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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CHODOROW'S 'THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING': AN EVALUATION AND EXTENSION

BY

SUZANNE SCHULZ

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled CHODOROW'S "THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING": AN EVALUATION AND EXTENSION submitted by SUZANNE SCHULZ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in Counseling Psychology

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Abstract

The present work evaluates and extends Chodorow's theory about why women mother and about how to change their position in the sexual division of labour. As an evaluative endeavour my own analysis follows the terms set out by Chodorow's discussion. Mothering refers both to the bearing and rearing of children and, for the most part, attention is directed to mothers in the context of the Anglo-American nuclear family. I argue that Chodorow developed her analysis in the midst of a feminist debate discussing whether innate givens or social factors carried determining force in women's mothering. I point out that Chodorow turned to psychodynamics, and to object relations theory as a derivative of the Freudian psychoanalytic account, in an attempt to find an alternative that could incorporate, and yet could get beyond, both social and biological determinants in order to account for the possibility of change. I tell how I think Chodorow was partially successful and yet, in the end, how she succumbed to the terms of the debate. To suggest, as she did, that mothers select for some potentialities in daughters and for other potentialities in sons, in fact invested a social factor with determining importance in the placement of women, and men, in society; that is, women mother.

Drawing on the work of Teresa Brennan, my extension of Chodorow's theory argues that there is indeed a "third force" to human reality found in an aspect of the psychic that is, to a certain extent, outside the reaches of both the social and the biological. I tell why I think that this psychic force emerges out of the material conditions of infant dependency and does provide the conditions necessary for taking social ideas about sexual difference "on board". But, because this psychic reality is formed outside of the bounds of socio-cultural factors it also is possible to separate children's awareness of sexual difference from later gender differentiated social constraints children may encounter. We carry psychically and corporeally the possibility for protesting ideas about social placement and parenting and for agentic change that is both human and humane.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Topic

Introduction

Like it or not, love her or not, each of us has a mother. Mothers are not all of one sort and nowadays most of us are quite adept at listing several varieties of mother including biological mothers, surrogate mothers, birth mothers, adoptive mothers and substitute mothers. For any one child "mother" may be more than one of these and may even refer to more than one person. In fact, at present a legal mind sometimes is more helpful than common sense to address the perplexing question, "Who is my mother?" It was more simple to tell before the new reproductive technology posed biological mothers against surrogate mothers and surrogate mothers against adoptive mothers in a debate over who is "really" mother and to what extent.

Yet, the more that things change, the more they seem to stay the same. Across time and culture no matter whether the tools of mothering are traditional or "high 'tech", in general it is understood that mothers contribute to the beginnings of life, carry and bear children and then, also, care for children. And, because this sequence of events has been accepted into common wisdom as "a matter of course", it also is understood that women mother, and that women mother ongoingly.

Women do give birth and a natural biological connection between women and children cannot be denied. But it is one step removed from the logic of biological necessity to assume, as is generally done, that women's birthing experience and lactation capacity somehow lead naturally to parenting knowhow. Yet, the notion persists that there is a natural connection between women's biology and women's responsibility for childcare.

This is taken for granted and is a presupposition embedded in thought and language so that, in the main, while "fathering a child" refers only to a man's biological contribution in a single act of procreation, we understand implicitly that "mothering a child" refers to a woman's ongoing responsibility for parenting children.

If a biological imperative for women's parenting responsibilities ever did exist, this was not at all obvious to Nancy Chodorow. In her work women's mothering became a topic for critique and analysis and the basis for her early cross-cultural studies of socialization practices (Chodorow, 1974). Drawing on an academic background in sociology for the analysis, Chodorow advanced her own theory of mothering to show that it is actually psychological predispositions that create sexual divisions of labour and, in particular, reproduce women's mothering from generation to generation.

The Topic of this Discussion

The general topic here is Chodorow's theory of mothering, as put forward in her basic text The reproduction of mothering. Focussing on the question central to her theoretical work, we follow the development of Chodorow's thesis that women come to be mothers because women themselves produce daughters who will mother, and sons who will not. The centrality of mothers to Chodorow's account of gender differentiation is outlined to show how a mother's connection to her daughter bears a fundamental relationship to the development of the feminine psyche and the desire to mother, and how, according to Chodorow, it is discontinuity in the mother-son relationship that creates both men's psychological predisposition to separate from others and sexual divisions in labour.

More specifically, Chodorow suggests that her central question "Why do women mother?" also invites consideration of how to change the division of labour, and in doing so, how to change women's position within it. Because Chodorow is a feminist, her concern to relate mothering to the feminist issue of change is not surprising. But what is

unusual is Chodorow's approach which appropriates both object relations and Freudian perspectives to argue that a relationship between mothering, change and socio-historical conditions does exist. More commonly, Freud's views on femininity povide the basis for a standard feminist critique of the "libidinal mother" (Ehrenreich & English, 1978) and of the idea that, for lack of a penis, women are psychically inferior to men. We will consider whether Chodorow's presentation of Freudian thought does account for the possibility of change within the context of her theory about why women mother.

Significance of the Topic

Motherhood has traditionally been held to be a natural, biologically based function that is, therefore, of little theoretical significance. While mainstream psychological thought has not recognized Chodorow's work as important, O'Brien (1981) notes that other natural, biological functions have been the basis of substantial and elegant theories. For example, Marx based an elaborate theoretical system on the need to eat. Freud developed the simple sex-act into "a system that shapes our consciousness and the world", and the existentialists, began at the end, with death, as a natural, biological certainty.

While "Mothering" is just one contribution to a growing body of literature investigating family organization and the institution of motherhood, it has gained currency as an analysis which has redirected psychological thought and developed an evaluation of interest to women - especially feminist women. By the time The reproduction of mothering was first published in 1978 psychoanalytic thought had fallen into disfavor among feminists because of Freud's emphasis on the determining importance of innate factors in behaviour and development. It was not that women could ignore Freud's explanation of the ambivalences women feel and the contradictions women experience; in this Freud had given voice to a reality women understood as mothers, daughters and wives. Instead, it was that feminists read Freud's notion of "innate, instinctual drives" as akin to biological

requisites, and what was biological as natural, essential and unchanging. Perhaps it was the number of times women had been put in their place with admonitions about innate maternal instincts and reproductive capacities that, finally, directed feminists to look elsewhere for an explanation of women's place in society and a way out of the contradictions. These feminists looked to socio-historical factors and variously found the conditions of women's oppression in economic modes of production, class and race relations and, of course, in mothering. The assumption was that if consciousness were grounded in, and determined by, social or historical conditions, then once those conditions were specified it would be possible to effect change through political action (Brennan, ca. 1986). I think it is signigicant that, while women lined up on sides of the social-biological debate, Chodorow's account spoke to both sides of the question.

On the one hand she said, "Social experience may universally enable the development of an identity which comes to constitute the self, affect the nature of psychic structure formation, and organize sexuality" (1978a, p. 53). She suggested that the relationship between a mother and her child enabled gender differentiation to occur, and where the mother provided a different interpersonal environment for sons and daughters, enabled gender differences to emerge. Unlike other accounts, women do not come out of this account looking like the "powerless victims" of men or biology. When gender differences are held to emerge in the mother's early relationship to her child, the biological determinism of Freud is overcome; and, immediately, for women "the personal is political" (Sayers, 1983). On this basis, it is possible to envision a world where gender characteristics are shared, where sexual differences need not be eliminated, and where women, assumed to be in a position of dominance can actualize their power and act as agents of change within the family.

On the other hand, while Chodorow's account did not focus on the possible impact of biological givens to development, her discussion did go so far as to acknowledge, "Certain capacities may be innate to humans and may unfold according to a predetermined

biological pattern, and operations like splitting, fantasy, repression and so forth may be universal human reactions (1978a, p. 53).

What I find interesting here in the development of Chodorow's thought is that she did not end her consideration of the factors impacting development after a discussion of social and biological determinants. Instead, time and again, she moved on from there to Freudian psychodynamics to describe processes of psychic development and to tell why women mother. When she says, "Psychoanalytic approaches to mental process, psychic structure, and development may be universally applicable (I think they are)," (1978a, p. 53) it is as if she is finding in the familiar Freudian psychoanalytic account the beginnings of something new - something outside both the social and the natural that, at the same time, might also be a universal factor in human development.

Chodorow did recognize that the discussion among feminists, placing social facts over against innate givens, had pushed each side of the debate into the inherent determinism of its own position and, I think it was to account for change, that she needed a way out of this determinism. She understood that, at best, extending the social-biological debate could only redefine the determining importance of the one factor relative to the other, and that continuing the discussion would not, and could not according to its own terms, provide a way out of the determinism of these positions. Perhaps, to Chodorow this was problematic because a psychic reality which merely reflected social and/or innate factors could not account for change or, more precisely, for experienced conflicts, contradictions and the desire for change. Given this, in her appropriation of psychoanalysis Chodorow seemed to suggest that psychic reality, in fact, might be contingent upon, yet not synonymous with either the social or the natural. And if so, then the contradictions and conflicts associated with the psychic life might possibly be the third factor that could account for change and for the desire for change.

Chodorow's account clearly did state that she is presenting psychodynamics as an alternative approach that can incorporate both drives and culture "without succumbing to

the determinism inherent in those approaches" (1978a, p. 47). According to Chodorow, she is simply utilizing object relations formulations in her theory as a means to this end. By implying that the psyche is not isolated from but, in some way, still might be separate from the social and the biological Chodorow raises the possibility of a third factor in gender development and mothering. It is what Brennan was first to call the possibility of a "third force in social relation" (ca. 1986, p. 46).

Certainly, the centrality of motherhood in Chodorow's account reflects her concern for a psychic explanation of women's position in society; it attempts to explain male dominance and describe women's psychological participation in its creation. Chodorow's account implicates mothers in the reproduction of motherhood and its contradictions because she says that psychically women want to mother. Put in these terms, Chodorow hints that mothering and gender differentiation is not just about cultural ideas getting in. It is also about psychic reality working on and creating a life of its own, and then about some ideas, and not others, within the psyche being projected out.

Yet, just as we sense that Chodorow is theorizing the possibility of self-motivated agentic change, Chodorow wavers and then falls back on the argument that psychoanalysis is really just a theory about socialization and about the development of a social product.

She states, "Women's capacities for mothering and abilities to get gratification from it are strongly internalized and psychologically enforced, and are built developmentally into the feminine psychic structure" (1978a, p.39). In this view the agency of the person is severely qualified. A daughter, for example, only has a "...way to work on or create that which (already) is internalized" (Ibid, p. 47), and motherhood becomes less a choice than a product of a particular socially-determined developmental process. Chodorow goes on to assert that the development of mothering capacities is contingent upon the fact that every woman who mothers is the daughter of a mother; and, the quality and nature of her mothering is largely determined by, and is the result of, that early relationship.

However tentative her approach to a resolution, in the end Chodorow appears to have settled on the notion that psychic reality really is determined by a socio-historical fact; that is, women mother. Her suggestion for change also reflects this notion. If exclusive female parenting produces psychological contradictions for both sexes and hatred of women, then changing that socio-historical fact offers the best remedy for all in the family. Chodorow concludes that fathers should share childcare responsibilities with mothers.

But it is significant that Chodorow remains equivocal about this solution. It is important to point out that she does not suggest shared parenting for its own sake and her ultimate goal is not a change in the social organization of parenting at all. Rather, the target of her intervention strategy is the psychic reality of children and, because of this, the notion persists that Chodorow is beginning to say that this reality is, to some extent, a separate entity and possibly a "third force" in human development.

What requires emphasis is that Chodorow's interpretations of human growth and development emerge from these and other theoretical assumptions, and that these assumptions ought to be tested for their internal consistency and validity before being accepted. Gould's review of the literature, for example, shows that Freud's views of women were widely accepted in clinical practise from the 1920's until very recently without critical evaluation. The separation of clinical and theoretical literatures allowed professional casework to accept the contributions of psychoanalysis as a system of treatment techniques while, at the same time prejudicial Freudian views on women went unchallenged (Gould, 1981; Rist, 1979). For some clientele on the receiving end of these misogynist Freudian ideas the consequences were disastrous (Rosenfeld et. al., 1979).

In this presentation I examine the theoretical assumptions which consolidate Chodorow's work. This seems all the more interesting because Chodorow does base her methodology upon Freudian psychoanalytic theory as "'a psychology of family' pure and simple" (1978a, p. 37). While she acknowledges that her own interpretaion of family structure and reproduction, based on Freudian clinical accounts, would not be accepted by

all psychoanalysts, she asserts, "...the clinically derived description and interpretation of experienced female object-relations in a nuclear family...have not been subjected to substantial revision within the psychoanalytic tradition nor criticism from without, and remain valid" (1978a, p. 93).

The Methodological Approach to the Topic

Textual criticism is the approach I bring to bear on Chodorow's work as I consider her theory of mothering. I evaluate Chodorow's work as I consider her theory of mothering. I evaluate Chodorow's answer to the basic question, "Why do women mother?" and its related query about how to change the sexual division of labour and women's position within it. Chodorow's success in addressing the issue of change is contingent upon the main thrust of her theory. I have already indicated that in Chodorow's view it was the conflicts and contradictions experienced in sexually based divisions which needed to be theorized, no matter whether these were materially, biologically or psychically based. She thought it was these contradictions which not only pointed to the need for changes but which, perhaps, possibly, could provide the impetus for change. Therefore, the two major questions which Chodorow takes up in her theory are indeed related and my own evaluation of her work does not, and cannot, touch on one without alluding to the other.

I have suggested that as things developed in the discussion contrasting social forces with innate givens Chodorow recognized that both sides had been pushed into the inherent determinism of their respective positions, and she searched for a way out. Following Brennan (ca. 1986), I have called this the search for a "third force" in social relations. And I have made this search the theme of this paper.

In the next chapter I position Chodorow within her socio-historical context. I relate the changing position of women in society to the practice of mothering and advice from the

psychological experts. This is to show how Chodorow is indebted to Freud and yet, when she attempts to overcome his biological statements, how she misses the possibilities in his account for theorizing psychic reality as a "third force" independent of biology. The historical survey of psychological thoughts on mothering also suggests that when ideas are propelled into the realm of social discourse they are drastically modified by their social and historical context. I suggest that this may indicate (I think it does) that if psychic reality exists as a third force that is in some way outside the reaches of the social and the natural, then the probable effect of socio-historical conditions is to reinforce or oppose them. This is to say that ideas propelled from the psychic realm must find "a match in socio-historical relations" if they are to have any impact on socio-historical conditions (ca. Brennan, 1986, p. 46).

Given this relatedness, it is not surprising that for Chodorow it seems to be a struggle to theorize the relative importance of the psychic and the social in gender development and the reproduction of mothering. Her statements sometimes appear to contradict one another and some analysts experience difficulty in knowing how to read her account. I couple a brief synopsis of her work with comments about how she resolves the struggle, and the implications of this to her analysis of mothering (Chapter 3).

Though Chodorow's work begins to develop a theory about mothers beyond natural and social determinants this was not understood by her critics who alternately dismissed, or laid claim to, her work in terms of the old argument posing social conditions against essential givens. In the end it was those who took Chodorow's for an essentialist account of mothering who implemented her theory in clinical practice. I discuss the implications of this for counseling (Chapter 4).

Then, in concluding this work, I suggest that the psychical does exist as a third force in social relations. To get at this third force I tell why I think it is not enough to point out the psychological sources of conflict and contradiction. Both Freudian psychoanalysis and Chodorow's derivative do point this out but I show that, in practise, both their psychic

and therapeutic goals aim to establish a homeostatic balance between and among the various conflicts and divisions. I argue that, in and of itself, this does not indicate that psychic reality exists outside of its biological and social determinants. More likely, it indicates how the psyche is divided in and against itself in the service of that which first determines it. I argue that, to get at "a third force", it is necessary to get beyond contradictions and conflict to develop a theory that takes account of agentic behaviour and resistance. I tell why I think it is important that such a theory can point out the psychological sources of resistance in women, particularly in regard to their "feminine" destiny, and how such a theory might account for agentic change.

My assumption is: for the psychic, in some way, to have a life of its own, it must at certain points actively oppose, or resist, that which originally determines it. Therefore, the psychological sources of women's resistance are our most certain signposts to an independent aspect of the psyche or the probable "third force". If this aspect cannot be found, it is important for us to know. I explain how, in psychoanalytic terms, this would base personal resistance on what is "not normal" and political resistance on what is illusion. Finally, I tell why I think that there is a trans-historical determinant of psychic life that is "formed out of" material structures and social content. Because it exists, in part, "outside" its social and material determinants it exists as a "third force". And, because an independent psychic force would account for both agency and resistance, we have available an alternative explanation of why women mother and of how to change their position in the sexual division of labour.

For the structuring and development of my thinking on this topic I am indebted to the work of Teresa Brennan. In her article, An impasse in psychoanalysis and feminism (ca. 1986), she takes up the possibility of a "third force" and tells how, to a certain extent, his would be independent of socio-historical and biological determinants. Then she relates these ideas to the issue of change. I have found her insights most helpful and samplings from her work are sprinkled throughout the chapters ahead. Having had the advantage of

her work to help in mine there are of course areas of disageement as well. I have conceptualized a distinction between resistance and conflict and this has led me to a different outcome. In the end, I find the "third force" in a different location than she. And, I hope with the benefit of following her, what I present addresses some of the difficulties of her account.

Chapter 2:

Socio-Historical Conditions and Psychological Thoughts on Mothering

Industrial Capitalism, Freud and Mothers

Before the advent of industrial capitalism "Why do women mother?" would not have been a question taken up in scholarly research. Women and men worked in their separate spheres and the domestic realm was thought to be a women's natural place. Depending on the point of view, it was women's privilege to bear and care for children or, perhaps, just their lot in life. Women without children were wet nurses, domestics or maiden aunts but, generally, their lives too centred on domestic affairs. This natural order of things did provide women with some benefits. They had a voice in the domestic economy and supportive relationships with other women.

Yet, even then women resisted their lot, and we know that they wrote about it (Spender, 1983). It was just that their ideas did not make a major impact on the thinking of the times because these women did not have access to the traditional means of social discourse outside the home. So it followed that when notions about the "natural" place of women were effectively challenged, the resultant shift in thinking clearly stemmed from changes in the economic mode of production rather than from any resistance on the part of women.

Of course, with the coming of industrial capitalism the transition from a domestic to a market economy was not achieved without massive upheaval in the lives of people and families. It was discovered that people did not act as efficiently and as "rationally" as machines. Instead, it was discovered that people acted for "psychological" reasons. And, no one in the fledgling field of psychology made more influencial discoveries than Freud.

> In this light Freud's theory of the Oedipus Complex takes on historical meaning. Freud lived in a time when the "sons" of the triumphant bourgeoisie were in the ascendency and the "fathers"- the traditional authorities of society - were in the decline. Freud could discern the marks of the struggle - envy, guilt, and the effort to become like the father - in the psychological makeup of the sons. Intellectually, Freud himself was among the most daring of the "sons" (Ehrenreich & English, 1979, pp. 15-16).

It was a bold stroke for Freud to depart from the natural explanations of the past to suggest a psychological explanation of how men must think in order to gain entry to the culture. In doing so Freud was pointing to something that was, in part, beyond the reach of both the biological and the material. The Oedipus Complex pointed beyond the biological precisely because it explained how boys were initiated into a masculine position in capitalist society when now, for the most part, their fathers were physically absent from the home. As Brennan (ca. 1986) observes, when Freud spoke of an inheritance of guilt, he clearly meant something other than a biological birthright. But what exactly did he mean?

Freud did gesture to history as that non-biological aspect of his theory. He argued that boys' entry into human culture, marked by the Oedipus Complex, was a reenactment of a similar event in the history of mankind. Yet, it would be a mistake to think that this makes Freud's non-biological factor into a socio-historical product. As Brennan (ca. 1986) notes, Freud's historical event was a symbolic myth of his own creation, and "...the symbolic is 'historical' only by analogy" (p.15). According to Freud's account, the heritage of symbolic meanings that men acquire is not grounded in actual social or historical conditions, nor is children's "awakening" to this heritage socio-historically induced (Freud, 1913). At this level, the symbolic lies beyond both biological and social determinants and is not reducible to either. But, a consideration of exactly what an independent aspect to psychic life might mean in development was not taken up because, by that time, Freud's biologism had become the focus of attention.

Freud argued that initially an infant is psychologically unorganized and sexually undifferentiated. Thereafter, as the infant seeks gratification, that is, release from the tension of its innate physiological drives, it matures according to a biologically determined series of stages into the "normal" unity of male and female forms. According to Freud it is the "instinct for mastery" that converts an infant's passive erotic aims to active aggressive aims. And it is drives that have been activated in this way that form the libido. Libidinal drives search out objects for gratification and release and, in the process of biological maturation, change the focus of the search from mouth to anus to genitals and, of course, to mothers. In short, Freud's theory tells how child development is influenced by the mother and yet, given the biological determinants of behaviour and development, how the child also agentically works to form a relationship to its own body and to others. It is ironic that, in accounting for the agency of the child, Freud's theory made female development a problem to be dealt with. The difficulty was that Freud had tied "the instinct for mastery", the libido and libidinal drives to active aims and, in his formulation, what was active was masculine (Freud, 1905, as cited in Brennan, ca. 1986)). This made it important to find out why it was that a girl's development was determined by active aims and a masculine libido and yet, in the end, she became more feminine than a boy did.

The theoretical contradiction between masculine drives and feminine outcome, reflected the contradictions women were experiencing in the larger social world. Industrial capitalism had made choices available to women that had previously only been open to men, including the option of working outside the home. However, for women the new opportunities and options were more than balanced off by domestic obligations, parenting responsibilities and social injunctions. In the end, many women facing the possibility of an even longer work day, decided to stick with their "feminine" duties in the home (Ehrenreich & English, 1979). However, the social contradictions of women's lives eluded Freud's explanation of why girls turn from masculine to feminine aims. Instead, he found the way

Freud suggested that early in the daughter's developmental process the mother became the object of the daughter's innate libidinal drives and, thus, of the daughter's incestuous sexual desire. Then, once the daughter reached a certain stage of biological maturation she recognized both her own and her mother's lack of a penis. Unable to gratify her original incestuous desire, according to Freud, the daughter transformed her active clitoral sexuality into a passive sexual desire to have her father and a baby. While Freud's theory does allow that everyone has both masculine and feminine aims, what we are discussing in the daughter's turn to passive aims as described here is not just a theoretical concept emptied of its biological content. Freud's argument effectively does root the passivity of women and their desire to mother in biological lack and inferior bodies. (Freud, 1931). I do not want to misprepresent Freud's position by minimizing his biological statements. Nor do I wish to avoid showing how his idea on the ascent of the feminine in women can be reduced to a biological component. Yet, even Freud had the grace to acknowlege that women would rebel against this feminine destiny (Freud, 1931). And, I think that what is significant about Freud's theoretical solution to the problem of female development is that it points beyond reductionism.

Specifically, though he did not resolve the problem himself, I think Freud's formulations suggest both that it is necessary to theorize women's resistance to the feminine and to feminine positions, such as mothering, and what is necessary to do so. It is possible to find this in Freud's theory because, as Brennan (ca. 1986) notes, it is a theory about how conditions are created so that social ideas about biology and sexual differences can be taken "on board". And, therefore, I think it is also a theory which potentially, possibly, can tell us something about how the conditions are created which form the basis for resistance to those ideas. "For want of a better term, the space in which these conditions are formed (and which they form) is called 'the psychical'. It is not a straightforward socio-historical product" (ca. Brennan, 1986, p. 25). Nor, as we have seen, is it reducible to biological determinants. And it is because psychical conditions lie

outside the social and the biological, to a certain extent, that I think that it is possible to theorize the meaning of resistance on the basis of these conditions. There are two ways to trace this possibility in Freud's work.

The first is to show that Freud leaves open the possibility that resistance is not synonymous with conflict, nor is it a direct outgrowth of sexual contradictions. Because these terms are frequently used interchangeably in discussions of Freud's work, I think it is important to draw out the possible distinction and the implications of that here.

Freud's conceptualization of contradictions and conflict both within and between persons is based on the notion of desire. Freud held that in the earliest stage of infancy the child has no notion of separations and divisions within itself or between itself and the mother. He described this state as a "limitless, unbounded - as it were 'oceanic'" sense of the world, out of which the self only later "separates off an external world from itself" (Freud, 1930, pp.251,255, as cited in Sayers, 1986, p. 65). It is this illusory state which also later gives rise to the fantasy of a return to oneness or non-separation, and the desire for mergence with others and for unity within the self. In Freud's view, it is only when "seen from the perspective of infantile desires and the Oedipal experience..." that erotic and aggressive drives, passive and active aims, and masculinity and femininity "are divided in and against themselves" (Segal, 1987 p.126).

Therefore, on the basis of his formulation we can distinquish conflict and contradiction from resistance. However, according to this formulation, conflict and contradiction are "real", whereas resistance to separations and divisions is based on the "unreal", or we might say, on "an illusion" of original unity. Resistance is a result of the self projecting "impossible desire" both back onto the memory of infancy and out onto others in the present. Given this, the goal of clinical psychoanalysis is to establish and maintain a homeostatic balance between conflictual drives and contradictory aims rather than to resist the existence of these. Similarly, where femininity exists "...in significant contrast to and continuing conflict with the cultural ideologies and expectations which

define (it)... at any particular time and place" (Segal, 1987, p.126) it is folly to resist. For politics is based on illusion and founded in impossible desire. And, taken in this light, we might better understand why Freud admonished feminists that it was useless to resist their feminine destiny until the social order itself had changed.

