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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE ALBERTA PROVINCIAL POLICE, 1917-1932

BY



SEAN INNES MOIR

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER
OF ARTS.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1992



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
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
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
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
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To Mom and Dad, Alison and Bill, with thanks.

ABSTRACT

The Alberta Provincial Police was created by the provincial government in 1917 following the Royal North-West Mounted Police's unilateral announcement that they were cancelling their recently signed provincial policing contracts with the western provinces. The Mounties' decision was the result of the implementation of the 1916 Alberta Liquor Act and similar pending prohibitory liquor legislation in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. While it was clearly not the fault of the APP that these events occurred, the provincial force was held responsible and faced unrelenting criticism for the first several years of their existence. Suffering from poor organization and a shortage of resources, the force seemed unable during the period 1917-1919 to boost public confidence in its abilities. Continued criticism for its role in the enforcement of Alberta's unpopular liquor laws and involvement in a number of labour disputes only aggravated this situation.

The reorganization of the senior administration in 1919, the appointment of Commissioner W.C. Bryan in 1922, a man with a great deal of experience and devotion to modern policing techniques, as well as the repeal of prohibition in 1924 resulted in a shift in public opinion favouring the force. Although Bryan faced a perennial shortage of financial resources, he struggled to implement new technologies and investigative and training techniques so as to improve the level of service to the public. Budgetary restrictions limited the extent of some of their achievements, but through hard

work the APP established an enviable conviction rate gaining the respect and support of Albertans and its North American peers.

The APP's increased efficiency and post-prohibition popularity counted for little in the face of the harsh economic realities of the early 1930s. Ironically, as was the case when the force was created in 1917, the province had little choice but to acquiesce, accept Ottawa's offer and disband its provincial police force in 1931-1932. Several major trends impacted on Alberta's decision; the RCMP's desire to expand, pressure from the Bennett government to relinquish this responsibility and growing support favouring the centralization and expansion of government services, including law enforcement, all in the name of efficiency.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALCBAlberta Liquor Control Board
APPAlberta Provincial Police
ASHAlberta Scrapbook Hansard
BCPPBritish Columbia Provincial Police
CIBCriminal Investigation Branch
CPRCanadian Pacific Railway
DAGDepartment of the Attorney General
FBIFederal Bureau of Investigation
GAIGlenbow Alberta Institute
GWVAGreat War Veteran's Association
HSSHistoric Sites Service
IWWIndustrial Workers of the World
MLAMember of the Legislative Assembly
NACNational Archives of Canada
NWMPNorth-West Mounted Police
OBUOne Big Union
OPPOntario Provincial Police
PAAProvincial Archives of Alberta
PMAProvincial Museum of Alberta
RCMPRoyal Canadian Mounted Police

RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
RNWMP	Royal North-West Mounted Police
SPP	Saskatchewan Provincial Police
UMWA	United Mine Workers of America
UNB	University of New Brunswick
WCTU	Women's Christian Temperance Organization

Chapter 1

'The Changing of the Guard': The Cancellation of the Federal Policing Contracts with the Prairie Provinces in 1916

Royal North-West Mounted Police Commissioner A. Bowen-Perry (Commissioner, 1900-1923) advised the federal government in a June 20th, 1916 police memorandum that the Royal North-West Mounted Police's law enforcement contracts with the prairie provinces should be 'temporarily' suspended for the duration of the war.¹ An October 11, 1916 letter from the Commissioner to Prime Minister Robert Borden indicates that Perry reiterated his June 20th recommendations in a July 15, 1916 report intended for the Prime Minister. Perry expressed concern that the steady decline in the number of policemen and Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) troops in Western Canada was unnecessarily exposing Canada to national security risks, and hindering the police's performance. Much of Perry's concern stemmed from the fact that the Mounties were assigned extra security related duties in addition to their regular responsibilities when war broke out in August 1914, but were given no extra resources to help them manage their new mandate.²

These new duties, which dealt with the control and monitoring of "enemy" populations residing in Canada and tighter surveillance along the border with the United States included; the registration of all individuals of "enemy" origin who were not citizens, guarding "enemy alien" prisoners and investigating complaints made either against or by Canada's "enemy alien" population. The Mounted Police shared these responsibilities with the Ottawa based Dominion Police

and the military. The Mounties were also responsible for patrolling the Canada-U.S. border from the Lake-of-the-Woods, Ontario, to the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains. In addition, the force established a special squadron of 150 men, headquartered at Regina, to be used in the event of riots or insurrections.³ According to S.W. Horrall, this was the Mounties' initiation into the world of secret agents and espionage. With the assumption of these duties the Royal North-West Mounted Police (RNWMP) became an integral part of an intelligence system, organized by the Dominion Police for the purpose of ensuring the nation's security.⁴ In reference to his July 15, 1916 correspondence with the Comptroller, Perry argued in an October 11 letter to the Prime Minister that a change in the mandate of the Mounted Police was necessary under the prevailing circumstances. This change was required to ensure that the nation's security was not breached as a result of the force not being able to fulfil all of its commitments. Perry was particularly concerned about German sympathizers based in the United States committing acts of sabotage in major Canadian population centres or aimed at transportation routes and communication links. He was fearful that this may encourage the "enemy" populations to rise up against the authorities, resulting in widespread insurrection and rioting.⁵ The Commissioner added that by relinquishing what he considered many of force's "minor" and "unimportant" duties, the police would be able to concentrate on their special wartime duties, and could guarantee both the peaceful behaviour of the "enemy aliens" and Canada's security needs for the duration of the war.⁶

Having spent the autumn of 1916 working out the details of the abrogation of the contracts with prairie premiers, Commissioner Perry reported to Borden on November 7th that Saskatchewan was agreeable to the 'temporary' change in provincial policing. The Alberta government, however, was uncertain of the future of policing in that province.⁷ Anxious for an answer, Borden sent Alberta Premier, Arthur Sifton, a persuasive telegram on November 25th. Sifton responded on the 27th, agreeing to the cancellation, but warned that any future "re-employment of the force in Alberta was unlikely."⁸ Ottawa passed the necessary orders-in-council on November 29th, 1916, cancelling the RNWMP contracts with the prairie provinces.⁹ It was agreed that both services and payments would cease as of midnight, December 31st, 1916.¹⁰

Perry's request for a 'temporary' release from provincial policing responsibilities brings to the fore a number of important questions. Having expressed concern regarding the behaviour of the enemy aliens, border security and the availability of 'qualified' recruits at different times since the onset of war, why did the Commissioner wait until the summer 1916 to take action? One must ask whether the Mounties' withdrawal from provincial policing and the introduction of prohibition in Alberta was coincidence or whether it this was by design? Second, if the Mounties' manpower situation was as desperate as Commissioner Perry stated it was during the autumn of 1916, why did the federal government and the Commissioner agree to a request from Alberta for additional time to organize its new provincial force? Lastly, if the cancellation of the

contracts in 1916 was intended to be a temporary measure, why did the Mounties wait until 1926, by which time prohibition had been repealed throughout the west, before initiating negotiations to regain control of their previous policing duties and historic jurisdiction in Western Canada? By examining the Commissioner's reasons for the cancellation of the contracts, his actions and statements throughout the war, the police's historical involvement with prohibition, and the force's subsequent aversion to this type of controversial legislation, it will become evident that the introduction of prohibition had a significant impact on Perry's decision to ask for a cancellation of the contracts. To do this, it is necessary first to investigate the validity of the Commissioner's concerns regarding Canada's wartime security needs. This includes determining if Canada's "enemy aliens" could be trusted, or if they presented a serious threat to Canada's national security; if the Mounted Police really faced a manpower shortage throughout the war, and; if Canada was ever seriously threatened by wide scale insurrection and sabotage attacks carried out by German sympathizers based in the United States. This is followed by an examination of the Mounties' lengthy and sometimes controversial involvement with liquor legislation during Territorial prohibition. Third, the behaviour and attitudes of the police leading up to the First World War, and throughout the 1920s and early 1930s bears consideration. This investigation will show that there was a great deal of resistance within the ranks of the Mounted Police regarding any involvement by the force with controversial liquor legislation. The Mounties had learned that this type of duty would only result in

the tarnishing of the force's public image. Contrary to what most contemporary political figures, former Mounted and provincial policemen and authors have stated, this had a significant impact on Commissioner Perry's decision to request a 'temporary' cancellation of the federal policing agreements with the prairie provinces in 1916-1917.¹¹

According to the 1911 census, roughly 175,000 immigrants from enemy countries resided in Alberta and Saskatchewan.¹² Howard Palmer, author of Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta, estimates that of the 175,000 "enemy aliens" living on the prairies, 37,000 unnaturalized citizens, originally from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, resided in Alberta.¹³ With the outbreak of World War I, the Canadian government faced the task of determining if these people could be trusted and counted on as loyal citizens during the nation's hour of need. Anglo-Canadian patriotism and nativism, which had been building since 1896 when large numbers of European immigrants began arriving in Canada, escalated dramatically with the declaration of war in August, 1914. Palmer argues that "the advent of World War I precipitated the most strenuous nationalism and the most pervasive nativism in Alberta's history."¹⁴

These "enemy aliens", as all immigrants from "enemy" countries were called, became the objects of persecution and hostility and the fires of Anglo-conformity were stoked to demand unswerving loyalty and an end to "hyphenated Canadianism".¹⁵

The pressure on immigrants to conform to Anglo-Canadian norms, proving their allegiance to their new country, was intense and remained so throughout the first half of the century.

The combination of Anglo fears and thinly veiled support for the "enemy" by a relatively small number of native born Germans and Austrians, created a great deal of tension for authorities, but as a whole, the "enemy alien" population caused little trouble for the police. Perry had expressed concern regarding the safety of all segments of the population since the beginning of the war, but the first time that he suggested that the potential for trouble existed within the "enemy alien" community, was July, 1916. Coincidentally, this was about the same time the Alberta government introduced their 1916 Liquor Act.

The progress of the war is eagerly but quietly discussed among themselves. They are confident of ultimate victory and are not depressed by reverses as they do not believe our press but rely on papers from the United States (printed in their own language) for 'accurate' information.¹⁶

In the same letter to the Comptroller, Perry suggested that, "Given the right incentive, they might throw all precautions aside and venture the most daring attempts. Such incentive would likely come from the United States."¹⁷ Simultaneously, however, the Commissioner added that despite the worst fears of many Anglo-Canadian citizens these people "have the wish, but not the power to do us harm".¹⁸ Logistically speaking, a successful uprising

orchestrated by the "enemy aliens" would have been extremely difficult. Almost all of their weapons had been confiscated, they were required to report regularly to the police, military or various other government officials, their movements were constantly monitored by the civil and military authorities, and many of them who had settled in western Canada resided in remote settlements, far from major transportation and communication links and population centres. All of these factors made it virtually impossible for them to inflict serious damage upon the country's wartime infrastructure.

While some members of the "enemy alien" population openly sympathized with Germany and Austria, few were willing to risk internment and deportation by participating in seditious or treasonous activities. Perry acknowledged in his 1915 report that the vast majority of the rumours pertaining to the "enemy alien" population were baseless, and those found guilty were dealt with quickly.¹⁹ This was reiterated by the police administration, which noted in its "1916-17 Estimates", compiled during the fall of 1915, that,

During the last 14 months the Police have had very little difficulty with the alien population, and have been unable to discover any organization having for its object the disturbing of the peace and good of the provinces.²⁰

The Commissioner reiterated his convictions regarding the peaceful nature of the "enemy aliens" in a letter to the Comptroller, on July

15, 1916. "There has been no agitation nor has there been any attempt to organize for the purpose of disturbing public security."²¹

Arrest statistics clearly indicate that the amount of trouble the police encountered was minimal. In 1915, the Mounties conducted 2,309 investigations of enemy aliens in Alberta and Saskatchewan, approximately fourteen percent of all cases entered that year, interning 396, paroling 326, and seizing 350 weapons. The remaining 1,587 individuals were released with warnings to abide strictly by the laws of the land.²² It is important to remember that while fourteen percent sounds like a very high number, the definition of an investigation is broad; it could range from casual questioning of individuals about their behaviour, or that of their neighbours to an indepth investigation and trial of someone suspected of seditious activities. Given the fact that the police regularly commented in their reports that the enemy alien population was of little trouble and that most complaints about them were unfounded, one would be safe to suggest that many of the investigations performed by the police were neither intensive, nor time consuming. Perry speculated in his 1915 annual report that there had been so few cases of "enemy alien" wrong doing because, "They own their farms, have large interests, and have no intention of imperiling their property and their own security and safety."²³ The number of investigations in 1916 decreased slightly from the previous year to 2,288, and the number of people interned and paroled dropped sharply from 396 to 162, and 326 to 171, respectively. There is no mention of the number of firearms confiscated in 1916.²⁴ The number of enemy alien

investigations performed by the police in 1916 represents sixteen percent of all cases entered into by the police for that year; an increase of two percent from the previous year. This two percent increase is the result of an overall decline in both the manpower of the police from 924 men in 1915 to 797 in 1916 and the number of investigations performed by the force. Perry's reports hardly mention the "enemy" population situation in 1917 and 1918, and give no indication as to how many cases were handled by the police,²⁵ leading one to believe that the number was minimal. It was common practice for the Commissioner to discontinue the inclusion of information and topics in the annual reports that were no longer of significance to the police despite the fact that these topics may have been forefront in the minds of the general public and press, as was clearly the case with the enemy alien situation during 1917-1918. Instead, he turned his attention, in his 1917 report, to the 1916 restructuring of the force and the rise of the radical union organization, the Industrial Workers of the World.²⁶ In 1918, he focused on the government's decision to permit a unit of the force to join the CEF for overseas duty.²⁷ This is further evidence supporting the argument that despite Perry's public statements concerning Canada's "enemy alien" population in 1916, the police were never overly concerned about the possibility of trouble.²⁸

Much of the controversy surrounding the "enemy aliens" stems from the fact that neither Canada's population nor the RNWMP, both predominantly Anglo-Saxon, understood who these people were. A large percentage of the 175,000 "Germans" and "Austrians" who

settled on the prairies were not of German or Austrian descent; rather, many of them were of Ukrainian heritage. The majority of Canada's Ukrainian population emigrated from the Ukrainian province of Galicia. With the onset of hostilities, however, most of these people were suddenly suspected of being German and Austrian sympathizers because they had been residents of either the German or Austro-Hungarian empires.²⁹ Few Anglo Canadians realized that many of these people "had come to Canada to escape military service demanded by Austrian imperial authorities",³⁰ and to start new lives, free of foreign domination. Joseph A. Boudreau, in "Western Canada's 'Enemy Aliens' in World War One", notes that only 15,000 of the roughly 100,000 German-speaking immigrants who settled in Canada by the beginning of the war were born in Germany. Most immigrants who declared German as their mother tongue had immigrated to Canada from Russia, the United States and Romania.³¹ Boudreau cites German sociologist Heinz Lehmann, who suggests that upwards of forty-five percent of the German population living on the prairies emigrated from Russia, while only twelve percent originated from Germany.³² Ironically, prior to the war, Germans, were considered among the most desirable immigrants by the federal government. The Anglo-Saxon community argued that unlike their southern and eastern European 'cousins', those of Germanic and Nordic descent were industrious and clean, and most likely to adopt Anglo-Canadian customs, thereby avoiding the mongrelization of the nation, as most believed was the case in the United States. All of this proved to be of little consequence with the outbreak of hostilities.

Wartime propaganda dramatized the image of Germans as barbarous "Huns", and the frustration, deprivation, and bitterness which the wartime experience engendered found a convenient scapegoat in the "enemy alien." The Germans who formerly had been counted among Western Canada's most desirable citizens, now became the most undesirable.³³

Suspicion, initially aimed at Germans and Austrians, quickly spread to all immigrant groups, even those who had proclaimed their loyalty to Canada and their hatred of the German and Austrian empires.³⁴

With the commencement of the war in August, 1914, Commissioner Perry denied requests for discharges to all members except military reservists³⁵ and wired the Comptroller on August 6, two days after the declaration of war, requesting an increase in manpower in order to cope with the apparent security threat posed by the presence of such a large "enemy" population within Canada.

Owing to large foreign population in Western Canada whose native countries are now at war with Great Britain, I am of the opinion that this force ought to be increased to 1,500 [from 1,000] men at once. If authorized, would call on all ex-members of the force to rejoin for one year who are physically fit and not over 45 years of age and whose discharge was not because of moral turpitude.³⁶

Perry received authorization from the government to proceed, but the increase in manpower was limited to 1,200 men.³⁷ The initial concern was how the "enemy aliens" and the rest of the population would react towards one another.

Antagonism between races often grows acute during a great war, and it was felt that an increase of the force was necessary to impress upon all races that good order would be preserved, and that our enemy aliens who quietly pursued their ordinary vocations and observed strictly their obligations as residents of this country, would receive adequate protection.³⁸

The police quickly recruited 500 'qualified' men for a special, one year engagement, increasing manpower from about 750 to just over 1,250 officers and men.³⁹ The apparent discrepancy in manpower between the 1,000 men cited by Perry in his August 6th communication and that noted above at 750 men in the annual report can be explained by a reduction in force strength between the time of his wire at the beginning of August and the time that the 1914 annual report was submitted. Most of the 500 men recruited during August and September 1914 were British, and joined the Mounted Police for one of three reasons: they could not secure passage overseas to join the British forces; the CEF could not initially accommodate the large number of enthusiastic volunteers, or they anticipated the RNWMP would send a unit overseas as they had in 1900, during the Boer War in South Africa.⁴⁰

By February, 1915, just six months after the beginning of the war, Perry was discussing a reduction of police manpower with government officials; a complete reversal of the policy the force had adopted in August, 1914. This reversal was owing to the,

... peaceable demeanour of the alien enemies and the presence of large bodies of troops in training in the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, it was not

necessary to keep the Force up to its strength of 1,200...⁴¹

They concluded that it would not result in a breach of security if they permitted a maximum of 300 officers, with less than three months to serve to conclude their engagements, to purchase their discharges for the purpose of joining the CEF.⁴² Not all of the men given the opportunity accepted the offer as a number of them re-engaged and others went on to other careers. Approximately 300 of the 500 men who joined the Mounties during August and September, 1914, for a one-year term, declined to re-engage upon the completion of their term when it became apparent the government was not going to allow the force to organize a unit for overseas service.⁴³ Despite the fact that most young men of British extraction initially expressed a great deal of enthusiasm for the war effort, the police still managed to enlist or re-enlist roughly 200 recruits over the twelve-month period ending September 30th, 1915, bringing RNWMP manpower a little more than 900.⁴⁴ Based on monthly CEF recruiting levels for 1915, Perry expected to lose more than 400 men between May and December, 1916.⁴⁵ Although 150 members took their discharges by September, 1916, the Mounties recruited 140 new men, over the same period, leaving the overall strength at roughly 800 officers.⁴⁶ The decline in manpower of about 100 men from a year earlier is accounted for by dismissals, retirements and desertions. An additional fifty recruits were taken on over the course of the next twelve months; these numbers increased dramatically the following year, 1918, as the force recruited an additional 800 men. The Mounties finally received

permission to send a contingent of men overseas in 1918 and most of those taken on that year were destined for service in either Western Europe or Russia. The number of officers remaining in Canada, however, dropped to less than 500 men during the later half of 1918.⁴⁷ While the force steadily declined in size throughout the war, leading one to accept Perry's argument that 'qualified' recruits were difficult to obtain, it is to be remembered that it was the Commissioner who proposed a gradual reduction in police manpower at the beginning of October 1915 due to the peaceful nature of the "enemy aliens". At the time Perry suggested that an increase in the size of the force to full wartime strength should only occur in the event of widespread domestic internal trouble.⁴⁸ In keeping with this policy, the number of officers serving in Canada was slowly reduced falling well below pre-war levels by 1918.⁴⁹

Beyond the stated policy which purposely reduced manpower to pre-war levels, recruiting was also affected by a struggling economy for the first two years of the war, and the decision on the part of Commissioner Perry not to advertise for recruits so as not to infringe upon the needs of the CEF. When the war began in August, 1914, the Canadian economy was in the midst of a serious recession. The West was particularly hard hit, feeling the effects of crop failures, weak grain prices, and a serious real estate crash brought on by several years of intense speculative activity in the western Canadian property markets. While crops and grain prices improved over the course of the war, the building industry in the West remained flat as money flowed east to be invested in armament

production.⁵⁰ The net result was an ample supply of recruits, mostly farmers and tradesmen. Many of these men were British immigrants who had fallen on hard times and were eager to serve their country and the Empire.⁵¹ The government encouraged farmers to join the Mounties throughout 1914, by guaranteeing the protection of their land from creditors and squatters for the duration of their engagement.⁵²

The Commissioner stated in the force's 1916 report that the Mounties had refrained from actively recruiting men for two reasons: Perry did not think it appropriate to compete for able bodied men with the CEF,⁵³ and there was overwhelming public support for the CEF.

... the public are so much concerned in the war, that they would view with a great deal of opposition, any attempt to recruit for this Force which might interfere with the success of recruiting of the army.⁵⁴

Due to the peaceful behaviour of the "enemy aliens", the general public was convinced there was little or no need for the Mounted Police to continue their operations in Canada. Aware of the fact that their continued, highly visible presence was only serving to provoke criticism of the force's members for failing to volunteer for overseas duty,⁵⁵ Commissioner Perry decided that a low-key approach to recruiting was the best strategy for the duration of war.⁵⁶ As it turned out, avoiding this kind of confrontation proved to be the prudent approach for the first eighteen months of the war,

when public enthusiasm for the great cause was at its peak and recruits for the CEF were plentiful. Interestingly enough, however, by the time that Perry began lobbying for the cancellation of the policing contracts, claiming that there was not enough qualified men to serve on the force, volunteer enlistments for the CEF began dropping dramatically. The CEF monthly recruitment levels fell in four months from a high of 34,913 volunteers in March 1916,⁵⁷ to a mere 8,389 in July, 5,279 in December, and fewer than 5,000 per month by April 1917.⁵⁸ By autumn 1917, the government had little choice but to introduce conscription. The decline in the number of CEF volunteers can be attributed to several factors: most of those enlisting during the first two years were British, or of British extraction. Naturally, they felt a stronger emotional attachment to the motherland than those of other ethnic backgrounds. Second, the economy in Canada, which had been in recession since 1913, had improved greatly by 1915-1916; this included everything from high prices for commodities such as grain to the well paying jobs in Central and Eastern Canadian factories which were producing armaments and supplies for the war effort. The decline in the number of volunteers for the CEF, however, must also be attributed to a decline in public enthusiasm for the war effort among those who were of age to serve, despite the fact that English speaking Canadians voted largely in favour of conscription and that war bonds continued to sell briskly. Most people were of the opinion that the war would only last several months, not four and half years and cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. No one envisioned the horrendous conditions, daily grind and death, destruction and

mutilation that the war would bring upon so many. By 1916, these stories began filtering back across the Atlantic, dampening enthusiasm for the war effort, especially among those who were of age to serve. Therefore, this shift in public opinion regarding the war, suggests that the low-profile recruiting policy instituted by the police may not have been necessary by mid-late 1916.

Having decided that it was inappropriate for the Mounties to compete with the CEF for the best available men, Perry looked to alternatives to help fill the ranks of the RNWMP. He admitted this would result in a considerable reduction in the force's recruitment standards, but felt this move was necessary to ensure that adequate manpower levels were maintained. Perry approached the Hospital Commissions Board in July, 1916 to "see what could be done with the view of coping with the wastage";⁵⁹ that is, soldiers no longer capable of fighting due to injuries, yet healthy enough to serve as peace officers. The following month he considered engaging ex-members over the age of forty, despite the fact police regulations clearly stipulated that recruitment candidates had to be between the ages of eighteen and forty.⁶⁰ In August 1917, the federal government permitted Commissioner Perry to hire as many men as he required, but requested that recruiting be restricted to the four western provinces, where public approval of the police was higher.⁶¹ The Mounties waited till autumn, and then proceeded with a very low-key campaign, hoping to recruit some of the men recently employed during the grain harvest.⁶² Facing keener competition for able bodied men with the implementation of conscription in the fall

of 1917, Perry worked out an arrangement with the military whereby the police would be allowed to hire as many 1-B or 1-C classified men as required. These individuals were classified as such by the military because they were unable to fight, but were qualified to serve as behind-the-lines support personnel or in the home guard, respectively.⁶³ In exchange, the police were required to discharge those 1-A classified members, a significant percentage of the force according to Perry, who expressed a desire to join the CEF.⁶⁴ The fact that there were a significant number of 1-A classified men serving on the force further undermines Commissioner Perry's claim that by 1916 the police were having difficulty finding "qualified" recruits to fill the ranks of the force.

Mounted Police recruiting standards had changed constantly since the inception of the force. These changes were due to an evolving perception of life on the Western frontier, political patronage and economic conditions. According to R.C. Macleod, author of The North-West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905, the preferred candidate was a strong, young, Canadian farm boy, who joined the force on his own accord.⁶⁵ Recruiting officers liked these individuals because they knew how to care for horses, were accustomed to rural life, held no romantic notions of living on the frontier and as a result, were less apt to desert.⁶⁶ Macleod points out, however, that since the inception of the force, there were never enough eager, young farm boys to fill the ranks of the force.⁶⁷ As a result, the Mounties had little choice but to look to Eastern Canada, urban centres and abroad. Inevitably, the quality of men suffered as

the police were forced to accept men with backgrounds as varied as former military officers, unskilled labourers, or patronage appointees. Macleod adds that recruiting campaigns in Eastern Canada were dominated by patronage concerns, especially with regards to the appointment of commissioned officers.⁶⁸ Economic conditions in Canada also had an important effect on Mounted Police recruiting efforts. Recessions usually resulted in a boon for police recruiting, as was the case during the lengthy depression of the late 1800s, and the pre-war recession that began in 1913. During such periods, the police would find themselves flooded with applications, from men looking for permanent work and a steady pay cheque.⁶⁹ Conversely, during prosperous times the Mounties were forced to seek candidates from farther afield. Despite introducing pension plans and pay increases during the late 1800s and early 1900s, the police did not have the resources to compete for manpower. Many occupations were far more financially rewarding, and far less physically gruelling.⁷⁰ Due to the new-found prosperity of Western Canada during the pre-war years, recruiting campaigns throughout Canada during 1912-1913 were dismal failures. During April, 1912, recruiting officers managed to only take in seventy-five applications in Winnipeg, of which only eleven were accepted by the force.⁷¹ S.W. Horrall points out that by 1914, approximately eighty percent of the men in the force were from Britain. In addition, one half of all new members were recruited directly from Britain, while most of those who enlisted in Canada had emigrated from overseas.⁷² Although the government seemed pleased with these men, referring to "old soldiers" as superior candidates,⁷³ it is

questionable as to whether these individuals, coming from different social, cultural and physical environments can legitimately be referred to as "superior" candidates. Clearly, however, as the economy prospered and receded, the force had little choice but to adjust its recruiting standards. As such, what constituted a superior candidate is unknown and Perry's claim that such individuals were not available in abundance must be questioned.

In addition to "enemy alien" behaviour and manpower needs, the third reason that Commissioner Perry cited in relation to the cancellation of the policing contracts was border security. Perry believed the combination of a shortage of policemen, the decreasing military presence in Western Canada, and the questionable reliability of American authorities, left Canada open to terrorist attacks by American based German sympathizers. According to the Commissioner, the Mounties were spread so thinly across the West by the summer of 1916, they could no longer be considered a defensive force capable of containing and stopping either internal insurrections or incursions into Canadian territory.⁷⁴ In June, Perry claimed that with the arrival of summer, the hundreds of trails and roads crisscrossing the prairies along the border would be dry, providing easy access for motor vehicles. The Commissioner was concerned that saboteurs would be able to use this to their advantage, moving in and out of Canada with a great deal of ease; and the Mounties, many of whom were still on horseback and stationed roughly twenty miles apart, would not be able to watch all of these access points in order to prevent a serious breach of security.⁷⁵

Perry overlooked the fact that the rudimentary motor vehicles of the period were neither fast, nor reliable, especially on rough country trails. S.W. Horrall notes in his pictorial history of the force that the police purchased a number of motorbikes and patrol cars in 1916, so as to maintain a 'competitive' edge with the criminal element.⁷⁶ More importantly, however, one must question why the concerns about motor vehicles and dry roads were not mentioned by the Commissioner in 1914 and 1915.⁷⁷ So far as the declining number of officers and soldiers is concerned, there was still a significant military presence in the region. This included internment camp guards, recruiting, training and administrative military personnel, new recruits, men on leave, the home guard and militia units. In addition, there was a significant number of discharged soldiers, various local police departments and private detective agencies. Further, the police confiscated the vast majority of the weapons belonging to the "enemy alien" population at the beginning of the war. All of these factors would have made it extremely difficult for anyone to coordinate and successfully execute an attack or to incite widespread civil unrest.

As long as the Americans stayed neutral, Commissioner Perry remained sceptical as to whether they could be trusted to assist in the apprehension of American-based saboteurs committing crimes in Canada; much of this attitude stems from the fact that the Mounties had long considered the American system of justice and law enforcement inferior to that in Canada.⁷⁸ The Americans, however, proved to be very helpful to Canadian authorities. For example, after

intercepting the following communication from German Foreign Secretary Alfred Zimmerman to the German Ambassador to Washington on January 3, 1916, U.S. officials passed the information on to the Canadian government almost immediately.

General staff desires energetic action in regard to proposed destruction of Canadian Pacific Railway at several points, with a view to complete and protracted interruption of traffic. Captain Boehm, who is known on your side and is shortly returning, has been given instructions. Inform the military attache and provide the necessary funds.⁷⁹

Although the U.S. government maintained an official policy of neutrality, there was never really any doubt as to how the American public felt. Americans identified with the British, the French and their allies, as most of them believed in liberal democratic ideals, rather than the militaristic nature of the German leadership. Reports of German atrocities committed in Belgium during the early stages of the war angered many in the United States. The sinking of the passenger ship, the Lusitania, by a German submarine on May 7, 1915, which claimed the lives of 128 U.S. citizens, served to galvanize American public opinion in favour of Britain and France.⁸⁰

In addition to these factors, the official American position was moving away from neutrality to one of increased intervention. Despite a festering dispute between Britain and the United States regarding neutral shipping rights, by the middle of the war the Americans had loaned Britain and France in excess of two billion

dollars. During the same period, the U.S. limited its line of credit to Germany to less than thirty million dollars.⁸¹ It is important to note that as soon as the Americans committed themselves to a full participatory role in the war, the Mounties dropped all doubts and concerns regarding American cooperation in the area of law enforcement.⁸² It is worth noting that the only time that Commissioner Perry mentioned the possibility of sabotage attacks and the need to ensure the defence of the border was in his 1917 report, filed on September 30th, of that year.⁸³ He added in the same report, that since the beginning of the war, all reports pertaining to possible security threats had been thoroughly investigated by the police, including the allegations in the Zimmerman telegram, and had been found to be baseless.⁸⁴

The evidence presented suggests that the police and the general public had little to fear from Canada's "enemy" populations, leading one to suspect that Commissioner Perry must have had other motives for wanting to divest the force of many of its 'minor' and 'unimportant' duties. Given the force's long and sometimes controversial involvement with the enforcement of various liquor laws in the west, it would be useful to study this aspect of the Mounties' history to see if it sheds any further light on the decision of the RNWMP to discontinue their traditional duties in Western Canada. Prior to the introduction of prohibition the Mounted Police consistently supported the re-negotiation of their contracts with the prairie provinces and opposed Saskatchewan's expressed desire to create a provincial police force in 1913-1914. Also of

significance is the fact that having 'temporarily' withdrawn from provincial policing in 1916-1917, the Mounties expressed little interest in recovering this jurisdiction until shortly after the repeal of prohibition throughout the prairie provinces. The 1916 Alberta Liquor Act took effect just one week after Perry first outlined the need for a change in the Mounties' policing mandate in Western Canada in a memorandum for Prime Minister Borden and about two weeks before he wrote to Borden requesting an end to the contracts. According to S.W. Horrall,

Enforcing liquor laws was just the kind of "civil policing" from which Perry believed the Force should remain aloof. Their enforcement, he informed Prime Minister Borden in 1916, undermined both efficiency and morale.⁸⁵

Horrall adds that the Mounties' involvement with liquor legislation in the 1880s and 1890s and the subsequent barrage of criticism they were forced to endure was a lesson they did not forget quickly and had a significant impact on their attitude towards the liquor legislation that was introduced by the prairie provinces during the mid-teen years.⁸⁶

R.C. Macleod states in "Canadianizing the West: The North-West Mounted Police as Agents of the National Policy", that the North West Mounted Police were dispatched to Western Canada by Prime Minister John A. Macdonald to ensure the success of his government's National Policy.⁸⁷ More specifically, Macleod states in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled, "The North-West Mounted Police, 1873-1905:

Law Enforcement and the Social Order in the Canadian North-West", that it was the Mounties' job, "to ensure that Canadian Administration and settlement of the newly acquired North-West Territories was carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner."⁸⁸ The keystone to achieving this was the peaceful transfer of the ownership of land from the Indians to the Canadian government, thereby allowing white settlement to prosper. Given the government's limited financial resources, a policy of forceful subjugation of the First Nations was out of the question. As R.C. Macleod notes in his article, by 1870 the Americans were spending in excess of twenty million dollars annually in an attempt to subdue the Indians in order to open the American West for white settlement; this amount exceeded the entire Canadian budget for that year. A peaceful West was vital as it would allow for the rapid completion of a transcontinental railway and lure prospective settlers with greater ease, both of which were cornerstones of Macdonald's National Policy.⁸⁹

The escalating racial violence between whites and Indians in Western Canada during the early 1870s was the result of the liquor traffic being conducted by whiskey traders. Liquor was also responsible for a number of devastating health and social problems, and intra-- and inter--tribal strife among the indigenous populations. If allowed to continue, it would dash any hopes of the Canadian government quickly and peacefully exerting its control over the region, which would clear the way for the implementation of the government's National Policy. The police were initially very

successful in putting an end to the whiskey trade. This was universally welcomed by Indians, Métis, missionaries and the small number of settlers in the region, all of whom favoured a peaceful co-existence. Assistant Commissioner James Macleod (Commissioner, 1876-1880) noted in a letter to his superior, Commissioner George Arthur French (Commissioner, 1874-1876) that the Indians were very thankful that the police had put an end to the liquor traffic, and as a result it might be the appropriate time for the government to press ahead with a treaty.⁹⁰

The police were proud of their early success, and of the fact they handled the situation with a limited amount of violence, unlike the alleged lawlessness that prevailed south of the 49th parallel. R.C. Macleod states,

They had been highly successful in stamping out the trade and controlling the excessive consumption of liquor by the tribes. The early reputation of the force was to a large extent founded upon this success.⁹¹

Stan Horrall, author of the article, " 'A policeman's lot is not a happy one': The Mounted Police and Prohibition in the North-West Territories, 1874-1891", concurs with R.C. Macleod. Horrall states that this short-lived success during the 1870s is the basis for much of the mythical status of the "Red Coated" heroes of the Western Plains that exists today.⁹² Commissioner French was so pleased by his men's performance that he boasted in his 1874 report, "law and order now prevail where last winter drunkenness, bloodshed and

murder were rife,"⁹³ "a more peaceful community than this ... could not be found anywhere."⁹⁴ Despite the accolades and self congratulation, the Mounties were unable to completely eradicate the liquor traffic. They did limit it sufficiently throughout the 1870s and early 1880s to avoid both racial violence and criticism from Eastern Canadian prohibitionists. Concern within the force about the liquor issue, was not voiced again until 1881, when Commissioner A.G. Irvine (Commissioner, 1880-1885) stated that steps were being taken to suppress the liquor trade.⁹⁵

Many of the settlers who moved to the west from Ontario, Great Britain and the United States once the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed, were in favour of free access to liquor. These people argued that laws which restricted the importation, purchasing, manufacturing, possession and consumption of intoxicating beverages were outdated, discriminatory, violated their fundamental liberties and, in relation to the behaviour of the NWMP, smacked of hypocrisy. While these individuals believed that white societies had outgrown such laws, they supported prohibition for primitive cultures, such as those of the North American Indian. It was a commonly held belief at the time, that the native peoples of Canada were incapable of self control, and, therefore, the continuation of the whiskey trade threatened the peaceful co-existence of the races.⁹⁶ Stan Horrall notes that the first large scale prohibition experiment in Canada was predicated on the basis of racial control, and "...had its origin in the widely held assumption that liquor reduced the Indian to a violent and unmanageable savage

who had to be protected from his own predilections for alcohol."⁹⁷ Regardless of what settlers or the men in the field thought, the senior command of the force considered it their duty to protect the native population from whiskey traders. They argued that the only means of ensuring that liquor did not end up in the hands of the Indians was to strictly enforce the Territory's prohibitory liquor laws. For twenty years, various police commissioners maintained this strategy for several reasons. First, since arriving in the west, "the Mounted Police regarded the protection of the Indians as a special responsibility".⁹⁸ Second, senior commanders were proud of their past success in controlling the trade, and did not accept the argument that this could not be maintained as the white population grew. Third, many of the older and senior officers maintained a rather rigid view of law enforcement, believing that the law was the law, regardless of political, social or moral consequences.⁹⁹

In his book, R.C. Macleod argues that settlers considered the law discriminatory because liquor was permissible only to those who had obtained a permit from the Lt. Governor of the North-West Territories. Those who did not have permits were angered by what they considered to be a double standard: while one arm of the government permitted a privileged few with licenses to purchase, import, possess and consume intoxicating beverages, another arm penalized those who did not possess the necessary documents.¹⁰⁰ Although Lt. Governor Edgar Dewdney and a number of politicians, businessmen and community leaders were manipulating the law in an attempt to attain greater political autonomy for the Territories,

which in turn would allow the residents of the region to implement their own laws, the public felt the political leadership of the Territories were manipulating the system for their own gain. Not surprisingly, the citizens of the NWT were outraged by what they considered to be a totally unfair and corrupt system. Dewdney purposely increased the number of permits he distributed to associates and friends, thereby, achieving a "de facto" change in the law,¹⁰¹ but infuriating the majority of the public, as they were still unable to attain licenses.¹⁰²

Gerald Hallowell, author of the book, Prohibition in Ontario, 1919-1923, argues that many of Western Canada's new immigrants viewed the territorial ban on liquor as a fundamental violation of their democratic liberties. Temperance was strongly supported by some factions of British society, but neither the British government nor the general citizenry considered prohibition as the best way to curb alcoholism and its associated problems. According to Hallowell, the British liberal democratic tradition dictated that the state's intervention in the area of moral and personal matters had to be resisted and curtailed.¹⁰³ Simply put, whether one imbibed or not, should not be of concern to the government.

