Schizophrenizing the Art Encounter:

Towards a Politics of Dehabituation

by

Jessie Lauren Beier

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Education

Department of Secondary Education

University of Alberta

ABSTRACT

We are at an impasse in education. In the name of past habits and future hopes, we have learned to hold the line, keeping ordinary routines locked in place. Put otherwise, within this space-time, we have learned to *adapt* as opposed to *create*. This thesis project flows from this impasse, looking to the specific phenomenon of the *art encounter* in pedagogical spaces. The following study investigates the ways in which the art encounter is conceptualized within the contemporary educational project, and in a concomitant move seeks to identify and actualize potential rupture points that might help us to think art as a de-habituating force. Positioning the study within a current climate of economic, political, and social precarity, this project performs a schizoanalysis of the assemblages that teach us how to interact with art, while simultaneously questioning particular axioms that have become dominant within contemporary educational practice and research. Drawing on the conceptual toolkit developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in concert with contemporary philosophical thought and artistic practices, this series of thought experiments seeks to challenge and refresh the dialogue surrounding commonsense understandings of both educational research and what an encounter with art might *do*. In this way, this research aims to draw attention to the social impact of art as an event that has the capacity to expose the potential inherent within our current impasse, providing an opportunity to break with already-established frameworks of knowledge and develop new ways of thinking in and of education.

Keywords: art encounter, art education, schizoanalysis, Deleuze, Guattari

DEDICATION

To my mother, Maureen Beier, who lives in my hands, heart and head, yesterday, today and tomorrow.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

INTERMEZZO | A MIDDLE

And thus we find ourselves at an impasse. We live in a moment defined by a swelling *precarity*. Within this cul-de-sac of uncertainty, an interminable narrative swirls, revolving around itself. It is here where we have learned to adapt, maintain, and salvage. We have learned to take a reactionary stance, fighting to keep outdated rhythms afloat, no matter the pain, exhaustion, or loss that comes of it. It is here, between things and in the middle, where we might begin.

For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) there is only ever a middle. This middle is not an average of what has come before, nor is it a measurable dot between point A and point B, but rather "a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 25, emphasis added). I begin this study knee-deep in the stream, so to speak. As the water rushes through and around my legs, pushing and pulling me in the process, I think of myself as a conjunction, a tiny machine that works towards association over division. An *and*. My aim, as I wade through this stream, is not to block or hinder flows, but rather harness the speed of the middle to create new connections.

Figure 1. Grace Sippy, 2014, *Fear of Psychosis* [Digital Inkjet, Screenprinting, and Chine Colle].

CHAPTER ONE | AN INTRODUCTION
Life in the Impasse

A Precarious Current

The twenty-first century is a time characterized by dynamic connections and constant change, resulting in the overwhelming impression that the world is *precarious*. Educational rhetoric in North America has acknowledged this precarious current, responding with overzealous excitement, on the one hand, and with austere economies of inertia, nostalgia, and paranoia, on the other hand. In the same breath, educational discourse celebrates the excitement of the twenty-first century, while issuing sober warnings to parents, teachers, and students alike: times are changing and so must we. The world is pulsing with social, political, and economic crises that seemingly have the potential to derail modes of thinking bound by historicism and past habits. Add to this an increasingly fluid vision of capitalism under the flexible and dispersive techniques of contemporary control, in addition to a fearful disposition about the state of the planet, and it seems the grounds are rife for upheaval. The impulsive changes inherent in the precarious flows of our world do not, however, necessarily overturn traditional or habitual organizations of life. In a time marked by accelerating change, many conventional points of reference are being reconstituted, presenting a new challenge to thinkers interested in understanding the social, political, and economic forces that work to organize life in our contemporary moment. It is to this overarching challenge that the following thesis project responds.

For Gilles Deleuze this perilous condition of existence, one without predictability or security, is, in fact, the condition for life itself. Throughout his philosophical project, Deleuze (with Félix Guattari) insists that the power of life—all life, not just that limited to the human— lies in its capacity to develop problems (Colebrook, 2002, p. 1). Put otherwise, our relationship with life is always already precarious because life itself is a constant creation; life is always everywhere flowing, catalyzing evolution, mutations, and becomings through the constant introduction of novel questions and problems. At the same time, however, these life flows are managed in particular ways. Education provides an optimal site for such management. Curriculum programmes, educational initiatives, classroom practices, and processes of learning,

are both responses to and productions created by the problematising forces of life, that is, each of these bodies are assemblages that organize life in a particular way. Such organization works to cut up, segment, categorize, and order experiences, which in turn can be *made sense of* by students and teachers alike. Educational practices, in this way, are not only sites for the acquisition of content and information, but also *machinic assemblages* that produce and maintain a certain sense of attachment and consistency within a world that is otherwise chaotic. In this way, education operates as one process that works to produce a sense of Self and how that Self connects to the world, or what we might otherwise think of as *subjectivization*.

With this in mind, any question of education, including those posed in this thesis project, is not only a question of learning, but also a question of how life is organized, and in turn, what subjectivities such organization produces (or limits). For Deleuze (1991), the "problem of subjectivity", which he identifies as early as 1953 in his work on Hume, arises from the assertion that the Self is not given, but instead formed through *habit* derived from an otherwise indeterminate and borderless world: "we are habits, nothing but habits" (Deleuze, 1991, x). Habit, otherwise thought of as the synthesis of bodily, desiring, and unconscious connections with the world, works to unify and make meaning of experience, in turn developing a particular concept of the Self. Subjectivity, for Deleuze and Guattari, is therefore not based on a pre-established code, but instead constructed through both the habitual and singular relations — the cuts, segments, and orders — one forms with the world. In this way, subjectivity works as "a strange "fiction" difficult to dissipate, since it is precisely the fiction of ourselves and our world" (Rajchman, 2000. p. 17). Of great import within the philosophical project of Deleuze and Guattari is therefore to examine how habitual responses to life and subsequently processes of subjectification, have come to haunt our culture, inspiring the segmentations, planifications, categorizations, and hierarchies which cut up experience in particular ways (Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, p. 229). This study is influenced by and responsive to the overarching organizations of life that have come to haunt a twenty-first century existence, our precarious current, or what I refer to in this study as the *impasse*.

The "Cruel Optimism" of Contemporary Education

In her book *Cruel Optimism,* Lauren Berlant (2011b) discusses the notion of the impasse as the space-time where one learns to live in constant crisis through the creation and maintenance of the "good life" fantasy. For Berlant, this focus on futurity, which is nevertheless (over)determined by the dominant or "ordinary" responses of the present, is that which maintains the status quo and thus limits subjective becomings and any sort of novel response to the problematizing force of life (Berlant, 2011, p. 1). For an example of this "cruel optimism", which names "a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility" (Berlant, 2011b, p. 24), one need only look at the realm of education. Education has become instrumental in reinforcing and perpetuating the narratives and techniques for living that are required to contain the present, by instigating a habitual focus on *the* future. It is perhaps important here to point to the use of 'the', which is used purposefully to assert that future-focused educational initiatives tend to project *one* determinate future, instead of acknowledging the multiplicity and unpredictability inherent in times to come. Such future-focused policy developments and curriculum reforms hinge on the axiom that education should produce citizens that can function in *the* future society, which is most often imagined by the dominant discourses of the past-present.

In Alberta, for instance, recent curriculum developments have been shaped by the unquestioned assertion that education should "prepare students to be successful in a future world that will be defined by global interaction, competition, engagement and networks" ("Curriculum Redesign", n.d.). As a result, Alberta Education has expressed that new curriculum initiatives need to ensure that "Alberta's young people will have the knowledge, skills and attitudes to be prepared for jobs that do not exist yet and in industries that are emerging or evolving" ("Curriculum Redesign", n.d.). Teaching and learning thusly become means to a decidedly specific end, albeit one that "do[es] not yet exist", and the school becomes the territory for the inculcation of the requisite duties, speeds, and repetitions of a future tethered to the past-present. Put otherwise, within the impasse, educational techniques contribute to the development of the necessary habits, including the fantasy of *the* future "good life", which in turn works to cover over the "ordinariness of mass precarity" (Berlant, 2011, p. 1) that defines our

contemporary moment. It is this attachment that ultimately produces a politics of containment and habituation, and thus the impasse.

This posture of "cruel optimism", has become a catalyst for a mass re-organization of life across the educational project. Policy makers and educational leaders have come to recognize the need to change from systems shaped by the demands of the industrial era to structures that better reflect the needs of our highly connected and dynamic globalized society. This shift has led to the adoption of new frameworks for student learning based on an updated understanding of core competencies, which now include skills such as creative thinking, innovation, problem solving, and collaboration. This shift has also produced renewed interest in particular subjects, including the arts. Arts integration is championed across the curriculum as a technique for generating intellectual challenge, inquiry skills, and initiative, which are not only considered important learning skills, but also recognized as vocationally relevant in today's economy (Aprill, 2010; Elkins, 2008; Eisner, 2002; Trilling & Fadel, 2009). An engagement with the arts is, in this way, positioned as an opportunity to develop the skills needed to become effective and productive workers and consumers in *the* future.

At first glance, these educational imperatives are difficult to argue with. As an arts educator myself, the idea of incorporating more opportunities for artistic encounters and creativity across the curriculum seems like a positive approach to rethinking the educational project in light of our contemporary moment. However, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that although the rhetoric has changed, contemporary discussions of education remain faithful to particular organizations of life that might ultimately reinforce *habitual* responses to life's precarious flows. For Deleuze and Guattari, this habituation is not inherently negative; habit is that which allows us to unify a series of experiences and make sense of our world. The *problem* with habit arises when one considers how such unification of experience, our habitual perceptions and thought patterns, works to dilute the variety, multiplicity, change, or what Deleuze considers *difference*, which is inherent in the precarious flows of our world. Put otherwise, Deleuze argues that in our everyday thinking, we have learned to mitigate our perception of the world through a limited conception of difference: difference-from-the-same (Stagoll, 2010, p. 25). It is this limitation which works to inhibit and reduce subjective

enunciation, an understanding of the Self in relation to the world, to those organizations that are always-already known. The question of habit for Deleuze (with Guattari) is therefore, not what habits mean but rather what do habits produce?

In this thesis project I assert that the dominant posture within educational discourse is one of habituation and adaptation, which works to order, striate, direct and in many cases limit opportunities for learning and thus subjective becoming. In the name of past habits and future hopes, it seems we have learned to hold the line, keeping ordinary routines locked in place. Put otherwise, we have learned to maintain, to salvage, and to survive *in spite of* our precarious relation to the world, no matter the loss, exhaustion, or pain that comes of it. Following Berlant, I assert that it is this posture which produces and prolongs our stay in the impasse, preventing learning and any significant transformation from taking place. While the precarious stream flows around us, the political, social, and economic demand for survival reverberates loudly, not only in the so-called public domain, but also in the domain of our own minds. As a result, we have learned to follow tempos, imitate movements, and continuously make the same connections, in order to enclose life's precarity and ward off its potential leakiness.

Berlant (2011) asserts that making it through the impasse requires an extrication from the "cramped" fantasies of the "good life" and an increased focus on the affective experience of the present, that is, the pre-codified and often "incoherent mash" of a present felt as such. The problem for contemporary educational research, then, is not necessarily ideological, but instead a problem of understanding this "mash" and the way in which it comes to be organized. Put otherwise, in order to break with habit, what is required first and foremost is that one becomes aware of its existence, which is to say "one must attend to ones already existing reactions and responses" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 92). This study works towards such awareness by looking at the specific phenomena of the *art encounter* in education. This study defines the art encounter as the machinic assemblage of bodies, conceptual and material, that work together to shape how we interact with art.

In what follows, I assert that within educational contexts, the art encounter is subtended by particular *axioms,* which, through habituation and adaptability perpetuate a sense of "cruel optimism", which has become reified, ubiquitous and therefore difficult to question. I argue that

Figure 2. Grace Sippy, 2014, *Rupture* [Digital Inkjet, Screenprinting, and Chine Colle].

these axiomatic systems, shaped by the larger goals and imperatives of contemporary society, have become sedimented in their relation with one another, thus limiting opportunities for subjective becoming, learning, and ultimately life. By diagramming the habitual connections within the specific site of the art encounter, this thesis project aims to provide a singular cartography of some of the political and cultural forces operative within the contemporary educational project. In a corresponding move, this study will also experiment with these organizations in order to diagram a counter-image that has the potential to work outside of habitual responses to life's precarity. This study seeks to differentiate and articulate what thought framed from a Deleuze|Guattarian perspective might suggest for the future of education. The aim of this study is therefore not to suggest new formulas and techniques with which to encounter art, but instead to look at this machinic assemblage (as it is explored in later sections) in terms of its potential for dilating educational thought within our contemporary moment. In summary, then, this study asks: how is life and learning organized through educational techniques such as the art encounter? And, what are the accords and axioms necessary for this organization to function? What happens when particular organizations are re-machined? What are the implications of this re-organization for the larger educational project?

Project Overview | Slip, Sneak, Fall, Reveal

      In order to respond to these questions, the following study unfolds as what is best understood as a series of interconnected thought experiments. For Deleuze and Guattari, to think is to experiment (Rajchman, 2000, p. 5). Throughout their oeuvre, Deleuze and Guattatri's methodology revolves around experimentation, with the aim of inventing a sort of experimentalism that does not only ask for descriptions and interpretations of possible life experiences, but also seeks out the conditions under which something as yet unthought might arise. It is important to note that this move towards experimentation does not close off critical discourse; Deleuze (1994) himself is often quick to point out that while our philosophical activity is a form of experimentation, it also has a dimension of necessity to it. Rather, such experimentation acts as a tool to *develop* philosophical concepts within an indeterminate zone that is not occluded by the establishment of representations of the world as it is given, including the image of a stable Self. In the scope of this project, such experimentation provides a powerful theoretical basis to investigate the different assemblages that are at work within the contemporary educational project, in addition to making available the "nonthought within thought" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1992, p. 59) that is necessary to respond to the impasse highlighted above.

      In the remainder of this introduction, I begin to diagram the way in which art encounters have been organized within educational contexts, paying close attention to the major axioms that have come to shape such encounters. In addition, this introductory chapter draws on the toolkit provided by Deleuze and Guattari in order to set in motion several conceptual trajectories that begin to think the art encounter differently. Following this diagramming, Chapter Two further outlines an approach informed by a Deleuze|Guattarian framework, providing a theoretical background and an outline of the method, that is the mode, style, and maneuvers, with which the study unfolds. In this second chapter, I work towards the production of a *minor philosophy of education* in relation to the questions posed in this thesis, drawing on the the method of schizoanalysis, as conceived by both Deleuze and Guattari. In addition, this chapter outlines the way in which the research proceeds through a transversal approach and a series of

"transpositions" (Rosi Braidotti, 2011). This chapter concludes with a brief investigation into the (de)limitations and challenges of working with the theories of Deleuze and Guattari.

Following this methodological background, Chapter Three further investigates the impasse, that is the social, economic and political situation, from which this study flows. This investigation proposes a new crisis of enclosure, focusing on the role of capital, control and communication in our contemporary moment. Drawing once again on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, this section maps the ways in which contemporary capitalism, characterized by constant fluctuations and deterritorializations, works in concert with dispersive systems of control to produce particular subjective formations and experiences of learning. These forces are further mapped in relation to the art encounter, with particular focus on the role of communication in the twenty-first century.

Once the theoretical and contextual background has been diagrammed, the study then proceeds through a series of thought experiments, or *essais,* wherein the axioms identified in the first section are further explored and subsequently counter-actualized through creative

Figure 3. Grace Sippy, 2014, *Slip: Sneak, Fall, Reveal* [Digital Inkjet, Screenprinting, and Chine Colle].

transpositions. These transpositions are constituted as a "situated method of tracking the qualitative shifts or ontological leaps from general chaos or indeterminate forms to actualized or determinate forms, while avoiding the pitfalls of subjectivism and individualism" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 226). Put otherwise, each chapter will investigate a particular axiom by bringing together heterogeneous examples from educational practice, popular culture, contemporary artistic practice, and recent philosophical thought, in order to create affirmative differences, and ultimately new ways of thinking in and of the educational project. These axioms and their related chapters are outlined further in the next section of this introduction.

As an unfolding series of thought experiments, this study endeavours to better understand the ways in which dominant approaches to the art encounter work to organize life, while at the same time exposing the potential lines of flight that might re-position art as an *event* that has the capacity to rupture those unquestioned, common sense and habitual responses to life that attempt to "think on our behalf" (jagodzinksi & Wallin, 2013, p. 5). Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate throughout their work that revolution and transformation is possible if one is open to experimentation to and with connections; it is life itself that has the potential to create new lines of flight and ultimately *a belief in the world* (Rajchman, 2000, p. 6). To connect, for Deleuze, is to work with possibilities that are not already given; Deleuze pushes the question of belief into that zone of an "improbable chance" and thus works in a pragmatic way to seek out new forces that are not always-already contained by dominant social formations and organizations of life (Rajchman, 2000, p. 7).

It is my assertion, that within the impasse we have lost belief in the world, or rather, "[the world] has been taken from us" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 176). In response to this loss, Deleuze asserts that it is through belief that the world can be revived:

> "If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volumes. […] Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a people" [34].

With this in mind, the impasse should be thought in terms of containment— its limits, boundaries, and thresholds— *as well as* its possibilities— its connections, the multiplicities

inherent within those connections, and the way in which those connections might machine to other flows. The impasse presents an important opportunity to slow down and become attuned to the alterity that might be found in the tempos, movements, and differential relations that seemingly define educational discourse today. It presents an opportunity to move beyond the present state of affairs, empowering creative counteractualizations and transformative alternatives.

Figure 4. Grace Sippy, 2014, *Schism* [Digital Inkjet, Screenprinting, and Chine Colle].

Diagramming the Art Encounter

Art Encounter as Machinic Assemblage

It seems we have learned to interact with art in very specific ways. In my experience as an educator, I have had the opportunity to work in a variety of roles where I have been able to observe and discuss such interactions. These observations have, in turn, led me to question the seemingly systematic ways that art encounters have come to be organized, as well as the way in which such organizations have shaped experiences of learning, and ultimately subjective enunciation. In my time as a program manager at a provincial art museum, for instance, I observed the way in which visitors, young and old, interacted with art in gallery spaces. In these observations, I began to notice the seemingly instinctual manner— those habitual drives— that visitors would progress through in their encounter with works of art. More often than not, I would witness visitors enter a gallery space and immediately search for the interpretive text that would explain the forthcoming experience. From here, the work would then be "encountered" through processes of deciphering and decoding, wherein visitors would correlate their interaction with any given work of art to the didactic texts and interpretive tools provided by the art gallery authorities. This correlation would then be followed by a determination of value, a judgement of what the work meant and whether this meaning was adequately conveyed.

I would watch this process continue throughout the exhibition space: interpretation, encounter, judge, interpretation, encounter, judge, interpretation, encounter, judge. Of course, this process was not inherently 'bad' or 'wrong'; in fact, it was this interaction that I highlighted and developed in the educational programming I created for the institution. These processes of meaning-making, whether aided by didactic texts, exhibition catalogues, or gallery tours, were able to provide the contextual information that many visitors perceived as necessary in order to understand the historical, social and/or biographical connotations of the work. What perplexed me about this process was therefore not necessarily its value, but rather how this process *worked*. What was the *function* of this process and how did such functionality become *habitual*? It was these questions which led me to begin thinking of the art encounter as a *machinic assemblage.*

Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1987), outline the concept of the machinic assemblage throughout their work, with particular focus in the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* books. In these

writings, the concept of the machine is not used as a metaphor, but is instead the literal way in which the thinkers conceive of life; life for these thinkers is nothing but an assemblage of connections. For Deleuze and Guattari, then, "there is no aspect of life that is not machinic; all life only works insofar as it connects with some other machine" (Colebrook, 2002, p. 56). In this way, each machine is both connected to larger machines and constituted of smaller machines, which between them have no beginning or end point; there is no starting point or final causes, nor is there some original source or final product when thinking the world machinically (Colebrook, 2002, p. 56-57). A machine, for these thinkers, can therefore not be considered solely an object, but instead it is constituted by the relations composed *between* parts. Machines are always in motion; machines are precarious. Thought in this way, machinic assemblages are not made by anything or for anything and therefore do not have a closed function or identity. There are, however, certain forces, sedentary in nature, that produce the illusion of starts, stops, and interruptions, thus closing off the potential for other machinic connections to form. Habit, for instance, operates through the production of particular connections, which over time become *commonsense*. Once such connections become normalized, their functionality becomes ubiquitous, even invisible, making it difficult to discern the connection in the first place.

In the case of the art encounter, it is this process of habituation that has led to the systematic approach I have outlined above. It is my assertion that the art encounter in pedagogical spaces has become a process of making habitual connections to representations of the world that are always-already given. In the anecdote above, for instance, these connections are derived from the authoritative voices of the art gallery. This approach to the art encounter, however, is not exclusive to gallery spaces. As my curiosity of this subject grew, I also began to observe the way in which the art encounter was approached in school settings. In my roles as a supply teacher and guest artist in secondary schools, I witnessed how art was *used* across the curriculum in order to iterate or uncover particular content, contexts, and information. In language arts classes, encounters with art were often positioned as a way to develop visual literacy skills, while in social studies classes the art encounter acted as a tool to further understand Otherness, be it historical or cultural. It appeared to me that in many cases the art encounter was structured as a means to an end, a channel through which one could travel in order to synthesize some original meaning or content. Art was positioned as yet another form of

communication, a conveyer of information, a *representation* of some unique essence, which could be decoded, interpreted, judged, and ultimately *understood* through an encounter with it. For me, however, this approach to the art encounter never seemed to suffice. In any given interaction with art, there appeared to be an excess, something that could not be re-cognized (as explored further in the next section). The art encounter was operating as a machinic assemblage, albeit one that had become *stuck*.

For Guattari (2009), a "normal" response to life results from the ability to move between machinic assemblages, that is, to live is to not get *stuck* in any one way of organizing life. An "abnormal" response, on the other hand, results when one gets stuck in a particular assemblage. In the case of the art encounter, it seems we have become *stuck* within particular ways of interacting with art, or put otherwise, the art encounter has become a process of *striation*, that is, it works to organize, regiment and re-present the otherwise *smooth* space created by an experience of art into something that can be re-cognized and ultimately understood. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) introduce the paired concepts of the *smooth* and the *striated* in *A Thousand Plateaus* as a way to rethink organizations of life as a complex mixture between forces that move and flow —smooth space —and those sedentary captures that delimit such movement—striated space (Pisters & Lysen, 2002, p.1). Together with the concept of coding, outlined as the process of ordering matter as it is drawn into a body, the concepts of the smooth and the striated are productive for thinking the way in which machinic assemblages, including that of the art encounter, function as an emergent unity that is capable of joining together heterogeneous bodies in a "consistency" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). It is this "consistency", in turn, that helps us to make sense of our interactions with the world, by cutting up, ordering, and territorializing experiences of life so that they can be *made sense of*. In the case of the art encounter, this stratification is what produces the illusion of starts, stops, and interruptions within the machinic assemblage, or, put otherwise the illusion of a particular way in which one is *supposed* to encounter art, ultimately limiting what art might *do*.

Axiomatic Underpinnings

The process of stratification outlined above operates through the development of particular cuts or blockages in the machinic assemblage, which we might otherwise refer to as

axioms. Axioms are the particular "proposition[s] that commend [themselves] to general acceptance" ("Axiom," n.d.), and as such, they operate as starting points of reasoning so evident so as to be accepted as true without controversy. The following section performs a beginning literature review (which is subsequently built out in each chapter) in order to further outline the axioms at play within the machinic assemblages that have come to shape the art encounter.