But, if we can separate our theorizing about contradictions and conflicts from our theorizing about the resistance of women to their feminine destiny, then Freud's analysis opens up a significant possibility. For, if it can be said that, to some as yet undetermined extent, the infant is a self and the infant's experience of unity is based in reality, rather than illusion, then we have established an essential condition for taking on social ideas about sexual difference and, at the same time, for resisting the contradictions and conflicts and oppositions inherent in these ideas. This would make resistance, in some cases at least, normal, human and humane.

As was noted, Freud's psychoanalytic account closed off this possibility. In his view, all experienced differences and contradictions were biologically based - in innate drives, aims and instincts. And, because of their material component, this made conflicts and contradictions and the oppositional nature of their effects in the social both "real" and natural. That the infant did not know this, was only to say that the infant was not a self and was without a subjective presence in the world. For Freud tied the development of a human selfhood inextricably together with the emergence of sexual differences, and in psychoanalytic thought these two cannot be separated one from the other.

So, in the end, despite the hint of other possibilities, Freud's theory concluded that all psychic development is determined by processes of biological growth and maturation. I have emphasized, admittedly for my own purposes, how this could not set conditions for resistance to oppositions and cultural dualisms in thinking about sexual difference. But, more pressing for Freud this formulation could not resolve the problematic because it eliminated conditions whereby the child could make something of its own biology and of its own sexuality. And so, in the last instance, Freud must allow that psychic development

not only follows but also precedes the child's biological unfolding(Ibid). In allowing this, Freud again leaves the door ajar to the possibility that aims, drives and instincts can be examined apart from sexual differences and contradictions which emerge later in the process of biological development.

I think that the second possibility for using Freud's psychoanalytic account to theorize women's resistance is more straightforward. It starts at the pre-Oedipal period to suggest that because a girl is essentially masculine, her later turn to the feminine is but a social overlay. By nature her biologically based drives and aims remain masculine. While this masculine nature provides the condition necessary for taking social ideas about sexuality "on board", it also is the basis for resistance to those ideas. On this basis resistance is "real" and natural because it is rooted in an essential biological component of female nature - the girl's essential masculine nature. It opposes that which is not natural - socialized femininity.

Of course, this was not Freud's argument. He found a biological explanation for the girl's turn to the feminine in the female Oedipal experience, or "castration complex", though this required some intellectual maneuvering. The difficulty was not to find a biological component in the girl's lack of a penis. Its absence was easy to see. Instead, the difficulty was to find a biological component in her desire to have one. Otherwise, a girl's desire "to have a penis" would be "unreal", that is, based on the impossible desire for mergence and non-separation. And, one supposes, what was "unreal" could form the basis for resistance to heterosexual love. Freud did not claim that such a resistance existed. He solved this dilemna and made desire contingent on what was "real" by making a baby the real, material component to a girl's desire. This made the girl's turn to the feminine natural because, in the end, she received a feminine penis - the baby. In this way, the feminine destiny was made biological and, therefore, natural. Whereas, in this formulation, women's resistance to the feminine destiny was made not natural and, therefore, not normal.

In the above, I have tried to show how Freud set out the terms for theorizing women's resistance and then, in the end, turned from this to argue that "...psychic development ...is determined by a biologically scheduled unfolding of stages of infantile sexuality" (Chodorow, 1978a, p. 46). Freud was never easy with his analysis of female development and over the course of twenty years he modified and added to his original account, Three essays on the theory of sexuality (1905). One of the most significant revisions questioned his own earlier claim that there is a parallel developmental process for girls and boys until puberty. This signalled an end to the notion that girls are originally masculine. And, by positing a separate developmental track for girls, feminine destiny was rooted more firmly still in female biology. According to the later formulation what was essential and biological about the feminine was simply that it was not masculine. In her own psychic ideations, the girl had to imagine being a penis - a penis that in the next level of ideation is castrated.

It did not concern North Americans that other possible interpretations of Freudian thought were lost when his ideas were reduced to biological essentials. "This, in fact, was the project of psychology: to take feelings, sensations, ideas, etc., and reduce them to a matter of nerve impulses; to take the traditional material of philosophy and seize it for biology" (Ehrenreich & English, 1979, p. 197). Bettleheim (1983) notes that in the translation of the Freudian account to North America, the language of Freud's "science of the soul" was replaced by sterile technical terminology. The "I" became the "ego", the "self" became the "id" and the "soul" a behaving object. But, one thing was not lost and that was the biological determinants of the psychoanalytic account. These most appealed to North American clinicians and, of course, mothering was one of the first things to be tied to the female body.

Mothers in the Pre-war Years

During the pre-war years in North America, Ehrenreich and English (1979) note that it was a mother's job to love her child. And, once psychoanalysts had discovered the maternal instinct, this was thought to be much easier for mothers to do. The experts believed that almost all women were natural mothers. Winnicott (1957) claimed, "If a child can play with a doll, you can be an ordinary devoted mother..." (p. vii). Not only that, but women were also told that they would instinctually find fulfillment in mothering. This was because a mother needed her child as much as the child needed her. For it was at the moment when a mother regressed to a child-like state and a [illegible] the baby into her arms as a feminine penis that the castration complex was resolved [illegible]ich & English, 1979, pp. 219-235).

"Natural" mothers toiled alone at home until the evidence of their mothering came to the attention of principals, physicians and social workers. That these crying, depressed and attention-seeking children might be a sign of mothers' resistance to isolation and their position in society did not occur to the experts. Because women's resistance was not theorized in North American psychoanalysis, what was happening could only be termed "not normal" and it was "not normal" on a massive scale (Ibid). "As psychoanalytic attention shifted from the normal to the deviant, from the 'healthy' to the pathological, the theory of instinctual motherhood quickly lost whatever comfort it might have held for women" (Ehrenreich & English, 1979, p. 226).

However, it was only later that the normalcy of instinctual motherhood was finally challenged to effect - and that challenge came in the form of a socio-historical event, rather than from mothers. It was the coming of World War II that brought the change. Psychological screening of draftees indicated that millions of men "lacked independence". And, that was when the experts began to warn mothers not to overprotect their children (Dr. E. Strecker, as cited in Friedan, 1973).

Mothers and Daughters in the 'Fifties

> Personal: Nancy Chodorow. Born January 20, 1944, in New York, N.Y.: daughter of Marvin (a professor of applied physics) and Leah Ruth (Turitz) Chodorow (a mother)[1] (Locher, 1982).

Mothers of the fifties found their growing independence, fostered during the war years, collapsed in on a more limited future in the suburbs during the post-war period. Recent historical scholarship shows that there was a concerted post war effort to give returning veterans priority in jobs and education, and to get women back into the home (Breines, 1985). That most women complied is evidence of their flexibility, adaptability and "tension-management" skills. No one seemed to notice that these characteristics best suited women (and, perhaps, least suited military men) to the new white collar jobs in government and industry which grew out of the war effort. These characteristics also predisposed women to "seek help" from the experts in preparing thir children for a changing world. And the experts responded with a wealth of advice. Reisman observes that during this period women became associated with the new and the avante garde, men with the traditional (as cited in Breines, 1985). Permissive childcare practices reversed earlier parenting styles and, with women providing the impetus, an Americanized version of Freudian psychoanalysis became the new pop-culture psychology (Breines, 1985; Goldner, 1985).

With the scope of their focus now being confined to the care of home and children, these mothers exerted their newfound independence within the domestic realm, where they were supposed to be. Within the context of a consumer society, women increased their control over household finances through their newfound "purchasing power". But, that women had not gained corresponding new powers in the larger socio-economic context did not moderate anxiety over this growing economic visibility of mothers within the home.

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[1] (Ruth Chodorow's occupation is the only one unlisted here, and on the basis I have made the assumption that she was a homemaker and fulltime mother.)

The experts suggested that mothers still suffered the effects of penis envy and had not mastered their very unfeminine drive to power (Lundberg & Farnham, 1971). Though women were supposed to be fulltime mothers, their preoccupation with the home and children was thought to emasculate sons. Consequently, under the influence of mothers' excessive involvement and overprotection, independent, entrepreneurial men, the "real men" of the pre-war years, were fast disappearing behind corporate desks (Breines, 1985).

The solution, according to the experts, was to be found in a father's intervention within the family. It was the father who could best weaken the mother-child bond and introduce some reality into the situation. By spending time with his children, especially sons, a father could introduce knowledge of appropriate sex-role behaviour. Though, of course, it was important not to be at home too much because this would model inappropriate masculine behaviour and defeat the purpose of it all. As a counterpart, the energies of a mother were best directed towards making herself attractive to her husband. According to the experts, this would keep her husband home and spare her children, especially sons, from excessive involvement with her. If a husband met his wife's sexual needs while he was at home, this too would help keep things in the proper perspective (Ehrenreich & English, 1979, pp. 237-247).

Despite the fact that notions of appropriate sex-role behaviour were shored up by the experts, this was still not enough to stop the assault of socio-historical forces on gender norms. Behind the scenes in the nuclear family things did not always work out according to the ideal. Though the ideology of the ideal nuclear family made this less apparent than real, those of us who grew up during the 'fifties can attest to the variety and diversity of parenting styles and arrangements in our friends' families. In her presentation of stories collected from the daughters of the 'fifties, Heron (1985) puts it this way, "Each story belongs somewhere inside that general pattern (the public image of 'the family'), yet none of them quite fits..." (p. 1). Fathers did not always model the masculine ideal, and nor did mothers always succeed in their feminine counterpart (Steedman, 1986).

Things did not always work out. The idea that being put in "their place" would create conflict for women, and the notion that women might be asked about their experience, did not occur. In fact, to integrate into the home the authoritarian model of masculinity bred in some men during military training was sometimes a bitter experience for mothers and children. The divorce rate was rising, and proceedings were most often initiated by women. In this too, mothers were thought to be at fault for not trying hard enough to make things work (Breines, 1985; Goldner, 1985).

Yet, these same shifts and changes in gender norms that became problematic for mothers, paved the way for the later advance of daughters into the professions and public institutions. As Segal (1987) points out, "Reading about women's lives in the fifties, recalling the lives of our mothers, is often grim and painful - tales of bitterness, resentment, and regret....Our women's movement (is) based upon young women's very determined resistance to such lives....(emphasis mine, p. 143).

A Daughter in the 'Sixties

What seems characteristic of the 'sixties is that daughters left home and mother behind, their concerns as young women with the opportunity to "make it on their own" not necessarily being those of their mothers. The changes which had been reshaping women's lives for some time were finding conscious expression in the political activity of their daughters. Moreover, group encounter and self study groups flourished and, coupled with the rediscovery of Freud's "science of the soul", these impelled the daughters of the 'sixties to "actualize their full potential". And, given this climate, the daughters' primary concern with the family of origin was to sort out the past - a therapeutic "looking back" suggested by Freudian psychoanalysis (Goldner, 1985).

Although there is not a great body of biographical material to draw on, what is available suggests that these characteristics of the period featured in Chodorow's life. Here

I try to elucidate from the general information available the particular development of her thought.

Leaving home and mother behind, Chodorow entered graduate school in London, and at Harvard and Brandeis Universities (Locher, 1982). Involved with the women's movement (Thurman, 1982), she joined the efforts of other women to achieving equality with men, on the same terms and by speaking the same language, that of liberal ideals. These articulate women making their way into the educational institutions and professions argued that any "difference" could be traced to the differential educational opportunities of women relative to men, and would disappear as efforts were made to redress this imbalance. Asserting that women, as rational beings, are entitled to exactly the same rights as men, they recommended that sexual differences be "deinstitutionalized" and that social and legal definitions ignore sexual difference "...in any other than a strictly reproductive context" (Jaggar, 1985).

This experience in graduate school led Chodorow to "look back" on her own experience of gender arrangements, not as a mother, but as a daughter. She had discovered that questions about mother and daughter relationships went unanswered in her sociology seminar on the family. There was nothing written on the subject; in the professor's own scholarly work on mother and son relationships, there was one line about daughters; it was as if families consisted of fathers, mothers and sons (Thurman, 1982).

Consequently, she and some female colleagues decided to study themselves, and in order to understand, to explore their own experience of mothering. Later, this self-study provided the impetus for Chodorow's research into gender arrangements and motherhood (Thurman, 1982). But this was still to come.

For the moment these feminist thinkers engaged in the task of making their personal vision a political reality. Goldner (1985) cites their concerns with establishing themselves in the public realm, "liberating" themselves from oppression, and balancing needs for

intimacy and selfhood. These concerns translated into an extensive social analysis, and, eventually, psychoanalytic theory itself came under scrutiny.

Concerns About Mothering in the 'Seventies

Women's consciousness about mothering was changed most of all by what O'Brien (1981) terms a "world-historical event". This event, put simply, was the development of the birth control pill. O'Brien argues that the pill not only gave women a safe method of birth control but also gave women a choice that they had never before had in the history of the world - the choice to mother or not. During the 'seventies an increasing number of women did decide to postpone motherhood. And more women planned to have children after their professional careers were established, in their thirties rather than in their twenties. Chodorow was one of these.

It was not that feminists were uninterested in motherhood. But it was that they had noticed the isolation, financial dependence and constraints that mothers experienced (Comer, 1974). So feminist efforts were focussed on documenting the conflicts and contradictions of the mother's role in society, and on procuring daycare and family planning for women (Jaggar, 1983, 1985).

In addition, as feminists advanced into the professions they learned to balance their public and private lives. And, finding that the two were not mutually exclusive, feminists began to ask why it was that their fathers had been absent from the home so much.

In short, the daughters of the 'fifties, supposedly trained into the appropriate sex-role behaviour so actively modelled by their parents, turned around and critiqued those very notions of masculinity and femininity. Clearly, sex-role training had not worked, in the case of daughters at least. Moreover, cross-cultural research added weight to their critique of socially sanctioned male and female roles. It was found that what counted as a "feminine" characteristic in one culture counted as a "masculine" characteristic in another.

Subsequently, gender difference emerged as a new category of research, distinct from findings about sexual difference.

Feminist writings reveal the challenges of this period and Chodorow's (1971) cross-cultural examination of the differential socialization of boys and girls is of this genre. Here she addresses "... issues that people concerned about the liberation of women and men from rigid and limiting sex roles must consider" (p. 259).

By the mid-seventies, as more feminists became mothers, or considered becoming mothers, "... family life in general, and motherhood in particular ... emerged as categories for analysis, critique and reconstruction" (Goldner, 1985). By this time feminists had taken up positions on either side of the social-biological debate. And I have previously introduced the idea that for feminists the issue dividing their respective positions was the issue of change. On the one hand, women had seen, or had heard of, the impact to mothers of Freud's biologism. If it was accepted that a woman's destiny was grounded in what was biological and natural, then it was also accepted that there was a transhistorical and unchanging aspect to women's mothering and women's position in society. If, on the other hand, women's mothering and women's relative powerlessness vis a vis men were found to be the product of socio-historical conditions, then, perhaps, there was a chance for change. Because once those conditions were identified, undermining them would undermine the sources of oppression for both women and men. This is where the debate stood at the time and feminists lined up on sides depending on whether they thought that a theory about the nature of femininity and women's mothering could be (ought to be) tied to a political agenda.

It was within the context of her particular socio-historical situation and within political climate that Chodorow's attention also shifted to domestic themes. Taken u the contradictions and conflicts that women experienced in their "feminine" role, Ch not only asked why women would want to mother but also how the contradictions cou

resolved so that women's position in society could change. This, of course, placed her on the social side of the debate.

However, Chodorow could not find a theoretical position from which to address the issue of mothering and its contradictions from among the available social theories. She noted that, in one way or another, all of these theories assumed behavioural conformity and social control and, therefore, there was an inherent determinism to each. She argued that it did not matter whether it was a question of role training so that "...girls choose to do 'girl-things' and, I suppose, eventually 'woman-things,' like mothering, as a result of learning that they are girls," or whether it was a question of socializing girls into the culture so that the cultural devaluation of women is internalized and perpetuates "low self esteem", relative powerlessness and eventually unpaid labour as mothers (1978a, pp. 31,47). As I understand it, her thinking on this could be summed up in saying that these arguments presuppose the femininity they seek to explain and, by looking back, apply social theory to show how femininity is determined by social effects. Chodorow claimed that none of these arguments could explain why women mother when it might not be politically wise to do so let alone why women are good mothers, since it is impossible to coerce anyone to be a good mother by enforcing behavioural acquisitions.

This seems to be what led Chodorow to look for a third factor beyond both biologically and socially derived behaviour. And the first step in that direction was a move towards a psychological explanation. She wrote, "A concern with parenting, then, must direct attention beyond behavior. This is because parenting is not simply a set of behaviors, but participation in an interpersonal, diffuse, affective relationship. Parenting is an eminently psychological role..." (1978a, p.33). She developed this theme in a 1974 article which outlined a model to show that the "tenacious" psychological commitment to gender roles is reproduced in the family.

A further difficulty lay in explaining how contradictions emerge between "social reality and psychic reality" (Chodorow, 1978a, p. 47). In terms of mothering this could be

framed as the "contradiction between what is deemed politically correct and what is desired" (Henrique et al, 1984, p.7). This is what Chodorow thought was the crux of the dilemna in mothering. Women continued to mother even though it was not the most expedient course of action given women's social position. Women desired to mother even though it was sometimes against all reason.

The discussion that arose concerning women's desire was very timely for feminists from the women's movement who were now in their thirties, facing an urgent choice about motherhood (Segal, 1987, p. 136). And, not surprisingly, Chodorow had a special interest in the discussion for this reason as well. Once again she argued that socialization theories which assume "direct transmission of social reality to psychic reality" cannot explain how these contradictions emerge. And, in the end, feminists such as Chodorow turned to psychoanalysis to explain their emergence.

Henriques et al (1984) suggest that feminists turned to psychoanalysis because it offered a way "...to theorize issues brought up by its emphasis on consciousness-change..." (p.7). If a woman's desire was not based on reason, then perhaps it was rooted beyond reasonings, in the unconscious. And if so, then the analytic process offered a way to address "...the consequent question of how women change their construction as feminine " (Ibid).

For Chodorow a psychoanalytic understanding of women's capacity and desire to mother also offered the possibility of theorizing a "third force" in gender development, a force both tied to socio-biological determinants and, in some way, independent of them. She utilized object relations theory for this purpose and asserted,

> It provides an alternative psychodynamic account of personality formation to the instinctual determinism of Freud...and to the direct environmental determinism of the cultural school. At the same time, it incorporates a view of the place of both drives and social relations in development (1978a, p. 47).

In 1976 Chodorow began to bring a psychodynamic approach to her work on gender relations and mothering. In that year she addressed the difficulties of heterosexual marriage, and the systematic, rather than accidental nature of those difficulties. And in 1978(b) she reconstructed the psychoanalytic account to show that the female oedipal complex is as much a mother-daughter issue, as it is a father-daughter issue.

The reproduction of mothering appeared as the culmination of this inquiry.[2] Following close behind Juliet Mitchell's (1974) Psychoanalysis and feminism and Dorothy Dinnerstein's (1976) The mermaid and the minotaur, it was one of a trilogy of texts on motherhood. Their proposed solutions to women's oppression differ, but the similarities are striking enough that I group them together here. While attempting to overcome the limitations of psychoanalytic theory, each relies heavily on the Freudian account and clinical evidence. The dominant mother of the fifties emerges as a characteristic feature in each account and their appropriation of Freud focusses on features of the family that stand in internal contradiction to one another and in contradiction to changes that are generated outside the family. To one degree or another each one moves their theoretical account beyond the biological and the socio-historical into a new space - the psychical. Like Chodorow each one seeks to show how social and historical conditions are mediated by psychodynamic processes "...through fantasy, introjection and projection, ambivalence, conflict, substitution, reversal, distortion, splitting, association, compromise, denial, and repression" (1978a, p.47).

However, to theorize an independent aspect to the psychic was not without its risk. To conceptualize the psychical as entirely separate from social conditions was to essentialize the psyche and, by the terms of the debate, the conditions for change could not be argued on this basis. Yet, to take social influences on the psychic into consideration

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2 Interestingly, The reproduction of mothering (1978 a) was published the year after her marriage in 1977, and in 1979, her first child was born (Locher, 1982 and Thurman, 1982).

was to run a risk of sociologising the whole theoretical framework. As Brennan (ca. 1986) notes, the power of the psychic is "drastically qualified" by social conditions and social ideologies. Certainly, the history of psychological thoughts on mothering makes this plain.

Brennan (ca. 1986) points out that Mitchell was not able to negotiate all the difficulties. Mitchell contributed the insight that Freud was not about the biological but rather about the psychical. But then she could take it no further because she had become "trapped by the existing terms of the debate" (p. 9). I think that Chodorow became trapped in much the same way. Chodorow extended the idea of a "third factor" further than it had been taken before, particularly in its relationship to change. But, in the end, she was caught by the need to find a non-essential, non-natural condition to account for change and fell back on a socio-historical explanation of why women mother in order to incorporate this. Chodorow found that socio-historical explanation in the organization of parenting and, specifically, in the fact that it is women who are responsible for the early care of children.

Chapter 3:

Chodorow's Theory: The Reproduction of Mothering

Why Do Women Mother?

According to Chodorow women become mothers because women themselves produce daughters who will mother, and sons who will not. Chodorow adds that masculine and feminine personality structures, developing as a product of women's mothering, also serve to maintain women intergenerationally in this mothering role. Chodorow claims that all this is the result of the assymetrical structure of parenting which situates women in the home. She argues that this is problematic because, when women are the primary caretakers, both girls and boys must experience the process of separation and individuation in relation to her.

To develop this analysis and to avoid the biological determinism that she perceives to be in the Freudian account, Chodorow works from within the object relations school of psychoanalysis. In contrast to the Freudian emphasis on innate libidinal drives which seek gratification, object relations theorists hold to the existence of primary love. According to this assumption "...infants have a primary need for human contact for itself" (Chodorow, 1978a, p.64) and will manipulate and use their innate drives to establish and maintain relationships.

This is not to say that the infant will "naturally" seek out relationships. Chodorow does not suggest that the child possesses any innate or instinctual motivating aim. In fact she argues, "At this early time of life the actions of the mother and her...involvement with the child exert a selective growth of some, and hold back, or fail to stimulate and libidinize, the growth of other potentialities" (Ibid , p.58). And furthermore, she claims that to "...argue that the person has innate capacities to organize that which comes from the

environment....does not contribute to our understanding of the person as a motivated subject" (p.49).

On this view the child does not create experiences but instead "takes into itself" or internalizes relationships as they are experienced. If the relationship is conflictual that too will be internalized by the child.

Chodorow claims that, because women are devalued in society, women are bound to treat their daughters differently than their sons. Therefore mothers' relationships with daughters will develop differently than their relationships with sons. And she continues, "To the extent that females and males experience different interpersonal environments as they grow up, feminine and masculine personality will develop differently and be preoccupied with different issues" (p. 51).

Chodorow claims that mothers experience their daughters as like themselves, and, therefore the process of separation and individuation is longer and more difficult for girls than for boys. Though, Chodorow asserts that this process is also more continuous. Consequently, girls experience a greater continuity in relationships, and grow up adopting their mothers' relational capabilities and openness and the desire to be mothers themselves.

In contrast to this, mothers experience sons as unlike themselves. Therefore, mothers encourage boys to separate from the relationship earlier and more completely than girls do. By this account boys grow up repressing their needs and capacities for nurturance, close themselves off from others emotionally, and at the same time deny the feminine in themselves and devalue its appearance in others.

It is on this basis that Chodorow claims, "... women's mothering is a central and defining feature of the social organization of gender and is implicated in the construction and reproduction of male dominance itself" (Chodorow, 1978, p.9).

On the Reproduction of Mothering

The oral stage

According to Chodorow the interactions of the mother with her child at the oral alimentary stage center on the "'taking' mode (concerned with taking and giving, emptying and filling)" (p.66). Initially the infant can not get along without its mother and, within this context, cathects the mother to itself, a "taking in" of the mother object which results in becoming emotionally related both to itself, and to her. In this way, the mother becomes the primary internalized love object of the child, who, experiencing mother as an "external ego", not separate from the self, aims "...to be loved and satisfied, without being under any obligation to give anything in return" (Balint, as cited in Chodorow, p.65).

Good enough mothering not only provides the holding and nurturance good enough for the child's eventual separation and individuation, but is also gratifying for the mother. This gratification stems from the interdependence of the mother and child, and their mutuality of interests. Rather than understanding the infant's needs intellectually, at a verbal level for example, good enough mothering depends on a preverbal (and in this sense non-social) maternal empathy stemming from an experience of the infant as one with the self, or as an extension of the self.

The symbiotic stage

During the "symbiotic" stage, the infant begins to experience the mother as separate, wavering between an experience of her as "me" and then "not me". Developing this sense of reality, this sense of the object as other, depends on the continuing need for mother-love because only as the infant is frustrated in seeking primary love does differentiation occur. This occurs in conjunction with both physiological maturation and the growing awareness of mother-absence when it occurs.

