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by

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Abstract

This work focuses on the need of electoral reform in Canada. The purpose is to identify some of the major defects of the existing electoral system and to suggest modifications to the system in order to correct such weaknesses. This is pursued by analysing the election data to determine major shortcomings of the current electoral system, reviewing the alternative electoral systems in use in other democracies, and evaluating some of the proposals for reform of the electoral system in Canada.

An analysis of the aggregate data from the last ten general elections (1957-1980) shows that the single-member district plurality election system in Canada has produced many anomalies. These anomalies are: discrepancy between seats and votes received by parties; distortions due to regional concentrations of party support; and the amplification of changes in party representation caused by small changes in the popular support of a party. The system also has not lived up to its expectations regarding the incidence of majority governments and the development of a two-party system.

A survey of alternative electoral systems suggests that though all systems have some virtues, none is devoid of shortcomings. Simulations to measure the effectiveness of some of the recent proposals for the reform of the electoral system in Canada indicate that while the proposals succeed in ameliorating some of the existing deficiencies, further

improvements can be made.

Finally, a new proposal is presented for the reform of the electoral system in Canada. After simulating the results of the last ten general elections, it is shown that the proposed scheme would be able to produce far-reaching improvements without making drastic changes in the existing system.

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1. Introduction

Although elections have been known since ancient times, the concept of an electoral system, like many of the political institutions of the modern democratic state, is of relatively recent origin. An electoral system may be defined as a set of rules which govern the mechanism by which electoral preferences are expressed as votes and by which these votes are translated into an elected legislature. In devising these rules politicians in all democratic countries have vacillated between a pragmatic acceptance of their necessary imperfections and a dream of pure fairness, of achieving a complete equity between input - the voters' preferences - and output - the resultant legislature. In the petty details, such as the rules governing fair play in campaigning and in ballotting, the restraints on parties and on candidates, every country has its own laws; and on the larger questions, such as the ballot structure, magnitude of the electoral districts, and finally the mathematical devices for linking votes cast with seats won, there is an extraordinary variety of answers.

The early electoral systems all rested on some kind of majority principle. The will of a part of the electorate was taken to express the will of the whole. The principal justification for this was the canonical doctrine of the maior et sanior pars, according to which a majority was

presumed to be endowed with wisdom superior to that of a minority.[1] However, the elections to the British House of Commons, as in the other medieval assemblies, were vastly different from the present day elections. Most elections in those days were uncontested. As Sir Goronwy Edwards has pointed out, during the four centuries between the first contested election for the House of Commons (in 1450) and the first major extension of the parliamentary franchise in 1832, 'the preponderant tradition in the English electoral practice was probably the tradition of uncontested elections'.[2]

The British House of Commons came into existence in 1265 when a writ was issued by Simon de Montfort in the King's name, ordering the election of two knights from each county, two citizens from each city, and two burgesses from each borough.[3] It had grown out of the corporational basis of early parliaments. Until the Reform Act of 1832, the major anomaly of the electoral system was the difference between the population of electoral districts. As extreme examples, there were boroughs such as Old Sarum and Gatton, with less than a half-dozen electors each. On the other hand, in the industrial north of England, large and growing

---

[1] W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, London 1975, 155.
[2] Sir Goronwy Edwards, "The Emergence of Majority Rule in English Parliamentary Elections," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, 14(1964), 183.
[3] For details of the history of British House of Commons, see Kenneth MacKenzie, The English Parliament, London, 1962, p. 15.

towns like Manchester, Sheffield and Birmingham had no members in Parliament. The Society of the Friends of the People estimated that in 1793, 51 English and Welsh boroughs, comprising less than 1,500 voters in total, sent 100 representatives to Westminster.[4]

In one of the earliest attempts for electoral reform, in 1776, John Wilkes proposed a re-allocation of seats more in accordance with the distribution of population. Four years later the Duke of Richmond proposed a scheme which not only called for districts with equal population, but also called for universal suffrage. However, it was not until 1832 that any reform proposal gained approval from the government. The main purposes of the Reform Act of 1832 were: redistribution of seats in accordance with population, diminishing the expense of elections, increasing the number of members, and extension of the franchise.[5] Though the Reform Act of 1832 made revolutionary changes in the electorate by the standards of those days, it did not make any revolutionary change in the character of the House of Commons. The number of voters increased to almost two thirds of a million but it was far cry from the universal suffrage of today. The Franchise Act of 1884 increased the number of voters to five million, or one in seven of the population, and also established the single-member constituency and the plurality system.

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[4]Ibid., 99.
[5]Ibid., p. 101.

With the progressive extensions of the voting rights and the gradual evolution of mass parties, the shortcomings of the plurality system became apparent. In 1859, Thomas Hare produced a work entitled Treatise on the Election of Representatives: Parliamentary and Municipal, in which he drew attention to the deficiencies of the existing system which gave no seats to the minority parties although they had substantial support in several areas. Hare argued that 'the object of representation was to represent', and this would be achieved only when the House of Commons accurately reflected all the shades of political opinion in the country. To correct the anomalies of then existing system, Hare proposed a proportional representation system involving multi-member constituencies, the single transferable vote and an electoral quota. In Representative Government (1861), John Stuart Mill praised the Hare scheme as one of the greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government, since it involved giving every minority in the nation its fair and equal share of representation. Mill was concerned whether Parliament represented all or only a majority. Unless it did represent all, it was not 'truly' representative; it was false democracy. Walter Bagehot, another distinguished nineteenth-century political thinker, criticised the Hare scheme because the formation of a government commanding a parliamentary majority would

obviously become more difficult under the scheme.[6]

Mill and Bagehot between them summarized the dispute which has gone on, ever since - although in somewhat different terms - as to the purpose of an electoral system; whether it is to provide a 'mirror image' of the community in the legislature, or a 'collectively effective assembly', capable of forming and sustaining governments.[7] This has resulted in the development of various forms of electoral systems which can be broadly classified into two groups: one, the 'first past the post' system followed in Britain, Canada, and most of the former British colonies, and the other a variety of proportional representation schemes in use in most western European democracies.

The 'first-past-the-post' system has been criticised on the grounds that it is unfair, that important segments of public opinion do not get their due share in the composition of the legislature, and that sometimes even a minority in the electorate may gain a majority in the legislature. Thus it is argued that this system does not provide for fair 'representation.' The primary argument against the proportional representation system has been that it does not provide workable majorities in the legislature but creates or maintains several parties and thus endangers cabinet

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[6] Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (New York: D. Appleton 1877)
[7] W.J.M. MacKenzie, Free Elections, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958)

stability.[8] Some of the ardent defenders of majority representation have based their criticism of proportional representation on the explicit assumption that "the primary function of a legislative assembly in modern democracy is not to hold up a mirror to the electorate but rather to determine the country's policy,"[9] and that "the object of representative bodies is not to represent but to act as agents for constitutional control of the government."[10]

The major claim made in favour of proportional representation has been that it is the only just electoral system that is 'fair' to everyone, and the only one that provides 'exact' representation for all.[11] The argument goes on that Government may or may not require stability above all, and stability may or may not be furthered by the plurality system. A representative assembly has other functions than insuring stability, and one should not seek artificially to destroy its representative character. As Van Den Bergh argues, in a two party system it is, in principle, easy to form a Government; but it is even easier in a one party system. There are also electoral systems which destroy all the parties - but one. But these electoral systems are

---

[8]For details of these arguments against PR, see F.A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation, Notre Dame, 1941.
[9]Dankwart A. Rustow, "Some Observations on Proportional Representation", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1, February 1950, pp. 111-112.
[10]F.A. Hermens, op. cit., p. 8.
[11]George H. Hallett, Proportional Representation - The Key to Democracy, New York, 1940, p. 3-18.

incompatible with fundamental democratic principles.[12]

From this debate over 'fair representation' versus 'cabinet stability' emerge two of the most influential traditional theories of electoral system. These are:

(1) The single-member district system with plurality election produces a two-party system, and there is a positive relationship between the two-party system and government stability.

(2) The multi-member district system with proportional representation favours multipartism and multipartism induces government instability.

In supporting the first of these theories Schattschneider writes "the American party system is the direct consequence of the American election system or system of representation." He then maintains that the widespread use in the United States of the single-member district with plurality elections operates to exaggerate the representation of the winning party and to give the second party a monopoly of opposition by discriminating against third parties.[13] Similar explanations have been provided by other scholars.[14] Duverger, on the basis of a much broader survey of party systems, reaches the following conclusions:

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[12]George Van Den Bergh, Unity in Diversity: A Systematic Study of All Electoral Systems, London, 1956, p. 46.

[13]E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government, New York, 1942, p. 69.

[14] For example, see V.O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, New York, 1952, pp. 224-225 and Maurice Duverger, "The Influence of the Electoral Systems on Political Life," International Social Bulletin, Vol. 3, Summer 1951, pp. 314-352.

(a) the party system and the electoral system are indissolubly linked;

(b) the simple-majority single-ballot system encourages a two-party system with alternations of power between major parties;

(c) proportional representation encourages a multi-party system; and finally,

(d) the multi-party system produces government instability. Cabinet crises, reshuffles and collapse "which are exceptional and rare under the two-party system," become frequent in a multi-party system.[15]

However, these theories of the electoral system have been criticised on the basis of historical evidence. Grumm, using the voting statistics of five western democracies (Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Germany) noted that before 1900, proportional representation had not been adopted by any of the European democracies for elections to the lower house of their parliaments. Some type of majority or plurality system prevailed in all these countries before that time. Yet in none of them could there be found anything similar to the two-party system that existed in Britain.[16]

Also, the single-member district plurality system has failed to maintain the two-party system with which Canada

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[15]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, New York, 1959, pp. 205, 217, 226, 248, 408, 410.

[16]John G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, November 1958, pp. 357-376.

began. The persistence of the lesser parties with their share of total voting strength, surely suggests that Canada has had something more than a conventional two-party system for two generations. Douglas Rae has pointed out that the Canadian exception is a valid and important one, which necessitates modification of the proposition that plurality formulae cause a two party system.[17] Even in Britain, which is considered to be a prime example of the two-party system, there have been coalition and minority governments for a total of thirty-one years in the twentieth century. Rae, using comparative electoral statistics of 21 democracies, concluded that if there is a connection between proportional representation and the multiplication of parties in some national histories, it results from a complex set of contingencies, not from the operation of a general law. Moreover, proportional representation plays only one of several parts.[18] Several other studies have also analyzed the influence of electoral system on government stability.[19] The result of this intellectual activity has been seriously

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[17] Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven, 1971, p. 95.

[18] Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven, 1971, p. 168.

[19] Some of these studies are: Leon Hurwitz, "Democratic Political Stability: Some Traditional Hypothesis Reexamined," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1971-72, pp. 476-490.
S.K. Mitra, "A Theory of Governmental Instability in Parliamentary Systems," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, July 1980, pp. 235-263.
H. Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway, Princeton, 1966.
L.C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. Princeton, 1976.

to question the traditional theories of electoral systems. The connection between the parties and electoral system is now generally conceived as a highly complex relationship of interdependence.

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that there exists a vast amount of literature on the analysis of electoral systems of various countries. However, in view of the subject's importance, the relatively scant systematic analysis given the Canadian electoral system has been surprising. Alan Cairns[20] was the first political scientist to examine critically the working of the Canadian electoral system. He points out that the Canadian electoral system fosters a party system which accentuates or /exacerbates sectional cleavages, sectional identities, and sectionally oriented parties. He further argues that the electoral system can be described as divisive and detrimental to national unity. Cairns points out that the electoral system has been an important factor in the evolution of the Canadian party system and that the capacity of the party system to act as an integrative force for the sectional communities of Canada is detrimentally affected by the electoral system. Recently, several other studies have appeared which further illuminate the adverse effects of the

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[20]Alan Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1968, pp. 55-80.

Canadian electoral system on the political parties.[1] To a large extent, in other democracies the debate over an efficient electoral system has centred around fair representation or stable government. However, in the Canadian context, the persistence of the effect that the electoral system exaggerates the regionalism of a regionally divided country is of main concern. The stability which is of concern here is not that of the cabinet in its relation to the legislature, but the stability of the political system as a whole.

In the last few general elections there has been an increasing regionalization in voting patterns, culminating in the 1980 election when the Liberals gained no seats west of Winnipeg, and the Progressive Conservatives had their representation from Quebec reduced to a single member. The dire consequences of such regional political party representation has led to several proposals regarding the reform of the electoral system.[2]

[1] These studies include, William P. Irvine, Does Canada Need a New Electoral System? Queens University, 1979.
David Elton and Roger Gibbins, Electoral Reform: The Need is Pressing, The Time is Now, A Report Prepared for the Canada West Foundation, May 1980.
Donald V. Smiley, "Federation and the Legislative Process in Canada," in The Legislative Process in Canada, Institute of Research on Public Policy, Montreal, 1978, pp. 73-87.
The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together, pp. 104-108.
Statement on Electoral Reform by the New Democratic Party, 1978.

[2] The various proposals to be included in this thesis are the proposals by Irvine, Broadbent, Smiley, Canada West Foundation, and the Task Force on Canadian Unity. Detailed references for each of these proposals will be given when they are discussed individually.

The purpose of this study is three-fold. First, it critically examines the Canadian electoral system and its effect on the stability of the political system in Canada. Second, it evaluates the various proposals for the reform of the Canadian electoral system. Finally, a new proposal for the reform of the electoral system in Canada is presented.

The major objectives of the reform are

(a) to eliminate or at least reduce the distortion between the proportion of the popular vote received by the parties and the proportion of seats accorded them;

(b) to provide better inducements to parties to campaign nationwide with equal zeal instead of concentrating on particular constituencies, and to establish regional representation where a party has significant popular support but few or no seats; and

(c) to contribute to government stability but not artificially create it.

It will be argued that in terms of the actual votes cast by Canadians, the national parties have much more broader support across the country than the election results show. It is assumed that if the distribution of the seats in the House of Commons could be brought more into line with the regional distribution of the popular vote, the political parties would be able to act more effectively as vehicles of national integration. Overall, the representative system would be vastly improved by eliminating the 'regional bunching' that occurs in every general election. There would

be less basis to the arguments that the Liberals do not represent the West, the Tories are a fiasco in Quebec, and that the NDP is not a national party. Yet the most important result would be that the governing caucus would be representative of all regions. Under the electoral system proposed in this study, the West would have almost ten times the weight it has now in the governing caucus. This would be beneficial for the West and national unity; the West would have its share of ministers, parliamentary assistants and parliamentary committee chairmen, all of whom would add to the sensitivity of the executive. A national party caucus would work more effectively as a forum for working out national policies. Yet more importantly, the government would be based on the active support of the popular vote and its legitimacy and authority would be considerably enhanced. Recently several writers have noted that one important source of regional alienation and discontent lies in the loss of the ability of the central government to represent and take into account of the interests of all regions. It is hoped that changes in the electoral system would help to rectify this. It will also be argued that, in a country with a pluralistic society, government stability manufactured by the electoral system in use may not be strong enough to keep the country together. Thus it will be suggested that a desirable electoral system is one which provides representation for various groups in society without encouraging the growth of splinter parties. It will be seen

that there are some techniques which help maintain government stability and impede the development of the multiplication of parties.

In the second chapter, it will be shown that in Canada the major plea for the reform of the electoral system does not rest on the issue of 'fair representation' versus 'government stability', but the emphasis is on the stability of the political system. It will be demonstrated that the electoral system exaggerates the sectionalism of a sectionally divided country.

Chapter 3 is devoted to a critical examination of the Canadian electoral system. Aggregate data from the last nineteen general elections (1921-1980) are used to demonstrate the anomalies produced by the electoral system. These anomalies are: discrepancy between seats and votes received by the parties; distortions due to regional concentrations of party support; and the amplification of changes in party representation caused by small changes in the popular support for a party.

Chapter 4 examines the various alternatives to the present electoral system. These include: Majority representation and its variants(repeated ballots, second ballot, the alternative vote), semi-proportional systems (the limited vote, single non-transferable vote, cumulative vote, points vote), proportional systems(list system, single transferable vote) and mixed systems. However, the chapter is not intended to give an exhaustive list of all electoral

systems, nor will it be claimed that any one of these systems remedies the present defects.

Chapter 5 discusses proposals for the reform of the electoral system in Canada. The proposals include those made by Irvine, Broadbent, Smiley, the Task Force, and the Canada West Foundation. All these proposals are inspired by the mixed system in use in the Federal Republic of Germany. Another common element of these proposals is an attempt to reduce the extent of apparent regionalization in the strength of the major parties which is caused and exaggerated by the present system. A simulation of the last ten general elections (1957-1980) is performed using the proposals mentioned above. The main exercise is to consider the actual distribution of votes and see the results there would have been under conditions present in the various proposals. The simulation results in an evaluation of the proposals in terms of the stated goals of electoral reform. It is found that although the proposals succeed in rectifying the deficiencies of the existing electoral system to varying degree, further improvements can still be made.

In view of the preceeding discussion, chapter 6 presents a new proposal which attempts to eliminate the serious defects of the present system. To substantiate the claims for this proposal, a simulation similar to one performed in the previous chapter is repeated for the current proposal and the results compared for evaluation.

Finally, chapter 7 briefly reviews electoral systems and the need for electoral reform in Canada. It reiterates the argument that in the Canadian context it is the stability of the political system that is at stake. It is contended that the new proposal in chapter 6 would be reasonably successful in achieving electoral reform in Canada.

2. Effects of the Electoral System on the Canadian Political System: the Cost of Sectionalism

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effects of the Canadian electoral system on the political system of Canada. How does the electoral system exaggerate sectionalism and what are its ramifications? How does the electoral system affect the national parties' role as an integrating agency and what are its implications for the Canadian political system?

The electoral system of Canada, the single-member district system with plurality election, fails to translate the votes cast for a party into the proportional number of seats won. In translating the votes into seats, it overrepresents the leading party in any area and underrepresents the parties which place second and third. However, the minor parties are discouraged by the system only when their support is diffuse - that is only when they aspire to be national rather than sectional parties.[23] It has been argued that sectionalism is encouraged by the system since the parties are seen to do best when they make their campaign appeal to geographical regions where rewards will be greatest. The party policies are attuned to the areas where they win the most votes. The result is that some

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[23] It may be noted here that the terms 'sectionalism' and 'regionalism', and 'sectional' and 'regional' have been used interchangeably by Canadian scholars.

regions are written off in election campaigns. The ramifications of this are complex, divisive and detrimental to the political system of Canada given the recurrent problems of Quebec's status and the inherent historical, demographic and economic differences among the different regions in the Canadian federation.

The electoral system makes the two major parliamentary parties, the Liberal party and the Progressive Conservative party, inaccurate reflections of the sectional distribution of their party support. The electoral system, by pulling the parliamentary Liberal party towards Quebec and the parliamentary Progressive Conservative party towards the West, makes the sectional cleavages much more pronounced in the Parliament than they are at the level of the electorate. As Smiley points out, "The essential defect of our electoral system is that it distorts regional and provincial balances in the House of Commons... and these imbalances are more pronounced than the relative proportion of the popular votes the two parties receive from these provinces/regions."[24] The consequences of this are numerous and adverse. First of all, a particular kind of sectional terminology has been developed in Canada. Quebec is portrayed as 'the solid Quebec of 1921' while western Canada is described as 'once the fortress of protest movements'. The consistent failure of the electoral system to reflect even roughly the distribution of partisan support in the various regions of

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[24]Donald V. Smiley, op. cit., p. 84.

the country and its tendency to create sectional sweeps for one party at the level of the representation make the Conservatives more of an Ontario based party, the Liberals more of a Quebec party, the CCF/NDP more of a prairies and West Coast party. The electoral system makes an independent contribution to the identification of particular sections with particular parties. By doing so it has undermined the partisan diversity within each region. As Elton and Gibbins assert:

> To an important degree the weakness of the Liberal party - and that of Liberal governments in western Canada and the weakness of the Progressive Conservative party in Quebec are artifacts of the electoral system ... artifacts that emasculate regional representation in the national government, deprive national government of regional spokesmen, while they heighten regional conflict and identification.[25]

Walter Stewart, a journalist, who made a persuasive argument for the reform of electoral system, commenting on the outcome of 1972 general election, concluded:

> ... (I)t was not the voter who turned Quebec into a Liberal enclave and Alberta into a Tory one, it was the electoral system.... It was the parliamentary results, and not the voting patterns that led to all those stories about the isolation of Quebec, the alienation of Alberta.... What is particularly alarming about the gap between the kind of Commons the people of Canada picked and the one they got was the way in which this distortion magnifies our regional differences, and set us all at each other's throats.[26]

another political scientist states: "The heterogeneity of the voting patterns is masked by the electoral system....

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[25] David Elton and Roger Gibbins, op. cit., p. 2.
[26] Walter Stewart, Divide and Con: Canadian Politics at Work. Toronto: New Press, 1973, pp. 225226.

(T)he system makes Canadian voting seem more regionalized than it really is".[27] A similar point was made by the Task Force on Canadian Unity when it noted: "(T)he simple fact is that our elections produce a distorted image of the country, making provinces appear more unanimous in their support of one federal party or another than they really are."[28]

Distortions between the votes and seats caused by the electoral system promote divisive electoral tactics by encouraging the parties to invest their resources and direct their appeals only in the regions where they have best chance of success. This hypothesis is supported by Downs' deductive model of political behaviour which assumes that political parties are rational: they seek to minimize inputs and maximize outputs. Party rationality in Downs' model means that parties, given the goal of winning elective offices, attempt to maximize votes.[29] There are several instances in Canadian history where the parties have emphasized regional and, ethnic differences in order to get elected. In Quebec in the 1920's and 1930's, Liberal campaigns were often directed towards stirring up French Canadian fears and animosities in order to maximize

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[27]Richard Johnston, "Federal and Provincial Voting: Contemporary Patterns and Historical Evolution," in Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life, edited by David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon, Toronto: Methuen, 1980, p. 138.
[28]Task Force on Canadian Unity, op. cit., p. 105.
[29]Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957, p. 124. A similar point is also made in J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: 1962, p. 285.

electoral support. The 'Gordon Churchill strategy' in 1957 is another example. Over the years it became clear to the Conservatives that the money spent in Quebec was money lost, even though a substantial minority of Quebec might support them, they would win very few seats. Consequently, the decision was made in 1957 to forget about Quebec and to concentrate on the rest of the country. As Cairns observes "the electoral system makes sectionalism a fruitful basis on which to organize support."[30]

Keeping the present political situation in mind, it is vital that someone represents the West in the Liberal caucus and Quebec in the Conservative caucus. But once the electoral system transforms the party struggle into a struggle between sections and once the regions are identified with one particular party, it is difficult to build local organizations and equally difficult to recruit competent candidates in Quebec and the West. As Irvine pointed out a candidate has to be close to a "masochist" to campaign as a Liberal in the West and a Conservative in Quebec.[31] Even when the party is successful in making a significant breakthrough it may have serious problems in assimilating the sudden input of the sections which the party had minimally represented over a long period. Thus part of Diefenbaker's inability to get along with French Canada may have resulted because he had never had an

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[30]Alan Cairns, op. cit. p. 142.
[31]William Irvine, "Power Requires Representation," in Policy Options, Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 1980- Jan. 1981, p. 21.

opportunity to work with the French Canadians in his party. One party dominance in a province for a long period places obstacles in the way of other parties even if they try to build their party organization. This observation was made by Norman Ward when he noted that the Liberal dominance in Quebec adds to "internal strains in other parties."[32]

The electoral system also affects party policies. Given the goal of maximizing votes, parties formulate policies favourable to regions where they can hope to gain the most votes. For the regions where they do not expect to receive many seats, they are less likely to focus on regional policies. Second, the electoral system also plays a significant role in the determination of who the party policy makers will be. The marginal representation of any region in the governing party is usually not significant enough to represent adequately the region's interests. As Scarrow noted, "... (I)t is the makeup of the parliamentary party, including the proportional strength and bargaining position of the various parts, which is the most crucial factor in determining policy at any time."[33] There are enough instances to substantiate Scarrow's proposition. The favourable treatment of Quebec and the French Canadians by the Liberal caucus and the lack of sensitivity on the part of the Liberal caucus toward the West are quite explicable.

