University of Alberta

Decoloniality and Political Rationality of the Union of South American Nations

by

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Dedication

For Sandra and Joshua, who with endless support and patience remind me that it is okay to struggle with a second language. Also, for my mom, who constantly comforts me by letting me know that I can do anything I want to do, but that not wanting to do anything and sit in contemplation is perfectly fine.

Abstract

In a context of international crisis, regionalism and regionalization are captivating academic attention as instruments for change. I aim to answer a main question: Does the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) entail a transformative exercise of government in this region? Also, what does the characterization of UNASUR as "postneoliberal" imply and how is it formulated? This critical theoretical study draws on governmentality and decoloniality to evaluate the transformative potentialities and novelty of regionalism and, specifically, UNASUR. This thesis contributes to the knowledge of regionalism first, by assessing determinism and flaws of mainstream regionalism research; second, assessing the shared assumptions underlying the research of UNASUR; third, identifying the South American initiative's political rationality and alternative excluded rationalities. Based on the decolonial stance, this thesis concludes that UNASUR's political rationality is not transformative. Rather, it may be understood in the context of mainstream regionalism research reproducing the modern/colonial matrix of power.

Acknowledgement

I must acknowledge that this thesis was first influenced by the value of the notion of "utopia" that Eduardo Galeano brought back to my very realist scholarly education. Galeano (1989), Uruguayan activist, emphasized that the purpose of utopia is to keep us—us idealist—walking to the horizon, dreaming of alternatives, planning and attempting better realities. He also affirmed that this path could only be walked by acknowledging and including the voice of *los nadies* (the nobodies), those that historically have been left behind, or more precisely have been exploited, in the quests for progress, development, and modernity.

This dreaming of other realities and unveiling the bound of *los nadies* was a possible academic endeavour only with the guidance and on-going support of my supervisor Dr. Malinda S. Smith, who has been a crucial source of influence while constantly promoting creative thinking and enabling an in-depth comprehension of the decolonial perspective. Thanks also to Dr. Julián Castro-Rea, my co-supervisor, who has patiently guided a thorough understanding of regionalism and regionalization theory and who has helped me to develop an informed critique to later support the process of developing an alternative stance of view.

Finally, I must thank Darcie Charlton and Joshua Walsh. Thanks to Darcie for being there for me since I moved to Edmonton, for providing not only a house but most importantly a home and a friendship. To Joshua, thank you for being my comrade.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALADI	Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración [Latin American Integration Association]
ALBA	Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America]
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASC	Alianza Social Continental [Continental Social Alliance]
CAN	Comunidad Andina de Naciones [Andean Community of Nations]
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CLAES	Centro Latinoamericano de Ecología Social [Latin American Centre of Social Ecology]
CDS	Consejo de Defensa Suramericano [South American Defence Council]
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
ILO	International Labour Organization

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IIRSA	Iniciative para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana [South American Regional Infrastructure Initiative]
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Association
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur [Common Market of the South]
NAC	Non-aligned Countries
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NRA	New Regionalism Approach
OAS	Organization of American States
SACN	South American Community of Nations
SAFTA	South America Free Trade Area
TUCA	Trade Union Committee of the Americas
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas [Union of South American Nations]
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNECLA	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War we witnessed the revitalization of regionalism and the spread of regionalization processes around the world (Farrell, Hettne & Langenhove, 2005; Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995; Hettne, 1994; Schultz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001). Approaching the study of regionalism and regionalization back then seemed necessary and in accordance with the prospects of transformation of the bipolar world order into a multipolar one characterized specifically by the emergence of a regional organization of the international system (Hettne, 1994).

Now, despite the differing positions and endless debates about this process of re-organization of power in tripolar, multipolar or uni-multipolar terms (Kim, 2004), we are again facing a period of global convulsions that seem to be an expression of a global desire for transformation. In fact, as Mignolo (2010b) argues, the notion of multipolarity in the world order has less relevance if understood not as a disaggregation of power between the parts as much as the decentralization of the points of production of the "colonial power" the one specific way of power that sustains modernity and capitalism (Quijano, 2010).

Certainly the mobilization and demand for transformation, which have taken different forms, from the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street Movement, are not directed to a pole or even multiple poles of power. Most importantly they are directed against a structural system of power–namely, the capitalist system of accumulation through domination and exclusion.

Thus, of great interest for this study is the broader puzzle of investigating the revitalization of processes of regionalization and doctrines of regionalism as potential means on the quest for this radical change. The focus of this study is specially centered on the South American case as regionalism and regionalization of apparently new contours have captivated the attention of international and comparative scholars as possible instruments of transformation, just when these seem to be required the most.

Latin America has experienced the perverse consequences of the capitalist system of accumulation and exclusion through the rule of market and neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is understood as the exaltation of the "belief of the moral necessity of market forces in the economy and 'entrepreneurs'… as a good and necessary social group" (Adésina, 2006, p.52). Neoliberalism is "the economics of a new imperialism" (Smith, 2006, p.7) that determines the best behaviours and values in tune with its economic goals. These goals have necessarily and historically implied the exploitation and domination of some human beings by others or the abandonment of those who cannot follow up with its doctrine (Mignolo, 2010a; see also, Hettne, 2009; Rose, 2006).

Latin America has faced the enforcement of neoliberalism through different schemes: the so-called Washington Consensus in the 1980s, the failed set of policy prescriptions established as prerequisites for monetary aid; the negative repercussions of the crisis of the East Asian model of growth and its dependence on resources' exportation; and recently the consequences of the model of open market-led regionalism of the 1990s. All of these aligned with

market determinism and were enforced by international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, Latin America still bet on schemes of regional integration to address the people's request for transformation of the world structures. Such integration is presented by Jimena Jiménez (2012) "as the transference of political authority from the national to supranational level" (p.67).

Drawing on the definition of Castro-Rea and Knight (forthcoming 2013), regionalization is a process that can lead to integration; however, I differ with these authors inasmuch as I consider that this process is always determined by regionalism as the doctrine that sets up what and in what way *one* is the best model of integration. Therefore I understand regionalism and regionalization as always means of governance.

Numerous authors, for example, Briceño (2010), Can (2010), Chávez (2010), and Castro-Rea and Knight (forthcoming 2013), have argued that the Latin American regionalism of the 21st century is one of a new kind, so-called "postneoliberal[1]" and positively considered as a potential means of transformation. A specific comprehension of neoliberalism as a set of economic reforms and therefore of "postneoliberalism" as a notion denoting the break with them and its crisis (Brie, 2009) has informed the analysis of "postneoliberal regionalism." The thesis of the "postneoliberal" character of UNASUR has been

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[1] The use of quotation marks when referring to "postneoliberalism" or "postneoliberal" regionalism responds to that in this study both are contested notions under analysis and cautious consideration, rather than descriptive terms assuming a *de facto* political transformation especially for the case of South America.

sustained in the return of the state as the main actor leading the process of integration; in other words, UNASUR is seen as an expression of the nation-states reassuming their role over the forces of the market and of the emphasis on objectives such as the promotion of peace, democracy, and social welfare (Sanahuja, 2007, 2008, 2012; Briceño, 2010; Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013).

However, Michael Brie (2009) argues, acknowledging postneoliberalism as a perspective has as a repercussion the lack of consideration of the plurality of neoliberalism' crises on the one hand—namely "overaccumulation crisis, reproduction crisis, integration crisis, democracy crisis, security crisis" (p.21), and of the capitalist mode of production as neoliberalism' broader determinant paradigm on the other hand. For the case of this thesis I understand that "postneoliberal" regionalism, as used by regionalist scholars, is pointing out to only two of the crises of neoliberalism, the crisis of the market and the crisis of integration through liberalization. Nevertheless, "postneoliberalism" does not indicate here any anti-capitalist endeavour nor the transformation of social relations of power and institutionalism.

If "postneoliberalism" is actually understood as a contested notion limitedly referring to the crisis of economic liberalization and of market as mediator of politics, in turn, "postneoliberal" regionalism as denoting the beginning of a new stage of transformative regionalism could actually be misleading. The attention on the differences between UNASUR and previous

initiatives overshadows that fact that regionalism and regionalization do not overcome the other mentioned crises and complex global capitalism.

The purpose of this critical theoretical study is to explore in detail the notion of "postneoliberal" regionalization for the case of UNASUR. To do so, this thesis begins by proposing an alternative analytical stance for the analysis of regionalism and regionalization. I aim to approach UNASUR and its "postneoliberal" characterization from a perspective that denaturalizes its regionalist political rationality, in order to re-evaluate its transformative potentialities and its novelty. Thus, the thesis focuses on one primary question: Does UNASUR entail a transformative exercise of government through the region as a technology of governance? Also, this thesis aims to explore secondary questions: What does the characterization of UNASUR as a post-neoliberal initiative imply and how is this characterization formulated? What political rationality does UNASUR contain and perform as a means of governance?

For the purposes of this research, UNASUR is understood as an expression and means of regionalism as an "international art of governance" (Larner & Walters, 2002). The South American region is assumed here not only as an intersubjective construction and space where the dynamics of political power among the member countries take place; but as well, the region is itself conceived as a means of ordering/governing the international space, the national space, and even the people within them.

The theoretical framework developed for this thesis draws heavily on the critical theory of governmentality by Foucault (1979), the notion of coloniality of

power by Quijano (2000), and the standpoint of the project of modernity/decoloniality advanced by several researchers such as Walter D. Mignolo, Aníbal Quijano, Madina Tlostanova, and Catherine Walsh. By governmentality, this thesis refers to "the tactics of government [technologies of governance] which make possible the *continual definition* and redefinition of what is within the [government's] competence" (Foucault, 2006, p.142). In other words, the assembling of mechanisms included in these regions and region-building processes are the means through which governance is *applied upon* the diverse actors of society.

The notions and the framework of the constructivist perspective of the new regionalism approach facilitate my point of departure moving away from a static conception of the South American region and of the process of regionalization entailed by UNASUR. But beyond this, it is the critical work of Larner and Walters (2002), Newstead (2009) and Rose and Miller (2010) on the governmentality of the regions that allow me to see regions and regionalism as potential reified constructions loaded with a "political rationality" (Rose & Miller, 1992, 2010). UNASUR is not only a social construction but also a technology of governance. Drawing on the notion of political rationality elaborated by Rose and Miller (1992, 2010) this study refers to it as a vocabulary of the governable, a perceived knowledge of what will be governed, and a moral justification of the authority to govern.

Although the character of UNASUR as a construction has been unveiled through an analysis of variables that appear to determine it as a *new* outcome,

some of the implications that can be drawn from this characterization remain unproblematized. These analyses are based upon the identification of variables such as national political interests or objectives of integration, which focused on the identification of differences with previous initiatives in the region. However, this mainstream analysis does not give account of the process of regionalization itself, as a process in which an overarching political rationality governs through the formal constitution of UNASUR and in which the apparent coherent rhetoric that accompanies it have obscured the existence and competition of alternative voices. This thesis argues that when seen as a means of governance, UNASUR and the process of regionalization that it leads are techniques of domination through naturalization and exclusion. Thus far these processes and techniques have remained unproblematized.

Drawing upon the work of Wendy Lerner and William Walters (2002), this study suggests that the "postneoliberal" characterization is directly dependent of a mainstream analysis which does not denaturalize regionalism itself, maintains an understanding of regionalism and regionalization as determined within the economic field, and does not recognize the exclusionary nature of UNASUR in the other spheres of the socio-political life. The naturalization and homogenization, if not silencing, of the multiplicity of rationalities of integration fail to sustain the potential for transformation that UNASUR could entail as an expression of contestation to the regionalism' rationality associated with a still paradigm of accumulation and exploitation (Hettne, 1994; 2005; 2009).

Furthermore, I aim to question the coherence behind the official discourse of UNASUR in order to unveil the multiplicity of voices (and silences) that have been part of its constitution. I aim to trace the political rationality enhanced within this project. I will depart from the recognition that most of the current analyses have been centered on the *"What"* question concerning the processes of integration of South America (Briceño, 2010; Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010; Kellogg, 2007; Ramírez, 2008; Sanahuja, 2008a). "What have been their causes and their results?" is a question typically posed, without trying to answer the deeper and more complex questions of the *"How"* and the *"Who"* for the specific case of UNASUR: How is a specific political rationality within the project of integration of UNASUR sustained and naturalized? Who enforces this specific discourse over the rest?

Thus, I aim to demonstrate that UNASUR is an expression and means of international governance through integration, resulting from a process in which multiple rationalities compete among each other. Hence, I attempt to assess the political rationality through which this *apparent* new attempt of regionalization renders invisible alternative voices of integration; even more important, it governs the process through which an integrationist rhetoric is naturalized and enforced as the official one.

I will argue that among the voices around integration there is still one preponderant rationality of capitalist production and developmentalism sustained in the neocolonial paradigm; this rationality is at the basis of simultaneously evading dissident points of enunciation and therefore reproducing practices of

exclusion at the regional level. Furthermore, this rationality is established as the preponderant one in so far as it is linked to the broader matrix of neocolonial power.