Initially, the child remains reliant on mother's protection; it is she who is sensitive to the infant's needs, responding when the child signals the need for attachment, or for

distance. Chodorow adds, "Along with these shifts go equally varied emotional changes, as the child goes from contented oneness, fulfilled primary love...to feelings of helplessness and ambivalence at the mother's power and her control" (p.73).

Sense of self

A bounded sense of self develops through the provision of opportunities to compare others. By comparing father to mother, for example, the child gains a sense of body boundaries and of its own differentiation.

By the time the child's sense of self is established, and the child is independently controlling proximity to mother, the infant has also accomplished a transformation of its love relationship with mother, from one of "naive egoism" to one of attachment, which recognizes her as a separate person. Chodorow holds that this "...relationship and its affective quality inform and interact with all other relationships (p.79). "...On a theoretical level, then, anyone--boy or girl--who has participated in a "good-enough" mother-infant relation has the relational basis of the capacity for parenting" (p.87).

Gender differentiation and the mothering relation

According to Chodorow, mothers introduce both girls and boys to gender differences and, through seductive behavior towards sons and holding onto daughters, introduce knowledge of its social and familial meaning. Sons are cathected as the absent father figure, and are treated as separate sexual beings. This does create disturbances in the developmental process for boys, but it also has the effect of helping the differentiation process along. On the other hand, mothers experience girls as an extension of themselves, as not separate. The differentiation process is made more difficult, and in its most extreme form can lead to a psychotic disruption within a prolonged pregenital stage.

The oedipal period

During the oedipal period "fathers generally sex type their children more consciously than mothers along traditional gender-role lines..." (p.118) but because this sex typing behavior is not rooted in an early relation of mutual interests and oneness with

the child, the actual developmental importance of the father's behavior is not as great as that of the mother.

The boy's intense emotional attachment to his mother and his love for her, with its sexual aspect, come into increasing conflict with his sense of self-love. In desiring his mother he places himself in opposition to the interests of his punishing father. This conflict is resolved only in identifying with his father, and a radical repression of his dependency needs, accomplished through adoption of the strictures of the paternal superego. His identification with his father is therefore a negative identification, based on the need to move away from his mother to independence and autonomy. By adopting this masculine identity he manages to avoid his father's wrath and, in addition, gains the promise of one day possessing a woman of his own and the permission to punish others himself.

In the case of a daughter, the father's seductive behavior is necessary to gender-role development, particularily in regard to the "heterosexual aspects of the feminine role ('passivity and dependence, for instance, as these behaviors are oriented toward men')" (p.139). If the father offers too little involvement, however, his absence could lead his daughter to idealize him as all-good, or all-punishing. If he offers too much involvement, she might develop defensive maneuvers to avoid his seduction and his possessiveness.

The reality principle and a positional identification with father

According to Chodorow, a father represents reality to his children, that is, they are conscious of him at a verbal, rather than a preverbal level. His relation to daughters and sons, and their identification with him, is therefore positional, rather than primarily relational. This is particularily obvious in the case of a son, whose negative identification with his father necessarily involves an identification with cultural norms.

The daughter identifies with her father positionally by incorporating him into a relational triangle; her relation to her father being added to her primary identification with her mother in a relational construct of much greater complexity than that experienced by sons. The desirability of her father as a symbol of power and freedom from her mother, is

counterbalanced by the wish to love her father because her mother prefers him, or because of her mother's connection to him. In addition, for mothers and daughters separation represents relational disaster.

In the end, the idealized image of the father figure, along with his seductive behavior, enable the daughter to overcome her anxiety and adopt a heterosexual orientation. However, because the father is not a love-object of sufficient strength, a total change of object does not occur.

The marriage relation

Boys eventually want to return to an experience of emotional attachment in the marriage relationship, but for girls it is much different. Girls eventually enter marriage out of concrete experiences of social and economic dependence. The physical and emotional distance of husbands and lovers enables girls, or women, to overlook the limitations of men, and to idealize them, while covering very rational decisions under a cloak of romanticism. Women continue to seek psychological satisfaction in relationships with their mothers and other women, rather than from their husbands. In Chodorow's view, sexual relations gratify both women and men as a satisfying return to oneness, primary love and refusion with the mother, though for women, a less complete merging with the mother image occurs. Finally, women want to recreate the experience of a relational triangle, of complexity and depth, in the husband and wife relationship - by adding children to it. In short, at the psychical level women want to mother. And, the cycle is complete in the reproduction of mothering.

To Summarize One Socio-historical Fact

As mentioned above, when Chodorow analyzed the issue of mothering the subject could be approached from one of two directions, either from the perspective of innate givens or from that of changeable social conditions. These were the terms of the feminist

debate. It was Chodorow's recognition of the determinism inherent in both of these approaches that led her to seek a third factor to explain why women mother, a factor that might guide her through the social-biological divide, and beyond the impasse. But, despite this attempt, she was not able to overcome the difficulty.

In her concern to address the issue of how to change women's position in the sexual division of labour, Chodorow carefully avoided any hint of essential and unchanging innate givens. Chodorow argued, for example, that the child does not possess any innate motivating aim and that "innate drives do not naturally determine behaviour" (p.48). In fact, to get beyond biologically derived behaviour and into the psychic dimension, Chodorow claimed that innate capacities tell us little about the motivating aims of the child.

Then, once she was into the psychodynamics of her account, Chodorow attempted to avoid coming down on the socio-historical side of the debate by theorizing an independent aspect to the psychic. Her attempt could be seen as an effort to give back to the child a certain psychic agency outside of the social order. It was necessary to do so because that agency was severely limited once innate capacities were written out of the account. To develop her position she said that by internalization she did not mean the direct transmission of the social relationship into psychic reality. Instead, she was arguing for an internalization of relationships that is mediated by fantasy and conflict so that the child can work on and create what is internalized. Yet, in the last instance, we see that she stood by her argument that "....the child's social experience from earliest infancy is determining for psychological growth and personality formation" (emphasis mine, p. 47). And so, while Chodorow pointed the way to something new - a possible third factor - in the end she was caught up in the same terms of the debate that had daunted others.

In the final analysis, Chodorow explained all psychic development in terms of one socio-historical fact, women mother. Simply put, her argument is as follows: It is mothers who select for and activate mothering capacities and psychological dispositions in

daughters, and do not do this with sons. Children internalize the social relationship with their mother as they experience it. This is why daughters will grow up to be mothers and will want to be mothers, but sons will not.

Elshtain (1984) observes that this account explains why women mother very well, in fact, too well. She insists that Chodorow has taken psychoanalysis and made it into a socialization theory, explaining how mothers mold human "objects" into the appropriate social "product". Taking this view, Chodorow's thesis could be summed up in the following way:

Women mother

Mothers produce daughters who will want to mother

Women mother

Mothers produce sons who deny the feminine

What we have left is a functionalist model. It even can explain the internalization of contradictions and conflicts to show how these are transmitted in socially conforming ways. In the relationship with the mother children are produced with both passive and active aims. They are both "fragile and acutely vulnerable" and "capable of assertive action" (Urwin, 1984, p. 321). Yet, as Brennan (ca. 1986) points out,

> The real contradiction here is not about whether girls are incited to be active...to a limited extent. It is that if girls are incited to be active, they are also incited to subordinate this activity to passive feminine aims. As this is the stronger social message, it should follow (if one adheres to a socialization account) that it will win in the end (p.31).

Of course, this analysis would not be cause for concern if women invariably did follow in their mother's footsteps and did carry out their socially prescribed roles. But, this is not the case. As I said, part of the problem with Chodorow's conceptualization is that she takes it as her end point to show that contradictions exist, when this is not enough. Something else is needed to suggest how the possibility of change might be explored. What is at issue is resistance. Chodorow nas failed to address women's resistance to the social pressures that would mold them in just the way she describes. Sayer (1986) adds,

"She thereby fails to address the psychological sources of women's resistance and struggle against those sexual divisions in society that obstruct their realizing (their) aspirations (p.77). To conclude that women want to mother and are psychologically prepared to subordinate their own interests to those of the child also fails to explain the active struggle for shared parenting that Chodorow supports.

I have told why I believe the Freudian account suggests two possibilities for addressing this issue of women's resistance. Each possibility alludes to a trans-historical psychical factor which creates the conditions for internalizing social ideas about sexuality and, at the same time, for resisting ideas based on separations and divisions. I raise the issue now only to leave it aside, until I take it up again in chapter five.

It is enough for here to point out that Chodorow was not able to move beyond the social-biological debate, and her critics were certainly not able to do this either. In fact, they critiqued Chodorow from their respective positions on one side and the other. However, I think it is important to review their various comments in order to understand the reception to Chodorow's work, its therapeutic implications and its application in clinical practice.

Chapter 4: The Reception To Chodorow's Work

The perspectives brought to bear on Chodorow's Reproduction of mothering are a source of new ideas and insightful comment. The various ideas not only respond to the difficulties of Chodorow's account, but also reflect the particular position of the respondent in the ongoing debate on mothering and the issue of change. "Standing in different social locations, some ... experience certain aspects of (the issues) with particular sharpness while others are affected more immediately by other aspects" (Jaggar, 1983, p.8). That particular and multidimensional experience, of course, yields complexity and depth to the differing views. My primary concern is to present these evaluative offerings with some clarity, to show how Chodorow's work ultimately was interpreted and then to get at the therapeutic implications of Chodorow's theory and its application in clinical practice.

Social Conditions and the Impact to "Mothering"

If psychoanalysis was not only about psychic meaning, but had something to say about social meaning as well, then psychoanalysis had to be rooted in the socio-historical conditions which give rise to ideology. Exactly what those conditions were which gave rise to women's oppression had to be determined.

Marxist feminists, such as Sayer (1983) generally had looked for those conditions in the economy. They claimed that mothering was created by, and maintained for, the benefit of capitalism and the class system, as were other sexually-based divisions of labour. Yet, because contradictions existed, between mothering and the socio-economic forces which determined it, there was hope for change in the capitalist system. For this reason Coser was optimistic about Chodorow's shared parenting solution. Coser wrote,

> I believe that the division of labor by which mothers nurture within a family circle and fathers guide boys into the world creates personality patterns and needs unsuited to the conditions of modern life. A sharp distinction between external and internal orientation creates a family imbalance harmful to both its emotional solidarity and its effectiveness in the economic sphere (as cited in Lorber et al., 1984, p.491).

Coser predicted that these contradictions would lead to change in the organization of parenting because it was in the interests of capital for these changes to occur.

Perhaps, it is not surprising that when early Marxist feminists focussed their analysis on the broad sweep of class related history the message implicit to this was that women had to sit back and wait for the revolution. Masked behind revolutionary fervour a passive stance towards the feminine destiny was reinforced. But it was not lost on feminists that tension between passive and active aims was exactly the issue that Freud's work addressed.

In Freud's formulations passive aims were associated with socialization experiences particularily in relationship to the mother but, what if this could be applied, as well, to the processes whereby historical factors like class and race molded and "informed" persons. Perhaps, there was a correspondence between passive aims and socialization experiences, whereas active aims were something different and not related to these experiences (Brennan, 1986). If this was correct, then active aims were those which impelled the ideas of persons out into the socio-economic order to form and "reform"it.

Whether a correspondence held or not progressive Marxists, such as Sayer, did suggest that the Marxist analysis was at least a sufficient explanation of the contradiction between women's consciousness and the societal roles they were expected to assume; consequently, according to Sayer (1983) the fact that many women do what they <u>do not want</u> to do is explained here, in a way that Chodorow's theory can not explain it. Of course, what Sayer's comment signalled was a subtle shift in meaning. The previous emphasis on <u>contradictions</u> had quietly moved towards addressing the issue of women's

resistance to oppressive structures, including the institution of motherhood. Although, at this stage it was an admittedly passive resistance under consideration.

At a more fundamental level these issues indicated that social conditions were not as closely related to psychic meaning, or ideology, as had previously been thought. Things were much more complex than that. For one thing, the contradictions for women did not necessarily work in the interests of capital (Jaggar, 1983), and neither did the arrival of socialism necessarily herald the demise of male dominance (Wilson, as cited in Sayer, 1982). What Marxist theory needed was a theory of sexuality.

For these reasons, several developments came together to impact the socio-historical consideration of mothering. Turning from the grand scale of things, analysts shifted to the idea of acting into specific sites of material practice. The study of the content of specific social situations raised the issue of coercive structures and relations of power. And women's resistance was related to these structures and power relations (Henriques et al, 1984).

One example of this new direction is Lorber's analysis of mothering and social institutions. She makes the case that, because all social institutions, including the family, have a history of their own, these structures, in their independence from individuals and personalities are the crucial variable in determining why women mother. Individual mothers most often respond to these social institutions, rather than the other way around (Lorber et al., 1981).

To be more specific, Lange (as cited in Jaggar, 1983) claims that women turn to reproductive labour (bearing and rearing children) out of economic necessity and that this is the basis of their subordination. Though she is not commenting directly on Chodorow's work, I include her analysis here because, in this respect, it runs remarkably true to Chodorow's own theory. But, Lange points out that there is a coercive aspect to this account of mothering. Women only appear to want to mother, she says, because marriage

and fa ..y remain the best economic options for them. And, as I mentioned, Chodorow denies that there can be any coercion in the case of mothering.

Elshtain, too, questioned Chodorow's assumption that there was a lack of coercion in mothering. Elshtain (1984) wrote, "Although classic functionalist doctrine masked the question of power there was an implicit assumption that in a hierarchical, well-ordered social world an importunate entity - the overall system of society - pulls other institutions along without the rude incursion of outright coercion..." (p.56).

If these presumptions about power are made explicit in respect to the institution of motherhood they take on the familiar "top-down" form, "...with those on the 'top' having more power than those 'down' below" (Ibid). The implications of this for mothering are related to class and race. For example, Sayer (1983) argues, "Chodorow ... assumes that mothering consists in essence of the psychological identification of the mother with her child" (p. 78). Citing empirical evidence to show that mother and child processes of identification differ between the working and middle classes, she concludes that it is an error to assume the prevalence of one type of psychological identification across classes. Along the same lines, Benjamin (1978) suggests that individual identification with one's child, which is Chodorow's starting point, is less likely to occur in working class families where social and kinship networks are more essential to survival (as cited in Sayer, 1983).

Mitchell (1974) adds that differences also reflect the parents' own experience of societal norms as alien, or as congruent with their own values. For example, middle class parents, identifying with these norms, convey them to their children through psychological identification, while working class parents experience these norms as externally imposed and convey these to their children as external injunctions. Mitchell argues that this process will tend to create a more authoritarian personality structure in the working class than in the middle class.

Lorber (1981) raises another issue when she insists that Chodorow's theory of masculine and feminine personality development does not adequately explain why sons and

daughters in the upper class are more alike than sons with sons, and daughters with daughters, across class and racial lines (Lorber, in Lorber et al., 1981). But, I think that Segal (1987) has the last word here. Her complaint is that Chodorow assumes that the ideal middle class bourgeoisie family is the norm for the kind of caregiving mothers offer; but it is "a form of parental care that is difficult for any working class parents to offer (for better or for worse) when they return home from work tired and exhausted" (bell books, p. 140, as cited in Segal, p. 141).

As more research is completed, more and more women agree that women's subordination cannot be tied causally to any one institution or social practise. Masculine and feminine positionings are replicated and reinforced throughout society, and not just in the home by mothers. Segal's (1987) work documents the many ways that social relations of power sustain sexual inequalities at all levels of society and in the workplace. Even small differences in physical strength and size coupled with different training opportunities sustain women's subordination in the workplace (Segal, 1987, chapter 2). And Cockburn's (1981) analysis of the printing trade led her to suggest that "the construction of gender difference and hierarchy is created at work as well as at home - and that the effect on women (less physical and technical capability, lack of confidence, lower pay) may well cast a shadow on the sex-relations of domestic life" (as cited in Segal, 1987, p. 144).

If it was originally thought that psychoanalysis could tell us something about how to change our construction as feminine once the conditions of women's oppression were identified, it can only be said that analysts have not agreed on what those conditions are. On the basis of the foregoing, most analysts would agree that the reproduction of women's subordination is multifaceted and multidimensional. And, as a corollary, they would not agree to Chodorow's contention that mothering, in and of itself, is centrally implicated in the reproduction of male dominance.

Despite the definitional role that Chodorow assigns mothers, she continues to maintain that, "'Feminist theories and feminist inquiry based on the notion of essential

difference, ...' are doing feminists a disservice" (Chodorow, 1980, as cited in McFaddan, 1984, p.500). Yet, she also tells us, "Our sexuality and engendering take a particular form because we grow up in families where women mother" (as cited in Lorber et al., 1981, p.502). Here, she seems to suggest that there is a core identity that daughters take up, that is different than that of sons. It was this suggestion of a core gender identity which invested her theory with its appeal to those on the essentialist side of the debate. Though Chodorow saw the negative aspect to the feminine identity, those who sought to valourize the essential nature of women took her as a "latent celebrant of difference" (Sayer, 1982).

Essentialism and the Impact To "Mothering"

Up to this place I have used the term "social-biological debate" to refer to the way feminists are divided over the issue of change. It is a convenient phrase for something much broader in scope than the term suggests. Certainly calling the one side biological is really to signal something much broader in scope than biology. For one thing, under this general rubric we have been looking at innate givens that cannot be changed. What cannot be changed, we can assume is essential to human development. These essential aspects might incidentally also be biological, in the strict physiological meaning of the term. Of course, if it can be shown that maternal capacities are essential and biologically determined in this precise sense, the implication is that no amount of parent education or shared caretaking will eliminate gender differentiation and sexual divisions of labour. And, this is exactly what Rossi attempted to show.

Rossi describes herself as a developmental biosocial scientist. She emphasizes individual biology as the primary determining factor of child development and of mother-child interactions, psychological development being a secondary focus. Rossi argues that during the preverbal years of child development there can be no ego, no "I", due to the incomplete myelinization of the cortex of the brain. Rather, the link between mother and

child develops out of biological cues. For example, an infant can differentiate its own mother's milk from that of other mother's milk, by smell. And, for her part, the mother's external motor and sensory responses to the child are de[illegible]ned by internal biochemical functioning. In response to Chodorow, Rossi asserts that biological research would be a better approach to the topic than a Freudian analysis. Maternal capacities unfold biologically: this is why women mother, and men do not (Rossi, in Gross et al., 1979; Rossi, in Lorber et al., 1981).

It is difficult (and perhaps not valid) to critique an analysis from outside of its own paradigm. And so, rather than discussing Rossi's results from the psychoanalytic perspective, it is enough to say that more recent scientific research calls her own findings in question. In fact, Lipsett says it is now clear that newborns have a mind and are capable of using basic mental operations. To be s[illegible]fic, the habituation response may be elicited in newborns. And what is significant in this [illegible]hat it is a learned response requiring at least the beginnings of memory (as cited [illegible] 1987). Lewis also discovered that infants as young as eighteen months did not exhibit a fear response to a stranger when that stranger was a child (Ibid). Taken together, these and other results would suggest that even for the very young infant development is definitional within a social context. This would tend to confirm the validity of Chodorow's emphasis on early social relationships in psychic development, though her work may be open to critique on other grounds.

Most other feminists who are on the essentialist side of the debate do not take Rossi's strict approach to biological determinants of mothering. They are not eager to claim a direct one-to-one correspondence between biology and mothering practice. For them, it matters not whether a direct link exists, or whether biological mother's are indirectly linked to mothering practice by way of their psychological predispositions. Either way, these women assert that biology remains an essential and universal feature of mothering. Hartsock (1983) and Ruddick (1983) argue that biological femaleness and maleness cannot be disconnected from social practise and that the difficulties in

Chodorow's account stem from an attempt to do this. These women celebrate sexual difference as importantly valuable and so they emphasize the biological component of mothering in a way that Chodorow does not. They claim that the experience of menstruation, coitus, pregnancy and birthing remains to differentiate women and men. They challenge the notion, and even the possibility, of the symmetrical society that Chodorow promotes. At the same time, they find a positive aspect in Chodorow's theoretical analysis of the mother's relationship to her daughter. In their view, if this connectedness could be transformed, it could be the source of the daughter's potential agency.

A common thread runs through their work, and it is that mothering changes mothers. The dynamic interaction of mother and child, touching, laughing, caring and holding enhances and facilitates the development of not just one, but two human beings: mother and child. The changes in, and development of, meanings, values and world view, arising out of the process of a mother bearing and caring for her child, are celebrated as important in and of themselves, and as the ground for a renewed society. By their analysis, biology is determining of the social practices of women, and it is mothering practice that "fixes" female psychology as feminine.

Hartsock (1983) emphasizes that women's experience of caring for men and children and of strengthening values in the home sustains their connection to nature, and to other human beings. Following Chodorow, Hartsock views masculine development as consisting of struggle and hostility toward the other, separation from the body and the denial of the needs of the self and others. Out of this emerges "abstract masculinity" which defines the value of other human beings in terms of the self. This opposition of self and other translates into the domination of nature, the domination of the sexual other and a sense of community in aggression. By contrast, as an extension of Chodorow's results Hartsock finds in women's connectedness the ground for a renewed social vision.

Ruddick (1983) uses Chodorow's theory to explain that the specific daily activities of a mother in "preserving, fostering and shaping the growth of a child" (p.234) enables a particular kind of thinking to develop: a maternal thinking she calls "attentive love". The child learns "attentive love" from its mother just as the mother herself is developing it. Therefore, this particular kind of thinking is not the preserve of mothers only, but of anyone who learns and exhibits that particular kind of nurturant and preservative care. Ruddick concludes that this maternal thinking can inform and empower a feminist politics of non-violence and anti-militarism.

Ruddick and Hartsock are not alone in extending this theory to show that women think differently than men. Gilligan (1982) argues that women appeal to reason as the basis for morality. But, in contrast to men, "care and responsibility" in human relationships, rather than individual rights, forms the organizing principle of female morality Coser tied the early mother-daughter relationship to girls' field dependency in problem solving and weakness in mathematical skills (Lorber et. al., 1981). And, Keller (1982) uses this theory to explain women's focus on interdependent, rather than independent, operations in scientific research.

Their exaggeration of sexual difference was to become the later focus of thorough critique. But, for here it is important to understand the therapeutic implications of this reading of exaggerated sexual difference into Chodorow's account, and how this focus was applied in clinical practise.

Therapeutic Implications and Clinical Practice

Chodorow, and many of those who followed her, did recognize the damaging effects of assymetrical development to women, men, children and society as a whole. They had a social analysis of the problem available to them, that is, men ought to share parenting responsibilities with women. Yet, when Chodorow's theory was applied in

practise the focus turned on recreating what was thought to be an essential element of the developmental process - the mother and daughter relationship. This time the part of the "good" mother was taken by the therapist.

Orbach and Eichenbaum's (1981; 1984) therapy is the most influential clinical development of Chodorow's theory. They sought to develop a practice that would heal the debilitating effects suffered by daughters growing up in a male-dominant world. Borrowing on Chodorow, therapy focussed on translating a few basic ideas into concrete practise. This practise accepts that daughters are needy as adults because adult men can not provide nurturance and support. As well, it is claimed that each daughter carries a needy little girl inside. She is needy because her own mother insisted that she become emotionally independent very early in life. The mother had looked to the little girl for support and emotional closeness because her husband could not provide this and, therefore, the little girl inside is neglected and uncared for. Ideally, in clinical practise, the therapist takes the part of the good mother. Within the context of a relationship of trust, the good mother (read therapist) is able to "hold" the child-like part of the daughter (read client). The child is held when the therapist lets her know that she is worthy of care, acceptance and emotional nurturance. An atmosphere of trust is established and as strength is infused into the relationship the client gains a sense of autonomy and self respect. Successful therapy provides a holding "good-enough". That men continue to rely emotionally on these women remains a well kept secret.

The writing and work of Orbach and Eichenbaum at the Women's Therapy Centre in London has influenced the lives of thousands of women. Women write of the "enormous encouragement and support" that they received there (Segal, 1987). Why does this therapy work so well? I think probably because one trustworthy supportive relationship is better than none. And there is always the hope that that one will form the basis for the development of others like it.

However, as Segal (1987) notes, "Therapeutic efficacy...does not establish theoretical adequacy, beyond the therapeutic relationship" (p. 139). Of course, it is not surprising that the same difficulties that limit the applicability of Chodorow's "Mothering" are carried over into its therapeutic counterpart. Some of these have already been discussed in relation to the theory of "Mothering". The theory takes account of only one particular class and race and one particular family structure. All larger social issues, including socio-historical conditions and a broad range of social relationships are reduced to the interpersonal level of the mother's interaction with her child. Its explanatory usefulness is probably limited to similar families in similar socio-economic situations. There is nothing to tell us otherwise. As Henriques (1984) notes this one-sided account, which leaves fathers out, adds little to our understanding of gender development. While there is no evidence that all men who are raised by women have a need to dominate women throughout life, this account does exclude men from the many regulating practises and social services that normalize family life in our society. What object relations theorists, such as Chodorow, did attempt was to redress the imbalance of Freud's focus which priorized the father's role in the family. But by emphasizing the mother's capacity, and responsibility, to respond to the child's needs, object relations more than any other Freudian derivative has contributed to the normalization of motherhood through institutionalized social practises and medical services (Riley, 1978).

