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Empathy and Word Order in Russian

by

Christine Mitchell



**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts**

in

Russian Linguistics

Department of Slavic and East European Studies

Edmonton, Alberta

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Yokoyama (1986) suggests that in Russian, the ordering of elements in an utterance, reflects the transfer of non-propositional information, namely the speaker's subjective assessment of what is of 'current concern' to the hearer. It is further suggested that a speaker's personal Empathy (degree of personal concern or identification toward a discourse referent) will result in an imposition of constituents denoting High Empathy referents into utterance-initial position, regardless of grammatical case. This position is normally 'reserved' for elements of current concern to both interlocutors. Diminutives and the interpersonal distance between interlocutors were identified as two features that generate or inhibit a display of Empathy on the part of speakers. In appropriate contextual circumstances, Empathy factors are claimed to be stronger than grammatical relations in determining word order.

An experiment was devised in order to test this claim. Contexts were created in which high-degree diminutives and close interpersonal relationships between interlocutors were featured, in order to operationalize speaker Empathy towards discourse referents in Object/Patient position. Informants selected and uttered aloud responses from variants supplied. Variants reflecting Empathy would be Object-initial, directly opposing grammatical orders. Results revealed that adherence to canonical grammatical arrangements dominate Empathy considerations. Patterned response choices among informants indicated that groups of subjects respond differently to Empathy stimulus. Refinements need to be made to the Empathy theory within Yokoyama's model. Verbs must be granted a more distinctive role. The Empathy strategy should be investigated further from a perspective of expressive intonation.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Russian is normally considered to be a free word order language. Deep case relationships are marked by inflectional desinences in surface realizations, thus the relative ordering of sentence constituents can vary, producing a set of acceptable utterances that all convey the same propositional information. Olga Yokoyama (1986) suggests that in Russian the relative ordering of elements in an utterance reflects the transfer of *non-propositional* (connotative/unintended) information, namely the speaker's subjective assessment of the discourse situation (assessment of what is communicatively relevant and/or of 'current concern' to the hearer).

To account for this discourse phenomenon, Yokoyama developed a Transactional Discourse Model, by which an informational exchange between two interlocutors is represented in terms of 'relocation' of knowledge, both 'cognitive' (informational/propositional) and 'non-cognitive' (metinformational/non-propositional). The two main distinguishing features of the model are the notions of 'locations of knowledge' and 'assessment'. The model operates on the principle that utterances are organized with respect to where particular informational items (utterance constituents) are located in the consciousness of the addresser and the addressee respectively at a particular point in discourse, relative to one another, within the sum of the knowledge possessed by interlocutors. Locations of knowledge are determined by the extent to which utterance constituents are considered to be of 'current concern' to both speakers and hearers and are arrived at through speaker 'assessment'.

When applied to Russian, Yokoyama observed a regularity in the order of constituents in discourse-initial utterances uttered with 'neutral' intonation. 'Acceptable' linear arrangements are those in which knowledge items are ordered from left to right, starting with those that are of shared 'current concern' (are of concern to both interlocutors), followed by those that are of less concern to the hearer, in turn followed by those that are unknown to the hearer. The linear arrangements resulting from this prediction are deemed 'acceptable' although they do not realize any consistent grammatical case

organization. The word orders that are predicted by the model are based primarily on the consideration of pragmatic 'assessment' and 'knowledge location' factors and intonation, though the interference from grammatical relations is also taken into account.

Having hypothesized that utterances in Russian are organized linearly according to locations of knowledge that have been determined by speaker assessment, Yokoyama develops further the notion that other *subjective* speaker-oriented knowledge, namely speaker *attitude*, can be conveyed by word order. Yokoyama draws on Kuno and Kaburaki's concept of Empathy, suggesting that the speaker can identify with and show personal concern for discourse referents. Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) and Kuno (1976, 1987) explain the concept of Empathy in terms of the amount of identification the speaker has toward a particular discourse referent (or referents), that is, the individual(s) who participate in the event s/he talks about in an utterance. They liken it to a particular camera angle, or vantage point from which the speaker relates the event.

Yokoyama notes that in Russian, speaker Empathy further interacts with linear order predictions derived from the Transactional Discourse Model, essentially by prompting a change in the location of knowledge of the discourse referent that is the object of a speaker's Empathy, a change that is not realized if knowledge locations have been determined 'objectively'. It is thus proposed that the manifestation of speaker Empathy in Russian results in a *preposing* (more specifically, an *imposition* arising from speaker misassessment) of those referent constituents most empathized with, into the utterance-initial knowledge intersection. This intersection is normally 'reserved' for elements of current concern to *both* of the discourse participants just prior to the utterance (in discourse-initial utterances, this intersection consisting normally of deictic elements {I, you, here, now}). Again, the resulting utterances are deemed 'acceptable' although this order does *not* reflect any consistent grammatical case organization pattern.

A speaker may empathize with one or another referent of a narrated event for various reasons. One may have a close relationship with, or may feel actual emotional concern, tenderness or closeness towards the referent. Participants for whom the speaker has a rather high degree of concern, are typically animate.

Russian is rich in diminutives - lexical items that encode (by means of suffixes and

multiple suffix combinations) such emotional-expressive nuances of speaker attitude as endearment, tenderness, familiarity, as well as irony, scorn, etc. Diminutives can also represent various degrees of subjective meaning, usually becoming more emphatic and more emotive as additional suffixes are added.

A justification for imposition, Yokoyama claims, is therefore already encoded into diminutives. They inherently possess 'High Empathy,' and are therefore more likely to be impositionally preposed into the utterance-initial knowledge intersection (that normally contains only those items of current concern to both discourse participants). The imposition of High Empathy items however, is not obligatory, and Yokoyama suggests that it is primarily the interpersonal distance (politeness, appropriateness) between interlocutors that allows or inhibits the subjective display of a speaker's personal Empathy. In instances where Empathy impositions do not occur therefore, canonical grammatical ordering strategies (in particular, the tendency to place Subjects/Agents before Objects/Patients) are claimed to condition the order of utterance-constituents.

This thesis therefore attempts to determine the extent to which word order in discourse-initial voluntary statements in Russian is affected by speaker Empathy, within the theory of discourse transactions as proposed by Yokoyama (1986). Yokoyama claims that in appropriate contextual circumstances, Empathy factors are stronger than grammatical relations in determining the order of elements in discourse-initial voluntary referential statements in Russian.

An experiment was devised in order to test this claim. Various two-part contexts were created. Contextual and lexical variables that condition the Empathy status of discourse referents were intentionally changed between the first and second parts of each context. This alternation was realized by adjusting two features: the diminutive degree used to refer to the discourse referent and the interpersonal distance between interlocutors.

The first part of each context therefore (featuring a close interpersonal distance between the speaker and hearer, and implementing a high degree diminutive to refer to the discourse referent in Object/Patient position) reflects circumstances equivalent to those Yokoyama proposes, and, we predict, will result in Empathy-conditioned word order selections. The second portion of each context employs lesser-degree diminutives to refer

to the same Object/Patient discourse referent, and features a greater interpersonal distance between interlocutors. We predict that in this case, word order selections will be conditioned by grammatical ordering strategies.

The diminutive alternation was purposely and invariably carried out on the Object/Patient discourse referent. If Empathy proves to be operational and the referent is imposed accordingly (into utterance-initial position), the resulting orders would be in direct opposition to more basic grammatical arrangements that linearly place Subjects/Agents *before* Objects/Patients. We cannot verify Empathy as an ordering strategy if we direct the speaker's Empathy toward the Subject/Agent discourse referent, as Subjects/Agents would claim utterance-initial position regardless of whether it is the Empathy or the Grammatical SO theory which is operational.

If Yokoyama's claims about diminutives operationalizing personal Empathy, as well as interpersonal distance either allowing or inhibiting a display of personal Empathy, are valid, we can expect a regularity to be seen between the two parts of each target context. We predict that Empathy-conditioned word order selections will be made when a high-degree diminutive is used, and interpersonal distance between interlocutors is small. Conversely, grammatically-motivated word order selections are expected where lesser-degree diminutives are used and where interpersonal distance between interlocutors is greater. The experiment attempts to determine the extent to which word order is conditioned by speaker-oriented Empathy factors, and if ordering strategies motivated by personal Empathy do in fact dominate grammatically-motivated ordering strategies.

CHAPTER TWO

Empathy and Word Order

2.0.0 Yokoyama's Transactional Discourse Model

Yokoyama in 1986 published a Transactional Discourse Model (hereafter TDM) which, she suggested, serves as a workable framework to represent the transfer of knowledge between participants in informational discourse. In particular, the model captures certain fine distinctions that are inherently involved in any transfer of knowledge; in any informational communicative act, knowledge is transferred both in a denotative (intended) and a connotative (unintended) manner. Although other discourse concepts may already be said to explain the transfer of connotative knowledge (such as the given/new, theme/rheme, topic/comment functional dichotomies), Yokoyama maintains that the TDM provides a system whereby knowledge can be defined unambiguously in terms of 'locations of knowledge' within the larger sets of knowledge possessed by interlocutors. Only when workable definitions of the locational 'status' of knowledge items have been determined, Yokoyama believes, can one begin to examine the way in which that knowledge is encoded on a linguistic level, and in particular, the means by which the 'unintended' transfer of knowledge is carried out.

Some of the types of knowledge available for transfer are highly dependent on the 'subjectivity' of the speaker (the speaker's assessment of relevance, imposition of speaker attitude), and are thus not necessarily encoded 'grammatically' into every utterance, though they may be encoded 'pragmatically'. It is Yokoyama's claim that within the regularized system of the TDM, the pragmatic transfer of subjectively-determined knowledge becomes apparent.

Yokoyama proposes that in Russian, the connotative transfer of pragmatically-oriented knowledge, such as a speaker's personal Empathy, is conveyed by word order. She employs the TDM in her development of a linear ordering rule that predicts the arrangement of elements in Russian utterances according to location of knowledge. In this chapter, the components of the TDM will be examined in general, then with respect to the manner by which Yokoyama proposes it accounts for the linear arrangement of discourse-


initial utterances in Russian (taking intonational factors into consideration). The concept of Empathy will be discussed, with particular attention to lexical choice and interpersonal distance, auxiliary features which are claimed to promote or inhibit the realization of speaker Empathy. The linear arrangement of utterances will then be re-examined in light of the proposed interaction of personal Empathy and related features.

2.1.0 Components

Yokoyama's TDM (1986) represents an informational discourse exchange in terms of the 'relocation' of knowledge between interlocutors. The main components of the model are sets A and B and their respective subsets C_a and C_b .¹ A and B represent the sum of all the knowledge possessed by speaker (A) and hearer (B) respectively. Because individuals cannot concern themselves with all the knowledge they possess simultaneously, subsets C_a and C_b represent those "matters of current concern" to A and B respectively. In essence these are particular matters that the speaker and hearer are thinking about, or are concerned with at any point during a discourse exchange, or prior to the onset of discourse. Knowledge sets A and B necessarily overlap (even if interlocutors A and B are physically removed from one another), since there is always some knowledge shared by human individuals (consider encyclopaedic knowledge of the world). Knowledge areas A-B and B-A therefore contain the knowledge that is not shared: items possessed only by A, and only by B respectively. The sets of current concern C_a and C_b must at least partially intersect in order to initiate a discourse exchange. The goal of a specific linguistic interchange then becomes to effectively bring about a greater overlap of C_a and C_b . In other words, A wants essentially to replace B's matters of current concern with his/her own. Following a successful discourse transaction therefore, the speaker's matters of current concern become (for a moment, at least) also what are of concern to B; sets C_a and C_b merge completely.

¹Yokoyama represents the speaker's and hearer's knowledge spheres and intersections thereof using a Venn diagram. (See Figure 2.1.)

Figure 2.1 The intersection of speaker's (A) and hearer's (B) knowledge sets²:



2.1.1 Metinformational and Informational Knowledge

There are essentially two main kinds of knowledge that constitute the larger knowledge intersections and areas of sets A and B. Yokoyama distinguishes “metinformational knowledge” as that which “primarily constitutes the means one needs to obtain or impart information,” from “informational knowledge,” which concerns “objects and events”, and is “unrelated to the communication process.” (1986:13)

Metinformational knowledge consists of two types, both “knowledge of the CODE” and “knowledge of the discourse situation.” Possessing knowledge of the CODE means an interlocutor has sufficient linguistic means (has general knowledge of the lexicon and is able to apply knowledge of linguistic rules of a particular language) enabling her/him to satisfactorily decode sentences and process and interpret their meaning. Knowledge of the discourse situation is defined as “the knowledge of the content and state of the interlocutor’s set of current concern in relation to the speaker’s set of knowledge and the matter of current concern” (1986:15). This type of knowledge characterizes the speaker’s assessment of what is relevant to the hearer (what items are likely to be in the hearer’s

² Diagram from Yokoyama (1986:5).

knowledge set). We will return to knowledge of the discourse situation in section 2.1.4 below.

Yokoyama outlines five types of informational knowledge: *propositional, specificational, referential, existential and predicational*. *Propositional* knowledge is defined as “the speaker’s belief in the truth of ‘bare’ propositions that do not yet contain specific terms but have specific predicates” (1986:11).

(1) Someone bought something.

(2) Someone went somewhere.

Specificational knowledge is “the knowledge that enables the speaker to replace the unspecified terms in such propositions with specific terms” (1986:11).

(3) Sammy bought a coat.

(4) Mr. Unger went to Leduc.

A speaker can be said to possess *referential* knowledge if s/he is able to correlate a set of unique and ‘subjective’ features (features which are determined to belong to the referent from the point of view of that particular speaker) with a real-world referent (which may or may not *actually* match those characteristics). As far as the speaker is able to say “I know Mr. Unger” (as in 4 above), in that they can use the title and proper noun {Mr. Unger} to refer to that subjectively-determined set of features that the speaker deems correspond with real-world entity {Mr. Unger}, that speaker can be said to possess referential knowledge of {Mr. Unger}. Another speaker for example may assign completely different features to {Mr. Unger}, although they both share this referential knowledge.

Referential knowledge corresponds to knowledge of the CODE as discussed above. General knowledge of the lexicon of a particular language would enable a speaker to provide a general ‘dictionary’-type definition of an object or event (for example “I know what a coat is” indicates nothing more than ‘I’ know the meaning of that word - I understand the linguistic code and am able to provide basic definitions for words of my language). For example, in utterance (3), the knowledge {a coat} is specificational, though not referential, in that the speaker is not referring to a particular coat with particular features that s/he believes match ‘real-world’ entity of a particular coat. The addressee’s knowledge of the CODE would be sufficient in interpreting the meaning of the utterance, whereas if the

speaker said “Sammy bought *the coat*”, the hearer would have to possess referential knowledge of the particular coat that the speaker must be referring to.) Referential knowledge enables the speaker to provide this same type of ‘definition’, though the definition need only satisfy the speaker’s own subjective judgment about what set of features can be matched by the term of reference to the actual referent.

Propositional, specificational and referential all imply the two other types of informational knowledge: *existential* and *predicational*. These two types of knowledge are part of every individuals’ knowledge set, as far as we can agree with such general notions as “things and beings exist, events occur to things and living beings, and living beings cause things to happen” (1986:12). In specified propositions (3) and (4) above, existential and predicational knowledge are implied, as far as we can assume from (4) that {Mr. Unger} exists, and {Leduc} exists (existential knowledge). If unspecified, the existential knowledge remains, (where ‘somebody’ [person exists] who went ‘somewhere’ [location exists]) as does the predicational knowledge (minimal knowledge that some unspecified event occurred).

2.1.2 Discourse Conditions

Certain conditions must be met in order for discourse to take place. Firstly, interlocutors must actually be “willing to engage in discourse”. Discourse is normally a cooperative process, particularly when the goal of communication (as in informational exchanges) is to obtain or transfer (presumably) meaningful knowledge. In this sense, interlocutors must cooperate in order to aid each other in the communication process and to successfully and mutually reach their respective communicative goals. Any utterance therefore (between reasonably rational individuals) should comply at least in some minimal way with the ‘Cooperative Principle’ as outlined by Grice (1975):

“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (1975:45)

A second prerequisite for beginning a discourse requires that the knowledge areas

C_a and C_b intersect (that $C_a \cap C_b$ not be a null-set). In other words, there must be some knowledge items shared by interlocutors in order to proceed with discourse. This intersection is automatically created once the subsequent discourse conditions are met, whereby {DEIXIS}, 'knowledge of the discourse situation,' and a common linguistic code are established as shared and become the elements that constitute the intersection itself. We will discuss the contents of the $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection below.

2.1.2.1 $C_a \cap C_b$

The speaker and hearer must be aware of each other and the discourse environment (though the interlocutors need not be physically accessible to one another; consider a telephone exchange). This mutual knowledge is often brought about by non-linguistic means, for example, through eye contact. This mutual knowledge suggests 'pre-linguistically' that the possibility of discourse exists. This mutual awareness of each other and of the discourse environment (both temporal and spatial/physical) essentially creates the $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection, and is represented as {DEIXIS}.³

The speaker must make his/her best attempt to assess the discourse situation adequately. The knowledge gained by the speaker through his/her subjective assessment is metainformational knowledge called 'knowledge of the discourse situation'. Although one may argue that we are essentially free to utter anything we want to at any given time and to anyone, regardless of what is likely of current concern to them, if the Cooperative Principle is met, and the interlocutors are indeed willing to engage in discourse, the speaker then has assumed the responsibility of trying to make the information exchange run smoothly.

Part of the speaker's assessment involves establishing whether s/he and the addressee share the linguistic CODE. Mutual knowledge of the CODE is in itself a condition for a discourse exchange. Although technically the mutual knowledge of the CODE cannot be established until something is uttered, (if the speaker has made a wrong

³ Yokoyama provides examples where prelinguistic awareness does not necessarily occur, but allows that {DEIXIS} in $C_a \cap C_b$ can be created simultaneously with A's utterance.

assessment, the hearer may simply not understand and perhaps will not/cannot respond), in the majority of situations, the speaker can rely on other extralinguistic knowledge to make an accurate assessment (s/he may know the addressee, the addressee lives in the same speech community, etc.). Once the CODE is established as shared, that knowledge which was described as 'mutual awareness of each other and the discourse environment', or {DEIXIS}, can be considered shared referential knowledge, represented as {I, you, here, now}.

One other type of knowledge present in the $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection pre-discourse-initially once the interlocutors have become aware of each other and of the discourse situation is the minimal predicational knowledge $||P||$. One of the interlocutors can 'see' that the other has some proposition to convey, but as yet, they only share unspecified predicational knowledge of "it" ("the event or state of an unspecified proposition that was, is or will be taking place or existing").

Consider a pre-discourse situation between two strangers who we know speak the same language. They share metainformational knowledge in that they have a common linguistic code. They are aware of each other's presence, as well as both the physical nature of the discourse environment and of the time frame in which the discourse is/will be taking place: the deictic elements. The hearer realizes that the speaker has some proposition to impart to him/her, therefore they share the predicational knowledge $||P||$. These are the items that constitute the $C_a \cap C_b$ knowledge intersection.

2.1.3 Discourse Motivations

Although the $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection has been created, and interlocutors seem willing to engage in discourse, the speaker must presumably have some motive for initiating discourse. We will be concerned only with an informational exchange, although these are by no means the only purposeful discourse exchanges that take place.⁴

⁴ Yokoyama refers also to Jakobson's "set for CONTACT, or in Malinowski's terms PHATIC function," namely those exchanges which Jakobson (1960:24) suggested serve "...to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works.. to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention."

The purpose of an informational exchange is to transfer those knowledge items into the addressee's knowledge set which the speaker *assumes* are not already there, and are deemed by the speaker to presumably be informationally relevant and of some interest to the addressee. Assuming that the interlocutors are observing the Cooperative Principle, the speaker must further satisfy two of Grice's communicational Maxims, those of Quantity and Relevance. Grice's Maxim of Quantity requires that conversational "contributions" be "as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)", and that they are not "more informative than is required" (both 1975:45). That is, to be more informative than is required would likely mean that the speaker has provided information that the addressee was already aware of. The Maxim of Relevance requires simply that the utterance "be relevant" (1975:46). In accordance with the Cooperative Principle, it follows that the responsibility of observing these Conversational Maxims lies both with the speaker and the hearer. As far as the speaker is obligated to communicate only that information that is missing from B, and that is relevant to B, hearer B in turn should be expected to assume that A is in fact complying with the Maxims, and that A wouldn't be communicating the information unless A thought it would be both informative and relevant to B.

2.1.4 Assessment

The speaker's primary motivation in an informational voluntary statement, therefore, is to provide the hearer with information that is both not already known to the hearer, and relevant to the hearer. The speaker is thus obligated to assess the current state of the interlocutor's knowledge sets and subsequently, those sets in relation to his/her own. More precisely, in order to proceed with an informational transaction, the speaker must attempt to determine what knowledge items are or are not located in B and if they do in fact constitute a part of B's knowledge, whether they are or are not in C_b . This type of knowledge, acquired via assessment, is 'metinformational', and constitutes a major part of what Yokoyama terms 'knowledge of the discourse situation'.

This necessity, to take into consideration the 'status' of the interlocutor's knowledge, to determine what is important and relevant to the addressee at a particular point in time, has also been addressed by Chafe (1976), who spoke of "temporary states of

the addressee's mind" (1976:28), stating that "language functions effectively only if the speaker takes account of such states in the mind of the person he is talking to" (1976:27-28).

If the speaker judges that an item is missing from B, s/he would be justified in volunteering it, thereby satisfying the Maxim of Quantity.⁵ The speaker must also consider the degree of relevance his/her intended utterance will have for the addressee. The speaker's assessment of C_b is helpful in establishing Relevance; if knowledge items A wishes to impart to, or acquire from B, are those which B is currently thinking about, they will likely be relevant to B.

The accuracy of speaker assessments is dependent on various factors. Firstly, it is relatively easy to make an accurate assessment based on an interlocutor's previous statement. For example, if B has just said "My hamburger is under-cooked", speaker A can be reasonably certain about what items are currently in C_b . In the absence of prior discourse however, (discourse-initially), the speaker often relies on various extralinguistic signals. For example, a patron in a restaurant could logically assume that a question posed to the waiter about the soup *du jour* would be relevant to B.

In discourse-initial situations such as these, the speaker can never be completely certain as to the current state of C_b . Even if the most minimal $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection exists however, (the interlocutors are aware of each other, both seem willing to engage in discourse, they share knowledge of the CODE), the speaker can often safely build an utterance around those items that have been established as shared (though 'pre-linguistically'), namely {DEIXIS} and ||P||. Hence the relative frequency with which conversations are initiated and statements volunteered, that begin with "you", or are built around the other items in {DEIXIS} (Yokoyama:1986:47-48).

The amount of previously established mutual knowledge shared by A and B also becomes an important factor affecting the accuracy of speaker's assessments. The amount of shared knowledge, in turn, is highly dependent on the proximity (personal/intellectual/social) of the interlocutors. Factors such as the degree to which interlocutors' life

⁵ Likewise, the speaker can justify a question by assuming that items missing from his/her knowledge set, are in fact, present in B's.

experiences, attitudes and prejudices coincide, the amount of previous discourse they have engaged in, as well as the lack or abundance of similar interests and tastes, all influence the interpersonal distance between interlocutors. As the proximity between interlocutors increases, the area of overlap of A's and B's knowledge sets also increases. There is a larger pool of previously-established shared knowledge, which the speaker, aware of this interpersonal distance, can assess with much more precision.

Thus the success of informational discourse exchanges weighs heavily on interlocutors' knowledge of the discourse situation, and their respective abilities to assess the state of each other's knowledge set(s) in their entirety adequately and accurately. Not only is the assessment of $C_a \cap C_b$ important to the utterance, but an adequate assessment of the addressee's entire knowledge set B (apart from C_b) extremely important, particularly in determining what is in fact relevant and worthy of communicating. In particular, we are concerned with discourse-initial statements that satisfy both the Maxims of Quantity and Relevance. In such situations, the speaker essentially volunteers information, motivated by the assumptions that the specified propositional knowledge is missing from the addressee's knowledge set, and is somehow relevant to the addressee.

