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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S SECONDARY
SCHOOLING

by

LENORE HOLYCHUK

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
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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled **THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S SECONDARY SCHOOLING** submitted by Lenore Holychuk in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF EDUCATION.

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In memory of my dido, Jacob Tymchyshyn, who gave me love, my baba, Anastasia Tymchyshyn, who shared her faith, and my mother, Mary Holychuk, who encouraged my dreaming, and dedicated to my husband, Paul Bourque, who brings much happiness to my life.

ABSTRACT

In traditional theories, First and Third World societies are described as developing similar tendencies. More recent critical theories examine the differences between both types of societies, particularly regarding the state's role. The processes of social change and stability are shaped partially by the state and articulated differently in each type of society.

The state's role in First World societies is legitimized by consensus developed within the civil society resulting in more opportunities for negotiation and mediation between the classes and the state than in most Third World societies. In a First World society, the processes of social change and stability are shaped by consensus in the civil society, creating a hegemonic social formation.

In peripheral capitalist, Third World societies, the domination practices of the state are institutionalized in civil society and supported by force. The state depends primarily on the threat of coercion to shape and monitor the unintegrated civil society, social change and stability resulting in a non-hegemonic social formation.

The struggle for legitimization by a non-hegemonic state is dependent upon several conditions. In Kenya, the country chosen for this study, the common sense everyday worldview does not incorporate elements of the dominant ideology that legitimizes state practices. State intervention in solving accumulation contradictions does not integrate the civil society. The need for social control and integration by the state depends upon the patron-client network to accommodate demands, displace instability and legitimize its practices. When this fails, coercion is

the next step in maintaining social control, resulting in less acceptance of the state's practices as legitimate.

Subordinate groups respond to and challenge the state's struggle for legitimacy in different ways. Subordinate demands for social change are often channelled through the patron-client network. School expansion and harambee secondary schooling are two consequences of subordinate activity that challenge and undermine the state's legitimacy. The rhetoric of meritocracy and the ideology of acquisitivism, which legitimize and motivate state practices, also partially shape subordinate challenges to the state. Schooling is one site in Kenya's civil society where state legitimation practices for stability and subordinate challenges for social change take place, with unprecedented results.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

PROLEGOMENA

The overall purpose of this study is to understand the processes, limits and possibilities of social change as it relates to educational provision in a Third World formation, by focusing on the relations between the state and civil society, the relations between dominant and subordinate classes and groups, and how these forces converge and are articulated within schooling.

This presents the need to address theories of social change with a view to identifying and critically examining their basic premises. Most theoretical and concrete analyses are grounded in First World understandings, and the premises inherent therein, are often implicit in the interpretations that are used to look at Third World formations. Such an approach possesses the danger of confusing and ignoring critical aspects of the Third World reality. Adaptations or reformulations of First World theoretical perspectives are needed for studying social change in Third World formations, given the specificities and constraints attendant upon the historical, cultural and material evolution of the latter under colonial domination. Theories of political economy advance and grow with new understandings of such historical developments. While orthodox political economy theories focus on the economic sphere as the site for producing change, more recent interpretations examine the potential for change as partially created by cultural phenomena, institutions and contexts. Theories of political economy that explore Third World formations need to examine indigenous specificities and the role of the

1

subordinate activity.

This study is based on secondary data yielded by recent studies guided by theories of Marxist political economy. The findings and the data from these studies are reinterpreted through a reformulated framework of theories of schooling and social reproduction and resistance. For the purpose of this study, a reformulation of a political economy approach and resistance theory will be used. This chapter begins with a brief account of how the theoretical framework used in this study was developed, and concludes with an account of how the study is organized.

TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For this study, a political economy approach will be used to examine how social change is articulated through schooling in Kenya. Orthodox political economy focuses on the economic sphere as the locus where change begins, and on how it shapes the remaining aspects of the social formation. This theoretical stance takes minimal notice of social and cultural embodiments as having the potential to partially determine the material and social transformation of human organization within a social formation. More recent political economy interpretations and analyses include a study of the significance of cultural phenomena, contexts and institutional sites. This particular study makes use of such recent theoretical approach.

The development of a theoretically more adequate framework for analysis of social change within a formation demands that an interdisciplinary approach be used to address the role of the state, the class basis of relations and practices, and the nature of political, cultural and ideological activity. This approach to political economy emphasizes

the importance of social and economic history, and cultural and intellectual development in order to understand change.[1] This includes the study of power and power relations that produce and reproduce key structures that shape diverse and specific class practices.[2] Schooling as a distinct institutional complex is shaped by such power relations between different economic, political and social groups.[3] This interpretation of political economy approaches social change as a multi-level phenomenon influenced by intentions, consequences and reactions.

The political economy approach provides a strong theoretical understanding of how the state, schooling and the economy are related and influenced by the dynamics of reproduction and change. A significant strength of the political economy perspective is the development of the role of the state, its nature and its functions within a social structure. This understanding illustrates how forms of domination become institution-alized and legitimated. However, this approach neglects how institutions such as the school, become transformed into a site of struggle between dominant and subordinate interests. In pursuing a political economy approach this knowledge is also necessary in understanding how subordinate struggle and resistance can produce change.

This interpretation will be combined with theories of resistance that are constructed from a conflict perspective and regard society from a contested subordination vantage point to provide a deeper understanding of change. Subordinate classes and groups are involved in the continual constitution of their own, as well as the larger, social reality by involvement with material and ideational activity.[4] This results in human agency and experience mediating the lived effects of intentions and the

structures of social reality.[5]

Dominant, subordinate and marginal classes and groups possess varied, and a broad range of class-based experiences on the basis of which they interpret social or cultural events and societal changes in general. Their range of experiences is not without limits, however. Other features of the social formation such as tribe affiliation or ethnicity, entwine with class relations to historically shape and determine the effects of both class existence and the structure of social reality. Subordinate groups experience particular forms of oppression, while dominant power and interests are never secure and need to be continually won through consent or coercion. This has an effect on and is affected by the different modes of cognition for thought and communication, and by the variety of material acts.[6]

In this reformulated perspective, schooling is an institution that is shaped by class struggle and its own specific contradictory relations. Schooling is not singularly related to the economic sphere, nor is it totally penetrated by dominant ideology; rather, it is a terrain of contestation producing local and regional settlements that are unstable and contradictory. As educational practice and knowledge are organized and developed primarily in response to dominant class interests, seeds of discontent develop into forms of resistance through the dialectical linkage between power, social relations and change.[7]

In the perspective of this study, culture as a feature of analysis, is perceived as a source of change as class and cultural forms are involved in negotiation, resistance and mediation.[8] It is important to understand that ideational phenomena are connected with the material aspects to:

> . . . have reciprocal effects in concrete social relations,
> but that material social existence pre-conditions individual
> comprehension in the particular sense that contradictions in
> the modes of production and reproduction of material life
> ultimately determine the transformation of material existence
> and lead to most major changes in the ideational forms . . .[9]

through which consciousness of society develops. Often when the established dominant ideology is perceived as inconsistent with common sense existence, the consensual acceptance and legitimacy are open to ideological reconstruction and change.[10]

The processes that influence change within the theories of resistance are negotiation, resistance and mediation. However, not enough attention has been paid to the descriptions of these processes, their difference and interrelatedness, and how they constitute subordinate activity for change. Negotiation, resistance and mediation provide subordinate classes and groups with opportunity to respond to their own lived experiences and to structures of domination and constraint, but in different ways. Theories of resistance distinctly focus on ideology and consciousness as generated and reproduced in class struggle and negotiation for change. This study focuses on the processes of negotiation, resistance, and mediation as it relates to educational change.

Negotiation is a constant process. Some negotiation processes are formalized and institutionalized, while others are sporadic and/or autonomous. Often, institutionalized negotiation is part of the reproductive logic and possesses a predictable range of results within the social and cultural context. Yet there are moments when institutionalized and autonomous negotiations can lead to possibilities that expose the dominant logic and develop critical reflections. Such experiences are part of the

societal capacity for knowledge and power that shape a subordinate, collective consciousness.

This consciousness is a transformative force that involves struggle and action. As moments of cultural production occur, there is intentionality of behaviour to contest the structures of domination. Resistance is more than oppositional behavior. Resistance possesses the logic of moral and political awareness, opportunity for self-reflection and a possibility of transcendence. The underlying interests which define resistance must be understood in context, past the immediacy of the behaviour in order to predict the potential for mediated change."

Mediation is a challenging concept to unravel, and to understand how it functions in the interests of resistance and social change. As dominant and subordinate activity create meaning, the process of mediation makes apparent the historical and social position of ideas, behaviour and forms, and provides an awareness of contradictions to work through. As social forces mediate these intentions and reactions, new understandings are realized that are inherent within the cognitive potential. These have elements of transcendence over social and ideological conditions, that can create a changed societal capacity for problem-solving. The process of mediation for subordinate change develops potential through negotiation and resistance, and creates social change that reflects the new meaning and intentions of a transformed situation and set of relations.¹²

These processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation surrounding subordinate attempts for social change, are also analytical constructs and modes of inquiry to examine the continual construction of reality by dominant and subordinate groups within a social formation. These

processes entwine with class relations to challenge and protect settle-
ments, and to realize new settlements. Their interdependence in everyday
reality shapes and is shaped by power relations and conscious action. To
understand these constructs, it is important to recognize and explain
these interactive processes as possessing autonomous and interdependent
functions within the historical and social context being studied.

The continual construction of a historical and social reality
results from evolutionary learning processes that draw upon the learning
capacity of individuals to comprise a cognitive potential for solving
societal problems. This cognitive potential acquires the form of a latent
societal knowledge that has the adaptive capacity, when challenged, for
being transposed into social practices. This endogenous growth of
knowledge responds to evolutionary challenges, by adapting and forming new
structures to solve system problems.

The adaptive capacity of a historical and social reality can be
limited by existing dominant principles of organization. This places
stress on the integrative structures, and forces collective structures of
learning to evolve within the societal capacity for adaptation and change.
The cognitive potential draws upon the latent societal knowledge to evolve
into new levels of learning that expand the range of social practices, and
the capacity for developing the productive forces. The processes of
negotiation, resistance and mediation are part of the cognitive potential
in that they contribute to evolutionary learning processes, and the
capacity for change and problem-solving.

These processes are part of all social formations and are specifi-
cally and historically articulated. There exists in many analyses of

social change the implicit premise that First World interpretations are applicable to understanding the dynamics of Third World formations. However, fundamental differences between these groupings and individual countries are embedded within the indigenous articulations. Therefore, theoretical responses to understanding change and the role of schooling in First World formations need to be adapted to the specificities of historical colonialism as experienced by many Third World countries.

Political economy analyses of Third World formations tend to focus primarily on economic activity, and little recognition is given to cultural change as a transformative force in society. The stress appears to be on the reproduction of domination, while contested subordination perspective is not developed. As a result, the approach for this study is a reinterpretation of secondary data developed by adapting certain First World theory and research, such as a Marxist theory of schooling, to the specificities of a particular Third World formation. In this case the study focuses on Kenya, a peripheral capitalist society. But why Kenya?

My interest in Kenya developed after reading Colin Leys' book, Underdevelopment In Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1975). Leys' analysis has deeply influenced this theoretical reinterpretation of data undertaken in this study with the purpose of identifying and describing indigenous dynamics of change in Kenya's secondary schooling within a political economy perspective. Other published secondary data about Kenya, such as articles, books, and monographs available from the University libraries have been used extensively as part of the theoretical reformulation developed in this study.

Kenya, during the late 1960s and the early 1970s appeared to be a relatively, stable country. However, its "stability" was the result of state and dominant power, which attempted to control the underlying reality of severe social and economic contradictions through coercion and the ideologies of self-help and meritocracy."[3] In response, subordinate practices during 1965 to 1975 evolved in different forms to challenge, contest and resist dominant and state interests. The focus of analysis in this study will be this time period as it was marked by the growth and institutionalization of the ideology of acquisitivism, structures of peripheral capitalism, and the emergence of subordinate response to class based opportunity in secondary schooling.

The dynamics of indigenous reproduction and change in Kenya have been empirically researched and analyzed by Michael Cowen, Gavin Kitching, Colin Leys and Nicola Swainson. Their work supports the basic premises developed by Alavi and Cliffe, (as elaborated in Chapter Three), that many modes of production can exist together within a social formation comprised of several dominant and subordinate classes. These four theorists provide specific examples from a single, internally coherent theoretical perspective of Marxian political economy to explain indigenous accumulation practices and class formation. Empirical and interactive research by David Court and Kabiru Kinyanjui describe the secondary school system in Kenya. Their work explains the structure of opportunity, dominant practices and unequal compromises faced by subordinate groups. Their class analysis of schooling corroborates the social and economic struggle for opportunity in Kenya as portrayed by Cowen, Kitching, Leys and Swainson.

PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Social and economic struggle for opportunity in Kenya is articulated through schooling between dominant and subordinate classes and groups. These dynamics create limitations and possibilities for social change that shape and motivate forms of resistance, and challenge structures of domination. The relations between civil society and the state provide the context for forms of resistance to emerge and challenge the dominant interests practised within secondary schooling, so as to create the potential for social change.

The purpose of this study is to explore the following questions:

1. What are the forms of resistance in Kenya's secondary schooling?

2. What are the limits of these forms of resistance?

3. What is their potential for mediating social change?

Questions 1 and 2 are discussed in Chapter Five. Documentation of the findings and consequences of these questions are provided to illustrate both the forms of resistance and the limitations. Question 3 is discussed in Chapter Six. This question focuses on the short term and long term potential developed by the forms of resistance.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This study is presented in seven chapters. Following Chapter One, a literature review is presented in Chapter Two. It focuses on theories of the state and social change from a First World perspective. The notion of social change as conceptualized and analyzed in the works of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas is determined by economic activity. Antonio Gramsci and Jurgen Habermas recognize the cultural sphere as possessing the possibilities for change. It is from these interpreta-

tions, that critical theories of change in the Third World social formations are developed.

In Chapter Three, the focus shifts to descriptions of Third World social formations. The first two sections describe the interpretations of Hamza Alavi and Lionel Cliffe, which explain specific articulations and consequences of colonial capitalism on indigenous forms of organization. The third section compares and analyzes the differences between First World and Third World formations, especially regarding the processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation. The final section offers a description of schooling in Kenya as a site for class struggle.

Chapters Four and Five present an analysis of Kenya's social formation and dynamics. Chapter Four focuses on the forms and practices of domination, by beginning with a description of the historical and social development of the indigenous bourgeoisie. The next section analyzes how the state practices the ideology of acquisitivism and institutionalizes forms of social control through the negotiating structure of the patron-client network. This chapter concludes with an analysis of how forms of domination are articulated within schooling.

Chapter Five examines the social context and dynamics surrounding subordinate classes and groups. The first half explains subordinate formation and relations within a contradictory rural economy that is caught between the two forces of proletarianization and household commodity production. The subsequent section describes schooling as a site where subordinate interests are negotiated and articulated, and contestation evolves into a specifically indigenous form of resistance.

The politics of resistance within harambee secondary schooling are explored in Chapter Six with a view to predicting what immediate and future possibilities could arise from these activities. Within a non-hegenomic society, the processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation produce indigenous combinations of intentions and reactions. The second half of this chapter explores the effect of these processes within society and in creating future possibilities for change.

The last chapter presents a summary of the conclusions developed within each chapter, a reflective discussion on the three processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation as analytical constructs, and an examination of the limits and possibilities of this study, especially of the theoretical approach used.

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CHAPTER TWO

**STATE, REPRODUCTION AND CHANGE IN MORE DEVELOPED
SOCIAL FORMATIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW**

PROLEGOMENA

General theories of the state provide a basis for understanding the
development of the state's role and function in modern social formations,
and how the processes of reproduction and change are legitimated. This
chapter describes specific, theoretical insights from the works of Antonio
Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas and Jurgen Habermas, which
provide a basis for recognizing and contexualizing tendencies of
domination practices and resistance activities. Gramsci analyzes the
dynamics and differences between the spheres in a social formation.
Althusser conceptualizes the state as rooted in the economic base and
possessing relative autonomy. Poulantzas views ideology functioning to
displace primary contradictions to the political terrain. Habermas
discusses principles of domination and legitimation that structure socio-
cultural experiences of a social formation.

GRAMSCI: IDEOLOGY AND THE HEGEMONIC STATE

Gramsci offers an analysis of reproduction and change that is not
impositional. Since ideology is grounded in material practices and
realities and possesses constitutive and constituting potential, the
organization and production of ideology is complex, contradictory and
specific. It is not theoretically limited to the expression of one class.
Many theorists have used and elaborated upon his ideas to analyze the
contradictory relations of production, and the dynamics of legitimation
and resistance.

