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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS OF U.S. CRISIS DIPLOMACY: CYPRUS  
1963-64 AND 1974

by

Fazil C. Korkut

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE  
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

Fall 1987

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## DEDICATION

To my Father and Mother

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of U.S. foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis Cyprus within the framework of a comparative case analysis of U.S. crisis diplomacy during the 1963-64 and 1974 Cyprus crises and within the context of the eastern Mediterranean as a regional subsystem (geographically defined as Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus). Its theoretical objective is to identify the nature of American power and purpose/interest in the eastern Mediterranean, through addressing the central question as to whether it is the 'Continuity' or 'State Department' theory that offers a better interpretation of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus. The [reductionist] Continuity theory rests upon the axioms of American preponderance in the eastern Mediterranean and an active American interest in the partition of Cyprus, and points to the machinations of a rational American gold-warrior commissioning outcomes in the eastern Mediterranean. The [systemic] State Department theory, by contrast, rests upon the premise of limited American means and ends in the region. The hypothesis put forward holds that it is the State Department theory, with its emphasis on America's limited influence in the regional subsystem and its preventive interest in keeping the problems in Cyprus from boiling over and disrupting NATO's cohesion, that provides a better interpretation of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus.

The practical objective of the study is to contribute to the analysis of U.S. foreign policy by evaluating U.S. policy effectiveness--the degree to which U.S. response strategies, in the two cases, were appropriate to American objectives in the eastern Mediterranean.

The data supports the State Department thesis and *inter alia* the relative effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy in 1963-64 and relative ineffectiveness in 1974. By 1974, U.S. policy proved to be ineffective as the salience of regional subsystemic dynamics, especially the key variables of Greek and Turkish nationalism and the impact of detente in the eastern Mediterranean, outweighed the waning power of cold war doctrine which had previously enabled the U.S. to exert some power over events in its capacity as Greece and Turkey's senior ally in NATO.

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## I. Introduction: The U.S. And The Eastern Mediterranean Triangle

This study deals with the nature of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward the Republic of Cyprus in two crisis situations (1963-64 and 1974); within the context of the eastern Mediterranean as a regional subsystem.<sup>1</sup> Cyprus is an island of strategic importance torn by intercommunal (Greek and Turkish Cypriot) conflicts since the fifties, thus becoming an object of rivalry among the regional powers, Greece and Turkey, which have traditional prestige, ethno-cultural links, and defence concerns with regard to Cyprus. In the words of U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell,

Cyprus viewed from Athens, Ankara, or even from the distance of the U.S. presents an immensely intricate problem in international relations with intertwining and conflicting elements of national prestige, territorial ambitions, natural political advantage and individual political survivals.<sup>2</sup>

Views as to the significance of Cyprus to U.S. interests have ranged widely between two extremes. While William Shannon of the NEW YORK TIMES has argued that "Cyprus ought not to be an American responsibility,"<sup>3</sup> and that the U.S. should not be concerned with events on the

<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this study, geographically defined as Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. A regional subsystem is characterised by the patterns of interaction and relationships among the major territorially based political actors existing at a particular time period within a geographically defined area.

<sup>2</sup> C. Pell, GREECE AND CYPRUS: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS., U.S. Senate, November 1975, p.7.

<sup>3</sup>W. Shannon, "Whose Crisis?", NEW YORK TIMES, August 20, 1974.



island and should attend to its own domestic problems, Benjamin Rosenthal (Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' Subcommittee on Europe in 1974) has alerted Americans that

the pressing and serious domestic concerns we face [should not] prevent us from studying the lessons of Cyprus. The role of the U.S. in the world today, and in the future, will not allow a false choice of domestic versus international concerns.<sup>4</sup>

A more specific and probably more accurate assessment comes from former Undersecretary of State George Ball, who during a Congressional hearing in August 1974 underlined America's interest in Cyprus by expressly putting Cyprus into the 'big league' of superpower politics through emphasising the perils of a Greco-Turkish war and relating Cyprus to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) stability and the defence of the Western world.<sup>5</sup> Since conflict in Cyprus raises the specter of Greco-Turkish war, the U.S. becomes immediately concerned whenever a 'Cyprus crisis' comes to the fore since she regards it disastrous for her two NATO allies to go to war over Cyprus, as this would disrupt NATO's all-important Southeastern flank. In the eastern Mediterranean, then, the policy problem for the U.S. translates into the task of walking a precarious tightrope between the national pride and security interests of two allies where the Cyprus question is concerned - the dilemma

<sup>4</sup>B. Rosenthal, [Chairman's introduction] CYPRUS-1974., Hearings before the Com. on Foreign Relations' Subcom. on Europe, House of Representatives, Aug. 19 and 20, 1974, Preface.

<sup>5</sup>G. Ball in Ibid, pp.33-Appendix.

of how to exert influence as senior ally/alliance manager, without tilting toward either power to the detriment of the other. Broadly speaking, a crisis in Cyprus - in effect, an intra-alliance quarrel - presents the U.S. with a choice between only two sensible policy options: 'passive evenhandedness/neutrality' or 'active evenhandedness/neutrality'. Passive evenhandedness begins with the premise that the U.S. cannot afford to interfere and dictate the terms of a settlement in Cyprus. It leaves the process of settlement exclusively in the hands of Greece and Turkey and in third party mediation procedures, especially those involving the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General. Active evenhandedness goes a step beyond America's 'close-in support' role<sup>6</sup> for the UN, as well as any other third party mediation procedure, and the risk-aversion characteristic of U.S. policy for fear of being perceived as tilting toward either ally, and thereby alienating either Greece or Turkey (or possibly, even both). It is a policy in which America's equidistant friendship with two important allies is augmented by prudent initiatives, often in the form of a direct mediating role, designed to resolve the Cyprus conflict and thereby terminate the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>This was a term used by the U.S. State Department in June 1964 to describe America's role vis-a-vis the UN in the Cyprus crisis.

<sup>7</sup>See T. Coulombis and D. Conostas, "Greek-Turkish Relations at The Crossroads", in SPOTLIGHT, Greek Institute for Political Studies: Greece, May 1986.

Relatedly, in the eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. also faces the policy problem of how best to exercise her diplomacy, oscillating between the risks of passivity and the dangers of coercive diplomacy, while minimizing Soviet opportunities for gaining access to Cyprus. The U.S. considers it perilous for Cyprus, as 'a securely anchored aircraft carrier' (possessing a network of communication and surveillance facilities operated by the British and Americans) within the 'NATO lake',<sup>8</sup> to slide toward the U.S.S.R. Reflective of U.S. apprehension over Soviet intrusion into Cyprus was the warning sounded by the NEW YORK TIMES in August 1961, only a year after the Republic's independence:

There is only one country where the U.S.S.R. may reasonably hope to see Communism taken over by normal democratic procedures. That country is Cyprus [due to the strength of the local indigenous Communist party A.K.E.L)....If one recalls the strategic importance of Cyprus, one sees the ultimate danger to the West.<sup>9</sup>

From the above one can abstract two propositions, which, stated in terms of U.S. objectives, constitute the crux of American interest vis-a-vis Cyprus. First, the U.S. has always sought to prevent interethnic conflict in Cyprus

<sup>8</sup>West German journalist Adalbert Weinstein's terminology as cited in M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS., Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979, p.149; and Alvin Rubinstein's terminology in his, "The Soviet Union and the Eastern Mediterranean: 1968-78," ORBIS, Summer 1979, Vol.23/2, pp.299-316, respectively. See also R. Cowton, "Anxiety Grows Over The Allies' Lake," THE TIMES [London] August 15, 1983.

<sup>9</sup>Tad Szulc as quoted in T. Adams and A.J Cottrell, CYPRUS: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968, p.34.

from severely disrupting Greco-Turkish relations and resulting in a Greco-Turkish war, and, second, the U.S. has sought to prevent Soviet intrusion into Cyprus by localising the conflict - that is, by confining it to an inter-allied dispute ('family problem'), as opposed to Makarios' attempts at internationalising the conflict by seeking UN, nonaligned, and Soviet bloc support. No one writing on U.S. foreign policy toward Cyprus would find these premises contentious; that the U.S. has always sought to prevent conflict on Cyprus from exploding into a Greco-Turkish war and that the U.S. has always sought to prevent Cyprus from becoming a Russian Mediterranean satellite is not contested. What is a point of contention, however, is the American role, in the attainment of its objectives, in the eastern Mediterranean. Has U.S. policy toward Cyprus been active partitionary or has it been one of preventive reaction? There have been those who have written from a 'Continuity' perspective, asserting that the American goliath consistently commissioned the partition of Cyprus to safeguard its interests in the region. On the other hand, there have been those who have written from a 'State Department' perspective, asserting that Gulliver's troubles in the region have been compounded by nationalist flare-ups on Cyprus and, in reaction [to regional instabilities] America's policy has not been one of commission but one of omissions.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup>These perspectives will be discussed in detail later in this study.

The American concerns in Cyprus, outlined above, stem from the geostrategic significance of Cyprus. This geostrategic significance is comprised of two tiers: the present operational utility of Cyprus and its future potential role. The first tier entails the highly visible presence of the two British sovereign base areas on Cyprus which constitute 3 per cent of the island's territory. One of those bases, Akrotiri, is the Royal Air Force's largest base anywhere in the world, and together with Dhekelia (the other British base on Cyprus) represent the last remnants of British power in the Middle East and Mediterranean world.<sup>11</sup> These bases contribute to NATO strategy since, among other things, the nuclear-capable Vulcan bombers stationed there are assigned the mission of penetrating Southern Russia in the event of nuclear warfare. There are already nuclear-capable American bombers stationed in Turkey, but Cyprus gives the Vulcan bomber force "a base from which to vary their angle of attack on the U.S.S.R." in their back-up role to the American bombers in Turkey.<sup>12</sup> This first tier of significance also entails the presence of a network of communications and surveillance facilities on Cyprus which are of enormous value to Western global strategy. What has been described as "possibly the best radar in the world" is located on Mount Olympus and it has been reported that

<sup>11</sup>Excluding Gibraltar, which is the Mediterranean's furthest point to the West.

<sup>12</sup>Philip Windsor, NATO AND THE CYPRUS CRISIS, Adelphi Paper #14, London:IISS, 1964. Quoted in M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979, p.13.

Cyprus is a base for the detection of intercontinental ballistic missile launches in the U.S.S.R.<sup>13</sup> Apart from the Mount Olympus radar and strategic reconnaissance equipment on the British bases, there are also Nine Signals Communication stations on the island which are part of the General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham, England.<sup>14</sup> Apart from British installations, there are also American communications stations in Cyprus which have existed since the British colonial era and which have been tolerated by the Republic of Cyprus. The specific role of all the American stations in Cyprus is not a matter of public record, but there were, for example, American civilians who operated the Foreign Broadcast Information Service station that monitored radio transmissions in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Another communications station near the capital of Nicosia was operated by the U.S. Navy, but in 1974 its operations were suspended - as was the case for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. These operations are now resumed, at least partially.

If one considers the post-WWII pattern of British withdrawal from former colonies and base areas, the significance of Cyprus to U.S. interests, as indicated by the American propensity to not tolerate the loss of those

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<sup>13</sup>David Fairhall in THE GUARDIAN, 29 May 1974., and THE OBSERVER, 11 August 1974.

<sup>14</sup>This is the British equivalent of the ultra-secretive American National Security Agency (NSA), which specialises in electronic intelligence.

base areas, becomes clear. In the spring of 1974 a British defence review concluded that due to financial cutbacks, much of the operations at Dhekelia had to be scaled down and that the Vulcan bomber force at Akrotiri had to be cut down as well.<sup>15</sup> There is no evidence to suggest that the Americans have stepped in, financially speaking, to maintain the bases, but there is clear evidence of increased American presence on Cyprus since the early seventies.

After intense negotiations with Britain and Cyprus, the U.S. based high-flying U-2 reconnaissance planes at Akrotiri on Cyprus's southeast coast in 1970. One of the conditions of the agreement was that it not be made public. This operation, called "Even Steven" within the U.S. government, monitored the 1970 Suez Canal cease-fire agreement that was arranged by the U.S. between Israel and Egypt...., the chance detention by Cypriot authorities of four U.S. Air Force personnel in February 1975 led to public disclosure of the flights.<sup>16</sup>

In 1974, a year before the public disclosure of the American use of Akrotiri as a base for U-2 spy planes, a couple hundred of U.S. marines landed on Cyprus for the purpose of helping in the clearing of the Suez canal, which was heavily mined during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The American landing, which was protested by Cypriot political parties, has been interpreted as an attempt by the Americans "to test their political chances of becoming an accepted successor to British military rights in the island."<sup>17</sup> Being aware of the

<sup>15</sup>See David Fairhall, THE GUARDIAN, 7 December 1975.

<sup>16</sup>See Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 1976, pp. 32-33.

<sup>17</sup>Nils Kadritzke, "Changes in Geopolitical Conditions Leading to the Last Stage of the Cyprus Conflict in 1974", in Cyprus Geographical Association, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

political sensitivity of their military presence on Cyprus, as mentioned, the Americans have been rather discreet in that aspect. Nevertheless, it is no well kept secret that there are a few hundred American personnel stationed at the British bases, using the strategic reconnaissance equipment there. The relevant point in all this is that one can detect the trend toward increased U.S. participation in the operating of those bases and the dissemination of information gathered from facilities in Cyprus.

Apart from its present operational utility, Cyprus has more of a potential utility deriving from its proximity to the most volatile and pivotal region of the world, the Middle East. As Edward Kolodziej puts it,

the Mediterranean, to which NATO's southern flank is exposed, links 300 million diverse peoples whose conflicts threaten Western security, economic interests, and internal cohesion. Upwards of 1200 vessels daily ply its waters. The states bordering the southern Mediterranean supply over fifty per cent of Europe's energy needs. The economic vitality of the area depends critically on undisturbed economic exchange; yet the region remains an armed camp and a threat to peace. The military forces of the littoral states total over 3 million, and the region is riven by armed conflicts - by the Iran-Iraq war, Lebanese civil strife, continued Arab-Israeli clashes, rebellion in the western Sahara, and persistent but unpredictable outbreaks of violence and terrorism.<sup>18</sup>

Given the political fluidity in the Middle East and Western vulnerability to oil disruptions, the potential utility of

<sup>17</sup>(cont'd) ON POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, PROCEEDINGS, 1976. Quoted in op.cit. Attaliades, p. 159.

<sup>18</sup>See Edward Kolodziej, "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected Front", in SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute, Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol.6/2, 1986, p.45.



Cyprus as a staging post in the case of limited wars cannot be underestimated. Cyprus is a securely anchored aircraft carrier at the doorstep of the Middle East, yet it is beyond the reach of Arab nationalisms and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The potential utility of Cyprus in serving as a logistic base for forward stockpiling... for the support of operations during "out of area"<sup>19</sup> crises has been already demonstrated. In 1956, during its ill-fated Suez venture with France against Egypt, Britain used its bases in Cyprus to launch airstrikes on Egypt. Years later, for logistical reasons, the U.S. used the British bases in Cyprus in its cleaning up of the Suez Canal and for basing U-2 spy planes which monitored the Arab-Israeli cease-fire arranged in the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967. As recently as 1986, during the U.S.-Libyan crisis, before it became evident that the U.S. used bases in England to launch airstrikes against Libya, there was widespread speculation that the Americans might use British bases in Cyprus to launch their airstrikes on Libya since no European power other than Britain was forthcoming in that regard. As it turns out, the bases on Cyprus were not used, but it is clear that the U.S. is unable to totally rely on any European power to grant the use of its territory to serve as a staging post in the event of future conflicts in the Middle East, where the American national interest might prompt resupplying a friendly regime

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<sup>19</sup>External to the eastern Mediterranean, that is.

or direct American intervention. This problem was starkly revealed during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when all European powers, except for West Germany and the then dictatorial Portugal, did not allow the U.S. to use their territory in resupplying Israel.

Finally, apart from its present operational utility and potential role, Cyprus is of significant psychological import to the U.S. As Thomas Adams points out, after equating U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean with the preservation of peace and maintenance of the strategic balance and contending that "peace in the area can only be had if Cyprus is under control [rather than conflict-ridden]"<sup>20</sup>,

U.S. interests in Cyprus are more regional than local, despite the existence of the American communications installations there. In a substantive sense, Cyprus, as a Western-oriented outpost, always had a certain psychological value which in many ways exceeds its specific operational utility for the U.S.<sup>21</sup>

It is important for an American global strategist, who charts regional mappings in 'spheres of influence' terms (i.e. Soviet vs. Western orientation of states), to know that Cyprus, which is located at the eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern juncture, is Western-oriented. For instance, it is not strategically imperative that the American Sixth Fleet use Cypriot facilities, but during its

<sup>20</sup>See T. Adams, "The American Concern In Cyprus", in R.D. Lambert (ed.) AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1972, p.99.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

presence at the eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern juncture it is important for the Americans to know that the waters around Cyprus are 'friendly waters'. This is especially true in the light of the proximity of Cyprus to Syria which contributes significantly to the Soviet naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean by providing homeporting facilities to the Soviet Fifth Escadra.<sup>22</sup>

In the final analysis, to sum up the American geostrategic interest in Cyprus, one can turn to the incisive analysis of John Campbell who wrote on the eve of the birth of the Republic that

Cyprus retains....., military value both to NATO strategy and to the Western position in the Middle East, which is vital to NATO. As to the former, it adds strength and flexibility by providing a base from which NATO operations in Turkey or elsewhere in the Mediterranean can be supported....., and it could be useful, though not essential to the Sixth Fleet..... Cyprus is one of the relatively few-remaining bases in Western hands.<sup>23</sup>

As stated at the outset, this study deals with the nature of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus during times of crisis; hence, the concern will be with what in the discipline of international relations is conventionally known as 'crisis diplomacy'.<sup>24</sup> It should be pointed out that the reasons for concentrating on U.S. diplomacy during times of crisis rather than normal/routine international politics are three-fold (all three being inter-related). First, by

<sup>22</sup>This is the Soviet 'Sixth Fleet'.

<sup>23</sup>See J. Campbell, DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, rev. ed., New York: Praeger, 1960, p. 198.

<sup>24</sup>A more specific statement on the nature of the inquiry will follow in the next chapter.

their very nature of being an extraordinary state of affairs, crises are more interesting and problematic and as such provided the impetus for this study in the first place. One only has to recall classic novels or academic texts to be reminded that history is made during times of crisis. Hence, in the case of Cyprus for instance, the reasons why 1974 (viz. 1974 crisis) was an *annus mirabilis* for the Cypriots and the annals of Cypriot history are: the neutralisation of President Makarios through a coup staged by the Athens junta; the subsequent military intervention by Turkey; and the final de facto partition of the island. Second, by being "telescoped in time and circumscribed as to the number of decision-makers,"<sup>25</sup> crisis situations are normally more fully documented by way of memoirs, legislative hearings, journalism, and the works of other scholars. Third, it can be argued that while state X (defined in terms of its central decision-makers) always has a foreign policy orientation toward Y, in the absence of a crisis it might not have a significant level of foreign policy behaviour toward Y. In the absence of crisis, the case (i.e. Cyprus) becomes a routine matter to be catered for by the Cypriot desk officer at the U.S. State Department. It is only crisis situations that attract the protracted attention of the highest-level decision-makers and prompt behaviour on their part. Thus, while a journalist like

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<sup>25</sup> R. Dougherty and R. Pfaltzgraaf, *CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.*, New York: Harper and Row, 1981, p.487.

Laurence Stern of the WASHINGTON POST is able to document U.S. foreign policy during the Cyprus debacle of 1974 by drawing upon, mainly, a few key decision-makers such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Undersecretary Joseph Sisco, and U.S. Ambassador to Athens Henry Tasca, he would be hard pressed to provide such an account for a relatively stable period.<sup>26</sup>

Finally, to reiterate the above points *in toto*, as an astute scholar of international crisis, Glenn Snyder, points out,

An international crisis is international politics in microcosm....It is a 'moment of truth'....That is to say, a crisis tends to highlight or force to the surface a wide range of factors and processes which are central to international politics in general. Such elements as power configurations, interests, values, risks, perceptions, degrees of resolve, bargaining, and decision-making lie at the core of international politics; in a crisis they tend to leap out at the observer, to be combined and related in a revealing way, and to be sharply focused on a single well-defined issue.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>See L. Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus?" FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1975; and THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY., New York: Times Books, 1977.

<sup>27</sup> G. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," in C. Hermann (ed.) INTERNATIONAL CRISES: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH., New York: Free Press, 1972, p.217.

## II. Theorizing About International Crises: Contending Approaches And Research Objective And Methodology

The dictum that 'where you stand depends on where you sit' is as true today of the literature on international relations as it has ever been. Scholars like Singer, Waltz, Rosenau, and Allison have shown how there is no one true explanation of international political phenomena, but that one's explanation (where one stands) depends on which level of analysis one takes (where one sits).<sup>28</sup> Hence, one can take either of two broad approaches to the explanation of U.S. crisis diplomacy toward Cyprus: a reductionist/micro or systemic/macro approach. As Waltz points out, the distinction between the two approaches is that "theories of international politics which concentrate on causes at the individual or national level are reductionist; [while] theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic".<sup>29</sup> As one would expect then, theorizing on crisis behaviour has generally been conducted through two different perspectives: the decision-making and systemic perspectives. Thus, while the

<sup>28</sup>See D. Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations", in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds.) THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THEORETICAL ESSAYS, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1961; K. Waltz, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR., New York: Columbia University Press, 1959; and THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, U.S.: Addison-Wesley, 1979 ; J. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in his THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY, London, U.K: Frances & Pinter, 1980 ; and G. Allison, ESSENCE OF DECISION, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

<sup>29</sup>Op.cit. Waltz, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, p.18.

unit of analysis, the object of investigation, has remained somewhat constant - state behaviour; the level of explanation, the kinds of theories invoked to explain state behaviour have differed (by virtue of being based on differing explanatory variables and, hence, data).

The theories have generally fallen into either the decision-making (based on individual psychological and/or national attribute data) or international systems (based on international events data) theory categories, hence yielding different definitions of international crisis.

For Oran Young<sup>30</sup>

an international crisis... is a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilising forces in the general international system or any of its subsystems substantially above 'normal' (i.e average) levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system.<sup>31</sup>

The 'father' of international systems theory, Charles McClelland, a pioneer in the use of international interaction analysis employing events data, contends that a crisis "represents a significant change in the quantity, quality, or intensity of interactions among nations".<sup>32</sup> For McClelland, then, as for Young, an international crisis is a situation that creates an abrupt or sudden change in one or more of the basic systemic variables, and would

<sup>30</sup>As will be seen, though, Oran Young will not be classified as an international systemicist due to the revisions made to his earlier works in his latter work, *THE POLITICS OF FORCE*.  
<sup>31</sup>O. Young, *THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES*, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1967, p.10.

<sup>32</sup> See O. Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision-making", in P. Lauren, *DIPLOMACY*, New York: Free Press, 1979, p.101.

(methodologically speaking) lead one to monitor the international system for indicators of changed interaction patterns among nations. Thus, in this conception there is clearly "a direct relationship between crises and systemic stability when stability is defined as the tendency of a system's essential variables to remain within defined limits".<sup>33</sup> In further characterising international systems theory, Charles McClelland points out that

the main characteristic of the systemic approach to crisis is its preoccupation with the exchanges of words and deeds occurring in the arena of conflict. It is the 'external behaviour' of the parties in conflict that are given full attention. Those who concentrate on crisis decision-making problems deal mainly with intra-unit situations and processes [an actor-centred approach] whereas the students of international systems primarily investigate inter-unit phenomena [an interaction-centred approach].<sup>34</sup>

Hence, the systemic approach "looks on the whole configuration of parties participating back and forth....,[at] the interplay of actions and responses between polities".<sup>35</sup>

In the international crisis literature, scholars employing international systems analysis have been identified as being part of the 'crisis anticipation' or 'crisis forecasting' school.<sup>36</sup> Using some variant of

<sup>33</sup>Op.cit. O. Young, THE INTERMEDIARIES.....,p.12.

<sup>34</sup>C. McClelland, "Some Effects on Theory From The International Event Analysis Movement", in E. Azar, R. Brody, and C. McClelland (eds.) INTERNATIONAL EVENTS INTERACTION ANALYSIS..., U.S.: Sage, 1972.

<sup>35</sup>See Ibid.,p.27 and op.cit. O. Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision-Making", p.101.

<sup>36</sup>For examples of works within this school, see the collected works in D. Singer and M. Wallace (eds.), TO AUGUR



McClelland's pioneering 22 World Event Interaction Survey [WEIS] event categories, these scholars attempt to build global early warning indicator systems which are used for anticipating crises through the routine transformation of international events data into international political 'tensionometers'.<sup>37</sup>

The decision-making perspective in defining a crisis focuses on the human participants rather than international system characteristics. In this approach, a premium is placed on pointing out that an environmental change results in a crisis situation if, and only if, it is perceived to be as such by the decision-makers, and explaining the cognitive

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<sup>36</sup>(cont'd) WELL: EARLY WARNING INDICATORS IN WORLD POLITICS, U.S.: Sage, 1979 ; N. Alcock, "Prediction of International Violence", PEACE RESEARCH, Vol.3 May 1971 ; M. R. Leavitt, "Markov Processes in International Crises: an Analytical Addendum To an Event-Based Simulation of The Taiwan Straits Crises", in J. A. Laponce and P. Smoker (eds.) EXPERIMENTATION AND SIMULATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972; J. Sigler, "Cooperation and Conflict in U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1966-71: A Quantitative Analysis", PAPER OF THE PEACE RESEARCH SOCIETY, 19, 1971, pp.107-128 ; H. Weil, "Domestic and International Violence: A Forecasting Approach", FUTURES, December 1974, pp.477-485 ; the works produced by CACI [Federal] Inc., Arlington, Virginia and ofcourse the works of C. McClelland which are mostly in mimeo. form at The University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and are too numerous to cite here.

<sup>37</sup>The WEIS project, conducted at The University of Southern California under McClelland's direction, uses the NEW YORK TIMES as a data source in an attempt "to categorize every recorded international act in one of 63 possible classes. This says, in effect, that there are 63 different ways a government can act toward another government..., the most common of these is a category system consisting of 22 basic types of acts". Through the further use of factor analytical techniques 6 major behaviour types have been isolated: 1. Cooperative action, 2. Participation, 3. Diplomatic exchange, 4. Verbal conflict, 5. Non-military conflict action, and 6. Military conflict action.

dynamics involved in decision-making once an occasion for decision has come about. The decision-making approach to crisis, diverse as it is in of itself, takes its cue from the seminal work of Richard Snyder and his colleagues in 1954.<sup>38</sup> The Snyder scheme is considered a pathbreaking enterprise not in the study of crisis behaviour alone,<sup>39</sup> but in the study of international politics and foreign policy at large for having contributed to the introduction of behavioral methodology in the discipline, which until then was characterised by traditionalism.<sup>40</sup> The contribution of the scheme was

1. The assumption that foreign policy consists of 'decisions' made by identifiable 'decision-makers'; the making of decisions, therefore, is the behavioural activity which requires explanation;
2. the concept of the decisionmakers' 'definition of the situation';
3. the emphasis on the domestic or societal sources of foreign policy decisions; and
4. the clear implication that the decision-making process itself may be an important, independent source of decisions.<sup>41</sup>

According to the Snyder scheme, the key to the explanation of why the state behaves the way it does lies in the manner its decision-makers perceive the external and internal

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<sup>38</sup>R. Snyder, W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics", FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Series No.3, Princeton, N.J; Princeton University Press, 1954.

<sup>39</sup> Glenn Paige's classical study of THE KOREAN DECISION, for instance, is explicitly an application of the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin model to a single crisis case.

<sup>40</sup>The approach to theorising that derives from history, law, and philosophy.

<sup>41</sup>See B.P White, "Decision-making Analysis", in T. Taylor (ed.) APPROACHES AND THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.K: Longman, 1979, p.145.

environment/setting (viz. definition of the situation). As such, 'perception' is a keynote in decision-making theory. In fact, in this view, there is no need to describe 'objective reality' if the subjective perceptions of the appropriate focus for explanation of state behaviour. As Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin state,

it is also one of our basic choices to take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of the world of the decision-makers as they view it..... the key to explanation of why the state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision-makers as actors define their situation.<sup>42</sup>

Some of the better known works in the micro-theoretical approach to crisis behaviour came from the [once] Stanford group of Ole Holsti, Robert North, and Richard Brody, who use a 'stimulus response' model in researching the outbreak of World War I and the Cuban missile crisis and ponder the role and relationship of the perception of time pressures, search for alternatives, and communications during crisis.<sup>43</sup> It is Charles Hermann, however, who has produced a

<sup>42</sup>Op.cit. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin., reprinted in S. Hoffman (ed.) CONTEMPORARY THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, New York:Prentice Hall, 1960,p.153.

<sup>43</sup>See O. Holsti, R. North and R. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in D. Singer (ed.) QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, New York: Free Press, 1968,pp.123-158; Holsti, North, and Brody,"Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction models: empirical materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis", JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 1964,pp.170-190; and the individual works of O. Holsti where the role of stress in decision-making is an important consideration:"The 1914 Case", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1965, Vol.59,pp.365-378; "Time, Alternatives, and Communications - The 1914 and Cuban Missile Crises", in C. Hermann (ed.) INTERNATIONAL CRISES: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH, New York: Free Press, 1972, pp.38-50; "Theories of Crisis Decision-Making", in P. Lauren (ed.) DIPLOMACY, New York: Free Press,

widely accepted definition of international crisis. Writing shortly after John Robinson's lament as late as 1968 that "'crisis' is a lay term in search of a scholarly meaning",<sup>44</sup> Hermann argued that

a crisis is a situation that (1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence. Underlying the proposed definition is the proposition that if all three traits are present then the decision process will be substantially different than if only one or two of the characteristics appear.<sup>45</sup>

More recently the Hermann definition of international crisis has been challenged by the also micro-oriented McGill-Jerusalem group headed by Michael Brecher. In this view, an international crisis is a situational change in the external or internal environment which creates in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of an international actor a perceived threat from the external environment to basic values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary.<sup>46</sup> In operational terms, an international crisis is

a situation with four necessary and sufficient

<sup>43</sup>(cont'd) 1979, pp.99-136; and above all his *CRISIS, ESCALATION, WAR.*, McGill-Queens University Press: Canada, 1972.

<sup>44</sup>See J. Robinson, "Crisis", in the *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*, Vol.3, Collier-Macmillan: U.S., 1968, p.510.

<sup>45</sup>C. Hermann, "International Crisis As a Situational Variable", in J. Rosenau (ed.) *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY*, New York: Free Press, 1969, p.414.

<sup>46</sup>See M. Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour", *INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY*, Vol.21/1, 1977, p.43.

conditions, as they are perceived by the highest level decision-makers of the actor concerned: (1) a change in its external or internal environment which generates (2) a threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent (3) high probability of involvement in military hostilities, and the awareness of (4) a finite time for their response to the external value threat.<sup>47</sup>

Hence, the McGill-Jerusalem group ( henceforth referred to as the ICB group and/or model; named after the International Crisis Behaviour project they have undertaken) have deleted Hermann's situational attribute 'surprise'/awareness and replaced it with 'the perceived high probability of involvement in military hostilities' and substituted 'finite' for 'short' time to respond.<sup>48</sup> The ICB group have also attempted to bridge the micro-macro level gap, to some extent, by adding to their definition as a necessary condition, a 'change in the environment' - which may "be construed in macro terms..., as a destabilising event(s) in the system, whether global or regional".<sup>49</sup> Further, the ICB model attempts to provide a link between perceptual variables (threat, time, and likelihood of war) and organizational context variables through the specification of 'coping mechanisms' to deal with crisis-induced stress:

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-44.

<sup>48</sup>Subsequent to Hermann's definition of international crisis, his explanatory variable surprise has not gained empirical validity. In this regard see L. Brady, "Threat, Decision Time, and Awareness: the Impact of Situational Variables on Foreign Policy Behaviour", Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University, 1974, pp. 3 and 258; and D. McCormick, DECISIONS, EVENTS, AND PERCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS..., Michigan:First Ann Arbor Corp., 1975, p. 16

<sup>49</sup>Op.cit. Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour", p. 44.

information search and processing, consultation, decisional forums, and the consideration of alternatives. Additionally, the ICB model also incorporates a feedback mechanism to indicate that crisis decision making is not a one step process (i.e one decision per crisis), as the title of works like Paige's THE KOREAN DECISION might misleadingly suggest, but a cyclical-flow process which typically involves shifting definitions of the situation, a multiplicity of coping methods, and a multiplicity of decisions during any one crisis; as well as there being a pre-crisis and post-crisis phase to consider.<sup>50</sup>

While the crisis decision-making approach is dominated by the focus on the perceptions of central decision-makers, one set of scholars within this approach focus more on the socio-psychological and bureaucratic/organizational dimension involved in decision-making. The best known exponent of the former dimension is Irving Janis with his VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK. Here Janis studies the dynamics of small group decision-making under crisis conditions and finds that such groups often suffer from the 'groupthink

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<sup>50</sup>Judging by the extent to which this model has been applied to different cases in the crisis literature, it represents the 'state of the art' at this juncture. See M. Brecher and B. Geist, DECISIONS IN CRISIS: ISRAEL, 1967 AND 1973, Calif.:University of California Press, 1980; B. Geist, "The Six Day War: a Study in The Setting and Process of Foreign Policy Decision -Making under Crisis Conditions", Ph.D dissertation, Hebrew University, 1974; A. Dowty, MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: U.S. DECISION -MAKING IN 1958, 1970, 1973 [Lebanon, Jordan, Yom Kippur]. University of California Press: U.S., 1984; and several works in a special edition on crisis behaviour, JERUSALEM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Winter-Spring 1977-78.

syndrome': an in-group drive toward attaining consensus and maintaining group cohesion at all costs, including at the cost of objectivity and hence rationality. In other words, 'groupthink' is a decision-making pathology prevalent among small groups which results in a fundamentally flawed decision-making process.<sup>51</sup> On another dimension, Graham Allison elaborates the 'bureaucratic politics' model, in which he explains crisis behaviour in terms of intranational bargaining among 'players', namely, the key organizations functioning according to their 'standard operating procedures' and the central decision-makers each with their own individual, bureaucratic, and national goals.<sup>52</sup>

To summarise, international crisis research has largely proceeded along either the international systems analysis or crisis decision-making tracks. For crisis decision-making theorists the dependent variable is the decision(s), and hence ultimately crisis behaviour. The independent or explanatory variables are most commonly the perceptions of the situation held by the highest-level decision-makers of an international actor. Typically, in the words of Michael Brecher,

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<sup>51</sup> I. Janis, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS. Boston: Houghton Mufflin, 1972.

<sup>52</sup>The present writer is referring to Allison's refined bureaucratic politics model as articulated in his work with Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: a Paradigm and Some Policy Implications", WORLD POLITICS, Vol.24, 1972, pp.40-79, where he merges his earlier 'organizational process' and governmental/bureaucratic politics models articulated in the ESSENCE OF DECISION.

the independent variable is perception of crisis, as derived from the decision-makers' images of stimuli from the external and/or internal environment; in operational terms, there are three independent variables - perception of threat, perception of time, and perception of probability of war.<sup>53</sup>

In one of its most developed forms (namely, the ICB model) this approach also acknowledges the role of organizational context attributes, which serve to describe the decision-making process and flow as intervening /mediating variables. In international systems analysis, by contrast, the "independent variables are prior configurations of interaction that predict to subsequent configurations of interaction, the latter serving as the dependent variable".<sup>54</sup> Hence, as the hallmark of this approach, the search for patterns of interaction where what happened in time T-4, T-3, T-2, T-1, and the present time T [independent variables], will explain/predict what is going to happen in the future time T+1 [dependent variable].

The preceding literature survey may give one the impression that the systemic and decision-making approaches to the study of international crisis exhaust the field. This is not the case. There is yet another perspective, the 'crisis management' approach to the study of international crisis. While the systemic and decision-making perspectives exemplify the behavioural revolution in international relations, crisis management research has, relatively speaking, been methodologically traditional (albeit

<sup>53</sup>Op.cit. Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour", p.52.

<sup>54</sup> Op.cit. McClelland, "Some Effects on Theory....."; p.28.



analytical and systematic, aimed at explaining and developing propositions and generalizations, rather than descriptive-historical).<sup>55</sup> The crisis management approach allows adherents to apply the traditional analytical-rational actor model<sup>56</sup> to crisis situations without losing sight of micro-level factors (namely, the perceptions held by central decision-makers) at play and to develop 'policy relevant' theory through the establishment of generalizations/propositions.<sup>57</sup> As such, the crisis management perspective cuts across different levels of analysis in explanation, through the utilisation of both interaction and actor-centred analysis; much in the vogue suggested by Allison in his conclusion to the ESSENCE OF DECISION. The best known works in this tradition are those

<sup>55</sup> For examples of crisis management literature see, G. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining", in op.cit. Hermann, INTERNATIONAL CRISES; A. Ferguson, "Tactics in a Local Crisis", in D.V Edwards (ed.) INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS: READINGS., New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969, pp.176-189; L. Bloomfield and A. Leiss, CONTROLLING SMALL WARS., New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969; and A. Perlmutter, "Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East Negotiations (Oct.73 - June74)", INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol.19, 1975, pp.316-43.

<sup>56</sup> See J. Steinbruner, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1974; and op.cit. Allison.

<sup>57</sup> See introduction, "The Need For Policy-Relevant Theory", in A. George, D. Hall, W. Simon, THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. For definitions of international crisis, typical of this approach, which are largely systemic but also account for the role of perceptions, see O. Young, THE POLITICS OF FORCE: BARGAINING DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES. Princeton University Press: U.S., 1968, p.9 - "a crisis is a process of interaction... characterized by higher levels of perceived intensity"; and G. Snyder and P. Diesing, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS. Princeton University Press: U.S., 1977, p.6 - "crisis is a sequence of interactions...., involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war".

of Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Oran Young, and the works of Alexander George and his colleagues; particularly George and Smoke's *DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY*.<sup>58</sup> In this work, George and Smoke not only present a comprehensive analysis of deterrence theory as of 1974, but also proceed to examine exhaustively theory and practice in eleven cases taken from the 1948-62 period. While each case study by itself stands as a superb analytic account of the episode in question, through the comparative case method, George and Smoke are able to arrive at generalisations and thereby attempt to reformulate deterrence theory. These crisis management theorists basically pay homage to the preeminent strategist of conflict, Thomas Schelling, in viewing crisis management as a bargaining situation among actors,<sup>59</sup> where the actors "involved create a system in which there are rules for action and strategies to follow and utilise".<sup>60</sup> In the bargaining conceptualisation of international crisis

bargaining implies a dynamic situation of states in interaction, each acting partly because of what it thinks its actions will produce in the opponent, and also reacting to the opponent's actions.<sup>61</sup>

Michael Sullivan likens this conceptualisation of international crisis to the youthful dating situation

<sup>58</sup>A. George and R. Smoke, *DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974; op.cit. Snyder and Diesing, *CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS*; op. cit. Young, *POLITICS OF FORCE*; and op.cit. George, Hall, and Simons, *THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY*.

<sup>59</sup>T. Schelling, *THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

<sup>60</sup>M. Sullivan, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE*, New York: Prentice Hall, 1976, p.258.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

in which each party is acting at least partly in terms of how he or she thinks the other will respond; in which clear strategies exist for prompting desired behaviour from the other party; in which manuevers, ploys, feints, threats and counter-threats - with the elements of utilities, costs, and risks they entail - are all made with each party rarely admitting that such behaviour is going on.<sup>62</sup>

It is basically this bargaining conceptualisation of international crisis, the crisis management perspective, that will be adopted in this study. The focal element of this study concerns the processes of bargaining between the U.S. and regional subsystemic actors. Since bargaining is essentially an interaction process, the nature of the interaction itself forms the basic focus for analysis.<sup>63</sup> In allowing one to employ the traditional analytic mode of analysis, the crisis management perspective enables one to overcome entrapment with the role of decision-makers' perceptions and confinement to the description of the crisis actor's decision-making process, that is characteristic of actor-centred analysis (viz. 'decision-making' approach). This study, then, proceeds from the 'crisis management' proposition that explanations of international political phenomena do not inhere in the attributes of one actor but rather inhere in the relationship/ interaction among two (or more) actors.

For our purposes the term crisis management will be defined as

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>63</sup>See Op.cit. Young, THE POLITICS OF FORCE, Chp.2.

any process which a manager exercises to meet his goals within a potentially deteriorating situation at an acceptable cost to him, persuading those with whom he is interacting that the costs of opposing him are greater than the costs of allowing him to attain his objectives... [and in the process attempts] to balance and reconcile the elements of coercion and accommodation, to find an optimum mix or trade-off between the two.<sup>64</sup>

Evidently, then, as Raymond Tanter simply defines it, "crisis management is the process of manipulating system or individual level variables to achieve certain goals".<sup>65</sup> In crisis management research, despite the diverse terminology used such as 'management impact', 'policy rationality', or simply 'success' or 'failure',<sup>66</sup> what is being explained is the extent to which the crisis management process or effort has resulted in the attainment of the objectives of the crisis manager, however they may be defined in particular cases. Couched more in the terminology of comparative case analysis, the dependent variable, then, is the policy-relevant variation among particular cases in outcomes of crisis management efforts.<sup>67</sup> Coral Bell, for instance,

<sup>64</sup> See R. Kuppermann et al., "Crisis Management: Some Opportunities", *SCIENCE*, Vol. 187, 1975, p. 404; and A. Gilbert and P. Lauren, "Crisis Management: an Assessment and Critique", *JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION*, 1980, Vol. 24/4, p. 646.

<sup>65</sup> R. Tanter, "Crisis Management [literature survey]", *JERUSALEM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*.

<sup>66</sup> See R. Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter...?", *INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY*, Vol. 22/2, 1978; G. Gustafson, and J. J. Richardson, "Concepts of Rationality and the Policy Process", *JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL RESEARCH*, Vol. 7/4, 1979; and C. Bell, *THE CONVENTIONS OF 'CRISIS: A STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC MANAGEMENT*, Oxford University Press: U.K., 1972; pages 198, 422, and 13 respectively.

<sup>67</sup> The concept of 'policy-relevant variation' is used, rather than simply 'variation', to denote that what is of interest for our purposes is judging whether or not the U.S. pursued the right management techniques in order that its objectives

with regard to intramural crises (such as the Cyprus crises which were potentially destabilising for the Western alliance and where the U.S. was a third party rather than a direct party such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which was an 'adversary crisis') points out that one may judge success or failure of management on the basis of 3 criteria:

First, is the ability of the alliance to function impaired or maintained? Second, what is the influence of the crisis settlement on the degree of satisfaction of the members with their positions within it? And thirdly, what is the impact of the settlement on the credibility of the [managing] power?<sup>68</sup>

In a similar fashion, Robert Butterworth judges management impact or success on the basis of five criteria: the extent to which the crisis manager is able to

1. restrain the prosecution of the conflict;
2. abate the claims of the protagonists;
3. reduce and/or stop hostilities;
4. keep third parties from becoming involved; and
5. settle their conflict.<sup>69</sup>

In this vogue, the dependent variable of this study is policy effectiveness - what is being explained is, given the

<sup>67</sup>(cont'd) be attained. The Cuban missile crisis, for instance, is widely accepted as a classic case of the successful application of a strategy of coercive diplomacy by the U.S. in a superpower crisis. The strategy of coercive diplomacy, as expressed through the policy of blockading Cuba coupled with U.S. threats of escalation, enabled the Kennedy administration to attain its objectives during the Cuban debacle. As such, one can take the Cuban case as the 'paradigm' of successful application of coercive diplomacy and ponder - as op.cit. George et al. do in THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY - why the same technique did not work in, say, Vietnam.

<sup>68</sup>See op.cit. Bell. Given that some crises end without clear settlement, one should perhaps use the term 'crisis outcome' rather than 'crisis settlement'.

<sup>69</sup>Op.cit. Butterworth.

crisis outcomes in the particular cases in question, to what degree can one say that American objectives have been attained in the eastern Mediterranean? In this study the success or failure of crisis management, or policy effectiveness, will be judged on the basis of 4 [not necessarily mutually exclusive] criteria: the extent to which the U.S. - as crisis manager- has been able to, first, restrain the prosecution of the conflict and abate the conflict of interests; second, prevent a regional conflict; third, keep third parties from becoming involved; and finally, what is the impact of the crisis outcome on the 'alliance managerial' role of the U.S. - U.S. credibility and the alliance's stability?

The objective of inquiry being the explanation of policy effectiveness, this comparative case analysis study employs what Alexander George has called the methodology of "structured, focused comparison".<sup>70</sup>

Focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case..., and structured because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in that historical case.<sup>71</sup>

In other words, there is a standardised set of questions\concerns which guides research and allows one to

<sup>70</sup>See A. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison", in op.cit. P. Lauren (ed.) DIPLOMACY.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid. This method has gained popularity among scholars of international politics because of its simplicity and elegance. For applications see R. Cohen, THREAT PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES., U.S.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979; and op.cit. O. Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision Making".

look at the cases within a common matrix, thus facilitating the ordering and comparison of data. These questions, in effect, are the independent variables of the study. The standardised questions to be asked of each case, or the 'crisis management descriptors', are listed below under three categories of variables: contextual, goal-related, and management technique.