A cursory survey of literature in relation to the art encounter in pedagogical spaces reveals that although there are many writings about arts-integration and arts-based strategies across the curriculum, specific mention of the art encounter is limited. In a review of the literature there is considerable research done on the way in which artistic production strategies are positioned in schools, however, there is very limited research that directly speaks of the way in which students are taught to encounter art. In many ways, this limited research speaks to the ubiquitous and commonsense character of the art encounter, pointing to the need for further analysis and critical discourse in relation to the subject. Although minimal, an understanding of the art encounter can be gleaned by looking at the overarching ways in which art is positioned in educational contexts. This requires a review of not only literature related to art education, but also approaches to arts-integration across the curriculum. Through such a review, particular axioms become apparent. Through a close reading of educational research in relation to art, I have identified three major axioms that have come to define and delimit the machinic assemblages that shape the art encounter. These axioms are introduced briefly here, in order to begin to set the scene, and explored in further depth in each of the following chapters.

The first axiom that becomes apparent in the literature is the notion that *an encounter with art can build creative capital*. In contemporary educational discourse, creativity and innovation have been recognized as essential skills for student success in the twenty-first century (Florida *et al*, 2011; Gates, 2010; Trilling & Fadel, 2009). The relationship between creativity and economic, social, and physical health is increasingly recognized around the world, and as a result, many school districts in the United States and Canada have ranked the abilities to think creatively and solve problems as two of the most important exit outcomes for their students (Parry & Gregory, 2003, p. 47). Of all the new forms of capital being generated in and through new organizational cultures, including schools, *creative capital* is emerging as the most valuable (McWilliam & Haukka, 2008). Proponents of the idea of creative capital generally conclude that

although creativity is complex and multifaceted, it is indeed and skill that can be taught (Perkins, 2001, p. 443). As a result, the arts are positioned as one space within which students can generate creative thinking, inquiry skills, and community building, or put otherwise, the creative capital necessary to navigate and be successful in a future world defined by constant change and dynamism (Aprill, 2010; Sheridan-Rabideau, 2010; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008).

With this first axiom in mind, a second assumption that becomes clear in a review of the literature is the idea that *art can be read*. Many educational scholars (Aprill, 2010; Elkins, 2008, Eisner, 2002) have come to recognize the importance of arts-integration in our twenty-first century existence, and as a result the skill of "reading art" has risen to the forefront. Proponents of this thinking assert that a twenty-first century existence is increasingly characterized by visual experiences and therefore students need to develop the necessary techniques and conventions of visual language in order to become more conscious, critical and appreciative readers, consumers and creators of visual products (Elkins, 2008; Felten, 2008; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006; Mitchell, 2008). Within this research, there is a distinct prevalence towards an approach to the art encounter as the process of reading signs, wherein art is conceptualized as *a something* that can be perceived, decoded, and ultimately understood through processes of reading. As early as the 1990s educational theorists and researchers started to suggest that skills such as visual literacy, or the "ability to understand, produce, and use culturally significant images, objects, and visible actions" (Felten, 2008, p. 60), should be adopted across the curriculum in order to prepare students for interaction in a highly visual world. As a result, encounters with art have come to be positioned as sites within which students can finesse visual literacy skills, and in turn, art is understood as a text that can be *made sense of* through processes that are similar to reading. Within this axiomatic thinking, an encounter with art is positioned similarly to an encounter with written and spoken language, and thus art becomes an object with which correlations can be made.

The third axiom identified in the literature further builds on the first two, and highlights one of the deep-seated assumptions that has come to shape the art encounter, as well as contemporary education in general. This axiom posits that *an encounter with art is subtended by a human subject,* or put otherwise, the art encounter relies on an anthropocentrically-biased

image of thought, which is, in brief, a worldview that considers humans to be the most important thing in the Universe, or at least on the planet Earth ("Anthropocentrism," 2008). Such anthropocentrism can be seen in many approaches to contemporary education, particularly those so-called "progressive approaches" that embrace postmodern frameworks of analysis and/or agendas based in critical pedagogy. A major line within the literature on the art encounter builds on such approaches, focusing on art's capacity to offer a site to investigate Otherness and transgress the limits of structuralism. These approaches aim to create opportunities for students to question who creates and controls imagery and how this imagery affects our understandings of reality (Gude, 2004, 2007, 2009; Stuhr, 2003). Although these approaches provide a discursive framework through which to critique and disrupt assumptions about objectivity, subjectivity, and the universality of human experience, these positions still tend to reinforce rather than subvert deep-seated anthropocentrically biased assumptions about "human nature" and a unitary vision of the humanist subject. It is this unitary vision of the human that prevents "an effective antidote to processes of fragmentation, flows and mutations that mark our era" and thus such anthropocentric biases demonstrate the need to "start from non-unitary, relational subject positions so as to learn to think differently about ourselves and our systems of values" (Braidotti, 2013, p. 184).

These axioms work together to sediment relations within the machinic assemblage of the art encounter, producing particular understandings of how one is *supposed* to encounter art. In summary, the dominant approach to the art encounter in educational settings is conceptualized as a site within which students can learn to ***build creative capital*** by learning the formulas, techniques and codes necessary to ***read art.*** These readings are always-already informed by an ***anthropocentric bias***, and thus the art encounter is an encounter with a representation of the world that is pre-determined, pre-codified, and limited to habitual connections. This brief introduction to the literature exposes a major assumption operating beneath the art encounter, and arguably the entire educational project: the art encounter is positioned as a discourse in *representation*, albeit one in crisis. Through these axioms, the art encounter functions as a process of resemblances and imitations. Students learn to interact with art based on the assumption that there are pre-established meanings that must be determined, and that through

such determination and identification one can *know* the world. As a result, subjective

enunciation, or the way one connects to the problemetizing forces of life, is limited to images of

thought that are already given and learning is positioned as a process of habituation and

adaptation.

Towards a Politics of Dehabituation

It is with these assertions in mind that I turn to the theoretical oeuvre of Deleuze and

Guattari. A key tenet of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical project is the perpetual critique of

the "regime of representation", which according to the philosophers "systematically subordinates

the concepts of difference and repetition to that of identity" in order to bind images of thought to

those that already exist (McMahon, 2011, p. 44). With this beginning literature review in mind,

the art encounter offers a site within which we might investigate such regimes of representation,

their relationship to habit and learning, and ultimately, how this relation works to enhance and/or

limit subjective becomings.

In response to the challenge of representation, what Deleuze (1994) seeks to expose is

what he considers the "true" movement of thought, one that is characterized by difference and

repetition. It is this thought that acts as an agent "of the future", ultimately creating the potential

for that which has yet to become thought (Deleuze, 1994). Here, I assert that an encounter with

art holds the potential for such movements. Deleuze (2002) suggests that the task of art is not to

re-present the world as it is given, but instead to be proactive in it through the creation of new

ways of experiencing life. Art, in this way, is not conceived as an object that is readily

representable and readable, but instead as a system of dynamized and impacting forces that are

capable of producing and generating intensities (Grosz, 2008, p.12). Put otherwise, art is a

productive force that works on the body to break with typical ways of thinking through the

creation of new bodily sensations (Deleuze, 2002). In conceptualizing an encounter with art,

then, it is not enough to ask what a work of art means, but also, what art *does*. This simple, yet

important, change in questioning provides an opportunity to dislodge the question of art from the

limiting inheritances of approaches based in representation, instead opening potentials for art to

act as a dehabituating force.

In this case of this investigation, then, what might art do? Deleuze and Guattari (1994) state that artists are "presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with them, they draw us into the compound" (p. 175). Considered in this way, artistic practices, including the practice of encountering art, have the capacity to interrupt or interfere with the larger machinic connections of the institutional, and indeed global, coding machines that dominate our way of thinking and being in the world through the production of singularities and affective assemblages. Singularities, or, what Deleuze (1990) understands as moments of discontinuity where *something happens,* are "turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion and condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 'sensitive' points" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 63). Such singularities are points of unpredictability, even when deterministic, and therefore they are sites of revolutionary potential. Art operates through the production of such singularities, in the way it unfolds spatio-temporally: "it is incalculable, it lingers, its occurrence may not be repeated, it spreads to form other communities, it has contagious potentialities, and is ultimately irreducible to the circuits of information as code; it presents a difference in-and-of-itself through its autonomy, and it is affirmative rather than negative" (jagodzinksi, 2010, p. 114). Put otherwise, art constitutes that which we can not re-cognize or subsume to a pre-ordained and habitual way of thinking. Art can not be defined as an object that is distinct from the ecologies surrounding it, but instead operates as an affective assemblage that works to produce new connections and potentials for novel becomings.

It is within this notion of becoming that the pedagogical power of art becomes apparent. The dynamics of becoming can be described as a process in which any given multiplicity "changes in nature as it expands its connections" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 8). Such becoming operates through affective risings and fallings, or, movements from one state of being to another that occur at the molecular level (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 197). Here, the notion of the molecular does not necessarily refer to biology, but instead to a micropolitics that is constantly at play within each of us. Deleuze posits that we are not homogenous types, but instead we contain multiplicities that constantly and simultaneously pull us in numerous

directions (Houle, 2011, p. 107). It is within this molecular space where sensation occurs, where affect is activated, and it is within this space where we might transform, if only momentarily, our sense of ourselves and our understanding of the world. It is within these multilayered levels of affectivity where we find the building blocks for creative transpositions, which "compose a plane of actualization of relations, that is to say, points of contact between self and surrounding" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 234). Positioned as the presenter of affect, the inventor and creator of affect, art holds the potential for the production of new becomings, and ultimately, the invention of new modes of existence (Deleuze, 1994, p. 175). In this way, the art encounter can be rethought as a transformative machine, or, an assemblage that enables novel becomings and experimentation with life, as opposed to a technique for propagating postures of adaptation and habituation. Put otherwise, framed from a Deleuze|Guattarian perspective, the art encounter can be thought as a catalyst for *learning.*

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) outlines a conception of learning by illustrating the process of learning to swim. For Deleuze, to learn is to enter the sea, which is conceptualized as a dynamic system of differential relations, much like our precarious present. When learning to swim, one might begin by imitating specific moves, which over time and through practice become habitual. However, once one finds oneself in the sea, one quickly becomes aware that imitation might not suffice, and instead it is necessary to engage and react with the differential relations of the sea, or what we have termed in this investigation as the precarious flows that might come our way. This conjunction requires not only consciousness of the flows, but also a certain openness to "feeling out" the situation and a willingness to experiment. Conceived in this way, learning is not about the development and imitation of habitual responses, but instead a process that is responsive to precarity, or the problematizing flows of life. Put otherwise, learning "takes place not in the relation between a representation and an action (reproduction of the Same) but in the relation between a sign and a response (encounter with the Other)" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 22). Learning is not a process of re-presenting that which already exists through imitation, but instead operates as an experimentation with movements based on the flows one encounters. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is only through such conjunction, experimentation, and an effort to make connections, that we might confront

something unexpected, something that might ultimately provoke us to think differently: "thought is nothing without something that forces and does violence to it" (Deleuze, 2000, p. 96). The art encounter can be positioned as a site for such violence, or put otherwise, as a site where one might encounter the world as an *event*.

An event, for Deleuze (1990), is not a state or happening itself but is something made actual or happening. In this way, events are always in the middle: becoming, fleeing, leaking; events are the "instantaneous production intrinsic to interactions between various kinds of forces" (Stagoll, 2010, p. 89). An event carries with it no specific outcomes or utility, only new potentials. The challenge put forward by Deleuze and Guattari throughout their oeuvre is to think the world in terms of events, in order to embrace the rich multiplicities of life and the potential that is immanent in every moment. Thought as an event, the art encounter is not only positioned as a space for thinking and learning, but also a space for developing a new politics. Rethought as an event, the art encounter has the potential to respond to, destabilize and/or enforce social formations in turn limiting or creating a belief in the world. Considered as such, art has the potential to operate as a force that is capable of redistributing relations on the molecular level, in turn shifting organizations and breaking up sedimented relations among bodies that might ultimately limit opportunities for learning (jagodzinksi, 2010, p. 110). In response to the question of what art does, then, this thesis asserts that art has the potential to liberate the problemetizing force of life from sedimented relations and organizations, ultimately producing a politics of dehabituation and potential becomings.

INTERMEZZO | WAVE INTERFERENCE

"The elecromagnetic spectum consists of waves of electromagnetic radiation, from low frequency radio waves to high frequency gamma rays. A sliver within this spectrum is visible light, and it is only its frequency that is different from the rest. We are typically oblivious to these waves until we have some detector (such as our eyes) to alert us to their presence" (Moody, 2013).

Figure 5. Robyn Moody, 2013, *Wave Interference*. [Multi-media sculpture and sound installation.]

CHAPTER TWO | AN APPROACH

Towards A Minor Philosophy of Education

In a response to the challenges presented by the contemporary impasse, this study looks to the conceptual toolkit developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Drawing on these thinkers, this research works to transition from an understanding of the art encounter bound by the limiting lineages of interpretation, and ultimately representation, towards a non-representational logic as it is developed by the Deleuze|Guattarian philosophical project. It is through this framework that I endeavour to *detect* the impasse in terms of its potentiality, that is the connections that might be made outside of habitual organizations, in turn producing an *interference* that dilates thought within the contemporary educational project. With this in mind, I am not interested in simply summarizing or rehashing the myriad of theories developed by these thinkers, but instead my aim is to produce a becoming methodology that works as a *minor philosophy of education.*

Deleuze and Guattari (1986; 1987) outline the notion of minority, and particularly becoming-minor, as the "production of a specifically collective enunciation; the calling forth of a people-yet-to-come who in some senses are already here, albeit masked by typical representational models" (O'Sullivan, 2005, para 1). Referring to the literature of Franz Kafka, the duo assert that it is this vision of minoritarianism, or becoming-minor, that might allow us to "break ground for new avenues of thought, and, above all, wipe out tracks of an old topography of mind and thought" (Bensmaia, 1986, p. xiv). Deleuze and Guattari develop this concept of minority in relation to three interrelated characteristics: a deterritorialization of language, a connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and a conception of enunciation as a collective assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986). In this thesis project, I aim to produce research that takes on similar characteristics.

Firstly, the project focuses on the dehabituating potential of art, as it is developed in the previous section, in order to create a minor pedagogical language. As we have begun to explore, art, according to Deleuze and Guattari, works as a type of emission that is constituted as an assemblage of intensities that we encounter in the absence of recognition (Deleuze, 2002). In this way the force of art is not easily represented or recognized through typical forms of language and

thus avoids easy categorization and identification. Instead, art works as an affective assemblage that has the potential to deterritorialize, fracture, and free life flows from habitual representational constructs, such as language. With this in mind, this research incorporates several contemporary art projects, which are situated as examples as well as citations, in order to catalyze connections that occur outside of the written text.

Secondly, this project has, at its core, a political impetus. The second characteristic of becoming-minor, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1986), is that it is always "political" (p.17). In their writing on the minor literature of Kafka the duo assert that "everything is political" (p. 17), that is to say, the lives and individual concerns of every individual body is always linked to the larger social milieu (O'Sullivan, 2005, para. 3.). This notion of the political, therefore does not necessarily refer to Politics itself, but rather the micro-politics at play within any body, as outlined in the previous chapter. Within this micro-politics the human subject, as we have seen, is not conceived as a stable being but is instead a "constantly changing assemblage of forces" (Stagoll, 2008, p. 27). This political impetus is important in considering the art encounter outside of representational schemas, as it redirects focus from issues of identity and signification, to issues of becoming, learning, and ultimately how might one live with the world.

Thirdly, this research project works towards a collective enunciation, that is to say, a move away from the authority or an individual author towards a focus on the expressive and collective production of territories (O'Sullivan, 2005, para. 4). In this thesis project, such collective enunciation will be enacted by bringing together heterogenous voices from the domains of education, art practice, popular culture, science, and otherwise. Through this collective enunciation, in concert with the other two characteristics, the aim of this approach is to perform a non-mimetic research, which works to minoritize philosophical and pedagogical discourse in order to expose the potentials for re-machining and making new connections.

The following three sections outline an approach to this minor philosophy of education, with particular focus on the mode and maneuvers with which the study will unfold. In a concomitant move, this section also considers some of the impossibilities and therefore possibilities of such a research approach. In this way, the following method responds to the

questions posed in this study, but also the challenge of conducting educational research itself, particularly within our contemporary impasse.

Mode | Schizoanalysis

Overall, this project operates as a schizoanalysis. Proposed by Félix Guattari (1992) in his clinical work, schizoanalysis is, in brief, the process of enriching, following, and "feeling out" a particular organization, or machinic assemblage. Critical of the closed processes of interpretation that tend to striate desiring flows through linear attachments to meanings that are always-already known, schizoanalysis seeks to create a new method for making meaning, an "attempt (albeit incomplete) to create a new and more adequate, immanent, or anti-transcendent model of interpretation" (Buchanan, 2013, p.12). Schizoanalysis is not interested in reducing things to a logical skeleton but instead enriching connections, following sequences, and unfolding the social implications found therein. Schizoanalysis is, in this way, an approach that endeavours to free over-coded flows and remove the axiomatic "bolts" that have come to define habitual interactions in and with the world (Guattari, 1992, p. 152). With our contemporary impasse in mind, a schizoanalysis provides a productive manner with which to identify axiomatic systems by exposing the *micro-political movements of desire* and the potential for new creative *productions*.

For Deleuze and Guattari (1983), desire is a key force in the way in which organizations are formed and therefore shape the way in which we make meaning of our world, or what we might otherwise understand as the production of reality. For Deleuze and Guattari, "desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 26) but instead "to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 27). This notion of desire is conceived as a multiplicity — an assembly line of affects and effects — that is not personal to a subject, but instead works as a machinic assemblage to produce and differentiate individuals (Semetsky, 2006, p. 19). For Deleuze and Guattari, the social field is immediately invested and constructed by desire; "there is only desire and the social, and nothing else" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 28-29). In this way, desire, its object and the social field are one and the same because desire is a productive machine.

Schizoanalysis is a method that seeks to trace this machine by insisting that social-production always provides the determinate conditions under which desiring-production takes shape (Ross, 2010, p. 66). Schizoanalysis' task is therefore to differentiate between active and reactive desires, or put otherwise, to map machinic assemblages in terms of the habitual connections that have become sedentary as well as the pre-coded and mixed semiotic lines that have the potential to create new machinic connections (Genosko, 2010, p. 123). In this way, the method of schizoanalysis does not provide a specific form or model for research, but instead offers a deliberate strategy for mapping the singularities that exist within systems. In terms of this study, a schizoanalysis will be used to map the flows within the contemporary impasse as it has been outlined thus far and further mapped in Chapter Three. This mapping aims to identify the particular micro-political enclosures and axiomatic systems that have come to define the art encounter, and through transversal manoeuvres (outlined below), these systems will be re-machined in order to produce new ways of thinking in and of education.

The overall approach is therefore not only concerned with analyses, consisting of deconstructions and critique, but also aims toward a series of *productions*. As these productions are experimental and untimely, a procedural approach to the study is insufficient. Instead, I approach the research as a sort of *stylistic* endeavour, which is constituted by a series of *maneuvers*. The style, or design, of the study, is an assemblage and the maneuvers with which the study proceeds are a series of transversal or schizoid connections, between contemporary practices in education, philosophical concepts and artistic practices. In summary, through the method of schizoanalysis, this study will operate as a machinic assemblage that connects heterogenous concepts in order to make new connections. Through such conceptual experimentation, that which cannot be said in the dominant language may be exposed, thus producing a violence or "strangeness" that is able to cross the bounds of commonsense relations and habitual organizations (Rajchman, 2000, p.10).

Maneuvers| Transversal Transpositions

This research operates through specific conceptual *maneuvers* that will not only map the current situation, but will strive to find an outside thought with which to assemble, or plug into. This study will continuously combine examples from educational practices, philosophical

thought, and contemporary art practices in order to question, mutate, and produce pedagogical concepts. As outlined above, this study aims to work in a minoritarian and non-representational mode. That being said, it is still necessary to be able to represent and communicate *some thing*, and therefore I am obliged to use existing images of thought, forms of speech, and linguistic conventions. These tools will permit communication, but can never fully articulate that which occurs in any present moment, especially in terms of what happens when one experiences a work of art. For this reason, I turn to the strategy of transversality (Deleuze, 2000; Guattari, 1984) and transpositions (Braidotti, 2011) in order to distort, mutate, and generate patterns of enunciation that might dilate educational thought and produce new pedagogical concepts. Each thought experiment that follows is transversal in nature, that is, it combines heterogeneous components in order to create a purposeful mixing of signs and territories. As a methodological strategy, transversality helps to disarticulate organizational forms so as to produce new, and often temporary, connections that have the potential to create their own signifiers and systems of value (jagodzinski, 2010, p.111).

The strategy of transversality is exercised by both Deleuze and Guattari throughout their work, albeit in different ways. For Deleuze, transversality functions as a concept for literary criticism that concerns the kind of communication proper to the transversal dimension of minor literary production (Deleuze, 2000). Put otherwise, transversality defines a modern way of analysis that is outside of the dialectical presuppositions of models of interpretation and reminiscence, wherein everything refers back to some fundamental meaning, instead envisioning an immanent and singularizing version of written production (Bryx & Genosko, 2010, p. 291). Conceptualized as a writing strategy, transversality has the capacity to reconstitute the creation of a world by drawing lines of communication through heterogenous pieces and fragments that refuse to belong to a whole (Bryx & Genosko, 2010, p. 292). For Guattari, transversality also refers to drawing connections between heterogeneous bodies, this time the bodies of subjects, or "group-subjects", in order to liberate those bodies from repressive forms of institutional organization (Wallin, 2013). Inspired by his work at La Borde clinic in France, Guattari (1965) writes about this method of transversality, presenting it as a theorization of various problems of institutional therapy. Transversality, for Guattari, is a concept that consists of multiple

micropolitics and thusly operates by drawing a line out of identitarian limitations as well as the conceptual and practical inclusions and exclusions that can be found within organizations (Guattari, 1965). In both iterations of this strategy, transversality produces machinic assemblages; it produces objects and resonances between them. It is therefore a tool that can be used to open hiterhto closed logics and hierarchies that might help to rethink life's organization.

How might such a transversal approach operate? Rosi Braidotti (2011) builds on the theory of transversality, developing a practical methodological tool she calls "transpositions". Borrowed from the realms of music and genealogy, the method of transposing can be understood as a "situated method of tracking the qualitative shifts or ontological leaps from generative chaos or indeterminate forms to actualized or determinate forms, while avoiding the pitfalls of subjectivism and individualism" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 226). Put otherwise, transposing involves a hybrid mixing of codes and modes of apprehension of ideas, where the research must become accountable for mapping assemblages through "intensive, or affective cartographies of the relations that empower and sustain them" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 225). It is this mapping that allows for the creation of affirmative differences and creative repetitions within dominant discourses and canonized corpuses of text.

In this investigation, the machinic assemblages that have come to define the art encounter are one such discourse. This study borrows Braidotti's strategy of transposing in order to map the way in which the art encounter has been constructed from the otherwise chaotic flows of life, without falling back on the limiting strategies of perspectivism, interpretation, and "reading" as outlined in the previous chapter. The strategy of transposing proves helpful when applied to an encounter with theoretical, social and cultural texts, including art, as it works from oral traces and affective imprints as opposed to pre-determined codes and signs. The focus of this method is not to re-present content or meanings, nor is it to directly cite prior interpretations, but rather to map the affective traces found within an encounter with a cultural text. This strategy therefore offers a way to remove focus from textual interiority or what we think of as the detailed re-presentation of artistic intent or meaning, as well as the weight of traditions of interpretation that are bound by regimes of representation (Braidotti, 2011, p. 233).

