Policy in Scotland. London: MacMillan.
- Miles, Robert and Anne Dunlop. 1986. "The Racialization of Politics in Britain; Why Scotland is Different," Patterns of Prejudice 20: 23-33.
- Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.
- Miljan, Toivo. 1981. "The Politics, Business and Security of Petroleum in Norway: Strategies, Problems and Prospects," in Energy Resources and Centre-Periphery Relations: Canada and Europe. R. Gilsdorf and F.C. Engelmann eds. European Politics Group, Canadian Political Science Association.
- Miller, William L. 1983. "The Denationalization of British Politics: The Emergency of the Periphery," West European Politics 6: 103-29.
- Miller, William. 1998. "The Periphery and Its Paradoxes," West European Politics 21: 167-89.
- Mitchell, James, David Denver, Charles Pattie and Hugh Bochel. 1998. "The 1997 Devolution Referendum in Scotland," Parliamentary Affairs 51 (April): 166-81.

- Mitchell, James. 1988. "Recent Developments in the Scottish National Party," Political Quarterly 59: 473-477.
- Mitchell, Ronald and Thomas Bernauer. 1998. "Empirical Research on International Environmental Policy: Designing Qualitative Case Studies," Journal of Environment and Development 7:1 (March): 4-31.
- Morris, Lydia. 1997. "Globalization, Migration and the Nation-State: The Path to a Post-national Europe?," British Journal of Sociology 48 (June): 192-209.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 1993. The Return of the Political . London: Verso.
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1993. Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Munro, Colin. 1997. "Power to the People," Public Law (Winter): 579-86.
- Nairn, Tom. 1981. The Breakup of Britain. London: NLB.
- Nairn, Tom. 1988. "The Timeless Girn," in Owen Dudley Edwards ed.: 163-78.
- Nairn, Tom. 1994. "Nationalism in Scotland" Talk at Diplomats Course, Pollock Halls of Residence, Edinburgh University June 27-July 1.
- Nairn, Tom. 1997a. "Sovereignty After the Election," New Left Review 224 (July/August): 3-18.
- Nairn, Tom. 1997b. Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited . London: Verso.
- National Health Service. June 2000. National Health Service A to Z
[<http://www.nhsatoz.org/nhsd/>]
- Nelles, Viv and Abraham Rotstein eds.. 1973. Nationalism or Local Control. Toronto: New Press.
- Newman, Saul. 1996. Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Newman, Saul. 1992. "The Rise and Decline of the Scottish National Party: Ethnic Politics in a Post-industrial Environment," Ethnic and Racial Studies 15: 2-33.
- Norway Ministry of Trade and Industry. June 2000. "The Structure of the Norwegian Economy," [<http://odin.dep.no/nhd/publ/naering/part1.html>]
- Norway Online Information service. February 1998. [<http://www.Norway.org/>]
- Nugent, Neill. 1991. The Government and Politics of the European Union. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan:
- Nugent, Neill. 1999. The Government and Politics of the European Union. 4th ed. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Odell, Peter. 1997. "The Global Oil Industry: The Location of Production-Middle East Domination or Regionalization?," Regional Studies 31: 311-322.

- O' Hearn, Denis. 2000. "Globalization, "New Tigers," and the End of the Developmental State? The Case of the Celtic Tiger," Politics and Society 28: 1: 67-92.
- Ó Riain, Seán. 2000. "The Flexible Developmental State: Globalization, Information Technology, and the "Celtic Tiger"," Politics and Society 28: 2 (June): 157-93.
- Parsler, Ron. 1980. Capitalism, Class and Politics in Scotland. Westmead: Gower.
- Pateman, Carole. 1992. "Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Women's Citizenship," in Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity. New York: Routledge.
- Paterson, Lindsay. 1994. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. Press.
- Peterson, John. 1994. "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision?," Parliamentary Affairs 47: 116-32.
- Pike, W. J. 1993. "The Oil Price Crisis and Its Impact on Scottish North Sea Oil Development, 1986-1988," Scottish Economic and Social Theory 13: 56-71.
- Pilkington, Colin. 1997. Representative Democracy in Britain Today. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Pinkney, Robert. 1997. "The Sleeping Night Watchman and Some Alternatives: Citizenship, Participation and Bases of Democratic Legitimacy in Britain," Government and Opposition 32 (Summer): 340-60.
- Podoba, Juraj. 1998. "Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia," Environmental Politics 7 (Spring): 129-44.
- Pratt, Larry. 1991. "Up From Nationalism," eds. Richards, John, Robert D. Cairns and Larry Pratt. Social Democracy Without Illusions. McClelland and Stewart: 132-157.
- Prebble, John. 1981. The Lion In The North. London: Penguin.
- Purdie, Bob. 1998. "Is Socialism Possible?" Unpublished.
- Ragin, Charles and David Zaret. 1983. "Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies," Social Forces 61: 731-54.
- Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rawkins, Phillip. 1983. "Nationalist Movements Within The Advanced Nationalist State: The Significance of Culture," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 10 (Fall): 221-33.
- Rawkins, Phillip. 1984. "The Role of the State in the Transformation of the Nationalist Movements of the 1960's: Comparing Wales and Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies 7: 86-105.