2.1.5 Misassessment and Imposition

Regardless of how sensitive a speaker attempts to be in carefully balancing his/her own communicational goals with consideration for what may be of current concern and informationally relevant to the hearer, s/he can never be completely accurate in his/her assessments, and understandably so, in that the speaker is essentially trying to evaluate the status of the hearer's consciousness.

Yokoyama claims that misassessments are of two types: A may assume that something is part of C_b when it is actually located elsewhere in B's knowledge set, or A may assume that something is in B's knowledge set which is not there at all. We are concerned with the first type of misassessment, which Yokoyama calls an "imposition", occurring when "the speaker assumes that something that currently concerns the speaker also concerns the addressee" (1986:60).

We mentioned above that the hearer is also obliged, by the terms of the Cooperative Principle, to assist the speaker in making discourse run smoothly. Yokoyama suggests that in the case of misassessment, the hearer will respond with an “adjustment”, in essence, assisting the speaker by communicating somehow that his/her assessment was misguided. For example, if the speaker volunteers the discourse-initial statement “Lucy left for St. Petersburg today”, and the hearer in fact knows two individuals named Lucy, the addressee may respond with an adjustment such as: “Which Lucy, Lucy Jones or Lucy Smith?”, thereby supplying information about his/her knowledge sets, and requesting further refinement of the terms.

Again, the interpersonal distance between interlocutors comes into play, but apart from its role in affecting the accuracy of assessment, here it determines the relative *freedom* with which the speaker can make impositions.

“...how presumptuous we allow ourselves to be with our interlocutors depends on various psychological and sociological factors. Generally, the closer we feel to the interlocutor, the less pertinent to his/her current matter of concern our own matters of concern need to be in order for us to feel free to impose them.” (1986:60)

In fact, any discourse-initial statement can be considered an imposition in its entirety, as far as the speaker’s goal essentially is to shift B’s attention away from those items in C_b , and onto those presently in C_a . Not all misassessments, however, require and result in adjustments by the hearer. In the previous example regarding Lucy Jones and Lucy Smith, the hearer had to straighten out the terms in order for discourse to proceed. If the hearer did know of the particular Lucy that the speaker was referring to, Yokoyama claims that the cooperative hearer makes a “silent, metinformational adjustment”, simply by accepting the terms of C_a into the established, minimal content of $C_a \cap C_b$. This positional statement, therefore, would likely be accepted by the addressee without adjustment, particularly if the interlocutors were fairly close.

Though an extreme example, consider the same statement “Lucy left for St.

Petersburg today”, uttered by the speaker to a complete stranger. An extreme imposition such as this would likely leave the addressee highly confused; the hearer cannot readily accept the terms of C_a into $C_a \cap C_b$ as they are completely irrelevant. A speaker’s statement to a complete stranger: “A friend of mine left for St. Petersburg today”, where at least an indefinite noun is used, is still an imposition, although it is not as extreme as the first example, where the speaker has assumed that “Lucy” (the specified referential knowledge) would be somehow relevant to the addressee. Conversely, if the speaker said “Mrs. Lucy Smith left for St. Petersburg today”, to an addressee in the same close-knit social circle as both Lucy and the speaker (in which she is invariably addressed as “Lucy”), the addressee may be confused, or may sense sarcasm or humour in the statement. Furthermore, the imposition’s acceptability increases if extralinguistic signals point to its relevance. For example, the statement “A friend of mine left for St. Petersburg today” may be deemed informationally relevant to a stranger on a bus who the speaker notices is reading a book about St. Petersburg.

We can see, therefore, how interpersonal distance as well as extralinguistic factors affect the freedom with which speakers make impositions resulting from misassessments of the content of the addressee’s knowledge sets in relation to his/her own. We have also touched on the role lexical choice has on the relative acceptability of impositions, a factor which will be important in our discussion of Empathy below.

2.1.6 Linear Order Predictions

Yokoyama’s model of discourse transactions predicts the linear order of sentence constituents in discourse-initial voluntary informational statements in Russian in accordance with the location of knowledge specified by the constituent, as it has been determined by the speaker’s assessment of the discourse situation. Consider these examples presented by Yokoyama (1986:217, 221):⁶

⁶Yokoyama also considers examples such as ‘*K vam prišla Galina Petrovna*’ (Galina Petrovna came to see you, (1986:217)), ‘*U nas pozolodalo*’ (It’s turned cold here, (1986:221)), etc. Yokoyama considers ‘*u nas*’ (genitive, ‘at us’), and ‘*k vam*’ (dative, ‘to you’) to be the referential items in these examples, referring essentially to ‘*vy*’ (you) and ‘*my*’ (we). We have excluded from our study utterances that involve such prepositional phrases in light of the fact that these phrases have a ‘locational’ status that may affect their linear placement in other ways.

- 5) Vas sprašivaet kakoj-to čelovek. DO-V-S
you-gen. asks some person
 "Some guy is asking for you."
- 6) Ètogo parnja ot lupil xuligan. DO-V-S
this guy-acc. beat up hooligan-nom.
 "A hooligan beat up this guy."
- 7) Menja isključili. DO-S
me-gen. expelled
 "I was expelled."
- 8) Prišla Galina Petrovna. V-S
arrived Galina Petrovna-nom.
 "Galina Petrovna arrived."
- 9) Vam prislali Ivanovy priglašenie. IO-V-S-DO
you-dat. sent Ivanovs -nom. invitation-acc.
 "The Ivanovs sent you an invitation."

Now consider the location of referential knowledge of the constituents:

$C_a \cap C_b$: *Vas, Ètogo parnja, Menja, Vam*; are all deictic elements that refer to {I, you, here, now} or constitute part of the direct discourse environment. *Ètogo parnja* = 'this' guy - can be pointed to.)

$C_a \cap (B - C_b)$: *Galina Petrovna, Ivanovy*; B is aware that Galina Petrovna, the Ivanovs exist, but is not thinking about them right now.

$A \cap (C_a - B)$: *Kakoj-to čelovek, xuligan*; these discourse referents are new to B.

If we consider the sentences again, this time replacing the sentence constituents with the locations of knowledge, a linear ordering pattern emerges:

- (5) $C_a \cap C_b$ --- V ---not filled--- $A \cap (C_a - B)$
 (6) $C_a \cap C_b$ --- V ---not filled--- $A \cap (C_a - B)$
 (7) $C_a \cap C_b$ --- V
 (8) ---not filled--- V - $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$
 (9) $C_a \cap C_b$ --- V - $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ - $A \cap (C_a - B)$

Items in $C_a \cap C_b$ precede the verb, items in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ follow the verb; items in $A \cap (C_a - B)$ follow those in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$. In other words, items that are of shared current concern, namely deictic elements and $||P||$, occur utterance-initially, followed by items that are in A's set of current concern (are known to B, but not in B's set of current concern), followed by items that are unknown to B. Note that all the slots need not necessarily be filled, and that more than one constituent may occur in any of the knowledge intersection slots. In the discourse-initial situation therefore, in the absence of referential items in $C_a \cap C_b$ (you, me here, now; referential items that 'point' to items/individuals in the physical discourse environment (as in (4)), the verb will occur utterance-initially.

The resulting order of constituents in terms of assessed locations of knowledge is therefore:

$$(10) \quad C_a \cap C_b - V - C_a \cap (B - C_b) - A \cap (C_a - B)$$

This order reflects the speaker's metinformational knowledge. At this point, it is important to note provisionally that the order of sentence constituents in (5) to (9) corresponds to the ordering template determined by locations of knowledge, irrespective of grammatical relations. In all of these examples in fact, the subject is in post-verbal location. In (5)-(7) and (9), the object appears pre-verbally. We will see that this linear order, determined exclusively in terms of locations of knowledge, is (for these examples) in direct opposition to grammatical orders.

Other permutations of utterances (5) to (9) are deemed unacceptable (with neutral intonation, see below). Note also that these 'unacceptable' variants generally follow a canonical grammatical order in which Subjects precede Objects.

- | | | |
|------|------------------------------------|-----------|
| (11) | *Kakoj-to čelovek vas sprašivaet. | S-DO-V |
| (12) | *Xuligan ètogo parnja izbil. | S-DO-V |
| (13) | *Ivanovy prislali priglašenje vam. | S-V-DO-IO |
| (14) | *Priglašenje Ivanovy prislali vam. | DO-S-V-IO |

Although they convey the same denotative/intended informational knowledge as their corresponding acceptable variants, it is the transfer of metinformational knowledge

(connotative/unintended) obtained through assessment of the discourse situation that determines the acceptable linear arrangement of elements in a particular context.

We have not yet discussed intonation, one final important factor that further impacts on the acceptability of discourse-initial utterances ordered according to the linear-ordering rule proposed above.

2.1.7 Intonation

Yokoyama identifies two intonational types in order to isolate those utterances, or portions thereof, which use word order exclusively to convey metinformational knowledge. Yokoyama proposes that Russian intonation be defined in terms of “sentential stress”⁷; the two intonational types thus consist of one which has, and one which lacks, sentential stress.⁸ The type which lacks ‘stress’ is generally considered to be the neutral, unmarked contour. The other has a pronounced ‘sentential’ (also referred to as ‘logical’ stress) which grants it an emphatic, emotive, marked status.

A Type I utterance is characterized by a lack of sentential stress, and is realized by a “potentially iterative phonemic rising contour tone LH (L = “Low”, H = “High”), concluded by a falling contour tone HL.” (1986:183) Generally speaking, this intonational type is considered ‘neutral’ or ‘narrative’ intonation, (as opposed to ‘expressive’ or ‘emotive’ variants). Further, Yokoyama incorporates the concept of ‘downstep’ into her formulation, noting that regardless of how many syntagmas, or intonation units, there are in a given utterance, each is pronounced progressively lower than the previous one. She suggests that Type I be expressed as “(LH_nHL), where *n* is the number of non-final

⁷ The term ‘sentential stress’ is used by Yokoyama (1986). The intonational type that correlates to this contour with sentential stress in traditional accounts of Russian word order is referred to as ‘emphatic’ or ‘emotive’ (marked) intonation, with ‘logical’ stress.

⁸ The Russian intonational system is traditionally described (Bryzgunova 1977) in terms of IKs (*Intonacionnye konstrukcii*), intonational contours, each with an intonational centre, that express a variety of meanings. According to these accounts, utterances consist of one, or are divided into syntagmas, a syntagma defined as “an intonation unit consisting of one or more closely knit words associated with or expressing one meaning determined by a given situation” (Bratus 1972:5). Each syntagma then, has its own intonational contour, which is determined by the required meaning of the utterance. Yokoyama remarks that “syntacticians operating with the notions of both sentential stress and word order... normally assume only one sentential stress per discreet utterance” (1986:181), noting that regardless of the number of syntagmatic segmentations that can be made in an utterance, and the number of different IKs that are employed on them, only one intonational center bears (at the same time) the sentential stress.

syntagmas, and \ indicates the range over which downstep is implemented” (1986:183).

Loosely schematized, intonation Type I looks like: (Yokoyama 1982)



Essentially, an utterance can have any number of LH tones, each pronounced at a progressively lower tone (downstep), where $n=0$ in a monosyntagmatic utterance.

Yokoyama identifies a benefit to her proposed notation; it can account for different speeds of speech. If speech is slowed, there may be more syntagmatic divisions, but the intonation type does not change - there are simply more LH tones. We can see how word order reflects the location of knowledge in Type I utterances in Yokoyama's examples (1986:190):

(15) X: Kto napisal Evgenija Onegina?
Who wrote Eugene Onegin-acc?
"Who wrote Eugene Onegin?"

(16) Y: Evgenija Onegina napisal Puškin.
Eugene Onegin-gen wrote Pushkin-acc.
"Pushkin wrote Eugene Onegin."

When (16) is uttered using Type I intonation in response to X's question (15), "the underlying tones are implemented from left to right and the order of elements reflects the metinformational knowledge of the speaker." (1986:191) There is a rising HL on the first syntagm (or first two syntagmas, depending on the speed of speech), and the falling contour tone (HL) falls on {*Puškin*}. {*Evgenija Onegina*}, is located utterance-initially in $C_a \cap C_b$ as it is in both the interlocutors sets of current concern; X asked about it in his/her question and now Y shares this knowledge. The answer {*Puškin*}, obviously missing from the X's knowledge set (hence the request for information), is therefore located in

either $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ or $A \cap (C_a - B)$ ⁹ and appears utterance-finally. Essentially, the order proceeds from left to right according to the ordering template proposed in (10) above.

The role of word order in the transfer of metinformational knowledge in Russian is particularly apparent when one considers the English translations of sentences (16) and (18):

(17) X: **Kakoj roman napisal Puškin?**
What novel-acc wrote Pushkin-acc?
 “What novel did Pushkin write?”

(18) Y: **Puškin napisal Evgenija Onegina.**
Pushkin-nom wrote Eugene Onegin-acc.
 “Pushkin wrote **Eugene Onegin.**”

In the Russian answer (18), with Type I intonation, again the order of elements reflects the metinformational knowledge of the speaker. This time, the item in $A \cap (C_a - B) / C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ is {*Evgenija Onegina*} and appears utterance-finally. Note that the word order in the corresponding English answers in (16) and (18) is identical; the sentential stress¹⁰ on each however, falls on the item in $A \cap (C_a - B) / C_a \cap (B - C_b)$. Therefore in English, the item that has the sentential stress is the one which is situated in $A \cap (C_a - B)$, while in the Russian Type I utterances, the transfer of the same metinformational knowledge is conveyed exclusively by word order.

In contrast, intonation Type II is characterized by the presence of sentential stress. Sentential stress is defined by Yokoyama as “that stress which marks the knowledge item that would occur in utterance-final position, were the same sentence to be uttered with intonation Type I instead” (1986:191). In essence, utterances with sentential stress have ‘normally-utterance-final’ knowledge items that have been preposed. Characteristic of Type II is that no rising stresses can occur after the sentential stress, (therefore there can be no

⁹ The item would be situated in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ if, in Y’s assessment of the discourse situation, s/he determined that X definitely knew of the item, but had temporarily forgotten about it, or likely was not thinking about it at the present time. The item would be situated in $A \cap (C_a - B)$ if Y assessed that the item was unknown to X.

¹⁰ The location of stress in Type II utterances will hereafter be marked with bold type.

syntagmatic segmentation after it). Essentially, the material over which the item bearing the sentential stress has been preposed, is joined to the preposed item. Yokoyama maintains that although no metinformational knowledge is conveyed by the item that carries the sentential stress, the remaining items in Type II utterances still convey metinformational knowledge. These types of utterances (Type II) generally correspond to so-called 'expressive' intonation. Type II variants of (16) and (18) respectively:

(19) Jevgenija Onegina **Puškin** napisal.

(20) **Puškin** Jevgenija Onegina napisal.

The utterance-final items in the corresponding Type I variants have been preposed and bear the sentential stress. The verb {*napisal*} is joined to the preposed item and is pronounced in a low tone with no rises.

It seems undesirable to define an intonational type in terms of word order, though in the scope of this study it is a circular problem we will not be able to reconcile.¹¹ It has always been recognized that word order and intonation are inter-related. Adamec (1973:131) notes as well (from a Functional Sentence Perspective standpoint) that word order and sentential stress are closely related, submitting that a particular word order must be considered along with the location of sentential stress. The circularity may stem unavoidably from the fact that regularity is clearly seen whereby rhematic elements are indeed preposed when "neutral" intonation is not employed (and vice versa).

Word order studies based on Functional Sentence Perspective (Theme-Rheme organization; cf. Adamec 1973; Kovtunova 1969, 1970; Krylova and Xavronina 1976, 1989; Valgina 1973) consider 'stylistically colored' or expressive intonational variants coincident with marked word orders. Utterances that follow the Theme - Rheme (objective) order have neutral intonation. Rheme - Theme order or discontinuous (e.g. Theme - Rheme - Theme) order (subjective or 'inverted') are said to occur concurrent with 'emotive' or 'expressive' intonation. In FSP terms, the general view is that the two (objective and subjective) orders are essentially synonymous for a given utterance. Those in which the Rheme has been preposed from its usual utterance-final position and bears the sentential

¹¹ Yokoyama submits that it seems to "reflect an inadmissible confusion of levels" but maintains that it is done in order to "formulate a rule for the placement of sentential stress in terms of non-phonological parameters" (both 1986:191).

stress, are thought to differ from the correlating 'objective' orders only in that they are stylistically colored. In fact, their explanation seems to mirror Yokoyama's. Where Yokoyama suggests that the sentential stress in Type II is carried by the sentence constituent that would appear utterance-finally in Type I, Krylova and Xavronina maintain that the intonational nucleus in 'emotive speech' is placed on the 'misplaced Rheme', which also appears utterance-finally in neutral variants. These items are intonationally 'marked' as having been moved from their most 'neutral' placement (utterance-final). In fact, it seems the main difference between the two intonational frameworks is that Yokoyama does not want to refer to Type II as necessarily expressive or emotive.

For the purpose of this study, we will attempt to analyze the intonational contours in terms of the 2-Type system proposed by Yokoyama, despite the fact that it may mirror previous accounts and for the moment disregarding the circular foundation of the framework.

We must now return to our examples (5) to (9). These utterances are acceptable discourse-initially when uttered with Type I intonation, and would be unacceptable discourse-initially with Type II. Similarly, alternative orderings of the same sentences would be acceptable discourse-initially when uttered with the second (Type II) intonational type, though not with Type I. That is, when the order of the utterance from left to right reflects the metinformational knowledge of the speaker, it is acceptable discourse-initially with Type I intonation.

2.1.8 The discourse-initial situation

That the statements under consideration occur 'discourse-initially' is extremely important in accordance with the parameters of Yokoyama's model. Previously referred to by Yokoyama as 'all-new' (1982) or 'all-unpredictable' (1984), Yokoyama posits these statements as those first uttered, for example, when the speaker enters a room where the hearer is or vice versa. They may occur in response to a general question, '*Nu, čto novogo?*' ("So/Well, what's new?"), or after a greeting or an introductory phrase, such as '*Vy znaete,*' (2nd p.p. - formal), '*Ty znaeš*' (2nd p.s. - familiar) ("You know," = "Guess what?"). The narrated event being conveyed in the utterance is unpredictable, although the

specified referential knowledge of the participants of the narrated event need not be 'new', in the sense that they may be unknown to the hearer.

The discourse-initial situation is significant in that it is characterized formally by a lack of shared referential knowledge in the $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection. At first glance, it may seem that this situation does not occur frequently enough to merit investigation. It is only in this instance however, that word order selections can be made without being influenced by prior discourse. Recall that once a statement has been made, the entire proposition conveyed is relocated into $C_a \cap C_b$. The speaker then has at his/her disposal this newly-acquired knowledge around which to build his/her next statement. It is clearly easier for the speaker to assess the state of the interlocutor's knowledge sets as well as the potential relevance of further transferable knowledge once a statement has been made; a 'theme' has been established.

In the discourse-initial instance however, the effects of speaker subjectivity are amplified. The speaker does his/her best to adequately assess the content of the interlocutor's knowledge sphere, and to determine what is informationally relevant to the addressee. Insofar as the communicative goal of a discourse-initial statement is to redirect the addressee's attention onto items located in C_a , concern for one's own matter of concern inevitably take, or have a greater potential to take precedence, depending on interpersonal distance. It is the discourse-initial situation therefore, in which impositions resulting from the expression of personal Empathy will be especially apparent and worthy of concentrated analysis.

2.1.9 Summary

Yokoyama's TDM therefore represents the transfer of knowledge between participants in discourse in terms of 'locations of knowledge'. The first step in proceeding in discourse is for interlocutors to enter into a communicative 'contract', whereby they are willing to engage in discourse and agree to proceed in accordance with communicative maxims of Relevance, Quantity and Quality. An intersection of A's and B's sets of current concern is created pre-linguistically or simultaneously with the first utterance, whereby they

share a common CODE, minimal predicational knowledge $\|P\|$, as well as knowledge of the specified referential items that constitute {DEIXIS}. Having some proposition to impart to the hearer, the speaker determines, through his/her assessment of the discourse situation, where the knowledge items to be relocated are situated in the interlocutor's knowledge set vis-à-vis his/her own, and structures his/her utterance accordingly. In Russian, the appropriate linear order reflecting the speaker's metinformational knowledge with Type I intonation, is one in which shared items (in $C_a \cap C_b$) occur utterance-initially, followed by the verb, followed by items in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ and $A \cap (C_a - B)$ respectively. In other words, items that are of common current concern appear first, followed by those that are known to B, but not of current concern, then by those that are altogether unknown to B. In Type II utterances, the last item in Type I is preposed and bears the sentential stress.

The reader may wonder, in what way does the TDM differ from other linearization concepts that may already be said to explain the linear order of constituents in Russian, such as the notions of Given/New and Theme/Rheme? Admittedly, a crude interpretation of Yokoyama's ordering schema would seem to loosely correlate to a communicative flow that proceeds from given to new. Items in $C_a \cap C_b$ seem to be those that are 'given' (Theme), while items in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ and $A \cap (C_a - B)$ could be interpreted to be those that are 'new', or that the utterance is about (Rheme). Yokoyama does not disregard the validity of such concepts in her analysis, but suggests that the TDM surpasses them in the way in which it represents more precisely the status of different knowledge items. An important refinement is made, whereby the TDM allows for the expression of *degrees* of newness/giveness in terms of where the information is located in the speaker's *and hearer's* knowledge intersections, as *assessed* by the speaker. There are two kinds of 'new': that which is of current concern to both interlocutors ($C_a \cap C_b$) and that which is already known/given to the hearer, but is soon *to become* of current concern to him/her ($C_a \cap (B - C_b)$). Only $A \cap (C_a - B)$ items are assessed (by the speaker) to be completely new/unknown to the hearer.

Having posited a linear ordering rule that reflects the transfer of metinformational

knowledge for Russian, Yokoyama notes further that another type of subjective knowledge can likewise be encoded into utterances, namely speaker attitude. She identifies one type of speaker attitude - personal Empathy - and notes that its manifestation can be seen in an interaction with the linear ordering principles already posited for discourse-initial utterances in Russian. Lexical choice, the use of diminutive forms in particular, is distinguished as one feature that identifies discourse referents as High Empathy items, which are thus expected to be imposed due to speaker Empathy. Furthermore, the interpersonal distance between interlocutors is identified as one of the main factors that permits or inhibits a speaker's display of personal Empathy, which therefore plays an important role in the prediction of linear arrangements potentially affected by Empathy constraints.

2.2.0 Empathy

Yokoyama suggests that the speaker can identify with and show personal concern for discourse referents, and that the results of this speaker *Empathy* manifest themselves in word order in Russian. The concept of Empathy was first introduced by Kuno and Kaburaki (1977), Kuno (1976, 1987) who describe it in terms of varying degrees of identification the speaker has toward a particular discourse referent (or referents), that is, the individual(s) who participate/s in the event that s/he talks about in an utterance. Kuno and Kaburaki have investigated various syntactic phenomena as they interact with Empathy in both English and Japanese, in particular, the effects of Empathy on reflexivization and the existence of 'Empathy' verbs. Empathy has also been seen to affect reflexivization in Russian (Yokoyama and Klenin 1977; Yokoyama 1991) and Icelandic (Thráinsson 1976).