Following this thinking, this study places examples of artistic practices throughout the thesis in order to produce new, and untimely connections as well as hiccups, or interferences, along the way. In addition, each chapter will look at the art encounter from a different angle in order to make connections from various points of view. Throughout the study, examples and illustrations from educational philosophy, policy, and practice, in addition to examples from the worlds of philosophy, contemporary art, and popular culture (to name a few) are brought together. Due to the nature of these heterogeneous and transversal maneuvers, it is easy to get swept away in the connections that might me made. In order to narrow the scope of this project, the study therefore focuses on the context of North America, in relation to the educational research explored, with specific focus on the province of Alberta, Canada, in terms of recent policy and curriculum developments. In addition, all of the artistic practices referenced throughout this project are based in Alberta, offering a moment to examine the particular machinic assemblages at play within this Canadian province.

Through a schizoanalysis that operates as a series of transversal combinations, this research is driven by the compelling force to make connections through processes of creative affirmation. By retelling, reconfiguring, and revisiting the same problematic, this study endeavours to rework the interrelations between axes of difference found within the art encounter, in turn providing an opportunity to dislodge difference from its hegemonic and habitual position as an instrument of control and limitation (Braidotti, 2011, p.225). The aim here is to work in a machinic manner in order to produce resonances between bodies that might otherwise be hidden. In this way, the approach of creative transpositions will not only offer a quantitative multiplication of creative responses, but also a qualitative leap of perspective (Braidotti, 2011, p. 225), which is necessary in light of our contemporary impasse. Through a mapping of the axiomatic systems at work within the art encounter, this study develops an intensified sensitivity or "feeling out" of the impasse, in turn actualizing potential rupture points that might ultimately force us to think.

(De)limitations

This research takes on an *untimely* character, that is, following Nietzsche, a character that "operates both in time and against time" (Deleuze, 2004, p.129). As such, the study will not

strive towards consistency or coherence *preceding* the thought experiment, but rather through the experiment itself. This is based on the understanding that consistency is not a quality that is established prior to the formation of a connection, but rather it is an *emergent* property that either does or does not arise *from* a machinic assemblage. After all, perhaps it is taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes and should precede any formulation and any institutional expression of them (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 24). This assertion is important in terms of the 'findings' of this study. This approach does not look to provide consistent or coherent 'findings' that can then be validated, measured and reproduced in 'practice', but instead it looks to produce new concepts that emerge in an assemblage *with* the approach itself. Put otherwise, the style with which this thought experiment will be conducted will be intricately intertwined with the conceptual productions that occur through the assemblage. In this way, this approach aims to develop a study that is not an image of the world, but that nonetheless forms connections with that world. It will act on the present but also against it: "let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come" (Deleuze, 1994, xxi). Through this overall approach, this study aims to develop a minor philosophy of education, that is to say, a philosophy of education that attempts to stammer and stutter what is already a highly organized research site.

As a minor philosophy, this approach has the potential to offer new lines of flight, or what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) consider "paths of mutation precipitated through the actualization of connections between bodies that were previously only implicit" (Lorraine, 2010, p. 147), outside of hegemonic and sedimented ways of thinking pedagogical life. However, there are several challenges that arise when one endeavours to work at the edges of representation, particularly concerning the notions of *communication* and *practicality*. A general issue for approaches informed by a non-representational thought like that of Deleuze and Guattari is the incommunicability of the micro-political and micro-social movements that emerge in the uncoded spaces they endeavour to investigate. Any kind of representation, generalization or reproduction of these uncoded spaces ultimately constitutes a striating force, an over-coding that works against the very impetus for using Deleuze and Guattari in the first place. For this reason, communicating "findings" or "results" of a study informed by Deleuzo|Guattarian philosophy can pose a challenge. Another potential issue with an approach informed by Deleuzo|Guattarian

philosophy relates to its practicality, or usefulness in practice. Many academics flee from the challenges of Deleuze's text, arguing it is too complex or too "unfocused" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 225). The interstitial spaces created by the dynamic image of Deleuze|Guattarian thought can be read as abstract, esoteric and impractical. A major challenge therefore arises when working with the thought of Deleuze and Guattari due to the understanding that representation, of which they are critical, is integral to both communication and practicality.

The challenges presented by Deleuze|Guattarian thought are, therefore, also the reason that these thinkers are important for educational research in our contemporary moment. The toolbox offered by the duo provide a chance to think at the edges of thought, a necessary capacity within the interminable swirl I have termed thus far as the impasse. The texts produced by Deleuze and Guattari are, in this way, not written for those who "confuse thinking with the mere exercise of sedentary protocols of institutional reason" (Braidotti, 2011, p.225). For Deleuze, it is not the goal to provide an anti-representational, abstract philosophy with nothing in common with representational constructs of the world; such a characterization presupposes the type of either/or thinking that Deleuze and Guattari were purposefully trying to avoid. Instead, the goal is to work outside of the bureaucratic and habitual state of mind that has come to organize thought and limit its potential for transformation. It is for this reason, that this study looks to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, in order to begin to deterritorialize the images of thought that have come to dominate educational research and practice. By experimenting in fields of unformed expression, though the absence of so-called masters in the discipline, this study aims to respond to the present, while creating possibilities to think anew.

With these (de)limitations in mind, this study will simultaneously respond to the key research questions posed *and* demonstrate the way in which the images of thought we know as *communication* and *practicality* may ultimately contribute to limiting the manner with which educational research is approached. This study attempts to relieve some of the tensions created by a Deleuzo|Guattarian approach by positioning the research as a conceptual experiment that nevertheless has practical and material implications, which ultimately have the potential to set in motion an active, as opposed to a traditionally adaptive, conceptualization of research itself.

INTERMEZZO | DREAM HUTS

Figure 6. Adam Maitland, 2014, *Dream Hut* [Gouache and ink on paper.]

Figure 7. Adam Maitland, 2014, *Dream Hut* [Gouache and ink on paper.]

Houses sit high on lawns

to stop water from pouring in.

They have roofs with a familiar posture

that announce them from afar

and windows that display

exactly what you need to know

about the people inside.

Houses are monuments

against rot and fear and rumors.

Houses are for significant dreams

and for families,

and for wealth

and for debt.

Huts are made of rot.

Huts take the forms they take

because they have to,

and because they can.

Huts are for bugs and crabs and spiders.

(Huts are not for birds.)

Huts can be tucked in a corner

or put in your pocket

or be made to float away.

Huts are for dreams,

not worth mentioning (Maitland, 2014).

CHAPTER THREE | APPREHENDING A "CRISIS ORDINARINESS"

The impasse, as we have seen thus far, is the name we might give to the space where the urgencies of livelihood, or our contemporary precarity, are worked out continuously without specific assurances of better futurity (Berlant, 2011b). For Berlant, the impasse is an important space to understand life in the twenty-first century. Berlant's impasse is shaped by particular machinic assemblages that have come to dominate contemporary life, namely neoliberalism and the "Austerity State", which has been created and maintained based on the assertion that "*something* was out of control that required a conserving hand" in the first place (p. 1). According to Berlant, the Austerity State represents the dominant response to the precarity produced by late capitalism and the growing awareness after the 2008 financial crisis that the state is at the same time abject *and* in contingent relation to private capital, as are its people (Berlant, 2011, p. 1). For Berlant, this has resulted in particular responses, namely suffering and optimism, or what she terms "cruel optimism" (Berlant, 2011b, p. 24), a concept that provides one way of understanding the habitual attachments that have come to make up the impasse.

Education in North America, is indeed a part of this contemporary impasse, adapting and responding to the imperatives of neoliberalism and the Austerity State in its own manner. By looking at the impasse in relation to education, particular attachments are exposed, ultimately shedding light on the larger *crisis of enclosure* that has come to define our contemporary moment. As we have explored in the introduction, Berlant claims that perceiving the present as an "incoherent mash" might allow us to better apprehend the conditions of "crisis ordinariness" in which we live today. In other words, only by recognizing and understanding the various impasses we face can we strive to create alternative conditions for living otherwise (Berlant, 2011b, 4-10). In this section I endeavour to further diagram the "crisis ordinariness" of our contemporary moment in relation to the art encounter by investigating the various impasses operating in the twenty-first century, namely those revolving around *capitalism*, *control* and *communication*.

A New Crisis of Enclosure

As the last six years of the 'global financial crisis' has demonstrated, contemporary capitalism is that which is capable of unceasingly overcoming its own limits and enclosures,

even when its markets are failing. Capitalism in the twenty-first century is no longer defined by a market place composed of deterministic goals and outcomes, but instead as a system of "vast, open networks that give it the possibility of uninhibited movement, while at the same time limiting the movement of bodies and labor" (DeLeon, 2010, p. 54). In this way, capitalism can be understood as a machinic assemblage, which at the same time works to proliferate *and* enclose difference and desiring-flows. Put otherwise, capitalism works as "a difference engine" that "promotes the marketing of pluralistic differences and the commodification of the existence, the culture, the discourses of "others", for the purpose of consumerism" (Braidotti, 2011, p.25). This form of capitalism celebrates the power of difference, albeit an understanding of difference that essentializes and reattaches otherwise multifaceted flows to unitary identities and consolidated traditions (Braidotti, 2011, 171).

One such multifaceted flow is that of desire. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) assert that capitalism does not limit desire through the creation of lack, but instead attempts to control its functions and its lines of flight through constant productions and re/de/territorializations. What capitalism needs of its subjects is for desire to be expressed in a way that the system can recuperate, that is, desires must be linearized, quantifiable and ultimately identifiable by the capitalist machine (Guattari, 2009, pg. 284). In this way, capitalism functions by bringing together heterogeneous phenomena, such as desiring flows, in order to make them express and organize a particular world, which in this case is a world of consumer capitalism. By controlling the movements of bodies, including the internal movements of affective desire, as well as the production of difference, contemporary capitalism functions by directing and containing the forced improvisation of a contemporary life into particular channels, ultimately creating a new crisis of enclosure.

This crisis of enclosure operates through techniques of control and communication, which create the illusion of an "open" or "free" society. This sense of freedom, however, is managed by a system of containers, striations, and organizations that can only be accessed given the "right" forms of behaviour. In this way, control, like capital, has taken on a different functionality in the twenty-first century. Unlike past models of control, which tend to understand it in terms of how it segments and fixes subjects in relation to one another through recordings,

assessments, and supervision (Foucault, 1979), contemporary control functions through modulations that are both internal and external to the subject (Deleuze, 1992b). In his essay *Postscript on Societies of Control,* Deleuze (1992b), outlines this contemporary concept of control, asserting that subjects are no longer only produced and delimited by techniques of discipline and punishment, but also through continuous internal modulations and "self-deforming cast(s) that will continuously change from one moment to the other" (Deleuze, 1992b, p. 4). Within our contemporary crisis of enclosure, then, power is not only exercised in economic spheres and institutional-social fields, but also in spaces internal to the subject through processes of *semiotization* or what Guattari (2009) refers to as "semiotic subjugation" (p. 278).

Guattari (2009) asserts that the success of any capitalist society hinges upon its ability to utilize various forms of semiotization, which is the process of inscribing the body based on specific pre-codified structures of perception. For Guattari (2009), semiotization is what happens within both acts of perception and acts of enunciation (p. 279) and therefore the process of semiotic subjugation is an important piece in understanding the way in which our various modes of expression, or our subjective enunciation, get "reduced to the dominant language, the language of power which coordinates its syntactic regulation with speech production in its totality" (Guattari, 2009, p. 279). Due to such processes of semiotization, control can no longer be defined solely in terms of distinct castes and mouldings, but instead in terms of its fluctuations, flows, and modulations (Deleuze, 1992b). This change in definition, however, does not change control's terms of application; if anything systems of control and power relations are more ruthless than ever (Braidotti, 2011, p.25). Due to this shift, contemporary control must be analyzed in terms of its functionality, which no longer operates so much by binary oppositions, but instead in a fragmented and all-pervasive manner. With this in mind, Deleuze suggests a critical move away from thinking control in the model of the Panopticon, instead thinking it as a sort of business, or corporation (Deleuze, 1992b).

If we look at this new crisis of enclosure in terms of an educational example, we can see that what a teacher requires of his or her students within a classroom is not only that students engage with particular content, but that they take up a particular semiotic subjugation or a "certain style of semiotic molding, a certain initiation to the given castes" (Guattari, 2009, p.

279). In the example of the curriculum reform within Alberta Education, for instance, these "given castes" are always-already determined by the imperatives of the State and a vision of *the* future. Students learn, through formal systems of instruction and assessment as well as the hidden curriculums inherent in schooling, the skills and attitudes necessary to "fit in" to such castes. As a result, desire becomes conflated with what is in a student's *best interest* and the multifaceted desiring flows that make up the subject become encoded in a linear way, in turn alienating the subject from their own desire. Like the "given castes" produced and reproduced through education, this alienation becomes habitual within the bureaucratic capitalist system because it has been modelled, through education for instance, in such a way so as to ensure that subjects are semiotically receptive to this system (Guattari, 2009, p. 289). This semiotic receptiveness is a product of the way in which education is increasingly shaped by models of the corporation. More and more schools are being "reshaped by the intensification of corporate logics that privilege competition, rankings and certain forms of closeness as agents for educational change" (Thompson & Cook, 2014, p. 281). Within such corporate logic, individuals are engaged in forms of competition and continuous training and control is thought in terms of its organizations - its divisions and enclosures- but also in terms of temporality. The "limitless postponements" proposed by this system of control means "one is never finished with anything" (Deleuze, 1992b, p. 5). As a result, students take up particular semiotic mouldings, which in the example of Alberta Education manifests in the underlying curriculum goal to create students that see themselves as life-long "entrepreneurs of oneself" (Alberta Education, 2010, p. 4). Such semiotization is only one facet of many new policy initiatives in Alberta, which focus on fostering "entrepreneurial spirits" and young people that are "competitive, adaptable and resilient" (Alberta Education, 2010, p.6). Under the auspices of contemporary capitalism and control, then, both perception and enunciation are perpetually stratified and territorialized through processes of semiotization, which ultimately functions to produce specific subjectivities that the capitalist system can recuperate. This striation shapes the way in which bodies perceive difference and multiplicity in the world, and therefore the perception of connections that can or can not be made.

In the example of Alberta Education, control is exercised as a power capable of establishing inexorable rivalries between individuals, wherein self-interest, or motivation, "sets individuals against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 179). This application of control works in concert with contemporary capitalism to manage desiring flows, which are conflated with students' *best interests* and thus drives become composed, assembled, and organized in a way that desire is invested in the system that produced that desire in the first place (Smith, 2007, p. 74). Like employees within a corporation, subjects take up the necessary semiotic mouldings, albeit ones in perpetual motion, in order to attain a certain sense of status or power, which will allow them to succeed in a consumer-driven capitalist society. As a result, subjects are no longer understood in relation to the larger mass- their number and rank- but instead as malleable individuals that are governed by a series of behaviours, codes and passwords that allow passage (or not) within the structure of the new control society (Deleuze, 1992b, p.5). Put otherwise, in order to access and/ or assert power within such a system, one must plug into the assemblages and lines of control in operation through a re-coding of one's drives, or what we might otherwise think of as the acquisition and reproduction of *passwords* (Deleuze, 1992b).

Commonsense Communication

It is here where communication becomes a key element in understanding the contemporary crisis of enclosure, particularly in relation to the art encounter. As Deleuze writes (1992b), in contemporary societies of control, we are no longer defined by a signature or a number, but rather a code: "the code is a password" (p. 5). It is these passwords that are necessary to navigate the contemporary crisis of enclosure, which appears as an "open society composed of thresholds, boundaries, and gateways" that is nevertheless only "open and free for movement provided the holder has the right pass" (jagodzinski, 2008, p. 147). In the realm of education, passwords have become integral in navigating our precarious present; creativity, innovation, collaboration, and entrepreneurism have become buzz words in the world of educational policy and practice. In my experience working in a provincial art gallery, for instance, these words became very useful for "selling" art programs to teachers and principals. In turn, such passwords come to effect the way in which organizations are perceived by educational

professionals, as well as students, who learn to take up particular postures and attitudes in relation to these passwords as a means of being successful in their world. The art encounter operates as one site wherein such passwords are acquired and practiced, resulting in particular forms of semiotization. As we will investigate in the following chapters, within the art encounter students not only learn how to interact with works of art, but also how to take up the semiotic moulding necessary to become a productive contributor and consumer within contemporary capitalism. The art encounter as it is currently positioned in education, teaches students that art can be read and that such reading will lead to the development of creative capital, which is highly desirable in our contemporary moment. In this way, student subjectivity is shaped by the "given castes" of the dominant language of the system and as a result enunciations are limited to specific pre-determined identitarian arrangements. Put otherwise, the art encounter is positioned not as a space for expression, but instead a space for *communication*.

　　　For Deleuze and Guattari, "the essence of communication is a communication of desire" (Guattari, 2009, p. 283). When a child plays, when a lover courts, when an artist creates, they are not transmitting information but creating "a richly expressive situation in which a whole series of semiotic components are involved" (Guattari, 2009, p. 283). On one hand it is though communication that we are able to express desire, temporarily freeing ourselves from systems of expression that are founded upon the principle of individuation (Guattari, 2009, p. 283). On the other hand, it is through communication that desiring-flows and expression are constructed, organized and ultimately striated by particular accords prescribed within dominant discourses. Deleuze and Guattari maintain that life is organized on the basis of these accords, which make possible the particular configurations of life that in turn become integrated social formations (Surin, 2010, p. 58). We might also call these integrated formations habit. In our contemporary crisis of enclosure, communication works through habitual connections to organize reality according to a dominant social order, in this case that of capitalism, and therefore everywhere that communication takes place, a dominant social order is confirmed and reinforced. Anything that occurs outside of this formation, either becomes abject, that is, it is dejected and treated as contemptible, or it is re-coded to fit within the social order. In terms of the art encounter, and as we will see in following chapters, student expression and thus desiring-flows are shaped by

particular forms of communication —passwords— that are always-already known, or *common sense.*

This notion of common sense does not necessarily refer to banality or practicality, but rather, the popular or majority view of the world, what we might think of as the dominant language. For Deleuze, "common sense [is] defined subjectively by the supposed identity of whatever object served as a focus for all the faculties" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 226) and therefore works to provide a coordination between self and object, forming an image of the world composed of stable correspondences. Commonsense communication, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) assert, harnesses concepts for their power to manipulate and conform as opposed to their power to produce, to change, and to create. It is through commonsense communication that expression is reduced to its most communicable and therefore the variety, difference and multiplicity of any given experience is always a simplification. The popularity of presentation formats such as TedTalks and PechaKucha in educational spheres speak to the desire for such simplification. Likewise when encountering art, students are taught formulaic and straightforward ways of reading art that are tied to commonsense ways of knowing the world, and thus communication becomes a process of laying claim to ideas, in order to reproduce, market, and exchange them within the flows of capital. In this way, the art encounter works as a machinic assemblage that produces and organizes passwords, in turn reproducing particular modes of semiotization, ultimately contributing to the circulating forces of contemporary capital. Although communication holds the potential for expression, accords, accepted and reproduced through habitual connections, work to limit expression and subjective becomings, in turn morphing it into a technique that produces and maintains commonsense images of thought. The art encounter does not function as a form of expression, but instead as a commodity that one "pays" for with attention and semiotic subjugation in order to participate within and for this stream of circulation.

The contemporary crisis of enclosure is constituted by dynamic flows of capital, dispersive systems of control, and commonsense communication. As we have seen, through processes of semiotization and the development of passwords, desiring flows are directed and conflated with self-interest and self-efficacy, which in turn creates a vision of the subject as an

individual and self-motivated "I" that persists in a being devoted to competition and progress. Through accords that are always-already determined by dominant social orders, such as capitalism, subjects learn to perceive the world, including the precarity of any given present, through specific habitual and common sense responses. These habitual responses work to propagate the dominant representations or images of thought that become sedimented in our own minds. Due to this functionality, any analysis of such a crisis of enclosure must take on an ecological disposition and an aesthetic attunement. An ecological disposition turns one's attention to the legion of things making up an impasse and how it might be thought otherwise and an aesthetic attunement exposes affective registers, shaped in part by the things prehended by them, thus producing new lines of flight. The following thought experiments take up these postures in order to respond to this impasse, and the overall axioms that make such a crisis of enclosure possible. In order to expose the attachments we have to particular formations, the way in which life is organized, and the habitual processes that might ultimately limit thinking and learning, it is crucial to refresh educational discourse around the art encounter and its relation to conceptual creativity, imagination, and affectivity.

INTERMEZZO | BITS

Figure 8. thinkITEM, 2013, *Bits* documentation*,* as captured by thinkITEM Instagram feed. [Mixed media collage.]

CHAPTER FOUR | CREATIVE CAPITAL + BECOMING-NOMAD

Introduction | thinkITEM

It's Monday morning on a busy downtown Edmonton street. As people hustle and bustle to work, a group of small artworks stare out toward the masses from their position on a wall of temporary construction siding. These art *Bits* (Figure 7, thinkItem, 2013) — tiny mixed-media drawings, paintings, and collages, framed by miniature, yet extravagant frames— are displayed similar to works in a gallery space; each work of art has been labeled appropriately and roped off so as to prevent audiences from getting too close. Fast forward several hours later and all but one work in the *Bits* series remains. The rest of these tiny art treasures have been removed from their place on the temporary walls, despite their careful placement. As it turns out, these art *Bits* were discovered and subsequently taken by admiring fans, who now own a bit of art all their own.

The *Bits* project is part of a larger artistic oeuvre that goes by the name of thinkITEM. thinkITEM is an Edmonton-based street-art project that creates non-permanent, site-specific artistic interventions. The thinkITEM oeuvre includes, but is not limited to, collage art, illustrations, t-shirts, stickers, skateboard decks, fabulated media and magazine images, masks, figurines, posters, and murals. Although various in their format, each of these projects references particular artistic strategies that borrow from and make reference to the world of street art and postmodern techniques of image manipulation. thinkITEM distorts and combines images of power — including images of monarchy, celebrities, and corporate branding — with "underground" images and text — comic book and cult film references, internet memes and cats — in turn creating images that are at the same time provocative and humorous.

If we were to continue in a "reading" of these works, we would most likely be able to deduce several meanings, depending on the framework of reference we choose. A post-modern reference point, for instance, might lead us to understand the art in terms of the master narratives it works to dismantle, whereas a critical theory reference point might lead to a critical analysis of contemporary society dominated by consumer capitalism. As these starting interpretations demonstrate, the thinkITEM project can be *made sense of* in many ways, particularly if we ask what the work of art *means*. However, following Deleuze and Guattari, and in response to this investigation, I look to the work of thinkITEm to investigate what such an artistic practice *does*.

Figure 9. thinkITEM, 2014, *Choose!!* [Digital print on paper.]

The thinkITEM project started in 2012 when a local artist became frustrated with the rigamarole of exhibition life. Dealing with application processes, funding bodies, and the constant demand to *explain* artistic projects began to tire the artist behind thinkITEM and thus a new experiment began. The artist explains that he was tired of playing the art world game, which for him was bound by strict rules and master scripts (thinkITEM, personal communication, May 5, 2014). The artist was no longer interested in fully committing to developing the necessary passwords to navigate the so-called professional art world, and therefore, he began to invent his own. It started small. The first intervention began in 2012 with a series of augmented Starbucks cups that were left in public spaces. Upon close inspection of this apparent garbage, one could find absurd drawings and doodles. This project got little attention, often dismissed as trash, and thus the artist decided to up the game.

In early 2013 a series of small wooden "droids" began to appear in unexpected spaces throughout downtown Edmonton. These figures, consisting of superhero-inspired bodies adorned in SNFU shirts and C3PO masks, could be seen hanging off of ledges and propped against windows throughout downtown Edmonton. In addition to their presence in the nooks and crannies of otherwise banal street-scapes, these figures also began to populate web browsers and social media feeds. As more droids popped up both in physical and virtual spaces, the figures began to take on a caché of their own; along with a growing number of "likes" and "shares" online, the droids became objects of desire, sought out and collected by their willing hunters.