- Reid, George. 1995. "Home Truths From Abroad," 10th Annual Donaldson Lecture. Scottish National Party Annual Conference, September.
- Republic of South Africa. June 2000. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. [<http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/bills/consnew.html#chap2>]
- Richmond, Anthony H. 1984. "Ethnic Nationalism and Post-Industrialism," Ethnic and Racial Studies 7: 4-18.
- Rogerson, Robert J. and Amanda Gloyer. 1995. "Gaelic Cultural Revival or Language Decline?," Scottish Geographical Magazine 111: 46-53.
- Rokkan, Stein and Derek W. Urwin eds. 1982. The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage Publications.
- Roulston, Carmel. 1997. "Gender, Nation, Class: The Politics of Difference In Northern Ireland," Scottish Affairs 18 (Winter): 54-68.
- Rudolph, Joseph R. Jr. and Robert J. Thompson. 1985. "Ethnoterritorial Movements and the Policy Process: Accommodating Nationalist Demands in the Developed World," Comparative Politics 17: 291-312.
- Saeed, Amir, Neil Blain and Douglas Forbes. 1999. "New Ethnic and National Questions in Scotland: Post-British Identities Among Glasgow Pakistani Teenagers," Ethnic and Racial Studies 22: 5: 821-844.
- Safran, William. 1997. "Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community," International Political Science Review 18: 313-35.
- Salmond, Alex. 1993. Horizons Without Bars: The Future of Scotland: A Series of Speeches by Alex Salmond MP. Edinburgh: SNP.
- Sampson, Anthony. 1976. The Seven Sisters. New York: Bantam.
- Sawyers, June Skinner. 1994. "A New Day Dawning: The Struggle For National Identity in Contemporary Scottish Song," Scottish Tradition 19: 1-23.
- Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. "Global Capitalism and the State," International Affairs 73: 427-52.
- Schwarmantzel, John. 1992. "Nation Versus Class: Nationalism and Socialism in Theory and Practice," in Coakley, ed.: 45-61.
- Scottish Office. Scotland Act 1998
[<http://www.hmsso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980046.html>]
- Scotsman Online [<http://www.Scotsman.com/>]
- Scott, P. H. 1995. "Explaining The Union of 1707," Scottish Affairs 11: 52-59.
- Scottish Office. June 2000. Local Government Act, 1988
[<http://www.hmsso.gov.uk/acts/summary/01988009.htm>]

