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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
EMPEDOCLES: THE COSMOS AND THE SOUL

by



IVAN ANDREW SUNDAL

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled EMPEDOCLES: THE COSMOS AND THE SOUL, submitted by Ivan Andrew Sundal, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.


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ABSTRACT

In the Peri Physeos Empedocles posits earth, air, fire and water as the basic elements of all sensible bodies; and he posits Love and Strife as cosmic forces of attraction and repulsion respectively which govern the mingling and separating of the elements. The proportion between Love's and Strife's share of control over the elements varies in a cyclical manner. This defines a four-stage cosmic cycle consisting of (1) a period of total Love, (2) a period during which the ratio of Strife to Love increases, (3) a momentary period of total Strife, and (4) a period during which the ratio of Love to Strife increases. A world such as ours is possible only during the second and fourth stages, since both forces must be active among the elements in order for there to be variety and change. In each of these two world-periods there is a zoogonical sequence. In the first one the quality of animal life undergoes several stages of deterioration as Strife's power increases, and in the second one the nature of animal life progressively becomes more harmonious as Love increases in power.

In the Katharmoi Empedocles portrays in puritanistic terms a cycle of the soul. In the beginning the souls or daemons dwell in a blessed place ruled only by Love. Whenever a daemon sins, i.e. whenever he puts his trust in Strife, he is exiled from the blessed place for a long period during which he must transmigrate through all forms of mortal creatures. He may not be released from the wheel of trans-

migration until he has purified himself.

I believe that the physical and religious doctrines can be related in the following way. In its blessed state the soul is a pure portion of the cosmic force of Love, and in its fallen state it is tainted with a portion of Strife. The soul is a vital part of the creatures it successively inhabits: it determines the structure of the body since it consists of forces which control the elements. It also has control over the moral acts of these creatures since Love and Strife are moral forces as well as physical ones. By living in a morally pure manner during its various incarnations the soul may expel the Strife from itself and thereby regain its original blessed state. The cosmic cycle and the soul-cycle are analogous, but the complete soul-cycle coincides with the part of the cosmic cycle during which the existence of individuals is possible, the part ranging from the beginning of increasing Strife to the last part of increasing Love. The daemons' primal stage of blessedness and their stage of blessedness regained can be correlated respectively with the first part and the last part of this period. During its periods of bliss the soul is incarnate in the highest type of creature of the zoogonies. Its fall and rise in the wheel of transmigration corresponds roughly with the changes in the two zoogonical sequences.

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE COSMIC SYSTEM	
Parmenides' Influence	5
The Elements	8
Love and Strife	12
Sense-Perception and Thought	20
The Cosmic Cycle	28
II. THE SOUL-CYCLE	42
III. THE DAEMONS AND THE COSMIC SYSTEM	52
Introduction	52
The Daemon as Love	55
Cornford's Correlations of the Cycles	64
An Alternative Correlation of the Cycles	70
NOTES	91
BIBLIOGRAPHY	94

INTRODUCTION

Empedocles wrote two important poems which appear to be radically different with respect to philosophical import. The Peri Physeos is primarily an analysis of the physical laws of the cosmos; and the Katharmoi is a mystical, puritanistic description of the original state of the soul, its plight in the present world, and its ultimate destiny. There has been considerable debate among scholars whether or not there is any common ground between these two poems. On the positive side there are a fair number of verbal and conceptual parallels in the two poems which suggest that Empedocles gave consideration to the relationship of the doctrines of the two poems. These parallels, however, are poetic clues; there are not any explicit statements in the extant fragments of either poem pertaining to the exact relationship between any physical laws and religious doctrines. The strongest argument against the compatibility of the two poems concerns the great difficulty involved in interpreting the transmigrating soul or daemon of the Katharmoi in terms of the physical principles. Empedocles' description in the Peri Physeos of man's physical constitution and the nature of his psychical capacities seems to leave no room for a doctrine of transmigration: in the Peri Physeos it appears, at least superficially, that man is mortal in all respects.

It is my opinion that F. M. Cornford's identification of the daemon with a portion of the cosmic force of Love is well founded.

Love and Strife appear in both poems: in the Peri Physeos they are portrayed as cosmic forces which operate on both a physical and a moral level, and in the religious poem they are depicted as gods of a moral nature. Despite this apparent difference in scope these forces can very plausibly be regarded as the key to the unity of the poems. A solid bridge between the two poems can be built if the daemon's substantial identity and his sorry plight in the present world can be defined in terms of these cosmic forces. The possibility of identifying the daemon with Love is suggested by the fact that according to the physical poem Love is implanted in the limbs of mortals and thereby has some measure of control over their moral actions. There appears to be nothing to bar the interpretation that the portion of Love in a mortal body could be a transmigrating soul. It is in fact possible to put forward a coherent explanation of how this could be the case.

There is, however, more to the aim of this study than illustrating the coherence of Cornford's theory. In the Peri Physeos Empedocles describes a number of major world-changes. He ties these changes together in the form of a cycle, a cosmic cycle which is governed by the varying strengths of Love and Strife. In the Katharmoi Empedocles depicts the journey of the soul as being cyclical. If the soul can be considered as a portion of Love then it is natural to inquire into the relationship of the two cycles. Although I do not think that all the stages of the two cycles can be correlated on a one to one basis, as Cornford has suggested, I believe that there is a simple, definable relationship between the two cycles.

It is my aim to attempt a detailed correlation of the events in the two cycles.

A word of warning is required here. There are a fair number of clues in the two poems pertaining to the similarity of certain events in the two cycles, but these clues do not provide definite information concerning exactly how the events should be related. In my opinion it is possible to develop quite a good foundation for correlating the two cycles, but beyond that point it is necessary to proceed somewhat speculatively. In order to attempt to put some of the details of the two cycles together it is necessary to some extent to draw inferences imaginatively on the basis of the foundational principles. It is clear from the Peri Physeos that Empedocles conceived of the cosmic cycle to a large degree in a spatial sense. Several peculiar problems arise in correlating the cycles; I shall attempt to solve them by means of spatial imagination.

In the first two chapters I shall discuss respectively the cosmic system and the cycle of the soul, dwelling on topics which are pertinent to the relationship of the two poems. Of particular importance is the outline of D. O'Brien's interpretation of the cosmic cycle. His fine interpretation opens up good possibilities for correlating the two cycles. In the last chapter I shall attempt to illustrate the unity of the two poems. I shall be mainly concerned with relating the physical and religious doctrines. I shall not deal with the following type of questions. Which poem did Empedocles write first? Did he undergo a personality change between writing the poems? Why is the Peri Physeos so secretive about the immortal

soul? There is a very fine article by C. H. Kahn¹ which includes discussion of such problems as these. In his opinion the two poems are fundamentally compatible.

I

THE COSMIC SYSTEM

Parmenides' Influence

The theory which Empedocles held about the cosmos can be appropriately introduced by discussing his philosophical relationship to Parmenides. Although Empedocles could not accept Parmenides' overall portrayal of reality, he nevertheless adopted several fundamental principles from him. These principles are important in the foundation of Empedocles' philosophy.

Although it is not possible to present briefly Parmenides' tightly interwoven arguments in The Way of Truth, it is possible to state his conclusions succinctly. According to Parmenides being or reality is one complete thing, and there are a number of properties which define its nature: it is an uncreated, imperishable, unchangeable, immovable, indivisible, spherical plenum (fr. 8). Parmenides arrived at this conception of reality purely through logical considerations. In his opinion truth is attainable not through sense-experience but by argument alone (fr. 1). It is clear that his static, homogeneous sphere of being bears no resemblance to the sensible world. He declares in fr. 1 that the things of which mortals speak are merely "things that seem to be" (trans. Burnet).

Empedocles could not share Parmenides' denial of the sensible world. In fr. 3 he asserts that the sense-organs can provide means of understanding:

Come now, observe with all thy powers how each thing is clear, neither holding sight in greater trust compared with hearing, nor noisy hearing above what the tongue makes plain, nor withhold trust from any of the other limbs, by whatever way there is a channel to understanding, but grasp each thing in the way in which it is clear. (Trans. Guthrie)

For Empedocles, then, knowledge was accessible by means of careful observation. He did not, however, believe that the senses or the mind were infallible or unlimited in power (fr. 2). This is why he says that each thing must be grasped "in the way in which it is clear."

The following fragments illustrate the extent to which Empedocles was indebted to Parmenides:

(Frr. 11-12) Fools -- for they have no far-reaching thoughts -- who fancy that that which formerly was not can come into being or that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed. For coming into being from that which in no way is is inconceivable, and it is impossible and unheard-of that that which is should be destroyed. For it will ever be there wherever one may keep pushing it. (Trans. Raven)

(Fr. 13) Nor is any part of the whole either empty or over-full. (Trans. Raven)

(Fr. 14) And no part of the whole is empty; whence then could anything enter into it? (Trans. Raven)

The argument in the first quotation is very similar to that of Parmenides, and it reveals two important Parmenidean tenets, that being can be neither created nor destroyed. The other two fragments show acknowledgement of Parmenides' canon that there is no such thing as a void. In order to describe a world compatible with sensory information Empedocles had to reject most of the other characteristics which Parmenides had attributed to being. He rejected the principles of monism, immovability and indivisibility.

In fr. 6 Empedocles introduces pluralism: "Hear first the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis who with her tears fills the springs of mortal men with water" (trans. Raven). In fr. 17 and 71 he refers to the four roots (which we may call elements) in physical terms: earth, air, fire and water. Nestis clearly represents water, and Zeus likely stands for fire (though in fr. 96 and 98 Hephaistos appears to represent fire), but it is not clear how the remaining deities should be related to air and earth.

In fr. 8 it is evident how Empedocles combines pluralism with Parmenidean principles:

I shall tell thee another thing: there is no birth of any mortal things, nor any end in baneful death, but only mingling and separation of what is mingled; birth is the name given to these by men. (Trans. Guthrie. See his remarks on this translation -- Hist. of Gr. Phil., II, 142, n. 2.)

According to Empedocles change occurs not in the nature of the elements, since they are immutable beings like Parmenides' sphere, but in their spatial relationships with each other. Since each of the elements has its own character (fr. 17.28) it follows that a fair number of distinct compounds can be formed and dissolved as the elements mingle and separate. The things which Parmenides said merely "seem to be" can be defined in Empedocles' system in terms of his roots of reality.

The fact that the elements can mingle and separate of course implies that they can move or be moved, and it also suggests that they are divisible. That Empedocles regarded the elements as divisible can be shown by an excerpt of fr. 22: "For all of these -- the

shining sun, earth, sky and sea [the world-masses of the elements] -- are one with their own parts which are scattered far from them in mortal things" (trans. Guthrie). One of Empedocles' achievements in philosophy was his explanation of motion. Parmenides had argued that being could not possibly move, that it was held fast by the chains of necessity (fr. 8). He presumably believed that it was unthinkable or illogical to attribute motion to being (though he did not elaborate much upon his claim). The earlier philosophers had never realized that motion presented a problem, that there was any need to explain it. Although Empedocles realized that motion was not illusory, it seems that he wanted his elements to be as much as possible like Parmenides' being. He accordingly posited causes of motion, not within the elements, but without them. He posited two cosmic, motive forces, Love and Strife, which were responsible for both the motion and the nature of the mingling of the elements. It is evident from fr. 17, 21 and 26 that Love is a force which unites unlike elements and Strife is a force which separates them. The combined action of these forces on the elements is responsible for the formation of mortal things and the processes of change which they undergo.

The Elements

It was likely for more than a poetic reason that Empedocles assigned names of deities to the four roots. First of all, they have the divine characteristic of being immortal. Even the traditional gods of Greek religion do not share this characteristic in

Empedocles' system, for in fr. 21 and 23 he indicates that even though the gods are long-lasting they are nevertheless mortal compounds of the elements. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is clear that in Empedocles' philosophy the elements are not lifeless masses of matter. In fr. 21 and 22 he indicates that the elements are dear to one another when united by Love and hostile toward each other when acted on by Strife. The elements certainly appear to be sentient beings. They respond in a psychological way as well as a physical way to the cosmic forces. It does not appear that Empedocles distinguished clearly between these two aspects. The simple fact that he chose Love and Strife as motive forces suggests that he did not distinguish between 'motive' and 'emotive'. Although he formally separated the causes of motion from the elements it seems that he did not entirely go beyond the hylozoism of his Milesian predecessors. His explanation of motion is far from being purely mechanistic. The elements are not simply pushed and pulled by external forces: their affective nature is part of the explanation of motion. It is also possible that Empedocles believed that the elements had some type of capacity for thought, for in fr. 103 and 110 he says that all things possess thought. This adds some measure of probability to the suggestion that he regarded the elements as gods. That Empedocles considered the elements to be gods is relevant because it suggests that the physical poem may have a religious dimension.

The cosmic roots are the constituents of all mortal things (see fr. 71 for a definitive statement of this). Since they are

all different they can combine in various ways to form a number of compounds. There is, however, a rather limited number of ways in which four things can be combined in groups of four or less -- fifteen in fact, including the four cases of isolated elements. In Empedocles' system there is more involved in distinguishing between compounds than the principle of combination. The principal criterion concerns the proportions in which the elements are mixed. In the extant fragments Empedocles specifies the ratio of mixture for bone, flesh and blood. Bone is composed of two parts of earth, two parts of water and four parts of fire (fr. 96). Blood and flesh are composed of nearly equal proportions of the four elements (fr. 98). Aetius (5.22.1) adds that according to Empedocles sinews are defined by a 1:1:2 ratio of fire, earth and water, and that nails develop from sinews chilled with air. Although these are all organic compounds it is reasonable to suppose that Empedocles believed that each type of thing in the world was characterised by a specific formula or ratio of mixture. Since Empedocles was a medical man, and since he likely regarded organic compounds as being higher on the scale of being than inorganic ones, he may have confined himself to determining only the formulas of organic mixtures.

There are two more means by which Empedocles may have distinguished between compounds. His description of the construction of the eye indicates that at least in some cases the arrangement of the elements in a mixture is important (see Theophrastus, De sens., 7). And in his explanation of thought it is evident that the size of the particles of the roots and the distance between them

can be important with respect to the nature of a mixture (see Theophrastus, De sens., 11).

It is evident that the divisibility of the roots is important in relation to Empedocles' theory of mixture. He conceived of a compound as being a conglomerate of particles of the elements. The following passages of Aristotle and Theophrastus illustrate briefly Empedocles' theory:²

For how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedocles? They must conceive it as composition -- just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones: and the 'Mixture', of which they speak, will be composed of the 'elements', these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which flesh and every other compound results from the 'elements'. (Arist., Gen. et corr., 334a27)

[According to Empedocles and others] bodies possess pores, invisible indeed owing to their minuteness, but close-set and arranged in rows. . . . 'Combination' too, they say, takes place 'only between bodies whose pores are in reciprocal symmetry'. (Arist., Gen. et corr., 324b31.)

