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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

MORAL EMOTIONS, MORAL IDEALS, AND MORAL EDUCATION

BY

© MOYA KAVANAGH

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Moral Emotions, Moral Ideals, and Moral Education, submitted by Moya Kavanagh, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in Philosophy of Education.

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This work is dedicated to my teachers;
especially to the first of these, my parents;
and to my husband and sons,
who are teaching me still.

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to distinguish and describe the moral emotions. Given a proper account of these, it becomes possible to suggest certain improvements to the practice of moral education, an endeavour currently meeting with remarkably little success, due to our almost exclusive concern with the rationalistic aspects of moral practice.

The work begins with an examination of the two different types of relationships which are instrumental to societal processes. It is necessary to delineate these clearly, for they represent different contexts of morality within which we will discern different moral ideals, and hence, different moral emotions. I proceed to an elaboration of Charles Taylor's interpretation of the emotions, and the different forms of desire from which they derive their import. Largely on the basis of Taylor's work, I am able to identify the strong evaluation second-order desires with the moral ideal. Thus the moral emotions are emotions arising with respect to these particular desires, which constitute the agent's conception of the good.

Particular examples of the moral emotions which we may expect to find in relationships of power and relationships of connection are discussed. These moral emotions do not represent an exhaustive catalogue, but are common emotions, reinterpreted and elaborated in terms of my hypothesis. Following this somewhat analytical approach, I turn to more general arguments concerning the inevitability and the significance of the moral emotions.

Finally, I develop some of the implications these ideas hold for the practice of moral education. Of first importance is my interpretation of the child as a being with the propensity to form strong

evaluation second-order desires. With these in place, the child can, and does, manifest moral emotions from a very young age. Moral education becomes, therefore, not the imposition of principles external to the child, which are eventually adopted as his or her own, but the broadening, refinement, and sophistication of those desires already present. Means by which we may accomplish this changing of the heart include the provision of exemplars, the manifestation of moral emotions, and the articulation and re-interpretation of the moral emotions' import ascriptions.

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Introduction

The topic of this dissertation is the moral emotions. I would like to begin by outlining the ways in which this topic became of interest and concern to me.

In my experience of courses and readings in ethics and moral education, morality was consistently presented as a facet of human reason. With the possible exception of works by Aristotle and Hume, the majority of moral theories I encountered were rationalistic. By this I mean that they emphasized such aspects of moral practice as reasoning, critical reflection, fact gathering, or rational deliberation guided by principles. The works of John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg, R.S. Peters, and R.M. Hare, to name a few of the contemporary authorities, typify this approach to moral education. Within this paradigm, morality is not so much a state of being as a form of knowledge. It involves knowing how to use moral language, how to reason morally, or knowing that particular facts are the relevant considerations to the case at hand. Kohlberg, for example, envisions the morally mature or educated person as one who reasons to "... an *objectively* fair or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all *rational* persons could agree ..."[1]

To be fair, most of the philosophers within this school of thought do not deny the emotional aspects of morality (except Kohlberg, of course). Hare recognizes love and sensitivity as criteria of the morally educated person.[2] Wilson calls "... the 'affective' components such as alertness, determination, commitment and so forth ... important for the

morally educated person."[3] Peters's criticisms of Kohlberg include the latter's lack of attention to the affective aspects of morality.[4] However, while an emotional constituent is recognized, the moral reasoning approach to moral education affords it scant attention. Hare, for example, regards love and sensitivity as simple concomitants of understanding.[5] Wilson describes the "affective" elements of commitment, etc., as not particular to morality, and therefore, of secondary importance.[6] Peters, while admitting emotion (especially the rational passions), argues that the presence of affective elements is no good reason for not according prominence to principles and to principled reasoning, in the moral life.[7]

There is within the literature, however, a contingent of philosophers who recognize the limitations of a rationalistic model of moral education. For example, G.J. Warnock argues that simply discerning the feelings of others, and the effects our actions have upon them, is not sufficient:

> ... we must try to inculcate also love of our fellow-men, so that I shall not want to cause them distress, but on the contrary will positively want to help, and benefit, and please them.[8]

Elsewhere Warnock also speaks out against the moral reasoning approach in claiming "... the essence of the remedy is not in reason, it is in non-indifference."[9] Warnock's point is that knowledge and understanding of the plight of others may be a purely intellectual response which, if divorced from caring or concern, is insufficient in a moral sense. Blum makes the same point in his article on compassion. Imaginative reconstruction of another's suffering "... is compatible with

malice and mere intellectual curiosity."[10] However, Peters implies that "real" understanding entails the appropriate emotions. This implication is clear, for example, in his discussion of the *consideration* of others' interests which, in the course of his argument, he equates with a *concern* for others' interests.[11] But Warnock and Blum are in the right here. Discernment, recognition, consideration are not the same as caring and concern. The first may be purely dispassionate and intellectual; the latter necessarily involve the emotions.

Iris Murdoch is another who notes the limits of reasons and reasoning in morality. Morality involves, she says, not seeing accurately as much as seeing justly or lovingly.[12] Along similar lines, Gilbert Ryle argues that becoming moral involves being taught to treat "... certain sorts of things as of overwhelming importance ..."[13] Moral learning culminates not simply in knowing certain things, but in being a certain way. It results "... in an improvement of one's heart, and only derivatively from this in an improvement of one's head."[14]

Despite the strong influence of the rationalistic school, therefore, there is operative within moral philosophy a broader conception of ethics, which encompasses both the reasoning and emotional facets of human being. I think this conception of ethics more likely to prove useful in the formulation of an effective theory of moral education. It strikes me, on considering my personal moral experience, that what moves me to be moral is not my knowing what is right or good, but rather my desire to do what is right or good. In the rationalistic accounts of morality, it is the omission of considerations of desire and the attendant emotions that leads, I believe, to ineffective practices in the field of moral education.

The point I am making here is similar to one made by John Passmore in his discussion of the difference between teaching the child to care, and teaching the child to be careful.[15] There are certain skills, techniques, and disciplines which, once acquired, allow the child the means of being careful in his work. Passmore argues that being careful in one's work is not the same as caring about one's work. Moreover, what we want as educators is to teach children to care *about* their work, at which point, the various ways of being careful become of use. One is careful because one wants the work itself to be as well done, as carefully done, as possible. It is caring about the end, the work itself, that ensures a consistent attention to and application of the means of being careful. Without a valuing of the work itself, being careful is little more than "... applying rules in a routine fashion."[16]

I believe teaching children to be moral is similar in an essential way. The skills of rational deliberation, principled reasoning and fact finding, and the correct use of moral language are means of being moral. That the means are at hand, however, does not ensure their employment. Moreover, if morality is to be more than "... applying rules in a routine fashion," the child must care about the end, to which such skills and rules are but the means. The challenge to moral educators is less the imparting of the rational tools of morality, than the imparting of a desire to be moral. We are aspiring to bring about, in Ryle's terms, a change of the heart. Such change, as Aristotle clearly recognized, comes about not through reason alone:

> Now if arguments were in themselves enough
> to make men good, they would justly ... have
> won very great rewards, ... but as things are

> ...they are not able to encourage the *many* to nobility and goodness.[17]

The morally educated person does not become so simply because there are good reasons for becoming so. Rather we become moral because we come to desire to be moral. To impart such desire and to provide the means of its realization are the tasks of the moral educator. As the achievement of being moral requires more than knowing how and knowing that, so too the practice of moral education requires more than teaching how and teaching that.

Just what this "more" might entail became clearer to me not so much through further readings in philosophy, as through the work of various novelists. Consider, for example, the following quotation from Gwethelyn Graham's *Earth and High Heaven.*

> "You see, the trouble with me is that I'm just like everybody else - I don't realize what something really means until it suddenly walks up and hits me between the eyes. I can be quite convinced intellectually that a situation is wrong, but it's still an academic question which doesn't really affect me personally, until, for some reason or other, it starts coming at me through my emotions as well. It isn't enough to *think*, you have to feel ..."[18]

Described here is exactly that dispassionate intellectual form of morality against which Warnock and Blum warn. What is of interest is the suggested remedy: an involvement of the emotions.

A fruitful source of ideas about emotions in the moral context is the series *Strangers and Brothers* by C.P. Snow.[19] These novels relate the life of Lewis Eliot in terms of his various positions and roles in the

public sphere, and in terms of his diverse relationships within the private sphere. There appears in these works a clear division between the public and private domains of Eliot's experience. Despite this dualism, not a surprising construction in the work of the author of *The Two Cultures*, Snow makes apparent the interplay and interaction between these two spheres.[20] More importantly, within both spheres, Snow describes with clarity and detail the variety of emotions which may coincidentally constitute an emotional experience.

> ... we sat without looking at each other: each of us was alone, with that special loneliness, containing both guilt and deprivation, containing also dislike and a kind of sullen hate, which comes to those who have known extreme intimacy, and who are seeing it drift away.[21]

He is also able to distinguish the different kinds of emotion and feeling to which we are subject. In the following passage, Jago, confident of being elected master of his college, has just learned his defeat is a certainty.

> Shames are more acute than sorrows, I thought as I sat by him ... The wounds of self-consciousness touch one's nerves more poignantly than the deepest agonies of feeling. But it is the deep agonies that cut at the roots of one's nature. It is there that one suffers, when vanity and self-consciousness have gone. And Jago suffered there.[22]

The richness, depth, and clarity of Snow's descriptions of the emotions at work provided me with material for consideration and reflection, and contributed substantially to the thesis I have developed. Most useful

perhaps was the idea, inherent in Snow's work, that different sorts of emotions and different forms of relationship tend to occur in the two spheres of human experience: the public and the private. Moreover, within these two domains, individuals are motivated by different kinds of aspirations and goals.

To what extent my ideas derived from reading (and rereading) Snow, and to what extent I have come to reinterpret Snow in the light of having formulated this thesis, is not altogether clear to me. Nevertheless, Snow's work was an important element of the conceptual framework within which I developed my ideas concerning the moral emotions.

A variety of other works helped shape my understanding of the emotions and, for example, their relationship with human reason. In *Howards End*, E.M. Forster speaks of

> ... the rainbow bridge that should connect the prose in us with the passion. Without it we are meaningless fragments, half monks, half beasts, unconnected arches that have never joined into a man. ... Only connect, and the beast and the monk, robbed of the isolation which is life to either, will die.[23]

This strikes me as a lovely metaphor for the dualism of reason and emotion that has long infected philosophy. It is a particularly debilitating infection of moral theory in that it has given rise to, and sustained the influence of the rationalistic theories of ethics, and their attendant theories of moral education. A conception of the human psyche which sees it as comprising separate faculties, some more "human" (and hence desirable), and others more "bestial" (and hence to

be suppressed or redirected), precludes a response to Forster's plea. Hence, in this thesis I argue to augment reason with emotion, not replace it. Reason and emotion both have a place in morality, and these two facets of human being are not independent, but interactive.

As regards the relationship between the emotions, ideals, and moral being, what more insightful portrait could be provided than George Eliot's *Silas Marner*?[24] In Thomas Hardy's work, particularly in *Jude the Obscure* and *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, we clearly see the power of ideals and aspirations as elements of the moral character, and the various emotions to which they can give rise.[25] Consider:

> He experienced not only the bitterness of a man who finds, in looking back upon an ambitious course, that what he has sacrificed in sentiment was worth as much as what he has gained in substance; but the superadded bitterness of seeing his very recantation nullified. He had been sorry for all this long ago; but his attempts to replace ambition by love had been as fully foiled as his ambition itself.[26]

This is not, perhaps unfortunately, a dissertation in English literature. The current digression into the realms of literature serves two purposes. First, it allows some indication of the sources of many of my ideas and interpretations of the emotions, and their connection with morality, reason, and ideals. Secondly, it serves to present the idea that from literature there is much that can be learned about morality, especially the emotional elements thereof. Wittgenstein said, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."[27] Literature, however, has a different constitution than philosophy: one which allows

the articulation of certain ideas, and the description of certain experiences notoriously difficult to formulate within a formal philosophical framework. Though here I anticipate ideas more fully developed in my concluding chapter, it is worth noting at this point the potential significance of literature as a tool of moral education.

I have described some of the influences which led me to the topic of this dissertation. What is now required is an introduction to the work itself. My fundamental thesis is that within the set of human emotions, we can distinguish a subset which I call the moral emotions. Before such a distinction can be established, it is necessary to interpret morality within the context of the different kinds of relationships which constitute the substance of morality. This is the job of the opening chapter. Here, within the framework of Jane Roland Martin's productive and reproductive societal processes, I demonstrate the logical consistency which obtains between these processes, relationships of power and of connection, and the moral emphases on rights and care.[28] This construction is necessary because we must look for different moral emotions to manifest themselves in the two different kinds of relationship, which, I will argue, constitute two distinct contexts of morality, as opposed to two different moralities.

Why we may expect different moral emotions to occur in different relational contexts becomes clearer in Chapter 2. First the moral emotions are defined in terms of Charles Taylor's concepts of the strong evaluation second-order desires, and the subject-referring import ascriptions which arise with respect to these sorts of desires.[29] Taylor's concepts, which provide the foundation of my distinction and elaboration of the moral emotions, are then extended and unified by

considerations of the nature of the moral ideal. In short, the moral ideal comprises the strong evaluation second-order desires. With respect to these arise the moral emotions. We may expect different moral emotions in relationships of power as opposed to relationships of connection, because these relationships and the societal processes they serve promote the development of different strong evaluation second-order desires, i.e., different moral ideals.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I present examples of the moral emotions, first in relationships of power and then in relationships of connection. These chapters are meant to include neither exhaustive nor definitive catalogues of the moral emotions. Rather, the emotions discussed are chosen to illustrate the derivation and nature of moral emotions within different relationships, and with respect to different sorts of ideals. A particularly important point, of which it is well to be aware as soon as possible, concerns my use of the term "moral," especially when speaking of moral ideals. The strong evaluation second-order desires are not moral in the sense that they are good, proper, or appropriate according to some specific moral code. They are moral in the sense that they constitute the subject's conception of what is good, proper, or appropriate, and as such will illustrate the various strengths or deficiencies characteristic of any given moral standard.

In Chapter 5, I develop arguments to demonstrate how the moral emotions are a necessary element of morality. I do not claim that they are necessarily apparent elements, nor are we necessarily conscious of them. Nevertheless, given the nature of the moral ideal, and the fact that with respect to these strong evaluation second-order desires emotions must inevitably arise, a moral life devoid of all moral emotion

is impossible. I argue as well for the development of a breadth of moral ideals to enable the subject to function morally within relationships of power and relationships of connection.

The concluding chapter deals specifically with the educational implications of my interpretation of the moral emotions. One hypothesis is central to all I have to say with respect to moral education. There is a human propensity to form strong evaluation second-order desires. Thus, as moral educators our role is not to put such desires in place, but to assist in the amelioration of those already there. Such amelioration may come about through the provision of exemplars, in a person's life or in her readings. It may come about through careful attention to certain emotional experiences, and through learning to articulate the ideals underlying such experience. However, any amelioration of the strong evaluation second-order desires can only be accomplished through those desires that are already in place. We do not make men and women moral by imposing on them principles which they eventually come to adopt as their own. It is a much more subtle process, to effect a change of the heart. To use Taylor's words, though in a broader application than he intended, the moral ideal and its constituent desires are a realm to which there is no dispassionate access.[30]

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1 Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 21-22. (My emphases)

2 R. M. Hare, "A Rejoinder," in D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazepides eds., *The Domain of Moral Education* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 119.

3 John Wilson, "Moral Components and Moral Education: A Reply to Francis Dunlop," in D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazepides eds., *The Domain of Moral Education* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 183.

4 R. S. Peters, *Moral Development and Moral Education* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 174ff.

5 Hare, "A Rejoinder," 119.

6 Wilson, "Moral Components," 183.

7 R. S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions," in N. F. Sizer and T. R. Sizer eds., *Moral Education: Five Lectures* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 37.

8 G. J. Warnock. "Morality and Language: A Reply to R.M. Hare," in D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazepides eds., *The Domain of Moral Education* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 113.

9 G. J. Warnock, *The Object of Morality* (London: Methuen & Co., 1971), 166.

10 Lawrence Blum, "Compassion," in A. O. Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 511.

11 Peters, *Moral Development,* 175.

12 Iris Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 23.

13 Gilbert Ryle, "Can Virtue Be Taught?" in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 441.

14 Ibid., 444.

15 J. A. Passmore, *The Philosophy of Teaching* (London: Duckworth, 1980), 183ff.

16 Ibid., 185.

17 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics,* David Ross trans., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 270 (bk X.9).