- Scottish Office. 1997. Scotland's Parliament. London: The Stationery Office Ltd.
- Scottish Office: Industry Department. 1994-5. Scottish Economic Bulletin. No. 50.
- Seifert, Wolfgang. 1997. "Admission Policy, Patterns of Migration and Integration: The German and French Case Compared," New Community 23 (October): 441-60.
- Sharp, Carol. "Women Councillors," The Woman's Claim of Right in Scotland ed.: 34-46.
- Sharpe, L. J. 1985. "Devolution and Celtic Nationalism in the UK," West European Politics 8: 82-100.
- Sheldrick, Bryon. 2000. "The Contradictions of Welfare to Work: Social Security Reform in Britain," Studies in Political Economy 62: 99-121.
- Sigurdson, Richard. 1994. "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science 27: 249-76.
- Sillars, Jim. 1986. Scotland: The Case for Optimism. Polygon: Edinburgh.
- Simmons, Harvey. 1996. The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy. Westview Press: Boulder.
- Simons, Jon. 1995. Foucault and the Political. Routledge: London.
- Simpson, David. 1969. Scottish Independence: An Economic Analysis. West Calder: SNP Publications.
- Skocpol, Theda and Margaret Somers . 1980. "The Uses of Comparative Method in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22: 174-97.
- Skocpol, Theda, ed. 1984. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Adam. 1976. Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Smith, Anthony. 1992. "Nationalism and the Historians," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33: 58-79.
- Smith, Anthony. 1994. "The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval and Modern?," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17: 375-399.
- Smith, Anthony. 1971. Theories of Nationalism. Duckworth: London.
- Smith, Dennis. 1991. The Rise of Historical Sociology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Smith, Graham. 1996. "When Nations Challenge and Nations Rule: Estonia and Latvia as Ethnic Democracies," International Politics 33 (March): 27-43.
- Smith, Nigel. 1996. "The Business Case For Devolution," Scottish Affairs 16: 7- 17.

- Smith, Trevor. 1996. "Citizenship, Community and Constitutionalism," Parliamentary Affairs 49: 2: 262-72
- SNP. 1974. It's Time... (Supplement to the Election manifesto of the Scottish National Party-September 1974).
- SNP. 1976a. Whys of Scottish Nationalism.
- SNP. 1976b. The Context of Independence. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1977a. Scotland: Facts and Comparisons. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1977b. SNP and You: Aims and Policy of the Scottish National Party. Fifth ed. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1978. Return to Nationhood. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1984. Scotland's Voice in Europe. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1992a. Research Bulletin. Autumn. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1992b. Research Bulletin. Summer. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1992c. Independence in Europe: Make It Happen Now! Manifesto of the Scottish National Party.
- SNP. 1992d. Small Nations in the EC. Background paper. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1992e. Scotland a European Nation: The Case for Membership of the EC. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1993/4. Research Bulletin. Winter. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1993b. Research Bulletin. Autumn. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1993c. Independence in Europe: The Case for Scotland as an Independent Member of the EC. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1993d. Snapshot: SNP Quarterly National Paper. Edition 5:Spring.
- SNP. 1993e. Policy Handbook. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1994/5. Research Bulletin. Winter. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1994a. Power for Change: A Manifesto For the European Elections Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1994b. Research Bulletin. Spring. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1994c. Research Bulletin. Summer. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1994. Research Bulletin. Autumn .
- SNP. 1995a. Research Bulletin. Autumn. Edinburgh.

- SNP. 1995b. Research Bulletin. Spring. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1995c. Research Bulletin. Summer. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1995d. For the Good of Scotland.
- SNP. 1995e. Towards a Better Scotland. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1996a. Research Bulletin. Fourth Quarter. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1996b. Research Bulletin. Winter. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1996c. Best For Scotland: Independence in Europe .
[<http://www.snp.org.uk/library/rr960912.html>]
- SNP. 1997a. What Scotland Needs Now! Manifesto for the 1997 General Election.
Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1997b. Research Bulletin: Election Special 1997 . Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1998. Research Bulletin. First Quarter. Edinburgh.
- SNP. 1998b. Towards the Scottish Parliament. Edinburgh,
- SNP. 1999. Scotland's Party: A Manifesto for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election. Edinburgh.
- Stewart, Donald. 1994. A Scot at Westminster. Sydney, Nova Scotia: The Catalone Press.
- Stokes, Gale. 1993. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Studlar, Donley T. and Ian McAllister. 1988. "Nationalism in Scotland and Wales: A Post-Industrial Phenomenon?," Ethnic and Racial Studies 11: 48-62.
- Stychin, Carl F. 1997. "Queer Nations: Nationalism, Sexuality and the Discourse of Rights in Quebec," Feminist Legal Studies V: 3-34.
- Sullivan, William. "Reinventing Community: Prospects for Politics," Crouch and Marquand eds.: 20-32.
- Talos, Emmerich and Christoph Badelt. 1999. "The Welfare State Between New Stimuli and New Pressures: Austrian Social Policy and the EU," Journal of European Social Policy 9:4: 351-361.
- Taylor, Rupert. 1996. "Political Science Encounters 'race' and 'ethnicity,'" Ethnic and Racial Studies 19: 884-895.
- Thomas, Dafydd Elis. 1991. "The Constitution of Wales," in National Identities. Bernard Crick ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 57-67.