#### A. Contextual questions

1. Background\Historical Context - What was the potentially destabilising problem that made the Cypriot political scene crisis-prone?;
2. Pre-crisis Period\Immediate Context - What are the preconditions for crisis?;
3. Trigger, Situational Change, and Gravity - What event precipitated the crisis and what was the new situation compared to the pre-crisis period? What were the kind of issue(s) involved?;
4. Systemic Attributes and Complexity - What is the regional-global context, and who are the actors, and hence what interests are involved?

#### B. Goal-related questions

1. Attributes of Crisis Actors [other than the U.S.] - What is the nature of their belief systems and, ultimately, stakes, bargaining positions, and policies?;
2. Threat Perception by the U.S. - What was the nature of

American interests in the eastern Mediterranean and how did the crisis in Cyprus affect these interests?;

3. U.S. Objectives and Policy Options - What were U.S. objectives given the perceived threat? What were the real and perceived policy options? How did the U.S. assess the requirements of these options? What constraints on meeting the requirements were perceived?;

#### C. Management techniques

1. Crisis Dimensions - What was the nature of the communication patterns, the intensity and duration of the crisis?;

2. Area Expertise - Was there any previous crisis management experience regarding the problem?;

3. Bureaucratic Response Level - At what level was crisis management conducted? Who were the central decision-makers?;

4. Role of International Organizations What, if at all, were the role of international institutional actors? When and why, if at all, did the U.S. seek to work through international institutions?;

~~5~~ Management Strategies - What management strategies did the U.S. employ in pursuit of its objectives?

It should be noted that the descriptors having to do with perceptual variables and the decision-making process (as in B.1,2, and 3) must be viewed in dynamic terms, as changing over time. In other words, in any one crisis there



is not one 'threat perception' or 'policy assessment' but possibly a multiplicity of them over time. Further, it should be noted that the case studies do not purport to provide a step by step 'answer' to each descriptor, but purport to have explained the crisis management descriptors in summation.

It is believed that the research framework outlined will facilitate the testing of the two major contending theories of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus: namely, the 'State Department' and 'Continuity' theories. This study seeks to identify the nature of American power and purpose in the eastern Mediterranean over the period in question, through addressing the central question as to whether it is the 'State Department' or 'Continuity' theory that provides a better interpretation of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus.<sup>72</sup> The hypothesis here is that it is the 'State Department' perspective, with its emphasis on America's limited influence in the regional subsystem and its preventive interest in keeping the problems in Cyprus from boiling over and disrupting NATO's cohesion, that provides a better interpretation of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus. If the 'State Department' theory is to be validated, one must be able to trace American incrementalism during the cases chosen for analysis; how the U.S. puzzled through the Cyprus crises with a view to

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<sup>72</sup>These two major contending theories in essence are two diametrically opposed views on the nature of American power and purpose/interest in the eastern Mediterranean.

prevent a Greco-Turkish war and the internationalization of the crisis through Soviet exploitation of the civil strife on the island. In that case, one will expect to see in the case studies evidence of limited American leverage over the eastern Mediterranean actors; that the political outcomes in the eastern Mediterranean were not the result of American commission, but rather the result of regional subsystemic dynamics. Hence, unlike the 'Continuity' theorists who look to Washington for explanations of political outcomes in the region, the 'State Department' theorists see only American reaction to events emanating from independent decisions taken in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. If the 'Continuity' theory is not to be rejected, one must be in a position to trace American 'comprehensive rationality' from one case to another, and be able to demonstrate that the U.S. took the initiative to neutralise Makarios, bring about the partition of the island, hence subsuming Cyprus to Greece and Turkey and thereby making it 'safe for NATO'. In that case, one will expect to see in the case studies a consistent American effort to effect the partition of Cyprus and evidence that, after its first crisis management experience in Cyprus in 1964, the 1974 crisis was not managed or mismanaged at all, since the events of 1974 were a result of advance American contingency planning to effect changes in Cyprus.

Thus, to reiterate and summarise, the crux of the matter is the question of the nature of American power and interest - will the comparative case analysis support the

view of a preponderant U.S. with a 'comprehensive rational' role or an incrementalist-preventive America with limited influence in the eastern Mediterranean? By virtue of being an interaction-centred approach, the crisis management approach enables one "to account for the causes and consequences of foreign policy behaviour by using more than one level of analysis",<sup>73</sup> hence facilitating the testing of the two theories in question. The decision-making approach, by contrast, does not facilitate the testing of the two theories in question because it does not enable one to satisfactorily test for systemic factors. By virtue of being an actor-centred approach, the decision-making perspective leads to the exclusive focus on psychological and (national) organizational factors. The international systems approach does not facilitate the testing of the two theories in question either, precisely for the opposite reason that it does not allow one to test for reductionist factors (i.e. individual-national factors). Finally, it should be recalled from the discussion in the previous chapter that, whether the hypothesis of the study is to be validated or nullified will ultimately depend upon the potency of systemic factors in evidence. In the 'State Department' perspective the flow of causation is from B (regional subsystemic dynamics) to A (American preventive reaction), in the 'Continuity' perspective it is the other way round - from A (American 'comprehensive rationality') to B (changes in the eastern

<sup>73</sup>P. McGowan and M. O'Leary, COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS MATERIALS., U.S.: Markham, 1971, p.4.

Mediterranean political configuration).

As indicated when the method of "structured, focused comparison" was briefly outlined, the case studies have been organized according to a similar format; the same questions, selected for their relevance in facilitating the evaluation of U.S. policy effectiveness, are asked of both cases. Each of the case studies begins with an appraisal of the pre-crisis period: the destabilization process in eastern Mediterranean politics. The initial regional subsystemic state of Greek-Turkish-Cypriot[ethnic] relations is established and the salient factors that triggered the crises are delineated. At the same time, the American role in the eastern Mediterranean during the pre-crisis period is analytically chronicled. The case studies then proceed to the exposition of the situational change in the eastern Mediterranean brought on by the trigger event and the threat it poses to American interests in the region. Thereafter, the case studies basically amount to the evaluation of the effectiveness of America's response strategy to stabilize the quadrangular relationship (the U.S. and Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus). Given the parameters (contextual factors) within which it can operate, America's management effort to attain its objectives in the eastern Mediterranean is analysed. Is it possible, for instance, that some potentially more effective response strategy/option was not considered? The gist of the matter is the degree to which U.S. response strategies were appropriate to American

objectives in the eastern Mediterranean.

### III. Theories Of U.S. Foreign Policy Behaviour Toward Cyprus

It is the dramatic events of 1974 that provided the impetus for the extensive academic and practical inquiries into the nature of U.S. foreign policy behaviour toward Cyprus.<sup>74</sup> On July 15, 1974, President Makarios of Cyprus was overthrown as a consequence of a coup staged by the surrogates of the Greek Junta and five days later Turkey intervened, militarily gaining control of 37 per cent of the territory. The end result of the coup and intervention was de facto partition. In U.S. government circles, the major concern regarding the events of 1974 has, inevitably, been the assessment of U.S. policy performance during the debacle. The major question raised in the academic literature (although the general concern - as is the concern in this study - has been with the nature of U.S. foreign policy behaviour since the founding of the Republic in 1960, within the context of Turko-American and Greco-American relations) has been the extent to which the political outcome of 1974 was a function of U.S. policy toward the eastern Mediterranean, in general, and toward Cyprus in particular.

Hitherto, there have been two major theories regarding this question: the 'State Department' theory, as expounded most influentially by John Campbell, which emphasises the

<sup>74</sup> 'Practical inquiries' as distinct from academic inquiries denotes the hearings and testimonies by practitioners before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives' relevant committees regarding the subject matter.

constraints and limits to U.S. power in the region and the declining American capacity to mediate and guarantee settlements in the eastern Mediterranean, and which sees no correlation between U.S. behaviour and the political outcome of 1974. The 'Theory of Continuity', on the other hand, sees a very strong correlation. According to this view, as expounded most influentially by Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus has been an expendable pawn in the cold war struggle because of her geopolitical significance and U.S. foreign policy objectives have been consistently to undermine the independence of Cyprus and to subsume Cyprus to Greece and Turkey through partition (hence, in this view, transforming Cyprus into a safe NATO base).<sup>75</sup> What is more, the underlying assumption is that the U.S. has the pre-ponderance to achieve her objectives in the region.<sup>75</sup>

The two major theories outlined above have their roots in different traditions of theorising in international relations. The 'Theory of Continuity', whether in its description of a cold war-minded rational actor (or in the words of Braybrooke and Lindblom, a 'synoptic planner') consistently attempting to partition Cyprus in order to make

<sup>75</sup> The labelling of the theories as such - 'State Department' and 'Continuity' - has been adopted from V. Coufoudakis' characterisation of T. Couloumbis' work. However, despite the same labelling, the two theories as employed here, should not be regarded as being identical to those of Couloumbis. Here they are used in a broader sense to incorporate similar, yet not identical approaches. See V. Coufoudakis' Introduction to ESSAYS ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT, New York:Pella., 1976 and T. Couloumbis' "Five Theories Regarding Kissinger's Handling of the 1974 Cyprus Crisis", INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NOTES, 2 (Spring 1975), pp.12-19.

Cyprus 'safe for NATO', or in its description of Kissinger as a value-maximising war-gamer who masterminded the events of 1974, imputes 'comprehensive rationality' to U.S. foreign policy and hence represents the (rational) 'foreign policy analysis' perspective in international relations. This approach, to use the terminology popularised by Kenneth Waltz,<sup>76</sup> is a reductionist one. External outcomes (de facto partition in Cyprus) are seen to be largely a function of the internal attributes of a particular state (U.S.). On the other hand, the 'State Department' theory, with its emphasis on declining U.S. dominance in the regional subsystem due to international system transformation and the subsystemic constraints and limits to U.S. power and policy, represents the 'systemic' perspective in international relations. The latter perspective points to the great complexity of the Cyprus issue, which denies the attributing of outcomes to U.S. behaviour. Rather than policy-makers controlling events, events control events - policy-makers are seen to be overawed by the complexity and uncertainty of environmental dynamics. In this view, U.S. foreign policy is seen as being essentially reactive; reacting to the challenges arising from the internal political processes of subsystemic actors.

The view one takes of the nature of U.S. interests in Cyprus becomes very important when one comes to the question of the nature of U.S. behaviour toward Cyprus and the interpretation of the events of 1974. Continuity theorists

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<sup>76</sup>See K. Waltz, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. U.S.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.



portend that Cyprus was regarded by American policymakers as the Achilles' heel of NATO's eastern wall, since

it was something of an anomaly that though Greece and Turkey, the two states with strong interests in Cyprus and linked to it by ties with their ethnic co-nationals there, were both members of NATO, Cyprus itself was nonaligned and had a President who not only made a fetish of non-alignment but also opened doors to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe as a balance against the Western powers.<sup>77</sup>

If like the Continuity theorists one sees the American interest in Cyprus as an active or synoptic one: to bring an end to the independence of Cyprus by partitioning it between Greece and Turkey in order to rectify this anomalous position of Cyprus, one attributes 'high policy rationality'<sup>78</sup> and 'success' to U.S. policy and establishes a link between U.S. policy and the political outcome of 1974. On the other hand, if like the 'State Department' theorists, one sees

the American interest in Cyprus as essentially a negative or preventive one: to keep its political problems from boiling over and throwing wrenches into..... U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey and the relations of those two states with each other,<sup>79</sup>

one is led to a different conclusion. In this case, one looks at the impact of the events of 1974, whereby U.S.

<sup>77</sup> See J. Campbell, "The U.S. and the Cyprus Question, 1974-75", in V. Coufoudakis (ed.) *ESSAYS ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT*. New York:Pella, 1976, p.15.

<sup>78</sup> See G. Gustafsson and J. J Richardson, in "Concepts of Rationality and the Policy Process", *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH*, Vol. 7/4, 1979. They contend that 'the rationality of a decision or policy is measured by the degree to which it is likely to achieve the objectives'.

<sup>79</sup> Op.cit. Campbell, p.14.

relations with Greece and Turkey and Greco-Turkish relations reached a post-war low and attributes 'mismanagement' and 'failure' to U.S. policy.

In essence, then, the two major contending theories of U.S. behaviour toward Cyprus rest upon certain assumptions or axioms regarding America's power and interests (means and ends) vis-a-vis the eastern Mediterranean, in general, and Cyprus in particular. In the case of the 'State Department' theory, these axioms are that American power in the eastern Mediterranean is limited, and that the American interest in Cyprus is a preventive or negative one. In the case of the 'Theory of Continuity', these axioms are that the U.S. is preponderant in the eastern Mediterranean, and that the American interest in Cyprus is an active or synoptic one.

The abundant literature regarding U.S. relative decline since the fifties (implicit theme in the State department theory) ranging from the Marxist citation of Leninist predictions of crises in Western capitalism to neo-realist works on the 'costs of hegemony' and the 'rise and decline of empires', is well known to students of international relations and does not need extensive reiteration. However, one strain of thought in the U.S. relative decline literature is relevant to this study and is therefore singled out for brief pontification here. The contention, in question, is that with the transformation of the international system from the relative low uncertainty of cold war bipolarity to the complexity of bipolycentricism

(characteristic of detente)<sup>80</sup>, the U.S. has been losing her capacity to shape international affairs, including the affairs of her allies. Thus, while at the height of the cold war the U.S. was regarded as having a high degree of foreign policy control over her allies (where foreign policy control, broadly construed, denotes the capacity to harmonise the foreign policy of other nations with ones own policy, and hence the control over outcomes pertaining to an issue), with the loosening of bipolarity after the Cuban missile crisis which gave way to the polycentricism of detente, the U.S. is seen as having lost relative control. Coral Bell, for instance, has written of the increasing "scope for local intransigence" on the part of the allies, referring to Greece and Turkey's increasingly asserted independence from U.S. control with the onset of detente and their refusal to relegate their national interests to 'alliance interests'.<sup>81</sup> In articulating a State Department approach, Bell regards the events of 1974 in Cyprus to be the result of this 'scope for local intransigence'. For instance, while the U.S. was able to avert - on a number of occasions - a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in the sixties, by reminding the Turks of the Soviet threat and her NATO obligations, it was no longer able to forestall the Turks in 1974 after they adopted "a foreign policy with a

<sup>80</sup> A term coined by John Spanier, as cited in C. Kegley and E. Wittkopf, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: PATTERN AND PROCESS. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, p.145.

<sup>81</sup> See the chapter entitled, "The Scope For Local Intransigence", in C. Bell, THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE: THE KISSINGER ERA. London, U.K: M. Robertson, 1977.

personality" (presumably meaning as opposed to being blindly dedicated to NATO).<sup>82</sup> Coral Bell's observation regarding U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey is supported by the work of Byung-joon who suggests "that changes in the global system of alliance relationships determine foreign policy behaviour more than any other variables,"<sup>83</sup> and hypothesises that

when policy consensus disappears between nations, the difference of domestic political processes emerges as an important source of foreign policy conflict. This has become increasingly apparent since the end of the cold war yielded to the era of detente.<sup>84</sup>

A month after confiding to Sulzberger of the NEW YORK TIMES that "he looked back on the dismal mess involving Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus as his biggest diplomatic failure,"<sup>85</sup> Henry Kissinger himself provides an exemplary State Department perspective in an interview with TIME magazine in February 1977. Kissinger portrays the U.S. as being at the mercy of the momentum of events ('train', in his terminology) resulting from the interplay of the subsystemic actors' domestic political processes, by stating the following:

<sup>82</sup>See H. Ulman and H. Dekmejian. "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967." ORBIS, Fall 1967, p.772-85.

<sup>83</sup>See Ahn Byung-joon, "Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Conflict: The Case of S. Korea", in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ENTERS THE EIGHTIES., ed. by R. Merritt. Abstracts of papers presented at the XI. World Congress of the I.P.S.A., 1979, p.16.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. p.15.

<sup>85</sup>See C. L. Sulzberger, NEW YORK TIMES. 26 Jan., 1977.

sometimes it feels as if you were in one of those movies, sitting on the track in front of an express train. The train is bearing down on you. You know what to do if you did not have ten other things that needed doing first. You are praying that the train will miss and you will not get hit. Such a situation occurred in Cyprus. If I had ever had 12 hours and been able to pick out an intelligence report, I would have seen that the situation needed attention.<sup>86</sup>

In his examination of the Kissinger era, John Stoessinger, Kissinger's long-standing friend from his student days at Harvard, conforms to Kissinger's self-analysis. According to Stoessinger, at the time of the Cyprus crisis of 1974, Kissinger was besieged - externally - by the Middle East and - internally - by Watergate, and thus responded to the crisis "cavalierly and haphazardly".<sup>87</sup>

From the State Department perspective, the most complete account of the events of 1974 comes from Laurence Stern. What Stern attempts to do is to explain how U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey prior to the summer of 1974 had "mortgaged the influence"<sup>88</sup> needed to exert pressure during the crisis of 1974, and the factors indigenous to the eastern Mediterranean that brought about the landslide toward the crisis. In Turkey, as Stern points out by way of showing how the U.S. had its hands tied there, there was a left-of-centre Prime Minister [Bulent Ecevit] in power.

<sup>86</sup>See TIME magazine, "The Lone Cowboy", 28 February 1977, p.15.

<sup>87</sup>See J. Stoessinger, HENRY KISSINGER: THE ANGUISH OF POWER. New York: Norton, 1976, p.139.

<sup>88</sup>This is the terminology used by Roger Morris in describing the extent of American leverage over Greece and Turkey during the summer of 1974. See R. Morris, UNCERTAIN GREATNESS: HENRY KISSINGER AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p.272.

Early in 1974, Ecevit had flouted U.S. authority by lifting the ban imposed on the cultivation of opium poppy, which previous Turkish administrations had imposed at America's request. The opium poppy case was important in that it was symbolic of Turko-American relations at large. As Stern would concur, Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand reports that the Ecevit government pursued policies which 'raised a lot of dust all too suddenly' for Washington's palate. If the U.S. was skeptical about Ecevit's politics, the feeling was mutual. In Turkey,

the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) ouster of Allende in Chile and America's approach to governments which pursued policies inimical to U.S. interests deeply concerned the R.P.P. (Ecevit's political party-the Republican People's Party) team. In the aftermath of the American reaction/protest to/of the decision to resume the cultivation of opium poppy, it is rumoured that Ecevit even began analysing books on the activities of the CIA.<sup>89</sup>

In Greece, according to Stern's account, while it may have been correct to say that the Greek Junta was under America's thumb until late 1973, this is not the case for the Junta's last six months or so. In November 1973, the relatively mild dictator Papadopoulos was ousted by the repressive head of the military police, Ioannides. Under Ioannides, the Junta became so decadent and corrupt that Greece, in effect, became a political no-man's land. According to Stern, for the first time in his memory, senior Pentagon officials were heard to complain about the repressiveness of the regime in Athens and political analysts in the U.S. Embassy in Athens

<sup>89</sup>See M. A Birand. THIRTY HOT DAYS. Istanbul:Milliyet, p.31.

remarked on the continuing erosion of civil government performance. Even U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca, who according to Stern was a 'cheerleader' for Papadopoulos' regime, was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the unrepentant dictatorship of Ioannides. Ioannides, to a much greater extent than his predecessor, was vehemently opposed to Makarios and it did not take too long after his assumption of power that he began to plot his incapacitation. Also, most importantly, in Cyprus, the legendary leader of the EOKA-B (formerly EOKA) guerrilla organization, General Grivas, died in January 1974. According to Stern, Grivas' death

became a green light for both the regime in Athens and agents in Cyprus to plot the downfall of Makarios (who was regarded by enosisists as having betrayed the cause, instead opting for the unfettered independence of Cyprus)..... Grivas' death actually made possible the full political capture of the anti-Makarios forces on the island by the Athens regime and its military surrogates, the Greek officer contingent.<sup>90</sup>

The man who was due to succeed Grivas as head of the EOKA-B organization, Major George Karousos, was quietly spirited off the island since, according to Stern, he was out of phase with what Athens wanted. Karousos was known to be against the bombing of pro-Makarios targets and assassination, but rather advocated political competition through party organization and, at worst, kidnapping.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>90</sup>Emphasis added in brackets. See L. Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus", FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1975, #19, p.35 and 39.

<sup>91</sup>In addition to his article in FOREIGN POLICY, see L. Stern., THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND

Continuity theorists would not agree with the above 'State Department' accounts which, on the whole, treat "U.S. reaction toward the latest phase of the dispute (i. e. the 1974 crisis) as an isolated event that occurred within the context of the developments in Greece and Cyprus during the Summer of 1974."<sup>92</sup> According to Coufoudakis, for instance, by the summer of 1964 the U.S. had concluded that her interests would best be served by eliminating Makarios and undermining Cypriot independence. He argues that U.S. objectives remained relatively constant over the 1964-1974 era, but that the means of their implementation have varied, ranging from direct U.S. initiatives such as the Acheson Plan of 1964,<sup>93</sup> through the endorsement of secret Greco-Turkish talks on the political division of Cyprus to the supporting of the Greek Junta which overthrew Makarios. All that need to be said - politically - about the Republic of Cyprus, according to Coufoudakis, is that it has been a victim of U.S. Cold War diplomacy. In his view, the continuity in American policy toward Cyprus is due to the preoccupation of successive American administrations with 'containment'; their exertion of cold war doctrine over the tide of regional political change and to the detriment of local needs and aspirations. For the U.S., in the case of

<sup>91</sup> (cont'd) FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. New York:Times Books, 1977.

<sup>92</sup> See V. Coufoudakis, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation." MILLENIUM, London School of Economics, Winter 1976-77, Vol. 5/3, pp.245-268.

<sup>93</sup> The Acheson Plan will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. At this stage, suffice to say that it was a plan widely regarded as a partition plan.



Cyprus, containment dictated the adoption of a policy of political division (subsuming Cyprus to Greece and Turkey through partition), so as to eliminate the possibility of Soviet intrusion into Cyprus. As such, a politically divided Cyprus would for all intents and purposes become a part of NATO. Given the nature of U.S. objectives regarding Cyprus, in this view, one would have been surprised had there not have been a de facto partition in Cyprus, as in 1974.<sup>94</sup>

Continuing in the same vein, by way of explaining the dangers to the U.S. of a recalcitrant Cyprus, Michael Attaliades makes several arguments as to the geopolitical significance of Cyprus in Western global strategy. Among other things, Attaliades points out that the R.A.F Akrotiri base in Cyprus is the largest R.A.F base in the world and that Cyprus has a network of communication and surveillance facilities of "enormous value both in terms of global and regional strategy". He adds that, "what is possibly the best radar in the World" is located on Mount Olympus and run by the British. Attaliades also points out that, with the political volatility in the Middle East and the possibility

<sup>94</sup> See V. Coufoudakis, "Introduction: The Cyprus Question-A Continuing Dialogue" and "The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies-The Cyprus Case", in V. Coufoudakis (ed.) *ESSAYS ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT*, New York: Pella., 1976. pp.XV-XV111&pp.27-50, respectively. For a detailed discussion of U.S. Cold War interests and policies in the Cyprus Question, see especially V. Coufoudakis, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study In Cold War Diplomacy," in T. Coulombis and S. Hicks (ed.) *U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD GREECE AND CYPRUS: THE CLASH OF PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM*. Centre for Mediterranean Studies: Washington, D. C., 1975, pp.106-138.

of future limited wars in that area, Cyprus - as "a securely anchored aircraft carrier" - has the potential for serving as a staging point; a base for 'forward stockpiling' in limited war scenarios.<sup>95</sup>

According to Attaliades, although it had been accepted in Washington, ever since 1964, that Cyprus ceased to be a viable sovereign state and that the U.S. pursued politically divisive policies, the employment of drastic means to realise U.S. objectives had to await the coming of Kissinger. In his view, Kissinger, somewhat akin to a 'think tank' war-gamer who undertakes a complex contingency planning and simulation exercise, undertook a project to solve the eastern Mediterranean equation and 'tidy-up the eastern Mediterranean sector'. Attaliades quotes West German journalist Adalbert Weinstein, writing a day before the Turkish military intervention (July 19, 1974), with glowing approval:

With tricks and half measures NATO can no longer make do. Somehow the main demands of the Turks must be met by those who want to be present politically and militarily in Cyprus, openly or secretly. Turkey wants to set up its own credible protection for the Turkish minority and secure a strategic base in Cyprus which is necessary for the security of the Turkish motherland. In exchange the Greeks and Greek Cypriots could be allowed union with the motherland. The division of the population groups and the dissolution of the existing state of Cyprus would be the price. One needed to be sure a Kissinger in high form to realise such a project.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> See M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979, pp.158-160.

<sup>96</sup> Adalbert Weinstein of the FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE ZEITUNG, as quoted in Ibid., p.161&p.173. Emphasis added.

Rather similarly, Coufoudakis states that "the Cyprus Question entered its latest and most tragic phase with the application of the Kissinger diplomacy (the quest for a stable international order, and thus the need to eliminate sources of instability in critical regions) to this perennial problem of the Western alliance."<sup>97</sup> To this effect, he quotes from Stephen Graubards' THE PORTRAIT OF A MIND (a work on Kissinger's 'philosophy') that Kissinger believes :

the policy-maker was the risk taker: there was no way to guarantee his success..... (As Vietnam shows).... the decision was made to run those risks, in the belief that the alternatives, while less dangerous, promised results that could not be satisfactory...<sup>98</sup>

and adds that "thus, calculated risks were taken in the Cyprus Question in July-August 1974, for the purpose of achieving the permanent solution that defied Dulles, Rusk, and Johnson."<sup>99</sup>

The most recent work in the continuity tradition, comes from Christopher Hitchens who, alternatively, refers to his theory as the 'Collusion' or 'Conspiracy' theory. Hitchens contends that there are four elements to the Cyprus problem: one, the local - the relationship between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; two, the regional - the relationship between Greece and Turkey; three, the ideological - since Cyprus became independent during the Cold War, it became a

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<sup>97</sup>Op.cit. Coufoudakis in MILLENIUM, p.262.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid. p.263.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid.

place of conflict (Lockeanism/Democracy vs. Communism) between the superpowers; and four, the superpower realpolitik element - since "outside powers have never scrupled to employ local and regional rivalries to get their own way there."<sup>100</sup> According to Hitchens, "Cyprus was plunged into war by the operations of the fourth element on the first and second - with the third element acting as an occasional incitement or justification."<sup>101</sup> After condoning the U.S. government, in the person of Undersecretary of State George Ball, for establishing an 'underground contact' with the guerilla leader Grivas in the sixties, as a "Great Power calculation designed to abolish the island's independence,"<sup>102</sup> he points out that "by helping further to poison an ethnic conflict the U.S. deliberately created the very conditions which it was later to cite, hypocritically, as the justification for partition."<sup>103</sup> Thus, in this view, "the U.S. and its proxies made an instrument out of..... Greek-Turkish rivalry and mistrust."<sup>104</sup> Evidently, while Hitchens is aware of local and regional 'variables' at play, for him, the explanatory variable or source regarding political outcomes in Cyprus is U.S. behaviour.

Finally, according to what may be regarded as a 'Covert operations' variant of the Continuity theory, as expounded by Turkish journalist Semih Altan, the U.S. collaborated

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<sup>100</sup>See C. Hitchens. CYPRUS. U.K:Quartet, 1984, p.158.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p.159.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p.160.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid.

with the Greek Junta in organising the coup against Makarios, but had no control over and gravely miscalculated regarding the Turkish military intervention. The major difference between this approach and the Continuity approach is that there is less talk of American diplomacy than there is talk of U.S. intelligence activities and connections. Writing in the style of CIA dissenters Victor Marchetti and John Marks,<sup>105</sup> Altan's allegations are revealing. According to Altan, the coup in Cyprus was part of a larger eastern Mediterranean scheme, with a view politically to swing the eastern Mediterranean to the right (only in Greece was there a right-wing regime). Allegedly the CIA was worried about Makarios and leftist tendencies in Cyprus, leftist challenges to the Junta in Greece, and the government of Social Democrat Ecevit in Turkey. In 1974, Altan contends, the CIA's eastern Mediterranean bureau Chief, James Hurry, became convinced that the U.S. had the opportunity 'to hit three birds with one stone' and collaborated (with the knowledge and consent of Kissinger) with the Greek Junta in planning the coup. According to Altan, in Hurry's calculations, as a result of a coup in Cyprus, one, the 'Castro of the Mediterranean', Makarios, would be neutralised and a subsidiary of the Athens regime would be established; two, the Junta's position would be strengthened vis-a-vis the leftists in Greece; and three, because of his

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<sup>105</sup>The ex-CIA agents well known for their work, CIA: THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE. (New York: Knopf, 1974)

non-intervention,<sup>106</sup> public opinion and the political opposition in Turkey would bring about Ecevit's demise.<sup>107</sup> Semih Altan is not alone in his emphasis on CIA-Greek Junta intelligence collaboration in the coup. Another Turkish writer, Mehmet Doner, points to allegations made by the NEW YORK TIMES' Athens correspondent, Steve Roberts:

The coup in Cyprus is entirely the 'achievement' of the intelligence agencies. Sixty CIA agents who came to Athens shortly before the coup, prepared the plan for the coup together with the Junta's officials in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Tasca. The CIA guided Greek Central Intelligence (KYP-Kentriki Ypiresia Plipoforion) in its endeavours and all planning was carried out in this light.<sup>108</sup>

Hence, views as to the nature of U.S. behaviour toward Cyprus have somewhat ranged between two 'theoretical' poles. There are writers like Campbell and Bell who talk of the constraints and limits to American power in the region and writers like Stern, Coulombis, Stoessinger, Morris, and Szulc who talk of the mismanagement of the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the failure of U.S. diplomacy on the one hand, and writers like Coufoudakis, Attaliades, and Hitchens who see a purposeful U.S. consistently attempting to undermine Cypriot independence and who look upon the political outcome of the 1974 crisis as the realisation of U.S. objectives, on

<sup>106</sup>The U.S., based on Pentagon and British Ministry of Defence reports, believed that Turkey did not have the military capability to launch a full-scale military operation in Cyprus.

<sup>107</sup> See S. Altan. THE THIRD MAN. Thirteenth ed. Istanbul: Birlik, 1974.

<sup>108</sup> THE INTRICACIES OF THE CIA AND THE THIRD MAN ECEVIT. Fourth ed., Istanbul: M Press, 1974, p.124. (translated from the Turkish text).

the other.<sup>109</sup> Given these conflicting interpretations, this study seeks to provide an assessment of U.S. diplomacy (explanation of its nature and variation) vis-a-vis Cyprus within the framework of a comparative case analysis of crisis diplomacy during the 1963-4 and 1974 Cyprus crises. In effect, this study purports to test the major contending theories of U.S. behaviour toward Cyprus.

<sup>109</sup> In addition to the op.cit. works see T. Szulc. THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON YEARS. New York: Viking Press, 1978, pp.794-97. T. Coulombis. THE U.S., GREECE, AND TURKEY: THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE. New York: Praeger, 1983.

#### IV. The Cyprus Problem And The U.S: 1955-1964

When Cyprus gained her independence from Britain in August 1960, against a background of years of civil strife, high hopes were vested in the 1960 constitution (drafted by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, who by virtue of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee became the guarantor powers of the Cyprus Republic) which sought to safeguard against ethnic polarisation and foster democratic stability. Judging by British journalist Charles Foley's account of the festivities among dignitaries, immediately after the February 1959 agreement to establish an independent republic, one would have thought that turbulence in Cyprus was to be a phenomenon of the past. As Foley vividly puts it,

within a few days of the agreement being signed the new Greek Minister Plenipotentiary in Nicosia announced a cocktail party. The Turkish Consul-General reciprocated and soon cocktail parties were as regular as curfews and accepted with the same fatalism. The Greek Navy paid a courtesy call; the Turkish Navy sent Kemal Ataturk's yacht through the Dardanelles to Famagusta where, with a band blaring in the bows, [Governor]Foot, [President-to-be]Makarios, [Vice-President to-be]Kutchuk, [General]Darling, among a hundred others, rocked gently on the clear waters of the harbour, drinking raki and eating lobster from the Bosphorus. Government House gave a Queen's Birthday party for thousands of guests; the Army brought out its regimental silver; the R.A.F flew a buffet from England.<sup>110</sup>

However, despite all the early exuberance, during the

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<sup>110</sup>Charles Foley. LEGACY OF STRIFE: CYPRUS FROM REBELLION TO CIVIL WAR. London: Penguin, 1964, 1964, pp.154-155.



Christmas of 1963 armed hostilities erupted on the island between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ethnic communities, marking the breakdown of the Cyprus Republic only three years after its inception.

In early 1964, Britain who had given up her sovereignty over Cyprus (except for two military bases) at the time of independence, also decided to give up her long standing conflict management or peace-maker role. On the Twenty-fifth of January 1964, the British Ambassador to Washington, Ormsby-Gore, notified Undersecretary of State George Ball, acting as Secretary of State during Dean Rusk's absence, that the British were no longer prepared to shoulder alone the task of keeping the peace on the island and safeguarding Western interests. Ormsby-Gore told Ball that "Her Majesty's government has concluded that it is best to establish an international force on Cyprus, and early rather than late."<sup>111</sup> In the Ambassador's view, the international force was to be basically a NATO force with a sizeable U.S. contingent. In effect, what the British were asking at this point was U.S. assumption of responsibility in the Cyprus issue. In the words of Weintal and Bartlett, this date marks the beginning of the United States' "critical involvement" in Cyprus.

Works on diplomatic history written with the benefit of hindsight, often lead one to believe that history begins or

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<sup>111</sup> E. Weintal and C. Bartlett. FACING THE BRINK: AN INTIMATE STUDY OF CRISIS DIPLOMACY, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967, p.18.

ends at certain points in time. Strictly speaking, what happens is that the writer imposes certain 'situations'<sup>112</sup> on history, with each situation being comprised of at least one event. Thus, history can be seen as a sequence of situations, whereby an understanding of a latter situation requires an appreciation of the earlier one. Given this, an understanding of U.S. policy toward Cyprus after the United States' 'critical involvement' requires an appreciation of the (1) origin of the contemporary socio-political configurations and the historical involvement of the guarantor powers in Cyprus and the (2) antecedent conditions prevalent in the last decade of British colonial rule in Cyprus. While the former point is particularly useful in understanding 'Enosis' (will be elaborated on later), which has led to most of the turbulence in Cyprus, the axis of this chapter has to do with the latter point. Who were the actors on the political scene? What were the political ideas in force? Above all, what was the nature of the conflict of interests that brought about U.S. involvement in the first place?

With the division of the Roman Empire in 395 A.D., Cyprus became part of the Byzantine Empire, and so it remained for eight centuries. Under Byzantine rule, which lay the first major cultural imprint on Cyprus, Greek was

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<sup>112</sup>See W. Riker, "Events and Situations," *JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY*, January 1957, Vol.60-61. Riker describes situations as, "the boundaries, the stops and starts, that humans impose on continuous reality...." and, "a situation is an arrangement and condition of movers and actors in a specified, instantaneous, and spatially extended location."

the official language and Christianity was the religion. In Greek history this era is referred to as the 'Great Hellenic era' and the idea of Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) has its origins embedded in the 'megali idea' (the great ideal) - an identification with the 'Great Hellenic era', and as its corollary, the vision of a pan-Hellenic empire in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, stretching from the Greek mainland to Cyprus and including parts of Turkey.

In 1191, Richard the Lion Heart of England seized Cyprus and he handed it to Guy de Lusignan (a dispossessed King of Jerusalem), who founded a feudal monarchy under French language and culture. In the fifteenth century, Cyprus became part of the Venetian Empire, and it remained so until its conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1571. The Ottomans colonised Cyprus, laying the second major cultural imprint on Cyprus, yet they granted religious and cultural autonomy to the Greeks. Islam was the religion of the Turkish inhabitants of the island, who came from the Turkish mainland, while the Greeks on Cyprus continued to keep faith in the Greek Orthodox church as they had since the Hellenic era.

In the words of Robert Stephens, "the modern history of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey begins in the 1820's with a series of massacres"<sup>113</sup> marking the onset of the Greek war of independence. After several years of rebellion against

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<sup>113</sup>R. Stephens, CYPRUS-A PLACE OF ARMS: POWER POLITICS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. London, U.K.: Praeger, 1966, p.44.

the Ottoman Empire, in 1830 the Ottoman Sultan acknowledged Greek independence, and thus modern day Greece was born. What was important about the Greek war of independence was that it

had introduced the explosive new idea of nationality into (the Near East).... For the first time a struggle had been launched....., for that combination of land, language, culture, and political sovereignty which is characteristic of modern day nationalism and is at the root of the Cyprus problem in its modern form..... Previously (while there were memories of the Byzantine heyday) there could have been no Enosis movement because there would have been no 'Greece' for Cyprus to unite with.<sup>114</sup>

Ottoman Rule in Cyprus lasted until 1878, when the British Empire took it into trust, and then formally annexed it in 1914, making it a crown colony. With the treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey officially recognised British rule in Cyprus. When the Republic of Cyprus was declared in August 1960, Cyprus had a population of about 600000, with roughly 79 per cent Greek Cypriots, 18 per cent Turkish Cypriots, and 3 per cent Armenian, Maronites, and others.

Though one can go as far back as to the Greek independence of 1830 to explain the Cyprus problem, for the purposes of this study, the 1950's are a good starting point. The Cyprus problem as a complex international problem, began to take shape in the fifties. First, in 1954 the issue of Cyprus was for the first time brought to the UN General Assembly by Greece, where Greece called for national self-determination for the Greek Cypriots. Also the Enosis

<sup>114</sup>Ibid. p.45. Emphasis added in brackets.

movement which was growing among the Greek Cypriots throughout the century intensified and finally manifested itself in a violent and systematic manner in 1955 through the launching of an armed terror campaign by the Greek guerrilla organization, EOKA.<sup>115</sup> Second, and reciprocally, as Greek nationalism grew (from the Turkish point of view, national self-determination amounted to Enosis); as a direct function of this Turkish nationalism grew among Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots began rallying around the idea of 'Taksim' - partition. Also, in the fifties, Turkey who always kept a watchful eye on Cyprus, began strongly voicing concern over Cyprus as it began to appear that the British were no longer able to preserve the long-standing status-quo on the island. Turkey had two major concerns over Cyprus: one concern being the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots on the island and the other being the strategic concern that if Cyprus were to become a Greek island, it would form the last link in a chain of Greek islands ringing Turkey from the Aegean coast through to the far-eastern Mediterranean coast.<sup>116</sup> Third, though Britain was initially

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<sup>115</sup>EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was formed by General Grivas in 1953 for the stated purpose of fighting "for the liberation of Cyprus from British yoke." Grivas operated under the pseudonym of a legendary folk hero - Digenis - and by virtue of the mystique associated with being an elusive and faceless guerilla leader was for many years regarded by the Greek populace as being a figure somewhere between fact and fiction.

<sup>116</sup>For the Turkish viewpoint regarding Cyprus see the statement of Fazil Kutchuk in C. Hitchens, CYPRUS. Quartet: London, 1984, p.31; and especially TURKEY AND CYPRUS: A SURVEY OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION WITH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE TURKISH VIEWPOINT., Press Attache's

reluctant to give up Cyprus, 'a strategic base between the point of exit from the Dardanelles and entry into the Suez', by the late fifties it faced the choice of 'Cyprus as a base, or a base in Cyprus'. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Cyprus question entered the Cold war political arena, for it began to impinge on NATO security since it involved three NATO allies in a conflict of interest and was potentially disruptive of the cohesion of the Western alliance. At this point, for fear of Soviet opportunism, U.S. policy was identical with British policy in attempting to 'localise' the Cyprus question by portraying it as Britain's domestic affair, as opposed to the Greek policy of 'internationalising' the problem by taking it to the UN and portraying the problem as one of an imperial power being unwilling to grant self-determination to the indigenous majority (i.e. the Greek Cypriots). U.S. policy in the fifties, then, sought the intra-alliance setting of quiet diplomacy, siding with the British and Turks against the Greek policy of taking the Cyprus question to the international setting of UN public diplomacy.

In the early fifties the Cyprus problem was essentially an Anglo-Greek one: an imperial power reluctant to give up a

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116 (cont'd) Office, Turkish Embassy, London, 1956 - The gist of the Turkish view of Cyprus as stated on p.26 of the latter was the following: "The status of Cyprus is a domestic question for Britain. That being assumed, in case Great Britain deemed it convenient to confer with or consult other countries on this subject or, if of her own free will she waiver her right to consider the question a domestic one, Turkey, before and above all other parties should be the one to be conferred with or consulted."

strategic colony, and the Greeks (Greek Cypriots and Greece) wanting union of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>117</sup> In the early fifties, Archbishop Makarios, as the Greek Cypriot leader, emerged as the head of the struggle for Enosis. With the beginning of Greek agitation for Enosis, British diplomacy turned toward legitimising Turkey's interest in Cyprus, so as to provide a counterweight to the Greek movement. Hence, the London Conference of 1955, where British, Turkish, and Greek Foreign Ministers met to discuss the Cyprus question, was the result of a British invitation to Turkey to attend as a third party and made official Turkey's stake in Cyprus. In 1955 British Prime Minister Anthony Eden made Britain's policy on Cyprus clear by stating the following:

I have never felt, and I do not believe now, that Cyprus is an Anglo-Greek question and can ever be treated as such. It is equally unrealistic to lecture Turkey as to the view she ought to take about an island no further from her coast than is the Isle of Man from us.... Our duty if called on....., is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our ally (Turkey).<sup>118</sup>

How the safeguarding of the strategic needs of Britain and Turkey was to be achieved was of course by not handing over Cyprus to Greece.

The London Conference of August 1955, where the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor powers met to resolve the Cyprus question, came to a deadlock due to Makarios' insistence on

<sup>117</sup> In a plebiscite on Enosis held in January 1950, out of some 225,000 Greek Cypriots eligible to vote, 96 per cent reportedly signed the petition for Enosis.

<sup>118</sup> Great Britain PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (1955-56) Vol. 550, p. 403. Quoted in M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979, p. 6.

self-determination and commitment to it by a particular date. Shortly after the London Conference, the Cyprus question began to visibly take its toll on Greco-Turkish relations. In the wake of EOKA terrorism in Cyprus, in Istanbul and Izmir, Turkey, anti-Greek riots took place during which the Greek minority communities living there were harassed. Greece reciprocated by withdrawing its officers from the mixed NATO regional command in Izmir. These state of affairs moved U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to send Greece and Turkey terse notes advising them to "mend their fences".<sup>119</sup>

As Kyriacos Markides points out, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC, until the EOKA campaign for Enosis mounted after 1955, on the whole, there was not that strong a nationalism among Turkish Cypriots whose rural population had for years been living with Greeks in mixed villages. Even though the Greeks had expressed anti-British sentiment in their bid for Enosis before the fifties, the Turkish Cypriots countered this by being supportive of the British rather than the assertion of Turkish nationalism. This changed by 1955. As Markides puts it, summing up much of what has to be said of the 1955-59 era,

the national consciousness of the Turkish Cypriot minority grew in direct proportion to the rise of Greek Cypriot national consciousness. As Greek Cypriots intensified the struggle for union with Greece, the Turks began feeling more nationalistic and declared their own ethnic interests and

<sup>119</sup>See T. Coulombis, THE U.S., GREECE, AND TURKEY: THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.29.



aspirations.... [As the psychological distance between the two communities grew] ....., the old mistrust and hatred that had characterised Greco-Turkish relations since the fall of Constantinople (1453) were revived with increasing intensity.<sup>120</sup>

Reflective of increasing Turkish nationalism in the face of EOKA terrorism and the loss of confidence in the British to preserve the status-quo and oppose Enosis, the Turks (Turkish Cypriots with the support of Turkey) launched their own militant opposition by forming the clandestine T.M.T - Turk Mukavemet Teshkilati (Turkish Defence Organization). By 1957 the Turkish Cypriots had a countervailing war-cry: Taksim.

Speeches were filled with Taksim, and Taksim came booming over the radio from Ankara. The biggest cinema in the Turkish quarter became the Taksim cinema, which was approached down the newly renamed Taksim Boulevard..... Taksim meant partition: if the Greek Cypriot majority wanted self-determination, then the Turkish Cypriot minority, of one-fifth should have it too,<sup>121</sup>

was the Turkish contention.

In 1958, intercommunal violence reached its zenith in Cyprus. An eight week period of heightened terror resulted in the loss of some 127 lives and over 300 injuries. In the midst of civil strife in Cyprus, with the British involved in an extensive policing operation (employing some 30000 British troops) trying to bring a cessation to the violence, in February 1959 the Premiers of Greece and Turkey struck an

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<sup>120</sup>K. Markides, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977, p.23. -  
 Emphasis added in brackets.