That which the public found particularly frustrating was the apparent hypocrisy of the system as demonstrated almost daily through the actions of the police. Many members of the Mounted Police, especially junior members, not only opposed the enforcement of the prohibition laws, but refused to abide by it themselves, and

continued to consume intoxicating beverages. According to R.C. Macleod, the consumption of alcohol by members of the force had been a reality since its inception in 1873.

The first contingent of one hundred and fifty men left Ottawa in October 1873 for the North-West. Before the train had reached Prescott, Ontario, a bare hundred miles from Ottawa, a man had been dismissed from the force for drunkenness.¹⁰⁴

Commissioners French and Macleod attributed the actions of their men to the harsh environment of the West and the nature of the work, excuses their successors could not use, due to the increasing settlement and 'civilization' of the region. In his 1878 report, Commissioner Macleod admitted, in so many words, that the consumption of alcohol was prevalent within the force.

... considering that the men are almost entirely removed from the restraining influences of society, and are, outside some of our posts, brought in contact with sharps, gamblers and blacklegs who infest the west, ... they showed exemplary discipline.¹⁰⁵

Stan Horrall notes that through their continued consumption of alcoholic beverages, the police actually helped the anti-prohibition lobby bring about an end to the restrictive laws in the early 1890s. "The police example merely illustrated what was true generally, that laws or regulations could not alter socially acceptable standards of behaviour."¹⁰⁶ R.C. Macleod states that most of the alcohol consumed by the police during the 1870s and early 1880s was contraband. All parties involved in the liquor trade considered it

the "legitimate spoils of war", and many Mounted policemen were of the opinion that before it could be submitted as evidence, it had to be tested to ensure it was an intoxicating beverage.¹⁰⁷ James H. Gray states in his book, Talk to My Lawyer!: Great Stories of Southern Alberta's Bar & Bench, that with the passage of time, the police drank in an increasingly free and open manner, often patronizing well known drinking establishments.¹⁰⁸ In another of his works, Booze: The Impact of Whiskey on the Prairie West, a study of the impact of liquor and prohibition on Western Canadian society during the late 1800s and early 1900s, Gray argues that alcohol was the most

disruptive influence within the force, and when they (the NWMP) were not riding herd on disorderly drunks in towns and villages, they were themselves getting roaring drunk in their barracks.¹⁰⁹

Although Gray, a proponent of stricter liquor laws, may be overstating the case, Commissioner Lawrence W. Herchmer (Commissioner, 1886-1900) confirmed in his 1888 report that most of the force's disciplinary problems stemmed from drunkenness or alcoholism.¹¹⁰ Realizing that he was unable to put an end to the consumption of intoxicating beverages Herchmer mistakenly believed that the establishment of beer canteens on police posts would help control and conceal the 'problem' from public view, but this only succeeded in exacerbating public outrage over the situation.¹¹¹ So far as anti-prohibitionists were concerned, the only positive outgrowth of this situation was that it helped push the

issue to the front of the political agenda in 1891-1892, forcing Ottawa to take notice of the situation.

As the population of the Territories grew throughout the 1880s, the number of liquor-related cases increased, from a negligible number in 1881, to 277, or approximately 45% of all the cases handled in 1886.¹¹² Commissioner Irvine's disappointment and frustration with the deteriorating situation was clearly evident by the time he submitted his last report in 1885,

The traffic in illicit liquor cannot, I regret to say, be said to be on the decline. Men who were law abiding citizens in the old province think it no crime to evade the liquor law and do so on every opportunity.¹¹³

Commissioner Herchmer reiterated these sentiments in his 1887 report, adding that people would go to great lengths to attain liquor; disguising it as everything from canned preserves to patent medicines and hiding it in a variety of "containers" ranging from coffins to livestock carcasses.¹¹⁴ Experienced smugglers proved to be very inventive in their attempts to out-wit the police. The Lethbridge News reported the following incident on January 26th, 1888:

As the police, "heads lowered," watched silently, a coffin was lifted from an incoming train and placed in a waiting hearse. The driver of the hearse, a well-known smuggler, was disguised "in a black suit of woe." While the Mounted Police continued to stand silently by, the hearse drove away with its coffin of liquor to celebrate the "funeral."¹¹⁵

Herchmer acknowledged in his 1888 report that the arrival of the railway a few years earlier had proven to be a tremendous boon to liquor smugglers.¹¹⁶ The Commissioner admitted that train employees were not the only ones 'willing to look the other way' as the financial temptations were sometimes too great for even some of his men to resist.¹¹⁷

Lawrence W. Herchmer, a former military officer, was appointed Commissioner of the force in 1886, by Prime Minister Macdonald because he possessed excellent administrative qualities and was a strict disciplinarian. According to R.C. Macleod, however, he had no sense of tact, which would prove to be very unfortunate for the police, as they continued to struggle with the sensitive issue of prohibition.¹¹⁸ Although Herchmer acknowledged that the enforcement of prohibition was a "most disagreeable and trying service", true to his character, the new Commissioner instituted a rigid enforcement policy which resulted in both a public relations disaster for the police and a drop in morale among members throughout the 1880s and the early 1890s.¹¹⁹ The initial drop in the number of liquor related cases prompted him to stick with this agenda for the next five years.¹²⁰ As Macleod points out, the force "had a great deal of emotional capital tied up in the issue of liquor law enforcement because of their early successes with it", and Herchmer seemed determined, to a fault, to repeat the successes of the past.¹²¹ Unfortunately, this interpretation of the law, and the role of the police with regards to the law, isolated Herchmer from

his men, almost all of whom opposed prohibition. Due to Herchmer's decision to pursue a strict enforcement policy, the police found themselves in a very difficult situation and at odds with much of the the population.¹²² The majority of the men were angered by the policy because they believed it tarnished their reputation and past achievements and would result in a further deterioration of their relationship with the general public. Despite reports from his senior field commanders, including Superintendent A. Bowen Perry, (Commissioner, 1900-1923) who argued that "the open evasion of the present law made it ineffective, that it drained the country of its resources, failed to stop drunkenness, was discriminatory and in any case was unenforceable",¹²³ Herchmer refused to back down, failing to recognize that the police were rapidly losing touch with a significant segment of the public and thus, undermined much of the usefulness of the force. Clearly, the newly appointed Commissioner did not understand that the control of crime is dependent upon both the cooperation law enforcement agencies receive from the general public and the level of trust and mutual respect these two groups have for one another.¹²⁴

From the time that the railway reached Calgary, until the Territorial prohibition laws were repealed in 1892, the Mounties were in an unenviable situation, saddled with an unenforceable law and facing an increasingly hostile public. Accustomed to being revered and viewed as protectors and operating from a position of authority and strength, being cast as persecutors by a large proportion of the population was emotionally and psychologically

draining for the force.¹²⁵ The introduction of newspapers intensified this pressure. Local newspapers helped rally and focus public opinion, and for the first time, the police were forced to defend the merits of their work in a public forum, and no longer had the only voice in the debate regarding the enforcement of prohibition.¹²⁶ Herchmer finally backed down from his rigid stance on the enforcement of Territorial liquor laws in 1891, accepting that it was "...impossible to enforce the (liquor) act".¹²⁷ He adopted this position when he became aware of the fact that the future existence of the force was being called into question by the federal government as a result of public discontent over police involvement with the liquor laws.¹²⁸ Fortunately for the police, public attention moved away from enforcement and focused on the federal government and the issue of greater political autonomy for the North-West Territories, as the debate intensified throughout 1890-1891. Ending prohibition, which had been imposed on the region by the federal government, became one of several rallying points in the struggle for self government within the North-West Territories.¹²⁹ Having obtained the authority from Ottawa, the Territorial Council wasted little time approving plans for a new Legislative Assembly. Following the elections, the members of the new assembly passed the necessary legislation to abolish the permit system and thereby allow the legal importation, sale and consumption of intoxicating beverages, beginning May 1, 1892.¹³⁰ Commissioner Herchmer was genuinely relieved with the repeal of the law, as it put an end to the criticism that the Mounted Police had been forced to endure since 1886.¹³¹ R.C. Macleod and Stan Horrall agree that had it not been for

the the repeal of prohibition in 1892, it is very likely that the Mounties would have been disbanded by the federal government, due to the disintegration of respect for the Mounties and general disregard for law and order in the Territories.¹³²

There were two long-term repercussions as a result of the repeal of Territorial prohibition in 1892. The first pertains to the NWMP whose near demise in 1892, "generated a firm resolve to avoid becoming again entangled in the enforcement of controversial social legislation."¹³³ Commissioner Herchmer and the senior police administration instituted a policy of refusing all pleas from towns and municipalities requiring help from the Mounties in order to enforce their local liquor laws. The police justified their action, or inaction, on the grounds that liquor legislation was a local matter and, as such, no longer the duty of the federal force.¹³⁴ The second repercussion, concerned the fledgling prohibition movement in Western Canada. Robert Irwin McLean, whose thesis is entitled, "A Most Effectual Remedy: Temperance and Prohibition in Alberta, 1875-1915", points out that the anti-liquor lobby in Eastern Canada was elated when Ottawa initially proclaimed prohibition the law in the North-West Territories in 1870;¹³⁵ they looked upon it as "experimental ground for their grand design."¹³⁶

Prohibitionists fought hard during the 1891 Territorial election but were overwhelmed by those who favoured free access to intoxicating beverages.¹³⁷ Despite this set-back, local option legislation under the Scott Act continued in those communities that

requested it and the dries did manage to force Sir Wilfrid Laurier's federal Liberal government to honour its 1896 election promise to hold a national plebiscite on prohibition. The prohibition lobby won this vote by a slim margin, but because the majority was so small, Laurier refused to accept the decision. A majority of English speaking Canadians supported the cause, but only one-sixth of the population of Quebec, mostly Anglophones, favoured this kind of legislation.¹³⁸ It took the better part of the next decade for the dries to rebound from this defeat. From the late 1890s to about 1910, the social reform movement underwent a metamorphosis. During this period of transition, the various organizations that made up the social reform movement, the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) amongst them, dedicated themselves to realizing major societal changes. The WCTU spearheaded a public education campaign which focused on the evils of intoxicating beverages. Theorizing that alcohol was at the root of society's problems, reformers argued that prohibition was the panacea for these society's ailments. Thus, the WCTU developed a national strategy for the implementation of their ideas and the coordination of their regional efforts, with their primary goal being the passage of prohibitory liquor legislation across the nation. Specific to Alberta was the creation of the Moral Reform League of Alberta, which served as an umbrella association for the coordination of the activities of all social reform groups operating in the province.¹³⁹ By 1910, the success of these organizations was evident from the fact that the "Banish the Bar" movement had become a major political issue.¹⁴⁰ Although prohibition dominated much of the debate in the Alberta legislature

during 1907-1908, the Alberta and Great Waterways Railway scandal began to unfold in 1909 and dominated the debate in the Legislature for the next two years.¹⁴¹ Once debate pertaining to the railway scandal came to a conclusion, the Liberal government of Arthur Sifton turned its attention to developing Alberta's agricultural and transportation infrastructures, and the province's educational system.¹⁴² When the United Farmers of Alberta adopted prohibition as part of their platform at the organization's 1913 annual convention, "Dry" forces used this momentum to once again push the issue of restrictive liquor legislation to the front of the political agenda.¹⁴³ Because the ruling Liberals depended upon the UFA to deliver them the rural vote, the Grits had little choice but to bring the matter up for debate, paving the way for a plebiscite in 1915.

The controversy that resulted from the Mounties' involvement with prohibition during the late 1880s and early 1890s caused many to question if the continued existence of the Mounted Police was necessary. Prime Minister Macdonald intimated from the outset in 1873, that the force was meant to be a temporary measure whose presence would only be required until the peaceful and orderly settlement of the West had been completed. Macdonald's actions, and that of successive Prime Ministers, however, proved to be quite the opposite. Prior to Laurier's victory in 1896, the Liberals looked upon the Mounties as nothing more than a "nest of Tories" maintained for patronage purposes,¹⁴⁴ and throughout the later 1880s, had argued that the police should be disbanded. The Tories countered that the

cost of maintaining the NWMP was worthwhile to the government and the people of Canada, especially when one considered the orderly nature of society in the west compared to the violence that supposedly prevailed in the United States.¹⁴⁵ Once in office, the Liberals, like their Tory predecessors, discovered that the Mounted Police could be manipulated for their political advantage. The Grits' negative attitude towards the police, and their political will to disband the force gradually disappeared.

The debate over whether the Mounted Police should be maintained or disbanded was rekindled in 1905 with the creation of the Prairie provinces. The RNWMP had served the people of Western Canada for roughly thirty years, and it was now up to the federal and provincial politicians to decide who should assume the responsibility for law enforcement within the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. The British North America Act, 1867, made policing a provincial responsibility. Accordingly, it would be unconstitutional for the Mounties, a federal agency, to carry out the administration of justice within a province. Beside being satisfied with the performance of the Mounties, it was a generally held belief that replacing the RNWMP would result in a decline in the quality of policing services in the West. In order to circumvent the country's constitutional requirements, a contractual rental system was developed whereby the provinces rented the services of a specific number of officers from Ottawa for an annual fee. These men were assigned the responsibility of enforcing provincial laws and were subject to the authority of the provincial attorney general. In all

other respects, the force remained a Dominion entity, subject to the control of the Commissioner and the central government. The first five-year agreement, signed in May 1906, lasted until March 1911, and required Alberta and Saskatchewan to pay Ottawa \$75,000.00 a year. In return the federal government guaranteed the force would maintain 500 men in the region.¹⁴⁶ Under the terms of these contracts the Mounted Police were responsible for enforcement of all provincial statutes, including the province's liquor laws, as well as the Criminal Code of Canada and federal statutes. They were not, however, responsible for enforcing local bylaws, unless the community in question had an agreement with the federal force. This is important, because at the time, local councils had the authority to implement local option laws prohibiting alcohol. The police under the command of Commissioner Perry, who had opposed Herchmer's strict stance on prohibition during the late 1880s and early 1890s, maintained its resolve not to become entangled with controversial liquor legislation despite mounting pressure from the prohibition movement.

In an attempt to undercut the momentum of the prohibition lobby, the Alberta government amended its liquor laws in 1906: These changes prohibited the licensing of taverns, bars or beverage rooms in towns or villages comprising less than forty dwellings located within a 960-acre radius.¹⁴⁷ Wets residing in rural areas claimed that the amendments amounted to prohibition for rural dwellers, creating a double standard favouring those in urban centres. Prohibitionists applauded the introduction of the new laws,

but argued that it did little to improve the woeful condition of enforcement in urban centres. Hoping to further pacify prohibitionists, the Alberta government passed "The Liquor License Amendment Act, 1907", giving the Attorney General the authority to appoint a Chief License Inspector and as many officers as were required to enforce the province's liquor laws, and "The Constables Act, 1908", entitling local governments to hire their own police officers.¹⁴⁸ C.K. Talbot, C.H.S. Jayewardene and F.J. Juliane, authors of, Canada's Constables: The Historical Development of Policing in Canada, point out that by passing these acts and appearing to "get tough" with violators of the province's liquor laws, the government was attempting to satisfy both wets and "drys". These laws did not further limit access to liquor, but they did clamp down on the number of violators. The government found this a difficult balancing act, hoping to avoid alienating both the wets and drys and as is usual in these situations, the government pleased no one and complaints and pressure from both groups multiplied.¹⁴⁹

Despite growing pressure by the drys on provincial governments regarding the Mounties' enforcement of liquor laws, Saskatchewan Premier Walter Scott continued to express his support for the RNWMP. In May, 1909, Premier Scott endorsed a proposal for a new contract, and in so doing, suggested it should be for seven or ten years, as opposed to five.¹⁵⁰ In the end, Alberta and Saskatchewan agreed to new five-year contracts identical to their previous agreements. Signed in 1910, they took effect in the spring of 1911. Although Commissioner Perry found the increasing levels of

public support for the prohibition movement troubling, he believed that the continued presence of the Mounties in the Prairie provinces was necessary. He noted the in the force's 1909 report that, "...it would be in the interest of Canada, as well as the provinces concerned, that the contract be renewed."¹⁵¹ In addition to endorsing the new contracts, Perry requested an increase in manpower in 1910, hoping that this would satisfy those who believed the force was not enforcing the province's liquor laws with enough vigour, and quiet the voices of those who favoured the disbanding of the Mounted Police.

No one will dispute the value of maintaining law and order among the newcomers from the very beginning. The moral and material advantages to Canada of a well ordered and well conducted population in these new provinces are so well understood that I feel justified in submitting the question of an increase in strength to your consideration...¹⁵²

The only aspect of the new agreement that Perry was uncomfortable with was the appointment of Assistant Commissioners for each province. Alberta made the request believing this would give them a greater say in the running of the force. The province hoped to use this to prove to the drys that they were doing everything in their power to see that the liquor laws were being enforced. Horrall argues that Perry agreed to the demands so that Ottawa and the police could placate provincial concerns. He also notes, however, that the changes were nominal; the real authority within the force

remained with the Commissioner as it had since the inception of the force in 1873.¹⁵³

As the prohibition movement continued to gain momentum in the pre-war years, Commissioner Perry informed the governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1912 that the RNWMP would no longer enforce provincial liquor laws.¹⁵⁴ In defence of his decisions, Perry stated that his men were, "middle class and well educated Englishmen, they were not accustomed to prohibition ideas and laws and did not think highly of them."¹⁵⁵ In part, Perry's actions were motivated by his concern regarding the increasing level of interference into the police's jurisdiction by the province's liquor inspectors. A 1913 RNWMP internal memorandum reported that Alberta and Saskatchewan were so satisfied with their inspectors' performances, due to the increased level of revenue they had generated for each province through fines, that the provinces were reportedly considering the expansion of these units and their responsibilities. Although Commissioner Perry was not keen to have the Mounties enforce liquor laws, he looked upon the appointment of provincial liquor agents as a infringement on the Mounted Police's jurisdiction and a threat to the force's future existence. He was particularly concerned that should these new agents sufficiently impress their political bosses, the provinces may not be interested in renewing their present federal policing contracts.¹⁵⁶

Prime Minister Borden wrote the Premiers of Alberta and Saskatchewan on December 9th, 1913, enquiring if they intended to

negotiate new agreements.¹⁵⁷ Premier Scott of Saskatchewan replied within a few days informing Borden that it was his wish to establish a provincial police force, utilizing the existing liquor enforcement squad, or "secret service" as it was known, as a base from which to build.¹⁵⁸ Scott was so anxious to proceed with his plan, he requested that the province's policing contract be terminated early, in April, 1915. Scott informed Borden that the province was unhappy with the force's attitude towards the enforcement of liquor laws, and for a variety of other reasons "it would be preferable for the province to create and control its own police force."¹⁵⁹ Commissioner Perry vigorously opposed Scott's idea of creating a provincial force, arguing that the Saskatchewan Premier was motivated by his desire to consolidate political power by turning the police into a patronage vehicle.¹⁶⁰ D.F. Robertson, author of "The Saskatchewan Provincial Police, 1917-1928", agrees with Perry's analysis of the situation, stating that Scott utilized the liquor issue to achieve his political objectives.¹⁶¹ According to W.F.A. Turgeon, Saskatchewan's Attorney General, the government wanted to keep the plans for a provincial force quiet for two reasons: they were concerned about the backlash from supporters of the Mounted Police, and the government feared that public knowledge of their plans to replace the RNWMP would result in hundreds of communities demanding provincial police detachments, effectively undermining the political value of the patronage appointments.¹⁶²

Any move of the Department in connection with our secret service must be kept as quiet as possible. Once the erroneous impression gets abroad that we are

establishing permanent detachments of Provincial Police throughout the Province you can see the nice mess we will get into ... it would be disastrous and wreck the whole thing if the matter becomes public and the various towns start agitating to become centres of Provincial Police detachments, etc.¹⁶³

A RNWMP Comptroller's secret memorandum, dated October 8th, 1915, confirmed that the Saskatchewan government backed away from their plan near the end of 1914, when the press leaked what the government was planning.¹⁶⁴

When Premier Sifton of Alberta responded to Borden's enquiries he informed the Prime Minister that neither he nor his government had considered the issue, but given the fact that any new agreement would require the province to pay a higher annual rental fee, he promised to consider the matter.¹⁶⁵ Sifton added that he had little interest in establishing a provincial police force, as it was sure to bring about extra political and financial burdens. The Premier was also concerned about the imposition of controversial liquor laws; he had little desire to find himself in the middle of any such controversy that was sure to arise should the province be held responsible for enforcing such legislation. Sifton was fully aware of both the trouble the Mounties faced during the 1880s and 1890s with controversial liquor laws and the increasing momentum of the prohibition lobby, and he had no desire to become entangled in these affairs. Sifton knew that the establishment of a police force would cost the province far more than maintaining the RNWMP even if one took into consideration the impending increases in annual rental

fees. Beside, apart from the Mounties' hesitancy to enforce liquor laws, Sifton, like most Albertans, was generally pleased with the performance of the RNWMP.¹⁶⁶

A year passed before the issue of renewing the contracts was further discussed by the two levels of government. Perry had been a strong supporter of new policing contracts, but only briefly mentioned them in his 1914 report, due to the commencement of the war.¹⁶⁷ Borden wrote Scott and Sifton on December 11th, 1914, inquiring if the provinces had decided upon negotiating new contracts or if they intended to establish their own police forces. Scott replied on the 26th, stating that, "under the conditions which exist to-day the Government would prefer to have the arrangement continued at least until the end of the term of the existing contract in 1916."¹⁶⁸ Scott did not identify the conditions in his reply to Borden, but it is likely he was referring to the press leak which exposed his government's plan to replace the Mounties with a provincial force and that his plan to create the GPP had been politically motivated. Knowledge of the fact that the Anglo community derived a great deal of comfort and peace of mind knowing that the RNWMP were at hand and capable of quelling any form of "enemy alien" inspired violence was also quite likely a factor in the government's decision. Two letters to the Prime Minister, one from the Duck Lake Board of Trade, May 10, 1915, the second from the North Battleford Board of Trade, May 12, 1915, indicate that these fears existed in the minds of many Western Canadian residents. As a whole, the public believed that a well

trained, experienced force, such as the RNWMP, was necessary to see that law and order prevailed.¹⁶⁹

Alberta Premier Arthur Sifton reiterated his position from the previous year in a January 9th, 1915, letter to Prime Minister Borden. Sifton stated that he had no desire to establish a provincial police force. To placate those who were not satisfied with the performance of the Mounted Police, however, Sifton requested that a new contract would have to include a one-year escape clause.¹⁷⁰ Commissioner Perry and the federal government were not keen on this idea as they were faced with a number of expenditures for new equipment and facilities. Ottawa did not want to expend a great deal of money on these items if the RNWMP were not going to need them in a year's time.¹⁷¹ Sifton assured Ottawa that as long as he was premier, the province would rely on the Mounted Police for their law enforcement needs. He added that should he quit, the chances of his successor establishing a provincial force were slim because whoever took on the task would have less than one year to complete such a daunting task.¹⁷² Anxious to maintain control of policing in the West, Perry and the federal government accepted Alberta's terms but insisted that the provinces be held responsible for reimbursing Ottawa should the provinces implement the one-year clause.¹⁷³ Borden reported to the House of Commons on March 19th, 1915, that the negotiations with Alberta were proceeding satisfactorily, but he was still uncertain as to what Premier Scott's intentions were. Out of necessity, Alberta and Ottawa agreed to each other's terms; the

new contract which was signed in April 1915 took effect April 1, 1916.¹⁷⁴

Premier Scott of Saskatchewan remained elusive for several weeks, eventually suggesting a temporary solution in an April 10th letter to the Prime Minister:

We think that an extension of the arrangement, for the time being ... will be satisfactory, pending a definite solution of the question, if such be possible, to ensure the permanent existence of the Force.¹⁷⁵

Although he still preferred the idea of establishing a provincial police force, Scott relented near the end of April and signed a new five-year deal with the Mounted Police, identical to the Alberta-Ottawa agreement.¹⁷⁶ Scott had been apprehensive about signing a new contract due to the Mounties' less than enthusiastic attitude towards the enforcement of the province's liquor laws. Duncan Francis Robertson notes that the on-going squabble over liquor law enforcement initiated by Perry in 1912 came to a culmination during the summer of 1915. One of Scott's "secret service" constables informed the premier in mid-June that the Mounted Police stationed at North Battleford were refusing to enforce the province's liquor regulations.¹⁷⁷ A few weeks later, a similar incident was brought to the attention of Saskatchewan's Attorney General, W.F.A. Turgeon, by Melfort MLA G.B. Johnson. Johnson claimed that local Mounted Policemen had been instructed by the senior command of the force not to enforce any of the province's liquor laws.¹⁷⁸ The problem was

resolved near the end of July, when the acting Federal Solicitor General, Senator Lougheed of Alberta, ruled that the police were obliged to enforce the liquor laws under the terms of their contracts.¹⁷⁹ Perry grudgingly accepted the situation but expressed his true feelings regarding the matter in a communication to the Comptroller:

As you are aware the enforcement of the Act for the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquor or for the restriction of the sale, is a very difficult, and to a certain extent, disagreeable work for the police force.¹⁸⁰

With no choice but to enforce the laws, Perry decided that it was in the interest of the force that the men do their jobs to the best of their abilities. The Commissioner hoped that this would alleviate the pressure being exerted on the force by the prohibition movement. Perry ordered that all necessary means be employed to ensure the Saskatchewan Sales of Liquor Act would be enforced to the letter of the law.

Officers Commanding are to personally impress upon all under their command what their duty is, and to point out that the reputation of the Force is at stake. All over the Province the working of the Act is being watched, and if it is not efficiently enforced, a large share of the blame will be attributed to the Mounted Police.¹⁸¹

While matters appeared to be settled in Saskatchewan, they remained unsolved in Alberta so far as the Mounties' role in the enforcement of the province's liquor legislation was concerned. The

Saskatchewan experience has been dealt with in detail because it helps to prove the case that prior to the introduction of prohibition throughout Western Canada in 1916-1917, the Mounted Police had no intentions of relinquishing control of their provincial policing duties.

A similar situation to that in Saskatchewan developed in Alberta the following year. Alberta Deputy Attorney General A.G. Browning wrote Commissioner Perry, August 12th, 1916, requesting that the police live up to their responsibilities by enforcing the new provincial Liquor Act. The Commissioner notified the Alberta Government that he would have to refer the request to the federal government for advice. Perry subsequently wrote the Comptroller asking for instructions from the Prime Minister.¹⁸² Clearly this was a stalling tactic, for it was well within the powers and authority of the Commissioner to determine police policy of this nature. Speaking in the House of Commons on two occasions in August, 1917, Borden confirmed that Perry initiated the process to cancel the provincial policing contracts in his July 15th, 1916 report. The Prime Minister added that it was on the basis of these recommendations that the decision was made.¹⁸³ Although the amount of control the commissioner enjoyed regarding the running of the police force would change somewhat under the King administration, it is clear that Perry enjoyed a great deal of latitude in the running of the police.

[U]pon the recommendation of the Commissioner who thought that in view of certain changes in the laws of the western provinces the men were being called upon to perform duties which would not tend to keep the force up to that degree of excellence which has always characterized it. Legislation in regard to the liquor traffic and other matters was recently enacted and the Commissioner made reports to this effect: in the first place, that there was ample scope for the time and energies of the force in dealing with conditions as they presented themselves in time of war, and, secondly, that a force called upon to enforce local police regulations was hardly able to maintain the morale and the efficiency which had always been maintained in the past.¹⁸⁴

R.B. Bennett, Conservative M.P. for Calgary, also defended the Commissioner's decision to withdraw the police in a speech of August 18th, 1917.

It was contended ... that with the passage of the prohibitory legislation in the two western provinces a burden was put upon the Mounted Police of what might be called domestic police duty that interfered with their usefulness in the larger sphere of the preservation of order and respect for constituted authority which their uniform has always impressed on a new population. It was not in accord with the eternal fitness of things that those who were charged with maintaining that respect and reverence for constituted authority that always should be maintained in the midst of our new population, should have at the same time to go out and search for a quart of beer or a pint of whiskey that might be brought into localities in contravention of the law.¹⁸⁵

On September 7th, Perry evidently attempted to sway the government's thinking with a letter to the Secretary of the Privy

Council, A.E. Blount, in which he explained why he thought it was wrong for the force to be involved in the enforcement of prohibitory liquor laws. According to the Commissioner, it "placed the Force in a very undesirable position, and that in his opinion, the enforcement of such acts should have been left entirely to the Provincial authorities."¹⁸⁶

Anxious to resolve the issue, Browning wrote Perry in September, stating somewhat optimistically that provincial officials had the situation under control for the time being, but "this condition of affairs cannot be expected to last forever."¹⁸⁷ Having apparently already decided to withdraw the services of the force from provincial policing duties, Perry continued to stall for another month while he prepared for the final negotiations regarding the dissolution of the policing contracts. As further proof that he did not want the force involved with this type of controversial legislation, the Commissioner prohibited his officers from reporting the whereabouts of known bootleggers and moonshiners directly to the provincial authorities as the Alberta Attorney General had requested.¹⁸⁸ Perry left no doubt about his feelings towards the issue in an October 23rd memorandum.

I notice that in some cases, action has been taken by members of the Force to enforce the above act. No instructions whatever had been issued by me in regard to this and you are informed that until such instructions are issued, this act is not to be enforced by the Mounted Police.¹⁸⁹

By the time Perry agreed to a by-pass of the regular chain of command allowing his men to report directly to provincial authorities it was the beginning of November and he had concluded his discussions with the prairie Premiers. During these negotiations he made it clear that their consent for the abrogation of the contracts was critical to the war effort.¹⁹⁰ Despite having impressed upon the western Premiers that their immediate cooperation was vital, Perry and the federal government agreed to a two-month extension for the transfer of policing responsibilities in Alberta.¹⁹¹ "It is desirable to make any such arrangements as will prevent unnecessary inconvenience to the Government of Alberta."¹⁹² Both he and the federal government were determined to accommodate the province of Alberta with regard to this matter, for both political and public relations purposes. This of course casts doubt on both the urgency and necessity of completing the 'temporary' suspension of the policing contracts as well as the previously discussed matter of Perry's concern regarding manpower shortages.

Approximately two and a half years later, February 1919, a period when the Alberta Provincial Police were facing constant criticism for their involvement with prohibition, Commissioner Perry stated in a letter to the Comptroller that he had made the right decision during the summer of 1916.

I took the position that it was not possible for a Federal Force to enforce such a contentious piece of legislation without becoming seriously involved. I think the results

in Alberta, where they have great difficulties and much criticism, show that my position was right. You can easily conceive the kind of speeches which would have been made by the Alberta government in their Legislature, if the Mounted Police had been responsible for the enforcement of the Liquor Law in that Province.¹⁹³

Perry noted that, given the force's past experience during the 1880s and 1890s, he believed he had no choice, and had to do what was necessary to preserve the integrity, image and future of the RNWMP.¹⁹⁴

During 1919-1920, the Mounted Police underwent significant changes. They joined forces with the Ottawa-based Dominion Police to become the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, North America's first integrated national law enforcement agency. (The United States government established a Bureau of Investigation within the department of Justice in 1908, but many look to the time of the appointment of J. Edgar Hoover in 1924 and the reorganization and renaming of the agency as the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] in 1935 as the commencement of its operations. Even after Hoover's appointment to the directorship of the Bureau, the FBI has not assumed as great a multitude of duties at various levels of government, as the Mounted Police.) As a result of the nation-wide expansion of the Mounties in 1919-1920 and increasing concern regarding the social unrest which was sweeping the nation in the wake of the Winnipeg General Strike, it is understandable that the police did not, seek the resumption of their provincial policing duties in Western Canada, following the war. One must question,

however, why the police decided in 1926 that the time was right for them to follow this course. Was it purely coincidence that prohibition had been repealed throughout much of the west, or were the two events inextricably related as has been argued throughout this chapter? The actions of the RCMP throughout the 1920s strongly suggest that it was their intention to regain control of all policing duties in Western Canada while remaining aloof of any activity that could damage or sully their reputation. The bitter taste of their experiences with prohibition during the 1880s and 1890s was apparently still a very real concern to those who set police policy.

A brief review of Alberta Provincial Police records indicate that one of the things that impeded their ability to enforce the province's liquor laws was the Mounties' unwillingness to assist in the apprehension of smugglers and manufacturers of illegal spirits. In his 1920 report APP Commissioner, Alfred Cuddy (Commissioner 1919-1922) stated that the provincial police had little choice but to enforce the Customs laws as the Mounted Police refused to vigorously pursue this responsibility.