18 Gwethalyn Graham, *Earth and High Heaven* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), 31.

19 C. P. Snow, *Strangers and Brothers* , 3 vols., (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962).

20 C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).

21 Snow, *Homecomings,* in *Strangers and Brothers,* vol. 2, 608.

22 Snow, *The Masters,* in *Strangers and Brothers,* vol. 2, 243.

23 E. M. Forster, *Howards End* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1941), 174.

24 George Eliot, *Silas Marner* (New York: NAL Penguin Inc., 1981).

25 Thomas Hardy, *Jude the Obscure* (London: Macmillan, 1974), and *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978).

26 Hardy, *The Mayor of Casterbridge,* 394.

27 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness trans., (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 74.

28 Jane Roland Martin, *Reclaiming a Conversation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

29 Charles Taylor, *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap.1-2.

30 Ibid., p.62.

Chapter 1: Relationships and Morality.

Any theory of moral emotion will rest upon some conception of the nature of morality and the moral domain. Underpinning my thesis concerning the moral emotions is the conception of morality as a form of human endeavour which directs or governs human inter-relationships. The relationship between the self and the other is the substance of morality; it is the matter with which morality must deal. Given this premise, it is plausible to argue that different kinds of relationships will influence moral manifestations, be these moral reasoning, moral judgement, moral action, or moral emotion. In other words, the moral domain is not a seamless uniform whole, but consists of distinguishable contexts of relationship, wherein different elements of moral practice will be more and less apparent. This chapter explores the interaction between different relationships and different moral emphases.

A lack of awareness of the significance of relationships in morality has had two unfortunate consequences in moral theory. First, the examination, interpretation, and description of morality in a single relational context has resulted in an almost exclusive concern with the role of principled reasoning in moral practice, at the expense of other important moral elements such as emotion. Those moral theories which I referred to as rationalistic in my introduction, are not so much incorrect as incomplete, for they fail to account for different moral responses which are of equal significance, and are more readily apparent in other relational contexts.

A second consequence arising from the failure to recognize the different forms of relationship which constitute the moral domain, is the notion of two moralities. It is not uncommon today to hear a morality of rights distinguished from a morality of care, or to come across references to a "... specifically feminine form of ethics."[1] To the morality of rights, also referred to as the justice perspective, are attributed the characteristics of principled reasoning and rational autonomy. A morality of care, on the other hand, is described in terms of responsibilities and connections. These two moralities have been genderized in the sense that the former is associated with the masculine, and the latter with the feminine. It will become clear as we proceed, however, that such differences in moral response stem from the different types of relationship we experience. Rather than two moralities, or gender specific forms of ethics, we are dealing with different emphases of different moral elements as required by different relational contexts.

The spectre of two moralities is first intimated in Carol Gilligan's *In A Different Voice*.[2] Carol Gilligan's work is an extension of Lawrence Kohlberg's in that she describes changes in the forms of moral reasoning that occur at various stages in moral development. However, she also attempts to reveal and trace the influence of alternative value systems which characterize the moral reasoning responses of men and women. Such different values stem, suggests Gilligan, from different perceptions of relationship.[3] Gilligan posits that men, in perceiving connection and attachment as dangerous, value autonomy. Hence, morality from their perspective is concerned with the maintenance of rights.[4] The moral problem reduces to a problem of

conflicting rights, and the moral response is a limitation of action in deference to the rights of others. In contrast, argues Gilligan, women value attachment since they perceive isolation, rather than connection, as threatening.[5] Thus, morality from a female perspective involves the development and preservation of relationships, rather than the assertion and protection of individual rights. Moral dilemmas as perceived by women center around conflicting responsibilities, and resolution entails not the limitations of actions, but positive acts of care.[6]

What is most relevant here is Gilligan's suggestion that distinct ways of reasoning about moral problems derive from different perceptions of relationship. This, as it stands, is an eminently plausible claim, when one considers that relationships are what morality is about. It is therefore reasonable to expect that our perception and experience of relationship will affect our moral behaviors. Gilligan goes on to associate different perceptions of relationship with gender. While it may be true that gender informs our perception of relationship, there are as well different types of relationships at work in the human experience. I suggest that the so-called morality of rights and morality of care have developed in response to these different types of relationship, rather than because men and women tend to perceive relationship differently. Though certain types of relationship may tend to predominate in the experience of men, and others in the experience of women, nevertheless, a moral emphasis on rights or on care is logically derived from the different types of relationships, and only indirectly, therefore, as a function of gender.

The different types of relationships I have in mind are perhaps best explained in the context of Jane Roland Martin's distinction of the

productive and reproductive societal processes.[7] The productive societal processes are those economic, political, and cultural activities carried out primarily in the public domain for the purpose of maintaining the society and providing the means and materials required and desired by its individual members. These productive societal processes arise in response to human needs (for sustenance, physical security, etc.), and from the human desire for agency and effect. Relationships within this sphere are instrumental to the purposes of the productive processes. Grimshaw describes them as "... means to pre-given ends."[8] These relationships are established not in response to desires for personal intimacy, but in response to desires for agency, effect, and accomplishment. They are impersonal relationships shaped by and required for one's functional role. I will refer to these kinds of relationships as relationships of power.

It is within this domain, of course, that an emphasis on rights has application. First of all, it is only within the context of power that the notion of rights has any purchase. Rights are elaborated either in defense of personal power, or as a defense against the power of others. In the absence of power, there is no need for rights. Furthermore, rights must be justified on the basis of generalizable criteria, and be guided in their application by reason, with its calls for consistency, non-arbitrariness and relevance. The wide diversity of possible individual circumstances necessitates generalized formulations of formal principles and policies to guide the appraisal of particular instances. Therefore, a moral emphasis on rights, which requires reason and generalized principles, is consistent with relationships of power.

Whereas productive societal processes and relationships of power are driven by the basic human desire for agency and effect, reproductive societal processes and relationships of connection arise from the other, equally fundamental human desire for community and attachment. The reproductive societal processes obviously include biological reproduction, but also include the *nurture* of individuals, through provision for their needs, and promotion of their interests and purposes.[9] Moreover, the objects of these processes are not only immature developing persons (i.e. children) but mature adults as well. Relationships within this sphere are functional, but only in the sense that they are instrumental to the reproductive processes. These relationships of connection are necessarily personal and individualized, for we need to *know* the other in order to provide for her needs or promote her interests and purposes. The affective aspects of a situation and the particulars of time, place, and identity will be important guides of judgement here. It is apparent, therefore, that a moral emphasis on care, which entails emotion and the particular, is logically consistent with the relationships of connection which serve the reproductive societal processes.

Given the logical consistency between the two types of relationship and an emphasis on either rights or care, I want to underline an earlier point: we are not dealing here with two moralities. Relationships of power are instrumental to productive processes; consistent with these relationships is an emphasis on rights which logically entails reason and the non-particular. Relationships of connection are functional within the reproductive processes, and an emphasis on care, which logically requires emotion and attention to the

particular, is consistent with these relationships. However, these arguments do not establish the existence of two distinct moralities. Moreover, an *exclusive* association of rights with reason, or emotion with care, is not warranted. While reason, and attention to the non-particular are necessary for an emphasis on rights, they are not sufficient. The same is true of emotion, and attention to the particular in an emphasis on care. Moral emotion and moral reasoning both play a part in moral practice, whether rights or care is emphasized. In later chapters I will specifically examine the moral emotions associated with the different relationships of power and connection, and the associated emphases on rights and care. Suffice it here to say, that though different moral emotions are at work in these different relational contexts, both emphases involve moral emotion. Similarly, principled moral reasoning guides moral judgement in the context of care, as well as in the context of rights: for a successful participation in and an advancement of the interests of others, requires reason as well as attachment.

I have described two types of relationships which are instrumental to Martin's two societal processes. It is important to realize that both kinds of relationship may occur coincidentally. For example, though relationships of power are functionally required in the sphere of productive processes, relationships of connection also arise in this context. Within the productive sphere, relationships of connection and a moral emphasis on care may morally complement the usual relationships of power and emphasis on rights, particularly in cases of inadequate or unrecognized rights. I am thinking here of situations where a person may be temporarily relieved of productive

responsibilities in the face of some personal difficulty. For example, a boss may give an employee the afternoon off, on learning that the employee's husband is coming out of surgery at noon. Of course relationships of connection in this context may also lead to less desirable situations such as nepotism.

In a similar way, relationships of power are present within the sphere of reproductive processes. The fact that we speak of "children's rights" suggests that relationships of power coincide with relationships of connection within this sphere. It is reasonable to suggest that an element of the parent/child relationship is a relationship of power, and that this is both desirable (because of the child's lack of agency) and instructive. Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage benefits accruing from relationships of power between adult family members, only if power is thought of simply as "power over." Power, however, may also mean "power to... ," and recognition of this power allows divisions of labour. (That such divisions may be inequitable, and the relative contributions unequally valued, is another matter.) Hence, relationships of power may be found within the reproductive sphere, which do not thwart its ends nor impede its more functional relationships of connection. However, it is not implausible to argue that relationships of power within the sphere of reproductive processes may destroy the required relationships of connection, leading to such morally abhorrent situations as child abuse and wife battering.

It is clear, therefore, that power relationships function within the family, and that the work place makes room for relationships of connection. However, that such is the case does not detract from earlier arguments for the logical consistency between different types of

relationship and different moral emphases. Rather, it suggests that societal institutions may involve, in varying degrees, both productive and reproductive processes, and hence, both relationships of power and connection. The institution of education is a good example here. Education and training are necessary for the maintenance of society, but equally, they (should) involve the promotion and development of individual interests and purposes. Hence proper systems of education utilize both productive and reproductive processes. Other institutions, such as the family or businesses, likewise rarely rely exclusively on one process or the other. The logical consistency obtains between types of relationships and a moral emphasis on rights or care. But such consistency does not warrant the relegation of rights to the public domain, nor caring to the private.

I have demonstrated a logical consistency between types of relationships and a moral emphasis on rights or care. I have argued that such different emphases do not constitute different moralities, and are incorrectly characterized in terms exclusively of reason or emotion. Furthermore, to assign one to the realm of the public and the other to the realm of the private is a distorting oversimplification. I wish to elaborate now a previously noted reservation concerning the association of rights with men or the masculine, and care with women or the feminine.

As was mentioned earlier, Carol Gilligan's work associated reasoning and rights with the masculine, and care and connection with the feminine. Nel Noddings, of course, furthered the gender dichotomy in calling her ethic of care a feminine ethic.[10] Dichotomizing ethics

according to gender, however, oversimplifies the issue and obscures the nature of the moral experience.

First of all, common experience argues against genderization. Men, whether "masculine" or not, are often aware of and responsive to the concrete particular elements in a moral situation, and are susceptible as well to feelings of compassion and care. R.S. Peters describes the experience: "The real tension is between the generalized demands of reason and the particularized promptings of compassion."[11] Furthermore, the interpretation of women's moral reasoning as guided more by affective particulars than by principles may be unfounded. Jean Grimshaw explores an interesting example: the different responses of a mother and father to their daughter's common law marriage.[12] The mother's continuing contact and involvement with the daughter, in contrast to the father's refusal to countenance the marriage or his daughter as part of it, does not necessarily imply an absence of principles, nor a narrowing of maternal attention to the concrete and affective. Grimshaw suggests that the behavior of both parents involves the application of moral principles. Their different responses derive from the different priorities accorded to principles held by both. Of greater importance to the father is the principle: "Consider whether your behaviour will condone that which you think to be morally wrong."[13] Of higher priority to the mother is the principle: "Consider whether your behavior will stand in the way of maintaining care and relationships."[14] The alternative simplistic interpretation that the father is guided by principled reasoning, and the mother by emotional attachment, is, at the very least, questionable. While Peters's quotation shows that men, as well as women, are subject to the particularized

promptings of compassion, Grimshaw's example illustrates that what appears as the promptings of compassion may, in fact, be principled reasoning.

The quotation from Peters and the example from Grimshaw show that different moral responses are not exclusive to one sex or the other. Women's moral practice may involve principled reasoning, and men as well as women may commonly feel and respond to the "particularized promptings of compassion." To classify reason and emotion, or general principles and concrete particulars, by sex, obscures the commonness of these elements in the moral experience of both men and women. Though the manifestation of particular human capacities and desires may be a function of gender in a sexist society, this fact does not preclude the possibility that the capacities and desires themselves are shared by both sexes. Both men and women desire agency and effect: desire, in other words, to realize personal purposes, aspirations and interests: desire effect *on* the world. But also common to both is the desire for attachment and community: a desire for connection *with* the world.

I have argued that an emphasis on rights or on care is *not exclusively associated* with (i) men or women, (ii) the public or the private domain, (iii) the productive or reproductive processes, nor with (iv) principled reason or affect and attachment. Such should suffice to make obvious the error of continuing to speak of "two moralities." To regard a morality of rights as an alternative to a morality of care is to imply that both are complete and sufficient, i.e., that each provides a framework or perspective which is fully adequate in a moral sense. This, I believe, is false. It is my contention that both rights and care are

needed for a complete moral theory. While I will argue this point more fully in chapter five, here let me simply specify the grounds for this contention. Both power and attachment are fundamental human desires. Hence, both productive and reproductive processes, and both relationships of power and relationships of connection are elements of a full human experience. The complete moral agent, therefore, must appropriately emphasize rights and/or care, and adequately attend to reason and/or emotion, as the situation demands. Morality has more than a single string to its bow.

In this chapter, I have shown how relationships of power and connection are instrumental to different societal processes. Logically consistent with these relationships is an emphasis on either rights or care. Reason is a necessary constituent of the former, and emotion of the latter. Furthermore, human activities and institutions rarely rely on purely productive or purely reproductive processes, and hence, human experience encompasses both relationships of power and relationships of connection. Therefore, an exclusive reliance on rights and reason, or on care and emotion, will be insufficient for moral practice. Furthermore, while reason is necessary in an emphasis on rights, as emotion is in an emphasis on care, neither is sufficient within either emphasis. Reason and emotion both play a role in moral practice whether rights or care is being emphasized.

It has been necessary to distinguish relationships of power from those of connection because, as I will show subsequently, particular moral emotions are characteristic of one kind of relationship or the other. Before we turn to particular moral emotions , I will examine the nature of emotion, desires, ideals, and the interactions among them.

This is the task of the next chapter which, in conjunction with this first chapter, establishes the theoretical framework for my interpretation of the moral emotions.

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1 D. T. Meyers and E. F. Kittay, *Women and Moral Theory* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), 3. See also M. Griffiths and M. Whitford, *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 22-23; Jean Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), chap.7.

2 Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

3 Ibid., 42.

4 Ibid., 38.

5 Ibid., 43.

6 Ibid., 19, 38.

7 Jane Roland Martin, "Becoming Educated: A Journey of Alienation or Integration?" *Journal of Education* 167,3 (1985): 75; and *Reclaiming a Conversation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Martin's differentiation of the productive and reproductive processes is subject to criticism, particularly in view of its possible confusion with a similar but differently defined distinction made by Marx. See, for example, S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, "Introduction," in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell eds., *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 2. The sense in which I employ this distinction is not Marxian, and is clearly elaborated in the main body of the text.

8 Jean Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 197.

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9 Martin, "Becoming Educated," 75.

10 Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

11 R. S. Peters, *Reason and Compassion* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 32.

12 Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking*, 208-210.

13 Ibid., 209.

14 Ibid.

Chapter 2: The Nature of the Moral Emotions.

As cognitive theorists have rightly argued, emotion involves judgement.[1] However, the evaluative aspects of emotion do not rest upon disinterested impersonal judgements. Rather, emotion involves the appraisal of events or circumstances in terms of how these relate to, impinge upon, or affect our personal desires, interests, and purposes.[2] Emotions, therefore, are a particular form of appraisal or judgement, which rests upon idiosyncratic criteria.

The work of Charles Taylor has furthered our understanding of emotion as a form of judgement.[3] Taylor regards import ascription as the essence of emotional experience. Import ascription involves a recognition of, and attribution of importance to events or circumstances significant in some personal sense. In other words, I ascribe import to those particular features or events which, for whatever reason, matter to me. The experience of emotion, say of anger or joy or jealousy, is concomitant with import ascription. Fear, for example, whether conscious or not, is the manifestation of ascribing an import "the menacing." To experience an emotion is to experience "... our situation as bearing a certain import."[4] Taylor emphasizes that the ascription of import does not affirm the subject's judgement of the situation.[5] Hence we may speak of emotions as mistaken, inappropriate, or irrational, since the import ascription may arise from a misapprehension of circumstances, mistaken beliefs, or in contradiction to accepted true beliefs. For example, I may intellectually recognize an event as non-threatening, such as the appearance of a garter snake on the path before me, yet persist irrationally in feeling fear. Import ascription and

emotion occur with the perception of circumstances as personally significant, rather than through knowing that this is or is not the case.

