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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

**THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE,
1990-1994:
THE KRAVCHUK YEARS**

By



ANDREW G. BENIUK

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In
HISTORY**

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
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
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
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
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Dedicated to my parents:

JOHN AND KATHERINE BENIUK

ABSTRACT

On 24 August 1991, national democrat and Communist parliamentarians passed the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, affirmed through a referendum (1 December 1991) when 90.32% of the electorate voted 'yes' in support. I regard the referendum as having been more than a vote for independence. The electorate also endorsed what I call a 'social contract' and the 'national rebirth of Ukraine' program that was presented and discussed during the referendum campaign.

Ukraine's independence was not established through an upsurge of Ukrainian national consciousness and democratic forces, but rather through the united efforts of the Soviet territorial elite under the leadership of Leonid Kravchuk, former Communist Party ideologue and parliamentary Speaker. It was the territorial establishment in all regions that delivered the overwhelming 'yes' vote, in the process, transforming itself into Ukraine's national elite.

When the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine's independence, suspended the Communist Party of Ukraine, and discarded Marxism-Leninism, it created an ideological void that was filled through the social contract and national rebirth of Ukraine program. The social contract promised that Ukraine would be a civil, multiparty, rule-by-law democracy, with a prosperous economy and protective of individual and national minority rights. The national rebirth of Ukraine program highlighted Ukraine's European roots and traditions, in the process, distancing Ukraine from a Russia defined as empire, autocratic, and

Eurasian. Together, they defined Ukraine, contributed to internal stability, and bond the elite and populace, Kyiv and the regions in support of independence. However, the nomenklatura encountered difficulties in adjusting to post-Soviet realities and through their positions of influence and power in all spheres of society resisted economic and legal reforms, privatization, and the internal restructuring of government and institutions.

It is the thesis of this text that the essence of the Kravchuk presidency, its nation- and state- building policies, priorities and objectives were conducted within the parameters of the social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program as approved through the referendum.

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INTRODUCTION

On 24 August 1991, unexpectedly, the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed the independence of Ukraine, suspended the Communist Party, and discarded Marxism-Leninism. Independence was not achieved through an upsurge of Ukrainian national consciousness and the triumph of democratic forces. It was achieved under the leadership of parliamentary speaker and former Communist Party ideologue Leonid Kravchuk, and through the united efforts of Ukraine's multiethnic territorial establishment who campaigned for independence and delivered the 'yes' vote. Over 90 percent of the electorate voted 'yes', affirming their support for independence during the referendum held on 1 December 1991. By their actions the territorial elite had reversed their decades-long strong opposition to Ukrainian national aspirations and statehood. The enthusiasm with which parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and the territorial establishment promoted Ukraine's independence raised high expectations of the benefits that independence would bestow upon all citizens, including job

opportunities and economic prosperity, as Ukraine claimed its independence and its European roots, traditions, and values.

The Soviet Union had ceased to be a subject of international law after the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States and annul the 1922 Union Treaty that had created the USSR. With the exception of the Baltic States, all Soviet republics signed the CIS agreement and joined the loosely defined CIS. The bipolar division of the world into two rival military and ideological camps had ended. The demise of the world's first proletarian state was hailed in the West as the triumph of capitalism, to be followed by the newly independent states imitating the West and transforming themselves into democratic and capitalist societies.

The West had a limited knowledge of the newly independent countries, their leaders, histories, and traditions. During the Soviet era, Western knowledge and concerns had been focused primarily upon Russians and the USSR, with Ukraine and the other republics regarded as provinces on the periphery of the centralized federal state. Special attention had been paid to the CPSU and its leadership, understandable as the Communist Party had exercised a monopoly of political power, but now the CPSU was gone.¹ During

¹ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan Press, 1984); Bohdan Harasymiw, *Soviet Communist Party Officials: Study in Organizational Roles and Change* (N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 1996); T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983); John Miller, "Putting Clients in Place: The Role of Patronage in Cooption into the Soviet Leadership," in *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union*, ed. Archie Brown (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 54-95; Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, *Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU* (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

the Soviet era, writings on the non-Russian nationalities had concentrated upon their ethnic history rather than upon the Soviet republic named after the titular nation. Through independence, the former Soviet republics became subjects of international law, politics, and history, and would influence world events and determine the future developments within the former Soviet space. Knowledge of these countries, their leaders, histories, traditions, and contemporary developments became essential. As Ukraine prioritized its nation- and state-building efforts and defined its national identity, ethnic Ukrainian history was replaced by the need for a state history of Ukraine that encompassed the achievements, through historic time, of all peoples who resided on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine replaced references to proletarian unity and Marxism-Leninism with its national rebirth of Ukraine program, reclaiming its European roots, traditions, and values, in the process, redefining its relations with Russia and the world community. Independence provided a new start for Ukraine and Ukrainians, placing new challenges before Ukrainian and Western scholars as they sought to define the new Ukraine and Ukrainians, and to analyze and explain the developments occurring within contemporary Ukraine. This work focuses upon political history, the formation of the Ukrainian State, 1990-1994, and President Kravchuk's nation- and state-building efforts.

One of the most ambitious scholarly projects to analyze and explain the new political reality in the former Soviet space is *Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, a ten volume² series produced by the Russian Littoral Project and

² See bibliography for list of the ten volume series.

sponsored by the University of Maryland and the Johns Hopkins University. Edited and written by prominent scholars specializing in the field, the series covers history, national identity and ethnicity, religion, foreign policy, state formation, military power, nuclear weapons, political culture, civil society, economic transformation, and the impact that the post-Communist transitions are having in the international area. As the title indicates, Ukraine is categorized as a Eurasian state at the same time that it was reclaiming its European roots and traditions while distancing itself from Russia. Only some 12 percent of the articles deal specifically with Ukraine, while the remaining articles make sporadic or no references to Ukraine. While informative, the series does not concentrate upon, nor explain, the formation of the Ukrainian state and President Kravchuk's nation- and state-building efforts.

History and the interpretation of historic events and personalities are contributing to Ukraine's nation- and state-building efforts and the formation of its new national identity. Written just prior to independence, Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History*³ affirms European roots and traditions and has found an interested readership in Ukraine. The writings of Kohut,⁴ Plokyh,⁵ and Sysyn,⁶ have highlighted the Cossack past with its democratic traditions, statehood status, and territorial settlement as part of contemporary Ukraine's history, inheritance,

³ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: CIUS & University of Toronto Press, 1990).

⁴ Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine," in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 123-146.

⁵ Serhii, Plokyh, "Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute," in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 147-170.

⁶ Frank E. Sysyn, "The Emergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research* 58/4 (Winter 1991), 845-863.

and character. Joining Prymak's *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture*⁷ is Soldatenko's *Ukrainska revoliutsiia: kontseptsii ta istoriografii (1918-1920 rr.)*⁸ in analyzing the turbulent years of revolution, national awakening, and failed statehood. Soviet Ukraine's past is being reexamined as through Baran's⁹ *Ukraina 1950-1960-kh rr.: evoliutsiia totalitarnoi systemy*, an analysis of the post-Stalin period and Ukraine's evolution from totalitarianism. Independence has separated Ukraine from Russia enabling each to establish new and separate national identities. Hryniv's *Ukraina i Rosiia: partnerstvo chy protystoiannia?*¹⁰ analyzes Ukrainian-Russian historic relations. Was their historic encounter as partners or as adversaries? As Ukraine is a newly independent country with short-lived periods of statehood and is in the process of establishing its national identity and state history, understandably, a scholarly debate prevailed as to whether Ukraine has a history. Von Hagen through his scholarly paper "Does Ukraine Have a History?" initiated the debate that generated an organized response from Serhii Plokyh, Iaroslav Isaievych, Yuri Slezkine, Andreas Kappeler, and George Grabowicz.¹¹

⁷ Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

⁸ V. F. Soldatenko, *Ukrainska revoliutsiia: kontseptsii ta istoriografii (1918-1920 rr.)* (Kyiv: Vydavnychi tsestr 'Prosvita,' 1999).

⁹ Volodymyr Baran, *Ukraina 1950-1960-kh rr.: evoliutsiia totalitarnoi systemy* (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 1996).

¹⁰ Oleh Hryniv, *Ukraina i Rosiia: partnerstvo chy protystoiannia?* (Lviv: Instytut narodoznavstva NAN Ukrainy, 1997); also see, B. Havrylyshyn, "Ukraina i Rosiia u svitovomu konteksti," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (10, 1991), 3-7.

¹¹ Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review* 54/3 (Fall 1995), 658-673; Serhii M. Plokyh, "The History of a 'Non-historical' Nation: Notes on the Nature and Current Problems of Ukrainian Historiography," *Slavic Review* 54/3 (Fall 1995), 709-715; Iaroslav Isaievych, "Ukrainian Studies- Exceptional or Merely Exemplary?" *Slavic Review* 54/3 (Fall 1995), 702-708; Yuri Slezkine, "Can We Have Our Nation State and Eat It Too?" *Slavic Review* 54/3 (Fall 1995), 717-719; Andreas Kappeler, "Ukrainian History from a German Perspective,"

This work does not revisit historic events and individuals, nor does it debate whether Ukraine has a history. Rather, part of the text discusses how parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and the territorial establishment used history as an instrument of state, selectively extracting historic events and personalities to promote Ukraine's independence during the referendum campaign.

The years leading up to independence have received attention from Ukrainian and Western scholars. One of the most detailed works on Ukrainian dissidents, national liberation movements, and workers' strikes, from the 1950s to independence is Rusnachenko's¹² *Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh v Ukraini*, providing the reader with an in-depth understanding as to why Rukh and the independence movement found fertile ground in western Ukraine. This work is complemented by his *Probudzhennia: robotnychy rukh na Ukraini v 1989-1993 rokakh*¹³ that deals with workers' strikes throughout Ukraine. Lytvyn's¹⁴ very informative *Politychna arena Ukrainy* provides the reader with a detailed chronological report of the events that unfolded in Ukraine commencing with Gorbachev's election as General Secretary and ending with President Kravchuk's electoral defeat by President Kuchma. Comparable to Lytvyn's work but from a western vantage point is Bohdan Nahaylo's *The Ukrainian Resurgence*,¹⁵ an in-depth chronological report of the momentum of political change that swept through Ukraine during the Gorbachev years culminating in

Slavic Review 54/3 (Fall 1995), 691-701; George G. Grabowicz, "Ukrainian Studies: Framing the Contexts," *Slavic Review* 54/3 (Fall 1995), 674-690.

¹² Anatolii Rusnachenko, *Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh v Ukraini: seredyna 1950-kh -pochatok 1990-kh rokiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1998).

¹³ Anatolii Rusnachenko, *Probudzhennia: robotnychy rukh na Ukraini v 1989-1993 rokakh* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo dim KM Akademia, 1995).

Ukraine's independence. The work also highlights concerns over the perils Ukraine encounters during its nation- and state-building consolidation. Aleksieiev, Kulchytsky, and Sliusarenko¹⁶ in their *Ukraina na zlami istorychnykh epokh* describe the political events that unfolded in Ukraine during the Gorbachev years and the first years of independence. The history of the movement in support of perebudova and hlasnist is detailed in Kovtun's¹⁷ *Istoriia narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy* and Honcharuk's¹⁸ *Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy istoriia*. In his *Ubyty drakona*, Haran¹⁹ concentrates upon 1989-1991 when Gorbachev's reforms facilitated the formation of Rukh, the passage of the Sovereignty Declaration, and the transfer of political power from the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to the 'will of the electorate', from the Communist Party to the Verkhovna Rada. Haran discusses how this new political environment influenced parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and his sovereignty Communists as they increasingly sided with Narodna Rada parliamentarians, refused to sign a new Union treaty, and ultimately proclaimed the independence of Ukraine.

This work takes a different path. Ukrainian writers confirm that Rukh was established with the approval of the political establishment, and provide an important insight into the changing political landscape as the political system was 'opening up' to the expression of political diversity. This work regards the

¹⁴ Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonatsvi* (Kyiv: Abrys, 1994).

¹⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Yu. Aleksieiev, S. V. Kulchytsky, and A. H. Sliusarenko, *Ukraina na zlami istorychnykh epokh (derzhavotvorchyi protses 1985-1999 rr.)* (Kyiv: 'EksOb,' 2000).

¹⁷ Volodymyr Kovtun, *Istoriia Narodnoho rukhu Ukrainy* (Kyiv: V. Kovtun, 1995).

¹⁸ Hryhorii Honcharuk, *Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy istoriia* (Odesa: Astroprynt, 1997).

role played by political dissidents and Rukh as secondary to achieving and sustaining Ukraine's independence, in sharp contrast to Nahaylo's *The Ukrainian Resurgence* that highlights the contributions of political dissidents and Rukh. This work credits parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and the territorial establishment for achieving and sustaining Ukraine's independence.

A multitude of political parties have emerged covering the entire political spectrum, from the extreme left to the extreme right, providing visible markers of the changing political landscape. Coming out of a one-party state Ukrainian writers place importance on the actual existence of political parties, listing them and their platforms, and at times explaining the new multi-party political system²⁰ and who is who within the politically diverse arena.²¹ Yurov has written about the origins and activities of the Labor Party of Ukraine, Markulova's Liberal Party, and the activities of the left and right wings of ultra-radical political parties in Luhansk, while analyzing the Donbas population's attitudes towards political parties and party platforms.²² Kuzio has written about

¹⁹ O. V. Haran, *Ubyty drakona: Z istorii Rukhu ta novykh partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: 'Lybid,' 1993).

²⁰ Pamiatky Ukrainy arkhheohrafichna komisiia, *Ukraina bahatopartiina: prohramni dokumenty novykh partii* (Kyiv: MP 'Pamiatky Ukrainy,' 1991); V. A. Viktorenko, ed., *Ukraina bahatopartiina: prohramni dokumenty novykh partii* (Kyiv: 'Pamiatky Ukrainy,' 1991); A. O. Bilous, *Politychni obiednannia Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo 'Ukraina,' 1993); Volodymyr Lytvyn and A. H. Sliusarenko, "Na politychnii areni Ukraini (90-ty rr.) rozdumy istorykiv," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1,2,3 (1994), 9-30, 28-51; F. M. Rudych et al., *Politychni struktury ta protsesy v suchasni Ukraini: politolohichnyi analiz* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995); Vasyl lablonsky, *Suchasni politychni partii Ukrainy: dovidnyk* (Kyiv: 'Leksykon,' 1996); H. Andrushchak, Yu. Marchenko, and O. Telemko, eds., *Politychni partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: TOV 'K.I.S.,' 1998); M. I. Mykhalchenko and F.M. Rubych, eds., *Suchasna ukrainska polityka: polityky i politolohy pro nei* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrainsko-finskoho instytutu menezhmentu i biznesu, 1999).

²¹ Serhii Bilikin, *Khto ie khto v ukrainskii politytsi: dovidnyk* (Kyiv: Kyivske naukove tovarystvo imeni Petro Mohyly, 1993); O. Kiliievych, Yu. Marchenko, and O. Telemko, eds., *Khto ie khto v ukrainskii politytsi*, no. 3 (Kyiv: TOV 'K.I.S.,' 1996); H. Andrushchak, ed., *Ofitsiina Ukraina sohodni* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo, 'K.I.S.,' 1998).

²² Yurii Yurov, "Partiia pratsi Ukrainy," *Heneza* 1 (1994), 205-214; "'Fenomen Markulova' chy liberalna alternatyva," *Heneza* 2 (1994), 190-197; "Dva poliusy luhanskoho politykumu," *Heneza*

the formation of radical nationalist political parties and movements in Ukraine,²³ Khomchuk on the far right in Russia and Ukraine,²⁴ while Wilson analyzed the Ukrainian Left and its attitudes towards democracy and the former USSR.²⁵ Birch analyzed western Ukrainian electoral behavior during the 1990 parliamentary elections and the 1991 independence referendum,²⁶ while Bablanov expressed the hope that the 1990 parliamentary elections would create a multi-party Verkhovna Rada.²⁷ Wilson and Bilous analyzed selected political parties and their structures,²⁸ while Kuzio analyzed the state of the multi-party system on the eve of the 1994 parliamentary elections.²⁹ Kuzio,³⁰ Bojcun,³¹ and Birch³² analyzed the 1994 parliamentary and presidential election

1 (1994), 198-204; "Stavlennia naseleння donbasu do politychnykh partii ta ikh prohramnykh zasad," *Henezha* 1 (1994), 195-197.

²³ Taras Kuzio, "Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence: The Right and Its Politics, 1989-1994," *Nationalities Papers* 25/2 (June 1997), 211-242.

²⁴ Oksana Khomchuk, "The Far Right in Russia and Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 8/2 (July 1995), 40-44.

²⁵ Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/7 (Nov 1997), p. 1293, 24p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

²⁶ Sarah Birch, "Electoral Behavior in Western Ukraine in National Elections and Referendum, 1989-91," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/7 (Nov 1995), p. 1145, 31p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

²⁷ N. Bablanov, "The Ukraine: A Multi-Party Parliament?" in *New Political Parties and Movements in the Soviet Union*, ed. M. A. Babkina (N.Y.: Nova Science, 1991), 113-116.

²⁸ Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilous, "Political Parties in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45/4 (July/August 1993), p. 693, 11p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

²⁹ Taras Kuzio, "The Multi-Party System in Ukraine on the Eve of Elections," *Government and Opposition* 29/1 (Winter 1994), 109-127.

³⁰ Taras Kuzio, "The 1994 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine," *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 11/4 (December 1995), 335-361; Taras Kuzio, "Kravchuk to Kuchma: The 1994 Presidential Elections in Ukraine 1994," *The Journal of Communist and Transition Politics* 12/2 (June 1996), 117-144.

³¹ Marko Bojcun "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/12 (March 1995), p. 229, 21p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta

results, while Birch also analyzed campaign strategy and vote choice in the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections.³³ Deshchytsia compared the rise of the multi-party systems in Ukraine and Poland.³⁴

This work discusses but does not concentrate on political parties. During the Kravchuk years numerous political parties were registered but few were represented in the Verkhovna Rada where independents (former Communists) dominated. Political parties did not play an important role in the formation of the Ukrainian State and Kravchuk's nation- and state-building efforts.

Articles written for scholarly periodicals and edited books discuss Ukraine's linguistic duality, its ethnic and regional diversity, russification, and the perception of many Russians that Ukrainians are an integral part of the Russian nation. Himka highlights this Russian attitude towards Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language.³⁵ Linguistic ukrainianization, the predominant use of the Russian language in eastern and southern Ukraine and Crimea, and the presence of ethnic Russians who comprise 22 percent of the population (67 percent in Crimea) have heightened concerns over Ukraine's internal stability, territorial integrity, and survivability as an independent state. This Russian and

Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:
<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

³² Sarah Birch, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994," *Electoral Studies* 14/1 (March 1995), 93-99.

³³ Sarah Birch, "The Spatial Dynamics of Campaign Strategy and Vote Choice in the Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994," *Political Studies* 46/1 (March 1998), p. 96, 19p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 00323217) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

³⁴ Andrii Deshchytsia, *Post-Communist Transitions: The Rise of the Multi-Party Systems in Poland and Ukraine* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1996).

³⁵ John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainians, Russians, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn," *Cross Currents* 11 (1992), 193-204.

Soviet legacy and its influence upon contemporary Ukraine is explained by Solchanyk³⁶ and Szporluk,³⁷ while Krawchenko, Motyl, and Prizel explain the current situation in Ukraine and restate how Ukraine achieved independence.³⁸ Concerns over Ukraine's difficult task of consolidating independence through nation- and state-building efforts and maintaining internal stability and territorial integrity are expressed in many articles.³⁹ Wilson has expressed the most negative interpretation of Ukraine's diversity, concluding that Ukraine is a

³⁶ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Belarussia, and Moldova: Imperial Integration, Russification and the Struggle for National Survival," in *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, ed. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 175-203; Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, the (Former) Center, Russia, and 'Russia,'" *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25/1 (March 1992), 90-107; "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9/4 (October-December 1993), 337-365.

³⁷ Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," *Daedalus* 126/3 (Summer 1997), 85-120.

³⁸ Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: the Politics of Independence," in *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (N.Y. & Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 75-98; Alexander J. Motyl and Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: From Empire to Statehood," in *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, ed. Ian Bremmer and Taras Kuzio (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 235-275; Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine Between Proto-democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism," in *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (N.Y. & Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 330-369.

³⁹ Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," in *The Soviet Nationality Reader*, ed. Rachel Denber (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 509-543; Roman Szporluk, "Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Question: A Comment," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9/4 (October-November 1993), 366-374; Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review* 7/7-9 (March-April 1994); Roman Szporluk, "Nation Building in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects," in *The Successor States of the USSR*, ed. John W. Blaney (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 173-183; David R. Marples, "After the Putsch: Prospects for Independent Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 21/2 (1993), 35-46; David R. Marples, "Ukraine's Relations with Russia in the Contemporary Era," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 103-112; Eugene B. Rumer, "Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?" *Foreign Policy* 96 (Fall 1994), p. 129, 16p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 00157228) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Janusz Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 165-181; William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, "Eurasia Letter: Unneighborly Neighbors," *Foreign Policy* 94 (Spring 1994), p. 84, 21p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 00157228) on World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Jeremy Lester, "Russian Political Attitudes to Ukrainian Independence," *The Journal of Post Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 10/2 (June 1992), 193-233.

fragile, internally very divided state whose future is uncertain and precarious,⁴⁰ a conclusion that is challenged by Sysyn.⁴¹ Arel, concentrating on language use, has concluded that a great linguistic and cultural divide influenced how individuals voted in the 1994 presidential elections and how they view relations with Russia, Russian as a second state language, and whether they support a Eurasian or European orientation.⁴² But Arel also acknowledged that language use was not a determining factor in voting patterns in the Verkhovna Rada,⁴³ while Bilaniuk and Berezovenko write that the Ukrainian language is in flux as Russian speakers attempt to speak Ukrainian mixing Russian words with Ukrainian.⁴⁴ The formation of the Ukrainian national identity encompassing all citizens regardless of ethnicity and region has inspired substantial research,⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990's: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge and N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997); "Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine," in *Myths & Nationhood*, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin (London: Hurst, 1997), 182-197.

⁴¹ Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian 'Nationalism': A Minority Faith?" *The Harriman Review* 10/2 (Summer 1997), 12-20.

⁴² Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers* 23/2 (1995), 597-621; "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society, in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 157-188; "A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12/1 (January-March 1996), 73-90; Dominique Arel and Valerii Khmelko, "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 81-91.

⁴³ Dominique Arel, "Voting Behavior in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor?" in *Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Thomas F. Remington (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 125-158.

⁴⁴ Laada Bilaniuk, "Speaking of Surzhyk: Ideologies and Mixed Languages," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21/1-2 (June 1997), 3-17; Antonina Berezovenko, "The Ukrainian Language of Tomorrow," in *Towards a New Ukraine II: Meeting the Next Century*, ed. Theofil Kis and Irena Makaryk with Roman Weretelnik (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies University of Ottawa, 1999), 153-158.

⁴⁵ V. M. Bebyk, "Shcho zh my za liudy, ukraintsi?" *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (6, 1992), 22-29; L. K. Finberh, M. Yu. Riabchuk, O. V. Haran, Ye. I. Holovakha, M. F. Marynovych, and V. L. Skurativsky, "Nova Ukraina - kudy ity?" *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (3, 1992), 3-26; I. F. Kuras et al., eds., *Demokratia i derzhavnist v Ukraini: problemy harmonizatsii* (Kyiv: Invip, 1997); Roman Szporluk, ed., *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanvich,

with special attention being paid to the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine, their national consciousness, Russian-ethnic identity, and loyalty to Ukraine.⁴⁶ Pirie has concentrated on ethnic Russians in Ukraine and their multi-layered self-identities and territorial loyalty to Ukraine,⁴⁷ while Kuzio and Meyer have noted the differences between Crimean Russians and Donbas Russians.⁴⁸

eds., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Search for Post-Soviet Identity in Ukraine and Russia and Its Influences on the Relations between the Two States," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 16-27; Taras Kuzio, "Defining the Political Community in Ukraine: State, Nation, and the Transition to Modernity," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 213-244.

⁴⁶ David D. Laitin, "Language and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Republics," *Post-Soviet Studies* 12/1 (January-March 1996), 4-24; David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Ian Bremmer, "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/2 (1994), p. 261, 23p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Ian Bremmer, "How Russian the Russians? New Minorities in the Post-Soviet Regions," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 65-69; V. Shlapentok, M. Sendich, and E. Payin, *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Evgenii Golovakha, Natalia Panina, and Nikolai Churilov, "Russians in Ukraine," in *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*, ed. Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 59-71; Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, "Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/5 (July 1997), p. 845, 20p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Paul Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Ihor Zevelev, "Russia and the Russian Diaspora," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12/3 (July-September 1996), 265-287; Anatol Lievan, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," *Survival* 41/2 (Summer 1999), 53-70; Stephen D. Shenfield, "Alternative Conceptions of Russian State Identity and Their Implications for Russian Attitudes towards Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 142-17; Volodymyr Yevtukh, "Ukraine's Ethnic Minorities: Between Politics and Reality," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 62-64.

⁴⁷ Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48/7 (Nov 1996), p. 1079, 26p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁴⁸ Taras Kuzio and David J. Meyer, "The Donbas and Crimea: An Institutional and Demographic Approach to Ethnic Mobilization in Two Ukrainian Regions," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 297-337.

Riabchuk⁴⁹ discusses Ukraine's diversity and internal compromise, Sochor⁵⁰ the difficulties of achieving consensus, while Shulman⁵¹ discusses competing and complementary identities in Ukrainian-Russian relations and territorial loyalties. Barrington⁵² looks at Ukraine's citizenship policy, Prisiajniuk⁵³ on the state of civil society, and Resler⁵⁴ on how national minority rights are safeguarded in Ukraine, while Marples, Duke, Budzhurova, Kostenko and Makeiev discuss the Crimean Tatars and Crimea and their impact upon Ukraine's territorial integrity.⁵⁵

The issues of regionalism and the devolution of power from Kyiv to the provinces are discussed by Hesli, Nemiria, Birch, and Zinko.⁵⁶ Motyl has

⁴⁹ Mykola Riabchuk, "Two Ukraines?" *East European Reporter* 5/4 (July-August 1992); "The Art of Compromise," *East European Reporter* 5/5 (September-October 1992).

⁵⁰ Zenovia A. Sochor, "No Middle Ground? On the Difficulties of Crafting a Consensus in Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 57-61.

⁵¹ Stephen Shulman, "Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Loyalties in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 26/4 (December 1998), 615-632.

⁵² Lowell Barrington, "The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/5 (July 1995), p. 531, 33p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁵³ Oxsana Prisiajniuk, "The State of Civil Society in Independent Ukraine," *The Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 20/1 (Summer-Winter 1995), 161-176.

⁵⁴ Tamara Resler, "Dilemmas of Democratisation: Safeguarding Minorities in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/1 (January 1997), p. 89, 28p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁵⁵ David R. Marples and David F. Duke, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Question of Crimea," *Nationalities Papers* 23/2 (June 1995), 261-289; Lilya Budzhurova, "The Current Sociopolitical Situation of the Crimean Tatars," *The Harriman Review* 11/1-2 (1998), 21-27; N. V. Kostenko and S. O. Makeiev, "Krymskyi konflikt: moral proty prava," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (11, 1991), 53-66.

⁵⁶ Vicki L. Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (1995), p. 91, 31p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>; Sarah Birch and Ihor Zinko, "The Dilemma of Regionalism," *Transition* (1 November 1996), 22-25, 64; Grigory Nemiria, "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building," in *Ukraine: The Search for a*

combined his knowledge and scholarly talents with an appeal to the West to be compassionate and understanding of the difficulties Ukraine is experiencing in transforming its economy due to several decades of Soviet rule.⁵⁷

This work takes a different path. While Ukraine's ethnic diversity, linguistic duality, and the chauvinistic attitude of many Russians towards Ukraine and Ukrainians are acknowledged, this work does not regard Ukraine's diversity as being a threat to its internal stability and territorial integrity. Western writers, not Ukrainian citizens, have raised these issues as being a potential threat to Ukraine's independence. While participating in Ukraine's independence referendum campaign with Ukrainian parliamentarians and university students in Kyiv and Luhansk, I noticed that ethnicity and language were not divisive issues.⁵⁸ Independence was achieved through the unified efforts of the multi-ethnic territorial establishment who enthusiastically promoted independence and delivered the 'yes' vote, with over 90 percent of the electorate voting their approval. I believe that through the referendum the electorate also approved the national rebirth of Ukraine program with its European orientation and what I call a new 'social contract' that bound the elite and populace, Kyiv and the regions.

National Identity, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 183-197.

⁵⁷ Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); "Will Ukraine Survive 1994?" *The Harriman Institute Forum* 7/5 (Jan. 1994), 3-6; "The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism," in *Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership*, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker, The John Olin Critical Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 103-121; "Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systematic Change in Ukraine and Russia," *Comparative Politics* 29/4 (July 1997), 433-447; "Making Sense of Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 10/3 (Winter 1997), 1-7.

⁵⁸ Andrew G. Beniuk, "The Referendum: On the Road to Ukraine's Independence," (M.A., University of Alberta, 1993).

Writings on Ukrainian foreign policy tend to concentrate on Ukraine's bilateral relations with other countries and Ukraine's involvement in multilateral organizations. Vasylieva-Chekalenko⁵⁹ in *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh, 1944-1996 rr.* details Ukraine's activities in the international arena from the founding of the United Nations to the end of the Kravchuk presidency. Fink, Garnett, Quester, Lubin, Dobriansky, and Garthoff discuss the background activities that led to American recognition of Ukraine's independence, and American foreign policy objectives of facilitating Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and encouraging economic and social reforms.⁶⁰ Ukraine has developed a special relationship with its western neighbors in East-Central Europe, explained by Burant, Bzhezinsky, Brzezinski, Duleba, Wolchik, Zieba, and Zelenko.⁶¹ Smolansky⁶² discusses Ukraine's relations with the Middle East,

⁵⁹ L. D. Vasylieva- Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh, 1944-1996 rr.* (Kyiv: 'Osvita,' 1998).

⁶⁰ Susan D. Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev' to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Ukraine," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21/1-2 (June 1997), 11-61; Sherman W. Garnett, "The Sources and Conduct of Ukrainian Nuclear Policy: November 1992 to January 1994," in *The Nuclear Challenge, in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. George Quester (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 125-152; Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch, Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997); George H. Quester, "The Roots of American Goals for Eurasia," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 123-145; Nancy Lubin, "U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 350-378; Paula J. Dobriansky, "U.S.-Ukrainian Relations in the 1990s: A View from Washington," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 121-132; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Western Efforts to Shape Post-Soviet Behavior: Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-32.

⁶¹ Stephen R. Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours- Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45/3 (1993), p. 395, 24p. Retrieved March 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign

while Kordan⁶³ discusses Canada's relations with Ukraine. Alexandrova discusses Ukraine's relations with Western Europe,⁶⁴ while Dombrowski discusses German and American financial assistance to Ukraine.⁶⁵ Prizel, D'Anieri, and Haran discuss the influence of internal factors and nation- and state-building policies upon the formulation of Ukraine's foreign policy.⁶⁶ Sakwa, Webber, Zagorski, Lewis, and Markus discuss the Commonwealth of Independent States and Ukraine's role in shaping the CIS into an amorphous

Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/7 (November 1995), p. 1125, 19p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Stephen R. Burant, "Ukraine and East Central Europe," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 45-77; Yan Y. Bzhezinsky, "Polsko-ukrainski stosunki: nedootsinena stratehichna vis Evropy," *Henezha* (1) (1994), 190-194; Ian Brzezinski, "Polish- Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis," *Survival* 35/3 London International Institute of Strategic Studies (1993), 26-37; Sharon L. Wolchik and Ryszard Zieba, "Ukraine's Relations with the Visegrad Countries," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 133-161; H. Zelenko, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis," *Survival* 35/3 (Autumn 1993), 26-37; H. Zelenko, "Ukraina-Polshcha, modernizatsiia politychnykh struktur: porivnialnyi analiz," in *Suchasna Ukrainska polityka: polityky i politolohy pro nei*, ed. M.I. Mykhalchenko and F.M. Rudych (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrainsko-finskoho instytutu menedzhmentu i biznesu, 1999), 267-275. Not available to me: Alexander Duleba, *Koniec sucasnej srednej Europy?: Ukrajina a Slovensko po prvei vlne rozsirenia NATO: geopoliticke scenare buduceso vyvinu neintegrovanej srednej Europy a alternatyvy pre Slovensko*.

⁶² Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine and the Middle East," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), 171-190.

⁶³ Bohdan S. Kordan, "Canadian-Ukrainian Relations: Articulating the Canadian Interest," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), 125-144.

⁶⁴ Olga Alexandrova, "Ukraine and Western Europe," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), 145-170.

⁶⁵ Peter Dombrowski, "German and American Assistance to the Post-Soviet Transition," *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 217-242.

⁶⁶ Ilya Prizel, "The Influence of Ethnicity on Foreign Policy: The Case of Ukraine," in *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Roman Szporluk (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 103-128; Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy as an Instrument of Nation Building," in *The Successor States of the USSR*, ed. John W. Blaney (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 196-207; Paul D'Anieri, "The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a 'Weak State'," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 83-105; O. V. Haran, "Between Russia & The West: Domestic Factors of Ukraine's Foreign Policy," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 117-123.

organization,⁶⁷ while Bilinsky, Vlasov, and Rubinstein discuss Ukrainian-Russian relations.⁶⁸ However, the most informative and valuable source of information for understanding Ukrainian-Russian relations, and the formation and evolution of the CIS into an amorphous entity are RFE/RL news and research reports.

This work links the referendum, the national rebirth of Ukraine program, and what I call the new 'social contract' to foreign policy objectives. Provisions of the social contract that envisioned Ukraine becoming the mirror image of the Western liberal democracies encouraged the West to recognize Ukraine's independence. The national rebirth of Ukraine program guided Ukraine's foreign policy objectives of integrating into Europe, disentangling Ukraine from Moscow, and insuring that the CIS would be a loose association of independent states.

Ukraine's security concerns were directed towards nationalizing Soviet military and security forces on its territory, insuring internal stability, the

⁶⁷ Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51/3 (May 1999). Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.htm!>; Andrei Zagorski, "Reintegration in the Former USSR?" *Aussenpolitik* 45/3 (1994), 263-272; Andrei Zagorski, "What Kind of a CIS Would Do?" *Aussenpolitik* 46/3 (1995), 263-270; William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, "Commonwealth of Independent States," Chapter 4 in *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations*, McNair Paper Number 58 (June 1998). Retrieved 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair58/m58cont.html>.

⁶⁸ Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Ukraine, Russia, and the West," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44/1 (Jan/Feb 1997), p. 27, 8p. Retrieved March April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 10758216) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.htm!>; Sergei Vlasov, "Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Between Russia and the West," in *Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, ed. Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev, and Dmitri Trenin, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 141-155; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy," in *The*

territorial integrity of its borders, disentangling itself from Union level structures, and establishing good relations with its neighbors and the world community, especially with Russia and the Western liberal democracies. The West's security concerns were directed towards Ukraine becoming a non-nuclear status state with substantially reduced military personnel. The best source of chronological and detailed information on Ukraine nationalizing the Soviet military forces, the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, and Ukraine's path to nuclear disarmament are RFE/RL news and research reports. Jaworsky, Olynyk, and Lepingwell discuss the formation and structure of the Ukrainian armed forces, military policy, and civil-military relations.⁶⁹ Gow, Zhovnirenko, Alexandrova, Kulinich, Larrabee, and Krawciw discuss Ukraine's security concerns, especially regarding Russia.⁷⁰ Wallander and Lucas look at

International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997) 33-67.

⁶⁹ John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability*, McNair Paper 42 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, August 1995); John Jaworsky, "Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 113-116; John Jaworsky, "Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), 223-247; Stephen D. Olynyk, "Emerging Post-Soviet Armies: The Case of Ukraine," *Military Review* 74/3 (March 1994), p. 5, 14p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 00264148) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; Stephen D. Olynyk, "Ukraine as a Military Power," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 69-93; John W. R. Lepingwell, "New States and Old Soldiers: Civil-Military Relations in the Former Soviet Union," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, ed. John W. Blaney (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 57-76.

⁷⁰ James Gow, "Independent Ukraine: The Politics of Security," *International Relations* 1/3 (December 1992), 253-67; Pavlo Zhovnirenko, "The Problems of Security in Ukrainian-Russian Relations: A Search for Common Interests," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 129-132; Olga Alexandrova, "Russia as a Factor in Ukrainian Security Concepts," *Aussenpolitik* 45/1 (1994), 68-78; Olga Alexandrova, "Ukraine and Russia in the European Security System: Perceptions and Reality," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 124-128; Nikolai A. Kulinich, "Ukraine in the New Geopolitical Environment: Issues of Regional and Subregional Security," in *The Making of Foreign Policy, in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 113-140; Nikolai A. Kulinich, "Ukraine's Russian Dilemma and Europe's Evolving Geography," in *Ukraine: The Search for a*

Russian efforts for peacekeeping in the former Soviet space.⁷¹ Garnett explains American foreign policy towards Ukraine that was centered upon nuclear disarmament and describes how the Trilateral Agreement was achieved that facilitated Ukraine's nuclear disarmament.⁷² Other sources dealing with nuclear disarmament are Batiouk, Quester, Schadlow, Miller, and Kuzio.⁷³

This work credits the referendum, the social contract, and the national rebirth of Ukraine program for the peaceful establishment of Ukraine's military and security forces from Soviet forces. Military and security personnel had voted in the referendum and were bound by the results, in turn, while downsizing occurred, there were no purges. Ukraine agreed to nuclear

National Identity, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 95-106; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), 249-270; Nicholas S. H. Krawciw, "Ukrainian Perspectives on National Security and Ukrainian Military Doctrine," in *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Bruce Parrott (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 134-156.

⁷¹ Celeste Wallander, "Conflict Resolution and Peace Operations in the Former Soviet Union: Is There a Role for Security Institutions?" in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 101-122; Michael R. Lucas, "Russia and Peacekeeping in the Former USSR," *Aussenpolitik* 46/2 (1995), 145-156.

⁷² Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch, Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997); "The Sources and Conduct of Ukrainian Nuclear Policy: November 1992 to January 1994," in *The Nuclear Challenge, in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. George Quester (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 125-152; "U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Past, Present, and Future," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), 103-123.

⁷³ Victor Batiouk, *Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Option*, Research Paper No. 14 (N.Y.: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992); George H. Quester, ed., *The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995); Nadia Schadlow, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security," *Harvard Ukrainian Review* 20 (1996), 271-287; Steven E. Miller, "Western Diplomacy and the Soviet Nuclear Legacy," *Survival* 34/3 (Autumn 1992), 3-27; Steven E. Miller, "Proliferation Dangers in the Former Soviet Union," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, ed. John W. Blaney (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 17-29; Joachim Krause, "Risks of Nuclear Proliferation Following the Dissolution of the Soviet Union," *Aussenpolitik* 43/4 (1992), 352-361; Taras Kuzio, "Nuclear Weapons and Military Policy in Independent Ukraine," *Harriman Institute Forum* 6/9 (May 1993).

disarmament to facilitate international recognition of its independence and assist with integration into Europe.

The best sources on Ukraine's economy are World Bank and IMF documents, reports, and papers.⁷⁴ One of the most prolific writers on Ukraine's economy is Oleh Havrylyshyn.⁷⁵ The material contained in Koropecykyi⁷⁶ on Soviet Ukraine's economy facilitates an understanding of the economic crisis that independent Ukraine inherited, and some of the difficulties that energy-short Ukraine encountered transforming its energy intensive military-industrial economy. Balmaceda⁷⁷ and Smolansky⁷⁸ discuss Ukraine's energy shortages,

⁷⁴ Patrick Lenain, "Ten Years of Transition: A Progress Report," *Finance & Development* 35/3 (IMF, September 1998). Retrieved June 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/09gray.htm>; Julian Exeter and Steven Fries, "The Post-Communist Transition: Pattern and Prospects," *Finance & Development* 35/3 (IMF, September 1998). Retrieved June 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/09gray.htm>; Dale Gray, "Energy Tax Reform in Russia and Other Former Soviet Union Countries," *Finance & Development* 35/3 (IMF, September 1998). Retrieved June 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/> and <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/09gray.htm>; Peter K. Cornelius and Patrick Lenain, eds., *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, Proceedings of an IMF/World Bank Seminar (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997); Liam Ebrill, Oleh Havrylyshyn, and IMF staff, *Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union*, Occasional Paper 182 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1999).

⁷⁵ Oleh Havrylyshyn, "Ukraine's Economic Crises and Western Economic Assistance," *Political Thought/Politychna dumka* 3 (1993); Oleh Havrylyshyn, "The Ukrainian Economy," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine* 1/1 (November-December 1994), Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>; Oleh Havrylyshyn, "Reviving NIS Trade," *Economy Policy*, A European Forum no. 19 supplement (December 1994), 171-187; Oleh Havrylyshyn, "Ukraine: Looking West, Looking East," *The Harriman Review* 10/3 (Winter 1997), 19-23; Oleh Havrylyshyn, "The Political Economy of Delayed Reform in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (N.Y.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 49-68; Oleh Havrylyshyn and Donal McGettigan, *Privatization in Transition Countries: Lessons of the First Decade*, Economic Issues 18 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1999).

⁷⁶ I. S. Koropecykyj, *Development in the Shadow: Studies in Ukrainian Economics* (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1990); I. S. Koropecykyj, ed., *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and Harvard University Press, 1992); Leslie Dienes, "Energy, Minerals, and Economic Policy," in *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges*, ed. I. S. Koropecykyj (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 123-147.

⁷⁷ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Politics: The Case of Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/2 (March 1998), 257-287. Retrieved

indebtedness and dependence upon Russia, and the search for new energy suppliers, while Krasnov and Brada⁷⁹ suggest that Russia is subsidizing energy sales to Ukraine, and Law reports a natural gas find in the Dnipro-Donets Basin.⁸⁰ Both Kushnirsky and Pereira report on an economic crisis among industrial enterprises.⁸¹ Kravchuk provides a very informative report on the state of the economy, why there was hyperinflation, and the role that President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada played through generous subsidies and credits to state enterprises and collective farms that intensified the economic crisis.⁸² Zvihlyanich discusses economic strategies for Ukraine.⁸³ And for those

May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁷⁸ Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (January-February 1995), 676-91. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁷⁹ Gregory V. Krasnov and Josef C. Brada, "Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade," in *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/5 (July 1997), 825-844. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁸⁰ B. E. Law et al., "Basin Centered Gas Evaluated in Dnieper-Donets Basin, Donbas Foldbelt, Ukraine," *Oil & Gas Journal* (Tulsa, 23 November 1998). Retrieved 13 April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.proquest.umi.com>.

⁸¹ Fyodr I. Kushnirsky, "Ukraine's Industrial Enterprises: Surviving Hard Times," *Comparative Economic Studies* 36/4 (1994), 21-39; Judith Pereira, "Hard Times in the Donbass," *Energy Economist* (London: December 1998). Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 02627108) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁸² Robert S. Kravchuk, *Budget Deficits, Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in Ukraine: 1991-96*. Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Retrieved May 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>; "The Quest for Balance: Regional Self-Government and Subnational Fiscal Policy in Ukraine," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 155-211.

⁸³ Volodymyr Zvihlyanich, "State and Nation: Economic Strategies for Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 237-263.

who want to know what Gorbachev was attempting to do with his political and economic reforms, Mau provides an informative explanation.⁸⁴

Corruption and the taking of bribes by government employees are widespread in Ukraine and the practice was inherited from Soviet Ukraine as Clark⁸⁵ and Dubrow⁸⁶ report. Corruption, bribery,⁸⁷ and over-regulation facilitate the emergence of an underground economy as Kaufmann explains.⁸⁸

Havrylyshyn explains how the politically connected benefit from Ukraine's regulated economy making vast amounts of money by acquiring export and import permits, favorable foreign exchange rates, and loans with interest set below the rate of inflation.⁸⁹ Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann refer to it as the

⁸⁴ Vladimir Mau, "Perestroika: Theoretical and Political Problems of Economic Reforms in the USSR," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/3 (May 1995), p. 387, 25p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁸⁵ William A. Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

⁸⁶ Geoff Dubrow, *Legacies of an Early Post-Totalitarian State: Corruption and Economic Reform in Ukraine*, Harvard Ukrainian Institute, 1999. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.hard.edu/>.

⁸⁷ Ase B. Grodeland and Tatyana Koshechkina, "Foolish to Give and Yet More Foolish Not to Take"--in-Depth Interviews With Post-Communist Citizens on Their Everyday Use of Bribes and Contacts," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/4 (June 1998), p. 651, 27p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 9668136) on World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>.

⁸⁸ Daniel Kaufmann, "Diminishing Returns to Administrative Controls and the Emergence of the Unofficial Economy: A Framework of Analysis and Applications to Ukraine," *Economy Policy*, A European Forum, no.19 supplement (December 1994), 51-69; Daniel Kaufmann, "Market Liberalization in Ukraine: To Regain a Lost Pillar of Economic Reform," *Transition* 5/7 (7 September 1994), 1-3; Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1997), p.114, 18p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elites, Item 9708190357) on World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html.databases/elite.html>; S. D. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, J. McMillan, and C. Woodruff, "Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism," *Journal of Public Economy* 76/3 (1 June 2000), 495-520. Retrieved April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.elsevier.nl/cgi-bin/cas/>.

⁸⁹ Oleh Havrylyshyn, "How Patriarchs and Rent-Seekers Are Hijacking the Transition to a Market Economy," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine* 2/3 (May-June 1995), Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.hard.edu/>.

seizure of the state by special interest groups, in Ukraine's case by the former nomenklatura.⁹⁰ Ukraine's police⁹¹ are not adequately trained to fight corruption and organized crime,⁹² another Soviet legacy, while the laws and legal system⁹³ have to be modernized to meet independent Ukraine needs.

In this work the social contract helps explain the lack of privatization and economic reforms and the widespread corruption that prevailed during the Kravchuk years. In exchange for supporting independence, the former Soviet territorial elite was transformed into Ukraine's national elite, retaining their positions of power and influence in all sectors of Ukrainian society. Internal reforms and the restructuring of government, industry, agriculture, police, and

⁹⁰ Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, *Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444 [Abstract]. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/publication/anticorrupt/>.

⁹¹ Louise Shelley, "The Sources of Soviet Policing," *Police Studies* 17/2 (1994). Retrieved June 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/tracc>. Louise Shelley, "Post-Socialist Policing: Limitations on Institutional Change," Chapter 5 in *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (London & N.Y.: Routledge, 1996). Retrieved June 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/tracc>.

⁹² Heiko Pleines, "Ukraine's Organized Crime is an Enduring Soviet Legacy," *Transition* 2/5 (8 March 1996), 11-13; Ariel Cohen, "Ukrainian and Russian Organized Crime: A Threat to Emerging Civil Society," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvihlyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2000), 285-302; Roman P. Zyla, "Corruption in Ukraine: Between Perceptions and Realities," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 245-267; Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 2/3 (Summer 1994), 341-358. Retrieved June 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/tracc>; Louise Shelley, "The Current State of Corruption in the NIS." Retrieved June 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/tracc>; Louise Shelley, "Disposal of Seized Laundered Assets," in *Killing Development: Money Laundering in the Global Economy*, ed. A. Jones, B. Rider, G. Saltmarsh, and L. Shelley. Retrieved June 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/tracc>.

⁹³ Bohdan A. Futey, "Upholding the Rule of Law in Ukraine: The Judiciary in Transition," in *Towards a New Ukraine II: Meeting the Next Century*, ed. Theofil Kis and Irena Makaryk with Roman Weretelnik (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies University of Ottawa, 1999), 59-76; Robert Sharlet, "Bringing the Rule of Law to Russia and the Newly Independent States: The Role of the West in the Transformation of the Post-Soviet Legal System," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, (1997), 322-349.

the law courts were not a priority of the elite that was educated, socialized, and rose to positions of power during the Soviet era.

This work differs from other works and contributes to a greater understanding of Ukraine by providing a comprehensive concept within which the achievement of Ukraine's independence and its nation- and state-building efforts were conducted during the Kravchuk years.⁹⁴ I regard the referendum vote to have been a vote for independence, affirming the actions of the Verkhovna Rada, and endorsing what I call the 'national rebirth of Ukraine' program and the 'social contract.' The national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract explains how and why Ukraine achieved independence, and why internal stability and territorial integrity prevailed despite concerns raised over ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity. The Soviet territorial establishment that controlled all levers of power and economic resources within government, industry, agriculture, the media, organizations, and institutions, including within the military, police, and KGB, initiated and promoted independence out of self-interest to protect their privileged positions. The territorial establishment was visibly united at the republic, regional, provincial, and local levels, as they promoted independence and delivered the 'yes' vote. It was the local territorial elite in each locality that appointed the election personnel who registered voters and issued and counted referendum ballots. It follows that the Crimean elite and the Black Sea Fleet commanders (Sevastopol) could have prevented a majority 'yes' vote in their localities as they

⁹⁴ I have been unable to consult: Kateryna Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*. This appeared too late to be used for the dissertation.

controlled the voting process: the registration of voters, and the issuance and counting of ballots. They either supported independence or were neutral when the electorate voted 'yes', affirming support for independence, the national rebirth of Ukraine program, and the social contract. Ukraine's independence was the product of the united effort of the territorial establishment.

The Communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine's independence, suspended the CPU, removed Communist influence over government structures, and discarded Marxism-Leninism. It was the territorial establishment under parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk's leadership that voluntarily adopted Rukh's program of the national rebirth of Ukraine, with its western Ukrainian bias, and the social contract that defined Ukraine and Ukrainians. It was the establishment who promised that Ukraine would become the mirror image of the Western democracies, economically prosperous, and respectful of individual and national rights. They did this to market Ukraine's independence among ethnic Ukrainians with a weak national consciousness and among the 100 national minorities that live in Ukraine in a manner that was acceptable and non-threatening to any individuals or groups. It was the establishment through the Communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada that had approved the Ukrainian language to be the language of state while permitting other languages in dealings with government in compact areas of settlement. The territorial establishment achieved independence for Ukraine and established the parameters that would define contemporary Ukraine with themselves as the national establishment. Having enjoyed special economic

privileges in Soviet Ukraine, the establishment enriched itself using their positions of influence and control of economic state-owned resources during the Kravchuk years.

The probability of Ukraine's independence being terminated by internal or external destabilizing factors was minimal. The Soviet territorial establishments in Ukraine and Russia continued in power as self-proclaimed reformers and nationalists who through the CIS agreement recognized each other's independence. The referendum vote highlighted popular support for independence, the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract in all regions and among all nationalities. The rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract provides a comprehensive concept that explains nation- and state-building priorities, the continued dominance of the former Soviet territorial elite, and the continuance of Soviet traditions and business practices. It also explains why internal stability and territorial integrity prevails despite the economic crisis and ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity.

During the referendum campaign, precedents of Ukrainian statehood were noted. The Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, reprinted on the referendum ballot, referred to 'the 1000 year state-creating tradition in Ukraine'. But the Mongols destroyed Kyiv in 1240, ending the Kyivan Rus' era, while in the fourteenth century Galicia-Volhynia became part of Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the referendum campaign, references were made in speeches and the media to the democratic traditions of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Cossack-style government of the

Hetmanate. But Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775 and abolished the Cossack regimental districts of the Left Bank in 1781, replacing them with three imperial provinces (Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siversk).⁹⁵

During World War I, Ukraine's state building efforts recommenced with the establishment of the Central Rada in Kyiv (March 1917).⁹⁶ President Hrushevsky and the General Secretariat (Cabinet), dominated by young and inexperienced intellectuals, prioritized cultural autonomy and radical land reform above the formation of stable state structures and an army.⁹⁷ The Central Rada through the Third Universal created the Ukrainian National Republic (20 November 1917) and by the Fourth Universal (25 January 1918) proclaimed the republic's independence.⁹⁸ Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Soviet Russia recognized Ukraine's independence through the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (9 February 1918). On 30 April 1918, the government changed when Lieutenant General Pavlo Skoropadsky, descendant of a Cossack Hetman, overthrew the Central Rada and established a conservative government that highlighted the Cossack past and prioritized state building objectives above social reforms and cultural revival.⁹⁹ Cabinet portfolios included Defense and Foreign Affairs with many ministers exhibiting 'Little Russian' characteristics. The defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary contributed to the Skoropadsky government being replaced by the Directory under Petliura. In Eastern Galicia and

⁹⁵ See Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*.

⁹⁶ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys Istorii Ukrainy: formuvannia modernoi ukrainskoi natsii XIX-XX stolittia* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo 'Heneza', 1996), 111-127.

⁹⁷ See, Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture*.

⁹⁸ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents," in *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: CISU Press, 1987), 389-416.

Bukovyna (Austria Ukraine) Ukrainians proclaimed the independence of the West Ukrainian National Republic (9 November 1918), followed by a union of the West Ukrainian National Republic with the Ukrainian National Republic (22 January 1919). Independence failed. Eastern Galicia, with the approval of the Entente powers, became part of Poland, while Lenin's Bolsheviks militarily incorporated Dnipro Ukraine into the soviet state.

Ukraine's brief period of independence and its fierce military resistance to the Bolshevik invasion convinced Lenin, as he consolidated Bolshevik power, to structure the soviet state as a federation, establish the Ukrainian SSR, and temporarily encourage a Ukrainian linguistic and cultural revival (1920s). The Stalinist era, characterized by purges, collectivization, and industrialization, witnessed the centralization of political, economic, social, and cultural control in Moscow to the detriment of Ukrainians. During World War II and immediately after, Stalin extended Ukraine's borders to incorporate ethnically Ukrainian lands in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, resulting in nationally conscious Ukrainians being annexed into the Ukrainian SSR. The post-Stalin era witnessed the devolution of some powers to the republics and the emergence of elite stability and republic-territorial loyalties. But it was General Secretary Gorbachev's attempted reforms of Soviet society and economy that provided Ukraine with a new opportunity for independence.

Responding to General Secretary Gorbachev's reforms unfolding from Moscow, Ukraine's parliamentarians commenced to define contemporary

⁹⁹ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys Istorii Ukrainy: formuvannia modernoi ukrainskoi natsii XIX-XX stolittia*, 111-134.

Ukraine through legislation. Passage of the Language Law (1989) made Ukrainian the state language while allowing other languages to be used in compact areas of settlement in dealings with government.¹⁰⁰ Through the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine (16 July 1990),¹⁰¹ parliamentarians proclaimed the supremacy of Ukraine's constitution and laws on its territory, and Ukraine's supreme authority over its natural resources, economy, and indivisible territory. They also proclaimed Ukraine's right to establish its own armed forces and security service, and declared Ukraine's intention to become a neutral, non-nuclear state. Through the Declaration of Economic Sovereignty of Ukraine (3 August 1990), parliamentarians sought to protect Ukraine's economy from Moscow ownership and control. Ukraine's sovereignty declarations provided the basis for amendments to Ukraine's 1978 Constitution¹⁰² and the passage of new laws dealing with Ukraine's referendum law (3 July 1991),¹⁰³ the office of President of Ukraine (5 July 1991),¹⁰⁴ the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, Ukraine's security and military forces

¹⁰⁰ "Iz zakonu URSR 'Pro movy v Ukrainskii RSR'," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: 'Vyshcha shkola', 2000), 179-180.

¹⁰¹ "Iz deklaratsii pro derzhavnii suverenitet Ukrainy," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: 'Vyshcha shkola', 2000), 182-184; "Deklaratsiia pro derzhavnii suverenitet Ukrainy," in *Mizhnarodnii symposium 'Konstytutsiia nezaleznoi Ukrainy' 3-5 Iypnia 1992*, ed. Serhii Holovaty (Kyiv: Ukrainska pravnycha fundatsiia, 1992), 21-26.

¹⁰² *Mizhnarodnii symposium 'Konstytutsiia nezaleznoi Ukrainy' 3-5 Iypnia 1992*, ed. Serhii Holovaty (Kyiv: Ukrainska pravnycha fundatsiia, 1992); Ukrainska Pravnycha Fundatsiia in cooperation with the Council of Advisors to the Parliament of Ukraine, *International Symposium on the Draft Constitution of Ukraine* (Kyiv, June 20-22, 1993).

¹⁰³ "Iz zakonu Ukrainskoi Radianskoi Sotsialistychoi Respubliky 'Pro vseukrainskii ta mistsevi referendumy'," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: 'Vyshcha shkola', 2000), 192.

¹⁰⁴ "Iz zakonu URSR 'Pro presyidenta Ukrainskoi RSR'," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: 'Vyshcha shkola', 2000), 192-193.

(October 1991),¹⁰⁵ the Declaration of the Nationality Rights in Ukraine (1 November 1991),¹⁰⁶ and the approval of the CIS Agreement, among others.

The foundations for independent Ukraine were laid through legislation but transforming Ukraine into a Western European-type democracy was complex. Independent Ukraine's elite was united on establishing nation-state structures like the military and security service but divided on economic, legal, and social reforms, and the interpretation and implementation of the social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine platform. The Communist Party's monopoly of political power had ended under Gorbachev, allowing interest groups and political parties to emerge, while Communist leaders who had dominated the political arena, like Shcherbytsky, retired and new Communist leaders, like Volodymyr Ivashko, preferred Moscow's political arena to Kyiv. New leaders emerged, many being former members of the CPU like Leonid Kravchuk who were more sensitive to the electorate during the changing and volatile times as they sought elite and populace consensus on the road to transforming Ukraine.

The text is divided into ten chapters. Chapter two provides a background to Ukraine's independence, highlighting the importance of events and policies generated in Moscow, and the roles of General Secretary Gorbachev, Russian President Yeltsin, the failed August coup, and parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk. Chapter three states and elaborates the thesis that the essence of the Kravchuk

¹⁰⁵ "Iz kontseptsii oborony ta budivnytstva zbroinykh syl Ukrainy, skhalenoi Verkhovnoiu Radoiu Ukrainy," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: 'Vyshcha shkola', 2000), 200-201.

presidency is encompassed in the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract as approved during the 100-day referendum campaign (24 August-1 December 1991). Chapter four acknowledges the existence of a 'great linguistic and cultural divide' due to the presence of a large ethnic-Russian minority and the prominent use of the Russian language, but questions whether this threatens internal stability. Chapter five describes the formation of Ukraine's military and security forces from nationalized Soviet forces stationed on Ukrainian territory, and Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Chapter 6 concentrates on foreign relations and the influence that the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract had on achieving international recognition for Ukraine's independence, the reclaiming of its East-Central European identity, maintaining territorial integrity, and the formation and role of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Chapter 7 focuses on Crimean separatism, its strengths and weaknesses, and its attempt to imitate the successful Ukrainian independence experience. Chapter 8 concentrates upon the economy: the banking system, lack of economic reforms, budget deficits, rampant inflation, and indebtedness to Russia over energy imports. Chapter 9 focuses upon continuity and corruption. The influence of inherited Soviet structures and traditions upon widespread corruption and bribery, obsolete laws and regulations, inept police and law courts, the economic crises, growth of an underground economy, and lack of investment. Chapter 10 concludes the text, summarizing important points and highlighting areas of academic research that

¹⁰⁶ "Deklaratsiia prav natsionalnosti Ukrainy," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: "Vyshcha shkola", 2000), 201-202.

would contribute to a better understanding of Ukraine. Throughout the text flow the themes of the national rebirth of Ukraine program, the social contract, and the role of the territorial establishment in influencing nation- and state-building efforts during the Kravchuk years.

Chapter 2

THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

The window of opportunity for Ukraine's independence was created under USSR General Secretary Gorbachev as he pursued reforms of Soviet society to increase economic productivity; in the process he discredited Marxism-Leninism, the ideology that held the Soviet system and the USSR together. To restructure and stimulate the highly centralized Soviet command economy Gorbachev felt compelled to decentralize authority and jurisdictions to the advantage of the republics, and to open up society through political reforms as Soviet economics and politics were fundamentally intertwined.¹ To undermine resistance within the CPSU, General Secretary Gorbachev had article 6 of the USSR Constitution repealed,² thereby ending the CPSU's monopoly of political power while simultaneously increasing the authority and prestige of the Verkhovna Rada at the Union and republic levels. To circumvent resistance within the CPSU to his *perebudova* [restructuring] and *glasnost*

¹ Vladimir Mau, "Perestroika: Theoretical and Political Problems of Economic Reforms in the USSR," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/3 (May 1995), 387-412. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>

² At its February 1990 Plenum the CPSU renounced its monopoly of power. See John Gooding, "The XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in Perspective," *Soviet Studies* 43/2 (1991), 237, 17 p. Retrieved 29 March 2002 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 00383859) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>

[openness] reforms, Gorbachev transferred power from the office of the General Secretary to that of the President and from the CPSU to the USSR's Supreme Soviet. This process was paralleled at the republic level in Ukraine and the other republics. These fundamental changes established new parameters for determining the legitimacy of government and state, by transferring legitimacy from the Communist Party and its principle of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' to that of the 'will of the people' as expressed through direct, secret, and universal franchise. This change weakened central control over the republics that previously had been exercised through the Communist Party. But it enhanced the prestige and authority of the republics and their leaders who were elected by direct secret ballot, contributing to the acceleration of centrifugal forces that were regional and ethnic in character. President Gorbachev, who had been elected by the USSR's Supreme Soviet and not by the electorate, was in a weakened position during negotiations over a new union treaty with republic leaders like President Yeltsin and Speaker Kravchuk who benefited from the endorsement of the electorate.