- Thomson, J. M. 1995. "Scots Law, National Identity and the European Union," Scottish Affairs 10 (Winter): 25-34.
- Touleman, Robert. 1998. "For a Democratic Europe," in Martin Westlake ed.. The European Union Beyond Amsterdam. London: Routledge.
- True, Jacqui. 1993. "National Selves and Feminine Others," Fletcher Forum (Summer): 75-89.
- Tura, Jordi Sole. 1989. "The Spanish Case: Remarks on the General Theories of Nationalism," International Political Science Review 10: 183-189.
- United Kingdom. June 2000. "UK Continental Shelf Upstream Oil and Gas Taxation," [http://www.og.dti.gov.uk/taxation/tax_pg.htm]
- Van Dijk. 1997. "Discourse as Interaction in Society," in Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction Vol.II Van Dijk ed.. London: Sage: 1-37.
- Vermeulen, Hans and Jeremy Boissevain eds. 1984. Ethnic Challenge: The Politics of Ethnicity in Europe. Gottingen: Edition Herodot.
- Vickers, Jill McCalla. 1990. "At His Mother's Knee: Sex/Gender and the Construction of National Identities," in Women and Men Greta Hofmann Nemiroff ed. Richmond Hill: Fitzhenry and Whiteside: 478-492.
- Vincent, Andrew. 1997. "Liberal Nationalism: an Irresponsible Compound?," Political Studies XLV: 275-95.
- Walby, Sylvia. 1992. "Woman and Nation," International Journal of Comparative Sociology XXXIII: 1-2: 81-99.
- Walker, Brian. 1998. "Social Movements as Nationalism or, On the Very Idea of Queer Nation," *Couture et al* eds. : 505-547.
- Walker, Nancy J. and Robert M. Worcester. 1986. "Nationalism in Great Britain," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 13 (Fall): 249-69.
- Walker, R. B. J. and Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.. 1990. Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Wallace, William and Julie Smith. 1995. "Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent," West European Politics 18: 137-57.
- Wallace, William. 1994. "Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945-93," Political Studies XLII: 52-76.
- Ware, Alan. 1996. Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Waterman, A. M. C. 1974. "Nationalism, Sovereignty and Economic Policy," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 1: 1-22.
- Waters, Malcolm. 1995. Globalization. London: Routledge.

- Webb, Keith. 1977. The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland. Glasgow: The Molendinar Press.
- Weber, Max. 1963. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology . H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds.. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society: Volume 1. New York: Bedminster Press.
- Weiler, J. H. H. and Ulrich R. Haltern and Franz Mayer. 1995. "European Democracy and Its Critique," West European Politics 18: 3: 4-39.
- Weiss, Linda. 1997. "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State," New Left Review 225: 3-27.
- Williams, Glyn. 1981. "Nationalism and Discursive Practice," In Richmond ed.
- Wolfe, Billy. 1981. Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence. Edinburgh: Reprographia. 1973.
- Woman's Claim of Right Group, ed. 1991. A Woman's Claim of Right in Scotland. Edinburgh: Polygon.
- Wood, David M. and Birol A. Yesilada. 1996. The Emerging European Union. White Plains: Longman.
- Woodcock, George. 1973. "A Plea for the Anti-nation," Nelles and Rotsstein eds.: 1-12.
- World Resources Institute, The UN Environment Program, The UN Development Program and the World Bank. 1998. World Resources: A Guide to the Global Environment. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wright, Alex. 1996. "Scottish Fishermen: A Choice Between British or European Union?," Scottish Affairs 14: 27-41.
- Yin, Robert K. 1993. Applications of Case Study Research . Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1996. "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy" in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political . Benhabib ed.: Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Appendix A

By the 1970s, devolution had returned to haunt the Labour party. With the SNP nipping at its heels in the elections of February and October 1974, the party was compelled to reappraise its devolution policy which had been mothballed from 1958-74. Divisions were apparent early on with the Scottish Trades Unions Congress (STUC) interested in some form of devolution, and the Scottish Council of the Labour party firmly opposed (Keating and Bleiman 1979, 161). Newly discovered oil and the upcoming referendum on the EEC kept the constitutional issue salient in political discourse, and the long-awaited Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution was due to report its findings on devolutionary change in September 1974.

