

Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy
Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro

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Family Trees: Sympathy, Comparison, and the Proliferation of the Passions in Hume and his Predecessors

Amy M. Schmitter

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Abstract and Keywords

Hume dubbed his *Treatise* account of the passions “new and extraordinary” — an assessment echoed by many contemporary scholars, who find his analysis of the social operation of the emotions particularly innovative. But Hume's explanation of how passions and sentiments are transferred, shared, reflected, and reverberate among persons through the mechanisms of sympathy, has several important precursors, including both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Even more strikingly, Malebranche describes mechanisms for the communication of passions remarkably similar to Hume's “sympathy” and “comparison”. Many of the roles that Hume assigns our socially generated and transmitted passions in generating social cohesion and shared standards of rationality may also be anticipated by Hobbes (and Spinoza). What remains most distinctive of Hume's account is his view that both social cohesion and epistemic authority can be founded on, and forwarded by, a genuine division of affective labor.

Keywords: Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Malebranche, Spinoza, passion, sentiment, reflection (reflexion), sympathy, comparison

1. A new and extraordinary account?

In 1757, a reviewer of David Hume’s work on the passions complained that it “contain[ed] nothing new or entertaining on the occasion,” while another commented that this would not be worth mentioning “if we were not talking of an author fond of novelty.”[1] Yet Hume himself considered his account of the passions not only “new,” but also “extraordinary.” Time has favored Hume’s assessment over those of his critics. Recently, Jane McIntyre praised Hume’s ingenuity in conceiving of the passions as regulated by a social discipline enabled through sympathy, rather than by a supposedly hegemonic reason. Others single out the “double relation of ideas and impressions,[2] while Hume’s “Abstract” to the *Treatise* identified the use of the principle of association as his main claim to the “glorious” name of inventor.[3] Each of these suggestions is plausible, but to see what is truly distinctive about Hume’s contribution to the philosophical explanation of our emotions requires locating his account in its native habitat. Doing so, however, is no easy task, since Hume is often coy about the provenance of many of his basic concepts and taxonomies, even when they clearly (p.256) owe a great

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deal to his immediate and not-so-immediate forerunners. My plan here is to consider the genealogy of some elements of Hume's account of the passions and sentiments, that is, impressions of reflection, as a way of identifying a few candidates for what is "new and entertaining" in his approach. Hume's account does not achieve its originality *ex nihilo* but by adopting, adapting, reimagining, and reassembling previous views, by giving elements in them new prominence and new functions, and by crossbreeding them with seemingly alien positions. So general a claim should surprise nobody, but perhaps the genealogies I trace will reveal slightly different and more variegated roots to Hume's family tree than those usually recognized, while illuminating the new and extraordinary dynamics of his understanding of our passionate communication.

2. Variations on reflection

One trend among recent commentators I will follow is taking Hume's commitments to naturalism and to recognizing our status as social animals as characteristic of his "science of man." Both inform Lilli Alanen's proposals for "new ideas central to Hume's treatment of emotions," one of which "is the idea of reflection which is constitutive for the passions themselves as impressions."[4] Important though reflection is to Hume, the notion is not new; at least the vocabulary appears in a number of Hume's immediate British predecessors. The most general sense can be found in Locke, who introduces "reflexion" as a source of "internal" experience, a form of receptive perception that is comparable, though subsequent to sense-perception. Although he does not adopt Locke's notion of introspective perception, Hume also maintains that impressions of reflection constitute a form of experience.

More closely allied to Hume's precise sense are the ways Shaftesbury and Hutcheson use reflection. For Shaftesbury, the "moral sense" rests on reflection, since reflected affections, that is, "sentiments," are both the source of our moral judgments and their objects.[5] Hume too declares that our moral distinctions are founded on sentiments, and those sentiments are directed at people's characters, particularly at the ingrained passionate dispositions motivating actions. But whereas Shaftesbury keeps the notion found in Locke of reflection as a perceptual faculty purely receptive of its content, Hume maintains that our reflective acts help *constitute* the objects on which we reflect. That is one reason for classifying our passions and sentiments as impressions of reflection, rather than of sense: they are responses to such perceptions that go beyond what is received therein (see THN 3.1.1.25–26; SBN 468–469).

In taking this stance, Hume draws deeply from Hutcheson's sentimentalism, which has its own concept of reflection. Hutcheson maintains that our moral judgments bottom out in emotions belonging to the moral sense. The moral sense is posterior to other sense modalities, for it requires reflection on them, but as is true of "affections" or " (p.257) passions" in general, it also constitutes an ampliative response to them.[6] By taking reflection to mark the difference between immediate sensations and affections, Hutcheson's use anticipates Hume's distinction between impressions of sensation and reflective

impressions (comprising "passions" and "sentiments"). Hutcheson also anticipates Hume's arguments about the animating force in our intentional actions[7] by tying the reflective element in affections and passions to their capacity to motivate.

Nonetheless, the differences between the two sentimentalisms are telling. For despite the modifications just described, Hutcheson still seems to assume the Lockean view of reflection as introspective perception, distinguished from external perception mainly by taking internal objects.[8] In contrast, Hume's classification of our reflective perceptions as *impressions* gives them a very different status. Hume understands his concept-empiricism to rule out deriving new content from the perception of ideas, even from the introspective perception of ideas already gained from external sense. Since reflective, secondary impressions introduce content into our psychology, they cannot count simply as perceptions of the workings of our own mind: instead, they are genuinely new kinds of experience. What we will see is that this new kind of experience has its own complicated dynamics.

3. A context for sympathy

Let me turn now to two other themes Alanen finds in Hume's approach to the passions: one is "the introduction of special psychological laws to explain the causes, associations, and effects of the passions governing our behavior; [another is] the bodily and behavioral expressions of passions through which they are communicated to and affect others, to be reflected back on us by their emotional reactions and behavior."[9] Both, she admits, "are anticipated by Spinoza." But I doubt that Spinoza should be singled out on either count. Spinoza does present covering-law explanations of our emotions as part of his naturalistic program,[10] but a generally similar naturalism appears earlier in Hobbes, and even Descartes and Malebranche, the last of whom precedes Hume in championing "the science of man."[11] And although Spinoza's understanding of the social communication of the passions shows some striking similarities to details of Hume's account,[12] it is unlikely that Spinoza was a genuine influence on, much less (p.258) model for, Hume's particular account, since his views were transmitted to Hume mainly through Bayle's *Dictionary*.[13] There are more likely sources for Hume's

understanding of the mechanism and medium for passionate communication.

Here let us look to the roots of the term “sympathy” itself. The very etymology of “sympathy” suggests the reception of a shared or similar effect. Andrew Cunningham argues that before the eighteenth century, sympathy was usually considered a broad natural principle, rather than a special psychological one,[14] describing a general “affinity” and likeness of response across space and time. An early seventeenth-century commentary on Pliny similarly characterizes the principle as “a fellow-feeling … for the agreement or amitie naturell in divers senselesse things, as betweene yron and the loadstone.”[15] Much the same sense appears in Aristotle, who cites a general principle argumentatively and in commonplaces at *Rhetoric* 1371b14–15. As a broad natural principle of affinity, sympathy indicates that two things are affected in similar ways; as a *basic* natural principle, that affinity needs no further causal mechanism to explain how it produces similar effects, even when those effects are separated widely in space and time.