There are three keys to understanding Gramsci's conception of ideology. There is the substructure of common sense found in the concretely lived culture of everyday. Common sense is dynamic and possesses internally contradictory forms of thought. Ideology also encompasses philosophy as systematic sets of conceptions with a potentially transformative relation to everyday culture. The third key is hegemony. Ideology becomes a part of hegemony to the extent that common sense perceptions conform to the needs of production and the consensual acceptance of a political system. This construction of ideology allows for the reproduction of activities and ideas in concrete relations, and the empowerment of individuals and groups for creative action.[1]

For Gramsci, the truth of ideology is in its power to develop critical consciousness, political action, and historical transformation. The reciprocal relationship between material production and conscious realization allows groups constituted by the dominant mode of production, to aim at cons tuting their own economic and political world. When accepted ideology is no longer consistent with social activity, the contradictions open common sense to ideological alternatives. Through media and education, groups not dominant in the state or economy can challenge direct, narrow, economic corporate actions. Therefore class fractions or alliances can become potential change agents politically, morally, and intellectually. Politics is the powerful link between the economically determined and the ideologically inspired conceptions of the world.[2]

The contested terrain of a social formation is created as players move through, develop consciousness and become political about their

interests and their choices.[3] Struggle, domination, and the hope of liberation are articulated through politics which involve ideology, power and consciousness. This causes constant tension within the lived relations between class rule and resistance.[4] Consciousness and power become the necessary forces for mediating and achieving social change. In response, common sense and dominant ideology recompose, delete or add to their forms of thinking.[5]

Ideology is an important construction for Gramsci because it aids in analyzing the different aspects of the social formation. Central to Gramsci's work on social change and ideology, is the relationship and distinctions between hegemony, the state and civil society.[6] The conceptual separation of these concepts illuminates how ideological domination is contested, resisted, reproduced and consolidated as hegemony.

There are two major aspects to hegemony. First, hegemony is a pedagogic and politically transformative process of domination by an allied ruling class to disseminate elements from its world views to other major groups. The second involves the dualistic relation between ideology and force to shape, incorporate and reproduce dominant societal relations.[7] Hegemony can become the connecting glue of a social formation.[8]

In Gramsci's analysis of hegemony, there is a distinction between a ruling class alliance of domination by force and coercion, and a ruling class alliance of legitimation by spontaneous consent. The latter organization is hegemonic and involves a ruling alliance over the state and civil society, a social order that is consensual and normative, the institutionalizing of state power in the outer trenches, and a spontaneous

consent rooted in common sense and dominant ideology. The organization of this spontaneous consent involves negotiating personal experience into social constructions of reality. These cultivated forms of consciousness support the dominant class concessions and do not alter the balance between fundamental interests. This process of active consent involves moral, philosophical, intellectual and cultural life and is seen as benefitting the majority.[9] Hegemony rules by consensus, while supported in the background by coercion.

The state in a hegemonic social structure becomes part of the outer defence. The state is involved in dialectical relations with civil society, the structure of relations in production, and ideology. In such a context the state has class power, and coercive and consensual functions to establish dominance, and support reproduction and legitimation. Without power over the construction of dominant consciousness, the exclusive use of coercion becomes necessary to develop the forces of production.[10] In this situation, the state becomes the central pivot and its more coercive and reproductive functions can become overdeveloped.

The ruling bloc within the state appropriates differentially its own dominant ideas, based on the relations of production. The state and its institutions attempt to express these interests as lived and natural by shaping and limiting the dynamics of class struggle and active opposition.[11] There is consensus on long term objectives, but not consistently on short term goals, policies, and practices. The state's need for both legitimacy and reproduction of dominant capital needs, necessitates that it participate in supporting the dominance of a particular class.[12] However a class may rule without being hegemonic. If this occurs, then

other groups and classes are manipulated to tolerate policies and actions that are not won by active consent resulting in suspicion, violence, and a lack of freedom and expression.[13] Ruling class domination in the state is dependent upon both ideological and coercive power.

Civil society is not directly involved in the processes of material production, or in the organization, of state ideology and coercion. As a result, civil society is a distinct sphere of social and cultural relations and activities. The borderline between the state and civil society shifts and changes, because of the depth of ideological domination, use of coercion, and organized resistance, and needs to be continually renegotiated in a social formation.[14] Therefore state domination or hegemony can never be simply reproduced, determined or completed without resistance and contestation.

Power is negotiated and expressed in civil society because the ruling class not only seeks dominance in the state, but throughout the social formation. Power is used unequally to produce and reproduce a variety of meanings, symbols, and practices, most of which support the dominant ideology and common sense. The mediating moment between the social structure, the institutions, and human experience creates and recreates culture. In civil society, power is part of culture, especially in the reproduction of dominant and subordinate cultures. Since culture negotiates and mediates the structure of antagonistic relations, consciousness, ideology and social practices are not simple reflexes from the economy or the state.[15] Reproduction and change occur in the private and public institutions of civil society, as power is differentially negotiated and contested within several cultures.

For Gramsci, institutions such as the school attempt to impose a collective identity through social and structural construction of experiences and world views."⁸ Schooling is based on class divisions and propagates the dominant, traditional class values to develop organic intellectuals that support the dominant class. Intellectuals from subordinate classes who succeed, give the impression of mobility. Schools not only support the conditions to develop ideological dominance, but recreate conditions to support capital reproduction."⁷ Schools are both cultural and economic institutions that negotiate and mediate the structure of antagonistic relations."⁸

Gramsci's analysis treats change and ideological and social reproduction to occur on terrain that is contested, not reflected. His notion of civil society serves as the focus for the intersection of agency and structure providing power and ideology with positive and negative functions. Therefore, hegemony is an unstable movement dependent upon the ruling class's capacity to harness the power of consciousness. It is not a one-sided, mechanical domination.

Louis Althusser theorizes about reproduction, the state and schooling. He acknowledges the contributions made by Gramsci, but as structuralist, views human subjectivity as externally constituted.

ALTHUSSER: SCHOOLING AND THE REPRODUCTIVE STATE

Althusser premises that reproduction takes place not only in the economic base, but also as part of the superstructure. Each social formation is divided into three forms of production and expression, that must reproduce the objects of its production and the conditions that favour its continuation."⁹ The economic, repressive and ideological forms

function within hierarchical relations and capacities to reproduce the power relations in an unequal society. The economic instance determines the ideological and political practices and potential, so the ruling class can dominate state power through the repressive apparatuses and use the ideological apparatus to hold power. As a result, the ideological state apparatuses function to unify all the institutions under the dominant ideology while the repressive forms intervene to secure reproduction.[20]

The degree of autonomy exercised by the ideological and repressive state apparatuses depends upon their relationship to the economic contradiction. The state is rooted in the economy, but it possesses relative autonomy and reciprocal relations with the base.[21] The principal determination of the economic contradiction originates in the base, within the relations of production. From this beginning develops a complex articulation of incremental contradictions, each with its own principle and secondary outcomes. This structural causality unites the causes and effects of contradictions and produces uneven determinations.[22] Contradictions are specific and not synchronized through all the levels of a social formation. The state and its ideological and repressive apparatuses are responsible for distinguishing any effective merging of contradictions that could constitute a structural crisis.[23]

Ideology is a closed system perpetuated by law, political structures, and other state apparatuses. As a level and material practice, ideology weaves together a social formation by intervening in the production of the conditions of production in favour of the dominant class.[24] As a result, individuals are transformed and constituted into subjects by the creation of an individuality based on the dominant mode

of production. These class-biased material and ideological practices of the state hide the economic contradictions of the real relations and conditions of production, by perpetuating an imaginary relation to the real relations.

A key ideological state apparatus for Althusser is schooling. The reproduction of the labour power and social relations dominates and constitutes the schooling process.[25] As an ideological state apparatus, schools prepare students into specific roles related to production as part of a socio-technical division of labour.[26] The dominant ideology inculcates individual students with a specific, lived relation to the real relations by reproducing the techniques and knowledge necessary, and developing the ability to manipulate such practices effectively.[27] The role of ideology within schools is to systematically construct a hidden socialization process based on ruling class domination and reproduction.

The reproduction of dominant ideology and economic funnelling in schools occurs in two major forms. The first takes place through a set of material practices that construct in schools ideological experiences which support the dominant class power. This gives schooling its political nature. The second form concerns the reproduction of lived or imaginary relations, based on the dominant system of meanings, symbols and values which structure the unconscious. The purpose in ideological reproduction is not to create levels of consciousness, but to objectify the world. Such material practices and forms of mediation reproduce the imaginary relations, and the real production relations. As ideological institutions, schools are a vital link in the reproduction of the economy, the state and the dominant ruling class.[28]

Althusser's work acknowledges that ideology has a material grounding and that schools are biased institutions in the reproduction of class power. To understand more specifically the workings of the state and its relations, certain theoretical concepts by Nicos Poulantzas who further develops Althusserian structuralism will be examined.

POULANTZAS: CONTRADICTIONS AND THE AUTONOMOUS STATE

According to Poulantzas, the state is constituted by the conflicts and contradictions between ruling class fractions in their struggle for social control and capital accumulation.[29] This provides the basis of real autonomy for the state and is an important element in the struggle between ruling and subordinate classes.[30] The autonomy of the state also affects the contradiction between reproducing accumulation conditions and legitimating the dominant ideology.[31] All contradictions are negotiated on state terrain, because the dominant ideology reflects and reconstitutes the contradictions as non-contradictions. Therefore class struggle and contradictions are not only mediated at the economic level, but are felt, developed, and maintained at higher levels such as the state.[32] The state is the centre for using power as the ruling classes create alliances in relation to the dominated classes. It is the condensation of class relations that marks the state.[33]

Through state mechanisms, the dominant ideology of the social formation transposes the class interests into general expressions of interest.[34] The dominant ruling class attempts to develop hegemony by possessing state power, then cementing the social formation through ideological domination.[35] The state does not generalize class domination, but uses ideology as a screen for inter-class differences and to create

acceptance for a unified social formation.[36] However the dominant classes are fractioned by private, self-interested competition, and to dominate the state and enjoy the functions of hegemony, there must be an alliance of ruling groups to create a power bloc.[37] For Poulantzas, only a dominant class can be hegemonic on political terrain with ideological support from the state.

As the social formation matures, the state increasingly uses its powers to directly intervene in the production crises. The state utilizes its economic, ideological and repressive functions through class struggle to maintain class hegemony and displace economic contradictions into other areas of the social formation. This causes the need for an appearance of class representation to downshift economic struggle by distributing conflict and power to the political terrain. An example of this is the expression of equality through voting. The dominant ideology supports the displacement of struggle by creating the appearance of a separation between the state and the economy.[38]

Ideology has several functions, as social relations are partly created and determined by the ideological and repressive apparatuses of the state. [39] Class struggle produces, shapes, and reconstitutes ideology as complex, coherent relations of beliefs, symbols, and values. At a specific objective level, ideology is indistinguishable from lived experience being a reflection of the conditions of existence. This ideological structure of falseness intermingles with some real knowledge to interpolate the classes. The construction of ideology on political terrain to represent general interests and smooth class struggle, creates a correspondence between ideological domination and class domination.[40]

Schools as an ideological apparatus shapes and instills dominant ideology as a part of the whole network of state institutions. As with other state apparatuses, schooling possesses ideological, repressive and economic functions. Schools reproduce the forces of production through certification, technical skills, and increased knowledge based on innovation. Relations of production are reproduced through dominant ideology. The economic purpose is to extract more surplus value and to enlarge the capacity to reproduce the forces of labour. As the state displaces class conflict and contradictions onto ideological terrain like the school, the ideological and repressive functions need to maintain dominance.

As a result, the school becomes part of the conflict between fractions and classes, and produces more conflict and contradiction. This occurs in a variety of forms. The school separates knowledge through a social division of labour as manual and mental knowledge. This develops into a relationship of power supported by the legitimating ideology between mass consumed knowledge and the scientific, technological knowledge. As social formations change, the nature of conflict changes. The role of schooling responds to the modifications in conflict and in turn, contradictions and negotiations respond to the changes in daily experiences. Schools and other state institutions along with the economic base are shaped by, part of, and the result of class struggle.[41]

Conflict and contradictions are negotiated by dominant ideology to form a unity to represent the dominant class. The state plays a vital role by preserving some autonomy from the ruling fractions and classes, and by legitimating schools as neutral in representing all classes. The

work of Jurgen Habermas explores the specific form and content of legitimating ideology."

HABERMAS: LEGITIMATION AND THE NORMATIVE STATE

An important element for understanding ideological hegemony is knowing how to separate legitimating practices from the institutionalization of dominance. The latter can survive if there is consent without opposition. Legitimation must be rationally grounded and recognized if it is to constitute society and realize integrative values."

Intersubjective meanings are constituted through a socio-cultural structure. Meanings develop, distort, and reveal consciousness in relation to inherited structures, values and world views. Learning processes result in knowledge that becomes part of the cultural experience to aid individuals interpret society. System problems of social integration are regulated, negotiated and mediated by the development of practical knowledge and insight. These learning processes are structural patterns based on collectively shared consciousness and knowledge."

A normative structure evolves as new principles and forms of social integration develop. Normative structures do not mirror the processes of reproduction, because of an internal dynamic that continually transforms basic forms of integration. The development of a normative structure involves rationalization processes. Knowledge is latently available in each form of integration along with a structurally limited, adaptive capacity to solve system problems. As dysfunctions occur in the reproduction and articulation of a normative social formation, new learning levels can be created and utilized. Social integration can either evolve into a loosening and letting in of new forms, or it can

stabilize by strengthening the institutions of the rationality structures. As institutions absorb new rationality structures and develop different forms of social integration, transformation and transition occur.[45]

Institutions embody structures of rationality. The institutional core of a social formation becomes a unity of practices based on values, and norms that specify a form of social integration. The relations of production encircle this core while the forces of production utilize its technical and moral knowledge. Institutionalization constitutes attempts to organize and ground consensual action as intersubjective and recognizable legitimacy claims. Social integration includes general structures of action, a morally and legally structured world view, and an institutionalized structure of laws and morals. Only a commonsensical understanding of the culture, action system, and institutions is necessary for identifying a collectivity, and for the latter to regulate its members.[46] Institutions are results of learning processes and possess cognitive potential.

Social integration and normative structures develop the conditions for legitimating domination. This provides an institutional network, action systems and mechanisms for the regulation of conflict, and incorporates practical knowledge evolved from experience and morality. Legitimating potential is based on communication structures that recognize and accept decisions as being made by consenting and equal individuals.[47]

Legitimation justifies the constituting elements of the common identity and the political power employed by certain institutions. It is the level of justification of these values and norms that determine and possess direction and power to produce purpose and consensus. These

levels of justifications are hierarchical, and their legitimating potential is affected by the changes and transitions in socio-cultural learning to new levels of objective knowledge.[48]

Legitimacy problems result from difficulties with forms of social integration and normative structures that are not transposed. These problems are usually related to class conflict in the sphere of influence and access, and affect the establishment of unity and consensus as defined by collective identities. Legal domination of a political order depends upon the extent of belief, recognition, validity and stability its normative content expresses to the dominated class. A political order has legitimacy to establish consensus and integration only when normative values and knowledge are rationally grounded. This includes the institutionalization of oppositional discourse to neutralize its disruptive effects.[49]

The state's internal structure is to develop and maintain the conditions which depoliticize the economy and shield it from moral values that could disintegrate society. A system of integration based on exchange relations allows the state to appear removed from production while being dependent upon it. The state's external relations shape an internal understanding that individuals have private autonomy in their role as economic agents. This is legally accepted and universally integrated. The process of legitimation attempts to keep system problems at a workable level and represents the dominant interests as worthwhile and common. The state does not attempt to conceal its relationship with the economy, but legitimizes it as being in the public interest.[50]

The normative and integrative functions in a social formation are protected, not determined, by the state. The common-sense beliefs and practices are safeguarded by the state from private and sectional interests. As society adapts to the permeating presence of economic production, societal elements become consolidated. Relations between the state and economy develop more interdependence. As disruptions occur, the state relies increasingly on political, legitimation goals and activities to eliminate the economically produced problems. The state supports legitimation as it successfully performs its integrative functions.[51]

There are contradictions which create legitimation difficulties for the state, one of those being the business cycle. The business cycle is affected by the expanding and contracting of the accumulation process. Problems also arise from the fundamental conflict inherent in the capitalist labour process between what groups possess that have repercussions on the external costs of production. Furthermore, distribution of opportunity and resources is unequally structured and organized. The state needs to contain these difficulties within an acceptable, political level and if necessary, will lower the threshold of social expectations. Radical questions and alternatives that threaten normative perceptions are redefined. Otherwise, legitimation is not integrative and results in increased struggles and policy breakdowns.[52]

The societal opportunity structure attempts to represent the integrative system of the normative structure. This reflects the knowledge and values legitimated by the exchange relations. The rewards of the opportunity structure are conforming and consensual. This form of social integration introduces and reproduces the norms, practices and values of possessive individualism.[53]

CONCLUSION

These four theorists complement each other's theoretical strengths and analytical depth. Their work on more developed social formations provides concepts and observations that can be used to compare and develop understandings about less developed societies. Gramsci describes the function of civil society and its changing relations with the state as open and constitutive. Althusser explains how state institutions possess both ideological and repressive functions that provide some autonomy. Poulantzas discusses the state as a site for conflict between ruling groups vying for power. Habermas articulates how the legitimation of dominant ideology is based on rationality structures that embue supportive justificatory systems. However, these theorists have developed their insights based on modern social formations.

Certain theoretical concepts of analysis developed by Gramsci, Poulantzas and Habermas are used in this study of a peripheral capitalist, Third World society. These concepts complement and highlight particular differences between First World and Third World societies. Gramsci's understanding is of civil society as a site for conflict and change. Political and cultural activity in civil society provides opportunity for subordinate groups and classes to influence social change. Poulantzas recognizes the state as a site of conflict. Dominant groups do not possess consistent and consensual short term interests, and the state becomes a site for shaping and undermining these interests. Habermas develops the concept of a societal knowledge and capacity for change. Political and cultural activities of both dominant and subordinate groups contribute towards a capacity for change that possesses potential for a

range of future consequences, yet to be realized. There exists the need
to recognize Third World political economic differences and from there,
identify the role of institutions as sites for reproduction and change,
recognize the conflict within and between dominant and subordinate groups,
and explore the possibilities for change inherent in political and
cultural activities.

