Mark Kulstad
Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection.
München: Philosophia Verlag (Analytica) 1991.
(cloth: ISBN 3-88405-069-9).

This hard-working volume does pretty much what its title announces: it considers where Leibniz's neologism 'apperception' fits in the hierarchy building from mere perceptions (contained in all monads) to the consciousness of distinct perceptions and then to the reflection on self and on innate truths that characterizes spirits. The study for the most part is devoted to tracing the development of Leibniz's understanding of these and related notions, especially after his encounter with Locke's thought. But Kulstad finds a touchstone in Leibniz's efforts to make a place for 'beasts' that would neither relegate them to the status of mere machines nor dissolve the distinction between animal souls and rational spirits; the strains of this twofold task, Kulstad argues, make Leibniz's use of 'apperception' unsettled, even erratic, but perhaps more interestingly complicated than is usually appreciated. Still any reader contemplating the distinction between animals and humans in general would be well-advised to have more than a passing interest in early modern philosophy before taking up the book; it takes a long time to reach any detailed account even of Leibniz's view on the matter.

Kulstad takes his cue from a passage in the *New Essays on Human Understanding*. There Leibniz describes the rush of an enraged boar at a human target as an example of an animal faculty of apperception: responding to a person foolishly shouting at it, the boar moves from having a 'bare perception' to 'apperceiving' this 'more notable and distinct' impression (19; NE 173). Against the claims of this passage, Kulstad sets the 'standard view' (as expressed by, e.g., Robert McRae, *Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought* [Toronto 1976]), which proposes that apperception is the privilege of spirits, and can be associated with reflection and self-consciousness. This view draws much of its plausibility from the *Principles of Nature and Grace*, where simple perception is distinguished from 'Apperception, which is consciousness or the reflexive knowledge of [the] interior state [of the monad]' (18; G VI 600). While acknowledging the strength of the 'standard view,' Kulstad argues that it must at the very least be modified in the light of the boar passage. More strongly, Kulstad proposes that we can distinguish between mere reflection, or the second-order perception that allows attention and memory, and the 'focused reflection' that involves attention to what is properly 'in us,' i.e., the self and its operations (24). Mere reflection seems necessary for the distinct perception characterizing sensation; it might be identified with consciousness and seems one form of apperception. Focused reflection, on the other hand, is apperception directed at the self and its operations (self-consciousness) and gives rise to the capacity for reason. Although the distinction is not drawn by Leibniz himself, Kulstad suggests that it is at work in those passages where apperception is granted to beasts;

than a guide, as when he begins a sentence: 'the work of the preceding subsection, or more precisely, the work of the preceding subsection combined with that of the earlier subsections of section II of this chapter, ...' (132). This is not as perspicuously put as one might wish. In short, the book does not give up its secrets without a fight.

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Helen S. Lang
Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties.
Albany, NY: State University of New York
1992. Pp. ix + 322.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1083-8);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1084-6).

This is an excellent monograph concerning several central features of Aristotle's physical theory and their various interpretations in the Middle Ages. The first half of this study treats of the definition of nature in book two of the *Physics*, the problem of the natural motion of the elements, and the much disputed conclusion of book eight concerning the first cause of motion in the universe. The second half of the book consists of four acute chapters in which the author shows how John Philoponus, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, John Buridan, and Duns Scotus used and interpreted parts of the *Physics*. The two main sections of the book are preceded by a thoughtful introductory study of the nature and structure of an Aristotelian *logos* or 'study'. This is a particularly important issue for the last two books of the *Physics*, the unity of each of which is anything but clear. The book contains extensive notes and a fairly comprehensive bibliography. About half the chapters in the book appeared in earlier versions in various journals.

Lang argues (6) that 'the immediate object of Aristotle's writing and of his thought is not constituted by the corpus as a whole but by particular problems expressed in individual *logoi*'. Thus, in understanding what Aristotle is doing in any 'unit' of writing, we must first identify what is usually a quite specific problem and then read the remainder of the *logos* as addressed to subordinate arguments, questions, and definitions intended to support the solution to the original problem. Thus, if, for example, we focus on book eight of the *Physics*, we should understand each of the many seemingly disconnected discussions in that book as logically related to the main thesis which is that motion is eternal. The main thesis always comes first and subsequent arguments are