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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A Preliminary Examination of the Dialectical Change in "Modern" Sport and of the Intervention of the Canadian State In Sport Between 1968 and 1988

by

Dwight Harry Zakus

A THESIS

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Date OCTOBER 14th 1988

Dedication

To the three people who make life so worth while,
Nicholas, Natasha, and Ann. You give it reason and joy.

Abstract

In the 1970s a formal Canadian sport bureaucracy evolved. The purpose of this study was to explain the reasons for this development through the logical category of abduction. A Marxist scientific model was applied as an analytical framework.

Through the use of materialism and dialectics, sport was put into a framework which allowed it to be defined as a historically particular form of human production with particular inherent contents. Within this framework, sport was viewed as a social activity which could be avocational or vocational, concrete labour or abstract labour, as a subjective or objective form of activity, and dominant feature within either the base or superstructure of society.

"Modern" sport was defined through particular historical developments of the Olympic movement. Therefore an analysis of Baron Pierre de Coubertin and the I.O.C. was completed.

The changing form and content of sport in the 1960s and 1970s provided the basis upon which capitalist states became directly involved in sport production. In the Canadian state this involvement was realized when Pierre Trudeau became Canada's Prime Minister. Trudeau had a well-defined political philosophy and agenda (praxis) through which certain individuals were able to push for the formal structuring of sport in the state.

The historical factors for this involvement were analyzed within the conceptual categories of: nationalism and national unity, dependency, federalism, state cultural intervention, and concrete capitalist state operations. The analysis of the Canadian situation was based on the historical developments within civil society generally and political society in particular. The latter discussion followed Meynaud's (1966) three motives for state intervention in sport. His third motive of "national prestige" was seen to give the clearest explanation for the Canadian case.

Through this study, the hypothesis that the global changes in the form of sport production from an avocational, concrete labour form to a vocational, abstract labour form, and the resultant content (organizational) changes, provided a basis for the intervention of the Canadian state in sport. The technical rationalization of sport production led to

bureaucratic rationalization of sport organization.

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge and thank the following people for their valuable and patient assistance in helping me realize this final goal of my doctoral program. To Gerry Glassford, my advisor, I must give special thanks for his constancy, direction, expertise, and bountiful patience. He has stood by me in some of the most difficult times of my life. The rest of my committee, Harvey Scott, Raj Pannu, and Gerald Redmond, have provided important guidance, thought, and correction in the development of this work. I would like to offer special thanks to Art Davis for the time he spent with me over and above the call of duty. I feel particularly fortunate to have had large amounts of time with Art as our discussions not only pertained to the dissertation but to a host of scholarly and generally interesting topics. Finally, I would like to thank Rob Beamish for his agreeing to sit as my external examiner. I have tried to follow the direction that Rob's work has taken, therefore it was a privilege to have him read and comment on this work.

There are many friends who have been very supportive throughout my time in this program. It would take too long to mention them by name, but they know who they are. My special thanks to them and to those special friends noted in the dedication.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Chapter I

Introduction

A. Introduction

Between the years 1968 and 1988 a large sport bureaucracy came into existence in Canada. The purpose of this study is to theoretically and empirically explore and understand the factors which led to the development of this structure. In particular, a political economy of "amateur" sport is developed as a key factor for this development. There is a substantive body of literature available which focusses upon the development of this bureaucracy. This study uses a Marxist perspective to examine the essential relations of sport itself, of sport developments globally, and between sport and the Canadian state. Furthermore, this study is concerned with macrosociological developments of "modern" sport and of the intervention of the Canadian state in sport.

The current position of the state in relation to sport has not essentially changed from that outlined by Campagnolo (1979c, 7) in that the aim of the state was to pursue "excellence in athletics nationally and internationally." To meet this objective, the Canadian state has invested heavily in this "unproductive" form of human labour and has developed a large, service-oriented bureaucracy to administer those funds. The evolution of this program is well documented (see especially Hallett 1981 and Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks 1987). Since these works contain empirical descriptions of Canadian state intervention, the present study has taken up the challenge of Cantelon and Gruneau (1982, 2) to "situate sport in the context of . . . [a] coherent theory of the state" and to locate the sport/state relationship in terms of the state and "its role in social and cultural life."

Following Beamish's work (1981, 1982, 1985) on the nature of sport as labour, and Kidd's analyses (1979, 1982, 1988) of sport in the political economy, a more complete description of the dialectical basis of sport is developed. Through an understanding of the essence and potentiality of sport, further analysis of "modern," high-performance sport the modern Olympic period was carried out. The power of the Olympic movement over sport

production, through its organizations, conditioned the content of sport practices. The effect of the Olympic movement on sport is considerable. Over the course of its existence the oppositional effects of socialist and Third World nations, of commercialism, and of politics have put great pressure on the Olympic movement. This has led to a dialectical change in both the Olympic movement itself (i.e., in its organizational structure and hegemony) and in sport.

Sport, it is argued, underwent a change from a hegemonically-based avocational form of production to an economically-led vocational form. Economic developments in the 1960s produced an increased quantification of sport (e.g., in the amount of media attention and in the monetary value of its commercial possibilities) which, tied to the successes of the socialist states in global competitions, led to a qualitative change in the attitude of how individual capitalist states came to view and to organize sport. These generalized changes in the form and content of sport were, therefore, the "historically mediated processes" which led individual capitalist states to become involved in the production and organization of sport.

The particular developments in the direct involvement of the Canadian state in sport followed the 1969 *Task Force Report*. By viewing the Canadian state as a capitalist formation with a particular form of "dependency" (Panitch 1981), this study analyzes unique Canadian historical developments in order to understand why state intervention in sport occurred. Arguments for welfare-state, the logic of capital, and the structuralist bases for this intervention are discussed. The result was, however, that the federalist and, in a rather contradictory manner, the nationalist underpinnings of Pierre Trudeau's "new Liberalism" (Laxer and Laxer 1977) offered the best explanation to this question. An aspect of this new liberalism that partly explains the federal state involvement in sport was to be found in Trudeau's belief in the rational government of experts, a form of cybernetics, which departs from the old liberal ideology of individual initiative (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987). This was already apparent in comments in the 1969 *Task Force Report*, and in parallel developments in state support of the arts (Woodcock 1985).

It was through a particular form of nationalism (Nairn 1975), rationalism (with a resultant bureaucratization), and federalism (Stevenson 1982), leading to a series of structural

developments in the Canadian state, that "vocationalized" sport came to be expanded, reproduced, and re-organized. The form of labour in this production process also supported the arguments, especially those of Kidd (1988), about the nature of "value" resulting from this process.

Finally, the consequences of funding elite sport, or the narrow core of the participatory pyramid, appear to be narrowing the opportunities for and numbers of participants at the base of that model. By looking at the funds allotted to sport versus recreation (Broom and Baka 1979, Hallett 1981) and to individual athletes (Beamish and Borowy 1987) this pattern becomes clearer. As the success or productivity measurement of this sport system has been based upon the number of Olympic medals and international championships won, a national "cult of narcissism" (Lasch 1979) appears to exist. The striving for and immediate gratification through these measures puts extreme pressures on Canadian elite athletes and generates a dissatisfaction with the system. The long-term effect points to further problems for the Canadian state and its sport system.

B. Statement of The Problem

It has been noted by many scholars (e.g., Wohl 1973; Gruneau 1983; Guttman 1978; Z. Krawczyk 1978) that in order to begin a study of some segment or part of a society, it is important that the part be clearly identified and delineated before any analysis be undertaken. Theories and ideas abound as to what sport is and how sport should be studied. In its concrete, real existence, sport has a multitude of possible forms and contents through which it might be identified as it is a complex entity. To make sense of "modern," high-performance sport, and solve a potentially large and complex problem, it was necessary to abstract and simplify these forms and contents into a conceptual framework through which a theoretical analysis can begin. Since this investigation uses a Marxist framework, the theory of historical materialism and the concomitant methodology of dialectics were employed. The second chapter contains a clarification and simplification of sport. The question of what sport is, is theoretically abstracted and delineated.

Following this abstract and theoretical simplification of the totality and essences of sport, it was necessary to locate sport empirically and historically in its present form. It was also important to tie that form to a particular temporal content in order to identify its historical and dialectical changes. Unless we can identify the particular form and content of sport for a particular time period in its wider global context, it will be difficult to comprehend the changes that have occurred in any one part of the totality of sport. Therefore, an empirical analysis of modern sport and its development, as a result of organizational changes in the Olympic movement, was undertaken in this thesis.

Once the problem of identification, location, and macrosociological change are outlined, the thesis turns to the problem of Canadian capitalist state intervention in sport. Again, a theoretical analysis of the capitalist state is completed before the connection between the state and sport is discussed. [1] What the capitalist state is, what it does under late or monopoly capitalism, and how and why it operates in certain social areas are essential elements for developing an understanding of the relationship between sport and the state. Out of this discussion the reasons why and where sport is located in capitalist states could be addressed and theoretically analyzed.

The questions of why and how sport became an institutional element of the federal political economy of Canada between the years 1968 and 1988, could then be developed. This is the key problem to be addressed in this work.

C. Statement of the Hypothesis

It is hypothesized that within the structure of the Canadian state, sport has become institutionalized as a result of the movement of sport from the avocational (concrete labour) moment to the vocational (abstract labour) moment, and through a concomitant technical and bureaucratic rationalization. Sport has become part of the Canadian civil society and political economy for reasons of national identity due to the strong external influence of the international sport movement in general and the Olympic movement in particular.

---

[1] A fuller theoretical discussion of the capitalist state, then that present in the fourth chapter, is to be found in Appendix III.

D. Delimitations and Limitations

1. Delimitations

The following delimitations were made for the study at hand:

1. As Livingstone (1983) has noted, a Marxist perspective intrinsically includes issues of class, gender, age, and ethnicity. However, this study did not focus upon these categories specifically.
2. The analysis of sport in the "professional" form was not pursued, since much of the writing on sport has focussed upon that form and is available elsewhere. The focus here will be on the so-called "amateur" sports.
3. Existing historical writings and analyses on Canada, its sport system, and its socio-economic and political systems will be used. In other words, no further empirical work was done beyond those available sources.

2. Limitations

The following limitations restricted the throughness of this study:

1. There are several titles in Russian, German, and Polish which are either not translated or not readily available if translated. Although the titles identified in works by authors of these languages appear to follow the conceptual thrust of this proposed study, they were not used as documentation for this study.
2. The sheer immensity of the available literature makes a complete review an impossibility. Some of the literature in the study of sport is repetitive and insubstantial, and therefore has not been employed in this study.

E. Methods

The analytical approach to be taken here follows that of Karl Marx. This approach contains three elements: the theory of historical materialism, the concept of praxis, and the methodology of dialectics. The attractiveness of using a Marxist framework, amongst other

reasons, is that it is a complete scientific model where theory, method, and change are inherent and intertwined. By employing this scientific model, we also accept Lukács's (1971, xxvi) statement that

> Orthodox Marxism, therefore does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. . . . Orthodoxy refers exclusively to *method*. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical Marxism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or "improve" it have led and must lead to oversimplification, triviality and eclectism.

It must be emphasized that the Marxist framework being employed here is an "orthodox" type. The basic tenets of Marx's own writings are held. Both the base and superstructure and the constant mediating action between them is observed.

The first part of this model, historical materialism, is based on the historical development of the relations of production of the material basis of human existence.

> In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production (Marx 1977d, 20).[2]

Historical materialism therefore forms the ontological and epistemological foundation of Marx's theory. In the study of sport we apply this theory to understand how athletes exist (live materially) and produce sport contests (labour in society).

The concept of praxis ". . . refers to the process through which human beings act upon the world, shaping it in particular ways" (Benson 1983, 39). It is a more complete concept than that contained in the normal sense of practical. Heydebrand (1977) and Koskinas (1987) pointed to the mediated historical processes involved in the results of activity in terms of: the objective products of the activity; the subjective consciousness of the present material, social, and cultural milieux; and the possibility of objective changes in those milieux by further conscious activitiy. Mao (1967) saw praxis as the dialectical connection between

[2]Marx (1977a, 398), in an often quoted passage, made the following qualification to this development: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." In terms of the development of sport and the modern Olympic movement, this passage holds great saliency.

theory and practice -- as being the manner in which social activity and society are formed and changed. The kernel of Marx's concept is contained in the eleventh *Theses on Feurbach* which states that the ". . . philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it" (Marx and Engels 1977a, 15). This concept becomes important when we discuss the thoughts and actions of certain human agents in the development and *change* in sport (e.g., de Coubertin, Brundage, Trudeau, Lefaive).

The methodology of dialectics has seen many usages throughout history. In a major study of the dialectic, Mirkovic (1980) synthesized out of these many uses an ideal-typical model which contained two key elements; contradiction and totality. He described dialectical thought as "a mode of viewing historical reality in its totality, in terms of its immanent contradicitons leading to qualitative change and transformation of the existing social relations" and as a heruistic device that would "aid man in his effort to penetrate below the surface of semblance" (1980, 5, 59).

The element of contradiction holds that in each thing there exists both its own being and non-being. Each individual and each social formation (structure) or movement contains within itself this contradiction. At one point of its existence a thing exists in a certain form but through the increase of quantity (e.g., age in a person, size in an organization) a new-quality[3] begins to emerge at a "nodal" point. This movement or struggle of increasing quantity and an emerging new quality reaches a relative point where the two aspects are in unity. However, as this unity is relative, the negation (non-being) moves the thing to a higher level of existence. This non-linear spiral movement is absolute; "anything that exists changes and that, in the course of its change or development, it is superceded or 'sublated' (*aufebehn*) [*sic*] by its other" (Mirkovic 1980, 52), that is, there is a negation of the negation. This constant change gives motion to our world. The new thing contains residual elements of its former being; it is not a totally new entity where the former being is destroyed.

The second element to which this dialectical contradiction is "inextricably related" is the category of totality (Mirkovic 1980, 3). This totality is a conceptual totality which is used

[3]This term does not mean that the new entity is subjectively better but that a different form based on a different content emerges.

to comprehend social reality by observing "relevant relations and their variables" (abstract: theoretical) and "the parts to the whole historically" (socio-historical: concerete) (ibid., 74). The latter are transitory and subject to change and are incorporated into the above mentioned contradictions. Marx's method was to observe concrete (material) reality, and then to abstract from this chaotic and obscure mass the relationships of "the structure of the whole [which] is reflected in the structure of the elements and [through which] the parts can be meaningfully understood only within the context of the whole" (ibid., 75). This permits a more ontologically complete picture of society in a dialectically scientific manner. (See Sayer, 1979; Hanson, 1969a, 1969b; Livingstone, 1983.)

This concept of totality is also linked to the Marxian scientific model through the concept of praxis -- the movement from the concrete to the abstract and then back to the concrete. In this category, as was mentioned above, the totality of concrete social relations and their variables, which are "transitory and subject to everlasting change" are seen in their complex interrelatedness and wholeness (which incorporates the internal contradictions or opposites as well). It is through the examination of the totality of sport at various historical junctures, where practice becomes theory and vice versa (nodal points), that we can see the material changes occurring in the existence of sportspersons. Points at which the dialectical change through the negation of the negation occurs leading to further change (in the sublated structures and practices). This also fits into the general scientific model and the particular model of Marx.

Sayer (1979) completed a major study of Marx's science (also see Livingstone 1983) where he discussed this ontology in terms of the third Aristoletian category of "abduction" or "retroduction" (see Hanson 1969a, 1969b).[4] The system of retroduction may appear as definable in the hypothetical-deductive or inductive systems, but it is a method of abstracting the complex/concrete into the simple/abstract in order to develop the transhistorical analytic categories in their essential relations and phenomenal forms, that is, in their dialectical

[4]Hanson (1969a, 69) stated that "abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them." Livergood (1967, 6) noted that "dialectical laws, he [Marx] maintains, are abstracted from facts," i.e., from material facts and not from the thoughts contained in the mind as Hegel did.

relationships.

As Sayer cautions, we must not assume a priori the true identity of transhistorical, or even historical, categories, such as is done with sport, as we are never sure that these categories are truly such. The brilliance of Marx's analysis in *Capital* was precisely his identification of those categories which allowed him to complete his historical analyses of the socio-economic formation of capitalism in all of its historical forms and developments. In terms of defining sport, retroductive logic was used in order to help us understand the essence and form of sport in certain phases of capitalism, and also to tie together historical and material developments which led the Canadian state to form a large sport bureaucracy.

F. Justification for the Study

1. Through a review of the literature on sport as a culturally and economically supported element of many societies, as a politically-contested feature of the "global" society, and as a paradoxical element in these societies, it is evident that a theory of the relationship of sport to the economic, social, political, cultural, and ideological elements in capitalist societies was needed. There are works which furnish fertile ideas for such a theoretical framework, or which provide alternative ones. As Chorbajian (1984, 66) pointed out, "one fruitful area of work is in combining existing literature on sport. Much of the factual information to be found demands reinterpretation and theoretical formulation, but there is valuable material of a factual and ideological nature in volumes of sports fiction, sporting magazines, 'histories,' and scholarly and semi-scholarly writing." Therefore, the materials used in this study will be from a variety of sources; although a few of those sources will be relied upon heavily.

2. Beamish (1985, 362) views the study of sport "as the actualization of social practice" which ". . . cannot be grasped on the basis of some transhistorical, autonomous form. The study of sport is best organized around the concept of labour and initiated through the study of its relationship to the political economy." This statement summarizes Beamish's continued calls for a materialist approach to the study of sport. In his article "Sport and the

Logic of Capitalism" Beamish (1982, 157-158) states that the conclusions he reached there "remain more suggestive than authoritative because this approach to the study of sport is still in the preliminary stages of elaboration." A complete understanding of the dialectic of sport has not been completed, nor is it fully understood in the "amateur" sports. The present study has built upon Beamish's research (especially the 1982 work) to further elaborate and to make more concrete the variety of sport practices within the materialist and dialectical framework.

3. Gruneau (1983, 130) has argued that ". . . in the absence of much research on sport and the state in Canada [for example], explanations for these developments [government sport legislation, sport policy, and formal organizations] can only be speculated upon." Although there has been an important theoretical movement that has examined "the complex relationships between class and state influences on ideology and cultural-production as a whole . . . remarkably, there is a very real silence in this literature on the role of sport in cultural production and its relationship to class and state power" (Cantelon and Gruneau 1982, xii). The collection of essays edited by Cantelon and Gruneau (ibid., xiii) were seen as not adding

> up to anything like a comprehesive theory of sport, culture and the modern state. But they do . . . contain important guidelines for future research and open up important areas of discussion and debate . . . . but before effective research of this type can be done we need to do the equally necessary task of theoretical groundclearing.

Hargreaves (1982, 22) supports this position: "there is a lack of, and evident need for, systematic work which will situate sport within a theory of the modern state which can take account of the different, and highly specific forms of state involvement in cultural hegemony and the politicisation of sport within the context of different nation states." These statements provided clear evidence that scholarly work is needed in the area of sport and the state.

Guldenpfennig and Schulke (1980, 128) further support this position: "The growing inclusion of sport in decisive political processes is so far lacking a sufficiently accurate scientific study of this development." They note that the texts that have been written on this subject "are not so much a presentation of the essential facts, or their general theoretical aspect, but rather dealt with single phenomenon, approached on the basis of a not always explicit formulated general understanding of sport politics, established a priori" (ibid.). They

criticize the "texts" written to date for looking at this relationship in the following ways. First, where sport is seen as being "apolitical," which denies the political element in sport; for sport contains the possibility of acting as a force for change. Second, where sport and politics are seen to exist independently of each other, resulting in the treatment of the sport/state relationship on a superficial level. Third, where any activity in sport is seen as a political action, which also conceals the true essence of the relationship. Following the elaboration and coalescence of sport in the political economy of a capitalist-based society, this analysis then proceeds to locate sport in the political structure (i.e., superstructure) of the Canadian capitalist state.

These brief comments point to the need for a theoretically grounded analysis of sport and its relation to the state. But this analysis must follow after sport is seen as a part of the political economy. Once this foundation is laid, then the means by which sport becomes an ideological, cultural, political element of the superstructure can be determined.

G. Definitions

The following definitions will be used throughout this investigation:

civil society -- a historically particular type of society which is distinct and internally divided into mutually opposed classes of people; it is the union of a particular type of economic organization to which an equally particular set of superstructural relations and organizations, including a state, (and the consciousness of these elements) is joined (Krader 1976).

political economy -- "is the set of relations of production, distribution, exchange and consumption in civil society, and is at the same time the relation of this set to the political system of state and law" (Krader 1976, 6).

state -- the state is an abstraction which becomes reified into a set of ideologies, institutions, and concrete formal structures. As a social formation in the superstructure of bourgeoisie civil society, the state is the political system and structure which maintains, protects, and perpetuates the class relations of the political economy.

politics -- (a) at the level of the individual: "For 'every man, in as much as he is active, *i.e.*, living, contributes to modifying the social environment in which he develops . . . in other words, he tends to establish "norms", rules of living and of behaviour.' (SPN 265) This contribution is 'politics'" (Hobsbawm 1982, 23) [The inside quote is from Gramsci, 1983 (original 1971).]

-- (b) at the collective level: "The process of creating public policy through influencing or controlling the source of power and authority. The process involves competition and usually conflict" (Theodorson and Theodorson 1969, 303).

hegemony -- hegemony is basically a set of ideas which are embedded in the social relations of society, in institutions which express the dominant group's cognitive (ways of thinking), normative (ways of judging), and conative (ways of acting) viewpoints. This hegemony can be seen as a special type of leadership over society which attempts to develop consensus to their particular "commonsense" view of the society, though in contested forms. Rather than see this leadership based purely on economic ownership or control of the means of production, although this is an important, large aspect of its control, the dominant class must struggle to maintain its ideas as those to be followed. This struggle is mediated by: processes of incorporation; making concessions and/or accomodation to the other classes; by forming temporary alliances; by anticipating and acting on potential problems of contestation; and by using coercion and persuasion to maintain its hegemony (which vary in time and context, i.e., they are particularistic). Likewise the "subordinate" groups can use several methods in contesting this hegemony; they can comply through "tacit acquiesence," or "positive allegience," or "pragmatic/instrumental modes of participation." The degree and type of strategy used when the hegemony is challenged depends on the situation and on each groups actions. Even when there is a major shift in the structure of a society, residual elements of the existing hegemony remain as part of the newly formed hegemony (Worsley 1984; Williams 1977).[5]

culture -- (following Williams, 1977) the study of culture involves looking at the forms, appearances, and institutions of cultural production (i.e., the practices which constitute the whole social order, which are not merely derived but which have residual elements from previous cultural forms) as well as the processes of social and cultural reproduction, i.e., the ideologies or "signifying systems" or "informing spirits" which act in a constituting manner. They are a "characteristic *world-view or general perspective* of a class or a social group, which will include formal or conscious beliefs but also less conscious, less formulated attitudes, habits and feelings, or even unconscious assumptions, bearings and commitments" (p. 26). As for hegemony these cultural practices and products are contested social areas between classes, as well as being areas where social change will (and must) occur.

totality -- the understanding of society as a complex, particular historical and contextual interconnection of economic, political, social, cultural, ideological forms and practices.

vocational -- activity having to do with an occupation, trade, or business, e.g., a person's regular occupation through which he earns a living. That is, labour is commodified as an alienated form of labour-power containing concrete (use) value and abstract (exchange) value.

avocational -- activity that one might do in one's spare time, e.g., a hobby. That is, a form of human labour which has a useful value for the individual, is not alienated, is both productive and reproductive, and contains both aspects of production and consumption.

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[5]See Appendix I for further discussion of this concept.

Chapter II

The Dialectic of Sport

> The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.
>
> Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*

A. Introduction

The analysis of sport completed in this chapter is abstract and theoretical. The intention here is to provide a framework for the empirical analysis that follows in subsequent chapters. The discussion here points to the need for identifying sport as a historically unique, concrete and particular form of human endeavour, especially within the analytic Sayer (1979) attributes to Marx. Further, to remain within the dialectical method, discussions of the totality of sport within a society and the inner essences of sport are carried out. The question of the completeness of these discussions might point to a critical weakness in this work. However, in order to facilitate and initiate an examination of the political economy of modern sport and the Canadian state response, this discussion has had to remain, at this time, brief and perhaps incomplete.

One must begin with the realization that sport is used as a transhistorical, abstract, general category. We can use and have used "sport" in such a way. The form and content of sport across history varied greatly. In order to understand sport, we would have to observe the historically unique form and content of various periods. Each historical period would evoke particular and distinct social and economic relations, within which sport would become identifiable. A cross-temporal and cross-cultural analysis of sport which does not identify these particularities will lose its effectiveness. As this task would demand a major study of its own, it will not be pursued here. Therefore, the first subsection of this chapter will discuss sport as a historically-based, particular concrete human movement activity within a historically particular type of society.

The second subsection will present a theoretical discussion of the dialectical basis of sport. The purpose here is to discover what the basis of the subject is in all of its forms and also the potentialities which exist within it and which point to changes in certain directions. A good deal of the work in this area has been carried out by Gruneau (1983), Hargreaves (1982a, 1982b), and, in particular, Beamish (1981, 1982, 1985). Scholars from the socialist countries have also added considerable knowledge in this particular focus on the study of sport. Working from these studies, we have expanded and synthesized the material in a form which covers the totality of sport practices as well as its inner essences.

B. Sport as a Particular Historical Object

The term "sport" has a current usage which covers a multitude of human physical movement activities. Furthermore, this category has been applied to human activity throughout time. We hear and read of sport in societies from antiquity through the Greek and Roman periods and on into the Middle Ages. Finally we reach the period which sport historians, and others, identify as the "modern" period. The term sport is most often used in this wide time span without locating it in the totality of the society in which the activities existed. Generally, and although exceptions exist, the form or practice of sport is focussed upon, while the contextual totality is not really studied in depth. The examination of sport therefore suffers as a result.

It was not intended to expand or defend this criticism in this study. The intention is to point out that the term "sport" has been used in this widened context and has been analyzed as a transhistorical, abstract, general category. But what sort of category is sport? Obviously it refers to a type of directed human physical movement activity. If we can accept sport as such a category, then we might proceed to identify the phenomenon that we currently refer to as sport.

Sayer (1979, 79) has shown in Marx's work that "transhistorical categories . . . refer to *attributes* of phenomena rather than phenomena as such" and that "historical particulars cannot be apprehended in transhistorical categories." What has been said is that there are

certain features of sport which are evident in all historical periods, for example, physical prowess, competition, courage, and fitness which are some of the attributes of the phenomenon of sport. But has this fact been recognized by scientists studying this phenomenon?

There are examples of this awareness. For example, Morford (1983) and Morford and Clark (1976) have shown how the concept of the "agon" was particular to contestual forms in certain historical circumstances but that it has been lost in modern sport. [6] Likewise, scholars have recognized that sport in this century has unique characteristics which demarcate it from previous forms of similar activity. Hargreaves (1982, 15) has noted that the current, specific appearance of sport "may be explained by the multiplicity of forms and meanings which characterize sport in modern society." Gruneau (1983, 50-1) has also made this distinction:

> rather than view any feature of play, games and sports as some sort of transhistorical essence, need or transcendent metaphysical form . . . I am opting for a view where play, games, and sports are all regarded as irreducibly constitutive of our social being. They are, in differing ways, all forms of *social practice*. As a result, even their "essential" or formal qualities cannot be conceived of independently of the organizing principles, expectations, conflicts, and disappointments that define lived social experiences at any given historical moment.

And finally Wohl (1973, 28-29) stated that "contemporary as well as the historical forms of the various systems of physical exercises, play and sports games, as well as hygienic procedures or agility exercises can be understood only within the framework of a given culture, on the background of the economic and socio-political relations." Although these scholars acknowledge the differences, and even though they are using Marxist methods, they do not acknowledge this transhistorical/historical distinction as fully as Sayer has pointed it out in terms of the overall framework of Marx's method.

Therefore the exact point at which the beginning of modern sport occurred is somewhat immaterial, as stages are often merely convenient synthetic separation points for

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[6] The use of the concept "agon," following Morford and Clark, refers to an individual contest or system of contests where the individuals involved are struggling for self assertion, success, and fame through the use of their physical capacities and endurance. The form that these contests took and the manner in which individuals competed was very important: "Victory alone was not sufficient; rather it was the quality of the victory that counted" (1976, 168) which was dependent upon peer evaluation.

the purpose of discussion (Krader 1979, 34-35). What is more important is to understand sport as we currently know it and to determine how it came to have such an appearance. We could start by identifying sport as a set of "highly structured, institutionally defined social practices" which are frequently "overregulated and instrumental" (Gruneau 1983, 21). That is, sport in the twentieth century has evolved a set of highly instrumental, highly regulated, and highly organized institutions [7] and practices. The literature is rife with discussions and arguments of how the current form of sport contains many problems and ills. The tendency following these outlines is to slip back into some form of normative idealization about what sport ought to be. The ideals of Olympism or of "pure amateurism" or the spontaneous joyous freedom of play (as a derivative of sport) is proclaimed. In all of this, the basic question is lost. How is it that sport has become what it is today? Why did it become as such?

Here, we can again refer to Sayer's work. Sayer (1979, 113) pointed out that Marx, in applying retroductive logic, worked back from his explananda, or the thing to be explained; which is often some observed, describable phenomenon, to the explanans, or the "essential relations which explain why the phenomena that he has isolated should take the particular forms they do." We can identify what sport is in modern industrial capitalism. It is: a technically, or scientifically, rationalized production of sportspersons; an alienated commodified form of labour (i.e., their sport performances become objects for sale on the market; objects which deny or remove parts or the whole manner of performance from the performer); a bureaucratically organized, planned, and restricted set of activities; a strictly controlled sphere in its process and product form; and very much a part of the capitalist society, particularly in the top levels of performance and in the internal competitive forms. [8]

Knowing that it has this typified historical, particular, concrete appearance, we began our search for the reasons or essential reasons which "distinguish between what a thing is

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[7] "Institutions in social life are generally depicted by sociologists as distinctive patterns of social interaction whose structural features represent recognized, established, and legitimated ways of pursuing some activity" (Gruneau 1983, 59).

[8] It is not intended that this overly pessimistic, reductionist view of sport be construed as a complete or accurate perspective. As will be shown in the second section below, sport should be seen as more than this typified view often found in the literature.

potentially from what it is *actually*" (Rader 1979, 98). In order to begin to be able to make this distinction through empirical analysis, it was necessary to locate sport within the totality of its own production (as both a direct and a mediate form of labour) and within the totality of social relations and structures (as a cultural entity and form of labour), and then outline and discuss the inherent potentialities of sport through an identification of its dialectical oppositions.

C. The Dialectic of Sport

The definition we have given to modern sport in the above section, or the explananda, leaves us to explain what the essential productive and social relations were which led this phenomenon to take on the particular form that it has now taken. However, this does not imply a working backwards to discover these relations, but rather to the use of a dialectical analysis. As Krawczyk, Jaworski, and Ulatowski (1973, 59) have noted that in their study of sport, their findings

> strongly indicated that this 20th-century phenomenon must be treated in its entirety and internal complexity. Only in this way can we penetrate to the deeper processes of sport reality which in its development demonstrates a tendency for being transformed into its opposite. This produces an inconsistent and internally antinomous phenomenon which complements not a mechanical, but a dialectical principle, differentiated but at the same time constituting an internally correlated integrated structure.

As has also been recognized by Beamish, amongst others, the foundation for the study of sport must begin with the basic forms of production that result from man moving in sport activities, which must also include a relationship to nature. The proposal made here is to first understand sport in terms of its performance basis[9] in the material and societal relations of man; and then secondly, to discuss the internal contradictions of sport. From this analysis it will be possible to understand how the intrinsic construction of sport gives it the potential to move in certain directions.

[9]Bouet (1973, 523) made this point very clear, "performance is the key-note of all sport, its basic principle."

1. Sport Within a Social Totality

Humans in their relation to nature must actively labour, or work, in and on nature in order to provide the basic necessities which ensure their life and reproduction. They must produce food, shelter, and the other basic requirements of life in order to ensure that they continues to exist as a human beings. Not only must they produce these necessities to ensure their own and their family's reproduction, but they must do so to ensure the reproduction of the species. Therefore human labour is both production and reproduction in both the mediate and direct senses in nature. At this basic level production and consumption are also mediate and direct.

The materials humans produce in nature are directly consumed. By directly consuming these products of their labour, humans mediate the production of their biological needs. This relation to nature is therefore two-fold; there are direct and mediate relations between the productive/reproductive and productive/consumptive moments.[10] This is the basic materialist moment in a primitive form of society. But what does this have to do with sport and with modern society?

Beamish (1982, 145) has pointed to the fact that, "man must interact with nature to realize himself physically and potentially. His productive activity mediates man with nature and changes his own being and his social formations." Krader (1976, 205) further supports this idea:

> Human beings, in their labor, work and toil, stand in relations to nature that are mediated by acquired skills and technics [*sic*], as they are by the instruments of labor applied, by the acquired skills and technics. Man goes mediately to work, in the condition of all human labor, whether in the primitive or civil condition.

However, this still does not really clarify why it is important to start with these direct and mediate human relations to nature and subsequently to certain social formations, including those for sport.

Humankind in their direct work on nature physically move in order to produce the necessities for their existence. These physical movements are purposeful activities which are

[10]Throughout this study the "/" will be used to identify and separate the oppositional aspects of the particular thing under study.

founded and modified by the requirements of the productive, consumptive, and reproductive acts. In this case they are relatively constrained and prescribed. Human movements as direct physical actions on nature are in turn mediated by the set of movements required to perform productive actions. These productive actions likewise perform the basic reproductive role through their hygienic, physiological results.

The reproductive role of the consumptive act is to fulfill the basic biological needs. Through this act, the necessary elements needed for the body to grow, develop, mature, or generally repair, replace, or generate new cells which forms the biological structure of humans are provided. However, human activity in the actual physical productive processes also provide a second important physiological result. The physical activity of human productive labour ensures the operational efficiency of the biological structure by eustressing[11] the various systems. In that these systems become more efficient, the total physiological structure operates better which in turn ensures the cellular reproduction, especially the digestive and reproductive processes. In sum, the physical activities of the human material relations to nature have this important biological function which needs to be acknowledged before moving on to the question of other human movement practices.

These productive actions are of both an objective and a subjective nature. Marx and Engels (1977b, 20) made this clear in the following,

> this mode of production [general labour] must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of these individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part.

These productive activities are both direct and mediate for the individual, they also contain a qualitative, expressive aspect.

Human movement practices, even in the primitive condition, were not purely utilitarian, instrumental activities; although this was the most important form. Some movements in these societies were tied to mental, expressive activities such as religious or cultic ceremonies, which contained certain ritualistic or dance movements tied to particular

[11]Bernard (1969, 8) described dystress as being physiologically debilitating stress and "eustress, contrariwise, is associated with excitement, adventure, thrilling experiences. It is fun, it enhances vital sensations, it 'turns people on,' it releases energy."

ideas and beliefs. Here, then, we see the beginnings of human physical movement activities moving away from the direct and mediate relations with nature for productive/reproductive and productive/consumptive purposes, and towards ones with a cultural character. This is not to say that these activities do not have a purposeful basis. On the contrary, these are expressions of consciousness of the species in relation to, in most cases, nature. The important point is that they do not have a direct relation to the productive labour process. But, they do have a mediate relation to the productive processes in and of themselves and through the development of normative consciousness as to how those processes ought to be performed. [12]

Laban (1960, 89-93) makes this point in his analysis of human movement performances in dance, theatre, mime -- which were performance forms that preceded sport as non-productive cultural activities:

> Movement styles have been in some ways useful in a particular period, or in a particular country, according to the main needs of the civilization. Such partial aesthetical and utilitarian conceptions which lead people to say this or that tennis-player, skater, batsman or film star "has style" descend frequently to tiny details of movement habits.

Similarly, the following quotation of Laban's, even though he refers to actor-dancers, is as appropriate to primitive or civil ceremonies, as it is to sportspersons and spectators, and further supports the above ideas.

> Actor-dancers in performing all kinds of implemental and non-implemental movements are indeed real people engaged in real bodily actions; the silent world of ideas and inner stirrings lies brooding within these actions waiting to be formed into a coherent shape. The performer stresses some of these strange shapes arising from the world of silence and stillness; and though he uses the same movements as any ordinary working person, he arranges them into rhythms and sequences which symbolise the the ideas that inspire him. The average actor will only admit with reluctance that the enjoyment of his art by the public is based upon a subconscious analysis of his movements. Yet the fact is that the spectator derives his experiences from the artist's movements. In his own way, the viewer distils the material presented, although he does so to a great extent subconsiously (ibid., 93)

Through Laban's analysis we can see how the physical movements in these directly non-productive actions can come to reinforce, support, or mediate productive and cultural actions. The actions in themselves are not directly productive, but they contain the productive

[12]The issue of productive/unproductive labour, which refers to a form of social labour, will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

actions in a mediative form which, like military exercises as another example, provide subjective support for these productive actions.

This brings us a step closer to sport. We have certain physical movements which are not directly related to the labour process yet are none the less mediated physical relational processes which have some currency to the social group. [13] As physical activity they still have certain reproductive purposes as discussed above. What we do have, though, are human physical movement activities which are, in part, labour, consumption, and reproduction, as well as being expressive and (directly)materialistically free. We can also observe a social division of labour being expanded to include these types of activities. Here then, is the point from which cultural activities such as sport can begin to emerge. [14]

Many scholars have pointed to the relation of play, games, and sport to certain socially specific activities. Huizinga (1955), for instance, has tied the play element of man to all forms of social activity, to the basis of all of man's activity throughout history. Despite the fact that Huizinga's work is rather broad, and has been criticized as such (cf. Gruneau 1983), it nevertheless points to the variety of ways in which human physical movement can be directed or constrained. Throughout history, these conceptual categories have taken on particular usages and have become socially objectified. Gruneau, we feel, has rightly contended that Huizinga's view reduces play, games, and sport solely to socially reproductive roles which do not contain or encompass the total reality of these activities. The important point to acknowledge here is that there are many qualitative aspects of human physical movement activities which are not socially and materially directed or purposeful. Their content and form does have a "usefulness" beyond the labour of humans in their material

[13]We hope that the mention of the social group or society will not be seen here as a quantum leap in this discussion. It was not intended to view man as a single objective entity, such as in an atomistic theory, but only to delineate the materialist basis. After all how can we talk of man's species reproduction in such a case?

[14]That these type of activities are able to begin to emerge at this point obviously implies a larger population in which an increasing social division of labour is evolving. With this increasing social division of labour, specialized positions come into existence which permits individuals to perform culturally productive and reproductive roles.

relations to nature and society, and in their socially reproductive roles.[15]

Human physical movement activity has a particular, concrete use-value in that it contains hygienic, reproductive, and conscious content and form. This is the particular use-value of the concrete activity of human physical movement; movements which also contain expressive, qualitative components as well. When we discuss such activities we must bear in mind that these components comprise their basic features. We must understand how it is that sport in particular, or modern sport in this case, has come to exist out of this subjectively and objectively united content and form of human movement activity.

A few more comments on the totality of sport as a form of human movement activity are needed here before a discussion of the inner essences of sport is begun. These comments are drawn from scholarly works which hold to the same scientific model as this work does (as opposed to the type of sport studies generally completed in North America). These works locate sport within the totality of a society, as Erbach (1973, 409) noted:

> By physical culture and sport we understand the totality of social attainments, conditions and factors appertaining to the physical culture of man.
>
> Physical culture serves as the main or leading concept. Sport is the dominating expression of physical culture. . . . Competitive sport is a specific domain of sport. It designates objectives of sporting performance at a high level in national and international contests which can be achieved through intensive training and on the basis of scientific knowledge. In recent years the concept of high-performance sport, which characterizes efforts to attain world championship performances and records and participation in important international contests, has come into general use.
>
> The objective and social effort of physical culture and sport as a socially determined phenomena [*sic*] are stamped by the class and power conditions in a particular form of society.[16]

Sport, then, is a part of the complex, integrated whole of both physical movement activities and of society, and is best seen as a whole set of practices, not as an object to be viewed and analyzed in its parts and isolated from the rest of society. Although this thesis will not be able to explore the particular historical moments at which each of the various sports

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[15]See Gruneau (1983) for his discussion of how these activities are nevertheless tied materially to socially prescribed roles.

[16]Riordan (1978, 3) stated that the use of "physical culture and sport" is an improper usage. Sport, he stated, is a *part* of physical culture and likewise does not equal physical culture. We do not feel that this distracted from Erbach's work but that it was important to note.

changed from a direct, concrete form of labour to an abstract form of labour. It is within the modern period (discussed in the following chapter) that sport as a particular aspect of human physical activity, or physical culture, took on a historically specific form.

From this discussion, the next section will analyze the various contradictions which are possible in sport as a particular type of human physical movement activity. Although the notion of totality implies a contradictory totality, the following section has been set off to identify and discuss, heuristically, the contradictions contained in sport. Sport in itself contains many contradictory aspects, which gives it the potential to change in various directions, in terms of its form and content, within the wider milieux. By identifying and discussing these contradictions, we will be better able to analyze the changes in sport which led the Canadian State to intervene in sport.

2. A Discussion of the Internal Contradictions of Sport

There are many parts of a thing which must be analyzed.

> In order to reveal the particularity of the contradictions in any process in the development of a thing, in their totality or interconnections, that is, in order to reveal the essence of the process, it is necessary to reveal the particularity of the two aspects of each of the contradictions in that process; otherwise it will be impossible to discover the essence of the process (Mao 1967, 81).

In terms of sport there are many parts which can be analyzed. As Hargreaves (1982: 15) noted, there are many forms which sport takes, to which we can add Erbach's (1973: 409) claim that sport is "the dominating expression of physical culture" and competitive sport "a specific domain of sport." In its totality, sport is a complex set of practices which is specifically and socially defined in particular historical periods. As was stated above sport will be analyzed through its dialectical aspects in order to understand the essential relations of this type of human physical movement and to work back toward the totality of sport and to the actual practices and conditions in which it is performed and through which it is changed.

We have previously argued (Zakus 1987) that the material for a more complete dialectical analysis of sport is contained in several studies. These studies have also followed the same theoretical lines as this study. Amongst these, Gruneau (1983), Beamish (1981,

1982, 1985), Krawczyk (1973), and Bouet (1973) have identified particular dialectical oppositions which form a part of sport. These writings have collectively provided pieces for the analytical model developed here. Of the dialectical oppositions pointed out, many are concomitant to the ones that, in our model, were felt to be the basic aspects of sport (these and others are outlined in Appendix II). The basic dialectical aspects which are treated as the essential relations of sport in our analytical framework are the following:

subject/object

concrete labour/abstract labour

avocational/vocational

base/superstructure.

Each of these pairings must be understood both intrinsically and relationally within the whole of sport as both a direct (physically-based) and mediate (socially-directed) activity. Within each of these aspects is a further set of relations which must be understood. Once these relations are understood, then the flow from subject/object to base/superstructure can be developed to locate the potentiality of sport. Once this potentiality has been outlined, then the discussion in subsequent chapters will help to provide a basis for understanding how and why modern sport has become what it is, and why it became located in state structures.

In its basic formulation, sport is the unity of the subject and object of the physical movement of the performance. Contained in this unity are: an actual performed movement, that is, an individual acting expressively, as the subject; a performance, the actual object; and the performer's consciousness of this performance. It also contains both the subjective moment (the freedom to move and the expression through this movement) and the objective moment (a performance in a context that is relatively free from regulation or constraint). The labour performed is concrete, it has a use-value for the performer. This concrete labour contains both the productive/consumptive and the production/reproduction moments. This is sport in a pure, free, spontaneous condition: but also in the private condition.

Before commenting on the obvious faults of the last statement above we would like to first mention a second part of this subject/object aspect. Gruneau (1980) has drawn attention

to the transformative/reproductive aspect of the play element in sport. He sees human agents, through the play component of sport, as being able to challenge the constraining institutional sport structures with potentially transformative results. The premise of this argument is that agents bring with them the potential to challenge, recreate, and renew the content and form of their social world. In a later work, Gruneau (1983, 63) modified this stance by focussing on the class-based inequalities that agents bring to bear in the social relationships:

> the resources individual or collective agents (e.g., a social class) can bring to bear on the production and reproduction of rules, procedures, legitimated interpretations, and even on the abilities needed to play effectively within certain structured conditions, are never distributed randomly in society. They are, rather, the negotiated products of historically specific systems of domination and divergences of interest -- systems whose objectified allocative strategies and fundamental social relations give some agents a disproportionate advantage in defining and shaping the fundamental structures through which social action proceeds, and in deflecting or incorporating pressures that are exerted against these strategies and relations.

We have moved ahead of ourselves with this quote, as we have brought in the cultural or superstructural aspect to be discussed below. There is, however, a purpose for this as, in the complex web of social action, these aspects are not completely separable.