I anticipated that this work would have been done by the RCMP as it was the Customs regulations that was being infringed, but up to date I am not aware of their taking any action to put a stop to this practise.¹⁹⁵

Cuddy reported that the same was true regarding the enforcement of the Inland Revenue Act. The APP realized that if they were to have any hope of enforcing prohibition, they would have to put an end to

the illegal manufacture of spirits. Because the Mounties showed little interest in this issue, the provincial police attempted to deal directly with the Federal Inland Revenue Department.¹⁹⁶ Inspector Risk, Commander of "D" Division, Lethbridge, echoed the Commissioner's sentiments in his 1920 report:

Although the RCMP are specially charged with the enforcement of this Act, it is a known fact in this part of the Province that the officials of the Inland Revenue call on us when they require assistance rather than request help from the RCMP although both are Dominion Government Departments.¹⁹⁷

The following year Inspector Scott, head of the APP's Liquor Squad, requested that some of his men be 'deputized' as Inland Revenue Officers because the Mounted Police were very slow to act. "Sometimes, after seizing a still or mash, we have to wait over two months before we could get the case prosecuted."¹⁹⁸ Cuddy and Superintendent W.C. Bryan (Commissioner 1922-1932) supported Scott's claims, noting that many cases against owners or operators of stills were dropped because, by the time federal officers arrived on the scene, the stills had been dismantled and the evidence destroyed.¹⁹⁹ The appointment of several provincial policemen as Inland Revenue Officers in 1922 was applauded by Inspector Scott. He stated in his 1922 report that the move has been "of great assistance in the enforcement of this Act".²⁰⁰ While it is reasonable to accept that during the early 1920s the Mounties were occupied with a great number of changes due to the reorganization of the force in 1919-1920, including assuming responsibility of the

secret service and controlling radical union and political activity, this should not be considered justification for their failure to enforce federal laws such as the Inland Revenue Act and the Customs Act.

The Mounties' lingering antipathy for prohibition was so prevalent that it became a major factor during the negotiations between Saskatchewan and Ottawa in 1927-1928 pertaining to the signing of a new RCMP provincial policing contract. According to Stan Horrall, RCMP Commissioner Cortlandt Starnes (Commissioner 1923-1930) endeavoured to exempt the police from the responsibility of enforcing Saskatchewan's liquor laws, but because he desired to oversee the expansion of the jurisdiction of the force, he had little choice but to accept the province's terms.²⁰¹ Alberta's Premier, John E. Brownlee claimed in a newspaper interview with the Lethbridge Herald in March 1928, that the Mounties' unwillingness to enforce provincial liquor laws was one of the main reasons his government refused a similar deal to the one offered Saskatchewan. "We find that in Saskatchewan where the same proposal was made, they ran up against the same difficulties that we have ... the question of liquor act enforcement."²⁰² According to Horrall, it was not till the end of the 1930's that "the bitter memories of the permit system were finally extinguished" within the ranks of the force. By that time, the last links with the past, that is, the pre-1900 era, had been largely severed.²⁰³ Liquor law enforcement was not a serious issue in the 1931-1932 negotiations during which Alberta and four other provinces agreed to disband

their forces, replacing them with the RCMP. The 1931-1932 contract talks focused on the provinces' deteriorating economic situation, the RCMP's desire to expand its jurisdiction and Ottawa's concerns about labour radicalism and the spread of communism.

The evidence presented clearly indicates that the cancellation of the Mounties' policing contracts in 1916-1917 was motivated by more than the reasons cited by the RNWMP and the federal government. This is not to say that the official reasons espoused by Commissioner Perry and the federal government were not without some validity, but the evidence identifies a number of inconsistencies in their arguments, suggesting that Perry had other motives for wanting to rid the force of what he referred to as some of their 'minor' and 'unimportant' duties. The most notable motive was to avoid becoming entangled with the enforcement of prohibition, which was introduced throughout the prairies during 1916-1917. Having served as a senior field officer under Commissioner Herchmer during the late 1880s and 1890s and having experienced first hand the turmoil that the police endured during the period of Territorial prohibition, Perry understood that the Mounties' involvement in the enforcement of such controversial legislation would have a dramatic impact on the force's image. The controversy surrounding the Territorial liquor act nearly resulted in the demise of the Mounties in 1892 and Perry had no intention of risking both the reputation and the future existence of force in 1916. The RNWMP withdrawal of their services from the western provinces shortly after the introduction of prohibition was not a coincidence; the

evidence clearly indicates that these events were integrally linked and that Commissioner Perry's decision to proceed with the abrogation of the force's contracts was greatly influenced by the introduction of prohibitory liquor laws throughout western Canada.

Chapter One
Endnotes

1. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 553, file 183 pt. 2, memorandum re: Probable loss of strength of the Force between now and December next.", June 20, 1916.
2. Ibid., vol. 517, file 1-17 pt. 1, Perry to Borden, October 11, 1916.
3. Ibid., file 1-17 pt. 3, Perry to Comptroller Fortesque, February 8, 1917; and Canada, Sessional Papers, 1920, RNWMP Annual Report, 1919, sessional paper no 28.
4. S.W. Horrall, " The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour Unrest in Western Canada, 1919", Canadian Historical Review, vol. 61, no. 2, (June, 1980), p. 171; and S.W. Horrall, The Pictorial History of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1973), p. 175. The Dominion Police was formed in 1868, and assigned the task of guarding federal facilities such as naval dockyards at Halifax, Nova Scotia and Coquitlam, British Columbia and the federal Parliament buildings in Ottawa. They were also responsible for all national security concerns. While the operations of the RNWMP were restricted to the North-West Territories, the Dominion Police operated throughout the country. The force was merged with the RNWMP in 1920, forming the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Unfortunately, little is known of their activities as few of their records remain.
5. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 517, file 1-17 pt. 1, Perry to Borden, October 11, 1916
6. Ibid.
7. NAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, vol. 176, Perry to Borden, November 7, 1916, p. 96055.
8. Ibid., Borden to Sifton, November 25, 1916, p. 96064, and Sifton to Borden, November 27, 1916, p. 96065.
9. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol 517, file 1-17 pt. 1, Certified copy of a report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by his

Excellency the Governor General on the 29th November, 1916, Clerk of the Privy Council, Rodolphe Boudreau to Borden.

10. NAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, vol 176, Borden Premiers Martin, p. 96068, Norris, p. 96069 and Sifton, p. 96070, of Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta, respectively.

11. Numerous authors who have written about the Mounted Police throughout the 20th century, such as Cecil E. Denny The Law Marches West, R.C. Fetherstonhaugh The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, C.W. Harvison The Horsemen, Nora and William Kelly The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: A Century of History and Vernon A. Kemp Without Fear, Favour or Affection: Thirty-Five Years With the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, have adopted the official argument espoused by the government and the RCMP that it was necessary for the federal police to withdraw their services from the western provinces due to manpower shortages that the police were facing.

12. Canada, Sessional Papers, 1914 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.

13. Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1982), p. 47.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 517, file 1-17 pt. 4, Perry to Comptroller Fortesque, July 15, 1916.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Canada, Sessional Papers, 1915 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.

20. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol 508, file 166-16, memorandum re: "Estimates, Royal North-West Mounted Police for 1916-17", October 1, 1915.

21. Ibid., vol. 517, file 1-17 pt. 4, Perry to Comptroller Fortesque, July 15, 1916.
22. Canada, Sessional Papers, 1915 RNWMP, Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 1916 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.
25. Ibid., 1917 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28; and 1918 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.
26. Ibid., 1917 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.
27. Ibid., 1918 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.
28. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 553, file 183 pt. 2, Perry to Comptroller McLean, July 4, 1917.
29. Joseph A. Boudreau, "Western Canada's "Enemy Aliens" in World War One", Alberta Historical Review, vol. 12, no. 1, (Winter, 1964), p. 1.
30. Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, p. 47; and Vernon A. Kemp, Without Fear, Favour or Affection: Thirty-Five Years With the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958), p. 56.
31. Boudreau, "Western Canada's "Enemy Aliens" in World War One", p. 1.
32. Ibid., p. 1.
33. Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, p. 47.
34. Ibid.
35. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 508, file 166-16, "Members of the Mounted Police joining the Expeditionary Forces leaving Canada for the war.", general order no. 8894, August 25, 1914; and Canada, Sessional Papers, 1915 RNWMP Annual Report, sessional paper no. 28.

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Chapter 2

'Alberta's Blue Coated Mounties'¹: Initial Organization, Early Management Problems, Criticisms and Duties of the Alberta Provincial Police

On March 1, 1917, the Alberta Provincial Police officially took over the provincial policing duties of the RNWMP. In reality, the Mounted Police remained at their posts serving Albertans for several more weeks because the APP was not in a position to assume all of its duties on 1st of March.² With the majority of the public strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the RNWMP, it was not a very auspicious beginning for the fledgling law enforcement agency. During its first few years of operations much of the public hostility directed towards the APP stemmed from its attempts to enforce the province's controversial prohibitory liquor legislation. This was in addition to the initial management and organizational problems that the APP faced that resulted in questions about the force's ability to provide proper policing services to the citizens of Alberta. The eventual repeal of the Alberta Liquor Act in 1924 gave the police the opportunity they required to prove to Albertans they were capable of filling the void left by their famed, scarlet-clad predecessors, the Royal North-West Mounted Police. The public's gradual embracing of the APP throughout the mid-late 1920s is testimony to the fact that despite its shortcomings the force was relatively successful in fulfilling the law enforcement needs and expectations of the citizens of the province. Public admiration for Alberta's 'Blue-Coated Mounties' intensified to the point that many strongly protested the decision to disband the force in 1932.

From the outset, the APP faced adversity. The prairie provinces received official notification of Ottawa's intention to cancel the Mounties' provincial policing contracts on November 29th, 1916, leaving Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba approximately one month to organize their own forces. Alberta realized that it was unable to meet this deadline. It requested and was granted an extension to March 1st.³ Beside the obvious time constraint, the Alberta government lacked the necessary financial resources to properly undertake a venture of this kind. This situation would not change and the APP was forced to put up with a shortage of funds throughout its fifteen-year existence. Other factors affecting the early operations of the APP included the emotional attachment many Albertans maintained for the RNWMP, and the provincial force's involvement with Alberta's controversial prohibitory liquor law. Some of the most vocal opponents of the change from the Mounties to the APP were the province's livestock and agricultural associations. The provincial association submitted a petition to the federal government in an attempt to retain the services of the Mounted Police. In part, the petition stated that

the RNWMP, by reason of their semi-military organization, by reason of their tradition and standards which they have ever lived up to and by reason of the prestige which they have, and the rich esteem in which they are held in the province, afford a feeling of security to the settlers in the districts and furnish to them and their property an actual protection which no body of civilian police could render.⁴

A number of other organizations and private citizens joined the attempt to save the Mounties, many sending petitions and writing letters to the provincial and federal governments. For example, Calgary bankers expressed grave concern over the safety of their rural branches,⁵ the Calgary Board of Trade supported the livestock and agricultural associations⁶ and the United Farmers of Alberta passed a resolution at their annual convention urging the provincial government to lobby Ottawa to reverse its decision.⁷ Ironically, once elected to office in 1921, the UFA consistently defended the APP against those who continued to press for a return of the Mounties. In an attempt to end the criticism of the provincial police, Premier Sifton argued that he was a longtime supporter of the RNWMP, but the federal government had initiated the negotiations for change and he could do little to have the Mounties reinstated. Even Prime Minister Borden attempted to quell the uproar by publishing a number of open letters in the province's major newspapers stating that neither Commissioner Perry nor the federal government would reverse the decision to withdraw the Mounties; the letters did little to defuse the controversy.⁸

Sifton had supported the continued presence of the RNWMP in Alberta because they were cost efficient for the province and were controlled by Ottawa, mitigating the possibility of political interference by provincial politicians.⁹ Faced with little choice but to establish a provincial law-enforcement agency, Sifton decided that the new police force should be kept at arm's length so as to minimize its politicization. In response to Sifton's demands, the

government recommended the establishment of a Board of Commissioners, a quasi-independent, government appointed body, that was intended to act as an intermediary between the politicians and the police.¹⁰ The three-man board that fell under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General, was created by an order-in-council on February 2nd, 1917. The three men chosen to sit on the Board were P.C.H. Primrose, Police Magistrate for the City of Edmonton and a former Mounted Policeman who served as Commissioner; A.G. Browning, Deputy Attorney General, Secretary; and G.E. Sanders, Police Magistrate for the City of Calgary, and also a former Mountie.¹¹ They were granted the authority to set forth general policies and guide-lines for the force in association with the Superintendent, oversee the hiring and dismissal of all personnel, and review all financial matters pertaining ¹² At their first meeting on February 3rd, the Commissioners selected their senior commanders, whose duty it would be to assist with the organization of the force and the screening of applicants.¹³ The Board chose A & C. MacDonnell and J.D. Nicholson, both former Mounted Policemen, for the position of Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, respectively;¹⁴ these men were responsible for the daily administering of the force and for the actions of their officers.¹⁵ The Commissioners also selected men for the rank of Inspector, who served as divisional commanders and assisted with the establishment of their respective offices.¹⁶

Most of the men applying for positions with the APP were either Mounties near the end of their term of engagement, or former

Mounties. This was a boon to the senior command in the sense that they required men with previous law enforcement and organizational experience, so the APP could assume all of its duties from the RNWMP as soon as possible. W.C. Bryan, Jr., a former provincial policeman, and grandson of APP Commissioner, W.C. Bryan, suggests that a large number of Mounties joined the APP because they were looking for a change from the militaristic training regimen emphasized by the Mounted Police and an opportunity to perform investigative police work. Many of these same men were attracted to the new force because the APP did not restrict its members from marrying.¹⁷ The large number of Mounties expressing an interest in the APP initially concerned Commissioner Perry of the RNWMP, who suspected the new police force of actively recruiting his men. Alberta Provincial Police Commission Chairman P.C.H. Primrose, assured Perry that he had nothing to fear, but requested that he be kept informed as to the status of any men near the end of their term of engagement or those that did not intend to re-engage with the federal force.¹⁸ By the time the APP was disbanded in 1932, roughly eighty per cent of those who had served in the APP throughout its fifteen-year existence had been Mounted Policemen.¹⁹ It is not surprising that the organizational structure of the APP was modelled after its famed federal counterpart, as this was the logical and natural pattern for the Commissioners and the senior command to follow.

Alberta Provincial Police headquarters was located in Edmonton and housed the offices of the Superintendent, his assistant

and their staff which included several civilian secretaries, a bookkeeper and a tailor. The province was initially divided into four divisional jurisdictions with "A" Division headquartered in Edmonton, "B" Division in Red Deer, "C" Division in Calgary and "D" Division in Lethbridge. In 1918, "E" Division, with its office located in Peace River, was created from territory that was previously part of "A" Division.²⁰ "E" Division was subsequently divided into two sub-districts in 1920, with Peace River remaining the headquarters of "E1" and Grande Prairie becoming the headquarters for "E2".²¹ (see figure one) Superintendent Bryan cited two reasons for the change. First, it quickly became apparent that "A" Division encompassed too vast an area to be properly administered from Edmonton. This situation was complicated by the influx of settlers to the Peace River district following the conclusion of hostilities in November 1918. Second, according to the police, the discovery of oil at Fort Norman in the North-West Territories added to the number of single men of "many nationalities" including con artists, speculators, and a variety of "thugs" of the worst kind, travelling throughout the northern region of the province.²² The law enforcement and justice community, which was almost exclusively comprised individuals of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity, anticipated an increase in the crime rate due to the increase in the number of foreigners in the region. The police believed that by increasing their visibility in the region they would dissuade many who were contemplating illegal ventures.

The five divisional regions of the province were divided into sub-districts and detachments. Sub-districts were located in larger towns such as Medicine Hat, or on major railway lines and transport routes, such as Drumheller and Westaskiwin. Detachments were located in smaller communities, situated throughout the province according to population concentrations. The APP began its operations in 1917 with forty-eight detachments, nearly doubling this number to seventy-four by the end of 1918.²³ Although the number of posts peaked in 1930 at 105, the APP operated an average of 90-95 detachments throughout the province.²⁴ (see table one) The majority of these offices were manned by a single constable, who were each responsible for a vast area of land. Edward Buchanan, who was assigned to the Wembley detachment west of Grande Prairie for several years, stated that his jurisdiction extended over an area in excess of 10,000 square miles.²⁵ This system of one-man detachments was frowned upon by the senior command which did not consider it conducive to proper discipline nor efficient policing. Due to the fact that the force was perennially short of financial resources, it was not able to hire the necessary manpower which would have given its commanders the option of deploying two men at every detachment.²⁶

Determining the extent of discipline maintained within the force is a difficult task as there is very little surviving and available documentation, and the former APP constables who have been interviewed would not discuss the issue at length. Edward Buchanan, R.E. Clark, Frank Rodberg and W.C. Bryan, Jr., all made a

point of stating that senior commanders were strict, but fair.²⁷ Rodberg noted, that Commissioner Bryan

didn't go for anything that would bring disgrace to the force. He tried to keep his men under full control, and I think he is probably one of the main reasons the APP had a good name. He was very fair and conscious of what the public thought of the police force.²⁸

Rodberg added that Commissioner Bryan spoke to him prior to his departure for his new posting in Peace River, advising him that if he embarrassed the APP, and therefore was unable to maintain the support and confidence of those he served because of a neglect of his sworn duties, he, not the public, would suffer the consequences.²⁹ R.E. Clark and W.C. Bryan, Jr. noted that the senior men assumed a paternalistic role, disciplining the men when necessary, but not in a militaristic fashion and helping the men with personal problems when they could.³⁰ Superintendent Bryan stated in a May 1922 letter to Inspector J.W. Hancock at Peace River, that not all disciplinary cases were black and white. Bryan added that as long as the offence committed was not a grievous crime, the officer in question should be given a second chance if he appeared prepared to welcome the assistance of his superiors and especially if he had the support of his commanding officer.³¹ In relation to the case that initiated Bryan's and Hancock's correspondence, the Superintendent stated that rather than dismissing Constable McCarthy because of his alcoholism, he should be given the opportunity to take a vow of sobriety and begin anew at a different posting.³² Interestingly enough, the McCarthy case occurred in 1922; thus he was not only

breaking police regulations but a provincial law, and an extremely controversial one at that.

Alcoholism existed within the ranks of the force, as did consumption by policemen during prohibition. Frank Rodberg recalled that two of his friends on the force developed serious drinking problems and attributed them to the constant pressure of the job and the loneliness that some of the single men endured at a number of the APP's more remote detachments.³³ Serge Zolotoohin openly admitted in his autobiography, Sentenced to Adventure, that during the two years he served on the force, 1926-28, he often consumed the liquor he had confiscated from others, as opposed to destroying it.³⁴ Elise Corbet, author of the study "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew, Alberta" has uncovered evidence to suggest that Constable Reay enjoyed his drink, and certainly consumed more than his superiors would have deemed acceptable for a man in his position.³⁵ Alcoholism was probably not as grave a problem for the APP as it was for the NWMP before the turn of the century, but it is clear from the annual reports that a number of men over the years were disciplined for being drunk while on duty, or for having a problem with alcohol.³⁶ In reference to the McCarthy case, the force's actions clearly demonstrate a desire on behalf of the senior command to deal with the problems of its members as opposed to firing an individual for one mistake. This approach to disciplinary problems was favoured by the police because the force wished to minimize the possibility of negative criticism by either the public or disgruntled members who believed they had been badly treated or

wrongfully dismissed. Serious crimes perpetrated by officers of the law were another matter and these men were dealt with in the same fashion as any other offender.

The senior command believed that the maintenance of a positive image, brought about in part by good discipline within the force, was important because maintaining the support and respect of the public was crucial if the APP was to successfully enforce the law.³⁷ This view was shared by the government, as noted in a November, 1922 letter to the Commissioner from Attorney General Brownlee. Brownlee stated that the public quickly recognizes if an officer is conscientious about completing his duties. The Attorney General judged an officer's success by the level of public confidence expressed in him by the people he served, adding that most of the correspondence he received was favourable.³⁸ Brownlee indicated that the government would not hesitate to become involved should an officer find himself at odds with the citizens that he served, as it was imperative to minimize the criticism that had 'dogged' the force, as a result of its replacement of the RNWMP and its enforcement of the province's liquor act.

I may say that I have endeavoured to offset the feeling that is still prevalent that things would be better if the Mounted Police returned, and I am particularly anxious to deal with any district in which there is much criticism before the House meets so that no member shall have an opportunity to find fault with any police officer.³⁹

Constable Reay's transfer to Andrew from Rimbey in 1925, after the Attorney General received a petition from the residents of Rimbey

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Constable Reay's transfer to Andrew from Rimbey in 1925, after the Attorney General received a petition from the residents of Rimbey

complaining about Reay's behaviour and suspected involvement with local moonshiners, is a further example of the senior command's and government's policy of reassigning officers to new detachments in order to minimize public controversy and dealing with member's personal problems.⁴⁰

The little documentation pertaining to internal disciplinary matters that is available is limited to the force's annual reports; this amounts to brief references under the headings "Engagements and Discharges" or "Conduct and Discipline". These sections do not usually state the reasons why members were dismissed, nor the names of those involved and only cover those cases involving the junior members of the force.⁴¹ Nor is it possible to determine the exact number of men dismissed, as this information is not complete. The data suggest an average of four or five men were dismissed from the force annually, meaning that less than 100 men were released from the force for misconduct over the APP's fifteen-year existence. Not surprisingly, the annual rate was higher during the prohibition era, with as many as eight or nine men dismissed each year.⁴² It is quite likely that cases involving senior officers were kept as quiet as possible so as to avoid further public criticism, negative press and calls for a return of the Mounted Police. The extent of the explanations provided in the reports varies from year to year, but as a rule, these write-ups only list the number of men who retired, resigned, purchased their discharges or were dismissed for misconduct, inefficiency or unsuitability for the job.⁴³ The 1921 report, for example, only lists the number of men in each category,

whereas the 1926 report, includes the names of the officers in question.⁴⁴

What constituted acceptable and unacceptable behaviour was dependent upon a number of factors including where an officer was posted, his commanding officer's expectations, the availability of competent men and an officer's relationship with the citizens he served. Reprimands, fines, demotions, and dismissals were handed down for a variety of reasons ranging from misdemeanours such as improper dress and failing to maintain one's quarters and equipment, to more serious charges such as allowing a prisoner to escape custody, falsifying documents or immoral conduct, such as behaviour unbecoming an officer.⁴⁵ It is reasonable to suggest that some of the less important regulations were not strictly enforced due to the constant shortage of manpower and resources, as well as the varied and extensive number of duties officers were expected to perform and the lack of inspections. Elise Corbet notes that Constable William Reay was usually without his jacket while working in and around the office, and did not, as a rule, wear it properly fastened while on patrol.⁴⁶ Numerous photos from the collection of Muriel Dunn, one of Reay's daughters, depict her father in uniform but with buttons undone, the lanyard too loose, often without a hat and smoking either a pipe or cigarette.⁴⁷ Technically, Reay should have been reprimanded for his "slovenliness", but due to the infrequency of inspections and his popularity within the community, his substandard appearance was never reported. As a result, Reay's name

never appeared in the defaulter's book, and his discharge record from the APP in 1932 read "very good".⁴⁸

Provincial police commanders did not have the time to carry out regular and surprise inspections. Inspector Piper of "A" Division explained in his 1927 annual report that, "... owing to the large amount of work requiring my attention at Headquarters, I found it impossible to visit many detachments."⁴⁹ When inspections did occur, constables always seemed to receive fair warning, giving them ample time to clean and repair their equipment, the detachment office and quarters and catch up on any neglected paper work.⁵⁰ Detachments such as Andrew, that were not easily accessible by either rail or automobile, received even fewer inspections, as it took a great deal of valuable time to reach them.⁵¹ The small number of charges, mostly minor infractions, laid against members of the force between 1917 and 1932 is indicative of the infrequency of inspection tours.⁵²

Although some of the men may have delayed or postponed the completion of their duties, the nature of their work brought them into constant contact with fellow APP, RNWMP/RCMP and local constabulary officers, justices, community leaders and the general public on a daily basis, all of whom would likely report any serious breaches of police regulations or neglect of duty to the senior command. In addition to living up to the daily scrutiny of those served, officers were required to file a variety of regular reports with their superiors; failing to do so would bring about a swift

response. Inspector J.S. Piper of "A" Division stated in his 1927 annual report that although he was unable to make as many inspection tours as he would have liked, he was confident that his men were completing their duties: "...with the system of reports forwarded by every detachment in the Division, I am in a position to know that the various duties have been faithfully carried out."⁵³ It is quite likely that discipline within the APP was not as rigorously enforced as some of the commanders would have preferred or enforced equally throughout the province, but given the conditions at hand, the senior administration had little choice but to trust their officers in the field.

The APP's initial recruiting campaign was launched immediately following the hiring of the senior commanders. The Morning Albertan reported on February 17th that the Commissioners had received 295 applications shortly after the force announced it was in need of about 100 men.⁵⁴ Section five of the 1917 APP Act permitted the Board of Commissioners and the senior officers to hire as many as 150 men; increased to 500 in 1922. The provincial force averaged 180-185 members throughout the 1920s, peaking at 205 men in 1931. (see table one) Over the fifteen years that the force existed, 708 men served in the APP; the longest period of service being fifteen years, the shortest, one day.⁵⁵ Because the APP placed greater emphasis on investigative police work, rather than military drills, and maintained no restrictions against married men, many still serving in the federal force who wanted to marry

and ex-members who had quit in order to start a family found the provincial force very attractive.⁵⁶

The official requirements for new recruits were set forth in section eight of the 1917 APP Act. Applicants had to be, "a British subject of sound constitution, able-bodied, not less than 21 nor more than 36 years of age and able to read and write the English language legibly."⁵⁷ Furthermore, successful applicants had to be at least 5 feet 9 inches in height, with chest measurements of 36 inches, and weigh at least 160 pounds. They were required to produce two letters of recommendation from individuals of lengthy acquaintance, attesting to sound moral character and they needed to pass a medical examination.⁵⁸ Those applicants that were accepted by the APP were required to take an oath of allegiance, promising to "faithfully, diligently and impartially execute and perform the duties required ... as a member of the Alberta Provincial Police", to "truly obey and perform all lawful orders and instructions", and to carry out their responsibilities "without fear, favour, or affection for or towards any person".⁵⁹

Unofficially, the hiring practices of the APP suggest that for almost the entire first decade of the force's operations, senior officers were only interested in recruiting men of Anglo, Nordic or Francophone backgrounds, who, preferably, had been raised in the rural west.⁶⁰ The increase in the size of the immigrant population in Canada since 1896 concerned the Anglo establishment, who believed that the Canadian way of life and culture was under siege

from this influx of foreigners. Thus the Anglo majority was of the opinion that it was their responsibility to 'Canadianize' or 'Anglicize' the immigrant populations. From this point of view the police were regarded in the same light as the schools: they were part of a system that was geared to ensuring that Canada's new arrivals became loyal, honest, hardworking citizens who adopted the ways of the Anglo majority. It was for this reason that the police, like most businesses and governments, required all prospective recruits to divulge personal information pertaining to their ethnic background and religious affiliation.⁶¹ Edward Buchanan concurs that not until the mid-1920s was the first man hired by the force who was not of Anglo Saxon or Francophone background. Buchanan noted that when these individuals were finally accepted by the force the main reason they were hired was that they could speak a second language, usually Ukrainian, Finnish, Russian, Italian or one of the other Eastern or Southern European languages; beside their obvious communication skills, they also understood the customs and outlook on life of the various ethnic groups in question. These same officers were important because they could be used to infiltrate social, labour and political organizations dominated by immigrants. Although the APP was involved in this type of undercover and coercive activity, Edward Buchanan stated that the RCMP hired a far greater number of non-Anglo officers for such purposes.⁶²

Ethnic background and previous police experience aside, former constables Buchanan, Rodberg and Bryan stated during interviews that most members of the provincial police were fairly well

educated men, from working or middle class families who had been exposed to people who were involved in the criminal justice system or the military. An education was important for the obvious reason that officers had to be able to read and write, but it was also important from the stand-point that a police officer required good communication and social skills. Edward Buchanan, for example, completed his schooling in Scotland, and took a number of upgrading courses at night through the now defunct Edmonton Technical School while working, before applying to the APP. His brother, William, had been a Mounted Policeman for about three years prior to both of them joining the provincial police. Edward stated that both he and his brother, William, developed an interest in the law because their father had been a magistrate in Glasgow, Scotland and told them of his experiences on the bench as they were growing up.⁶³ Frank Rodberg enrolled in the Jesuit College in Edmonton en route to a classical education but did not have the necessary financial resources to complete his degree. Having heard that the provincial police might be in need of radio operators and having a longtime interest in crystal sets and radio transmission, he set out to attain his International Radio Code Certificate. Rodberg's grandfather had also been a Justice of the Peace and had numerous tales regarding the law which he passed on to his grandson. Rodberg's interest in the police was also fostered by the fact that he grew up with Inspector Piper's children and was introduced to Superintendent Hancock's family by way of his sister. Rodberg noted that he developed a great deal of respect for both of these men over the years, and as a child, wanted to "be like them".⁶⁴ W.C. Bryan, Jr. also finished high school

and trained as a radio operator before joining the force. One might say that he came by his interest in the force 'naturally' because his grandfather served in the Mounties, worked for the provincial court system for several years and served as an Inspector, the Assistant Superintendent, Superintendent and Commissioner of the APP during his fifteen-year career with the force.⁶⁵

Not all the members of the APP, however, finished school and according to former constable R E Clark, nor was it always necessary. Following his mother's death, Clark quit school, having completed grade nine, so he could help his father on the family farm.⁶⁶ From the time that he left school to the time that he was old enough to join the APP at twenty-one, Mr. Clark held several jobs, including farming, bridge building and railway construction.⁶⁷ Clark claimed that as long as a person could pass the physical, "... they didn't give a darn. If you had a grade eight education, and were tall enough, they'd take you right on."⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, Clark became a policeman because his father and his brother had both served in the NWMP/RNWMP.⁶⁹ Elise Corbet's study of the Andrew police post concurs with Mr. Clark's statements, regarding the education levels of successful applicants. The grammar and spelling mistakes in Constable William Reay's reports clearly indicate that he was not a very well educated man.⁷⁰ The fact that some of the men might not have finished the equivalent of high school was obviously not considered a significant detriment by commanders, especially if the individual had police experience and a good record. For those that had no previous experience in the field of law

enforcement, the APP attempted to deal with any inadequacies by offering a number of mandatory short courses.⁷¹ Although the official regulations stipulated that a good education was required, the force was not adverse to accepting under-qualified applicants such as Reay and Clark, who otherwise met or surpassed all other guide-lines, if it found itself short of applicants.

Although there were some similarities between the APP and the Mounted Police, one significant difference was the training procedure recruits underwent, or lack thereof, in the case of APP. Upon joining the Mounties, candidates underwent an official six-month training program. Prior to World War II, the regimen emphasized military drills as opposed to police investigation skills and legal training. Former RCMP Commissioner, C.W. Harvison noted in his book The Horsemen that the training he underwent in 1920 was very similar to that in the military. Upon returning to Regina in 1931-1932 for an additional three months' instruction, he noted that there was more emphasis on modern policing techniques but activities such as riding, shooting and riot training remained an important part of the daily routine.⁷² Edward Buchanan stated that his brother William, who joined the Mounted Police in 1913, reported a similar experience to that described by Harvison.⁷³ W.C. Bryan, Jr., who served in the provincial force as a radio operator during 1931-1932 and went on to a lengthy career in the Mounted Police, concurred with both Buchanan and Harvison.⁷⁴ Edward Buchanan pointed out that new members of the federal force often sought the advice of their former APP colleagues. Upon joining the Mounties in

1932, he found that he was continually giving advice to his federal co-workers, many of whom were skilled horsemen but had little understanding of investigative police work.⁷⁵

To the despair of the APP command and especially Commissioner Bryan, there were never sufficient financial resources to institute a formal training program for new recruits. Edward Buchanan noted that the 'training' members received could be likened to an apprenticeship. Following basic orientation at APP Headquarters and "A" Division in Edmonton, recruits began by studying the Criminal Code, which they had to purchase for themselves. Recruits also had to purchase a number of other legal texts, a small veterinary handbook, a typewriter and many other basic supplies which the force was unable to supply on a regular basis.⁷⁶ Senior officers lectured and tested candidates on subjects such as basic procedures and protocol. According to Edward Buchanan, study time was limited to off-duty hours because the men were constantly on the go.⁷⁷ The first assignment for most recruits was guard duty at the old cell block in Edmonton and escorting prisoners to and from the Fort Saskatchewan jail.⁷⁸ Within several weeks of joining the force, new members began accompanying experienced officers on calls, preparing their own reports upon returning to the station and performing highway patrol, which entailed enforcement of the vehicles and highways acts and night patrol of towns to ensure all was peaceful.⁷⁹ Edward Buchanan stated that this type of hands-on-experience was the corner stone of the 'training' program and that most recruits caught on very

quickly. He added that for those men bound for one-man detachments, this practical experience was invaluable.⁸⁰

Commissioner Bryan continually lobbied the government for extra funding so as to establish a formal training programme emphasizing investigative techniques and legal studies.⁸¹ The Commissioner argued that this type of training was imperative if his men were to deliver a high level of service and keep pace with the latest technological and procedural developments in the realm of law enforcement but his requests for additional funds were continually rejected by the Alberta government.⁸² Direct criticism of the APP by Attorney General Boyle in 1920, resulting from a number of lost and dismissed cases because of inadequate and inaccurate information provided to crown attorneys by the police, indicates that Bryan was correct in his assessment of the need for legal and procedural training for his men. By the late 1920s, Bryan was suggesting that criminology courses be established at the University of Alberta, for anyone wishing to become a peace officer. Judges, lawyers, businessmen, leading citizens, newspapers and the Deputy Attorney General, George Henwood, supported the idea, but this too was ignored by the government.⁸³ Police Magistrate and former Chairman of the APP Board of Commissioners, P.C.H. Primrose stated in an Edmonton Journal interview that he supported Bryan's proposed criminology classes because modern police forces required experts highly trained in the fields of ballistics, finger printing, photography and similar sciences.⁸⁴ Alberta's chief justice stated in a Calgary Herald article that these types of courses would be of

great assistance and in the interest of police efficiency.⁸⁵ W.C. Bryan, Jr. stated in a September 1987 interview that the lack of a proper training program for the men was of particular concern to his grandfather because,

A large percentage of the recruits were ex-RCMP types, and it soon became evident that they might look smart in uniform, but that they were not policemen, and that training was required. He (Commissioner Bryan) was responsible for overseeing the writing of a constable's manual and they had training courses in Edmonton that everyone was required to pass through at some stage at the game.⁸⁶

Despite limited financial resources, Commissioner Bryan did his best to stay abreast of new developments in the area of law enforcement. Bryan kept in contact with his associates throughout Canada and the United States, especially those in the north-west, to ensure that the APP was up to date with the latest procedures and techniques. During the early and mid-1920s, Inspectors Hancock and Bavin travelled to London for training and upgrading courses at Scotland Yard.⁸⁷

Limited funding by the government was a perennial problem for the APP, affecting every facet of its operations. Annual expenditures for the period 1918-1922 averaged approximately \$445,000.00. This represented about five and half percent of the Alberta government's total annual revenue. The average level of police expenditures remained constant throughout the 1920s, increasing slightly for the years 1930-1932. Throughout this same period of time, provincial

revenues increased by two and a half times, from \$6.3 million in 1918 to \$15.7 million in 1931 before declining to \$13.5 million in 1932. Therefore, in terms of total government annual revenues the cost of operating the police declined by two to three percentage points. Wages consistently accounted for approximately two-thirds of all police expenditures, leaving an average of \$145,000.00 a year for operating and capital costs, a sum which declined to less than \$130,000.00 during the early to mid 1920s.⁸⁸ (see table two) As a result, the force was unable to provide necessities such as boots for its members until 1927,⁸⁹ new motor vehicles (the police constantly complained of being outmanoeuvred and outdistanced by rum-runners in faster and more powerful cars), radio systems, new firearms (the APP inherited the Mounties' obsolete 45-75 Winchester Carbines, purchased by the NWMP in 1873), or proper training.⁹⁰

Once APP officers began working in the field, they had a multitude of official and unofficial responsibilities to fulfil. According to the 1917 APP Act, it was the duty of each officer to preserve the peace, prevent crime, enforce provincial laws and the Criminal Code of Canada, apprehend criminals, ensure the proper execution of all warrants and to see to the safe transport of prisoners, convicts and lunatics from courts, prisons, asylums and all other places of arrest or detention.⁹¹ Of special concern to the law makers drafting the APP Act was the role of provincial police regarding the enforcement of prohibition; indeed those responsible for drafting the law devoted an entire chapter of the 1917 APP act

to this issue. While this would be expected for a special force created for the purpose of enforcing a specific law or set of laws such as the Drug Enforcement Agency in the United States, it is rather unusual during the early part of the 20th century in the case of a civilian police force responsible for an array of duties. This section of the Act authorized the police to search, seize and destroy any liquor found on any person or in any building, and to search such places on the basis of probable grounds.⁹² Unlike today where the police must obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search, Edward Buchanan recalled that some members of the APP, himself included, were issued a writ of assistance from the Exchequer Court of Canada: "... this was issued to members of the force who were considered responsible, and that gave you the right to search in any home or building in Canada, you didn't have to get a warrant."⁹³

In addition to enforcing laws, the APP's vast array of duties included inspecting restaurants, theatres, factories and billiard rooms and the checking of their licenses; locating missing persons; serving as game and fire guardians; investigating cases of neglected children, and of illegal trapping; checking backgrounds of people applying for chauffeur's and liquor licenses; collecting the fur tax; enforcing the Noxious Weed, Domestic Animals, Vehicles and Traffic, School Attendance, Public Health and the Workmen's Compensation Acts; selling game, fishing, trapping and liquor permits; distributing Mother's Pensions to widows and relief to the destitute; caring for and escorting lunatics; collecting hospital fees, and protecting the belongings of those who were wards of the province.⁹⁴ The Act also

reminded constables that the"... prevention of crime is of even greater importance than the punishment of criminals ... (and) obedience is the first quality required of them. It is the essence of discipline and the channel of advancement."⁹⁵ Officially, "A steady and impartial line of conduct" accompanied by cleanliness, sobriety, orderly habits and a visible respect for all classes of people were seen as vital components of a policeman's character and behaviour.⁹⁶

Cleanliness, and little details in the matter of dress, courtesy to the public and the energetic manner in performing your duties, count largely with the Public. Endeavour to become acquainted with everyone in your district; and in visiting small towns you should call on the mayor, clergymen, and any other prominent person, and introduce yourself: enquire into the conditions of things in the town or village, showing them that you are taking an interest in your work; and you will find in most cases they will respond cheerfully in giving you information.⁹⁷

Superintendent Bryan stated this in a 1918 APP circular memorandum, stressing the importance of making a good impression and staying abreast of the events in one's jurisdiction.