For universally he [Empedocles] regards mixture as due to a correspondence with these passages. This explains why oil and water will not mix. (Theophr., De sens., 12.)

The theory involved here is that a compound consists of microscopic particles of the roots and pores or passages. Two bodies, presumably whether they be compounds or masses of isolated elements, can be combined or mixed when their pore-particle structures permit. The process of mixture consists in the particles of each body fitting into the pores of the other. If the passages of one body are too wide then the particles of the other body will pass through them, and if they are too narrow the particles will not be able to

enter them. This is what Aristotle and Theophrastus mean by symmetry or correspondence of the passages. Theophrastus alludes to a certain passage of Empedocles as an example of the point (fr. 91): "Water fits better into wine, but it will not (mingle) with oil" (trans. Burnet). In several fragments (17, 21 and 26) about the process of mixture Empedocles speaks of the elements "running through one another." This probably refers to the process of particles running through passages.

In fr. 89 Empedocles says: "Perceiving that there are effluences from all things that have come into being" (trans. Guthrie). These effluences are films of particles of the elements. Plutarch, who preserves the fragment, adds that the continual outflow of these particles is the cause of the perishing of all things (Qu. nat., 916D). It will be seen below in connection with Empedocles' explanation of sense-perception that these effluences can enter the pores of other bodies. It therefore seems possible that the effluences could cause growth in some cases. The whole process involving effluences is pertinent to Empedocles' theory that birth, death and change in general are a "mingling and separation of what is mingled" (fr. 8).

Love and Strife

The Love and Strife of the Peri Physeos may be described as forces of attraction and repulsion respectively. This, however, describes only a part of the nature of Love and Strife. They are immortal beings (fr. 16); they are assigned mythical names:

Aphrodite (fr. 17) or Love and Strife (Neikos). Within fr. 17 Empedocles says of Love: "she is recognized as inborn in mortal limbs; by her they think kind thoughts and do the works of concord" (trans. Raven). It is clear from this that Love is more than a physical force of attraction: her nature is identical to the love which humans experience; in fact according to Empedocles the love which we feel in our bodies is part of the cosmic Love. This argument of course depends on the assumption that the love which humans experience is more than a physical force of attraction. And to me this appears to be a reasonable assumption. The love which binds people together is not simply a magnetic-like force: it is an emotion; the experience of love is not merely an experience of physical force. This of course is in line with the fact that the elements respond affectively as well as physically to the cosmic forces. Love unites the elements by causing them to desire each other.

It is also a little misleading to speak of Love and Strife as forces, if anything abstract or immaterial is meant by 'force', for in fr. 17.19-20 Empedocles speaks of the physical dimensions of Love and Strife: they clearly have some sort of body. Empedocles could hardly have thought otherwise, since in his time there was no concept of immaterial being. It is evident, however, that these substances are very different from the elements, for Empedocles implies in fr. 17 that Love can be seen only with the mind. This suggests that Love and likely Strife too are very fine or tenuous and perhaps without sensible qualities, at least not perceivable, sensi-

ble qualities. This is appropriate, for after all the four roots are the basic constituents of the sensible world: the formulas of compounds are defined in terms of the elements. Although Love and Strife may be present in compounds as corporeal, structural principles (see pp. 18-19) they are not present in mixtures as definitive ingredients.

There are no explicit statements in the extant fragments of the Peri Physeos pertaining to what type of bodies the cosmic forces have, but there are some figurative expressions concerning this. F. M. Cornford, using fr. 35 as evidence, conceived of the cosmic forces as fluids.³ In fr. 35 Empedocles says: "But as much as it [Strife] continued to run forth, so there ever pursued it a gentle immortal stream of blameless Love" (trans. Guthrie). This clearly suggests that both Love and Strife are fluid-like. It appears to me that fr. 98, which is about the composition of flesh and blood, is also relevant in this connection: "And the earth came together with these in almost equal proportions, with Hephaestus, with moisture and with brilliant aither, and so it anchored in the perfect harbours of Kupris [Love], either a little more of it or less of it with more of the other" (trans. Raven). The fact that earth anchors in Love, a perfect harbor, suggests that Love is fluid-like. This fragment is also pertinent to Love's capacity to bind the elements together harmoniously. A harbor is a place of safety and rest for ships. Love, similarly, is a fluid in which the elements may anchor or find security. In fr. 35.13 (quoted just above) Love is

said to be a "gentle immortal stream." The word used in the original Greek for 'gentle' is Ēpiophrōn, which K. Freeman translates as 'benevolent'. This is in line with the idea of Love being a safe harbor or a place of rest and refuge for the elements -- refuge from the turbulent influence of Strife. It will be seen below that it is better to consider Love as a cause of rest than as a cause of motion, though of course Love must move the elements in order to bring them together in a harmonious state. To return to the basic point, however, Love appears to be a very special fluid. She is after all a force as well as a fluid-like substance: she is perhaps something like a magnetic glue which never hardens. Her force, moreover, is psychological as well as physical. The peculiarity of Love reflects the inability of the Presocratics to conceive of immaterial being.

It seems appropriate to me to consider the cosmic forces as fluid-like. First of all, it differentiates them from the particulate elements. This could partly explain the power of the cosmic forces: as tenuous fluids they would presumably be very mobile and capable of existing in and around all sensible bodies. With respect to their subtlety and power they perhaps resemble the Nous of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras says the following concerning Nous or Mind:

(Fr. 14) But Mind, which ever is, is assuredly even now where everything else is too, in the surrounding mass and in the things that have been either aggregated or separated.
(Trans. Raven)

(Fr. 12) For it is the finest of all things and the purest, it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest power. (Trans. Raven)

Also, by considering the cosmic forces as fluid-like it is possible

to rescue Empedocles from a rather obvious inconsistency. Empedocles' theory that there are pores in bodies appears to be incompatible with his belief that there is no such thing as a void. It seems possible to me that Empedocles may have conceived of the pores as being filled with Love and in most cases partly with Strife too. He says that Love is implanted in mortals (fr. 17). Love is probably present in all compounds as the "cement of Harmonia" (fr. 96. See pp. 18-19). There is no place in bodies other than the pores where Love or Strife could be. It seems that the only way to eradicate the void in a world of particulate, moving matter is to fill it up with something continuous and fluid-like.

It has been mentioned that Love unites unlike elements and Strife divides them, and that a world with diversity and change depends on both processes. In the cosmic cycle (which will be discussed in a subsequent section) there is a stage when Love has complete rule over the elements. At this time the elements are blended evenly and smoothly by Love into a single spherical mass (fr. 27). It is like Parmenides' sphere of being, except that there is a plurality hidden within the unity. Obviously, then, the world perceivable to us cannot be governed solely by Love. On the other hand it cannot be governed solely by Strife, for when Strife has complete control over the elements he divides them into four separate masses (fr. 17). Our world is intermediate between complete union and complete separation.

Love is the positive factor in the forming of compounds, as the following fragments illustrate:

(Fr. 71) How by the mixture of water, earth, air and sun there came into being the shapes and colours of all mortal things that are now in being, put together by Aphrodite. . . .
(Trans. Guthrie)

(Fr. 86) Out of which divine Aphrodite formed eyes.
(Trans. Guthrie)

(Fr. 87) Aphrodite having wrought them with rivets of love.
(Trans. Guthrie)

(Fr. 96) . . . and they became white bones, wondrously joined by the cement of Harmonia. (Trans. Guthrie)

From these fragments it is clear that Love is responsible for both fitting together the elements of compounds and holding them together.

The notion of a compound being fitted together by Love likely refers to the pore-particle explanation of mixture. Fragment 22 is relevant here:

. . . The same is true of things more particularly suited for mixing. When they are made alike by Aphrodite, they cling to each other. When they are enemies, they most of all keep furthest apart from each other. In virtue of their birth, by their capacity for mixture, and by the shapes impressed upon them, in every way it is against their nature to come together, and very loth are they to do so. This is at the instigation of Strife, when Strife controls their birth. (Trans. O'Brien, Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle, p. 312. See his justification of this translation.)

Things which are "suited for mixing" are presumably things whose pores are in reciprocal symmetry. Such things are alike; "they are made alike by Aphrodite." Since they are alike "they cling to each other." They cling to each other because they fit together.

The attraction of like for like is a general principle of Empedocles. It has been mentioned that when Strife has complete control the four elements are divided into four separate masses. It appears that when Strife overcomes Love's power to hold the

elements together they seek their own kind. "Earth augments its own body, and air augments air" (fr. 37, trans. Guthrie). In fr. 62 the following occurs: "These the fire sent up, wishing to come to its like" (trans. Guthrie). The conjunction of the following statements may seem paradoxical: Strife makes it possible for like to join like; the function of Love is to unite unlike elements; and like things are fitted together by Love. O'Brien explains the apparent inconsistency as follows: "'like to like' describes the activity of both Love and Strife. Paradoxical though it may seem, for Empedocles fire to fire and fire to water are both manifestations of the principle that like is attracted to like: for Love, when she unites opposite elements, makes them alike."⁴ She does not, however, make them qualitatively alike, but alike only with respect to their pre-particle structures.

Love also has the function of holding together the elements in the compounds she has formed. Her continued presence prevents the elements from dispersing. In fr. 96 Empedocles says that bones are formed when certain portions of the elements are "joined by the cement of Harmonia." Harmonia in this fragment is a name for Love, as in fr. 27. Love or Harmonia seems to be the cause of the ordered proportions in compounds, though Strife too, as will become evident below, appears to have a role, perhaps indirectly, in determining the proportions in compounds. This links Love very closely to the ratio of mixture. It may be in fact that Empedocles did not distinguish clearly between the Love in a compound and the ratio

between the compound's elements. Aristotle was rather confused about this aspect of Empedocles' concept of Love: "Is love this ratio itself, or is love something over and above this?" he asks in De anima, 408a23. The answer to this question is that Love appears to be both. Cornford says that Empedocles conceived of Love as "both a ratio and a spiritual substance."⁵ Love is physically present in the mixture as a structural principle, though not as an ingredient; she physically causes order among the elements. Empedocles was probably not able to conceive of this order as something abstract, as something apart from the substantial nature of Love. Such abstractions were not understood in his time.

The two functions of Love outlined above, that of fitting the elements together and that of holding them together thereafter, are closely related. Love fits unlike elements together by making them alike, by arranging their pores in reciprocal symmetry. "When they are made alike by Aphrodite, they cling to each other" (fr. 22). This appears to suggest that the elements of a compound remain together simply by means of their interlocking capacity. But they are also held together by the cement of Harmonia. Love, as an embodiment of order, is the cause of both the interlocking phenomenon and the ratio of mixture. As a glue-like or psychically viscuous substance Love holds the elemental particles of a compound fast, thus maintaining both the interlocking structure and the proportions of the elements.

It is to the point here to ask whether or not Strife is in

compounds too. It has been mentioned that when Love has full control she blends all the elements smoothly and evenly into a sphere, thus obliterating all perceptible distinctions. The elements in the Sphere are of course mingled in a 1:1:1:1 ratio. This ratio is perfect harmony, the condition of perfect love. Since not all mortal compounds contain all four elements, and since with the exception of blood they are not characterized by a 1:1:1:1 ratio of mixture, it appears that Strife has a role in determining their nature. The fact that compounds give off effluences suggests that Strife is present in them: the divisionary power of Strife is likely the cause of the outflow of particles. If Strife were in compounds, which appears to be the case, it would certainly have a role in determining their structures. Depending on how much of it there is in relation to Love it could cause divisions and inequalities in a compound. There would be no variety in the world if it were not for Strife's divisionary power.

Sense-Perception and Thought

There are many problems in Empedocles' explanation of the cognitive processes. I shall not, however, discuss many of them, since most of them are not particularly important with respect to the development of this work.

Empedocles explains sense-perception in general on the basis of two types of like-to-like action: structural similarity and qualitative likeness. Concerning the former, Theophrastus, who gives

the fullest account of Empedocles' theory of the cognitive processes, has the following to say:

Empedocles has a common method of treating all the senses: he says that perception occurs because something fits into the passages of the particular <sense organ>. For this reason the senses cannot discern one another's objects, he holds, because the passages of some <of the sense-organs> are too wide for the object, and those of others are too narrow. And consequently some <of these objects> hold their course through without contact, while others are quite unable to enter. (De sens., 7)

The objects which enter the sense-organs are effluences from bodies.

The role of qualitative likeness is revealed by fr. 109:

For with earth do we see earth, with water water, with air bright air, with fire consuming fire; with Love do we see Love, Strife with dread Strife. (Trans. Raven)

From a remark of Theophrastus (De sens., 10) it is evident that fr. 107 should follow fr. 109:

(Fr. 107) Out of these things are all things fitted together and constructed, and by these do they think and feel pleasure or pain. (Trans. Raven)

This suggests that the word 'see' is used in a general, cognitive sense in fr. 109. This can be supported by the fact that in fr. 17 Empedocles implies that Love cannot be seen, but must be perceived by the mind. It could be that the mention of Love and Strife in fr. 109 is relevant to thought but not sense-perception. So, leaving Love and Strife out of this, it appears, from the conjunction of fr. 109 and the passage of Theophrastus quoted above, that sense-perception occurs when elemental particles of the right size come into contact with their likes in the sense-organ.

One of Theophrastus' criticisms is worthy of comment. He

says that on an Empedoclean basis lifeless objects ought to enjoy sense-perception since particles can enter their pores (De sens., 12). On the basis of this he says that there can be no distinction in Empedocles' system between animate and inanimate beings, which is probably true since the elements themselves appear to be alive. But it is highly unlikely that Empedocles thought that each and every object could see and hear and so on. Empedocles presumably conceived of the eye, for instance, as having a definite structure (see Theophr., De sens., 7) because he thought that vision was dependent on that structure. Vision may be ultimately a matter of physical contact, but the right type of contact seems to depend on the structure of the eye.

Empedocles also explained thought in terms of like-to-like action. From the conjunction of fr. 109 and 107 (both of which are quoted above, p.21) it follows that the four elements, Love and Strife are known by means of their likes.

In fr. 105 Empedocles says:

. . . (The heart) dwelling in the sea of blood which surges back and forth, where especially is what is called thought by men; for the blood around men's hearts is their thought.
(Trans. Raven)

The blood, then, according to Empedocles, is the mind. According to fr. 98 it consists of all four elements "in almost equal proportions." The blood's capacity for thought depends on the nature of its blend. Degrees of intelligence in people vary with how closely their blood approaches to the perfect mixture, as the following

passage of Theophrastus indicates:

Those in whom these mingled elements [in the blood] are of the same <amount>, being neither widely separated nor too small nor of excessive size, -- such persons are most intelligent and keen of sense; and others are intelligent and keen of sense according as they approach to such a mixture. . . . Again, persons in whom the elements lie loose and rare are slow and laborious; while such as have them compact and divided fine are impulsively carried away. . . . But when the composition in some member lies in the mean, the person is accomplished in that part. For this reason some are clever orators, others artisans; for in the one case the happy mixture is in the tongue, in the other it is in the hands. (De sens., 11)

That blood consisting of an even mixture is intelligent fits in with the doctrine that each element is known by its like: since the blood is not deficient in any of the elements it can know them all equally well.