At the leadership level, Labour was dismissive of devolution. The Scottish Labour executive had issued a report called *Scotland and the UK* (just prior to the release of the Kilbrandon Commission findings) which rejected devolution and which, as Keating and Bleiman (1979, 162) observe, brought the party back to its 1940 position, rejecting a Scottish assembly. The position taken by Scottish Labour MPs against devolution needs to be explained. After all, this period represented the height of nationalist sentiment in Scotland. What could explain their defense of the status quo ?

Keating and Bleiman (1979, 162-163) suggest three reasons for Labour's 1970s' antipathy toward devolution. First, the party feared the dilution of Scottish influence in Westminster. Scotland has, for some time, been overrepresented in Westminster relative to its population. This representation would surely be reduced in the event of the creation of a Scottish Assembly (as it will), and Labour leaders thought that this would ultimately marginalize Scottish interests (as well as those of the Labour party itself).

The second reason concerned the fate of politically-influential local authorities governed by Labour. Another layer of government would surely reduce Labour's influence at the local level, as it would possibly usurp certain local functions. Moreover, the parliament

could well be governed by a party other than Labour, and hence seek to alter funding arrangements for local government. A third, and more fundamental concern, arose from a fear that devolution would fragment the economic unity of the UK as a whole and hence have a negative impact on industrial standards and wages.

These were important objections to devolution but they had an abstract flavor in the absence of any concrete devolutionary proposal. Kilbrandon provided some serious propositions about which all political parties were forced to deliver judgment. The need to respond to the Commission, which was divided on both the principles of devolution as well as prospective constitutional reforms, pushed the constitutional issue to the forefront of Scottish politics. The 1974 electoral successes of the SNP also forced Labour to confront devolution directly.

In August 1974 the Labour Party delivered a new verdict on devolution, which supported, in principle, an assembly for Scotland, but one within the present structure of the UK constitution. This, as Keating and Bleiman (1979,166) point out, was a very important decision. In endorsing the Assembly within the structure of the UK, Labour managed to cut short debate about Westminster representation for Scotland. Nothing would change except that a new level of government would be added in Scotland. This resolution, endorsed by conference, departed from Kilbrandon whose majority favored an assembly but, supported also a reduction in the number of Scottish MPs at Westminster. The apparent change of heart on the part of the Labour party stemmed partly from the support of unions for constitutional reform and to a lesser degree from the anticipated electoral gains to be had (Keating and Bleiman 1979, 168-9). It was also ideologically assimilable because the Labour party had supported devolution for almost all of the party's history (Keating and Bleiman 169).

Unfortunately for the Labour government, too many pressures prevented it from dealing properly with devolution. The party had committed itself, in principle, to devolution and when a slim majority (three seats) Labour government took power in October 1974, it

had to attend to the disparate interests of its own membership and electorate, as well as the 11 watchful SNP MPs who took their places in Parliament.¹ The difficult task of turning principle into policy was now upon them.

The first organized resistance to devolution came from English members of cabinet to whom a Scottish assembly seemed to smack of special treatment for Scotland. Didn't Scotland already have too many MPs, and get more than its share of public expenditure? The government might have countered with assembly offers for English regions, but these were not in demand, and the first strains on the government's devolutionary agenda began to show themselves.²

1975 was a watershed year in British politics. That year saw the referendum on membership in the European Community, the ascension of Margaret Thatcher to the leadership of the Conservative party, and the first of the Labour government's Bills on administrative devolution. The devolution story of the 1970's is complicated and discouraging. A desire on the part of the Scottish public for a new relationship with the UK became a contest of political maneuver within and between parties. The Kilbrandon commission had a broad frame of reference to examine possible improvements to government in the UK. Two dissenters on the Committee, Lord Crowther-Hunt and A.T. Peacock, issued a memorandum of dissent in which they went beyond the devolutionary measures recommended by the Commission and suggested a West German-style federal government (Bogdanor 1979, 149). The majority report rejected both separatism and federalism, and supported a devolved assembly for Scotland elected by PR.