But this is not the only difficulty. To isolate the mother and child relationship from the larger social context in order to write a book about it provides a major intellectual challenge. But to isolate the mother and child relationship within the therapeutic setting is taking the idea to another level of reality. This has more immediate implications for life and for how to live.

There is no doubt that the mother and child relationship is important in a child's life, but recent research indicates that it is not the exclusive relationship we once thought. Trotter's (1987) review of research developments indicates, "There is considerable

evidence...that children form significant and parallel relationships with others besides their mothers and that these relationships also contribute to social development" (p. 45). Lewis' studies, for example, make it clear that infants become attached to fathers, siblings, grandparents and even uncles (as cited in Trotter, 1987, p.45).

It is true that the father of Chodorow's account does become a significant other for the child but, according to her account, this does not happen until the father is known to the child at the verbal level. In this, perhaps Freud was closer to the truth because he did account for the power of the absent father in Totem and taboo (1913). Moreover, Freud's clinical evidence of the Rat Man (evidence Chodorow says she accepts) indicates that an object of desire can be other than the mother.

But this is not all, because we now know that the ability to imitate suggests some cognitive development in three day old infants we are having to rethink previous assumptions about the emergence of "cognitive and social competence" (Meltzoff, as cited in Trotter, 1987). Because the world of the imaginary is a world of sensory images, the father may be a powerful image to the child long before the child acquires language (that is, long relative to the span of infancy). What I wish to indicate here is that fathers and grandparents and significant others move into this space surrounding the mother and child but are never acknowleged in Chodorow's theory. And the same is true of the therapeutic situation.

In therapy, the mother (read therapist) and daughter (read client) focus allows for the resolution of conflicts between them and, at the level of mental activity, within the daughter's psychic life. The therapeutic relationship provides a safe place for the daughter to express her neediness, the implication being that quite the opposite would be required at home. It is a safe place to express fear, only courage being allowed elsewhere. The list, of course, could go on. The point being that the outside world is hovering, never acknowleged, in the therapeutic situation. As each contradiction is brought to consciousness its power is diffused.

Who are the significant others who impact her psychic reality at this place and time? Perhaps it is an employer who wants her working a thirty-five hour week but won't give her a full-time job because that would mean paying out benefits. Perhaps it is a husband who helps out by reading to the children and taking them out while she cleans the house.

These issues might not seem urgent or immediate given the therapeutic situation - unless one accepts (as I do) that women are reproduced as feminine in the specific sites of material practice. Then the immediacy of the issues may be plainer. For the therapeutic setting is one such site and it is striking that according to Freud's definition of passivity and activity what happens in "mother-daughter" therapy is mostly the former.

Partly, this emphasis emerged because it was women on the essentialist side of the debate who appropriated Chodorow's account. And that a return to conventional ideas of womanly virtues, emotional capacities and superior moral sense would be so popular was a sign of the times. After the initial impetus of the early women's movement things were settling down into some semblance of reality about what had, and what had not, been accomplished.

So that, resolving conflicts within the therapeutic context really meant finding a homeostatic balance, an inner peace and an equilibrium. Recall that, in the clinical setting, the mother (therapist) pours her own "goodness" into the daughter (client). In what is essentially a socialization process, the daughter takes this "goodness" into herself and she is constructed as "feminine", or what passes as feminine in the service of society. The daughter's needy little child can now balance feelings of rejection with those of acceptance, neglect with those of care and fear with joy. She doesn't feel so "bad" anymore.

There are benefits to this type of therapeutic relationship, and thousands of women would confirm this. I don't wish to minimize these benefits. Rather, this is to say that, by including certain ideas about what it means to be "mothered" and "feminine", other ideas necessarily are excluded. The "good-enough" mother of Chodorow's account actualizes some potentialities and not others. As certain ideas and fantasies are poured into the

daughter, other ideas, dreams and fantasies are being kept from getting out. Without anticipating my later analysis of a "third force", I just note that for the psychical to make any socio-historical impact it must find "a match" within the specific social relationship. As mentioned above, the therapy involves one such relationship. So, how would the ideational impact of the daughter's psychic life be affected? It is a question about what ideas will not be reinforced, will not find a "match" and will not get out.

It might not be considered a "good" idea to talk about:

> Important things like rage, frustration, aggression, sexuality, irrational intense love and hate, re-experiencing of one's own childhood, blurring of body boundaries, conflict between the demands of a child, one's mate, other children and other work...(Flax, 1984, p. 13).

To bring up these ideas, to really feel their impact, might suggest that women's superior moral sense is merely a function of social subordination; that given forum women have a lot to say that doesn't sound moral in the strict conventional sense. The issue of social subordination might lead to another difficult topic, men's privileged position in society vis a vis women. And, how privilege translates into relationships of unequal power might lead to some unconventional insights about why women mother. Wallsgrove (1985) explains why:

> I know ...that you get a sense of power, strangely. Not just over the child, though I do think there's nothing adults can do about the fact that children are relatively helpless and dependent on countless decisions we make for them, but also in relation to other adults. Mothers are oppressed by male-dominated society in so many ways, as are non-mothers. But I suggest that many feminists who are now choosing to have children want to have some area of life, childcare, where they'll have the last word, where the importance of their position - as the one and only Mum - is assured (p. 21, as cited in Segal, 1987, p. 158).

It could be assumed that this idea (that power is a motivating aim of mothers) would not be one actively advanced by the "good-enough" therapist. Within the therapeutic situation, the agency of the therapist is wholly directed to providing emotional support, care, nurturance and holding for the daughter (clearly in accord with Chodorow's theory the "good-enough" therapist does this without expectation of anything in return. When

considering that the stated goal of this therapy is to instill strength and autonomy in women I think it is important to remember that the therapist is modelling what is meant by this, in concrete terms. Put in these terms, autonomy might require the ability to stand on one's own two feet, but it is certain that a great deal of strength would be required to provide a holding "good-enough" for all the children at home. I can't help feeling that while the daughter is taking in mothers' "goodness", she is also being set up with an unrealistic mother image to emulate. The only power that finds a match in the therapist-client relationship is mothers' power to "uphold" the members of the family.

I do not think (as Chodorow does) that being constructed as "feminine" is primarily confined to the early relationship of the child with its mother. Instead, I believe that femininity is re-produced through long years of socialization within specific social relationships. Modelling "mother" is another way that I think the client is constructed as "feminine" within a specific therapeutic practise.

Why is it effective to construct women as feminine within a specific social setting? Henrique (1984) suggests that because women "...are neither totally powerful nor powerless, but fragmentary and positioned and repositioned from one moment to the next" (p. 225), it is the contradictions inherent in such fragmentation of our experience which evoke anxiety, distress, and the desire for some sense of continuity and coherence. In Henriques' (1984) example the female academic who is both powerful within the academic setting, yet has experiences of powerlessness as a woman, is motivated by these contradictions to seek a "mature" and "coherent" identity. But the impetus for a unitary positioning does not only stem from within the individual psyche. According to Henrique, the psychic desire for unity finds its match in the "normative practises which fix us" in society. These practises suggest what is the ideal mature, rational and non-contradictory identity for women and for men.

> Much is therefore invested in our recognizing ourselves as unitary, whole, non-contradictory, mature, rational. In consequence those normative applications of psychoanalysis which we have discussed help to produce and sediment that unitariness (Henriques et al, 1984, p. 225).

What this analysis does not go on to show is the reason that we humans have such a tremendous investment in seeing ourselves as whole and unified if it is true that we are complex, contradictory and conflictual from the beginning. The normative strength of social practise and institutions must find a match in the psychic for its impact to be felt. This is what Chodorow was saying when she claimed that mothers at some level must want to mother because good mothering cannot be coerced out of anyone. Of course, this is not to underestimate the power of the social to construct coherent, "normal" individuals. This power to reinforce or oppose psychic desire modifies the direction of that desire. It is the reason why the contradictions of which Henriques and Chodorow speak are so effectively settled at the personal level. That is, where the social prescription of the normal unity of male and female forms and the personal vision of a coherent identity conflict, most often these conflicts are settled in therapy in favour of society. It is the individual who adjusts their concept of wholeness. Hence, in mother-daughter therapy, to be a mother or a daughter is to practise being fulfilled and to experience the situation as a non-contradictory positioning available to women and, what's more, socially sanctioned. It is good enough.

The developing awareness that innate givens and social conditions are not mutually exclusive, and that there is a dialectic between them, has led most recent theorists to take some sort of interactional approach to explain the development of the individual psyche within the social context. Elstain's (1984), for example, is a profitable extension of Chodorow's thesis along these lines.

Elshtain (1984) emphasizes both the biological fact as it is experienced by sentient human beings and the social interactions of the parent with the child. She maintains an interactional approach is upheld because it is the dynamic interplay of the social and the

biological that transforms all participants, the child educating its own body and its parents, as well as the reverse.

In her account, the "I", the "self" of the child, does develop within a social context. Yet, Elshtain's analysis also seeks to redress what she sees as Chodorow's mistaken overemphasis of the strength of social practises in development at the expense of self motivation, language and the agentic nature of the child. In her view the human child also develops through an "extraordinary preoccupation" with its physical, sexual body and from the beginning is self-motivatedly exploring its own body as a source of pleasure and non-pleasure.

Elshtain argues that this means the child is not merely a "passive bit of human clay" merged in, and molded by, an identification with its mother as Chodorow seems to suggest it is. Rather, she sees the infant child as more of "... 'an artist, helping to create the world which holds him,' with a repertoire of 'grunts, sighs, coos, (and) postures'..." (Kaplan, as cited in Elshtain, 1984, p.81). In her view, as the child's biological equipment evolves, the relationship of the child to its own body and the relationship of the child to the parent are informed in new and different ways as a result of the fantasy, language and conscious thought of the child.

What Elshtain points out is the fact that accounts which reduce to socialization theories tend "...towards a determinist explanation that strips individuals of agency and can treat 'failures' in socialization only as instances of 'deviance' (not protest!)" (1984, p. 56). But understanding that there must be a basis for resistance to societal demands within the individual does not cover the whole issue of how we usually get to the normal unity of male and female forms while we, at the same time, retain the option to protest. If psychic desire for unity must find a match in socio-historical conditions for its impact to be felt, the reverse must also be true. Social norms must find a match in psychic reality and in the psychic desire for an exploration, however tortuous, whose end is integration, coherence and unity of form. For without the individual, albeit multiplied many times, there would be

no cultural ideology, no ongoing normative social practises and no regulatory requirements upheld.

I have come around to Elshtain's thought here because now it is my turn. And I do draw on Elshtain's work. In the next chapter of the present work I want to leave off criticizing Chodorow's theory, or the theoretical and therapeutic derivatives of it, on the logic of their underlying assumptions. Instead, I wish to draw on Chodorow's theory and the insights of theorists such as Elshtain to extend that aspect of Chodorow's work that points to something new - the possibility of a "third force".

Like most other developmental accounts I too start off with the child. But my approach does not follow that of others in assuming "...that the conscious 'I,' able to experience and act on the world (be it at first in a very limited way), is from the very beginning enfolded in a baby" (Vanderburg, 1985, p.35). And, while drawing on Elshtain's work, I will not stop at the observation that the body evokes and mediates ways of being and informs the child's self definition within the social context. Instead, I will offer what I think is an alternative account that gets beyond descriptions of interactions to show where, and how, the biological and the social might be integrated, and how this integration is the impetus for the development of the child's sense of self and the child's gendered subjectivity. I will suggest how to account for the agentic nature of the child, for conflicts and contradictions at the psychic level.

At the same time I hope not to explain all these away so that my alternative joins Chodorow's in explaining development and the origins of motherhood all in terms of personality structures that emerge as a result of early childhood experiences. "Of course, (as Segal notes) you could suggest that female parenting has been the motor force of human history, propelling it on towards capitalism, commodity fetishism, state bureaucracy and beyond. But it is not the most convincing of suppositions" (Segal, 1987, p. 143). It does not account for cultural and historical variation in sex-gender systems. To account for

these we need to consider individual protest and social change. To say it once again, in both theory and practice, what women are not accorded is agency. What women are not allowed is resistance.

What might be found out about the nature of a "third force" could influence what we think about protest and agentic change, about the best options for change, and about what is the most humane and decent direction for changes to take.

Chapter 5:

A "Third Force" In Gender Differentiation And Women's Mothering

Material Embodiment and What Is Real

Most interactional accounts of childhood development and of adult positioning within the social context critique, and are concerned to redress, the perceived imbalances of one side or the other in the social-biological debate. Though Chodorow sought a way out of this dilemna we have seen that her own theory was not spared this same critique. Now it is my turn to come up with an alternative account for critical review. My starting point is the biological human being. And I agree with Elshtain that for Chodorow to treat the embodiment of the human being merely as one "variable" among others in the process of development is not enough, especially when we are talking about the emergence of a sense of gendered self. As Elshtain (1984) observes,

> To call the body-subject a 'variable' is baffling indeed, for the fact that we are never-not-our-bodies and never in the world save as body subjects seems a rather more basic and ungetoverable reality than to strip our bodies down to size as but one 'variable', among others. Variables don't grow up, grow ill, make love, grow old, and die (p. 75).

But, having noted that this is in contrast to Chodorow's position, I now wish to move from this point to pursue the development of an alternative here. As with most other accounts tracing the emergence of a gendered sense of self, mine is a developmental account. However, unlike some other analysts, I do not take the approach of looking back on childhood and taking to it the adult perspective about what is "real". My approach examines the possibilities of very early experience in relation to the biological and social position of the child. In doing so I attempt to get a child's eye view of what is "real".

Early theorists, such as Freud, took up the notion that the child was both a biologically sexed and a social being, their formulations focussing on a particular

developmental stage. For Freud it was the Oedipus Complex which was targeted as the child's point of entry into culture. (Recall that Lacan's account shifted this focal point slightly to the acquisition of language). But, common to Freud and to Freudian derivatives is the idea that biological sex and social gender cannot be separated, precisely because it is only when the child enters into the cultural meanings of his or her gender that the child "becomes" human. To account for new research developments, more recent theorists have backed up this starting point to the moment of birth. Elshtain, for example, says,

> From her first moments, the infant experiences her body as a source of pleasure and unpleasure that goes beyond the mere registering of sensation. Embodiment implicates her in the active construction of her inner world, in part through the 'taking in' of the body's surfaces as part of 'external' reality (1984, p. 84).

My own account of early development owes much to Elshtain's work but I move the starting point back even further still. I am interested in the prenatal development of the child. And when I say that "from her first moments" the body is a source of experience for the child, I am talking about the fetuses "active construction of her inner world" within a maternal environment - the womb. I do believe that psychic aspects of human life emerging within the maternal environment provide the conditions necessary to take "on board" the socio-cultural aspects of our gendered self at a later time. As well, because the development of these psychic conditions precedes the child's entrance into the socio-cultural order, at points where these prior conditions oppose the socio-cultural, they provide the basis on which to resist aspects of socio-cultural conditions.

To back up the starting point of my analysis to prenatal life accomplishes several things. We are now able to examine psychic aspects of human life as a possible "third force" outside the reaches of socio-historical imperative. And, while at this level, it is possible to separate the emergence of the psychic dimension from socio-cultural structures, we find that at this level the psychic aspects of human life are uniquely integrated with, and inseparable from, the material structures of human biology. The material structures to

which I am referring are both the evolving biological body of the fetus and the material structures of the womb. At this place of integration the impact of social reality and of social relations are uniquely mediated by material structures in a way that they are not, and cannot be, after the birth of the child[3]. For one simple example of this, the sound of a mother's voice or a father's voice is mediated by the material structures of the womb and of the mother's embodied self. In fact, it could be said that the social relation and the material relation are one - though social aspects of significant others are mediated by the mother's embodied self. On this view the fetus in the womb is already partaking in the larger social world because the womb is not merely a "bag of waters", but a physical medium, for the taking in of external reality. The developing child is physically "immersed" in the material environment and also, through its mother's embodiment, in the social world.

Swimming, kicking, drinking and expelling the mother's fluid, the child creates his own world, yet lives within it, and others. Sounds, voices, feelings, bumps and jostles travel through material structures external to this small world, and into it, to the child.

What I am suggesting is a way of thinking about the psychic life as an aspect of the human that is formed from out of material structures. I hope to tell how this psychic aspect becomes a "third force" in human relations and yet, in the end, how it moves out of, and beyond, the social and material relations from whence it was formed.

This chapter forwards the basic ideas necessary to establish an alternative account of why women mother. And because this is my primary focus my discussion of the development of a "third force" in psychic reality and of its relationship to material and socio-cultural reality can be preliminary at best. But, to begin it is necessary to consider how it is that we commonly conceptualize "reality" and how we might more accurately reflect what is "real". Of course, this is a philosophical question but it must be addressed

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[3] I think it is important to note that I am not attempting to put forward the argument that the prenatal fetus is a "person" and, in the legal sense of the term, possesses all of the rights and benefits due to mothers. I think the fetus is not. But this is another issue entirely.

if we are to move beyond to a shared understanding of what is meant by human nature and of how this is related to biological and mental structures and a possible "third force" in psychic life.

According to Freud, "what is human" is subsequent to the resolution of the Oedipus Complex. According to Chodorow, the father has a central position in defining what is really human. It was at the father's instigation that children were thought to be introduced to the "reality principle" and to its social and familial meaning. Here what is "real" is assumed to be inseparably tied to culture and language, thereby rendering the preverbal and the "pre-social" unreal, not-quite-human and, incidentally, unintelligible because it is outside the reaches of logic and language. However, I would briefly argue on two counts that tying the "real" to the cultural is by no means justified on the basis of either logic or evidence. I think that, more probably, this connection stems from the adult tendency to assume that the adult perspective is the "correct" perspective. The evidence itself would suggest, to the contrary, that the infant's experience is no less "real" than that of adults' though there are different parameters which define the "real" in infancy and, perhaps, even prenatally.

In the first place, though I am not going to make it a point to argue here about exactly when experience first becomes "real", prenatally experience is inextricably tied to material structures which mediate all relationships, material, social and environmental. Without anticipating my later analysis, I will just say for here that the developing human experience in its original, most primative form cannot be understood outside of its material embodiment. It is connected to real material structures in a way that our own experience is not. For example, we cannot eat directly from out of our environment. Prenatally a fetus can, and does. In this sense, the experience is "real" though this same experience of integration of the body and the environment is not "real" for us Arguments about what is the infant's experience of materiality and our own assumptions about "what is real" are bound to run past each other. The adult oriented response to this observation is that, of

course, the fetus and infant do not know that culture exists. Therefore, our experience of the real takes precedence. But, if we could put ourselves in a comparable position we might come to a different conclusion.

This brings me to the second point in challenging the view linking what is real to culture. From an adult perspective, the correctness of the adult point of view is a matter of common sense. But it is really a matter of perspective or perhaps a matter for philosophy and is not as simple as common sense at all. To take an example from the "real" world, consider that one aspect of our reality is that it is experienced in three dimensions. But if we go on one of Einstein's thought experiments we see that, in theory, it is more correct to realize that there must be a fourth dimension where time and space are intimately connected. Zukac (1984) writes,

> If we could view our reality in a four-dimensional way, we would see that everything that now seems to unfold before us with the passing of time, already exists 'in toto', painted, as it were, on the fabric of space-time. We would see all, the past, the present, and the future with one glance (p. 150).

Of course, none of us can enter the fourth dimension of experience though the evidence suggests that it does exist. Does this make our existence in the third dimension "unreal"? I think not, but perhaps this thought experiment makes it plainer that our notions about what is "real" are not so simple after all. And it calls in question the notion that, because the developing human has not yet entered the cultural dimension of existence, its experience is somehow "unreal" or more "unreal" than ours. The position that I take here is that original human experiences are not more "unreal" than our own. They are, so to speak, just experienced in a different dimension. Given this we might ask what is the nature of that early experience, how is it related to biology and environmental structures and what part does it play in later developmental process? To begin to address these questions I turn to consider the prenatal development of human life.

The Relationship of Experience to Biology and Environmental Structures

I have touched on some of the ways in which theorists account for the infant's ability to make sense of the social world after birth. One approach is to posit that the infant is "naturally" endowed with the necessary capabilities and for the most part the emergence of these abilities goes untheorized. However, this approach cannot account for the conflicts and contradictions of mental life and for resistance to certain aspects of the social world that is about to be poured into this pregiven child-like mold.

Another approach is to view the infant's mental life as conflictual and contradictory from the beginning. Common to theorists of this persuasion is the notion that the infant's experience of the world is fragmentary and illusory. And I have explained how this falls short of providing an explanatory basis for resistance and change and the strength of the desire for unity.

I think that what is needed to overcome these difficulties is an account of human development that can incorporate both conflicts and contradictions together with the desire for integration and that can establish a basis for all of these in reality, or in "what is real". This is not to exclude the possibility that there is also an illusory and fantasmic aspect to psychic life (I think there is) but it is to say that, conflictual as its experience might be, the developing human being generally operates according to its own "reality principle".

I think that biological research does lend support to this position. In the womb the cerebral cortex is formed by an "inside-out migration of cells":

> Immature cells give rise first to one population of neurons, then to a second population, which migrates outward beyond the first, then a third, which migrates beyond the second, and so forth until there are five or six distinct layers (Kalat, 1984, p. 82).

The brain, at birth weighs about 350 grams and during the first year of life continues this developmental process until it weighs approximately 1000 grams (Ibid.)

During the post natal period the infant's experience leads to a developmental pattern of behaviour that appears to approximate the biological process. That is, early behavioural capabilities do not disappear but give rise to an overlay of more complex behaviours. The most primative forms of more complex behaviours emerge before birth. So it appears that the inside-out development of material structures (both fetal and maternal) and experience and behaviour are interrelated and reciprocal beginning in the womb and continuing on after birth.[4]

Moreover "...prenatal activity seems to be necessary for normal prenatal development. The use of incompletely formed structures apparently contributes to their final form and function" (Gottlieb, 1976; Kalat, 1984, p. 153). For example, with reference to the relationship of behaviour and early biological development, we do know that immobility in fetuses may contribute to the development of clubfoot and cleft palate in humans (Humphrey, 1970, as cited in Kalat, 1984). So, on this basis we can assume that fetal behaviour such as kicking the legs, closing fingers, sucking and breathing motions also contributes to brain development. For the brain is a biological structure. But what is important to us here is not just to show the integrity of biological systems and behaviour nor just to show the cohesion of their dynamic interplay. It is to discover the nature of something less easy to observe, and that is the nature of experience.

The registering of sensations which evoke behaviours and direct development is always mediated through infantile experience of its own embodiment and of its mother's body. For example, at 8 weeks in response to a touch on the side of its mouth the fetus will turn its head, at 14 weeks a touch to the hand elicits a flexing of the fingers and at 18

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[4] The validity of making assumptions about prenatal development on the basis of the infant's developmental experience shortly after birth would hold unless we can show that parturition marks a disjunction between prenatal and post natal development. And the existence of a disjunction is not supported by biological research.

weeks the touch causes a grasping motion (Kalat, 1984). In other words, during this period of development, biology and behaviour, and experience, are inseparable, indivisible, coherent and integrated in their mutual effects. Therefore, we could expect that if these fetal experiences were registered at the psychic level as fragmented and fragmentary, then brain development and fetal behavioural response would be prompted to follow a fragmented and disordered course. But, given that this is not the case the observable evidence suggests that the fetus experiences sensations as unitary, integrated and cohesive, and that these are organized in an integrated manner which contributes to the final integration of brain structure and function.

I am not saying that the infant does not experience contradictions and conflictual sensations. It may even be that the fetus is able to differentiate between and among various sensations, but pleasure and pain for example would be experienced as different forms of the same thing. The same, of course, would be true of the fetal experience of materiality. Its own body and bodily sensations, its environment and the walls of that environment and the first experience of socially induced sounds mediated by that environment would all be experienced as different forms of the same thing. And so, at this juncture, there is complete unity of experience, beyond sameness.

Is it "real"? I think it is. Not only is it directly connected to the child's "real" concrete physical situation, embodied in another, fed by another's labour, and completely satisfied by the environment but it is also "real" in the sense that this very experience is inseparable from the integrity of the developing brain. It is non-rational, non-logical sensory experience and yet will be effective in mediating our rational ways of knowing later in life. I am arguing that for this to happen it is not necessary for this experience to be reserved in memory (though we know that by the time the fetus is born it has the cognitive structures necessary for simple recall). What is important is that this experience, emerging out of biological, material structures, also contributes to the direction of development in the incompletely formed brain and body structures. I am suggesting that the experience of

integration, of complete wholeness, is actually folded into the material, biological structures of our brain and body as these develop. As Elshtain (1984) asserts, "Our corporeality bears powerful imperatives for how we come to know and to be. A child can neither negate physically nor transcend conceptually the manner in which his or her body 'registers itself...'" (p. 84). On this view, not only will this experience of wholeness and non-separation be carried with us corporeally throughout life but, because this experience is rooted in material reality it will always have the force of reality for the individual and it will form the basis of the desire for unity. While what has occurred in prenatal experience cannot predetermine developmental outcomes, it does become the baseline for any developments later in life.

Still to come, is our consideration of the development of the psychic life. Its development as a centre of fantasy, demand and desire is contingent upon the maturation of biological structures.