Considered as such a broad, basic natural principle, sympathy received a great deal of ridicule from early modern philosophers, including Spinoza (E3P15S) and Hume (THN 1.4.3.10–11; SBN 224–225), mainly because it seemed that sympathy could only be measured by similarity of effect, making any appeal to a principle of affinity circular and explanatorily vacuous. Then too, sympathy seemed to violate the dictum of no action at a distance. But as Cunningham documents, the notion of sympathy did not utterly disappear: many eighteenth-century theorists simply restricted the notion to the applicability of the psychology of the passions.[16] Still, demoting sympathy from a basic natural principle, while curtailing its application, makes it a phenomenon in need of an explanation: just what is the mechanism by which the like-to-like transfer takes place? Consider the vicissitudes of the physiological sense of “sympathy,” used to mark how a body with spatially distributed parts could nonetheless exhibit a systematic unity, or more generally, “a relation between two bodily organs or parts (or between two persons) such that disorder, or any condition, of the one induces a corresponding condition in the other.”[17] Although such sympathy was originally thought sufficient to explain how corresponding effects could appear between widely separated parts of the

body, seventeenth and eighteenth-century physicians such as Thomas Willis and Hermann Boorhaave appealed to the actions of the nerves and other body parts for (p.259) an underlying causal account of the mutual influences on distinct parts of the body.[18] Those actions could, in turn, be explained using the basic mechanical principles of the new science.

Another root for Hume's account is the long history of the concept of a process for transmitting emotions, found in areas as diverse as aesthetic theory, pedagogy, and rhetoric. Books 2 and 3 of Plato's *Republic*, for instance, worry that mimetic arts such as theater, poetry, and even music tend to generate emotions resembling those expressed or represented.[19] An especially durable line of thought sprang from rhetoric, following Aristotle's suggestion that audiences need psychological preparation to be susceptible to various truths, even inherently plausible ones. On this view, a particularly important task of rhetoric is to prepare an audience by arousing appropriate emotions in it. How those emotions are to be aroused is a further matter; several important authors after Aristotle assume that the most effective mechanism was a literal *communication* of emotions [*pathê*], whereby emotions are aroused through some sort of mimetic identification, either in character or in emotional state,[20] as when an effective speaker conveys emotions she feels, expresses, or describes herself. Both Cicero and Quintilian take the strong position that an orator must feel, or at least simulate, the passions to arouse pity in an audience: "Where there is occasion for moving compassion too, we must endeavor to believe and to feel convinced that the evils of which we complain have actually happened to ourselves."[21] Quintilian's view implies that such communication works according to a principle of resemblance, generating passions *like* those expressed by the speaker (even if directed at different targets), so that the social proliferation of passions is a matter of like-to-like transfer. Taking such a view thus gives the traditional sense of "sympathy" a ready application for characterizing the transmission of resembling passions across persons, even when sympathetic processes rest on more fundamental causal mechanisms.

4. Malebranche and Hume on the communication of the passions

We can, I suggest, find many of the considerations I've just described coming together in Malebranche's work, particularly in Part V of his *Search After Truth*, which is devoted to the passions insofar as they "move us mainly in order to link us to all sensible things for the preservation of society and of our sensible being" (LO 377). Malebranche may (p.260) only rarely be appreciated as an influence on Hume's account of the passions,[22] but his role in inspiring several generations of British philosophers is widely recognized:[23] Hutcheson examines Malebranche's taxonomy of the passions at length (EI 49–51), and Hume himself recommends consulting Malebranche's *Search after Truth* to "comprehend the metaphysical Parts of [his] Reasoning."[24] Despite Hume's boasts that other parts of his thought have "little Dependence on all former systems of Philosophy," many elements of his associationist psychology are also foreshadowed in Malebranche, including much of the account of the social communication of the passions. Consider the way Malebranche extends the association of ideas and emotions *across* persons. To start, he describes the mechanical effects of experiencing a passion on the movements of the blood and animal spirits. Because of these movements, a passion produces facial expressions and other sensible bodily effects, such as bearing, changes of color, words, and cries, within the individual who experiences it. Perceiving these outer symptoms of the passions, other humans (or even animals) find their imaginations stirred (LO 166). That, in turn, initiates a series of bodily changes, which culminates in arousing yet another passion in the observer. The causal basis of the process, Malebranche insists, is entirely mechanical:

> I cannot overemphasize the fact that all the passions excited in us by the sight of some external object mechanically produce their particular facial expression in those struck by them, i.e., an appearance that by its impression mechanically disposes everyone seeing it to those passions and actions useful to the good of society. (LO 377)

Despite his insistence on the functionality of our responses, Malebranche's remarks show a conception of the causal process whereby we come to feel the passions others appear to feel that is very close to Hume's description of sympathy.[25] Humean sympathy likewise starts with observations of the outward signs of a passion in another. From there, we form an idea of, indeed typically a belief in, the existence of some passion (THN 2.1.11.2–3; SBN 317). Hume also gives a starring role to imagination: in the first place, it makes the jump from external observations to the perception of passion, following standard causal reasoning (THN 2.1.11.8; SBN 320). Because we have repeatedly experienced resembling patterns of connected events, we form habits of association between perceptions. Observing a token of part of the pattern thus arouses and invigorates an idea, which in this case, is an idea of the passion. We then attribute the passion to the other whom we observe, and because of the vigor of the idea, believe the other experiences the passion. Hume allows that we may not run (p.261) through all the distinct steps in a chain of causal reasoning, but rely on causal generalizations. The influence of "general rules" also means that we can sympathetically form a vigorous perception of a passion even when some quirk of situation blocks belief that the other actually experiences the passion in question—as in theatrical performances, or the case of infant princes at the mercy of their enemies (THN 2.2.7; SBN 369–371). Like Malebranche, Hume holds that our sympathetic processes operate within the imagination, often below the level of our full notice and without requiring a well-formed belief in the other's passion. What matters most is having a lively idea, connected with other perceptions through patterns of association. With that in place, our mental architecture can exploit the close relations we share with the other person to convert the lively idea into a full-blown passion (THN 2.1.11.3–5; SBN 318).

Although Hume again follows Malebranche in taking relations among people as associative conduits for transferring passions, he charges the imagination with a task that Malebranche does not, and thereby illustrates the different dynamics of his psychology. For the conversion of an idea, even a lively one, into a passion requires some way to channel vivacity to the idea (THN 2.1.11.3–5; SBN 318), for which the close relations between self and others provide the means. Hume's concept-empiricism not only derives the content of

less lively ideas from lively impressions, but also much of their vivacity. Thus, the sympathetic process of enlivening ideas requires an external source of vivacity. Hume needs to find something more than associative connections leading the imagination from self to other; those connections must also be rooted in something lively enough to transform an idea (of the other's passion) into an impression (in me). This is the heart of the vivification process of sympathy (THN 2.1.11.7–8; SBN 319), a causal process by which the associations of resemblance between self and other provide a pathway for borrowing vivacity from what Hume declares to be the ever-present, extremely lively sense of self (THN 2.1.11.8–9; SBN 320).