Ukraine's political landscape had changed following the resignation of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the conservative First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine [CC CPU] in September 1989.³ The March 1990 parliamentary elections were the first republic multi-candidate elections in the history of the Ukrainian SSR, with successful candidates required to receive a minimum of 50 percent of the vote. While the CPU was

³ Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* (Kyiv: Abrys, 1994), 190.

the only political party registered, there were 3,653 candidates that contested the 450 electoral districts with 199 candidates being endorsed by the Democratic Bloc, a broad alliance of democratic forces supporting reforms.⁴ 110 Democratic Bloc candidates were elected and formed the Narodna Rada [People's Council], soon joined by 30 Communist parliamentarians who had previously formed the Democratic Platform group within the Communist caucus.⁵ Prior to Ukraine's declaration of independence the Verkhovna Rada was divided into two caucuses: the Narodna Rada caucus, and the Communist caucus that in turn was subdivided into pro-Union Communists and the moderate sovereignty Communists.⁶ After Shcherbytsky's resignation, Volodymyr Ivashko had been elected First Secretary of the CC CPU (September 1989) and parliamentary Speaker (June 1990) before quickly departing in July 1990 for Moscow to become Deputy General Secretary of the CC CPSU.⁷ On 24 July 1990, Leonid Kravchuk, former CPU ideologue,⁸ was elected parliamentary Speaker backed by 239 sovereignty Communists.⁹

⁴ Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], "Report on the March 4, 1990 Supreme Council Elections in Ukraine," *Elections in the Baltic States and Soviet Republics, A Compendium of Reports on Parliamentary Elections Held in 1990* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 127; S. Tsikora, "Election Campaign is Under Way: First Deputies Named: the Ukraine," *Izvestiia* (7 March 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 43/10, 29-30; S. Tsikora, "The Election Campaign is Under Way: ...Run-Off Elections in ...Ukraine," *Izvestiia* (19 March 1990), 1, as reported in *CDSP* 42/11, 29; T. Kuzio, "Elections and National Discontent in Ukraine," *Soviet Analyst* 19/6 (21 March 1990), 3-5.

⁵ M. Derimov, "What's Happening at the Session?" *Pravda Ukrainy* (19 May 1990), 1, as reported in *CDSP* 42/20, 13; S. Tsikora, "Deputies Who Left the Party," *Izvestiia* (26 July 1990), 1, as reported in *CDSP* 42/30, 24; David Marples and Chrystia Freeland, "Inside Ukrainian Politics: An Interview with Dmytro Pavlychko," *Report on the USSR* 2/28 (13 July 1990), 23.

⁶ Roman Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR* 3/24 (14 June 1991), 20.

⁷ Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* (Kyiv: Abrys, 1994), 190; Taras Kuzio, "Post-Election Blues in Ukraine?" *Soviet Analyst* 19/11 (6 June 1990), 3-5. V. Ivashko was replaced as First Secretary by Stanislav Hurenko on 23 June 1990, see M. Odinet

Gorbachev's policies and the Russian Federation's precedents encouraged Ukraine to move towards sovereignty. President Gorbachev had advocated a new union treaty to replace the 1922 Union treaty, whereby all republics would voluntarily join the new Union of Sovereign States after having first legislated their Sovereignty Declarations. But attempts to draft and adopt a new union treaty revealed major divisions between reformers and supporters of the status-quo, and among advocates of a strong union center, a loose confederation, or complete independence for the republics. To push through his union treaty Gorbachev turned to the people with a referendum question on 17 March 1991:

Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal, sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed? 'Yes' or 'No'.¹⁰

Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada countered with its own referendum question:

Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics on the basis of the declaration of the state of sovereignty of Ukraine?¹¹

and I. Tikhomirov, "First Secretary Elected," *Pravda* (24 June 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 42/25, 23.

⁸ Following Shcherbytsky's resignation Leonid Kravchuk was elected Communist Party ideologue, see Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*, 194-195.

⁹ S. Tsikora, "New Leader and Old Problems," *Izvestiia* (24 July 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 42/30, 26; Taras Kuzio, "Leonid Kravchuk - Patriot or Placeman?" *Soviet Analyst* 20/12 (19 June 1991), 4-6; Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*, 241.

¹⁰ "Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Organization of and Measures for Conducting a USSR Referendum on the Question of Preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *Izvestiia* (18 January 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 43/3, 29-30.

¹¹ *Komsomolskoe znamia* (13 February 1991) as reported by Roman Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR* 3/24 (14 June 1991), 21-22.

And the western Ukrainian provinces of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk countered with their referendum question:

Do you agree that Ukraine should be an independent state, which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, which guarantees the equal rights of all citizens, regardless of nationality and religion?¹²

While western Ukrainians voted overwhelming for independence, voters in eastern and southern Ukraine voted in favor of both the Union's and the republic's referendum question. Speaker Kravchuk appears to have been influenced by the results as he moved cautiously towards the pro-sovereignty position.¹³ Meanwhile, Gorbachev was quoted during an interview in *Der Spiegel* that republics would be allowed to secede from the Union as independent states.¹⁴

Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada followed the Russian Federation's lead in adopting its Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine (16 July 1990).¹⁵ The sovereignty debate in the Verkhovna Rada was emotional and coincided with the reform-oriented 28th CPSU Congress in Moscow¹⁶ and the Donbas

¹² *Ibid.*, 22.

¹³ "Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Organization of and Measures for Conducting a USSR Referendum on the Question of Preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *Izvestiia* (18 January 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 43/2, 29; CSCE, "Ukraine," *Referendum in the Soviet Union, A Compendium of Reports on the March 17, 1991 Referendum on the Future of the USSR*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 2; A. Stepovoi, "What the Referendum Showed," *Izvestiia* (21 March 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 42/11, 5.

¹⁴ Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Indicates Republics May Leave," *RFE/RL* 59 (25 March 1991).

¹⁵ "Deklaratsiia: pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy," in *Novi zakony Ukrainy, Uchbovyi posidnyk*, Vypusk 1, ed. V.F. Opryshko, S.E. Demsky and A.V. Hapon (Kyiv: Ukrainaska asotsiatsiia vykladachiv prava, 1991), 5-7; Peter Shutsk, "Ukraine Declares Sovereignty," *Soviet Analyst* 19/15 (1 August 1990), 5-7; "Declaration of Sovereignty," *Pravda* (17 July 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 42/30, 8.

¹⁶ At the 28th CPSU Congress, General Secretary Gorbachev pushed through major reforms to revitalize the CPSU, see, E. Teague, "The Twenty-Eighth Party Congress: An Overview,"

miners' strike.¹⁷ While the majority of Communist parliamentarians regarded the Sovereignty Declaration as a declaration of intent and not a constitutional law,¹⁸ passage of the Sovereignty Declaration raised expectations especially among western Ukrainians, Rukh supporters, and students, and provided the basis for Ukraine's subsequent declaration of independence. Frequent and large demonstrations against a new union treaty and for the implementation of the Sovereignty Declaration were joined by a student hunger strike (October 1990) at Lenin's statue on October Square (now Independence Square) with the students adding their demands that compulsory military service be restricted to Ukraine's territory.¹⁹ Increasingly, parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and his sovereignty Communist supporters joined the Narodna Rada caucus and the

Report on the USSR 2/29 (20 July 1990), 1-3; J. Tedstrom, "Party to Play Smaller Role in Making Economic Policy," *Report on the USSR 2/29* (20 July 1990), 4-6; M. Jacobs, "The Party and the People: A Parting of the Ways?" *Report on the USSR 2/29* (20 July 1990), 8-10; "No New Party," *Soviet Analyst 19/14* (18 July 1990), 1-3; A. Sheehy, "New Party Rules Give Republican Communist Parties More Autonomy," *Report on the USSR 2/29* (20 July 1990), 11-13; "The Party's Over?" *Soviet Analyst 20/4* (14 February 1990), 1-2.

¹⁷ N. Lisovenko et al., "Situation in the Coal Basins," *Izvestiia* (11 July 1990), 1 & 3, as reported in *CDSP 42/28*, 23; David Marples, "The Background of the Coal Strike on July 11," *Report on the USSR 2/30* (27 July 1990), 15-17; E. Teague and P. Hanson, "Most Soviet Strikes Politically Motivated," *Report on the USSR 2/34* (24 August 1990), 1-2.

¹⁸ K. Mihalisko, "The Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty," *Report on the USSR 2/30* (27 July 1990), 17; S. Tsikora, "Anxious Days in Kiev," *Izvestiia* (10 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/41*, 15; S. Tsikora, "Amendments to the Ukraine's Constitution," *Izvestiia* (26 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/43*, 9.

¹⁹ M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov, "The Ukraine's September Ordeal: Battles of More than Local Significance," *Pravda* (28 September 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/40*, 9; M. Sokolov, "Which Big Brother in Renewed Union?" *Soviet Analyst 20/16* (14 August 1991), 4-5; S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: A Difficult Monday," *Izvestiia* (1 October 1990), 1-2, as reported in *CDSP 42/40*, 9-10; S. Tsikora, "In Search of Stabilization Measures," *Izvestiia* (3 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/40*, 10; S. Tsikora, "Parliament under Siege by Students," *Izvestiia* (16 October 1990), 3, as reported in *CDSP 42/41*, 15-16; "Let's Look the Truth in the Eye," *Pravda* (25 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/43*, 8-9. V. Savichev, "Students and Politics," *Argumenty i fakty* 49, 7, as reported in *CDSP 42/49*, 21-22; S. Tsikora, "Deputies Declare Hunger Strike," *Izvestiia* (11 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/41*, 15. S. Tsikora, "Anxious Days in Kiev," *Izvestiia* (10 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 42/41*, 15; S. Tsikora, "Rally on the Street and in the Meeting Hall," *Izvestiia* 2 October 1990), 2, as reported in *CDSP 4/40*, 10; M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov, "And in Kiev," *Pravda* (17 October 1990), 2,

Rukh movement in support for greater political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine.²⁰

While Speaker Kravchuk insisted that Ukraine would not sign a new union treaty, President Gorbachev continued to press for it²¹ triggering a reactionary coup in Moscow on 19 August 1991 that collapsed within three days.²² The State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE] claimed that a mortal danger loomed over the Soviet Union because President Gorbachev's policies were leading the country into a blind alley, making it ungovernable, and bringing it to the verge of economic collapse.²³ The SCSE leaders justified their actions with little reference to socialism or the Marxist-Leninist ideology.²⁴ Russian President Yeltsin was visibly active resisting the coup in the All-Union and Russian Federation capital of Moscow,²⁵ while Speaker Kravchuk fully conscious of his inability to change the events unfolding in Moscow but being very vulnerable to their final outcome, was cautious.²⁶ Soviet General Varennikov visited Kravchuk and cautioned him that resistance would prompt

as reported in *CDSP* 42/41, 16; Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*, 249-252.

²⁰ Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*, 262-263.

Shevardnadze is quoted as saying that after talking to Kravchuk he concluded that Kravchuk was set on a course leading to Ukraine's independence.

²¹ The Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan were to sign the Union Treaty.

²² "Collapse of a Coup-56 Hours," *The Manchester Guardian* (22 August 1991), 4-5; "Anatomy of a Botched Putsch," *The Economist* (24 August 1991), 17.

²³ "Gorbachev is Ousted in an Apparent Coup by Soviet Armed Forces and Hard-liners; Accused of Steering into a 'Blind Alley'," *The New York Times* (19 Aug 1991), A1 & A6;

²⁴ Vladimir Mau, "Perestroika: Theoretical and Political Problems of Economic Reforms in the USSR," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/3 (May 1995), 387-412.

²⁵ "Yeltsin Rallies Resistance against 'Eternal Night'," *The Manchester Guardian* (20 August 1991), 9.

²⁶ Zenovia A. Sochor, "August 1991 in Comparative Perspective: Moscow and Kiev," in *The Legacy of the Soviet Bloc*, eds. Jane Shapiro Zacek and Ilpyong J. Kim (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1997), 91-105.

imposition of martial law.²⁷ On 19 August Kravchuk addressed the Ukrainian nation by television and radio appealing for calm while affirming that Ukraine's Constitution was in force on the territory, declaring the SCSE's actions as unconstitutional, and that Ukraine was prepared to defend its sovereignty.²⁸ On 20 August, the 25-member Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada voted 15 to 10 with Kravchuk voting in favor of adopting a resolution nullifying and voiding all SCSE decrees on Ukraine's territory.²⁹ Rukh supported Yeltsin's call for resistance against the coup and criticized Kravchuk for not having called the Verkhovna Rada into emergency session.³⁰ Kravchuk later claimed that he did not want to destabilize the situation and that he wanted to avoid bloodshed.³¹

With the collapse of the coup Russian President Yeltsin continued his assault against the coup leaders,³² attacking USSR President Gorbachev's credibility on television by producing minutes of a Cabinet meeting for the day of the coup that allegedly implicated the entire Gorbachev cabinet as coup sympathizers. The participation of many prominent officials from the CPSU, KGB, and the military in the abortive coup discredited, disoriented, and

²⁷ Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*, 270; Natalie Melnyczuk, "Soviet Troops into Kiev," *RFE/RL* 158 (21 August 1991).

²⁸ V. Portnikov, "Chronicle of the Coup and Resistance: the Ukraine," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (22 August 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 43/33, 24; "Countering the Counter-Revolution," *The Economist* (24 August 1991), 18; Roman Solchanyk, "Kravchuk Refuses to Recognize GKChP," *RFE/RL* 158 (21 August 1991).

²⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "Presidium of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Issues Statement," *RFE/RL* 158 (21 August 1991); "Republics Beat the Drum of Freedom: Ukraine," *The Manchester Guardian* (21 August 1991), 3.

³⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "'Rukh' Calls for General Strike," *RFE/RL* 157 (20 August 1991); Bohdan Nahaylo, "Reaction in Ukraine to Coup," *RFE/RL* 157 (20 August 1991); Roman Solchanyk, "Protest in Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 159 (22 August 1991).

³¹ Kravchuk explains and justifies his actions in Valentyn Chemerys, *Prezydent: roman-ese* (Kyiv: 'Svenas', 1994).

³² J. Rettie, "Yeltsin Lays Down the Law to Gorbachev," *The Manchester Guardian* (24 August 1991), 1.

demoralized President Gorbachev and his supporters.³³ President Yeltsin had launched a political power grab³⁴ in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup as evidenced by his firing 400 KGB generals³⁵ stationed on Russian Federation territory that prior to the coup had been under USSR jurisdiction. The massive and rapid dismissals of high-ranking officials weakened these union institutions and placed on the defensive their personnel, who feared being targeted and classified as possible sympathizers of the failed coup.³⁶ The coup had tarnished and weakened the CPSU and the Soviet government and institutions, all of which had been used by President Gorbachev to introduce his political and economic reforms.

President Yeltsin's anti-Communist decrees and activities encouraged angry citizens to express pent-up anger through symbolic acts that included toppling KGB founder Dzhherzhinsky's statue and encircling the CPSU headquarters.³⁷ President Yeltsin on 23 August suspended the Russian Communist Party and banned it from operating within the security forces on

³³ Coup leaders included: O. D. Baklanov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council; V. A. Kriuchkov, KGB Chairman; V. S. Pavlov, Prime Minister of USSR; B. K. Pugo, Interior Minister of USSR; V. A. Tiziakov, President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial Construction, Transport, & Communications Facilities of USSR; D. T. Yazov, Defense Minister of USSR; G. I. Yanaev, Acting President of USSR.

³⁴ For a discussion on 'empire-savers' and 'nation-builders' see Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," in *The Soviet Nationality Reader*, ed. Rachel Denber (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 509-543.

³⁵ Victor Yasmann, "Where Has the KGB Gone?" *RFE/RL Research Report 2/2* (8 January 1993), 17-20.

³⁶ A. Roxburgh and agencies Moscow, "Heads Start to Roll as Political Purges Begins in Moscow," *The Manchester Guardian* (24 August 1991), 2 & 28; J. Steel and J. Rettie, "The Second Revolution," *The Manchester Guardian* (24 August 1991), 1; S. Schmemmann, "Radicals' Proud Moment," *The New York Times* (24 August 1991), A1; F.X. Clines, "Yeltsin is Routing Communist Party from Key Roles throughout Russia; He Forces Vast Gorbachev Shake-up," *The New York Times* (24 August 1991), A1 & A4.

³⁷ F. Fleck, "Fury and a Sense of History as Crowds Lay Siege to Central Committee Offices," *The Manchester Guardian* (24 August 1991), 1.

Russian territory, froze its assets, and decreed Russian control and ownership over all resources on Russian territory.³⁸ Unable to stem the anti-Communist momentum, President Gorbachev by decree banned the CPSU from operating within the USSR's armed forces, the KGB, the police, and all other state law enforcement and military bodies at the union level, and ordered CPSU property nationalized according to the laws of the USSR and the republics.³⁹ Gorbachev then resigned as General Secretary of the CC CPSU on 24 August, and recommended that the CC CPSU disband itself, leaving the fate of republic Communist parties to the republics themselves.⁴⁰

Communist parliamentarians in Ukraine were greatly influenced by the news from Moscow that General Secretary Gorbachev had resigned from the CC CPSU with a recommendation that the CC CPSU disband itself. They also took note of Russian President Yeltsin's anti-Communist decrees and appropriation of Union structures situated on Russian Federation territory. Within the Communist caucus the directors of collective farms, state enterprises, institutions, and organizations were well represented and all pondered their precarious fate. Outside the Verkhovna Rada thousands of demonstrators demanded the immediate proclamation of Ukraine's independence. Survival, compromise, stability, and unity were the priorities of

³⁸ On 23 August 1991: "Decree of the Russian SFSR President: On Suspending the Activity of the RSFSR Communist Party," *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (27 August 1991), as reported in *CDSP* 43/35, 11; A. Roxburgh and J. Rettie, "Russians Euphoric as Yeltsin Sets Pace of Reform," *The Manchester Guardian* (23 August 1991), 1.

³⁹ 24 August 1991: "Decree of the President of the USSR: On Terminating the Activity of Political Parties and Political Movements in the USSR Armed Forces, Law-Enforcement Agencies and the State Apparatus," *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (27 August 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* (43/35), 11.

⁴⁰ "Gorbachev Statement on Party," *The New York Times* (25 August 1991), A14.

the day. An agreement between Communist and national democrat parliamentarians solidified support for independence as all activities that promoted discord were banned and the nomenklatura was guaranteed their current jobs or new jobs at current level of earnings in exchange for supporting independence.⁴¹ Ukraine's independence and the transformation of the nomenklatura into Ukraine's national elite would be achieved if the national democrats and the Communists presented a unified front. In Ukraine there was no official anti-Communist upheaval and no anti-coup purges within the CPU, the military, and security services as the national democrats and the territorial elite joined together to support independence. General Secretary Gorbachev's resignation from the CC CPSU combined with President Yeltsin's anti-Communist decrees and power grab of Union structures had inspired the Communists in Ukraine to join with the national democrats to pass the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine with 321 parliamentarians voting 'yes', 6 'no', and 2 abstaining.⁴²

As Ihor Yukhnovsky stated during the parliamentary debate, it was insufficient to simply proclaim Ukraine's independence, it was essential to distance independent Ukraine from its Communist past in order to be welcomed by the international community of nations.⁴³ The alternative was potential isolation and pariah status in the world community with independent Ukraine standing in opposition to President Yeltsin's democratic Russia. Influencing

⁴¹ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 389-391.

⁴² V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (27 August 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 43/35, 12

Ukraine's predicament was the West's image of President Gorbachev's USSR. Under Gorbachev the West's image of the USSR had changed from 'the evil empire', to use President Reagan's words, to an authoritarian state in transition towards democracy and a more open economy. Financially and morally Western leaders supported Gorbachev's reforms and his efforts to preserve the USSR through a new voluntary union treaty. Russian President Yeltsin's active resistance to the reactionary coup in August elevated him in Western eyes to the rank of a democrat and reformer, while the West's knowledge of other republic leaders and the situation in other republics was incomplete. The West viewed Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin as democrats and reformists; therefore, isolating Ukraine through independence from Moscow carried the negative image of an attempt to preserve the old Soviet order. Compounding the dilemma and highlighting the potential vulnerability of the Communists, questions were being raised as to how sympathetic Speaker Kravchuk and the other Communists had been to the failed coup.⁴⁴ To preserve internal stability and acquire international acceptability, Communist parliamentarians suspended the CPU, nationalized its assets, and discarded Marxism-Leninism,⁴⁵ followed immediately by banning all CPU activities within the KGB,⁴⁶ the police, the

⁴³ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 389-390.

⁴⁴ Roman Solchanyk, "Kravchuk Resigns from Leading Party Organs," *RFE/RL* 161 (26 August 1991).

⁴⁵ Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*, 268-275; M. Dyczok and J. Rettie, "Assets Seized after Kiev Votes for Secession," *The Manchester Guardian* (26 August 1991), 2; S. Tsikora, "What Kind of Independence has the Ukraine Proclaimed?" *Izvestiia* (26 August 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 43/35, 13; Taras Kuzio, "An Independent Ukraine- But Still Communist?" *Soviet Analyst* 20/17 (28 August 1991), 7-8; Taras Kuzio, "Kravchuk and Ukrainian Communism," *Soviet Analyst* 21/3, 8-10

⁴⁶ Kathy Mihalisko, "Transformation of Ukrainian KGB," *RFE/RL* 183 (25 September 1991). The KGB was renamed National Security Service of Ukraine.

Prosecutor's Office, and other state institutions, bringing to an end CPU control and supervision.

A new image was required, a new ideology to bind the elite and the people, Kyiv and the provinces, that was also acceptable to the Western liberal democracies whose recognition and financial and technical assistance would be solicited. The social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine platform were adopted to meet independent Ukraine's internal and international requirements. Under Leonid Kravchuk's leadership, the new social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program were presented, debated, and accepted during the referendum campaign.

Chapter 3

THE NATIONAL REBIRTH OF UKRAINE, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

On the referendum ballot the electorate were asked if they "affirm the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine?" and not simply if they supported Ukraine's independence. I regard the referendum as having been more than a vote for independence. During the referendum campaign presidential candidate Kravchuk and the territorial elite made promises and defined the parameters that would characterize independent Ukraine. Through the referendum vote the electorate affirmed their support for the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, a new 'social contract' and the 'national rebirth of Ukraine' program.

This thesis argues that the essence of the Kravchuk presidency, its objectives and priorities, strengths and weaknesses, are encompassed in the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract that were presented, discussed, and approved during the 100-day referendum campaign (24 August-1 December 1991). Ukraine's independence was achieved under the leadership of parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and the united efforts of Ukraine's territorial establishment. When the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine's independence, suspended the Communist Party of Ukraine, and discarded Marxism-Leninism, it had created an ideological void that had to be filled quickly. The national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract

were adopted to fill this ideological vacuum and were approved by the electorate through the independence referendum. The social contract was a political platform that contained promises of intent, not detailed plans for action, and was developed to appeal to the diverse aspirations and expectations of all citizens regardless of ethnicity and region, enabling both the nomenklatura and former political prisoners to endorse it. The national rebirth of Ukraine program highlighted Ukraine's European roots, values, traditions, and norms, while the social contract promised that independent Ukraine would be the antithesis of its Soviet totalitarian past and would develop into a European-style democracy. Ukraine would be a civil, multiethnic, multiparty, pluralistic, rule-by-law democracy, where individual and national rights would be protected according to international standards, and where an open, competitive, and prosperous economy would emerge for the benefit all. The social contract facilitated the peaceful transformation of Ukraine from Soviet republic into a democratic, internationally recognized country as Ukraine's territorial establishment strove to avoid the isolation and pariah status that the USSR and its Communist elite had endured for decades in the world community. The national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract defined independent Ukraine, its people and history, and its potentially bright and prosperous future. Together, they established the foundation and guidelines upon which nation- and state-building efforts were conducted during the Kravchuk years.

Ukraine's independence was achieved spontaneously and unexpectedly when the aspirations of national democrats merged, during a moment in history, with those of the Communists. There was no turning back after the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed the independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991, affirmed by republic-wide referendum on 1 December 1991.¹ The dash out of the Soviet Union towards an expected embrace by the world community was accompanied by the suspension of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the official discarding of Marxism-Leninism. This dramatic shift in Ukraine's destiny occurred under the leadership of former CPU ideologue and parliamentary Speaker Leonid Kravchuk, the highest-ranking elected politician, with the full support of Ukraine's political, economic, cultural, military, religious, and ethnic leaders, who became firmly committed to establishing an independent Ukraine. Under Kravchuk's leadership the national democrats and the Russian-speaking multiethnic territorial establishment campaigned for Ukraine's independence.

When the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed the independence of Ukraine, suspended the CPU, and discarded Marxism-Leninism, it did what would have been unthinkable prior to General Secretary Gorbachev's reforms, the failed reactionary coup, and Russian President Yeltsin's power grab of Union institutions on Russian territory that accompanied his anti-Communist decrees. Events had discredited and weakened the historic pillars of Soviet unity and stability: the Communist Party, the KGB, and the military. Gorbachev's reforms had partially discredited Marxism-Leninism, while the repeal of the CPSU's

¹ I. Pliushch, "Tak! - nezalezhnii Ukraini," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 37 (42) (Nov. 1991), 1.

monopoly of political power had removed an obstacle to Ukraine's ability to exercise its constitutional right to secede from the USSR. The electoral will of the people as expressed through secret, direct, and universal franchise became the new standard of legitimacy of government and state, replacing the Communist Party's 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Leonid Kravchuk and the territorial elite were not revolutionaries but the territorial establishment as they pursued legal (legislation) and electoral (referendum) methods to achieve Ukraine's independence.

After the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine's independence, Leonid Kravchuk's challenge was to promote and market independence, prevent instability and violence, protect Ukraine's territorial integrity, and position the territorial elite as Ukraine's national elite with its influence intact. Kravchuk was ideally suited for the task. He had emerged as the most visible and influential Ukrainian politician during the transition period that witnessed political power transferred from the CPU to the Verkhovna Rada, from the First Secretary of the CC CPU to the parliamentary Speaker and then to the President. Called the silver fox by friends and foes alike, articulate and politically astute, Leonid Kravchuk was sensitive to the shifting political ground. He claims to have responded to General Secretary Gorbachev's policies of *perebudova* and *glasnost* by assisting the Ukrainian Writers Union in their efforts to establish Rukh, a popular movement in support of *perebudova* and *glasnost*, and helped draft its platform.² But he remained loyal to the CPU and undermined Rukh's

² Valentyn Chemerys, *Prezydent: roman-ese* (Kyiv: 'Svenas', 1994).

electoral chances by delaying registering Rukh as a political party for the 1990 multi-candidate parliamentary elections. During the election, the CPU had also benefited from incumbency and control of the mass media. Upon being elected parliamentary speaker with the support of 239 Communist deputies, Kravchuk joined other republic leaders, including Russian President Yeltsin, in advocating greater political and economic sovereignty for the republics. The emerging political reality that placed his political future and Ukraine's destiny upon the popular will of the electorate influenced Kravchuk.

Leonid Kravchuk underwent a major image transformation from CPU ideologue and supporter of the Soviet Union to that of a Ukrainian patriot. This transformation commenced with his election as parliamentary speaker and continued through his presidency. At a time when the CPU was in decline, Kravchuk emerged from bureaucratic obscurity to become a popular nationalist, defender of Ukraine against the Union center, and the first democratically elected president of Ukraine. Enhancing his popular appeal, boyhood Kravchuk was portrayed as a Ukrainian Abe Lincoln, born in poverty in Rivne, sleeping with his grandfather on the grass under the stars, but in adulthood rising to lead the nation that his father died defending during the Second World War.³ Leonid Kravchuk displayed his remarkable skills as a professional propagandist, an astute issue-and-opinion-sensitive politician who initiated and guided the highly professional, very focused, state-driven, and state-financed marketing of Ukraine's independence through referendum. In speeches, personal

³ Ibid.

appearances, interviews, press conferences, and campaign advertisements, Kravchuk promoted his nationality- and state-building efforts, skillfully tapping into the emotional psyche of the Ukrainian voter, winning overwhelming support for Ukraine's independence in all regions of Ukraine.⁴ Kravchuk's political style was to seek a broad consensus while positioning himself as a moderate in the political center, supportive of the political will of the people and parliamentary rights within a promised democratic, pluralistic, multiparty, and rule-by-law society.

An epoch had ended and a vacuum created when Marxism-Leninism was discarded, the CPU suspended, and Ukraine's independence proclaimed. Marxism-Leninism had sanctioned the guidelines of acceptable behavior and activities, penetrating all spheres of public life, determining the political, economic, and social norms of Soviet society. Now, under the leadership of its ideologue, Leonid Kravchuk, with the full support of its most ardent supporters and beneficiaries within the CPU, Marxism-Leninism was declared an unwanted relic of Ukraine's Soviet totalitarian past. After several decades of being extolled to sacrifice in building the world's first proletarian state, the population was suddenly confronted with a new reality. Not only was Marxism-Leninism discarded, but Ukraine's independence proclaimed by the territorial establishment that had continuously and firmly opposed Ukrainian national aspirations and independence, having labeled supporters of Ukrainian independence as fascists and nationalists before dispatching them to the gulag.

⁴ Leonid Kravchuk, *'Ye taka derzhava - Ukraina'* (Kyiv: 'Hlobus,' 1992).

This total reversal of position by the territorial elite generated among the population feelings of surprise, ecstasy, confusion, and disorientation. The Verkhovna Rada's actions had created an ideological void.

The void had to be filled quickly to insure internal stability, enable the nomenklatura to be transformed into Ukraine's national elite, to distance Ukraine from Russia, and to project a democratic and reformist image that would facilitate the West's acceptance of Ukraine's independence. If no alternative to Marxism-Leninism were provided, by default, it could be assumed that Marxism-Leninism, in modified form, would continue as the ideological underpinnings of government and society despite having been officially discarded. Parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada had few acceptable ideological alternatives to choose from as the Communist Party through its monopoly of political power had eradicated all rivals to Marxism-Leninism over the decades. General Secretary Gorbachev's reforms had permitted the emergence of autonomous cultural and interest groupings and political parties. Rukh, the democratic movement in support of *perebudova* and *hlasnist*, had been established under the leadership of the Ukrainian Writers Union and had taken root in western Ukraine and Kyiv. In eastern and southern Ukraine and in Crimea the Communists had discredited Rukh, labeling it a nationalist and fascist movement. Despite Rukh's narrow support base, lacking a creditable alternative, parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and Ukraine's multiethnic establishment united visibly and solidly behind Rukh's national

rebirth of Ukraine program that they adopted and marketed selectively in all regions of Ukraine.⁵

Having adopted Rukh's national rebirth of Ukraine program, Kravchuk broadened the program's credibility and appeal by revealing that as CPU ideologue he had worked closely with the Ukrainian Writers Union in writing and approving its program prior to it being adopted and published in the Writers Union's newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina*. He also revealed that he had been in attendance during the meeting when General Secretary Gorbachev, First Secretary Shcherbytsky, and representatives of the Ukrainian Writers Union discussed the formation of the movement in support of *perebudova* and *hlasnist*.⁶ Inspired by the meeting, on his own initiative, Kravchuk claims to have become a reformer and Ukrainian patriot, visibly active in supporting Gorbachev's efforts and the Ukrainian revival by assisting the writers to draft, print, and distribute the Rukh platform, and by providing logistical support for Rukh functions.⁷ Kravchuk was familiar with the contents of Rukh's program⁸ that supported Gorbachev's reforms; Ukraine's political and economic sovereignty; the revival of the Ukrainian language, culture, and studies; a humane, democratic, and socialist society; freedom of religion; improved health

⁵ Through television, radio, and newspapers the territorial establishment displayed solid support as they endorsed and campaigned for independence.

⁶ See Valentyn Chemerys, *Prezydent: roman-ese*.

⁷ See O. V. Haran, *Ubyty drakona: Z istorii Rukhu ta novykh partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: 'Lybid.' 1993); Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*; Hryhorii Honcharuk, *Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy istoriia* (Odesa: Astroprynt, 1997).

⁸ "Prohrama Narodnoho rukhu Ukrainy za perebudovu." Adopted on 9 September 1989, see appendix of Anatolii Rusnachenko, *Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi Rukh v Ukraini: seredyna 1950-kh - pochatok 1990-kh rokiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1998), 652-673; *Rukh 1993* (Kyiv: 'Taki spravy,' 1993); O. V. Haran, *Ubyty drakona, Z istorii Rukhu ta novykh partii Ukrainy*; Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukrainy: diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi*.

care, and an improved environment. The program's preamble referred to the severe political, economic, social, ideological, and mortality crisis that Ukraine was experiencing, mentioned the consequences of one-party totalitarian rule, including the famine and Stalin's purges. Written by the Ukrainian national cultural elite that was concerned with the revival of the Ukrainian nation, its language, history, and culture, the platform contained few references to economic matters. The adoption of the Rukh program facilitated an image change for Kravchuk, who claimed to have participated in writing and approving it, and for the motivation behind Ukraine's declaration of independence. Instead of being viewed as an attempt to isolate Ukraine from the anti-Communist events unfolding in Moscow, independence could now be interpreted as an attempt to reclaim Ukrainian European roots and to establish a democratic and humane society that respected individual and national rights. Having proclaimed Ukraine's independence on 24 August 1991 and subsequently adopted Rukh's program, Kravchuk and the territorial elite were now committed to fulfilling the resolution that had been adopted at Rukh's Second Congress in October 1990 that called for Ukraine's independence.⁹

The adoption of the national rebirth of Ukraine program committed the territorial establishment to demonstrate through the selective extraction and interpretation of historic events and personalities that Ukrainians had a state history and were currently engaged in "continuing the 1000 year state-creating

⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "The Uncertain Road to Independence," *Report on the USSR* (4 January 1991), 22-23; S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine: Anxious Sunday in Kiev," *Izvestiia* (29 October 1991), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 42/43, 9.

tradition in Ukraine".¹⁰ Kravchuk and the territorial establishment sought to establish a new national identity for Ukraine and to reinterpret historic events to counter the impact of over three centuries of shared Ukrainian-Russian experiences within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Some historic events are shared as when the Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarussian nations claim historic rights to the state history of Kyivan Rus, a large state that had dominated Eastern Europe a thousand years ago with its capital in Kyiv. Other events were selectively interpreted for the benefit of Russians and to the disadvantage of Ukrainians. For example, the traditional claims by Russian historians that following the destruction of Kyiv by the Mongols the center and population had shifted northeast, and with it, the patrimonial, institutional, and ethnic continuity from Kyivan Rus to Russia [Suzdal/Muscovy]. This meant that the Russian and Ukrainian peoples are ethnically similar, the Ukrainian language a dialect of Russian, and the Pereiaslav agreement between Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite Tsar a reunification of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples that had been forcefully separated following the destruction of Kyivan Rus. Lenin, after the forceful and bloody occupation of Ukraine by his Bolsheviks, turned to history and national identity to broaden his support among Ukrainians by accepting the Ukrainian nation as distinct, establishing the Ukrainian SSR, and approving the flourishing of the Ukrainian language and culture in the 1920's. Under Stalin the Ukrainian nation, language, and culture suffered enormously, especially during collectivization

¹⁰ Words as they appeared on the 1 December 1991 independence referendum ballot.

and the purges. Under Brezhnev's 'trust in cadres' policy a territorial identity and loyalty to the Ukrainian republic emerged,¹¹ while intermarriage, shared languages, religious, economic, and historic experiences weakened the national consciousness and ethnic identity of Ukrainians and Russians. Territorial identity and loyalty compensated for the lack of Ukrainian national consciousness outside of western Ukraine and contributed to internal ethnic stability as Ukraine achieved independence under the leadership of its multiethnic territorial establishment with the full support of all the national minorities.

The national rebirth of Ukraine required the formation of a state history that would highlight many historic events and personalities that were absent, overemphasized, or misinterpreted in Ukrainian ethnic history¹² and the Soviet version of Ukrainian history. This meant that the achievements of ethnic Ukrainians residing outside of Ukraine would be excluded from the state history of Ukraine while the achievements of all residents of Ukraine, regardless of ethnicity and historic time would be included. Soviet history had emphasized Ukraine's solidarity with the USSR, the world's first proletarian state; now Ukraine's state history would distance Ukraine from Russia as both nations strove to establish their separate national identities in the post-Soviet world. A major justification of Ukraine's right to independent statehood was that the

¹¹ Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1987); Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia The Politics of Upheaval* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 15.

¹² Ukrainian ethnic history excluded the achievements from the Ukrainian nation of Ukrainians who had been assimilated into the Polish, Russian, and Hungarian nations. See Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and CIUS, 1990).

Ukrainian nation, language, and culture were different from the Russian nation, language, and culture. To distance Ukraine from Russia and to verify that Ukrainians had historic European traditions and roots, Kravchuk turned to Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, author of the multi-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and former president of the Ukrainian National Republic. Hrushevsky's research led him to conclude that following the destruction of Kyivan Rus, Ukrainian history moved through Galicia-Volhynia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Khmelnytsky, the Hetmanate, and the Central Rada of 1917-18. By referring to himself as Ukraine's Second President, Kravchuk strengthened Ukraine's claims to a state history by reestablishing continuity with the short lived Central Rada and President Hrushevsky, while ignoring the seventy-year Soviet interregnum.¹³ It was through Galicia-Volhynia and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that Ukraine laid claim to European traditions and roots, through the Zaporozhian Cossacks' democratic traditions,¹⁴ and through the Hetmanate a statehood legacy. Ukraine's claim to democratic traditions and European roots contrasted with Russia's past as an autocracy, a monarchy, a Eurasian empire, and the dominant republic in the USSR. Kravchuk assisted the formation of the Ukrainian national identity by having published the writings of 19th and 20th

¹³ The 16-page pamphlet *Chotyry Universaly* was published linking the Ukrainian National Republic to President Kravchuk and independent Ukraine; Yuri Lukanov, *Tretii prezident* (Kyiv: "Taki spravy", 1996) refers to President Kuchma as the third president.

¹⁴ Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research* 58/4 (1991), 845-864; Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine," in *Legacy of History*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 123-146; Serhii M. Plokyh, "Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute," in *Legacy of History*, 147-170.

century Ukrainian scholars.¹⁵ By selectively highlighting specific events, individuals, democratic traditions, European roots, and shared common characteristics and experiences, Kravchuk was facilitating the formation of new Ukrainian identity markers that would replace the Soviet and Russian ones. Claims of European roots and traditions enhanced pride in Ukrainian citizenship and raised expectations of improved economic prosperity through financial and technical assistance from the West.¹⁶

During the referendum campaign Ukrainian Television and Radio had been instructed to focus all its resources on insuring a successful 'yes' vote by developing special informational and literary programs that focused on three areas: the nationalities question, economic issues, and the history and cultural achievements of the Ukrainian people.¹⁷ The program *Who Are We?* was directed towards developing a territorial national consciousness and identification with Ukraine. *Pleiada* was a cultural program that featured prominent individuals from the arts and literature. *The Pearls of People's Souls* concentrated on folklore and religion while *Heritage* featured Ukrainian architecture and architectural monuments. In addition, television programs like *December 1 Studio* featured a variety of well-known and respected economists, writers, journalists, philosophers, and politicians, all of whom strongly endorsed Ukraine's independence, its European roots, its economic potential and

¹⁵ Igor Torbakov, "Historiography and Modern Nation-Building," *Transition* (6 Sept 1996), 9-13.

¹⁶ The writer had been told repeatedly by Kyivites in 1991 that being a European nation would facilitate assistance to Ukraine from Western Europe.

¹⁷ Based upon taped interviews the writer had with Yarema Fridryk, First Vice-President of Ukrainian Television and Radio, 24 December 1991; Hryhorii Hlad, Chairman and Editor-in-

benefits. Through special programs during the referendum campaign Ukrainian Television and Radio mobilized support for independence and contributed to the formation of Ukraine's new national identity and state history.

The social contract defined Ukraine as a civil and multinational state with Ukrainians being the numerically dominant nation around whom the new state and national identity would be formed, while the rights of national minorities would be protected according to international standards. Ukraine inherited its multiethnic elite and population of fifty million people from the Ukrainian SSR, with Ukrainians comprising 73%, Russians 22%, Jews 1%, and a hundred other nationalities the balance. In October 1991, the Verkhovna Rada passed the citizenship law¹⁸ that bestowed citizenship upon everyone who resided on Ukrainian territory at the time the citizenship law was passed. Citizenship is based on residency and not ethnic origin, with all citizens enjoying equal rights and privileges regardless of ethnicity or religion, and all citizens are registered as Ukrainian on their passports. That is, the state definition of Ukrainian includes all citizens of Ukraine. Excluded from Ukrainian citizenship and state history were the Ukrainian western and eastern diaspora, including several million ethnic-Ukrainians living in adjoining Russian provinces and the Kuban, but included were all peoples who resided on Ukrainian territory, including military personnel who took an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

Chief of the Editorial Unit on National Revival of Ukrainian Television and Radio, and his deputy, Volodymyr Boboshko, 14 February 1992.

¹⁸ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Parliament Passes Liberal Citizenship Law," *RFE/RL* 192 (9 October 1991).

The national minorities and their issues of concern played an important role in formulating the social contract, while their endorsement of independence, the national rebirth of Ukraine program, and the social contract was vital for internal stability and international acceptability. Kravchuk courted all the national minorities living on Ukrainian territory to support Ukraine's independence, and throughout his presidency he was sensitive to potential challenges to Ukraine's territorial integrity and internal stability by unhappy national minorities living in compact areas adjacent to their titular states. The Verkhovna Rada through the Sovereignty Declaration (June 1990), the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine (1 Nov 1991),¹⁹ and the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine (25 June 1992)²⁰ guaranteed national minority rights, cultural autonomy, and financial assistance to the national minorities. In mid-November 1991, representatives of over 100 national minorities held a Congress in Odessa where they simultaneously endorsed Ukraine's independence, the national rebirth of Ukraine program, and the social contract.²¹ Besides ethnic Russians, national minorities living in compact settlements adjacent to their titular homelands are Hungarians in Zakarpattia and Romanians in Chernivtsi. The Rusyns in Zakarpattia regard themselves as a distinct national minority, while the Crimean Tatars have historic ties with Turkey. Kravchuk signaled to the world Ukraine's multinational character and

¹⁹ "Deklaratsiia prav natsionalnostei Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* (Kyiv) 231 (29 November 1991), 2.

²⁰ Susan Stewart, "Ukraine's Policy Toward Its Ethnic Minorities," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/36 (10 September 1993).

²¹ "Pershomu Vseukrainskomu mizhnatsionalnomu konhresu," *Holos Ukrainy* (Kyiv) 222 (16 November 1991), 2; "Zvernennia do vsikh natsii i natsionalno-etnichnykh hrup Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* (Kyiv) 224 (20 November 1991), 3.

tolerance of minorities when in February 1992 he invited the ethnic Germans that Stalin had exiled to Kazakhstan to return to Ukraine.²² The social contract addressed the concerns raised by national minorities, affirmed the equality of all citizens regardless of ethnicity and religion, and pledged that Ukraine would be bound by international standards regarding respect for individual and national rights.

The social contract promised continuity in personnel, with the Soviet territorial establishment, the nomenklatura, positioned to become the national establishment. That is, in exchange for supporting independence, the nomenklatura were guaranteed the retention of their influential positions in government, industry, organizations, and institutions. Strategically positioned, the nomenklatura was mobilized to deliver the pro-independence vote. With the suspension of the CPU, the party's hierarchical command structure was officially terminated but the nomenklatura remained sensitive to directives from the Verkhovna Rada as the state dominated all facets of economic and public life, with individuals, collective farms, state enterprises, institutions, and organizations financially dependent upon the state. To coordinate the referendum campaign, parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk established a 25 member Temporary Commission for the All-Ukraine Referendum Question with Deputy Speaker Ivan Pliushch as Chairman of the Commission.²³ In the final analysis, self-interest, the hierarchical command structure, patron-client

²² Roman Solchanyk, "Kravchuk in Bonn," *RFE/RL* 24 (5 February 1992), "Kravchuk on Ethnic Germans," *RFE/RL* 26 (7 February 1992).

²³ "Sklad Tymchasovoi komisii z pytan vseukrainskoho referendumu," *Holos Ukrainy* (Kyiv) 222 (16 November 1991), 2; and in *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 35/36 (40/41) (November 1991), 10.

relationships, and a national-territorial consciousness based upon common experiences and characteristics had generated and consolidated support for independence that compensated for the lack of Ukrainian national consciousness among the elite and populace in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Continuity prevailed in other spheres. Ukraine had inherited its people, elite, constitution, laws, infrastructure, industries, and resources from the Ukrainian SSR and asserted ownership of all Union level state properties, equipment, and personnel situated in Ukraine, including Soviet military and security forces that were nationalized through an oath of allegiance. Parliamentarians elected in March 1990 continued to serve until new elections were held in March-April 1994. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR (amended 19 times from April 1991 to February 1994) continued in force through the Kravchuk years.²⁴ Soviet institutions and organizations became Ukraine's national institutions and redirected to serving the needs of independent Ukraine but with few accompanying structural changes in government, institutions, organizations, and state enterprises. The Kravchuk years were noted for a lack of economic restructuring and privatization while the government continued to intervene, control, and own economic entities and provide generous state subsidies and credits to inefficient state enterprises and collective farms.²⁵ President Kravchuk symbolized this continuity and change when he established his presidential administration in the offices formally

²⁴ *The Constitution of Ukraine with Changes and Additions Incorporated by the Laws of the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Ukraine*, provided to the writer by the Council of Advisors to the Verkhovna Rada.

²⁵ See chapters on the Economy, and Continuity and Corruption.

occupied by the First Secretary of the CC-CPU on Bankova Street. He focused upon promoting the national rebirth of Ukraine and the social contract, leaving the economy, public administration, and law enforcement, to other professionals.

The social contract promised that Ukraine would become a pluralistic society like other European nations as Kravchuk led Ukraine to reclaim its European roots, values, and traditions as expressed in the national rebirth of Ukraine platform. Pluralism had not been tolerated under Soviet rule where Marxism-Leninism had penetrated all spheres of Soviet society, distorting and warping the natural development of economic, social, cultural, and political life. Marxism-Leninism had sanctioned the monopoly of political power exercised by the CPSU/CPU that, in turn, enforced compliance to Marxism-Leninism through the strategically positioned nomenklatura, the police, and law courts.²⁶ The occasions when members of the nomenklatura resisted or modified directives from above did not equate to pluralism.²⁷ Few Ukrainians experienced life within a pluralistic society and therefore were not knowledgeable as to what constitutes a pluralistic society and the benefits derived. Under General Secretary Gorbachev some autonomous interest groups started to emerge but they were small, weak, and financially insolvent, a situation that continued in Kravchuk's Ukraine. The most successful independent organization, Rukh, had

²⁶ See chapter on Continuity and Corruption.

²⁷ Theodore H. Friedgut, "Pluralism and Politics in an Urban Soviet: Donetsk, 1990-1992," in *Search of Pluralism Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics*, ed. Carol R. Saivetz and Anthony Jones (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 45-61.

been approved by CPU ideologue Kravchuk and established by the Ukrainian Writers Union, an organization itself previously established by the CPU.

A pluralistic society is characterized by the existence of a variety of diverse, legitimate, and autonomous groups supported by a population financially independent from the state through the ownership of economic and financial resources, including land. This situation did not exist in Kravchuk's Ukraine where the state continued to own almost all financial and economic resources, with a minimum of state-owned property being sold and private ownership of land not allowed, making it difficult for autonomous interest groups to effectively function. Unfamiliar with a pluralistic society, Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada failed to initiate and implement government policies and reforms that would facilitate the emergence of autonomous and financially solvent organizations and groups. However, if the pluralistic society promised was simply a guarantee that the state would not attempt to control and approve the existence of organizations, institutions, and interest groups as the Communist Party had done, then a pluralistic society was established.

Interest and lobby groups existed during the Kravchuk presidency but this did not equate to pluralism but rather to the continuation of patron-client relationships and nomenklatura activities that had existed in Soviet Ukraine.²⁸ Former members of the nomenklatura continued to dominate, influencing and implementing government policies while parliamentarians continued to lobby for their state-owned enterprises, collective farms, and economic sectors, in the

²⁸ See chapter on Continuity and Corruption.

process, financially benefiting from their efforts.²⁹ Profitable sectors of state enterprises were privatized by some directors of state enterprise while other directors had difficulties distinguishing between management and ownership of state enterprises, both activities contributing to the emergence of financial oligarchs as corruption and bribery traditions inherited from Soviet times became a hallmark of independent Ukraine. Autonomous interest groups representing the general population were small, powerless, and not represented within the inner circle of power as the general population was pauperized during the economic crisis. In Kravchuk's Ukraine, the state was not neutral in balancing the diverse interests of Ukrainians, advantaging the interests of the former nomenklatura as they sought dominance of the economic, cultural, and political norms of society to the exclusion of the interests of the general population. While a pluralistic society was promised, it was not delivered, having stopped in midpoint. Freedom of association prevailed but the Soviet experience of providing financial advantages to the vanguard, the elite, continued in Kravchuk's Ukraine to the disadvantage of the general population.

The social contract promised a rule-by-law society where all citizens would be equal before the law and bound to compliance with the law, replacing the Soviet legal system that served the interests of the Communist Party. The CPSU/CPU had mandated the state, police, and criminal law courts to enforce compliance by citizens to Marxism-Leninism and to preserve the political monopoly of the Communist Party. Criminal law was used more often than civil

²⁹ Paul Kubicek, *Unbroken Ties, The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).

law, and lawyers were employees of the state rather than free agents. There was no respect for individual rights, no academic freedom, no freedom of the press, and no politically impartial legal system. The primary focus of police was not fighting crime but monitoring and regulating public activities including registering people as to their residence and employment.³⁰ Private business activities were a crime. As all businesses and means of production were owned by the state there was no need for commercial laws and courts to impartially enforce compliance with commercial contracts. Having a powerful patron was important, as patron-client relationships protected clients, with all patrons also being clients except for the General Secretary. Patron-client relationships were centered upon the Communist Party secretary at each level of the party hierarchy and society, with the hierarchical structure radiating from the General Secretary through the First Secretary to the local Communist officials. Corruption, bribery, and embezzlement were tolerated and protected through the patron-client system with anti-corruption drives having political objectives and signaling limits of tolerance. Bribes demanded by bureaucrats were common, as was the need of directors of state enterprises to engage in illegal barter to acquire input resources to fulfill production quotas in a production system characterized by constant product shortages. The requirements of Ukraine's legal system changed with the discarding of Marxism-Leninism, the legalization of private business, and the pledge to respect individual rights according to international standards, but the necessary reforms

³⁰ See chapter on Continuity and Corruption.

of the legal system were slow in being applied. The Soviet practice of corruption, bribery, and embezzlement of state property continued through the Kravchuk years as police extracted bribes from motorists while administrators of state property enriched themselves. The passage and application of new laws and regulations, and new standards of conduct for police and law courts were required to create a legal system based upon the rule-of-law that would facilitate commerce, curtail corruption, and install trust in the fairness of the legal system. The reform of the legal system to Western European and North American standards was slow in coming during the Kravchuk presidency.

The social contract promised a multiparty system. After several decades of one-party rule the territorial establishment that had risen to influence and power through the CPU was orphaned, resulting in parliamentarians becoming independents in search of a new home as they floated from caucus to parliamentary caucus. In keeping with the promise of establishing a diverse political arena during a time when political parties³¹ were new, small, numerous, and sparsely financed with limited electoral support, the independent-dominated Verkhovna Rada enacted the electoral law for the 1994 parliamentary elections that favored independent candidates over political parties. President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada appear to have placed little importance on establishing an important role for political parties in Ukraine's political system. The Prime Minister and Cabinet were not chosen from political parties or caucuses that constituted a majority within the Verkhovna Rada, which is

understandable as the majority of parliamentarians were independents and parliamentary caucuses had fluid and fluctuating memberships. While President Kravchuk courted Rukh, the movement, in support of his presidential policies, he failed to build a Ukraine-wide coalition of political parties to facilitate his reelection as president in 1994. The nomenklatura that ensured his election as president in 1991 was politically dispersed in 1994. During the Kravchuk years the emerging political parties did not fulfill the role assigned to political parties in Western democracies. While the promise of a multiparty system was fulfilled with the proliferation of over 40 new political parties, this did not constitute a viable multiparty system. During the Kravchuk years the one-party system ended, no singular party or coalition of parties formed the government, and while a multitude of political parties were registered, few had elected representatives in the Verkhovna Rada.

Economic prosperity, job opportunities, and a high living standard were to be independent Ukraine's hallmark. Stories abounded through television, radio, and newspapers, about Ukraine's abundance of diverse natural resources and its fertile soil that would make Ukraine the breadbasket of Europe. Continuous references were made to the economic evaluation report issued by Germany's Deutsche Bank that claimed Ukraine was best positioned of all former Soviet republics to succeed economically, giving Ukraine 83 points

³¹ V. A. Viktorenko, ed., *Ukraina bahatopartiina: prohramni dokumenty novykh partii* (Kyiv: 'Pamiatky Ukrainy,' 1991); Vasyl Yablonsky, *Suchasni politychni partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: 'Leksykon,' 1996).

compared to Russia's 72 points.³² Economists projected that in the future Ukraine would have the strongest national currency of all the former Soviet republics.³³ In Russian-speaking eastern and southern Ukraine promises of economic prosperity found fertile ground for Ukraine's independence during a time of inflation, shortages of food and consumer products, and industrial dislocation, that negatively affected everyone and contributed to feelings of economic exploitation by the Union. Independence would end product shortages, resulting in Ukrainian citizens benefiting from their productivity and abundant natural resources. Kravchuk emphasized the economic exploitation theme, blaming the Union, not Russians, for Ukraine's dire economic situation.³⁴ The disintegrating Soviet economy had encouraged the Verkhovna Rada to protect Ukraine's economic interests by passing the Law on Ukraine's Economic Sovereignty (3 August 1990),³⁵ and on 7 June 1991 voting to transfer to Ukraine's jurisdiction all Union level enterprises and organizations located in Ukraine.³⁶ Kravchuk marketed Ukraine's independence by emphasizing the positive benefits of economic prosperity and improved living standards, without

³² A chart prepared by the Deutsche Bank, listing 13 republics and their potential performance in 12 categories, was published in "Potentsial Ukrainy," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 37 (42) (November 1991), 4-5.

³³ L. Samsonenko, "Proekty i prozhekty," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 35/36 (40/41) (Nov. 1991), 4.

³⁴ "Ekonomika Ukrainy," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 35/36 (40/41) (November 1991), 3; A.K. Minchenko (Superintendent of Ukraine's Ministry of Economics), "Iakby tilky nam ne zavazhaly," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 35/36 (40/41) (November 1991), 4; "Terytorii i natsionalnyi sklad naselennia," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 35/36 (40/41) (November 1991), 4.

³⁵ "Pro ekonomichnu samostiinist Ukrainskoi RSR," in *Novi zakony Ukrainy, uchbovyi posibnyk* vypusk 1, ed. V.F. Opryshko, S.E. Demsky and A.V. Hapon (Kyiv: Ukrainaska asotsiatsiia vykladachiv prava, 1991), 7-9; S. Tsikora, "Government Receives Power," *Izvestiia* (4 August 1990), 1, as reported in *CDSP* 42/31, 30-31.

³⁶ S. Tsikora, "The Ukraine Puts All Enterprises under Its Jurisdiction," *Izvestiia* (7 June 1991), 1, as reported in *CDSP* 53/23, 22.

mentioning economic restructuring or shock therapy, and accepting as a given that Moscow's control over Ukraine's economy would be severed.

However, contemporary economic reality was tied to the Soviet past. The territorial elite had risen to power and influence through Soviet structures, excelling within a regulated economy when success of state enterprises was measured in fulfilling directives from the center and not in producing quality products for the end-consumer. Interdependence among republics and enterprises was built into the economic system with state enterprises tending to be large, employing thousands of employees and producing specialized products as part of a complex production chain that extended throughout the Soviet Union. The USSR and the central command economy disintegrated, resulting in directors of state enterprises and collective farms gaining autonomy while markets for their products were severely disrupted requiring new suppliers and customers. The move from a centrally planned economy was by default towards a regulated economy with its state contracts, government subsidies, and low interest credits, but the move towards a fully competitive market raised issues of insecurity and uncertainty. Without internal restructuring of government and industry, Cabinet Ministers and departments defended and lobbied for their economic sectors of responsibility rather than supporting change. The human factor, the role of President Kravchuk and the territorial establishment had been overlooked in economic projections. Ukraine's economy continued in crisis, financially pauperizing the population through inflation and the breakdown of industrial production, while President Kravchuk

and the economic establishment wavered and sought security within a regulated economy, delaying economic restructuring to meet post-Soviet economic realities.

Having replaced Marxism-Leninism with the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract, President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada proceeded to change state symbols to more accurately express Ukraine's national identity and to assist in the nation- and state-building process. Symbolic changes of state symbols did not equate to structural reforms of government, industry, or institutions. National symbols of state replaced Soviet symbols of state. The Verkhovna Rada replaced the Soviet hammer and sickle with the Kyivan Rus *tryzub*, symbolically extending Ukraine's state history back a thousand years to a large state that had dominated Eastern Europe with its capital in Kyiv.³⁷ *Tryzub* buttons replaced the hammer and sickle buttons on military and police uniforms, while red markings became crimson. In keeping with the national rebirth of Ukraine theme, *Ukraine Is Not Yet Dead*, was adopted as Ukraine's national anthem, the same national anthem adopted by Hrushevsky's Ukrainian National Republic. Parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk used the Cossack hetman's mace to symbolically link Ukraine to the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their democratic traditions. The adoption of the blue and yellow flag to replace the Soviet Ukrainian flag (red and blue flag with a hammer and sickle) was more controversial as the blue and yellow flag had been the national flag of the Ukrainian National Republic that had resisted the

³⁷ Petro Tolochko, "Malyi herb Ukrainy," adopted 19 February 1992, *Holos Ukrainy* 44 (294), (11 March 1992), 12.

Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine.³⁸ The blue and yellow flag was Rukh's symbol and with independence and the adoption of the Rukh national rebirth of Ukraine program the Verkhovna Rada adopted the blue and yellow flag as Ukraine's national flag. Throughout Ukraine other symbolic changes took place varying in intensity and depth depending on the district, city, and oblast. Western Ukraine and Kyiv led the symbolic changeover of names for metro stations, streets, and buildings, and the removal of Lenin's statues. Kyiv's October Square was renamed Independence Square and its huge statue of Lenin was dismantled and removed, while the Soviet hammer and sickle remained affixed to the fence at the Verkhovna Rada. There was symbolic change and symbolic continuity during the Kravchuk years but minimal internal restructuring of government, institutions, organizations, state enterprises, and collective farms.

Through legislation and republic-wide referendum the Ukrainian SSR became independent Ukraine; in the process, Marxism-Leninism was discarded and the Communist Party temporarily suspended. The territorial establishment under the leadership of former CPU ideologue and parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk was intent on preserving its privileged positions of influence and power in government, institutions, organizations, state-owned enterprises, and collective farms. The national rebirth of Ukraine program filled the ideological void left by Marxism-Leninism. The social contract defined independent Ukraine, its history, people, traditions, and national identity through the inclusion of all citizens, while distancing and differentiating independent Ukraine from its

³⁸ Bohdan Krawchenko, "National Memory in Ukraine: The Role of the Blue And Yellow Flag," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 27 (Summer 1990), 1-21

Soviet past and from Russia. The social contract promised that Ukraine would be a democratic, multiethnic, multiparty, pluralistic, rule-by-law state that would respect individual and national rights according to international standards. Ukraine would be a multiethnic state with the national identity formed around the numerically dominant ethnic-Ukrainians, their language, culture, and shared history. Citizenship would be based upon residency, not ethnicity. The social contract was a political program of intent, an image of what was to be, it was not a detailed plan of action, and there were no references to 'shock economic therapy' and the need for internal structuring of government, institutions, and industry. The social contract and the referendum campaign contributed to Ukraine's internal unity and international acceptance, broadened the decision-making process, bound the territorial establishment and the populace, Kyiv and the provinces, and all national minorities in Ukraine behind independence through a display of unity and euphoria unprecedented in Ukrainian history. At thousands of locations throughout Ukraine, through 28,804,071 referendum ballots, the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine with its component social contract and national rebirth of Ukraine program were affirmed for implementation.

Chapter 4

UKRAINE: VULNERABLE AND DIVIDED?

As Deputy Speaker Ivan Pliushch wrote in the Cabinet of Minister's newspaper *Uriadovyi kurier* a few days before the referendum vote: there was no going back once the Verkhovna Rada had proclaimed Ukraine's independence.¹ As far as Ukraine's territorial establishment was concerned, the Soviet epoch was over and all references to the USSR contained the adjective 'former' USSR. An agreement between Communist and national democrat parliamentarians solidified support for independence as all activities that promoted discord were banned and the nomenklatura was guaranteed their current jobs or new jobs at the current level of earnings.² Together and united, the national democrats and the Russian-speaking, multi-ethnic territorial elite campaigned for Ukraine's independence, promoting a new social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program. Over 90 percent of the electorate voted 'yes' affirming their support for the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, with voters in all provinces and regions, including Crimea with its majority of ethnic Russians, and Sevastopol the homeport of the Black Sea Fleet, supporting independence. Directors of collective farms, state enterprises,

¹ I. Pliushch, "'Tak!' - nezalezhnii Ukraini," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 37 (42) (Nov. 1991), 1.

organizations, and institutions, delivered the votes of their subordinates, while military officers delivered the military vote. The territorial elite established an independent Ukraine to distance itself and Ukraine from Moscow. The social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program were approved through referendum and contributed to the acceptance of Ukraine by the international community of nations. This was in stark contrast to the decades of isolation and pariah status that the USSR and its elite had endured. The United Kingdom in 1925 extended diplomatic recognition to the USSR while the United States waited until 1933. Having achieved independence, could independence be sustained?

Widespread concerns were raised in academic writings that Ukraine's linguistic, ethnic, and regional diversity could undermine internal stability and territorial integrity, shortening the duration of Ukraine's independence.³

² Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 389-391.