Moreover, it is the specific work around the notions of governmentality (Foucault, 2006) and political rationality (Rose & Miller, 2010) which will allow us to uncover a preponderant political rationality behind UNASUR integration itself, and to identify it as constructing the region while simultaneously governing it. At the moment of assessing how *one* political rationality dominates over the other ones as the best, it is the decolonial approach, drawing upon the historical wound of colonialism in the region, which allows us to clarify the process through which a specific rationality stands above the rest through dynamics of oppression, exclusion and "coloniality of power" (Quijano 2000).

In order to carry out an alternative analysis of UNASUR as a means of governance, this thesis is methodologically developed through the analysis and critique of the mainstream regionalist approach and the posterior constructivist-led new regionalism approach (NRA). First, an exhaustive literature review of the mainstream regionalism approaches is necessary in order to delineate the realist perspective through which UNASUR has been mainly analyzed and thereby determine the flaws of this perspective and the determinism that it carries. Second, with this critical review of the theoretical mainstream categories, this thesis will further advance the analysis of the academic characterization of UNASUR as different, transformative and post-neoliberal. For this, I will focus attention to the research developed in regards to the constitution and development

of UNASUR, the analysis of the theoretical notions applied and the determinism of the mainstream theory. Finally, this study will identify UNASUR's political rationality with an analysis of discourse methodology of UNASUR's official documentation since the beginning of its formation (Summit of Brasilia, 2000). Additionally, I will unveil alternative rationalities of integration through the analysis of the published documents and declarations by the main actors gathered together in the Summit of the Peoples (Cochabamba, 2006).

I will make use of the so-called "abductive research strategy", based on the central ontological consideration of regions as social constructions, as part of "social reality […] product of processes by which social actors together negotiate […] meanings" (Blaikie, 2000, p.115). This strategy is centered on the interpretation of discourse as concepts and languages that carry meaning which simultaneously perform the world in a particular way.

This analysis will also involve the combination of *emergent* and an *imposed structure* of analysis (Wilson, 1999) insofar as, at a first level of analysis, the gathered documentation is explored without previous categories. In other words, my categories of analysis will be deducted from the data itself after identifying patterns of enunciation and regular themes. At the second level, the material will be reviewed with previous established categories of analysis provided by the theoretical framework, those of the three tenets of political rationality.

Finally, by assuming a critical stance this study contributes to the de-naturalization or the de-reification of the notions of region, regionalism and

regionalization as positive and desirable schemes or processes to reach an authentic structural change, particularly in South America. This study contributes with fresh insights about order and power, bringing together elements of governmentality and decoloniality which represent a promising offer for the understanding of the organization of the international context sustained in a matrix of modernity/neocolonial domination in which the spheres of authority, knowledge, production, and subjectivity (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2009) work together trapping specific potential initiatives of change. Most importantly this thesis brings to the fore of the debate three elements: first, the fact that by adopting an initiative of integration South American countries are reproducing themselves the project of modernity/coloniality, are committing to spread a geopolitical notion—regionalism as desirable and universal sustaining the relations of power that this entails; second, the necessity to think in different terms than "postneoliberal" regionalism when referring to UNASUR, insofar as this notion seems exclusive to one crisis of neoliberalism and misleads the important endeavour of acknowledging the ones that have not been yet overcome; third, the axial role of the decolonial project as the broader framework that reveals other rationalities as outside the intra-modernity perspectives and as the political stance that promotes the politicization of other rationalities as legitimate.

In commitment to the decolonial project and in a context of upheaval and multiple quests for transformation, this thesis is intended for the academic realm first, by unveiling the still important knowledge-power nexus; and second is addressed to the policy sector since UNASUR is a process still unfolding and thus

it is extremely important to emphasize the governance by domination and exclusion that is reproduced at the regional level.

The thesis will be developed as follows. First, I aim to identify the relationship between knowledge and power and to outline what the mainstream approach is still not attending to. In this section I will proceed to critically engage with a broader comprehension of regions and regionalism from the governmentality and decolonial perspectives. Second, I attempt to critically assess the shared assumptions underlying the latest case of regionalization in South America and to problematize the absolute characterization that bypasses the multiplicity of its origins. Specifically, I will approach the "postneoliberal" label in order to question an overarching characterization of UNASUR which sustains its conclusions in an analysis of differences and a typology of variables. Finally, I will focus on the analysis of discourse of the official documentation and primary policy documents published since the Summit of Brasilia in 2000 until now, as a means to identify UNASUR's political rationality and to outline a general alternative view of it as a "technology of governance at distance" (Rose & Miller, 1992). Apart from the official political rationality, this study also attempts to bring to the light the existence of alternative voices of integration and to outline the elements and/or rationalities for which these are kept overshadowed.

Chapter 1: Reviewing the mainstream regionalism approach

1.1. Introduction

UNASUR is widely recognized as an expression and a component of one of the international trends that has attracted significant academic attention since the end of the Second World War: New Regionalism. Characterized as a re-emerging and revitalized force, new regionalism is thought to occupy a central role within the rearrangements of the world system. In 1995, Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell already emphasized the importance of analyses of regionalism as a "principle of international order" (1995, p.4), and by 2005 authors such as Peter Katzenstein clearly stated that "regional comparison, linked to an analysis of the global power and processes that connect them, offers a promising way to understand 'how the world works'" (p.ix).

As my analysis is grounded on this relevance, it is important to make clear a number of points about our analysis of UNASUR. First, it is based in a particular understanding of regionalism and regionalization as ordering principles and as an art of governance acting upon not only nation-states but also upon people within them. Second, although the mainstream production of theoretical knowledge around regionalism has played an important role in understanding UNASUR, it is still insufficient. This study makes an important intervention in advancing knowledge and understanding regionalism as inserted in the matrix of neocolonial power governing through domination. Third, although UNASUR is viewed by some as an expression of a period of transformation, this research is built on the critical perception of UNASUR's capabilities as actually limited

insofar as dynamics of exclusion have remained through its process of development and constitution.

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the body of theory and conceptual categories appropriate to the object of study, to expound my particular position of analysis in accordance with my research objectives. In a broader sense, my aim is to contribute to the advancement of research and scholarship on regionalization processes, especially important to critically evaluate the idea of a third wave of regionalism.

This chapter will proceed with a brief overview of the contextual changes that defined the shift from old to new regionalism in order to highlight how these transformations also propelled a change in the academic scholarship on the issue of regionalism. This overview should serve to situate UNASUR within the reinvigorated context of new regionalism. Second, while recognizing the advancement brought by the constructivist turn on the second wave of regionalism, I also intend to outline its limitations in terms of de-naturalizing regionalism and regionalization, and of understanding them as means of governance. Finally, I aim to justify the need for a more critical understanding of UNASUR by bringing into the analysis the perspectives of governmentality and decoloniality. These can help us to elucidate the process of construction of UNASUR; and, more precisely, to expound upon how the formation of this regional body as a means of governance is embedded in a matrix of neocolonial power.

1.2 Old Regionalism to New Regionalism

1.2.1 The Eurocentric issue and its determinism

For the purpose of this research, it is fundamental to begin with an overview of these two periods in which processes of regional integration seemed to achieve a very important status in the international realm. The particularities of each wave of regionalism did give rise to a series of categories and academic notions, which at the time seemed more appropriate to account for the phenomenon of regional integration. Understanding the context in which each body of research emerged will help to sustain my theoretical position.

The historical event that marked the beginning of the first wave of regionalism was the end of the Second World War (Fawcet & Hurrell, 1995; Hettne, 1994; Schultz et.al., 2001). In the context of a world war and with the focus on reconstruction, it seemed logical that the analytical attention was centered on the new interactions of cooperation around security and economic integration among the nation-states—academically considered the preponderant analytic units of the international system (Schultz et. al., 2001). Nation-states within an older trajectory considered regional integration as a protectionist technique to get back in the path of economic growth, re-start processes of sustained development, and to legitimize their position of power (Shadrina, 2006). As well regional integration was a preferred alternative for newer sovereign states as a means to assert this sovereignty and to join efforts to consolidate their small economies as a stronger regional one (Buzan, 1991).

Also, understanding old regionalism in the aftermath of WWII was directly determined by the major concern of security. If before WWII peace was a goal perceived and promoted in universalist terms, peace after WWII was a more achievable objective attempted by regional means and causally associated with economic welfare (Nye, 1968). Closed economic solidarity fostered through regional trade areas was the instrument to achieve peace and political sovereignty; as argued by Fawcett (1995), self-sufficient and robust economies were the ones with better prospects of consolidating their international position.

Framed in the context of the WWII aftermath, the first wave of regionalism can be perceived as having deep roots in the specific European regional project. This project associated its own reconstruction endeavors to the provision of broader markets, the recuperation of the European power position, security, development, and material capabilities. The apparent logical association among these elements was represented in the specific milestones of the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) (Kim, 2004). As Ann Capling and Kim Richard Nossal (2009) state, "The regionalist project in Europe […] was driven by a shared desire […] to re-establish European power in the world [….] The development of regionalism proceeded […] the periodic resurgence of nationalist interests and identities" (p. 153).

These beginnings are undoubtedly important to the later comprehension of Eurocentrism that characterizes regionalization and the production of knowledge around regionalism. Strongly determined by the European experience, the

theoretical scholarship developed was greatly concentrated on the measurement of levels of economic exchange and integration (Schultz et al., 2011). At the time, the so-called *objective realist research* supported in quantitative methodology also perceived the conceptualization of region *objectively* insofar as it was geographically sustained.

Scholars drawing on empiricist observations and within a rationalist epistemology, perceived regions as agglomerations of "objective and dormant" nation-states (Hettne, 1994 p.2). Regionalism, in turn, according to Joseph Nye (1968), gave account of "the formation of interstate groupings on the basis of regions" as a "limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence" (as cited in Fawcett, 1995, p.11).

As Schultz et al. (2001) pointed out, other central element defining the first wave of academic research was the approach to "regions from the outside in," implying the identification of "the state [as] the major player" reacting to outside challenges (p.7). In this manner, the academic work at the time was influenced by the advancements of David Mitrany who focused on functional programs which, in a so-called realistic way, would not aim to surpass states' sovereignty; while on the other hand, the work of Karl W. Deutsch was focused on and advocated for supranational institutions as the most effective means of harnessing integration (Schultz et al., 2001, p.9).

Another central element was the scholarship's evolutionary perception of the character of these processes. With a clearly stated distinction between the

political dimension and the economic one, integration was assumed as an evolutionary process in which the strengthening of one phase could strengthen the next one until all the spheres of governance were mutually consolidated in a regional coherent formation (Schultz et al., 2001).

The scholarship within the first wave of regionalism was the apparently non-normative (Shadrina, 2006) rationalist-led and objective description of the international realm post WWII. This analysis was uni-dimensional and uni-directional within the frame of the Westphalian system and the obsession on economic integration, as the most important type of integration; furthermore, an international context understood from above and outside as "the halfway house between the nation-state and a world not ready to become one" (Sir Oliver Franks, as cited in Nye, 1968, p.V).

By the end of the 1970s the European paradigm of evolutionary supranational integration lost relevance. As Fawcett (1995) stated, the grandiose projects of European integration declined; however, economically-led regional integration did favored the post-war processes of reconstruction of Europe and set up the model of recovery and development as associated to the preponderance of neo-mercantilist paradigms of accumulation.

The theoretical advancements on regionalization also gave place to a spate of scholarly work around what was now considered to be "broader challenges posed by transnationalism and interdependence" (Fawcett, 1995 p.14). It was not until the beginnings of the second wave of regionalism that the critique of economic determinisms was theoretically formulated.

Today the body of research of regionalism has been developed and broadened beyond its initial insights. Although the Eurocentrism associated with the first wave of regionalism has been acknowledged and the relationship between the post-war context and the academic concerns has been highlighted (Hettne, 1994; 2005), the determinism of the relationship between development and economic integration based on the European model has not completely disappeared (González & Ovando, 2008).

1.2.2 The New Regionalism approach and the constructivist turn

After the lost years of regionalism (Fawcett, 1995) that followed the stagnation of the West European initiatives and the failure of the free trade areas among countries of the so-called Third World, the international context once again took a drastic shift propelled by a series of structural and attitudinal transformations. Remarkably, the most important, was the end of the Cold War igniting a phase of regional integration of new dimensions, dynamics and significance: the second wave of new regionalism (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995; Hettne & Inotai, 1994; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 2000; Schultz et al., 2001).

As Hettne[2] stated in 1994, both the context and the content of the second wave of regionalism changed. In fact, several specialists had elaborated on the relationship between the international developments at that time and their implications for the newer processes of integration. Here, I would like to highlight

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[2] As considered by Warleigh-Lack (2006) chief representative or proponent of the new regionalist approach (NRA), the constructivist-led approach framed in the context of the second wave of regionalism.

that although there has been agreement identifying these propelling contextual events, the theorization around their implications has been less than unanimous. The spectrum of integration's possibilities broadened; and therefore, the theorization in regards to regionalism was as well reconsidered.