Despite the different dynamics, the solution Hume finds for a source of vivacity bears comparison to Malebranche. As Susan James argues, Malebranche gives preeminence to the passions of pride and self-esteem, and so to the consciousness of self (although not to self-knowledge). Moreover, in the drive for our own eminence, Malebranche sees pride as a pivot point for the reflection and reverberation of passions that both preserve the body and knit society together. This is closely akin to the role Hume gives to pride, which is also a self-directed passion that drives many of our most socially engaged passions. James also suggests that for Malebranche, the contemplation of *grandeur* extended through sympathetic connections helps form the very sense of self.[26] If so, then our sense of self for Malebranche is fundamentally a passionate one—again surprisingly close to Hume's conception (see THN 1.4.6.4–6, 2.1.1.4; SBN 253, 277).[27]

(p.262) 5. Comparison in Malebranche and Hume

Yet though James provides material for linking Malebranche and Hume, her main aim is to contrast the two: she argues that our passions "are primarily competitive" for Malebranche, whereas Hume tempers the social tensions generated by the passions with the moderating principle of sympathy.[28] Although she allows that Hume thinks every individual has a tendency towards the self-directed passion of pride, which introduces social friction when expressed,[29] she considers Malebranche to give the drive towards self-aggrandizement a more dominant position in our emotional psychology than Hume does pride. The reason for this difference, she argues, is that Malebranche relies primarily on a mechanism of comparison, whereas Hume gives a significant, moderating role to the principle of sympathy, so that our competitive tendencies are "balanced by a more disinterested benevolence."[30] James admits that Hume learned from Malebranche the importance of comparison to promote our sense of self-worth.[31] But even in the complicated cases of respect and contempt, Hume believes "the disposition to sympathize and the disposition to compare are … both at work," allowing him to "play down the potentially corrosive effects of comparison and to emphasize the more benign role of sympathy in our passionate responses."[32] So on her view, Hume recognizes that "the comparative passions," such as pride, humility, admiration, and contempt, "are part of our nature, [but …] are also naturally limited by the operation of sympathy,"[33] which produces love and compassion. Here I think James slightly misunderstands the mechanism of transmission at work in Malebranche, while mischaracterizing the nature of comparison and sympathy in Hume. Hume neither associates sympathy with benevolence (conceptually *or* causally), nor identifies comparison and competition. Because of this error, James ends up missing the genuinely innovative way that Hume builds on Malebranche.

Let us examine how James analyzes Malebranche's account of the interplay between self-esteem and self-effacing humility. On her view, what drives the play of our passions is our "natural love of *grandeur*," the desire to see ourselves as somehow eminent, which can be strengthened by the veneration of others (LO 162).[34] In this context, Malebranche identifies a number of passions, such as esteem, self-esteem,

and their contraries, that intrinsically involve responses to perceived levels of *grandeur* garnered through comparison (LO 318). The causal basis for those responses is purely mechanical, operating even in the absence of a human mind: just as a servant's display of self-abasing veneration affirms a courtier's conception of his own grandeur (see LO 171), so does a dog's display of submission play on a dominant dog's "passions" (or rather the movement of its animal spirits) to increase its authoritative bearing and behavior (LO 376–377). These examples might suggest that our passions engage in a zero-sum game to satisfy the yearning for *grandeur* at the cost of others' self-esteem. But the back-and-forth communication of the passions works to divert outright competition by forging passionate alliances with others in possession of elevated senses of their own *grandeur* (see LO 333, which complicates the account yet further). Thus, James argues, individuals maintain their sense of self-worth by building on esteem "both through their encounters with those who are less great than they are and through their connections with those above them on the social scale" (see LO 330). The drive to pride naturally generates a series of further interlocked passions of self-esteem, veneration, and humility, constituting a hierarchy of affective responses to the undeniable *grandeur* of an exceptional few. Nonetheless, that hierarchy emerges out of what James maintains are basically competitive urges, which are so strong that a certain amount of "social hypocrisy" is necessary for harmony.[35]

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On James's view, the influence of comparison in Malebranchean social psychology generates a pattern at odds with our sympathetic impulses, so that sometimes "an initial passion is answered by a different one."[36] But this puts comparison at the wrong level: Malebranche insists that we are naturally disposed "to share the same passions" (LO 161). Although their communication may reproduce and reinforce the social pecking order, the central passions of esteem, contempt, and their variants still count as species of the same passion: wonder. We can see the ubiquity of wonder even in canine social hierarchy; the behavior of small dogs in the presence of larger dogs expresses wonder, while the larger dogs, in their turn, demonstrate wonder at their own greatness in a display of canine self-esteem. Both dogs manifest the same basic passion directed at the same object. The difference is whether the object of wonder is identical

with the "self" of the dog in question. Because of that difference, the replication of resembling passions generates a mass of bickering of pooches and humans.

In counting both esteem and self-esteem as species of wonder, Malebranche follows the classification laid down by Descartes.[37] Malebranche also follows Descartes in holding that the objects of our wonder may appear either "great" or "small." But unlike Descartes, who emphasizes that the varieties of wonder (esteem or contempt) have the same "function," and thus similar physiological and epistemic consequences,[38] Malebranche declares that the ideas of greatness and smallness have contrary effects on the motion of spirits in the brain (LO 376). The difference lies particularly in (p.264) the intensity of motion so induced, and thus how attention-grabbing we find the object: "the idea of greatness produces a great deal of motion in the spirits in the brain," which results in fixing "the mind's attention on the consideration of this idea" (LO 376). In contrast, an object of contempt *ipso facto* fails to engage our interest or stimulate much of any reaction. However, other passions "accompany" contempt, and they may be more invigorating. For Malebranche specifies that when we feel contempt, we also feel esteem and respect. This only makes sense if those passions are directed at other objects, so wondering at the small seems to involve—at least implicitly—some evaluation of other things as comparatively great (and thus objects of esteeming wonder). Comparison comes in, then, because our wondering passions rest on highly relative perceptions juxtaposing the "greatness" and "smallness" of contrasting objects of wonder.[39]

James thus misunderstands the place of comparison in Malebranche by treating it as a principle for generating distinct, other-related passions at odds with the patterns of sympathy: no distinct principle is required to explain the genesis of the other-directed passions, which arise in tandem with the self-related ones, whether we feel contempt for the other, or esteem. Moreover, she does not fully appreciate the stake Malebranche has in defending our passions as tending toward the good: *all* our passions work to bind us closer to our bodies, to other humans, and to the rest of nature, although after Original Sin they are also sources of error and confusion that distract us from our true good, the love of God. Nonetheless, the passions are established to alert us to what

preserves our bodies, and their proliferation throughout a population is orchestrated to generate social cohesion. In conceiving *how* the passions proliferate, Malebranche remains wedded to the old principle that the communication of passions is a communication of like-to-like: only so, he thinks, can the transmission of the passions serve to join "men together in relation to good and evil and [make] them exactly like one another not only in their mental disposition but also in the condition of their body" (LO 377). In making this assumption, Malebranche conflates two points: that the mechanical transfer of passions serves to replicate them, and that the spread of similar passions promotes sociability. Thus, even a purely mechanical transfer of passions preserves the principle of like-to-like communication that is the traditional heart of sympathy.