This subject/object aspect, as a foundation of the dialectic of sport, can also be seen as containing relatively synonymous, but identifiably different, aspects in the form of the following pairings: enabling/constraining; voluntary/determined; and autoletic[17]/rationalized. At this point the discussion of these parts is relatively asocial, which is not the context in which sport is performed; however, the analysis must be done in this manner to set the stage. This identification is important in order to determine, again, the essential relations of the thing before it is put back into the totality, and before discussing its negation and sublation in that totality.

Gruneau's (1983) work also indicated the enabling/constraining and voluntary/determined parts of this aspect as well. When people come to perform sport as a particular physical movement activity they are making a free choice about coming to that sport form. While performing that sport form there are prescribed and proscribed contents

[17]Guttman (1978, 3), in describing *play*, wrote the following: "Play is autoletic. *Pleasure is in the doing and not in what has been done.* One might say that play is to work as process is to results" (emphasis added). It is felt that this term can also be applied to *sport*.

but the performer can choose to or not to observe some or all of those regulations. This, too, is generally at a basic level of sport performance; however, we see all forms of performance in sport. For instance people on skates, with sticks, and a puck we say are playing ice hockey. Yet the performance of their activity is much different from that of a league hockey match. Likewise, someone cycling, even on a track, or skiing down a hill or along trails, or swimming, or running on a track or through the outdoors are all performing "sports" but they are not performing those sports in ways constrained by formalized regulations.

Of course, it would be pointed out that these people are doing "physical activities" and not sport. The line between sport forms performed as useful concrete labour, that is as physical activity, and sport performed as sport is unclear. Or is there a dividing line? Perhaps not. Perhaps sport, as we know it, permeates all of our physical activity so that the distinction is blurred. Either way the point of this particular discussion is that human agents have the freedom to choose that activity they wish to perform and the degree to which they wish to perform it in the prescribed and proscribed ways. The degree to which they accept these definitions depends upon the intent and context of their performance. However, once that performance takes place in a structured situation, then those agents are constrained to perform in certain ways. At this point their choice of activity goes from one of being relatively free and enabling to one of constraint, in various degrees of course. Here also, the change from voluntary to determined activity content occurs.

The difference between this dialectical pairing and the one above may not be clear at first. If one chooses an activity freely, one could also say voluntarily, then the choice to accept or reject the regulative form still exists. Should the form chosen be the normal context of the sport, then the freedom of expression and movement is constrained. That is, it is determined. Yet the agents, going back to the first case, in not choosing the normal context can voluntarily submit to whatever performance constraints are suggested. In a three-on-three basketball game or a shinny ice hockey game, discussion of how this sport form is to be carried out is generally agreed upon before the performance. Each person can voluntarily accept or reject participating and/or some of the guidelines. However, once the performance

begins there is a certain determination occurring, but not in the same way as in the normal performance context; that is, as defined by the rules and regulations upheld by sport governing bodies.

Similarly, the autoletic/rationalized part of this aspect deals with what the agents bring with them in their performance of a sport. Are they there to enjoy the process, the actual physical movement itself (a "means" orientation), or are they there for the purpose of some achievement, goal, or product (an "ends" orientation)? This perhaps negates the above two parts, that is, the enabling and voluntary by the constraining and determined sides of this aspect. If a sportsperson performs with some particular end in mind, then the restrictions of the content and form of that sport are accepted and become constraining and deterministic. In many situations this is the case, whether made by the individual performing in the sport, by parents, by peer pressure, or by other external pressures.

In each of the above cases it is clear that for those agents who come to a sport for process purposes, there are degrees of enablement (freedom) and of voluntarism. This occurs not only in the initial choice of participation but also in the way in which that participation is carried out. Here is where sport, at a particular moment, can potentially be a spontaneous, free, joyful expression of human physical movement. Here the constitutive aspects of sport, as a form of movement, appear in their subjective moment. Here the objective moment, and the consciousness thereof, has a liberating, privately reproductive, and even transformative function. This is also where a large number of people perform in sport.

A point often overlooked in modern sport is that most people perform in sport at a level where the negation of the "positive" aspect of sport (i.e., its potentially liberative moment) has not occurred. Even though the economic, cultural, and media support and coverage of sport is focussed on top-level "amateur" and commercial or "professional" sport, to the detriment of the majority of the active sporting public, the greater number of sport participants do not strive for "the top." Analyses of sport tend to focus on the top of the performance pyramids so common in Coubertin's Olympic model and in state models. As was noted above, the time, money, and effort of sport organizations is with the narrow group of

sportspersons at the apex and core of the pyramid. This study will also go on to narrow the focus to that group as well, although for specific purposes. What cannot be overlooked however, is the fact that sportspersons populate the entire pyramid and that most of them occupy the lower levels of that pyramid outside of the core. Those persons performing in the lower, non-core areas, come to sport in its physical activity form or in its normal context for particular reasons, for particular use-values, and for a variety of reasons. This must not be denied in any study of sport, even though this often happens.

In sum, the objective moment of sport practice must start from the subjective basis. Not all of the objective moments of sport are negations of its qualitatively beneficial side. Likewise, the subjective aspect must be seen from the perspective of all sport participants, not just the elite or the professional. An awareness of the breadth of the subjective moment, the performance, and the consciousness of this moment are all particular and variant. To begin with this aspect of sport will lead to distinctive analyses and to functionally different dialectical movements, and to the need to discuss the form of labour that sport participation takes.

In many of the writings on sport, sport is seen as a commodity to be exchanged in the capitalist market economy in both the commercialized and the State forms. [18] There are problems with this: first, how does sport become a commodity with exchange value; and second, how can it be valorized by private capitalists or the State? It appears that scholars have made a leap in logic (e.g., Rigauer, 1981) or have returned to the professional case (e.g., Beamish, 1982) in order to support their ideas. What needed to be done was to explore each side of this aspect of the inner essence of sport in order to clarify how, or if, sport as a concrete form of labour has been negated by its abstract form of labour.[19]

Sport as a concrete form of labour, as was discussed above, has a useful value for the sportsperson. In this labour form, the productive/reproductive and production/consumption moments of the person performing the movement reach a point of relative unity. Or, as was

[18]Much of the analysis contained in this section follows the work of Beamish (1982), Mandel (1976), and Krader (1976, 1979).
[19]The task of the valorization of sport is dealt with in the fourth chapter.

said, the subjective and objective moment and the consciousness of the performer are united. The transformative, enabling, voluntary side of sport are expressed in the movement. This is sport production both in society but also apart from society. There is a social relationship in competing against another or others, or cooperating with another or others against another group. Sport does not exist in a social vacuum; "concrete labor is at once in relation to nature and labor in its social relation . . . . concrete value is value in its social and natural relation" (Krader 1976, 205). This is what is identified as private labour which is opposed to social, or public labour (which contains both concrete and abstract labour); "whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of his own labour, creates, indeed, use-values" (Marx 1977e, 48). Marx (ibid., 50) further qualifies this relation,

> so far therefore as labour is a creator of use-value, is useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature -- imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life.

As was expressed above, this is the level (i.e., physical recreation) at which a great deal of sport participation takes place. Even though there is often severe criticism of sport, from youth through to elite levels, in terms of its negative, problematic forms, the criticism really applies to the production of sport events where the pressure to win or to strive to the highest levels of achievement are present. Drawing our attention to a growing emphasis on this aspect of sport, Erbach (1973, 410) wrote that,

> the effort man makes to achieve high performance in the various spheres of life -- as in sport as one side of human capacity and political and moral worth -- leaves us in no doubt that high-performance sport has a growing influence upon the development of physical culture and sport as a whole.

Krawczyk (1973, 367) reaffirms this view when he writes that "for a *narrow, select* group of people the participation in a sport competition ceases to be only an exciting entertainment and becomes inevitably a difficult . . . realization of norms assigned by the role of . . . competitor and representative of one's country" (emphasis added). This interjection into the discussion of concrete/abstract labour is intended to point out the fact that few sportspersons are capable of, or able to, or are interested in competing in sport beyond this level of concrete use-values, that is, participation as an eustressing or liberative end in itself.

Many arguments have been made about the social, ideological, or moral values which are intrinsic to sport, or which have been externally imposed on sport, and the achievement of successful, high calibre results. These values are evident in the production of sport and are often corrupting and denying of those productions. Indeed it is only in rare cases that such value is extrinsically rewarded to a substantial degree, but those occasions when this does happen, do signify a socially determined value. If this is the case then sport labour has value as a type of social labour and therefore must be identified as abstract labour. The question of how often this is the case becomes important. In the broad spectrum of sport, how widespread is this rewarding of sport on a basis where we can actually say that an abstract value has been produced? In reality, the number of these cases is probably quite small.

The fact is that we see this type of recognition only at the top levels of the sport development pyramid. Here the form of sport takes on a different content. Here sport starts to take on value, in the true Marxist economic sense, as a socially produced commodity which contains both a use-value and an exchange value. That is, a division of labour develops, therefore a social economy of sport labour results. Relations of production in sport change, the production of sport occurs for a different group to consume, but the sport performance produced must have a use-value qualitatively different from the above case. The use-value produced in this abstract case must be a value for someone other than the producer. Only if the performance has some use for someone else will it become a socially-determined need or want for another. In such a case, the labour of the sportsperson is abstracted into the product, that is, it becomes an object for someone else's use, or consumption.

We now enter the realm of political economy where the producers of sport become a specialized group whose product not only has a particular use-value but also an exchange value. Abstract (social) labour is evidenced, but only when both concrete and abstract aspects are contained in that labour. Both aspects are necessary for labour to become commodified. Once the labour has become commodified it contains an exchangeable-value which must be realized in the exchange process in a particular social and economic market. "The thing produced is transformed into a commodity by being exchanged; thereupon the category to

which it belongs comprises things which are produced in society; the social production of commodities follows from their having been exchanged" (Krader 1976, 194). It is in this relationship that "value" is determined. This determination has several implications for sport performances.

The sport labour contained in the performance becomes abstracted into a use-value which forms part of the abstract labour form. The qualitative attributes of sport performance become subsumed to the quantifiable attributes of the same (i.e., into its exchange value). The value is determined by the amount of "socially necessary labour time" contained in that performance, and its value is measured in the other use-values for which it can be exchanged. The labour of the sportsperson now becomes labour-power, or the ability of the sport performer to labour in a particular manner and of a definite quantity. Therefore, the sport performer must produce a performance which is useful to members of the non-sport group, a performance in which the production/reproduction and production/consumption relationships (unities) are negated, and through which the object produced becomes alienated from the performer. The unity of the sport performance becomes subsumed to the value determined in the process of commodifying sport, the concrete use-value of the initial moment of sport becomes negated by its abstraction into social labour, that is, labour with a different use-value and a quantifiable exchange value.[20]

As was emphasized above, this negation does not take place throughout sport. Where it appears is at the level of professional sport. But whether or not this category applies to the amateur sports is a question to be dealt with below for

> exchange is not a universal, it is a historical condition, which is developed under given social relations. Production, on the contrary is a universal human relation. Commodity exchange takes place in the social and political economy, and takes place there alone; this mode of exchange is one of the constituents of that economy, together with the relations of production in the society (Krader 1976, 193).

A discussion of this aspect requires further analysis which depends upon the location of sport production in its historical and material relations of a particular civil society, that is, what

[20]The discussion of the third form of value, that is, surplus value has not taken place here. This was done with the intention of completing that discussion in terms of sport's place in the state; therefore, we refer the reader to the third section of the fourth chapter.

type of commodity is it, or is it one at all, or is it one in all cases? It is the work of subsequent chapters to raise and answer these perplexing questions, but the question of sport as labour also points to hegemonic definitions of the sport labourer. For when one discusses the concrete/abstract labour contradiction, there is an implication of the avocational/vocational dimension as well.

The avocational/vocational potential of sport has been discussed widely in the literature on sport under the dichotomy of "amateur versus professional." These descriptors have been avoided in this work since they have connotations beyond the elementary issue of why sportspersons, at the higher levels of performance especially, come to participate. As Riordan (n.d.) noted, "the distinction in sport between the amateur and professional, such a strong feature in British sport, was a Victorian creation and a matter of fact class distinction" (cf. Young 1984, 14-15). The use of the terms amateur and professional brings to bear certain social class distinctions which cloud the issue and more properly belong to the base/superstructure aspect and to a range of discrete and important historical developments.

To re-emphasize the statements made above, not all persons participating in sport do so in terms of achieving high performance results or for extrinsic rewards. Many people participate for avocational purposes alone. That is, they participate or compete in sport in their spare time as a hobby or a recreation; they do not aspire to a vocational calling in sport. One must look to the historical and material relations once again to observe how the avocational/vocational aspect has become negated in certain cases and in certain levels and types of sport.

The vocational aspect implies that the sportsperson approaches sport as an occupational activity through which a living is earned. The degree and kind of vocational approach to sport is varied. Some participants do it as the sole source of income and on full-time basis, others do it on a part-time basis. Some are able to derive great benefit from a sport vocation, others a short-lived, relatively meagre fiscal benefit. The problem of inequality, inherent in capitalism, is exacerbated by the notions of abstract labour.

Not all athletes come from class backgrounds which allow for an avocational participation in sport, therefore they must gain subsistence through their athletic endeavours. However, not all levels and forms of sport are easily or highly commodifiable. That is, not all athletes are able to derive economic benefit from their performances. The range of opportunities for economic benefit between the different sports and between athletes, even between athletes within the same sport, adds to this inequality. Finally, as sport labour becomes more alienated and objectified, the uncertainties of the capitialist marketplace deepen the inequalities as avocational sport labour is negated by vocational sport labour. In a subsequent section we will observe how the dialectical shift in this aspect has led to major changes in the nature of sport production. Here we have merely outlined the possibility of sport having an avocational/vocational aspect, as indeed do many spheres of human labour, especially under captialism (Mandel 1975). Up to this point we have only discussed the contradictions in sport predominantly at the individual level. We must now go on to look at the contradictions that exist on the societal level.

The dialectical aspect most often employed in Marxist studies is that of the base/superstructure. However, there are often problems with this. The initial response to this category or to these terms is one of "economic determinism" or "reductionism." Although these are the broad conceptual categories of a civil society, the ones in which particular functions of that society are carried out, there is a tendency to focus more on one of these areas than on the other. Writers critical of current sport practices, such as Brohm (1978), Rigauer (1981), and Hoch (1972), have tended to be reductionist in their analyses of sport and its relation to society and to the dominant economic class relations in the base or political economy side. Similarily, current cultural theorists of sport such as Jennifer Hargreaves (1982), John Hargreaves (1982a, 1982b, 1985), and in particular, those who write on sport and culture, or sport and politics, or sport and class relations as a small part of the overall study of sport have tended to focus on the institutional aspects of the superstructure more than on the political economic base. Beamish has called (1982, 145) for a materialist study which includes addressing the "society/labour relation and the culture/society relation." His

framework for this type of study is contained in his papers (1981, 1985, and above) and is supported by the works of Gruneau (1983) and Kidd (1979, 1982).

The difficulty with identifying both sides of civil society in its totality is caused by the ongoing historical changes within and between these two aspects:

> Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles. . . . . In social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away is infinite . . . (Mao 1967, 66).

This perhaps is the reason for sport studies to locate on one side or the other. We feel that a second factor comes into play which also leads to this type of study.

In the same article Mao (ibid., 94-95), in his discussion of principal aspects of contradictions, noted that

> the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive roles; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role . . . .

That is, there is a constant interplay between elements of the base and of the superstructure. In their ongoing change there are points of relative unity. But more often there is the absolute struggle for change. In this change, the economic forces of production will be the major aspect some of the time and the superstructure minor, and vice versa as change occurs. In terms of the development and change in sport, therefore, we need to understand the essential relations in the production of sport practices, as a mode of the overall mode of production, as well as the relations of sport to other attributes of the superstructure. Furthermore, we must be cognizant of the fact that the political economy of sport might be the predominant element at certain times, whereas at other times the political, cultural, ideological, or class factors, embedded in elements of the superstructure, will dominate.

According to Krader (1976,6) the key element of the base/superstructure aspect is the identification of "the social production and its organization, reproduction, distribution and exchange" processes on the one hand, and of the "political system, or political society, the state, law and right, civil right, property right, and the consciousness of all of these" systems

of the superstructure, on the other. Sport must be located within each side of this aspect in order to identify the processes and structures of which it is part, and through which change will occur. Sport, as Beamish (1982) wrote, is both a product and a process, that is, it is constituted in civil society and constitutive of civil society through its position in both the political economy and political society. At certain historical moments the political economy emerges as the major dimension, at other times the superstructure assumes dominance. Both are mutual determinants of the form and content of sport -- subject and object. As the driving forces which shape the change in sport.

D. Summary

The purpose of this chapter was not to define sport, but rather to establish the essential relations of sport as an area of human movement in terms of its inherent possibilities. The various sections of the chapter set out a description of the potentialities of sport as a transhistorical, universal category. The distinction between sport as an universal category and its particular, unique, historical form has been made. The remainder of this study will focus on sport in its "modern" form, in the period between the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. Through this dialectical description of sport, it was intended that each side of each of these aspects could be identified, and then which side of each of these aspects was the major or dominant one and which was the minor one at a particular point in history. As Mao (1967, 89) put it, "there are many contradictions in the process of development of a thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence or development of other contradictions."

Once this observation was established it was possible to discuss how events have led to the fundamental changes in sport and to its inclusion in state structures. The intention of this chapter was to discuss sport in structural terms to show how the movement of its form, especially at the higher performance levels, from a particularly and potentially attractive element of man's existence, to some other form can result.

Likewise, comments have been made on the totality of the form and content of sport which are tied to the need for a historically specific identification, but which are also tied to the inherent totality of sport as sport. Before sport can be described in a particular temporal period, it was necessary to understand it in its inner totality. At this point some disagreement over the dialectical aspects presented as comprising the inner essence of sport could be made. It might be argued that these dialectical aspects are redundant, overlapping, or incomplete. So be it; however, in reviewing the literature, these dialectical aspects are the ones most often mentioned (often in partial analyses), as being a part of sport. Therefore, out of this review, the four dialectical pairings used here were identified as forming the totality of sport.

The important thing to remember is that each of the dialectical aspects presented here is a part of the total potential being of sport. They are elements of sport as a human physical movement form and were discussed in pieces in order to outline their contribution to sport as a qualitatively unique aspect of man's being and to show the possibility of sport moving from one side of the dialectical opposition to the other. In other words, for one side of the aspect to be negated by the other side. This was done for ease of discussion. What must now be emphasized is that all of these oppositional pairings form the total inner being of sport.

It is very difficult to discuss sport in its historical concreteness by focussing on one or a few of these dialectical aspects rather than on the sum of them. The subject/object moment of the existence of sport depends as much upon its concrete/abstract labour, avocational/vocational, and base/superstructure moments, as do each of the others amongst themselves. The negation by one aspect of the other in these couplets implies the immanent negation of the others. If sport becomes a form of abstract labour, then the possibility exists for a vocational form of sport to emerge, and for new relations of sport production to result (i.e., a change in the relations of production in the superstructure). In other words, the objective moment of sport begins, or completes, the negation of the subject/object unity. In this shift sport could become an alienated form of social labour with specific mediated consciousnesses and certain legal requirements and obligations. A change, or rather the immanent negation, in one of these oppositional pairings will inevitably cause changes to the

others; such is their inextricable nature in the inner totality of sport.

Therefore, current in the literature are analyses where sport has such and such an appearance which is attributed to this and that fact. Most often sport is not viewed in its own totality. Furthermore, this incomplete picture of sport is then *put* into a context without a proper identification of its form and content at that particular time. Then a series of causal facts are presented to describe the changes that have occurred. We feel that by observing these dialectical aspects of sport at a historically concrete moment and then describing the totality in which it is located, a better understanding will result of why sport has had its form and content changed and why it has taken on particular forms or institutional manifestations. We disagree with Hargreaves's (1982, 16) statement that "sport is immediate and transient, it can rarely be reduced to artefacts for examination." If she had said the "performance" of sport is such we could agree, but sport is more than this, it has become an institutionally-organized part of society; there are artefacts available for examination. As Schulke (1977, 69) put it

> sport exists not for the sake of sport alone, but is a field that does not directly belong to the material production, though it depends on it or is connected to it. The indirect aspect can be fully understood only in sport sociological research, if one will reach back to social production and reproduction of material life . . . .

This supports the discussion of Beamish's call for analyzing sport as a material practice in its temporal and social totality.

Before going on to a further examination of sport in this manner, and to focus on the elite levels of sport, we wish to re-emphasize the fact that sport has different meanings and practices throughout societies. Krawczyk (1977, 46) has argued that,

> the interaction of the two different spheres of man's activity became visible first in the metamorphoses of sport. Without completely losing its properties of play, i.e. voluntary, spontaneous activity, though based on rules and norms, which is the source of joy and a change in normal life, sport simultaneously accepts features of work, i.e. activity whose aim is the achievement of useful, socially expected values such as the results of a sport contest.

This is the paradox of sport, it takes on both appearances. However, the degree and context of the form of labour given to sport are varied. As we have argued above, a great deal of sport, at all levels, does maintain aspects of play, does have concrete use-value for the participant, and does have many positive aspects. With this basic premise it was possible to

investigate why some forms of sport have become the opposite: a negative, problem-riddled, alienated form of human physical movement activity; why the qualitative attributes have been subsumed under the quantitative attributes.

Chapter III

Modern Sport and The Olympic Movement

> There is in every social formation a particular branch of production which determines the position and importance of all others, and the relations obtaining in this branch accordingly determine the relations of all other branches as well. It is as though light of a particular hue were cast upon everything, tingeing all other colours and modifying their specific features; or as if a special ether determined the specific gravity of everything found in it.
>
> Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*

A. Introduction

Through this organization and the dialectical change within it, the production of sport, at all levels has been affected. The notion of *Citius, Altius, Fortius*, of elitism, and the rewards, both material and psychological, for athletic success have provided the conditions through which sport could change dialectically as well. The objective conditions necessary for high-performance sport demand not only a vocational approach to sport but also a well-funded infrastructure. The new mode of production resulting from scientific advancement in the knowledge of the physiological, kinesiological, biomedical, and other bases of sport, in the development of equipment and milieu, in the production of spectacles, in the reporting of the spectacles, and in the sheer quantities of sports and events, have pushed the organizational structure of sport to develop and to set out new relations of production. These structures and activities have also had to become vocationally-based in order to keep up with the quantitative and qualitative increases.

In the production of high-performance sport, with the Olympic movement as the epitome of representative, elite sport production, and through the changes resulting from the historically mediated processes of this organization, it is not a matter of amateur-professional sport, but one of vocational sport. The current form of avocational sport differs from that of the earlier period of the modern Olympic movement. Whereas in the early years of the movement the majority of the competitors did train and compete in an avocational form, in the current situation there are few instances where an avocational sportsperson competes in top level events. The development of the Coubertinian pyramid has had repercussions

throughout the levels of sport production represented in that construct (see Goodhart and Chataway 1968, 1-19).

In current parlance, the pyramid is used to describe "sport delivery systems." Tied to the pyramid is a great deal of rhetoric regarding liberal-democratic notions of egalitarian sport development. In countries with sport systems, written and verbal materials describe how the totality of sport performances are supported in their particular state structures by alluding to the pyramid construct. In his discussion of high-performance sport, Bouet (1973, 524-5) wrote that,

> . . . the tendency to reach for higher and higher records in certain types of sport appears tied to a structure of objectives without upper limit, nevertheless it is by the operation of this tendency that norms are established for the lower levels, which means that in sport the *superior* is the norm. This leads us back in a certain sense to Coubertin's "pyramid" concept. It is true, however, that we must be aware of his ultimate interpretation (both seen from below and from above) and of his causal and hierarchic valuations. We can, if necessary, flatten out the pyramid; high performance remains nonetheless at the center, a principle of unity for the variety of sports and the majority of athletes.

The study of the relationship between modern sport and the Olympic movement has two important implications. The first relates to the form and content of sport production in general and in the Olympic movement in particular. We cannot discuss modern sport just as a general category; we must view high-performance sport as a particular form within modern sport. Any discussion of sport and the Olympic movement implies such a connection. Therefore the implication arising here is one of the elite level of sport production, that is, sport production at the peak of sporting achievement.

The second implication involves a two-fold relationship between the organization of high-performance sport and the effects thereof in all branches of sport production. In order to begin to carry out this part of the analysis, it was necessary to examine the International Olympic Committee (I.O.C.) in terms of its own organizational form (structure and process). The influences of this organization on sport, the dialectical changes which occurred within it, and the global response to its influence are important factors to be considered in understanding the change, not only in high-performance sport, but within modern sport in general and how modern sport is organized.

As Mao Tse-Tung (1967, 73) clarified in his writings, the ". . . external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes." When discussing sport the internal causes, the inner dialectical contradictions of sport, are the inner or internal basis of change. They provide the impetus for change and movement in that social practice or structure; it is part of the dialectic of sport. The external conditions in which change occurs are numerous. There are many factors in the totality, at both the macro (global) and micro (local) societal levels, which become reciprocally related through the inner essence of sport. It will be argued that the Olympic movement has been the key external cause or condition of the dialectical change of sport; it has been the "light" or "ether" which provided the context for the change in sport.

It is through an understanding of how the Olympic movement acts as the key external condition of change for the dialectical movement of sport that we can begin to understand how the Canadian state came to be directly involved in sport and came to establish a federal organization for sport. The potentiality for sport to change from one side of its dialectical opposition to the other (e.g., from the avocational to the vocational), from a certain set of relations of production (superstructural ones) to different forces of production (economically-based ones), will become evident from the discussion of modern sport and of its sub-branch of production, high-performance sport.

B. Modern Sport and High-Performance Sport

In order to begin a discussion of modern sport and high-performance sport, two assertions must be made. The first assertion is that the modern form of sport rose to prominence by the mid nineteenth century and has continued to be the dominant for into the present. The second assertion is that the development of sport in Britain is the focal point from which discussions of modern sport must begin. An understanding of the substance of these two assertions must be made clear before going on to discuss the dialectic of modern sport and the particular form of high-performance sport.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century ". . . sport was an occassional pastime or luxury" which was ". . . emerging from medieval inhibitions, but it was still largely local and rural, informal and unstructured, lacking codification or mass direction, and rigidly based upon class distinctions" (Glassford and Redmond 1979, 133). The upper classes participated in or patronized sports such as hunting, shooting, angling, golf, cricket, horse-racing, prize-fighting and pedestrianism (running races, long-distance walks). Some of these sports were performed in mixed class groupings and often involved money prizes. Many of these were exhibitions of what Veblen (1953) identified as "conspicuous consumption." The lower classes had their own activities: indigenous and local forms of sport; competitions at country fairs; and various forms of mob football (McIntosh 1968). Overall, the sports of the upper classes were better organized and were economically and socially exclusive: these, too, were the sports which were among the first to be structured as national organizations with singularly codified rules and generally accepted guidelines for competition.

According to McIntosh (1968, 62), "two of the most remarkable features in nineteenth century sport were the great proliferation of sports and their organization under effective governing bodies." This generally is how modern sport is identified: by its proliferation or popularization to a wide number of participants; its increasingly unique and stringent codification; by the development of organizations to regulate and govern individual sports; and finally to the spread of sports through the colonial networks. Therefore certain mediated historical processes must be observed in order to see this development.

There are a number of historical occurrences which are pointed to as reasons for the expansion of sport. This was a period of rapid change on a global basis, often referred to as the "Age of Progress," in which sport grew. The Industrial Revolution had led to several significant developments in transportation, mass production methods, communications, and scientific advancement (e.g., outdoor lighting) which made regional, national, and international sporting events easier and cheaper to hold. The steamboat, train, steamship, and inter-urban tramline allowed competitors to compete in larger leagues and in events held over wider geographical areas. Mass production increased the quantity and standardization of sport

equipment which was subsequently available at progressively lower prices. The development of the telegraph, telephone, and wireless radio provided, as did a more efficient print media, a more immediate knowledge of events to be held and the results of those competitions. Finally, the social and economic transitions, a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, led to an urbanized population of industrial workers which provided an audience for sport competitions. With reductions in the hours of work and a lack of urban recreational space for individual participation, the supply of vicarious participants continued the process of professional sport-club development and to increased gates at other national and international sport events.[21]

The increased codification and organization can be attributed to the rise of the bourgeoisie following the Industrial Revolution. As this class, "Philistines" in Matthew Arnold's classification, emerged, new sports and new British public schools emerged. "The winning of educational privilege by the Philistines coincided with, and was responsible for, the growth of organized games, particularly cricket and football" (McIntosh ibid., 65). McIntosh (ibid., 64) specified further the importance of the bourgeoisie class for sport:

> . . . at the beginning of the century all that was prominent and all that was organized in British sport was Barbarian [the upper class], but the Barbarians made no attempt to hand down their sports to the populace, nor to organize them for participation by a wider clientele. At the end of the century the pattern of sport was predominantly Philistine. The middle classes had produced their own team games such as football and hockey, their own form of track and field athletics, their own swimming competitions and their own racket game of lawn tennis. Rowing and cycling they organized, and into cricket they inflitrated in such numbers that they made it almost a middle-class game. . . . The other sports were discovered in an embryonic state and were developed and organized by the Philistines. The successful sports were all those that could be practised in and around the growing towns and cities, in suburban gardens, on quite small grass fields, in public parks, on rivers, in public swimming baths and on the public highway. Moreover, the Philistines after some initial reluctance to embrace the Populace [the working class] in their sports did at last welcome them provided that the Populace would conform to the etiquette and conduct in play. Many Philistines went further and introduced games and sports to the Populace with a missionary zeal.

The Philistines were able to spread sport and to ensure some degree of participant conformity in the sports through the organizations of which they were members. Of these, the public

[21]The information for this paragraph was taken from Bennett, Howell, and Simri (1975) and Glassford and Redmond (1979). Also see Ingham (1978) and Betts (1953).

schools and universities, the public and colonial services, the churches, and the newly formed Philistine sport governing bodies were the key outlets for their zealous spread of sport.

The connection of this discussion to Britain has been obvious and difficult to avoid. The Industrial Revolution had a great impact on Britain, and Britain had the largest reaching empire, two factors which point to that nation as a focal point for the rise of modern sport:

> . . . although it may be inaccurate to describe Britain as the cradle of sport, it may be regarded as the main crucible in which modern sport was forged for mass production and worldwide distribution. . . . The Industrial Revolution created irrevocable social changes which in turn served to mold modern sport, and export was easily accomodated through the international network of Empire (now Commonwealth) (Glassford and Redmond 1979, 136).

Table 1 presents the chronological development of national sport-governing bodies for certain countries. The formation of these bodies is important in that it denotes when a national code for a sport became established. The prominance of the British influence is quite evident. Glassford and Redmond summarized "the prominent status of Britain as a pioneer of modern sport" (ibid., 139) in the following passage:

> In essence, therefore, the great British contributions to sport in the nineteenth century concerned the transformation to orderliness, the development of organizations, and export to other lands. Such elements were not completely absent beforehand -- one can find organized sport on the British pattern outside of the United Kingdom in the eigtheenth century, for example -- but the comprehensive nature of British contributions during this period is undeniable (ibid., 135).

One is able to see that the rise of modern sport and the major focal point for that occurrence in Britain are very closely related. This, however, does not give the complete picture of the actual production of sport practices nor does it provide all of the practices of modern sport. These elucidations must be made before proceeding to the discussion of the Olympic movement.

The bourgeoisie and upper classes in Britain were closely linked to the development of professional sport; to the vocational abstract labour form of sport.[22] These two classes were also widely concerned with the development of amateur sport and with the preservation of Victorian ideals in this form of sport. The notions of "muscular Christianity" and "athleticism" were the ideological concepts to which sport in the Victorian and Edwardian

[22]This aspect of sport, as was noted earlier, will not be focussed on or discussed beyond the minimum required for clarification or comparison.

Table 1
Earliest National Organization or Championship [23]

Sport	Great Britain	United States	Germany	Switzerland	Canada
Horse-racing	c.1750	1894	----	----	1926
Golf	1754	1894	----	----	c.1895
Cricket	1788	1878	----	----	1911
Shooting	1860	1871	1861	*1824	c.1869
Soccer	1863	1913	1900	1895	1912
Athletics	1866[1]	1879	1898	1905	1889
Swimming	1869	1878	1886	1918	1909
Cycling	1878	1880	1884	1883	1894
Skating	1879	1888	1888	----	1887
Rowing	1879	1872	1883	*1886	1880
Boxing	1880	1888	1910	1913	1969
Field Hockey	1886	1922	----	----	1962
Tennis	1888	*1881	1907	1896	1890
Gymnastics	1890	1885	1868	*1832	1899
Badminton	1893	1936	----	----	1921
Fencing	1898	*1891	1911	1914	1914

1. McIntosh (1968, 63) gives two dates for 'athletics,' 1866 and 1880. The earlier date is used here.(Killanin and Rodda (1976, 37) give 1878.)

* Denotes cases where a country other than Great Britain lead in the formation of a national organization or held an earlier national championship.

periods was connected. The former concept is of an uncertain origin (Redmond 1978) but had important implications for sport. Underlying "muscular Christianity" is the concept of manliness: possession of a strong moral character, a devotion to do good, and a strong, healthy, robust body with which to do God's work. As Mangan (1981, 53) put it: "Pious, compassionate, volatile, nervously intense, physically exhuberant, he had all the hallmarks of that odd breed of religious, introverted extroverts epitomised by Kingsley."[24] These qualities of muscular Christianity are also a part of athleticism and are enhanced within the latter concept as Redmond (1987, 7) has noted; ". . . physical activity and sports (especially team games like cricket and football) [have] contributed significantly towards the development of

[23]Materials for this table were drawn from: McIntosh, 1968; Glassford and Redmond, 1979; and Bennett, Howell, and Simri, 1982.

[24]The reference in this quote was to H. H. Almond of Loretto as a prototypical "muscular Christian." Also see Mallea 1974-75.

moral character, fostered a desirable patriotism, and . . . such participation and its ensuing virtues were transferable to other situations and/or later life . . . ."

This ideology had a strong influence on the practice of sport. McIntosh (1968) pointed out how Cardinal Newman's liberal ideas on sport as a utilitarian end in itself fit into the "gentleman-amateur" conception and into the social control function that they were able to perform in public schools and in church congregations. The use of sport to inculcate Christian values, and social conformity, through this utilitarian liberalism of Newman was criticized as being "machinery" by Matthew Arnold:

> He [Arnold] did not, however, agree with Newman about the justification of sport as an end in itself. "Population," he wrote in *Culture and Anarchy*, "and bodily health are nowhere treated in such an unintelligent, misleading, exaggerated way as in England. Both are really machinery; . . . (ibid., 74).

The argument here was that overemphasis on sport as either a means to an improved spiritual condition (we include proper social behaviour here) or as a means to improved physical health and vigour was overly reductive. The use of the concept of athleticism in these terms had to be seen as a part of a larger whole in the overall development of moral and physical attributes.

The concept of athleticism, containing the attributes of "muscular Christianity," was the basis of a powerful ideology which promoted sport as an avocational, concrete labour form of practice located in class-based and class-restrictive organizations in the superstructure. Dobbs (1973, 33) recognized the power of this ideology in his discussion of the generally negative Edwardian moral stance toward professional sport:

> This latter stance was taken by those for whom everything in the sporting garden was lovely. They played football, cricket, etc. in the way they had been taught in school, because they loved the games and because they were inbued with the doctrine that this was a worthy and morality-inducing thing to do. They were also, and this is crucial, a privileged minority who could *afford* to play sports. And to keep sport "pure", modelled as it was in their image, they erected a vast superstructure of laws and qualifications to keep the masses out of *their* garden.

It is evident that "by 1890 the Philistine's revolution of sport had determined the pattern of organization, the laws and the techniques both for themselves and for the Populace" (McIntosh ibid., 74). Sport in general was performed at a level of personal use-value (both moral and physical), was performed for both subjective and objective moments, and was a

leisure activity.

To summarize this discussion on sport in general in the modern period the following quotes are offered;

> Athleticism was strongest and most vigourous at the turn of the century and during the Edwardian era. Throughout the period of development the fundamental question whether sport was liberal in Newman's sense or machinery in Matthew Arnold's was never resolved, but most of those who played felt no great compulsion to find a justification for their games other than the satisfaction that they derived from their performance (McIntosh ibid., 79).

and

> . . . the age had more fun than conflict, more grace than ugliness, and more emphasis on winning well than on the contemporary philosophy of first ensuring that one does not lose, is undoubtedly true (Dobbs ibid., 36).

However, as Dobbs (ibid., 34) was to admit, the major trends we observe in sport today found their early development in the Edwardian period, as the seeds for trends in the Edwardian period were sown in the Victorian era. The rise of modern sport, as difficult as it is to periodize, must be seen as the development of sport practices began in the Victorian period, with the process of negation (e.g., the issue of professional sport practices spreading), beginning in the Edwardian period. Finally the negation and sublation of sport occurred in the present with the development of high-performance sport. To this we now turn.

Modern sport as discussed above, first spread to the national level, but soon moved beyond these boundaries. There are many examples of international sport throughout the early modern sport period (see Redmond, 1981; Glassford and Redmond, 1979; Leiper, 1976; and Bennett, Howell, and Simri, 1982 for particular examples), in the mid to late nineteenth century. But these were *mainly* single sport contests between two nations. It was with the beginning of the modern Olympic movement in 1896 that sport started to become international and increasingly focussed on high-performance.

> The international competitive sports program is strongly connected with the development of the Olympic movement. The beginning of the modern Olympic games in 1896 was a major step toward the creation of an international sports movement. Since that time the Olympic movement has played a paramount role in shaping international sports competition (Bennett, Howell, and Simri 1975, 139).

This quote serves to justify a thesis of this work, that is, that the Olympic movement is the key external condition for the dialectical change in sport. This connection between the

Olympic movement and high-performance sport also implies a connection between high-performance sport and the state/sport relationship, and in the type of labour inherent in the high-performance, representative sport form. Of the several categories of modern sport which Goodhart and Chataway (1968, 3) described, they highlighted one category as being particular to this century:

> there is a fourth kind of sport, however, of which there are very few examples before modern times, and which has blossomed only in the twentieth century. It could be called *representative* sport.

This type of sport practice, they said, was primarily for spectators, it was a spectacle, where athletes are representatives of their town, region, or nation, or of the spectators, in high-performance contests. Lenk (1984, 13) supports this claim; "the Olympic Idea, thus, is characterized by a *specific* principle of achievement, namely the agonetic or competitive one at the top level." In two articles, Lenk (1979, 1984) pointed out that the associative value inherent in representative sport is part of the total scheme, but that "sporting action and achievement cannot be delegated, vicariously achieved, pretended or obtained surreptitiously: . . . sporting action and performance requires personal -- usually, at least at top level athletics -- almost total devotion and engagement" (1984, 12).

The important aspect of Lenk's (ibid.) argument concerns the subjective relative freedom of the high-performance athlete, for "only an athlete who is freely devoting himself to a strenuous regime of training is capable of extraordinary accomplishments: You can command somebody to march but not to establish a world record." Bouet (1973) approaches the subject of high-performance sport in terms of its essence as a practice within the quantitive/qualitative dialectic and with a certain structure and meaning, which are categories similar to Lenk's discussion.

Bouet (1973, 523) starts his discussion of high-performance sport by questioning whether it is "merely sport on a high level, whether it is the only form of sport where performance is the key, or whether one might consider it as one 'species' (the sporting species) in a family of top-class performances, such as exist in many fields (science, art, etc.)." He felt that the first case was the best interpretation of high-performance sport as the

quantifiable measurements intrinsic to sport (e.g., the highest, fastest, strongest performance of a sport contest), reached a maximum level, and the actual sport performances were qualitatively better -- in that they contained a greater mastery, style, completeness, and technical perfection.

> From the point of view of the producer, high-performance sport -- in terms of quantity -- represents a small number of individuals. These constitute an elite; that is, they are superior in quality to a degree which makes them "different from the others." They give their very best. They are champions. . . .
>
> Thus we come to understand another fundamental characteristic of high-performance sport, a two-fold characteristic: it serves quantitatively as a standard of *measurement* for all sporting performance, and qualitatively as a *model* (ibid., 524).

It is the intensity in the interplay of the quantity and quality of high-performance sport which leads to ever better performances in competition and better competitions through better performances. Both Lenk and Bouet agree that in the final analysis the athletes are humans who come to sport for certain of their own needs and wants:

> Top athletes are also human. They are not "machine-like producers of medals", nor top-performance muscular machines, nor "useful achieving idiots", nor "pampered high performance beasts" (Lenk 1979, 118);

> The champion is neither robot, nor hero, nor artist, but is merely the expression of sport -- of a particular sport -- and therefore an expression of himself as a unique personality, as a human being. . . . As a human being the champion above all symbolizes man's power over his body and through his body, over techniques and over the natural elements (Bouet 1973, 529).

In the development of this work we have evolved a framework for the study of the labour form of sport. In the second chapter we described, rather abstractly, the dialectic of sport and its potential to become a vocational, objectified, abstract form of labour. The development of sport in its modern, high-performance form and content was seen to be directly and mediately conditioned by the historical processes leading to international representative sport in which the Olympic movement was a key factor.

We argued, at that point, that sport, in the so-called amateur form, could be identified as having an avocational form, which was objectively constrained by the international organizational and social-class content. The subjective content of that nascent modern form was likely strong, as Goodhart and Chataway (1968, 10) wrote in reference to the 1912 Stockholm Olympic Games, "most of the competitors could still genuinely warm to

the official philosophy of the movement. Largely drawn from the upper strata of their respective societies, they could indeed feel that 'the important thing . . . is not winning, but taking part.'"

As the number of countries entering international sport competitions increased (Table 2),[25] along with the number of individuals participating in sport in those countries (Meynaud 1966, 230), so did the economic possibilities for the intervention of capital. Preparing for, hosting, reporting on, and holding international competitions provides a multitude of opportunities for capital investment and profit. Media reports on the economic impact of the Winter Olympic Games on Calgary provide recent evidence of the increased economic possibilities resulting from the expansion of sport. Mandel (1975, Ch. 4) indicated that there was a general, global long wave of economic expansion following the second World War. This expansion lasted into the late 1960s and resulted in extra capital being available for expansion into new markets. One particularly evident result of this expansion involved the spread of television. Television networks, programming, technology, and its commodity hardware market (e.g., the actual television receivers) went through a marked growth in this period.

This growth of television was aided by and reflected the need for capitalist enterprises to find new ways to realize their surplus value, and to realize that value under the best conditions possible. In the "late" phase of capitalism this has occurred in the "unproductive" labour areas. In particular the exchange and distribution areas have been expanded. These areas have found their greatest expression in sales and marketing practices. In television, these practices found a vehicle through which surplus value could be better realized and also valorized.[26] By analyzing the audiences for various forms of television programming, commercial time slots were segmented into markets. For certain products and in terms of

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[25]We would point to the expansion of major international sport festivals as well. These were often based on geographic or political association. For example: the Commonwealth Games (formerly the British Empire Games) (1930); the Pan-American Games (1951); the Asian Games (c. 1950); Mediterranean Games (1951); and the African Games (1960). It should be noted that these Games had to be sanctioned by the I.O.C. (Espy 1979; Guttman 1984).

[26]Witness the conglomeration of advertising and media enterprises into large corporations.

audience appeal, televised sport offered an excellent marketing opportunity. The Olympic movement, through the commodification of its Games, found a growing source of revenue through the sale of television rights.[27]

The expansion of television, its global market, and its need for more attractive commodities to broadcast in order to sell commercial time was a key aspect of the dialectical negation of sport and concomitantly, the Olympic movement. The symbiotic relationship between the quantitative commercial expansion of sport and the televised aspects of the Olympic movement provided the conditions for the dialectical change in sport productions themselves.

Not only did the television corporations use sport as a medium through which they could increase their realization of surplus value in the capital marketplace, but sporting goods manufacturers and tourist facility operators in particular found that the use of athletes for distributive purposes (e.g., in advertising), was economically beneficial (Gruneau 1984, Cantelon and Gruneau 1988, MacFarlane 1986). The use of athletes for such purposes obviously entailed an economic relationship which ran counter to the hegemony of Olympism and the formal objective content of the amateur rule in the I.O.C. *Charter*. The economic relation between Olympic sport, television, and, in this case, amateur athletes demands further comment.