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[32]Quoted in Alan Cairns, op. cit., p. 144.
[33]Howard A. Scarrow. "Distinguishing Between Political Parties: The Case of Canada," in Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 9, 1965, p. 69.

Nevertheless, sometimes party policies are affected not by the need to solicit certain regions but by the availability of personnel from different regions in the party caucus. This point is made by Cairns:

> The relative, or on occasion total, absence of such spokesmen for particular sectional communities seriously affects the image of the parties as national bodies, deprives the party concerned of articulate proponents of particular sectional interests in caucus and in the House, and, it can be deductively suggested, renders the members of the parliament party personally less sensitive to the interest of the unrepresented sections than they otherwise would be. As a result the general perspectives and policy orientations of a party are likely to be skewed in favour of those interests which by virtue of strong parliamentary representation, can vigorously assert their claims.[34]

The danger of such a development had been anticipated by J.S. Mill:

> In the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes than those of the persons whom it directly concerns.[35]

Regions frozen out of representation in the governing party caucus, as Quebecers were during the brief Clark government and as westerners have been for many years, are likely to feel that their interests are forgotten. As the Task Force on Canadian Unity noted: "... (T)his sort of situation leads to a sense of alienation and exclusion from power. Westerners in particular increasingly resent a disproportionate number of Quebec members in a Liberal

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[34] Alan Cairns, op. cit. p. 147.
[35] John Stuart Mill, On Representative Government, London, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1910, p. 209.

caucus which has very few of their own."[36] Smiley made a similar point when he wrote "(B)eyond the specific grievances of the Western provinces in economic matters, the westerners came in the 1960's to believe themselves out of the mainstream of national life."[37] On the other hand several Canadian scholars have noted that the regional tensions are intensified as the provincial politicians defend regional interests that are not represented within the national government. As a consequence the legitimacy and strength of the national government is undercut. The national government becomes insensitive to regional perspectives, and lacks the elected representatives effectively to explain and justify its policies across all the regions of the country. As Engelmann and Schwartz point out "(F)ailing to gain broad support, (parties) can make little justifiable assertion of an ability to contribute to a genuine consensus on issues and political goals across regional lines."[38]

Finally, it has been noted that the present electoral system has undermined the potential for classical brokerage politics at the national level; an important and essential feature of any democratic system.[39] In the brokerage model

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[36]Task Force on Canadian Unity, op. cit., p. 105.
[37]Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1980, p. 262.
[38]F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, Prentice Hall of Canada Limited, 1967, p. 236.
[39] These include McClokie, Corry, Dawson, Ward, Underhill, Porter and Brady.

each party whose representatives would bargain with the party, would have roots in all major regions and groups. Yet a more important role of parties is seen to function as what Engelmann and Schwartz called "conciliating intermediaries" which minimize differences, restrain fissiparous tendencies and help bring together the diverse interests of a polity weak in integration. Engelmann and Schwartz noted that "[t]he consensual aspect of party politics has been a favoured theme of Canadian commentators"[41] and pointed out that in the case of Canada, this view of parties has evolved rather easily out of the experience of the pressing need for national unity.[42] Several other theorists outside Canada have also assigned an important role to political parties in the nationalization process[43] while others have noted that the parties have performed this role in modern industrial societies in the twentieth century.[44] Contrary to this, it

[41] Ibid., p. 224.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall considered "nurturing consensus" to be one of the main functions of the American party system. See Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1956, pp. 509-513. For related comments, also see R.E. Scott, "Political Parties and Policy Making in Latin America," in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, Parties and Developments, Princeton, 1966, pp. 331-332, and D.E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, 1965, pp. 181-191.
[44] For more explicit discussions of these developments, see Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies, Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963, pp. 109-141, and V.O. Key Jr., American State Politics: an Introduction, 1956, p. 26, and E.E. Schattschneider, "United States: The Functional Approach to Government Party," in Sigmund Neumann, ed. Modern Political Parties, Chicago, 1956, pp. 208, and Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, op. cit., p. 508.

has been noted that the Canadian political parties are becoming less national. In Canada "... (T)he capacity of the party system to act as an integrating agency for the sectional communities of Canada is detrimentally affected by the electoral system."[44] The electoral system has exaggerated sectional cleavages at the expense of social ones - cleavages of residence rather than of stratification have lent a conservative tone to the political scene. The emphasis of sectional divisions endangered by the electoral system has submerged class conflicts.[45]

Although the universal interpretation is that parties should ideally play an integrative role, there are some distinct Canadian explanations which make this role 'indispensable' for the Canadian parties.

First and most important is the fact that the Canadian confederation is not inherently stable. Many writers have argued that Canada is still far from a cohesive national unit and instead suffers an acute national problem. It is a truism that divisive forces threaten Canadian national unity. According to this view the major barrier to national integration is the continuing strength of ethnic, linguistic, religious identifications and economic disparity. As John Meisel argues:

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[44]Alan Cairns, op. cit. p. 157.
[45]David Elkins and Richard Simeon, op. cit., pp. 293-295.

> In a country lacking a strong national political culture and the institutions fostering it, political parties have a special role to play as agency for the creation of national symbols, experiences, memories, heroes, and villains not to mention national favours and concessions.[46]

Second, in other liberal democratic federations, the institutions of the central government are designed to ensure the widest possible political representation of regions at the federal level. The federal Upper Houses are ideally designed for this purpose.[47] In both the U.S. and Australia the senate is effective in this regard. A federal house elected on a provincial basis is capable of ensuring strong regional participation in federal decision making as in the West German Bundesrat. In Canada, the mechanism for expression and representation of specific regional interests at the federal level is rather weak and ineffective. The current state of the Canadian senate, with its membership constituted by political patronage dispensed by the federal executive, performs no useful 'federal' functions. The national parties are the only institutions which can represent all regions effectively in the government party and the cabinet.

Third, in a parliamentary system, the majority party in the House of Commons controls all decision-making powers and

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[46] John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Politics," in Party Politics in Canada, edited by H.G. Thornburn, Scarborough, 1967, p. 34.

[47] For the discussion of how these Upper Houses are structured, see F.C. Engelmann, "The West and the Structural Crises of Canadian Federal Government," in Western Separatism, edited by Garth Stevenson and Larry Pratt, Edmonton, 1981.

thereby governs the country. Not only do the Ministers collectively and individually enjoy vast and virtually undiluted legislative and executive power, they also enjoy personal patronage and a monopoly of information and research assistance. While the Government enjoys the plentitude of power, the opposition enjoys nothing. The opposition role in governing the country is very marginal. In a political system where the governing party has all the powers and there has been a one-party dominance, the governing party must be representative of all the regions, acting as an integrating agency that tries to bring together the diverse forces within the political system by appealing to and drawing support from all segments of the society. If this is not done as is the case in Canada, the national parties can not be considered as being representative of all the regions.

From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the electoral system in Canada has played an important role in the evolution of the Canadian party system. Moreover, its influence is intimately tied up with the politics of sectionalism which it has stimulated. A politics of sectionalism may be seen as politics of instability. As Cairns argued "this is essentially because sectional politics has an inherent tendency to call into question the

very nature of the political system and its legitimacy."[48] The danger of such sectional politics was anticipated by the Task Force on Canadian Unity when they commented:

> Our research of experience in other federations indicates that when party membership in the central parliament becomes concentrated in regional blocks it is an advance signal of eventual disintegration. The regional polarization of the federal political parties corrodes federal unity. Because we see developing signs of such a situation in Canada we have come to the conclusion that electoral reform is urgent and of very high priority.[49]

In Canada, the single-member district system with plurality election has often been defended on the ground that it produces cabinet stability. But one may question whether such a stability is always desirable. Taking the Canadian example, in 1963, 1965, 1972, 1974, and 1980 the Liberal party formed the government despite very weak representation from Western Canada. The national governments are formed, yet are not national in their composition because of the exclusion or near exclusion of important regions in the country. When the national government is formed or the cabinet is selected from one section of the country, the viability of the country as a single political entity remains seriously threatened. As Duverger has pointed out, the single-member district system with plurality election

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[48]Alan Cairns, op. cit., p. 153.
[49]Task Force on Canadian Unity, op. cit., p. 105.

> ... accentuates the geographical localization of opinions: one might even say that it tends to transform a national opinion... into a local opinion by allowing it to be represented only in the sections of the country in which it is strongest.[50]

Rustow also observed that the single-member district system with plurality election is not workable in a polity in which "crystalized majorities" exist in individual constituencies or regions.[51] Lewis made the point that the electoral system can in fact enhance the importance of such regional majorities, thereby endangering national unity by accentuating regional differences. He argued that this system is dysfunctional for stability in polities which have cleavages of a religious, tribal or etnic nature.[52]

The discussion so far has been entirely normative in nature. In the next chapter, some of the propositions stated in this chapter will be substantiated quantitatively by using the aggregate data from the last nineteen general elections(1921-1980).

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[50]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit. p. 383.
[51] Dankwart A. Rustow, op. cit., p. 116.
[52]W.A. Lewis, Politics in West Africa, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 70-74.

3. Defects of the Canadian Electoral System

Canada's electoral system is variously described as a 'spot vote' or a 'first-past-the-post' or a plurality system. Those who wish to run for the House of Commons present themselves in a territorially defined constituency which elects one Member. Thus 282 constituencies return one member each. Parties may nominate one candidate for each constituency and the voter indicates his/her preference by making a mark opposite one of the names on the ballot. The candidate with the highest number of votes is declared elected. In a multiple candidate contest the person elected need not be the candidate favoured by the majority of electors, but usually is the one favoured by the largest minority, called a plurality.[53] The plurality candidate usually wins election on the basis of a strategy of "divide and conquer." This has led some scholars to say that this system is unsuitable for employment in any election in which more than two candidates compete for a single seat. In most elections held under the single-member district plurality system, the ratios of seats obtained by the parties are vastly out of proportion with the ratios of votes they receive. In fact, it is generally claimed that for this

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[53]For example, in the Canadian election of 1980, only 142 out of the 282 winning candidates had majority support in their respective constituencies. In fact, 27 of the winning candidates won their seats with less than 40 percent of the popular votes.

system, the ratio of seats between two parties approximates the cubed ratio of their votes:[54]

$$\frac{S_a}{S_b} = \frac{T_a^3}{T_b^3}$$

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the major defects of the Canadian electoral system. Aggregate data from the past nineteen general elections(1921-1980) are used to support the arguments put forward in this chapter. The system is also analyzed in terms of its ascribed virtues.

The electoral system exaggerates the parliamentary representation of the strongest party. Table 1 demonstrates that in every general election in Canada since 1921, the party which formed the government, obtained a greater percentage of total seats than votes. Thus the electoral system gives a 'bonus' to the strongest party in the parliament. As it is clear from the Table, there have been cases when the 'bonus' of seats for the strongest party has been quite large. For example, in 1935, the Liberal party won almost 71 percent of the seats in the House of Commons with less than 45 percent of the total votes. Thus in that election, the Liberal party received nearly 60 percent more seats than it would have been entitled under a proportional representation scheme. In the same manner, the Conservatives

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[54]Douglas Rae, op. cit., p. 27. Also, for details of this mathematical relationship commonly refered to as the 'cubic law', see M.G. Kendall and A. Stuart, "Cubic Proportion in Electoral Results," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1,, No. 3, 1950, pp. 183-196.

Table 1

Comparison of Votes and Seats for Government Party in Canada, 1921-1980.

Election Year	Government Party	% Votes	% Seats	Difference % Seats - % Votes
1921	Liberal	40.7	49.4	+8.7
1925	Liberal	39.8	40.4	+0.6
1926	Liberal	46.1	52.2	+6.1
1930	Cons.	48.7	55.9	+7.2
1935	Liberal	44.9	70.6	+25.7
1940	Liberal	51.5	73.9	+22.4
1945	Liberal	41.1	51.0	+9.9
1949	Liberal	49.5	73.7	+24.2
1953	Liberal	48.9	64.5	+15.6
1957	P.C.	38.9	42.3	+3.4
1958	P.C.	53.6	78.5	+24.9
1962	P.C.	37.3	43.8	+6.5
1963	Liberal	41.7	48.7	+7.0
1965	Liberal	40.2	49.4	+9.2
1968	Liberal	45.5	58.7	+13.2
1972	Liberal	38.5	41.3	+2.8
1974	Liberal	43.6	53.0	+9.4
1979	P.C.	35.9	48.2	+12.3
1980	Liberal	44.3	52.1	+7.8

won almost 79 percent of the seats with only 54 percent of the vote in 1958. The result is that although the government elected is the people's choice it is more powerful than the people's votes would seem to indicate. It has led one scholar to argue that the present Canadian electoral system does not fulfill the democratic requirements. He argues:

> ... (T)he basic precondition of democracy can only be met when the elector's choice of parties is accurately reflected in the composition of the legislature. When parties in Parliament receive either a substantially higher or a substantially lower proportion of the available seats than the proportion of the popular vote which they have received, the government which is formed as a result of the Parliament's composition is not the choice of the people, and the basic requirement of democratic government is not fulfilled.[55]

It is also apparent from Table 2 that the electoral system produces results which are insensitive to voters' preferences, since many candidates win election with the support of less than half of their constituents. For the four elections considered in Table 2, a total of 439 MPs were elected with less than 50 percent of votes. Thus over 40 percent of the MPs elected in these elections had more votes cast against them than for them. Actually, 93 out of the 1095 seats were won by the members with less than 40 percent of the total vote. The result is an unrepresentative legislature and an underrepresented electorate. A strong criticism of this tendency of the single member district plurality system is made by Lewis:

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[55]Fred Schindeler, "One Man, One Vote: One Vote, One Value," Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 3, 1968, p. 16.

Table 2

Unrepresentative Members

Distribution of Members Elected in the General Elections of 1957, 1958, 1979, and 1980 by Party and Percentage.

Elec. Year	Party	Number of Members Elected with Over 50% of the votes	40-50% of the votes	Less than 40% of the votes	Total
1957	Liberal	79	17	9	105
	P.C.	78	28	7	113
	CCF	1	9	15	25
	S.C.	2	10	7	19
	Other	3		1	4
1958	Liberal	32	16	1	49
	P.C.	169	38	1	208
	CCF		4	4	8
1979	Liberal	72	36	6	114
	P.C.	71	56	9	136
	NDP	6	14	6	26
	S.C.	1	5		6
1980	Liberal	102	39	6	147
	P.C.	36	54	13	103
	NDP	4	20	8	32
Total		656	346	93	1095

> The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of the 'first-past-the-post'.... 'First-past-the-post' does not even require 51 percent of the votes in each constituency to give one party all the seats. If there were three parties it can be done theoretically with only 34 percent; or if there were four parties, with only 26 percent. Governments can get away with this in secure democracies without destroying faith.... (Y)ou can hardly build much faith in the system if you win 30 percent of those votes and get only 20 percent of the seats, or even no seats at all.[56]

When candidates can be elected to Parliament with support from less than half of the voters in their constituency, the degree to which they represent their constituents is questionable. In a representative democracy, when all the voters delegate their decision-making power to a representative assembly, the first condition which the body must meet is that it should be truly representative of the constituents. It is not disputed that the Canadian House of Commons is not the image of the nation desired by theorists such as Mill.

One of the most serious drawbacks of the single-member district plurality election system in Canada is that the electoral system promotes the identification of particular parties with particular regions and provinces. For 19 consecutive elections(1921-1980) covering more than half a century there has been a consistent and usually marked overrepresentation of Quebec in the parliamentary Liberal party and marked underrepresentation in the parliamentary Conservative party. With the exception of 1958, the way in

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[56]W.A. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

which the electoral system affected the relationship of Quebec to the parliamentary wings of the two major parties is evident in the alarming discrepancies between votes and seats for the two parties. Table 3 shows that the Conservatives have been unfairly treated by the electoral system in Quebec. Throughout this period the Progressive Conservatives captured an average of more than 20 percent of the votes in Quebec but rarely came away with more than a handful of seats. One can see the growing Liberal dominance in Quebec and the steady erosion of Conservative representation. While 3 conservative candidates were elected in 1974, only two were elected in 1979 and only one in 1980. However, as Table 3 demonstrates the distribution of the Quebec popular vote is more balanced among the parties than is the distribution of seats. The electoral system continues to penalize the Progressive Conservative party in Quebec since the party obtained only about one tenth as many seats as it would have under strict proportionality. There would have been no problem finding cabinet material from the province in 1979 had some form of proportional representation been in place.[57]

The bias which operates in the Canadian electoral system is not a national bias. Different parties are favoured to varying degrees throughout the country. The electoral situation in Quebec closely parallels that in

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[57]As is well known, Prime Minister Joe Clark could not give adequate representation to Quebec in the federal cabinet because only two Conservative MPs were elected from Quebec.

Table 3

Liberals and Conservatives: Percentage of Seats and Votes from Quebec.

Year	Liberals			Conservatives		
	Seats %	Votes %	Diff.	Seats %	Votes %	Diff.
1921	100	70.2	+29.8	0	18.4	-18.4
1925	90.8	59.3	+31.5	6.2	33.7	-27.5
1926	92.3	62.3	+30.0	6.2	34.3	-28.1
1930	61.5	53.2	+8.3	36.9	44.7	-7.8
1935	84.6	54.4	+30.2	7.7	28.2	-20.5
1940	93.8	63.3	+30.5	1.5	19.8	-18.3
1945	81.5	50.8	+30.7	3.1	8.4	-5.3
1949	93.2	60.4	+32.8	2.7	24.6	-21.9
1953	88.0	61.0	+27.0	5.3	29.4	-24.1
1957	82.7	57.6	+25.1	12.0	31.1	-19.1
1958	33.3	45.7	-12.5	66.7	49.6	7.1
1962	46.7	39.2	+7.5	18.7	29.6	.9
1963	62.7	45.6	+17.1	10.7	19.5	.8
1965	74.7	45.6	+29.1	10.7	21.2	5
1968	75.7	53.6	+22.1	5.4	21.4	.0
1972	75.7	49.1	+26.6	2.7	17.4	-14.7
1974	81.1	54.1	+27.0	4.1	21.2	-17.1
1979	89.3	61.7	+27.6	2.7	13.5	-10.8
1980	98.7	67.4	+31.3	1.3	12.5	-11.2

western Canada. Table 4 shows the growing weakness of the Liberal party in western Canada. The Conservatives have consistently obtained more seats than their share of votes. Since 1958, the Conservatives have averaged less than 45 percent of the votes in the West but have received a much higher percentage of seats. On the other hand, the Liberals consistently obtained over 20 percent of the votes in all western provinces yet often received less than 10 percent of the seats. As Table 4 indicates, the Liberals are not as unpopular in western Canada as their share of seats in the House of Commons suggests. This regional imbalance is more apparent if one looks at the regional distribution of the parties' parliamentary representation rather than at the parties' share of the popular vote. For example, in Alberta, the Conservatives have won 139 of the 150 [illegible] from the 1958 to 1980 federal elections. Thus, they were able to win over 93 percent of the seats with only about 50 percent of the votes. On the other hand, the Liberals obtained only 2 out of the 77 seats from western Canada in the 1980 election although they received over 20 percent of the popular vote. As Table 5 shows, the electoral system has converted Alberta into a solid Conservative stronghold despite a considerable proportion of Alberta voters having voted against the Conservative party.

The regional imbalances in both the West and Quebec have now reached alarming proportions in the party system and have created serious political problems. It has been a

Table 4

Liberals and Conservatives: Percentage of Seats and Votes from the West.

Year	Liberals			Conservatives		
	Seats %	Votes %	Diff.	Seats %	Votes %	Diff.
1921	8.9	19.2	-10.3	12.5	26.1	-13.6
1925	33.8	31.6	+2.2	30.9	36.8	-5.9
1926	48.5	40.9	+7.6	19.1	38.3	-19.2
1930	33.8	39.4	-5.6	44.1	42.0	+2.1
1935	52.1	34.4	+17.7	11.3	21.8	-10.5
1940	62.0	41.6	+20.4	9.9	21.2	-11.3
1945	26.8	29.2	-2.4	14.1	23.5	-9.4
1949	59.2	40.3	+18.9	9.9	20.8	-10.9
1953	35.2	35.3	-0.1	12.7	16.1	-3.4
1957	11.4	25.6	-14.2	30.0	30.0	0.0
1958	0	17.4	-17.4	92.9	53.9	+39.0
1962	8.6	25.1	-16.5	68.6	38.9	+29.7
1963	14.3	28.3	-14.0	64.3	38.8	+25.5
1965	12.9	27.0	-14.1	64.3	36.6	+27.7
1968	39.7	37.4	+2.3	36.8	33.0	+3.8
1972	10.3	27.6	-17.3	61.8	42.1	+19.7
1974	19.1	29.6	-10.5	72.1	47.2	+29.9
1979	3.9	22.6	-18.7	74.0	49.6	+24.4
1980	2.6	23.5	-20.9	63.6	46.8	+16.8

Table 5

Alberta in Federal Elections: 1945-1980.

Year	% of popular votes P.C.	Lib.	S.C.	NDP	Seats P.C.	Lib.	S.C.
1945	18.7	21.8	36.6	18.4	2	2	13
1949	16.8	34.5	37.4	9.3	2	5	10
1953	14.5	35.0	40.8	6.9	2	4	11
1957	27.6	27.9	27.8	6.3	3	1	13
1958	59.9	13.7	21.6	4.4	17	0	0
1962	42.8	19.4	29.2	8.4	15	0	2
1963	45.3	21.1	25.8	6.5	14	1	2
1965	46.6	22.4	22.5	8.3	15	0	2
1968	50.4	35.7	1.9	9.3	15	4	0
1972	57.6	25.0	4.5	12.6	19	0	0
1974	61.2	24.8	3.4	9.3	19	0	0
1979	65.6	22.1	9.9	1.0	21	0	0
1980	64.7	22.1	10.3	1.0	21	0	0

relatively rare event in the post-war Canadian political history when provinces have not elected at least one member of the goverment side of the House, and thus have not provided at least the 'raw material' for cabinet representation. Tables 6 and 7 show respectively the members of parliament of the governing party and cabinet ministers from the West. One can see a sharp decline of the West's representation in the governing Liberal party. However, the growing weakness of the Liberal party in western Canada has not prevented the Liberal party from forming the national government or even forming a majority government. One may conclude that the electoral system accentuates regional cleavages within the House of Commons beyond those that exist within the electorate at large.

The bias which operates in the Canadian electoral system is not necessarily against the weakest party. As Table 8 indicates, in eleven elections out of the total nineteen since 1921, the weakest party received a higher percentage of seats than votes. On the other hand, in every federal election since its formation, the CCF/NDP has received a smaller proportion of the seats in the House of Commons than its proportion of the popular vote has warranted and sometimes these discrepancies have been large.

Table 9 reveals that the electoral system positively favours minor parties with regional strongholds and discourages minor parties with diffuse national support. The classic example of this phenomenon is provided by the

Table 6

Number of MPs in Governing Party from Western Provinces Since 1921.

Year	Seats for West	Governing party	Seats won by the governing party in West
1921	56	Lib.	5
1925	68	Lib.	23
1926	68	Lib.	33
1930	68	Cons.	30
1935	71	Lib.	37
1940	71	Lib.	44
1945	71	Lib.	19
1949	71	Lib.	42
1953	70	Lib.	25
1957	70	P.C.	21
1958	70	P.C.	65
1962	70	P.C.	48
1963	70	Lib.	10
1965	70	Lib.	9
1968	68	Lib.	27
1972	68	Lib.	7
1974	68	Lib.	13
1979	77	P.C.	57
1980	77	Lib.	2

Table 7

Representation of Western Provinces in the Federal Ministries Since 1921.