Hume accepts none of these claims about the replication of the passions. In the first place, he does not assume that sympathy produces exactly the same passion in us that we imagine in another. For sympathy may alter the object of the passion it conveys, and therefore, violate type identity. That is what happens when sympathy converts the love and admiration others feel for us into pride. Hume introduces the mechanism of sympathy to explain just such cases, which require no common interests between the (p.265) parties (THN 2.1.11.1; SBN 316). Hume's taxonomy takes the difference between the object of pride and that of love to follow a genuine difference in kind (THN 2.2.1.1; SBN 329) between "simple and uniform impressions" (THN 2.1.2.1; SBN 277). Love and pride can be so differentiated because both count among the "indirect" passions, passions having objects, as well as causes (THN 2.1.1.3–4; SBN 276–277). To explain the distinction, Hume relies on the structure of the "double relation" of impressions and ideas (THN 2.1.5.5; SBN 286).[40] The double relation of impressions and ideas shows how indirect passions are "deriv'd" as a response to the (pleasurable or painful) quality of some cause directed at some object. The two relations in question hold, first, between the quality of the cause (a sense-impression) and the passion, and then, between the idea of the subject of the quality and the idea of the object of the passion. Although distinct in kind, the relations reinforce each other, imparting a "double impulse" to the mind (THN 2.1.5.5; SBN 287). The structure of the double

relation allows passions to show several distinct resemblances, for example in qualities or objects, at the same time as they show dissimilarities making them different in kind.

Hume exploits the double relation to illustrate the variations possible among related passions in a series of thought experiments, “experiments to confirm this system” (THN 2.2.2; SBN 332f.), altering the qualities of the original impressions or the identity of the associated objects to generate pride, humility, love, and hate. The substitutions of resembling qualities of the associated impressions track a plausible progress of sentiments in the psychic life of an individual (e.g., from love to pride), and also a path for the communication of passions *across* individuals. While confirming the double relation, the “experiments” thus trace associative chains for transferring passions within an individual or through groups. But the result of such transfers need not be simply the replication of like-to-like. To be sure, Humean sympathy involves some resemblances, but they are limited. For one, sympathy generates passions alike in being either pleasurable or painful (following the original impression in the double relation). But that vague resemblance can hold between otherwise very different passions. Sympathy also operates along imagined relations of resemblance between self and other that allow the transfer of vivacity. But the related persons may not be the objects of the passions at all.[41] For these reasons, sympathy can produce mutation as much as replication.

6. The inverting mechanism of Humean comparison

Another wrinkle appears with what Hume explicitly calls "comparison." Like sympathy, comparison is a general mechanism for communicating passions, but one that inverts the effects of sympathy, while exploiting its operations. Hume's treatment of comparison is deceptive, for he introduces it first simply as a matter of context and (p.266) contrast (THN 2.2.8.7; SBN 375), superadded to the operations of sympathy, and then augments it with several complications.[42] Gerald Postema usefully disentangles these different senses of comparison,[43] and identifies the kind most important for our purposes as "reversal-comparison."[44] Reversal-comparison operates when, for instance, we feel, or at least vividly imagine, the unhappy passion of another, and thereby come to feel our own comparatively happy non-sympathetic passions all the more strongly. It thus works to stimulate our pleasurable (or painful) passions through contrastive experience with the painful (or pleasurable) passions of others. In full bloom, reversal-comparison produces passions with affective tendencies directly opposed to those of our initial, sympathetic dispositions:

> 'Tis evident we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from reflecting on our own condition and circumstances, in proportion as they appear more or less fortunate or unhappy … as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. The former, therefore, produces delight; and the latter uneasiness. (THN 2.2.8.8; SBN 375)

Not only does sympathy provide the contrast class of passions, reversal-comparison draws from the same resources as uncomplicated sympathy to enliven already lively ideas into full passions, although those passions may then crowd out any sympathetic feelings we experience. Hume uses this kind of comparison to explain envy, and even more, the very possibility of malice, a sort of "pity reverst," involving an "unprovok'd desire of producing evil to another" (THN

2.2.8.12; SBN 377). As "pity reverst" illustrates, "sympathy and reversal-comparison operate from the same psychological [p.267] but yield contrary results."[45]

We should note that there is no intrinsic reason to restrict the effects of reversal-comparison to dark, antisocial passions. Humean sympathy is a morally and socially neutral causal mechanism, distinct from both compassion and benevolence.[46] By the same token, reversal-comparison is a neutral mechanism, not to be conflated with tendencies towards conflict or competition. The neutrality of the mechanism may not be obvious, however, because of how Hume invokes it to explain envy and malice as disinterested, yet still hostile emotions. Such examples can easily deceive us into assuming that comparison can only yield socially divisive results.[47] The historical background may also mislead us about the nature of comparison. For Hume's consideration is very unusual: few early modern theorists recognize disinterestedly malevolent passions. Even such otherwise dissimilar philosophers as Hobbes and Hutcheson deny their very possibility,[48] while the handful who admit passions such as malice do not credit them with those features Hume emphasizes in reversal-comparison.[49] A particularly telling case appears in Spinoza's account of the potent passion of envy, in which he appeals to the way contrasting affects compete within an individual's imagination to explain why we are "glad of [our] equals' weakness and saddened by their … virtue" (E3P55S, see also E3P32S). But he does not generalize his explanation into a mechanism of reversal-comparison like Hume's. More importantly, Spinoza assumes the desirability of like-to-like communication of emotions. He even outstrips Malebranche on this score, for he elevates likeness to a basic principle of sociability, holding that insofar as we "agree in nature," we promote each other's interest (see E4P31–36). Thus, only what Spinoza calls "passions," particularly those passive affects that hold us in bondage and tear us asunder, can be communicated through inversion.[50] The social proliferation of either active affects or those passions capable of being turned into such affects preserves the like-to-like principle, leaving comparison to be a source of conflict.

Hume appears unique in making the mechanism that produces envy and malice an important and intrinsically neutral bit of our psychological apparatus. Again, comparison and sympathy are analogous in this respect, for sympathy too can generate

unsociable passions under some circumstances. I might, for instance, sympathetically feel another's pain, and so come to hate the other as an object with painful qualities.[51] That this does not always happen means that another principle—comparison—must be at work. Producing the benevolent pity for another's pain that spurs the "desire of happiness to another" requires a mixture of mechanisms balancing our passions in just the right way (THN 2.2.9.3; SBN 382). What is crucial is for the overall "bent or tendency" of our mental activity to move us from the painful impression, through a passion of pity directed at another, to a desire for the other's happiness.[52] That bent or tendency is largely a matter of the double impulse provided by the double relation of ideas at work (see THN 2.2.9.1–11; SBN 381–385). Whether the impulse turns towards benevolent pity or active malice depends on whether the overall relations of impressions and ideas directed at the other, bend in ways akin to love or to hate.