The principle involved in the above passage can be extrapolated to cover all compounds. In fr. 103 and 110 Empedocles says that all things have a share of thought. The share of thought which a given compound has would depend on the nature of its mixture, since the only differences there are among compounds concern the nature of their mixtures. In Empedocles' philosophy psychical capacity varies directly with smoothness and equality of mixture. Of course it also depends on how many of the elements are present in the mixture. A mass of an isolated element would be capable of recognizing only its like.

The problem now is to determine the means by which likes are known by their likes. Aristotle asserts that there is no distinction between thought and perception in Empedocles' system (De

an., 427a21). Theophrastus (De sens., 10) says that in Empedocles' view "thought is either identical with sense perception or very similar to it." The phrase "very similar" is probably the more appropriate. It seems unlikely that Empedocles would have considered sight, for example, to be exactly the same as thought: his description of the eye is very different from his description of blood. Since, however, he says that all things possess thought it appears to follow that the eye possesses thought. It could be that vision is a special type of knowledge: knowledge of colors and shapes. The main point here, however, is that it is very plausible that Empedocles regarded thought as being very similar to perception. It could be that a person obtains knowledge by means of effluences. It is difficult to imagine how else Empedocles could explain the acquisition of knowledge. A. A. Long⁶ argues that the pore-and-effluence means of communication is likely what Empedocles had in mind in fr. 110:

For if you plant these things deep into your firm mind and gaze upon them favourably with pure attention, all these things shall be yours entirely throughout your life and you will obtain many other things from them. For these things of themselves cause each thing to grow in its own way, whatever is the nature of each thing. But if you stretch after different things, thousands of worthless things such as dwell among men and blunt their thoughts, then those things will quickly fail you as time comes round and they long to return to their own dear family. For know that all things have wisdom and a share of thought. (Trans. Long)

Long interprets the "things" that are to be planted in the mind to be Empedocles' teachings or true statements about the world. He also feels that the word refers to the elements. The explanation of this ambiguity is that Empedocles must have conceived of thoughts or

truths as physical entities composed of the elements. The question now arises: how can these physical entities be planted in the mind? Long perceives a clue to this in a sentence of fr. 110: "For these things of themselves cause each thing to grow in its own way, whatever is the nature of each thing." According to Theophrastus Empedocles explained perception, mixture and growth in terms of symmetry of pores (De sens., 12). Aristotle adds that Empedocles conceived of growth in terms of addition: a thing grows when particles are added to it (Gen. et corr., 333a35). The idea, then, is that truth as a composite of elements enters the blood and causes growth in a physical and epistemological sense. Long also makes the point that the elements of these truths do not likely come from the senses, since there is no evidence that Empedocles conceived of any mechanism to explain such an occurrence.⁷ Empedocles likely believed the mind to be like a sixth sense — an independent sense, however, since all the senses are independent of each other.

Fragments 106 and 108 express ideas which are pertinent to fr. 110:

(Fr. 106) For the wisdom of men grows according to what is before them. (Trans. Burnet)

(Fr. 108) As much as men change their nature, so they think different thoughts. (Trans. Guthrie)

Aristotle (Met., 1009b17) uses these passages to illustrate that Empedocles believed that a change of physical constitution in a man resulted in a change of his knowledge. It appears that knowledge and physical constitution are not distinguishable in Empedocles'

philosophy. Long argues that the truth about the world must consist of an equally proportioned blend of the elements.⁸ This is why the blood must be evenly blended in order to be effective. The blood can receive truth only if it is structurally similar to truth. It is probable that as a man's knowledge grows or as he acquires truths his blood correspondingly becomes more evenly balanced. And of course as his blood becomes more evenly balanced he becomes more capable of receiving truth. Fragments 106 and 108 above, if considered in relation to fr. 110, seem to imply something like this. Of course the opposite may happen too: a man may lose knowledge and correspondingly suffer an unfavorable change of physical constitution. This is perhaps why Empedocles warns Pausanias in fr. 110 not to dwell on the worthless things that occupy the minds of most men. Such thoughts blunt the mind; they disturb the balance of the elements in the blood. When this happens the particles of truth "long to return to their own dear family." Like returns to like. The loss of particles from the mind is explanatory of forgetfulness.

There is yet one aspect of Empedocles' explanation of thought which should be examined: the role of Love and Strife. It is evident from fr. 109 that we know Love by Love and Strife by Strife. It has been argued above that Love and Strife are present in compounds not as constituents but as structural principles. It appears, as Raven says,⁹ that Empedocles conceived of the blood in two different ways: as a physical compound it is a mixture of the four elements; as the seat of consciousness it also contains Love

and Strife. We perhaps acquire some comprehension of the cosmic forces by means of the Love and Strife within us.

Perhaps the most important role of Love and Strife in the thought-process concerns their organizational capacities. Love is important in a positive sense, since she is the cause of harmony, and Strife is significant in a negative sense. It is reasonable to suppose that the quality of the blend of the blood would vary with the proportions of Love and Strife in it. Perfectly blended blood would be saturated with Love but would contain no Strife. It would resemble the Sphere of Love with respect to the nature of its mixture. A comparison of two fragments, one from the Peri Physeos and one from the Katharmoi, suggests that there is some connection between the Sphere and thought (though the relevance of this comparison depends on the assumption that the two poems are compatible):

(Fr. 29) Two branches spring not from his back, he has no feet, no swift knees, no fertile parts; rather was he a sphere, equal to himself from every side. (Trans. Raven)

(Fr. 134) He boasts not a human head upon his body, two branches spring not from his shoulders, no feet has he, no swift knees, no shaggy parts; rather is he only a holy, unspeakable mind, darting with swift thoughts over the whole world. (Trans. Raven)

The similarity of these passages suggests that the Sphere of Love and the holy mind are one and the same thing. It is appropriate since the Sphere is the perfect mixture, and since the level of thought varies with the quality of mixture. On the basis of the relationship between Love and the level of intelligence it appears to follow that as a man gains in wisdom the ratio of Love to Strife

in his blood increases. Perhaps as this happens the Strife in his blood is expelled and additional Love comes in to take its place. Love has the power to hold the elements in place. With a high predominance of Love in his blood a man would not be apt to lose his wisdom. Forgetfulness, it may be recalled, is due to particles escaping from the blood. This is most likely due to Strife's influence, since Strife is the cause of effluences.

The Cosmic Cycle

In my opinion D. O'Brien's work, Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle, is a very coherent interpretation of the cycle. From a huge, complicated array of evidence he draws simple, clear conclusions about the cycle, conclusions which are compatible with Empedocles' basic principles. I shall set forth the general lines of O'Brien's interpretation, though I shall not go into it in great detail. For my purposes the most important part of O'Brien's interpretation is his correlation of the zoogonies with the cycle. I shall use this when I attempt to relate the soul's cycle of incarnation to the cosmic cycle.

Empedocles introduces the cosmic cycle in fr. 17:


A double tale will I tell: at one time it grew to be one only from many, at another it divided again to be many from one. There is a double coming into being of mortal things and a double passing away. One is brought about, and again destroyed, by the coming together of all things, the other grows up and is scattered as things are again divided. And these things never cease from continual shifting, at one time all coming together, through Love, into one, at another each borne apart from the others through Strife. . . . At one time it grew to be one only

from many, at another it divided again to be many from one,
 fire and water and earth and the vast height of air, dread
 Strife too, apart from these, everywhere equally balanced,
 and Love in their midst, equal in length and breadth. . . .
 (Trans. Raven)

From this it can be gathered that there are four stages in the endless cycle. There is a time when Love has all the elements united in a single mass, and at the opposite pole there is a time when Strife has the elements separated into four distinct masses. There is a transitional stage from total Love to total Strife when a race of mortals comes into being and perishes. At this time Strife's power increases as Love's power decreases (see pp.34-36). There is also a transitional stage from total Strife back to total Love when another race of mortals comes into being and perishes. Love's power at this time increases as Strife's power decreases (see fr. 35).

O'Brien argues, on the basis of considerable though complicated evidence (some of which I shall mention), that the elements are at rest during the time of total Love and are moving at all other times (O'Brien, ch. two); and that the speed of the elements varies directly with the strength of Strife's power (ch. three); and that the time of total Love is equal to the time of the rest of the cycle, the time of total Strife being only momentary (ch. four). He accordingly argues that there are two alternations in the cycle, a major one and a minor one.¹⁰ The major alternation is between the state of unity and rest and the world of plurality and motion. The minor alternation is between increasing Strife and increasing Love. The two equal periods of the second alternation,

which are separated by the momentary period of total Strife, comprise the half of the cycle characterized by plurality and motion. This concept of the cycle may be diagrammed with respect to time as follows:



Aristotle says several times that Empedocles' world alternates between rest and motion (Phys., 250b26, 252a7 and 252a19). He also says that according to Empedocles the elements arose out of the Sphere (the state of total Love) through motion (Gen. et corr., 315a19). This suggests that the Sphere was motionless. In De caelo (300b26) he implies that according to Empedocles the separated elements under total Strife are in motion. Since mortal creatures are formed during the stages of increasing Strife and increasing Love it follows that

there is motion during these times. It follows, therefore, that there is rest only during total Love. Empedocles says in fr. 31 that when Strife penetrated the Sphere "all the god's limbs in turn began to quake" (trans. Raven). This also suggests that the Sphere was motionless and that Strife caused motion to begin. O'Brien's interpretation can also be argued for on general grounds. The time of total Love is a time of complete peace and harmony. Love, as the "cement of Harmonia," would allow no motion.*

Aetius (5.18.1) says that according to Empedocles the sun moved more slowly in the beginning of the world than it does now. It is likely that Empedocles had in mind the world of increasing Strife.¹¹ As Strife progressively gains control over the elements, and as Love correspondingly loses its capacity to hold them fast, their speed will naturally increase. It will reach a maximum during total Strife and thereafter decrease as Love increases in power.

Aristotle (Phys., 252a31) says that in Empedocles' system "the predominance of each of the two forces lasts for an equal period of time." This occurs in a context in which Aristotle is discussing Empedocles' theory of alternate periods of rest and motion.

*Also, to some extent there is a tendency among the Presocratics to associate unity and rest. In the Pythagorean table of opposites 'one' and 'resting' are listed in the same column, and 'plurality' and 'moving' are listed in the opposite column (Arist. Met., 986a21). Perhaps more significant is the fact that Parmenides' sphere of being is motionless. Since Empedocles borrowed a number of doctrines from Parmenides it is quite possible that he borrowed the idea of a motionless sphere from him too.

O'Brien argues persuasively that the passage refers to equal durations of rest and motion.¹² From this it follows that the time of total Love is equal to the time of the rest of the cycle. The cycle is divided equally into two halves: one half characterized by unity and rest, and the other characterized by plurality and motion.

O'Brien uses fr. 35 to illustrate that the time of total Strife is momentary. He interprets lines 3-5 to mean approximately the following: when Strife has gained full power and has reached the center of the world, and Love has withdrawn to the center of the world, the elements immediately begin to come together.¹³ On the basis of this total Strife is only momentary.

During the stage of total Love the elements are bonded together by Love in the form of a sphere (frr. 27-29). It is worth remarking that in frr. 27 and 31 Empedocles refers to the Sphere as a god. He may in fact have regarded the Sphere as the highest god in the cosmos: the four elements and Love are all divinities, and the Sphere is the state or being in which these divinities are most happily related. This adds plausibility to a point made earlier (pp. 27-28) which involved comparing the Sphere with the holy mind, apparently the highest god of the Katharmoi. O'Brien holds that lines 19-20 of fr. 17 are the best indication of the shape of Love and Strife during the time of the Sphere and the rest of the cycle too.¹⁴ Raven translates these lines as follows:

. . . dread Strife too, apart from these [the elements], everywhere equally balanced, and Love in their midst, equal in length and breadth.

Love herself appears to be equal in length and breadth. This suggests that Love is evenly distributed throughout the Sphere, since all diameters of a sphere are equal. The even distribution of Love in the Sphere is compatible with the theory that she is fluid-like. It seems that Love would have to be fluid-like to be distributed evenly throughout the massive conglomerate of tiny particles. O'Brien admits the possibility that Love and Strife are fluids.¹⁵ During her total reign Love appears to be a fluid sphere in which the elemental particles are suspended in a perfectly harmonious arrangement. During the time of the Sphere Strife is apart from the elements and "everywhere equally balanced." This suggests that Strife is like a spherical envelope enclosing the Sphere. Fragment 35.10 also indicates that during Love's total rule Strife circumscribes the Sphere. Concerning Strife O'Brien says that "an even spherical layer is the only symmetrical position a fluid body can adopt on the surface of a sphere."¹⁶

In fr. 30 and 31 Empedocles introduces the transition from the one to the many, the disruption of the Sphere:

(Fr. 30) But when Strife waxed great in the limbs, and sprang to his prerogatives as the time was fulfilled which is fixed for them in turn by a broad oath. (Trans. Raven)

(Fr. 31) For all the god's limbs in turn began to quake. (Trans. Raven)

The remarks of Aristotle (Met., 1000b9) and Simplicius (Phys., 1184, 11-13) indicate that fr. 30 is about the disruption of the Sphere.¹⁷ Simplicius prefaces his quotation of fr. 31 as follows (Phys., 1184, 2): "But when Strife began once more to prevail, then there is again

motion in the Sphere" (trans. Raven). The mention in fr. 30 of alternate times fixed by a broad oath probably refers to the alternation between the Sphere and plurality, the reign of Love and the reign of Strife.¹⁸ When Love has had complete rule over the elements for a certain period of time Strife springs "to his prerogatives." At this time Love yields to Strife: she gives up her reign of complete peace and harmony. A contest or battle between Love and Strife begins immediately. The whole duration in which there is conflict and change belongs to Strife, even though Love is present as his opponent.¹⁹ This interpretation of course lends support to the theory that the major alternation is between the one and the many, and that the periods for each are likely of equal duration.