Period	Party	Cabinet members (A)	Cabinet members from the West from H. of C. (B)	Cabinet members from the West from Senate (C)	(B+C)/A %
1921-25	Lib.	20	4		20
1925-26	Lib.	19	4		21
1926-30	Lib.	18	5		28
1930-35	Cons.	19	4		21
1935-40	Lib.	16	4		25
1940-45	Lib.	20	4	1	25
1945-49	Lib.	20	4		20
1949-53	Lib.	22	4		19
1953-57	Lib.	21	3		15
1957-58	P.C.	22	5	2	32
1958-62	P.C.	23	5		22
1962-63	P.C.	21	4		19
1963-65	Lib.	27	4		15
1965-68	Lib.	26	3		12
1968-72	Lib.	29	6		20
1972-74	Lib.	30	4		13
1974-79	Lib.	28	3	1	14
1979-80	P.C.	30	8		27
1980-82	Lib.	33	2	2	12

Note: These figures are derived from Parliamentary Guides.

TABLE 8

Bias of Electoral System in Translating Votes into Seats
(The Ratio of Percentage of Seats to Percentage of Votes)

Election year	Rank order of parties in terms of percentage of vote 1	2	3	4	5
1921	Lib 1.21	Cons 0.70	Prog 1.20		
1925	Cons 1.017	Lib 1.015	Prog 1.09		
1926	Lib 1.13	Cons 0.82	Prog 1.55		
1930	Cons 1.15	Lib 0.82	Prog 1.53		
1935	Lib 1.57	Cons 0.55	CCF 0.33	Rec 0.05	SC 1.65
1940	Lib 1.43	Cons 0.53	CCF 0.39	SC 1.52	
1945	Lib 1.24	Cons 1.0	CCF 0.73	SC 1.29	
1949	Lib 1.49	Cons 0.53	CCF 0.37	SC 1.03	
1953	Lib 1.32	Cons 0.62	CCF 0.77	SC 1.06	
1957	Lib 0.97	Cons 1.09	CCF 0.88	SC 1.09	
1958	Cons 1.46	Lib 0.55	CCF 0.32	SC 0.0	
1962	Cons 1.17	Lib 1.01	NDP 0.53	SC 0.97	
1963	Lib 1.17	Cons 1.09	NDP 0.49	SC 0.76	
1965	Lib 1.23	Cons 1.13	NDP 0.44	Cred 0.44	SC 0.51
1968	Lib 1.29	Cons 0.87	NDP 0.49	SC 1.2	
1972	Lib 1.07	Cons 1.16	NDP 0.66	SC 0.74	
1974	Lib 1.24	Cons 1.02	NDP 0.39	SC 0.82	
1979	Lib 1.01	Cons 1.34	NDP 0.52	SC 0.62	
1980	Lib 1.18	Cons 1.13	NDP 0.57	SC 0.0	

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TABLE 9

Minor Parties: Percentage of Seats and Votes.

Year	Prog. Votes	Prog. Seats	CCF/NDP Votes	CCF/NDP Seats	Socred Votes	Socred Seats	Recons. Votes	Recons. Seats
1921	23.1	27.7						
1925	9.0	9.8						
1926	5.3	8.2						
1930	3.2	4.9						
1935			8.9	2.9	4.1	6.9	8.7	0.4
1940			8.5	3.3	2.7	4.1		
1945			15.6	11.4	4.1	5.3		
1949			13.4	5.0	3.7	3.8		
1953			11.3	8.7	5.4	5.7		
1957			10.7	9.4	6.6	7.2		
1958			9.5	3.0	2.6	0.0		
1962			13.5	7.2	11.7	11.3		
1963			13.1	6.4	11.9	9.1		
1965			17.9	7.9	8.3	5.3		
1968			17.0	8.3	4.4	5.3		
1972			17.7	11.7	7.6	5.7		
1974			15.4	6.1	5.1	4.2		
1979			17.9	9.2	4.6	2.1		
1980			19.8	11.4	1.7	0.0		

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Reconstruction party in the 1935 election. For its 8 percent of the vote it was rewarded with one seat. Yet its electoral support was more than twice that of Social Credit which gained 17 seats. In 1963, 13 percent of the votes garnered 17 seats for the NDP while 12 percent of the votes gained 24 seats for the Social Credit. As Cairns pointed out "The case of the Reconstruction party provides dramatic illustration of the futility of party effort for a minor party which lacks a regional stronghold."[58] Smiley noted that it is the minor parties of particular value and significance in Canadian political history who have suffered most from the vagaries of the single-member district plurality election system, and he further commented on the dilemma these parties face:

> Under this kind of electoral law, however, the position of minor parties is untenable. They may either confine themselves to one section and thus forego any possibility of coming to power nationally or they may dissipate their strength throughout the nation under the inherent disadvantages of the electoral system.[59]

The party with diffuse support such as the NDP which aspires to be a national and major party never receives as many seats as would be justified by its voting support. As is obvious from Table 9, the total of its votes may approach a fifth of the entire national poll, but it always lags behind the other two national parties in terms of the seats

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[58]Alan Cairns, op. cit., p. 137.
[59]Donald V. Smiley, "The Two Party System and One Party Dominance in the Liberal Democratic State," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 24, 1958, p. 316.

to votes ratio. The handicapping of the NDP is seen most clearly in the average number of votes it has needed to elect one MP. As Table 10 shows, in most elections, the NDP had to obtain over 60,000 votes to elect one MP, while the Liberals and the Conservatives have needed only about 30,000 votes to elect one MP. In contrast, the treatment of the sectional minor parties - the Social Credit and the Progressives - by the electoral system has been favorable as is clear from Table 9. The Progressive party always gained more seats than its votes and the same holds true for the Social Credit party until 1968. In other words it can be asserted that the Canadian electoral system encourages minor parties with sectional bases of support and the system damages minor parties with a broad base of support. The first part of this proposition is consistent with one study which concluded that the smaller the party, the more concentrated in one or more provinces should be its vote if it is to maximize its strength in the Parliament.[60]

There have been severe cases of absolute non-representation. One may cite several such examples in every federal election. For example, in 1935 and 1945 the CCF gained 33 percent and 32 percent of votes in Ontario, yet won no seats. Another striking instance is that the Liberals won 45 percent of the electorate in Prince Edward Island in 1968 but not a single Liberal was elected from

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[60] Richard Johnstone and Janet Ballantyne, "Geography and the Electoral System," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, 1977, p. 866.

Table 10

Average Number of Votes Obtained Per Seat in the House of Commons by Each Party Since 1945.

Year	Liberal	P.C.	NDP/CCF	Socred
1945	17,170	21,429	29,152	16,538
1949	15,013	42,346	60,185	13,521
1953	16,089	34,305	27,665	20,370
1957	25,738	22,972	28,306	22,982
1958	49,957	18,791	86,549	
1962	28,618	24,703	54,571	29,885
1963	25,533	27,280	61,050	39,195
1965	23,660	25,772	65,793	45,849
1968	23,863	35,482	62,654	30,279
1972	34,112	31,621	55,275	49,198
1974	29,097	35,466	91,734	43,748
1979	40,301	30,232	78,799	87,934
1980	33,019	34,495	67,655	

Note: In 1965 and 1968, Social Credit in the West and R.C. in Quebec are counted together as one party for calculation purposes.

that province. The NDP also managed to win a significant proportion of the vote in Alberta since 1968, in Nova Scotia in 1972, and in Newfoundland and New Brunswick in 1974 without electing a single member.

Volatility of the seat to vote ratio of the parties and their inconsistency from province to province is also noteworthy. By inconsistency it is meant that a party can get approximately the same vote in two different provinces but a much different proportion of seats. For example, in 1968, the Progressive Conservative party obtained about the same proportion of votes in New Brunswick as it had in Alberta, and about the same in Ontario as in Manitoba. In each case, the party obtained proportionately fewer seats in New Brunswick and Ontario. Another example: in 1945, the CCF gained 260,000 votes in Ontario yet won no seats, while the 167,000 votes the party received in Saskatchewan resulted in 64 percent of its federal seats.

As a reflection of malproportion between votes cast and seats won a truly insignificant shift in popular votes cast can eject one government and install its opponent. Such a shift is calculated in the so called "swing" which measures the net movement of voting between one party and its adversary. A "swing" of 1 percent for example, means that one in every 100 voters had transferred his or her

allegiance from party A to B.[61] For example, in Canada, the Liberals formed a majority government in 1974 with 43.2 percent of the total votes. In 1979, a mere loss of 3.1 percent in total support resulted in the ouster of the Liberals from power. However, the Liberals managed to return to power again in 1980 with only an increase of 4.1 percent in popular support.

It has been said that there is no greater gamble on earth than a British general election.[62] Since in Canada the same system is in use, Canadian general elections share the same dubious distinction of being lotteries. It has been argued that there is nothing in the rules of single member district with plurality election system to ensure that a party's share of seats will be related in a predictable way to its share of votes.

However, some British scholars have made studies of the votes and seats relationship and they have refuted the criticism that the results of elections under single-member district plurality system are random and haphazard. They have argued that it is possible to predict results by the "cubic law". In a system, in which two parties A1 and A2 dominate, the "cubic law" can be expressed by the formula:

$$F(A_i) = A_i^3 / (A_1^3 + A_2^3) \quad \text{where} \quad A_i = A_1 \text{ or } A_2.$$

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[61] S.E. Finer, Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, Anthony Wigram Publishers, 1975, p. 8.
[62] Enid Lakeman, Voting in Democracies, London: Faber & Faber, 1959, p.

Butler, who explained the "cubic law" in more political and less mathematical terms suggested that the "cubic law" could only be applied to the vote seat relationship in a relatively homogeneous country whose politics were fought predominantly on national issues and where swings from one party to another were relatively uniform across all the constituencies.[63] There have been very few studies of vote seat relationships in Canada. In one of these studies, Qualter claimed that the "cubic law" has a wider application than that claimed by some British scholars.[64] He applied the "cubic law" to the Canadian election data and reported that the formula had produced predicted results surprisingly close to those which have actually occurred. Another Canadian scholar reported that neither the "cubic law" nor linear regression offers a convincing account of election outcomes in Canada. He noted that for the major parties over the period from 1921 to 1965, no more than about three quarters of the variance of the share of seats can be explained by changes in the share of votes, assuming linearity, compared to more than nine tenths of the variance

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[63]See for details David B. Butler, The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918, London, 1963, pp. 196-202.

[64]Qualter puts forward a modified "cubic law" for the multi-party case and applies it to Canada. For details see T.H. Qualter, "Seats and Votes: An Application of Cube law to the Canadian Electoral System," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, 1968, pp. 336-344.

of the share of seats explained by Dahl.[65] Even in Britain, it has been noted that successful application of the "cubic law" depends on the relative insignificance of the challenge of third parties. It is maintained that only if the third national party falls below a certain level of voting will the other two major parties reap that disproportionate advantage in seats gained in the parliament. If the third party gains 25 percent of the total votes cast, the relationship between the votes obtained and the seats won goes "wild" and the outcome of the election becomes unpredictable.[66] This proposition is consistent with Indian election results. Until 1967, the single member district plurality election system invariably worked in favour of the Congress party. But as other parties have come up, the element of gamble and uncertainty ingrained in the system also has started playing havoc with the Congress," noted two Indian political scientists.[67] The element of gamble is not remedied by the "cubic law", argued Lakeman:

> The cubic law itself is an admission that changes in the composition of the House of Commons are out of all proportions to changes in public opinion - that small causes may prove great effects. The conditions attached to the law are further admission that the

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[65] D. Spafford, "The Electoral System of Canada," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, 1970, p. 169. In this article, Spafford refers to the study by Robert Dahl who devised linear equations to examine the relationship between seats and votes of the democratic party in the House of Representatives. For details of this study, see Robert Dahl's A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago, 1956, pp. 148-149.

[66] S.E. Finer, op. cit., p. 10.

[67] S.C. Kasyap and J.P. Sharma, Elections and Electoral Reform in India, Delhi: Stirling Publishers Pvt Ltd., 1971, p. 4.

> success of either of two parties depends on factors other than the degree of public support for it.... A party whose success depends not only on its ability to win over the electors but also on extraneous circumstances can fairly be said to be taking part in a gamble.[68]

Some scholars have identified other factors which also contribute to the distortion between votes and seats relationship in the single member district plurality election system. District magnitude is one of these factors which certainly affects the proportionality of the seat allocation.[69] Any electoral formula can be really effective only in constituencies returning at least eight to ten members from each district; the reasoning behind this is that the more members there are, the fewer remaining or "unused" votes there will be. Though the proportionality begins to become significant in a three-member district, it becomes maximum only if the entire state were one great multi-member constituency.

There are other factors which are also said to account for the distortion between votes and seats. Malapportionment and gerrymandering can contribute to this distortion. It is argued that the distortion between votes and seats could be improved by redrawing the electoral map and making the ridings more uniform as regards the voting population.[70]

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[68] Enid Lakeman, op. cit., p. 57.

[69] For details see Douglas Rae, op. cit., p. 126. Also, see R.C. Silva, "Relation of Representation and the Party System to the Number of Seats Apportioned to a Legislative District," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1964, p. 769.

[70] For example, Lovink argued that these distortions between votes and seats are remediable without changing of the electoral system, by making constituencies equal in size.

[70] It is true that an extremely unbalanced map, like the one previously used in Canada before the Readjustment Act of 1964,[71] can make the system even more incoherent. Problems arising from partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering have also produced quite biased and unresponsive electoral results. Yet, it would be incorrect to imply that these distortions between the parties' proportion of the nationwide popular votes and its proportion of legislative seats is caused wholly by malapportionment and gerrymandering and not by the single-member district plurality election system. Furthermore, even if an equal number of votes were cast in each district and even if the district lines were drawn according to a set and impartial

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[70](cont'd)See for details, J.A.A. Lovink, "On Analyzing the Impact of the Electoral System on the Party System in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1970, p. 501.

[71]The extreme inequalities between the rural and urban constituencies exist in Canada. There existed a structure of constituencies in which the population ranged from 12,479 to 267,252. There were 25 constituencies with a population of less than 40,000 and 36 constituencies with a population of over 100,000 three of them over 200,000. For details of this point and more, see Norman Ward, "A Century of Constituencies," in Canadian Public Adminstration, Vol. 10, 1967, pp. 105-122, and
T.H. Qualter, "Representation by Population: A Comparative Study," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1967, pp. 246-268.
The Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act of 1964 provided a new and improved method of redistributing seats in the House of Commons. This Act also terminated the long standing abuse of allowing the government party of the day at Ottawa to influence to its advantage the redrawing of the constituency boundaries. Gerrymandering was ended by the Act which provided for independent commissions to revise constituency lines. The Act also attempted to modify to some degree the overrepresentation of rural areas in the Parliament of Canada.

standard this electoral system would, rarely, if ever, produce a parliament which accurately reflects the various parties' nationwide electoral strength.[72] Malapportionment and gerrymandering merely exaggerates the parliament's unrepresentative character. Considering all these factors, Ward concluded that the plurality election system is the main cause of distortions between votes and seats:

> These jumbled results may be due in part to the inequalities in the size of the constituencies before 1966; in part to a mixture of sweeping victories by one party and closely won elections by another; and in part to the parties' varying regional strength; but the major cause was the election of candidates on pluralities (not actual majorities) in three, four, and five cornered contests.[73]

In spite of all these defects, the single-member district plurality election system has been defended on several grounds by its proponents. One of the basic defences of this system is that it provides the Canadian political system with electoral majorities and consequently with governmental stability. However, with the occurrence of six different minority governments in Canada between 1957 and 1980 one can speculate just how valid this assertion is. As

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[72]The single-member district plurality election system is deficient in itself, by its very nature irrespective of the electoral map used, noted the Green Paper on Electoral Reform in Quebec. This paper further argued that the best balanced map ever used in Quebec general election, that used in 1973, created a year earlier by the Commission Permanente De Reforme Des Districts Electoraux, did not prevent the greatest distortion of representatives in the electoral history of Quebec. See for details Robert Burns, One Citizen One Vote, Ministry of State for Parliamentary and Electoral Reform, Quebec 1979.

[73] R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, Revised by Norman Ward, fifth edition, Toronto Press, 1970, p. 315.

Table 1 shows the consistent tendency of the electoral system in every election from 1921 to 1980 to give the government party a greater percentage of seats than of votes is not enough to create a majority government every time. With the exception of 1940 and 1958, the electoral system transformed a minority of votes into a majority of seats on only eight of seventeen occasions. The Canadian electoral system manufactures regional differences more efficiently than it does parliamentary majorities.

It must also be considered that a working parliamentary system requires both a stable majority and an effective opposition. If the assessment of the electoral system is extended to include not only its contribution to one-party majorities but its contribution to the maintenance of effective opposition (defined as at least one-third of the House members), it appears an even less satisfactory system.

This system has also been defended on the ground that it produces a two-party system. The scholars of modern politics in the English speaking democracies have regarded the two-party system as the norm of the liberal democratic polity as well as the sine que non for the successful functioning of the parliamentary institutions. This view is most explicit with the Canadian scholar Corry who stated:

> ... The two-party system offers the best, if not the only means for maintaining liberal-democratic government. Single-member territorial constituencies, where every voter has one vote regardless of interest, provide the best mode of representation for encouraging the continuance of

two-party system.[74]

Douglas Rae defined the two-party system as one in which the first party holds less than 70 percent of the legislative seats, and the first two parties together hold at least 90 percent of the seats. Taking in account the definition provided by Rae and looking at the election results from 1921 to 1980 in Canada, not even once have the criteria of two-party system been met. In Canada, the system does not seem to operate against the survival of a substantial third party, though these parties have been usually underrepresented in national parliaments. The limitation of parties to two has never been absolute, and there are three parties at the national level, none of which shows any sign of disappearing. On the contrary, as some scholars have noted, patterns of political behaviour fail to conform with the single-member district plurality election theory and quite often has run counter to it.[75]

One of the other more common and plausible arguments in defence of the electoral system advanced is that it establishes a close personal tie between the representative

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[74] J.A. Corry and J.E. Hodgetts, Democratic Government and Politics, third ed. revised, University of Toronto Press, 1959, p. 298.

[75] E. F. Ricketts and Herbert Waltzer, "Electoral Arrangements and Party Systems: The Case of Canada," Western Political Quarterly. Vol. 23, 1970, p. 712.

and the represented.[76] The reasoning is as follows: The single-member district is usually a smaller constituency than one in which several MPs are chosen. Consequently, the legislator from the small constituency is usually forced to have a more local point of view and to serve local interests more carefully. To support this proposition, a thorough investigation of the single-member districts' implications for constituents-member relations is required. No such data exist in Canada. However, an exhaustive discussion of this relationship is reported by Crewe, a British scholar, who found that the impact of a member of the Parliament on his constituents in Britain is not as extensive as has been assumed, and does not vary by constituency size. He further suggested that insofar as the attentiveness of the representative to constituents' views and needs are concerned, it is a function of electoral incentives rather than of personal inclination. Conversely, he argued that the greater vulnerability of the MPs in a system like proportional representation/ single transferable vote would enhance the link between the representative and the

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[76]Precisely this was one of the arguments put forward by several MPs in the Canadian House of Commons when the topic of electoral reform was discussed in the House. For more details, see Parliamentary Government, Vol. 1, No. 4, Summer 1980. Also, see Jeffrey Simpson, Alter Rep by POP to get Rep by Prop?, Globe and Mail, March 20, 1979. p. 7. In this article, Simpson covers briefly the parliamentary debate in which the reform of the electoral system of Canada was discussed.

represented.[77] Commenting on this relationship, J.F.S. Rose, a distinguished student of elections, commented:

> That personal contact is largely illusory. No doubt the Member, with his heavy batches of letters from constituents, and the enthusiastic reception he receives from his more immediate and ardent supporters at election rallies and garden parties, feels very much in the swim; but actually these contacts touch only the fringe of electorate.[78]

The defenders of the single-member plurality system also claim that one member elections fracture "caucus combinations" and focus attention upon the candidate rather than the party. The argument put forward is that since the MP elected in a small constituency is likely to have closer ties to his district, his reelection is rarely impeded and often fostered by his independence from his party's organization in the legislature. But when one looks at the realities of political life it becomes obvious that this system itself is no safegaurd against the domination of the parties in Canada. Both the major Canadian parties have been cohesive in parliaments. As Epstein stated "generally, it is simply taken for granted that MPs, particularly of the governing parties but also of major opposition parties, will vote according to a previously arranged caucus, influenced strongly by its leadership." He further noted that MPs may play a policymaking role in the parliamentary party caucus but any independence in this role usually comes to an end

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[77] I. Crewe, "Electoral Reform and Local MP," in S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 317-342.

[78] J.F.S. Rose, Elections and Electors, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1955, p. 52.

with the caucus decision.[79] Dawson noted as early as the 1920s that "few Canadian members of Parliament have shown independence of their party."[80] Two decades later another Canadian political scientist, Clokie, wrote "... Canadian parties display a notable coherence and subservience to their leader".[81] In Canadian history one can find that despite intra-party differences the Prime Minister was always able to secure full parliamentary party support on a question of confidence. There has been only one case of a governing party being forced from office because its own followers defected in a parliamentary division. There are several instances when there was an open intra-party disagreement over policy; most notable was in 1963 when there was open disagreement over nuclear arms policy between the Conservative Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his Minister of Defence. It is known that most Conservative MPs agreed with the Minister rather than the Prime Minister yet the Conservative party voted almost unanimously in the Prime Minister's favour. Another recent example is the War Measures Act introduced by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1970. Many Liberal MPs were opposed to it at the time but they did not vote against it. Engelmann and Schwartz noted that the Liberal caucus appears to be more disciplined than the others. However, they suggested that the conclusions about

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[79] L. Epstein, "The Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," in O.M. Kruhalk, et al, op. cit., p. 334.
[80] Quoted in Epstein, op. cit., p. 334.
[81] H.M. Clokie, Canadian Goverment and Politics, Toronto: Longman's Green, 1949, p. 135.

caucus discipline are only tentative because there are few survey studies of this phenomenon.[82]

Realistically speaking, no member can be expected to be in agreement with his party on every occasion. The member, however, votes with it even when in disagreement, for any of four reasons. (1) To endorse party policies, (2)because failure to do so may bring about the defeat of the party, (3)to advance their own career, (4) because the member is subjected to some form of coercion. The possibility of coercion results from the fact that the member has little, if any, hope of being reelected without the support of the party. Whatever the reasons, it is quite common for an MP to vote with the party even when in disagreement with it.

The single-member district plurality election system in Canada has been defended on the ground that the system has been in operation for over 100 years and has the advantage of being well known and well understood by the voters. There is no argument against this proposition; nevertheless, this feature alone is not substantive enough to retain the system. Canada has employed a variety of electoral arrangements, though the preponderant preference has been for plurality choice and single-member districts at both national and provincial levels. But multi-member districts and proportional representation, and preferential voting,

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[82] F.C. Engelmann and M. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 250.

have been employed at the provincial level.[83]

It is often assumed that Canada's electoral system is similar to that used in other democracies. But in fact the great majority of the democratic countries of the world hold elections by some form of proportional representation. For these countries, the ability of the legislature to reflect the party preference of the voter is more important than the creation of an unrepresentative majority government. The next chapter deals with the different types of electoral systems used by most of these western democracies.

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[83] Two constituencies- Halifax and Queens(PEI) had two members until the redistribution of 1965-66, when they were eliminated. At one time (1872-92) no less than 10 constituencies returned two members each: but they gradually dwindled to the two mentioned above. The single alternative vote existed for many years for provincial elections in the province of Manitoba and Alberta and was also introduced briefly in British Columbia. A system of proportional representation was applied for provincial seats in the cities of Winnipeg, Calgary and Edmonton.

4. Alternative Electoral Systems

The purpose of this chapter is to explore and analyze the different electoral systems used by some of the world's democracies. The emphasis, however, will be on objectives and political influence of the electoral system on the political life of a country and not on the mechanics of the electoral system itself. The principal characteristics of these electoral systems are shown in Table 11. The Table contains a number of features worth noting. First of all, the eighteen democracies included in this chapter conduct their electoral business under a remarkable diversity of institutional arrangements. Britain(Canada) could be taken as the archetype of the majoritarian voting with its pure system of single member district with plurality election system. Israel(Netherlands) could be taken as the archetype of proportional representation, which elects its Knesset(Parliament) with the entire nation as a single district and the voters chosing from the party lists. All systems fall into a continuum that runs from a 'first-past-the-post' system based on single member constituency, to a purely proportional one with a national list. There lie many variants between the two poles. For example, Australia uses single member constituencies but eschews election by simple plurality in favour of the alternative vote. France also has single member

Table 11

Electoral Systems in some Selected Democratic Countries.