From its trashy beginnings, the thinkITEM project has grown into a full-fledged ecology, or what some might refer to as a *brand*. thinkITEM continues to create art objects and interventions, sprinkling the streets of Edmonton and Instagram feeds with new projects almost daily. In addition, the thinkITEM project now sells artwork and a variety of other merchandise through social media campaigns and an online store. Each new project grows from an experimental move by the artist —be it a playful combination of logos or the creation of a series of masks, packaged and left to be found — and is then shaped by the overall brand, shared with the public, and subsequently *consumed,* either through social media or by actually taking the art work home.

Figure 10. thinkITEM, 2013, *Droid* [Wooden sculpture and silkscreen.]

In response to the question of what this artwork does, it can be argued that this example illustrates a particular organization that has come to shape an encounter with art, namely, the the machine of *creative capital*. With his online store and explicit production of merchandise, one might be quick to critique this artist as "selling out", and in fact some have. However, this is a somewhat simplistic take on the situation. The thinkITEM project did not start out with the intent of marketing or selling any work; it began as an experimentation in exhibition strategies, which led to a different process and set of "rules" when making the art work. Put otherwise, the project began as an attempt by the artist to disassemble a seemingly striated space, that of the art world, in turn resulting in a series of de/re/territorializations. In this way, the thinkITEM project offers a prime site to examine the de/re/territorializing forces capital, particularly in relation to the ways in which we learn to interact with art.

In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari (1987) introduce the notion of territory as one response to the problem of representation and identity. As we have seen, machines are not made by anything or for anything, and therefore do not have a closed identity. Identity, instead, is

created through the illusion of particular organizations, that is, the illusion of starts, stops, and interruptions within a machinic assemblage. The concept of territory challenges the notion of identity because it exists in a state of constant process; there can not be territory without territorialization and subsequent deterritorialization (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Territories are continually passing into something else, all the while maintaining internal organisations and thresholds. In the case of thinkITEM, we can see this concept of territorialization at work: creative difference is actualized with each new artistic experimentation, and is subsequently territorialized by the overall thinkITEM brand, captured as a form of capital to be marketed and sold. Within contemporary capitalism, which works as a "difference engine" (Braidotti, 2011), the ability to re/de/territorialize is integral to the constant flux of capitalist flows, and thus the ability to *create difference* is an important part of the machine. Put otherwise, under the auspices of contemporary capitalism, *creativity* has become a form of capital itself. This territorialization is demonstrated in the world of art, as well as in schools, where creative capital is emerging as the most valuable (McWilliam & Haukka, 2008).

As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) assert, any territorialization, in this case the territorialization of creativity by capital, is always open to de/re/territorializations, and thus systems are never fully totalizing. There are always lines of flight. With this in mind, the art encounter becomes a site to examine the complex ways in which machines, such as capitalism, function. In addition, the site of the art encounter also catalyzes the development of postures necessary to resist such machinic connections in favour of those that enhance pedagogical life, instead of limiting it. These postures are characterized by a willingness to experiment, an openness to making connections, and a certain vulnerability to process, or what is explored further in this chapter as *nomadism*. This brief introduction provides an example of the concepts of territorialization in relation to capital, thus setting the scene for the following thought experiment.

The following chapter performs a schizoanalysis of one of the axiomatic images of thought that has come to characterize the art encounter, that is, the assertion that *art can build creative capital*. In what follows, I investigate the imperative for creativity in the 21st century and how this imperative has come to shape the art encounter. From this investigation, I highlight

the major accords that make this axiomatic machine functional, paying particular attention to the

concepts of *difference* and *repetition*. Lastly, I endeavor to present a counter-image to the

commonsense notion of creativity that has come to dominate educational thought by drawing on

the Deleuze|Guattarian concept of the *nomad*.

<center>**Creativity in the Twenty-First Century**</center>

The Creativity Explosion

What is the nature of creativity in the twenty-first century? We live, it seems, in a present

moment that has embraced the concept of *creativity* with unprecedented fervor. Walk through

any airport bookstore and one will notice a number of "how to *be* creative" manuals (in the form

of popular non-fiction writing) that point to the growing ubiquity, but apparent lack of, creativity

in the twenty-first century. This "creativity explosion", a discursive reference initiated (critically)

by Osborne (2003) to describe the emergent mandatory role assigned to creativity, required and

so produced within a capitalist context, positions creativity as a "a kind of moral imperative" in

our contemporary moment (Osborne, 2003, p.508). Within the "creativity explosion", creative

thinking is no longer "the exclusive prerogative of geniuses or great thinkers" but it is instead

something that can be actively produced and "finesse[d] through technique" (Osborne, 2003, p.

509).

Popular business writers, such as Daniel Pink (2005; 2011) and Richard Florida (2002),

have amplified this fervour in their 'crusade' in favour of creativity in the twenty-first century.

Daniel Pink, the author of several "provocative, bestselling" books about the changing world of

work proposes that creativity is an essential skill needed to contend in today's globalized

marketplace, especially for students in the west who are competing with "Asia, Abundance and

Automation" (Pink, 2005, para. 9). Pink suggests that success for students hinges on their

"ability to create artistic and emotional beauty, to detect patterns and opportunities, to craft a

satisfying narrative, and to come up with inventions the world didn't know it was missing" (Pink,

2005, para. 23). In other words, student success today is dependent on the ability to harness the

power of creation in order to consistently and persistently develop new forms of capital. Richard

Florida, Harvard economist and "one of the world's leading public intellectuals on economic

competitiveness" (Florida, 2008), echoes Pink's ideas and proposes that society is moving

towards a place wherein a "creative ethos is increasingly dominant" and the choices of the "creative class" (constituted by a group of "creative types") will determine how the workplace is organized, what companies will succeed or fail, and even which cities will thrive or wither (Florida, 2002). Both Pink and Florida advocate that creativity is one of the keys to success in the twenty-first century, especially if that success is measured in capitalistic terms. Both writers, although not trained in education, have also suggested that a major force in unleashing this creative power is education.

The economic benefits of creativity have catalyzed new points of discussion in educational circles. As we have seen, educational imperatives are increasingly driven by the challenge to prepare future generations of people to address the complexities of an unknowable world they are certain to inherit (Sheridan-Rabideau, 2010, p. 54). Influenced by the "creativity explosion" and business thinkers such as Pink and Florida, creativity is positioned as one *foundational skill* that will help to prepare students for such an unforeseeable future. This imperative has caused a move away from a focus on creativity as "'artiness' [and] individual genius and idiosyncrasy", towards a notion of creativity that is "economically valuable, team- or community- or organization-based, observable and learnable" (McWilliam & Haukka, 2008, p. 8). Positioned in this way, creativity is understood in terms of its replicable processes and practices within daily economic and social life; creative capabilities are regarded as important vocational capacities in all globally competitive enterprises, and creativity is therefore recognized as the *cultural capital* of the twenty-first century (Sheridan-Rabideau, 2010; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008).

Engineering Creativity

With this vision of creativity in mind, curriculum leaders and policy makers alike are exploring new ways to *engineer* creativity in schools, including the integration of arts across the curriculum. Within the "creativity explosion" arts-integration is championed for its capacity to develop creative thinking skills and, in turn, art encounters have become more common in multiple discipline areas (Aprill, 2010; Sheridan-Rabideau, 2010; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008). English and humanities departments, for instance, take up art as another form of communication that provides a "means of enhancing the kinds of observational, analytical and critical thinking

skills that are assumed to be fundamental to successful learning" (Shifrin, 2008, p. 108).

Likewise in the domain of science, art is increasingly positioned as a tool that can help the next

generation of scientists develop their communication skills: "through art projects, students learn

to recognize patterns, link various pieces of information, and reflect on the adequacy of various

solutions to problems" (Buczynski et. al. 2012, p.30). A specific example of this integration can

be seen in projects such as "STEM to STEAM", a movement developed by Rhode Island School

of Design (RISD) that asserts that Art and Design have the potential to "transform our economy

in the 21st century just as science and technology did in the last century" ("STEM to STEAM,"

2014). STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Art, Math) responds to a "climate of

economic uncertainty" and aims to transform research policy to place Art and Design at the

centre of STEM in order to teach the "flexible thinking, risk-taking and creative problem solving

needed to solve today's most complex and pressing challenges" ("STEM to STEAM," 2014).

Within this movement, an encounter with art is an opportunity to develop the knowledge, skills,

and attitudes needed for the twenty-first century, or put otherwise, a site within which students

can build creative capital.

      A major question that arises from this increasing desire to engineer creativity, and in turn

incorporate encounters with art, is therefore: how does this dominant understanding of creativity

operate? And, perhaps more importantly, what does it produce? The dominant vision of creativity

in the twenty-first century, is based on processes of imitation and adaptation, that is, students are

taught to be creative in a way that *resembles* some pre-established and, most often, affirmative

ideal of what creativity is. On the one hand, creativity, has been reduced to a vocationally salable

skill that can be calculated and measured, and is subsequently tied to quality assurance. On the

other hand, creativity is now positioned as a skill that is ubiquitous, where anything a student

does that involves production is considered creative. In both instances, creativity is positioned as

a skill that can be taught and learned, finessed through technique and practice. Within this mode

of thinking, learners discover how to imitate creativity, from models, demonstrations, graphic

organizers, and formulaic rubrics, similarly to other skills and processes taught in school.

Creative capital therefore functions through the territorialization, identification and modelization

of creative processes. As a result of this modelization, the concept of creativity to which we refer has become commonsense and something that "everybody knows".

Under the auspices of the creativity explosion, the idea of creativity itself has therefore become dull, rigid and inflexible. Creativity, in this way, has become a way of engineering difference—so-called innovative ways of thinking in and of the world —that are nevertheless tied to a particular identity, or image of *sameness*. As a result, strategies for building creative capital are positioned as a means to a particular end: to territorialize difference under sameness in order to build creative capital. 'Authentic' creativity is, in turn, replaced with imitation and ultimately the reproduction of learned behaviours and dominant modes of semiotization. It would seem that if this is the case, what we are actually teaching students is how to be truly uncreative.

Normcore Creativity

We might further understand this commonsense vision of creativity through an example from the world of popular culture, namely, the emerging trend that has been termed *Normcore*. Normcore is the name given to a movement initiated by the New York trend forecasting group K-Hole, which responds to the phenomena of "Mass Indie" by forecasting a new trend. According to K-Hole it is this trend that holds the capacity to provide "freedom" from the scarcity of difference they see on the scene today: "[t]here's a limited amount of difference in the world, and the mainstreaming of its pursuit has only made difference all the scarcer. The anxiety that there is no new terrain is always a catalyst for change" ("K-Hole," 2014). K-Hole positions the notion of difference, or "being special", against "being free" which has led to what they term, "normcore", or the "new world order of blankness" ("K-Hole," 2014). Normcore is a "self-aware, stylized blandness"; it is fashion and style for "those who realize they're one in seven billion" (Duncan, 2014). K-Hole suggests that this trend is not only about fashion or a particular look, but a general *attitude*. As we have seen, the acceleration of capitalism within the twenty-first century necessitates an increase in the rate at which we manufacture venues for consumption, even in such innovative ways as by making creativity itself a consumable package. The normcore trend is a prime example of the flexibility and agility of contemporary capitalism, exemplifying how this "difference engine" can even market "sameness" as a new form of difference. This example also demonstrates how control works through processes of imitation and resemblance, which are

Figure 11. *A new world order of blankness,* K-Hole: A report on freedom, 2014.

always tied back to models, or what Deleuze refers to as the *Law*.

Creativity in the twenty-first century has become the new norm, or put otherwise, the new *Law* of the times. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) writes of the concept of Law in relation to the concepts of *repetition* and *resemblance*. Deleuze asserts that repetition and resemblance are different in kind: resemblance is based in generality, whereas repetition is that which describes a unique series of things or events. To resemble, is to belong to the order of Laws, that is, the order of representation or that which is always-already known. This Law is what determines the resemblance of the subjects ruled by it, along with their equivalence and value in relation to the terms which it designates. Repetition, on the other hand, is opposed to such generalities from the point of view of behaviour and from the point of view of Law. Put otherwise, to repeat is to behave in a particular manner, but only in relation to something unique or singular (Deleuze, 1994). Repetition, unlike resemblance, is inherently creative, that is, repetition gives name to a certain power that has the potential to affirm itself against the Law, working underneath or perhaps above Laws: "it is repetition that expresses at once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneity opposed to variation and an eternity opposed to permanence" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 2-3).

Under the aegis of the creativity explosion, creativity functions towards the production of resemblances as opposed to repetitions. The territorialization of creativity by capital ultimately positions the creative act as a model linked to resemblance and Law instead of difference and repetition. In turn, an encounter with art becomes a means to learn the Laws, or generalities, of any given art experience and subjective enunciation is necessarily correlated to regimes of representation driven by a desire for resemblance. Creative expression remains impossible for pure subjects of Law — be it the fashionistas who follow the normcore trend or students who adopt commonsense practices of creativity — and instead, the Law condemns subjects to transform, albeit towards a pre-established identity that such Law requires. As an empty form of difference, a Law therefore compels its subjects to illustrate it only at the cost of their own semiotization. The normcore example demonstrates how through resemblance — in this case processes of identification, branding, and marketing — difference is essentialized and reattached

to unitary identities and consolidated traditions (Braidotti, 2011, p. 171). Conceptualized as a machinic assemblage, this trend generates a difference only to re-attach it to an identity, which can subsequently be named, coded, and exchanged as a form of capital. Put otherwise, difference is territorialized and sameness is commodified as something novel and creative.

A similar process of territorialization plays out within the art encounter within the context of the creativity explosion. When tied to creativity in this way, an encounter with art is positioned as a means to an end, and that end is to develop the necessary passwords and thus creative capital to succeed in a capitalist society. The arts are sold as a venue to build creative capital, where creative thinking is conflated with innovation and entrepreneurialism, skills that are recognized as "essential" in preparing the next generation of successful professionals within the world of work (Sheridan-Rabideau, 2010, 56). Examples such as the RISD initiative of STEM to STEAM demonstrate the rhetoric behind arts integration, which is ultimately tied back to ideas of progress, utility, and instrumentalism. As a result, the potential for the art encounter to create opportunities to actualize difference and to see the world in terms of multiplicity and possibility is managed in order to territorialize creativity once again as sameness. It is this attachment to sameness which produces habitual ways of thinking in and of the world, thus limiting opportunities for learning.

<div align="center">

Dislodging Difference

</div>

Migrants + Nomads

Under the "creativity explosion", students learn to desire the ability to be creative, which is conceptualized as a skill that can be engineered and reproduced as a form of capital. As we have seen with the example of thinkITEM however, these desiring flows, like the flows of capital, are open to constant re/de/territorializations. As the forces of the capitalist machine work to territorialize creativity with images of resemblance, it also works to deterritorialize such images in order to create affirmative differences. As Deleuze and Guattari write (1987) machinic assemblages, including capitalism, are never totalizing, as there are always machines that are not yet commanded and thus open to new lines of flight. With this understanding of capitalism in mind, it is necessary to rethink concepts such as creativity, as well as subjectivity and learning, in terms of affectivity, inter-relationality, and the constant production of territories (Braidotti, 2006,

p.1). Put otherwise, in order to navigate and potentially resist the complex flows of contemporary capitalism and its productions, it is necessary to adopt a posture that is not bound by Laws and resemblances, but is instead open to creative repetitions and difference. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) term this posture *nomadism*.

In *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guattari (1987) introduce the figure of the nomad in opposition to the figure of the migrant. For these thinkers, migrants are subjective formations that live comfortably within the organizations and stratifications of the State, which for Deleuze and Guattari is the dominant power that operates through the capture of movement and the partition of space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 385). Put otherwise, migrants accept that 'the way things are' are true and act accordingly; they take accepted knowledge and store it for future reference. Nomads, on the other hand, operate in opposition to the State, constantly resisting the hierarchy of centralization that occurs through processes of resemblance and Law. Unlike the migrant, the nomad existence is a way of being between points, avoiding the traps of resemblance, identification, and ultimately, representation. The nomad makes decisions for themselves with the drive to transform and make new connections; a nomad does not seek out the accepted way, but instead constantly looks for new opportunities for creation.

When the art encounter is positioned as as a site to build creative capital, students take up the subjective position of the migrant, that is, students take up the semiotic moulding of a worker in motion that is nevertheless bound by sedentary organizations and habitual reactions. As migrants, students learn to harness creativity for its ability to create differences, only to reattach those differences to pre-determined images of thought. In this subjective position, students learn to adapt to the Laws of the time, which as we have seen, position creativity as a process of imitation and resemblance. Within the creativity explosion, then, these migrants are driven by an illusory sense of uninhibited movement and freedom. *Being creative* is now an outcome that suggests students are free to think of content in new ways, by forming innovate hypotheses and unexpected solutions. This so-called freedom, however, is always-already defined by particular outcomes, goals and formulaic processes, which are tied to results. One can be creative, but only if that creativity is in line with the goals set out by any given assignment or line of questioning. Positioned as a form of capital, creativity therefore works to *limit* the connections that can and

can not be made and thus subjective experiences and opportunities for learning. How might we dislodge this understanding of creativity, and thus difference, from its hegemonic position as an instrument of imitation and domination? One response is, by taking up a position based in the theory of nomadism. Through this posture, we might be able to reforge understandings of creativity, subjectivity, and learning that are not bound by pre-imposed goals and outcomes, but rather characterized by affirmative differences.

Becoming-nomad

Rosi Braidotti (2011) analyzes, illustrates, and assesses the relevance of nomadic thought in our contemporary moment, exploring the method, structure, and practical applications of nomadic theory. For Braidotti, it is nomadic thought that might respond to the challenge presented by contemporary capitalism by empowering creative alternatives. Braidotti's nomadic ethico-political project focuses on becomings as a pragmatic philosophy that stresses the need to act, to experiment with different modes of constituting subjectivity, and different ways of inhabiting our corporeality (Braidotti, 2006, p. 1). Nomadism therefore works as a method that has the potential to rupture systems of commonsense thinking, in turn providing a powerful way to think about lines of flight, escape, and the possibilities for resistance that might emerge through the "cracks" of capitalism. As we have seen, capitalism is not only defined by its thresholds and limits, but also by its fluctuations and uninhibited movements. In this way, capitalism feeds off of instability and insecurity, our precarious current, by territorializing difference in ways that the capitalist machine can recuperate. With this in mind, nomadic theory presents an opportunity to investigate concepts of identity and subjectivity in relation to this machine, in order to develop a new configuration of bodies that are rooted in change and instability, while at the same time capable of resisting the coding and decoding mechanisms of contemporary capitalism (Haworth & Deleon, 190). In summary, nomadism invites us to "rethink the structures and boundaries of the self by tackling the deeper conceptual roots of issues of identity" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 3).

Crucial to the concept of nomadism is therefore the undoing of commonsense ways of thinking based in Law and resemblance. Instead, nomadism seeks to arouse an affirmative passion for the transformative flows of life, or what Deleuze terms singularities, which have the

capacity to destabilize identity, including those identities that are constantly in flux, and thus the limiting organizations of life that restrict subjective becomings. The nomadic subject is able to navigate dynamic machinic assemblages, such as capitalism, by adopting postures of vulnerability *and* mobility. Nomadism involves an openness to connections with the world, but also the capacity to leave those connections behind when they no longer serve their purpose. It is in this way that nomadic becomings operate as a "process of affirmation of the unalterably positive structure of difference, unhinged from binary systems that are traditionally opposed to Sameness" (Braidotti, 2011, 151).

In relation to the art encounter, it is this nomadic approach that provides an opportunity to confront difference, exposing the singular power of an interaction with art. This singular power, as outlined in Chapter One, does not refer to the unique or one-of-a-kind experience of an artwork based on a human actor, but instead the singular turning points of an event, a becoming, an encounter where something *happens*. These moments are inherent in repetition, as it is developed by Deleuze (1994) and therefore it is through creative *repetition* that Law might be put into question. Unlike subjects of Law, such as the migrant, the nomad's key subjective experience is movement, where movement acts as "a signal for a new configuration of bodies that is rooted in change and instability" (Haworth & Deleon, p. 190). For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the nomad is therefore resistant to general hierarchies and laws of thought since the nomad itself cannot be compared legitimately to anything else, that is, such a subjective position is not measurable according to pre-established categories based in generalities. In this way, the nomad is a figure who is constantly becoming, opposing Law through creative repetitions. Such a figure therefore works to question laws of "human nature" and some of the ontological assumptions that have come to dominate educational discourse.

In conceptualizing the art encounter, then, the concept of nomadism provides an opportunity to position the art encounter as a nomadic process that is able to question commonsense understandings, such as that of creativity, in turn opening up new ways of thinking about the dehabituating force of art. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) assert that if we want to change the way a concept is thought and thus the world that is created by that thought, we must understand how it is possible for us to change, or how it is possible to move from a state of being

to a state of becoming. A starting point for this move lies in a deterritorialization of thought itself. Repositioning art as a nomadic force necessarily changes an encounter with it, creating the possibility for such becomings. Thought as an opportunity for becoming-nomad, the art encounter might better be better able to account for the different machines that condition our relation to the world, and thus to life itself.

The Peculiar (and Pedagogical) Power of Repetition

For Deleuze, creativity is not only that which leads to affirmative differences — possibilities— but also that which creates problems: "[a] creator who isn't seized by the throat by a set of impossibilities is no creator. A creator is someone who creates his own impossibilities, and thereby creates possibilities. It's by banging your head against the wall that you find the answer." (Gilles Deleuze, 1995, p. 292). Under the auspices of contemporary capitalism, which functions as the ultimate smooth space of our time (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 81), creativity has become a means to create a vision of the Self within education. Specifically, students learn to develop creative capital in order to build an entrepreneurial Self that can compete within a globally connected workplace. This Self is positioned as a migrant, travelling through striated space that restricts free movement through the use of 'walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures' and thus this Self is always-already known (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 381).

Conceived in terms of nomadism, that is, a site for experiencing the world in terms of its ongoing becomings, the art encounter has the capacity to resist these commonsense subjective formations. As explored above, smooth space undergoes a constant process of de/re/ territorializations and therefore must be navigated by constant reference to one's present environments. Maps and compasses, or in the case of this investigation, pre-established formulas for creativity, will not suffice to navigate smooth spaces. Instead, what is required is attention to the singularities of the materials that must be traversed, or put otherwise, the peculiar power of repetition inherent within an encounter with art. Re-considered as nomadic, the art encounter provides the opportunity to become attuned to the singularities presented by art, in turn actualizing difference through creative repetitions.

Reality Show

How, then, might such creative repetition play out in educational contexts? In the introduction to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) looks to the work of Keirkgaard and Neitzsche, asserting that these philosophers are able to make repetition a power peculiar to the limiting bounds of representational thought, what he terms a "superior pathos and pathology", as well as provoke a new philosophy of the future (p. 5). Drawing on these thinkers, Deleuze identifies several propositions, which indicate the points on which these philosophers coincide (p. 5). With the problem of creative capital and the theory of nomadism in mind, I have borrowed and extended three of Deleuze's propositions in order to provide insight on how the art encounter might be thought in terms of its potential for creative repetition, and thus a power capable of opening the Self to a universe of potentials. In order to explicate these suggestions, I look to an art example entitled *Reality Show* (Figure 12, 13), by Edmonton-based artist Andrew Buzchak. Connecting this art example to Deleuze's propositions, I position the art encounter as a site that is capable of operating both at the edge of dominant social formations, in this case the edge of capital's expansion, *as well as* a site where commodity forms might be disrupted and identitarian visions of the subject might be dismantled (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 73).

Andrew Buszchak's digital video *Reality Show (2010)* begins with a single column positioned amid the dark skies of the Milky Way galaxy. The video features the cursor movements of the artist as he creates the illusion of depth by cutting, re-sizing, and pasting the original column over and over again. The little white arrow moves back and forth repeatedly until the sequentially smaller columns are confronted with the limitations of the computer software, ultimately being reduced to a single pixel which becomes lost in the array of stars in which it is situated. As just another star in the sky, the column loses its identity, its iconic stature and architectural function, opening itself to the potentials of the universe.