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[27]Epsy (1979) has completed an excellent and detailed analysis of this relationship. Likewise, Cantelon and Gruneau (1988, and Gruneau 1984), Guttman (1984, Ch. 13), and Whannel (1984) provide excellent analyses of the impact of television. The economic dependency of the Olympic movement on television revenues has led to changes in how the Games are awarded (i.e., so that events can be broadcast at prime times for the eastern United States markets), how the events are programmed and produced (see Cantelon and Gruneau 1988), and who actually has control. For example, former British sport minister Neil MacFarlane commented on an incident in Sarajevo at the 1984 Winter Games; he was with Princess Anne at the skating arena when an American Broadcast Companies, Inc. cameraman came very close to the Princess and focussed his camera upon her for some time which ". . . was a clear breach of protocol, so her detective from Special Branch stood up, removed his fur hat and place it over the lens of the camera. . . . One of the American crew glowered at us and, in a voice loud enough for all to hear, snarled: 'Go f*** yourselves. We bought the Games'" (1986, 219-20). This perception appears to be a belief amongst the American networks; "*We* finance the Games, we call the shots."

Strenk (1988, 310-11) wrote, in reference to two Swedish runners who were suspended in 1946 for professionalism, that one of the runners had ". . . delivered an opinion that many sport experts had argued since the days of Nurmi; namely, that amateur statutes actually hinder the establishment of new world records." Underwood (1969; cited in Strenk ibid., 315), quoting an Olympic athlete, gives further support to this topic: the athlete stated that "world class athletes would not be world class athletes without taking money. They would never be able to afford the proper training and diet." In the same article, Strenk (ibid., 312) noted that "meet promoters, long anxious to ensure the participation of key athletes, paid appearance money to ensure that an athlete entered a competition." Issues of amateur standing in terms of financial incentives, appearance fees, and endorsements have had a long history in the Olympic movement. These issues became acute in the 1968-1972 Olympiad and Winter Olympic Games. Their resolution produced the basis for the substantive changes that were to follow in the ensuing years.

It was through the medium of television that the financial possibilities for sport organizers, the Olympic movement, and athletes grew to incredible proportions (Macintosh et al. 1987, 48-52). Beginning with the 1960 Games, revenues from television began to escalate. The Games in Rome generated approximately $1.2 million, while the 1984 Los Angeles Games generated over $300 million. In order to sell itself, the Olympic movement has had to ensure that its product would generate and hold a sufficient audience. This implies the presence of two key factors.

First, the Games themselves must be well produced; they must be a spectacle and within "the logic of 'professional presentation'" in order to be viewed as a "legimate entertainment rather than game forms" (ibid., 50). This was a key point that Guttman made in reference to Brundage's role. For although Brundage had fought hard to limit the commercialization of the Olympic Games, his struggle had come to naught, for "by 1972, Olympism was not dead, but it had come increasingly [*sic*] to resemble what Brundage had for fifty years inveighed against, a branch of the entertainment industry" (Guttman 1984, 221-2). MacAloon (1981, 1988) has studied the "spectacular" nature of this movement and the use of

the Games as a marketable commodity, those works are pointed to for further support of this factor. Second, the quality of the sport performances must also be of a sufficiently high level in order to attract an audience. The Olympics are the epitome of high performance, representative sport. The audience expects to see *their* athletes, in particular, perform to these high levels. The drama, suspense, and potential for success, failure, or upset must all be evident in the Olympic sport production. Therefore, the I.O.C. must ensure that the production of the Games remains a spectacle[28] and that the actual sport events remain attractive to the audience. Th. has led to a dilemma for the I.O.C. in terms of the events and the athletes within those events.

Not all Olympic sport disciplines are able to attract or have a suffiently large audience. There are a few "centerpiece" sports which can attract and hold an audience. Athletics, gymnastics, swimming, figure skating, ice hockey, and alpine skiing are the sports which can draw the largest audiences. It is mainly within these sports that the I.O.C. has had the greatest conflict over amateurism. Athletes in these disciplines have been able to generate the largest economic benefits. Athletes is these sports, because the sports are popular, are given more exposure through television. This exposure becomes economically beneficial as they are focussed upon more often and for longer periods, and as they develop an identity in the minds of the television viewers beyond the actual competitions. Through this exposure, certain athletes can and have been able to commodify themselves to a greater extent. As televised sport, including the Olympic Games; expanded; so did the struggles between the I.O.C. and athletes "cashing in" on their new-found status.

This struggle came to a climax during the 1968-1972 period. Strenk (1988) and MacFarlane (1986) have provided well-rounded discussions of the "great shoe contract war" which centered on the 1968 Olympic Games. However, it was the downhill skiers who seemed to attract the greatest attention, and the greatest ire from Brundage. Brohm (1978, 123-8) expanded upon the "commercialization" of sport, and in particular alpine skiing. He noted (ibid., 126) that if Brundage had had his way over the endorsement issue, over ". . . 90 per

[28]The way in which this is done is presented below.

cent of the athletes currently taking part in the Games would have to be disqualified." But Brundage was insistent. The issue of endorsements reached a critical point at the 1972 Winter Olympic Games.

Brundage had long sought to use the alpine skiers as an example in his crusade for Olympic amateur purity. Many skiers had been suspended for professionalism (Strenk 1988, 315-6), yet Brundage was ". . . determined to 'eliminate all commercialism from the Games'" (Brohm 1978, 125). His continued efforts exacerbated the problems of amateurism. Strenk (1988, 318) wrote that Brundage's ". . . wide ranging ban aroused the international ski federation, FIS, to opposition in time to prevent a wholesale eviction of the sport's elite from international competition." Brundage's efforts, in a situation that was changed, were eventually placated when

> the IOC stepped in at Sapporo to disqualify the World Cup champion, Austrian Karl Schranz, for professionalism. Schranz suffered the penalty, not because he was the only skier earning unauthorized money,[29] but because he was earning more and was more open about the fact (Strenk 1988, 316).

By containing, for the moment, Brundage at this level of action, the I.O.C. and the FIS avoided a potentially disasterous moment for the Olympic movement, the Sapporo organizing committee, the television networks, and the FIS; not to mention a possibly long legal battle. Alpine skiing is perhaps "the" winter Olympic event. The actions taken by Brundage could have significantly reduced the commercial potential of the Olympic Games and they could have killed the "golden goose." It is likely that his stance shook the Olympic movement and the I.O.C. into re-evaluating the current realitites of "amateur" sport, and it may be that this philosophical conflict led to the termination of Brundage's presidency of the I.O.C..

It is the "Schranz affair" more than any other, that points to the historical moment at which avocational sport was negated by vocational sport.[30] The symbiotic relationship between

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[29]See Brohm 1978, Macintosh et al. 1987, Guttman 1984, 119-20, and Epsy 1979, 134-8 for more on this incident and on the hypocrisy surrounding Schranz's suspension.

[30] Brohm (1978, 126) summarized this nicely: "So it is in no one's interest to sabotage the Games by banning suspect athletes. On the contrary, everyone concerned has an interest in building the Games up as a world event so that 'sports capital' can expand. Too many interests are involved, starting with the enormous investments needed to organize the Games themselves, for anyone to be

the quantitative commercial expansion of sport and the televised aspects of the Olympic movement provided the conditions for the dialectical change in sport productions themselves. The expansion of the economic possibilities of high-performance sport came to be seen as the only way to compete at the elite levels. "For some an income from the sport was needed in order to continue to participate. The attitudes of others is that, if their hard-won athletic ability gives entertainment for which the public are prepared to pay, there is no apparent reason why they should not share in the proceeds" (Goodhart and Chataway 1968, 14).

Indeed the increased quantity: of high-caliber competitions; of capital investment in the production and sale of athletic contests and equipment; of increased rational and technological production of contests and athletes; and of the number of participants at all levels (which led to a further social division of labour and the rational response of bureaucratization), all led to the negation of avocational sport, at the elite levels. As Guttman (1984, 119) noted, "in other words, top-level athletes are forced to professionalize in the sense that sports become not the avocation but the vocation, not the diversion of a summer afternoon but the preoccupation of the entire year. When players become specialists in their play, when they *train*, distinctions dissolve and categories are confounded."

In the late 1960s Goodhart and Chataway (1968, 18) were able to state that "the whole amateur-professional controversy now has little reality. Amateurism, in sport as elsewhere, was an inevitable casualty in the pursuit of excellence." Strenk (1988, 303-4) noted that by 1972 the Olympic movement had not only dropped the term "amateur" from its *Charter* (Rule 26), it had also dealt with broken-time payments, shifted the ". . . emphasis away from defining an amateur by concentrating on defining a professional," and had also

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[30](cont'd) 'unreasonable'. Governments are involved in the race after industrial competitivity and the export of commodities and capital. They invest considerable financial, human and organisational resources in Olympic activity. They have every reason to do their utmost to ensure the success of the Olympic operation by promoting a sort of national sports solidarity pact; a version of the war-time national coalition. This involves diplomatic initiatives, advertising campaigns and politico-financial speculation. All these elements are thought up, directed and executed by a general staff, representing all the different organisations involved in the run up to the Olympics." These facts are particularly evident in the efforts and money put into procuring the Games for a particular city."

shifted the burden of determining eligibility to the International Sport Federations. Finally, in 1982 the I.O.C. legalized the alternative sources of income, for example, appearance fees, prize monies, endorsement contracts, that ". . . *some* athletes have been able to earn" (Kidd 1988, 297; emphasis added). These changes reflect the current realities of high-performance sport production, that is, the increasing vocationalization of sport performances.

One final point that is raised above concerns the notions of equality and class. We emphasized in the quote from Kidd that only *some* athletes benefit from the plethora of economic possibilities of non-professional vocational sport. This inequality of economic support raises new issues and alters the class questions prevelant in the old definitions of amateur. As Roditchenko (1978, 26) emphasized, in regard to the tacit humanism in Olympism, ". . . certain scholars tend to hyperbolize the principle of 'equal opportunities' in sport and seem to forget that the process of sport training -- a sine qua non of sporting success -- is largely dependent upon socioeconomic factors." This again points to residual elements of the hegemony so strongly defended by Brundage. Again we quote Guttman (1984, 129):

> One reason for Brundage's stubborn stand on the broken-time issue, and on all other threats to the purity of the amateur ideal, was his obdurate conviction that 95 percent of all Olympic medals are won by "poor boys" (like Avery Brundage). He asserted on more that one occassion that no rich boy had ever been an Olympic champion (which assertion must have astonished the Marquess of Exeter). Sport sociologists have shown repeatedly that, on the contrary, poor boys ("those of low socioeconomic status" is their preferred locution) are very much underrepresented at the Olympic Games, but Brundage simply ridiculed empirical studies of sports and blamed sociologists like Gregory Stone and Guenther Lueschen for not doing their scholarly work properly and for contaminating youth "by their laxity in enforcing regulations." [31]

It appears that, even without the archaic class restriction of "amateurism," the class backgrounds of high-performance athletes remains at the middle to upper class range (cf. Halberstam 1985). It is still the athletes with substantial family economic resources that are able to compete at this level (Kidd 1988, 302; Macintosh et al. ibid.). The amounts paid to athletes, considering that they are the direct producers of sport performances, are meagre. This discrepancy, in which Kidd (1988, 300) sees Canadian amateur athletes "as underpaid

[31] This reference to the socio-economic status of athletes also finds scholarly support in Canadian based studies. This is discussed further in the next chapter.

professionals" who subsidize ". . . the careers of hundreds of fully paid coaches, sport scientists, and bureaucrats, not to mention the ambitions of the federal state and the products and ideology of the corporations which sponsor teams and competitions," [32] is a clear example of the "means-ends inversion." The structure becomes reified and the production becomes alienated.

High-performance sport, therefore, exists as a blend of the subjective/objective moments in terms of both the performance and the competition and as the unity of the uppermost levels of quantity and quality. It is also at the high-performance level that the use-values of the concrete labour form, the avocational/vocational aspect, and the base/superstructure aspect change. The hygienic use-value is surpassed to an ultimate physiological efficiency which is beyond that needed for average positive healthful benefits. But then what are these new use-values? Likewise, how are the avocational/vocational and the base/superstructure aspects affected by high-performance sport? These questions have raised interesting debates throughout the modern sport period and which can only be answered after understanding how the conditions for sport practices at the high-performance levels have evolved.

The following section will outline the changes that have occurred in the Olympic movement, which is postulated to be the "particular branch of production" influencing change in sport. Following that analysis we shall return to these questions for clarification and discussion.

C. The Olympic Movement

> For me and I think for all athletes, the Olympic Games have a special place on a plane apart from all other races, all other competitions, national or international.
>
> Roger Bannister (1973)

[32] Kidd (1988, 300) went on to add that, "in this respect, too, the elite athlete of today labours under conditions radically different from those of the amateur of yesterday."

1. Introduction

The proposal that the Olympic movement and its Games are the key external condition, or focal point, of the current form and content of sport is well supported by the literature, by the media, and by the immense spectacle that they contain. Quotes from athletes, such as Bannister's above, and others, [33] attest to the feelings of participants in these Games and to the importance and centrality of the Olympics in world sport. This type of thought is also evident within the organization itself.

Canadian I.O.C. member Richard Pound stated in *Maclean's magazine* (23 March 1987, 29) that certain changes were needed in the Olympics to " . . . ensure that the Games 'remain the pinnacle of athletic events.'" The current I.O.C. President, Juan Samaranch, quoted in the *Edmonton Journal* (25 November 1987, H9) had the following to say, "I can say maybe the most important social movement at the end of this century is sports"; and "at the peak of the sport's movement, we feel, are the Olympics." These comments, from the participants and administrators of the Olympic Games, in and of themselves do not justify the above claim, but they point to the important position of this festival amongst the key actors in world sport and in this organization, although the claim of bias might be extended. However the academic literature offers further credence to the above claims.

MacAloon (1984, 241-2) stated that

> in merely eighty years, the Olympic Games have grown into a cultural performance of global proportion. Participants in the Games . . . now number in the scores of thousands and are drawn from as many as 151 nations . . . . In short, the Games are an institution without parallel in nature and scope in the twentieth century. Insofar as there exists, in the Hegelian-Marxian phrase, a "world-historical process," the Olympics have emerged as its privileged expression and celebration.[34]

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[33] For example, Lenk (1979, 140) stated "but even for the athletes capable of breaking world records at the Games, an Olympic victory counts more than the record per se. A record can be achieved elsewhere, but you can only become an Olympic champion at the Games. . . . the ancient proverb '*Hic Rhodos* (Olympia)*hic salta*' still holds in modern Olympics." In Hallberstam's book (1985, 16) on amateur rowers, he wrote that "there was something different, almost noble about the Olympian in his [John Biglow, a rower] mind. Four years ago he had been asked by his friend . . . why he was working so hard in preparation for the 1980 Olympics, and he answered 'the Olympian stands alone.'"

[34] Other scholars support the importance of the Olympic movement in sport: ". . . the IOC evolved as a very powerful coordinator of world sports" (Lenk 1979, 187); "the Olympic Games represent for thousands of athletes in a variety of sports, the

While these statements may not be conclusive support of the precept to be dealt with here, they do point to the importance and centrality of the Olympic movement in the development of sport. What is important is to move forward to show the results of the connection between the emergence of the Olympics and the changes which have occurred in sport in recent decades. We will analyze the Olympic movement as an organization in which we will show that, as such, this organization has undergone a dialectical change which paralleled the dialectical change in sport.

John Lucas (1962), in his study of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, made an interesting statement, which, even if not in the analytical context he intended, is important in the context of our analysis of the Olympic movement as an organization. Lucas (1962, 155) stated that "the Olympic Movement, like all human institutions 'carries the seeds of its own destruction.'" Epsy (1979, 163) also alluded to this dialectical notion when he stated that "the structure of the Olympic Games from the outset prevented the ideal from becoming a reality." It is recognized that these comments were not intended to augment a dialectical study of the Olympic movement, none the less they point to the inherently contradictory nature of the structure and process of this body as an organization.

Organizational analysts working in the "radical/critical" paradigm have outlined how such a study should proceed. Heydebrand's 1977 paper on "Organizational Contradictions in Public Bureaucracies" has been a seminal work in the study of organizations from this perspective, but it need not just apply to the study of public organizations. Benson's works (1977, 1983) have elaborated this type of analysis further, setting out a model for such a study. Again we see the basic forms of dialectical contradiction between base and superstructure, subjective and objective. Heydebrand (1977, 86-101) sees the contradiction as

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[34](cont'd) zenith of athletic achievement . . . . the modern Olympic Games have developed into an institution of international importance and have helped shape our conception of modern sport" (Segrave and Chu 1981, xviii); and "the international competitive sports program is strongly connected with the development of the Olympic movement. The beginning of the modern Olympic games in 1896 was a major step on the international scene in sports. Since that time the Olympic movement has played a paramount role in shaping international sports competition" (Bennett, Howell, and Simri 1975, 139).

being between "organizing activity" (organizations as activity or process) and "organization" ("an established structure").

Therefore, we must observe the historical processes between the forces and relations of production in the organization under study here in order to understand the structural changes which have occurred. Changes based on the dialectical contradictions, the totality, and the praxis of the actors, through which we can define and analyze that organization. For definitional purposes we will follow Heydebrand's (ibid., 86) description of organizations:

> The historical character of the processes of mediating between activity and outcome is particularly salient in the formation and transformation of organizations. Organizations are concrete social structures formally established for the purpose of achieving specific objectives. As such, organizations can be seen as objective historical outcomes of practical collective activity, especially activity organized around the production of material life and the reproduction of social life.

The organizational subject in this case, the Olympic movement, however, does not lend itself to the normally prescribed organizational analytical theories or paradigms. Although other "unproductive" organizations have been widely studied, the Olympic movement deviates even further from the norm in terms of its activity and outcome. Its structure has been an oddity, given that it has moved from a very small private aristocratic structure, through oligarchic control, to its present large, un-democratically controlled, corporate form.

The initial impulse in the study of an organization is to take it as a given structural fact. The Olympic movement, which is described as ". . . the world organization for the promotion of Olympism" (I.O.C., 1972, 8) by the I.O.C., its governing body, existed for a number of years before it became a movement of some permanence with an identifiable structure. The movement struggled for recognition and stability between 1896, the first modern celebration of the Games, and the 1908 Olympic Games held in London, England. Mandell (1976, 170) noted that "it should be remembered that until after about 1908 there was no working I.O.C." Until the 1912 Games in Stockholm we can view the activity and processes leading to the structure which became more evident at that historical point. Once we can identify an Olympic organizational structure, we can then observe the challenges to that structural form which has led to the present form. In the following analysis we propose to follow, for terminological ease, the processes which led to the superstructural elements

becoming the major aspect of this organization. Then we shall consider the contradictions within the economic base which led to a negation of the structure and to the current sublation process which can now be observed.

2. Baron Pierre de Coubertin

The 1896 revival of the Olympic Games has been attributed to one man, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, referred to by his biographers as "le Rénovateur."[35] Starting with Lucas (1962), following through to MacAloon's 1981 work, and onto Mandell's 1976 work on the 1896 Games, we have a broad and intensive study of Coubertin. Although numerous articles have been written on Coubertin, these works are the key ones. They serve as a basis upon which to form an understanding of the origins and developments in the Olympic movement and of its contradictory nature. It was Coubertin or subsequently his ideas which formed the basis of the hegemony of Olympism and to which I.O.C. members, as "trustees of the Olympic idea" (Berlioux 1976, 12), were required to pledge an oath. "I bind myself to promote the Olympic movement to the best of my ability and to guard and preserve its fundamental principles as conceived by the Baron de Coubertin . . ." (ibid.; see Hoberman 1986, 60). It is important to define these points contained in the philosophy of Olympism. This philosophy led to the formation of a particular structure and a particular set of objectified social practices. We must have a solid understanding of where it came from, how it became entrenched as the guiding principles of this organization, and the hypocrisy and contradicton that almost immediately followed. More importantly, it is imperative to understand these processes as their influence on the content and form of amateur sport were in the forefront in the development of sport throughout the world.

Of the two key works on Coubertin, MacAloon's 1981 work contains greater analytical detail than Lucas's 1962 work, and therefore it gives us a better understanding of the background of the founder of this movement. MacAloon's use of the concepts of *prouesse*, *patronage*, and marginality deepened his analysis.

[35]That is, the praxis of Coubertin crystalized the particular content, form, and contradiction in the development and organization of amateur sport.

Prouesse is attributed to the traditional French aristocracy into which Coubertin was born. MacAloon (1981, 13-17) followed Pitts's description of these "feats of prowess," which brought honour and demonstrated virtue, as being ". . . the search for spontaneous, irreproducible, unique, and conspicuous moral acts, undertaken for honor and not for utility. . . . based upon 'clearly defined and well-known' *principe* . . ." (ibid., 14).

Next MacAloon described the connection between *prouesse* and *patronage*:

> *Patronage* -- that is, organized acts of *prouesse* in which the lower orders serve as direct objects and not as merely validating spectators -- forms a second, alternative, and, in the context of the new order, more dependable and widely available paradigm for virtue and action through which aristocrats might claim a valued place in the changed conditions of national life [in the Third Republic] while preserving continuity with their traditional ethos" (ibid., 16)

The long description of Coubertin's lineage was presented in MacAloon's work in order to locate Coubertin temporally and culturally in the fin-de-siècle period and the declining French aristocracy of the Third Republic (1870-1914), and from which to begin an analysis of his life and work. Because of the turbulent changes in France the aristocracy lost some of its identification and prestige. As MacAloon pointed out, Coubertin grew up in these changing conditions which not only led him to rebel against his parents, but also to rail against his marginal status and to ". . . perform his acts of *prouesse* and *patronage* in favor of a moral order in which all could partake of *prouesse* and *patronage*" (ibid., 21).

Because of the societal changes in France, the aristocracy became a weaker group in the social structure. The bourgeoisie revolution had began a new societal form in which the bourgeoisie came to occupy the key positions. Coubertin, even though he had renounced the old aristocratic notions of his parents, sought to find a place in their society (ibid.). The result was the marginality of his position between the old aristocracy and the emergent bourgeoisie order. He sought to carry out his newly defined versions of *prouesse* and *patronage* in bourgeoisie society. He looked back to the aristocracy for a sense of community and homogeneity in thought and deed, and tried with great difficulty for a position in the bourgeoisie social structure through which he could exercise his *patronage* (Turner and Turner 1978, 250-2). [36]

[36]Although it might appear odd or academically questionable to insert these

MacAloon (1981, 38) offered the following analysis of the connection between Coubertin's marginality and his resultant life work:

> Wealth, education, and social connections were considerable resources for plotting an autonomous, individual career. Yet these same resources were emblems of a social class and caste suddenly marginal in the new order of things. Coubertin suffered and lamented that marginality, but it left him solidary [*sic*] with no group, for he came to despise the escapism, and hedonism, and the vacant illusions of his brother aristocrats. Committed to performing great individual deeds, he was nonetheless desperate for some experience of community for himself, in an era of vibrant and vital solidarities. A string of committees and voluntary associations, each dedicated to one or another form of social *patronage*, offered him a taste of group allegiance and a wharf from which to launch his personal missions and on which to display the booty of those journeys. Coubertin spent the 1880s anchored to such committees; he spent the rest of this life creating them.

It is important to understand how these concepts apply to Coubertin's life and work in order to comprehend his ideas for the Olympic movement. There are, however, certain other aspects of his [illegible] which must be emphasized before the Olympic movement can be discussed as an incipient organization.

Another key factor in the development of Coubertin's thought was contained in his belief that an "Arnoldian" sport system was what was needed to rejuvenate French youth. This would later provide a model for the revived Olympic movement. Coubertin travelled to England a number of times (and would later travel to the United States for similar purposes) to study the public school system. As a result of these journeys, the ideologies of athleticism and "muscular Christianity" would come to be part of Coubertin's philosophy of sport and find expression in his Olympic movement. This provided an outlet for Coubertin to pursue his acts of *patronage*. But he also found outlets in other ways.

As MacAloon (ibid., Chapter 4) noted, Coubertin joined the Unions de la paix sociale in 1883 while a law student, and in 1886 the Société Unions de la paix after leaving the Ecole des sciences politiques where he had begun studies. These two groups were formed by Frédéric Le Play by which his thoughts were disseminated and through which alledgedly non-ideological social scientific knowledge could be spread. It was in the publications and meetings of these groups that Coubertin's work was first published and heard, and as

[36](cont'd) anthropological concepts into a particular theoretical analysis, we feel that these concepts as described are within the methodology used in this work and their use defensible on those grounds.

MacAloon noted, which gave Coubertin a forum in which to test his ideas.

Other than a public outlet for his pedagogical ideas and reforms, these groups held an apolitical stance in their membership, meeting and publishing style, and in their search for social and cultural reform. The apolitical writings of Coubertin were likely influenced or supported by his participation in these groups. MacAloon (ibid., 89) stated that "this habit surely paid dividends for the fledging Olympic movement, but it also prevented Coubertin from arriving at a satisfying social theory of sport. Above all, it laid the basis for his mature belief that sport could and ought to stand outside of political and governmental interference." The important factor for the purposes here are contained in the following analysis from MacAloon (ibid.):

> The International Olympic Committee that he would create to control international sport likewise had its models in "nonideological" institutions like the British patronage associations Taine celebrated, the Ecole des sciences politiques, and, above all, the Société/Unions de la paix. Société precedents existed for all of the principles of I.O.C. organization: membership by cooptation; service to the "idea" and to "humanity" rather than to narrower segmental constituencies (the principle of "reversed delegation," he would call it); a "moral elite" that happened to be an economic and status elite as well; a "non-political" or privately political association (in the event, disproportionately conservative); emphasis on decision making by consensus rather than voting which in practice augmented the domination by the principal man (Coubertin himself); and jealously independent control over projects combined with the patronage of heads of state (as Le Play's societies had sought and received the patronage of Napoleon III in the 1860s, and of republican statesment like Jules Simon in the '80s).

Finally, Coubertin started a committee of his own, the *Comité pour la propaganda des exercises physiques*, or the *Comité Jules Simon* as Coubertin called it in honour of Jules Simon who endorsed his ideas. The members recruited to this committee came from diverse origins and ideas -- from the elite, from sport associations, and from all parts of the ideological spectrum of ludic thought and expression. The sectarian ideas and values contained in this "polychromatic mosaic" were too disparate to perform the role Coubertin had in mind. This perhaps, along with his marginality, pointed to the type of person Coubertin would seek for membership on the I.O.C..

Two events in 1889 add to the particular form and content that the Olympic Games would take. The first was the recognition and expansive participation in sport Coubertin witnessed in his visit to the United States. The second was the Paris Exposition that same

year. The Exposition[37] with its ceremony, mass appeal, festivity, and "cultural performance" (ibid., 180) made a lasting impression on Coubertin. These are evident in the current Games format. Both of these "cultural performances" were "liminal" (Turner and Turner 1978) activities which Coubertin could use in various aspects for each of his own patronage plans. The final aspect which led Coubertin to test his Olympic idea in the Sorbonne Congress of 1894 was the revived interest in ancient Greece due to the extensive excavations taking place there in the late 1880s.

It was the thought of Coubertin, above all, which was evident in the revival of the Games. It is the superstructural ideology, based on events in Coubertin's life and his related thoughts and beliefs, which led to the concept of the modern Games and which, it appears, allowed the movement to survive its early organizational development. But most importantly it is the philosophy of this organization, which is basically Coubertin's, that all members of the I.O.C. must pledge to support and perpetuate. For these reasons it was important to recount certain aspects of Coubertin's life. The next task is to identify this philosophy, Olympism, in order to clarify the historical processes which led to the organizational formation of the Olympic movement.

3. Olympism

Perhaps the most complex and most problematic aspect of the Olympic movement centers on the philosophy of Olympism: "Despite the ubiquitousness of the term Olympism, and the rhetorical uses to which it has been put, a clear, precise, and simple definition that goes beyond generality has yet to be formulated" (Segrave 1988, 151). As Leiper (1976, vi) found ". . . the I.O.C. has not succeeded in disseminating an understanding and acceptance of Olympism throughout the world." The literature on the topic of Olympism support this comment (see Segrave, 1988; Lucas, 1962; Eyquem, 1976; Lenk, 1979; MacAloon, 1981). The confusion originates from the fact that Coubertin never put together a complete explanation of what Olympism was and what the various aspects of this philosophy meant (Lenk, 1979;

[37]Which included sport displays and competitions.

Segrave, 1988). Despite this shortfall many of Coubertin's diverse writings have been used to describe Olympism.

The key part of this philosophy was Coubertin's early deification of Thomas Arnold and what he saw as "the Arnoldian system, [which] as Coubertin described it, was composed of moral development, athletics, and social education, in this order, and its two axial principles and methods were 'liberty and sport'" (MacAloon 1981, 60). Perhaps this was due to the archeological excavations and discoveries in Greece during the latter half of the nineteenth-century, which raised public interest in the Classical period. These developments gave Coubertin his ultimate form of *prouesse* and his act of *patronage*. MacAloon stated that it was unlikely that Coubertin had a great deal of exposure to the literature and recent findings surrounding the ancient Olympic Games.

Noting a passage of Coubertin's memoirs written between 1906 and 1908, MacAloon questioned the pre-1896 depth of knowledge Coubertin had of the ancient Games, beyond mention of it in his classical studies at school. Therefore, "there can be no question of a simple historical relationship between the ancient and modern Olympic Games, for in appropriating the classical past, Coubertin and his collegues distorted it to fit the modern situation" (MacAloon 1981, 142). Young stated this point more strongly. By using Coubertin's account of his visit to the Brooke's Olympics in Shropshire, England, Young (1984, 59n) was able to assert that is was here that ". . . Coubertin seems (first?) to have associated Victorian England with ancient Greece." Young (ibid.) also noted that ". . . Coubertin never set foot in Greece until he went to Athens to negotiate arrangements for the Greeks' 1896 Olympics; his knowledge of ancient history, culture, and literature was superficial at best."

Whatever the case might be, the "Arnoldian system" and the Greek ideal of ârete appear to emphasize the same qualities. Arete was,

> a striving for excellence or quality, coupled with the concept of man (in the generic sense of mankind) as a total being not divided into mind, body, and spirit. Beauty, strength, and wisdom are necessary ingredients of the balanced individual one is striving to become. Arete is possible only while one is striving; those who think they have attained ârete have lost it and have passed into hubris (Olsen 1983, frontispiece).

Hence, ârete was clearly part of his overall concept of what sport should be and what he saw the Olympic movement working toward. Shrouding his Anglocentric belief in the "Arnoldian system" with a Classical ideology of sport was, perhaps, more acceptable internationally as a guiding principle.

Leiper (1976), in an indepth study of the topic, offered the following I.O.C. "fundamental principle" as the most sufficient, yet incomplete, definition of Olympism;

> the aims of the Olympic movement are: to promote the development of those fine physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport, to educate young people through sport in a spirit of better understanding between each other and of friendship, thereby helping to build a better and more peaceful world, to spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby creating international goodwill, to bring together the athletes of the world in the great four-year sport festival, the Olympic Games (I.O.C. 1987, 6).

Leiper (ibid., Chapter 3) found that elements of Coubertin's philosophy were absent in the above rule, but noted that "the totality of his statements suggested a grouping of the elements of amateurism, physical and character (moral) development, internationalism, and aesthetics and arts and letters, as being the factors which formed the philosophy of Olympism" (p. 33). These elements appear in other literature as well. For example, Lenk (1979, 123-4) stated that,

> . . . the values and principles concerned are the following ones: the values of religious-cultic import, the festive, artistic and spiritual impregnation of the Games, the creation of a sporting elite and their paragon function, the idea of top performance, records and achievement, the idea of equality of opportunity for those taking part in and trying to qualify for the Olympics and in competition, the agonetic, the fair play, the ancient idea of a peaceful truce during the Games and the Movement's concept of its peaceful mission.

MacAloon (1981, passim) also noted that the principles of religious-cultic expression of humanity, egalitarianism and democracy, a moral and social elite of high achievers, a festival atmosphere with ritual and ceremony leading to spectacle, and education, were evident as parts of a "neo-Olympism." Segrave (1988, 149-59) used the categories of education, international understanding, equal opportunity, fair and equal competition, cultural expression, independence of sport, and excellence to analyze Olympism (cf. Eyquem 1976). And finally, Lucas (1988, 95-6) used the three broad categories of religion, peace, and beauty to complement "the Olympic Ideal" in his description of this philosophy.

From these analytical descriptions we can glean the following elements for further scrutiny, while not claiming any better knowledge of this "idealistic" philosophy:

1. the concepts of ârete and agon;
2. the notions of egalitarian (democratic) elitism and amateurism;
3. the goals of internationalism and pedagogy; and
4. the many aspects contained in the idea of "cultural performance" (MacAloon 1981, 1984, 1988). [38]

Before proceeding with this analysis and subsequent critique we wish to make very clear that this philosophy, idealistic and unfulfilled though it has been in this complex and troubled world, is undoubtedly rooted in a beautiful conception of humanism which most people in the world would likely support and live under. None the less, these very principles contain within themselves their own oppositions, in the non-dialectical sense, which has led to a number of problems and issues due to the hypocrisy and excessive idealism they contain. This in turn has abetted the dialectical transformation of amateur sport of the Olympic movement.

The first of these parts, the ârete and agon have been described above. Anyone familiar with the necessary integration of the physical, cognitive, and affective domains of students in physical education classes or of athletes in sport would not question the concept of ârete as being the totality that sportspersons must work with or be guided toward. The degree to which this unity is achieved, sought, or implanted in athletes is difficult to ascertain. Obviously it does occur to some degree in some athletes by accounts given in biographies and autobiographies. The manifestation of this part of the philosophy is evident in the aims cited above, as well as in the Olympic mottos: *Citius, Altius, Fortius* (Didon's); ". . . the most important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win but to take part, just as the most important thing in life is not the triumph but the struggle. The essential thing is not to have conquered but to have fought well (from the Bishop of Pennsylvania; cited in Berlioux 1976, 14); and *Mens fervida in corpore lacertoso*[39] (Coubertin 1931, 115f; cited in Lenk 1979,

[38]We do not wish to further cloud a confused situation by introducing new terminology, but merely wish to propose these categories for analytical purposes. It is not our intent to define Olympism.

[39]"A glowing spirit (mind) in a physically strong body."

144).[40]

The agon, as described above, outlines the competitive structure exemplified by the motto that competing properly is more important than winning. It is better to compete fairly and honourably than to win. The notion of individual striving is present here as well. The judgment of peers as to the quality of the performance is held in great esteem. This aspect of the philosophy is also evident in comments given by athletes as to the value of respect for their competitors.

Coubertin saw a certain benefit in the production of a moral elite; "it's always an elite that one keeps in mind, for a small and superior phalanx always returns more than does widespread mediocrity" (Coubertin 1887, 636; cited in MacAloon 1981, 72). Coubertin also said that "the second characteristic of Olympism is that it is an aristocracy, an elite; but of course, an aristocracy whose origin is completely egalitarian, since it is determined by bodily superiority of the individual and his muscular possibilities" (I.O.C. 1976, 10). Lenk (1979, 145-6) qualified this further in the following:

> Coubertin did not interpret the Olympic élite as tied to a specific social class, but as an independent functional élite of achievement and endeavor. This élite would serve as an ideal educational model for achievement oriented youth generally, but, in particular, for sports:
>
> > In order that a hundred dedicate themselves to physical culture, fifty have to practice sport. In order that fifty practice sport, twenty have to specialize. In order that twenty specialize, five have to be capable of amazing achievements [Coubertin] (1935).[41]

This moral elite of sportspersons of egalitarian origins would serve as pedagogical models for the world's youth and would be an export commodity, a muscular diplomatic corps in Coubertin's scheme; "Let us export rowers, runners and fencers; there is the free trade of the future . . . "(Coubertin 1892; cited in Eyquem 1976, 139). Here the connections with pedagogy and internationalism are evident. What is more evident is the contradiction between this notion and that of amateurism.

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[40]There are interconnections between the parts of this philosophy, i.e., they were used for more than one aspect of the philosophy, giving some completeness to Olympism. For example: educational as well as moral principles are contained in Coubertin's motto; elitism and ârete in Didon's motto; and egalitarianism and amateurism in Coubertin's concept of amateurism.

[41] This quote forms the "Coubertin pyramid" of sport participation.

At the Sorbonne Congress in 1894 Coubertin had used the topic of amateurism to hide his real goal of reviving the Olympic movement (Lucas, 1962; MacAloon, 1981). Although there was a session on the topic of amateurism, Coubertin appeared to be somewhat indifferent to the issue then and later. Certain of Coubertin's writings dealt with amateurism in a restrictive sense, his notions of *prouesse* and of *bonheur* were confused with his wish to use the Olympics as his *patronage.* [42] These parts of Coubertin's inner being and aristocratic outlook likely led to this apparent indifference. We find the following by Eyquem (1976, 140) to be of great interest and [illegible] it at length.

> It was to help the a[illegible] his nobleness of soul, his independence, that the IOC defined the rule[illegible]urism. Coubertin would never agree with the narrow character of these rule[illegible]tablished by the majority of the IOC against his advice. He wrote in 1934:
>
> > The actual rules are wicked. Their terms are indefensible as much from the point of view of logic which they offend as that of human liberty which they cheapen.
>
> And he wanted the rules on amateurism to be completely rewritten.
>
> > By the Olympic oath I ask only one thing: loyalty to sport. . . . It is the sportman's spirit that interests me and not the respect of that ridiculous English concept that allows only lone millionaires to dedicate themselves to sport without being tied to an out-of-date dogma (*L'Auto,* 4 September 1936, a year before his death).
>
> Certainly for Coubertin, independence was the ideal towards which the Olympic athlete should tend, but, as he wrote as early as 1894, he made a distinction "between profits and expenses". Financial help for athletes, above all the underpriviledged, would not make them professionals but rather would give them an equal standing [egalitarianism], reducing what "a man of feeling cannot tolerate -- social inequality".

We can observe from this quote that Coubertin was a humanist with very idealistic, yet sincere, visions of mankind and its betterment through sport. A realist he was not. This unrealistic belief in man was not obviously felt by the "disciples" of Coubertin and his ideals. In the above quote, in subsequent organizational activities of the I.O.C., and in the writings and interpretations of amateurism, including Coubertin's, it is obvious that his "disciples" had

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[42]The concept of *bonheur* is important in this discussion and we refer to MacAloon's (1981, 89) description of it for clarification: "Into his own thought, Coubertin also absorbed Le Play's stress on *bonheur,* meaning individual happiness and peace. . . . Just as *bonheur* lent a psychological dimension to Le Play's theories, so it would add to Coubertin's psychology of sport a measure of counterpoint to his more common emphasis on sport's utilitarian, character building values. Moreover, the later Coubertinian concept of 'eurythmy' came to represent the interpenetration of individual *bonheur* with the aesthetic choreography of the Olympic festival."

more social chauvinistic thoughts. This fact can be seen in the selection of the "Coubertinia" used to promulgate amateurism and Olympism, especially by Avery Brundage.

The contradiction between a moral elite striving for *Citius, Altius, Fortius* and for the agon are in opposition to amateurism. This issue has been one that was an ongoing organizational problem which was handled with great incoherence, inconsistency, and zealousness (especially in Brundage's case). By observing what Coubertin saw as elitism and amateurism in the Olympic movement, we can only seek answers to the resulting incongruence in the actual processes of the organization (see below).

Although the concept of pedagogy has been mentioned above, its place in Olympism is also tied to the notion of internationalism. Coubertin felt that his wish for global peace and understanding could be achieved by individuals meeting and understanding peoples of other nations through friendly competition in sport contests. Athletes would not only come to understand their own objective unity through sport (*la pedagogie sportive*), but they could also come to remove patriotic and nationalistic subjectiveness in the same way.

In terms of internationalism we see issues of patriotism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism. MacAloon's (1981, 258) differentiation of the first two categories, in terms of Coubertin's writings was that "patriotism was the love of one's country and the desire to serve her; nationalism, the hatred of other countries and the desire to do them ill." Therefore patriotism was acceptable in the Olympics as long as "true internationalism" was part of the scheme. Here again Coubertin differentiated between cosmopolitanism and internationalism. The former was a result of easier travel due to the "Age of Progress" which permitted people, but especially affluent Europeans, to live and experience different national lifestyles and skills. People could seek out the best different countries had to offer, but in this framework they kept their chauvinism from truly allowing them to understand the foreign country and its populace that they were visiting. "True internationalism" was ". . . found with those who go out among peoples they visit, who do not recreate the habits and society of their own land in foreign ones, who do not judge by material appearances, and who seek to test their prejudices and expectations by careful observation" (MacAloon 1981, 265). This internationalism had to

be an "intellectual, not material" one. Patriotism, so long as it did not exhibit the ill judgments of cosmopolitanism nor the bellicose potential of overt nationalism, was acceptable in the framework of "true internationalism."

Again the ceremonies of the Games and the realities of world politics have led to contradictory and problematic situations in the Olympic movement. Often at the level of individuals in and around the Olympic Games we hear reports of internationalism occurring. However, we also see the opposite occurring. For example, the Soviet Union-Hungary water polo match in the 1956 Games. Coubertin himself acknowledged this potential in sport, in that sport ". . . can set in motion the most noble passions or the most vile ones; it can develop disinterestedness and the sense of honor as well as the love of lucre; it can be chivalric or corrupt, virile or beastial; finally, it can be used to consolidate peace or prepare for war" (Coubertin 1931; cited in Hoberman 1986, 85). Here again Coubertin's experience with the thoughts and societies of Le Play, as was noted above, led to his belief that sport could exist above political issues of individuals and states. This idealism was to suffer the similiar ideological fates of other aspects of Olympism.

Perhaps the most enduring aspect of Olympism is contained in the concept of "cultural performance" which MacAloon has concentrated upon and analyzed. He saw the Olympic Games as being a combination of four key elements: game; ritual; festival; and spectacle. The Olympic Games are concerned with ". . . primarily, though not exclusively, athletic games. They focus on human bodies: . . . bodies exploring and extending the limits -- in the words of the Olympic motto -- of swiftness, height, and strength" (MacAloon 1988, 281). The Games are not only centered on bodily culture and the emotions expressible through bodily movement, they also form a root metaphor for life and actual forms of ludic endeavour.

Ritual is expressed in the Olympic movement in a series of activities surrounding the opening, victory, and closing ceremonies. "Coubertin insisted repeatedly on the religious character of the Games. He wrote in 1929 that 'the central idea' of the Olympic revival was that 'modern athletics is a religion, a cult, an impassioned soaring'" (MacAloon 1984, 251).

Coubertin also saw the use of ceremonies in the Games as the key way in which they would be separated from and above other world championships or games. The "Olympic rituals, like all rites, are sets of evocative symbols organized processually in space and time. Olympic rituals take body symbolism, join it with symbols of determined social categories, and meld the whole into expressions of Olympic ideology that the rituals are designed to render emotionally veridical" (MacAloon 1988, 286). These rituals have been evident since the first Games in 1896 and have undergone a process of refinement and expansion which, MacAloon pointed out, have resulted in the Olympics becoming a "modern spectacle par excellence."

The I.O.C. has insisted that the Olympic Games are a festival, likely following Coubertin; "Coubertin called the Games 'a festival of human unity' and, by 1935, he had grown worried that they might become 'only theatrical displays, pointless spectacles'" (MacAloon 1984, 248). MacAloon (ibid., 263) argued that the I.O.C.'s desire ". . . to reach a mass audience (e.g., television) and their willingness to renegotiate certain key structural principles (e.g., amateurism) in order to accommodate as many nations as possible and to ensure the quality of performances have made the edging into spectacle inevitable." As participation by the audience is not as direct as in festivals, and due to the "size and awe" the Games evoke, they are "spectacles." MacAloon (1988, 285) described how these features are integrated: "Olympic sport events are encased in a set of rituals surrounded by a huge festival and take on the magnitude of a spectacle. Game, rite, festival, and spectacle are genres of performance, analogous to literary genres, and are bound together into a complex performance system in the Olympics," that is, into a "cultural performance." Eyquem (1976, 139-40) saw this aspect of the Olympic movement as being the expression of Olympism.

It is within this last category of Olympism that we can see the totality of the concept. The category of "cultural performances do not simply express human experience, they constitute it" (MacAloon 1981, 271), they contain a subjective and objective connotation of "game," they include the rituals of the various Olympic ceremonies and the "performative genres of festival and spectacle" (MacAloon 1984, 247-8).[43] Within the Olympic movement

[43] The whole of this quotation is important in regards of these genres; ". . . the performative genres of festival and spectacle are in frank opposition to one another.

itself, especially through a variably tacit ideology, and in the production of the Games themselves all the aspects of Olympism are present in reality, (e.g., in various degrees of arete and agon), and in idealism (e.g., in the pagentry and ceremonial trappings of the "cultural performance"). This philosophy, as expressed in these aspects, is present in various degrees in the Olympic Games. The important fact is that Olympism has sustained the Olympic movement for the length of its existence. Olympism allowed the movement to develop until it became institutionalized, and through the "disciples" of Olympism, such as Avery Brundage,[44] it has been kept alive against strong forces for change and through many problems.