<sup>121</sup>Op.Cit. Foley, p.100.

agreement. A commitment was made to the formation of an independent Republic within a year. The agreed upon resolution formula, with the concurrence of Britain, led to the establishment of a Republic with a Greek Cypriot as President and a Turkish Cypriot as Vice-President, each endowed with the power to veto legislation. There was to be a 70-30 ratio of representative powers in the parliament and government between Greeks and Turks, respectively, and a ratio of 60-40 in the armed forces and police between the two respective communities. Unfortunately this constitutional arrangement did not work in practice, and by 1963 democratic politics came to a stalemate in Cyprus.

The major difficulty, from the beginning of independence, remained the implementation of the 70-30 ratio which the Turks insisted must be put into effect immediately, whereas the Greeks argued that a more gradualist approach to the problem would cause less dislocation and upheaval. Quarrels over basic taxation (which the Turkish members of parliament vetoed), over the establishment of separate municipalities (which the Greeks felt was tantamount to partition), and over the insistence of the Turks that the police and army should constitute ethnically separate organizational units brought the governmental machinery to a virtual standstill.<sup>122</sup>

In November 1963, by which time intercommunal mistrust and suspicion had reverted to its pre-1960 level, President Makarios proposed several revisions to the 1960 constitution, most notably proposing the dispensation of the Turkish Cypriot veto power. The Turks flatly rejected these proposals, as they saw it as a step toward Enosis.

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<sup>122</sup>Op.Cit. Markides, p.27.

If one views the breakdown of the Republic of Cyprus in December 1963 against the background of the historical legacy of Byzantine, Ottoman, and British rule, the antagonism of the fifties and the stalemate in the functioning of central government due to the bickerings over the interpretation and application of the constitution, one sees that the Cyprus problem or question is by no means unique to the era during which events on Cyprus precipitated the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis - marking the beginning of critical U.S. diplomatic experience with the problem of Cyprus. It is evident from the preceding concise history of the Cyprus problem that the problem 'escalated' and became more and more complex over time. What began as an essentially Anglo-Greek dispute in the very early fifties became a complex international problem by the sixties. The complexity of the Cyprus problem has been astutely underlined by the preeminent British conflict researcher John Burton:

the Cyprus case....., was not one dispute, the two communities were in dispute over issues at the down-to-earth level of personal security, political participation, and non-discrimination. But other disputes involved different parties and different issues. There was the dispute between the Turkish and Greek governments, and the issues were their defence requirements and traditional prestige considerations in relation to Cyprus..... There was another dispute between the U.S. and U.S.S.R....., and the U.K was also interested. The issues relevant to all three were related to global strategy. No compromise, or solution could be found by a mediator to satisfy all of these varied interests.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>123</sup> J. Burton., "The Relevance of Theories of the International System, in J.N Moore (ed.) LAW AND CIVIL WAR

Hence, what is meant by the much repeated **Cyprus problem** is the absence of any one political formula to satisfy all interests simultaneously, and the conflict arising out of the pursuit of interests in the absence of such a formula.

In attempting to describe the dynamics of domestic politics, Graham Allison has shown how different players in the game see, and act upon, different faces of an issue. The same holds true with international politics, where different states or major political groups, each with their unique interests and apprehensions generally see different faces of certain issues. As Burton pointed out above, what to the ethnic communities on Cyprus was a matter of personal security and political participation was to the U.S. a matter of global strategy. Such is the nature of 'Gullivers troubles' (to use Stanley Hoffmann's apt phrase, characterising the criticism directed at the U.S. for too often concentrating on the 'big picture' /global strategy at the expense of the local needs and aspirations of smaller states) who from where he stands sees the parts (Cyprus) as they relate to the whole (global order).<sup>124</sup>

In the 1955-59 era, the U.S. essentially took a passive role, with Britain at the forefront as colonial governor safeguarding Western interests in Cyprus. American interests were identical with British ones, in that both powers wanted

<sup>123</sup>(cont'd) IN THE MODERN WORLD. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p.105.

<sup>124</sup>See G.Allison. ESSENCE OF DECISION. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971., and S.Hoffmann. GULLIVERS TROUBLES, OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. New York: McGraw Hill.

to preserve Western presence on the strategic island and to seek damage control within the NATO alliance. In 1955, British Prime Minister Eden made explicit the importance of Cyprus to Britain and the Western alliance:

Neither the NATO obligations....., nor the Baghdad Pact, nor any agreement in the Middle East area or the Persian Gulf, or anything else, none of those can be speedily and effectively carried out today unless we have the assured and unfettered use of bases and facilities in Cyprus..... The welfare and indeed the lives of our people depends on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those interests, above all oil.<sup>125</sup>

Earlier, as a response to the Enosis movement, Prime Minister Eden was stating that "Her Majesty's government could not agree to discuss the status of Cyprus", while Minister of State for the Colonies, Lord Colyton, was stating that "there [were] certain territories in the Commonwealth which, because of their particular circumstances, [could] never expect to be fully independent."<sup>126</sup> The reason why the British put such a premium on Cyprus, and were reluctant to give it up, only becomes fully intelligible against the background of the situation in the Middle East.

To British Near Eastern policy....., Cyprus had never appeared of greater strategic value....., the political instability of the Arab states and the smouldering Arab-Israeli conflict provided a constant danger. In the eyes of Western politicians and strategists..., obsessed by the Cold war and therefore apt to underrate Arab nationalism as an independent force, the uncertain attitude of the

<sup>125</sup>Op.Cit. Attaliades, p.6.

<sup>126</sup>See F. Maier, CYPRUS:FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT DAY. London: Elek Books, p.154.

Arab states exposed the whole area to the danger of Russian intervention... [Also] with the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone... Cyprus became the last British military base in the Middle East. When after the retreat from the Suez, the Baghdad Pact seemed to inaugurate a new British sponsored system of defence, Cyprus acquired a key position.<sup>127</sup>

Shortly thereafter the situation began to change. Apart from the domestic condition on Cyprus, whereby the struggle for Enosis had entered a violent phase with the initiation of EOKA terrorism,

a reassessment of the British attitude had become inevitable after the Suez crisis. Already the Baghdad Pact, rather than strengthening Britain's hand in the Middle East, had aroused renewed suspicions against 'western imperialism' in the Arab world.<sup>128</sup>

With the withdrawal of American financial help in connection with the Aswan Dam, a move to express American disapproval of Nasser's relations with the Eastern bloc, had come Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez canal on July 26, 1956. This resulted in the Anglo-French attack at the end of October 1956.

Based on....., the illusion that military intervention could secure British and French power in this region, the whole scheme was doomed, not least because of American opposition.... In consequence, the realisation grew in responsible British circles that traditional military methods provided no solution. Cyprus thus ceased to matter greatly in the strategists' schemes.<sup>129</sup>

The changing British attitude toward Cyprus, whereby it began to appear that Britain might consider relinquishing

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p.153 and p.155. Emphasis added.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., pp.157-58.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p.158.

sovereignty, raised the intensity of the 'battle for Cyprus'. To the Greeks it seemed that their two-track policy of, diplomatically, internationalising the Cyprus question and, clandestinely, harassing the British by using guerilla tactics, was paying off and should be sustained. Most importantly, Turkey, who had never taken the Enosis movement too seriously since she believed that Britain's decision not to quit the island was an unassailable answer to the whole question, took a stronger hand in the matter. As mentioned earlier, the Turks adopted the policy of Taksim. At a time of inter-allied turbulence in 1957, the American Ambassador to Greece, George Allen, in a 'we are not a party to the dispute' manner of speaking, was stating that America's only interest was to see harmony restored in the Middle East and among the NATO nations of the area.<sup>130</sup> In their analysis of U.S. policy toward Cyprus during the 1955-59 era, Adams and Cottrell interpret U.S. policy in the same manner. They contend that the U.S. took "a rather passive role" in the dispute, expressing "the hope that a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem would be worked out among her three involved NATO allies."<sup>131</sup> They also point out that several resolutions to this effect were passed by the U.S. Congress. Thus, the U.S. welcomed the Zurich-London agreements of February 1959, which, at least temporarily, ended civil strife in Cyprus and restored harmony among the three NATO

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<sup>130</sup>See op.cit. Foley, p.99.

<sup>131</sup> T. Adams and A. Cottrell, CYPRUS: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1968, p.55.

allies.

It must be noted that a rather different interpretation of U.S. policy toward Cyprus during the 1955-59 era is offered by Coufoudakis and Attaliades.<sup>132</sup> Although they agree with the widely accepted view regarding America's paramount concern (i.e. alliance cohesion), they disagree on the U.S. role. In their view the U.S. worked behind the scenes to make Cyprus 'safe for NATO'. While Coufoudakis cites evidence from the work of Francois Crouzet to the effect that "the U.S. in 1956 quietly endorsed the principle of division in the interests of allied solidarity, while at the same time reminding the parties of other successful divisions such as Trieste,"<sup>133</sup> Attaliades talks of a plan put forward by John Foster Dulles in 1957, which sought to make Cyprus a part of NATO.

In the 1960-63 era, the period from the establishment of the 'reluctant' Republic of Cyprus to the 1963-64 crisis, the U.S. became more actively involved in Cyprus. In this era, the U.S. gave some \$20 million in foreign aid over three years, and initially when there appeared to be little to impede U.S. policy objectives in Cyprus, the U.S. expressed its expectations of the new Republic:

First, the Republic of Cyprus should develop

<sup>132</sup> The works of these two scholars have already been mentioned in the chapter on "Theories of U.S. Foreign Policy Behaviour Toward Cyprus."

<sup>133</sup> V. Coufoudakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies: The Case of Cyprus," in V. Coufoudakis (ed.), *ESSAYS ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT*, New York: Pella, 1976, p.37.



political stability and should join together with Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey to form a solid bulwark against Communism. Second, Cyprus should stress economic development, free democratic institutions and a pro-Western orientation. Third, the U.S. should enjoy unrestricted use of its existing communications facilities on the island. Fourth, the British Sovereign Base Areas should remain inviolate and available to any Western nation for any purpose.<sup>134</sup>

Given the nature of American goals in the new Republic, it is not surprising that America's apprehension over Cyprus grew as Makarios established close relations with the Soviets shortly after independence. The Soviet Union's approach to Makarios began in late 1960, when Moscow offered a barter of Cypriot raisins (the entire 1960 crop) and citrus fruit for Soviet timber and cement. Makarios accepted the barter offer and also signed a number of trade agreements for the next couple of years, reportedly, causing "a wave of concern in the U.S. State Department."<sup>135</sup> On the domestic scene, Makarios gave the local Communist party, AKEL, a respectable political role, including seats in parliament, and on the international scene appeared to identify with champions of nonalignment such as Tito and Nasser. In fact, Makarios was so effective on the international scene that people who knew nothing about Cyprus, knew of Makarios; for all intents and purposes, in the eyes of the international community Makarios was Cyprus.

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<sup>134</sup> T. Adams and A. Cottrell, CYPRUS-BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968, p.56. The first author is a former political specialist in NASA's Office of Policy Analysis, and the second, a former professor at the National War College in Washington D.C.

<sup>135</sup> Op.Cit. Adams and Cottrell, p.33.

Moscow, sensing a wedge of opportunity in the new-found Republic reciprocated to Makarios' international orientation by underlining Cypriot independence and nonalignment at every opportunity. It was this general state of affairs which led to the subsequent dubbing, in American diplomatic circles, of Cyprus as potentially being 'the Cuba of the Mediterranean' and Makarios as 'the Castro of the Mediterranean'.

Despite American apprehension, as evidence of the success of Makarios' non-alignment policy, Cypriot relations with both superpowers during this era can be described as being very good. Marking the occasion of a state visit by Makarios to the U.S. in June 1962, Adams and Cottrell, for instance, talk of a flourishing Cypriot-American friendship. During his visit, Makarios was reminded by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that one could be nonaligned and uncommitted militarily but that one could not be uncommitted regarding the age old question that preoccupied the likes of Plato, Hobbes, Locke, the 'Founding Fathers' of the American constitution, Marx, Lenin, among many others: government, more specifically, the 'right' *modus vivendi*. At a state dinner held in Makarios' honour, Secretary of State Rusk made the following remarks:

Unaligned, perhaps in any military sense, with military blocs. That we understand and appreciate. But neutral, neutral to the great issues facing mankind in the world in which we live? This has not been the case. Uncommitted to us perhaps, but with the deepest commitments of [your] own - committed to the indispensable moral and constitutional limits

upon the exercise of power, committed to the freedom of other people...<sup>136</sup>

In the fall of 1962, at a time it was reported that Cyprus was playing host to a fifty-man Soviet Embassy, three times the size of the American Embassy staff, by way of signalling the premium put by Washington on a pro-Western Cyprus, Vice-President Johnson visited Cyprus. During his visit Johnson urged a speed-up in the economic development of Cyprus and expressed concern over the growing Communist influence on the island. The U.S. Vice-President drew particular attention to what he perceived as the threat posed by a strong indigenous Communist movement and, asked the Cypriots to act to defer the growth of Communist influence.<sup>137</sup> Whatever Washington's apprehensions in relation to Cyprus were in this era, whatever the nature of Washington's view as to the durability of the Republic of Cyprus was, and even there may have been guarded optimism in international diplomatic circles that the Cyprus problem had been resolved, by mid-1964 Tad Szulc of the NEW YORK TIMES was able to state - what perhaps policy-makers in public office couldn't, but probably knew since December 1963:

that Cyprus has ceased to be a viable sovereign state is a fact of political life that by now has been tacitly accepted in Washington and in all other major capitals of the world.<sup>138</sup>

The eruption of intercommunal conflict in Cyprus in December 1963 heralded the beginning of a new chapter in

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. p.59.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p.59-60.

<sup>138</sup> Tad Szulc, NEW YORK TIMES, 21 June 1964.

U.S.-Cypriot relations, whereby, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. was to step into what had traditionally been British shoes and assume prime international responsibility in the Cyprus question. On December 26, 1963, President Johnson sent a joint letter to President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk expressing grave anxiety over the intercommunal violence and promising to support attempts to find a peaceful solution. U.S. policy at this time, and thereafter, maintained that with the 1963 outbreak of intercommunal hostilities on the island, the Cyprus situation ought to "be transformed from a danger into a problem."<sup>139</sup>

As Adams and Cottrell point out, when in late January 1964 Britain notified the U.S. that it could no longer carry the burden of the Cyprus question alone and asked the U.S. to send troops to Cyprus as part of a NATO peacekeeping force,

Attorney General Robert Kennedy happened to be in London and took the opportunity to discuss the British proposal. Although no action was taken to commit American troops, this was a first step in what was to become an extensive exercise for America in 'crisis management'.<sup>140</sup>

Henceforth, it will be the locus of this study to analyse this U.S. crisis management role in Cyprus.

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<sup>139</sup> Op.cit. Adams and Cottrell, p.56 and p.61.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. p.61.

## V. The 1963-64 Cyprus Crisis

Aristotle once remarked that the essential of a Greek tragedy is that it shows a change from prosperity to its reverse and it shows the change as a probable or necessary sequence of events. The political situation in Cyprus from 1960 to 1964 was somewhat akin to a Greek tragedy. On the whole, 1963 was a year of democratic stalemate and heightened tension as the shortlived *modus vivendi* between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots broke down. On December 21, 1963, not too long after Makarios' "proposed measures for facilitating the smooth functioning of the state and for the removal of certain causes of intercommunal friction"<sup>141</sup> of November 30, 1963, intercommunal violence flared-up on the island. Cyprus was, thus, once again set to be the scene of civil strife, albeit, with one added drastic consequence as compared to the fifties: it became an international question triggering an international crisis. In the fifties, the British could rightfully claim that "if Cyprus is not an international question which might have incalculable effects on relations in the eastern Mediterranean, it is simply because we, the British, are there,"<sup>142</sup> whereas in 1963 Cyprus was a vulnerable small Republic, no longer enjoying

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<sup>141</sup> Memorandum from the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios, to the President Kuchuk. November 30, 1963., in U.S. Dept. of State, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1963, Document IV-69, Released in 1967.

<sup>142</sup> The Marquess of Salisbury, 15 December, 1955, as quoted in C. Foley, LEGACY OF STRIFE: CYPRUS FROM REBELLION TO CIVIL WAR. London: Penguin, 1964.

the shield of British sovereignty as a safeguard against the development of a political power vacuum and the internationalisation of a civil conflict.

### The Early Phase

It is not the purpose of this study to examine in detail the events of December 1963 and provide an account of the incidents that sparked the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1963. All that need to be said in that regard is that "a trivial incident sparked the outbreak, but the timber was dry and plenty of fuel lay to hand."<sup>143</sup> On December 25, 1963, when the outnumbered Turkish Cypriots appeared to be overrun by the Greek Cypriots, Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey sent four jet fighters in token passes over the island as a reminder of the nearby Turkish presence. Additionally, President Gursel of Turkey dispatched a letter to President Johnson, in which he expressed his alarm at what he saw as "acts of genocide aiming at the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots"<sup>144</sup> and asked Johnson to do all in his power to stop this. The next day, on December 26,

<sup>143</sup> Op.Cit. Foley, p.166. See also, T.Ehrlich, INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW: CYPRUS, 1958-1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p.45.

<sup>144</sup> Message from the President of the Republic of Turkey, Cemal Gursel, to the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. December 25, 1963., in Op.Cit. U.S. Dept. of State, Document IV-70.

President Johnson sent a reply to Gursel, telling him that the U.S. was ready "to support any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful solution."<sup>145</sup> The same day, President Johnson also sent identically worded letters to President Makarios and Vice-President Kuchuk of Cyprus, in which he expressed his displeasure over the fighting between the two communities:

I hope and trust that tomorrow will find all Cypriots living at peace with one another and with the three nations which have special treaty responsibilities for the security of Cyprus.<sup>146</sup>

After the late night and early morning hours of 25-26 December that marked a point of climax due to the first Turkish intervention scare in the crisis,<sup>147</sup> the next few days saw a relative lull in intercommunal violence, with efforts being made by the guarantor powers to establish a cease-fire and the interposition of British troops between the warring Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, the diplomatic war at the UN Security Council heated up, and the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus set a precedent for what continues to this day as a bone of contention. The Greek Cypriots claim they represent the whole of Cyprus (i.e. both communities), and the Turkish Cypriots claim that the Greek Cypriots cannot represent them since they use the

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<sup>145</sup>H. Salih, CYPRUS: THE IMPACT OF DIVERSE NATIONALISM ON A STATE, U.S.: University of Alabama Press, 1978, p.35.

<sup>146</sup>Op.Cit. U.S. Dept. of State, Document IV-71.

<sup>147</sup>See op.cit. Foley, Chapter beginning p.166, for an account of the events of 25-26 December.

claim of being the Cyprus government as a cover-up for suppressing the Turkish Cypriots. On December 26, Makarios sent a telegram to UN Secretary General U Thant stating that his representative Zenon Rossides "is....., authorised to represent the Republic of Cyprus before the Security Council."<sup>148</sup> The next day, Vice-President Kuchuk sent U Thant a telegram stating that "any representation which Rossides may make....., be treated as illegal and unconstitutional."<sup>149</sup> At the UN Security Council session on December 27, Rossides complained of Turkish policy, by pointing out that he received a phone-call from his Foreign Minister who told him that the atmosphere on Cyprus was electrified and that the cease-fire was in danger because Turkish ships were sighted speeding toward Cyprus. In continuation, Rossides pondered as to whether

that was an act tending to pacify the people and keep the cease-fire or was it in effect electrifying the atmosphere and causing a breakdown of the cease-fire?....This gun-boat diplomacy....., even if there is not actually an invasion....., could not but be an invitation to disorder.<sup>150</sup>

The Turkish representative at the UN, Kural, replied to the Greek Cypriots' charge of gun-boat diplomacy in a very subtle manner, emphasising the proximity of Cyprus to Turkey.

Rumours have been circulated that some Turkish ships were heading towards Cyprus. I....., state officially and categorically that there are no Turkish ships

<sup>148</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Dept. of State. Document IV-74.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. Document IV-75.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. Document IV-76.



sailing toward Cyprus, and that any ships which might have been seen in the area are sailing from one Turkish port to another.<sup>151</sup>

As late as the end of December, 1963, at a time when harsh diplomatic exchanges were taking place between the Greeks and Turks, and there were violations of the cease-fire, with its breakdown at hand, Washington had told the Turkish government that it was "not a party to this issue".<sup>152</sup> Britain, as a guarantor power and as the power carrying the prime international responsibility for the Cyprus issue, was still the 'policeman' looked up to by the warring parties. British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys flew to Cyprus for purposes of mediation and was able to arrange a conference among the protagonists, scheduled for January 15 in London. Apparently heartened by Sandys' presence on the island, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's statement during a January 2, 1964 news conference was again very much in the 'we are not a party to this issue' vein; where Rusk stated that "at the moment [the U.S. was] relying upon the leadership of the two communities and the three guarantor powers to try to find an answer"<sup>153</sup> to the Cyprus problem. However, soon thereafter the U.S. was to step-up its role in an attempt to convey forcefully her desire for a peaceful solution to what President Johnson would later

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<sup>151</sup>Ibid. Document IV-77.

<sup>152</sup>See G. Harris, TROUBLED ALLIANCE, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976, p. 110.

<sup>153</sup>U.S. Dept. of State. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1964. Released 1967, Washington, D.C. Document IV-90.

refer to as "one of the most complex problems on earth".<sup>154</sup>

### The U.S. Becomes Involved

With the coming of the new year, the situation on Cyprus took a turn for the worse. On January 1, Makarios announced his intention to abrogate the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, in an attempt to rule out Turkey's constitutional right to intervene on the island and turn Cyprus into a unitary state (to dispense with the Turkish Cypriot veto power) with unfettered independence. In expressing the intent to abrogate the treaties of 1960 and the amendment of the constitution at large, the official stance of the Greek Cypriots - as articulated later at the UN - was that the

constitution was foisted on Cyprus....The combined effect of the constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee is that a situation has been created whereby the constitutional and political development of the Republic has been arrested in its infancy and the Republic as a sovereign State has been placed in a strait jacket.<sup>155</sup>

Under such circumstances, argued the Greek Cypriots, there was but no choice to regard the 1960 arrangements as anything but null and void. On his part, [the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Kuchuk was talking of the

<sup>154</sup> See T. Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus", ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, #401, 1972.p. 104.

<sup>155</sup>Op.cit. Ehrlich.p.46.

impossibility of the two communities living together, and in an interview given to LE MONDE, on January 12, he talked of partition as the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem. With such a wide rift in stances the London Conference was doomed to failure. In the aftermath of the conference Makarios admitted to having torpedoed the proceedings: "I preferred to let the conference fail slowly rather than refuse to be represented."<sup>156</sup> After the collapse of the conference, the British, who at the time were stretched in terms of manpower and resources in Aden and Malaysia, and were "in danger of being left indefinitely holding a very unruly baby and of being involved in a threatened Turkish invasion of Cyprus,"<sup>157</sup> turned toward seeking an American commitment to the issue. As mentioned earlier, the British proposed that a NATO peace-keeping force be established in Cyprus, with a sizeable U.S. contingent.

As a function of the increasing sense of alarm in Western diplomatic circles, as of mid-January, the major international institutional machinery for crisis management came into full play. At the UN, where the Security Council had been preoccupied with the Cyprus issue since late December, Secretary-General U Thant appointed Lieutenant-General Gyani of India as his personal observer in Cyprus. At the NATO headquarters in Brussels, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the NATO Council, Thomas

<sup>156</sup>See R. Stephens, CYPRUS-A PLACE OF ARMS :POWER POLITICS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. London:Praeger, 1966.p.187.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid. p.188.

Finletter, urged NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker to request full information from all parties concerned and to call an emergency NATO meeting as soon as it became evident that peace between Greece and Turkey was seriously threatened. In late January, NATO's Supreme Commander Lyman Lemnitzer --as President Johnson's personal envoy-- visited Athens and Ankara to alert both allies to the consequences of a Greco-Turkish war. The purpose of this personal appeal by the Western Alliance's highest ranking military figure (sanctioned by the President of the U.S.) was to stall Turkey, who was perceived to be on the verge of intervening in Cyprus, until an Anglo-American peacekeeping proposal was articulated.

Washington's view of the deteriorating situation in the eastern Mediterranean after the collapse of the January 15 London Conference, is best expressed by America's Undersecretary of State at the time, George Ball, who points out that the Cyprus problem presented eight 'complexities'. In three cases he uses the word threat to describe the complexities that had the most dire implications for U.S. national security. First, he states, the Cyprus problem threatened to lead to a Greco-Turkish war, and hence, second, it threatened to cripple the Western Alliance. Third, he states, it threatened to bring the Soviet Union into a strategic area, through exploitation of the intercommunal conflict.<sup>158</sup> "Watching from Washington, we

<sup>158</sup>See G. Ball. THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN. New York: W.W Norton, 1982, p.339.

could see that open warfare was imminent. Since the Turkish Cypriot population was suffering the greater casualties, Turkey was on the verge of intervening,"<sup>159</sup> contends Ball. As to whether Britain could be depended on, as in the past, to assume the role of policeman, Ball states that "London no longer had the will or resources to preside over such a conflict."<sup>160</sup> However, when British policy turned toward seeking a U.S. commitment to the issue, Ball contends:

I stated emphatically that the U.S. did not want to get involved; we already had far too much on our plate. I was sick at heart at our deepening involvement in Vietnam....., mounting troubles in Panama....., an irksome involvement in the Congo....., disputing with the Soviets over Berlin....., and foresaw mounting differences with Indonesia.<sup>161</sup>

The answer as to why the U.S. got involved in the Cyprus quagmire, despite great reluctance to do so, lies in the American policy-maker's perception of a dual threat, as made explicit by Ball: First, a Greco-Turkish war, and, as a consequence, the crippling of NATO. Second, Soviet intrusion into Cyprus, through exploitation of the civil strife on the island.<sup>162</sup> As Ball points out, the British were adamant they would no longer carry the Cyprus burden alone. Given this, the only alternative to U.S. involvement would be UN involvement. However, in Ball's perception, "involving the UN risked giving the Communist countries leverage in that

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<sup>159</sup>Ibid. p. 340.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid.

<sup>162</sup>Referred to below as threat Ia, threat Ib, and threat II, respectively.

strategically placed island [threat II]...., the UN would dither. The Turks would not wait [threat Ia.] ..."<sup>163</sup> On January Ball met with Robert McNamara to review the Cyprus problem. McNamara, as Secretary of Defence, was apt to see the problem in terms of its implications for America's defence posture; "that an exploding Cyprus could not only endanger [America's] Mediterranean position, but undermine the whole southern flank of NATO. [threat Ib]."<sup>164</sup> As to President Johnson's initial reaction, Ball states that, despite his great reluctance to see the U.S. involved, "he quickly grasped the seriousness of the Cyprus problem and directed me to come up with an acceptable solution."<sup>165</sup>

At a January 2 news conference, by way of signalling U.S. non-involvement, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had stated that the U.S. Sixth Fleet (very much a barometer of U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean) had been given no specific instructions regarding the Cyprus issue. The picture of a few weeks later, which suggests a growing awareness of the threat of a Greco-Turkish war and some attempt to head it off, is provided vividly by Charles Foley:

From his London Headquarters in Grosvenor Square, Admiral Charles Griffin, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval forces in Europe, was plotting the movements of the Sixth Fleet as it sailed into the stormy waters between Greece and Turkey.... His orders to Admiral James Russell, the U.S. Commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe, were to make sure that

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid. p. 341.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

the fleet did not blunder into Cyprus trouble; it was to 'show the flag' with such timing and discretion that its very presence would prevent war between America's good friends, Greece and Turkey.<sup>166</sup>

In late January, America's perception of the threat of a Greco-Turkish war was further reinforced by the U.S. Ambassadors to London and Ankara, David Bruce and Raymond Hare respectively. Ambassador Bruce advised Washington that they had no option but to participate in a NATO peacekeeping force, otherwise no other country would take action and the Turks would inevitably move. On January 28, Hare was told by Turkish Prime Minister Inonu that the Turks were going to intervene militarily unless the U.S. gave them some kind of an answer by the next morning. With the U.S. still holding back on a firm commitment, in their anxiety to commit the U.S., the British leaked to the press the substance of the NATO peace-keeping plan, putting the U.S. into the precarious position of being publicly committed although it was not officially so. Finally, however, on January 31, an official Anglo-American proposal of a NATO peace-keeping force in Cyprus was made. The major American input into the plan, which came out of the Ball-McNamara meeting of January 25, was the insistence on three conditions:

that the duration of the force be limited to three months, that the Greeks and Turks agree not to use their unilateral intervention rights for three months and that they agree on a mediator who was not a representative of any of the guarantor powers but from another NATO European country. Finally..... that the American contingent not exceed 1200 men,

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<sup>166</sup>Op.cit. Foley, p.174.

with the British agreeing to put in 4000 and the balance of 10000 to come from other European nations.<sup>167</sup>

For the U.S., the Anglo-American peacekeeping plan of January 31 marked its first entry into the annals of U.S. crisis management vis-a-vis Cyprus. The overriding American objective regarding the Cyprus conflict at this stage was simply to 'dampen the whole thing down'.<sup>168</sup> In this regard, it was in America's interest to find a solution to the Cyprus problem within the framework of the Western Alliance, so as to prevent the crisis from being exploited by the communists. The U.S. at the time, was concerned with the strength of the local communist party Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenon Laou (A.K.E.L) and President Makarios' foreign policy orientation which was to gain him the reputation in the West as being 'the Castro of the Mediterranean'. In addition to having extremely cordial relations with the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, and with Nasser of Egypt<sup>169</sup>, on the domestic scene Makarios was in political harmony with A.K.E.L, whose paramount aim was to turn public opinion against Great Britain and the U.S.

A.K.E.L, which has been described as "probably the largest

<sup>167</sup>Op.cit.Ball,p.341.

<sup>168</sup>This is the terminology used by Philip Stoddard during a personal interview with the author. Stoddard worked for the U.S. State Department during the 60's and 70's in different capacities: in the Near East Office and as Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Analysis for Intelligence and Research. He is currently the Director of the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C.

<sup>169</sup>Nasser pursued the anti-NATO policy of seeking the removal of the British bases in Cyprus, having not forgotten that they were used by the British against Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956.



non-ruling communist party in the world"<sup>170</sup> at the time, had polled almost 40 percent of the Greek Cypriot electoral vote in 1960 and was instrumental in arranging commercial agreements between the Republic of Cyprus and the Soviet bloc. A.K.E.L controls seven-eighths of the trade unions in the Greek Cypriot sector, and in that sector members of A.K.E.L hold major offices in city municipalities and have elected members seated in parliament. Conversely in the Turkish Cypriot sector, while there are communist sympathisers, communist party activities were outlawed beginning in 1964. A.K.E.L's political message or propaganda rhetoric, depending on where one stands politically, reaches the Cypriots through its daily paper *Haravghi* (Dawn), the weekly *Neoi Kairoi* (New Times), its journal *Politiki Epitheorisis* (Political Survey), the labour weekly *Ergatiko Vima* (Workers' Forum), the weekly for the youth front *Neolaia* (Youth), the afternoon paper *Democratia* (Republic), and the two monthlies *Nea Epochi* (New Epoch) and *Neos Democratis* (New Democrat).<sup>171</sup> A.K.E.L supports the independence and nonalignment of the Republic of Cyprus and is thus opposed to both *Enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) and *taksim* (partition). As such A.K.E.L staunchly supported the nonaligned foreign policy of President Makarios. Not surprisingly, being 'anti-colonial' and 'anti-imperial' in

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<sup>170</sup>See Thomas W. Adams, *A.K.E.L: THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CYPRUS*. California: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p.2.

<sup>171</sup>See Halil Salih, *CYPRUS: THE IMPACT OF DIVERSE NATIONALISM ON A STATE*. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978, pp.35-36.

stance, it worked domestically to defeat the Anglo-American plan by portraying it as an attempt by the U.S. and U.K. to pull Cyprus into the NATO orbit.<sup>172</sup>

It took Makarios, himself, only until February 4 to outright reject the Anglo-American proposal. The plan ran contrary to Makarios' policy of internationalising the Cyprus issue by keeping it in the public forum of UN diplomacy where he could count on nonaligned and Soviet support. In his rejection of the proposal Makarios stated the following:

The principle that an international force should be created and stationed in Cyprus is accepted. Such a force should be under the UN Security Council..... which is the only international organ created for and entrusted with the preservation of peace. The Anglo-American plan leads to the conclusion that it is intended that the proposed NATO Committee will assume the functions of the Government of the Republic.<sup>173</sup>

Shortly thereafter, on February 7, much to the chagrin of American policy-makers who feared Soviet opportunism, Khrushchev made an appeal for support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. In similar letters sent to the American, British, Turkish, Greek, and French Heads of State, Khrushchev called upon all states interested in the Cyprus dispute to exercise restraint and refrain from military intrusion on Cyprus.<sup>174</sup> In a note to the UN dated February 8, "Concerning The Question of Cyprus", Khrushchev

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<sup>172</sup> A.K.E.L. was already opposed to the presence of the Sovereign British bases on Cyprus.

<sup>173</sup> Op. Cit. U.S. State Dept. 1964. Document IV-93.

<sup>174</sup> See Ibid. Document IV-95.

charged that

certain Powers, flouting the principles of the UN Charter and the accepted standards of international law, are at present attempting to impose on the people and Government of Cyprus a solution of those Powers' own choosing to problems which affect only the Cypriot people. [These Powers are attempting to bring about] the de facto occupation by NATO armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus which is pursuing a policy of nonalignment with military blocs. <sup>175</sup>

In effect, then, Khrushchev was throwing his weight behind Makarios. One analyst of the Cyprus conflict puts the Soviets' opportunism and the Soviet-Makarios 'wedding' into perspective by stating that

The Soviet intent in the Middle East has been to extend its sphere of influence and weaken the southeastern flank of the NATO alliance; therefore, the Kremlin concurred with the demands of Makarios that any international peacekeeping force should come under the authority of the UN Security Council and warned all nations to against interference in the internal affairs of the Republic. <sup>176</sup>

The very same day of the Khrushchev note to the UN, "Concerning The Question of Cyprus", U.S. Secretary of State Rusk was offering a rationale for the stepped-up U.S. role in Cyprus. After stating that for a period of months the U.S. maintained that the Cyprus problem was a matter for the Cypriot communities and the three guarantor Powers to deal with, he contends that "there came a moment when it appeared that some new element would have to be injected into the

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<sup>175</sup>UN Security Council. Message dated 8 February 1964 from Mr. N. Khrushchev Addressed to the P.M of the U.K, Presidents of the U.S. and of France, and the P.M's of Greece and Turkey, Concerning the question of Cyprus. UN Doc. S/5534, 8 Feb.

<sup>176</sup>Op.Cit. Salih,p.36.

situation if an agreement could be reached".<sup>177</sup> The new element referred to by Rusk was the proposed presence of forces from NATO countries, including a sizeable American contingent.

Assignment--Eastern Mediterranean: The Diplomatic Mission Of U.S. Undersecretary Of State George Ball

Despite Makarios' rejection of the NATO peacekeeping plan and the Soviet Union's warning against it, the U.S. still favoured NATO involvement in Cyprus rather than UN involvement. For this reason, President Johnson dispatched Undersecretary of State George Ball on a diplomatic mission to the eastern Mediterranean to impress upon the protagonists the need for seeking a solution to the problem within the framework of the Western alliance and to bring Makarios around to the idea of accepting the Anglo-American plan. As of February 4, the date Makarios rejected the plan, Greece, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot community had accepted to back the plan. Evidence suggests that in the early phase of the Cyprus crisis, American decision-makers had been under the impression that they could achieve quick results in Cyprus<sup>178</sup> for a couple of reasons. First, because of American-Cypriot good will and Cypriot gratitude toward the U.S. for its economic and financial generosity toward

<sup>177</sup>Op.Cit. U.S. State Dept. Doc. IV-96.

<sup>178</sup>A point made by op.cit. Salih.

the Republic.<sup>179</sup> Second, generally speaking, 'Cyprus' as an exercise in crisis management was a new phenomenon for the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In other words, to use the language of organizational theory, there was no 'bureaucratic memory' where the Cyprus problem in its new form (i.e. as an international crisis) was concerned. Until then the U.S. foreign policy establishment had been accustomed to viewing Cyprus as a sideshow; solely within the context of America's relations with Greece and Turkey and with inadequate appreciation of the local political nuances. This would suggest that it must have been difficult for American decision-makers to see how they may not be able to get quick results in Cyprus, when they worked through their allies, Greece and Turkey, which as the guarantor Powers of the Republic and 'motherlands' of the respective ethnic communities in Cyprus, had considerable leverage in Cyprus. Initial American expectations could have been realised and the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis been terminated in early 1964 had it not been, above all, for the Makarios factor - an independent force in his own right and by no means under the control of Athens.

On February 8, marking the occasion of the start of the Ball mission to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, for discussing the establishment of a NATO peacekeeping force in Cyprus, Deputy Director of the Office of News, McCloskey, took the opportunity to reiterate America's approach to the

<sup>179</sup>Already described in the previous chapter while discussing U.S. policy toward Cyprus during the 1960-63 era.

situation in Cyprus. McCloskey pointed out that the U.S. welcomed the independence of Cyprus in 1960, had since maintained close and cordial relations with the Republic, and had followed with "sympathy and understanding" the efforts to resolve the problems that had arisen between the two communities in Cyprus. In continuation he contended that

in January, officials of the Government of Cyprus as well as the three guarantor powers indicated their desire that the U.S. play a more active role in the increasingly difficult Cyprus situation. In response, the U.S. has undertaken to explore ways in which it might usefully contribute to the reestablishment of peaceful conditions.<sup>181</sup>

Finally, McCloskey emphasised very strongly that the U.S. had "no preconceptions or preferences" where a final solution to the Cyprus problem was concerned and concluded by stating that the U.S., however, had "a major interest in the maintenance of peace in the eastern Mediterranean".<sup>182</sup> Hence, at this juncture the American concern regarding the situation in Cyprus was portrayed as one of a neutral and impartial global power with an interest in regional stability.<sup>183</sup>

In his memoirs *THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN*, regarding his mission to the center of conflict, Ball talks of having

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<sup>180</sup>See Op.cit. U.S. State Dept. 1964, Doc.IV-97.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> See Ibid.

<sup>183</sup>Ofcourse one could argue that there is a paradox here since being interested in regional stability - at all costs - meant that the U.S. could not be impartial. Indeed Makarios, AKEL, and the Soviet Union did not think so, but viewed the U.S. as trying to impose a NATO solution.

no illusions that he could easily shake Makarios out of his intransigence (his rejection of the Anglo-American plan). Ball's first stop, on February 9, was London, where he met Duncan Sandys to discuss how they could improve the Anglo-American plan's<sup>184</sup> 'marketability' and to tell him of the diplomatic strategy he would follow. What Ball basically had in mind was to use the stick of a Turkish intervention against Makarios, telling him that if he continued to block a solution that would eliminate Turkey's reason for intervening, he would be left alone to face the Turks in the event of an intervention. If Makarios finally turned Ball down, he planned to tell the guarantor powers to take the problem to the Security Council and understand that the U.S. would not contribute to a UN force.

After London, Ball went on to Ankara, where he met with Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. The Ball-Inonu meeting apparently flowed along smoothly since Ball had nothing but praise for Inonu; describing him as a Prime Minister with a "history and personality", a "legendary figure",<sup>185</sup> as providing "stability and strength" to Turkey, as projecting "force and conviction", and above all - diplomatically - being "direct in his approach".<sup>186</sup> Inonu's position was that, "so long as nothing was done to impair Turkey's right

<sup>184</sup> Later it was also termed the Sandys-Ball plan.

<sup>185</sup> Ismet Inonu is regarded by the Turks as being the most prominent public figure in the history of the Turkish Republic, second only to the 'Father of the Turks' and the founder of modern Turkey in 1923, Kemal Ataturk, with whom Inonu fought alongside during WW1 and the Turkish war of Independence in the early twenties.

<sup>186</sup> See Op.cit. Ball, p.343.

of intervention...., the Turkish government was prepared to go along with the Anglo-American proposal for a NATO force".<sup>187</sup> On his next stop, in Athens, Ball found that 'Greece had no government at all'.<sup>188</sup> Since the previous year when Prime Minister Karamanlis resigned because of a dispute with King Paul, there had been a succession of caretaker governments in Greece. The latest government was headed by Ionnis Paraskevopoulos, whose position was weak and who couldn't make any commitment to Ball. Most importantly, although the Greek government had initially accepted the Anglo-American plan, Paraskevopoulos reverted to telling Ball that Greece would not agree to any scheme that was not first approved by Makarios. Shortly after the Paraskevopoulos-Ball meeting, on February 19, there was to be a change of government in Greece, with George Papandreou becoming Prime Minister after an electoral victory. Papandreou was to take a stronger stand on Cyprus in support of Makarios, sending him a message on February 25 in which he was to assure Makarios of the solidarity of the Greek nation and government.

After his meetings in Athens and Ankara, Ball found that 'all roads lead to Nicosia/Makarios'. It was Makarios who would make or break America's effort to make the Cyprus issue a NATO responsibility. Thus, the highlight of Ball's mission came on February 12, when he arrived in Nicosia to meet Makarios. Ball came to the meeting having heard an

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>188</sup> See Ibid.p.344.



extremely negative appraisal of Makarios from the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson. Stevenson who had spent three days as Makarios' guest in 1963, talked about Makarios with vitriol, telling Ball that he "sat across the table from that pious looking replica of Jesus Christ..... and if you saw him with his beard shaved and a push-cart, you would recall the old saying that there hasn't been an honest thief since Barabbas".<sup>189</sup>

During his first meeting with Makarios, Ball was accompanied by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Joseph Sisco; his deputy, Jack Jernegan, and the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, Frazer Wilkins. Britain was represented by Cyril Pickard, the Acting High Commissioner in Cyprus. Ball describes the afternoon session of the first day as a 'bloody' one. He, and Cyril Pickard, spent the session by telling Makarios off (for the atrocities committed against the Turkish Cypriots) in 'a fashion remote from diplomatic exchanges'. As planned, Ball used the stick of a Turkish intervention against Makarios, telling him that "the Turks...., would inevitably invade, and neither the U.S. nor any other Western power would raise a finger to stop them".<sup>190</sup> Diplomatically speaking, the balance of the first day, as Ball told Rusk in a teletype conversation on the night of February 12, was that "a blow-up is exceedingly possible and that overwhelming pressure...., be brought on Makarios to frighten

<sup>189</sup> Ibid. p. 341

<sup>190</sup> See Ibid. p. 345.

him sufficiently to consider some move to halt the 'killing'.<sup>191</sup> Ball met with Makarios for the next couple of days but found that Makarios had no intention of accepting the Anglo-American plan. Instead, he relentlessly repeated that the Cyprus issue be submitted to the UN Security Council and that the UN guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. Through his discussions with Makarios, Ball came to regard Makarios' central interest as being to block-off Turkish intervention, "so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots,"<sup>192</sup> - an opinion he conveyed to Pickard. Given this conception, during the second day meeting Ball strongly denounced Makarios, telling him that the world would not stand idly by and allow him to turn Cyprus into his 'private abattoir'.

At the time Ball was in Nicosia, British Prime Minister Douglas-Home, and Foreign Secretary Butler, were in Washington paying a working visit to President Johnson. Prior to his last meeting with Makarios, on the third day, after a teletype conversation carried out with Johnson, Douglas-Home, Rusk, and Butler, Ball got their approval to propose a variant of the NATO force plan to Makarios. With this plan, which was somewhat reminiscent of an earlier scheme suggested by the ECONOMIST, Ball attempted to provide some link with the UN so as to satisfy Makarios. On February 1 the ECONOMIST had run a feature length article entitled

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

"Circle of Fear", asking the question as to whether a "UN umbrella over a NATO fire extinguisher [is] the right equipment for keeping the peace in Cyprus".<sup>193</sup> The idea entertained was that it would be better for NATO countries to provide peacekeeping forces since presumably they were more interested in ending the Cyprus crisis early, than would say the Finns or Swedes; yet, even though being a NATO force, it would be put under the authority of the UN Security Council. Makarios still rejected the idea.

On the last leg of his tour, Ball stopped over in London again on February 14 and began working on yet another scheme. Since he found that he could not go through Makarios, he devised a new plan in an attempt to go around him. What the new plan sought was the creation of a peacekeeping force not requiring the consent of the Makarios government. That meant working over Makarios' head by asking the three guarantor powers to take joint action by exercising their rights of intervention provided by the Treaty of Guarantee, an integral part of the 1960 constitution. This scheme had obvious parallels with NATO Supreme Allied Commander Lemnitzer's scheme. Lemnitzer, who had visited Athens and Ankara in late January, is said to have tried to impose de facto partition.<sup>194</sup> He reportedly urged Greece and Turkey "to disembark troops on the island which would have led to the landing of a NATO mixed force to

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<sup>193</sup>ECONOMIST, London:U.K, February 1, 1964, p.386.