Now, what about the rest of the transitional period between total Love and total Strife? It has been mentioned that it is gradual and that a race of mortals comes into being and perishes during this time. There is no direct evidence in the fragments pertaining to the relationship between Love and Strife at this time; but there is a description in fr. 35 of what happens in the other half of the world of plurality and motion, when Love is gaining on Strife. By reason of symmetry it is highly likely that each world-process is the reverse of the other. W. K. C. Guthrie's translation of fr. 35 is appropriate in relation to O'Brien's interpretation of it:²⁰

. . . When Strife reached the lowest depth of the vortex, and whenever Love finds herself in the midst of the whirl, there all things come together to be one only -- not suddenly, but combining from different directions at will. And as they came together, Strife began to retire to the

boundary. Yet many remained unmixed alternating with those that were mingling, all those, that is, that Strife still held back in suspense; for it had not all retired blamelessly from them to the furthest ends of the circle, but parts of it remained within while other parts had passed out of the limbs. But as much as it continued to run forth, so there ever pursued it a gentle immortal stream of blameless Love. Then quickly those things grew mortal that before knew immortality, and those that were unmixed became mixed as they changed their ways. And as they mingled a myriad tribes of mortal creatures were poured forth, endowed with all sorts of shapes, a wonder to behold.

This fragment depicts the formation of a world under increasing Love. The opening part of it describes the positions of Love and Strife during the momentary, total rule of Strife. Love appears to be in the very center of the cosmos and Strife appears to be situated around her. This is confirmed by the subsequent actions of Love and Strife. As Love begins to gain power she pursues Strife outward toward the "ends of the circle." She will acquire full control when she has formed the elements into the Sphere and has forced Strife outside of it. It is to the point here to note that the process of Strife withdrawing and Love pursuing appears to be more or less regular or balanced. The shapes of Love and Strife during total Love are respectively a solid sphere and a hollow sphere, and they likely maintain these shapes approximately during the whole cycle. When Strife is increasing he probably contracts and forces Love toward the center, and when Love is increasing she probably expands and forces Strife toward the outer limits.²¹ I use the word 'approximately' above because Empedocles says that when Love is increasing some parts of Strife remain within while

other parts pass out of the limbs, which indicates that Love and Strife cannot be perfectly spherical during this process.

The movement of these two forces through the cosmos, through the elements, is what causes a race of mortals to come into being and perish. As the two forces begin to move outward Love begins to bring the separated elements together. Both forces are active at this time so both mingling and separating of elements occur. When Love gains sufficient power mortal creatures can be formed. It is reasonable to suppose that as the ratio of Love to Strife increases creatures of a more harmonious nature will be formed. In the end, when Love gains full control, all creatures will perish: there will be only the Sphere at that time.

The process by which a world is formed under increasing Strife is presumably the reverse of that under increasing Love. Individual creatures cannot be formed until there is sufficient separation of the elements. As Strife gains more control less harmonious creatures will be formed. All creatures will perish when complete separation of the elements occurs.

Now, what happens to the elements when they separate? Since like is attracted by like the particles of each root probably cluster together in a single mass (fr. 37). Under total Strife the elements are probably arranged in four concentric spheres around the core of Love.²² Fire and air are probably the outermost spheres and water and earth are probably the innermost. The divisions in the present world among land, sea, sky and firmament were undoubted-

ly evidence for Empedocles of a state of partial separation.

In Empedocles' system there is a zoogony in each of the two world-periods (fr. 26). The sequential development in one is probably the reverse of that in the other, since the two world-processes appear to differ only with respect to the direction of the flow of the cosmic forces. Aetius (5.19.5) states that according to Empedocles there are four stages in the development of animal life: first, separate limbs (frr. 57 and 58); second, monsters (frr. 60 and 61); third, whole-natured creatures (fr. 62); fourth, men and women. O'Brien relates these stages to the two world-periods in what appears to be the only coherent way possible:²³

Increasing Strife

1. whole-natured creatures
2. men and women.
3. separate limbs and monsters.

Increasing Love

1. separate limbs and monsters.
2. men and women.
3. whole-natured creatures

The first creatures to be formed in the world of increasing Strife are the whole-natured creatures of fr. 62:

Come now and hear this, how fire as it was separated raised up the nocturnal scions of men and pitiable women: it is no erring or ignorant tale. Whole-natured forms first sprang up from the earth, having a portion of both water and heat. These the fire sent up, wishing to come to its like. Not yet did they display the comely shape of limbs, nor voice nor the part proper to men. (Trans. Guthrie)

The fact that fire is being separated from the other elements indicates that this fragment pertains to the world of increasing Strife. And the fact that there is no sun yet illustrates that the time is at the beginning of the period. The whole-natured creatures, since

they are created when Love predominates greatly over Strife, are the most harmonious creatures in the zoogonical sequence. As their name implies, they are complete, which may seem paradoxical since they lack limbs, voice and probably all other animal parts. The development of various, distinct animal parts, however, is due to the separating power of Strife. The whole-natured creatures are probably complete in the same sense in which the Sphere of Love is complete. Fragments 27 and 29 reveal that the Sphere has no limbs, at least not perceptibly distinguishable limbs. The Sphere is complete in the sense that it contains everything except Strife. The whole-natured creatures obviously do not contain all of reality, but it is plausible that they are microcosmically like the Sphere. Fragment 62 suggests that they contain equal portions of fire and water. If they were similar to the Sphere they would contain equal portions of all the elements. Empedocles probably mentions fire and water to illustrate that there are portions of both sexes in the whole-natured creatures. Fragments 65 and 67, which are about the womb, indicate that fire and water are respectively the male and female elements. Males arise from the warm part of the womb and females arise from the cold part.²⁴ It seems that Empedocles has deliberately drawn an analogy between the whole-natured creature and the womb, since he indicates that men and women arise from the whole-natured creatures. This analogy of course suggests that the whole-natured creatures are roundish. The main reason for supposing that the whole-natured creatures contain equal portions of all

four elements is that they are created when Love has nearly full control over the elements. In my opinion they are probably much like the Sphere. It could be that Strife more or less sculpts them out of the Sphere. Perhaps Strife does not have the power at first to penetrate them and form limbs. He merely has the power to create individuals. If they are fragments of the Sphere which have not been penetrated by Strife then they would have equal portions of all the elements.

The second stage of development under Strife is when the whole-natured creatures divide and yield men and women.²⁵ Although the whole-natured creatures mentioned in fr. 62 appear to be specifically the parents of humans, it is likely that Empedocles believed that the other animals originated in the same way.²⁶

The third stage under increasing Strife consists of further separation. O'Brien translates and interprets fr. 20 as follows:²⁷

This (the alternation of increasing Love and increasing Strife) is manifest in the frame of the human body. Limbs that in the peak of blooming life have found a body, at one time (i.e. during increasing Love) come together through Love to be all one. At another time (i.e. during increasing Strife) they are torn apart again (i.e. under increasing Strife so as to be in the same condition as they were before under increasing Love) by wicked spirits of dissension, and wander each of them apart along the breakers of life's shore. The same is true for bushes and for fish in water palaces, for beasts that sleep on the mountain side and pigeons that float on wings.

This fragment indicates that just as limbs are united to form bodies under increasing Love, they are separated from bodies during increasing Strife.

Aristophanes' speech in Plato's Symposium (189ff.) can also be used as evidence pertaining to the division of creatures into separate limbs. In a discussion about the nature of Love Aristophanes describes the origin of men and women in a way that rather clearly parodies Empedocles' theory. He says that originally there were spherical, double-sexed creatures. After they had insulted the gods Zeus cut them in two. They existed as men and women then. Zeus also threatened them with further separation if they continued to be insolent. The pattern of this follows the pattern in Empedocles' theory. It also adds credence to the speculation that Empedocles' whole-natured creatures are spherical.

In fr. 57 Empedocles introduces the first stage of animal development under increasing Love:

On the earth many heads sprang up without necks, arms wandered bare, bereft of shoulders, and eyes strayed alone in need of foreheads. (Trans. Guthrie)

Aristotle (De caelo, 300b29) says that in Empedocles' system separate limbs are formed during increasing Love, and Simplicius (Phys., 371, 33-35) adds that they are formed during the first stage of this period. The next development occurs when Love joins the limbs together (Arist., De an., 430a30). Since Love is not very strong at this time the first creatures are probably the monsters of fr. 61:

Many creatures were born with faces and breasts on both sides, man-faced ox-progeny, while others again sprang forth as ox-headed offspring of man, creatures compounded partly of male, partly of the nature of female, and fitted with shadowy parts. (Trans. Raven)

These monsters are probably the result of limbs joining haphazardly.

The next stage under increasing Love is the formation of men and women and other normal creatures. Simplicius (Phys., 371, 33ff.) asserts that according to Empedocles men and women are formed from separate limbs.²⁸ It appears that as Love's power increases limbs can be combined to form not monsters but normal creatures.

The final stage in Love's zoogony is the formation of the whole-natured creatures. The only evidence for this is the symmetry of the two world-processes. Whole-natured creatures are the first in Strife's zoogonical sequence, so it is probable that they are the last in Love's zoogony. It is of course appropriate that the harmonious, whole-natured creatures should be formed when Love has gained nearly full control. In Aristophanes' speech in the Symposium the men and women who have been formed out of the double creatures are promised a return to their original, blissful state if they live a pious life. This pattern of division followed by reunification could refer to the overall pattern in the two world-periods of Empedocles: division occurs under increasing Strife and unification occurs under increasing Love.

II

THE SOUL-CYCLE

In the Katharmoi Empedocles addresses the people of Akragas on the fall of the soul and the means of purification which are essential for its redemption. He tells them that their souls have fallen through sin from a divine, peaceful place into the present, troublous world, and that they may return to the blessed place if they live purely. The sequence in the soul's journey is similar to the cosmic sequence involving unity and plurality. Love and Strife are important in the Katharmoi in connection with the soul's periods of peace and woe respectively. The four elements too have a role in this poem: they define the setting of the soul's fallen state. These principles from the Peri Physeos, however, are not employed for the purpose of detailed, physical explanations: Love and Strife seem to be used strictly on a moral level, and the elements are not used extensively. Empedocles' purpose in the Katharmoi is to tell the people how and why they should purify themselves. The complex cosmology of the Peri Physeos would be a hindrance to his purpose. It does not follow, therefore, that Empedocles did not have the physical system in mind when he expounded his religious doctrines (the relationship between the two poems will be examined in the next chapter).

In fr. 115 Empedocles depicts the fate of the souls or dae-

mons that sin:

There is an oracle of Necessity, ancient decree of the gods, eternal and sealed with broad oaths: whenever one of those demi-gods [daemons], whose lot is long-lasting life, has sinfully defiled his dear limbs with bloodshed, or following strife has sworn a false oath, thrice ten thousand seasons does he wander far from the blessed, being born throughout that time in the forms of all manner of mortal things and changing one baleful path of life for another. The might of the air pursues him into the sea, the sea spews him forth on to the dry land, the earth casts him into the rays of the burning sun, and the sun into the eddies of air. One takes him from the other, but all alike abhor him. Of these I too am now one, a fugitive from the gods and a wanderer, who put my trust in raving strife. (Trans. Raven)

The souls that follow Strife are cast out of the blessed place into the wheel of transmigration. This is a moral interpretation of Strife's power of separation: the souls that put their trust in Strife are separated or exiled from the gods. The transmigrating souls go through the round of the elements -- the air, the sea, the earth and the sun. This could signify that the creatures which the souls inhabit are composed of the elements, or it could possibly signify that the souls transmigrate through birds, fish and land creatures.

Fragments 128 and 130 portray the nature of the blessed state:

Among them was no war-god Ares [Strife] worshipped, nor the battle-cry, nor was Zeus their king nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Cypris [Love] was queen. Her they propitiated with pious offerings, painted figures and variously scented unguents, sacrifices of unmixed myrrh and fragrant incense, and they poured on the ground libations of yellow honey. But no altar was wet with the shameful slaughter of bulls; nay it was held the foulest defilement to tear out the life and devour the goodly limbs. (Trans. Guthrie)

All things were tame and kindly to man, and lovingkindness was kindled abroad. (Trans. Guthrie)

The concept in these passages appears to be modelled on Hesiod's golden age (The Works and Days, 109ff.). Hesiod says that the first race of people on earth were free of all worries and sorrows. He refers to them as golden people, by which he means good people. Both the people and the age described by Empedocles could be called golden. It is an age ruled by Love. The bond of friendship between men and animals indicates the moral aspect of Love's unifying power.

It is my interpretation that the golden people of fr. 128 are identifiable in some sense with the daemons of fr. 115 in their pure state before the fall. According to fr. 115 the daemons fall when they shed blood or put their trust in Strife. The people of fr. 128 exist at a time prior to the time of animal sacrifices. It is therefore highly unlikely that Empedocles considered the golden people to be the first race of people after the fall. In fr. 115 Empedocles says that the daemons swear a false oath when they follow Strife. This indicates that they owe their allegiance to a different power. It is most likely Love. The fact that Love is the only ruler of the people of fr. 128 appears, therefore, to relate the pure daemons and the golden people.

The problem now is to determine in what way the golden people are identifiable with the pure daemons. In fr. 115 Empedocles speaks of the daemons defiling their limbs with bloodshed. The daemons cannot literally be humans or any other type of animal; animal

bodies cannot constitute any part of the daemons: if this were the case then the daemons would not be able to enter the wheel of transmigration; a daemon as a human compound, for instance, could not as such enter or become a goat or whatever. It is possible, however, that Empedocles considered the pure daemons to be incarnated in perfect humans, in which case the logical choice would be the golden people. If this were so then a daemon, in so far as he has control over the body (see pp. 49 and 57-60), could incite an act of bloodshed. It is also possible that Empedocles was working on a strictly symbolic level in speaking of the daemons committing bloodshed. If this were the case then the golden people would be appropriate symbols of the pure daemons. Empedocles offers alternative reasons for the fall: bloodshed and trust in Strife. On the basis of the second suggestion following Strife would be the primal sin and shedding blood would be symbolically equivalent to it. Empedocles could have used this symbolism in order to drive home the point that the customs in his time of sacrificing animals and eating meat were instances of following Strife, re-enactments of the primal sin. Since Love is a ruler who wants to bind men and animals together in friendship, it appears to follow that shedding blood is an act of following Strife. On the basis of the Katharmoi alone it seems that the two interpretations suggested here are the only coherent ones possible. In the next chapter, when I discuss the relationship between the two poems, I shall put forward a third interpretation about the initial state of the daemons, an interpretation which in-

volves aspects of both of the above interpretations.

In the Works and Days Hesiod speaks of the golden age as a thing of the past. The golden people died out and the gods replaced them with the silver people who were greatly inferior. In fr. 128 Empedocles also speaks of the innocent people as a race of the past. If they are representative in one way or another of the pure daemons then it appears to follow that the fall of the daemons was collective. In fr. 115, however, Empedocles indicates that each daemon falls through his own sin. Empedocles probably conceived of the fall as being both individual and collective: all the daemons fall, but each one through his own sin. The oddity of this is most likely due to Empedocles' attempt to account for necessity and individual freedom and responsibility (a conflict which will be discussed in the next chapter). The element of necessity enters the picture when the physical principles are related to the religious doctrines. This twofold concept of the fall appears therefore to be some type of evidence for the claim that Empedocles worked out the two poems in relation to each other.