(p.268) Hume offers a "principle" governing the bent of our passions: "strong sympathy produces love or tenderness," while pain weakly sympathized with generates hate (THN 2.2.9.12; SBN 385). Although Hume's account is sketchy, the difference seems to be a matter of how each directs the association of perceptions. Weak sympathy with another's pain may allow us to think of him only as a source of our pain, thereby producing hate; hate can, in turn, combine with comparison to our own better state to produce malice (although malice does not require antecedent hate). In contrast, a strong sympathy with the other's pain prompts us to take a lively interest in the comparative idea of overcoming that pain, spurring us to love and benevolence. Postema proposes that the important difference is how each mechanism directs our attention: a weak sympathy allows us to remain concentrated on ourselves to a much greater degree than when we experience truly engrossing sympathetic concern for the other. For our purposes, the exact mechanisms at work are less important than simply noting that Hume seems to require both sympathy and comparison to operate in these cases. A strong sympathy with another's pain produces love only by way of "a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires, which arise from different principles" (THN 2.2.9.12; SBN 385)—namely both "from sympathy and from comparison" (THN 2.2.9.9; SBN 384). In short, the overall arc

from pain through pity to benevolence cannot be explained by the simple replication of resembling passions across persons: it requires a mixture of passions and mechanisms of transfer. By the same token, even a preponderance of comparison need not lead to socially divisive passions and conflict. Postema puts the point well: reversal-comparison can produce emotional states "analogous in structure to malice, but without the dark side of that emotion or the motivation to act on it."

Unlike many other commentators, Postema considers reversal-comparison a distinct principle in Humean psychology that "may work in tandem with, or compete against the deliverances of sympathy," without requiring the "complicity of sympathy." Although they involve the same basic psychological architecture, the two principles make very different use of the relation between self and other. Because of the way sympathy uses the relation between self and other to borrow vivacity from the perception of self for enlivening the idea of the other's passion, Postema plausibly argues that it diverts attention from the self: we lose the sense of ourselves in our involvement with the other. But reversal-comparison gets a grip when we sympathize only weakly with another, and so Postema maintains that it keeps the self and the self's condition in view. On this gloss, reversal-comparison does not convert the idea of the other's passion into a passion itself, but uses the idea only to enliven the contrasting passion. For this reason, Postema insists that reversal-comparison does not build on sympathy, but runs parallel to it. Nonetheless, he maintains that this distinctive operation of reversal-comparison draws off a pervasive self- and other-referencing, that is, an operation whereby we form our very sense of self over and against others we see as both peers and rivals. These "deep features of human psychology" are socially and morally ambivalent, since "some of [them] typically bind us together, while others can (p.269) drive us apart."[53] Postema's main concern in advancing his interpretation lies with the balance found within our individual and social psychologies between the sense of self and the sense of others. Despite apportioning the relation rather differently, sympathy and comparison show that our senses of self and of others are mutually constitutive and interdependent. This, Postema maintains, is a basic bit of human psychology, with both social and antisocial consequences. As such, the "'diseased qualities' of malice and

envy have their root causes in a psychological principle that is essential to the constitution of human nature," and cannot be eliminated.[54]

Postema's evaluation of comparison gives the kind of nuance to Hume's account I hope to advance here. But perhaps it does not go far enough in accounting for how comparison mixes with sympathy. I am not convinced that comparison is distinct from sympathy, rather than a complication of it.[55] In seemingly analogous mechanisms of inversion, sympathy provides the initial "impulse." For instance, Hume argues that the enjoyment of dramatic tragedy rests on redirecting strongly felt passions sympathetic to the characters' misfortunes according to pleasing sentiments aroused by the performance. The conversion to pleasure involves an inversion of sympathy, so that, Hume insists, "the more [spectators] are touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle; and as soon as the uneasy passions cease to operate, the piece is at an end."[56] I wonder too if Postema's stance does not invite the thought that we might suppress comparison, even if it cannot be eliminated completely. That is certainly not his intention: Postema emphasizes that the basis of the two principles, what he calls "self-" and "other-" referencing, are intertwined for both good and ill. Still, I think we can find alloys of sympathy and comparison at many different levels of Humean explanation, and thereby extend Postema's point from the deep psychology of individuals to a whole host of their external expressions and social relations. Ultimately, I think we will see that the mix of communicative mechanisms and the resulting amalgam of resembling and contrasting passions confer social benefits, and in so doing, mirror the complexities of the roles and interdependencies Hume thinks are distributed throughout modern societies—*and* internalized within individuals.

Certainly, we can find sympathetic and comparative impulses at work intra-psychically; they appear not merely in the implicit principles governing our psychology as Postema suggests, but in our overtly self-directed attitudes, where they show some of (p.270) the complexity found in aesthetic conversions. For instance, Hume uses the comparative mechanisms at work in ordinary malice to explain how we might bear a kind of malice against ourselves: such self-directed "malice" may make us feel an uncomfortable guilt in the face of the misfortunes of a friend, or in consideration of

our own misdeeds (THN 2.2.8.11–12; SBN 377). *Mutatis mutandi*, we may rejoice when contemplating unhappiness in our past. In these cases, such "malice" seems innocent, and may in fact, be well worth cultivating: guilt feelings may motivate socially beneficial behavior, and malice against a past self can prove a useful psychological device for reconciling us to the present. The possibility of such inversions among our self-directed passions also complicates the kinematics of Humean affective psychology. Hume's official doctrine holds that impressions can only be directly associated on the basis of resemblances (THN 2.1.4.3; SBN 283), while additional principles of contiguity and causation unite ideas (THN 1.1.4.1; SBN 11). Comparison, however, stands besides sympathetic resemblance as a principle associating impressions *across* persons, since the mechanism communicates passions by way of various causal and intentional pivot points that do not generate similarity in their affective qualities. By allowing comparison to work intra-psychically, Hume introduces new forms for the progress of our passions and sentiments that are not structured primarily by patterns of resemblance.

A particularly telling example of the alloy of sympathy and comparison arises when our self-directed passions collide with externally directed ones to shape our deportment. Consider Hume's appraisal of the social standing of pride, of which "nothing can be more laudable" and nothing "more useful to us in the conduct of life" (THN 3.3.2.8; SBN 596), but which is also obnoxious to others because of the workings of comparison. We negotiate this tension by establishing "the *rules of good-breeding*" (THN 3.3.2.10; SBN 597), which require that we maintain the "appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behavior" (THN 3.3.2.10; SBN 598). Good-breeding, then, demands people keep secret precisely that passion to which we are all most prone. But insofar as we do that which we approve, we give ourselves causes for pride. And so Hume declares that what is essential to a "man of character" and most "indispensably requisite to procure the esteem and approbation of mankind" is a "genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal'd and well founded" (THN 3.3.2.11; SBN 598). Here the upshot of the social communication and interaction of passions is a norm opposing public expression and encouraging "secret sentiments." Our motive to conform to the rules of good-

breeding that demand modesty in our bearing must itself be founded on a fairly direct sympathy with the responses of others. Yet because of that sympathy, we would find ourselves humiliated were we to appear excessively proud.

Much the same amalgam of sympathetic and comparative mechanisms appears indispensable throughout our social relations, whether a matter of face-to-face encounters or broadly public life. In the first instance, the right mix of different self- and other-related attitudes is crucial to the functioning of civil society: *respect* involves (p.271) considering the good qualities of others, both in their own right and in comparison with our own, and so requires a mix of mechanisms producing the passions of love and humility (THN 2.2.10.2–3; SBN 390). A larger-scale example arises from the complexities of economic cooperation and competition that drive trade. On Hume's view, economic cooperation and competition are fueled by passions involving both sympathy (with partners) and comparison (with rivals), directed by interest (THN 2.2.9.3–4; SBN 384). Economically basic operations are motivated by such a mix of mechanisms and resulting passions, which thereby make modern economic life possible. More generally, the division of labor corresponds to a genuine division of affects, both because "our passions are the only causes of labour" ("Of Commerce," Es 261), and because particular branches of industry foster characteristic passions and desires (see "Of Interest," Es 301). Such differentiation and mixture mirror the complexity of individual affective life, but as we have seen, individual passions and sentiments are themselves shaped by a mix of reflecting and inverting forms of affective communication with others. Social systems ranging from economic institutions to rules of etiquette work best when they take into account the delicate balance of forces that shape our individual affective psychology. Perhaps that is why Hume lauds the prevailing British form of government as "mixed," and credits its stability and character to the way it keeps power suspended, not just among a host of private interests, but also between private passion and public sentiment (Es 44–45).