As mentioned above, by the time of birth the infant has available the cognitive structures necessary for the development of memory. It is this development, together with the infant's ongoing dependency which, I think, leads to the emergence of an aspect of the psychic life that could be called a "third force". Because it precedes the development of oppositions and the positioning of the child in one gendered identity or another, its impact can be examined outside of the direct effects of socio-historical conditions. Furthermore, because I argue that the experience of the fetus, whether or not it is conflictual and contradictory, is organized in an integrated manner, I think this does establish the necessary condition for taking social ideas about sexual difference "on board". It also gives us the basis for resistance to the oppositions inherent in ideas that, for example, ascribe masculine aims to one sex and passive aims to the other. And where the socio-historical places limitations on this aspect of psychic life, it implies a potential opposition between the psychically derived fantasies and socio-historical relations (Brennan, 1986, p. 43). In the next section, I consider how psychic life is to a certain extent independent from biological

structures and how this independent aspect becomes the motivating response which impels the child into social relationships and the socio-cultural order.

After Birth: The Emergence of an Independent Aspect to Psychic Life

I think that any attempt to take account of the experience of the newborn must start by considering that the infant's dependence on the relationships that sustain it does not end at birth. Most theorists relate the immaturity of the human brain at birth to the development of bipedalism, and to the subsequent development of a larger brain and relatively small birth canal. But regardless of whether this is accurate or not, the fact remains that human infants are born much more helpless than the offspring of many other animals. This being so, I think that the infant's dependent state enables a continuing experience of being in the world that is integrative and connective.

It is true that relationships become more differentiated during this period. For example, newborns are able to differentiate between various tastes and have particular flavor favorites (Lipsett, as cited in Trotter, 1987). They are also able to discern and imitate various facial gestures (Meltzoff, as cited in Trotter, 1987). And, of course, people can respond to infants and initiate activities in a way that objects cannot. People can provide care, can feed, and can comfort children. So it is not surprising that four-day old infant's show a clear preference for their mother's rather than another woman's, face (Field, as cited in Trotter, 1987). And not long after birth infants show a preference for features organized into the form of a human face, rather than for human features that are disorganized and dissembled.

Yet, I think that infants experience an immediate connection with all aspects of their environment in the way that their relationships depend on the whole of their world, and not on separate parts and independent objects. Their preference for organization and for images that "make sense" suggests that "whole" experiences more easily find a match in

already established brain structures. And the newborn's ability to imitate facial gestures suggests that, to some degree, new experiences are coordinated among the senses (Meltzoff, as cited in Trotter, 1987). During this first year of life the brain will more than double in size and experiences and behaviours simultaneously will become more complex. Recent research suggests that the mother and child relationship need not become exclusive. Instead, research shows that "...children form significant and parallel relationships with others besides their mothers and that these relationships also contribute to social development" (Lewis, as cited in Trotter, 1987). In short, children develop relationships with fathers, uncles, grandparents and siblings. Just as the relations between the body and behaviour and environment were mediated by, and integrated with, experience prenatally, so also, I think that early childhood development is best defined in terms of relationships. It is this rather than simply a way of perceiving the world that, I think, is firmed up in the child's brain. But it is important to note that the infant's ability to differentiate between and among various relations has not yet given way to an awareness of loss and separation and oppositions in its relationship to itself and to other material objects. For one instance of this, Elshtain (1984) observes, "At the beginning the child has no sense of belonging to one gender or another, though male and female bodies from the beginning will surely register themselves somewhat differently" (emphasis mine, p.85).

What is especially important to our later consideration of the motivating aims of the child and of self-motivated choice is that it is not just that there are two gendered positions available to the child at this point, it is that all positions are available. Because the child's relationship to itself, to other people and objects and to the world is, in some sense, a continuation of its own self everything is immediately connected to the child. That is from the child's point of view. And at the start this is related to the child's continuing helplessness. The newborn cannot turn over, crawl or walk, it cannot turn its head or even provide itself with food (Fischer & Lazerson, 1984). And this way of thinking about the

world as an unbroken whole will persist even as the child's position is changing in relation to it.

From the adult perspective on reality the child appears "egocentric", yet at first the child has no knowledge that its own interests might be in opposition to those of its mother or father. The psychic organization of the child which gives rise to this particular outlook will become even more apparent when the child has gained the ability to move independently of others, and then begins to speak. Children cannot easily distinguish their own characteristics from those of inanimate objects for example. When a two year old sees a ship and thinks of taking a bath, she links this activity directly to the ship: "Mommy, Mommy, that ship is taking a bath!" (Fisher & Lazerson. 1984, p.343). And I think that personification may be another example of the tendency to make sense, to organize, to find unity in the world, and to relate the world to the self. "Look, the moon is following me Mommy!" (Ibid, p. 325).

The motivating response

On this view, the tendency to make sense and to find unity, together with the child's state of dependence, establishes what is the motivating response of the child. I suggest that motivating response is the desire to maintain a position of integration in the whole world. The infant will seek to stay in relationship to all aspects of the self and the environment. However, this is not to say that children are innately social. That is, from the beginning, from among all possible relationships children do not have a greater preference for relationships with people. But, an aspect of motivating desire will impel them to position themselves in relation to people in order to maintain relationships with significant others.

Though, newborns have many capabilities including the ability to "match" facial expressions, for the most part, it is people who initiate children into recognizing that people

are "a special class" of material objects (Urwin, as cited in Henriques et. al., 1984). It is possible for many significant people to play a role in the development of infant sociability by investing infant behaviour with social meaning. These meanings are ascribed by both parents, even from conception though after birth most observations centre on mother and child "social behaviour". Mother's baby talk and hypothetical questioning of the child (Who's the pretty baby? That's the pretty baby) are ways in which mothers make a social investment in the child's behaviour.

In time the child begins to assign its own rudimentary meanings to situations and events. The child signals needs for attention or support by crying or points to objects that are wished for. Later when a mother takes up social games with her child she may give up control of the game, enabling the child to try out the new more adult position.

> [Thomas' mother]...lifted him up and jiggled him from side to side. He squealed with delight. She put him on her lap and lifted him up again. Again he squealed. After a few times Thomas started to squeal in a forced fashion, with a deliberateness which I had not seen before. His mother used this squeal as the signal to lift him up again, so that he was 'controlling' the game (Urwin, as cited in Henriques et. al., 1984, p. 296).

As Urwin (1984) notes, in these situations sharing control is not so simple as it seems. A mother brings her own positioning in society to the game. She sets out tasks commensurate with those that the child is presently able to perform, while at the same time, keeping in mind the potential relationship between the child's performance and what will eventually be required of the child. What a mother thinks about this relates to her own past history and to any conflicts and contradictions that might be resolved by her particular pattern of childcare. For example, if the decision to have a child stems from a lack of opportunities for full employment then the mother might have an exaggerated investment in maintaining control of the game.

As the child develops, the mother will usually assert her own authority more and more frequently to introduce the child to appropriate social communication, by waiting for

the child to say "Please", for example. In this way mothers and other significant persons "...contribute both to the baby's recognition of the disjunction between their illusion of control and their dependence on adults for the completion of these communications, and at the same time they promote the infant's repositioning in more adult directions" (Urwin, as cited in Henriques et. al., p. 300). Thus, the motivating response of the child to maintain relationship and non-separation necessarily impels the child towards an awareness of people, of power and of her own dependence.

Beyond oppositions

I have noted above that the prenatal experience of unity and oneness does not have to be open to recall for its impact to be felt in how we come to know and to be. It does not have to be because it is grounded in what is or what can happen. In other words it is grounded in material structures and relations. Memory, on the other hand, represents sensory images and fantasies at the psychic level of reality. It is the part of the psychic that emerges out of, yet moves beyond, material relations. At the same time, it is the condition necessary for taking in socio-cultural ideas about sexual difference - that is, ideas about gender difference - and for the creation of desire.

We know that newborns have a trace memory at least because they are able to learn an habituation response. Infants can also remember sensorimotor behaviours such as how to suck on their pacifiers. Given this, theorists conclude that infants are able to represent objects or the properties of objects in memory. This requires the ability to think about things without having to act on them (Fischer & Lazerson, 1984).

Even in infancy, memory gives rise to desire. For whenever the infant thinks about an object or a part of an object, such as the mother's breast, that once satisfied a need and now is absent, the image of that object evokes desire. For it stands in for what is lacking. And therefore, demand will ever evoke desire. And "...fantasy is intertwined with desire

(absence, lack) from the outset" (Brennan, 1986, p. 41). However, I am suggesting that at this point in development the oppositional nature of the desire for unity and the lack of it does not register with the child. Again, lack and satisfaction are experienced differently but as different forms of the same unity - not as opposites. Here the image of the breast, for example, does not mean that its absence is acknowledged. For the mental operations of the child are not yet established in logic and rationality.

This is the reason why I think that children at around one year of age experience separation anxiety. At this age children still have not quite negotiated the concept that the "other" is a separate human being with separate interests of their own. The child senses separation as loss of self, as well as loss of the other. The two are intertwined. But this separation anxiety disappears when the child understands that other people are separate from its own self and have an independence of their own. This understanding, therefore, also is contingent upon the child's initially becoming aware of its own selfhood. And, this awakening to self occurs at about eighteen months, according to Trotter (1987).

All possibilities and the possibility of choice

That the possibility of all positions, and the possibility of relatedness to every thing, exists at the psychic level is, as mentioned, the motive force in our first taking up positions in relation to others and in relation to the world. At first we do not know in the rational sense that we can only have one - one sex, one biological mother and father, one place at a time. But, later, when we do know that we can only have one, our lack evokes desire for other possibilities and paradoxically the very socio-historical limitations placed on possibilities at the psychic level give rise to our sense of choice and the sense that we have the freedom to choose other possibilities. Throughout life, then, we carry psychically the possibilities that oppose socio-historical relations, the option to resist these relations, the choice to "try on" other positions, and the underlying sense that we have the freedom to

choose. Of course, most often we do not choose to resist or oppose socio-cultural relations. As outlined previously, the impact of the psychic force which would oppose social relations is not "all- powerful". As Brennan (ca. 1986) puts it, this is because psychical factors "...cannot exist in isolation: they can only exist in social relations and ideologies which contribute to their content at the formative level, and either oppose or reinforce them at a social level" (p. 46). I mention this to tell why I think that the ideational impact of this "third force" is transhistorical at the psychic level and, while it is not all powerful, to some extent, it also carries with it the possibility of resistance, agentic choice and change at the social level. In carrying this through to the analysis of gender differentiation and social location to tell why women mother, it can be said that from the beginning the social world places limits on psychical possibilities. But, it can also be said at the same time that from among all possibilities children, as agents, do locate themselves in a gendered social world.

Applying this analysis to the child's choice of gender leads me to think that to take up a sense of self on the basis of gender is to take up a social location, without changing the underlying psychic structure which allows all positions or every position available. That this underlying psychic reality remains ensures that, despite the changes and vicissitudes of our sometimes conflictual and contradictory social positionings, there is a sense of the unitary self which can incorporate, include and transcend conflicts and contradictions at the psychic level. This premise is in basic disagreement with other theorists who take account of the contradictions inherent in human psychological development to suggest that the basic human "self" is fragile and tenuous outside of the social order which locates it. By my own account the unitary "self" is not situated, on the one hand, within the confines of normative social institutions and regulations or, on the other hand, outside of conflicts and contradictions. Instead, the unitary self is a "third force" in psychic reality that incorporates conflicts and contradictions and differences, without these standing in opposition to one another or being accorded unequal value.

On this basis a few modest ideas present themselves. Following Elshtain I think,

> The first is that we would all be better off, and come closer to creating a world to our heart's desirings, if we accepted our bodi- in better grace and recognized that a sexual differen- need not be an affront, an outrage, a narcissistic injury, a blow to fem... self-esteem forced on women by a male-dominant world" (1984, p. 86);

second, representations of sexual difference are incorporated at the psychic level before knowledge of inner/outer, internal/external, dependence and power and can be examined outside of social stere- -pes and socio-historical relations and, following this, sexual difference in and of itself is not a rationale for sexual inequality.

The Discrimination of Sex and Gender Differences

If we start at a point before the age of two, then we are talking about how the child begins to experience social effects at the non-rational level. Since I am suggesting that the motiv- rce for integration into society is a transhistorical psychic reality I am assuming that its effects hold for all times and cultures, though the strength of its effect will vary given particular social conditions. What I am about to trace out is the possible interplay of social and psychic effects where these intersect at a particular site of social practise. That site is the one which concerned Chodorow, the nuclear family in Anglo-American society. At this site I believe that identification with significant others is the primary mode through which the child expresses its motivating response at the social level. In turn, the social relations specific to this site, contribute to the content of a particular gender position so that the child is presented with an "image ideal"[5] . On my account, the "image ideal" suggests

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[5] Though I believe that the term was first coined by Lacan to describe the disjuncture between the child's fragmentary self and the "image ideal" that he glimpses in the mirror, the meaning I attach to this term is specific to my analysis and does not correspond to Lacan's. It can also be distinguished from Urwin's (1984) interpretation of the "image ideal" as "imagined perfection".

to the child a way of integrating the self and the social world by taking up a particular gender position. However, the content of that "image ideal" varies according to the past history of significant others and according to their own positioning in the different practises and institutions of the society. An even greater discontinuity between and among "image ideals" will be seen cross-culturally, and so what I am about to outline suggests only one instance of how a child is initiated into and, at the same time, "takes up" a particular sense of gendered self.

The motivating aim, to maintain a position of unbroken wholeness in relationship to the environment, significant others and one's own body, propels the child into an embodied sense of self and an awareness of sexual difference. As Elshtain (1984) puts it:

> The human infant does not have the cognitive nor the neurological structure or organization necessary to demarcate tidily inner and outer, internal and external. What the infant does is to incorporate with eyes, ears, mouth and touch a world complicatedly inner/outer. Slowly, the I is built up, in part through complex representations of the child's body, in part through inner representations of the bodies of others (objects) with whom the child is implicated in exquisitely social relations from the start (p.84).

I would like to interpret Elshtain's analysis to say that, at the level of psychic reality, all positions, and in particular both gender positions, are available to the infant. And, as the child self-motivated explores its own body a sense of belonging to one sex or another is attained, though the socio-cultural meaning of that distinction is unknown to it.

By the age of two children are discovering their own effectiveness in maintaining a position of relatedness with the world by getting the world to revolve around themselves. However, at about this time, the increasing demands of significant others oblige children to discover the limitations of their manipulations and control, their dependence on adults to shore up their sense of control and how their own powers of assertion differ from those of adults (Urwin, as cited in Henriques et. al., 1984). Urwin suggests:

> Wanting to be independent will in consequence often come into conflict with a wish to be dependent, so that infants will frequently oscillate between the two; here the pathos is that the gaining of one implies the loss of the other. Ultimately a partial resolution to this contradiction is achieved through repositionings within discursive relations which enable the child to act in more 'adult' ways, a process which ... involves suppressing the position of the dependent infant (Ibid, p. 302).

In this way the child is moved closer to its gendered "image ideal". But the child also has its own powers of assertion and is able to move herself closer to, or away from, the "image ideal" presented to her. This is because power and dependence are not mutually exclusive. The world is not neatly divided up in this way and I think it is a mistake to assume that the child's sense of power and omnipotence is not based in reality, at least to some extent. For even here the child has her own powers as soon as significant others choose to care. Though Urwin uses the following example in another discussion I think it illustrates the point that I am making:

> Linette swaggers towards the television set, reaches for the knob and turns to smile at the mother. 'You know, don't you?' Linette laughs, reaches for the knob again, and holds her hand hovering over it. She taunts her mother, repeatedly; by her manner she 'dares' her mother to tell her off. Yet she also makes it plain that she has no intention of actually touching the knob, so that the mother is 'caught' as to whether or not she should utter the rebuke (Urwin, as cited in Henriques et. al., 1984, p.303).

I think that it would be a mistake to think that Linette is just playing with power here. She is not. Linette knows what is, and what is not, allowed, yet she has real power in the situation because her mother is caught in normative social practises which position her to care for the child and which suggest that caring involves avoiding conflict with children. Of course, if Linette's mother left the room and Linette began to cry this would be a discovery of the limits of that power. But, for here, what is important is that the child is not merely molded by social forces outside its control. To a certain, though lesser, extent the child also has the power to locate herself in the social world and to try out

various positions and to experiment; and this is at the same time that the motive force of psychic desire impels the child to find a place of integration and relatedness in the world.

In social play children are soon able to allocate positions to adults and to take up positions comparable to that of the adult in the game. In regulated play activities the child is able to "try on" and practise the image ideal by identifying with the position of adults with whom it has a significant relationship. Urwin notes that in this "trying on" the child not only shifts her position in the power relationship but also simultaneously cares for herself as the dependent child, the position which will be suppressed (Ibid, p. 307).

At this juncture, it would be a mistake to assume that the child's identification with the same sex parent or adult is straightforward. As an incidental part of regular household activities, adults may encourage their children along socially ascribed gender differentiated lines by suggesting that they call "Help daddy" or "Help mommy", for instance. But, adult encouragement and children's identification with the same sex parent cannot account for instances where children resist such suggestions and encouragements. Lee (1975) cites the example of Jeff with his father (Morgan) who is cooking breakfast:

> Morgan: I'll be cooking and you telephone, okay? I'll be the daddy, okay?
> Jeff: No, no--mommies cook.
> Morgan: Oh...I'll cook. I'll be the mommy
> Jeff: Uh?
> Morgan: I'll be the mommy.
> Jeff: And I'll be the daddy, cause I'm the...Good.
> Morgan: You'll be ironing.
> Jeff: Yes, Daddy'll be ironing.
> Morgan: Mommies iron, mommies iron. Not boys...not daddies.
> Jeff: Oh, and you can cook. (Jeff goes to the ironing board.)

In this instance the sex-role stereotype won out regardless of the fact that Jeff's father actually was cooking. Not only is Jeff capable of assuming other positions in opposition to those encouraged by the significant others in his life but Jeff's "choice" here indicates that the social milieu that his parents create, exerts its own influence on him. It is an influence that to a certain extent is outside their control and therefore increases the

options Jeff has. In this instance Jeff's father colludes with him in the end though, where the ideational impact of Jeff's psychic reality finds a "match" in socio-cultural conditions, these may be in opposition to his father's desires.

I have used the word opposition rather freely here and what I wish to say next is related to this. Jeff does not know that this minor conflict with his father could be read as opposing his father. Nor does he understand that men's work/women's work could be set up as an oppositional pair. Fischer and Lazerson (1984) make this point when they argue that the child's insistence that there are male and female characteristics does not mean that the child understands these characteristics of men and women's roles as oppositional. The three year old may say "Men do these things," but he or she will not say, "Men do these things, so women shouldn't" (p. 331). And according to these authors, a three year old's understanding of how 'boy' is related to 'man,' or 'man' to 'woman'" is transitional at best (Ibid, p.390). I think a discussion between three year old Jimmy and six year old Johnny illustrates the confusion entailed when social knowledge confronts the three year old's continuing preference for relationships which connect them to the whole of reality:

> Johnny: I'm going to be an airplane builder when I grow up.
> Jimmy: When I grow, I'll be a Mommy.
> Johnny: No, you can't be a Mommy. You have to be a Daddy.
> Jimmy: No, I'm going to be a Mommy.
> Johnny: No, you're not a girl, you can't be a Mommy.
> Jimmy: Yes, I can (Kohlberg, 1966, as cited in Fischer and Lazerson, 1984, p. 390).

In the midst of this confusion over gender permanence, significant others in the child's life may begin to move the child in the direction of seeing male/female and masculine/feminine as oppositional pairs by excluding themselves or another adult from one side of the pairing in social situations. Recall, in the example of Jeff and his father Morgan, that Morgan did not stop at colluding with Jeff in the idea that the cook ought to be a mommy. Instead, Morgan upped the ante when he began to move Jeff in the direction of seeing women's work/men's work as an oppositional pair. He did so by suggesting that

mommy is excluded from the boy-daddy pair that do not .on. Perhaps it is the wisdom of children that Jeff did not catch on and went to the ironing board anyway.

In the nuclear family where fathers are more frequently absent mothers may both reinforce the child's fantasy about daddy and, for boys, fantasies about being as good as daddy and then exclude themselves from that boy-man relation Urwin described how this worked with Jeremy and his moth .r. After she had confirmed that Jeremy could work with the tools as well as daddy could Jeremy's mother sat back, whispered and pointed:

> 'Jeremy. Look. There's a doll sleeping. Co... ...e blanket.' Jeremy looks. 'Would you like to go ... tha... 'No.' Jeremy goes back to the tool set. The mother laug... ...nk you would.' Jeremy turns a screw in the tool set. 'Dadd... ...cited in Henriques et. al., 1984, p. 309).

Urwin notes that play ac... ...es this are already regulated by various social practices and expectations of the a... ...orld. Mothers bring their experience and ideas associated with their own positioning in the family to the child. This includes taking account of the father's expectations about how she will act and what she will do when he is absent. And mothers generally act in accord with institutional and social expectations about how a good mother ought to represent the absent father to the children, and about how to enhance a son's, or a daughter's, self worth. As well, even as the child assumes a position of control in practising regulated play activities, that position has already been molded by power relations within the family and acting on the family.

Psychodynamic Operations Leading to Opposed Positions

Though children do not have an understanding of opposed positions, as they practise with experiences of control and dependence they practise the corresponding psychodynamic operations of splitting, projection and introjection which eventually lead to

the pairing of characteristics as opposites. In one early example, two year old Kate splits the good and bad aspects of her experiences with adult women so that,

> When one of her mother's women friends, whom Kate knew well, came to visit, Kate would regularly take her into the bedroom and slam the door, shutting her mother out, and giving her pleasure and attention to the woman friend (Urwin, as cited above, p. 305).

Much later splitting together with exclusion will be effective in positioning such children, as women and men in oppositional gender differentiated roles. I say that these positions are oppositional, rather than complementary, as is commonly held because, given a pair of characteristics, according to the practises which regulate social relations each member of a heterosexual pair must exclude one side of the pair from their contribution in order to be "gender appropriate". This moves each member of the pair toward "gender appropriate" behaviour such as mothering or bread winning.

One such pair is "weakness"/"strength". Here Clare explains why she felt in a weak position in her relationship with Phil:

> Clare: I mean, with Phil he was very loud and dominating, and I was very quiet and weak. He was strong, and I was weak. I guess that was the main thing. And I was more feminine.
> Wendy: What did that involve?
> Clare: Looking pretty. I think it relates back to when I said that when I was little I was the good, pretty little girl. It's to do with - the fear - being frightened of not being attractive enough.
> Wendy: To keep him?
> Clare: Mmmm (Hollway, as cited in Henriques et. al., 1984, p. 241).

Another pair of characteristics is "expressing feelings"/"giving support". Jim discusses what happens when one side of this pair is excluded through projection of all that characteristic onto the other person:

> Jim: The thing got specialized, as it were polarized, where one person does the feeling. My relationship with Jeanette, who I lived with for many years, developed in such a way that she was responsible for doing the feelings - she was the one that got upset, and I was the one who was coping, providing support, kindness, et cetera. And so what that meant was that I

> didn't get to express any f[illegible]ngs and she didn't g[illegible]t to express any support. And so what that means is that both sides are completely prevented from experiencing what the other person's 'job' is. Which means that you get a completely shrivelled - a completely incomplete - idea of what's going on (Ibid, p. 253).

Hollway notes that there is a "common sense" split assumed between Jeanette who (naturally) gets upset and Jim who said at the time that he "was just not a feeling person". Of course, the assumed opposition of this pairing into female and male characteristics is not [illegible]ical opposition at all. It is sustained by [illegible]g the "expressing feelings"/"giving support" pair with the "weakness"/"strength" pair . Hollway argues that in this social construct, "The value which we are obliged to accept in order to make sense of this opposition is that people, usually women, who express feeling need support because expressing feelings is a weakness" (Ibid, p. 253). Since giving support to women who are susceptible to the unfortunate weakness of feeling makes men appear superior, gender inequalities are reproduced in specific instances of social discourse. And, in turn, male superiority commonly becomes the rationale for the unequal division of power in female/male relationships generally and mother/father relationships specifically.

Hollway notes that where there is no alternative to this polarized positioning because both the participants have an exceptional investment in maintaining the polarized relationship, the gender differentiated positioning will be produced and re-produced with its oppositional component. This is also the case where specific social conditions and practises place limits on other possibilities. Just how children move from an awareness of sexual differences to take up opposed positions on the basis of gender is the issue I now take up.

Entering Culture With Language: The Development of Gender Oppositions

On my view, the psychic forces that propel children to take up a position in culture and language are non-rational but they are not irrational. For though the motivating response to the world is not based on logical thinking, psychic desire is a reason. It is the reason for entering into rational activity and for the suppression of other possibilities not consistent with adult social relations. And it is precisely because an aspect of this desire goes beyond reason that it is so powerful in positioning children and adults in society when that position may not appear reasonable. I think what makes it powerful is its emotive aspect for the impact of the psychic only can be felt through social relations and cultural ideologies. Sometimes this emotive aspect comes to be focussed on certain relations. And because parents most frequently present the "image ideal" to children in the nuclear family they generally are significant others in the language acquisition process. Psychic desire is the reason that children experiment with language acquistion strategies and that parents become the focus of the child's emotional investment in the process. If these strategies find a "match" in social relations, then language development will proceed more quickly. And, it appears to be the parent's emotional investment in the process that will determine whether there is a "match" or "mismatch" at the level of strategies (Henriques et. al., 1984). Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers find children show more rapid progress when parents make an emotional investment in helping the process along, are supportive and are not overly controlling (Fischer & Lazerson, 1984).