In general, Empathy is considered to be one of many relative notions (topicality, givenness, definiteness, etc.) subsumed under the broader topic 'familiarity'. The concept of Empathy as introduced by Kuno and Kaburaki has its correlates with Ertel's (1977) notion 'closeness to the speaker's cognitive field' and Zubin's (1979) concept of 'focus of interest'. All such concepts coincide in that they are "dependent on variables internal to the speaker" (Siewierska 1988:61). The Empathy perspective is on one level related to animacy hierarchies. Essentially, one empathizes more with oneself over other human beings, with human beings over animals/'other' animate, and with animate beings over inanimate

objects/abstract entities. The Empathy perspective as we will be investigating it however, is more specific in terms of relative degrees of Empathy within one category. The Empathy hierarchy is sensitive to the speaker's 'point-of-view' relative to participants which are of *equal* status on an animacy hierarchy.

Kuno and Kaburaki explain the Empathy perspective in terms of the vantage point or particular 'camera angle' from which the speaker relates the event. They demonstrate that any alteration in the speaker's camera angle or the vantage point from which s/he views the 'event', will effect the syntactic arrangement of the utterance. For example, if the speaker positions him/herself equidistant from both Mary and John, the utterance realized may be "John hit Mary." If the speaker views this narrated event at a vantage point closer to John, the resulting utterance may be "John hit his wife", whereas a speaker empathizing with Mary may say "Mary's husband hit her" or "Mary was hit by John."

With respect to the last two utterances, Kuno (1987:207) suggests that in the case of a descriptor, for example, (Mary), and another descriptor that is dependent on the former (Mary's husband), the speaker is empathizing with 'Mary' more than with 'Mary's husband'.¹² By using the descriptor 'Mary's husband' to refer to 'John', the speaker invokes a characterization of John that is dependent on Mary (1987:204). Kuno and Kaburaki also argue that in the environment of the *by*-passive agentive, the speaker is empathizing more with the referent of the subject.¹³ They also note that there cannot be more than one focus of the speaker's Empathy in one utterance.¹⁴ Thus, the sentence "Mary's husband hit his wife" (where 'Mary's husband' indicates Empathy is on Mary, while in 'his wife' = 'John's wife', John is empathized with, 'wife' being dependent on John) is marginal, if not completely unacceptable.

One of Kuno and Kaburaki's observations that is particularly relevant to the present study concerns the use of 'Empathy adjectives'. They suggest that expressions such as

¹² The Descriptor Empathy Hierarchy: 'Given descriptor (x), (Mary), and another that is dependent upon (x), (Mary's husband), the speaker's Empathy with (x) is greater than with f(x). (Kuno 1987:432)

¹³ The Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy: It is easiest for the speaker to empathize with the referent of the subject; it is next easiest for him to empathize with the referent of the object... It is next to impossible for the speaker to empathize with the referent of the *by*-passive agentive. (Kuno and Kaburaki 1977:646)

¹⁴ The Ban on Conflicting Empathy Foci: A single sentence cannot contain two or more conflicting foci of the speaker's Empathy. (Kuno 1987:432).

'beloved' and 'dear old' can only be used when the speaker strongly identifies with, or views the narrated event from a vantage point close to the experiencer of those feelings. Essentially, these adjectives explicitly describe internal feelings and attitudes, and are therefore most often used by speakers to convey their own feeling: 'my dear old friend..' When they are used to describe someone else's feelings, however, Kuno and Kaburaki suggest that the speaker must empathize with that person (participant of the narrated event) in order to somehow plausibly convey the third party's 'internal feeling'. Otherwise, the resulting utterance, they suggest, may convey sarcasm or sound like quotation. i.e. 'My boss talked to me about his beloved wife.'

The sentences examined are all of the type: 'X talked to Y about his/her beloved/dear old Z.' Though the discourse referent that is described using the terms 'dear old' or 'beloved' (Z) is not the one empathized with, the fact that Kuno and Kaburaki suggest that the speaker must be aware of a close interpersonal distance between him/herself and the discourse referent who's internal feelings s/he is expressing, (X's), explicitly shows how the speaker must be conscious of all such relative vantage points. For example, in this case, not only does the speaker choose to use the Empathy adjective 'dear old' or 'beloved', but in order to use it without sarcasm, the speaker must have a high degree of Empathy for X. The speaker is able, in a sense, to know X's thoughts; that X would sincerely use the adjectives 'dear old' and 'beloved' in this context when speaking about Z.

Ertel's (1977) investigations into subject selection deal with similar concepts from a psychological angle. He suggests that although there are numerous 'nominal phrases' (cognitive units) in a speaker's mind at one time, that s/he cannot communicate them all simultaneously. He suggests that the production of a sentence centres around a selection process called "nominal seizing", the unit that is seized then serving as the reference point upon which to build the rest of the sentence.

"..if the subject of a sentence represents a cognitive unit that has been mentally seized by the speaker one should expect symptoms of relative closeness between the subject element and the speaker's ego." (1977:147.)

One of Ertel's tests involved an analysis of newspaper write-ups about local soccer


matches. He hypothesized that the notion of closeness to the speaker's/writer's ego would correlate to a social distinction between 'my group' and 'the other group.' Sentences in which a player from each team was mentioned (one in the nominative case, the other in an oblique case or prepositional phrase) were analyzed. Indeed, the reporters put players from the home teams in the nominative case more than twice as frequently as their opponents. (Home team players were as consistently mentioned in the nominative case even when their team was defeated.)

Although Ertel's investigations centre on the anchoring of the subject in terms of what knowledge items are closest to the speaker's cognitive field, (while we predict word-order variations independent of subject-status of such knowledge items), his investigations further support the notion that speakers' perceptions and point of view do play an important role in the formation of utterances.

Similarly, Zubin notes that such 'egocentric' tendencies are involved when a speaker focusses his/her interest on one over another entity in discourse, and that these egocentric biases are encoded grammatically in the Focus System in German. He remarks that:

"Given the choice of focussing interest on one of several entities in an event, the speaker will choose the entity closest to ego on the scale."
(1979:478)

The scale relative to the ego:



In order to test the hypothesis that speakers are egocentric when selecting entities toward which to direct their focus, Zubin analyzed sentences from two written samples (a novel and a scientific journal), counting the number of instances in which the speaker/writer uses the nominative case when referring to himself and when referring to other discourse participants that are further away from the EGO on the scale. The results support the hypothesis that the nominative case is used progressively less often to refer to entities that

are outside the focus of interest of the speaker, proportionate to their location respective to the EGO on the scale. The use of the nominative case indicates an entity is in the speaker's focus of interest; entities in the dative and accusative cases are not in the speaker's focus.

The notions of Empathy, familiarity and 'focus of interest' have been seen to primarily condition subject selection. Their effect on linear precedence relations seems secondary since in the languages discussed, such egocentric realizations coincide with and support the existing dominant grammatical orders. They are therefore 'seen as providing the motivation for the almost universal preference to position the subject before the object' (Siewierska:1988:61).

It is suggested however, by Yokoyama's TDM, that Russian word order strategies are conditioned by pragmatic roles over grammatical relations. If we focus on transitive Subject-Verb-Object constructions, taking into account the fact that passivization in Russian occurs rather infrequently, we may argue that the same speaker-centred phenomena occur in Russian, though do not result in an 'Empathized-with' or 'nominally-seized' constituent to necessarily, or to as regularly appear as subject or agent. Comrie (1989:81) notes that the Russian equivalent of the English sentence 'Masha was killed by Tanja' would be '*Mašu ubila Tanja.*' That is, in English, 'Masha' is the HE (High Empathy) constituent (as per Kuno and Kaburaki's Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy Rule, (where E(x) signifies Empathy for (x)), E(subject)>E(by-agentive) (1987:207); E(*Masha*)>E(*Tanja*)). In the Russian version, *Maša* is not subjectivized, but is the direct object in the accusative case and appears utterance-initially. The passive variant is possible, '*Maša byla ubita Tanjej*' where *Maša* has undergone subjectivization, though this alternative is much less likely to occur.

Bivon (1971:9) similarly offers that the English translation of the Russian sentence '*Petra nenavidel Ivan.*' ('Peter-acc - hates - Ivan-nom.') is one which involves a passive construction: 'Peter was hated by Ivan.' Borrás and Christian (1959:384) note that "the object in Russian is often placed first in the first sentence of a story when it is uppermost in the author's mind and he wishes to bring it first to the reader's attention... The same effect may be achieved in English by the use of a passive construction". If Kuno and Kaburaki's

Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy Rule rightly indicates that the subject is the HE item, and the passivized item is LE, and the Russian correlates provided are indeed the preferred translations, a comparison of the English and Russian variants suggest that though Empathy processes are universally manifest, their realizations differ between languages.

Where HE constituents are subjectivized (or 'nominally-seized') in English and German, based on the HE status of an item arising from identification or closeness felt by the speaker, we suggest that HE constituents in Russian will be imposed into the $C_a \cap C_b$ knowledge intersection regardless of case, and will thus occur pre-verbally.

2.2.1 Empathy and the interlocutor

Since Yokoyama's TDM has as one of its base elements the necessity of the speaker to assess the discourse situation (the current state of the interlocutor's knowledge sets in relation to his/her own), she broadens the notion of Empathy as presented by Kuno and Kaburaki in two ways. First of all Empathy must encompass not only the speaker's subjectively-determined vantage point relative to discourse participants, but also the 'assumed' vantage point(s) of the hearer relative to the discourse participants. Secondly, the interpersonal distance between the speaker and hearer must be considered.

In essence, Yokoyama integrates the idea of assessment of the discourse situation with the Empathy perspective, taking into account not only the degree to which the speaker identifies with discourse participants, but as well, the assessment (likelihood) of whether or not the addressee *shares* the degree of identification, and the subsequent adjustment of the utterance (via word order alternations in Russian) to account for it. For example, appropriate usage of a diminutive name in Russian (to refer to a discourse participant) must reflect the relationship between the speaker and the discourse referent, as well as the relationship between the hearer and the discourse referent. The ability of the speaker to assess the appropriateness of his/her diminutive usage is further conditioned by the interpersonal distance between the interlocutors themselves. (We will discuss this matter further in 2.2.2 below.)

Chafe (1976) considered Empathy as one factor that influences the status of nouns,

noting that a noun may 'represent the point of view the speaker is taking, or with whom the speaker is empathizing' (1976:28). As we mentioned earlier however, Chafe also noted that a speaker adjusts his speech upon consideration of the 'temporary states of the addressee's mind' (1976:28). Not only is the speaker able to view events and states from his/her point of view, but s/he is also able (and according to the Cooperative Principle, is perhaps obliged) to view events and states through the eyes of others. Manifestations of Empathy cannot be considered only from the speaker's perspective, but must reflect (or at least consider the potential for there to be) a balance between speaker-motivated manifestations of Empathy and the speaker's efforts to accommodate the temporary states of the addressee's mind.¹⁵

Earlier, we discussed how the interpersonal distance between the interlocutors dictates to a great extent the accuracy and relative freedom with which the speaker is able to make assessments of what is of current concern to the addressee. Therefore, not only is the speaker's Empathy with discourse participants important in determining the final form of the utterance, but the relationship between the speaker and hearer, and *assumed* relationship between the hearer and the discourse referents are also involved. The result is an extremely complex triangular relationship that is highly dependent on the speaker's subjectivity and personal attitude. Certainly the speaker's own Empathy, as demonstrated by Kuno and Kaburaki, will affect the syntactic arrangement of utterances, but as Yokoyama and others have suggested, the speaker has to balance his/her own Empathy/attitudinal judgments with those s/he assumes will or will not be shared by the interlocutor, and these assumptions, in turn, are determined to a great extent on the interpersonal distance between the speaker and hearer.

We have in mind here the idea that a speaker can express his/her Empathy, or may essentially 'override' this display of personal Empathy depending on whether its expression is appropriate or desirable in a particular context. Yokoyama suggests that the decision of whether or not to display one's personal Empathy is primarily a function of the interpersonal distance between interlocutors. Empathy is essentially an imposition, and as

¹⁵ Consideration of what the addressee may be thinking about seems not to be considered by Kuno and Kaburaki in their discussion of Empathy.

discussed earlier, impositions are more readily accepted when the interpersonal distance is not great. If interlocutors are less familiar with each other, then the speaker will most likely feel less free to make impositions, particularly those that are 'attitudinal.'

In summary, discourse-initial utterances should reflect the appropriate triangular relationship that will be acceptable to the addressee in a given situation.

2.2.2 Empathy and Russian Diminutives

We learned from Kuno and Kaburaki's analyses, that the speaker's choice of term of reference is extremely revealing as an indicator of the speaker's camera angle. For instance, in the sentence 'Bob's wife hit his sister', although the subject of the sentence is 'Bob's wife' (Mary), the speaker's Empathy is with Bob.¹⁶ Had the speaker viewed the narrated event from a vantage point closer to Mary, the sentence would have read 'Mary hit Bob's sister' or perhaps 'Mary hit her sister-in-law' or 'Mary hit her husband's sister.'

Yokoyama agrees that the choice of term of reference in Russian is particularly helpful in terms of evaluating the degree of identification the speaker has for a particular discourse referent, or the degree of identification that s/he is willing to express in a particular situation.

More specifically, Russian diminutives encode by means of suffixes and multiple-suffix combinations emotional-expressive nuances such as endearment or familiarity (as well as pejorative nuances). If we speak in terms of 'degrees' of identification with discourse referents, we can also speak of degrees of diminutives. Bratus (1969) distinguishes three degrees of diminutives. The first has only one diminutive component. Second degree diminutives are formed with 'suffixes of heightened expression' (1969:9). The third degree involves two or more diminutive suffix components, and express the most affection/ tenderness, as "the stringing together of suffixes reinforces the emotive-expressive meaning." (1969:8)

For example, if the speaker refers to a student as *Aleksander*, it can be understood that the speaker doesn't have a close, friendly relationship with him, though the use of *Saška* from friends indicates the opposite. Perhaps *Saška*'s mother always addresses him

¹⁶See note 12.

as *Sašen'ka*, expressive of extreme endearment and familiarity. This name then has various forms expressing increasing degrees of familiarity and endearment towards the participant: *Aleksander: Saša* (1st degree), *Saška* (2nd degree), *Sašen'ka* (3rd degree). As the different degrees of diminutives are used by the speaker, we can imagine the speaker's psychological vantage point moving closer and closer to the referent.

It is not enough to say, however, that the term of reference chosen by the speaker is always in complete accordance with his/her actual, "real" degree of identification with the discourse referent.

Uspenskij, in his analysis of 'point-of-view' in literature and pictorial art, notes that in everyday speech as well, changes in point-of-view or 'authorial position' are formally expressed through the act of naming. He suggests that speakers can change their position, and that they may assume the point-of-view of another discourse participant, or of one who is not even involved in the narration. Uspenskij supplies an example where X is talking with Y about Z:

"Z's family name is Ivanov, and his given name and patronymic are Vladimir Petrovich. But when X speaks to Z, he is accustomed to calling him by his nickname, Volodya, and Y in talking to Z calls him Vladimir. When Z thinks about himself he uses the name Vova, a nickname his family gave him when he was a child. So in a conversation between X and Y about Z, X may give Z one of several possible names:

a) X may call Z by the nickname 'Volodya.' In this case, he speaks from his own personal point of view.

b) X may call Z 'Vladimir.' Here, he adopts someone else's (Y's) point of view on Z. It is as if he had assumed the point of view of his interlocutor."

c) X may call Z by the nickname "Vova." The point of view he has adopted here is that of still another person (namely, that of Z), for Vova is a name which neither the speaker nor the interlocutor ever used in direct intercourse with Z.

d) X may speak about Z respectfully as "Vladimir Petrovich," in spite of the fact that both X and Y, in personal contact with Z, address him by one of the forms of the given name. In this case, it is as if X has adopted the point of view of some abstract detached observer who is neither a participant nor the subject of the conversation, and whose place is unspecified." (1973:20-21)

As exemplified by Uspenskij, the speaker can alter his/her point of view towards the discourse referent as the particular discourse context dictates, for various reasons. It could be to emphasize the hearer's relationship to the referent, or to incite some kind of

reaction, sarcasm, humour, etc., depending on the speaker's particular communicative goal.

Particularly relevant to our discussion is the alternation in choice of referential expression in (a) and (b) of Uspenskij's example. In (a), the speaker's vantage point alone vis-à-vis the discourse participant determines the term of reference to be used, whereas in (b), the speaker essentially overrides his/her own 'usual' stance towards the discourse referent, choosing instead to refer to him with the lexical item used primarily by the hearer.

For example, although *Aleksander*'s mother always calls him by the endearment form *Sašen'ka*, if she is phoning him at work and asking the boss to call him to the phone, it is unlikely that she would ask for *Sašen'ka*. In the mother's assessment of the discourse situation (of the temporary state of the addressee's mind), she probably realizes that 1) the boss may not realize who *Sašen'ka* is; 2) she should be specific, in that the boss is likely not thinking about *Aleksander* right now; 3) she doesn't know the boss at all, and would likely not be so 'open' as to show endearment towards her son, particularly in his own professional environment, with a complete stranger over the telephone. It is likely she would ask for '*Aleksander Petrovič*' (first name and patronymic), assuming the vantage point of an objective outsider, as in (d) of Uspenskij's example. Although the relationship mother → *Sašen'ka* has not changed, the mother makes an alternative lexical choice in light of what the discourse context called for. These conditions are a combination of assessment factors: addressee → discourse referent; speaker → addressee. The speaker need not assess the relationship speaker → discourse referent, because it is in the speaker's knowledge of the discourse situation, although this relationship is never static. Even here, the mother shifts her son out of that area of familiarity, having recognized that the interpersonal distance here precludes a display of personal interest. Conversely, if the mother is speaking to her husband about their son, she will likely refer to him as *Sašen'ka*, using the term of reference both parents are accustomed to using.

2.3.0 Empathy and Russian Word Order

We have established the method by which Yokoyama's TDM attempts to predict the

linear order of discourse initial utterances in terms of location of knowledge. We have examined intonational factors and discussed Yokoyama's two types, which render such utterances acceptable or unacceptable discourse-initially. We have discussed the Empathy concept and how identification for discourse participants and interpersonal distance will affect a speaker's choice of term of reference. It now remains for us to discuss how Yokoyama proposes that Empathy will interact with the TDM and affect linear ordering processes in Russian.

We are concerned primarily with the linear order of elements as they are affected by personal Empathy in discourse-initial utterances.¹⁷ As outlined earlier, just prior to a discourse-initial utterance, the only knowledge that is located in the intersection $C_a \cap C_b$ is of {DEIXIS} and ||P||. According to the ordering rule proposed in (10) of 2.1.6, it follows that *verbs* of non-impositional utterances whose only specified referents are participants of a narrated event (i.e. 'third parties' that are not located in {DEIXIS}), would necessarily be utterance-initial. For example:

$$\cancel{C_a \cap C_b} - V - C_a \cap (B - C_b) - A \cap (C_a - B)$$

When there are no available $C_a \cap C_b$ items (i.e. 'you/me'), that position is not filled; the utterance begins with the verb, and is followed by items of current concern to A but not to B, followed by those that are unknown to B. According to the ordering rule, when the items to be relocated in a given utterance are all situated in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ or $A \cap (C_a - B)$, they should necessarily follow the verb. This would suggest that verb-initial utterances would be very common discourse-initially. That we don't find verb-initial transitive utterances exclusively discourse-initially in the absence of shared items of current concern ($C_a \cap C_b$ items), we predict, can be accounted for by the interaction of Empathy arising from speaker attitude and subjectivity involved with assessment, and the relative strength of grammatical relations.

Consider Yokoyama's example (a discourse-initial statement by a mother to her

¹⁷ Although Yokoyama considers other utterance-types, questions, effusions, performatives, and their respective linear orders, we will refer only to statements, for our purposes.

husband relating an incident between their son *Sašen'ka* and another boy known to both of them):

- (21) *Sašen'ku ot lupil pervoklassnik Petrov.*
Sašen'ku-acc. beat up first-grader Petrov-nom.
 "Sašen'ka was beaten up by first-grader Petrov."

The locations of knowledge are:

Sašen'ku, pervoklassnik Petrov: in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$; both discourse participants are known to the interlocutor, though it is unlikely that either one is of current concern to B at the precise moment when s/he entered the room.

Though both items are in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$, there is a difference in the Empathy status assigned to the two nouns. *Sašen'ka* in this instance is the son of the speaker, therefore it is logical to assume that the speaker would have a relatively high degree of emotional concern for him. Furthermore, the use of the third-degree diminutive '*Sašen'ka*' expressing extreme familiarity, requires it receive HE status:

$E(Sašen'ka) > E(pervoklassnik Petrov)$

Yokoyama suggests that in situations where the speaker identifies strongly with one of the participants, and assumes the hearer shares this identification, that the referent will be imposed (that is, the speaker makes an imposition of the first type as described in section 2.1.5 above, where s/he assumes that an item is in C_b when it is actually located elsewhere) into the $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection, resulting in its placement utterance-initially in (as in (21)), with Type I intonation. Word orders that are contrary to the relative degrees of Empathy therefore become unacceptable with Type I intonation:

- (22) **Pervoklassnik Petrov ot lupil Sašen'ku.*

Yokoyama expands her ordering rule by adding the following generalization:

- (23) "In the absence of any referential items in $C_a \cap C_b$, the {High Empathy} item among the referential items is positionally placed into $C_a \cap C_b$." (1986:257)

Other orders are of course acceptable, though only when uttered with Type II intonation. In a Type I utterance where an imposition due to Empathy has been made, the speaker's misassessment requires that the item be placed in $C_a \cap C_b$. From that point on then, the ordering rule is maintained.

2.3.1 Pre-position in Type II utterances

The situation with Type II utterance-types is rather different from the standpoint of information location. With Type II intonation, Yokoyama maintains that the pre-position of the stressed item reflects NO CHANGE in the location of its referential knowledge. It is still located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ or $A \cap (C_a - B)$, as it would have been under Type I intonation.

The NP has been preposed from post-verbal location due to stress assignment.

Yokoyama comes to the conclusion therefore, that since the preposed item in Type II utterances is the only item that can convey metinformational knowledge through sentential stress, that "word order...must be meaningful not only in Type I utterances as a whole, but also in the choice of the landing site of the preposed item in Type II utterances, and within all those stretches of segmental material that bear no sentential stress before and after the word that bears it as well" (1986:199).

Though Yokoyama discusses the fact that word order in Type II utterances (except for the item marked by sentential stress) is significant, the examples provided in her discussion of personal Empathy are for the most part those that would be acceptable discourse-initially with Type I intonation. She submits that unacceptable variants of these examples would be acceptable with Type II, though there is often only one unacceptable variant provided. Furthermore, little discussion about the meaning of word order resulting from Type II is provided, and there is no suggestion that any item other than the utterance-final item under Type I (for instance, the verb) be preposed and bear the sentential stress in Type II. (This is particularly troubling, since even with a 3-word utterance, there are 6 possible word order permutations with Type I intonation, plus 12 more each which realize sentential stress on any one of the three components which have been preposed, and 6

more which could have the sentential stress on the utterance-final item¹⁸).

The fact that Yokoyama does not discuss in any detail what implications the implementation of Type II will have on Empathy-influenced utterances in particular makes it difficult for us to make any strong predictions about where or whether Empathy impositions are occurring in Type II utterances, relative to the location of sentential stress. This problem is particularly compounded by the fact that much of the word order literature that is based on FSP maintains that 'objective' order pronounced with 'neutral' intonation (essentially Type I), is characteristic of literary (written) language, and that 'subjective' or 'inverted' order is characteristic of conversational speech, in conjunction with 'emphatic' intonation. In fact, most accounts suggest that in conversational speech, the Functional Sentence Perspective (the division of the utterance in Theme and Rheme) is determined primarily by intonation, whereby the rheme is identifiable intonationally in that it is the portion that bears the 'logical stress'. It seems contradictory in these terms then, that Yokoyama's examples, all being conversational, would be discussed with regard primarily with Type I intonation.