Certainly, the end of the Cold War opened a scenario of more positive attitudes towards cooperation and of interest towards regional groupings; also, a multiplicity of new and diverse cases appeared. The spate and proliferation of initiatives seemed to respond to the approval and support of different international actors. For example, a favorable environment for regional grouping and intergovernmental organizations was fostered by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and specialized agencies as the UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC) (Sanahuja, 2012). According to Fawcett (1995), these entities after overcoming the critical environment of the Cold War were overburdened and consequentially showed interest in the regional bodies that could pursue developmental goals by their own means (Fawcett, 1995). Furthermore, the new milieu of diverse regional attempts confronted analysts and commentators with a phenomenon in need of a revitalized conceptual framework and clarity of categorization.

By 1994, Björn Hettne stated, "the new [regionalism] is taking shape in a more multipolar world order." He further argued that under the Cold War logic the old regionalism encompassed a "hegemonic regionalism," a world order in which regional powers replied as "sub-imperialist" actors to one of the two competing leaders (p.1-4). According to Hettne (1994), the end of the Cold War

entailed the possibility of a new type of regionalism distanced from global hegemonic ambitions, opening the space for new types of regional groupings. Seven years later Schultz et al. (2001) similarly pointed out that we were facing the displacement from bipolarity, but differently, towards a "tripolar structure […] around EU, NAFTA and Asia-Pacific" (p.260).

Meanwhile, Samuel Kim (2004), for example, has outlined this same displacement in overcoming bipolarity, but he highlighted this as a shift that could be understood "…toward multipolarity, tripolarity or even *uni-multipolarity*" (p.42) [emphasis added]. Kim's position reminds us that the scholarly literature attempting to conceptualize the implications of the second wave of regionalism is still in a stage of open debate. While there has been agreement about the events that led to the opening of the international space for geopolitical maneuver among the countries that pursued integration as a mean of exerting their own power aspirations, there is less clarity at the moment to draw conclusions over the new regionalism and its possibilities as an axis of new world order, issues to which we will return.

As Fawcett (1995), Sanahuja (2012) and Schultz et al. (2001) stated, the end of a closed solidarity among Third World countries reached a point of stagnation when the prosperities created by the old closed regionalism did not match the expectations.[3] After seeing the center-periphery structure reproduced at the regional level, the attitudes of the developing and post-communist countries

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[3]For a detailed analysis of the implications of closed and open regionalism for Latin American countries see Sanahuja (2012).

changed towards a more rapid liberalization and neoliberal economy beyond regional borders (Hettne & Inotai, 1994; Kim, 2004; Sanahuja, 2012; Schultz et al., 2001).

Regionalism in its so-called second wave is particularly interesting as the model of liberalization was adopted around the world, yet this regionalism was assumed as endogenous in its nature (Hettne, 1994). This endogenous nature has actually implied two elements that need further explanation. On the one hand, Hettne (1994) and other commentators (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995; Schultz et al., 2001) have emphasized how the new regional arrangements responded to the particular interests of each country involved and therefore present endogenous characteristics. On the other hand, scholars have had also recognize these initiatives of new endogenous characteristics as a response to exogenous forces. Hettne (1994) posit, "the emphasis on the new regionalism as a process 'from within' does not mean that it is purely endogenous to the respective region. Even if [these] initiatives are taken within the region, the factors which make these […] are [necessarily] global" (p.12).

In other words, the new wave of regionalism moved away from the determinism of the bipolar world order and from the particular interests of the hegemonic powers. However, this displacement has not meant leaving behind the determinism of the European experience as the model case (Bjorn, 2001; Hettne & Inotai, 1994; González & Ovando, 2008). Acknowledging endogenous characteristics of each different case has not meant that the causes for a new regionalism primarily responded to internal forces for transformation, but

ultimately to global forces of the capitalist economy (Hettne & Inotai, 1994; Larner & Walters, 2002). Therefore, the potential implications for a multipolar world order have not implied a transformation of the capitalist paradigm of production determining the system of power in its content. What has been initiated in this second wave is the multiplication of the centers of power from where the same system is sustained and reproduced (Ferguson & Gupta; 2002 Mignolo, 2010b; Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2009).

The complexity and multidimensionality of the new processes of regionalization entailed the advancement of a type of scholarly analysis transcending what was the focus of attention and the core assumptions of previous functionalist and neofunctionalists rationalist-led mainstream perspectives. The research on regionalization that stemmed from the first stage dominated by a rationalist epistemology, a state-centric perspective and a Eurocentric bias obsessed with economic integration under-evaluated the role of inter-subjectivity and the social nature of world politics (Väyrynen, 2003; Schultz et al., 2001).

Constructivism made its appearance in International Relations (IR) as what Kubálkova, Onuf & Cowert (1998) described as the "radical category" and the "post-movement," influenced by philosophers and social theorists (p.11). The constructivist turn did imply a critical stance inasmuch as it questioned the ontology *what we know* and the epistemology *how we know* (Kubálkova et al., 1998). It was grounded on the understanding that the socio-political world is a constructed reality, a product of human practice; and therefore, this ontologically

different perspective ought to unravel how the construction processes of this world take place (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1994, 1995; Kubálkova et. al., 1998).

Although authors such as Alex Warleigh-Lack (2006) argue against a strict differentiation of scholarly old regionalism approaches and what has been termed the New Regional Approach (NRA), as two separate paradigms, as if each is concerned with completely different matters belonging to old processes of regionalization and new ones. Warleigh-Lack is right to claim that the actual difference between one and the other is an expression of their different epistemological orientation, the latter oriented by a constructivist epistemology. The influence of constructivism in the scholarly advancements of regionalism has been crucially important inasmuch as it allowed an inquiry into the basic understanding of the notion of region and fostered a critical and more conscious categorical differentiation of regionalization and regionalism.

Certainly, constructivism emphasized the importance of understanding the *process* of the subjective construction of regions insofar as within these processes both "interests and identities are created and evolve" (Hurrell, 1995a, p.352). The determinism of previous rationalist perspectives that emerged from the analysis of economic models of integration gave space to a more social perspective. Within this, a core assumption is that regions are socially constructed and to some extent "subjectively defined" (Hurrell 1995b). By defining a region from a constructivist stance, we are giving account of it as "the projection of a social, political or economic concept over a given geographical area or territory […] a strategy to make human sense of it" (Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013, p. 2).

The re-elaboration of the notion of region was strongly influenced by the work of Emanuel Adler (1997a, 1997b) who, recognizing that after the end of the Cold War new pressures from below and above the national-states were generating new dynamics of inter-state organization called for a social analysis and advanced the notion of "cognitive regions." Adler stated that the new functional communities at the international level questioned the conception of citizenship and territorially-based identity. This, in turn, required the acknowledgement of "the social construction of a cognitive region out of intersubjective understandings, values, and norms [which] enable people to achieve a community life that transcends the nation-state and indeed any territorial base" (Adler, 1997, p. 254).

The constructivist framework strongly influencing the studies of the new regionalism wave is of fundamental importance for a critical comprehension of the trend of new regionalism inasmuch as it unveils the socially constructed nature of regions and regionalization processes. In this sense, the material forces, factual capabilities and relations of power considered determinant elements of a given structure are taken into account alongside the processes, intersubjectivities and sets of ideas that sustain and also potentially can transform a particular structural order. In other words, the NRA contemplates that "in order to understand structural change we must move from structure to *agency, actors* and *strategies*" (Schultz et al., 2011, p. 15).

The acknowledgement of the social dimensions of regions as an intersubjective construction has also opened the space for a more critical

differentiation between regionalism and regionalization. If regions are constructed, these construction processes need to be further investigated and the elements that inform them need to be revealed.

Some scholars have embarked upon a heavily theoretical debate about the differentiation between regionalization and regionalism in terms of the content that these two categories come to represent, the former descriptive and the latter normative (Farrell et al., 2005; Hurrell, 1995; Kim, 2004; Warleigh-Lack, 2006). Others have emphasized the evolutionary character in which both are inscribed, meaning a more informal/superficial level characterized as regionalization, to a more institutionalized/formal level characterized as regionalism (Capplin & Nossal, 2009; Hettne, 1994; Hurrell, 1995; Rozman, 2004; Shadrina, 2006). Some others have highlighted the difference in terms of the type of leadership more commonly identified for each; thus, regionalization is identified in terms of informal/non-governmental actorship and regionalism is identified with formal/state actorship (Capplin & Nossal, 2009; Hurrell, 1995; Kacowitz, 1999; Kim, 2004; Shadrina, 2006). It is of value to clarify that the elements of categorization tend to overlap, but the final emphasis on one or the other seems related to each analyst's objective.

I agree with Castro-Rea & Knight (forthcoming 2013) when they accurately identify that some of the above distinctions have been highlighted to reduce the complexity and multidimensionality of the new regionalism, and to facilitate academic endeavors. However, it is worth noting the tendency to associate regionalization only with processes of integration less institutionalized,

and commonly led by non-governmental actors outside of the formal sphere. On the other hand, regionalism would refer only to the normative prescriptions that have achieved institutionalization at the inter-state level inside the formal sphere.

As developed by Castro-Rea and Knight (forthcoming 2013) I would like to make use of the differentiation of these two notions, which enlightens the dynamism of the new processes of regionalization in the case of Latin America. It proposes that a multiplicity of actors, state and non-state ones, can interchangeably participate in regionalism as well as in regionalization.[4] While I agree with the definition of regionalism as "plan" and regionalization as "process," I will further differ in our comprehension of the interaction between them.

I believe that these accounts provide an image of the social nature of regions differentiating between regionalism at an ideational level and regionalization at a factual level; however, by proceeding with a static distinction these conceptualizations lose sight of the constant process of making and re-making in which regionalism and regionalization interact with each other. Within the scholarly categorization, strongly differentiating regionalization from regionalism has brought benefits for conceptual clarity; however, that conceptual clarity has relied on a dichotomist understanding.

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[4] (a) Regionalism understood as a "normative term" and defined as a "master plan" can be conceived among different sets of actors, governmental and non-governmental. (b) Regionalization understood as a "descriptive term" refers to the actual "process" of integration and, again, it can be fostered by official national groups or by non-official ones.

Thus Castro-Rea and Knight (forthcoming 2013) state, for example, that "[regionalization] may or may not have a master plan […] may or may not be the result of regionalism. Whatever occurs in the regionalization process may not necessarily be what was foreseen in any given regionalism plan" (p.6). However, this dichotomist differentiation assumes regionalization as a given phenomenon and loses sight of all the antecedents that actually constructed it (its European origins, its economical strategic nature responding/aligning to global forces, and the scholarly literature that sustained it as desirable). In fact, this study agrees with the assertion that regionalization may not be what was politically planned by different actors. Yet I aim to further explain in this section that outside of a stated plan, regionalization and regions themselves are *always* framed to some extent in a normative regionalism. As I attempted to outline, this regionalism as having geo-politically defined origins but apparently universal desirable goals is a technique of governance in a broader world system (Larner & Walters, 2002).

From a constructivist stance, regionalism has been understood at the ideational and intersubjective levels, while regionalization seems to encompass the material *de facto* and more dynamic level. But what I want to emphasize at this point is the still unclear interaction between regionalism and regionalization, an interaction that affirmed as always existent and dynamic, but which can be obscured when the definition of regionalism acquires a certain level of reification. The emphasis on the ideational level within regionalism should not overlook its normative nature.

Chapter 2: Broadening the Scope from Governmentality and Decoloniality

2.1 Introduction

One of the core assumptions of this thesis still needs to be fully foregrounded: the fact that the dynamic among region, regionalism and regionalization is a dynamic of power. Not only in realist terms of the increased or decreased power of the nation-states as units or totalities, but in this case in terms of this dynamic of power deploying a type of order and governance through the region. (Clarkson, 2002; Fergurson & Gupta, 2002; Grinspun & Kreklewich, 1994; Larner & Walters, 2002; Newstead, 2009; Rose, 2006; Rose & Miller, 2010)

For the purpose of this thesis, regions are not only defined as social constructions and "instruments designed to achieve specific political and economic goals" (Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013, p.4), but also as a space of governance and a space of politics. Regions and regionalization as always determined by regionalism are instruments *through which* and *upon which* the international realm can be ordered in specific ways (Larner & Walters, 2002; Newstead, 2009).

In this sense, my understanding of regionalism does not only encompass its definition as a "normative master plan" (Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013), but in a broader sense this normative plan should be further understood as an "art of international organization," as a "governmental technology" of the international and even the national space (Larner & Walters, 2002). This understanding actually implies that, regionalism as preconceived plan or not,

carries a political rationality beyond the decisions or motivations of the actors involved. This has to do with the fact that regionalism is a construction widespread outside its geo-political origins and it is deploying a body-political[5] hierarchy (Mignolo, 2009a).

As I will further develop, the framework of governmentality facilitates the understanding of regionalism and regionalization in dynamic terms. Analytically these two categories can be differentiated and even associated with different moments and actors in the process, but within the governmentality approach we would have to keep in mind that regionalization is always framed in a predominant sort of regionalism as a governmental technology.