For Deleuze, if one is to live, there must be a connection or exposure to the so-called "outside" alongside a creation or perception of that outside, with perception being the perception of difference in itself (Colebrook, 2010, p. 5). Put otherwise, and as outlined in the introduction, life is a process of repetition that is inherently creative, and what it creates is difference. Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) conception of life, their ontology, therefore asserts that relations are

Figure 12 (top). Andrew Buszchak, 2010, *Reality Show* [Still image from Single-channel digital video. Duration: 6:13].
Figure 13 (bottom). Andrew Buszchak, 2010, *Reality Show* [Still image from Single-channel digital video. Duration: 6:13].

external to their terms and thus ontology itself is a commitment to perceiving life in terms of its connections and relations, which are neither fixed nor pre-determined. Life, in this way, is conceived as a constant becoming — a transformation — which is clearly situated by both Deleuze and Guattari in an experimental milieu that is necessarily creative (Parr, 2010, p. 60). Buzchak's *Reality Show* illustrates this vision of life, wherein creative repetition, in this case the repetition of the Corinthian columns, is that which creates relations between these forms and their so-called outside, in this case the Universe. Repetition, in this way, is not a redundancy that contributes to the habitual recognition of the Same, but rather acts as a productive force that is able to create new connections and relation to the outside, and thus new opportunities for life.

In order to think repetition as a productive force, Deleuze puts forward several propositions. Firstly, Deleuze (1994) asserts that we must "make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a test, with a selection or selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom" (p. 6). We might otherwise think of this suggestion as a push for *experimentation*. For Deleuze and Guattari, experimentation is key to understanding how one acts in the world, "for multiplicity, more than a matter of logic, is something one must make or do, and learn by making or doing" (Rajchman, 2000, p. 7). This approach to experimentation is highlighted in the first few sentences of *A Thousand Plateaus,* where Deleuze and Guattari assert we must *make* connections, ever more connections, which are not determined by predictive outcomes, but instead attentive to possibilities (Rajchman, 2000, p.7). In *Reality Show,* we bear witness to such experimentation as we watch the often tentative movements of the cursor move across the screen. We witness the movement of the artist, as he cuts, copies, and drags elements around the screen. The tools are visible to us and although the artist is not present, the evidence of his experimentation remains on the screen. This experimentation, underscores the functionality of repetition, which is not only a style of thought, but also a "matter of acting"; repetition itself can be understood as novelty, that is, "a freedom and a task of freedom" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 6).

Secondly, in addition to the suggestion to "make something new of repetition", Deleuze (1994) suggests that such novelty must be opposed to the Law, including both the "laws of nature" and "moral laws" (p. 6-7). Throughout his oeuvre, Deleuze analyses the way in which

Law operates in society, including the "laws of thought" (Rajchman, 2000, p. 74). In this Chapter, for instance, we have examined the way in which the Law of creativity has worked to shape an understanding of creativity that is, in fact, truly uncreative. For Deleuze, it is these Laws that ultimately function to enclose power within a logic that limits one's very power —or what he termed *puissance*—of thought (Rajchman, 2000, p. 73). In a resistant move, then, Deleuze endeavours to challenge such Laws of thought, in order to *affirm* the power of thought, or put otherwise, to *affirm life.* In *Reality Show,* we witness the artist's experimentation with the Laws of his own milieu, that is the binary codes and pixelated limitations of the computer program with which he works. These Laws, which are necessary to the functioning of the program, are pushed to their limits as the columns become smaller and smaller and the program is unable to discern them from the pixelated image within which they are situated. Put otherwise, as the columns are repeated, they are confronted with the impossibilities of the computer screen, eventually "falling away" until the columns themselves become open to processes of transformation.

The third proposition follows from the first two and asserts that "we must oppose repetition not only to the generalities of habit but also to the particularities of memory" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 7). This last assertion is especially important for education and thinking the Self in relation to habit and the limiting inheritances of regimes of representation. Deleuze's final suggestion calls for a "clearing away" of the clichéd images of thought that have come to striate thinking and an "opening up" of the Self to the universe. Such "opening up" might start with an alternate conception of the Self, considered not as an individual and identifiable body, but instead as a *process* that is collective, intersubjective, and not individual (Braidotti, 2011, p.153). Once again, in Buzchak's work, this is demonstrated in the dissolution of the Corinthian columns, which begin as highly identifiable structures that slowly dissipate until they are nothing but pixels. These pixels, in turn, become joyfully discontinuous, destabilizing the sanctity of the past and the authority of experience (Braidotti, 2011, p. 229).

With the transversal example of *Reality Show* in mind, Deleuze's propositions urge a reconsideration of repetition, and thus creativity, as a force that is capable of opening the Self to the world and its connections. For such connections to take place, I have posited what is

necessary is a nomadic posture, be it a nomadic subjective position or a nomadic understanding of art, which can provide a site to enact such powers of thought. Rethought as a nomadic force that produces singularities, the art encounter can be considered as a process open to experimentation and repetition. It is such experimentation, which necessitates a level of vulnerability and openness to connections, that might fragment notions of identity based on correspondences, thus enhancing one's ability to "take in" the world. Through such openness to creative becomings, students learn to constantly reinvent oneself, desiring the creation of a Self as a process of transformation as opposed to a process of identification. This leads to a newfound sense of desire: not a desire to preserve, but a deep yearning for transformation. Rethought as nomadic processes, then, creativity and the art encounter hold the power to actively displace formations of identity, memory and identification, from Laws of imitation and resemblance, thus opening such formations to possible encounters with the "outside" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 235). It is this vision of creativity, one that functions through creative repetitions and untimely experimentations that might lead to new problems, creative differences, and ultimately an affirmation of life.

INTERMEZZO | MASTER IN SINCERITY

"Humor is the art of the surface, which is opposed to the old irony, the art of depths and heights" (Deleuze 1990, p. 9).

The Cedar Tavern Singers
AKA
Les Phonoréalistes

On the authority of The Cedar Tavern Singers AKA Les Phonoréalistes

_____

having complied with all requirements of quality, knowledge, and merit
is hereby granted the degree of

MASTER IN SINCERITY

with all the rights, privileges, and obligations thereto pertaining
In testimony whereof, we have affixed our signatures and the seal of
The Cedar Tavern Singers AKA Les Phonoréalistes.

m.a. McFrowe
PRESIDENT

Daniel Wong
PRESIDENT

Figure 14. Cedar Tavern Singers, 2008, *Master in Sincerity* [Downloadable Certificate produced for "Art Snob Solutions Phase I"]

CHAPTER FIVE | READING ART + CRACKING UP
Introduction | Sheep, Signs, Knowledge

An engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician were on a train heading north, and had just crossed the border into Scotland. The engineer looked out of the window and said "Look! Scottish sheep are black!" The physicist said, "No, no. Some Scottish sheep are black." The mathematician looked irritated. "There is at least one field, containing at least one sheep, of which at least one side is black."

This somewhat frivolous (or perhaps hilarious, depending on your brand of humour) anecdote offers a site to discuss the art encounter and our contemporary impasse from another perspective, this time in relation to *knowledge* and *signs*. In this joke, each interlocutor demonstrates a different attachment to the world: the engineer applies knowledge, the physicist theorizes that knowledge, and the mathematician seeks proof, in abstract terms, that such knowledge exists. Although varied in perspective, each of these figures is driven by a particular desire to *know* the world, where knowledge is positioned as something that exists outside of the subject, but is nevertheless available to be discovered through processes of scientific or empirical study.

The difference expressed in these perspectives is reflective of the structuralist tendency to know the world based on the meaning we create through the language of difference we impose on it (Colebrook, 2002b, p.27). In this manner of thinking, it is through the human subject's knowledge, expressed through acts of speech, that a world of meaning, or what we term reality, is constructed. As a result, we come to know and represent the world through "a system of differences that we impose on the world, such that knowledge and representation actually constitute the world" (Colebrook, 2002b, p. 27). As we have seen, Deleuze (1994) is in agreement with the notion that difference is primary to an experience of life, however unlike such structural approaches, he argues that difference is not an imposed system but instead constituted by a set of relations.

All joking aside, then, this brief anecdote speaks yet again to the way in which difference is managed within the impasse, this time through particular attachments to perspectivism, and ultimately knowledge. In the introduction, we looked at one such attachment, that of "cruel

optimism" (Berlant, 2011). Berlant describes this phenomena as the relation of attachment to particular narratives or habitual behaviors that have come to provide a sense of continuity for the subject (p. 21). It is this attachment that works to produce a sense of Self, while at the same time compromising the conditions of possibility for what it might mean to live in our present moment. Put otherwise, through attachments such as that outlined by Berlant, we are able to correlate ourselves to specific ways of knowing the world, often habitual and commonsense in nature, even if those ways of knowing limit opportunities for transformation and becoming.

In contemporary education, this attitude of "cruel optimism" has become the modus operandi. In Alberta, for instance, recent educational discussions, such as the *Inspiring Education* dialogue, have become the basis for curriculum re-developments and policy changes. In 2009 an initiative termed *Inspiring Education* was introduced. This initiative gathered Albertans in person and online in order to ask what an educated Albertan will look like in the year 2029 ("Inspiring Education," n.d.). The initiative was catalyzed by the overwhelming assertion that the world is changing at an unprecedented rate and as a result the future is unforeseeable. Discussions revolved around this vision of the future, culminating with a report that asserts: "[w]e need to prepare Alberta's students for this unknown and unknowable future" ("Inspiring Education," n.d.). *Inspiring Education* is one example of an educational movement that positions teaching and learning as means to develop skills that can be applied to unknowable circumstances, and in turn, students and teachers learn to desire the attitudes and postures that are championed as necessary for living in such an unforeseeable time.

What is cruel about this attachment, is that subjects who have this desire in their lives might not endure giving it up, even though its presence may threaten their well-being (Berlant, 2011b, p. 21). Students learn to desire a future-oriented attitude and any changes to such a posture are made difficult due to the *content* of the attachment, which provides the illusion of continuity and that subject's sense of what it means to go forward *being* in the world. The future, however, is always unforeseeable; no one can tell the future, not even the weatherman. It is this unknowability, this precarity of life, that ultimately produces problems, or what we might consider in this investigation, opportunities for learning. As we have seen, learning for Deleuze (1994) does not happen through the creation of stable correspondences, but rather through the relations inherent in difference itself. Learning "takes place not in the relation between a

representation and an action (reproduction of the Same) but in the relation between a sign and a response (encounter with the Other)" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 22). As we explored in the last chapter, the art encounter as it is dominantly conceived is constructed as a site to build creative capital through the production of resemblances that reference the world *as is,* or put otherwise, reproduce an image of sameness based on pre-determined Laws. Learning within the art encounter is therefore a process of creating relations between representations and actions, as opposed to signs and responses.

This assertion leads us to the second axiom identified in this investigation, the axiom that *art can be read.* Let us take this moment to return back to the joke that opened this chapter. For the purposes of this investigation, we might add another voice to the anecdote. After the mathematician makes his assertion, an artist pops her head out from the back seat and says:

"Look there are some sheep! Why did the sheep cross the road?"

"Why?" ask the scientists.

"Because he saw the ice cream truck and had to chase it about 20 blocks already. Unfortunately as it was walking around the truck the ice cream man did not see him so when he started to drive, he felt a bump in the road, but figured it was nothing and kept driving. All the little kids seeing the dead sheep started to cry and never bought ice cream from him again."

For Deleuze, the task of the artist is not to represent the world *as it is given* through the creation of stable correspondences, but instead to *create a world within this world* (O'Sullivan, 2006). Such worlds are not meant to be fascistic or exclusionary, but rather they are meant to produce a "stuttering and stammering" that Deleuze associates with true creativity (O'Sullivan, 2006, p.13). Art, in this way, is not an object of knowledge, but rather it *does something else:* "art is precisely antithetical to knowledge, if by knowledge we understand the accretion of information about 'reality' as we typically experience it" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 40). Put otherwise, art does not consist of a series of signs positioned to be read, but instead works on an intensive level to *produce* new signs, or ways of knowing the world (Deleuze, 2002). It seems, however, that we have come to understand that an encounter with art is an encounter with knowledge, that is, an encounter with signs that we can decipher through close readings and

processes of decoding that expose some original knowledge about the world. Such positioning ultimately works to cover over the intensive quality of art, which might otherwise expose difference and opportunities for learning.

In order to further investigate this axiomatic image of thought, this chapter looks to the concepts of irony and humour to understand the function of both knowledge and signs within the contemporary impasse. In what follows, I outline the way in which this second axiom functions within the contemporary educational project, focusing on the phenomena of visual literacy in the twenty-first century. Following this mapping, I then look to Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of lines and surfaces to further elaborate on how the art encounter functions as a reading-machine, and in turn, what such a machine produces. Drawing on the concepts of irony and humour, I then work to develop a counter-image to this conceptualization of the art encounter, concluding with a proposition for pedagogy inspired by the domain of 'pataphysics.

Reading Art | Lines + Surfaces

How To Talk About Art

Hi there! We're the Cedar Tavern Singers, aka Les Phonorealistes. We know from experience just how challenging art can be these days. When you walk into a gallery, you're as likely to see a well-painted landscape, as a dead shark floating in a tank of formaldehyde. It's hard to know what to think sometimes, and ever harder to know what to say. We have been thinking about this a lot, and we have some advice for you.

Oh when you're faced with a canvas

That's painted only blue

You don't know what to do

Or when you see a readymade

Sitting on display

You don't know what to say

Well this is how to talk about art

Say "It's conceptual" or "material"

These are some ways to talk about art

"Is it narrative or intuitive?"

Impress your friends with heady phrases like:

"Juxtaposition", and "formal composition"

Oh when you walk into the gallery

And there is nothing but a guy

Cooking pad thai

What can you think when the next time you go

There's a woman there

And they're cutting her hair

Well just open up a discourse about

The context, is it evocative?

You'll knock their socks off if you proclaim it's

Iconoclastic, and/or antagonistic

If you don't have the words

Just throw out these terms:

"Post-painterly", "immateriality"

Well, this is how to talk about art

Say "It's conceptual" or "material"

These are some ways to talk about art

"Is it narrative or intuitive?"

Impress your friends with heady phrases like:

"Juxtaposition" and "formal composition"

Well, this is how to talk about art

Well, this is how to talk about art (Cedar Tavern Singers, 2012).

The above lyrics are written and performed by artist collective Cedar Tavern Singers. Named after a New York bar frequented by the Abstract Expressionists, Lethbridge's Cedar Tavern Singers offer a response to what is often considered one of the most exclusive and elitist social spheres: the art world. Since meeting at the Banff Centre in 2006, Mary-Anne McTrowe and Daniel Wong have been singing about various topics in relation to the world of art including the history of specific Canadian art galleries, East Coast art versus West Coast art debates, and the challenge of talking about and making art. In the above artwork, entitled "How to Talk About Art", the duo offer some pragmatic advice for engaging with others on the topic of contemporary art through the medium of an upbeat, albeit humorous, folk song. Although the artwork is literally positioned to be read — one can read the lyrics and interpret the linguistic meanings — a brief listen to the song demonstrates that although the work is readable, *something happens* outside of the linguistic system of signification that is much harder to name.

Cedar Tavern Singers present a work of art that is, at the same time, didactic — it is intended to teach us how to understand and talk about art— *and* humorous. We might otherwise understand the artwork in terms of how it is able to "look two ways": it looks towards the world as it is given —in this case towards the institutionalized systems of signification operating in the art world— as well as towards the chaos of the universe —the humourous approach provides lines of flight from these systems which open up to the realm of potential that might catalyze connections to the world (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 68). Within the impasse, where it is desirable to rely on ways of knowing the world as it is given, it is easy to get stuck in an understanding of the art encounter that favours the first orientation, in this case the work of art's reference to art institutions. Within and without educational contexts, it has become common practice to *read* art as a representation of the world *as is,* which, as I assert above, contributes to the "cruel optimism" that defines the contemporary impasse.

Visual Literacy in the Twenty-First Century

We might further understand this approach to the art encounter through the example of *visual literacy*, as it is positioned within the twenty-first century. We live in a present moment where the visual is increasingly recognized as a pervasive and highly influential catalyst for cultural change, which has in turn shaped new understandings of art and an encounter with it

(Freedman & Stuhr, 2004, p. 816). This increased focus on the visual, or what W. T. J. Mitchell has called the "pictorial turn" (Mitchell, 1995), suggests that images are no longer used primarily to illustrate or entertain, but instead are central to communication and how we make meaning of the world (Felten, 2008; Elkins, 2008). One only has to open a web browser to realize that information is no longer disseminated solely through text, but also through a system of highly designed visual representations that have come to shape the way in which communication itself operates.

Although there is increased focus on the visual in our contemporary moment, there is also an acknowledgment that students and teachers alike are not being given the skills to read the visual world (Kress & Van Leeuwen,, 2006; Yenawine, 1997). Proponents of visual literacy approaches posit that there is little instruction in visual literacy in schools, as well as little recognition that learning to look is similar to reading (Yenawine, 1997, p. 2). This assertion has, therefore, led to heightened concentration on how to best equip learners with the skills needed to navigate an increasingly visual world. One such skill is that of *visual literacy* or "the ability to see, to understand, and ultimately to think, create, and communicate graphically" (Thibault & Walbert, 2003, para. 2). In concert with the "creative explosion", the "pictorial turn" positions the art encounter as an important site within which visual literacy skills can be developed. Like creative thinking, such skills are recognized more and more as "fundamental" within the twenty-first century, and thus visual literacy and its related terms become yet another series of passwords that students need to learn in order to take up the semiotic mouldings necessary to participate in the future. Conceptualized as a site to develop visual literacy skills, then, the art encounter operates under two major assumptions: firstly, the visual world can, in fact, be read; and secondly this reading of the world is highly desirable in our contemporary moment.

Positioned as a site to practice visual literacy, the art encounter assumes that images, like written texts, can be "made sense of " through a process that is similar to reading. Visual literacy approaches are presented as a way to develop a semiotic mode of understanding the visual world, that is to say, an understanding that is based on the hypothesis that the world is constructed and perceived as a system of signs that can be decoded and interpreted. Within this model, the assumption is that the perception of the visual involves developing visual cultural forms of

"coding", or "the construction and/or transmutation of the world into signs that work by analogy to what is represented" (Dallow, 2008, p. 93). This semiotic approach has been promulgated through the work of educational theorists such as Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) who assert that, although there is definitely a difference between language and the visual, the two still share an "attitude" or overall approach, which assumes that "as a resource for representation, images, like language, will display regularities, which can be made the subject of relatively formal description" (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 20). The supposition here is that although the visual world is complex, it is underscored by a system of meaning constituted by "facts, principles, rules, and ways of making and understanding that [can be] learned through an education system and/or a social structure that determines how a culture sees and experiences the world" (Chanda, 2004, p. 86).

The assertion that the visual world can be read also assumes particular things about our meaning-making desires. This vision of the art encounter, supposes that an interaction with the world is driven by a desire for *interpretation*, or what Deleuze and Guattari consider as the Western disease of "interpretosis" (Colebrook, 2002, p.134). This contemporary malady is characterized by an imperative to trace all meanings back to some original sense, meaning, or image of thought that represents that world *as is*. This drive is built on the foundational idea, following Kant in terms of perception and Freud in terms of desire, that "every experienced affect is read as the signifier of some original scene" (Colebrook, 2002, p.134). As a result, interpretation traces meaning to an already-established pattern, in turn preventing an encounter with the world as it occurs in terms of flows and connections. The suppositions that the world can be read and it is our "human nature" to desire such readings, shape the art encounter as a discourse of representation, a reading-machine, wherein singularities are denied in favour of regularities and generalities. This reading-machine ties knowledge to meanings outside of the subject that are nevertheless available through readings of the world, or put otherwise, operates through the development and maintenance of *linear attachments*.

On Lines + Surfaces

In *Dialogues II*, Deleuze (1987) asserts that "[w]hether we are individuals or groups, we are made of lines" (Deleuze & Parnet, p. 124). This idea is built out further in *A Thousand*

Plateaus, where Deleuze and Guattari attend to these these kinds of "lifelines" or "lines of flesh" and the way in which they operate as "person-constructing" mechanisms (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 22). The duo write about two kinds of lines: *the organic line*, which delineates form through vertical and horizontal enclosures, sticking to a centre that is representational (that is, it represents something other than what it is); and the *abstract or nomadic line,* which disrupts this function in favour of creating new connections (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 492–9). An art encounter based in reading works through the creation and promulgation of organic lines, which striate experiences of art, creating correspondences with pre-determined linguistic and semiotic systems of knowing. In this way, the art encounter operates through processes of segmentarity, linearity, and hierachization, which ultimately work to individualize experience and correlate knowledge to an image of the world as it is given.

Positioned as a process of reading, the art encounter favours systems of enunciation that tend toward the individuation of enunciation and subsequently the degeneration of collective arrangements of enunciation. Guattari (2009) understands this process of individuation as a "situation where the entirety of complex systems of expression […] is abandoned for an individuation that implies the position of a speaker and an auditor, such that the only thing that remains of a communication is the transmission of information quantified in "bits" (Guattari, 2009, Chaosophy). In the example of the art encounter, this individuation is what suppresses those desiring-flows that might otherwise constitute a subject, and thus expression is limited to commonsense articulations. Conceived as a strategy to develop visual literacy, the art encounter is bound by particular rules of perception and speech which not only depend on a certain syntax and sign system, but also a certain Law of correlation and correspondence. Through individuation and correlation, then, the art encounter is constructed as a process of reading the world in terms of organic lines, ultimately contributing to the larger process of semiotic subjugation that plays out in schools.

As the example of Cedar Tavern Singers demonstrates, however, such a linear approach to art does not fully account for what art does. After "reading" a work of art, that is, correlating one's experience of it to pre-existing images of thought, there remains an excess, which can not necessarily be re-cognized through linguistic or structural means. What dominant understandings

of the art encounter miss, then, is the idea that life goes on regardless of any reading of it: "art, whether we will it or not, continues producing affects" which are "extra-discursive and extra-textual" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 41). The song "How to Talk About Art" not only works within systems of signification, such as written language, but it is also performative: it produces nomadic lines and new signs. Such an assertion challenges notions of the art encounter based in processes of "reading", calling attention to an alternative notion of signs, including what such signs make us do as well as their "knowledge producing aspects" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 20).

For Deleuze (1990) there is no metaphysical gap between the signifier and that which it signifies, and thus a word or proposition cannot be given meaning by anything outside of it. Deleuze asserts that the sign is constituted as "an assemblage of intensities—of percepts and affects—that we encounter in the absence of recognition" (Flaxman, 2012, p. 183). In this way, the sign is related closely to affective production, which bears little relation to semiotics or structuralism, and therefore signs can not be solely understood as linguistic, but rather types of *emissions* from a particular body. A Deleuzian notion of the sign can thusly be thought as a "block of transport through which one might begin to detect tiny molecules of difference and potentials for connection from under broad blocks of representational thought" (Wallin, 2013, p. 7). Put otherwise, signs have the potential to produce nomadic lines because of the way in which they operate in terms of *surfaces:* with art "we are led back to the surface, where there is no longer anything to denote or even to signify. This is the place where pure sense is produced" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 154). By considering art in terms of such surfaces, we are urged to reconsider what constitutes a sign, how signs operate, and in turn, what they might produce within an encounter with art.

Positioned as a site for reading, the art encounter is shaped by organic lines, which ultimately work to limit enunciation and opportunities for learning through the production of linear correspondences and attachments to the world as it is given. It is this posture that contributes towards an overall attitude of "cruel optimism", which ultimately keeps us in the impasse, a space, according to Berlant, where "[p]eople can be destroyed…or they might refuse to adapt, becoming political or depressed, or both" (Berlant, 2009). Art, however, has the potential to rupture such attachments through the creation of new encountering sensations, new

signs, new surfaces. We might further understand such ruptures, and their implications for the educational project, through a transversal experimentation with the concepts of *humour* and *irony*.