<sup>194</sup>See S. Panteli, A NEW HISTORY OF CYPRUS. U.K.:East-West pubs., 1984, pp.358-59.

interpose itself between the two communities and confront Makarios with a fait accompli.<sup>195</sup> One might add that the Greco-Turkish forces landed would have been in addition to the British forces who were already in place on the island. In the end, Ball's final scheme never got off the ground. For one thing, it was difficult to get Greece and Turkey to work together in a tripartite policing action when their contingents were fighting each other in Cyprus. It was not Greek or Turkish rejection, however, that didn't give the plan a chance, but British rejection. In Ball's own words:

the British wanted above all to divest themselves of responsibility for Cyprus; my scheme would reinject them into the mess. As a result, I returned to the U.S. without anything clearly in place to stop a war.<sup>196</sup>

In the final analysis, it can be said that by mid-February, NATO had been 'sponsored and rejected'.<sup>197</sup> George Ball who had been sent to Nicosia to shake Makarios out of his intransigence regarding a NATO solution had failed. Evidently, Ball never forgave the Archbishop, for later (in 1969 after he had left the State Department) during a Brookings Institution conference he remarked, referring to Makarios, "that son of a bitch will have to be killed before anything happens in Cyprus".<sup>198</sup> Makarios had

<sup>195</sup>Ibid.

<sup>196</sup>Op.cit.Ball,p.348.

<sup>197</sup>See Philip Windsor, NATO AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT. London: ISS, Adelphi Paper No.14, November 1964, p.13.

<sup>198</sup> Though one might write-off such a remark as being the product of imagination on the part of conspiracy theorists of U.S. foreign policy toward Cyprus, the fact that Ball made this remark was confirmed to the Author by a Turkish Cypriot diplomatic representative in Washington D.C., 1986.

clearly won the test of brinkmanship. Despite recurring threats, an actual Turkish military intervention had not materialised and he had saved off Anglo-American pressure with a view to making Cyprus a NATO responsibility. Apart from the fact that he could count on Soviet and nonaligned support at the UN, Makarios had a number of other more specific motives for seeking refuge at the UN. First, UN intervention would insulate his government from a Turkish military intervention and rule out partition as demanded by the Turks. Second, making the UN directly responsible for the solution of the Cyprus problem would enable him to escape from the straitjacket of having to negotiate with the guarantor powers alone and NATO. Third, UN intervention would enable him to gather enough support to nullify, in due course, the 1960 constitution and pave the way for a unitary state with majority rule -- regarded by the Turks as amounting to Enosis.<sup>199</sup> It has been argued that, in evolving his tactics (i.e. seeking UN intervention) during the January-February phase of the crisis, Makarios, in fact, had the UN's operation in the Congo (1960-64) in mind, where the net result of UN intervention had been the bolstering of the central government in Leopoldville to the detriment of

<sup>198</sup>(cont'd) who maintains contact with sources close to Ball. Ball's remark has been used as prime 'ammunition' by Conspiracy theorists who have used it as evidence as part of a cause-effect link in U.S. foreign policy. The 'cause' being America's desire to neutralise Makarios because of his hindrance to the partitioning of Cyprus, which would draw Cyprus into the NATO orbit, and the 'effect' being the coup against Makarios by the Junta in Athens and the ensuing Turkish military intervention in 1974.

<sup>199</sup>See Op.Cit. Panteli, pp. 359-60.

secessionist Katanga. For Makarios, this meant that UN intervention in Cyprus would result in the bolstering of his government, which in the international forum he portrayed as the central and legitimate government of the Republic, to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriots who were portrayed as a rebel minority.<sup>200</sup>

### The U.S. Falls Back On The UN

After the failure of the Ball mission, U.S. policy, in line with British policy, turned toward working through the UN as the only other available course. At a news conference on February 14, given the imminent transfer of the Cyprus problem to the UN Security Council following a deadlock in negotiations, in response to the alleged U.S. fear of having the Cyprus problem brought to the UN, Secretary of State Rusk stated that the problem was not one of fear of having it discussed at the Security Council but to find a solution. He continued by stating that the U.S. thought a negotiated solution, along the lines of the Anglo-American plan, would be quicker.<sup>201</sup> The next day, on February 15, the British requested that the UN Security Council meet to consider the Cyprus crisis. Although the British government initiated the request for UN involvement in the issue, it also strongly

<sup>200</sup>For the argument that Makarios had the Congo model in mind when developing his tactics in Cyprus see the ECONOMIST (London), March 14, 1964, p.979.

<sup>201</sup>See Op.Cit. U.S. State Dept., 1964, Doc. IV-98

emphasised that such involvement, whatever the form, would not infringe on existing treaty rights. The British emphasis on the 'existing treaty rights' was due to the fact that they did not want the guarantor power status of Britain and Turkey to be jeopardised, given Makarios' inclinations to abrogate the treaties of 1960. On February 19, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, during a speech at the Security Council backed-up the British position by singling out the Treaty of Guarantee as being 'an integral part of the organic arrangements' that led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. He continued by reiterating that the Treaty of Guarantee was a 'basic article of the constitution of Cyprus' and that, as any other treaty, it could not be abrogated, nullified, or modified by the UN Security Council.<sup>202</sup> At this point, the U.S. was demonstrating sensitivity to Turkey's demand, as had been conveyed by Turkish P.M Inonu to Ball during their earlier meeting, that no diplomatic avenue be taken that would jeopardise Turkey's right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee.

During the same speech of February 19, Stevenson called for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force for Cyprus and the designation of a mediator to the Cyprus dispute. In the final analysis, the effect of Stevenson's address was the laying of the onus of the Cyprus problem onto the shoulders of the UN, in the person of its Secretary-General

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<sup>202</sup>See Ibid. Doc.IV-101.

U Thant. Hence, February 19 marked a decisive shift in U.S. policy, as compared to the earlier stages of the crisis, whereby the U.S. accepted that the Cyprus issue be taken from the intra-alliance setting of quiet diplomacy to the international public forum of UN diplomacy.

### The Cyprus Issue Becomes The Responsibility Of The UN.

After a couple of weeks of debate at the UN Security Council, on March 4, 1964, the Security Council adopted a resolution for the establishment of a peacekeeping force for Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the appointment of a mediator by Secretary General U Thant (Sakari Tuomioja of Finland was shortly thereafter appointed) to seek a political solution to the problem.<sup>203</sup> Hence, the resolution of March 4 envisaged both a peacekeeping and peacemaking role for the UN. At one and the same time, it would be an exercise both in 'preventive diplomacy'<sup>204</sup>, and, presumably when the tensions have been reduced, the UN would act as a third party intermediary in an attempt to terminate the conflict

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<sup>203</sup>The text of the resolution of March 4, which describes the UN's mandate, is printed in Op.Cit. U.S. State Dept. 1964, as Doc.IV-105

<sup>204</sup>As R.Stephens in CYPRUS:A PLACE OF ARMS- POWER POLITICS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ( New York:Praeger, 1966,p.192) points out "the essence of the peacekeeping philosophy which had developed under Dag Hammarskjold was that the UN could insulate a conflict and prevent its being aggravated by external intervention. It could also act as a buffer between the opposed local forces".



altogether. The spirit of preventive diplomacy was also evident in President Johnson's reply, on March 4, to the Khrushchev letter of February 7 where Johnson concurred with the need to avoid "the aggravation of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean" by not trying to "inflame passions from without". President Johnson also told Khrushchev that the Soviet government had misunderstood the motivation of the U.S.,<sup>205</sup> whose policy he defined as having been directed toward "one purpose alone, that of helping the Cypriots to restore a peaceful situation in Cyprus."<sup>206</sup> Again, on the same day, in a statement read at the White House, referring to the Security Council resolution adopted that morning, President Johnson said that he was "gratified by this action" and defined America's further role in the Cyprus crisis as one of complementing the UN mediator's efforts to find a solution.<sup>207</sup>

The March 4 resolution did not contribute to the reduction of tension on the island in the light of the fact that its adoption and implementation were two different matters. UNFICYP became operational later that month on March 27, but during the adoption-implementation time lag one of the high points of the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis was experienced. At 2 a.m. in the morning on March 13, the Greek Ambassador to Ankara was summoned to the Turkish Foreign

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<sup>205</sup> Indicating the Soviet charges in February, as especially voiced by the Soviet UN representative Federenko, that American policy was aimed at the NATOization of Cyprus.

<sup>206</sup> See Op.Cit. U.S. State Dept. 1964, Doc.IV-104.

<sup>207</sup> See Ibid. Doc.106.

Office and given an ultimatum letter, for Makarios (who happened to be in Greece at the time), indicating that unless atrocities against Turkish Cypriots ceased immediately Turkey would exercise its rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and take unilateral action in defence of the Turkish Cypriot community.<sup>208</sup> The renewed threat of Turkish intervention prompted a day of diplomatic flurry - where the Cyprus issue was concerned. The Makarios government swiftly rejected the Turkish claim to the right of unilateral intervention in Cyprus<sup>209</sup> and requested that the UN Security Council meet to avert the imminent Turkish intervention on Cyprus.<sup>210</sup> Greece, for its part, threw its weight behind Makarios by announcing its intention to intervene in Cyprus in the event of a Turkish intervention.<sup>211</sup> With the atmosphere in the eastern Mediterranean highly electrified, later that day, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon all states to refrain from any action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus,<sup>212</sup> and Secretary-General U Thant personally appealed to the Turkish Representative at the UN, Eralp, against a Turkish intervention on Cyprus, asking him to allow for time so that the March 4 resolution be implemented.<sup>213</sup> Evidently, the counsel of restraint had

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<sup>208</sup> An excerpt of this letter is printed in *Ibid.* as Doc. IV-107.

<sup>209</sup> UN Doc. S/5607 as excerpted in *ibid.* in Doc. IV-108.

<sup>210</sup> UN Doc. S/5598 excerpted in *ibid.* Doc. IV-109.

<sup>211</sup> UN Doc. S/PV.1103, excerpted in *ibid.* Doc. IV-111.

<sup>212</sup> UN Doc. S/5603 printed in *ibid.* as Doc. IV-112.

<sup>213</sup> UN Doc. S/5600 printed in *ibid.* as Doc. IV-110.

prevailed in Turkey, since Turkey refrained from taking action. Turkish Prime Minister Inonu, a very cautious and risk-averse man by nature, was very well aware that a Turkish intervention could leave Turkey isolated with very little support in the international community. As the *ECONOMIST* reported on February 22, Turkey was deeply worried about its lack of friends in the world and many Turks felt that "the constant threat of a Turkish invasion (was) better than an actual invasion whose consequences would be hard to predict".<sup>214</sup>

Despite the reports that began reaching the U.S. State Department on March 13, and continued to do so thereafter, describing the situation in Cyprus as "painful and on the verge of becoming catastrophic",<sup>215</sup> the U.S. had not made any diplomatic overtures to the eastern Mediterranean powers to the effect of counselling restraint. Nevertheless, as chronicled in Lester Pearson's memoirs,

President Johnson was so worried about the Cyprus situation that he telephoned Lester Pearson asking if the Canadian contingent for the UN force could be expedited, and Pearson replied that Canada knew its responsibility to the UN. The President seemed reassured and grateful.<sup>216</sup>

The next day a Canadian advance party for the UN force reached Cyprus and was to become the first contingent to

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<sup>214</sup>See the *ECONOMIST*, London, February 22, 1964, p.692.

<sup>215</sup>See E.Weintal and C. Bartlett, *FACING THE BRINK: AN INTIMATE STUDY OF CRISIS DIPLOMACY*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967, p.21.

<sup>216</sup>See Sydney Bailey, *HOW WARS END: THE UN AND THE TERMINATION OF ARMED CONFLICT: 1946-1964*, Vol.2; New York: Oxford Un. Press, 1982, p.683.

reach the island. On March 27, with other contingents having followed, UNFICYP became operationally established under Commander Lt.-General Gyani of India and Deputy Commander Major General Carver of Britain, and began to use its best efforts toward the prevention of the recurrence of intercommunal fighting and the restoration of law and order.<sup>217</sup>

Given the UN intervention in Cyprus in March and the American support for it,<sup>218</sup> the question one asks at this stage is that of the utility of the UN as an instrument of U.S. interests.<sup>219</sup> In turn this raises two analytic questions. First, when and why, if at all, does the U.S. (a national actor with, theoretically, multiple foreign policy options open to it) seek in a crisis situation to operate through the UN, -- an international, intergovernmental actor which epitomises the diplomatic track in international affairs? Second, to what extent does the UN's intervention contribute to American interests - effectiveness as an instrument of policy?

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<sup>217</sup>See U Thant's statement on the 'Objectives of the UN Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus', April 29, UN Doc. S/5671.

<sup>218</sup>Needless to say, the March 4 resolution was adopted with America's concurrence (i.e. no veto) and the U.S. contributed over one-third of the \$12.5 million needed to maintain UNFICYP.

<sup>219</sup>Considerable work has been done regarding this question. See especially, L. Bloomfield, *THE UN AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1967; R. Riggs, *U.S./UN - FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*, U.S.: Meredith, 1971; R. Russell, *THE UN AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY*, Wash., D.C.: Brookings, 1968; and F. Gross, "The U.S. National Interest and the UN", and G. Ball, "The UN and the Real World", in F. Gross ed., *THE U.S. AND THE UN.*, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1964.

One simple answer, regarding the first question, has already been provided in this study. With the British abdication of responsibility over the Cyprus issue in January, there was the need for a third force to control the Cyprus crisis and only the UN happened to be such a force that was acceptable to all parties to the dispute. After efforts to find a solution to the problem within a bilateral and regional framework had failed, by mid-February the U.S. had no alternative but to turn toward working through the UN in an attempt to 'dampen the whole thing down'. The decision to work through the UN represented a decisional tradeoff on the part of American policymakers. As mentioned, the Cyprus problem presented American policymakers with a dual threat: First, the threat of a Greco-Turkish war, which would have disastrous consequences for NATO, and second, the threat of communist exploitation of the crisis to gain influence in Cyprus. Attempting to avert the first threat by working through the UN raised the possibility of the materialization of the second threat; attempting to avert the second threat by keeping the Cyprus issue away from the UN, might have meant the materialization of the first threat. Evidently, U.S. policymakers decided that the threat of a Greco-Turkish war was more immediate and real than the threat of communist exploitation of the issue once it was taken to the UN,<sup>220</sup> and turned toward working through the UN. The scenario that created dread in the U.S. ever since the beginning of the

<sup>220</sup>A point made implicit by an ex-State Department official during an interview with the Author in May 1986.

Cyprus crisis in late December 1963 was that, intercommunal conflict on the island (with the Turkish Cypriots heavily outnumbered) would lead to Turkish military intervention; Greece would then move to defend the Greek Cypriots and a full-scale Greco-Turkish war would ensue. The American calculation as of late February, despite the anxiety felt over giving the Soviets a say in the issue, was that the UN would dampen the conflict on the island, thus eliminating Turkey's case for military intervention and thereby averting a Greco-Turkish war.

Another plausible, and somewhat conjunctional, answer regarding the first question lies in the 'clues' offered in an earlier address by George Ball. In a 1962 speech entitled 'The UN and the Real World', Ball had stated that U.S. interests were best served by "practicing at the same time bilateral diplomacy, regional diplomacy, and global diplomacy through the UN."<sup>221</sup> During his address Ball had expressed that he was at odds with those who viewed the matter as one of, it meaning that whenever the U.S. was seen to be practicing regional diplomacy (working through NATO) it was turning its back on the UN, as if policy options had to be pursued singly. For Ball, each policy option, by being used in concert with other options, could be seen in a complementary role. Hence, in this view it would have been surprising had the U.S. not turned toward working through the UN to contain the Cyprus crisis, since maximum

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<sup>221</sup> G. Ball in op.cit. Gross, p.307.

diplomatic impact could best be attained when a mix, a multiplicity, of policy options were used.

### UN Intervention And U.S. Interests

At the time of the commencement of UN intervention in Cyprus, judging the extent to which the UN would be effective in Cyprus depended on the degree of the two ethnic communities' convergence of expectations as to the role of the UN. However, even as the March 4 resolution (henceforth referred to as Resolution 186) was being adopted, the two ethnic communities had different interpretations of what the resolution meant. As reported by the ECONOMIST on March 7,

The Security Council resolution contrive(d) to give some satisfaction to both parties: to the Turks by specifically referring to the 1960 treaty, and to the Greeks by invoking Article 2 of the UN Charter which forbids member states to threaten with force the territorial integrity and political independence of any state.... The Turkish Cypriots (were) interpreting it as a rejection of the Greek attempt to set aside the treaties of guarantee, but the Greek Cypriots (were) triumphantly declaring that the resolution recognises the termination of the treaties to be unavoidable.<sup>222</sup>

Consequently, the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus had different expectations about the role of the UN operation. Makarios looked upon the UN force as "almost an adjunct of the security forces of the government of Cyprus", as "an arm of the Government of Cyprus". Turkish Cypriot

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<sup>222</sup> See the ECONOMIST, London, March 7, 1964, p.865.

leader Kutchuk, on the other hand, demanded that UNFICYP "should not regard the Cypriot Government or any acts taken by it as legal".<sup>223</sup> Such being the state of intercommunal affairs, the UN intervention did not contribute, initially at least, to the effective reduction of violence on the island. On April 4 Makarios denounced the Treaty of Alliance with Greece and Turkey; a move aimed solely at Turkey, since there was already an 'alliance' between Greece and the Makarios government. Shortly thereafter, Greek-Greek Cypriot solidarity reached its zenith, when during a visit to Athens, Makarios concluded a four-point agreement on principle with Greek P.M George Papandreou. It was agreed that a solution to the Cyprus problem would be sought only through the UN ; that the ultimate goal was to be Enosis; that every effort be made not to provoke Turkey; and that Greece would come to the aid of the Greek Cypriots should they be attacked by Turkey.<sup>224</sup> The Makarios-Papandreou agreements, with its echoing of Enosis and the decision for a Greek force build-up, served to further heighten the tension on the island as the beleaguered Turkish Cypriots looked toward Ankara in desperation. Throughout April there were renewed outbreaks of hostilities. On April 27, a month after UNFICYP had become operational, U Thant explained that

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<sup>223</sup>See op.cit. Bailey, p.684.

<sup>224</sup>In order that its commitment to Makarios be credible, was Turkey, the Greeks calculated that for their commitment to Makarios to be credible they had to ship arms and men to Cyprus before a Turkish attack. By mid-Summer about 20000 men were sent sent to Cyprus. See Andreas Papandreou, DEMOCRACY AT GUNPOINT, New York:Doubleday, 1970, p.132.



in spite of the presence of UN forces there had been 126 outbursts of shooting in the past month.<sup>225</sup>

Beyond the Cyprus scene, despite that NATO had been rejected as a forum for negotiation on the Cyprus issue, the North Atlantic Council<sup>226</sup> was at that point virtually the only forum where Greek and Turkish representatives got together around a table; as one would expect, expressing grievances about each other. In that regard, NATO served as a forum for the Greeks and Turks to 'vent off steam' and there were efforts within NATO to revive the Greco-Turkish dialogue. A result of this effort was NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker's 'watching brief' of May 1964; a vague framework for exploring points of agreement and disagreement among the antagonistic allies.<sup>227</sup> Also, at least one national actor to the dispute, Turkey, had not given up on enlisting NATO's intervention in the matter. On May 2, Turkey, who was increasingly frustrated over the events in Cyprus and America's unwillingness to take a firm stand in the matter for fear of alienating either of the allies, brought the Cyprus issue before the North Atlantic Council. Turkey invoked Article 1 of the 1949 North Atlantic treaty, which it interpreted as calling upon the allies to intervene in disputes concerning members of the alliance. Greece, on

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<sup>225</sup>As reported in op.cit. Pantelj, p.361.

<sup>226</sup>NATO's equivalent of the UN Security Council.

<sup>227</sup>Information gathered from Philip Stoddard's (currently, the Director of the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C.) unpub. manuscript, "The Impact of the Cyprus Crisis on NATO's Southeastern Flank", which he courteously made available to the Author.

the other hand argued that NATO had no legal right to intervene in the matter since the alliance was not founded for the purpose of tackling intra-alliance problems; an argument that stood up well in the North Atlantic Council. Thus, at that point NATO degenerated into a forum for Greco-Turkish tug-of-war on the legality of potential NATO involvement in the Cyprus dispute.

On May 6, at a time when the NEW YORK TIMES was sounding the warning that, despite UN intervention, the situation on the island was deteriorating,<sup>228</sup> Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was named as President Johnson's personal envoy to embark on a fact-finding mission in Athens and Ankara. He was asked by President Johnson to take a 'fresh look' at the international implications of Cyprus and to convey the sense of urgency felt in the U.S. regarding the restoration of order on the island.<sup>229</sup> The Johnson administration made it clear that Senator Fulbright was not visiting the eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of mediating, nor was he to offer suggestions as to the shape of a solution for the Cyprus problem. Despite allegations to the contrary, the U.S.'s official stand at that point, as it had been since the beginning of the crisis, was that it had no 'preferences or preconceptions' as to the shape of a Cypriot

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<sup>228</sup>See the NEW YORK TIMES May 6, 1964, p.26. Editorial by C.L. Sulzberger on the impending Senator Fulbright mission.  
<sup>229</sup>See C. Foley, THE LEGACY OF STRIFE, London: Penguin, 1964, p.185. and op.cit. Panteli, p.364.

settlement.<sup>230</sup>

It would appear that Senator Fulbright was rather ill-suited for fact-finding in the eastern Mediterranean. His political temperament and partiality were called into question, most noticeably by the Turkish press, during his visit.<sup>231</sup> Senator Fulbright was by political temperament a global strategist, interested in the 'big picture' and apt to see regional conflicts within the context of Soviet-American global rivalry, rather than a regional pragmatist sympathetic to local values and aspirations, and aware of the political, economic, cultural, and historic nuances and uniqueness of every region. As such he was apt at coming across to his hosts as a man with a 'superiority complex', with little tolerance of what he considered to be meager regional disputes. During his visit he rather typically is known to have remarked that the U.S. had a dozen other problems such as Cyprus, implying that most of them were more important.<sup>232</sup> Again rather typically, he pointed out to Turkish Premier Inonu on May 7 that the U.S. had given about a billion dollars in aid since 1945 for the purpose of enhancing Western security, but there was a lack

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<sup>230</sup>In February the Makarios Government had charged that the U.S. was 'privately' seeking the partitioning of Cyprus - a charge U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson had to deny in public. According to respected British journalist Charles Foley, by early May the U.S. had begun considering the idea of Enosis for ending the Cyprus crisis.

<sup>231</sup>For instance, I. Aslan, "Gerçek Pesinde Sohbet: Zengin Adamin Cilesi" (Fact finding through casual conversation: the rich man's burden), ULUS (Nation), May 10, 1964.

<sup>232</sup>See op.cit. Foley, p. 185.

of gratitude for "it appears that our friends and allies are seeing only their own problems, to the detriment of the security of the Western world."<sup>233</sup> In Fulbright's view, then, Greece and Turkey were acting irresponsibly in pursuing their national interests to the detriment of 'alliance interests'. In Fulbright's view, one way in which 'alliance interests' could presumably be safeguarded would be the union of Cyprus with Greece, with sufficient compensation to Turkey. According to respected British journalist Charles Foley, from Fulbright's talks came the idea that the

Turkish Cypriot minority should be encouraged to the Turkish mainland, with generous provision for resettlement. The Turkish government would also require compensation; perhaps it might be given in the form of a few strategic Greek islands off the Turkish coast or a rectification of the frontier in Western Thrace in Turkey's favour."<sup>234</sup>

During his visit to Athens and Ankara, Senator Fulbright had given the Premiers of Greece and Turkey private messages from President Johnson, the gist of which were a call for restraint on the part of the allies since a Greco-Turkish war was unacceptable to the U.S. Later that month, on May 13, during a speech at a NATO Minister's conference in the Netherlands, U.S. Secretary of State Rusk reiterated the same point. Rusk stated that war between Greece and Turkey was 'unthinkable' and used the occasion to

<sup>233</sup>See the NEW YORK TIMES, May 8, 1964, p.9.

<sup>234</sup>See op.cit. Foley, p.185. This idea never gained public notoriety, but came up within the Johnson administration later that summer as a possible solution to the Cyprus problem.

express America's commitment to the UN by stating that "NATO is not getting into the Cyprus question at all. It is for the UN."<sup>235</sup> Thereafter, however, there was to be a temporary lapse in the crisis management pattern that had emerged ever since the UN intervention in March; rather than play second fiddle to the UN, the U.S. was to provide a clearer application of American diplomatic power by engaging in Presidential peacemaking.

#### American "Heavily Involved Neutrality": President Johnson Takes A Hand

On June 2 the lingering Cyprus crisis reached a crescendo, when a critical message arrived in Washington from U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare in Ankara. The message informed the Johnson administration that the Turkish Security Council had decided, the night before, on military intervention on Cyprus. While on earlier occasions the question as to whether the Turks were bluffing or not remains, this time all indications were that the Turks were all set to intervene. The acquisition of the capability needed for a Cyprus landing and contingency planning had been proceeding since early 1964. Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff Memduh Tagmac had been given command of the landing force, whose objective was to secure a political and

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<sup>235</sup>See the NEW YORK TIMES, May 14, p.5 and May 15, p.16.

military beachhead' on the island. The Turks hoped this would give them a bargaining chip in the negotiations that were expected to follow immediately after the landing.<sup>236</sup>

Ambassador Hare's message was relayed to the State Department's Seventh floor to George Ball, who was acting as Secretary of State in Rusk's absence<sup>237</sup>. Before departing for Paris on June 4, where he was scheduled to meet with French President De Gaulle, George Ball advised President Johnson that only a strong personal appeal by him (i.e. Johnson) would forestall a Turkish intervention on Cyprus. President Johnson decided to heed Ball's counsel, and when Secretary of State Rusk arrived back in Washington he immediately began working on the draft of a letter for President Johnson's signature. Secretary Rusk, working with Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland and his deputy Joseph Sisco, produced what Ball referred to as "the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb".<sup>238</sup> Before leaving for France on the evening of June 4, having read the draft produced, Ball expressed to Rusk that it went far beyond his advice for a strong appeal by commenting: "this is the most brutal letter I have ever seen."<sup>239</sup>

On June 5 Washington dispatched to Ankara what has come to be known as the 'Johnson letter'. The letter, which from the Turkish perspective was an ultimatum, stated,

<sup>236</sup>See more on Turkish preparations, see op.cit. Weintal and Bartlett.

<sup>237</sup>Dean Rusk was on his way back from Nehru's funeral via Saigon and Honolulu.

<sup>238</sup>See op.cit. Ball, p.350.

<sup>239</sup>Ibid.

I wish to emphasise in fullest friendship and frankness that I do not consider such course of action (a Cyprus invasion) by Turkey, fraught with far-reaching consequences, as consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully in advance with us.....It is [not] appropriate for your government, in effect, to present a unilateral decision of such consequences to an ally.....I must, therefore, urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.<sup>240</sup>

The letter, then, repeatedly impressed upon the Turks the unenviable responsibility for the 'consequences' of an intervention in Cyprus, in an attempt to load the cost side of the Turks' cost-benefit calculus. In continuation, the letter made explicit what Washington viewed a Turkish military intervention as leading to: a Greco-Turkish war; uproar at the UN; the collapse of the UN role in Cyprus; and the slaughtering of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the island. Further, the letter continued,

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

And unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation, I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare for secrecy, and I must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and the UN Security Council. ....<sup>241</sup>

Despite the harsh tone that was deemed necessary to forestall a Turkish intervention, Rusk and his co-drafters, Cleveland and Sisco, were also well aware that the proud and

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<sup>240</sup>The text of this letter and also Turkish Premier Inonu's reply are in the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Summer 1966, pp.386-83.

<sup>241</sup>Ibid.

sensitive Turks might react negatively to excessive American pressure. Therefore, they attempted to cushion the blow through yaglamak.<sup>242</sup> After citing the esteem in which Turkey is held in the U.S., by talking of Turko-American "solidarity" in resisting Communist expansionism and how Turkey is considered as a "great ally" whose security and prosperity are of "deep concern" to Americans, the letter began to wind down with a general definition of American policy toward Cyprus.

You may consider that what I have just said is much too severe and that we are disregarding of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves privately and publicly to assure the safety of the Turkish Cypriots and insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest on the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible you feel in Ankara the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens, and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Makarios.<sup>243</sup>

The letter concluded by inviting Turkish Prime Minister Inonu to Washington for a discussion of the Cyprus issue.

The Johnson letter was a watershed in Turko-American relations. It led to bitter resentment and a sense of betrayal in Turkey,<sup>244</sup> hence, creating a sharp divide between the two allies. America's questioning of NATO

<sup>242</sup>Turkish expression literally meaning 'greasing' - for an attempt by one that is very visibly and very much evident to the other, to bolster the others ego.

<sup>243</sup>Op.cit. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.

<sup>244</sup>As George Harris, TROUBLED ALLIANCE, ( U.S.:AEI, 1972 )pp.115-116, points out, to make matters worse, distorted versions of the Johnson letter leaked into the Turkish press almost immediately, generating profound popular reaction.



support if a Turkish intervention, should lead to a Soviet attack against Turkey was particularly difficult for the Turks to come to terms with. Turkish Premier Inonu was compelled to conclude that "there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature of the basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance."<sup>245</sup> Subsequently, there began in Turkey an extensive reevaluation of Turkey's role in the Western Alliance, and a move toward a more independent and diverse policy from and beyond NATO -- a "foreign policy with a personality".<sup>246</sup> A leading Turkish foreign affairs specialist, has expressed the view regarding Turkey's change in its foreign policy orientation that the "first awakening began with the commencement of the Cyprus conflict."<sup>247</sup> Esmer attributes this awakening to one incident: "President Johnson's letter written in bad taste and form to P.M Inonu and his threatening of Turkey with the possibility of Soviet retaliation has compelled Turkey to revise its foreign policy orientation." Similarly, Ferenc Vali in his BRIDGE ACROSS THE BOSPHORUS (probably the most renowned English language text on Turkish foreign policy) has argued that President Johnson's "undiplomatic" and "unwise" letter to Inonu moved the Turkish leaders to "search for a new orientation".<sup>248</sup>

<sup>245</sup> See Ibid. p. 115.

<sup>246</sup> This included a rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the mid-60's. See H. Ulman and R.H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns In Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967", ORBIS, Fall 1967.

<sup>247</sup> Ahmet Esmer quoted in M. Tamkoc, THE WARRIOR DIPLOMATS, U.S.: University of Utah Press, 1976, p. 283.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

While Ankara was simmering over the Johnson letter, on June 9, Undersecretary Ball, who was in Geneva for an UNCTAD<sup>249</sup> conference, received a telephone call from Secretary of State Rusk telling him "the President is worried about Cyprus and wants more action there".<sup>250</sup> Rusk, shortly thereafter, instructed Ball to abort his plan of flying back to Washington, and instead proceed to Athens and Ankara. Ball's mission was to once again remind the allies that the U.S. would not permit a war between them and to bring them around to a summit meeting on the Cyprus issue; one that did not involve Makarios. Above all, Ball's most immediate objective was to be the securing of an acceptance on the part of the allied Premiers to visit Washington later that month for a discussion of the Cyprus issue.

Undersecretary Ball arrived in Athens on June 10 for talks with Greek P.M. George Papandreu. For Ball, and hence from the perspective of American interests, Papandreu turned out to be a disappointment. Ball regarded Papandreu, aged 77, as "old, tired, and incapable of facing reality... too feeble to grasp a fresh idea" and above all as "lacking the force to make hard decisions"<sup>251</sup>, which led Ball to conclude that he wouldn't be of much help in solving the Cyprus problem. Papandreu told Ball that Greece wanted a solution in Cyprus based on Enosis; Ball rejected this as "total fantasy". Then, Papandreu attributed the turbulence

<sup>249</sup>Abbreviation for, United Nations Conference on Trade And Development.

<sup>250</sup>See op.cit. Weintal and Bartlett, p.25.

<sup>251</sup>See op.cit. Ball, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN, p.353.

in Cyprus to the threats of Turkish intervention, an argument again rejected by Ball as being "a simplistic explanation of a complex problem of causality".<sup>252</sup> The Greek P.M.'s position on the Cyprus issue led Ball to define Greece's policy as one of pursuing Enosis, while counting on the U.S. to avert a Turkish intervention. Hence, Ball told Papandreou that a Turkish intervention had most recently been averted only as a result of President Johnson's strong personal appeal to Turkey, something the U.S. was no longer in a position to do. Papandreou did not take the warning too seriously. Evidently, the lesson the Greeks learned from the repeatedly aborted Turkish intervention plans when faced with U.S. pressure was what President Johnson was telling them all along: the U.S. would not permit a war between Greece and Turkey, and by implication would not permit a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Just as the Turks had done after the Johnson letter, Papandreou reacted to Ball's warning by questioning what the nature of the Western Alliance was if "the U.S. [would] sit back and let a NATO member, armed and financed by NATO, attack a NATO ally".<sup>253</sup>

Despite that the meeting highlighted a number of disagreements between the Greek and American positions on the Cyprus issue, Ball came away from Athens with one positive note, The Greek Premier had agreed to visit Washington later that month for a discussion of the Cyprus problem. Papandreou, however, was very careful not to

<sup>252</sup> Ibid.

<sup>253</sup> See op.cit. Papandreou, DEMOCRACY AT GUNPOINT, p.133.

undercut Makarios, and hence insisted that he would visit Washington on the condition that his visit would not be interpreted that he would be willing to meet Inonu and bypass the UN. He was afraid that direct talks with Inonu would suggest that the Cyprus issue was a Greco-Turkish affair and his meeting with President Johnson could be interpreted to mean that Cyprus was a NATO problem.

The next day, on June 11, Undersecretary Ball arrived in Ankara for a meeting with Turkish Premier Inonu. Ball arrived in Ankara with considerable anxiety over what effect the Johnson letter had on the Turkish psyche. Ball's fears were not put to rest when, during a briefing, Ambassador Hare relayed to him the remarks of a senior Turkish diplomat: "we understand why it may have been necessary to administer such a bitter pill, what we don't understand is why it had to have such a bitter coating as well."<sup>254</sup>

Despite the Johnson letter however, which resulted in Inonu's cooler reception toward him than their previous encounter in February, Ball once again found the Turks easier to work with. At that point, there was at least some symmetry in Turkish and American policy. Both wanted the Cyprus problem to be settled immediately and definitively. Greece, by contrast, could afford to let time take its toll since it did not share the Turkish anxiety of having its compatriots being repressed (viz. Turkey's concern for the Turkish Cypriots). Turkey, of course, wanted a solution that

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<sup>254</sup>Quoted in op.cit. Weintal and Bartlett, *FACING THE BRINK*, p. 27.

safeguarded its strategic interests and the well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus and was aware of the power political reality in the eastern Mediterranean,<sup>255</sup> that any solution to the Cyprus problem had to take into account Turkish interests. Unlike Papandreou, Inonu accepted a Greco-Turkish summit for the purpose of discussing the Cyprus problem, and readily accepted Ball's invitation to visit Washington without insisting on assurances that his visit wouldn't be misinterpreted. When Ball returned to Washington the next day,<sup>256</sup> he was taken directly to the White House where the dates of the Greek and Turkish Premiers' visits were confirmed: Inonu was to visit Washington on the 22nd and Papandreou on the 24th of June. Hence, as the headlines of one reputable newspaper went, President Johnson's much sought 'Cyprus showdown' was all set.<sup>257</sup>

Why was the Johnson letter issued and why the subsequent efforts to get a Presidential peacemaking process underway? The Johnson administration presumably had given up on both NATO and the UN as forums for a Cyprus settlement. The U.S. seemed to want to revive interest in the tripartite

<sup>255</sup> i.e. The reality of the regional balance of power. Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, was strategically located 40 miles south of Turkey. Turkey had defined it as a 'do or die' matter of vital interest that Cyprus would never be allowed to become a Greek island; and if that appeared to be the case, Turkey could easily project its military power into the Cyprus scenario while the more distant Greece would not be able to do so.

<sup>256</sup> Rather the same day, since due to time difference it was still June 11 in Washington.

<sup>257</sup> See the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 18, p.1, "Johnson Seeks Cyprus Showdown".

guarantor machinery, with the U.S. added to Britain (and one might add, in effect, substituting for Britain), Greece, and Turkey.<sup>258</sup> In the words of Robert Brunn of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,

The Americans decided that the time had come to move in fast and deep if things in Cyprus were not to deteriorate again. What the American policymakers had seen again was that the UN has many masters. At this juncture a clearer application of power was seen as the need... So President Johnson is deep in an intricate but open maneuver, bringing the Greek and Turkish Premiers to the sanctum of unrelenting persuasion.<sup>259</sup>

By that point in time the U.S. policy of 'heavily involved neutrality' began to take its toll on America's relations with its eastern Mediterranean allies. The U.S. in trying to be impartial for fear of being perceived by either ally as tilting toward one to the detriment of the other, was in fact being rebuked by both. The Greeks, generally, looked upon the U.S. as pursuing a pro-Turkish policy since it was claiming the validity of the 1959 Zurich-London treaties and thereby not supporting self-determination for the Greek Cypriot majority. The Turks, generally, looked upon the U.S. as pursuing a pro-Greek policy since it was not taking a strong stand on the matter, thus allowing the Greeks to inch toward control over Cyprus, and pressuring Turkey to refrain from armed intervention in Cyprus. Now, both allies had questioned the nature and basic principles

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<sup>258</sup>This is the view expressed by op.cit. Stoddard, Interview with Author and unpub. manuscript.

<sup>259</sup>See R. Brunn, "Johnson Seeks Cyprus Showdown", CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 18, p.1. Emphasis added.

of the Western Alliance in reaction to American pressure. The U.S. was discovering, what holds true to this day, that when it came to the issue of Cyprus it was in the unenviable position of Odysseus sailing between Charybdis and Scylla.<sup>260</sup> Despite that, the two allies were perplexed by America's 'heavily involved neutrality', because the Johnson administration planned nothing beyond that for the Presidential talks with the Premiers. The U.S. was to offer no formula for a solution, nor commitment to either side. The U.S. goal was to arrange a Greco-Turkish summit, without the involvement of Makarios, in order that the Cyprus crisis would be ended quickly.

It has been discussed how it was the threat of a Greco-Turkish war which provided the immediate impetus for the American involvement in the Cyprus crisis, while the threat of Cyprus becoming a 'Russian Mediterranean satellite' was a relatively longer-term apprehension. With regard to the latter, despite the fact that the Cyprus crisis had developed cold war overtones in early February with Khrushchev's support for Makarios and warning to Western leaders to keep hands off Cyprus, this had subsided with the UN's intervention in March. After all, it was the very essence of the UN's doctrine of preventive diplomacy, as conceived and developed by Dag Hammarskjold, to contain the

<sup>260</sup>In Greek mythology, Charybdis and Scylla are two sea monsters who dwelt in caves opposite one another; hence, the analogy to neighbours Greece and Turkey antagonizing over Cyprus. Odysseus, the hero of Homer's ODYSSEY, had an anxious time whenever his ship sailed between Charybdis and Scylla.

cold war rivalry among the two superpowers from spilling into so-called peripheral areas. Indeed, the UN was able to play the role that it did in Cyprus, only because the superpowers decided that it was in their self-interest to limit their involvement in a dispute that might escalate. Nevertheless, as has been argued, the UN did not prove to be as effective as the parties involved, particularly the Turks, expected it to be. Thus, by mid-June Turkish P.M. Inonu was able to declare that the UN intervention had achieved "no active results".<sup>261</sup>

During May the UN mediator, Sakari Tuomioja, had met Makarios and on June 10 Turkish Cypriot leader Kuchuk to receive a briefing on their respective positions. In a nutshell, the respective positions on the Cyprus issue presented were that, Makarios denounced the 1959 Zurich-London treaties and expressed his desire for a unitary state based on majority rule. Kuchuk, on the other hand, regarding a unitary state as being tantamount to Enosis, and proceeding from the binding effects of the 1959 Zurich-London treaties, favoured a federal solution with the two communities separated physically but with a central administration. UN mediator Tuomioja came away from the meetings disheartened, reporting to U Thant that the two positions were "wholly irreconcilable" and did not even provide a basis for discussion.<sup>262</sup> On June 15, UN

Secretary-General U Thant presented the first detailed

<sup>261</sup> See the NEW YORK TIMES, June 19, 1964, p. 3.

<sup>262</sup> See op.cit. Bailey, HOW WARS END, p. 686.



report of the UN's operation in Cyprus since its intervention in March. In overall terms, he presented a "gloomy picture"<sup>263</sup> : there were recurrent outbreaks of hostilities and a political solution was not in sight.<sup>264</sup> It was clear to American policymakers, therefore, that the UN was not sufficiently dampening down the Cyprus crisis and, as its corollary, was not fulfilling effectively its preventive diplomacy role of containing the possibility of Superpower (viz. Soviet) intrusion into the conflict. As long as the Cyprus crisis festered, American policymakers feared that with Makarios and AKEL on the local scene a sudden turn of events might lead to the 'Cubanization' of Cyprus.<sup>265</sup> As Robert Brunn of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported on June 18,

U.S. policy for Cyprus is to be sure that no Cuba' is suddenly plunked into the middle of the Mediterranean.... Dropping all diplomatic trappings the Americans say the Soviets see the Cypriot political maze as 'made to order for a Communist takeover'.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>263</sup>As reported by the NEW YORK TIMES on June 16, 1964.

<sup>264</sup>UN Doc. S/5764.

<sup>265</sup> American policymakers exhibited what is one of the defining characteristics of crisis behaviour: a sense and fear of losing control over the course of events.

<sup>266</sup> See op.cit. Brunn, "Johnson Seeks Cyprus Showdown". The American policymakers' fear of the 'Cubanization' of Cyprus was confirmed to the Author by Thomas Adams during a telephone interview. Adams is the American author with the greatest number of publications on the Cyprus issue and was the Dept. of Defense's foremost expert on the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis. His publications include, CYPRUS- AN AREA HANDBOOK, prepared by the Pentagon in 1964; CYPRUS- BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, 1968; AKEL IN CYPRUS, 1972; and several articles in periodicals.

Johnsonian Diplomacy And The Return Of The Cyprus Deadlock  
To The UN

On June 22, Turkish P.M. Inonu met with President Johnson. The talks between the two leaders have been described as "straightforward".<sup>267</sup> His meeting with the Turkish P.M. was not the show-up that President Johnson had been seeking. The Turks had already indicated that they were willing to participate in a summit meeting with the Greeks for the purpose of discussing Cyprus, thus, Inonu was not the part of the 'Cyprus knot' that President Johnson had to loosen.<sup>268</sup> It was Papandreou who would not agree to direct talks with Inonu, and therefore to whom pressure and all the trappings of Presidential persuasion had to be applied. At the end of the Johnson-Inonu meeting a joint communique was issued which stated that the talks had proceeded "from the present binding effects of existing treaties".<sup>269</sup> From the Greek perspective the statement manifested a clearly pro-Turkish line of policy, since Makarios and Papandreou had been arguing that the 1959 Zurich-London treaties were no longer valid. This resulted in an uproar by the Greeks and set the tone for the June 24th Johnson-Papandreou meeting which was expected to be tough. On June 24, President Johnson opened the talks by stating America's position.

<sup>267</sup> See op.cit. Ball, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN, p. 355.

<sup>268</sup> See the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 29, 1964, p. 3.

<sup>269</sup> The communique is printed in op.cit. U.S. State Dept., AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY..., 1964 as Doc. IV-123.

It was faced by the possibility of a confrontation between two allies. It could not take the side of either, and it could not afford to stop Turkey once more from intervening.... It had done so already on a number of occasions. He did not have a formula for the solution of the problem. Such a formula could be found, though, by direct talks between the two interested parties Greece and Turkey. Inonu was still in the U.S. Would George Papandreou be ready to meet him?<sup>270</sup>

This was all but a reiteration of what Ball had told Papandreou earlier that month in Athens. Again, in order not to undercut Makarios, Papandreou declined the American suggestion for a Greco-Turkish summit. Faced with Papandreou's obduracy, the American diplomatic machinery shifted into high gear. On June 25, Secretary Rusk visited Papandreou. In a cool and business-like manner, Rusk urged Papandreou to follow President Johnson's prescription and accept a Greco-Turkish summit. The next evening, during a dinner at the residence of the Greek Ambassador, Secretary of Defence McNamara brought up the military angle of the matter by reminding Papandreou that Turkey had a powerful air force and if a confrontation were to take place between Greece and Turkey, the Turkish planes would literally burn-up the Greek countryside. Also present at the dinner was former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson was somewhat of a legendary figure in Greece and Turkey because of his role in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, and the Johnson administration felt that bringing 'the cold warrior' himself into the picture might be useful under the

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<sup>270</sup>See op.cit. Papandreou, DEMOCRACY AT GUNPOINT, p. 134.

deadlocked circumstances.<sup>271</sup> Acheson made no open gambit to Papandreou, but instead allowed his 'self-confident presence' to make its own impact.<sup>272</sup> The style of American diplomacy, as exemplified by the Rusk and McNamara approaches, did not go down well with the Greeks. They came to regard the whole American diplomatic effort as a "brainwashing operation" and an exercise in "sledge-hammer style" of diplomacy.<sup>273</sup> Papandreou publicly accused the U.S. of trying to arrange a Greco-Turkish summit through the deliverance of ultimatums to Greece.<sup>274</sup>

On June 26, in an attempt to circumvent Papandreou's objection that there was to be no direct Greco-Turkish talks, the seasonable Ball proposed that a Greek representative meet, separately from the Turkish representative, with Dean Acheson at Camp David. Papandreou, again, declined such an arrangement since it bypassed the UN; but implied that he might agree to such a pattern of

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<sup>271</sup> The Truman doctrine is of course best known for having heralded the start of America's policy of containment, but it essentially began with a declaration of American commitment to defend Greece and Turkey against perceived Soviet expansionism. Truman proceeded to announce an open-ended commitment to defend all free peoples of the world against communism. The term 'cold warrior' is used by American authors to drive home the point that Dean Acheson was the architect of America's cold war policy.