One solution, then, would be to posit the use of Type II intonation as one factor that essentially 'cancels out' personal Empathy, (in much the same way that grammatical relations have the potential to do). But if, as Yokoyama suggests, the remainder of the utterance conveys metinformational knowledge, what is the difference between these two Type II variants of (21) in terms of Empathy?:

- (24) **Sašen'ku pervoklassnik Petrov ot lupil.**
Sašen'ku-acc. p. Petrov-nom. beat up.
 "First-grader Petrov beat up Sašen'ka."
- (25) **Pervoklassnik Petrov Sašen'ku ot lupil.**
P. Petrov-nom. Sašen'ku-acc. beat up.
 "First-grader Petrov beat up Sašen'ka."

Both appear to be instances in which Empathy impositions have been made coincident with Type II intonation. By definition, the utterance-final item with Type I intonation is preposed and bears the sentential stress, and the location of knowledge of the

¹⁸ Such utterances may be pronounced with an IK-2 final syntagma. Bryzgunova's IK-2 is similar to IK-1, but has a stronger emphasis on the intonational centre.

remaining items does not change. In essence, these utterances could be considered 'metinformationally synonymous' to their Type I correlate in (21). In fact, linguists working from the FSP perspective would agree that they are equivalent, but that the Type II variants are 'stylistically-colored.'

Moreover, it seems that wherever the HE item occurs pre-verbally and does not bear sentential stress, that it has been preposed due to Empathy. If a speaker is uninhibited in making an Empathy imposition, s/he essentially expects the hearer to accept the imposition unconditionally. That HE items are either imposed in Type I utterances or do not bear sentential stress in Type II utterances is perhaps an indication that they do not, based on the speaker's assessment, warrant an intonational 'marker', as do constituents that are located furthest away from the set of matters of current concern.

Although Yokoyama applies the TDM to explain some aspects of the deaccentuation of nouns in English, it seems that a similar tendency may serve to explain why, in Empathy-influenced utterances in Russian, the HE item should not bear sentential stress. Ladd (1978:90) notes that a noun is less likely to bear sentential stress if it is 'retrievable' or 'known'.

In both variants (24) and (25) the HE item *{Sašen'ka}* is pre-verbal and deaccented and has therefore been imposed and is located in $C_a \cap C_b$; the LE item *{pervoklassnik Petrov}* is stressed and preposed and is thus located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$. Though the two utterances appear to be equal in terms of location of knowledge, the two differ in terms of the landing site of the preposed LE item relative to the imposed HE item. Contrary to our arguments in favour of both (24) and (25) realizing Empathy impositions, it will become clear that (25) is unacceptable as an Empathy variant.

In terms of landing sites of preposed $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ items, Yokoyama specifies that they should not precede items in $C_a \cap C_b$ (1986:222). Variant (25) is therefore unacceptable, since the impositionally-placed *{Sašen'ka}* in $C_a \cap C_b$ due to Empathy is nevertheless preceded by the preposed LE item. The distinction between the two appears to

be subtle, and it becomes difficult to suggest that this variant would be ‘unacceptable’, or at least not in accordance with Empathy restrictions, as the HE item is still pre-verbal, deaccented and is derived from the same Type I correlate as is (24). The circular reasoning involved, whereby Type II utterances are defined in terms of their Type I correlates, surfaces here as a real impediment to our efforts to classify Type II variants into those that do and do not realize Empathy impositions.

This inconsistency is troubling for yet another reason, since there are other phonological factors that interact to determine the landing site of preposed items. Among these, Yokoyama maintains that the preposed item should not be moved so far leftward that it becomes difficult for the rest of the segmental material following it to be pronounced without rising stresses. Since, in (25), the material following the sentential stress is not particularly unmanageable, it is unlikely that this factor would account for the landing site. We are likely dealing here with an instance of interference of grammatical relations, which we will discuss below.

2.3.2 Empathy and word order: inhibited by the interlocutor relationship

Yokoyama suggests that where the speaker assesses that the hearer *does not* share identification for the referent, or where the speaker might appear exceedingly egocentric showing his/her own identification/concern for the referent, the speaker will not impose the item into $C_a \cap C_b$ and again, depending on the context, may use an alternative term of reference for the participant. Consider the same scenario as in (21), but this time the mother is speaking to the boy’s (*pervoklassnik Petrov’s*) mother:

- (26) Kolja ot lupil Sašu.
Kolja-nom. beat up Sašu-acc.
 “Kolja beat up Saša.”

The more distant interpersonal relationship cancels the two expressions of personal Empathy seen in (21). The previously HE item is not imposed, and the 3rd degree diminutive is replaced by {*Saša*}, a more neutral (1st degree) variant expressing less affection. Furthermore, in this case the mother refers to the other boy as ‘*Kolja*,’ since

'*pervoklassnik Petrov*' is too detached and impersonal in the other mother's presence.¹⁹ *Kolja* is a first degree diminutive form of the name *Nikolaj* (Nicholas). The degree of Empathy carried by both referential expressions is essentially equal.

Although the ordering rule would predict that in a situation where personal Empathy is inhibited by the interlocutor relationship, where referential items are still located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$, the resulting utterance would be verb-initial, it appears that a SVO order would nevertheless be more likely. It is at this point where we must discuss grammatical relations and consider the interference of grammatical ordering strategies with Empathy factors.

2.4.0 Grammatical Relations

It is important to note that the orders of sentence constituents (in (5) to (10) and (21)) correspond to the ordering template determined by locations of knowledge, irrespective of grammatical relations. The sentences are considered acceptable (and variations thereof are not acceptable when uttered with Type I intonation) although the word orders realized do not reflect any consistent deep case organization. That these orders

¹⁹ One of Yokoyama's only examples similar to (24) in which the speaker is presumably inhibited by the interpersonal relationship, is '*Vaša žena serditsja na Sašu*,' ("Your wife is angry at Saša"), the statement made by Saša's mother to her neighbour's husband. Yokoyama maintains that in this case, since the context inhibits the expression of personal Empathy, the referential knowledge of both items is located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$, just as it would have been prior to an imposition made in an Empathy-influenced utterance, as in (24).

If we recall Kuno and Kaburaki's Descriptor Empathy Hierarchy, where given a descriptor (you) and another that is dependent on (you), (your wife), the speaker's Empathy with (you) is greater than with (your wife). Although 'vaša' is a possessive modifier and not a full lexical item in the possessive genitive with 's, the referent 'žena' (wife) is certainly dependent on 'vy' (you), in this case, the interlocutor. 'You' and not 'žena' must therefore receive the HE status. As we stated earlier, 'you' is referential knowledge located in {DEIXIS}, therefore in $C_a \cap C_b$, and according to Yokoyama's ordering rule, would automatically be placed utterance-initially.

Yokoyama uses these examples to introduce the question of grammatical interference into her analysis and suggests that in cases such as these, where both referential items are located in the same intersection, deep semantic roles will determine their linear placement in the absence of Empathy factors. It seems in this example however, that Empathy has come into play and the items are not located in the same intersection, though it seems to be Empathy directed towards the hearer. Yokoyama seems to have 'overcompensated' somewhat in her example.

We do agree that effects brought about by personal Empathy diminish when the interpersonal distance becomes greater, and that especially in such cases, grammatical norms have the potential to dominate word order choices. In our experiment, however, we have supplied scenarios where we believe the two referential items are in fact located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$.

(non-SVO) be deemed acceptable discourse-initially further validates the strength of pragmatic considerations over grammatical relations. Although one may assume the discourse-initial situation to be the best in identifying 'basic' word orders, the fact that one consistent grammatical order does not emerge suggests that the assessed locations of knowledge have the potential to outweigh grammatical considerations in the linear arrangement of sentence constituents. It may be misleading to consider as some have (Pullum 1977:266) that the discourse-initial situation is useful in determining 'basic order' on the assumption that it is 'context-free'. If, as suggested, an assessment indeed takes place, whereby the speaker carefully considers and balances his/her own communicational goals with what may/may not be relevant and meaningful to the hearer, it follows therefore that there is indeed a preceding context, albeit 'pre-linguistic', one that cannot be considered 'pragmatically-neutral'.

Linguists working from a Functional Sentence Perspective standpoint, claim that Russian word order is free, that is, until the FSP for a particular sentence has been determined. Babby (1978) also agrees that a basic order does not exist, and in an analysis of transformational structures represented in terms of tree-structures, maintains that the order of elements is then determined only by the contextual/pragmatic features that will indicate Theme and Rheme.

Although Russian is often considered a free word order language, SVO is certainly more canonical than the other (though grammatical) permutations. The strength of SVO as a basic order is often supported by the fact that it is the preferred interpretation for sentences where subjects and objects cannot be determined morphologically. For example, sentences such as '*Mat' ljubit doč'*' (Mother-nom/acc. loves daughter-nom/acc.) (Comrie:1981:88). The SVO order is much more frequent than the other permutations, thereby suggesting that it is dominant, if not basic. Bivon (1971), in an analysis of frequency determined that 89% of clauses in Russian are SVO (though this was an analysis of written Russian).

Disregarding for the moment the canonical status of SVO, there is other evidence that suggests that SO combinations are themselves dominant, perhaps regardless of the location of the verb. Comrie notes that the predominance of SO in basic word orders seems to correlate to a universal psychological tendency to place Agents before Patients.

Yokoyama suggests that one can arrive at a ‘basic’ order only by examining the arrangement of an utterance consisting of knowledge items that are all equal, both in terms of Empathy and their location of referential knowledge (1986:271). She arrives at a similar conclusion, and asserts that “between items equal in their animacy status, agents precede objects” (1986:273). She maintains therefore, that ‘grammatical relations’ as they interact and/or interfere with the TDM should be understood in terms of deep semantic roles, with particular regard to animacy factors, rather than notions of surface case grammatical categories.

Yokoyama returns to the example (9) of Chapter 2:

(27) Vam prislali Ivanovy priglasenie.

$C_a \cap C_b$ -V- $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ - $A \cap (C_a - B)$

It was considered the acceptable variant with Type I intonation according to locations of knowledge. Now she submits that speakers may claim other variants to be more appropriate discourse-initially:

(28) Vam Ivanovy prislali priglasenie.

IO/Ben. - S/Agent - V - DO/Pat.

(29) Ivanovy prislali vam priglasenie.

S/Agent - V - IO/Ben. - DO/Pat.

It is suggested that in (29), the grammatically (semantically) prominent item {*Ivanovy*}, though clearly situated in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$, has overridden {*vam*}, the semantically less-prominent $C_a \cap C_b$ item’s claim for utterance-initial position, as in (28). Yokoyama proposes a seemingly ‘catch-all’ notion of *demotion*, whereby items that should presumably be pre-verbal ({*DEIXIS*}), either remain in post-verbal location, or appear pre-verbally, but follow grammatically-dominant items located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$.

The combined notions of grammatical interference and *demotion* seem to adequately account for the order of the animate constituents in (28) and (29). Note, however, that none of the referential items stand out clearly as targets of a speaker’s Empathy. The unacceptability of our Empathy example (22), therefore, needs to be reconsidered (repeated here as (30)):

(30) Pervoklassnik Petrov otlupil Sašen'ku.

Perhaps, as argued above for (28) and (29), this variant could also be considered an entirely appropriate discourse-initial utterance. Though it opposes all of the word order formulations proposed thus far based on locations of knowledge involving items with HE status, the constituents are ordered in accordance with the grammatical condition that Agents precede Patients (SO). We could tentatively account for this occurrence by suggesting that *{Pervoklassnik Petrov}* has claimed utterance-initial position because it is a semantically dominant Agent, and that *{Sašen'ku}*, though imposed into $C_a \cap C_b$ due to Empathy, has been demoted out of that knowledge intersection because it is a (semantically weaker) Patient.

The suggestion that grammatical factors can effectively rival the linear orders predicted by the TDM is problematic. It implies that whenever TDM-supported arrangements and grammatically-supported arrangements are in direct opposition (as in (28)-(30)), the usage of either one can be justified 'after the fact' by applying the criteria of whichever approach is reflected.²⁰

Although Yokoyama offers that grammatical relations interfere with items non-imensionally located pre-verbally (namely {DEIXIS}), as in (28) and (29), she maintains that grammatical factors do not affect items that have been imposed, due to Empathy, into $C_a \cap C_b$. She asserts that, "claims for preverbal position made by referential items carrying the speaker's personal Empathy have...been shown to be dominant," remarking further that the examples discussed in her analysis of personal Empathy "indicate that...

(31) ..grammatical factors unambiguously yield the preverbal position to items marked with personal Empathy." (both Yokoyama 1986:279)

Unfortunately, having drawn this conclusion, it became unnecessary for Yokoyama to provide examples where grammatical relations might have interfered with Empathy

²⁰ Indeed, this seems to be the case in Yokoyama's analysis of statements that do not involve Empathy. Here, grammatical relations, demotion, and another concept of 'shifting out' (whereby a speaker shifts the deictic element that is referring to him/herself out of $C_a \cap C_b$ due to politeness or humility), are used to account for all examples that do not follow the ordering rule proposed.

impositions.

In anticipation of our experiment however, we must consider the possibility that speakers may select variants that clearly support a grammatical SO order, rather than an order that reflects the proposed appropriate Empathy relationships and locations of knowledge. For example:

(32) **Pervoklassnik Petrov Sašen'ku otlupil.** (Type I)

(33) **Otlupil pervoklassnik Petrov Sašen'ku.** (Type I)

There are also numerous Type II variants that appear to reflect the grammatical SO order in conflict with the order predicted for Empathy-conditioned utterances. For example:

(34) **Otlupil pervoklassnik Petrov Sašen'ku.**

(35) **Pervoklassnik Petrov otlupil Sašen'ku.**

(36) **Sašen'ku pervoklassnik Petrov otlupil.**

(37) **Sašen'ku otlupil pervoklassnik Petrov.**

(38) **Otlupil Sašen'ku pervoklassnik Petrov.**

(39) **Pervoklassnik Petrov Sašen'ku otlupil.**

Though Yokoyama would deem these variants 'unacceptable,' we must include them in our account since the possibility exists that native speakers may select these arrangements. We will avoid the notion of *demotion* in our analysis however, choosing instead to contrast the use of 'grammatically inverted' object-initial patterns (on account of Empathy) with the grammatical SO pattern. In essence, evidence for Empathy impositions would be provided if utterances are clearly dominant, in which HE objects/patients appear utterance-initially, because this arrangement runs counter to the universal tendency to place subjects before objects.

2.5.0 Summary

The TDM as it relates the connative encoding of metinformational knowledge in an ordered, traceable manner appears to be a powerful system capable of predicting the order of elements in Russian discourse-initial voluntary informational statements.

Empathy as an operational ordering strategy is claimed to be active in discourse-initial situations where discourse referents in a transitive relationship are located in the same

knowledge intersection. Within the TDM's linear template, items are ordered from left to right from those that are of shared current concern to both the speaker and the hearer, followed by the verb, followed by those that are known to the hearer, but not of current concern, to those that are unknown to the hearer. Since the speaker can never be absolutely certain in a discourse-initial situation about what is of current concern to his/her interlocutor, s/he must make a subjective assessment of the state of his/her hearer's knowledge sphere. This assessment is claimed to be conditioned to a great extent by a speaker's personal Empathy.

One discourse referent is imposed into utterance-initial position according to the relative number or strength of Empathy features associated with it. Empathy is claimed to condition linear arrangements in the following ways. First, a referent may receive HE status when it is referred to with a diminutive, which, as suggested, is an indicator of a 'real' level of closeness and familiarity felt by a speaker towards a participant. Secondly, when the speaker assesses the hearer to share his/her personal interest in the discourse referent, the degree of Empathy increases. Thirdly, when the interpersonal distance between speaker and hearer is small, the speaker feels more comfortable making impositions of personal Empathy, whether or not the hearer shares Empathy toward the discourse referent (though this last feature does not affect a referent's position on the Empathy scale).

Yokoyama claims that orders resulting from Empathy-influenced contexts will accord with the pattern $(Ca \cap Cb - V - Ca \cap (B - Cb))$ regardless of the grammatical case of discourse referents. As grammatical factors are claimed to yield preverbal position to HE items, a word order variant with a HE Object/Patient in utterance-initial position (though in opposition to the grammatical SO arrangement) would be the only acceptable variant.

Acceptable orders may be of two intonational types, classified by Yokoyama as Type I and Type II. Type I intonation lacks sentential stress. Acceptable discourse-initial Empathy-conditioned utterances with Type I intonation are arranged from left to right according to locations of knowledge. Word order is used exclusively to convey the metinformational 'assessment' knowledge of the speaker. Though Type II intonation

utterances are characterized by sentential stress, they can also be Empathy influenced. The sentence constituent that would appear utterance-finally under Type I intonation bears the sentential stress and is pre-posed. Yokoyama maintains that although there is an intonational 'marker' in Type II utterances (that conveys metainformational knowledge about what is 'unknown/new' to the hearer), the relative order of the remaining constituents is meaningful, as is the landing site of the preposed item. Empathy appears to be active when HE discourse referents claim utterance-initial position and are unstressed (in BOTH Type I and Type II utterances) This situation can be verified only by determining the extent to which unstressed Object/Patient HE constituents are imposed into utterance-initial position, as the resulting order would oppose canonical grammatical orders where Subjects *precede* Objects.

As Yokoyama does not supply any data to support her claim that Empathy-conditioned linear orders are dominant although they directly oppose grammatical 'SO' linear precedence relations, we feel it necessary to test the model, in order to determine to what extent the predicted results will be exemplified in an experimental situation.

CHAPTER THREE

Hypotheses and Experiment

3.0.0 Introduction

In this chapter, we outline the experimental design as well as present the hypotheses that we intend to test. Our experiment was designed in order to determine whether HE items will indeed claim utterance-initial position in discourse-initial voluntary statements in Russian, even when the resulting arrangement opposes the grammatical SO pattern, as has been suggested by Yokoyama (1986).

Our primary hypotheses are conditioned by the terms of what linear orderings of discourse-initial utterances Yokoyama deems 'acceptable' with either Type I or Type II intonation in circumstances where an Empathy relationship is involved. In light of some of the anticipated inconsistencies (for instance, the difficulty faced in making hypotheses about the placement of sentential stress in Type II utterances, as well as the significance of word order in the remaining segmental material in Type I utterances), we will address these issues in terms of secondary questions, which will be discussed descriptively as they arise throughout our investigation. We expect that we may be able to point out certain areas where Empathy factors interact with the TDM and suggest modifications to the theory or define its limitations for use. (For example, it may not be a strong predictive tool, but worthwhile as a descriptive tool.)

3.1.0 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1:

In target contexts featuring Empathy conditions (diminutives and close interpersonal relationships) unstressed-Object-initial word order variants will be selected (OSV, OVS, OSV, OVS).

In the first portion of the target contexts, subjects are to select discourse-initial utterances that will be pronounced to an interlocutor who is interpersonally close to him/her. In this

instance, we expect that native speakers will select one of the four variants which realize impositions due to personal Empathy, those which do not reflect grammatical ordering sequences. The orders selected, we predict, will follow Yokoyama's linear ordering arrangement

$Ca \cap Cb - V - Ca \cap (B-Cb)$

as well as Empathy hierarchy

HE > LE

from left to right. In accordance with both Yokoyama's claims for what factors determine the location of knowledge and the variables set up in our contexts, a high-degree diminutive in Object position will be the item most appropriate to impose into $Ca \cap Cb$, leaving the LE Subject/Agent discourse referent to fill the $Ca \cap (B-Cb)$ (post-verbal) knowledge intersection. In grammatical terms, orders of the type

- (a) OSV
- (b) OVS
- (c) OSV
- (d) OVS

will be selected. In other words, the HE item (referred to here with a 3rd-degree diminutive) will claim utterance-initial position and will be unstressed. (Note that the expected Empathy responses can be uttered with both Type I and Type II intonation.)

Hypothesis 2:

In target contexts without Empathy conditions (diminutives and close interpersonal relationships are not featured) grammatical word order variants will be selected.

In the second portions of the target contexts, grammatical ordering strategies will dominate word order selections. Again, orders will reflect Yokoyama's ordering pattern

$Ca \cap Cb - V - Ca \cap (B-Cb)$

The interlocutor in this instance, however, is a more distantly-related individual. The Object

referent in this case is referred to using a lesser-degree diminutive or none at all. Both discourse referents are therefore essentially equal on the Empathy scale. If the interpersonal distance between interlocutors and the use of a lesser-degree diminutive, as proposed, inhibits or does not activate a display of personal Empathy, word order selections (a)-(d) above, will not be chosen as readily. Instead, we expect that order selections reflecting the grammatical SO pattern will dominate.

3.2.0 Subjects

Twenty-one native speaking Russian subjects participated in the experiment, fourteen adult men and seven adult women. Their age varied from 27 years to 49 years. All but one had a university education, and their time of residence outside of the USSR or Russia was between three months and six years.

3.3.0 Procedure

Subjects were given a booklet containing 25 contexts and an instruction sheet explaining how they were to proceed with the tasks. Fifteen of the contexts were 'target' scenarios, the relationships which we were directly testing, while the remaining ten were 'distractor' contexts.

The target contexts in the booklet narrated a variety of scenarios involving two main characters. One of the characters depicted was shown to have a close interpersonal relationship with the subject (who ultimately plays the role of the speaker), for example, the subject's mother, brother, sister, best friend, aunt, etc. The second character was invariably someone that the speaker knew, had seen or had heard of, but who was certainly not interpersonally 'close' to the speaker ([the] coach, [the] cashier, [the] musician).

The situations described some event culminating in the more interpersonally distant character doing something to the closely related character. The subjects were to imagine they were relating the event (discourse-initially) to their husband/wife/mother or some other closely related individual. Subjects were asked to read all the possibilities to themselves, then to mark their first and second choices. As specified by the instructions, the informants first choice was to be that variant that matched their most genuine personal reaction.

Subjects were to select the most acceptable of the remaining variants as their second choice. Informants were asked if they had any questions before the test was given. All questions and any possible confusion regarding the instructions or anything dealing with how to proceed with the experiment, were clarified by the author at that point. When the informants had made their selections, they were asked to pronounce their choices aloud, at which time the utterances were recorded. They were encouraged to introduce their choices with introductory phrases or questions such as *'Nu, ty znaeš'...* ("Well/So, you know..."), *'Ty můžeš' sebe představit'...* ("Can you imagine..."), etc.

The six three-word discourse-initial variants provided differed only with respect to word order. The more distantly-related character appeared in the nominative case, and was referred to with an impersonal noun ([the] coach, [the] actor, [the] gardener). The closely related individual was always the direct object of a transitive verb, and in the first part, was referred to using a 3rd-degree diminutive. Examples of utterances include: *'Mašen'ku napoil francuz.'* ("The Frenchman got Mašen'ka drunk."), *'Dimočku nokautiroval trener.'* ("Dimočka was KO'd by the trainer."), *'Yuročku vybral korrespondent.'* ("Yuročka was chosen by the correspondent.").

In eleven of the fifteen contexts, the HE object was 'victimized,' in the sense that s/he was the object of some negative or 'uncalled-for' action (cheated, offended, robbed, punished, told off, betrayed, knocked out, killed, spanked, made drunk). Not only did we intend for this victimization to generate more Empathy on the part of the speaker toward the HE referent, but it was a useful approach that served to make the discourse-initial utterances less contrived, insofar as the events communicated could be considered more 'newsworthy.' In the remaining four contexts, the HE patients were the objects of some positive action (praised, kissed, defended, chosen).

In the second part, the subjects were again asked to imagine they were relating the same event, but this time to a more distantly-related interlocutor (a neighbour, acquaintance) and again, to choose from among six variants, which differed from those in the first part only in the term of reference used to refer to the closely-related character. In place of a 3rd-degree diminutive, a 1st or 2nd-degree diminutive was used (in one case, a

name with no diminutive suffixes was used).

Again, subjects were asked to read all the possibilities to themselves, then to mark their first and second choices. They pronounced their choices aloud, at which time the utterances were recorded.