<div align="center">

Cracking Up | Humour + Irony

</div>

The Rise of Irony

Our contemporary impasse, shaped by seemingly limitless flows of capital and dispersive systems of control, has produced particular ways of knowing and relating to the world. Within the impasse, as we have seen, it is common to see the development of reactionary stances, wherein people struggle to keep damaged and outdated rhythms afloat. Such a stance can be exhausting, painful and in some cases debilitating. As a result, it is easy to become despondent, pessimistic, and cynical. David Foster Wallace, an American novelist and essayist, points to these responses in his 1993 essay titled "E Unibus Pluram". In the essay, Wallace (1993) diagnoses what he sees as the malaise of modern American culture of his time: *irony*. Wallace writes about the impact of modern media in the aftermath of the 1960s, which, as he sees it, begins to adopt a particular despondent and cynical, yet self-referential, attitude in order to make viewers feel smarter than the naive "public". Irony, as Wallace points out, operates as a protective shell, a defense mechanism against the possibility of seeming naïve, or what we might think of as the unknowable character of life. Irony allows one to *know* the world. Wallace recognizes this movement as a process of gradual but unavoidable isolation, whereby the knowingness and self-referentiality of postmodernism is slowly absorbed into popular culture and irony and ridicule become entertaining and effective media tools that are at the same time, "agents of a great despair and stasis" (Wallace, 1993, p. 171).

Over twenty years later, this ironic posture, one of "despair and stasis", contributes to the overall impasse. In our contemporary moment, irony is a widely embraced setting for social interaction, cultural production, and visual arts alike. The ironic figure of the "hipster" for instance, is at the centre of many discussions of youth culture and websites such as *The Onion* have become mainstream news sources, albeit ones that present the news in a satirical and ironic fashion. In the contemporary art world, ironic references also abound and it appears that a "widespread outbreak of laughter has been underway in recent years that would ostensibly seem

to drown out the chorus of melancholy that has prevailed since the gradual demise of the postmodern" (Garnett, 2010, p. 178). The Whitney Biennial, for instance, has been noted for showcasing work that results from relativism and ironic parodies of Western art history for decades now (Ashby & Carroll, 2014). This ironic posture could be perceived as a welcome reprieve within the impasse, if this sense of humour was not, as I wish to argue here, a perpetual refrain of resemblance and resignation. At one time, irony served to challenge the establishment; now it is the establishment. Irony, in this way, works as a habitual strategy for knowing the world, without having to truly connect to it. This posture, what we might think of as irony for irony's sake, is what enables cynicism, disavowal, and ultimately our stay in the impasse. Taken as a transversal example, then, irony might help us further understand the way in which the art encounter operates, particularly in relation to institutionalization.

It could be argued that Wallace himself was an ironist, and therefore it is important to understand the nuances of Wallace's critique. What he was critiquing wasn't irony, per se, but a very flat understanding and misappropriation, or what he called an institutionalization of the idea, or, the "oppressiveness of institutionalized irony":

> "Anyone with the heretical gall to ask an ironist what he actually stands for ends up looking like an hysteric or a prig. And herein lies the oppressiveness of institutionalized irony, the too-successful rebel: the ability to interdict the question without attending to its subject is, when exercised, tyranny. It [uses] the very tool that exposed its enemy to insulate itself" (Wallace, 1993, p. 184).

Put otherwise, the problem with irony lies in its territorialization by dominant images of thought, or clichés, through processes of institutionalization. This institutionalization is made possible, in many ways, through language. Irony deconstructs language, to a degree, but is nevertheless tied to a signifying register. Irony gets caught in the "milieu of the cliché" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 66), or what Deleuze (2002) refers to as as the commonsense floating images of thought, which constitute how we understand our world. Deleuze (2002) outlines this notion of the cliché in relation to the paintings of Francis Bacon. He asserts that when an artist begins to paint, he is not faced with a blank canvas, but rather a canvas full of clichés. These images of thought that fill the canvas of our minds might also be understood as habits: "habits of sight and habits of

thought" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 63). An artist may be content to transform these clichés, "to deform and mutilate [them], to manipulate [them] in every possible way", but this approach, for Deleuze, is "still too intellectual, too abstract: it allows the cliché to rise again from its ashes" (Deleuze, 2002, p. 62). It is therefore the task of the artist to clear away the clichés in order to make space for something essential, something novel (Rajchman, 2000, p. 13).

Irony operates in a similar way; irony is dependant on clichés, those signifying formations that surround us everyday and prevent new images and new ways of thinking from developing (Deleuze, 2002, p. 73). Deleuze (2002) asserts that over time, there has been a multiplication of clichés, to the point that even reactions against clichés are themselves creating clichés (Deleuze, 2002, p. 63). This is the case with institutionalized irony, as it is critiqued by Wallace, which operates as an aggregate of clichés that are seemingly subversive or rebellious. Such irony, however, remains tied to dominant regimes of representation. Both irony and ideas have traditionally been explained through metaphors of linearity, depths and heights, or what was explored in the previous section as organic lines. Ideas, like irony, exist *above* existence, giving the world form. In this way, irony operates by adopting a point of view *above* a context, allowing us to view the context from *on high; "*irony acts as the instance which assures the coextensiveness of being and of the individual within the world of representation" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 138).

Irony, according to Deleuze, is thus a tendency in thinking "to not rest with the world in all its flux of differences [instead] to positing some ultimate point of view beyond difference" (Colebrook, 2004, p. 133). The problem with irony, then, is that it works to eliminate difference because it is unable to admit what is beyond its point of view. Irony always "subordinates the saying to the said, always misses the event of the joke, never really gets it, remains detached from the gesture, the qualitative difference that the joke entails" (Garnett, 2010, p. 179). Considering the impasse, characterized by despair and stasis, it is this ironic posture that works to cover over precarity, while at the same time enabling the impasse to sustain itself.

A Humorous Descent

For Deleuze, the ironist is one who seeks first a principle, which comes before any encounter with the world, to which all further knowledge can be attached (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 68). Positioned as a reading-machine, the art encounter takes on a similar character to irony: it is a process for creating resemblances that are always-already tied to some principle, and thus difference is eliminated through attachments to representational schema. However, through a Deleuze|Guattarian framework, we have seen that art has the potential to break with such attachments, particularly if we are to consider art as force capable of opposing such ironic postures. Such opposition can be elucidated by looking at the force of art in relation to the concept of *humour*.

According to Deleuze, humour, like art, does not operate based on principles found above the world, but instead through descension and mutation: while "irony rises and subverts", "humour descends and perverts" (Foucault, 1977, p. 165). While irony rises to a transcendent Law and then descends in order to demonstrate its inadequacy to any worldly determinant context, humour "falls down" or collapses from meaning and intentions to expose the singularities of life that have no order, no high and low, no before and after (Colebrook, 2004, p. 134). In this way, Deleuze sees humour not just as an opposite to thinking in terms of organic lines, but also a catalyst to re-consider just how the distinction between high and low has enabled us to think in the first place. Radical humour, or what Deleuze terms a "superior irony" works to dissolve such high-low distinctions, in turn favouring a way of thinking in terms of surfaces, which is to say, intensities that operate at an affective and non-signifying register. Considered in this way, humour is that which is endlessly affirmative in character, deriving from the careful yet playful repetition of difference. Humour opposes clichéd and habitual perceptions of the world through the creation of its own logic based in difference and repetition. This logic is ultimately irreducible to signification, as we have come to understand it, due to the notion that something always remains in excess (O'Sullivan, 2010, p.190). Humour, like art, thusly operates through a subversion of logic bound by Laws of representation, and is, in turn, able to perform a sort of "stealing away" that overturns dominate regimes of representation.

According to Deleuze (1994), the first way of overturning the Law is ironic, where irony appears as an art of principles and ascent. David Foster Wallace (1993) highlights this overturning, asserting that through institutionalization, such acts are not subversive at all, and in fact, work to maintain postures of stasis and despair. An alternate way of overturning the Law is thus through humour, which is instead "an art of consequences and descents, of suspensions and falls" (Deleuze 1994, p. 5). Instead of thinking in terms of the concept as a Law that governs what we say, "humour and satire focus on the bodies, particularities, noises and disruptions that are in excess of the system and law of speech" (Colebrook, 2004, p. 130). Deleuze calls this art of descension a "double theft" or "stealing away" which ultimately produces an excess, an elsewhere in the here and now (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 40). Within this humorous posture, to quote Deleuze, "there is nothing to understand; there are only varying levels of humour" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 142). Humour beyond irony, then, is the art of thinking the noises, sensations, affects and sensible singularities from which bodies are composed, bodies that can then have relations with "outside" thoughts (Deleuze, 1994, p. 182). By falling down and stealing away from meaning, humour exposes the precarious flows of life, which as we have seen, have no order, no high and low, no before and after. In this way, humour can work to "reverse or pervert logic, disrupt moral categories or dissolve the body into parts without any governing intention" (Colebrook, 2004, p. 134).

In this way, humour is "completely the opposite" to Laws of representation; it is "completely atonal, absolutely imperceptible, it makes something shoot off. It never goes up or down, it is on the surface: surface effects" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 69). Put otherwise, humour, like art, is able to overturn regimes of signs through the creation of events. Humour is an art of pure events; it takes one to the Outside of signification, stopping the conversations of the "good life" and future-oriented stances in their tracks, confounding it in favour of producing new questions. Humour therefore involves the play of imagination and prompts us to view ordinary objects and situations in different and innovative ways while simultaneously exposing us to alternative ideas and world views. In this way, humour acts as a sort of affirmative violence, a violence against typical signifying formations, and thus provides opportunities for learning.

'Pata-pedagogy + Treacherous Encounters

What might this distinction between irony and humour offer us in re-thinking the art encounter, and ultimately, the educational project? As we have seen, a humorous posture exposes singularities whose interferent perturbance is not only capable of subverting dominant regimes of representation, but also enriching the complexity of any system. Rethinking the art encounter through a humorous posture, that is, one that understands signs in terms of their surfaces, their affective and non-signifying productions, offers an opportunity to betray the Laws of representation. For Deleuze, humour is treachery, the agent of which is the traitor as opposed to the trickster (Garnett, 2010, p. 179). Whereas the trickster plays on words through practices of ironic positionality, the traitor makes gestures, proceeding through different expressive postures as opposed to positions that are always in relation to the Law. In order to develop a pedagogical application for such treachery, I will borrow from the realm of 'pataphysics, explored below, with the aim of re-positioning the art encounter as a space for affirmative difference, creative connections, and ultimately a politics of dehabituation.

Coined by French writer Alfred Jarry (1873–1907), 'pataphysics is "the science of imaginary solutions, which symbolically attributes the properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their lineaments" (Jarry 1996, p.21). There are over one hundred differing definitions of 'pataphysics, but in brief, "'pataphysics represents a supplement to metaphysics, accenting it, then replacing it, in order to create a philosophic alternative to rationalism" (Bök, 2002, p. 3). Jarry suggests that through 'pataphysics reality does not exist as we habitually come to think of it, "it is real only to the degree to which it can seem to be real and only for so long as it can be made to stay real" (Bök, 2002, p. 8). In this way, a 'pataphysical vision of reality is "never *as it is* but always *as if it is"* (Bök, 2002, p. 8). As a tool for thinking, particularly in the realm of education, 'pataphysics works to reveal how so-called rational and linear ways of knowing the world are not as "lucid" as once thought, due to the fact that they must often ignore the arbitrary status of their own axioms (Bök, 2002, p. 3). Drawing on a 'pataphysical approach to knowledge in addition to the notion of humour put forward by Deleuze, the art encounter can be positioned as a site where we might begin to rethink our attachment to knowledge in new ways.

The Time of Art

We have learned to position the art encounter as a process of reading signs that have meanings which can ultimately help us understand our reality. Within this process, experience is individualized and correspondences are made based on organic lines. This linearity comes to shape the way in which we perceive signs and create knowledge, as well as the way in which we constitute *time*. Positioned as a site for "reading" the world, the art encounter is defined by linear time, that is, the time of the art event is assumed to take place in an orderly fashion: art is encountered by a subject, meaning is established, and thus the subject learns about the world. Time in this way is conceived as a subjective experience; it is the synthesis of an ordered world from some stable viewpoint, in this case the viewpoint of the subject. The time of irony operates in a similar fashion: "[w]hat all the figures of irony have in common is that they confine the singularity [of time] within the limits of the individual or the person" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 139). Irony, like the art encounter, is therefore understood as a temporal process constituted by a subject who *precedes* speech, referencing some original world that was there to be signified in the first place (Colebrook, 2004, p. 131).

Humour, on the other hand, calls for an alternative conception of time. With humour, time is out of line, that is, the linear before and after relations that allow us to to think in terms of causes and intentions are abandoned (Colebrook, 2004, p. 134). If we think of this in terms of the jokes that began this chapter, it could be said that something is humorous not because life is suddenly rendered funny or amusing, but rather we laugh when the order of time and the logic of cause and effect explanations no longer hold. Put otherwise, the time of humour, like the time of an art event, cannot be specified; it is instead an untimely and emergent process. Events, such as the event of art, do not exist so much as they *become* (Bok, 2002, p. 44). Escaping linear attachments to the world, such as those produced by irony, therefore requires a rethinking of the logic of time. 'Pataphysics offers one tool with which this can be done.

Like humour, 'pataphysics works to disrupt linear and stable attachments to clichéd notions of reality, by engendering solutions to problems that occur *at the same time* that a problem determines itself (Bok, 2002, p. 45). Deleuze (1990) asserts that when a problem arises, it does not simply mean there has been a failure of a theorem, but it is the question itself which

might define in advance the regime of answers and thus problems. In this way, the problem always persists in the very paradigm that allows the solution to make sense as a solution in the first place. Therefore the time of any encounter can not necessarily be perceived in terms of linearity or an orderly fashion, but rather must be considered in terms of its untimeliness. An encounter with art exemplifies this untimely process in the way that it is able to "look two ways"; it references the world as is while at the same time producing problems that work out of time (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 68). Reconsidered in terms of its capacity to work out of time, the art encounter provides an opportunity to perceive that which lies "outside" of clichéd images of historicism and habit, creating a line from these forms into a realm of potentiality (O'Sullivan, 2006, p. 67). It is this untimely practice that ultimately works toward rupturing dominant habitual formations, and in so doing, "actualises other durations, other possibilities for life" (O'Sullivan, 2010, p. 205).

Becoming-'patapedagogical

By re-thinking the logic of time, the art encounter can be positioned as a counter-representational, or counter-ironic, process that does not produce a point of view above and beyond life, but sees life itself as a humorous or joyous multiplicity of incommensurable perceptions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.194). Such visions of life, in turn, offer a moment to rethink the subject differently. Opposed to a vision of the Self as a stable entity produced by linear correspondences with the world, 'pataphysics works to think the Self in terms of its unformed corporeality, constituted by multiplicities and ongoing becomings. 'Pataphysicians assert that modern science has endeavoured to colonize the identity of the subject, "leaving no space for poetic wisdom to speak the truth about culture except through an act of defiance against such a norm" (Bok, 2002, p. 22). The advent of 'pataphysics therefore signals an attempt to subvert modern science from within its own limits, by asserting that it can offer no cure, but instead that each person must live his or her life as an exception, proving no law but his or her own (Shattuck, 1984, p. 106).

In order to further explore this vision of subjectivity, I look to Calgary-based artist Terrence Houle's series entitled *Urban Indian.* The *Urban Indian* series (Figure 15; 16; 17), features the artist in a collection of everyday scenarios — i.e. leaving the house for work, at the

Figure 15 (top left). Terrence Houle, 2007, *Urban Indian #1* from *Urban Indian Series* [Digital Photograph].
Figure 16 (top right). Terrence Houle, 2007, *Urban Indian #3* from *Urban Indian Series* [Digital Photograph].
Figure 17 (bottom left). Terrence Houle, 2007, *Urban Indian #7* from *Urban Indian Series* [Digital Photograph].

grocery store, relaxing in the bathtub — all the while dressed in elaborate powwow regalia. This series is at the same time performative and documentarian; Houle performs each of these scenarios live, in turn remaking the troubled history of colonialism and First Nations identity through photographic and video documentation. An initial reading of this artistic project might take on an ironic character. Houle's witty approach to complex issues of Otherness and identity could be perceived as ironic commentary on the status of Aboriginal identity in the twenty-first century. This commentary depends on knowledge of such identity formations, requiring one to create correspondences between what one sees and this knowledge. Like the example of Cedar Tavern Singers, however, this reading is unable to account for the humorous and uneasy undertone created in this work. Houle's self-deprecating style results in a humorous stealing away of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal notions of an urban Indian status quo, putting notions of the Self constituted as a stable body of identitarian formations into question.

In humour, as is the case of the *Urban Indian* series, the Self appears less as an organized agent or organizing subject and more as a collection of incongruous body parts. If Houle's work is in fact humorous, it is in part because the Self can no longer be understood as a unified subject, but instead as "an ad hoc, disconnected and disrupted connection of movements" (Colebrook, 2004, p. 135). This sense of Self is less oriented to pre-determined identifies and meaning, and as such it is taken back to its corporeal and affective origins. Opposed to irony, which strives to think subjectivity as something that exists above any of its specific terms, a humorous vision of the self therefore works to produce "a collective assemblage, a rally point for a web of complex relations that displace the centrality of ego-indexed notions of identity" (Braidotti, 2011, p. 151). In the case of the art encounter, this understanding of the subject provides a productive way in which to approach the untimely problem of art.

'Pata-pedagogy responds to the challenge put forward by Deleuze to extract a vital image from a world overrun by clichés, by producing an alternative logic of time and a conception of the subject based in processes of becoming. By becoming-'patapedagogical, we might think the art encounter as a site for the creation of new signs, which as Deleuze & Guattari (994) suggest, operate as "objects of an encounter" that can not be anticipated and cannot be recognized. In this

way, the signs produced by an encounter with art can not be assimilated into previous ways of thinking of the world, but instead cause us to think the world in terms of what 'pataphysics calls "imaginary solutions". These imaginary solutions are integral to thinking life within the impasse, as they have the potential to counteract operations of correspondence, reason, and ultimately "cruel optimism" by opening the possibility for the production of new images of the future.

INTERMEZZO | DOTS + CAT BURGLARS

"Dots freak people out. So they join them with lines that aren't there" (Marshall, 2010, p. 310).

© Paul Freeman 2010

© Paul Freeman 2010

Figure 18 (top). Paul Freeman, *Cat Burglar 1*, [Pastel drawing on paper.]
Figure 19 (bottom). Paul Freeman, *Cat Burglar 2*, [Pastel drawing on paper.]

CHAPTER SIX | THE ANTHROPOCENE + ESPIONAGE

Introduction | Life in the Future Anterior

Berlant (2011) asserts that within the contemporary impasse precarity has taken shape as many things including "a realist term, denoting a condition of instability created by changes in the compact between capital and the state [as well as] an affective term, describing the historical present" (p. 2). Both of these formations have been exemplified thus far in this investigation. In Chapter Four, we examined the "creativity explosion" (Osborne, 2003) and the way in which this phenomena has come to direct desiring-flows so as to make creativity a major source of capital in the twenty-first century. Here, the precarious nature of capitalism, which works as a "difference engine" was highlighted , and thus in this context precarity was positioned as a realist term in the way that it approaches "the condition of instability created by changes in the compact between capital and the State" (Berlant, 2011, p. 2). In Chapter Five, the focus shifted to the precarity of knowledge in the post-modern era, and the way in which a desire for attachment has worked as a coping mechanism within our precarious world. In this context, precarity took the shape as an affective term, pointing to the anxiety felt in the contemporary impasse, and in turn, the perceived need to cover over this anxiety by forming linear attachments and habitual ways of knowing the world. In addition to these conceptions of precarity, Berlant (2011) also highlights the way in which precarity can take shape as an ideological term, "a rallying cry for a new world of interdependency and care that takes the public good as the apriori whose energies do not exist for the benefit of private wealth and which should be protected by the political class" (p. 2). With this shape of precarity in mind, this chapter asks, what prevents this "rallying cry" and thus creative responses to the precarity of our present moment from occurring? It is here that we turn to the last axiom explored in this investigation, the axiom that *an encounter with art is subtended by a human subject*

It seems we have learned to live in the *future anterior.* In education, as explored in this study, the twenty-first century has bared witness to a proliferation of future-focused discourses, which have in turn resulted in educational practices that hinge on the axiom that education should produce citizens that can function in *the* future society. Such pedagogical approaches aim to prepare students to be successful in a future world that is pre-determined by discourses of the

past-present and thus teaching and learning become processes of inculcating students for success in a future that is always-already known. Within the future anterior, then, learning is positioned as a process of habituation based on connections that *will have been* made: this content *will have been* learned; this life *will have been* lived. The future has been decided and it is up to us to adapt to this prediction, despite the exhaustion, loss, or pain that comes of it. In this way, and as highlighted in the introduction of this study, it could be said that "the world has been taken from us" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 176).

This existence in the future anterior is not limited to education. As we have explored throughout this study, our twenty-first century existence is characterized by a new crisis of enclosure. An increasingly fluid vision of capitalism, constituted by a system of "vast, open networks that give it the possibility of uninhibited movement, while at the same time limiting the movement of bodies and labor" (DeLeon, 2010, p. 54), has contributed to new machines of semiotization that have come to shape the whole social, economic, cultural life of the planet. As a result, control no longer functions solely through processes of discipline and punishment but also, as Deleuze (1992b) points out, through ongoing modulations that are both internal and external to the subject. The machinic assemblages that have come to define this crisis of enclosure function based on their ability to utilize various forms of semiotization, in order to control the maximum number of existential relations possible, or put otherwise, how we relate to the world. This crisis of enclosure therefore works to manage the relations between the so-called subject and its apparent exteriority — "the outside" — resulting in a movement of *implosion,* that is, subjectification is always-already determined by modes of living that can be recuperated by the capitalist machine.

As a result of this implosion, the dominant relation between bodies has become one of insides vs. outsides (i.e. subject vs. object, nature vs. culture) which are nevertheless held together by a dominant image of thought, valorized as the essential centre. We have come to know of this image of thought as the *human*. The economic, social, political and educational assemblages of our contemporary moment revolve around a particular vision of the human subject conceived as an organism characterized by individuality, rationality, and a distinct separation from objects, animals, the earth, and ultimately, the world it inhabits. Put otherwise,

an anthropocentric worldview has come to dominate the way in which the subject is thought and thus the connections that can and can not be made with the world. This anthropocentric bias plays out in different ways, including, as Guattari (1989) suggests in his essay *The Three Ecologies*, through the authority of a global market that destroys specific value systems by putting material assets, cultural assets and wildlife areas, for instance, at the same level of equivalence (p. 29). This is concomitant with the organization of all social relations under dispersive systems of control, which work to create a consistently nagging paradox: on the one hand the continuous development of techno-scientific interventions has provided the means to resolve ecological issues within our contemporary existence, while on the other hand, there is a distinct feeling that contemporary social forces and constituted subjective formations are unable to take hold of such resources and make them work (Guattari, 1989, p. 31).

This paradox is exemplified in recent studies, such as one party-funded by Nasa's Goddard Space Flight Center, which highlights the prospect that "global industrial civilization could collapse in coming decades due to unsustainable resource exploitation and increasingly unequal wealth distribution" (Ahmed, 2014). This study models several different scenarios of what is termed an "unavoidable collapse", concluding that under conditions "closely reflecting the reality of the world today […] we find that collapse is difficult to avoid" (Ahmed, 2014). This study is just one example of how our connection with the world is positioned as that which *will have been made*. In this brief example, the future has been determined, and thus we live in a time where the world *will have ended; this end will have been true*. It is in this sense that we have, perhaps, lost the world, or as Deleuze (1995) writes "it has been taken from us" (p. 176). As Deleuze (1995) asserts, what is most needed in today's world is thus belief: "if you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume" (p. 176).