At birth infants are capable of discriminating between and among objects and soon communicate this ability through the use of non-verbal vocalization and gesture.

> For instance, with or without distinguishing intonational patterns, gestures of demand or indicative pointing may persist as accompaniments to children's first single-word utterances, and it is these communicative procedures which enable them to communicate differentially whether they want a particular object or are merely drawing the other person's attention towards it (Ibid, p. 268).

To make a gesture of demand, for example, the child must be able to imagine or, place in fantasy, a representation of the object of demand. And such imagined representations are the prototype for later single word representations. Fischer and Lazerson (1984) observe that, "...in making a doll act as a person, for example, a child can represent the person doing only one thing at a time---a child walking, a man eating, or a woman washing her hands" (p. 327). But, for all their simplicity, even these initial representations are emotionally laden because they are related to the social world of the child and represent the position of relatedness that the child experiences. And when children move from non-verbal communication to single word utterances, overgeneralization makes plainer the transition from seeing the world as an unbroken whole to peceiving the splits and divisions. The tendency to call every adult man, "Daddy" and every four legged animal, "dog", suggests the psychic reality of the child reflects unity and non-separation. And in being initiated into the language the child does not understand that it can only have one, and that the one does not represent the whole or the whole of relationships. As the experience of wholeness gives rise to a rational and logical way of perceiving, my own interpretation of developmental process would suggest that the original experience is superceded but does not disappear.

By the time that the child is about four years of age it is able to hold and relate two representations at once. This enables the child to compare and contrast and to begin to set things up as opposites. Children may insist that men and women are opposites and that, "Ladies wear dresses, men wear pants" or "Only children play. Mommies and Daddies work" (Fischer & Lazerson, 1984, p. 333,334). Yet again, the fact that children at this age do not realize that sex and gender cannot be changed suggests that such oppositional pairings are transient in nature (Marcus & Overton, 1978). Moreover, the basis of Freud's Oedipal Complex was the discovery that children of this age do not yet recognize that their own interest to grow up and marry mommy might be in opposition to the interests of their father.

Children continue to gain practise in repres socio-cultural relations through play and other activities at the same time that they are gaining mastery of a more complex representational system in language. Taking up a position of relative power is not unproblematic in either. The child gains the advantage of an adult frame of reference but, also, may be limited by the repression of other possibilities. The following example shows how two year old Marie took an assertive position but in the end lost relative power in the situation.

> This is the children's first visit to the University playroom. Their mothers are out of the room, watching through the one-way mirror. Both children have been playing with a tea-set. Marie sees a tool-set and goes over to play with it. Christopher goes over too and reaches to take it away. Marie resists initially. But then she pauses, "Boy have it," she says, and gives it to him. She looks at the camera, smiles, and goes back to the tea-set (Urwin, as cited in Henriques et. al., 1984, p. 317).

Urwin notes that Marie is pleased with herself because she has responded in a "grown-up" way by taking a position of assertion relative to mother and Christopher. However, she has also acted in accord with social practises regulating what is appropriate for boys and what is appropriate for girls. In so doing she has advanced her own oppression (Ibid).

In another example, Ervin-Tripp shows how our emotional investments in social relationships and relationships of power lead children to take up different positions in language. In an experiment comparing the language used with mothers and with fathers, the child demanded, "Mommy, I want milk" but in the presence of the father the child was more ingratiating.

> 'What's that?' 'Milk.'
> 'My milk, Daddy.' 'Yes, it's your milk.'
> 'Daddy yours. Yours Daddy?' 'OK yours. OK it's mine.'
> 'It's milk Daddy.' 'Yes it is.'
> 'You want milk Daddy?' 'I have some thank you.'
> 'Milk in there Daddy?' 'Yes.'
> Daddy, I want some please? Please Daddy, milk?' (as cited Henriques et. al., 1984, p. 274).

Urwin takes this to show that as the child enters into the socially prescribed aspects of masculinity and femininity, the production of language itself may define gender differentiated social positions. In this, feminists such as Urwin borrow heavily on Lacan's work. And because, in following Lacan, Brennan (1986) also suggests that language is determining of social and psychic reality I think it is important to tell why I think that it is not.

According to Brennan, it is the structure of language that may be a "third force" in psychic reality. She develops Lacan's idea that the symbolic order itself is patriarcal because the structure of language is patriarchal. And so she suggests that the very act of submitting to language, whether it be in its cultural, social or institutional forms, is an act of a child submitting to patriarchy. Such an analysis, of course may not bode well for our hope of changing conditions of inequality. It suggests that children might be inserted into a preexisting and transhistorical symbolic order when they begin to use language. There is the further suggestion that some ideological meanings inherent to this structure that language takes might be fixed and stable, varying only in the intensity of their impact cross time and culture according to what socio-historical conditions will allow. On this view, the best we can hope for is to study and then work to modify socio-historical conditions in the direction of increased equality in social relations. And the limits of change might already be set by adding together what has been done in the past. But even more significant is the fact that Brennan (1986) does suggest that "transhistorical psychic factors are not just about internalisation", but also might be a "third force" at the level of individual psychic life which "contribute to the formation of patriarchy" (p. 43). According to Brennan, these "transhistorical psychic factors" emerge in the individual psyche because the child's initial fantasy of unity, which is broken up by the symbolic order, remains the underlying desire of psychic ideation. Therefore, when Brennan talks about "stopping some 'ideas' getting out" in psychoanalysis (p. 46), according to her own formulation she is advocating that we

put an end to ideas about the "real" divisive nature of human reality and let out the fantasies and illusions about unity and equality.

If her formulation is correct, I think that this therapeutic ethos seems questionable, while the demand for change lacks seriousness. While I do find the thrust of Brennan's work importantly valuable, what of her conclusion? "Does it make sense to suggest that and of itself, language assigns social position or that the structure of language determines psychic reality?"

I do agree that language can come to "represent" what we demand. Man woman girl-boy, to have one sex you cannot have the other. And what we demand denotes our desire for unity and our lack. Brennan (1986) writes:

> Desire is inextricably bound in speech and language, for desire (lack) is continually created by speech. By speaking one is committing the act which maintains one's place as separate. While this confers distinctness, and the ability to express meaning, its price is an alienation. For speech can only express demand. It cannot express all that underlies the demand (p. 22).

It cannot express the experience of unbroken wholeness. But, my argument has been that this is an experience based in reality, and is no illusion.

It is true that to take up a place in the culture on the basis of a sexed identity it is necessary for the child to enter into the language as the system of communication. As Brennan notes, "To be the object of auditory or visual images with no self-imposed 'meaning' attached to them is to be psychotic" (Ibid p. 20).

However, I do not think that opposed meanings are inherent in language. Instead, meanings are socially ascribed and, as well, we are able to infer and ascribe meaning on the basis of our own experience and social context. It follows that the child's developing gender identity may have a lot to do with the positions that she takes up in language in relation to her mother and her father. But this does not actually produce or fix gender differentiated meanings in language. Instead, because I hold that all possibilities are available to us at the psychic level, I think it is not the perogative of one sex or the other to

control linguistic meanings. It is true that men have had control of social institutions and of the public means of discourse and that women have been marginalized in relation to these. But this evidence of male power is not to be confused with control of linguistic meanings. Language can be modified and can be turned against unfairness and inequalities precisely because those inequalities are not inherent to language.

A child can, and will, use the language to position herself in social relationships. Urwin notes that in the example above the child fought for control of her mother and subordinated her own demands to the interests of her father. But, this could change because there are other possibilities available at the psychic level, such as defying her father or blaming her mother for the empty glass or manipulating the situation by prefacing the demand with "I love you". Moreover, there are other possibilities because social relations and relations of power are constantly changing and the child is already positioned in conflictual and contradictory ways though this is not yet rationally understood.

I have tried to show that, first and foremost, the child is placed and takes her place on the basis of being an embodied self positioned in social relations. If a daughter's use of language is tentative and uncertain in her father's presence or if women are insecure users of written and learned language and have been denied access to education, as Cameron (1987) points out, "This has nothing to do with the language itself and everything to do with the way we were defined in relation to it" (p. 148).

The question is then, if I am suggesting that not the culture itself nor the structure of language can produce the socially sanctioned masculine and feminine form, then how is it that in the face of all of the possibilities and contradictions a person maintains a subjective sense of identity? And how is it that all the various contradictory positionings will be tied together and make up the child's idea of being a gendered self? The answer I think lies in the fact that, no matter what the contradictions, there is always reserved to the individual the notion of choice. There are other possibilities but "I" choose one. And in the choice of one the "I" is established and reaffirmed at the psychic level.

Of course, as the child matures social and socio-cultural relations suggest what is the ideal placement for the child. The image ideal not only introduces the child to a more adult positioning and to knowledge of divisions and oppositions, but also stands in for a point of integration with the social world. There is, therefore, a tremendous emotional investment in gender differentiated and gender appropriate behaviour, both for the adult and for the child.

Consequently, there is a tremendous pull towards making the "correct" choice. For the "correct" choice will more certainly maintain significant relationships and immediately connect the child and the adult with others. Whereas resistance may immediately advance equality but ultimately advance alienation from relationships and, thereby, alienation from the deepest sense of self.

By the time the child is six both that child and the parents are confronted with a vast socio-cultural structure - the educational institution. And there is a tremendous investment in that child becoming an educated young woman or man in twelve years or less. There are many ways in which the child has already been introduced to exclusive pairings and the child has an experiencial knowledge of oppositions such as presence and absence, loss and gain, dependence and independence, my gender and not my gender. By the time schooling begins the child usually has the cognitive capacity to know at a rational level that to have one of these you cannot have the other. At school this introduction into the socio-cultural way of thinking will be formalized. Opposite pairs are memorized in Grade One, sometimes in kindergarten:

> It would be very strange if these [opposite] pairs were innate in anyone's mind, since they are extraordinarily conventional, heterogeneous and in many cases opaque. Who as a child could have said why black and white are opposites? Day and night, though more obvious are quite different, and sometimes (e.g. in the context of clothes) evening is the opposite of day. There are polar opposites like North and South, and pseudo-opposites like long/short. The principle of duality, rather than being innate, has to be etched on the conceptual apparatus of the child (Cameron, 1987, p. 61).

Of course, there is nothing biologically speaking that would make male/female an opposite pairing either. It can only be understood in this way when we uncover the ideological meaning attached to it. Undergirding the male/female opposition is the notion of (male) superiority and its opposite, (female) inferiority. Or, in other words, dominance/submission, top/down. Cameron (1987) observed, "Language is a means of upholding not power but the notion of superiority that makes power look natural or fair" (p.113). But, precisely because ideas which sustain inequalities violate our psychic experience of a unity beyond sameness, they violate what is natural and are more than unfair. They are a loss of an aspect of the self and a loss of the wholeness of the other.

As an example, we can consider a child's relationship to her mother. To start the child is placed and only later are the mother and child positions viewed as oppositional. In my view, the image ideal of "mother" oftentimes comes to stand in for what we may lose in entering the culture. We measure our mothers against this ideal, just as we measure ourselves against the ideal of what we must be, or ought to be.

What is problematic is that accepting a socio-cultural expression of the image ideal always involves renouncing an aspect of the self, though this may be confused with loss of an actual person or an aspect of that person. Thus, we might assert:

> Boys must renounce mother psychologically at a relatively early age in our culture. Men carry around an unfinished sense of vulnerability and loneliness from their childhood struggle to show their independence from mother even as they yearned to stay longer in her warm presence (Osherson, 1986,p. 105).

But really what we are talking about is how the child's knowledge of separations and oppositions has lead him to accept an image ideal which entails renouncing an aspect of the self. This aspect may be feminine, masculine, a sense of connectedness to nature or of continuity with all time, or a sense of harmony with all life. To accept an image ideal is, therefore, only a partial and unsatisfactory resolution to the entrance to culture.

Entering Culture and the Self - Other Opposition

When the part of the self that desires wholeness is renounced in order to gain the position of a separate and independent self in the socio-cultural order and in the particular social relations which surround us, then we have truly lost or annihilated a part of the self and we must find that part in another. In our own culture , Hollway notes that the social assumptions emerging out of this annihilation, and that are most frequently available to us, pose men as "powerful, rational, autonomous, in control and self-confident". Its social effect is to place a positive value on and "to foreground men's qualities and conceal their weaknesses and to do the opposite for women" (Ibid, p. 248). This perpetuates the "otherness" orientation of gender differentiation.

For Jim having a girl had nothing to do with sex and everything to do with being a "proper man" according to this "otherness" orientation:

> Jim: I remember very young - before - twelve - feeling a pressure to have a girlfriend and not having a clue. I remember hanging around a local cinema thinking that might be how something happened. But it was like an abstract pressure - I just felt that I should in order to show I was growing up properly. It didn't have any connection with the rest of my life, it was just something that I felt I should take on (Ibid, p. 239).

Jim went on to say that for him the gender appropriate position meant, "I did feel the onus always to actually be pushy, to see how far it was possible to go with somebody, to see how far they were actually into me." For Clare, her available position could be summed up in "being attractive (means) being attractive to boys (means) engaging in sex (or protosex) with boys (means) having a boyfriend" (Ibid, p.240).

This easily moves into the weakness/strength pairing and then the expressing feelings/giving support pairing and, as mentioned above, while members of the couple are actually working on gaining a unitary sense of their own selfhood there is a shift in power. As one woman put it:

> If he's saying he has no expectations, no needs, then I can't let him down. If I can't let him down, he has more power. He has the power to hurt me, but I don't have the power to hurt him (Ibid, p. 244).

This covers over men's need for the other.

> Martin: People's needs for others are systematically denied in ordinary relationships. And in a love relationship you make the most fundamental admission about yourself - that you want somebody else. It seems to me that that is the greatest need, and the need which, in relationship to its power, is most strongly hidden and repressed. Once you've shown the other person that you need them, then you've make yourself incredibly vulnerable (Ibid, p. 246).

At this point renouncing the need to be related to others which exists at the deepest level of psychic reality renders that need a weakness and that weakness is projected out onto the "other", who is usually the woman in a heterosexual partnership. She, as the "other" makes up for the lost self by being "the self that needs relationship". But, paradoxically, she must do this strongly because she must do it for both members of the partnership. He must project his weakness, and yet, at the same time, be able to introject the strength of that part he has annihilated. So she must show the strength of weakness, while he is invested in showing the strength of his position. Will could only allow women to be as strong as he wanted when they lived between the covers of a book:

> Will: Women are developing strength, which is in a way what I wanted, because when I was at school - I mean, women were nothing and I hated it. Because I couldn't think of them as equals. I felt them as people with whom I could only have a false relationship. I felt really bad about that. And I used to read novels in which there were strong women, with whom I could talk because actually the women I found around were not like that (Ibid, p. 256).

Now it is possible to see how the impact of psychic ideation that is qualified by socio-historical conditions makes its effects felt at the social level to make it appear that it is only women who want to have children. It is possible to see this here because Will's partner cuts through his apparent lack of feelings and reveals that his need for relatedness and his desire for a child actually is powerful and emotive.

> Will: We were having a conversation about something which at the moment I've repressed. Oh yes, it was about the small matter of pregnancy and having a child. I can't imagine how I forgot about that. (Laughs) And I was in a sort of reassuring mood. And what she said was she was very worried about it - it was at the end of quite a long conversation - and she'd been saying how she felt and I'd been doing my reassuring bit. It sounds so ludicrous but it wasn't at all. I said, 'In my mind, I'm prepared for every eventuality.' Right, and this was some way of saying, 'If you want an abortion, we'll have an abortion, and if you don't want an abortion, we won't have an abortion.' And she said quite sharply, and nastily, 'You mean we could have the child and then strangle it immediately afterwards!' And I burst into tears...(Ibid, p.257).

When Will's partner cuts through the mask of Will's "unfeeling" image ideal, this move revealed just how psychologically constraining that image was for him. Yet, the notion that there is a socially prescribed position of integration "out there" that we can put on like a glove persists. Goode (1980) notes that because men enjoy more privilege than women in our society they are afforded a wider range of activities and behaviours than women. There are therefore a larger selection of "image ideals" available to men. Adopting the image ideal affords the illusion of the complete and unitary self. But how many "John Wayne's" do we really know? And, quite possibly, even John Wayne was not John Wayne, the image ideal. Osherson writes,

> Losses that can't be tolerated or adequately dealt with often result in idealization; we glorify in a false, desperate way what we have lost in order to hold on to it. How much of men's attempts to make women into Madonnas, soft healing creatures of the imagination, may be compensation for the early losses of nurturance in our lives? (Osherson, 1986. p. 124,125).

And to what extent are more recent image ideals for women, such as the Total Woman, an expression of the strength of weakness?

I think that these are interesting questions to consider but, to be fair, for these socio-cultural images to have normative strength in prescribing the unity of male and female ways of being they must find a "match" at the psychic level of the child and adult. For

psychic reality holds forth the possibility of choice. And therefore socio-cultural forms may be opposed and resisted at the psychic level.

Accepting a self - other resolution to the transition to culture begins when the child starts to realize that separations exist. At this juncture the child's emotional investment in gender appropriate behaviour can be focussed on people and things that, in some fashion, represent a point of certainty, a place of truth and knowledge and integration in the world. The attempted resolution to the conflict between a psychic reality based on and grounded in integration with the material and social world and an emerging understanding that we can never go back, that we are entering a world of divisions, often involves making the other person(s) or a part of another person stand in for every thing that we lose by entering this world. Though Mitchell and Rose (1982) believe that this loss is constructed within language, while I am saying instead that it is communicated by language, I think that their comments do carry the implications of loss and desire for the other very well. They say:

> ...(We) persist in the belief that somewhere there is a point of certainty, of knowledge and of truth. When the subject addresses its demand outside itself to another, the Other becomes the fantasised place of just such a knowledge or certainty....The Other appears to hold the 'truth' of the subject and the power to make good its loss. But this is the ultimate fantasy (p.32).

So, in this attempted resolution, not only is there a tremendous investment in upholding our own gender appropriate image ideal (because this is part of our position of certainty) but there is also, paradoxically, a tremendous investment in protecting the position of the Other, even when this does not appear rational. For our desire to do this is placed beyond the rational in the desire for unity and for the Other to make up the loss. Desire is the "reason" even though it might not be rational or politically correct. This can be seen in particular where women (and men) position themselves or are positioned in ways that add to their own oppression. For example, Schecter (1970) indicates that wives often protect a fragile husband when it is found that he is infertile.

> [The wives] intuitively felt that such a deficiency would be seen by husbands as severely affecting their masculine ego and so...were willing to assume the defect. The acute sensitivity of these women to potential narcissistic hurts in their husbands often led to delays in requests for adoption of a child. So many women...feel definitively that they have a number of children plus one (their husband) to care for - and their reality-testing frequently is extremely accurate (as cited in Osnerson, 1986, p. 104).

Social norms are effective in offering, however modestly, a semblance of the unified self. At the same time, we continue to carry with us the longing for a position of integration, in which everthing will be put in its rightful place and everything will be given its rightful due just by being there. Because the impact of psychic ideation can only be felt when it is projected out into the social, the power of the psychic in social relations is, to a certain extent, dependent on what ideas can get out and on what ideas cannot. But because the impact of the psychic can be felt in the social its power cannot, must not, be underestimated either. For, as Brennan (1986) notes, the impact, being social, might be termed an ideological effect. This raises the possibility that ideologies emerging out of social relations can reinforce or oppose psychical ideation deriving directly or indirectly from early material relations.

Where social norms strongly enforce an ideology of the unitary self, we hide our desire for the Other from ourselves. Rather, than resolving the problematic this invests the ideology and the illusion of wholeness with even more staying power. We are not able to get at our own inner resources to establish a sense of self based on our underlying possibilities. Men continue to be stunted by idealogies asserting that "real" men do not want or need relationships as much as women and, following this, they will be caught up in ideologies which say that men do not really want or need children very much. Women continue to be trapped by ideologies that imply "real" women do not need or want sex as much as men and what women really need and want is babies. Hollway suggests that gender characteristics such as these are set up as oppositional because there "...is an

investment in exercising power on behalf of a subjectivity protecting itself from the vulnerability of desire for the Other" (Ibid, p. 251).

The implication of my analysis is that while socio-cultural ideologies may strongly enforce socio-cultural norms in accordance with the material conditions of a society, the possibility remains that psychic ideations will resist and oppose these at the social level. This opens up the possibility of changing our position and of changing ideologies in the social context.

Socio-cultural Forces and Psychic Reality

It is fine to talk about the possibilites of initiating change at the place where ideology and psychic ideation meet. But is the force of the socio-cultural such that it will inevitably qualify underlying psychic reality so that men are always at every time and place positioned to assume the place of power, of rationality, of the strength of self-sufficiency in heterosexual relationships, while women are not. Some analysts think it may be so. Brennan, for example, suggests that lack might always be represented by the penis. Men have it and women do not. Men carry the visual symbol with them, but women do not have this option. According to this view, women must represent lack and desire by imagining themselves as having the penis that is castrated. However, for both sexes, lack and desire are always associated with what is biologically male, albeit in the admittedly tardy last instance. Yet, that women by all accounts have a very difficult time effecting such a symbolic castration at the psychic level suggests to me that this interpretation does not reflect what is really happening. I think that the penis does not universally represent lack and desire.

My account situates the emergence of differences, including sexual difference outside of the socio-historical. At the psychic level the processes of splitting, introjection, and projection which develop and work together to produce different placements in an

unbroken whole are eventually informed by cultural influences to contribute to oppositional forms and images. But this leaves open the possibility that because the desire for unity is a motivating response which lies beyond the cultural, the particular culturally induced ways in which desire and lack are later represented rationally will not be universal and, instead, will vary according to socio-historical conditions. I think that Chodorow was correct to say that for many women in our society the penis, being male, stands in for what women lack in terms of agentic power, social status and the economic means to bring about what is desired. But, in our own society the womb sometimes stands in for male lack. Osherson (1986) writes,

> Growing up thinking that men are strong, women are weak; that male power is conquest; that strength alone resides in the outer world can lead to a true existential crisis when confronted with the power of pregnancy. Many men look inside themselves and wonder if they can nurture too....[This] can stir up feelings about their own creativity, their ability to hold life as men (p. 136).

It is true that in our own culture this does not translate into equal power sharing arrangements between men and women. But in other cultures it just is not, or was not, this way. Sanday (1981) compiled evidence of other power sharing arrangements which accord equal power and value on the basis of women's capacity to give life. Women have it and men do not. This sentiment is aptly phrased in the lines of a West African saying, "Whether the male chief is big or small what matters is that he was given birth by a woman". The power of women in dual-sex systems, such as that in West Africa, and in cultures where birthing is associated with magico-religious creative power cannot be denied. This is also carried over to women's economic contr', influence and leverage in such societies.

In other words different does not, in and of itself, mean separate and unequal, even when the psychic is projected out into the social and the cultural. But an inadequate

resolution of the transition from a position of unity to a knowledge of the divisions inherent in social positionings probably will lead to this result.

And I think that the impact of the psychical and the direction of its impact cannot be known simply on the basis of whether lack is expressed in fantasies relating to male or female biology. For example, Lacan discussed how, at one particular historical juncture, the elevated position of women in courtly love stood in for male lack and how this image of women was a fantasy that held out the promise of unity. Despite its psychic origin its effects were felt in the social, men "coming off elegantly from the absence of sexual relation" (Lacan, 1972/3, p. 141), and women getting the 'pedestal treatment' (Brennan, 1986). But, here, though lack was expressed in female terms rather than in terms of the male penis its direction did not establish equality, nor did it diminish the power of men in the social relation.

As mentioned above, the impact that these fantasies have is tied to normative social practises, so that the need for the "Other" will be expressed in one way or in another when it finds a "match" in the social. The same dynamics are at work when "motherhood" is elevated above other images for women. This finds its "match" in taxation and welfare systems which privilege mothers above married and single women. At the same time motherhood is made a more attractive option for women and social standards are reinforced which establish motherhood as the normal unity of female form.

When normative social practises that produce a "unitary" position and describe what is the normal female (and male) form find a "match" at the psychic level in women, out of all the possibilities many women choose to mother. I do not want to idealize this choice because I believe that given various social situations for many women it may be the only way to affirm their selfhood, or may be simply a problem. However, for many others it is indeed a choice from among other possibilities. And, even though women may choose to affirm their selfhood in this way I do not want to idealize motherhood either, as THE position of unity in this world for women. Many times through sad experience women

find it is not. And, in any case, there are moments of just plain drudgery. But, in being a position of integration within society for women, sometimes it works. Here I want to tell something about when it works and in the next section discuss why it works.