D. Dialectical Change in the Olympic Organization

[redacted]ons of the Olympic movement have been dealt with in previous sections. They do not, nor can they ever in this study, begin to exhaust the scholarly work which has been completed on Coubertin, the revival of the Olympic movement, and the first modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896. The works of Lucas (1962), Mandell (1976), and MacAloon (1981) are broad, rich, and deep in historical and analytical details on these subjects. In terms of analyzing the Olympic movement as an organization we have a suitable point of reference from which to begin. For as an "amateur sport organization," we can observe how the dialectical change in sport production led to a dialectical change in this organization and, more importantly, set the stage for national amateur sport organizations.

The I.O.C. is the governing body of the Olympic organization. As such it is important to understand its early developments in order to better appreciate its relation to the

[43](cont'd) While the Olympic Games are our grandest spectacle, they are simultaneously a festival, and much of the character and history of modern Olympism is contained in the dialectic between these two genres of cultural performance. The same forces that have precipitated their spectacular quality are responsible for much of the global popularity of the Games" (MacAloon 1984, 247-8).

[44] Guttman's (1984, 134) comments on Brundage give an indication of the type of person such disciples were: "He was a Middle Western adherent of the Republican Party, a believer in laissez-faire capitalism and in liberal (not social) democracy."

development and change in amateur sport and, indeed, in its own dialectical change.[45] Unfortunately, there is a lacuna in the literature outlining the historical developments of the Olympic movement between the first Games in 1896 and the fourth Games in London (1908); therefore, there is little detail available for a thorough analysis of the movement over that time. Regardless of the obvious need for further study, we must proceed on what is available and extrapolate and assert where necessary. We have learned from Mandell that there was no working I.O.C. in this period, that it was basically Coubertin's efforts from his home which kept the movement going forward. We can also note that the 1912 Games in Stockholm appear to have been closer to the vision Coubertin held for them.

> Not until the 1912 Stockholm Games did the Olympic Movement fully regain its strength and begin to make good on the promise of Athens. The wonder is that during these sixteen years Coubertin did not give up and the Olympic Games did not vanish, to be remembered only as a fin-de-siècle curiosity. Pierre de Coubertin's greatest display of *prouesse* came during these dark years (MacAloon 1981, 274).

Before we move forward, it would be appropriate to look back at some events before and around the first Games which support MacAloon's claim. From the works of the above scholars it is apparent that events in Coubertin's life and work are contained in the Olympic movement. Coubertin's hand is evident, so is his jealous protectiveness of the Games. Young (1984), rather vehemently, Mandell, and MacAloon all acknowledge Coubertin's disavowal of many of the "psuedo-Olympics" (Redmond, 1988) and his "compromise" support of the "Interim Games [1906, Athens]" which he acknowledged, ". . . but did not give IOC patronage to them" (Rodda 1976, 36). Coubertin also borrowed from a variety of sources and and often used great journalistic licence with those materials, especially those of the Classical period since it gave the modern Games ". . . a claim regarding the heritage of ancient Greece to give it legitimacy" (Kanin 1978, 517). He nurtured and protected his form of *patronage*.

An aspect of Coubertin's life and work which was very important in the early survival of this movement was in his use of spectacle.

> Robert Da Matta has written that symbols are created by acts of dislocation; so too, we may add, a taste for symbols appears in dislocated men. Coubertin's Catholic and

[45]That is, the dialectical change of the I.O.C. is a minor contradiction to that of modern high-performance sport itself (see quote from Mao 1967 above).

> aristocratic background and his marginality in the face of it; the trials he had endured as an adolescent; the reveries commanded in him by Arnold's and Lesneven's and Washington's tombs; the hyperactive, even disparate, seriousness with which he gambled on the representational world of sport and Olympics; the ceremonies of the Paris and Chicago expositions; all of these plus some inscrutible force of spirit had endowed him with a tacit understanding of the power and of dominant symbols which he could never discursively articulate (in place of the utilitarian, instrumental language of his time) but could manipulate like few others (MacAloon ibid., 170).

MacAloon also felt that "though such things cannot be proved, it seems to me that the Olympic Games would have been less likely to survive the traumas of the next twelve years [after the Athens Games] had not the symbolic capital . . ." (ibid., 240) of the first Games and Spiridon Loues victory be[illegible] so great. [illegible]man (1986, 3,88) also saw aspects of spectacle and Olympism as "the core doctrine [illegible] Olympic movement . . . which strives for global participation at all costs, even sacrificing moral standards. The IOC has promoted its psuedo-ethical ideal of 'sportsmanship' by employing a psuedo-religious jargon." Coubertin was also ". . . intent upon establishing the hegemony of the Olympic movement as an international institution" above all other sport contests (ibid.).[46] It was the concept of Olympism that acted as a strong hegemonic organizational device through which the I.O.C. developed and maintained its hold on worldwide amateur sport. This hegemony, even if poorly stated and recognized, is the integral concept in understanding the above power[47] relations and conversely, the contradictions experienced in amateur sport. Further, by understanding the hegemony of Olympism one is able to grasp the real and complex social formation of the Olympic movement which is under pressure to renew, recreate, and defend itself against the constant challenges of a modernizing world.

It was through the tenacity of Coubertin that the Olympic movement was able to survive through its early years. The bulk of the I.O.C.'s business was conducted by Coubertin, however, in 1921, an executive board was formed to provide a more formal and

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[46]Hoberman labels this doctrine "amoral universalism."

[47]We have chosen to define power following Lukes (1974). In that definition there are: observable (overt and covert) and latent conflicts of interest which are dealt with through coercion or force, or manipulation (respectively); where inducement, encouragement, persuasion, etc. are used to influence others where no conflict of interests are evident; power may or may not be a form of influence used and used with or without sanctions; and certain potentially political issues can be controlled through manipulation of the political agenda.

business-like management structure to the movement. As will be discussed below, the I.O.C. continued to grow into what we observe today, a large corporation.

1. Development of the I.O.C.

a. Structure, Hegemony, and Their Perpetuation

With the above background and an understanding of the hegemony of Olympism, we can now proceed to see how this organization developed and changed. First, by observing the aims of the I.O.C. we can see that its main task is the protection and perpetuation of this "effective dominant culture." This was accomplished by

i Ensuring the regular celebration of the Games.
ii Making these Games increasingly perfect, more and more worthy of their glorious past and in keeping with the high ideals that inspired those who revived them.
iii Encouraging or organizing all events and, in general, the taking of all steps likely to lead modern athletics along the right lines.[48](Killanin and Rodda 1976, 12).

These aims or goals were virtually unchanged from those established at the formation of the I.O.C. (see Leiper 1976, 78-80). What this points out is that the main focus and measure of achievement of this organization lies within its ability to preserve the hegemony of Olympism.

Knowing that this philosophical ideology developed and strengthened through Coubertin merely gives us a partial picture of how Olympism has survived in a modernizing world. An hegemony, as was stated above, is never guaranteed to the dominant class or class faction. What must now be addressed is how this hegemony has, against this premise, been maintained by the I.O.C.. As Eyquem (1976, 140) noted, "the life of the Olympic Movement was inseparable from that of the founder of the Modern Games until 1924." Coubertin surrounded himself with like-minded men of the same class to both generate support for the renewal of the Olympic Games and to develop and perpetuate Olympism. Coubertin hand-picked the first twelve members of the I.O.C. from his select group at the Paris

[48] Leiper (1976, 79), using a 1971 version of the *Olympic Rules and Regulations*, describes a fourth "goal" which was not included in the I.O.C. publication used for this study. That goal is: "Inspiring and leading sport within the Olympic ideal, thereby promoting and strengthening friendship between the sportsmen of all countries." This fourth goal fits into the above mentioned protection and perpetuation function as well.

meeting. The self-perpetuating nature of the I.O.C. developed from this initial selection procedure.

New members are recruited by present members, guaranteeing their class and ideological base "fit" the I.O.C. mould (see Krotee 1988). The twelfth rule of the *Olympic Charter* (I.O.C. 1987, 9) notes that "the I.O.C. is a permanent organization. It selects such persons *as it considers qualified to be members*, provided that they speak French or English and are a citizen of and reside in a country which possesses an [*sic*] NOC recognized by the I.O.C." (emphasis added). To rise through the ranks of the I.O.C. is even more encumbered. To become a member of the Executive Board (president, three vice-presidents, seven additional members), an individual must be nominated, in writing, have their nomination signed by at least three I.O.C. members, and have the nomination submitted to the Secretariat so that it can be announced by the President the day before the vote (ibid., 10). The voting is by secret ballot, through which an absolute majority of I.O.C. members in attendance must approve the nominee. The closed nature of the recruitment procedure and the narrow method of electing an executive restrict the access to and movement within the I.O.C..

What the first members, and Coubertin in particular, ensured was a closed-associational relationship (Weber 1978, 41-6). Memebership in the I.O.C. is controlled by individuals on the I.O.C. who allow only those persons holding to the "set of common absolute values (*Gesinnungsverein*)" (Weber ibid., 41), identified above, to become members of this prestigious voluntary association. The use of "social closure" by persons holding to the "mission" of the I.O.C. is the key factor in the establishment of Olympism as an hegemony. Krotee also completed an analysis of the I.O.C. using Michels's theory of the "iron law of oligarchy." He found that the organizational features of the I.O.C. fit it into the category of an oligarchy as: its size and complexity are unsuitable to democratic control; its product, the Olympic Games, has developed a "psychosocial dependency" in athletes and the public; and, due to its size, complex interrelationships, and transnational nature, it requires "expert leadership." Furthermore, these leaders had to have ". . . strength of conviction, pride, force of ideas, moral correctness, and extreme dedication" as well as the appropriate knowledge,

cultural accessories, and wealth in order to be "gratified" by positions in the I.O.C. (1981, 213-215).[49]

Olympic historian Xenophon Messiniesi lends further support to the class identity of the I.O.C. by stating that: "The International Olympic Committee was formed with select, trusted, expert and *aristocratic* members who were to be, as they still are, not representatives of their countries, but representatives of the I.O.C. to their countries" (1973, 64; emphasis added). This class-based, oligarchical nature of the I.O.C. is one of the most problematic features of this organization and a focal point for change, in terms of a more democratic formation, being urged by the developing and socialist countries (see Castro, 1985) Yet Coubertin was always ready to defend the I.O.C. on this point for he felt that it was the only way it could remain apolitical and independent, and thereby able to develop Olympism in its true form:

> . . . the best means of safeguarding liberty and serving democracy is not always to abandon everything to election, but on the contrary to maintain within the broad electoral ocean some islets whereon there may be assured, in certain specialties, the continuity of a stable and independent effort. Independence and stability . . . [are] too frequently the qualities which are lacking in present day groupings, particularly sporting groupings. (Coubertin; cited in Leiper 1976, 94).

As disagreeable as one may find this aspect of the I.O.C., it does appear to be a key factor in the continued celebration of the Games. Nafziger (1978), Kanin (1978), Hoberman (1986), and Epsy (1979) have all analyzed the I.O.C. in terms of its international political position, and have found that its strength lies in its "pattern maintenance" abilities against external pressures and threats, and in its international organizational and ideological activities which are stronger and more entrenched than those any political state could provide. The following citation from Morton (1963, 92) summarizes this fact:

> If anywhere in the world a true international body is operating it is this small group of men beholden to no one, whose sovereignity is upheld neither by wealth nor by armies but by a powerful ideal that has so far withstood all reorganization by nationalistic interests. Its efficacy is the envy of other world organizations that have found themselves denied freedom of action for the international good by the selfishness of individual countries.

We would argue that some changes have occurred, partly due to pressures from particular

[49]See Hoberman (1986, 57-64) for his reasoning of how the socialist states are able to maintain their ideology and still belong to this organization.

nations; pressures which have continued to grow.

At present, the most significant aspect of the I.O.C.'s pattern maintainence strengths are a set of symbols and ceremonies. The symbols of this organization, the Olympic flag, the Olympic rings, and the motto ('*Citius, altius, fortius*') not only have a strong representational value, but they are also ". . . exclusive property of the I.O.C. and may not be used without its approval" (I.O.C. 1972, 17). This provides the I.O.C. with a source of immense economic sustenance. Therefore, these copyrighted properties have been zealously guarded by the I.O.C. and Games organizing committees because they are important sources of revenues.

Guttman, (1984, 213), in discussing Avery Brundage, gives an example of this protection in the following; ". . . the appropriation of the Olympic rings or the motto 'altius, citius, fortius' [*sic*] for any purpose other than the Olympic movement was -- in the strictest sense -- blasphemy. His zeal in this matter was extraordinary if not wacky."[50] As was evidenced in court proceedings in the United States and in recent government intervention in Canada, the use of the word "Olympic," which has been in existence since 1610 (ibid.), is seen as being in the public domain and as such has certain precedents of use. Both Brundage, collecting bread wrappers (Guttman 1984), and the Calgary organizing committee, acting as "Olympic name police" (*Edmonton Journal*, 20 November 1987, A1), have taken the protection of the I.O.C.'s commercial property to extremes, which pointed to the potential that these properties have beyond their ideological values. Following the 1960 Games in Rome, the revenues generated from the sale of television rights and other copyrighted symbols and slogans has provided an increasing source of funding for the I.O.C. and its sub-groups. It has been this economic strength, as well as politically astute co-optation and concession, which has helped the I.O.C. fend off strong challenges to its international sport stature from the International Sport Federations (ISFs) and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) (see Epsy 1979, 161-162).

The ceremonies of the I.O.C. are also used to tie the modern games back to the ancient Greek games and to celebrate Olympism. The athlete's oath and the awards ceremony

[50]See Chapter XIII "Olympic Commerce" in Guttmann (1984) for a more expansive discussion of this topic.

are modern renditions of the ancient oath to Zeus taken by Greek athletes and of the olive crowns awarded to the victors, respectively. The Olympic flame and the opening and closing ceremonies are modern additions to the games which also add to the sacred symbolism of the event and to the tenets of Olympism. MacAloon (1984, 286-7) noted that the "Olympic rituals are organized around the classic schema of rites of passage . . ." and the devices used to connect the modern and ancient Games ". . . are rites of separation from 'ordinary life' initiating the period of public liminality." Coubertin stressed the importance of these ceremonies, "it is here above all else that the Olympiad must set itself aside from a series of world championships. It comprises a solemnity and a ceremonial which must not fall below the prestige to which its nobility entitles it" (I.O.C. 1972, 34).[51]

The ritualized opening ceremony with the parade of national teams, the reception of all competitors by the Sovereign or Chief of State and the I.O.C. President, the opening speeches, the playing of the Olympic hymn while the Olympic flag is raised, a trumpet fanfare, a three-gun salute and the release of a thousand pigeons powerfully reinforce the Baron's statement. But the opening rituals do not end here, for the Olympic flame and oath must also be delivered before any athletic events can take place. "In each of these ways, the symbols of the Olympic community are positioned hierarchically above those of the nation-states, but without contravening them" (I.O.C. 1972, 286).

It is, however, the closing ceremonies which have the greatest symbolism in support of the international aspect of Olympism. The rituals involved in this ceremony are similar; the flags, trumpet fanfare, hymns, anthems, and proclamations also appear here. But it is the intermingling of athletes from all participating countries during the the closing ceremonies which is central to the Coubertinian concept of internationalism. Finally, "the Closing Ceremonies are rites or reaggregation with ordinary life. Here the role of the national symbols is altogether reduced" (ibid., 287). It is evident that the symbols and ritualized ceremonies of

[51] Young (1984) has pointed out how Coubertin and his followers have consistently defended Coubertin as "the founder" of the modern Olympic movement and that previous nineteenth-century Greek Games and other worldwide games were of less importance, or were not to be recognized. Also see Kidd (1984) for a critique of this connection.

the Olympic Games have also been structured to perpetuate the hegemony of Olympism.

A further dominant aspect of the I.O.C. is discernable from Messiniesi's quote; an aspect also built into the I.O.C. by Coubertin and his followers. Members of the I.O.C. are not representatives *of* their countries, but are representatives of the I.O.C. *to* their country. This "reverse representation" was emphasized in the hope that I.O.C. members would not be subject to political and non-Olympic ideational pressures, another principle of the Olympic movement that was under constant pressure and is generally a not de facto situation. However, this is not the important point (even though it is often contentious) of this structural variable. It was important that the I.O.C. be recognized as a power unto itself and answerable to no higher authority. At the particular historical moment when this organization was formed there were virtually no international sport organizations. This situation gave the I.O.C. tremendous power and scope to define the ways in which international sport would operate and also to define the hegemony of those operations. The historical aperture entered by the I.O.C. gave it powers beyond those of any local, national, or international sport body, a position it defended and guarded zealously (and ideologically, if not completely in fact).

b. The Expansion of Sport Organizations Under the I.O.C.

In the late nineteenth-century there were few national and international sport governing bodies and few international sport competitions were held on a regular basis. Leiper (1976, 67-70) noted that international sport activities in pedestrianism, tennis, football, rowing, cycling, yachting, and track events had occurred within Europe and North America and between countries of each continent since the middle of that century. She further described a variety of "psuedo-Olympics" which had been held in England, Canada, Greece, and Germany, with some, albeit truncated, success (see Redmond, 1988; Glassford and Redmond, 1979; Mandell, 1976; MacAloon, 1981; and Lucas, 1962). Of these Young (1984, 28-34) describes the Olympics held in Athens in 1859, 1870, 1875, and 1889 as having had variable successes and which ". . . are now virtually forgotten, even in Greece. That, too, is by Coubertin's careful design" (ibid., 28) (cf. Hoberman 1986, 88). It was not until the 1896

Olympic Games in Athens that a major multi-sport and multi-national event was held.

At the time of the first modern Olympic Games there were three international sport federations in existence -- gymnastics (1881), ice skating (1892), and rowing (1892)[52] -- to regulate sport competitions between countries. There were a larger number of national sport governing bodies operating within a series of countries with the responsibility to regulate competitions between regions of those states. It is not surprising that at the first Olympic Games, only the athletes of France (1894), Greece (1894), Australia (1895), Hungary (1895), and the United States (1895)[53] were represented by a National Olympic Committee (Killanin and Rodda 1976, 265-6). Such organizations are the I.O.C.'s representatives within a recognized state and were in their infancy prior to 1896.

The emergence of the modern Olympics was preceeded by by an array of changes. The nineteenth-century was also a period of growth of both nationalism and colonialism. Empires were developed and solidified by the European nations and militaristic chauvinism was at its peak. Europe was also in constant turmoil as nations emerged and disappeared producing a constantly changing configuration of political maps. The benefits of physical fitness developed through regimented activity also became recognized as an integral feature of nationalistic success as standing armies were replaced by population-based armies. In essence, the need for efficient human materiel in times of modern war was acknowledged. In Germany and Sweden national systems of gymnastics were developed to aid in the military preparation of their populations. Britain, in contrast, evolved a large number of team games, such as cricket and rugby, which were seen to develop fitness, moral courage, leadership, and *espirit de corps*, all qualities necessary among its leaders to expand and to regulate the Empire.

The spread of these gymnastics systems and sports through the colonial network enlarged the number of states participating in these physical activities. This led, in the case of sports, to a desire for an expansion of intra-state and inter-state competition, which returns

[52]The I.O.C. (1972, 18) stated the the shooting federation was in existence but gave no date of its origin. Krotee (1988, 138) cites 1907 as the date of origin for the International Shooting Union.

[53]Chile (1896) also had a NOC at this time but did not have athletic representation in Athens.

us to the somewhat bereft situation mentioned above. Even within a single nation-state there were often several manners and codes in which similar sports were played. Britain, the United States, and Switzerland were leaders in developing national sport-governing bodies in order to standardize and control the technical aspects of intra-state competition. Beyond this level there were few international governing bodies for sport, particularly by 1896. Coubertin's timing led the I.O.C. to fill a void in international sport. As there were no real, powerful sport governing bodies at this time, the young Olympic movement was able to fill that void and to establish a considerable power base from which to define and control international sport competitions.

The idealistic philosophy of Olympism and the growing success and importance of the Olympics garnered prestige for the I.O.C. and allowed it to expand its power base over larger areas of sport. As this prestige grew, the organization grew. As the organization grew, it became necessary to delegate some of its responsibility (while retaining control over a substantial segment of international sport), therefore a bureaucratization of the organization occurred. The I.O.C. continued to expand the participatory base of the Olympics by encouraging groups within nations to form NOCs.

Coubertin feared that these national committees would become too closely tied to the political and economic ideologies of the nations in which they were to be established.

> The National Olympic Committees are not to be merely emanations [*sic*] of the main sport federations or associations of the country and, in general, they must take care to remain aloof from internal quarrels that prevail more or less in all places. They must therefore be composed of competent personalities, beyond all reproach and unconnected with any factions (I.O.C. 1972, 23).

We are able to see here the type of person envisioned by Coubertin to carry out the defined roles for the NOCs. These roles paralleled those of the I.O.C. in that the persons would "provide for the official representation of the athletes of their country or territory in the Olympic Games," are "responsible for organizing and supervising the participation of its team," and "see to the protection and development of the Olympic Movement and amateur sport" (I.O.C. 1972, 23). Although an I.O.C. rule requiring the formation of national committees did not appear until 1920, twenty-six nations had already formed such bodies

(Keiper 1976, 110) by that date. The number of national committees continued to grow, reaching 167 in 1988, as more emerging states viewed I.O.C. recognition as a "collective legitimization" and sport as a vehicle for "domestic integration and foreign policy expression" (Kanin 1978, 527-530). The formation of NOCs was one way in which the I.O.C. could expand its sphere of influence and retain control (see Epsy, 1979). [54]

As the Olympic programme expanded, the I.O.C. realized the need for increased unity, clarity, and assistance in the production of the Games. The I.O.C. did not perceive the technical aspects of production to be an area where they had expertise nor an area where they felt a challenge to their hegemony. Since several countries had already established national sport governing bodies for specific sports, the I.O.C. encouraged these groups to federate into international bodies. The role of these federations was delineated by the 1921 Olympic Congress in Lausanne:

> the technical responsibility for the Games has been the apanage of the International Sports Federations. It is up to them therefore, after laying down the rules inherent in each of the different sports, to supervise the Olympic competitions, to form juries, to train and then select referees, judges and timekeepers, and to ensure the smooth running and fairness of the contests (I.O.C. 1972, 20).

The stature of the ISFs gives them considerable authority in worldwide amateur sport. In fact, we would argue that their power has come to rival that of the I.O.C. as the annual championships in many sports have become very prestigious and economically attractive events. The International Football Association's (F.I.F.A.) World Cup and the International Amateur Athletic Federation's (I.A.A.F.) annual World Championships exemplify these developments. In the 1960s the International Sport Federations and the NOCs each formed a global body with which to challenge the I.O.C. The challenge was met and abated by the I.O.C. (see Guttman 1984, Ch. 10; Espy 1979, 115-8, Ch. 5).

Even though the regional, national, and international championships of the sport federations are very prestigious, it is still the "psychosocial dependence" (Krotee 1981, 213-5) and economic possibilities of the Olympic Games which attracts the athletic elite. The I.O.C.

[54]Luschen (1979) found that most national Olympic committees held to their role as I.O.C. representatives and ideologues; however, he also found some indication that State influence and interference was significant in the functions of these committees.

still retains the power to identify who can compete in an Olympic Games, which sports will be part of the program, and how the considerable financial resources will be shared, thereby retaining considerable control. In order to be a part of the Olympic programme, a status desired by more and more sport federations, they must conform to the wishes of the I.O.C. As Henri de Baillet-Latour, a former I.O.C. president, stated:

> The IOC has never imposed its will, it has always used *persuasion*; it has spontaneously refrained from interfering in technical matters, limiting itself to guiding towards the same high goal of morality the athletes of all sports, and obtaining for them, outside the world of sport, the backing of society" (I.O.C. 1972, 19; emphasis added).

It is clear from these facts that the hegemony of the I.O.C. can control the sport federations by using incorporative and co-optive devices to ensure that the Olympic Games proceed within the limits of the "effective dominant culture." As Espy (1979, 170) noted ". . . organizations are set up with specific purposes and goals, the achievement of these goals is paramount. In order to achieve the stated goals the organization must be maintained."

c. Expansion of the I.O.C., Financing, and Conflict

As the Olympic movement grew, the formal organizational structure was enlarged in order to handle the increased administrative duties and to retain control over international sport relationships. The original I.O.C. membership consisted of the fifteen[55] members chosen by Coubertin and the headquarters were located in Coubertin's Paris and Lausanne (from 1915 onwards) homes. The Baron served as President (except for 1895-96) and Secretary-Treasurer until 1925 when an Executive Board was formed (Leiper 1976, 102-103) and five members were appointed to assist Coubertin with the administrative duties. This Board later grew to the present nine member configuration.[56] In 1922 the I.O.C. obtained offices in la Campagne Mon-Repos in Lausanne which served as the headquarters until 1968 when the larger Chateau de Vidy was secured.

[55]This number has been debated by various historians, see Leiper (1976, 75) and Lucas (1962, 107-108).

[56]The Executive Board consists of a president, elected for eight years, and three vice-presidents and five members elected for four years each.

When the I.O.C. moved into Mon-Repos, a bureaucracy began to form. With the increased size of the Olympic movement, it was possible to see the social process of "bureaucratization" taking place. Bendix (1968, 208) has noted that this "pattern of social change" could be ". . . traced to the royal households of medieval Europe, to the eventual employment of university-trained jurists as administrators, to the civilian transformation of military controllers on the Continent, and to the civil service reforms in England and the United States in the nineteenth century." This process occurred in the Olympic movement at a point in time, the late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the increased size of armies, state administrations, businesses, and industries demanded a more efficient organization. Weber (1978) focussed his studies on the process of bureaucratization. In particular, he described a form of legal-rational bureaucracy. This form of organization

> . . . establishes a relationship between legally instated authorities and their subordinate officials which is characterized by defined rights and duties, prescribed in written regulations; authority relations between positions, which are ordered systematically; appointment and promotion based on contractual agreements and regulated accordingly; technical training and experience as a formal condition of employment; fixed monetary salaries; a strict separation of office and incumbent in the sense that the official does not own the "means of administration" and cannot appropriate the position; and administrative work as a full-time occupation (Bendix 1968, 206).

A clear understanding of this process in terms of the Olympic movement is beyond the limits of this work.[57] But it is clear that the process was occurring in the Olympic movement as it moved to a legal-rational form of bureaucracy.

As the size and complexity of sport, the Games, and the I.O.C.'s own need for control expanded, so did the need for a more rational form of organization. As the Olympic movement grew, particularly in the 1950-1980 period, the process of bureaucratic rationality had to grow. In order for the Olympic movement to operate and to reach its current organizational form, that of a large multi-national corporation, it had to employ this process early and continue to apply bureaucratic principles. The Olympic movement was no different than other social groups in finding bureaucratization a necessary development, for it was a social phenomenon of the times. Moreover, this process, in the I.O.C., led to a contradiction.

[57]See the recommendations section of the fifth chapter.

It was noted above how membership to this organization and to its governing board occurs, and how this process is actually restrictive, thereby retarding the rate of change. This group has been under the control of what Weber (1978, 241-54) identified as "charismatic authority." The oath that new members to the I.O.C. must take provides support for this claim. As Weber (ibid., 242) described it,

> it is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma. This recognition is freely given and guaranteed by what is held to be a proof, originally always a miracle, and consists in devotion to the corresponding revelation, hero worship, or absolute trust in the leader. But where charisma is genuine, it is not this which is the basis to legitimacy. This basis lies rather in the conception that *it is the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to recognize its genuineness and to act accordingly* (emphasis added).

Both in Coubertin's personal background and in the subsequent hegemony of Olympism, this form of authority was present. The contradiction between this form of authority and the legal-rational type described above, resulted in problems for the authority structure of the I.O.C. and in its actual operation.

Marx (1977a, 398) wrote that "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personnages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He [Hegel] forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce." During Coubertin's time, the Olympic movement was a small, hegemonically-led organization upon which bureaucratization became necessary. His moral leadership could function within the I.O.C. of his time. During Brundage's time this social process developed rapidly as the expansion of sport, the Games, and the Olympic organization grew to huge proportions. It was Brundage's unwillingness to adapt his leadership to the commercial and organizational dictates of the time which made him a "farcical" character. The larger developments were beyond his and the charismatic nature of the I.O.C.'s authority structure to abate. The authority structure continues to resist change and only time will show that that structure, too, must change.

Bureaucratization of the I.O.C. found its first manifestation in the formation of an administrative staff, identified as the General Secretariat. This staff is under the leadership of a Director and carries out the routinized duties that one would expect from any large, complex, transnational organization. The staff consists of: a technical director, a public

relations person, translators, writers, librarians, and secretaries. The magnitude of this organization is considerable as the international sport federations, national Olympic committees, and local Games organizing committees have also evolved bureaucracies at different times. Although no figures are available, we suggest that this organization parallels other multi-national corporations in terms of size and centralized control functions (see Espy, 1979, 117-8).

Coupled with the bureaucratization of the structure, the I.O.C. also formed numerous internal Commissions as part of its incorporation and concession tactics, due to strong oppositional forces developing in the 1960s. The purpose of these Commissions was to use non-I.O.C. expertise in preparing studies or making recommendations to the Executive Board on the various problems and concerns that faced this organization. The president has the perogative to form and to set the guidelines for these Commissions. Currently there are eighteen such Commissions in existence: Commission for the International Olympic Academy; Eligibility Commission; Athletes Commission; Cultural Commission; Finance Commission; Juridical Commission; Medical Commission; Commission for the Olympic Movement; Joint Mass Media Commission; Press Commission; Radio Commission; Television Commission; Commission for the Programme; Commission for the Revision of the Charter; Olympic Solidarity Commission (Tripartite); Working Group "Masses Sport"; and Council of the Olympic Order (Krotee 1988, 140-4).

We have commented on the difficulty of identifying historical stages. This will be the case in determining the historical points at which the Olympic movement went through dialectical changes. Up to the mid-1920s the organization was at a stage where it had some permanence and stability. The organizational structure finally gained some formalization during that decade. Up to the end of Coubertin's presidency, much of the organizational work had been carried out in his home and much of the "formalization" (Daft 1983) had derived from his thoughts. When the I.O.C. established offices in Mon-Repos (1922), hierarchical staff relations began to emerge. Also, more formal relations were established with the sub-unit structures of NOCs and ISFs.

The procedures for the operation of the I.O.C., the Games, and the related groups were increasingly defined and formalized in written documents. Discussions of the operation of this organization were carried out at annual meetings, General Assemblies or "sessions" (except in Olympic years when two meetings are held), of all I.O.C. members. The meetings followed a standardized format in terms of ceremony and agenda, and decisions were voted upon in a prescribed manner. The Executive Board, which meets two or three times per year outside of the sessions, is in overall control of the organziation (I.O.C. 1972), however it is the secretariat which ensures the day-to-day operations. The size of the Executive Board has remained fairly stable since its inception. The I.O.C. membership has risen consistently over the modern Games period. From the original fifteen in 1894, the number has increased steadily to 88 in 1984 (92 in 1988 based on Krotee's [1988, 135] list). Likewise, the sub-units, the NOCs and ISFs, have grown quite large.

From the six NOCs in existence at the time of the first Games in Athens, the number of these organizations has increased to the current 167 members.[58] Of the sports competed in at the first Games only three were formalized. At present twenty-nine sports are in the overall Olympic program (I.O.C. 1987, 23-4) and many more are trying to enter. Although information is not available, we can assume that the internal size and complexity of the individual NOCs and ISFs has grown larger, parallel to their increased organizational needs. As these organizations grew so did their need for financing.

The problem of financing was also evident in the I.O.C.. Although it sees itself as a non-profit organization (I.O.C. 1972; Krotee 1988) it has obvious need for revenues to carry out its organizational duties. Berlioux (1976, 22) noted that after World War II the subscriptions paid by the I.O.C. membership were not sufficient to cover costs. The I.O.C. asked for revenues from the Games organizing committees for the 1948, 1952, and 1956 Games, and received its first television revenues from the 1960 Games committee. The 1964 Tokyo Games ". . . for the first time in the history of the modern Games, produced a

[58]Based on a newspaper article of NOCs accepting (161) or not accepting (6) invitations to the 1988 Seoul Games (*Edmonton Journal*, 18 January 1988, D6). Krotee (1988, 138-40) listed 160 based on 1985 figures from the United States Olympic Committee.

substantial amount of money" (Espy 1979, 117). The NOCs and ISFs were also feeling the need for more revenues by the early 1960s. The I.O.C. had met with the NOCs and ISFs at both the annual General Assemblies and at the congresses (1905, 1914, 1921, 1930) in order to discuss the relations amongst these groups and the rules and regulations of the Games. We have noted that the I.O.C. passed the questions of technical matters pertaining to the Games events themselves onto the ISFs in 1921. The I.O.C. rule (number 24) regarding the relationships and duties of the NOCs did not become official until 1954. However at the 1930 congress ". . . Coubertin's fears of a clamouring for power from beneath began to manifest themselves. . . . [due to] the personal and national rivalries of the IF and NOC delegates, the IOC feared that by allowing a succession of Olympic Congresses, there would be disorder, paralysis and finally ruin" (Berlioux 1976, 15). Looking at the history of the I.O.C. there is a noticeable forty-three year gap in the congresses held.

The gap, between 1930 and 1973, however, is easy to explain. We must simply look at the style of leadership, although Coubertin was no longer in direct control in 1930, and the feelings of Coubertin and Brundage. Berlioux (ibid.) argued that "Coubertin abhorred parliamentary government. He would have found an Olympic Congress held at regular intervals unbearable." Guttman (1984, 180) also noted that "there had not been a congress since the one in Berlin in 1930, but Brundage's position was that such affairs are a *waste of time and money*" (emphasis added). Both of these former I.O.C. presidents had dictatorial styles of leadership. Hoberman (1986, 51) made some interesting connections in this matter; "Like his model Coubertin, he [Brundage] exchanged morality for an Edwardian ethos of sport, sacrificing ethics for the rigidity and psuedo-nobility of a code." Hoberman (ibid.) identified Brundage as the ". . . second, and perhaps, the last giant of the Olympic movement." It is interesting how the idealism of each man allowed them to turn a blind eye to the realities of the world. This is another example of what Hoberman called "amoral universalism," the way that political realities could be ignored or defined out of Olympism. As both men, but more so Brundage in recent times, held the power and the control of the agenda, they could keep the congresses from being held.

It is important to remember that the purpose of these congresses was to provide ". . . a forum where the three agents of the Olympic Movement: the International Olympic Committee, the National Olympic Committees and the International Sport Federations, can discuss, directly exchange opinions, and make their remarks and their criticisms" (I.O.C. 1972, 53). Even though Brundage led in a dictatorial manner, the subordinate groups have put considerable pressure on the I.O.C. to change (see Hoberman 1986, 59-60). As their needs, both financially and in the desire to discuss changes within sport, were being ignored, the NOCs and ISFs sought other means with which to bring issues forward. As far back as 1920 the international sport federations had demanded a greater say in the Olympic movement (Guttman 1984, 179). It was not until 1967, after some agreement on revenue sharing had occurred,[59] that the sport federations banded together to form the General Assembly of the International Federations (GAIF). Espy (1979, 113) noted that "ostensibly, the main problem was financial, but the issue ran much deeper. Sport and the Olympic Games had become profitable *business*" (emphasis added). Due to the increased commercial possibilities of sport and to its increased worldwide popularity, some sport federations could generate more money in their world championships, however, they had to forgo these events in Olympic years. There was a considerable difference in the revenues they received through their Olympic share and what they could raise from their own championship (Espy 1979). Again, this issue was not the key one, the federations wanted greater input into how sport was organized at the elite levels.

This, too, was the case among the NOCs. Brundage had succeeded in upsetting both member groups of the Olympic movement. Guttman (1984) has laid out the issues and detailed the intransigent behaviour of Brundage in dealing with these groups. Soviet I.O.C. member, Constantin Andrianov, had pressed for changes in the I.O.C. to better represent all member NOCs and ISFs. The pressures for change continued and through events of the early 1960s a Permanent General Assembly of National Committees (PGA) was formed. Brundage

[59] According to Espy (1979, 71) the revenue sharing issue arose after the 1956 Games. It was not until 1966 that a sharing scheme was worked out. In 1970 a change to Rule 21 of the I.O.C. *Rules and Regulations* was made to take into account the realization of larger revenues mainly due to the sale of television rights.

saw these groups as being in conflict of interest with those of the I.O.C. and used overt and covert methods to play their existence down. Brundage's struggle with these alliances eventually resulted in the formation of the Olympic Solidarity Program (1972), with a director, office space, funds, and a staff at the I.O.C. headquarters to help organize sport in the "developing areas," and the tripartite commission (1973), formed by members from the I.O.C., NOCs, and ISFs, through which problems of the I.O.C., the conduct of sport, financing, and independence from political and commercial interests could be resolved (Espy 1979, 144-5).

Finally, with the retirement of Brundage in 1972, an Olympic congress was held in Varna, Bulgaria in 1973. Berlioux (1976, 15) wrote that three topics were discussed: the redefinition of the Olympic movement; the relations between the three key committees of the I.O.C.; and how the Games would be patterned in the future. It was also at this congress that the rule on amateurism was brought more in line with the then current realities. Even Berlioux (ibid., 130) admitted that until Killanin's presidency, the manner of I.O.C. actions had ". . . often been based upon flimsy evidence or taken hastily, [which] have damaged the image of the IOC, giving it the reputation of being out of step with sports development in modern society." Espy (1979, 138-9) made the same observation:

> For some years the IOC's inflexibility had fostered dissension and division within the Olympic movement. The increased demands on the sport organizations from commercial interests, government interference, growing financial strains with the prospect of alleviation through television revenue, all put pressure on an organizational structure that had been conceived at a time when such problems did not exist or were minor at best.

d. Dialectical Change in the I.O.C.

The year 1972 seems to be a "nodal point" in the history of the Games. Changes to the organizational structure of the Olympic movement came quickly after the retirement of Brundage. His "quixotic" protection of Olympism at all costs had really disacknowledged the changes taking place. In this regard Brundage was a marginal figure, he was a bourgeoisie individualist struggling to maintain an aristocratically-based notion of *prouesse* embedded in

an idealistic philosophy which never really worked. His struggle to maintain the Olympic movement as an amateur organization was for naught. The economics of the movement negated the hegemonically-based superstructural aspect which was dominant in the early years of the movement.

The economic base had become the dominant aspect of the Olympic organization since the early 1970s. The seeds for this change have likely existed since the 1932 Los Angeles Games. The commercial possibilities of the Olympic Games became evident at that time, but it was not until the Rome (1960) and Tokyo (1964) Games that the possibility of a solid economic base of operation became a reality. Although the costs of the 1960 and 1964 Games were financially dependent upon State funding, the revenues shared up front between the I.O.C., NOCs, ISFs, and Games organizing committees had allowed the first three of these groups to realize large collective revenues. It was not until the commercial success of the 1984 Los Angeles Games that the full financial potential was realized. Again, Espy (1979, 71) has outlined these ideas very well:

> Several factors set this revenue sharing problem apart in importance: (1) it reflected the growing monetary benefits of the Games, (2) it reflected the growing participation in international sport, increasing the operating costs of the organizations, (3) the economic aspects of the Games and sport in general were beginning to become overriding factors of concern, producing something of a "profit and loss" outlook on the part of the organizations involved, (4) the economic impact and viewpoint reflected the profitability of the Games and sport for business interests, and (5) the economic aspect served further to divided the amateur sport organizations, leaving the Olympic movement even more susceptible to the forces of nationalism and political conflict.

It appears that within the Olympic organization a negation has resulted from the struggle between the hegemonically-based superstructure, as evidenced in the movement's leadership, and the economic base, as evidenced in its current corporate structure. As the Games grew in size (see Table . , nd as sport changed, a new mode of sport production demanded new relations of production. The structure changed from a small, dictatorial-cum oligarchical led structure to a large bureaucratic transnational corporation. Once this latter process occurs then the membership act to protect and maintain the economic viability and perpetuation of this organization. Whereas the athlete, in the idealistic Games of the period of relative unity (c. 1912-1932), was a key focus, the current athlete becomes

subsumed in the organization's attempt at "rationalized" operation. That is, the Olympic organization through its relation to the totality of world sport production has become more political in order to meet its goals.

Hoberman (1986), Strenk (1978), and Espy (1979), amongst others, have provided considerable empirical evidence of the obvious political milieu of the Olympic movement. The political nature of the Games has been an aspect of this organization's essence since its inception. The celebration of the Berlin Games (1936), the London Games (1948), the Melbourne Games (1956), and the Games since Munich (1972) have all been interfered with by overt political actions. The I.O.C. has moved to allieviate the boycott issue as a political device by altering the invitation process. To complete the analysis of the Olympic movement as an organization, it appears that the 1988 Seoul Games could represent the sublation "nodal point" in the historical development of this organization.

The residual elements of the hegemony contained in the spectacle and Olympism have remained in the negated organization. The Olympic corporation as an extremely viable economic concern, still contains a strong political essence. The resulting Olympic movement that could result, if one does, of this sublation might well resemble in various ways the multitudinous suggestions that have been made for its reformation. It will only be through the unfolding of future historically mediated processes that the sublation process will become evident.

E. Summary

The notion of *Citius, Altius, Fortius*, of elitism, and the rewards, both material and psychological, for athletic success have provided the conditions through which sport could change dialectically. The objective conditions necessary for high-performance sport demand not only a vocational approach to sport but also a well-funded infrastructure. The new mode of sport production resulting from scientific advancement in the knowledge of the physiological, kinesiological, biomedical, and other aspects of sport, in the development of equipment and milieu, in the production of spectacles, in the reporting (mediation) of the

Table 2
Data on the Summer Olympic Games[60]

Olympic Site	Date	No. of Nations	No. of Events	Total Athletes
Athens, Greece	1896	13	42	311
Paris, France	1900	22	60	1,077
St. Louis, U.S.A.	1904	12	67	625
London, England	1908	22	104	2,034
Stockholm, Sweden	1912	28	106	2,504
Antwerp, Belgium	1920	29	154	2,607
Paris, France	1924	44	137	3,092
Amsterdam, Holland	1928	46	120	3,014
Los Angeles, U.S.A.	1932	38	124	1,408
Berlin, Germany	1936	49	142	4,064
London, England	1948	59	138	4,099
Helsinki, Finland	1952	69	149	4,925
Melbourne, Australia	1956	67	145	3,342
Stockholm, Sweden	1956	29	3	158
Rome, Italy	1960	84	150	5,346
Tokyo, Japan	1964	94	162	5,586
Mexico City, Mexico	1968	112	172	5,531
Munich, F.R.G.	1972	123	196	8,144
Montreal, Canada	1976	88	199	6,189
Moscow, U.S.S.R.	1980	79	200	5,872
Los Angeles, U.S.A.	1984	140	223	7,078

spectacles, and in the sheer quantities of sports and events, have pushed the organizational structure of sport to develop and to acknowledge new relations of production. These structures and activities have also had to become vocationally-based in order to keep up with the quantitative and qualitative increases.

The rising importance and mediation of sport in the global marketplace led from the tacit, in Brundage's time, to the overt materialization, after his time, of the mode of production of sport. Athletes could received varying amounts of financial benefits in a variety of ways. As this materialization of sport in general, and the Olympic Games in particular, led to the emergence of economically-driven sport organizations, both public and private, vocational and volunteer, new structures became established, or in the case of the Olympic

[60]The information for this table was taken from Krotee 1988, 122.

movement, to the negation of the structure. The growing financial needs of sport organizations in the post-World War II period focussed attention on the economic base, in both sport performances and organizing activities of sport, thereby elevating it to a dominant position vis a vis the superstructure (organization structure). Therefore it appears that the organization of sport followed Marx's dictum of a change in the mode of production giving rise to new sets of relations, which become located and reified in particular organizational structures, such as bureaucracies.

As an organization the Olympic movement has undergone a series of historically mediated processes through which we can observe a dialectical change. The movement originated in the mind of Pierre de Coubertin and its early organizing activities were the results of his thoughts and activities. We have seen how his marginality and search for *prouesse* finally found substance in the Olympic movement. It was through his continued refinement, extension, and incorporation of ideas and rituals into Olympism that led to the formation of a hegemony. It was this hegemony which allowed the nascent organization to survive its "pangs of birth."

It has been pointed out how new members, as "trustees" or "disciples" to the I.O.C. must pledge to support Olympism and the ideas of Coubertin (see Killanin and Rodda 1976, 264 for this pledge; also Hoberman 1986, 60). The manner in which members are selected for the I.O.C. helped to ensure support of this hegemony. The size and closed nature of the early I.O.C. membership, the organizational control remaining firmly with Coubertin until the 1920s, and the early phase of development of sport allowed close control of the Games. From 1912, into the "Golden Age of Sport" in the 1920s, and on to the early 1930s the Olympic movement resembled very closely the hegemonic ideals of the founder; we could say that, overall, this was a period of relative unity.