³ David R. Marples, "Ukraine's Relations with Russia in the Contemporary Era," *The Harriman Review* 9/1-2 (Spring 1996), 103-112; Alexander J. Motyl, "Will Ukraine Survive 1994?" *The Harriman Institute Forum* 7/5 (January 1994), 3-6; Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review* 7/7-9 (March-April 1994), 1-10; David R. Marples, "Ukraine, Belarus, and the Energy Dilemma," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/27 (2 July 1993), 39-44; Gert Weisskirchen, "Ukraine at the Crossroads," *Aussenpolitik* 45/4 (1994), 325-335; Liubomyr Skochylas, "Imperska polityka Rosii v SND," *Henezha* 1(3) (1995), 200-205; Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to 'Eurasia'?" *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/32 (19 August 1994), 1-12; Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, "Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/5 (July 1997), p. 845, 20p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Eugene B. Rumer, "Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?" *Foreign Policy* 96 (Fall 1994), p. 129, 16p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 00157228) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/1 (1994), p.47, 22p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

Independence achieved unexpectedly under the leadership of the territorial establishment that had for decades opposed Ukrainian national aspirations and independence; therefore, its commitment to independence was questionable. Further, Ukraine's historic record as an independent state was fragmented through historic time. Some Russians expressed difficulties in accepting Ukrainian independence, evidenced by Russian parliamentary resolutions that laid claim to Crimea and Sevastopol,⁴ in turn, encouraging Crimean separatism that threatened Ukraine's territorial integrity. Russian government statements offering protection to Russian speakers in CIS countries implied that Russia reserved the right to interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs.⁵ Ukrainian-Russian disagreements over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet⁶ and the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States,⁷ combined with Ukraine's indebtedness to Russia over oil and natural gas imports, strained relations. Ukraine's economy, characterized by declining product output, hyperinflation, unemployment, lack of natural gas for home and industry, salary arrears, and the financial pauperization of the population, threatened economic collapse and political instability.⁸ The 1994 presidential election results appear to have highlighted a great linguistic and cultural divide that Mace places along the pre-

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; "Briefing to Focus on Serious Challenges Facing Ukraine," Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C.: May 1994), 1-20.

⁴ See chapter on Crimean Separatism.

⁵ See chapter on Foreign Policy.

⁶ See the section on the Black Sea Fleet in the chapter on the Formation of Ukraine's Military and Security Forces.

⁷ See section on the Commonwealth of Independent States in the chapter dealing with Foreign Policy.

⁸ See chapter on the Economy.

1939 Soviet Ukraine border.⁹ Disillusionment with Kyiv's economic policies and declining living standards combined with Ukraine's historic, political, economic, ethnic, and linguistic diversity contributed to the growth of regionalism.¹⁰ All these factors contributed to growing widespread concerns over Ukraine's ability to maintain its internal stability, territorial integrity, and independence.

Russian imperial and Soviet policies encouraged the use of the Russian language and the movement and mixing of population, resulting in the Russian language being the dominant language of home and work, and 22 percent of Ukrainians (67 percent in Crimea) being ethnically Russian. Ethnic Russian officers dominated the officer ranks of the Soviet military forces that were nationalized through an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Ukrainian responses to language use and Russia's intentions towards Ukraine varied, with western Ukrainians suspicious of Russia's intentions, cautious as to the loyalty of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine and disapproving of the use of the Russian language. Eastern and southern Ukrainians of ethnic Ukrainian and Russian origin have demonstrated a preference for speaking in Russian and maintaining cordial business and political relations with Russia, without perceiving it as disloyalty to Ukraine. While all countries exhibit regional diversity, concerns have been expressed that the perceived 'great language and cultural' divide could indicate

⁹ James E. Mace, "Ukraine on the Threshold of the New Millennium," *Towards a New Ukraine II: Meeting the Next Century*, ed. Theofil Kis and Irene Makaryk with Roman Weretelnik (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1999), 11-22

¹⁰ Janusz Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 165-181.

a serious rift that could destabilize Ukraine, jeopardize the integrity of its borders, and terminate its existence as an independent country.

But it should be noted that all CIS leaders, including Russian President Yeltsin, at Alma-Ata (21 December 1991) unanimously recognized the independence and territorial integrity of each republic.¹¹ Like feudal lords the republic leaders had granted each other exclusive sovereignty over all state assets and resources in their republic while agreeing to settle disputes arising from the division of jointly-claimed USSR assets and liabilities at their CIS summit meetings. Privatizing republic assets would keep each elite busy within their own republic. For pragmatic reasons, and through the CIS agreement, the Helsinki Accord, and membership in the OSCE, the CIS countries pledged to respect each republic's borders and territorial integrity. Challenging the integrity of the Ukrainian-Russian border through military force would have precipitated ethnic violence and destabilized the region, leading to loss of control that could imperil the status of the elite in Russia and Ukraine. To preserve their privileged positions and financial advantages, the elite strove for stability and rejected the use of military force to prevent a repeat of the violence and upheaval of 1917.¹² Violence, ethnic unrest, and economic collapse would have undermined Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence, but it would also have destabilized the region.

¹¹ Bess Brown, "Commonwealth of Independent States Proclaimed in Alma-Ata," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

¹² In December 1991 in Kyiv, the writer was told by a prominent politician that Ukraine's greatest achievement was that independence was achieved without a single bullet being fired.

Ukraine was a 69-year-old administrative territorial entity at independence¹³ with a stable population and an established elite that supported and had an invested interest in achieving and maintaining Ukraine's independence. Ukraine inherited the Ukrainian SSR's constitution, the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, government bureaucracy, institutions, organizations, laws, law courts, state enterprises, collective agriculture, international and provincial [oblast] borders, police, and Ukraine's seat at the United Nations. To this were added the Union level organizations and institutions, including military forces situated in Ukraine. There was no social or political upheaval and no revolutionary change. The Kravchuk years were years of continuity and change as the Ukrainian SSR became Ukraine.

There was no abrupt change in the administration of government, unlike in other countries of Eastern Europe where the Communist elite lost power to the democrats. In Ukraine, the government elite and government structures remained. Soviet Ukraine's 1978 Constitution as amended periodically by the Verkhovna Rada to comply with Ukraine's sovereignty and independent status continued in force throughout the Kravchuk years.¹⁴ Ihor Markov¹⁵ writes that

¹³ Soviet Ukraine was a founding republic of the USSR in 1922.

¹⁴ Ihor Butko, "Nova konstitutsiia Ukrainy: idei, dumky, propozytsii deiaki rezultaty anketuvannia deputativ i pratsivnykiv mistsevykh rad," *Holos Ukrainy* 4 (254), (10 January 1992), 6; Serhii Holovaty, ed., *Mizhnarodnyi sympozium 'Konstitutsiia nezaleznoi Ukrainy,' 3-5 lypnia 1992* (Kyiv: Ukrainska pravnycha fundatsiia, 1992); Serhii Holovaty, ed., *Konstitutsiia Nezalezhoi Ukrainy: dokumenty, komentari, statti* (Kyiv: Ukrainska pravnycha fundatsiia, 1995); "The Constitution of Ukraine, Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, Ninth Convocation, on April 20, 1978," contains 15 constitutional revisions from April 1991 to December 1992, in *International Symposium on the Draft Constitution of Ukraine*, organized by the Ukrainian Legal Foundation in cooperation with the Council of Advisors to the Verkhovna Rada, Kyiv, 20-22 July 1993.

¹⁵ Ihor Markov, "The Role of the President in the Ukrainian Political System," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/48 (3 Dec. 1993), 31-35.

as political power shifted from the CPU to the Verkhovna Rada, executive authority merged with legislative authority, resulting in parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk performing executive functions, including those of head of government and state. In June 1991, to overcome this merging of executive and legislative authority in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine followed the examples provided by the Soviet Union and Russia and amended its constitution to establish the office of President, thereby, creating a parliamentary-presidential system to be effective 1 December 1991. The President was granted substantial powers as head of state and of the executive branch of government [article 114(1)-114(10)] with the Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the President and subordinate to him, while the Cabinet is confirmed, accountable, and responsible to the Verkhovna Rada [article 117]. The highest ranking elected politician, parliamentary Speaker Leonid Kravchuk, remained, but after 1 December 1991 as President of Ukraine. Cabinet portfolios remained structured Soviet-style along economic sectors resulting in Cabinet Ministers concentrating on protecting their economic sectors rather than advocating reforms and restructuring to improve productivity.¹⁶ The executive and legislative triangle continued with the First Secretary of the CPU-Cabinet of Ministers-Verkhovna Rada triangle being replaced by the President-Cabinet of Ministers-Verkhovna Rada triangle, with power sharing poorly delineated.

¹⁶ Alex Sundakov, "The Machinery of Government and Economic Policy in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, Proceedings of an IMF/World Bank Seminar, ed. Peter K. Cornelius and Patrick Lenain (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997), 275-287.

There were some moderate changes in the political arena. The CPU had been temporarily suspended by the Communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada,¹⁷ only to reemerge during the March 1994 parliamentary elections as a political force in eastern Ukraine, especially in the Donbas. Parliamentarians elected in March 1990 continued to serve until 1994, with those elected on the CPU platform enjoying greater individual autonomy as independents as they protected and lobbied for their state enterprises, collective farms, economic sectors, and regions. Parliamentarians elected in 1990 had voted for the Sovereignty Declaration (16 July 1990), resisted approving a new union treaty, survived the Moscow-based abortive reactionary coup, proclaimed Ukraine's independence, and successfully campaigned for the acceptance of the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract through referendum. They had ratified the Commonwealth of Independent States agreement and annulled the 1922 agreement that had established the USSR. They had approved two temporary national currencies (coupon and karbovanets) and a two-tier banking system, adopted national state symbols, approved the nationalization of Soviet military and security forces stationed in Ukraine, and ratified the Trilateral Agreement on nuclear disarmament. Products of the Soviet system, they had failed to adopt a new constitution to delineate executive and legislative powers, to pass legislation to reform the economy and bureaucracy, to allow private ownership of land, and to de-collectivize agriculture. But they had established an independent Ukraine and guided Ukraine's destiny during its volatile first

¹⁷ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 389-391.

years of independence. They had provided stability, continuity, and a determination to protect Ukraine's independence. The majority of parliamentarians elected in 1990 did not run in 1994, preferring to retain their positions in business and academia, but all influenced Ukraine's destiny.¹⁸

Public perceptions gained from listening to parliamentary debates broadcast live influenced the outcome of the 1994 elections. While the Verkhovna Rada debated and enacted legislation, the actual day-to-day operations of government and economy were in the hands of the presidential administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, the government bureaucracy, and the directors of state enterprises and collective farms, none being directly accountable to the Verkhovna Rada. A partial exception was Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma who had been granted special economic powers for six months by the Verkhovna Rada. Many parliamentarians exercised real power as directors of state enterprises and collective farms and used their positions to lobby for financial assistance for their enterprises and economic sectors. The national democrats lacked executive and administrative authority to implement policies but dominated the live broadcasts of parliamentary debates giving the impression that they were in charge and that their economic policies prevailed during the worsening economic crisis.¹⁹ The fruits of their parliamentary oratory became evident during the March 1994 elections when they suffered electoral setbacks at the hands of disillusioned voters. The electoral turnout in Kyiv,

¹⁸ The writer had been provided with a list of all deputies elected in 1990, a brief biography on each deputy, constituency, and caucus affiliation.

where support for reforms was strong, was so low that few parliamentarians were elected despite a series of runoff elections. Meanwhile, the suspension of the CPU removed it as a lightning rod for the discontent while former Communists sat as independents and maintained a low profile during parliamentary debates. This contributed to the reemergence of the CPU as a political force among disillusioned voters in the Donbas upset with the state of the economy and Kyiv's inconsistent economic policies, giving the impression that they were voting for a return to the Soviet era and closer ties with Russia.

Independence brought a proliferation of new political parties that covered the entire political spectrum and represented the diverse and emerging interests of individuals, clans, and regions, with Ukraine's political center being further to the left than in Western democracies.²⁰ Rukh, the movement, became a political party with its electoral support centered mainly in western Ukraine and Kyiv.²¹ The Republican Party was Rukh's main rival in western Ukraine where

¹⁹ In conversations with the writer, people continuously placed the majority of blame for the deteriorating economy on the Verkhovna Rada rather than on the President, Cabinet of Ministers, the government bureaucracy, and the National Bank.

²⁰ Vasyl Iablonsky, *Suchasni politychni partii Ukrainy: dovidnyk* (Kyiv: 'Leksykon,' 1996). The book lists 44 registered political parties, year registered, position on the political spectrum, and a brief background on each party, its platform, and its leader; V.A. Viktorenko, ed., *Ukraina bahatopartiina prohramni dokumenty novykh partii* (Kyiv: 'Pamiatky Ukrainy,' 1991); Annonina Kolobii, "Politychnyi spektr: pro deiki kryterii 'livitykh' i 'pravykh' politychnykh rukhiv u posttotalitarnykh suspilstvakh," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (9-10, 1995), 3-24; A. H. Sliusarenko and M.V. Tomenko, "Do problemy klasyfikatsii novykh politychnykh partii Ukrainy," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (5, 1992), 3-10; Yurii Yurov, "Stavliennia naseleennia donbasu do politychnykh partii ta ikh prohramnykh zasad," *Henezha* (1, 94), 195-197; Yurii Yurov, "Dva poliusy luhanskoho politykumu," *Henezha* (1, 94), 198-204; Miroslav Popovych, *levropa-Ukraina: pravi i livi* (Kyiv: 'Kyivske bratstvo', 1996); Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilous, "Political Parties in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45/4 (July/August, 1993), p. 693, 11p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

²¹ O. V. Haran, *Ubyty drakona: Z istorii Rukhu ta novykh partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: 'Lybid,' 1993); Hryhorii Honcharuk, *Napodnyi Rukh Ukraini istoriia* (Odesa: Astroprint, 1997); *Rukh 1993* (Kyiv: 'Taki spravy,' 1993); Roman Solchanyk and Taras Kuzio, "Democratic Political Blocs in

nation- and state-building issues dominate, and where political parties are situated from center-right to extreme right on the political spectrum.²² Among the fringe rightwing parties are the Ukrainian National Assembly, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, and the Ukrainian National Conservative Party. Initially, western Ukrainians were more active in the formation of political parties and defining the national identity but in 1992-94, the eastern elites became more politically involved and commenced to establish political parties concentrating on regional and economic issues.²³ Many of these political parties are based in the Donbas, occupy the political spectrum from the extreme left to the center-right, and tap into regional and economic issues, including the miners' strikes, for their support.²⁴ The Communist Party was reborn in the Donbas where it elected most of its candidates during the 1994 parliamentary elections. Among the center-right political parties established by the eastern territorial elite and business interests are: the Liberal Party, the Party of Labor, the People's Democratic Party, New Ukraine, the Party of Democratic Renewal, and the Social Democratic Party.²⁵ With the exception of the Communist Party,

Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/16 (16 April 1993), 14-17; Vladimir Skachko, "RUKH stal politicheshoi partiei, ostavshis obshchestvennoi organizatsiei," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (8 December 1992), 3.

²² Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/16 (22 April 1994), 42-49.

²³ Grigory Nemiria, "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-building," in *Ukraine: The Search for a New National Identity, 183-197*.

²⁴ Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/7 (Nov. 1997), p. 1293, 24p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

²⁵ "Iz zaiavy Prezydii' hromadskoho obiednannia 'Nova Ukraina'," *Holos Ukrainy* 9 (259), (22 January 1992), 6; Yuri Yurov, "Partiia pratsi Ukrainy," *Henezha* 1(1994), 205-214; Monika Jung, "The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/12 (25 March 1994), 51-56.

membership in political parties tends to be small with membership figures varying depending upon source.²⁶ Only 16 political parties were represented in the Verkhovna Rada in 1994. Most political parties lack financial resources, an exception being the Liberal Party that was formed in Donetsk with branches throughout Ukraine and heavily financed by industrialists, but it failed to emerge as a political force.²⁷ Despite the abundance of political parties registered to represent the diverse interests of Ukrainians there was no concerted effort during the Kravchuk years to develop a mature political party system. In fact, the election rules for the 1994 election benefited independent candidates while penalizing candidates seeking political party nominations.

In November 1993, the Verkhovna Rada changed the election law for nominating candidates for the March 1994 elections. The new law specified three methods for nominating candidates: a signed declaration by ten electors, confirmation by a workplace collective meeting, and a complex process for candidates being nominated by a political party, resulting in most candidates running as independent candidates.²⁸ The election law expressed the distrust and indifference of the electorate towards political parties and the situation within the independent-dominated Verkhovna Rada where independents were grouped around numerous informal, loosely structured caucuses. Further, to win election in 1994 each winning candidate in the 450 constituencies had to

²⁶ Jaroslaw Martyniuk, "The Demographics of Party Support in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/48 (3 Dec. 1993), 36-42.

²⁷ Yuriy Yurov, "Fenomen Markulova' chy liberalna alternatyva," *Henezha* 2 (1994), 190-197.

²⁸ Marko Bojcun, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/2 (March 1995), p. 229, 21p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

receive a minimum of half of the votes cast with a minimum of half of the electorate having voted. This challenging process resulted in some constituencies, especially in Kyiv, not electing representatives to the Verkhovna Rada.²⁹

President Kravchuk and the territorial elite achieved independence for Ukraine; however, could independence have been attained without the participation of the nationally conscious western Ukrainians? Western Ukrainians offered an alternative national identity and traditions to balance the Eurasian identity and russification that prevailed in eastern Ukraine and which would not have been helpful to marketing Ukraine's independence. The western Ukrainian version calling for the national rebirth of Ukraine and a return to its historic European roots, values, and traditions, was seized upon by the territorial elite to promote independence and distinguish Ukraine from Russia. Ukraine's diversity, balancing nationally conscious western Ukraine with the russified east, contributed to the achievement and strengthening of independence.³⁰ Western Ukraine, former Eastern Galicia, is different from most other regions of Ukraine, having been annexed into the USSR (and Soviet

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/26 (1 July 1994).

²⁹ Kostiantyn Malieiev and Danylo Yanevsky, "Sytuatsiia v Ukraini: liutyi- berezen 1994 roku," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (3/4, 1994), 3-15.

³⁰ Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/7 (Nov 1995), p.1125, 19p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Ustina Markus, "Belarus, Ukraine Take Opposite Views," *Transition* (15 Nov 1996), 20-22, 64; David Marples, "National Awakening and National Consciousness in Belarus," *Nationalities Papers* 27/4 (December 1999), p. 565. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item 00905992) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

Ukraine) in 1939 and encountered Russian migration only thereafter.³¹ Under Austrian rule Ukrainians developed a strong national consciousness and participated in elections while the Ukrainian Catholic Church emerged as a strong supporter of Ukrainian nationhood. National consciousness and a firm commitment to an independent Ukraine remained strong throughout the Polish and Soviet periods with western Ukrainian dissidents filling the Soviet gulag.³² Western Ukrainian anti-Communist and anti-Russian bias provided fertile ground for Rukh, the movement in support of reforming and restructuring Soviet society. In addition to Rukh, the Republican Party (successor of the Helsinki Union), the Memorial Society, the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, Green World, and Tovarystvo Lev (Lion Society) found support in western Ukraine during the Gorbachev era. Western Ukrainians provided the emotions and participants during demonstrations outside the Verkhovna Rada in support of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. During the referendum campaign western Ukrainians campaigned throughout Ukraine in support of independence and for their Rukh (Chornovil) and Republican Party (Lukianenko) presidential candidates, at times encountering hostility, the

³¹ Ivan Terliuk, "Do pytannia pro prychny mihratsii rosiiskoho naseleattia u halytskii ta volynskii oblastiakh Ukrainy," *Henezza* 1(3)(1995), 194-199; Oles Filts and Oleh Neveliuk, "Do vyvchennia problemy mentalnosti naseleattia Halychyny," *Henezza* 1 (1994), 231-235; Ivan Terliuk, "Etnichni rosiiany u zakhidnii Ukraini," *Henezza* 2 (1994), 222-232; Ivan Terliuk, "Etnichni protsesy ta ikh vplyv na chyselnist rosiiskoho naseleattia zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy," *Henezza* 1 (1994), 216-220.

³² For information on the dissident movement in western Ukraine that provided the historic base for Rukh support, see Anatolii Rusnachenko, *Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi Rukh v Ukraini: seredyna 1950-kh - pochatok 1990-kh rokiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1998).

product of decades of Communist propaganda that had labeled western Ukrainians as nationalists and fascists.³³

The decline of western Ukrainian political influence in favor of center-east Ukraine was inevitable based upon population size and the economic strength.³⁴ Sixty percent of Ukraine's national income and 60 percent of the money is found in seven provinces (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Odessa), while provincial contributions on a per capita basis to the national economy vary from province to province by up to 45 percent. This income spread in interregional social and economic development causes social tensions and regional divisions, leaving the impression in industrial eastern Ukraine that a disproportionate amount of their money goes to Kyiv and western Ukraine.³⁵ In heavily industrialized but economically hard hit Donbas with its crisis plagued coal mining industry this impression creates fertile ground for resentment and disillusionment with Kyiv's economic policies.³⁶ Promises of economic prosperity had influenced the eastern Ukrainian electorate to vote for independence while Kyiv's inconsistent economic policies stimulated regional industrialists and local elites to seek additional powers and decentralization to facilitate economic recovery and reforms, without challenging Ukraine's territorial integrity or independence.³⁷

³³ Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990's: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge and N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian 'Nationalism': A Minority Faith?" *The Harriman Review* 10/2 (Summer 1997), 12-20.

³⁴ Grigory Nemiria, "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building," in *Ukraine: The Search for a New National Identity, 183-197*.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Janusz Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity, 165-181*.

The miners' strikes of 1993 resulted in Kyiv granting greater autonomy to several eastern provinces to manage state enterprises. In February 1994, just before the presidential election, President Kravchuk issued a presidential decree granting the industrial provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia greater regional self-government and control over the administration of state property.³⁸ Situated adjacent to Russian provinces and markets along an invisible border, Ukraine's eastern provinces lobbied for economic concessions, not political or secessionist objectives, for greater autonomy to reestablish trade relations with the neighboring regions in Russia. Other provinces, including Zakarpattia and Odessa, lobbied for the creation of economic zones and other special concessions.³⁹ Decentralization of political and economic decision making builds local expertise, undermines dependency on Kyiv, but raises fears for Ukraine's territorial integrity as the regions seeking greater autonomy have substantial national minorities.⁴⁰ But Ukraine has a unitary form of government with 24 provinces plus Crimea, with only the Republic of Crimea having specifically delineated powers that are recognized and protected by the Crimean constitution, approved by the Verkhovna Rada.⁴¹ Thus, when Kyiv grants additional authority to the provinces and local governments this new authority is not constitutionally protected, as Ukraine is not a federation.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Mykola Horbat interviewed by S. Ustychem: "Rynok: Laboratoriia na Zakarpatti?" *Holos Ukrainy* 2 (252), (4 January 1992), 7.

⁴⁰ Sarah Birch and Ihor Zinko, "The Dilemma of Regionalism," *Transition* (1 Nov 1996), 22-25, 64.

⁴¹ See chapter on Crimean Separatism.

Ukrainians from different regions with different historical experiences vary in their views on Ukraine's national identity,⁴² and during federal elections they express their personal and regional concerns. The pact between Communist and national democrat parliamentarians included the adoption of Rukh's 'the national rebirth of Ukraine program' with its western Ukrainian bias. President Kravchuk adhered to the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract throughout his presidency, helping to distance Ukraine from Russia and demonstrate to the world community and to Russians that Ukrainians were a distinct European nation. But with independence achieved, other versions of Ukrainian national identity have moved to the forefront for public discourse with the debate centered mainly between Europe-oriented and Eurasian ties. Ukraine's population and economic center is not in western Ukraine but in the center-east. While historically western Ukrainians were accustomed to speaking the Ukrainian language and participating in their European heritage, eastern Ukrainians were conditioned by centuries of association with Russians and the use of the Russian language. Regardless of their version of the national identity all Ukrainians regard themselves as loyal citizens, regardless of language use and ethnicity. Ukrainians are in the process of finding a balance, a compromise as they attempt to define Ukraine's national identity and establish visible markers for themselves, including

⁴² See I. F. Kuras et al., eds., *Demokratiia i derzhavnist v Ukraini: problemy harmonizatsii* (Kyiv: Invip, 1997); L. K. Finberh, M. Yu. Riabchuk, O. V. Haran, Ye. I. Holovakha, M. F. Marynovych, and V. L. Skurativsky, "Nova Ukraina - kudy ity?" *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (3, 1992), 3-26.

language and a European or Eurasian orientation, or a combination thereof.⁴³ An inclusive Ukrainian national identity must meet the requirements of Ukrainians living in all regions of Ukraine.⁴⁴

The merging of ethnic nations into the Soviet people under the leadership of the Russian nation and through the use of the Russian language had ended. In keeping with the social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program, Ukraine was proclaimed a civil, multinational state with all citizens being equal regardless of ethnicity or religion, with individual and nation minority rights protected according to international standards.⁴⁵ All citizens possess a single citizenship⁴⁶ and are registered as Ukrainian on their passports.⁴⁷ President Kravchuk pursued a policy of inclusion and accommodation to insure internal stability and the continued support for Ukraine's independence by national minorities. Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration (16 July 1990) and Declaration of the rights of Nationalities (1

⁴³ Stephen Shulman, "Cultures in Competition: Ukrainian Foreign Policy and the 'Cultural Threat' From Abroad," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/2 (March 1998), p. 287, 17p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁴⁴ Chrystyna Lapychak, "The Quest for a Common Destiny," *Transition* (6 September 1996), 6-8.

⁴⁵ Lowell Barrington, "The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/5 (July 1995), p. 531, 33p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Susan Stewart, "Ukraine's Policy towards Its Ethnic Minorities," *RFE/RL* 2/36 (10 Sept 1993), 55-62; Tamara Resler, "Dilemmas of Democratisation: Safeguarding Minorities in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/1 (Jan 1997), p. 89, 28p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁴⁶ On Russia's idea of dual citizenship, see Ihor Zevelev, "Russia and the Russian Diaspora," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12/3 (July-Sept. 1996), 265-287.

⁴⁷ V. M. Bebyk, "Shcho zh my za liudy, ukraintsi?" *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (6, 1992), 22-29.

November 1919) affirm Ukraine's commitment to protecting the rights of national minorities. The national minorities had responded by endorsing Ukraine's independence at their November 1991 conference held in Odessa and through the referendum. Enhancing Ukraine's claim to a distinct national identity, the Ukrainian language replaced the Russian language but continuity was retained with the Ukrainian language being the official language of state and the Russian language continuing as the language of business and social discourse, especially in eastern and southern Ukraine. Laitin writes that a consociation relationship exists whereby Russians and Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine can work and study in their regions while remaining monolingual in Russian, but for influence and power in the republic they have to learn Ukrainian.⁴⁸ Despite references to fears of linguistic Ukrainianization there is no hostility to the actual use of the Ukrainian language, only to the forced learning of the Ukrainian language, with most Russian speakers understanding some Ukrainian and being comfortable and not threatened in Ukraine.⁴⁹ The social contract acknowledged, accepted, and supported Ukraine's ethnic and linguistic diversity, in the process unifying the ethnically diverse elite and population behind independence.

⁴⁸ David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁴⁹ Ian Bremmer, "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/2 (1994), p. 261, 23 p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Mykola Riabchuk, "Behind the Talks on 'Ukrainianization': Laissez Faire or Affirmative Action?" in *Towards A New Ukraine II*, ed. Theofil Kis and Irena Makaryk with Roman Weretelnyk (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies University of Ottawa, 1999), 135-142.

Historically, the phenomenon of multiple self-identities has been the norm through much of Ukrainian history. Ukrainians have tended to vary in their inclination to identify with the center (Warsaw, Vienna, Budapest, and Moscow/St. Petersburg), assimilate into the dominant culture, and use the state language, while simultaneously retaining their territorial, ethnic, and linguistic distinctiveness.⁵⁰ The classic example was the Little Russian identity. Even Ukraine's first president, historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, experienced difficulties in overcoming his identification with the Russian state, evidenced by his return to Kyiv at the outbreak of World War I and the Four Universals proclaimed by his government.⁵¹ This phenomenon of a layering of multiple identities is evident in independent Ukraine among all nationalities.

In southern and eastern Ukraine individuals tend to belong to more than one ethno-national group, possess multiple ethnic identifications, and various levels of identification with one or more nationalities as they undergo a transition from one identification to another.⁵² Mixed ethnic self-identification is due to inter-ethnic marriages, language usage, and urbanization, with the national identity reflected in the political life of the region. Pirie writes that by compartmentalizing the national identity of individuals, Russians could be regarded as a fifth column in Ukraine; language use confuses the national identity question similar to when the Russian government declared its intent to

⁵⁰ Paul R. Magosci, "The Ukrainian National Revival- A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 16/1-2 (1989), 45-62.

⁵¹ Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

⁵² Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48/7 (Nov 1996), p. 1079, 26p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta

defend Russian speakers, thereby implying that language use determines nationality. Besides language use other factors determine national self-identification and political attitudes. Pirie writes that in Donetsk 41.7% of families are mixed, with only 32.5% being mono-ethnically Ukrainian. In Crimea, 36.4% of the families are mixed, 47.6% of Russian families ethnically are homogeneous, and only 13.1% of Ukrainian families are ethnically homogeneous, partly explaining why a pro-Russian movement has not flourished in Donbas and a pro-Ukrainian movement has not flourished in Crimea.⁵³ In an all-Ukrainian survey between 1993-94, 57% of the adult population in Ukraine considered themselves to be exclusively ethnically Ukrainian, 11% exclusively ethnically Russian, and 25-26% regarded themselves to be simultaneously Ukrainian and Russian.⁵⁴ While the official census statistics for Donetsk register 51% of its population as Ukrainians and 44% as Russians, a 1991 sociological poll recorded 32% of respondents as declaring themselves Ukrainian, 27% as Russians, and 36% as both Ukrainian and Russian. Bugajski agrees, noting that in the Donbas national identity is multi-layered with most people regarding themselves simultaneously as Ukrainian, Russian, and Slavic, while regional territorial concerns dominate.⁵⁵ Russians in southern and eastern Ukraine (not Crimea) possess a weak sense of Russian identity that is reflected in their lack of political action based upon ethnicity and

Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:
<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁵³ Ibid. Also see Anatol Lievan, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," *Survival* 41/2 (Summer 1999), 53-70.

⁵⁴ Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48/7 (Nov 1996), p. 1079, 26p.

a lack of solidarity with Russians in other CIS countries.⁵⁶ Russians in the Donbas have strong territorial roots and share common historic, political, and economic experiences with Ukrainians, including the use of the Russian language.

The voting pattern during the 1994 presidential election raised the issue of the 'divide' along geographical, historical, and linguistic lines. Arel⁵⁷ writes that language politics is the politics of threatened identity and that during the presidential election Ukraine was territorially polarized with Russian speakers having supported Leonid Kuchma on closer relations with Russia, greater involvement in the CIS, and Russian as a second official language. Arel notes that while the Verkhovna Rada in October 1989 approved the Ukrainian language as the singular official state language, and government language policy of 1992 emphasized Ukrainian as the language of government, state-owned television, and school instruction, there has been resistance to ukrainianization in central and eastern Ukraine, concluding that the language issue influenced the 1994 election. That is, Kravchuk was defeated because of the economic crisis, the question of Ukraine's national identity, and Ukraine's relations with Russia, while Kuchma benefited by having advocated Russian as

⁵⁵ Janusz Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 165-181.

⁵⁶ Graham Smith, *The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition* (London: Arnold, 1999), 78-79; Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, "Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/5 (July 1997), p. 845, 20p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁵⁷ Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers* 23/3 (1995), 597-621; Dominique Arel, "A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12/1 (Jan-March 1996), 73-90.

a state language and closer relations with Russia.⁵⁸ Kuzio, on the other hand, notes that while Kuchma had campaigned on a Eurasian platform and Russian as a second state language, he has shifted his foreign policy westward, and that many Ukrainians are bilingual and half of the Russophones regard the Ukrainian language as an attribute of Ukrainian statehood.⁵⁹ Further, following the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections there was no substantial change in Ukraine as continuity prevailed.⁶⁰

National elites have tended to regard language use as an indicator of national self-identity and loyalty to a state. Language assimilation of the Russians and Russian speakers is essential for a national minority to be assimilated, the alternative being that the national minority remains a separate entity within Ukraine.⁶¹ Laitin states that linguistic assimilation is essential for a national minority to be integrated into the nationalizing state. While the Ukrainian and Russian language issue is debated, the issue of surzhyk⁶² cannot be ignored as Russian speakers attempt to learn Ukrainian resulting in the mixing of languages.

⁵⁸ Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to 'Eurasia'?" *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/32 (19 Aug 1994), 1-12.

⁵⁹ Taras Kuzio, "End Note: The Myth of Russophone Unity in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Newslines* 4/129 (7 July 2000).

⁶⁰ Ustina Markus, "Stability amid Political Turnover," *Transition* (15 Feb. 1995), 66-70.

⁶¹ David D. Laitin, "Language and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Republics," *Post-Soviet Studies* 12/1 (Jan-March 1996), 4-24.

Election Results:

Does the Language and Cultural Divide Threaten Ukraine's Existence?

During Soviet Ukraine's first multi-candidate elections (March 1990), the electorate did not vote along linguistic or cultural lines when the candidates backed by the Democratic Bloc won 110 seats in western Ukraine,⁶³ Kyiv, and Kharkiv. Nor did language use determine how deputies voted in the Verkhovna Rada.⁶⁴ While western Ukrainians are nationally conscious and Ukrainian speakers, Kyiv and Kharkiv are predominately Russian-speaking cities. Western Ukraine and Kyiv, the national capital, were fertile ground for anti-CPU candidates and supportive of change. Centered in Kharkiv, the Democratic Platform group supported reforms from within the CPU. Three quarters of the 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada were won by CPU candidates who benefited from the CPU being the only registered party, incumbency, and control of the mass media by its supporters.

The results of the independence referendum do not show a voting pattern along language lines when 84.18% of the electorate voted, with 90.32% voting 'yes' for independence. Ukrainian-speaking western Ukraine voted 98% for independence while Russian-speaking Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia

⁶² Laada Bilaniuk, "Speaking of Surzhyk: Ideologies and Mixed Languages," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21/1-2 (June 1997) 3- 117; Antonina Berezovenko, "The Ukrainian Language of Tomorrow," in *Towards A New Ukraine II*, 153-158.

⁶³ Sarah Birch, "Electoral Behavior in Western Ukraine in National Elections and Referendum, 1989-91," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/7 (Nov. 1995), p. 1145, 31p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

voted 90% for independence. Russian-speaking Luhansk with a 44.8% and Donetsk with a 43.6% ethnic-Russian population⁶⁵ voted 84% for independence. Ethnic Russians have lived a long time in eastern and southern Ukraine side-by-side with Ukrainians and are territorially attached to Ukraine as their homeland. Both Russians and Ukrainians in the region tend to have a low national consciousness, speak Russian, and have shared common historical experiences. As there are no linguistic or ethnic frictions between the Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians they tend to participate in the same social, economic, and political organizations. Crimea is slightly different having been transferred to Ukraine in 1954. Crimea voted 54% for Ukraine's independence, is home to new arrivals, mainly retirees, with a two-thirds ethnic Russian population, a 18% Tatar population, and simmering secessionism. Regardless of language and ethnicity, the overwhelming majority in eastern and southern Ukraine voted for independence.

The presidential election conducted parallel with the independence referendum consisted of six candidates: L. Kravchuk (61.59%), V. Chornovil (23.27), L. Lukianenko (4.49%), V. Hryniiov (4.17%), I. Iukhnovsky (1.74), L. Taburiansky (0.57%).⁶⁶ Their political platforms were similar. Parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk, an ethnic Ukrainian, was the establishment candidate and

⁶⁴ Dominique Arel, "Voting Behavior in the Ukrainian Parliament the Language Factor," in *Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Thomas F. Remington (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 125 -158.

⁶⁵ Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/1 (January-February 1994), p. 47, 22p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁶⁶ "Rezultaty vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrainy," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 38/39 (43/44) (Dec 1991).

former CPU ideologue whose platform was the national rebirth of Ukraine and the social contract. Chornovil, an ethnic Ukrainian and former political prisoner, was the Rukh candidate whose Rukh platform Kravchuk had borrowed. Lukianenko, an ethnic Ukrainian and former political prisoner, was the leader of the Republican Party, whose platform was the national rebirth of Ukraine. Hryniiov, an ethnic Russian and Russian speaker from Kharkiv, supported the national rebirth of Ukraine and a federal state. All presidential candidates supported the social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program. The Rukh movement was strong in western Ukraine where Communists were not popular and Chornovil was head of the Lviv oblast. Language was not a determining factor during the first presidential elections when the majority of voters supported the establishment candidate, the social contract, and the national rebirth of Ukraine platform.

Of the 338 deputies⁶⁷ elected to the 1994 Verkhovna Rada in the first two voting rounds, the political left won 123 seats (Communists 86, Crimean Communists 5, Agrarians 18, Socialists 14).⁶⁸ In the first round Communists received 40% of the votes in Luhansk, 32% in Donetsk, but only 8% in

⁶⁷ Parliamentary elections results obtained from IFES in Kyiv and from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ifes.org>; and from tables in appendix of, Marko Bojcun, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/2 (March 1995), p. 229, 21p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Andrew Wilson "The Ukrainian Left: in Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/7 (November 1997), p. 1293, 24p. Retrieved March 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/26 (1 July 1994), 6-17.

⁶⁸ Vladimír Skachko, "Kommunisty prazdnuiut pobedu-oni gotovy k chrezvychnym meram i otmene prezidentstva," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (21 April 1994), 3.

Dnipropetrovsk. The national democratic parties did well in western Ukraine but their support had dropped from the 1990 levels due to disillusionment and concerns over the deteriorating economy. A low voter turnout in Kyiv resulted in Kyivites not electing most of their allotted deputies. Rukh elected 25 deputies and the Republican Party 11. The center right political parties based in central-eastern Ukraine elected 27 deputies with the Interregional Bloc for Reform electing 15 deputies, the Party of Democratic Renewal 4, and Labor 4. The 1994 election results do not reveal a Ukrainian-Russian language divide but rather concerns over social and economic issues as witnessed by the electoral strength of the Communist and Socialist parties in the depressed coal and metallurgical center of Donbas during the period of labor unrest and strikes by miners. The high-tech industrial center of Dnipropetrovsk did not support the Communist and Socialist parties. Agrarian Party candidates received scattered rural support in all regions of Ukraine except western Ukraine. However, the election results for party preference are not accurate as many candidates ran as independents but upon winning revealed their party preference. Independent parliamentarians joined a variety of caucuses, each with a minimum of 25 deputies, and elected socialist leader V. Moroz as parliamentary speaker. The voting pattern during the 1994 parliamentary election was influenced by social and economic issues of concern, and not by a linguistic and cultural divide.

The 26 June and 10 July 1994 presidential elections apparently reveal that the linguistic divide influenced the voting pattern as western and central Ukrainians voted for Kravchuk while central, eastern, southern, and Crimean

Ukrainians voted for Kuchma. One should remember that Kuchma was prominent within the powerful Dnipropetrovsk clan. During a time of economic crisis that saw gross national product for 1991-1993 drop by 39% (while as a comparison the Great Depression in the United States never exceeded a drop of 25%),⁶⁹ President Kravchuk based his presidential campaign on a pro-European and nation-state building platform, not on economic reforms. During his years as president he unsuccessfully solicited Rukh's support for his presidency⁷⁰ but he failed to concentrate on building a political party as a vehicle for his reelection campaign. While Kravchuk had presidential representatives in all oblasts, this was not the same as having a political campaign machine.⁷¹ During the 1991 referendum and presidential campaigns the nomenklatura apparatus was still in place and eager to assist Kravchuk, the establishment candidate. Kravchuk entered the 1994 presidential campaign without the support structure he enjoyed in 1991 and deeply disadvantaged by the economic crisis.

Kuchma on the other hand benefited from his exposure as Prime Minister, having created an image as a reformer. Home based in the geographic center of Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk, Kuchma was an establishment leader of the military-industrial complex with access to campaign funds and a network of unhappy state enterprise directors who wanted closer economic ties

⁶⁹ President L. Kuchma, *Along the Road of Radical Economic Reform, Address of the President of Ukraine on the basic tenets of economic and social policy Presented to Members of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine 11 October 1994*. Obtained from the Council of Advisors to the Verkhovna Rada.

⁷⁰ "Vystup prezidenta Ukrainy L. Kravchuka na III vseukrainskykh zborakh narodnoho RUKHU," *Holos Ukrainy* 38 (288), (3 March 1992), 3.

with Russia and the CIS for commercial not political reasons. Kuchma used the economic crisis to his advantage, emphasizing economic issues and reforms, closer economic ties with Russia and the CIS, a Eurasian orientation, and, exploiting unfounded fears of forced language conversion from Russian to Ukrainian, promised to make Russian the second official language. Economic issues dominated the voting patterns in eastern Ukraine during the independence referendum and during the 1994 presidential elections. Kravchuk's 1991 promises of economic prosperity were not fulfilled, an important component in the social contract for eastern Ukraine voters.⁷² Further, billions of dollars of western financial assistance entered Russia not Ukraine. Energy shortages had temporarily closed factories and kept residences on low heat. Kuchma's campaign exploited issues of public concern to his electoral advantage.

The issue of the language divide influencing voting patterns emerges with the presidential election of 1994. During the first round there were seven candidates: V. Babych (2.43%) (644,263), L. Kravchuk (37.68%) (9,977,766), L. Kuchma (31.25%) (8,274,806), V. Lanovy (9.38%) (2,483,986), O. Moroz (13.09%) (3,466,541), I. Pliushch (1.22%) (321,886), and P. Talanchuk (0.54%) (143,361).⁷³ A total of 25,315,609 people voted. The second tier candidates

⁷¹ "Zakon Ukrainy: Pro predstavnyka prezidenta Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* 51 (301), (20 March 1992), 2.

⁷² During the 1991 referendum campaign in Luhansk several people told the writer that if Kravchuk did not perform he would be out of office within two years. President Kravchuk lasted two and a half years.

⁷³ IFES, *Election Results of the First Round of the President Election June 26, 1994*, and *Election Results of the Second Round of the President Election July 10, 1994*. Retrieved 1997 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ifes.org>; Kostiantyn Malieiev and Danylo Yanevsky, "Sytuatsiia v chervni," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (7/8, 1994), 3-7.

drained votes away from the two front runners but it was still possible to notice that Kravchuk had greater appeal in central and western Ukraine while Kuchma had greater appeal in eastern and southern Ukraine. These patterns became extremely noticeable in the second round. In 1991, Kravchuk as the establishment candidate had won all the regions except western Ukraine where former dissident and Rukh candidate Chornovil came out on top. In 1994, President Kravchuk was running against a powerful and highly connected representative of the eastern industrial and political establishment, and a leading member of the Dnipropetrovsk clan. In the second round L. Kravchuk received 45.06% and 12,111,603 votes, while L. Kuchma received 52.16% and 14,016,850 votes of a total of 26,128,453 votes cast. A total of 812,944 more electors voted in the second round.

Where did these votes come from?⁷⁴ In the second round Kravchuk had increased his votes in every single oblast with the biggest jump in support occurring in the city of Kyiv where he gained 200,000 votes, while throughout Ukraine he increased his vote by 2,133,837 votes. But Kuchma's political organization was more impressive, increasing Kuchma's vote by 5,742,044. In Luhansk Kuchma's support jumped by 539,770, in Donetsk by 713,790, in Dnipropetrovsk by 446,394, and in Kharkiv by 566,707 votes. All are Russian speaking regions. However, in the city of Kyiv, Kuchma's vote went from 18,579 to 359,271, in Vinnytsia oblast from 211,292 to 440,079, in Zakarpattia from 96,062 to 136,787, in Kirovohrad from 136,626 to 315,967, in Cherkasy

⁷⁴ Ibid.

from 155,120 to 380,666, in Volyn from 32,563 to 83,971, in Zhytomyr from 163,357 to 345,392. These are regarded as Ukrainian speaking areas. Did

Oblast	Leonid Kravchuk			Leonid Kuchma		
	June 26	July 10	Increase	June 26	July 10	Increase
Kyiv City	395,741	603,139	207,398	185,791	359,271	173,480
Cherkassy	336,853	422,846	85,993	155,121	380,666	255,545
Chernihiv	182,171	203,796	21,625	365,692	588,081	222,389
Chernivtsi	279,311	309,176	29,865	106,107	176,342	70,235
Crimea	74,243	103,119	28,876	825,251	1,041,671	216,420
Sevastopol	11,009	13,502	2,493	162,767	189,972	27,205
Dnipropetrovsk	524,285	576,169	51,884	868,404	1,314,798	446,394
Donetsk	387,957	469,677	81,720	1,292,627	2,006,417	713,790
Ivano-Frankivsk	734,541	867,658	133,117	25,715	35,481	9,766
Kharkiv	366,155	394,244	28,089	512,106	1,078,813	566,707
Kherson	161,595	199,361	37,766	222,719	401,741	179,022
Khmelnysky	362,376	504,841	142,465	142,829	346,454	203,625
Kirovohrad	195,769	290,473	94,704	136,628	315,967	179,339
Kyiv	411,541	552,225	140,684	184,751	363,462	178,711
Luhansk	135,839	148,225	12,386	750,602	1,290,372	539,770
Lviv	1,485,789	1,727,052	241,263	58,903	71,746	12,843
Mykolayiv	238,843	279,806	40,963	220,711	330,841	110,130
Odessa	275,722	351,189	75,467	500,826	802,683	301,857
Poltava	300,357	371,945	71,588	288,943	587,741	298,798
Rivne	492,573	568,823	76,250	38,936	71,961	33,025
Sumy	174,936	221,921	46,985	229,784	519,941	290,157
Ternopil	665,871	749,499	83,628	18,371	29,645	11,274
Vinnysia	478,319	564,856	86,537	211,292	440,079	228,787
Volyn	411,334	504,908	93,574	32,563	83,971	51,408
Zakarpattia	283,673	382,683	99,010	96,062	136,787	40,725
Zaporizhzhia	234,344	268,135	33,791	477,982	706,546	228,564
Zhytomyr	386,621	462,336	75,715	163,357	345,392	182,035
TOTAL	9,977,766	12,111,603	2,133,837	8,274,806	14,016,851	5,742,045

Election results of the first round of the presidential election June 26, 1994, and the election results of the second round of the president election July 10, 1994.⁷⁵

Kuchma win because of the great language and cultural divide and a desire for closer relations with Russia? Or did Kuchma have a better, more organized, more dedicated campaign organization? V. Filenko, head of Nova Ukraina,

supported Kuchma accounting for part of the increased vote in Kharkiv. In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections when Communist candidates were elected in the Donbas, Kuchma's electoral strength in the Donbas and his pledge of economic reforms indicate that the electorate were voting for economic improvement, not ideology.

The above data on the 1994 presidential election challenges the assumption that the linguistic divide threatens Ukraine's territorial integrity or internal stability or its independence. Ukraine is a stable, several-decades-old multiethnic administrative territorial entity with an established elite, normal regional diversity, and a new political tradition of changing governments through parliamentary and presidential elections. In Ukraine, as in Canada, regional diversity is expressed during political debates on government policy and during federal elections. As in other countries, Ukraine's diversity is the product of history, economic development, settlement patterns, and regional issues. Ukraine's diversity has contributed to the debate on national identity. Western Ukrainians fear Russia's intentions, are focused on nation- and state-building efforts, and regard the Ukrainian language as a prime national identity marker. Eastern Ukrainians should not be compartmentized as Russian speakers and ethnic Russians as they exhibit multi-layered national identity markers. They have been conditioned over the centuries to speak the Russian language and are relaxed in their dealings with Russians. Ukraine's independence is not in jeopardy from ethnic Russians living in Ukraine as they exhibit a strong

⁷⁵ Compiled from: IFES, *Election Results of the First Round of the President Election June 26, 1994*, and *Election Results of the Second Round of the President Election July 10, 1994*.

territorial identity and loyalty while possessing weak ethnic identity ties with Russians in other CIS countries. Language use should not be regarded as an indicator of national loyalty but a means of communication as the Ukrainian language in time replaces Russian. Through diversity there is unity, and the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract enabled Ukraine's diversity to be utilized to enhance Ukraine's nation- and state-building efforts through the inclusion of all citizens and regions.

Chapter 5

FORMATION OF UKRAINE'S MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

A "state is not a state without armed forces." [Prime Minister Fokin]¹

Introduction

Ukraine's military and security forces, with the approval of Communist and national-democratic parliamentarians, were formed from nationalized Soviet units stationed on Ukrainian territory through an oath of allegiance to Ukraine,² and the transfer of ownership and control of all non-strategic military and security assets,³ rather than establishing them from zero.⁴ Temporary difficulties were encountered with the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the

¹ Bohdan Nahyalo, "Ukrainian Reaction to Creation of Russian Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 53 (17 March 1992).

² Oleksandra Klymenko, "Lotchyky prysiahnuly Ukraini," *Holos Ukrainy* 3 (253) (9 January 1992), 1, 9, shows soldiers talking their oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

³ For a partial list of the military equipment Ukraine inherited see: H. M. Perepelytsia, *Beziadernyi status i natsionalna bezpeka Ukrainy, Serii 'Voienna bezpeka'*, vypusk 6 (Kyiv: Rada natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy, 1998), 9-13.

⁴ Mark von Hagen, "The Legacy of the Soviet Army for Ukraine's Armed Forces," in *The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine's Armed Forces*, Conference Proceedings 12-13 May 1994 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies, 1995), 39-57; John S. Jaworsky, "The Transition from a Soviet Military in Ukraine to a Ukrainian Military" in *The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine's Armed Forces*, 62-76; John W.R. Lepingwell, "New States and Old Soldiers: Civil-Military Relations in the Former Soviet Union," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, ed. John W. Blaney (Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1995), 57-76;

disposal of nuclear weapons, but were resolved peacefully. Article 9 of Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration⁵ (16 July 1990) authorized the establishment of military and security forces, but no action was taken until after Ukraine's declaration of independence. The planning phase for the formation of the Ukrainian armed forces lasted from 24 August 1991 to December 1991. In January 1992, following the approval by all CIS leaders, Ukraine nationalized all the multiethnic Soviet military units on its territory. Due to its geo-military position on the western front line of Soviet defense, Ukraine inherited some of the best-trained troops, equipped with the most sophisticated equipment, and an elaborate military-industrial infrastructure.⁶

Nationalizing Soviet military and security forces contributed to Ukraine's internal stability and territorial integrity by removing the possibility of Russian controlled CIS land and air units being stationed in Ukraine. Prior to independence, parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk did not advocate the formation of the Ukrainian armed forces when he repeatedly refused to sign a new union treaty and demanded greater political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine. The Communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada only agreed to establish a

Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (N.Y. and Cambridge, U.K.: University of Cambridge Press, 1994), 245-250.

⁵ "Deklaratsiia: pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy," in *Novi zakony Ukrainy*, uchbovyi posibnyk vypusk 1, ed. V.F. Opryshko, S.E. Demsky and A.V. Hapon (Kyiv: Ukrainaska asotsiatsiia vykladachiv prava, 1991), 5-7.

⁶ Stephen D. Olynyk, "Emerging Post-Soviet Armies: The Case of Ukraine," *Military Review* 74/3 (March 1994), p. 5, 14p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 00264148) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Ukraine, Russia, and the West," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44/1 (Jan/Feb 1997), p. 27, 8p. Retrieved March 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 10758216) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Stephen D. Olynyk, "Ukraine as a Military Power," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 69-93.

permanent parliamentary commission on security (24 April 1991).⁷ It was the national-democratic organizations like Rukh, the Republican Party,⁸ and the Congress of Officers of Ukraine that promoted and lobbied for the formation of the Ukrainian army,⁹ joined by striking students (October 1990) who demanded military service be restricted to within Ukraine.¹⁰ Only after Ukraine declared independence did Speaker Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada consider establishing a Ukrainian National Guard and asserting control over Soviet troops stationed in Ukraine,¹¹ having been sensitized to how highly vulnerable they and Ukraine were to events directed from Moscow.¹² President Hrushevsky's rejection of the military protection offered by Ukrainian army regiments stationed in Kyiv had left the Central Rada and the Ukrainian National Republic defenseless when Lenin's Bolsheviks attacked.¹³ Contemporary Ukraine, by possessing its own military and security forces would remove Moscow's control of former Soviet coercive organs stationed in Ukraine.

Planning the nationalization of Soviet military forces on Ukrainian territory commenced with Ukraine's declaration of independence.¹⁴ The Verkhovna

⁷ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukraine Appoints Defense Commission," *RFE/RL* 81 (26 April 1991).

⁸ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukrainian Army under Discussion," *RFE/RL* 24 (4 February 1991).

⁹ Kathy Mihalishko, "Congress of Ukrainian Officers for a National Army," *RFE/RL* 141 (26 July 1991) and "Congress of Officers of Ukraine Ends," *RFE/RL* 143 (30 July 1991).

¹⁰ "Iz kontseptsii oborony ta budivnytstva zbroinykh syl Ukrainy, skhvalenoi Verkhovnoiu Radoiu Ukrainy," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N.M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: "Vyscha shkola", 2000), 200-201.

¹¹ Natalie Melnychuk, "Ukraine to Consider National Guard, Control over Army," *RFE/RL* 160 (23 August 1991).

¹² Natalie Melnychuk, "Soviet Troops Move into Kiev," *RFE/RL* 158 (21 August 1991).

¹³ Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 139.

¹⁴ John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability* McNair Paper 42 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, August 1995), 56-59; Borys Savchuk, *Zbroini Syly Ukrainy: etapy vichnoho pokhodu* (Rivne: Derzhavne redaktsiino-

Rada voted to place all Soviet armed forces in Ukraine under its control and jurisdiction and designated parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk as commander-in-chief with special powers equivalent to those of a president.¹⁵ In September 1991, as the anti-coup upheaval continued in Moscow, Speaker Kravchuk met with the commanders of Ukraine's three military districts and the Black Sea Fleet and received their support to transfer all military units and their personnel stationed in Ukraine under the Verkhovna Rada's jurisdiction.¹⁶ In turn, the Verkhovna Rada guaranteed to honor the continuation of existing benefits and privileges, including pensions, for military personnel, and guaranteed that there would be no discrimination based on ethnicity.¹⁷ During this phase, the Soviet military elite was offered and accepted inclusion into Ukraine's elite and protection from the anti-coup purges that their military colleagues underwent in President Yeltsin's Russia.¹⁸ While still under *de facto* USSR command, their actions demonstrated no military opposition towards Ukraine's declaration of independence, and military personnel participated in the 1 December 1991 independence referendum approving the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract and were bound by its results.¹⁹

vydavnyche pidpriemstvo, 1992), 46-81; Bohdan Yakymovych, *Zbroini sily Ukrainy: narys istorii* (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha, 1996), 226-295.

¹⁵ V. Portnikov, "The Ukraine Proclaims Independence," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (27 August 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP*, 43/35, 12.

¹⁶ S. Tsikora, "Ukraine Creates Its Own Army," *Izvestiia* (4 September 1991), 1, as reported in *CDSP* 43/36, 18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ A. Roxburgh and agencies Moscow, "Heads Start to Roll as Political Purge Begins in Moscow," *The Manchester Guardian* (24 August 1991), 2, 28; F.X. Clines, "Yeltsin is Routing Communist Party from Key Roles throughout Russia; He Forces Vast Gorbachev Shake-Up," *The New York Times* (24 August 1991), A1, A4.

¹⁹ Rukh supporters and pro-independence university students told the writer that they were worried that the military would vote against independence but were pleased that the military voted for independence.

General Kostiantyn Morozov²⁰ was appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister on 3 September 1991²¹ and in October he announced that a defense council and a general staff would be formed to oversee the two year process for transforming Soviet military units into Ukrainian military forces.²² From September to December, Morozov and his team worked to establish the infrastructure, determine the logistics, and obtain an officer consensus that enabled a smooth, peaceful, and negotiated transition from Soviet to Ukrainian land and air forces while simultaneously reassuring Ukraine's neighbors that Ukraine's military forces would be defensively oriented.²³ Estimates vary but it is generally assumed that stationed on Ukrainian territory were over 720,000²⁴ Soviet military personnel commanded by predominantly ethnic Russian officers.²⁵ In October 1991, the Ukrainian Cabinet approved the formation of a

²⁰ Colonel General Kostiantyn Morozov was appointed Defense Minister (3 September 1991) and a permanent member of the Council of National Security of Ukraine (1 July 1992). In 1988 he had been Commander of the 17th Air Force Army stationed in Ukraine. He resigned 4 October 1993 in protest over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the possible stationing of Russian naval personnel on Ukrainian soil. His mother was ethnic Ukrainian and his father ethnic Russian. For Morozov's views see, Kostiantyn Morozov, "Ukrainian Independence in the International Context," *Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine* 2/1 (January-February 1995), Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Retrieved 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>.

²¹ Stephen Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/25 (18 June 1993), 61.

²² Kostiantyn Morozov, "Current Ukrainian Military Policy and Issues in its Formulation," in *The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine's Armed Forces*, 25-38; Kathy Mihalisko, "Morozov: Ukraine Should Have Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 189 (4 October 1991) and "Morozov on Concept of Ukrainian Army," *RFE/RL* 198 (17 October 1991).

²³ Kathy Mihalisko, "Morozov: Ukrainian Force No Threat to Neighbors," *RFE/RL* 34 (19 February 1992); John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability* McNair Paper 42, 56-59.

²⁴ John Jaworsky refers to '800,000 individuals in military uniform' in his *Ukraine: Stability and Instability*, 55, while he uses '750,000 individuals' in his "Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy"; Ustina Markus refers to 726,000 in her "Recent Defense Developments in Ukraine," 26; Stephen Foye quotes Morozov on page 62 as saying there were 726,000 and 720,000 servicemen in Ukraine while on page 61 Foye refers to 'half a million Soviet soldiers' stationed in Ukraine in his "Civilian-Military Tension in Ukraine."

²⁵ Stephen Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/25 (18 June 1993), 63.

450,000 Ukrainian army,²⁶ while the Verkhovna Rada extended Ukrainian jurisdiction over railroad, government communications, and civil defense military forces in Ukraine,²⁷ and legislated the creation of a Ukrainian army, navy, air force, national guard, and border troops.²⁸ In November, Speaker Kravchuk met with representatives of the Kyiv Military District to discuss plans for the formation of the Ukrainian armed forces while Defense Minister Morozov addressed the independent Union of Officers of Ukraine Second Congress (2 November 1991).²⁹ Political support for a Ukrainian military force inspired some military units stationed in Ukraine to offer to swear an oath of loyalty to Ukraine and subordinate themselves to the Verkhovna Rada,³⁰ while support for the creation of republic armed forces was expressed from within the Soviet Ministry of Defense.³¹

The Soviet military elite at their assembly in Moscow on 10-11 December 1991 approved the disintegration of the USSR into its republic parts and the future formation of national armies from the Soviet armed forces.³² On 10

²⁶ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine Plans to Create Army of 450,000," *RFE/RL* (8 October 1991).

²⁷ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukraine Asserts Authority over Railroad and Civil Defense Troops," *RFE/RL* 199 (18 October 1991).

²⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "Draft Laws on Ukrainian Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 202 (23 October 1991) and "Morozov Responds to Shaposhnikov," *RFE/RL* 201 (22 October 1991); Kathy Mihalisko, "Kiev Adopts Law on National Guard," *RFE/RL* 210 (5 November 1991) and "Ukrainian Presidium on Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 224 (26 November 1991).

²⁹ Kathy Mihalisko, "Kravchuk on Ukrainian Army," and "Officers for a Ukrainian Army," *RFE/RL* 209 (4 November 1991).

³⁰ Kathy Mihalisko, "Carpathian Military Regiment Wants to Serve Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 188 (2 October 1991) and "48th Army Division Refuses to Budge from Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 197 (16 October 1991).

³¹ Roman Solchanyk, "Soviet Generals Agree to Ukrainian Army," *RFE/RL* 204 (25 October 1991).

³² Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Wins Army's Support?" and "A Problematic Alliance," *RFE/RL* 235 (12 December 1991); Doug Clarke, "Gorbachev Still Controls Soviet Nukes," *RFE/RL* 235 (12 December 1991); Ann Sheehy, "Gorbachev and Yeltsin Meet," *RFE/RL* 235 (12 December 1991); Stephen Foye, "Gorbachev's Appeal to Army," *RFE/RL* (13 December 1991).

December USSR President Gorbachev had met with senior military commanders from the USSR Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and all heads of military districts and fleets, and military representatives from the former Soviet republics, while Russian President Yeltsin met with them on 11 December.³³ Russian President Yeltsin won their support for his CIS agreement, preventing the possibility of the Soviet armed forces splitting along pro-USSR and pro-CIS lines.³⁴ Military approval assured the peaceful demise of the USSR, Ukraine's independence, and the formation of Ukrainian armed forces from Soviet conventional forces.

At their Minsk meeting (30 December 1991), CIS leaders approved the right for each republic to establish its own national armed forces from former Soviet units³⁵ but disagreed on security issues.³⁶ They agreed to place strategic forces under a unified CIS command and under Russian control, with 'strategic forces' deliberately vaguely defined³⁷ to diplomatically accommodate Russian and Ukrainian positions. A broad definition of strategic would benefit Russia, allowing Russian control of CIS forces stationed throughout the CIS geo-military space and possible future ownership should CIS forces be transformed into the Russian armed forces. Russian expectations of its share

³³ Stephen Foye, "Gorbachev, Yeltsin Meet with Commanders," and "Who is Commander-in-Chief," and "Turmoil in the Defense Ministry," *RFE/RL* 234 (11 December 1991); Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin to meet Commanders before Assembly," *RFE/RL* 8 (4 January 1992) and "All-Army Officers' Assembly," *RFE/RL* 11 (17 January 1992) and "Poll: Officers Support CIS," *RFE/RL* 12 (20 January 1992).

³⁴ 52% of officer delegates supported the CIS while 35% did not. 67% wanted the armed forces united. 95% wanted a transitional period if the forces were to be divided. Stephen Foye, "Poll: Officers Support CIS," *RFE/RL* 12 (20 January 1992).

³⁵ Doug Clarke, "Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces," and Stephen Foye, "CIS Leaders Stumble Over United Army," *RFE/RL* 1 (2 January 1992).

³⁶ Stephen Foye, "Disagreement on Defense," *RFE/RL* 244 (30 December 1991).

of the Soviet armed forces is evident from the February 1992 plan prepared by the CIS military command that allotted two-thirds of Soviet land and air forces to Russia with the balance to be distributed among other republics.³⁸ Ukraine's narrow definition of strategic diminished the need for Russian controlled CIS troops to be stationed on Ukrainian territory and expanded Ukraine's ownership claims to Soviet units stationed in Ukraine.