The next chapter will present analyses of Third World social
formations, and propose a description of a typical non-hegemonic
peripheral capitalist society, that being Kenya.

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NON-HEGEMONIC SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN IDEOLOGY, RESISTANCE AND SCHOOLING

PROLEGOMENA

The processes of social reproduction and change are closely associated with the development of the state, social institutions, and class relations. Due to the external force of transplanted capitalism interacting with their internal socio-cultural patterns, less developed social formations have historically developed some distinctive features. The term "peripheral capitalism" is frequently used by scholars when referring to these societies to underscore their distinctiveness. A crucial difference between more and less developed social formations is the degree to which evolution of a common sense worldview that is consensual and supportive of the dominant rationality has occurred. Developed capitalist social formations are characterized by a fairly high level of normative integration, and their social struggles take place around hegemonic settlements. But peripheral capitalist formations lack sufficient normative consensus in the public sphere, and therefore, the struggle for legitimation often involves the unmasked use of coercion by the state. Such fundamental differences shape and constrain the use of schooling for the purpose of social reproduction and resistance.

In this chapter, the limits of First World theoretical constructions in understanding Third World realities are made apparent through the work of Hamza Alavi and Lionel Cliffe. The discussion starts by examining the complexity of the class structure of the non-hegemonic Third World societies. Alavi's theoretical work describes the formation of dominant and subordinate classes and their relations to economy and state. In non-

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hegemonic societies, this process is shaped within a fluid social structure with several dominant and subordinate classes, that are related to modes of production subsumed by peripheral capitalism. There also exists in these societies, a capitalist structural imperative which limits subordinate representation and their ability to negotiate and mobilize within political institutions. Cliffe theorizes about the unpredictability of the articulation process due to local, indigenous modes of production being undermined by coercive and economic mechanisms introduced by external forms of capitalism. This creates structural conflict and new social relations between classes.

Next, a comparison of hegemonic First World and non-hegemonic Third World societies is developed. The dominant, technocratic ideology has different consequences in each type of society. In the former, this ideology is perceived as legitimate, because it is grounded in the everyday, common sense worldview. Technocratic ideology is a part of the institutionalized dominance in non-hegemonic societies also, but its capacity to shape conscious and structural action is severely limited due to the undemocratic and coercive nature of state practices. In each type of society, resistance and negotiation practices develop in response to the degree of consent and coercion that exists in the state and civil society. Schooling in hegemonic societies promotes a common sense worldview legitimized by the dominant ideology. Schooling in non-hegemonic societies, on the other hand, attempts to institutionalize the dominant ideology. There also exists within schooling in both types of society, the potential for developing alternative ideology and practice.

The third and last section of this Chapter examines the class structural features of Kenya as a specific, non-hegemonic social formation. It is influenced by the dominant, indigenous ideology of acquisitivism practised through the patron-client network and supported by the state as the ideology of meritocracy. School expansion and equality of educational opportunity are shaped by this ideology of meritocracy. However, its lack of common sense legitimation and other challenges create the potential to undermine the political stability and acceptance of the school system in Kenya.

ALAVI: PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM AND THE OVERDEVELOPED STATE

Alavi's analysis of peripheral capitalism is based on identifying class relations to modes of production, and the consequences of the capitalist structural imperative. A mode of production as an analytical concept is used to understand the coherent and articulated structures within a social formation. There are specific social relations and basic classes that are inherent to a particular mode of production. Within a social formation, there can be more than one mode of production and several dominant and subordinate classes. To support the continuation of capitalism, there exists a structural imperative. As the capitalist mode of production becomes dominant, a structural presence is created not only through trade, but by the activities of capitalist organizations and resources which negotiate on their behalf. When policies and actions contravene capitalist rationality and objective needs, continuous social and economic assessment suggests alternatives to correct the deviations. As underlying contradictions affect conditions independent of the interests, the structural imperative conditions the formulation of state

actions that alleviate the effects. The structural imperative defines what is successful and profitable, and supports capitalist behaviour by governing individual and state actions. The structural imperative in a peripheral capitalist social formation shapes the articulation of the modes of production and the formation of and relations among the social classes.[1]

Pre-capitalist modes become subsumed to external, colonial capital, first by existing in mutual contradiction, then by transforming the production and reproduction process through capitalist subsumption.[2] The rapid change produced by modernization creates structural discontinuities for the pre-capitalist modes.[3] The old forms can persist, but with new meanings, relations, and conflict. Colonial capital develops as an internal force with its own dynamic and contradictions, which further disintegrates pre-capitalist modes and creates new social forces for capital accumulation. The motor of this new dynamic is found in the preconditions developed through money and commodity exchange. Under certain circumstances, this form of production becomes commodified creating conditions for surplus extraction and accumulation.[4]

There are specific, structural conditions in this peripheral capitalist process. Free labour is created as producers are separated from the means of production. Property rights and relations are changed to accommodate generalized commodity production and to transform labour power into commodity form. This destroys local self-sufficiency, disarticulates the internal circuit of production and consumption, and links the periphery to the metropolis by providing markets and exports.[5]

The peripheral, capitalist social formation articulates different modes of production and is characterized by new class relations compared to its pre-capitalist development. However, a large class of peasants continues to exist in peripheral social formations, but in an altered structural form. The reproduction of this social class is now realized through the reproduction of conditions conducive to private capital accumulation. These conditions include the payment of taxes in cash, legalized land access, abolition of communal rights to land for cultivation or pasturing, and the destruction of peasant craft production. As capitalist relations are mediated through various forms of simple commodity production, social struggles to change the different relations to capital occur between peasant producers, the state and the economy. Peripheral capitalism undermines peasant autonomy and self-sufficiency, but it cannot generate rapid development of the production forces to provide alternative employment and work opportunities to support rapid capital accumulation.[6] In the absence of new opportunities for wage employment, the displaced peasantry, a large reserve labour pool, remains an untapped resources.

The peasantry are a large and critical subordinate class in a peripheral capitalist society. Along with the rural and urban worker, the migrant worker and the landless, these subordinate classes possess very little power. The dominant classes, on the other hand, have access and opportunity, and are comprised of the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and the landowners.

The state in peripheral capitalism is an arena of class struggle for the dominant classes. Their rival interests are negotiated by the state,

so no class is consistently dominant and the state enjoys considerable autonomy. This permits internal decision making and institutional growth. An overdeveloped capacity of the state for power, control and regulation creates an imbalance favouring the state in societal activities. The extraction of surplus value and international investment provides the state with its own financial base for large scale expenditure. These activities benefit players in powerful positions, support state institutions with provisions of economic resources, and control political access by demanding that personal remuneration be partially reinvested into the peripheral, capitalist structure.[7]

In peripheral capitalism, there exists a plurality of dominant classes. These classes face no serious structural contradictions that might hinder their material alliance based on common, long-term interests. The indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and the landowners have in common the exploitation of labour, specifically of peasants. Their roles are independent of each other, but their actions are not.[8] The state controls and regulates the social formation, but not as an instrument of any one dominant class.[9]

Auxiliary classes are also a part of peripheral capitalism. The petit bourgeoisie have status as state employees and possess day-to-day state powers, but cannot legitimate themselves as a ruling class. As a group, they fracture according to representational interests and sectional affiliations. The capitalist rationality surrounds their worksite and motivates their behaviour. The higher echelons of the bureaucracy have dominant class origins and link with local or foreign capital based upon their short term interests. In their positions, they have legislational,

administrational, and coercive powers to specifically undermine detrimental policies and suppress organizing potential of subordinate classes.[10]

There is minimal subordinate representation of the peasantry, rural and urban worker, migrant worker and the landless within the state. Subordinate representation in the state and economy is limited by the capitalist structural imperative. The lack of political institutions to negotiate and mobilize groups limits subordinate power. Those at the centre of the state possess coercive power that supersedes legal, constitutional, and ideological constraints. However, as the fundamental classes need to develop institutions to support exchange and production, the subordinate classes become increasingly incorporated. The demand for compromises and concessions opens civil society to the actions of the subordinate classes.[11]

The internal and external relations of the state in peripheral capitalism demonstrates structural differences between developed capitalist social formations and developing capitalist social structures. The use of Lionel Cliffe's analysis describes the process of change resulting from external, capital penetration on closed pre-capitalist systems.

CLIFFE: INCORPORATION AND THE PERIPHERAL CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION

The peripheral capitalist process of articulation is specifically related to the structure of the pre-capitalist formation.[12] There is no predetermined path or outcome for agricultural and other pre-capitalist modes of production with respect to the effects of capitalist penetration. The fundamental transition results from competing forces combining and realizing their limits and potential. The role of capital in these

transitions is specific to historical patterns of class collaboration and struggle.[13]

The articulation process involves non-economic and economic mechanisms to transform existing relations of production, to implement commodity production and to create a cheap labour force.[14] In the early interactions, coercive non-economic intervention takes place. There are economic and political demands to extract labour and generate production of export crops. This results in the separation of agricultural production from its direct producers, the forced production of export crops, and the elimination of alternatives to wage labour. To subsidize family reproduction, an unorganized, partially proletarianized work force migrates for jobs. As the circulation of money and commodities support the extraction of surplus labour, social relations become dependent upon the cash nexus. Economic non-coercive forms of exploitation develop in response to peasants and workers needing cash for taxes, purchasing basic commodities and selling produce and labour to supplement low wages and to reproduce the family.[15]

New social relations begin to emerge because of the domination of capital's need for labour. The extent of capitalist elements in relations vary due to the uneven, articulation process. Some displaced peasants and landless labourers support fledgling industries as proletarianized, urban labourers. A few become petty commodity producers. Some kulaks attracted to capitalism, organize their own forms of indigenous accumulation. Remaining peasants and migrants, are caught in a process of conflicting tendencies.[16]

In this articulation process, class struggle creates historical distinctions in the process of social reproduction and cultural potential. As capital unevenly develops forces and relations of production, the differentiated rural classes and workers have crucial roles to play. Relationships with capital are tendencies that become patterns resulting from the changes produced in the articulation process. These qualitative transformations affect all social relations by turning labour into a commodity and creating structural antagonism between the classes. The unpredictability of the articulation process in shaping forces and relations of production of peripheral capitalism is the result of the ways classes mediate precapitalist and capitalist modes of production with international capital and the state."

As capitalism penetrates closed systems, transformations occur in the economic relations which generate changes in the rest of the social formation. Alavi and Cliffe accept peripheral capitalist formations as having both external and internal historical influences on change and reproduction. Both theorists describe the transformation process as indeterminate and acknowledge that classes posses power and agency. Alavi has developed his perspective mainly from Asian experiences, while Cliffe has predominantly written about African articulations.

An alternative framework for understanding reproduction, change and resistance in a peripheral, capitalist formation is developed and presented next. This analytical framework attempts to demonstrate that in peripheral, social formations in the struggle for legitimacy there is potential for change, and that the nature of reproduction is, as a rule, non-hegemonic and shaped through coercion and domination.

RESISTANCE AND THE NON-HEGEMONIC STATE

Political-economic differences between more and less developed societies lead to ideological, political and cultural specificities that are contextual to the social formation. The interdependence between the grounding of ideology, the capacity for resistance and mediation, and the functions of schooling is constitutive and constituting in both types of formations but not with the same intent or effect.

This discussion highlights the relationship between common sense and dominant ideology, resistance and negotiation practices, and schooling and institutionalized dominance as dialectically shaped by the state in hegemonic in non-hegemonic societies.

In more developed social formations, the common sense rationality is based on the technocratic ideology. Normative structures reproduce, integrate and adapt this form of rationality by grounding its beliefs in the justificatory system of legitimation. The legitimation of technocratic ideology through normative structures and a consensual social order involves the process of hegemony. Dominant interests, concerns and worldview are seen as representative of all through the development in civil society of an active and continuous consent. The solving of system problems through technocratic activity is accepted by the common sense culture. This dominant moral and political philosophy of technocracy permeates the social formation as a form of shared rationality based on choice, consent and participation. The power of hegemony is negotiated by the political sphere and accepted as collective property rooted in cultural ideas, values and practices.

In hegemonic social formations, the state is part of the outer circle, not its centre. With a strongly developed civil society, hegemonic interests complemented by economic alliances disseminate the moral and political philosophy of technocracy through education and the media. Everyone is exposed to technocracy as a way of viewing the world. Through balanced employment of consent and indirect coercion, and by limiting alternative and oppositional practice and discourse in the civil society, the dominant classes can shape, incorporate and contain subordinate views and opportunities. As hegemonic, technocratic interests dominate the economic, political and cultural spheres, the state relies more on its consensual and cohesive worldview and practices, and less on its coercive function to negotiate oppositional and resistance activity.

In many less developed social formations, there exists a struggle for legitimation of the dominant ideology. Technocratic rationality is not part of the common sense ideology, therefore the knowledge, insight and practices of technocracy are not embodied in normative structures. System problems are not easily explained away or depoliticized through the use of this form of knowledge. As a result, social integration lacks consensus and collective identities are not homogenized in many Third World countries.

In non-hegemonic social formations, ideological legitimation is marked by severe limits; this serves to increase the state's dependency on coercive practices. The different levels of contradictions are difficult to hide and negotiate. There is a lack of compromise and resources to trade in exchange for support from subordinate groups, especially as there are several ruling and subordinate classes represent-

ing more than one mode of production. Forms of legitimate negotiation such as patron-client relationships are based upon competition and contradictions that ulcerate the system more than placate its practices and effects. Patron-client networking is a form of social control that supports inequality of access, distribution and reward. Disparity is not hidden by, but presented as a natural outcome of, social practices of the state to support future development.

The state in a non-hegemonic Third World formation has overdeveloped coercive powers vis a vis the less developed civil society. As the central stronghold, the state must attempt to legitimate its interests, suppress alternative logic, dominate social integration, and downplay economic contradictions. Without a civil society based on a consensual worldview and normative structures, the negotiation and mediation of problems is limited, state autonomy is buttressed, and coercive practices and institutionalized dominance prevail. Institutions and legitimation practices are not supported by normative development and common sense knowledge. Therefore negotiation mechanisms and mediation practices are reduced to being no more than forms of social control with little access to the public sphere. What results is the institutionalization of coercive domination, not a common sense legitimation.

The mechanisms for negotiation and the short term consequences of resistance and contestation differ between hegemonic and non-hegemonic social formations. In the former, the balance between coercion and consensus accommodates and adapts oppositional practices as non-threatening but deviant. Negotiations allow for a limited range of choice, based on common sense acceptance and normative consensus. The

hegemonic technocratic ideology provides the professional knowledge with a warrant which is used to depoliticize structural issues, legitimize state activity and shape civil society. Resistance is seldom met initially by coercive practice, but rather by the judicial arm of the state.

In non-hegemonic social formations, negotiation mechanisms such as the patron-client network in Kenya are closed; they reflect dominant interests and are a political form of social control. Resistance activities in a less developed civil society are not part of the consensual negotiation between the state and classes. The lack of legitimation of the technocratic ideology to buffer and adapt resistance activities encourages the use of coercive practises by the state, which discourages any negotiation and mediation through oppositional voice or activity in the public sphere. Subordinate groups and classes tend to develop power by slowly transforming dominant negotiating mechanisms into vehicles for pursuing some of their goals. Even when resistance activities are met with violence, the consequences of resistance activities politically undertaken by corporate groups such as peasants and trade unions become part of the societal capacity for latent knowledge and organization.

Resistance is more easily identifiable, more disruptive, and therefore less tolerable in a non-hegemonic social formation. Resistance also possesses the potential for negotiation and mediation activity to have positive effects on long term structural change in both hegemonic and non-hegemonic formations. It is crucial to understand the limits of certain modes of resistance in context in order to assess its potential

to develop critical insight regarding forms of domination.

Social contexts such as schools are governed overtly by the state, supported by dominant classes, and shaped by contestation and resistance. As a cultural institution, schooling participates in structural reproduction and production. Schooling promotes ideological legitimation as it strives to reproduce the worldview, knowledge, and practices of the dominant classes, and by structuring disparity as a natural outcome. There exists a crucial difference between the schooling institutions in hegemonic and non-hegemonic societies.

In hegemonic social formations, schooling is a normative and integrative institution. Common sense ideology which includes aspects of the dominant worldview is disseminated, reproduced and shaped in schools. Meritocracy legitimizes unequal schooling benefits which support dominant class competition through the mechanism of equality of opportunity. Meritocracy is part of the technocratic rationality that supports the norms of professional knowledge production and acquisition. The grounding of the technocratic rationality within the common sense ideology is a function of schooling in hegemonic social formations.

In social formations that lack hegemony and negotiation mechanisms, institutions such as the school protect and reproduce dominant interests and rewards so as to control dominant classes' access to social and economic benefits. As a consequence, schooling does not articulate integrative norms or worldviews, but becomes a form of social control. The ideologies of technocracy and meritocracy are presented as legitimation for structural inequality, and as answers for system problems and contradictions that threaten the one-sided "ownership" of schools.