In terms of the parameters proposed by Yokoyama for the discourse-initial situation, the knowledge of both the characters in each of the contexts is located in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$. In other words, the specified referential knowledge is known to B (the hearer), but is not at present time part of B's matters of current concern. The contexts were structured also so that the character referred to with an impersonal noun could not be considered indefinite (could not be located in $A \cap (C_a - B)$, i.e. could only be understood to be, for example, 'the cashier' rather than 'a cashier').

The contexts were developed with a fair amount of precision, containing between 6 and 13 sentences each, in order that the subjects take the time and have access to enough contextual detail in each instance to adequately 'set the scene' within his/her mind. This approach was taken in light of the results of a pilot study undertaken in which the contexts proved to be underdeveloped and as a result, there was little or no variation in word order selection.

A sample target context (translated) is as follows:

Your 12-year old son Sašen'ka plays hockey. You and Sašen'ka were on your way to his game when you had car trouble, and ended up being late. As a result, the strict coach didn't let Sašen'ka play. After the game, the coach told Sašen'ka that he had to be more disciplined, and therefore would also not allow him to play in the next game. Furthermore, the coach wouldn't give Sašen'ka a chance to explain why he arrived late.

You returned home after the game. Sašen'ka was very angry and went straight to his bedroom.

Your husband/wife returns home from work. What do you tell him/her about what happened?

Nakazal trener Sašen'ku.
punished coach-nom Sašen'ka-acc.
 Sašen'ka was punished by the coach.

Trener nakazal Sašen'ku.

Trener Sašen'ku nakazal.

Sašen'ku trener nakazal.
Sašen'ku nakazal trener.
Nakazal Sašen'ku trener.

A little while later a family friend, the father of a boy who plays on another team, called you. What do you tell him about what happened?

Sašu nakazal trener.
Sašu-acc. punished coach-nom.
Saša was punished by the coach.
Nakazal Saša trener.
Trener Saša nakazal.
Trener nakazal Saša.
Nakazal trener Saša.
Saša trener nakazal.

The ten distracter contexts were similar in structure. The subject noun was a human agent in nine cases, and the direct object was inanimate in six cases. In three cases, the direct object was an animal, in one context, both agent and patient were animals. Again, a diminutive alternation was carried out in the distracter contexts. In all nine contexts with a human agent, the diminutive variation was carried out with the term of reference designating him/her. In the context with the two animal characters, the direct object animal was diminutivized.

Participants were given as much time as required in order to complete the experiment. The duration of the task varied widely between participants (from 40 minutes to approximately 70 minutes).

3.3.1 Response Choices - Type I

Although there are only six word order permutations possible from the 3-word discourse-initial utterances provided, the application of either Type I or Type II intonation makes it necessary to consider eighteen possible arrangements. We must identify which of the eighteen utterance possibilities support, and which conflict with the Empathy and/or the grammatical (SO) theories respectively, in order to proceed with the analysis of subjects'

selections. This inventory refers only to the target contexts, in which the HE items are objects invariably, and the expected linear order predicted for Empathy is in opposition to the grammatical order SO. In strict accordance with the terms outlined by Yokoyama, acceptable variants realizing Empathy impositions would occur in 2 of the 6 possible word order variants with Type I intonation:

- | | | |
|--|----------|-----|
| (1) Katen'ku otrugal dvornik. | (Type I) | OVS |
| <i>Katen'ku-acc. swore gardener-nom.</i> | | |
| Katen'ka was 'told off' by the gardener. | | |
| (2) Katen'ku dvornik otrugal. | (Type I) | OSV |

In (1), LE {*dvornik*} remains post-verbally in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$, while HE {*Katen'ka*} has been imposed into $C_a \cap C_b$ and is situated utterance-initially. In (2), {*dvornik*} has also been imposed into $C_a \cap C_b$, but follows the HE item. Furthermore, both orders directly oppose the grammatical SO pattern.

Empathy impositions do not occur in the 4 remaining Type I possibilities:

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|-----|
| (3) Dvornik Katen'ku otrugal. | (Type I) | SOV |
| (4) Otrugal Katen'ku dvornik. | (Type I) | VOS |
| (5) Otrugal dvornik Katen'ku. | (Type I) | VSO |
| (6) Dvornik otrugal Katen'ku. | (Type I) | SVO |

In (4), (5) and (6), HE {*Katen'ka*} is not imposed pre-verbally. Though imposed in (3), it follows the LE item. Since the grammatically prominent subject/agent has overridden the HE item's claim for utterance-initial position in (3) and (6), Yokoyama would deem these choices unacceptable. As the HE item should be imposed into $C_a \cap C_b$ and thus appear pre-verbally in (4) and (5), these two are also unacceptable Empathy variants. The orders in (3), (5) and (6) all reflect the Agent preceding Patient SO order. (4) reflects neither the Empathy nor the grammatical theory.

3.3.2 Response Choices - Type II

The classification of Type II utterances as to whether they support the Empathy or Grammar theories (or neither) is more problematic. Again, the difficulty arises because our definition indicates that Type II variants have been derived from Type I correlates. In

essence, preposed items bearing sentential stress appear utterance-finally in corresponding Type I utterances. The location of knowledge of the remaining items does not change. Only two of the 12 possible Type II utterance variants realize impositions due to personal Empathy:

(7) *Katen'ku dvornik otrugal.* (Type II) OSV

In (7) {*dvornik*} is preposed, but bears sentential stress, indicating that its referential knowledge is still located in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$.

(8) *Katen'ku otrugal dvornik.* (Type II) OVS

Although Yokoyama does not consider the possibility that the verb could bear the sentential stress and be preposed, we will include this variant among those that realize Empathy impositions, as the other Empathy criteria are met; the HE item has claimed utterance-initial position and is deaccented. Both (7) and (8) are in opposition to the SO arrangement.

The remaining Type II variants do not realize Empathy impositions:

(9) *Dvornik Katen'ku otrugal.* (Type II) SOV

The sentential stress in (9) on the LE item (indicating that it is metinformationally located in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$), coupled with the consequent deaccentuation and pre-verbal location of HE {*Katen'ka*} may suggest that this utterance accords with our Empathy criteria. Recall Yokoyama's claim (of (31) of Chapter 2), however, that $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ items preposed with Type II intonation *should not precede* those in $C_a \cap C_b$, maintaining that even grammatically prominent LE items yield utterance-initial position to HE items. This variant is therefore unacceptable as an Empathy utterance. This variant similarly does not support the grammatical theory. Although it may appear that the order is clearly SOV, we have taken the approach that Type II utterances can be defined only in conjunction with their Type I correlates. The 'underlying' order is therefore OVS and still opposes the SO arrangement.

The other two variants in which the LE item bears the sentential stress realize no Empathy influence; the HE item is not imposed pre-verbally:

(10) *Dvornik otrugal Katen'ku.* (Type II) SVO

(11) *Otrugal dvornik Katen'ku.* (Type II) VSO

Again, the arrangements in (10) and (11), from left to right, seem to reflect SO order. If we agree to evaluate them in terms of their Type I correlates (submitting that the stressed item has been preposed from an equivalent 'non-stressed' meaningful utterance-final location), it follows that the utterances in (9), (10) and (11) support neither the Empathy nor the grammatical theories.

We will again attempt to determine (as we did in (8)), where personal Empathy is operational in variants where the verb bears the sentential stress, although this possibility is not considered in Yokoyama's Empathy analysis. This occurs in 3 instances:

- | | |
|--|-----|
| (12) Otrugal Katen'ku dvornik. (Type II) | VOS |
| (13) Otrugal dvornik Katen'ku. (Type II) | VSO |
| (14) Dvornik otrugal Katen'ku. (Type II) | SVO |

By definition, preposed items bearing sentential stress appear utterance-finally in corresponding Type I utterances, while the location of knowledge of the remaining items does not change. The corresponding Type I utterance of (12) would then be:

- (a) Katen'ku dvornik otrugal.

Utterances (13) and (14) correspond to:

- (b) Dvornik Katen'ku otrugal.

As we established above for utterance selections (2) and (3) respectively, an Empathy imposition is realized in (a) and not in (b), thereby suggesting that Type II utterance (12) is Empathy influenced, while (13) and (14) are not. Although the pre-verbal location of the HE item in Type I utterances (2) and (3) indicates that Empathy impositions have been made, we cannot justifiably use these corresponding variants as evidence for an Empathy imposition in (12). 'Imposition' specifies movement leftward over the verb. In Type II utterances (12)-(14), the verb itself has been preposed. To then refer back to 'equivalent' Type I utterances of (11)-(14) in order to confirm that Empathy impositions have been made, by which a HE item is *itself* moved leftward over the verb, seems totally inappropriate. We hesitate to include these utterances among those that unquestionably reflect Empathy impositions, as the reasoning by which one may suggest that Empathy factors are apparent therein, is founded precisely on the type of circular justification we

referred to earlier.

We suggest instead that variant (12) should be considered in terms of the landing site of the preposed item, as was variant (9). There, Yokoyama specified that preposed, stressed $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ items should not precede those imposed into $C_a \cap C_b$ due to Empathy.

Again, though stressed, preposed verbs were not covered in Yokoyama's analysis, since the HE item is not utterance-initial, it cannot be said to reflect a true Empathy imposition. Similarly, the grammatical SO order is not reflected. Variant (12), therefore, supports neither theory.

The remaining 4 possibilities all have the HE item preposed and bearing sentential stress:

- | | |
|---|------------|
| (15) Katen'ku otrugal dvornik. (Type II) | OVS |
| (16) Katen'ku dvornik otrugal. (Type II) | OSV |
| (17) Otrugal Katen'ku dvornik. (Type II) | VOS |
| (18) Dvornik Katen'ku otrugal. (Type II) | SOV |

Recall that a reflection of personal Empathy would entail that the HE item is imposed into $C_a \cap C_b$. Where the HE item {*Katen'ka*} bears the sentential stress, is an indication that it is located in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$, and has therefore not been imposed. Empathy impositions therefore, do not occur in these variants.

3.4.0 Summary

We have isolated four of eighteen possible variants that realize Empathy impositions, in accordance with Yokoyama's predictions involving personal Empathy²¹ :

- | | |
|----------|-----|
| (19) OVS | (1) |
| (20) OSV | (2) |
| (21) OSV | (7) |
| (22) OVS | (8) |

We have isolated nine variants that reflect the grammatical order SO:

- | | |
|----------|-----|
| (23) SVO | (6) |
| (24) SOV | (3) |

²¹ The numbers to the right of each pattern refer to the number of that particular example in our discussion above.

(25) VSO	(5)
(26) VSO	(13)
(27) SVO	(14)
(28) OVS	(15)
(29) OSV	(16)
(30) VOS	(17)
(31) SOV	(18)

The remaining five possibilities support neither the Empathy nor the grammatical theories:

(32) VOS	(4)
(33) VSO	(11)
(34) SVO	(10)
(35) SOV	(9)
(36) VOS	(12)

Upon first glance, the classification of some Type II orders may appear to be incorrect. In particular, one may wonder why orders where S precedes O linearly (as in (33)-(35)) are classified as not supporting the grammatical theory. How can orders where O precedes S (as in (28)-(31)) be identified as supporting the grammatical SO theory? Again we stress that the sentence types were classified according to what Yokoyama claims the orders reflect 'metinformationally.' This determination, in turn, was arrived at by considering what kinds of information (i.e. current concern to both interlocutors, current concern to A only, unknown to B) are to be located in each utterance position *with Type I intonation*. Essentially, these Type II utterances are variants of their 'underlying' Type I correlates. In Russian, we cannot observe the order of elements and what it reflects informationally without considering intonation. Recall that FSP scholars noted the same type of correlation between 'neutral' (Type I) and 'emotive' (Type II) variants. Items bearing sentential stress in Type II are considered to be new/rhematic elements, regardless of their case/grammatical status. It is an intonational marker that accounts for its movement leftward from its neutral position in a Type I correlate.

We expect that all responses will reflect Yokoyama's linear ordering template.

$C_a \cap C_b - V C_a \cap (B - C_b)$

As the determination of what belongs in each knowledge intersection discourse-initially is based on the speaker's *subjective* assessment of the discourse situation, personal Empathy

conditions utterance constituents' placement in the linear arrangement. When discourse referents have HE status, they are more likely to be imposed into $Ca \cap Cb$, the intersection that is normally reserved for items of current concern to *both* interlocutors. We therefore made lexical and contextual changes (involving diminutives and interpersonal distance between interlocutors) in order to change the E status of discourse referents, in order to generate different responses from the first and second parts of 15 experimental contexts.

In Part (a) of the target contexts therefore, the grammatical Patient/DO was referred to using a third degree diminutive. It automatically receives HE status and should therefore be imposed directly into $Ca \cap Cb$, more so as the subjects are communicating this utterance to a closely related interlocutor. We expect selections of the type (19)-(22).

In Part (b) of the target contexts, the grammatical Patient/DO receives a lesser degree diminutive (first or none). It is therefore approximately equal in terms of Empathy as the Subject discourse referent. Furthermore, the tendency to empathize is inhibited by a more distant interlocutor relationship. We expect grammatical word ordering strategies to dominate, and therefore predict that utterances of the type (23)-(31) will be chosen more readily.

CHAPTER FOUR

Results

4.0.0 Introduction

Subjects' recorded responses were analysed by the author. The relative orders of Subject, Verb and Object, as well as whether the utterance was chosen as a first or a second choice, were verified with the responses that informants marked on the questionnaires. The author then determined whether or not the uttered responses were to be classified as Type I or Type II. The item bearing the stress in Type II utterances was identified.²² All responses were then entered into tables and counted according to the inventory of utterance-types established in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Separate tallies were taken for each individual context, including both target and distractor contexts. Though first and second choices were marked as such in the original data tables, they were later combined in the majority of total raw scores.

A running total impacting our primary hypotheses was carried out across all target contexts. We calculated the total number of Empathy-influenced selections made in Part (a) of the experiment against the total number of grammatical selections in Part (b). Overall totals of other experimental variables were noted as well. The total number selected of each of the 18 word order variants (in Parts (a) and (b) and totals) provided a hierarchy of preferred linear orders. The number of selections made (in Parts (a) and (b) and totals) using Type I or Type II intonation was also counted. The results are presented in this chapter following this order. The final section presents χ^2 tests comparing Empathy, Grammar and 'Other' responses by category, responses to Parts (a) and (b) and intonation Type.

4.1.0 Empathy, Grammar and 'Other' Responses

In the Part (a) sections of the target scenarios (those in which the Object/Patient

²²In order to support the author's determination of both which intonational Type was implemented, and which item was stress-bearing in Type II utterances, the responses would ideally be verified by a panel of judges or by instrumental analysis. The intonational variation was quite pronounced and rather easily discernible across the 3-item possibilities in this test.

referent was referred to using a high-degree diminutive and in which subjects were addressing closely-related interlocutors with their discourse-initial utterances), Empathy supported variants were selected 248 times out of a total 630 selections made (1st and 2nd choices combined). That is, Empathy impositions were realized in only 39.4% of cases.

Table 4.1 Part (a) responses

	Total	Percentage
Empathy	248	39.4%
Grammar	357	56.6%
Other	25	4.0%
	630	100.0%

In the Part (b) sections of the target contexts, the more distant interlocutor relationship and the use of a lesser-degree diminutive to refer to the Object/Patient discourse referent was expected to inhibit a display of personal Empathy on the part of speakers. We expected that the number of selections made reflecting Empathy would decrease, and grammatically-supported variant selections would increase proportionally. Grammatical variants were selected slightly more often.

Table 4.2 Part (b) responses

	Total	Percentage
Empathy	224	35.5%
Grammar	374	59.4%
Other	32	5.1%
	630	100.0%

The percentage increase in word orders reflecting the grammatical SO pattern from Part (a) to Part (b) is therefore only 2.8%. Empathy-influenced selections decreased by 3.9% from Part (a) to Part (b). The percentage increase-decrease is presented in Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1 Increase/Decrease in Empathy, Grammar and 'Other' responses from Part (a) to Part (b):




Table 4.3 presents the total number of Empathy, Grammatical and 'Other' variants chosen in individual target contexts (in Part (a)). Although individual Part (a) contexts varied dramatically in terms of the percentages of variants selected realizing Empathy impositions, the highest percentage of Empathy choices in a given context was 64.3% (27 out of 42 possible choices). Only 5 out of the 15 Part (a) contexts resulted in Empathy selections more than 50% of the time. (These 5 are marked in bold type.)

Table 4.3 Part (a) target contexts: Empathy, Grammar and 'Other' response distribution (42 total) and % of Empathy responses

Context	Total Empathy	% Empathy	Total Grammar	Total Other
1a (obscitala) 'cheated'	22	52.4%	20	0
2a (obidel) 'offended'	23	54.8%	18	1
3a (poxvalil) 'praised'	13	31.0%	29	0
4a (ograbil) 'robbed'	27	64.3%	13	2
5a (nakazal) 'punished'	23	54.8%	19	0
6a (otrugal) 'told off'	27	64.3%	15	0
7a (nokautiroval) 'KO'd'	16	38.1%	23	3
8a (vybral) 'chose'	10	23.8%	31	1
9a (napoil) 'made drunk'	16	38.1%	25	1
10a (zascitil) 'defended'	10	23.8%	28	4
11a (obidela) 'offended'	15	35.7%	25	2
12a (obmanul) 'betrayed'	10	23.8%	25	7
13a (otsljopala) 'spanked'	3	7.1%	38	1
14a (ubil) 'killed'	14	33.3%	28	0
15a (poceloval) 'kissed'	20	47.6%	22	0

4.2.0 Preferred Selections

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below present the total number of selections made for each of the 18 possibilities across all target contexts in Parts (a) and (b) respectively.

Table 4.4 Selections (Part (a)) across total 18 word order variants²³:

	E	G	1st choice	2nd choice	Total	Percentage
ovs	√	x	62	56	118	18.7%
osv	√	x	11	8	19	3.0%
oSv	√	x	55	50	105	16.7%
oVs	√	x	2	4	6	1.0%
				Total E	248	39.4%
svo	x	√	99	63	162	25.7%
sov	x	√	30	30	60	9.5%
vso	x	√	6	0	6	1.0%
Vso	x	√	7	7	14	2.2%
sVo	x	√	11	14	25	4.0%
Ovs	x	√	0	0	0	0.0%
Osv	x	√	0	1	1	0.2%
vOs	x	√	0	0	0	0.0%
sOv	x	√	26	63	89	14.1%
				Total G	357	56.7%
vos	x	x	2	3	5	0.8%
vSo	x	x	0	0	0	0.0%
Svo	x	x	1	0	1	0.2%
Sov	x	x	0	1	1	0.2%
Vos	?	x	4	14	18	2.9%
				Total O	25	4.0%
					630	100.0%


²³ In all data tables and figures, capital letters S, O and V indicate sentential stress is carried by these constituents. They are therefore all Type II variants.

Table 4.5 Selections (Part (b)) across total 18 word order variants:

	E	G	1st choice	2nd choice	Total	Percentage
ovs	√	x	61	67	128	20.3%
osv	√	x	9	9	18	2.9%
oSv	√	x	30	46	76	12.1%
oVs	√	x	1	1	2	0.3%
				Total E	224	35.6%
svo	x	√	125	49	174	27.6%
sov	x	√	19	40	59	9.4%
vso	x	√	2	3	5	0.8%
Vso	x	√	12	12	24	3.8%
sVo	x	√	12	12	24	3.8%
Ovs	x	√	1	1	2	0.3%
Osv	x	√	1	2	3	0.5%
vOs	x	√	0	1	1	0.2%
sOv	x	√	32	50	82	13.0%
				Total G	374	59.4%
vos	x	x	2	3	5	0.8%
vSo	x	x	0	1	1	0.2%
Svo	x	x	1	1	2	0.3%
Sov	x	x	2	1	3	0.5%
Vos	?	x	5	16	21	3.3%
				Total O	32	5.1%
					630	100.0%

The percentage of total selections made of each of the 18 variants in order from those most often selected to those selected least often in Parts (a) and (b) combined is presented in Table 4.2.

Figure 4.2 Preferred Arrangements



Certain orders clearly stand out as preferred. They are:

SVO
SOV
OVS
OSV

which account for 74.1% of all selections across all target contexts. Note that these variants can be considered metinformationally paired according to our definition of Type II stress (see pages 21-23). We notice another possible pairing that was next chosen most frequently:

SOV
SVO

Including this third pairing, these 6 variants account for a significant 87.5% of all selections made.

The next 3 most frequently chosen variants occur virtually equally. They are:

VOS


VSO

OSV

These nine most preferred variants account for 96.5% of all responses. We will restrict our statistical analysis to these top 9 variants in some instances, as they are clearly most reflective of orders Russian native speakers would most naturally and frequently use.

Contrary to our expectation, there was only a marginal decrease from Part (a) to (b) in Empathy-influenced selections, as well as a negligible increase from (a) to (b) in grammatical variants. Just as the difference in diminutive-degree and the change in interpersonal distance between Parts (a) and (b) seems not to have affected subjects' selections in support of one of either the Empathy or Grammatical SO theories, the favourability of particular orders also does not seem to have been affected by the context changes between Parts (a) and (b). Figure 4.3 compares the number of selections made of each of the most favoured nine variants in Part (a) and Part (b).

Figure 4.3 Most preferred 9 variants:
Number of selections in Part (a) vs. Part (b)



4.3.0 Type I and Type II

Type I variants account for 759 out of 1260 selections made (60.2%) compared with 501 out of 1260 (39.8%) Type II choices. This 3:2 ratio is consistent when we compare Type I and Type II occurrences in Parts (a) and Parts (b) of the target contexts as presented in Table 4.6. Table 4.7 divides the Type I and Type II occurrences in Parts (a) and (b) into Empathy/Grammatical and 'Other' categories.

Table 4.6 Type I and Type II selections made in Parts (a) and (b).


Part (a)	Total	Percentage	Part (b)	Total	Percentage
Type I	370	58.7%	Type I	389	61.7%
Type II	260	41.3%	Type II	241	38.3%
	630	100.0%		630	100.0%

Table 4.7 Number of Type I and Type II intonation responses (across Empathy/Grammar/Other categories) and totals:

Type I	Part (a)	Part (b)	Total	Type II	Part (a)	Part (b)	Total
Empathy	137	146	283	Empathy	111	78	189
Grammar	228	238	466	Grammar	129	136	265
Other	5	5	10	Other	20	27	47
	370	389	759		260	241	501

Though not one of our main hypotheses, we wondered how the interpersonal distance between interlocutors would affect intonation choice. The subjects mentioned often that they were less likely to use an extremely expressive intonation when addressing someone interpersonally distant (as exemplified in the (b) parts of our target contexts). We would expect then to find an increase in the use of Type I (so-called 'neutral' intonation) in the (b) parts, and the Type II ('expressive'/'emotive' intonation) in the (a) parts, where our subjects are addressing closely-related individuals. We did find a very slight increase/decrease relationship from (a) to (b). The percentages are presented in Figure 4.4 below.

Figure 4.4 Part (a) and (b) combined:
Increase/Decrease in use of Type I/Type II intonation



4.4.0 Tests for Independence

We conducted a series of χ^2 tests on our data in order to determine whether or not our main experimental variables are connected, and if so, in what way they are related. The variables compared were the Empathy/Grammar/Other utterance-type selections, Parts (a) and (b) of our experiment (which were characterized by the presence or lack of diminutives, as well as by a close or distant interpersonal relationship between interlocutors) and Type I and Type II intonation.

The χ^2 analysis is the most appropriate for these data since we did expect to find some kind of connection between variables; the experiment was structured based on predictions that Parts (a) of target contexts would generate Empathy selections and Parts (b) would generate Grammar selections. We did not make any hypotheses about the use of Type I and Type II intonation, but as Type II is often considered 'emotive,' we expected that it may be used more often in diminutive contexts.