<sup>272</sup> In his memoirs, *op.cit.* DEMOCRACY AT GUNPOINT, p.135., Andreas Papandreou regards Acheson as being confident to the point of narcissism. They met for the first time on June 25 on the President's yacht, when Acheson was accompanied by McNamara.

<sup>273</sup> See *Ibid.*, pp.134-36.

<sup>274</sup> For excerpts from the public stenographic record of talks between Papandreou and Rusk, where Papandreou accused the U.S. of delivering ultimatums to Greece, see John Katris, *EYE WITNESS IN GREECE*, U.S.:New Critics, 1971, p.149.

negotiations should the UN be willing to supervise them. In other words, Papandreou would agree to Greek and Turkish representatives meeting separately with UN mediator Tuomioja. The same day, Ball flew to New York to secure U Thant's acceptance of UN supervision for such a pattern of negotiations, with the expectation that Acheson would be on hand during the negotiations. U Thant decided that Geneva would be a better site for such talks than Camp David, and objected to Acheson's presence during the negotiations for fear that it might imply that the U.S. was taking the diplomatic initiative away from the UN. The Secretary-General was anticipating Soviet charges that the Geneva negotiations were 'made in America' and that Tuomioja was being bossed around by Acheson. U Thant told Ball that Acheson could set himself up in 'the next room or next building', so to speak, and act as an observer and consultant rather than an associate mediator. Despite balking over Acheson's relegation to the wings, Ball reported to President Johnson that Geneva with UN mediation was better than nothing, since official American mediation was not accepted, and that Acheson, even if in the wings, could make himself felt at Geneva. By June 27, while both Inonu and Papandreou were still in New York, Ball's plan had been submitted, discussed, moulded, and accepted by the UN Secretary-General and, subsequently, by Greece and Turkey.

With the road set for Geneva, a new and very significant development was taking place on Cyprus itself.

That summer the legendary George Grivas, head of the EOKA guerilla organization which spearheaded the struggle for Enosis in the fifties, had returned to the island from Greece for the purpose of organizing the armed Greek irregulars. Grivas, as the symbol of the Greek struggle for Enosis was a very powerful figure in Cyprus and had brought with him a plan for the attainment of Enosis. The Grivas plan sought the union of Cyprus with Greece, while providing protection for Turkish Cypriots remaining on the island and compensation for those wishing to leave. Further, the British bases on the island were to be turned over to Turkey. Most importantly, the Grivas plan implicitly provided for the ouster of Makarios who was opposed to any foreign bases on Cyprus. Since the Grivas plan appeared to parallel American interests with its features of ending Greco-Turkish discord and the ouster of Makarios, that summer the U.S. established an underground contact with Grivas' chief lieutenant Socrates Iliades.<sup>275</sup> Hence during July, while the U.S. was publicly supporting the UN mediation effort in Geneva and the now famous Acheson Plan was taking shape, the 1963-64 crisis also featured a clandestine venture by the U.S. into the personal relationship (~~viz.~~ hostility) of the two Cypriot legends: Makarios and Grivas.

With Grivas added to the Cypriot political terrain as a third force, in addition to the Makarios government and the

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<sup>275</sup>See op.cit. Ball, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN.

Turkish Cypriot community, on the eve of the Geneva negotiations set to begin on July 8 the NEW YORK TIMES put the Cyprus crisis into perspective, excellently summarising most of what had to be said regarding the matter at that juncture.

It is seven months since the present Cyprus crisis started and it is getting worse not better...Turks see no way of stopping Makarios if he insists on ignoring his obligations under the Zurich-London pacts, except by landing troops on Cyprus, as provided under those pacts....Inonu feels he cannot permit a situation so disadvantageous to Turkey to continue indefinitely...Athens is now slowly but immutably taking over power in Cyprus. It has sent Grivas to create a Cypriot armed force...Grivas is not a great friend of Makarios and is clearly responsible to Athens alone. As each day passes, while the UN debates the problem, the Greeks inch toward ultimate control of Cyprus.<sup>276</sup>

### The Acheson Plan

On July 8 the Geneva negotiations began. In Cyprus, Makarios was seething over American diplomatic involvement in the Cyprus dispute and his expulsion from Geneva; he charged that the U.S. was trying to impose a settlement on the Cyprus government. It is a matter of semantics to argue whether the U.S. was trying to 'impose' or 'effect' a settlement, but the latter was certainly the American objective. Earlier, in late June, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR carried an editorial pondering the question as to

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<sup>276</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, "Cyprus- The Margin Narrows", July 4, 1964, p. 12.

whether there was a "Drastic Solution For Cyprus[?]" in the making. Describing how diplomats felt a sense of futility when considering the Cyprus problem, Mario Rossi went on to point out that there was a feeling in Washington that unless something drastic was done "the UN may end up staying on the island for an indefinite period.... A solution can be enforced by an outside party capable of bringing the necessary pressure to bear... Washington could be such a party".<sup>277</sup> Hence, the reason why Undersecretary Ball told U Thant on June 26, when U Thant objected to Acheson's presence at Geneva, that if a settlement was to be effected then there was the need for 'American authority'. Indeed, such appeared to be the case in mid to late July. By that time the now famous Acheson Plan had taken shape and both Greece and Turkey had initially accented it as a basis for further discussion (though they later retracted). The Acheson Plan, in summary, called for the union of Cyprus with Greece in return for the cession of the small Aegean island of Kastellorizon to Turkey, resettlement and compensation for Turkish Cypriots wishing to emigrate, two enclaves on Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots who wished to remain, and the establishment of a Turkish military base.<sup>278</sup>

<sup>277</sup>Mario Rossi, "Drastic Solution For Cyprus?" , CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 24, 1964, p.2.

<sup>278</sup>It should be noted that there are different versions of the Acheson Plan printed for it evolved over July and August in a piecemeal manner. Notwithstanding the distorted versions that appeared in the local-regional press, there are basically two versions: an original/initial one and a revised one. The version summarised here is the original one as printed in op.cit. Ball, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN; Weintal and Bartlett, FACING THE BRINK; and Adams and



In Acheson's own words, the plan essentially was to give Greece its desired Enosis but also to provide for Turkey,

..... a military presence unhampered by the need for tripartite consent at every turn. A sequestered base for ground, air, and sea forces not only could be a defense for Cyprus but prevent its being used hostilely against Turkey, could defend the sea approaches to the south Turkish seaports, and be a constant reminder on the island of Turkish presence and interest.<sup>279</sup>

Makarios saw the Acheson Plan for what it was: not Enosis, as presented to the Greek public at large, but rather 'double Enosis' (partition), an arrangement whereby Greek Cypriots would all be resettled in one part of the island and Turkish Cypriots in another (albeit on a less sizeable territory), while each would come under the sovereignty of its respective metropolitan power.<sup>280</sup>

Makarios was shrewd enough to read between the lines and grasp the implications of the Acheson Plan; the end of an independent, nonaligned Cyprus and, consequently, his reign in power. Therefore, the Makarios government began to fear that so strong were Greece's alliance interests that it might come to some arrangement with Turkey, under American pressure, to deceive the Greek Cypriots into abandoning their statehood. To add to the apprehension and confusion among Greek Cypriot ranks, during August when the Makarios government was pressing for the interruption of the Geneva

<sup>278</sup>(cont'd) Cottrell, CYPRUS - BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

Earlier A. Cottrell had not been indicated as co-author with Adams.

<sup>279</sup>Dean Acheson's address to the Chicago Bar Association, March 24, 1965. Quoted in op.cit. Adams and Cottrell.

<sup>280</sup>'Double Enosis' as defined by U.S. Undersecretary Ball.

talks, there were rumours which found their way into newspapers that the Greek forces in Cyprus would conduct a coup and proclaim Enosis on the basis of the Acheson Plan.<sup>281</sup> In August a senior Greek Cypriot politician, the then President of the House of Representatives, expounded the unacceptability of schemes along the lines of the Acheson Plan by stating that,

If union with Greece is to take place first and then Greece is to negotiate with Turkey what the rights of the Turkish community in Cyprus are going to be and whether there will be a Turkish or NATO base in Cyprus, then this is an unacceptable proposition...[For it would amount to] an attempt to force the solution of the Cyprus problem within the Western Alliance and to deprive Cyprus of the support of countries outside the alliance.<sup>282</sup>

Makarios himself, at this juncture was drawing a distinction between the unconditional union of Cyprus with Greece, or 'genuine Enosis' (which he statedly welcomed), and the various forms of condominium of Greece and Turkey over Cyprus which were being presented as Enosis (viz. the Acheson Plan/'Double Enosis').<sup>283</sup> The local communist party AKEL's reaction to the Acheson Plan was identical to and adopted from Makarios: 'genuine Enosis' versus 'double Enosis'. AKEL's General-Secretary Andreas Ziartides pointed out that,

... wearing the mask of the Enosist, the Anglo-Americans and their agents try to conceal

<sup>281</sup>See the WASHINGTON POST, August 27, 1964., and M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979, p.69.

<sup>282</sup>The WASHINGTON POST, August 24, 1964.

<sup>283</sup>The WASHINGTON POST, August 27, 1964.

their real policy which is the partition and enslavement of Cyprus to NATO.... What we want is national liberation and in Cyprus this means Enosis - but we want genuine Enosis and not the kind proposed by Acheson.<sup>284</sup>

It is clear, then, that U.S. diplomacy at Geneva was not aimed at the cooptation of Makarios, for the Americans knew that any form of Turkish (i.e. that of Turkey) presence on Cyprus was anathema to Makarios and that he was working to disrupt the Geneva talks, but rather toward Greece and Turkey. There was a widely held view in Washington that Turkey was being responsive to American peacemaking overtures but that Greece was not.<sup>285</sup> Thus, in the American scheme of things, at the Geneva juncture, Greece was the key variable. The U.S. was looking to Greece for two things: for Greece to accept the Acheson Plan and having done so to somehow deliver Makarios. Hence, throughout July and August U.S. pressure was, once again, brought to bear on Greece. By way of warming up to Geneva, on July 2 President Johnson sent Papandreou a very strong letter urging him to come to terms with Turkey. Though this letter was not of the same

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<sup>284</sup>Ziartides quoted in op. cit. Attaliades, p.115, and op.cit. Adams and Cottrell, p.22. Needless to say, as one can infer from AKEL's position, the Soviet Union was also negatively disposed to the Acheson Plan.

<sup>285</sup>The WASHINGTON POST, July 16, 1964. This is also the impression one gets on reading George Ball's memoirs, op.cit. THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN, where he hardly complained about Turkish policy in this regard, talking of the straightforwardness and likeability of Premier Inonu and how the Turks "could see the problem in its larger global context". By contrast, he regarded Papandreou as being "incapable of facing reality" and seemingly "incapable of comprehending the larger issues"; that "if the Greek leader had shown anything like the same understanding [ as Inonu ], serious progress could have been made".

calibre as the 'Johnson letter' delivered to Turkey earlier, Papandreou was enraged and called it an ultimatum. For the Greek Premier it was "more of the same" that he had heard from Undersecretary Ball in Athens and President Johnson in Washington in June.<sup>286</sup> Later in July when the Geneva negotiations got underway, Andreas Papandreou (son of the Greek Premier and a Minister in his cabinet) described "the American pressure on us to accept the Acheson Plan was unbearable".<sup>287</sup> The U.S. Ambassador to Athens, Henry Labouisse, and the U.S. Charge D'Affair, Norbert Anschuetz, were visiting Papandreou on a daily basis and pouring over maps of Cyprus. Also, at that point, the U.S. decided to pressure Greece by pinning the blame for a deterioration of the situation in Cyprus on the Greeks. During a NATO Council meeting in Paris on July 14, the U.S. representative at NATO, Thomas Finletter, told the NATO nations of Greek aggression in Cyprus; namely, that the Greeks were fuelling an arms race and exacerbating the crisis by pursuing a military build-up in Cyprus.<sup>288</sup> At the same time, UN Secretary-General U Thant was publicly condoning the Makarios regime for interfering with UN troop movement on the island.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>286</sup>Op.cit. Weintal and Bartlett, p.30.

<sup>287</sup> Op.cit. Papandreou, p.137.

<sup>288</sup>The WASHINGTON POST, July 16.

<sup>289</sup>UN S.C Resolution 186 of March had stipulated 'non-interference by the protagonists. The Makarios regime had sealed off the port of Limassol, hence not allowing UN troops into the vicinity, because troops and weaponry from Greece were being disembarked.

Was U.S. pressure on Greece bearing fruit, in the light of the U.S. objective to first secure Greece's compliance to the Acheson Plan and second for Greece to deliver Makarios? That Greece would be willing to pay some 'price' to Turkey in exchange for the union of Cyprus with Greece appeared for a while to be a possibility. Compared to Makarios, at least Papandreou was taking a more sanguine view of such a possibility. Writing to Dean Acheson, and referring to Acheson's warnings of the threat of communist takeover in Cyprus, he said

I agree with your view that this threat creates a common interest between Greece and Turkey which is greater than the exact lines we draw on a map [i.e. on Cyprus].<sup>290</sup>

As for the U.S. looking to Greece to deliver Makarios, any hopes entertained thereto were quickly dispelled. Papandreou was aware that he did not control Makarios, and duly pointed this out to Acheson in the mentioned letter. He told Acheson that the Greek Defence Minister had just returned from Nicosia and all he had succeeded in doing was the postponement of the projected visits of the Cypriot Foreign Minister to Moscow and of Makarios to Cairo. Further, he pointed out to Acheson, Makarios had told the Greek Defence Minister that he not only opposed the establishment of a Turkish base in Cyprus (as envisaged in the Acheson Plan) but would also work for the abolition of the existing British bases on the island, which were provided under the

<sup>290</sup>Greek Premier G. Papandreou quoted in op.cit. Attaliades, pp.66-7.

1960 constitution. In any case, in early August the Geneva negotiations were abruptly interrupted, having been overtaken by events on Cyprus. With the political atmosphere on the island making the recourse to military force more acceptable to the protagonists, the Cyprus crisis was to deepen further and flare-up into its most explosive form "its worst in Cyprus's recent history".<sup>291</sup>

#### The Turkish "Gulf Of Tonkin" And The End Of The Crisis

As of early August, then, neither Greece or Turkey had yet outright rejected the Acheson Plan. The Greek Cypriots ever fearful that a Greco-Turkish understanding may be reached in Geneva, began on August 5 a series of land and sea assaults on Turkish Cypriot strongholds in the northern coastal area of Kokkina-Mansoura. The Greek Cypriots were claiming to be retaliating for the captivity by the Turkish Cypriots of 3 Greek Cypriots in Nicosia. However, apart from wanting to disrupt the Geneva negotiations, in NATO circles military opinion was that the Greek Cypriots moved against the northerly coastal strip controlled by the Turkish Cypriots, because it was the only area through which Turkey could pass men and arms from the mainland 40 miles away. The area, then, was essential to Turkey if the Turkish Cypriots were to be supplied. Hence, the Greek Cypriot assaults were

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<sup>291</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, August 9, 1964.

an attempt to cut-off the Turkish Cypriots' 'life support system'.<sup>292</sup> Within a couple of days the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros, Mansoura, and Alevga fell to the stronger Greek Cypriot forces. With the Turkish Cypriots outnumbered and running low on morale and military hardware, on August 7 Turkey sent 4 jet fighters over Cyprus as a warning to the Greek Cypriots to desist from further advance. With the Turkish warnings unheeded by the Greek Cypriots, Turkey carried out waves of aerial bombardment on August 8 and 9. On August 8 Turkey sent 30 jets, and the next day, 64 jets to bombard Greek Cypriot targets. The second wave of bombardment was very decisive and devastated the Greek Cypriot forces, inflicting high casualties and paralysing the mobile units. Thus, a new element had been injected into the Cyprus crisis: for the first time, Turkey had directly used military force against the Greek Cypriots. Having sustained heavy casualties, in an emotional oratory on local radio, Makarios exhorted the Greek Cypriots to 'fight till death'.

No sooner had the Turkish air strikes begun than the international institutional diplomatic machinery was activated. The UN Security Council and the NATO Permanent Council both went into an emergency session on August 8 to discuss the most recent developments in Cyprus. Both Turkey and the Makarios regime had asked for a meeting of the UN Security Council: the Greek Cypriots requested that the

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<sup>292</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, August 9, 1964.

Security Council meet to consider the Turkish air raids on Cyprus and the Turks requested the consideration of the Greek Cypriot assaults on the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>293</sup> The UN Security Council, predictably, became a forum for a war of words between the protagonists, with each side accusing the other of having committed an act of aggression. A tit-for-tat developed between the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives Bitsios and Rossides, on the one hand, and the Turkish representative Eralp, on the other. Amidst the emotional debates, the most sensible approach came from U.S. representative Adlai Stevenson who argued that the Security Council should "not fiddle or quibble while Cyprus burns...The danger is international war".<sup>294</sup> The American desire to 'dampen the whole thing down' was as true at that stage of the crisis as it had been ever since intercommunal conflict began in December 1963. Therefore, the first order of business for the U.S. at that point was to secure a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. The Cyprus crisis, however, was taking on a paradoxical nature. As forcefully conveyed by Stevenson,

Archbishop Makarios says that unless Turkey stops its air attacks by 12 noon he will launch a full-scale attack on the Turkish community and forces. The Government of Turkey says that until the Greeks in Cyprus stop attacking the Turks, the air strikes will continue... in these circumstances until all hostilities stop, none will stop, and perhaps in a matter of hours we will be over the brink and in the abyss...The situation demands swift action. An appeal for a cease-fire is the

<sup>293</sup>UN Doc. S/5861 and S/5859, respectively.

<sup>294</sup>The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 11, 1964.



swiftest action the Council can take.<sup>295</sup>

On August 9 the Security Council duly adopted a resolution, with Soviet and Czech abstentions, calling for an immediate cease-fire on the island.<sup>296</sup> In the same tone, President Johnson sent letters to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus asking all parties to cease all military operations on the island.

Meanwhile, at the U.S. State Department a 24-Hour Cyprus command post was established, with Undersecretary Ball at its helm. The U.S. was reported to be monitoring the events in Cyprus unfold with 'grave concern'. A U.S. State Department spokesman publicly pinned the blame for the August flare-up on the Makarios regime,

The U.S. is of the opinion that the crisis leading to the Turkish air strikes was ignited by the evident intention of the Makarios regime to capture the strategic heights in the region and coastal villages.<sup>297</sup>

Further, the U.S. refrained from being overtly critical of the Turkish action by observing that "Turkey apparently considered the attacks necessary in a situation grown desperate for the Turkish Cypriot community".<sup>298</sup> It was not only the Turkish Cypriots who had faced desperation at that stage but also, albeit a different kind, the political leadership in Greece. Greece had pledged to defend the Greek Cypriots should Turkey ever attack them, but when a Turkish attack actually materialised Greece felt unready to fight

<sup>295</sup>Op.cit. U.S. State Dept. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, Doc. IV-125.

<sup>296</sup>Ibid. Doc. IV-126.

<sup>297</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, August 9, 1964.

<sup>298</sup>Ibid.

Turkey. Rather than resorting to military means, Greece began pressing the U.S. to intervene in the matter and was content to threaten that should "America... not do something about the worsening Cyprus situation, Greece would be forced to intervene..., because our patience is wearing thin".<sup>299</sup> In Cyprus, on the other hand, Makarios was known to have requested Soviet intervention on his behalf. The prospect of such intervention led Undersecretary Ball to observe: "I am certain that the Soviet Union would recognise the seriousness of any involvement on its part."<sup>300</sup> Having said this, however, he added during a TV program "that any fighting there could escalate into a wider conflict is always present".<sup>301</sup> It was this perception of the threat of escalation that had moved the Pentagon to put the U.S. Sixth fleet on crisis alert and deployed in "the general area of the island". It was stated that the 50 ship, 25,000 men strong fleet was "prepared for any eventuality if war started over Cyprus". Further, a Pentagon spokesman stated that "its aims are entirely friendly, but it is always battle-ready - capable of waging any kind of warfare, hot or cold, limited or general, atomic or conventional".<sup>302</sup> Beyond the obvious utility of the Sixth fleet as a deterrent [viz. "its aims are entirely friendly"]; a reminder to the Greeks and Turks, and Soviets, of America's stake in preventing the Cyprus conflict from escalating and thereby

<sup>299</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, August 10, 1964.

<sup>300</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, August 9, 1964.

<sup>301</sup>Ibid.

<sup>302</sup>Ibid.

threatening NATO's stability, it has never been made clear exactly what the Sixth fleet would do if Greece and Turkey did actually go to war. In what manner (against its allies!), if at all, would the impressive American capability be employed?

Ironically enough, U.S. officials who were preoccupied, at the beginning of the week, with air strikes against North Vietnamese bases in the Gulf of Tonkin, ended the week trying to halt a Turkish air strike against Greek Cypriot forces in Cyprus. Turkish officials had commented at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident that the U.S. was doing what it had pressed Turkey not to do over Cyprus. Apparently, then, in undertaking retaliatory air strikes against Greek Cypriot forces, Turkey took its cue from the American retaliatory air strikes against the North Vietnamese a few days earlier. Indeed, if one substitutes the eastern Mediterranean theater and actors for the South East Asian theater and its actors, one sees the 'Yeshilcham syndrome'<sup>303</sup> in evidence. On August 6, two days before the Turkish air strikes, the NEW YORK TIMES reported in an anticipatory tone that

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<sup>303</sup>In Turkish, 'Yeshilcham' literally means Greenpine and is the name of Turkey's equivalent to Hollywood - the centre of the film-making industry. The term, as used here, describes how adept the Turks are in turning things 'made in America' to appear as uniquely 'made in Turkey'. The expression originates from the fact that, especially in the 60's and 70's a sizeable number of Turkish films were actually Hollywood films re-made with local actors, locale, and flavour; a fact that one would not know, had one not seen the original Hollywood version.

the attacks on U.S. vessels in international waters and the swift American reply were followed by Turks as closely as they could without taking their eyes off "our own crisis in Cyprus". . . . The Turks contend that President Makarios is an 'aggressor' because he seeks to abrogate the 1960 treaty through which Turkey, with Britain and Greece, are guarantors of the rights of the two hostile groups. . . . Turkey "understood" the U.S. action and considered it justified because "there was open aggression against the U.S.". <sup>304</sup>

Hence, by implication, Turkey would expect the U.S. to understand any 'retaliatory preventive air strikes' <sup>305</sup> in Cyprus against an aggressor (viz. the Makarios regime). Further, in observing the American reaction in the Gulf of Tonkin, "Turkey could not have failed to notice the obvious restraint Moscow exercised after the American reaction". <sup>306</sup>

The high point stage of the crisis began to phase out beginning August 10. Faced with Turkish retaliation and deprived of the support of Greece and the Soviet Union, Makarios backed down. Thereafter, there was to be a general calm on the island, with Makarios easing the economic blockade that had been imposed on the Turkish Cypriots and, in general, ceasing hostilities against them. The Cyprus situation was to be stabilised at a very low level of conflict; the tension and division between the two communities remaining, there being occasional casualties, yet no longer systematic clashes. Thereby, the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis can be said to have ended in the aftermath of

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<sup>304</sup>An August 6 report from the NEW YORK TIMES' Ankara correspondent, as printed in the NEW YORK TIMES on August 8.

<sup>305</sup>Both the U.S., in the Gulf of Tonkin, and Turkey, in Cyprus, described their action as such.

<sup>306</sup>The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 11, 1964.

the August 8-9 flare-up. From the point of view of Washington, at last, after several months of the perceived threats of a Greco-Turkish war and Soviet exploitation of a local conflict to its advantage, the situation had been 'dampened down'.<sup>307</sup> Why, specifically, had the dampening down come about at that time? Evidently, Makarios drew some important conclusions from the whole affair. In the world of Realpolitik two basic facts ('the lessons of history' which did not escape Makarios) were made clear by the events of August 8-9.

\* Turkey proved by what it termed 'preventive air strikes' that it would risk open war for the embattled Turkish Cypriots. Greece and the Soviet Union, at opposite ends of the political spectrum, showed that they were not yet ready to do so for President Makarios' Greek Cypriot government.<sup>308</sup>

Greek Premier Papandreu, enraged at Makarios for having undertaken the series of land and sea assaults on the Turkish Cypriots without consulting Athens, instead of committing Greece in Makarios' defence wrote to him: "In accordance with our common agreement I appeal to you for peace...Hostilities must end immediately. A solution on Cyprus will be pursued by other means".<sup>309</sup> Khrushchev, for his part, did not live up to his earlier sabrerattling. In a note to Makarios he only went as far as lending his 'sympathies' to the Cypriot people and told Makarios that an

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<sup>307</sup>Recall op.cit. Stoddard's remark as to the overall U.S. objective regarding the Cyprus crisis: simply 'to dampen the whole thing down'.

<sup>308</sup>The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 11, 1964.

<sup>309</sup>The WASHINGTON POST, August 9, 1964.

end to the bloodshed on the island would be "an important contribution to the normalization of the situation".<sup>310</sup> Hence, the 1963-64 crisis ended because in addition to holding the balance of power in the region (no party to the dispute doubted this), Turkey demonstrated that it held the balance of resolve as well - the ability to run risks; to demonstrate that one has more of a stake in an issue than others do; to have the political will to make good on its word.

Finally, it should be noted that the Geneva negotiations which were interrupted by the events of the early part of August resumed later that month. However, when the talks reconvened, Greece and Turkey found themselves to be farther apart than ever on the Cyprus issue. Turkey had objected to Acheson's original plan, wanting a more sizeable presence than a military base of only, presumably, a few percent of the island's territory. Therefore, in a last effort to produce a settlement, Acheson presented a final version of his plan on August 20 which had been revised so as to circumvent the Turkish objection. The key provisions of the final version were that,

1. Cyprus was to be united with Greece, in return for a 30-to-50 year lease of a military base to Turkey. The Turks would have sovereignty over the base, whose size was to be approximately equal to one fifth of the island...Castellorizon, a small island on the Aegean, was also to be ceded to Turkey.
2. Cyprus would be cantonized... divided into eight districts and the administrators of two of those

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<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

districts always were to be Turkish Cypriots. An appreciable number of the officials of the districts were also to be Turkish Cypriots.

3. A joint military command for Turkey would be set up.

4. Compensation would be paid to all Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island. <sup>311</sup>

In reaction, Turkey strongly rejected any leasing arrangement, while Greece found it difficult to continue the talks without Makarios' approval and expressed unwillingness to enforce any settlement on the Greek Cypriots. Greek Premier Papandreou reportedly remarked to Acheson that,

It's okay for you to work up a brilliant plan. What you are saying is that I have to tell my people to shed Greek blood. You want me to whip Makarios and the Greek Cypriots into shape. I've got the army to shoot them with. You may be ready to do it, but I'm not. <sup>312</sup>

Hence, the final version of the Acheson Plan was not acceptable to either Greece or Turkey and the Acheson mission was liquidated at the end of August. In the aftermath of the negotiations, Acheson vented his annoyance for having failed to produce a settlement at Geneva by reserving his bitter remarks for the Greek political actors to the Cyprus drama. He talked of Makarios as a "political priest with considerable gifts of demagogy and ruthlessness" and explained 'Geneva' in a nutshell by pointing out that "the Archbishop did not go out of his way to be helpful. He threw a monkey wrench into the whole machinery". <sup>313</sup> Further,

<sup>311</sup> See op.cit. Panteli, p.365 and op.cit. Salih, p.49.

<sup>312</sup> Papandreou quoted in Laurence Stern, THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, New York: Times Books, 1977, p.32.

<sup>313</sup> Acheson quoted in op.cit. Salih, p.50.

he described the Papandreous (the Premier George Papandreou and his son Andreas Papandreou, who as his father's adviser hardly ever left his side) as "the old fool and the young rascal".<sup>314</sup>

Hence, in the final analysis, the U.S. had failed in conflict resolution but succeeded in crisis management: neither had there been a Greco-Turkish war nor the Cubanization of Cyprus. With the crisis managed and having ended, but the Cyprus conflict still unresolved, however, eastern Mediterranean politics remained fluid.

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<sup>314</sup> See op.cit. Stern, p.26.



## VI. The 1974 Cyprus Crisis

### The Pre-crisis Period

After the 1963-64 crisis the Cyprus conflict was stabilised at a very low level of intensity. Except for a major round of hostilities in late 1967, which prompted U.S. mediation by President Johnson's Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, the period of late 1964 to 1974 was one of an intercommunal cold war rather than actual conflict. Having received no external support in the face of Turkish aerial attacks in August 1964, Makarios had subsequently changed his policies toward the Turkish Cypriots. Outright hostilities had ceased, the economic blockade that had been imposed by the Greek Cypriots was modified, and Turkish Cypriots were able to move beyond their defensive enclaves. By 1968, in sharp contrast to the 1963-64 crisis state of affairs, James Stegenga was able to declare that

the level of violence has declined appreciably; a semblance of order and stability in the Republic has been established; fear and anxiety have correspondingly diminished; and many aspects of daily life have returned to near normal.<sup>315</sup>

In the late sixties, intercommunal dialogue was established and continued until 1974. Supported by the UN and all major external powers, the periodically held intercommunal talks

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<sup>315</sup>See J. Stegenga, THE UN FORCE IN CYPRUS, Ohio:Ohio University Press, 1968, p.149.

came to be regarded as the only avenue for the effectuation of a political settlement in Cyprus and institutionalised the post-1964 status-quo (one which was extremely unsatisfactory for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots since the Turkish Cypriots were not enjoying the rights that was their due under the 1960 constitution. Namely, Makarios' Greek Cypriot government ruled the country without a wing Turkish Cypriot participation).

During the inter-crisis era, then, the most salient aspect of Cypriot politics was not intercommunal armed conflict but rather an intercommunal cold war characterised by political division and ethnic polarisation. With the intercommunal conflict frozen at a low level of intensity, conflict among the Greeks themselves began to emerge as the most salient aspect of Cypriot politics. The beginnings of intra-Greek (here 'Greek' refers to the Greeks in Cyprus and Greece in toto) conflict has its roots in the coming to power of the military regime and the death of democracy in Greece in 1967. Over the years the vehemently anti-communist and fanatically pro-Enosist military clique in Athens and extreme right-wing factions in Cyprus, found Makarios not to be as ardent an Enosist as they would have liked. In fact, by the latter part of the sixties, despite public pronouncements of devotion to Enosis, Makarios was more interested in preserving the status-quo in Cyprus since Makarios was well aware that his power base lay in the continued independence of Cyprus rather than Enosis. It was

really a paradox of Greek Cypriot political life that Enosis was still an emotion-laden slogan, one which no sensible Greek Cypriot leader could outright reject, yet it made no real sense for Cyprus - with a much higher standard of living than Greece and with a large group of Greek Cypriots (especially the commerce-business class) having a distinct Cypriot identity and a vested interest in the independent status of Cyprus - to become a provincial outpost of Greece. Above all, it made no real sense for Makarios personally to realize Enosis, since in that eventuality the most he could politically hope for would be some sort of provincial governorship of a Greek island.

The intra-Greek conflict in Cyprus took the form of an outright terrorist-insurgency movement and became institutionalized in 1971 with the return to Cyprus of the legendary Enosist leader Grivas and the formation of EOKA-B.<sup>316</sup> EOKA-B was financed and controlled from Athens and became the Junta's instrument in Cyprus for overthrowing Makarios, who rejected subordination to Athens. The period of 1970 to 1974 was one punctuated by EOKA-B sabotage against government institutions and attempts to unseat Makarios.

As Laurence Stern contends,

in an important sense the tragedy in Cyprus was a by-product of the seven-year-long U.S. relationship with the ashamedly repressive regime of the colonels

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<sup>316</sup> The revised Enosis movement founded by Grivas in 1971 as a successor to his original organization, EOKA, founded in the fifties.

in Athens, a marriage in which two American administrations tolerated the extinction of constitutional government in Athens in exchange for supposedly stable U.S. military base rights.<sup>317</sup>

Therefore it would appear that what the 'Continuity' theorists have been telling one all along, that the U.S. is responsible for the events of 1974 in Cyprus has validity. Even if the U.S. did not directly engineer the events of 1974 in Cyprus, in this view, it is still responsible for them since it supported the repressive military regime in Athens. By inference, in this view, the U.S. also supported the Junta's efforts to neutralize Makarios. The reality of the matter is more complicated and requires a brief analysis of Greek politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Greece in the inter-crisis era (1964-1974). Such an analysis will suffice to nullify what are rather over-arching 'continuity' premises as to the nature of Greek politics and the U.S.-Junta relationship. First, in the light of the military dictatorship that ruled Greece for seven years, an impression has been given that the Colonels 'killed' democracy in Greece by taking over a nation which enjoyed democratic stability, and that the Junta was extremely repressive all along. In reality, the Colonels seized power on April 21, 1967, against a background of political and economic turmoil and were actually welcomed by many Greeks. Further, George Papadopoulos, who headed the Junta until November 1973, was basically a mild dictator with

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<sup>317</sup> See L. Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed In Cyprus", FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1975, #19, p.40.

egalitarian ideas and a desire to see Greece returned to civilian parliamentary rule. It was only after the countercoup of November 1973 when the extremist and much feared head of the military policy, Dimitrios Ioannides, replaced Papadopoulos that the Junta became an unrepentant dictatorship. Second, the U.S. has been implicated in the Greek Colonels' 1967 coup, and the impression has been given that the U.S. whole-heartedly supported the Junta in a "warm and corrupt" relationship. In reality, there has been no evidence to link the U.S. to the Colonels' coup, even though the U.S. at the time had its fair share of interference in and manipulation of Greek politics. Further, U.S. policy after the coup oscillated between tolerance of the Colonels and qualified support for them, but never was one of unqualified support.

With the February 1964 elections in Greece, George Papandreou, as leader of the Center Union party, became Premier. As such, Papandreou had been one of the key players of the 1963-64 Cyprus crisis, and had emerged from that crisis as a supporter of Makarios' policy of a non-aligned and independent Cyprus (hence, the failure of the Acheson Plan which would have subsumed Cyprus to Greece and Turkey, albeit primarily to the former). Subsequently, Papandreou came under attack from fervently nationalist right-wing elements in Greek politics for his handling of the Cyprus crisis (viz. succumbing to Makarios). Beyond the Cyprus imbroglio, in more general terms, Papandreou came under

attack for increasingly moving toward the left under the influence of his radical son, Andreas Papandreou, who was a minister in his cabinet. By late 1964, largely thanks to the Cyprus crisis which pushed public opinion into his hands, Andreas had become the 'prophet' of the left-wing and a one man force in Greek politics. In August 1964, when the U.S. failed to take the Greek side unequivocally against Turkey, who had carried out aerial bombardment in Cyprus, public sentiment in Greece turned against the Americans. The Greek people found a ready 'I told you so' sympathizer in Andreas, who had been advocating that Greece should not belong to NATO and be within the American sphere of influence. Thereafter, the fate of democracy in Greece was sealed as the emboldened Andreas, in effect the George Papandreou government, began to advocate liberal reforms in the traditionally right-wing and royalist Greek military.<sup>318</sup> Thus, the Papandreou government was set on a collision course with both the military and the Crown, as the King looked upon advocated liberal reforms as a challenge to his person and as a prelude to deposing him.

In the spring of 1965, the Center Union fell into open disfavour with the military when Premier Papandreou disclosed the so-called Pericles plan which implicated the highest-ranking military officers in an alleged 1961 election-rigging scheme which brought to power the rightist

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<sup>318</sup>Until 1973, Greece was a Monarchy, rather than a Republic, and the military was regarded as the propriety of the King.

National Radical Union (E.R.E) party. By the summer of 1965, the 'Aspida affair' exploded on the Greek political scene. This time, in juxtaposition to the Pericles disclosures, Andreas Papandreou was implicated in a plot of left-leaning officers to subvert the army and take over with Andreas at the head. Whether or not the Aspida affair was a trumped-up charge of the right designed to overthrow the government of George Papandreou, it became "a *cause celebre* - a confrontation between George Papandreou and the King, nationalist officers against liberal ones, the army of the King against the army of Andreas."<sup>319</sup> The crux of the matter, then, is that at the time the key question confronting Greece was whether or not the army was apolitical (by definition, royalist-nationalist). In July 1965 things came to a head when, on the advice of Andreas, Premier Papandreou decided to effect changes in the military and found that he was opposed by Defence Minister Garoufolias. When Premier Papandreou took his case to the King and asked him to dismiss the Defence Minister, King Constantine chose to dismiss Papandreou instead -- thereby precipitating a constitutional crisis. After the July 1965 crisis in Greek politics, the next couple of years marked a period of caretaker governments, powerbroking and national turmoil: "strikes, chaos, anarchy, inflation, slanderous attacks upon institutions, the squandering of public funds,

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<sup>319</sup>T. Theodoropoulos, THE GREEK UPHEAVAL, U.K.: Stacey International, 1976, p.147.

and the breakdown of all sense of hierarchy."<sup>320</sup> The state of affairs in Greek politics during this period was succinctly expressed by Sulzberger of THE NEW YORK TIMES, whose column "Conspirators and Kings" appeared on 5 October 1966.

Greece's political situation is... polarized dangerously toward Left and Right. The amorphous center is being impelled to choose between leaders who wish closer relations with the communist world, neutralism and withdrawal from NATO, and those ready to go to extremes in support of conservatism and the monarchy.<sup>321</sup>

On 3 April 1967, with the understanding of the King and the Center Union leader George Papandreou, the leader of the caretaker E.R.E government, Kannepoulos, proclaimed elections for 28 May 1967. On 21 April 1967, a group of colonels led by the Deputy Director of the operations branch of the army General Staff, George Papadopoulos, carried out a military putsch and seized power. Only six days before the coup, on April 15, the NEW YORK TIMES was reporting on the Greek political situation, that

many of those close to the King - army leaders, some extremist members of the National Radical Union and other court advisers - believe that this is in fact what the Center Union would do [i.e. depose the King] if it won the elections, as seems likely.... What is widely feared here is that the King may become convinced by his advisers that there is no other way to preserve the monarchy except to prevent a Center Union victory. This argument, in effect, becomes a plea for suspending the constitution and

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<sup>320</sup> Ibid. p.160.

<sup>321</sup> Stephen Rousseas, THE DEATH OF A DEMOCRACY: GREECE AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, New York: Grove Press, 1967, p.118.



establishing a dictatorship.<sup>322</sup>

In the light of such reporting of the Greek political situation prior to the coup, an impression has been given that the coup was a royal coup sanctioned by the King-- hence, the implication of the U.S. which was very close to King Constantine. This is not the case. In this regard, Stephen Rousseas' distinction between a Big junta and a Little junta is appropriate. The Little junta was comprised of the colonels, while the Big junta was comprised of the King, the Generals, and some conservative politicians. Apparently, the Big junta had a scheme of their own, but were beaten to it by the colonels. According to Rousseas, had the Big junta taken action

their kind of dictatorship would have been more cleverly done - less in the Gestapo-Nazi style, with more democratic looking officers, and with established conservative politicians in the government. They would have hoped to keep the moderates of both the Right and Center Union parties with them, arguing immediately for social reform and an eventual return to democracy. The U.S. was a part of the Big junta, if only because it knew of its plans and went along with them.<sup>323</sup>

At a top-secret inter-departmental meeting which had been convened in Washington to assess the Greek political situation, "CIA reports had left no doubt that a military coup [a Generals' coup, not a colonels' one] was in the making with the knowledge, if not the sanction of King Constantine."<sup>324</sup> The meeting had concluded on the note that

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<sup>322</sup>Ibid. p.131.

<sup>323</sup>Ibid. p.63-64.

<sup>324</sup>Ibid. p.64.

"no course of action [by the U.S.] was feasible", and National Security Adviser Walt Rostow reportedly closed the meeting with these words: "I hope you understand gentlemen, [that] what we have concluded here, or rather failed to conclude, makes the future course of events in Greece inevitable [that there will be a royal coup]." <sup>325</sup>

Accepting the above explanation leads one to the conclusion that both the King and the U.S. were truly surprised by the April 21 coup, even though the King had to accept the colonels' fait accompli once it took place and the colonels found it politically tactful to declare that they were acting under royal proclamation. <sup>326</sup> The American reaction to the colonels' coup was expressed in a special news report from Washington in the NEW YORK TIMES on April 23. According to the TIMES, U.S. officials were said to maintain

that there is no question of breaking diplomatic relations with the new [military] government since King Constantine has remained as the constitutional chief of state: the military takeover is thus a matter of domestic, rather than international politics. <sup>327</sup>

Thus, as long as there was still a King, it seemed to be of little import to the U.S. whether the general elections in Greece, which were scheduled for 28 May 1967, took place or whether a military junta suspended democracy for an

<sup>325</sup>Ibid.

<sup>326</sup>That the U.S. was surprised by the coup was confirmed to the author by Philip Stoddard who was the State Department's Near East bureau chief at the time, during an interview in May 1986 in Washington D.C.

<sup>327</sup>Ibid. p.116.

indefinite period.<sup>328</sup>

The official American attitude was that the U.S. was in no way involved in a coup which had been the result of Greek internal politics and poor administration; that NATO needed Greece and that the U.S. was, therefore, in no position to intervene against the Colonels; that Papadopoulos was a moderate and a shrewd political personality, strongly attached to the idea of a return to democracy; that a withdrawal of America's moral support and the complete cutting off of military aid could jeopardize his position and bring to power extremists like Ladas and Ioannides; therefore, to sum up, American support for, and good relations with, the regime were only way to bring about a return to parliamentary government.<sup>329</sup>

The only sanction the U.S. applied to the Papadopoulos regime was to initially impose a selective arms embargo, which basically had the effect of slowing the pace of arms delivery to Greece. When the Nixon administration took office in 1969, even this mild sanction was discontinued. By 1973, Papadopoulos had lived up to the expectations of the U.S. which had extended its provisional support to him: a number of social reforms had been effected, the Greek economy had been stabilised, and Greece had been set on the path back to parliamentary rule. As such, relative to dictatorships elsewhere, 'Papadocracy' had turned out to be not all that bad. Papadopoulos' very success in setting Greece on a more liberal course was to result in his downfall.

While it may have been correct to talk of a good U.S.-Greek junta relationship until late 1973, this was to

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<sup>328</sup> See Ibid. p.116.

<sup>329</sup> Op.cit. Theodoropoulos, THE GREEK UPHEAVAL, p.197.

change thereafter. In November 1973, the relatively mild dictator Papadopoulos was ousted by the extremist repressive head of the military police, Dimitris Ioannides, on the pretext that Greece was not ready to return to civilian rule. Under Ioannides, the junta became so decadent and corrupt that Greece, in effect, became a political no-man's land. According to Laurence Stern of the WASHINGTON POST, for the first time in his memory[!], senior Pentagon officials were heard to complain about the repressiveness of the regime in Athens and political analysts in the U.S. Embassy in Athens remarked on the continuing erosion of government performance. Even U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca, who according to Stern had been a 'cheerleader' for Papadopoulos' regime, was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the unrepentant dictatorship of Ioannides.<sup>330</sup> Also, to a much greater extent than his predecessor, Ioannides was vehemently opposed to Makarios. While Papadopoulos had been able to maintain some semblance of a relationship with Makarios, despite clandestinely working to neutralize him, under Ioannides the Makarios-junta antagonism came to a head and became a matter of public record.

The analysis of the Greek political situation and Greco-American relations during the inter-crisis era of 1964-74, thus far, suffices to establish that there was no rational American monolith responsible for the 'death of

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<sup>330</sup>See L. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, New York: Times Books, 1977.

democracy in Greece (1967 coup), and that it did not subsequently stand as 'puppet-master' to the Athens junta. For, if one were to accept such a premise, one would not be able to take into account a number of important regional subsystemic variables at play. First, one would not be able to take into account the independent national dynamics prior to the coup in Greece (viz. the July 1965 crisis and the ensuing political turmoil); second, the fact that, despite over-generalizing by talking of 'the junta', there was a Papadopoulos regime and a more repressive Ioannides regime - that under the latter, U.S.-Athens relations deteriorated; third, and perhaps most importantly, the timing of the 1974 anti-Makarios coup in Cyprus (viz. the particular form the Athens junta-Makarios relationship took; the explanation of which is still pending). Having established that the premise which serves as a 'continuity' pre-theory for the inference that the U.S. supported the junta's efforts to neutralize Makarios is unfounded, one can now proceed to a closer analysis of the U.S. attitude toward the junta's efforts in this regard.

The U.S. Ambassador to Athens from 1969 to 1974, Henry Tasca, describes U.S. policy during his tenure as one of support for Makarios and the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and opposition to changes in the Cypriot status-quo.<sup>331</sup> A similar description of U.S. policy toward

<sup>331</sup> Testimony by Henry Tasca., U.S. Congress. House: Intelligence Agencies and Activities., Committee Proceedings. Select Committee On Intelligence. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.