Country	Elect. system lower house	Formula used	Dist. No.	Seats No.	Seat distribution in a recent elec. Year	Seats won by party
Australia	AV	Majority	124	124	1977	Lib. 67 NCP 19 ALP 38
Austria	PR	d'Hondt	9	183	1979	Soc. 95 Peop. 77 Lib. 11
Belgium	PR	d'Hondt	30	212	1978	CS. 82 Soc. 58 lib. 37 Other 35
Canada	FPTP	Plurality	282	282	1980	Lib. 147 PC 103 NDP 32
Denmark	PR	Lague	17	175	1977	S.D. 65 Prog. 26 Lib. 21 Con. 15 Other 48
Finland	PR	d'Hondt	15	199	1978	S.D. 52 Con. 47 cent. 36 Com. 35 Other 29
France	Second Ballot	Majority Plurality	491	491	1978	RPF 154 UDF 123 Soc. 115 Com. 86 Other 13
West Germany	FPTP+PR	Plurality d'Hondt	248	496	1980	CDU/CSU 226 SDP 218 FDP 52
India	FPTP	Plurality	544	544	1980	Cong. I 351 Lok Dal 41 Janata 31 Com. M 35 Com. I 11 Other 56
Ireland	STV	Hare	42	148	1976	FF 84 FG 43 Lab. 17 Other 4

(Table Continues.)

Table 11 Continued

Country	Elec. system lower house	Formula used	Dist. No.	Seats No.	Seat in a Year	Distribution recent elec. Seats won by party
Israel	PR	Largest remain.	1	120	1977	Likud 43 Lab. 32 DMC 15 Rel. 12 Other 18
Italy	PR	Imp. LR	32	630	1979	CD 262 Com. 201 Soc. 62 Other 105
Japan	Limited vote	Multi member plurality	130	511	1980	Lib. D 284 J. Soc. 107 Komeito 33 Com. 29 D.S. 32 Other 26
Holland	PR	PR,LA	1	150	1977	Soc. 53 CD. 49 Lib. 28 Other 20
Norway	PR	Lague	20	155	1977	Lab. 76 Con. 41 CP. 22 Cent. 12 Other 4
Sweden	PR	Lague	28	349	1979	S.D. 152 Cent. 86 Con. 55 Lib. 39 Comm. 17
Switz.	PR	d'Hondt	25	200	1979	S.D. 55 Rad. 47 CD 46 Peop. 21 Other 31
U.K.	FPTP	Plurality	635	635	1979	Cons. 339 Lab. 269 Lib. 11 Other 16

constituencies but requires election by absolute majority, if neccessary, in a run-off between the candidates. Yet two other democracies use practices that are still more intricately mixed. The Federal Republic of Germany chooses half the members of the Bundestag from single member constituencies and the remaining half from the national party lists in a way that matches the party's share of seats to its share of the national vote. The Japanese have used a device to create a system that is unique and perhaps the most intricate of all. Members of the Diet are chosen from districts with three to five seats but each voter is allowed to vote only for a single candidate.

It is obvious from an examination of Table 1 that there has been an ethnocentric element in adopting electoral system. The countries in Continental Europe followed different traditions from the English speaking world, which have wanted to keep single member constituencies but to eliminate the arbitrariness of the plurality system have looked to the alternative vote in the English-speaking world, but elsewhere to the second ballot. Advocates of greater 'fairness' have turned to the single transferable vote in the English-speaking world, but elsewhere to the list system of proportional representation(PR). The electoral systems which are being analyzed in this chapter can be divided into five major categories: plurality system, majoritarian system, semi-proportional system, mixed system, and PR system.

4.1 Plurality System

The plurality election system used in Canada is also used in Britain and India. The working of this system was discussed in the previous chapter which demonstrated that this system produces distortion in translating the votes into seats. The British and Indian general election data also supply instances of the anomalies similar to those described in the last chapter. For example, in India, the Congress party managed to secure an overwhelming majority of seats despite its minority hold on the electorate in the general elections of 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, and 1980. Also in Britain, among elections from 1885 onwards, only two are found (1892 and 1923) which did not seriously distort the representation of the parties. In all the other general elections since 1885 there has been a general tendency of this system to exaggerate the representation of the largest party and to reduce that of the smaller ones.[84] Both Britain and India have their domestic critics of the electoral system and electoral reform has been a constant subject of scholarly discussion. The electoral system has been held responsible for serious anomalies among the Indian political parties. It has been argued that the electoral system helps in the maintenance of the superiority of the social structure over the functioning of the parties. Political parties, instead of selling their programmes and policies,

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[84] Detailed data for the elections from 1885 to 1970 are provided by Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 30-34.

try to measure the constituency in terms of religious or Caste arithmetic and search for a candidate who qualifies by that arithmetic.[85] Elections are not an exercise in choice among various party programmes. The so called merits of the candidate assume a decisive role in elections. Usually, a candidate is nominated by a party because he belonged to the largest community of a district; e.g. a Jat would be nominated in a Jat dominated constituency with the expectation that he would draw most of the Jat votes. The single-member plurality election system dilutes party programmes and ideology. In Britain, the 'first-past-the-post' system, in addition to causing anomalies similar to those described earlier, has also been blamed for the lack of stable economic policies.[86]

4.2 Majoritarian System

The second classification of the electoral systems includes the alternative vote and the second ballot. The primary function of these systems is to produce an absolute majority of votes for the winning candidate, especially by bringing into play the alternative choice of the voters. The

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[85]How this arithmetic has been used by the Congress party for its building, see M. Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress, The University of Chicago Press, 1967.

[86]For the details as how the electoral system has caused sharp discontinuities and U-turns in British economic policies, see T. Wilson, "The Economic Costs of the Adversary System," and D.K. Stout, "Income Policy and the Costs of the Adversary System," in S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 99-140.

absolute majority is achieved either through candidate negotiations, withdrawl of candidates, or by having the voters indicate their secondary choices on the ballot. The candidates who can not muster sufficient support at each count to stay ahead of their rivals are gradually eliminated. The essential point about the rule of the majority is that the winning party defeats the entire field of opposition; no combination of opponents can match its numerical strength. Of the eighteen countries studied here, only two use the majority formula. The elections to the French National Assembly have been held under the second ballot system. Under this system election on the first ballot, but not on the second, requires an absolute majority. Very few candidates obtain the required initial majorities so they are elected on the second ballot.[87]

The second ballot has been tried in some European countries and in Britain by trade unions, but was abandoned everywhere except in France. This system seems to have disadvantages if used for parliamentary choices, since second ballot victory is often by 'inter-party transactions at the expense of ideals and programmes'.[88] Besides, the two ballots result in extra cost, and many voters may not bother to vote twice. Also, the election results under the second

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[87] For explanations and analyses of various second ballot systems, see M. Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., pp. 216-228.
Also see Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections Since 1789, London: Faber and Faber, 1958, pp. 134-135.

[88] Fred Schindeler, op. cit., p. 17.

ballot can be as unrepresentative as those of the first-past-the-post system. For example, in the French election of 1968 the Government party supported by substantially less than half of the voters won three quarters of the seats.[89] Neither does this system guarantee a strong or stable government.

Elections to the Australian House of Representatives are also conducted on a majority formula, under the alternative vote system. This system allows a quicker and more efficient way of achieving an absolute majority which squeezes all of the required run-off into one ballot by having the elector indicate his order of preferences among the candidates by putting numbers opposite their names. The alternative vote system allows the voter to indicate his first, second, third, and perhaps more choices. These preferences indicate what to do with the ballot if the voter's favourite candidate is defeated. Thus, under the alternative vote, a voter would be required to place a '1' against the name of his favourite candidate, '2' against the name of the candidate he would prefer if his first choice candidate were defeated, and '3' against his next choice after that. During the vote counting process, the first preference votes obtained by each candidate would be totalled. If one of the candidate received more than 50 percent of the votes polled, then he would be declared

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[89]For the results of this election, see Enid Lakeman, op. cit., p. 225.

elected. However, if no candidate obtained more than half of the total vote, the candidate who finished last would be eliminated first. The eliminated candidate's votes would be transferred to other candidates on the basis of second preference votes. The process of elimination and vote transfer would continue until one candidate receives more than 50 percent of the total vote.[90] However, the alternative vote has been criticised on several grounds. It is claimed that this system requires a voter to make an immediate decision about several hypothetical choices which may or may not arise in the course of determining the final winner of an election. Thus the choices are made under any number of unforeseen circumstances. This system, like the second ballot, also makes a member's election depend on the support of some party smaller than his own, and involves the major party in angling the second preferences of those groups that have least support in the electorate. Worse still, results under the alternative system can be as unrepresentative as those of a plurality election system. They may vary from the comparatively mild distortion of the 1966 Australian House of Representative election to the extreme exaggeration of the 1948 Alberta provincial election.

Both the alternative vote and the second ballot are designed to ensure only the election of a legislator who is

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[90]For a detailed explanation of the vote counting procedure under the alternative vote system, see Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

acceptable to an electoral majority. However, Lakeman criticises these systems since they are often responsible for unfortunate effects on the relations between the parties. Under either of them the successful candidate owes his election to the support of some other party. The smaller party may sell its support for the promise of some concessions. As long as two major parties are unable to cooperate even if they obtain 90 percent of the total votes, a small party even with 10 percent votes would enjoy a strong bargaining position. This has led Enid Lakeman to state that "either system, however, may involve party combinations that are quite incongruous and dictated by nothing more than political opportunitism."[91] Rae criticised majority systems for their tendency to produce deadlocks in which no party can win a given seat. He further argued that this possibility of electoral deadlock is so threatening to the viability of a political system that majority elections are avoided.[92]

4.3 Semi-Proportional System

The third group of electoral systems is called semi-proportional systems. The basic objective of this system is the enhancement of minority representation. These systems include the limited vote, cumulative vote, and single non-transferable vote and they might bear serious

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[91] Enid Lakeman, op. cit., p. 70.
[92] Douglas Rae, op. cit., p. 25.

attention if minority representation were a major issue in the selection of an electoral method for any particular country.[93]

Among the semi-proportional systems only the single non-transferable vote system is in use at present. This system has been used in Japan since 1900 for electing members of the Diet. This is the simplest scheme to be used with multi-member constituencies, each voter having only one vote.[94] If the number of votes per elector is reduced to one and the number of seats apportioned to each district is fairly large, the result is likely to be a more representative elected body. In Japan, where two to ten members are returned to the Diet from each district, this system may give representation to a number of minor parties but at the same time it prevents the very smallest minorities from winning seats. Lakeman noted that this system resulted in much more nearly reflecting the wishes of the voters than those in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless she objects to this system on two grounds. First, voters may resent being limited to expressing an opinion about only one candidate out of perhaps a dozen or more. Second, and more important, this method has tended to produce stagnation because the parties are afraid to put up too many candidates

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[93] For details of the cumulative vote system and the limited vote system, see Ruth Silva, "Relation of Representation and the Party System to the Number of Seats Apportioned to a Legislative District," in Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1964, pp. 748-757, and also see, Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 83-89, and George Van Den Bergh, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[94] Ruth Silva, op. cit., p. 750.

for fear that many of them may lose.[95] However, Mackenzie has suggested "... there has been so little study of these elections that it would be unwise to draw conclusions from them."[96]

4.4 Mixed System

The fourth category of electoral systems is called the mixed system. West Germany holds its elections by a system which is designed to synthesize the first-past-the-post system and the PR/list system. This mixed system was evolved in 1949 for the first (post-Hitler) election in the Federal Republic of Germany.[97] It is designed to meet the chief objections levied both against single member constituency and PR. A certain number of members are elected exactly as in the U.K., namely, through the plurality system, while the distortion of party representation is rectified by adding members from separate lists so as to bring up the total representation of each party's as nearly as possible to proportionality. Originally, the parties' allocation of seats was based on the totals of votes cast for their candidates in the single member constituencies, but in the Bundestag elections from 1953 onwards the electors have cast

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[95] For details of these arguments, see Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
[96] W. J. M. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 58.
[97] The discussion of the German electoral system is largely derived here from the article by G.K. Roberts, "The Federal Republic of Germany," in S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 201-222, and Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 107-110.

a second vote for a party list in their province. Seats are allotted to the parties by the d'Hondt rule[98] on the basis of their provincial totals of second votes.

A distinguishing feature of the German electoral system is a provision which effectively prevents the growth of splinter parties. The German electoral law includes a provision that only that party would be entitled to a share in the additional seats alloted on the basis of party list which has secured either five percent of the valid votes cast for the federal elections or won at least three constituency seats. A critic of the German electoral system may point out that the list basis puts too much emphasis on the role of a party in selecting candidates. Those candidates are the people who are in some way well regarded by the party apparatus, but may not be popular with the electorate. But one can argue that even in Britain and France, where the list system does not exist, the party input in selecting candidates is no less significant. In fact, the German voter has a slight advantage over the British voter since, if he wishes to support a party but considers some candidate personally superior to his party's nominee in his constituency, he can use his first vote for that other candidate without affecting the total party representation. Another objection made against the German mixed system is that it creates two kinds of MPs - some

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[98] An explanation of the d'Hondt rule and procedure for the calculations required to use it is provided in Appendix I.

elected through constituencies and some chosen from the party lists. But this seems to have created no problems since the system has been used for nearly four decades.

On balance, the German electoral system appears to have more advantages than disadvantages. As an electoral system, it is above all equitable in terms of the relationship between the votes gained by a party and the seats won by it. Despite initial fears of such an electoral system leading to unstable governments and a multi-party Bundestag, only once has a Bundestag failed to survive for its full four years(in 1972). The electorate of the Federal Republic of Germany has become increasingly polarized into two dominant parties, the Christian and the Social Democrat. Radical movements of the left or the right secure little electoral support and their influence on political outcomes at any level of government is insignificant. This has led one scholar to say that "The Federal Republic of Germany occupies an enviable position. Her economic prosperity is accompanied by a degree of political stability greater than that of Italy, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom."[99] Successful transitions of power have taken place and no national minority or separatist groups threaten the integrity of the State. Of course there may have been other factors besides the electoral system which contributed to the remarkably flexible and stable system of government which has developed since 1949, but the electoral system can

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[99]Ibid., p. 202.

be considered one of the contributing factors.

4.5 Proportional Representation System

The fifth category of the electoral systems includes PR systems used by most of the European democracies. The distinguishing feature of the PR formulae is that, unlike majoritarian and plurality formulae, they define the legitimate claim to parliamentary seats by the proportionality of vote shares. To win a seat, a party must win a number of votes proportional to the seat's value. The party need not, however, win a majority or plurality of the district's votes to win a seat. There are two main types of PR: the single transferable vote and the list system. Each has many variants and it is possible to mix them with each other. But no matter what the variations in detail, the fundamental principle of PR is always the same: to secure a representative assembly reflecting with more or less exactness the various divisions in the electorate. The list systems are all based on the assumption that the voter is primarily concerned with the support of a party and that the party as such should be given representation in proportion to its support. Under the list plan, each party nominates a slate of candidates for the district. The elector votes for the party rather than an individual candidate although some list plans permit the voter to indicate his preference for a

candidate of the party for which he votes.[100]

The list system has been criticised on two grounds. First, it is maintained that the list system allows the voter little freedom of choice. Second, since the party organization decides the candidates who get the seats won by the party, it is asserted that leaders tend to become authoritarian and that it is next to impossible for the party membership to dislodge entrenched leaders. The proponents of the list system maintain that this system strengthens party organization and cohesion because votes are cast primarily for parties and seats are alloted to the parties on the basis of their overall strength in the district. Furthermore, some countries using a list system have modified it to give the voters a choice between candidates. The simplest of these modifications is the Belgian, in which the elector may vote either for one party's list of candidates as it stands or for one particular candidate within the list. Two of the other most successful democracies, Switzerland and Finland, have gone further than others in modifying the system so as to give the voter, rather than the party, power to elect the candidate he wishes to act as his representative.[101] The voters are allowed to cross out names on the list, to put marks of preferences for one or several names on the list or

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[100] For the details of the PR/list systems, see W.J.M. Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 75-84, and also see Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 92-107.

[101] Enid Lakeman, op. cit., p. 105.

even to mark preferences simultaneously for candidates from several lists in a process called "panachage".

In the PR/list systems there are several formulae for distributing seats among the parties. As the Table 1 indicates, Austria, Belgium, Finland and Switzerland employ the D'Hondt formula, while Denmark, Norway and Sweden use the Sainte Lague highest average formula. Israel and Holland use the largest average formula. Within different PR systems the different formulae of vote counting can make a difference to the allocation of seats among the parties. The largest average method of awarding seats is the simplest, but it favours the larger parties at the expense of the smaller. The D'Hondt formula somewhat modifies this tendency and it has been more widely used. The object of the Sainte Lague method is two-fold. First, it reduces the overrepresentation of the larger parties by making it progressively harder for them to gain seats in a given constituency. Second, the initial 1.4 divisor raises a threshold against the smaller parties, while another method of allocating seats, the largest remainder procedure, begins with the computation of a 'quota'. This 'quota' serves as the initial price for each seat. The Italians employ a variant intended to lower the price of the initial seats, helping weaker parties. This system is called the 'Imperiali' largest remainder formula. Netherlands and Israel aside, no system is totally fair to the smaller parties and no system diverges very far from proportionality

for the major parties.[102]

In English-speaking countries, the approach to PR is fundamentally different. Those who first advocated the single transferable vote(STV) were concerned less with the fortunes of the parties than with giving greater freedom to the individual voter. This system of PR is designed to make every vote count. The main object of the STV is to enable each voter to take part as freely and as fully as possible in the selection of his representative.[103] The PR/STV makes it possible for several different groups to obtain representation, which is particularly important in a plural society.

The PR/STV allows each voter to rank all of the candidates in order of preference. He may, however, give only one vote to a single candidate, and his vote will be counted for only one candidate regardless of the number of preferences indicated. The quota of votes necessary for a candidate's election is established beforehand. This method is applied not in single member constituencies but in constituencies returning at least three members. Each successful candidate is elected not by a majority but by the

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[102]For details of these different formulae, see Douglas Rae, op. cit., pp. 31-36, and Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 93-99, and also see W.J.M. Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 77-81.

[103]For further details on STV, see W.J.M. Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 61-74, and also see Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 111-149.

quota.[104] The first choice votes are counted, and all candidates with a total equal to or more than the quota are declared elected. If no candidate reaches the quota, the one with the fewest votes is dropped from the race. Each victor's surplus votes - those of excess of the quota - and the loser's votes are then transferred to the candidates who were designated as second choice on these ballots. If any second choice candidate has already been elected or dropped, such votes are transferred to the third choice candidates. This process is continued until all of the seats have been filled. The PR/STV differs from all other list systems in two ways; firstly, it allows the voter full freedom to express his preference for an individual candidate either with or without regard to the candidate's party affiliation. Secondly, it ensures that no vote shall assist in the return of any candidate or any party unless the voter has expressly indicated that he wishes it to do so.

The Republic of Ireland has been using the PR/STV system for electing members of the Dail for almost sixty years. There is a minimum quota of votes required for the parties to gain a seat in the Dail. This provision has kept the number of parties small. However, in the general election of 1948 no party received a majority and Ireland had to form a coalition government composed of all the minor

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[104] The quota which has been associated with this system is the Droop quota. This formula is generally considered to be superior to other formulae. For a discussion of the relative merits of these and other formulae, see Enid Lakeman, op. cit., pp. 113-130.

parties. But in the election of 1957 the Fianna Fail was able to achieve an absolute majority and since then, with one recent exception, it has been able to maintain a predominant position even though sometimes it has been obliged to seek coalition partners. In evaluating the PR/STV system in Ireland, one scholar has noted that it had its ups and downs; nevertheless it is safe to assert that at present it enjoys widespread public acceptance.[105]

In all of the countries with PR systems, there are at least three techniques which can be used to help maintain government stability and lessen the chances of party multiplication. These include (1) a bonus to the winner; (2) limiting constituencies to a list of only three to five candidates; and (3) obliging parties to attain a minimum threshold of representation. For example, in Ireland, most constituencies have three or four members, which implies a threshold of representation of 25 percent or 20 percent of the votes. In Germany a party can only qualify for list seats if it secures 5 percent of the national vote, while in Sweden there is a 4 percent threshold of representation. In Austria, in order to qualify for the list seats, a party has to win at least one seat in any province.

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[105] Cornelius O'Leary, Irish Elections: 1918-1977, Parties, Voters, and Proportional Representation, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979, p. 113. In this book the author gives a complete account of every general election from 1918 to 1977. He explains the reasons for the introduction of PR in Ireland, investigates how politicians have gradually adjusted to the system and discusses its effects on voting patterns and party behaviour.

In spite of its widespread use the PR systems have been criticized by some scholars who see certain technical, and more importantly, political objections to their adoption. Some of the objections include that

- the larger constituencies required by the system would impair the close relationship between the representative and the represented;
- PR is a complex system of election and too difficult to understand;
- the greater difficulty and complexity of this system make many voters abstain from voting.

However, these objections have not gone unchallenged. As discussed in the previous chapter, some scholars have refuted these criticisms and argued that there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate the proposition that there exists a close relationship between the representative and the represented under the single member district system with plurality election. As far as the complexity of the PR system is concerned one may argue that it does not seem to perturb the Europeans, who are operating parliamentary government under this system with considerable success.

Also, evidence does not support the proposition that difficulty in understanding the PR system keeps many voters away from the polls. Conversely, it has been claimed that PR based on multimember constituencies produces a higher turnout than the single member district plurality system. It is maintained that the distortion between a party's seats

and votes manufactured by the SMD/PE system discourages some electors from voting. This is especially true for the supporters of minor parties. Furthermore, seats in the SMD/PE system are almost always secure while the seats in the multi-member districts are marginal. This logic is consistent with survey evidence which suggests that electors are most likely to vote when there is a close finish.[106] Crewe reported that in the nine countries with SMD/PE system, average turnout since the Second World War has been 76.0 percent; in the fourteen countries with PR it has been 80.5 percent.[107]

Generally PR systems are looked upon with great disfavour by the Anglo-Saxon countries. They are blamed for instability of government and it is asserted that these systems increase unduly the number of parties and fractionalize the party system. However, the advocates of PR argue that the opponents of PR exaggerate its tendency to faciliate an increase in the number of parties and ignore the fact that a multiplicity of parties may arise from many causes and often exists under the majority systems as well. An ardent supporter of PR, Enid Lakeman, provides evidence that the number of parties in a country has little relationship to its voting system except for the United Kingdom. Referring to the party system in Europe, she shows

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[106] For the details of this survey see Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter, New York: John Wiley, 1960, p. 99.
[107] Ivor Crewe, "Electoral Participation," in Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of the Competetive National Elections, ed. by David Butler et al, op. cit., p. 256.

that the countries which changed from majority to PR systems, experienced no marked increase in the number of parties; in some cases there was even a decrease.[108]

Usually three classic cases are cited as indicative of what any country would suffer if it changed its electoral system to PR. These include France under the Third and Fourth Republics, Germany under Weimar, and Italy. The experience of these countries is taken as typical. In fact, the experience of these three countries is not typical of that of countries with multi-party systems and can be explained by reference to their own special social, political and economic factors. France was under the PR system for too short a period to afford reliable evidence as to the effect of PR on the political life of the country. Secondly, the instability of French governments from 1870 to 1958 arose from a complex of social, political and institutional factors which had some similarity to factors found in Weimar Germany and Italy but are absent elsewhere.[109] The introduction of PR in France was not responsible for the large number of parties and political instabilities. These conditions had already existed under the discarded majority system. Under the Third Republic,

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[108]Enid Lakeman, op. cit., p. 173.