After the daemons sin they are exiled from the blessed place for thirty thousand seasons, during which time they must transmigrate through all manner of mortal creatures. In fr. 117 Empedocles says that he has been incarnated in a boy, a girl, a bush, a bird and a fish. It seems that the daemons transmigrate through all forms of life. It also appears that some of the daemons are capable of remembering their previous incarnations.

The long period of transmigration is punishment for the daemon. It does not seem, however, that this punishment in itself qualifies the daemon for readmittance into the blessed place. Empedocles' purpose in the Katharmoi is to tell the people how they may purify themselves so that they may escape from the wheel of transmigration. It appears that most of the part of the poem dealing with the means of purification has been lost. From what does survive, however, it is clear that it is of prime importance to refrain from sacrificing animals and eating meat (frr. 136, 137 and 139). In fr. 137 Empedocles says:

The father lifts up his own son changed in form, and slaughters him with a prayer in his great folly. Others look on beseeching as he sacrifices; but he, deaf to their protestations, slays him and makes ready in his halls an evil feast. Even so son seizes father and children mother, and tearing out the life they feed on kindred flesh.
(Trans. Guthrie)

Slaughtering of animals is taboo because of the doctrine of transmigration: a person may kill his own kin by killing an animal. In the stage of innocence all the daemons were united in friendship by Love. It is therefore an act of strife to kill a creature that may harbor a daemon: it is a re-enactment of the primal sin. A person must "fast from wickedness" (fr. 144, trans. Burnet) in order to purify himself.

Within the wheel of transmigration there is a hierarchy of forms of lives. Aelian writes the following (On Animals, 12. 7):

And Empedocles maintains that if his lot translates a man into an animal, then it is best for him to transmigrate into a lion; if into a plant, then into a sweet-bay. Empedocles' words are [fr. 127] "Among wild beasts they become lions that couch upon the mountains and sleep on the

earth, and among trees with fair foliage sweet-bay-trees."
 (Trans. Scholfield)

In fr. 146-147 Empedocles indicates that there are gradations within mankind, and that the souls that are ready to return home are incarnated in the highest types of men:

At the end they become prophets, bards, physicians, and princes among men on earth. Thence they arise as gods highest in honour, sharing hearth and table with the other immortals, free from human sorrows, unwearied. (Trans. Guthrie)

It seems probable that a daemon goes up or down the ladder of being after each of his lives depending on how purely he has lived during those lives. Empedocles, who was a prophet, a poet and a physician, must have felt that he was on the verge of apotheosis. This would explain his elevated claim in fr. 112 that he was an immortal god.

Judging from fr. 132 it seems that the daemon on the way toward godhood must acquire wisdom in addition to fasting from evil: "Blessed is he who has obtained the riches of divine wisdom, and wretched he who has a dim opinion in his thought concerning the gods" (trans. Guthrie). W. K. C. Guthrie says that according to Empedocles "since like is known by like, to know the divine is to be assimilated to it."²⁹ This perhaps depends on, or is at least parallel to, the theory in the Peri Physeos that as a person acquires truth he correspondingly develops a truth-like structure in his mind. Similarly, according to Guthrie's interpretation, as a person gains knowledge of the divine he becomes more divine. It can be inferred from fr. 129 that a

daemon is capable of accumulating knowledge throughout his sojourn. A daemon probably moves up the scale of being after any given life if he has obtained some measure of divine wisdom during that time.

In fr. 133 Empedocles declares that God cannot be perceived by the senses. The reason for this is given in fr. 134: God has no limbs or any other animal parts; he is a holy mind. Since God is a holy mind and since like is known by like it seems to follow that God must be comprehended by the mind. There is no explanation in the Katharmoi of how this process could alter the daemon's purity. There are no statements concerning the relationship, if there is one, between the daemon and the mind. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that there is some type of interaction between the daemon and the creatures it inhabits: if this were not the case then the doctrine of purification would be senseless. The center of interaction could be the mind. It is of course possible that Empedocles did not realize that there must be interaction between the soul and body. There is no way of determining this from the Katharmoi. The only recourse is to look to the Peri Physeos for clues concerning the nature of the daemon and its relationship to the body (see the next chapter, pp. 57ff.).

There is yet one problem in the Katharmoi which should be discussed. Empedocles fixes the period of exile at thirty thousand seasons, yet he indicates that the daemon may be released from the wheel of transmigration whenever he has purified himself. There is no clarification of this apparent inconsistency in the

extant fragments of the Katharmoi. In fr. 112 Empedocles indicates that he is on the threshold of apotheosis. Could it be that he has finished the sentence of thirty thousand seasons? This seems unlikely, since he suggests that the other people of Akragas are far below him. Since the fall was collective the period of exile would terminate for everyone at the same time. It is probable, however, that the daemons did not all fall at exactly the same time, since each one fell through his own sin. But there was not likely any large time differentials involved: the stage of innocence of fr. 128 probably terminated within a reasonable time after Strife began to get a foothold among the people (or daemons). Empedocles could have believed that Strife is capable of growing in the moral sphere just as it is in the physical one. One evil deed leads to another. Just as the rule of Love ended when Strife penetrated the Sphere, the reign of Cypris (fr. 128) probably ended when bloodshed began, that is, when the daemons began to follow Strife (fr. 115). It is still possible, however, that Empedocles fell somewhat before most of the other daemons and has finished his period of exile and process of purification somewhat before the others. This, however, does not alter the question in theory: it does not solve the problem of what would happen to any daemons that purify themselves before their sentence is finished. O'Brien offers the following suggestions:

In the Phaedrus Plato allows a shorter time of exile . . . for someone who lives consistently as a perfect philosopher, 248E-249A. Empedocles' apparent assurance of his own divinization . . . may likewise imply an earlier release from the cycle of incarnation for the chosen few.

An alternative, or a complementary, explanation may be that although some daimones become leaders of men and then gods, as in fr. 146, they may nonetheless not return to full blessedness until the reconstitution . . . of the golden age. . . . It may be that these purified daimones are kept waiting, as it were, until the full period of thirty thousand seasons has run its course; but that their period of waiting is less burdensome than it is for tainted mortals. The purified daimones may go to some place where they are unaffected by the changes of the world; or they may be the daimones described by Hippolytus as roaming the earth and directing earthly affairs.³⁰ (Most of the omissions pertain to the physical poem; they are not relevant at this point.)

All these suggestions appear to be plausible. In my opinion the problem is part of the freedom-necessity problem. In fr. 115 Empedocles says that the exile-period of thirty thousand seasons was determined by an "oracle of Necessity." The significance of this remark does not become fully apparent until the cosmic cycle and the soul-cycle are considered in relation to each other. Although Empedocles realized that the daemons were subject to forces beyond their control, he nevertheless believed that they were free within limits to determine their own destinies. The fallen daemons may not regain full blessedness prior to the thirty thousand seasons, but through pure living they may rid themselves of the taint of Strife before that time.

III

THE DAEMONS AND THE COSMIC SYSTEM

Introduction

In view of the fact that Love, Strife and the elements appear in both of Empedocles' poems, and the fact that the cosmic cycle and the soul-cycle are similar, the question arises whether or not the two poems have a common basis. Is it possible to use the principles of the Peri Physeos to define the nature of the daemon, the phenomenon of transmigration and the process of purification? It will be shown in this chapter that in all probability Empedocles believed that his physical principles and religious doctrines were relatable.

There are several reasons for supposing that Empedocles considered his two poems to be relatable. First of all is the fact that Love and Strife are used in both poems in similar ways. In the Peri Physeos Love unites the elements and Strife separates them. There is a moral dimension involved in these actions: the elements are dear to one another when united by Love and hostile toward each other when influenced by Strife. In fr. 17 Empedocles says that it is the Love implanted in mortals that causes them to have kind thoughts and do the works of peace. In the golden age Love is likewise the cause of peace and friendliness. Strife, in both poems, is the cause of hostility. It remains to be seen, however, whether

the Love and Strife of the Katharmoi can be interpreted as physical forces.

Another reason for supposing there is unity in the two poems is the similarity of the two cycles. In each cycle there is a reign of Love: in one case the elements exist in perfect harmony under Love's influence, and in the other case the souls exist in concord. The disruption of the Sphere of Love by Strife may be compared to the fall of the souls that follow Strife. There is a verbal parallel in the two poems which sharpens the comparison: in fr. 30 Empedocles says that the time is set for the disruption of the Sphere by a "broad oath," and in fr. 115 he says that the oracle of Necessity that determines the fate of the souls that sin is sealed by "broad oaths." The period of transmigration, during which the daemons are tainted with Strife, may be compared to the half of the cosmic cycle in which Strife has influence on the elements. The period of increasing Love ending with the reconstitution of the Sphere may be compared with the process of purification ending with apotheosis. It is F. M. Cornford's opinion that Empedocles conceived of the cosmic cycle in terms of his religious beliefs.³¹ As part of his argument he mentions that a religious cycle similar to Empedocles' is in Pindar's second Olympian which was written for Theron of Akragas when Empedocles was a youth. Empedocles was no doubt aware of this Orphic doctrine when he wrote the Peri Physeos.

There is another important verbal parallel which suggests that Empedocles was thinking of the two poems in relation to each other.

Empedocles' description in fr. 134 of the holy mind is almost identical to his description in fr. 29 of the Sphere of Love (both fragments are quoted on p. 27). The Sphere, which Empedocles refers to as a god, is like a perfect, cosmic mind, since it is a smooth, even mixture of the elements. In view of this it is tempting to consider the Sphere and the holy mind as one and the same thing. The problem with this is that the perfect Sphere does not exist in the present world, yet in fr. 134 Empedocles speaks of the holy mind as something pervading the present world (see pp. 64-65 for a plausible solution of this problem). Even if the Sphere and the holy mind cannot be identified, the remarkable similarity of the two fragments still indicates that Empedocles was thinking of the doctrines of the two poems in relation to each other. He has compared the highest divinities of each of the two poems.

The similarities and verbal parallels discussed above clearly suggest that Empedocles considered his physical and religious systems to be structurally similar in a broad sense. The question now is whether or not the details of the two systems can be related. The Katharmoi is basically about the daemon, so the obvious question, then, is whether or not the daemon can be defined in terms of the physical principles. Is there a place in the Peri Physeos for a transmigrating daemon? Some scholars³² argue that there is no clear connection between the daemon and the material nature of consciousness described in the physical poem, and that the two poems are therefore incompatible. In the Peri Physeos Empedocles defines the

organs of cognition as being various types of compounds of the elements, and he describes the processes of cognition in terms of the mingling of the elements. Since the organs of cognition are compounds they are subject to dissolution through the action of Strife. It is clear, therefore, that the daemon cannot be identified with the blood or the sense-organs: the daemon is separable from the body, but the blood and sense-organs are not. On a superficial basis it appears that there is no way of importing the daemon into the Peri Physeos. There is, however, one fragment in the physical poem which could clearly refer to the doctrine of transmigration (fr. 15):

A man who is wise in such matters would never surmise in his heart that as long as mortals live what they call their life, so long they are, and suffer good and ill; while before they were formed and after they have been dissolved they are just nothing at all. (Trans. Burnet)

This appears to signify that a person's life is not confined to the duration of his bodily existence. It is a short step from this to the doctrine of transmigration. The above fragment also suggests that a person's self is something over and above his body. This self would naturally be the daemon. But how can this be? The four elements and Love and Strife are the only realities of the Peri Physeos. Is it possible to identify the daemon with one of these or a combination of them?

The Daemon as Love

It is the opinion of F. M. Cornford³³ and several other scholars³⁴ who have followed him that the daemon can be considered

as a portion of the cosmic force of Love. In its pure state it is regarded as being a portion of pure Love, and in its defiled state it is regarded as being polluted with a portion of Strife. The object of purification for the daemon is to expel the Strife from himself. There are a number of good reasons for accepting this interpretation.

By a process of elimination it can be determined that Love is the only plausible candidate for identification with the daemon. The daemon cannot be identified with any of the elements, since in fr. 115 Empedocles says that the exiled daemon transmigrates through the elements. Each of the elements, furthermore, rejects the tainted daemon. It would be equally absurd to identify the daemon with Strife, since it is through following Strife that the daemon falls: Strife is the enemy of the daemon. It would not be unreasonable, however, to identify the daemon with Love, since Love is the ruler of the stage of innocence. The daemon is perhaps kin to or a part of Love since he owes his allegiance to her. The analogy, indicated by the verbal parallel in frr. 30 and 115, between the disruption of the Sphere of Love by Strife and the fall of the souls that follow Strife adds plausibility to the identification of the daemon with Love. When Love loses her complete control over the elements she combines with Strife to form mortal compounds out of the elements, compounds which are inferior to the mixture of the Sphere. Similarly, it could be that when the daemon falls through following Strife he becomes contaminated with Strife and enters one of these inferior creatures (the relationship of the two cycles will

be discussed in the next two sections). In connection with fr. 115 O'Brien offers a very tidy argument for identifying the daemon with Love.³⁵ He says that since the primary characters of fr. 115 are the daemons, the four elements and Strife, and since all of these except for the daemons have equivalents in the physical poem, it is reasonable to assume that the daemons are identifiable with Love, the only other primary character of the physical poem.

A passage from Aristotle's De Anima (408a8) also serves as evidence for identifying the daemon with Love. After explaining what he considers to be the absurdity of some philosophers' identification of the soul with the ratio of mixture he says the following:

From Empedocles at any rate we might demand an answer to the following question -- for he says that each of the parts of the body is what it is in virtue of a ratio between the elements: is the soul identical with this ratio, or is it not rather something over and above this which is formed in the parts? Is love the cause of any and every mixture, or only of those that are in the right ratio? Is love this ratio itself, or is love something over and above this?

Aristotle asks identical questions concerning both the soul and Love. Are they identical with the ratio of mixture, or are they something over and above the ratio? This suggests that Aristotle may have been aware of some evidence to the effect that according to Empedocles both the soul and Love are the cause of the ratio of mixture in the body. The natural conclusion of this is that the soul and Love are one and the same thing.