The concept of import ascription is a useful one. It allows us to distinguish our emotions from immediate feelings and sensations (such as pain), which require no ascription.[6] Furthermore, Taylor suggests that in making explicit a specific import ascription, we describe the emotion itself.[7] We explain and understand the experience of shame, for example, by making explicit the notion "shameful." Emotions may be individuated therefore, and each more clearly comprehended, in terms of their import ascriptions.

This idea of making explicit an import ascription leads to Taylor's distinction between subject-referring and non-subject-referring emotions. Consider fear as an example of the latter. The inherent import ascription is "the menacing," and the concept of menace can be elucidated in objective "mechanical" terms without appeal to subjective experience.[8] In other words, we need not have experienced fear in order to comprehend "menace." In contrast, shame, a subject-referring emotion, and its inherent import ascription "the shameful," cannot be elucidated in purely objective terms or explanations. To understand shame and the shameful appeal must be made to elements of subjective human experience, and to various desires, aspirations, and ideals implicit therein. Hence, concludes Taylor, the subject-referring emotions constitute a realm "... to which there is no dispassionate access."[9]

I believe that subject-referring import ascriptions are a distinguishing characteristic of the moral emotions. It is important, therefore, to ensure that the distinction of subject-referring from non-

subject-referring emotions is clear. I am not claiming that we can see something as menacing without being fearful, nor denying that part of what it means for something to be menacing is that it is fear-inspiring. I am only claiming that it is possible to *understand* the import ascription "menacing" without appeal to subjective experience. This is not true of the import ascription "shameful." To elucidate the meaning of shameful one must employ terms such as:

> ... 'base', 'dishonourable', 'degrading', or a host of moral terms: 'cheat', 'liar', 'coward', 'fraud', which involve meanings that things have for us. We cannot escape from these terms into an objective account, because in fact shame is about an aspect of the life of the subject qua subject.[10]

Moreover, it is not the case that the subject-referring emotions are identified in terms of human desires and aspirations, while non-subject-referring emotions are independent of such desires. All emotions and import ascriptions arise as judgements of things with respect to our desires. If we lacked the desire for physical integrity or well being, we would neither feel fear, nor ascribe the import of menace, (though we could understand the concept of the latter in objective terms). However, subject-referring and non-subject referring emotions arise with respect to different kinds of desires and aspirations. We need, therefore, to consider the different sorts of desires, and, in particular, those desires associated with the ascription of subject-referring imports.

Frankfurt has argued that what separates the human from the non-human is the capacity for second-order desires.[11] First-order desires are straight forward desires to do (or not to do) something: for

example, to go for a walk, to drink a cup of coffee. In contrast, second-order desires involve reflective evaluations of such first-order wants. They are desires of the form: I want to want to x .

Taylor further examines Frankfurt's distinction between first and second-order desires, and concludes that different types of reflective evaluation give rise to different kinds of second-order desire.[12] What Taylor calls weak evaluation involves the weighing of first-order desires in terms of the personal satisfaction they afford the subject. Hence, alternative desires may be appraised in terms of their convenience, in terms of their consistency with other plans or desires, in terms of their instrumentality towards some goal, or simply in terms of their relative strengths (i.e., their degree of attraction).[13]

Taylor contrasts weak evaluation of first-order desires with strong evaluation. Here again, first-order wants are appraised, but in different terms. Strong evaluation weighs the qualitative worth of our desires: they "... are classified in such categories as higher and lower, virtuous and vicious, more and less fulfilling, more and less refined, profound and superficial, noble and base."[14] Strong evaluations, therefore, involve more than simple preferences and satisfactions; they involve concerns and considerations "... about the quality of life, the kind of beings we are or want to be."[15]

Taylor goes on to argue that strong evaluations and subject-referring imports are inextricably linked: that the first, which deals with desires, and the second, a characteristic of particular emotions, are somehow "anchored" in each other.[16] Though I believe that Taylor is correct here, I feel he fails to establish the connection satisfactorily. Strong evaluation and subject-referring emotions are linked by a third

factor, which Taylor does not elaborate sufficiently, though recognition of it is implicit in his work. This third factor is the moral ideal.

Consider first of all, Taylor's description of strong evaluation. It invokes what we might call standards: of goodness, fulfillment, nobility, etc. It is not contentious, I hope, to suggest that these are moral standards, and that moral ideals comprise such standards. Strong evaluation therefore presupposes some moral ideal, according to which first-order desires are appraised. The ideal forms the grounds of judgement. Strong evaluation is an evaluation of the extent to which our desires are in accord with our ideal.

Now consider the subject-referring imports: the shameful, the flagrantly wrongful, or the admirable, for example. Here again moral standards are employed, but in this case as designators of import. Simply knowing what "shameful" means is not sufficient. The ascription of the import "shameful", i.e., the emotional experience of shame, requires that this standard is not simply known, but in some sense is incorporated into our way of perceiving the world. The standard is internalized; it is adopted or adhered to; it is actively employed by the subject in structuring experience. The subject-referring emotions such as shame, indignation, or admiration, thus also presuppose a moral ideal, or set of moral standards. It is such an ideal that links the process of strong evaluation with the experience of the subject-referring or moral emotions. The ideal is common to both and equally necessary.

More specifically, on the basis of moral standards we derive strong evaluation second-order desires, and it is with respect to these desires that we experience moral emotions such as shame, indignation,

or admiration. The moral emotions are the affective response to perceptions of circumstances or events as significant in some way, to the realization of our strong evaluation second-order desires, that is, to the realization of our moral standards or moral ideal. These emotions necessarily involve subject-referring import ascriptions, since the ascriptions can only be explicated in terms of the subjective aspirations and desires, the moral ideals, with respect to which the emotions arise and the ascriptions derive their import.

It might be argued that subject-referring emotions may be experienced with respect to weak evaluation second-order desires. For example, Alan says he would prefer to drive a Mercedes and is ashamed he cannot afford one. This doesn't seem to presuppose a moral ideal: that driving a Mercedes is the noble, good, or fulfilling thing to do. It is a simple preference.

However, there is an important flaw in this counter-example. First consider the object of Alan's shame. Is it the lack of a Mercedes specifically? Would he feel this shame if he owned a Porsche or Lamborghini, but lacked a Mercedes? Probably not, for what is perceived as shameful here is not the lack of the Mercedes specifically, but the lack of financial resources to afford one. The Mercedes, therefore, is more than a simple preference; it is also a mark or measure of financial success. Shame derives from Alan's perception of "no Mercedes" as "failure to achieve that mark of financial success." Indeed, there is no presupposition that driving a Mercedes is the noble, good, or fulfilling thing to do. Rather, the moral ideal presupposed here is one concerning the nobleness, goodness, or fulfillment of financial achievement. This is evident in Alan's statement itself. He is

ashamed he cannot *afford* a Mercedes. This counter-example in fact supports my contention that the subject-referring emotions presuppose the same strong evaluation second-order desires as constitute the moral ideal. Alan does not feel shame with respect to his simple preference, but with respect to his failure to realize a strong evaluation second-order desire. He feels shame in perceiving his failure to instantiate his moral ideal.

An elaboration of what I mean by a "moral ideal" may further clarify some points. Ideals may be understood as forms of desires. I have implied this interpretation in speaking of the strong evaluation second-order desires as "constituting" the moral ideal. This poses a problem of the chicken-and-the-egg sort. If ideals themselves are second-order desires derived from strong evaluation, where were, or what were, the ideals that governed the strong evaluation of their origin?

This question may be partially answered by an appeal to current theories of moral development. Kohlberg, for example, sees moral development as a progress from heteronomous rules to autonomous principles. This distinction of heteronomy from autonomy leads to the suggestion that in early development the standards which govern strong evaluation are heteronomous: though employed by the child, these standards are in some sense external to her. The child, however, comes to be acquainted with the standards for strong evaluation. For example, a parent wishing to instil some sense of co-operation may reason with the child about sharing, may speak of a playmate's needs or interests, or make appeal to the child's "goodness." The child, though perhaps incapable of a strong evaluation of her desires in these terms, consents

to share her toys from a desire for the parent's commendation. Thus, moral standards, repeatedly invoked and elaborated, are made available for use by the child. Moreover, the repeated association of moral standards (though invoked by others and external to the child) with behavior desired by the child for other reasons (such as parental approval) may encourage their employment and eventual adoption as autonomous principles.

There is another way of looking at the question of the origin of moral standards and the initiation of strong evaluations based upon them. I invoke first Frankfurt's and Taylor's assertions that second-order desires, especially strong evaluation second-order desires, are uniquely distinguishing human attributes.[17] To be human is to evince a propensity to elaborate second-order desires. Secondly, I rely upon Jerome Kagan's observation that children at a very young age begin to form standards concerning how things should be, or ought to be, ideally.[18] Given these starting points, consider the following possibility.

Imagine in the very young child the presence of second-order desires, for example, the desire for parental love and approval. This desire initially may arise from a weak evaluation, that is, it is appraised simply in terms of the satisfaction it affords the child. However, if Kagan is correct, the child soon begins to categorize events and circumstances as good or bad, right or wrong, i.e., begins to conceive the ideal and the standards which constitute the good.[19] It is at this point that the child's weak evaluation second-order desire for parental approval may become a strong evaluation second-order desire. It changes from "I want to want Mummy's approval because it feels good," to "I want to want Mummy's approval because having her

approval is part of what ought to be, what is right and good." Hence the child's desire for approval is maintained because it accords with the child's representation of how things should be. I want to claim that the child, having formed a strong evaluation second-order desire, has internalized or adopted an autonomous moral principle. It is not "moral" in the sense that it is morally correct or even appropriate. It is "moral" to the extent that it identifies the child's conception of the good. With this principle, ideal, or strong evaluation second-order desire in place, the child may continue to conform to heteronomous rules: to share her toys, tell the truth, not hurt other children, etc. That such conformity occurs to ensure parental approval, rather than because the child recognizes the intrinsic moral worth of such behavior, does not mean the child is heteronomous and without her own moral principles. It only means that the child's conception of the good is still primitive and uneducated. Moral education becomes, therefore, the reforming and extension of those strong evaluation second-order desires which constitute the child's ideal. Moral development is not the progress from heteronomous rules to autonomous principles, but the change and development of the autonomous, albeit primitive, ideals already in place.

The purpose of this digression into developmental theory has been to show how strong evaluation second-order desires may become stable dispositions, and coextensive with the moral standards upon which further strong evaluations are based. I would like to spell out more clearly the essential sameness of moral principles and these strong evaluation second-order desires, or moral standards, which constitute the ideal.

Consider R.S. Peters's statement that moral principles "... *sensitize* us to features of a situation which are morally relevant."[20] Now sensitivity involves a recognition of, an attention and affording of significance to something. In other word, Peters's "sensitivity" is very like import ascription. Peters also speaks of "... sensitivity to aspects of a situation that are made morally relevant by a principle."[21] In other words, the sensitivity or import ascription derives from the moral principle. This is the basis of my argument for the co-essentialism of strong evaluation second-order desires (which I equate with moral standards or ideals) and moral principles. Peters describes a sensitivity "... to some considerations and not to others...," based on moral principle, whereas I speak in terms of moral emotion and subject-referring import ascription based on strong evaluation second-order desires.[22] One will speak of "sensitivity" and "moral principles" when one is interested in understanding and describing morality in terms of reason. However, to understand and describe morality in terms of the emotions and desires requires the concepts of import ascription and strong evaluation second-order desires. These concepts allow a clarification of the role of emotion and desire in morality, and furthermore, properly ground the question of moral motivation in the realm of desire, rather than the realm of reason. Moral principles, as I see them, are simply the conceptualization or articulation of the strong evaluation second-order desires.

I would like to tie together what has been said about desires, ideals, and moral emotions in the form of an example. I envisage the mature moral agent as one who has developed a moral ideal. This ideal comprises strong evaluation second-order desires. The experience of a

particular moral emotion, compassion for example, coincides with an import ascription. In the case of compassion, the import ascription involves the recognition of particular circumstances as an instance of human suffering.[23] This suffering is discordant with the ideal of human flourishing. The ideal, as desire, affords import to the recognition. The circumstance only comes to my attention, and is only afforded personal significance (i.e., becomes a matter of emotion), because the ideal from which it departs is personally desired. Hence compassion is, as are all emotions, a means of interpreting experience in terms of personal desires. It is a moral emotion because the desire involved is a strong evaluation second-order desire, i.e., a moral ideal. The import ascribed is subject-referring since it derives from an ideal of human flourishing, the meaning of which requires concepts like "thriving," "prosperous," "fulfilled," "enriched." These terms appeal to elements of subjective experience, and the import ascription cannot, therefore, be reduced to an account of objective physical properties. Put another way, the import ascriptions of moral emotions, such as compassion, are necessarily subject-referring in that they act as designators of discordance or accordance with desires and ideals which are themselves subject-referring.

Moral emotion, of course, is not the whole of morality. Needed as well are intent or action, both informed and guided by reason and knowledge. However, moral emotion is the necessary precursor of moral intent or moral action, for it is through moral emotion that we recognize and acknowledge the moral domain, and consequently are motivated to action within it. To use Taylor's terms, it is strong

evaluation and the subject-referring emotions which allow us to draw a moral map.[24]

There remains one difficulty to be considered. I claimed in chapter one that relationships are the substance of morality. To what extent is this assertion consistent with the ideas and interpretations I have advanced here?

Recall the example of Alan, who was ashamed that he could not afford a Mercedes. I suggested that this shame was the moral emotion coincident with Alan's perception of the lack of a Mercedes as a failure to realize a strong evaluation second-order desire: a failure to instantiate his moral ideal. Recall as well, the distinction made between relationships of power and relationships of connection. Now commonly, in thinking of relationships, what comes first to mind are examples of relationships of connection. In this context, it is difficult to see how Alan's moral ideal or moral emotion has anything to do with relationships. This is because shame, and the other moral emotions which derive from ideals concerning individualistic achievement or failure, rarely occur in this relational context. Rather, such moral emotions and moral ideals are associated with relationships of power. That this should be the case is more fully discussed in the next chapter. It may be as well here, however, to consider the "relationships" in Alan's case.

As discussed earlier, relationships of power are impersonal in that they are instrumental to the productive societal processes, which are themselves responses to the human desire for agency and effect. These relationships are perhaps better thought of as inter-role relationships, rather than interpersonal ones, for they obtain between the roles we

fulfill as individuals, rather than between our personal selves. Moreover, the tie between role and power is inextricable. The designation of role designates power, and the relative degree of power. Alan's moral ideal of financial achievement is the sort of ideal that arises within such a relational context. It presupposes individualistic agency, and the strong evaluation second-order desires which issue here are those to do with individual achievement or failure within a particular role. What the particular role may be is not terribly important. Alan may perceive his role as the provider for his family, or as a company executive, or as an important political personage. In one of these, or some other role, he develops the strong evaluation second-order desire for achievement, which he happens to measure by the financial wherewithal to afford a Mercedes. Alan's shame derives import from this strong evaluation second-order desire, which is elaborated in the context of relationships of power.

My assertion that relationships are the substance of morality is at least plausible, and not inconsistent with my proposed interpretation of moral ideals and moral emotions. The question of relationships in morality is an important one which deserves more detailed consideration than can be provided here. However, it has been necessary to consider the question, if only briefly, for the following reason. To this point I have presented an interpretation of moral ideals as strong evaluation second-order desires, with respect to which the moral emotions arise. I have also, in chapter one, described the relationships of power and of connection, the different societal processes they serve, and the different moral emphases associated with them. In the next two chapters I will examine and discuss particular

moral emotions as they occur first in relationships of power, and then in relationships of connection. It is my contention that these different kinds of relationships, and the societal processes they serve, promote the formation of different strong evaluation second-order desires, and hence the manifestation of different moral emotions. We turn now to the moral emotions associated with relationships of power.

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1 William Lyons, *Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 2. See also R. S. Peters, "The Education of the Emotions," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1977).