Furthermore, I agree with Alex Warleigh-Lack's (2006) position, grounded on a constructivist epistemological stance and the governmentality approach, insofar as he proposed regionalization as a process, and more as a process seen as a dependent variable. Within the framework of governmentality, regionalization occurs as an effect of governance ordering precepts, namely these as regionalism (Hettne, 1995) or even regionalization, neither of these notions escape the idea of being inserted into a broader doctrine. Warleigh-Lack (2006) spotlighted the importance of understanding the process of regionalization as a construction itself; thus, his notion of regionalization is of great value for the purposes of this research:

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[5] Mignolo (2009a) develops the notion of body-politics to explain how universal categories or constructions have exercised power upon processes of segregation of other beings and other knowledges. As it will be further explore in chapter 4 a parallel can be drawn with the notion of regionalism.

An explicit, but not necessarily formally institutionalized, process of *adapting* participant state norms, policy making processes, policy styles, policy content, political opportunity structures, economies and identity (potentially at both elite and popular levels) to both *align with* and *shape a new* collective set of priorities, norms and interests at regional level, which may itself then evolve, dissolve or reach stasis. (p. 758 emphasis added)

The line of argumentation about regionalization as a process leading to stability understood as normalization—*aligning with a previous defined order*—or of transformation—*shaping a new collectivity*—not only underscores the region as an outcome but also stresses the acknowledgement of regionalization as a dynamic process of interaction among forces *of* power, not exclusively seeking *for* power in realist terms as nation-states.

Highlighting regionalization as a dependent variable allows us to comprehend some of the assertions elaborated from a governmentality analysis of regionalism. First, regionalization as a dependent variable implies that there could be other outcomes, or there could be no regionalization at all. Second and as a result, it promotes the denaturalization of the phenomenon of regionalism itself. Regionalism, regionalization and region are political categories, not irreversible natural conditions; they are elements of a specific ordering of the world. Third, it critically elucidates the point made by authors such as Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Larner and Walters (2002), Newstead (2009) and Sidaway (2002) that

new regionalism is an expression and part of the governmentalization of the region sustained in a particular "political rationality" (Rose & Miller, 1992). The regionalization of the second wave is therefore always informed by regionalism; regionalism or its parallel notion integration is understood as part of the production of knowledge in which every attempt of *exclusionary regionalization* is grounded on. I will come back to this point.

In order to elaborate upon this, it is necessary to unravel the notion of governmentality as a conceptual tool which could allow us to approach the phenomenon of the new regionalism, in general, and of regionalism within the case of UNASUR in particular, in terms of power relations and technologies of governance.

2.2 The Governmentality Approach

Foucault's notion of governmentality makes reference to the displacement of the techniques of governance and order outside of the direct apparatus of the state (Foucault, 2006). Thus, Mitchell Dean (1999) refers to the Foucaldian notion of governmentality as the concern with distinguishing "mentalities, arts and regimes of government and administration […] the conduct of conduct" (p.2). In more specific terms, Dean emphasizes how governmentality alludes to the modern processes of problematization and managements of government, processes through which the power to govern is enhanced by mechanisms external to the formal apparatus of governance (pp.1-8).

Dean has further stated that studies of governmentality are focused on the questions of *how* power of governance is organized, how our ways are organized

through regimes of practice. For the purpose of this thesis, two specifications in relation to this conceptual tool should be stressed. On the one hand, the "analytics of government" are highly concerned with "thought as […] embedded within programs for the direction and reform of conduct," (Dean, 1999, p.18) as Rose and Miller (1992, 2010) put it, with "political rationalities". On the other hand, the "analytics of government" recognizes the discourses on government as "internal parts of the workings of government, rather than only a means of legitimization" (Dean, 1999, p.26).

By analytics of governmentality I refer to the identification of how the thoughts about governing the regional space have been organized, how these thoughts were involved in practices taken for granted, and how these practices constitute governable objects (Dean, 1999). Following Rose and Miller's (1992, 2010) argumentation, we can draw a parallel at the regional level.

Through the analytics of government, I aim to respond to how regionalism attempts to *make-up* regions and regional subjects in a certain way, but it is constantly confronted in different ways. The political rationality of new regionalism is sustained with a specific content of accumulation, domination, and exclusion. Larner and Walters (2002) have identified this as neoliberal, but I further assert it goes beyond this as it spreads as desirable in a universal manner in the spectrum of modernity/coloniality (Mignolo 2010b). Alternative integrations, solidarities, and notions of governance/authorities could be seen as confrontational to the main political rationality of regionalism in this way.

There are a series of dynamics of power and influence at different levels. The multiple and proliferating processes of regionalization, the so-called new regionalism, portrays a political rationality and exercises a technology of government by itself, which does not only create, adapt, and shape a regional unit (or the broader international order in terms of status quo or transformation) but can also adapt, shape and/or be confronted by the national rationality-*ies* (also in terms of status quo or transformation).

As Rose and Miller (2010) put it "the mentalities and machinations of government that we explore are not merely traces, signs, causes or effects of ´real´ transformation in social relations. The terrain they constitute has a density and a significance of its own" (p.273).

Rose and Miller (2006, 2010) elaborated their argument on the basis that political power is exercised differently today. Modern power goes beyond the problematic of the state as the centralized source of it; power is now descentered in a multiplicity of alliances, and it is not imposed but *technically* spread through multiple technologies, expertise and rationalities. "Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints," as it is a matter of making subjects governable, "bearing a kind of regulated freedom" (Rose & Miller, 2010, p.272).

According to Rose and Miller (2010), the problematics of government can be analyzed using a two-fold method of identification. First, they may be analyzed "in terms of their political rationalities"; and second, they should also be analyzed "in terms of their governmental technologies" (p.273).

The term "political rationalities" refers to discerning regularities in the discourse; as Rose and Miller (2010) stated, the discourse is the realm in which formulation and justification of ideas take place while "representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it" (p.276). First, the political rationality implies a "moral form"; it gives account of rights and responsibilities of authorities and of governance, and it also makes explicit the principles under which actions are directed. Second, political rationalities contain an "epistemological character"; their articulation is directly related to the conception of what is to be governable. Third, political rationalities have a "distinctive idiom"; in our case this is understood as a particular regionalism's vocabulary which expresses the nature and limits of the issue at hand (pp.276 – 279).

On the other hand, we encounter the technologies of government generally as the set and assembly of strategies, techniques and procedures directly responding to the issues of governance, making governance operable. The technologies of government are the operable expression of the political rationalities, but I should emphasize that they are not necessarily the extension of these rationalities. Rather they are the filtered result of disputing forces finally regulated by authoritative bases (Rose & Miller, 2010).

Although Rose and Miller developed these tools for the analysis of governance at the national level, Larner and Walters (2002) positioned and applied them to the analysis of the governmentalization of government at the regional level. Drawing upon Larner and Walter's work (2002) and the case study

of Newstead (2009), I intend therefore to develop the analysis of UNASUR as an art of international governance.

Based on the concept of governmentality, Wendy Larner and William Walters (2002) further elaborated on the specialized understanding of regions as new constructions of power – that is, as modern forms of government characterized by being sustained in a particular "political rationality," that of new regionalism. Drawing upon the work of Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (1992, 2010), Larner and Walters (2002) developed an analysis of new regionalism to conclude that it is sustained in a political rationality directly linked to neoliberalism. Regionalism is understood as an "art of international government" naturalized, part and expression of the governmentalization of the government of the region.

Newstead (2009), for his part, analyses the specific case of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM, constituted in 1973) to portray it as the result of integrational dynamics between members states; and, most importantly as a governmental technique that overcomes these dynamics and through which the region is governed by the global economy of neoliberalism. At the basis of his argumentation is the concern with the governmentalization of the state that Foucault postulated and now could be seen displaced to a regional level.

> Larner and Walters (2002: 423) argue that, just as Michel
> Foucault highlighted the "governmentalization of the state"
> through which "the state became connected to a heterogeneous
> field of governmental technologies," we might now usefully

examine the processes through which the region emerges as a

site of competing political strategies and as an instrument of

government" (as cited in Newstead, 2009, p.160)

However, approaching the same topic, Larner and Walters (2002) and

Newstead (2009) highlight some differing elements, which are important to keep

in mind for the analysis of this thesis. Larner and Walters (2002) argued that the

empirical comparative work on regionalization has had perhaps the unexpected

parallel consequence of naturalizing regionalism. The authors started by

questioning regionalism as a "self-evident feature of the political economic

landscape" (p.395); they argue that regionalism is a different mode of exercising

authority across international space.

Newstead (2009), recognizes that the new regionalism is not only a new

trend in the international realm but also a means of ordering which is promoted by

the alignment, and even the analytical homogenization, of different states. Thus

CARICOM framed within this new regionalism is a neoliberal technique

supported in a complex mix of rationalities through which "market order is

extended and new neoliberal spaces and subjects brought into beings" (p. 159).

For the specific case of CARICOM, Newstead (2009) revealed that

regionalism is sustained by a particular neoliberal rationality. The process of

regionalization in which CARICOM has been institutionalized is the space in

which differences are confronted and attempted to be normalized, and the space of

politics in which regionalism has been confronted by different rationalities of

integration. In this way the author concludes that CARICOM is not the result of

weak intergovernmental integration as much as is the result of a well constituted and naturalized new regionalism, one that is exclusionary of a multiplicity of rationalities.

Authors such as Stephen Clarkson (2002), and Ricardo Grinspun and Robert Kreklewich (1994) have also developed analyses of the specific determinism or conditioning that certain schemes of integration or economic liberalization represent for the Canadian case. Clarkson (2002) perceived initiatives such as the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as "supraconstitutions" (p.47) that determine and sustain a particular kind of global governance. In a similar manner, Grinspun and Kreklewich (1994) approached NAFTA as a "conditioning framework"—namely, technologies and mechanism that consolidate neoliberalism. Two of the most salient differences between these authors' framework of analysis and the governmentality one used in this thesis is that the notion of region is not denaturalized and the sphere of attention remains as the economic one. Stephen Clarkson (2002), and Ricardo Grinspun and Robert Kreklewich (1994) question the alignment of the North American region to certain neoliberal principles specially in regards to economic liberalization; however, the governmentality analysis starts by questioning the creation of the notion of region itself as a mechanism of the broader capitalist mode of production. This also implies that the conditioning or determinisms of this construction extend to other spheres such as subjectivity, knowledge, etc.

So far I have argued for an analysis of regionalization that goes beyond the ideational level of intersubjective processes. I am concerned with the notion of region as a created space of politics (Newstead, 2009) and as regionalism as an international art of governance (Larner & Walters, 2002). The governmentality approach has the potential of allowing us to identify the multiple rationalities behind the construction of UNASUR—the governmental technology that makes the region intelligible as a political space, in which there continues to be a clash of rationalities through regionalization.

Given my argument, that South America can be politically characterized as a space of multiplicity of voices and/or multiplicity of rationalities (in terms of governmentality), it is of significant importance to pay attention to the process of "translation" as conceived by Rose and Miller (1992, 2010). In order to further explain *whether or not and how* regionalism naturalized as a political rationality linked to neoliberalism still has a central role in South America. Through which means and why regionalism still plays a central role in South America as a project of authoritative power in the "translation" process is still unclear.

Rose and Miller (1992, 2010) stated that governing is to some extent always a failing action insofar as the realms of rationalities, in which the ideals are elaborated, and technologies, in which the feasible is uploaded as programs, do not synchronize perfectly; "the relation between political rationalities and […] programs of government is not of derivation or determination but of translation" (p.279).

The key element here is that I seek to reach a thorough understanding of the exclusionary and deterministic character of this "translation" for the case of regionalization framed by UNASUR. Furthermore, this translation in the Latin American context should be analyzed by the stance of decoloniality insofar as the South American moment of regional transformation, if real, needs to acknowledge the scholarly production around regionalism built upon Eurocentrism, and the determinism of regionalization and regionalism as reified notions, regular international phenomenon.

2.3 The Decolonial Project

Decoloniality provides a critical set of concepts that can help to elucidate some of the core inquiries of this thesis. It raises questions such as the following: why do some rationalities reach to the level of technologies of government and others do not? What does the characterization of UNASUR as "postneoliberal" imply and what does it obscure? And most importantly, why is regionalism (as a Eurocentric rationality) in South America constantly a conflictual endeavor?

It is essential to begin here by stating that decoloniality is more than an academic perspective; it actually represents a particular critical stance beyond being any sort of academic tool. Decoloniality represents a "border-thinking" inasmuch as it critically seeks to overcome the disciplines, the totality of human sciences. In other words, decoloniality questions the core assumptions of disciplines such as sociology, political science, economics in an effort to "delink" from the Westernized constructions of knowledge. Decoloniality stands upon the

certainty that "another world is possible,[6]" and therefore, that there are other ways of thinking and other knowledges; border paradigms are, and should be, feasible too (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2009; Mignolo 2010b).