However, the school ideology and knowledge which embodies these dominant ideologies are not part of the common sense worldview; therefore, dominant forms of answers gain no consensual support from subordinate classes. This form of knowledge lacks legitimation potential, but is never the less institutionalized in order to protect dominant accumulation practices from compromising demands for change.

In many non-hegemonic societies, schooling supports the linking of specific technological knowledge to the single-minded goal of economic development through man-power training and production identifiable technical skills. Patterns of access to the hierarchical levels of schooling reinforce social reproduction and mechanisms supporting the dominant classes and their financial advantage. The coercive function of schooling is based on reward and punishment mechanisms that pattern access based on social and ethnic group affiliation, and urban and rural origins. The rewards of educational success are continued access to elitist knowledge and social mobility. Oppositional and resisting behaviours incur punishments that range from financial penalties such as fines and additional tuition fees to expulsion to imprisonment. These mechanisms discourage acts of opposition, limit the range of choices, and inhibit two-way accountability. Schools in non-hegemonic social formations lack normative support, negotiation mechanisms, and room for subordinate social practices and worldviews.

In both hegemonic and non-hegemonic societies, schooling is also a site for processes that do not support the dominant ideology. In non-hegemonic societies, the cultural capital developed and legitimized in schools through the ideology of meritocracy, does not completely conceal

the lack of a substantive equality of opportunity enjoyed by different social groups, nor reward all the participants equitably. This institutionalization of dominance enjoys limited acceptance, and must also contend with widespread oppositional behaviours. As subordinate groups and classes respond with resistance activities to contradictions in the schooling system, this can have long term effects on the societal capacity for change. Therefore, schooling is at once a site for articulating the coercive and ideological efforts of the state, and for realizing the potential of oppositional and resistance behaviours.

In the next section these processes will be described briefly with reference to Kenya, one such social formation.

KENYA: SCHOOLING AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMATION

Kenya has a peripheral capitalist mode of production and a non-hegemonic state. There exist several classes based on the differing modes of production in Kenya, but none has developed hegemony in the over-developed state or in the underdeveloped civil society. Within the state, production and maintenance of conditions for capitalist accumulation predominate policy-making and other practices. However, none of the dominant classes or fractions has decisively swung in its favour the balance of power in the state and captured completely or consistently the processes of capital accumulation for its constitution.[18] As a result, in Kenya the struggle between foreign and local capital is not pre-determined. This conflict defines, negotiates and supports certain forms of local accumulation practices. The rise and development of an indigenous bourgeoisie with specific capitalization needs affects the dynamics of reproduction and change. In Kenya, the state's lack of

consensual, social integration practices and normative structures prompts the use of coercive and exploitative means by a rising bourgeoisie to gain economic and political dominance.[19]

Historically grounded in Kenya's indigenous dominant classes' worldview and social practices is the ideology of acquisitivism that informs its action plans and strengthens its identity.[20] Social disparity continues to support the structures and institutions that favour the indigenous dominant classes. This ideology of acquisitivism furthers inequality by supporting conditions of capital accumulation as negotiated by the state, favouring the indigenous bourgeoisie over local subordinate classes, and, at times, over foreign capital.

In Kenya, the acquisitivism ideology is legitimated by the practices and rhetoric of the state as an ideology of meritocracy and through the patron-client network. Unequal access and opportunity is reproduced through the patron-client network as the only legitimate form of negotiation of inequality and as a neutral process of competition rewarding those with natural talent. This system of domination links the local interests and action plans to the centre of power in Kenya. As a form of negotiation, the client-patron network is promoted by a self-help ideology to integrate and legitimate Kenya's state structure of unequal accumulation and distribution.[21] This process is plagued with competition and contradiction as the acquisitivism ideology encourages the use of communal as well as individual means to achieve individual goals.

Schooling in Kenya is a site of social control. Policies maximize the political, in order to maintain social stability and economic order.[22] The expansion of education and the use of meritocratic ideology to define

the content of equality of opportunity policies represent attempts to develop a social acceptance for systemic inequality and to alleviate some of its disruptive consequences. Access to schooling is increased especially at the primary level, while secondary schooling continues to be shaped so as not to be a universally, uniform process.[23] As a result, linear expansion rather than structural reform, is the main feature of schooling in Kenya.[24] Appropriate expectations and aspirations relating to the occupational reward system are instilled specifically at the secondary level. This illusion of concealing inequality by the dominant indigenous classes also legitimizes schooling in Kenya as a highly selective system. Such diffuse support enables the schooling system to continue, even when specific rewards, for example, salaried occupations and social mobility are not given.[25] The institutionalization of the dominant ideology of acquisitivism masked as the ideology of meritocracy in schools is presumably intended to support political stability of Kenya's social formation.

Contradictions and pressures develop that question the legitimacy and political stability of the schooling system in Kenya. The expansion of free primary schooling provides more opportunity for students to apply for limited secondary school places.[26] This demand for academic education, that is relevant and beneficial for a select few places a drain on resources, increases competition between different locations and diverts development planning into responses that hinder a balanced and centralized program.[27] Increased unemployment of rising numbers of primary and secondary graduates is a response to this process which causes concern, and more pressure on the schooling system for continued expansion and

opportunity.[28]

The secondary school expansion by harambee communities also challenges the legitimacy and political stability of schooling. These communities are crucial publics that cannot be ignored by the state. Their independent activity exacerbates regional inequality and ethnic competition for support.[29] In response, the state demonstrates a symbolic interest to support political stability at the expense of economic considerations.[30] As harambee is not a coherent or dominant ideology, reality and state policy contradict. The legitimation ideology of meritocracy and the expanded mechanism of equality of opportunity reward the government aided secondary schools and support the emergence of a common school culture.[31] Harambee schools, on the other hand, threaten state policy, especially because the ideology of meritocracy and equality of opportunity are not realized. As a result, legitimacy and the political stability of the schooling system are slowly undermined, which encourages the public to view the system in less benign and individual terms.

Schooling, in the non-hegemonic social formation of Kenya, is not a normative or integrative system for all of society, therefore its dominant function is to support the needs of the overdeveloped state. The conditions of inequality are to be recognized as objective and natural in Kenya by accepting the dominant worldview and practices disseminated in schools. This acceptance is equated with legitimation. The justificatory systems of legitimation are part of the dominant culture and its ideology of acquisitivism. However, in Kenya, legitimation ideology and practices are rooted in domination structures, not the social integrative and

justificatory systems of subordinate and common sense culture and ideology. In Kenyan schools, oppositional behaviours and moments of resistance occur in a context of institutionalized dominance and a struggle for legitimation.

Inequality in schools develops its own momentum in response to differential advantages and selection. The subordinate classes use schooling to advance and equalize their lack of opportunity. Schooling is a site of contradictory processes with the potential for oppositional behaviours to resist dominant powers of reproduction. In Kenya, oppositional behaviour is quickly rewarded or punished. The potential of oppositional behaviour to partially limit, challenge and impinge upon the logic of capital is a long term, open-ended dynamic that manifests itself in different patterns. Forms of resistance can be quietly subversive at one level, while supporting the dominant process of reproduction at another social level. Some forms of resistance in Kenya can capture critical insights, but without the learning capacity to produce change in the fundamental interests. Moments of opposition develop through conflict and contradiction. Resistance in Kenya evolves with time as a series of contradictory and disjointed practices. At another level, resistance possesses a deep grounding in lived culture and a strong potential for change. In Kenya, two examples of subordinate behaviours that can be interpreted in some ways as oppositional with potential for resistance are the creation of Harambee Secondary Schools through the patron-client network, and the disruption caused by secondary school strikes involving students.

Schooling in Kenya is affected by the dynamics of change and reproduction. Change in schooling is grounded in the larger context and is not a consensual, transformative process. Schooling in Kenya is shaped by the inequalities produced by the ideology of acquisitivism in a social context that lacks normative integration.

CONCLUSION

The non-hegemonic social structures of most peripheral capitalist Third World countries such as Kenya possess comparatively less developed civil societies, and technocratically oriented institutions that are not grounded in the common sense worldview and practices. As a result, the dominant ideology is not legitimized through popular consent, but rather through institutionalized through coercive practices. This creates a need in accessible sites such as the school, for resistance produced activity to support and shape the societal capacity for change. Therefore, First World interpretations and solutions to system problems underestimate the processes of change, that below the surface are creating an undetermined future, in a country like Kenya.

In the next chapter, the interplay between the indigenous bourgeoisie, the state, and schooling will be examined to understand better the reproduction, legitimation and contradiction processes in Kenya.

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CHAPTER FOUR

STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMATION:
THE DOMINATION OF SCHOOLING IN KENYA

PROLEGOMENA

The structures of domination in Kenya have developed in response to and have shaped, the indigenous accumulation practices, specifically of the Kikuyu. During the pre-Independence years, the Kikuyu motivated by the ideology of acquisitivism developed a dominant indigenous presence as traders and merchants. As indigenous and colonial capital interests interacted, power struggles ensued which created situations and practices that allowed the indigenous accumulators through accumulation practices and education to develop internal dominance. During the early years of Independence, the state became actively supportive of the indigenous accumulators, as economic, professional, political and bureaucratic class positions overlapped. This cross-over also partially shaped the move of indigenous accumulators, mainly the Kikuyu, from circulation (trade and agriculture), to industrial and finance capital.

As these indigenous accumulators developed economic and political dominance, there arose a need to integrate the society and maintain social control. The patron-client network evolved as the only legitimate form of negotiation. As it managed to promote and protect the Kikuyu dominance, the patron-client network also became riddled with contradictions and discontinuities. Ethnic rivalries, unequal access, lack of resources and grass roots participation motivated by the self-help ideology have posed threats to the legitimacy of the patron-client network and the Kikuyu dominance in the state.

Many of these contradictions and struggles are articulated and shaped within the schooling system. Two structures of domination within schooling, which maintain and protect the Kikuyu access to and opportunity for economic and political capital are differentiated access to, and expansion of schooling. The mechanism of equality of opportunity and the ideology of meritocracy provide the appearance that the demand for more equality of opportunity and resources is being addressed. The primacy of examinations and the status of dominant cultural capital shape the structure of opportunity and mobility, favouring the Kikuyu accumulators, bureaucrats and politicians.

In this chapter, the first section discusses the historical development of the dominanc of the Kikuyu, their accumulation practices and their political involvement with the colonial state. Initially, the Kikuyu accumulators were supported by colonial mechanisms, but were thwarted by the political and economic demand for land. Combinations of economic mechanisms and social factors have influenced the growth of the Kikuyu, while also, developing a closer relationship between these accumulators and the colonial state. This relationship, along with a strong educational and economic investment background, helped to consolidate Kikuyu power as part of the post colonial state, as described in section two. Present day contradictions continue to shape their struggle for continued dominance and legitimacy.

The third section focuses on the development of the patron-client network during the 1960s and 70s, as a form of state control. Based on centralized control through official directives, the electoral process and the civil service, the dominant Kikuyu accumulators maintained their

control of the state, and especially, political and economic activity. As opportunity became restricted for other social and ethnic groups and the practices of self-help began to create tension, the patron-client network experienced difficulty in negotiating a balance between state control and the demand for opportunity.

In the final section, schooling is described as a crucial site for maintaining state control and providing an illusion of opportunity. Different institutional practices that support dominant access, especially of the Kikuyu, are developed as part of the context that shape continued capital accumulation activity. Increased equality of opportunity has been expressed as linear expression and not structural change.

THE FORMATION OF THE INDIGENOUS BOURGEOISIE

At the turn of the century, some of the Kikuyu in the area presently known as the Central Province developed new forms of commodity production based upon the direct employment of wage labour.[1] Their economic pattern consisted of land accumulation, consolidation, and some agricultural commodity production.[2] Such appropriation of land by this group of primitive accumulators, became the motor for developing and capitalizing upon surplus value.[3] These practices grounded in the ideology of acquisitivism supported the development of the Kikuyu accumulators into aggressive elites.[4] Mechanisms of institutional economic coercion such as the appointment of chiefs to recruit labour and collect head taxes were used to support colonial capital needs. A consequence of this was the growth of a privileged, official group of Kikuyu.[5]

During this pre-independence period, certain situations continued to develop that promoted indigenous accumulation practices, and supported

a group of indigenous accumulators, mainly the Kikuyu, who were interested in economic and political dominance. Each of these situations influenced other practices and consequences in the social formation. The introduction of land titles and the development of straddling practices were partially shaped by the organized lobbying of tribal associations, and the granting of distribution and government credit to indigenous traders. For the mobile indigenous accumulator, education and trade became the major routes for developing economic and political power. The support of the colonial government became important for this group.

The granting of land titles and straddling developed as two major mechanisms that supported the indigenous demand for land.[6] After many years of violent suppression of the demand for land, a change occurred. The large and middle independent, free peasants were given opportunity to secure freehold individual land titles through the Swynnerton Plan, initially implemented in 1953. Land fragments were consolidated into single holdings that could be registered, and used as security by large landowners to borrow money from the banks or the government to purchase more land.[7] The indigenous accumulation by the Kikuyu was undermined by the universal issue of freehold land as members of other competing ethnic groups such as the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya purchased land. This resulted in less land and labour for Kikuyu expansion and exploitation.[8]

The second mechanism which supported the accumulators involved, was the process of straddling agricultural production and trade. Straddling is the process of differentiation and accumulation practiced by certain segments of peasants linked differentially to off-farm labour, trade and

petty commodity production. Their predictable income from off-farm sources supported expansion of farm income by enlarging or purchasing more cropped land.[9] This urban-rural blending of resources created bundles of income for the farming households benefitting the most from the acquisitivism ideology. As a result, the Kikuyu in the Central Province have continued their dominance in commercial farming since early colonialism, and have applied this advantage to a sequential pattern of capital accumulation in other sectors.[10]

Two crucial social factors supported the acquisitivism of these Kikuyu accumulators. By the end of the 1940s, different forms of political and social organizations developed to direct indigenous actions towards removing barriers to property and credit. These organizations were based on tribal support, but mostly depended upon their propensity for accumulation as their basic purpose for organizing.[11] For example, the expansion of small holder production and purchase of large farms involved mostly the Kikuyu from the Central Province area.[12] The second factor was the external decision by foreign capital to extend wholesale distribution to indigenous traders on the reserves and to provide credit facilities. This encouraged expansion of the indigenous retail trade and commodity production, a move into small scale manufacturing, and the development of an indigenous market. As the metropolitan and colonial state no longer supported the settler interest, indigenous capital began to use state power to favour the expansion and regulation of its growing dominance in accumulation. As a result, those involved in distribution in the 1940s-1950s would later develop market access into production during the 1960s.[13]

These two crucial social factors enabled profitable export crops to

be cultivated by Africans, and African traders to become a more dominant link between foreign capital, Asian merchant firms and the African commodity producers. The rapid expansion of African traders resulted in the number of trading licences issued to Africans to be restricted, while indigenous demands for African merchant capital to be expanded were met with increased support from the colonial government. Government assistance to African traders during the 1950s encouraged the taking-over of established firms and businesses. This supported the accumulation practices of African groups already developing dominance, primarily the Kikuyu.[14]

Capital accumulation practices in Kenya have developed into two major routes. The white collar route involves the acquisition of formal education qualifications followed by upward mobility in salaried occupations. This provides a predictable source of income, some of which is invested in trade, business, or land, as discussed earlier. The recognition and acceptance of this route towards prosperity has created an intense demand for education, especially in the cash crop farming communities. Historically, families who started accumulation practices early have enjoyed more profits and advantages in trade and business because of the cumulative effect of capital investments and privilege. The continued maintenance of their dominance depends upon increased capital and skill, appropriate alliances, protected access, and state supported contracts and status. This specific accumulation route dominates and protects educational access to support the next generation's white collar entry into high occupational levels and land purchase.[15] Thus, education for the next generation is another form of investment to

support their access to status and salaried positions.[16]

The second route has a trading-business base for accumulating capital that, in turn, is moved into agriculture as a form of investment. Both these routes are characterized by increased competition between individuals and families. This competition also includes tribal rivalries between the dominant Kikuyu and those from other ethnicities.[17]

All these situations created the need for an indigenous middle class to stabilize the political unrest and to assist in raising production. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the British colonial administration backed by the British finance capital encouraged and regulated the expansion of capital that favoured the indigenous merchant class.[18] Schooling also played a role by providing a group of indigenous leaders with skills, a shared political consciousness, and legitimacy to support the interests of both the local tribal organizations and the colonial government.[19] To develop economic power during the 1950s, loans and financial assistance went to traders for buying established firms and businesses, and small scale manufacturing plants.[20] The Kikuyu became the largest ethnic group possessing indigenous capital, living in the economic and political centres, and sharing state representation.[21]

From this position, the Kikuyu played a central role in creating unrest and opposing the colonial state, so as to develop their economic and political dominance.[22] The land tenure schemes of the 1950's concentrated ownership of land into fewer hands, thus producing only a symbolic shift of power. The state agencies and credit programs served to increase the social differentiation of peasants and to consolidate the Kikuyu structural dominance in production.[23] The colonial state helped

nurture the Kikuyu bourgeoisie into the dominant indigenous group of accumulators. This helped the Kikuyu respond to the contradictions of capital accumulation with political action based on the acquisitivism ideology.[24] Settler capital which had historically subordinated indigenous capital, later on became limited itself by the international capital's claim on labour. During the early years of Independence, the indigenous Kikuyu capitalists were able to displace the settler capital's internal dominance through their heavy investment in education and their strength as indigenous accumulators.[25] The potential for continuous and expanded accumulation of the Kikuyu depended upon their national dominance of the state.