Within the impasse this belief has been occluded by particular images of thought that resist creative responses to the problematizing flows of life, opting instead for postures of habituation, adaptability, and ultimately, *survival*. In the name of past habits and future hopes, it seems we have learned to hold the line, adapting to the narratives set out for us. As a result, we have learned to live *in spite of* our seemingly precarious relation to the world, attaching ourselves

to particular images of thought through which we can provide some sort of consistency. This survival mode is what provides stability in an otherwise precarious and chaotic world; images of *the* "future" and *the* "human", for instance, provide a way to make meaning of the chaos of our world, or as Guattari (2009) writes, these images are how we *semiotize,* inscribing our bodies based on specific pre-codified structures of perception. With this posture of survival in mind, and as Deleuze (1995) asserts, we must examine our contemporary moment in terms of the various ways individuals and groups constitute themselves as subjects, and particularly "the extent to which, as they take shape, they elude both established forms of knowledge and the dominant forms of power" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 176). Put otherwise, we need to examine the images of thought that work to create subjects, as well as the cracks found in this production.

It is here where we will begin to unfold the third axiom in this investigation. In addition to the notion that art can be read and such reading can develop creative capital, approaches to arts-based practices, including the art encounter, remain wed to the the "presumption of a primary human actor" (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2013, p. 167). Encounters with art are grounded in the fundamental notion that 'behind' any art object persists a "creative and intentional consciousness" (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2013, p. 167). It is this human subject, which in part occludes the inhuman and singular power of art. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) assert, "[n]o art and no sensation have ever been representational (p. 193). Art is not a representation of the world as it is given and therefore it does not simply reflect the human being's artistic intentions or original meanings, but rather it mobilizes affects, which are subsequently subsumed under particular regimes of representation (Colebrook, 2006). Art in this way does not "reflect experience but rather, actualizes matter's potential to differ in ways capable of escaping a human point of view" (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2013, p. 168).

The conceit of a human subject at the centre of the art encounter contributes to the overall impasse by limiting the connections that can and can not be made with the world. This bias is what limits our perception of the world to one based in all-too-human systems of knowledge and critique, in turn keeping the world at bay. With this assertion in mind, it is necessary to pose new questions of how it is that we, as so-called "humans", have come to relate to our world, and perhaps more importantly, how this relationship might be rethought in a manner detached from

the semiotizing mechanisms of contemporary capitalism and modes of control. Such questioning has the potential to lead to a new mode of resistance. Following Guattari (1989), it is no longer adequate to think of resistance as a force that penetrates from the supposed "outside", something that is concerned mainly with the molar and visible relations between things, but instead as a force that is able to cultivate a *dissensus,* working inside and out at the molecular level, stimulating the production of new modes of existence, and ultimately belief in the world.

In this chapter, the art encounter is investigated in relation to this mode of resistance. As Deleuze posits, art is not concerned with knowledge; art is not a useful tool for acquiring knowledge, in fact, it might be better thought of as an event that *interrupts* established knowledge (O'Sullivan, 2009, p. 251). This interruption occurs through the production of singularities, points of indeterminacy, or glitches, which open up the potential for a multiplicity of connections and possible worlds to form. These glitches are moments of critique, but also moments of creation; the glitch is the 'sound' of *something happening*, something different that has the potential to break worlds of knowledge in order to make new worlds (O'Sullivan, 2009, p. 251-252). In the following chapter, a further investigation of the anthropocene unfolds, with particular focus on how this image of thought has come the shape the art encounter. An anthropocentric worldview is mapped and analyzed in relation to knowledge and belief, in order to expose the anthropocentric "blind spots" that operate in contemporary education. This image of thought is then explored in relation to the "warring power" of art and Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the war machine. Following this mapping, I look to two artistic projects with the aim of disrupting the typically anthropocentric drives that have come to shape an encounter with art. Positioning the art encounter as a type of espionage, this chapter aims to investigate the inhuman character of art and its potential for dehabituation.

Knowledge + Belief in the Age of the Anthropocene

In an essay entitled *From Knowledge to Belief, from Critique to the Production of Subjectivity*, Maurizio Lazzarato (2008) refers to Deleuze's philosophical project as an attempt, in part, to replace limiting models of cognition, such as the model of critique, with models of *belief* (para. 2). Lazzarato suggests that it is this shift which changes questions of life from just understanding, an analysis of the limits of knowledge, to a focus on the possibility of our actions,

the possibility to create a belief in the world. Belief in this way is not understood in the perhaps typical religious or political sense, where it is linked with universes of value or ideological suppositions, but instead the essence of belief here lies in *action*; the belief in an invisible world, one that is to come that in turn affirms it as real, putting to test the ability for a subject to act on such a possible belief. As Lazzarato (2008) puts it, belief is the "disposition to act" (para. 4). Here, belief affirms the world as it is believed as a "processual, polyphonic and auto poetic" device, that is able to construct its own rules and protocols, machinic assemblages, and hypotheses, which then must always be put to the test (Lazzarato, 2008, para. 40). Put otherwise, to believe is to risk one's own disposition, to act in a new way, to experiment with the problemetizing forces of life. In the impasse, however, this disposition to act, and thus the connection between individual and the world and between individual and others, has been broken. Through images of thought, such as the anthropocene, relations are predetermined and thus belief is replaced with knowledge and critique.

The anthropocene signals the geological age since the industrial revolution, where, through its activities and its growing population, the human species has emerged as a geological force now altering the planet's climate and environment (Dibley, 2012). An anthropocentric worldview posits that humans are the height of the natural evolutionary progression of species and of life, an assertion that assumes that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species. Within this worldview, humans are positioned as free agents separate from and contending with the rest of nature, and in turn, our fulfillment is predicated on overcoming the material constraints presented by such an opponent. This assumption of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since Aristotle, not only produces hierarchies between different lifeforms, but also legitimizes attitudes of exploitation and profiteering in terms of the connections that are made and not made within machinic assemblages. Put otherwise, an anthropocentric worldview functions not only to understand life, but also to justify the exploitation of so-called non-human lifeforms by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96).

These attitudes of exploitation and legitimization are not only prevalent in thinking the relations between living and non-living forms, but also used to justify the exploitation of minoritarian human groups (women, indigenous peoples, for instance) who are deemed to be

closer to nature, that is animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized (Haraway, 1989). As Guattari (1989) asserts, it is such an anthropocentrically-biased worldview that posits distinct separations between ecological registers —the mental, the social, the ecological— and thus critique, a mode of transgression that posits limits and oppositions, has come to characterize modes of resistance. It is for this reason that disrupting the accords of such an anthropocentric bias is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging social arrangements, particularly as they play out in education (Bell & Russell, 2000, p. 190).

Anthropocentric Blind Spots

This worldview derives its persuasiveness from its "seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others" (Bell & Russell, 2000, p. 192). The question of the anthropocene is difficult to raise precisely because such a bias often manifests itself in silence. The primacy of the human enterprise has become axiomatic, and as such, it is simply not questioned. Since this bias is not a topic of discussion common to pedagogical discourse, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Examples of anthropocentrism often occur "in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences" (Harding, 1986, p. 112). In this way, an anthropocentric bias operates through "blind spots" that nevertheless have come to shape contemporary education (Bell & Russell, 2000).

Many "progressive" approaches to contemporary education operate in the purview of such blind spots. Although these approaches provide a discursive framework through which to *transgress,* and *disrupt* assumptions about objectivity, the unified subject, and the universality of human experience, they still tend to rely on postures of critique, which work to reinforce rather than subvert deep-seated anthropocentrically biased assumptions about "human nature". Critical pedagogy, for instance, provides a discursive framework through which to critique and contest many of the key tenets of humanism and the cultural and historical specificity of all human knowledge. This approach, however, continues from earlier traditions, such as "progressive," "emancipatory," and "liberation" pedagogies, whose root metaphors are distinctly modern (Bowers, 1993). That is to say, critical pedagogy is subtended by humanist assumptions about

humans and nature, which take for granted the borders and categories that define and delimit subjects in relation to nature and what is perceived as the devalued Other. In critical pedagogy, investigations of inequality and exploitation, have proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human beings and the world in which we have come to occupy; "[t]he more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. (Bell & Russell, 2000, p. 191). Although critical pedagogy provides a mode to critique social formations, it is still very much shaped and delimited by an anthropocentric worldview.

Similar blind spots play out in typical approaches to the art encounter. It has become commonsense to place a human actor, be it the artist, the Self, or the essentialized Other, at the centre of any experience of art. As a result, the singular force of art is pre-empted by the exclusive focus on humans and human language in a human-centred epistemological framework. In order to further unfold this assertion, it may prove helpful to look at one particular example of an approach to the art encounter, namely the "progressive" approach of postmodern analysis. Like critical pedagogy, outlined above, a postmodern approach to the art encounter seeks to transgress the limits of a modernist approach to art interpretations in order to empower students to participate in their own meaning-making, and thus learning (Gude, 2004; 2007, Stuhr, 2003). Olivia Gude (2004; 2007), a major proponent of this approach, asserts that conventional standards for art education, which for her are underwritten by modernist principles, "are neither sufficient nor necessary to inspire a quality art curriculum through which students come to see the arts as a significant contribution to their lives" (Gude, 2007, p. 6). In response to the limiting inheritances of modernism, Gude works to dismantle *The* elements and principles of art by underscoring what she sees as the problem of their universal and foundational characteristics. In turn, Gude puts forward a new set of principles that work to give "students a sense of participating in the unfolding of contemporary culture" (Gude, 2004, p.8). Such an approach has, at its core, certain assumptions about experiences of art in relation to the human, namely that an encounter with art presents an opportunity for students to "spontaneously question who creates and controls imagery and how this imagery affects our understandings of reality" (Gude, 2004, p.

10). The art encounter is therefore positioned as one way in which students can create new subjective understandings of the world and a critical awareness of their own visual consumption.

In this way, a postmodern practice works to dismantle the master narratives that have come to define art experiences, but also perpetuates and reinforces an anthropocentric image of thought at the centre of any encounter with art. This approach consistently posits an "empathic projection of the 'self' into an art-object" (O'Sullivan, 2006, p. 164) as well as an Other, that can be discovered through processes of critical reading. Through a postmodern reading, then, students learn to project themselves into an experience of art, in order to further understand how Otherness, be it cultural, historical or otherwise, is covered over by master narratives. In addition to positing an empathetic Self and an essential Other, this approach also presumes a central human artist, that is, "a creative and intentional consciousness operating 'behind' the object of its production" (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2014, p. 167). The assumption of this human actor, in turn, works to individualize and make personal the art experience. Students learn to read the art in terms of their own lived experience and phenomenological interpretations, thus making sense of the encounter based on their individual connection to the world.

Reterritorializing the image of the world upon the praxis of the individual, even such progressive approaches as critical pedagogy and postmodern analyses remain faithful to the legacy of anthropocentrism. By continually recuperating an image of the human actor at the centre of artistic encounters this lingering anthropocentric fidelity, in turn, occludes what is most inhuman in art: "[t]hat is, where art is reterritorialized upon the personal narrative of the artist, the intentionality of a conscious creator, or the metaphysics of genius, it fails to apprehend art's monumental power" (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2014, p. 167).

The Art of War

What, then, are the implications of such an anthropocentric bias? Thought of as one axiom operating within the larger machinic assemblage of contemporary education, what does this worldview produce? As we have seen in the examples above, an anthropocentric image of thought is that which striates and ultimately limits machinic connections or the relations that can and can not be made with the world. In this way, the anthropocene is key to processes of semiotization within the contemporary impasse. By juxtaposing bodies against one another —

i.e. human and non-human — the anthropocene provides a model of subjectification that produces particular ways of thinking the subject as an *individual.* This human individual is characterized by self-determination, self-motivation, and competition, which as we have seen, are desirable traits within the contemporary crisis of enclosure. As such, these traits are propagated and maintained though habitual ways of thinking the world, and thus the image of the anthropocene becomes axiomatic and difficult to question. Positioned as an individual defined by these traits, the human is conflated with particular characteristics, namely a certain egotism and self-centredness, and thus the all-too-human modes of thinking that have come to shape the impasse work machinically to create a sense of Self in opposition to the world. Of particular concern within this machinic assemblage is thus the way in which this human subject "limits a swarm of potential ways in which a life might divide, intensify, and organize" (jagodzinksi & Wallin, 2014, p. 96). In this limitation, subjects are left with the impression that there is but one life to be lived — *this life will have been lived* — and that it is a distinctly human one.

In addition to creating hierarchies between bodies, and thus individuals, an anthropocentric bias also produces hierarchies *within* bodies, ultimately producing certain understandings of how we are able to *perceive* the world. Under the aegis of the anthropocene, the human body is understood in terms of its organ-ization, that is, how organs function in relation to so-called human traits and characteristics. The organs of perception, for instance, are often understood as defining human organs, that is, these are the organs that help us make-meaning of the world in ways that are different than animals and non-living things. With the eye, our world can be perceived, interpreted, and subsequently *represented* through the linguistic, phenomenal, and logical structures that typically characterize the human. As a result of this organ-ization, particular senses come to be privileged over others. Sight, for instance, is often prioritized, perhaps over the ear or the nose, as the primary organ through which the world can be experienced and measured empirically and thus contributes to the way in which overall meaning-making occurs. This organ-ization, in turn, shapes the way in which we perceive our world. In summary, the anthropocene operates machinically to direct and enclose the connections possible both between bodies and within bodies, thus defining how we relate to the world.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, relations never come pre-established, but instead they must be always be created. Every body we perceive as distinct in the world is therefore derived from a multiplicity of forces or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the *war machine* (1987). The concept of the war machine is developed in opposition to the State apparatus, which as we have seen, works to organize and distribute territories and bodies through the creation of borders and boundaries. In contrast to such limiting state apparatus, the war machine operates based on principles of movement, becoming, and indifference to State organizations; the war machine is, in this way, a nomadic force (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). With this in mind, the concept of the war machine offers a way of understanding the differences between autonomous social networks and hierarchical and repressive formations of thought that are otherwise difficult to detect, such as that of the anthropocene.

The anthropocene operates as a machine that does not exist or exert power outside of the relations it produces, or what Deleuze and Guattari call its "warring power", but instead operates thought the production of distinct hierarchies and identities (Holland, 2010, p.188). As Deleuze and Guattari write: "the war machine's form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological innovation, in a commercial circuit as well as in a religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 360). Deleuze and Guattari assert, however, that the war machine does not make war its aim; the "war" in the war machine does not necessarily refer to actual war, but rather "a struggle at the level of representations which creates radical theoretical openings and in which all essential unities and collectivities are ruptured" (Newman, 2009). Put otherwise, war results from the *failure* of the war machine; it is "the only object left for the war machine after it has lost its power to change" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 230).

The worst case for the failed war machine therefore occurs when it "has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 230). We might say that such a destructive apparatus has resulted from the anthropocene. Under the image of anthropocentrism, it seems we have entered a permanent state of war; this is the

case for the state of our planet and for the state of the "humans" that occupy it. The war machine has failed, leaving us with little belief in the world. Like all machinic assemblages, however, the war machine can be reconstituted through experimentation and the creation of novel connections. Such a re-machining can be catalyzed by encounters with images of thought that exist outside of dominant social formations, such as that which might occur in an encounter with art.

Art Encounter as Espionage

In his book *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche (1977) offers a series of assorted maxims, including the dictum that we must recognize and detach from the anthropocentric bias that has come to dominate thought. He writes:

> "Nothing is more difficult for man than to apprehend a thing impersonally: I mean to see it as a thing, not as a person: one might question, indeed, whether it is at all possible for him to suspend the clockwork of his person-constructing, person-inventing drive even for a moment. He traffics even with ideas, though they be the most abstract, as if they were individuals with whom one has to struggle, to whom one was to ally oneself, whom one has to tend, protect and nourish. We have only to spy on ourselves at that moment when we hear or discover a proposition new to us" (Nietzsche , 1977, p. 219).

An anthropocentric worldview is difficult to suspend, even for a moment, because it amounts to the way in which life itself is conceived. Resistance to this image, however, is possible. Guattari (1989) asserts that the demands of singularities are rising up everywhere, creating new ecological problematics, that are in need of new ecological approaches and new ways to believe. As we have seen, this belief requires action; an action that is not necessarily individual, but one that relates to different levels of the world. In the case of the art encounter, what might this action look like? Nietzsche suggests we must "spy on ourselves" at that moment when we are met with something new. Perhaps the art encounter holds the potential for such action, for such espionage.

To spy on the art encounter would entail an acknowledgement of the inhuman character of art. As unfolded throughout this study, Deleuze and Guattari endeavour to develop an understanding of art that is "noncontinuous with either the experience of the subject or the conscious creative activity of the artist" (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2014, p. 167). Art, for Deleuze

and Guattari (1994), is not an individual practice, but instead an intensive practice that aims towards the production of novel sensations, and thus ways of sensing life's infinite possibilities. By transposing the art experience beyond the confines of individual perspectives and phenomenological legacies, art necessarily takes on an inhuman character in that it is able to connect to the animal, the vegetable, earthy and planetary forces that surround us (Braidotti, 2013, p. 107). Put otherwise, art is that which is able to carry us to the limits of what our embodied selves can do or endure insofar as it stretches the boundaries of representation. Art is inhuman because it does not reflect experience, but rather, actualizes matter's potential to differ in ways capable of escaping a human point of view (jagodzinski & Wallin, 2014, p. 168).

Espionage would thusly entail further investigation into this inhuman quality of art, but also the understanding that such inhuman qualities are those that often exist outside of ways of thinking that are easily re-cognized and re-presentable. As Nietzsche points out in the passage above, it is in the moment where we are confronted with something new that we might be able to lift the veil and expose this inhuman force, that which might cause a shock to thought, in turn exposing the anthropocentric blind spots that have come to dominate thought. The art encounter therefore has the capacity to dilate thought beyond an anthropocentric bias, presenting an opportunity for "otherworldly conversations," that is, conversations wherein the main conversants are not necessarily "us" (Haraway, 1992, p. 84). In the following examples, I attempt to enact such espionage by investigating two artistic projects: *Resophonic City* and *I need you, I don't need you.*

Breaking the Eye | *Resophonic City*

Resophonic City is an experimental project devised by Mark Templeton & Nicola Ratti that integrates with and builds upon the existing soundscape of two cities of different origin, size, and architecture: Milan, Italy and Edmonton, Alberta. For this project, which was exhibited in Edmonton, Alberta in the winter of 2014, locations in these two cities were flooded with synthetic sounds, recorded, and subsequently shared between the artistic collaborators. Although similar sounds were emitted, the soundscapes created in each city took on different tones: the wind-buffed concrete and open spaces of Edmonton created acoustic filters and resonating chambers, whereas the narrow passageways and private courtyards of Milan siphoned sound

Figure 21 (top). Recording sound in Edmonton, photo courtesy of Mark Templeton.
Figure 22 (bottom). Recording sound in Milan, photo courtesy of Mark Templeton.

Figure 20. Mark Templeton & Nicola Ratti, with Leanne Olsen. *Resophonic City,* installation view, 2013. [Sound installation & Digital photographs.]

through slow accumulations, before quieting in corners and stairwells. As a procedural project, *Resophonic City* underwent a series of stages, each contributing to the overall experimentation. For the exhibitions presented in both the cities of Edmonton and Milan, the soundscapes were extended through the work of local visual artists, who received audio files of the finished recordings without knowing the locations they were drawn from. These artists then produced work in response to these unknown sonic ecologies, actualizing new ways of visualizing each of the cities.

As an experiment in both sound and collaboration, *Resophonic City* "ponders the creation of an illusion" (Templeton, 2014), that is, this multi-faceted artistic project investigates the illusory image of movement that oscillates between two very different cities. With this experimentation in repetition, the artists question the way in which identity, in this case the identity of cities, is often discerned through visual appearances, and in turn, how this might be thought otherwise through the production of sonic ecologies and creative collaborations. Templeton and Ratti, in concert with the visual artists they engaged, oppose typical ways of knowing these location, in this case through occular-centric identification, instead turning their focus to acoustic ecologies and sonic territories. The soundscapes created by the two artists highlight the difference that can be found "in the emptiness of the respective places where our foreign sounds have served as a magnifying lens through which we observe them" (Templeton, 2014). By highlighting this difference, *Resophonic City* presents an opportunity to challenge habitual interpretive drives, particularly those informed by ocular-centric approaches, thus catalyzing a dis-organ-ization of the typical perceptual connections made within the art encounter.

This dis-organ-ization points to the inhuman quality of art. Through the production of soundscapes, *Resophonic City* takes on a pre-personal and nonsignifying character that is able to disrupt all-too-human modes of perception. In *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) write that sound is not a "form of expression", but rather it is an "unformed material of expression, that will act on other terms" (p. 6). Sound, as a sign, is that which is constantly fleeing, leaking, and disappearing into difference; it organizes itself momentarily, only to disorganize its own forms and that of content, freeing up its own intense material of

expression. Sound is, in this way, a nomadic force that is open to the multiplicity of flows that enable assemblages between bodies outside of what is readily representable; "in sound, intensity alone matters" and as such sound is always "nonsignifying" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 6). Due to this non signifying nature, sound acts as a sign that is only known by the way in which it is able to tear sense from representation, creating a sort of dissonance, an irrevocable deterritorialization, that functions by "taking flight" and bringing into play new connections and new becomings (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 28). In *Resophonic City* it is these nonsignifying connections and becomings, that work to dis-organ-ize typically human modes of perception, in this case the typical drive to make meaning through the eye, thus dilating the field of perception and the connections that might be made with the world.

In addition to (and as a result of) this dilation, *Resophonic City* puts perception into question, catalyzing a detachment of perception from the perspective of a so-called human perceiver. It is this detachment which liberates art's potential to act as a singular and pre-personal force that might lead to a politics of dehabituation. In an encounter with *Resophonic City*, typical interpretive drives are challenged. One might initially seek to encounter this work through sight, including a survey of the gallery layout (Figure 20) or a reading of the didactic information that accompanies the work. These interpretive strategies, however, do not suffice in an experience of this work. Although influential, the visual space and interpretive texts do not account for the affective experience of the soundscapes, which as outlined above, avoid easy categorization, identification, and thus representation. In this way, the artwork does not act as a sign poised to be read by the representational animal we have come to know as the human, but instead, operates as a pre-personal machine of expression that is capable of dis-organ-izing the very way in which this animal is thought.

As a result, *Resophonic City* calls for a shift in questioning as concerns perception and ultimately the body. In an encounter with this artwork, it is not enough to ask "what is a body?" or "how is a body organ-ized?" but rather "what can a body do?". Deleuze and Guattari (following Spinoza) trouble the idea of an organized body through this very question. By asking "what can a body do?" or "how much can a body take?", the body is no longer understood as a compilation of identifiable traits and characteristics —its organ-ization —but rather the way in

which that body is able to connect with the world. This shift in questioning is that which produces a dilation in thinking about how we relate to the world, which in turn has important implications for the art encounter, and ultimately learning. Learning, as it is conceived in this study, is that which occurs in processes of becoming. In this way, learning does not merely entail the mental acquisition of certain ideas, but also coincides with bodily processes. As Deleuze (1994) asserts, the path to thought begins with sensibility; it is the privileged origin of the encounter, that which forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same. Learning is thus the perception of a difference in intensity, which is both "the object of the encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 145). Through the production of sonic ecologies that produce a site to spy on oneself and one's typical interpretive drives, *Resophonic City* can be thought as a site that might produce such encounters.