When Mothering Provides a Position of Integration

Rather than go on about "a satisfying return to oneness" I would like to take a more research oriented approach and Kahn's (1980/1) findings are a great help in this regard. In her study of historical and contemporary "achieving" women and college students, Kahn found that if their mothers were described as strong, active, loving and supportive this was more closely tied to their daughters later success than whether they were traditional wives and mothers or not. What I find interesting here is the emotive force of these qualities. What may be implied by these findings is that if mothers are satisfied with their position as mothers, this more than anything else will contribute to the daughters success. That these mothers were invested in children and home did not lock daughters into the same position. Rather, it appears that daughters of these mothers looked for a satisfying position congruent with their mothers experience of mothering. Likewise, daughters who did well later had fathers who were their emotionally supportive mentors. What seems to typify these "successful" homes is not the absence of male/female differences, nor necessarily the presence of male/female symmetry. From what I can tell of Kahn's findings, what typifies these relationships is the absence of top-down oppositions. Mothers and fathers had different but mutually supportive positions and this was carried over into their relationship with their daughters. What I suspect is that in these families, and in the relationship with their daughters, the transition from a psychic experience of oneness to an experience of different positionings in the larger world was resolved much more satisfactorily than is generally the case. How such a resolution is accomplished so that we are not type cast by

society and for want of another available option become, as Will so aptly put it, "a completely incomplete' is the issue I turn to now.

Entering Culture and Equality: The Self and Other Resolution

To practise the motivating moral response

I have argued that at the deepest reaches of psychic experience there is an integration of the whole beyond the sameness of its various aspects. To emerge from this world and to understand, that is to come to know logically, that our experiences take place within a framework of societal sanctions and regulations and that they are in some respects independent from, and even opposed to, other socio-economic relations is a crucial task in becoming integrated into a "societal" world.

However, my thesis suggests that where there is a "match" between the child's early social environment and the child's experience of psychic and social harmony and integration, the motivating response engendered by this experience will give rise to a particular moral response that is pre-rational, yet is the underlying reason for the development of a particular form of justice. It is this progressive development that, I think, marks the successful resolution of the child's entrance into society so that the child's underlying psychic reality need not be renounced and so that the child need not annihilate an aspect of the self in the process of initiation. This returns the place of the other in the self-other equation to a position of equality, so that, possibly, potentially, all positions are balanced and so that the whole is sustained unbroken.

If children are motivated to maintain an experience of harmony with themselves, significant others, and the environment, it follows that when the child's development is fostered along lines congruent with the child's capabilities, the child will be motivated to be "moral". I do not mean morality here in its formal sense. I am not talking about knowing

the rationale for justice. What I am talking about is a sense of being "fair", a sense that everything is inseparably the whole and, as mentioned above, with everything in its rightful place everything will be accorded its rightful due just by being there.

Before the child is self-aware, he experiences his own continuity with the world and, therefore, the child does not have any idea that having the candy bar all to himself really excludes anyone else from having it. But as self-awareness develops the child finding support for its actions in surrounding social relationships will begin to share. In fact, little children will sometimes share everything, give it all away and then ask the parent for more for themselves. It is when the child finds there are limits on the things handed out that the child is intitated into the idea that somehow the sharing must be done systematically.

What I am saying flies in the face of findings such as those of Kohlberg (1981) who would say that very young children have no sense of justice, even in the informal sense. However, Damon (1977) using simpler and more concrete tasks found that children as young as four years old did indeed have a sense of fairness or, we could say, a rudimentary concept of justice. In one task related by Fischer and Lazerson (1984) four children were given a task to do and at the end the youngest child was called out. Then the remaining three four year olds were asked to distribute the reward for the task - ten candy bars.

> Experimenter: How do you think we should give them out?
> Jonathan: (Gives 2 to everyone, has 2 left over. Then takes the extra 2 for himself.) I'm going to take these and eat them for supper.
> Experimenter: What do you think, Ben? Do you think they (the extra 2) should go to you and Jonathan?
> Ben: (Nods yes).
> Experimenter: What do you think, Kerri?
> Kerri: No.
> Experimenter: What way do you think would be best?
> Kerri: I don't know.
> Experimenter: What do you think, though? Put them out again, and let Kerri give them out.
> Kerri: (Gives 2 to Ben, 2 to Jonathan, 2 to herself; sets aside 2 for Jennifer.)

Here Kerri shares the bars fairly and later makes it clear that she is not sure of what to do with the others but does not think that they ought to be given to just one or two of the children. Jonathan has decided to take the extras for supper and this, in and of itself, does not show that Jonathan is unfair. Because, if he is not sure what to do, the extras might as well go to himself.

My assumption here contrasts with most other theory on justice and morality. I am saying that the basis for the motivating moral response is not learned as a result of socio-historical conditions and social relations. I am saying that this response is consequent to the material relations which give rise to an underlying psychic reality of integration and wholeness. The experience of harmony between and among differences, and the contradictory and conflictual aspects of the developing psyche gives rise to this response. It is only later when the child is beginning to sense that there are divisions that rational reasons for being moral come into play. And the reasons for being just and definitions of justice based on reasons can suppress this original motivating moral response. And this is because definitions of justice based on reasons can be devised to serve special interests, to foster top-down oppositions, and can even create divisions and suppress the concept of equal human rights. Reasons for being just are learned and sustained through practise. They are contingent upon particular familial relations and, of course, these relations are responsive to socio-cultural factors. The original motivating moral response is sustained through practise as well. If the original motivating response of the child is not fostered in the immediate context, or if socio-historical conditions do not affirm concepts of human equality, justice, life enhancing choice and social responsibility, then this motivating moral response will not "get out" into the social in a life enhancing way. It will instead begin to take on the flavor of oppositional distinctions even before the child is aware of the intransigence of oppositional pairings.

So I am not saying that all children, all the time, will naturally practise a moral response. If we look again at the example above we see that Jonathan was not sure what to

do with the extra two bars. His initial decision to give the bars to himself may reflect the confusion experienced by children when they are moving between the idea that their desires are consistent with those of everyone else and the idea that they may not be consistent. However, Jonathan's move did not work and in his subsequent bids to get the bars we can see a progression as he moves into a series of socially induced rationales for his particular notion of fairness. These may be the precursor of an adult oppositional morality. To take up the example at the point where Kerri has divided the bars evenly:

> Experimenter: What about these two?
> Jonathan: These 2 go for me and Ben.
> Experimenter: Is that what you wanted to do?
> Kerri: (Nods no.)
> Experimenter: What do you think, Jonathan? You think two and two, three and three? Do you think that way would be fair?
> Jonathan: Yes.
> Experimenter: Why would it be fair?
> Jonathan: 'Cause I hate girls.
> Experimenter: Kerri doesn't think it's fair.
> Ben: I do. I hope Jenny would.
> Jonathan: Yeah, Jenny would, cause she always thinks.
> Experimenter: O.K. So the two boys want to give the boys more, and Kerri wants to give everybody the same? Does anyone think they might change their mind?
> All children: No (pp. 542,543).

Here there seems to be a relationship between Jonathan's developing gender identity and the position he takes up in relation to "justice". Jonathan's emotional investment in a particular image ideal for his sex and gender involves the "giving and taking" pair of opposites. Appropriate to his developing gender identity, Jonathan does the taking, while the "Other" is placed in the position of giving to the relationship. Already Jonathan is able to hide from himself the reality that he too is reliant on relationships. By setting himself up as the Judge in this judicial system, there is a shift in power and Jonathan is able to assert quite convincingly that right-thinking or "proper" girls do the giving. Jonathan is able to protect himself from the vulnerability of his own desire, but it is inescapably expressed through the lacking emotions - greed and "hate". To borrow

Brennan's (1986) analysis and apply it here: the strength of Jonathan's emotional investment "takes an ingredient from reality" (Kerri's behaviour) but his demands and implied "accusations of deprivation do not stem from her behaviour" but from his own desire. And "that desire, as lack,...(is) concretised not only in sexuality, but in the lacking emotions: like envy, greed, general frustration (and hate) (p.39).

Not only does Jonathan succeed in hiding his own vulnerability, but his strategy finds its "match" in the social situation and so the ideational impact of his fantasy is powerful in its social effects. Because Jonathan does not succeed in gaining the bars for himself, he distances himself from his vulnerability even further by appearing to subordinate his own interests to the interests of all boys. Not only does Jonathan succeed in winning Ben over but the two boys then attempt to maneuver Jenny into colluding. Their baldfaced attempt suggested that Jenny would probably agree to their demand because she was a right-thinker. According to this reasoned out system of justice, Kerri was not a right-thinker or she would have seen that the boys were deserving of more.

It is important to say at this point that I do not believe Jonathan is really calculating in setting up male and female positions as opposites in relation to justice. As mentioned previously, Jonathan is four and at that age putting on a different gender is as simple as putting on a dress and earrings. Instead, I wish to show how the motivating moral response of children is not always directed to fairness and equality, nor is it always encouraged to develop in that way. But sometimes it is and, I believe, the ongoing practise of the motivating moral response is what sustains a satisfactory resolution of the entry into culture.

When the child is encouraged to find moral expression in ways that are consistent with the child's underlying psychic reality, I think that fairness and caring for the self and others continue to develop as the moral response and the motivating response. Shogan (1986) tells why the moral response is not a set of reasons but is a motivating response. That motivating response, according to her, impels the moral person to care that the others

welfare is enhanced as much as their own. My account parallels this. What I am arguing is that the motivating response that impels the child into relatedness with the social, material and cultural worlds, is also itself, even in the earliest stages, the primative form of a moral response. It is a moral response because it carries this promise of being in harmony with all aspects of life and of finding a position of integration so that caring for the other and enhancing the welfare of the other is the same as doing this for the self.

To develop a position of psychological and social harmony and integration does not mean that the child is not introduced to a knowledge of oppositions and divisions. Quite the contrary. At about the age of six the child begins to take on the strictures and injunctions of its social world and of the society. It is important for the child to learn the "shoulds", "should nots", "musts" and "must nots" which regulate social relationships and institutional practise. It is also necessary for the child to know that others may stand in opposition to its interests and to know how to protect itself when these interests are opposed or when it opposes another. But to successfully resolve the transition to this way of knowing rationally, this "knowing" must be integrated to the psychic reality so that this reality need not be renounced and a part of the self be lost.

In the underlying psychic reality all positions are possible. Unity transcends conflict, contradiction and difference. In the social world we can only have one position or, at least, only one at a time. To know this and to integrate it within the psychic life is to affirm the equality of all positions. It is to affirm balance and fairness and "different but equal". In relations of power it is to give up power where the other has less, it is to take power when the self has less than is required to maintain the balance. When "I" choose one position in the social relation from among all of the other possibilities, the "I" is established in the choice. When I develop morality as a motivating response I am not only affirming the life of the other, I am affirming the health and the wholeness of my own psychic life. There is no splitting of the underlying wholeness and, at the deepest level, there is no loss of self.

To borrow on Shogan's (1986) analysis, we could say that to live the motivating moral response does not mean that we will be "moral" at every moment, for much of life does not require such a response. It is an attitude of mutual respect and mutual regard that expresses who we are at the psychic level. And what rational choices we have practised between situations requiring a moral response, will determine how we respond when a situation emerges which requires such a response again. It will not have to be reasoned out because the immediacy of the response is contingent upon what is non-rational. It is based on desire that is not renounced. It is an experience that must be practised.

Why Women Mother

In an unequal, fragmented and oftentimes unbalanced world, women's mothering can be a satisfying place of integration, a place where it is possible to practise the moral motivating response without upsetting too many applecarts. Mothers not only have real sources of power in the childrearing situation, but are also able to give it up - to care for the other as for the self, to create equality for the child, to love the self as the child. In this sense, psychic health is a resource that is strengthened through practise in the mother and child situation and by the responsiveness of the socio-cultural environment to a woman's mothering. This I think is why women mother.

As the mother becomes 'full' with the fetus within, her experiences of material, social and psychological oneness with the child are real because they are embodied experience. This is not to say that this is all it is for the mother. Less pleasant experiences are associated with carrying a child. And while the mother may be lifegiving and strong in relation to the baby, the larger social world may not be responsive to her needs in the same way.

At the same time, this experience of a position of integration so that caring for the other and enhancing the welfare of the other is the same as doing this for the self may

revitalize the motivating moral response of the mother. I think that it is this response which carries mothers through so many of the problems of caring for very young children and of rearing them to young adulthood.

If the mother's situation is such that this motivating response predominates in her particular approach to life, then I think that daughters will be more prone to see motherhood as a possible position of psychological and social integration. However, the research suggests that the daughter's response to the experience of being mothered by such women is to seek to enter into such an experience of life themselves. This might be found in motherhood and/or "out there" in the larger society. In the choice the "I" will be established.

On this account, it is not women's social position as mothers that creates inequalities. The material situatedness of the child gives rise to a particular psychic reality and a particular motivating response. That women carry children in their own bodies, and that the child is dependent on significant others after birth (be they mothers or someone else), is a material reality beyond inequalities. At this level, it cannot be touched by socio-historical conditions. This makes inequalities a later development and not to be confused with sexual difference.

I think that this accounts for the fact that in some societies with assymetrical gender related roles, each sex was accorded different but equal powers (Sanday, 1981). But this does not exclude the possiblity of shared parenting and symmetrical positionings in parenting either. My analysis suggests that all positions are possible for men as well as women. And Segal notes that a more equal distribution of power does develop in situations where men share childcare responsibilities. It is one possibility.

We have noted that the research indicates that daughters, and not just sons, do better when fathers are involved in their lives in emotionally supportive ways. At the same time there is a lot of evidence that men place themselves, and are propelled, "out there" to take up socially sanctioned images of the male ideal. Some of these men are so caught up

in self-other oppositions that they would be unable to give emotionally to a child if situated back in the home. Other men, "out there" do act in accord with a motivating moral response, for instance, in regard to environmental, political and social issues. For these men the desire to find a position of integration does not evolve into the unbalanced need to manipulate others and to take centre stage. But men who wish to participate more actively in rearing their children find themselves in opposition to the forces of cultural ideology. These ideologies uphold institutional practises and social services that tend to position men outside the home and women within it. Segal (1987) observes that:

> Men who would like to spend more time in the home, as many men do now tell us (particularly when their children are young), find that it is precisely when they are most needed at home that economic constraints are greatest and shorter hours at work impossible. Employers, for economic reasons are notoriously resistant to any agreements for shorter working time, other than the ridiculously exploitative, and hence now popular introduction of part time work, which often carries no job security, protection, holiday pay, etc. (p. 156,157).

Segal (1987) goes on to say that ironically the parents who find it possible to share childcare responsibilities are professionals or the unemployed. And we know too well that where one parent does take parttime work, usually it is the mother who does. (And this will penalize her even further if she is on her own when she draws a pension.) An emphasis on shared parenting also ignores the reality of one-parent families. Segal (1987) notes that it is the ideology of the "privacy" of family life that masks the fact that for many children the quality of care that they recieve is directly related to government sponsored day care, child support payments and youth group activities. Moreover, changing the structure of parenting cannot in and of itself change the relative power and privilege that men enjoy in the larger society. For the relative power of men is undergirded by the notion of male superiority and the notion that men provide for women and children. And these notions which support and rationalize social and economic structures exist at the ideological level.

At the same time, where social structures and bureaucracies create harmful environmental conditions, unequal employment opportunities or tensions within the family and community prejudice, psychic representations of these cannot be wished away or brushed aside, nor can these problems be resolved at the psychic level. What psychic reality does afford is a basis for opposing such conditions in the social context. But the effect of that resistance is tied to socio-historical conditions, and to what psychically derived content those conditions will reinforce or oppose. Of course, for women to feel the effects of socio-historical conditions they too must "...be conveyed across the space of a social relation....[and] insofar as these effects involve social discourse they could be explained as ideological effects" (Brennan, 1986, p. 37).

While the "ideological" and "psychical ideation" meet in the social, they are commonly held to have different points of origin - socio-historical conditions and the psyche respectively. I have argued that there are commonalities. At root both are grounded in material relations. And both must "be conveyed across the space of a social relation". Now I would like to take up Brennan's suggestion that there may be an even more intimate connection of the two and show its relationship to psychic reality as a "third force" that I have developed here. This possibility suggests that an ideology can result from a psychic state.

I think that, possibly, the early material conditions which give rise to a certain psychic reality may also give rise to a certain psychic content that is universal and trans-historical. For example it would be worth working out whether trans-historical, cross-cultural notions of a "sacred" are derived from the specific material relations associated with child dependency. The notion of someone more powerful than the self who, at the same time, is committed to meeting the needs of the self is so pervasive, as to be called universal. If ideology can reinforce psychic ideation, and visa versa, at the social level, then this might suggest why the "sacred" is such a powerful motivating force even at a national level. And since mothers are so closely associated with the period of child dependency, it

would be important to work out what this means in specific practical terms for women generally, for mothers in particular. It also raises the issue of why it is that at the abstract level of theological thought in every major religion it is a father figure who is made the cultural personification of the Creator God. I think it is possible that, at this level, abstract thought is an expression of men's being abstracted from "what is real". And it would be important to find whether this is an expression of men's separation from the nurturant and caregiving aspects of life, in terms of real material concrete practise. In this case, an abstracted, idealized God might undergird the cultural ideology of male superiority and of men's provision for women and children. While its "matching" ideation could be found in various psychically derived images and fantasies about women and mothers (and about men).

If this was found to be correct, then it would be important to find whether there are other ideological effects that can be tied to psychically content. And we might explore how to oppose some ideations at the social level so as to undermine oppressive structures, and how to get other ideas out so that we could see a shift on a global scale in the direction of a motivating moral response. Then caring for, and rearing, a child would be one of many placements in the unbroken whole available to both women and men. And that would be the reason why women mother and men father - in a new way.

Chapter 6:

Reflections on the Future

A Way of Thinking About Psychic Reality and Mothering

I have developed the idea that women's mothering is consequent to an underlying psychic reality common to all humanity. As pointed out above, because the position of "mother" is a socially sanctioned image ideal for women it may come to stand in for the desire for unity and a position of integration with the whole world. Of course, women who are typecast according to this societal image will truly be, and will feel themselves to be, a "completely incomplete". This experience of reality holds whenever a person attempts to find an image ideal and adopt it whole and unaltered.

At the same time, mothering a child has the potential, for certain women in certain relationships and socio-historical situations, to be an emancipatory experience. It carries with it the possibility of being a particular site of material practise where caring for the other and enhancing the welfare of the other is the same as doing this for the self. In this case, the practise of mothering involves identifying with parts of the image ideal in a more self-satisfying way which allows a moral motivating response to be reawakened, or reinforced.

On this view, other positions in society also afford the same potential for an experience of relatedness that does not involve loss of an aspect of the self or the expectation that the other will give up something in order to make up that loss. But, according to my own analysis, it is the act of carrying a child and bearing that child from out of her own body that affords to a woman, rather than to a man, the closest adult experience we know of a return to material oneness. Because this experience originally gives rise to the motivating response it is most likely to reactivate it, and because it is the experience of adult women, rather than children, it holds the possiblity that women will be

enabled to integrate the non-rational and the rational, the po[illegible]nbodiment and dependence on one's own body and the personal and the socio-cultural with renewed vision and depth of understanding.

The question that emerges out of this is whether this makes women, particularily mothers, inherently more moral than men. And to this I would say no. What is inherent and transhistorical about the emergence of the moral motivating response is available to both sexes and, in fact, is a necessary condition to early human survival. All of us are carried by our mothers and experience an extended period of dependency in infancy. However, there are many social and socio-cultural influences which can suppress or distort the expression of this early motivating response. To survive and flourish it must be practised. And again, bearing a child is one such site of practise for women and it can be a powerful experience which is carried over into child rearing.

Having said this, that this particular practise is not available to men ought not to be underestimated either, in its impact to men and then to all of us. O'Brien (1981) notes that men are alienated from their seed from the moment of conception to the moment of birth. And, within the context of what has been said about the human need and desire for relatedness and connection to all of life, this alienation might be experienced not only as a loss but also as a violation. Still I am not willing to join Chodorow in implying that it is a sense of loss, whether it be associated with separation from mother or separation from their seed, that gives rise to fragile ego's in men. Nor would I like to suggest that because alienation from relationships may be experienced as a violation that this can account for men's violence against women. I would not like to take this position because the problem is not that most men have weak identities. The sociologist Bob Connell (1977) argues:

> ...'masculinity' is securely embedded or 'naturalised' in the body through long years of participation in various social practices....[The] problem with most forms of masculinity is ... that these identities as they operate through existing social relations are so very frequently oppressive to women, and quite often, to other men as well (as cited in Segal, 1987, p. 152).

It is the culmination of our practises that makes us what we are. And that the practise of bearing a child is not available to men does not render them inherently less moral, nor less responsible to be moral, but it does mean that men who wish to be "complete" in relationship to themselves and others must find other corresponding sites of practise. In the end, this is true for women as well. Pregnancy and birthing cover nine months in a much longer life.

So it cannot be said that bearing a child "fixes" female psychology once and for all and for the better, any more than it can be said that coming only so close to this experience as a pot-belly will allow "fixes" male psychology forever and for the worse. We know that particular practises preceding or following this nine-month period can distort the childbearing experience itself - for example, in the direction of meeting societal demands for a "normal unity of form" even in infants.

Much could be said about the impact of the new reproductive technology in alienating women from their own seed and in intensifying the societal demand to produce an infant image ideal. Dr. James Bonner is a geneticist working in Pasadena, California who "very strongly" supports this demand and is a proponent of its undergirding socio-cultural morality. As he puts it, this morality is a morality which says:

> ...since we can only have one or two children per family, let's have those children not only free of genetic defects, but let's endow them with the best genes that are available. Let's be the first on our block to have the smartest children ever (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC], 1987).

Perhaps parents who opt for "superior sperm" are looking to their children, even before conception, to "make up the loss" for themselves. For Robert Graham of the Repository for Germinal Choice finds that such parents are interested in "...having as bright a child as they can, and as healthy, and this seems to override the wish for children who duplicate the parents" (CBC, p.1).

On my own account, what suppresses the original moral potential for mutual respect for all life, including human life, is not only related to the social location that a child originally takes up on the basis of identification but also, and to a much greater extent, is related to the social relationships and socio-cultural options available to the child. Adams (1982), for example, has pointed out that children are not free to choose the normative images presented to them, such as those of the "proper parents" (Henriques et. al., 1984). And given the force of a child's motivating response together with the child's dependence, it is certain that a child is free to accept norms but is not equally free to stand outside norms and reject them. Therefore, it seems to me that we do not need better babies. What we need is a better world for them to enter.

A better world is an exceptional goal. If we are saying that everything must be changed we will be crushed beneath the weight of the thought if we do not say how it is to be accomplished. What I turn to now is a discussion of the type of changes that I think would be profitable in the areas of parenting, education and clinical therapy. I relate the practical implications of change in these areas to my own thinking about psychic reality to tell why I think that the changes I put forward would foster both what is human and what is humane. Prefacing that work is a discussion of the basic principles that, I think, could emerge from my analysis to direct the change process. I briefly illustrate how these general principles would work in practice and, for a concrete example, how this would relate to linguistic change.

General Principles and their Application in a Change Process

I have outlined how both socio-historical conditions and a "third force" in psychic reality emerge out of material relations. Socio-historical conditions generally are tied to larger material structures such as the economy, kinship structures and the structure of parenting. In addition, I have argued here that a psychic reality that is particularly human

is tied to particular material structures - which refer to the fetus' own embodiment, to its embodiment within another and then to an extended period of biological dependency in infancy.

Socio-historic and psychic effects meet again, and meet repeatedly, in the social. And I think that Brennan (1986) is correct to suggest that since these effects are conveyed across the space of the social they can be termed ideological and ideational effects respectively. In contrast to Brennan I would argue that this meeting of ideology and ideation starts at the non-verbal level and that the non-verbal contributes to the force and direction of our communications throughout life, though the verbal part of a conversation or social exchange might be the most obvious part.

Within the social context ideological and ideational effects may be mutually reinforcing or may stand in opposition to one another (Brennan, 1986). According to Brennan this particularly limits the force of psychic ideation when it comes up against an ideological wall. So, we could say that ideational effects are not all-powerful because their effects must be felt in the social. But, what I wish to emphasize here is that ideational effects are powerful for precisely the same reason - their effects must be felt in the social.

I deliberately have adopted the image of an ideological wall receiving a blow in order to make the related point that any site of social discourse is also, inevitably, a site of material practise. The social must be acted out in a material relation and that material relation must necessarily intersect with the broad sweep of socio-historical material structures. This is important because, just as a psychic state may result in an ideology, so also a psychic state acted out in a material relation may result in a socio-historical effect that restructures material relations on a broader scale. If an impact is made to an ideology, a myth, that accords power and supports oppressive structures, then the impact to normative institutions and practices must be felt almost simultaneously. And, it is not necessary to undermine the whole structure in order to make some impact to its ideological foundation.

In short, underlying psychic reality affords the reason to oppose oppressive myths and ideologies which support unfair institutional structures and practices. Psychic ideation, projected into the material relation at the social level, will sustain or transform larger material relations at the socio-historical level. As Pateman (1980) puts it, The change in outward practice constitutes a restructuring of at least one aspect of one social relationship...every act reproduces or subverts a social institution" (as cited in Cameron, 1987, p. 172). To speak into the social situation, in both verbal and non-verbal ways, will impact ideologies, regulatory institutions and norming practices where the social situation intersects with socio-historical situatedness. As I see it, this is the central principle of the change process.