[109]Almond and Verba pointed out that in Germany, France, Italy the encounters between the modernizing tendencies and traditional powers "seem to have been too massive and too uncompromising to permit the emergence of a shared culture of political accomodation. The civic culture is present in the form of aspiration, and democratic infra-structure is still far from being attained." For more details, see Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, Little Brown, Boston, 1967, p. 7.

when France had used two types of majority systems, she had more than 90 cabinets compared with 20 in Great Britain.[110]

The PR system of the Weimar Republic has been subjected to scathing criticism by both theorists and practitioners. The most through student of the entire [illegible] F.A. Hermens, arrived at a very negative conclusion and went as far as to assert that PR 'caused' the collapse of the Weimar Republic.[111] However, the advocates of a PR system maintain that to attribute the failure of the Weimar Republic to the electoral system is a gross oversimplification. There was, first of all, the provision that the size of the Reidistag was to depend on the number of votes cast - a provision not necessary for the operation of PR. Then, there were broad factors which led to instability, failure of the attempt at democratic goverment, and consequently, dictatorship in Germany. These factors are best summarized by Campbell:

> The tendency towards a multiplicity of intransigent and uncooperative parties which characterized the Weimar Republic was a legacy of Imperial Germany and attributable to the ways in which Germany was first united and then ruled; the hostility to liberalism amongst important sectors of society, the character and psychological consequences of defeat in 1918, and the political and economic aftermath of the Great War - particulary the social disintegration caused by the inflation and the slump: all these were much more important causes of the failure of the Weimar Republic than its electoral system, which in other circumstances might have had the beneficial effects which similar systems have had elsewhere - and were to have in West Germany after the Second World War.[112]

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[110]Ibid., p. 220.
[111]F.A. Hermens, op. cit., pp. 214-246.
[112]Peter Campbell, "European Experience: Electoral System and Coalition Governments," in S.E. Finer, op. cit., p. 149.

Another country with a PR system which has suffered governmental instability is Italy. But as one scholar argued the reason for this instability does not lie in PR. He suggested that Italy is unstable because one of the beneficiaries of the PR system, the Italian Communist party, is an 'anti-system' party.[113]

It is also argued that PR tends to fractionalize opinion, encouraging the secession of factions from the existing parties. But as Donald Stokes argued, the fractionalization process is not confined to the countries with PR systems. After examining the functioning of several democracies he concluded:

> ... (A)n effective competition for power can emerge under the most diverse electoral systems. In particular, little in the experience of these countries supports the familiar thesis that PR is more likely than the single member, simple plurality system to fragment the party system.[114]

Another objection to PR systems is that they necessarily entail coalition government or generate governmental instability. Although that it may indeed do either or both, by the same token it may do neither. First of all, as has been argued, the causes of multiplicity of parties and instability of governments are too various and fundamental in nature to be remedied by a change in the electoral system alone. Secondly, PR is not incompatible with single party majorities. Germany, Sweden, Norway, the

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[113] D. Fisichella, "The Italian Experience," in S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 249-265.
[114] Donald E. Stokes, "What Decides Elections?" in David Butler et al, op. cit., p. 283.

Irish Republic all have had elections under PR which returned one of the parties with an absolute majority of the seats. The difference from Canada is that in these cases the party had won an absolute majority, or something very near it, of the popular vote. In Austria, PR has been in use for many years and the country has developed a clearly polarized two-party system.

It has been argued that coalition governments are not necessarily unstable, weak and ineffective. Lewis argued that the idea that democracy is effective only when there are only two parties, one in the government and the other in opposition, is an "Anglo-American myth." He further maintained that the great majority of the world's democracies have more than two parties, and the majority of Western European democracies have coalition governments.[115] In the countries which had coalition governments, stability has been accompanied by a quality absent from British or Canadian politics: incrementalism and continuity and consistency in national policies of these countries. Minority and coalition governments have been the commonest type of regimes in the Scandinavian states since 1921. These governments have done much to expand the social services in these countries and have provided effective countermeasures to economic depression. This is especially true of the 1929-40 Social Democratic - Radical-Liberal coalition in Denmark and the 1936-39 Social Democratic- Agrarian

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[115]W.A. Lewis, op. cit., p. 70.

coalition in Sweden. In Norway, the 1965-71 four-party non-socialist coalition passed a major reform of the pension system which the former Labor government had planned before its demise.[116]

Any electoral system should be examined and evaluated within the political, social and ethnic context of a country. It is a fact that within the framework of most continental European countries, there always have been divisive cleavages of the people along the lines of religion, language and region. The very intensity of animosities among these groups necessitated PR systems. The suppression of minority representation was creating serious internal dissension and any electoral system which would not give these different groups adequate representation in the legislative process would have been unacceptable. PR systems not only made the representation of minority groups effective but have removed from the political life certain disadvantages which a majority system had imposed. The countries which are more united as a consequence of having adopted PR system include Switzerland and Ireland.

Writers such as Lewis, Lipset, and Duverger have suggested that a country possessed of strong underlying tendencies to regionalism, ethnicity and religion is better

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[116]For detailes of the experiences of these countries under PR, see N.C.M. Elder, "The Scandinavian States," in S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 185-202.

served by the PR systems.[117] Under PR systems the minorities within regions are not frozen out as they tend to be under the SMD/PE system. The singular capacity of PR systems to encourage all parties to search for votes in all regions of the country makes these parties not only the representative of all groups in society but also makes them truly national in character.

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[117]W.A. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 60-74.
S.M. Lipset, "Party System and the Representation of the Social Groups," European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1, 1960, pp. 76-77.
M. Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., pp. 382-4.

5. An Analysis of Some Proposed Electoral Systems for Canada

In recent general elections, the electoral system in Canada has produced a grossly distorted image of the country. This performance has endangered the effective and harmonious operation of the federation. In order to rectify this situation, many academics and groups have suggested possible electoral reforms. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine and evaluate these proposals. It is impossible to consider all these proposals, therefore five of the better known proposals are included in this study. These are the proposals presented by William Irvine, political scientist at Queen's University,[118] Donald Smiley, a distinguished Canadian political scientist,[119] Edward Broadbent, the leader of the New Democratic Party in the Canadian House of Commons,[120] the Task Force on Canadian Unity,[121] and the Canada West Foundation.[122] Although considerably different in application, these proposals share

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[118] William P. Irvine. Does Canada Need a New Electoral System? Queen's University: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1979.

[119] Donald V. Smiley, "Federalism and the Legislative Process in Canada," in W.A.W. Neilson and J.C. MacPherson eds., The Legislative Process in Canada: The Need for Reform. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978, pp. 73-87.

[120] Edward Broadbent, Opening Statement to the Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee on the Constitution, August 15, 1978.

[121] The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together, Hull: Supply and Services, 1979.

[122] David Elton and Roger Gibbins, Electoral Reform: The Need is Pressing, the Time is Now, Calgary, 1981.

the common goal of more accurately reflecting the popular vote in parliamentary representation. However, the literature lacks detailed analysis of these proposals.

In an attempt to measure the impact and effectiveness of these reforms, a simulation of the last ten federal elections (1957-1980) using these proposals has been done. (Details of the calculation procedures for each proposal are given in Appendix 1.) Throughout this analysis it has been assumed that, had these proposed systems been in place, the parties would have won the same proportion of the constituency contests and the same proportion of the provincial popular vote. It must be stressed that neither assumption is entirely plausible, but the number of alternative scenarios is simply too vast to be simulated.

5.1 The Irvine Proposal

In Does Canada Need a New Electoral System? William Irvine suggests a mixed electoral system for Canada. This proposal involves enlarging the House of Commons to 354 members, 188 of whom would be elected from single-member constituencies in a manner identical to that in place today. The remaining 166 seats would be distributed among provinces in proportion to their population. The method of electing MPs representing these seats is described below:

> ... (P)olitical parties desiring to elect provincial representatives would have to provide the chief electoral officer with eleven lists (one for each jurisdiction), each with a number of names equal to the number of provincial representatives and listed in rank order. On election night, votes would be tabulated in each constituency and the candidate with the highest total would be declared elected from that constituency. So far, there has been no change from current practice. However, the votes for candidates of each recognized party which had submitted provincial lists would be aggregated to the provincial level, and the percentage distribution of the provincial vote so aggregated would be calculated. The total number of provincial seats (constituency plus provincial representatives) would be multiplied by each party's percentage of the provincial vote, yielding each party's provincial 'entitlement'. If the number of constituencies won exceeds the entitlement for any party, no action is taken. All constituencies are represented by their most popular candidate. Where the number of constituencies is less than the entitlement, sufficient candidates from the party's provincial list are declared elected to make up the entitlement, beginning at the top of the list and skipping over any person already elected from a constituency. (As this implies, a candidate could offer himself both in a constituency and on the list.)[12]

Tables 12 through 21 show how the last ten general elections (1957-1980) might have come out under the system proposed by Irvine. An examination of these tables leads one to draw the following conclusions.

Although the proposal is presented as a mixed system in appearance, it produces results which are very close to a full proportional representation system.

It would result in substantial representation for the Liberals from western Canada, and for the Conservatives from Quebec.

It would substantially decrease the likelihood of a

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[12]William Irvine, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

Table 12

A Simulation of the 1957 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	1				5
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.		3				3
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	7				8
	prov.	6		1			7
	total	7	7	1			15
NB	const.	4	4				8
	prov.	3	3				6
	total	7	7				14
Que.	const.	44	6			3	53
	prov.	14	25	2		6	47
	total	58	31	2		9	100
Ont.	const.	15	43	2			60
	prov.	27	13	12	2		54
	total	42	56	14	2		114
Man.	const.	1	6	3			10
	prov.	4	1	2	2		9
	total	5	7	5	2		19
Sask.	const.	3	2	7			12
	prov.	4	3	2	2		11
	total	7	5	9	2		23
Alta.	const.	1	2		9		12
	prov.	5	4	2			11
	total	6	6	2	9		23
BC	const.	1	5	5	4		15
	prov.	5	4	2	3		14
	total	6	9	7	7		29
North	const.	2					2
	prov.		1				1
	total	2	1				3
Canada	seats	148	135	40	22	9	354
	seat(%)	41.8	38.1	11.3	6.2	2.5	
	vote(%)	40.9	38.9	10.7	6.6	2.8	
	actual seat(%)	39.6	42.3	9.4	7.2	1.5	

Table 13

A Simulation of the 1958 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	1				5
	prov.	1	3				4
	total	5	4				9
PEI	const.		3				3
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.		9				9
	prov.	6		1			7
	total	6	9	1			16
NB	const.	2	5				7
	prov.	4	2				6
	total	6	7				13
Que.	const.	18	35				53
	prov.	28	15	2		2	47
	total	46	50	2		2	100
Ont.	const.	11	47	2			60
	prov.	26	18	10			54
	total	37	65	12			114
Man.	const.		10				10
	prov.	4	1	4			9
	total	4	11	4			19
Sask.	const.		11	1			12
	prov.	4	1	6			11
	total	4	12	7			23
Alta.	const.		12				12
	prov.	3	2	1	5		11
	total	3	14	1	5		23
BC	const.		12	3			15
	prov.	5	2	4	3		14
	total	5	14	7	3		29
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.	1					1
	total	2	1				3
Canada	seats	120	190	34	8	2	354
	seat(%)	33.9	53.7	9.6	2.3	0.6	
	vote(%)	33.6	53.6	9.5	2.6	0.7	
	actual seat(%)	18.5	78.5	3.0			

Table 14

A Simulation of the 1962 General Election under the Irvine Proposal

Prov.	MP	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	1				5
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.		3				3
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	7	1			9
	prov.	6	1				7
	total	7	8	1			16
NB	const.	4	3				7
	prov.	2	3	1			6
	total	6	6	1			13
Que.	const.	25	10		18		53
	prov.	14	20	4	8	1	47
	total	39	30	4	26	1	100
Ont.	const.	31	25	4			60
	prov.	17	20	15	2		54
	total	48	45	19	2		114
Man.	const.	1	8	1			10
	prov.	5		3	1		9
	total	6	8	4	1		19
Sask.	const.	1	11				12
	prov.	4	1	5	1		11
	total	5	12	5	1		23
Alta.	const.		10		2		12
	prov.	4		2	5		11
	total	4	10	2	7		23
BC	const.	3	4	7	1		15
	prov.	5	4	2	3		14
	total	8	8	9	4		29
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.		1				1
	total	1	2				3
Canada	seats	132	135	45	41	1	354
	seat(%)	37.3	38.1	12.7	11.6	0.3	
	vote(%)	37.2	37.3	13.5	11.7	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	37.7	43.8	7.2	11.3		

Table 15

A Simulation of the 1963 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5					5
	prov.	1	3				4
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.		1				1
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	3	5				8
	prov.	4	3	1			8
	total	7	8	1			16
NB	const.	4	3				7
	prov.	2	2	1	1		6
	total	6	5	1	1		13
Que.	const.	33	6		14		53
	prov.	13	14	7	13		47
	total	46	20	7	27		100
Ont.	const.	37	19	4			60
	prov.	16	21	15	2		54
	total	53	40	19	2		114
Man.	const.	1	8	1			10
	prov.	6		2	1		9
	total	7	8	3	1		19
Sask.	const.		12				12
	prov.	6		4	1		11
	total	6	12	4	1		23
Alta.	const.	1	10		1		12
	prov.	4		2	5		11
	total	5	10	2	6		23
BC	const.	5	3	6	1		15
	prov.	4	4	3	3		14
	total	9	7	9	4		29
North	const.		2				2
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	2				3
Canada	seats	148	118	46	42		354
	seat(%)	41.8	33.3	13.0	11.9		
	vote(%)	41.7	32.8	13.1	11.9	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	48.7	35.8	6.4	9.1		

Table 16

A Simulation of the 1965 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5					5
	prov.	1	3				4
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.		3				3
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	7				9
	prov.	5	1	1			7
	total	7	8	1			16
NB	const.	3	4				7
	prov.	3	2	1			6
	total	6	6	1			13
Que.	const.	40	6		6	1	53
	prov.	6	15	12	12	2	47
	total	46	21	12	18	3	100
Ont.	const.	36	18	6			60
	prov.	13	21	19		1	54
	total	49	39	25		1	114
Man.	const.		8	2			10
	prov.	6		3			9
	total	6	8	5			19
Sask.	const.		12				12
	prov.	5		6			11
	total	5	12	6			23
Alta.	const.		11		1		12
	prov.	5		2	4		11
	total	5	11	2	5		23
BC	const.	5	2	6	2		15
	prov.	4	3	4	3		14
	total	9	5	10	5		29
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.	1					1
	total	2	1				3
Canada	seats	143	117	62	28	4	354
	seat(%)	40.4	33.0	17.5	7.9	1.1	
	vote(%)	40.2	32.4	17.9	8.3	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	49.4	36.6	7.9	5.3	0.8	

Table 17

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	1	4				5
	prov.	3	1				4
	total	4	5				9
PEI	const.		3				3
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	6				7
	prov.	4	2	1			7
	total	5	8	1			14
NB	const.	3	3				6
	prov.	2	3	1			6
	total	5	6	1			12
Que.	const.	38	3		9		50
	prov.	12	17	7	7	1	44
	total	50	20	7	16	1	94
Ont.	const.	46	12	4		1	63
	prov.	10	26	21			57
	total	56	38	25		1	120
Man.	const.	4	4	2			10
	prov.	3	2	3			8
	total	7	6	5			18
Sask.	const.	2	3	4			9
	prov.	3	3	2			8
	total	5	6	6			17
Alta.	const.	3	11				14
	prov.	6	2	3		1	12
	total	9	13	3		1	26
BC	const.	13		6			19
	prov.	2	7	5	2		16
	total	15	7	11	2		35
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	2	2				4
Canada	seats	160	114	59	18	3	354
	seat(%)	45.3	32.0	16.7	5.1	0.9	
	vote(%)	45.5	31.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	58.7	27.3	8.3	5.3	0.4	

Table 18

A Simulation of the 1972 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	2	3				5
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	4	5				9
PEI	const.	1	2				3
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	6				7
	prov.	4	1	2			7
	total	5	7	2			14
NB	const.	3	3				6
	prov.	2	2	1	1		6
	total	5	5	1	1		12
Que.	const.	38	1		10	1	50
	prov.	8	15	6	13	2	44
	total	46	16	6	23	3	94
Ont.	const.	26	29	8		1	64
	prov.	19	18	18			55
	total	45	47	26		1	119
Man.	const.	2	6	2			10
	prov.	4	2	3			9
	total	6	8	5			19
Sask.	const.	1	5	3			9
	prov.	3	2	3			8
	total	4	7	6			17
Alta.	const.		14				14
	prov.	7	1	3	1		12
	total	7	15	3	1		26
BC	const.	3	7	9			19
	prov.	7	5	3	1		16
	total	10	12	12	1		35
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	1	2	1			4
Canada	seats	135	127	62	26	4	354
	seat(%)	38.1	35.9	17.5	7.3	1.1	
	vote(%)	38.5	35.0	17.7	7.6	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	41.3	40.5	11.7	5.7	0.8	

Table 19

A Simulation of the 1974 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	2				5
	prov.	1	2	1			4
	total	4	4	1			9
PEI	const.	1	2				3
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	5	1			7
	prov.	5	2				7
	total	6	7	1			14
NB	const.	4	2			1	7
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	6	4	1		1	12
Que.	const.	41	2		7		50
	prov.	10	18	7	9		44
	total	51	20	7	16		94
Ont.	const.	39	18	6			63
	prov.	15	24	17			56
	total	54	44	23			119
Man.	const.	2	6	1			9
	prov.	3	3	3			9
	total	5	9	4			18
Sask.	const.	2	6	1			9
	prov.	3	1	5			9
	total	5	7	6			18
Alta.	const.		14				14
	prov.	7	2	2	1		12
	total	7	16	2	1		26
BC	const.	7	11	1			19
	prov.	5	4	7			16
	total	12	15	8			35
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	1	2	1			4
Canada	seats	153	129	54	17	1	354
	seat(%)	43.0	36.0	15.0	5.0	0.3	
	vote(%)	43.0	35.0	15.0	5.0	0.9	
	actual seat(%)	53.0	36.0	6.0	4.0	0.4	

Table 20

A Simulation of the 1979 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	1	1			5
	prov.		2	2			4
	total	3	3	3			9
PEI	const.		3				3
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	4	1			7
	prov.	3	2	2			7
	total	5	6	3			14
NB	const.	4	3				7
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	5	5	2			12
Que.	const.	45	1		4		50
	prov.	13	12	5	11	3	44
	total	58	13	5	15	3	94
Ont.	const.	21	38	4			63
	prov.	23	12	21			56
	total	44	50	25			119
Man.	const.	1	5	3			9
	prov.	3	3	3			9
	total	4	8	6			18
Sask.	const.		7	2			9
	prov.	3	1	5			9
	total	3	8	7			18
Alta.	const.		14				14
	prov.	6	3	3			12
	total	6	17	3			26
BC	const.		14	5			19
	prov.	8	2	6			16
	total	8	16	11			35
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	1	2	1			4
Canada	seats	139	131	66	15	3	354
	seat(%)	39.2	37.0	18.6	4.2	0.8	
	vote(%)	39.9	36.1	17.9	4.5	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	40.4	48.2	9.2	2.1	0.0	

Table 21

A Simulation of the 1980 General Election under the Irvine Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	1				5
	prov.		2	2			4
	total	4	3	2			9
PEI	const.	2	1				3
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	3	2				5
NS	const.	3	4				7
	prov.	3	1	3			7
	total	6	5	3			14
NB	const.	5	2				7
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	6	4	2			12
Que.	const.	49	1				50
	prov.	15	11	9	6	3	44
	total	64	12	9	6	3	94
Ont.	const.	34	25	4			63
	prov.	16	18	22			56
	total	50	43	26			119
Man.	const.	1	3	5			9
	prov.	4	4	1			9
	total	5	7	6			18
Sask.	const.		5	5			10
	prov.	4	2	2			8
	total	4	7	7			18
Alta.	const.		14				14
	prov.	6	3	3			12
	total	6	17	3			26
BC	const.		11	8			19
	prov.	8	4	4			16
	total	8	15	12			35
North	const.		2				2
	prov.	1		1			2
	total	1	2	1			4
Canada	seats	158	116	71	6	3	354
	seat(%)	44.6	32.8	20.0	1.7	0.9	
	vote(%)	44.3	32.5	19.8	1.7	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	52.1	36.5	11.4			

majority government being elected.

- It would give the NDP "a strategic parliamentary position".

As Tables 12 through 21 indicate and Table 22 further clarifies, the Irvine proposal produces results where the seats won by the parties are almost proportional to their percentage of total votes obtained. Thus the proposal is very successful in eliminating the distortions in translating votes into seats caused by the present electoral system in Canada. As a consequence, the Irvine proposal would increase the Liberal representation from the West and the Conservative representation from Quebec. Under this proposal, over the ten general elections, the Conservatives would have won 233 seats from Quebec out of a total of 970, and the Liberals would have won 251 seats from western Canada out of a total of 954. Thus the current situation, which implies alternatively the virtual exclusion of Quebec or of the West from power, would no longer exist under the electoral system proposed by Irvine.

On the other hand, as is clear from the Tables 12 through 21, the Irvine proposal would have resulted in nine minority governments during the period under consideration. Under this proposed system, Canada would have seen a majority government only in 1958. Thus the major beneficiary of this system would have been the NDP which would have held the balancing power in most elections under the proposal.

Table 22

Ratios of Percentage of Seats Won to Percentage of Votes Obtained for Major Parties According to Irvine Proposal.

Year	Liberal	P.C.	NDP
1957	1.02	0.98	1.06
1958	1.01	1.00	1.01
1962	1.00	1.02	0.94
1963	1.00	1.02	0.99
1965	1.00	1.02	0.98
1968	1.00	1.02	0.98
1972	0.99	1.03	0.99
1974	1.00	1.03	1.00
1979	0.98	1.02	1.04
1980	1.01	1.01	1.01

5.2 The Smiley Proposal

In March 1978, Donald V. Smiley offered a proposal to reform the electoral system in Canada. He described its working as follows:

> ....(V)oters would cast their ballots as they now do and the same number of MP's would be elected from single-member districts. But the House of Commons would be enlarged to include one hundred "provincial" MP's, with Prince Edward Island having one of these and the rest distributed among the other provinces in proportion to their respective populations. The "provincial" members would have the same standing in the House as their other colleagues and be given services in their respective provincial capitals. The provincial MP's would be chosen by ranking in each province those candidates who had received the highest proportion of popular votes to the winning candidates. Thus in Newfoundland, which according to the 1971 census would gain two seats under my proposal, the provincial members would be those two who had come nearest to capturing the seven seats in the province.[124]

Tables 23 through 32 present the simulated results of the last general elections in Canada had they been held under the Smiley proposal. As the tables indicate, under the Smiley proposal, the Liberals would have had reasonable representation from the West while the Conservatives would have had similar representation from Quebec. However, unlike the Irvine proposal, the Smiley proposal would not have altered the incidence of majority governments during the period under consideration. As the tables show, the Smiley proposal would have maintained the majority governments of 1958, 1968, and 1974, and it would have converted the Liberal minority government in 1963 to a majority one and

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[124]Donald V. Smiley, op. cit., p. 85.