2 Lyons, *Emotion*, 35.

3 Charles Taylor, "Self-Interpreting Animals," *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Rather than as a form of judgement, emotion has been characterized in various other ways, ranging from Satre's idea of emotion as a magical view of the world, to Peters's passive perceptions. Reviews of these alternative interpretations include: Mary Warnock, "The Education of the Emotions," in D. E. Cooper ed., *Education, Values, and Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); William P. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling" in Paul Edwards ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), vol. 2, 479; Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Pres, 1984), chap. 6. See also references noted in footnote 1 above.

4 Ibid., 50.

5 Ibid., 50.
6 Ibid., 49-50, 72.
7 Ibid., 49-50.
8 Ibid., 54.
9 Ibid., 62.
10 Ibid., 55.
11 H. G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *Journal of Philosophy* 67 (January 1971): 5-20.
12 Charles Taylor, "What is Human Agency?" *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
13 Ibid.,16,19.
14 Ibid.,16.
15 Ibid., 26.
16 Taylor, "Self-Interpreting," 67.
17 Taylor, "Human Agency," 15-16.
18 Jerome Kagan, *The Nature of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), 124-126.
19 Ibid., 126.
20 R. S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and Rational Passions," *Psychology and Ethical Development* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), 285. (My emphasis.)
21 Ibid., 287.
22 Ibid., 286.
23 Lawrence Blum, "Compassion," in A. O. Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 511.
24 Taylor, "Self-Interpreting," 67.

Chapter 3: Moral Emotions in Relationships of Power.

The different types of interpersonal relationships establish different contexts of moral practice within which arise the different moral emphases on rights or care. Furthermore, the different relationships promote the formation of different sorts of strong evaluation second- order desires, and hence we will see different moral emotions in the two contexts. This chapter explores the moral emotions which are characteristic of relationships of power. First, a brief review of earlier remarks is necessary. I presented, in chapter one, the idea that relationships are functional, in that they are instrumental to the purpose or goals of different societal processes. Relationships of power are consistent with the productive societal processes, which are themselves responses to the human desire for agency and effect. I would like to begin by examining the way in which the child, in learning to participate in relationships of power, learns, at the same time, an emphasis on rights. Concurrently, the child is extending her conception of the good, identified by her strong evaluation second-order desires, in particular directions, and begins, therefore, to manifest certain moral emotions.

Coming to understand and successfully participate in relationships of power requires that the child recognize other persons as individuals with their own desires and purposes. This requires the child's first attributing to herself an individuality and separateness from the non-self. Once the child conceives her separateness, she can recognize her own agency and effect, i.e., her ability to modify and mark the world around her. Hence, the distinction of self from non-self is logically

prior to the child's conception of her power and effect. The child's first relationship of power is one between herself and a largely undifferentiated non-self. As the child comes to differentiate that class of objects recognized as persons, she attributes to them both the individuality and the agency she has recognized in herself. However, she must also recognize the idiosyncratic nature of desires in others, and the fact that these may conflict with her own. It is with the recognition of others as individuals with the agency to effect idiosyncratic desires that the child enters into relationships of power with other persons qua persons.

It is worth pointing out here that relationships of connection with other people also require the child to distinguish self from non-self, and to generalize the attributes of individual agency, desire, and purpose to others. Though the two types of relationship require certain common conceptual developments, they serve distinctly different ends. Moreover, they emphasize different aspects of the process of human individuation. Relationships of power recognize the differences and potential conflicts between our own desires and others'. Relationships of connection, however, rest on the commonness and universality of certain human needs and desires.

It is within relationships of power, and on the occasions of conflict of idiosyncratic desires or purposes, that the child comes to know a moral emphasis on rights. Consider the common admonitions: "Don't take that truck from your brother! He's playing with it." "No, no! Don't touch! Those are Mummy's papers." Implicit in such admonitions are the concepts of individual purposes and personal property which are to be respected, i.e., the concept of individual

rights and a respect for these rights. As the child matures, more explicit articulations of rights are possible. Long before this, however, the child employs the notion of rights. "That's not fair! He has a larger piece of cake than me." "You can't have that. It's my turn." In such appeals we hear a tacit invocation of rights. As the child comes to recognize the disparity between his own desires and those of others, comes, that is, to appreciate more fully the differences between human beings, so he comes to learn the moral emphasis on rights.

Of particular interest here, however, is the question of why relationships of power and a moral emphasis on rights should be associated with certain moral emotions rather than others. This association rests on the fact that underlying relationships of power and an emphasis on rights is the perception of others as *individual* beings, with desires distinct from and in possible conflict with our own. In contrast to relationships of connection, wherein the commonness of desires, interests, and purposes is accentuated, relationships of power rely upon the notion of the separateness and uniqueness of individuals. The strong evaluation second-order desires or moral ideals, which develop in this latter context, are therefore ones to do with individualistic achievement and accomplishment. With respect to these sorts of ideals we will see moral emotions such as pride, shame, arrogance, respect, esteem, admiration, contempt, envy and jealousy. The remainder of this chapter therefore examines these moral emotions associated with relationships of power. Such emotions are correctly regarded as moral in that they fulfill the criteria established in chapter two. To briefly recapitulate: moral emotions are those emotions which arise with respect to the strong evaluation second-order desires which

identify the subject's conception of the good. Secondly, the moral emotions involve subject-referring import ascriptions, since an explanation and understanding of the import requires appeal to subjective human experience, and the various desires, aspirations, and ideals implicit therein. Let us begin with pride.

Pride ascribes import to a situation or occurrence which is perceived as converging towards some ideal of personal achievement.[1] The particular incident which occasions the emotion may be anything from successfully riding a bicycle, to winning the Nobel prize. In the former case, the strong evaluation second-order desire may have something to do with demonstrable physical competence. In the second case, the moral ideal may involve notions of excellence in the pursuit of knowledge. Alternatively, the specific ideal, with respect to which the import ascription "the prideful" derives, may be other than these. For example, riding a bicycle may be perceived as according with an ideal "to be like the big boys." It is important to remember that the ideal itself is moral only in that it constitutes the subject's conception of what is right, proper, and good. Hence, occurrences which are perceived as instantiating an ideal of right, proper, or good achievement will occasion pride.

Arrogance also rests on the perception of personal accomplishment. However, unlike pride, the import ascription connected with arrogance involves the further implication of personal superiority. In other words, not only have I achieved something of which I can be proud, but this achievement demonstrates my superiority over others. Now the cognates, "arrogate" and "arrogation," have to do with unjust and unwarranted claims. It might be suggested, therefore,

that arrogance is simply unwarranted pride, i.e., the perception as achievement of that which is not. I think this sort of mistake we would more likely refer to as false pride, an illogical or unreasonably founded emotion. What is unwarranted in arrogance is rather its extension of achievement to that which confers superiority of person.

An interesting thing about arrogance is that though we may frequently attribute the emotion to others, it is rarely used as a term of self-description. That we may meaningfully attribute it to others, however, suggests it is not unknown in ourselves. If no-one, in fact, experienced arrogance, it is hard to imagine how we would recognize it in others. It might be argued that arrogance is not an emotion at all, but rather a character trait or disposition, stemming from the belief that one is superior to others. I would suggest, however, that arrogance is more than a belief in one's superiority; it is a feeling of superiority, a perception of oneself as higher or better than others. The underlying desire from which arrogance derives its import is thus broader than that which gives rise to pride. It involves not only an ideal of personal achievement, but an ideal of superior personal being. Pride recognizes right, proper, or good achievements; arrogance, on the basis of such achievement, designates superiority of being.

Pride and arrogance are distinguishable, therefore, since they involve different import ascriptions and different strong evaluation second-order desires. Both are different again from what we call false pride, which involves the ascription of "the prideful" to that which does not warrant the ascription. The clearest case is one in which the subject misinterprets low, or simply adequate performance as an achievement. A young boy, for example, may be proud of his ball playing, perhaps

his pitching. Had he the opportunity or the inclination to objectively compare his pitching with others of his ability and experience, he might recognize his pride as unfounded, based, that is, on inappropriately low standards of achievement. On the other hand, another player, with less ability, may in fact be rightfully proud to demonstrate the same level of performance. Hence, we cannot establish the appropriateness of pride simply on the basis of what has been done. Whether what has been done is correctly regarded as achievement or accomplishment depends upon what might ideally be done, all things being equal.

Given my interpretation of pride, the expression "I'm very proud of you" is incoherent, in that "you" are not my achievement, nor accomplishment. A close examination of the feelings which tend to prompt such statements suggests that this "pride" may be a misnomer. I might say, "I'm very proud of you," to my son, for example, when presented with an outstanding report card. My occurrent emotions, however, are more aptly described as delight in his pride and pleasure, and respect for his accomplishment. If this is tinged with pride, this reveals the unfortunate parental tendency to regard their children, and their children's success, as their own achievements. Hence parental pride is a form of false pride in one of two possible ways. Either it attributes to the self accomplishments rightfully belonging to another, or, more seriously still, it regards another (in this case, the child) as an achievement, some*thing* which is the product of the parent's effort and agency.

The difficulty with this suggestion is that it renders some quite ordinary locutions incoherent. Consider: "I'm proud of you, class. You did so well on the exam!" or "I'm proud of the government for the

stand they have taken on apartheid." The first case is very similar to the case of parental pride. A teacher, in experiencing such pride, perceives her students and her students accomplishments as her own achievement. I think this is a misperception. Teaching, like parenting, involves promoting the development of other individuals. In this sense, it is the job of teachers and parents to encourage and to teach certain skills and concepts which will allow the child to achieve various things (whether this be demonstrating knowledge on an exam, or tieing his shoe laces). While it is reasonable to feel proud of one's contribution towards or promotion of another's achievement, it is unreasonable to feel proud of the person himself, because *he* is not one's own personal achievement or accomplishment. To be proud of someone in this sense is to fail to recognize oneself as simply the instrument of the other's success. Another example: I recently said to my younger son, "I'm awfully proud of you, that you were brave enough to tell the truth about this." But what is this really saying? I am proud that he told the truth, i.e., that he behaved in a way in which I feel it is important to behave. But the behavior is *his*. While I may be rightly proud of any contribution I made to encourage this behavior, only he is properly proud of himself and his behavior. Why then do we so commonly use this locution, especially with children? I think this expression is used to convey two ideas. First, we are saying that we find the behavior commendable or praiseworthy. We are recognizing accomplishment. Secondly, and of equal importance, we are pointing out to the child that this accomplishment is something of which to be proud. We are teaching which occasions and occurrences are the proper objects of pride. Hence we may interpret the second example given above: "I'm proud of the

government for the stand they have taken on apartheid." This statement expresses our commendation of a moral stance, of which one may be rightly proud. To interpret "I am proud of the government" as an expression of my personal pride is reasonable only if I am responsible, to some extent, for the government's achievement. It would be coherent from the mouth of the Prime Minister. Otherwise, such a locution rests on a misperception of circumstances, one which fails to distinguish the proper author of the achievement.

To summarize, pride involves an ideal: a strong evaluation second-order desire for personal and individual achievement. The experience of the emotion is coincident with the ascription of congruence with, or convergence towards the ideal. Pride is distinguishable from arrogance, which confounds achievement with superiority of being. Statements such as "I'm proud of you" are, strictly speaking, logically incoherent, but serve nonetheless to denote occurrences which we find commendable and regard as proper occasions of pride. This last point is important and merits a further few remarks.

If, as this thesis attempts to show, moral emotions are fundamental to moral practice, then any theory of moral education must take the moral emotions into account. However, to connect education and the emotions requires that the latter be subject to criteria such as correct, appropriate, rational. I have shown that locutions such as "I am proud of you," exemplify ways in which we teach the appropriate objects of emotions. Further, the fact that we can identify false pride establishes that emotions are also subject to standards of rationality and correctness. It is intelligible, therefore, to speak of the education of the

moral emotions, in that we have, employ, and teach rationally grounded criteria applicable to these emotional experiences.

As pride recognizes achievement or accomplishment, so its converse shame recognizes failure. The import ascription "the shameful" consists of the subject's perception of his actions, beliefs, or intentions as falling short of some personal standard of achievement. Shame marks perceived divergence from the desired ideal, as pride marks convergence towards it. Again, as is the case with pride, the particular incidents which occasion the emotion of shame depend upon the subject's ideals, the strong evaluation second-order desires which constitute his conception of what is right and proper. We have open, therefore, the same possibilities for unwarranted shame as for unwarranted pride.

Interestingly enough, we may also use mislocutions here in order to teach the appropriate objects and occasions of shame. Perhaps as an idiosyncratic consequence of current child development theory, I cannot personally recall saying to a child, or to a class, "I'm ashamed of you." The expression, however, is not altogether uncommon. It conveys condemnation and points out an appropriate occasion of shame. Nevertheless, as a straightforward articulation of emotion it is a mislocution for the same reason as is "I am proud of you": it rests on a confusion as to who is the author of the shameful incident. Neither other's actions nor other's selves are the logically proper objects of my shame or my pride.

To further this line of argument, recall that I suggested that we are particularly prone to use the mislocution "I'm proud of you" with children, since it allows us to convey commendation and to point out to

the child an appropriate occasion of pride. That this is the function of such expressions is supported by the fact that we rarely use this expression when speaking to an equal or a superior. I remember once saying to my husband, "I'm very proud of you." I was immediately aware of some mistake in the statement. It didn't sound as well, nor elicit as unambiguous a response, as when addressed to one of my children. A further example: a friend and I were discussing her dissatisfaction with her husband. She reported her mother's complete failure to sympathize with her discontent. The mother had remarked, "But darling, he's so very proud of you." My friend, further incensed, had agreed that this was so, but replied that she could take care of being proud of herself. What she hoped for from a husband was respect, esteem, and admiration. She was not, she believed, something of which he had a right to be proud.

A further point concerning pride and shame becomes clear when we examine the statement "I am ashamed of having raised this child." This locution is unobjectionable in as much as there is no confusion here as to agency. Having raised the child, it is reasonable that I feel shame (or pride) with respect to this endeavour. Yet there may be a difficulty with this statement: a difficulty arising from a confusion as to the nature of child raising. The statement presumes that raising a child is something essentially accomplished or determined by the speaker. However, raising a child (like educating a child) is not a piece of work like writing a book, doing an experiment, or building a house. The difference is the same one that distinguishes the reproductive from the productive societal processes. It is right to feel pride and shame with respect to the products of our endeavors, the consequences of our

agency and effect. However, to ascribe the import shameful to to an endeavour like child raising, which is less the result of our agency and effect than of our connection and attachment, is, I suggest, a mistake. The point I am arguing here is quite straightforward. Of those things which we accomplish though our individual agency and effect, within relationships of power, we may be rightly proud or ashamed. Of those things which come about though attachment and community, within relationships of connection, we will feel other sorts of moral emotions such as joy, delight, guilt, or sorrow.

Personal anecdote cannot establish my argument that the proper objects of pride and shame are those occurrences consequential to one's own agency and effect. However, I hope that the points raised are at least persuasive. I have taken some trouble to clarify the nature of these two moral emotions because they are very important ones. First, the emotions of pride and shame strongly influence one's sense of self-esteem or self-worth. Of course, one's self-image comprises more than these two emotions. However, pride and shame, as well as being psychologically potent emotions are, I believe, among the earliest of the moral emotions to develop in the child (see the example in chapter 6). Hence, they are important precursors of other moral emotions such as admiration and contempt.

Admiration, like pride, ascribes import to achievement or accomplishment, but admiration recognizes these in another, pride, in oneself. Admiration, therefore, and its converse, contempt, are what we feel when we correctly attribute the authorship of another's achievement or failure. In close conjunction with admiration is the moral emotion of respect. Both emotions are an import ascription of

approval or commendation resting on the perception of another's actions as accomplishments or achievements. In other words, both admiration and respect recognize another's agency as successful, i.e., congruent with or convergent towards the subject's ideals.

What are the differences between these closely allied emotions? It is intelligible to say that I feel respect for a colleague, but not admiration. It strikes me as incoherent, however, to profess admiration and deny respect. It seems that the ascription "the admirable" entails "the respectful," while the reverse is not true. There is a further facet of admiration missing in respect. If I feel admiration for another, this emotion is coincident with a desire to be like that person. I am not suggesting that this desire to imitate is *part* of the emotion itself, but it is nonetheless a concomitant of it. On the other hand, I may respect a person or their achievements free from any desire to emulate them.