Unofficially, the day-to-day routine of a policeman included a vast array of responsibilities, especially for those in one-man detachments. In many of the remote towns and villages there was no one else for the general public to turn to for advice or assistance in the case of an emergency. Edward Buchanan noted that "It was all your job; everything! You had to do the whole works".⁹⁸ Policemen were often the sole government representative in the region and,

therefore, forced to 'wear many hats' during the course of a day. Frank Rodberg stated that the only thing consistent about one's routine was that "No two days were alike", with the general exception of Sunday, which was usually quiet.⁹⁹ According to Edward Buchanan, officers assumed an array of roles ranging from father confessor to social convener for sports and cultural events, to coroner, to veterinary assistant, to prosecutor.¹⁰⁰ Attending the local cultural festivities, dances and sporting events to ensure that matters did not 'get out of hand' was also important from a community relations point of view. Buchanan recalls that in the summer, towns hosted 'Sport Days', "... you had booze coming in causing trouble, and usually all of these little country towns had a little bit of a stampede, and that's what caused trouble ... you were on the go pretty steady."¹⁰¹

Because the police were expected to fulfil such a vast array of duties, many beyond the realm of what we today have become accustomed to think of as police work, it was important for officers to fit in and become acquainted with the community they were assigned to as soon as possible. Edward Buchanan noted that successful policemen developed a good rapport with the citizens of the communities they served. "When you are living in a detachment like that you become a part of the community."¹⁰² Buchanan added that in order for officers to be successful, it was necessary that they present themselves to the citizenry as a friend first, and a policeman second, because they often found themselves turning to these people for assistance. Often they required someone to help

guard or assist with an unruly prisoner, or needed to use their telephone, or a place to stay for the night while on patrol.¹⁰³ Prudent officers refrained from pressing charges for every minor violation of the law. Elise Corbet's evidence suggests that Constable Reay, for example, preferred to give individuals a stern warning following their first offence, or stall for time in order to allow those involved in less serious incidents time to 'cool off' before proceeding with charges.¹⁰⁴ Finding mutually satisfactory solutions to minor problems proved to be a much more successful method of keeping the peace and gaining the trust and respect of the public.¹⁰⁵ According to Frank Rodberg, ensuring that the law was not broken and capturing criminals were an officer's most important duties, but it was critical for a policeman to keep in mind that most cases were not black and white. He added that it was increasingly important to show compassion for those experiencing economic and family difficulties, especially when jobs were scarce and if the individual involved in an incident had a good reputation and the nature of the crime was not serious.¹⁰⁶

Nowhere was the development of a trusting relationship between police and the public more important than in communities dominated by recently arrived immigrants who were unfamiliar with the customs and laws of their newly adopted homeland. Other than the obvious language barrier that had to be bridged, establishment of such a rapport was often hampered by deep seated fear, mistrust and misunderstanding of one another. The Anglo-Canadian establishment found itself facing a dilemma once large numbers of foreigners from

southern and eastern Europe began arriving in Canada in the 1890s. The establishment feared the socio-political impact these people would have on Anglo-Canadian culture, particularly those from cultures that were significantly different from the Anglo-Saxon heritage, yet they valued and required the physical contribution that these people made to the development of the nation.¹⁰⁷ Those who emigrated to Canada from countries such as Italy, Ukraine or Russia did so for one of two reasons: first, to earn extra money so as to improve their standard of living at home; or second, and more commonly, to escape repressive regimes. One feature common to all of these regimes was the role of the police or gendarme in the subjugation of the working and peasant classes.¹⁰⁸ As part of their cultural baggage, when these people arrived in Canada they feared the police and looked upon them with suspicion and mistrust.¹⁰⁹ Suspicion of authority figures was not helped by the police's paternalistic attitude and involvement in a system that sought to Canadianize or Anglicize these people by eradicating their own customs and language. As Steven Paul Boddington argues in his thesis, "The Alberta Liquor Control Board, 1924-1935", it was the goal of the ALCB to reform the unacceptable drinking habits of "outsiders" as part of a larger scheme that included the education system, the police, the courts, protestant churches, charitable organizations and the government.¹¹⁰

The APP was of the opinion that the acculturation process was not an easy task, as many Eastern European immigrants were generally thought to be a lawless lot, determined to live by their

own set of rules, as opposed to adopting the laws and customs of Canada.¹¹¹ Throughout the period 1917-1932, most police commanders were of the opinion that the rise in the level of violent crime and the radicalization of the union movement were directly related to an increase in the number of non-Anglo, non-Nordic immigrants settling in Alberta. Commissioner Cuddy stated in his 1921 annual report that Alberta was difficult to police "owing to its cosmopolitan population".¹¹² Members of the APP often stated in their reports that many of the immigrant groups residing in Alberta neither afforded them the respect nor the assistance the police deserved, which, no doubt, contributed to the view that the immigrant populations were largely an unlawful, undisciplined lot.¹¹³ Time did little to change the view of the senior command of the force. In a 1927 letter to Attorney General Lymburn, Commissioner Bryan noted that the foreign-born element was,

drawn from every country on the globe, the majority of them uneducated, except in the most radical ideas of the present time. They have to be taught respect for the law and educated into being law abiding citizens.¹¹⁴

Several months later, in the March 1928 edition of The Canadian Police Gazette magazine, Commissioner W.C. Bryan singled out what he referred to as the "Slav race" in an article entitled "The Alberta Provincial Police", accusing them of committing some of the worst crimes imaginable.¹¹⁵ Later that same year Bryan reiterated these concerns in the force's annual report, noting a rise in the number of serious crimes committed by foreigners whom he accused of taking the law into their own hands to settle disputes.¹¹⁶ The fact that the

Commissioner singled out those of Slavic descent is somewhat misleading, as anyone who was not white, of Anglo-Saxon heritage and a believer in the protestant faith felt the establishment's discrimination to lesser or greater degree. Inspector Risk's 1920 annual report clearly demonstrates that the police were neither particular nor concerned about distinguishing one group from another. For example, Risk's report contains a passing reference to the large number of Mormons in the Cardston district of "D" division in which he lumped them together with Mennonites and other "Russian fanatics" indicating that so far as he was concerned these groups were one in the same. It is clear that anyone who did not generally conform to the Anglo culture was considered potentially dangerous.¹¹⁷

There is no denying that Canada's immigrant population committed its share of crimes and that there was a degree of fanaticism among groups such as the Doukhobors, but not to the extent that was intimated by the APP's reports and correspondence. As Elise Corbet points out, most newly arrived immigrants were simply looking for a means to improve their lives and to do so as quietly as possible, avoiding confrontations with the authorities. Many were willing and anxious to learn and adopt the customs of their new homeland, but this was not always immediately feasible for financial and cultural reasons.¹¹⁸ An examination of the force's criminal case files indicates that contrary to the collective opinion of the Anglo establishment, including many members of the senior command of the APP, individuals of non-Anglo-Saxon origin were not

responsible for the majority of the violent or serious crimes.¹¹⁹ It is interesting to note, however, that Commissioners Cuddy and Bryan and the commanders of "A" and "E" divisions, Edmonton and Peace River/Grande Prairie, respectively, tended to associate foreigners with the occurrence of violent crimes more frequently than their counterparts serving in other regions of the province.¹²⁰ The following points relating to this situation are worth noting and may explain why these members of the senior command associated an increase in the level of crime with foreigners. Many of Alberta's non-Anglo, post-World War I immigrants were poor, and therefore settled in north-central and northern Alberta where inexpensive homestead land was still available. This large influx and concentration of individuals into hitherto sparsely populated areas was bound to result in an increase in the number of violations of the law and require increased policing in such a regions. Many of these violations were due to the fact the individuals in question were unfamiliar with the laws and customs of their adopted homeland. In addition, in areas heavily populated by persons of a particular ethnic background, common sense suggests that they will be responsible for the majority of the criminal activity in that region; such was the case, for example, in east-central Alberta where individuals of Slavic and Ukrainian lineage accounted for a large segment of the population. Unquestionably Alberta's immigrant populations committed their share of crimes, but these numbers have been singled out by those who found it convenient to blame immigrants for many of society's ailments. Newly arrived foreigners were easy targets for criticism due to their noticeably different cultural and

economic backgrounds. Much of the anger aimed at the immigrant populations stemmed from a fear that the increase of their population would result in the erosion of the power of the Anglo establishment and the mongrelization of the Anglo-Canadian culture.

The opinion of the men in the field was somewhat different from that of their superiors. Discrimination existed, but to what extent is difficult to determine as each situation was different and depended on the officer involved and the communities he served. According to Frank Rodberg and William Buchanan, there was a degree of lawlessness in the remote areas of the province, but most of the people were honest, hard working individuals.¹²¹ Buchanan suggested that following a period of adjustment and given a period of time to overcome any initial fears of settling in a new land, most people were eager to learn the laws of the country.¹²² With the help of interpreters, the police had an opportunity to explain the role of the police and the way the law worked in Canada. Over time, as the level of trust between immigrants and police officers increased they not only began to appreciate one another's needs and concerns but those of non-Anglo background began to assume responsibilities within the legal system, serving as justices and eventually police officers. William Buchanan recalled several Ukrainian justices in the Smokey Lake district with whom he worked closely and developed good relationship.¹²³ The prudent officer worked to win the favour of those he served, regardless of nationality, by acting in their interest and applying the law fairly. It is important to remember that sometimes officers were on their own or part of a very small

minority in these isolated communities. Repeated mismanagement of situations, favouritism or unfair treatment would inevitably lead to a disregard of the officer and the law in general.¹²⁴ With the passage of time and a greater understanding of each other's situation, what began as a rather confrontational coexistence evolved into a peaceful accommodation. The Anglo dominated community did not relinquish their attitudes regarding their own superiority, but accepted the fact that their demand for quick and absolute 'acculturation' was an impossible goal.

The work performed by the police on a day-to-day basis depended upon an officer's posting and the time of year. Members of the force spent a great deal of time during the the first six years of its existence attempting to enforce prohibition and quelling violence on the picket lines of a number of strikes during the height of the labour radicalism of the late teens and the early 1920s. Duties were also determined by the likelihood of a particular type of offence being committed in one jurisdiction as opposed to another. Car theft, for example, was much more likely in Calgary or Edmonton than rural areas because there were a greater number of vehicles in the cities. Auto thefts also declined during the winter as fewer people operated their vehicles during the colder months. For those serving in remote, one-man detachments such as Wemblay, where Edward Buchanan served for several years, the horse was still relied upon as the primary mode of transportation. In such cases tending to one's steed was the first duty of the day. This was followed by any number of duties including regular patrols, investigation of complaints or

crimes, preparation for court or the completion of one's regular reports.¹²⁵ Most of the crimes reported and handled by the APP, regardless of location, were of a less serious nature. They included common assault, petty theft, vagrancy, and violation of the Masters and Servants Ordinance, the Motor Vehicles, Public Health, Insanity and various liquor acts and the War Measures, Military Service and Alien acts until their repeal following the war.¹²⁶ In contrast to the daily routine and duties of Edward and William Buchanan and Frank Rodberg who served in smaller, northern detachments, R.E. Clark was assigned to the Lethbridge divisional detachment where he spent a great deal of his time on highway patrol, keeping the peace during labour disputes in the coal mining districts of the Crow's Nest Pass and Lethbridge and pursuing bootleggers in addition to his regular patrols and investigation assignments.¹²⁷ Unlike detachment constables who were responsible for a wide range of daily duties within their jurisdictions, it was the responsibility of detectives assigned to the various divisional headquarters throughout the province to investigate all complicated cases and unsolved crimes. Finally, it was the role of the APP's Headquarters' staff to deal with administrative matters, internal investigations, communications and special details.¹²⁸

Those duties that the members of the force disliked the most were the transport of prisoners and mental patients, mediating labour disputes and the enforcement of the province's prohibition laws; (the latter will be discussed in chapter three). Former policeman Frank Rodberg noted that the transport of prisoners to

divisional headquarters or prisons was a time-consuming, boring and tedious task. There was little to do while riding the trains or buses because the prisoners had to be constantly watched and in his case the return trip from Peace River to Edmonton or Fort Saskatchewan was at least a three-day journey.¹²⁹ Quite often a single officer would be given responsibility for ten or twelve prisoners if it was a short trip. In these cases, the prisoners would be handcuffed and chained together, and would be segregated from the rest of the passengers.¹³⁰ In the event of a woman prisoner or mental patient, a matron accompanied the officer and never let the prisoner out of her sight.¹³¹

Insanity remained a provincial statute offence throughout the fifteen-year history of the force and therefore fell to the police to enforce. This act was somewhat different from others in that the police did not seek out such individuals as they would in the case of those who had committed a specific crime. Those charged with a violation of the Insanity Act were often already in custody for another offence and their transport to a facility where they could receive proper treatment was viewed by the police as a humanitarian service. The handling of mental patients amounted to the transfer of such individuals to either the Ponoka hospital or the Oliver facility near Edmonton. Several former officers stated that in most cases family members, friends or neighbours notified the police of the individual's unusual, erratic or violent behaviour. Unfortunately, too often these cases were not reported until after a violent crime, such as assault, a sex offence or murder had been

committed.¹³² Police reports indicate that the occurrence of insanity was much more frequent in the rural areas where people were faced with long periods of isolation and often harsh conditions. Financial losses stemming from crop failures, and the pressure of keeping a homestead viable and the creditors at bay was often too much for many to cope with.¹³³ Serge Zolotoohin, who served with the APP from 1926 to 1928, argues in his autobiography, Sentenced to Adventure, that the federal government and the transport companies involved in the promotion of the Canadian West were to blame for the high level of insanity among settlers, as they misled thousands into believing that good land and vast riches awaited those willing to emigrate to the prairies. It was Zolotoohin's belief that had government officials been more candid about the rigorous conditions of homestead life, refusing those with no rural or farming experience and properly preparing other immigrants for the harsh realities of life on the prairies, many of the individuals the police committed to mental institutions would have lived productive lives.¹³⁴ Those officers interviewed for this thesis, all of whom worked in smaller or remote communities, concur with Zolotoohin's assessment that the rough conditions of the homesteading experience were too much for many and the main reason that many individuals suffered breakdowns. Frank Rodberg expressed a great deal of sympathy for the women, as they often had no medical assistance during child birth and little or no companionship other than their children, as the men were either in the fields or working away from the farm to earn extra income for the family. Rodberg recalled that as a result of these circumstances, there were as many

women patients as men.¹³⁵ R.E. Clark concurred, citing similar reasons and noted that some of the individuals he arrested complained that they found the incessant blowing of the wind, and the subsequent dust that it caused, annoying to the point that it affected their general demeanour.¹³⁶ Provincial Police records do not indicate any particular trends regarding the number of cases of mental illness throughout the 1920s, other than a decrease on a per capita basis as the population grew throughout the 1920s and conditions for settlers improved.¹³⁷

Although members of the force did not enjoy this aspect of their duty, annual reports and statements from former officers indicate that the police pitied these individuals, sympathized with their families and attempted to deal with mental patients in a compassionate manner. Of greatest concern at all times was their safety and comfort. The police were aware of the fact that they were neither properly equipped nor trained to care for such people; thus they attempted to have them transported to a proper facility as quickly as possible.¹³⁸ Inspector Brankley, Commander of "C" Division, Calgary, stated in his 1927 annual report that he "regretted that we have no padded cells in our Guard Room, for some patients we have to handle are most pitiful, and we have no means of making them comfortable."¹³⁹ According to Frank Rodberg, extreme care had to be taken to ensure that persons in transport in no way injured themselves or the officer accompanying them would be reprimanded.¹⁴⁰ For this reason, those known or thought to be violent were either handcuffed, sedated by a doctor or fitted with a

straight jacket, or any combination of the above, for the duration of their stay in the police cells or while in transport.¹⁴¹ Had the police any choice in the matter, there is little doubt they would have relinquished this duty to others better equipped to handle the task.

Peace keeping during Alberta's labour disputes, the majority of which involved the coal mining industry, was another unpleasant responsibility the members of the police would have preferred to avoid. R.E. Clark recalled that this duty could be either very boring and monotonous or very dangerous as seemingly passive situations could turn violent very quickly. Clark tended to sympathize with the miners, as did many others he knew, probably because many of the individuals serving in the force, not unlike the miners, came from rather humble backgrounds. There was only so much the police could tolerate, however, and although Clark noted that the working and living conditions of the miners and their families were "damn miserable", he tired of the constant bickering and infighting between rival factions of miners and their unions because it often lead to trouble. Clark also added that he and his colleagues tired of the insults that they were often forced to endure during these confrontations.¹⁴² During the 1923 strike at the Cardiff mines near Edmonton, an attempt was made on Commissioner Bryan's life on the night of January 6, 1923, as he toured the mine site by auto. The attempt was likely in response to the Commissioner's decision to use tear gas and mounted policemen armed with batons to restore order and to put a stop to the destruction of private property.¹⁴³ Whether they disliked the role or not, the police had little choice in

the matter, as it was the policy of the government during the early 1920s to ensure that Albertans received their winter supply of coal regardless of confrontation between labour and management.¹⁴⁴ The fact that the early 1920s was the peak of labour radicalism in the province only intensified the possibility of violence each time the police became involved.

The police also disliked this duty because it was a 'no-win' situation , not unlike the enforcement of prohibition. Despite attempts to remain impartial, management, labour or both invariably criticized the force's actions. This criticism was unfair in the sense that it usually stemmed from disgruntled owners who had been refused police assistance in suppressing a strike, as in the case of a confrontation at Wayne, near Drumheller, in 1928. Inspector Brankley of "C" Division Calgary, reported that the owners had requested extra police assistance but he suspected that it was "for the reason that they would like to display force to help them end the strike."¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, labour continually accused the police of siding with management, accusing the police of brutality and excessive force while breaking up violent confrontations between union members and the owners 'special constables' hired to protect their property and replacement workers. In answer to a complaint from Alex Clifton, Secretary of the Wayne local, number 4632, of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), District 18, regarding police activities, Premier Greenfield explained that it was the role of the police to maintain law and order and that the police had instructions not to interfere with those strikers who obeyed the

laws. Greenfield indicated, however, that the police would become involved should the law be broken by either the owners or the workers.¹⁴⁶ Even as the number of confrontations increased and intensified with the onset of the depression, Premier Brownlee made it clear to the Attorney General and the police that he disapproved of police involvement in labour disputes as it compromised their impartiality. The premier was adamant that the police would not be manipulated by either the owners or labour during these confrontations. So far as the Premier was concerned, all that was needed at the outset of a strike were several stern words of caution from the police that violence would not be tolerated.¹⁴⁷

Much of labour's initial anti-APP attitude was a holdover from the Mounted Police, whom the unions had long since considered 'lackies' of the capitalist system. J.S. Woodsworth commented in the House of Commons on April 4, 1922, that the Mounties' recent coercive role and underhanded activities had irreversibly scarred the federal force's once proud heritage, by reducing its members to agents provocateurs.¹⁴⁸ The police were by no means without fault and critics were correct to point out cases where they failed to act impartially. During the 1919 Drumheller strike, the APP refused to take any action against the owner's strike breakers for several days while they harassed, threatened and beat those who chose to support the radical One Big Union (OBU) movement rather than the conservative UMWA.¹⁴⁹ Four years later during another strike in the Drumheller region, the police employed what many argued was excessive force when the APP utilized tear gas, horses and batons to

disperse men and women who were attempting to shut down several of the area's mines.¹⁵⁰ During the same strike, the radical elements of the union correctly accused the police of infiltrating their organizations throughout the Red Deer valley with the intention of undermining their operations.¹⁵¹

Police involvement with labour issues commenced shortly after the conclusion of world hostilities in 1918-1919. Several factors including a recession, the return of thousands of soldiers expecting jobs but finding few as a result of the poor economy, increasing concern and paranoia over the spread of Bolshevik propaganda spurred on by recent events in Russia, and the 'radicalization' of the labour movement and political left, combined to create a very volatile situation during the late teens and early 1920s. As the economy recovered and lingering ethnic tensions dissipated, the number of confrontations subsided.¹⁵² The police were relieved to see an end to the violence, often sparked by confrontation within the labour movement itself, that had plagued the early 1920s. During the same time period, radical organizations such as the OBU, communists and other organizations were fighting to gain control of the union movement from the large international trade organizations. The internal squabbling within the unions was what angered many members of the APP as it was this that often resulted in violence, requiring police involvement to restore order.¹⁵³ In relation to the activities of a number of communists organizations during the 1925 Drumheller strike, Commissioner Bryan stated in a communication to Inspector Brankley: "What I

would like to see is more loyal people of Drumheller (GWVA [Great War Veteran's Association--my brackets] and Others) to just wallop them, and it might probably (sic) be the end of the red element at Drumheller."¹⁵⁴ Improvement in the economy during the mid-late 1920s resulted in far fewer strikes and those that did occur were comparatively peaceful. Although the number of confrontations with labour, the communists and the unemployed increased during 1930-1931, the several years of relative peace on the labour front during the later 1920s were welcomed by members of the APP who viewed this duty in the same light as the transport of prisoners or mental patients, handling drunks or enforcing prohibition.

For the most part, officers serving in smaller, remote, rural detachments dealt with minor offences, not labour disputes, major bootleggers or serious crimes, therefore arrest and ensuing court procedures were straightforward. Information pertaining to a case and initial statements were recorded on a document entitled "Information and Complaint"; more often than not, the constable was the complainant. In the event that a complaint was phoned in or a message was delivered to the detachment, it was an officer's duty to investigate the complaint as soon as possible by seeking out the individuals involved.¹⁵⁵ If necessary, the constable obtained a warrant from a local Justice, located the accused, read the charges, touching the person at the same time to signify the physical act of arrest, showed them the warrant, asked if they wished to make a statement, searched the person, residence, place of business or building and surrounding area and returned with the prisoner to the

detachment office.¹⁵⁶ In minor cases, the defendant was brought before a Justice of the Peace to stand trial as soon as possible. When witnesses other than the arresting officer were required, subpoenas were issued and a summons prepared for the defendant. The summons stated when they were required to return for the hearing, which usually took place in the detachment office.¹⁵⁷ Most convictions resulted in the payment of a small fine and court costs. If an individual was unable to pay, they were usually required to perform community service work, spend a few days in jail or return to the detachment cell every weekend for a specified period of time and perform chores around the police station.¹⁵⁸ More often than not, minor disputes between neighbours never made it to trial as officers attempted to find a viable solution to the problem, thus saving money, time and possibly friendships.¹⁵⁹ In the event of cases that exceeded the jurisdiction of the local Justices, prisoners were either released on bail, depending upon the accused's trustworthiness and the charge, or they were transported to the nearest major centre for trial.¹⁶⁰ Prior to being placed in a holding cell, prisoners were searched and their belongings were listed in the "Prisoner's Effects Book"; these belongings were then placed in a canvas bag where they remained until the individual was either released or transferred.¹⁶¹ As previously mentioned, in the case of "lunatics", it was sometimes necessary to use a restraining device to stop them from hurting themselves while locked in the cells.

Regardless of one's posting or the type of work performed, officers were obliged to maintain a daily diary in which they made

quick reference notes pertaining to the weather, time of commencement and completion of specific duties or details relating to cases and investigations and time spent away from the office. One of the reasons for keeping a diary was that it could be used as a quick reference tool during investigations or trials.¹⁶² Diary entries were listed in the daily report which was supposed to be completed at the end of each day, regardless of when an officer returned to the detachment office. If away for several days, constables kept track of the day's events in a pocket diary and completed a report upon returning home. Officers also had to complete weekly patrol reports that listed those individuals called upon during the week, their occupations, signatures and any complaints or concerns. Patrol reports and diary entries were incorporated into a general weekly report that was sent to divisional headquarters along with the week's crime reports. In the event of an important case, officers immediately notified their divisional commanders by phone or telegram, with notification of a detailed written report to follow.¹⁶³ As important as the paperwork and administrative details were, officers were often left facing it late at night and on the weekends because emergency calls or the investigation of serious crimes always took precedence.¹⁶⁴

Edward Buchanan noted that although the amount of office work increased over the years, so did the time allotted to complete it. Investigations and patrols took less time to complete with the introduction of telephones and motor vehicles during the late 1920s.¹⁶⁵ As the province's highways improved throughout the

1920s, the number of horses used by the police gradually decreased. In 1918 the number of horses in use was fifty-eight, increasing to sixty-nine in 1922. Thereafter, the number of horses declined, so that by the time the force was disbanded in 1932, there were only twelve horses in use. Meanwhile, the number of motor vehicles owned by the force increased from five in 1917 to twenty-eight in 1931. This number does not include the large number of vehicles owned by members of the force that were used on a daily basis.¹⁶⁶ (see table one) Those who used their own vehicles for police work were reimbursed by the government to help cover the cost of depreciation of the automobile and to pay for repairs and regular maintenance. The rate was initially set at three cents a mile in 1919, but rose to fifteen cents by 1931.¹⁶⁷ The force took on chauffeurs as special constables whose sole duty was to drive the force's vehicles and ensure they were properly maintained by the mechanics.¹⁶⁸ In addition to cars and horses the APP also utilized motor-boats, motorbikes, sleighs and democrat wagons, dog sleds and airplanes. The various modes of transportation were used at different times, depending upon the terrain, the season and the task at hand.¹⁶⁹ In addition to the introduction of the automobile, the completion of some duties was made easier with the installation of telephones throughout many of the remote regions of the province. During the late teens and early 1920s many of the detachments, especially those in the northern regions, were without telephones; some did not even have immediate access to telegraph stations. Edward Buchanan recalled that when he arrived in Wembley, the

detachment did not have a telephone and it was sixteen miles by horseback to the nearest telegraph station in Grande Prairie.¹⁷⁰

The disappearance of the horse and the increasing use of the motor vehicle was a sign of growing prosperity and the quickening pace of life during the mid-late 1920s. The automobile had a significant impact on the APP, making on-going duties easier, but it also resulted in a number of new problems and responsibilities for the police. These included dealing with auto accidents, speeders, inexperienced motorists, drunk driving and vehicle thefts. William Buchanan, posted at Leduc from 1928 to 1932, recalled that the increase in traffic along the Edmonton-Calgary highway resulted in a rise in the number of accidents, especially at night when it was harder to see the road and harder to control vehicles on a gravel surface.¹⁷¹ As accidents and related fatalities increased, motor vehicle enthusiasts and clubs, such as the Calgary Auto Club, began lobbying the provincial government for increased safety regulations and highway patrols.¹⁷² The police responded almost immediately upon receiving notification from the government that something had to be done; the eight Indian motorcycles previously used to chase bootleggers were reconditioned and put to work patrolling Alberta's busiest highways.¹⁷³ Commissioner Bryan had concurred with the need for increased highway patrols, as the roads were increasingly busy with trucks, school buses and summer vacationers, few of whom, according to Bryan, obeyed the rules of the road.¹⁷⁴ Tourism in the Banff area resulted in a dramatic increase in traffic along the Calgary-Banff highway. Due to the increase in trucking the police

implemented highway night patrols in 1930.¹⁷⁵ The Indian motorcycles that were put to use for patrol purposes in 1927 were decommissioned the following year because they were unable to withstand the wear and tear of being driven on gravel roads and were too expensive to maintain; they were replaced by Ford Roadsters.¹⁷⁶ Bryan reported in the spring of 1929 that increased highway patrols by the police were having an effect as there had been a great improvement in the observances of the laws among the motoring public.¹⁷⁷ In a letter to Mr J.B. Hayfield, the Commissioner agreed that those caught operating motor vehicles under the influence of alcohol were a menace and should have their licenses revoked. Bryan regretted, however, that he did not have the authority to do this.¹⁷⁸ The motor vehicle made many aspects of policing easier, but as the popularity of the 'horseless carriage' increased so too did the number of motor vehicle cases handled by the police; these accounted for roughly one-tenth of the cases investigated by the APP during the years 1918, 1920-1931.¹⁷⁹

All members of the APP were officially on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, but the implications of this were far more demanding on those serving in one-man detachments. The only exceptions to fulfilling their duties were sickness, injuries, grave personal or family problems and annual leaves. Annual leaves were initially set at three weeks with pay, but this was later reduced to two weeks.¹⁸⁰ Officers required written permission to leave their jurisdictions on private business, or to attend to a personal matter or social function in civilian clothing.¹⁸¹ In the event of any of

these circumstances, officers from adjoining detachments would be assigned the responsibility of patrolling the unattended jurisdiction. According to Edward Buchanan, divisional headquarters usually did not have the excess manpower to dispatch a temporary replacement.¹⁸² The long hours and the isolation for unmarried men demanded a strong character and a great deal of self reliance. Seasonal climatic conditions and the onset of cooler weather, however, brought some relief to the hectic pace of summer, providing more time for social and recreational activities. The nature of the work required officers to travel year round, but everything moved at much slower pace during the winter. Inclement weather, for example, often resulted in layovers and delays in the completion of patrols because of impassable roads.¹⁸³ Other than the few major highways in the province that connected large centres, most motor vehicle transportation ground to a halt during the winter. Although an officer was expected to respond to calls regardless of time of day or season of year, generally speaking an officer had more time for social occasions, involvement with community events, family and friends during the winter.¹⁸⁴

Detachments usually housed both the police office and living quarters. The government rented private houses, making whatever renovations were necessary to separate the office from the family residence. Depending on their location, these facilities varied in size from rather large, comfortable, two storey homes to small shacks.¹⁸⁵ Young, single recruits often bunked in the dormitory in the basement of the old court house during training or made other

arrangements depending on their financial situation.¹⁸⁶ Edward Buchanan noted that his first home in Wembley was quite small and poorly constructed, with only five rooms for both the residence and the detachment office. During his first winter there, it was necessary to keep all three stoves and fireplaces burning, as the only thing separating him and his family from the elements were a single layer of boards, brown paper and wall paper; he added that it was often warmer in the barn with the horses.¹⁸⁷ The following spring, Buchanan convinced the local lumber merchant to build a large, properly insulated home for himself and his family. It was a rather generous undertaking on the part of the local businessman, considering the fact that the government refused to pay more for this new facility than the thirty dollars a month it had been paying for the smaller house.¹⁸⁸ Maintenance of the quarters and the grounds was left to the officer and this was taken into consideration during inspection. As was the case with basic supplies, officers were expected to obtain parts for repairs and maintenance through whatever means they could and as cheaply as possible.¹⁸⁹

Although peace officers were generally well respected by the people they served, one did not become a policeman for the immediate financial rewards. A policeman's annual salary was enough to provide for a comfortable existence and the pay was steady, which is more than can be said about farming and some other types of work available at the time. Several photos from the Muriel Dunn collection depict the members of the Reay family as healthy

and well clothed during all seasons, even when doing chores, indicating that a constable's salary was sufficient to raise a family and enjoy a few of life's pleasures.¹⁹⁰ With promotions came pay increases which allowed the senior officers and their families to enjoy some of the finer amenities that life had to offer. For those who were able to utilize the contacts they had made with prominent community members while serving as a peace officer the financial rewards once they retired from policing could be quite significant. Wages in 1917 ranged from \$4,000.00-\$5,000.00 per year for the Superintendent and Commissioner to \$3.00 per diem for constables,¹⁹¹ plus reimbursement for any costs incurred while on police business. Provincial police constables were authorized to spend fifty cents per meal, twenty-five cents for a room at a private dwelling and an additional "two-bits" for the care and feeding of their horse.¹⁹²

Upon recognition that the men were being underpaid, the base salary for constables was quickly changed from the daily rate of three dollars (\$90-\$93/month), to a monthly salary of \$125.00. This was increased to \$140.00 several years later, where it remained until the force was disbanded in 1932.¹⁹³ In addition, a pension fund was established for the members of the force, but the men were solely responsible for contributions. Officers were permitted to contribute five percent of their salary to the fund that would, in turn, earn them five per cent interest, compounded annually. Anyone discharged for wrongful behaviour or indicted on a criminal offence, forfeited their share of the pension fund. If an officer was killed his

portion, interest included, was paid out to his lawful next-of-kin.¹⁹⁴

Undermanned, short of supplies and still negotiating jurisdictional issues with the RNWMP, the APP took over provincial policing duties from their federal counterparts, on March 1, 1917. The Mounties maintained a small force within the province but restricted their activities to enforcing federal laws and tending to Ottawa's concerns. During the late teens and the early 1920s, many of the federal officers serving in the province concentrated their activities on the enemy alien situation and labour issues to the frustration of their provincial counterparts, who accused the Mounties of neglecting their customs and excise responsibilities. The provincial police with less than 100 men, a handful of cars, less than fifty horses and only forty-eight detachments, were expected to take over provincial policing responsibilities for a geographic area in excess of 225,000 square miles, which had recently been patrolled by more than 200 Mounted Policemen.¹⁹⁵ Anticipating the APP's shortfall during the first month of operations, P.C.H. Primrose, Chairman of the Police Commission, inquired as to which detachments the RNWMP planned to leave open. It was Primrose's intention to avoid duplicating services as much as possible, and unofficially rely on the Mounties to continue providing provincial policing services until the APP had the resources in place to properly develop a province-wide infrastructure.¹⁹⁶

Superintendent MacDonnell of the APP and Commissioner Perry of the RNWMP agreed to the following deal by the middle of April, 1917: in addition to all provincial policing responsibilities, the APP took over daily policing duties in the National Parks and on Indian Reserves. The Mounties maintained detachment offices in Jasper and Banff, and agreed to provide assistance in the event of any irregularities or cases pertaining to federal jurisdiction.¹⁹⁷ Although towns and villages were responsible for hiring their own constables, many refrained from doing so for financial reasons and unofficially relied on the APP. The job of local town constable was not looked upon as a very attractive position. Many of the men who assumed these duties had little or no police experience, and frequently turned to the local provincial police officer for assistance. The result was a difference in the manner in which the laws were enforced from one town to the next; this proved to be very controversial in connection with prohibition and caused the APP a great deal of criticism and bad press.¹⁹⁸