Table 23

A Simulation of the 1957 General Election
under the Smiley Proposal

Prov	MP	Lib	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const	[illegible]	2				7
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	7	3				10
PEI	const		4				4
	prov	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov	3	1				4
	total	5	11				16
NB	const	[illegible]	5				10
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	[illegible]	6				13
Que.	const.	62	[illegible]			4	[illegible]
	prov	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	29
	total	73	[illegible]			[illegible]	104
Ont	const	21	[illegible]	[illegible]			85
	prov	18	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]
	total	39	76	4			119
Man.	const	[illegible]	8	5			14
	prov.	2	1	[illegible]	1		[illegible]
	total	3	9	[illegible]	1		[illegible]
Sask	const	4	[illegible]	10			[illegible]
	prov	[illegible]	[illegible]	3			[illegible]
	total	[illegible]	4	13			22
Alta	const	[illegible]	3		13		[illegible]
	prov.	3	2		2		[illegible]
	total	4	5		15		24
BC	const	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	6		[illegible]
	prov.	2	3	3	1		9
	total	4	10	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
North	const	[illegible]					[illegible]
	prov						
	total	[illegible]					[illegible]
Canada	seats	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	9	[illegible]
	seat(%)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	vote(%)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	actual seat(%)	39.6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Table 24

A Simulation of the 1958 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	6	4				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.		12				12
	prov.	4					4
	total	4	12				16
NB	const.	3	7				10
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	5	8				13
Que.	const.	25	50				75
	prov.	17	11			1	29
	total	42	61			1	104
Ont.	const.	15	67	3			85
	prov.	19	15				34
	total	34	82	3			119
Man.	const.		14				14
	prov.	1		4			5
	total	1	14	4			19
Sask.	const.		16	1			17
	prov.	1	1	3			5
	total	1	17	4			22
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.	1			6		7
	total	1	17		6		24
BC	const.		18	4			22
	prov.	2	4	3			9
	total	2	22	7			31
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	98	242	18	6	1	365
	seat(%)	26.9	66.3	4.9	1.6	0.3	
	vote(%)	33.6	53.6	9.5	2.6	0.7	
	actual seat(%)	18.5	78.5	3.0			

Table 25

A Simulation of the 1962 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	6	1				7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	7	3				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	9	1			12
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	4	11	1			16
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.		3				3
	total	6	7				13
Que.	const.	35	14		26		75
	prov.	14	11		4		29
	total	49	25		30		104
Ont.	const.	44	35	6			85
	prov.	12	20	2			34
	total	56	55	8			119
Man.	const.	1	11	2			14
	prov.	4	1				5
	total	5	12	2			19
Sask.	const.	1	16				17
	prov.	3	1	1			5
	total	4	17	1			22
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	4	16		4		24
BC	const.	4	6	10	2		22
	prov.	3	3	3			9
	total	7	9	13	2		31
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	144	160	25	36		365
	seat(%)	39.5	43.8	6.8	9.9		
	vote(%)	37.2	37.3	13.5	11.7	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	37.7	43.8	7.2	11.3		

Table 26

A Simulation of the 1963 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		3				3
	total	7	3				10
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.		1				1
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	5	7				12
	prov.	2	1	1			4
	total	7	8	1			16
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	7	6				13
Que.	const.	47	8		20		75
	prov.	17	5		7		29
	total	64	13		27		104
Ont.	const.	52	27	6			85
	prov.	20	12	2			34
	total	72	39	8			119
Man.	const.	2	10	2			14
	prov.	4	1				5
	total	6	11	2			19
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	5					5
	total	5	17				22
Alta.	const.	1	14		2		17
	prov.	2	3		2		7
	total	3	17		4		24
BC	const.	7	4	9	2		22
	prov.	3	3	3			9
	total	10	7	12	2		31
North	const.		2				2
	prov.						
	total		2				2
Canada	seats	183	126	23	33		365
	seat(%)	50.1	34.5	6.3	9.0		
	vote(%)	41.7	32.8	13.1	11.9	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	48.7	35.8	6.4	9.1		

Table 27

A Simulation of the 1965 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		3				3
	total	7	3				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	3	1				4
	total	5	11				16
NB	const.	4	6				10
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	5	8				13
Que.	const.	56	8		9	2	75
	prov.	12	8	1	7	1	29
	total	68	16	1	16	3	104
Ont.	const.	51	25	9			85
	prov.	14	16	4			34
	total	65	41	13			119
Man.	const.	1	10	3			14
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	4	12	3			19
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	2		3			5
	total	2	17	3			22
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	4	1		2		7
	total	4	16		4		24
BC	const.	7	3	9	3		22
	prov.	2	3	4			9
	total	9	6	13	3		31
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	171	135	33	23	3	365
	seat(%)	46.9	37.0	9.0	6.3	0.8	
	vote(%)	40.2	32.4	17.9	8.3	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	49.4	36.6	7.9	5.3	0.8	

Table 28

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP..	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	1	6				7
	prov.	2					2
	total	3	6				9
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	1	10				11
	prov.	3	1				4
	total	4	11				15
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	7	6				13
Que.	const.	56	4		14		74
	prov.	13	7	1	8		29
	total	69	11	1	22		103
Ont.	const.	64	17	6		1	88
	prov.	17	14	4			35
	total	81	31	10		1	123
Man.	const.	5	5	3			13
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	8	7	3			18
Sask.	const.	2	5	6			13
	prov.		3	2			5
	total	2	8	8			18
Alta.	const.	4	15				19
	prov.	5	2				7
	total	9	17				26
BC	const.	16		7			23
	prov.	1	2	6			9
	total	17	2	13			32
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	202	104	35	22	1	364
	seat(%)	55.5	28.6	9.6	6.0	0.3	
	vote(%)	45.5	31.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	58.7	27.3	8.3	5.3	0.4	

Table 29

A Simulation of the 1972 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	4				7
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	4	5				9
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.		1				1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	1	11				12
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	3	11				14
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	7	6				13
Que.	const.	56	2		15	1	74
	prov.	16	3		8	1	28
	total	72	5		23	2	102
Ont.	const.	36	40	11		1	88
	prov.	16	16	4			36
	total	52	56	15		1	124
Man.	const.	2	8	3			13
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	4	10	4			18
Sask.	const.	1	7	5			13
	prov.		1	3			4
	total	1	8	8			17
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	7					7
	total	7	17				24
BC	const.	4	8	11			23
	prov.	6	2	2			10
	total	10	10	13			33
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	161	145	41	23	3	364
	seat(%)	44.2	39.8	11.3	6.3	0.8	
	vote(%)	38.5	35.0	17.7	7.6	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	41.3	40.5	11.7	5.7	0.8	

Table 30

A Simulation of the 1974 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	3				7
	prov.		2				2
	total	4	5				9
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	3	1				4
	total	5	9	1			15
NB	const.	6	3			1	10
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	8	4			1	13
Que.	const.	60	3		11		74
	prov.	11	11		6		28
	total	71	14		17		102
Ont.	const.	55	25	8			88
	prov.	19	14	3			36
	total	74	39	11			124
Man.	const.	2	9	2			13
	prov.		3	2			5
	total	2	12	4			18
Sask.	const.	3	8	2			13
	prov.		2	2			4
	total	3	10	4			17
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	7					7
	total	7	19				26
BC	const.	8	13	2			23
	prov.	1	6	3			10
	total	9	19	5			33
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	185	135	26	17	1	364
	seat(%)	50.8	37.1	7.1	4.7	0.3	
	vote(%)	43.2	35.4	15.4	5.1	0.9	
	actual seat(%)	53.4	36.0	6.1	4.2	0.4	

Table 31

A Simulation of the 1979 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	2	1			7
	prov.			2			2
	total	4	2	3			9
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	4	10	1			15
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	7	6				13
Que.	const.	67	2		6		75
	prov.	8	8		9	1	26
	total	75	10		15	1	101
Ont.	const.	32	57	6			95
	prov.	16	12	8			36
	total	48	69	14			131
Man.	const.	2	7	5			14
	prov.		2	2			4
	total	2	9	7			18
Sask.	const.		10	4			14
	prov.		1	3			4
	total		11	7			18
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	9					9
	total	9	21				30
BC	const.	1	19	8			28
	prov.	3	5	3			11
	total	4	24	11			39
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	154	168	44	15	1	382
	seat(%)	40.3	44.0	11.5	3.9	0.3	
	vote(%)	40.1	35.9	17.9	4.6	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	40.4	48.2	9.2	2.1		

Table 32

A Simulation of the 1980 General Election under the Smiley Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.	1		1			2
	total	6	2	1			9
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.	1					3
	total	3	2				5
NS	const.	5	6				11
	prov.	2	1	1			4
	total	7	7	1			15
NB	const	7	3				10
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	9	4				13
Que.	const.	74	1				75
	prov.	1	14	3	8		26
	total	75	15	3	8		101
Ont.	const.	52	38	5			95
	prov.	17	14	5			36
	total	69	52	10			131
Man.	const.	2	5	7			14
	prov.						4
	total	2	9	7			18
Sask.	const.		7	7			14
	prov.	1	2	1			4
	total	1	9	8			18
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	9					9
	total	9	21				30
BC	const.		16	12			28
	prov.	3	5	3			11
	total	3	21	15			39
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	184	144	46	8		382
	seat(%)	48.2	37.7	12.0	2.1		
	vote(%)	44.3	32.5	19.8	1.7	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	52.1	36.5	11.4			

the Liberal majority government in 1980 to a minority one. Therefore, in some ways the Smiley proposal would ameliorate the regional discrepancies within party caucuses without altering the outcome of elections except in very unusual circumstances.(For example, in 1957, it would have resulted in a tie for the Liberals and the Conservatives instead of a Conservative plurality(Table 23).)

It is also clear from Tables 23 through 32 that the Smiley proposal tends to favour the top two parties in any province. As a consequence of this, the NDP would have gained only 7 seats out of the 386 provincial seats provided under this proposal for Quebec and the Maritime provinces. In other words, the bias of the current electoral system against third parties attempting a nation-wide appeal would be prominent under the Smiley proposal as well. The Smiley proposal also tends to favour regional third parties. For example, in 8 out of the 10 elections it would have resulted in increased representation for the Social Credit party.

5.3 The Broadbent Proposal

On August 15, 1978, Edward Broadbent, the leader of the NDP, proposed in the House of Commons that the Senate be abolished and that the House of Commons be enlarged by 100 seats. He suggested that these additional 100 members would consist of twenty from each of the five regions, distributed among the parties on the basis of the proportionate share of

the regional vote obtained by each party.[125] The proposal was later modified to have 50 additional members instead of 100. Since the distribution at the provincial level of these additional seats was not specified in the Broadbent proposal, discretion has been used in distributing the regional seats among the provinces for various parties. Details of the procedure are provided in Appendix 1.

Tables 33 through 42 present the results of the last ten general elections simulated according to the modified Broadbent proposal. As is clear from these Tables, the Broadbent proposal would ensure minimal representation within each caucus from each region. For example, in the 1980 election under this proposal, of the 10 additional seats for Quebec, seven would go to the Liberals and only one each to the NDP, Social Credit and the Conservatives. At the same time, out of the 20 additional seats from the West, the Liberals would get five, the NDP would get six, and the Conservatives would get nine. Thus, the Broadbent proposal would guarantee a token representation within each caucus from each region but would further accentuate the problem at the national level - there would be even more Liberals from Quebec, and more Conservatives from the West.

The Broadbent proposal would not alter the composition of the House of Commons in a strong manner. For example, as the Tables 33-42 indicate, this proposal would not have affected the likelihood of majority governments during the

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[125]Edward Broadbent, op. cit. p. 8.

Table 33

A Simulation of the 1957 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	6	4				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	4	11				15
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	6	7				13
Que.	const.	62	9			4	75
	prov.	6	3			1	10
	total	68	12			5	85
Ont.	const.	21	61	3			85
	prov.	4	5	1			10
	total	25	66	4			95
Man.	const.	1	8	5			14
	prov.	1		1	1		1
	total	2	8	6	1		17
Sask.	const.	4	3	10			17
	prov.		2		1		3
	total	4	5	10	1		20
Alta.	const.	1	3		13		17
	prov.	2	1	1			4
	total	3	4	1	13		21
BC	const.	2	7	7	6		22
	prov.	2	3	2	3		10
	total	4	10	9	9		32
North	const.	2					2
	prov.						
	total	2					2
Canada	seats	125	131	30	24	5	315
	seat(%)	39.7	41.6	9.5	7.6	1.6	
	vote(%)	40.9	38.9	10.7	6.6	2.8	
	actual seat(%)	39.6	42.3	9.4	7.2	1.5	

Table 34

A Simulation of the 1958 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.		3				3
	total	5	5				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.		12				12
	prov.	3					3
	total	3	12				15
NB	const.	3	7				10
	prov.		3				3
	total	3	10				13
Que.	const.	25	50				75
	prov.	5	5				10
	total	30	55				85
Ont.	const.	15	67	3			85
	prov.	3	6	1			10
	total	18	73	4			95
Man.	const.		14				14
	prov.	1	1	1			3
	total	1	15	1			17
Sask.	const.		16	1			17
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	1	18	1			20
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.		2	1	1		4
	total		19	1	1	1	21
BC	const.		18	4			22
	prov.	2	5	2	1		10
	total	2	23	6	1		32
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	65	235	13	2		315
	seat(%)	20.6	74.6	4.1	0.6		
	vote(%)	33.6	53.6	9.5	2.6	0.7	
	actual seat(%)	18.5	78.5	3.0			

Table 35

A Simulation of the 1962 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal

Prov.	MP	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	total
Nfld.	const.	6	1				7
	prov.		3				3
	total	6	4				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	9	1			12
	prov.	3					3
	total	5	9	1			15
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.	1	1	1			3
	total	7	5	1			13
Que.	const.	35	14		26		75
	prov.	4	3		3		10
	total	39	17		29		85
Ont.	const.	44	35	6			85
	prov.	4	4	2			10
	total	48	39	8			95
Man.	const.	1	11	2			14
	prov.		3				3
	total	1	14	2			17
Sask.	const.	1	16				17
	prov.		2	1			3
	total	1	18	1			20
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	2		1	1		4
	total	2	15	1	3		21
BC	const.	4	6	10	2		22
	prov.	3	3	3	1		10
	total	7	9	13	3		32
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	118	135	27	35		315
	seat(%)	37.5	42.9	8.6	11.1		
	vote(%)	37.2	37.3	13.5	11.7	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	37.7	43.9	7.2	11.3		

Table 36

A Simulation of the 1963 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	8	2				10
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.						
	total	2	2				4
NS	const.	5	7				12
	prov.	2		1			3
	total	7	7	1			15
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	8	6				14
Que.	const	47	8		20		75
	prov.	4	2	1	3		10
	total	51	10	1	23		85
Ont.	const.	52	27	6			85
	prov.	5	3	2			10
	total	57	30	8			95
Man.	const.	2	10	2			14
	prov.		3				3
	total	2	13	2			17
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	1	19				2o
Alta.	const.	1	14		2		17
	prov.	2		1	1		4
	total	3	14	1	3		21
BC	const.	7	4	9	2		22
	prov.	3	3	3	1		10
	total	10	7	12	3		32
North	const.		2				2
	prov.						
	total		2				2
Canada	seats	149	112	25	29		315
	seat(%)	47.3	35.6	7.9	9.2		
	vote(%)	41.7	32.8	13.1	11.9	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	48.7	35.8	6.4	9.1		

Table 37

A Simulation of the 1965 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		3				3
	total	7	3				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	3		1			4
	total	5	10	1			16
NB	const.	4	6				10
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	5	7				12
Que.	const.	56	8		9	2	75
	prov.	5	2	1	2		10
	total	61	10	1	11	2	85
Ont.	const.	51	25	9			85
	prov.	4	4	2			10
	total	55	29	11			95
Man.	const.	1	10	3			14
	prov.		2				2
	total	1	12	3			16
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	2	1	1			4
	total	2	18	1			21
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	1	1	1	1		4
	total	1	16	1	3		21
BC	const.	7	3	9	3		22
	prov.	3	2	3	2		10
	total	10	5	12	5		32
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	149	115	30	19	2	315
	seat(%)	47.3	36.5	9.5	6.0	0.6	
	vote(%)	40.2	32.4	17.9	8.3	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	49.4	36.6	7.9	5.3	0.8	

Table 38

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	1	6				7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	2	8				10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	1	10				11
	prov.	2	1	1			4
	total	3	11	1			15
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.		2				2
	total	5	7				12
Que.	const.	56	4		14		74
	prov.	5	2	1	2		10
	total	61	6	1	16		84
Ont.	const.	64	17	6		1	88
	prov.	5	3	2			10
	total	69	20	8		1	98
Man.	const.	5	5	3			13
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	6	7	3			16
Sask.	2	5	6				13
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	4	6	6			16
Alta.	const.	4	15				19
	prov.	1	1	2			4
	total	5	16	2			23
BC	const.	16		7			23
	prov.	4	2	3	1		10
	total	20	2	10	1		33
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	177	88	31	17	1	314
	seat(%)	56.4	28.0	9.9	5.4	0.3	
	vote(%)	45.5	31.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	58.7	27.3	8.3	5.3	0.4	

Table 39

A Simulation of the 1972 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	4				7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	4	6				10
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.						
	total	1	3				4
NS	const.	1	10				11
	prov.	3		1			4
	total	4	10	1			15
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.		3				3
	total	5	8				13
Que.	const.	56	2		15	1	74
	prov.	5	2	1	2		10
	total	61	4	1	17	1	84
Ont.	const.	36	40	11		1	88
	prov.	4	4	2			10
	total	40	44	13		1	98
Man.	const.	2	8	3			13
	prov.		3				3
	total	2	11	3			16
Sask.	const.	1	7	5			13
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	2	9	5			16
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	2		2			4
	total	2	19	2			23
BC	const.	4	8	11			23
	prov.	3	3	4			10
	total	7	11	15			33
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	128	126	41	17	2	314
	seat(%)	40.8	40.1	13.1	5.4	0.6	
	vote(%)	38.5	35.0	17.7	7.6	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	41.3	40.5	11.7	5.7	0.8	

Table 40

A Simulation of the 1974 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	3				7
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	6	4				10
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.						
	total	1	3				4
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	4	9	1			14
NB	const.	6	3			1	10
	prov.	1	2	1			4
	total	7	5	1		1	14
Quebec	const.	60	3		11		74
	prov.	5	2	1	2		10
	total	65	5	1	13		84
Ont.	const.	55	25	8			88
	prov.	5	3	2			10
	total	60	28	10			98
Man.	const.	2	9	2			13
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	3	11	2			16
Sask.	const.	3	8	2			13
	prov.		3				3
	total	3	11	2			16
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	2		2			4
	total	2	19	2			23
BC	const.	8	13	2			23
	prov.	4	4	2			10
	total	12	17	4			33
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	163	113	24	13	1	314
	seat(%)	51.9	36.0	7.6	4.1	0.3	
	vote(%)	43.2	35.4	15.4	5.1	0.9	
	actual seat(%)	53.4	36.0	6.1	4.2	0.4	

Table 41

A Simulation of the 1979 General Election
under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	2	1			7
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	5	4	1			10
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	1	1	1			3
	total	3	9	2			14
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.	1	1	1			3
	total	7	5	1			13
Que.	const.	67	2		6		75
	prov.	6	1	1	2		10
	total	73	3	1	8		85
Ont.	const.	32	57	6			95
	prov.	4	4	2			10
	total	36	61	8			105
Man.	const.	2	7	5			14
	prov.		4				4
	total	2	11	5			18
Sask.	const.		10	4			14
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	1	12	4			17
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	1		2			3
	total	1	21	2			24
BC	const.	1	19	8			28
	prov.	2	5	3			10
	total	3	24	11			38
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	132	156	36	8		332
	seat(%)	39.8	47.0	10.8	2.4		
	vote(%)	40.1	35.9	17.9	4.6	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	40.4	48.2	9.2	2.1		

Table 42

A Simulation of the 1980 General Election under the Broadbent Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.	1	1	1			3
	total	6	3	1			10
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.						
	total	2	2				4
NS	const.	5	6				11
	prov.	2	1	1			4
	total	7	7	1			15
NB	const.	7	3				10
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	8	5				13
Que.	const.	74	1				75
	prov.	7	1	1	1		10
	total	81	2	1	1		85
Ont.	const.	52	38	5			95
	prov.	4	4	2			10
	total	56	42	7			105
Man.	const.	2	5	7			14
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	3	7	7			17
Sask.	const.		7	7			14
	prov.	1	2				3
	total	1	9	7			17
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	1	1	2			4
	total	1	22	2			25
BC	const.		16	12			28
	prov.	2	4	4			10
	total	2	20	16			38
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	167	121	43	1		332
	seat(%)	50.3	36.4	13.0	0.3		
	vote(%)	44.3	32.5	19.8	1.7	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	52.1	36.5	11.4			

period under consideration (1957-1980).

The major difference between the Broadbent proposal and the two proposals discussed previously is that the Broadbent proposal abandons representation by population. The justification for abandoning this principle is that regional interests are distinct on most matters of public policy and that the alienation of the less populous regions is traceable to their relative weakness in parliament. However, even if this argument on regional homogeneity is taken as valid, the Broadbent proposal only results in slightly overrepresenting the less populous regions in the House of Commons without significantly improving the regional imbalances in the party caucuses.

5.4 The Task Force Proposal

The Task Force on Canadian Unity proposed an electoral system which in their opinion would enhance the effectiveness of the House of Commons and correct the existing situation with its corrosive effect on Canadian unity. The working of the system is described below.

> ... (W)e would continue the current simple-majority single-member constituency system because of the direct links it establishes between the voter and his MP, but would add to it a degree of proportional representation. We would increase the overall number of Commons seats by about 60 and these additional seats would be awarded to candidates from ranked lists announced by the parties before the election, seats being awarded to parties on the basis of percentages of the popular vote. We have opted for these additional seats being assigned to those on party lists announced before an election rather than

> to candidates who have run and placed second in individual constituencies in order to avoid any connotation that these additional members are second-class representatives and to encourage parties to use this means to attract candidates who might otherwise be difficult to entice into politics.[126]

The method of distribution of the 60 additional MPs among the provinces was not completely defined by the Task Force, but one of the suggestions was to allocate the 60 seats on the basis of the percentage of the country-wide vote received by each party and to apply the d'Hondt formula for allocating seats provincially among parties.

Tables 43 through 52 show how the Task Force proposal might have worked in each federal election since 1957. As is clear from these Tables, under this proposal, the Liberals would get improved representation from the West while the Conservatives would considerably enhance their representation from Quebec. For example, in the 1980 election, the Liberals would increase their strength in the West from 2 to 22 MPs, while the Conservatives would increase their membership in Quebec from one to twelve. Thus, the Liberal caucus would still be Quebec dominated but there would be enough representatives from the West to get their share of cabinet positions. By the same token, the Conservative caucus would still be strongly western dominated but almost 10 percent of its members would come from Quebec.

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[126]The Task Force on Canadian Unity, op. cit., p. 105.