POST COLONIAL PERIOD: CHANGES IN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

The post colonial state dominated by a Kikuyu bourgeoisie and the acquisitivism ideology needed to keep civil order, repress labour and support straddling.[26] A key characteristic of indigenous capital during the 1960s and 1970s was its movement from the sphere of circulation based on trade and agriculture into industrial production and manufacturing.[27] The state localized control of the conditions for capitalization through credit programs, tariffs, taxes, regulations and partnerships.[28] Provisions were developed and legislated for increased indigenous management, ownership and shareholding of local capital as it moved into production, which benefitted the Kikuyu. Many of the indigenous employees and managers of multinational interests bought into the company or developed skills and techniques to independently start their own firm. The takeover of businesses in the trading and service sectors supported the conditions of accumulation, as the formation of new enterprises

furthered the practices of accumulation.[29] A strong network of ownership and management in the private sector overlapped with growing indigenous pre-eminence in political, bureaucratic, and professional class positions in the state sector. The process of straddling was thus completed.

This process produced consequences that affect the practices and dominance of the indigenous accumulators. The process of capital accumulation in Kenya is staggered as land availability declines and the rate of wage employment relative to demand decreases. Therefore, late starters in capital accumulation have many more barriers to overcome before enjoying the unequal benefits of social and economic reproduction as compared to the early starters dominated by the Kikuyu.[30]

The indigenous bourgeoisie dominated by those of Kikuyu descent have benefitted from their practices grounded in the ideology of acquisitivism. This dominance in indigenous accumulation and capitalist development has involved the reproduction of both direct wage labour and household production. As a result, this class is contending with structural contradictions that affect the struggle for legitimacy and reproduction of dominance. The economic structure is failing to absorb and develop the labour force.[31] The social structure is mediating the growth of the universalization of the capital-wage relationship in manufacturing and its decline in agriculture.[32] The political level is struggling to integrate, dominate and coerce the competing capitalist fractions and the demanding, repressed majority.[33] This next section will discuss the struggle for legitimacy by the indigenous bourgeoisie and the state.

THE STATE'S ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMATION

An important role of the state in Kenya is to provide legitimacy to the maintenance of the social order, by ensuring conditions of capital production and by repressing labour demands.[34] The state's repressive and integrative functions have developed from the colonial need for domination and control. Democratic institutions have been added onto the authoritarian structures to legitimate the independent state and provide accessibility routes. The ideologies of clientilism and ethnicity support the decision-making practices of the state.[35] The strength of the state depends upon the effectiveness of its intervention in situations of conflict, which include struggles between indigenous capital and foreign capital, ethnic and regional groupings and other different social strata.[36]

Patron-client networks have become the vehicle for the state to maintain social control. This practice has been shaped by state policies, the election process, and a consolidated civil service. The role of ethnicity and self-help have been powerful motivators in linking and cementing the relationship between those at the centre, and clients with differing levels of power. An important consequence of the patron-client network has been its support for dominant power relations.

State practices have evolved to support the reproduction of dominant power relations and accumulation through policy changes and their implementation, which shape the patron-client network. In 1965, Sessional Paper No. 10 on the Application of African Socialism in Kenya[37] directed that development money would go to areas capable of yielding large agricultural increases with new technical products. The objective of this plan was to support the structure of disparity and favour the already

productive areas such as Central Province.[38] The sixth amendment of Act. 17 took place in April 1966, providing the President with special powers including detention without trial. This enabled President Kenyatta to maintain political dominance by repressing dissidents. The tenth amendment of Act 45 in 1968 modified the election procedures and composition of the National Assembly.[39] These two amendments supported the consolidation of executive power through constitutional changes, allowing the President to have complete decision-making power without accountability. All three official directives illustrate the network of power and influence between specific groups of indigenous accumulators, mainly the Kikuyu and their allies, and the centre of executive power in the state controlled by Kenyatta, a member of the Kikuyu tribe. These practices have limited the range of responses the 'clients' have in stating interests, which affect their role within the patron-client network to complete for access to resources at the centre.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the parliamentary elections in Kenya at one level attempted to legitimize the process of choice and provide visibility to the KANU party.[40] However at another level, the elections developed into a mechanism of elite recruitment that support dominant structures. In the election process, dissidents were weeded out, sectional and tribal cleavages intensified, and the level of vertical integration increased. The electoral process was designed to select the candidate perceived to have the best mediating skills to forge favourable links with the decision-making centre of the bureaucracy.[41] However, these M.P.s had little voice in parliament because the real power was based in Kenyatta's inner court. Dissent could only be voiced outside the party,

the bureaucracy and the election process. Parliamentary elections became a form of institutionalized dominance and served to support the interests of the dominant indigenous bourgeoisie, and did not affect the content or direction of public policy making.[42] The electoral process has helped to institutionalize the patron-client network as a form of control over grass root participation.

To institutionalize prevailing patterns of dominance, the ruling indigenous bourgeoisie consolidated power and administrative control through the civil service. This process took two forms. Firstly, key positions were given to reliable and capable Kikuyu. Secondly, the whole civil service was well paid, especially in the higher ranks. As a result, the Kenya African National Union political party declined as a vehicle for political participation. Since 1963, local government lost regional control in the provinces as the management of critical resources and affairs transferred to the President's Office, Ministries and the bureaucracy. The regional administration and the local authority became the prime agency for handling political participation, local social activities, and local complaints and demands.[43] Local sources of patronage were dominated by the bureaucracy and altered by the centralization and concentration of power to support Kikuyu alliances.[44] For a patron-client network to be successful, it must include strong ties to powerful bureaucrats who help maintain levels of inequality.

Patron-client networks, as a political form of integration favoured the politically powerful capital accumulators, especially from the Central Province, by disproportionately enriching their resources. For example, the Kikuyu as the dominant ethnic group tended to support people

from their own tribes, and not other tribes. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, peasants and workers were linked to political patrons who bargained and struggled for power and resources. The state through powerful fractions of accumulators and bureaucrats divided and controlled struggles based on ethnicity, to counteract patron demands and prevent the development of class consciousness. The development of ethnicity as tribalism in Kenya based on tribal recruitment patterns in economic and political activities, created a consciousness of being Kikuyu or not Kikuyu. Ethnicity was used as a political control mechanism to support Kikuyu political dominance in state, to conceal or off-set alternative choices, and to discourage opportunities for other groups through the patron-client hierarchy, regarding access to resources and use of power.[45] As a result, the most successful tribe continues to be the Kikuyu, as senior state officials and as movers of local capital into production.[46]

The activities of self-help were part of the relations between ethnicity and patron-client hierarchies. The ideology and practices of self-help grew at independence as a mechanism for participation and community-centre linkage, and as a legitimation for state control and reproduction of domination. This resulted in the patron-client network becoming the only state legitimized form of negotiation and participation. The institutionalisation of these relations began at a time when the state and bureaucracy needed to consolidate power. However, this integrative structure of self-help activities and patron-client network has become too expensive, especially as the rural petty-bourgeoisie challenge dominant interests.[47]

The incompatibility between state control mechanisms which include patron-client hierarchy and self-help ideology, and social integration in Kenya is a growing problem. Unequal distribution of income, high population growth rate, severe unemployment, and limited arable land encourage public demand for redistribution of wealth, openness towards mass participation, and change in accessibility. These demands are incongruent with the relations of production and the need for domination in peripheral capitalism. As a result, the organization of dissent and use of the public sphere remains heavily discouraged by administration and the police. The dominant goal of capital accumulation and increased levels of inequality make state legitimation practiced through patron-client networks and based upon the self-help ideology problematic.[48] The Kenyan society does not possess or mirror a normative, consensual common sense culture because the legitimation potential of the patron-client network is not grounded in the justificatory levels of common sense culture or in structures that produce a normative identity and consensus. The patron-client network is used by the state to force legitimation and integration, and when this practice no longer negotiates mass demand, coercion becomes necessary to maintain social control and accumulation conditions and practices.

Schooling is a site for the reproduction and protection of dominant interests and accessibility. The following section presents a discussion of the dominant control of schooling by the state and the indigenous bourgeoisie.

STRUCTURES OF DOMINATION IN SCHOOLING

The historical pattern in the distribution of educational resources

and opportunities reflects a regional imbalance biased towards the Kikuyu elite from the Central Province. The ideology of acquisitivism developed structures for accumulation that support specific ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu. The colonial legacy of capitalist penetration and missionary activity advanced the intense and specific aspirations of indigenous accumulators.[49] The Western schooling of influential, indigenous individuals combined with the cumulative impact of the foreign ideology of individualism shaped the disproportionate pattern of access, opportunity and rewards. Areas possessing long associations with colonial settlements, cash cropping, and urban centres are favoured with better developed schools and educational opportunities. Regional competition at work since before independence aggravates present inequalities in educational facilities and access, while increasing the need for national unity.[50] Opportunity limited by the pace of economic growth, the inherited colonial model of formal schooling and the ideology of self-help activities both illustrate and intensify the structures of disparity.[51]

In Kenya, there exists a differentiated accessibility to primary and secondary schools. The primary schools approach universal enrolment, while the secondary schools have a limited number of available student places. This process of schooling reflects the recent demand for more accessibility shaped by the struggle for educational expansion, increased competition for opportunity and resources. The state accommodates this demand for accessibility by expanding schooling and by attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, a more equitable distribution of resources across diverse and unequal regions and groups. The use of standardized exams to provide equal opportunity to and fair competition for meritocratic rewards, gives

schooling a powerful role in justifying dominant cultural capital, and in determining who has access to educational and economic opportunity.[52] The state maintains dominant interests by controlling the demand for increased educational opportunity, firstly by the use of meritocratic selection to regulate access and rewards and secondly by the expansion of schooling to meet basic needs.

Dominant interests are protected and reproduced in the schooling process, through the maintenance of a variety in school types differentiated by quality of resources allocated to them. Secondary school accessibility is determined by the ability to pay fees, C.P.E. (Certificate of Primary Education) results, ethnic loyalties and regional location. These schools are ranked for their educational quality, test results, and social mobility. In effect, secondary schools constitute a three-tier system. The national catchment and high cost schools are credited with having the most influence because they are highly selective and receive a disproportionately large share of resources.[53] European and missionary in their character and background, these schools enjoy a reputation for high quality and limited access.

The local catchment secondary schools are either government assisted or Harambee supported. These service small areas, tribal interests and are relatively recent in origin. The government aided schools have low fees, are mostly in rural areas, and are usually self-sufficient.[54] The older, government supported secondary schools are better equipped because at the time of construction or adoption by the government from Harambee status, the state budget could accommodate the expenditures. The unaided Harambee schools have developed more recently in response to the

competition for secondary school places. Often local authority elicits contributions in coercive ways to build Harambee schools. The manner of funding the Harambee school functions as a form of regressive taxation because the benefits are more accessible to local dominant families than the rural poor. Everyone pays taxes. However, the rural poor must contribute towards the building of schools, from their own resources while continuing to pay taxes. Where as schools in prosperous areas are paid for from government revenues only. Also, students from local dominant groups accepted by harambee schools have a financial advantage over the rural poor students. Harambee schools receive the least resources, have low quality facilities and produce a high number of drop outs.[55]

The largest catchment schools are located in the Central Province, where the dominant ethnic group is the Kikuyu. This province has a favourable proportion of aided places, and an historical advantage in the number of unaided school places. The proximity of Central Province to missionary activity, white settlements, agricultural development, self-help projects, urban centres, and the political centre - all of these factors supported the early start in Western schooling practices in this region. This biased pattern of distribution of secondary school places and resources has not changed since independence. The generous state support and rapid growth of the self-help projects in Central Province compound the unequal structure of schooling opportunity in Kenya.[56]

Differentiated access is also shaped by regionalism which develops both as a result of historical conditions and centralized planning in Kenya. As there exist government limitations on provisions for assistance, the self-help activities of school construction and local

taxation express and intensify regional differences with respect to quality of educational provision. The progressive and more prosperous regions raise more money and develop stronger organizations which increase the disparity levels between areas in terms of school opportunity, resources and quality. These differences reflect the dominant patterns of economic and political power, and deepen and intensify social cleavages and conflict along ethnic and regional lines. Regional differences and differentiated access in Kenya support the biased opportunity structure and expansion of schooling in the Central Province favouring the Kikuyu.[57]

The expansion of schooling is a mechanism that is presumed to support the widening of opportunity. The political rational is to develop an impression of increased equality. As the state cannot continue this rate of expenditure because of the constraints in capital accumulation, limits in employment possibilities and the redistribution of resources, stability and perceptions must be maintained in other forms. In regions where domination and political influence are entrenched, schooling is expanded, such as in Central Province. In the rural areas, educational expansion is less a priority and there is a perception of deprivation of opportunity.[58]

Educational expansion gives the appearance of an attempt being made to alleviate extreme consequences of disparity and poverty. Centralized planning finances boarding school facilities in some of the deprived pastoral communities. However, students from more developed areas are permitted to compete for these school places taking away opportunity from the local population. The state does not make use of quotas to balance ethnic and regional access and representation. The uneven allocation of

trained teachers, facilities for pre-school preparation, and resources needed for quality schooling generally favours the urban areas of political and economic influence.[59] As a result, during the expansion of schooling, the hierarchical and selective school system develops its own momentum, resting as it does on existing ethnic and regional inequalities, in response to monopolized access. This increases the demand for the expansion of school places, while the class and region-linked pattern of academic achievement continues unchallenged and unmodified, making equality of opportunity and accessibility less and less probable for the majority who are poor and powerless. The needs of the indigenous bourgeoisie and the state are accommodated by centralized planning through policies of equality of opportunity, developed first through the expansion of schooling, then through the distribution of resources and fulfilment of basic needs.

In the expansion of schooling, resources are continually stretched resulting in declining examination success rates. The research and reform surrounding testing does little in determining whether the knowledge measured is equally available to all individuals and groups, and the development and use of more equitable examinations has increased the gap in collective performance.[60] Such processes contribute to increased disparity in opportunity and access, but are perceived merely as malfunctions of a system easily correctible by changes in curriculum content, school expansion and distribution of resources and opportunity.[61] Examination results and educational credentials decisively influence opportunity and accessibility to further schooling and employment.[62]

Domination structures in schooling rewards high status political and ethnic cultural capital with educational access and achievement. Dominant class fractions use schooling to maintain status and social advantages. Home life filled with books and T.V. support the learning of knowledge with high cultural capital. The teaching and use of the English language at home and with tutors provides an academic advantage in schools. Placing children in the appropriate nursery schools biases the competition for opportunity from early on in favour of families of the already advantaged.[63] Most of the high quality schools demand a high tuition fee that is affordable mostly by the families from the indigenous bourgeoisie. Regional differences in school quality and opportunity advantages associated with quality schooling benefit the indigenous bourgeoisie of the Central Province. As members of this group enjoy dominance in high status positions as well as schooling opportunity, they are the least critical of the pattern of state control as discussed earlier.[64]

Schooling as a centralized, national system objectifies the direct relation between school quality and the likelihood of acquisition of specialized skill and knowledge tested in examinations. This is a strong and critical factor in promotion mobility which shapes differential access.[65] The better educated and financially secure families tend to live near schooling facilities of higher quality located in urban areas. Local rural graduates must compete for educational and occupational accessibility with students from families possessing a successful history of educational and/or accumulation opportunities.[66] Over eighty percent of the population live in rural areas and derive their livelihood from agriculture. Yet the participation rate for these rural students remains

low except in areas where farming is characterized by innovative techniques, commodity production and credit access, such as Central Province.[67] The opportunity structure in schooling and occupation is strongly tilted in the direction of students of families with financial, political and ethnic clout.

In a 1965 government sessional paper previously mentioned, education is described as being more of an economic rather than social service. This plan also recognizes differences in achievement between individuals and regions, and encourages the educational system to develop as part of the economic process which justifies and supports differential rewards. The original expectation of this relation expresses itself as an across-the-board expansion of educational opportunity. The effect is a linear expansion of schooling motivated by private, political, and economic pressures for equality, integration, and distribution. This change is not structural, therefore occupational status and rewards benefit those who already have access to the formal and highest levels of schooling.[68]

In summary, schooling in Kenya is characterized by a limited accessibility to a three-tiered secondary system rooted in economic and social differences, an unequal distribution of resources favouring the economically productive Central Province and urban areas, and a standard examination system that determines internal school placement and external occupation choices based on meritocratic ideology. These elements together reflect structures of domination as it manifests itself through schooling.

CONCLUSION

Focusing on the nature of domination and the manner in which

specific intentions are pursued successfully or not, provides an understanding about the relations between domination structures, and legitimation practices and ideologies. Domination can be rooted, shaped and articulated in different ways depending upon the cultural structures and structural tendencies present in each social formation. This has implications for acceptance of class inequality as legitimate or as the consequence of institutionalized dominance. Schooling is a site where such structures of dominance and inequality are produced, reproduced and contested, depending upon the nature of domination and its legitimacy in partially shaping class relations and the potential for change.

In Kenya, structures of domination are not rooted in the common sense worldview and therefore, do not possess a legitimate capacity to rationalize inequality. The process of schooling reflects how domination practices are organized for the advantage of the indigenous bourgeoisie, and at the expense of developing a fundamental legitimacy and structural change. In the next chapter, the analysis highlights the practices of the subordinate classes in response to structures of domination in accumulation activities and in the process of schooling.