7. Divisions of labor in the government of the passions

I want to develop the picture of a hybrid affective community further by looking briefly at Jane McIntyre's reading of Hume's approach to the "government" of the passions. Against a long backdrop of counsel to submit passions to the guidance of reason, McIntyre traces the erosion, first, of the faculty psychology that motivated that advice, and then, of any view of the potency of reason that would make it practical. Instead, she argues that by the second half of the seventeenth century, reason was widely judged to serve only as an external guide, giving us a sense of the standards to which we could aspire, but incapable of motivating action. Hume's innovation, she proposes, is to remove reason from the picture altogether, and turn instead to the way in which our passions are governed by social interactions through the mechanism of sympathy.[57] Because we genuinely feel the evaluative sentiments others direct towards us, there is a passionate check on publicly obnoxious, though privately pleasurable emotions. The processes we have seen in the interaction between good breeding and the passion of pride offer one example, but just one example, of what McIntyre has in mind.

(p.272) Once again, I think we may complicate the claim that social forces, not reason, impose normative constraints on our passions by looking to the roots of the view. Hutcheson seems an obvious forerunner here, since he took the view that reason is psychologically inert, and that only passion can restrain passion. Indeed his account of the psychic economy of passions and "affections" makes socially proliferating affections into genuine standards of value, not just checks on the more idiosyncratic passions. "Passions" are the confused emotions, those prone to a kind of violence and agitation, typically directed at particular objects (EI 31, 50). In contrast, affections, particularly "benevolence," are relatively calm (EI 40), and so we tend to associate them with "reasonableness" (EI 175). Such calm affections and desires are capable of regulating even the most violent passions when we exercise reflection, particularly if we make it habitual. We can be motivated to practice such regulation for reasons of prudence, but also by the calm affection of general benevolence, a motive capable of giving the action moral worth, and one we approve on reflection (EI 32–33, 143).

Benevolence can thus govern our passions, playing just the role McIntyre claims was previously assigned to reason. But benevolence is an affection, and general benevolence constitutes the very form of an other-directed affection for Hutcheson. It takes the broadest possible social object, the whole of humanity, while it is forwarded by sympathy-like mechanisms of social communication. However, Hutcheson holds that a disposition for benevolence is implanted in each of us naturally (EI 25–27). So despite its other characteristics, it does not count as the sort of socially *generated* emotion McIntyre attributes to Hume. Hume undoubtedly learned a great deal from Hutcheson, and took over many elements of the distinction between the passions and the calm affections.[58] But he went beyond Hutcheson in conceiving a formative role for social relations and the mechanism of sympathy.

Instead, I propose Hobbes as a perhaps surprising figure to anticipate Hume in giving social roles a truly active hand in disciplining the passions. On the face of it, he is not a likely forerunner: Hobbes contrasts reason and passion often, for even as he identifies passions as the source of our motivations, he recommends pursuing reason to constrain them. In making his case, he associates the former with the benefits of civil society, for which the sovereign provides the "common measure" of reason, while taking the latter to be behind the worst excesses of the state of nature (see L 19.5, 26.21, 27.4, 27.18, 46.32 inter alia). But the contrast is very odd in the full context of his thought. Hobbes identifies passions as motions and takes them to be necessary to initiate animal motion. Thinking and reasoning are kinds of animal motion, so they too must be driven by passion (L 6.1, 49). By the same token, lack of passion results in dullness and mental sluggishness (L 8.16). Yet Hobbes also seems to treat the conclusions of reason as incapable of checking our passions: passions can only be bridled by other passions, particularly, the passion of fear (L 14.18, 31). This seems to leave the picture of reason (p.273) as a purely external standard that McIntyre suggested. It also leaves reason looking vacuous and purely epiphenomenal. So how are we to understand Hobbes's apparent valorization of reason over the passions? I suggest that despite some turns of phrase, Hobbes does not suppose that passion and reason constitute independent psychological faculties that could stand in conflict. No such division is entailed by the declaration: "The naturall state hath the same proportion to the Civill, I

mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to Reason, or a Beast to a Man."[59] Rather, this analogy compares the passions to the natural state of liberty, where we act solely on idiosyncratic preferences, and reason to the civil state, where the sovereign provides a common measure. It marks a difference between what is disorganized and what is organized: that is, between the chaotic and unbridled passions that run rampant in the state of nature and the organization that emerges when passions are channeled by an overriding fear of a coercive power to accord with a common measure. What counts as "reason" arises out of the coordination of passions enabled and demanded by social power (see L 5.3).

This gloss puts Hobbes pretty close to McIntyre's picture of a publicly accessible and publicly generated standard that constrains our passions in the absence of an independent faculty of reason. What's missing is the feature we have already glimpsed in Hume's account: the differential distribution of emotions and recognition of the social benefit it confers. Hobbes does consider social organization to be crucial to the government of our passions, since it makes possible the fear that coordinates and controls other passions; he also takes *power* to be differentially distributed. But on Hobbes's view, the coordinating passion of fear should be spread equally among the subjects; that is what forges individuals into a socially cohesive body politic. The "artificial person" thereby generated may lack the passion of fear, but it is not a private person *within* the society headed by the sovereign. Distributed equally and universally throughout the commonwealth, fear governs our private passions to make us sociable and cooperative both with each other and with the sovereign.

Hume offers a different and far more variegated vision of how our affective states can be effectively distributed, which may come out most clearly in his treatment of our moral and aesthetic sentiments, and their normative expression in judgments. In both cases, feelings of approval or disapproval must be submitted to some standard for them to gain the normative status of genuinely moral or aesthetic responses. Hume gives the standard for moral judgment a twofold task, both of which are enabled by sympathy: on the one hand, it instructs us to direct our responses to stable patterns and properties, so that we are responding to the proper object of moral evaluation, the "characters" of those we judge. On the

other it instructs us to submit our responses to considerations of what others might feel, so that we take a "general survey" (THN 3.2.2.24; SBN 499). But because "our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation," we need to "fix on some *steady* and *general* points of view; and always, in (p.274) our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation" (THN 3.3.1.15; SBN 581–582). We fix on those points of view by various causal and counter-factual applications of general rules; sympathy is what makes them affect our passions and sentiments. Sympathy also plays a role in allowing us to learn what counts as the appropriate general point of view,[60] since it motivates us to adopt the means "of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language" used by others (THN 3.3.1.16; SBN 582). Hume's position suggests that simply to understand what counts as virtue requires feeling some of its appeal. This would give sympathy a cognitive function, and indeed, Hume generally supposes that a community of opinion goes hand in hand with a community of feeling, just because of the effects sympathy has on both (THN 2.1.11.8; SBN 320). These features explain why "a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion" appears "reasonable" (THN 3.3.1.18; SBN 583): it has been subjected to a battery of corrections, and now serves as a normative standard for our passions and sentiments.