Table 43

A Simulation of the 1957 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.						
	total	5	2				7
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	5					5
	total	7	10				17
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.						
	total	5	5				10
Que.	const.	62	9			4	75
	prov.		18	1		1	20
	total	62	27	1		5	95
Ont.	const.	21	61	3			85
	prov.	12		6	1		19
	total	33	61	9	1		104
Man.	const.	1	8	5			14
	prov.	2			2		4
	total	3	8	5	2		18
Sask.	const.	4	3	10			17
	prov.		1		1		2
	total	4	4	10	1		19
Alta.	const.	1	3		13		17
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	4	5		13		22
BC	const.	2	7	7	6		22
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	4	9	7	6		26
North	const.	2					2
	prov.						
	total	2					2
Canada	seats	130	135	32	23	5	325
	seat(%)	40.0	41.5	9.9	7.1	1.5	
	vote(%)	40.9	38.9	10.7	6.6	2.8	
	actual seat(%)	39.6	42.3	9.4	7.2	1.5	

Table 44

A Simulation of the 1958 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.		2				2
	total	5	4				9
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.						
	total		4				4
NS	const.		12				12
	prov.	4	2				6
	total	4	14				18
NB	const.	3	7				10
	prov.		1				1
	total	3	8				11
Que.	const.	25	50				75
	prov.	1	10	1			12
	total	26	60	1			87
Ont.	const.	15	67	3			85
	prov.	8	17	3			28
	total	23	84	6			113
Man.	const.		14				14
	prov.	2		1			3
	total	2	14	1			17
Sask.	const.		16	1			17
	prov.	2		1			3
	total	2	16	2			20
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.	1			1		2
	total	1	17		1		19
BC	const.		18	4			22
	prov.	2			1		3
	total	2	18	4	1		25
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	69	240	14	2		325
	seat(%)	21.2	73.9	4.3	0.6		
	vote(%)	33.6	53.6	9.5	2.6	0.7	
	actual seat(%)	18.5	78.5	3.0			

Table 45

A Simulation of the 1962 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	6	1				7
	prov.		1				1
	total	6	2				8
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	9	1			12
	prov.	5					5
	total	7	9	1			17
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.						
	total	6	4				10
Que.	const.	35	14		26		75
	prov.		12	2			14
	total	35	26	2	26		89
Ont.	const.	44	35	6			85
	prov.	2	9	3	2		16
	total	46	44	9	2		101
Man.	const.	1	11	2			14
	prov.	4			1		5
	total	5	11	2	1		19
Sask.	const.	1	16				17
	prov.	3		2			5
	total	4	16	2			22
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	4		1	3		8
	total	4	15	1	5		25
BC	const.	4	6	10	2		22
	prov.	3	1		1		5
	total	7	7	10	3		27
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	122	139	27	37		325
	seat(%)	37.5	42.8	8.3	11.4		
	vote(%)	37.2	37.3	13.5	11.7	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	37.7	43.8	7.2	11.3		

Table 46

A Simulation of the 1963 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		1				1
	total	7	1				8
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.						
	total	2	2				4
NS	const.	5	7				12
	prov.	4					4
	total	9	7				16
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.						
	total	6	4				10
Que.	const.	47	8		20		75
	prov.		7	3			10
	total	47	15	3			85
Ont.	const.	52	27	6			85
	prov.	6	10	4	2		22
	total	58	37	10	2		107
Man.	const.	2	10	2			14
	prov.	4			1		5
	total	6	10	2	1		19
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	4		1			5
	total	4	17	1			22
Alta.	const.	1	14		2		17
	prov.	4			3		7
	total	5	14		5		24
BC	const.	7	4	9	2		22
	prov.	3	2		1		6
	total	10	6	9	3		28
North	const.		2				2
	prov.						
	total		2				2
Canada	seats	154	115	25	31		325
	seat(%)	47.4	35.4	7.7	9.5		
	vote(%)	41.7	32.8	13.1	11.9	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	48.7	35.8	6.4	9.1		

Table 47

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the Task Force Proposal

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		1				1
	total	7	1				8
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	6					6
	total	8	10				18
NB	const.	4	6				10
	prov.	1					1
	total	5	6				11
Que.	const.	56	8		9	2	75
	prov.		8		2		15
	total	56	16		11	2	90
Ont.	const.	51	25				85
	prov.		9				13
	total	51	34				98
Man.	const.	1	10	3			14
	prov.	4					4
	total	5	10	3			18
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	4		2			6
	total	4	17	2			23
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	5			2		7
	total	5	15		4		24
BC	const.	7	3	9	3		22
	prov.	3	2		1		6
	total	10	5	9	4		28
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	159	117	32	14	2	325
	seat (%)	47.7	36.0	9.9	5.4	0.6	
	vote (%)	40.2	32.4	17.4	8.3	1.2	
	actual seat (%)	49.4	36.6	7.9	5.3	0.8	

Table 48

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	1	6				7
	prov.	2					2
	total	3	6				9
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	1	10				11
	prov.	5					5
	total	6	10				16
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.						
	total	5	5				10
Que.	const.	56	4		14		74
	prov.	1	8	3	1		13
	total	57	12	3	15		87
Ont.	const.	64	17	6		1	88
	prov.	4	7	6			17
	total	68	24	12		1	105
Man.	const.	5	5	3			13
	prov.	3					3
	total	8	5	3			16
Sask.	const.	2	5	6			13
	prov.	3					3
	total	5	5	6			16
Alta.	const.	4	15				19
	prov.	9		1			10
	total	13	15	1			29
BC	const.	16		7			23
	prov.		4		2		6
	total	16	4	7	2		29
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	183	91	32	17	1	324
	seat(%)	56.5	28.1	9.9	5.2	0.3	
	vote(%)	45.5	31.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	58.7	27.3	8.3	5.3	0.4	

Table 49

A Simulation of the 1972 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	4				7
	prov.						
	total	3	4				7
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.						
	total	1	3				4
NS	const.	1	10				11
	prov.	3		1			4
	total	4	10	1			15
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.						
	total	5	5				10
Que.	const.	56	2		15	1	74
	prov.		13	3	5		21
	total	56	15	3	20	1	95
Ont.	const.	36	40	11		1	88
	prov.	7	6	6			19
	total	43	46	17		1	107
Man.	const.	2	8	3			13
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	8	3			15
Sask.	const.	1	7	5			13
	prov.	2					2
	total	3	7	5			15
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	5		1			6
	total	5	19	1			25
BC	const.	4	8	11			23
	prov.	4	2				6
	total	8	10	11			29
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	132	128	42	20	2	324
	seat(%)	40.7	39.5	13.0	6.2	0.6	
	vote(%)	38.5	35.0	17.7	7.6	1.19	
	actual seat(%)	41.3	40.5	11.7	5.7	0.76	

Table 50

A Simulation of the 1974 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	3				7
	prov.						
	total	4	3				7
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.						
	total	1	3				4
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	4					4
	total	6	8	1			15
NB	const.	6	3			1	10
	prov.						
	total	6	3			1	10
Que.	const.	60	3		11		74
	prov.		11	2	3		16
	total	60	14	2	14		90
Ont.	const.	55	25	8			88
	prov.	8	11	4			23
	total	63	36	12			111
Man.	const.	2	9	2			13
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	9	2			15
Sask.	const.	3	8	2			13
	prov.	1					1
	total	4	8	2			14
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	6		1			7
	total	6	19	1			26
BC	const.	8	13	2			23
	prov.	5		2			7
	total	13	13	4			30
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	167	119	25	14	1	324
	seat(%)	51.5	36.1	7.7	4.3	0.3	
	vote(%)	43.2	35.4	15.4	5.1	0.9	
	actual seat(%)	53.4	36.0	6.1	4.2	0.4	

Table 51

A Simulation of the 1979 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	2	1			7
	prov.						
	total	4	2	1			7
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.						
	total		4				4
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	8	1			13
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.						
	total	6	4				10
Que.	const.	67	2		6		75
	prov.		14	2	3		19
	total	67	16	2	9		94
Ont.	const.	32	57	6			95
	prov.	8	7	8			23
	total	40	64	14			108
Man.	const.	2	7	5			14
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	3	8	5			16
Sask.	const.		10	4			14
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	10	4			16
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	5		1			6
	total	5	21	1			27
BC	const.	1	19	8			28
	prov.	6					6
	total	7	19	8			34
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	138	158	37	9		342
	seat(%)	40.4	46.2	10.8	2.6		
	vote(%)	40.1	35.9	17.9	4.6	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	40.4	48.2	9.2	2.1		

Table 52

A Simulation of the 1980 General Election under the Task Force Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.						
	total	5	2				7
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.						
	total	2	2				4
NS	const.	5	6				11
	prov.			1			1
	total	5	6	1			12
NB	const.	7	3				10
	prov.						
	total	7	3				10
Que.	const.	74	1				75
	prov.		11	3	2		16
	total	74	12	3	2		91
Ont.	const.	52	38	5			85
	prov.	7	8	7			22
	total	59	46	12			117
Man.	const.	2	5	7			14
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	5	7			16
Sask.	const.		7	7			14
	prov.	3					3
	total	3	7	7			17
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	6		1			7
	total	6	21	1			28
BC	const.		16	12			28
	prov.	9					9
	total	9	16	12			37
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	174	122	44	2		342
	seat(%)	50.9	35.7	12.9	0.6		
	vote(%)	44.3	32.5	19.8	1.69	1.74	
	actual seat(%)	52.1	36.5	11.4			

The Task Force proposal would also provide marginal representation for the NDP from Quebec and the Maritimes. For example, the NDP would get a total of 25 seats from Quebec in the last ten elections while under the present system it never had a member of parliament from Quebec. The Task Force proposal also would not affect the likelihood of majority governments. As is indicated by the Tables 43-52, the Task Force proposal would have preserved the majority governments of 1958, 1968, 1974, and 1980.

5.5 The Canada West Foundation Proposal

In a report, Electoral Reform: The Need is Pressing, The Time is Now, prepared for the Canada West Foundation, Professors David Elton and Roger Gibbins presented a proposal for the reform of the electoral system in Canada. This proposal called for the reduction of SMD/PE constituencies from 282 to 255, and for the addition of 75 new MPs to be elected from party lists in province-wide contests. The specific features of the proposal are presented below.

> (1) 255 constituency MPs would be elected through the same plurality, first-past-the-post electoral rules that are in place today. Only the number of MPs would be altered; the method of election would remain the same.
> (2) Each province would retain the same proportion of MPs in the new 330 member House of Commons that it has at present.
> (3) Each province would have a minimum of 5 MPs (4 in Prince Edward Island) elected on the basis of PR. These MPs would be elected from provincial party lists.

(4) Prior to the election each political party would select a number of candidates equal to the total number of provincial seats available (e.g., 5 in Saskatchewan, 8 in B.C., etc.). The method of nomination would be the responsibility of each party, as at present. It would be hoped that the parties would hold open nomination meetings in which all members of the party could support the candidate(s) of their choice.
(5) The voter would be given two ballots. The first, identical to the existing ballot, would be used to elect the constituency MP. The second ballot would allow the voter to choose the party of his/her choice.
(6) Party votes would be aggregated across the province to determine the allocation of the PR seats. Any party obtaining 15 to 20 percent of the vote in a province would obtain legislative representation from that province. A party obtaining 60 percent of the popular vote in a province with 5 PR seats (e.g., Manitoba, New Brunswick) would obtain 3 of the 5 seats.[127]

Tables 53-62 show the impact of the Canada West Foundation proposal on the last ten general elections. It is seen from these Tables that the proposed system would result in a modest but significant improvement in the Liberal representation in the House of Commons from the West and the Conservative representation from Quebec. It would also provide the NDP with minimal representation from Quebec and the Maritimes.

The Canada West Foundation proposal, in spite of reducing the regional imbalance within party caucuses in the House of Commons, would not increase the incidence of minority governments. As the Tables show, it would have preserved the four majority governments during this period.

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[127]David Elton and Roger Gibbins, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

Table 53

A Simulation of the 1957 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	1				4
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	8				10
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	4	11				15
NS	const.	4	4				8
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	6	7				13
Que.	const.	65	9			4	78
	prov.	9	5			1	15
	total	74	14			5	93
Ont.	const.	23	65	3			91
	prov.	6	7	2			15
	total	29	72	5			106
Man.	const.	1	7	4			12
	prov.	1	2	1	1		5
	total	2	9	5	1		17
Sask.	const.	3	3	9			15
	prov.	2	1	2	1		6
	total	5	4	11	1		21
Alta.	const.	1	2		11		14
	prov.	2	2		3		7
	total	3	4		14		21
BC	const.	2	6	6	5		19
	prov.	2	2	2	2		8
	total	4	8	8	7		27
North	const.	3					3
	prov.						
	total	3					3
Canada	seats	138	135	29	23	5	330
	seat(%)	41.8	40.9	8.8	7.0	1.5	
	vote(%)	40.9	38.9	10.7	6.6	2.8	
	actual seat(%)	39.6	42.3	9.4	7.2	1.5	

Table 54

A Simulation of the 1958 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	1				4
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.		10				10
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	2	13				15
NB	const.	2	6				8
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	4	9				13
Que.	const.	26	52				78
	prov.	7	8				15
	total	33	60				93
Ont.	const.	16	72	3			91
	prov.	5	8	2			15
	total	21	80	5			106
Man.	const.		12				12
	prov.	1	3	1			5
	total	1	15	1			17
Sask.	const.		14	1			15
	prov.	1	3	2			6
	total	1	17	3			21
Alta.	const.		14				14
	prov.	1	4		2		7
	total	1	18		2		21
BC	const.		16	3			19
	prov.	1	4	2	1		8
	total	1	20	5	1		27
North	const.	2	1				3
	prov.						
	total	2	1				3
Canada	seats	64	239	14	3		330
	seat(%)	19.4	72.4	4.2	0.9		
	vote(%)	33.6	53.6	9.5	2.6	0.7	
	actual seat(%)	18.5	78.5	3.0			

Table 55

A Simulation of the 1962 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	1				4
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	6	3				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	7	1			10
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	4	10	1			15
NB	const.	5	3				8
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	7	6				13
Que.	const.	36	15		27		78
	prov.	6	4	1	4		15
	total	42	19	1	31		93
Ont.	const.	47	38	6			91
	prov.	6	6	3			15
	total	53	44	9			106
Man.	const.	1	9	2			12
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	3	11	3			17
Sask.	const.	1	14				15
	prov.	2	3	1			6
	total	3	17	1			21
Alta.	const.		12		2		14
	prov.	1	3	1	2		7
	total						
BC	const.	3	5	9	2		19
	prov.	2	2	3	1		8
	total	5	7	12	3		27
North	const.	1	2				3
	prov.						
	total	1	2				3
Canada	seats	127	137	28	38		330
	seat(%)	38.5	41.5	8.5	11.5		
	vote(%)	37.2	37.3	13.5	11.7	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	37.7	43.8	7.2	11.3		

Table 56

A Simulation of the 1963 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4					4
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	7	2				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	4	6				10
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	6	9				15
NB	const.	5	3				8
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	8	5				13
Que.	const.	49	8		21		78
	prov.	7	3	1	4		15
	total	56	11	1	25		93
Ont.	const.	56	29	6			91
	prov.	7	5	3			15
	total	63	34	9			106
Man.	const.	2	8	2			12
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	4	10	3			17
Sask.	const.		15				15
	prov.	2	3	1			6
	total	2	18	1			21
Alta.	const.	1	11		2		14
	prov.	2	3		2		7
	total	3	14		4		21
BC	const.	6	3	8	2		19
	prov.	3	2	2	1		8
	total	9	5	10	3		27
North	const.		3				3
	prov.						
	total		3				3
Canada	seats	160	114	24	32		330
	seat(%)	48.5	34.6	7.3	9.7		
	vote(%)	41.7	32.8	13.1	11.9	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	48.7	35.8	6.4	9.1		

Table 57

A Simulation of the 1965 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4					4
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	7	2				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	8				10
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	4	11				15
NB	const.	3	5				8
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	6	7				13
Que.	const.	58	9		9	2	78
	prov.	7	3	2	3		15
	total	65	12	2	12	2	93
Ont.	const.	54	27	10			91
	prov.	7	5	3			15
	total	61	32	13			106
Man.	const.	1	9	2			12
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	3	11	3			17
Sask.	const.		15				15
	prov.	1	3	2			6
	total	1	18	2			21
Alta.	const.		13		1		14
	prov.	2	3	1	1		7
	total	2	16	1	2		21
BC	const.	6	3	7	3		19
	prov.	2	2	3	1		8
	total	8	5	10	4		27
North	const.	2	1				3
	prov.						
	total	2	1				3
Canada	seats	161	118	31	18	2	330
	seat(%)	48.8	35.8	9.4	5.5	0.6	
	vote(%)	40.2	32.4	17.9	8.3	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	49.4	36.6	7.9	5.3	0.8	

Table 58

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	1	3				4
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	3	6				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	7				8
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	3	10				13
NB	const.	3	4				7
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	6	6				12
Que.	const.	54	4		13		71
	prov.	8	3	1	3		15
	total	62	7	1	16		86
Ont.	const.	69	18	7		1	95
	prov.	7	5	3			15
	total	76	23	10		1	110
Man.	const.	5	4	3			12
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	7	6	4			17
Sask.	const.	2	5	5			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	3	7	7			17
Alta.	const.	4	13				17
	prov.	3	4	1			8
	total	7	17	1			25
BC	const.	17		8			25
	prov.	3	2	3			8
	total	20	2	11			33
North	const.	2	1				3
	prov.						
	total	2	1				3
Canada	seats	191	88	34	16	1	330
	seat(%)	57.9	27.7	10.3	4.8	0.3	
	vote(%)	45.5	31.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	58.7	27.3	8.3	5.3	0.4	

Table 59

A Simulation of the 1972 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	2	2				4
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	4	5				9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	7				8
	prov.	2	3				5
	total	3	10				13
NB	const.	3	4				7
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	6	6				12
Que.	const.	54	2		14	1	71
	prov.	7	3	1	4		15
	total	61	5	1	18	1	86
Ont.	const.	39	43	12		1	95
	prov.	6	6	3			15
	total	45	49	15		1	110
Man.	const.	2	7	3			12
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	4	9	4			17
Sask.	const	1	6	5			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	2	8	7			17
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.	2	5	1			8
	total	2	22	1			25
BC	const.	4	9	12			25
	prov.	2	3	3			8
	total	6	12	15			33
North	const.	1	1	1			3
	prov.						
	total	1	1	1			3
Canada	seats	136	130	44	18	2	330
	seat(%)	41.2	39.4	13.3	5.5	0.6	
	vote(%)	38.5	35.0	17.7	7.6	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	41.3	40.5	11.7	5.7	0.8	

Table 60

A Simulation of the 1974 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	2	2				4
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	4	4	1			9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	2	6				8
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	4	8	1			13
NB	const.	4	2			1	7
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	6	4	1		1	12
Que.	const.	57	3		11		71
	prov.	8	3	1	3		17
	total	65	6	1	14		86
Ont.	const.	57	27	9			95
	prov.	7	5	3			15
	total	66	32	12			110
Man.	const.	2	8	2			12
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	4	10	3			17
Sask.	const.	3	7	2			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	4	9	4			17
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.	2	5	1			8
	total	2	22	1			25
BC	const.	9	14	2			25
	prov.	3	3	2			8
	total	12	17	4			33
North	const.	1	1	1			3
	prov.						
	total	1	1	1			3
Canada	seats	170	116	29	14	1	330
	seat(%)	51.5	35.2	8.8	4.2	0.3	
	vote(%)	43.2	35.4	15.4	5.1	0.9	
	actual seat(%)	53.4	36.0	6.1	4.2	0.4	

Table 61

A Simulation of the 1979 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	2	1	1			4
	prov.	2	1	2			5
	total	4	2	3			9
PEI	const.		1				1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	2	3				5
NS	const.	1	6	1			8
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	3	8	2			13
NB	const.	4	3				7
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	6	5	1			12
Que.	const.	63	2		6		71
	prov.	10	2	1	2		15
	total	73	4	1	8		86
Ont.	const.	32	57	6			95
	prov.	6	6	3			15
	total	38	63	9			110
Man.	const.	2	6	4			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	3	8	6			17
Sask.	const.		9	3			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	1	11	5			17
Alta.	const.		17				0
	prov.	2	5	1			8
	total	2	22	1			25
BC	const.	1	17	7			25
	prov.	2	3	3			8
	total	3	20	10			33
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	135	148	39	8		330
	seat(%)	40.9	44.8	11.8	2.4		
	vote(%)	40.1	35.9	17.9	4.6	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	40.4	48.2	9.2	2.1		

Table 62

A Simulation of the 1980 General Election under the Canada West Foundation Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	1				4
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	5	3	1			9
PEI	const.	1					1
	prov.	2	2				4
	total	3	2				5
NS	const.	4	4				8
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	6	6	1			13
NB	const.	5	2				7
	prov.	2	2	1			5
	total	7	4	1			12
Que.	const.	70	1				71
	prov.	10	2	2	1		15
	total	80	3	2	1		86
Ont.	const.	52	38	5			95
	prov.	6	6	3			15
	total	58	44	8			110
Man.	const.	2	4	6			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	3	6	8			17
Sask.	const.		6	6			12
	prov.	1	2	2			5
	total	1	8	8			17
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.	2	5	1			8
	total	2	22	1			25
BC	const.		14	11			25
	prov.	2	3	3			8
	total	2	17	14			33
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	167	117	45	1		330
	seat(%)	50.6	35.5	13.6	0.3		
	vote(%)	44.3	32.5	19.8	1.7	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	52.1	36.5	11.4			

5.6 Summary of the Analysis

The foregoing discussion has presented an analysis of each of the five proposals individually. Table 63 presents in a summary form the highlights of the proposals. In order to perform some form of comparison test for all these proposals, some measurement criteria are needed. Following the theme of this study, these criteria are: Liberal representation from the West, Conservative representation from Quebec, NDP representation national as well as from Quebec eastward, Social Credit strength in the House of Commons, and incidence of minority governments.

Figure 1 indicates the Liberal representation from the West in the last ten elections according to the five proposals as well as the actual results. It is clear that the Irvine proposal would have resulted in the maximum representation of the Liberals from the West. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that the Irvine proposal would have also provided the maximum Conservative representation from Quebec. Of course, these results should not be surprising because the Irvine proposal is closest to the proportional representation system among the five proposals considered here.

Table 64 provides further insight for a comparison of various electoral reform proposals. As is clear from the table, only the Irvine formula would have altered the incidence of majority governments during this period. All other proposals would have resulted in four majority

Table 63

A Comparison of the Proposals for Electoral Reform in Canada.

	Number of Seats SMD /PE	PR	Total	Voting System	Method for PR Seats Assignment
Irvine	188	166	354	Single ballot	Provincial lists, distribution formula predefined.
Smiley	282	100	382	Single ballot	Runners-up in closest races win provincial seats.
Broadbent (1980)	282	50	332	Single ballot	Regional lists, parties determine.
CWF	255	75	330	Double ballot	Provincial lists, formula predefined.
Task Force	282	60	342	Single ballot	Provincial lists, parties determine.

Note: The 60 PR seats in the Task Force proposal are distributed nationally by using the d'Hondt formula for each party. Thus, under the Task Force proposal the number of PR seats in each province may vary from election to election. In the remaining proposals, the PR seats are fixed provincially or regionally.

Table 64

A Comparison of Simulation Results for Various Electoral Reform Proposals for the Last Ten General Elections (1957-1980)

	Proposal					
	Irvine	Smiley	B'bent	CWF	Task Force	Actual result
No. of majority governments.	1	4	4	4	4	4
Liberal party's share of seats from the west.	26.3%	19.8%	15.4%	17.1%	24.5%	12.1%
P.C. party's share of seats from Quebec (excluding 1958).	21.0%	14.1%	10.4%	10.1%	18.7%	9.1%
NDP's share of seats nationally.	15.2%	8.8%	9.4%	9.6%	9.4%	8.1%
Socred's share of seats nationally.	6.4%	5.5%	5.2%	5.2%	5.3%	5.0%
NDP's share of seats from Quebec and Maritimes.	6.6%	0.6%	1.65%	1.8%	2.4%	0.37%



Figure 1. Liberal Party's Share of Seats from the West: A Comparison of Actual Results with the Simulations for Various Proposals.



Figure 2. Conservative Party's Share of Seats from Quebec: A Comparison of Actual Results with the Simulations of Various Proposals.

governments. Also, the Irvine proposal would result in maximum benefit for the NDP (a third party with diffuse support), while the Social Credit party (a party with regional support) would have benefitted a little from any of the proposals.

6. A Proposal for Electoral Reform In Canada

After reviewing the various electoral reform proposals in the preceeding chapter, it is felt that although all the proposals tend to rectify deficiencies of the existing electoral system, there is still room for further improvement. None of the proposals has tried to prevent the growth of regional or splinter groups. The Irvine proposal is most successful in eliminating the distortion between the votes obtained and seats won for the parties, but it would result in minority government almost always if the number of parties entitled to parliamentary seats is more than two. The other four proposals studied would not alter the incidence of minority governments but they have other shortcomings. For example, according to the Smiley proposal, in years of strong third party emergence, a second place finisher having only one-third of the vote in a constituency may be entitled to a provincial seat. But a second place finisher in a constituency with only two candidates would not get the provincial seat even if he receives almost 45% of the constituency vote. The Broadbent proposal and the Canada West Foundation proposal attempt to correct the regional imbalance in the caucuses of the major parties but only to a marginal degree. The Task Force proposal seems to be one which tends to provide representation for the major parties in all the provinces without increasing the

incidence of minority governments. In doing so, the Task Force proposal abandons the principle of representation by population although not to a great degree.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a new proposal for the reform of the electoral system in Canada. The proposal attempts to meet the objectives of reform set out in the first chapter. Its specific features are as follows:

1. A total of 50 national seats would be added to the present 282 single-member constituencies, and this number of 50 seats would stay the same despite projected increases in the single-member constituencies in future redistributions for the House of Commons.

2. The constituency MPs would be elected through the same, first-past-the-post electoral rules that are in place today.

3. A minimum national vote of six percent of the enumerated national electorate would be required before any party qualifies for seats from the 50 national seats.