Ukraine's Land and Air Forces

The CIS agreement signed at Minsk (8 December 1991) specified a "common military-strategic space under joint command, including single control of nuclear arms," but the Verkhovna Rada prior to ratification amended article 6 to permit Ukraine to establish its own armed forces as per article 9 of Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration.³⁹ Ukraine wanted to control all military and security forces on its territory to protect its independence and territorial integrity. Russia wanted to exert influence over the CIS space and advocated the formation of a unified CIS military command under the joint control of the CIS Heads of State Council but in reality under the control of Russian President Yeltsin through a CIS military command structure dominated by ethnic-Russian officers.⁴⁰ Without the use of military force it was impossible for Russia to impose its will

³⁷ Doug Clarke, "Another Strategic Agreement Signed," *RFE/RL* 32 (17 February 1992).

³⁸ Stephen Foye, "CIS Defense Changes," *RFE/RL* 27 (10 February 1992).

³⁹ "Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States," and "Reservations of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine to the Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Ukraine in the World, special issue 20 (1996), Appendix B and C, 297-301, 302-304.

upon Ukraine, while the use of military force would destabilize and undermine the status of the elite in both countries. The nationalization of Soviet air and land units stationed throughout Ukraine was assisted by the fact that, unlike the Black Sea Fleet, Soviet land and air units were not under a singular unified military command structure but divided into three separate military command districts and under a multi-hierarchical command structure.

President Kravchuk (13 December 1991) decreed himself as commander-in-chief and decreed the establishment of the Ukrainian armed forces out of former units of the Soviet army, navy, and air force.⁴¹ But before he did that, Ukraine's independence referendum was held, the CIS established, the Act that created the USSR had been annulled, and the officer assembly in Moscow had endorsed the CIS and the creation of national armies. Prior to Ukraine's referendum vote, Soviet military officials in Moscow were willing, in principle, to partially accommodate Ukraine's insistence on establishing its own conventional army.⁴² Soviet Defense Minister Shaposhnikov dispatched a high-level team under General Piankov to Kyiv to negotiate retention of unified CIS control over broadly defined 'strategic forces'.⁴³ At the CIS Minsk meeting (30 December 1991), Ukraine and Russia agreed to set up a panel of experts headed by General Piankov to resolve their defense disputes, and agreed that

⁴⁰ Stephen Foye, "End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?" *RFE/RL Research Report 2/27* (2 July 1993), 45-46.

⁴¹ Kathy Mihalisko, "Kravchuk Decree on Ukrainian Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 236 (13 Dec 1991).

⁴² Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukraine Headed for Military Agreement with Kremlin?" *RFE/RL* 215 (12 November 1991).

⁴³ Stephen Foye, "Military Delegation in Kiev," *RFE/RL* 239 (18 December 1991) and "General on Ukrainian Military Plans," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

in Ukraine there were strategic and non-strategic military units stationed.⁴⁴ General Piankov returned to Kyiv on 2 January 1992 to continue negotiations, emphasizing a peaceful and civilized separation while noting that Ukraine's strategic geopolitical position had endowed it with some of the best Soviet troops and facilities.⁴⁵ On 3 January 1992, Ukraine took over all non-strategic forces on Ukrainian territory through an oath of allegiance to Ukraine,⁴⁶ and proceeded to cut military communication links between commanders in Ukraine and their former commanders in Moscow.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the CIS command announced (20 January 1992) its willingness to assist republics to establish their own conventional armed forces as agreed to by the Minsk CIS Heads of State agreement (30 December).⁴⁸

Through bilateral negotiations between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk⁴⁹ and during the Minsk CIS Heads of State meeting (15 February 1992)⁵⁰ the status and a narrower definition of strategic armed forces was

⁴⁴ Stephen Foye, "Ukraine, Russia Reach Compromise on Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 7 (13 January 1992).

⁴⁵ Stephen Foye, "Pyankov to Kiev," *RFE/RL* 2 (3 January 1992) and "Pyankov on Dividing Up the Troops," *RFE/RL* 48 (10 March 1992).

⁴⁶ "Zvemennia: Do viiskovosluzhbovtziv, iaki prokhodiat sluzhbu na terytorii Ukrainy ta za ii mezhamy: prezident Ukrainy Holovnokomanduiuchy Zbroiny Sylamy L. Kravchuk," *Holos Ukrainy* 3 (253), (9 January 1992), 3; "Ukaz prezidenta Ukrainy: Pro poriadok realizatsii viiskamy Zbroinykh Syl na terytorii Ukrainy materialnykh zasobiv, tekhniky, ozbroiennia i nerukhomosti," signed by President L. Kravchuk on 31 December 1991, *Holos Ukrainy* 4 (254), (10 January 1992), 2; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine Takes Control of Armed Forces on Its Territory," *RFE/RL* 2 (3 January 1992); Kathy Mihalisko, "Kravchuk and High Command Set Schedule for Military Oath," and "Parliament to Discuss Ukraine's Military Doctrine," *RFE/RL* 4 (8 January 1992).

⁴⁷ Kathy Mihalisko, "Defense Communications between Moscow and Kiev Cut?" *RFE/RL* 6 (10 January 1992).

⁴⁸ Stephen Foye, "Military Spokesman on Future of Army," *REF/RL* 13 (21 January 1992).

⁴⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "Yeltsin Proposes Ukrainian-Russian Summit," *RFE/RL* 27 (10 February 1992).

⁵⁰ Doug Clarke, "Another Strategic Agreement Signed," *RFE/RL* 32 (17 February 1992).

clarified.⁵¹ The narrower definition of strategic forces included Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Force and Navy nuclear delivery components, ballistic missile warning systems, anti-missile defense system, and parts of the space force, but the issue of Ukrainian administrative control over strategic forces remained unresolved.⁵² By this time, Ukraine had distinguished between the aircraft and the nuclear weapons the aircraft carried, with the aircraft being Ukrainian assets while the nuclear weapons were CIS controlled. The issue of Ukraine's administrative control over strategic forces became central after Russian airmen stationed in Ukraine illegally flew aircraft to Russia. Markus writes that Russia encouraged and even ordered aircraft to be flown from Ukraine to Russia during 1992.⁵³

Ukraine had inherited over 1,100 Soviet combat aircraft,⁵⁴ twenty Il-78 tanker airplanes, plus 270 additional combat aircraft, including Tu-95 'Bear' long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles and bombs.⁵⁵ In February 1992, Russian airmen stationed near Kyiv (Uzyn) having refused to swear an oath of allegiance to Ukraine flew their six SU-24 Fencer jet bombers to Russia⁵⁶ while six strategic bombers had left Stryi (Western Ukraine) for

⁵¹ Doug Clarke, "Progress with Russian/Ukraine Agreement on Forces," *RFE/RL* 34 (19 February 1992).

⁵² Doug Clarke, "CIS Strategic Forces Redefined," *RFE/RL* 101 (27 May 1992).

⁵² Stephen Foye, "Defense Ministers Fail to Remove Tensions," *RFE/RL* 126 (6 July 1992); Doug Clarke, "Ukraine, Russia Differ on Strategic Troops," *RFE/RL* 102 (29 May 1992).

⁵³ Ustina Markus, "Ukraine Restructures Its Air Forces: New Role, New Problems," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/42* (22 October 1993), 49.

⁵⁴ The combat aircraft included Tu-16s, Tu-22s, Tu-26s, Su-24s, Su-25s, Su-27, MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-29s, Yak-28s, and L-39/I-29 trainers.

⁵⁵ Ustina Markus, "Ukraine Restructures Its Air Forces: New Roles, New Problems," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/42* (22 October 1993), 48-49.

⁵⁶ Doug Clarke, "Russian Pilots 'Defect' from Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 32 (17 February 1992).

Belarus and never returned.⁵⁷ On 17 February 1992, President Kravchuk protested to President Yeltsin demanding that the aircrews, the six long-range bombers and the regimental banner be returned,⁵⁸ while the Ukrainian parliamentary newspaper, *Holos Ukrainy*, hinted that the incident was a Russian plot.⁵⁹ Dividing the jurisdiction and control over strategic and non-strategic forces resulted in the military personnel of the tanker aircraft regiment and divisional headquarters at the strategic airbase at Uzyn swearing an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, while the crews of the 21 strategic bombers stationed there remained under CIS command. To protect its aircraft property, Ukraine asserted the right of administrative control over strategic forces while acknowledging CIS operational control. This required the First Strategic Air Division at Uzyn to swear allegiance to Ukraine, resulting in the CIS commander of long-range strategic aviation firing the division commander, and President Kravchuk annulling the firing.⁶⁰ In March 1992, Defense Minister Morozov and the division leaders succeeded in removing from the list of CIS strategic forces the regiment of refueling IL-78 aircraft tankers,⁶¹ enabling Ukraine to assert jurisdiction over the airbase and its property.

The nationalization of former Soviet forces on Ukrainian territory resulted in a transfer of allegiance from Moscow to Kyiv, in President Kravchuk appointing new top commanders, and in the downsizing of the armed forces.

⁵⁷ Doug Clarke, "More Air Force Bombers flee Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 65 (2 April 1992).

⁵⁸ Kathy Mihalisko, "Kravchuk Demands Return of Bombers," *RFE/RL* 33 (18 February 1992).

⁵⁹ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukrainian Paper Senses Moscow Plot in 'Defection' of Bomber Pilots," *RFE/RL* 35 (20 February 1992).

But there was no apparent internal restructuring or reforms of the armed forces and little increased use of the Ukrainian language, especially after Morozov's resignation. Upon becoming commander-in-chief, President Kravchuk appointed (28 January 1992) new commanders in Ukraine's three military districts, dismissing the CIS appointed commanders,⁶² followed by the appointment (5 June 1992) of six generals (five Ukrainian and one Belarusian) to top positions within the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.⁶³ Periodic personnel changes took place as in February 1993 when Lt. Gen. V. Antonets was appointed commander of a united Air Force with two deputy commanders: Lt. Gen. V. Vasilev, commander of Aviation Forces, and Lt. Gen. M. Lopatin, commander of Air Defense Forces.⁶⁴ Some restructuring took place, as in 1992 when Morozov disbanded one of the three operational groups within the Kyiv Military District,⁶⁵ and combined into a single Air Defense Troops branch the existing Air Force and Air Defense Forces.⁶⁶

There was no redeployment of military forces within Ukraine to meet its new security requirements, nor tight control over its military equipment. Ukraine inherited from the Soviet era a disproportionate deployment of military personnel, equipment, and bases facing the western borders, with none

⁶⁰ Doug Clarke, "Air Division Opts for Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 33 (18 February 1992) and "Update on Defecting Pilots, Air Division," *REF/RL* 19 February 1992); Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukraine Clarifies Position on Strategic Airbase," *RFE/RL* 34 (19 February 1992).

⁶¹ Doug Clarke, "Ukraine Takes over Strategic Tankers," *RFE/RL* 50 (12 March 1992).

⁶² Kathy Mihalisko, "Kravchuk Replaces Three Military District Commanders," *RFE/RL* 19 (29 January 1992).

⁶³ Stephen Foye, "Kravchuk Fills Defense Ministry Posts," *RFE/RL* 108 (9 June 1992).

⁶⁴ Stephen Foye, "Defense Reforms," *RFE/RL* 33 (18 February 1993).

⁶⁵ Stephen Foye, "Ukrainian Defense Developments, Problem," *RFE/RL* 212 (3 November 1992).

⁶⁶ Stephen Foye, "Morozov on Ukrainian Military Reform," *RFE/RL* 180 (18 September 1992).

defending Ukraine from Russia.⁶⁷ Lack of funds made it difficult to establish new bases and deploy troops and equipment to the eastern and northern borders, and such an act would have annoyed Russia. As John Jaworsky writes, the problem was compounded, because Ukraine lacked an inventory of equipment and personnel stationed on its territory at the time of independence while there was a massive movement of military equipment from Ukraine to Russia during 1991-92 along with a massive theft of military equipment. Ukraine also lacked funds to pay wages, repair existing equipment, or purchase new equipment. Very significantly, Jaworsky notes that there was no medium or long-range planning that accompanied downsizing, that restructuring was nothing more than random downsizing. He notes that Ukraine has underutilized military-educational institutions,⁶⁸ and has great difficulties in utilizing the massive military-industrial complex⁶⁹ due to its dependence upon component parts from other republics, especially Russia. A National Security Council had been established in July 1992 to coordinate security policy but as of July 1993 the Council's status remained uncertain.⁷⁰

During the Soviet era, the armed forces enjoyed a privileged status with civilian needs subordinated to military requirements. When Ukraine

⁶⁷ John Jaworsky, "Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* special issue 20 (1996), 223-247.

⁶⁸ For a list of military-education institutions, see Stephen D. Olynyk, "Emerging Post-Soviet Armies: The Case of Ukraine," *Military Review* 74/3 (March 1994).

⁶⁹ In November 1991, Speaker Kravchuk had claimed there were 1,330 enterprises of the military-industrial complex in Ukraine. Alexander Rahr, "Military Installations in Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 212 (7 November 1991).

⁷⁰ Stephen Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/25 (18 June 1993), 60-61.

established its armed forces it had assumed funding for them (January 1992)⁷¹ but by February 1994, military authorities reported that the Ukrainian army was barely surviving, having received less than 10% of funds allotted.⁷² With independence, Ukraine's military entered a period of unorganized downsizing, reduced draft terms for conscripts,⁷³ draft evasion, and financial under-funding that resulted in soldiers being rented out to work on construction projects, farms, and as guards to obtain funds or through barter acquire food, utilities, and shelter for the military. The Deputy General Procurator of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported in August 1993 widespread corruption and crime in the military, increased *dedovshchina* (hazing and harassment) that caused three deaths and forty suicides, while 7000 deserted.⁷⁴ The older, more conservative officers retained their positions, while the younger, more ambitious, and best-qualified officers left the service.⁷⁵ Older officers tended to be more conservative in their political and economic orientation hindering internal reforms and perpetuating the retention of Soviet military characteristics.

With independence and the suspension of the Communist Party the military was depoliticized. Under Defense Minister Morozov, to promote the Ukrainian language and infuse a spirit of Ukrainian nationalism among the troops, the Social-Psychological Service was established much to the annoyance of some officers. Efforts at promoting the Ukrainian language within

⁷¹ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukraine Footing the Military Bill," *RFE/RL* 8 (14 January 1992).

⁷² Ustina Markus, "Financial Woes in Ukraine's Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 33 (17 February 1994).

⁷³ Kathy Mihalisko, "Length of Military Duty in Ukraine Cut to 18 Months," *RFE/RL* 23 (4 February 1992).

⁷⁴ John Lepingwell, "Crime Rate Rises in Ukrainian Military," *RFE/RL* 154 (13 August 1993).

the military suffered a setback when General Radetsky, a Russian-speaker, replaced Defense Minister Morozov. One of Radetsky's first tasks was to restructure the Social-Psychological Service by replacing General Mulyava with General Kobzar as head of the Social-Psychological Service.⁷⁶ Under General Kobzar the linguistic ukrainianization of the military forces suffered a setback.

Ethnic Russians dominated the upper ranks of the Soviet armed forces stationed in Ukraine, with the majority swearing the oath of loyalty to Ukraine. Some did not. Some retired, while others were transferred to other republics. In June 1993, Morozov ordered the removal from Ukraine of over 6,000 officers who failed to take the oath of loyalty to Ukraine while complaining that Moscow was not honoring the agreement to transfer ethnic Ukrainian officers to Ukraine.⁷⁷ To encourage the return of ethnic Ukrainian officers stationed in other CIS countries, a conference was held in Kyiv on 25-26 January 1992 organized by the Union of Officers of Ukraine and attended by ethnic Ukrainian officers presently serving outside of Ukraine.⁷⁸ In addition to their loyalty to Ukraine, officers were partially influenced by material considerations including expectations of Ukraine's future prosperity. Under the Soviet system salaries and remuneration were given in kind, not cash, and continued into retirement with retired officers continuing to use military accommodation, shops, hospitals,

⁷⁵ Stephen Foye, "The Armed Forces of the CIS: Legacies and Strategies," *RFE/RL* 3/1 (7 January 1994), 18-19.

⁷⁶ Zenon Kohut, "Making the Ukrainian Armed Forces Ukrainian: The Role of National (Non-Soviet Military Traditions)," in *The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History*, Conference Proceedings, 12-13 May 1994, 1-21; Ustina Markus, "Recent Defense Developments in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/4 (28 January 1994), 27-28.

⁷⁷ Stephen Foye, "Morozov on Ukrainian Defense Developments," *RFE/RL* 108 (9 June 1992) and "Officers to be Transferred from Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 111 (12 June 1992).

⁷⁸ Kathy Mihalisko, "Expatriate Officers Meet in Kyiv," *RFE/RL* 18 (28 January 1992).

and transport.⁷⁹ With the massive influx of Soviet troops returning from Central and Eastern Europe, mainly to Russia and Ukraine, accommodation shortages were a serious problem and a consideration in decisions made by officers.

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE]

Under article 12 of the Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, all the former Soviet republics agreed to fulfill all the international obligations, treaties, and agreements of the former USSR. The 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, and the June 1991 USA-USSR agreement dealing with the elimination of a quarter of the equipment situated east of the Urals (about 14,500 tanks, armored personnel vehicles, and artillery systems),⁸⁰ were threatened by the Russia-Ukraine dispute over the division of military equipment. Ukraine by its strategic geopolitical position had been home to a disproportionate amount of sophisticated Soviet military equipment and elite troops when the CFE was signed; meaning that under the terms of the treaty Ukraine would possess more military equipment than Russia west of the Urals.⁸¹ This complicated dividing up the Soviet non-strategic military forces within CFE guidelines. At the Tashkent CIS meeting, the Heads of State Council reached an agreement to divide up the weapons quotas to meet the

⁷⁹ Christopher Donnelly, "Evolutionary Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces," *Survival* 34/3 (Autumn 1992), 34-35.

⁸⁰ Stephen Foye, "CFE Compromise Approved," *RFE/RL* 113 (17 June 1991).

⁸¹ Stephen Foye, "Problems on CFE," and "Kobets on CFE and Division of Army," *RFE/RL* 29 (12 February 1992).

terms of the CFE guidelines,⁸² Russia keeping 54%, Ukraine 27% and Belarus 12%.⁸³ In July 1992, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the CFE treaty that allowed Ukraine to maintain the second largest army in Europe.⁸⁴ Following Ukraine's ratification of the CFE treaty, the Russian parliament ratified it on 8 July, and also by parliamentary resolution accepted responsibility for the USSR's biological and chemical weapons.⁸⁵ On 10 July 1992, in Helsinki, Ukraine joined twenty-nine states in formally signing the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.⁸⁶ The CFE treaty came into force in Ukraine on 17 July followed by French military inspectors arriving in Ukraine to conduct verification inspections of installations in Donetsk.⁸⁷ Between 18 August and 18 September 1992, Ukraine began CFE mandated weapons reductions to destroy some 2,450 tanks, 2,220 armored combat vehicles, and large caliber artillery pieces.⁸⁸ On 9 November 1992, after Belarus and Kazakhstan finally signed, the CFE treaty formally entered into force.⁸⁹ On 4 February 1993, Ukraine started converting military tanks for civilian use under the CFE treaty guidelines and international monitoring.⁹⁰

⁸² Doug Clarke, "Chief of Staff Says Agreement Reached on CFE," *RFE/RL* 95 (19 May 1992).

⁸³ Doug Clarke, "NATO Given Conventional Arms Figures," *RFE/RL* 100 (26 May 1992).

⁸⁴ Stephen Foye, "Ukraine: Ratifies CFE; on Army," *RFE/RL* 125 (3 July 1992).

⁸⁵ Stephen Foye, "Russian Parliament Ratifies CFE," *RFE/RL* 129 (9 July 1992).

⁸⁶ Stephen Foye, "CIS States Sign CFE Agreement," *RFE/RL* 131 (13 July 1992).

⁸⁷ Chris Hummel, "French Military Inspectors Arrive in Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 138 (22 July 1992).

⁸⁸ Stephen Foye, "Ukraine to Begin Destroying Conventional Arms," *RFE/RL* 157 (18 August 1992); Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine Disarming," *RFE/RL* 26 (8 February 1994).

⁸⁹ Doug Clarke, "Conventional Arms Treaty Becomes Law," *RFE/RL* 217 (10 November 1992).

⁹⁰ John Lepingwell, "Ukraine Converting Tanks under CFE Accord," *RFE/RL* 24 (5 February 1993).

Thus, nationalizing Soviet land and air forces stationed in Ukraine proceeded smoothly with the full support of the national-democratic parliamentarians and despite the predominance of ethnic Russian officers. All the CIS leaders, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Soviet officer assembly in Moscow had all approved the formation of national armies from Soviet forces before Ukraine cautiously nationalized them. The planning phase to establish the Ukrainian military (August to December 1991) appears to have been totally focused on nationalizing and not on restructuring and reforming the military to serve Ukraine's needs. Downsizing was random, determined by lack of funding and not by military efficiency requirements. Former Soviet officers, with minor changes at the upper echelon, remained and perpetuated the Soviet experience. Ukraine's geo-military position had insured that some of the best-trained Soviet troops and most sophisticated military equipment were situated in Ukraine and easily nationalized but adjusted to comply with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. While the highly sophisticated and lethal aircraft were nationalized without incident, the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet became a major political issue between Ukraine and Russia.

Black Sea Fleet

The nationalization of the conventional Soviet land and air military forces, and the Dnipro River flotilla, had proceeded smoothly, but the efforts to nationalize the Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol encountered stiff

opposition from the naval officers, the CIS military command, Russian President Yeltsin, and the Russian parliament. Ukraine was disadvantaged because the BSF was under a singular hierarchical naval command structure dominated by ethnic Russian naval officers with allies in the Russian government and parliament who wanted to maintain a unified and strong navy under CIS or Russian ownership and control. Under the Minsk (31 December 1991) CIS agreement, Ukraine was allowed to establish its own navy and proceeded to do so by claiming the BSF based on Ukrainian territory and headquartered in Sevastopol. Ukraine regarded the fleet as non-strategic and Ukraine's share of the Soviet Navy that it had financially contributed to build.⁹¹ Russia, through the CIS structure, had already claimed the ships and port facilities of the Soviet Navy based on Russian territory on the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, on the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas,⁹² and now laid claim to the BSF based in Ukraine and Georgia.⁹³

The issues involved in the BSF dispute were complex and emotional, political and military in nature, involving opposite positions on the future structure of the CIS and difficulties in accepting Ukraine's independence. Russian claims to the BSF would deny Ukraine its share of the assets of the Soviet Navy and prevent Ukraine from becoming a naval power while Russia would maintain its self-professed historic role as a great naval power in the Black Sea-Mediterranean Sea region. Russia's claims to the BSF and its port

⁹¹ Valerii Volkovynsky, "20-ti vidbudova Chornomorskoho Flotu," *Holos Ukrainy* 45 (295), (12 March 1992), 1.

⁹² Doug Clarke, "Azerbaijanis to Get Quarter of Caspian Flotilla," *RFE/RL* 75 (16 April 1992).

⁹³ Doug Clarke, "Georgia Wants Part of Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 32 (17 February 1992).

and land-based facilities, which included ships, shipbuilding and repair yards, and naval academies, challenged Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Sevastopol and Crimea as further evidenced by Russian parliamentary resolutions. Should Sevastopol become the homeport of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine would find itself inside Russia's external defense perimeter with Russian naval personnel stationed on its territory.

The assets of the BSF included vessels stationed in Ukrainian ports, and the land-based infrastructure that supported the fleet. In addition to Sevastopol, the BSF used Ukrainian port facilities at Chornomorsk, Donuzlav, Balaklava, and Feodosiia (all in Crimea), and the shipbuilding and repair yards at Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kerch.⁹⁴ Markus estimates the BSF had between 330-440 ships, including 40 major surface ships, 18 submarines, 250 smaller vessels, plus 300 naval aircraft and helicopters with a total of 70,000 personnel.⁹⁵ Lepingwell estimates the BSF personnel between 70,000 and 100,000 and he subdivided the BSF assets into: 1) combatants: 2 guided missile cruisers, 3 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 24 frigates, and 18 submarines; 2) other vessels: 106 coastal, patrol, mine warfare, amphibious vessels with an additional 140 classified as support vessels; 3) naval aviation: 143 fighters, bombers, and tankers; plus 220 fighters and bombers in storage; and 139 specialized mission aircraft and helicopters; 4) land forces: a naval infantry brigade stationed in Sevastopol and

⁹⁴ Ustina Markus, "The Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/18 (6 May 1994), 33.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 33; General-major V. Dudnik, "Ne stoit milliardov flot, stoiashchii i stenki," *Nezavisimost* 42 (13455), (27 May 1992), 7.

a coastal motorized rifle defense division (both subordinated to Ukraine) and an artillery brigade.⁹⁶

The definition of 'strategic' would determine the right of ownership, with Russia advocating a broad definition and Ukraine a narrow definition. Defense Minister Morozov, supported by parliamentarians, was determined to claim the BSF for Ukraine⁹⁷ and on 5 January announced that the BSF was non-strategic, therefore, Ukrainian, and the fleet personnel were expected to take an oath of loyalty to Ukraine.⁹⁸ In response, the CIS command claimed the BSF as strategic with half of its ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons.⁹⁹ A joint Ukrainian-Russian panel of military experts was established in January with the task of defining what portion of the fleet was strategic.¹⁰⁰ As expected, Ukrainians regarded the majority of the fleet as non-strategic, therefore, Ukrainian, while the Russian/CIS side claimed the majority of vessels for the CIS command and Russian control.¹⁰¹ CIS naval commander Chernavin's arrival in Sevastopol (27 January) with orders for the fleet personnel to take an

⁹⁶ John W.R. Lepingwell, "The Black Sea Fleet Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?" *RFE/RL Research Report 2/28* (9 July 1993), 49.

⁹⁷ Kathy Mihalisko, "Morozov: Ukraine Should Have Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 189 (4 October 1991) and "Morozov on Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 227 (2 December 1991); Levko Lukianenko, "Zaiava URP u spavi Chornomorskoho Flotu," dated 7 January 1992, *Holos Ukrainy* 5 (255), (11 January 1992), 3.

⁹⁸ Heorhii Vorotniuk, "Morflot molodoi derzhavy," *Holos Ukrainy* 3 (253), (9 January 1992), 6; Stephen Foye, "Tensions Rise over Control of Army, Fleet," *RFE/RL* 2 (7 January 1992).

⁹⁹ Aleksandr Pilat, "Komu prysiahatymut moriaky-chornomortsyi?" *Holos Ukrainy* 4 (254) (10 January 1992), 5; Valentii Oleksiienko, "Chorne More nam vsmikhnetsia...", *Holos Ukrainy* 5 (255), (11 January 1992), 9; Stephen Foye, "CIS Command Rejects Ukrainian Claim," *RFE/RL* 3 (7 January 1992).

¹⁰⁰ Valentii Lavunsky, "Sevastopol na porozi novoi istorii," *Holos Ukrainy* 13 (263), (28 January 1992), 9; Stephen Foye, "Ukraine, Russia Reach Compromise on Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 7 (13 January 1992); Stephen Foye, "Fleet Talks Launched," *RFE/RL* 8 (14 January 1992); Doug Clarke, "Bargain in the Making over Black Sea Fleet?" *RFE/RL* 5 (9 January 1992).

oath of loyalty to the CIS¹⁰² and President Yeltsin's statement in Novorossisk (28 January) to naval officers that the fleet would remain under CIS jurisdiction intensified the issue.¹⁰³ Emotions were heightened when on 29 January 1992 BSF commander, Admiral Kasatonov, refused to meet with Ukrainian parliamentarians and defense officials who visited Sevastopol and refused them access to the ships.¹⁰⁴

The disputed fleet remained under CIS command, theoretically under the jurisdiction of the CIS Heads of State Council, but Ukrainian and Russian claims quickly transformed the BSF into a Ukraine-Russia bilateral issue to be determined by Ukrainian and Russian experts and by Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin. In April 1992 in support of their positions both presidents issued decrees asserting jurisdiction over the BSF. On 3 April, President Yeltsin warned Ukraine that he would place the BSF under Russian jurisdiction and sent Vice-President Rutskoi to Crimea where Rutskoi's comments infuriated Ukraine's leaders.¹⁰⁵ President Kravchuk (6 April), charging that Rutskoi had directly interfered in Ukraine's internal affairs, signed a decree creating a Ukrainian Navy, and instructed the Ukrainian Defense Ministry to determine which BSF ships would temporarily be assigned to CIS command, thereby

¹⁰¹ Mariia Dmytriienko and Dmytro Tabachnyk, "Chy nakazhe Yeltsyn topyty flot?" *Holos Ukrainy* 3 (253) (9 January 1992), 12; Stephen Foye, "Black Sea Fleet Controversies," *RFE/RL* 9 (15 January 1992) and "Black Sea Fleet Update," *RFE/RL* 16 (24 January 1992).

¹⁰² Stephen Foye, "Black Sea Fleet Oaths of Loyalty," *RFE/RL* 18 (28 January 1992).

¹⁰³ Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Surfaces in Novorossisk," *RFE/RL* 19 (29 January 1992).

¹⁰⁴ Valentii Lavunsky, "Znaiomstvo z kabinetnym Flotom," *Holos Ukrainy* 7 (257), (18 January 1992), 1; Kathy Mihalisko, "Kasatonov Snubs Ukrainian Parliamentarians," *RFE/RL* 20 (30 January 1992).

¹⁰⁵ Doug Clarke, "Black Sea Fleet Developments," *RFE/RL* 67 (6 April 1992).

claiming majority ownership of the fleet for Ukraine.¹⁰⁶ Ukrainian parliamentarians and defense representatives went to Sevastopol in April to explain President Kravchuk's and the Verkhovna Rada's position on the BSF, but BSF Admiral Kasatanov rejected Ukraine's claim to the fleet.¹⁰⁷ President Yeltsin responded (7 April) with a decree asserting Russian jurisdiction and direct control over BSF while ordering negotiations with Ukraine over the basing of ships in Ukrainian ports and the transfer of part of the fleet to Ukraine.¹⁰⁸ The Verkhovna Rada (8 April) condemned Yeltsin's decree as a declaration of war against Ukraine,¹⁰⁹ while Kravchuk repeated that all the ships based in Ukrainian ports belong to Ukraine¹¹⁰ and appointed Rear Admiral Kozhnin as commander of the Ukrainian Navy.¹¹¹ Having asserted their rights to the ownership of the BSF, Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin (9 April) agreed to

¹⁰⁶ "Ukaz prezidenta Ukrainy: Pro nevidkladni zakhody po dudivnytstvu zbroinykh syl Ukrainy," signed by President Kravchuk on 5 April 1992, *Holos Ukrainy* 64 (314), (8 April 1992), 2; "Iz zaiavy prezidii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy shchodo chornomorskoho flotu," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko, 208; Vladimir Skachko, "Borotba za chornomorskii flot - Kravchuk sdela novyi khod, Yeltsyn otvetia," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (8 April 1992), 1, 3; Borys Savchuk, *Zbroini syly Ukrainy: etapy vichnoho pokhodu*, 77-80. Doug Clarke, "More Verbal Salvos over Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 68 (7 April 1992).

¹⁰⁷ Volodymyr Skachko, "Dlia Admirala Kasatonova ukaz prezidenta Ukrainy- ne ukaz?" *Holos Ukrainy* 64 (314), (8 April 1992), 1, 6; Volodymyr Skachko, "Chornomorskyi flot buv, ye i bude. Iak i Chorne More. - 'Otiechestvo' na dumtsi, a na slovakh shcho?" *Holos Ukrainy* 67 (317), 11 April 1992), 1, 3; Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian Delegation in Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 69 (8 April 1992).

¹⁰⁸ Kathy Mihalisko, "Yeltsin Decree on Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 69 (8 April 1992).

¹⁰⁹ "Zaiava Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* 67 (317), (11 April 1992), 2; "Zaiava Prezidii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy shchodo chornomorskoho flotu," *Holos Ukrainy* 63 (313), (7 April 1992), 2; "Zvernennia Derzhavnoi delehatsii Ukrainy na mizhderzhavnykh perehovorakh shchodo chornomorskoho flotu," *Holos Ukrainy* 78 (328), (29 April 1992), 1; Valentii Lavunsky, "Chornomorskii flot: Odeskii raund," *Holos Ukrainy* 78 (328), (29 April 1992), 1, 6.

¹¹⁰ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukrainian Parliament Responds to Yeltsin's Decree," and "Further Ukrainian Reaction," *RFE/RL* 70 (9 April 1992).

¹¹¹ Admiral Kozhnin interview with Volodymyr Skania, "Borus Kozhnin: Ya povazhaiu liudynu i na tsomu stoiu," *Holos Ukrainy* 68 (318), (14 April 1992), 2; Doug Clarke, "Ukraine Names Navy Commander," *RFE/RL* 70 (9 April 1992).

defuse the escalating situation by suspending their decrees on the BSF and establishing a joint parliamentary commission to settle the dispute.¹¹²

At their Dagomys meeting (23 June 1992) Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin agreed to jointly fund the BSF and through negotiations not unilateral action to establish the Ukrainian and Russian navies from the BSF.¹¹³ Tensions continued to increase as Ukraine and the CIS encouraged oaths of allegiance to their respective side resulting in a ship hoisting the Ukrainian flag and sailing to Odessa being pursued by other BSF vessels and aircraft.¹¹⁴ At their Yalta meeting (3 August 1992) both presidents agreed to transfer the BSF from CIS command to a jointly appointed Russian-Ukrainian command and in 1995 to divide the fleet between Ukraine and Russia without specifying the percentage split.¹¹⁵ Admiral Baltin was jointly appointed BSF commander.¹¹⁶ The ownership of BSF land-based infrastructure facilities emerged as a prominent issue when Ukraine took over all shore facilities, including military schools, on its territory,¹¹⁷ and questioned the Russian BSF's right to use these facilities. While Russia claimed that the Dagomys and Yalta agreements provided for

¹¹² Volodymyr Skachko, "Flot dovedetsia dilyty: prodyktovano u nomer," *Holos Ukrainy* 65 (315), (9 April 1992), 2; Doug Clarke, "Presidents Suspend Black Sea Fleet Decrees," *RFE/RL* 70 (10 April 1992); "Razygryvaetsia politicheskaia karta Kryma: problema chernomorskogo flota vyzyvaet goriachie diskussii ne tolko v parlamentakh Ukrainy i Rossii, ne tolko v chastiakh i na korabliakh..." *Nezavisimost* 28 (13441)- 29 (13442), (10-16 April 1992), 1; "Perehovory shchodo chornomorskoho floty vidkladaiutsia," *Holos Ukrainy* 74 (324), (22 April 1992), 1.

¹¹³ Stephen Foye, "Russian-Ukrainian Accord on Security Issues," *RFE/RL* 118 (24 June 1992).

¹¹⁴ Stephen Foye, "Tensions Flare over Black Sea Fleet, Strategic Forces," *RFE/RL* 129 (9 July 1992).

¹¹⁵ Vladimir Skachko, "Chernomorskii flot: sovladetsy obviniaut drug druga- segodnia v Kieve nachnetsia ocherednoi raund rossiisko-ukrainskikh peregovorov," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (23 September 1992), 1, 3; Doug Clarke, "Joint Control of Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 147 (4 August 1992).

¹¹⁶ Doug Clarke, "Commander for Black Sea Fleet Named," *RFE/RL* 10 (18 January 1993).

¹¹⁷ John Lepingwell, "Black Sea Fleet Update," *RFE/RL* 74 (20 April 1993).

fleet assets to be shared, including facilities in Sevastopol, Ukraine disagreed asserting that the Russian BSF's use of Sevastopol violated Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹¹⁸

In Moscow (17 June 1993) Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin agreed that Ukraine's navy would to be formed in September 1993 rather than in 1995, and that the BSF would be divided 50-50 after a separate agreement was reached on the division and basing of the Russian Navy on Ukrainian territory.¹¹⁹ While Sevastopol was not mentioned the agreement hints that the Russian BSF may remain as the agreement referred to "the division of shore facilities as well as vessels".¹²⁰ Ukraine with its economy in a downward spiral and mounting indebtedness to Russia over oil and gas imports was forced to make substantial concessions over the BSF and land-based facilities. These concessions reached a climax at Massandra¹²¹ when President Yeltsin claimed that President Kravchuk had agreed to sell Ukraine's half of the BSF plus its nuclear warheads in exchange for debt repayment. Public and parliamentary emotional

¹¹⁸ Vladimir Skachko, "Kto narushaet Dagomisskie soglasheniia? -Dal press-konferentsii v Sevastopole," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (16 July 1992) 3; John Lepingwell, "Black Sea Fleet Negotiations Reach Impasse," *RFE/RL* 91 (13 May 1993); Roman Solchanyk, "Sevastopol Not for Rent," *RFE/RL* 108 (9 June 1993).

¹¹⁹ John Lepingwell, "The Black Sea Fleet Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?" *RFE/RL Research Report 2/28* (9 July 1993), 53-54; Ustina Markus, "Yeltsin, Kravchuk Agree on Splitting Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL* 114 (18 June 1993).

¹²⁰ John Lepingwell, "The Black Sea Fleet Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?" *RFE/RL Research Report 2/28* (9 July 1993), 53.

¹²¹ Vitalii Portnikov, "Sudba Kravchuka ne mozhет byt bezraziichna Moskve- versiiа o peredache chernomorskogo flota Rossii za neskolko chasov izmenilas do neuznavаемosti," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (7 September 1993), 1; Vera Kuznetsova, "Kto i chito podpisal v Massandre," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (9 September 1993), 1; Bohdan Nayhalo, "The Massandra Summit and Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/37* (17 September 1993); Sergei Leskov, "The View from Moscow," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49/9 (Nov 1993), p. 8, 3p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item

reaction forced Kravchuk to emphatically deny any such agreement had been reached.¹²² The first casualty was Defence Minister Morozov who resigned on 4 October 1993 in protest over the proposed division of the BSF and possible stationing of the Russian BSF on Ukrainian territory.¹²³

Ukraine was determined to protect its territorial sovereignty and neutrality by rejecting foreign military personnel being based on its territory while Russia claimed it had no appropriate alternative port facilities for its BSF. Initially, Ukraine claimed the entire BSF as its share of the Soviet Navy but encountered resistance from the Russian-dominated BSF naval command, Russian financial pressure, and territorial claims on Crimea and Sevastopol that threatened Ukraine's territorial integrity. Ukraine settled for a promised half of the fleet. While Ukraine succeeded in exerting its jurisdiction over land-based BSF naval academy and repair facilities, the actual division of the BSF, the formation of the Ukrainian Navy, and the decision where Russia's BSF would be stationed remained for the Kuchma presidency to resolve.¹²⁴ Ukraine and Russia were unable to resolve the BSF issues during the Kravchuk years.

00963402) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>

¹²² Vladimir Skachko, "Ne ratifitsiruet parlament ne budem prodavat- Leonid Kravchuk khochet, chtoby nad preodoleniem krizisa rabotali vse," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (8 September 1993), 3.

¹²³ Ustina Markus, "Ukrainian Defense Minister Resigns," *RFE/RL* 191 (5 October 1993).

Nuclear Disarmament

Anti-nuclear feelings generated by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident were strong in Ukraine and a 1990 parliamentary resolution symbolically declared the Ukrainian SSR as a non-aligned nuclear weapons free republic. Ukraine inherited on its territory a nuclear arsenal that made it the world's third nuclear power, but over a four-year period Ukraine transferred its nuclear weapons to Russia and became a non-nuclear status state.¹²⁵ The total Soviet nuclear arsenal consisted of some thirty thousand nuclear weapons,¹²⁶ including tactical nuclear weapons, all under Moscow control and distributed throughout the 15 Soviet republics and several Warsaw Pact countries,¹²⁷ with nuclear weapons stationed in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Neither the Ukrainian authorities nor the citizens knew the extent of nuclear armaments on Ukrainian territory, their value, or the costs to be associated with nuclear disarmament. John Lepingwell¹²⁸ estimates that on Ukrainian territory there were: 1) (ICBMs) 130 SS-19 with six warheads of 550 kilotons each, and 46 SS-24 missiles carrying ten 550-kiloton warheads; 2) 21 Tu-95 Bear-H16 strategic bombers stationed at Uzyn (near Kyiv), each able to carry up to 16 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs); 3) and almost all of the former USSR's fleet

¹²⁴ Ustina Markus, "The Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/18 (6 May 1994), 32-40.

¹²⁵ H. M. Perepelytsia, *Beziadernyi status i natsionalna bezpeka Ukrainy*, Serii "Voienna bezpeka", vypusk 6 (Kyiv: Rada natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy, 1998), 16-24.

¹²⁶ Steven E. Miller, "Proliferation Dangers in the Former Soviet Union," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, 17.

¹²⁷ Steven E. Miller, "Western Diplomacy and the Soviet Nuclear Legacy," *Survival* 34/3 (Autumn 1992), 3-27.

of modern Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, each capable of carrying up to 12 weapons. This meant that Ukraine was the world's third nuclear power possessing a total of 1,768 nuclear warheads: 1,240 warheads on missiles and 528 warheads assigned to bombers. Bohdan Nahaylo¹²⁹ refers to 176 ICBMs with 1,240 nuclear warheads and 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons.

At the founding CIS meeting (Minsk, 8 December) and at Alma-Ata, where eight other republics joined (21 December 1991), CIS leaders had agreed that all nuclear weapons would be under joint CIS military control. The Verkhovna Rada had ratified the CIS agreement with amendments that recognized Ukraine's intent:

They aspire to the liquidation of all nuclear arms and to general and total disarmament under strict international control. The Parties will respect the desire of the participants in the Agreement that wish to attain the status of a nuclear-free or neutral state. [art.3]¹³⁰

At the 21 December CIS Alma-Ata summit, Ukraine agreed to transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia¹³¹ with Russian President Yeltsin controlling the firing mechanism he had inherited from President Gorbachev, but with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan being consulted prior to the use of nuclear weapons from their territory. President Kravchuk insisted on a veto over the firing of missiles by establishing a system that would block the transmission of launch signals from Moscow to the missiles located in Ukraine. To prevent the further

¹²⁸ John W.R. Lepingwell, "Beyond START: Ukrainian-Russian Negotiations," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/8* (19 February 1993), 47.

¹²⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/8* (19 February 1993), 25.

¹³⁰ "Reservations of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine to the Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States; Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States" (8 December 1991) *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), Appendix C, 302-304.

removal of Ukrainian military equipment, President Kravchuk (April 1992) signed a decree that allowed strategic nuclear forces to remain under the operational control of the CIS command but placed them under Ukrainian administrative control through an oath of loyalty to Ukraine.¹³² The decree raised Western concerns that Ukraine had nuclear status ambitions, increased tensions with Russia over the control of strategic forces, and narrowed the definition of strategic.

Ukraine's acceptance into the world community was dependent on Ukraine acquiring non-nuclear status. Nuclear weapons, not political and economic reforms, dominated Ukraine's relations with the Western democracies, especially the United States, during the first two critical years of independence as the United States spearheaded a policy, supported by its NATO allies, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹³³ The United States had not favored the disintegration of the USSR and was concerned about the potential of regional instability and nationalism. Committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States regarded Russia as the sole nuclear heir to the USSR and insisted that all nuclear

¹³¹ Doug Clarke, "Agreement on Nuclear Weapons," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

¹³² John W.R. Lepingwell, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Control of Nuclear Weapons," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/8 (19 February 1993), 10.

¹³³ Vladimir Skachko, "Ukraina: Zapad nastavaet na iademom razoruzhenii Ukrainy," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (11 January 1993), 1, 3; Vitalii Portnikov, "Mnenie: Strasti po ukrainskim boegolovkam - chto dvizhet uchastnikami diskussii?" *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (11 January 1993), 3; Steven E. Miller, "Proliferation Dangers in the Former Soviet Union," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, ed. John W. Blaney (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1995), 17-29; Robbin Frederick Laird, "Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons: The Experience of the Former Soviet Union," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, 30-56; Nadia Schadow, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 271-287.

weapons be transferred to Russia regardless of Ukrainian security concerns or the financial cost.

When parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk traveled abroad seeking the West's support for Ukraine's independence, to neutralize emotional concerns of nuclear proliferation and regional instability he repeatedly stressed that Ukraine favored nuclear-free status. In mid-December 1991, President Kravchuk reassured Washington that Ukraine would become nuclear free, then quickly authorized the transfer of all tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to Russia without Verkhovna Rada approval or financial compensation or security guarantees from the United States or Russia.¹³⁴ This upset many parliamentarians, like Chornovil, who regarded Russia as Ukraine's historic enemy, and the act of one state unconditionally transferring its nuclear weapons to another state as unprecedented.¹³⁵ With increased Russia-Ukraine tensions over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, Kravchuk (12 March 1992) cited lack of assurances that the weapons were being destroyed and temporarily suspended the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, in the process generating increased concerns in the West over Ukraine's nuclear intent. Under pressure from U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, President Kravchuk reversed himself and on 16 April following a Ukraine-Russia agreement commenced the transfer of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons to Russia.¹³⁶ Kravchuk's

¹³⁴ Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/8* (19 February 1993), 31.

¹³⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/8* (19 February 1993), 25.

¹³⁶ John W. R. Lepingwell, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Control of Nuclear Weapons," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/8* (19 February 1993), 7-8.

temporary suspension of transferring the tactical nuclear weapons to Russia created a feeling of suspicion and uncertainty as to Ukraine's true intentions regarding nuclear weapons in its possession.

Russia, nuclear heir to the USSR, originally regarded the START-1 treaty as a bilateral USA-USSR agreement that became a USA-Russian Federation agreement, and claimed the right to negotiate on behalf of all CIS countries.¹³⁷ President Kravchuk protested, insisting that Ukraine with the other republics were also successors to the USSR and should be included in the disarmament discussions. The United States agreed. On 9 April 1992, the Verkhovna Rada passed a resolution entitled "On Additional Measures for Ensuring Ukraine's Acquisition of Non-nuclear Status". The resolution: 1) reaffirmed that Ukraine will sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty [NPT] but criticized Russia for failing to implement a system that would allow Ukraine to block the use of nuclear weapons located on its territory. 2) Upheld the decision to suspend the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia until there was international supervision of their destruction. 3) Called for discussions on implementing the START-1 treaty, 4) for international supervision of the dismantling of all nuclear weapons removed from Ukrainian territory, and 5) specified that Ukraine would take over the manning of the strategic forces.¹³⁸ On the 23 May 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol agreeing to ratify at the earliest the START-1 treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty [NPT] as non-nuclear status countries. President Kravchuk by letter to President Bush

¹³⁷ Ibid., 10.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 8.

specified conditions, including a request for security guarantees that were attached to the Lisbon Protocol; there was no linkage between the START-1 and the NPT treaties; and the issues of ownership and control of nuclear weapons were not addressed.¹³⁹

President Kravchuk promised that the START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol would be discussed and ratified quickly by the Verkhovna Rada. But the speed of approval depended upon negotiations with Russia on 1) the maintenance of the warheads in Ukraine, 2) payment for the fissile materials contained in the warheads, and 3) financial and material assistance to dismantle or convert the missiles, silos, and bombers.¹⁴⁰ Ukraine's interest in compensation and ownership over nuclear warheads arose in Ukraine-Russia negotiations after the United States agreed to purchase from Russia recycled uranium from dismantled warheads for some \$12 billion dollars over twenty years.¹⁴¹ Ukraine, supported by the United States, insisted that the deal must also compensate Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, either in cash or nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants. Additional conditions for ratifying START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol included United States security guarantees and financial assistance to offset the costs of dismantling the missiles and destroying the silos, estimated in the billions of dollars.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 11.

¹⁴⁰ John W.R. Lepingwell, "Negotiations over Nuclear Weapons: The Past as Prologue?" *RFE/RL Research Report 3/4* (28 January 1994), 4.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 3; Andrei Vaganov, "Rossiia budet prodavat v SShA oruzhenii uran- kontrakt ob etom podpisan. Vse dolzhny byt dovolony, v tom chisle i Ukraina," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (15 January 1994), 1.

On 18 November 1993, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the START-1 and Lisbon Protocol but with conditions that Article 5 committing Ukraine to join NPT did not apply, that Ukraine would receive compensation for the tactical nuclear warheads withdrawn to Russia in 1992, foreign financial assistance for disarmament, binding security guarantees, and recognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity and existing borders.¹⁴² Ukraine's conditional ratification of the START-1 treaty upset the U.S. and Russia,¹⁴³ with Russia suggesting it might apply economic pressure on Ukraine.¹⁴⁴ Ukrainian parliamentarians were divided on the non-nuclear status issue, concerned about Ukraine's territorial integrity, and its inability to finance nuclear disarmament. Ukraine's reluctance to transfer nuclear weapons to its former colonial master for security reasons and its inability to finance nuclear disarmament were initially ignored in the West with Ukraine being ostracized for delaying nuclear disarmament.

Ukraine's official and repeatedly declared policy was to become a non-nuclear weapons state but the process of negotiating a bilateral agreement with Russia and ratifying the START-1 and NPT treaties proved complex, creating numerous delays. Sherman W. Garnett¹⁴⁵ has divided Ukraine's road to nuclear weapons free status into three phases: from independence to the signing of the Lisbon Protocol (May 1992) that affirmed Ukraine's intentions to

¹⁴² John W. R. Lepingwell, "START-1: Ukraine Ratifies with Conditions," *RFE/RL* 222 (19 November 1993).

¹⁴³ John W. R. Lepingwell, "CIS, U.S., Russia, React to Ukrainian Start Decision," *RFE/RL* 223 (22 November 1993).

¹⁴⁴ John W. R. Lepingwell, "Russia Hints at Economic Pressure over Start," *RFE/RL* 225 (24 November 1993).

¹⁴⁵ Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch, Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International

ratify START-1 and the NPT treaty; from the Lisbon Protocol to the signing of the Ukraine-United States-Russia trilateral agreement (January 1994); and from the trilateral agreement to June 1995 when Ukraine became nuclear weapons free. Prior to the START-1 and the NPT treaties being ratified, Ukraine had to reach agreement with Russia on the dismantling, transferring, and destruction of nuclear weapons Ukraine inherited. These negotiations were being conducted during a period of rising Russia-Ukraine tensions, threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity, an internal economic crisis, mounting indebtedness to Russia over gas purchases, an inability to finance nuclear disarmament, while being increasingly isolated and ostracized over the nuclear issue by Western countries. Possession of the nuclear arsenal may have stabilized Ukraine-Russia relations during the vulnerable first years when Ukraine's territorial integrity was tested.¹⁴⁶ In response to its vulnerable position, Ukraine progressively attached conditions of security guarantees, financial compensation for the nuclear material, the need of financial assistance in dismantling the nuclear weapons and international observers to monitor the destruction of the nuclear weapons in Russia.

Peace, 1997) and "U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Past, Present, and Future," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 103-124.

¹⁴⁶ Steven E. Miller, "The Case against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72/3 (Summer 1993), p. 67+. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 00157120) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>;

John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case For a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), p. 50+. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 00157120) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Lyle Goldstein and Blake Loveless, "Keeping the Bear at Bay," *Harvard International Review* 14/4 (Summer 1992), p. 46, 3p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 07391854) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>

Only when the bilateral Ukraine-Russia negotiations became trilateral with United States mediation, with promises of financial assistance and security assurances was an agreement reached followed by ratification of START-1. Garnett emphasizes that a major policy change in American policy had occurred towards Ukraine. Until mid-1993, American policy had focused only on the final results, with promises of \$175 million in assistance. After mid-1993, the United States broadened its interest in the Ukraine dilemma, became more flexible, offering to mediate the Ukraine-Russia complex negotiations with offers of financial assistance for disarmament and assistance for the Ukrainian economy. The end result was the Trilateral Agreement signed in Moscow by Presidents Bill Clinton, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin (14 January 1994) that brought to closure the Ukrainian nuclear weapons issue that had dominated United States-Ukraine relations. The Trilateral Agreement had met Ukraine's conditions for compensation, financial assistance, and security guarantees.¹⁴⁷ On 3 February 1994, the Verkhovna Rada removed its conditions attached to the ratification of the START-1 treaty but it did not approve the NPT treaty claiming that legally Ukraine was not a non-nuclear state because it owned, and had on its territory, nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁸ Only when the nuclear weapons were destroyed could Ukraine sign the NPT treaty as a non-nuclear state. In October 1994, under President Kuchma, the Verkhovna Rada acceded to the NPT.

¹⁴⁷ John W.R. Lepingwell, "The Trilateral Agreement on Nuclear Weapons," and "Negotiations over Nuclear Weapons: The Past as Prologue?" *RFE/RL Research Report 3/4* (28 January 1994).

¹⁴⁸ John W.R. Lepingwell, "Ukrainian Parliament Removes START-1 Conditions," *RFE/FL Research Report 3/8* (25 February 1994).

At independence, Ukraine was the world's third nuclear power although Russia controlled the nuclear trigger for the weapons situated on Ukrainian territory. Nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory were another negative and expensive Soviet legacy, placing a financial burden upon Ukraine to dismantle and destroy the nuclear weapons and silos. Until mid-1993, Ukraine's security and financial concerns were not central issues of concern for the American administration. The Bush and Clinton administrations were committed to the fulfillment of the USA-USSR START 1 and the USA-Russian Federation START 2 treaties that required Ukraine to sign the START-1 and the Non-Nuclear Proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear status country. Ukraine lost a valuable opportunity to reform its economy, enter world organizations, and receive Western financial and technical assistance due to the nuclear disarmament issue dominating Ukraine's relations with the West. As Garnett points out, once the nuclear issue was resolved, the United States and Ukraine entered into a mutually beneficial partnership and Ukraine was welcomed into the world organizations. While the nuclear disarmament issue was a bilateral Russia-Ukraine issue, United States involvement brought the issue to closure with security guarantees and financial assistance. Ukraine acceded to START-1 and the NPT treaty as a country with non-nuclear status.

NATO's Partnership for Peace Program [PfP]

At the request of the United States, NATO approved the Partnership for Peace program [PfP] of increased military cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics based on bilateral agreements with NATO. PfP operates within the framework established by the North Atlantic Cooperative Council [NACC] in 1991 to promote dialogue, cooperation, and partnership between former adversaries and to prevent a new division of Europe.¹⁴⁹ The Partnership for Peace program is flexible and able to accommodate different purposes: providing East-Central Europe with additional security, addressing Russian concerns about being isolated, Ukraine's efforts at broadening its relations with NATO, and giving NATO a new mission within the new European security environment.¹⁵⁰ The PfP distinguishes between NATO's allies and partners, with NATO offering collective security to its allies and PfP offering consultation and solidarity to a partner that believes its political independence and territorial integrity is threatened. While the PfP program offers no membership in NATO and no security guarantees, it does provide a vehicle for possible future NATO membership.¹⁵¹

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner visited Kyiv in February to establish cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, and expressed initial

¹⁴⁹ Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?" *Survival* 38/1 (Spring 1996), 98-110.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Mihalka, "Squaring the Circle: NATO's Offer to the East," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/12 (25 March 1994), 1-9; "European-Russian Security and NATO's Partnership for Peace," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/33 (26 August 1994), 34-45.

satisfaction with Ukraine's position on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁵² But some NATO members preferred to have Ukraine join the PfP program only after it had removed all nuclear weapons from its territory, ratified START-1, and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear power. While pressuring Ukraine to transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia, NATO rejected Ukraine's request for security guarantees but offered some NATO assurances and promises of assistance in dismantling Ukraine's nuclear weapons.¹⁵³ Both USA Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev agreed that Ukraine should be offered security guarantees but Russia wanted Ukraine to unconditionally ratify START-1 while the USA wanted nuclear disarmament and economic reforms to proceed.¹⁵⁴ In January 1994, Ukrainian officials expressed support for the NATO PfP program while expressing concerns that a partial NATO enlargement would position Ukraine between NATO and Russia.¹⁵⁵ In February 1994, Ukraine officially announced that it would join NATO's PfP program, signing the membership document in Brussels on 8 February 1994.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ John Lepingwell, "NATO on 'Partnership for Peace'," *RFE/RL* 231 (3 December 1993); Louisa Vinton, "NATO Rebuffs Eastern Europe," *RFE/RL* 204 (22 October 1993).

¹⁵² Kathy Mihalisko, "NATO's Manfred Woerner in Kiev," *RFE/RL* (24 February 1992).

¹⁵³ Ustina Markus, "Conflicting Attitudes in NATO towards Ukraine," and John Lepingwell, "NATO: No Security Guarantee for Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 231 (3 December 1993).

¹⁵⁴ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine Offered Security Guarantees, Threatened with Aid Slowdown," *RFE/RL* 232 (6 December 1993).

¹⁵⁵ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine Supports NATO Partnership for Peace Plan," *RFE/RL* 5 (10 January 1994) and "Ukraine Welcomes Partnership for Peace Arrangement," *RFE/RL* 7 (12 January 1994).

¹⁵⁶ Ustina Markus, "Ukraine to Join Partnership for Peace," *RFE/RL* 26 (8 February 1994); Karoly Okolicsanyi and Ustina Markus, "Hungary, Ukraine, Sign Partnership for Peace Agreement," *RFE/RL* 27 (9 February 1994).

Ukraine's Military Doctrine

Almost two years after the formation of the Ukrainian armed forces, on 19 October 1993, the Verkhovna Rada finally adopted Ukraine's military doctrine¹⁵⁷ containing political, technical, and economic sections. The military/political section stated that the purpose of the Ukrainian armed forces was to protect Ukraine from external military threats and to uphold international security and peace. It affirmed that Ukraine has no expansionist goals and upholds accepted principles of international law, the statutes of the UN, and Helsinki agreements. The military/technical section defined the duties of the armed forces in peacetime and war, and their reliance upon hi-tech weapons in defending Ukraine. The military/economic section dealt with military spending, the importance of the military-industrial complex to Ukraine's defense, military preparedness, and the mobilization of resources during war. On the issue of nuclear weapons, Ukraine defined its status as an owner of nuclear weapons with the intent of becoming a non-nuclear state provided that the world community provided reliable security guarantees. "Thus, the doctrine renounces neither nuclear status nor nuclear weapons, articulating only the intent to divest the country of the arsenal."¹⁵⁸ The military doctrine did not deal with internal reforms and restructuring of the military to meet the requirements of fulfilling the military doctrine.

¹⁵⁷ For a summary of Ukraine's military doctrine see, Ustina Markus, "Recent Defense Developments in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/4 (28 January 1994), 29.

Republic KGB/ Ukrainian National Security Service [SNBU]

Historically, Ukraine's KGB was the republic branch of the highly centralized security organ established to function as the sword and shield of the CPSU. It was molded under Stalin into an obedient instrument of the Secretary General of the CC CPSU and underwent several name changes [GPU, MVD, NKVD] from its Cheka origins. KGB chairman Andropov transformed the image of the KGB but it continued to function as an instrument of state that in Ukraine vigorously defended the CPSU/CPU's monopoly of political power and the unity of the USSR against any expressions of Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism'. When President Gorbachev repealed the political monopoly of the Communist Party, approved multi-candidate elections, and released political dissidents, the KGB faced a major challenge adjusting to the new environment and its new role. As there is no evidence that *perebudova* and *glasnost* reforms penetrated the military, it is doubtful that these reforms would have penetrated the KGB. KGB chairman V. A. Kriuchkov, concerned over the fate of the USSR and objecting to the devolution of power from the center to the republics, became one of the leaders of the abortive Moscow-based August coup.

The coup attempt had shattered the image of loyalty of the KGB and raised concerns that its internal operations and structures had not been influenced by President Gorbachev's *perebudova* and *glasnost* reforms. Vadim Bakatin was named chairman of KGB with instructions to transform it, to prevent

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

the KGB from participating in any future coup attempts at the Union level. The KGB was 'departized' and underwent an image change that left most people thinking the KGB had been abolished, replaced by a new security service.¹⁵⁹ During his 100 days as chairman, Bakatin 'transformed' the KGB along five functional lines: 1) counterintelligence and internal security, 2) foreign intelligence, 3) communications and electronic intelligence, 4) presidential security, 5) and border guards. Foreign intelligence and border guards remained under Union control while Bakatin transferred to the republic KGB counterintelligence and internal security duties, and all government communications equipment, including codes, to Ukraine's jurisdiction and control. In October 1991, he signed an agreement with Ukraine's KGB that delineated state security functions with the USSR KGB preserving an organizing and coordinating role.¹⁶⁰ In 1991, Ukraine started its own foreign intelligence service with Moscow providing continued training, technical support, codes and ciphers. Through signed agreements of cooperation with the Russian security service, successor to the USSR KGB, and the National Security Service of Ukraine connections to its former headquarters in Moscow continued.¹⁶¹

On 24 September 1991, Ukraine renamed its republic KGB as the National Security Service of Ukraine (SNBU) with Mykola Holushko, former

¹⁵⁹ See J. Michael Waller, "Commonwealth of Chekists: The Former KGB is Alive and Well in Post-Soviet Society," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, 38-56; Victor Yasmann, "Where Has the KGB Gone?" *RFE/RL Research Report 2/2* (8 January 1993), 17-20.

¹⁶⁰ Victor Yasmann, "KGB USSR, Ukraine, Belarus' Sign Cooperation Protocols," *RFE/RL* 208 (31 October 1991).

chairman of the republic KGB, as acting chairman of the SNBU and KGB employees remaining on duty while the security service was restructured.¹⁶² In March 1992 the Verkhovna Rada legislated the transformation of the National Security Service of Ukraine to serve the needs of an independent and democratic Ukraine.¹⁶³ Waller and Yasmann believe there were no internal personnel or organizational shakeups within the SNBU, that it maintained close links with other renamed KGB organizations in other CIS countries, and that each CIS government, including Ukraine, found it more beneficial to maintain the security service rather than transform it. While the KGB was the sword and shield of the Communist Party, the SNBU serves the government and is responsible to the President.

Conclusion

In keeping with the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract, Ukraine's land, air, and security forces were formed from nationalized Soviet units stationed on Ukrainian territory through an oath of allegiance to Ukraine and assertion of ownership of Soviet military assets and equipment. The division of the Black Sea Fleet and the removal of nuclear weapons were more complex. While article 9 of Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration authorized

¹⁶¹ Victor Yasmann, "Agreement on CIS Intelligence Services Cooperation," *RFE/RL* 60 (26 March 1992); "Russian-Ukrainian Intelligence Agreement," *RFE/RL* 137 (21 July 1992).