Even during this "golden" time there were strong forces for change developing. As the Games grew in size, image, and cost, the economic potential of the movement was forcing the I.O.C. to incorporate certain changes to avoid serious, overt uses of force. The most important of these was in regards to the concept of amateurism. We have noted that the

amateur rule has been incoherent in definition, inconsistent in form and application, and zealously applied. As the Olympic movement became more "materialistic" and "commercial" starting in the 1960s, so too did the economic viability and possibilities of high-performance sport for the direct producers -- the athletes.

In order to maintain the apparent egalitarian nature of the democratically-based elite of sportspersons for high-performance sport events, a large amount of funding was needed. To make the Olympics ever more perfect and glorious in line with their heritage, ever more perfect and glorious sportspersons were needed. In order to produce athletes capable of achieving *Citius, Altius, Fortius*, the application of more scientific and technological input was required, and the material and competitive needs of the sport performers had to be developed, supported, and funded. The two parts are inextricably intertwined. Due to the long tenure of Avery Brundage as I.O.C. President (1952-1972), the issue of amateurism became a long, hard, and ridiculous struggle. This materialization of the Olympic movement, both in the organization's structure (i.e., its increasing staff and operating costs) and the organizing activities (i.e., the costs of producing athletes, sport performances, and the cultural performance spectacle of the Games themselves) continued unabated. The increasing quantity of all aspects of the Olympic movement from the 1920s into the early 1970s led to qualitative changes after Brundage's retirement in 1972.

The qualitative change became evident in a corporate management style with increases in bureaucratic structuring and regulation. The Olympic movement had a product (i.e., the Games spectacle) and a variety of symbols (e.g., the Olympic rings, mottos) to market. Once Brundage retired in 1972 there were many changes made in both the structure and activity of this organization. The economic aspects of the organization forced structural changes to the relationships within itself. Underlying all of the struggles and changes which occurred was a strong political essence. It is the very political nature of sport and the Games, exemplified in the boycotts and the Munich massacre, that will lead to a new synthesis of this organization.

The historical process leading toward the sublation of the Olympic movement continues. As is axiomatic with this methodology, certain aspects of Olympism will remain as

a set of guidelines and a philosophy for the organization as residual elements. The organizational structure now in place resembles a transnational corporation in terms of its bureaucratic structure: it has 167 national representative bureaux (NOCs); it has 29 technical bureaux (ISFs); and Games organizing bureaux (e.g., XV Olympic Winter Games Organizing Committee for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympic Games), under its organizational control. Yet it is also, according to the 1979 I.O.C. Charter, ". . . a nonprofit body, corporate by international law, and has juridical status and perpetual succession" (Krotee 1988, 119). The organizing activities to control this structure has demanded a more formal control structure, more expertise, more funds, and new rules and regulations.

On the macrosociological level the Olympic movement has conditioned sport whereby the objective mode of production has led to the negation of the avocational by the vocational, the base by the superstructure, and possibly the subjective by the objective in that the current forms of sport labour contain abstract (versus concrete) values. We will go on to look at a particular state, Canada, to determine how that state became involved with sport due to the dialectic of sport, what superstructural arrangements evolved and the nature of their impact on sport production, and how the production of sport can be seen within the political economy of a state.

Chapter IV

The Canadian State and Sport

> The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without. . . . Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order"; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.
>
> Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.*

A. Introduction

The Canadian federal government has been involved in funding *sport* since 1908. However, its direct intervention with sport really began with the *Fitness and Amateur Sport Act* (*FASA*) in 1961. This relationship grew through the 1960s and 1970s until at present "an extensive bureaucracy has evolved to support and direct sport. A large corps of public servants, executive and technical directors, and coaches not only operate at the national level in Ottawa, but have also become entrenched in most Canadian provinces"(Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks 1987, 4-5).

This direct intervention began following a 1968 election speech in which Pierre Trudeau said that ". . . he had 'come to the realization that the federal government must do more for sport'" (Canada 1969, 89) and promised to form a task force to assess the current situation in Canadian sport and to make recommendations for change. Up to that point in time the government had legislated the *FASA* through which a National Advisory Committee acted as an executive body in distributing grants to the various sport groups in Canada. However, it was the *Task Force Report on Sport for Canadians* (Canada 1969) that pointed to the problems of the pre-1969 voluntary national sport associations which formed the organizational structure of sport at that time.

One of the key concerns noted in the task force report was that "the national head office of the associaton may well be the president's rumpus room or the kitchen table" (ibid., 58) and that they lacked ". . . the support of a sufficient number of full-time administrators, planners, and researchers, [and] are no longer capable of coming to grips effectively with the problems arising from the size and scope of athletics in Canada" (ibid., 40). Even though Hallett (1981, 291) saw these groups as being of a sufficient size by 1961 to form the "primary mechanism within the total delivery system," the *Report* itself was politely scathing in its findings, others were not:

> The Task Force Report on Sport had criticized amateur sport organizations in 1969 for their "kitchen table" style of operation. National sport governing bodies were characterized by part-time volunteer officers and officials, national executives who were drawn typically from only one or two regions of the country, and a high degree of inefficiency and disorganization (Macintosh et al. 1987, 157).

Kidd (1988, 295) noted the change more succinctly, "the state has transformed the once autonomous voluntary, and largely regulatory sports-governing bodies into professionally administered non-profit corporations which conduct ambitious training and development programs under strict governmental direction."

There have been numerous studies completed which focus upon the relationship of the Canadian state and sport. Three of these can be pointed to as being the key ones for developing an understanding of why this relationship developed: Hallett's 1981 dissertation, "A History of Federal Government Involvement in the Development of Sport in Canada: 1943-1979"; Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks' 1987 book, *Sport and Politics in Canada: Federal Government Involvement Since 1961*; and a collection of essays edited by Hart Cantelon and Richard Gruneau in 1982, *Sport, Culture and the Modern State*. In the latter work a number of points for further study on this topic were raised.

In his article in this collection, Gruneau (1982, 2-3) noted that "very little of the recent work on sport and politics has attempted to situate sport in the context of any coherent theory of the state. . . . [and] that most social and political theorists have tended to be equally insensitive to the importance of sport as an aspect of the state's involvement in cultural production and social reproduction." Both Cantelon and Gruneau (1982, viii), in the

introduction of this collection, noted that in relation to writings on sport and politics ". . . one is hard pressed to find in this literature much concern about what the state actually is (although hidden assumptions abound), whose interests it serves, and how it articulates with people's cultural productions." To which they further add, "as a result, the consequences of sport's changing association with the state are rarely discussed in terms of their links to the production and reproduction of social and cultural relations as a whole." They added that sport is often seen as ". . . an independent object of study rather than a mediated cultural form located in an ensemble of social relations" (ibid., viii-ix). These challenges, plus those in other articles of the collection, provide a focus for the present chapter.

These challenges will be addressed in the following manner. First, an adumbrated theoretical framework of the capitalist state will be presented. Second, a discussion of the change in the mode of high-performance sport production and the manner through which the Canadian state responded, both economically and superstructurally, to this new mode is presented. Third, the discussion then proceeds with a presentation of certain particular mediate historical processes which led to the formalization of the relations of sport production. In particular, changes in the production of sport, as a part of the overall Canadian culture, are also compared with developments in other cultural areas. Finally, these changes are tied together to give coherence to the reciprocal interaction and change in the relations of production within an altered mode of production.

B. A Theoretical Framework

Capitalist society is a contradictory formation which operates in identifiably concrete ways. As Krader noted, we must understand the moments of civil society, political economy, and social consciousness as both separate and unified entities in a societal totality. For only by understanding these three moments, in their unity and their scission, can we come to see the dialectical nature of the capitalist state, the contradictory position and operation of the state, and its actual concrete operations.[61]

[61]See Appendix III for a further elaboration of the form and content of the capitalist state.

What features are important? As we know that Canada is a society based on a capitalist market economy, it follows that the Canadian state, as a superstructural element, must operate in certain ways for that society to exist. The formation and operation of Canadian society has developed in historically particular, and somewhat unique ways -- ways that have been generally identified and studied by scholars. The features we are particularly interested in pertain to certain historical developments (facts) which were in need of theoretical explanation to better our understanding of the reasons for the intervention in sport by the Canadian state.

Features of the Canadian civil society, the overarching category of a society, have to be understood in terms of certain historical developments. We know and can observe these historical developments, for example, the position and development of Canadian sport and the bureaucratization of Canadian sport. But what explains why or how these developments progressed in particular directions or why they occurred at all needs clarification. Secondly, we have seen a marked change in how sport is produced in Canada. But what do these facts tell us unless they are analyzed by some theory? Finally, the consciousness of sport and the value of sport to Canadian society has changed; facts reported in various media tell us this. Again what do these facts mean, why has this change occurred? We have many observable facts -- facts which many scholars have identified and discussed. But how can we make more sense of these facts?

Following the theoretical logic of retroduction, these facts can be tied to theory in order to further our understanding of them. We have Krader's dialectical theory of the state and three moments within that theory to help sort out these facts. We have historical writings which describe the general nature and premise upon which Canada rests. Therefore, this work will take particular facts, facts seen to have strong implications, and use the concrete theoretical factors described above to make sense of Canadian state intervention in sport.

The three functions of the state, the categories of state expenditure, the implication of the service sector, and the importance of hegemony are the concrete features of capitalist state

theory which will be applied in the following sections.[62] How and what these features can tell us about the moment of the political economy, of civil society, and of consciousness will be applied to the historical facts in order to better understand and analyze this intervention by the Canadian state. Based on the information presented in previous chapters, we will attempt to demonstrate the mutual interconnections and structured integration of the historically mediated facts through the theoretical framework. In particular, the changes that have occurred in the economic base of sport production in Canada will be analyzed. Then an understanding of the new relations of production which arose from the above changes and the resultant structural arrangements will be analyzed. This should, finally, allow us to identify how a particular hegemony (i.e., a totality of consciousness) was integral to these developments.

C. Sport Production in the Political Economy

1. Introduction

Before we can begin to analyze theoretically the position of sport in a state, we must more fully understand its materialist basis. Following the above theoretical framework we must first understand the precise mode of sport production before attempting to locate the concomitant relations of production in the objective superstructural embodiment of the state. The limitation of this part of the analysis is that it is overly economic. It is not denied that the analysis is therefore constrained, but it must necessarily be so at this time in order that the totality of political, ideological, and social issues will not distract our attention. Sport labour must be placed in this totality for its full comprehension.

In the second chapter we discussed the concrete labour/abstract labour aspect of sport. At that time the discussion did not go beyond these types of labour and their concomitant value forms. A brief discussion of the two related notions of surplus value and the appropriation of that surplus value is in order here. However before embarking on this task

[62]See Appendix III for and elaboration of these features.

we shall recapitulate our discussion of concrete and abstract labour. In the private, concrete moment of sport production (work), even if it takes place in a social context, has a concrete value for the sportsperson; the use-value produced in sport is within the unity of the production/consumption moment and the production/reproduction moment. When we reach the point of high-performance or elite sport, the pure, concrete form of labour and its value are passed. At this level we have reached a point of social labour production. Although elements of the private, concrete labour moment are still evident, they are in the form of a residual character.

If we employ Krader's separation of the social and political economy moments of production here, the analysis will be clearer. Once labour enters into social production (i.e., where a specialized division of labour is formed), then the value form becomes abstract. That is, it contains a concrete and an abstract value, or a social (rather than private) use-value plus an exchange value; this is the social moment of "value." Furthermore, out of this labour form we identify commodities, things or products which contained abstract value and the potential to be exchanged. For it is only through the exchange of these commodified values that they can be realized both as commodities and as exchange values. It is also in this exchange of commodified values that the subsumed use-values can lead to the creation of surplus value. For, if the quantity of use-values socially necessary for the production of a sport performance is less than the amount needed in that social production, and if the realized exchange value is greater than the use-values consumed in that production, then surplus value is possible. The issue then, for the present purpose, is whether surplus value is produced in non-professional elite sport, and if so, how is that surplus value realized? For, it is in the *political economy*, as part of the totality of production in modern civil society, that the group of non-producers appropriates this surplus value in order to valorize that extra value into larger amounts of capital through the circulation process.

Once again, the professional case is relatively straightforward, as Beamish has (1982, 1985) noted, in that it follows the "logic of capital." The question here is whether sport production in its high-performance "non-professional vocational" mode, in an advanced

capitalist society, must, in all cases, follow the logic of capitalism? When we talk of high-performance athletes, those receiving funds from the state, whom Kidd identifies as "underpaid state workers" (1982) and as "sweat-suited philanthropists" (1988), are we discussing a form of labour in the political economy of the Canadian capitalist civil society and state? The question is perplexing. Is the Canadian state acting as a capitalist in its financing and organizing of high-performance sport? We believe that by approaching these questions from the theory of the state we may approximate tentative answers to these questions.

The capitalist state acts in three ways to perpetuate and stabilize the civil society. These are through expenditures to ensure capital accumulation, which is the basis of the whole society and a major source of revenue for the state; to legitimize its own existence and that of the capitalist civil society; and to coerce the populace, both directly through the legal and repressive institutions, and indirectly or mediately, through ideological institutions. The ways through which the state expends its revenues roughly follow the above three areas. Further, it is important to note that state expenditures are not distinctly or exclusively tied any one of these expenditure categories, we must identify the "predominant material characteristic" in which the State expends funds for sport (Gough 1975; cf. Appendix III).

Expenditures in the "social investment category" are clearly evident in the intervention funding of the state. One of the recommendations of the *Task Force Report* concerned the need for more facilities for sport (Canada 1969, 82). This recommendation was tied to another for the implementation of the Canada Games concept, both of which have come to fruition. But perhaps not as envisioned, since facilities constructed for these and other Games have benefitted private capital accumulation and have been virtually exclusive of general public use (Kidd 1981, 246-7). [63] We can see state expenditures in this area as supporting private capital accumulation. In this case the state is producing some athletes of sufficient quality so that private capital will purchase their time in exchange for endorsement fees for distribution purposes (for example, to advertise their products). In both of these cases, it

[63] As one among many who have been rightfully critical on this topic.

does not appear that state expenditures in this area provide sufficient support to identify a "predominant material characteristic."

Likewise, looking at the "social consumption" expenditures it is difficult to locate Canadian state sport-funding predominantly within this category. As we wish to discuss the "welfare state" issue in the next section, we will point to its nature as being within this category. The arguments for the inclusion of sport in this category are wide. However, we would posit, at this point of the discussion, that this category has been one in which state expenditures, including those for sport, occur. We feel, however, that the third category of "social expenses" or "luxuries" is the area in which sport expenditures are primarily located.[64]

Gough (1975, 71) stated that this category of "social expenses" consisted of "projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony." He went on to say that expenditures in this category "neither directly nor indirectly" enter into "the value of labour power," but are necessitated by the contradictory nature of capitalism (ibid., 72). In the first instance, this supports the notion expressed by many that sport is used as a culturally productive element in the development of Canadian national unity. We do not want to agree or disagree with this connection at this point, so we will merely acknowledge this widely given rationale for the involvement of the Canadian state in sport.

Clearly there is an underlying notion of ideological purpose in this category, besides the clearly repressive ones noted by Gough. Do we simply put the whole sport system down to being an "ideological state apparatus" as Poulantzas (1980) described? Or do we say that a large, elaborate, expensive bureaucracy is there merely to develop Canadian patriotism?

At this point we will assert that Canadian state funding of sport serves to support the dominant capitalist hegemony of legal-rationalism, as Mandel (1975) noted, in both its technical and bureaucratic forms. The class interests of federal civil servants and particular politicians were served by the direct intervention in the area of sport, which manifested itself

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[64]This discussion is in opposition to statements made above. Following Gough (1975), there is a surplus value formed here, but it is not appropriated by an identifiable class in Canadian society; thereby it does not follow the fundamental principle of political economy, the realization and appropriation of surplus value by one class in a society.

in the formation of the Ministry of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport. We must observe these historical processes in order to complete this discussion, which follow in the next section dealing with the superstructural aspects.

2. Canadian State Funding of "Amateur" Athletes

With the demise of amateurism, the passing of Brundage, and Killanin's initiatives in changing the eligibility guidelines, athletes were permitted to receive funds from both public and private sources, as long as the latter funds were held in trust by their sport association. Through this the "non-professional vocational" athlete was recognized. This new form of sport-performance producer, the sublated "amateur" athlete, could receive material benefit for their efforts. Shortly after these changes were made, the federal government began to fund elite athletes. A number of studies have outlined the development of the federal government's direct financial "aid" to elite athletes (Beamish and Borowy 1987; Kidd 1988; Sack and Kidd 1985; Hallett 1981; Macintosh et al. 1987). Beamish and Borowy's study is perhaps the most extensive of these studies as they focussed on changes in the nature of program funding to athletes from the 1970 *Proposed Sport Policy for Canadians* to the 1986-87 *Athlete Assistance Program (AAP) Policy and Guidelines*. Although the federal government denies the existence of any contractual employment relationship, the work of Kidd (1988) and Beamish and Borowy (1987) show otherwise. Both of these studies demonstrate that the carding system contains the ". . . four main indicators of the presence of an employment relationship: (a) the employer's power of selection of the employee, (b) the payment of wages or other remuneration, (c) the employer's right to control the method of doing the work, and (d) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal" (Kidd 1988, 300) in its "National Sport Organization (NSO)/Athlete Agreement" form. Beamish and Borowy (1987, 26) added that "the latest card additions to the AAP make the funding structure appear to add the final touches to a hierarchical employment system for Canada's high performance athletes."

It appears that the "amateur" ideology lingers in the attitudes of the Canadian Olympic Association membership and in Sport Canada's bureaucratic corps. By claiming that the amounts paid through the AAP are *not* remuneration for work, Sport Canada and the NSOs avoid other contractual obligations, for example, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, pension, and holiday-pay provisions, plus legal rights such as "due process" and others contained in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Canadian Bill of Rights*, and certain provincial acts (e.g., the Ontario *Statutory Powers Procedure Act* and *Ombudsman Act*) (Kidd and Eberts 1982, Ch. 2). The amounts paid makes the issue of non-professional vocational sport production one of degree, not kind. Under the federal AAP[65] athletes can receive between $300 - $650 per month, plus ". . . a monthly supplement, granted on the basis of demonstrated need, [which] may be paid for extra-ordinary training costs, child care, special equipment, moving and travel expenses, and facility rentals. As well, the program pays for university and college tuition, books, and supplies" (Kidd 1988, 295-6). Overall, a high-performance athlete could receive up to $1,500 per month in total awards (ibid.), but, as Macintosh and Albinson (1985, 21) pointed out, the

> total reported mean income for current athletes averaged $979 per month; however the standard deviation of $829 indicated a wide range of total income. The median income was $750 per month; some very high salaries skewed the mean badly. The figure of $750 better reflects the typical total monthly income of current athletes.

Beamish and Borowy (1987, 29) also noted that ". . . an A carded athlete who received funds at the 1985-86 levels, received less than minimum wage for a forty hour week -- s/he will receive the equivalent of about $4.00 per hour for a 37.5 hour work week." The question raised by these figures is, are Canadian state amateur athletes earning enough to survive (produce and reproduce themselves)? If they do not earn enough, how is it that they can continue their athletic careers?

Macintosh and Albinson (1985, 79) reported that athletes receiving support under the AAP tended to underestimate their expenses, which "were low and indicated a very modest

[65]It must be noted that some athletes receive funding from more than one level of government.

lifestyle." They also noted that "the net income index indicated that about one-third of the current AAP athletes were unable to maintain financial equilibrium, . . . [which] suggests that a substantial number of AAP athletes are falling into debt; . . ." (ibid.). Kidd (1988, 297, 300) noted, in regard to the above study, that ". . . 59 per cent [of carded elite athletes] said their funding was 'adequate to help meet high performance needs,'" and that ". . . the program provided the sole income for 65 per cent of active performers. Only 35 per cent said they could continue current levels of training if funding were withdrawn." This still points to a discrepancy in the economic support Canadian state amateur athletes receive. Therefore, we must look at the socio-economic backgrounds of these athletes to find a putative reason for the continued operation of a sport system where athletes are so poorly paid for their production.

Gruneau (1975, 115-6) found that the socio-economic backgrounds of the athletes at the 1971 Canada Winter Games, based on their father's occupation, ". . . were over-represented in the professional and white collar occupational categories . . . and under-represented in those categories primarily reflecting blue collar and primary industry occupations" (also see Gruneau 1976). Macintosh and Albinson (1985, 77-8) also found that

> sixty-three percent of the primary wage-earner parents of interviewed athletes (56 of 59 responded) were either in professional or managerial positions. This far exceeds normal population expectations and is much higher that the findings of Gruneau (1976) about parents of Canada Winter Games athletes in 1971 (the percentage of parents in managerial/professional positions was 37% in Gruneau's study).

Of the interviewed athletes participating in the AAP during the 1985 study, sixty-nine per cent received "other income," of which "about one-third . . . reported that they received income from gifts, prizes, scholarships, trusts, etc." (ibid., 21). Of that sixty-nine per cent, "the majority . . . (61%) indicated that the main source [of that "other income"] was their parents" (ibid.). Macintosh and Albinson (ibid., 78) noted that the connection between the interviewed AAP athletes and their socio-economic backgrounds would likely not account for "all of the variance."

In the 1985 survey of carded athletes it was found that "the parents of AAP athletes, . . . carry a substantial part of the financial burden of Canada's high-performance sport

program" (ibid., 78). This identifies the major source of revenue for the direct, elite sport performers in Canada. While the class backgrounds of the athletes *does not* likely account for all of the variance; it does account for a substantial economic support for the sport structure in Canada (also see Sack and Kidd 1985, 51). We must remember that these figures are for Game-Plan sportpersons at the apex of the pyramid only. Those athletes in non-Game-Plan sports and in the lower levels of the pyramid must be under even further economic stress, or they must have substantial socio-economic backgrounds in order to participate in high-performance sport. It seems to be conclusive that the families of Canadian elite athletes are maintaining the operation of the Canadian sport system through the private resources provided to athletes to train and compete.

By observing Table 3 it is possible to see discrepancies in the way funds are allocated in the Canadian sport system. First, the amounts allocated for direct support of athletes has averaged 10.6 per cent of the total budget. As this allocation is small, class connection becomes very pertinent and important. Second, we can observe the above mentioned "means-ends inversion" as the bulk of the funding goes into the operations, programs, and staff costs. The bulk of the funding goes into the system itself, and little to those people who actually produce the sport performances.

Of course the sport bureaucrats see this differently. In an interview, former AAP program administrator John Brooks (Gorman 1986, 10) pointed out that "this is an assistance program. It was never intended to support the full costs of the athletes' lifestyle. I don't want to get into a situation where we are employing an athlete at $25,000 a year to perform for us." This argument is all the more questionable, as the salary scale for non-athletic labour ranges from $21,000 to $41,800 per annum for skilled workers (Sport Canada 1987).

Kidd's crusade for better funding (Sack and Kidd 1985) and contractual protection (Kidd and Eberts 1982) of elite athletes is well-founded. Part of the problem lies in the social relations of production in Canada, and in the confusion and unclear rationale as to why the Canadian state has intervened in sport. Now that the issue of amateur versus professional sport has been settled in favour of vocationalization, the question of the class background of

Table 3
Fitness and Amateur Sport Budgets and Expenditures[66]

Budget Year	Total Budget	Sport Canada	Fitness Canada	NSRC	AAP	AAP%
1971-72	-----	5,832,472	433,905	671,146	1,058,721	18
1972-73	-----	6,891,233	2,097,897	915,867	1,002,946	15
1973-74	11,809,842	8,679,929	3,129,913	1,032,997	1,613,825	19
1974-75	12,637,539	8,554,155	3,436,201	1,413,000	1,694,950	20
1975-76	17,325,109	12,832,938	3,848,434	1,650,000	2,367,000	18
1976-77	25,522,094	20,854,872	3,912,277	1,900,000	1,667,434	8
1977-78	24,164,470	19,650,478	4,776,402	2,169,000	2,530,810	13
1978-79	34,976,933	22,991,328	5,181,218	2,992,000	2,111,312	9
1979-80	30,872,572	21,668,601	3,908,303	2,832,000	2,472,507	11
1980-81	38,034,125	26,462,076	6,480,134	3,401,531	2,024,569	8
1981-82	49,805,309	31,124,975	6,202,000	3,839,301	2,310,144	7
1982-83	59,428,179	40,429,128	6,382,441	4,651,615	3,231,519	8
1983-84	58,522,527	43,363,448	7,144,813	5,397,640	3,661,770	8
1984-85	65,091,234	48,295,136	7,786,729	5,989,649	4,890,309	10
1985-86	58,102,493	50,534,428	7,568,065	6,518,129	4,984,119	10
1986-87	68,145,601	50,558,340	7,606,027	6,928,188	4,983,128	8.6

1. The Fitness Canada branch was previously "Recreation Canada" and "Recreation and Fitness Canada."
2. NSRC is the National Sport and Recreation Center, the Fitness and Amateur Sport bureaucracy.
3. AAP is the Athlete Assistance Program. The figures include both "Game Plan" and student grants-in-aid program funds.
4. The last column represents the percentage of AAP funds against the total Sport Canada allocation. This is the direct amount paid to athletes versus the total budget for sport.

athletes has become one of distributional or quantitative concerns over participation. The vocational nature of sport has become more objectified through the rationalization of the production methods and the bureaucratization of the organizational process. Vocationalization represents a significant qualitative change, for it redefines and reconstitutes the very meaning and social purpose of sport.

3. Summary: Vocational Sport - The New Reality

The expansion of modern, high-performance, international sport, particularly evident in and conditioned by the Olympic movement, was a quantifiable change which provided the conditions for sport to change to a qualitatively new entity. Whereas the hegemony of

[66]Canada 1971-87, passim.

Olympism and the amateur ethos had held sway into the early twentieth century, the pressures of several external factors broke the (relative) unity of the Olympic movement pointed to by Goodhart and Chataway (1968). As the I.O.C. had come to hold great power, the struggle against change was a long, hypocritical, and fruitless exercise.

Change was inevitable. As the demand for better performances and records increased, as the number of competitions increased, and as the reporting of competitions increased, so did the need for an economic infrastructure to produce athletes of a sufficiently high quality. More importantly, the athletes themselves needed more material resources to produce these performances. As states and capitalist organizations came to realize the potential value of success in international sport competition, the pressures for better performances and more of them increased. All of these pressures worked against the amateur ethos, that is, against the economic base or mode of sport production contained in that ideal.

Sport production at the international level was no longer an avocational endeavour. It became a vocational form of production. Concomitant to this change was a change in the form of labour and value embodied in sport. The concrete labour and value of avocational sport became abstract labour and value in vocational sport. That is, vocational sport contains a different form of use-value as well as exchange value. Likewise, the objective nature of international sport negates many, if not all, of the subjective factors of sport performance. Finally, the changes in the economic base of sport evoked changes in the superstructure to formalize and organize the new relations of production resultant from the qualitative change in sport. In recent times, this has meant the involvement of the state, the location where these new relations have become institutionalized.

As Hallett (1981, 269) has noted, over the 1943-1961 period, "the principle that amateur sport should control itself and be responsible for raising the funds it required in the private sector remained a firmly held one by persons in sport and was an underlying policy of all federal government administrations for the period." From 1961 to 1968 the federal government began indirectly to support sport through a grant system provision of the *FASA*.

> Between 1961 and 1968 the National Advisory Council and the federal-provincial agreements stood out as the two dominant structures of the federal government's

> Fitness and Amateur Sport program. Linking the two was a small body of civil service administrators known as the Fitness and Amateur Directorate. This internal structure was designed to serve the advisory council as well as to work in the federal-provincial network (West 1973, 1; cited in Broom and Baka 1979, 11).

A total of five million dollars per year was allocated to this program under the *FASA*, but it was not until after 1971 that that amount was reached or exceeded in actual expenditures (Broom and Baka 1979, 41). As Sport Canada has continued to have little success in attracting private revenues, it is not surprising that the voluntary, part-time sport associations of the pre-1969 period were no more successful, especially considering their organizational form as described in the *Task Force Report*. Clearly, privately controlled sport bodies were unable to generate sufficient revenues from private capital to allow their athletes to train and compete at the international high-performance level even though "many Canadian corporations are sufficiently wealthy to contribute to amateur sport in their own right, without a quid pro quo, but they refuse to do so" (Kidd 1981, 247; also see Hallett 1981, 763).

A two-fold dilemma exists here. First, the state has become involved in funding sport since private capital was not readily forthcoming with its support. Second, since 1979 the politicians responsible for Fitness and Amateur Sport have emphasized the need for increas private sector support for sport to the point where a Sport Marketing Council (1986) was established in the National Sport and Recreation Center. The success of the Sport Marketing Council has yet to be seen. But based on 1986 information, Thibault (1988, 3) noted that ". . . the budgets of high performance national sport organizations [NSOs] were comprised, on average, of approximately 72% of Sport Canada financial contributions."[67] Kidd pointed to the results of this increased corporate sector revenue. "Most of this new revenue goes to the NSO in the form of sponsorship fees; despite the liberalization of the rules, very few individual athletes have benefitted directly. Nevertheless, sponsorship has intensified the pressure on the athlete to win and to conform to behaviour codes" (Kidd 1988,

[67] In her paper, Thibault actually cites 1984 data. In conversation she provided updated (1986) information on the NSOs in the study she cited (Thibault, Slack, and Hinings 1988). The ratio of contributions in 1986 was close to that of 1984.

301).[68] Therefore, the attempts thus far to rationalize the organization and to enhance the development of the sport product into a commodity attractive to corporate sponsors appears to have had little effect and appears to be irrational.

As private capital would not invest heavily in sport before the upgrading and repackaging attempts by the sport bureaucrats, why should they do so now? There are a few Canadian sport organizations and even fewer athletes, generally from the more attractive, in terms of audience appeal, sports (e.g., ice hockey, curling, track and field, figure skating, swimming, downhill skiing), who can command high sponsorship, endorsement, or prize fees (see Kidd 1979, 52 and Macintosh et al. 1987, 184). This is the exception, not the rule. Only a few athletes have trust account funds equal to or better than what professional athletes might receive in salaries. Likewise, only a few NSOs have large revenue generating contracts.[69] The inequality between sport forms and between athletes in the same disciplines continues to widen. Rationality becomes irrationality in the current vision for Sport Canada; "reprivatization" is a confusion in thought.[70]

The involvement of the federal government in sport is an intervention in an area of social and cultural production where the "unproductive" nature of the labour form does not follow the capitalistic nature of its context. Once again we encounter the problem of whether "unproductive" labour is productive of surplus value, especially that of labour produced through revenues generated through taxes and allocations in state economic planning. In his analysis of productive and unproductive labour, Tarbuck (1983, 98,96) states that ". . . productive labour is labour that is exchanged with capital and produces surplus-value, a surplus-value moreover which in its material form is *capable* of being used as capital for the

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[68]This is one point at which scholars critical of the current rationalized production of high-performance sport made clear the negative effects of productivity (see Whitson 1984), as a form of rationalism. Also see Kidd (1979) and Rigauer (1981).

[69]It was also noted by Thibault (1988) that, of the 36 NSOs studied, only the following associations received over fifty per cent of their total budget funds from the private sector: figure skating, yachting, alpine skiing, and basketball.

[70] See the work of Ingham (1985), Hargreaves (1985, 224), and Whannel (1984, 20-1) for discussions of this neo-Conservative plan, in other states, to "roll-back the welfare state." For comments on the Canadian state see Macintosh et al. 1987, 182-5.

reproduction and extension of capital" (valorized); and that ". . . there cannot really be any doubt as to Marx's view that *services* are not productive, either of surplus-value or surplus-product" (cf. Gough 1972). Likewise, the producers of luxury goods are consuming part of the surplus product of the labourers in the other departments: "The whole of the means of production and necessary means of consumption used or consumed in connection with luxury good production is derived from the surplus-value-product of the other two departments of production" (ibid., 97). However, even though a close relationship exists between unproductive consumption and unproductive labour, the two categories should not be lumped together. Finally, Tarbuck (ibid., 96) wrote that Marx was concerned with ". . . the *social form*, which is historically determined, and the appropriation of surplus product" (ibid., 96) in that society, which can vary by class-state and by historical processes of change in those states; and that

> only by a social accounting can the true social surplus be properly assessed. Unproductive activities need to be placed within the framework of the overall social goals set by a particular society. Not all unproductive labour is parasitic; on the contrary some may even well be vital to the continued existence of a social formation. It is when we come to examine the historical, political and moral justification of a particular social formation that we need to pose the differences of rationale between social systems, but for capitalism the only rationality, the only morality, is profitability (ibid., 99).

As we have discussed above, state spending depends basically on revenues from taxation. State allocations to sport, whether seen as social consumption or social expense, are, in the first place, deductions from the social surplus. In the second place they do not lead to the production of a commodifiable product[71] with a tangible exchange value.

Therefore, we must agree with Tarbuck's analysis as it applies to sport production in the Canadian state. As Krader (1976, 198) observed, "a surplus may be produced in the primitive condition, but not surplus value. Use value and exchange value are produced in the relations of social economy; surplus value is produced in the relations of political economy." Further, as "the relations of social economy and of political economy form a whole, being distinct only in the relations of value" (ibid., 198) we can conclude that even though the

[71]Or at least a product with sufficient exchange value, i.e., as entertainment value if we attempt to extend its social value.

Canadian sport system exists in a capitalist socio-economic civil society, it is not necessarily so that surplus value is generated, realized, or appropriated. Even if the social production aspect of the socio-economic totality contains a surplus value, that surplus value can only be realized in the political economy. As the state sport production system does not directly enter the relations of the political economy, any surplus value, if it is generated, is not appropriated or realized by the state in this case and therefore attempts to rationally organize, reprivitize, and market sport[72] can only be seen as contradictory and as leading to irrational forms of praxis (i.e., they are based on faulty theory). None the less, there exists a considerably large organization for sport in the superstructure. We must now take the theoretical premises developed in the analysis completed to this point, and apply them toward the theoretical understanding of Canadian state intervention in sport which we are attempting to develop.

D. Canadian State Intervention In Sport

> The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between material transformations of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.
>
> Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*

[72] Kidd (1979, 52-3) argued that ". . . if the provision of opportunities for gifted and dedicated athletes to pursue high performance sport is a legitimate social goal, then a free society cannot afford to allocate them . . . according to corporate marketing schemes -- sport can stand on its own merits; . . . . "

1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to analyze the development and formal structuring of "new superior relations of production" for Canadian sport (i.e., a new superstructural arrangement), based upon the "transformation of the economic conditions of production." As Marx noted, "no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed and the material conditions for their existence have matured" in the existing social structure. In previous chapters we have described the changes in the productive forces of elite sport (both nationally and internationally) and in the relations of production at the elite, international level. After making a brief comment on the outline this chapter is to follow, further comments are made upon the transitory period in the structure of the relations of Canadian sport production, before the analysis of each of Meynaud's motives is completed. This analysis, as will be seen, focussed on Meynaud's third motive, which is given the greatest attention in this chapter.

The attempt to theorize the relationship between the Canadian state and sport could be approached from many angles. We propose to follow Harvey and Proulx's (1988) lead and use Meynaud's (1966) "classic work on the political sociology of sport." In that work Meynaud proposed a

> classification of the various motives that prompt the states to intervene in the area of sport. The first of these motives is the safeguarding of public order. Improving the physical fitness of the population is the second major motive identified by Meynaud. Physical activity has long been fostered with a view to military preparedness. It is also encouraged by modern states to further the equilibrium and well-being of the population and to increase productivity. The third motive is the assertion of national prestige, which is probably the main reason for the massive intervention of modern states in elite sport. The competition for Olympic medals is not motivated solely by a desire for international prestige; it also allows individuals to increase their sense of national belonging (Harvey and Proulx 1988, 93).

As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, the federal government started its direct involvement in *sport* in 1961 with the passage of Bill C-131. The general objective of the *FASA* was ". . . to encourage, promote and develop fitness and amateur sport in Canada" (Canada 1961, 3249). However, the first of the specific objectives was to "provide assistance for the promotion and development of Canadian participation in national and international sport" (ibid.).

The *FASA* was seen to be a ". . . flexible piece of legislation which could be adapted to changing circumstances in future years" (Hallett 1981, 295), yet the true intention appeared to be an increased involvement with sport. Hallett (ibid., 293) quoted comments by Douglas Fisher on the rationale for the *FASA*: ". . . the move (toward government involvement in fitness and sport) was glossed with the idealistic aim of creating a healthier citizenry. Perhaps it will, but in substance it was recognition that national prestige and status is tied directly to sporting skills in international competition." The key document relating to the intention of the dtate to organize sport was the 1969 *Task Force Report on Sport for Canadians*. The political dealings behind this report are interesting. In the Febuary previous to the Liberal election victory in July, 1986, Lou Lefaive had become Director of the Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate. Hallett (1981, 589) noted that, although Lefaive, a public service bureaucrat, ". . . did not have formal training in physical education and sport he soon became a strong advocate of excellence and high performance sport." It is evident, however, that Lefaive was politically astute and had "considerable technical experience and expertise" (Macintosh et al. 1987, 57). Shortly after the Liberal victory he was quick to move.

As Hallett wrote (ibid., 590),

> the relative close timing of the Munro-Lefaive appointments were fundamental in having the Task Force become a *prominant* reality. Both men respected each other and considered sport the most important aspect of the fitness and amateur sport program. Munro also agreed with Lefaive that the NAC[73] had become an executive body and that the Directorate should have the lead role.

Following the formation of this "partnership," the NAC soon lost its executive position which ". . . resulted in Lefaive having almost a free-hand in taking the program in a new direction" (ibid.; also see Macintosh et al. 1987, 70-1). Indeed he was quick to have the Task Force formed and its report completed. Again, Hallett provided important information for our understanding of the political nature of this period.

First, he noted ". . . the simple fact that most -- if not all the Task Force's recommendations can be found embodied in reports, proceedings, and minutes of the NAC and other organizations years before the Task Force was struck," to which he added, "what

[73]National Advisory Council.

can be concluded from the interview data was that there was a general consensus that the Task Force became the mechanism to move the fitness and amateur sport program forward by highlighting the pre-conceived ideas that were not coming to fruition (ibid., 606,607). Next he pointed out that

> Lefaive . . . believes the real thinking behind the recommendations was done by Fisher, Wise, Lang and himself. Fisher . . . concurs saying that he, Wise and Lang had a real influence on what was actually said because they framed the working of the recommendations in the *Report*. Rea . . . also credits Fisher and Lang with the final product stating ". . . they put it together. . . . They had a very clear concept of the various problems we had to deal with." (ibid., 604).[74]

As far as Hallett (ibid., 771) could ascertain it was Pierre Trudeau who was the key figure in the announcement of the task force on sport. However, by taking Hallett's observations into the picture it appears that a group of well situated individuals provided the impetus for the government's move into sport. Together with the apparent "hidden agenda" Hallett pointed to, there were considerable pressures for sport to be an emphasis in the Canadian state structure, and to be structured in the image of these few individuals.

This adumbrated discussion of the intervention of the Canadian state into sport will conclude by remarking that in the remaining period covered by this work (up to early 1988), the government issued two green (discussion) papers (Campagnolo 1979a, 1979b), and a series of white (policy) papers (Munro 1970; Campagnolo 1979c; Regan 1981). The policies proposed in the white papers established the sport delivery system as it exists today. The statements made in these papers clearly outlined the intention of the state to focus its energies and funds on international high-performance sport (Campagnolo 1979c, 7; Regan 1981, 2). Since Hallett (1981) and more-so Macintosh et al. (1987) have described and thoroughly discussed these policies there is no need to reproduce that discussion here. Rather, we shall refer to both the original documents and these secondary sources when the need becomes evident in the analysis to follow.

The analysis of the superstructural developments in Canadian sport will follow Meynaud's three motives as outlined by Harvey and Proulx, within the context of the

[74]In a separate note, Hallett (1981, 604, note 10) wrote that, "Fisher was a very influential personal advisor to John Munro . . . . He still is one of the most influential persons in Canadian sport today."

theoretical model being employed. It must be noted that there is a strong similarity between Meynaud's three motives and the three functions and expenditure categories of the capitalist state. Each of Meynaud's motives will be analyzed in order to determine that category's explanatory power in understanding the mediated historical processes which led to the formation of a bureaucratized Canadian sport system.

2. Motive #1 - "Safeguarding Public Order"

What we can glean from the untranslated (French) version of Meynaud's work, is that a key motive for state (or political) intervention is to "build" good citizens for a particular form of government. The initial response to this category is that it resembles the accumulation function outlined above. Indeed, the purpose of this capitalist state function is to protect and perpetuate the socio-economic foundation of that state. However, as Meynaud and Harvey and Proulx say little in this regard, we have followed their focus on the educational value of sport, so widely written about by Coubertin, that is used to mould and inculcate a political ideology and lifestyle. The Victorian ideals of fair play, acceptance of others, valour in victory or in defeat are seen as being methods by which this "ideal" law-abiding citizen could be developed.

Meynaud pointed out how this form of inculcation was used by fascist and totalitarian regimes. He felt that the educative use of sport for developing democratically-idealistic citizens does not hold, "au terme de ces observations dout le caractère impressionniste sante aux yeux, nous hésiterions beaucoup à formuler un jugement tranché sur les rapports entre la participation aux activitiés sportives et la consolidation des idéaux démocratiques" (1966, 230). As Harvey and Proulx spent very little space on this motive, and Meynaud does likewise, we can only offer the following as examples of the way in which the Canadian state has intervened in this manner.

The first example has to do with its legal interventions. Physical violence and other incidences in sport contests not only go against a society's ethical norms, they also go against many of the laws of the state. Ice hockey has been a particularly obvious case in which this

contradiction exists. On numerous occasions the state has issued warrants or arrested hockey players for flagrant physical violence in the form of fistfights and stickfights. Occasionally these cases go to court, more often the National Hockey League argues that they have rules (laws) and ways of enforcing those rules better that the legal system can (i.e., they are their own juridical system, complete with morally justified laws). As sport has been seen as a form of social control, the intervention of the state to "purify" sport through its legal apparatus is in stark contrast to what should exist. That the state must intervene witnesses the need to ensure public order, especially in an important a cultural area like Canadian ice hockey.

The second example is more abstract, but also limited in its explanatory strength. This generally has been in the ideological-educative area. Programs such as: PARTICIPaction, to a degree, plus policy statements, whose ostensible aim is "to increase the appreciation for the understanding of fitness, physical recreation and amateur sport" and "*Activity 1 -- Promotions and Communications* -- Strategies and activities to promote a better understanding and active interest in fitness, physical recreation and amateur sport" (Government of Canada, *Estimates*, 1976-1980; cited in Hallett 1981, 733); the SportAction Travelcade -- Sport Demonstration Projects; and programs jointly developed with national organizations such as the Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation (CAHPER), point to this idea. As education is in the provincial jurisdiction, educative programs are generally carried out at that level, or at the local club level. Overall, we must argue that this motive for Canadian state intervention in sport does not help us to better understand the relationship.

3. Motive #2 - "Improving Physical Fitness"

In citing Meynaud, Harvey and Proulx included the improvement of physical fitness, military preparedness, well-being, and increased productivity within this second motive. These factors are collapsed into the "welfare state" rubric which many claim to be *the* reason for state involvement in sport (Harvey 1987; Harvey and Proulx 1988). We agree with Gruneau's (1983, 132-2) claim ". . . that it is very easy to make too much of the rise of 'welfare-statism' as an explanation for the expanded involvement of the Canadian state in the

'structuring' of sports and physical recreation." It is clear that early efforts by the federal state were in the areas which could be classed as "welfare" programs; the very titles exude this claim: the *Unemployment and Agricultural Assistance Act* (1937) which was replaced by the *Youth Training Act* (1939); the *Vocational Training Coordination Act* (1942); the *Strathcona Trust* (1909)[75]; and finally "the first legislation specifically designed to foster physical fitness in Canada . . . the National Physical Fitness Act" (1943) (Hallett 1981, 54). The focus of these acts was to alleviate the ills of economic decline and to improve the health of the citizenry. The first three acts provided a physical fitness element in their provision to ease the potential social unrest as well as to train unemployed persons. The latter two dealt with the health benefits to be gained through physical activity and are directly related to military problems in the state. The provisions in these acts directly dealt with the betterment of the individual and were responses to capitalist market problems

> . . . in which organized power is deliberately used . . . in an effort to *modify* the play of market forces in at least three directions: 1) to guarantee individuals and families a minimum income, 2) to enable them to meet certain "social contingencies" . . . and 3) to ensure all citizens access to a certain agreed range of social services without regard to status or class (Asa Briggs 1961; cited in Herman 1971, 131; cf. Harvey 1987).