4. The 50 national seats would be divided among the qualifying parties according to the proportions of their national votes.

5. Once it is determined how many seats each party is to get, the seats would be allocated among provinces by using the d'Hondt formula. For example, in the 1980 general election, only the Liberals, Conservatives and NDP would have been entitled to gain additional seats. When the 50 additional seats would have been distributed among these three parties on the basis of their national votes, the outcome would have been 23 additional seats for the Liberals, 17 for the Conservatives and 10 for the NDP. Applying the d'Hondt formula at the provincial level for each party would have resulted in a distribution shown in Table 10.

6. The MPs for the national seats would be chosen from rank ordered lists provided by each party before the election. A limit of two terms of office

would be applied for the candidates from the list seats to prevent stagnation of the national party lists.

Tables 65 through 75 and Figures 3-4 show how the last ten general elections (1957-1980) might have come out under the current proposal. A cursory look at these tables leads one to draw the following conclusions regarding the proposal.

- The proposal would result in substantial representation for the Liberal party from western Canada.
- The Conservatives would obtain a significant representation from Quebec.
- The NDP would improve its strength nationally.
- The Social Credit or any other splinter party with only regional strength would not get any additional representation through the national seats. However, from the point of view of fairness in representation, any regional party would be able to keep any seat or seats it wins through the single-member constituencies.
- The proposal would not alter the incidence of majority governments.

It should be noted that the current proposal rectifies the deficiencies of the existing system in a cost-effective manner. By adding only 50 seats to the existing House of Commons the proposal would be able to make the national party caucuses more national in character. Thus according to the current proposal, not only would the parliament represent all parts of Canada, but so would government and

Table 65

A Simulation of the 1957 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.						
	total	5	2				7
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	4					4
	total	6	10				16
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.						
	total	5	5				10
Que.	const.	62	9			4	75
	prov.		16	1			17
	total	62	25	1		4	92
Ont.	const.	21	61	3			85
	prov.	9		5	1		15
	total	30	61	8	1		100
Man.	const.	1	8	5			14
	prov.	2			1		3
	total	3	8	5	1		17
Sask.	const.	4	3	10			17
	prov.		1		1		2
	total	4	4	10	1		19
Alta.	const.	1	3		13		17
	prov.	3	2				5
	total	4	5		13		22
BC	const.	2	7	7	6		22
	prov.	2	1				3
	total	4	8	7	6		25
North	const.	2					2
	prov.						
	total	2					2
Canada	seats	126	132	31	22	4	315
	seat(%)	40.2	41.9	9.8	7.0	1.3	
	vote(%)	39.6	42.3	9.4	7.2	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	38.9	40.9	10.7	6.6	2.8	

Table 66

A Simulation of the 1958 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.		2				2
	total	5	4				9
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.						
	total		4				4
NS	const.		12				12
	prov.	4	2				6
	total	4	14				18
NB	const.	3	7				10
	prov.						
	total	3	7				10
Que.	const	25	50				75
	prov.		8	1			9
	total	25	58	1			84
Ont.	const.	15	67	3			85
	prov.	6	16	2			24
	total	21	83	5			109
Man.	const.		14				14
	prov.	2		1			3
	total	2	14	1			17
Sask.	const.		16	1			17
	prov.	2		1			3
	total	2	16	2			20
Alta.	const.		17				17
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	17				18
BC	const.		18	4			22
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	18	4			24
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	66	236	13			315
	seat(%)	21.0	74.9	4.1			
	vote(%)	33.6	53.6	9.5	2.6	0.7	
	actual seat(%)	18.5	78.5	3.0			

Table 67

A Simulation of the 1962 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	6	1				7
	prov.		1				1
	total	6	2				8
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	9	1			12
	prov.	5					5
	total	7	9	1			17
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.						
	total	6	4				10
Que.	const.	35	14		26		75
	prov.		10	2			12
	total	35	24	2	26		87
Ont.	const.	44	35	6			85
	prov.	1	7	3	1		12
	total	45	42	9	1		97
Man.	const.	1	11	2			14
	prov.	3			1		4
	total	4	11	2	1		18
Sask.	const.	1	16				17
	prov.	2		2			4
	total	3	16	2			21
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	3			3		6
	total	3	15		5		23
BC	const.	4	6	10	2		22
	prov.	3	1		1		5
	total	7	7	10	3		27
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	118	135	26	36		315
	seat(%)	37.5	42.9	8.3	11.4		
	vote(%)	37.2	37.3	13.5	11.7	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	37.7	43.8	7.2	11.3		

Table 68

A Simulation of the 1963 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		1				1
	total	7	1				8
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.						
	total	2	2				4
NS	const.	5	7				12
	prov.	3					3
	total	8	7				15
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.						
	total	6	4				10
Que.	const.	47	8		20		75
	prov.	5	6	3			14
	total	52	14	3	20		89
Ont.	const.	52	27	6			85
	prov.		7	3	1		11
	total	52	34	9	1		96
Man.	const.	2	10	2			14
	prov.	3			1		4
	total	5	10	2	1		18
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	4		1			5
	total	4	17	1			22
Alta.	const.	1	14		2		17
	prov.	4			3		7
	total	5	14		5		24
BC	const.	7	4	9	2		22
	prov.	2	2		1		5
	total	9	6	9	3		27
North	const.		2				2
	prov.						
	total		2				2
Canada	seats	150	111	24	30		315
	seat(%)	47.6	35.2	7.6	9.5		
	vote(%)	41.7	32.8	13.1	11.9	0.4	
	actual seat(%)	48.7	35.8	6.4	9.1		

Table 69

A Simulation of the 1965 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	7					7
	prov.		1				1
	total	7	1				8
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	2	10				12
	prov.	5					5
	total	7	10				17
NB	const.	4	6				10
	prov.						
	total	4	6				10
Que.	const.	56	8		9	2	75
	prov.		7	4	2		13
	total	56	15	4	11	2	88
Ont.	const.	51	25	9			85
	prov.		8	3			11
	total	51	33	12			96
Man.	const.	1	10	3			14
	prov.	3					3
	total	4	10	3			17
Sask.	const.		17				17
	prov.	4		2			6
	total	4	17	2			23
Alta.	const.		15		2		17
	prov.	5			1		6
	total	5	15		3		23
BC	const.	7	3	9	3		22
	prov.	2	1		1		4
	total	9	4	9	4		26
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	149	116	30	18	2	315
	seat(%)	47.3	36.8	9.5	5.7	0.6	
	vote(%)	40.2	32.4	17.9	8.3	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	49.4	36.6	7.9	5.3	0.8	

Table 70

A Simulation of the 1968 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	1	6				7
	prov.	2					2
	total	3	6				9
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.	1					1
	total	1	4				5
NS	const.	1	10				11
	prov.	5					5
	total	6	10				16
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.						
	total	5	5				10
Que.	const.	56	4		14		74
	prov.	1	7	3			11
	total	57	11	3	14		85
Ont.	const.	64	17	6		1	88
	prov.	4	7	5			16
	total	68	24	11		1	104
Man.	const.	5	5	3			13
	prov.	3					3
	total	8	5	3			16
Sask.	const.	2	5	6			13
	prov.	3					3
	total	5	5	6			16
Alta.	const.	4	15				19
	prov.	5		1			6
	total	9	15	1			25
BC	const.	16		7			23
	prov.		3				3
	total	16	3	7	26		
North	const.	1	1				2
	prov.						
	total	1	1				2
Canada	seats	179	89	31	14	1	314
	seat(%)	57.0	28.3	9.9	4.5	0.3	
	vote(%)	45.5	31.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	58.7	27.3	8.3	5.3	0.4	

Table 71

A Simulation of the 1972 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	3	4				7
	prov.						
	total	3	4				
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.						
	total	1	3				
NS	const.	1	10				
	prov.	2					
	total	3	10				
NB	const.	5	5				10
	prov.						
	total	5	5				10
Que.	const.	56	2			1	74
	prov.		12	3	4		19
	total	56	14	3	9	1	93
Ont.	const.	36	40	11		1	88
	prov.	4	4	5			13
	total	40	44	16		1	101
Man.	const.	2	8	3			13
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	8	3			15
Sask.	const.	1	7	5			13
	prov.	2					2
	total	3	7	5			15
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	5		1			6
	total	5	19	1			25
BC	const.	4	8	11			23
	prov.	4	2				6
	total	8	10	11			29
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	128	125	40	19	2	314
	seat(%)	40.8	39.8	12.7	6.1	0.6	
	vote(%)	38.5	35.	17.7	7.6	1.2	
	actual seat(%)	41.3	40.5	11.7	5.7	0.8	

Table 72

A Simulation of the 1974 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	3				7
	prov.						
	total	4	3				7
PEI	const.	1	3				4
	prov.						
	total	1	3				4
NS	const.	2	1				11
	prov.	4					4
	total	6	8	1			15
NB	const.	6	3			1	10
	prov.						
	total	6	3			1	10
Que.	const.	60	3		11		74
	prov.		11	2			13
	total	60	14	2	11		87
Ont.	const.	55	25	8			88
	prov.	6	8	3			17
	total	61	33	11			105
Man.	const.	2	9	2			13
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	9	2			15
Sask.	const.	3	8	2			13
	prov.	1					1
	total	4	8	2			14
Alta.	const.		19				19
	prov.	6		1			7
	total	6	19	1			26
BC	const.	8	13	2			23
	prov.	4		2			6
	total	12	13	4			29
North	const.		1	1			2
	prov.						
	total		1	1			2
Canada	seats	164	114	24	11	1	314
	seat(%)	52.2	36.3	7.6	3.5	0.3	
	vote(%)	43.2	35.4	15.4	5.1	0.9	
	actual seat(%)	53.4	36.0	6.1	4.2	0.4	

Table 73

A Simulation of the 1979 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	4	2	1			7
	prov.						
	total	4	2	1			7
PEI	const.		4				4
	prov.						
	total		4				4
NS	const.	2	8	1			11
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	8	1			13
NB	const.	6	4				10
	prov.						
	total	6	4				10
Que.	const.	67	2		6		75
	prov.		12	2	6		14
	total	67	14	2	6		89
Ont.	const.	32	57	6			95
	prov.	6	6	7			19
	total	38	63	13			114
Man.	const.	2	7	5			14
	prov.	1	1				2
	total	3	8	5			16
Sask.	const.		10	4			14
	prov.	2					2
	total	2	10	4			16
Alta.	const.		21				21
	prov.	4		1			5
	total	4	21	1			26
BC	const.	1	19	8			28
	prov.	6					6
	total	7	19	8			34
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	135	155	36	6		332
	seat(%)	40.7	46.7	10.8	1.8		
	vote(%)	40.1	35.9	17.9	4.6	1.5	
	actual seat(%)	40.4	48.2	9.2	2.1		

Table 74

A Simulation of the 1980 General Election under the New Proposal.

Prov.	MP.	Lib.	PC	NDP	SC	Other	Total
Nfld.	const.	5	2				7
	prov.						
	total	5	2				7
PEI	const.	2	2				4
	prov.						
	total	2	2				4
NS	const.	5	6				11
	prov.						
	total	5	6				11
NB	const.	7	3				10
	prov.						
	total	7	3				10
Que.	const.	74	1				75
	prov.		11	2			13
	total	74	12	2			88
Ont.	const.	52	38	5			95
	prov.	4	6	8			18
	total	56	44	13			113
Man.	const.	2	5	7			14
	prov.	2					2
	total	4	5	7			16
Sask.	const.		7	7			14
	prov.	3					3
	total	3	7	7			17
Alta..	const.		21				21
	prov.	5					5
	total	5	21				26
BC	const.		16	12			28
	prov.	9					9
	total	9	16	12			37
North	const.		2	1			3
	prov.						
	total		2	1			3
Canada	seats	170	120	40			332
	seat(%)	51.2	36.1	12.6			
	vote(%)	44.3	32.5	19.8	1.7	1.7	
	actual seat(%)	52.1	36.5	11.4			

Table 75

A Comparison of Simulation Results for Various Electoral Reform Proposals for the Last Ten General Elections(1957-1980).

	Proposal						
	Irvine	Smiley	B'bent	CWF	Task Force	This study	Actual result
No. of majority governments.	1	4	4	4	4	4	4
Liberal party's share of seats from the west.	26.3%	19.8%	15.4%	17.1%	24.5%	23.8%	12.1%
P.C. party's share of seats from Quebec (excluding 1958).	21.0%	14.1%	10.4%	10.1%	18.7%	17.9%	9.1%
NDP's share of seats nationally.	15.2%	8.8%	9.4%	9.6%	9.4%	9.3%	8.1%
Socred's share of seats nationally.	6.4%	5.5%	5.2%	5.2%	5.3%	4.9%	5.0%
NDP's share of seats from Quebec and Maritimes.	6.6%	0.6%	1.65%	1.8%	2.4%	2.2%	0.37%



Figure 3. Conservative Party's Share of Seats from Quebec: A Comparison of Actual Results with the Simulation of Present Proposal.



Figure 4. Liberal Party's Share of Seats from the West: A Comparison of Actual Results with the Simulation of Present Proposal.

opposition.

The proposal may be criticized on the grounds that it abandons the principle of representation by population. However, as Tables 76 and 77 indicate, the departure from this principle would be minimal. The Tables present a comparison of the seat shares of the four regions as well as the ten provinces in the Canadian House of Commons for the present proposal, and the actual distribution. It is seen that over the last ten general elections, the deviation from the existing percentages would have been less than one percent. It may be further argued that such deviations exist anyway since the seat redistribution is done only once in a decade while populations of the provinces are changing from one election to another.

It can be argued that the current proposal would provide incentives for the major parties to launch vigorous campaigns nationwide. For example, under the existing system it is difficult for the federal Liberals to organize an effective campaign in Alberta and a similar situation exists for the Conservatives in Quebec. However, since under the proposed system the national seats would be divided among the parties by the d'Hondt formula, the federal Liberal party in Alberta would try to mobilize all its sympathizers and bring them to the polls, for even if they do not win a single seat from the constituency seats, they can win a considerable number of national seats from Alberta if only they can get their supporters to the polls. A similar

Table 76

A Comparison of the Actual Seat Shares of Various Regions in the House of Commons with the Seat Shares According to the New Proposal over the Last Ten General Elections.

	Share of House of Commons Seats	
	Actual	New Proposal
Maritimes	12.1%	11.7%
Quebec	27.9%	27.7%
Ontario	32.8%	32.5%
West	26.4%	27.3%

Table 77

A Comparison of the Actual Seat Shares of Various Provinces in the House of Commons with the Seat Shares According to the New Proposal over the Last Ten General Elections.

	Share of House of Commons Seats	
	Actual	New Proposal
Newfoundland	2.6%	2.4%
P.E.I.	1.5%	1.4%
Nova Scotia	4.3%	4.7%
New Brunswick	3.7%	3.1%
Quebec	27.9%	27.7%
Ontario	32.8%	32.5%
Manitoba	5.1%	5.2%
Saskatchewan	5.7%	6.1%
Alberta	6.9%	7.5%
British Columbia	8.8%	8.9%

argument holds for the Conservatives in Quebec.

The threshold of six percent for qualifying for the national seats may also reduce the growth of regional parties. In fact, it may encourage the regional parties to merge with national parties with an ideology similar to their own. For example, if the Social Credit party in Quebec realizes that it cannot get enough votes to qualify for the national seats, it may well decide to merge with the Conservatives after some bargaining for future benefits for its leaders and supporters. Thus, in effect the current proposal may lead to a decrease in the number of parties and to the formation of national parties which are more national in character.

7. Summary and Conclusions

This study has been concerned with electoral reform in Canada. In order to make a persuasive case for the need of electoral reform, it was demonstrated that the single-member district plurality election system has accentuated the regional imbalances in party support in the parliament and consequently in the cabinet. It was shown that the electoral system, by distorting the ratio of votes obtained to seats won for the various parties, has exaggerated the regional nature of a regionally divided country. It was further demonstrated that the electoral system has detrimentally affected the national parties' role as an integrating agency and in the process it has endangered the stability of the Canadian political system.

Data from several past elections were used to point out the major defects of the electoral system in Canada. The data indicated that the electoral system tends to favour the strongest party by giving it a 'bonus' of seats. The electoral system was also found to underrepresent in parliament a third party with diffuse national support, and overrepresent a party with only strong regional support. It was shown that the electoral system, in recent elections, has produced results under which neither the government nor the opposition caucuses have been truly national in character.

The electoral system was also analyzed with respect to its ascribed virtues. However, it was found that at least in Canada, the single-member district plurality election system has not shown the virtues its proponents claim it possesses. The first of these virtues is its ability to produce majority governments. But the data indicate that in six out of last ten elections Canada had to live with minority governments. Also, the supposed ability of the SMD/PE system to produce a two-party system has not been realized in Canada. The relationship between the representative and the represented, which has been emphasized by the advocates of the SMD/PE system also has not been proven.

After concluding that serious defects exist in the electoral system used by Canada, the next task was to study some other electoral systems used by various democratic countries of the world. A brief study of these alternative systems showed that various electoral systems have been used by other countries with different degrees of success. However, no electoral system could be said to contain all virtues and no defects. In general, it was found that PR systems have worked reasonably well wherever they have been used.

Though it was argued that PR systems seem to be most suitable for a democratic country, whether Canada should follow the path of many European countries in adopting some form of PR, was not considered. Instead, the fifth chapter was devoted to an analysis of five of the major proposals

for the reform of the electoral system in Canada. All these proposals have a common goal of making the caucuses in the parliament more representative of the whole nation by reducing their present regional character. Every proposal contained elements which could reduce the distortion between the votes and seats ratio for the contesting parties and make the final composition of the parliament somewhat closer to proportional representation. However, the extent to which the proposals would bring about proportionality, varied considerably.

Simulations of the last ten general elections (1957-1980) were performed to evaluate the impact of each proposal. The simulations were based on the assumption that voter preferences would remain the same under the new electoral systems as they were in the actual elections. The results of the simulation for each proposal were tested against criteria set out at the begining of the thesis. It was found that each proposal resulted in improvement over the existing situation but the degree of improvement varied considerably.

A new proposal for the reform of the Canadian electoral system was introduced in chapter 6. To test the impact of the proposal, simulations similar to those performed for the other proposals were repeated for the new proposal. It was shown that the new proposal improved the existing deficiencies in a very cost effective manner. It was demonstrated that the new proposal would have resulted in

parliamentary caucuses which would have been more national in character. However, in doing so, the new system would not have affected the incidence of majority governments. The proposed system also would have deterred the growth of regional parties and encouraged the growth of parties with a nation-wide appeal.

Finally, it may be concluded that this study has demonstrated the need for the reform of the electoral system in Canada, and after a careful analysis of the alternatives, it has produced a new proposal which could be successful in eliminating the defects of the existing system. The proposed electoral system would be capable of producing far-reaching changes within the framework of Canada's political system.

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Appendix 1

Simulation Procedure for Various Proposals

1. The Irvine Proposal

Step 1. Change the number of constituencies to 188 by reducing each province's seats in appropriate proportion. For example, in the 1980 election, the number of constituency seats from Newfoundland according the Irvine proposal would have been 7 x 188/282 rounded to the nearest whole number, i.e. 5.

Step 2. Assign the provincial seats to each province in proper proportion. For example, in the 1980 election, the number of provincial seats from Newfoundland according to the Irvine proposal would have been 5 x 166/188 rounded to the nearest whole number, i.e. 4.

Step 3. Adjust the number of seats won by each party in each province. For example, in the 1980 election, the number of Liberal constituency seats from Newfoundland would have been 5 x 5/7 rounded to the nearest whole number, i.e. 4.

Step 4. Calculate the total entitlement of each party in each province on the basis of their percentage of the popular vote. For example, the Liberal entitlement in the 1980 election from Newfoundland would have been 9 x .467

rounded to the nearest whole number, i.e. 4. Since the Liberals would have won four constituency seats, they would not have been entitled to gain any of the provincial seats.

Step 5. Obtain the distribution of seats won by each party nation-wide by adding the seats won from each province.

2. The Smiley Proposal

Step 1. Keep the constituency seats unchanged.

Step 2. Assign a total of 100 provincial seats nation-wide so that Prince Edward Island gets one of these seats, and the remaining 99 seats are distributed among the other provinces in proportion to their populations. (Note: Population figures used in the simulations for this study were taken from the respective Canada Yearbooks.)

Step 3. For every constituency in a province, calculate the proportion of the votes received by the losing candidates to the votes received by the winning candidate. For example, in the 1979 election, the winning candidate from the Bonavista-Trinity-Conception constituency in Newfoundland was D. Rooney of the Liberal party. Among the defeated candidates from the same constituency, the NDP candidate received 0.659 of the votes polled by the winner, while the PC candidate obtained 0.524 of the votes polled by the winning candidate.

Step 4. From the proportions calculated in step 3, select the winners of the provincial seats by rank ordering the calculated proportions.

Step 5. Complete the distribution of the provincial seats nation-wide and determine the composition of the House of Commons by adding the provincial and constituency seats for each party.

3. The Broadbent Proposal

Step 1. Keep the constituency seats unchanged.

Step 2. Assign ten extra seats to each region. (According to the Broadbent proposal, the regions are: British Columbia, Prairies (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba), Ontario, Quebec, and the Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island).) Distribute these extra seats among the parties in proportion to their votes from the region under consideration. For example, in the 1980 election, the ten extra seats from Quebec would have been distributed as follows: seven for the Liberals and one each for the Conservatives, the New Democrates, and the Social Creditors. (Note: Since Broadbent did not specify how to distribute the seats among the multi-province regions (Prairies, Maritimes), the author has used her discretion in distributing these seats among the provinces of these regions. For example, in the 1979 election, the Liberals would have been entitled to three extra seats from the prairies. In the simulation shown in Table 42, these seats were given to the Liberal party in a way that they got one extra seat each in the three provinces involved, namely, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba.)

4. The Canada West Foundation Proposal

Step 1. Readjust the constituency seats from 282 to 255 (or from the existing number to 255), and add 75 seats for provincial representation.

Step 2. Similar to the calculations for the Irvine proposal, recalculate the number of constituency seats for each party in each province.

Step 3. Assign the provincial seats to each province such that Prince Edward Island gets four of these, every other province gets the number of seats such that the proportions of total seats for each province stays the same as the one existing now. However, no province except Prince Edward Island should get fewer than five provincial seats. For example, in the 1974 election, the 75 provincial seats would have been distributed among the provinces as follows: Prince Edward Island - 4, Newfoundland - 5, Nova Scotia - 5, New Brunswick - 5, Manitoba - 5, saskatchewan - 5, Alberta - 8, British Columbia - 8, Ontario - 15, and Quebec - 15.

Step 4. Distribute the provincial seats from each province among the parties in proportion to the popular vote in the province.

Step 5. Complete the composition of the House of Commons by adding the provincial and constituency seats for the parties from each province.

5. The Task Force Proposal

Step 1. Keep the constituency seats unchanged.

Step 2. Calculate the national quota of each party out of the 60 additional seats by multiplying the vote percentage of each party by 0.60. For example, in the 1980 election, the Liberal party's share of the additional seats would have been 44.3 x 0.6 rounded to the nearest whole number, i.e. 27.

Step 3. For each party, prepare a table for the d'Hondt procedure from each province. Determine the number of extra seats for the party by going through the table till the party's national quota of additional seats is accounted for.

Step 4. Determine the composition of the House of Commons by adding the national and constituency seats for the parties nation-wide.

6. The d'Hondt System

The rule formulated by d'Hondt himself is as follows: The vote totals of the various parties are set side by side and then successively divided by 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. If the number of seats to be allocated is 'N', then to each of the 'N' largest quotients, a seat is assigned.

Example. Elections in a province with four parties contesting the elections.

Party A	Party B	Party C	Party D
119911	55456	48985	24995
59956	27728	24493	12497
39970	18385	16328	8332
29978	13864	12246	6249
23980	11091	9797	
19985	9263	8164	

Thus, if in a province with four parties contesting the election, the seats to be distributed are eight and the votes received by the parties are as shown in row one of the above table, the seats would be distributed as follows: party A - 4, party B - 2, party C - 1, and party D - 1.