The χ^2 value from table 4.8, where we analyzed all responses across Parts (a) and

Parts (b) with the Empathy/Grammar/Other response choices is insignificant. There is therefore no relationship between these variables. There is only a small divergence between the Observed and Expected values - Empathy selections are observed more often than they are expected in Part (a) (diminutive) contexts, and Grammar selections more often in Part (b) non-diminutive contexts.

Table 4.8 Contingency table showing relationship between utterance-type selection across Empathy/Grammatical and 'Other' categories in Parts (a) and (b) across 1260 selections

		Part (a)	Part (b)	
Empathy	Observed	248	224	472
	Expected	236	236	
Grammar	Observed	357	374	731
	Expected	366.5	366.5	
Other	Observed	25	32	57
	Expected	28.5	28.5	
		630	630	1260

$$\chi^2=2.47$$

$$df=2$$

$$p<0.3 \text{ ns}$$

The situation is much the same in our χ^2 test of Table 4.9 below. We compared the same variables as above, but eliminated those orders that are clearly not favoured by native speakers (and therefore not a true reflection of what native speakers use), from the data. Again, the χ^2 value shows no significant relationship between the variables.

Table 4.9 Contingency table showing relationship between utterance-type selection across Empathy/Grammatical and 'Other' categories in Parts (a) and (b) across most favored (9) word order variants only (1216 selections made)

Top 9 wo's		Part (a)	Part (b)	
Empathy	Observed	242	222	464
	Expected	233	231	
Grammar	Observed	350	363	713
	Expected	358	355	
Other	Observed	18	21	39
	Expected	20	19	
		610	606	1216

$$\chi^2=1.48$$

$$df=2$$

$$p<0.5 \text{ ns}$$

We did expect to find some difference in the number of Type I and Type II selections made from Parts (a) to Parts (b) of the target contexts. We anticipated that the close interpersonal relationship and use of diminutives in Parts (a) might result in more Type II selections overall. In Parts (b), where the interlocutor relationship is more distant, and no diminutive or one of lesser degree is used, we expected more Type I selections. The relationship between the two is presented in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10 Contingency table showing relationship between intonation type and Parts (a) and (b) across all contexts (1260 selections made)

all		Part (a)	Part (b)	
Type I	Observed	370	389	759
	Expected	380	380	
Type II	Observed	260	241	501
	Expected	251	251	
		630	630	1260

$$\chi^2=1.19$$

$$df=1$$

$$p<0.30 \text{ ns}$$

The χ^2 value indicates that there is no significant relationship between Parts (a) and (b) and intonational type. There is some divergence between expected and observed frequencies; the observed frequency of Type II intonation in Parts (a) was higher than expected, and lower than expected in Parts (b).

The only instance where we found any χ^2 significance compared the relationship between the Empathy and Grammar theories, and Parts (a) and (b), within Type II variants selected. That is, observed and expected frequencies of the orders oVs and oSv were compared with Vso, sVo, Ovs, Osv, vOs and sOv. There appears to be a relationship between word order strategy and contexts characterized by the presence or lack of diminutives and smaller and greater interpersonal distances between interlocutors *within* Type II responses. We find more than expected Empathy selections in diminutive/close interpersonal relationship contexts in this sample, and observe less than expected Empathy selections in non-diminutive/distant interpersonal relationship environments.

Table 4.11 Relationship between utterance-type selection (Empathy vs Grammar) and Parts (a) and (b) across Type II variants only (454 selections made)

Type II		Part (a)	Part (b)	
Empathy	Observed	111	78	189
	Expected	100	89	
Grammar	Observed	129	136	265
	Expected	140	125	
		240	214	454

$$\chi^2=4.40$$

$$df=1$$

$$p<0.05 *$$

4.5.0 Summary

The results did not support the hypotheses. Word order variants reflecting personal Empathy were not selected predominantly in Parts (a) of the experiment. This result made it difficult to verify our second hypothesis; we expected there to be a measurable difference between Empathy and Grammar responses between Parts (a) and Parts (b) of the target

contexts, as a result of Empathy factor manipulation.

There proved to be no relationship between ordering strategy and the presence or lack of personal Empathy stimuli in the context overall. Certain orders (reflecting both a Grammar and an Empathy strategy) were preferred over others, though also did not reflect any relationship between ordering strategy and context type. We found no relationship between intonational type and context type overall. An important connection was discovered, however, between word order strategy and context *within* the Type II utterances. These results will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

Discussion and Conclusion

5.0.0 Introduction

In this chapter, we discuss our experimental results in relation to the hypotheses tested, as well as the implications that these results have for the Empathy theory and the Transactional Discourse Model proposed by Yokoyama. We also discuss a number of unexpected findings, including subjects' tendencies to pattern both consistently and contradictorily their first and second choice responses, as well as the relative frequency of stressed verb variants in general, and stressed verb-initial variants in particular. Throughout our discussion, we point out areas where flaws in our test contexts or experimental method may have created confounding variables. Finally, we suggest directions for future study.

5.1.0 Hypothesis I

In target contexts featuring Empathy conditions (diminutives and close interpersonal relationships) unstressed-Object-initial word order variants will be selected (OSV, OVS, OSV, OVS).

Our results did not support the prediction made by our first hypothesis. Object-initial word order variants certainly were not selected frequently enough in Parts (a) of the target contexts to verify that personal Empathy is dominant over grammatical relations. That SO orders far outweighed OS orders in terms of word order strategy, even when the Objects in question were considered to have HE status, has serious implications for the validity of Yokoyama's theory of personal Empathy as it interacts with word order in Russian. The results suggest that when two discourse referents are located in the same knowledge intersection pre-discourse-initially (in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ where both are 'known' to the interlocutor, but not of 'current concern' to him/her), that the one more semantically salient will most often claim utterance-initial position. There is a stronger tendency to place Subjects/Agents before Objects/Patients even when the Object/Patient referent is a target of

the speaker's personal interest.

5.2.0 Hypothesis II

In target contexts without Empathy conditions (diminutives and close interpersonal relationships are not featured) grammatical word order variants will be selected.

The prediction made by our second hypothesis is, to some extent, supported by our results. We expected that where the contextual circumstances prevent a display of personal Empathy on the part of the speaker, and where there is a lack of lexical stimulus to activate personal Empathy (no diminutive present), that grammatical word order variants would dominate subjects' selections. This did occur, as the majority of response choices in Parts (b) of the target contexts were those classified as 'grammatical.' Unfortunately this hypothesis was made based upon the expectation that Empathy-influenced orders would dominate in Parts (a) and there would be a measurable difference between Empathy and Grammar orders selected from Parts (a) to Parts (b) of the target contexts, resulting from lexical and contextual alternations made within them. We cannot rightly say that the lack of diminutive use and greater interpersonal distance between interlocutors prevents a display of personal Empathy (in (b) or in general) when Empathy did not emerge as a viable word order strategy.

The percentage of Empathy-influenced orders did decrease as the percentage of Grammar-influenced orders increased from Parts (a) to Parts (b), though only slightly (see Figure 4.1). The χ^2 test (Table 4.6) of raw scores across all contexts and word order variants indicates that there is no significant relationship between either of the Empathy or Grammar theories and the alternating contextual variables that characterized Parts (a) (diminutive/close interlocutor relationship) and Parts (b) (non- or lesser-degree diminutive/distant interlocutor relationship). A χ^2 test done on a narrower sample of data including only the preferred 9 word orders selected across all contexts (Table 4.7) moves closer to significant probability levels, though still not enough to suggest that there is any real connection between them.

In our post hoc analysis, we did another χ^2 test on only those 5 target contexts that resulted in Empathy responses in Parts (a) more than 50% of the time. The results are presented in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 Contingency table showing the relationship between utterance-type selection across Empathy and Grammatical categories in Parts (a) and (b) across the 5 contexts best reflecting Empathy (411 selections made)

Top 5 contexts		Part (a)	Part (b)	
Empathy	Observed	122	101	223
	Expected	112	112	
Grammar	Observed	85	103	188
	Expected	95	93	
		207	204	411

$$\chi^2=3.92$$

$$df=1$$

$$p<0.05 *$$

Though we had predicted a connection between these variables for all our target contexts, only these 5 examples generated a higher number of observed Empathy selections in Part (a) than the calculated expected value. There is a similar divergence in all other cells; Empathy selections occur in Parts (b) less often than expected, Grammar selections appear less often than expected in Parts (a), and instances of Grammar selection in Parts (b) are observed more frequently than expected. Only across this narrow sample does the relationship between Empathy and Grammar, and Parts (a) and (b) prove to be significant.

One aspect of our experimental procedure may have contributed to the similarity between response choices from parts (a) to parts (b). Informants were invariably required to first relate the narrated event to a close interlocutor and secondly to a more distant interlocutor. This pattern was consistent across all contexts. This invariability may have generated an unanticipated carry-over effect from parts (a) to parts (b). Furthermore, there was little supplemental information in the narrative that preceded part (b). More contextual material placed in between parts (a) and (b) may have helped to eliminate or lessen this priming effect.

Though other, context-specific inconsistencies detected through our post hoc

analysis in the remaining experimental narratives may have created confounding variables that interfered with the Empathy relationships, these oversights were certainly not severe enough to account for the insignificance of our results.

We noticed, however, that our analysis of raw scores *overall* was not reflective of where the Empathy strategy was most active. In fact, when we limited our statistical analysis to those variants selected *within* Type II intonation (see Table 4.11), we found that there was a significant relationship between the Empathy and Grammar theories respectively, and contextual variation. If Empathy results are significant only within Type II (recall that is is the emphatic/emotive/expressive/marked contour), we must determine why this is so. When emotional, subjective and attitudinal information in Empathy utterances is compounded (the use of a high-degree diminutive carries emotional meaning, the close interpersonal relationship would permit the speaker to display his/her emotion and expressiveness), there is a triggering of the use of Type II intonation. We will discuss this result further in section 5.8.0 below.

5.3.0 Diminutives

As stated above, the experimental results suggest that personal Empathy is not a dominant factor in determining word orders of discourse-initial utterances in Russian. It serves to reevaluate, however, the features that are claimed to stimulate personal Empathy on the part of speakers, in order to determine whether it is Empathy in a broad sense that is not operational, or whether these features themselves did not contribute enough to effect any results supporting the Empathy theory in our experiment.

One feature identified was the use of diminutives to refer to discourse participants. Perhaps a justification for imposition, as Yokoyama claims, is not encoded into diminutives, and as a result, our diminutives were not operational. Subjects were required to use the diminutives as they were presented to them in the contexts. In some instances in fact, subjects objected to the use of certain diminutives (although we checked our diminutives and contexts with native speakers prior to the experiment). Several informants mentioned that '*Mamočka*' would not normally be used by adults when speaking to their husbands or wives.

The level of 'real' Empathy directed toward a referent as operationalized by a diminutive would necessarily increase if the diminutive used was chosen and implemented by the speaker him/herself. In other words, the diminutives as they referred to imaginary characters in our experiment, may not have been reflective of the endearment/familiarity they may have conveyed, had the subjects actually known the target referent. Some subjects may simply have not been able to validly carry out the task, if they were unable to imagine themselves in such situations, or were not willing to use the required forms as presented in the scenarios.

We present this only as an extreme possibility that may have impacted our results. It has been firmly established that the use of diminutives and varying degrees thereof (Bratus:1969) clearly conveys a speaker's level of endearment and familiarity towards the referent. Furthermore, Uspenskij demonstrated how the speaker's choice of term of reference reveals where the speaker positions him/herself vis-à-vis the hearer.

In order to confirm that this is in fact not a confounding variable, it would be valuable to undertake a similarly-constructed test in which informants are interviewed prior to the experiment about actual individuals in their lives (parents, siblings, friends) and terms of reference normally used to refer to these individuals in various contexts. As we expected, one might (as in Uspenskij's example of 2.2.2) use one diminutive variant to refer to the individual when speaking to a close friend, and another less endearing variant in a professional context, for example. If the experiment reflected this variation, though based on 'real-world' information gathered from subjects, one could be more certain that the diminutives and other terms of reference were operational, and genuinely reflective of a HE status assigned to a discourse referent.

5.4.0 Interpersonal Distance between Interlocutors

The interpersonal distance between interlocutors was identified as being another feature that affected Empathy impositions. A large distance was expected to inhibit speakers from openly displaying their Empathy toward discourse referents. We predicted that a closer relationship would result in more Empathy impositions; speakers, sensing that their personal concern for the referent was shared by the interlocutor, would feel more free in

imposing their subjective attitude.

Again, this feature needs to be reexamined in light of our experimental results. Does the fact that Empathy variants were not dominant in contexts where the close interpersonal relationship was expected to reinforce the speakers' Empathy make interpersonal distance as an Empathy feature invalid? Just as we concluded in our discussion of diminutives' effectiveness in operationalizing Empathy, interpersonal distance may have been weak as an Empathy-influencing feature since the subjects were forced to make their selections based on imaginary person-to-person relationships. Again, an experimental situation that reflects subjects' real-world relationships would be ideal.

Overall, the imaginary nature of the contexts may have impeded our efforts to accurately verify the extent to which Empathy conditions affect word order. As a result, we might hesitate at this point, to completely discount the Empathy strategy in Russian word order, since the features combined to generate Empathy in our test may not have been reflective of the 'actual' level of Empathy a native speaker may assign to discourse referents, as well as the manner in which Empathy might be encoded on a linguistic level, had it been generated from a 'real-world' context.

Although it becomes impractical to generate theories that are not experimentally viable, perhaps some aspects of the theory can be salvaged if more 'real-world' factors could be incorporated into testing.

5.5.0 Response Strategies

In the majority of contexts, it became clear that informants developed patterned response strategies with their first and second choices. The patterns either reflected a consistency in terms of the proposed locations of metinformational knowledge of constituents in both choices, or first and second choices contradicted each other as to the location of metinformational knowledge (as predicted for constituents in each context).

Recall that each target context was structured so that the pre-discourse-initial situation (prior to any Empathy status being assigned to a referent or any interpersonal distance factor being incorporated) featured two discourse referents supposedly located

metinformationally in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$. In other words, both referents were known to the hearer, but not presently in his/her set of current concern. Informants were then free to select what they felt were the 2 most appropriate variants. As responses were pronounced aloud, 2 of 18 variants were possible for each set of utterances. Let us disregard for the moment which of the Empathy or Grammatical theories were applied in subjects' selections.

If we agree that assessed locations of knowledge are the main criteria by which the linear arrangement of utterance constituents are determined,²⁴ then we would expect the first *and* second choices to convey the same metinformational knowledge. For example, if informant X chose to impose the HE discourse referent into utterance-initial position $C_a \cap C_b$, the resulting order in terms of metinformational knowledge (in accordance with Yokoyama's ordering template) would be:

(1) $C_a \cap C_b - V - C_a \cap (B - C_b)$

In accordance with our test, the order selected would be of the type:

(2) ovs (Type I)

It seems logical that informant X, having made a metinformational assessment that led to his/her first choice, would make a second choice consistent with the first assessment. That is, s/he considered the Object/Patient to be of current concern to him/herself and the hearer, but the Subject/Agent to be out of the hearer's set of current concern. A second choice reflecting the *same* assessment would be of the type:

(3) oSv (Type II)

Recall that in Type II utterances, the utterance-final item with Type I intonation has been preposed and bears sentential stress, but there is no change in the location of metinformational knowledge. The Object is still located in $C_a \cap C_b$. The Subject remains in

²⁴ Yokoyama's ordering template is based on this premise; orders are determined according to where knowledge is assessed to be located in his/her knowledge sphere in relation to his/her interlocutor's knowledge sphere. The ordering template exists as such $C_a \cap C_b - V - C_a \cap (B - C_b)$ before any other factors (Empathy or Grammatical Relations) are incorporated. (See Section 2.1.6)

$C_a \cap (B - C_b)$.

Supposing informant Y, after contemplating the same context, feels that the Subject referent is more appropriate (for whatever reason) in utterance-initial position, and makes his/her two selections accordingly:

- (4) svo (Type I)
- (5) sOv (Type II)

Again, the informant made a consistent second choice; the utterance-final constituent (in the Type I utterance) was preposed and bears sentential stress in Type II.

This type of consistent intonational alternating pattern between first and second choices reflecting equivalent knowledge locations was implemented particularly frequently in the distractor contexts. An extract from our data tabulation of first and second choices of Part (a) of one of the distractor contexts where 19 out of 21 informants followed this pattern is presented in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 Data table showing each (of 21) informants' first and second choices across all possible word orders for Part (a) of distractor context:

'Papočka kupil ščenka'
Daddy-nom bought puppy-acc
"Daddy bought a puppy."

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
ovs																					
osv																					
oSv																					
oVs																					
svo	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	
sov																					
vso																					
Vso																					
sVo																					
Ovs																		2			
Osv																					2
vOs																					
sOv	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1		1	1
vos																					
vSo																					
Svo																					
Sov																					
Vos																					

Another frequent pattern that emerged, however, was the alternation between first and second choices of variants that *conflicted* in terms of locations of knowledge. Consider again informant X's first choice 'ovs' in (1) and (2) above. S/he has imposed the Object referent into $C_a \cap C_b$. The Subject referent remains post-verbally in $C_a \cap (B - C_b)$. Suppose informant X's second choice is 'svo' (Type I). This variant is in direct opposition to the metinformational assessment s/he made in his/her first selection. Though the Subject referent may have been preposed because of Grammatical Relations, the Object referent remains post-verbally. This type of conflicting pattern was made with Type II variants as well. For example, arrangements oSv and sOv directly oppose one another in

This finding has important significance to the whole notion of locations of knowledge within the TDM. The first and second choices that are consistent and reflect equivalent metinformational assessments using intonation (for example, the pairings svo - sOv; ovs - oSv; perhaps sov - sVo) could support the suggestion that word order is based on locations of knowledge that are essentially fixed once a speaker's assessment has been made - and that word order permutations that bear sentential stress are informationally equivalent to their Type I 'neutral' correlates.

First and second choices in opposition however (ovs - svo; oSv - sOv; ovs - sOv; svo - oSv), suggest that assessed locations of knowledge are *not always* the main criteria used in establishing linear arrangements. In fact, we may even consider the possibility that word order variant acceptability is measured on a frequency hierarchy, and not determined by the communicative content of the utterance.

We are uncertain as to whether or not these patterns should be evaluated either as support or evidence against the notion of locations of knowledge since the patterning results from individual informants are quite varied. It seems that subjects each created their own personal strategies to respond to the task. Table 5.4 presents the response behaviours of each subject. The column entitled 'Consistent' presents the number of times the subject made metinformationally equivalent selections with his/her first and second choices (paired choices of the type: ovs - oSv; svo - sOv). The column 'Contradictory' presents the number of times each subject made inconsistent selections with his/her first and second choices across all target contexts.


Table 5.4 Target contexts: Subjects' selection strategies
 Consistent stress alternation pairing vs contradictory pairing in 1st and 2nd choices

Subjects	Consistent	Contradictory	Other	
1	19	5	6	
2	15	5	10	
3	8	8	14	
4	5	5	20	
5	7	3	20	
6	3	10	17	
7	0	11	19	
8	19	3	8	
9	12	0	18	
10	9	3	18	
11	23	5	2	
12	2	19	9	
13	13	11	6	
14	9	19	2	
15	10	4	16	
16	8	4	18	
17	6	2	22	
18	11	3	16	
19	10	14	6	
20	14	2	14	
21	7	7	16	
Totals	210	143	277	630
%	33.33%	22.70%	43.97%	

Though response behaviours varied widely across subjects, we feel that this tendency cannot be disregarded, as patterned first and second choices in total account for over 50% of paired responses in both target and distractor contexts. It is interesting to compare the percentage of patterned 'inconsistent' (metinformationally contradictory) responses across the target contexts and across distractor contexts. See Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Difference in percentage of occurrence of subjects' selection response patterns between target (t) and distractor (d) contexts:

SA = Stress Alternations; patterns of the type svo - sOv;
 MC = Metinformationally Contradictory; patterns of the type ovs - svo



The difference between target contexts (SA) and (MC) pairings is not very wide: 33.3% of all response pairs were made based on metinformational equivalency and stress alternations, while 22.7% were metinformationally contradictory.

The percentage of metinformationally contradictory patterned responses in the distractor contexts is extremely low (5.2%), but the percentage of consistent patterns made with stress alternations is comparatively high (46.9%). The high percentage of *consistent* patterns made across distractor contexts supports the notion that Type I and Type II variants are paired and convey the same metinformational knowledge. Recall that in the distractor contexts, the Object referent was inanimate in 6 out of 10 cases, and an animal in the other 4. The Subjects were human in 9 contexts. One Subject was an animal.

We may draw the conclusion that where discourse referents are equal on an animacy hierarchy (as were all our human referents across all target contexts), the relative locations of knowledge for each referent are extremely difficult to determine (whether or not the Empathy or Grammatical theory is being adhered to). Conversely, when one referent is clearly dominant on an animacy scale, the informant feels more confident in

his/her response, and more often selects a second variant that reinforces the first one.

Though not intended to be featured in our analysis, one of the distractor contexts involved two animal discourse referents. Since it was a distractor context, no Empathy conditions were directed toward either of the referents. As in the target contexts, informants once again used the conflicting pattern in their first and second choices. This suggests that when referents are equal on the animacy hierarchy, subjects become less assured in their assessments, and as a result, provide word order alternatives that are metinformationally contradictory.

It is interesting that discourse-initial contexts similar to this two-animal context (featuring 2 referents equal on an animacy hierarchy in the absence of Empathy factors) are those which Yokoyama employs to first set out her ordering template according to locations of knowledge; discourse referents are equal in animacy and are both *not* part of the interlocutors' matters of current concern. If Empathy factors surface at this stage, they are claimed to cause impositions and thus affect the resulting word orders. In the absence of Empathy factors, deep semantic roles (Grammatical Relations) are claimed to determine the arrangement of sentence constituents. The fact that results from this single distractor context where no Empathy factors were featured mirror the results obtained from our target contexts (in terms of informants' contradictory response patterns) strongly suggests that Empathy factors are very weak, or at best inconsistent in accounting for word order variation in Russian discourse-initial utterances. These distractor results show that informants face similar difficulty in making consistent first and second choices when referents are equal in animacy *with or without* interference from Empathy factors.

Another context that produced rather unexpected results involved the discourse-initial utterance '*Oxotnik ubil sobaku*' (The hunter-nom. killed the dog-acc.) 'The hunter killed the dog.' This was a Part (b) context where the speaker was reporting about the slaying of his/her dog (referred to by its name '*Žučka*' in Part (a)) by a hunter in an off-limits area to a police officer. Assuming the police officer just arrived on the scene, neither referent could be considered to be of current concern. We would expect 'svo' grammatical orders to be chosen. Interestingly, many 'ovs' orders were selected, and again, contradictory, patterned responses prevailed. This is another instance where informants

contradicted themselves *in the absence of Empathy factors*. We suggest that in future tests, more ‘distractor’ contexts of this type should be incorporated. If informants respond similarly to both target contexts (referents equal in animacy + Empathy factors) AND distractor contexts (referents equal in animacy without Empathy factors), results would disprove the Empathy theory completely. Rather, one may focus on other conclusions that focus on animacy relationships and Russian discourse-initial word orders.

5.6.0 Verbs

We anticipated that difficulties would be encountered if variants with stressed verbs were selected. The verb did indeed appear stressed rather frequently; 3 of the 9 preferred variants were those which include stressed verbs (Vos, Vso and sVo). In some cases, these choices may reflect oversights in building the narratives. For instance, it became apparent that the action may have been expected and participants of the event were known to be involved in some way with the unspecified proposition; the verb was stressed in order to confirm that the action occurred.

Consider this Part (b) target context:

‘Trener nokautiroval Dimu.’
The coach-nom. KO’d Dima-acc.)
“The coach knocked out Dima.”