The difficulty encountered among the above acts and the definitions of welfare programs is that *sport* does not clearly fit into any of these categories. As was noted above the "major demand articulators" of the federal government organization and development of sport in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Lou Lefaive, Dan Pugliese, Doug Fisher, Geoff Gowan, Bryce Taylor, Sid Wise, Chris Lang, and Harold Rea) were predominantly interested in sport. Hallett (1981, 607), quoting an interview with Lefaive, emphasized that "the Task Force to me [Lefaive] was by far the most significant document in fitness and amateur sport history . . . it changed to my mind, the whole emphasis away from justifying government expenditures [for sport] by rationalizing it was for fitness." Two further observations Hallett made bear on this fact. First,

> the need for a clear statement or policy to enhance cooperation between the two levels of government slowly evolved during this period. As "sport" was a more

[75]This trust was related to physical fitness, problems of national security and employment, and military training (Hallett 1981, 23).

> definitive area than "fitness" and because fitness was perceived to be more of a recreation-related provincial concern, unlike sport, it became inevitable that as a policy area sport was more "in line" with the federal government objectives (ibid., 592).

And second, "the significance of the *P. S. Ross Report* was that it provided a detailed rationale for federal government involvement in sport, fitness and recreation" (ibid., 613; note order).

The policy statements, green papers, reports, speeches, studies, and other documents completed and acted upon since that time have more clearly established the federal role as being in the area of sport and not in physical fitness. Campagnolo (1979c, 5) said that she ". . . recognized that the two fields [sport and recreation] overlap and in practice have a mutually reinforcing relationship. From the public discussion on the Green Paper, I have concluded that the federal government must accord a higher priority to sport." Regan (1981, 10) added that the federal government would ". . . focus its energies and resources on the pursuit of excellence in amateur sport" in his policy statement, this focus is clearly evident in the discrepancy between the funds allocated to sport and to fitness.

By observing the federal contributions to Sport Canada and Recreation Canada, we can see this funding discrepancy. Broom and Baka (1979, 40-1; also see Table 3, page 112) have discussed this discrepancy. What has occurred in Canada, is a narrowing of opportunties for physical activity and sport through the funding scheme at the federal level. The funds provided for "fitness and amateur sport" are actually for the sport structure itself and, secondarily, for the high performance athletes.

Finally, in response to Campagnolo's (1979c) green paper on sport, Trudeau responded that "if Sport Canada is really only interested in gold medals at the Olympics it should say so and give up the pretense of trying to be all things to all people. Whatever its mandate, it should be clearly defined" (Trudeau 1978; cited in Macintosh et al. 1987, 120). All of these statements clearly point to the role of the state following the task force report.

Two other factors influence this discourse as well. Panitch (1979, 20) has noted that "in the field of social services the Canadian state has again been a laggard in comparison with its pathbreaking performance in the field of accumulation. The "welfare state" was late in

coming to Canada,[76] and once it came, did not outrun by any means the provision of benefits or redistribution of incomes of other capitalist societies." [77] The second factor relates to the structure of the Canadian state. Banting (1982, 41) said that ". . . countries with federal systems devote a smaller proportion of their national resources to welfare than do those with a centralized political systems." He goes on to say that there exist

> two inter-related propositions about the structure of Canadian federalism [which] deserve special attention here. The first is that the Canadian structure of government ensures that the interests of governments, as governments, assume an unusual importance in decision-making. The second is that the complexity of our system insulates decision-makers from public pressures and that policy, as a consequence, is often unresponsive to the wishes of the public. Clearly these are important charges in any state that claims to be a democracy (ibid., 42).

But what does this imply in terms of Canadian state intervention in sport?

Nothing, as it would be a baseless argument to claim that the funding of *sport* is a type of welfare program. Within the definition of the "welfare-state" and the types of programs generally accepted within that state (e.g., unemployment insurance, welfare payments, pensions, medicare, education support, housing) sport can hardly be classed as an area within that class of provisions. It could however, be argued that if one considers the amounts received by athletes through the state's AAP program, such income could almost be seen as a type of "minimum income-security payment." Based on the class backgrounds the athletes generally come from and on the responses given to the 1985 survey on the AAP program, this rationale appears to be unsupported. Therefore, this classification of state intervention in sport does not hold much currency. The history and structure of the Canadian state and the general economic climate at the time of its direct intervention into sport add further support to this conclusion. As Banting (1982), Panitch (1979), and Finkel (1979) have shown, these types of programs have been antithetical to Canada's early economic and ideological (e.g., 'rugged individualism') roots; hence, the delay in federal government intervention in these areas.

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[76]cf. Banting 1982, 33-6.

[77]Gruneau (1983, 133) also cites this fact in reference to the over-emphasis on "welfare-statism" as a factor for Canadian state involvement in sport.

More significantly, this direct intervention in sport began in the late 1960s at the beginning of a global long wave of economic contraction (Mandel 1975, Ch. 4). This presented problems for the state in terms of the "fiscal crisis of the state." [78] Again it appears illogical and irrational for the state to involve itself in sport for these reasons. At a time when its resources were burdened by decreasing revenues, increasing welfare allocations, and increasing national debt, through Keynesian deficit financing (Finkel 1979, 362), appear to work against the the view of sport as both a state welfare provision and as an area for state intervention.

The federal state had previously (Campagnolo 1979c; Regan 1981) encouraged the NSOs to find their own source of funding, to some how commodify the sport performances produced in the marketplace. Then, as was noted earlier, the state intervened as the NSOs did not have the organizational support structures with which to accomplish this commodification process. Once again Lou Lefaive has emerged as the director of the Sport Marketing Council, through which economics of scale will be sought to remedy this process. If sport is an area of welfare provision, it is unlikely that capital will find it attractive enough to re-commodify it; much as capital does not appear willing to take on medicare, unemployment insurance, education, or other such provisions, when the state will fund and organize them. The result is a situation not of the state using sport as a social program to legitimize an economic system that produces severe inequalities (Finkel 1979, 365; Herman 1971, 131), but of the state socializing the costs of production in the belief that in the future it will lead to the privatization of capital accumulation through the further commodification of high-performance elite sport (Gough 1975, 67; Harvey 1987, 9-10). This belief can only be described as illogical and irrational. This leaves, virtually by default, Meynaud's third motive as an explanation for Canadian state intervention; this motive will next be analyzed.

[78] Refer to Appendix III for a further discussion of this crisis of the capitalist state.

4. Motive #3 - "National Prestige"

As Harvey and Proulx (1988, 93) noted, the third motive of Meynaud's framework consists of ". . . the assertion of national prestige," which they saw as not only being the "desire for international prestige" but a way that ". . . allows individuals to increase their sense of national belonging." As this motive is seen as being the predominant rationale for the involvement of the Canadian state in sport, it is given further breadth of analysis. In order to fulfill the premise of this work, the analysis must first focus on the social processes involved and then, second, on those individuals who were instrumental in the development of the incipient superstructural relations of production that were given form following the 1968 Canadian federal election.

The approach to be taken here is to first discuss the development of liberal ideology, as a hegemonic element of the Canadian totality, in order to understand the hegemony upon which Canadian dependence is based and with which Canada has been governed.[79] The discussion will then proceed to discuss, briefly, how Canadian culture in general and Canadian sport as a particular cultural entity has been influenced by this dependence. Finally, historical evidence of Canadian state intervention into the cultural area, using the "arts" as an example, will be presented to support the explanatory strength of this motive and to identify the objective process undertaken to use sport as a culturally unifying factor in Canadian society.

a. Liberal Ideology and Canadian Dependency

Liberal ideology, generally, saw the striving, individualistic ambitions of man in his pursuit for a better life as the driving force for progress in society, as well as being the type of individual needed under a market-driven socio-economic formation. Laxer and Laxer (1977) have noted how prevelant that liberal ideology has been in Canada as the liberal party had been the governing party for the greater part of Canada's history, with the Conservative party periods in office being "episodic." However in Canada, liberal ideology has held elements of both the British and American versions and has gone through redefinition as the

[79]For we cannot discuss "things Canadian" if that discusssion does not include the concept of dependency.

metropole changed.

As the Laxers (ibid., 20) put it,

> naturally, the emphases within the Liberal system altered as Canadian society evolved. The decline of Britain and the emergence of the United States, as the chief source of foreign capital and foreign markets greatly enforced the Liberal orientation toward the United States.
>
> When Laurier took office [1896], Canada stood at the nexus of two metropolitan economic systems -- the British and the American.

This "liberal system" of Laurier, as the Laxers (ibid., 18) pointed out, ". . . rested on the premise of provincial autonomy in educational and cultural matters" while it retained

> . . . fundamentals of the National Policy, [and it] had a North American orientation. It sought closer ties with the United States while warding off the embrace of the imperial mother country. The Liberals were open to the tradition of reciprocity with the United States and to the perennial influences of the American liberal tradition, culturally and politically (ibid., 19).[10]

This system was further built upon "populism" and "egalitarianism" which became strengthened during Mackenzie King's prime ministership as "the party coordinated the economy on behalf of the large business interests, but did not forget that political stability rested on providing hope for the disadvantaged regions and for the non-privileged mass of the population" (ibid., 20). The policy maintained a balance between "centrist" policies that favoured the central Canadian economic bloc, while placating the masses with the welfare programs developed under Mackenzie King's leadership.

The form of this dependency has been revised in certain writings (e.g., Hutcheson 1973; Panitch 1981), and is different from other "metropole-hinterland" dependency models of under-development. Panitch (1981, 21) has made a strong case for this difference, based on the economic development of Canada (in relation to the United States), in that ". . . American industry was more profitable than Canadian . . . . And this has not produced by any means the conditions of underdevelopment that dependency theory identifies. Indeed, even under the aegis of this capital, Canada's class structure has evolved in the twentieth century increasingly along the lines of advanced capitalism" (cf. Hutcheson 1973, 162-7). The size of the Canadian bourgeoisie, the quick economic-based expansion to the west coast (to protect the country from American expansion), the small indigenous market for capital

[10]Although this view of the National Policy could be questioned. See Davis 1971.

valorization and expansion, the large staple goods base of the economy, and the lack of large amounts of indigenous capital have lead to the slower development of "advanced capitalism" in Canada and to its taking the form of "dependent industrialization" (ibid., 23). Davis (1971, 13) and Panitch (1981, 28) both point to the missing element, evident in the dependency models used in, for example, Laxer and Laxer (1977), Laxer (1973), and Smythe (1981). Both Davis and Panitch emphasized the dialectical nature of the hinterland-metropole (in both the intra- and inter-state cases) relationship, rather than the one-sided accounts often given, that is, where the dependency appears absolute or debilitating to the dependent state. To make this point Panitch (ibid., 26-7) noted that, "a more precise source of the weaknesses of the new political economy [rather] than nationalism, . . . may be said to be its insufficient dialectical approach to social phenomena . . . . We have to recognize that imperialism has effects not only on the periphery but on the metropole itself."[81]

The notion of dependency, however, does not rely solely on economic patterns, but is part of a totality through which dependency is established. Panitch (1981, 26-7) wrote that

> . . . it is not the state that primarily sustains American imperialism within the Canadian society. The imperial relation is secured and maintained more fundamentally within civil society itself -- in the integration of all the dominant fractions of capital under the hegemony of the American bourgeoisie, in a continental labour market and international unions, and above all, in our culture -- not so much the "haute culture" of the intellectuals but the popular culture which is produced and reproduced in advertising, the mass media and the mass educational system. Just as it is by virtue of a cultural hegemony in civil society that bourgeois domination is made compatible with liberal democracy in advanced capitalist societies, so Canadian dependency remains compatible with liberal democracy itself by American culture.

Therefore, the consciousness a people adhere to through cultural identification must be developed, but developed in a certain way.

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[81]Davis (1971, 13) noted "the symbiotic *metropolis-hinterland* model assumes (1) conflict of interests between metropolis and hinterland; and (2) a tendency on the part of the hinterland groups and interests to fight back eventually against their metropolitan exploiters in order to gain a larger place in the regional or national or international sun." In terms of sport, Howell and Howell (1985, 397) have noted that Canadians introduced ". . . rugby to the United States, leading to the development of American football," one of the largest cultural and capitalist industries in that country (also see Harris 1987 and Smith 1988).

To Panitch's analysis we must add, secondly, that of Smythe. Smythe (1981, xi) wrote that "even though capitalism has prospered by its capacity to organize the production of goods and services in the short run, its survival as a system depends upon its ability to produce people ideologically willing to support it in the long run." Although it was noted above that Smythe's use of dependency was seen as one-sided, or non-dialectical, it does not detract from his work. For indeed, the strength of the American economic-cultural imperialism is great; this fact is widely understood and documented. Based upon these ideas developed by Panitch and Smythe, two factors become important for this analysis.

The first fact relates to the relationship in the totality between the structure of the economic infrastructure and the acceptance of that substructure by the mass population. In Smythe's (1981, xi-xiii) outline of his work, he wrote that

> the heart of the analysis presented here of the transformative process which developed monopoly capitalism concerns the growth of giant corporations and the means by which they achieved control over not only the resources and labour for physical production of commodities but also over the creation of demand for commodities. It was equally necessary to establish scientifically-based methods of producing physical goods, as to create the marketing institutions by which consumer demand for goods could be managed. At the same time, it was necessary for the security of the giant corporations that they establish hegemony over the state apparatus.
>
> The mass media of communications was a *systemic* invention of monopoly capitalism. Their purpose is to set a daily agenda of issues, problems, values, and policies for the guidance of other institutions and the whole population. They mass produce audiences and sell them to advertisers. There audiences work on, and are consumed in, the marketing of mass-produced consumer goods and services to themselves.

The generation of "audience commodities," as Smythe (ibid., xv) noted, is a process where contradictions exist; ". . . in producting their own labour power, audience members experience the dialectical tension between their two 'faces,' i.e., that which deals with their work as audience members in choosing brands and candidates, and that which deals with their non- or anticapitalist values in living and raising children" (ibid., xv). Here we can see a dialectical process whereby oppositional patterns of individual action work within and yet against a system rife with contradictions. The need under monopoly capitalism for the creation of "audiences" and for the use of ideological inculcation are both endemic to this socio-economic formation; one sustains it economically, the other deflects strong opposition

to its political-economy.

The second factor relates back to Panitch's emphasis on the dialectical basis of dependency and the oppositional tendencies thereof. In citing a passage from Ian Lumsden's work,[82] Panitch (1981, 27) pointed out how this doubly contradictory position of Canada works against "Canadian bourgeois nationalism" and "cultural nationalists" plans for independent status of the Canadian state:

> Of course, I have stressed the paramount importance of American imperialism in shaping the nature of Canada's dependent capitalism. But I am skeptical of the belief that Canadians will be mobilized to overthrow capitalism merely on that account; they are, for the most part, materially too well off for that. Rather they must come to grasp the growing contradictions of our dependent integration within American capitalism, even as they see more clearly the exploitive and alienating system of capitalism for what it is. The two strands so interpenetrate in the Canadian context that they cannot be separated. This means, in turn, if a *sine qua non* for the mobilization of the Canadian people is their prior cultural decolonization -- and consequent ability to identify the American factor in our oppression -- this cultural decolonization must occur alongside of a struggle to overcome the social alienation which is inherent in all forms of capitalism . . . (Lumsden 1975, 44-5).

This further fracturing of the struggle against American monopoly capitalism, its need for audiences, and its cultural hegemony, adds to an already formidable barrier to Canadian economic and cultural independence from the United States.

The branch-plant nature of Canada's economy forms the major part of this barrier. Whether this aspect of Canadian dependence can be overcome through nationalization of other resource and other primary industries (e.g., the National Energy Program) and in the face of state programs which work in favour of monopoly capitalism, especially American capital (e.g., tax concessions, weak anti-trust laws, FIDA, lack of laws forbidding interlocking boards of directors [Smythe 1981, 292]), seems highly unlikely. It is, however, the cultural area which is important in this discussion. How does Canadian opposition to American cultural hegemony organize itself? Smythe noted, while discussing Canadian consciousness-raising processes, that "the main difference is that although Canadians are perfectly aware we have serious problems -- even inflation -- they feel they can be solved by government" (Gregg 1979; cited in Smythe 1981, 287). Globerman (1983, 30-1) also noted

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[82] Lusmden. 1975. Thoughts on Canadian Dependency. *This Magazine* 9(November-December).

this strong reliance in Canada on state intervention in cultural areas;

> since Confederation, successive Canadian governments have used their taxing, spending, and regulatory powers to create a national consciousness or sense of identity . . ." although "cultural nationalists, as a rule, do not address the issue of why cultural intervention is required to create a national consciousness. . . . it is blandly asserted that increased Canadian cultural output is required to preserve Canada's cultural (or political) sovereignty (usually from American "domination"). Then it is further asserted that government intervention is required to realize the goal of increased Canadian cultural output.[83]

The development of Canadian sport reflected this dependency and political response, but in contradictory ways. Gruneau (1983, Ch. 3) has outlined this in terms of the games and sports in early Canadian society. He hypothesized

> . . . that as constitutive features of a conservative and traditional colonial culture, games and popular recreations presumably had a representational significance that was as attached to underlying notions of social ascription and colonial tradition as it was to the less ascriptively based features of social life on the frontier. Indeed, existing accounts of the time convey the sense that the games and recreational pastimes of early nineteenth-century Canada were somewhat more than just the idle play of the colonial squire or a periodic attempt by farmers and artisans to relieve the monotony of the almost constant work of frontier life. In their various "folk" and "elite" forms, these games and pastimes also appear to have been symbolic statements of differential life chances and social location. As such they could be understood as cultural components in the representation of, and forms of resistance to, a pattern of domination that, if not completely feudal, was nonetheless highly paternalistic and antidemocratic in nature (1983, 96).

Gruneau has pointed to the dependent nature of early Canadian sport practices and their potential use as cultural forms of resistance to that dependence. Metcalfe (1987) and Redmond (1979), amongst others, have shown in more empirical ways, the forms of sport practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The development of Canadian sport offers evidence of this dependence and of the change noted above. By the 1920s, the "golden age of Canadian sport" (Jones 1985), there was a well established sporting culture in Canada and sport was an important aspect of many peoples' lives. Even though the economic problems of the pre-World War II period, increased urbanization and proletarianization, and restricted opportunities (socially, economically, contextually) caused certain dislocations in these activities and in the health and cultural identities of the citizens, the federal government

[83] Although Globerman (1983, 31) realized that "the claim that increased Canadian cultural output is required to maintain Canada's national identity and political sovereignty is an extremely difficult (perhaps intractable) issue to address with conventional academic tools."

did not act to promote *sport*. MacKenzie King's populist and egalitarian policies were not to include this particular form of cultural activity in their welfare reconciliation of the Canadian population, even though important cultural identity could be generated through sport and even though there were calls for a Sport Ministry to be formed.

As it is not the purpose of this work to trace this history, the above material was presented to point to the national identity of Canadians and its early roots in the sporting practices of the nation. Sport is part of the history and culture of Canada, that is, it gives meaning and identity to individual Canadians as part of the whole. In Marxist studies, culture, following the work of Raymond Williams (1973, 1977), is generally subsumed under the concept of "hegemony." Hargreaves (1982b; cf. Hollands 1981) work on sport as a cultural form has given us a better understanding of this connection. First stating that ". . . cultural processes refer to the habits, customs, pastimes, rituals, style of life, and the achieved state of knowledge and learning; . . . ." (Hargreaves 1982b, 49), Hargreaves (ibid.) next went on to locate sport in the societal totality:

> thus sports partake of the economy, in so far as they require resources, which in capitalist societies are mostly allocated on a commercial basis; they partake of politics, in so far as they serve as an agency of political mobilisation on occasions; and they partake of culture, in so far as they are a popular form of leisure activity.

A paradox becomes evident from this statement. Hargreaves is talking about sports, yet sees their cultural form as a "leisure activity," essentially as avocational. However, as we have argued earlier, sport must be viewed as being a form of cultural activity in both its avocational and vocational form. This was not the case with the federal state in the pre-*FASA* (1961) period. Sport was not seen as an instrument for the development of a Canadian cultural identity or as a method to enhance national unity.

b. Nationalism versus National Unity

Before exploring the historical processes of the intervention of the Canadian state in cultural production, the concepts of "nationalism" and "national-unity," as well as their relation to dependency must be clarified. As these concepts have wide usage, particularly in dependent states, it is important to differentiate them in order that their respective roles can

be evaluated in terms of the Canadian state. The first differentiation must be made between a country and a nation. As Kidd (1982) and Smythe (1981) argued, Canada is a country; that is, it is not an ". . . ethnic community with certain specific characteristics: a common language, territory and economic life, a common culture and sense of identity" (Kidd 1982, 284; cf. Nairn 1975) such as are the French-Canadian or Dene *nations* within the territory of Canada. Smythe (1981, 291) emphasized that Canada ". . . houses two nations and the numerically larger one denies the existence of the smaller and is more closely connected with the United States than it is with the Québécois." However, the "English-speaking nation," according to Kidd, is becoming more difficult to distinguish as a nation because of the cultural imperialism of the United States, which has lead to a struggle, fought through various means, against this dominance. This historical result, Smythe (ibid., 290) added, was abetted through the neglect of the late nineteenth-century Canadian governments ". . . to take steps to build a cultural policy patterned on small bourgeois national experience in Europe which would protect and develop a national culture . . . ." Even though Canada might not be a nation, the state nevertheless has had to build an image and cultural identity of the Canadian people, however confused and contradictory the basis of this identity might be.

In the second chapter we noted MacAloon's differentiation of patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism. It would be worthwhile to restate the differences here as a point of departure. Patriotism, it was noted, is an inward feeling towards one's country, "the love of one's country and the desire to serve her" (MacAloon 1981, 258-9). Nationalism, was clearly an outward expression of chauvinism, "the hatred of other countries and the desire to do them ill" (ibid.). And finally internationalism, was described as the intellectual understanding of other peoples and their countries based on their social structure and not on one's own ethnocentrism. If these definitions can be accepted then a discussion of their use may follow.

Nationalism has been used in the sense of both patriotism, or national unity, and nationalism, as in the jingoist connotation. Nairn (1975, 17) saw nationalism as being either of a "healthy - progressive" or "derivative - degenerative" type, depending on the

situation.[14] This dual usage, however, adds confusion and leads to questionable or mixed usages. For example, in the Canadian sport literature, Kidd (1981, 241) has acknowledged that the Trudeau governments have ". . . reiterated the commitment to athletic success for ideological reasons. . . the Conservatives [under Diefenbaker] saw sport as important for the image of Canada, the Liberals sought to develop athletic success for the image Canadians have of themselves." Yet in reference to the Liberal government's policies and practices in sport, Kidd (1982, 295) has stated that it was ". . . an explicit means of strengthening national unity," as well as being the ". . . pan-Canadian nationalism of Pierre Trudeau." This confusion does not detract from Kidd's work. It is noted here merely to point out these relatively subtle yet significant differences.

Again referring to Nairn's work, he claims that nationalism can supply an internal, psychological need for a country but is, at the same time, a force used by dependent nations against their imperialist metropole. He claims that in economic terms, the "real, uneven development has invariably generated an imperialism of the center over the periphery: one after another, these peripheric areas have been forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this dominance, seeking at once to resist it and to somehow take over its vital forces for their own use" (1975,12). This dual usage of nationalism goes against that of Coubertin, as noted by MacAloon, but more importantly for this work, against that of Trudeau (1968).

Writing on the issue of French-Canadian nationalism and its expression through the desire for a separate Quebec nation (a result of Anglo-Canadian nationalism), Trudeau (1968, 175) has written that nationalism ". . . as an emotional stimulus directed at an entire community, can indeed let loose unforeseen powers. . . . where right reasoning and thought are reduced to rudimentary proportions"; and that ". . . people who win their freedom with

[14] In Radwanski's (1978, 117) description of Trudeau's thought on "nationalism" he stated that: "He [Trudeau] divides nationalism into two forms: aggressive and defensive. 'Nations that were dominated, dismembered, exploited, and humiliated conceived an unbounded hatred for their oppressors; and united by this hatred they erected against aggressive nationalism a defensive nationalism' [Trudeau 1968, 161]." In both Nairn's and Trudeau's descriptions, two types of nationalism are evident, but both must be seen as negative.

passion rather than with reason are generally disappointed to find themselves just as poor and deprived as ever; and strong governments are necessary to put an end to their unrest." Trudeau (ibid., 190,193) referred to nationalism as an "emotional gum" used to hold nations within nation-states and as such it is a "rustic and clumsy tool" which ". . . will eventually have to be rejected as a principle of sound government." He (ibid., 169) added that

> . . . a nationalistic government is by nature intolerant, discriminating, and, when all is said and done, totalitarian. A truly democratic government cannot be "nationalist," because it must pursue the good of all its citizens, without prejudice to ethnic origin. The democratic government, then, stands for and encourages good citizenship, never nationalism.

In this work, Trudeau also quoted Lord Acton, who summarized his feelings on "nationalism":

> Nationalism does not aim at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind (Acton 1948, 194; cited in Trudeau 1968, 181).

As this view of nationalism will have bearing on the discussion to follow, it is timely to note that although Trudeau (ibid., 195) did not approve of this emotive force, he claimed that he was ". . . not heralding the impending advent of reason as the prime mover in politics, for nationalism is too cheap and too powerful a tool to be soon discarded by politicans of all countries; the rising *bourgeoisies* in particular have too large a vested interest in nationalism to let it die out unattended."

This excursus on nationalism was taken to add two more pieces to the analysis. The first, an understanding of national unity (patriotism) versus nationalism, and the second, to note Nairn's point about dependent nations and the rise of nationalism within those countries (see Trudeau's account also). Nairn based his discussion of nationalism on the uneven or perhaps debilitating nature of imperial capitalism. He noted that in these peripheral nations the expectations of the populace often exceed the material progress of the country, which, due to the colonial boundaries crossing and mixing nations of peoples, led to the development of a nationalism which ". . . works through *differentiae* like those because it has to. It is not necessarily democratic in outlook, but it *is* invariably populist" (1975, 11).

It must be emphasized, by referring back to Panitch's (1981) work, that Canadian dependence is much different than that of the majority of the periphery countries. Even though this was the case, Canada has had to deal with nationalistic problems both internally and externally. Internally between Anglo and French Canadian nationalisms, and between the central Canadian economic bloc and the Western and Maritime provinces. And externally against the cultural hegemony of the United States. Both of these forms of nationalism have a bearing on Canadian state intervention in the area of culture and, later, sport. Also evident in Canada is the notion of "populist" nationalism. Again, recognizing Canada's particular and different form of dependency, it is interesting to note Laxer and Laxer's (1977) discussion of the Liberal government's use of "populist" programs which led Canada into the "welfare-state" era.

c. The Canadian State and Cultural Intervention

Perhaps the first major intervention by the Canadian state into the cultural area, was through the development of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) out of the Broadcasting Act of 1932. Before, and after, this event the state had dabbled with various programs for the arts. However, the state became very closely and deeply involved in the cultural area, and especially in the arts, following the report of the Massey Commission in 1951. As Endres (1979, 417) wrote, the Canada Council, formed on this commission's recommendation, had a ". . . threefold purpose of subsidizing the arts in Canada, promoting Canada's cultural image abroad through tours and exchanges, and acting as a national commission for UNESCO." Endres (1979), Woodcock (1985), and Globerman (1983) have all studied the development and funding practices of Canadian arts by the state.

Globerman (1983, xix) gave an account of how

> the general economic arguments in support of government intervention into private transactions are largely subsumed under the broad heading of "market failure." Market failure denotes the presence of one or more conditions that preclude the efficient allocation of resources by private transactions. That is, left to its own devices, the free market will either produce "too much" or "too little" of a particular good or service.

He goes on to note that this reason is given ". . . explicitly and implicitly on the *presumed*

existence of some market failure" and ". . . may have reached the point where it is more politically and socially divisive than unifying, in part because government actions have largely overruled market forces where no issue of market failure was at stake" (ibid., 4,31). Endres (1979, 420) analyzed the involvement of the state in the arts through expenditures in the following areas. First, for direct capital accumulation of "cultural hardware," such as arts centers, theaters. Second, for indirect capital accumulation, such as, the giving grants to arts organizations rather than having the corporate elite donate. Third, by permitting tax breaks on corporate donations and by subsidizing festivals and arts productions (which attract adjunct investment and tourist dollars). And fourth, through returns on direct and indirect taxes.

Globerman (1983, 7) listed the "instruments of government intervention" as such:

- Exhortion, negotiation, and moral suasion (e.g., ministerial speeches, the creation of task forces to study a problem, and threats of government action);
- Direct expenditures, including both capital and current outlays for the provision of public services, grants, subsidies, and transfer payments;
- Tax expenditures, i.e., the use of tax exemptions or incentives when the cost is measured in terms of revenue forgone;
- Taxation, i.e., direct or indirect taxes, fees or prices for public services, contributions to compulsory pension plans or insurance schemes;
- Public ownership, including joint ventures in which government is the controlling partner;
- Regulation, which includes statues and all subordinate legislation such as regulations, directives, guide-lines, and the like; and
- Loans and guarantees (Economic Council of Canada 1979, 43)

These closely parallel the categories of Endres (cf. Jhally 1983, 138).

Each of these studies included two key conclusions. The first is that the state cannot become completely involved in the funding of these programs for fear of ". . . excessive bureaucratic control of cultural activity" (Jhally 1983, 136). That is, if the involvement of the state became too great, censorship or control of the products of cultural activities would result.[15] This is obviously not the case in sport, the "relative autonomy" of the state does not occur in its relation to sport production. However, a dilemma results as the state either moves to privatize arts funding (cut back on state subsidies) or encounters a "fiscal crisis" in that the cultural programs have become dependent on the involvement of the state and any change

[15]Jhally (1983, 137) defines "cultural activities" as ". . . those activities that can be called the individual or performing arts (visual and applied arts, performing arts, literature) and those that can be labelled the cultural industries (recording, film and broadcasting)."

would be regressive, even though the current situation is not ideal. Kidd (1981) makes the same point in terms of sport; even though the intervention of the state is riddled with contradictions, to go back to what existed previous to its intervention would be even more debilitating for sport. There has to be pressure to alleviate the ills of the structure as it exists.

The second conclusion reached was that it is the artists who are the true subsidizers of the arts in Canada (Endres 1979, 436-8; Woodcock 1985, Ch. 10). Overall, Endres (1979, 438) found that ". . . state funding patterns have catered to the material and cultural interests of the ruling elite [which] has resulted in three deformations: art which is undemocratic in its form and content; continuing economic privation of the artist and distortion of his creativity; and real but intangible sanctions against the participation of the vast majority of Canadians in their culture." Based on the work of Kidd (1988), Beamish and Borowy (1987), and the findings of Macintosh and Albinson (1985), it would be safe to make a parallel statement in regards to sport, it is the athletes, or perhaps their families, that are the direct subsidizers of Canadian sport.

Endres (1979, 430-4) and Woodcock (1985) emphasize the fact that artists are generally excluded or not wanted on arts boards, and that the state bureacracy is generally unsympathetic (see Endres 1979, 434). Woodcock (1985, 8-9) commented on what he sees as two perils, other than the poverty level existence of artists, for the arts in Canada:

> One is the danger of the arts increasingly becoming the servant of the state. In recent years governments have tended to retreat from the arm's length principle on which the Canada Council was established as an autonomous agency, and to attach political strings to their grants, so that if the cultural bureaucrats have their will, artists may well be more frequently expected to pay for what aid they receive by producing approved works useful to governments, as happens already in totalitarian countries
>
> The other peril, manifest in the increasing tendency to see the arts as "cultural industries," is that of artists becoming the victims of the profit motive. The threat in this direction does not come merely from free enterprise. It comes even more from government departments that seek economic evidence of the benefits of government aid. These bureaucrats fail to understand that the benefits the arts confer on the community are not material and therefore cannot be assessed in this way.

The interesting point to note about this bureaucratic intrusion, is that indifference and increased control followed changes to the arts programs following the election of Pierre Trudeau (ibid., 106-7). There is a double irony here: the first one relates to the bureaucratic

changes that followed Trudeau's election, as an enlarged bureaucracy for sport evolved after this same historical point, and as Kidd (1981,1988) and Macintosh (1988) have noted, led to the erosion of the old structure, control, and power bases of Canadian sport. The second irony relates to the call from many quarters of the Canadian sport public, for an arm's length agency for sport, such as the Canada Council.[16] This rather long discussion of the arts was undertaken, because there are many parallels between its programs and those for sport. Some have been mentioned, but some of the particular historical processes of the intervention of the state in sport will finally bring us to a point where we can clarify the explanatory strength of this motive.

d. Pierre Trudeau and His Political Philosophy

Within this discussion of Meynaud's third motive for state involvement in sport, we had discussed the place of sport in Canadian cultural development up to the late 1920s. At that time the state was advocating the "self-help" principle for sport associations, developing physical fitness programs, and funding Olympic teams, but was not involved directly with sport. This was the level of involvement up to 1961 when the *FASA* was passed. As was noted, the spread of international sport, evident in the growth of the Olympic movement and of televised sport, and the entrance of the Soviet Union and other eastern-bloc countries into world-wide sport competitions greatly increased the quantitative and political aspects of sport.

The Canadian government, under the *FASA*, had allocated five million dollars per year under this Act, but remained basically in an "enabler" role (Kidd 1981, Macintosh et al. 1987, Hallett 1981). During the 1961-69 period, it was also noted that a number of key actors were working behind the scenes to move sport into a more prominent position. If we might paraphrase Marx, it was in the late 1960s that the new relations of sport production were well into their development in a new form and content. These relations were evolving into a legimate "non-professional vocational form of production, for which a new structural form would be required, that is, "new superior (objectively advanced) relations of production"

[16]This type of structure was proposed policy (Campagnolo 1979c), but was never realized nor brought out in subsequent policy (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987, 182-6).

were to replace older ones as the material conditions were present in the *FASA* funding for a qualitative new set of structural relations.

The key actors had prepared the new objective structure, at least in its nascent form, when Pierre Trudeau began his first term as Canada's prime minister. The political philosophy and national vision with which Trudeau came to power, fit into the plans for sport held by this group. Trudeau could be called the catalyst of this direct state intervention into sport. Indeed, his desire for a strong federal state, which included Quebec, was the key focus of his political agenda, and sport as a cultural element, was seen to fit into this plan.

In his biography of Trudeau, Radwanski (1978, 107-8) outlined the political philosophy of his subject:

> If his thinking has changed little over the years, it's because it is so deeply rooted in a whole chain of reasoning that begins with the role of the individual, works its way through the function of the state, and goes from there to various specific political problems. Four themes dominate the theory: the absolute value of the individual, *the supremacy of rationality*, the constant struggle between totalitarianism and democratic tendencies in society, and the obligation of every individual to involve himself in the political process (emphasis added).

As Radwanski (ibid., 107) went on to note, Trudeau ". . . far more that most Western leaders, came to power with a coherent and painstakingly developed political philosophy. And he still operates not by instinct or improvisaton, but by constant reference to an elaborate philosophical framework." It was noted above how Trudeau emphasized a cold unemotional rationality in individual thought, action, and political behaviour; "to appeal to people in politics through their emotions is, in Trudeau's system, to strike at their freedom; hence, in part, his hostility to nationalism, which must always have an emotional base" (ibid., 109). Even though the theoretical thought basic to Trudeau's philosophy was well-defined, and apparently complete, the praxis of his leadership led to major contradictions between his theory and actual political practice and further accentuated the contradictions of Canada's capitalist-based society.

Laxer and Laxer have called Trudeau's thought "new liberalism." They saw it as a clash between "old populist" and "new morality" liberalism that follows from the mid-1970s economic crisis, as ". . . an ideology of restraint. Its purpose [was] to achieve such a basic

change in human expectations that social confrontation which otherwise threatens can be avoided" (Laxer and Laxer 1977, 78). Smythe (1981, 292) took issue with the Laxers' position in that he agreed that

> . . . the ideology of liberalism has been the basis of Canadian national policy, but that its negation in practice offers (as the authors imply) any basis for *expecting* Canada to reduce its future dependence on the United States is itself an idealist illusion. The practice of all capitalist countries is based on the ideology of the market place and possessive individualism. And *all* of them, especially the United States, employ state agencies when necessary to provide economically and politically desirable results, waiving ideological purity for the sake of long-run profitability.

The Laxers (1977, 65) pointed to the left and right political pulls in Canadian society as being problematic in the realization of a full, practical liberal ideology, but concluded that ". . . the Liberal party has been a unique blend of social cohesion and consensus politics." This added to its political longevity. Trudeau's political thought was not really a negation of liberalism ("illiberalism" in Smythe's view), as can be deduced from Smythe's thought. Trudeau's philosophy was more a contradiction between thought and practical political application, or between the ideal and the real possibilities.

i. Trudeau's View of Nationalism and Federalism

In the foreword to the Laxers' book, George Grant wrote that

> . . . Mr. Trudeau has always scorned nationalism as a retrograde force. This has been basic to his political ideology, and necessarily so, because the capitalist politics of cybernetics which he so admires must inevitably work against national identity . . . . Modern liberalism has always claimed that it dilutes and dissolves ideology in the name of the progress of cybernetics as rationality. In fact it is itself a powerful ideology, and one that speaks against the survival of nation states such as Canada (Laxer and Laxer 1977, 11).[87]

Stevenson's (1982, 16) work on federalism, which is a state structure that ". . . protects minorities and enables cultural, linguistic, religious, and ideological diversity to flourish," found that a ". . . prominent supporter of this perspective is Pierre Elliott Trudeau whose well-known but often misunderstood hostility to nationalism is really no more than the view that the state should not be intolerant of diversity and should not be identified with any

[87]Grant (1970) saw the Canadian liberal ideology as leading to "the ideology of continentalism," to the dissolution of Canada into the North American empire, rather than forming a positive "nationalism" as had occurred in Britain and America.

ethnic or cultural group. In a federal state, he would argue, this is less likely to happen." Here it is possible to see that there are different views on Trudeau's basic political thought. It was, as Stevenson pointed out, through federalism that Trudeau's rationalistic philosophy was to be applied to the Canadian state.

According to Trudeau (1968, 191, 179, 177), "federalism is by its very essence a compromise and a pact" and that "Canadian federalism is an experiment of major proportions; it could become a brilliant prototype for the moulding of tomorrow's civilization" and be "a truly pluralistic and polyethnic society." The nature of federalism as a political system, was described by Stevenson (1982, 8) as a

> system in which most or all of the structural elements of the state (executive, legislative, bureaucratic, judiciary, army or police, and machinery for levying taxation) are duplicated at two levels, with both sets of structures exercising effective control over the same territory or population. Furthermore, neither set of structures (or levels of government) should be able to abolish the other's jurisdiciton over this territory or population. As a corollary of this, relations between the two levels of government will tend to be characterized by bargaining, since neither level can fully impose its will on the other.

It is apparent that federalism was the political system Trudeau felt would move Canada ahead, would unify the Anglo and French Canadians, and help to develop a new Canadian identity.

When Trudeau came to power, Radwanski (1978, 161, 120, 313) noted that the following facts of his leadership were evident. First, "every prime minister has certain subject areas which he considers particularly his own; . . . For Trudeau, that principal subject area is the whole field of national unity, defined broadly to encompass federal-provincial relations, the constitution, language policy, equalization payments, and manifestations of the federal presence." Second, that he would follow his plan for Canada's future and not just administer the state.[88] Third, to ensure and maintain individual fulfillment, the health and safety of the citizenry must not only be protected, but also ". . . that no one is denied the basics -- economic, social, and *cultural* -- that are a precondition to any real freedom and

[88] "'If we're just here to administer, what the hell are we wasting the best years of our lives for? Let the Tories or some other gang administer. But we're here to try to give direction to the country.' When I feel that I am only administering, that I can't contribute to the creation of tomorrow, certainly I won't have the patience to stay on here" (Radwanski 1978, 190).

development" (emphasis added). Four, Trudeau ". . . repeatedly made the mistake of studying decisions -- so long that time ran out and he must scramble frantically or start from scratch."

Radwanski (ibid., 212-3) made special reference to this last point in his work on Trudeau. He noted that Trudeau

> . . . began the planning process by setting up task forces to review virtually every area of government activity and determine where change was desirable. By the fall of 1968, there were task forces studying foreign policy, defense policy, housing policy, communications policy, tax policy, information policy, sports policy, prices and incomes policy, and a number of other areas. This was Trudeau the free-thinker at work, the man who wanted to "cast down totems, break down the taboos", insisting that nothing was sacred and that every major policy had to be re-examined from just principles.

From this overview, it is possible to see how Trudeau generally wished to develop his vision for the Canadian state, but there is an underlying contradiction which must be exposed, for it led to less than ideal results.

Noted above was Trudeau's distain for nationalism, as well as his comments on it being an ever available tool for leaders.[89] Due to the nationalistic problems in Quebec, Trudeau (1968, 193) saw that

> one way of offsetting the appeal of separatism is by investing tremendous amounts of time, energy, and money in nationalism, *at the federal level*. A national image must be created that will have such an appeal as to make any image of a separtist group unattractive. Resources must be diverted into such things as national flags, anthems, education, arts councils, broadcasting corporations, film boards; the territory must be bound together by a network of railways, highways, airlines; the national culture and the national economy must be protected by taxes and tariffs; ownership of resources and industry by nationals must be made a matter of policy. In short, the whole of the citizenry must be made to feel that it is only within the framework of the federal state that their language, culture, institutions, sacred traditions, and standards of living can be protected from external attack and internal strife.

Trudeau both decried the use of nationalism, yet saw it as an integral part of his purpose for a unique Canada. This is an interesting paradox that resulted in a debatable praxis during the Trudeau leadership era.

In his political satire of the Trudeau leadership years, Zolf (1973), pointed out how Trudeau often became short with reporters or citizens who questioned his philosophy and

[89] A "bread and circuses," or as Riordan has said in passing, a "cakes and ales" panacea.

national direction. Trudeau would point to *Federalism and the French Canadians* as being the source of the answers to these questions. This book, in fact, was his political agenda. The question that begs answering, but will not be answered here, is whether Lefaive, Fisher, et al. were cognizant of this agenda and were able, as a result of this knowledge, to bring sport policy to the forefront during Trudeau's first campaign. None the less, it is clear that Trudeau had concrete ideas and means through which Canada would evolve as a state. These ideas and means are both important in terms of how the superstructural relations for sport were to change.

ii. National-Unity Through Sport

The notion of national-unity being served through a new sport policy can be seen as the principle rationale or condition for the direct intervention of the Canadian state in sport. John Munro's *A Proposed Sport Policy for Canadians* contained the first such statement of government purpose to use sport for this goal. Munro (1970, 1) emphasized that

> our policy is about people -- the greatest number of Canadians possible -- increasing their participation in sports and recreational activities, and improving the benefits they can enjoy from such participation. If, along the way, it also serves to upgrade the caliber of Canadian participation in the world sports arena -- which we are completely confident it will -- then we will be able to really take pride in ourselves for having achieved something that very few other nations have been able to develop -- a successful yet well balanced total national sports program. The fact that we are all proud of our country . . . shows another reason for a strong federal effort in the sports field: *National Unity*.

Campagnolo (1979c, 5) added support to this rationale in the following statement:

> I have come to believe that there are some things about sport and recreation which are not only worthwhile for their own sake, but also have important contributions to make to Canadian society. The activities of our athletes are as intrinsic and vital to our culture as are the activities of our creative artists. Sport must take its rightful place in all appropriate facets of Canadian cultural life. My experience of the past two years has given me the conviction that sport and recreation help tie us together as a people; that their many strands serve, in an infinite variety of ways, to bring together the several regions of the country. This also, I believe, is a conviction held by most Canadians.

And finally Regan (1981,4) commented on how federal government activities and resource provisions have been integral to the significant results achieved in international sport; results which have ". . . brought remarkable returns to the nation, whether in such intangible forms

as prestige and enhanced national self-image, or in more concrete terms such as economic and social benefits." These policy statements all support the claim that Canadian federal state policy on sport was to enhance national unity and prestige.

Indeed, there are many important ways in which Canada has gained international acclaim through sport: acclaim which has likely had beneficial results for Canadian cultural identity and national unity. There have been athletes who have generated this recognition through outstanding performances. Certain components of the Fitness and Amateur Sport Ministry are internationally recognized and have been emulated elsewhere (e.g., the National Coaching Certification Program, the Sport Information Retrieval System). Following Canada's first place finish in the unofficial standings of the 1978 Commonwealth Games, Canada was labeled the "East Germany of the west." Finally, the major international sports festivals and championships held in Canada have been well-organized and well-run, resulting in praise and undoubtedly a sense of positive national self-satisfaction and pride.[90] The bureaucratization of Canadian sport should not be seen as being completely negative, for there have been results of this process which have been beneficial to the development of Canadian national unity.

However, Trudeau's vision of a more rationally-operated, federally-strong, culturally-unique Canadian state appears to have fallen short of its target. Radwanski (1978, 122) emphasized that Trudeau had seen "an important but carefully limited role for the state" in the cultural areas, that the state could use its legal and economic forces to ensure the survival and integrity of Canadian social objectives in the cultural area. However, when sport was formally institutionalized the power and control taken by the bureaucrats should have come as no surprise to the volunteer administrators or participants in Canada, nor to those in the arts, nor to Trudeau.