While the force was short of almost all supplies, one situation that senior administrators believed required immediate attention was the lack of a distinct uniform, so the public could easily distinguish the APP from their federal counterparts.¹⁹⁹ The first uniform worn by provincial officers was designed after that worn by the London Metropolitan Police force. These uniforms distinguished the APP from the Mounties and a surplus supply was readily available from the Edmonton and Calgary police departments at a significantly reduced price. They were blue in colour, with straight

leg pants and pith helmets, making them suitable for foot or car patrol in an urban environment. These uniforms, however, were not very practical for patrolling remote regions of the province on horseback.²⁰⁰ What the Board of Commissioners failed to take into consideration was that these uniforms insulted the sensibilities of the men, almost eighty per cent of whom were former Mounted Policemen. An elitist mentality had pervaded the ranks of the Mounted Police since 1873 and it was drilled into new members from the first day of training. The Mounted Policemen viewed themselves as superior to other law enforcement agents, especially local policemen, whom they viewed as little more than glorified night-watchmen and whose responsibilities rarely extended beyond the enforcement of local bylaws and rounding up town drunks.²⁰¹ As such, the idea of donning a metropolitan police uniform was embarrassing for many who believed it associated the APP with the type of work they had previously considered beneath them. Commissioner Bryan concurred, noting in his 1924 report, that the members of the APP found the first set of uniforms "very objectionable".²⁰² Beside offending the men's egos, the uniforms were immediately denounced as sub-standard in quality and totally inappropriate for the task at hand. Senior commanders were inundated with reports stating that the uniforms looked so shabby within a few months time that many of the men were ashamed to wear them in public. In addition, the helmet gave little protection from the scorching sun, or driving rain, and the straight leg pants were totally inappropriate for riding.²⁰³

By the time Edward Buchanan and his brother joined the APP, the force had adopted a "Mounted Police" style uniform. The force provided officers with stetson hats, leggings, pants, tunics, winter coats and side arms. Two uniforms were issued to each man; one uniform was khaki coloured and for everyday use and the second outfit was blue, supposedly for formal occasions only, such as inspections, court cases, police ceremonies and important community events.²⁰⁴ It was 1927 before the force had sufficient funds to purchase boots for the men; until that time, officers were responsible for supplying their own.²⁰⁵ Photographs suggest that officers could choose between tall riding boots or short boots and leggings with their riding breeches or straight leg pants. The same photos suggest that those men who patrolled on foot or in cars usually wore short boots and straight leg pants.²⁰⁶ Edward Buchanan recalled that the first set of hats they received were of poor quality; thus every time it rained the brim flopped down, rendering them useless. The men had to make do by ironing and sprinkling sugar on the brims to stiffen them up.²⁰⁷ A 1927 purchase of hats caused a great deal of controversy because the APP spent what amounted to several more dollars for new Stetsons, as opposed to saving some money and purchasing a cheaper brand name. What followed was a stream of correspondence, lasting close to a month, between the Provincial Treasurer, who opposed the purchase, and the Deputy Attorney General and the Commissioner, who were attempting to provide their officers with proper equipment.²⁰⁸

With the arrival of summer, 1917, the matter of proper and functional uniforms for the force was soon overshadowed by a serious rift that was developing between the two senior officers of the force, Superintendent A.E.C. MacDonnell and his assistant, J.D. Nicholson. Both men were experienced and capable police officers, but according to Edward Buchanan and W.C. Bryan Jr., they were incompatible. Nicholson was a plain-clothes detective accustomed to operating in his own manner and was not a disciplinarian; MacDonnell was of the 'old school', had spent his entire career in uniform and was a disciplinarian who demanded attention to detail and the chain of command.²⁰⁹ Bryan noted that both Nicholson and MacDonnell were eager to assume the top position within the force. Bryan also credits Nicholson with being a good policeman, an excellent detective and having a good rapport with both his grandfather and the junior men of the force. He suggests that MacDonnell was overly ambitious, somewhat erratic in behaviour and not a very stable individual.²¹⁰ What is likely to have contributed to the animosity between the two men was MacDonnell's jealousy of Nicholson's popularity with men. It is possible that he misconstrued this as an attempt by his assistant to develop a power base. Edward Buchanan intimated that MacDonnell was suspicious of Nicholson's apparent desire for greater power and was to blame for Nicholson's resignation in December, 1917.²¹¹

That which provided MacDonnell with "proof" of Nicholson's insubordination was rather petty in nature involving the purchase of uniforms and the payment of a special constable without

MacDonnell's authority.²¹² The Superintendent asked for Nicholson's resignation on the 21st of August, 1917, informing the Board of Commissioners that the action "was made necessary by this officer having not given me support which he should have, in the position he occupies."²¹³ Nicholson initially refused to step down, holding on to his position until December 10, 1917. At the beginning of November, MacDonnell sent Nicholson a scathing memo, requesting that he, "... please explain why you disobeyed my orders ...", and again asked for his assistant's resignation.²¹⁴ In an attempt to prove that he was not at fault, Nicholson appealed to the Board, stating that MacDonnell had given him no indication that his superior was upset with his performance. Nicholson noted that if anyone was to blame for the trouble between the two men it was MacDonnell, and that "... from the very beginning of [his] appointment he acted in such a manner as to make my position as useless a one as possible."²¹⁵ Nicholson was supported by Inspector Albert Schurer, the commander of "A" Division, who claimed that from the beginning, MacDonnell had interfered with the day to day operations of his division and the duties of his men. Schurer charged that the superintendent had issued direct orders to his men without referring to him first; had treated two men unfairly by transferring them against their will and with no regard to the fact that neither man could afford the cost of relocating and had held Schurer and his men accountable for the enforcement of the liquor act within the City of Edmonton, an area that fell under the jurisdiction of the municipal police force.²¹⁶ For whatever reasons, the Board chose not to take Nicholson's and Schurer's statements into consideration, but rather

sided with MacDonnell. Both men were forced to submit their resignations, but did so under protest, claiming that they had been poorly treated by the force and the Superintendent.²¹⁷ Upon Nicholson's resignation, Commissioner Bryan was appointed Assistant Superintendent by the Board and MacDonnell.²¹⁸

These events were watched and reported on closely by the press. It was not long before the resignations of Nicholson, Schurer and approximately sixty other members of the force became a political issue. The government soon found itself being criticized for its handling of the affair, and the creation of such an unstable command structure. A.E. Ewing, MLA for Edmonton West, demanded an investigation into the affair, as well as the operations of the force during the March, 1918 debate in the Alberta legislature.²¹⁹ Premier Charles Stewart attempted to quell the criticism by praising those responsible for the organization of the force, claiming they had done an excellent job considering the conditions they were faced with.²²⁰ As for the sixty-plus resignations, Stewart stated that the men had left the force on their own accord to join the CEF, and that it was unrelated to the trouble between MacDonnell and Nicholson.²²¹ This explanation is questionable for two reasons. First, the bulk of the resignations in 1917 followed those of Nicholson and Schurer, leading one to suspect that many of the men resigned in a show of solidarity for their commanders.²²² Second, the number of men signing up for overseas duty had slowed dramatically by the summer of 1916. Stewart's efforts were in vain as demands for an inquiry into the operations of the force continued.

Realizing their mistake, and under increasing pressure from the public and the press, the Board of Commissioners asked for Macdonnell's resignation. He tendered it on March 26th, 1918, and was appointed a police magistrate for the region of Peace River.²²³ W.C. Bryan replaced MacDonnell as Superintendent, and subsequently re-hired Nicholson as his assistant.

The controversy surrounding the senior command had been settled, but public resentment over the replacement of the RNWMP with the APP and the provincial police's involvement with prohibition remained intense. On March 6th, 1918, the province's politically powerful cattlemen's and horsemen's associations reiterated their concerns of a year earlier in a letter to the federal Deputy Minister of the Interior.

... in their (RNWMP) absence the stock industry is greatly endangered by thieves and the provincial police are absolutely unable to cope with the difficulty whereas the Mounted Police have always proved themselves well adapted for this work.²²⁴

The Minister relayed this information to the Comptroller McLean of the RNWMP, stating that a Mr. Butcher of the Twin Butte chapter of the association had put forth the argument that the provincial police were incapable of dealing with the situation and that the Mounties should be re-deployed.²²⁵ This was followed by a call from the Social Service League of Alberta, on the 15th of March, for more stringent enforcement of the province's liquor laws. This only served

to intensify and broaden the spectrum of the criticism being levelled at the APP.²²⁶

During the March 1918 Legislative debate, Premier Stewart defended the organizational structure of the force and the APP's record in enforcing prohibition. Stewart remained confident of the abilities of the Board of Commissioners and the force, suggesting that the problem was MacDonnell's inability to work with his men. Ironically, Stewart reiterated the need for the continued existence of the Board, as it was necessary to keep the police out of the political arena.²²⁷ Stewart also noted that the resignations of Nicholson, Schurer and the sixty-odd other members of the force were unrelated and separate events. The Premier warned that any interference in the running of the force by the government would undermine the credibility of the Board and erode police discipline. Premier Stewart concluded his remarks by adding that the APP continued to outperform the Mounties regarding the enforcement of the province's liquor laws, a remarkable feat given the continued legal presence of export warehouses within the province, and the force's limited manpower and finances.²²⁸ In an attempt to raise morale, Superintendent Bryan followed the Premier's lead, addressing his men with the following comments;

These criticisms, in my opinion, are entirely unjustified, as, with one or two exceptions every man has done his duty to the best of his ability. The next three months will be a period of very hard work for all, as the Force is now practically on trial. As you all know, the most bitter criticisms that have been levelled against us were in

connection with the enforcement of the Liquor Act, and I appeal to every man in the Force to do his best to put a stop to this traffic.²²⁹

While these words may have benefited some, they did little to stem the on-going public criticism of the provincial police.

By 1919, the pressure on the government and the APP over the issues of the police's handling of prohibition and the command structure of the force was too much to bear. Many of those who were still angry regarding the replacement of the Mounties, blamed the police for an increase in crime, arguing that the small size and haphazard organization of the force were resulting in the neglect of many of its duties so it could concentrate on the enforcement of the Liquor Act.²³⁰ Ironically, the Board of Commissioners that was initially established to shield the police from political influence had itself, by 1919, become the central issue of the political controversy. The Morning Albertan blamed the Board of Commissioners for much of the organizational trouble faced by the senior command of the police. The paper stated that the commissioner's division on policy matters rendered it impossible to achieve unity and harmony within the force.²³¹ A few days later, February 22, 1919, in an attack on the government, the same paper also claimed that the Board was "a government evasion of duty and contrary to the principle of responsible government."²³² The controversy surrounding the senior police administration was finally laid to rest with the passage of a new APP Act on April 17, 1919. The new act abolished the three-man Board, making the force the direct responsibility of the Attorney General, established an Office

of Commissioner and created a separate plain-clothes Liquor Branch that was given the sole responsibility of enforcing Alberta's prohibitory liquor laws.²³³ (see figure one)

The reorganization of the senior command proved to be a positive step for the police although it was not recognized as such until the repeal of prohibition in 1924 which continued to mar the reputation of the APP. By placing control of the force in the hands of a single commissioner the reorganization eliminated the possibility of stagnation and the subsequent erosion of what was left of the public's confidence in the APP, all of which had occurred under the leadership of the Board of Commissioners. One of the major problems with the Board was that its members had become entangled in disagreements and bureaucratic wrangling over policy and budgetary issues. The selections of Alfred Cuddy and W.C. Bryan would prove to be good choices as both men were rather progressive in their approach to law enforcement. This in turn helped to boost the morale of the force. This change, however, did not improve the APP's rather bleak financial situation nor did it immediately put an end to the criticism that had dogged the force since its creation in the spring of 1917 because of its replacement of the Mounted Police and involvement with prohibition. Bryan's efforts to improve the public image of the force eventually paid off, but the APP was unable to escape its shortage of financial resources. To a great extent, this problem stemmed from the fact that the public expected the police to carry out an increasing number of responsibilities yet at the same time demanded fiscal stringency on the part of the force

and the provincial government. All the while, technological advances made it increasingly difficult for the police to keep pace with the criminal element. Thus, although public expectations for the police increased, their willingness to properly finance the police did not keep pace.

Chapter Two

Endnotes

1. The first part of the title of this chapter was derived from Harold Flyer's article, " 'Blue-Coated Mounties': The Alberta Provincial Police", in his book, Alberta: The Pioneer Years, (Langley, British Columbia: Stagecoach Publishers, 1977). Despite the fact that the reference "Blue-Coated Mounties" implies similarities, and many considered the APP to be no different than the RCMP, the name is somewhat of a misnomer because there were significant differences between the two law enforcement organizations.
2. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 517, file 1-17, various correspondence dating from December 27, 1916 to January 4, 1917, between the offices of the Prime Minister, the Comptroller and the Commissioner of the RNWMP.
3. NAC, MG 26 H, Borden papers, vol. 176, Borden to Premiers Martin 96068, Norris 96069 and Sifton 96070 of Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta, respectively; and NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 517, file 1-17, various correspondence dating from December 27, 1916 to January 4, 1917, between the offices of the Prime Minister, the Comptroller and the Commissioner of the RNWMP.
4. Medicine Hat News, January 6, 1917.
5. Calgary Herald, January 15, 1917.
6. Calgary Herald, January 22, 1917.
7. Edmonton Journal, January 27, 1917.
8. Calgary Herald, February 3 and 14, 1917.
9. C.K. Talbot, C.H.S Jayewardene and J.F. Juliane, Canada's Constables: The Historical Development of Policing in Canada, (Ottawa: Crimecare, Inc., 1986), pp. 142-143; Carl Betke, "Selected Aspects in the Historical role of the Mounted Police in Canada", chapter 4, part 1, of An Historical Background of Policing in Canada, prepared by W.F. Wrenshall, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1978), p. 2; and NAC, MG 26 H, Borden Papers, vol. 176, comptroller's memorandum re: "The attached letter from the Honourable Premier of Alberta regarding the continuance of services of the RNW Mounted

Police in that Province after the termination of the present agreement on the 31st of March, 1916", p. 96002.

10. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 3.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., sections 3 and 28.

13. Ibid., section 3.

14. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item no. 1287, Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Police Commission Meetings, February 5, 1917.

15. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 11-12.

16. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item no. 1287, Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Police Commission Meetings, February 9, 1917.

17. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir..

18. NAC, RG 18, B-1, vol. 1910, file 159, Primrose to Perry, February 6, 1917.

19. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1924 APP Annual Report.

20. Ibid., box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.

21. Ibid., 1920 APP Annual Report.

22. Ibid., 1920-1921 APP Annual Reports.

23. Ibid., 1918 APP Annual Report.

24. Ibid., boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.

25. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.

26. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1920-1921 APP Annual Reports.

Police in that Province after the termination of the present agreement on the 31st of March, 1916", p. 96002.

10. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 3.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., sections 3 and 28.

13. Ibid., section 3.

14. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item no. 1287, Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Police Commission Meetings, February 5, 1917.

15. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 11-12.

16. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item no. 1287, Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Police Commission Meetings, February 9, 1917.

17. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir..

18. NAC, FG 18, B-1, vol. 1910, file 159, Primrose to Perry, February 6, 1917.

19. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1924 APP Annual Report.

20. Ibid., box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.

21. Ibid., 1920 APP Annual Report.

22. Ibid., 1920-1921 APP Annual Reports.

23. Ibid., 1918 APP Annual Report.

24. Ibid., boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.

25. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.

26. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1920-1921 APP Annual Reports.

27. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988; and R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
28. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
29. Ibid.
30. Interviews with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988; and W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
31. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 215, file 4532, Bryan to Hancock, May 10, 1922.
32. Ibid. and Hancock to Bryan, May 9, 1922.
33. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
34. Serge Zolotochin. Sentenced to Adventure: An Autobiography, (London: G.G. Harrap, 1936), p. 168.
35. Elise Corbet "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew, Alberta: Narrative History", (Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Village, Historic Sites Service, Alberta Culture, March, 1985), pp. 68-69.
36. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931, APP Annual Reports.
37. Interviews with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988; and W.C. Bryan, jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
38. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 215, file 4533, Brownlee to Bryan, November 8, 1922.
39. Ibid.
40. Corbet, "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", pp. 67-68.
41. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., boxes 1 and 3, 1921 and 1926 APP Annual Reports.
45. Ibid., boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Report.
46. Corbet "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 68.
47. PAA and PMA, photo resources, M. Dunn collection.
48. Corbet "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 68.
49. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 4, 1927 APP Annual Report.
50. Interviews with Frank Rodberg, August 29, 1984; and Dennis Mighall, August 30, 1984, by Elise Corbet.
51. Corbet, "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 27.
52. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
53. Ibid., boxes 4, 1927 APP Annual Report.
54. Morning Albertan, February 17, 1917.
55. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 5; and; PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918, 1920-1931, APP Annual Reports.
56. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988; and W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
57. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 8; and Morning Albertan, February 17, 1917.
58. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item no. 1287, Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Police Commission Meetings, February 5, 1917.
59. Ibid.; and Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 10.
60. PAA, acc. no. 76.347, box 7, file 184, Lymburn to Henry Spencer, Alberta MP, September 5, 1930.

61. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, APP application form, 1917-1932.
62. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
63. Ibid.
64. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
65. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
66. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Corbet, "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew" p. 63.
71. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
72. C.W. Harvison, The Horsemen, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1967), p.66.
73. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
74. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
75. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
76. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988; and R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir; interview with Dennis Mighall, August 30, 1984, by Elise Corbet; and interview with Edward Buchanan, October 21, 1983, by Syvalya Elchen,
77. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988; and R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.; and Interviews with Dennis Mighall, August 30, 1984, by Elise Corbet; and Edward Buchanan, October 21, 1983, by Syvalya Elchen.
80. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
81. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1919-1921 APP Annual Reports.
82. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 2-5, 1922-1931 APP Annual Reports.
83. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 215, file 4533, Boyle to Cuddy, October 4, 1920, Cuddy to Boyle, October 5, 1920; acc. no. 72.370, box 5, 1929 APP Annual Report; acc. no. 76.347, box 7, file 184, Bryan to Henwood, May 25, 1929, Henwood to Bryan, May 28, 1929 and Bryan to Henwood, May 29, 1929.
84. Edmonton Journal, November 29, 1930.
85. Calgary Herald, December 3, 1930.
86. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
87. Ibid.
88. Alberta, Public Accounts of Alberta, 1917-1932.
89. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 4, 1927 APP Annual Report.
90. Ibid., boxes 1 and 5, 1918 and 1931 APP Annual Reports.
91. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 12.
92. Ibid., section 13.
93. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
94. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 6; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
95. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, "The Alberta Provincial Police Regulations", July 7, 1917.

96. Ibid.
97. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item 534, APP circular memorandum no. 137, April 3, 1918.
98. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
99. Interview with Frank Rodberg, August 29, 1984, by Elise Corbet.
100. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
101. Ibid.; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-2, 1918-1924 APP Annual Reports.
102. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
103. Ibid.
104. Corbet "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 68.
105. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
106. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
107. Frances Swyripa, "The Ukrainians in Alberta", in People of Alberta: Portraits of Cultural Diversity, ed. by Howard and Tamara Palmer (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985), p. 222.
108. Corbett, "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 30.
109. Ibid.
110. Steven Paul Boddington, "The Alberta Liquor Control Board, 1924-1935", (MA thesis, University of Alberta, 1990), p. 1.
111. Interview with William Buchanan, May 28, 1973, by Gerry Dunsmore.
112. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1921 APP Annual Report.

113. Ibid.

114. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 215, file 4530, Bryan to Lymburn, November 4, 1927.

115. W.C. Bryan, "The Alberta Provincial Police", in The Canadian Police Gazette: A Magazine Devoted to the Explanation of Police Activities in Canada, vol. 2, no. 12 (March 1928), p. 1.

116. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 4, 1928 APP Annual Report.

117. Ibid., box 1, 1920 APP Annual Report.

118. Corbett, "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 30.

119. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports; and PAA, acc. no. 72.26, Criminal Case Files, 1914-1928, Attorney General's Department.

120. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.

121. Interview with William Buchanan, May 28, 1973, by Gerry Dunsmore; and interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.

122. Interview with William Buchanan, May 28, 1973 by Gerry Dunsmore.

123. Ibid.; and Corbett, "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", pp. 28 and 30.

124. Interview with Dennis Mighall, August 30, 1984, by Elise Corbett.

125. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.

126. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918, 1920-1931 APP Annual Reports.

127. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.

128. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918, 1920-1931 APP Annual Reports.
129. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
130. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
131. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
132. Interviews with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988 and W.C. Bryan Jr. September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
133. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
134. Zolotoohin, Sentenced to Adventure, p. 159.
135. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
136. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
137. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918, 1920-1931 APP Annual reports.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid., box 4, 1927 APP Annual Report.
140. Interview with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, Sean Moir.
141. Interviews with Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
142. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
143. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1923 APP Annual Report.

144. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, item 4533, Brownlee to Cuddy, December 21, 1921.
145. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 4, 1928 APP Annual Report.
146. PAA, acc. no. 69.289, file 326, Greenfield to Clifton, January 6, 1923.
147. Ibid., file 77a, item 2, Brownlee to Lymburn, January 26, 1931.
148. Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, pp. 670-673, April 4, 1922.
149. M. Ann Capling, "Drumheller Strike of 1925", in Alberta History, vol 31, no. 4, (Autumn 1983), p. 15.
150. Ibid., p. 16.
151. Ibid., p. 17.
152. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
153. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 38, file 818, Lymburn to F. Edgell, Secretary of the Big Valley United Farmers of Alberta District Association, July 9, 1925.
154. Capling, "Drumheller Strike of 1925", p. 15.
155. Corbet "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 39.
156. Ibid., pp. 39-42.
157. Ibid, pp. 39-40.
158. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988 and Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
159. Ibid.
160. Corbet "The Alberta Provincial Police Post at Andrew", p. 42.
161. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

162. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
163. Ibid.
164. Interview with Frank Rodberg, August 29, 1984, by Elise Corbet.
165. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
166. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
167. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 5, 1931 APP Annual Report.
168. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
169. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918-1931 APP Annual Reports.
170. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
171. Ibid.; and Interview with William Buchanan, May 28, 1973, by Gerry Dunsmore.
172. PAA, acc. no. 69.289, file 77a, item 2, W.S. Deisman, Secretary, Calgary Auto Club, to Brownlee, March 8, 1927.
173. PAA, acc. no. 76.347, box 7, file 182, Bryan to Lymburn, April 16, 1927; and acc. no. 69.289, file 77a, item 2, unsigned government memo, March 19, 1927.
174. PAA, acc. no. 76.347, box 7, file 182, Bryan to Lymburn, April 16, 1927.
175. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 4-5, 1928 and 1930 APP Annual Reports.
176. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 4, 1928 APP Annual Report.

177. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 219, file 4624, Bryan to J.B. Hayfield, Secretary-Treasurer, United Mine Workers of America, local no. 18, May 13, 1929.

178. Ibid.

179. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-5, 1918, 1920-1932 APP Annual Reports.

180. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988 and R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir; and PAA, acc. no. 66.166, "The Alberta Provincial Police Regulations", July 7, 1917.

181. Interview with Edward Buchanan, January 7, 1985, by Elise Corbet.

182. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid.

185. PAA and PMA, photo resources, M. Dunn, E. Buchanan, S. Mcpherson and R.E. Clark collections; and GAI, photo resources, acc. nos., NA-2899-1,2,3,4,5, and NA-4691-1,2,3,4.

186. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.

189. Interview with Edward Buchanan, November 2, 1983, by Syvalya Eichen.

190. PAA, photo resources, M. Dunn collection.

191. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 16.

192. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
193. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 16; PAA, acc. no. 66.166, "Alberta Provincial Police Regulations", July 7, 1917; and Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
194. Alberta. Statutes. "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1917", section 17.
195. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.
196. NAC, RG-18, B-1, vol. 1910, file 159, Primrose to Perry, February 6, 1917.
197. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item 1595, APP circular memorandum; and NAC, RG-18, B-1, Perry to McDonnell, April 25, 1917.
198. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988 and R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
199. Edmonton Journal, March 3, 1917.
200. Morning Albertan, March 13, 1917; and Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
201. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.
202. Ibid., boxes 1- 2, 1918 and 1924 APP Annual Reports.
203. Ibid., box 1, 1919 APP Annual Report; and interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
204. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
205. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1927 APP Annual Report.
206. PAA and PMA, photo resources, E. Buchanan, S. McPherson, M. Dunn and R.E. Clark collections.

207. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
208. PAA, acc. no. 76.347, box 7, file 182, memorandum from Deputy Provincial Treasurer Newson to Deputy Attorney General, Henwood, June 10, 1927.
209. Interviews with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988 and W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
210. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
211. Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
212. PAA, acc. no. 75.125, box 5, item 247, McDonnell to Nicholson, no date; and Edmonton Journal, March 1, 1918.
213. PAA, acc. no. 70.414, box 7, Sessional Paper no. 27, McDonnell to the Board of Commissioners, November 28, 1917.
214. PAA, acc. no. 75.125, box 5, item 247, McDonnell to Nicholson, November 8, 1917.
215. PAA, APP Journals, Nicholson to McDonnell, December 1, 1917.
216. Edmonton Journal, March 1, 1918.
217. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item 1287, APP Commission Minutes, December 4, 1917.
218. PAA, acc. no. 75.125, box 5, item 247, Bryan to Henwood, February 7, 1928.
219. Edmonton Journal, March 20, 1918.
220. Ibid.
221. Ibid.; and Edmonton Bulletin, March 20, 1918.
222. Ibid.

223. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item 1288, APP Commission Minutes, 1918, March 28, 1918; and Interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.

224. NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol 554, file 224-1918, H. Butcher, Secretary of the Twin Butte Cattle and Horse Association to the Deputy Minister of the Interior, March 6, 1918.

225. Ibid., Deputy Minister of the Interior to RNWMP Comptroller, March 12, 1918.

226. Edmonton Bulletin, March 15, 1918.

227. Ibid., March 20, 1918.

228. Ibid., March 20, 1918.

229. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, item 534, APP circular memorandum no. 137, April 3, 1918.

230. Morning Albertan, February 20, 1919; and Lethbridge Daily Herald, January 14, 1919.

231. Morning Albertan, February 20, 1919.

232. Ibid., February 22, 1919.

233. Alberta, Statutes, "The Alberta Provincial Police Act, 1919", sections 4-6; Edmonton Journal, February 22, 1919; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1919 APP Annual Report. According to Bill Bryan, Jr., the role of the Commissioner was that of overseeing the administrative needs of the force, representing the police to the provincial government, assessing long-term needs and setting forth broad police policies. In comparison the Superintendent was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the force and because of Nicholson's reputation as an excellent investigator, he was in charge in of all criminal investigations.

Chapter 3

'Alberta's Blue Coated Mounties'¹: Prohibition, Growth, Modernization and W.C. Bryan's Leadership of the Alberta Provincial Police

The 1919 reorganization of the senior command structure of the APP was necessary because the Board of Commissioners, the body created by the government to keep the police free from political interference, had itself become the focus of a political controversy. The Board became too bureaucratic in nature, losing touch with those issues that were of importance to the police, resulting in a decline in the quality of the service and giving those who had opposed the creation of the force even more reason to criticize the APP's performance. The police required a dynamic, experienced, progressive leader, capable of improving the service and public image of the force. The APP was fortunate to find two such individuals in Alfred Cuddy and his successor W.C. Bryan. The government appointed Cuddy, the Chief Constable of the Calgary police force, to the post of Commissioner of the APP on July 7th, 1919.² Originally from Britain, he served with the Toronto Metropolitan Police force for thirty years before accepting the Chief Constable's position in Calgary. He remained with the APP until May 11, 1922, at which time he resigned to accept the Assistant Commissionership of the Ontario Provincial Police.³ Information pertaining to Cuddy is limited to the annual reports for 1919 through 1922, and determining his success or failure as Commissioner and his influence on the APP is thus somewhat difficult to assess. This assessment is further complicated by the fact that he joined the force as it emerged from a controversial reorganization of the

senior administration and at a time when anger among the general public over the removal of the RNWMP persisted and criticism of the APP's involvement with prohibition continued to escalate.

Enforcement of the province's liquor laws and the constant criticism of the APP for its involvement in this area dominated all of Cuddy's term as Commissioner and the first two years of his successor, W.C. Bryan. Cuddy referred to the task in his 1919 report as the most onerous duty the force was called upon to perform.⁴ The APP and the Alberta government attempted in vain to enforce the province's controversial 1916 Liquor Act by modernizing the force's transportation, increasing its manpower, establishing detachments in strategic and troublesome areas, creating a separate Liquor Branch and pursuing the deputization of a number of its officers as special agents of the federal Inland Revenue Department; for its part the provincial government amended its liquor legislation in an attempt to restrict the inter-provincial trade of alcoholic beverages. These efforts were undermined by several factors: most important, a large segment of the population did not look upon the consumption of alcohol as morally wrong or sinful, never mind a criminal act; second, the 1916 Liquor Act was initially designed as a political compromise and therefore contained numerous loopholes; third, the Mounted Police were reluctant to enforce federal customs and Inland Revenue regulations for which they were responsible and; fourth, the lucrative nature of the liquor trade was too tempting for even some policemen to resist. As a result, the authorities' efforts to enforce provincial prohibition were constantly undermined.

Shortly after the commencement of operations in 1917 the senior command of the APP realized that the force had neither the necessary equipment nor the manpower to capture well financed bootleggers, most of whom operated in the southern part of the province and ran liquor between Alberta, B.C. and Montana. As automobiles became more reliable and popular it was not long before horses were proven to be inadequate for the task of extensive highway and border patrols. Short of financial resources and unable to follow through with Superintendent Bryan's 1918 recommendations to upgrade the force's small fleet of vehicles the APP turned to its members requesting they use their own vehicles in exchange for a small stipend to help pay for gasoline, maintenance and repairs.⁵ Another partial solution was the purchase of several fast, yet inexpensive motorbikes in 1922 for use in the southern regions of the province. Each unit was fitted with a side car and a machine gun. The bikes were fitted with the guns so they could shoot out the tires of liquor-laden vehicles attempting to outrun the authorities, as well as serve as a show of force in light of the increasing violence that had come to be associated with the liquor trade during the early-mid 1920s.⁶ As part of the APP's increased highway surveillance and patrol strategy during the 1920s the police established Barrier detachment just west of Coleman in the Crow's Nest Pass in 1922. This was the favoured route of those transporting liquor from B.C., where it could be purchased legally from government vendors, to Alberta or Montana where it was sold illegally for a substantial profit.⁷ Although the Barrier detachment

did slow the volume of liquor entering the province by motor vehicle, the preferred method of smugglers, it also caused an increase in the use of the trains to transport liquor across provincial boundaries. Although the railway companies pledged their cooperation to the authorities, many junior ranking employees looked upon the opportunity to earn this extra money as an chance to ensure their future.⁸ Fred King, a former Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) employee, freely admitted during a February, 1972 interview that he had participated in the distribution of liquor because he was unable to support his family on his salary. He admitted to making a significant amount of money during his days at Coutts where he distributed liquor to his American counterparts.⁹ Harold Routledge, a Lethbridge automobile dealer, who at one time worked for Mark Rogers, a well known bootlegger in the Lethbridge region, stated during an October 1st, 1980 interview that the trains were regularly used to transport liquor and that "The train crews were always in on it; they weren't going to bring that stuff down here for nothing."¹⁰ He added that the liquor was often hidden on the coal cars where it was very difficult for the police to detect and according to Commissioner Bryan's 1922 report, even if the authorities did find a stash it was next to impossible to link the alcohol with those that were responsible for smuggling it as they were rarely involved in the delivery process. ¹¹

During the period 1918 to 1922 the police increased its manpower and detachment levels from 155 to 199 and 74 to 94, respectively.¹² (see table one) The increase in manpower permitted

the force to broaden its surveillance of bootleggers and moonshiners by establishing new detachments in those areas that the police believed were of strategic importance to curtailing both the importation and illicit manufacturing of alcohol.¹³ Establishment of the Barrier Detachment in the Crow's Nest Pass is one such example; two others were those at the coal mining community of Wayne, near Drumheller, thought to be the headquarters of a regional smuggling operation, and the tiny community of Horse Lake in the Peace River country. Similar to the Barrier detachment in the south, the Horse Lake post was used to intercept liquor being brought in to the Peace River and Grande Prairie region from Pouce Coupe, B.C.¹⁴ Following an initial peak in manpower at 199 members in 1922, the size of the force dropped to approximately 180 men and remained at that number for the rest of the decade.¹⁵ (see table one) It is logical to suggest that the initial peak in manpower in 1922 and its subsequent decline was related to the government's concerns regarding the post-war social and labour unrest and to a lesser extent the rise and fall of public support for prohibition. By 1922 the economy was beginning to improve, albeit gradually, and the number of labour disputes were declining, so the government did not feel that the force required the same level of manpower. In addition, despite public rhetoric suggesting continued government commitment to the enforcement of prohibition, the newly elected, pro-prohibition UFA government recognized the fact that the cause had never been supported by a large segment of the population and like many other measures espoused by social reformers, prohibition was beginning to lose its appeal among the electorate. Premier

Herbert Greenfield and his government understood that failing to heed the public's wishes and change the liquor laws would affect their re-election chances.¹⁶ The UFA leadership was also aware of the concerns of the senior command of the APP who argued that the force's continued enforcement of prohibition was impeding the administration of the law in general.¹⁷

The force's main initiative in its struggle to enforce the Liquor Act was the establishment of a separate Liquor Branch in July 1919. This department was a plain-clothes, investigative team that was headquartered in Edmonton, but with men dispersed throughout the province. The number of men serving in this section of the force ranged from ten to thirty officers, depending on manpower availability, fiscal resources and the number of complaints received. Although the Liquor Branch was a separate agency within the APP, its members continued to work in association with uniformed members of the force, exchanging information and assisting one another during raids and searches.¹⁸ The department was established when it became apparent that uniformed men were being forced to neglect their regular duties in order to meet the demands of enforcing prohibition. The Branch employed a number of methods including the infiltration of bootlegging and moonshining organizations and the utilization of spotters and informants. These espionage methods were used in an attempt to expose smuggling operations and to ensure that those individuals permitted by law to either manufacture and export liquor, or purchase alcohol for professional reasons, did not abuse their privileges.¹⁹ The Liquor

Branch was closed in the spring of 1924 following the repeal of prohibition and its members either returned to regular service in the APP or joined the inspection and enforcement division of the newly created Liquor Control Board.²⁰

While the authorities did make some headway with regards to slowing the amount of liquor entering the province, there was very little that they could do to control the amount of illicitly manufactured alcohol. The police and the government were of the opinion that the introduction of prohibition had resulted in a significant increase in the production of moonshine, which was a contravention of the federal Inland Revenue Act.²¹ This situation, according to the police, took a turn for the worse when federal legislation banning the inter-provincial liquor trade, further restricting access to alcoholic beverages, took effect in 1921.²² In 1919 Attorney General Boyle estimated that the police had managed to seize only ten percent of the stills being operated in Alberta. One of the reasons for this was that many were small, quick to assemble stove-top stills used to produce small batches of alcohol.²³ Orest T. Martynowych, author of Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924, concurs, stating that "Prohibition during the war years did little to stop alcohol abuse, as the production of homebrew became widespread",²⁴ and fines did little to deter larger producers as the profits from the sale of moonshine, despite its questionable quality, were too lucrative to forsake.²⁵ The job of the provincial police was made even more difficult because the federal authorities, namely the Mounted Police, were very reluctant to enforce the

federal Inland Revenue Act. The Mounties' history of involvement with controversial liquor laws had not been a favourable one, so they were afraid to re-enter similar territory for fear that such actions would result in the tarnishing of their favourable image. Simultaneously Ottawa refused to relinquish authority over the enforcement of the Inland Revenue Act, as the APP and the government of Alberta requested, for fear of losing any revenue generated by the fines imposed upon those found to be in contravention of the law. The senior command of the APP and the provincial government became very frustrated with this situation because every time a provincial policeman located a still, they had to wait for a federal officer to arrive to make the arrest. This not only meant that Ottawa received the revenue generated from the fine despite the fact that provincial officers had done most of the work, but it wasted provincial officer's time and gave those under surveillance time to dispose of or hide their stills and moonshine.²⁶ Requests to the federal government by Commissioner Cuddy, Superintendent Bryan and the provincial government to have a number of APP officers deputized as Inland Revenue agents went unnoticed for four years.²⁷ Much to Commissioner Bryan's relief, the federal government finally relented in 1922 and agreed to authorize the deputization of a select group of provincial policemen as Inland Revenue agents.²⁸

From the outset Premier Sifton's Liberal government reluctantly supported the prohibition movement. Because support for the cause was far from unanimous, Sifton's Liberals attempted to

remain as neutral as possible. This is reflected in the 1916 Liquor Act, a highly politicized document, full of loopholes permitting the continuation of import-export businesses, which in turn allowed individuals to attain limited quantities of liquor from outside the province for personal consumption within their own dwellings, as well as sanctioning the continued manufacture, purchase and use of alcohol for medicinal, religious and scientific purposes. In essence, the law was intended to please both supporters of prohibition by outlawing the sale and consumption of liquor in public places and the detractors of the movement by permitting some access to alcoholic beverages under special circumstances.²⁹ Faced with the possibility of losing its rural constituency which largely supported prohibition, the Liberals attempted in 1920, following the lapse of federal wartime temperance legislation in 1919, to ban the inter-provincial liquor trade in Alberta, closing all warehouses and export houses in the province. Several warehouse and export operators, however, challenged the legislation on the grounds that laws governing inter-provincial trade were a federal concern; the wets won their appeal and the provincial law was declared *ultra vires*.³⁰ This set-back was remedied by the federally sponsored referendum in October, 1920, (similar votes were held in each province) in which Albertans including women, who largely supported prohibition-voted in favour of banning the inter-provincial liquor trade. Howard Palmer argues that the margin of victory for the drys during the 1920 vote was smaller than the 1915 referendum and implies that had it not been for the enfranchisement of women, it is quite likely that the wets would have prevailed.³¹ The new federal legislation put in place in

1921 following a referendum in 1920 pertaining to a ban on the interprovincial liquor trade did very little to end organized bootlegging because by the time that warehouses and export operations were forced to shut down and dispose of their stocks, the people of Alberta were once again being asked to return to the polls in 1923 to determine the fate of the province's prohibitory liquor legislation. A dramatic decline in support for the cause between 1920 and 1923 resulted in voters favouring a system of government control similar to that in B.C.³²

Throughout the late teens and early 1920s the government and the senior command of the police force continued to publicly exude a great deal of confidence in their efforts and ability to control the illegal liquor traffic. Privately, however, the police were anything but confident, and by late 1922 and early 1923, even the newly elected pro-reform UFA government accepted the fact that prohibitory liquor laws were no longer acceptable to the majority of the public.³³ Many, including the police, were cynical about the value of the prohibition experiment, arguing that its only achievements were an increase in the production and consumption of illicitly manufactured alcohol and increased wealth for those smuggling liquor.³⁴ The enforcement measures of the police and the government had failed because authorities were unable to overcome several major obstacles: a lack of universal support for the law, loopholes in the legislation, a lack of cooperation on the part of federal authorities, and the lucrative nature of the illicit liquor

trade, which proved to be too enticing even for some members of the APP.