Respect, according to the Concise Oxford, is a feeling of deferential esteem. Given this definition, respect has certain parallels with arrogance, in that it presupposes a hierarchy of being, position, or power. Such deference is clear in statements such as "He respects the authority of the Church." It is less clear that an element of deference is necessarily part of our feelings of respect for other individuals. It is possible, for example, to respect a colleague without deferring to her. This notion of deference in respect becomes even more problematic in common statements such as: "I respect his work" or "I respect her." In the first case, I can respect someone's work, in finding it reputable, reliable, honest, etc., yet disagree with the findings, in which case I will certainly not defer to it. In the second case, if deference is implicit in expressing our respect for another person, this implies that we can only

respect those whom we recognize as superior in some way. These sorts of difficulties lead me to suggest that what we mean in saying "I feel respect for ... ," depends upon the object of respect. Most simply, my respect for another individual is a moral emotion which recognizes the worthiness of another's achievement or person. In contrast, my respect for another's work, position, or authority is perhaps more correctly described as an attitude, which may comprise a complex of emotions and beliefs, possibly, but not necessarily, including deference.

Let us consider now the moral emotions of jealousy and envy. The latter is akin to admiration, in that envy also ascribes import to the accomplishment or achievements of another in perceiving them as instantiations of the subject's ideal. However, feelings of envy differ from feelings of admiration in that envy presupposes a deficiency of self or circumstances, which renders the subject's realization of the ideal unlikely. As I argued above, in admiring someone we feel encouraged by their example. Their instantiation of the ideal seems to reaffirm its worth to us and to spur our own efforts towards it. Envy, on the other hand, arises with the perception of the other's achievement as something heretofore, and perhaps interminably, beyond our reach. Rather than experiencing encouragement, with envy we tacitly recognize the impediments to our realization of the ideal. This is why we often hear, associated with envy, criticisms of its object. For example, an intense sort of individual may report, "I envy my sister's serene disposition." In fact, he may idealize a way of being which is calm and tranquil, a disposition unruffled by ordinary excitements. Despite such aspiration, he knows that he cares too much about things generally to achieve such a dispassionate demeanour. He genuinely envies his sister, desiring to

be as she is. Yet on other occasions, he may criticize what he believes to be her means to this end: calling her insensitive and lacking in intelligence in her failure to recognize the proper significance of things. In this way, he may rationalize his own failure with respect to his ideal. However, it is with his implicit recognition that he is unlikely to realize, for whatever reasons, his strong evaluation second-order desire that he feels envy rather than admiration.

It might be argued that envy is not necessarily a moral emotion at all, since it may arise with respect to other than strong evaluation second-order desires. We may hear: "I envy her that beautiful home" or "I envy him his education." However, such statements convey more than "I wish I had a beautiful home" or "I wish I'd had the advantage of an education." It is important to separate the person from the possession or the accomplishment. We feel envious of people, not of things, though the grounds of our envy may be the things themselves: a beautiful home, an education, a serene disposition, etc. The desires with respect to which envy arises are not simply second-order desires, such as I want to want an education, or a beautiful home, because I prefer these over other things, or believe they are instrumental to the realization of other desires. Rather, envy stems from strong evaluation second-order desires: I want to want a beautiful home not simply because the realization of this desire would be pleasant or instrumentally valuable, but because the realization of this desire is a constituent of what I regard as right, proper, and good. Hence, as was pointed out in our discussion of pride, the particular achievement or possession which engenders the moral emotion will depend upon the subject's conceptualization of the ideal. Nevertheless, despite the variety of

circumstances which can occasion envy, it is a moral emotion in that these circumstances, whatever they are, are perceived by the subject as realizations of an ideal likely to be denied him.

Jealousy is a moral emotion closely allied with admiration and envy. It differs from the latter in that it has to do with another's possession or achievement perceived as rightfully one's own. Of a colleague who wins an outstanding award, I may feel envious. If, however, I believe that the award should properly have come to me, I will be jealous rather than envious. The experience of jealousy may, like the other moral emotions, arise in a variety of circumstances, again depending upon the particular strong evaluation second-order desires of the subject, and the extent to which he perceives the realizations of these ideals to be unjustly denied him. Perhaps this formulation most clearly distinguishes jealousy from envy. Both emotions involve the recognition that the subject's ideals have been realized by another. However, implicit in envy is the sense that the subject may not realize these herself, and hence envy contains an element of the simpler emotion of sadness. It involves seeing something one wants and does not have, and perhaps can never have. In contrast, jealousy is more closely akin to the simpler emotions of fear and anger, for one's failure to realize the ideal is due not to one's personal insufficiencies, but to the wrongful or unjust actions of others. Frequently, jealousy is tinged with paranoia.

Jealousy is an especially interesting moral emotion within the context of personal relationships. There are differences, worth exploring, between being jealous of a colleague's success, and being jealous of my husband's former [illegible] have associated jealousy with

relationships of power because it is an emotion founded on beliefs and ideals about the individualistic and competitive nature of agency and effect. However, it is an emotion that frequently occurs within what purport to be relationships of connection, i.e., within friendships and loving relationships. Despite this apparent inconsistency, I maintain that jealousy is a moral emotion associated with relationships of power. This can best be shown by an example provided and carefully elaborated by Vita Sackville-West.[2] In *No Signposts in the Sea*, Sackville-West recounts the thoughts and feelings of Edmund Carr, a man diagnosed as terminally ill, who chooses to spend his final weeks on a cruise because Laura, a woman whom he admires and comes to love, will be on the same cruise. As time proceeds, Carr experiences increasingly frequent and distorting bouts of jealousy, as a healthy and handsome colonel competes for Laura's attention. Carr reflects:

> Yet what right have I to scrutinize much less to criticize the way she chooses to pursue? It is natural that she should prefer the company of her social equals... I have unwittingly become too possessive in my thoughts, too prone to regard her as *my* friend, *my* Laura, to whom nobody else had any claim.[3]

This example clearly delineates the foundations of jealousy. While Carr wishes to promote a friendship, a relationship of connection, he carries into it ideals, beliefs, perceptions, and emotions more appropriate to relationships of power, namely the notions of rights and possessions. Carr realizes his error, but sadly is unable to free himself from the illusion that Laura's attention and affection are the sort of things he earns or accomplishes: the sort of things, in fact,

which are subject to his agency and effect. This illusion or misconception is similar to one discussed earlier, concerning the parent ashamed of having raised her child. In that case, the parent misconceived the nature of the reproductive process of child raising. The misconception which underlies jealousy of another for the attention, affection, or love of a third party, also confuses reproductive with productive processes. Jealousy confounds love mediated by connection, with achievement effected by power.

In this chapter, I have described some of the moral emotions which arise in the context of relationships of power. Those presented do not, in any way, represent an exhaustive catalogue. Rather, I have chosen them because they are fairly common emotions, with sufficient similarities and distinctions among them to allow a development of my ideas about moral emotions. There are other moral emotions associated with relationships of power, and these include: indignation, pity, moral repugnance, and adulation. There are likely others to be identified as well.

These particular moral emotions emerge within relationships of power, since these relationships promote the development of particular moral ideals having to do with individualistic achievement or accomplishment. I have tried to outline how the conception of the individual as one with the agency to effect idiosyncratic desires, which may differ from and perhaps conflict with our own, leads to the need for and invocation of rights. I have also attempted to show how the child, while learning to participate in relationships of power, learns the notion and invocation of rights. These concepts of individual agency, idiosyncratic desire, and rights must be in place before such moral

emotions as pride, envy, or admiration can occur. How can we, for example, be jealous of another's achievement, without the concept of "mine by rights"? How can we even recognize achievement, without the concept of individualistic agency?

The emotions we have examined exemplify those which stem from the moral ideals which arise within relationships of power, and hence, in conjunction with an emphasis on rights. In the following chapter, I examine the moral emotions in relationships of connection, in hopes of further elucidating my interpretation of relationships, moral ideals, and moral emotions.

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1 Possibly there are instances of amoral pride. Such cases involve an accomplishment or achievement congruent with a first-order or a weak evaluation second-order desire, and independent of the moral ideal or any conception of the good life. I may. for example, feel proud of myself for successfully completing a particularly difficult job, such as wallpapering my stairwell. I am proud of this accomplishment, but it can be quite independent of my moral ideal.

2 Vita Sackville-West, *No Signposts in the Sea* (London: Virago Press, 1985).

3 Ibid., 79.

Chapter 4: Moral Emotions in Relationships of Connection.

Relationships of connection, in contrast to relationships of power, arise in response to the human desire for attachment and community. These relationships involve both participation in and promotion of the interests of others, and a reciprocal recognition and support by others (not necessarily the same "others") of one's own desires and purposes. It is relationships of connection which mediate the reproductive societal processes, since these require the security and support of community to ensure their success. The bearing, rearing, educating, and fulfilled development of an individual cannot be accomplished by that individual alone. Whereas productive processes can be imagined within a "society" of one member (despite the loss of efficiency and effectiveness this might entail), the full range of reproductive processes cannot imaginably occur in such a context. The reproductive processes require more than self; they require the self and other in relationships of connection.

Associated with relationships of connection is a moral emphasis on care. Fundamental to these relationships, and to this moral emphasis, is the conception of humans as individual beings who, despite their apparent idiosyncrasies, share certain desires and needs which may be satisfied through co-operation and reciprocation.

It requires pointing out, perhaps, that such desires and needs do not disappear on the achievement of mature adulthood. The reproductive processes, which the relationships of connection serve, involve more than the immature of the species as an object, and more than the fecund adult as subject. The purpose of these processes is

broader than the raising of future generations; it concerns as well the fulfillment of potentials within the current generations.

A moral emphasis on care, within the context of the reproductive processes and relationships of connection, entails different moral emotions than does an emphasis on rights. In the latter case, the ideals which inform the moral emotions in relationships of power, rest upon the notion of a person as a distinct, individualistic, and powerful being. In contrast, the moral emotions associated with an emphasis on care in relationships of connection, derive from ideals which presuppose attachment and community as necessary human attributes. The distinction, therefore, between different families of moral emotions associated with different types of relationships, rests upon distinct fundamental conceptions of what it means to be human.

As I will argue in the next chapter, neither of these conceptions of human nature is adequate on its own. As there is a requirement in human culture for both productive and reproductive processes, so too there is a requirement that individuals ably contribute to both these sorts of processes. In order to contribute ably, individuals must function within both relationships of power and relationships of connection; they must recognize that power and competition are only one facet of being human, and that the necessary complement for completeness includes connection, co-operation and care.

The moral emotions which arise in the context of relationships connection are properly classified as moral according to the same criteria as were discussed earlier. They coincide with subject-referring import ascriptions which derive from strong evaluation second-order desires constitutive of a moral ideal. However, it quickly becomes

apparent that these emotions, the ideals from which they derive import, and the import ascriptions themselves, are much more difficult to articulate than was the case for the moral emotions in relationships of power. It is perhaps worth mentioning that in coming to this realization I was somewhat surprised: for it is this family of emotions, including affection, trust, gratitude, compassion, guilt, and grief, among others, that have frequently been objects of attention and reflection in my own life. The challenge of trying to explicate such emotions was unanticipated, and, I must admit, the difficulties have not eased with practice. This observation has significance, I believe, when one considers the possible reasons for such difficulties. Recall that relationships of power are instrumental to the productive societal processes which are primarily associated with the public domain. I suggest that historically, philosophy has attended far more to questions within this sphere that to questions within the private sphere, the more usual context of relationships of connection and the reproductive processes. It is a matter of contention, perhaps, but it is this disparity of attention, I believe, which makes the exposition of the moral emotions in relationships of connection so very much more difficult a task. It is not the case that this is an area of investigation which precludes, by its very nature, precision or clarity. Rather, it is an area of significance in our understanding of human being and moral being, which requires at least the same degree of speculation and analysis which has been rendered to the productive processes and the public domain. What follows, therefore, might kindly be considered a preliminary foray into largely uncharted regions.

I wish to examine first the emotion of affection. Some may immediately challenge my referring to this state as an emotion at all, preferring to regard it as a disposition or attitude. Indeed we frequently use the word in this way in such locutions as: "She is an affectionate person," or "He shows her much affection." However, the attribution of such dispositions or attitudes is made on the basis of repeated manifestations of the occurrent emotion. To say, therefore, that affection is an attitude or disposition in no way precludes its also being an occurrent emotion. Rather, the designation of an affectionate attitude or disposition presupposes some prior demonstration of the emotion itself. The occurrent emotions, if you like, are the seeds of emotional dispositions and attitudes. That we use "affection" to denote an emotion (as well as a disposition or an attitude) is apparent in such expressions as: "She had lost the slightest feeling of affection for him," or "In her absence she rarely crossed his mind, but he was filled with a warm and lively affection for her when she appeared."

If I am justified in regarding affection as an emotion it should be possible to describe the sorts of feelings or sensations attendant on it, and to articulate its import ascription. First, the experience of affection involves a sense of warmth and closeness. The import ascription coincident with such feelings is not easily made clear, but involves the recognition of a mutuality of well-being. In other words, affection is the perception of an identity between my own interests and desires and those of another, in such a way that impairment or advancement of the other's well-being necessarily impairs or advances my own. I am speaking here of something more than either sympathy or empathy. Though both may facilitate affection, they are different from it.

Empathy allows us to comprehend another's state, and sympathy, to share it. Affection however perceives its object as intrinsically of import to me. While I may understand and share another's joy or anguish, this does not ensure my affection for them. On the other hand, to perceive an object of my affection as joyful causes me pleasure, even without knowing the source of such joy; in the same way, perceiving him or her as anguished will cause me distress.

It becomes necessary now to substantiate my interpretation of affection as a moral emotion: one deriving from a strong evaluation second-order desire. This is perhaps best accomplished by comparing it with liking. Liking is an emotion which arises with respect to either first-order desires, or weak evaluation second-order desires. The first case coincides with what we frequently speak of as attraction. The sorts of first-order desires involved may include: I want to speak to this person; I want to get to know something about this person; I would like to see this person again. Weak evaluations of such first-order desires will appraise them in terms of their overall personal satisfaction. For example, the desire to see the person again may be weighed in terms of its convenience, in terms of its strength relative to contemporaneous desires, or in terms of its consistency with other desires or goals. Thus, if I know that the individual to whom I am attracted is strongly disliked by a current friend, the desire to see this individual again may conflict with my desire to preserve the friendship. Alternatively, my attraction to this individual, my desire to see more of him, may be of sufficient strength to override such considerations. In either case, what results from the weak evaluation is one of the following second-order desires. I want to want to see this person again or, I do not want to want to see

this person again. Given the establishment of desires of this form, based on these sorts of reflective evaluations, we might reasonably regard the subject as liking, or not liking, the individual in question.

Now, liking need not necessarily lead to affection. The distinctions made between an acquaintanceship, a friendly acquaintanceship and a friendship rest, I suggest, on the different emotions involved. We may intelligibly report, "I always liked her, but now I feel we're friends," alluding to different forms of interpersonal interaction involving different emotions. It is in friendship, one of the relationships of connection, that we commonly experience affection. This emotion is distinguished from liking in that the desire with respect to which it arises is a strong evaluation second-order desire. In other words, the reflective evaluation is based not on grounds of convenience or strength of preference, but on considerations of the extent to which such desires are consistent with an ideal of human fulfillment, completeness, flourishing, or well-being. The emotion of affection coincides with the ascribing of import to some person perceived as promoting, expanding, or extending this way of being. That the ascription derives its import from desires appraised on moral grounds, rather than simple preference or convenience, is attested to by the fact that we speak of "claims of affection." In contrast, we do not associate liking someone with claims of any sort. Indeed, the emotion of affection may pave the way for all sorts of unpleasant experiences, or claims upon us, separate from that sense of warmth, ease, and attachment which marks the occurrent emotion.

I have attempted to argue a plausible case for affection being regarded as a moral emotion. The difficulties of explication, mentioned

earlier, are by now readily apparent, and call for the following observation. As was perhaps evident in chapter three, the moral emotions of the relationships of power exhibit a common thread. All the strong evaluation second-order desires constitutive of the moral ideal, and with respect to which those moral emotions derive their import, make reference to the notion of achievement. Pride, admiration, shame and all the others mentioned, derive from the perception of the self or the other as instantiations of some ideal of individual accomplishment, or its antithesis, failure. Such concepts and ideas are relatively straight- forward and easy to lay out. While the emotions in relationships of connection also exhibit a common thread, this thread is more difficult to pick out clearly. The term that comes closest is perhaps fulfillment. The moral ideals which ground these emotions all require some concept, however elusive, of fullness or completeness of being: an enrichment, flourishing, or extension of the self beyond its individualistic endeavors and merits.