I have discussed change as the restructuring of an ideological wall which may suggest that, for all intents and purposes, the ideology and the material structure are one and the same thing. However, my own analysis priorizes change at the ideological level. To be certain, this is not because I deny the need for a restructuring of material relations. Instead, I priorize ideological change because I think that it is possible to substantially modify regulatory institutions and practises without changing the ideology that supports them. And if the ideology that supports inequalities is not changed, women (or the poor or racial minorities) will gain access to institutions controlled by a group of (mostly white, upper and middle class) men and still be defined negatively within that institution and in relation to its practices. But I think that the reverse is not true. As Spender noted, where oppressive ideologies crumble, the controlling elite has lost the justification for its power and must either give up some of that power and privilege or find another way to justify it.

Something substantial must change. And, the reason why those marginalized by the power elite have more control over change at the ideological level is because men do exercise institutional control in our society but they do not control psychic ideation or the meaning that we might attach to their institutional power. This does not belong to the elite, nor can it be appropriated by them (Cameron, 1987). Given this, I argue that changing

oppressive structures is more likely to be successful when ideations projected into social relations at a site of material practise oppose the ideologies which support and rationalize those oppressive structures.

In what follows I draw on Cameron's (1987) work to show how these principles apply to the practical task of linguistic change and, in particular, to the task of changing women's position in relation to the normative institutions which regulate language use.

Linguistic change: a practical task

Cameron (1987) writes:

> The institutions that regulate language use in our own society, and indeed those of most societies, are deliberately oppressive to women. Men control them, not in the rather mystical sense that they are said to control meaning, by making esoteric semantic [illegible] possessing the vital signifier, but simply because it is the prerogative of those with economic and political power to set up and regulate [illegible] social institutions (p. 144).

Cameron makes the point that language belongs to everyone, in fact early on in the developmental process girls are more adept users of language than boys. In her integrative account she makes another related point that there is, in practise and in speech, no division or opposition between the non-verbal and the verbal, the semantic and the semiotic or non-grammatical structures and formalized rational meanings. Girls and women are not shut out of language, the capacity for communication, but, instead, they are shut out of the language of the culture, the "apparatus of ritual", the measure of the standard of excellence, the social institution.

According to Cameron, men's control of linguistic institutions disadvantages women because it gives precedence to written, rather than spoken, language, it defines women's communications as inadequate in relation to the linguistic standard and in both formal and informal ways it has excluded women from public and ritual speech. In other words, the power of linguistic institutions to disadvantage women is sustained by a series

of value judgments based on an ideology of male superiority - which renders a "masculine" image ideal the "human" image ideal.

Taken in this light, we can see why it is not enough for women to change their language to conform to the institutional standard. It is not enough because institutional practice itself is unfair and sustains inequalities and what is not humane. Instead, it is important for women (and men) to change their language to change the institution, and to redress imbalances at the ideological level.

To begin, Cameron suggests that anything that encourages people to reflect on the meaning of linguistic standards and on where these meanings come from contributes to the process of change. The awareness of privilege and of privileged positions can lead to a consideration of other ideas, of other possiblities.

Then in social practice it does make a difference whether we make seemingly small changes, whether we say and write she or he. And it does make a difference which one we write first precisely because "every act reproduces or subverts a social institution" (Cameron, 1987, p. 172) and every act sustains or redresses an imbalance. For the same reason, Cameron continues, it is important for women not to "downgrade" their own talk nor to allow men "to trivialize the talk of women". And, not only that. It is also important for women to attach importance to their talk and to make places "...to privilege it over their interactions with men (as in the case of consciousness-raising)" (Ibid, p. 157).

When Cameron goes on to assert, "We have a choice," within the framework I have set out I interpret that to mean that our rational choice to redress an imbalance and to promote mutual respect in the world is not just an attempt to try harder. It is a choice which opens up real possibilities that are available to us at the psychic level and which are powerful at the ideational and ideological level.

In that choice there is the possibility that the motivating response which seeks to be in harmony and relationship with the world will be revitalized and, in addition, that a fuller sense of self will be established. This is because:

> ...to make a change in the way you speak or write is to assume a certain responsibility for your relationship to the world and for your behaviour, in its way an act of the greatest political importance. "For in my act I have asserted that I can control language; I have stopped acting as if language necessarily controls me" (Pateman, 1980, as cited in Cameron, 1987).

In short, this is how I see the principles of the change process being applied to the practical task of linguistic change. However brief, I hope this makes plainer why such change is both human and humane and how a singular act can take on socio-cultural importance. I now turn to tell what implications I think this would have for parenting, clinical therapy and education.

Implications for Parenting

Chodorow felt that all would be well if fathers began to share in the task of childrearing along with mothers, and of course on equal terms. She felt it promised a way to avoid the loss boys feel when they are separated from the support and nurturance of their mothers and a way out of the idealization of fathers who are absent from the home most of the time and, because of that, are largely unknown. But, I think that this could not of itself solve the problems we experience in growing up and into the society, even if we could by fiat accord all men nurturant skills and could situate all men in the home. For as I have outlined previously, a structural change, whether it be access to an institution or a restructuring of parenting does not, and cannot, guarantee equality and a mutual respect that takes into account differences in age and sex within the household. For this type of relatedness to be assured there must be change at the ideological level.

Of course, what we have said about ideas and ideologies meeting at a particular site of social and material practise applies to parenting. It is important in the practise of everyday mothering that mothers not downgrade their own contributions by building up father-son activities and then trivializing their own in the comparison. It is important that

mothers not be an example to their daughters of how to gain immediate power at the expense of their own selfhood. Then, probably, daughters will not say "Boy have it" with such a sense of triumph. It is important that mothers do this for their sons as well, not only to engender growth within a nurturant and equitable environment but, also, to keep alive for the son the possibility of a selfhood that is whole and wholesome. But, perhaps, more important, to be effective nurturers of a child's sense of relatedness, I think it is important that mothers do not have to do all of this in a vacuum.

It is impossible for the acts of one mother to bring down the power of oppressive socio-political structures which impact the nuclear family through normative practices and economic sanctions, not to mention through social stereotypes. Every act constitutes a restructuring, but every act will not bring down the ideological wall. For a mother to be effective in providing a "living" environment for her children at least as important as her own efforts is the question of whether the father joins her in the task.

By this I do not mean to prescribe shared parenting as a panacea. As I have mentioned, I do not think that this is the remedy her may be physically present with his children and still encourage social stereotypes and a partial selfhood in his children. This is possible even in men who consider themselves to be, and may be, somewhat enlightened. If we go back to the episode where Jeff is practising some regulated household activities and his father, Morgan, is cooking, we can find an example of this. To begin, Jeff set out the terms of the play activity and he objected to cooking because he wanted to be the father and, according to Jeff, fathers don't cook. Recall that we took the dialogue as far as Morgan's collusion with Jeff in this idea. After this, Morgan suggested that Jeff could iron, if he was not going to cook. But this is not where it all ended. When Jeff agreed to this, Morgan immediately changed his mind, asserting that Jeff could not iron after all because daddies don't cook or iron. Jeff ignored or, more likely, did not understnad what his father was getting at and the dialogue ended in the following way.

Jeff goes to the ironing board.
Morgan: No, no, mommies. Daddies don't iron. (Morgan holds the iron to prevent Jeff from ironing.)
Jeff: But...
Morgan: When the mommies are gone, daddies iron?
Jeff: Yeah.
Morgan: Oh. (He releases the iron.) (Fischer & Lazerson, 1984, p. 330).

To begin, though Morgan colluded with Jeff this act did not end up being just a way to avoid conflict with a child. For Morgan used the episode to "teach" Jeff a little about stereotypes and was willing to reinforce this by physically withholding the iron from his son. This advanced his power and control as a father both in the immediate situation and over the long term, at the expense of Jeff's mother. In contrast, mothers' colluding with children in social stereotyping advances their own oppression and so it is easier for fathers to appear "nicer" to their children at the same time that they are gaining power.

Things might have gone differently if Morgan had understood that his son was able to discriminate similarities and differences but that, to Jeff's way of thinking, these differences were not fixed and did not have an oppositional element to them. Lamb (1981) tells us that fathers, much more than mothers, do tend to imagine their sons as they will be, and do tend to relate to their sons with a future perspective in mind, rather than as they are. It may be that fathers, more than mothers, need to learn to set aside an adult perspective on "reality" in order to truly meet the needs of their children. To have moved in Jeff's direction, instead of expecting that Jeff could, or would understand how to think like an adult man, would have enabled Morgan to see Jeff's way of thinking about things as "real" and a valid reflection of "reality". In this case, I think that Morgan would have been able to accord Jeff his own selfhood rather than feeling compelled to push Jeff into a mature way of thinking - the way he would think once he was a "real" person. And, in turn, Morgan's own sense of self might have been nurtured in being able to care for his son in this other way. That Morgan was not able to do this did not depend on whether he was sharing the parenting. It had to do with his own sense of "masculinity" and the image ideal he

identified with himself. However, there is no doubt that a sense of self that is nurturant and full is best sustained in practise, and I think that "fathering" a child can foster this sense of self in a man.

I have noted wider social influences that tend to situate women in the home and men outside it, and reduce the possibility of shared parenting being an option for families. For women I believe that this lack of options reflects a lack of socially sanctioned image ideals. Norming institutions and practices do exert a coercive influence in streaming women into a few professional occupations, more low paying temporary jobs and, most likely of all, into motherhood. The ideology of the private nuclear family does afford many women a sphere of power and influence within the immediate childrearing situation. However, this is not achieved without a trade off of "future considerations". For the ideology of "good enough" mothering leaves the development of a mother's selfhood in relation to her children outside her control. It is a developmental milestone that children negotiate, seemingly with little direct involvement from mothers. Thus, both physical and temporal limitations are placed on a mother's power.

In the case of mothering, of course, the solution may appear simple enough. That is, mothers must take power in situations where they are not accorded enough to advance their own equality in relationships, keeping both present and future considerations in mind. But things are not so simple when we realize that the demand for shared parenting, and for fathers to be on the scene more at home, may diminish a woman's power in the only area where she has been able to exercise it. Horna and Lupri's (1987) study of Canadian fathers' participation in work, family life and leisure indicates that, relative to other childrearing tasks, fathers are willing to take more of a share in game times than in any other childcare activity. It appears that shared parenting involves power sharing - and an equitable power sharing arrangement is not easily achieved. Therefore, it is not surprising that women do not easily give up their power in the home. This is an issue that must be

addressed at the same time that we take up the related issues of male dominance/female subordination and the limited options for women outside the home.

Likewise, it may appear simple enough for men to give up an image ideal based on the notion of male superiority. But it is not simple at all when it is realized that, for men, this means to give up power. This seldom happens without conflict and negotiation in the home. More frequently, a shared parenting arrangement does not mean an end to the ideology buttressing inequities in relationships. As we saw in the dialogue between Morgan and his son Jeff, despite structural modifications in the assignment of parenting tasks, mothers may continue to be defined negatively in relation to fathers.

To negotiate a relationship of equity and balance among all in the family requires commitment on the part of both parents. In the midst of a culture upheld by an ideology of inequality between and within races, classes, sexes and ages parenting partners must actively oppose social stereotypes of the normal female and male form.

Osherson (1986) writes,

> Both sexes today seem to share a stereotype: that men are distant and unconnected, while relationships are the female speciality. Many people believe that women care more than men about love. Yet the division of the sexes into men as rational and women as feelers is simply untrue, a harmful and dangerous myth (p. 11).

We could equally emphasize the reverse: that the myth that women are passive and nonagentic and that these attributes are the preserve of men is harmful. Many people believe that women naturally fulfill their own selfhood through others. But this is false. Women can only achieve a very incomplete selfhood when [illegible] not established on the basis of choices that favour the self, as well as the other.

To actively oppose these stereotypes not only mea[illegible] that they exist and to heighten the awareness of children to stereotyping [illegible] eighbourhood, the school system and the community. It also means that par[illegible]ntically seek to reclaim those aspects of the self that have been lost and to allow corresponding attributes to

emerge in the life of the other parenting partner. It means to encourage children not to take an image ideal and adopt it whole but rather to identify with aspects of that image in a more self-satisfying and self-fulfilling way.

Unfortunately, as is the case with many good things, a sense of self rooted in a relatedness to all of life and a mutual regard for the self and for others, is most easily identified in its absence. Many men, identifying with an image ideal of manhood do not cease from violence against women and children. They are "completely incomplete". And, in their homes children do not have the option of choosing the image ideal of the "proper parent" that will be presented to them. The cycle continues through the generations. Only through intensive, relationally-based therapy can such men come to sense the possiblities that lie untapped at the wellspring of their own beings. And, paradoxically, the option of divorcing such men often does not alleviate the stress and anxiety of women attempting to protect their children. The danger is that in seeking to move institutions and social service practice to provide the help that they require, women may enhance the chances of equitable treatment for their children, while advancing their own sense of alienation within the system. This alienation may be experienced as a violation of self-in-relation. And, then the stage is set for situational stressors to trigger violent episodes. The incidence of mothers battering their children is not decreasing.

Implications for Clinical Therapy

There are several principles that undergird my own definition of mental health that I reiterate here. First, I think that there is a "third force" emerging out of our early psychic reality which holds the promise of a continuing sense of the unitary self - a sense of self which can incorporate conflicts, contradictions and differences without these being opposed or being accorded unequal value. Second, I think that, out of this, there is the potential for the motivating response of the person to be expressed as a moral response that

enables the person to be positioned in relationship to others, and to the world, in a way that maintains a balance and an equality between and among various positions. And third, the self-motivated choice of the individual to maintain a position of integration with the whole world is a continuation of self-in-relationship, and the "I" is established in that choice.

Given this, at the psychic level mental health is the affirmation of, and balance among, all aspects of the self including the masculine and the feminine, the passive and the active and the assertive and the dependent. At the social level, mental health is a sense of continuity across time, of connection to nature and of relatedness to all forms of life - a relatedness which seeks the welfare of the other as much as of the self.

It is the entrance into culture that requires a renegotiation of psychic life and socio-cultural reality so that this sense of relationship can be extended and developed through adulthood without the suppression or loss of any aspect of the self. In the transition, a loss can take place at many levels and with reference to many aspects of reality. To suggest that for children or women or men that a loss is more likely to occur in one area than in another is, of course, to overgeneralize. But because the image ideals of the culture tend to promote stereotypic oppositions in gender-based roles, we can say that cultural ideologies suggest that females suppress certain psychic possibilities and that males suppress other ones. In what follows I am speaking to those ideologies and in general terms.

In therapy, anything that exposes oppressive ideologies for the "dangerous myths" that they are is a beginning. Anything that encourages women and men to resist stereotypes which suppress an aspect of the self is important. An equivalent therapy for women and men, therefore, will not be the same therapy for both sexes. Sturdivant (1980) suggests that an effective therapy for women will centre on actualizing the possibilities for agency, for directing emotional care towards the self and for self-determination. Osherson (1986) suggests that an effective therapy for men will centre on what is akin to "good enough" fathering, on the ability to nurture the self through others and on living with pain as a humanizing experience.

Of course, for psychic ideation to make an impact it must find a match at the social level. Sturdivant (1980) observes that social and economic regulatory practices and institutions have severely limited the options of women, and mothers have come to believe that they have "no choice". McKeachie (1976) points out that "...if I assume that I have no choice, I do not attempt to exercise the choices I have, and I do not strive to increase the arena of choice" (p. 830, as cited in Sturdivant, 1980, p. 97). Therapy for women, therefore, must focus on changing this set of internalized beliefs to match changing circumstances. This establishes autonomy and self-determination as valuable goals for mothers. And in the choice the "I" is established.

As well in women-centred therapy "...it is assumed that [mothers]... cannot fully actualize their potential for emotional experiencing and expression if they curtail the range of feelings they allow themselves" (Ibid, p. 98). Therefore, such therapy seeks to allow mothers to experience anger and to find effective ways to express it. It also encourages women to direct both their sexual and emotional energies towards themselves and their own interests, as well as toward another.

I think that it is particularly within the context of a feminist therapeutic relationship that the prototype for equality in relationships is developed. Among the guiding principles of feminist therapy is the notion that confrontation of the therapist's views is acceptable and that the therapist ought not make decisions for the client. In addition, "[F]eminism asserts that no person should have noncontractual dominion over another; it thus encourages egalitarian relationships between people, whether they be husband/wife, parent/child, friends, or lovers (Sturdivant, 1980, p. 6). And where interpersonal, cultural and socio-economic factors do close options to a mother and eliminate the possibility of choice, feminist therapy uniquely advocates political awareness and social action.

As a counterpart, I think that Osherson (1986) offers insightful comment about what an effective therapy for fathers could entail. Osherson suggests that a son's relationship to his father often comes to "stand in" for the costs of identifying with the

masculine image ideal. He writes, "Few pains in life are as intense as the recognition that you want to befriend someone and there's only one way to do it: Give yourself up" (p. 58). That aspect of the self that must be offered up is feminine. He continues:

> When emotional holding and caring is a feminine task and masculinity is activity and conquest, the male child is put in a precarious position in having to identify with that image of masculinity. We accomplish the "developmental task" of identifying with our fathers by murdering the feminine within ourselves" (Ibid, p. 124).

Osherson goes on to say that, when a grown son later turns to the task of developing his own identity as a father, often he only has the memories of his own father to draw on. Cultural values and a masculine image ideal prevent many sons from reviving a sense of closeness to the feminine aspects of life.

Given this context, Osherson suggests that one therapeutic task ought to focus on "detoxifying" the son's image of the father. Osherson observes that for many men working things out with the father might simply involve listening to him talk about his interests or about the things that are important to him. Recognition and acceptance of the father's values and attitudes would leave a son free to identify with his father in a less complete way. This would allow the son to develop other possibilities in his own identity as a father.

Other practical suggestions focus on reclaiming a nurturant aspect within the self. Osherson emphasizes the need for tactile contact between fathers and children. And he suggests that, even from the time the mother is pregnant, fathers ought to imagine what it would be like to hold and carry the child. Seeing the grandfather with his child also may help the new father to identify both with caring for and being cared for in a relationship.

These intervention strategies move both mothers and fathers away from their respective image ideals towards a fuller sense of self. But along the way, there is a potential for conflict that may be resolved best within the therapeutic setting. To begin to understand that an aspect of the self has been violated and suppressed can lead to feelings

of rage and vulnerability. Osherson says he has noticed that many men carry with them the feeling that they secretly are destructive or violent. I think that this applies equally to women. And when social censorship is directed to moving women and men back to their respective norms and images, that pent up rage and vulnerability can be directed outward, sometimes at the normative institutions of society but usually at the more accessible parenting partner. Talking with the other parent in a supportive therapeutic environment can help. As Osherson (1986) puts it, "Otherwise it is difficult to be present emotionally if you are secretly frightened that there is a demon inside trying to get out" (p. 124).

There are difficulties enough to surmount when there is a concern to change and to initiate change. But what of the situation where there is none. If the changes that are sought are humane in intent, then how is the impetus for change generated.

Many people think that "an education" is the answer.

Implications for Education

Earlier I tried to show that the oppositions that are introduced within the context of our formal schooling are not innate. Rather, they are, and must be, etched onto the conceptual apparatus of our minds. Therefore, we might suppose that withholding a formal indoctrination into this scheme of opposed pairings until Grade 8, for example, would solve any difficulty. Young children would no longer learn to parrot back "boy" when given the cue word "girl", or "woman" given the cue word "man". At progressive levels of difficulty teachers would instead actively affirm sexual continuity beyond sameness, a concept based on the latest biological research. And, later, the concept of opposed pairings would be introduced together with instruction on the arbitrary nature of such definitions. The question, of course, is whether restructuring curriculum content in this way would produce the desired effect both at the ideational level and at the ideological level.

To explore, and to consider the adequacy of, this possibility taken on its own I turn to the work of Jane Roland Martin (1985). In the following discussion I draw mainly on her thought.

Martin observes that the "ideal" of a liberal education involves a formal component and also a less widely acknowledged, or sometimes unacknowledged, informal component. It is for unstated and unacknowledged reasons that becoming educated means entering into a particular image ideal. That image ideal is "the educated man". And, therefore, Martin says that to become educated does not only involve the acquisition of knowledge and skills. She notes that along the way to becoming the "educated man", the learner has:

> ...acquired conceptual schemes to raise his knowledge beyond the level of a collection of disjointed facts and to enable him to understand the reason for things; moreover, the knowledge he acquired is not inert, but characterizes the way he looks at the world and involves the kind of commitment to the standards of evidence and canons of proof of the various disciplines that comes from "getting on the inside of a form of thought and awareness" (p.188)

In the process, what is gained is food for thought and for ideas; it is the world of rationality, purified and objectified by its very disconnection from feeling, emotion, intimacy, connection and the body. Martin argues that the educated man, therefore, will assume that these latter qualities are related to the home, the private realm and the reproductive processes of society, and that they have nothing to do with, and cannot speak to, the productive relations and academic processes involved in a liberal education.

Yet, all productive social processes, including education, are contingent upon reproductive processes. Productive activities would quickly lose all sense of continuity, of creativity, of a reason to be, without reproductive processes relating to nurturance and care, the bearing and rearing of children and to family living. Martin observes that, throughout history, "...no matter what sort of education ...philosophers were claiming for women, they could not ignore the reproductive processes of society and their associated traits,

tasks, functions, and institutions" (p.178). And I would go on from there to say that, no matter what sort of education was being claimed for men, they could not make the claim without taking reproductive processes for granted.

Taking these for granted, of course, is not without its cost. For the transmission of values and beliefs, of feelings and emotions is posed against educational goals by definition only. So that when, by definition, productive processes and what is associated with men are more "educational" than what is associated with women we can understand this as another analogy for loss.

Entering into a liberal education is an opening of the door to the other side of the divide separating the public and the private, the masculine and the feminine, mind and body, rational and emotional. Thus, Martin suggests that this entering in is often a "narrative of loss". And, she tells how Richard Rodriguez discovered that becoming educated involved silence and thoughtful contemplation of "big ideas" and how, at the expense of outward connection, he gained a sense of inner harmony. But then, once disconnected from bodily exercise, Martin notes that Rodriguez began to be "...worried that his education was making him effeminate" (p. 196).

That Rodriguez lost an aspect of the self associated with his Spanish heritage, familial ties and the intimacy of his home illustrates how a liberal education is, itself, opposed to underlying psychic reality. Thus, it ought not to surprise that Martin claims neither the "educated man" nor the "educated woman" need to be tolerant, generous or moral according to the terms set out in the present work. She writes:

> ...there is no place...for education of the body, and since most action involves bodily movement, this means there is little room in it for education of action. Nor is there room for education of other-regarding feelings and emotions. The liberally educated man or woman will be provided with knowledge about others but will not be taught to care about their welfare or to act kindly toward them. That person will be given some understanding of society, but will not be taught to feel its injustices or even to be concerned over its fate. The liberally educated person will be an ivory-tower person - or a technical person - one who likes to solve real problems but does not care about the solutions' consequences for real people and for the earth itself (1985, p. 190)

We might consider, in passing, what the smartest babies on the block do when they grow up. But what is really at issue here is whether "an education" can change inequalities and culturally defined oppositions.

What Martin is saying (and I concur) is that "an education" itself is opposed to what is humane, and the fact that a liberal education sustains inequalities is not just a matter of curriculum content. Because the system itself sustains inequalities, changes within that system can be a partial solution at best. It is not good enough that women, as well as men, enter into "an education". Nor is it good enough to do away with what we have. It must all be transformed. But how?

Martin sets out some general principles to direct the task of reshaping "an education". And to begin, she observes that men (and women) must be educated into the need for a formal education in reproductive qualities such as nurturance and relatedness. And, because the assumptions which undergird present educational processes and goals are unstated and informal, again, we are speaking to cultural ideology.

What this means is that, when sexual differences are placed in opposition at the ideational level, any thing that raises conscious awareness of the social and educational outcomes is important. According to Martin, within the educational context "...we must constantly be aware of the workings of sex and gender because in this historical and cultural moment, paradoxically they sometimes make a big difference even if they sometimes make no difference at all" (p. 195).

Then it is important to point out that, because some ideas "get out there" through curriculum content, other ideas must necessarily be stopped from getting out and how, taken together, this adds up to the implicit denigration of what is associated with reproductive processes and with women. On this basis, Martin argues that women's studies courses ought to be a part of the curriculum at every level of the school system. But, yet again, stopping at that is not enough.

It is necessary to change the ideological base which supports the education, the ritual practice, and the social institution. And, an essential step is to establish overall educational goals based on reproductive qualities and processes in the same way that a broad framework for eductional practise is now derived from productive processes. Martin writes:

> In making nurturance, caring, concern, and connection goals of education, we must beware of replicating within the curriculum the split between the productive and reproductive processes of society. If education links nurturing capacities and the 3Cs only to subjects such as home economics that arise out of the reproductive processes, we will lose sight of the general moral, social, and political significance of these traits. So long as rationality and autonomous judgment are linked exclusively with the productive processes of society, the reproductive ones will be devalued. Thus, we must find ways of incorporating [these]...virtues into our science, math, history, literature, and auto mechanics courses, even as we emphasize theoretical knowledge and the development of reason in the teaching of nutrition or family living" (p. 198).

What Martin envisions is no less than the development of a new ideology which will transform and integrate dichotomous oppositions and undergird a new educational ideal. So that "an education" refers to a new emancipatory ideal: where the image ideal of the "educated human being" refers to balance and harmony both within and between people.

At that point an education could reflect and foster the possibilities within human lives that could yield new possibilities for a humane relationship with all aspects of our world. Then we could hope to leave a better world for our children to enter.

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