¹⁶² Kathy Mihalisko, "Transformation of Ukrainian KGB," *RFE/RL* 183 (25 September 1991).

¹⁶³ Serhii Lavreniuk, "'Zubnii bil,' SBU ne pokynuv denne ta vechirnie zasdannia 25 bereznia," *Holos Ukrainy* 56 (306), (27 March 1992), 2, discusses the Verkhovna Rada enacting "Pro

the formation of military and security forces, the Verkhovna Rada approved their formation only on 6 December 1991 and President Kravchuk declared himself commander-in-chief of all non-strategic forces on 12 December. When in January 1992 Ukraine nationalized all Soviet military units on its territory it inherited some of the best-trained troops equipped with the most sophisticated equipment and an elaborate military infrastructure. Nationalization did not equate to the increased use of the Ukrainian language nor to internal reforms and restructuring of the Ukrainian military and security forces. Downsizing of military units was unplanned and sporadic with no medium or long-range planning objectives. Ukraine's Military Doctrine did not address or provide the financial resources to restructure the armed forces to efficiently fulfill the Military Doctrine's objectives. Ukraine's main adversary became Russia while its military defense capacity remained focused on its western, not eastern border. Ukrainian armed forces were underfunded but equipped with Soviet-era sophisticated equipment. Defense Minister Morozov, who so smoothly established the Ukrainian armed forces through oaths of allegiance, resigned on principle during negotiations over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the possible long term stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

Sluzhbu bezpeky Ukrainy" and "Pro zahalnu viiskovu sluzhbu". Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Security Service Reformed," *RFE/RL* 60 (26 March 1992).

Chapter 6

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Under President Kravchuk, the social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program played a determining role in the formation of Ukraine's foreign policy and Ukraine's acceptance as an independent country. Ukraine's declaration of independence and its status as a founding member of the United Nations¹ did not guarantee Ukraine's recognition as a subject of international law. To achieve independence and prevent being isolated in the world, Ukraine needed to be recognized as an independent country by the world community, especially by the United States, Canada, and the European countries, and granted membership in world organizations. An obstacle was American fears of "suicidal nationalism" that might accompany the disintegration of the USSR.² The West's perception of the USSR had changed from an 'evil empire', to use President Reagan's words, to a state in transition. The West was supportive of

¹ For an overview of Soviet Ukraine's involvement in international affairs from 1944 to 1991, see L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)* (Kyiv: 'Osvita,' 1998), 3-60.

² Frances Clines, "Bush in Ukraine, Walks Fine Line on Sovereignty," *New York Times* (2 August 1991), A1, A8; Peter Stothard, "Bush Supports Gorbachev on Rebel Republics," *The Times of London* (2 August 1991), 1; Mary Dejevsky, "Bush Ventures into Diplomatic No Man's Land," *The Times of London* (2 August 1991), 11; Ann Devroy and Michael Dobbs, "Bush Warms Ukraine on Independence: President Supports Gorbachev's Union Treaty in Kiev Speech," *Washington Post* (2 August 1991), A1, A7; Kathy Mihalisko, "Bush's Itinerary in Kiev," *RFE/RL* 143 (30 July 1991) and "Ukrainian Reaction to Bush Speech," *RFE/RL* 146 (2 August

President Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* policies and of his efforts to establish a new federation through a new Union treaty. The West also classified Russian President Yeltsin as a reformer for his visible resistance to the reactionary August coup and subsequent anti-Communist decrees, but the West had limited knowledge of the situation and personalities in Ukraine.

The timing of Ukraine's declaration of independence by its Communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada in the immediate aftermath of the failed reactionary coup created the initial impression that independence was an attempt to isolate Ukraine from the anti-Communist events unfolding under Russian President Yeltsin in Moscow. This anti-reform image was slightly adjusted when the Verkhovna Rada suspended the CPU and ended the CPU's control of state structures, including within the military, security service, and police. Replacing Marxism-Leninism with the new social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine platform changed the significance and image of Ukraine's declaration of independence by highlighting Ukraine's promise to become a multiparty, pluralistic, rule-by-law democracy that was intent on reclaiming its European roots, values, and traditions. During the referendum campaign, the alternative to Ukraine's independence was presented as the continuation of the totalitarian Soviet epoch within the Union. International concerns over potential instability that nationalism and border adjustments might provoke were reduced by Ukraine's commitment that citizenship would be based upon residency not ethnicity, and individual and national minority rights would be guaranteed

1991); Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian Opposition on Bush Visit to Kiev," *RFE/RL* 145 (1 August 1991); Natalie Melnyczuk, "Bush Cautions against Isolation," *RFE/RL* 146 (2 August 1991).

according to international standards. Ukraine proclaimed its military neutrality as it pursued a European-orientation³ and good neighbor policy with all countries. It renounced all territorial claims against other countries and rejected all territorial claims against Ukraine. It reassured the West and its neighbors that Ukraine's military would be used for defense purposes only and that Ukraine would become a non-nuclear state.

During the Kravchuk years, foreign policy priorities and goals, the intensity of diplomatic activity, and the geographic scope of international operations were continuously adjusted to meet Ukraine's changing requirements. Soviet Ukraine had been a founding member of the United Nations but it was only with the passage of the Sovereignty Declaration (16 July 1990) that Ukraine's Foreign Ministry expanded its activities, as permitted by Moscow.⁴ Ukraine followed the lead of the Baltic republics, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Moldova in passing its Sovereignty Declaration. Gorbachev's reforms had encouraged a controlled devolution of power from the center to the republics. The sovereignty declarations enacted by the republics allowed them greater political and economic autonomy. Passage of these sovereignty declarations assisted General Secretary Gorbachev in his efforts to reform and restructure the USSR into a new, democratic, and voluntary federation that would be legitimized by a new union treaty that would be ratified by each republic's democratically elected Supreme Council. For the Verkhovna Rada to project

³ Serhii Tolstov, "Transatlantychni perspektyvy ukrainskoi zovnishnoi polityky," *Henezha* 1(4) (1996), 208-215.

⁴ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)* (Kyiv: 'Osvita,' 1998), 45-60.

the required legitimacy to bind the republic into a new union, parliamentarians had to appear to be democratically elected and representing the will of the people. This was in sharp contrast to the violence and excessive armed force used by Lenin's Bolsheviks to forge the USSR. After proclaiming their sovereignty, the republics would demonstrate their new sovereignty by signing bilateral agreements with each other. Ukraine followed the precedent established by Russia and signed bilateral agreements with other Soviet republics and former members of the Warsaw Pact countries, agreements that recognized the integrity of their common borders. The first and most important of these bilateral agreements was signed on 19 November 1990 with Russia; it recognized and accepted the integrity of the existing Ukrainian-Russian border. This agreement insured that the Ukrainian-Russian border remained stable after Ukraine proclaimed its independence despite suggestions by Russians that the agreement had been intended to refer to the permanency of the border only if Ukraine had remained within the USSR or the CIS. Ukraine signed bilateral agreements with Belarus (29 December 1990), Kazakhstan (20 December 1991), Kyrgyzstan (2 April 1991), and Hungary (31 May 1991). During this phase, Ukraine's international diplomatic activity was limited to the Soviet republics and the Warsaw Pact countries.

The declaration of independence changed the priorities and goals of Ukrainian foreign policy, Ukraine declared its neutrality, and rapidly expanded the scope of diplomatic activities towards obtaining international recognition for

independence and guarantees for Ukraine's territorial integrity.⁵ Leonid Kravchuk, as the highest elected official, assumed the leading role in the formation of foreign policy. Anatolii Zlenko, an experienced and respected diplomat, became Ukraine's Foreign Minister in August 1991. Membership in the United Nations and the provisions contained in the United Nations Statutes, other international documents, and the USSR Constitution confirmed Ukraine's right to independence but were insufficient to guarantee independence. Political reality required that President Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet republics, especially Russian President Yeltsin, acknowledge Ukraine's independence. It was impractical for Gorbachev to use the KGB and the military to maintain the integrity of the USSR as such action would discredit his efforts to establish a new voluntary federation of sovereign republics through a new union treaty. Ukraine benefited from the political power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin over the future destiny of the USSR and Russia's future role within the Soviet geopolitical space, with Yeltsin siding with the republics against Gorbachev.

⁵ Nikolay Churilov and Tatyana Koshechkina, "Public Attitudes in Ukraine," in *Perceptions of Security: Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies*, ed. Richard Smoke (N.Y.: Manchester University Press, 1996), 189-208; Leonid Kistersky and Serhii Pirozhkov, "Ukraine: Policy Analysis and Options," in *Perceptions of Security: Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies*, 209-227; Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy as an Instrument of Nation Building," in *The Successor States of the USSR*, 196-207; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 249-270; Boris Tarasyuk, "Ukraine in the World," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 9-15; Paul A. Goble, "Establishing Independence in an Interdependent World," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 107-119; Sergei Vlasov, "Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Between Russia and the West," in *Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, ed. Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev, and Dmitri Trenin (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 140-155; Serhii Tolstov, "Heopolitychni chynnyky natsionalnoi bezpeky," *Henezha* 2 (1994), 171-185.

The referendum solidified Ukraine's path towards independence with countries recognizing Ukraine's independence after the referendum results were announced. Poland recognized Ukraine on 2 December 1991, Hungary and Canada on 3 December, Russia and Latvia on 4 December, Bulgaria on 5 December, Estonia on 6 December, and Czechoslovakia on 8 December.⁶ Russia's recognition of Ukraine was pivotal and the signing of the CIS agreement on 8 December 1991 decisive in ending the Soviet epoch. President Yeltsin was influenced in his actions by the 90 percent vote in favor of Ukraine's independence, Ukraine's refusal to sign a union treaty, and Yeltsin's personal ambitions and plans for Russia within the Soviet geopolitical space. While Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed on the need to end the existence of the USSR as a subject of international law, their views on the future role and structure of the CIS differed sharply (see CIS section below). Sweden and Spain recognized Ukraine on 19 December, Costa Rica on 20 December, Switzerland on 23 December and Mongolia on 24 December. By this time Ukraine and Russia had ratified the CIS agreement, and the other Soviet republics were joining the CIS. On 25 December 1991, the same day that President Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR, President Bush announced that the United States would recognize Ukraine and Russia. On 26 December 1991 formal relations were established between the United States and Ukraine, with the American Embassy being opened in Kyiv on 22 January

⁶ Artem Slavin, "Vyznannia, shcho tryvaie," *Holos Ukrainy* 3(253), (9 January 1992), 1.

1992.⁷ By 1993, 130 countries had recognized Ukraine's independence with 106 countries having established diplomatic relations with Ukraine.⁸ With Ukraine's independence established, foreign policy priorities shifted to establishing embassies and consulates around the world, joining international organizations, and signing bilateral agreements, while protecting Ukraine's independence and the integrity of its borders.

In its pursuit of international recognition and to demonstrate that the Soviet era was over, Ukraine courted the Ukrainian community in Canada and the United States seeking advice, financial assistance for establishing embassies and consulates, investments, and political influence to encourage Canada and the United States to recognize Ukraine. In response to lobbying by the Ukrainian community, Prime Minister Mulroney promised that Canada would recognize Ukraine immediately after the referendum results were announced but did not promise financial assistance to Ukraine.⁹ Canada's initial financial assistance to Ukraine was limited to a loan of fifty million Canadian dollars directed towards the printing of Ukraine's new hryvniia currency by the Canadian Bank Note Company but that loan was temporarily suspended for a few years.¹⁰ Under American leadership Canada joined other western countries in insisting as a precondition for financial assistance and closer cooperation that

⁷ Artem Slavin, "Ameryka vidkryla nas," *Holos Ukrainy* 3 (253), (9 January 1992), 11; United States Embassy in Kyiv web site. Retrieved 29 March 2002 from the World Wide Web: <http://usinfo.usemb.kiev.ua>.

⁸ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996)*, 52-53; Artem Prokhorenko, "Vyznannia, shcho tryvaie," *Holos Ukrainy* 3 (253) (9 January 1992), 1.

⁹ Bohdan S. Kordan, "Canadian-Ukrainian Relations: Articulating the Canadian Interest," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 125-144; L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 136-137.

Ukraine transfer all nuclear weapons to Russia. While the Ukrainian community in Canada, the United States, and Australia assisted financially to establish Ukraine's embassies and consulates in their adopted homelands, few invested in Ukraine due to an absence of commercial laws and widespread corruption within government that created a negative investment climate. Ukrainians from Canada and the United States who went to Ukraine as advisers, including a large contingent from Alberta, made positive contributions to Ukraine, but Kravchuk's high expectations of financial investments from the western Ukrainian communities was never realized. However, by reaching out to the Ukrainian diaspora in the West, Kravchuk created a new image for Ukraine as an open society that welcomed the return of the exiles. The iron curtain was no more and the participation of the diaspora in Ukrainian economic and political affairs was welcomed.

Ukraine also reached out to prominent Westerners, former ministers in and advisers to western governments, appealing for their assistance to help Ukraine with initial reforms and with Ukraine's efforts to integrate into the world community. The Council of Advisers to the Verkhovna Rada was formed, funded mainly by the Hungarian-born American billionaire George Soros¹¹ and chaired by Bohdan Havrylyshyn from the International Business School in Geneva, Switzerland. American Henry Kissinger¹² joined other representatives

¹⁰ *A Proposal for a Joint Venture between the National Bank of Ukraine, Government of Ukraine, and Canadian Bank Note Company Limited.* (January 1992).

¹¹ George Soros had established an International Renaissance Foundation through which he funded projects in all the East-Central European and former USSR countries.

¹² Bohdan Nahaylo, "Henry Kissinger to Advise Ukraine on Its Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL* 195 (14 October 1991).

from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in serving on this Council. The Council was located on the sixth floor of the Lesia Ukrainka building that housed deputies of the Verkhovna Rada and parliamentary committees. The Council functioned during the Kravchuk years, advising the Verkhovna Rada on drafting laws, economic reforms, foreign relations, and translating statutes from western countries. The Council ceased to function when President Kuchma assumed office.

Soviet Ukraine had a small Foreign Ministry but was isolated from the international diplomatic community as Soviet foreign policy had been determined in Moscow. After Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty Moscow permitted Ukraine to participate in external relations with the other Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact countries. With independence, Ukraine reached out to the international community but regarded its historic ties and common interests and borders with the countries of East Central Europe as being special. Ukraine claimed an East Central European identity as it pursued the path of integration into Europe while distancing its identity from Russia. Ukraine's claims to European roots were based upon the research of Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky who claimed that Galicia-Volhynia was the successor to Kyivan Rus' and not Vladimir-Suzdal as claimed by Russian historians. Until their lands were annexed into the USSR (and Soviet Ukraine) during W.W.II, western Ukrainians had shared common historic and cultural ties with the other peoples of East Central Europe. They shared experiences within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland that facilitated the formation of

Ukrainian self-identity and national consciousness. Prior to W.W.I western Ukraine had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, during the interwar period Zakarpattia was part of Czechoslovakia, Bukovina part of Romania, and Galicia and western Volhynia part of Poland. Ukrainians also shared with the other East Central Europeans a Communist legacy, fear of Russian expansion, a desire to be integrated into the European Community while distancing themselves from Russia.

Ukraine sought to join the East Central European countries in their pursuit of integration into the European Community, a path that they had commenced with the fall of the Berlin wall. They were further along the path of reforming their economies and closer to integration into the European Union and acceptance into NATO than Ukraine.¹³ Ukraine was just starting on the long road. To enhance their chances of joining the European Union and NATO, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary were establishing for themselves a Central European identity. They organized the Visegrad triangle on 15 February 1991 through which they could assist each other on the road to integration into European institutions. In December 1991, Ukraine expressed a strong desire to join the Visegrad triangle, with Polish assistance, but the Visegrad states refused Ukraine, concerned over Ukraine's lack of economic reforms and Ukraine's legacy as a Soviet republic.¹⁴ While they supported Ukraine's independence and were pleased with the disintegration of the USSR, these Central European countries were concerned that Ukraine's closer

¹³ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 112-131.

involvement with the Visegrad group would undermine their Central European identity and slow them down in their efforts to join the European Union and NATO.¹⁵ Ukraine was more successful in joining the Central European Free Trade Association¹⁶ (July 1994) and the Central European Initiative (1996).¹⁷

On 14 February 1993, foreign ministers from Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary signed documents in Debrecen, Hungary that established the Carpathian Euroregion. It is the largest Euroregion in population and territory, encompassing fourteen million people and 141,485 square kilometers, including Ukraine's Zakarpattia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivsti provinces, eastern Slovakia, southeastern Poland, northeastern Hungary, and northwestern Romania.¹⁸ The Euroregion is economically underdeveloped with very diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious populations. Euroregions are established to promote voluntary cross border cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural spheres among neighboring countries and local governments. The Carpathian Euroregion has a Council comprised of three representatives from each country, a Secretary General, a Secretariat that administers the daily

¹⁴ Sharon L. Wolchik and Ryszard Zieba, "Ukraine's Relations with the Visegrad Countries," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 133-161.

¹⁵ See Stephen R. Burant, "Ukraine and East Central Europe," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 45-77.

¹⁶ L. D. Vasyliieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 161-163.

¹⁷ See Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/7 (November 1995), p. 1125, 19p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; L. D. Vasyliieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 164-165.

The Central European Initiative was founded by Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia in 1989. Its membership expanded to 10 in 1994, and to 17 in 2000. It has a flexible and non-institutional structure, and fosters cooperation and co-ordination among member countries in the political, economic, cultural, and parliamentary spheres.

¹⁸ For statistical data, see "Carpathian Euroregion." Retrieved May 2001 from World Wide Web: <http://www.carpathianfoundation.org/languages/en/tcer.php>.

affairs of the Euroregion, and Working Commissions in economic development, environment, health care, and cultural cooperation and tourism. Euroregions reduce potential conflicts and regional instability, and promote mutual cooperation and economic development.

President Kravchuk in February 1993 proposed the establishment of a stability and security zone for East Central Europe to fill the military space situated between NATO and Russia.¹⁹ Kravchuk's proposal was in response to mounting tensions between Ukraine and Russia over the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea, and the failure of Western countries to provide concrete security guarantees for Ukraine. Countries that occupied this vulnerable space were invited to join a loose association of countries whose members would recognize the existing borders and the territorial integrity of all members and would work towards preventing regional conflicts. Kravchuk visualized membership being extended to Austria, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria and the Baltic States. His proposal failed. Central European countries were more interested in joining NATO while NATO countries were concerned that their relationship with Russia would suffer and that Russia would feel isolated from Europe.²⁰

Historically, Polish-Ukrainian relations were complex and often antagonistic and centered upon Poland laying claim to Ukrainian inhabited

¹⁹ See Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/7 (November 1995), p. 1125, 19p.

²⁰ O. Ya. Manachynsky and Ye. K. Pronkin, *Ukraina i voienno-politychna obstanovka u sviti, Seriia 'Informatsiino-analitychnyi ohliad'* (Kyiv: Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, 1995); O. Ya. Manachynsky, *Suchasni voienno-politychni vidnosyny Ukrainy iz sumizhno-*

lands ruled by Poland over the centuries. These differences were resolved while Ukraine was part of the USSR, when Ukraine exercised its sovereignty and signed a bilateral treaty with Poland (October 1990) that recognized the Polish-Ukrainian border as inviolable, with both countries rejecting any territorial claims against the other country. A special strategic relationship developed between Poland and Ukraine, with Poland being the first country to recognize Ukraine. Poland has been supportive of Ukraine, signing a treaty of cooperation (November 1990), an economic agreement (January 1991), and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (May 1992).²¹ Ukraine and Poland also established a Joint Commission on Polish and Ukrainian Minorities (March 1991), a Polish-Ukrainian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation (May 1992), and a President's Committee on Polish-Ukrainian Relations (May 1993). Poland has attempted to assist Ukraine in joining European institutions. Cross border trade between Poland and Ukraine has been brisk. While fearing Russian expansion, Poland has attempted to maintain good relations with Russia while maintaining its strategic relationship with Ukraine. Poland's first priority is its own integration into the European Community and NATO.

prylehlymy derzhavamy, Serii 'Voienna bezpeka', vypusk 2 (Kyiv: Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, 1996).

²¹ H. Zelenko, "Ukraina-Polshcha, modernizatsiia politychnykh struktur: porivnialnyi analiz," in *Suchasna ukrainska polityka: polityky i politolohy pro nei* (Kyiv: Vyd-vo ukrainsko-finskoho instytutu menedzhmentu i biznesu, 1999), 267-275; Stephen R. Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours- Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45/3 (1993), p. 395, 24p. Retrieved March 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Poland's Eastern Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/7 (18 Feb. 1994), 10-13; Ian Bzhezinski, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis," *Survival* 35/3 London International Institute of Strategic Studies (1993), 26-37.

Hungary supported Ukraine's integration into NATO and the European Community, is pleased with Ukraine's policies towards national minorities and the treatment of Hungarians in Zakarpattia, and was less concerned about alienating Russia than Poland.²² When Kravchuk visited Hungary in May 1991, nine documents were signed dealing with Ukrainian-Hungarian cooperation. It was with Hungary that Ukraine signed its first international agreement as an independent country (26 December 1991). Romania supported Ukraine's independence, was pleased with a buffer separating it from Russia, but challenged the existing border and claimed Serpent Island at the mouth of the Danube.²³

Strategically positioned in Eastern Europe, Ukraine's national security requirements and the protection of the integrity of its borders became issues of importance for stability in Europe, as did Ukraine's inheritance of a vast conventional and nuclear military force. During the Kravchuk years, nuclear disarmament was a major foreign policy issue that consumed substantial diplomatic activity. The West, unfamiliar and uncertain with Ukraine, initially regarded Ukraine as a potentially destabilizing force in Eastern Europe. Further, the United States was determined that nuclear proliferation would not accompany the disintegration of the USSR. American foreign policy towards Ukraine was focused on insuring that Russia alone would inherit the nuclear-power status of the USSR. President Kravchuk placed the highest priority on

²² NCA/Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian-Hungarian Talks," *RFE/RL* 21 (30 January 1991).

²³ Vladimir Socor, "Romanian Government Restates Territorial Claim on Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 230 (5 December 1991).

establishing close relations with the United States,²⁴ the only country strong enough to guarantee Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity from Russia. The Americans did not initially support Ukraine's independence but once independence was achieved, the Americans tried to influence Ukrainian military policy and internal reforms.²⁵ The Americans regarded good relations and financial assistance²⁶ possible with Ukraine only after Ukraine transferred its nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the START-1 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear status state.

Speaker Kravchuk traveled to Western Europe soliciting support for independence and closer relations and integration into Europe and the world community. While Ukraine was admitted to the Council of Europe²⁷ (14 July 1992), initially, the Western European countries were either indifferent to or not supportive of Ukraine's independence, extending recognition only after President Gorbachev had resigned and the USSR ceased to exist.²⁸ When recognition was reluctantly extended at the end of December 1991, it was conditional upon Ukraine respecting the civil rights of individuals and the

²⁴ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 137-140; "Zustrich L. Kravchuka z senatoramy SShA," *Holos Ukrainy* 8 (258), (21 January 1992), 2.

²⁵ Raymond L. Garthoff, "Western Efforts to Shape Post-Soviet Behavior: Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-32; George H. Quester, "The Roots of American Goals for Eurasia," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 123-145; S. Frederick Starr, "United States Policy and National Development in the Post-Soviet States," *The Successor States to the USSR*, 265-279; Sherman Garnett, "U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Past, Present, and Future," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 103-124; Paula J. Dobriansky, "U.S.-Ukrainian Relations in the 1990s: A View from Washington," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 121-132.

²⁶ Nancy Lubin, "U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 350-378.

²⁷ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 155-157.

national rights of minorities, and Ukraine becoming a non-nuclear status state. Russia, as the acknowledged successor to the USSR, was supported by Europe in its disputes with Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the former Soviet foreign debt, and over the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia, but not on Crimea. The Western European states feared instability associated with border adjustments, and through the Helsinki Accord and OSCE²⁹ were committed to maintaining existing borders and the territorial integrity of states. Until January 1994, Ukraine was chastised, criticized, and isolated by Western Europe because of delays in removing nuclear weapons from its territory. However, in late 1993, following the bloody storming by the military of the Russian parliament and the election of radical Russian nationalists to parliament, Western European countries started to reevaluate their policies towards Ukraine. In January 1994 the nuclear issue had been resolved with the signing of the Trilateral Agreement and soon thereafter the Verkhovna Rada ratified START-1 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. In the final days of his presidency, President Kravchuk negotiated and signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (May 1994) with the European Community. The European Union³⁰ established the Tacis Programme (Action Programme and Projects) for the Newly Independent States and Mongolia to foster the development of economic and political links with the European Union and to

²⁸ Olga Alexandrova, "Ukraine and Western Europe," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 145-170.

²⁹ Ukraine joined the OSCE on 30 January 1992, see *Conference for Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Second Meeting of the Council* (January 1992). Retrieved April 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/mcs/2prga92e.html>; L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 159-161.

provide financial assistance to help in the transformation to market economies and democratic societies. From 1991 to 1995, Ukraine had received ECU 243 million (US\$ 303.8 million) for some 100 projects,³¹ with most of the funds approved in 1994 and 1995, after the Trilateral Agreement was signed that brought to conclusion the nuclear issue. The World Bank/IMF had established the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to assist the former Communist countries, but in comparison to Russia and the countries of East-Central Europe, Ukraine received few funds.³² While advocating a pro-West foreign policy, President Kravchuk failed to establish a strong relationship with the Western European countries.

Western European countries varied slightly in their policies towards Ukraine. Germany³³ was sympathetic and financially supportive as it provided export credits for Ukraine and funded apartment construction projects to house soldiers returning from East Germany. Kravchuk courted German support with invitations to ethnic Germans living in Kazakhstan to resettle in Ukraine. Germany maintained equally cordial and good relations with Russia and

³⁰ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 157-159.

³¹ *Tacis, Action Programme and Projects, Ukraine 1993* (European Commission, June 1994).

³² Bartłomiej Kaminski and Zhen Kun Wong, "External Finance, Policy Conditionalities, and Transition from Central Planning," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 277-296; "EBRD Information," European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (GO9.doc, 7/4/97); Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Eastern Views of the ENRD," *RFE/RL Research Report* (2/23 (4 June 1993), 50-52.

³³ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 131-134; Angela Stent, "Germany and the Post-Soviet States," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 197-216; Peter Dombrowski, "German and American Assistance to the Post-Soviet Transition," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 217-242; Angela Stent, "The Overburdened Partner: Germany and the Successor States," in *The Successor States to the USSR*, 280-293.

Ukraine. The United Kingdom's³⁴ policy towards Ukraine mirrored that of the United States, stressing nuclear disarmament prior to financial assistance and closer relations. Dutch companies became major investors in Ukraine, in telecommunications, while the Netherlands encouraged political and economic reforms. Italian³⁵ business ventures were evident in Ukraine. France³⁶ was the most indifferent to Ukraine and most supportive of Russia.

Ukraine's foreign policy towards the Middle East was driven by economic and political considerations.³⁷ A sizeable Ukrainian-Jewish diaspora in Israel maintains strong economic and family ties with Ukraine, while Israel maintains a special relationship with the United States that extends into the highest offices in Washington, something that Ukraine lacked. In January 1992, a large Iranian delegation was in Kyiv for trade talks that concluded in an agreement to deliver to Ukraine 4 million tons of petroleum and 3 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Ukraine in exchange for petroleum products, chemicals, building materials, machinery, and machine tools.³⁸ This was followed by an agreement to construct a Ukraine-Iran natural gas pipeline to Europe through Azerbaijan with construction to start in 1992 and completion in 1996.³⁹ Nothing happened.

³⁴ L. D. Vasyliieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 140-141.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 134-135.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 135-136.

³⁷ Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine and the Middle East." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 171-190; Vitalii Portnikov, "Leonid Kravchuk v Kaire- sushchestvuet li ukrainskaia geopolitika?" *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (23 December 1992), 1.

³⁸ The Iranian oil delegation stayed at Hotel Kyiv and the writer had the opportunity to meet with members of the delegation.

Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (January/February 1995), 676-91. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

³⁹ *Ibid.*; Oleksii Trotsenko, "Pidpysano vazhlyvi ukrainsko-iranski dokumenty," *Holos Ukrainy* 10 (260), (23 January 1992), 2.

President Kravchuk traveled to Arab countries in the Middle East seeking an alternative supply for Ukraine's oil and gas requirements, and a potential market for Ukraine's products and services. However, the Soviet legacy left Ukraine with pipelines carrying oil and gas from Russia, but no port facilities to unload oil imported from other countries to meet the requirements of its six oil refineries. Lack of port facilities and a shortage of foreign cash reserves forced Ukraine to continue to rely on Russia for its oil and natural gas and Turkmenia for natural gas.

President Kravchuk for political and economic reasons established a close relationship with Turkey, regarding Turkey as a valuable regional partner, soliciting and receiving Turkey's support for Ukraine's claim to Crimea and, thereby, further solidifying Crimean Tatar support.⁴⁰ Turkey took the initiative to establish the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, a multipurpose regional organization (June 1992) consisting of all Black Sea countries: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.⁴¹ The BSEC strives to improve the environment of the polluted Black Sea and the economic prosperity of the Black Sea region through regional cooperation and the future transport of Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas through the Black Sea to the West. This complements Ukraine's plans to build an oil-import terminal at Odessa with a pipeline to Western Europe through Ukrainian

⁴⁰ Bazoglu Sezer, "Ukraine, Turkey, and the Black Sea Region," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 79-101.

⁴¹ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Role of Turkey and Iran in Incorporating the Former Soviet Republics into the World System," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 168-196; Daniel A. Connelly, "Black Sea Economic

territory. Turkey turned to creating the BSEC regional group after being denied membership in the European Community.

The collapse of the USSR resulted in the emergence of all the Soviet republics as internationally recognized countries. The Commonwealth of Independent States had been formed as a means of disentangling the republics from USSR structures and dividing USSR assets amongst themselves. Differences emerged as to the nature and structure of the CIS, with Ukraine rejecting any infringement on its sovereignty by the CIS while Russia supported the creation of a permanent structure for the CIS but under Russian Federation control. Relations among the independent republics shifted from republican to international relations and were conducted through formal and informal bilateral and CIS structures. Ukraine's elite and populace underwent a rapid mental adjustment redefining national interests to mean Ukrainian rather than Soviet or Russian. Working relationships and friendships that had been developed through the CPSU, Soviet organizations, institutions, and enterprises, meant that Ukraine's territorial elite could continue to function at a more informal level with other CIS elites to resolve a multitude of issues. For example, Speaker Kravchuk's telephone call in August 1991 to President Yeltsin to correct Yeltsin's press secretary's press release concerning border adjustments. Discussions among CIS presidents at their CIS Summits undoubtedly were both formal and informal, carried out within an atmosphere that recognized that all participants had risen through the party structure into the former Soviet

Cooperation," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/26 (1 July 1994), 31-38; Oleh Dorozhovets, "Pivdennyi vektor ukrainskoi zovnishnoi polityky," *Henezha* 2 (1994), 166-170.

establishment. They were former colleagues and establishment insiders, not strangers. It was former colleagues that negotiated the division of Soviet assets, military assets, and the continued flow of oil and gas from resource rich Russia to energy-starved Ukraine despite payments arrears.

Ukraine's foreign relations with Russia during the Kravchuk years were tense but peaceful as Ukraine disentangled itself from Soviet institutions and organizations.⁴² In 1990, when Soviet republics were enacting their sovereignty declarations, Ukraine followed Russia's lead and recognized the sovereignty of other republics through bilateral agreements. The Russia-Ukraine bilateral agreement (19 November 1990) recognized their common border as being stable and inviolable for ten years. Many Russians had difficulty accepting Ukraine's independence, believing that Ukraine was an eternal part of Russia.⁴³ Issues of nuclear disarmament, nationalization of the Soviet armed forces, the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimean issue, Ukraine's indebtedness to Russia over oil and natural gas imports, and the formation and operation of the CIS are discussed in detail in other sections of this dissertation. Ukraine regarded the CIS as a vehicle for peacefully disentangling itself from Soviet-era,

⁴² L. D. Vasylieva-Chekatenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 90-112; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 33-67; Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 19-43; Nikolai A. Kulinich, "Ukraine's Russian Dilemma and Europe's Evolving Geography," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 95-106; B. Havrylyshyn, "Ukraina i Rosiia u svitovomu konteksti," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (10, 1991), 3-7; "Roundtable: The Future of Ukrainian-Russian Relations," *The Harriman Review* 10/3 (Winter 1997), 35-52; William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnychuk, "Eurasia Letter: Unneighborly Neighbors," *Foreign Policy* 94 (Spring 1994), p. 84, 21p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 00157228) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>; Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9/4 (October-December 1993), 337-365.

Moscow-based institutions, and the division of Soviet assets and liabilities jointly claimed by all republics. At their December 1991 meetings, the leaders signed CIS agreements confirming the independence of all former Soviet republics, the inviolability of their borders and the integrity of their territory. At a regional level Ukraine helped establish a regional grouping for political and economic reasons with the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) that supported the CIS as a temporary organization necessary for a civil divorce. Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin, defending the interests of their respective states, worked together to insure a peaceful and civil divorce during the potentially volatile first years of Ukraine's independence.

Remarkably, Ukraine had conducted intense and complex negotiations, including nuclear disarmament, with Russia and the West while simultaneously expanding its small Foreign Ministry and joining numerous international organizations.⁴⁴ Kravchuk had lobbied for the international recognition of Ukraine, and as president had established and maintained good relations with all states, signed bilateral treaties with adjoining countries, except Romania, that confirmed the inviolability of common borders while simultaneously addressing the concerns of national minorities living adjacent to their titular homelands. President Kravchuk had assumed responsibility for Ukraine's foreign policy and oriented it towards the West. Foreign policy and diplomacy assisted the state-building process, Ukraine's East Central European image,

⁴³ B. O. Kistiakovsky, "Ukrainci i rosiiske suspilstvo," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (1, 1992), 132-135.

⁴⁴ Douglas L. Clarke, "Europe's Changing Constellations," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/37* (17 Sept. 1993), 13-15.

and enhanced Ukraine's international reputation and status. It helped obtain guarantees for Ukraine's territorial integrity, and negotiated Ukraine's non-nuclear status.

Ukraine's Borders

A prime objective of Ukraine's foreign policy was maintaining the integrity of its borders as inherited from the Ukrainian SSR. These include the former USSR's (and Soviet Ukraine's) international borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania; Ukraine's borders with Russia, Belarus, and Moldova; and Ukraine's maritime borders on the Sea of Azov and the Straits of Kerch (with Russia), the mouth of the Danube (with Romania), and the Black Sea. Ukraine's state borders do not correspond to Ukrainian ethnic settlement. Several million ethnic Ukrainians live in adjoining countries, most in bordering Russian provinces, while 27% of Ukraine's population is not ethnically Ukrainian mainly due to tsarist Russian and Soviet immigration policies.

Soviet Ukraine's borders with Belarus and Russia were determined and approved in Moscow based upon the recommendations of a 1924 Soviet boundaries commission that had considered ethnic and economic criteria. The commission recommended that nine predominantly ethnically Ukrainian former Russian imperial provinces (Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Taurida, Kherson, Podilia, Kyiv, and Volyn), with minor adjustments, be included within

the Ukrainian SSR.⁴⁵ In 1954, celebrating the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav agreement that brought Left-bank Ukraine and Kyiv under Muscovite control, Secretary General Khrushchev, the CPSU, and the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR, Russia, and Ukraine, unanimously approved the transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.

Ukraine's (and the USSR's) international borders with Poland, Czechoslovakia (now Slovakia), Hungary, and Romania were determined under Stalin during and following WW II. The Polish-Ukrainian (and Soviet) border along the San and Buh rivers was formed in August 1939 by the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, when ethnically Ukrainian lands were annexed into the Ukrainian SSR (1 November 1939). Zakarpattia [Transcarpathia] during the interwar years was part of Czechoslovakia, during WW II part of Hungary, and in 1945 was annexed by the USSR into the Ukrainian SSR with the formal agreement of Czechoslovakia. Zakarpattia is strategically situated south of the Carpathian Mountains. While little was reported during the Kravchuk years regarding Ukraine's maritime borders, except for Romania's claim to Serpent Island, demarcating the maritime boundaries of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea would protect Ukraine's fishing rights and ownership over potential oil, gas, and other resources.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Vasyl Boiechko, Oksana Hanzha, and Borys Zakharchuk, *Formuvannia derzhavnykh kordoniv Ukrainy 1917-1940 rr.* Prepynt, n. 3, a 31-page monograph written in 1990; *Kordony Ukrainy: istorychna retrospektyva ta suchasnyi stan* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1994); Vasyl Boiechko, Oksana Hanzha, and Borys Zakharchuk, "Derzhavni kordony Ukrainy: istoriia i suchasnist," *Holos Ukrainy* 64 (314), (8 April 1992), 13. For Ukraine's changing borders over the centuries see Paul Robert Magocsi, *Ukraine A Historical Atlas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

⁴⁶ BBC Monitoring Service, "Ukraine, Romania Argue over Oil, Gas," (August 17, 2001). Retrieved 18 August 2001 from the World Wide Web:

Ukraine affirmed the inviolability of its existing boundaries through article 5 of its Sovereignty Declaration; by article 6 of the Russia-Ukraine bilateral treaty (1990); through its independence referendum with ballots containing the words: "the territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable"; by article 5 of the CIS agreement (8 December 1991); and through its membership in the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (January 1992).⁴⁷ Belarus never questioned its border with Ukraine, but Moldova did until late 1994.⁴⁸ Immediately after Ukraine's declaration of independence the legitimacy of Ukraine's borders became a major issue of concern that threatened the stability of Ukraine, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern Europe. Within three days (27 August) President Yeltsin's press secretary issued a statement claiming that Russia had the right to raise the question of reviewing borders with adjacent republics that proclaimed their independence⁴⁹ while USSR President Gorbachev (28 August) stated that border disputes could follow a republic's secession from the USSR.⁵⁰ The issue was temporarily defused after Speaker Kravchuk discussed the border issue with President Yeltsin by telephone but Russian parliamentarians continued to

<http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles/html>.; Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/2 (March 1998), 257-287. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁴⁷ *Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, Second Meeting of the Council, Prague (January 1992). Retrieved 30 April 2001 from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.osce.org/dos/english/1990-1999/mcs/2prag92e.htm>

⁴⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), 33.

⁴⁹ "Statement by the Press Secretary of the President of the Russian SFSR," *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (27 August 1991), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 43/35, 15; *The Economist* (27 August 1991), 2.

⁵⁰ S. Chugayev and V. Shchepotkin, "As Deputies Squabble, the Union Breaks Up," *Izvestiia* (28 August 1991), 1-2, as reported in *CDSP* 43/35: 5.

question the status of Crimea, fueling Crimean separatism during negotiations over the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Russia recognized Ukraine's borders through the 19 November 1990 Russia-Ukraine bilateral treaty, CIS agreements signed at Minsk (8 December 1991) and Alma-Ata (21 December 1991), and through membership in international organizations like the OSCE,⁵¹ and NATO's Partnership for Peace [PfP], among others. Initially, Russia tried to restrict its recognition of Ukraine's borders to 'within' the USSR and 'within' the CIS but through the trilateral nuclear agreement (January 1994) signed by American President Clinton, Russian President Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Kravchuk, the integrity and inviolability of Ukraine's borders were affirmed.

Concerns were also raised that Poland, Hungary, and Romania might question their borders with Ukraine based on their former occupation of Ukrainian ethnic lands. Prior to the Khmelnytsky Cossack revolt in the seventeenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth included Ukrainian lands. Prior to W.W.I, Ukrainian lands were divided between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, and during the interwar period among the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Poland had regarded Galicia and Right-bank Ukraine as part of Poland and after defeating the West Ukrainian People's Republic, occupied Eastern Galicia in July 1919, at first receiving recognition from the Entente powers as a temporary military

⁵¹ Bess Brown, "Five CIS States Sign Helsinki Final Act," *RFE/RL* 40 (27 February 1992). Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus signed the Accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 26 February 1992. Russia as the successor to the USSR was already a member.

occupant but in March 1923 granted sovereignty over Galicia.⁵² Hungary continued to claim Zakarpattia, and during 1918-40 northern Bukovina was part of Romania. In June 1940, the USSR annexed northern Bukovina and northern and southern Bessarabia into the Ukrainian SSR and joined central Bessarabia to Moldova (Moldavian SSR).⁵³ The Romanian parliament (24 June 1991) condemned the annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.⁵⁴ In November 1991, Romania rejected the existing Romanian-Ukrainian border, instead suggesting negotiations with Ukraine under the provisions of the OSCE to peacefully change the current borders and, thus, the jurisdiction over northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.⁵⁵ Romania also claimed the tiny island of Serpent at the mouth of the Danube, to establish a favorable boundary marker for future negotiations over maritime boundaries. In response to Romania's claims to Ukrainian territory, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko cancelled his planned trip to Romania.⁵⁶ Throughout the Kravchuk years, Romania continued to insist upon border revisions that Ukraine adamantly refused to consider. Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia made no territorial claims upon Ukraine and recognized the integrity and inviolability of their shared border with Ukraine.

Historically, attempts to adjust state borders to more accurately reflect ethnic settlement in regions of mixed ethnic settlements has unleashed

⁵² Paul Robert Magocsi, *Ukraine A Historical Atlas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 22.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Socor, "Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Condemned by Romania," *Report on the USSR* (19 July 1991), 24.

⁵⁵ Vladimir Socor, "Romanian Government Restates Territorial Claim on Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 230 (5 December 1991).

⁵⁶ Vladimir Socor, "More on Zlenko's Cancelled Visit to Romania," *RFE/RL* 230 (5 December 1991).

emotions that destabilize, promoting violence and ethnic hatred, the latest examples being Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The interwar period in Eastern Europe has demonstrated that denial of full citizenship rights to national minorities and attempts to aggressively assimilate minorities into the titular nation tended to undermine the state and increase tensions between states as adjoining titular homelands reacted to protect the minority from perceived discrimination. Ukraine granted full citizenship rights to all residents living in Ukraine at the time of independence regardless of ethnicity, and made acquiring citizenship through naturalization easy.⁵⁷ Ukraine rejected Russia's suggestion of dual citizenship and efforts to 'protect' Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, defining Ukraine as a civil multiethnic society that guaranteed individual and national rights according to international standards.⁵⁸ Endorsed through referendum, the provisions of the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract contributed to Ukraine's territorial integrity and internal unity.

Commonwealth of Independent States

On 8 December 1991, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Belarus parliamentary Speaker Stanislau

⁵⁷ Lowell Barrington, "The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/5 (July 1995), p. 731, 33p. Retrieved March 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web:
<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

Shushkevich met at [Belovezha] Minsk, Belarus with the stated objective of coordinating economic policy⁵⁹ and discussing international problems and future foreign policy.⁶⁰ They surprised the world by signing the *Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States* that annulled the 1922 Union Treaty that had established the USSR.⁶¹ The CIS agreement removed the USSR as a subject of international law and eliminated Union level structures. Their actions required ratification by republic Supreme Councils. USSR President Gorbachev never approved the CIS agreement.⁶² Ukraine on 5 December, the same day that Kravchuk was sworn in as President, had annulled the 1922 Union Treaty.⁶³ The speed with which other Soviet republics expressed an interest in joining the CIS agreement and the general acceptance by Soviet citizens of the demise of the USSR demonstrates the phenomenal transformation that had occurred under Gorbachev. Soviets had been conditioned by negotiations towards a new Union treaty, the republics' sovereignty and independence declarations, the 17 March 1991 referenda, the

⁵⁸ Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review* 7/7-9 (March-May 1994), 1-9.

⁵⁹ Keith Bush, "Inter-Republican Economic Coordination," *RFE/RL* 231 (6 December 1991); Kathy Mihalisko, "Does Kravchuk Have Something Else to Offer Minsk?" *RFE/RL* 230 (5 December 1991).

⁶⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "Slavic Summit in Minsk," *RFE/RL* 229 (4 December 1991).

⁶¹ "Zaiava hlav derzhav respubliky Bielarus, RRFSR, Ukrainy," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti: zbirnyk, dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: Vyscha shkola, 2000), 203; "Z uhody mizh respublikoiu Bielarus, RRFSR, Ukrainoiu pro stvorennia spivdruzhnosti nezaleznykh derzhav," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko, 203-205.

L.D. Vasyliieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 64-65; Kathy Mihalisko, "Slavic Leaders Establish Commonwealth of Independent States," *RFE/RL* 232 (9 December 1991); Lila Shevtsova, "The August Coup and the Soviet Collapse," *Survival* 34/1 (Spring 1992), 5-18.

⁶² Ann Sheelny, "Gorbachev Issues Statement," *RFE/RL* 233 (10 December 1991).

⁶³ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine Repudiates 1922 Union Treaty," *RFE/RL* 231 (6 December 1991).

failed August coup, the announced elimination of 80 Union ministries and departments,⁶⁴ Russia's takeover of several Union level structures, and Russian President Yeltsin's recognition of Ukraine's independence. President Gorbachev had stated (25 March 1991) in *Der Spiegel* that republics could secede from the Union as independent states⁶⁵ but later suggested Ukraine's vote for independence did not automatically mean secession from the USSR.⁶⁶ Debate and negotiations on a new Union treaty had centered on whether the new Union should be a federation, a confederation, a loose association, or whether the republics should become independent states, all concepts vaguely defined. From these debates and negotiations the Minsk CIS agreement flowed naturally. President Kravchuk, who refused to sign a new Union treaty, regarded the CIS as an instrument for assisting Ukraine to disentangle itself from Union institutions and organizations,⁶⁷ while President Yeltsin regarded it as an instrument through which Russia would replace the USSR.⁶⁸ Debate on the future of the USSR ended, replaced by debate over the future of the CIS and the former Soviet geopolitical space.

President Gorbachev initiated debate on the future of the USSR as he attempted to replace Marxism-Leninism with social democracy and the USSR with a new Union democratically and voluntarily formed through a new Union

⁶⁴ Ann Sheehy, "80 Ministries and Departments to Stop Working November 15," *RFE/RL* 209 (4 November 1991).

⁶⁵ Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Indicates Republics May Leave," *RFE/RL* 59 (25 March 1991).

⁶⁶ Roman Solchanyk, "Gorbachev on Ukrainian Independence," *RFE/RL* 227 (2 December 1991).

⁶⁷ R. Ia. Evzerov, *Ukraina: s Rossiei vmeste ili vroz?* (Moscow: Vesmir, 2000), 67- 80; Graham Smith, *The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition* (London: Arnold, 1999), 161-170.

treaty.⁶⁹ He had repealed the CPSU's monopoly of political power and authorized multi-candidate and multiparty elections, forcing the Communist Party at the Union and republic levels to compete for the electoral support that would now determine the legitimacy of government. Through the July/August 1991 CPSU draft party platform, Gorbachev attempted to transform the CPSU and its republic branches into a Western European type of Social Democratic party, even if it meant splitting the CPSU into a Gorbachev-led Social Democratic party and a conservative Marxist-Leninist party.⁷⁰ In keeping with political power flowing from the will of the people, Gorbachev transferred power from the office of General Secretary to the office of President, from the Communist Party to the USSR Supreme Council. In Ukraine, power shifted from the CPU to the Verkhovna Rada and from the First Secretary to the parliamentary Speaker (and later to the President). The Verkhovna Rada, further legitimized through the March 1990 multi-candidate elections, followed Russia's lead and enacted Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration (16 July 1990). The electoral process with multi-candidate elections had sensitized the republic Verkhovna Rada as an advocate of, and rallying point for, ethnic-national and territorial-republic interests, escalating centripetal forces. Independence declarations by the Baltic States challenged the territorial integrity of the USSR

⁶⁸ A. V. Zagorskii, "Rossiia i SNG," in *Vneshniaia politika Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1992-1999, Uchebnoe posobie*, ed. A. V. Torkunov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), 96-112.

⁶⁹ Jeffrey Surovell, "Gorbachev's Last Year: Leftist or Rightist?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/3 (1994), p. 465, 23p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 0966813) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁷⁰ Mark Sandle, "The Final Word: The Draft Party Programme of July/August 1991," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48/7 (November 1996), p. 1131, 20p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of

while sovereignty demands by republic leaders and Verkhovna Rada infringed upon and increasingly challenged the authority and jurisdiction of the Union center.

President Gorbachev's reforms and policies had weakened the pillars that held the USSR together while Gorbachev lacked the political legitimacy and authority of an elected mandate, having been appointed President by the USSR's Verkhovna Rada. President Gorbachev had alienated conservatives within the CPSU with his reforms and policies, while his wavering had alienated reformers when he backtracked or sided with conservatives. For example, in 1990 he initially supported the radical 500-day Shatalin Plan that would have transformed Soviet society but, thereafter, rejected it, in the process, alienating Yeltsin who emerged as Gorbachev's main rival.⁷¹ The power struggle between the center and the republics over the division of powers and jurisdiction was central to the debate on the new Union treaty. To reassert his authority, maintain central control, and preserve the territorial integrity of the USSR, President Gorbachev turned to the Soviet electorate to determine the fate of the Soviet Union with the question:

Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed? "Yes" or "No."⁷²

Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 0966813) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁷¹ Jeffrey Surovell, "Gorbachev's Last Year: Leftist or Rightist?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/3 (1994), p. 465, 23p.

Not prepared to allow President Gorbachev to undermine and curtail Ukraine's newly acquired sovereignty, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada countered with its own referendum question:

Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics on the basis of the declaration of the state of sovereignty of Ukraine?⁷³

And the western Ukrainian provinces of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk countered with their referendum question:

Do you agree that Ukraine should be an independent state, which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, which guarantees the equal rights of all citizens, regardless of nationality and religion?⁷⁴

All referendum questions⁷⁵ were carefully worded to solicit a favorable "yes" response. 83.5 percent of the Ukraine electorate voted on the All-Union referendum question with 70.16 percent voting "yes" in support of President Gorbachev's vision of a new Union. Countering this endorsement, 83.48 percent of the Ukraine electorate voted on the Ukraine referendum question with 80.17 voting "yes" in support of protecting Ukraine's sovereignty. Gorbachev's question emphasized a renewed federation of equal sovereign states while Ukraine's question defined sovereignty as being based upon its Sovereignty Declaration of 16 July 1990. Western Ukrainians endorsed

⁷² "Resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Organization of and Measures for Conducting a USSR Referendum on the Question of Preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *Izvestiia* (18 January 1991), 3, as reported in *CDSP* 43/3, 29.

⁷³ R. Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR* 3/44 (14 June 1991), 21-22.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

independence through the western Ukrainian referendum question. In comparison, 75.3 percent of the Russian electorate voted on the All-Union referendum question with 73 percent voting "Yes" but these results were countered by 70 percent of the electorate approving the creation of the position of President of the RSFSR by universal suffrage. Yeltsin was elected Russian president and played a pivotal role in the disintegration of the USSR. The referendum results did not resolve the division of powers between the center and the republics and the negotiations on a new Union treaty continued.

Expressing the will of the Verkhovna Rada, parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk repeatedly refused to sign any Union treaty. On 18 March 1991, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev reported that President Gorbachev was asked to head a group of four republics (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) in negotiations to form a new union to preserve the USSR,⁷⁵ but Yeltsin denied that Gorbachev had been invited to head the group.⁷⁷ Boris Yeltsin's rivalry with Gorbachev had also been evident on 14 January 1991 when he announced that the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan had decided to meet in Minsk in the near future to sign a treaty among themselves, without waiting for a Union treaty.⁷⁸ Other republics would be allowed to join later. This statement was made eleven months before the

⁷⁵ For referendum questions and vote results see, CSCE, *Referendum in the Soviet Union, A Compendium of Reports on the March 17, 1991 Referendum on the Future of the USSR*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991).

⁷⁶ Bess Brown and Elizabeth Teague, "Nazarbaev on Group of Four," *RFE/RL* 54 (18 March 1991).

⁷⁷ Elizabeth Teague, "Yeltsin Denies Gorbachev Invited to Head Reunion of Five," *RFE/RL* 54 (18 March 1991).

⁷⁸ I. Demchenko and V. Kurasov, "B. Yeltsin's Press Conference," *Izvestiia* (15 January 1991), 2, as reported *CDSF* 43/2, 9.

signing of the Minsk CIS agreement. Negotiations between President Gorbachev and the republic leaders continued with a new Union treaty agreement being reached, satisfying the concerns of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, but not Ukraine. Among the concerns raised by Ukrainian Premier V. Fokin were provisions in the draft agreement that would have allowed 45 percent of Ukraine's industrial potential to remain under Union management along with Union control of land, sea, and air transportation.⁷⁹ On the eve of the signing of this Union treaty the abortive August coup occurred, followed by the anti-Communist upheaval in Moscow and Ukraine's declaration of independence. As the center was weakened by the participation in the coup of top officials from the CPSU, the KGB, and the military, Russia commenced the takeover of Union responsibilities and institutions.

Preserving the status quo of the discredited USSR was unacceptable to President Gorbachev and all republic leaders, Ukraine refused to sign any new Union treaty and was concerned about Russia replacing the USSR, while President Yeltsin's Russia was not prepared to totally withdraw from the former Soviet geopolitical space. Use of military force to preserve the USSR would destabilize the situation and undermine President Gorbachev's prime objectives in creating a Union of Sovereign Republics through a mutually agreed upon new Union treaty, while an uncontrolled disintegration of the USSR might precipitate border disputes, misunderstandings, chaos, violence, and wars. Ukraine and Russia were politically, economically, militarily, and culturally

⁷⁹ Ann Sheehy, "Ukrainian Premier on Draft Union Treaty," *RFE/RL* 152 (12 August 1991).

bound for over 300 years, including several decades of Soviet rule, making it difficult to instantly sever these deeply ingrained ties. From Ukraine's perspective, negotiations with Moscow and the other eleven republics required a temporary structure for resolving all political, economic, military, and property issues to prevent instability, uncontrolled disintegration, and violence. Russia viewed the CIS as a vehicle through which it would replace the USSR. The amorphous CIS would satisfy the diverse needs of all the former Soviet republics in the post-USSR world.

At Alma-Ata, on 21 December 1991, the CIS was enlarged from 3 to 11 members and later to 12, with all member states being regarded as original co-founders and equal.⁸⁰ Russia's official recognition of Ukraine's independence on 3 December 1991⁸¹ and President Yeltsin's commitment to continue close relations with Belarus, Ukraine,⁸² and the other republics helped insure a peaceful transition from Soviet republics to independent states. By mutual agreement and cooperation republic leaders agreed to dismantle the Soviet Union into its republic parts, and accepted the exclusivity of each republic elite's jurisdiction within its own republic with each republic assuming near total control over all resources and assets on its territory. Each republic exerted ownership and control of all lands, resources, institutions, factories, security and military forces, located within their republic. Territorial residence, not ethnicity, would determine citizenship in each republic. The process was peaceful as the Soviet

⁸⁰ Bess Brown, "Commonwealth of Independent States Proclaimed in Alma-Ata," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

⁸¹ Roman Solchanyk, "Russia Recognizes Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 229 (4 December 1991).

⁸² Roman Solchank, "Yeltsin on Ukrainian Independence," *RFE/RL* 230 (5 December 1991).

republics joined the world community leaving behind their totalitarian tarnished and discredited Marxist-Leninist past. The former Soviet republic elite, transformed into the national elite, promised their peoples and the Western democracies a new beginning, professing to adopt for their newly independent countries standards of state and society associated with Western democracies. Republics were to be transformed into democratic, multi-party, pluralistic, rule-by-law states with capitalist economies. Membership in international organizations was sought and adherence to the rights of individuals and nations promised.

The 8 December CIS agreement⁸³ was a political document addressed to meet the urgent needs of the situation as viewed by its signatories. It was worded in generalities and expressions of intent that could be interpreted to support the polar opposite positions of Russia and Ukraine as to the future structure and development of the CIS and its geopolitical space. The preamble contains such expressions as: "seeking to build democratic law-based states," "inalienable right to self-determination," "principles of equality and noninterference in internal affairs," "rejection of the use of force, economic or any other methods of pressure"; adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and international norms, and the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was terminology that all republic leaders and all former Soviet republics would

⁸³ "Agreement on the Creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), Appendix B, 297-301, and *RFE/RL Research Report* 1/2 (10 Jan. 1992), 4-5.

be pleased to be associated with as they sought a new beginning, and entry into the world community of independent states.

The 14 articles in the Agreement highlight the different issues of concern brought forth by Ukraine and Russia. To express the democratic character and tolerance of the independent states whose borders are not ethnic-national borders and to prevent possible ethnic conflicts there are guarantees of "equal rights and freedoms" for citizens (Art. 2), and a desire "to promote" "the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of the national minorities" (Art. 3). Ukraine's concerns over potential territorial claims and border disputes and Russia's attempt to preserve the unity of the former Soviet space were addressed by inserting the word 'within' into Article 5: "Parties recognize and respect each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing frontiers within the framework of the commonwealth." The Russians wanted to retain under their direct control all former Soviet military forces through a unified CIS command structure, especially nuclear weapons: "preserve and support a common military-strategic space under joint command, including single control of nuclear arms" (Art. 6). A broad "joint activity" category covering: "foreign policy," "formation and development of a common economic space," "development of transport and communications systems," "migration policy," and the "struggle with organized crime" (Art. 7). Minsk, the capital of the Slavic republic of Belarus, was chosen as the CIS headquarters (Art. 14) with membership open to all states of the former USSR (Art. 13) and with members having the right to opt out by giving a one year notice (Art. 10). CIS members

guaranteed the fulfillment of the USSR's international treaty and agreement obligations (Art. 12). The CIS founding agreement could be interpreted by Ukraine and Russia to support diametrically opposite views on the future of the CIS. The CIS agreement provided no mechanism to implement these declarations of intent and to coordinate the activities of members.⁸⁴

President Kravchuk's signing of the CIS agreement was unexpected, as Kravchuk had repeatedly stated that he would not sign any Union treaty. Upon his return, Kravchuk encountered grave concerns that he had betrayed the interests of Ukraine and failed to consult the Verkhovna Rada prior to signing the CIS agreement, while a few supporters interpreted the CIS as a future equivalent of the European Community.⁸⁵ Prior to the Verkhovna Rada ratifying the CIS agreement on 10 December 1991, it debated and made several amendments to the agreement, including changing article six to allow Ukraine to establish its own armed forces from Soviet forces stationed on Ukrainian territory.⁸⁶ The Russian Verkhovna Rada ratified the CIS agreement on 12 December⁸⁷ but it was slightly different from the Ukrainian version that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada had amended before ratifying.

⁸⁴ Ann Sheehy, "Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy Compromise," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1/2 (10 January 1992), 2.

⁸⁵ Vasyl Tuhluk, "Chy stane Minsk novoiu Moskvoiu?" *Holos Ukrainy* 2 (252), (4 January 1992), 3, 6; Kathy Mihalisko, "Tough Questions to Kravchuk on Commonwealth," *RFE/RL* 233 (10 December 1991).

⁸⁶ "Reservations of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine to the Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), Appendix C, 302-304; Kathy Mihalisko, "Belorussia and Ukraine Ratify Commonwealth Agreement," *RFE/RL* 234 (11 December 1991).

⁸⁷ Ann Sheehy, "RSFSR Supreme Soviet Approves Commonwealth Agreement," *RFE/RL* 236 (13 December 1991).

Nahaylo⁸⁸ claims that the 28 August 1991 joint Ukrainian-Russian communique was the prototype for the CIS agreement. When Ukraine had declared its independence on 24 August 1991, the Russian and USSR parliaments responded by dispatching delegations to Kyiv to negotiate with Ukraine. Their negotiated joint communique recognized Ukraine's and Russia's right to state independence, reaffirmed the 1990 Ukraine-Russia bilateral treaty that had recognized each other's borders, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Both countries had also agreed to cooperate to avoid an uncontrolled disintegration and to establish temporary interstate structures that all former Soviet republics could join as equals.

Prior to the CIS meeting at Alma-Ata [21 December], President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada reaffirmed that Ukraine would participate in the CIS only if it remains "a loose association and does not become a new state": there must be no commonwealth citizenship and no joint defense of external CIS borders.⁸⁹ This was reaffirmed by Dmytro Pavlychko, Chair of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, who was quoted as saying Ukraine regards the CIS as temporary, fulfilling a transitional role to enable republics to consolidate their independence and economies.⁹⁰ On 26 December 1991, President Kravchuk restated that the CIS "is supposed to be an association of equals and that Ukraine is not prepared to allow Russia to unilaterally assign a

⁸⁸ Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/8* (19 February 1993), 24.

⁸⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine Reaffirms Its Independence with Respect to New Commonwealth," *RFE/RL 242* (23 December 1991).

⁹⁰ Ann Sheehy, "Ukrainian Presidential Aide Sees Commonwealth as Temporary," *RFE/RL 239* (18 December 1991).

leading role to itself" and to represent the interests of the CIS, an association of 11 independent states.⁹¹ Kravchuk's comments were in response to the European Community's recognition of Russia as the legal successor to the USSR.

The impact of diverse expectations, needs, and concerns upon the development of the CIS increased as its membership expanded from 3 to 11 at Alma-Ata (21 December).⁹² Within the next few months the decisions made at CIS Heads of State Council summits determined the future structures and direction of the CIS, resulting in the CIS evolving into an amorphous organization that met the basic needs of all participating countries but completely satisfied none. At the Alma-Ata meeting, members recognized the independence and current borders of all former Soviet republics and Russia was granted the USSR Security Council seat.⁹³ A Council of Heads of State and a Council of Heads of Government was established that would meet twice a year, and consideration was given to several ministerial committees.⁹⁴ The nuclear arms issue was addressed through an "Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons" signed by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan that confirmed all strategic nuclear weapons were to be removed

⁹¹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine Objects to Russia Being a 'First Among Equals,'" *RFE/RL* 243 (27 December 1991).

⁹² L. D. Vasyliieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 65-66; Mykola Tomenko et al., *Abetka ukrainskoi polityky: dovidnyk* (Kyiv: 'Smoloskyp', 2000), 206-219.