In the hope that examples may at least illustrate that which I am at present unable to explicate more clearly, I would ask the reader to consider the following. The purpose of this example is twofold. First, it allows the examination of certain other moral emotions in the context of relationships of connection. Secondly, it provides an illustration of the coincidence and simultaneity of quite different sorts of moral emotions.

Imagine two close friends who have worked together on a common project, say a paper for joint publication. Friend A, for reasons unknown, and unbeknownst to B, has plagiarized an obscure author in his section of the work. Friend B eventually spots the

plagiarism, but only after the paper has been accepted for publication. What moral emotions might B experience in these circumstances?

First, it must be noted that this situation involves both productive and reproductive processes, and therefore both relationships of power and of connection. Hence we might expect indignation and contempt, moral emotions associated with relationships of power to issue here. A, in the process of a co-operative productive project, has jeopardized B' s reputation. His departure from the standards of honesty (inherent in B's concept of academic achievement), impugn not only his own integrity, but B's as well. B may feel strongly indignant in the face of such flagrant wrong-doing, which potentially confounds his own aspirations. Moreover, in perceiving A's actions as an impediment to B's prudential desires, (for promotion or tenure, for example), B may feel intensely angry. The emotion of anger, arising with the perception of threat or impediment to the realization of weak evaluation second-order desires, is an amoral emotion, and a very likely one in the circumstances. Let us examine, however, the moral emotions associated with the relationship of connection.

A first and obvious one might be a feeling of profound disappointment or hurt. B, in his affection for the plagiarist, still sees this wrong-doing as a departure from the ideal, but in recognizing the mutuality of their well-being feels a disappointment in A, as he might feel shame in himself had B authored the plagiarism. As well, B may feel betrayed by A, that is, let down and distressed to discover that A doesn't warrant his trust, having apparently failed to consider B's interests in the matter. Other moral emotions of connection may also come into play. B may feel concern, for example, in wondering what

possibly adverse circumstances may have prompted A to plagiarize. B may even feel compassion for A, in perceiving this as an instance involving suffering on A's part, so convinced is B of A's essential integrity. Eventually, B may perhaps experience a feeling of forgiveness. This moral emotion rests on the recognition of failure, or departure from the ideal, as inevitable in human experience, but not irreparable. Forgiveness reaffirms affection, for it recognizes the other as still integral to oneself despite his failure, and as likely to benefit more from maintained affection than from abandonment.

This example of the plagiarist and his friend shows, first of all, the wide diversity of moral emotions which may occur in a given instance. Which of these in fact occur will be a function of the strength of the strong evaluation second-order desires which the circumstances thwart or promote. In other words, whether B determines to regard this incident as an unforgivable, hurtful betrayal, or with compassionate forgiveness, depends upon the constitution of his moral ideal. All sorts of contingencies will influence his actual behavior and actions, for example, the plagiarist's response on being confronted with his wrong-doing. The moral emotions manifest strong evaluation second-order desires, the relative strengths of which will determine which emotions predominate.

Another important point demonstrated in this example is that different types of moral emotions may occur simultaneously. In this case, indignation, an emotion associated with relationships of power, may coincide with compassion, a moral emotion of relationships of connection. To appraise the desirability of such diverse emotions, it is necessary first to establish the object of the exercise, so to speak. It is

important to B to remedy the plagiarism. Various avenues are open to accomplish this, some less humiliating and potentially harmful than others. Some would argue that this moral response is all that is needed, some rectification of the dishonesty, and that further moral considerations are not pertinent: "... for there are circumstances and occasions when emotions, even emotions such as compassion, are not morally relevant."[1] Let me argue that such interpretations curtail morality by regarding as sufficient remedial actions which redress only part of the moral wrong. B, in his relationships with A, is involved not only in plagiarism, but also in friendship. Both reproductive and productive processes are at work. Therefore, to regard B's compassion as morally irrelevant here, is to neglect the morally relevant factor of friendship, and to attribute to A and B a singleness of purpose (namely, a productive process) that incompletely characterizes their endeavor. Such an interpretation limits moral considerations to the productive processes, relationships of power, an emphasis on rights, and the individualistic desires for agency and effect. I hope the plagiarism example makes evident the fact that morality may encompass more than these. Moral considerations may need to accommodate as well: the reproductive processes, relationships of connection, an emphasis on care, and the human desires for attachment and community. In the next chapter I will elaborate this argument more fully. Here, I only wish to suggest that emotions necessarily moral, such as compassion, are necessarily morally relevant.

To return to more general considerations of the moral emotions in relationships of connection, it should be noted that these emotions are as much subject to scrutiny in terms of appropriateness and correctness,

as were the moral emotions in relationships of power. Clearly, the experience of these emotions may also derive from false beliefs, misinterpretations, or misperceptions. Guilt is a good example. The import ascription coincident with feeling guilty perceives one's actions or omissions as having detracted from another's well-being. This emotion need not entail sorrow. I may own the consequences of my actions as harmful, and feel guilty, (i.e., distressed that I caused this harm), without feeling sorrow for the person thus harmed. However, guilt may issue from false beliefs or misapprehensions of the circumstances. What is perceived as harm or harmful may in fact be otherwise. Furthermore, guilt may arise from illusory notions of one's own influence or effect on others. I am thinking here of situations wherein one assumes responsibility for harm which was the consequence of entirely unrelated actions or events. I may, for example, feel guilty when an acquaintance fails an exam, because I enticed her away from her books the night before it was scheduled. However, the harmful consequence, the failure, may well result from numerous other causes: lack of ability, a case of nerves, or inadequate preparation which could not be remedied in a final night of study. Questionable here too may be the description of my actions as enticement. If I did entice my friend from her studies, this presupposes that she genuinely desired to study, and I in some way distracted or diverted her from the realization of this desire. It may be the case, however, that her desire to study, even if professed, was not genuine, and that I and my suggestions for alternative ways to spend the evening were just the excuse she was looking for. Even more clear cut examples of unreasonable or inappropriate guilt occur frequently in mothers, on the death, illness, or

even the misbehavior of a child. They assume responsibility for, and claim ownership of consequences which may very well be entirely beyond their control.[2] As Dewey says: "The final outcome is determined by a multitude of causes of which the one acting can foresee only a few."[3] The contingent nature of consequences, posits Dewey, frees us from moral responsibility for the outcome. While I disagree with Dewey's interpretation of moral responsibility, it remains clear that certain moral emotions, such as guilt, may stem from a misperception and exaggeration of personal responsibility.

An interesting example, relevant to questions concerning the development of moral standards and ideals, occurs in the case of gratitude. This moral emotion ascribes import to those actions of others which are perceived as beneficial to one's own well-being. In a sense, gratitude is the antithesis of disappointment in affection, which I described earlier. Gratitude does not require supererogatory actions of another. It may be felt as strongly when a friend exhibits a simple thoughtfulness, as when a stranger relieves some dire need. What is necessary for the experience of gratitude is the recognition of another as acting on one's own behalf. The developmental issue which is interesting here is that children, from a very young age, are taught to say "Thank you." In other words, children are taught to express gratitude long before they can feel it. In an earlier chapter, I discussed how parental exhortations may reinforce particular behaviors, and simultaneously acquaint the child with the moral standards required for strong evaluation. The two-year old's "thank you," of course, is an example of a child's conformity to moral standards for prudential reasons. It is a paradigm of the virtuous act done for non-virtuous

reasons. Why it is worthy of note, however, is that it suggests that the child's learning and adoption of moral standards may involve not only listening, and compliant behaviors (including speech acts), but also an increasing understanding of language and meaning. The child may say "thank you" as a habit but come, nonetheless, to understand that these words express a particular emotion. The child learns of this emotion through others, on those occasions when their gratitude is manifested and articulated. Moreover, in learning the occasions appropriate to the expression, the child learns the occasions appropriate to the emotion. All of this applies equally well to the emotion of sorrow, and the child's habitual statement "I'm sorry." Thus, adult exhortation may help acquaint the child with the moral standards, as training and habituation help to define the occasions of their application; and adult manifestations of the moral emotions increase the child's awareness and understanding of the emotions themselves.

I would like to conclude this chapter with some remarks concerning joy. Is this a moral emotion, and if so, why one associated with relationships of connection? The experience of joy involves feelings of celebration, of delight, of affirmed well-being. It coincides with the import ascription of achievement, or attainment of something particularly worthy, which in some sense enriches us, fulfills us, contributes to human flourishing. How then is joy distinguished from pride or admiration, those moral emotions in relationships of power which also ascribe import to achievement? What renders joy distinct is the concept of attachment or community which is inherent to it. We can speak intelligibly of pride, respect, or shame as private emotions. Joy, however, though it may not be made public (i.e. remain unexpressed),

requires some sense of connection in order to be experienced. In a parallel way, pride and admiration require the concept of individual agency and effect, in order that they may be felt. Joy is an emotion denied to the detached person, whereas the other two are not.

The necessarily non-individualistic nature of joy is perhaps best brought out in its description as a sense of celebration. Celebration is a sharing, and sharing requires more than one. Congratulations, which occasions of celebration call for, are, according to the Concise Oxford, expressions of sympathetic joy. It appears we lack a name for this further moral emotion of "sympathetic joy." Well-wishing or benevolence do not quite do the job, for they do not require joy. I may genuinely wish someone well prior to her surgery, certainly not an occasion involving joy.

That joy be classified as a moral emotion requires first a subject-referring import ascription. The ascription in the case of joy is clearly subject-referring, since the concept of an enriching or fulfilling attainment cannot be explicated by the detailing of objective physical properties. The second characteristic of moral emotions requires that joy be the affective response to instantiations of strong evaluation second-order desires. Strong evaluation, recall, is the appraisal of desires in terms of their intrinsic worth: their profoundness, refinement, nobility, fulfillingness. It is only such strong evaluation desires that can provide the categories for the ascription of enriching attainment, which joy recognizes. It is only such second-order desires which can afford the circumstances of joy their import.

Given all this, can a hermit be joyful? Yes: and a consideration of why this is so allows the elaboration of an important, and heretofore

unexamined difficulty with my interpretation of the moral ideals and moral emotions.

Before we immediately tackle the question of the joyful or joyless hermit, there is a more fundamental question to be addressed. If, as I have stipulated, interpersonal relationships are the substance of morality, is the hermit therefore amoral? I suggest not, for the simple reason that the hermit has not always been a hermit. She may have in place strong evaluation second-order desires which constitute her moral ideal, and which have developed in earlier relationships of power and connection. The hermit has simply removed herself from those situations, circumstances, and interactions that call for morality, i.e., that invoke or require the moral ideal.

The hermit, therefore, may be moral, but, given my interpretation of joy, may she be joyful? I have said that the moral emotions derive their import from strong evaluation second-order desires. All moral emotions may be so characterized. However, there are other strong evaluation second-order desires, besides those which constitute the moral ideal. With respect to these issue emotions similar to but distinguishable from the moral emotions. The two clearest examples of what I have in mind are those desires which make up what we might call the aesthetic ideal and the spiritual ideal. These will provide the import ascriptions for the aesthetic and the spiritual emotions. Therefore, while the hermit's isolation precludes what I have described as the moral emotion of joy, it does not preclude aesthetic or spiritual joy.

The question of the joyful hermit opens a further avenue for exploration. I can do no more here than intuit that it will prove to be

an exciting and enlightening exploration. With respect to the work at hand, two points of importance arise. First, though I am unprepared to defend the contention here, I believe that the spiritual and aesthetic ideals and emotions are closely allied with those of the moral, even beyond the fact that all three involve strong evaluation second-order desires. Furthermore, it seems likely to me that an examination of the spiritual and aesthetic will augment our understanding of the moral. Secondly, and perhaps of greater immediate importance is the point that while all moral emotions derive their import from strong evaluation second-order desires, such types of desire may constitute other than the moral ideal and, therefore, the grounds of other than moral emotions.

The moral emotions in relationships of connection rest upon ideals which conceive the human individual as aspiring to a fulfillment or flourishing of being through the reproductive processes. Relationships of connection, given the rarity of purely productive or reproductive processes in human activities, characterize many human interactions. Moral theory, therefore, must as well accommodate these relationships, the associated moral emotions, and the entailed emphasis on care, as it presently accounts for relationships of power and the moral emphasis on rights.

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1 This statement is not a verbatim quotation, but is placed in quotation marks for emphasis. Though expressed in other words, arguments like this were made to me by Jerry Coombs and others during a seminar at the University of British Columbia during the spring of 1986.

2 Jean Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 196. See also H. G. Lerner, *The Dance of Intimacy* (New York: Harpers & Row, 1989), 186-188.

3 John Dewey, "Moral Control," *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Vol.2, 1887* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), 343-344.

Chapter 5: The Significance of the Moral Emotions and an Argument for a Breadth of Ideals.

At this point it becomes possible to tie together some of the ideas and interpretations which have been advanced, and to consider in a broader context the moral emotions and their place in moral practice. Till now, such discussion was hampered by the need to examine particular aspects of emotion and morality. It was necessary to take the larger question apart, so to speak, to scrutinize its components in the previous four chapters. First, I argued for the two different relationships which serve the human drives for power and connection: drives which are arguably innate and which are realized in the societal processes of production and reproduction. Thus the two types of relationships are differentiated on the basis of different kinds of human desire and endeavor, and represent different contexts of morality, informed and motivated by different sorts of moral ideals. It was then necessary to examine the different forms of desire, the way in which emotions arise with respect to these, and to identify the strong evaluation second-order desires with moral ideals. The moral emotions, then, are those emotions whose import ascriptions derive from the strong evaluation second-order desires which constitute the subject's ideal of what is right, good or proper. To examine specific moral emotions it was necessary to turn again to the distinguishable contexts of either relationships of power or relationships of connection, as within these, different sorts of ideals are at work with respect to which arise different moral emotions.

The difficulty with this breaking down into component parts is that, while necessary for the elaboration of a theory, it presents too narrow a perspective for the consideration of larger questions. Hence, the present chapter attempts to work with a reassembled whole in order to examine the feasibility of my thesis in a broader context. To begin, I wish to consider the inevitability, and the significance of the moral emotions.

If my interpretation of moral emotion is correct, then it follows that moral emotions are an inevitable part of moral experience. They are a logically necessary element of being moral. I reason as follows. Moral practice is motivated, as are all human practices, by desire. Moral practice is distinguished from what we might call prudential practice by the different kinds of desires underlying each. The particular desires which give rise to moral reasoning, judgement, or action are the strong evaluation second-order desires. If such desires are in place, it is inevitable that with respect to these, certain emotions will arise. Apparent desires, in the absence of any attendant emotion, are not true desires. This is not a stipulative claim, but one which follows from my interpretation of the nature of desire and emotion. It is through the emotions that those facets of experience calling for action, be it prudential or moral, come to our attention. We are moved to consider, reason about, reflect, or act upon those things, occurrences, or states of affairs which are perceived as affecting the realization of our desires. The ascription of import, the experience of emotion, picks out these things. The moral emotions are like a screen sifting our experience, selecting and holding up for attention certain elements thereof. I take as given that the world must inevitably move in ways

which impede or promote the realization of particular desires. Only if such impediments or promotions remain unrecognized by the subject, can he be devoid of all emotion in the presence of desires. Such a situation I suggest, could only obtain in the case of extensive fantasy and psychosis. Allowing for the counter-example of pathology, therefore, and given the way of the world and the nature of desire, emotion is an inevitable human accoutrement. Specifically, given the establishment of strong evaluation second-order desires, which constitute the moral ideal, moral emotions are an inevitable part of moral being.

I hope it is clear that I am not arguing for a life continually suffused with emotion. We may be as frequently unaware of particular emotions, as we are of particular beliefs. For example, the desire with respect to which some emotion arises, may not be an especially pressing one. As a result, the prick of the emotion may fail to rise to the level of our conscious attention. Even if we are aware of some emotion, even a strong emotion, this need not necessarily distract us from concurrent activities. Indeed, the extent to which we allow our attention to focus on our emotions, the extent to which we allow them to influence our behavior, beliefs, and intentions, and to be made manifest to others, will be largely idiosyncratic: a function of the sum of our personality, character, and experience. I am not therefore putting forth the claim that we are all and always in the wash of emotion, but rather that the moral emotions are a necessary concomitant of the strong evaluation second-order desires, though our awareness and manifestation of these emotions may vary.