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CHAPTER FIVE

STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES:
SUBORDINATE ACTIVITY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLING

PROLEGOMENA

Both Gavin Kitching and Lionel Cliffe have argued that, in Kenya, rural subordinate classes are crucial factors in societal transformation. Change in agrarian production and distribution of resources occurs in unpredictable forms, and does not rely exclusively on foreign or indigenous capital. The role of differentiated peasant groups and work groups is constituted in and is constitutive of the processes of class formation and agrarian transition.[1]

The social formation in Kenya is fluid and characterized by a differentiated rural social structure. The middle peasants and the large farmers, who are part of the petty-bourgeoisie, develop connections with the other groups in the social structure involved in the patron-client network, such as politicians and bureaucrats. This provides them with access to positions of power. The peasants, who virtually have no political access or economic power, are the largest rural grouping and at times, must ally with different rural petty-bourgeoisie to obtain some benefits.

The peasants involved in household commodity production are involved in the contradictory trends between independent commodity production and wage labour. This contradiction is located between the concentration of property rights to extend capitalist interests, and the entrenchment of property rights to provide land to peasants for subsistence. These contradictory dynamics are part of the social relations, and shape the activities surrounding equality of opportunity, especially, regarding the

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democratization of school accessibility.

The harambee secondary school movement was an attempt to equalize opportunity and provide accessibility, for the rural poor and some elements of the petty-bourgeoisie. Through the patron-client network, their demands for equality have developed contradictions that affect the distribution of schooling and resources, funding of capital and recurrent costs, and the quality of materials and instruction. The patron-client network could not manage and negotiate the political demands completely or satisfactorily for any one group. The students, who are outside this network, could only voice their discontent and perceptions about the different experiences of government aided and harambee secondary school students, through strike action. This had negative public reaction.

The beginning section in this chapter describes the blending-over tendency between different social groups and the differentiation of the rural social structure, in particular the peasants. The latter group is the largest social class in Kenya, and has responded to the social and economic context, through their involvement in household production. This form of accumulation has contradictory tendencies that shape social relations and the accumulation activities of the wage labourers, the landless, and the middle and large farmers.

The focus of the last section is on the harambee secondary school movement as an attempt, initially by the state, then continued by local community effort, to expand educational opportunity and provide increased secondary school access. The patron-client network has become the vehicle for many community groups to pressure the state for funding and to improve quality and provide more opportunity. The interests of the different

social groups are articulated through the patron-client network, producing contradictory effects regarding distribution of schooling facilities, inequities in local funding, and quality of resources. This continuing demand for education expansion and equitable distribution of educational resources has created political pressures on the state and on the patron-client network.

This last section concludes with a description of harambee secondary school students' perceptions of the system and their response to the inequities. These students sensed their second class status in the schooling system and the occupational structure. Their attempt to negotiate change reflected this awareness. Their strike action demonstrated a lack of awareness of social relations, resulting in violence, state coercion and public disapproval.

SOCIAL CONTEXT OF SUBORDINATE CLASSES IN KENYA

The subgroups of the Kenyan social formation include ruling classes, middle and auxiliary classes, workers, and peasants. The middle and auxiliary classes are comprised of bureaucrats, professionals, and a petty-bourgeoisie involved in a variety of production relations in urban and rural areas. The urban workers engage primarily in wage labour and are controlled with strike bans, wage curbs and regulated unions. The rural workers include landless peasants, subsistence-farming peasants who hire out their labour, productive Kulaks and capitalist farmers. There is much fluidity between these classes and groups, as individual subjects straddle their accumulation and occupation practices (as described in Chapter Four), migrate to labour areas for wage work, and utilize the family farm to reproduce a necessary level of subsistence. This fluidity

and the domination of certain segments of indigenous and foreign capital in the rural, predominantly agricultural, economy have created groups of peasants involved in peasant commodity production, that are neither proletarianized nor pauperized.[2] As a result, the rural, Kenyan population continues to be constituted by a blending-over between different social classes involved in wage labour and household farming.[3]

Kenyan peasants are active rural producers and agents with differentiated social relations and accumulation practices. Proximity to centres of labour demand, environments with cash cropping, variable access to markets, competing forms of capital, and patterns of local domination by indigenous elites are factors that reproduce and accentuate the support of the economic, political and ideological differentiation of peasants. Though settler capital during colonial occupations undermined the economic independence of peasant household production, a modified form of household production continues to exist with a limited dependence on commodity production for its own reproduction.[4]

The majority of rural households in Kenya are involved in peasant commodity production. In 1969, these included approximately 620,000 households of poor peasants and 300,000 households of landless peasants. The former group usually supplemented their meagre farm income with wages earned as labourers, while the latter group would have some access to growing foodstuffs to support household consumption. Together these subordinate groups continue to possess relatively the least amount of economic and political power, and yet are in the majority, just as in 1969, when they totalled sixty-six percent of the rural population.[5]

In comparison, the middle peasant household has enjoyed access to credit, land for purchasing and innovational agricultural programmes, which has enhanced their production of sufficient surplus from which to hire help and meet consumption needs. In 1969, this group consisted of 250,000 households or eighteen percent of the rural population. During this same time period, the richest rural households numbered 225,000 or sixteen percent of the rural structure. Excluded from this discussion are the pastoral households estimated in 1969 at 220,000. The middle and the rich rural households, though in the minority in terms of population, have the most political and economic influence in rural Kenya.[6]

Some of the large farmers are directly related to or associated with those elements of petty-bourgeoisie that work in rural areas for the state. Usually the large farmers some of whom are also state employees are educated, western influenced, and have a strategic position in the rural class structure. As state employees and as members of other occupational groups, the petty-bourgeoisie exercises or enjoys considerable influence with the ruling classes, and with the ethnic and regional networks involved in patron-client politics. The petty-bourgeoisie are partly dependent upon state legislation and the Chamber of Commerce to increase their accessibility for accumulation opportunity and credit. Those occupying high status positions in the state bureaucratic structure constitute the most powerful segment of the petty-bourgeoisie.[7]

The ideology of acquisitivism is just as pervasive in the social practices of the peasantry as of other groups described in Chapter Four, and motivates individuals to engage in diverse forms of labour to raise

their incomes and to increase the life chances of family members. Unlike the poor peasants, large farmers or Kulaks do not need to worry about meeting their subsistence needs. Productive farming is often a part of accumulation routes that include straddling by economically successful farmers. Through different combinations of land inheritance, off-farm income, tenant farming and land purchase, large farmers gain security and a base for other occupational activities. Their resources and production activities support, indeed require, the hiring of subsistent peasants and landless peasants.[8]

The rural social structure in Kenya can also be understood from the perspective of the rural wage labourer, who is also partially connected with the differentiated rural households. The majority of rural wage labourers are either regularly or casually employed, mainly on small holdings. In 1969, there were approximately 240,000 regular workers and 235,000 seasonal labourers. Also, approximately 180,000 other workers were employed by large mixed farms and export crop farms. Only 80,000 rural workers were involved in non-agricultural enterprises such as crafts and repair shops, and 100,000 were employed in non-agricultural, rural "service" positions such as those working with the government.[9]

In Kenyan agriculture however, not all rural producers, the peasants, are wage workers who are completely separated from their own means of production. This has created limits to capital production and accumulation in agriculture and in turn, necessitated the development of another process to restructure productive capital in agriculture through non-capitalist institutions, which is organizing work on the basis of family within peasant household production. As commodity relations became

extended to household production, this extension had the effect of reducing pressures on peasants to engage in wage labour. The dualistic nature of household commodity production permitted peasants to meet both subsistence and cash needs. This has resulted in peasants realizing the conditions of their reproduction as producers and sellers of labour power and/or commodities, and as consumers of manufactured items.[10]

To meet subsistence needs, groups of peasants engage in both independent commodity production on their own farm as well as wage labour for others. As household size increases and land availability decreases, the dual need for subsistence farming based on household commodity production and for wage labour intensifies. This pattern engages an increasing number of the rural labour force, and as a result has developed into an economic mechanism which reinforces the tendency towards gradual proletarianization of rural workers, especially migrant wage labourers. In the process of becoming regular and casual labourers, these peasants work for middle peasants and large farmers,[11] and are distinguished by their contradictory social relations to the labour process under capitalist penetration.[12]

This contradiction is located in the growing concentration of property in fewer hands to expand the reproduction of capital, on the one hand, and the entrenchment of property rights to reproduce the subordinate form of subsistence on the other hand. Capital accumulation and development in Kenya is limited by the increased scope and depth of peasant commodity production. This occurs in two forms. Income from middle and small land holdings increases, as wages paid to partially proletarianized labour is below labour power value. As a result, there

is no incentive to raise labour productivity, and the incomes and productivity rises slowly in peasant commodity production. Peasant household production has become a site of indigenous struggle between the peasant producers, different segments of capital, and the state for control and appropriation of economic surplus.[13]

Changes in the economic base are visibly generated through changes in social relations. Within Kenya's peripheral capitalist social structure develops different roles, relations, and expectations for an increasingly differentiated rural formation. These capitalist tendencies include the concentration and privatization of land ownership, family and exchange labour, alienation from production, expansion of surplus production, appropriation of surplus value, and transactions with cash. This creates a rural-urban interdependence. In the cash crop areas of Kenya, the structure of rural inequalities has been organically connected to the urban-rural distribution of wealth, opportunity and income. This growing fusion of the richer segments of the rural economy with urban capital (commercial and industrial) affects the formation of subordinate classes, relations and inequality in rural Kenya in general.[14]

It is within this social context, that subordinate groups' forms of resistance, sporadic and localized as they have been, have developed. The repressive arms of the state and the institutionalized violence of the police attempt to extinguish any attempt to use the public sphere for oppositional discourse and behaviour. Such forms of oppression hinder the development of subordinate political action and collective consciousness. However, the struggle and resistance activities of the subordinate classes keep the structure of disparity open to the reciprocal processes of

reproduction and change."[15] During the period under study, these struggles for change, in the Kenyan context, focused on democratization of access to schooling.

In the next section an examination of two forms of subordinate resistance within schooling, the patron-client network surrounding harambee schools and student strikes, will be described. These struggles centre on the widely shared and popular demand for the realization of a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunity in the educational system.

SUBORDINATE RESPONSE TO THE STRUCTURE OF SECONDARY SCHOOLING: THE POLITICS OF HARAMBEE SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT

A form of community planning and mobilization indigenous to Kenya developed in the early 1960s, which evolved into a strong, grassroots movement with specific objectives and consequences by 1970. Jomo Kenyatta, who later became the first president of Kenya coined the term in 1960, that is now used to describe these community projects. His word was "harambee," which means "all pull together."[16]

The harambee movement motivated, as it was by an ideology of self-help, has been an arena for political, ethnic and regional competition. At one time, land as a source of economic opportunity and social mobility, was no longer available to subordinate groups. Their most visible route for opportunity and change became accessibility to schooling. As described in the 1965 sessional paper quoted earlier, it is officially conceded that all citizens have a right to equal opportunity."[17] For subordinate groups, this has meant a struggle to ensure that their children get as good an opportunity in schooling as enjoyed by children

of the dominant strata. As a result, the harambee school originated in response to community demand for more equitable educational opportunity. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, harambee communities provided secondary schooling to primary school leavers who did not obtain places in government aided schools. Most of these secondary schools initially started locally and through popular political pressure, later on obtained government status in order to qualify for public funding to improve quality. This remains the goal harambee school supporters work towards."

The harambee movement as perceived by the state and the dominant classes was intended to legitimize the dominant ideology of acquisitivism through patronage and self-help activities. The role of the state as the original provider depended upon public acceptance of unequal meritocratic distribution of opportunity. As a state initiative, harambee activities were part of the dominant attempt to construct a hegemonic social structure. Originally, harambee was the state's response to both urban and rural differences and to gross inequalities within the rural social structure. Its main thrust was to shift the responsibilities of development from the government to the local communities. It was hoped that harambee would incorporate the less advantaged areas, make use of local resources and material, and provide low cost facilities, and therefore, lessen the local demand for government resources."

The harambee movement and the ideology of self-help bloomed at independence. At that time, state finances were channelled into land compensation payments, the bureaucracy was at its lowest level of power, and a fluid class structure along with declining post-colonial political structures seemed to be the emergent pattern. All of these conditions

combined to create the appearance of a state dedicated to encouraging mass participation.[20] At the base of these self-help harambee projects which included activities such as road building and health clinic construction, as well as the establishment of secondary schools, was an exchange of state's materials for political support that subsequently developed into clientalist linkage networks. For certain segments of the rural petty-bourgeoisie, these self-help projects provided opportunity to develop leadership abilities, and to become more highly incorporated and consolidated into political, authority structures. This emergent group of rural leaders consisted mostly of wealthy peasants, trading and commercial accumulators, and local community civil servants; they used harambee to advance their social, political and economic position at a time when such mobility was possible.[21]

The state bureaucracy at the local level connected with harambee was composed of salaried state employees, some of whom were involved in straddling activities. Within this rural social structure, this group numbered a very small percentage (as discussed earlier). Some of these bureaucrats were local residents, while others were transferred from urban centers. These bureaucratic fractions controlled local policy making and implementation, money allocations and leadership routes, in an attempt to channel local mobilization into bureaucratic planning structures that reassert state control. This created competition for local control of decision-making within the rural petty-bourgeoisie. As the demand for harambee was from poor peasants, the powerful segments of the rural petty-bourgeoisie wanted to stem the mass desire, discourage participation and influence state policy. These powerful segments consisted mainly of

Nairobi centered state employees, who excluded the potential for decision-making, even from the provincial and local state employees by controlling the power involved with harambee.[22]

For the majority of the rural population, harambee projects like the building of secondary schools symbolized the development of opportunity that would lead to wage employment for their children.[23] These relatively poor peasants could not send their children to government aided or private secondary schools, as was generally practiced by the rural petty-bourgeoisie.[24] Therefore harambee schools provided children from poor families, who had graduated with a C.P.E., with secondary schooling opportunity.

The rise of harambee secondary schools in the rural areas of Kenya was motivated and shaped by this large group of peasants and the political manoeuvring of aspiring rural petty-bourgeoisie. Harambee schools reflected the community composition to which they catered. In comparison to government aided and private secondary schools, the children attending harambee secondary schools generally came from families with fathers with the least amount of education, and who were peasant farmers or unskilled labourers.[25] Yet the parental representation on Home-School Associations consisted of a disproportionate number of the wealthier and better educated parents.[26] A number of poor peasants invested in their children's harambee education by selling land and/or cattle in order to afford the fees, and many of their children worked on the family farm or as labourers to help pay for fees, and if possible, to earn pocket money.[27] Harambee provided the peasants with some power and immediate benefits, while demanding monetary sacrifices, and at times, encouraging short term

alliances with the rural petty-bourgeoisie to mount pressure on the bureaucracy for more resources.[28]

As competition increased for government aided and private secondary schooling places, and as the costs for secondary schooling increased, the rural petty-bourgeoisie gained an advantage over the rural poor because of their ability to 'buy' school places away from poor peasants. As a result, this local competition for schooling opportunity under conditions of relative scarcity of educational provision at the secondary level, exacerbated class differences and polarized educational access along class lines causing differentiation and increased local dissatisfaction.[29]

There were many reasons why the intended consequences of harambee did not materialize as expected. The financing to takeover harambee schools became a constant pressure the state could not afford.[30] This pressure took the form of requests at the local level for government takeover of the school. The state responded to such pressure in an ad hoc fashion. It established and used no universal criteria for assuming control of the schools. Consequently, the state responded to such demands opportunistically. This led to the development of a structure of political patronage, wherein, local politicians and other influentials played a critical role in deciding which schools would either be taken over directly by the state or receive state funding. Harambee secondary schools' requests for government support through these patron-client networks increased so rapidly, that state officials pushed for the Ministry of Education to take a more controlling and directive position. In response, the government pledged in 1968 to take-over schools that met certain conditions including such matters as demonstrated effective

management, capacity to implement the curriculum, and support for the development needs of Kenya. This only further encouraged the communities to work harder at constructing harambee schools and lobbying for government assistance.[31]

The rise of harambee secondary schools produced contradictory outcomes regarding distribution, financing and quality. Areas already favoured with the most government aided secondary schools in the Central, Western and Eastern Provinces also increased their number of harambee schools creating more inequality between regions. This pattern of growth of harambee schools created an imbalance, further exacerbating regional inequalities, regional school facilities, and resource takeover. These areas had had a head start in western education, and as high profile political areas were able to lobby quickly and successfully through their patron-client network for government funding to takeover harambee secondary schools, soon after they were established. The poor districts in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, North Eastern and Coast Provinces on the other hand, increased minimally their number of harambee secondary schools in relation to their share of the national population. Generally, in all areas, low participation rates in secondary education continued to exist for children from squatter and seasonal worker households.[32] The result of the rural politics was that a larger number of harambee schools as being built in more advantaged areas and not the less advantaged communities, which continued to demand more equitable educational opportunity.[33]

These government and community responses produced problems of dissatisfaction and unfulfilled expectations. Many harambee schools

waiting for government assistance experienced financial difficulties, partly due to the inexperience of the Board of Trustees and head teachers in budgeting recurrent costs, and partly because the heavy capital input combined with sustained costs became too difficult for local communities to maintain. The inequities in local funding between different areas due to historical, ethnic factors and accumulation practices, created a considerable variability in the quality of available facilities and resources, and in achievement results and selection procedures. The client-patron network articulated demands for funding to make qualitative changes in harambee schools to support student opportunity. However, the continued pressure on the state for change and the state's inability to negotiate, made it difficult for the state to use harambee schooling as a form of incorporating the subordinate classes through the patron-client network into existing power structures and developing a hegemonic context. As a result, the government began to discourage new schools from being built and existing harambee schools from expecting financial assistance. This created political conflict in supporting den. ads from all provinces.[34]

Just as the expectations and practices of the peasants, rural petty-bourgeoisie and the state shaped the secondary school system, attendance at these schools shaped student understanding. Secondary school experience has been seen as an influence on political awareness and practice, as educated youth are more able to recognize the needs of society as a whole and be disposed towards change, than less educated peers.[35] In surveys and discussions done during the 1970s, the better educated group responded with more egalitarian values than primary students.[36] In particular, harambee students, who are the product of a

highly political community, tended to be more involved in political discussions than the secondary students at government aided schools. They may not have had as wide a range of political cognitions, but were aware of the need for daily improvement.[37] Harambee secondary students' understandings continue to be a part of an autonomous, local initiative motivated by a loose national ideology of self-help and an indigenous ideology of acquisitivism.[38]

It is often the informal aspects of schooling, which emanate from a wider environment that mold harambee secondary students' perceptions.[39] Based on their answers in surveys, harambee school students appeared to sense that their options were limited and that they would settle for lower status jobs to earn a living, than the government aided secondary school student.[40] They also had different perceptions of how they related to the political system, and were aware of the favouritism that worked against them.[41] Even the concerns of the teachers for major qualitative changes in harambee schools and in preparing students for tests shaped expectations, and took time away from developing relationships of support. In comparison, in government secondary schools, the concerns of the teaching staff were efficiency and the molding of future leaders, which articulate the technocratic ideology.[42] Harambee secondary students were aware of the marginal link between their schools and the Ministry of Education, and that government aided secondary schools have priority.[43] Their demand for curriculum to be of an academic nature was perceived as a way of equalizing the competition for higher education and status occupation. This competition for educational opportunity by harambee school students and supporters has had far-reaching effects within the

wider community as previously described and within the harambee schools.