One of the main reasons the dries attained a sixty percent majority in the 1915 referendum stemmed from their ability to convince the public that prohibition was necessary for the war effort. Prohibitionists were unable, however, to overcome the fact that a large segment of the population did not accept the argument that the consumption of alcohol was a sin, never mind a criminal act, and that prohibiting it would solve all of society's problems.³⁵ As an aside, while linking the prohibition cause to the war effort initially proved to be a success, with the cessation of hostilities few saw the need for the continuation of such sacrifice and the public as a whole began turning its attention from such idealistic struggles to more immediate concerns, notably the post-war recession and the resulting labour crises.³⁶ Unlike avid supporters of the cause who accepted prohibition's inevitability as a matter of faith, opponents disagreed with the criminalization of the production, shipment and consumption of liquor.³⁷ Many, most notably the liquor interests, argued that the province's restrictive liquor laws were a violation of one's civil rights because they were far from being universally accepted and therefore undermined the principles upon which laws and criminal codes were founded. The wets argued that prohibitionists were attempting to criminalize an activity that had been an acceptable part of many cultures for centuries, unlike murder or theft, that had always been looked upon by mankind as fundamentally wrong.³⁸ Those constituencies that

consistently rejected the idea of restrictive liquor legislation in all three referendums were the coal-mining, working-class and immigrant-dominated regions and neighbourhoods of Lethbridge, the Rocky Mountains and the provinces major urban areas, and those settlements in northern and north-central Alberta where French Canadians, central and eastern Europeans and frontiersmen made up the largest segment of the population.³⁹ For many of these individuals, the consumption of alcoholic beverages was as much a part of everyday life as eating, sleeping and working. Orest T. Martynowych argues that within the Ukrainian-Canadian community during the pre and post-war settlement periods, "drinking was a social problem of major proportions in some of the rural settlements", and that which was often consumed was an extremely strong, homemade drink.⁴⁰ Despite this rather harsh condemnation of some members of the Ukrainian community, Martynowych sympathizes with their plight, suggesting that the number of individuals consuming large quantities of what was sometimes a rather vile concoction was limited and should not be construed as representative of the majority of settlers. He adds that those settling in the remote regions of the country, cut off from both their own culture and that of the host society, had a greater tendency to drink as it was one of the few comforts they enjoyed in what was otherwise a very rugged and tenuous existence.⁴¹ Martynowych argues that it was these individuals that the Anglo community pointed to in an attempt to justify the imposition of prohibition on society, arguing that it was necessary to uplift and reform their crude and uncivilized ways. Aware of this fact that this was

impacting negatively upon the entire immigrant community, the Ukrainian intelligentsia looked for ways to uplift, enlighten and reform their people and their social customs.⁴² While a number of these methods such as reading groups and left-wing political organizations were usually rejected by peasant settlers, others such as theatre groups and church organizations were well attended and readily accepted.⁴³ Community leaders and the intelligentsia used these formats to stress the benefits of temperance and sobriety. Plays contained messages condemning vices and encouraging morality and the laymen of Ukrainian Catholic church, unlike the conservative and aloof regular clergy, involved themselves in the affairs of the people and the community in an attempt to instil the importance of their message, especially that pertaining to the consumption of intoxicating beverages.⁴⁴ As such, the peoples of these communities were offended by the paternal attitude of the Anglo establishment that attempted to impose its own religiously inspired moral values upon their society, especially when there was already a well organized temperance movement existing within their own communities.⁴⁵ Diane Stretch and Howard Palmer both suggest that this domination of the prohibition movement by middle and upper-class Anglos proved to be its greatest downfall within the immigrant community because it offended their cultural and religious sensibilities.⁴⁶

A great many individuals truly believed in the righteousness of the prohibition cause and dedicated themselves to its success. Gerald Hallowell points out in his book Prohibition in Ontario, 1919-

1923, however, that opponents of the cause such as the well known satirist Stephen Leacock criticized prohibitionists arguing that many of those who publicly proclaimed their support for prohibition were interested in the cause and the social reform movement as a whole for self indulgent reasons; that is to say, it provided them with a sense of fulfilment and self gratification and they revelled in the personal recognition and praise from their peers, yet at the same time many of them continued to imbibe.⁴⁷ Regular references throughout the APP's annual reports, including the following remarks by Commissioner Cuddy in 1919 and Inspector Friar in 1920, support Leacock's arguments and accusations.

It is impossible to enforce this Act as it should be enforced, as it stands at present, one of the reasons, and the chief one in my opinion, being that a very large percentage of the Citizens of the Province break this Act indirectly ...⁴⁸

Insofar as the Liquor Act is concerned it has been vigorously enforced but nevertheless it is an unpopular one and appears to be more honoured in the breach than in the observance, especially at what might be considered a better class of citizens who under ordinary circumstances would not violate any law.⁴⁹

The fact that many, including respected community leaders, did not look upon a violation of the Liquor Act as something morally or ethically wrong made enforcement of the law all the more difficult and unpleasant for the APP; increasingly, neither the police nor the law in general were respected by the public.

The on-going criticism that the authorities faced following the cessation of hostilities from both opponents and proponents of the law is another indication that much of the initial enthusiasm expressed for the prohibition cause was as a result of the war and therefore, superficial in nature. It is important to note that the decline in support for prohibition can also be attributed to a general change in the mood of society during the course of the war, from one of optimism and support for reform efforts to pessimism and despair over the lack of jobs and the continuing economic and social unrest. These factors resulted in an increase in the number of those voicing their opposition against prohibition and in the level of concern the dries expressed regarding the enforcement of the law. Opponents of restrictive liquor legislation reiterated their opposition to the underhanded methods employed by the police, which included the use of undercover agents and informants, on the basis that it resulted in an invasion of privacy. Conversely, proponents of prohibition complained about police inefficiency, corruption and the general lack of enforcement of the law. The fact that they lodged these criticisms of the authorities on a regular basis throughout the prohibition era is a clear indication that there was a great deal of illegal activity taking place regardless of the actions taken by the police.⁵⁰ Both sides also complained about discrepancies in the enforcement of the law in urban and rural regions of Alberta. Many, including the APP and the Mounted Police, considered the standard of law enforcement in the province's large urban communities to be vastly inferior to the level of policing provided by the provincial force in the rural regions of Alberta. wets

residing in the country argued that this resulted in a double standard. Liquor was freely available to those in urban centres but they were forced to manufacture and consume moonshine or homebrew. Conversely, dries living in cities and towns complained that bootleggers were free to sell their wares because most local forces were far less diligent in their enforcement of the liquor act than the APP.⁵¹ While complaints were numerous, in particular those suggesting wrongdoing on the part of the police, many were anonymous.⁵² Commissioner Cuddy was resentful of this type of criticism of his men arguing in 1921 that, "There is a lot of moral cowardice among citizens who clamour for rigid enforcement of the Act."⁵³ Cuddy made note of this trend for the first time a few years earlier in 1919 stating that "... even those who do not drink and who voted for prohibition are very loath to give any evidence against those who do break this Act."⁵⁴ Inspector Fisher reiterated these feelings in 1922,

We still find a large faction of the Public very unwilling to assist us in any way in the investigation and (sic) violations of the Liquor Act and it is surprising that in a good many instances those people are some of the most reputable in the community and are only too willing to give us any assistance in the investigation of criminal matters, but when it comes to matters under the Liquor Act their ignorance of same is, to say the least, most astonishing.⁵⁵

Not only was the general public unwilling to assist the police enforce the Liquor Act, but increasingly, as relations between the APP and the citizens of Alberta deteriorated over the prohibition

issue, citizens were hesitant to become involved with the police for any reason. This was in complete contrast to what the police reported following the repeal of the province's liquor laws in the spring of 1924. Commissioner Bryan expressed genuine relief in his 1924 report that the ordeal was over, stating that "We find in our investigations now a complete change of heart on the part of the public, and the majority of whom are willing to give us all the information and assistance possible which I must admit was not the case heretofore."⁵⁶ This change in the citizenry's attitude towards the police can be attributed to the fact that with liquor legally available to those who wanted it, and the police no longer 'harassing' otherwise honest people over the possession or consumption of an alcoholic beverage, bootleggers and rum-runners quickly lost their heroic status and popular appeal and were increasingly viewed as common criminals.

The police may have expected opposition to their enforcement of the act from the general public, but the confrontations they encountered with numerous local Justices of the Peace who refused to preside over liquor related cases were particularly demoralizing. Many of the J.P.s the police had to deal with were local businessmen and were dependent upon the patronage of the local citizenry for their livelihood. Subsequently, they were unwilling to ostracize themselves by handing down stiff sentences or even convicting individuals no matter how overwhelming the evidence.⁵⁷ What was even more demoralizing and disturbing for the police was the fact that some justices publicly censured constables for even laying the

liquor-related charges in the first place.⁵⁸ Commissioner Cuddy summed up the feelings and frustration of many of his men in his 1919 report by stating that, "This is one of the hardest and most onerous duties we are called upon to perform",⁵⁹ and he "strongly recommended that the sale of liquor be placed absolutely under government control."⁶⁰ Cuddy believed that placing control of liquor sales in the hands of the government would ensure that Albertans, not bootleggers, would benefit from the revenue generated by the sale of alcoholic beverages.⁶¹ While the law was in place Bryan publicly insisted on the strict enforcement of the province's liquor laws for the simple reason that it was the law, but he too supported the establishment of a government controlled system. The marked change in the content and tone of Bryan's 1924 report from previous ones and those of Commissioner Cuddy is a clear indication that the police were relieved to see the end of the prohibition era. The shift in public attitude towards the force meant that the APP experienced a tremendous boost in morale as well as "a great improvement in both conduct and discipline" among the men.⁶²

The presence of several loopholes in the Liquor Act also explains why attempts to enforce the law were not very effective. The presence of these loopholes clearly indicate that the Sifton government recognized the controversial nature of the issue and were more concerned with minimizing any potential negative political repercussions among the electorate than they were about banning alcoholic beverages in Alberta.⁶³ As a result, liquor warehouses involved in the import-export business were permitted

to continue operating, individuals were allowed to import limited quantities of liquor from other provinces for consumption within the confines of their own homes and the manufacture, purchase and use of alcohol for medicinal, religious and scientific purposes continued relatively uninhibited.⁶⁴ The import-export business proved to be an on-going problem for the police because many of these operations carried on illegal bootlegging businesses, but this was nowhere near as troublesome as attempting to monitor the practices of the province's doctors and druggists.

Doctors were permitted to keep alcoholic beverages on hand for medicinal use and could also write prescriptions for liquor to be filled by druggists.⁶⁵ This problem was accentuated by several factors: first, Doctors and pharmacists received a fee for every prescription they wrote or filled and were permitted to prescribe and dispense as much as forty ounces of alcoholic beverages at any one time.⁶⁶ Second, many pharmacists neglected to maintain official lists of registered doctors; thus they had no idea, and in some cases did not care, if the prescriptions they were filling were legitimate.⁶⁷ Third, according to the province's Chief Liquor Inspector, F.G. Forster, a significant number of doctors, pharmacists and veterinarians were failing to submit their monthly returns stipulating how much liquor they had dispensed, and those that were, were exceeding their monthly limits.⁶⁸ Fourth, unlike today, liquor bottles were not required by law to be sealed with a government sticker or label. Thus there was no way for the police to determine if the liquor being prescribed and sold by doctors and pharmacists

had been legally obtained from a government vendor or another source, or if it had been tampered with.⁶⁹ Initially, senior police authorities were hesitant to accuse such high profile and respected community leaders such as doctors and druggists of perpetrating illegal activities. Instead, they suggested that any wrongdoing on the part of these individuals was the case of 'a few bad apples in the bunch' bending the laws.⁷⁰ Others, including Liquor Inspector Forster and most APP divisional inspectors, were much more forthright in their assessments of the activities of the province's doctors and druggists.⁷¹ Inspector Fisher of "A" Division stated in his 1918 report that, "As the matter now stands, the majority of the drug stores are nothing more than legalized blind pigs, whereas the druggist who wishes to do a legitimate business is financially a loser over his less scrupulous business opponent."⁷² The police reported that bootlegging by drug store owners in southern Alberta and in Edmonton and Calgary was much more extensive than in other parts of the province.⁷³ As early as 1918 the police recommended that all liquor sold by licensed vendors be packaged in standard size receptacles bearing a government seal so as to curb tampering and profiteering and to simplify inspections.⁷⁴ By 1920, Commissioner Cuddy was convinced that many within the medical community were blatantly abusing their privileges. Henceforth he argued that druggists should have their licences to dispense liquor revoked and that all prescriptions should be filled by government licensed vendors.⁷⁵ As restrictions on the availability of legal liquor intensified with the elimination of the legal inter-provincial liquor trade, so too did the pressure on doctors and druggists throughout

the province to dispense liquor illegally. The police reported in 1922 that the six leading drug stores in Calgary sold nearly 1,600 bottles of liquor in one month and in Edmonton more than 3,350 prescriptions for liquor were filled during the same period.⁷⁶ Clearly, many stores were being opened throughout the province for the sole purpose of selling liquor, forcing existing legitimate pharmacies to break the law in order to stave off bankruptcy.⁷⁷

When the *Alta.* a government implemented the 1916 Liquor Act, the senior command of the RNWMP became very concerned that the Mounties would also become engulfed in the prohibition controversy. This concern on behalf of the senior officers of the Mounted Police stemmed from experiences in the 1880s and 1890s which nearly resulted in the dissolution of the NWMP. The Mounties were so concerned about this issue that they were reluctant to enforce federal laws such as the Inland Revenue Act and the Customs Act for which they were partially responsible. When encountered about this situation by angry provincial officials Commissioner Perry responded by stating that the Mounted Police would continue to patrol the border and search for stills, but they would not be making any special efforts to enforce these laws. Perry was concerned that involvement with the province's prohibition laws "might place the Dominion Government in a position of being responsible largely for illegal liquor selling".⁷⁸ The following year Perry reiterated his concerns stating that "no action could be taken except in aiding the Customs and Immigration officials to enforce the laws."⁷⁹

Not surprisingly provincial authorities were not pleased with Perry's statements because the lack of a federal presence severely limited the APP's ability to enforce prohibition. This resulted in the provincial police having to put up with a great deal of unjustified criticism because many within the prohibition movement were unaware of the jurisdictional restrictions regarding the enforcement of the various laws. The APP's Commissioner Alfred Cuddy expressed his frustration with the Mounties in 1919 stating that "I anticipated that this work would have been done by the R.C.M.P. as it was the Customs regulations that was (sic) being infringed, but up to date I am not aware of their taking any action to put a stop to the practise."⁸⁰ Commissioner Bryan was so frustrated by the performance of the Mounted Police that prior to the appointment of several provincial policemen as Inland Revenue officers in 1922 he proposed the removal of the federal force from Alberta and the assumption of their duties by the APP.⁸¹

The last impediment that the police were unable to overcome in their struggle to enforce prohibition was the lucrative nature of the illicit liquor trade. For example, the APP reported in 1918 that a bottle of locally made Hennessy's Three Star Brandy could be produced for as little as a \$1.50 but sold for \$15.00.⁸² Commissioner Cuddy stated in 1919 that those running liquor from Montana to Alberta, prior to the implementation of nation-wide federal prohibition in the United States, could purchase a case of liquor in the U.S. for \$15.00-\$20.00 and sell it in Canada for \$75.00.

The large, powerful vehicles used by bootleggers were capable of carrying twenty or more cases of liquor, thus an initial investment of a few hundred dollars could return several thousand, sometimes within a matter of hours.⁸³ During the spring of 1924 the government estimated that between 1920 and 1924 the money earned by bootleggers would have been sufficient to have retired all of the province's debts.⁸⁴

The vast sums of money earned by bootleggers not only permitted them to purchase the largest, most powerful vehicles, but to pay their 'employees' handsome wages to ensure their loyalty, avoid jail sentences and successfully bribe a number of public officials. Commissioner Cuddy acknowledged in his 1919 Annual Report that "there is so much money in the liquor business that the people engaged in it can afford to maintain an efficient espionage system to keep them informed of our movements."⁸⁵ As previously discussed, the police were faced with the fact that many Justices of the Peace were reluctant to preside over liquor cases, and when they did assess a fine it was usually quite small in comparison to the amount of money that many bootleggers were earning from their illegal operations. It goes without saying that the subsequent residual effect was negligible and that this was frustrating for the police. Inspector Brankley of "C" Division commented in 1921 that the bootlegging 'business' had to be good because most of the individuals arrested for violating the Liquor Act opted to pay their fines rather than serve a jail term. Brankley argued that it was only when authorities were given the go-ahead to confiscate vehicles as

well as illicit alcohol and money that smugglers were adversely affected.⁸⁶ When the police did intercept a load of liquor the prosecution often found itself out-matched in court by the high-priced lawyers that many of the large operators could afford.⁸⁷

As is the case regarding the topic of discipline within the force, (see chapter two) it is very difficult to determine the extent of corruption or wrongdoing, tied to prohibition, that occurred within the APP. That some existed, there is no doubt: as to how many officers and other public officials were involved, is very difficult to determine because there is little information on the topic and only one former officer interviewed for this thesis would not even acknowledge or discuss the subject. Even at that Frank Rodberg's statements on the topic gravitated to generalizations about a few officers in the south getting into trouble and recollections that some members were either caught drinking or had drinking problems.⁸⁸ The APP's reports for the period 1918-1924 refer to less than ten cases in which policemen were either dismissed from the force and charged with violating the province's Liquor Act, forced to resign under suspicion of involvement or deserted for fear of being detected by their superiors.⁸⁹ The following examples would tend to suggest that there was a great deal of incentive, especially given the rather low wages that constables were initially paid, and that bribes were frequently made to members of the APP, officers of the courts and other officials within the judicial system. Constable A.E. Smith of the Coutts detachment, located along the Alberta-Montana border, reported to his superiors that he was

offered \$5,000.00 to be absent from work for just two days by an American liquor smuggler.⁹⁰ A second example pertains to Inspector Brankley's February, 1928, correspondence with the Commissioner regarding accusations that he had contravened the province's prohibition laws during the early 1920s. Brankley argued that he had served the APP and the people of Alberta faithfully, stating in one letter to Commissioner Bryan that, "During prohibition I had every opportunity to make thousands, and I defy any one to point a finger at me in the way of graft or dishonesty, or any thing else as far as that goes."⁹¹ The aforementioned number of men dismissed from the force for wrongdoings is low in comparison to those suggested by other sources such as pro-prohibitionist newspapers and organizations, but this is not surprising as one would expect the police to present this information in such a manner so as to minimize criticism of the force. Negative publicity and criticism of this type was a regular occurrence for the police at this time because of the public's initial impression that they had 'failed' to 'fill the shoes' of their predecessors and because of their involvement with prohibition. There is a strong suggestion in the reports of the senior command that there may have been more wrongdoing on the part of the members of the APP than they were prepared to admit. They intimated this by repeatedly referring to the "great temptations" all members of the force faced. Inspector Hodgkins of the Liquor Branch stated in his 1920 report that "The particular kind of work these men have to do leads them into all kinds of temptation ... "⁹² Similar references by other commanders suggest that the discipline of the men was acceptable but not

without some serious problems.⁹³ While these statements do not constitute evidence that policemen were directly involved in the illegal liquor business, they strongly suggest that members of the force may have committed less serious violations of the law such as the consumption of alcohol or that commanders simply were not pleased with the enforcement efforts of their men. Further evidence that disciplinary problems existed during this period is the change in the substance and tone of the comments of the senior commanders in the 1924 report following the repeal of prohibition during the spring of that year. Not only was there a decline in the number of men dismissed from the APP but there was unanimous agreement among senior ranking officers that the repeal of the law had resulted in a vast improvement in attitude and discipline of the men.⁹⁴

Upon his resignation in April, 1922 Commissioner Cuddy stated in a letter to Alberta Premier Herbert Greenfield that he was proud of the progress the force had achieved under his leadership despite the on-going problem of enforcing the province's liquor laws. He took credit for over seeing the reorganization of the force in 1919, keeping the APP free from the encroachment of union activists and clear of any politicization or corruption.⁹⁵ While it is obvious from the previous discussion on prohibition that not all of his claims were justifiable, Cuddy was correct to take credit for recognizing and retaining those individuals with both the necessary experience and respect of the men to oversee the reorganization of the APP. The commissioner noted that when he took over the leadership of the

APP in 1919 the force was in disarray due to the lack of qualified individuals in key organizational and administrative positions. Cuddy pointed to his retention of W.C. Bryan as Superintendent as one of the important elements in the revitalization of the APP. Cuddy added that as a result of the changes he had implemented the members of the force were loyal, in good spirits, working efficiently and well organized. Cuddy confidently claimed that Alberta's provincial police force was one of the most efficient and best organized law enforcement agencies in North America.⁹⁶

Cuddy was not one to shy away from implementing new technologies, providing it was within the force's budget. In October, 1920, with help from Superintendent Bryan, the Commissioner authorized the establishment of the APP's Identification Bureau under the command of Corporal A.A. Kirby. Kirby, the man in charge of establishing the 'rogues' gallery', managed this department until his departure from the force in 1928. Every individual arrested for a serious crime was fingerprinted and photographed. These files were circulated within the force and distributed across Canada and the United States.⁹⁷ The availability of this type of information was particularly useful for inter-agency investigations. Cooperation of this nature and the sharing of techniques and procedures led to greater efficiency within the law enforcement community as a whole, making the capture of fugitives much easier.

Overlooked for the Commissioner's position in 1910 W.C. Bryan was appointed to this post when Alfred Cuddy left the service in

July, 1922. Cuddy made a recommendation to Premier Greenfield that Superintendent Bryan takeover the leadership of the force and W.F.W. Hancock, the young commanding officer of the Peace River Division, assume the position of Superintendent. Cuddy stated that the two men were disciplinarians, but fair and would retain the respect of the men.⁹⁸ Bryan, who was appointed Commissioner, chose J.D. Nicholson for the Superintendent's post. Several months later, Cuddy, then the Assistant Commissioner of the OPP wrote to Attorney General Brownlee, complimenting the government on its decision to hire Bryan as Commissioner. Cuddy stated that he "... still considers him (Bryan) one of the best organizers and one of the best police officers we have in Canada."⁹⁹ Technically, Bryan remained Commissioner of the APP until the force was disbanded in 1932, at which point he retired and moved to the West Coast; from December, 1931, to March, 1932, Bryan was on extended leave, and W.F.W. Hancock, who had taken over as Superintendent when Nicholson was asked to resign from the force in 1928, assumed the role of Acting Commissioner.¹⁰⁰

Willoughby Charles Bryan led an adventuresome and diverse life that helped to prepare him for the leadership role he assumed in 1922. Born in Rockenford, county of Devon, in southern England in 1865, he emigrated to Canada in 1883 at the age of eighteen with the intention of homesteading with his cousin in Souris, Manitoba. Tiring of agricultural life after two moderately successful years, Bryan spent the next two and a half years as a labourer with the Manitoba and North Western Railway. He worked as a stage hand and

an extra with the Buffalo Bill Cody Wild West Show for about a year as it toured across the continent and apparently served under the command of President Diaz in the Mexican army for a very short time although this cannot be confirmed. He also served with the Texas Rangers, remaining with this law enforcement organization for approximately one year.¹⁰¹ Bryan returned to England briefly in 1887, before coming back to Canada to join the NWMP that same year. After training in Regina and Winnipeg he was assigned to Fort Macleod, where he spent the majority of next twenty years, rising to the rank of Sergeant Major before resigning from the force in 1907.¹⁰² In 1889, Bryan married his first wife, Mary Nelson of Ft. Macleod. She died in Edmonton in 1929 and the Colonel remarried in 1932.¹⁰³ Following his resignation from the RNWMP, he joined the provincial court in Macleod, assuming the position of district clerk in 1908, and served in that capacity for the next six years. During this time he became involved in a syndicate that was involved in oil exploration in southern Alberta.¹⁰⁴

Upon the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Bryan applied for overseas duty but was refused due to his age and a recurring arm injury from his youthful horse-breaking days. Not fit for active service, he turned his attention to helping the war effort at home, and set out to organize the 191st Southern Albertan Battalion in 1916.¹⁰⁵ That same year he was appointed to the rank of Colonel and was posted to Petawawa, Ontario, where he served as one of the training facility's commanders for four months. Returning to Alberta after about half a year in the east, Bryan was reportedly offered a

foreign commission posting in China that entailed the reorganization of the Wei Hai Wei police department. Bryan turned down the position in order to join the Alberta Provincial Police force as an Inspector.¹⁰⁶ While serving as Commissioner, he was nominated in April 1931 for the King's Police Medal by Alberta's Deputy Attorney General, George Henwood.¹⁰⁷ Bryan moved to the west coast following the disbanding of the APP, and remained there till his death at the age of 80 years, in 1945. During his retirement, he acted as a consultant to the City of Vancouver during 1938-39, helping that city reorganize its Municipal Police force.¹⁰⁸

Commissioner Cuddy's praise for W.C. Bryan was more than gentlemanly parting words. The path the APP followed under Bryan's leadership strongly suggests that he had a great deal to do with the reorganization of the force and adoption of new technologies and tactics while serving under Cuddy from 1919 to 1922. Bryan's greatest priority, and probably his greatest disappointment, was his failure to convince the fiscally conservative provincial governments of the day that the police required a proper training program in order to meet the changing role and growing list of demands expected of law enforcement agencies. This failure was despite the fact that he enjoyed good professional and personal relationships with several senior provincial government ministers and their deputies.¹⁰⁹ Bryan was instrumental, however, in the implementation of new tactics utilized by the APP in their efforts to enforce prohibition. Although he noted in every annual report during the prohibition period that the

work was an onerous task, curiously enough, at no time did he suggest changes to the law to make the police's task easier.¹¹⁰

In an attempt to keep up with changing technology and new criminal behaviour and techniques, Bryan both initiated and oversaw a number of changes in the APP. The force implemented the use of dogs for the first time in 1919-1920 at "D" Division, Lethbridge. The dogs were used to track both individuals and contraband liquor, whether stills or liquor shipments hidden in cars, buildings or on trains.¹¹¹ Dogs were acquired by all of the divisions, but were phased out of use by the late 1920s as part of the force's cost-cutting measures.¹¹² By contrast, the first mention of dogs being used in this capacity by the RCMP is in the 1939 RCMP annual report, and the first member to use the canines was a former APP officer.¹¹³ In 1920, as previously noted, Bryan oversaw Corporal A.A. Kirby's organization of the Identification Bureau (photographing and fingerprinting of serious offenders). As motor vehicles became the criminal's favoured mode of transportation, the mechanization of the APP, whenever finances allowed, became a priority. Beside the gradual replacement of the horse with automobiles, the police purchased several high-speed Indian motorcycles in 1923. These motorbikes were initially equipped with side-cars and machine guns capable of firing 240 rounds per minute. The motorbikes were bought by the police with the intention to use them to catch the high powered vehicles operated by bootleggers. If necessary, the machine guns were used to shoot out the tires of those vehicles driven by bootleggers who were attempting to out-run the police. The show of

weaponry was also intended to counteract the increasing level of violence associated with prohibition and to protect the police. The shooting death of Constable Lawson in 1922 sparked a great deal of controversy among the police, the government and the public and it had a serious negative effect on the morale of the force. The purchase and arming of the bikes was heartily endorsed by the senior commanders who were not about to sit idly by while their men were killed in the line of duty.¹¹⁴ The bikes were put to extensive use patrolling the highways until prohibition was repealed. They were then used for highway patrol for the next four years.¹¹⁵

Beginning in 1928, Commissioner Bryan urged the government to provide the force with sufficient financial resources to purchase both a radio network and a "flying machine" or airplane. Bryan felt a plane would be very useful for search and rescue and for patrolling the Crow's Nest Pass and the Alberta-Montana Border for liquor smugglers. The government refused to purchase a plane for the police, informing Bryan that it was an expensive luxury and that for the few times a year the force genuinely required one, it would be much cheaper to rent or lease an airplane.¹¹⁶ Although the government would not purchase an airplane, it did eventually provide the necessary financial resources for the installation of a radio network. This installation was approved only after the government was convinced that it would lead to greater efficiency and subsequently, financial savings. In a letter to Attorney General Lymburn, Bryan argued that a radio network would save wasted manpower that presently ran messages between detachments and

that other government or emergency services could use and also benefit from the same system.¹¹⁷ The APP purchased and installed its system during the summer and fall of 1931; second in Canada only to the B.C. Provincial Police (BCPP), which installed such a system in 1928.¹¹⁸ The BCPP's development of radio technology followed closely on the heels of experiments performed during the mid-1920s in Europe, Britain and the United States. When the APP proceeded with the installation of their system, Commissioner Bryan sought the advice of his B.C. counterpart and friend, Commissioner Foster, as to how best utilize the system. In addition, the officers in charge of the B.C. system helped install the APP's new system.¹¹⁹

The APP opted for the wireless transmission radio system as opposed to the voice transmission type. This system allowed the five divisional headquarters to communicate with one another. According to W.C. Bryan Jr. confidential material was not sent by means of the new transmitting system as the lines were open to anyone who owned a receiver and had it tuned to the police frequency.¹²⁰ R.E. Clark noted that the radio system was installed to save postage and long distance phone charges, but he recalled the operators spending more time on the telephone ensuring that the messages were received, than prior to the installation of the system.¹²¹ Frank Rodberg stated that depending on the weather conditions and the time of day, he was not always able to reach Edmonton, and when his transmission signal to Edmonton went dead, he sent his messages via the B.C.P.P. system.¹²² Due to the takeover

of the APP by the RCMP, the provincial police never had the opportunity to expand their radio system to include links between the detachments, their respective divisional headquarters and their patrol vehicles. The implementation of this expansion of the system was discussed as the initial system was being installed, but it never materialized.¹²³

Both W.C. Bryan Jr. and Frank Rodberg were Radio Constables with the APP at Lethbridge and Peace River respectively; the other three transmitting systems were located at Edmonton, Calgary and Red Deer.¹²⁴ Rodberg attained his radio transmission proficiency and underwent regular police training. Bryan, on the other hand, was only eighteen at the time and was assured a position in the force by his grandfather, the Commissioner, upon the completion of his wireless courses.¹²⁵ For the five radio constables on the force, manning the radio was their primary task. When they were not transmitting or receiving messages, they assisted with various administrative tasks, guarded prisoners when the other officers were unavailable, and performed regular policing duties when Edmonton signed off for the weekend.¹²⁶ For the young Constable Bryan, however, regular duty did not amount to much more than 'ride-alongs', observation and the performing of minor tasks, as he was both underage and had no police training.¹²⁷ When the force operators temporarily signed off, they requested Edmonton to hold their messages and indicated when they would return. This usually only occurred in an emergency situation when their assistance was needed for other purposes.¹²⁸

1928 proved to be a pivotal year for the force for several additional reasons. Bryan oversaw the creation of the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) under the command of Inspector Piper, soon replaced by Detective Lesley. Lesley choose his men carefully, preferring that each detective possessed a specific skill such as proficiency in ballistics, identifying forgeries or fingerprinting. Fluency in a second or third language was a definite asset, especially if it was an Eastern or Southern European language. By the late 1920s governments were once again becoming concerned about the activities of the Communists and other left wing union and political organizations whom they felt were manipulating the foreign elements of the population. Lesley sought individuals of non-Angle Saxon background who could easily infiltrate the ranks of labour, political and social organizations dominated by foreigners.¹²⁹ The creation of the CIB resulted in a more efficient means of utilizing manpower and resources for the purpose of investigating cases. The CIB included Corporal Kirby's Identification Branch, giving key investigators easier access to vital information which enhanced the efficiency of the service. (see figure one) Second, the activities of the detectives who remained within their divisions and reverted to regular duty when not needed by the CIB, were coordinated from a central office. This coordination resulted in the need for fewer investigators, which in turn meant a saving to the government.¹³⁰ Only in the event of an unsolved case of a serious nature would senior detectives from Edmonton and Calgary assist or take over cases, regardless of the jurisdiction.¹³¹