The cybernetic rationality so strongly supported by Trudeau (1968, 203) must inevitably lead to the structural manifestation of the "myth and ceremony" of bureaucracy. Trudeau feared that bureaucratic centralization would lead to an enlarged, powerful, yet

[90]However the 1976 Olympiad in Montreal would be an exception to this claim. See Auf de Mur (1976).

unresponsive and unelected body of civil servants who would follow an ethos which perpetuates and protects their "empire." This, however, is part of the capitalist hegemony pointed to by Mandel (1975) and should have been foreseen. It is not clear in the literature what Trudeau (1968, 198-200) saw as a solution to the centralization and empire-building of the federal bureaucracy, for this has occurred. A bureaucratic elite, who have ". . . the skills, knowledge and powers that are required and utilized in hierarchically controlled organizations" (Beamish 1978, 25), as well as a particular family and socio-economic class background, have come to hold more power than the volunteer executive boards that ostensibly run the national sport structure and its organizational sub-units (see Beamish 1978, 1983; Macintosh and Beamish 1987; Hollands and Gruneau 1979).[91] Basically one group from the middle to upper class has replaced a similarly class-based group. Kidd has taken issue with this point a number of times (1981, 1982, 1988) arguing that athletes (as well as the average taxpaying citizen) subsidize ". . . the careers of hundreds of fully paid coaches, sport scientists, and bureaucrats" (1988, 300) and that the current structure of sport leads to the removal of ". . . day to day direction and administration away from volunteer executives, . . . [and has] brought them within the compass of federal bureaucracy [*sic*] . . . [and] created a new class of professional administrators whose ties . . . are closer to government officials than to the athletes, coaches, and clubs whose interests they nominally represent" (1981, 241).

Beamish (1983, 28-9) also acknowledged this fact, but tied it more closely to the products expected of bureaucratic control:

> The late 1960's and early 1970's comprise a period of increasing formalization, certification, bureaucratization and growing government involvement in the lives of Canadians. Thus it seemed not only inevitable but also necessary to develop amateur sporting associations along the lines to make them more effective -- at least it seemed that way to members of parliament, the authors of the *Report of Task Force on Sport for Canadians*, the National Sport Governing Bodies, the Canadian Amateur Sport Federation and CAHPER (see Hallett 1982, p. 455). The route followed, however, defined *effective* largely in terms of administrative ease and control and the production of gold medals. Thus, the executives saw their mandates exclusively in terms of developing coaching programmes, technical certification and improved performances by athletes. And in the course of these events there was a tremendous investment of resources into the single definition of sport as higher, faster, further (see Beamish 1982) (cf. Whitson 1984; Gruneau 1983, 133; Kidd and

[91]Although this change has not led to a change in the class, ethnic, or gender origins of those persons.

Eberts 1982, 99).

The outcome of Trudeau's rational approach to Canadian sport, based on the available literature, appears to have lessened rather than increased the individual's freedom and rights in high-performance sport, leading to a more objective basis of sport production and thereby negating the subjective nature of sport even further. The measurement of success in terms of medal production in international competitions can only lead to further alienation, dys-stress, and poor performance of Canada's high-performance athletes. Lasch's (1979) "culture of narcissism" appears to be working not only at the individual level, but also at the bureaucratic and state levels.

Lasch wrote on "the degradation of sport." But the key point of this narcissist culture is that it focusses on gratification in the present, the seeking of individual attention, and a general disillusionment of economic, social, and personal relationships. The striving for international success through medal quotas, the infusion of large amounts of funds for a particular Olympiad or Olympic Winter Games (e.g., "Game Plan," "Best Ever" programs),[92] and the focus on the narrow core and tip of the sport pyramid model all add to a bureaucratic and state narcissism in the Canadian sport structure. Whether the former federal sport minister's (Otto Jelinek) statement (see *Edmonton Journal*, 30 March 1988, F2; *Globe and Mail*, 30 March 1988, A16) about spending more money and giving more attention to the base of the pyramid becomes fact, and leads to the lessening of the current contradictions in the sport structure is yet to be seen. As with the state arts programs, the sport system cannot depend on the "logic of capital," at least outside of the state's protection, for its continuation. Trudeau's vision and philosophy appear to have fallen short of their intended goals.

For if we use the winning of medals in international sport competitions as a goal and as a measure of success of the sport system and of Canadian prestige, the massive state intervention in sport (post-task force) appears to have been no more successful than that

[92]For example, to increase the possibility of Canadian athletic successes at the Games, 25 (for winter sports) and 37.2 (for summer sports) million dollars were put into these programs (Canada 1983-87, passim).

achieved by the pre-task force structure, even with a large infusion of funds (refer to Table 3). Discounting the two boycotted Olympiads, the results achieved in terms of total Olympic medals in the 1972 and 1976 Games were not significantly better than in those Games prior to the massive bureaucratization of the sport system (see Table 4 below). In fact, the inter-war period, where sport production was avocationally-based and strongly under amateur hegemony, the results were better. Obviously the measurement of success by such criteria takes on an "apples and oranges" banality. The key question remains, has the development of a federal sport system enhanced the lives and self-images of Canadians? Has athletic success in international competitions drawn Canada together and promoted a unique cultural identity? These questions, as Regan (1981) noted in his policy paper, are "intangible forms" and hard to measure. Perhaps some quantifiable survey would provide more definitive answers to these questions. However, on the surface it appears that a "cakes and ales" scenario, as Riordan noted, has resulted. A strong, consistent Canadian nationalism has not been formed.

The federal nationalism that Trudeau saw as being a positive development in Canada's historical development appears to be contradictory in terms of sport. Trudeau (1968, 193) acknowledged that "the advantage as well as the peril of federalism is that it permits the development of a regional consensus based on regional values; so federalism is ultimately bound to fail if the nationalism it cultivates is unable to generate a national image which has *immensely* more appeal than the regional ones" (emphasis added; see Whitson and Macintosh 1988). Magder (1985, 18) has asked whether liberal nationalism could ". . . develop policy mechanisms that will offset the process of cultural homogenization and develop both a viable domestic sector of cultural production and a vigorous cultural expressiveness." The prevelance of the market-based political economy of capitalism (i.e., the "logic of capital"), the cultural dependence or colonization of Canadian society, the implicit or tacit belief in rationalization, in both its technical and bureaucratic forms, and the use of state agencies to "weld the country together" (Smythe 1981, 291) all add extremely contradictory aspects to an already inherently contradictory socio-economic system. Jhally's (1983, 142) comments on the Applebaum-Hébert Report on federal cultural policy perhaps best summarizes this apparent

Table 4
Olympic Medals Won By Canadian Athletes [93]

Olympiad	Gold Medals	Silver Medals	Bronze Medals
Pre-Task Force.			
1908	3	3	9
1912	3	2	3
1920	2(1)	3(0)	3(0)
1924	0(1)	3(0)	1(0)
1928	4(1)	4(0)	7(0)
1932	2(1)	5(1)	8(5)
1936	1(1)	3(0)	5(0)
1948	0(2)	1(0)	2(1)
1952	2(1)	2(0)	0(1)
1956	2(0)	1(1)	3(2)
1960	0(2)	1(1)	0(1)
1964	1(1)	2(0)	1(2)
1968	1(1)	3(1)	1(1)
Post Task Force.			
1972	0(0)	2(1)	3(0)
1976	0(1)	5(1)	6(1)
1980	0(0)	0(1)	0(1).
1984	10(2)	18(1)	16(1)

1. The first number in each column represents the total summer Games medals won, the bracketed number represents the total winter Games medals won.
2. There were major boycotts of the 1980 and 1984 Olympiads. In 1980 the United States-led boycott kept most of the western nations out of the Moscow Games. In 1984 the Soviet-led boycott kept most of the socialist states out of the Los Angeles Games.

lack of success of Trudeau's federal nationalism:

> Ultimately, however, the report bears witness to the fact that cultural problems cannot be answered through an industrial policy. Instead of cultural freedom, what we see is the intensification of the process of . . . the industrialization of culture and the move of commodity relations into the creative sphere. Only when the effects of commodity production within the cultural realm and the tyranny of the marketplace have been overcome can we even hope for creative integrity and freedom.

And, we may add, for the development of a unique Canadian cultural identity.

National identity and international prestige are very strong motives for the involvement of the state in sport, as Meynaud noted. Based on the regional (provincial) structures and programs for sport, this motive appears to both support and dispute its explanatory claim in Canada. The political ideas of Pierre Trudeau bear strongly on the

[93]Howell and Howell 1985, 418-38.

historical moment that the state became involved in sport. The very clear thoughts of Trudeau both explain and yet expose the difficulty of state intervention in cultural areas, especially through a rationalized process within a contradictory socio-economic system and a culturally dependent country. It is obvious that nationalism, even as Trudeau attempted to use it against his obvious dislike for such a method of unification, and national unity, or patriotism, are the key ways that sport, as a cultural entity, are employed to support the hegemony (positive coercion) of a capitalist state. Again, we must not speak in absolutes, for there have been other motives used, but this one is the "predominant material characteristic" of the intervention of the Canadian state in sport.

E. Base and Superstructure in Canadian Sport - A Summary

As Marx (1977d, 21) wrote, ". . . changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure." The section on the political economy of Canadian sport tied together the changes in the form of sport which led to the transformation of an aspect of the superstructure (but not the "immense whole"). Using the dialectic of sport and the developments of the Olympic movement, it was possible to view the historically mediated, material changes in sport production, which led to a negation of the form and content of sport in the early phase of modern, high-performance, international sport. This change was evident as sport moved through a period of large quantitative changes. The mode of sport production (base) at the high-performance level changed from an avocational to a vocational form and content, that is, to a sublated "non-professional vocational" form and content. New qualitatively different superstructural content was developed for these different relations of production. The shift in the amateur rule which allowed broken-time payments, state support payments, and entrusted endorsement and prize fees, led to a new, formal economic infrastructure (base), which in turn led to a change in the sport delivery system in Canada: to new superstructural organizations. This qualitative change in the sport delivery system led to an enlarged, separate formal State bureaucratic structure for sport.

The particular historical processes surrounding this "nodal" point (c. late 1960s and early 1970s) in the dialectical development of Canadian elite sport are particularly interesting. As it is theoretically problematic to see this development without focussing on the human agents involved, these people and their role must be emphasized before theorizing about the role of the state in this development. Hallett's study of the involvement of the state in sport mentioned several individuals who can be identified as the "key actors" in that direct intervention in sport. He identified Lou Lefaive, Doug Fisher, Sid Wise, Chris Lang, amongst others, as those who were working toward this involvement. Again, Hallett noted that much of the content of the 1969 *Task Force Report* was contained in previously generated materials. What appears to have happened is that these people had developed a new model or format for the structural relations of sport production and were in need of the appropriate economic and political moment to realize their goals. Or to quote Marx (1977d, 21), "no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society."

With the emergence of Pierre Trudeau as prime minister, his clearly defined political philosophy and agenda,[94] and an obvious role for sport within his political agenda and intent, the time for state intervention in the sport delivery system was ripe. Trudeau (1968, 203) held that ". . . cold, emotional rationality can still save the ship" of Canadian cultural identity. He was against emotional nationalism, but was for a federal nationalism through which a national identity and unification could be developed. He felt that rationalism and federal nationalism could overcome provincial and ethnic nationalism, and that through a deliberately ordered federalism, a "pluralistic and polyethnic society" would evolve. These nation building tools were to be employed throughout the totality of society -- in the social, political, economic, and cultural areas. It was noted that Trudeau planned to study all areas of federal policy through the use of policy conferences, white papers, and other open discussion forums before legislating or reforming existing legislation. In that Trudeau's agenda and philosophy

[94]This must be seen as a form of praxis as the political philosophy formed the theory and the political agenda the practice for Trudeau's vision for Canada.

augmented the desire of the above agents, a task force was formed to report on the situation of sport in Canada.

The recommendations of this report, as Hallett (1981) noted, were almost wholly implemented. In fact, Munro (1970, 4) noted in his *Proposed Sport Policy for Canadians*, that by 1970 the National Health and Welfare Ministry had ". . . implemented or begun the process of implementation on more than 80% of the recommendations" of the *Task Force Report*. In that many of these recommendations had been previously and unofficially formulated, we can conclude that it was the purely political action taken by these individuals, many of whom were state employees, which led to the direct intervention in sport by the government.

Trudeau's viewpoint of rational government by experts and his personal mandate for national unity were ideally served by sport. The bureaucratization of sport, the expanded role and power of a bureaucratic and middle-class elite, and the centralization (i.e., economies of scale) of this new sport structure would replace the undermanned, organizationally-overwhelmed volunteer sport associations of the pre-1969 era. The funding of sport would also be under the closer control of the state, as would the new technical programs developed in coaching, research, and information retrieval. Finally, the overall rationalization of Canadian sport could realize greater productivity through medals won in elite international competitions. The effect this has had on athletes has been severe. Many fail under the pressure to win, and to win now. This could be described as a form of national "narcissism" (Lasch 1979). Considering the amounts of time, effort, and money that have been infused into the sport system, there have not really been significantly better results, which was evident in the number of Olympic medals won by Canadian athletes.

Recent attempts to market high-performance sport point to the faulty logic used in the federal sport ministry. The commodification of cultural activities (e.g., finding or developing an "audience" for amateur sport), is evident in the parallel work of scholars writing on the development of Canada's arts policy (Jhally 1983; Woodcock 1985; Endres 1979; Globerman 1983). This leads to an extremely contradictory situation in both

policy-formation and program funding. To develop an identifiable Canadian culture separate from the American one in order to establish, to some degree, our independence as a country, appears to be in confusion. The direct producers (sportspersons) receive little financial support (see Table 3) and even less input into the organization of their productive practices. Again, the thoughts of bureaucrats and their desire to protect their position, funding, and organization, take on a powerful influence and control in the selection of and the degree of support for cultural activities. Bureaucrats decide which activities will be supported, and what constitutes the measurement of successful productivity. These, at least according to Trudeau's written thought, are not what he apparently had in mind.

The above factors point to how the state justifies its intervention into sport. In the preceeding discussion of the capitalist state, it was shown that the economic relations of production become legitimated and institutionalized in structures of the superstructure, as they become objectified, and reified. As the nature of capitalism has changed, so too has the form and content of the political structure. Under monopoly capitalism it was observed that the state performs three functions to support and perpetuate the current form and content of the socio-economic formation. These were identified as: accumulation, legitimation, and coercion (both positive-hegemonic, and negative-repressive). Within each of these areas, the state has a variety of methods whereby to invest, transfer, allocate, or redistribute economic resources. These methods are categorized as forms of social investment, social consumption, and social expense.

In terms of sport, most state funding would fall under the social expense category. As it is an unproductive labour form, that is, a form of labour attaining social production but not fully a part of the overall political economy, sport funding as a consequence, is a deduction from the social surplus. As Gough (1975) showed, no area of state expenditure falls completely within one category. There are some state funds going into social investment (e.g., for stadium construction and major games operations), and social consumption (e.g., the pre-1969 physical fitness programs). Since sport funding is predominantly in the social expense category, one would expect that sport programs would be particularly affected by

overall economic problems (e.g., fiscal crises of the state). This has not been the case, as the bureaucracy and the funding continued to show some expansion. As was shown by Macintosh and Beamish (1987, 145), the staff (executive and technical directors and clerical support) at the National Sport and Recreation Center grew from 65 in 1970 to 532 in 1984. Table 3 showed the growth in expenditures for this center. We have seen from Kidd's (1988) work, that the most an athlete could receive from the various direct state funding (from all levels) is $1500 per month. Sport Canada recently *suggested* that executive and technical directors receive between $27,400 and $41,800 per year, and that program coordinators receive between $21,000 and $28,000 per year (Sport Canada 1987). The total amount available under the AAP in 1986-87 ($3,231,519), was shared by 797 athletes. Although the amounts provided to each athlete varies depending upon the card level at which they are ranked, on a per capita basis they received $4,054 per year. There is an obvious assumption being made about the economic background of Canada's elite athletes and their ability to fund their own sport production.

The state is deriving social surplus from the high-performance athletes that it funds, although the source of the revenue and productive mode does not allow appropriation of that surplus value. Therefore, one must conclude that in the social accounting that Tarbuck (1983) discussed, the state derives ideological surplus value from this funding. The middle class bureaucratic elite employed by this system depend upon the middle class family backgrounds of the majority of these athletes for the system to continue. The basis of inequality in the structure will only deepen under the current distributive inequities, even as members of the middle class are played off against each other, each for their own prestige and advancement. We might even add that the production of state sport can be seen as a luxury item to be consumed by the wealthy and state elite; a point which can be supported by examing the high cost of tickets at the Calgary Winter Olympic Games.

Canadian sport and its objective structuring will continue in their current contradictory position much as have the state programs for the arts. Macintosh et al. (1987, 112-3) summarized the situation of the late 1970s, which is much the same today:

> By the late 1970s, it had become acceptable for prominent Canadian amateur athletes to associate their talents with the sale of goods and services, and the monies

forthcoming accrued either in special trust funds or to the athlete's respective national sport governing bodies. The propensity to judge sport performances on purely objective measurements continued unabated in the 1970s. The dominant forms of sport were valued by the distance jumped or thrown, the time elapsed, the number of goals and assists and points accumulated, rather than the versatility and aesthetic nature of the performance and the struggle and give and take of the competition. This rationalization of sport fitted nicely with the values that sport bureaucrats had assimilated in the scientifically based undergraduate and graduate programs in which they received their training in the 1960s and 1970s.

The great growth of the amateur-sport bureaucracy in Canada, given its bias towards performance evaluation of sport, in turn, added impetus to the propensity to evaluate amateur sport performance largely on the basis of objective record -- and to set goals for respective sport organizations to achieve even better performances and records. The development of "Game Plan" in preparation for the 1976 Olympics gave additional impetus to this rationalization of sport (cf. Gruneau 1983,143).

The ongoing attempts of the Canadian capitalist state to be "all things to everyone" in sport will further add to the conundrum. The current changes in the arts should be an example for those in sport. If change occurs in state provisions in cultural areas, it will be in response to the economic commands of the capitalist system and not through any rational change in the objective form and content of current legitimating function sport performs. Erbach's (1973, 413) criticism of the organizational goals of capitalist states supports the notion that the development of state-planned cultural organization is unrealistic under capitalism:

> Since it is impossible, given the conditions of social production under private ownership, to find a place for sport and high-performance sport in an overall conception of harmoniously developed humanity, bourgeois ideologists try, through partial planning, to offer alternative solutions promising success. . . . Success and failure in planning high-performance sport are determined by the development and degree of maturity of overall social planning which today primarily includes control of the qualitative process of the scientific and technological revolution.

If the state has taken the organization of sport into its orb with the pretense that it could rationally organize, improve, and produce high-performance athletes better than was possible in the pre-1969 era, it has failed to prove this claim. Although there have been considerable improvements in many areas of sport production, there have also been further contradictions generated. The most significant contradiction, due to its inegalitarian nature, has been in the direct funds allocated to athletes, the actual performers (sport producers). The classical means-ends inversion is at work, the structure that was to cure and equalize has taken the dominent position. As the historical process continues to unfold, the dialectical

process will hopefully point to a better set of relations of sport production. Whether this can occur in a capitalist economic system is questionable. We have witnessed one major synthesis through the negation of amateur and professional sport and the bureaucratization of a state structure. One can only hold an optimistic view that further historical development will lead to a culturally responsive and culturally expressive structure and political economy for Canadian performers.

Chapter V

Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

> It [the evaluation of the AAP] made good sense. With $16 million being spent over the next quadrennial, the government wanted to be sure it would get a good return on its investment.
>
> Abigail Hoffman (1986)

A. Summary

In order to develop a coherent, directed praxis for the federal sport system, that system and the rationales for the intervention of that state, must first be theoretically studied and understood. That is, there should not be any hidden assumptions about the operation of the state under monopoly capitalism. Further, the rationales for the state intervention must be non-tautological and well-reasoned. The purpose of this study was to trace the developments of a particular form and content of sport through its dialectical process in the global milieux, and to theoretically relate it to the direct intervention of the Canadian state in sport, by analyzing certain Canadian historical processes and capitalist state theory to provide explanations for this occurrence.

The previous chapters have provided a basis from which we can begin to understand how it was that modern sport developed, or was conditioned, in particular ways. There are many pieces to the puzzle which needed to be clarified, especially the basis of the individual agent's role in modern, high-performance sport. Two major points form this basis. First, we were discussing the branch of sport production at the elite level, at the core of the pyramid, and those sports particular to the Olympic movement, which narrows the discussion of the sport forms. And second we were observing how the Olympic movement has led sport to change dialectically.

The particular sport form observed today is a result of the content originating in the Victorian era, a form that continued to develop through the fin-de-siécle Edwardian period, and on into the the post-World War II cold war developments; the latter have resulted in what has been described as "war without weapons" (Goodhart and Chataway 1968). This period

was identified as the modern period in sport. Within this content was a form of ârete and agon which found its ultimate expression in Olympism. Through the connection with and the spread of international sport, particularly in the Olympic Games, the content of sport began to take on organizing structures and activities which have been analyzed and criticized as being rationalized and bureaucratized (e.g., see Rigauer 1981, Heinla 1973, and Krawczyk 1974, amongst others). This change, as we have noted, did not occur in the way Coubertin had envisioned or intended it would. The symbolic trappings of the Olympic spectacle ". . . not only imply, as intended by Baron de Coubertin, the very meaning and ideal of sport but also the possibility for the transformation of sport into something other than the founders of the Olympic Games had envisioned" (Heinla 1973, 351).[95] Within this modern period of sport, we added the inter-related particularities of high-performance (elite) sport and "Olympic" (representational) sport.

An increased interest in sport, from the bottom "grassroots" levels of the pyramid to the upper international elite levels, and the above "transformation" of sport were not seen as merely being "cause and effect" developments. We cannot merely identify so many causal points and lump them together into statements of evolutionary effect. To understand what the potentialities of sport performance might be, versus the reality of its current practice, a discussion of the dialectical oppositions of sport was completed. The contradictions discussed were: subject/object, concrete labour/abstract labour, avocational/vocational, and base/superstructure. At a particular historical moment sport practices contain a combination of these aspects, predominantly from one side of the oppositional pairings. By observing the concrete productive form (appearance) of sport at a historical moment, it was possible to determine the development of sport at that moment, and to observe where the ongoing direct mediate historical pressures of the individual agents and of the structures surrounding sport could potentially condition the further development of sport. The inherent possibilities of the essence of sport were traced through its historical development. This permitted an understanding as to why sport began to hold its present particular phenomenal forms. A point

[95]Even former I.O.C. vice-president Willie Daume had, as noted by Lenk (1979, 143), ". . . admitted '"*Citius, Altius, Fortius*" is quite a dangerous statement.'"

was reached where the need for specific empirical support for the thesis of dialectical change becomes problematic.

To have singled out a specific sport, for example, athletics or gymnastics, for analysis, while being very useful and scientifically-appropriate, would have lead to two problems. First, each sport has developed in and at its own rate; therefore, specific analyses of a sport would require a study of great depth and particularity. This might well comprise a complete study for each sport. Second, in order to develop the present thesis, we had to remain at this level of generality so that some coherence could be maintained. In that we are discussing modern, high-performance, and Olympic sport, we have already narrowed the sports under consideration. This narrowing to the twenty-nine sports in the Olympic program was seen as both a *raison d'etre* and an ongoing problem for the Canadian state sport system which attempted to be "all things to all people."

In this discussion, we remained at this level of generality. The large number of sports and events within those sports has been a source of re-occurring fiscal and logistical problem in the Olympic movement. Coubertin could not have perceived, or imagined, the incredible expansion of sport forms when he initially structured the Olympic movement. Originally he felt that all legitimate sport should be brought into the Olympic Games. In the early Games of the 1912-1936 period there was concern over the size and the concomitant costs involved in holding ever larger Olympics. This discussion and concern continues to the present. More sports (i.e., international sport federations) wanted the identification and prestige of being included within the Olympic Games, hence they have increased the pressure for the inclusion of their sport.

The base of power held by the I.O.C. in this regard is immense, for it has the ultimate decision as to which sports will be included on the program. However, the financial and logistical realities of producing the Games themselves have also become immense, countering the expansion of the Games to fulfill Coubertin's vision. Whether the I.O.C. can successfully resolve this conundrum is integral to the future of the Games. Several ISFs hold very large and successful world championships, in terms of financial results and in the

"cultural performance" produced. The expansion and success of these events, which must be seen as a further specialization, appears to be another form of opposition not only to the Olympic movement but also to the Games under the I.O.C.'s partronage. For example, a number of the best Canadian track and field athletes chose not to compete in the 1987 Pan-American Games in order to prepare for and compete in the IAAF World Championships.

The increased quantity of sport performances in the 1960s was concomitant with the global long wave of capitalist economic expansion, the expansion of television technology and productive capacity, and the need for states and television to create audiences for the consumption of cathartic, ideological, physically-non-confrontational (i.e., mediated) sport productions. This quantification process inevitably led to the commercialization of sport producers. For example, successful athletes became promoters and endorsers of particular brand name products through advertisements. Sport performances, such as the selling of Games "spectacles" through competitive television network bidding drew wider audiences. In these ways the evolving economic modes of production in high-performance sport presented new possibilities for some high calibre athletes to generate large amounts of money through their sporting success.

This quantitative increase of the economic basis of international sport, in particular, led to serious contradictions in the Olympic movement. The intense struggle led to a negation of the avocationally-defined amateur sport form and content upon the retirement of Avery Brundage as I.O.C. president. Under Lord Killanin, the amateur definition and application underwent change, as did the objective structure of the I.O.C. We observed the emergence of a new economic mode of high-performance sport production resulting from the transformation of a hegemonically-led form and content to an economically-led form and content. The I.O.C. itself, as the organizational structure of the movement, has also undergone a similar change as its objective form follows the corporate, commercial dictates of capitalism. Today the I.O.C. enters into lucrative contracts to expand and realize its economic potentialities. It has even hired a large Swiss marketing firm to negotiate contracts with

multi-national capitalist corporations to sell to the highest bidder its image, spectacle, and audience. The I.O.C., however, continues to struggle against the political forces for change and against the problems of "*citius, altius, fortius.*"

With the acceptance of the U.S.S.R. into the Olympic movement in the early 1950s, along with the newly constituted socialist eastern-bloc and later the Third World nations, the political-ideological struggle came to prominence and has intensified since that time. This is not to imply that political issues have not been part of the Olympic movement since its inception, but only that the cold-war ideological struggle has intensified and may well "tear asunder" the whole Olympic movement. Former British sport minister, Neil MacFarlane, has identified the historical "nodal" point which we asserted will result in the sublation of the Olympic movement: "I must confess that I can think of no greater idiocy on the part of the IOC members than the awarding of the Olympics to yet another aligned country, to a state [South Korea] which does not even have diplomatic relations with the Communist bloc" (1986, 246). This "idiocy" has already forced the I.O.C. to change a key aspect of its operational procedures, in that the I.O.C. and not the host country's N.O.C. sent the invitations for the 1988 Olympiad in order to avoid the problem of boycotts. Even more fundamental changes are likely to follow.

The intrusion of performance-enhancing drugs has also forced the I.O.C. to instigate many expensive operational and regulative practices. The differences between the best high-performance athletes, trained in highly technical, rational ways, are marginal. Generally, any athlete, with minor exceptions, could become an Olympic champion on any given performance date. The psychological preparation of the athlete is often the only differentiating factor between competitors. However, due to the prestige and economic possibilities of an Olympic victory, we witness -- in newspaper reports and through the funding of elaborate, expensive testing programs -- the increasing use of drugs by athletes, amongst other forms of "technical cheating," in order to widen or eliminate the marginal difference between victory and defeat. This problem is related to both the economic and the political pressures for Olympic success. At present, however, this factor does not appear to be

as intense a force for dialectical change in the Olympic movement's form and content as does the political-ideological struggle.

The global political-ideological struggle, the dialectical changes in international, high-performance modern sport, and the political-ideological potential, both intra-nationally and internationally, of sport has led many western capitalist societies to develop state sport systems. This trend has also occurred in Canada, but it has followed particular historical processes mediated by both the political economy of its capitalist state structure and the indigenous political developments, which were evolving around the same time as the I.O.C.'s dialectical change. Like other capitalist states in general, but following its own particular form of dependency on the United States economic and cultural metropole as well, it was possible to identify particular state actions that help to explain the intervention of the Canadian state in sport.

The Canadian state, it was observed, retained its apparent "relative autonomy" in its actions to economically, politically, and hegemonically protect and perpetuate the monopoly capitalist structure that characterizes this country, as well as to produce a national identity separate from the American one. In the first instance, the Canadian capitalist state has used methods of economic, political, and hegemonic intervention, identified as accumulation, legitimation, and coercion, to accomplish this "relative autonomy," and to struggle against foreign dominance. Gough (1975) used O'Connor's framework to identify how the state expends its resources to fulfill its role under capitalism.

The three areas of state expenditure parallel the three functions a state performs under monopoly capitalism. These are identified as social investment, social consumption, and social expense. As Gough also pointed out, it is difficult to delimit state expenditures, in any particular area of intervention (e.g., cultural/sport funding), purely into one of these categories. He suggested, however, that a "predominant material category" could be identified. In the Canadian example, it was possible to observe that the category of social expense was the "predominant material category." We assumed the existence of a parallel connection between this third category of state expenditure and the third category of state

action under monopoly capitalism, which made it possible to claim that the Canadian state expenditures for sport were social expenses for coercive functions. It was also asserted that these coercive functions were of both a positive and negative type. Whereas the negative coercive functions can generally be lumped under the structural Marxist category of "repressive state apparatuses," the former are generally seen as being "ideological state apparatuses."

"Ideological state apparatuses" were also seen as both positive (i.e., developing a healthy individual or national identity), and negative (i.e., generating a false consciousness about the true nature of capitalism). Surrounding this sphere of function and action is a prevelant hegemony of technical rationality; that is, a widespread expectation and belief that the actions of the state are informed by such rationality and thereby the state will provide a healthful, prosperous, culturally-complete life.

The particular political philosophy in Canada was seen to be that of liberalism (Laxer and Laxer 1977; Smythe 1981). The notion of individualistic ambition and rational choice in the freely-operating market was seen to be basic to this ideology and the means of social progress. It was argued that this served capitalism very well and operated to develop a positive nationalism in the metropole states. But it has had the effect of generating a "continentalist" situation in the Canadian case (Grant 1970). Canada's dependency was seen to have been augmented by Liberal government policies which, over the years, encouraged foreign capital investment, and by a slower development of indigenous Canadian capitalism. Not only did Canada become an economic "branch plant" of American capitalism, but it has also become a "cultural colony"(see Laxer and Laxer 1977; Laxer 1973; Kidd 1982). The contradictions of capitalism, the dependence of Canada, and the ambivalent Canadian struggle to foster both capitalist economic growth and cultural identity, has lead to a most difficult situation as contradictions have intensified.

Canadian governments must legitimate themselves, the economic system, and sponsor the growth of a Canadian culture, and to do so must ameliorate the contradictions and ills of capitalism and establish objective support structures with which to produce cultural activities

(Jhally 1983). These legitimating cultural activities must be funded through means which, for the greater part, are deductions from the social surplus, that is, they are unproductive labour forms of a luxury-social expense type of expenditure. Those studying the arts have pointed to the contradictions of the intervention of the state in cultural activities. First, the decision-making input and economic survival of the direct producers is reduced through state intervention. Second, the quality of the cultural product has tended to be lower when funds provided are in excess of the capacity of the producers available to utilize them. Third, the bureaucracies become unresponsive and goal-oriented in ways detrimental to the free and individual expressiveness of the cultural producers. Four, due to the capitalist hegemony held, the rationality of profitability and the logic of the market come to be seen as competing funding alternatives for cultural activities.

As Mandel (1975) noted, under capitalism, the ideology of technical and bureaucratic rationality becomes irrational as it adds to the contradictions existing in the society. This contradiction is exemplified in the attempts by the state to legislate, govern, and direct the country; the state must balance the forces which threaten economic collapse and those which threaten social unrest. The areas open to the state within which to achieve and maintain this balance are limited and often found in the areas of unproductive labour. As private capital will only hesitantly move into these areas, or will not venture capital into them without prior state assistance, the state is left in a position where it must socialize the costs of production. This generally means the progressive socialization of costs on the one hand, and the private appropriation of the profits on the other (Harvey 1987). Witness, for example, the massive state funding of major Games and at the same time, private accumulation of profits through the hosting of those Games (Calgary 1988).

The historical development of the intervention of the Canadian state in sport began with the passing of the *Fitness and Amateur Sport Act* in 1961. At that time the role of the state was one of "enabler." The administration of this act was largely under the control of a volunteer council, which basically handled a federal-provincial joint-funding program. According to Hallett (1981) there was dissatisfaction with the administrative process under

this Act because of the lack of policy direction and public accountablility for the funds provided. This dissatisfaction was held by several key actors in and around the federal government. Hallett pointed out who the key agents were in the initial and ongoing efforts to bring the government into direct control of amateur sport. People such as Lou Lefaive, Doug Fisher, Harold Rea, amongst others, were behind the effort to increase the role of the state in sport, to create a task force to study the Canadian situation, and to actually write the task force report.

The historical moment these people required to achieve their goals occurred early in the Trudeau era. In an election speech during his first campaign as Liberal leader, Trudeau promised to form a task force to study the situation and policy needs of Canadian sport. The political philosophy and agenda of Trudeau is clearly defined in his book *Federalism and the French Canadians* (1968). Trudeau saw that nationalism in its separate Anglo and French Canadian versions was leading to a potentially divisive condition in Canadian history. While deriding nationalism, he nevertheless employed it, along with a zealous belief in federalism, to further his version of national unity. Trudeau's federal nationalism was to be such an attractive and unifying force that regional and ethnic nationalisms would lose their force. This federal nationalism was to cover the totality of Canadian society, that is, it would be applied to economic, political, social, and cultural areas, thereby forming a unique, independent "pan-Canadian" identity.

A second aspect of Trudeau's philosophy was his belief in rational action in politics, lifestyle, economic behaviour, and ". . . to a world beyond emotionalism and nationalism where a new technocratic elite will cooly and wisely guide the affairs of men" (Laxer and Laxer 1977, 94). This belief in "cybernetics" was to be actualized in the administration of the Canadian state. Specifically, it was believed that the state could better organize and administer Canadian society in the areas outside of direct capital enterprise. This aspect, coupled with the federal nationalism noted above, was variably realized in the milieux of Canada's political reality. Whatever the overall success of this attempted realization might have been, the key political actors had an opening and a leader through whom their goal of direct state

intervention in sport could be achieved. The *Task Force Report* (Canada 1969) pointed to the weaknesses of the then current sport structure, to its non-rational organization, and to its poor performance record in international sport, especially in ice hockey. Trudeau's belief in the cybernetic government of experts, the use of cultural programs and sport success for the development of Canadian nationalism, and the general international dialectical change in sports modes and relations of production made sport a useful tool to help achieve his goal of national unity within his rational perception of organization and governance.

The report of the task force on sport was tabled in Parliament in 1969 and federal policies to implement the recommended changes soon followed. To rationalize, control, and improve Canadian sport, the sport system was restructured through the development of an expanded, formal [illegible]racy. The voluntary nature of both the Fitness and Amateur Sport administrative [illegible]e administrative bodies of the national sport organzations was lessened consi[illegible]ese functions and activities were now centralized in and controlled through the National Sport and Recreation Center in Ottawa. From this point in the early 1970s up to the present, the politicians and bureaucrats have continued this rationalization of the sport delivery system. The various means by which this process is carried out is well documented in Hallett (1981) and Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks (1987), and evident in the quadrennial planning process now in place.

Much has been written on the class nature of the volunteer administrators, professional administrators, and the state athletes themselves. In each case there is a clear pre-eminence of personnel from the middle class and upper-middle classes. The economic, family, educational, and occupational characteristics needed to fill administrative or athletic roles has been shown to be clearly class biased. What has really occurred is that the lower socio-economic groups are still discriminated against, and the middle classes are in a struggle of "all against all." If it were not for the family and socio-economic status backgrounds of the majority of the Canadian athletes, there might well not be a federal sport system. The salaries of those employed in the bureaucracy are competitive with those of the market for comparable positional capacities; whereas, the amounts paid to the athletic elite are very low

in comparison. As the state, including the sub-central levels of government, is basically the only employer, and as it holds the power to determine who can compete, it is in a very powerful position.

The involvement of the Canadian state in sport formed part of the dialectical change in its delivery system. Through changes in the mode of production -- to a vocational, high-performance, goal-directed sport performance, and in the relations of production -- in the rationality of the technical and bureaucratic organization and in the capitalist orientation of the national and international sport structures, and through the political-ideological legitimation of sport success, especially during the cold-war period, the Canadian state moved, to negate the subjective and objective basis of its sport system. After the Trudeau Liberal government came to power in 1968, sport, along with other aspects of Canadian life, became an increasingly "socially necessary" productive area for the development of Canadian federal national unity goals, for catching up with American and other cultural imperialisms. Sport, as for other cultural areas, were seen to be in need of a cybernetic fix within Trudeau's overall plan for maintaining the ethnic and regional status quo. In the main Trudeau did not seek basic change, but pattern maintainence.

B. Conclusions

The following conclusions can be made based on our observations.

1. The dialectical change to modern, high-performance, international sport through the negation of the "amateur" athlete category of sport performer at the upper levels of production and the corresponding changes in the I.O.C.'s organizational structure, were major harbingers of the intervention of the Canadian state in sport. The shift towards a "vocational" form of sport carried with it the demands for a scientific preparation of athletes, a substantial increase in the funds for that preparation, and amounts of time needed by athletes and their immediate support staff. Sources of funding, outside of the sphere of private capital, which would not make a substantial, ongoing financial commitment to sport, had to be found elsewhere. This provided the opportunity and the

situation for federal state intervention in Canadian sport.

2. The increasing "quantification" of international sport and the development of a global audience for sport made it a primary focal point for political-ideological cold war confrontations and for displays of national chauvinism. The political-ideological use of international sport allowed individual countries to use this form of sport production for the development of a national identity, national unification, and nationalism.
3. One of the three functions of the state under monopoly capitalism was identified as being coercive. It was argued that this function has both its positive and negative usages. In terms of sport, the positive, cultural, ideological purposes which success in international competitions can elicit is beneficial to that state. Funding provisions for this function were described as predominantly a social expense or a Department III luxury-type.

These expenditures are a deduction from the social surplus value and logically the allocations for sport should shrink or at least be under severe restraints, especially during a general economic downturn. Although Sport Canada budgets have increased, the increases have not accounted for inflation. Even so, these increases, plus Game-Plan funding show that the Canadian state views expenditures for sport as being a socially necessary allocation with a concomitant social value. Besides having an ideological value in national identification, success in international sport legitmates the state role in sport, its role in general, and, therefore, its purpose in perpetuating and protecting the institutional framework of capitalist society.

4. The allocation of funds to athletes and the intensity of their training and competitive programs support their identification as vocational sportspersons. As they receive direct state funding, even if a contractual relationship is denied, they are producing socially useful commodities. That is, their sport labour is abstract labour; it has a use value through which the state and many of its citizens derive entertainment, pride, and identification. State funding of sport helps legitimize the state.

If an audience of suitable size and permanence could be generated, then it is likely that private venture capital investments would be elicited, and these sport forms would

enter more directly into the relations of capitalist political economy. As this is not the case, then sport production in the state can only be accounted for as a socially determinable value, that is, it has value to the society in non-economic terms (Tarbuck 1983).

5. A marked contradiction of the state sport system resulted from the perpetuation of its inegalitarian nature and its unequal renumeration among the individuals involved. Studies of the class backgrounds of Canada's high-performance athletes point to their middle and upper-middle class location. It is contradictory, on the face of it, that the state currently spends over fifty million dollars per year on sport, yet cannot or will not provide parallel opportunities for all of its citizens. If it was not for the economic backgrounds of most of the state athletes, as found in certain studies (e.g., Gruneau 1975; Macintosh and Albinson 1985), it is unlikely that there would be a real need for the structure, as there would likely be few direct "amateur" sport producers of an international caliber.

This contradiction becomes more marked when the amounts paid to the bureaucrats is compared with that paid to athletes. The average Sport Canada recommended annual salary for a technical or executive director is $34,600. With the AAP carding system the athletes receive varied amounts; but if we average the total AAP funds available by the number of total carded athletes, as a comparative exercise, an annual amount of $4,054 results. Even the top ranked athlete, according to Kidd (1988), is eligible to receive a maximum of $1,500 per month or $18,000 per annum. This is a considerable difference. Undoubtedly it would be argued that there are many more athletes than administrators, coaches, secretaries, and it would be beyond the means of the state to provide substantial amounts to each athlete (Kidd 1988). Further, it would be argued that the state must pay these high non-athlete salaries to attract and retain quality employees in the face of competition with private capital. The state (and we must include the provinces here) has a monopsony position in dealing with the athletes. It does not matter that it is attempting to draw out, develop, and extract value from these high quality people. It does not have to compete with private capital (professional teams and

leagues for athletic labour, except in certain obvious sports, e.g., ice hockey). State athletes must be seen as poorly paid, but nevertheless vocational employees. It is a matter of degree and not of kind.

6. Sport is predominantly state-funded for hegemonic reasons and billed against the social surplus. But this may seem contrary to capitalist market principles. These latter principles hold considerable social and emotional or ideological currency, so that the true nature of their operation is sometimes hidden. In the sport system, large amounts of money are being spent for medal production; an expensive "service" oriented bureaucracy is operating; and the direct sport performance producers receive little direct economic support from the state.

In fact, state intervention in Canadian sport is actually a good example of over-all capitalist principles and practices. For sport is like public utilities: it has use values for the state, for participants, and for the general public. Sport, however, is [illegible] and intermittent to attract private capital. Indeed, sport is more comparable to those private-sector enterprises which seek state subsidies whenever economic downturns occur.

This study began with the hypothesis that within the structure of the Canadian state, sport has become bureaucratized as a result of the movement of sport from the avocational (concrete labour) moment to the vocational (abstract labour) moment. Sport has become part of Canadian civil society and political economy through its own inherent nature, through its ability to effect national identity, and due to the strong external influence of the international sport movement in general and the Olympic movement in particular. Based on these concluding statements, we find that our initial hypothesis was supported. Through the hypothesis, it was possible to identify the theoretical and praxical connections that explain the intervention of the Canadian state in sport. In particular, state vocational sport does not fully enter the political economy, partly because of the revenue source and the nature of the

product generated. This has led to a contradiction in the ongoing attempts of the state to privatize vocational sport in all sport disciplines.

C. Recommendations

The nature of scholarly work is such that as one attempts to answer questions and to seek support for hypotheses, many more questions are raised. Not only does an academic study press toward answering its own question, but it answers that question within certain limitations and delimitations; consequently any given study may or may not completely exhaust a particular question. Through the completion of this study, the following areas were seen as needing further study.

1. There is need for the study of the subjective aspects of high-performance sport. We have accounts which have been written by former high-performance athletes (e.g., Lenk 1979; Bannister 1973; Dryden 1984; Russell and Branch 1979) and those which include statements on the subjective experiences of the athletes (e.g., MacAloon 1988). But we do not have scientifically-based studies which support the claim that high-performance sport is alienating and de-humanizing because of the rationalization and bureaucratization taking place within that sport form. Lenk (1979) argued against this claim, but the lack of substantive literature in this area points to a need for further study.
2. A more thorough organizational analysis, along the lines suggested by Heydebrand (1977), and discussed by Benson (1977, 1983) is needed on the International Olympic Committee. The outline of the I.O.C.'s dialectical analysis offered here is tentative. A much closer study of the documents which delineate and regulate the organizing activities of this "transnational" corporation is needed. Only through the knowledge of these activities as recorded in these various documents, can we come closer to understanding the structural changes which have occurred in the I.O.C. and which so strongly influence national and international sport practices.
3. A more complete, in-depth economic analysis is required to draw out comparisons between the amounts paid to various agents in the Canadian sport delivery system and to

the athletes. The varied reporting methods used by the Fitness and Amateur Sport administration in the reporting of their annual transactions makes it very difficult to draw solid conclusions, beyond the superficial level, about the total operation of the sport-delivery system.

4. Further application of the conclusions reached in this study are indicated. Whether changes in the productive form of sport, in the organizational content of sport, and in the internal needs of a state are strong indicators of state intervention in sport, is in need of further examination. Studies of the intervention of other capitalist states in sport would provide support for the hypothesis reached here.

5. After the hypothesis has been applied to other capitalist states, hypothetical-deductive studies could be completed toward developing a higher level hypothesis or a theory to explain the reasons for capitalist state intervention in sport.