Decoloniality as a concept emerged at the same time when the world faced the so-called end of history and the emergence of a new global order organization (namely multipolar, tripolar or uni-multipolar regionalism as I had previously stated). In this context, as Mignolo (2011) pointed out, the impact of the conceptualization of coloniality, the core notion in the decolonial perspective; can be read as similar to the impact of Foucault's concepts of bio-politics and governmentality but for the non-European world. Decoloniality is not a universal tool to comprehend power and authority differently within modernity, "but [decoloniality] as an option" to delink thinking and being (Mignolo, 2011, p.273) from the approaches sustaining the modernity/coloniality project.

I have also noticed that despite fundamental differences between the governmentality perspective and the decolonial position the latter calls attention

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[6] Arturo Escobar (2010) refers to decoloniality as "the modernity/coloniality research program". Escobar clearly pointed out that although it came from Latin America, its scope of reach overcomes territorial realities since it is not a new paradigm but a perspective. "the MC project does not fit into a linear history of paradigms or epistemes; to do so would mean to integrate it to the history of modern thought." (p.34) On his side, Walter Mignolo (2011) stated that its origins can be traced to the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Countries' (NAC) conference of 1961, in which the horizon was to imagine a future different than capitalism or communism. Thus, according to the later, decoloniality encompass a series of projects of delinking from Western thinking around the globe, with different names and different particularities.

to the problem of "transition," just as governmentality attempts with "translation." Transition as part of the rhetoric of modernity implies the disappearing of the so-called old/traditional/folkloric when the new/modern/civilized appears; the problem with it is that they "who are not lucky enough to be in the *space* where *time* and *history* move forward [would also disappear]" (Mignolo, 2010a, p.321).

Coloniality as the central concept upon which the decolonial option has been built implies, as Catherine Walsh (2010) stated, a "model of power" that continues beyond the end of historical administrative colonialism. This model of power constitutes a central piece in the organization of the world order understood as "modernity"; it implies a codification of differences based on race, which after over 500 years of maintenance has been successfully reconfigured as a "hierarchical ordering of social identities," perpetuating the criteria to establish who should be dominated (or should be applied authority upon) based on inferiority (p.83).

Furthermore, Madina Tlostanova and Walter Mignolo (2009), drawing upon the work of Aníbal Quijano (2000), pointed out that "conceptually, coloniality is the hidden side of modernity […] coloniality is constitutive of modernity, and […] there is no modernity without coloniality" (p.132). These authors added that, if modernity with its companion concept of development attempted to overcome underdevelopment, modernity, did not attempt to overcome coloniality as a mode of power. Coloniality, as exclusion and domination, was built upon the horizon of "eliminat[ing] 'barbarism' and overcom[ing] 'tradition'" (Mignolo & Tlostanova 2009, p.133).

Within this study, decoloniality is the central standpoint of analysis insofar as it allows approaching regionalism and regionalization in terms of technologies of government, but most importantly as Western constructions outside what constitutes its historical origins and reified as international desirable strategies. From a decolonial perspective, regionalism and regionalization do not respond to the global forces but are rationalities and technologies built upon exclusion making subjects and spaces governable on the basis of necessity, quest for development, and desirability of modernity. One of the central issues with these reified constructions is that they render invisible the fact that modernity, in the history and space of South America, encompasses coloniality. Additionally, coloniality as modernity's darker side needs to be understood from a different perspective, a border perspective, meaning outside or at the edge of intra-modern views (in this case, outside mainstream regionalism) (Mignolo, 2011).

Escobar (2010), drawing upon the work of Dussel (2000) and Quijano (2000), confronted us[7] with an understanding of "modernity/coloniality" grounded outside of established theories of modernity. Seeing modernity outside itself allows a critical understanding of the role that international arts of governance, such as regionalism and regionalization, plays in a reality of sustaining authority in terms of domination and exclusion. Thus, Escobar (2010) affirms that:

> Colonialism and the making of the capitalist world system [are] constitutive of modernity [....] the identification of the domination of others outside the European core [ought to be

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[7] Us, as trained in intra-modern perspectives, but not in alternative ones from outside modernity.

recognized as] necessary dimension of modernity, with the
concomitant subarlternization of the knowledges and cultures of
these others [….] a conception of Eurocentrism as the
knowledge form of modernity/coloniality – a hegemonic
representation and mode of knowing that claims universality for
itself. (Escobar, 2010, p.38)

One of the most important points for this thesis lies precisely in the
problem of seeing or comprehending modernity, and its governmental
technologies such as regionalism, not from a decolonial stance but from intra-
modern perspectives in a circular manner that, therefore, does not allow to
critically appreciate what modernity in its constitution obscures. The notion of
coloniality takes higher importance insofar as, suggested by Quijano (2000, 2007,
2010), Mignolo & Tlostanova (2009), and Mignolo (2009a, 2010b, 2011), the
idea of globalization entails "the universalization and radicalization of modernity"
(Escobar, 2010, p.38), the universalization of coloniality as a mode of power, or
in other terms the consolidation of the "colonial matrix of power" (Patzi-Paco,
2004).

If in Foucaldian terms modernity has been strongly characterized by the
decentralization of power explained through bio-politics and governmentality
means. Within the decolonial perspective the radicalization of modernity through
globalization, has to do most significantly with the decentralization of power
based upon coloniality as a mode of power. The notion of the colonial matrix of
power implies two elements-namely, that the multipolarity of power is not an

exchange of the mode of power, only the disaggregation of the centers of its production. Second that although this mode of power is closely linked with the neoliberal mode of accumulation within the capitalist system, it goes beyond the economic sphere.

In general terms this colonial matrix of power makes reference to a systematic coloniality of power, knowledge and being (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2010a; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; 2010). Domination, exploitation and hegemonic authoritative dynamics has crossed the different dimensions of "control of authority," "control of economics," "control of the private sphere," and "control of knowledge and subjectivity" (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2009, pp.132-136).

Simultaneously, the rhetoric that obscures this matrix has gone through change and re-accommodation according to the need of the "globalizing force"; the so-called "mission of conversion to Christianity" was transformed into "the civilizing mission," to later on be presented as "the developmental and modernizing mission" with the contours of one of the two stronger globalizing forces: the neoliberal Western one or the socialist one (Mignolo & Tlostanova 2009 pp. 136-137).

Now the dimensions, strength and the contours of the colonial matrix of power are shifting to another level by the decentralization of its reproduction. In other words, the authoritative control of it is out of the Western center of power, is diversified in a "polycentric world order" in which the economic nodes are unfolding globally (Mignolo & Tlostanova 2009 p.138). According to this view, what the neo-marxists Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (1985) called "multi

political nodes," Bjorn Hettne and András Inotai (1994) called "multipolar world" have not implications of the surpassing of coloniality since the descentered of power has not implied overcoming the specific logic that sustains it, that of accumulation, exploitation and death.

Stephen Clarkson (2002) makes this argument clearer when he analyzes the implications of global governance and globalism within the Canadian case. Clarkson highlights that the manifestation of transnational integration cannot be seen based exclusively on external factors, independent variables, or forces outside the state. Insofar as we keep working with the same mode of power, everyone fulfils a role in this matrix of neocolonial power. While "Canada has not been entirely passive in the face of external forces" (Clarkson, 2002, p.9), we will see South American governments (called progressive or not) not passive when reproducing the same mode of power or authority that they clamed to try to escape.

What this decentralization of power represents is more clearly understood with the image of "reification" (Berger, Peter & Luckmann, 1966). The production and reproduction of the colonial matrix of power happens to occur outside any center of thought, the reproduction of an exclusionary mode of being seems *magically* and *consensually* sustained on its own. But these modes of being, thinking, and governing are actually misconceived as a process or result as if it has a living existence outside the material practices and intersubjective relations of human beings. The colonial matrix of power has escaped Western control: "The polycentric world order is organized around the dispute for the

control of the colonial matrix, which is being played out at different and interconnected levels" (Mignolo, 2010b, p.15). One of these levels, I argue, is the regional one.

2.4 Overcoming Mainstream Regionalism

The intention of addressing the evolutionary character of the broad phenomenon of regionalism responds to this thesis objective of understanding the body of theoretical advancements in close relation to contextual particularities. This study recognizes the value of the insights from mainstream theories of regionalism and from the advancements of the NRA, within a constructivist framework, aiming to overcome the Eurocentrism and economic determinisms of the first wave of regional integration. However, while new *endogenous* regionalism has still been defined by global forces, the NRA has also still been constrained by some of the insights of the scholarship of the first stage: the preponderance of attention to states as the solely main actors in the international system, a view of determinant from the outside-in approach, and the major attention to the economic field.

In a nutshell, if the constructivist-led analysis of new regionalism elucidated the identification of regions as social constructions and of regionalism as the set of normative principles, less attention has been fostered in regionalization and regionalism from an alternative view as technologies of governance. Order and governance is applied through regionalism and regionalization as inserted in the broader neocolonial matrix of power of modernity/coloniality.

The idea of constructed regions renders invisible these as a political space of confrontation and, ultimately, governance of the multiplicity of knowledges and beings. As I stated in the beginning of this chapter, regionalization could be the process in which the preponderant political rationality of regionalism is confronted. However, regionalization processes are so subsumed in economic determinism and exclusionary patterns of capitalism that regionalism remains as desirable and natural. Within this confrontation there is, on the one hand, the neoliberal rationality of *the* new regionalism program, not exclusively understood in economical terms, but as a mode of power sustained in a set of values (Smith, 2006). While on the other hand, the multiplicity of other rationalities where heterogeneity is displayed outside the modern scheme should be acknowledged as well.

I have attempted to show what governmentality and decoloniality have to offer, especially for an alternative analysis that places modernity and coloniality in parallel terms, and which can give us different insights for the analysis of the specific case of UNASUR. While governmentality can give account of the process of regionalization as a process seeking governance through normalization, decoloniality can give account of this process as sustained in a Western constructed universal—that of regionalism, as a means of exclusion and of the matrix of power as a broader scenario in which regionalism ended up reproducing modernity/coloniality.

The focus of the following section is on understanding the apparent new contours of the "postneoliberal" regionalism in South America through the case of

UNASUR. The main specific objectives will be to elucidate how scholars that analyze UNASUR find it different, how specific differences are used to argue a "postneoliberal" regionalism, and what conception of regionalism is actually at the basis of most of the literature produced.

Chapter 3: Approaching UNASUR within the Framework of Mainstream Research

3.1 Introduction

Through this section I aim to describe, analyze and critically engage with the literature related to UNASUR. I seek to identify the pertinent analyses and to evaluate the contribution of diverse specialists in order to determine trends, strengths of argumentation, weaknesses, and possible gaps in the current state of analysis. This literature review is not intended as an exhaustive summary but as a critical engagement of some of the most relevant scholarship in relation to my investigation and the specific objectives of this thesis. In other words, through this section I aim to understand the apparently new transformative content that accompanies the emergence of UNASUR, the basis for its characterization as "postneoliberal", and the relationship between the scholarship produced and a specific perspective of analysis that remains at the realist level.

Most importantly, I expect to identify to what extent the literature developed questions or reverts to the normalization of regionalism and regionalization (Larner & Walters, 2002), and to further assert the salience of the governmentality approach and of the decolonial stance of critical thought. In a general manner, I seek to spotlight the role that social science scholars play in the authoritative exercise of the normative characterization of regionalism for the South American case. I aim to identify the conception of regionalism that the work of these analysts, purposely or not, reproduced.

Given that UNASUR is the latest attempt of regionalization among the countries of the Southern Cone, analysis of it is at a basic stage[8]. However, it has already been characterized as an initiative of a new type of regionalism, without addressing an exhaustive analysis of what this trend implies or to what extent this trend is driven by a particular rationality not so distance from the ones of previous schemes and its analysis from an approach still centered in the mainstream scholarship. Authors such as José Antonio Sanahuja (2007, 2008, 2012) characterizes it as "post-liberal," while Julián Castro-Rea and Andy Knight (forthcoming 2013) describe it as a "post-neo-liberal […] managed regionalism" (p.10)[9].

I believe that this characterization introduces two elements to be considered. On the one hand, if UNASUR is actually an expression of a new

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[8] Nowadays, between other initiatives encompassing countries of the southern cone we can also find the Andean Community (CAN) formally constituted in 1969, now formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; the Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI) formally constituted in 1980, now formed by the southern countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela; the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) formally constituted in 1991, now formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela; and the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our America (ALBA) formally constituted in 2004, now formed by the southern countries of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

[9] From now on the differentiation of the terms post-liberal and post-neo-liberal will be overcome by the use of the concept "postneoliberal" regionalism in order to not to make use of one or another as meaning different things. As I will further elaborate, both terms are referring to the breaking of UNASUR with the same elements of neoliberalism.

phase within the new regionalism or even an expression of a potential third wave, the overview of the preceding waves is a necessary exercise in order to identify continuities and ruptures. Furthermore, this study will also inquire to what extent previous theoretical advancements—those formulated in response to previous waves—can inform a thorough analysis of *newer* cases such UNASUR.

If the theoretical characterization as "postneoliberal" remains unclear when regionalism and regionalization are denaturalized and alternatively introduced as techniques of governance, this certainly should be considered expression of conflictual nature at the foundations of UNASUR. Although characterized as *new* and "postneoliberal," UNASUR from an alternative view seems, still, as a technology of governance evading the multiplicity of political rationalities conflicting with each other and, furthermore, as a means sustaining modernity/coloniality.