The same points apply to our aesthetic sentiments, for which we seek a "rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; [or] at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another" (Es 229). Hume finds the "true standard of taste and beauty" in the "joint verdict" of true judges (Es 241), that is, in the sentiment of those judges with both the capacity for judgment and the opportunity to exercise the capacity properly. In general, Hume likens such dispositions to those of a "sound state of an organ," such as a healthy eye. But aesthetic judgments have an obvious peculiarity, which make them unlike determining the "true color" of an object by way of its appearance "in day-light, to the eye of a man in health." Judgments that particular paintings, poems, or plays are beautiful do not command "an entire or [even] a considerable uniformity of sentiment among men," from which we could straightforwardly "derive an idea of the perfect beauty" (Es 234). Such "variety of taste," "still greater in reality than in appearance," is the central problem

of Hume's essay (Es 227). Hume takes this problem to show simply that not everybody is a true judge, and common sentiment is not the standard of taste. There still is a standard —one located in the sentimental capacities of the select few who are true judges.

Hume emphasizes that although we may not agree in our sentiments, we can nonetheless agree that the sentimental dispositions of the true judges form a standard of taste for all of us. Above all, we agree that the character of being "endowed with good sense and a delicate imagination, [and] free from prejudice … is valuable and estimable," and that people with such a character "will be acknowledged by universal sentiment to have a preference above others" (Es 242). These people are experts—affective experts—whose capacities for experiencing sentiments have been developed (p.275) in ways we value, even if we do not share them. Their judgments still rest on sentiment, yet they embody an expertise that the judgments of the untutored and insensitive lack. In recognizing their judgments as the standard for taste, the rest of us have agreed to a division of sentimental labor, where the task of feeling appropriate sentiments falls to those who have established the character of the true judge. We neither expect, nor demand that everybody in that society develop the disposition for such sentiments. Where we may be duty-bound is in recognizing that expertise as part of the concept of taste, but that does not mean we are bound to become experts ourselves.

But note that this division of sentimental labor is not a matter of mere deference to the tastes of another. I may acknowledge that the views of the music critic Anton Fancy-Pants on a particular performance of *Wozzeck* is worth far more than my knee-jerk reaction, but what entitles Mr F-P to the character of a good critic is something I can recognize without possessing it myself: "strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice" (Es 241). Moreover, the grounds for Mr F-P's sentiments are publicly available, at least in principle, and we can ask him to justify particular judgments by pointing to relevant aspects of the work itself. Hume insists that even those of us with "a faint and dubious perception of beauty, … yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke, which is pointed out" (Es 243). In aesthetic judgment as in moral, there is no fact of the matter to be discovered; instead, verifying a

judgment is a matter of justifying that the judge has the capacity we esteem (and has exercised it properly). That capacity in turn is demonstrated by interacting with the object so as to provoke appropriate sentiments in others, thereby cultivating the beginnings of sentimental expertise in the latter. True judges are thus tastemakers in a double sense: they embody the standard of taste and they teach others how to adopt it.

A number of the themes I have traced throughout this discussion come together here. The standard of taste supposes a differentiation of affective labor, and the general recognition of the standard of taste rests on *respect* for the judge's character and position. This is not mere capitulation to the judge's pronouncements: it requires sympathetic appreciation of the normative status of the judge's viewpoint, comparison of it to our own, and some sense of what it might take to bridge that difference. Such respect requires that both sympathetic and comparative processes of communication be at work. The resulting picture of how our affective communication knits society together is very different from the hierarchical arrangements James describes for Malebranche: there, the replication of the passion of wonder produces a rank-ordering based on degrees of perceptible *grandeur*. Hume's account shows instead a differentiated web of interlinked and overlapping affective relations. It also illustrates McIntyre's claim: in the standard of taste, we find a standard governing our personal passions that gains its normative status, as well as its power to govern our passions, from social interactions communicated through the mechanism of sympathy. But the mechanism (p.276) of comparison is also at work, and because it is, the standard rests on an affectively differentiated set of social relations.

I think that what really sets Hume apart from most of his predecessors is the insight to see such a differential distribution of our passions and sentiments as a fruitful division of labor, not a worrisome sign of social division. This is not to deny that fruitful differentiation can become unproductive faction, but it seems difficult to find a rigid line of demarcation. Hume seems to think that different degrees and patterns of differentiation are appropriate in different arenas of life. While happy to let a few experts in aesthetic judgment shoulder the burden of appropriate sentiment for the rest of us, he requires reliable dispositions for moral

sentiment to be distributed much more uniformly. That makes sense: widespread moral dilettantism, like widespread linguistic ineptitude, would make social life unmanageable. Perhaps though, Hume could countenance a moderate form of moral pluralism: if some people find themselves moved more by expressions of benevolence and others by justice, the former might establish themselves as specialists in benevolence, and the latter as specialists in justice. At the very least, the ordinary division of labor may require some moral specialization: magistrates, for one, should exercise a keener sense of pure justice than is demanded of medical workers at a disaster site, even while each maintains an appreciation of the others' expertise and a sense of the broad distinction between virtues and vices. In general, we might look for a highly developed division of affective labor anywhere there is unevenly distributed expertise and that expertise consists in, or at least is forwarded by, the development of certain sentimental dispositions. On Hume's view, we can expect to find a number of spheres where different sentiments and passions are distributed by age, "rank," geography, gender, and perhaps most interestingly, profession. What generates such differential distribution and allows it to flourish and govern the passions of individuals are the psychological mechanisms of sympathy and comparison. We also, I think, deploy both mechanisms internally. Doing so allows us to experience both the idiosyncratic responses that constitute merely personal passions and tastes, and the steady, general sentiments that provide a standard and rule, while keeping them distinct. The picture of the self that emerges pairs private and public, self-involved and other-directed, sympathetic and comparative passions in one individual, who may be almost as affectively differentiated as the society in which she lives.[61]

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Notes:

([1]) From the *Critical Review* 3 (1757): 97–107, 209–16, and *Essays, Magazine or, Universal Review* 2 (1757): 32–36, both cited in Fieser's, "Hume's Classification." Note that the reviews concern the "Dissertation on the Passions" from the *Four Dissertations*, not the *Treatise of Human Nature*, now the preferred text for scholars. But the complaints of the reviewers do not seem directed at the (slight) differences between earlier and later publications.

([2]) See Jane McIntyre, "Hume's 'New and Extraordinary' Account." Arguably, the double relation is (or should be) the focus of Davidson's "Hume's Cognitive Account," 751. Haruko Inoue explicitly stresses its importance in "The Origin."

([3]) David Hume, THN Abstract 32–35; SBN 661–662; subsequent references will appear parenthetically in the text as THN with book, part, section, and paragraph number, followed by Selby-Bigge number.

([4]) Alanen, "Reflection," 118. Alanen herself puts little stress on the supposed novelty of these ideas.

([5]) Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*.

([6]) Hutcheson, *An Essay*, 30. Cited henceforth in the text as EI, followed by page number.

([7]) Hume's general considerations for this point can be found in "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" (THN 2.3.3; SBN 413–418) and "Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason" (THN 3.1.1; SBN 455–470).