6. Further study is required on the efficacy of the Sport Marketing Council. By comparing the private versus public contributions to sport at different historical points, e.g., 1958/1961, 1968/1973, 1986, 1988, it would be possible to strengthen the arguments put forward in this work on the irrational praxis of the Canadian sport ministry.

7. Finally, based on the current on-going studies, we must begin to develop a praxis through which a solid, focussed opposition to certain aspects of the current structure and process can be developed. The work of Kidd, Eberts, Gruneau, Beamish, and Borowy, amongst others, has started to narrow the focus to the key issues which must be addressed if the objective form and content are to undergo further development. Pessimism towards the seemingly impenetrable barrier of capitalism and its ideology of rationality (both technical and bureaucratic) can only be reduced through a theoretical understanding of the operation of the system which may assist us toward new practical solutions (Mao 1967).

In particular, we personally support the work of Bruce Kidd and Mary Eberts in their demands for full contract rights for athletes. Their efforts also serve to underscore the larger patterns of sport in a capitalist society. For capitalist enterprises inherently

generate moves for contervailing unions of workers.

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Appendix I

The Concept of Hegemony

Hargreaves (1982), Gruneau (1983), and Williams (1973) have argued that the analysis of social relationships under the Marxian category of hegemony gives a more complete understanding of the society, and its sub-units, being studied. By using hegemony to study a sport organization, one is able to look at it as a "totality of social practices" which is "compatible with the notion of social being determining consciousness, but it does not understand this process in terms of base and superstructure" (Williams 1973, 87); that is, in its reductionist or economic determinist usage.[96] Both Hargreaves and Williams returned to Gramsci to define the concept of hegemony. Williams (ibid., 88) argued that,

> . . . hegemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total, which is not merely secondary or superstructural . . . [but] which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the limit of common sense for most people under its sway, that is it corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure.[97]

It is important to note that hegemony is never static nor guaranteed to a group in society. The group must continually defend, adapt, and, to a degree, accommodate it to others in society. This is particularly important, yet difficult to obtain across long historic time periods.

Before identifying a hegemony, one must be aware of the ways in which each group of social participants relate to a particular hegemony. One group of this social relationship is identified as the "dominant" class or fraction which is able to define the "effective dominant culture"; to which the second or subordinate group generally conform. For example, in the

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[96] Williams (1973, 87) gives this idea further clarification in the following: "any society is a complex whole of such practices, it is also true that any society has a specific organization, a specific structure, and that the principles of this organization and structure can be seen as directly related to certain social intentions, intentions which we define the society, intentions by which in all our experience have been the rule of a particular class."

[97] Hargreaves (1982a, 114) wrote that this theory "allows sport to be related to society in a way which does not reduce it to a mere appendage of the mode of production or a servant of the ruling class."

case of the Olympic movement the key groupings of this relationship are, respectively: the I.O.C. and its organizational sub-groups -- the National Olympic Committees, the International Sport Federations, the Games Organizing Committee, the numerous sub-committees of the I.O.C., and the attendant administrative bureaucracies of each of these groups: the subordinate group includes; the athletes, the nation-states of the developed and socialist countries (in particular), and those calling for changes in this organization from many other countries (in general). The effective dominant culture becomes a ". . . central system of practices, meanings, and values . . . which are not merely abstract but which are organized and lived" and are ". . . passed off as 'the tradition' or 'significant past'" (Williams ibid., 89). The subordinate group complies with this hegemony in a variety of modes ranging from positive allegiance through tacit acquiescence to pragmatic-instrumental participation (Hargreaves 1982a, 114-5).

The dominant group has developed strategies through which the challenges of the subordinate group can be kept within limits and thereby protect and maintain their hegemony. These strategies cover a range of modes through which the subordinate groups' challenges can be met; these strategies fall under the rubric of "incorporation" and their use varies depending upon the strength and type of challenge. Incorporation can take the form of "compulsion" or "manipulation," as the polar methods, with persuasion, negotiation, concession, and compromise falling between these extremes (Hargreaves ibid.).

The dominant group has several institutions (e.g., education, politics, the media) through which the hegemony is formed and remade. Also, hegemony is based upon residual or past

> . . . experiences, meanings, and values which cannot be verified or cannot be expressed in the terms of the dominant culture, [but] are nevertheless lived and practiced on the basis of the residue -- cultural as well as social -- of some previous formation (Williams 1973, 90).

This supports the incorporation of hegemony as the tradition or significant past.[98] Finally,

[98] Emergent forces (i.e., new meanings, values, practices, experiences) are continually being created and must be incorporated. This is part of the continual challenge an hegemony faces; for hegemony does not encompass the full range of human practice, so that the emergent forces which "are part -- and yet not part -- of effective contemporary practice" (Williams 1973, 91) must be assimilated.

rituals, symbols, and ceremonies are significant and strong methods used by the dominant group to reinforce and maintain its hegemony.

Appendix II

A Taxonomy of Oppositional Aspects Used in Dialectical Studies

This is a listing of the dialectical oppositions that have been used in general studies and, in certain cases, in the study of sport. Where specific sources can be identified, the citation is attached.[99]

SUBJECT(IVE)/OBJECT(IVE)
UNIVERSAL (supra- or transhistorical)/PARTICULAR (historical)
ESSENCE/APPEARANCE
SUBSTANCE (content)/FORM
BASE (essential relations)/SUPERSTRUCTURE (ideological forms)
NECESSARY LABOUR/SURPLUS LABOUR
CONCRETE LABOUR/ABSTRACT LABOUR
USE(FUL)/EXCHANGE LABOUR
CONCRETE (use) VALUE/ABSTRACT (exchange) VALUE
AVOCATIONAL/VOCATIONAL
PRIVATE LABOUR/PUBLIC (social) LABOUR

From the sport literature:

1. Boudrieu (1978, and Hargreaves 1982)
   i amateur/professional
   ii participant sport/spectator sport
   iii popular (mass) sport/distinctive (elite) sport
   iv hedonist use of body/asectic use of body

2. Gruneau (1983)
   i transformative/reproductive
   ii freedom (enabling)/constraint
   iii voluntarism/determinism

3. Zakus (1987)
   i autoletic/rationalized
   ii means oriented (process)/ends oriented (product)

4. Hargreaves (1982)
   i constitutive/constituting

5. Heydebrand (1977)
   i organizing activity/organizational structure

[99]The majority of the general oppositions are derived from Marx's work.

Appendix III

The Capitalist State

Introduction

This appendix has been included in the thesis to discuss and outline the salient features of the capitalist state in its current form. This discussion and subsequent outline will provide further information for the analysis of the Canadian state contained in the fourth chapter.

The discussion will proceed in the following manner. First, a brief outline of the classical Marxist writings on the state will be made. Following this, the second section will present an abstract[100] theory of the capitalist state as outlined by Krader (1976, 1979). In order to analyze concretely the Canadian state and its role in sport, the third section will present categories through which the capitalist state operates to govern and guide a particular nation. The last section presents a brief discussion of the increased service sector and the resultant fiscal difficulties that the "late" or "monopoly capitalist" state encounters in its current operation.

Classical Marxist Theory of the Capitalist State

Although Marx never completed his analysis of the political state under capitalism, scholars in this tradition have extended Marxist State theory in several directions but generally within the dialectical relationship that Marx identified. Marx outlined this relationship in the "Preface" to his work *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. It is through the historical conditions of human material production that this relationship begins:

> My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term "civil society"; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy (Marx 1977d, 20).

[100]We have avoided the use of "general" here for reasons argued by Poulantzas (1980, 19).

From this premise Marx (ibid., 20-1) went on to describe how this materialist basis led to the totality of structural relationships in a civil society:

> In the social production of their existence men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage of development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

This, then, is the historical and dialectical materialist basis of the formation of a state. Before going into more depth on these relationships, two other statements made by Marx in connection with the above must be mentioned. They relate to the historical specificity of a superstructure and to its change. First, "the changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure." Second, "no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society" and that this ". . . problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formulation"(ibid., 21).

These are the foundations from which the neo-Marxists, critical theorists (the Frankfurt School), structuralist Marxists, Gramscians, and cultural theorists begin their analyses of the state. A particular historical form of the state they study is the capitalist one, one in which a particular political economy exists. "Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore presupposes developed bourgeois conditions, ... [which] begins with *commodities*, with the moment when products are exchanged, either by individuals or by primitive communities" (Engels 1977c, 218,226).

As far as we can observe, the main difference between these various schools of Marxist thought depends upon their focus on the economic base or on the superstructure. For example, the neo-Marxists (e.g., Lenin, Mao) tend toward economic analyses whereas the Gramscians and cultural theorists tend toward the superstructural elements for their analyses.

each verging on a narrow determinism to the detriment of a complete dialectical analysis. We do not wish to imply that there is an over-determination in any of these schools of Marxist thought, but merely that analysis of the historical processes of the capitalist state can at times become stuck in one or the other of the base or superstructure. It is important to note that at particular historical moments one of these aspects is the dominant one (see Mao 1967); however, the dialectic of a society, as can be seen in the above quotes from Marx, must not be left out of such analyses (cf. Sayer 1979, 80-1). In order to continue this general discussion of the capitalist state, we now wish to follow Beamish's (1982) lead and use the work of Krader (1976,1979) to establish a capitalist state theory.

Krader's Abstract Theory of the Capitalist State

In his *Dialectic of Civil Society*, Krader (1976, ix) begins with the material basis of labour in a particular civil (versus primitive) society, that is, ". . . society of opposed social classes and the state." He proceeds to explicate the dialectic between the relation of the political economy and society which together result in the superstructural abstraction of the state; a state which later becomes concrete through particular agencies, such as bureaucracies for the government, judiciary, law and right, military, education. Krader separated the totality of civil society into its social and political economic elements in order to expose the relations of this modern, bourgeoisie form of society.[101] This was done in order to understand the forms of labour, and their concomitant "values," out of which particular social relations develop and are codified and legalized in the state (as a particular element of the superstructure), and from which a consciousness of these relations is developed and maintained. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness" (Marx 1977d, 21).

In the primitive condition of human productive activity, their work impacts and modifies nature. Out of this form of concrete labour, concrete value is produced (i.e.,

[101]We must emphasize that the heuristic separation of these elements of civil society is for a clearer understanding of the mode and relations of production and that their final position is in the "totality" of civil society.

use-values). This completes the unity of the production/reproduction and production/consumption moments, which have direct and non-mediate values. This is the natural moment of labour. However, in the civil condition, human productive activity produces a mediate, concrete use-value and an abstract exchange value. Each value must be present in social production; that is, they are co-determinants of the social moment of labour.

The social moment of labour and the social moment of value are determinants of the social relations of production in the political economy. In the political economy the values of social labour are "reckoned up" and a third form of value is determined, surplus value.[102] The production of surplus value does not become part of the political economy of bourgeois society until it is appropriated and realized through the exchange of commodities. The appropriation of this surplus by certain members of a society leads to a class-divided society, the modern or bourgeois form of civil society; a society where the producers of surplus values are opposed to the controllers of that surplus value and the production/consumption unity is broken.

Krader (1976, 6) wrote that "civil society is the organization of the society; as such it part of the social substructure. . . . [which] comprises the social production and its organization, reproduction, distribution, and exchange." But in the political economy these relations take on a further dimension as property rights enter the economic infrastructure. In civil society the class relations between those who control the surplus values (i.e., the owners of the means of production), and those who sell their labour-power come into opposition and conflict. The need to formalize and protect private-property relations and to identify the general social relations between individuals and the collective group led to the formation of a political system, of which "the state is the organization for the control and regulation of the relations within and between the classes of society; . . . : " (ibid., 22). Out of the economic or social productive substructure of society and through a particular set of historical processes, a mediated, determined superstructure is formulated. In the present case, this is a capitalist state formation.

[102]A further elaboration of these determinations of value, taken from Krader, is to be found in Appendix IV.

> The state is the product of the relations of the public sphere of civil society internally, in respect of the moments of public force and cult, together with the juridical and political institutions. The state as abstraction [*sic*] arches over the differences and expresses the unity of civil society as a formality alone; the state through the agencies thereof concretely [*sic*] is the means of suppression of the oppositions and differences that make up civil society. . . . The state is thus directly the product of the oppositions between the social classes, directly the product of the formation of the public sphere of civil society, as a category of class-divided society, directly as the expression of the official and formal side of civil and class-divided society, and directly as the expression of the concentration of the social power in the public sphere of civil society (1979, 26-27).

With the formation of the public sphere, an opposition develops between it and the private sphere. Not only is there "an abstract formalism of human relations" in this separation, but the subject/object (private) moment becomes projected into the public sphere through the formalization of ". . . relations within the family and between friends, in the private relations in the private sphere generally"(1976, 23).[103]

As Krader (1976, 23) discussed, in the political economy, private and social economy are distinct; private and public property are distinct; and a division and opposition exists between: head and hand labour, rural and urban production, and the city and the countryside. These separations are fundamental to the political economy with its opposition between producers and appropriators of surplus value, and also within the increasingly enlarged social division of labour. The development of social production, that is, the formation of abstract labour value through exchanges of commodities, the opposition of public and private spheres of human relations, and the separation and fragmentation of individuals through the structures of political economy and society also find and define a new system of wants. These

[103]Krader (1976, 17) also noted that "modern society has many elements in the private sphere that are not directly interrelated with the public; likewise, there are in social life many elements of an informal nature which have no immediate relation to the formal systems of the state and law. Some of these private, informal relations are found in the *play element* in social life, in artistic creation, and the like. These may indeed have their own element of organization, and their own social character, but from the standpoint of civil society they constitute the unorganized and informal aspects of social life, and their relations to civil society and the state are wholly different. . . . "(emphasis added). It appears that Krader is discussing "unproductive" labour areas and with some licence we might argue that he incorrectly perceives the relationship between these human activity areas and the state. For it was indeed this "private" conception of play (sport) and the arts which the Canadian state initially used as excuses to remain out of these areas of production.

wants are both universal and particular, public and private, subjective and objective, biological and social, and direct and mediate.

> Being multiplied, and not limited by instinct, they are a matter of culture and nurture, and not of nature. Being nurtural and cultural, the wants are not uniform but variable. . . . The common and the different are the joint condition of human wants; these, the universal and the particular are the dialectic of humanity (1976, 65).

Krader (ibid., 95) described the connection between the opposition of public/private and free/bound relations in capitalist society in the following:

> The human being in respect of civil society is the citizen, in respect of civil law the person, in respect of the state he is the subject, and in respect of the political economy the free contracting party to the sale and purchase of his labour power. The human being stands in an outward relation to the political economy, civil society, the state and law of the same. Other than the relation of citizen, person, associate, subject, the contracting party and the family member, etc., is the inward relation of the human being.
>
> In civil society the inward relation is alienated from the outward relation. The product of artistic, scientific, etc., creation is made into a commodity in the political economy, the art gallery, concert hall, laboratory, university lecture hall, sells the product of art and science, as any other commodity. Here the work of hand and head is outwardly displayed and marketed. The internal relation of painting, thinking, composing is externalized. It has exchange value.

This further shows how in the social relations of production use-values change from personal, direct wants (e.g., for production/reproduction or production/consumption of the direct producer) to social, mediated wants as part of an exchange value in commodities. This is what Marx (1977e, 76-87) identified as the "fetishism of commodities" which leads to a process of alienation occurring between the producers of exchange and surplus values (i.e., commodities), and the process and product of their labour. This is a historical process in the development of the capitalist labour process. [104]

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[104]Colletti (1975, 27-9) argued the following, ". . . *the theory of alienation and the theory of contradiction are now seen as a single theory -- one which (we now may add) embraces and encompasses within itself the theory of value.* For the fundamental contradiction . . . which takes pride of place is the *separation* which is immanent in commodities between 'use value and value', between private labour and direct social labour, between a particularized concrete kind of labour and abstract human labour.

In a word, the contradiction arises from the fact that the *private* and *social* aspects of labour, which are 'intimately connected' (since they are aspects of the labour that the individual accomplishes *in society*), are given a *separate* representation and existence: the private or concrete aspect in the commodity's 'use-value', and on the other hand the social aspect, with another existence of its own -- separated, and hence *abstracted* from the former -- as the commodity's

As the ". . . mediation of human wants and the means of their satisfaction is through labour" (ibid.), the oppositions of the classes means that some are bound to certain production relations in the political economy.

> Freedom in civil society in general is an external and formal relation, freedom in the modern civil society of the production of capital is no different. Civil society in general, modern bourgeois . . . in particular are constituted of the externalization of human relations, which is summed up in the state as the formalization thereof (Krader 1976, 99).

But at the same time "[contractual] bondage is an external relation which is not only that of unfreedom but also that of inequality. Not all are bound in civil society; outwardly and formally, some are bound some are free" (ibid.). In capitalist society the formalization of the freedom of individuals in the constitution, that is, freedom in the market for goods, services, and wages, and of the bondage of contractual labour, through a legal, juridical system, is important to the functioning and maintenance of the productive relations in the social substructure (economic base). Not only must these formalized relations ensure the stability or harmony of a particular civil society, but they must also ensure ". . . the social production of a surplus that is over and above the quantity expended in the maintenance of the immediate producers as a class, or the reproduction of that class" (ibid., 91). That is, the class of producers of surplus value must not only ensure the reproduction of themselves as producers (organically and biologically), but also of the social totality. This further adds to the opposition and conflict between the classes.

The particular historical outcome of the transformation of civil society through capital production, contract, and wage labour was modern bourgeois society. The formation of a particular superstructure out of this class-divided society contained a political system where the state and law embodied the production and property relations of the economic base. This particular type of society is rife with contradictions between the subjective and objective,

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[104](cont'd) 'value'.

The contradiction is determined, in short, by the very nature of this society. For this is a society in which, while individuals live together they are not only divided and competitive with each other, but precisely because they are separated from each other, they come to be separated from the society itself, i.e. from the complex of relations between them." Also see Marx (1977c) for a further discussion of this concept.

universal and particular, public and private, direct and mediate, and biological and social needs, wants, freedoms, bonds of the two classes of individuals. The State, in its concrete agencies attempts to maintain a balance between these oppositional forces in order to maintain and perpetuate the particular society of which they are part. Krader's writings go on to show how the base and superstructure of society go through a dialectical change whereby new relations of social production have led to new superstructural forms through the Asiatic, classical, feudal, and modern periods.

One final but highly important aspect of this theory must be expanded upon at this point. In Krader's discussion of the dialectic of everyday life in civil society, he saw the unity of the political economy and civil society forming a totality, a unity which was at the same time a disunity (or opposition or scission), and

> civil society, as the category that arches over the whole of the society of political economy and the state . . . [and is] subjected to an inner dynamism, or development, of which three moments are . . . singled out: A) the moment of the political economy, B) the moment of civil society, and C) the moment of the conscious expression of both (1976, 84).

We have discussed the first two moments in the above paragraphs and, therefore, will focus on the last moment here. Just as modern civil society is divided into opposing classes, so, too, is the consciousness of the social groups, the thoughts and perceptions of the members of each group, and the articulation of the same in language, symbolic systems, and mediated visual and print forms. "The social consciousness is the consciousness of the whole of civil society at once a unitary and a divided form" (ibid., 88). It is the position of the bourgeoisie class and the state to ensure that the consciousness of the dominated class does not become divisive;

> . . . it is not only the bourgeoisie that wills the fact of class struggle to disappear from the consciousness, it is the agency of the state everywhere to do so. The state, in the condition by which it prolongs its own existence, by which it assures itself that it will neither be abolished not abolish itself, is the means to the continuation of the relations of political economy and civil society, or the antagonisms of the social classes expressed therein. (The state does not prolong its existence directly but mediately, acting through its agencies and intrumentalities; nor does it guarantee its own abolition directly, but only through its agencies. The state is an abstraction, its agencies are the concretion of the same.)(ibid., 87).

The subjective and objective means and structures used to manipulate the consciousness of the

dominated classes are given concrete form in the use of hegemony by the state.

The value of Krader's work is that it provides a theoretical framework of the dialectical development and structure of bourgeois or capitalist society. The abstract nature of his work must be grounded in research on particular aspects of this form and operation of the state. This will be the purpose of the second section of this discussion of the capitalist state.

Concrete Theoretical Formulations and Operations of the Capitalist State

Functions of the State Under Capitalism

In terms of the concrete dialectical relations between the base and superstructure of present-day capitalist states, there is agreement in the literature as to the basic features of this relationship. Mandel (1975, 475) defined these functions in the following points:

> i Provision of those general conditions of production which cannot be assured by the private activities of member of the dominant class.
> ii Repression of any threat to the prevailing mode of production from the dominated classes or particular sections of the dominant classes, by means of army, police, judiciary and prison-system.
> iii Integration of the dominated classes, to ensure that the ruling ideology of the society remains that of the ruling class, and that consequently the exploited classes accept their own exploitation without the immediate exercise of repression against them (because they believe it to be inevitable, or the "lesser evil", or "superior might" or fail even to perceive it as exploitation),

or, in simpler terms -- accumulation, coercion, legitimation (Panitch 1979, 8). We must caution that strict categorization of the activities of the state exclusively into any one of these forms is not theoretically sound. It is not a case of "either-or"; rather these functions often overlap and are often positive attempts to alleviate dysfunctions or to maintain social harmony, even though they might appear otherwise in the highly contradictory nature of the capitalist state (see Poulantzas 1980).

From this point it becomes useful to accept Panitch's (1979, 5) prouncement that

> . . . a fully developed theory of the state in capitalist society must meet at least three basic requirements. It must clearly delimit the complex of institutions that go to make up the state. It must demonstrate concretely, rather than just define abstractly, the linkages between the state and the system of class inequality in the society, particularly its ties to the dominant social class. And it must specify as far as possible the functions of the state under the capitalist mode of production . . .

in a historical manner, in order to make sense of the concrete role of the state. Following the lead of Miliband (1983), Panitch (ibid., 6) gave a delimited list of the "complex of institutions" which make up the concrete agencies of the state:

> The state is a complex of institutions, including government, but also including the bureaucracy (embodied in the civil service as well as in public corporations, central banks, regulatory commissions, etc.), the military, the judiciary, representative assemblies, and (very important for Canada) what Miliband calls the sub-central levels of government, that is; provincial executives, legislatures, and bureaucracies, and municipal governmental institutions.

The discussion of the class linkages of the state was completed in the above section from Krader's work. Therefore, the following sections offer an outline of the three functions of the state.

a. Accumulation Function

In particular, the relation of the state in ensuring the maintenance and protection of the economic structure and, concomitantly, the class system is paramount.[105] This is generally defined as its "accumulation" function (Panitch 1979; Mandel 1975). In short, the state must attempt to ". . . . maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation [and valorization, cf. Mandel 1975] is possible" (Panitch 1979, 8). Poulantzas (1980,26) emphasized that the mode of production is not an "instance," but rather is a "totality of economic, political and ideological determinations," and is secondary to the relations of production, ". . . it is the primacy of the relation of production over the productive forces that gives to their articulation the form of a *process* of production and reproduction." It is the primacy of these relations (i.e., class relations) which

> . . . delimit the given field of the State, it has a role of its own in the formation of these same relations. The way in which the State is bound up with the relations of production constitutes its primary relation with social classes and the class struggle. As regards the capitalist State, its relative separation from the relations of production -- which is produced by those relations themselves -- is the basis of its organizational framework and already maps out the mode of its relation to social classes and the class struggle (ibid., 25-6).

Two points are raised in the above: first, the state enjoys a form of "relative autonomy," and second, that the relations of production ". . . find expression in class *powers*

[105]For a more complete empirical and theoretical discussions of the Canadian class system see Clement (1975, 1979). On the class system and sport see Gruneau (1983).

that are organically articulated to the political and ideological relations which concretize and legitimize them" (ibid.). The state, in its historical progression has had to have a separation not only from the dominant class, but also from the dominated classes so that it might balance the contradictions that derive from the nature of a capitalist economic formation and reproduce that social formation by stabilizing both intra- and inter-class harmony (cf. Mandel 1975, Ch. 15 and Shaw 1974): It is accepted that the state does not act directly for the dominant class (at their *behest*), but rather on their *behalf*, both mediately and directly, in a variety of ways. Not only would direct compliance, even under monopoly capitalism, be difficult for the state to achieve and maintain, it would likely cause disturbances amongst the various groups in the dominant class, which Panitch (1979, 4) saw as being "dysfunctional to it managing the common affairs of that class." Further, the dominated classes would likely take great issue with such actions.

b. Legitmation Function

The state must, in the last instance, be seen as acting on behalf of all members of society, impartially and equitably, that is, democratically.[106] In its struggle to be seen as not acting directly on the dominant class's behalf, the state must ". . . try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony" (Panitch 1979, 8) through "legitimation" functions. These functions must be seen as comprising a totality of political, economic, and ideological aspects. In terms of the political, the principle of democratic representative government is given as the way in which individual, and atomized or fractionalized, voters are given to affect change in situations of dissatisfaction. This, of course, is a way of giving a false impression of the electoral process: one vote does not make an iota of difference in the various electoral methods of capitalist-based liberal-democracies.[107] In terms of the economy, capitalist states have evolved a series of income stabilization and "welfare-state" programs to alleviate some of the worst problems resulting from this socio-economic system. Finally, in terms of the

[106]Even though this is impossible in a class-divided society.
[107]This is why MacPherson (1965) was able to argue that many divergent forms of society could be identified as being "democractic."

ideological aspects, we have the concepts of "ideological apparatuses" (Poulantzas 1980) and "hegemony" (Gramsci 1983).

c. Coercion Function

It is in these ideological, or rather hegemonic, aspects, which are part of the superstructure of a society, but determined and mediated by the substructure, that recent work by those following Gramsci have expanded our understanding of how capitalism has endured in the face of on-going crises and of the lack of development of a revolutionary dominated-class consciousness. What seems to be missing is the dialectic between the hegemony (ideologies) and the institutions of the superstructure in which it is located, defended, and perpetuated. Poulantzas's work is criticized for being "structuralist," and those on the other side as being hegemonic or culturally deterministic. What we need to observe here is the dialectic between the ideas, or ideologies, in the hegemony of capitalist societies and their expression in various and ever-changing institutions of the superstructure; both aspects are important in the totality.

In Poulantzas's *State, Power, Socialism*, Carnoy (1984, 108-21) pointed out how functions of the state have both public and private forms of "ideological state apparatuses," which extends Gramsci's formulation, plus a variety of "repressive apparatuses." The latter "coercive" function, it is argued, includes the institutions of: army, police, juridical systems, prisons, state administration, and law; which allows the state to use legitimated physical violence or constraint, or to manipulate, human beings through the use of these institutions (Poulantzas 1980, 28-9). Because this role of the state is unpleasant, the other apparatuses available are important in order to avoid the use of these "repressive" apparatuses. The ideological apparatuses can be purely public, such as schools, universities (e.g., Gramsci's "organic intellectuals") -- plus certain bureaucracies of the state, or they might be combinations of public and private (juridically speaking) apparatuses which are closely tied to the state, " . . such as the Church (private), media (State and private), cultural institutions (State and private), etc." (Carnoy 1984, 110, cf. Shaw 1974).

Mandel, in his book *Late Capitalism* (1975), gives us further clarification of the role of the state under capitalism.[108] Mandel (1975, 483-4) pointed to the fact that the monopoly capitalist state has had to enlarge its size, its points and frequency of intervention, and its sphere of influence through increased budget commitments to social legislation, as a result of

> . . . three main features of late capitalism: the shortening of the turn-over time of fixed capital, the acceleration of technological innovation, and the enormous increase in the cost of major projects of capital accumulation due to the third technological revolution, with its corresponding increase in the risks of any delay or failure in the valorization of the enormous volumes of capital needed for them.

Mandel (ibid., 484) goes on to discuss the results of these features:

> The result of these pressures is a tendency in late capitalism towards an increase not only in State economic planning, but also in State socialization of costs (risks) and losses in a steadily growing number of productive processes. There is thus an *inherent trend under late capitalism for the State to incorporate an ever greater number of productive and reproductive sectors into the "general conditions of production" which it finances.* Without such a socialization of costs, these sectors would no longer be even remotely capable of answering the needs of the capitalist labour process.

These provisions for capitalist investment in state industries, for example, armaments, environment, overseas assistance, infrastructural works, for direct financial aid to capital, and for the technical reproduction of the working class have been augmented by a "huge machinery of ideological manipulation," in order to develop the tools for "permanent crisis-management" (ibid., 485ff).

These then are the general ways in which the state functions in the economic areas. In any discussion of the capitalist state and its current operation, these three functions must be acknowledged, discussed, and analyzed. The next section will deal with the categories of state expenditures. It is obvious that these categories parallel the above mentioned functions, they in fact answer the question of "how" to the above description of "what."

Categories of Capitalist State Expenditures

[108]It is important to note that the role of the state has altered as capitalism has changed. Its role in early competitive capitalism was different from its role under imperialist, or liberal, capitalism and now under monopoly, or late, capitalism. It has had to intervene in a variety of ways to ensure not only the accumulation of capital, but to ensure the very survival of this socio-economic system (see Mandel 1975; Braverman 1974).

In his article on "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," Gough (1975) clearly identifies the three categories of state expenditure. He cited O'Connors work[109] on this subject; O'Connor's categories were:

1. "*Social investment* consists of projects and services that increase the productivity of a given amount of labour power and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit." This is "social constant capital".
2. "*Social consumption* consists of projects and services that lower the reproduction costs of labour and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit." This is "social variable capital".
3. "*Social expenses* consist of projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony" . . . (Gough 1975, 71).[110]

Therefore, the first two categories are elements linked to the production of surplus value while the third is not; however, the distinction between these types of expenditures is not absolute, that is, there is some overlap and expenditures should at best be categorized as being of a "predominant material characteristic" (ibid.). The major items of Department III identified by Gough (ibid., 71-2) were, "external services, the police and judiciary and interest on the National Debt," which are ". . . services entering neither directly nor indirectly into the value of labour power, but required because of the antagonistic nature of capitalism . . ." (ibid., 71-2). It is also within the production of luxury goods that we see the state becoming more involved through the expansion of and production in the "service" sector.

The Service Sector

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[109]*The Fiscal Crisis of the State,* New York, 1973, page 7; footnote 3, page 54. Gough also pointed out that O'Connor should have used "labour" instead of "labour power" in category I and vice versa in category II, note 72.

[110]Gough (1975, 71-2) noted how O'Connor's categories are parallel to Marx's departments of production: Department I, "the material elements of constant capital (means of production)"; Department II, "variable capital (wage goods)"; and Department III, "luxuries" (see Marx 1977f, 399-406). Mandel (1975, 593) defined them as follows: "Department I: branches of capitalist production producing means of production (raw materials, energy, machinery and tools, buildings); Department II: branches of capitalist production producing means of consumption (consumer goods), which reconstitute the labour-force of the direct producers and contribute to the livelihood of the capitalists and their dependents; and Department III: branches of capitalist production which do not enter the process of reproduction -- i.e., which renew neither constant nor variable capital: for example, production of luxury goods exclusively consumed by capitalists, or production of weapons."

The expansion of the service sector in society in general, and in the state in particular, is evident in "late capitalism." Mandel has analyzed this trend toward the expansion of the service sector. He found that secular fall in the rate of profit, set off by the post-World War II long wave of economic expansion, led to an excess of non-invested capital. Due to this excess, Mandel (1975, 384,383) found an increased centralization of capital ". . . in the form of vertical integration of big companies, multinational firms and conglomerates" and an increased division of labour which was ". . . combined with [a] growing objective socialization of the labour process by an extension of *intermediate functions*: hence the unprecedented expansion of the sectors of commerce, transport and services generally."

Out of these developments a "generalized universal industrialization" of productive activities formerly done as a privately reproductive, or unproductive, labour activity occurred, through which capital could find alternatives to the problems of valorization and turn-over time of surplus capital. As Mandel (ibid., 388) noted, accumulated capital results in a devalorization and an overall fall in the rate of profit, which has led to a

> vast penetration of capital into the spheres of circulation, services and reproduction [which] can in turn lead to an increase in the mass of surplus-value:
> 1. by partially taking over productive functions from industrial capital proper, as is the case, for example in the transport sector;
> 2. by reducing the indirect costs of production, as in the infrastructure;
> 3. by extending the boundaries of commodity production -- in other words, replacing the exchange of individual services and private revenues with the sale of commodities containing surplus-value.

The changes which needed to occur for the above results to develop, included: a change in the demand for consumer commodities; a change in the production and relationship of the nuclear family; the commodification, and to a certain extent reprivatization, of cultural activities; and the creation of a "mass consumer society" through an extension of needs and through psycho-sociological manipulation (cf. Packard 1968)(Mandel 1975, 390-401). The totality of these economic activities form an increasingly large role in the amplification of the inherent contradictions of "late capitalism." The following summary of the increasing service sector is important to our understanding of the expansion of, among other things, the "unproductive" labour areas, many of which the state has come to involve itself with. It is quoted here at length.

The apparently homogeneous notion of the expansion of the services sector, that is typical of late capitalism, must therefore be reduced to its contradictory constitutive elements. This expansion involves:

1. The tendency towards a general extension of intermediate functions, as a result of the counterposition of a growing division of labour with a growing objective socialization of labour. Part of this expansion is technically determined, and will therefore outlive the capitalist mode of production itself . . . .
2. The tendency toward an enormous expansion both of selling costs . . . and of consumer credit. This aspect of the expansion of the services sector is for the most part socially, and not technically determined; it stems from the growing difficulties of realization and will disappear along with the capitalist mode of production or generalized commodity production.
3. The possibilities for developing the cultural and civilizing needs of the working population (education, health care, recreational activity), as distinct from the pure consumption of commodities, created by the growing productivity of labour and the corresponding limitation of necessary labour time (with growing differentiation of consumption). The services which correspond to these needs are not exclusively tied to the specific form of capitalist production and exchange, and will not in fact be able to develop fully before the capitalist mode of production has been overthrown . . . .
4. The extension of *commodity* production which is not a part of the so-called "services sector" at all, but is a result of the growing centralization of certain forms of production which were previously largely private. Electricity, gas, water, ready-made meals and electrical household appliances are material goods and their production is a commodity production in the real sense and in no way sale of services.
5. The growth in the number of unproductively employed wage-earners, since the massive penetration of capital into the sphere of circulation and services affords capital which can no longer be accumulated productively the opportunity of receiving at least the average profit of the non-monopolized sectors instead of obtaining only the average interest. This growth is consequently a result of the tendency towards over-capitalization in late capitalism (Mandel 1975, 401-2).

We have discussed in previous parts of this appendix the areas of state expenditure in late capitalism. One aspect of this role involved the increased role of the state in the socialization of costs in order for capital accumulation to be realized. This role is parallel to that identified above by Mandel, a role which at times conflicts with private production and with private capitalization of these costs. Yet it often augments this process by focussing on different areas. The second category, however, is more widely evidenced in the late capitalist state. The "welfare-state" provisions are the most visible of these expenditures. Again, aspects of this provision have been mentioned previously (see the Department II and III provisions mentioned earlier), but are in need of some further explication for the present purpose.

Both Mandel and Banting (1982) have noted that the development of capitalism, that is, increased industrialization and increased economic and social inequality as a result of the

inherent contradictions of capitalism, has been a major factor in the development of welfare provisions, yet there was ". . . no standard political configuration -- no common inner logic -- to the origins of the welfare state in industrial nations" (Banting 1982, 38). The policies formulated for welfare provisions, for example, income maintenance, education, health and welfare, housing, have varied between countries due to variances in industrial development, but also through the complexity of political, ideological, and social beliefs about the state and individual rights, and over "State provision or State financing of private providers" (Gough 1975, 74) of these services. The need for the state to interfere with "the free play of market forces" (Herman 1971), as we have seen above, was a result of the long wave of economic contraction beginning by the mid-1960s and accentuated by the mid-1970s energy crisis which necessitated further state intervention.

> The general pressure for increased control of all the elements of the productive and reproductive process, either directly by monopoly capital or indirectly by the late capitalist State, is an inevitable consequence of the combined need to prevent social crisis from menacing the system, and to provide economic guarantees for the process of valorization and accumulation in late capitalism.
>
> *The growing hypertrophy and growing autonomy of the late capitalist State are historically a corollary of the increasing difficulties of a smooth valorization of capital and realization of surplus-value* (Mandel 1975, 486).

The problem of this need for increased state intervention occurred at a historically problematic time as state revenues were decreasing, while its expenditures were increasing, leading to O'Connor's identification of the "fiscal crisis of the state" (also see Gough 1975).

This contradiction is also particularly acute as many of the non-industrial functions the state performs are in the "unproductive" labour areas, or in "non-capitalist state activities (non-CSA)"(Carchedi 1977; cited in Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). "Unproductive" labour is not a pejorative term referring to the quality of the labour power or the labour produced, but rather relates to the product produced and the source of revenue used to pay workers in this area. In that the products produced in "unproductive" labour are not hard commodities through which surplus-value can more directly be realized (i.e., part of the normal capitalist labour production process), the accounting of the extra value produced is difficult to determine. In the private sector, the "unproductive" labour-power might be essential for the realization of productive surplus-value, but, in the public sector the "reckoning up" of

surplus-value is the obverse of the normal case. The surplus-value of the "unproductive" public labourers can enter the capitalist relations of production by producing a healthy, highly-(technically)educated ideologically-satisfied labour force for which the capitalist does not have to contribute any variable capital (see Mandel 1975, 552-61). However, there is no surplus-value appropriated here. The source of revenue for this public "unproductive" labour force is the key element for the differentiation between it and "productive" labour.

The revenue used to pay "unproductive" state workers is generated through taxation of surplus-value produced in the capitalist sector (see Gough 1975, 82; Hutcheson 1977, 78-9; Tarbuck 1983; Clegg and Dunkerley 1980, 486-491,544; Mandel 1975, 403-7; Koskinas 1987, 58-60). Gough (1975, 61) added, using OECD data, that the rapid expansion of state revenues was mainly through increased taxation, but that the burden of those tax revenues had shifted from corporations to households. [111] Mandel (1975, 407) pointed out that the ". . . overall social surplus-value which accrues to the capitalist services sector is a deduction from, rather than an addition to, the surplus-value created by productive capital." The deduction for state services further exacerbates the crisis.[112] The contradictions resultant as both the public and private spheres increase the quantity of unproductive workers, as capital faces a crisis in its own accumulation and valorization, and as the state tries to maintain a balance between its social production, social consumption, and social expense functions (with a declining revenue and an increasing demand for "allocative" transfers) the whole structure of capitalist civil society and its state reach a potential negation point in its dialectical movement (see Offe 1984). The crisis-management skills of the state are exercised to their fullest potential at such times.[113]

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[111]This does not deny the ongoing, enlarged expenditures in Department III of national debt interest payments.

[112]Tarbuck (1983, 98) qualified this fact, somewhat, by noting that, "the proliferation of service 'industries' in the advanced capitalist countries is not evidence that such services are productive of surplus-value, but rather it is evidence that the productive workers proper are *very* productive, and that there is a need for greater unproductive expenditures to realize the potential surplus-value."

[113]Especially while attempting to placate voters without raising taxes, while at the same time reducing the national debt.

Fiscal Crisis of the State and Hegemony

As the fiscal crisis of the state heightens, so, too, must its ideological or hegemonic management in order to maintain social harmony. The hegemony of capitalism is not only protected and perpetuated through the institutions outlined above, but also through linkages between state employees and the dominant class and within the state civil servants themselves. Miliband (1983), Panitch (1979), Olsen (1979), Mandel (1975), Clement (1979), and Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) have all provided empirically-base studies of the class backgrounds of politicans and bureaucrats, the institutional linkages between state and private structures and individuals, and the educational linkages (i.e., the reproductive content of business school ideologies [Clegg and Dunkerley 1980]) and the social connections through particular institutions (Newman 1979; Clement 1975). These particular linkages become more emphatic through the ideology of "technical rationalism" of late capitalism. Through this particular ideology, the state has come to be seen as *the* body through which neutral, rational, and equitable decision-making can be executed for the betterment of the society in question. The power and hegemony developed through these linkages is further supported by the "professional bureaucrats," who also come to hold considerable power of their own through their positions in the state apparatus.

In order to link these theoretical concepts of the state to Canada and to its sport system, it is necessary to note how the above ideology is held in a state. It has to do with the belief in late capitalism of "the omnipotence of technology." "This ideology proclaims the ability of existing social order gradually to eliminate all chances of crises, to find a 'technical' solution to all its contradictions, to integrate rebellious social classes and to avoid political explosions" (Mandel 1975, 501). Ingham (1975,1978) sees this "in terms of the Weberian perspective, [where] rationality has become methodologically hegemonic; for knowing the ends and the alternative means to those ends, we select the most rational means-ends relationships" (1975, 346). This hegemony includes both the objective nature of rationality, in its technical and bureaucratic forms, plus a ". . . legitimation of a stratification system based upon competitive economic performance," that is, a system based on a hegemony of "meritocratic

ideology" (ibid., 347). Mandel (1975, Ch. 16) and Meyer and Rowan (1980) see this technical rationalism in a different light.

Mandel argued that the ideology of organization (i.e:, bureaucratic rationality) is necessary for the survival of bourgeois society and its quest for profit, which, therefore, requires the regulative functions of the state (1975, 502-3). He went on to argue that this "ideology of 'technological rationalism'" (including its bureaucratic form) mystifies and "conceals social reality and its contradictions" in four ways. First, it acts as a form of reification whereby it is ". . . a mechanism completely independent of all human objectives and decisions, which proceeds independently of class structure and class rule in the automatic manner of a natural law" (ibid.), in which man's conscious praxis is subsumed. Second, it is "incomplete and therefore internally incoherent" which leads to a form of irrationality and fails thereby to explain "the contradiction between the increased skill and culture of the mass of the working class on the one hand, and the petrified hierarchical structure of command in the factory, economy and state on the other . . . ." (ibid., 503-4). Third, it falsely justifies and thereby mystifies the fundamental contradictory nature of capitalism -- "philosophers who fall prey to the fetishism of technology and overestimate the ability of late capitalism to achieve the integration of the masses, typically forget the fundamental contradiction between use-value and exchange-value by which capitalism is riven, when they seek to prove the hopelessness of popular resistance to the existing social order" (ibid., 507). That is, the development of ideology is mystified and commodified through the very dominance of the socio-economic system in which it exists. Fourth, the notion of economic rationality is ". . . in fact a *contradictory combination of partial rationality and overall irrationality*" (ibid., 508; Mandel is citing Lukács [1971] here), as it must work on several levels simultaneously thereby leading to this contradictory combination, not only in the operation of economic enterprises, but between the satisfaction and optimal development of human needs and the valorization of capital.

Meyer and Rowan's (1980, 300) discussion focussed on the organization which they saw as being

> . . . driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures.

They described how the "myth and ceremony" of bureaucratic legal-rationality has lead to organizational structures in which: institutional agents must act in good faith; this principle of organization is accepted as the dominant and legitimate form without question; and certain elaborate internal and external displays of confidence, satisfaction, and compliance (i.e., ceremonies) support these institutionalized organizations. In both of these cases, the questionable nature of technological and bureaucratic rationality is apparent; however, in the period of late capitalism they have become the dominant structural and hegemonic form. Therefore, the challenge to their hegemonic strength and position is weak as the dominated classes acquiesce or fail to mount a suitable opposition.

Although the above information discusses the state as a reified object (an abstraction seen as a concrete entity), the state is obviously an institution in which particular social processess are operating. Those processes are formed in human interactions; therefore, when it was noted that "the state" did something, it should be read as those who work in the state were doing something. For it is this collective of human individuals who carry out the social processes of the state.

Finally, through the above discussion, it was possible to see the abstract and practical processes of the state. Together, with the above qualification, we can see the praxis of the capitalist state.

Appendix IV

Krader's "Table of the Relations of Social and Political Economy"[114]

It would have belaboured the discussion of Krader's theoretical framework of the state to include the following material in the text of chapter four. The material quoted below will aid our analysis of the location of sport in the political economy and the state in Canada, so it has been presented here at length.

> "Exchange and production in society are mutual determinants, one of the other. The commodity does not stand in a reciprocal relation to the process of social production, but is the determinate of that process, as may be seen from the following table of the relations of social and political economy:
>
> exchange→social production
> social production→exchange
> social labour→exchange value
> (social production→exchange value)
> amount of social labour→amount of exchange value
> (amount of social production→amount of exchange value)
> exchange→commodity
> commodity→exchange
> commodity exchange→commodity production
> social production→commodity exchange and production
> commodity→use and exchange value
> use and exchange value→commodity
>
> (The arrow indicates the direction of the determination. The order of the sequence is important.)
>
> . . . It is not the relation of distribution that binds the units of production together in the social economy, it is the relation of exchange. Distribution is an important factor in the social economy, but it is not necessarily a social relation, whereas exchange and commodity relations are of necessity social relations. Distribution takes place within the unit of consumption and within the unit of production, not necessarily between them."

[114]Krader 1976, 195.