Ironically, despite the attempt to cut costs by coordinating the activities of the detectives, the members of the CIB were involved in a number of seemingly minor cases that could have been investigated by uniformed men. Detective Lesley, commander of the CIB, reported in 1928 that his men were wasting a great deal of time with investigations pertaining to automobile accidents, Game Act violations, taxi driver robberies and vagrancy cases; Lesley recommended that these be handed over to regular constables, so his higher paid, highly skilled officers could be put to effective use on cases that required their attention.¹³²

1928 was also important because the issue of government funding of the APP was once again at the top of the political agenda, despite the fact that provincial revenues were increasing and the operating costs of the APP as a percentage of revenues were decreasing. The Mounties had resumed provincial policing activities in Saskatchewan this same year, and had offered Alberta a similar deal. Many individuals who had long supported a return of the federal force were pressuring the government to accept Ottawa's offer. This in turn had a serious negative effect on the morale of the members of the force, and as long as Alberta's UFA government entertained the idea, the APP found it difficult to recruit competent individuals.¹³³ In a letter to Commissioner Bryan from a Constable Holmes, who appears to have been an informant for the Commissioner, Holmes stated that "the uncertain state of affairs is playing hell with the morale of the boys and if it continues I would not be surprised to see a number of them quit."¹³⁴ Upon conclusion

of an inspection tour of south-central Alberta following the government's refusal of Ottawa's offer, Bryan reported to Attorney General Lymburn that the men were much more at ease knowing that the provincial government was behind them and not about to disband the force in favour of the Mounties. Bryan added that there were no serious complaints and so far as he was concerned he "... found the men all 'keyed-up' in regard to their work ..."¹³⁵

In an attempt to curtail the on-going criticism of the government over law enforcement expenditures, Bryan worked with the Attorney General to implement a number of changes of various magnitudes. These changes, which for the most part amounted to small savings, but had a large political and public relations impact, included the following: the creation of the CIB in 1928, thereby centralizing and coordinating the activities of the force's detectives; the amalgamation of APP Headquarters and "A" Division operations, both of which were located in Edmonton; and the disbanding of "B" Division, headquartered in Red Deer, the following year. Responsibility for the detachments formerly under "B" Division's jurisdiction were divided between Edmonton and Calgary.¹³⁶ (see figure one) Changes of less significance included the government's 1927 initiative to limit the number of annual police reports produced; the hiring of a cook and the acquisition of a barracks in Edmonton in 1928 so that men having to stay overnight on police business could be billeted and fed at less expense to the force than permitting them a daily expenditure account; and the assignment of

rank to the APP's accountant, J.E. Woodhead, in 1929, thereby fixing his annual pay and stopping him from submitting higher fees.¹³⁷

By implementing these cost-cutting measures the APP was able to increase its manpower and detachment level. During the last three years of the APP's existence, manpower levels rose from 172 men in 1929 to 205 in 1931. The number of detachments increased from 95 in 1929 to 105 in 1930, before declining to 100 in 1931.¹³⁸ (see table one) The increase in manpower was necessary for several reasons. As the economic situation worsened and more people joined the ranks of the unemployed, governments were fearful that Communist infiltration and organization of the unemployed and the union movement would lead to violence and revolt. In addition, pressure from citizens and small communities over claims of increasing crime rates stemming from the APP's reduced visibility prompted the government and the police to act. Commissioner Bryan received a memo from Premier Brownlee near the end of July, 1929, stipulating that the police were to cooperate with members of a multi-level, government committee that had been struck

to look quietly into the unemployment situation in the Province, with a view to determining how serious it may become during the winter and to formulate such plans as may be necessary to adequately meet the situation.¹³⁹

Concern among governments over the potential of subversive activities on the part of radicals increased as the Depression worsened and as increasing numbers of individuals lost their jobs. Hugh Guthrie, Federal Attorney General, expressed this concern in a

March, 1931, letter to Premier Brownlee, stating that it might be necessary for the police to keep an eye on certain individuals 'hanging around' some of the larger centres.¹⁴⁰ Earlier that year Lymburn had suggested to the federal government that if the economy rebounded, the communists would quickly lose their audience. Should conditions not improve, however, he noted that "it would be idle to ignore the problem created by the large number of foreigners in our midst, added to the large number of unemployed."¹⁴¹ Although Lymburn took heed of what Guthrie and the federal government had to say, he was rather optimistic that the situation would improve with spring and the planting season which would help to reduce unemployment and alleviate the tension that had built up over the course of the winter in the urban areas. In what appeared to be a rather defensive tone, Alberta's Attorney General added that the APP had plenty of well trained operatives working in the field to offset the activities of the Communists; suggesting that he may not have been very pleased to learn of the RCMP's rather significant undercover presence within the province.¹⁴²

As economic conditions worsened during 1929-1930, many small rural communities began to complain to the provincial government that the level of petty thieving had increased. Towns that had once possessed an APP detachment and others that had been requesting one for several years increased pressure on the government to re-establish or set-up new detachments within their communities. In response to letters of this nature, Commissioner Bryan informed them that due to the government's stringent fiscal

policy, the force did not have the financial resources to hire the necessary manpower to provide policing services to all of the province's communities and therefore had no choice but to be very selective in its placement of detachments.¹⁴³ The province relented in the 1929-1930 fiscal year by providing the Police with the necessary funds to increase its manpower, partially meeting this demand. The government was prodded to increase the police budget by letters such as the one Premier Brownlee received in November, 1930, from the Blindman Municipal District. This particular letter pleaded with the government to reopen the Rimbey detachment. The Treasurer of the local council, W.A. Saunders, noted that the frequency of petty larceny and more serious crimes was on the rise in their once peaceful community and that sheep, poultry and cattle were disappearing and being butchered.¹⁴⁴

In addition to those communities that were facing increased criminal activity, many others, small and large alike, were no longer financially capable of providing their own law enforcement services and were looking to the province for assistance. Bryan prepared a report for the Attorney General in February, 1931, about a possible APP takeover of policing duties in Edmonton. The Commissioner concluded that the venture was possible, but would require approximately eighty men, radio equipment for patrol cars, the creation of a twenty-four hour flying squadron and the reorganization of "A" Division's offices and the CIB unit so as to maximize efficiency and coordinate the APP's rural and municipal services. Bryan estimated that the cost to the City would be

approximately \$160,000.00 a year, which would be payable in two payments.¹⁴⁵ The Commissioner's only stipulation was that the provincial police would maintain complete control of the municipal division and that the city would assume responsibility for extra costs stemming from damaged property caused by rioting and insurrection. Commissioner Bryan's major concern regarding the potential takeover was that most of the men on the Edmonton municipal force were over thirty-five years of age which was the maximum age for new APP recruits; hiring a large number of these individuals could result in a shortfall with the APP's pension fund.¹⁴⁶ The City had little choice but to agree to all of these conditions; the only matter that required further negotiation was the issue of financial compensation for members of the municipal force left unemployed as a result of the change over.¹⁴⁷ The province began the process of preparing amendments to the police act, but this was never completed. The province soon found itself being pressured by the RCMP, R.B. Bennett's newly elected Conservative government and long-time supporters of the federal police to relinquish its control of provincial policing for financial and political reasons.

Commissioner Bryan was unable to accomplish one of his primary goals for the APP: the establishment of a formal training programme. He did, however, succeed in gaining the confidence and trust of Albertans, who expressed nothing but hostility for the provincial police when it was created and for the first several years of its existence. Bryan recognized the urgency of the APP's need for

widespread public support shortly after joining the force worked with his superiors and co-workers to implement those measures necessary to achieve this objective. In an April, 1913, directive to the members of the force, he instructed his men to "be always thinking" and to remember that "courtesy to the public and the energetic manner in performing your duties count largely with the public."¹⁴⁸ Bryan concluded by adding that with the cooperation and loyalty of the members of the force, the APP could, and would be one of the finest law enforcement agencies in the Western World.¹⁴⁹ Upon notification of Bryan's resignation, provincial newspapers praised the Commissioner for not only being an efficient police administrator, but for always extending a courteous and receptive demeanour to the public and members of the press. Regarding this, the Lethbridge Herald noted that, "This attribute has permeated through the individual members of the force, among whom courtesy is prominent, and has given a tone to the force."¹⁵⁰ Bryan received similar accolades from the Premier and the government, regretting Bryan's departure, but thankful for his years of service and excellent leadership.¹⁵¹

Not everyone was enamoured with either the APP's or Commissioner Bryan's achievements and leadership style. A significant percentage of the population had always remained loyal to the Mounted Police, while others had complaints about the service they had received from the APP. There were also former members of the provincial force who were angry because they believed they had been mistreated or unfairly dismissed from the APP. The

relationship between the Mounties and the provincial police had been satisfactory, but from the outset, contention between the two forces existed over prohibition and the fact that for a variety of reasons a number of Mounties left the federal service to join the APP: some wished to begin families, but Mounted Police regulations demanded that men serve twelve years before they could even apply for permission to marry; others wished to remain within Alberta, relatively close to their homes; still others were unimpressed with the militaristic training and organization of the RNWMP/RCMP and sought law enforcement careers that emphasized investigative policing. W.C. Bryan Jr. recalled that the senior command of the Mounted Police not only resented the loss of manpower to the provincial force but were angry with the APP for copying the style of its uniforms. The federal force had traditionally considered itself superior to all other police forces in the country, if not the continent, and was concerned that should the APP not 'measure up', this would reflect upon and damage the Mounties' image.¹⁵² Bryan added in a 1987 interview that he recalled his grandfather, with whom he lived for many years, often complaining about the lack of cooperation the APP received from the Mounties, especially from some of the local commanders during prohibition.¹⁵³

Two complaints received by the government, typical of those from individuals disgruntled with the performance of the APP, criticized the force's efficiency and leadership. J.C. Buckley, an Alberta MLA, wrote the Attorney General suggesting that the APP should be re-structured following the model of the Royal Irish

Constabulary (RIC). Bryan argued that the comparison to the RIC was unfair because it had access to vastly superior financial resources and the citizens that it served were largely of one ethnic background. In addition, the geography, weather and geographic area that the APP had to cope with was vastly different from that of Ireland.¹⁵⁴ Ironically, what Buckley failed to realize was that the organizational structure of the APP was largely based on the RCMP, which in turn had initially been based on the RIC. The second complaint was from a former Scotland Yard Inspector by the name of William J. Brigham, who criticized the leadership and organizational structure of the force for being unsound, expensive and in need of repair. He added that the men in charge of the force had "wrecked the ship".¹⁵⁵ Brigham offered to complete an independent review of the APP, arguing that the implementation of his recommendations would achieve the following: first, show the public that an effort was being made to reform the police; second, re-establish the force's integrity in the eyes of the citizens it served, and; third, restore confidence and boost morale within the APP.¹⁵⁶ Brigham's offer was refused, probably on the grounds that the government did not wish to undermine the authority of Commissioner Bryan and ruin the favourable working relationship it enjoyed with him. In addition, a review of this nature would be costly, and Brigham's background was in metropolitan policing, hardly suitable for the rural policing that the APP performed.

Several former APP members also complained about Commissioner Bryan's apparent 'high handed' approach to the running

of the force. One such complaint was that he often hired personal friends, many without the necessary qualifications. A scathing personal attack on Bryan was received from a former PP constable, Justice J. Bradner. Apparently of the Lethbridge area, Bradner claimed to be acting in the interest of justice and "on the behalf of those interested, and I may say they are many."¹⁵⁷ For unknown reasons, a Detective by the name of J.H. Reid, serving in the Lethbridge area was transferred to Cardston. Bradner's complaint stemmed from the fact the Commissioner Bryan filled Reid's position with Mr. Frank Lavigne, an American from Helena, Montana, instead of offering the position to one of the other men in the Lethbridge division.¹⁵⁸ Lavigne had been employed by the Montana Stock Association for many years and according to Superintendent J.D. Nicholson, was considered by many, himself included, to be one of the most competent and experienced men in the field.¹⁵⁹ Bradner was outraged by Bryan's decision to hire Lavigne as a permanent member of the force, because this contravened the APP Act which specifically stated that all permanent members had to be British subjects. Bradner added that if Bryan was going to be allowed to continue to proceed in this fashion, it would lead to the wholesale corruption of the force, as this was not the first time that this had occurred. Bradner would not specify any other cases, but claimed that a thorough independent investigation would prove he was telling the truth.¹⁶⁰ An investigation by the Attorney General's department revealed that Lavigne had been hired by Bryan, but as a special constable. Whether Bryan did this so as to circumvent the law is

unknown as the matter came to an end with the completion of the aforementioned investigation.¹⁶¹

Three years later, 1929, following his resignation from the force, Reid wrote to J.A. Johansen of Woolford, Alberta, complaining of high level inefficiency and incompetence, favouritism and the existence of what amounted to an 'old boy's network' within the force. Interestingly, Reid did not mention the Lavigne case, but complained that Inspector J.O. Scott, formerly in charge of the Medicine Hat subdistrict and the Crow's Nest Pass region when Constable Steve Lawson was killed, was completely incapable of command. According to Reid, who served under Scott at Medicine Hat, the Inspector had no police experience upon joining the APP, yet quickly advanced to the level of a ranking officer.¹⁶² Reid cited two other cases, one pertaining to a stock detective by the name of Vernon Shaw, and the other A.W. King, a plain-clothes detective from Edmonton, who was friends with both Shaw and Scott. According to Reid, King and Shaw were posted to Cardston by Commissioner Bryan. While serving in Cardston, Reid was of the opinion that Shaw was virtually useless, and King spent most of his time trying to set him (Reid) up. King's APP career came to an end in 1927 and Shaw concluded his provincial policing career with the APP in 1932 and was not accepted by the RCMP, who classified him as "old--usefulness at end".¹⁶³ The Mounties' assessment of Shaw apparently corroborates Reid's accusations, but there is no means of proving that Bryan appointed him to his post in Cardston knowing that he was unfit for duty. Reid resigned in 1929, after failing to improve

his relationship with Inspector Scott, by that time the Commander of "D" Division, Lethbridge, and after being accused of several wrongdoings, all of which were dismissed during an investigation by Superintendent Hancock. Reid claimed that Hancock would not state who was at fault for the poor relationship that existed between the two men. Reid argued that the system was rife with patronage and cover-ups and that a large part of the problem stemmed from the fact that there was little financial incentive for qualified men to seek advancement as wages and benefits did not improve proportionately with the higher ranks.¹⁶⁴ There was no response or related correspondence from the government or the police, so it would seem that Reid did not press the issue.

A third case involved Mr. C.L. Hayward of Edmonton who in a March, 1928, letter to the Premier stated that he was 'framed' by Commissioner Bryan, Inspector Brankley, commander of "C" Division and other members of the Calgary divisional office because they held a personal grievance against him. According to Hayward, he was released from the force with a "good" discharge record in 1925, but Bryan had pressured him to resign. Hayward added that the Commissioner obtained information about him from his Calgary co-workers in 1927 and threatened to use it against him should he ever mention Brankley's involvement in his dismissal.¹⁶⁵ Hayward accused Bryan of withholding the information he (Bryan) had obtained in 1927, because according to Hayward, Brankley was being 'set up' and 'forced out' of the force in the same fashion that he had been in 1925. Hayward argued that Bryan was willing to use the

information against him in his present job with Canadian National Railways, as well as that pertaining to Brankley, should either of them go to the public with this information.¹⁶⁶ As an aside, the information of which Hayward speaks probably refers to Inspector Brankley's marital problems due to his infidelity. Although Commissioner Bryan considered Brankley a reputable officer, he did not think that this was appropriate behaviour for someone in his high profile position, whose duty it was to lead by example. Brankley tendered his resignation in January, 1927.¹⁶⁷ Needless to say, there was no apparent government involvement, and as with the other aforementioned cases, nothing further was heard of the matter.

It is inconceivable that there was not a certain degree of favouritism and patronage within the APP. A letter from Premier Brownlee to Attorney General Lymburn dated April, 1927, states that a number of MLA's were unhappy with the present operations of the APP and demanded an immediate reorganization of the force.¹⁶⁸ While this is very vague, it certainly implies political interference in the operations of the APP and the hiring and dismissing of its personnel. The police force was, after all, a political creation, and its commanders were to a certain extent, responsible to their political bosses. One need only survey the list of those who have served as RCMP Commissioners for examples of political appointments. Contention did exist between some of the members of the force, but it would be impossible to run an organization of this nature without any antagonism within its membership. As for claims of gross inefficiency, corruption, and overall disarray, these are

highly questionable given the fact that the APP possessed a very positive national and international reputation. If the senior command of the force had been as incompetent as Reid, Hayward and Bradner claimed, no matter how good the performance of the junior ranks, the force would not have been capable of maintaining its eighty-plus percent conviction rate from 1917 to 1932, nor would the general populace have supported the provincial police in the manner they did following the repeal of prohibition.

Throughout the course of the existence of the force, the Alberta government received a number of requests for information pertaining to the organizational structure and the general operations of the APP from other provincial and state governments. Ontario was looking for a model upon which to base the re-organization of the Ontario Provincial Police. Dahn Higley noted in his history of the OPP that Superintendent Rogers, the man in charge of revamping the OPP's command structure looked at several American state police organizations but was more impressed with the APP.¹⁶⁹ In 1930, Attorney General Lymburn was in correspondence with the government of the state of Minnesota which was interested in the APP's criminal apprehension and highway patrol techniques.¹⁷⁰ The following year, 1931, the Deputy Attorney General of the province of Quebec M. Lanctot requested information from the Alberta Attorney General's department regarding all aspects of the organization, operations and financing of the APP.¹⁷¹ The fact that former members pointed out the force's international reputation is not surprising, but the fact that it was looked to as a model by its North

American peers suggests that despite its shortcomings, the APP was a comparatively well run law enforcement organization with competent leadership.

Recognition of this type and public support was not something the Alberta Provincial Police had the benefit of when it was first created in the spring of 1917. The formation of the force occurred during very chaotic times with the outbreak of war in Europe and resulting ethnic and racial tensions at home, the implementation of the province's controversial liquor legislation and public resentment over the replacement of the RNWMP. As a result, some members of the public vented their anger towards the fledgling provincial police force. This anger was heightened by several factors: First, the leadership problems that the provincial police experienced in both 1917 and again in 1919 convinced many that the APP was ill-prepared to assume the role vacated by the Mounties. Second, as initial support for prohibition faded, rightly or wrongly, the APP was blamed for the law's continued presence. Third, the police gained many enemies within the labour movement for their 'mediating' role during a number of labour disputes throughout the late teens and early twenties.

The assumption of the leadership of the force by W.C. Bryan was accompanied by a recognition that the police could not continue to operate in the face of such criticism. Bryan implemented measures to improve the performance of his members and thus, the public image of the force. Realizing that the public still looked upon

the Mounted Police as a superior law enforcement organization, Bryan set out to prove otherwise by introducing new procedures, technologies and emphasizing the preparedness of the men. Although the new Commissioner was unable to convince the government to provide the necessary funds to establish a proper training program, he encouraged extra instruction when possible and promoted young, dynamic officers adept with modern policing methods and technologies. Training and good relations, however, did not convince everyone that the APP was capable of equalling the performance of the RCMP, nor did it mean the police did not continue to suffer from its share of internal problems. Between 1917 and 1932, over 100 men were released from the force because they were unable to satisfactorily perform their duties or were dismissed for misconduct. Many of these occurrences took place during the late teens and early 1920s when the temptations of the liquor trade proved too lucrative for some members to resist. The combination of the repeal of prohibition and the implementation of Bryan's initiatives changed the way that many Albertans viewed the provincial police force so that when the government considered disbanding the APP in 1928 the concept was largely opposed. Although the talks of 1928 were a federal initiative, the government of Mackenzie King was not willing to tread on provincial rights for fear of the negative political repercussions. This approach was the opposite to that of R.B. Bennett's administration. Once given the opportunity Bennett was very forthright in expressing his desire to see the Mounted Police regain control of provincial policing throughout Canada. Bennett's administration was successful in

propagating the idea that the province, under severe economic stress resulting from the Depression, would be much better served, both fiscally and from a law enforcement point of view, by the RCMP. The disbanding of the APP was a personal defeat for W.C. Bryan, its Commissioner of ten years, as he had overseen a great deal of change and improvement in the force, despite a chronic shortage of financial resources. It would be a fair summation of the attitudes of the era that although the APP initially faced a great deal of controversy and was not without its shortcomings, it was able to gain the trust and support of much of the public by adequately serving and fulfilling their needs throughout the majority of its fifteen-year existence.

Chapter Three

Endnotes

1. See Endnote no. 1, chapter no. 2, p. 120
2. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1919 APP Annual Report.
3. Ibid., box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report, acc. no. 69.287, box 1, item C.3, Cuddy to Greenfield, April 12, 1922; Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir; and Dahn D. Higley, O.P.P. : The History of the Ontario Provincial Police Force, (Toronto: The Queens Printer, 1984), p. 131.
4. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1919 APP Annual Report.
5. Ibid., 1918-1919 APP Annual Reports.
6. Ibid., box 2, 1923 APP Annual Report.
7. Ibid., 1922 APP Annual Report.
8. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report; interviews with Fred King, February 1972, by Gerry Puckett; and Harold Routledge, October 1, 1980, by Tom Kirkham.
9. Interview with Fred King, February 1972, by Gerry Puckett.
10. Interview with Harold Routledge, October 1, 1980, by Tom Kirkham.
11. Ibid. and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report.
12. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report.
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15. Ibid., 1922 APP Annual Report.
16. Howard Palmer with Tamara Palmer, Alberta: A New History, (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd., 1990), pp. 213-214.

17. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-2, 1918, 1920-1924 APP Annual Reports.
18. Ibid., box 1, 1919 APP Annual Report.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., box 2, 1924 APP Annual Report; and Alberta, Statutes, "The Government Liquor Control Act of Alberta, 1924".
21. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1920 APP Annual Report; and interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
22. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1920 APP Annual Report; Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1974), pp. 299-302; and Alberta, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the Liquor Export Act, 1920".
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24. Orest T Martynowych, Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University of Alberta, 1991), p. 98.
25. Ibid.
26. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1919-1921 APP Annual Report; Stretch, "From Prohibition to Government Control", p. 11; and Edmonton Bulletin, Friday March 28, 1919.
27. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1918-1921, APP Annual Report; and PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 215, file 4533, Cuddy to Attorney General Boyle, February 16, 1920; and Bryan to Attorney General Brownlee, December 9, 1922.
28. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report.
29. Palmer, Alberta: A New History, pp. 174 and 176.

30. Ibid., box 1, 1920 APP Annual Report.
31. Palmer, Alberta: A New History, p. 177.
32. Stretch, "From Prohibition to Government Control", pp. 15-20. See Steven Paul Boddington's MA thesis, "The Alberta Liquor Control Board, 1924-1935", University of Alberta, for a discussion regarding the creation of the Liquor Board.
33. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-2, 1918-1923 APP Annual Reports.
34. Ibid.; and interview with Edward Buchanan, February 3, 1988, by Sean Moir.
35. PAA, acc. no. 73.23, box 5, item 233, 1915 Prohibition Election "Statement of Poll"; Palmer, Alberta: A New History, p. 174; and John Herd Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1978), p. 98.
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40. Martynowych, Ukrainians in Canada, p. 97.
41. Ibid., p. 100.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 265.
44. Ibid., pp. 293-297 and 386-387.
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Alberta, 1875-1915", (MA Thesis, University of Calgary, 1969), pp. 18-19; and Greg Robinson, "Crime, Liquor and Law Enforcement in Ukrainian Bloc Settlements", (University of Alberta History Department "Brown Bag Luncheon Series" seminar, 1988--unpublished).

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47. Hallowell, Prohibition in Ontario, 1919-1923, pp. 17-18.

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49. Ibid., 1920 APP Annual Report.

50. Edmonton Bulletin, March 15, 1918, March 29, 1918, February 11, 1919 and April 9, 1919; and PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 38, file 817, Deputy Attorney General Browning to Cuddy, April 19, 1922.

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54. Ibid., 1919 APP Annual Report.

55. Ibid., box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report.

56. Ibid., 1924 APP Annual Report.

57. Ibid., box 1, 1920 APP Annual Report.

58. Ibid., 1921 APP Annual Report.

59. Ibid., 1919 APP Annual Report.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., box 2, 1924 APP Annual Report.
63. Palmer, Alberta: A New History, p. 176.
64. Alberta, Statutes, "The Liquor Act, 1916"; and PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1 and 2, 1918-1924 APP Annual Reports.
65. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-2, 1918, 1919, 1923-1924 APP Annual Reports.
66. Ibid., 1918-1923 APP Annual Reports.
67. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 30, item 735a, Calgary Government Liquor Inspector, D.C. Bayne to Deputy Attorney General Browning, September 24, 1918.
68. PAA, acc. no. 75.126, box 30, item 735a, memorandums from Forster to Browning, March 22 and April 3, 1917, and Browning to Forster, April 15, 1917.
69. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.
70. Ibid., box1, 1918-1919 APP Annual Reports.
71. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes1-2, 1918-1923 APP Annual Reports.
72. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.
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87. Ibid., box 2, 1922 APP Annual Report.
88. Interviews with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988 and Frank Rodberg, February 9, 1988, by Sean Moir.
89. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, boxes 1-2, 1918-1924 APP Annual Reports.
90. Ibid., box 1, 1918 APP Annual Report.
91. PAA, acc. no. 75.125, item 39, Brankley to Commissioner Bryan Feb. 27, 1928.
92. PAA, acc. no. 72.370, box 1, box 1, 1920 APP Annual Report.
93. Ibid., boxes 1-2, 1918-1924 APP Annual Reports.
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103. Lethbridge Herald, December 16, 1931; and Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
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108. Interview with W.C. Bryan, Jr., September 24, 1987, by Sean Moir.
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116. Ibid, box 4, 1928 APP Annual Report.
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121. Interview with R.E. Clark, February 10, 1988, by Sean Moir.
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147. Ibid., Brownlee to Douglas, March 9, 1931.

148. PAA, acc. no. 66.166, box 19, item 152, circular memorandum 137, April 3, 1918.

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168. Ibid., Brownlee to Lymburn, April 7, 1927.

169. Higley, The O.P.P., pp. 111-112.

170. PAA, acc. no. 76.347, box 7, file 185, Oscar Mallam to Lymburn, September 24, 1930.

171. Ibid, file 184, M. Charles Lanctot, Quebec Deputy Attorney General to Smith, August 1, 1931.

Chapter Four

'Recession and Centralization': The Disbanding of the Alberta Provincial Police Force

"The 'Mounties' have taken over" proclaimed the Albertan newspaper on April 1, 1931.¹ Most of the province's major papers carried similar stories proclaiming the disbanding of the Alberta Provincial Police and the assumption of their duties by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.² The article in the Albertan praised the APP for their heroics, their fair mindedness, and for compiling a law enforcement record that was equal to, or better than, that of many of their North American peers. The fact that the province was going to be able to reduce its law enforcement budget by half did not go unnoticed by the author of the article, as the reporter speculated concerning the significant savings that the province would reap as a result of the forthcoming change.³ From the time that the province was created in 1905 to the present, money has been an integral part of the debate as to whether Alberta should contract with the federal government for the services of the RCMP or operate its own police force. The question of money became even more pertinent during the early 1930s with the onset of the Depression. The economic woes facing the province in 1930-1932 do not in themselves, however, fully explain why the Alberta government sought a federal policing arrangement with Ottawa. The following factors also influenced (some would suggest, forced) the Alberta government to disband the APP: the expansionist aspirations of the Mounted Police; recognition by politicians and senior bureaucrats in Ottawa that the federal police had become an indispensable, cost-efficient component of the

federal bureaucracy; a shift of societal views in the industrialized world supporting centrally controlled, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement agencies; the increasing acceptance of the philosophy by the nation's leaders that the centralization and expansion of national institutions equalled efficiency; the personal favour with which Prime Minister Bennett viewed the RCMP; the similarity of the policy to expand the role of the Mounties with that of other policies carried out during the Bennett administration; and Ottawa's concern that the activities of a number of left-wing political and labour groups would hamper or derail Ottawa's plans to revive the economy. There can be little doubt that the onset of the Depression and the effect that it had on Alberta is central to the federal-provincial policing debate. It is questionable, however, as to whether the disbanding of the APP would have occurred had the economic downturn not coincided with the desire of the federal government and the senior command of the RCMP to oversee the expansion of the Mounted Police.

The 1931-1932 negotiations that resulted in a new federal policing contract for Alberta were not the only time the province flirted with the idea of disbanding the APP. Ottawa initially approached Alberta while the federal government was negotiating a policing agreement with Saskatchewan in 1928. Correspondence between the Alberta and Saskatchewan governments throughout 1930 and 1931 also indicates an increasing level of interest on the part of the former in the activities of the RCMP in Saskatchewan. As previously stated, Ottawa approached Alberta in 1928 with a deal

similar to that which had been offered to Saskatchewan. Following several months of serious deliberation Alberta walked away from the negotiations deeming the potential agreement not to be in the best interest of the province. This decision was arrived at by Premier Brownlee and his cabinet for several reasons. To begin with, the federal government wanted to charge Alberta more for the services of the RCMP than they were charging Saskatchewan. Ottawa argued that in comparison to Saskatchewan the force would require more men to police the province. Federal negotiators specifically cited Alberta's volatile mining industry, often afflicted by labour trouble, and the continuation of bootlegging activities in the Crow's Nest Pass area and major urban centres, as reasons why more men would be required. They continued by stating that unlike Alberta, where men would have to be pulled from the field in the event of widespread trouble, Saskatchewan had a 'permanent' force on hand at Regina's Training Depot, already paid for by the federal government. Besides disagreeing over manpower levels and costs, the two governments failed to find a consensus over which duties the RCMP would assume from the APP and which ones the province would have to undertake. That which caused the greatest concern was the enforcement of the province's liquor legislation. For reasons discussed in chapter one, the RCMP was still very reluctant to accept responsibility for this duty despite the repeal of prohibition in Alberta in 1924 and the implementation of a system of government control. Had Alberta accepted the federal government's offer, the province would have been faced with maintaining a provincial liquor squad in addition to paying for the services of the

Mounted Police, thereby eliminating much of the saving associated with a new federal policing contract. There were also the issues of quality of service and control over the activities of the federal force. Premier Brownlee was not convinced that the Mounted Police, having been removed from the realm of provincial policing for some time, could provide the same quality of service that Albertans had come to expect from the APP. He was also worried, despite the promise of the appointment of a provincial commander, that due to the remoteness of RCMP headquarters in Ottawa, concerns raised by the provincial government would go unheeded.⁴ Finally, unlike 1931-1932, Alberta's economic situation in 1928 appeared to be improving and this gave provincial politicians the financial latitude to manoeuvre and ultimately refuse Ottawa's offer. Commodity prices had increased gradually during the mid-1920s and investment confidence in the province was returning after more than a decade of decline and stagnation.⁵ As a result, provincial revenues began to increase, and subsequently the cost of maintaining the APP as a percentage of these revenues declined.⁶ (See table two)

In addition to finding fault with the terms of the deal offered by the federal government the provincial government soon found itself in the middle of a public relations battle between those who had advocated a return of the RCMP since their withdrawal from provincial policing in 1917 and those opposed to the disbanding of the APP. Supporters of Ottawa's proposal, such as the provincial Conservative and Liberal parties, southern ranchers concerned for their herds and rural businessmen continued to press for a return of

the RCMP, arguing that the operation of a provincial force was fiscally irresponsible. These individuals were of the opinion that the Mounted Police were a vastly superior law enforcement agency, unaffected by political influence, unlike their provincial counterpart.⁷

For reasons discussed in chapter two, public support for the provincial force had not always been so apparent as it had become by the mid-to-late 1920s. The appointment of competent leadership, the repeal of prohibition and hard work on the part of the police began to have a positive effect on the public. Opposition to the disbanding of the APP came from the United Farmers of Alberta (political and non-political wings), labour and left-wing political groups, those who advocated increased regional and local political autonomy and of course, the APP itself. Members of both the political and non-political wings of the UFA supported the APP. Many viewed the issue in the broader context of provincial rights and resented Ottawa's intrusion into provincial affairs. As is the case today, Westerners aspired to attain equality with Central Canada. Thus, viewed in association with Ottawa's refusal to relinquish control over Alberta's and Saskatchewan's natural resources, supporters of the APP considered the disbanding of the police as a step backwards from their goal of equality and a step towards the further erosion of provincial powers. Others disapproved of the economics of the deal, especially in light of the fact that Alberta would be held responsible for maintaining a separate liquor squad. Although unions had severely criticized the APP for its role in a

number of post-World War I labour disputes, labour supported the retention of the provincial police. Union boses and the political left cautioned the country about the potential for the abuse of power should the Mounted Police be permitted to expand its jurisdiction in an unchecked manner. In addition they pointed out that the force's decision makers were based in Ottawa, too far removed to fully understand or appreciate local needs and problems.⁸

Not surprisingly, the APP strongly objected to a new federal policing contract. There was little love lost between the APP and the RCMP, each looking upon the other as inferior for various reasons and in the case of the APP, lingering anger over the uncooperative nature of the Mounties during prohibition and the trouble this caused the provincial force. The provincial police's opinion of the RCMP became known in 1922 when Commissioner Bryan proposed to the government that the APP assume all law enforcement responsibilities in the Alberta. He made the suggestion because the Mounties were unwilling to either assist the APP or fulfil their own responsibilities regarding the enforcement of the province's and the dominion's liquor laws.⁹ The 1928 discussions caused a great deal of unrest within the force, causing morale to plummet. The government's decision to reject the deal, however, resulted in Commissioner Bryan being able to state in no uncertain terms that he was very pleased with the decision and that the morale of the men had never been better.¹⁰

While reviewing the 1928 negotiations it is also necessary to understand the position of the federal government and the importance which it placed on the expansion of the Mounted Police: In other words, was the expansion of the RCMP a priority for the federal government, as was clearly the case in 1931-1932? Traditionally, the Liberal party had been suspicious of the RCMP because of its Tory roots. Prime Minister King's government was beginning to see beyond this and appreciate the advantages of a multi-jurisdictional police force not only from a law enforcement perspective, but because the force was important to the efficient operation of the federal bureaucracy. An examination of Prime Minister King's papers, the Debates of the House of Commons and the papers of the RCMP, however, indicates that despite this King displayed little personal interest in the force itself, unlike his successor R.B. Bennett.¹¹ Nor did King seem willing to spearhead an expansion of the police in an abrupt, confrontational manner if it seemed to conflict with provincial aspirations. An examination of the Debates of the House of Commons throughout the 1920s and early 1930s reveals that King's contribution to these discussions, when compared to Bennett's, was minimal if not non-existent most of the time.¹² King's decision to support the expansion of the Mounties in 1928 was motivated as much by political considerations as anything else. A January 21, 1927, letter from the Prime Minister to his Justice Minister, Ernest Lapointe, regarding Saskatchewan's request that something be done about the policing situation in that province, clearly indicates King's indifference about the matter so far as the Mounted Police were concerned. In passing the issue off to Lapointe,

King indicated that the policing situation in Saskatchewan should be resolved to Premier Gardiner's satisfaction, regardless of whether this meant an expanded role for the RCMP or an assumption of the federal force's role by the SPP.¹³ It would seem likely that King was hoping that his support for a fellow Liberal would result in political dividends for him and his party in Saskatchewan during the next federal election.