In this context, variants featuring stressed verbs were selected 19 times out of 42. The utterance was to be uttered to an athlete friend of the speaker’s younger brother Dima, who had warned Dima about the dangers of sparring with this particular coach. The frequency with which variants with stressed verbs were chosen in this instance indicates that even discourse-initially, the informational status of verbs can outweigh that of discourse referents. Informants chose to confirm the act of ‘knocking out,’ as the assessment would reveal that the hearer is already familiar with the terms of the proposition. S/he needs confirmation about whether or not this event took place.

Consider another example, a Part (a) context:

‘Sofočku obmanul fotograf.’
Sofočku-acc. betrayed the photographer-nom.
“Sofočka was betrayed by the photographer.”

Variants with stressed verbs were chosen 15 times out of 42. Here, the predicational knowledge was not being confirmed. Instead, the semantic dominance of this strong, rather negative verb seems to have overpowered both discourse referents in terms of informational salience. It was not **Sofočka** that was betrayed by the photographer, or the **photographer** who betrayed Sofočka; the act of **betrayal** itself became the focus.

Of course all variants with stressed verbs are Type II. Recall that we encountered difficulty classifying these variants, since our definition of Type II intonation specifies that utterance-final items under Type I intonation are stressed and preposed. We classified the oVs variant as Empathy-influenced, since the Object claims utterance-initial position and is unstressed. sVo is a grammatical order. The Subject claims utterance-initial position and the Object follows (immediately after the verb, if we continue to consider this an intonational variant equivalent to sov). Variants Vos and Vso present problems however. Are they equivalent to Type I variants osv and sov? If so, then variants sVo, Vso and sov and orders oVs, Vos and osv respectively, would be considered metinformationally equal. (The last item in the Type I variant is stressed and preposed - to either utterance-medial, or utterance-initial position.)

Recall that in Yokoyama's framework, verbs are represented simply as verbs (V) in the ordering template. Prior to discourse, they are considered unspecified predicational knowledge $||P||$ located in $C_a \cap C_b$. According to the model then, verbs should never bear sentential stress, as the possibility that they be located in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ is not considered. Let us consider the acceptability of stressed-verb-initial variants, supposing that verbs *can* be located in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$. Yokoyama incorporated a restriction into her analysis regarding the landing site of preposed items. It specified that preposed items whose knowledge is located in $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ should not precede items in $C_a \cap C_b$ (See p. 40). We might conclude then, that stressed verb-initial variants are unacceptable, since they have been preposed and have claimed landing sites before (what appear to be) imposed $C_a \cap C_b$ items in correlate Type I variants. We hesitate to suggest that stressed verb-initial variants are unacceptable, since

they were frequently selected. We suggest instead that this restriction does not apply to verbs.

Clearly, a refinement to the TDM needs to be made to account for stressed verb variants. There is no reason to believe that unspecified predicational knowledge (to be specified by a particular verb) should not be considered ‘information to be relocated’ as is the knowledge specified by discourse referents (nouns) in a give utterance. In simpler terms, the informational status of a verb is not always predetermined in the environment of nominal sentence constituents that fluctuate in terms of informational importance based on contextual/discourse factors.

We are suggesting here that verbs also move in and out of one’s matters of current concern based on contextual and perhaps even attitudinal factors. In light of this development, we propose that predicational knowledge $||P||$ (represented as V in the ordering template and specified by a particular verb in an utterance) not be automatically included in the pre-discourse-initial $C_a \cap C_b$ intersection. Instead, verbs must also be assessed and located within the knowledge intersections of A and B. As these few examples have shown, there is reason to assume that verbs do not always remain in the matters of shared concern, and may move in or out of different knowledge intersections as a result of contextual factors or salience.

We cannot concede that all the stressed verb selections made were a result of structural flaws in our narratives and were not genuinely reflective of the discourse-initial situation. The predicate in the context “Sofočka was betrayed by the photographer,” could in no way have been expected by the hearer. The variability in semantic weight of verbs needs to be addressed in the TDM if we are to continue to apply it to account for word order in Russian.

Let us return to the issue of landing sites of preposed items for a moment. When verbs are stressed, they appear utterance-initially more frequently than they do utterance-medially. (Vos and Vso were selected 77 times; oVs and sVo were selected 57 times.) The difference may not seem so significant until it is compared with other stressed-initial variants.

Table 5.5 Total selections: variants with stressed utterance-initial items

Variant	Total selections
Svo	3
Sov	4
Ovs	2
Osv	4
Vos	39
Vso	38

Variants that have stressed utterance-initial Subjects and Objects are chosen infrequently. We do not agree that their infrequency is accounted for by phonological factors that are claimed to interfere with landing sites of preposed items (see page 41). Yokoyama claimed that native speakers tend not to prepose items too far leftward, as the implementation of Type II intonation would require all the segmental material that follows the item to be pronounced with a low tone (see page 22). Phonological factors obviously did not inhibit stressed verb-initial variants from being selected, as all the utterances in our test were relatively brief, consisting of only 3 items. Perhaps Yokoyama's claim that preposed $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ items should not precede imposed $C_a \cap C_b$ items legitimately accounts for the infrequency of stressed Object and Subject-initial variants. Unfortunately, this restriction is founded on other claims regarding the prominence of imposed $C_a \cap C_b$ items that proved to be invalid. Obviously, some other restriction or tendency inhibits stressed Objects and Subjects from being placed utterance-initially, but permits stressed verbs from occupying *either* position. Again, further refinements must be made to the TDM, in this case to account for the free movement of stressed verbs and the restricted mobility of stressed Subjects and Objects.

5.7.0 Type I and Type II Intonation

The relationship between Type I and II intonation is particularly interesting and at the same time, most problematic. Firstly, Yokoyama conducted her analysis of word order in Russian from the standpoint of Type I 'neutral' intonation. The ordering template arranged according to locations of knowledge was established using Type I intonation.

Type II intonation was subsequently defined in terms of the acceptable orders that were generated according to this Type I template. From this early stage then, Type I and Type II were considered to be 'metinformationally paired.' Knowledge locations of sentence constituents remain constant in both Types, though the utterance-final item under Type I intonation is preposed and bears sentential stress in Type II to mark this pre-position.

We disagree with Yokoyama's approach whereby the the framework and interaction of Empathy within the TDM were outlined primarily upon utterances with Type I intonation. The analysis centred around discourse-initial utterances - those to be uttered aloud in conversation between two interlocutors. It is firmly established that intonation we refer to as Type II or 'emotive' (regardless of terminology) is *the* intonational contour used primarily in conversation. Perhaps we are not justified in criticizing Yokoyama's approach as our results show that Type I variants were chosen more frequently overall (759 times out of 1260). We suggest however, that this result is a reflection of the artificial nature of the experimental situation. Informants were required first to read the narratives to themselves. Perhaps this put our subjects into a literary state of mind. Intonational Type II is noticeably 'expressive,' 'emotive' and 'emphatic'; subjects may not have felt completely comfortable in uttering Type II selections aloud in front of the tester.

Although not one of our primary hypotheses, we did expect to find some difference in the number of Type I and Type II selections made from Parts (a) to Parts (b) of the target contexts. In fact, some informants mentioned that they made an intonational distinction in terms of the degree of expressiveness they were willing to display to more distant interlocutors. We thought therefore, that the close interpersonal relationship and use of diminutives in Parts (a) might result in more Type II selections overall. In Parts (b), where the interlocutor relationship is more distant, and no diminutive or one of lesser degree is used, we expected more Type I selections. The relationship between the two was presented in Table 4.10. Although the χ^2 test revealed that the relationship between Parts (a) and (b) and intonational Type was not significant, there was some divergence between expected and observed frequencies; the observed frequency of Type II intonation in Parts (a) was higher than expected, and lower than expected in Parts (b).

The only instance where we found highly relevant χ^2 significance was in the analysis of the relationship between the Empathy and Grammar theories, and Parts (a) and (b), when the data was limited to selections with Type II intonation. (See Table 4.11) It revealed that there *is* a relationship between ordering strategy and contexts characterized by the presence or lack of diminutives and smaller and greater interpersonal distances between interlocutors, though *within* variants characterised by ‘emphatic/expressive’ (Type II) intonation. That we found more than expected Empathy selections in diminutive/close interpersonal relationship contexts in this sample, and less than expected Empathy selections in non-diminutive/distant interpersonal relationship contexts, indicates that the use of the Empathy strategy is best reflected in Type II utterances.

In light of this result, it becomes increasingly difficult to support Yokoyama’s Empathy analysis as it was developed primarily around Type I intonation. Of course she refers repeatedly to Type II variant acceptability in her discussion, but does not focus her Empathy argument at all on Type II variants, those that now appear to most significantly interact with Empathy.

If we continue to grant Empathy some measure of validity as a condition that affects word order in Russian discourse-initial utterances within the TDM, a reworking of the theory from a standpoint closer to Type II needs to be provided. In particular, what is happening metinformationally in Type II utterances? (We have done our best here to structure some kind of system within which to classify Type II utterances, but it is clear that there are still complications.) Can Type I and Type II variants still assumed to be considered metinformationally paired? This assumption is partially disproved by the subjects’ tendency to select first and second choices that contradict one another in terms of locations of knowledge. Perhaps Type II, as it has been reflected in oSv and oVs orders (those that were significant in terms of Empathy) should be investigated more directly in terms of Object-initial patterns. It makes sense that Type II is used more frequently in these situations; ‘expressive’ intonation is said to be used to mark the ‘misplaced’ Rheme, the movement leftward of the ‘new’ information, or in Yokoyama’s terms, the pre-position of $C_a \cap (B-C_b)$ from utterance-final position. As these Object-initial patterns directly oppose

grammatical SO order, perhaps the implementation of Type II marks not only the misplaced (preposed) utterance-final item, but also the fact that the word order in general is in opposition to a grammatical order.

5.8.0 Theoretical Observations

Should we wish to continue to work within the TDM when approaching word order in Russian, important refinements need to be made. We mentioned earlier in our discussion that the role of verbs in the transfer of metinformational knowledge needs to be reevaluated. The fact that stressed verb variants were often selected indicates, contrary to Yokoyama's formulations, that they cannot always be considered unspecified predicational knowledge $||P||$, located in $C_a \cap C_b$ prior to discourse.

We also pointed out a significant shortcoming in the formulation of the Empathy theory. As a discourse theory applied primarily to conversation, it follows that the framework be constructed from the standpoint of Type II intonation. Although Type II intonation was seen to best reflect the theory, it was never defined nor explained (in terms of the transfer of knowledge in Empathy contexts) independently of Type I.

Our experimental results have serious implications for Yokoyama's theory of Empathy in terms of its interaction with word order in Russian. Clearly, Empathy is marginally, if at all, influential in determining linear arrangements of discourse-initial utterances. If it is to be considered operational, it can be investigated and activated primarily within Type II 'emphatic/expressive' intonation. Though we have considered the effects of some confounding variables that may have influenced our test, their combined interference was not severe enough to discount our results.

If we wish to grant Empathy a place in word order theory in Russian, we must consider its expression on a gradient scale. A speaker does not simply have two mutually exclusive strategies (Empathy and Grammar) to consider before s/he produces his/her utterance. An individual's point-of-view and attitude towards discourse referents and the willingness of the speaker to display this point-of-view are in constant flux. The linguistic expression of such a variable concept is likely just as flexible. We suggest that Empathy be

considered in degrees; more or less empathy can be conveyed in a particular instance depending on contextual variables. Whether or not the situation warrants an expression of 'full' Empathy is to be determined by the speaker. The use of a diminutive as a term of reference is already evidence of an Empathy judgment on the part of the speaker. An unstressed-Object-initial pattern can be considered a manifestation of Empathy in terms of linear expression. These two factors compounded may further trigger the use of Type II 'emphatic/emotive' intonation. Clearly, the speaker has one or all of these (and likely other) linguistic 'signals' at his/her disposal.

We cannot make any definitive claims as to the effectiveness of the TDM as a basis for ordering constituents in general; we have no reason to dispute the fact that linear arrangements are affected by pragmatic considerations. Yokoyama's theory of knowledge intersections certainly correlates to (and attempts to represent more precisely) 'Theme/Rheme' 'given/new' dichotomies, which have long been seen to significantly affect word order in Russian. Their expression in terms of linear arrangement, however, is perhaps most apparent within the stream of discourse. Our test was designed to determine the strength of pragmatic considerations exclusively at the outset of discourse (discourse-initially); they can be considered operational if proven to be effective in instances where no Topic/given/Theme has been firmly established.

In other words, the Empathy theory proposed that a kind of Topic/given/Theme (understood as being an imposition made of one item into $C_a \cap C_b$) is established prior to discourse based on subjective and attitudinal factors. Contrary to the claims made by Yokoyama, discourse-initial orders in environments conditioned by personal Empathy are arranged primarily on the basis of grammatical case relationships and not in accordance with locations of knowledge determined by speaker assessment. The contradictory nature of patterned responses, however, reveal that groups of informants rely on different strategies when making assessments prior to discourse. Obviously, contextual factors manipulated in order to stimulate a 'Topic' choice pre-discourse-initially were not equally influential to all subjects. We may suggest then, that some subjects do make a Topic choice based on Empathy factors, while others rely on grammatical strategies. Others combine

both approaches.

Certainly our results indicate that Empathy is not stronger than grammatical relations in determining word order in Russian. In contrast with Yokoyama's proposal, it did not emerge as the dominant theory in the environments tested. Empathy must instead be considered one of several tendencies that has the potential to influence word order in appropriate contextual circumstances.

5.9.0 Future Research

We have already encountered certain problems that may be addressed by further research. We suggested that tests based on 'real-world' information gathered from subjects may render diminutives and terms of reference more operational when testing Empathy. When discussing patterned response choices, we suggested that similar tests be carried out that feature referents equal in animacy, both with and without Empathy factors. One may then be able to determine whether the Empathy theory is operative, or whether informants simply cannot agree or consistently determine where referents belong 'metinformationally' when referents are equal in animacy, regardless of personal Empathy.

We identified a problem with our experimental procedure that may have influenced our results, and which should be eliminated in further investigations. Recall that overall, there was not a very noticeable difference in responses from parts (a) to parts (b). The speaker was to relate the event to an interpersonally close interlocutor in part (a), which was always placed first, then to a more distant interlocutor in part (b). In our post hoc analysis, we realized that the consistency of this arrangement across all 25 narratives may have had a priming effect towards the part (b) answers, resulting in a sustained pattern across both parts (a) and (b). It would be worthwhile to conduct another test where this order is varied. The speaker may first relate the event to an acquaintance or a neighbour, for instance, and then to a close relative or friend.

It is also important to determine whether or not Type I and Type II variants are metinformationally equivalent. We suggest that contexts similar to these be tested, but that word order variants (that we predict reflect or do not reflect Empathy) be provided (in Type I - Type II pairs), to be read aloud by informants. The intonational contour that informants

apply to the selections, as a response to the contextual circumstances, would provide insights into both the equivalency of intonational types, as well as the acceptability of orders resulting from a particular context.

Though we clarified all of our informants' confusions and questions regarding the completion of the task before the test, some may have interpreted the instructions in an unexpected way. We intended the first choice to be the speaker's most genuine spoken reaction in that context. Difficulty encountered in trying to provide a proper equivalent in Russian to specify a speaker's 'second choice,' resulted in the second variant being referred to as 'the most acceptable variant of the remaining choices.' Informants may have indeed provided their first, and most natural, reaction, then resorting to what they may have considered to be an acceptable 'grammatical' variant in their second choice. We mention this only as an extreme possibility that may have affected first and second choices. It was almost always specified to the subject prior to the experiment that the second answer was to be their second-most natural reaction. We do suggest, however, that the instructions be absolutely precise in this regard in all further tests.

Furthermore, it would be valuable to carry out more tests involving a larger number of subjects and similar contexts, in order to determine whether groups of informants can be isolated that respond differently, but regularly. We already observed that some informants responded consistently, while others responded with contradictory selections. Perhaps the Empathy theory can be considered operational, though as a response strategy used exclusively among a group of speakers. In particular, subjects that appear to employ the same response strategy, such as the stress alternation pattern, (see Table 5.4) should be grouped together and analysed independently from those that employ a contradictory metinformational knowledge pattern, or no consistent pattern at all. Insights from such restricted analysis may support the suggestion that an individual's tendency to employ or rely on either Empathy or another word order strategy may depend on his/her language capacity or competence.

It should also be mentioned that all our informants had been living in an English-speaking environment for various periods of time. This could certainly have interfered somewhat with our results; it is reasonable to assume their responses may have been

affected by English word order. It would be beneficial to carry out all further research with informants who have not been exposed to English.

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APPENDIX

В данном буклете содержатся 25 отрывков текста. Каждый отрывок разделён на две части. После каждого параграфа текста, приводятся варианты ответов.

I

а)

—Внимательно прочитайте первый абзац текста. Вы сможете заметить, что каждый отрывок рассказывает о событии, которое произошло недавно. При этом, вовлечены люди, имеющие определённое отношение к вам, например, ваши родственники или знакомые. Представьте, что вы являетесь участником этих событий, как бы играете роль.

б) Прочитайте предложения, следующие за 1-ым абзацем и произнесите их про себя. (В реальном контексте данным предложениям могут предшествовать фразы типа: „Ну, что нового?“, „Ты знаешь...“.)

Пометьте цифрой '1' вариант, который, с вашей точки зрения, был бы вашей естественной реакцией. Произнесите это предложение вслух.

Пометьте цифрой '2' вариант, который был бы наиболее приемлемым из оставшихся предложений. Произнесите это предложение вслух.

II

а) Прочитайте второй абзац текста. Представьте себе данную ситуацию.

б) Повторите последовательность из п. 1, (б). (В реальном контексте данным предложениям могут предшествовать фразы типа: „Ну, что нового?“, „Вы знаете...“.)

Социологические данные участвующего в эксперименте:

Пол: _____

Год рождения: _____

Родной язык: _____

Образование: _____

Время проживания за границей: _____

Просим обратить внимание на то, что анкета является анонимной. Вы вправе прекратить эксперимент в любое время.

Вашей маме шестьдесят пять лет. В течение последних лет её зрение ухудшилось. К тому же, она всегда волнуется в магазинах, особенно когда за ней длинная очередь людей, которые спешат. Ей трудно различать разные купюры. Ей необходимо специальное лекарство, которое она всегда покупает в аптеке, где ваш друг работает фармацевтом.

Сегодня она пошла в аптеку с двумя банкнотами – 5,000 р. и 10,000 р., которые вы ей дали. Лекарство стоит 5,000 р. Придя домой, она вам отдала оставшиеся деньги – 5,000-ный банкнот.

Оказалось, что кассирша специально ничего не сказала, когда мамочка по ошибке заплатила 10,000 р. вместо 5,000 р.

Ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы сказали ей о случившемся?

Обсчитала мамочку кассирша

Кассирша обсчитала мамочку.

Мамочку обсчитала кассирша.

Обсчитала кассирша мамочку.

Кассирша мамочку обсчитала.

Мамочку кассирша обсчитала.

Вы решили пойти в аптеку и рассказать вашему другу (фармацевту), что произошло. Что бы вы сказали ему?

Кассирша маму обсчитала.

Маму обсчитала кассирша.

Кассирша обсчитала маму.

Обсчитала кассирша маму.

Обсчитала маму кассирша.

Маму кассирша обсчитала.

Ваш брат Саша работает инженером—строителем. Его недавно пригласили участвовать на конференции по гражданскому строительству в Германии. Он всегда всё оставляет до последней минуты. Буквально в последний день перед поездкой он получил визу и купил билет на самолёт.

Наконец всё было готово и Саша поехал в аэропорт. Через некоторое время Сашенька позвонил вам и сказал, что он забыл дома паспорт. Он попросил вас привезти его в аэропорт.

В этот момент, ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы сказали ей сказали о случившемся?

Сашенька забыл паспорт.

Паспорт забыл Сашенька.

Забыл Сашенька паспорт.

Забыл паспорт Сашенька.

Паспорт Сашенька забыл.

Сашенька паспорт забыл.

Так как у вас нет машины, вы позвонили вашему знакомому и попросили его отвезти вас в аэропорт. Что бы вы сказали ему о случившемся?

Паспорт Саша забыл.

Паспорт забыл Саша.

Забыл Саша паспорт.

Саша паспорт забыл.

Саша забыл паспорт.

Забыл паспорт Саша.

Сашенька – ваш тринадцатилетний сын – очень хороший мальчик. Он очень хорошо ведёт себя в школе, и до сих пор он всегда получал пятёрки по всем своим предметам. Математика – любимый предмет Сашеньки. Кроме своих уроков, он интересуется музыкой. Он играет на скрипке.

В этом году на работу в школу приняли нового учителя. Он преподаёт математику, а также любит заниматься спортом. Все говорят, что учитель лучше относится к студентам, которые играют в школьных командах и посмеивается над студентами, которые не занимаются спортом.

С вами Сашенька никогда не говорил об этой ситуации в школе, хотя вы чувствовали, что что-то не в порядке. Наконец он пришёл домой очень расстроенный.

Ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы рассказали ей об этом?

Обидел учитель Сашеньку.

Сашеньку обидел учитель.

Обидел Сашеньку учитель.

Сашеньку учитель обидел.

Учитель обидел Сашеньку.

Учитель Сашеньку обидел.

На работе во время перерыва вы с коллегами беседовали, когда вошла ещё одна сотрудница. Её сын – одноклассник Сашеньки, и он играет в баскетбол и в хоккей. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Сашу обидел учитель.

Учитель обидел Сашу.

Обидел Сашу учитель.

Обидел учитель Сашу.

Сашу учитель обидел.

Учитель Сашу обидел.

Драматический театр в вашем городе организовал лотерею, в которой выигравший должен получить билеты на премьеру новой постановки. Вы решили купить два лотерейных билета. Один билет вы оставили себе, а другой отдали маме. Через неделю были объявлены выигрышные номера. Вы сразу же увидели, что у мамы был выигрышный билет. Вы пошли к ней, чтобы рассказать о счастливой случайности. Мамочка начала искать билет по всей квартире, но не могла найти его. Вы поехали в театр, чтобы узнать, ведётся ли у них учёт купленных билетов.

В тот же вечер мамочка позвонила вам. Оказалось, что билет завалился за письменный стол.

Ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Билет нашла Мамочка.

Нашла билет Мамочка.

Мамочка нашла билет.

Билет Мамочка нашла.

Нашла Мамочка билет.

Мамочка билет нашла.

На следующий день вы поехали ещё раз в театр с выигрышным билетом. Что вы сказали в театре?

Нашла Мама билет.

Мама нашла билет.

Билет Мама нашла.

Нашла билет Мама.

Билет нашла Мама.

Мама билет нашла.

Ваша лучшая подруга Машенька – композитор. Она очень трудолюбивая и получила известность в вашем городе, но в других местах её произведения до сих пор ещё не очень хорошо известны. Вчера у неё был уникальный шанс. В ваш город приехал давать концерт знаменитый музыкант. Его пригласили на прослушивание студентов консерватории, где исполнялись некоторые произведения местных молодых композиторов. Одним из них была пьеса вашей подруги. Вы узнали, что её композиция произвела хорошее впечатление на него, и после прослушивания он очень долго говорил о её таланте.

По просьбе Машеньки вы заехали за её мужем в аэропорт – он только что вернулся из поездки и пропустил прослушивание. Что бы вы сказали ему о случившемся?

Музыкант похвалил Машеньку.

Машеньку похвалил музыкант.

Похвалил музыкант Машеньку.

Машеньку музыкант похвалил.

Музыкант Машеньку похвалил.

Похвалил Машеньку музыкант.

Вы встречаетесь со знакомой Машеньки, тоже студенткой, которая также пишет музыку, но пока не получила большого признания. Что бы вы сказали ей о случившемся?

Машу похвалил музыкант.

Машу музыкант похвалил.

Похвалил Машу музыкант.