The harambee students did not always develop a contextual understanding of the barriers and contradictions of their harambee secondary schooling experience. Their helplessness, confusion and sense of want combined to give their demands, power, in the form of strikes.[44] The majority of student strikes took place in rural schools where quality of facilities, materials and teachers was low, compared to long time state-supported schools.[45] This form of resistance threatened the integrative function of authority and was therefore met with dominant disapproval and state supported punishment. Yet these students, who directly suffered the consequences of declining resources and opportunity, felt that their only recourse was strike action.

Student strikes had several consequences. For one, the students undermined the authority of the head-teacher and classroom teachers. Even though only a portion of students reacted with extreme violence, their motivational experiences and conditions were shared by many more students. The violent form that these strikes took suggest that students interpreted the cause of their unresolved frustration as located within the school and not society at large. There seemed to be little awareness by students that head-teachers had no control over resource allocation.[46] As supportive communication seldom occurred between the head teacher and students, there existed no internal school mechanism to negotiate and mediate the disputes and requests. As a result, the police were often called in to suppress the strikes. In dealing with the student strikes, the Ministry of Education responded with directives that warned and blamed all students for the strike action, while failing to understand the

connection between student dissent and the structure of schooling and schooling practices.[47]

Secondly, the closing of schools affected by strikes by higher authorities only served to further the already evident disparity between the students of more fortunate backgrounds and those from peasant origins by taking away from the latter, educational opportunity and the hope for wage employment. Thirdly, the use of the court system to punish, fine and jail students was just another instance of state coercion to institutionalize dominance, restrict opportunity and deny oppositional discourse.[48]

Finally, the state responded to the student strikes by decreeing, in August 1974, a ban on strikes by both students and workers. The majority of the media expressed the need for the Ministry of Education to deal harshly with the violence and student in-discipline by placing these students in the National Youth Service and having their parents pay for damages. Parent laxity, negative foreign influence and student deviancy were cited as influences motivating student strikes. Only a few editors discussed the need for students to have their grievances heard and to have more responsibility in running their school.[49]

For gaining public awareness and acceptance, the use of violence among students was a tactical error that allowed the state to confuse issues and legitimate its practices. The state emphasized student violence as deviancy started by a specific group of undisciplined students. This shifted the focus of the debate away from understanding the real causes of student discontent and deprived the students of subordinate support. It became difficult for the public to understand the

collective experience of student strikes as grounded in real conditions, when grievances were ignored and the blame placed on a few students.[50] However, incidence of widespread strikes in these secondary schools expressed and reinforced the common perception that expanded schooling had not resulted in greater equality of educational opportunity.[51]

The politics surrounding the rise of the harambee school development in Kenya during the late 1960s and early 1970s were an expression of dissatisfaction over unequal distribution of educational resources and opportunity. As these responses developed into subordinate, collective activities, their main focus was to affect changes at the local level of the schooling structure. At the centralized level of planning, the practices and effects of the potential of the patron-client network surrounding harambee schools and student strikes were not as purposeful or directed. However, their force exacerbated certain contradictions and in some ways, increased the opportunity potential for change as con-structed by subordinate groups of peasants. One example is in the city of Nakuru, where the dissident rural proletariat captured political office, representing the subordinate class.[52] Also, the unemployed but better educated children of this social group have had more opportunity to develop a larger understanding of the inequities and literacy skills through their schooling, than their parents. As a result, they may be better able to pressure the political system for changes in employment opportunity and harambee schooling.

CONCLUSION

In the hierarchy of subordinate rural social classes, the landless peasant has the least opportunity for schooling and social mobility.

Peasants involved in household commodity production have little in terms of life chances and are caught in a contradictory situation. The middle and rich peasant and the rural petty-bourgeoisie have more opportunity because of access to predictable sources of income and political positions of power. These subordinate classes and groups have at times allied with each other in harambee secondary school projects to have more political clout. However, this has not meant more educational opportunity and social accessibility for the poor peasants causing frustrations and dissatisfaction.

The harambee movement evolved from a state initiative to a more negotiable phenomenon between dominant and subordinate interests through the patron-client network, placing high demands on the state for resources, exacerbating contradictory outcomes, and encouraging discontent. Without an understanding of how the dominant structures control schooling opportunity, spasmodic subordinate expressions of anger such as student strikes, have resulted, not necessarily shaping immediate structural changes, but creating the potential for future possibilities. The rise of the harambee movement has provided moments of resistance with consequences that are developing societal potential for structural change. The next chapter will discuss the potential of subordinate resistance in Kenya.

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CHAPTER SIX

SUBORDINATE INTERVENTION: THE POSSIBILITIES FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE WITHIN SCHOOLING

PROLEGOMENA

The two defining features of non-hegemonic social formations such as Kenya, that shape and affect social change are a strongly developed state with matching coercive powers, and a less developed and integrated civil society. While the state limits the degrees of freedom, other civil society institutions in response create more sources of resistance and contradictions. This provides openings for subordinate classes involved in specific institutions like the school, to play a crucial role by taking advantage and creating moments of resistance.

In Kenya, during the 1960s and 70s, the patron-client network involved in harambee secondary schools and the student strikes possessed both reproductive and resistance potential. The patron-client network was seen as a legitimate form of control by the state and as a form of negotiation. Subordinate groups negotiated for guarded access to the public sphere through the patron-client network, so as to discuss issues about inequality and to bargain for resources. Subordinate pressure for change and bureaucratic interest in the control of power has limited the patron-client network's ability to meet all the demands.

Student strikes occurred when their demands for change were ignored. Their attempt to mediate for change through discussion possessed little awareness of institutional relations and individual motivation. These strikes were grounded in the biased experiences of the harambee secondary student, the ideology of acquisitivism and the politics surrounding the patron-client network. The students' attempts to negotiate were negated

by the use of force by themselves and the state, resulting in both the reproduction of dominant control, and the creation of a potential for change.

In Kenya, future change is influenced by the resistance activities within civil society, and in particular, the interaction between the school and the public sphere. These activities and interactions create knowledge that has the potential for more equitable change. As subordinate groups challenge the structure of power, negotiate choices, and participate as a collective within the public sphere, the more potential the patron-client network and the student strikes will be able to realize.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the two forms of resistance in harambee schooling, the patron-client network and student strikes, that contribute towards a future potential for change. The patron-client network possesses varying degrees of political effectiveness. The network is influenced by contradictions and the reliance on coerced stability. As subordinate groups develop awareness of the limitations of the network and continue to make demands of it, their actions contribute towards alternative political practice. The student strikes had no immediate effect on the disparity experienced by the students, weakened the legitimating ideology of meritocracy and demonstrated public intolerance to dissent.

The last section highlights the public sphere as a site in civil society, where subordinate and dominant groups interact. Knowledge is produced and reproduced as a result. For this process to be meaningful for subordinate groups, there must exist collective practice in the civil

society between the school and the public sphere. Then potential change will be realized. The chapter ends with some important consequences of subordinate activity.

FORMS OF RESISTANCE WITHIN HARAMBEE SCHOOLING: THE PATRON-CLIENT NETWORK AND STUDENT STRIKES

The harambee creation of secondary schools during the 1960s and early 1970s possessed reproductive elements and resistance potential. It grew from a state initiative to placate local demands into activities motivated by local initiative and collective political action. The self-help rhetoric provided motivation for groups to influence historical disparity. The political practices of patron-client hierarchies engendered in the subordinate groups, particularly, the poor rural peasants and workers, who are the majority social group in the rural social structure, a degree of negotiating skill, and a base from which to affect the centralized distribution of resources. However, as the movement grew, the early independence and self-responsibility of community projects became structured under bureaucratic control. In areas where the local Member of Parliament had influence with the state, harambee projects became valued as political showpieces but without commitment for long term consideration and support from the state. In areas with less political influence, the patron-client network could not always support the maintenance of harambee projects. Student strikes, as one form of response, began with political action to mediate for change, through discussion, before erupting into violence. This general lack of political effectiveness differentially affected the radical potential of subordinate activities, the level of state support and the degree of local

dissatisfaction within the harambee movement.

The push for harambee secondary schooling to promote more equality of opportunity has made it difficult for centralized planning and uncontrolled community activity to ultimately support the same logic without contradiction and resistance.' For example, increased harambee secondary schooling has made economic absorption of student graduates more difficult. These contradictions challenge the state's autonomy, accumulation practices and institutionalized dominance. As the state intensifies its use of legitimating rhetoric, its justifications are further separated from the everyday social conditions of the majority. As a result, the increased reliance on coerced stability increases the risk of societal disintegration. In response, subordinate groups can attempt to mediate contradictions as part of the public sphere. It is through political and collective activities that a subordinate source of logic can develop. Such awareness and activity is necessary as contradictions and disparities controlled at one level can re-emerge in a different form elsewhere in the opportunity structure to challenge the state.

As subordinate groups slowly extend oppositional behaviour into more effective forms of resistance, the elements with which to confront and engage structural power will evolve.² For example, as expectations and aspirations were not met through harambee secondary school experiences, poor adults and students became more susceptible to developing awareness and more prone to questioning those with authority. The patron-client network surrounding harambee schooling projects became riddled with demands, pressure and contradictions due to its inability effectively to

negotiate concerns that challenged the structures of dominance and control.

The patron-client network provided harambee supporters with a single legitimate form of political negotiation in the public sphere. The beginning of resistance was the symbolic awareness of this power network and of schooling as a political site. As subordinate groups realized the limitations of the state controlled network and public sphere, they could accept domination as a dynamic that is not complete. By using the patron-client form of political negotiation and contesting the inequalities of schooling in the public sphere, subordinate action plans focussed on demands and developed insights with the potential for broader scope and long term power.

Subordinate activity has the potential to attempt different social relations, experiment with forms of political practice and develop alternative logic. It would seem that change in political patronage in some communities across Kenya was possibly a demonstration of local, political control. The continued demand for expanded schooling opportunities and to develop autonomy and control over distribution of resources did result in the creation of harambee technological institutes. Harambee projects, motivated by a mixture of capitalist and alternative logic embedded within the social conditions, developed the potential for a future tendency for political collectives to realize group objectives, rewards and power. As subordinate groups negotiate conflict and contradictions, resistance practices increase and involve more mediation and activity motivated by alternative logic.

As with the patron-client network in the movement for harambee secondary schools, student strikes attempted to negotiate perceived contradictions. At different levels in the construction of social experience, the effects of student strikes at once supported dominant reproduction, diffused a degree of political awareness, and constituted a radical potential. The strikes were based on shared experiences but were not grounded in an understanding of societal dynamics or an appreciation of school relations as discussed in Chapter Five. Due to the failure on the part of participating students to perceive and understand the relationship of schooling to specific social and historical conditions in Kenya, the immediate emancipatory potential of student strikes was diminished and the institutional bases of disparity remained untouched and unchallenged.

The students' behaviour and demands centred on their own immediacy of conditions as described in Chapter Four. The projection of their anger did not show an understanding of the real interdependence between power, economic resources, and social conditions as also described in Chapter Four. The motivation behind their strikes demonstrated a diffused form of resistance at an individual level of concern. The group action during the strike violence gave form to their immediate perceptions regarding accountability about school deficiencies. The strike violence was not a collective, political action motivated by alternative logic to engage the dominant authority as much as it was a reaction to the continued lack of attention by authority.

In many cases students requested meetings with school authorities to discuss concerns. These students perceived the material differences

that existed between other students, schools and themselves. To be in secondary schools and feel justified in making demands, demonstrates a certain degree of belief in the legitimation rhetoric. The students' negotiations began with a sense of hope that their initial negotiation attempts would be heard. However in the Kenyan structure of schooling, there is no negotiation mechanism or room for interaction initiated by subordinate groups. The student requests to authority to justify and rectify the lack of equal opportunity threatened dominant control over schooling and the legitimation power of the state.

The government controlled the one-sided debate over student strikes in the public sphere by stressing the violent nature and lack of discipline shown by the striking students. As already mentioned, in Chapter Five, the use of violence denied immediate potential for developing subordinate support. The immediate radical potential of the striking students became negated because of the coercive logic underlying their behaviour. Their violence was based on negative power and reflected the logic of dominance, but in reverse. The striking students could see the negative effects of the authoritarian decision-making on their life chances, but could not apply the same self-awareness to their own behaviour. As stated in Chapter Five, the striking students were labelled deviant in the public sphere which gave the state a "legitimate" pretext and chance for repression of oppositional behaviour and for a portrayal of student grievances as inconsequential.

The eruption of violence during the student strikes served to reproduce the dominant response to re-establish coerced and immediate stability, but the student strikes also showed that the institutionaliza-

tion of dominance is not complete, in that it still had to depend on direct application of coercion. It is necessary for poor, subordinate groups to develop autonomy within and from state structures of domination like the patron-client network, to confront local bureaucracy and non-subordinate politicians. Within these processes exist the seeds of discontent and resistance as potential sources of social changes which subordinate groups may yet again bring about starting with schools as an important political site.

THE EFFECT OF RESISTANCE ON CAPACITY AND POTENTIAL IN SCHOOLING AND SOCIETY

In Kenya, one site where societal capacity for change and reproduction is shaped and developed within the public sphere is the school. The shared belief that harambee secondary schooling provides equality of educational opportunity and wage employment, creates contradictions. These contradictions provide a common basis from which subordinate collectives contest forms of inequality within civil society. The practices and world views of dominant and subordinate groups confront and interact with each other in all cultural sites in civil society and through such interaction produce alternative and latent knowledge for societal problem solving. Schooling can produce, form, and limit the potential of this knowledge which shapes societal capacity for change within civil society.

The societal capacity for solving system problems and for creating subordinate opportunity in civil society is shaped by antagonistic relations, political institutions and social forms like the patron-client network. These produce unequal experiences and practices which produce

different meanings in school and are informed by varying degrees of power. These practices and experiences mediate and negotiate pressures for domination and pressures for change. Societal capacity for change is limited by the degree of mediation and negotiation schools can perform in Kenya's civil society.

The lack of a shared, common sense culture within a potentially integrative structure, such as the school can support dominant control in schools and civil society. However, as resistance potential and subordinate opportunity take the form of empowerment in school, collective action reflects, shapes and mediates contradictions. The patron-client network and student strikes are examples of such attempts. Such capacity for change is dependent upon the appropriation of knowledge, that supports understanding and produces new forms of oppositional power. The potential of such consciousness to become meaningful occurs when reality is increasingly interpreted and practised within alternative world views and forms of resistance developed by subordinate activities in school.[3]

In Kenya, schooling is a site where resistance activities contest the present structure of power in order to form and negotiate alternative choices. Schooling in Kenya is increasingly linked to public criticism and expectations through the patron-client network. This affects the potential of school learning to positively affect change. As active and observant participants become educated, they develop critical understanding that promotes political literacy, progressive coalitions, and a more continuous momentum.[4] The capacity for learning in schools and elsewhere in society is based on an individual and collective capacity. As collective structures and interpretation systems such as patron-client

network change and allow for increased access to individual learners, the unequal nature and effects of Kenyan schooling can change. Resistance activities that demonstrate elements of collective power and alternative logic in school have the continual potential to expand learning capacity.