¹ In March 1976 Harold Wilson abruptly announced his resignation upon turning 60. Wilson was succeeded by James Callaghan in the subsequent leadership contest. In February 1976 Labour MP George Thomas was elected speaker, reducing Labour's majority to two. In November 1976 Labour lost its majority following the loss of two by-elections in Walsall-North and Workington.

² John Power, former Labour Lord Mayor of Oxford, quoted in an article by Kenny Farquharson, "Regional differences pose danger," published in Scotland on Sunday on 8 January 1995, takes a candid view of current proposals for English regional assemblies suggesting that "This [talk of English regional assemblies] has just been tacked on to make sense of the Scottish devolution plans, to make it look like an all-British thing. It's a load of bollocks."

The Labour government, elected by the October 1974 election, acted on the Kilbrandon proposals by issuing a White Paper, *Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales*. The document outlined a tightly circumscribed body for Scotland, or, in Bogdanor's words, "a minimalist conception of devolution," having no tax raising powers and permitting the Secretary of State for Scotland to veto legislation viewed as unacceptable to the government of the day (Bogdanor 1979, 153). Legislation would be reviewed on the grounds of *ultra vires* (strictly speaking, this means that legislation would have to conform to the jurisdiction outlined in the Act), and, revealingly, in light of the government's policy preferences. An addendum to this White Paper emerged in August 1976 that extinguished the option of the Scottish Secretary to veto legislation on 'policy grounds'. Instead, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would adjudicate the *vires* of Assembly legislation (Bogdanor 1979, 154). This was designed to silence critics in Scotland, such as the Faculty of Advocates, who viewed the veto provisions for the Secretary of State as reminiscent of the British Raj.

In December 1976, the Callaghan government introduced the Scotland and Wales Bill. The bill passed second reading with much cross-party voting. The government feared that the Bill would fail in the face of Labour backbench opposition. The compromise arrived at haunts Scottish politics to this day. The government decided to hold a referendum on the Scotland and Wales Bill and freed government MPs to fight on either side of that campaign. This decision was opposed by, among others, Michael Foot who argued that, as part of the government's election manifesto, it was obligated to attempt to pass the bill in Parliament.

In March of 1977, the minority government entered into an agreement with the Liberal party. The Liberals wanted any proposed assembly in Scotland to have tax-raising powers and a proportional electoral system. This was ambitious as the government had previously failed to secure PR for direct elections for the European elections (George 1997). According to an article by Kenny Farquharson and John Curtice, "Labour split on Scottish PR plans," published in Scotland on Sunday on 30 October 1994, Labour's

Scottish wing agonized over proposals for PR for the Scottish Assembly, with some arguing that PR would simply cede power to other parties, while others in the party argued for PR in hope of achieving a consensual form of government.³ Further, the government would not concede on block grants of revenue to the proposed assembly. The Liberals acquiesced after the government proposed a set formula by which funding would be automatically allocated to the assembly.

The Scotland and Wales Bills passed second reading and entered the committee stage. Here, the Bill was altered to include an amendment (Section 85(2)) introduced by Labour MP George Cunningham which would require the referenda on the bills to meet with the approval of 40 percent of the electorates of Scotland and Wales. This requirement imposed a heavy burden on the Yes campaign, which would be forced to secure a healthy majority of the referendum vote in order to reach the 40 percent threshold. In addition, the bill would permit the Secretary of State for Scotland to defend the interests of the Orkney and Shetland Islands should their interests be compromised by an Edinburgh Assembly. The bills received Royal assent in July 1978 and the referenda were held in March of 1979. Both referenda were defeated. In Scotland, 52 percent of voters supported devolution, but these constituted only 33 percent of the total electorate. In the referendum aftermath, pro-devolutionists among Labour and SNP MPs pushed to have the Act passed anyway. In March of 1979 the SNP's National Council issued an ultimatum to Callaghan's Labour government: pass the bill or lose the support of SNP MPs. Labour's subsequent inaction caused the SNP MPs to censure the government, and a subsequent vote of non-confidence saw the government fall by one vote (311 to 310 votes). The 3 May 1979 election which followed saw the victory of the Conservative party and the end of the devolution era.