An analogy here may be useful. I suggest that the moral emotions are to the strong evaluation second-order desires much as visual

perceptions are to cognitive beliefs. As we would not expect a person, lacking the concept "tree," to be able to report "I see a tree," so an individual lacking an ideal of achievement could not meaningfully state "I feel proud." Alternatively, given that the appropriate concepts are in place, we might reasonably expect a person, standing before a table and asked to report what he saw, to respond "I see a table." In the same way, given that certain ideals concerning human well-being are held, a person confronted with an occasion of human suffering and asked what he felt might be expected to reply, "I feel compassion," or sorrow or pity, etc. As we do not expect anyone to remark upon nor be consciously aware of every tree or table within visual range, so too we do not expect anyone to be continuously reporting or attending to their pride, compassion, or pity. That such perceptions, be they visual or emotional, go unremarked or even unnoticed is due to the limitations of human attention. Moreover, if I asked you to describe the colour of a cow and you replied it was purple, I would think that something was amiss either with your eyes or your understanding (discounting for the moment the possibility of humour). So, too, in the face of suffering, if you reported feeling jealous, I should suspect either that your strong evaluation second-order desires were very different from mine, or that something was peculiar to your perceptual construction of the experience.

The analogy is not perfect, but the parallel is clear. As visual perceptions are categorizations of visual sensory experience based on cognitive beliefs, so the moral emotions are categorizations of our integrated sensory and cognitive experience, based on the strong evaluation second-order desires. Visual perceptions, though

unremarked and perhaps unnoticed, go on given that certain concepts are in place. So too do moral emotions occur, given established moral ideals.

Now, even if it is agreed that moral emotions are an integral part of being moral, it is still possible to question their moral significance. It has been suggested to me that in certain circumstances emotions, moral or otherwise, are simply not morally relevant. An example may help clarify the issue. An employee has been caught stealing tools from the mill where he works and subsequently selling them. If the man is charged and convicted he will serve a prison term, and carry thereafter a criminal record which will likely preclude future employment in his previous capacity. However, somewhat extenuating circumstances gave rise to this unfortunate state of affairs. The individual concerned, through no fault of his own, got himself badly in debt through dealing with unscrupulous investors. Payments of the debt were such that his family genuinely suffered from the lack of necessities such as food, clothing, and adequate shelter. It was these circumstances which drove the man, previously reliable and trustworthy, to steal.

The question here is whether or not the compassion we might feel for this individual's plight is a factor of moral relevance. Some would argue it is not, and that the only relevant fact is the deliberate theft of another's property. While we might feel compassion, it is not something which should influence our moral considerations. However, it is not clear to me, in this case or in others like it, why we should not be guided by our moral emotions as well as by disinterested, principled moral reasoning. The experience of compassion brings to our attention that this incident deviates from our ideal of human flourishing. In fact,

if we reflect upon this import ascription and the particulars facts on the basis of which the ascription is made, we may be led to devise an alternative moral response: one which accommodates restitution to the injured party, but not at the expense of innocent bystanders such as the man's family, nor at the cost of the man's never recovering from the consequences of his wrong-doing.

I suggest that an exclusive reliance on disinterested, principled moral reasoning tends to abstract morality from its proper setting, i.e. from the web of human relationships. It is, I believe, our disproportionate concern for the productive societal processes and the attendant relationships of power, which leads to our frequent emphasis on rights, and extensive reliance on principled reason. Within both relationships of power and relationships of connection, however, morality is broadened and made more concrete through the examination of our moral emotions. Consider how frequently apparently disinterested and well reasoned moral judgements are in fact tinged with pride, envy, or admiration. Again, I am not proposing here a moral life guided only by emotion. However, I am suggesting that as the moral emotions are an integral part of being moral, and as these emotions broaden and deepen our moral considerations in stemming, as they do, from particulars of the case, they are rightly regarded as relevant to our moral considerations.

There is a further argument in favour of the significance of the moral emotions, and that is their role in moral education. I will elaborate this argument more fully in the next chapter. Here, I wish only to point out that the moral emotions allow us, through the articulation of their import ascriptions, to get at the underlying moral

ideals. These strong evaluation second-order desires are themselves subject, thereby, to modification, extension, and amelioration. Moreover, it is through our experience of moral emotion in others that we come to be acquainted with alternative moral ideals, and, more importantly, to recognize their weight and significance. As I noted earlier, Taylor stipulates that the subject-referring emotions (those which I argue arise with respect to the strong evaluation second-order desires and are therefore moral emotions) are a realm to which there is no dispassionate access.[1] The arguments, examples, and illustrations so far presented justify an extension of this claim: morality is a realm to which there is no dispassionate access.

I would like to turn now to a difficult question, which has troubled me throughout this work, and to which I am not confident of providing an adequate answer. Is it the case that the moral ideals of the educated person, or the morally mature agent, must encompass both relationships of power and relationships of connection? I believe that the answer is yes, and provide the following argument by way of justification.

If we agree that:

(i) the moral ideal consists of strong evaluation second order desires, and that the mature moral agent will have some such ideals in place;

(ii) that such ideals, in the form of desire, will motivate moral practice;

(iii) that the individual human life necessarily involves both relationships of power and relationships of connection;

then

(iv) if the individual is to function in a moral capacity in both sorts of relationships, her/his moral ideal must accommodate both ideals to do with individualistic achievement and ideals to do with human fulfillment.

This is as succinctly as I can put this argument. The weak link in the chain is (iii), which requires further justification.

Consider again those fundamental desires I have described as the desire for power, agency or effect (associated with the productive societal processes), and the desire for connection, attachment or community (associated with the reproductive processes). I suggested earlier that these desires may be innate. I think it likely that they are innate, and of sufficient strength that they may be termed "instinctually rooted life forces."[2] To interpret these desires in this way is not to argue that they are necessarily realized in each individual's life. Rather, our socialization and education may lead to the repression of either, or in the extreme case, both. This, in fact, is what has happened historically in our culture. Males stereotypically have been socialized, taught, encouraged to involve themselves with the productive societal processes. As a result, relationships of power and moral ideals concerning individualistic achievement have characterized men. It was largely within this context that morality was examined, leading to the emphasis on rights and principled reason. (Hence Piaget's and Kohlberg's reports of moral deficiency in women, and the inestimable value to moral theory of Gilligan's work.)

Consider an alternative. If I am correct in regarding the fundamental desires for agency and attachment as innately human, and if it is agreed that all individuals should be provided with an equal opportunity to realize these desires, then the necessity for both relationships of power and relationships of connection within the individual's life must follow. Hence, we do require that the morally educated person hold ideals both of individualistic achievement and human fulfillment, if this person is to function morally in both types of relationships.

There is another approach to this issue: an appeal for breadth in moral education. It is plausible to suggest that the moral agent is in some sense inadequate if utterly lacking moral capacity in either the productive or reproductive sphere. I am thus proposing a minimum standard for comprehensiveness or completeness of moral capacity, to accompany the usual requirement that the morally educated person be an autonomous rational agent directed by principled reasoning.

What I have attempted to do is to present not so much a logically compelling argument, as a plausible argument in support of my contention that the morally mature agent must hold ideals which encompass both relationships of power and connection, thereby ensuring a moral capacity within both productive and reproductive societal processes. Perhaps, all I have succeeded in doing is to make clear a personal strong evaluation second-order desire. That, of course, is a result not without relevance to my thesis, for if nothing else, it clearly delineates an inherent bias in the work.

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1 Charles Taylor, "Self-Interpreting Animals," in *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 62.

2 Michael E. Kerr, "Chronic Anxiety and Defining a Self," *The Atlantic Monthly* 262 (September 1988): 35-58.

Chapter 6: Moral Education.

To put things most simply, the object of moral education is to make people good. While in certain circumstances we might content ourselves with having people behave well, this is the goal of moral training rather than moral education. The morally virtuous person will be one in whom, to use Aristotle's words, "... both the reasoning must be true and the desire right..."[1] It is the second criterion that I have explored in this thesis. If my interpretation of moral emotions and moral ideals is correct, the virtuous person will have particular moral ideals, that is, strong evaluation second-order desires of a certain kind. The morally virtuous person will act in accord with, or be motivated by such desires. Further, the morally virtuous person will evince a repertoire of moral emotions which arise with respect to these desires.

I am not in a position to catalogue the necessary and sufficient ideals which would constitute goodness. These ideals will be as various and diverse as are the particular conceptions of the good which comprise them. Rather than specifying which desires must be in place for moral goodness, I am interested here in considering how we can encourage the formation of particular moral ideals, and how, given that less desirable moral ideals are in place, we might promote their amelioration.

I will take as given that human beings are born with a propensity to form moral ideals or strong evaluation second-order desires.[2] Frankfurt and Taylor posit desires as a uniquely human characteristic.[3] However, it is sufficient for our present purposes that such desires are characteristic of humans, if not uniquely distinguishing. Further, much

as humans appear born with a propensity to elaborate cognitive beliefs, the content of which will be influenced by experience, so too the specific moral ideals held by any individual will be shaped and influenced by experience and learning. Hence, if education of the intellect is concerned with the elaboration of true beliefs, so moral education must be concerned with the formation of morally correct or good ideals. In other words, as we expect the educated person to have more than beliefs, in that we require that these beliefs be true (or at least supported by good reasons), so also the morally educated person must have not only ideals, but morally commendable ideals. This analogy puts to rest I think, any possibility of "content-free" moral education.[4] Such a notion is no more coherent than the idea of a content-free cognitive education .

In chapter three, I discussed possible means for the development of strong evaluation second-order desires. I would like now to consider a specific example of moral emotion in young children and the educational implications which derive from it.

Given my interpretation of ideals and moral emotions, one might expect that young children would lack strong evaluation second-order desires, and hence not manifest moral emotions such as shame or compassion. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise.[5] In fact, children as young as three years appear to experience shame. For example, a common incident which occasions this emotion in young children is "an accident." A youngster busy playing and enjoying himself may ignore or misinterpret the urgency of signals from his bladder. For whatever reason it happens, following the accident many young children (though not by any means all) appear to feel ashamed. Suppose that such a child

genuinely experiences shame. If so, he is ascribing the import "shameful" to an incident he perceives as a departure from some ideal. But what sort of ideal might a three year old have formulated? More importantly, can we reasonably regard any such ideal as moral?

There are a variety of ideals such a child may have formulated. Consider one possibility: an ideal of personal cleanliness. This may be a strong evaluation second-order desire, something the child wants to want, not simply because it is more comfortable, but because it is in accord with his idea of how things should be. Alternatively, at the root of the child's shame may lie a desire like: I want to be like my big brother, or I want to be a big boy. The child feels shame in perceiving the incident as a departure from this ideal.

However, the second question to be addressed here is: are such strong evaluation second-order desires or ideals moral? If we are asking whether all such desires are morally good, the answer, of course, is no. Indeed certain strong evaluation second-order desires may be morally abhorrent, for example, the moral ideal of racial purity promoted by the Nazis. Other desires of this type may even be correctly classified as amoral, in that they have more to do with prudence than with morality. I suggest that the child's ideal of personal cleanliness might be a case in point. However, I am not claiming that strong evaluation second-order desires are moral because they are morally good, or commendable, or adequate, or even appropriate. They are moral in that they constitute the subject's conception of the good. It is plausible to argue that a three year old's primitive conception of the good may be identified with cleanliness, or being like the big boys. Furthermore, I think it reasonable to regard all such

strong evaluation second-order desires as moral ideals in that they identify the good as the subject conceives it.

Hence, to the extent that the child is sufficiently reflective to form strong evaluation second-order desires, he is a moral agent with moral ideals, and subject to moral emotions such as shame, compassion and admiration. This point is of considerable significance to the practice of moral education. Just as the child comes to school with certain beliefs about the world already in place, so too she comes with moral ideals and conceptions of the good already in hand. As educators must assist in the restructuring and further elaboration of cognitive beliefs, so the moral educator must help to refine and extend the child's moral ideals. How this is to be done is a question without ready answers, for we are looking here not for means to modify beliefs alone, but for means to modify desires.

It strikes me that one of the most potent influences in shaping and reshaping a child's ideals, will be the ideals, both implicit and explicit, of the people around her. But our personal ideals are not reformed by someone telling us, for example, "Honestly is one of my ideals." Such information is personally irrelevant unless the source of the information is someone of particular significance to us. This fact intimates the importance of relationships in moral education. Furthermore, given the relative rarity of such explicit statements of ideals, it is apparent that much of what we learn of the ideals of significant others is learned by way of their moral emotions, which manifest without explication their underlying ideals. Hence, moral education will require more than learning about ideals. It will require the actual reformation of certain ideals already in place. This reformation will be attendant upon an

awareness and an appreciation of the ideals of significant others. Such ideals, because of their nature, cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms, nor from a disinterested impersonal perspective. The awareness and appreciation of moral ideals requires a degree of empathy only possible on the basis of common subjective experience. My ideas here can perhaps be spelled out more clearly in an example.

Currently in the health sciences there is a growing awareness of the ethical issues that health professionals must deal with in the course of their careers. This has led to an expansion of the curriculum, in many of these fields, to include a course or courses in ethics. Presently, at one of our Canadian universities there is a required course in ethics in the Faculty of Dentistry. This course was developed in response to the fact that, despite the ethical standards implicit in a service profession such as dentistry, incidents of unethical practice are not unknown. For example, certain practitioners perform costly restorative or reparative treatments not strictly necessary. Moreover, in the profession at large there is little interest and involvement in effective preventive practice, which might, in the long term, greatly reduce the need for elaborate restorative work. It was suggested that a course in ethics might go some way in improving the ethical standards of dental practice and in impressing upon practitioners their essential role as servers of the public health.

The particular course in question presents a brief history of ethical theories and then concentrates on examples of ethical dilemmas such as dentists and dental students might encounter. The dilemmas are carefully described in terms of the particulars of each situation and in terms of the thoughts and reasoning of the people involved. The facts

which are morally relevant are specified, as are the moral principles pertinent to the case. Various responses to the dilemmas and the reasons for and against such responses are discussed. The course is presently being programmed for C.A.I. (computer assisted instruction), in the belief that this will be a more efficient way for the students to learn: to scrutinize moral issues, to abstract the relevant facts, and to make moral judgements on the basis of sound reasons and in accordance with established moral principles. The question remains however: will such a course decrease the incidence of unethical dental practice? I think not.

Many things are missing in such an approach to moral education. First of all, if we are concerned to educate dentists in their role as servers of the public health, it is not sufficient simply to present public service as a guiding principle of dental practice. In fact, various individuals will be attracted to this profession who lack aspirations for public service, but desire instead the lucrative living a dental practice often provides. It is necessary therefore to have some means of instilling the ideal of public well-being, which will at least complement the established ideal of personal wealth. To be cognizant of such an alternative or additional ideal is not sufficient. Students, if they are to be consistently guided by the ethical standards of the profession must adopt such an ideal. How? Certainly not by sitting in front of a computer screen and analyzing ethical dilemmas. Moral judgements to which one gives intellectual assent in such a disinterested impersonal context are no guarantee of the adoption of particular moral ideals, nor of particular moral behaviors in the future.

There are other approaches however which might encourage the augmentation of an ideal of personal wealth with some ideal of the

public well-being. Dental students, as apprentices, might work with and observe the practice of dentists who in fact espouse such ideals. The influence of such a mentor will be negligible, of course, unless the student perceives the practitioner, or his way of life, as exemplary in some way.

Consider by way of a parallel, an individual's acquisition of belief. Take the assertion "The Martians are landing." Whether or not we believe this claim will depend to a large extent upon the authority and reputation we afford its source. If a shabby stranger rushes up on the street shouting, "The Martians are landing," I will tend to discount his claim. Alternatively, if a radio program is interrupted with the same announcement, I am much more likely to believe it. The truth value I attribute to assertions is thus influenced by the reputation (for reliably true statements) I afford those who make the assertion. In a parallel way, the desirability I attribute to new or alternative moral ideals, will be influenced by the reputation I afford those who espouse such ideals.

To return to our dentistry example, suppose some dental student has chosen her profession as a means to financial success. If, as an apprentice, she is assigned to a dentist who runs an inefficient and poorly paying practice, she is unlikely to regard this practitioner as exemplifying the good, as she conceives it, in dentistry. On the other hand, if apprenticed to a successful practitioner who also incorporates high ethical standards in his promotion of the public well-being, she may indeed be led to feel the desirability of such an ideal. In the second case, the student sees the practitioner as exemplary, and hence as a reliable or reputable source of ideals new to her.