The harambee secondary students through a shared consciousness, attempted to develop a collective power. At one level, these students were provided with unequal resources and treated as losers by the state and dominant structures. At another level, their differential experiences and moments of opposition and resistance possess the potential to combine and develop a collective mechanism for political mediation and control of dominant power. Other subordinate students not involved in these acts of resistance, have had their social awareness heightened also. As all these students mature, they may work to keep the issue of equal opportunity in schooling a part of the public sphere through the patron-client network, reflecting their hope for change. As adults, they may discover more subversive forms of resistance that undermine authority, and politicize their intolerance for state rhetoric and practices. These students face the decision of accepting the dominance of capitalist logic or developing an alternative logic.

Other important consequences have resulted from the students' attempt at resistance. The negotiation and mediation behaviour, and demand for modern discipline by many of the students reflected a beginning awareness about the complexity of power and control. These students demonstrated alternative logic, by approaching the power hierarchy in an uninstitutionalized manner, and requesting a change in social relations and responsibilities. In their experiences rooted, perhaps, in the

politics surrounding the patron-client network, the students perceived autonomous sources of power and used this knowledge in their problem-solving. The students' lack of political experience and control forced certain student strikes to rely upon power in its more familiar form of violence. Partially as a result of these students' actions, researchers are examining more closely the internal dynamics of schooling in Kenya.

The future potential of schooling to affect unequal conditions is rooted within the individual and community initiatives of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These include the patron-client network within harambee secondary schools, student strikes, the village polytechnic institutes of technology, and the nine year school cycle.[5] These societal challenges develop mediation potential to challenge the dominant coercive structures. Effective changes will evolve in schools and other social sites in civil society as a result, which support subordinate opportunity and the capacity to develop more equitable opportunity.

CONCLUSION

The lack of integration between institutions in civil society is ridden with constraints and state coercion, but also with contradictions and political disputes that provide subordinate groups opportunity to negotiate. As a result, change is not predetermined or completely one-sided, but evolves in a tug and pull manner through negotiation and mediation. The effects are not always immediate but contribute toward the societal capacity for change. To understand change, it is crucial to appreciate the actors involved in resistance, particularly their past experiences and knowledge, their present expectations and interactions, and their future options, so as to have a clearer picture of how change

and reproduction are reciprocally shaped. In non-hegemonic societies like Kenya, the dynamics of social change are played within the relatively underdeveloped civil society where the risks are decisive and abrupt, and the future benefits are substantial.

The final chapter will examine the conclusions raised throughout this study, how certain analytical terms were effectively employed and the possibilities and limitations.

ENDNOTES

1. Court and Kinyanjui. "Development Policy and Educational Opportunity: The Experience of Kenya and Tanzania," _Regional Disparities in Educational Development_. Gabriel Carron and Ta Ngoc Chau (eds.) Paris: UNESCO, 1980, p. 361, 401.

2. Giroux, _op. cit._, p. 200.

3. _Ibid._, p. 14-24.

4. Apple. "Reproduction, Contestation, and Curriculum: An Essay in Self-Criticism," _Interchange_. Vol. 12, Nos. 2-3, 1981.

5. Court and Kinyanjui, _op. cit._, p. 402.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

PROLEGOMENA

The objective of this study has been to understand the context of social change particularly in Kenya, a Third World peripheral capitalist social formation, by focusing on the relations between dominant and subordinate classes and groups within the state and civil society, regarding the provision of schooling. This study has attempted to demonstrate how dominant and subordinate classes and groups in Kenya, reproduce, negotiate, resist and mediate structures of domination within schooling, and as a result, affect the societal capacity for change. As previously mentioned in Chapter One, the reinterpretation of the findings and data from previously published research literature through a reformulated framework have been guided by these questions: What are the forms of resistance in Kenya's secondary schooling? What are the limits of these forms of resistance? What is their potential for mediating social change?

Cultural change is an important concept within the forces of social change. Countries such as Kenya, where attempts to change the forms of inequality are met with political and economic coercion, movements and structures that promote cultural change are often localized and sporadic. Presently, the most negotiable avenue for social change in Kenya in which subordinate interests can become articulated and incorporated is the one offered within the institutions of their poorly integrated civil society by the public system of education.

The first half of this chapter summarizes the conclusions developed within each chapter. The last half discusses the concepts of negotiation, resistance and mediation as part of cultural change, and highlights the limitations and possibilities arising from the use of this framework in this study.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In Third World social formations like Kenya, social change is not a smooth, transitional process because the peripheral capitalist social structure lacks mechanisms to negotiate inequality, opportunity and subordinate demands. This study has explored the processes at work in society and schooling in Kenya that shape social change and that are articulated within schooling as a site for both structures of domination and resistance activities. A major concern of this study has been to identify in Kenya processes of social change and forms of resistance that contribute towards the societal capacity for future change.

Chapters Two and Three describe and compare the processes of social change between First World social formations and peripheral capitalist formations like Kenya. A potent force for social change is cultural and political activity. Such activity is shaped to conform to the dominant worldview and the state's interests. The state possesses relatively more political autonomy and control over institutions in peripheral capitalist societies in comparison to First World social formations. The degree of autonomy in the former society is historically rooted in its colonial origins and is partially shaped by its reliance largely on coercion to obtain acceptance and maintain social control in a poorly integrated and weak civil society. In First World formations, the degree of state

autonomy is shaped largely by consensus. Dominant cultural and political activity is differentially institutionalized to reproduce inequality and biased opportunity in a way that supports and reinforces the relative autonomy enjoyed by the state in both types of societies. However, the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the state in each case is very different.

The state attempts to negotiate and displace economic inequality and contradictions within political structures in order to minimize potential disruption. In First World formations, the state's activities are integrated with the civil society and enjoy a degree of legitimacy. This degree of consensus influences the access subordinate groups have to the public sphere to discuss issues. In peripheral capitalist societies, specifically Kenya, on the other hand, the strong autonomy of the state which ironically is the result of its failure to strike deep roots in the civil society, prevents an integrated relationship from developing between the state and civil society. There is a lack of legitimate acceptance by subordinate groups of the dominant cultural and political activity of the state. As a result, the state is not able to politically negotiate the economic contradictions, minimize the negative political and cultural consequences, or develop an integrated relationship with civil society. Subordinate groups are controlled, not by legitimate state activities and consensus, but by force in order to minimize potential disruptions.

Chapters Two and Three provide the theoretical context for understanding the similarities and differences between both types of societies. Traditionally, First World interpretations of social change within Third World social formations overestimate the dominant processes as complete and one-sided. There are fundamental differences between both

types of societies, which have an effect on the processes of social change, and on theoretical interpretations.

Chapter Four in this study attempts to examine the dominant practices in Kenya, particularly of the Kikuyu, and to illustrate the indigenous structures of domination as open-ended. Third World formations like Kenya possess very specific and historical tendencies. These shape the role and nature of dominant practices in gaining acquiescence through the use of coercion and foreclosing of visible alternatives. However, this does not lead to the disappearance of resistance activities, but only to the erection of powerful social and political barriers. The state acts against subordinate struggles for more equitable change, especially in institutions like schooling.

Chapter Four describes how the patron-client network as an institutionalized form of control has been linked to inequality and monopolized dominant accessibility favouring the Kikuyu. This network continues to be the only legitimate form of negotiation and is controlled through bureaucratic and state practices and agencies. The ideology and practices of self help supported the patron-client network of control and legitimacy, partly by delegating responsibility for social services to the community. However, in response, subordinate groups were able to capitalize on opportunities that more or less successfully challenged the stress on centralization of decision-making and distribution of resources. The patron-client network as a form of control and negotiation partially functioned to mediate the consequences of inherent tendencies such as unequal resource distribution and household commodity production. Within social sites such as schooling, the negotiation of institutionalized

accessibility and inequality challenged the structures of dominant opportunity.

Chapter Four also explains how structures and forms of domination in Kenya's schooling reflect a historical pattern of regional and ethnic differences that support the dominant opportunity structure. The dominant political response to this pattern has been to expand schooling opportunity and to institutionalize the ideology of meritocracy. This has had the consequence of reproducing differing experiences of dominant and subordinate inequality. The centralized control of schooling shapes differing opportunity and schooling experiences that are linked to the specific skills and knowledge to be learnt, differential rates of test-taking success, promotion within schooling, and occupational opportunity and mobility. This control also creates discontinuities and contradictions such as harambee school funding expectations and a growing realization that the schooling-social mobility linkage is false. The domination practices in schooling are related to the historical conditions that have promoted the economic and political dominance of the Kikuyu.

Chapter Five describes and discusses the social context of capitalist tendencies, acquisitivism ideology, and an increasingly, differentiated social structure, all of which affect subordinate relations and opportunities in Kenya. Contradictions between capitalist market forces and household production regarding land ownership, entrenchment of property rights, the expansion of the reproduction of capital, and the control of direct consumption versus that produced elsewhere have given rise to new structures of inequality. Such contradictions have been embedded in the relative poverty of the peasant commodity production and

in the political and ethnic conflict over unequal distribution of resources and opportunity. This internal dynamic of conflict has spawned quite distinct dominant and subordinate responses to changing social relations throughout the social structure, especially within schooling.

Harambee schooling, which grew out of the patron-client network and the self-help ideology, developed into a form of subordinate demand that contradicted forms of centralized control. As harambee students and parents began to realize the lack of a schooling-social mobility linkage, they responded by demanding change that emphasized individual mobility inherent in the ideology of meritocracy. Just as parents negotiated within the patron-client network for financial support to influence distribution of resources, a number of harambee students were involved in school strikes to demonstrate their perceived lack of equal resources and opportunity in schooling. The structures of domination within the harambee organization of schooling repressed and restricted the potential of such efforts and the perceptions of available options for parents and students to influence change. As a result, demands for individual realization of opportunity continued at the expense of long-term involvement and consolidation of organized, subordinate groups. However, the negotiated and spasmodic activities of resistance also possessed corporate and emancipatory potential.

In Chapter Six, the analysis focuses on the seeds of discontent within schooling as a potential source for resistance activities, political collaboration and social change. Participation in the patron-client network, student strikes and harambee schooling has encouraged access to and involvement in the public sphere to negotiate differentiated

power relations and understandings. In Kenya, this participation often did not include an understanding of the interdependence between power, resources and opportunity within the larger social context. Therefore, the subordinate groups' focus on the immediacy of their unequal conditions met with coercive and abrupt forms of institutionalized dominance. Such interaction encouraged societal "instability", which tended to limit the negotiating capacity of dominant practices, while providing openings for corporate activity by subordinate groups. Our analysis in Chapter Six suggests that within subordinate activity, there exists the potential for subordinate negotiating capacity to increase and provide more opportunity to mediate contradictions and disjunctions.

Within Kenya's civil society, such resistance activity is grounded in the everyday practices and conditions, and possesses emancipatory potential. The lack of an integrated relationship between the state and civil society, and of a shared common sense ideology in Kenya limits the availability of legitimate forms of negotiation and mediation practices. In Kenya, schooling is recognized as a political site of domination and opportunity. Not only are domination structures articulated here, but alternative expectations are expressed and produced as well. As alternative expectations are interpreted and practised in and out of schooling; the appropriation of knowledge contributes to a cognitive potential in society that not only sows the seeds of discontent but shapes and directs its expression. As subordinate groups question dominant inequality, they can develop and practise alternative expectations through collective action. In civil society, schooling can be a site and a process that recognizes domination as incomplete, empowers subordinate

activity, and integrates alternative expectations with other institutions.

Chapters Five and Six address the role of subordinate groups in creating the potential for change through schooling. For subordinate groups, the negotiating potential of the patron-client network combined with the self-help ideology has produced opportunity for social change to be developed and shaped in unprecedented ways. Subordinate groups that incorporated over specific issues, such as schooling quality in the student strikes, were able to intervene in social processes to negotiate dominant intentions and responses so as to affect social relations. The discussions in Chapters Five and Six reveal that inherent within resistance activities is the negotiating and mediating potential to shape future possibilities.

In Kenya, a coercive social formation, forms of resistance such as the patron-client network and student strikes are cultural and political activities that shape social change within civil society. The lack of socially integrated relations between institutions in the civil society creates difficulties for subordinate cultural and political activities to evolve into an organized movement; but at the same time, these activities create more contradictions, resistance and some autonomy from the coercive domination of the state. Grounded in the everyday conditions, subordinate resistance can over time negotiate the incomplete and contradictory practices of domination and can mediate social change by discovering emancipatory potential through corporate activity.

DISCUSSION

In this study, three analytical concepts were employed to better describe the processes of social change within Kenya. These concepts are

negotiation, resistance and mediation, and are crucial to understanding subordinate activity as it responds to structures of domination and pressures for social change.

The challenge to understand social change and domination has been explored through different theories with varying degrees of success. Theories of reproduction look at dominant structures and practices, and describe the consequences for subordinate groups as one-sided. Economic structures are seen as the powerful agent of control favouring dominant intentions. Theories of correspondence describe economic dominance as reflected in cultural sites such as schooling. Contradictions, negotiations and disruptions do not play a crucial role in the interactions between dominant and subordinate groups and classes. These theories lack an interpretation of the role subordinate classes and groups play in response to social pressures, and interruptions, and in creating the potential for social change.

Theories of resistance attempt to focus on ideological and political activity as not just constituted, but also as constituting of both dominant and subordinate practices. Relations and practices are perceived to be embedded in the everyday conditions and forces that shape and are shaped by the interaction between dominant and subordinate groups. This results in incomplete and mutable structures that are not simply externally created and reproduced, but are negotiated and mediated by social forces. Ideology is an important social force that develops dominant and subordinate worldviews and practices, which at times support a common worldview while developing contradictory experiences. Theories of resistance provide a direction and a capacity for placing in context

the dynamics of relationships between dominant and subordinate classes, and in understanding the potential of subordinate activity.

In understanding and applying theories of resistance, it becomes necessary to better recognize and identify the processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation as multi-level issues dealing with social change and reproduction. These processes do not occur in a linear and sequential order, but shape differing consequences and intentions which cannot always be foreseen or predicted in advance throughout the society. As a result, it is difficult to conceptualize and analyze elements of these processes as predictable and complete intentions and settlements. These processes need to be explored empirically in order to develop the concepts more fully as analytical tools.

In using these concepts to better understand the social dynamics of change in Kenya, it becomes necessary to see their differences, while still maintaining an awareness of the interrelatedness between these processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation. These analytical concepts have served to refine and enrich our exploration and analysis, in Kenya's schooling, of subordinate activity for change, especially within forms of resistance.

Through the work of Habermas, awareness has been developed of how problem-solving activity is dependent upon and contributes towards a societal capacity for latent knowledge and the capacity for change. Gramsci's description of civil society and ideology provided a framework for identifying the negotiation between dominant and subordinate classes, and for analyzing how over time subordinate classes resist dominant structures and practices, and create moments of mediation that transform

structural forces and relations. The work of Giroux and Livingstone helped explore the constitution and constituting of subordinate groups, and the role of resistance and ideological force within civil societal institutions such as schooling. The challenge has been to transfer these concepts developed in First World analyses to an analysis of a social formation like Kenya, with minimal integrated relations and a coercive state.

These analytical concepts provide a framework and a direction for identifying and analyzing the collective efforts of subordinate groups and classes for developing emancipatory potential within the dynamic context of reproduction and change. The intentions and reactions of dominant and subordinate classes can be viewed at a variety of social levels and across institutions and spheres. The historical development of social formations can be linked with present forms and practices to analyze and predict the societal capacity for future possibilities. What is needed are indepth empirical and analytical studies that explore the role of subordinate resistance and its contribution to development of the capacity for social change in both more and less developed formations, in order to refine and specify these concepts.

A limitation of this study has been its lack of empirical research and data collected through research and observation. This leads to a second limitation that affects the reinterpretation of secondary data. The reliance on theoretical analyses could mask crucial gaps of knowledge and information and reflect undisclosed biases. As a result, this framework which has been developed to identify and analyze the processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation that support the subordinate role

in social change and reproduction in Kenya, can be said to have received only a tentative support in this study.

These limitations have created a need for a broad theoretical grounding to ensure analytical relevancy. From this develop two crucial areas of research promising of further possibilities. The first area focuses on the fundamental differences between First and Third World social formations. The constitution and the role of subordinate classes, and the processes of negotiation, resistance and mediation are articulated differently within the two types of societies. The accumulation practices, the number of dominant and subordinate classes, the coercive state and an unintegrated civil society constitute a context that makes every settlement between different groups a tenuous issue. Further studies could elaborate more on these social formation differences, how subordinate classes and groups are constituted, and the relations between these processes, settlements and the potential for change.

The second area for further research is a more focused study of those structures and processes located in the civil society as distinct from the state as a site for subordinate activity in Third World formations. Possibilities could include identifying and analyzing structures of negotiation, forms of resistance and the potential for mediated change. Conjunctures and contradictions pressure the system problems and produce crises that create difficulties for subordinate groups to reconstitute. Investigating such structural relations, tendencies and consequences within specific institutions of the civil society is another research possibility that could support an understanding of the differences between forms of institutionalized

dominance and the hegemonic social formation.

Every social formation is in the process of change, as the forces of domination and resistance interact and become constituted by the processes of change and reproduction. Each society develops a capacity for reproducing itself and for creating a potential for change. In Kenya, the coercive practices of the state and a lack of ideological integration make it difficult, but not impossible for subordinate groups to reconstitute and realize opportunities for mediation. Kenya, as a peripheral capitalist formation may reflect a continuity of dominance, but it is also a society where profound changes are occurring through forms of resistance.

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