⁹³ Bess Brown, "Commonwealth of Independent States Proclaimed in Alma-Ata," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

⁹⁴ Alexander Rahr, "The Commonwealth's Central Structure," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

from Ukraine and Belarus to Russia for dismantling.⁹⁵ USSR Defense Minister Evgenii Shaposhnikov was named CIS commander-in-chief of strategic and conventional forces while the republics were permitted to establish their own armies and Ukraine a small navy.⁹⁶

At the Minsk CIS Heads of State Council meeting (30 December 1991)⁹⁷ disagreements increased among members over military and economic issues and Russia's role within the CIS, with Ukraine determined to protect its independence, establish its own armed forces, and pursue its own foreign policy.⁹⁸ None of the fifteen agreements dealt with coordinating economic reforms and the freeing of prices. The military agreement covered strategic forces, nuclear weapons, and the Soviet armed forces. It granted President Yeltsin control over nuclear weapons but restricted their use to prior agreement with the three countries where nuclear weapons were stationed, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and consultation with all CIS states, thus enabling Kravchuk to claim that he could prevent the use of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil.⁹⁹ At Ukraine's insistence the agreement acknowledged the right of the countries to establish their own national armies¹⁰⁰ with Ukraine immediately taking control over all troops stationed on its territory and requiring

⁹⁵ Doug Clarke, "Alma-Ata Agreement on Nuclear Weapons," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

⁹⁶ Stephan Foye, "Shaposhnikov Named Interim Commander," and "Two Defense Plans," *RFE/RL* 242 (23 December 1991).

⁹⁷ L. D. Vasylieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 66-67; Bohdan Nahaylo, "CIS Leaders Begin Crucial Summit Meeting in Minsk," *RFE/RL* 244 (30 December 1991); Ann Sheehy, "Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy Compromise," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1/2 (10 Jan. 1992), 1-5.

⁹⁸ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Kravchuk on Ukrainian Independence and the Commonwealth," *RFE/RL* 244 (30 December 1991).

⁹⁹ Doug Clarke, "Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces," *RFE/RL* 1 (2 January 1992).

all military personnel to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.¹⁰¹ The Minsk agreement provided for a bilateral Russia-Ukraine panel of experts to be established to resolve disputes on the division of military assets in Ukraine, including the Black Sea Fleet.¹⁰² The broadly defined 'strategic forces' quickly became a controversial issue as Ukraine regarded the Black Sea Fleet to be non-strategic while Russia regarded it as strategic. Kravchuk was satisfied that the Minsk decisions did not interfere with Ukraine's internal and foreign policy spheres,¹⁰³ while anticipating and objecting to Russia's takeover of all USSR embassies around the world, stressing that all CIS states had a right to a portion of USSR assets in other countries.¹⁰⁴

The CIS Moscow Heads of State Council meeting (16 January 1992) discussed military and economic issues and established an organizational group to prepare future CIS meetings. A special commission composed of Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS military high command was established to resolve the division and ownership of the Black Sea Fleet.¹⁰⁵ At the CIS Minsk meeting (14 February 1992) most of the documents signed were declarations of intent, the definition of strategic forces was still vague, and many issues were left unresolved.¹⁰⁶ At their 13 March meeting, the CIS Heads of Government Council reached an agreement on the division of the USSR external debt with

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Foye, "CIS Leaders Stumble over United Army," *RFE/RL* 1 (2 January 1992).

¹⁰¹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine Takes Control of Armed Forces on Its Territory," *RFE/RL* 2 (3 January 1992).

¹⁰² Stephen Foye, "Ukraine, Russia Reach Compromise on Armed Forces," *RFE/RL* 7 (13 January 1992).

¹⁰³ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine Generally Satisfied with Minsk CIS Summit," *REF/RL* 1 (2 January 1992).

¹⁰⁴ Suzanne Crow, "Russia Takes over All USSR Embassies," *RFE/RL* 3 (7 January 1992).

¹⁰⁵ Stephen Foye, "Limited Progress on Military Issues," *RFE/RL* 11 (17 January 1992).

Ukraine to assume 16% of the debt.¹⁰⁷ At the Kyiv CIS Heads of State Council meeting (20 March 1992) the diversity of opinion on military, economic, and political questions increased with Ukraine refusing to sign most documents.¹⁰⁸ The leaders failed to agree on the composition of the CIS strategic forces and a joint military budget. Ukraine's disinterest in CIS structures was further evident at the May Tashkent CIS summit where Prime Minister Fokin not President Kravchuk attended, and where six states signed the Collective Security agreement but not Ukraine.¹⁰⁹

Russia's interest in the former Soviet geopolitical space was multidimensional.¹¹⁰ From the defense perspective, the USSR's defense perimeters had been established along its external borders and not along the Russian Federation's borders with adjacent former Soviet republics. All former Soviet republics, except Armenia and Moldova, border on the Russian Federation. Originally, Russia's political and military leaders had attempted to retain control and influence over the former Soviet geopolitical-military space

¹⁰⁶ Doug Clarke, "Another Strategic Agreement Signed," *RFE/RL* 32 (17 February 1992).

¹⁰⁷ Keith Bush, "CIS Agreement on Debt Repayment," *RFE/RL* 52 (16 March 1992).

¹⁰⁸ "Interviu prezidenta Ukrainy L. Kravchuka telekompanii 'Ostakkino'," on 22 March 1992, *Holos Ukrainy* 53 (303), (24 March 1992), 3, 7; "Pro shcho domovymos? Zustrich kerivnykiv nezaleznykh derzhav spivdruzhnosti vidbulasia vchora u Kyievi," *Holos Ukrainy* 52 (302), (21 March 1992), 1-2; Anatolii Krasliansky and Svitlana Pysarenko, "Kyivska zustrich: iakshcho ne perelomna, to chy potribna nastupna?- Pres-Konferentsiia hlav derzhav SND," *Holos Ukrainy* 53 (303), (24 March 1992), 2; Vitalii Portnikov, "Sodruzhestvo eto mechta- posle Kievskoi vstrechi-pochti nesbytochnaia," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (24 March 1992), 1-2.

¹⁰⁹ Stephen Foye, "CIS Collective Security Agreement," *RFE/RL* 94 (18 May 1992). Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Armenia signed the Collective Security agreement; Vitalii Portnikov, "Rossiia obratilas litsom k azi, chtobyl stat garantom stabilnosti v regione?" *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (19 May 1992), 1.

¹¹⁰ Liubomyr Skochylas, "Imperska polityka Rosii v SND," *Henezha* 1 (3) (1995), 200-205; Andranik Migranian, "Rossiia i blizhnee zarubezhe - stanovlenie novogo vneshnepolicheskogo kursa RF (vvodnye zamechaniia)," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (12 January 1994), 1, 4; Andranik Migranian, "Rossiia i blizhnee zarubezhe- vse prostranstvo byvshego SSSR iavliaetsia sferoi zhiznennykh interesov Rossii," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (18 January 1994), 4-5, 8.

through the CIS military command structure, dominated by ethnic Russian officers, but Russia encountered stiff resistance from Ukraine and other CIS countries. As the Soviet armed forces had been stationed throughout the USSR, a broad definition of 'strategic' would have resulted in Russian-controlled CIS military forces continuing to be stationed in each CIS country, including Ukraine, potentially undermining Ukraine's independence. Further, the definition of 'strategic' predetermined the potential size and capacity of the 'conventional' armed forces that could be established by Ukraine and the other CIS countries. While the CIS command was formally subordinated to the CIS Council of Heads of State, in reality the CIS armed forces were governed by the personal relationship between President Yeltsin and CIS commander Shaposhnikov, and by an absence of a clear division between the CIS command and the Russian government.¹¹¹ In addition to the unified CIS command structure, Russia could potentially exert influence and control over the armed forces established by CIS countries due to the predominance of ethnic Russian officers, who through an oath of allegiance continued to serve in post-Soviet republics, including in Ukraine.

Resistance to CIS military integration under Russian control had been strong among several CIS members, especially Ukraine, who feared losing their independence through a centrally controlled military.¹¹² As early as February 1992, substantial disinterest by CIS members in any unified CIS military

¹¹¹ Stephen Foye, "The CIS Armed Forces," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/1* (1 January 1993), 42.

¹¹² William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, "Commonwealth of Independent States," Chapter 4, *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations*, McNair Paper Number

structure had already resulted in the CIS military command having prepared a plan that would have allocated two-thirds of CIS (Soviet) non-nuclear forces to Russia and the balance distributed to other CIS members.¹¹³ This ratio would have prevented any military rivals to Russia from emerging among other CIS countries. In March 1992, the Russian Verkhovna Rada urged President Yeltsin to establish a Russian Defense Ministry, which Yeltsin did on 16 March 1992,¹¹⁴ followed by a decree that established the Russian army that would "incorporate ground forces, naval forces, MVD troops, a defense ministry, general staff,...include all troops in Russia, along with those troops now deployed outside of the borders of the CIS."¹¹⁵ Shaposhnikov, commander of CIS forces, in February 1992, endorsed the return of Russian military traditions and uniforms, and in May 1992 he complained that CIS forces existed only on paper and endorsed the creation of a Russian army.¹¹⁶ In May 1992, President Yeltsin held a closed door meeting on Russia's military doctrine and the formation of the Russian armed forces.¹¹⁷

58 (June 1998). Retrieved 2000 from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair58/m58cont.html>.

¹¹³ Stephen Foye, "CIS Defense Changes," *RFE/RL* 27 (10 February 1992).

¹¹⁴ Stephen Foye, "Russia to Create Own Army," *RFE/RL* 46 (6 March 1992); Doug Clarke, "Yeltsin Established Russian Defense Ministry," *RFE/RL* 53 (17 March 1992).

¹¹⁵ Stephen Foye, "Russia to Create Own Army," *RFE/RL* 30 (13 February 1992).

¹¹⁶ Doug Clarke, "Shaposhnikov on Russian Traditions, Soviet Marshals," *RFE/RL* 30 (13 February 1992); Stephen Foye, "Shaposhnikov on CIS Problems," *RFE/RL* 84 (4 May 1992); Pavel Felgengauer, "Sopernichestvo Ukrainy i Rossii za armiiu, flot, i Krym obostriaetsia-Dmitrii Volkogonov: 'my budem deistvovat iskhodia iz interesov Rossii' - na formirovanie rossiiskoi armii otpushchen mesiatz," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (9 April 1992), 1-2.

¹¹⁷ Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Chairs talks on Military Doctrine," *RFE/RL* 87 (7 May 1992); William E. Odom, "The Soviet Military Changes Names," in *The Legacy of the Soviet Bloc*, ed. Jane Shapiro Zacek and Ilpyong J. Kim (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1997), 16-35.

The CIS Collective Security treaty¹¹⁸ was signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 by six states¹¹⁹ (not Ukraine); however, funding for a permanent CIS military structure remained an issue.¹²⁰ In January 1993, the Russian Defense Ministry started to assert greater control and jurisdiction over all strategic forces, including nuclear weapons, stationed throughout the former USSR republics, while simultaneously insisting that a Warsaw Pact command structure model, not the NATO model, be used for CIS conventional forces.¹²¹ This move was accompanied by Russia's decreased funding of the CIS command structure and the increased tendency for Russia to sign bilateral security agreements with CIS members (not Ukraine).¹²² In August 1993, CIS defense ministers agreed to discontinue attempts to maintain a unified CIS command structure under Russian control and abolished the position of CIS command-in-chief and dissolved the CIS Joint military command¹²³ while widening defense cooperation among the signatories to the CIS Collective Security treaty.¹²⁴ Russia had effectively used the CIS umbrella to justify the majority of former

¹¹⁸ "Treaty on CIS Collective Security," in Stephen Foye, "The Soviet Legacy," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/25 (18 June 1993), 4-5.

¹¹⁹ John Lepingwell, "CIS Collective Security Pact Discussed," *RFE/RL* 53 (18 March 1993); Stephen Foye, "CIS Collective Security Agreement," *RFE/RL* 94 (18 May 1992).

[Signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Armenia. Joined later by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus]; Stephen Foye, "Russia Ratified Collective Security Treaty," *RFE/RL* 145 (2 August 1993).

¹²⁰ Stephen Foye, "CIS Defense Ministers Make Little Progress," *RFE/RL* 161 (24 August 1993).

¹²¹ Pavel Felgengauier, "Segodnia problemy SNG obsuzhdaiutsia na vstreche v verkhakh v Bishkeke," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (8 October 1992), 1; Stephen Foye, "The Armed Forces of the CIS: Legacies and Strategies," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/1 (January 1994), 18-21.

¹²² Stephen Foye, "Russia behind the Break-Up?" *RFE/RL* 112 (16 June 1993).

¹²³ Stephen Foye, "CIS Defense Chiefs Reach Agreements," *RFE/RL* 162 (25 August 1993) and "CIS Joint Command Abolished," *RFE/RL* 112 (16 June 1993) and "End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?" *RFE/RL* 2/27 (2 July 1993), 45-49.

¹²⁴ Stephen Foye, "Collective Security Signatories Widen Cooperation," *RFE/RL* 162 (25 August 1993).

Soviet military personnel and equipment remaining under CIS military command and Russian control, which subsequently Russia transferred to its jurisdiction and ownership. This trend from unified CIS command to bilateral agreements was also evident with the Black Sea Fleet, when the fleet was transferred from CIS command to joint Russia-Ukraine jurisdiction. As Russia's military policy shifted from unified CIS command to regional collective security treaties, bilateral agreements, and peacekeeping operations, Ukraine continued to refuse to participate.

The shift to peacekeeping operations commenced when Russia in 1993 lobbied the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to recognize the CIS as a regional and international organization, grant their approval, and provide material and financial assistance for CIS peacekeeping operations within the CIS space.¹²⁵ Designation of CIS peacekeepers as United Nations or CSCE peacekeepers would have assisted Russia in justifying its 'peacekeeping' efforts in CIS countries, and in reasserting Russian influence over the former Soviet geopolitical space.¹²⁶ Russia's objective was to use the CIS as the vehicle to enforce its own Monroe Doctrine and to carry out peacekeeping operations within CIS countries using mainly Russian troops. Russia's Military Doctrine (November 1993) emphasized Russia's claim to special peacekeeping rights in the CIS. Russia

¹²⁵ Suzanne Crow, "CIS an International Organization?" *RFE/RL* 246 (27 December 1993) and "Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/11 (18 March 1994), 33-38; Celeste A. Wallander, "Conflict Resolution and Peace Operations in the Former Soviet Union: Is There a Role for Security Institutions?" in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 101-122.

1) has special interests in CIS geopolitical space; 2) a special responsibility for the security of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians, and Russian speakers in CIS countries;¹²⁷ and 3) regional and global responsibilities.¹²⁸ Russia continuously stressed that the former external borders of the former USSR should be commonly defended. On 30 April 1994, President Yeltsin issued an order for 30 Russian military bases in CIS countries.¹²⁹ Ukraine and other CIS countries were suspicious of Russian intentions and strongly objected to Russia's plans for the CIS, and its peacekeeping operations within the former Soviet space. The United Nations and the CSCE did not approve of Russia's plans to have Russian-controlled CIS troops designated as U. N. peacekeepers within the CIS.¹³⁰ Peacekeepers sent into conflict areas should be impartial, neutral, and it was doubtful that Russian/CIS peacekeepers would be impartial.

During 1993, Russia had adopted a more aggressive stance with its CIS neighbors, the 'near abroad,' as it attempted to establish greater influence throughout the CIS space, not through direct Russian rule, but by citing mutual

¹²⁶ Suzanne Crow, "Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/11 (18 March 1994), 33-38; Michael R. Lucas, "Russia and Peacekeeping in the Former USSR," *Aussenpolitik* 46/2 (1995), 145-156.

¹²⁷ Martin Klatt, "Russians in the 'Near Abroad,'" *RFE/RL Research Paper* 3/32 (19 Aug. 1994), 33-44.

¹²⁸ Michael R. Lucas, "Russia and Peacekeeping in the former USSR," *Aussenpolitik* 46/2 (1995), 148.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*; "Diplomatiia: Kozyrev - za voennoe prisutstvie v sosednikh gosudarstvakh- MID provel soveshchanie po vneshchnei politike Rossii," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (19 January 1994), 1.

¹³⁰ Mikhail Karpov, "Diplomatiia: Butrosa-Gali blagodarili vse- gensek OON otvechal tem zhe, no stoial na svoem," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (5 April 1994), 1; William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, "Commonwealth of Independent States," Chapter 4 in *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations*, McNair Paper No. 58 (June 1998). Retrieved 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair58/m58cont.html>.

economic interdependence, security concerns, and a common heritage.¹³¹ Zagorski writes that Russian policy towards the CIS countries changed from 1991 to 1994.¹³² When the CIS was established, Zagorski states, Russia was more interested in concentrating its energies on its economic and political transformation rather than worrying about the other CIS republics. During 1992, Russia tried to maintain the unity of the CIS space and patiently waited for the economic interdependence of CIS states to bring them into a consolidated CIS. During 1993 and into 1994, Russia sought to reintegrate the CIS countries into a consolidated CIS through peacekeeping methods and as the guarantor of peace and stability. Zagorski mentions some of the methods used by Russia for encouraging reintegration of CIS countries: protect and strengthen the positions of Russian speakers in CIS countries; the gradual formation of supranational institutions for the CIS with the approval of CIS members; creation of an economic union; military-technical cooperation with other CIS countries; fulfilling the provisions of the Treaty of Collective Security; stopping the further subdivision of Soviet forces and stationing Russian troops in CIS countries; peacekeeping operations; and joint control over the external borders of the former USSR. Ethnic Russians dominated all CIS structures from the moment they were established. Russia was assisted in exerting its influence over other CIS countries by the lack of Western economic assistance to other

¹³¹ Maxim Shashenkov, "Russian Peacekeeping in the 'Near Abroad'," *Survival* 36/3 (Autumn 1994): 44-69; Elizabeth Teague, "The CIS: An Unpredictable Future," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/1 (7 January 1994), 9-12.

¹³² Andrei Zagorski, "Reintegration in the Former USSR?" *Aussenpolitik* 45/3 (1994), 263-272.

CIS countries that continued to be economically dependent upon Russia, especially for energy supplies.

The CIS Charter that defined the rights and obligations of members was signed by seven members (but not Ukraine) on 22 January 1993 and came into force in January 1994.¹³³ The CIS Charter deals with military-political-economic cooperation including committing members to an agreed policy of international security, disarmament, and the structuring of armed forces,¹³⁴ which violates Ukraine's declaration of neutrality. Ukraine objected to the CIS Charter, comparing it to the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 and to the Union Treaty of 1922, while declaring the Charter's references to a common economic space, joint external borders, and harmonizing of legislation, as unacceptable.¹³⁵ Ukraine's fear of absorption by Russia distanced Ukraine from the Charter.

Since the establishment of the CIS, there have been constant references to economic cooperation, creating a single economic space, and cooperating in price increases, all failing to become a reality despite the high economic interdependence among republics at the time of the USSR collapse.¹³⁶ Ukraine and the other CIS republics focused on protecting their economic sovereignty and overcoming their domestic economic crises as they individually moved

¹³³ Ann Sheehy, "Seven States Sign Charter Strengthening CIS," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/9* (26 February 1993), 10-14; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Strong Opposition in Ukraine to Proposed CIS Charter," *RFE/RL 3* (7 January 1993); Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the CIS: A Troubled Relationship," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/7* (12 February 1993), 23-27; Ann Sheehy "The CIS Charter," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/12* (19 March 1993), 23-27. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the CIS Charter.

¹³⁴ Ann Sheehy, "The CIS Charter," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/12* (19 March 1993), 24-25.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 26-27.

¹³⁶ Erick Whitlock, "Ukrainian-Russian Trade: The Economic of Dependency," *REF/RL Research Report 2/43* (29 October 1993), 38-42.

towards a mixed capitalist economy at different speeds¹³⁷ resulting in increased economic autarchy and severed trade and production links.¹³⁸ At the 14 May 1993 CIS meeting in Moscow, President Kravchuk endorsed the declaration of intent to establish an economic union;¹³⁹ however, the Verkhovna Rada debated before agreeing President Kravchuk could attend the 24 September 1993 CIS summit in Moscow where an Economic Union would be discussed and signed.¹⁴⁰ Ukraine, facing a severe economic crisis, signed the Economic Union agreement as an associate member¹⁴¹ but no economic union was actually established. In fact, Whitlock quotes Yeltsin as saying that the economic union did not necessarily mean an economic union but a variety of preferential trading arrangements with some CIS countries stopping at customs union, others at currency union, others at whatever level of integration they were comfortable with.¹⁴² Despite talk of economic integration, trade among CIS members decreased while their trade with non-CIS members greatly

¹³⁷ Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," *Slavic Review* 58/4 (Winter 1999), 756-793; Gertrude Schroeder, "The Economic Transformation Process in the Post-Soviet States," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 243-276.

¹³⁸ L. D. Vasyliieva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 67-89; Erik Whitlock, "The CIS Economies: Divergent and Troubled Paths," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/1 (7 January 1994), 13-17 and "The CIS Economy," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/1 (1 January 1993), 46-49.

¹³⁹ "O zaiavlenii pravitelstv respublik- Belarus, Rossiiskoi Federatsii, i Ukrainy o neotlozhnykh merakh po uglubleniiu ekonomicheskoi integratsii," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (21 July 1993), 1, 3; Erik Whitlock, "CIS Heads Call For Economic Integration," *RFE/RL* 93 (17 May 1993) and "Obstacles to CIS Economic Integration," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/27 (2 July 1993), 34-38.

¹⁴⁰ Alexander Rahr, "Ukraine Debates CIS Summit Participation," *RFE/RL* 183 (23 September 1993).

¹⁴¹ Keith Bush, "Economic Union Treaty Signed," *RFE/RL* 185 (27 September 1993).

¹⁴² Erik Whitlock, "Obstacles to CIS Economic Integration," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/27 (2 July 1993), 34-35.

increased.¹⁴³ In fact, the World Bank estimated that trade among CIS countries fell 50% in constant rubles from the end of 1990 to the end of 1992.¹⁴⁴

In March 1992, under the determined leadership of Russian parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov the Interparliamentary Assembly [IPA] was established, headquartered in St. Petersburg's Tauride Palace.¹⁴⁵ In the background was a bitter power struggle between Russian President Yeltsin and Russian parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov concerning the delineation of powers between the Russian president and the Verkhovna Rada and over the future direction of Russia, the CIS, and the former Soviet geopolitical space. The IPA was not part of the CIS structures and it had no centralizing, legislative, or coordinating functions. Seven states joined the IPA: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and sent parliamentary delegations to IPA Council of Assembly meetings held every two years.¹⁴⁶ Ukrainian parliamentary Speaker Pliushch regarded the IPA as an unnecessary suprastate structure and Ukraine refused to participate

¹⁴³ Oleh Havrylyshyn, "Reviving NIS trade," *Economy Policy*, A European Forum no. 19 supplement (December 1994), 171-187; Oleh Havrylyshyn, "Ukraine: Looking West, Looking East," *The Harriman Review* 10/3 (Winter 1997), 19-23; Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51/3 (May 1999). Retrieved 2000 from the University of Alberta Library databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 09668136), on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Erik Whitlock, "The CIS Economies: Divergent and Troubled Paths," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/1 (7 January 1994), 15.

¹⁴⁵ Vladimir Todres, "Glavy parlamentov SNG soveshchaitesia v Peterburge- iavilis chetvero, dvoe prislali zamestitelei," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (22 December 1992), 3; Jan S. Adams, "CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/26 (25 June 1993), 19-23; Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51/3 (May 1999).

¹⁴⁶ Jan S. Adams, "CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/26 (25 June 1993), 19

preferring bilateral Russia-Ukraine parliamentary discussions.¹⁴⁷ Khasbulatov, elected the IPA's first chairman, had hoped that the IPA would evolve into a CIS parliament, which it did not.

Ukraine's resistance to the CIS becoming a permanent organization and its refusal to sign CIS agreements that infringed upon Ukraine's independence helped shape the structure and internal operations of the CIS, greatly contributing to the ability of all CIS republics to develop in independent and diverse ways.¹⁴⁸ The CIS members can be understood as two groups: 1) Russia,¹⁴⁹ Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia would support greater integration, 2) Ukraine, Moldova, Turkmenia, and Azerbaijan would resist integration.¹⁵⁰ Russia successfully encouraged all former Soviet republics, except the Baltics, to become members of the CIS. Participation within the CIS was very optional, voluntary, and fluid as all decisions are reached by consensus, members may abstain from participating, are not bound by any decisions, are not required to sign documents, and CIS agreements are not legally binding with most being mere declarations of intention.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 19.

¹⁴⁸ Vladimir Skachko, "U Kieva po-prezhnemu osoboii vzgliad na vooruzheniia i flot," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (15 October 1992, 3; Andrei Zagorski, "What Kind of a CIS Would Do?" *Aussenpolitik* 46/3 (1995), 263-270; Ann Sheehy, "The CIS: A Shaky Edifice," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/1 (1 January 1993), 37-40; Andrei Lipsky, "SNG god spustia: itogi i perspektivy- ot raspada k integratsii?" *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (22 December 1992), 3; Allen Lynch, "Postcommunist Political Dynamics: Ex Uno Plura," *RFE/RL Research Paper* 3/1 (7 January 1994), 1-8.

¹⁴⁹ Boris Yeltsin, "CIS, A Not So Happy Birthday," *Transitions* (June 1997), 12.

¹⁵⁰ Ann Sheehy, "The CIS: A Shaky Edifice," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/1 (1 Jan. 1993), 37-40.

¹⁵¹ William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, "Commonwealth of Independent States," Chapter 4 in *Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations*, McNair Paper No. 58 (June 1998). Retrieved 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair58/m58cont.html>.

The CIS, paradoxically, turns out to be one of the central institutions maintaining the sovereignty and independence of the Soviet successor states. In this sense, its importance lies not so much in what it can do but in preventing what would be done in its absence.¹⁵²

Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin had agreed that the time had come to end the existence of the USSR and to remove the Union level structures when they signed the CIS agreement on 8 December 1991 but they had different plans for the CIS. Their opposing positions shaped the CIS and determined the destiny of the former Soviet geopolitical space. Repeatedly, Ukraine refused to commit itself to CIS structures and projects, and to documents that might infringe on its independence, as it regarded the CIS to be a vehicle to disentangle, not perpetuate, Ukraine's ties with Moscow. The CIS was to be a vehicle through which the heads of state and government would meet and agree to the division of Soviet assets and liabilities including military forces, assist member states on the road to political independence and economic readjustment, and coordinate short-term economic activities including price increases. During the life of the CIS, the republics have drifted economically, politically, and militarily apart but continue to meet and discuss common issues of concern while bilateral and regional agreements among members have increased but have not necessary been fulfilled. The CIS continues to exist, meeting the needs of former Soviet republics in a non-threatening, voluntary way. The CIS has become a commonwealth closer to the British type than a

¹⁵² Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51/3 (May 1999).

successor to the USSR that President Gorbachev had advocated.¹⁵³ The CIS complemented President Kravchuk's nation and state-building priorities.

¹⁵³ Ann Sheehy, "Gorbachev Letter to Alma-Ata Meeting," *RFE/RL* 241 (20 December 1991).

Chapter 7

CRIMEAN SEPARATISM

The Crimean political elite looked to their ethnic brethren in Moscow for moral support and political pronouncements, but they looked to Kyiv for a successful example of how to achieve greater political and economic sovereignty, even independence, for Crimea. Ukraine's methods of achieving independence were imitated in many respects by Crimean leaders, but failed because the republic center, Kyiv, did not implode and the leadership and residents of Ukraine's other administrative units, the oblasts, did not share Crimea's quest for independence. In support of their movement the Crimean elite also did not adopt a social contract and a national rebirth program that would generate a feeling of inclusion by all the Crimean people and the formation of a distinct identity, different from Russians and Ukrainians. Ukraine's social contract recognized the right of the Russian language to be used in compact settlement areas like Crimea and guaranteed individual and national minority rights according to international standards.¹ In its pursuit of sovereignty, Crimea benefited from the predominance of ethnic Russians in Crimea and from Crimea's distinctive history, having been transferred in 1954

from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. During the Kravchuk years, Crimea and its political leaders became willing pawns and beneficiaries in the power struggle between Ukraine and Russia over the division of the Black Sea Fleet's vessels and land-based assets.² Having gone through the process Kravchuk knew how to respond, confident that international recognition of Crimean sovereignty or its transfer to Russia would not be forthcoming. President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada adhered to the social contract emphasizing compromise, elite accommodation and concessions, stability, respect of the electoral will of the people, reliance on constitutional, legislated, and diplomatic initiatives, while stressing the inviolability of Ukraine's borders and noninterference in Ukraine's internal affairs. Forcefully adjusting Ukraine's borders would violate the CIS agreement³ and the 1990 Ukraine-Russia treaty,⁴ destabilize the region, and lead to possible ethnic conflicts that could spread to other CIS and East-Central European countries. During the Crimean crisis, the United Nations, the OSCE, the United States, and other western countries verbally supported Ukraine, cautioned Russia, while Russian support for Crimean separatism remained limited to verbal pronouncements by nationalists and a few parliamentarians.

¹ "Iz zakonu URSR 'Pro movy v Ukrainskii RSR'," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko (Kyiv: 'Vyscha shkola', 2000), 179-180; "Deklaratsiia prav natsionalnosti Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* (Kyiv) 231 (29 November 1991), 2.

² Mykhailo Lukiniuk, *Ukraina-Krym-Rosiiia- suchashe na tli mynuloho, abo stari mify i nova realnist vzaiemyn* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo 'Biblioteka ukrainsia', 2000).

³ "Z uhody mizh respublikoiu Bielarus, RRFSSR, Ukrainoiu pro stvorennia spivdruzhnosti nezaleznykh derzhav," in *Ukraina v XX stolitti: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. N. M. Shevchenko, 203-205; "Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996), Appendix B, 297-301.

Crimea, linguistically Russian and 67% ethnically Russian, has a large Soviet-era nomenklatura and military retiree community with historically strong ties to Moscow, not Kyiv. Within the USSR and within Ukraine, Crimea has occupied a unique geo-strategic space on the periphery of the state, surrounded by water except for a narrow land bridge connecting the peninsula to the mainland. It has been and remains dependent upon Ukraine for its electricity, food, and water supplies, and like Ukraine, upon Russia for energy supplies. Historically, the Black Sea Fleet's homeport, Sevastopol, had special status, its administration divided between civilian and military control, the civil administration subordinate to Kyiv and the military administration previously under Soviet naval command. Within Ukraine, the two cities of Sevastopol and Kyiv enjoy an administrative and electoral status equal to Ukraine's provinces.

The year 1990 witnessed the acceleration of the devolution of power in the USSR and an increase in the prestige and influence of Soviet republics as they enacted sovereignty declarations with the approval and support of President Gorbachev. They entered into bilateral agreements among themselves unaware that the invincible USSR would unexpectedly cease to exist and they would become independent states. Crimea joined the devolution process by holding a referendum on 20 January 1991 wherein 93.3% of the electorate voted in favor of Crimea acquiring republic status (within Ukraine).⁵

⁴ "Treaty on Relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 20 (1996), Appendix A, 302-304. Signed 19 November 1990.

⁵ Roman Solchanyk, "Kravchuk Satisfied with Crimea Referendum Vote," *RFE/RL* 20 (29 January 1991); Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 342-343.

Since its creation in 1921, the Crimean ASSR had been part of the Russian SFSR.⁶ In 1954, Crimea had been transferred to Ukraine as an oblast. Parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk approved of the results and the Verkhovna Rada on 12 February 1991 restored Crimea's autonomy.⁷ As a formality, on 22 March 1991, Nikolai Bahrov, head of the Crimean Oblast Rada, was elected parliamentary Speaker of the Crimean ASSR and a commission was established to prepare a new constitution in keeping with Crimea's new status.⁸ On 26 February 1992, Crimea was renamed the Republic of Crimea and, like Ukraine, adopted a state anthem.⁹ As in Ukraine, so in Crimea, there were no new parliamentary elections and a presidential-parliamentary system was chosen. Only in September 1993 did the Crimean parliament approve new parliamentary elections (held in March 1994 like for the Verkhovna Rada) and passed legislation for the election of the president by direct popular vote for a four-year term (held on 16 January 1994).¹⁰

The issue of Crimean separatism emerged during Ukraine's independence referendum.¹¹ While 54.19 percent in Crimea and 57.07 percent

⁶ Paul Robert Magocsi, *Ukraine: A Historical Atlas*, 22.

⁷ Kathy Mihalisko, "Crimean Autonomy Recognized," *RFE/RL* (36 (20 February 1991); Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 345-346.

⁸ Kathy Mihalisko, "Crimean ASSR Chooses New Chairman, Prepares Constitution," *RFE/RL* 59 (25 March 1991).

⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea Changes Its Name," *RFE/RL* 40 (27 February 1992) and "Crimea and Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 41 (28 February 1992).

¹⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "Stormy Session of Crimean Parliament," *RFE/RL* 59 (26 March 1993); "Crimean Presidency Law," *RFE/RL* 181 (21 September 1993).

¹¹ David R. Marples and David F. Duke, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Question of Crimea," *Nationalities Papers* 23/2 (June 1995), 261-289; Kostiantyn Paryshkura, "Iak rozihruiets' Krymska karta...", and "Ukrainska federatsiia i Krym," *Holos Ukrainy* 193 (4 October 1991), 12-13. Along with the articles appeared a cartoon that showed two masked bandits trying to steal Crimea by sawing Crimea off from Ukraine; Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/1 (January/February 1994), p. 47, 22p. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library

in Sevastopol voted 'yes' in support of Ukraine's independence,¹² some Crimean ethnic Russians pressured the Crimean parliament to hold a Crimea referendum to secede from Ukraine if Ukraine seceded from the USSR. The issue intensified during the Russia-Ukraine dispute over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, placing the Crimean elite in a strong situation to press for increased Crimean political and economic autonomy to their benefit. The Crimean crisis had three components: the Russia-Ukraine negotiations over the BSF, Russian parliamentary claims to Crimea and Sevastopol, and Kyiv-Simferopol negotiations on the delineation of powers, all interwoven.

Control of Levers of Power

The control of the levers of political, economic, and military power in Crimea by ethnic Russians worked to the advantage of the secessionists who used their strength to mobilize the ethnic-political forces seeking secession from Ukraine.¹³ Taras Kuzio and David J. Meyer¹⁴ compared ethnic Russian mobilization efforts in the Donbas and Crimea.¹⁵ They write that in the Donbas, ethnic Russians lacking their own administrative, political, social, and economic institutions joined with their ethnic Ukrainian neighbors with whom they shared a

databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item no. 09668136), on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

¹² "Vidomosti pro rezultaty vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrainy," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 38/39 (43/44) (December 1991).

¹³ Andrew Wilson, "Crimea's Political Cauldron," *RFE/RL* 2/45 (12 Nov. 1993), 1-8.

¹⁴ Taras Kuzio and David J. Meyer, "The Donbas and Crimea: An Institutional and Demographic Approach to Ethnic Mobilization in Two Ukrainian Regions," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 297-337.

common language and socio-economic issues of concern to participate jointly in broad socioeconomic movements, including political parties. They conclude that in Crimea, ethnic Russians benefited by mobilizing as a political and regional force using emotional issues, including fear of potentially forced linguistic Ukrainianization, to generate broad local support to take control of Crimea's administrative institutions, thereby further increasing their strength and prestige.

Following Ukrainian Precedent

Crimea's efforts at mobilizing popular support for secession from Ukraine¹⁶ appear modeled upon the successful precedent established by Ukraine. Rukh, the movement, mobilized popular electoral support for Ukraine's sovereignty, then independence, especially in Western Ukraine and Kyiv, helped forge the Democratic Bloc of individuals for the 1990 parliamentary elections, and staged political demonstrations. In Crimea, the pro-secessionist Republican Movement of Crimea, renamed the Russian Movement of Crimea,¹⁷ and the Sevastopol Russian People's Council, renamed the Bloc of Patriotic Forces¹⁸ collected signatures for the referendum,¹⁹ staged pro-Russia

¹⁵ See Yurii Yurov, "Krymska karta v donbaskomu pasiansi," *Henezha* 1 (3) (1995), 188-193.

¹⁶ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian-Russian Summit on Crimea Proposed," *RFE/RL* 25 (6 February 1992).

A poll conducted in January 1992 in Crimea showed that 42% of respondents favored remaining within Ukraine, 15% favored joining Russia, 22% favored the status of a sovereign republic within the CIS, and only 8% favored independence.

¹⁷ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Separatists 'Reorganize,'" *RFE/RL* 189 (1 October 1992).

¹⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "Sevastopol National Salvation Front Reconstituted," *RFE/RL* 196 (12 October 1993).

demonstrations,²⁰ and forged with other political parties a Russian electoral bloc to help elect Meshkov president.²¹ However, not all Crimean residents supported secession.²² The Verkhovna Rada had first legislatively enacted Ukraine's independence, then had its action affirmed by republic-wide referendum while simultaneously seeking international recognition. On 22 November 1991²³ the Crimean parliament enacted the referendum law to determine the future status of Crimea and on 5 May 1992 passed the act proclaiming Crimea's independence subject to approval by a referendum.²⁴ While Leonid Kravchuk's presidential election campaign championed Ukraine's independence, Yurii Meshkov's presidential campaign championed Crimea's secession from Ukraine. While Ukraine courted broad international recognition, Crimea focused on Russia. A crucial difference was that the USSR center had collapsed, ceased to exist, by the actions and approval of Russia and Ukraine, followed by all Soviet republics agreeing among themselves at Minsk (8 December) and Alma-Ata (21 December 1991) to recognize each other's

¹⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Referendum on Secession Looks Likely," *RFE/RL* 57 (23 March 1992); Roman Solchanyk "Crimean Referendum Campaign," *RFE/RL* 68 (7 April 1992).

²⁰ Hal Kosiba, "Russian Demonstrators Confront Ukrainian Authorities in Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 15 (25 January 1993); Roman Solchanyk, "Ferment in Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 16 (26 January 1993) and "More Ferment in the Crimea," *RFE/RL* 20 (1 February 1993) and "Conflict Brewing in Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 7 (24 March 1993); "Stavki rastut. I poteri..." *Nezavisimost* 38 (13451), (20 May 1992), 1; "Krym: ebeno ognennoi dugi," *Nezavisimost* 35 (13448)- 36 (13449), (15 May 1992), 1.

²¹ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Elections," *RFE/RL* 9 (14 January 1994); *Crimea's Presidential Election*, *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/11 (18 March 1994), 1-4.

²² Serhii Lytvyn, *Za ukrainskii Krym: Publitsystychni statti, dopovidi, vystupy, interviu (1992-1996 rr.)*, (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1997); Aleksandr Pilan, "Nad Krymom lunaie 'Shche ne vmerla Ukraina'," *Holos Ukrainy* 11 (261), (24 January 1992), 3; Refat Uchbarov, "Referendum- shliakh u bezvykhid," *Holos Ukrainy* 74 (324), (22 April 1992), 7; Aleksandr Pilat, "Za Krym u skladi Ukrainy: vyslovyvsia Vsekrymskii Forum demokratychnykh orhanizatsii," *Holos Ukrainy* 63 (313), (7 April 1992), 5.

independence and inviolable borders. In Crimea's case, Ukraine did not collapse and the other oblast administrative units did not seek independence nor support Crimea's secessionist efforts. Crimea stood alone. In both cases, the issue was handled peacefully with all parties rejecting the use of violence and armed conflicts.²⁵

Kravchuk, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet announced plans and then proceeded to nationalize the Soviet military forces stationed on Ukrainian territory. Crimea did not follow this example. The Black Sea Fleet was in dispute between Ukraine and Russia, Crimea did not claim the BSF, but Crimea did offer to participate in discussions but was ignored. The only coercive forces stationed in Crimea that Crimean President Meshkov and parliament could target were the police, and this they did in 1994 by challenging Kyiv's jurisdiction over the police in Crimea, placing the police under the jurisdiction of Crimean Interior Minister Kuznetsov.²⁶ In May 1994, President Kravchuk responded by dismissing the leadership of the Crimean Interior Ministry, subordinating the Ministry to the Ukrainian president while other Ukrainian special forces entered Sevastopol, resulting in Kuznetsov alleging a coup attempt by Ukraine.²⁷ Ukraine's Defense Ministry denied a coup attempt but

²³ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Parliament Meets to Discuss Referendum on Secession from Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 222 (22 November 1991) and "Crimean Parliament Clears Way for Referendum on Secession from Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 223 (25 November 1991).

²⁴ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea Moves towards Independence," *RFE/RL* 86 (6 May 1992).

²⁵ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Parliament Appeals to Military," *RFE/RL* 74 (15 April 1992). On 14 April 1992 the Crimean parliament issued an appeal to military forces in Crimea to refrain from participating in political movements, meetings, and demonstrations. John Lepingwell, "Yeltsin, Shakhrai on Crimea," *RFE/RL* 97 (24 May 1994). On 22 May 1994 President Yeltsin claimed that President Kravchuk promised him that Ukraine would not use force in Crimea.

²⁶ Ustina Markus, "Crimea Overrides Kiev Decree on Militia," *RFE/RL* 127 (7 July 1994).

²⁷ Ustina Markus, "Crimea Accuses Ukraine of Attempted Coup," *RFE/RL* 96 (20 May 1994).

confirmed that troops were sent into Crimea, including armored vehicles to Simferopol, and that National Guard units would patrol Crimea's streets.²⁸ The Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Vasylyshyn criticized Crimean authorities for failing to carry out instructions from Kyiv and asked for assurances that the Crimean Interior Ministry will remain part of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior.²⁹ President Kravchuk designated Crimea's Interior Ministry as a separate department under the jurisdiction of Ukraine's Interior Ministry but Crimea refused to obey and Ukrainian officials were unable to implement Kravchuk's decree, resulting in the majority of interior ministry personnel remaining under the control of the Crimean Minister of the Interior. A compromise was reached that allowed for two separate structures: the Ministry of the Interior of Crimea and a separate autonomous directorate of Ukraine's Interior Ministry in Crimea, but the compromise failed.³⁰ President Kravchuk's order replacing Kuznetsov by a Kyiv appointee could not be enforced. When on 28 June the Verkhovna Rada attempted to assert control over the Crimean militsiia by subordinating them to the Ukrainian government, the Crimean parliament voted to repeal all Ukrainian acts that contradicted the Crimean Constitution or previous resolutions of the Crimean parliament and president. The drama of President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada attempting to assert their authority over Crimea and its Ministry of Interior personnel highlights some of the difficulties that the CIS command may have encountered in attempting to peacefully retain CIS control over military forces stationed in Ukraine.

²⁸ Ustina Markas, "Which Ukraine Denies," *RFE/RL* 96 (20 May 1994).

²⁹ Ustina Markus, "Crimean Update," *RFE/RL* 99 (26 May 1994).

The 1992 Crimean Crisis

In February 1992, the Crimean parliament drafted its new constitution minus the words 'autonomous' and 'within Ukraine'³¹ provoking a concerned reaction from Kyiv,³² followed by a March meeting between Ukrainian and Crimean officials to work out an agreement on the delineation of powers between Kyiv and Crimea.³³ This resulted in the Crimean parliament enacting a draft law that delineated powers between Kyiv and Crimea, which the Verkhovna Rada amended than passed.³⁴ The pro-secessionist Republican Movement of Crimea pressured the Crimean parliament to adopt (5 May 1992) an act declaring Crimea's independence subject to approval by referendum (2 August 1992)³⁵ but the following day the Crimean parliament amended Crimea's constitution to affirm that Crimea is part of Ukraine.³⁶ Under pressure from President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada, the Crimean parliament suspended the referendum on 9 July 1992.³⁷ Sevastopol, due to its special

³⁰ Ustina Markus, "Compromise over Crimean Interior Ministry," *RFE/RL* 102 (31 May 1994).

³¹ Aleksandr Pilat, "Pivostriv staie derzhavoiu: opublikovano proet konstytutsii Krymu," *Holos Ukrainy* 4 (254), (10 January 1992), 4; Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea and Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 41 (28 February 1992).

³² Aleksandr Pilat, "V Krymu rozmezhuvalysia," *Holos Ukrainy* 61 (311), (3 April 1992), 2; Kathy Mihalisko, "Russians Erect Barricades in Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 69 (8 April 1992).

³³ "Pro perehovory po rozmezhuvaniu povnovazhen mizh Ukrainoiu i Respublikoiu Krym," *Holos Ukrainy* 57 (307), 28 March 1992), 2; Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Negotiations," *RFE/RL* 70 (10 April 1992); Aleksandr Pilat, "Holovne dlia Krymu- spokii," *Holos Ukrainy* 67 (317), (11 April 1992), 3.

³⁴ President L. Kravchuk: "Zvernennia: Do narodnykh deputativ usikh rivniv, politychnykh syl naselennia respubliky Krym," *Holos Ukrainy* 73 (323), (21 April 1992), 2.

Roman Solchanyk, "Law on Crimea's Status Adopted," *RFE/RL* 83 (30 April 1992).

³⁵ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea Moves towards Independence," *RFE/RL* 86 (6 May 1992).

³⁶ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea to Remain Part of Ukraine?" *RFE/RL* 87 (7 May 1992).

³⁷ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Referendum Suspended," *RFE/RL* 130 (10 July 1992).

status, debated holding a separate referendum on the issue.³⁸ The debate over holding the Crimea referendum dragged on³⁹ and varied in intensity.

When Crimea passed its declaration of independence, President Kravchuk downplayed its importance while restating that Ukraine's borders are inviolable.⁴⁰ The next day the Verkhovna Rada, following discussions with members of the Crimean Presidium and Crimean Tatars,⁴¹ annulled Crimea's act of independence and referendum giving the Crimean parliament until 20 May to rescind its decision. Non-compliance could result in: the Crimean parliament being dissolved, direct presidential rule being introduced in Crimea, and Crimean parliamentary Speaker Bagrov being held criminally responsible.⁴² On 19 May the Presidium of the Crimean parliament approved rescinding the act of independence,⁴³ but the Crimean parliament at first failed to repeal the declaration of independence or to cancel the referendum;⁴⁴ but the following day, it repealed its declaration of independence and suspended preparations for, but did not cancel, the referendum.⁴⁵ In June 1992, Ukrainian and Crimean parliamentary Speakers confirmed that Crimea was an integral part of Ukraine

³⁸ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Parliament Sets Date for Decision on Referendum," *RFE/RL* 78 (23 April 1992) and "Crimea and the Referendum," *RFE/RL* 85 (5 May 1992); Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea and the Referendum," *RFE/RL* 85 (5 May 1992).

³⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea to Examine Agreement with Kiev," *RFE/RL* 65 (2 April 1992); Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Parliament Sets Date for Decision on Referendum," *RFE/RL* 78 (23 April 1992).

⁴⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "Aid for the Crimean Tatars," *RFE/RL* 90 (12 May 1992).

⁴¹ Roman Solchanyk, "Protests over Crimea," *RFE/RL* 91 (13 May 1992).

⁴² Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian Parliament Annuls Crimean Independence," *RFE/RL* 92 (14 May 1992).

⁴³ Kathy Mihalisko, "Crimean Leaders Endorse Rescinding of Independence Act," *RFE/RL* 96 (20 May 1992).

⁴⁴ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Issue at Crucial Stage," *RFE/RL* 97 (21 May 1992).

⁴⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Parliament Opts for Compromise," *RFE/RL* 98 (22 May 1992); "Krymskii 'opolzen': ostanovim?" *Nezavisimost* 44 (13457), (29 May 1997), 4.

with special economic status,⁴⁶ while in July 1992 the Verkhovna Rada approved changes to its previously passed law delineating powers between Simferopol and Kyiv. The new law recognized Crimea as an autonomous entity within Ukraine, all Crimean citizens as Ukraine citizens, and that only with the approval of the Crimean legislature and the Verkhovna Rada could Crimea's territory be changed or transferred to another country.⁴⁷ In accordance with Crimea's constitution and the Ukrainian law delineating powers between Kyiv and Simferopol,⁴⁸ in September 1992 the Crimean legislature proceeded to adopt a state flag and state symbols for Crimea.

1994 Crimean Crisis

In anticipation of secessionist Yurii Meshkov winning the presidency, the Verkhovna Rada amended Ukraine's constitution to enable President Kravchuk, while respecting the election results, to annul any illegal act that violated the Ukrainian constitution or laws, or challenged Ukraine's territorial integrity.⁴⁹ Six candidates registered for Crimea's presidential election, including parliamentary Speaker Mykola Bahrov and pro-secessionist Yurii Meshkov, leader of the Republican Party of Crimea and backed by the Russia electoral bloc.⁵⁰ In the first round (16 January 1994), Yurii Meshkov received 38.5 percent while

⁴⁶ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Crimea Reach Accommodation?" *RFE/RL* 104 (2 June 1992).

⁴⁷ Aleksandr Pilat, "Na ocheredi - vtoroi tug prezidentskikh vyborov - Iurii Meshkov operezhaet Nikolaia Bagrova," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (15 January 1994), 1, 3; Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea and Ukraine: Delineation of Powers," *RFE/RL* 123 (1 July 1992).

⁴⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea Amends Constitution," *RFE/RL* 186 (28 September 1992).

parliamentary Speaker Bahrov 17.5 percent, in the runoff election (30 January 1994)⁵¹ Meshkov won receiving 72.9% of the vote.

Meshkov announced a referendum for 27 March 1994 on Crimea's future status⁵² that would include questions on dual citizenship and greater powers for the president. Upon his return from Moscow,⁵³ Meshkov affirmed his intention to establish closer economic ties with Russia and the other CIS states.⁵⁴ He appointed a Russian citizen, Yevgenii Saburov, as Crimea's Prime Minister, an act regarded by Kyiv as illegal.⁵⁵ Ukraine's response was swift. On 24 February 1994, the Verkhovna Rada called upon Crimea to bring its constitution and laws into line with Ukraine's constitution and laws and their power-sharing agreement, while reminding Crimea that it does not have the right to declare sovereignty, enter into external relations, or introduce separate citizenship.⁵⁶ On 15 March President Kravchuk annulled the Crimean referendum set for 27

⁴⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine's Crimean Crisis Continues," *RFE/RL* 15 (24 January 1994) and "Ukrainian Reaction to Meshkov's Victory," *RFE/RL* 20 (31 January 1994).

⁵⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Elections," *RFE/RL* 9 (14 January 1994).

⁵¹ Aleksandr Pilat, "Iurii Meshkov - prezident respubliki Krym - sluchilos to, chego tak ne khoteli v Kieve, i k chemu, pokhozhe, okazalis ne gotovy v Moskve," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (1 February 1994), 1; Aleksandr Pilat, "Vstrecha prezidenta Meshkova s admiralom Baltinim - mozhnet uskoret opredelenie statusa SNF," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (9 February 1994), 3; Roman Solchanyk, "Final Election Results in Crimea," *RFE/RL* 11 (18 January 1994); Andrew Wilson, "The Elections in Crimea," *RFE/RE Research Report* 3/25 (24 June 1994), 7-19.

⁵² Bohdan Nahaylo, "Russian Nationalist Wins Crimean Presidential Election," *RFE/RL* 20 (31 January 1994).

⁵³ Bohdan Nahaylo, "New Crimean President Seeks Military-Political Pact with Russia," *RFE/RL* 20 (31 January 1994); Alexander Rahr, "Crimean President to Moscow for Talks," *RFE/RL* 29 (11 February 1994).

⁵⁴ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Development," *RFE/RL* 30 (14 February 1994).

⁵⁵ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea Referendum Planned," *REF/RL* 49 (11 March 1994); Alexander Rahr, "Saburov to Become Crimean Prime Minister," *RFE/RL* 30 (14 February 1994).

⁵⁶ Vladimir Skachko, "Kiev dal poniat Simferopoliu, chto tot slishkom mnogo o sebe vozomnil-trebovanie privesti konstitutsiiu Kryma v sootvetstvie s Ukrainskoi mozhnet okonchatelno rassorit Iurii Meshkova s parlamentariiami poluoostrova. A mozhnet i net," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (26 February 1994), 1, 3; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Parliament Tells Crimea Not to Exceed Its Prerogatives," *RFE/RL* 39 (25 February 1994) and "Crimean Developments," *RFE/RL* 51 (15 March 1994).

March,⁵⁷ but Meshkov refused to cancel the referendum. On 19 March President Kravchuk restated his objections to the Crimean referendum and Ukraine reduced electricity supply to Crimea for unpaid electricity bills by Crimea and the BSF (while Russia was reducing energy supplies to Ukraine for unpaid bills).⁵⁸ Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk warned Russia not to interfere in the Crimea crisis as it could jeopardize the trilateral nuclear agreement.⁵⁹

On 20 May 1994 Crimea's new parliament restored the 1992 constitution.⁶⁰ Russian news reports abounded with accounts of Ukrainian troop movements in Crimea.⁶¹ President Kravchuk reaffirmed his determination to protect Ukraine's territorial integrity while the Ukrainian parliament called on Crimea to cancel its constitutional decision within 10 days.⁶² Crimea refused to comply.⁶³ Ukraine advised the UN and NATO that it would protect its borders. The Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Russia met but officially to discuss the BSF situation, not Crimea, an internal affair of Ukraine.⁶⁴ In May President Yeltsin stated that President Kravchuk had promised him that Ukraine would not use

⁵⁷ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine's President Annuls Crimean Referendum," *RFE/RL* 52 (16 March 1994).

⁵⁸ Ustina Markus, "More Crimean News," *RFE/RL* 55 (21 March 1994).

⁵⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Reaction to Meshkov's Victory," *RFE/RL* 20 (31 January 1994).

⁶⁰ Aleksandr Pilat, "Ubeditelnaia pobeda bloka 'Rossiia'- v vysshem zakonodatelenom organe bolshinstvo- storonniki Iurii Meshkova," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (12 April 1994), 3; Ustina Markus, "Crimea Restores 1992 Constitution," *REF/RL Research Report* 3/23 (10 June 1994), 9-12.

⁶¹ Ustina Markus, "Conflicting Reports over Troops in Crimea," *RFE/RL* 97 (24 May 1994).

⁶² Aleksandr Pilat, "Novyi vitok konfrontatsii mezhdu Simferopolem i Kievom- Prezident Kravchuk predlagaet deputatam krymskogo parlamenta khorosho podumat," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (20 May 1994), 1.

⁶³ Ustina Markus, "Crimean Parliament Passes Constitutional Amendment," *RFE/RL* 97 (24 May 1994).

⁶⁴ Ustina Markus, "Zvyahilsky Meets Chernomyrdin over Crimean Crises," *RFE/RL* 97 (24 May 1994).

force in Crimea,⁶⁵ while Kravchuk criticized Yeltsin for violating international law by interfering in an internal affair between Kyiv and Crimea⁶⁶ and denounced the Russian media for spreading dishonest information.⁶⁷

On 24 May, Crimean and Ukrainian officials met in Kyiv to defuse the Crimean crisis, agreeing to establish a joint working group to resolve the Crimean issue. On 1 June, the Verkhovna Rada rejected as too vague President Kravchuk's proposal to establish a constitutional court with powers to annul Crimean legislation that violated Ukraine's constitution. Instead, the Verkhovna Rada created a parliamentary commission with instructions to change within two weeks Ukraine's laws to enable Ukraine to annul actions by Crimean authorities. When the Verkhovna Rada reaffirmed its insistence that Crimea rescind the 1992 constitution, Crimean President Meshkov on 2 June said the 1992 constitution was not in force, as he had not signed it.⁶⁸

A political compromise was sought to settle the issue. Ukrainian and Crimean parliamentary delegates agreed (4 June 1994) that Crimean laws should comply with the Ukrainian constitution and that a working group should delineate power-sharing between Kyiv and Simferopol,⁶⁹ but the Crimean parliament rejected the 4 June agreement instead endorsing further negotiations with Ukraine.⁷⁰ On 11 June 1994, Crimea published its May 1992 constitution. The Ukrainian-Crimean parliamentary working group asked the

⁶⁵ John Lepingwell, "Yeltsin, Shakhrai on Crimea," *RFE/RL* 97 (24 May 1994).

⁶⁶ Ustina Markus, "Movement in Crimean Talks," *RFE/RL* 98 (25 May 1994).

⁶⁷ John Lepingwell, "Ostankino TV Has Press Credentials Revoked," *RFE/RL* 98 (25 May 1994).

⁶⁸ Ustina Markus, "Ukrainian Parliament's Revolution on Crimea," *RFE/RL* 104 (3 June 1994).

⁶⁹ Ustina Markus, "Update on Crimean Negotiations," *RFE/RL* 105 (6 June 1994).

⁷⁰ Ustina Markus, "Crimean Parliament Rejects Ukrainian Accord," *RFE/RL* 107 (8 June 1994).

Crimean parliament to send fully authorized representatives to Kyiv for the parliamentary sessions dealing with drafting Ukraine's constitution.⁷¹ On 16 June President Kravchuk again sent a mixed signal stating that the Crimea issue must be resolved within the context of the Ukrainian constitution, then adding that Ukraine would not impede Crimea's drive for more autonomy provided that Ukraine's territorial integrity was not violated.⁷² This was reminiscent of President Gorbachev trying to save the Union by continuously promising greater autonomy for the republics in exchange for signing a new union treaty. On 30 June, the Crimean parliament responded by voting itself complete authority on the territory of Crimea, except for the powers it voluntarily delegated to Kyiv; condemned Ukraine's legislative and executive actions that violated the Crimea constitution and its 1992 law that delineated authority between Crimea and Kyiv; and threatened to hold the referendum unless negotiations continued and Kyiv refrained from establishing an internal affairs department in Crimea.⁷³ The crisis was left for President Kuchma to resolve, as President Kravchuk was defeated at the height of the Crimean crisis.

⁷¹ Ustina Markus, "Crimean 1992 Constitution in Effect," *RFE/RL* 114 (17 June 1994).

⁷² Ustina Markus, "Kravchuk on Crimea," *RFE/RL* 114 (17 June 1994).

Crimean Tatars

The Crimean Tatars⁷⁴ supported Kyiv's position and the social contract that guaranteed them individual and national minority rights according to international standards and promised that Ukraine would be a democratic society based upon the rule-of-law. The Tatars opposed Crimean autonomy, looked towards Kyiv for protection and assistance in being resettled in Crimea, and regarded Rukh as an ally and President Meshkov as hostile to the Crimean Tatar issues.⁷⁵ The Tatars demanded their own autonomy and their own Tatar republic within Crimea, demands that helped undermine Crimean separatism.⁷⁶ At the time of Ukraine's independence approximately a third of Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea in a rather unorganized fashion, encountering an unwelcoming reception from local authorities.⁷⁷ At their 28 July 1991 congress

⁷³ Kathy Mihalisko, "Crimea Votes for Full Authority over Its Affairs," RFE/RL 124 (1 July 1994).

⁷⁴ Yurii Zinchenko, *Krymski Tatory-istorychnyi narys* (Kyiv: Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy, 1998); A. R. Viamkin and Z. S. Kulpin eds., *Krymskie Tatory: problemy repatriatsii* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk institut vostokovedeniia, 1997); *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*, ed. Edward A. Allworth (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998); Borys Sydorenko, "Chas urazy, abo iak krymski tatory shukaiut i ne znakhodiat vykhodu z labiryntu zavdovzhky maizhe u pivstolittia," *Holos Ukrainy* 61 (311), (3 April 1992), 3; David R. Marples and David F. Duke, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Question of Crimea," *Nationalities Papers* 23/2 (June 1995), 261-289.

⁷⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Tatar Reaction," RFE/RL 20 (31 January 1994); Susan Stewart, "The Tatar Dimension," RFE/RL Research Report 3/19 (13 May 1994), 22-26; Ian Bremmer, "Ethnic Issues in Crimea," RFE/RL Research Report 2/18 (30 April 1993), 24-28.

⁷⁶ Ian Bremmer, "Ethnic Issues in Crimea," RFE/RL Research Report 2/18 (30 April 1993), 24-28; Susan Stewart, "The Tatar Dimension," RFE/RL Research Report 3/19 (13 May 1994), 22-26.

⁷⁷ The appendix in Yurii Zinchenko's *Krymski Tatory: istorychnyi narys* contains government documents (1942-1994) on Crimean Tatars, 130-202; while the appendix in A. R. Viamkin and Z. S. Kulpin's, *Krymskie Tatory: problemy repatriatsii* contains Stalin's order deporting the Crimean Tatars: Prilozhenie: gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony - Postanovlenie GOKO no. 5859ss (11 maia 1944 roda) Moskva, Kreml: "O Krymskikh Tatarakh," 137-140; Ann Sheehy, "Session of Crimean Tatar Commission," RFE/RL 100 (28 May 1991) and "Return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea," RFE/RL 116 (20 June 1991); N.V. Kostenko and S.O. Makeiev, "Krymskyi konflikt: moral proty prava," *Filosofska i sotsiologichna dumka* (11, 1991), 53-66; Lilya R.

they had already proclaimed Crimea as their national territory and resolved to create a sovereign national state.⁷⁸ Displeased with the bureaucratic obstacles to their integration into Crimean society, several hundred Crimean Tatars demonstrated in Kyiv for the restoration of their national-territorial autonomy in Crimea and for governmental assistance to facilitate their resettlement in Crimea.⁷⁹

Crimean authorities were not supportive of the large inflow of returning Crimean Tatars, resulting in some violent clashes between Tatars and Crimean authorities as when authorities ordered the removal of temporary houses built by Tatars at Alushta.⁸⁰ On 5 October, Crimean Tatars blocked roads to the Crimean capital, Simferopol, demonstrated in front of government offices,⁸¹ and on 6 October they attempted to occupy Crimea's parliament building⁸² demanding the release of Tatars arrested during violent clashes with authorities. As tension between Tatars and Crimean authorities escalated, the Crimean Tatar Council called for mobilization of all Crimean Tatar forces while Ukraine deployed National Guard units to Crimea and on 8 October the

Budzhurova, "The Current Sociopolitical Situation of the Crimean Tatars," *The Harriman Review* 11/1-2 (1998), 21-27.