I proceed through a general presentation of the open scholarly debate about "postneoliberalism" in general and "postneoliberal" regionalism in particular. In order to explore how this argument has been elaborated for the case of UNASUR first I introduce some of the general assertions about this initiative. Second, I present the elements of analysis that seem more recurrent and to which prioritized attention has been given. In turn, this particular focus, allows me to unveil those elements that remain in the shadow and, therefore, under-theorized. By elements, this study makes reference to the emphasis on the actorship analysis, the focus on the intergovernmental dynamics, the revision of the interests and perceived benefits of integration, and the analysis of UNASUR's agenda and the

core themes around it. Third, and in light of the above, I aim to outline the core understanding of the notion of regionalism, which although not explicit in most of these analyses, I nonetheless believe informs and determines most of them (Hurrell 1995b, 2005). Our broader objective through this literature review is to justify the *raison d'être* of our research as pertinent for the comprehension of UNASUR from a different perspective and necessary for the advancement of studies of regionalization in South America.

3.2 The nebulosity of the "Postneoliberal" characterization

The characterization of regionalism in Latin America as "postneoliberal" especially in the particular case of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is certainly here a point of debate, most importantly when this characterization has been conceived as a sign of transformation taking place in the region. In the first place, there are a series of underlying elements that need to be considered in the explanation of the notion of postneoliberalism: its particular conceptualization in the Latin American context, its specific use among scholars of regionalism, and the broader academic debate about it as a catch-all word or a valuable political concept (Brand & Sekler, 2009).

In the Latin American context, references to postneoliberalism are confusing and blurred as they correspond to a notion of diverse content and understanding, that of neoliberalism (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Palacion, 1996; Sader, 2009). Neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America has been predominately perceived as constricted to the economic sphere; it basically referred to the displacement of the state by the laissez-faire market (Palacios,

1996). Its most common comprehension referred to "economic reform policies" that have so negatively impacted since Pinochet's regime (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p.143). Framed on this understanding, the notion of postneoliberalism of the second half of the 1990's was more of a normative construction emphasizing the need of the countries of the region to overcome neoliberalism and to find a different paradigm in order to achieve the sustained and equal development promised within the previous scheme. Nowadays, the scope of the comprehension of the implications of neoliberalism has broadened; that is, among some critical scholars it is agreed that neoliberalism has had a series of implications as a set of policies, as a development model, and, most importantly, as an ideology (Sader, 2009), a universal paradigm defining ways of thinking and being (Escobar, 2010).

According to Sader (2009) neoliberalism has redefined the fields of the political with the polarisation of "state and civil society," of the economics with the polarisation of "state and market," and of the social relations and subjectivities displacing "workers and citizens by consumers, rights by competition […] human companionship by television, social policies by private corporate welfare […] social integration by social exclusion […] solidarity by selfishness, humanism by consumerism" (p. 171). In this sense, Sader adds, "postneoliberalism" is not more than a re-adaptation and re-elaboration of capitalism in a way that is still legitimate and valid in Latin America.

Scholars who have paid attention to the Latin American initiatives of integration, especially those informed by the mainstream scholarship on regionalism, introduce the notion of "postneoliberal" regionalism as restricted to

its economic connotations. This characterization has not seemed to explore continuities in the political and social relations of power deployed through the region; it has to some extent taken attention away from the normative connotations that the notion has had in its origins, and most important has not further explored the relationship between the social system—neoliberalism—and the overarching paradigm of production—capitalism (Brie, 2009).

Postneoliberal regionalism seems then unclear and in need of further elaboration. Succinctly, "post-liberal" regionalism refers to the rejection of open regionalism as the preponderance of economic integration and liberalization in which "liberal policies [were aligned to] the so-called 'Washington Consensus'" (Sanahuja, 2012, p.3). And "post-neo-liberal" regionalism implies a critique of the salience role of the market as directing processes of integration in the 1990s, but it does not reject the importance of competition and the linking of domestic markets to the global economy with a stronger presence of the state in a way of "manag[ing] regionalism" (Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013, p.10).

These notions appear similar to each other in that they both emphasize the new generation of initiatives attempting to overcome the principles that determined open regionalism in general and the role of the market in particular. However what this study finds problematic is that these notions in reality respond to a limited understanding of neoliberalism. The notion of "postneoliberal" regionalism can be understood if literally taken as a regionalism in contrast or rejection exclusively to economic liberalization; this, I believe, is a more accurate presentation of the type of transformation that UNASUR entails. But, as I aim to

demonstrate throughout this thesis, calling regionalism "postneoliberal" does not overcome the understanding of neoliberalism in a broader sense, in the decolonial understanding of it as aligned to the project of modernity/coloniality. As was stated in the introduction of this study, neoliberalism does not only refer to its economic aspects but is part of a system of thought, a system of production of global capitalism and accumulation, and system of authority of exclusion.

Brand and Sekler (2009) state that after the financial crisis of 2008 many scholars rapidly denounced the "end of neoliberalism," (p.5) which in turn, has motivated to explore what lies beyond it, the elements that conform and idea of postneoliberalism, and most importantly if postneoliberalism is a valid political concept that attempts to articulate the neoliberal crisis to others crises. In this sense, an important differentiation is made: talking of postneoliberalism does not refer to the question of the beginning or not of a new era, but postneoliberalism is actually considered as a perspective facilitating to elucidate some of the crises and transformations. As approaches, all postneoliberal perspectives emphasize the breaks that we are experiencing with some aspect of neoliberalism (Brand & Sekler, 2009).

However, Michael Brie (2009) argues, acknowledging postneoliberalism as a perspective has as a repercussion the lack of consideration of the plurality of neoliberalism' crises on the one hand—namely the "overaccumulation crisis, reproduction crisis, integration crisis, democracy crisis, security crisis" (p.21)— and of the capitalist mode of production as neoliberalism' broader determinant paradigm on the other hand. For this thesis, I understand "postneoliberal"

regionalism, as used by other authors, as pointing to only two of the crises of neoliberalism: the crisis of the market and the crisis of integration through liberalization. Nevertheless, "postneoliberalism" does not indicate here any anti-capitalist endeavour nor the transformation of social relations and institutionalism.

I agree with Esther Ceceña (2009) when she argues that the *post* and the *neo* prefixes make the topic of discussion undefined, the former refers to something *after* but completely undefined, while the latter is a not very creative way of not fully explaining continuity or rupture. Ceceña accurately states that "postneoliberalism" leaves open a path of multiple redefinitions of capitalism; the Latin American case exemplifies this. The "alternative national postneoliberalism" (Ceceña, 2009, p.39) expresses acknowledgment that the market as the mediator of capitalism has achieved a point of stagnation. Under "postneoliberalism," the nation-states return, but for most of the Latin American countries, nation-states and democracy represent "institution[s] created by capitalism to secure private property and social control" (p.40). Furthermore, Gago and Sztulwark (2009) posit that the notion of "postneoliberalism" oversimplifies crisis and power. The crisis of representation and lack of civil participation remain. These authors emphasize that regulation and control through a *democratic management* reduces space for the manoeuvring of multiple social movements. It does not transform empty *democratic* institutionalism and the type of governance at the service of capital but not the people.

If "postneoliberalism" is actually understood as a contested notion limitedly referring to the crisis of economic liberalization and of market as

mediator of politics, in turn, "postneoliberal" regionalism as denoting the beginning of a new stage of transformative regionalism could actually be misleading. The attention on the differences between UNASUR and previous initiatives overshadows that fact that regionalism and regionalization do not overcome the other mentioned crises and the complex global capitalism.

From a more critical perspective, I aim to identify that some of the elements that sustain the argument of new type of regionalism are actually based on (a) an analysis of variables sustained in a specific theoretical framework that misses regionalism and regionalization as technologies of governance; (b) in turn, the scholarship about UNASUR has been grounded on a particularly limited definition of power (in realist terms) and on what I argue as a limited understanding of neoliberalism as exclusively economic. What the categories "postneoliberal" actually encompass for the case of UNASUR will be further explored throughout this section.

3.2.1 Mainstream Analysis

UNASUR is considered an expression of a new type of regionalism that not only introduces all the features of the new second wave insofar as, for example, it is multidimensional and it engages with a multiplicity of actors beyond governmental ones (Sanahuja, 2008). But, apparently, it has also overcome the determinisms and limitations that open regionalism signified for the Latin American region (Briceño, 2010; Castro-Rea and Knight, forthcoming 2012; Chavez, 2010; Sanahuja, 2008, 2012).

It is remarkably interesting to note, however, that although UNASUR is recognized by most of the analysts as a *new* and *different* scheme of regional integration. Yet, these same analysts maintain their approaches within the mainstream rationalist perspective, failing to overcome some biases and determinisms such as the outside-in view, the state-centric analysis, the economic bias and the problem-solving emphasis (Schultz et al., 2001). In addition, the mainstream scholarship is centered in intra-modernity perspectives limiting even more a comprehensive understanding of neoliberalism (Escobar, 2010). The cornerstone assertion of a new and different regionalism seems to be based on analyses which give a descriptive account of some of the changes of the contours of UNASUR, but do not engage with other aspects of its supposedly transformative nature.

These scholars emphasize that UNASUR, in this new phase of regionalism does not only respond to the challenges of the international context and the global changes, but it also brings with it a broader agenda with specific social and production objectives, seeking to enhance the players' capabilities at the domestic level (Briceño, 2010). Hence, at first glance UNASUR moves away from the framework of open-regionalism insofar as it departs from the reactive customs unions and market liberalization to a proactive strategy of integration. An open question remains, is this enough to think of a newer transformative trend—namely "postneoliberal"?

On the one hand, UNASUR is still perceived by scholars with a systemic neorealist perspective as a response to a broader space of maneuver for South

American countries (Chavez, 2010; De la Barra & Dello Bruno, 2009; Gardini, 2010). These analysts understand that since the United States' hegemonic power has been reduced and questioned, likewise the strength of the neoliberal paradigm and the market-driven forces has declined. With this at the background, the rejection of the Washington Consensus became loud and straightforward and the accession to power of left-wing parties fostered the rise of other concerns in the agenda of integration. Within this IR framework, the role of the state is still the most important one; its dynamics still respond to the transformations, challenges, and now also opportunities provided from the broader international system; states are the key actors in dealing with this context.

Along these lines, Briceño (2010) highlighted that the creation of UNASUR has implied a change in the strategy of building South American regionalism. According to Briceño, it is valid to argue that the origins of the project responded, in a reactive way, to the American intentions to launch the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. In a first moment, this response evolved as the South American counterproposal for the establishment of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). However, within the frame of the above mentioned contextual transformations, South American countries later sought to counterbalance with a broader project intended to transcend the economic dimension. The South American Community of Nations (SACN):

> Sought to establish a space of solidarity among the countries of the
> region for addressing issues such as democratic governance, lack of
> adequate infrastructure, the existence of regional disparities,

economic growth with equity [….] The minimalist project [intended with SAFTA] was developed gradually. (Briceño, 2010, p.213)

According to authors such as Chávez (2010), Sanahuja (2007, 2008, 2012) and Serbin (2008), UNASUR is the result of a period of analytical reflection and a more critical engagement with the broader international panorama. For these authors, the evolution from SAFTA to SACN and then from SACN to UNASUR represent a process of remarkable strong critique of open regionalism and of the obvious flaws of the market-driven trend.

Among the analyses of this transitional period the critique to open regionalism seems to be understood from a more neofunctionalists perspective (Botelho, 2008; Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010; Sanahuja, 2008a). In other words, this critique was associated with the prominence of a logic of "negative integration" or reference to a weak institutional dimension, the over-estimation of the "commercial commitments" and "market liberalization," the under-estimation of a social agenda and the "absence of a citizen dimension of integration", elements pushed aside by bureaucratic mechanism and private interests (Chávez, 2010, p.31).

On the contrary, according to the analyses reviewed, the new trend of regional integration that UNASUR embodies seeks to find a balance between market competition within the global economy and government policy interventionism (Briceño, 2010). This apparently new trend is also re-defined in terms of regional sovereignty for the case of South America, as an instrument to

assert the region's sovereignty facing American initiatives, and as an instrument as well underpinning the countries' capacity for coherent and strong self-governability (Sanahuja, 2012). Moreover, Sanahuja (2008) introduces the characterization of this trend by four core elements:

> (a) The primacy of a political agenda and less attention to the economic and commercial one […] (b) The return of the 'development agenda' within the framework of the economic agendas of the 'post-Washington Consensus' […] (c) A greater role of the state actors, facing the protagonist role that the private actors and the forces of the market used to have within the previous model. (d) A greater emphasis on the 'positive' agenda of integration focused on the creation of institutions and common policies. (p. 22, author's translation)

Undoubtedly, UNASUR understood as part of this new trend of regionalism seems promising and its differences can be clearly asserted when compared to previous or parallel integration initiatives, especially in their economic terms. However, other commentators (Flores, 2007; Giacalone, 2008; González & Ovando, 2008; Kellogg, 2007; Serbin, 2008) have pertinently inquired about certain areas in which UNASUR still presents some similar features when compared to its predecessors.