Breaking the I | *I Need You, I Don't Need You*

Dara Humniski's sculptural and photographic project, entitled *I Need You, I Don't Need You* (Figures 23-26), features a series of figurative studies that explore how ideas of loss, labour, and the desire to manipulate one's environment play out through one's own hands. Catalyzed by a group show entitled *Manus* (2013)*,* Humniski's hand studies are self-portraits of the artist, albeit portraits that do not fall back on typical notions of identity and signification. Rendered in delicate materials and placed among diverse ecologies, these portraits work as incomplete or unformed bodies, fragments that express an openness to the world as well as a deep vulnerability: "they're not perfect or whole, a good metaphor for the normal helplessness of our own bodies" (Humniski, n.d.). Put otherwise, these portraits propose a certain sense of loss, or what we might consider a death of the Self.

As we have seen, an anthropocentric worldview posits a distinctly human Self that is most often defined in opposition to the ecologies within which it is situated. This notion of the Self is subtended by particular understandings of ontology, defined by oppositions and categorizations, which in turn shape how we connect to the world. Ontology, for Deleuze and Guattari, however, does not conceive of being as a state defined by easy categorization, but rather it is defined as a constant process of becoming. Relations are always occurring, which in turn, generate subject and object positions; these relations do not come pre-existing but are

Figure 23 (top). Dara Humniski, 2013, *Untitled*, from the series *I need you, I don't need you.* [Mixed media sculptures and digital photograph.]
Figure 24 (bottom). Dara Humniski, 2013, *Untitled*, from the series *I need you, I don't need you.* [Mixed media sculptures and digital photograph.]

Figure 25 (top). Dara Humniski, 2013, *Untitled*, from the series *I need you, I don't need you.* [Mixed media sculptures and digital photograph.]
Figure 26 (bottom). Dara Humniski, 2013, *Untitled*, from the series *I need you, I don't need you.* [Mixed media sculptures and digital photograph.]

always comprised in relation to one another. Any Self is therefore constituted as a multiplicity of drives that are always in motion: "[a] multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature…" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 8). This understanding of the Self therefore challenges typical ways of thinking the human subject by exposing the potential for connections to and with other bodies.

Humniski's work presents a moment to spy on this multiple Self. The hands in this photographic series are placed in relation to various ecologies, as both subjects and objects. Considered at the same time human (the hands are recognizable as human hands) as well as non-human (these hands are detached from typically human associations of how a hand functions) Humniski's hands illustrate the way in which bodies might be rethought in terms of the relations to the ecologies they inhabit. As a result of this dynamic relation, "something opens up to an Outside, what we call the 'virtual Real,' an impersonal plane of subjectivity that is populated with object processes and physical phenomena that constitute their own subjectivities" (jagodzinksi & Wallin, 2013, p. 33). By extension, the so-called human body, and thus the image of the Self, can be rethought as a process that is constantly interactive, open to connections and new transformations. This vision of the subject allows us to move beyond the centrality of the human Self and the dualism of human/non-human dichotomies, in turn opening up new potentials for thinking ourselves in relation to the world.

Artistic projects such as *Resophonic City* and *I Need You, I Don't Need You* provide a moment of critique, but also the impetus for creation. By breaking the eye/I, these artworks illustrate the potential for art to produce a sort of "letting go", or what we might otherwise think of as, *belief in the world*. Belief, as outlined earlier in this chapter, is not understood as an ideological supposition, but rather the belief in an invisible world, one that is to come. As Lazarrato (2008) asserts, this belief is the "disposition to act", which affirms the world as it is believed through the construction of connections and machinic assemblages. In this way, belief requires a different understanding of bodies governed by a different logic—a logic of intensity where humans are not considered totalized bodies but rather as partial objects that find potential vectors of subjectification that create belief in a world, create the world itself. Such approaches to life, Guattari (1989) asserts, need to articulate themselves in terms of heterogeneity and

tangles, that is they need to isolate and activate repressed singularities that are otherwise turning in circles, stuck in the impasse.

Positioned as a practice of espionage, the art encounter has the potential to work toward such belief. Instead of calling for interpretation, this notion of the art encounter actively frees sense from representation, creating an alternative form of enunciation that is pre-personal and inhuman. In this way the art encounter is no longer subtended by the urge to make sense, a typically human drive, but instead a constant actualization of the "circuit of states that form a mutual becoming, in the heart of necessarily multiple or collective assemblage[s]" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 22). In this way, art and our encounter with it takes on the character of an event in that it is constantly becoming, forming new assemblages between bodies through evermore territories.

These artworks demonstrate the complexity of subjective experience and the ways in which life is limited by particular images of thought, such as that of the "human." In this way, an encounter with the works of Templeton and Humniski offers an expository example of the way in which the image of the human can be challenged and unheard of lines of becoming—new life— can form. As we have seen. Deleuze insists that the power of life—all life, not just that limited to the human—lies within the forces of becoming. In the case of this investigation, the art encounter has the potential to catalyze such becoming, in turn challenging typically anthropocentric organizations and all-too-human regimes of representation. It is these characteristics that must be applied to the educational project in order to rethink it as a force that is capable of enhancing life instead of limiting it.

CODA | MAKING LOVE TO THE WORLD

Learning, following Deleuze (1994), is that which takes place in the dynamic and untimely relation between a novel sign, that is, something that makes us think, and a response (p. 22). Learning, in this way, is not a process of re-presenting that which already exists, but operates instead through experimentation and conjunctions with the world. As unfolded in this study, the contemporary educational project, shaped by the larger crisis of enclosure of our time, has adopted an overall posture of survival, which in turn has limited opportunities to connect to the world, and thus opportunities for learning. The art encounter provides one site to examine this posture of survival, and how such responses to the precarious flows of life have been produced through processes of habituation.

As we have seen, the art encounter operates as one machinic assemblage at work within the educational project, which over time has come to function based on the axiomatic understandings that art can be read through all-too-human regimes of representation in order to build creative capital. Positioned in this way, and as we have investigated throughout this study, the art encounter acts as a machine of semiotization that works to keep us in the impasse. Rethought in terms of its singular and inhuman potential, whether thought as a nomadic force, a humorous machine, or a site for espionage, this research works to re-think and reposition the art encounter as a space that might provide opportunities to expose both the limits and potentials inherent within our contemporary impasse. Put otherwise, by rethinking the art encounter as a site for making connections *with* the world, and thus a site for learning, we might be able to better approach the precarity of our present moment outside of postures of survival and adaptation, instead opting to make connections, *to make love,* with the world.

Making love with the world elicits the disappearance of firm boundaries between Self and other, as well as Self and the world; love is the enlargement of one's field of perception and capacity to experience (Braidotti, 2011, p.197). Love, in this sense, is not defined in terms of romanticism or even the love between two "humans", but instead as Guattari (2009) asserts "there are all kinds of ways to make love: one can make it with flowers, with science, with art, with machines, with social groups…" (p. 172). Love, in this way, has no subject. It is more than human, coursing across the human, across life in all its material and incorporeal ecologies, in

turn shaping an enthusiasm that forever exceeds us. It is this sense of love with which I assert we must approach our contemporary moment. We must open ourselves to connections and endeavour to move beyond typical representational modes of thinking; instead of knowing about, we must endeavour to know *with*. Making love with the world therefore involves a new kind of symbiosis, or an ethics of connection (jagodzinkisi & Wallin, 2013, p. 14-15) that is able to steal away from the certitude of identity, in turn dismantling those axioms that have come to define educational practices, including the art encounter.

References

Ahmed, N. (2014). Nasa-funded study: industrial civilisation headed for 'irreversible collapse'?
     Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/14/
     nasa-civilisation-irreversible-collapse-study-scientists.

Alliez, E. (2006). Anti-Oedipus – Thirty years on (Between art and politics). M. Fuglsang & B.
     M. Sorensen (Eds.), *Deleuze and the social* (pp. 151-168). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh
     University Press.

Anthropocentrism. (2008). In The Gale Encyclopedia of Science. Retrieved from http://
     www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Anthropocentrism.aspx

Apple, M. (2005) 'Education, Markets and an Audit Culture', *Critical Quarterly*,
     47:1–2, pp. 11–29.

Aprill, A. (2010). Direct instruction vs. arts integration: A false dichotomy. *Teaching Artist
     Journal, 8*(1), 6–15.

Ashby, M. & Carroll, B. (2014). David Foster Wallace was right: Irony is ruining our culture.
     Retrieved from http://www.salon.com/2014/04/13/
     david_foster_wallace_was_right_irony_is_ruining_our_culture/

Axiom [Def. 1a]. (n.d.). In *Oxford English Dictionary Online,* Retrieved May 25, 2014, from
     http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/axiom?q=axiom

Ball, S. (2003) 'The Teacher's Soul and the Terrors of Performativity', *Journal of
     Education Policy,* 18:2, pp. 215–28.

Bell, A. & Russell, C. (2000). Beyond human, beyond words: Anthropocentrism, critical
     pedagogy, and the poststructuralist turn. *Canadian Journal of Education, 25*(3), 188-203.

Bensmaia, R. (1986). Forward: The Kafka effect. *Kafka: Towards a minor literature*.
     Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Berlant, L. (2009, February). After the good life, the impasse: Human resources, time out, and
     the precarious present. *Gendering the Social Sciences*. Lecture conducted from London
     School of Economics Gender Institute.

Berlant, L. (2011). Austerity, precarity, awkwardness. Retrieved from
     http://supervalentthought.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/berlant-aaa-2011final.pdf

Berlant, L. (2011b). *Cruel optimism.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Bogue, R. (2004). Search, swim and see: Deleuze's apprenticeship in signs and pedagogy of
       images. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, *36(*3), 327-342.

Bok, C. (2002). *'Pataphysics: The poetics of an imaginary science*. Illinois: Northwestern
       University Press.

Braidotti, R. (2006). *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Braidotti, R. (2010). Politics & Ecology. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised
       Edition) (211-213). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Braidotti, R. (2011). *Nomadic theory: The portable Rosi Braidotti.* New York, NY: Columbia
       University Press.

Braidotti, R. (2013). *The posthuman.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bryx, A. & Genosko, G. (2010). Transversality. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary*
       (Revised Edition) (291-292). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Buchanan, I. (2013). The Little Hans assemblage. *Visual Arts Research, 39*(1): 9-17.

Buczynski, S. Ireland, K., Reed, S., Lacanienta, E. (2012). Communicating science concepts
       through art: 21st century skills in practice. *Science Scope, 35*(9): 45-51.

Cole, D. R. (2012). Doing work as a reflection of the other: Notes on the educational materialism
       of Deleuze and Guattari. In D. Cole (Ed.), *Surviving economic crisis through education*
       (165-181). New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

Colebrook, C. (2002). *Gilles Deleuze*. London: Routeledge.

Colebrook, C. (2002b). *Understanding Deleuze*. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin.

Colebrook, C. (2004). *Irony*. London/New York: Routeledge.

Colebrook, C. (2010). Introduction. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition)
       (1-6). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Curriculum Redesign. (n.d.). In *Alberta Education.* Retrieved from https://
       www.education.alberta.ca/department/ipr/curriculum.aspx

DeLeon, A.P. (2010). Reporting from the realm of the absurd: Rethinking space in a neoliberal
       world. *Theory in Action, 3*(4), 38-58.

Deleuze, G. (1990). *The logic of sense* (C. Stivale and M. Lester, Trans.). New York: Columbia
University Press.

Deleuze. G. (1991). *Empiricism and subjectivity: An essay on Hume's theory of human nature*
(C. Boundas, Trans.). NY: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1953).

Deleuze, G. (1992). Mediators. In Crary, J. & Kwinter, S. (Eds.) *Zone 6: Incorporations.* New
York: Zone Books.

Deleuze, G. (1992b). Postscript on the societies of control. *October*, *50*(2), 3-7.

Deleuze, G. (1994). *Difference and Repetition*. (P. Patton, Trans.). New York: Columbia
University Press.

Deleuze, G. (1995). *Negotiations 1972-1990* (M. Joughin, Trans.). New York: Columbia
University Press.

Deleuze, G. (1997). *Essays critical and clinical* (D. W. Smith & M. A. Greco, Trans.).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G. (2000). *Proust and signs (*R. Howard, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.

Deleuze, G. (2002). *Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation.* (D. W. Smith, Trans.). Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1981)

Deleuze, G. (2004). *Desert islands and other texts, 1953-1974.* New York: Semiotext(e).

Deleuze, G. (2006). What is the creative act? In D. Lapoujade (Ed.), A. Hodges, & M. Taormina
(Trans.), *Two regimes of madness: Texts and interviews 1975-1995* (pp.312-324). New
York, NY: Semiotext(e).

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1983). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia* (Trans. by R.
Hurley, M. Seem, & H. R. Lane). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze G. & Guattari, F. (1986). *Kafka: Towards a minor literature*. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia* (Trans.
by R. Hurley, M. Seem, & H. R. Lane). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). *What is philosophy?* London: Verso.

Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. (2002). *Dialogues II*. NY: Columbia University Press.

Dibley, B. (2012). Nature is us: the Anthropocene and species-being. Retrieved from http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_21/article_07.shtml

Duncan, F. (2014). Normcore: Fashion for those who realize they're one in 7 billion. Retrieved from http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/02/normcore-fashion-trend.html

Elkins, J. (2008). Introduction: The concept of visual literacy and its limitations. In: Elkins, J. (Eds), *Visual literacy*. New York: Routledge, 2008: 1-9.

Eisner, E. W. (2002). *The arts and the creation of mind*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Evernden, N. (1992). *The social creation of nature*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Felten, P. (2008). Visual literacy. *Change, 40*(6): 60-64.

Feyerabend, P. K. (1975). *Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge*. London: New Left Books.

Fisher, J. (2011) "The Walking Wounded": Youth, Public Education, and the Turn to Precarious Pedagogy, *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*, 33:5, 379-432, DOI: 10.1080/10714413.2011.620858

Flaxman, G. (2012). *Gilles Deleuze and the fabulation of philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Florida, R. (2002). *Rise of the creative class…and how it's transforming work, leisure, community & everyday life*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Florida, R. (2008). About Richard Florida. Retrieved from http://www.creativeclass.com/richard_florida/about_richard

Florida, R., Charlotta Mellander, C., Stolarick, K., Kimberly Silk K., Matheson Z., Hopgood, M. (2011). *Creativity and prosperity: The global creativity index*. Martin Prosperity Institute.

Foucault, M. (1979). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). London: Penguin Books.

Foucault, M. (2008). *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79* (G. Burchell, Trans.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. & Deleuze, G. (1972). Intellectuals and power: A conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. Retrieved from https://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-between-michel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze.

Garnett, R. (2010). Abstract humor, humorous abstraction. In S. Zepke & S. O'Sullivan (Eds.), *Deleuze and contemporary art* (pp. 176–188). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Gates, G.J. (2010) The creativity-diversity link. *Education Canada, 44*(2), 12-14 & 53.

Genosko, G. (2010). Guattari, Pierre-Felix (1930-92). In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition) (121-123). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Gregoriou, Z. (2004). Commencing the rhizome: Towards a minor philosophy of education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 36*(3), 233-251.

Grosz, E. A. (2008). *Chaos, territory, art: Deleuze and the framing of the earth.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Guattari, F. (1984). *Molecular revolution: Psychiatry and politics.* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Guattari, F. (1989) *The three ecologies* (I. Pindar & P. Sutton, Trans.). London: Athlone Press.

Guattari, F. (1992). *Chaosmosis: An ethico-aesthetic paradigm.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Guattari, F. (2009). *Chaosophy: Texts and interviews 1972-1977.* (Trans. D.L. Sweet, J. Becker, & T. Adkins). Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).

Guattari, F. (1965). La transversalité. In Revue de psychothérapie institutionnelle, No. 1, 91–106.

Gude, O. (2004). Postmodern Principles: In Search of a 21st Century Art Education. *Art Education, 57*(1), 6-14.

Gude, O. (2007). Principles of Possibility: Considerations for a 21st-Century Art & Culture Curriculum. *Art Education, 60*(1), 6-17.

Gude, O. (2009). Art education for democratic life. *Art Education, 62*(6), 6-11.

Haworth, R. & DeLeon A. P. (2012). The crisis of mutative capitalism: Holey spaces, creative struggle and educative innovations. In D. Cole (Ed.), *Surviving economic crisis through education* (182-197). New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

Haraway, D. (1989). *Primate visions: Gender, race and nature in the world of modern science.*
        New York: Routledge.

Haraway, D. (1992). Otherworldly conversations: terran topics; local terms. *Science*
        as Culture, 3(14), 64–98.

Harding, S. (1986). *The science question in feminism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Herbert, D. (2006). Arts education and the creative economy. *Journal of Dance Education, 6*(2),
        37-40.

Holland, E. (2010). Nomadicism & Citizenship. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary*
        (Revised Edition) (188-189). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Holland, E. (2011). Desire. In C. J. Stivale (Eds.), *Gilles Deleuze: Key concepts* (2nd Ed) (p.
        55-64). Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Houle, K. (2011). Micropolitics. In C. J. Stivale (Ed.), *Gilles Deleuze: Key concepts* (2nd ed., pp.
        103–115). Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Humniski, D. (n.d.). Manus. Retrieved from http://www.darahumniski.com/Manus

Hunter, D. and Higgs, H. (2012). What is the creative challenge index? In *Creative*
        Challenge, Inc. Retrieved November 20, 2012, from http://
        www.creativechallengeindex.org/?page_id=7.

Inspiring Education. (n.d.). Retrieved from
        https://education.alberta.ca/department/ipr/inspiringeducation.aspx

jagodzinski, j. (2008). Postmetaphysical vision: Art education's challenge in an age of
        globalized aesthetics (A mondofesto). *Studies in Art Education, 49*(2), 147-160.

jagodzinski, j. (2010). *Visual art and education in an era of designer capitalism: Deconstructing*
        the oral eye. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

jagodzinski, j. & Wallin, J. (2013). *Arts-based research: A critique and a proposal.* Rotterdam:
        Sense Publishers.

Jeanes, E.J. & De Cock, C. (2005). Making the Familiar Strange: A Deleuzian Perspective on
        Creativity. Paper for the *Creativity and Innovation Management Community Workshop*,
        23-24 March 2005, Oxford.

K-Hole. (2014). Youth mode: A report on freedom. Retrieved from http://khole.net/.

Kress, Gunther; Leeuwen, Theo Van. (2006). *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*.

      Taylor & Francis. Retrieved from <http://lib.myilibrary.com? ID=47857>

Lazzarato, M. (2008). From knowledge to belief, from critique to the production of subjectivity

      (C. Nielsen, Trans.). Retrieved from http://eipcp.net/transversal/0808/lazzarato/en

Leland, C. H., & Harste, J. C. (1994). Multiple ways of knowing: Curriculum in a

      new key. *Language Arts*, *71:* 337–345.

Lorraine, T. (2010). Lines of flight. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition)

      (147-148). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Marshall, M. (2010). *Bad things*. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers.

McMahon, M. (2011). Difference, repetition. In C. J. Stivale (Eds.), *Gilles Deleuze: Key

      concepts* (2nd Ed) (pp. 44-54). Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

McWilliam, E. & Haukka, S. (2008). Educating the creative workforce: new directions for 21st

      century schooling. *British Education Research Journal,* 34 (5 (Special Issues on

      Creativity and Performativity)). pp.651-666.

Mitchell, W. J. (2008). Visual literacy or literary visualcy? In: Elkins, J. (eds), *Visual literacy.*

      New York: Routledge, 2008: 1-29.

Newman, S (2009). War on the state: Stirner and Deleuze's anarchism. Retrieved from http://

      theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-war-on-the-state-stirner-and-deleuze-s-

      anarchism.

Nietzsche, F. (1977). *Human, all too human* (M. Faber, Trans.). Lincoln: University of Nebraska

      Press.

Osborne, T. (2003). Against 'Creativity': A Philistine Rant. *Economy and Society*, *4*(4): 507-525.

O'Sullivan, S. (2009). From stuttering and stammering to the diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and

      contemporary art practice. *Deleuze Studies, 3*(2): 247-258.

O'Sullivan, S. (2005). Notes towards a minor art practice. *Drain: Journal of Contemporary Art

      and Culture*, 05. Retrieved from http://www.drainmag.com/contentNOVEMBER/

      RELATED_ESSAYS/Notes_Towards_Minor_Practice.htm

O'Sullivan, S. (2010). From aesthetics to the abstract machine: Deleuze, Guattari and contemporary art practice. In S. Zepke & S. O'Sullivan (Eds.), *Deleuze and contemporary art* (pp. 189–207). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Parry, T., & Gregory, G. (2003). *Designing brain-compatible learning.* Glenview, IL: Pearson Education, Inc.

Perkins, D. (2001). Thinking for understanding. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), *Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking* (pp. 442–445). Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

Peters, M.A. (2009). Education, creativity and the economy of passions: New forms of educational capitalism. *Thesis Eleven*, (96): 40-63.

Peters, M. A. (2012). 'Knowledge economy', economic crisis and cognitive capitalism: Public education and the promise of open science. In D. Cole (Ed.), *Surviving economic crisis through education* (21-44). New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

Pink, D. (2005). Revenge of the Right Brain. Adapted from *A Whole New Mind: Moving from the Information Age to the Conceptual Age*. Retrieved online: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.02/brain.html

Pink, D. (2011). About Daniel Pink. Retrieved from http://www.danpink.com/about

Pisters, P. & Lysen, F. (2012). Introduction: The smooth and the striated. *Deleuze Studies 6.1*:1-5.

Protevi, J. (2010). Earth/Land (Terre). In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition) (188-189). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Rajchman, J. (2000). *The Deleuze connections.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Reed, P. (2014). Glitches in orality and the stakes of semantics: A conversation with Jodi Dean. *C Magazine*, v. 120. Retrieved from http://cmagazine.com/2013_120_reed.htm

Ross, A. (2010). Desire. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition) (66-67). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Semetsky, I. (2006). *Deleuze, Education and Becoming*. Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense Publishers.

Shattuck, R. (1984). *The innocent eye*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Sheridan-Rabideau, M. P. (2010). *Design literacies : learning and innovation in the digital age*. London: Routledge.

Shifrin, S. (2008). Visual literacy in North American secondary schools: Arts-centered learning, the classroom and visual literacy. In J. Elkins (Ed.), *Visual literacy* (pp. 105–128). New York, NY: Routledge.

Smith, D.W. (2007). Deleuze and the question of desire: Toward an immanent theory of ethics. *Parrhesia, 2*: 66-78. Retrieved from: www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia02/ parrhesia02_smith.pdf

"STEM to STEAM" (2014). Retrieved on May 14, 2014 from http://stemtosteam.org/

Stagoll, C. (2010). Becoming. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition) (89-91). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Stuhr, P. L. (2003). A Tale of why social and cultural content is often excluded from art education—And why it should not be. *Studies In Art Education*, *44(*4), 301-314.

Surin, K. (2010). Control society & state theory. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition) (57-59). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Templeton, M. (2014). Resophonic. Retrieved from http://fieldsawake.com/resophonic.

Thompson, G. & Cook, I. (2014). The Eternal Return of Teaching in the Time of the Corporation, *Deleuze Studies 8.2*: 280–298, Edinburgh University Press.

Toscano, A. (2010) Capture. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze dictionary* (Revised Edition) (188-189). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd.

Trilling, B., & Fadel, C. (2009). *21st century skills: Learning for life in our times*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Wallin, J. (2010). *A Deleuzian approach to curriculum: Essays on a pedagogical life.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wallin, J. (2011). Mobilizing powers of the false for arts-based research. V*isual Arts Research, 37*(1), 105-111.

Wallin, J. (2013). Get out from behind the lectern: Counter-cartographies of the transversal institution. In Masny, D. (Ed.) *Cartographies of Becoming in Education: A Deleuze-Guattari Perspective*. Rotterdam/Taipei: Sense Publishers.

Yenawine, P. (1997). Thoughts on visual literacy. In J. Floor, S.B. Heath, & D. Lapp (Eds). *Handbook of Research on Teaching Literacy through the Communicative and Visual Arts.* Macmillan Library Reference.