Cyprus is provided by Michael Belcher, the U.S. Ambassador to Nicosia during the 1964-1969 period. Responding to allegations that the U.S. had sought to neutralize Makarios and, thus, supported the Junta's ouster of Makarios, Belcher testified before Congress that,

I do not believe that our sins in this instance were sins of commission but rather sins of omission. I do not subscribe to the theory which I have heard expressed that there was a conscious effort on our part to bring about the downfall of Makarios.<sup>332</sup>

On February 14 when Makarios' security forces discovered an Athens-EOKA-B plan to overthrow him, the Speaker of the House Glafkos Clerides rushed to see the U.S. Ambassador to Nicosia David Popper and asked him what he knew about the planned coup. Although Popper's reply was a cryptic, "I am not authorized to tell you anything",<sup>333</sup> the very same day U.S. Ambassador to Athens, Tasca, issued the junta leader Papadopoulos a warning to refrain from any violence in Cyprus: "I warned him against any violence or heavy bluff".<sup>334</sup> The reason why the Greek Cypriot officials rushed to the American Embassy on discovering the plan for an anti-Makarios coup was because earlier in 1970 the Americans seemed well informed about Operation Hermes, which came within a hairsbreadth of success when terrorists machined-gunned Makarios' helicopter out of the sky. The Archbishop walked away from the downed helicopter unscathed.

In that case, 17 days before the incident took place

<sup>332</sup> Testimony by Michael Belcher., in Ibid.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid. p.45.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

Ambassador Popper had warned Makarios that there would be an attempt on his life within the next fifteen days. As it turns out, Popper missed the mark by a couple of days!<sup>335</sup> In 1973 yet another plan, Operation Apollo, was foiled by Makarios' security forces during a raid on one of EOKA-B's hideouts. That the American-supported Athens junta attempted to neutralize Makarios during the early seventies is not in doubt. However, American support for the colonels in order that American military base rights in Greece be safeguarded, does not necessarily mean that the U.S. supported the colonels' repeated efforts to unseat Makarios. Pending further analysis in this regard, it can be said that, the description of U.S. policy by Ambassadors Tasca and Belcher, as they viewed it from Athens and Nicosia respectively, and the American warnings to Makarios of impending attempts by Athens to neutralize him, certainly do not square with the 'Continuity' thesis.

#### From The Anti-Makarios Coup To Turkish Military

##### Intervention: July 15-July 20

Against this background of repeated attempts by Athens to neutralize Makarios, throughout the early part of 1974

<sup>335</sup> Ambassador Popper's warning to Makarios followed an earlier warning by an American Embassy official in Nairobi in January, while Makarios was on a State visit to Kenya, that the Archbishop would be assassinated at Nicosia airport on returning to Cyprus. The January prediction turned out to be unfounded, but Popper's February prediction was not.

there was a sense of déjà vu as rumours circulated in Cypriot circles of an impending coup against Makarios. On July 15, Athens put into effect Operation Aphrodite and finally succeeded in overthrowing Makarios, thereby triggering the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Despite announcements in the immediate aftermath of the coup that he had been killed, Makarios managed to escape from the Presidential palace which had been sieged by the Greek National Guard commanded by Greek mainland officers. Athens installed its puppet Nikos Sampson as President of the Republic.

The U.S. administration has been bitterly criticised both from within and without, for failing to try to forestall the coup against the Makarios government. 'State Department' and 'Continuity' theorists have used the fact that the U.S. was not able to forestall the coup to argue two very different points of view. The 'Continuity' theorists see the failure to forestall the coup as evidence of an anti-Makarios, pro-coup stance by the U.S. since it is, in this view, rather unbelievable that the CIA, which had played a very influential role in Greece since it was first established there during the post-WWII Greek Civil war, had no foreknowledge of the impending coup. The real clincher in the 'Continuity' argument is that, leaving aside the CIA and also U.S. diplomatic presence in Athens, the junta's plans were outlined in Cypriot newspapers and reiterated by THE TIMES (of London) a fortnight before the coup. The 'State Department' theorists, on the other hand,



argue that the U.S. should have anticipated the coup (as opposed to denying foreknowledge) and acted decisively to forestall it. At a press conference on July 22 Secretary of State Kissinger himself denied that the State Department had any prior knowledge of the Greek junta's plans for a coup against Makarios since "the information concerning an impending coup was not exactly lying around on the streets."<sup>336</sup> Despite what Kissinger said, however, there was ample evidence that a coup was being contemplated. As early as March 1974, the Cypriot Ambassador to Washington, Nikos Dimitriou, informed the then Assistant Secretary of State For Near Eastern Affairs Rodger Davies and the State Department's Cyprus Desk officer Thomas Boyatt that he had "reliable intelligence estimates that a serious effort would be made to assassinate Makarios before Greek Easter."<sup>337</sup> Even before March, and through the period until the coup, Thomas Boyatt had attempted to alert his superiors in the State Department that General Ioannides was determined to remove Makarios from power. Boyatt's warnings were ignored by the State Department's seventh floor and U.S. Ambassador to Athens Henry Tasca, since Boyatt came to be regarded as a mother hen about Cyprus, needlessly apprehending Washington and Athens with dire predictions. Over the course of 1974 it became an established adage in Foggy Bottom that the Cypriot

<sup>336</sup>U.S. State Department, Press Conference by The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, July 22, 1974. Press release #309, 1974, p. 14.

<sup>337</sup>See Laurence Stern, THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, New York:Times Books, 1977, p.94.

specialists had "predicted 300 of the last 2 coup attempts against Makarios."<sup>338</sup> Although Boyatt's many warnings were ignored, the seventh floor could not discount Ioannides' own statement to a CIA operative on June 20 that he was planning to neutralize Makarios.<sup>339</sup> The very same day the CIA station in Athens sent Washington a message urgently noting the threat Makarios faced. In Washington there was disagreement

over the exact thrust of Ioannides' intent. It was interpreted variously as a clear declaration of his plan to move against Makarios, as a feeler to determine Washington's attitude toward such a move, or as a request for a green light."<sup>340</sup>

Despite this lack of clarity as to Ioannides' exact intent in speculating about what he might do in Cyprus to neutralize Makarios, Kissinger and his Undersecretary Joseph Sisco directed Ambassador Tasca to warn Ioannides against violent action against Makarios. Ambassador Tasca, however, refused to see Ioannides personally, but instead sent the Administration's word to Ioannides through officials in the Greek Foreign Ministry, the top Greek military commanders, and a middle-level CIA liaison officer. As Tasca later told NEWSWEEK, he did not perceive it as his role as Ambassador to "make diplomatic demarches to a cop (Ioannides had been and still retained the title of - the chief of military police)."<sup>341</sup> What Tasca was afraid of was being criticised for having too close a relationship with the repressive

<sup>338</sup> See Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.47.

<sup>339</sup> See Op.cit. U.S. Congress, Select Committee on Intelligence, p.1301.

<sup>340</sup> See op. cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", pp.49-50.

<sup>341</sup> Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.49.

military regime in Athens; hence, he preferred to minimise his contacts with Ioannides. In any case, Ioannides had let it be known that he preferred to deal with the CIA rather than the American diplomatic mission in Athens. At that time, then, U.S. foreign policy in Greece was conducted through the CIA rather than normal diplomatic channels.<sup>342</sup> Later in 1975, when asked, while testifying before Congress, as to why he did not personally see Ioannides given a telegram from Boyatt urging him to personally admonish Ioannides, Tasca replied:

I did not see his assessment of a tactical warning because he had nothing... there is no information I had in anything that Boyatt had drafted that said 'Ioannides is about to move tomorrow and our information says he is going to do it and so do this.' All we got from the Boyatt telegram was the kind of thing we have been getting for a long time from Boyatt... 'gee, it's terrible...do something about it.' In other words, the level of decibels of the Boyatt position on Greece and Cyprus was not much higher at the time of the crisis than it was before.<sup>343</sup>

Given Tasca's refusal to admonish Ioannides directly, Kissinger and Sisco did not pursue the matter further, since they were assured by Tasca that the word had gotten through to Ioannides. Neither did Kissinger or Sisco undertake any initiatives of their own to register their disapproval of the Greek junta's plans. As a high-ranking Greek Foreign Ministry official who was opposed to the coup later put it:

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<sup>342</sup>In 1975 while testifying before Congress, when asked some key questions regarding the American role in the junta's coup, Tasca himself admitted it was conceivable that the CIA might have kept him in the dark at the time.

<sup>343</sup>See op.cit. U.S. Congress, Select Com. on Intelligence, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES, p.1540.

If Kissinger had called in our Ambassador in Washington, it would have been a valuable weapon in our hands. We could have gone screaming to the generals saying, 'Look what we are being told in Washington.'<sup>344</sup>

If Ioannides' motive in speculating to the CIA operative on June 20 as to what he might do in Cyprus to neutralize Makarios was indeed to get a feeler for what the American attitude would be, it is quite comprehensible that he "considered the warnings from Tasca as window-dressing and not as serious American objections to a coup."<sup>345</sup>

Further, on July 1, Ioannides' plan to oust Makarios prompted the resignation of the Greek Foreign Minister Spyros Tetenes and two other senior Foreign Ministry officials who were opposed to the coup and who until then had no knowledge of Athens' funding of EOKA-B.<sup>346</sup> Instead of regarding this development as a warning that the bridges between Athens and Nicosia were about to blow, the State Department dismissed them as "routine retirements."<sup>347</sup> Two days after the resignations, on July 3, the contents of a letter from Makarios to President Gizikis of Greece, sent early in June, were made public. This was unmistakable evidence, made public, that the junta-Makarios feud had reached the 'zero hour'. Makarios told Gizikis, "It is with profound grief that I have to set out to you certain

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<sup>344</sup>Op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.101.

<sup>345</sup>See P. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS, CONGRESS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE POLITICS OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO EXPERIENCE, U.S.: Greenwood Press, 1984, p.88 and op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.101.

<sup>346</sup>THE TIMES, (London), July 7&8, 1974.

<sup>347</sup>Op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.101.

inadmissable situations and events in Cyprus for which I regard the Greek government as responsible."<sup>348</sup> In continuation, Makarios outlined the machinations of the junta and its agents (EOKA-B, the branch of the Greek CIA in Cyprus, and the Greek General Staff office)) in Cyprus and publicly indicted the junta by declaring:

I have more than once so far felt, and in some cases I have almost touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence."<sup>349</sup>

The locus of the letter was Makarios' request that the 650 Greek mainland officers commanding the Cypriot National Guard under Lieutenant-General Denissis be recalled to Athens. Publicly challenging the junta's authority and embarrassing them by branding them as conspirators was not a politically sound act by Makarios, since he hammered a nail into his own coffin (so to speak) through this act. A couple of days after the letter was made public, the junta sent Makarios its reply - a stern 'no'. Thus, the lines of battle were clearly drawn, prompting THE SUNDAY TIMES' (London) Nicosia correspondent Michael Manning to headline on July 7, that there were "Growing Civil War Fears in Cyprus."<sup>350</sup>

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<sup>348</sup>The full text of the Makarios letter is printed in the Appendix of op.cit. U.S. Congress, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES.

<sup>349</sup>Ibid.

<sup>350</sup>THE SUNDAY TIMES, July 7 1974. Ofcourse, Manning was extremely prophetic, since the period from July 15 to July 20 was one of a civil war, with pro-Makarios Greeks (Cypriot&mainland) as one of a civil war, with pro-Makarios Greeks (Cypriot&mainland) killing anti-Makarios Greeks.

Secretary of State Kissinger's comment, that the "information concerning an impending coup was not exactly lying around on the streets",<sup>351</sup> notwithstanding, news of Operation Aphrodite was literally available on the streets of Nicosia on July 5. The pro-Makarios daily APOGEVMATINI reported that,

the conspiratorial brains are planning a broad coupist action to take place in the next few days supported by certain military circles in cooperation with units of the national guard and EOKA-B groups for the purpose of seizing power. If the plan succeeds, the government will be taken over by a certain person who has already been chosen and who, in substance, will be the puppet for a transitional period. Naturally it is understood that the partition of Cyprus will be achieved through the coup plan with the understanding that the Turks have their plans prepared for such a golden opportunity."<sup>352</sup>

Over the next few days, there were additional newspaper reports revealing the junta's plans and indicating that the junta-Makarios feud was approaching its 'zerø hour'. The Athens junta, which had no scruples in using violence in Cyprus to neutralize Makarios, was on the verge of undertaking a decisive putsch against Makarios. The Nicosia newspaper ELEFThERIA and THE TIMES (London) carried articles to this effect. Mario Madiano, THE TIMES' Athens correspondent, argued that Ioannides and his inner circle had decided to assassinate Makarios through the national guard in Cyprus. Reportedly, Ioannides assured his officers as to the consequences of an assassination: "Don't worry,

<sup>351</sup>Op.cit. U.S. State Dept. Press Release #309, 1974.

<sup>352</sup>APOGEVMATINI, July 6, 1974., as quoted from extensively in the Cyprus crisis literature.

There will be no consequences if the job is done quickly and neatly."<sup>353</sup>

Evidently then, the case of the critics of the U.S. administration, targeted at Secretary of State Kissinger, seems to be well founded. Given all the above political indicators, the U.S. should have been able to anticipate and forestall the coup. Yet, accepting this, it is a different matter to indict the U.S. for being behind the coup all along, since once again 'reality' is rather more complicated than as presented by 'Continuity' theorists. It is one thing for an analyst with the benefit of hindsight to piece together the 'evidence' that it is unbelievable for Kissinger not to have known of the impending coup, and it is another to be a U.S. Secretary of State who had Watergate, U.S.-Soviet summitry and the Middle East, among other things competing for his attention, to have given sufficient attention to the Cyprus situation. The truth of the matter is, as Laurence Stern tells, that "Cyprus, from the lofty heights of the seventh floor in Foggy Bottom, was a far-off blip on Kissinger's storm charts."<sup>354</sup> Further, there was merit in the adage heard on the seventh floor that the Cypriot specialists had predicted 300 of the last two coup attempts in Cyprus. As Kissinger was fond of telling his subordinates, the U.S. foreign policy machinery is like a car sitting in neutral at traffic-lights waiting for the

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<sup>353</sup> See op. cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS..., p.89 and Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.55.

<sup>354</sup> op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.57.

green light.<sup>355</sup> The 'car' could not go into motion in the absence of the green light (hard evidence); the U.S. could not act on every dire prediction regarding Cyprus. The U.S. knew that there was talk of a coup, but that was hardly novel. Of course, the political signs were strong enough to move Kissinger to direct Tasca that he register his disapproval of the coup plans to Ioannides. Yet, apparently the signs were not strong enough for Kissinger to pursue the matter further when Tasca refused to admonish Ioannides personally. The CIA which had stirred-up Washington in June with the urgent note of the threat Makarios faced subsequently downgraded its assessment of the threat. In fact, the 'National Intelligence Bulletin for July 15 which was distributed within the U.S. National Security apparatus was plainly embarrassing. On the morning that the U.S. Secretary of Defence might have been reading that "General Ioannides takes moderate line while playing for time in dispute with Makarios", Ioannides was not taking a moderate line but was in fact overthrowing Makarios.<sup>356</sup>

Hence, the truth of the matter is that it is not the case that Kissinger did not know anything about Ioannides' desire to ouster Makarios (viz. the talk), but that when he claimed to have been taken by surprise he in all probability

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<sup>355</sup>Kissinger's analogy was conveyed to the author by Philip Stoddard - formerly the State Department's Chief of The Near East Office, then Deputy Director and Director of Intelligence and Research.

<sup>356</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES, p.1291.



meant the timing,<sup>357</sup> and the fact that it was actually carried out in the face of American warnings, weak as they were, for Ioannides to refrain from such action.<sup>358</sup>

The second major line of criticism directed against the U.S., in the person of Secretary of State Kissinger during the 1974 crisis, is that after the coup the U.S. government did not condemn it and instead tilted toward the illegitimate Sampson regime. The U.S. was the only major power in the world that did not denounce the coup. Guarantor powers Turkey and Britain, all other NATO allies (except of course Greece), the Eastern bloc, and the nonaligned were all unanimous in their denouncement of the coup and called for the reinstatement of the Makarios government.

On July 15, after the coup had just taken place, Secretary of State Kissinger met with the Cypriot Ambassador to Washington Nikos Dimitriou, who had unsuccessfully requested many times prior to July 15 to meet with Kissinger to try and prevent the impending coup. At the time of the meeting, even though Makarios was rumoured to have been assassinated, Kissinger did not even mention Makarios or

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<sup>357</sup>At a July 22 press conference Secretary Kissinger pointed out that the man most immediately involved, Makarios, did not expect a coup that very day.

<sup>358</sup>Apart from Ambassador Tasca, the CIA also attempted to stop Ioannides through the Greek-American CIA operative Peter Koromalis, who was confidant and adviser to Ioannides. See L. Paine, *THE CIA AT WORK*, U.K.: Robert Hale, 1977, p. 141. Also, according to op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", the CIA station chief in Athens Stacy Hulse was virtually thrown out of Ioannides' office when he visited the General a few days before the coup. To Stern this suggests that Hulse made Ioannides angry by advocating restraint.

express his condolences. In fact, Kissinger's manner was disturbingly light-hearted - he was constantly laughing and joking."<sup>359</sup> The first statement that came out of the State Department after the coup was sufficiently elastic to reflect Kissinger's position which was simply, "We will wait and see";<sup>360</sup> it could have easily been issued even in the absence of a coup, as a statement of general U.S. policy toward Cyprus. The statement read as follows :

The U.S. has long been on record as opposed to any resort to violence on the island. Our policy remains that of supporting the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus and its constitutional arrangements.<sup>361</sup>

Absent were any explicit words of condemnation of the Greek junta's action and any words of regret about the attempt to assassinate Makarios. Neither was there any call for the reinstallation of the Makarios government. There is now sufficient evidence to suggest that there was a split within the State Department regarding the question as to whether the U.S. should denounce the junta's violent intervention in Cyprus. Commenting specifically on the split that existed prior to the coup, as to whether the U.S. should give Athens a stern warning to refrain from violence in Cyprus, but essentially describing the split that existed at all stages of the crisis, the State Department's Country Director for

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<sup>359</sup> Andres Nicolliades, Counselor, Embassy of Cyprus. Interviewed by Paul Watanabe, op.cit. ETHNIC GROUPS.... p.90.

<sup>360</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 1974.

<sup>361</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, CYPRUS-1974, p.53.

Cyprus in 1975-76 James Morton points out that

There was a split. There were some people at lower levels who recommended certain courses of action which were contrary to the policy that was followed or implicated. That is very evident from the files, which are of course still classified.<sup>362</sup>

Working-level officers in the State Department, such as the then Cyprus country director Boyatt, urged the Secretary of State to denounce the junta's action but he refused to do so. Thus, it is not the case as subsequent Congressional hearings concluded that there was "'system breakdown' . . . , what happens is that recommendations at lower levels of intelligence never get passed on. They don't get delivered."<sup>363</sup> Rather, the truth of the matter is not that recommendations did not reach the seventh floor, but in this case at least, simply were not heeded. The only top-level executive member to suggest a course of action similar to that of the State Department's working-level officers was Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger.<sup>364</sup> Kissinger, however, as he told the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) which met to discuss the Cyprus crisis,<sup>365</sup> did not want to risk sanctions against the junta for fear of jeopardising U.S. military base rights in Greece. As Dana Schmidt of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported on July

<sup>362</sup> James Morton, country director for Greece and former country director for Cyprus (1975-76), interviewed by Paul Watanabe in 1977. Printed in op.cit. Watanabe, p.89.

<sup>363</sup> Chairman Otis PIKE, op.cit. U.S. Congress, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES, p.741.

<sup>364</sup> See Henry Kissinger, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, p.1190.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

19, the overriding consideration in Kissinger's policy of extreme restraint was

to avoid risking the safety of American military interests in Greece. These are 'home port' arrangements for a part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet-Pyraeus base rights for the Navy and Air Force at Suda Bay on Crete. Without these positions in Greece, the Sixth Fleet would find it difficult to operate in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>366</sup>

Further, as Schmidt puts it, Kissinger intended to preserve U.S. interests in the region "even at the expense of Archbishop Makarios."<sup>367</sup> Later, in his memoirs THE YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, Kissinger argued that his inaction/extreme restraint on this matter was due to his belief that condoning Athens would be an invitation for the Turks to militarily intervene in Cyprus. That is, the Turks would say "gee, you see, even Washington denounces the junta's action, and by implication would understand if we were to exercise our right of intervention under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee." One will never know whether this is simply ex post facto [face-saving] rationalisation on the part of Kissinger or the truth. In any case, as will be argued shortly, it was precisely his inaction that invited Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

On July 16, a day after the coup, much to the dismay of the Turks and very much out of step with world-wide reaction to the installation of Sampson as President, the U.S. established informal contact with the Sampson regime. The

<sup>366</sup>Dana Schmidt, "Kissinger Insists On U.S. Caution On Cyprus", CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 19 1974.

<sup>367</sup>Ibid.

U.S. Ambassador to Nicosia Rodger Davies had informal talks with Sampson's representatives. The same day, State Department spokesman Robert Anderson was asked, "Is the Makarios government the government of Cyprus at the moment as far as we are concerned?"<sup>368</sup> He replied: "I would rather just not comment on it at all."<sup>369</sup> On July 17, this time in response to a question as to whether in the view of the U.S. government there had been external intervention against Makarios, Anderson replied (contradicting the preceding three weeks of furious cable traffic between Foggy Bottom and the U.S. Embassy in Athens<sup>370</sup>), "no, in our view, there has been no outside intervention."<sup>371</sup> At the time, Makarios, who was being hosted in London, was scheduled to visit the U.S. upon the invitation of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright.<sup>372</sup> During his visit to the U.S., Makarios was scheduled to address the UN General Assembly and to meet with Kissinger in Washington. Robert Anderson was asked whether Secretary Kissinger would be meeting with Makarios as President or as a private citizen. He replied very tactfully that Kissinger was meeting with Archbishop Makarios. Again, when asked on July

<sup>368</sup>Op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.112.

<sup>369</sup>Ibid.

<sup>370</sup>See op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.60.

<sup>371</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, CYPRUS-1974. p.60.

<sup>372</sup> That Makarios, still recognized internationally as the legitimate leader of Cyprus, was to visit the U.S. upon the invitation of a Senator rather than the U.S. administration remains an unintelligible piece of historical data for observers of U.S. foreign policy during that era. Critics of the U.S. administration regard it as evidence of Kissinger's 'coolness' toward Makarios and consistent with Kissinger's failure to denounce the junta for ousting Makarios.

19 about a story in the NEW YORK TIMES which reported that "high American officials indicated that the Nixon administration was leaning more toward Sampson... than toward Archbishop Makarios",<sup>373</sup> Anderson did not deny the NEW YORK TIMES' statement.<sup>374</sup> Also, on July 19, when by then there was no doubt that Athens had carried out the coup and that it was not an internal Cypriot affair as the State Department had stated earlier, Anderson indicated that the U.S. deplored Greek intervention "to the extent it may have occurred in this case."<sup>375</sup>

U.S. policy from July 15 to July 19 reflected a view shared by many observers of the Cyprus issue that the anti-Makarios coup and subsequent installation of Sampson as President were not entirely unwelcomed by Kissinger and the senior State Department officials. As Paul Watanabe contends,

the first private reaction from inside the State Department to the news that Makarios had been ousted was one of relief that [the U.S. was] finally rid of 'the Castro of the Mediterranean'.<sup>376</sup>

Indeed, when it was heard late on Monday (July 15) that Makarios was not dead, as had been reported by Sampson's people, one State Department official reportedly snapped: "How inconvenient."<sup>377</sup> Kissinger, like earlier Cyprus crisis

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<sup>373</sup>The NEW YORK TIMES, July 18, 1974.

<sup>374</sup> See op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS..., p.92.

<sup>375</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, CYPRUS-1974, p.74.

<sup>376</sup>Op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS..., p.90-91. See also, Tad Szulc, THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON YEARS., Viking Press, U.S., 1978, p.795.

<sup>377</sup>Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.57.

managers like Acheson, disdained Makarios for his recalcitrance and his turning to the Soviet Union for support at every turn. George Ball's undiplomatic bashing of the noncompliant Makarios in 1964, using his ceremonial title of address, "God damn it your Beatitude...", had become an established anecdote in the State Department and reflected the view of Makarios shared by senior officials in the State Department. Kissinger, for his part, told a group of Greek-American leaders shortly after the 1974 crisis that he considered Makarios as "much too big of a man for such a small island."<sup>378</sup> Not surprisingly then, during the 1974 crisis the U.S. was not among the powers calling for the reinstallation of the Makarios government. Kissinger's view was that Makarios was finished politically. Thus, when Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman, Kissinger's troubleshooter in the latter phase of the crisis, visited Athens in August 1974, much to the bewilderment of the newly installed civilian democratic government of Konstantin Karamanlis he told the Greeks that "it is important in the interests of the future settlement of Cyprus that Archbishop Makarios not return to Cyprus."

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<sup>378</sup>As relayed by Peter Bell, Chairman of the Justice for Cyprus committee of the American Hellenic Education and Progressive Association, to Paul Watanabe. See op.cit. Watanabe, p.91.

<sup>379</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES, p.1294.

U.S. Failure To Forestall Turkish Military Intervention in  
Cyprus

For analytic purposes the 1974 crisis can be conceptualised as being comprised of three phases. After the precipitant event of the anti-Makarios coup, there was the first phase of the crisis from July 15 to July 19. With the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus on July 20, began the second phase of the crisis, which after a limited Turkish military operation was followed by two rounds of talks in Geneva between Greece and Turkey under British auspices. With the collapse of the second Geneva talks on August 13, came the third phase of the crisis when on August 14 the Turks launched a major offensive and within a few days gained control of 37 per cent of the island. It has already been discussed how the U.S. has been criticised for not being able to prevent the anti-Makarios coup and subsequently for tilting toward the Sampson regime for fear of risking sanctions against the Athens junta. The Turkish armed intervention which brought on the second phase of the crisis led to a third major line of criticism of U.S. policy: that, the U.S., in effect, invited Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Because of Kissinger's policy of 'wait and see' inaction the U.S. was unable to forestall the Turkish action and subsequently was seen to tilt, this time, toward Turkey. Just as he was not able to risk sanctions against the junta, Kissinger was not, according to his own



statement, able to risk sanctions against Turkey. During a July 21 Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting, Kissinger explained to his colleagues that the only way Turkey could have been stopped was by taking U.S. military action, which, in his view, was out of the question.<sup>380</sup> Kissinger's argument aired during the WSAG meeting was essentially a face-saving one. In fact, the U.S. inability to prevent Turkish action was predicated on U.S. policy during the first phase of the crisis (viz. tilt toward the Sampson regime). As a Congressional critic of Kissinger's policy summarily puts it, during the July 15-19 initial phase of the crisis, the U.S. government "indicated a willingness to work with Mr. Sampson. This was consistent with our support of the Greek junta which initiated these actions."<sup>381</sup> The true import of this American position, in so far as it contributed to the materialization of the Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus, is brought to light by former Cyprus troubleshooters George Ball and Cyrus Vance. While testifying before Congress, Ball and Vance criticised Kissinger's failure to denounce the junta's anti-Makarios coup and the Sampson regime, and his failure to forestall Turkish action. Vance and Ball both argued that there were other diplomatic options available to Kissinger that could have prevented the Turkish armed intervention. In the words

<sup>380</sup>Henry A. Kissinger, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, p. 1190.

<sup>381</sup> Donald Fraser before the U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY. 94th Congress, 1st session, July 10, 1975, p. 16-17.

of Cyrus Vance:

It seemed to me that once the legitimate constitutional government of Cyprus was overthrown by a coup that the first clear step that the U.S. should have taken was to denounce that action and to state very clearly that it expected the constitutional government to be restored. This would have been in conformity with what Great Britain had publicly stated and what our NATO allies had said. If this had been done then I think it would be clear to the people of Greece and to the people of Turkey where we stood... With respect to Turkey, it would appear to them that we were either supporting or willing to stand aside and let come to power somebody who was committed to *Enosis*. Under those circumstances I think it was to be expected that Turkey would move. So with the lack of clarity that was caused by a failure to state our position, it is not surprising that Turkey moved.<sup>382</sup>

The statement made by a senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official bears out the validity of Vance's criticism of Kissinger's inaction. In the words of a senior Turkish diplomat; "If we delayed our intervention America was going to recognise Sampson. We read the statements by Robert Anderson. I told my government that the U.S. will recognise Sampson if we don't move now."<sup>383</sup> Kissinger's policy, then, reflects very little empathy on his part for the Turkish position in the initial phase of the crisis. The Turks immediately interpreted the coup as *de facto* *Enosis*, especially in the light of Sampson being installed as President. It is curious that had the junta looked for somebody more unacceptable and loathsome than Sampson, from the Turkish point of view, there would be nobody. Apart from Grivas, Sampson was the most renowned advocate of *Enosis* and

<sup>382</sup> *ibid.* p.51.

<sup>383</sup> As reported in *op.cit.* Stern, *THE WRONG HORSE*, p.115.

a reputed killer of Turks and British during EOKA's Enosis campaign in the fifties. During his meeting with Kissinger on July 15 Makarios' Ambassador to Washington Nikos Dimitriou, when asked who Sampson was, referred to Sampson as a paranoid and egomaniac.

Former Cyprus crisis manager George Ball's view is similar to Vance's, but Ball provides a more elaborate assessment and critique of Kissinger's handling of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. During Congressional testimony, when the pivotal question of American leverage over Greece and Turkey was brought up (under Kissinger it appeared that there was no leverage), Ball contended that

there was but one basis for the exercise of American leverage at the time. That was first to move against the junta. To say to the junta: "You are finished as far as the U.S. is concerned unless you reverse the coup, unless you reinstall the legitimate government, the constitutional government, of Cyprus." On that basis we would have had leverage with Turkey. That would have been very different from going to the Turks and saying, "We are not going to do anything about this situation but we want you not to invade....." I think instead of denouncing the junta's action, the impression was given, rightly or wrongly, that the U.S. might be prepared to live with the Sampson government... once this impression was given, our leverage with the Turks became almost nonexistent because the only basis we could even legitimately ask the Turks not to move was that the U.S. was going to mobilize not only its strength but the strength of other interested major powers to put such pressure on the junta that they would have to reverse the effects of this coup.<sup>384</sup>

George Ball's analysis of how Kissinger's inaction deprived the U.S. of much needed leverage notwithstanding, it appears

<sup>384</sup> George Ball in testimony. Op.cit. U.S. Congress, House, CYPRUS-1974, p.39.

that despite his junta-Sampson policy, which was anathema to the Turks, Kissinger believed that he might be able to prevent a Turkish armed intervention. For this purpose, on July 17 he dispatched Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco on an eastern Mediterranean diplomatic mission. This diplomatic venture of Sisco's has been described as a "mission impossible."<sup>385</sup> In the words of George Ball, Sisco was sent

there with an empty bag....I think he might have been effective had he been in a position to say to the Ecevit government, "The U.S. is taking very strong measures to bring about the reversal of this coup, so please hold off while we do it."<sup>386</sup>

Further, Ball contends that the U.S. should have empathised with the Turks by conveying to them how the U.S. understood that the Sampson government constituted a menace for the Turkish Cypriot population. Thus, because of his superior's reluctance to risk highhandedness by threatening either Greece or Turkey, Sisco was, of course, unable to stop the Turks.

Kissinger, himself, in accounting for the refusal to threaten the Turks by raising the possibility of the cessation of military aid should they intervene, contended "it was considered that such an action would be ineffective, and would not prevent the threatening eventuality."<sup>387</sup> By taking this position Kissinger was paying homage to the

<sup>385</sup>See op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.116.  
<sup>386</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, House, CYPRUS-1974, p.39.  
<sup>387</sup>U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, News Release: Press Conference by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, August 19, 1974, p.3.

Turkish government's public admonition that it would never again succumb to American pressure on the Cyprus issue (viz. as in the sixties). As Arthur Hartman, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs at the time, put it

Short of the use by the U.S. of force, we do not believe that there was any way to stop the armed intervention by Turkey... Before we stopped Turkey [1964 and 1967] from its intervention right which it felt it had under the Zurich and London agreements. I was told in Ankara that would not happen again... that they were [not] going to listen to that advice from the U.S. We accepted that conclusion.<sup>388</sup>

#### Turkish Domestic Politics and The Decision To Intervene

Though the Turkish military intervention of July 20<sup>o</sup> is to be seen as a reaction to Athen's action on July 15 and the American restraint with no clear and forthright position, it is nevertheless a Turkish domestic political resultant - not an international event commissioned by the U.S. as 'Continuity' theorists would argue. In this regard, as will be analysed shortly, one must also consider the important role played by Great Britain who, as guarantor power, played the frontal third party intermediary role.

On hearing the news of an anti-Makarios coup in Cyprus, the director of the Greco-Turkish relations office of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Ecmel Barutcu immediately interpreted the situation as de facto Enosis. He made the

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<sup>388</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress. CYPRUS-1974, p.4.

case for an immediate Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Prime Minister Ecevit shared the same perception as Barutcu and, thus, he immediately asked the military chiefs to begin preparations for a Turkish landing on Cyprus. Ecevit, nevertheless, wanted to try other options first, especially that of persuading Britain to participate in a joint Anglo-Turkish intervention. On the evening of July 15, the Turkish National Security Council met to discuss the Cyprus situation. The Minister of the Treasury Deniz Baykal, a firm advocate of armed intervention, played the leading role during the meeting. Baykal spent considerable time explaining why Turkey could not let the fait accompli on Cyprus to go unchecked. He made the argument that

the international relaxation of tensions which has resulted from the nuclear parity among the superpowers, has changed national reactions to international crises. We are now in an era where rather than direct intervention and seeking crisis termination, rather than the seeking out of the just and unjust, we have the management of regional crises. As a result the state that precipitates the crisis is always at an advantage [since it gains the initiative and places the burden of choosing whether to react or not to the other side, while third party crisis managers act to stall the side which is at a disadvantage]...Hitherto, the Greeks have taken large strides by using this tactic of crisis initiation. The coup undertaken by the Athens junta is the latest example of this. We have two options. We either acquiesce and accept the fait accompli on Cyprus, confining ourselves to 'verbal diplomacy' which brings no results or we respond to a crisis with a crisis....The real significance of the coup is not that the killer of Turks and the British Sampson has been installed as President, but that Greece is now in a position to extend its control to our southern shores. <sup>389</sup>

<sup>389</sup> Translation of Deniz Baykal's statement during the Turkish National Security Council meeting of July 15, 1974.

In continuation, Baykal explained that the new-found Turkish foreign policy under Ecevit was one of Realpolitik rather than one of verbal diplomacy, which had in the past doomed Turkey to allowing what it could not pass it by and being unable to safeguard its national interests. No sooner had the coup taken place, then there was in Ankara a strong belief that Turkey would have to act militarily to redress the situation in Cyprus. Although international diplomatic reaction to the coup was what Turkey wanted to see when Turkish officials asked themselves the key question as to who would physically change the Sampson regime, the answer seemed to be no power but Turkey.

On July 17, Turkish Premier Ecevit flew to London to meet British Premier Harold Wilson. Before undertaking unilateral action, Ecevit considered it necessary to consult with Britain, as a guarantor power, and ask the British to join Turkey in restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus. Much to his chagrin, Ecevit found that the British had no interest in a joint Anglo-Turkish intervention with Turkey and tried to pacify Ecevit. While the British were carrying the Cyprus ball, as far as Western allied interests were concerned,<sup>390</sup> Secretary of State Kissinger was pursuing his favourite two-track diplomacy - limited and restrained public statements to save everyone's face, plus bustling activity behind the scenes to put the U.S. in the middle-man

<sup>389</sup>(cont'd) Printed in M. Birand, OTUZ SICAK GUN (THE THIRTY HOT DAYS), Istanbul: Milliyet, 1975. Emphasis added in bold.

<sup>390</sup>To paraphrase a NEW YORK TIMES headline on July 18, 1974.

role.<sup>391</sup> Even as Wilson was meeting with Ecevit at 10 Downing Street, Kissinger was almost constantly being briefed by British Foreign Minister James Callaghan on the phone and was urging the British to pacify the Turks.

On July 18, Ecevit met with Sisco who had arrived in London the same day as Ecevit. Sisco brought with him a letter from Kissinger stating that "the U.S. is opposed to a Turkish intervention in Cyprus to redress the coup. We believe this would lead to war among the two NATO members [Greece and Turkey]."<sup>392</sup> In his meeting with Ecevit, Sisco basically reiterated the theme of U.S. apprehension over the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war, and told Ecevit that the Soviet Union was likely to react to a Turkish armed intervention. What Ecevit heard from Sisco on July 18, was what he had heard from Wilson and Callaghan the previous day. These were the same arguments that earlier American crisis managers, as well as the British, had made to Turkey in the sixties. Ecevit was not moved by the spectre of Greek reprisals, nor was he worried about the Soviet threat, since the Soviets had taken a forthright pro-Turkish position on July 16. The Soviet Ambassador to Ankara Grubyakov delivered a message to the Turkish government stating that "the coup has been organized by external forces. The Soviet government is behind those who oppose the coupists."<sup>393</sup> At the UN,

<sup>391</sup> See Leslie Gelb, "Inside Cyprus Crisis: How U.S. Policy Appeared To Change Course", the NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974.

<sup>392</sup> Op.cit. Birand, THE THIRTY HOT DAYS, p.48.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid. p.30. Also information gathered from the archives of the Turkish Cypriot Diplomatic Office in Washington D.C.,



meanwhile, the Soviet delegation was declaring that "Greece is swallowing Cyprus."<sup>394</sup> Ecevit knew that the ouster of Makarios was most disturbing to the Soviet Union, since the Soviets saw Makarios as a guarantee against the NATOization of Cyprus. The Soviets had never supported Enosis, since through Enosis Cyprus would become a part of Greece and hence a NATO bastion. Thus, Turkey could count on Soviet support in undertaking a move to restore the constitutional order destroyed by the vehemently anti-communist Greek junta which was loathed by Moscow. Rather curiously, Ecevit was more skeptical of the position of its senior ally, the U.S., which had taken no forthright position and, as mentioned, appeared to acquiesce in the face of developments on Cyprus.

An American diplomat who accompanied Sisco in London points out that

the arguments made by Ecevit and his determined stand changed Sisco's, hence Kissinger's, policy toward Turkey. If that meeting hadn't taken place there could have been very dangerous consequences... Ecevit told us clearly that if the U.S. tried to deter Turkey by twisting its arm, U.S. interests in Turkey would suffer greatly; in fact, he told this in an almost threatening manner."<sup>395</sup>

Hence, the reason why Kissinger was reluctant to threaten the Turks in an attempt to deter them

After his meeting with Ecevit, Sisco went on to Athens, taking with him the demands of the Turkish government for a diplomatic solution to the Cyprus crisis. Ecevit's minimum

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<sup>393</sup> (cont'd) May 1986.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid. pp.48-49.

demands were the immediate removal of Sampson; withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers which commanded the Cypriot national guard; and ironclad pledges that the island would remain independent. In Athens, Sisco and U.S. Ambassador Tasca met with Ioannides on July 19. When warned by Sisco that the Turks would move should diplomacy fail, Ioannides infuriatingly balked at the notion that the Turks would move. He rejected the Turkish demands and offered to replace, not withdraw, the 650 Greek officers in Cyprus. Sisco was astute enough to know that for the Turks the proper value of the Greek concession was practically nil. While Sisco was failing to make diplomatic headway in Athens, in Ankara the Turkish Defence Minister Hasan Esat Isik, when asked if Turkey would act or not declared that "everything depends on the answer Sisco brings from Athens."<sup>396</sup>

With the Turks poised to move should diplomacy fail, and Athens rejecting the Turkish demands for the cessation of the Cyprus crisis, Sisco relayed the latest situation in the eastern Mediterranean to Kissinger. At the time, Ambassador Tasca suggested to Kissinger that the U.S. interpose the Sixth Fleet between Turkey and Cyprus to stop the Turks. Kissinger categorically rejected Tasca's suggestion. Later the same evening (July 19), Sisco arrived in Ankara to once again exercise pacification therapy on the Turks. Having come from Athens empty-handed, his meeting with Ecevit took

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<sup>396</sup>See NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1974, p.48.

on a chilly atmosphere. In a last-ditch effort to stop Turkey, he asked Ecevit for 48 hours so that he could bring to Ankara an American formula. Ecevit, however, told Sisco that it was all too late: "We have tried it your way for 10 years, now we are going to try it our way."<sup>397</sup> A few hours after his meeting with Sisco had ended, Ecevit went on the radio to thank the U.S. and the U.K for their efforts and stated that the diplomatic course had failed and the Turkish landing in Cyprus had begun.

In summary then, in the pivotal initial phase of the crisis, U.S. policy was characterised by 'constructive ambiguity'<sup>398</sup>. The U.S. took no forthright position and while U.S. policy was espousedly neutral, in practice there was a tilt toward the junta and Sampson. U.S. policy, under Kissinger, in this initial phase --and subsequently-- has been widely described as one of Realpolitik. The Cyprus crisis confronted the U.S., rather typically, with the clash between principle (ethics) and pragmatism (the national interest). Though one junior U.S. diplomat exclaimed "here is a golden opportunity to put morality ahead of concern about those Sixth Fleet bases and let Athens know it simply can't get away with acting like an international outlaw," in the Realpolitik view of Kissinger American military interests in Greece could not be endangered for the sake of Makarios. For Kissinger the future of Makarios was of secondary importance. Kissinger believed that it was

<sup>397</sup>Op.cit. Birand, THE THIRTY HOT DAYS pp.64-65.

<sup>398</sup>NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1974, p.48.

virtually impossible to reinstall Makarios, and believed that "Makarios is a loser."<sup>399</sup> The U.S. Secretary of State, guided by the axioms of Realpolitik, appears to have been willing to let the regional subsystemic course of events to flow on their own accord so long as there was no danger of a Greco-Turkish war. In Kissinger's own words: "It is not a question of what we would like to do, not primarily whether we like Makarios or don't like Sampson. First of all, we have the overriding objective of avoiding war between Greece and Turkey."<sup>400</sup> Kissinger's extreme restraint and ambiguous stance during the initial phase of the crisis can be explained, then, by Kissinger's belief that it was essential to follow the middleman strategy and keep the U.S. in a position (neutral) where it could mediate between its Greek and Turkish allies in the latter stages of the crisis, particularly in the event of a showdown by the two allies. As Leslie Gelb of the NEW YORK TIMES puts it,

Top State Department officials expressed a sense of powerlessness to alter basic decisions in Athens and Ankara. Stiff pressures would not work, they judged, and public statements condemning dictatorships or aggression would be mere posturing. A middleman strategy, in which Washington would be acceptable to both sides as a mediator was the only way to moderate the crisis, they concluded.<sup>401</sup>

Gelb's contention as to the sense of powerlessness to alter basic decisions in Athens and Ankara and the account of Turkish policy under Ecevit run counterwise to the

<sup>399</sup> Ibid.

<sup>400</sup> Ibid.

<sup>401</sup> Leslie Gelb, "Inside Cyprus Crisis: How U.S. Policy Appeared To Change Course", NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974.

'Continuity' thesis. Rather than the American Goliath controlling and commissioning political outcomes in the region, it is the independent regional dynamics that bears the brunt for the political outcomes in the region.

### The First Turkish Peace Operation And The Geneva Cyprus Peace Talks

Within 24 hours of landing on Cyprus the Turkish army attained a territorial foothold in the northern coastal region of Kyrenia. This was the Turks' long sought 'access to the sea' which would provide entry-exit opportunity not subject to Greek Cypriot control and allow the Turks to readily intervene in behalf of the Turkish Cypriots in moments of threat. No sooner had the Turkish armed intervention begun on July 20 that the UN met to discuss the intervention. The UN Security Council passed resolution 353, calling for an immediate cease-fire on the island; withdrawal of foreign troops; commencement of negotiations; and respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Resolution 353 became the paradigm for subsequent Anglo-American efforts to manage the crisis. "The U.S. concentrated on getting the cease-fire; the U.K. concentrated on getting the negotiating process started after the cease-fire."<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>402</sup>Henry Kissinger, newsconference on July 22, printed in DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, Vol.71, July-December 1974,

Kissinger had not stopped a Turkish intervention, but he was determined to prevent a second Turkish war, which seemed imminent with an adventurous and unpredictable military clique in Athens which was resisting Sisco's pressures to restrain them. The first order of business for Kissinger, however, was to prevent the further internationalization of the conflict. In this regard, after having spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador to Washington Dobrynin, Kissinger declared that there was no danger of there being a superpower conflict of interest in the region at that juncture. As such, with any apprehension over Soviet meddling out of the way, Kissinger turned his efforts to the securing of a cease-fire by engaging in a personal brand of transatlantic 'telephone diplomacy'. He is reported to have had about 20 telephone conversations during the crisis with Turkish Premier Ecevit alone, and was known to be in almost constant communication with British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. Also, he was a frequent caller on Konstantin Karamanlis, the head of the newly installed democratic government after the collapse of the junta on July 22. While the UN Security Council had adopted resolution 353 on July 20, it was Kissinger who was instrumental in arranging the first cease-fire on July 22 and paving the way for negotiations between Greece and Turkey (with the Cypriot communal members present) in Geneva on July 25 - with James Callaghan as mediator. A Turkish diplomat who was privy to the Kissinger-Ecevit telephone exchanges described Kissinger

as being very credible and persuasive because

He had an exceptional grasp of military strategy. At times it appeared that he knew what was happening on Cyprus better than we did. His analyses were also very accurate...."<sup>403</sup>

Apart from his 'telephone diplomacy', immediately after the Turkish landing had begun on July 20, Kissinger got President Nixon to issue a strongly worded letter to both Athens and Ankara in which it was made clear to the two allies "that no war would be fought between NATO allies with an open American supply line."<sup>404</sup>

On July 23 the winds of amelioration were in the air. With a cease-fire in effect in Cyprus, in Athens the junta stepped down from power and after a seven year absence a civilian democratic government was installed. In Cyprus, Sampson abdicated and was replaced by a moderate political figure, Glafkos Clerides, who became Acting President of Cyprus. With these developments,

In Washington there was a sense of relief at having muddled through another East Mediterranean crisis with Kissinger's 'telephone diplomacy' ("rolling negotiation, a drafting exercise over transatlantic telephone", one American official called it) and a little bit of luck.<sup>405</sup>

There is no doubt that for a Greek observer of the Cyprus debacle, the very fact that Turkey intervened in Cyprus using American-made weaponry<sup>406</sup> was a sure sign of the

<sup>403</sup>Op.cit. Birand, THE THIRTY HOT DAYS, p.131.