As argued above, the SNP should have had an easy time with the devolution issue. A modest assembly lacking tax-raising powers and substantial policy-making authority might

³ Polling data from Scotland show that just over half of Scots (55 percent) now support PR (Curtice 1993, 30).

have provided ample grist for the nationalist mill. One can imagine an indignant Assembly leader making impassioned speeches advocating for greater powers to match the aspirations of the Scottish electorate, pointing to Westminster as the ever-present source of Scotland's woes. This was not to be; the party had to deliver a verdict on devolution which would not exacerbate tensions *within* the party. The SNP's performance during the 1970s debates over devolution reflected the gap between a pragmatic view which saw devolution as a stepping stone to ease the electorate into independence, and a fundamentalist perspective which saw independence as the only acceptable policy.

Levy (1990, 58-86) has examined the twists and turns in SNP devolution policy which reflect the intra-party tensions described above. Levy argues that the party squandered its potential Parliamentary and societal influence. The SNP sacrificed this influence in favor of party unity which, in the event, remained elusive. Prior to 1971, the SNP maintained a 'mandate' approach, that is, upon winning 37 or more seats at a General election they would press Westminster for negotiations on the exit of Scotland from the UK. At the party's 1972 conference, Resolution 31 was endorsed, affirming independence as a goal, but accepting devolutionary concessions as transitional arrangements on the way to a Scottish state. The resolution also rejected an Association of British States. Resolution 31, while passed, was sent back to the National Executive Committee for further study and, in effect, the party had no clear stand on devolution.

With the relative electoral successes of February and October 1974, the SNP was in the unprecedented position of supporting a minority Labour government. With the promise of a Bill on assemblies for Scotland and Wales, the SNP was forced to confront devolution and formulate a coherent policy. In 1975, the National Council sponsored Resolution 17 which stated:

This conference resolves that the SNP will participate fully in any Scottish Assembly which is democratically elected and will conduct an all out campaign to gain a majority of assembly seats, and that its objectives in doing so will be to make a constructive contribution in those limited areas of responsibility likely to be given to the assembly by the present Westminster government, and to work vigorously to extend the assembly's powers until it becomes a real Scottish

Parliament capable of serving effectively in the interests of the Scottish people (Levy 1990, 67).

Despite the resistance of party 'fundamentalists', the resolution was passed, albeit with the somewhat derisive reference to the long-term SNP goal of a 'real' parliament. In effect, the party delivered the verdict that, ultimately, no assembly--save one in an independent state-- would do. The tactical commitment to an Assembly would be clear in the later referendum as the 'No' forces could claim that the devolution on offer was--as Tam Dalyell would argue-- an attempt to 'dish the Nats' and a cynical ploy to preserve Labour's Scottish seats. No amount of discursive acrobatics could disguise a central element of SNP discourse: that sovereignty belonged with the Scottish people, and that anything short of independence would be unsatisfactory, and democratically illegitimate.

By 1976, anti-devolutionary views within the SNP were, as Levy (1990, 75) observes, "crystallizing", with the leadership adopting an evolutionary approach to independence and hardliners maintaining an anti-devolution, independence-first view. By 1977, tensions mounted between the party's MPs, who advocated cooperation with the government to secure a Yes vote on the referendum, and its Edinburgh leadership, which was split among fundamentalist hardliners, and those tolerant of devolution as a necessary stepping stone to independence. The 1978 Conference saw tension between those in favor of a trans-organizational alliance between devolution supporters, and those who favored a reaffirmation of the slogan "Independence--Nothing Less" as adopted at the 1978 Conference. The party essentially abandoned any devolution policy and, as a result, the SNP was in disarray by the time of the March 1979 referendum. Relations between the party executive and the parliamentary group were strained and the constituency organizations were in decline. The devolution campaign was essentially fought between the "No" side (Conservatives, Labour dissidents, business) and the Yes side (Labour, some SNP activists).