Kellogg (2007) suggest that, although different, the "UNASUR/CSN project […] is rooted in a 'politics from above'—deep-rooted institutional and structural processes working […] in opposition to US hegemony, but rooted in the

class power structure of Latin America" (p. 199). For Kellogg, UNASUR clearly represents "a direct challenge to neo-liberalism" (p.200) in the sense that it has opposed the emphasis on market and liberalization. However, Kellogg also emphasizes that the replacement of the role of the market for a stronger state does not imply overcoming inequalities and accumulation competition, inherent to the nature of capitalism.

Kellogg affirms that still rooted in the class power structure of South America, UNASUR reproduces this structure with its themes, agenda, and priorities which are primarily of interest to economic elites and the capitalist class. In a similar way, Margarita Flores (2007) questions the consideration of the regionalism of UNASUR as different and as the basis for a new type of South American society. According to Flores (2007), the salience of the South American Regional Infrastructural Initiative (IIRSA), the prevalence of a model of exportation, and the centrality of the oil politics make UNASUR's transformative capabilities rather doubtful.

First, the displacement of the market forces and private interests for the role of strong interventionist states does not assure a real transformation within the countries (Kellogg, 2007). Kellogg asserts that the economic boom experienced by Latin American countries can foster the authoritative role of the states, but that when this positive context falters "state capitalism and social welfare" would falter as well as any prospect of system transformation (p.208).

Second, authors such as Gonzáles and Ovando (2008), Kellogg (2007), and Serbin (2008) also remind us that within the framework of UNASUR, the

plans to integrate states have not implied so far the integration of minorities such as Indigenous Peoples or social participation of organized groups such as labour unions or feminist movements with their specific concerns. According to these authors, the emphasis on civil society participation has been limited to the rhetoric of justification and to the goal of the achieving support for UNASUR.

Although the mentioned scholars have questioned the so-called different regionalism entailed by UNASUR, others do not completely disregard the promising potential of a *transformative* trend of regionalism. Authors such as Can (2010) and Grugel (2006) argue that the new regionalism in Latin America can be associated with the emergence of a "radical identity formation" built upon the resistance against neoliberalism and globalization. Drawing on Mittelman's concept of "transformative regionalism," Can (2010) argues that UNASUR can be seen as expression of "regional transformation in slow motion" (p.27).

On the other hand, however, González and Ovando (2008) and Giacalone (2008) question this so-called slow motion transformation insofar as the attempts of integration historically have not provoked transformation but normalization, these have been founded and developed in light of European models, and they have been developed based on an understanding that confronts borders, as differences, with integration, as homogenization. At the core of these observers' critical analysis is the attention to integration as embedded in a specific political and contextual rationality that has signified normalization of alternatives and assimilation more than inclusion.

These briefly outlined analyses enable us to move to a central point within this thesis' argument: If UNASUR has been characterized as part of this new regionalism, the rationalist-led framework of analysis has not further facilitated the research on the content behind this descriptive transformation. UNASUR, although an expression of a moment of transition within regionalism in South America (Briceño, 2010; Can, 2010; Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013; Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010 Sanahuja 2008a, 2008b, 2012), for the most part has been analyzed with an emphasis on its intergovernmental origins, its level of institutionalization or its lack of convergence within its economic objectives. These are determinisms from the mainstream analytical approaches; and, the emphasis of attention on these has favored the argument of a new trend of regionalism while some gray areas of analysis have remained unexplained.

It is not our intention to underestimate the sort of analyses that in fact give account of the differences that UNASUR represents for regionalism in South America. Undoubtedly, UNASUR is a project different from its predecessors or alternative initiatives. However, the rationalist analyses that give account of the differences seem to lose emphasis on certain similarities, especially those regarding the region as a space of governance and regionalism as an art of ordering the world and its peoples.

It is now possible to state that the rationalist analyses centered on the agenda of UNASUR, the transformation of its objectives, and the break that represents with economic liberalization do not seem to acknowledge that although different UNASUR still has some ways to go in terms of a truly transformative

initiative. This path is not illuminated by analyzing UNASUR through mainstream regionalism lenses. I believe that an approach outside the mainstream frameworks could provide insight to further elaborate on this potentiality of transformation by elucidating what remains within UNASUR and so far has not been transformed.

3.2.2 Elements of Difference

As previously mentioned, the assertion of a new trend of regionalism in the case of UNASUR is mostly sustained in a rationalist-led analysis stressing a series of specific elements. UNASUR has been analytically approached with an emphasis on its characterization as a corollary of dynamics proper of intergovernmentalism. This is frame from which several reviews of the perceived interests and benefits of the countries' members have followed.

The genesis of UNASUR, its current functioning and its actual prospects of achieving the goals for which it was constituted are largely explained by referencing to intergovernmentalism as *the* adequate frame insofar. In other words, analysts attempt to explain this regional integration as mainly a process between the *central* actors of regionalism: states. Ultimately, as we will see in the case of UNASUR, states have been considered the actors with a preponderant role; government's representatives have been the central players at the moment of defining the agenda of integration and the *minimal convergence* through which some of the elements on the agenda have moved forward as constant themes of discussion.

Grounded in this intergovernmentalism, one of the notable elements that has also been noticed is the importance attributed to the interests of and perceived benefits reaped by the major member countries, especially Brazil and Venezuela, which are also recognized as the ones disputing the leadership of UNASUR (Amoroso, 2008; Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010; Serbin, 2008). Closely related to this dynamics is the focus on the agenda of integration, its transformation and most importantly its contours determined by the potential leader (Amoroso, 2008; Briceño, 2010; Contreras, 2009; Motta & Ríos, 2007; Vigevani & Fernandes, 2007). Finally, also of importance it has been the attention to the themes that dominated in the summits of heads of government and state were subsequently translated into specific programs or sub-entities[10] (Comini 2010; Crisóstomo, 2009; Griffiths, 2009; Wagner, 2010).

Some of the explanations of the factors leading to the consolidation of UNASUR paid special attention to the dynamics between particular countries recognized as *leaders* or drivers of the forces behind this latest initiative. In these, the regional project has been understood as the space in which the potential leaders have disputed the right to outline the regional political project in a parallel way to their own foreign policy. Thus, numerous commentators (Amoroso, (2008); Chávez, (2010); Gardini (2010); Guedes de Oliveira, 2010; Vigevani & Fernandes, 2007) agree that a thorough analysis of the development of UNASUR

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[10] The literature produced on the specific programs and sub-entities of UNASUR is prolific and to some extent very specific. Although it is not an objective of this thesis to present a detailed review of this, I consider it pertinent to introduce a brief overview of some of the most interesting findings and those significant for my own argumentation.

requires the acknowledgement of the role that Brazil has played since 1993 with the initiative of the South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA), and the role of Venezuela since its more active participation in 2004 at the Cochabamba Summit.

UNASUR is (or at least is understood as) a reflection of the political international agenda of the *strongest* and sometimes *loudest* country in the region. Thus, most of the attention has been paid to the role and the dynamics of interaction between Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela to attempt to give response to the reasoning behind the formation of UNASUR. Furthermore, the dynamic among these *regional powers* is not interpreted independent of the international system and the influences, potentialities or constraints that it could represent. The analysis of the causes of integration behind UNASUR seemed to be strongly related to the reading of the particular position that these regional powers attempt to maintain as a way to face the international realm and to obtain the best results of its interaction within it.

As Kellogg (2007) formulated, although it is pertinent to keep attention on the foreign policies of the strategic countries, it is also fundamental to acknowledge that at the background of UNASUR's constitution there was a context of positive economic conjuncture of growth. Drawing on Kellogg's argument is important in order to understand the still strong determinism of exogenous forces, of pressures coming outside-in, as well as the social implications that will be addressed later in this paper.

South American integration has been directly fostered by the impact of China's demand for raw materials from the countries of region; while on the other

hand, integration has also been related to the "politics of pipelines" or the matters of natural gas and politics of oil at the forefront of the regional agenda. Kellogg makes the point clearly in saying, "this return to growth is shaking up political as well as economic alliances" (Kellogg, 2007, p.191). The combination of a favourable economic context, a clearer political scenario of "post hegemonic regionalism" with the decline of the United States as the hegemon (Hettne, 1994, p.5), and a certain convergence among the interests of the member countries have been central elements for the explanation of the emergence of UNASUR.

Within this conjunction of international forces, the formulations of Hettne about previously sub-imperialist power becoming sub-regional hegemons (1994, 2005) seem accurate and have not been overlooked by observers of the South American case. Despite the constant recurrence of the notion of minimal convergence or the minimal common denominator when making sense of UNASUR, the interests of Brazil or Venezuela are still approached as the ambitions of countries attempting to achieve hegemonic power.

Along these lines, Amoroso (2008), Chaves (2010), and Gardini (2010) among others, argue that UNASUR is the result of the specific geopolitical strategic interests of Brazil and its vision for the region; however, the growing role of Venezuela has not gone unnoticed (Kellogg, 2007; Sanahuja, 2008). Moreover, most of the observers emphasize that the origins of the Union of South American Nations can be drawn from the proposal of SAFTA in 1993 as a counter initiative that sought to present a broader project of regionalism, facing at

the time the American intention of launching the FTAA and the adherence of Mexico to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

According to Briceño (2010), the construction of the new South American regionalism was a process initiated when the proposed SAFTA took a turn at the Summit of Brasilia in 2000, fostering the centrality of the notion of the South American region as an entity of counterbalance encompassing matters beyond trade. By 2004, the proposal was transformed into the South America Community of Nations (SACN), which "without rejecting the idea of free trade, […] included integration mechanisms beyond trade liberalization and the promotion of investments" (Briceño, 2010, p.212).

Interestingly, the Brazilian-shaped SACN was not conceived as a long term initiative nor as a frame to merge markets, but as "a process to promote the progressive union of national economic spaces in a new economic and political entity" (Briceño, 2010, p.213). Under the leadership dispute between Venezuela and Brazil, finally in 2006 SACN started to changed into UNASUR, and in 2008 became formally constituted as such (Briceño, 2010).

As mentioned before, Brazil and Argentina developed a historical role along different processes of integration; their diplomatic bilateral relations constituted the foundations for initiatives such as MERCOSUR (Gardini, 2007) and their importance is still justified in terms of their influence in the design and negotiations of the previous SAFTA, the subsequently SACN, and the now legally consolidated UNASUR (Briceño, 2010; Kellogg, 2007, Sanahuja, 2008).

The Argentinean position of influence decreased considerably since its financial crisis at the beginning of the 2000s. However, it is widely recognized as an important actor because of its role as the supporter or ally for one or another potential leader, whether Brazil or Venezuela. According to Chávez (2010), the Argentinean perception of Brazil in the regional scenario has been of suspicion, especially since Argentina's interests in the initiative of MERCOSUR were threatened by Brazil's decrease of attention since the consolidation of UNASUR. If well for Argentina, MERCOSUR was more promising for international insertion than UNASUR, during the first years of UNASUR's content formulation, Argentina became a close supporter of Venezuela, especially due to "the famous Venezuelan purchase of the onerous Argentinean external debt" (p. 36).

In this particular scenario, the interests of Argentina in the creation of UNASUR were in regards to response to its more immediate objectives, the solution to its own financial crisis and the counterbalance of the perceived historical hegemonic influence that Brazil has pursued in the region. For Argentina, as for most of the medium size players, the ultimate goal is to secure its position in the UNASUR initiative of influence, especially since the strength of alternative ones such as MERCOSUR or CAN has politically decreased (Ramírez, 2008; Amoroso, 2008; Chaves, 2010).

For the analysis of the Brazilian role and its interests in the formation and consolidation of UNASUR there seems to be a consensus among the different observers. Brazil has been a central actor in designing and promoting

integrationist initiatives; as such, it has played a key role in UNASUR since its origins. Brazil's specific interests have been understood in terms of hegemonic aspirations in the sub-region, embedded in the scenario of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent reorganization of the world order in economic blocs as geopolitical unities. This is a new phase of opportunities in the Brazilian long trajectory of strategically seeking to benefit itself by pursuing a model of insertion in the international realm (Kellogg, 2007; Ramírez, 2008; Chavez, 2010; Gardini, 2010).

On the one hand, Brazilian interests as a geopolitical regional hegemon can be pragmatically explained in terms of the goal of economic expansion (Kellogg, 2007). On the other hand, and most importantly, these interests have evolved and seemed to respond to the Brazilian self-perception as a regional political power (Ramírez, 2008; Briceño, 2010; Kellogg, 2007). According to Kellogg (2007), back in the 60s Brazilian sociologist Ruy Mauro Marini already identified Brazil's aspirations to become a regional power. Drawing upon the studies of Marini (1965), Daniel Zirker (1994) and Sean W. Burges (2005), Kellogg states that the role of Brazil is deeply linked to its own interest of emerging as a regional hegemon and much of this ambition can be framed in the notion of a "South American community," (p. 198) which Brazil pursued in the first place.