As economic conditions in western Canada deteriorated throughout 1930-1931, Premier Brownlee's UFA government apparently began to reconsider Ottawa's offer to have the RCMP assume the province's policing responsibilities. Gerald Friesen, author of The Canadian Prairies: A History, states western Canada's increasing economic dependency on wheat during the 1920s set the stage for a severe economic crisis. Friesen argues that due to a number of domestic and global factors, the agricultural sector of the economy, and therefore the economy of western Canada as a whole, was in serious trouble by that summer. The drop in world wheat prices in 1929 was the first indication of a change in the health of the Alberta economy.¹⁴ This drop in prices, however, was initially thought to be of little consequence; farmers remained confident that the large yields and good prices that they enjoyed throughout the mid-1920s would continue.¹⁵ This heavy dependence on a single commodity, mounting personal debt levels fuelled by aggressive expansion, increased amounts of wheat for export, shrinking demand by traditional grain importers due to politically motivated tariffs and a subsequent drop in grain prices and the onset of drought across

much of the prairies in 1930 put an end to the short-lived window of prosperity Alberta had begun to enjoy during the late 1920s.¹⁶ This decline in the agricultural economy had a serious impact on government revenues because agriculture made up such a large percentage of the provincial economy. The increase in government revenues for 1929-1930 paled in comparison to the annual substantial increases of the previous few years. Revenues rose on an annual basis by several percentage points during the early part of the decade before jumping twenty-five percent between late 1927 and early 1929. Throughout the rest of 1929 and 1930, however, revenues were considerably lower, increasing by a mere four percent, before declining gradually in 1931 and by a significantly greater margin again in 1932.¹⁷ As the economic situation worsened and provincial revenues declined the government was forced to expend more money on enlarging the APP: local governments requested that the APP assume their policing responsibilities; communities complained of increased petty crime due to economic hardships; and there was a greater demand for the distribution of welfare benefits in many areas of the province, and the APP proved to be one of the most efficient means of distributing this aid. As a result of these circumstances, and against the wishes of a number of its own members, the government began to re-evaluate its position on the APP.¹⁸

In November, 1930, Premier Brownlee initiated correspondence with Saskatchewan Attorney General M.A. Macpherson inquiring whether his province was satisfied with the performance of the

Mounted Police. In particular, Brownlee wanted to know if the Mounties were expressing any reluctance to become involved with controversial issues such as the enforcement of liquor laws and assisting local authorities in the event of labour troubles and in the distribution of relief.¹⁹ Macpherson replied on December 3rd, stating that, "There is no doubt now as to the thought that the RCMP is prepared to assist us at any time in the event of labour trouble...", adding that what little trouble the province had experienced was quickly taken care of by the Mounted Police.²⁰ This was followed by a response from Brownlee on January 14, 1931, inquiring how many men of the old SPP were taken on by the Mounties and whether they had been treated fairly by the federal force.²¹

Further evidence of the government's move towards acceptance of Ottawa's offer is the rather sudden resignation of APP Commissioner W.C. Bryan on October 1, 1931, reportedly due to health concerns.²² As an aside, a subsequent letter to Lymburn from Bryan on December 1, indicates that the Commissioner was still on the job, calling into question the legitimacy of his alleged medical problems.²³ In a September 24, 1987 interview, W.C. Bryan, Jr. dismissed the medical explanation, suggesting that his grandfather had little desire to rejoin the RCMP in a subordinate position, having served as Alberta's top-ranking law enforcement officer for close to a decade.²⁴ Bryan's resignation is a clear indication that he had lost the battle to save the force he had struggled to develop and modernize, and that the government had virtually made up its mind to proceed with negotiations with Ottawa for a new federal policing

agreement by the Autumn of 1931. By the end of that year, as revenues declined, welfare (relief) expenditures rose and pressure from RCMP supporters mounted, it was clear to Brownlee that action had to be taken. Whatever their personal feelings, the Depression left the political leadership of Alberta, Manitoba and the Maritimes with little choice but to eliminate 'non-essential' expenditures. According to S.W. Horrall, law enforcement was targeted as it could easily be justified on the basis of "why have two forces when one could supposedly do the job for less?"²⁵

The fact that the government considered the issue of disbanding the APP in 1928 and throughout 1930-1931 did not make the decision to proceed with this course of action in 1931-1932 any less difficult. In a March 11, 1932, interview with the Edmonton Journal pertaining to the forthcoming disbanding of the APP, Attorney General, J.F. Lymburn noted that,

When the RCMP were withdrawn, at the time there were some people who believed the provincial force would be unable to measure up to the standards of the federal body. Today, the challenge is thrown back at the RCMP to stand up to the record of the APP.²⁶

Many Albertans had developed a great deal of admiration and respect for the APP which had made tremendous progress since its tumultuous start in 1917. By 1931-1932, the APP was widely respected by its North American peers making the decision all the more difficult.²⁷ Despite this show of affection for the APP, supporters of the RCMP such as the provincial Liberal and

Conservative parties pressed Brownlee's UFA government, even more so than in 1928, to negotiate a policing contract with Ottawa. They argued that fiscal responsibility was crucial to the province's survival during such difficult economic times.²⁸ Conservative MLA D. M. Duggan had been one of the most persistent boosters of the RCMP throughout the 1920s, regularly pointing out to the Brownlee government during the 1930-1931 sittings of the legislature how much money the province of Saskatchewan had saved as a result of its new policing agreement with Ottawa. Throughout the late 1920s the Alberta government had questioned the validity of such arguments about the savings Saskatchewan was obtaining, yet ironically, one year later, the government used the same economic arguments to justify its decision to disband the APP.²⁹ Supporters of the APP were too late in organizing any form of effective opposition to the government's decision to disband the provincial force. Not until late winter and early spring of 1932, long after the federal policing deal had been signed, that the voices of opposition made themselves heard.³⁰ Judging from the reaction in the press, in comparison to 1928, opposition to the government's decision to disband the police in 1931-1932 was muted by both the speed with which negotiations were concluded and, the worsening economic conditions. In light of the dramatic shift in the economic situation facing the the province in 1931, the police quickly became expendable in the minds of many Albertans.³¹ When they finally did speak up about the issue, those who opposed the move included the same groups as four years earlier, and for largely the same reasons as they cited in 1928: that is, a federal policing arrangement would

result in an intrusion into provincial powers by Ottawa, in inadequate fiscal compensation, and in a lack of control over the operations of the Mounted Police senior command remote from Alberta. Of all of those opposed to the disbanding of the APP, labour was the most vocal.³² Left-wing organizations had never enjoyed a good relationship with the Mounted Police and held a dim view of the methods employed by the federal police, especially since the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike. J.S. Woodsworth, the Labour leader from Winnipeg and a long time opponent of the federal force, referred to the Mounties as "agents provocateurs", claiming that their main objective had become one of infiltrating unions and left-wing political organizations, such as that which he belonged to, and disrupting their activities.³³ So far as the members of the APP were concerned, they were deeply disappointed with the provincial government's decision to disband the force. They felt they had made great strides during its fifteen-year existence, and longer serving members of the force were very proud of the work and record they had accomplished, given the varying circumstances they had been expected to work under.³⁴

Faced with a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, Alberta's Premier Brownlee rather reluctantly approached Ottawa seeking a new federal policing contract and arranged for a meeting with the new Commissioner of the RCMP, General James H. MacBrien on December 3, 1931.³⁵ Brownlee's fiscally conservative UFA government was motivated to act on the policing situation by the economic down-turn, but it is quite clear that several other factors

hastened the process. Aware of the financial stress that a number of the provinces were experiencing, the RCMP exploited this situation in order to regain historically significant territories and in doing so ensured its future existence which had been in doubt since the early 1920s. Meanwhile, Ottawa aggressively marketed the services of the federal force for several reasons; some, upon closer examination, were more important than others and of greater concern to the government than they were willing to admit. Publicly, Bennett argued that maintaining two levels of police forces resulted in inefficiency and wasted resources. By adopting the RCMP the provinces would be able to significantly cut their law enforcement budgets which was increasingly important during the hard economic times of the early 1930s. The Mounties could provide a far superior level of service to the citizens of the country in comparison to what Bennett referred to as the "venal, amateur and arbitrary practices of the nation's municipal and provincial forces".³⁶ Bennett had long considered the federal police to be a superior law enforcement agency and had opposed their withdrawal from provincial policing in 1917. What Bennett's government and the new senior command of the RCMP did not state, nor publicize, was that the financial agreements of the new contracts actually amounted to a hefty federal subsidy for the provinces. Bennett offered the provinces such lucrative deals because he and Commissioner Macbrien were deeply concerned about the activities of a number of left-wing organizations which they believed were responsible for much of the unrest among the unemployed and involved in subversive activities.

The RCMP's long-standing desire to expand its jurisdiction was an important factor during the negotiations of 1931-1932 because from the force's outset in 1873 its future had always been in doubt: expansion during the early 1930s offered the means by which the Mounted Police could solidify its future once and for all. Although the Mounties willingly relinquished their provincial policing role in 1916-1917 to avoid becoming involved with controversial provincial prohibitory liquor laws, they soon found themselves looking for a means to justify their continued existence. Following their withdrawal from the provinces they turned their attention to a number of war-related duties and issues of national security, but with the entry of the United States into the war many of these responsibilities became irrelevant. According to Peter Maurice German, author of "Federal-Provincial Contracting For Royal Canadian Mounted Police Services: A Survey Utilizing The Interplay Model of Public Policy Analysis", it was at this time that the police realized that without their provincial duties they were no longer a viable entity and could easily become redundant in the face of an increasing number of provincial and municipal forces.³⁷ Fortunately for the Mounted Police the federal government realized in the aftermath of the Winnipeg General Strike that both its ability to deal with issues of national security and the existing secret service forces operated by the RNWMP and the Dominion Police were inadequate to meet the demands of a rapidly changing world. Upon a request from Prime Minister Borden and N.W. Rowell, Minister responsible for the Mounted Police, Commissioner Perry advised the government in the autumn of 1919 that the creation of a single

national police force, including an expanded secret service, was required and that the expansion of the Mounties was the only logical option open to the government.³⁸ The Commissioner argued that the continued use of private or American investigative agencies, the absorption of the RNWMP by the Dominion Police and the dependence of the government on local or regional forces purposes of national security would not meet the requirements of the situation.³⁹ Clearly, Perry was eager to see the RNWMP become the nation's sole federal force and assume all secret service responsibilities. This would fill the void left by their former provincial policing duties and thereby ensure the continued existence of the force.

The creation of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1919-1920, seemed to achieve the type of security for the force's future that Perry was seeking.⁴⁰ Gradual economic improvement, the submission of radical labour forces and the election of William Lyon Mackenzie King's Liberals in 1921, however, once again brought the future of the Mounted Police into question. Not only was the urgency to investigate 'subversive' organizations decreasing, but an increasing number of individuals, including newly elected Prime Minister King, found the retention of reserve riot troops repugnant and unnecessary.⁴¹ This and the fact that Mackenzie King had little interest in the Mounted Police contributed to his newly elected government's lack of a clear policy on the future of the RCMP. In 1922, the Minister of Defence, George Graham, announced the transfer of the RCMP to his department, but the government immediately came under fire from former Conservative/Union

ministers such as Arthur Meighen and Hugh Guthrie, who argued that this would lead to the militarization of the police.⁴² Faced with this rather unexpected challenge from supporters of the force, as well as having to forge ties with the Progressives, a radical farmer's organization with strong urban labour and socialist ties, in order to maintain power, Prime Minister King announced that the force would not be used to support or assist local law enforcement agencies during labour disputes.⁴³ While this satisfied supporters of the Mounted Police, it opened the government up to attacks from the force's detractors on fiscal and constitutional grounds. T.A. Crerar, the leader of the Progressive party recognized the fact that the government was struggling to find a solution to the problem of what to do with the police; Crerar suggested that the scope of the force's operations be limited to the Yukon and North West Territories. Crerar's arguments that this would be fiscally responsible and would remove a constitutional anomaly was warmly received by most members of all parties.⁴⁴ Macleod argues that it was at this time that the force faced its greatest challenge for two reasons: First. Crerar's suggestion had gained broad appeal and the government was dependent upon the Progressives to stay in power; and second, there appeared to be no other significant or clear role for the force to play.⁴⁵ That which proved to be the salvation of the RCMP was the criticism aimed at the force by J.S. Woodsworth. Unlike Crerar, Woodsworth's comments were ideologically based, not constitutional. As noted earlier in this chapter, Woodsworth complained about the 'subversive' work performed by the Mounties, especially during the Winnipeg General Strike, yet most members of

the House believed that the kind of security and intelligence work performed by the RCMP was necessary.⁴⁶ Clearly frustrated with the situation and unsure as to what to do, King retreated into silence leaving Sir Lomer Gouin, his Justice Minister, as well as minister responsible for the RCMP, to defend the the status quo on the grounds of administrative efficiency.⁴⁷

The result was the adoption of a policy of containment, as opposed to disbandment, which lasted for several years.⁴⁸ Both Vernon Kemp, in Without Fear, Favour or Affection, and C.W. Harvison, in The Horsemen, state that it was the desire of both Commissioners Perry and Starnes to oversee the expansion of the force throughout the 1920s, arguing that it was necessary for the future security of the nation.⁴⁹ Both, however, faced an uninterested Prime Minister and uncommitted government, which was particularly frustrating for the new Commissioner, Cortlandt Starnes, who took over from Perry in 1923 and who, according to Carl Betke, supported a return of the Mounties to their pre-1917 provincial policing duties. It was Starnes' belief that this would result in a more effective and efficient system of policing in Canada. Betke states that Starnes hoped to reorganize and expand the RCMP's law enforcement role in Canada so as to lessen the tension and friction that existed between the various federal, provincial and municipal forces and their respective governments over issues of jurisdiction.⁵⁰ Instead Starnes' leadership was an uphill battle devoted to holding the line against further cutbacks and reductions until the takeover of policing in Saskatchewan in 1928.⁵¹ The

government's policy of containment meant that the force's budget was cut by about one-third between 1922 and 1925 and did not exceed the 1922 level until the early 1930s.⁵² Manpower levels declined throughout the mid-1920s from approximately 1700 members in 1921 and would not surpass this level until the 1932 takeover of five provincial policing agencies. Reserve troops were also limited to Regina and Ottawa.⁵³ Finally, the nature of the force's work changed from the late teens and early 1920s when it focused largely on criminal, labour and political issues, to the mid-late '20s when the force became an integral part of the federal bureaucracy by performing numerous administrative duties for a variety of departments.⁵⁴ Although this shift in the force's workload would ultimately save the force from being disbanded, the immediate impact was a drop in morale, growing concern for the future of the force and an increasing sense of frustration among all ranks.⁵⁵

Concern among the senior command of the RCMP reached its peak in November, 1926, when Saskatchewan Premier James Gardiner wrote Ernest Lapointe requesting a meeting to discuss policing in that province. Gardiner cited over-policing as the main reason for his concern and wished to resolve the matter before it became a political controversy.

We have a condition which developed during the war, which leaves us with virtually three police forces, the RCMP, the Provincial Police and the Municipal Police. The result is that there is overlapping, local friction,

disagreement between different organizations, the appearance of too many uniformed men at every public gathering,- (giving the appearance of a military occupation) and cost which, if continued will develop a first class political issue.⁵⁶

In addition to his concern about over-policing, especially in Regina, location of the SPP's headquarters and the RCMP's Training Depot, Macleod and Robertson suggest that the Saskatchewan Premier was also concerned about the unpopularity of the SPP's continued enforcement of provincial liquor laws and the impropriety of using the police for patronage purposes.⁵⁷ With regards to the liquor issue, criticism of the SPP usually resulted in criticism of the provincial government, so a number of politicians were adopting the attitude that "it would be easier to disassociate themselves from unpopular police action if such action was the responsibility of the RCMP...".⁵⁸ To alleviate the situation Gardiner suggested three possible solutions: first, the SPP assume all policing responsibilities in the province of Saskatchewan; second, the Mounties take over the duties of the SPP; and third, the Mounties limit their operations to the remote, northern regions of the province and along the international border, leaving the SPP would carry out all other policing functions in the province.⁵⁹

Recognizing the fact that Gardiner's proposal threatened not only the possibility of any future expansion for the force but its present status, Commissioner Starnes prepared a secret report for Justice Minister Lapointe presenting a number of powerful arguments for the return of the RCMP to provincial policing in

Saskatchewan. This "extraordinarily able document", as R.C. Macleod correctly terms it, not only points out the different interests of the two levels of government involved but "offers both a convincing choice between service, efficiency and savings with the RCMP or expense, inefficiency and potential conflict without it."⁶⁰ Starnes rejected the idea of the SPP assuming the federal policing duties of the RCMP in no uncertain terms, suggesting that the SPP and other provincial forces were inferior to the Mounted Police in all respects and were highly susceptible to political influence.⁶¹ The document not only won over the support of the federal government but the Saskatchewan government immediately agreed to disband the SPP and proceed with negotiations for a new policing contract. Talks came to a halt for a few months over the question of how much control the provincial Attorney General would exercise over matters of provincial jurisdiction and the appointment of senior police officers, but this issue was eventually resolved.⁶²

Peter Maurice German argues that Starnes' success in convincing King's government was because this arrangement allowed the police to maintain a presence in the west, which was important for reasons of national security, and to do it in a less repugnant fashion than situating reserve riot troops throughout the land, a prospect that King found unpalatable. Ottawa also liked the fact that as these troops were deemed necessary for purposes of national security, they could now be performing a much more useful police function and the province would be paying part of the cost.⁶³ Although German states that Starnes' acceptance of responsibility

for the enforcement of Saskatchewan's liquor laws was a concession to the province, the Commissioner did endeavour to exempt the force from the issue. However, it is, along with the extension of a similar offer to Alberta, an indication of how anxious the Commissioner was to expand the jurisdiction of the RCMP.⁶⁴ A final note on the 1928 agreement: as momentous as it was for the future of policing in Canada, aroused no political interest. This document has been the basis upon which all subsequent federal policing contracts have been based, yet at the time cabinet approved it without hesitation and there were no questions asked about it in the House of Commons during the discussion of the RCMP annual estimates.⁶⁵

The force's desire for expansion did not stop with the assumption of provincial policing duties in Saskatchewan in 1928. Prime Minister Bennett's appointment of Commissioner Starnes' successor, General James H. MacBrien, in 1930 ensured this. MacBrien shared Bennett's vision of what was best for the federal force and what system of law enforcement the country required in a changing world. If Cortlandt Starnes' leadership of the RCMP is best described as one of holding the line and uncertainty for the Mounties' future because of the King government's policy of containment for most of the 1920s, then that of MacBrien can be characterized as one of expansion, modernization and the restoration of confidence and morale within the Mounted Police. King's government eventually adopted a supportive position regarding the expansion of the Mounties and the centralization of law enforcement in Canada. This, however, paled in comparison to the very aggressive policy of

support the Bennett government employed which is best exemplified by Ottawa's offer in 1931-1932 to take over the provincial policing duties across the country at a very attractive cost to the provinces, as well as the 1932 takeover of the 600-man preventive service of the Department of National Revenue.⁶⁶ This expansionist trend continued under successive Liberal governments, who had come to appreciate the role the RCMP played, with the RCMP's assumption of policing duties in Newfoundland in 1949 and British Columbia in 1951.

Several important factors relating specifically to the RCMP and to policing in general became increasingly evident during the late 1920s and early 1930s, resulting in stabilization of the force's future as well as guaranteeing future growth. These factors were a recognition of the value of the police to the efficient operation of the government bureaucracy by the King and Bennett governments; the evolution of society's attitudes regarding both the role of police in society, and; the adoption of the philosophy that centralization of government services or operations equalled efficiency. By the late 1920s Ottawa was beginning to recognize just how important the RCMP was to the efficient operation of the federal bureaucracy. Starnes' secret report written during the 1927-1928 Saskatchewan negotiations helped to point this out to the politicians.⁶⁷ Macleod argues that by the late 1920s it had become evident to the politicians and bureaucrats in Ottawa that the value of the RCMP to the federal government was not necessarily in a law enforcement and national security capacity but rather for its administrative

function.⁶⁸ Prior to the creation of the RCMP in 1920, the federal force had been held responsible for roughly thirty federal statutes. The Dominion Police shared in some of this work and some departments hired private agencies such as Pinkerton's when the necessity arose, but for the most part the work was not performed in a systematic manner.⁶⁹ Thus, with the creation of the RCMP in 1920, government departments suddenly realized that they had at their disposal a nation-wide, well-trained body of men with very little to do. As a result, investigations by the police pertaining to federal statutes quadrupled from 2,068 to 8,353 between 1920 and 1932.⁷⁰ The real increase in the Mounties' workload, however, came in the area that the RCMP referred to as "assistance to other departments" and defined by Macleod as "investigations requested by other government departments that did not fall directly under one of the statutes the police were formally responsible for", in which there was no charge to these various federal departments.⁷¹ The number of these investigations carried out by the police increased from 8,500 in 1921 to 21,743 in 1925 to 83,216 in 1932. By 1932, seventy percent of all cases entered into by the Mounties fell under the heading "assistance to other departments", while Criminal Code investigations amounted to just sixteen percent, or 17,469 of a total of 119,825 cases for that same year.⁷² The importance of this is that the alternative to the RCMP carrying out much of Ottawa's administrative work was for each department to establish its own investigative/police body. While this idea probably appealed to a number of ambitious civil servants, jealous of this type of bureaucratic expansion in the United States, it was impracticable in

a country the size of Canada.⁷³ Macleod argues that it was in fact the Mounties' "work for other government departments that ensured the survival of the force in the late 1920s".⁷⁴

The initial decision to create the Mounted Police in 1920 and their continued expansion, particularly under the Bennett administration, also grew out of industrialized world's changing perception and understanding of law enforcement. Philip John Stead argues that the complexities of modern 20th-century society demanded the professionalization of police forces. The creation of the RCMP in 1919-1920 is consistent with Stead's theory that the more complex and integrated a society becomes the greater the need for a coordinated approach to law enforcement.⁷⁵ It was quite evident by the end of the war to those in positions of power that local constables and the militia were no longer capable of fulfilling the law enforcement needs of modern society, particularly with regards to issues of national security, widespread social unrest or organized crime. The problem with many local forces was that they were poorly trained and lacked the necessary resources to keep up with new technologies in the areas of transportation, weaponry and communications, all of which played increasingly important roles in creating opportunities for criminal activity.⁷⁶ Those in Canada who supported this trend to centralized law enforcement liked to point to the questionable status of policing in the United States which had been traditionally dependent upon local forces apparently resulting in a much higher rate of crime than Canada. Conservative member for South York, William Maclean, during one of the few debates that took

place in the House of Commons regarding the status of policing in the country, stated that the U.S. was moving towards a more coordinated approach to law enforcement and as a result were far better prepared to handle emergency situations than Canada. Maclean argued that Canada needed to move in the same direction, noting that we should learn from the failure of the Americans' 150 years of experience with local policing.⁷⁷ The U.S. began moving in this direction in 1908 when President Theodore Roosevelt created the Bureau of Investigation within the Justice Department. J. Edgar Hoover's appointment as head of this body in 1924 and the subsequent formalization of the FBI in 1935 is evidence of Washington's increasing involvement in the realm of criminal law enforcement.⁷⁸ Americans were concerned about the increasing level of labour and left-wing political activism and criminal activity. Their initial resistance to the federal government's involvement in local law enforcement on the basis of constitutional, civil or state's rights issues was cast aside when it appeared the status quo was in danger from the post-World War I unrest and increasing violence, in part created by the imposition of prohibitory liquor legislation.⁷⁹

A growing central bureaucracy and its dependence on the RCMP for efficiency and the centralization and expansion of law enforcement services was indicative of the post-Victorian era. The early decades of the 20th century were a period of great expansion for the state apparatus. Doug Owram states in his book, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-

1945 that "Governments all over the western world were regulating the lives of their citizens and providing services in ways that were unheard of before the First World War."⁸⁰ Owsam points out the following example of the growth of government: During the first year of the Laurier administration, 1896, the government's total expenditures equalled \$36 million and the fourteen cabinet ministers presided over a permanent civil service of approximately 5,000 people. By 1945 the government's annual budget equalled nearly \$5.25 billion and the number of full-time civil servants employed by Ottawa had risen to more than 115,000 individuals.⁸¹ According to Owsam, this expansion of the state apparatus was the result of the intellectual community's recognition of the fact that by the turn of the century, because of the changes Canadian society had undergone, particularly industrialization, those institutions that had served the nation well in the past were no longer sufficient.⁸² Intellectuals argued that the pre-war laissez-faire system was unsuited for Canada and that irreparable damage would come to the nation if it was left unchecked. They looked to the state as a means to improve society by acting as a voice of moderation and the only way that this could be achieved was by significant government intervention and growth.⁸³

The election of the Conservatives in 1930 and Prime Minister Bennett's appointment of General MacBrien to the post of Commissioner of the RCMP accentuated the aforementioned factors and in doing so ensured the future existence of the force. Bennett and MacBrien put forth the argument that a single, nation-wide law

enforcement agency was more efficient than a multitude of provincial forces and necessary to preserve order during the turbulent economic times of the early 1930s.⁸⁴ Bennett's enthusiasm for the expansion of the RCMP and their return to provincial policing duties partially stems from his admiration for the force which began with his arrival in Calgary in the late 1880s, and is perhaps best described in the following passage from the 1917 Debates of the House of Commons. At the time Bennett was a member of Prime Minister Borden's caucus and opposed the government's decision to withdraw the Mounties from the western provinces.

I have always felt that it was a very great mistake to disassociate the maintenance of law and order in the provinces from the mounted police, except with respect to the liquor traffic, and I had always hoped that we might be able ultimately to absorb the forces in the provinces. For the great traditions that lie behind that force give it an incomparable place, it seems to me, in the life of the country; the scarlet uniform of these men -- and it is the only scarlet uniform left in Canada, or that you see at least in days like these -- impresses the newcomer to our land as no other thing can, in converting him to the idea that however new may be the country and however sparse the population, reverence for constituted authority and respect for the law will be maintained at any cost.⁸⁵

More importantly, the Prime Minister and the Commissioner were deeply concerned about the activities of the union movement and a number of left-wing political parties; organizations that both Bennett and Commissioner MacBrien considered subversive and

responsible for inciting unrest, especially among the unemployed and recently arrived immigrants. Defending the expansion of the police in the House of Commons on March 23, 1932, Bennett stated that his government proceeded with this course of action to preserve the "peace, order and good government of Canada--that there should be no possible chance of the breaking up of those institutions which this country has regarded so highly."⁸⁶ Peter Maurice German argues that the police and the government shared a very similar agenda, and that "They sought and obtained the provincial policing responsibilities in order to ensure the maintenance of law and order in Canadian society, prevent insurrection and permit the orderly implementation of government programs."⁸⁷ Bennett's fervent anti-communist feelings were well known, and were re-confirmed these during one of the Prime Minister's speeches in November, 1932, in Toronto. Borrowing a phrase from Jack London's novel, The Iron Heel, he urged Canadians "to put the iron heel ruthlessly on propaganda of that kind"; (The phrase 'That kind', of course, referring to socialist or communist propaganda). ⁸⁸ Ironically, London's novel told the tale of a successful proletarian revolution in North America.⁸⁹ Bennett and MacBrien were especially concerned that the Communist Party of Canada would incite large numbers of unemployed to organize and demand a complete restructuring of the economy. The Ottawa establishment believed that left unchecked, this could lead to mass strikes and violence. For that reason the Commissioner established several large reserves of riot police across the country.⁹⁰

The eagerness with which the Bennett administration pursued the expansion of the RCMP resulted in extremely good terms for the five provinces, Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, that accepted Ottawa's offer in 1931-1932. Alberta's contract required the province to pay the federal government \$225,000.00 during the first year, and \$250,000.00 annually for the next four years, in return for the services of 200-225 Mounted Policemen; these amounts included prisoner transportation and maintenance costs.⁹¹ This was approximately half of what it cost the Alberta government to operate the APP. An examination of RCMP expenditures and the new policing contracts strongly suggest that the government was attempting to hide the fact that they were subsidizing the cost of policing in the provinces as opponents of the deal had contended all along. Sixty-five percent, or 1,560, of the 2,400 men on the federal force were stationed in the Prairie or Maritime provinces during 1932-1933, yet these provinces contributed less than \$800,000.00, or thirteen percent of the force's entire annual budget during this same period.⁹² Three hundred and fifty men, or 14.5 percent of the Mounties' manpower served in Alberta, but the province contributed a mere 3.6 percent of the RCMPs' budget.⁹³ Discounting the fact that not all officers stationed in any given province were assigned exclusively to provincial police work, provincial financial contributions still resulted in a shortfall for the federal government. In Alberta for example, the terms of the new policing contract stipulated that 225 of the 350 men serving within the province were specifically assigned to provincial duties. These 225 officers represented 9.4

percent of the RCMP's entire manpower, yet as stated previously, the province's annual financial contribution equalled 3.6 percent of the Mounties' annual budget.⁹⁴ Subsequently, the federal government found itself having to defend the agreements and attempted to do so by suggesting that the adoption of the Mounted Police would eliminate the duplication of services and lead to greater fiscal responsibility for the nation as a whole yet would not further burden the national treasury.⁹⁵ Bennett stated in the House of Commons on April 6, 1932, that "It does away with two series of overheads. That is the whole story."⁹⁶

Opponents of the policing contracts and their questions about the economics of the agreements lingered. Commissioner MacBrien predicted in a December 11, 1931, police memorandum that the money to be received from the provinces would be sufficient to pay for the Mounties' new provincial responsibilities.⁹⁷ Pressed in the House of Commons about the issue the Prime Minister reiterated MacBrien's statement. Bennett informed the members of the House that the \$1,000.00 per man, per annum fee was sufficient to pay for all policing costs associated with the force's new duties, including any extraordinary items stemming from the takeover.⁹⁸ Such claims were, as Macleod points out, at best misleading and the Liberal opposition as well as other opponents of the new deals refused to either let the matter pass or to accept the word of the government until J.S. Woodsworth began his criticisms of the RCMP and the Bennett government on ideological, rather than constitutional or financial grounds. Ironically, as was the case some ten years earlier

when he protested the creation of the Mounted Police, Woodsworth's opposition to the expansion of the Mounted Police increased support for the move.⁹⁹ Woodsworth pointed out that by pursuing the expansion of the Mounties the Prime Minister was contravening his own philosophy of the need for government restraint and fiscal responsibility. The labour leader also opposed the appointment of MacBrien and what Woodsworth referred to as the militarization of the police under its new commander.¹⁰⁰ Woodsworth's opposition to MacBrien was based on the fact that the new commissioner believed one of the best ways to deal with the on-going unrest and unemployment was to deport all individuals of foreign origin who were not citizens of Canada. MacBrien, like Bennett, associated communism with foreigners and believed the spread of communism could be stopped by eliminating what he thought was the source of much of the trouble.¹⁰¹ Woodsworth also complained about the militarization of the force under MacBrien's leadership and pointed to the creation of a special "riot squad" in Regina that had been established for the purpose of suppressing protests by any organizations the government deemed subversive or dangerous.¹⁰² Although the Bennett government initially denied these claims, Commissioner MacBrien confirmed Woodsworth's allegations in his March, 1932, report by stating that the force had stationed reserves of riot police across the country, in the event of mass strikes, or Communist-led rallies.¹⁰³ When Woodsworth pointed this out in the House, many of the members applauded the move.¹⁰⁴

Despite the APP had quite an impressive record during its fifteen-year existence, the Alberta government determined that disbanding its provincial force was the prudent thing to do given the economic circumstances of the early 1930s. The Mounties initially accepted the vast majority of the force's members, refusing just twenty-seven men.¹⁰⁵ Many of these individuals signed three-year agreements, whereas others, due to questionable APP service records, were taken on for one-year terms. Upon the completion of these contracts, all new RCMP members underwent review processes to determine if they should be hired on a permanent basis. Those unable to meet the standards of the federal force for reasons of age, physical condition, past wrongdoings or in some cases internal politics, were refused.¹⁰⁶ Negotiations were completed very quickly, in January, 1932 largely at Commissioner MacBrien's behest, as he wished to begin talks with the governments of Manitoba and the Maritime provinces as soon as possible. All of these agreements were completed by late spring and early summer.¹⁰⁷ The bill to disband the APP was given third reading in the Provincial Legislature on March 7, and it was passed by a vote of fifty to seven.¹⁰⁸ Officially, the Alberta Provincial Police ceased to exist as of 12:00 pm midnight, March 31, and the RCMP took over their duties as of 12:01 am, April 1st, 1932.

In the final analysis, it would be inaccurate to state that the disbanding of the APP was solely the result of the economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the expansionary aspirations of the Mounted Police or the political motives of the newly elected

Bennett government. By 1931-32, there was severe economic pressure on the province to cut unnecessary expenditures to meet the needs of a growing number of unemployed or welfare recipient. Both the RCMP and the Bennett administration exploited Alberta's situation, 'advertising' the fact that the province would reap great financial benefits by signing a new federal policing agreement. The Mounties took advantage of the situation to solidify their future which had been in doubt throughout most of the 1920s, while the Bennett administration pursued its own political agenda. This heightened the expectations of those, namely the provincial Conservative and Liberal parties, who for fiscal reasons had long advocated the return of the Mounties. This in turn increased the pressure on the Alberta government to reconsider Ottawa's earlier offer from the 1928 Saskatchewan negotiations. These are not the only reasons, however, for the expansion of the Mounted Police in 1932. Possibly, the factor which should be thought of as most important leading up to the disbanding of the APP are the emergence of the RCMP as an integral part of a growing federal bureaucracy and the recognition of this fact by politicians and civil servants by the late 1920s. Closely related to this was the gradual adoption by the leading pundits of the day that the centralization of government services, including law enforcement, equalled efficiency, and the industrialized world's changing perception and understanding of law enforcement, namely, a demand for the professionalization of police forces. The result of the events of the 1920s and early 1930s, according to Macleod has been the emergence of a stable law-enforcement system that has remained largely unchanged for the

past sixty years. This was a rather remarkable feat, considering the extent of the on-going constitutional wrangling this nation has experienced over the years, especially in the last few decades which have witnessed a demand by the provinces for increased provincial powers.¹⁰⁹

Chapter Four
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
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FIGURE ONE



APP ANNUAL MANPOWER, DETACHMENT, TRANSPORTATION LEVELS AND CASE LOAD

YEAR	MANPOWER & TRANSPORTATION				CASES	CASE LOAD	
	MAN-POWER	DETACH-MENTS	HORSE	AUTOS/ MOTORBIKES		CONVIC-TIONS	CONVICTIONS PERCENT
1917	N/A	N/A	N/A	5 / 0	N/A	N/A	N/A
1918	155	74	58	N A / 0	5 553	5 553	82.70%
1919	160	81	51	N A / 0	5 411	5 452	82.30%
1920	175	84	60	14 / 0	6 384	6 183	81.20%
1921	185	87	65	16 / 0	6 851	6 719	83.50%
1922	199	94	69	18 / 8	7 156	5 889	82.30%
1923	181	93	60	17 / 8	6 584	5 567	84.60%
1924	179	90	49	19 / 8	6 615	5 613	83.90%
1925	183	94	45	18 / 8	6 950	5 815	83.60%
1926	183	95	42	18 / 8	6 866	5 791	84.30%
1927	180	94	35	18 / 8	7 191	6 061	84.30%
1928	176	91	29	17 / 8	8 766	7 544	86.10%
1929	172	95	20	19 / 0	9 774	8 424	86.20%
1930	196	105	15	19 / 0	10 258	8 608	83.90%
1931	205	100	12	28 / 0	8 793	7 313	83.20%
1932	N/A	N/A	N/A	N A / 0			
TOTALS					103 233	86 569	83.90%

TABLE TWO

APP ANNUAL COSTS IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

Date ending	Time expired (months)	APP Expenses (thousands \$)	Gov't Revenue (millions \$)	APP Expenses %/Gov't revs
17/12/31	9 months	181 317.78	N/A	N/A
18/12/31	12 months	357 953.51	6 283	5.7
19/12/31	"	420 741.12	8 004	5.3
20/12/31	"	451 421.17	9 006	5
21/12/31	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
22/12/31	12 months	494 881.94	9 325	5.3
23/12/31	"	440 077.11	10 419	4.2
24/12/31	"	468 130.89	10 507	4.5
25/12/31	"	437 223.00	11 531	3.8
26/12/31	"	426 572.84	11 912	3.6
27/12/31	"	429 703.89	12 261	3.5
28/3/31	3 months	106 361.79	3 886	2.7
29/3/31	12 months	424 918.18	15 265	2.8
30/3/31	"	460 348.39	15 830	2.9
31/3/31	"	507 263.48	15 711	3.2
32/3/31	"	483 677.22	13 492	3.6