<sup>404</sup> Op.cit. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN.

<sup>405</sup>Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.71.

<sup>406</sup>Later -as will be mentioned- this became a big issue within the U.S. when the Executive branch clashed with Congress over the question of a Turkish arms embargo.

failure of U.S. foreign policy. Viewing matters from Washington according to the yardstick of American interests, however, until that point at least Kissinger's 'constructive ambiguity' or 'quiet diplomacy' had worked. As respected Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand declared, "Kissinger was a winner."<sup>407</sup> In Athens, democracy had been restored and the pro-Western Karamanlis had become Prime Minister; the recalcitrant Makarios was replaced by the moderate Clerides; and Turkey had attained a beachhead in Cyprus, which for the U.S. was the best conceivable guarantee that Cyprus would not drift toward rival spheres of influence.<sup>408</sup> Clearly then, the 1974 Cyprus crisis not only confronted the U.S. with threats, but also raised opportunities. It would be giving Kissinger too much credit to say that he cold-bloodedly managed the first two phases of the crisis with a view to such an end, but from the American perspective at the Geneva juncture there was a golden opportunity to finally effect a permanent Cyprus settlement - in the light of the 'new realities' favourable to U.S. interests, particularly with Makarios out of the way. In this regard, the U.S. miscalculated on two major accounts. First, the U.S. did not have too much of a sense of the Turkish determination to press the advantage that they had gained. On July 22, Turkish Premier Ecevit had declared that

<sup>406</sup>(cont'd) Congressional critics argued that Turkey defied American law by using American-made weaponry supplied to it on the condition that they not be used for non-NATO purposes.

<sup>407</sup>Op.cit. Birand, THE THIRTY HOT DAYS, p. 56.

<sup>408</sup>Ibid.



the Turkish presence on the island was 'irrevocable'. Ecevit was willing to settle for a restoration of the status quo ante prior to July 20, but it would have been politically suicidal for him at home to settle for the status quo ante (which Turkey had deemed as being unfavourable to the Turkish Cypriots since 1963, in the first place) after hundreds of Turkish lives had been lost and millions of dollars had been expended. Leaving aside the question as to whether the Turkish public would stand for it, there was the fact that Turkey by tradition had a strong military power elite which always looked over the shoulders of the civil politicians. The military simply would not have accepted having gone to all that trouble, merely to accept the status quo ante in return. Second, the shadow Makarios cast over the Cyprus issue loomed so large that even in his absence the Acting President of Cyprus Clerides who was in Geneva, could not accept the Turkish proposal for a bizonal federated state. Only Makarios had the popularity and the trust of the people to put his signature on a Cyprus settlement. Furthermore, the Archbishop had declared in London that a federated Cyprus was unacceptable.

Despite the fact that the first Geneva negotiations got underway against a background of cease-fire violations on Cyprus, the protagonists felt it was in their interests to see the first round of talks through. Since most of the cease-fire violations came in the form of Turkish encroachments, this moved Kissinger's man on the spot in

Geneva, Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Bill Buffum, to ponder the Turkish attitude: "We know know that you want to improve the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus and some movements to this end are understandable. But how long will all this continue? Where do you intend to stop?"<sup>409</sup> The first round of negotiations that lasted from July 25 to July 30 was more of an agreement to negotiate than actual negotiation. The order of business was for the three Foreign Ministers (Gunes of Turkey, Mavros of Greece, and Callaghan of Britain) to agree on a joint declaration revolving around UN resolution 353, and then begin negotiating proper in a second round of talks. On July 29, the first Geneva talks were on the verge of collapsing because of Turkish reluctance to accept in the joint declaration the UN resolution 353 clause calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus. In this regard, suffice to say that Kissinger saved the negotiations; when things started to fall apart he began to tie them up together again. He basically went over the contentious draft with Ecevit on the phone, and together they redrafted until a draft satisfying Ecevit was worked out. Kissinger repeated his performance in the second Geneva talks which began on August 8. For the second round of talks Bill Buffum had been replaced by the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur Hartman as Kissinger's man on the spot in Geneva. By August 11 the talks ran into a dead end,

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<sup>409</sup> Op.cit. Birand, THE THIRTY HOT DAYS, p.166.

since the Greeks were not willing to accept a bizonal federated state as a solution. Kissinger, then, while empathizing with the Turks, telling them that he knew they couldn't be satisfied with a mere beachhead in Cyprus, urged Ankara to seek a diplomatic solution. He requested that Ankara draft a cantonal plan, which Clerides had hinted he would consider. While Ankara was busy drafting a cantonal plan, in Geneva Turkish Foreign Minister Gunesh was telling Arthur Hartman that he was personally opposed to a cantonal plan since he believed that it would not prove to be durable in practice. His personal opinion notwithstanding, Gunesh officially offered the Greeks a cantonal plan (one main Turkish canton to the north, and five other smaller cantons with access to the sea). On August 13, State Department spokesman Robert Anderson was expressing the U.S. position at that juncture:

We recognize the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted. And therefore the U.S. would consider a resort to military action unjustified. <sup>410</sup>

Later that day, the Greek Foreign Minister Mavros and the Acting President of Cyprus Clerides asked the Turks for 36 hours to review the cantonal plan. While British Foreign Secretary Callaghan thought this was a legitimate request, the Turks took it as an indicator of Greek delay tactics and

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<sup>410</sup>Op.cit. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, July-August 1974.

delivered the Greeks an ultimatum - decide on the spot or never. With the Greeks perceiving themselves as being threatened at gunpoint (viz. the superior Turkish military presence in Cyprus), the second Geneva Cyprus peace talks collapsed.

### Turkish Peace Operation II And The End Of The Crisis

In the early morning hours of August 14, Turkish armed forces undertook a full-scale expansive thrust and within a couple of days gained control of 37 per cent of the island, bringing about the de facto partition of the island along the so-called 'Attila line'. With this move American Congressional opinion in particular and international public opinion in general, which had been favourable to Turkey during the early phases of the crisis turned totally against it. There was a general feeling that with the removal of the Greek military junta in Athens, and the replacement of Sampson by Clerides in Cyprus on July 23, the problems that had provided the rationale for Turkey's military action on Cyprus had been rectified and its responsibilities as a guarantor power fulfilled. Thus, outside Turkey, the further Turkish expansion on August 14 was seen to be unjustified. As U.S. Congressman Donald Riegle, who was particularly disturbed by the displacement of a third of the Cypriot population due to the de facto partition, put it:

To this point [after 'Peace Operation' I] the Turks had achieved the goals intended by their military intervention: they stopped the illegal coup on Cyprus, restoring that islands' legitimate government. The intervention had also caused indirectly, the fall of the 7 year Athens dictatorship. Whether this first Turkish military action was legal under American law is debatable [the use by Turkey of U.S. made weaponry supplied to it by the U.S. solely to be used for NATO purposes]. Turkey had a right under the London accords of 1959, to intervene in Cyprus if the other guarantor powers (Greece and Britain) failed to act jointly but only for the purpose of restoring the state of affairs under the Treaty [of Guarantee]. If Turkey had moved militarily for that purpose and had ended its actions when such restoration had occurred, the tragedy of Cyprus would not exist today.<sup>411</sup>

James Callaghan, whose mediation came to nought, emerged from Geneva as a critic of the Turks. Returning to London following the renewed Turkish military action, he criticised Turkey bitterly for not wanting to negotiate and charged that they had decided to move even before the conference had collapsed. Callaghan lamented that "A great opportunity has been thrown away. All we needed in Geneva was another 36 hours to work out a solution. All that has been thrown away".<sup>412</sup> The State Department, meanwhile, issued its first public criticism of Turkey, stating: "We deplore the Turkish resort to the use of force."<sup>413</sup> On August 18, Secretary of State Schlesinger, who during earlier WSAG meetings had been the only senior official to advocate a more forceful American diplomacy, warned Turkey against using its military strength to drive Greece into a corner.<sup>414</sup> Schlesinger

<sup>411</sup>U.S. Congressman Donald Riegle, GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS STATEMENT, July 2 1975, pp.2-3.

<sup>412</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, CYPRUS-1974. p.79.

<sup>413</sup> Ibid.

<sup>414</sup>Ibid. p.57.

expressed his disapproval of the Turks' August 14 offensive in the following terms: "We've understood the desire of the Turks to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority, but the Turkish moves at this point have gone beyond what any of its friends or sympathisers would have accepted."<sup>415</sup>

On August 16, Turkish Premier Ecevit declared a unilateral cease-fire and the next day announced that Turkish territorial objectives had been attained and that Turkey was willing to return to the negotiating table. What the Turkish Premier had in mind was plain enough for everyone to see. With the bargaining power accruing from the Turkish military presence on Cyprus and their control of a sizeable chunk of territory, Ecevit sought to negotiate a Cyprus settlement more favourable to the Turkish Cypriots than the status quo ante had been. The Turks would give up territory they controlled on Cyprus in return for Turkish Cypriot political equality in a federal arrangement and better safeguards for their security.

In the U.S., 'the long nightmare of Watergate' (as Gerald Ford referred to it) had just ended. During Geneva II, Richard Nixon had resigned and Gerald Ford had become President. It has been argued, regarding the first two phases of the Cyprus crisis, that the collapse of the Nixon administration at the time made rational U.S. policy response difficult.<sup>416</sup> While it is true that President

<sup>415</sup>U.S. Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger before the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1975, ONE YEAR AFTER THE INVASION, p.44.

<sup>416</sup>Memo. drafted by a Congressional aide in May 1986; made

Nixon, who was experiencing severe stress, did not get involved with the Cyprus issue, the argument is rather misleading. The explanation as to why U.S. policy took the course that it did over Cyprus lies in Secretary Kissinger's Realpolitik; not that there was a collapsing and/or divided administration.<sup>417</sup> In any case, while Richard Nixon did not get involved with the Cyprus crisis, the third phase of the crisis became President Ford's first foreign policy crisis. As in the earlier phases of the crisis, however, Kissinger was still firmly in control of U.S. foreign policy where Cyprus was concerned especially in the light of the fact that Gerald Ford came to the Presidency as a "neophyte" in foreign affairs and had to be "tutored" daily by Kissinger.<sup>418</sup> On August 19, Kissinger expressed his receptivity to Ecevit's strategy of negotiating from strength by announcing that it was "imperative and urgent" that negotiations begin and that

in these negotiations...., it will be necessary for Turkey, as the stronger power on the ground to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities, both in terms of territory and the

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<sup>416</sup>(cont'd) privy to the author by a Turkish Cypriot diplomat in Washington.

<sup>417</sup>It should be pointed out that despite his relatively autocratic style of decision-making, Kissinger did not act as a complete virtuoso in the making of Cyprus policy. Other members of the State Department's Cyprus policy team included: Undersecretary Joseph Sisco; Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll; Deputy Asst. Secretary Wells Stabler; Asst. Secretary for European Affairs Arthur Hartman; Ambassador at Large - former Ambassador to Cyprus - Robert McCloskey; and Cyprus Country director Thomas Boyatt. Also, Kissinger's policy was endorsed by the WSAG group.

<sup>418</sup>See TIME magazine, last two issues of August 1974.

size of military forces on the island.<sup>419</sup>

Kissinger also announced that the U.S. was willing to mediate the dispute and invited the Greek and Turkish leaders to Washington to meet with President Ford.

Despite the Turko-American desire to bring the Cyprus issue to the negotiating table, at the time, an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism was sweeping Greece and the Greek Cypriot controlled part of Cyprus. The U.S. was blamed for the de facto partitioning of Cyprus because of its allegedly pro-Turkish stance after July 20. In the Greek view, the U.S. had tacitly supported what they deemed as Turkish aggression on Cyprus and thus was responsible for the 'rape' of Cyprus and the resulting human tragedy of a third of the population (200,000) becoming refugees. Such was the extent of Anti-Americanism that on August 19, in Nicosia, the U.S. Ambassador Roger Davies was shot to death by an angry group of demonstrators. Even in Lafayette Square, Washington D.C, Kissinger was burnt in effigy by Greek-Americans. With a wave of anti-Americanism prevalent in Greece, if for no other reason but to fend off pressures from the political left, Greek Premier Caramanlis refused the offer of American mediation of the dispute. While, then, the Turks wanted to translate their military victory into political gain, the Greeks who were suffering from a 'national mourning' syndrome were in no mood to negotiate anything. As such, with the de facto partition of the

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<sup>419</sup>Op.cit. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, p.354.



island, the crisis ended since "no one was foolish enough to try anything."<sup>420</sup>

As alluded to on a number of occasions, U.S. policy during the second and third phases of the crisis led to a fourth, and most severe, line of criticism directed against the U.S. From the Turkish armed intervention on July 20 through the aftermath of the Turkish offensive of August 14, U.S. policy has been seen to have tilted toward Turkey. There is a feeling, particularly among the Greeks and the Greek-American ethnic group in the U.S., that if the U.S. had taken decisive action to restrain the Turks, the Turks could not have continued to militarily expand on Cyprus and gain control of 37 per cent of the island's territory. It has already been mentioned that, for Kissinger, the reason why the U.S. took no decisive action such as the threatening of the suspension of military aid was because "it was considered that such an action would be ineffective, and would not prevent the threatened eventuality."<sup>421</sup> Evidence, however, suggests that either Kissinger miscalculated the potential effectiveness of pressuring the Turks or he was disinclined for reasons of Realpolitik to issue threats such as the suspension of military aid. The latter much more

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<sup>420</sup>This is the remark made by Philip Stoddard -ex-State Dept.- official, who indicated that when Turkish 'Peace Operation' II ended, the Cyprus conflict had become stalemated. The Turks would not move beyond the 'Attila Line' for they would become a pariah state in the international community and the Greeks would not do anything given the reality of superior Turkish military power not in Cyprus alone, but in the region at large.

<sup>421</sup>Op.cit. Kissinger, THE YEARS OF UPHEAVAL.

likely being the case, one sees that there is indeed merit in the argument that Kissinger refrained from not only pressuring the Turks but also from outright denunciations of their actions.

On July 22, two days after the Turkish landing, Kissinger devoted a press conference to discussion of the Cyprus situation without denouncing the Turkish action.<sup>422</sup> On July 25, Kissinger again met with the press and when a number of inquiries were made about the Cyprus situation he once again did not criticize Turkey.<sup>423</sup> Even in the face of ceasefire violations by the Turks during Geneva I, Kissinger expressed to the Turks, through his representative at Geneva Bill Buffum, his understanding of the situation.<sup>424</sup> During Geneva II, with further Turkish military action on Cyprus imminent, Thomas Boyatt sent a 'dissent channel' memorandum to Kissinger indicating that if Turkey was not restrained it would take further military action. As in the earlier stages of the crisis, Boyatt was not heeded.<sup>425</sup> For Paul Watanabe, a Professor at The University of Massachusetts and a critic of Kissinger's Cyprus policy, what was most disturbing was the State Department announcement of August 13 expressing support for greater Turkish Cypriot autonomy. Coming on the eve of the Turkish expansive thrust of August 14

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<sup>422</sup>Op.cit. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, Vol.71, 1974.

<sup>423</sup>U.S. Dept. of State, Press Conference by the Honourable Henry Kissinger, Grand Forks Air Force Base, Grand Forks, North Dakota. July 25, 1974. Press release #318.

<sup>424</sup>Op.cit. Birand, p.156.

<sup>425</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES, pp.1297-99.

The tone and especially the timing of this statement aroused a batch of denunciations. Notably missing from the announcement was any word of condemnation of the Turkish military presence in Cyprus and any call for Turkey to respect the political and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Coming after the first invasion and during the delicate Geneva discussions, some individuals surmised that Washington's relatively conciliatory attitude may have emboldened Ankara to launch its more....decisive second strike against Cyprus the very next day.<sup>426</sup>

Even after the Turkish expansive thrust, although having 'deplored' the Turkish action on August 14, on August 16 the State Department spokesman stated after the Turks unilaterally announced a ceasefire: "We welcome the Turkish government's announcement of a ceasefire and we want to make it clear that we could not understand any resumption by Turkey of military operations on Cyprus."<sup>427</sup> To the foremost critic of Kissinger's Cyprus policy, Greek-American Congressman Paul Sarbanes, "this is incredibly mild diplomatic language and obviously suggests that the State Department could understand the Turkish military operations up to that point."<sup>428</sup> For most of the critics of Kissinger's policy the clearest evidence that there was a perceptible tilt by Kissinger in favour of Turkey is that the Turks themselves looked favourably upon U.S. policy during the crisis. On August 15, after having met with U.S. Ambassador to Ankara William Macomber, Turkish Premier Ecevit told reporters that he was very happy with the "frank and open" U.S. policy on Cyprus. The next day, at a press conference,

<sup>426</sup>Op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS....., p.96.

<sup>427</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, CYPRUS-1974, p.79.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

Ecevit further elaborated the Turkish view of the American role. He pointed out that he had frequent telephone conversations with Kissinger and praised him for his role. According to Ecevit, Washington had been "less emotional" and more objective than Britain, whose Foreign Secretary James Callaghan had sternly denounced Turkey for its policy at Geneva II. The U.S., Ecevit said, had "evaluated the problem objectively, refrained from taking sides, refrained from pressures."<sup>429</sup> A Congressional study mission which went to the eastern Mediterranean shortly after the crisis reached the same conclusions as the critics of Kissinger's policy, that indeed a tilt toward Turkey seemed to characterize American policy. The Study Mission reported to Congress, regarding their view of a tilted policy, that

Nothing dramatizes this more...than the simple fact that the Study Mission was told again, by Turkish spokesmen in the field and in Washington, that they felt that U.S. policy toward Cyprus was 'right', 'equitable', 'fair', and 'good'. Needless to say, the same kinds of feelings were not expressed in Athens or in the Greek controlled area of Cyprus.<sup>430</sup>

On August 14, Kissinger's aide Robert McCloskey had stated that the charges made against the U.S. for having tilted in favour of Turkey were pure "baloney."<sup>431</sup> On August 19, when Kissinger himself was asked to pass judgement on McCloskey's

<sup>429</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, CYPRUS-1974, p.79.

<sup>430</sup>Senate Committee on the Judiciary CRISIS ON CYPRUS:1974. A Study Report Prepared For The Use of the Subcom. To Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Com. on the Judiciary. 93rd Congress, 2nd session, Oct.14, 1974, p.45.

<sup>431</sup>Op.cit. Dept. of State Bull., Secretary Kissinger's August 19 press conference.

statement, he supported his aide and defended himself against his critics by tactfully contending that

The situation on Cyprus tilted toward Turkey not as a result of American policy, but as a result of the action of the previous Greek government which destroyed the balance of forces as it had existed on the island. <sup>432</sup>

Kissinger's contention notwithstanding, there was in fact a de facto tilt toward Turkey. Kissinger's purported neutrality meant that in practice, the U.S. tilted toward the stronger party. A policy of neutrality in the face of rapidly unfolding events inevitably amounts to tilting in favour of the party which has the initiative on its side. During the initial phase of the crisis, this meant tilting toward the junta and Sampson, and after the Turkish intervention it meant tilting toward Turkey.

After the initial phase of the crisis,

Kissinger had made a cold-blooded strategic decision that Turkey was more important to U.S. national security interests and to the NATO community than the new and unpredictable Greek government and its volatile electorate. <sup>433</sup>

One U.S. diplomat summed up the calculus of American interest at the time in the following terms: "Let's say that Greece is Denmark and Turkey is Germany. We may be fonder of the Danes but we need the Germans more." <sup>434</sup> This calculus in Kissinger's Cyprus policy led to yet another line of criticism directed at his handling of the situation, which

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<sup>432</sup> Ibid.

<sup>433</sup> Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons", p.74.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid.

was linked to his failure to take decisive action against the Turks. Greeks, pro-Greek groups and liberal critics of Administration policy in the U.S. criticised Kissinger for failing to endorse strongly the Karamanlis government in Greece. Although having phoned Greek Foreign Minister to-be George Mavros when informed of the installment of the new democratic regime on July 23 and having declared, "That's swell"....., Kissinger soon disappointed [the Greeks] by refusing serious attempts to restrain Turkey from further military encroachments on Cyprus... Kissinger appeared to have chosen the stability of the Turks over the uncertainty of the new regime in Greece."<sup>435</sup> According to Senator Lloyd Bentsen, a critic of Kissinger's Cyprus policy,

there was still another opportunity to correct our course when the Greek junta collapsed and Karamanlis emerged as a new leader. This was a golden opportunity too for the U.S. to regain its stature as a leader of the democratic free world....At that point the Administration could have restored their [the Greek government's] self-confidence and justified their steadfastness, but error compounded error in the incredible mishandling of the Cyprus situation, and the tilt toward Turkey now became clear.<sup>436</sup>

Moved by the axiom of Realpolitik that Turkey was more important to U.S. national security interests than Greece and working from the assumption that, after July 20, "the Turkish generals would insist on clear-cut military victory, that Premier Ecevit would have to go along and, indeed, that

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<sup>435</sup>See op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.126 and op.cit. Watanabe, "ETHNIC GROUPS.....", p.101.

<sup>436</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Congress, SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, p.147.

he would be strengthened politically",<sup>437</sup> it is not surprising that Kissinger did not take decisive action against the Turks after their armed intervention in Cyprus. In the U.S. administration's eyes - being the eastern anchor of NATO and the pillar of the Near and Middle East - Turkey could not be antagonized. In the final analysis, then, as one high State Department official characterized U.S. policy at the time:

We were having trouble with Turkey over the opium issue.....We were worried about increased Soviet influence in Ankara and the Soviets were breathing down our necks, so we had to take care of Turkey's interests first - but mainly we were neutral.<sup>438</sup>

This policy of 'mainly being neutral', which was dictated by Realpolitik, for liberal observers of the Cyprus issue all too readily submerged morality to strategic interests. According to Harvard University Professor Dennis Skiotis,

U.S. policy at every crucial stage of the Cyprus crisis seems to have been one of hasty improvisation, coldly calculated to minimize disturbances within NATO. Not only it achieved the opposite results in the end, but most importantly, in human terms it failed the defenceless people of Cyprus.<sup>439</sup>

If one is an adherent of the 'operational code' approach to the study of foreign policy<sup>440</sup> one can explain

<sup>437</sup>Op.cit. Gelb, "Inside Cyprus Crisis....".

<sup>438</sup>Op.cit. Gelb, "Inside Cyprus Crisis...."

<sup>439</sup>Op.cit. U.S. Senate, HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS, pp.6-7.

<sup>440</sup>A very popular theoretical construct in foreign policy analysis, first introduced by Alexander George in the 1969 volume of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Scholars using this construct basically seek to demonstrate the correlation between a policymakers belief system and his decisions/actions.

U.S. foreign policy during the 1974 Cyprus crisis by looking at Kissinger's 'philosophy' (a Realpolitiker, for whom the magic word is stability, fascinated by the policies of his idol Metternich), regardless of the specific nuances of eastern Mediterranean politics in 1974. As Laurence Stern of the WASHINGTON POST very interestingly points out, in A WORLD RESTORED (Kissinger's doctoral thesis at Harvard), Kissinger chronicles a situation in the history of nineteenth century Europe comparable to the eastern Mediterranean situation in 1974. It was during the Greek war of independence against the Ottoman Turks in 1821:

The two conservators of the nineteenth century balance of power, Metternich and Castlereagh, counseled the Czar against intervening in the struggle notwithstanding the bloody Turkish reprisals against the Greek independence forces [which appalled European liberals]. Both Metternich and Castlereagh agreed with regret that while the Turkish excesses were deplorable, humanitarian considerations should be submerged in the interest of maintaining the continental order of which they were the principal architects.<sup>441</sup>

For Metternich and Castlereagh Russian involvement would only have been destabilising. From this one can infer, then, that Kissinger presumed high-handed American involvement during the 1974 Cyprus crisis would only have been destabilising. Alike Stern, Stanley Karnow of THE NEW REPUBLIC also sees a historical parallel, pointing out that Kissinger's handling of the 1974 Cyprus crisis (in effect, an 'eastern Mediterranean crisis' as Karnow refers to it),

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<sup>441</sup>Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.74.



"bears striking resemblance"<sup>442</sup> to Metternich and Castlereagh's handling of the 1821 situation.

To sum up and reiterate, then, "in response to the Cyprus crisis, Kissinger felt that the national interest demanded stability in the eastern Mediterranean, which was defined in policy terms as taking care not to antagonize the Turks."<sup>443</sup> This conception of the national interest defined in terms of the primacy of strategic interests over moral and legal considerations soon thereafter led "to the most dramatic and important congressional intervention in the conduct of foreign policy in recent years outside of Indochina - the cut-off of aid to Turkey."<sup>444</sup> Because of Kissinger's reluctance to take decisive action against the Turks, who were deemed by a majority of Congressmen as having violated the terms of U.S. military assistance laws by using American-made weaponry to conduct their military operations in Cyprus, an Executive-Congressional showdown ensued - dubbed as 'the Turkish arms embargo' case. The debate over whether or not an arms embargo should be imposed on Turkey became a textbook case of the showdown between an executive upholding the strategic imperative and a Congress upholding the legal-moral imperative in the conduct of foreign policy.

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<sup>442</sup> Stanley Karnow, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 7.

<sup>443</sup> See Op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS . . . . ., p.117 and op.cit. Kissinger, THE YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, pp.1190 -92.

<sup>444</sup> Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.36.

Among those who drew the lines for the battle over the Turkish arms embargo was Senator Edward Kennedy. During Senate hearings on the Cyprus crisis, Senator Kennedy underlined what he saw as the failure of U.S. policy to take into account the moral dimension involved in the Cyprus situation:

If Cyprus is on the brink of new conflict and even greater tragedy, our government's policy bears a special responsibility. For the omissions in our diplomacy over Cyprus, our support of the Turkish position, and the President's insistence on maintaining a business-as-usual attitude toward military shipments to Turkey, only encourages Ankara's intransigence and feeds frustrations on Cyprus and among our friends in neighbouring Greece..... In too many quarters -including our own government- the human dimensions of the Cyprus crisis, and the plight of Cypriot civilians, has taken second place to the political and military issues at stake.<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>445</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1974, A Study Mission Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Com. on the Judiciary. Oct. 14, 1974 and Senate Com. on the Judiciary, CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1975.....Senator Edward Kennedy's 'Preface' before these hearings.

## VII. Conclusion

Have the solutions developed in the case studies, to the questions posed in Chapter two, answered the problem of whether it is the Continuity or State Department theory which better explains U.S. foreign policy toward Cyprus? In other words, what have the case studies shown? In an important sense, both the 1963-64 and 1974 Cyprus crises had their origins in the longstanding Greek and Turkish nationalist struggle for the mastery of Cyprus. In the last decade of British colonial rule in Cyprus, in the fifties, this struggle took on the form of demands by the Greeks for Enosis (union with Greece) and demands by the Turks for Taksim (partition). With the failure of the Republic of Cyprus' 1960 constitution to provide for a *modus vivendi* among the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the central governmental organs of the Republic came to a virtual standstill in 1963. After months of heightened tension, in November 1963, President Makarios proposed amendments to the constitution which were perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as an attempt to relegate them to second class citizen status. In December, a year of heightened tension climaxed in the eruption of intercommunal conflict.

The intercommunal conflict of December 1963, and the ensuing civil strife that lasted for several months, was the occasion for the first international crisis on Cyprus. For about eight months, American foreign policymakers faced the

spectre of a Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus, which it was presumed would be the prelude to a full-scale Greek-Turkish war. Additionally, American policymakers feared Soviet penetration of the eastern Mediterranean through exploitation of the crisis. During this crisis the U.S. largely oscillated between a policy of 'passive evenhandedness' and a policy of 'active evenhandedness' - that is between a close-in support role to the UN and attempts at direct American mediation.<sup>446</sup> There was also American 'highhandedness', as the Americans came to regard in June that only a strongly-worded letter from President Johnson, in effect an ultimatum, would stop the Turks from armed intervention in Cyprus. America's collaboration with the British in late January which produced the NATO peacekeeping plan; Ball's February mission to the eastern Mediterranean to sell the plan; President Johnson's consultations with the Greek and Turkish Premiers in Washington in June; and the Acheson mediation effort at Geneva in July and August were reflective of American active evenhandedness. Therefore, American active evenhandedness was typical of U.S. policy during the early phase of the crisis, before UN intervention in March, and later in the crisis, when by June, it became clear that the UN could not sufficiently stabilise the situation. Despite Ball's failure to persuade Makarios to agree to a NATO peacekeeping plan, President Johnson's failure to persuade Greek Premier

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<sup>446</sup>See introductory chapter for definitions of these terms.

Papandreou to conduct direct Greek-Turkish talks on Cyprus without involving Makarios, and the failure of the Acheson plan, U.S. crisis diplomacy in 1964 must still be qualified as a success in terms of U.S. objectives at the time. U.S. policy during the 1964 crisis had been effective - success in crisis management, even though it was a failure in conflict resolution.

There had been Turkish aerial bombardment of Greek Cypriot forces in August 1964, but American diplomacy had staved off a full-scale Turkish landing on Cyprus and, perhaps, a full-scale Greco-Turkish war. Also, by joining Britain and Turkey in opposing the abrogation [by Makarios] of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, American diplomacy precluded the one scenario in which Cyprus could conceivably have become Cubanized. Had the U.S. taken a passive stand on the matter and refused British overtures to commit itself to the Cyprus issue, Moscow could have conceivably taken this as a signal of American indifference over Cyprus and encouraged Makarios to declare Cyprus a full-fledged neutral state no longer bound by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, which lays the Western allied imprint on Cyprus by giving Britain, Turkey, and Greece the right to collective or unilateral intervention in Cyprus. In the end, despite the occasional highhandedness during the affair, the U.S. managed to preserve its firm, if somewhat cooler, relations with its eastern Mediterranean allies, Greece and Turkey.<sup>447</sup>

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<sup>447</sup>For a positive appraisal of U.S. diplomacy during the 1963-64 crisis see E. Weintal and C. Bartlett, FACING THE

During the 1974 crisis, by contrast, U.S. policy was ineffective, as Cyprus ceased to be only a term of geographical reference, and became "a metaphor for American foreign policy failure under the leadership of Secretary of State Kissinger."<sup>448</sup> It did not stave off a Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus, and Kissinger's 'quiet diplomacy' of extreme restraint eroded U.S. influence in the eastern Mediterranean to a post-war low.<sup>449</sup> The common premise among American scholars and columnists is that the 1974 Cyprus crisis was "mismanaged", that there was a "foul-up", and that Secretary Kissinger reacted to the crisis "cavalierly and haphazardly."<sup>450</sup>

Within a couple of days of the August 14 Turkish military offensive in Cyprus, Greece, who blamed the U.S. for not stopping the Turks, withdrew from the military command of NATO. Unlike the 1964 case, which had no domestic

<sup>447</sup>(cont'd) BRINK:AN INTIMATE STUDY OF CRISIS DIPLOMACY, New York: Charles Scribner's, 1967.

<sup>448</sup>See L. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE:THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, New York:Times Books,1977, p.6.

<sup>449</sup>See L. Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed In Cyprus", FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1975, #19.

<sup>450</sup>Among others, see T. Szulc, THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON YEARS, New York:Viking Press, 1978; J. Stoessinger, HENRY KISSINGER: THE ANGUISH OF POWER, New York: Norton, 1976; S. Karnow, "Foul-up In The Mediterranean", NEW REPUBLIC, September 7, 1974; and HUMAN EVENTS, "How Kissinger Dropped Ball In Cyprus Crisis", September 14, 1974. Rather amusingly, the latter likens Kissinger to a star quarterback who dropped the ball: "the international reputation he won for himself as a diplomatic broker through his handling of the Arab-Israeli negotiations has been seriously tarnished by his total inability to bring his diplomatic talents to bear in the Cyprus crisis. It is now obvious that the Cyprus crisis has resulted in a disastrous diplomatic, political, and military defeat for the U.S. and NATO."

ramifications in the U.S., the 1974 case became domesticated as Greek-American activists, together with their allies in Congress, mobilized enough Congressional clout to impose an arms embargo on Turkey in December 1974. Turkey retaliated by announcing the suspension of certain American base rights in Turkey and Turko-American relations went into a demur. Judging from the vantage point of NATO's stability, then, the 1974 U.S. crisis management effort was a failure - it led to the impairment of the functioning of NATO's southeastern flank. It also left the U.S. with little or no credibility in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greeks rejected American mediation after the Turkish military offensive of August 14 and after the imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey, the U.S. found itself unable to facilitate progress toward a Cyprus settlement as the Turks did not want to be seen to be succumbing to American pressure. As a result, the Turks played deaf as the Americans called for Turkish flexibility on Cyprus. The U.S. found itself in a fix in the eastern Mediterranean. Greece, the Greek Cypriots, and the Greek ethnic lobby in the U.S. pressured the U.S. administration to persuade the Turks to withdraw from Cyprus, while the U.S. administration found itself unable to act as diplomatic broker in the face of the counterproductive effect the arms embargo had on the Turks.

In 1974, just about the only success the U.S. had was the Soviets' restraint in the matter. Even then, this was not really attributable to U.S. policy during the crisis,

but due to detente.

If the detente operated in this case [in the eastern Mediterranean] to diminish American diplomatic leverage, it also operated to limit the capacity or will of the Soviet Union to secure advantage from the resulting situation.<sup>451</sup>

Detente, however, did not mean that the Soviets exercised restraint globally but, on the contrary, in the seventies they adopted a confident "forward policy" or "assertive opportunism" which involved more venturesome regional policies.<sup>452</sup> In the eastern Mediterranean, though, unlike the situation in areas like the Horn of Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, where the interest in cooperation was subordinated to competitive interests, the Soviet Union could duefully exercise restraint and still benefit from the fissures that would result in the Western alliance because of a Cyprus crisis. The eastern Mediterranean, then, was not an arena where superpower clients clashed directly (e.g. Yom Kippur and Ogaden wars) or one where the superpowers competed because of a power vacuum (e.g. Angola) and hence the Soviet "forward policy" was not in evidence. Rather than having to project its power in one form or another, as in other regions, in the eastern Mediterranean the Soviet effort was directed at the cultivation of a benign image and the neutralization of

<sup>451</sup>See C. Bell, THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE, U.K.:M. Robertson, 1977, p. 155.

<sup>452</sup>These are the terminology of A. Rubinstein in "The Evolution of Soviet Strategy in The Middle East", ORBIS, Vol. 24, 1980-81, and C. Saivetz and S. Woodby in SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS, U.S.:Westview Press., 1985, respectively.



NATO's eastern wall through 'Finlandization' of the regional actors.<sup>453</sup> As such, the policy task for the Soviet Union during the 1974 Cyprus crisis translated into the exercising of restraint as Moscow could not risk jeopardising the success of having cultivated a benign image in the region.

During the 1974 crisis, then, the U.S. had not been able to: significantly exert power over events and abate the conflict of interests; prevent a Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus and the destabilisation of NATO's southeastern flank; and stop the erosion of U.S. influence in the region to a post-war low. Of course, a full-scale Greek-Turkish war had been avoided, but that was less the result of American pressure than it was the Greek military commander's refusal to implement Junta leader Ioannides' decision to attack Turkey.

While in 1964 U.S. policy oscillated between passive evenhandedness and active evenhandedness, with the application of highhandedness as necessary, U.S. policy in 1974 - ineffective as it was - was remarkably consistent.<sup>454</sup> Throughout the four week crisis, the U.S. pursued a quiet diplomacy of extreme restraint or constructive ambiguity.

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<sup>453</sup>The evolving East-West detente had made possible a Turko-Soviet rapprochement which came of age in the seventies. With a vehemently anti-communist military regime in power in Athens, and the already staunchly nonaligned Makarios in Cyprus, Turkey became the major target for Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean since inducing Turkey to opt for de facto nonalignment offered the best prospect of improving Soviet posture in that region.

<sup>454</sup>In the 1964 case, U.S. 'passive evenhandedness' denotes America's close-in support role and deference to the UN as a third party intermediary.

This involved a public posture of neutrality, low key involvement, and deference to the British third party intermediary role, coupled with behind the scenes transatlantic telephone or high-wire diplomacy by Kissinger to exert some influence over events. When one comes to the question of why the U.S worked through the British [as third party intermediaries] rather than the UN during the 1974 crisis, one sees a significant variation from the 1964 case as to the potential of the latter. In 1964 the UN assumed a third party intermediary role in the Cyprus crisis, but in 1974 the UN did not have the capacity or mandate to deal with what, in terms of a decade of UN involvement in Cyprus, was a novel situation. The 1964 UN role, supported by the guarantor powers, was one of trying to keep the peace among two warring ethnic communities (peacekeeping role) and attempting to settle their dispute once some order had been established (UN mediation under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General). In 1974, there had been double external intervention in Cyprus: first by Greece and then by Turkey, the two guarantor powers. Under such circumstances the UN could not play a significant role in 1974. It is the very definition of the UN's preventive diplomacy, that the role of the UN is to insulate a conflict from external intervention. Once the powers which had agreed to sanction the UN's preventive diplomacy decide to intervene, in an extra-diplomatic manner, the UN is left with no significant role. As 1964 Cyprus crisis manager George Ball explains,

The role of the UN peacekeeping force has been to interpose itself as a buffer between the contending forces. I think it is essential still [at this juncture, in 1974], but once you put the armed forces of a significant power such as Turkey on the island, it is hard for the UN forces to be very effective because there is a modern effective military force on one side while they are just a thin red line. Since they are only a handful and they can't engage in fighting, except for self-defence, what can they do?<sup>455</sup>

Hence, in 1974, when Turkey introduced some 20,000 to 40,000 professionally-trained troops to the island with tanks, heavy artillery, and aerial support, and engaged in 'blitzkrieg', the few thousand UN troops equipped with only jeeps and machine-guns could not - and did not - play a role during the crisis. With the UN's inability to assume a crisis management role as in 1964, on 18 July 1974 the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR aptly described the requisites for the management of the Cyprus crisis in "Britain Carries Cyprus Ball"<sup>456</sup>:

The Turks have every reason to be anxious about what may happen next. A Cyprus controlled from Athens is very unacceptable to them. As one diplomat put it, "the name of the game is keeping the Turks from intervening." Presumably they will hold back if given convincing commitments by Washington. The British alone simply cannot do it.<sup>457</sup>

The British, who a decade earlier had asked Washington to assume prime responsibility of the Cyprus issue, knew their limitations in the eastern Mediterranean. As a Foreign Office official in Whitehall who was deeply involved in the

<sup>455</sup>U.S. Congress, CYPRUS-1974. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe. 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., August 19 and 20, p.43.

<sup>456</sup>The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 18 July 1974.

<sup>457</sup>Ibid.

Cyprus issue put it," from the beginning we approached the situation with the attitude that Henry is going to do it. We did not repudiate our responsibility, but we needed support from the U.S."<sup>458</sup> Thus, in 1974, the British played the role of "the referee, trying to maintain order and keep the diplomatic ball in play while Kissinger tried to bring his leverage to bear behind the scenes."<sup>459</sup> As such, when Washington's attitude, under the leadership of Kissinger, was that "in the last three weeks of Nixon's Presidency we were in no position to make credible threats or credible promises - the instrumentalities of diplomacy",<sup>460</sup> there was no diplomatic muscle mustered in international diplomatic circles to exert influence over events in the eastern Mediterranean. U.S. policy in 1974, then, basically amounted to a policy of allowing the events run their course - albeit not intentionally, but in effect. In the end, as already recounted, Kissinger paid a high price for allowing events to run their course. He had misjudged Turkey's unwillingness to surrender the initiative (August 14 offensive), the political volatility of Greece (withdrawal from NATO's military command), the influence of the Greek ethnic lobby and the adversary temper of Congress (the Turkish arms embargo case and its consequences).

In late July 1974, however, it appeared for a while that another diplomatic triumph was in the making for Henry

<sup>458</sup>Op. cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p. 129.

<sup>459</sup>Ibid. p. 130.

<sup>460</sup>See H. Kissinger, THE YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, p. 1191.

Kissinger. After events had run their course considerably in the eastern Mediterranean, the Turks had intervened, gained a foothold, and agreed to a cease-fire in Cyprus, and democracy had been restored in both Greece and Cyprus<sup>461</sup>, it seemed that there emerged a state of equilibrium among the contending interests that the diplomatic managers could freeze into a status quo. Kissinger had taken the initiative in trying to help the Turks achieve their objective of writing a new political future for Cyprus in a manner that at the time would allow the new Greek government to save face.<sup>462</sup> After Greece and the Greek Cypriots had rejected the Turkish bizonal federation proposal at Geneva II, Kissinger told the Turks that "it would be difficult for both the Greek government and the Greek Cypriot leaders to accept a federation based on two separate regions, for it would appear as a division of the island into two, placing one part under Turkish hegemony."<sup>463</sup> Kissinger then urged the Turks to draft a cantonal federation plan, which the Turks did. In any case, as already recounted, Geneva II collapsed and Kissinger's efforts came to nought.

For Continuity theorists, Kissinger's clear pro-Turkish tilt at that juncture completes the evidence that, to reiterate, "Washington followed a single, premeditated,

<sup>461</sup> After the collapse of the Greek Junta in Athens, a couple of days after the Turkish armed intervention of July 20, its puppet [Sampson] regime in Cyprus also collapsed. In both Greece and Cyprus political figures steeped in the democratic tradition came to power - namely, Konstantin Karamanlis in Greece and Glafkos Clerides in Cyprus.

<sup>462</sup> See op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.131.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid.

unswerving pro-Turkish partition policy from the Acheson-Ball plan of 1964 to Kissinger's tilt toward Ankara of 1974."<sup>464</sup> Once again, and finally, the Continuity thesis is found wanting. It fails to account for change in American foreign policy toward Cyprus. Historically speaking, the 'Acheson-Ball plan' and the 'Kissinger's tilt toward Ankara in 1974' are two instances on a wide spectrum. If the Continuity theory can claim to explain those instances, it clearly does not explain why the U.S. supported the Republic of Cyprus after its independence in 1960 until the 1963-64 crisis when its support for Makarios began to sour; it does not explain why after the failure of the Acheson plan and the end of that crisis, American policy shifted toward support for the intercommunal talks which began in 1968 under the auspices of the UN; it does not explain why U.S. policy was to support this dialogue, with its underlining of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and the establishment of a modified 1960 constitution, and to oppose thoughts of a coup by Athens against Makarios. The answer is simple. There was indeed a continuity in U.S. policy toward Cyprus, but of a different kind: U.S. policy towards Cyprus has always been based on a policy of realism, the structural imperatives of Realpolitik. U.S. policy at every turn has steered in the direction of whichever option offered the best prospects for stabilising the Cyprus situation and, ultimately, the eastern Mediterranean. As Glen Camp

<sup>464</sup>See G. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict Over Cyprus", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 95/4, 1980-81, p.53.

explains, characterising U.S. diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean as one of political realism,

the statesman is thus a realist seeking a settlement based upon the existing balance of power, not an idealist seeking to rectify passionately felt injustices. Structurally....., a policy of realism often neglects justices and tends to apotheosise stability regardless of how achieved.<sup>465</sup>

In his memoirs, *THE YEARS OF UPHEAVAL*, Kissinger, after offering a capsule history of the "atavistic bitterness" and "blood feud" between the Greeks and Turks traced back to the Byzantine-Ottoman animosity, points out that Cyprus is 44 miles from mainland Turkey with a population of 80 per cent Greek and about 20 per cent Turk - "a lethal cocktail."<sup>466</sup> Kissinger's remark on Cyprus encapsulates the thrust of American policy toward Cyprus from 1964 to 1974: a policy based on the imperatives of the regional balance of power rather than local/Cypriot questions of equity. The U.S. as a global power and senior alliance manager could not afford to look at Cyprus out of the context of the eastern Mediterranean triangle; even though this would be erroneous from the vantage point of 'Western liberal democracy', which would dictate that given the size of the Greek Cypriot population, Cyprus should be a unitary state based on majority rule - Enosis. The U.S. has not supported Enosis. A continuity in U.S. policy has been that if there is to be stability in the eastern Mediterranean then Turkey's stake in Cyprus has to be acknowledged. The "lethal cocktail"

<sup>465</sup>Op.cit. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict Over Cyprus", p.44.