([8]) See EI 5–6, and 17. As an "inward power of perception," reflection plays some of the role traditionally played by "abstraction" in discovering "The universal Concomitant *Ideas* which may attend any *Idea* whatsoever" (EI 16).

([9]) Alanen, "Reflection," 118.

([10]) Spinoza, *Ethics*, (E. Curley, trans.); see, e.g., "Preface" of Part 3, cited hereafter simply as E followed by Part, and when relevant, proposition and component.

([11]) See Malebranche, LO xxxix.

([12]) See particularly E3P27Dem.

([13]) Cf. Cassidy, "Some Similarities."

([14]) Cunningham, "Was Eighteenth-Century Sentimentalism Unprecedented?" 385–386. Cunningham argues that the psychological understanding of sympathy was something of an 18th century invention, although he credits French theorists (e.g., the Abbé Dubos) as much as British ones (ibid. 383).

([15]) [*Sic*] from Pliny the Elder, *Pliny's Historie of the World, commonly called the Natural Historie,* trans. Philemon Holland, 1601, cited in the first entry for "sympathy" in *The Oxford English Dictionary On-Line*, [*OED*] 2nd edn, 1989.

([16]) For instance, Shaftesbury talks about the "sympathetic" communication of panic passions through contact, *Characteristics*, 10.

([17]) See entry 1.b. for "sympathy" in the *OED*.

([18]) See Cunningham, "Was Eighteenth-Century Sentimentalism Unprecedented?" 386–387, for a general account.

([19]) For an argument that some notion of emotion applies here, see, e.g., Halliwell, "Plato."

([20]) For an examination of the diverse kinds of similarity used to explain the arousal of emotions, as well as some caveats, see Konstan, *The Emotions*, 27–28, and chaps 6, 10.

([21]) See Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory*, 6.2.34. See also Cicero's more ambivalent claim at *Tusculan Disputations* 4.55. For an account of the difficulties their ethical commitments posed for the view that "to move others, one must be moved oneself," see Winterbottom, "On Impulse," 315ff.

([22]) A few who acknowledge the influence are James, "Sympathy," and Jones, *Hume's Sentiments*.

([23]) See, e.g., McCracken, *Malebranche*.

([24]) See the 1731 letter to Michael Ramsay, quoted in Popkin, "So, Hume did Read Berkeley," 774–775. For Hume's debt to Malebranche on problems of causation, see, e.g., Kail, "On Hume's Appropriation," and Bell, "Hume and Causal Power."

([25]) Although I think that these mechanisms are similar to Humean "sympathy," I can find only one general use of terminology cognate to "sympathy" in LO (407).

([26]) James, "Sympathy," 113.

([27]) A number of commentators have recommended finding the "idea or rather impression" of self (THN 2.1.11.1–3; SBN 317) that fuels sympathy in the object of pride, see, e.g., Rorty, "Pride," as well as Schmitter, "Making an Object."

([28]) James, "Sympathy," 124.

([29]) See ibid. 122.

([30]) Ibid. 121.

([31]) Ibid. 115, 120. Notice that at 120, James mentions "pride and contempt," but I think "contempt" here must be a misprint for "humility."

([32]) Ibid. 119–120.

([33]) Ibid. 123.

([34]) Ibid. 111–113.

([35]) Ibid. 119.

([36]) Ibid. 113.

([37]) Descartes, *Passions*, in CMS; see, art. 54 (AT 11:373–374; CSM 1:350), also arts. 149–151 (AT 11:443–445; CSM 1:383). Note that in other respects, there are important differences between their taxonomies of wonder; see "Descartes on the Emotions" and "Malebranche on the Emotions," supplementing Schmitter, "17th and 18th Century Theories."

([38]) Descartes, *Passions*, arts. 70–71, 74–75 (AT 11:380–384; CSM 1:353–355).

([39]) Note that Malebranche is comfortable attributing multi-termed, quasi-propositional structure to perceptions, and even characterizes the first component of a passion as a kind of perceived judgment (a "natural judgment"), from which follows a determination of the will and a chain of sensations (LO 347–349).

([40]) See Schmitter, "Making an Object," for more on the double relation.

([41]) For a good discussion of this point, see Postema, "Cemented with Diseased Qualities," see, especially 257–262.

([42]) This understandably misleads some commentators, e.g. James, who sometimes restricts Humean comparison to simple situation-relativity in judgment; see "Sympathy," 114.

([43]) Postema also identifies a "contextual" principle covering situation-relativity in epistemic judgments, and a "contrast principle" requiring a contrast class for evaluative judgments; see "Cemented with Diseased Qualities," 264. These senses are run together in Árdal, *Passion*, 59.

([44]) Postema, "Cemented with Diseased Qualities," 265.

([45]) Ibid.

([46]) Postema makes this point too, ibid. 270.

([47]) As it did James. For another example, see Árdal, *Passion,* 69.

([48]) Hobbes does not "conceive it possible" to take pleasure in others' "great harmes" without ends of one's own: 6.47 in *Leviathan* (henceforth cited as L with chapter and paragraph). Hutcheson also denies the possibility of a calm desire of misery for its own sake (EI 53, 58).

([49]) For instance, Postema explains that Mandeville considers envy and malice self-involved, if not precisely self-interested, "Cemented with Diseased Qualities," 273–275.

([50]) E4P46 seems an exception, since it describes the reasonable person's striving "as far as he can, to repay the other's Hate … with Love." But the rational person does not feel love *because*, but *in spite* (or independently) of another's hate.

([51]) Árdal, *Passion,* makes a similar point for the moral sentiments, 118.

([52]) Postema notes some of the same points, but comes to other conclusions; see "Cemented with Diseased Qualities,"

269–273. Nonetheless, we agree on the importance of the mixtures; ibid, 279.

([53]) Postema, “Cemented with Diseased Qualities,” 285.

([54]) Ibid., 276–277, and for his full treatment, 275–279, 282–283.

([55]) For this alternative, see Baier, *A Progress*, 149–150, whom I follow in “Hume on the Emotions,” in Schmitter, “17th and 18th Century Theories.” Note that the main passage Postema adduces for his reading is indeterminate and comes only at the very end of the *Treatise* (THN 3.3.2–4; SBN 593–594). Postema also relies heavily on the claim that our self remains a kind of object in comparison, which is difficult to square with some views of Hume’s psychology.

([56]) Hume, “Of Tragedy,” in *Essays*, 216; henceforth cited in the text as Es, with page number. Note that my point here is simply that some (innocuous) forms of inversion demand an initial sympathy—not that it is “comparison” that renders tragedy agreeable. But it would certainly simplify matters were it comparison all the way down.

([57]) See McIntyre, “Hume’s ‘New and Extraordinary’ Account,” 212–213.

([58]) Although I cannot argue it here, it seems to me that Hume sometimes opposes “passion” and “sentiment” in ways indebted to Hutcheson’s contrast between “passion” and “affection.”

([59]) Hobbes, *De Cive* 7.18, 107.

([60]) Note that there may be rather different appropriate points of view for judging natural virtues and judging artificial virtues; the former are immediately pleasing to those who interact face to face with an agent, while the latter require consideration of how an “artifice” affects society at large.

Family Trees: Sympathy, Comparison, and the Proliferation of the Passions in Hume and his Predecessors

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