It has been mentioned that soul-body interaction must be posited if the doctrine of purification is to make sense. A man's

soul must be somehow related to his body if its purity can be affected by his deeds. Furthermore, if the daemon can be held responsible for the evil deeds of the creatures he inhabits, and if he has the opportunity to advance himself through pure living, it follows that the daemon must have control over the moral acts of the creatures he inhabits. Love and Strife, since they are moral principles as well as physical principles, qualify admirably as ingredients of an impure daemon, a daemon capable of inciting the body to do either good or evil. Plutarch, in his De Tranquillitate Animi (474B-C), states that according to Empedocles two daemons -- one good and one evil -- take over a person at birth and guide him thereafter. He quotes fr. 122 to illustrate the two daemons: "There were the Earth-maiden and far-seeing Sun-maiden, bloody Discord and grave Harmonia, Beauty and Ugliness, Haste and Tarrying, lovely Truth and black-haired Obscurity" (trans. Guthrie). Elsewhere Plutarch says that Discord and Harmonia are the same as Love and Strife (De Is. et Os., 370D-E). O'Brien³⁶ suggests that the other pairs of contrasting divinities could be manifestations of Love and Strife, which seems to be reasonable. It appears that according to Plutarch Empedocles held that Love and Strife constituted man's moral character.

Empedocles' moral use of the term 'daemon' was not unique. Hesiod (The Works and Days, 121ff.) refers to the discarnate spirits of the extinct people of the golden age as daemons. He says that they are good and that "they watch over mortal men and defend them from evil" (trans. Lattimore). This passage is significant in view

of the fact that Empedocles seems to have modelled the stage of innocence of fr. 128 on Hesiod's golden age. The end of the golden age in Hesiod has been compared to the fall of the daemons in fr. 115. After the fall, i.e. after the stage of innocence, the daemons migrate into mortals. Hesiod's daemons likewise dwell among men after the golden age. According to Plutarch the daemons that take over a person at birth are forces of good and evil. The good daemons could be compared to Hesiod's guardian daemons. Empedocles seems, however, to have demythologized the concept somewhat: instead of considering the daemon as an external influence upon man he places the daemon within man. He regards the daemon to be the self of a man, a self which is responsible for its own actions. Actually, this revision of the concept, as O'Brien³⁷ notes, appears to have been previously accomplished by Heraclitus. Guthrie translates Heraclitus' fr. 119 as follows" "A man's individuality is his daimon."³⁸

The problem now is to determine how the daemon is related to the body and how it exercises moral control. In fr. 17 Empedocles says the following concerning Love: "she is recognized as inborn in mortal limbs; by her they think kind thoughts and do the works of concord." This of course squares with Plutarch's assertion that according to Empedocles the good and evil forces are with us from birth. If the daemon is Love then it probably permeates the whole body. Love is an organizational principle; it holds the body together. Strife too is important in determining the structure of the body. On this basis the impure daemon, as a portion of Love

argued in chapter two that as a man gains wisdom the ratio of Love to Strife in his blood increases. As he acquires truth the blend of his blood becomes more balanced. This must be accompanied by an increase of Love and a decrease of Strife (or perhaps just the latter): it is like the condition of the cosmos under increasing Love. The process of purification, moreover, has been compared to the period of increasing Love.

Purification, of course, occurs over a series of incarnations. The fact that Love and Strife are present in the blood as structural principles and as ingredients of consciousness yet are not elements of the blood-compound (see pp. 26-27) is important with respect to the doctrine of transmigration.³⁹ It effects a distinction between the body and the soul. It could be that when the body dies and its particles of the four elements begin to disperse the fluid mass of Love and Strife simply exits intact from the body and enters another creature, presumably one being born, as Plutarch indicates. The type of creature which the soul enters will depend on how purely it has lived. It will depend specifically on its ratio of Love to Strife. If this ratio has increased, if the soul has achieved a degree of purification, then the soul can inhabit a higher form of creature; but if it has decreased the soul will have to migrate into a lower form. This is similar to the zoogonical sequences: throughout the period of increasing Strife the forms of animals become less harmonious. The reason that the soul may move up the hierarchy of creatures when it increases its ratio of Love to Strife

contaminated with Strife, can be considered as the principle of life, which of course is the primary significance of 'soul' (psyche) in early Greek thought.

In the previous chapter it was suggested that the center of interaction between the soul and body could be the mind. In the above quotation Empedocles says that it is Love that causes men to have kind thoughts. It should be recalled from chapter one that Love and Strife are ingredients of consciousness. The quality of the mixture of blood and the level of thought depend on the proportions of Love and Strife. If the daemon were nearly pure there would be little Strife in the blood, in which case the mind would be very intelligent, and it would have kind thoughts. There are probably two reasons why it would have kind thoughts. First of all, the predominant portion of Love as an element of the organ of thought, would have knowledge of its like outside the mind. Secondly, the predominant portion of Love would blend the elements of the blood harmoniously: it would be a loving mixture so it would likely have kind thoughts as well as intelligent ones. Fragment 122 perhaps affords evidence that in the Katharmoi Empedocles believed that there was some connection between Love and intelligence or truth, for he lists Truth and Obscurity with Harmonia and Discord. It appears that the daemon controls a man's moral actions by shaping his thoughts.

This theory can be used to explain how a man's acquisition of knowledge contributes to the purification of his daemon. It was

is that it then has more capacity for harmonizing the elements. With an increased ratio of Love to Strife the daemon has more potential for forming a creature with high intelligence. Empedocles' hierarchy among creatures -- plants, animals, men -- can be considered as a hierarchy with respect to intelligence. The highest types of men -- prophets, poets, physicians and princes -- perhaps conform to this interpretation. Apart from princes these types of men can obviously be regarded as highly intelligent. Princes are probably included because they have honor and are leaders of men. In early Greek thought, including the fifth century B.C., men of high birth or social position with administrative skill were regarded as good men.⁴⁰ They would therefore tend to be regarded as intelligent.

In chapter two it was mentioned that a daemon is capable of accumulating the knowledge he acquires in his various incarnations (see fr. 129). The knowledge a person has depends on the quality of the mixture of his blood. It therefore appears that when a person dies he loses most of his knowledge. He would not lose all his consciousness and knowledge, however, since the Love and Strife which compose his daemon are ingredients of his consciousness. But the separated daemon would have knowledge only of Love and Strife. All knowledge of the world, all truths composed of the four elements, would be lost when the elements of the blood disperse. It seems possible, however, that this knowledge could be reconstituted in the next incarnation. Since Love and Strife are organizational principles it is possible that when they migrate into a new crea-

ture they would organize the elements of the blood in proportions similar to the proportions in the previous creature at the time of its death. The only difference would be that the knowledge would be contained in a new parcel of matter. A truth is a truth, however, irrespective of which particular pieces of matter compose it. The important thing is the ratio of mixture. The daemon is the true identity of a creature. It matters not which particular pieces of matter he uses to compose the body. The daemon himself contains the ratio of mixture; Love is harmony. The quantity of Strife present in the daemon is of course pertinent in relation to the exact ratio of mixture. The reconstitution of knowledge would be a gradual process, since it appears that the daemon takes over a creature at birth. As the creature grows, as the quantity of its elemental particles increases, its mental state develops too. A rather extravagant comparison with modern genetics may illuminate this point. The daemon may be compared with the DNA molecule, the genetic blueprint. When the egg and sperm combine through conception to form the first cell the first DNA molecule is formed. It is the blueprint of the fully developed person: it determines a person's features and to some extent his personality and intelligence. As the baby grows it develops in line with this blueprint. The daemon is like a genetic blueprint: it contains the ratio of mixture. The basic difference is that the organizational capacity of the daemon is variable. In Empedocles' system the individual has the freedom to improve his blueprint through pure living.

Cornford's Correlations of the Cycles

It is clear that Love is a very good candidate for identification with the daemon. The real test of this theory, however, consists in determining whether the daemon's cycle can be coherently related to the cosmic cycle. If the daemon consists of Love in its pure state and Love and Strife in its defiled state then it must somehow be involved in the cosmic cycle. There are a great many problems involved in relating the details of the two cycles. Most scholars who argue that the daemon can be considered as a portion of Love are hesitant, perhaps wisely so, to discuss a detailed correlation of the cycles. They do not go much beyond pointing out how the two cycles are analogous. Cornford, who pioneered the theory of the daemon as Love, is an exception. In two different works (see n. 33) he attempted two different correlations. Although the second correlation is an improvement over the first, there are, in my opinion, serious problems in both of them. It will be beneficial to analyze these problems prior to offering an alternative correlation.

In his first attempt Cornford correlated the soul-cycle with the period of the cosmic cycle ranging from total Love to total Strife.⁴¹ In this interpretation the primal harmony of the daemons is identical with the Sphere of Love. Cornford says that "the Sphere is the body of God, and Love is the soul which pervades it."⁴² He also asserts that the god or holy mind of the Katharmoi which pervades the present world is Love.⁴³ This draws a clear connection between the Sphere of Love and the holy mind (cf. frr. 29 and 134):

the soul of the Sphere is the god of fr. 134 (which solves the problem raised on p. 54 concerning the relationship of the Sphere and the holy mind). It appears that in Cornford's interpretation the totality of pure daemons compose the soul of the Sphere. The unity of God is the unity of the daemons. Cornford states that Empedocles' description in fr. 128 of an original, peaceful race of men ruled by Love is a mythical counterpart of the harmony of the Sphere, and he indicates that the fall of man through sin is the mythical counterpart of the disruption of the Sphere.⁴⁴ In his interpretation the fall of the daemons in fact occurs when Strife invades the Sphere:

When the Sphere is invaded by the inrushing streams of Neikos, all the elements combine to make mortal forms. The four bodily elements compose their bodies; the two soul-substances compose a fallen, impure soul, in which a portion of Love, now scattered like a fluid broken into drops, is mixed with a portion of Strife. The principle of division has broken up the one all-pervading God, or Soul, of the Sphere into a plurality of daemons, each composed of Love and Strife, of good and evil.⁴⁵

The daemons transmigrate through mortal forms until they can be reunited in the soul of God. This, according to Cornford, will occur when Strife gains full control of the elements, when Love becomes separated from both the elements and Strife.⁴⁶

There are basically two things wrong with this correlation of the cycles. First of all, there is no fall of individual souls: it appears instead that the fall is the fall of God, the disruption of the Sphere. It seems clear that Empedocles is serious in the Katharmoi in talking about original sin. Cornford's theory cannot

account for original sin: the Sphere disrupts not because of sin but because it must yield to Strife at a certain time set by an oath (fr. 30). The individuals created as a result of this disruption have not committed any crime, nor have they inherited any guilt from God since God had not committed any crime. They have, in Cornford's interpretation, become contaminated with Strife; but there is no religious reason for this: it is merely a consequence of the physical operations of the cosmos. There seems to be no way of introducing into this interpretation the soul's primal sin of falsely putting its trust in Strife. If Empedocles' religious logic is to be preserved in the correlation then a way must be found of relating the daemon's taint of Strife to guilt.

The other thing wrong with Cornford's interpretation concerns the range of the cosmic cycle to which he relates the soul-cycle. Why does apotheosis correspond with the conquest of Strife? If O'Brien's claim that total Strife is only momentary is not taken into account then Cornford's theory is reasonable from a physical point of view, since at the time of total Strife Love is separated from the elements and Strife. It makes sense to suppose that Love has become purified of Strife at this time. But from a religious and psychological perspective it is an awkward theory. The reason Love is isolated is that it has lost control over the elements. Love has yielded completely to Strife. It is obvious from the Peri Physeos that the happiest state of the cosmos is when Love has complete control over the elements, when she has them fused together

in the form of a sphere. The soul of God must be happiest during the time of the Sphere. It is likely the unhappiest when it has been totally deprived of its function of binding together the elements. Since in Cornford's interpretation the daemons are portions of God it appears very unlikely that their apotheosis could correspond with the conquest of Strife.

There appear to be two reasons why Cornford terminated the soul-cycle at total Strife. It is generally held among Empedoclean scholars that according to Empedocles incarnation is as such punishment for the daemon. If the daemons are portions of Love it follows that the only time all the daemons can be liberated from the bodily elements is during total Strife. The only fragment which can be used to support the interpretation that incarnation as such is punishment for the daemon is fr. 126: "(A female divinity) clothing (the soul) in the unfamiliar tunic of flesh" (trans. Freeman). This indicates that the animals through which the daemon transmigrates are unfamiliar to it, but it does not exclude the possibility that the daemon could be incarnated in some form prior to its fall and after its apotheosis. In Cornford's interpretation the daemon is originally incarnate in the Sphere, which is reasonable apart from the problem concerning individuality. It is reasonable in the sense that the mixture in the Sphere is pure and balanced. God has a perfect body during its time of peace and harmony, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that the daemon would be incarnated in a perfect body during his stages of bliss. If the daemon is identified with Love it is illogical to hold that the pure daemon

must be discarnate: the function of Love is to harmonize the elements.

Fragment 115 may be helpful in determining the nature of the daemon's punishment and his relationship with the elements. Empedocles depicts the daemon's transmigration through the elements as punishment, but he does not indicate that the daemon would like to be separated from the elements. He says that the elements in turn reject the daemon. This seems to be the punishment. But the reason the elements reject the daemon is that he is tainted with Strife. It could be that the daemon wants to be among the elements but has a difficult time staying among them because of Strife's influence. During the stage of increasing Strife the elements gradually separate from each other and from Love. Strife has a tendency to divide them into four concentric spheres. If the daemon as Love is involved in this process he will be separated from the elements. He will be rejected by each of them as they go their own ways to form the four concentric spheres. The elements are not responsible for the soul's troubled time in the world: Strife is responsible. Strife is the cause of a corrupt world: "a joyless place, where Bloodshed and Wrath, and tribes of Fates too, withering Plagues and corruptions and Deluges roam in the darkness over the field of Doom" (fr. 121, trans. Raven).

There could be another reason why Cornford terminated the soul-cycle at total Strife: the fact that Empedocles believed that the present world was in the period of increasing Strife (see Arist.,

Gen. et corr., 334a5 and De caelo, 301a14). All creatures of the present world will perish when Strife triumphs. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose that the daemons will be liberated from the wheel of transmigration at that time. The credibility of Cornford's correlation is augmented when Empedocles' claim that he is on the verge of apotheosis is taken into account. There is the world of increasing Love between the present time and the reconstitution of the Sphere. It has been more or less hinted that on Cornford's basis apotheosis should correspond with the reconstitution of the Sphere. That would make the primal stage of innocence and the stage of innocence regained identical. It would do away with the strange association of apotheosis with the conquest of Strife. But if this were the case then how could Empedocles' purification in the world of increasing Strife be explained? The explanation in the previous chapter (pp. 50-51) of Empedocles' early release could be relevant here. This problem will be discussed more in the next section. Most of the evidence points toward the implausibility of correlating the stage of innocence regained with total Strife.

In his 1926 article Cornford made one important change: he correlated the soul-cycle with the complete cosmic cycle.⁴⁷ This corrects the second problem of his first correlation. He speaks of the two cycles as being parallel with each other. He evidently does not mean that the two cycles are distinct. He means that Empedocles' description of a religious cycle and his description of a cosmic cycle are merely alternative descriptions of one and the same thing.