Музыкант похвалил Машу.

Музыкант Машу похвалил.

Похвалил музыкант Машу.

Ваша любимая тётя, которая живёт в квартире в вашем доме, собиралась поехать навестить свою сестру, которую она давно не видела. Она долго откладывала деньги на поездку и наконец смогла поехать. Она хотела добраться до вокзала на метро, но опоздала. Так как времени было мало, пока вы с помощью вашей жены поспешно укладывали её вещи, тётушка пошла и остановила такси на улице. Любопытная соседка тётушки сидела у подъезда и смотрела, как она спешила. Вы с женой сажаете тётушку на машину, прощаетесь с ней и возвращаетесь домой.

Через некоторое время тётушка звонит с вокзала очень расстроенная. Оказалось, что шофёр отобрал у неё кошелёк и уехал. Услышав звонок, ваша жена вошла в комнату. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Ограбил тётушку шофёр.

Шофёр ограбил тётушку.

Тётушку шофёр ограбил.

Ограбил шофёр тётушку.

Тётушку ограбил шофёр.

Шофёр тётушку ограбил.

После этого вы поехали за тётей на вокзал. Соседка по-прежнему сидела у подъезда. Что бы вы ей сказали о случившемся?

Шофёр ограбил тётю.

Шофёр тётю ограбил.

Тётю ограбил шофёр.

Тётю шофёр ограбил.

Ограбил тётю шофёр.

Ограбил шофёр тётю.

Сегодня ваша сестра Соня сдавала вступительный экзамен в ИНЯЗ для переводчиков. Год назад Соня сдавала экзамен первый раз, но провалилась.

После экзамена Соня вернулась домой. Она была не уверена, сдала ли она экзамен или нет. Она поехала на юг, чтобы развеяться.

И вот вам звонит её подруга из института, чтобы сообщить хорошую новость.

Ваш папа возвращается домой с работы. Что бы вы рассказали ему?

Сонечка сдала экзамен.

Экзамен сдала Сонечка.

Сдала Сонечка экзамен.

Сдала экзамен Сонечка.

Экзамен Сонечка сдала.

Сонечка экзамен сдала.

Вечером вы пошли в магазин и встретились со своим знакомым, сын которого в прошлом году дважды провалился на экзамене. Что бы вы ему сказали?

Сдала Соня экзамен.

Сдала экзамен Соня.

Экзамен Соня сдала.

Соня экзамен сдала.

Соня сдала экзамен.

Экзамен сдала Соня.

Ваш двенадцатилетний сын Сашенька играет в хоккей. Вместе с ним вы поехали на игру, но по пути у вас были неполадки с машиной, поэтому вы опоздали. В результате, строгий тренер команды не позволил Сашеньке играть. После игры тренер сказал ему, что он должен быть более дисциплинированным, и поэтому он не позволит ему принимать участие в следующей игре. Тренер даже не дал Сашеньке объяснить, почему он опоздал. Вы вернулись домой с игры. Сашенька очень сердитый сразу ушёл в спальню.

Ваша жена возвращается с работы. Что вы расскажете ей о случившемся?

Наказал тренер Сашеньку.

Тренер наказал Сашеньку.

Тренер Сашеньку наказал.

Сашеньку тренер наказал.

Сашеньку наказал тренер.

Наказал Сашеньку тренер.

Через некоторое время вам позвонил друг семьи, отец мальчика, играющего за другую команду. Что бы вы рассказали ему о случившемся?

Сашу наказал тренер.

Наказал Сашу тренер.

Тренер Сашу наказал.

Тренер наказал Сашу.

Наказал тренер Сашу.

Сашу тренер наказал.

Ваша восьмилетняя дочка Катенька пришла домой с улицы. Вы увидели, что она плачет и спросили её, что с ней. Она рассказала вам, что двое мальчишек разбили окно в сарае для инструментов во дворе и сразу же убежали. Увидев, что случилось, дворник начал сильно ругаться и накричал на Катеньку.

Ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Дворник Катеньку отругал.

Катеньку отругал дворник.

Отругал Катеньку дворник.

Дворник отругал Катеньку.

Катеньку дворник отругал.

Отругал дворник Катеньку.

Вечером, вы пошли погулять и встретили на улице соседку, которая живёт на другом этаже. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Дворник Катю отругал.

Отругал дворник Катю.

Отругал Катю дворник.

Катю отругал дворник.

Дворник отругал Катю.

Катю дворник отругал.

Ваш знакомый работает режиссёром. Недавно он снял документальный фильм об архитектуре. Ваш брат Дима хочет стать архитектором. Режиссёр был уверен, что фильм Димочке будет интересен и посоветовал посмотреть его. Димочка пропустил премьеру, потому что был за городом. Через месяц, когда фильм ещё раз показали по телевизору, Димочка наконец посмотрел его.

После фильма Димочка ещё больше убедился, что ему надо учиться на архитектора.

Ваш папа вернулся домой с работы. Что бы вы ему рассказали?

Посмотрел фильм Димочка.

Димочка посмотрел фильм.

Фильм посмотрел Димочка.

Посмотрел Димочка фильм.

Фильм Димочка посмотрел.

Димочка фильм посмотрел.

Вы встретили режиссёра в метро. Что бы вы сказали ему?

Фильм посмотрел Дима.

Фильм Дима посмотрел.

Посмотрел фильм Дима.

Посмотрел Дима фильм.

Дима посмотрел фильм.

Дима фильм посмотрел.

Ваш брат Димочка занимается культуризмом. Он проводит много времени в спортивном комплексе, где тренером работает бывший олимпийский боксёр. Недавно тренер предложил Димочке заняться и боксом. Он начал тренироваться и оказался хорошим боксёром. Тренер предлагал ему спаринг. Димочка был горд своими успехами и поэтому согласился. Все боялись, потому что тренер раньше предлагал спаринг другим молодым боксёрам и потом не давал им пощады. Некоторые из них получили нокаут. Узнав от других об этом, Димочка сам стал беспокоиться, но тренер уверил его, что он безусловно примет во внимание степень мастерства Димочки и что они не будут боксировать до нокаута.

Димочка вернулся домой после боя в ужасном состоянии. Оказалось, что тренер ещё раз не смог себя сдержать. Димочкина подружка позвонила в тот вечер. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Димочку нокаутировал тренер.

Тренер нокаутировал Димочку.

Димочку тренер нокаутировал.

Нокаутировал тренер Димочку.

Нокаутировал Димочку тренер.

Тренер Димочку нокаутировал.

В тот же вечер на улице вы встретили молодого человека, с которым Димочка занимался культуризмом до тех пор, пока Дима не пошёл на бокс. Этот знакомый советовал Димочке, чтобы тот не шёл на спаринг с тренером. Что бы вы рассказали ему о случившемся?

Нокаутировал тренер Диму.

Нокаутировал Диму тренер.

Тренер Диму нокаутировал.

Диму тренер нокаутировал.

Диму нокаутировал тренер.

Тренер нокаутировал Диму.

Вы только что переехали на новую квартиру в Эдмонтоне. У вас никогда не было домашних животных, так как в вашем бывшем доме было запрещено их держать. Вы все, особенно ваша младшая сестра Леночка, хотели бы иметь собаку. Как вам были приятно узнать, что в этом новом доме квартирантам позволено иметь домашних животных!

Однажды к вашему величайшему удивлению папа вернулся домой с милым щенком. Вы сгораете от нетерпения сказать сестре о нём.

Папа пошёл погулять со щенком, и тут ваша сестра вернулась домой из школы. Что бы вы ей сказали?

Купил щенка папочка.

Папочка щенка купил.

Папочка купил щенка.

Щенка папочка купил.

Щенка купил папочка.

Купил папочка щенка.

В тот вечер, вам позвонил ваш друг. Что бы вы рассказали?

Щенка купил папа.

Купил щенка папа.

Папа щенка купил.

Купил папа щенка.

Щенка папа купил.

Папа купил щенка.

Вашей племяннице Маше пятнадцать лет. Она очень милая, умная и воспитанная девушка. Недавно она встретила молодого француза, который приехал в Россию изучать русский язык. Он был старше её на шесть лет. Они встречались несколько раз, и Машенька помогла ему подготовиться к экзамену. Мы все поняли, что француз ей очень нравится. После экзамена он пригласил её к себе на вечеринку в общежитие. Она волновалась и с нетерпением ждала этого дня.

Она вернулась домой с вечеринки совсем пьяная и её всю ночь рвало. Машенька редко пьёт и поэтому на вечеринке пыталась отказываться от алкоголя, но француз всё время подливал ей.

И вот вам позвонила её мама и рассказала, что произошло. Ваша жена приходит с работы. Что вы скажете ей о случившемся?

Машеньку француз напоил.

Француз напоил Машеньку.

Машеньку напоил француз.

Напоил француз Машеньку.

Напоил Машеньку француз.

Француз Машеньку напоил.

На улице вы встретили друга семьи, который работает преподавателем на факультете русского языка для иностранцев, где учится этот молодой француз. Что бы вы рассказали ему о случившемся?

Напоил Машу француз.

Машу напоил француз.

Француз Машу напоил.

Машу француз напоил.

Француз напоил Машу.

Напоил француз Машу.

Знаменитый американский корреспондент приехал в ваш город, чтобы интервьюировать людей об их повседневной жизни в России. Он работает над передачей, которую будут показывать по телевидению в Америке. Он уже взял интервью у бизнесменов, мэра, учителей и других людей, но ему ещё оставалось взять интервью у какого-нибудь типичного представителя молодёжи из вашего города. Он решил присутствовать на собрании молодёжного клуба, чтобы выбрать себе кандидата для интервью. Каждый, в том числе и ваш шестнадцатилетний брат Юра, надеялся, что корреспондент выберет его. Поскольку Юру большинство ваших знакомых считало очень красноречивым и умным молодым человеком, вы думали, что он имел все шансы на успех.

Юрочка вам позвонил после собрания и сказал, что опоздает к ужину. Оказалось, что корреспондент попросил его остаться, чтобы взять интервью. Вы звоните вашей маме. Что бы вы ей сказали?

Выбрал Юрочку корреспондент.

Выбрал корреспондент Юрочку.

Юрочку выбрал корреспондент.

Юрочку корреспондент выбрал.

Корреспондент выбрал Юрочку.

Корреспондент Юрочку выбрал.

После этого вы пошли в магазин и встретили на улице женщину, дочь которой также хотела дать интервью. Что бы вы ей рассказали?

Корреспондент выбрал Юру.

Выбрал корреспондент Юру.

Выбрал Юру корреспондент.

Юру корреспондент выбрал.

Корреспондент Юру выбрал.

Юру выбрал корреспондент.

Ваш десятилетний двоюродный брат Дима часто ходит на рыбалку с вашим папой, дядей и другими друзьями. Но рыба у него не ловится. Димочка обычно теряет терпение и перестаёт удить, но ему всё—таки нравится ходить.

Однажды когда они вернулись домой с рыбалки, Димочка снял от радости. Он открыл свою сумку и показал вам свой улов.

Через некоторое время вернулась домой ваша мама. Что бы вы сказали ей об этом?

Рыбу поймал Димочка.

Рыбу Димочка поймал.

Димочка поймал рыбу.

Поймал Димочка рыбу.

Поймал рыбу Димочка.

Димочка рыбу поймал.

В тот же вечер вы встретились с рыбаком, который обычно ходит на рыбалку, но который не ходил сегодня. Что бы вы сказали ему?

Дима рыбу поймал.

Поймал Дима рыбу.

Рыбу Дима поймал.

Поймал рыбу Дима.

Дима поймал рыбу.

Рыбу поймал Дима.

Ваша подруга Лена работала машинисткой в издательстве. Её очень уважали другие машинистки. К тому же, начальник отдела считал её лучшей машинисткой и собирался сделать её своей личной секретаршей. Но его самого продвинули в должности и он стал заместителем директора.

Через короткое время на его бывшую должность на работу приняли нового сотрудника. Он оказался злобным человеком, который почему-то был не доволен работой Леночки, и именно к ней относился с особенной неприязнью. Она с трудом сдерживалась, но поскольку положение ухудшалось, в конце концов она вышла из себя. Она выразила ему своё недовольство по поводу несправедливости в отделе и сказала, что его подход непрофессионален.

Всем было известно, что этот новый начальник собирался пойти к заместителю директора и убедить его, что Леночку нужно уволить. Потом вам позвонила Леночка, чтобы рассказать, что случилось.

Оказалось, что новый начальник доказывал, что она плохо работает, некорректно ведёт себя и с высока относится ко всем в отделе. Но замдиректора, знавший о работе Леночки, не стал его слушать и сказал, что новый начальник был не прав.

Ваша жена вернулась с работы. Что бы вы сказали ей об этом?

Леночку замдиректора защитил.

Замдиректора Леночку защитил.

Защитил Леночку замдиректора.

Защитил замдиректора Леночку.

Замдиректора защитил Леночку.

Леночку защитил замдиректора.

Возвращаясь домой с работы, вы заехали за Леночкой в издательство и там встретили главного корректора. Похоже, что он не знал о случившемся. Как бы вы ему сказали об этом?

Защитил Лену замдиректора.

Лену замдиректора защитил.

Защитил замдиректора Лену.

Замдиректора Лену защитил.

Замдиректора защитил Лену.

Лену защитил замдиректора.

Ваш брат Алёша зашёл к вашему соседу, и спросил его, может ли он пойти погулять с его собакой Рексом в парке. Сосед разрешил, и брат ушёл с собакой. Через три часа брат вернулся один. Оказалось, что, болтая со своим другом по университету, он забыл о собаке на секундочку и она убежала. Ваш сосед живёт один. Рекс — его лучший друг.

Ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы рассказали ей об этом?

Потерял Алёша Рекса.

Алёша потерял Рекса.

Потерял Рекса Алёша.

Рекса потерял Алёша.

Рекса Алёша потерял.

Алёша Рекса потерял.

Алёша пошёл ещё раз в парк искать Рекса. Вы идёте к соседу. Что вы скажете ему ослучившемся?

Рекса Алексей потерял.

Рекса потерял Алексей.

Потерял Алексей Рекса.

Алексей Рекса потерял.

Алексей потерял Рекса.

Потерял Рекса Алексей.

Ваша сестра Катя – студентка факультета иностранных языков в университете. С первого класса она изучала английский язык и поступила в университет благодаря своему основательному знанию английского. Две недели назад для работы в России по обмену приехала американская аспирантка. Она сняла комнату у одного вашего знакомого по работе. Катенька с нетерпением ждала встречи с этой девушкой. Она очень хотела поговорить с ней на английском и была готова ей помочь с русским языком.

После же встречи с аспиранткой Катенька пришла домой очень расстроенная. Оказалось, что американка смеялась над её грамматическими ошибками и критиковала её акцент.

Ваша жена вернулась домой после работы. Что бы вы рассказали ей об этом?

Обидела Катеньку американка.

Катеньку обидела американка.

Обидела американка Катеньку.

Американка Катеньку обидела.

Катеньку американка обидела.

Американка обидела Катеньку.

На следующий день на работе в коридоре вы встретили вашего знакомого, у которого живёт эта девушка из Америки. Что бы вы сказали ему об этом?

Обидела американка Катю.

Американка обидела Катю.

Катю обидела американка.

Обидела Катю американка.

Американка Катю обидела.

Катю американка обидела.

Ваша сестра Софья очень надеялась стать манекенщицей. Она красивая и уже участвовала в некоторых показах мод. Несколько открывателей талантов считают её подающей очень большие надежды. Как и другие начинающие манекенщицы, она ждала своего шанса пробиться в мире мод.

После одного из недавних показов мод женщина, работающая в доме моделей, познакомила Софочку с молодым фотографом. Он дал Софочке свою визитку и сказал, что работает по договорам с западноевропейскими модными журналами. Он убеждал её, что ей нужен полный набор фотографий и предложил свои услуги. Он был уверен, что когда он покажет этот набор редакторам журналов, Софочке безусловно предложат контракт. Фотограф попросил Софочку заплатить вперёд за сеанс. У неё едва хватало денег на это, но она не хотела отказаться от шанса, и в конце концов согласилась и дала ему деньги. Он сказал, что позвонит ей, чтобы договориться о встрече. Но фотограф всё не звонил. К тому же, номер телефона, который был указан на визитке, оказался неправильным.

Ваша мама вам позвонила, чтобы узнать у вас, что нового. Что бы вы рассказали ей об этом?

Фотограф Софочку обманул.

Софочку обманул фотограф.

Фотограф обманул Софочку.

Обманул фотограф Софочку.

Софочку фотограф обманул.

Обманул Софочку фотограф.

На улице вы встретили женщину, которая познакомила Софечку с фотографом. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Обманул фотограф Софью.

Фотограф обманул Софью.

Софью обманул фотограф.

Софью фотограф обманул.

Обманул Софью фотограф.

Фотограф Софью обманул.

Вместе с другими хорошими студентами, вашего брата Сашу выбрали участвовать в состязании ораторского искусства. Конкурсантов попросили подготовить речь на какую-нибудь тему. Затем они должны были произнести свою речь перед аудиторией, состоящей из преподавателей, других студентов и жюри. Участвовать в состязании – большая честь, кроме того победитель получал большой приз.

Вы с семьёй поехали послушать выступление. Хотя Саша волновался перед выступлением, он очень свободно и чётко произнёс свою речь и говорил с уверенностью. И вот жюри объявляет, что Сашенька – победитель.

Когда вы выходите из зала после состязания вы встречаетесь со знакомым, дочь которого также участвовала в конкурсе. Оказалось, что он только что приехал и поэтому пропустил всё. Что бы вы сказали ему?

Получил Саша приз.

Приз Саша получил.

Приз получил Саша.

Саша получил приз.

Получил приз Саша.

Саша приз получил.

Что бы вы сказали своей маме, которая заболела и не могла прийти на конкурс?

Сашенька приз получил.

Получил приз Сашенька.

Сашенька получил приз.

Приз получил Сашенька.

Получил Сашенька приз.

Приз Сашенька получил.

Вам предложили новую работу и поэтому, вы переехали в другой город. В прошлом ваша мама присматривала за вашим пятилетним сыном, Алёшей. Вы беспокоитесь о том, кто будет смотреть за Алёшей, когда вы будете на работе. Вы уже познакомились с соседями. По рекомендации одной из соседок вы решили нанять проходящую няню.

Хотя Алёша ещё очень мал, он очень хорошо себя ведёт и вообще он спокойный ребёнок. Няне было дано указание не наказывать Алёшу ни при каких условиях. Для вас очень важно, что вы сами можете влиять на него, когда он плохо себя ведёт.

Вы вернулись домой с работы и увидели через окно, что няня гуляет во дворе с Алёшей. Внезапно Алёша уронил свой стаканчик с соком на землю. Увидев, что стаканчик разбился, Алёша начал плакать, и няня дала Алёше звонкий шлепок.

Вы рассердились и немедленно уволили няню. Ваша жена вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Отшлёпала няня Алёшу.

Няня отшлёпала Алёшу.

Отшлёпала Алёшу Няня.

Няня Алёшу отшлёпала.

Алёшу няня отшлёпала.

Алёшу отшлёпала няня.

В тот же вечер вы встретились в лифте с соседкой, которая рекомендовала эту проходящую няню. Что бы вы рассказали ей о случившемся?

Алексея няня отшлёпала.

Алексея отшлёпала няня.

Няня отшлёпала Алексея.

Няня Алексея отшлёпала.

Отшлёпала няня Алексея.

Отшлёпала Алексея няня.

Сестра подружки вашего младшего брата Флёши попросила Флёшу и его подружку прийти к ним вечером посидеть с детьми. Вы стали немножко подтрунивать над ним по этому поводу, потому что всем было известно, что Флёша не любит присматривать за детьми. Но Флёша готов сделать всё для своей девушки, и поэтому он согласился пойти с ней.

На следующий день она звонит и просит вас позвать Флёшу к телефону. Вы спрашиваете её, как Флёша обращался с детьми, и она сказала, что он много играл с пятилетним мальчиком, но что более удивительно – накормил другого ребёнка.

Ваша мама входит в комнату. Что бы вы сказали ей об этом?

Накормил ребёнка Флёша.

Флёша накормил ребёнка.

Ребёнка накормил Флёша.

Флёша ребёнка накормил.

Ребёнка Флёша накормил.

Накормил Флёша ребёнка.

В тот вечер вы встретили маму Флёшиной подружки. Что бы вы ей сказали?

Накормил Алексей ребёнка.

Накормил ребёнка Алексей.

Ребёнка накормил Алексей.

Ребёнка Алексей накормил.

Алексей накормил ребёнка.

Алексей ребёнка накормил.

Вы поехали в деревню на неделю посетить вашу семью. Родители и ваша собака Жучка живут на ферме. Жучке очень нравится бегать по лесу, который простирается далеко за фермерским домом. Последнее время ваши родители боятся, что с Жучкой может что-нибудь случиться. Недавно они видели охотника в этом лесу, хотя охота в этом районе запрещена.

Утром Жучка побежала гулять и долго не возвращалась. Внезапно вы услышали из леса громкий выстрел и немедленно побежали по направлению к нему. Вы увидели, что Жучка лежит на земле. Вы также увидели охотника, который бежал к ней и кричал, что он случайно попал в собаку. Вы побежали домой за помощью. Ваш отец только что приехал на машине. Что бы вы сказали ему?

Убил охотник Жучку.

Охотник убил Жучку.

Убил Жучку охотник.

Жучку убил охотник.

Жучку охотник убил.

Охотник Жучку убил.

В тот же вечер к вам пришёл милиционер, чтобы составить подробный протокол. Что бы вы сказали ему о случившемся?

Убил охотник собаку.

Убил собаку охотник.

Собаку убил охотник.

Охотник убил собаку.

Охотник собаку убил.

Собаку охотник убил.

Бабушка подарила вашей десятилетней сестре Лене на день рождения канарейку. Лена была очень рада. Она хотела научить её петь. В вашей квартире живёт старая и злобная кошка.

Однажды, вы вернулись домой и увидели, что кошка сидит в углу с птицей во рту.

Ваша мама вернулась домой. Что бы вы сказали ей о случившемся?

Птицу кошка съела.

Кошка птицу съела.

Птицу съела кошка.

Съела птицу кошка.

Съела кошка птицу.

Кошка съела птицу.

В тот же вечер, вы с бабушкой поехали за новой птицей к тому же человеку, который продал бабушке первую канарейку. Что бы вы сказали ему о случившемся?

Птицу кошка съела.

Птицу съела кошка.

Съела птицу кошка.

Съела кошка птицу.

Кошка съела птицу.

Кошка птицу съела.

Ваша пятнадцатилетняя сестра Маша увлекалась новым популярным телесериалом. Ей, как и её подругам, очень нравился красивый молодой актёр. Машенька была очень взволнована, потому что этот актёр должен был приехать в ваш город на встречу со зрителями, чтобы рекламировать телесериал.

Машенька с друзьями стояла три часа в очереди, надеясь получить автограф и фотографию. После встречи актёр раздавал автографы, и когда наконец подошла Машенькина очередь появился фотограф из местной газеты и попросил актёра позировать для него. Актёр позировал с Машенькой и даже поцеловал её в щёку.

Машенька вернулась домой и рассказала вам, что произошло. Она была на седьмом небе. Чуть позже ваша мама вернулась домой с работы. Что бы вы сказали ей об этом?

Актёр поцеловал Машеньку.

Машеньку актёр поцеловал.

Поцеловал Машеньку актёр.

Поцеловал актёр Машеньку.

Машеньку поцеловал актёр.

Актёр Машеньку поцеловал.

В тот вечер вы встретили на улице мать одной из подруг Машеньки. Что бы вы сказали ей?

Актёр поцеловал Машу.

Машу поцеловал актёр.

Актёр Машу поцеловал.

Поцеловал Машу актёр.

Поцеловал актёр Машу.

Машу актёр поцеловал.