⁷⁸ Ann Sheehy, "Crimean Tatar Congress Declares Sovereignty," *RFE/RL* 123 (1 July 1991).

⁷⁹ "Obhovoriuvalys krymsko-tatarski problemy," *Holos Ukrainy* 51 (301), (20 March 1992), 3; Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Tatars Demonstrate in Kyiv," *RFE/RL* 57 (23 March 1992) and Bohdan Nahaylo, "Crimean Tatars Maintain Their Pressure on Ukrainian Authorities," *RFE/RL* 60 (26 March 1992).

⁸⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Mejlis to Hold Emergency Session," *RFE/RL* 191 (5 October 1992).

⁸¹ Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Tatars Demonstrate," *RFE/RL* 192 (6 October 1992).

⁸² Aleksandr Pilat, "Situatsiia nakalena do predela- segodnia otkryvaetaia chrezvychnaia sessiia VS," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (8 October 1992), 3; Hal Kosiba, "Crimean Tatars Clash with Police in Simferopol," *RFE/RL* 193 (7 October 1992).

Crimean parliament discussed the conflict.⁸³ Rukh supported the Crimean Tatars while condemning the Crimean authorities.⁸⁴

By 29 September 1993, Crimean Tatars were demanding guaranteed representation in the Crimean parliament through a quota system for deported nations, a demand supported by parliamentary speaker Bahrov⁸⁵ who in turn was endorsed by the Tatars during the Crimean presidential campaign. By May 1994, the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement was demanding that the Tatar faction in the Crimean parliament have a veto over certain legislation to protect Tatar interests and needs.⁸⁶ Tatar disagreements with Crimean authorities continued and in June 1994 the Tatars took over two nine-story buildings in Yalta and refused to move out.⁸⁷

Russian Involvement in the Crimean Crisis

For internal political consumption in its power struggle with President Yeltsin, because of difficulties in accepting Ukraine's independence, and as a pressure tactic during negotiations over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and the future use of the BSF's homeport of Sevastopol,⁸⁸ the Russian

⁸³ Roman Solchanyk, "Tension in the Crimea," *RFE/RL* 194 (8 October 1992).

⁸⁴ Roman Solchanyk, "'Rukh' Supports Crimean Tatars," *RFE/RL* 195 (9 October 1992).

⁸⁵ Aleksandr Pilat, "Krymskie Tatary vse-taki budut vybirat prezidenta," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (11 January 1994), 3; Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Tatar Protests," *RFE/RL* 188 (30 September 1993).

⁸⁶ Ustina Markus, "Crimean Tatars Demand Veto," *RFE/RL* 102 (31 May 1994).

⁸⁷ Ustina Markus, "Crimean 1992 Constitution in Effect," *RFE/RL* 114 (17 June 1994).

⁸⁸ Ann Sheehy, "Secret Letter Suggests Crimea Bargaining Chip," *RFE/RL* 16 (24 January 1992); Ustina Markus, "Zvyahilsky Meets Chernomyrdin over Crimean Crises," *RFE/RL* 97 (24 May 1994). The Prime Ministers officially met on 23 May 1994 to discuss the BSF, not Crimea.

parliament entered the Crimea debate.⁸⁹ It did so following reports that in November 1991 Russia was considering building a new base for the BSF at Novorossiisk but this was quickly denied by the Soviet Navy's Deputy Chief, Ivan Kapitanets.⁹⁰ It was Sevastopol or nothing. Russia's involvement in the Crimean crisis proceeded at two levels: moderate official policies by the president and government regarding Crimea, Sevastopol, and the BSF; and the more emotional and aggressive comments by prominent Russian politicians and nationalists, including parliamentary resolutions. Officially, Russia adhered to the provisions of the 1990 Russia-Ukraine bilateral treaty and the CIS agreement that recognized Ukraine's borders as inviolable. Russian parliamentary resolutions applied pressure upon Ukraine and encouraged Crimean separatism: on 23 January 1992 the Russian parliament passed a resolution to reconsider the constitutionality of the 1954 transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine,⁹¹ and on 21 May 1993 declared the transfer of Crimea to be retroactively illegal. President Yeltsin on 25 February 1992 criticized the Russian parliamentary actions regarding Crimea,⁹² while on 27 January 1993, Russia's ambassador to Ukraine, L. Smoliakov, denied Russia had any

⁸⁹ L.D. Vasylijeva-Chekalenko, *Ukraina v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh (1944-1996rr)*, 97-102.

⁹⁰ Suzanne Crow, "USSR To Build New Black Sea Naval Base," *RFE/RL* 210 (5 November 1991) and "Navy Denies New Base, Discusses Fleet," *RFE/RL* 211 (6 November 1991).

⁹¹ Mykhailo Lukiniuk, "Mif chetvertii: lak Khrushchov Ukraini Krym 'podaruvav', abo imperskyi variant 'syndromu Popandopulo'," chapter 6 in *Ukraina-Krym-Rosiiā- suchashe na tli mynuloho, abo stari mify i nova realnist vzaiemyn*, 49-59; Ann Sheehy, "Russian Parliament Demands Rethink on Crimea," and "Secret Letter Suggests Crimea Bargaining Chip," *RFE/RL* 16 (24 January 1992); Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over the Crimea," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1/8 (21 February 1992), 26-30.

⁹² Roman Solchanyk, "Yeltsin on Crimea, Relations with Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 39 (26 February 1992).

intentions to claim Ukrainian territory.⁹³ The executive and legislative branches sent mixed signals as when Russian Vice-president Rutskoi visited Crimea in April and October 1992 and claimed Crimea for Russia,⁹⁴ while Russian parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov denied Russian territorial claims against Ukraine.⁹⁵

In 1993, Russian interference in Crimea became more focused, targeting Sevastopol, home of the BSF.⁹⁶ On 9 July, the Russian parliament voted to declare Sevastopol part of the Russian Federation, claiming that Russia did not transfer Sevastopol to Ukraine when Crimea was transferred in 1954.⁹⁷ This might be a reference to the dual administration units in Sevastopol, one civil under Kyiv and the other military, historically under Soviet naval command. On 10 July, President Yeltsin condemned the Russian parliament's decision on Sevastopol while on 11 July the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing the Russian parliament's actions, distancing both the president and government from its decision.⁹⁸ On 21 July, the Russian parliament refused to reconsider its resolution on Sevastopol despite being criticized by the UN

⁹³ Roman Solchanyk, "Russian Ambassador on The Crimea," *RFE/RL* 18 (28 January 1993).

⁹⁴ Roman Solchanyk, "Rutskoi (Again) Claims the Crimea for Russia," *RFE/RL* 195 (9 October 1992); "Rutskoi: Crimea Must Be Part of Russia," *RFE/RL* 67 (6 April 1992).

⁹⁵ Kathy Mihalisko, "Khasbulatov: Russia Has No Claims on Ukraine," *RFE/RL* 95 (19 May 1992).

⁹⁶ Mykhailo Lukiniuk, "Mif pershii: 'Sevastopol gotovitsia k tretei oborone', abo pro 'kovarnykh i sebe na ume' ukraintsiv...," chapter 3 in *Ukraina-Krym-Rosiiia- suchashe na tli mynuloho, abo stari mify i nova realnist vzaiemyn*, 19-27.

⁹⁷ "Oborona Sevastopolia - reshenie rossiiskogo parlamenta o vozvrashchenii Sevastopolia pod iurisdiktsiiu Rossii sozdaet novuiu politicheskuiu situatsiiu i v Kieve, i v Moskve," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (21 July 1993), 1, 3; Dominic Gualtieri and John Lepingwell, "Russian Parliament Declares Sevastopol a Russian City," *RFE/RL* 130 (12 July 1993).

⁹⁸ Suzanne Crow, "Yeltsin Condemns Parliament's Action," *RFE/RL* 130 (12 July 1993).

Security Council and the Crimean parliament.⁹⁹ While Crimea's parliament talked of seceding from Ukraine, it was not prepared to lose Sevastopol to Russia. And on 16 September 1993, Russian parliamentarian Rumiantsev stated that the new Russian constitution must recognize Sevastopol as a Russian city with special status,¹⁰⁰ while on 23 May 1994 Russian parliamentary Speaker Rybkin and presidential assistant Filatov claimed that Kyiv, not Simferopol, was responsible for the Crimean crises.¹⁰¹

Responding to the Russian parliament's decision to review the legal status of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada debated the issue and dispatched a fact-finding team to Crimea.¹⁰² President Kravchuk on 8 April 1992 criticized the Russian government for not implementing signed agreements and Russian Vice-president Rutskoi for claiming Crimea for Russia, warning that questioning the legal status of Crimea would result in Ukraine claiming territory against Russia.¹⁰³ Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomatic note of protest to Moscow,¹⁰⁴ forwarding a copy of the note to the Secretary General of the United Nations.¹⁰⁵ On 2 June 1992, the Verkhovna Rada declared the Russian parliament's resolution on Crimea not legal and as

⁹⁹ John Lepington, "Russian Parliament Refuses to Reconsider Sevastopol Resolution," *RFE/RL* 138 (22 July 1993).

¹⁰⁰ John Lepingwell, "Rumyantsev on Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 179 (17 September 1993).

¹⁰¹ John Lepingwell, "Russian Politicians on Crimean Crisis," *REF/RL* 98 (25 May 1994).

¹⁰² Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian Deputies to Visit the Crimea," *RFE/RL* 24 (5 February 1992).

¹⁰³ Roman Solchanyk, "Kravchuk on the Crimean Question," *RFE/RL* 70 (10 April 1992); "Kravchuk on the Crimean Question," *RFE/RL* 19 (29 January 1992).

¹⁰⁴ "Nota MZS Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* 66 (316), (10 April 1992), 1; Kathy Mihalisko, "...And Russian Decision on Crimea," *RFE/RL* 99 (25 May 1992).

¹⁰⁵ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukraine Raises Crimea Issue in U. N.," *RFE/RL* 101 (27 May 1992).

interference in Ukraine's internal affairs.¹⁰⁶ On 8 June 1993 the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense declared that Sevastopol is not for lease and will not be leased to Russia.¹⁰⁷ On 9 July 1993, the Crimean crisis intensified when the Russian parliament declared Sevastopol part of the Russian Federation, a Russian city.¹⁰⁸ The same day, 9 July, President Kravchuk declared the Russian parliament's actions a violation of acceptable norms and principles of international law, and an infringement of Ukraine's territorial integrity and borders.¹⁰⁹ The Verkhovna Rada condemned the Russian parliament's resolution on Sevastopol.¹¹⁰ To decrease tensions on 19 July 1993 Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin discussed by telephone the Sevastopol issue.¹¹¹

When the Russian parliament first decided to review the status of Sevastopol, the Crimean parliament refused to place the issue on its agenda and ignored Russian claims.¹¹² On 22 July 1993, the Sevastopol City Council, without stating its position on the Russian parliament's declaration, affirmed the validity of Ukrainian laws while deciding to hold a referendum on 26 September 1993 to determine the status of Sevastopol.¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Parliament Denounces Russian 'Interference' in Crimean Issue..." *RFE/RL* 105 (3 June 1992).

¹⁰⁷ Roman Solchanyk, "Sevastopol Not For Rent," *RFE/RL* 108 (9 June 1993).

¹⁰⁸ Dominic Gualtiere and John Lepingwell, "Russian Parliament Declares Sevastopol a Russian City," *RFE/RL* 130 (12 July 1993).

¹⁰⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian Reaction," *RFE/RL* 130 (12 July 1993).

¹¹⁰ John Lepingwell, "Ukrainian Parliament Resolution on Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 133 (15 July 1993).

¹¹¹ John Lepingwell, "Yeltsin, Kravchuk to Meet over Sevastopol?" *RFE/RL* 137 (21 July 1993).

¹¹² Roman Solchanyk, "Crimean Parliament Ignores Russian Claim to Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 243 (18 December 1992).

International Response

The international community supported Ukraine and criticized the Russian parliament. The United States (10 July 1993),¹¹⁴ the United Kingdom (12 July 1993),¹¹⁵ and the United Nations affirmed their support for Sevastopol being an integral part of Ukraine and for Ukraine's borders being inviolable and criticized the Russian parliament's resolution on Sevastopol. The Russian government, having repudiated the Russian parliament's declaration on Sevastopol, supported Ukraine taking the issue to the UN Security Council.¹¹⁶ On 20 July the UN Security Council issued a statement that the Russian parliament's resolution on Sevastopol was inconsistent with the UN Charter and the 1990 Russia-Ukraine treaty that recognized Ukraine's sovereignty and borders.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

International support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolable borders, the position of the Russian government, and the Russian parliament's use of words not deeds in its territorial claims to Crimea and Sevastopol,

¹¹³ Aleksandr Pilat, "V Sevastopole poka spokojno- narodnoe veche izbralo Rossiiskii narodnyi sovet," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (20 July 1993), 3; Roman Solchanyk, "Referendum in Sevastopol," *REF/RL* 141 (27 July 1993).

¹¹⁴ Suzanne Crow and Roman Solchanyk, "US Reaction," *RFE/RL* 130 (12 July 1993).

¹¹⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Britain Expresses Support for Ukraine over Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 131 (13 July 1993).

¹¹⁶ John Lepingwell, "Sevastopol Update," *RFE/RL* 136 (20 July 1993) and "Ukraine to take Sevastopol Issue to UN Security Council," *RFE/RL* 132 (14 July 1993).

¹¹⁷ John Lepingwell, "UN Security Council on Sevastopol," *RFE/RL* 137 (21 July 1993).

enabled Ukraine to contain Crimea's secessionist forces. Reminiscent of President Gorbachev's efforts to preserve the Union, President Kravchuk repeatedly rejected the notion that Crimea could secede from Ukraine, stressing compliance with Ukraine's constitution and laws while simultaneously encouraging secession by continuously promising greater multi-sphere autonomy for Crimea if only the independence referendum would be cancelled, if only Crimea would comply with Ukraine's constitution and laws, if only.... The only organized anti-secessionist organization in Crimea was that of the Crimean Tatars who had their own agenda for supporting Kyiv over Simferopol.¹¹⁸ The Crimean power struggle with Kyiv, especially under Meshkov, demonstrates the difficulty of containing secessionist aspirations in a region where one group enthusiastically endorses secession while the anti-secessionist forces are non-existent or unorganized. Ukraine succeeded in seceding from the USSR because the center collapsed, and Russia seeking its own independence also endorsed Ukraine's independence. President Kravchuk contained Crimea's aspirations, but incoming President Kuchma was left the task of defusing and undermining the Crimean secessionist forces.

¹¹⁸ Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimea: Another Kind of Referendum," RFE/RL 222 (22 November 1992). Rukh, not Kravchuk, had attempted to organize a Congress of Ukrainians of Sevastopol to co-operate with other parties and nationalities as a counterweight to pro-Russian meetings and demonstrations. It was a failure.

Chapter 8

THE ECONOMY

Presidential candidate and parliamentary Speaker Leonid Kravchuk envisioned economic prosperity for Ukraine and all its citizens when he promoted Ukraine's independence and the social contract during the referendum campaign. The Deutsche Bank agreed, confirming that Ukraine had the best potential for success as an independent country compared to the other 14 republics of the former Soviet Union.¹ But the Kravchuk years became associated with massive economic dislocation, rising unemployment and underemployment,² salary arrears,³ hyperinflation, the pauperization of the middle class,⁴ disintegrating social safety net,⁵ energy shortages, cold apartments,⁶ manufacturing input shortages, reduced markets for manufactured

¹ "Potentsial Ukrainy," *Uriadovyi kurier* (Kyiv) 37 (42) (November 1991), 4-5.

² See Jeanine Braithwaite and Tom Hoopengardner, "Who Are Ukraine's Poor?" in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 61-80; Peter Fallon, Tom Hoopengardner, and Ella Libanova, "Poverty and the Ukrainian Labor Market," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 81-96.

³ Employees were not paid for months while inflation raged. State enterprises also required employees to take time off without pay.

⁴ Inflation wiped out life savings as banks paid interest substantially below the rate of inflation.

⁵ *Ukraine: The Social Sectors during Transition* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993); Sanjeev Gupta, Elliott Harris, and Alexandros Mourmouras, "Reforming Ukraine's Social Safety Net," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 97-131; Christopher M. Davis, "The Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/40* (8 Oct. 1993), 35-43; Sheila Marnie, "Economic Reform and the Social Safety Net," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/17* (23 April 1993), 1-2.

⁶ Numerous buildings are heated from a single central heating source. The heat is turned on in October. There are no thermostats in apartments to regulate the amount of heat desired.

goods, factory closures, and the asset stripping of factories.⁷ During his tenure, President Kravchuk had concentrated his energies in nation- and state-building on non-economic spheres of activity: the promotion of Ukraine's independence, the adoption of state symbols, internal and external stability, the integrity of Ukraine's borders, and the transformation of the Soviet elite into Ukraine's national elite.

It was the Prime Minister and Cabinet that were actively involved in the daily operations of the economy with Prime Ministers appointed from the economic elite⁸ and cabinet portfolios structured along economic sectors.⁹ Parliamentarians influenced monetary and fiscal policies as they lobbied for subsidies and low interest credits for their enterprises and economic sectors. The Soviet economic elite settled in as Ukraine's national economic elite while the ministries continued to protect their economic sectors, together hindering

Authorities determine how much heat shall be provided. It is customary for authorities to turn off the hot water in summer for a month.

⁷ Patrick Lenain, "Ten Years of Transition: A Progress Report," *Finance & Development* 35/3 (IMF, Sept. 1998). Retrieved June 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/09gray.htm>; Julian Exeter and Steven Fries, "The Post-Communist Transition: Pattern and Prospects," *Finance & Development* 35/3 (IMF, September 1998); Ben Slay, "An Economy at the Crossroads," *Transition* (15 November 1996), 51-55; "Ukraine: How to Wreck an Economy," *The Economist* (7 May 1994), 5-7; Ye. Marchuk, "Politychni ta ekonomichni reformy v Ukraini: vid mynuloho v maibutnie," in *Suchasna ukrainska polityka: polityky i politolohy pro nei*, 22-35.

Alexander Motyl asserts that Ukraine's record of achievement has been immense since independence if we consider the wars, famine, and Communist rule that Ukrainians suffered through during the 20th century. See Alexander J. Motyl, "Making Sense of Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 10/3 (Winter 1997), 1-7; Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).

⁸ Vitold Fokin was the former head of *Derzhplan* (the Ukrainian Central Planning Committee), L. Kuchma was the former head of the Pivdenmash missile plant, while Y. Zvyahilsky was a director in the Donbas coal mining sector.

⁹ See Alex Sundakov, "The Machinery of Government and Economic Policy in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 275-287.

economic restructuring.¹⁰ The disintegration of the USSR contributed to Ukraine's economic dislocation, while energy-intensive industrial enterprises increased Ukraine's indebtedness to Russia.¹¹ The breakdown in trade patterns and payment relations, higher energy prices, large subsidies to state enterprises, monetary expansion, and a reluctance by the government to adhere to state budget constraints, contributed to Ukraine's economic decline and growing poverty.¹² But it was the absence of pragmatic and consistent monetary and fiscal policies, and a lack of commitment by the political and economic elite to undertake essential macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms that compounded Ukraine's economic crisis¹³ resulting in Ukraine's economic downturn exceeding in severity the Great American Depression.

¹⁰ For a corporatist view, see Paul Kubicek *Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000); Paul Kubicek, "Ukrainian Interest Groups, Corporatism, and Economic Reform," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 57-81; Paul Kubicek, "Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48/1 (January 1996), 27-46.

¹¹ For statistical data on Ukraine and the other CIS countries see: *Strany-chleny SNG: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Finstatinform, 1993); *Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv v 1994 roku (kratkii spravochnik predvaritelnykh statisticheskikh itogov)*, (Moscow, Ianvar 1995); *Kratkosrochnnye pokazateli ekonomiki stran Sodruzhestva nezavisimykh gosudarstv* (Moscow, 1995); *Vneshneekonomicheskaiia deiatelnost gosudarstv sodruzhestva v 1993 g.: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1994); *Vneshneekonomicheskaiia deiatelnost gosudarstv sodruzhestva v 1993 g.: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1995).

¹² *Ukraine: Restoring Growth with Equity: A Participatory Country Economic Memorandum* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999).

¹³ V. Andrushchenko, B. Bilobrov, and V. Sarapin, "Dynamyka reform v Ukraini na rubezhi stolit: ideia staloho liudskoho rozvytku," in *Suchasna ukrainska polityka: polityky i politolohy pro nei*, 147-158; Colin Jones, "Free Fall to Catastrophe," *The Banker* 143/813 (London: November 1993), p. 26. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 00055395) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>; Charles A. White, "Shock without Therapy," *Canada and the World* 59/9 (May 94), p. 6, 2p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 9406017637) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>.

The President appoints and the Verkhovna Rada approves the appointment of the Prime Minister. President Kravchuk's choices for Prime Minister were not focused on transforming the economy to improve productivity. The central planning structures had collapsed with the disintegration of the USSR, leaving Ukraine suspended in a mid-zone as government attempted to control consumer product prices and prevent unemployment. Prime Minister Fokin (August 1991-October 1992) during the period of ruble currency shortages rejected following Russia's lead in the removal of price controls (January 1992), preferring the continuation of price controls,¹⁴ export restrictions, and the issuance of coupons to protect the Ukrainian consumer. Prior to the IMF's acceptance of Ukraine's membership (3 September 1992), Deputy Prime Minister Lanovy had prepared and the Verkhovna Rada accepted a reform program that was never implemented. Under Fokin the economy remained highly regulated, some profitable sectors of state enterprises were privatized to managers and worker collectives, and low interest loans and profitable import-export licenses were issued to some enterprises.¹⁵ Under Prime Minister Kuchma (October 1992-October 1993), who was given special parliamentary authority for six months to rule by decree to overcome Ukraine's economic crisis, foreign exchange and the economy were initially somewhat deregulated but in his final months Kuchma reversed direction and reasserted

¹⁴ The government controlled price increases. "Kabinet Ministriv Ukrainy: postanova no. 376 Kyiv: Pro systemu tsin u narodnomu hospodarstvi i na spozhyvchomu rynku Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* 2 (252), (4 January 1992), 2; "Dodatok do postanovy Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainy no. 376: Hranychni rozmiry pidvyschennia derzhavnykh tsin i taryfiv na produktsiiu, tovary i posluhy," *Holos Ukrainy* 2 (252), (4 January 1992), 3.

foreign exchange and price controls. The economic crisis deepened during his tenure. The Verkhovna Rada and President Kravchuk in the summer of 1993 approved a massive increase in direct low interest loans to state enterprises and collective farms that contributed to hyperinflation. Kuchma's successor, Prime Minister Yukhym Zviatkovskyy resorted to increased administrative controls over all spheres of the economy and decreed an increase in state orders and purchases from enterprises and imposed export quotas and licenses.¹⁶ During the Kravchuk years Ukraine's economy continued its downward spiral as the government appeared more focused on attempting to stabilize the economic crisis through price controls and the printing of new money to cover loans to enterprises and state budget deficits.¹⁷

National Currency and Two-tier Banking System

A national currency and a national two-tier (central bank and commercial banks) banking system are the recognized hallmarks and essential components for insuring the economic independence of a state. Governments regulate the

¹⁵ Vitalii Portnikov, "Pensioner Vitold Fokin- krizis vlasti v Kieve," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (2 October 1992), 1.

¹⁶ Anonymous, "Ukraine Policy," *Finance East Europe* 3/21 (London: 5 November 1993). [Abstract] Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 00885883) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>.

¹⁷ Also see Volodymyr Lanoviy, "Macro- and Microeconomic Crisis in Ukraine: The Social and Political Stakes," *Economic Policy*, A European Forum 19 Supplement (December 1994), 191-195; Victor Pynzenyk, "Ukrainian Economic Reforms: Reflections on the Past and the Future," *Economic Policy*, A European Forum, 197-204; Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, "The Impact of Economics," Chapter 5 in *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 177-181; Raphael Shen, *Ukraine's Economic Reform: Obstacles, Errors, Lessons* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).

economy, trying to keep it in its most productive state, through monetary and fiscal policies. State building and management of a national economy can not proceed without a national currency and a national banking system. At independence Ukraine lacked a national currency and a banking infrastructure essential for implementing an effective monetary policy. Soviet banks situated in Ukraine had operated as department branches of the USSR Gosbank fulfilling directives from central planners in Moscow, distributing credits to enterprises as allocated under the plan, while the savings bank department collected household savings deposits for reallocation by central planners in Moscow. During 1987-88, a Soviet two-tier banking system was introduced with commercial banks operating separately from the central bank.¹⁸ Since March 1991, a two-tier banking system has existed in Ukraine, with the Ukrainian branch of Gosbank becoming the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) and gradually assuming the functions of the former USSR central bank in Ukraine including in May 1991 the licensing and supervision of Ukrainian banks.¹⁹ The Head of the NBU is appointed by and accountable to the Verkhovna Rada while monetary decisions appear determined by the Cabinet and the Verkhovna Rada.²⁰ In 1990, Gosbank was reorganized into five specialized Soviet banks that in December 1991 on Ukrainian territory became Ukrainian state banks: Prominvest (industrial), Ukraina (agriculture), Sotsbank (social sector), State

¹⁸ *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review 1992*, (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1992), 34.

¹⁹ Victor Yushchenko, "Rol Natsionalnoho Banku Ukrainy u perekhidnii ukrainskii ekonomitsi," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 124-132; *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review 1994* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, March 1995), 32-33.

²⁰ *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review 1994* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, March 1995), 2, 34.

Import-Export Bank (EXIM) (foreign trade bank),²¹ and Oshchadbank (savings bank). These banks continued fulfilling the accustomed role channeling government funds to state enterprises rather than deciding on loan applications based on sound investment criteria.²²

Since independence over 250 commercial banks have been registered in Ukraine, many with minimal capital, others as banking operations of large enterprises doing corporate not retail banking, while the five state banks continue to dominate the banking field.²³ Oshchadbank accounted for 80% of all household and enterprise deposits in Ukraine in 1992, 70% in 1993, and 45% in 1994, with deposits state insured but Oshchadbank does not directly lend money.²⁴ Being the depository of most of Ukrainian household savings, Oshchadbank is within a special category: on its Advisory Board sit the Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Economics Minister, Head of the Pension Fund, and the Head of the NBU.²⁵ During 1991, 70% of Oshchadbank's new deposits were borrowed by the NBU while 30% were lent to other banks for lending to state enterprises and collective farms, with the state having first claim to

²¹ On 1 January 1992, Ukraine's Export-Import Bank was established by presidential decree. "Ukaz prezydenta Ukrainy pro utvorennia eksportno-importnoho banku Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* 2(252) (4 January 1992), 1.

²² For an interesting article on the Russian banking system that covers some of the problems prevailing in the Ukrainian banking system, see William Tompson, "Old Habits Die Hard: Fiscal Imperatives, State Regulation and the Role of Russia's Banks," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/7 (November 97), p.1159, 27p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 90732) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>

²³ For information on the number and size of Ukrainian banks, see *Informatsiinyi biuleten, no. 12 hruden, Asotsiatsii ukrainskykh bankiv* (Kyiv: TOV 'Sivera', December 1998).

²⁴ *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review* 1992 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1992), 34; *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review* 1994 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, March 1995), 39.

²⁵ Bank officials informed the writer in 1999.

savings deposits mainly to finance government budgetary deficits.²⁶ This policy has continued with the government using most of the available credit, hindering private businesses and consumers from obtaining loans, resulting in Ukraine having one of the smallest banking and monetary systems in the world relative to GDP.²⁷ It is also a very difficult and cumbersome procedure for private organizations and companies to open and operate a bank account.²⁸ The IMF and the World Bank have assisted the NBU and the commercial banks to modernize commercial banking practices²⁹ but Ukraine's banking system is weak regarding consumer loans and mortgages while the big five state banks continue to service their special sectors. However, in early 1994 the International Electronic Inter-bank Clearing System was developed and implemented by the NBU, with twenty-five regional clearing centers in each province and Crimea. Managed by the NBU the system provides electronic exchange of documents and allows the banks to clear their accounts via corresponding accounts in the NBU and to take part in inter-bank clearings.³⁰

Ukraine's Sovereignty Declaration, inflation, and an acute shortage of rubles placed the issue of a Ukrainian currency on the agenda. To facilitate the

²⁶ *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review 1992* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1992), 34.

²⁷ *Ukraine Restoring Growth with Equity: A Participatory Country Economic Memorandum*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, October 1999), xiv.

²⁸ The writer was informed that private companies had to make appointments in advance before a company representative would be allowed inside a bank to deposit or withdraw money. A church official associated with a Western church complained to the writer that after six months of paperwork the church's bank account was still not open.

²⁹ Julio Jimenez, "Issues for Banking Reform in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 146-154; *Report and Recommendations of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Financial Sector Adjustment Loan in the amount of US\$ 300 Million to Ukraine*, World Bank, Report No. P7226UA (24 February 1998), 2.

³⁰ Anatolii Moroz, "Bankivska systema Ukrainy: rozvytok i problemy," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 112-124

creation of a two-tier banking system and a Ukrainian currency, the Verkhovna Rada with Prime Minister Fokin's encouragement legislated a new law on banks and banking activity (March 1991).³¹ During debate, parliamentarians noted that Ukraine's money supply decreased in 1990 by 1.4 billion rubles while the money supply in the USSR grew by 25 billion rubles.³² Passage of this legislation was foreshadowed during the debate on the Ukrainian Property Law (7 February 1991) when some parliamentarians claimed that the Komsomol and the Communist Party were already involved in profitable businesses and commercial banking activity.³³ The issue of a Ukrainian currency was also raised in February 1991 by Speaker Kravchuk who implied it would be a strong currency backed by Ukrainian mined gold reserves and a future business climate that recognized legal property guarantees within a stable economic and political environment.³⁴

Russia's takeover of the Soviet ruble printing presses to meet its own cash requirements restricted the outflow of new ruble notes to other republics, thereby favoring Russian purchasing power over Ukrainian lower priced products. To protect Ukrainian consumers during high inflation and ruble currency shortages the NBU introduced the 'coupon' currency in 1991 to be used for purchases of basic items, especially food, in state stores. The ruble continued to be used on the open market. The amount of coupons issued was determined by Ministry of Internal Trade based on the availability of goods in

³¹ Valentyn Moroz, "Ukraine to Have Its Own Banking System?" *RFE/RL* 43 (1 March 1991).

³² Kathy Mihalisko, "Discussion of Separate Ukrainian Currency," *RFE/RL* 58 (22 March 1991).

³³ Valentyn Moroz, "Ukrainian Property Law Adopted," *RFE/RL* 28 (8 February 1991).

state stores, with the coupons issued at work as a percentage of salary and with government social payments (pensions) to residents of Ukraine.³⁵ Non-residents purchased the coupons with hard currency.

The Head of the NBU announced in October 1991, and reaffirmed on 5 January 1992, that Ukraine would introduce the karbovanets³⁶ as its temporary currency, on par and exchangeable with the Soviet ruble, to be followed by Ukraine's permanent national currency, the hryvnia, after the economy is stabilized and financial institutions strengthened.³⁷ This information was relayed by the NBU to the G-7 financial leaders on 26 November 1991.³⁸ When Russia liberalized its prices in January 1992, President Kravchuk said that the karbovanets would be introduced in consultation with Russia and the other CIS states.³⁹ In September 1991 all 15 republics had already agreed to coordinate their monetary policies through an association of central banks.⁴⁰ Prime Minister Fokin told the Verkhovna Rada on 12 May 1992 that Ukraine must quickly leave

³⁴ Valentyn Moroz, "Ukrainian Currency Will Be Based on Own Gold Reserves," *RFE/RL* 30 (12 February 1991) and "More on Ukrainian Gold," *RFE/RL* 31 (13 February 1991).

³⁵ *Ukraine, IMF Economic Review 1992* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1992), 38.

³⁶ In November 1991, before Ukraine's independence referendum, newspaper articles already appeared advocating that each republic should have its own currency. See Pyotr Aven, "Opinion of Pyotr Aven of International Center for Research on Economic Reforms," *Nezavisimaya hazeta* (12 Nov 1991), 4, as reported in *CDSP* 43:46, 13-14; "Professor V. Pashkovsky, Head of the Department of Credit and Monetary Circulation at the Finance Research Institute," *Izvestia* (19 Nov 1991), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 43:46, 14-15.

³⁷ Keith Bush, "Ukrainian Currency by Year's End," *RFE/RL* 204 (25 October 1991) and "Introduction of Coupons/Money Substitutes in CIS," *RFE/RL* 4 (8 January 1992).

³⁸ Kathy Mihalisko, "Ukrainian Currency Due Soon," *RFE/RL* 225 (27 November 1991).

³⁹ Roman Solchanyk, "Kravchuk on Ukrainian Coupons," *RFE/RL* 13 (21 January 1992); Anatolii Halchynsky, "Karbovanets v ahonii iomu proponuiut shtuchne sertse," *Holos Ukrainy* 5 (255), (11 January 1992), 6.

⁴⁰ Keith Bush, "Banking Agreement Reached?" *RFE/RL* 185 (27 September 1991).

the ruble zone, predicting a temporary currency in circulation by June.⁴¹ The karbovanets replaced the coupon. The karbovanets, to be used for all cash and non-cash transactions, replaced the ruble at a fixed 1:1 initial exchange rate to prevent a flood of rubles from Ukraine into Russia.⁴² In September 1992, the IMF had accepted Ukraine's membership⁴³ and appears to have been very supportive of the creation of national currencies, inspiring Prime Minister Fokin on 5 September 1992 to request IMF financial assistance for a currency stabilization fund.⁴⁴ The IMF and the World Bank appear to have promised various republics financial assistance if they left the ruble zone and introduced their own national currency.⁴⁵

On 12 November 1992, President Kravchuk by decree withdrew Ukraine from the ruble zone, suspended the ruble as legal tender, and made the karbovanets Ukraine's official currency.⁴⁶ While there was a shortage of ruble notes in all republics, the central banks of CIS countries continued to issue ruble credits and receive ruble credits from Russia's central bank, resulting in the republics being blamed for Russia's failure to overcome its fiscal inflationary

⁴¹ Keith Bush, "New Currencies Soon in Ukraine and Belarus?" *RFE/RL* 92 (14 May 1992); Johathan Dunn and Patrick Lenain, "The Role of Monetary Policy in Ukraine's Medium-Term Adjustment Strategy," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 40-54.

⁴² Erik Whitlock, "What is a Karbovanets?" and "Ukraine to Have New Parallel Currency This Month?" *RFE/RL* 192 (6 October 1992).

⁴³ Erick Whitlock, "Ukraine to Gain IMF Membership," *RFE/RL* 168 (2 September 1992).

⁴⁴ Erik Whitlock, "Ukraine Wants IMF Money for Currency Support," *RFE/RL* 171 (7 Sept 1992).

⁴⁵ Bess Brown, "Kyrgyzstan to Introduce Own Currency," *RFE/RL* 84 (4 May 1993) and "Krygyzstan to Introduce Own Currency on 10 May," *RFE/RL* 87 (7 May 1993); Keith Martin, "Azerbaijan Leaves the Ruble Zone," *RFE/RL* 11 (15 June 1993); Catherine Dale, "Georgia Leaves Ruble Zone," *RFE/RL* 147 (4 August 1993).

⁴⁶ Erik Whitlock, "Ukraine Suspends Ruble," *RFE/RL* 220 (13 November 1992); Keith Bush, "Ukraine to Leave Ruble Zone 'Shortly,'" *RFE/RL* 215 (6 November 1992).

crisis.⁴⁷ In June 1992, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar warned that Russia would require republics who wished to remain in the ruble zone to sign bilateral agreements containing severe financial terms that would place those republics under Russian monetary control.⁴⁸ At their Dagomys (23 June 1992) meeting, presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin reportedly had agreed on the procedures for establishing separate currencies, but the Ukrainian delegation at the Minsk CIS (June 1992) summit questioned the arrangements for transferring cash rubles to Russia when Ukraine introduced its own currency in the fall.⁴⁹ Russia's Central Bank favored the retention of the ruble zone but regarded the introduction of a new strong Russian ruble as essential to curb hyperinflation. Therefore, to remain in the ruble zone other CIS governments would have to coordinate with Russia their economic policies and credit emissions.⁵⁰ On 24 July 1993, without prior public notice the Russian Central Bank announced the withdrawal of pre-1992 Soviet and Russian bank notes with Russian citizens and resident permit holders allowed to exchange up to 35,000 rubles for 1993 notes, the balance to be deposited in six-month term deposits.⁵¹ The IMF claimed it had not been consulted about Russia's currency reform of 24 July

⁴⁷ Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Chapter 5 in *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, 171-174.

⁴⁸ Ann Sheehy, "Stern Measures to Protect Ruble Zone," *RFE/RL* 111 (12 June 1992); Sarah Helmstadter, "Single Exchange Rate for the Ruble Starting 1 July," *RFE/RL* 111 (12 June 1992); Igor Sinyakevich, *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (5 January 1993), 3, as reported in *CDSU* 45:1, 20.

⁴⁹ Keith Bush, "No CIS Agreement on Currencies," *RFE/RL* 121 (29 June 1992).

⁵⁰ Keith Bush, "Russian Ruble to Be Introduced?" *RFE/RL* 190 (4 October 1992); Erik Whitlock, "Ministry of Finance Foresees Strong Ruble," *RFE/RL* 152 (11 August 1993).

⁵¹ Dominic Gualtieri, "Enough Money in Circulation Says Central Bank," *RFE/RL* 129 (9 July 1993); Keith Bush, "Pre-1993 Banknotes Withdrawn," *RFE/RL* 140 (26 July 1993) and "Yeltsin Eases Currency Reform," *RFE/RL* 141 (27 July 1993) and "Tension Continues over Currency Reform," *RFE/RL* 142 (28 July 1993) and "Recriminations Mount," *RFE/RL* 142 (28 July 1993)

1993.⁵² Ukraine had rejected Russia's attempt to control and coordinate Ukraine's monetary policy, or as Prime Minister Kuchma stated on 4 July 1993, the Russian Central Bank's currency reform confirmed that Russia had been trying to push Ukraine out of the ruble zone.⁵³

Economic Reforms

Two conditions were required for a successful transformation of the Ukrainian economy from a semi-regulated economy to a full competitive market. Both conditions were absent during the Kravchuk years: removal of price controls that would have replaced a seller's market with a buyer's market and enforced state budget constraints that would have encouraged privatization and the elimination of subsidies.⁵⁴ While evidence confirms that privatized enterprises outperform state-run enterprises, and newly established private companies outperform privatized companies⁵⁵ there was no government commitment to privatize.⁵⁶ The issue of radical economic reforms, of shock

and "Fedorov Attacks Gerashchenko," and "Gerashchenko Stands Firm," *RFE/RL* 143 (29 July 1993).

⁵² Keith Bush, "IMF Distances Itself from Currency Reform," *RFE/RL* 143 (29 July 1993).

⁵³ Erik Whitlock, "Kuchma on Russian Currency Reform," *RFE/RL* 148 (5 August 1993).

⁵⁴ Oleh Havrylyshyn and Donal McGettigan, *Privatization in Transition Countries: Lessons of the First Decade*, Economic Issues 18 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1999), 1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 13; Saul Estrin and Adam Rosevear, "Enterprise Performance and Ownership: The Case of Ukraine," *European Economic Review* 43/4-6 (1 April 1999), p.1125, 11p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item # not given) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>.

⁵⁶ However, numerous laws were passed dealing with privatization. *Zakony Ukrainy: Zakonodavstvo pro pryvatyzatsiiu- zbirnyk zakoniv i naukovo praktychnyi komentar*, vypusk 2 (Kyiv: Kpnvts 'Parytet', 1993).

therapy,⁵⁷ was tempered by concerns over social stability, especially concerning the coal industry and enterprises of the military-industrial complex that had been cut off from their input and export markets. Many of these state enterprises employed several thousand workers. Ukrainians had experienced shock economic therapy on the road to the promised Marxist-Leninist paradise under Stalin and now were being encouraged by the West to rapidly transform their economy into a full competitive market.⁵⁸ Caution prevailed as the Ukrainian leadership expressed interest, accepted advice, and passed legislation, but few economic reforms were undertaken during the Kravchuk presidency.⁵⁹

President Kravchuk, the Cabinet, and the Verkhovna Rada lacked the political will or desire to undertake the necessary financial and economic reforms to overcome inflation and restructure the economy. The Government did not pursue economic reforms to overcome the inefficiencies inherent in the distorted production system caused by administratively determined pricing, nor encourage structural change at state enterprises, nor use monetary policies to stabilize the economy, nor redistribute incomes using microeconomic anti-

⁵⁷ For a challenge to the shock economic therapy approach, see Paul Aligica, "The Institutionalists' Take on Transition," *Transition* (7 March 1997), 46-49.

⁵⁸ See Georges de Menil, Wing Thye Woo, and John Black, eds. *Economic Policy, A European Forum* no. 19 supplement (December 1991).

⁵⁹ "Zakon Ukrainy: 'Pro pryvatzatsiiu derzhavnykh pidpriemstv'," *Holos Ukrainy* 8 (258), (21 January 1992), 9-11; "Zakon Ukrainy: 'Pro pryvatzatsiiu derzhavnykh pidpriemstv (malu pryvatzatsiiu)'," *Holos Ukrainy* 8 (258), (21 January 1992), 12-13.

"The Old Comrades' Club," *The Economist* 325/7779 (10/3/92), p.19, 2p. Retrieved April 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 9211020624) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>;

Jaroslav Martyniuk and Ustina Markus, "Attitudes Prove to Be a Major Obstacle to Economic Reform," *Transition* (6 Sept. 1996), 16-17.

inflationary policies, nor undertake necessary investment programs.⁶⁰ Instead of liberalizing internal prices and establishing a modern national financial system, the Government made administrative decisions that aggravated the crisis. Stepankova points out that after January 1992, when the Government established wholesale prices and granted substantial subsidies that contributed to inflation, it did not review production costs nor income and social security policies. This policy resulted in higher wholesale price increases than in Russia. Russia's wholesale prices for material production rose 5 times in January while in Ukraine they rose 8 times, compared to the corresponding period the previous year. High taxes raised production costs and the selling price of products, in the process reducing the demand for products manufactured by monopoly state enterprises. Lack of a modern financial system, including bank-to-bank direct correspondent accounts with banks in other countries, contributed to a payment crisis by enterprises within Ukraine and abroad. Inflation resulted in capital investments being cut 5 times faster than volumes of industrial production during the year. Inflation and the rise of wholesale prices were partly caused by 'the parity and the purchasing capacity principles,' that is, equal pay for equal work, and regular, proportional increases in wages at par with the total price increase for consumer goods. Stepankova also writes that manufacturing inefficiencies and foreign exchange rates contributed to the rise of imports, increased demand for hard currency, the flight

⁶⁰ Tetiana Stepankova, "Liberalizatsiia ekonomiky: trudnoshchi i problemy," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 62-82.

of hard currency abroad, a lack of a hard currency market, and absence of investment necessary for structural transformation.

During the Kravchuk years a major economic reform occurred when state enterprises were separated from their traditional non-economic activities, leaving enterprises to concentrate on their economic activities.⁶¹ Soviet state enterprises had fulfilled multi-purpose functions, including providing housing, social services, and public utilities, while exercising political influence over their workers and the region. Transferring non-economic functions to the state facilitated enterprises to be more effective in the economic sphere and allowed for future changes in management and ownership.

Oleh Havrylyshyn⁶² lists a number of factors that may have contributed to delays in economic reform: 1) President Kravchuk's emphasis on nation-building ahead of the economic reforms, 2) the lack of a strong supportive financial friend in the West during the first years of independence, 3) the increased price of natural gas and oil imports from Russia, 4) state subsidies to industry, agriculture, energy, transportation, apartments and basic consumer goods, 5) intellectual uncertainty about the speed of economic reforms, and 6) the self-interests of the economic elite. He concludes that the economic elite influenced the positioning of economic reforms in the mid-zone, half way

⁶¹ Vasyl Hureiev, "Strukturny problemi i zavdannia potochnoi ekonomichnoi polityky," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 82-94.

⁶² See Oleh Havrylyshyn, "The Ukrainian Economy," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine* 1/1 (November-December 1994), Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>; Oleh Havrylyshyn, "How Patriarchs and Rent-Seekers Are Hijacking the Transition to a Market Economy," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine* 2/3 (May-June 1995). Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>; Oleh Havrylyshyn, "The Political Economy of Delayed Reform in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 49-68.

between the command economy and a full competitive market, a perfect situation for monopolistic capitalist rent-seekers. Havrylyshyn defines 'rent-seekers' as individuals who make large monopolistic profits through government connections and privileges benefiting from monopolies, price distortions, and export or import licenses. Ukraine's former Soviet economic elite initially felt threatened during the disintegration of the command economy, but under President Kravchuk were able to retain their positions of influence and privilege while being transformed into Ukraine's monopolistic capitalist elite. Directors gained greater autonomy while retaining administrative control over the assets and finances of state-owned enterprises and collective farms. They privatized the profitable sections of state enterprises for their own financial benefit. As state enterprises tended to be large, employing thousands, at times, tens of thousands of employees, the government was concerned that unemployment might create social and political instability. The directors benefited by pressuring the government for low interest loans and subsidies to keep the inefficient state-owned factories operating and workers employed. Profitable import-export licenses were obtained to enable state enterprises to purchase necessary inputs and to export their products abroad, with hard currency earnings usually remaining abroad. The gradualist position,⁶³ Ukraine's third way advocated by President Kravchuk to prevent unemployment and maintain social stability insured financial credits and subsidies to enterprises and collective farms that rent-seekers could easily divert for their benefit.

⁶³ *Ukraine Economic Reviews 1994* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, March 1995), 1.

Havrylyshyn states that it is to the advantage of rent-seekers to support a stable currency, privatization of state assets, a noncompetitive highly regulated economy that creates shortages of material, inflation, corruption, and flight of capital, but not market liberalization as that would threaten their privileged positions. He claims Ukraine's monetary and fiscal policies contributed to capital flight that the IMF conservatively estimates between \$8 to \$10 billion USD but more probably closer to \$15-20 billion USD over the years. Lack of reforms has benefited the economic elite while undermining Ukraine's economic recovery. It should be noted that as early as February 1992 the Verkhovna Rada had passed the first law to restrict monopolies and unfair competition, followed by other laws and decrees refining this law.⁶⁴

Economist Robert Kravchuk⁶⁵ rejects Ukrainian government claims that inflation was caused by consumer price liberalization, the drop in industrial production, monopoly pricing by state firms, and increased energy prices. He blames government policies of providing subsidies and low interest credit to enterprises and resorting to the printing of new money to cover budget deficits. From 1992-95, less than 20% of state fiscal deficits were financed by borrowing. In 1992, subsidies and bank credits to industrial and agricultural enterprises amounted to 16% of GDP. While the Ukrainian government benefited from inflation by covering its expenditures with the new money supply, Ukrainian households were pauperized due to inflation in 1992. Hyperinflation

⁶⁴ Peter K Cornelius, "Removing Market Barriers: The Role of Competition Policy in Ukraine's Economic Transition," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 155-168.

encouraged citizens and companies to avoid the karbovanets in favor of the United States dollar. During Kravchuk's presidency, Ukraine's economic policy emphasized inexpensive bank credit to enterprises while maintaining administrative controls to reduce or suppress inflationary pressures. The National Bank of Ukraine failed to restrain the government as the NBU was not an independent monetary authority but subordinated to the Verkhovna Rada and Cabinet fulfilling monetary expansion directives.

During the Kravchuk years there was an absence of a political commitment to a consistent pragmatic monetary and fiscal policy partly because the NBU was accountable to the Verkhovna Rada that was dominated by lobbyist-representatives who sought financial credits and subsidies for their economic sectors and enterprises. A trend is evident. IMF data⁶⁶ show that product prices were held down through price controls and subsidies until the financial burden on government and money losing state enterprises forced the government to approve a price increase resulting in an inflationary upsurge. Inflation doubled in January 1993. The cycle was repeated with another inflationary upsurge in June 1993. In response to the miners' strike in June 1993 and concerns over grain harvest operations parliamentarians passed a resolution (June) and President Kravchuk issued a decree that extended unlimited credit to the agricultural sector and to the coal industry contributing to

⁶⁵ See Robert S. Kravchuk, *Budget Deficits, Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in Ukraine: 1991-96*, The Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University. Retrieved May 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>.

⁶⁶ See *Ukraine Economic Reviews 1994* (Washington, D.C.: March 1995), 32-38; Simon Johnson and Oleh Ustenko, "Ukraine Slips into Hyperinflation," *RFE/RL Research Report 2/26* (25 June 1993), 24-32.

an inflation rate of 80% in September 1993. Tight money followed reducing money supply in the fourth quarter (1993) by 16% but inflationary pressures of the massive June credit emission contributed to hyperinflation. Agricultural credits had contributed 230% out of the 470% increase in the money supply in the third quarter (1993) with the budget deficit responsible for the balance. During hyperinflation the NBU's fourth quarter (1993) tight money policy forced debt-ridden enterprises and cash-strapped commercial banks into financial difficulties. The NBU responded by injecting liquidity into the banking system during the first quarter of 1994. The government also assisted through the NBU to provide financial credit to selected state enterprises with the government assuming responsibility for this indebtedness. During the first quarter (1994) the government's net credit expansion equaled 12 percent of GDP. During the first six months of 1994, the NBU had financed government credit, the budget deficit, and government directed assistance to state enterprises through new credit. Inflation reached 10,000 % in 1993 eroding confidence in the karbovanets and increasing the movement to the USD. NBU interest rates did not reflect the true cost of money when inflation was taken into account. Officially, the NBU charged an interest rate of 100 % per year in March, 240% per year in May 1993, and 140% in July 1994. But most funds were loaned to commercial banks at below the official rate while the agricultural loans were at 30%-50% per year and interest paid on demand deposits remained at about 30% per year. Government, state enterprises, and collective farms had benefited from inflation having received loans at below cost.

Agriculture

During the Kravchuk years, the agricultural sector continued to function within its Soviet-era structures but without the central command component. For ideological and political reasons Stalin had forced Ukrainian peasants to transfer their private farmland holdings into large collective farms using aggressive, draconian methods including famine and deportations that cost several million lives and immeasurable suffering. The most prosperous and productive farmers, called kulaks, were targeted for elimination. The farming sector that emerged consisted of large state and collective farms administered by Communist Party appointees. Farm families were allowed to retain their homes and small garden plots within the collective farm. In the workers' state that favored industry over agriculture, state and collective farms proved to be economically unproductive, underfunded, and disadvantaged by the price structure for farm products, a situation that continued during the Kravchuk years. Within the Verkhovna Rada the powerful agricultural parliamentary lobby composed of farm chairmen and directors of food processing state enterprises resisted restructuring of the agricultural sector that threatened their positions while obtaining subsidies and low interest government-backed loans. Parliamentarians, in principle, legislatively recognized the existence of private, state, and collective property ownership rights, but they failed to legislate the right for individuals and companies to buy and sell land, especially farmland,

and have not provided the infrastructure to enable profitable commercial private farming operations to emerge.

The World Bank discussion paper⁶⁷ that examined land reform and restructuring during the Kravchuk years reported that government plans to restructure collective and state farms had been prepared, that land sales were envisioned to proceed after a 6-year moratorium, and that documentation confirming individual ownership of land was being carried out. The report stated that in 1992 large transfers of state land were made to collective and individual ownership, reducing state-owned land from 100% in 1991 to 35% in January 1994, with 75% of agricultural land managed by collective and state farms. By July 1994 there were apparently about 20,000 private farmers that cultivated 2% of the agricultural land in 20-hectare farms while another 12% of farmland was cultivated by farm families on 1/2-hectare garden plots on collective farms. One of the difficulties of analyzing agrarian reforms is separating actual restructuring from plans to restructure. Parliamentarians have failed to accept the concept of land, especially farmland, as a marketable commodity to be privately owned and sold.⁶⁸ A private farmer may lease farmland presumably as long as he farms the land; otherwise, land leases may range from up to 3 years or up to 50 years.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Zvi Lerman, Karen Brooks, and Csaba Csaki, *Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in Ukraine*, World Bank Discussion Papers (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994); also see Mark R. Lundell, "Realizing Ukraine's Agricultural Potential," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 185-197.

⁶⁸ "Zakon Ukrainy: Pro selianske (fermerske) gospodarstvo," was signed by President Kravchuk on 20 December 1991. *Holos Ukrainy* 6 (326), (14 January 1992), 13-14.

⁶⁹ Anatolii Peresada and Tetiana Stepankova, "Ekonomichnyi potentsial ta investytsiina polityka v Ukrainy," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi, polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 132-144.

Ukraine is blessed with an abundance of black soil and a moderate climate and could once again emerge as a world-renowned food basket but is hindered from achieving its full potential due to the Soviet legacy and government agricultural policies. In October 1991, Ukraine signaled its intent to maintain agricultural prices at below cost by requisitioning agricultural products at fixed prices, restricting export sales, and stating that state orders will equal 70% of farm products at fixed prices.⁷⁰ The agricultural industry is undercapitalized with aging, poorly maintained and fuel-inefficient, equipment that jeopardizes seeding and harvesting operations.⁷¹ Grain storage facilities are inadequate and defective on state and collective farms, contributing to yearly grain losses through spoilage of some 25%.⁷² When grain is shipped from farms it enters the grain storage monopoly of 'bread Ukraine' that assists the state to control and regulate the grain market.⁷³ Food sold in government stores was subsidized partly by keeping food prices at the farm gate below input cost and partly by state subsidies to state food processing plants. The share of material input costs as a share of the value of agricultural products rose from 36% in 1991 to 60% in 1993.⁷⁴ Lack of proper payment for agricultural products means an inability by farms to purchase new equipment and the necessary inputs for seeding and harvesting operations. A yearly agricultural crisis

⁷⁰ V. Filippov, *Izvestia* (7 October 1991), 2, as reported in *CDSP* 43/40, 8.

⁷¹ While in Ukraine, the writer had met with business people who in the mid-1990's had purchased German combines and harvested grain from large state and collective farms for a percentage of the crop. They claimed that Soviet-era combines left over 20% of the grain lying on the fields.

⁷² While in Ukraine in 1999 the writer was informed of the urgent need for new grain storage sheds on all the large state and collective farms.

⁷³ Kyiv newspaper articles and television news broadcasts reported in 1999 that the United States was encouraging Ukraine to end the 'bread Ukraine' grain storage monopoly.

emerges requiring the government to extend cash advances for seeding and harvesting operations, to purchase fertilizers, pesticides, and fuel, repayment being made through future crop purchases at below input cost. Following tradition, in March 1993, Prime Minister Kuchma promised additional support for agriculture, especially for oil and fuel.⁷⁵ By summer the Verkhovna Rada and President Kravchuk endorsed unlimited low-interest loans for the agricultural sector to temporarily finance input costs, in the process contributing to hyperinflation. Ukraine's state agriculture bank, Ukraina bank, on government orders extended massive credits to the agriculture sector that almost jeopardized its existence, but being a state bank it has survived.⁷⁶ Ukraina bank does not appear structured to assist private farming operations and appears to operate as an extension of government policy. The vast amount of financial credits extended to the agricultural sector during the summer of 1993 did not appear to improve the productivity of the farming sector, indicating the damage sustained by the agricultural industry through decades of neglect and underfunding and the need to restructure the industry.⁷⁷

A cycle of dependency exists that requires farms to fulfill state orders to insure future government financial assistance and access to scarce farm inputs, reinforcing the state as the main supplier of farm inputs and purchaser of its products. For example, the Cabinet of Ministers assigned as of 1992 minimum

⁷⁴ *Ukraine, IMF Economic Reviews 1994* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1994), 9.

⁷⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Kuchma Seeks to Reassure Ukrainian Farmers," *RFE/RL* 61 (30 March 1993).

⁷⁶ Bank officials in Ukraine informed the writer in 1999 that Ukraina bank was still financially recovering from the massive government-ordered loans to the agriculture sector.

delivery quotas for farms to fill state orders equal to 70 percent of the average annual output during 1986-1990, with the balance allowed to be sold by the farms at prices set by the Cabinet.⁷⁸ State orders for agricultural products at below cost continued under all three Prime Ministers. Government control over oil imports and refined oil products at state owned refineries reinforced this dependency. However, during the Kravchuk years some businessmen were able to purchase oil from Russia and have it refined at Ukraine's underutilized refineries, then sell or barter it to farms.⁷⁹ Lacking cash some farms bartered farm products for essential inputs with barter transactions potentially very profitable for farm directors and firms doing barter deals with farms.⁸⁰ Barter is associated with lower profitability and is less common with private firms.⁸¹ Havrylyshyn's analysis of the economic elite as monopolistic capitalist rent-seekers benefiting from their positions of privilege partly explains why the state and collective farm directors have resisted reforms and the restructuring of the agricultural sector that employs 20% of Ukraine's work force.

⁷⁷ The writer heard many stories of 'good farm managers' who built big houses for themselves. However, the collective farms lacked money to pay for the basic inputs needed in seeding and harvesting operations. Farms also lacked adequate storage facilities.

⁷⁸ V. Filippov, *Izvestia* (7 Oct 1991), 2 as reported in *CDSP* 43:40, 18.

⁷⁹ The writer met some businessmen involved in this activity.

⁸⁰ An employee at USAID in Kyiv told the writer that some firms preferred barter to cash deals with farms as barter guaranteed higher profits and eliminated or reduced taxes.

⁸¹ Saul Estrin and Adam Rosevear, "Enterprise Performance and Ownership: The Case of Ukraine," *European Economic Review* 43/4-6 (1 April 1999), 1125-1136.

Oil, Natural Gas, Indebtedness

Ukraine went from surplus oil and natural gas reserves to energy deficiency as a result of Soviet extraction and investment policies. Over 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas and a third of that amount in oil (heat equivalent) were extracted leaving Ukraine's proven oil and gas reserves scattered at depths of 3500-6000 meters,⁸² with oil reserves estimated at 153.3 million tons and natural gas reserves at 1,095 trillion cubic meters.⁸³ Soviet energy policies directed investment towards tapping the West Siberian oil and gas fields while simultaneously depleting existing Ukrainian oil and gas reserves, resulting in the extraction of Ukrainian oil dropping by 61%, natural gas by 49%, coal by 13% and fuel peat by 49% from 1970 to 1989.⁸⁴ In 1989 over 91% of all Soviet oil wells were drilled in Russia, and over 77% of natural gas was extracted from there.⁸⁵

During the Kravchuk years, Ukraine made no concerted attempt to develop its energy potential to end its dependence on Russia. Balmaceda⁸⁶ has estimated that 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 1.3 billion barrels of oil

⁸² Leslie Dienes, "Energy, Minerals, and Economic Policy," in *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges*, ed. I.S. Koropecykj (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 123-147.

⁸³ Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (January/February 1995), 67-91. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁸⁴ Ivan Lukinov, "Radical Reconstruction of the Ukrainian Economy: Reasons, Reforms, Outlook," in *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges*, 123-147.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/2 (March 1998), 257-287.

are situated in the Black Sea shelf⁸⁷ but delays to demarcate the Ukraine-Russia maritime border have delayed developing the Black Sea and Sea of Azov reserves. In the Dniro-Donets basin and Donbas foldbelt that covers 35,000 square kilometers and extends through 7,000 meters of carboniferous rock, recoverable natural gas reserves are estimated in excess of 100 trillion cubic feet.⁸⁸ But Ukraine in February 1993 agreed to help Uzbekistan develop its energy reserves, Kazakhstan to uncap existing oil wells, and in March to help Russia develop its Siberian oil and gas reserves.⁸⁹ Ukrainian government price policy for domestically produced oil and gas discouraged exploration and production as the wholesale prices (1994) for petroleum and natural gas were \$32 USD per ton and \$7 USD per 1000 cubic meters respectively, being equivalent to 29% and 9% of the world prices.⁹⁰ President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada failed to enact energy legislation that would have established a favorable investment climate for domestic and foreign investors and an appropriate energy tax regime to make Ukraine energy self-sufficient.

The absence of individual natural gas meters and thermostats for industrial, commercial, and residential consumers hampered energy efficiency

⁸⁷ BBC monitoring service reported on 17 August 2001 that Ukraine discovered oil and gas deposits near Serpent Island. The island demarcates the Romanian-Ukrainian maritime border. <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html>.

⁸⁸ B.E. Law et al, "Basin Centered Gas Evaluated in Dnieper-Donets Basin, Donbas Foldbelt, Ukraine," *Oil & Gas Journal* (Tulsa, 23 November 1998). Retrieved 13 April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.proquest.umi.com/>; Leslie C. Texas, Mihail I. Machuzhak, and Pyotr M. Chepily, "Modern Methods Wrest More Gas, Oil from Ukraine's Historic Producing Basins," *Oil & Gas Journal* (Tulsa, 23 November 1998). Retrieved 13 April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.proquest.umi.com/>

⁸⁹ Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (January/February 1995), 67-91.

⁹⁰ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/2 (March 1998), 257-287.

and required that energy consumption be arbitrarily determined.⁹¹ Non-payment of natural gas billings was physically impossible to enforce as a central heating system provided heat to a number of apartment buildings and businesses. Authorities determined the amount of heat generated, leaving apartment dwellers cold during the energy crisis of 1992-94. For political reasons, out of concern for worker unrest in large state enterprises and social instability, delinquent industrial enterprises were initially not cut off for failing to pay utility bills. Consumer energy payments are low, contributing to Ukraine's indebtedness to Russian suppliers. The administered price of natural gas to industry averaged below cost, being in July 1994 30% of the price at the border (converted at the NBU auction rate) with the difference absorbed by the state-owned gas importer and distributor.⁹² Inter-enterprise debts during 1993 and 1994 were four to five times greater than the money supply mostly for gas and electricity arrears.⁹³ Ukraine's Soviet inheritance included factories that consumed three to four times as much energy as western factories per item of production. As Russia reduced its natural gas exports to Ukraine, industrial enterprises had their energy consumption restricted resulting in some temporary factory closures as natural gas was diverted to heat apartments.

As inexpensive Soviet energy became expensive Russian imported energy payable in hard currency, Ukraine's indebtedness to Russia increased

⁹¹ The writer had met in Kyiv with American specialists who were advising the Ukrainian government on the installation of utility meters for residential, business, and industrial customers.