He declares that the Sphere is "the physical counterpart of the moral condition" of the souls' stage of innocence.⁴⁸ He compares the fall of the daemons with the incursion of Strife into the Sphere, and the process of purification with the stage of increasing Love. Concerning the last stage he says that the soul loses its separate identity when it merges with the other portions of Love in the Sphere, and that "this is the physical transcription of the spiritual reunion of the soul with God."⁴⁹ The problem of the individual daemon, then, is in Cornford's second correlation too.

An Alternative Correlation of the Cycles

C. H. Kahn, who expounds excellent arguments to the effect that Empedocles' physics and religion are fundamentally compatible, says that the two poems "belong together in a loose unity, and any attempt to impose a systematic pattern upon them is bound to resort to artifice."⁵⁰ This is not an unreasonable statement, in view of the problems that have been raised in the above section. I do not believe, however, that it does justice to Empedocles. The Peri Physeos itself provides excellent evidence that Empedocles possessed a remarkable capacity for synthesizing diverse strains of thought. By developing the concept of elements and the idea of motive forces he was able to combine Parmenidean logic with aspects of Milesian philosophy, a type of philosophy which appeared absurd under the light of Parmenides' arguments. He also coherently introduced the Pythagorean concept of ratio or harmony into his scheme. If Empedocles held, as Kahn thinks, that the daemon was a portion of Love,

then he surely would have given careful consideration to the relationship of the daemon to the cosmic cycle. He would not have been content with a loose unity. It is of course questionable, perhaps doubtful, whether a thoroughly tight unity is possible. Empedocles may have come up against some rather vexing problems in terms of freedom and necessity, but it goes without saying that this problem has always been one of the most difficult in philosophy.

In Kahn's opinion the main barrier to systematically relating the two cycles is the problem of individuals.⁵¹ He rejects Cornford's theory that the daemons in their pure state have no individuality, that they are fused together in the unity of God. It also seems that he assumes that the only way of attempting a systematic correlation is to correlate the soul-cycle with the complete cosmic cycle, as Cornford does in his second attempt. On the basis of this assumption it indeed appears to be impossible to account for pure, individual daemons. But is this assumption necessary?

W. K. C. Guthrie offers an interesting suggestion concerning the time of the golden age. He says that "since throughout our present era Love has been losing and Strife gaining in power, it is obvious that when men were first formed Love was a stronger force. This may be called the reign of Love in the human sphere."⁵² After the incursion of Strife into the Sphere the existence of individuals is possible. Love is a greatly predominant force for quite a long time after this incursion of Strife. It is possible that there could be pure individuals during this time. A similar period would

occur before the reconstitution of the Sphere. It is possible that these two periods could represent the primal stage of innocence and the stage of innocence regained.

In Guthrie's interpretation the golden age is literally an era of innocent human beings, an era after the fall of the daemons. This presents a problem, as he himself realizes:

In strict logic one might for instance ask: if incarnation is for the daimones a punishment for perjury and bloodshed, and if the souls of men are incarnate daimones, how is it that there was a period of human life when men were sinless and had not yet killed? I do not think this question would occur to Empedocles, nor is the origin of moral evil ever capable of rational explanation by one who holds that man is made in the image of God, be he Empedocles, Plato or the author of the Book of Genesis. There are truths of religion for which myth is the only possible form of expression.⁵³

What Guthrie says about the irrational nature of religious accounts of the origin of evil may be true, but it does not adequately answer the question he asks. In my opinion Empedocles was not incapable of realizing that it is contradictory to assert that the soul sins before it has sinned. It is better not to regard Empedocles' golden age on a literal level. It is better to regard the golden people as symbolic of the daemons in their pure state, as I have argued in the previous chapter.

Before going on to consider exactly what state the golden age could symbolize, it is necessary to investigate the problem of immortality. Kahn says

if immortality in Empedocles' view cannot be defined as the personal survival of a particular human being, still less can it be identified with the escape from individuality as such. . . . The terms he uses suggest the continued, harmonious coexistence of discrete individuals.⁵⁴

If there can be discrete individuals only during the plurality-and-motion half of the cosmic cycle, and if the soul-cycle is to be related to that period, then it is clear that the daemons cannot be immortal in the sense of having continual life as discrete individuals. They may be immortal in the sense that Love is uncreated and imperishable, and they may be immortal as individuals in the sense that the cosmic cycle is repeated endlessly (fr. 17) and there are individuals in the second half of each occurrence of the cycle, but there are no discrete individuals during the periods when Love rules totally. The question now is whether Empedocles in fact uses terms which "suggest the continued . . .coexistence of discrete individuals."

Empedocles makes two sorts of statements about the life of the daemons. In fr. 112 he refers to himself as an immortal god, and similarly in frr. 146-147 he indicates that when the daemons complete their purification they rise up as gods to join the other immortals. In fr. 115, however, he describes the daemons as long-lived (makraiōn). In fr. 21 of the Peri Physeos he depicts the gods as being long-lived (dolichaiōn). It is clear that in frr. 21 and 23 Empedocles means that although the gods are long-lived they are mortal, since he says that they are composed of the elements: all compounds are subject to dissolution through Strife's influence. Does this verbal similarity suggest that the daemons are mortal? In frr. 21 and 23 the gods are also described as being highest in honor (timēisi pheristoi). The same phrase is used to describe the

gods in frr. 146-147, one of the passages in which the gods are referred to as immortal. It appears, then, that in different places Empedocles describes the gods and daemons as being immortal and mortal. It is of course possible that some of the occurrences of the above Greek words could be explained along stylistic lines — in terms of meter and sound.

The apparent inconsistency above can perhaps be explained as follows: the daemons as portions of Love are immortal in so far as Love is indestructible, but they are mortal in the sense that they lose their separate identities when they merge together in the Sphere (an explanation of the other gods or other immortals will be offered below, p. 78). They could, however, be long-lived individuals: they could maintain their identities for most of the second half of the cosmic cycle. During the momentary period of total Strife they would lose their separate existences.

The following very similar excerpts of frr. 17 and 26 illustrate an important point Empedocles makes about mortality and immortality:

(Fr. 17) <So, in so far as they have learnt to grow into one from many,> and again, when the one is sundered, are once more many, thus far they come into being and they have no lasting life; but in so far as they never cease from continual interchange of places, thus far are they ever changeless in the cycle. (Trans. Raven)

(Fr. 26) Thus in so far as they are wont to grow into one out of many, and again divided become more than one, so far they come into being and their life is not lasting; but in so far as they never cease changing continually, so far are they evermore, immovable in the cycle. (Burnet)

Both mortality and everlasting life are predicated of the elements in these passages. It seems that they are mortal in so far as they do not have permanent or stable places in the cosmos. But since the cycle is endless they occur both as one and as many countless times: "they are ever changeless in the cycle." It is clear that Empedocles felt that a distinction concerning one and the same thing could be drawn between mortality and immortality in terms of the cycle. It appears probable that the daemons, too, undergo an endless, cyclical succession of being one and being many: they are one during total Love and the momentary period of total Strife at the opposite pole, and they are many during increasing Strife and increasing Love. They are substantially immortal since Love is immortal. As individuals they are long-lived though mortal in so far as the state of individuals is not stable, but they are immortal in so far as they are "immovable in the cycle."

It has been suggested above that the primal stage of innocence and the stage of innocence regained could be placed respectively in the period immediately following the disruption of the Sphere and the period immediately preceding its reconstitution. These are the most harmonious periods during the half of the cycle in which the existence of individuals is possible. It has also been determined that it is highly improbable that the daemons in their pure state are discarnate. Is it possible, then, that the pure daemons are incarnated in sinless human beings, which could be suggested by the golden age? This would not create a compatible

junction of the two poems. From the Peri Physeos it follows that human beings have a fair portion of Strife in them: this is indicated by the fact that humans have limbs and various other distinct and differing parts. There is also fr. 126 which states that the tunic of flesh is alien to the daemon. It should be recalled that the most harmonious creature of the zoogonical sequences is the whole-natured creature. It is the type of compound which a portion of pure Love would form if it were given charge over a parcel of the elements: a compound without perceptibly distinct parts. It is the desire of Love to gather everything into one. There is probably no Strife in the whole-natured creature. It has been argued that it is quite possibly like a microcosm of the Sphere. It is therefore possibly like God in his happiest condition. Since it has no bodily parts it is not what would normally be called an animal. Since it likely consists of equal portions of the elements it is more like a pure mind than an animal. It is like the Sphere or holy mind. It probably has on a microcosmic level the same knowledge that the Sphere has; it probably knows the truth of the cosmos, since the truth of the cosmos is an evenly blended mixture of the elements. It is the type of creature into which a daemon would migrate after purification, after it had gained divine knowledge. It is also very significant that the whole-natured creature is the first in the sequence of Strife's zoogony and the last in Love's zoogony. This means that it exists soon after the disruption of the Sphere and in the period just prior to its reconstitution. All the evi-

dence points toward the identification of the daemons in their pure state with the portions of Love that inhabit the whole-natured creatures.

This question, however, may be asked: why is there no record of this unique doctrine? In my opinion it is highly unlikely that Empedocles would have mentioned the whole-natured creatures in the Katharmoi. The Katharmoi is a religious poem, and there is a great deal of mythical description in it. The whole-natured creatures, as they are described in the physical poem, would be out of place in it. Hesiod's golden race, however, is poetically appropriate. The people to whom the Katharmoi was addressed might have been familiar with Hesiod's legend of the golden age, whereas they would not likely have been familiar with the whole-natured creatures of the Peri Physeos. It has been shown above on more than one occasion that there is a problem in determining the exact role of the golden race in the Katharmoi. On the basis of the Katharmoi alone it appears that the golden people are representative in some way of the pure daemons. Cornford, in relating the two poems, considered the golden age to be a mythical counterpart of the Sphere, of God. This interpretation is reasonable on a literary level, and Empedocles no doubt conceived of the golden age as being analogous to the state of the Sphere. But in so far as Cornford's interpretation suppresses the individual pure daemon it is not acceptable. Guthrie, in considering the two poems in relation to each other, regarded the golden age in a literal level -- an age of pure men after the fall.

This preserves the individual, but it results in a drastic inconsistency, as has been shown. It appears that what is required is an interpretation that falls between those of Cornford and Guthrie. The whole-natured creature is the link between the Sphere or God and man. The peaceful golden people probably symbolize the harmonious whole-natured creatures.* In line with this interpretation it would not be unreasonable to regard the gods (i.e. other than the daemons) of fr. 115 and the "other immortals" of frr. 146-147 as poetic window dressing. On the basis of the physical principles it does not seem that there could be any divinities between the whole-natured creatures and God. The only possibility is that the gods themselves could be whole-natured creatures -- bigger than the ones which yield men and women after the fall. There does not, however, appear to be any reason for positing such gods.

It is perhaps misleading to say that there is no record or testimony of the doctrine in question here. Aristophanes' speech in Plato's Symposium, in so far as it is based on Empedocles' whole-natured creatures, is perhaps a fair record of Empedocles' doctrine. Plato, who presumably had access to Empedocles' complete poems,

*A speculation of Guthrie adds some measure of probability to this. He says "it may well be that some of those whom the poet [Hesiod] has in mind, some of these perfect men who lived so long ago, many generations before the heroic age of Homer, are in origin not heroes at all, but underworld spirits, daemons of fertility. Their character as wealth-givers . . . suggests the possibility." (The Greeks and Their Gods, p. 299.) Empedocles' whole-natured creatures "sprang up from the earth" (fr. 62). The fact that the whole-natured creatures are womb-like, that they yield men and women when they divide, suggests that there could be some connection between them and Hesiod's golden age fertility daemons.

seems to have thought that there was religious significance, albeit comical, to the whole-natured creatures. Aristophanes, in a discussion about love, says that the happy, spherical, double-sexed creatures are divided into men and women after they sin against the gods, and are threatened with further separation if they do not become respectful of the gods. They are also promised reunification if they learn to live piously. The cycle inherent in this resembles what I consider to be Empedocles' soul-cycle.

If the daemons in their pure state can be identified with the portions of Love that inhabit the whole-natured creatures then it is possible to relate in some detail the soul-cycle to the cosmic cycle, though it must necessarily be very speculative, and there are problems involved. The interpretation here is that the two cycles are structurally similar, but that the complete soul-cycle falls within the plurality-and-motion half of the cosmic cycle, the fall and rise of the daemon in the ladder of being corresponding roughly with Strife's zoogony and Love's zoogony respectively.

It has been shown that Empedocles compared the disruption of the Sphere and the fall of the daemons (see p. 53). The comparison may now be sharpened. During total Love the limbs (or elements) of the Sphere are indistinguishable (fr. 27). There is no Strife in his limbs (fr. 27a). When Strife penetrates the Sphere, however, all the limbs of the god begin in turn to quake (fr. 31). The Sphere begins to be divided, to show its limbs. The same thing happens to the spherical, whole-natured creatures. As the power of

Strife increases in the world it becomes increasingly difficult for the daemons in the whole-natured creatures to resist the influence of Strife. The fall of a daemon occurs when the spherical mind-body, which is structured and governed by the daemon, puts its trust in Strife. It then divides into a man and a woman; it shows its limbs. This would not necessarily happen at exactly the same time to all the daemons. The time for each daemon would depend on its fortitude. It could be that some of the weaker whole-natured creatures are divided into male and female animals of various types.

A peculiar question arises at this point: does a whole-natured creature contain one or two daemons? I cannot conceive of a thoroughly adequate explanation of this problem. It could be a problem which simply did not occur to Empedocles. Or perhaps there is nothing wrong with the idea of one daemon becoming two daemons. This would be analogous to the soul of God dividing into a plurality of portions of Love (it will be argued below that not all these portions are daemons). Fragment 66, which is placed among the fragments concerning the womb, could possibly be relevant here, since Empedocles regarded the womb and the whole-natured creature as analogous: "The divided meadows of Aphrodite" (trans. Burnet). It could be that as the whole-natured creature divides two souls or two portions of Aphrodite enter the wheel of transmigration. So long as it is possible in Strife's zoogony for these souls to enter complete animals they will not further divide. With regard to individuality, however, this explanation appears to be defective in the

same sense as Cornford's correlation. The individual appears to be suppressed whether he is mingled with one other in a small sphere or whether he is mingled with the totality of daemons in the cosmic sphere. There is, however, a basic difference: there is only one cosmic sphere but there are a plurality of discrete whole-natured creatures. As I have indicated, it may be best to regard the Love within a whole-natured creature as one soul. When it sins it is divided in two; this is its original punishment, as in Aristophanes' speech. Now, whether the two portions of Love are to be considered as whole souls or half souls is a matter of interpretation. Is a human being half-natured or whole-natured? A man is half-natured relative to a whole-natured creature; but, so it seems to me, he himself is a complete personality or individual. He physically inherits his guilt or portion of Strife from his whole-natured parent.