Perhaps the fundamental point here is the notion of a dissonance between ideals. It takes, I believe, a very imaginative and empathetic person to appreciate another's ideals if they are very different from his own. For example, it would be of little use to have King Midas apprentice with Mother Teresa. The disparity of ideals is too great. The reformation and amelioration of moral ideals takes place, I suspect, in fairly small steps. For this reason, the dental student who aspires only to financial success needs to serve with a practitioner who, while espousing the ideal of public service, also attends to and values the more materialistic aspects of making a good living. A commonness of some ideals will help dampen the dissonance of others.

The influence and effect of exemplars, those who instantiate the ideal, has been discussed by Kazepides.[6] Of course exemplars, like heroes, will be exemplary, or heroic, to greater and lesser extents. However, the influence of such individuals is one of the ways through which our moral ideals are shaped and reshaped. Further, it is not necessary that the exemplar be someone known to us personally. Exemplars may be people we come to know about through cultural or religious traditions, or through stories, literature, or art. A personal anecdote may serve here. As a child, I read a number of biographies of famous scientists. The only one I recall clearly was about Marie Curie. I distinctly remember the admiration that the story of her discovery excited, and the description of her lab: cold, stark, and darkened to facilitate the detection of the radiation. Curie instantiated certain ideals I already held at the time: ideals to do with the nobleness of a scientific pursuit of truth. Through the story of her overcoming impediments and adversity, I came to feel the desirability of determination and

discipline, and to extend my conception of the good to accommodate them.

As anecdotes generally are, this is perhaps overly simplistic. However, it serves to illustrate the influence of exemplars, or the significance of role models, in moral education. Exemplars, be they mentors, heroes, charismatic teachers, or parents, play an important role in leading us to reshape and extend our moral ideals, the standards by which we judge goodness of being. Their influence is limited by two factors: the degree of dissonance which obtains between the ideals they instantiate, and the ideals presently in place in the subject; and the extent to which they embody other attributes perceived as good or desirable by the subject.

If we grant the significance of exemplars in moral education, certain practical implications follow. First, there is much to be said for apprenticeship programs, not simply in the professions, but in training programs generally. It is through coming to know and working with ethical practitioners that the moral standards of a trade or profession are most readily handed on. Furthermore, such apprenticing requires more than a random assignment of apprentices. The personal desires and aspirations, the moral ideals already in place within the students, must be taken into account. Most important of all perhaps, the practitioners who take apprentices must be carefully selected. If we aim to improve either the technique or the ethics of a practice, only exemplary practitioners should be allowed the privilege and accolade of an apprentice.

I have argued for the role of the exemplar in moral education. Have we other ways of influencing and reshaping strong evaluation

second- order desires? Much of what we learn about moral ideals comes about through the moral emotions. While occasions do arise where someone explicitly articulates an ideal or ideals, we more frequently find moral ideals manifested implicitly through moral emotions. Of course, we may misread the emotion, or be deliberately duped by a display of false emotion. Alternatively, we may lack emotional sensitivity or acuity and hence miss altogether a manifestation of underlying ideals. Despite what can go wrong, through the ambiguity of emotions, often much goes right. The moral emotions as an instrument of moral education may be illustrated by the following example.

Imagine a child growing up in a family of comfortable means. The father is a successful self-employed business man whose company is being plagued with labour difficulties. Attempts to form a union eventually succeed, at considerable cost to the company, and after a protracted period of bitterness and anger on both sides. During this time, the father has talked at home of events and changes at work, and on these occasions has often displayed emotions such as righteous anger, contempt and indignation directed towards those he sees as responsible for the situation. At no time does the father articulate his ideal, which is one involving the notion of the self-made man, whose individual merits, determination, and hard work are rightly rewarded with financial success. Nor does he elaborate *his* conception of the unions desire: well-being, and a share in the company's financial success for all, regardless of merit. The child admires her father and perceives him as a good man. Through listening to her father and seeing his emotion, she comes to sense the significance and moral rightness of individual

merit and self-sufficiency, and to regard as wrong claims against the individual in the name of the general good. Such an experience is a significant aspect of the child's moral education, for through it she is taught, in Gilbert Ryle's words, to treat "... certain sorts of things as of overwhelming importance ..."[7]

It is only through emotion that the significance or importance of things is conveyed. This is not to say that a dispassionate discussion of an ideal or ideals cannot help inform a child. But we are not simply concerned that a child be cognizant of certain ideals. We want to persuade the child to adopt certain of these, and to abandon others. We want the child to feel the overwhelming importance of certain things. Jerome Kagan suggests that:

> Recognition of the relation of feelings to morality may help to explain the useful distinction between a conventional and a principled standard, because only the latter is tied to strong emotion.[8]

We want to promote the formation of particular strong evaluation second-order desires, and we can only convey their true importance through emotion. Charles Taylor argues that the import ascriptions of the moral emotions must be learned through the avenue of other emotions. The realm of what I have described as the moral ideals and moral emotions "... is a domain to which there is no dispassionate access."[9] If we are to instill particular desires which will constitute the child's moral ideals, this cannot be accomplished in the context of disinterested logic and analysis.

There is a further way in which moral emotions are a means of moral education. The example above illustrated the moral emotions as

conveyers of tl. : significance and importance of particular moral ideals. In addition, an understanding and clarification of a subject's own emotions may mediate modification of certain ideals. In one way, R.S. Peters is correct when he describes emotion as a passive experience, as something that comes over us.[10] Import ascriptions *are* immediate, and hence non-reflective, appraisals. However immediate and, in Peters's sense, passive occurrent emotion may be, nonetheless, emotions are subject to change. Taylor argues that it is through the articulation of imports that emotions are transformed.[11] He speaks of import-redefining revolutions and transvaluations which "... by changing our understanding of the import, also change the emotions we can experience."[12] Taylor provides examples to illustrate the clarification of emotional experience, and the changes of outlook that occur when a subject comes to understand new concepts, and the relevance and appropriateness of these new concepts to their perception of a situation. The following example will also serve to illustrate these ideas.

In studies of rape victims, it has been noticed that the likelihood of psychological recovery is related to the kind of emotions displayed by the victims.[13] Some women respond to this assault with emotions such as anger or fear. These women tend to describe the rape as a physical assault, a consequence of the rapist's superior strength, an incident of might over right. Though it may take some time, women who respond in this way appear to recover their psychological balance. A second type of victim, however, has a less positive prognosis. These women speak of feeling defiled, despoiled, or unclean. They describe the rape as in some sense contaminating their being, as violating their selves, not just their bodies. They experience a strong sense of self-

revulsion, guilt, or shame. Hence the psychic wounds suffered in the two cases are quite different, and the likelihood of recovery and healing in the second case is much smaller than in the first.

Assistance to victims of the latter sort has involved trying to change their feelings concerning the rape. The means of this change is, in Taylor's terms, an import redefining revolution, which changes not only the victims perception of the incident itself, but also the deeper standards whereby the subject judges her goodness or worthiness of being. The import ascription changes from "the shameful" or "the defiling" to simply "the menacing." The emotions change from guilt and shame and self-revulsion, to those of anger and fear, and are thus directed outward rather than inward.

I am interested in this example as an illustration of how emotions, through the articulation and subsequent modification of their import ascriptions, are subject to change, and in this sense are not passive experiences. Furthermore, in changing the import ascriptions in this case, we are altering not only the way the incident is perceived, but also the standards, ideals, or strong evaluation second-order desires initially used to appraise the situation, and which gave rise to the original emotions. Hence, through the emotions, and the articulation and reinterpretation of their import ascriptions, we can modify not only emotional experience, but reshape the ideals and desires upon which it rests.

This example suggests the possibility of educating the emotions as part of moral education. We must learn how to articulate rather than simply manifest our emotions, if we are to render such emotions and the underlying desires subject to change. This idea ties in with Mary

Warnock's suggestions concerning the sophistication of the emotions. Warnock points out that we educate perceptions of sight and sound, in that individuals may be said to see or hear in a more sophisticated or educated way.[14] Ready examples of this come to mind from the areas of music and the visual arts. If we may think of emotions as something like perceptions (an interpretation consistent with my own), we can thus meaningfully speak of their sophistication, in terms of discrimination or sensitivity, for example. It is through the articulation and elucidation of their import ascriptions that we can sophisticate the moral emotions. In doing so, what we fundamentally accomplish is a refinement (in the sense of increased distinction) and a broadening of our strong evaluation second-order desires, our moral ideals.

There is a further approach to the education of the emotions which I would like to consider. Warnock refers to this as a practical, versus a rational, method.[15] It involves role playing: the idea being that if we can practice expressing or demonstrating certain emotions, we can in fact, come genuinely to feel them. I am uncertain of the effectiveness of this approach. For example, we are concerned not simply that people appear compassionate, but that they feel compassion, which derives from their perception of a situation as one which deviates from the desired ideal of human flourishing. It is conceivable, I suppose, that in acting out certain emotions we might come to sense the desires which would genuinely give rise to these emotions. We might even convincingly imagine ourselves to have such desires (which must be, I think, what truly gifted actors are able to do). I do not quite see, however, why we would not stop imagining once we stepped out of the acting role. While role playing may promote an empathetic

understanding of others' emotions and desires, I fail to see why we would adopt such desires for our own simply because we can imagine them. Of course, if the "others" in question are significant to us, for example, exemplars or role models we wish to emulate, then the imaginative portrayal of certain emotions, and a sense of the desires underlying these, might indeed facilitate the formation or reformation of one's own ideals.

In this chapter I have pointed out certain implications for the practice of moral education which arise from my interpretation of the moral emotions and moral ideals. However, any discussion of moral education would be incomplete without some reference to moral reasoning. It remains for me to consider this important facet of moral practice, and its place in moral education, in the light of the present work.

In the course of this dissertation I have repeatedly emphasized that both reason and emotion have a place in moral practice. The object here has not been to supplant reason, but to augment our concept of morality with an understanding of the moral ideals and moral emotions. Any theory of morality or moral education which limits its attention to reason alone will be incomplete and ineffective. Human behavior is neither governed nor driven exclusively by reason. The theory and practice of moral education must account for and accommodate those desires that give rise to moral behavior, be it reasoning, reflection, action, intention, or emotion.

Many, perhaps most, would find this argument unobjectionable, but would nevertheless side with Peters in affording prominence to principles and principled reasoning, despite the affective aspects of

morality.[16] After all, is it not the case that most people are well intentioned, that is, have in place the proper and appropriate strong evaluation second-order desires? Our role as moral educators, therefore, is to ensure that people have, to use Wilson's terms, the proper "pieces of equipment" to realize these desires, to instantiate these ideals.[17] Thus, we must concern ourselves with the promulgation of "... certain concepts, certain decision-procedures, the intellectual respectability of certain reasons, certain relevant facts ..."[18]

While I endorse unequivocally the necessity of such "pieces of equipment," I am certain, at the same time, that on their own they are unequal to the task. An example will illustrate the serious limitations of moral reasoning, and the rationalistic approach to morality and moral education.

In Canada, women have the vote, and have enjoyed the status of legal persons for sixty-eight years. Such enhancement of the status of women was largely due to the application of "... certain concepts, certain decision-procedures," and to the recognition of "... the intellectual respectability of certain reasons, certain relevant facts ..."[19] One must ask, however, if such changes and the means of their accomplishment led to any substantial amelioration from a moral point of view. I think not, for the following reasons.

> One in four women in Canada can expect to be sexually assaulted some time in her life ... women are more likely to be assaulted by an acquaintance or spouse than by a stranger ... Canada is becoming a country in which half of its citizens are afraid of the other half.[20]

As I said earlier, moral behavior is neither governed nor driven by reason alone. The morally abhorrent state of affairs which obtains in our country (and I have provided but one of numerous examples) will continue as long as we limit our attention in moral education to moral reasoning, i.e., to concepts, decision-procedures, the intellectual respectability of certain reasons, certain relevant facts. We must attend to the underlying moral ideals, and elaborate and employ the various means of ameliorating these.

John Wilson provides a succinct summary of moral education:

> In moral education (as in any other kind of education) we can only proceed intelligently by trying to list the bits of equipment that are needed by someone performing in this area: then by devising methods to assess whether pupils have these bits or not, or the extent to which they have them: then by seeing what practical methods of education give them the bits most efficiently.[21]

I am arguing that a crucially important "bit of equipment" is the moral ideal, and specifically the strong evaluation second-order desires which constitute it. Furthermore, as my example clearly illustrates, we are not justified in assuming that this "bit", this moral ideal, is fine as it is, and that all we need do is provide the means for its realization. This "bit of equipment" is desperately in need of the attention and efforts of philosophers and educators alike.

Moral reasoning is an important and necessary "bit of moral equipment." We are right to encourage its development and application. Nevertheless, we curtail our effectiveness as moral educators in affording it sole prominence. What is required now is attention to the

more fundamental and equally important moral ideals and their constituent desires. However, as reason and desire work together, it is perhaps worthwhile to outline briefly their symbiosis.[22]

First of all, let me make clear my distaste for Wilson's "bits of equipment" model. As well as distasteful, I find it misleading. It suggests, for example, that moral reasoning and its various "bits" are something that may be added onto the moral ideal. However, I do not see these elements of morality as developing or functioning in isolation from each other. The strong evaluation second-order desires do not evolve immune from the influence of reason and reasoning. Reason plays a role in the elaboration of the ideal, as well as in its realization. At the same time, it is the ideal and its constituent desires which move us to reason, to consider, to criticize, and to reflect upon the various moral aspects of our experience. Moreover, while reason may influence the formation of the ideal, it is not the only influence. Moral development and moral education change our ways of thinking and reflecting, as well as the constitution of our moral ideal and the strong evaluation second-order desires which motivate moral behavior. As moral educators, we attend to the changing and amelioration of the nexus of practical reason, which is to attend to reason *and* desires.

I have explored various educational implications stemming from my interpretation of the moral emotions and the moral ideal. I have argued that strong evaluation second-order desires begin to form early in childhood, and that moral education ameliorates and broadens those desires already in place. Further, I suggested that the shaping and reshaping of these desires is strongly influenced by the ideals, either explicitly articulated or implicitly manifested in the moral emotions, of

significant others. I argued for the importance of exemplars in moral education, whose influence will be limited, however, by a strong dissonance of ideals, or by a lack of other common ideals. Finally, I have shown how the articulation of import ascriptions can lead to altered emotional experience, and to the amelioration, refinement and broadening of the underlying desires and ideals. Through all of this runs a unifying theme. Moral goodness requires more than reason and knowledge. It requires that certain strong evaluation second-order desires be in place. If we are concerned therefore with moral education, we must attend to these often inchoate desires of human beings, and to their frequently obscure manifestations, the moral emotions.

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1 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics,* David Ross trans., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 138-139 (bk VI.2).

2 This point was raised earlier, in Chapter 2.

3 Charles Taylor, "What is Human Agency?" *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15-16.

4 John Wilson, "Moral Components and Moral Education: A Reply to Francis Dunlop," and Francis Dunlop "Moral Procedures and Moral Education," in D. B. Cochrane, C. M. Hamm, and A. C. Kazepides eds., *The Domain of Moral Education* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 169-186.

5 Jerome Kagan, *The Nature of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), 124-134; and June Callwood, *Emotions* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1986), 25.

6 A. C. Kazepides, personal communication concerning a paper he has published on this topic, in Greek.

7 Gilbert Ryle, "Can Virtue be Taught?" in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 441.

8 Kagan, *The Nature of the Child*, 121.

9 Charles Taylor, "Self-Interpreting Animals," *Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 62.

10 R. S. Peters, "The Education of the Emotions," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 470.

11 Taylor, "Self-Interpreting," 68-75.

12 Ibid., 70.

13 Seminar sponsored by Esso Petroleum Canada, presented by a staff psychologist, on the role of Esso wives, Toronto, June, 1985.

14 Mary Warnock, "The Education of the Emotions," in D. E. Cooper ed., *Education, Values, and Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 175.

15 Ibid., 180-181.

16 R. S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions," in N. F. Sizer and T. R. Sizer eds., *Moral Education: Five Lectures* (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1970), 37.

17 John Wilson, "Example or Timetable? A Note on the Warnock Fallacy," *Journal of Moral Education* 14,3 (1985): 173-176.

18 Ibid., 173.

19 Ibid.

20 Vivien Smith, "Living in Fear," *The Globe and Mail* (April 28, 1990): pt. D, 1,8.

21 Wilson, "Example or Timetable?" 175.

22 Of considerable help to me in formulating some of these ideas concerning the relationship between reason and desire was

the work by Norman O. Dahl, *Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), chap1,2.

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