<sup>466</sup>Op.cit. Kissinger, *YEARS OF UPHEAVAL*, p.1189.

represents the paradox of eastern Mediterranean politics which has led to all the turbulence in Cyprus.

Though the Turks comprised only 18 per cent of the island's population, it was the Greek Cypriots who constituted the true minority in their corner of the Mediterranean. A glance at the map shows that Cyprus lies in the shadow of the Anatolian peninsula, the jumping-off point for a Turkish military machine that could easily devastate the Greek Cypriots and any mainland Greek expeditionary force that crossed the Mediterranean to do battle there.<sup>467</sup>

This structural imperative of Realpolitik, the American cognizance of the need to enter Turkey's objectives in Cyprus into any Cypriot political calculation, led Acheson to propose Greece and Turkey's dominion over Cyprus in 1964, and moved Kissinger a decade later to favour a solution to the Cyprus problem along the lines of cantonal federation (not partition). The U.S. policy of Realpolitik, which apotheosised stability, thus adapted to changing circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1964, in the latter part of the Cyprus crisis, Realpolitik dictated that American diplomacy favour Greek and Turkish mainland dominion over Cyprus; in the inter-crisis era it dictated U.S. diplomatic support for the intercommunal dialogue which aimed at establishing a *modus operandi* along the lines of the 1960 constitution; and in 1974 it moved Kissinger to favour a cantonal federation solution for Cyprus.

Evidently, then, the history of American diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean has not been wholly monochromatic, an example of Cold War doctrine exerting power over events.

<sup>467</sup>Op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.80.



Rather, as has been shown, that history has been etched and overtaken by regional subsystemic events and differing conceptions among American statesmen as to which diplomatic strategies offered the better prospect for eastern Mediterranean stability.

The task to be accomplished hereafter is the substantiation of the aforementioned, through the scrutiny of relevant internal and external factors which figure prominently in the evaluation of U.S. policy effectiveness, the potency of which have not been affirmed by the case studies. In this regard, there should be analysed the national level variable of the influence of the Greek ethnic lobby in the U.S. in the aftermath of the 1974 crisis, the potency of systemic variables, namely the role of Turkish and Soviet behaviour in accounting for the results of the crises. Since the crisis management descriptors model prompted a study of American crisis diplomacy, the case studies could not incorporate a mini-case study of American post-crisis diplomacy and a mini-case study of Turkish and Soviet behaviour and relations in the inter-crisis era [1964-1974]. Nevertheless, the importance of these factors became evident on comparison of the two cases. When compared, one sees that one of the major differences between the two cases is that, unlike the 1964 case which remained an exclusively [U.S.] executive affair, the 1974 crisis became domesticated in the U.S. and led to a bitter legislative-executive showdown over America's eastern

Mediterranean posture. As such, it is necessary to extend the analysis of U.S. diplomacy further down the road to the immediate aftermath of the 1974 crisis, as this strengthens the validity of the State Department theory. Another major difference between the two cases, revealed through comparison, is the nature of regional subsystemic change as it contributed to the political outcomes of 1974. Hence, in support of the State Department thesis and *inter alia* the relative effectiveness of U.S. policy in 1964 and ineffectiveness in 1974, two prime situational/systemic factors need to be mentioned in accounting for the results of the crises. These factors are the nature of Turkish and Soviet foreign policy during the 1964-74 era, as they relate to each other and the U.S.

The Turkish arms embargo debate between the Ford administration and Congress in the immediate aftermath of Turkey's controversial Peace Operation II, contributed to the failure of U.S. crisis diplomacy in 1974. The pivotal argument of the pro-embargo activists had to do with 'the Rule of Law'. The central and simple notion, in this view, was that continuing to supply arms to Turkey after its use of American-supplied military equipment in its military operations in Cyprus, represented a serious violation of U.S. laws.<sup>468</sup> As Eugene Rossides, chairman of the American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee, put it, "the

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<sup>468</sup>See P. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS, CONGRESS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE POLITICS OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO. U.S.:Greenwood Press, 1984, p.112.

basic overriding issue is, of course, the rule of law."<sup>469</sup> In the view of the pro-embargo activists, even if Turkey's first 'peace operation' could be regarded as the exercising of its legal right of unilateral intervention under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey's second 'peace operation' of August 14 was clear aggression and thus in violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Sales Act of 1968. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provided that: "defense articles and defense services to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense."<sup>470</sup> Further, the 1961 Act stipulated that any country which hereafter uses defense articles and defense services furnished..., in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter ....., shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.<sup>471</sup> Additionally, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 also outlined similar penalties for the misuse of equipment acquired through sales agreements with the U.S. The rule of law argument coupled with the moral argument that even if Turkey had not used U.S. arms in its August 14 Cyprus operation, which was deemed as overtly aggressive, "it is a basic principle of U.S. foreign policy to oppose

aggression,"<sup>472</sup> provided the pro-embargo activists with a

<sup>469</sup>U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations. SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY. 94th Congress, 1st session, July 10, 1975, p.108.

<sup>470</sup>Op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS....., p.114.

<sup>471</sup>Ibid.

<sup>472</sup> Eugene Rossides, Chairman of the American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee, at a Congressional

powerful case for the embargo.<sup>473</sup> Benjamin Rosenthal, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Europe, argued in this vogue that,

the U.S. bears not only the legal responsibility for which we are in unconditional violation of our own laws, but also a major moral responsibility in violation of the UN Charter, the NATO covenants, and our own agreements with both nations.<sup>474</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of Turkey's second military operation in Cyprus, at a news conference on 19 August 1974, Kissinger was questioned as to what his understanding of the legal terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was, "whether the U.S. was required under the terms of of the 1961 Act to cut military assistance to Turkey?"<sup>475</sup> Kissinger evasively answered: "well, I will have to get a legal opinion on that subject, which I have not done."<sup>476</sup> Later, on 22 October 1974, Edward Kennedy, as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees, sent a letter to Kissinger asking him what the administration's "final conclusion" on the legality of continuing military assistance to Turkey was.<sup>477</sup> In

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<sup>472</sup>(cont'd) hearing. Op.cit. SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS....., p.110.

<sup>473</sup>On Capitol Hill, the pro-embargo movement was spearheaded by Greek-American Congressmen John Brademas, Paul Sarbanes, Gus Yatron, Peter Kyros, Skip Bafalis, and non-Greek ethnic Representatives Benjamin Rosenthal and Donald Riegle, and Senators Thomas Eagleton, Edward Kennedy, and Lyodd Bentsen.

<sup>474</sup>Remarks by Benjamin Rosenthal at a meeting of the House of Representatives, September 24, 1974. Quoted in op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS..., p.113.

<sup>475</sup>Secretary of State Kissinger's August 19, 1974, news conference printed in DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, July-December, Vol.71, 1974, p.357.

<sup>476</sup>Ibid.

<sup>477</sup>U.S Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

November 1974, the administration's reply came from Linwood Holton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional affairs:

after carefully weighing the legal and foreign policy considerations, the Administration decided that it was impossible to express a legal conclusion on the issue of Turkey's eligibility for further assistance and sales without undermining our foreign policy objectives of persuading Turkey and Greece to enter into direct negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem.<sup>478</sup>

This argument, that following the rule of law undermined U.S. foreign policy objectives in the eastern Mediterranean, became part of the U.S. administration's assertion of the primacy of strategic interests in the determination of its eastern Mediterranean policy. Secretary Kissinger's definition of the national interest in strategic terms, which in the case of the eastern Mediterranean translated into a policy that equated the interests of the U.S. and NATO with recognition of Turkey's presumed supreme importance, constituted the administration's 'defence' against the pro-embargo group in Congress. At a Congressional hearing, Undersecretary Sisco, outlined Turkey's strategic importance in the following terms:

with respect to NATO responsibilities, Turkey has somewhere between 450,000 to 500,000 armed forces. It is a key military force in the eastern Mediterranean and in terms of the whole southern flank of NATO.... We believe that Turkey is significant because it is right there up along the border of the Soviet Union. There are very important

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<sup>477</sup> (cont'd) HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS, PART II, December 17, 1974, p. 39.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid. p. 46.

facilities and installations which we use.... We feel the Turkish facilities are a key to the strategic situation. When you consider how important Turkey is in this context, particularly if one relates it to the instability that exists in the Middle East, combined with the instability which I believe exists the eastern Mediterranean today as a result of the differences over Cyprus....., you can see why we are deeply concerned.<sup>479</sup>

Despite the administration's opposition, however, in December 1974 Congress passed legislation for the imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey, which was to go into effect as of February 1975 -- an act Secretary Kissinger called a "national tragedy."<sup>480</sup> Having failed to stop Congress, despite a couple of Presidential vetoes,<sup>481</sup> in the new year (1975) the U.S. administration turned its energies toward effecting the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Turkey. To that end, in the fall of 1975, President Ford sent a letter to Congressman Thomas Morgan, chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, outlining the

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<sup>479</sup>Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph Sisco's testimony, in op.cit. U.S Congress, SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS.....,p.11.

<sup>480</sup>See op. cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...", p.36.

<sup>481</sup>Congressional deliberations on the issue of military aid to Turkey began in the early fall of 1974. The primary vehicle for embargo proponents was the amendment of continuing appropriations legislation. The Eagleton amendment in the Senate and the Rosenthal-Du Pont amendment in the House called contained provisions calling for an immediate ban on arms to Turkey. Despite intensive administration lobbying, the continuing appropriations measure with the Turkish arms ban provision passed both houses in October but was vetoed by President Ford. After President Ford's rejection, the House and Senate redrew a new appropriations bill, which this time authorized the President to delay a ban on military aid to Turkey until 10 December 1974, but required that the ban be imposed immediately if Turkey shipped any additional military equipment to Cyprus before that date. President Ford vetoed this new bill as well.

administration's position. The letter constituted a succinct statement of the administration's eastern Mediterranean posture.

I am convinced that immediate Congressional action is needed to relax the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey if U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean are not to be jeopardised beyond repair.

U.S.-Turkish ties have been subjected to intense strains since the arms embargo went into effect on February 5...., the Turkish Government suspended operations at major U.S. military facilities which provided intelligence collection capability and support to U.S. and NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The affected facilities are vital to U.S. and western security. I firmly believe failure to lift the embargo soon will lead to complete closure of a majority of U.S. installations in Turkey. Some of these installations are unique and irreplaceable.

Not only does the embargo harm U.S. and NATO security interests, it is a major impediment to negotiations toward a constructive settlement of the tragic Cyprus problem. It also serves generally to prevent the improvement of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, without which a Cyprus settlement is unlikely.

I intend to continue my effort to help achieve a Cyprus solution, to improve further U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO relations, and to contribute to a broad relaxation of tensions between Greece and Turkey. I also will do everything possible to ensure the overall relationships in NATO are strengthened and that essential U.S. security interests are safeguarded. In that regard, it cannot be in our interest to risk further weakening Turkey's ties with the Western alliance system....I believe the arms ban should be removed in its entirety at the earliest possible date [to] permit us to begin the essential task of rebuilding our bilateral relationship with Turkey...."<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>482</sup> The text of President Ford's letter can be found in, U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING AND THE PARTIAL LIFTING OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO. Hearing before the Committee on S.2230 (document of December 1974 authorizing an arms embargo on Turkey). 94th Congress, 1st session, Sept. 17, 1975, p.4.

Thus, that the outcome of the 1974 Cyprus crisis constituted a failure for U.S. foreign policy was not in doubt, save for the Continuity theorists, but what was in doubt was who was to blame for the deterioration of America's position in the eastern Mediterranean. U.S.-Turkish, U.S.-Greek, Greek-Turkish relations were all stymied and the Cyprus question was frozen, as there could be no progress toward a settlement given this state of affairs. The crux of the matter is that the Cyprus crisis resulted in destabilizing the eastern Mediterranean, and, hence, negatively affected the U.S. and NATO. On this count, the executive branch of government and Congress blamed each other. Congressional criticism of the administration was directed at the major architect of U.S. foreign policy during the Cyprus crisis, Secretary Kissinger. Congressional critics who for too long felt alienated by Kissinger's coldly pragmatic, arrogant, highly personalized approach to foreign policy, and his near monopolisation of foreign policymaking power in the hands of the White House and Foggy Bottom (rather than seeking a balance between the two and Capitol Hill), used his handling of the Cyprus crisis and the ensuing Turkish arms embargo ban dispute to question the canons of his foreign policy. Senator Eagleton, one of the forerunners of the pro-embargo group, attacked Kissinger's opposition to Congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs and what he characterized as Kissinger's ill-conceived policy tilts.



We are told to ignore the law, we are told that Henry does not like the law; that Henry will have his hands tied, just as Henry said we would tie his hands if we terminated the Cambodian bombing.... our distinguished Secretary of State is famous for his tilts. He tilts toward the junta in Chile. He tilts toward Thieu in Vietnam. His most famous tilt was the pro-Pakistan tilt. His current tilt, his Turkey tilt, is no wiser than the other tilts.<sup>483</sup>

The Turkish arms embargo debate was more than a policy debate, however, because Kissinger's personal prestige was caught up in it. In the words of Laurence Stern of the WASHINGTON POST, "it drew the Secretary of State into the severest confrontation he has ever faced with Congress, one which was described on the House floor early in the debate as 'Kissinger's Watergate and Waterloo'."<sup>484</sup> Another pro-embargo Senator, Adlai Stevenson, leveled a ferocious attack at Kissinger that went beyond criticism of Kissinger's eastern Mediterranean policy.

Now that history has stripped the policies of Henry Kissinger of their pretensions to grandeur and his actions of their pretensions of success, the Secretary is casting the blame upon Congress.... The Congress is to blame for the deterioration of America's position in the world, but not for reasons assigned by the Secretary of State. Congress is to blame because for too long its members naively applauded the adventures of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon [and] they became part of the personality cult.... Now in the twilight they see the errors of personal diplomacy.<sup>485</sup>

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<sup>483</sup>Congressional Record, December 4, 1974, 120:33268. Reprinted in op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS, CONGRESS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, p.127.

<sup>484</sup>Op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons....", p.41.

<sup>485</sup>Quoted in L. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, New York:Times Books, 1977, p.151 and op.cit. Watanabe, ETHNIC GROUPS...., p.127.

Kissinger, for his part, looked upon the Greek-American activists, the most prominent members of which he had met shortly after the Cyprus crisis, as playing ethnic politics. He regarded them as acting upon emotion rather than bearing the national interest in mind. Joseph Harsch of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reflected Kissinger's view that "nowhere else are there so many vigorous ethnic minorities who often get emotional about matters they really don't understand."<sup>486</sup> In broader terms, for Kissinger whose personal prestige was caught up in the Turkish arms ban debate, the issue was not one of simply Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. It was much more fundamentally, in his view, the issue of Congressional challenge to the foreign policy leadership of the President of the U.S. and the Secretary of State.<sup>487</sup> On January 25, 1975, in a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council entitled "Toward a New National Partnership [Executive-Congress]", Secretary Kissinger, with the Turkish arms question clearly in mind, unleashed an attack against what he saw as excessive Congressional meddling in foreign policy:

the growing tendency of the Congress to legislate in detail the day-to-day or week-to-week conduct of our foreign affairs raises grave issues. American policy - given the wide range of our interests and responsibilities - must be a coherent and purposeful whole. The way we act in our relations with one

<sup>486</sup>J. Harsch, "The Turkish Aid Cutoff", CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, October 8, 1974.

<sup>487</sup>This view was expressed by C. Hackett, staff consultant for Europe, House Committee on International Relations., when interviewed by P. Watanabe. See op.cit. Watanabe, pp. 128-29.

country almost inevitably affects our relationship with others. To single out individual countries [namely, Turkey] for special legislative attention has unintended but inevitable consequences and risks unravelling the entire fabric of our foreign policy.<sup>488</sup>

It is rather an irony, that at a time when the U.S. administration was extremely worried about America's political-military posture in the eastern Mediterranean and Kissinger was talking of the need for American policy to be a coherent and purposeful whole, Continuity theorists, in looking at the outcomes of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, were talking of the American rational monolith's success in carving-up Cyprus. According to Continuity theorist Michael Attaliades, before the 1974 Cyprus crisis, one could

almost hear State Department policymakers think, we almost lost both Greece and Turkey in 1964-67 trying to prevent a war between the two. if we let them both have their heads and support the stronger, we might lose the weaker (but this is unlikely with a communistophobic dictatorship ruling Greece). One way or another Greece and Turkey between them will have solved the "Makarios problem" [the dangers of an independent, nonaligned, and recalcitrant Cyprus].<sup>489</sup>

In Attaliades' view, given this background of the persistent American desire to effect the partition of Cyprus, there can only be one interpretation of the 1974 crisis outcome from the American standpoint: unqualified success. To this effect, Attaliades quotes another Continuity theorist, Christopher Hitchens, with approval.

<sup>488</sup> U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, The Secretary of State. Speech: A New National Partnership. January 24, 1975, p.6. Emphasis added.

<sup>489</sup> M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Edinburgh: Q. Press, 1979, pp.184-85.

The island has been effectively partitioned, though the proportions may be varied in a cosmetic way. The U-2 planes continue to take-off from British bases to overfly the Middle East. The possibility of a communist takeover internally or externally has been avoided by the simple fact that there are nearly as many NATO soldiers on the island as there are left-wingers.<sup>490</sup>

It now becomes clear that the Continuity thesis rests upon a narrow world-view, in the tradition of the rational actor model; one that takes the domestic political environment as given. As such, Continuity theorists fail to take into account the consequences of Kissinger's handling of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, namely the Congressional movement to impose an arms embargo on Turkey and its ramifications. They fail to realize that in the U.S. 'Cyprus' was not that big of an issue, save for the Greek ethnic lobby which turned it into one. Further, it should be recognized that the Continuity thesis rests upon a particular view of the external environment; one in which U.S. influence in the eastern Mediterranean is seen to inhere in the attributes of the U.S. Influence, however, can only be evaluated in any real sense, and even then very tenuously, by considering the government to government relationship between the U.S. and a regional actor and the regional subsystem in which they are interacting. As such, Continuity theorists are in fact recasting history by imputing purpose and omnipotence to the U.S. and assigning the status of strategic maestroism to Kissinger, when the very state of the quadrangular relationship in the aftermath of the crisis defies such

<sup>490</sup> Ibid. p.186.

interpretations. The Continuity interpretation is of course rendered plausible if one overlooks the Congressional backlash, and the fact that in the summer of 1974 Kissinger was preoccupied, externally, with superpower summitry and the Middle East, and, internally, with Watergate. Kissinger didn't care less about Cyprus until the crisis exploded.

Unlike the 1964 case, the 1974 crisis was managed by the U.S. administration without a President at its helm. Richard Nixon, living the last weeks of his Presidency in severe depression and as a recluse, did not get involved with the Cyprus issue. This is in marked contrast to the 1964 case where President Johnson was firmly in charge of the Cyprus crisis management effort. Continuity theorists simply ignore the fact that the Cyprus crisis was managed against the background of Watergate. It has already been mentioned how HUMAN EVENTS magazine commented on Kissinger's "total inability to bring his diplomatic talents to bear in the Cyprus crisis." John Stoessinger, Kissinger's long-standing friend from Harvard, points out the reason as being that

most of Kissinger's energies during the final phase of the Cyprus denouement were absorbed by Watergate. The agonies of the Presidential transition had left him virtually spent during this time of depression and uncertainty. He was unable to muster his usual determination and vitality.<sup>491</sup>

In his memoirs, Kissinger excuses his failure to significantly exert influence over events in 1974 and

<sup>491</sup> J. Stoessinger, HENRY KISSINGER: THE ANGUISH OF POWER. New York: W.W Norton, 1976, p.143.

formulate a coherent Cyprus policy by asserting the personal struggle for preeminence between himself and Secretary of Defence Schlesinger, which, with no Presidential direction, rendered U.S. policy ineffective.

Even in the third week of July [during the 1974 Cyprus crisis] it was clear that we were losing control over events. Foreign policy, as I have repeatedly stated, is the mastery of nuance; it requires the ability to relate disparate elements into a pattern. That coherence was rapidly disintegrating.

Our internal disputes were no longer geared to substance; they had become a struggle for preeminence. Schlesinger and I battled over turf continually; every issue, whether it was SALT or human rights or Cyprus, became a source of tension between us. The bureaucratic struggle reduced my dominance only to create a deadlock; for it could not be resolved by a President in extremis 3000 miles away [in San Clemente].<sup>492</sup>

While the 1974 Cyprus crisis caught Washington without a Commander-in-Chief, in the crucial initial phase of the crisis the decision-making machineries in Athens and Nicosia were also out of kilter. In crisis management theory it is a rarely expressed assumption, probably because it is taken for granted, that successful crisis management requires that there be rational interlocutors on all ends of the crisis interaction system (i.e. responsible and representative authorities in all parties to the dispute). It is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for successful crisis management that there be rational interlocutors that can receive and evaluate diplomatic communications (protest, disapproval, support, threat, etc.) and make decisions or

<sup>492</sup> See H. Kissinger, THE YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, p.1192. Emphasis added.

non-decisions in response. The ouster of Makarios in Cyprus and faceless junta leaders in the final days of their reign in Greece, left Nicosia and Athens without rational interlocutors. U.S. Undersecretary Sisco, while in Athens on July 19, was unable to immediately make contact with responsible Greek authorities. Sisco is known to have lamented that "this is the god damnest government I have ever had to deal with."<sup>493</sup> Thus, while in 1974 there were no rational interlocutors in the eastern Mediterranean, save for the Ecevit government in Turkey, in 1964 there had been Makarios in Cyprus, George Papandreou in Greece, and Ismet Inonu in Turkey.

When one comes to the question of the nature of regional subsystemic change, as it contributed to the political outcomes of 1974, one sees that the 1963-64 crisis had occurred during the last leg of a loose bipolar system increasingly being punctuated by the forces of polycentricism. By the time of the 1974 crisis, the detente that had evolved at the international level had a two-way reinforcing effect that resulted in the increased likelihood of Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus (viz. diminishing costs and risks for Turkey) and the de facto partition that would be the result of that intervention. On the one hand, detente led to extreme Soviet restraint in the eastern Mediterranean, and on the other hand, detente, by decreasing American diplomatic leverage over Turkey and diminishing, the

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<sup>493</sup> See op.cit. Stern, "Bitter Lessons...".

Turkish perception of a Soviet threat and a sense of its vulnerability, increased the scope for local intransigence (viz. that the Turkish national interest would not be subordinated to Western allied interests).

During the 1963-64 crisis, the sabre-rattling and risk-acceptant personality of Khrushchev came to bear as the Cyprus crisis took on cold war overtones in the early phase of that crisis. American policymakers looked on anxiously as Khrushchev staunchly supported Makarios who had defied the Anglo-American effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem within the NATO framework. While supporting Makarios' policy of taking the Cyprus issue to the international public forum of UN diplomacy and supplying arms to Makarios, the Soviets had abstained when a vote was taken on the sending of a peacekeeping force to Cyprus. Moscow perceived UNFICYP to be a stabilizing force in an otherwise potentially "revolutionary situation."<sup>494</sup> By June 20, 1964, Moscow had changed its position on UNFICYP and had voted for the renewal of the mandate for that force. On June 19, in notes sent to the U.S., U.K., Greece, Turkey, and France, the Soviet government strongly emphasised the UN role in the crisis and suggested that the U.S.S.R. supported the independence of Cyprus and opposed any external intervention. This sudden change in Soviet policy was a reaction to President Johnson's efforts to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem through direct Greco-Turkish talks and

<sup>494</sup> See T. Adams and A. Cottrell, CYPRUS-BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1968, p.36.



his invitation of the Greek and Turkish Premiers to Washington for consultations. The American policymaker's fear at this time, that "the Soviets see the Cypriot political maze as 'made to order for a Communist takeover'."<sup>495</sup> seems to be unfounded. Soviet policy during the crisis was merely one of reacting to American initiatives, making sure that they could keep up with the Americans. When, in January, the U.S. had proposed a NATO peacekeeping force for Cyprus, the Soviet Union reacted by throwing its weight behind Makarios who had refused the American initiative. When, as mentioned, President Johnson personally took a hand in seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem through Greco-Turkish talks, the Soviet Union reacted by emphasising the UN role in the crisis. Ironically enough, since it is often the U.S.'s avowed purpose, Soviet diplomacy was geared toward the preservation of the status-quo (as it existed during the crisis; which was rather different from constitutional arrangements) in Cyprus -- the rule of Makarios. For Moscow, Makarios' policy of nonalignment was an effective guarantee against the NATOization of Cyprus; there is no evidence that the Soviet Union envisaged a communist takeover of Cyprus. Seeing to it that Makarios remained in power was a policy that did not carry the risks and costs of attempting a communist takeover of an island under the international guarantee of three NATO powers - Greece, Turkey, and Britain.

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<sup>495</sup>R. Brunn, "Johnson Seeks Cyprus Showdown", CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 18, p.1.

Despite expressions of support for Makarios, warnings against external intervention in Cyprus, and the supplying of arms to Makarios throughout the crisis, when in August 1964 Turkey conducted aerial bombardment of Greek Cypriot targets, Moscow exercised restraint. Although Makarios appealed for Soviet armed intervention on his behalf, Moscow did no more than extend him the sympathies of the Soviet people. The Soviet restraint at that stage of the crisis was a prime factor in the abatement of the crisis. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, having received no support from either Greece or the Soviet Union, Makarios desisted from hostilities against the Turkish Cypriots and began seeking a rapprochement with them so as not to give Turkey an excuse for intervention. After the abatement of the 1963-64 crisis and the advent of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, the Kremlin apparently reassessed its Cyprus policy. In January 1965, a senior Politburo member, Nikolai Podgorny, led a delegation to Turkey. During his visit, as a first for a Soviet official, Podgorny spoke of the "two communities" on Cyprus as having sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legal rights. This long had been the Turkish position, and was the basis of the Turkish demand for a federated state of Cyprus.<sup>496</sup> Later, in a series of Turko-Soviet joint comminiques, the Soviet Union continued to announce its adherence to the pro-Turkish "two communities" concept.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>496</sup>See op.cit. Adams and Cottrell, p.42.

<sup>497</sup>In May 1965 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Ankara; in August 1965 Turkish Premier Urguplu visited Moscow; in December 1966 Soviet Premier Kosygin visited

This change in the Soviet position was part of a larger Soviet policy objective, that of cultivating good relations with Turkey and possibly luring Turkey away from the U.S. [inducing Turkey to opt for de facto nonalignment] or at least gaining enough influence in Ankara to stop the T. from invading Cyprus should another Cyprus crisis come to the fore. The major Soviet instrument of policy, to that end, has been the provision of economic assistance to Turkey. During the period from the mid-Sixties through the seventies the U.S.S.R. provided Turkey with about \$2 billion worth of economic assistance. In the seventies, Turkey was the recipient of more Soviet economic assistance than any other developing country.

Especially important has been the Soviet role in Turkey's energy program. Oil poor....., Turkey welcomed the U.S.S.R.'s assistance which has included the construction of several thermal plants, dams, and a nuclear power plant with a guarantee of fuel for its operation; exploration for oil in southeastern Turkey; the sale of larger quantities of oil; and erection of a second power transmission line that will more than double Turkey's imports of electricity from the U.S.S.R.<sup>498</sup>

Based on the experiences of the 1963-64 crisis, the Soviet Union generally assumed that any Turkish intervention in Cyprus would be against the Makarios regime, and, by implication, detrimental to Soviet interests. By 1974, this situation had changed drastically. With the ouster of

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<sup>497</sup> (cont'd) Ankara; and in 1967 Turkish Premier Demirel visited Moscow.

<sup>498</sup> A. Rubinstein, SOVIET POLICY TOWARD TURKEY, IRAN, AND AFGHANISTAN: THE DYNAMICS OF INFLUENCE. New York: Praeger, 1982, p.28.

Makarios by the vehemently anti-communist Athens junta, which was loathed by Moscow, the Soviets exercised extreme restraint as the Turks launched a full-scale landing on Cyprus. In fact, the Soviets tacitly supported the Turkish action. On July 22, Soviet news organ PRAVDA portrayed the Turkish armed intervention as a means

to enable the legitimate government of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios to remove all Greek servicemen from the island, and it took favourable note of Turkey's assertion that military action was necessary because peaceful ways of settling the conflict had been exhausted.<sup>499</sup>

A week later, however, after Turkish Premier Ecevit's announcement of Turkey's intention to remain on the island, the Kremlin became anxious and PRAVDA announced that

the question whether there is or is not to be an independent sovereign state and member of the UN is most acute... Certain NATO circles are working towards confronting the world with the *fait accompli* of the partition of the country, or at least creating the conditions of such a partition... In effect, an effort is being made to consolidate the occupation of the island.<sup>500</sup>

Despite this anxiety felt over developments in Cyprus, the Soviet Union confined itself to verbal innuendo rather than substantive practical measures in the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Evidently, the Soviets were not prepared to risk the rupturing of the regional detente with Turkey and the international detente with the U.S. for the sake of Cyprus and Archbishop Makarios. Such was the Soviet restraint that

<sup>499</sup>R. Cutler, "Domestic and Foreign Influences on Policy Making: The Soviet Union in the 1974 Cyprus Conflict", SOVIET STUDIES, Vol.37, #1, 1985, pp.65-66.

<sup>500</sup>Ibid. p.66.

even Soviet polemics were directed at the safe target of "NATO circles", rather than explicit denunciation of the U.S. and Kissinger's policies. As such, for the U.S. the 1974 Cyprus crisis was a classic case of alliance management - without the complications of Soviet involvement. The 1963-64 crisis, by contrast, was more than an alliance management problem for the U.S, as there was the American perception of the potential for Soviet penetration, through exploitation of the crisis and the resulting instability in the eastern Mediterranean, of NATO's eastern wall.

In 1964 Turkey had faced a double deterrent against Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus. In the final analysis, both American and Soviet diplomacy toward Turkey constituted deterrent diplomacy. Both superpowers, albeit for different reasons, worked toward forestalling the Turks: the Americans did so because they feared a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a Greco-Turkish war and undermine NATO's southeastern flank; the Soviets did so in their support of Makarios' independent and nonaligned posture, which Turkish intervention would have presumably terminated. By 1974, the forementioned situational change [Soviet-Turkish relations] had the effect of alleviating Turkey from the Soviet deterrent. In 1974, Turkey had been faced with the American deterrent (Sisco's attempt to stop the Turks) but the detente which had been evolving at the international level weakened that deterrent, for reasons that will become clear shortly, leaving Turkey with its hands tied virtually loose;

to intervene.

Detente redistributes diplomatic leverage in the international system, which results in the loss of diplomatic leverage by the great powers against middle-power allies. Middle-level powers believe themselves able to defy pressures from senior allies, in a way that would have been unlikely during the more systemically tight and systemically discrete years of the cold war.<sup>501</sup> As Coral Bell points out,

the central tensions of a cold war give...., middle-powers like Turkey a strong sense of their own vulnerability and therefore a reason for keeping local tensions reasonably low. Detente reduces the sense of threat, and thereby increases the scope for local intransigence.<sup>502</sup>

That detente had this effect in the eastern Mediterranean is in evidence, as a Turkish diplomat in Washington during the 1974 crisis said:

the Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the golden opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964... the U.S. leverage on us in 1974 was minimal. We could no longer be scared off by threats of the Soviet bogeyman.<sup>503</sup>

All this does not enable one to say with certainty that there was nothing the U.S. could do to change the course of events in 1974. It can be argued that there could have been much heavier Washington pressure against the junta to stop

501 'Systemic discreteness' refers to the degree of intra-bloc cohesion and 'systemic discreteness' refers to the extent to which there is inter-bloc interaction.

502 C. Bell, THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE: THE KISSINGER ERA. U.K.:M. Robertson, 1977, p.138.

503 Op.cit. Stern, THE WRONG HORSE, p.117. Emphasis added in underlining.

the coup, and, failing that, against the Turks to stop the armed intervention. Could heavier American pressure changed eastern Mediterranean history? To this effect, it is apt to quote at some length Coral Bell's conclusive remarks in this regard.

It cannot of course be shown conclusively that heavier American pressure would still have failed to deter the local decision-makers from the choices they saw as in their best interests. But diplomatic pressure to be effective, requires a rational decision-maker at the other end to receive the pressure and to weigh up what he has to gain against what he has to lose. It is difficult to see any rational interlocutor in either Athens or Nicosia in the immediate aftermath of July 15. There was a rational interlocutor in Ankara, but here the changed distribution of diplomatic leverage exerted its effect. "What is the 'or else' we have to put to them?" Dr. Kissinger once demanded in another crisis. There was not really much of an 'or else' to be put to the Turks in the circumstances of 1974: only the American arms aid against which they could and did bargain the U.S. bases. So the widespread assumption that the American pressures on the Turks which worked in 1964 and 1967 could have been made to work again in 1974, seems questionable. <sup>504</sup>

In the light of the success in 1964 to stave off a Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus, former Cyprus crisis manager George Ball disagrees with the conclusions of this analysis as to the 'possibilities' of U.S. crisis diplomacy in 1964. George Ball is not convinced that the U.S. did not have the capacity to stop the Turks in 1974. For Ball the problem was one of American will rather than capacity in this regard. To this effect, he says at a Congressional hearing: "I wish we had tried to use leverage to prevent the invasion which just recently occurred because we are now in the situation that we

<sup>504</sup> Ibid. p. 148. Emphasis added.

tried to avoid and succeeded, in avoiding in 1964.<sup>505</sup>

Further, to this effect, Ball contends that

I could only say that in 1964 we took some steps and they stopped a war. They stopped an invasion of Cyprus. I would be much more persuaded by an explanation today that there was nothing that could have been done if something had been tried.<sup>506</sup>

With some trepidation - given Ball's experience in the matter - one should point out that Ball overlooks the fact that the eastern Mediterranean political landscape had changed drastically between 1964 and 1974; that the two cases were parallel but not identical. U.S. Undersecretary Sisco, who had accompanied Ball on a parallel mission in 1964, found out the hard way what the 'new circumstances of 1974' were in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1974, in Ankara, the Turks told Sisco that the U.S. had made them 'stand down' on a number of occasions in the sixties. They told Sisco that, "you the U.S. stood us down by promising that you will help resolve the Cyprus problem. To this day the problem remains unresolved and Turkish Cypriots continue to be oppressed."<sup>507</sup> Under the circumstances of 1974 no Turkish government could have succumbed to American pressure, for no government in Turkey could have remained in power having done so. In Turkey, Cyprus was the national issue; public opinion blew hot and cold everytime news from Cyprus reached

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<sup>505</sup> U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, CYPRUS-1974, p.37.

<sup>506</sup> Ibid. p.51.

<sup>507</sup> Op.cit. U.S. Congress, SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's testimony before the House Committee on International Relations.



Turkey that the descendants of the Ottoman Empire [the Turkish Cypriots] were being abused by their former subjects - the Greek Cypriots. The military had been drawing contingency plans for a Turkish landing on Cyprus for a decade, and they had experienced the professional frustration and humiliation of going through the motions of such a landing, only to be told by the politicians at the last moment that it was a 'no go' situation. On the eve of the Turkish armed intervention in 1974, naval commander-in-chief Admiral Kemal Kayacan clearly and bluntly told Turkish Premier Ecevit: "Mr. P.M., if we turn back from Cyprus as before, I won't be able to remain naval commander-in-chief and you won't be able to remain P.M."<sup>508</sup> This remark, and its implications, more or less encapsulate the Turkish position in 1974: a decade of frustration over the Cyprus issue, the tide of nationalism at the time, and a Premier heading a precarious coalition government in a society where, by tradition, the generals looked over the shoulders of the politicians.<sup>509</sup> From the perspective of the American expectation that the pattern of the sixties could be repeated [dissuasion of the Turks], Bernard Gwertzman of the NEW YORK TIMES reported on a Pentagon leak, that,

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<sup>508</sup> See C. Hitchens, CYPRUS, U.K.: Quartet Books, 1984, p. 96. and M. A. Birand, OIUZ SICAK GUN (THE THIRTY HOT DAYS), Istanbul: Milliyet, 1975, p. 55.

<sup>509</sup> Ecevit's political party, the Republican Peoples Party, was in coalition with the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan, who regarded it as "god's will" that the Turkish army not only intervene in Cyprus but annex the island.

"we were misled...., because the diplomats [State Department] said they believed they could talk the Turks out of it [as before]." But as the U.S. has already found out in the dispute over Turkey's resumption of opium cultivation, the left-of-center coalition headed by Premier Bulent Ecevit relies heavily on actions that may not please Washington, but satisfy Turkish nationalism.<sup>510</sup>

Thus, unlike 1964, the 1974 case had a history of national frustration and standing down in the face of American pressure. Also, unlike 1964, there was no fear of the Soviet bogeyman, as the Turko-Soviet rapprochement which had begun in the mid-sixties and the fact that the anti-Makarios coup was carried out by the vehemently anti-communist Athens junta which Moscow loathed, moved the Soviet Union from opposition to tacit approval of a Turkish armed intervention. Finally, unlike 1964, when Makarios in Cyprus and George Papandreou in Athens were firmly in control, in Athens and Cyprus in 1974, there was a power vacuum and disorder. Further, Makarios' ouster in Cyprus had provided Turkey with an iron-clad international legal case for an intervention, since under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee Turkey had the right to unilateral intervention in the event that there be external intervention [Athen's putsch] in Cypriot national affairs.

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### The Limits Of Diplomacy In International Affairs

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<sup>510</sup> B. Gwertzman, NEW YORK TIMES, 21 July 1974.

One evening in March 1970, the then Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, Vasili Grubyakov, went to the Turkish Foreign Office to tip-off the Turks that the CIA was about to engineer a coup in Cyprus by using the Athens junta to oust Makarios. At that time there had been no coup, and both the Turks and the Americans saw the Soviet tip-off for what it was: an act of KGB disinformation to disrupt Western allied relations.<sup>511</sup> This act was consistent with the Soviets' earlier statements. After the colonels seized power in Greece in April 1967, on 5 July 1967 Soviet newspaper TASS stated

the official Kremlin position [which] implied U.S. collusion in effecting the Greek junta's seizure of power. More importantly, it explicitly charged that the new Greek regime was to be used as the tool of the NATO leaders to overthrow Makarios and to establish a pro-Western dictatorship on Cyprus. The statement went on to charge that the "imperialists" were plotting to make Cyprus a major NATO base for potential use against the communist countries, the Arab states, and national liberation movements.<sup>512</sup>

If Soviet polemics and disinformation were to be believed, then the events of 1974 in Cyprus would have come as no surprise to anybody and are readily explicable in terms of the purposeful American monolith effecting schemes to realize certain designs in the eastern Mediterranean (viz. Continuity theory).

A key U.S. Congressional staffer during the seventies, Clifford Hackett; by contrast, leads one to a different

<sup>511</sup> See L. Paine's chapter on "The Quadrangle and Quicksand," in *THE CIA AT WORK*, U.K.: Robert Hale, 1977.

<sup>512</sup> T. Adams and A. Cottrell, *CYPRUS: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST*, Baltimore: John Hopkins U. Press, 1968, p.51.

conclusion in regards to the American role vis-a-vis Cyprus. After pointing out that early on Saturday morning, 20 July 1974, a convoy of Turkish landing craft left the Turkish mainland port of Mersin for the northern shores of Cyprus, he maintains that

over 300 miles to the north in Ankara, Joseph Sisco, then U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, waited outside the meeting of the Turkish national security council. Sisco, sent by Secretary of State Kissinger to prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, did not see that his mission had failed. While recognizing that the odds were against him, he hoped that Prime Minister Ecevit realised that a Turkish military adventure in Cyprus would be a disaster from every viewpoint. Sisco also hoped that Ecevit would then be able to convince the security council of the dimensions of the impending disaster and thus obtain more time for his Kissinger-style shuttle diplomacy to operate.

Secretary Sisco waiting in Ankara for a decision already implemented in the Turkish mainland ports symbolized the entire history of U.S. policy in this area over the preceding ten years: events always two steps ahead of perceptions and policy decisions two steps behind the changing perceptions.<sup>513</sup>

Given Hackett's narration of Sisco's diplomatic ordeal in Ankara, that is, the fact that Sisco was embarrassingly left out in the cold by the Turks who had already decided on armed intervention in Cyprus and begun to implement that decision, at a time when Sisco still hoped he could dissuade the Turks, exposes the myth of "the State Department's carving designs" in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>514</sup> Given this

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<sup>513</sup>C. Hackett, "Ethnic Politics in Congress: The Turkish Embargo Experience," in A. Said (ed.) ETHNICITY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, New York: Praeger, 1981, pp. 33-34. Emphasis added.

<sup>514</sup>See M. Attaliades, CYPRUS: NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Edinburgh: Q Press, p. 184.

fact, one can only persist in arguing the case for the Continuity theory of U.S. foreign policy toward Cyprus, if one is prepared to believe that Secretary Kissinger set up his own Undersecretary by sending him on a futile diplomatic mission to the eastern Mediterranean!

The 1974 case, being the litmus test for the Continuity thesis since one case [1964] on its own merit cannot validate or nullify a thesis, simply does not validate the Continuity theorem. The American omnipotence and active interest in the partition of Cyprus attributed to U.S. foreign policy behaviour in the eastern Mediterranean by Continuity theorists, is not substantiated by this study of U.S. crisis management. Rather than the machinations of a rational American monolith commissioning events in the eastern Mediterranean, it is the regional subsystemic dynamics, especially the key variables of Turkish and Greek nationalism and the impact of detente in the eastern Mediterranean; the lack of political leaders in Greece and Cyprus in 1974; and the [extra-regional] collapse of the Nixon administration in the U.S. that explains '1974'.

The failure or omissions in U.S. foreign policy during the 1974 crisis is not difficult to understand if one considers what can be termed the 'how much is enough?' syndrome in diplomatic practice. In international politics everything is much more clear *ex post facto*, but crisis managers operating during crises without the gift of foresight, are perplexed by the question as to how they

should steer between the risk of inaction and the dangers of overreaction. The U.S., for instance, has been criticised for not taking stronger action to deter the Turks from military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. It is now clear, *ex post facto*, that sending the undersecretary Sisco to the eastern Mediterranean with little leverage did not suffice to deter the Turks. Yet the fact remains that, the U.S did take the matter seriously and took strong measures. After all, Sisco was the State Department's No.2 man at the time. But how was Kissinger to know 'how much was enough' diplomatically at the time? Should he have, as has been suggested, threatened Turkey with an aid cut-off? Should he have authorized the Sixth fleet to interpose itself between Cyprus and Turkey? Clearly, Kissinger did not want to risk overreaction and antagonizing the Turks. The lessons of U.S. crisis management in 1964 had been learned. In 1964, President Johnson's ultimatum to Turkey had turned out to be just that: an overreaction. The Johnson administration did not know 'how much was enough' and for fear of being ineffective, overreacted by sending to Ankara what 1964 Cyprus crisis manager George Ball himself referred to as the most brutal letter ever sent to an ally. That ultimatum had engendered Turkish distrust of the Americans and an extensive reevaluation of Turkish foreign policy, which included a Turko-Soviet rapprochement.

In the same vain, Kissinger was also criticised for not applying enough pressure on the Turks to refrain them from

undertaking Peace Operation II, whereby the Turks proceeded to gain control of 37 per cent of the island's territory. Once again we now know, *ex post facto*, that sending the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Arthur Hartman, and the engagement of Kissinger in a personalised brand of behind the scenes transatlantic telephone diplomacy did not suffice to produce a diplomatic solution at Geneva. What else could have Kissinger done to prevent the diplomatic negotiations at Geneva from collapsing and, thereby, avert further Turkish military operations? Once again, it can be argued that he could have threatened to apply sanctions to Turkey in the event of further military action, as a means of inducing Turkey to remain on the diplomatic track. Failing that, it can be argued, Kissinger himself could have gone to Geneva. The answer as to why Kissinger could not risk overreaction and antagonizing the Turks lies in the pages of his *A WORLD RESTORED*. Kissinger's posture in 1974, as the analogy has already been made, was akin to the posture of his idol Prince Metternich in the 1820's, where for the sake of European stability Metternich did not risk antagonizing the Ottoman Turks despite their bloody purges of the Greeks. The answer as to why Kissinger did not go to Geneva was that 'Geneva' corresponded to the resignation of Richard Nixon and the Presidential transition; clearly a time of acute internal difficulties, when Kissinger had to be in Washington.

This evidence, validating the State Department thesis, of American foreign policy being plagued by the 'how much is enough?' syndrome, does not correlate with the Continuity thesis that a preponderant U.S. has 'whatever it takes' to effect desired political outcomes in the eastern Mediterranean.



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