The division of a whole-natured creature into a man and a woman may be considered as a birth (cf. fr. 62, 65 and 67). In fr. 124 Empedocles says: "O alack, O wretched race of mortals, O sore unblest; out of such contentions and groanings were ye born" (trans. Guthrie). This clearly seems to refer to the fall. It may be that the birth mentioned here is not figurative. The "contentions" or strifes cause the birth of mortals: Strife causes each of the whole-natured creatures to divide. Fragment 118 may also possibly be relevant in relation to the fall as a birth: "I wept and wailed when I saw the unfamiliar place" (trans. Raven). An infant cries after it is born. The child in the womb is a perfect symbol of the state

of innocence and security. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Empedocles could have thought of the daemon's primal state of innocence as being like a child in the womb, since he considered the whole-natured creature as being like a womb. The whole-natured creatures themselves are born in the womb of the earth. They are brought to the surface by rising fire, at a time prior to the formation of the sun. They likely remain in their harmonious condition for quite some time, probably the length of time it takes for the basic features of the present world to be defined, a world capable of supporting animal life. The whole-natured creatures, as their name suggests, are complete in themselves. They do not have to eke out a living, nor could they. They are like Hesiod's golden people, who did not have to work to procure food. They are also like a child in the womb in this respect. Their condition is also like that of the Sphere: "he stays fast in the close covering of Harmony, a rounded sphere rejoicing in his circular solitude" (frr. 27-28, trans. Raven). The whole-natured creature most likely experiences this joy too. But by the time a man and a woman emerge from the whole-natured creature Strife has gained considerable influence in the world. It is no wonder Empedocles wept and wailed when he saw the unfamiliar place.

After the fall the daemon is contaminated with a portion of Strife. During the stage of increasing Strife Love withdraws gradually toward the center of the cosmos, with Strife in pursuit of it. The overall surface of contact between these two forces can be con-

sidered as a creative front, for as these two forces move through the elements they create mortal forms. The daemon can be regarded as a part of this creative front. The daemon, as a fluid mass of Love and Strife, flows through mortal bodies as the creative front flows through the elements. There is a verbal parallel in the two poems which lends some support to this interpretation. In the opinion of W. K. C. Guthrie line eight of fr. 115 echoes line fifteen of fr. 35.⁵⁵ The contexts in which these lines occur are somewhat similar except for the fact that fr. 115 is about the period of increasing Strife and fr. 35 is about increasing Love. The two lines occur in the following two excerpts:

thrice ten thousand seasons does he wander far from the blessed, being born throughout that time in the forms of all manner of mortal things and changing one baleful path of life for another. The might of air pursues him into the sea, the sea spews him forth on to the dry land, the earth casts him into the rays of the burning sun, and the sun into the eddies of air. (Fr. 115, trans. Raven)

But as much as it [Strife] continued to run forth, so there ever pursued it a gentle immortal stream of blameless Love. Then quickly those things grew mortal that before knew immortality, and those that were unmixed became mixed as they changed their ways [paths]. (Fr. 35, trans. Guthrie)

The second passage is about what happens as Love and Strife flow through the elements; the first passage is about the daemon (a mass of Love and Strife) moving through the elements. The daemon changes its path as it transmigrates through bodies; the elements, according to the second passage, change their paths as they combine to form mortal creatures when Love and Strife flow through them. Although the verbal parallel concerns two different subjects, namely

the daemon and the elements, the general similarity of the passages seems significant. It creates an association between the transmigration of the daemon through bodies and the flow of the cosmic forces through the elements.

It appears that the fate of the daemon is determined by the movements of the cosmic forces. During the period of increasing Strife the quality or harmony of animal life becomes increasingly less. During any given time of this period, however, there are undoubtedly gradations among creatures. In the present world there are plants, animals and men. Even though the overall power of Strife is increasing it can still be the case that an individual daemon may move up or down the scale of creatures depending on how purely he lives. The daemon can still expel some of the Strife from himself despite the fact that Strife is heading toward a cosmic victory. This is perhaps compatible with the description in fr. 35 of how the creative front moves through the cosmos. The flow of the forces is not perfectly even. The contraction of Strife upon Love during increasing Strife is not completely smooth; the power or quantity of Strife could vary somewhat throughout the creative front. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the daemon's overall course during the period of increasing Strife would be down the scale of being.

The question now arises: what happens to the daemon when Strife approaches total control, when limbs wander separately? It could be that the daemons divide as limbs separate from bodies

to yield completely to Strife. The daemons are likely separated from the elements for only a very brief time. We must simply assume that personal identities are not permanently destroyed during the transitional moment of total Strife.

Fragment 59 of the Peri Physeos is relevant in relation to the state of the daemons in the first part of increasing Love:

But, as divinity [daemon] was mingled still further with divinity [daemon] these things joined together as each might chance, and many other things besides them continually arose. (Trans. Burnet)

O'Brien⁵⁷ argues that the daemons in this fragment are portions of Love, and that the things being joined together are limbs (see Simplicius, De caelo, 587, 18-19). This means that portions of Love, perhaps portions of daemons, combine as limbs are joined together to form creatures. The first creatures are apparently the monsters, the ox-men and so on. This could plausibly afford evidence that the portions of Love which inhabit the separate limbs are portions of complete daemons. The daemon, it has been argued, is the structural principle or ratio of the body; it has been compared to a genetic blueprint. An Empedoclean monster, since it is formed out of an unnatural combination of limbs, does not seem to have a single or coherent identity. There are perhaps different blueprints in its various limbs. It has portions of different soul-identities in its body. Perhaps it is only when Love's power increases somewhat that the individual identities in the world can be properly constituted.

The remaining part of the soul's journey should be evident. During the remaining part of Love's zoogony the soul may go up and

(see p. 86 for some evidence of this). The pattern of division of the daemon during increasing Strife could be the same as the pattern of division set out by Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium. First of all the daemon of the whole-natured creature divides; later on the daemons divide when bodies are divided. One more question: what happens to the portions of Love when Strife gains complete control? It must be that they are all gathered together in the core of the cosmos. This, however, is only a momentary state. Though on the other hand it is clear that pieces of Love have been accumulating in the core of the cosmos for some time. It is unlikely, however, that the totality of daemons represents the totality of Love. Empedocles indicates in fr. 117 that a daemon can sink so low as to inhabit a bush; but there is nothing to suggest that he could be incarnated in a rock, for instance, or any other inorganic compound. Nevertheless it is clear that there must be some Love present as the cement of harmonia in inorganic compounds. It could be that organic compounds are the last to be dissolved under increasing Strife and the first to be formed under increasing Love. O'Brien says that living creatures, separate animal parts specifically, are the first things to be formed during increasing Love.⁵⁶ Simplicius writes the following (Phys., 371, 33): "Empedocles says that during the rule of Love first of all there came into being at random parts of animals such as heads, hands and feet, . . ." (trans. Guthrie). By reason of symmetry it is probable that under increasing Strife the portions of Love that inhabit separate animal parts are the last

down the scale of creatures somewhat depending on how purely it lives, but its overall journey will be upward. In the end it will migrate into a whole-natured creature. After that it will be re-absorbed into the Sphere.

There is yet one problem that remains to be discussed. It has been determined that Empedocles most likely believed that he was on the threshold of apotheosis. This presents a problem since the present world is in the stage of increasing Strife. Empedocles' early purification is a problem in the Katharmoi itself, since the period of exile is set at thirty thousand seasons. Two complementary suggestions of O'Brien were set forth in the previous chapter as possible solutions to the problem. He says that the few daemons that achieve early purification may be released from the cycle of incarnation at that time; and he adds that it could be that these few chosen daemons may not return to full blessedness until the reconstitution of the golden age, but that they may go someplace during the waiting interval where they will not be affected by the changes in the world. He suggests that this special place could be a cosmic pool of Love.⁵⁸ The logical place for this pool would be in the center of the world where Love accumulates during increasing Strife. The problem with this theory is that the daemon's individuality would be lost during the waiting interval. It is clear, however, that the area around the center of the cosmos is the last place over which Strife gains complete control during its period of increase, and it is the first place in which the elements begin to come together during increasing Love. A portion of Love could possibly remain among a reasonably harmonious conglomerate of ele-

ments near the center of the cosmos for most of the plurality-and-motion half of the cycle. It would of course be absorbed into the pool in the center during the moment of total Strife. It appears possible that Empedocles believed that at his death his pure soul would travel down through the earth to a place near the core of Love where it could have a relatively peaceful life among the elements while waiting for Love to reconstitute a harmonious world. Perhaps it is possible that during some of the waiting interval his soul could inhabit a whole-natured creature near the core of Love. In that case the journey of the soul down into the earth would be somewhat the reverse of the whole-natured creatures being born in the earth and then rising to the surface. The return of the soul would be like a return to the womb of the earth.

Now, is it possible to interpret this speculative solution strictly on a physical basis? It is of course natural for Love to head toward the center of the cosmos during increasing Strife: it is the only place to which it can retreat. Is it reasonable, however, to associate the daemon's release from the cycle of incarnation with a retreat? It has been stated that the soul cannot regain full blessedness until the reconstitution of the golden age. It therefore does not seem unreasonable to consider the release of a few special daemons as a retreat. When the daemon is contaminated with Strife it is situated in the creative front where Love and Strife are mingled. Perhaps a particular portion of Love cannot retreat of its own will to the elements around the core of Love unless it expels the Strife from itself. It would be a godsend to

a daemon if he could withdraw from the front of advancing Strife.

It has been suggested that some of the problems in correlating the cycles are due to a freedom-necessity conflict in Empedocles' system. Empedocles was clearly aware of the element of necessity, for in fr. 115 he says that an "oracle of Necessity" determines the fate of the souls that follow Strife: they must spend thirty thousand seasons in the wheel of transmigration. He also says that this oracle is sealed by "broad oaths," a phrase he uses in fr. 30, which is about the disruption of the Sphere: "But when Strife waxed great in the limbs, and sprang to his prerogatives as the time was fulfilled which is fixed for them in turn by a broad oath" (trans. Raven). The conjunction of the two fragments suggests that the Necessity of fr. 115 pertains to the cosmic pattern: it is necessary for the soul to fall, just as it is necessary for the Sphere of Love to yield to Strife. The thirty thousand seasons probably represents the time in the cosmic cycle during which Strife is so strong it is impossible (or nearly impossible) for the daemons to have peaceful lives. Despite the cosmic force of necessity Empedocles believed that the individual is responsible for his own actions and is free to some extent to determine his own fate. Hence a paradox arises in connection with the fall: although it is necessary for the daemons to fall it is nevertheless their own fault when they fall. It may seem that freedom is not possible in Empedocles' system: since the daemon is a portion of the cosmic force of Love, and since Love and Strife are bound by an oath to rule the cosmos in turn, it ap-

pears to follow that the soul is chained to the cosmic pattern. It must not be forgotten, however, that Love and Strife are beings with personalities. It seems that Empedocles regarded the daemon as an individualized, personal portion of Love, a being with its own mind, as it were. The daemon is capable of fighting against Strife. Empedocles even believed that a daemon could achieve purification during increasing Strife. The cosmic pattern, however, imposes limits on the individual: in fact there can be no individual souls during total Love and the moment of total Strife. But the individual soul can determine its own fate to a large extent during the plurality-and-motion half of the cycle.

NOTES

¹"Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul," AGP, XLII (1960), 3-35.

²All quotations herein of Aristotle will be from the Oxford translation of Aristotle's complete works, and all quotations from Theophrastus' De sensibus will be from G. M. Stratton's translation.

³From Religion to Philosophy, pp. 230-231.

⁴Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle, p. 313.

⁵Rel. to Phil., p. 234

⁶"Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or Materialism?" CQ, LX (1966), 268ff.

⁷p. 268.

⁸p. 271.

⁹In G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 358.

¹⁰pp. 98-99 and 169ff.

¹¹See O'Brien, pp. 46-54.

¹²pp. 59-69.

¹³See O'Brien, pp. 106-120.

¹⁴pp. 129-144.

¹⁵pp. 129, n. 2.

¹⁶p. 129.

¹⁷See O'Brien, pp. 81-82.

¹⁸See O'Brien, pp. 82-85.

¹⁹See O'Brien's explanation, pp. 76-80.

²⁰See Guthrie's explanation of his translation in Hist. of Gr. Phil., II, 183-185; and see O'Brien, pp. 206-220.

- ²¹See O'Brien, p. 129
- ²²See O'Brien, pp. 146-155.
- ²³Pp. 199-230.
- ²⁴See Arist., De gen. anim., 746a1-b3 and 765a8.
- ²⁵Simplicius, Phys., 381, 29-30 and 382, 17-20.
- ²⁶O'Brien, pp. 231-234.
- ²⁷P. 227.
- ²⁸See O'Brien's discussion of Simplicius' statement, pp. 211-216.
- ²⁹Hist. of Gr. Phil., II, 256.
- ³⁰P. 90.
- ³¹"Mystery Religions and Pre-Socratic Philosophy," The Cambridge Ancient History, IV (1926), 566.
- ³²See for instance G. Vlastos in "Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought," PQ, II (1952), 119-121; and A. A. Long in "Thinking and Sense-Perception . . .," pp. 257-259 and 273-276.
- ³³From Rel. to Phil., 1912, pp. 236-240; and "Mystery Religions . . .," 1926, pp. 568-569.
- ³⁴H. S. Long, "The Unity of Empedocles' Thought," AJP, LXX (1949), 156-158; J. E. Raven in The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 355-361; C. H. Kahn, "Religion and Natural Philosophy . . .," pp. 19ff.; D. O'Brien, Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle, pp. 325-336.
- ³⁵P. 330.
- ³⁶P. 333.
- ³⁷P. 332.
- ³⁸See Guthrie's remarks on this fragment in Hist. of Gr. Phil., I, 482.
- ³⁹See Raven in The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 358-359.
- ⁴⁰See A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, pp. 32-37 and 75-79.

- ⁴¹From Rel. to Phil., pp. 233-240.
- ⁴²p. 234.
- ⁴³p. 235.
- ⁴⁴pp. 235-238.
- ⁴⁵pp. 238-239.
- ⁴⁶p. 239.
- ⁴⁷"Mystery Religions . . .," pp. 566-569.
- ⁴⁸p. 566.
- ⁴⁹p. 569.
- ⁵⁰"Religion and Natural Philosophy . . .," p. 25.
- ⁵¹pp. 25-26.
- ⁵²Hist. of Gr. Phil., II, 248.
- ⁵³Hist. of Gr. Phil., II, 257, n. 2.
- ⁵⁴p. 25.
- ⁵⁵Hist. of Gr. Phil., II, 251, n. 4.
- ⁵⁶pp. 119 and 201.
- ⁵⁷pp. 234-235 and 325-336.
- ⁵⁸p. 97.

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