⁹² *Ukraine Economic Reviews* 1994 (Washington, D.C.: March 1995), 11; also see Laszlo Lovei and Konstantin Skorik, "Commercializing Ukraine's Energy Sector," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 198-208.

substantially while Ukrainian consumption was forcibly reduced. Soviet Ukraine had consumed 65 million tons of oil per year, of which 55 millions tons were imported mainly from Russia but for 1992 Russia only guaranteed 15 million tons to Ukraine and for 1993 only 35-40 million tons to all the CIS countries.⁹⁴ Smolansky states that Ukraine required 60 million tons of crude oil and 115-120 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year, of which 15-20% of its annual natural gas and 8% of its oil requirements could be domestically produced. By 1993 Russia was charging hard currency and the world price for its oil.

Energy dependence and indebtedness became central to Ukraine-Russia relations, to the advantage of Russia. Ukraine was Russia's largest oil and natural gas customer. But to whom was Ukrainian energy indebtedness payable? Russia, with 25% of the world's proven gas reserves and 6.7 billion tons of proven oil reserves, had privatized its energy industry through the voucher system, transferring an estimated \$50-60 billion dollars of assets for less than \$1.5 billion into the state budget.⁹⁵ The Russian oil industry was not a monopoly, was 85% privatized, with 7% being joint ventures with foreign companies. Dale Gray writes that Gazprom, valued in 1996 at \$119 billion USD plus gas reserves, was 40% owned by the state and 60% by managers of gas producing companies and residents of gas producing regions and enjoyed a monopoly on the supply gas from its low-cost gas fields. Ukraine's

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁹⁴ Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (January/February 1995), 67-91.

⁹⁵ Dale Gray, "Energy Tax Reform in Russia and Other Former Soviet Union Countries," *Finance & Development*, A quarterly magazine of the IMF, 35/3 (September 1998). Retrieved

indebtedness for oil and gas purchases was both to Russia and Russian privatized enterprises that periodically reduced gas and oil supplies and threatened to cut off energy supplies.

While all Soviet republics through the union budget had contributed to the development of the Russian oil and gas reserves, Russia became the sole owner of all resources located on its territory, leading Krasnov and Brada⁹⁶ to conclude that Russia financially subsidized Ukraine's post-independence energy consumption. However, Balmaceda⁹⁷ states that under the June 1993 agreement the price of natural gas supplied to Ukraine by Gazprom was set at \$80 USD per 1000 cubic meters, a price higher than that paid in 1995 by Central and Eastern European countries (excluding fees for transit through Ukraine). Natural gas prices continued to be negotiated between gas monopolies Gasprom (Russia) and Ukrhazprom (Ukraine) until an agreement was reached in early 1994 that provided for low natural gas prices to Ukraine and low transit fees for Russian natural gas exported through the Druzhba and Soyuz pipelines to Central Europe. Ukraine was to pay \$50 per 1000 cubic meters for natural gas and receive a net gas transit fee of \$0.65 per 1000 cubic meters per 100 kilometers for 1993 and 1994.⁹⁸ The IMF regarded the \$0.65 transit fee to be

April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/>; also see Chrystia Freeland, *Sale of the Century* (Doubleday Canada, 2000).

⁹⁶ Gregory V. Krasnov and Josef C. Brada, "Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/5 (July 1997), 825-844. Retrieved May 2000 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 09668136) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

⁹⁷ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, "Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/2 (March 1998), 257-287.

⁹⁸ Gregory V. Krasnov and Josef C. Brada, "Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49/5 (July 1997), 825-844.

half the fee prevailing elsewhere in the world, while the world market price for natural gas ranged from \$75 to \$83.⁹⁹

Most of Ukraine's state energy indebtedness to Russia occurred during the Kravchuk years. The Ukrainian state was officially responsible for all Russian oil and gas purchases made by the state gas monopoly Ukrhazprom on behalf of industrial enterprises, state organizations and the general population, and for the sovereign guarantees granted to some private companies for fuel purchases when they defaulted. Ukraine's control over oil and gas export pipelines to Europe, international pressure, and concerns over Ukraine's economic stability, encouraged Russia to continue to supply oil and gas to Ukraine despite unpaid energy bills. In 1993, Russia raised the issue of swapping energy debt for Ukraine's ownership in the Black Sea Fleet and for shares in Ukrainian enterprises, including refineries and pipelines. On principle, the Verkhovna Rada rejected the suggestion.

Ukraine searched for alternative energy sources in other oil and natural gas producing countries but kept returning to Russia. Pipelines had carried oil and gas from Russia to the Ukrainian refineries (Lisichansk, Kremenchuk, Kherson, and Odessa) that in turn had serviced the Soviet market but now were underutilized, and through Ukraine to Eastern and Central European markets. As oil moved by pipeline to Ukraine there was no need during the Soviet era for port facilities to unload oil. Since 1992 there have been discussions on building a Baltic-Black Sea pipeline through Ukraine from Odessa to Brody¹⁰⁰ that would

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Construction of the pipeline was completed in August 2001.

reduce Ukraine's and the Baltic States' dependence on Russian energy and make Ukraine the main transfer point for Middle Eastern and Caspian oil into Europe. Construction of the pipeline has been delayed due to cost and Russian behind-the-scenes lobbying.

An alternative to natural gas for heat is coal. The Donbas has produced 8.4 billion tons of coal from very productive coal beds over its existence but today the coal beds are thin and at great depths with mining conditions substandard and fatal accidents frequent.¹⁰¹ Coal mining employs 1.3 million workers producing 180-190 million tons of coal a year in economically unproductive mines with the producer price to industry and household subsidized to 27% of the world price of coal in 1994.¹⁰² Ukraine has over 250 coal mines but only four mines are profitable, with Ukrainian coal costing \$50 per ton to mine compared to the world average of \$35 per ton.¹⁰³ Coal consumers especially state industrial enterprises are in arrears in their payments for coal purchases, contributing to coal miners not being paid for months at a time. Coal miners have frequently gone on strike to back their economic demands and the government has responded in crisis fashion. On 6 June 1993 the miners commenced another major strike but one with economic and political demands. They wanted a referendum on President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada, precipitating a political crisis that resulted in early parliamentary and presidential

¹⁰¹ Leslie Dienes, "Energy, Minerals, and Economic Policy," in *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges*, 126.

¹⁰² *Ukraine Economic Reviews 1994* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, March 1995), 10.

¹⁰³ Judith Pereira, "Hard Times in the Donbass," *Energy Economist* (London: December 1998). Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search

elections, and an abundance of low cost bank credits for the coal industry that fueled hyperinflation. Yukhym Zviatkovsky, a coal director, succeeded Leonid Kuchma as Prime Minister. Restructuring of the crisis-ridden coal industry did not take place under President Kravchuk.

Industrial Complex

Ukraine inherited a vast industrial complex that was obsolete (coal mining) and highly sophisticated (military oriented). Industrial production was highly interconnected in the Soviet system with some plants specializing in the mass production of particular parts, others in the assembly of products, all supplying and receiving products of other plants scattered throughout the USSR based on central planning directives. In 1991 there was an abrupt severing of the production process causing production to decline, input sources and product markets to vanish. Ukraine has a large state-owned heavy industry and mineral extraction industrial complex that during the Kravchuk years accounted for half of Ukraine's net material product [NMP] but experienced a yearly 15% decline.¹⁰⁴ Most enterprises employed tens of thousands of workers.

To their final days, Soviet central planners continued to favor heavy industry, investing 75% of industrial funds into machine building, fuel energy, and metallurgical complexes and only 10% into food and light industries. Ukraine's heavy industry accounted for 71.2% of total industrial output while

Fulltext Elite, Item 02627108) on the World Wide Web:
<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite.html>.

consumer goods accounted for only 28.8% (1989); Ukraine exported metallurgical products (27.8%), machinery products (22.1%), coal (10.1%), chemicals and petrochemicals (9.2%) (1988), reaffirming its dependence on heavy industry.¹⁰⁵ Soviet industrial enterprises were rewarded based on meeting planned targets of quantity and weight rather than on quality of products produced and the efficient economic use of input resources. With the command economy gone and state orders in disarray, plant managers had to adjust to finding new input sources and new consumer markets. Meanwhile, to prevent unemployment and mass closure of plants the government provided low-cost loans and subsidies that contributed to Ukraine's budget deficits and bouts of inflation.

The most sophisticated industrial sector had serviced the military, enterprises like the Antonov Design Bureau, the Zaporizhzhia Motor Sich aircraft engine plant, Mykolaiv shipyard, and Pivdenmash missile factory. Seven hundred enterprises employing 1.3 million people specialized in servicing military requirements with another 1,100 enterprises employing 1.4 million employees indirectly involved in the production of spaceships, satellites, missiles, aircraft carriers, communications equipment, and naval surface vessels of various sizes.¹⁰⁶ During the Kravchuk years there was great of talk

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., Tables 1, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/1 (January/February 1995), 676-91.

¹⁰⁶ H. M. Perepelytsia, *Beziadernyi status i natsionalna bezpeka Ukrainy, Seria 'Voenna bezpeka'*, vypusk 6 (Kyiv: Rada natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy, 1998), 13-15; Ustina Markus, "An Ailing Military-Industrial Complex," *Transition* (23 Feb 1996), 52-54.

of converting these large high-tech, specialty plants into production facilities for consumer products.

Conclusion

Nation and state building efforts can not ignore the economic sector, especially when a people are pauperized through inflation and lack of jobs. The elite, relying on its previous experience with a command economy and out of personal self-interest, resorted to regulation and the use of bank credits to overcome the economic crisis. They tried to regulate prices and spend their way out of the economic crisis by printing money. In the process they compounded the economic crisis triggering hyperinflation during a period of massive unemployment and underemployment. Attempts at maintaining low prices for food and other basic products created a yearly crisis on the undercapitalized and underfunded farms that required the government to advance funds for the basic necessities to seed and harvest crops; in exchange the crops grown were purchased at low prices. Ukraine's transformation from the Soviet command economy into a mixed capitalist economy became frozen in mid-zone. For the average citizen it was the worst of both worlds but for the economic elite a financial bonanza due to their ability to use their positions of influence to become rent-seekers making large profits from the regulated distorted marketplace. Oil and natural gas purchases from Russia were inevitable and collection from financially pauperized citizens of utility bills

difficult, but state pricing policies and lack of incentives to explore domestic energy resources greatly compounded the indebtedness situation. Surprising for a nation- and state-builder, President Kravchuk did not lead Ukraine's efforts to establish its own national currency and banking system. External forces forced Ukraine into adopting its temporary coupon and karbovanets. In fact, monetary and fiscal policies that perpetuated inflation undermined attempts to introduce Ukraine's permanent currency, the hryvnia.

Chapter 9

CONTINUITY AND CORRUPTION

Many Ukrainian citizens have come to associate independence with the widespread corruption¹ that is rampant throughout society, in all levels of government, industry, and institutions.² The standard for corruption appears to have been established by the elite, especially by the politicians and directors of state enterprises and collective farms, who continued to control the material and financial resources of the state when Ukraine became independent. Parliamentarians have immunity, and many directors of collective farms and state enterprises are parliamentarians, and have benefited financially from their political connections. When the CPU was suspended, its influence over the legal system, government bureaucracy, industry, and institutions was officially terminated, ending CPU control over the former nomenklatura. As Ukraine's territorial elite, the former nomenklatura entrenched itself as the national elite and 'the party of power.' This was not a political party but a loose association of politically connected individuals positioned in strategic jobs throughout society who controlled the pace of reforms and the implementation of government policy. Some members of the elite used their positions to accumulate wealth

¹ Corruption is defined as the misuse of public office for private profit or political gain.

and emerge as financial oligarchs. The World Bank and IMF report that under President Kravchuk the privatization of state property was minimal, but it appears to have been easy for some individuals to accumulate vast wealth during this fluid period.³ There appears to be a fine line that distinguishes the rights associated with owning private property and the rights associated with managing state property, soviet-style. The roots of widespread corruption in Ukraine can be traced to the Soviet system, a system that fostered corruption through an intrusive administrative bureaucracy, reliance on patron-client relationships, and the subordination of the legal system to the interests of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Ukraine inherited the Soviet legal system, and the root causes and traditions of corruption.

Soviet Roots of Corruption

William Clark's research into corruption among the Soviet elite during the last 25 years of the Soviet Union shows that corruption was widespread, officially tolerated, and used by General Secretary Brezhnev as a substitute for reform.⁴ Corruption had been a prominent feature of Soviet society from Lenin to Gorbachev. Clark states that under Brezhnev over 20 million citizens were involved in illegal activities that generated between 150 to 400 billion rubles in

² See Roman P. Zyla, "Corruption in Ukraine: Between Perceptions and Realities," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, 245-267.

³ The writer in conversations with Ukrainian business people (1991-1999) was repeatedly told that most of their money was made under President Kravchuk, and not under President Kuchma.

earnings per year by providing basic food and services that met some of the needs of 83 percent of the Soviet population.⁵ Clark regards corruption as inevitable in a society with severe and chronic shortages of basic products, a large underpaid bureaucracy, and an excessive need by citizens for government documents. The state tolerated government employees routinely demanding bribes for services that they were legally required to provide, while the criminal system operated informally to encourage certain types of behavior.⁶ To fulfill their assigned quotas in an economy of chronic input shortages, state enterprises hired specialists who illegally procured through barter the necessary inputs. Barter by state enterprises and the padding of reports was illegal but common and facilitated the functioning of the Soviet system.⁷ Reliance on barter transactions continued during the Kravchuk years. Anti-corruption campaigns were politically motivated or used to signal a change in policy, but they did not result in substantive change. Local authorities treated the anti-corruption campaigns as they did their production: proforma compliance and manipulation to serve their interests.⁸

While Communist leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev publicly proclaimed egalitarian objectives they simultaneously and deliberately provided special privileges and material benefits for CPSU/CPU functionaries and the

⁴ William A. Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 92.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 73-74.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 93, 95.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

nomenklatura.⁹ The Communist Party recruited and appointed loyal cadres to strategic and influential positions throughout the Soviet system.¹⁰ The nomenklatura accounted for 1.5 to 2% of the Soviet labor force.¹¹ Benefits provided to the nomenklatura included better and more spacious housing, access to a closed network of special health care facilities,¹² and the availability of quality consumer products at nominal prices at restricted consumer retail outlets. The nomenklatura had the right to purchase foreign currency, at favorable exchange rates, for use in foreign currency stores and for travel abroad. They also were paid higher salaries, bonuses, special pensions, and provided with the use of chauffeur driven cars. By comparison, the general public had to wait in long lines for many hours in order to purchase the basic necessities, paying bribes for services and scarce products.

Corruption was a built-in feature of the Soviet system and formed part of the Soviet legacy that Ukraine had inherited. Corruption and patronage were a fundamental feature of the patron-client relationships that extended from the General Secretary, through the party secretaries, to the local level. Through patron-client relationships the General Secretary consolidated his power, the

⁹ Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978); John H. Miller, "Putting Clients in Place: the Role of Patronage in Cooption into the Soviet Leadership," in *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union*, ed. Archie Brown (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 54-95.

¹⁰ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan Press, 1984).

¹¹ T. H. Rigby, "Introduction," in *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, ed. T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983).

¹² The writer is aware of parliamentarians who were admitted to Feofaniia, the special health care facility outside Kyiv.

periphery was bound to the center,¹³ and local party secretaries were able to enrich themselves with little interference from the center.¹⁴ Around each party secretary, at each level of the hierarchy, clans were formed. The internal hierarchical structure of the CPSU/CPU¹⁵ and its monopoly of political power, the nomenklatura system of appointments, and General Secretary Brezhnev's 'trust in cadres' policy,¹⁶ were fundamental pillars in the formation of these clans.¹⁷ Under Brezhnev, regional and local party elites enjoyed long term security of office, greater autonomy, and weak supervision from the center. At each level of the hierarchy, a party secretary's long-term control of the party apparatus enabled a clan to be formed around him that controlled and dominated Soviet society at that level. Local clans were powerful, being composed of the local Soviet elite that included the heads of the Communist Party, the local Rada, the trade union, state enterprises, collective farms, and the KGB. Under the leadership of the party secretary these clans, at their level of jurisdiction, controlled the nomenklatura and patronage systems and appointed relatives, friends, and loyalists to strategic and financially rewarding positions. This fostered the creation of a personal support network of patron-client relationships that protected and enriched the clan members. With the

¹³ John Miller, "Nomenklatura: Check on Localism?" in *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, 62-97.

¹⁴ For the role of patronage and patron-client relations, see John P. Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

¹⁵ See Bohdan Harasymiw, *Soviet Communist Party Officials: A Study in Organizational Roles and Changes* (N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 1996).

¹⁶ Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics*; Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, 15.

¹⁷ Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, *Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).

exception of the General Secretary, each patron was also a client in the hierarchy. These patron-client relationships bound Soviet society, linking the General Secretary to Ukraine's First Secretary, to loyal subordinates who implemented their directives and policies, and, in turn, were protected by their patron and offered prospects of advancement.¹⁸ Patron-client relationships provided a 'roof' of protection for the client: the more powerful the patron, the more protected the client. The client was protected when he misused his office, embezzled state property, padded reports, or accepted bribes. As the legal system was subordinated to the needs of the Communist Party and state, a powerful patron protected a client from the law. It should be noted that embezzlement of state property was the dominant Soviet crime, with the nomenklatura enriching itself and the average individual compensating oneself for the low wages paid by regarding state property as personal property. Ukraine inherited the Soviet legal system, the patron-client clans, widespread corruption, and the culture of kleptocracy practiced by most members of the elite.

Gorbachev's attempt to replace the nomenklatura system with competitive elections was aimed at changing how the elite was recruited and in reducing the opportunities for corruption. Competitive elections would have undermined patron-client relations and clan control over Soviet society in its region. Soviet Ukraine's regional and local clans resisted holding competitive elections. From 1981 to 1985, some 60% of the provincial party [obkom]

¹⁸ Gyula Jozsa, "Political Seilschaften in the USSR," in *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia*, 139-173; Jeffy Klugman, *The New Soviet Elite: How*

secretaries, and 88% of the town [gorkom] and district committee [raikom] secretaries had been replaced, but as late as January 1988, only 10% of the town and district committee leaders had been selected through competitive elections.¹⁹ The pace of reforms increased with the departure of First Secretary Shcherbytsky in 1989. The suspension of the CPU ended formal Communist ties but the clans continued to exist informally and continued to dominate political and economic life in their region, assisted by the social contract that guaranteed that the former nomenklatura would continue in their influential positions of employment.

Ukraine inherited the Soviet militia as its national, and only, police force. The Soviet militia had been established in support of the Revolution, as the shield of Communist power, to assist the security service in maintaining political and social control over Soviet citizens and ensuring citizen compliance with Marxism-Leninism.²⁰ The Soviet police were a highly centralized, militarized, and authoritarian instrument of state that derived legitimacy, authority, and power from the Communist Party rather than from the people or from a legal system that respected civil rights, the rule of law, and ethnic-national aspirations. There was an absence of a legal framework to regulate and restrain police activity normally associated with a civil society. The police penetrated all spheres of public life as they enforced and regulated Soviet laws

They Think & What They Want (N.Y.: Praeger, 1989).

¹⁹ Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, *Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 93.

²⁰ Louise Shelley, "The Sources of Soviet Policing," *Police Studies* 17/2, 1994. With appendix, "Functions of the Soviet Militia as per 1973 USSR Statute." Retrieved April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/tracc>.

and protected the Communist Party's monopoly of political power. Police suppressed dissidents using criminal law not civil law. Police were responsible for controlling population movement by registering people as to their residency, registering printing presses, overseeing public assemblies and meetings, monitoring cultural activities, public health and hygiene, monitoring food supplies, control of dangerous substances, fire prevention, planning public works, protecting state property, preventing crime, and drafting laws. Some laws and regulations were not published but classified for police knowledge only, contributing to police corruption in the application of laws. Crime prevention and justice were of secondary importance. The absence of civil liberties and individual rights, of private property and a legal system that adhered to the rule of law made citizens vulnerable. Private business was regarded as a crime. The prime responsibility of the police was not preventing crime but protecting the CPSU/CPU's monopoly of political power, state property, and enforcing citizen compliance with Marxism-Leninism. At independence, the CPU was suspended and its influence over police operations terminated, but the police force Ukraine inherited was not of the western type. As with other Soviet-era institutions, continuity was maintained as police personnel remained in their positions, and there is little evidence of internal reforms.

The Soviet judiciary was not independent from political control but rather functioned as an instrument of the CPSU/CPU and the state.²¹ Lawyers were

²¹ It was only with the adoption of the new Ukrainian Constitution on 28 June 1996 that the judiciary became more independent. See Serhiy Holovaty, "The New Constitution of Ukraine:

employees of the state.²² As individual rights did not exist, civil law was underdeveloped and underutilized. Dissidents were tried and judged in criminal court. As all property was owned by the state, there was no need for a land registry, insurance industry, and stock exchange. The service sector was small compared to western industrialized countries. Private business was illegal, removing the need for western-style commercial laws that facilitated business activities and law court enforcement. At independence Ukraine inherited a commercial and civil legal system that failed to promote confidence in the courts, protect private property, and facilitate commercial transactions. During 1991-1994, the Verkhovna Rada enacted laws and the President and Cabinet issued decrees directed at establishing the legislative base for a market economy.²³ These laws and decrees were general in nature and difficult to implement, and while dealing with private property, commercial, tax, and foreign investment laws, they did not address the issue of private ownership of land.²⁴ Lack of a trusted commercial and civil legal system has contributed to rampant

Development and Perspectives," in *Towards a New Ukraine II: Meeting the Next Century*, 25-42; Ed Ratushny and Kim Ratushny, "The Challenge of an Independent Judiciary in an Independent Ukraine," in *Towards a New Ukraine II: Meeting the Next Century*, 43-57; Bohdan A. Futey, "Upholding the Rule of Law in Ukraine: The Judiciary in Transition," in *Towards a New Ukraine II: Meeting the Next Century*, 59-76.

²² The Soros funded Ukrainian Legal Foundation assisted lawyers to establish an independent law society.

²³ *Zakony Ukrainy: zakonodavstvo pro pryvatzatsiiu-zbirnyk zakoniv i naukovo praktychnii komentar* (Kyiv: KPNBTS 'Parytet', 1993); *Prezydent Ukrainy: bibliografichnii pokazhchyk (1991-1999)*, (Kyiv: Sekretariat Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 2000); S. V. Bobrovnyk and O. L. Bohynych, *Systema Zakonodavstva Ukrainy: aktualni problemy ta perspektyvy rozvytku* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994).

²⁴ Tetiana Stepankova, "Liberalizatsiia ekonomiky: trudnoshchi i problemy," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 62-82; Anatolii Peresada and Tetiana Stepankova, "Ekonomichniy potentsiial ta investytsiina polityka v Ukrainy," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 132-144.

corruption that discourages foreign investment,²⁵ restricts the establishment of small businesses, contributes to a large shadow economy, and enables the politically connected oligarchs to financially excel. This situation continued despite the assistance of the IMF,²⁶ Western governments,²⁷ and the Soros sponsored Ukrainian Legal Foundation to assist with legal reforms.

The Third Road to Reforms, The Gradualist Approach²⁸

The social contract insured that there was continuity with the Soviet past when Communist and national democrat parliamentarians agreed to guarantee the territorial elite their current jobs or new jobs at the current level of earnings, and banned all activities that promoted discord.²⁹ The former nomenklatura became the national elite, and ruled as the party of power. During the Soviet era, the nomenklatura had been the vanguard of Soviet society, enjoyed special privileges, and controlled all the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. In independent Ukraine, the elite continued to enjoy special privileges through

²⁵ Foreign investment was legalized: "Zakon Ukrainy: Pro inozemni investytsii," *Holos Ukrainy* 77 (327), (25 April 1992), 6-8; Viktor Tymchenko, "Rozvinchannia mifiv, abo chomu ne idut nimetski biznesmeny v Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy* 1 (251), (3 January 1992), 11.

²⁶ Galina Mikhlin-Oliver and Sandra Bloemenkamp, "Legal Reforms in Ukraine," *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 169-177; Vito Tanzi, "Public Governance in Transition," *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, 225-233; Liam Ebrill, Oleh Havrylyshyn, and IMF staff team, *Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union*, Occasional Paper 182 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1999).

²⁷ Robert Sharlet, "Bringing the Rule of Law to Russia and the Newly Independent States: The Role of the West in the Transformation of the Post-Soviet Legal Systems," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 322-349.

²⁸ For a rejection of the gradualist and country-specific position, see Leczek Balcerowicz, "Common Fallacies in the Debate on the Transition to a Market Economy," *Economic Policy*, A European Forum, 19 supplement (December 1994), 17-50.

²⁹ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 389-391.

political connections and clan relationships. As the World Bank³⁰ report confirmed, government policies and laws allowed a small politically connected elite to accumulate vast wealth while the same government policies contributed to poverty and declining living standards of the general population. The transformation of the nomenklatura into the national elite and the party of power perpetuated the existence of regional and local clans that were bound by patron-client relationships and associated with the culture of corruption. Clan families continued their influence in Ukrainian society. The Dnipropetrovsk clan, whose patron in Soviet times had been General Secretary Brezhnev, retained its status as the most powerful clan. The existence of clans that controlled the economic and political activities in their localities helped Ukraine achieve independence through referendum but reduced the probability of internal restructuring and reforms and perpetuated the culture of corruption and lack of reliance on the rule of law.

During Soviet times, the general population had endured economic hardship, low wages, shortages of consumer goods, and bribe demands from government officials. During the Kravchuk years, the general population continued to endure economic hardship, low wages, unemployment and underemployment, delays in salary payments, loss of life savings due to

³⁰ *World Bank Report: Ten Years After the Break Up of the Soviet System*. World Bank Report retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/news>; Ron Synovitz, "End Note, World Bank Report Blames Poverty on Governments, Vested Interests," *RFE/RL Newslines* 4/186 (26 September 2000).

hyperinflation, and bribe demands from government officials.³¹ The middle class was pauperized, making it necessary for highly educated professionals to sell miscellaneous products at outdoor markets in order to survive. The economic command economy had disintegrated along with the USSR, severing ties of accountability with supervisors in Moscow. Directors of state enterprises and collective farms gained autonomy from external controls and enjoyed greater discretionary authority over the allocation of resources under their control. Some state enterprises were closed and stripped of assets by directors,³² or closed because directors feared losing control through joint ventures with foreign companies.³³ While the command economy was gone, it was not replaced by a competitive mixed economic system of the type that exists in the West. Rather, the government continued to dominate the economic sphere through state ownership, regulations, price controls, and state procurement of products, especially agricultural products. Directors of inefficient state enterprises benefited from government regulations, company inefficiencies, and monopoly positions as they lobbied for government financial assistance, government contracts, and export and import permits. Directors of

³¹ See Vasyl Kremin and Victor Bondarenko, "Derzhava ta ukrainske suspilstvo: stan i problemy sotsiohumanitarnoho rozvytku," in *Ukraina na perekhidnomu etapi: polityka, ekonomika, kultura*, 41-61.

³² The writer is aware of an electronics plant that supplied high quality electronic parts to the military complex and employed over 10,000 employees that was closed. Mysteriously all plant chattels vanished.

³³ The writer was informed of a joint venture that manufactured clothing for the western market. At the insistence of the joint venture partner the plant director was replaced due to incompetence. Directors of other clothing manufacturing plants refused to participate in joint ventures, preferring to keep their plants empty and closed rather than risk being fired for incompetence.

collective farms benefited from lack of private land ownership, the absence of which perpetuated the collective farm structures.

President Kravchuk, who projected the image of a moderate, left the economic sector to his Prime Ministers and other economic experts. Following the miners' strikes in June 1993 that had threatened his presidency and internal stability, Kravchuk called for a gradual approach to reforms, a third path to meet Ukraine's unique economic requirements,³⁴ this, despite the absence of any substantial economic reforms. Kravchuk rejected Poland's path of shock economic therapy and Russia's path that included rapid privatization of state assets and the liberalization of prices. However, his successor would follow the Russian example of privatization for the benefit of a few politically connected individuals. Ukraine's economy continued to be regulated and controlled through the Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada. The Cabinet ministries were structured along economic sector lines as during Soviet lines, with each minister and department responsible for promoting, protecting, and lobbying for the enterprises in their sector. The Verkhovna Rada was comprised of directors of state enterprises and collective farms that had elected Kravchuk as parliamentary speaker, and had campaigned for independence and Kravchuk for president. They used their parliamentary votes to lobby for their enterprises and economic sectors. These politically connected directors and their state enterprises and collective farms benefited when in mid-1993 the Verkhovna Rada instructed the National Bank to issue immense credits that

³⁴ Volodymyr Zvihlyanich, "State and Nation: Economic Strategies for Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 237-263.

fueled hyperinflation (see chapter on the economy). These credits did not improve collective farm or state enterprise productivity but contributed to the wealth accumulation of a small politically connected elite. Many of these low interest loans were through the state owned agriculture bank, Ukraina, and undermined the bank's solvency.

While under President Kravchuk, privatization was limited to small businesses, mainly in the service sector and housing units, a political poll conducted among working youth in the Dnipropetrovsk region showed that 63 percent supported private ownership and 32 percent supported private enterprise.³⁵ Small businesses were usually purchased by worker cooperatives. If a family lived in their apartment for ten years or more they could purchase the apartment for a nominal price. The purchase price was paid to the local municipality and ownership was registered in the municipal office. As Kyiv is divided into fifteen districts, the purchase and registration took place in the local district office. Parliamentarians were provided with free, newly constructed apartments near Lesia Ukrainka Street. But privatization was also being carried out on a larger unofficial scale. Criminal elements were acquiring ownership of apartments from the elderly and poor,³⁶ and under the cover of

³⁵ Oleksii Hylun, "Stavlennia silskoi molodi Prydniprovia do formuvannia rynkovykh vidnosyn," *Henezha 1* (1994), 214-216.

³⁶ In 1992, a sportsman kickboxer told the writer that he owned a number of apartments in downtown Kyiv that he wanted to rent. He said that he had purchased them from the elderly but refused to say what he paid.

cooperatives the politically connected were assembling substantial real estate in downtown Kyiv.³⁷

Organized crime existed in Soviet times but went unreported. In fact, Bolshevik ties to criminal activities extended back to pre-Revolution days, while a lack of adherence to the rule of law characterized the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.³⁸ Since independence, organized crime has become more visible and diversified in its activities.³⁹ For organized crime to operate openly in a society there must be collusion among the criminal organizations, the police, the judiciary, the government bureaucracy, and the politicians. Criminal organizations are engaged in illegal drug trafficking, gambling,⁴⁰ murder,⁴¹ theft, extortion and protection rackets,⁴² fraud, the export of oil⁴³ and raw materials,⁴⁴ prostitution, the trafficking in women to other countries,⁴⁵ and the smuggling of

³⁷ In 1992, the writer met with a businessman whose office was adjacent to St. Sophia's Cathedral who claimed to be head of a cooperative that owned vast real estate holdings in Kyiv. He wanted to sell property to foreign investors.

³⁸ Serhii Hrabovsky, "Mentalnist spany," *Suchasnist* 3 (March 1998), 71-76.

³⁹ Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 2/3 (Summer 1994), 341-358. Retrieved April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/traccc>; Ariel Cohen, "Ukrainian and Russian Organized Crime: A Threat to Emerging Civil Society," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 285-302; Tanya Frisby, "The Rise of Organized Crime in Russia: Its Roots and Social Significance," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/1 (January 1998), p. 27, 23p. Retrieved in April, 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item 267424) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite/html>.

⁴⁰ The writer in 1995 had been informed that the son of a former highly placed CPU official owned one of the largest gambling establishments in Kyiv.

⁴¹ An example is the murder of the head of the National Bank of Ukraine, Vadym Hetman, by criminals on orders from a Russian businessman. See "Russian Businessman Implicated in Murdering Head of Ukraine's Central Bank," *BBC Monitoring Service* (U.K.: July 18, 2001). Retrieved July 19, 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.brama.com/news/index.html>

⁴² In 1992, as the writer was walking by an outdoor bazaar he noticed two young men counting a thick bundle of cash. They were discussing who had paid and who had not.

⁴³ Oil imported from Russia at below the world price and under Ukrainian state guarantee was re-exported to Europe at a large profit by the politically connected elite and by criminals.

⁴⁴ One exporter boasted that he could not go broke by buying grain at one-third of the world price and selling on the world market at two-thirds of the world price.

⁴⁵ Louise I. Shelley, "Trafficking in Women: Defining the Problem." Statement made before the Hearing on Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United States,

military weapons. Racketeers are also engaged in price control, forcing merchants to maintain high prices and forbidding price competition.⁴⁶ Using their vast financial resources, criminal organizations have penetrated all levels of government, working with corrupt government officials for their mutual financial benefit. The illegal export of money is a joint effort of corrupt government and banking officials,⁴⁷ criminal organizations, former security personnel, and the elite.⁴⁸ This appears to be a continuation of the soviet legacy when Communists and the KGB had set up phony corporations abroad to channel party and state funds out of the country, laundered money, exported arms, trafficked in drugs, and smuggled nuclear material.⁴⁹ Money exported from Ukraine comes from many sources. Some is transferred out of the country to escape unfavorable tax policies, inflation, and the lack of legal protection for private property. Money may have been earned in the shadow economy, or through fraud, theft of state property, and bribes received by officials. Money

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission), June 28, 1999. Retrieved April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/traccc>.

⁴⁶ In private, some bazaar merchants explained to the writer the strong influence racketeers have on retail prices.

⁴⁷ See Louise Shelley, "The Current State of Corruption in the NIS," Statement by Louise Shelley, Director of TraCCC; and "Disposal of Seized Laundered Assets," in *Killing Development: Money Laundering in the Global Economy*, ed. A. Jones, B. Rider, G. Saltmarsh, and L. Shelley. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.american.edu/traccc>; Staffs of IMF and the World Bank, *Enhancing Contributions to Combating Money Laundering: Policy Paper* (26 April 2001). Retrieved April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng>.

⁴⁸ P.J. O'Rourke, "The Godfather Decade," *Foreign Policy* 121 (November/December 2000), p. 74, 7p. Retrieved April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 3802736) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>.

⁴⁹ Robert S. Leiken, "Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 96/97), 105 p. 55, 19p. Retrieved in April, 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item 9612173076) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite/html>.

earned through the export of raw materials and weapons usually remains abroad.

During the Kravchuk years, as members of the elite acquired financial strength and private property they commenced to hire police and security service officers as private bodyguards and chauffeurs. This provided prestige, protection, and a special status when a vehicle driven by a police officer was stopped for a traffic violation. Many security service and police officers sought higher incomes by leaving the state service and getting involved in criminal activities. Criminal organizations, in addition to extorting protection from small businesses, have established private guard services staffed by former security service and police officers that they hire out to foreign and Ukrainian businesses. A market for private guards was created by the inability of the police to protect citizens and businesses.

Ukraine inherited its national police force from Soviet Ukraine. There is only one police force in Ukraine, operating in all regions and municipalities, and under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Ukrainian police force traditions and training are different from the police forces in the West. Ukraine's police were not trained and equipped to fight corruption and organized crime, uphold the rule of law, and the civil rights of individuals.⁵⁰ For several decades the police were trained to regard business activities as criminal acts and wealth accumulation as inappropriate, now they are assigned to protect private business activities and private property. Police are having difficulties adjusting

to their new duties, with many officers extracting bribes from merchants and drivers of vehicles. In addition, police can accept payment for fines, but these fines are rarely forwarded to the state coffers. Some police engage in extracting bribes to compensate for low wages. There is a police joke about a new police officer, after waiting for three months to be paid his salary, approaches his supervisor and asks when he will be paid. The surprised supervisor takes the officer to the street, stops a number of cars and extracts a bribe from each driver. He then turns to the young officer and tells him that while he gets paid once a month, the officer has the opportunity to be paid several times a day.

Many of Ukrainian laws and regulations are obsolete and assist the bribe extraction process.⁵¹ Overregulation, unclear laws and regulations, and the lack of a legal framework to punish bribe seekers assists the corruption process. For example, every car owned by a business must have a special booklet within which are recorded the names of every driver of that vehicle and the exact times that a driver drove the vehicle. This information must be continuously updated. Failure to maintain accurate and updated records results in fines by the traffic police. Every car owner must purchase an extensive package of emergency items, most of which would never be used. Failure to have these items results in a fine. Private sector merchants must maintain

⁵⁰ Louise Shelley, "Post-Socialist Policing: Limitations on Institutional Change," Chapter 5 in *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (London & N.Y.: Routledge, 1996). Retrieved April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/traccc>.

⁵¹ See "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers (Washington, D.C.: IMF, December 1998). Retrieved April 2000 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.proquest.umi/pqdweb>.

accurate records showing their inventory at the beginning of the business day, all purchases and sales, and their inventory at the end of the day. This is shown to tax inspectors during their periodic visits during the day but tax laws are unclear and can be interpreted differently at the discretion of tax officials. Periodic visits by health, taxation, fire, and other inspectors are common and each inspector usually demands a bribe.⁵² Of the 845 official licenses that the state construction commission requires for different types of construction work only 29 of these licenses are justified by law.⁵³

President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada did little to combat the widespread corruption that centered upon the territorial elite and the party of power as they used their positions with state enterprises and collective farms to increase their personal wealth.⁵⁴ The World Bank⁵⁵ noted the government's policy of tolerating organized crime and widespread corruption by civil servants,⁵⁶ allowing the police, tax officials, health inspectors, building

⁵² For attempts at reforming the civil service, see Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Law on the Civil Service: A Case Study of Administrative Reform in Ukraine," *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 135-153.

⁵³ Geoffrey York, "Embarrassment Looms for Ukraine," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto). Retrieved Sept 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://ukar.org/06dec97.shtml>.

⁵⁴ See Louise Shelley, "The Current State of Corruption in the NIS." Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.american.edu/traccc>; While there is a big difference between tolerating corruption and encouraging corruption, it should be noted that Matviienko, former head of the Komsomol, while head of the People's Democratic Party (the party of power) charged that President Kuchma adhered to a deliberate policy of encouraging subordinates to corruption. See Tetiana Korobova, "'Nelivyi' Prezydent rozchyshchaie dorohu ultralivym," *Den* 76 (613) (27 April 1999), 1, 4; Tetiana Korobova, "Matviienko viddaie 'shkuru vbytoi NDP' Pustovoitenku. Dobrovilno," *Den* 87 (624) (18 May 1999), 1, 4.

⁵⁵ *World Bank Report Ten Years After the Breakup of the Soviet System*. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/news>; Ron Synovitz, "End Note, World Bank Report Blames Poverty on Governments, Vested Interests," *RFE/RL Newslines* 4/186 (26 September 2000).

⁵⁶ See Ase B. Grodland et al., "'Foolish to Give and Yet More Foolish Not to Take'--In-Depth Interviews With Post-Communist Citizens on Their Everyday Use of Bribes and Contacts," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50/4 (June 1998), p. 651, 27p, 4 charts. Retrieved May 2000 from the

inspectors, among many others, to regularly extort bribes from private businesses. Because of low salaries, professionals like doctors and schoolteachers are also demanding bribes. The World Bank admitted that it had underestimated the amount of corruption and criminal influence within Ukraine and the impact this would have on market reforms and privatization of state assets.⁵⁷

Corruption discourages foreign investment and undermines attempts at establishing a true democracy and a prosperous economy. While bribes reduce waiting time for obtaining permits or processing documents, there is no guarantee that additional bribes will not be demanded or the services paid for delivered. Daniel Kaufmann⁵⁸ writes that corruption encourages additional excessive and discretionary regulations to arise in order to extract additional bribes. Corruption takes revenue from state coffers and encourages bureaucrats to promote complex and expensive projects from which it is easier to embezzle money. Corruption is profitable but negotiating bribes is time consuming for business people and government officials. Statistics that are available for 1996 should also be applicable to the Kravchuk years. Kaufmann writes that in 1996, owners of firms who paid many bribes spend almost 1/3 more of their time with government officials than owners of firms who paid fewer bribes. Also, company staff spent more time with government officials: 75 staff

University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, Item 817790) on the World Wide Web: <http://www.library.ualberta.ca/libraryhtml/databases/elite.html>.

⁵⁷ Also see Andreas Wittkowsky, "Western Privatization Assistance Brings Mixed Results," *Transition* (1 Nov. 1996), 26-29.

⁵⁸ Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 97) p. 114, 18p. Retrieved in April, 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search

weeks for bribing firms compared to 22 staff weeks for companies that paid fewer bribes. Ninety percent of Ukrainian managers say it is normal to pay bribes to government officials and protection money to criminal gangs. This hostile business environment has contributed to Ukraine's unofficial economy being approximately 50% of the total economy.⁵⁹ As Kaufmann notes, the incidence of corruption increases with regulatory and state-bureaucratic interference in business, and with increases in regulatory discretion. High regulations and taxes are associated with the need to pay higher bribes in order to survive, increasing the cost of doing business.⁶⁰ Corruption reduces state revenues, reduces investment in education, and lowers investment and the rates of economic growth. Corruption undermines economic development and foreign investment while market liberalization and privatization reduces corruption. The elite benefits by corruption and the lack of reforms, as elite interests become entrenched as their financial wealth accumulates through non-competitive structures. Kaufmann writes that even if judicial institutions are not as yet well developed, deregulation, liberalization, budget and tax reforms,

Fulltext Elite, item 9708190357) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite/html>.

⁵⁹ Ihor Greenwald, "Maverick Marketeers in Ukraine Keep Quiet," *Christian Science Monitor* 8/9/95, 87/178, p. 7, 1c. [Abstract] Retrieved in April 2001 from the University of Alberta Library Databases (Academic Search Fulltext Elite, item 9508281440) on the World Wide Web:

<http://www.library.ualberta.ca/library.html/databases/elite/html>.

⁶⁰ S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, J. McMillan, and C. Woodruff, "Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism," *Journal of Public Economic* 76/3 (1 June 2000), 495-520. Retrieved in April 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.elsevier.nl/cgi-bin/cas/>.

and privatization will reduce corruption.⁶¹ As economic regulations disappear, the need for subsidies and soft credits disappears.

Geoff Dubrow⁶² draws a distinction between the situation in East Central Europe and Ukraine. In East Central Europe, the Communists were defeated and economic reforms undertaken. In Ukraine, the former Soviet territorial elite remained in power because the national democrats prioritized independence above economic reforms. Dubrow asserts this meant there was no ideological transformation and no acceptance of government policies that would end corruption, foster democracy, capitalism, and micro liberalization of the economy. He also attributes corruption and lack of reforms to the adoption of the presidential system and the continued practice of appointing cabinets that are not responsible to the people or the Verkhovna Rada. The former nomenklatura by remaining in their positions of employment have resisted the transition to democracy and capitalism, and participated in corruption through the awarding of government contracts, the allocation of import and export licenses, and the privatization of state assets.

Widespread corruption is an inheritance from Soviet Ukraine. Corruption undermines efforts to establish a true democracy and a prosperous country while enabling the politically connected to accumulate vast wealth. The government's tolerance of corruption among the elite and of organized crime

⁶¹ Also see Daniel Kaufmann, "Diminishing Returns to Administrative Controls and the Emergence of the Unofficial Economy: A Framework of Analysis and Applications to Ukraine," *Economic Policy*, A European Forum, 51-69.

⁶² Geoff Dubrow, "Legacies of an Early Post-Totalitarian State: Corruption and Economic Reform in Ukraine," Harvard Ukrainian Institute, 1999. Retrieved May 2001 from the World Wide Web: <http://www.huri.harvard.edu/>.

has contributed to the emergence of financial oligarchs. Police are not trained and equipped to fight corruption and organized crime, having historically been more concerned with guaranteeing Soviet power and Marxism-Leninism than fighting crime. Adherence to the rule of law and respect for civil rights were not features of Soviet police traditions. The territorial elite established Ukraine's independence for their own benefit. The local and regional clans that were formed around the CPU secretary continued their existence after the CPU was suspended. The territorial elite, including the powerful clans, helped deliver the votes in favor of independence. As the nomenklatura entrenched itself as Ukraine's national elite, it continued to dominate the Ukrainian government, business, agriculture, and institutions, being referred to as the party of power. The social contract had facilitated the transformation of the Soviet territorial elite into Ukraine's national elite.

Chapter 10

CONCLUSION

The objectives and priorities of the Kravchuk presidency are evident in the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract as approved through referendum. When Ukraine's multiethnic electorate overwhelmingly voted 'yes' to affirm the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on 1 December 1991, they also approved the parameters that would define independent Ukraine, its people, and self-identity. Ukraine would be a prosperous, democratic, and rule-by-law society. The national rebirth of Ukraine program and social contract provided the foundation upon which Leonid Kravchuk, as parliamentary speaker and president, pursued his nation- and state-building policies.

Ukraine's independence was not achieved through a national awakening or the triumph of national democratic forces but through the unified determination of the Soviet territorial establishment who were intent on isolating Ukraine from events unfolding in Moscow. General Secretary Gorbachev's attempts to reform the Soviet economy and society encountered resistance from conservative Communists within the CPSU and positioned strategically throughout Soviet structures. To mobilize Communist and popular support

behind his reforms, Gorbachev approved criticism of Soviet past deeds, in the process discrediting Marxism-Leninism. To undermine resistance to his reforms, Gorbachev repealed the CPSU's monopoly of political power and transferred power from the office of General Secretary to that of President, from the Communist Party to the USSR's Verkhovna Rada. This was repeated at the republic level. To establish a democratic foundation for the USSR he pursued a new Union treaty that would be voluntarily entered into by each republic with the approval of its democratically elected Verkhovna Rada. Parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk resisted signing a new Union treaty, insisting on a weak and powerless center. Gorbachev's plans were foiled by the attempted August coup, led by prominent members of the CPSU, the KGB, and military, that further discredited the institutional pillars that held the USSR together. Post-coup events in Moscow provided the catalyst for Ukraine's independence: Russian President Yeltsin's power grab of Union institutions and assets on Russian territory and his anti-Communist decrees, and General Secretary Gorbachev's resignation from the CC CPSU and his recommendation that the Central Committee disband itself.

The timing of Ukraine's unexpected and spontaneous declaration of independence under the leadership of the Soviet territorial establishment projected the image that reactionary forces were isolating Ukraine from the anti-Communist events unfolding in Moscow under the leadership of Russian President Yeltsin, a perceived reformer. A new image and a direction was required that would distance independent Ukraine from its tarnished Soviet past

while maintaining continuity through Ukraine's inheritance from the Ukrainian SSR and Union assets, institutions, and organizations situated on Ukrainian territory. Continuity also prevailed through an agreement between Communist and national democrat parliamentarians that in exchange for supporting independence the nomenklatura would be allowed to retain their important and strategic positions in government, institutions, organizations, and industry. The suspension of the CPU removed a lightning rod for the discontent, benefiting former CPU ideologue Kravchuk and the Soviet territorial elite. Parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk's prime concerns being internal stability, territorial integrity, international acceptability, and the retention of the Soviet territorial establishment as Ukraine's national establishment. Marxism-Leninism was discarded as a relic of the Soviet past, and along with it, Ukraine's ties to the world's first proletarian state, replaced by Rukh's national rebirth of Ukraine program that called for independence and emphasized Ukrainian European roots that contrasted with Russia's Eurasian status. The national rebirth of Ukraine and the social contract were presented, discussed, and overwhelmingly approved during the 100-day referendum campaign. Ukraine's history, people, traditions, and national identity were defined while distancing Ukraine from its Soviet past and Russia. The social contract promised that Ukraine would be the antithesis of its Soviet past. Independent Ukraine would be a democratic, multiethnic, multiparty, pluralistic, rule-by-law state that would respect individual and national rights according to international standards, and provide job opportunities and economic prosperity for all. The social contract was a political

platform, a statement of intent and not a plan of action, enabling the nomenklatura and former political prisoners to endorse it. While a pluralistic, multiparty, economically prosperous, and rule-by-law society was promised, internal reforms and restructuring of Ukrainian government, industry, organizations, and institutions, including the police and law courts, were not. The social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine platform united the elite and the governed, Kyiv and the provinces, and all national minorities in Ukraine behind independence through a display of unity and euphoria unprecedented in Ukrainian history.

Shortly after independence was established under the leadership of the Russian-speaking, multiethnic territorial elite, concerns were heard questioning the durability and longevity of Ukraine's independence. Issues of concern centered upon Ukraine's ethnic and regional diversity, linguistic duality, and centuries of russification. Understandably, as the unexpected disintegration of the USSR had caught the world by surprise, extra vigilance was concentrated upon the cleavages that could precipitate the disintegration of Ukraine. But the territorial elite in all regions had campaigned for and delivered the 'yes' vote that approved independence, the national rebirth of Ukraine program, and the social contract. The electorate had reaffirmed support for the Ukrainian language as the official language of state, with the right of other languages to be used in dealings with government in compact areas of settlement, as originally enacted into law under the Ukrainian SSR. During the dash out of the USSR, lacking alternatives and to distance Ukraine from Russia, Rukh's national rebirth of

Ukraine program was adopted that advantaged the western Ukrainian version of the national identity, but with independence established other regions began actively contributing to the formation of the national identity. A great linguistic divide was detected during the 1994 presidential elections; however, closer examination reveals a complex set of factors that contributed to President Kuchma's election victory besides his stated Eurasian orientation and comments regarding the Russian language, including the economic crisis and a superior campaign organization. The social contract with its 90% electoral endorsement by referendum contributed to Ukraine's internal unity and international acceptance, broadened the decision-making process for independence, and bound the elite and populace in all regions in support.

Soviet military and security personnel stationed in Ukraine participated in the 1 December 1991 referendum and were bound by the results that endorsed the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract. Ukraine's military and security forces were established from nationalized multinational Soviet forces with predominantly ethnic-Russian officers through an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Planning for the establishment of Ukraine's armed forces commenced with the declaration of independence and the appointment of Colonel General Kostiantyn Morozov as Defense Minister, while the actual formation commenced after the leaders of the CIS countries approved the formation of non-strategic national military forces from Soviet forces. Ukraine acquired some 700,000 military personnel, a disproportionate amount of sophisticated weapons positioned for frontline defense, and a vast military-

industrial complex. No difficulties were encountered in nationalizing Soviet ground and air forces but attempts to nationalize the Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol encountered counterclaims to the ownership of the fleet by Russia that were not resolved during the Kravchuk presidency, strained Ukraine-Russia relations, and influenced Crimean separatism. Nationalizing Soviet forces did not equate to linguistic ukrainianization or to internal restructuring. And random and sporadic downsizing of the armed forces did not equate to improved military efficiency.

At independence, Ukraine became the world's third largest nuclear power, although control of the nuclear weapons remained in Russian President Yeltsin's hands through the CIS military command. The West insisted that only Russia could inherit nuclear status, with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan required to transfer their nuclear weapons to Russia and to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty as non-nuclear status states and ratify START-1. While tactical nuclear weapons were easily transferred to Russia, the removal of nuclear warheads from silos was more complex and expensive. Ukraine's road to disarmament was difficult and expensive, with the West ostracizing Ukraine and providing minimal financial assistance, all directed towards nuclear disarmament. Ukraine insisted on being financially compensated for recycled uranium from dismantled warheads that America agreed to purchase from Russia for \$12 billion dollars over 20 years. In mid-1993 the Clinton administration changed direction, offered Ukraine financial assistance for economic development, increased assistance for disarmament, and security

guarantees. In January 1994, the Trilateral Agreement was signed by Presidents Clinton, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin that facilitated the final phase of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty and START-1.

The national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract played a determining role in the formation of Ukraine's foreign policy with its emphasis upon European roots and the declared intention to reintegrate into Europe. The social contract addressed some of the issues associated with Ukraine's relations with, and proposed future entry into, the European Union. Ukraine pursued reintegration into Europe through the assistance of East Central European countries, specifically through Poland with whom Ukraine had a long and complex historic relationship. Ukraine sought entry into the Visegrad triangle and the Central European Free Trade Association, and became a founding member of the Carpathian Euroregion. While approving of NATO's eastward expansion, President Kravchuk attempted to forge the East Central European states, situated between NATO and Russia, into a stability and security zone.

Ukraine's relations with Russia were formal and informal, bilateral, and multilateral through the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Ukrainian and Russian leadership had shared the Soviet experience as colleagues, having risen to power through CPSU structures. They spoke a common language, shared similar Soviet engrained values, and faced similar adjustments into the post-Soviet world. Russia was advantaged as the

internationally recognized lawful heir to the USSR and by its abundant energy resources that Ukraine was dependent upon. Having terminated the USSR's existence as an entity of international law, Ukraine and Russia advocated two different destinies for the former Soviet space. Russia wanted the CIS to develop an infrastructure through which Russia, as the first among equals, could control the former Soviet space. Ukraine, in keeping with its national rebirth of Ukraine program, regarded the CIS as a temporary vehicle to facilitate the peaceful and controlled severing of ties that would end Ukraine's subservience to Moscow. By mutual agreement the CIS leaders approved Soviet military forces being nationalized into national armies and Russia becoming the sole nuclear heir. At their summits, the CIS leaders resolved disputes regarding the division of Union assets and liabilities. By adhering to its national rebirth of Ukraine program, Ukraine contributed to the CIS becoming a loose association of states that does not infringe upon the sovereign rights or territorial integrity of Ukraine and the other CIS members.

Crimean separatism and Russian parliamentary resolutions challenged Ukraine's territorial integrity during the dispute over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet's vessels and land-based assets. Crimea, a Ukrainian province since 1954, was granted the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine in February 1991. Crimea is linguistically Russian and 67 percent ethnically Russian, with many Russians being naval personnel and retirees with strong ties with Russia. The Crimean Tatars, exiled by Stalin, have been returning to Crimea in large numbers and are strong supporters of Ukraine's jurisdiction

over Crimea. Crimean separatists followed Ukraine's example as they pursued greater sovereignty for Crimea, while President Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada utilized legislative and constitutional means to counter separatism. Crimean residents, including naval personnel, had voted in Ukraine's independence referendum endorsing the social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine program. The social contract recognized the equality of all citizens regardless of ethnicity and granted the right to use the Russian language in dealings with government, while the national rebirth of Ukraine program highlighted Ukraine's territorial integrity. During the Kravchuk years the issue of Crimean separatism was not resolved.

The social contract promised continuity with the Soviet past through the retention of the nomenklatura as Ukraine's national elite, some of whom resisted essential reforms of government, industry, and institutions. During the referendum campaign an abundance of job opportunities was promised with economic prosperity for all in independent Ukraine, but little mention was made of economic reforms and 'shock' therapy. The collapse of the USSR had disrupted and severed the production chain that linked industrial enterprises throughout the Soviet Union into an extensive production line, resulting in the need for new sources of input materials and new markets for finished products. Directors of state-enterprises and collective farms achieved greater autonomy and discretion over economic resources, and having excelled in a command economy they preferred the regulated economy with its government contracts, subsidies, and easy credits, to the uncertainties of a fully competitive market

economy. Government budget deficits, generous subsidies and credits to inefficient state-enterprises and collective farms, fueled inflation that wiped out savings and financially pauperized the population while enriching the politically connected and protected elite.

The commercial and legal requirements of independent Ukraine were different from those of Soviet Ukraine. Independence and the demise of the command economy changed the mandate of the banking system that now required a national currency and the establishment of a two-tier banking system, consisting of a central bank and commercial banks. Widespread practices of corruption, bribery, and embezzlement of state property that facilitated the functioning of the Soviet system were counterproductive in independent Ukraine, contributing to the emergence of an underground economy that equaled half of Ukraine's economic activities. Corruption, bribery, and criminal gangs discouraged private business and investments, deprived the state treasury of needed tax revenues while enriching the politically connected and protected. The CPSU had mandated the Soviet police and law courts to enforce compliance with Marxist-Leninist guidelines, with private business activities and land ownership being regarded as illegal and criminal. With Marxism-Leninism discarded, the CPSU out of power, and private business activities legalized, Ukraine required new laws and regulations. Required were commercial laws and trust in the court system to fairly and impartially enforce compliance with commercial contracts. The Kravchuk years witnessed a

deficiency in government attempts to curtail corruption, bribery, and criminal gang activities, while the underground economy expanded rapidly.

The Kravchuk years defined and established the parameters of independent Ukraine but it was in Soviet Ukraine that the political and economic elite rose to power, were educated and socialized to acceptable standards of conduct, and established vital patron-client relationships. It follows that a better understanding of the last decade of Soviet Ukraine's existence is important. The prevailing image of Soviet Ukraine amongst the western Ukrainian diaspora is centered upon Stalinism, collectivization, and the man-made famine. Yet, it was only under Gorbachev that the Soviet people were informed of the black deeds of the Marxist-Leninist experiment. During the referendum campaign Kravchuk emphasized that Stalin and the Union level (being discarded), and not Russia or Russians were responsible. Ukraine's self-identity and perceptions of Russia's intentions towards Ukraine varies among regions, with western Ukrainians being at one end of the spectrum and Russians in the Donbas and Crimea at the other extreme. In fact, the benchmark used by western Ukrainians, eastern Ukrainians, ethnic Russians, and the West, for viewing and interpreting Ukrainian events and individuals varies dramatically, influenced by knowledge and personal experience of the Soviet era.

Leonid Kravchuk, as parliamentary speaker and president, repeatedly highlighted the need for internal stability, territorial integrity, and international acceptability. Independence was achieved under the leadership of the territorial establishment who were intent in preserving their status quo, their jobs and

influence, and not by revolutionary forces intent on overthrowing and destroying the Soviet legacy. While the central command economy and Marxism-Leninism were discarded, continuity of inherited Soviet traditions, practices, and ingrained values continued to influence individuals and events as the social contract was implemented and capitalism defined. To better understand the successes and failures of President Kravchuk and contemporary Ukraine it is necessary to establish a benchmark, a reference point, from which to measure and judge. This requires research into the final years of Soviet Ukraine's existence to exact an understanding of what Ukraine inherited, what it preserved, and what it discarded, for Ukraine is founded upon Soviet Ukraine's infrastructure.

The proliferation of political parties signaled the emergence of a multiparty system and the freedom of political expression and association, but it also signaled that, prior to independence, diversity of opinion prevailed within the territorial establishment who enjoyed privileges as the vanguard of the Communist Party and guardians of Marxism-Leninism. A tolerance of diverse political expression among the territorial elite was starting to emerge when the Ukrainian Writers Union spearheaded the establishment of Rukh, CPU ideologue Kravchuk won a contested election to become parliamentary speaker, and the Democratic Platform group was formed within the CPU. When the CPU was suspended, Communist deputies became independent and established a vast array of parliamentary caucuses, further indicating the prior existence of diverse opinions and political relationships. Just as Rukh and the Republican Party (Helsinki Union) have roots in the dissident movement, and

the rightwing nationalist parties had roots in the interwar period, many of the new political parties registered during the Kravchuk years have Soviet roots in patron-client relationships. We know that some large industrial and farm enterprises established small commercial banks to serve their specific needs, did patron-client clans establish political parties to serve their interests? Indications are yes. As decades of experience had shown that clan interests were not the same as the interests of the general population, this may partially explain the lack of popular support for political parties. Research of Soviet patron-client clans as they adjusted to the new political reality may assist our understanding of the formation, objectives, and electoral appeal of political parties.

An understanding of the Soviet legal system, traditions, and deficiencies that Ukraine inherited may enhance our understanding of the difficulties being encountered in eradicating widespread corruption, bribery, and criminal activity in Ukraine. While Western legal tradition relied on the rule-of-law, Soviet tradition relied on powerful patrons. The state, police, and law courts were more focused on using criminal law to enforce compliance with Marxism-Leninism rather than punishing corruption, bribery, and embezzlement of state property that facilitated the functioning of the system. It would be extremely interesting to read a series of compiled articles, in book format, written by Ukrainian and Western specialists on Soviet Ukraine's and independent Ukraine's legal system and business traditions, including government over-

regulation. This would enhance a better appreciation of the current situation in Ukraine and may encourage a more focused targeting of reforms.

Elite-populace relations should deserve special attention, including a comparison between Soviet and current times. During the Soviet era the nomenklatura enjoyed special privileges and were insulated from the economic hardships, consumer product shortages, and bribery demands that the general population endured. Transformed into the national elite, the former nomenklatura continues in their privileged role amassing financial fortunes through political connections and protection while the general population continues to endure economic hardship. Rather than membership in the CPU, now control or ownership of economic and financial resources determines elite status, the movement of individuals into the elite and from the elite, and the availability of an array of consumer products. However, the 'mass', the general population was not important during the Soviet era and their concerns continued to be secondary in independent Ukraine.

And finally, it must be noted that many topics of importance to a better understanding of Ukraine were not included in this text with its primary focus upon political history and the nation- and state-building efforts during the Kravchuk years. Health care, social issues, the labor movement, education, the mass media, environment, Chornobyl, local government, and religion, among many others were not discussed. All could have been included under the theme of the national rebirth of Ukraine and the social contract but topics were

prioritized as to their perceived importance in the nation- and state-building efforts.

Ukraine's independence was achieved under the leadership of parliamentary Speaker Kravchuk and the territorial establishment who were intent on isolating Ukraine from the events unfolding in Moscow in order to protect their privileges and influence. The essence of the Kravchuk presidency is encompassed in the national rebirth of Ukraine program and the social contract that were promoted by the territorial establishment and endorsed by the electorate on 1 December 1991. The referendum campaign contributed to Ukraine's internal unity and international acceptance, broadened the decision-making process, bound the territorial establishment and the populace, Kyiv and the provinces, and all national minorities in Ukraine behind independence through a display of unity and euphoria unprecedented in Ukrainian history. The social contract was a political program of intent, not a detailed plan of action. The national rebirth of Ukraine and the social contract defined Ukraine and its people and promised that Ukraine would be a democratic, rule-by-law society that would respect individual and national rights, and provide job opportunities and economic prosperity for all citizens. The social contract and the national rebirth of Ukraine provided the foundation and guidelines upon which the formation of the Ukrainian state was conducted during the Kravchuk years. Kravchuk's finest hour was the 100-day campaign that he led to overcome several decades of Communist propaganda to generate the 90% 'yes' vote for Ukraine's independence.

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