According to Gardini (2010), UNASUR is the result of the Brazilian vision to "create South America as a politically active and coherent community" (p.22). Thus, for this author, it is understandable that UNASUR is a strictly

intergovernmental initiative, a cornerstone for political coordination and an instrument for the "South Americanization" of political matters (Gardini, 2010, p.22). With UNASUR, Brazil has not aimed to create a supranational entity, but to build an intergovernmental space of coordination which ultimately aims to restraint the involvement of foreign forces in South American regional political issues, an instrument defined in terms of sovereignty (Chávez, 2010).

Chávez (2010) further states that Brazil is responding to its "natural" role as leader of the region inasmuch as it has been the protagonist mobilizing and motivating the members in each attempt of integration. Furthermore, Chávez states, according to Brazilian interests the regional integration of South America is part of its strategic international and global policy prospects. In this frame, the country's emphasis on security and development allows it to strengthen the political regional platform necessary for its beneficial strategic insertion in the realm of international relations.

Furthermore, Briceño (2010) has highlighted how the Brazilian hegemonic interests have been adapted in its foreign policy in response to the transformations of the international context; the idea of "autonomy through autarky" (p.214), which has been one of the central pillars of Brazil´s foreign policy, was remarkably strong within the context of the programs of import substitution industrialization (ISI), fostering the aspiration of self-sufficient development through a diversified industrialization. Vigevani and Oliveira (2007) and Briceño (2010) argue that the re-orientation of the Brazilian economy and the transformation of the international system gave way to a more complex notion of

"autonomy by integration" upon which Brazil has sought to strength its own position in the international realm by means of carving a favorable regional scenario for itself (p. 214).

If the role of Brazil in the consolidation of UNASUR has been portrayed as that one of the designer according to its hegemonic interests; the active participation of Venezuela, especially since the Cuzco Summit of 2004, has been portrayed in terms of rivalry in order to secure the leadership of the scheme. What appears unclearly defined, however, is the sort of leadership that Venezuela offers, if radically different or similar to the Brazilian one.

The particularities of the foreign policy of Venezuela on the one hand, and the striking rhetoric of its President on the other seem to present an unclear image of the role and interests of Venezuela in regards to UNASUR. However, several observers argue that UNASUR represents for Venezuela a space of potential expansion of its political project, a project characterized as *ideological* but not clearly defined (Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010; Kellogg, 2007; Sanahuja, 2008).

Chávez (2010) clearly states that Venezuela underpins a construction of the notion of South American identity, which simultaneously represents the foundation and the means for its geopolitical strategic goal, and a "new international system of multipolar character" (p.37). According to Chávez (2010), the South American project under the influence of Venezuela "is held in the existence of common problematics (backwardness, economic dependency and poverty) and socio-historical factors (legacy of the Bolivarian thought) which generate shared aspirations of change within the power relations" (p. 37).

Amoroso (2008), Chávez (2010) and Sanahuja (2008), among others, agree with the ideological character that appears to define the Venezuelan position. With the highlights of the declarations of President Hugo Chávez Frías when referring to the future of "21st century socialism" (See Kellogg, 2007), this posture is perceived as framed in a broader realist systemic horizon of transformation of the relations of power, translated into a "multi-polar" order confronting the unilateralism of the United Stated (Giacalone, 2006).

What has given strength and support to the ambitious interests of Venezuela is that it has undertaken the role of the paymaster within the regional scheme, a role that Brazil seemed unwilling to take on to the same extent (Amoroso, 2008). Kellogg (2007) and Chávez (2010) have developed this idea in detail by explaining that certainly Venezuela has consolidated its position as an entity of finance, not only for the case of Argentina in 2005, but as well for its bilateral relations with other countries in the region within the framework of the "hemispheric energy integration" and in the pursuit of consolidation of its position in oil negotiations with China (Kellogg, 2007, p. 193).

I consider the analysis provided by Kellogg (2007) of great importance, insofar as he differs from other commentators in their bold assertions about the Venezuelan stance as more radical as ideologically loaded and as opposed to the Brazilian one. He develops his argument through three important points of analysis from which other questions will be explored throughout this thesis. First, the review of the economic aspirations of Venezuela in relation to its oil politics; second, the assertion of UNASUR as a means to assert sovereignty; and, third,

that although this sovereignty is asserted in direct opposition to Washington and to neoliberalism, it is not radically opposed to capitalism and therefore it is dependent on an economically favorable context.

As previously mentioned, the politics of oil and the potentialities connected to these are directly related to the opening of the Asian market, which Venezuela is attempting to embrace by displacing its current market focused on its American neighbor. In a similar manner, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina have signed the base documents for the future constitution of Petrosur that alongside the IIRSA project seeks to promote the diversification of Venezuela's market and the energy union that would be framed in the conception of Petroamérica (Kellogg, 2007). Petrosur is the project through which Venezuela seeks to consolidate the dynamics of energy's offer and demand between the countries in the region.

These analysts are right to draw attention to the economic and political moves from Venezuela, accompanied by a clear and loud rhetoric against American influence in the region. On the one hand, Venezuela has pragmatically aimed for different markets for the allocation of its commodities. On the other, Venezuela has loaded this process with a political rhetoric of assertion of sovereignty and multipolarity. While the difference of ends between Brazil and Venezuela are not so irreconcilable, as basically economic diversification of their markets, the means and rhetoric certainly are different. As clearly presented by Kellogg (2007), the oil industry of Venezuela as the heart of its prospects is

compatible with a mode of accumulation still based in capitalism and provoking unequal growth.

In addition, the potential benefits that UNASUR encompasses for other countries in the region have been presented along similar lines. It has been claimed that Chile benefits from UNASUR with energy security and that this regional body could regionalize and balance its conflicts and instability with Bolivia. Likewise Bolivia can benefit from the regionalization of the Pacific issue and it can take advantage of a bigger market for its gas. The openness to the gas exports could also be a benefit to Peru, which can as well assert its role as port to the Asian market. For Colombia, UNASUR is seen as space for political dialogue especially with the countries with which it shares geographical borders and the problematic of the FARC camps (Gardini, 2010; Sanahuja, 2008a, 2008b). Some of these benefits have actually proved certain in terms of political coordination and resolution of intra-regional problems, as well as the gas and oil negotiations fostered by the programs that UNASUR encompasses.

Finally, among the elements of analysis and the themes that have received profuse attention and that have also served as means of argumentation of the post-liberal character of UNASUR are: the transition of its agenda since its beginnings with SACN and the attention of the programs that appear to encompass much of its underlying beliefs, IIRSA in the case of regional infrastructure and SADC in the case of regional security.

Briceño (2010) highlights how the apparent *politicization* of the agenda of UNASUR has implied a transformation of its content, which is now reflected in

what he considers a "maximalist project" (pp.10-13). Although Briceño concludes in his article that UNASUR finally represents of minimal convergence despite its maximalist agenda, it is interesting to highlight that according to him, this represents a transformation of the strategies of constructing the "new South American regionalism" (p.209). Each project during this transition is presented as associated to the political national objectives of the disputing leaders, Brazil and Venezuela; and certainly the *minimal convergence* result, that UNASUR represents, is a recurrent element of agreement among the different analyses (Briceño, 2010; Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010; Sanahuja, 2007, 2010).

Briceño (2010), drawing on the work of Tokatlian (2005), posits that the minimalist agenda of the then SACN was "based on the idea that a community of interest between the countries of South America can be built by setting a few priorities, gradually and through specific examples" (p. 209). These interests were expressed in the strengthening of peace in the region, the still important consolidation of SAFTA by joining CAN and MERCOSUR, the development of IIRSA, the energy sector, the objective of eradication of drug trafficking and the development of regional information and communication technologies. However, the Cochabamba Summit represented the emergence of the *alternative* maximalist agenda, with objectives implied a more ambitious structural transformation of the international order through "goals in the social and production areas" (Briceño, 2010, p.209).

The minimalist project advanced by Brazil and the maximalist one advanced by Venezuela have given place to a minimal convergence that for some

observers is represented by the programs of IIRSA and SADC (Briceño, 2010; Comini, 2010; Crisóstomo, 2009). The Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America has accompanied the objectives of development of the necessary infrastructure that the energy sector requires despite of the criticism that has accompanied it since its formulation in 2000 (Flores, 2007). On its side, the SADC has represented the space of conflict resolution at times of controversy among the members, and a space of exchanging knowledge among military representatives of government. SADC has been the instrument for the other important dimension of assertion of sovereignty, security (Comini, 2010; Crisóstomo, 2009). This defense committee has also been closely related with the aspirations of Brazil since it was proposed by the ex-president Lula Da Silva in 2008; specifically, the SACD represents the counter-balance initiative that Brazil aims to lead, grounded in the consideration of the key role that the United States plays in the regional security entities as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Chávez, 2010; Sanahuja, 2008).

3.2.3 The Understanding of UNASUR's Regionalism from Mainstream Approach

In this section I have briefly introduced some of the analytical findings, the elements of study and the theoretical stance that have received privileged attention in the study of the Union of South American Nations. Hence, I consider it of utmost importance to provide a general overview of the notion of regionalism that underlies most of these analyses as the core element from which subsequent

affirmations have been developed. Heavily drawing on the work of Andrew Hurrell (2005) on the review of theoretical schemes of analysis, I aim to identify the theoretical perspective from which the South American region has been explored.

First, although most of the academic work developed around UNASUR can be classified as important advancements we need to acknowledge that these analyses are in the first place grounded in the naturalization and therefore presumed necessity of regionalism. Regionalism is still mostly beneficial and therefore no matter its limitations it is presented as desirable. According to Hurrell (2005), "regional cooperation has to move forward and has to be made to work – despite the very limited results that have been achieved outside of the EU and NAFTA and the real problems within both"(p.51).

Much of the academic work about UNASUR revolves around this unquestionable necessity. We seem to overlook that the theoretical frameworks from which this initiative is analyzed, the "varied logics" of analysis, "depend heavily on the purpose of the inquiry" (Hurrell, 2005, p.41). The purposes of inquiry in the case of the analysts of UNASUR do not seem to include the question about what the notion of regionalism still negatively implies. Using analytical tools by which regionalism is reinforced and folds uncritically back on itself, enables me to assert that to certain extent these analysts are portraying a normative stance from which it is left unanalyzed that the regionalism encompasses as an "art of international governance".

Hurrell (2005) states that "all regions are socially constructed but region-building is politically programmatic [….] Political agency and normative commitment are central to the practice of politics and need also to be reflected in the analysis of politics" (p.53). On the one hand, if the region-building process is politically programmatic it is necessary to determine the type of problematization that precedes this process of translation from rationalities to programs: how is it determined? Who and what is part of this problematization? What is the role that academics play within the definition of this problematization?

On the other hand, the naturalization of regionalism within the case of UNASUR can be an example of the type of *soft power* and the governance deployed beyond the state and through the region with an analytical approach grounded in governmentality. Hurrell's work (2005) can serve as an example of how the analysis of regionalism within regionalism can potentially end up folding back on to itself, and not see alternatives outside it or not pointing out its shortcomings as an ordering principle. By the idea of regionalism within regionalism this study refers to the fact that approaching processes of regionalization or initiatives of regionalism within mainstream theoretical tools. Mainstream perspectives do not denaturalize regional processes and do not emphasize these as international art of governance. Mainstream perspectives have focused on the quest of power among nations-states, but not in the deployment of power that these states entail by agreeing to integration.

From the summit of Brasilia in 2000 to the signing of its constitutive treaty in 2008, UNASUR has come to represent a space of transition in which its first

counter-balance aspirations were considered a reactive response. The reactive scheme of the first part of the 2000s has given place to a more proactive initiative of integration in which the region is at the service of the interests of the parts. All this denotes a "postneoliberal" agenda—in a nutshell an agenda bringing back the states as the regulating actors (Briceño, 2010; Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2012; Sanahuja, 2008a, 2008b, 2012). As this characterization of UNASUR responds to an specific and somehow limited comprehension of neoliberalism as encompassing only economic matters. This perception loses sight of neoliberalism as morals and values that affect all other spheres of government, as closely related to capitalism within the perspective of modernity/coloniality, and therefore, as sustaining specific dynamics of power and exclusion that happen to keep invisible some other actors.

From acknowledging UNASUR's analysis from mainstream perspectives, two main arguments should be recognized, the one explaining the relation between UNASUR and the global system and the other one giving account of intra-regional theorizing. I will further explore other continuities that remain in the way of governance through UNASUR, however for now, it is important to outline the continuity of regionalism as a strategy.

Analysts emphasize that UNASUR represents a better approach to integrate South American countries to the international system. The strategies still are heavily related to how the decision makers perceive the regionalism – global system relation. The former is a means of taking the best possible advantage of the global economy, it *directly corresponds* to it (Hurrell, 2005); and although

most of the analyses reviewed emphasize how the member countries attempt a better, a more equal world order, there is less attention to question how the same strategy of better insertion can actually change the content of the game.

Certainly, on paper, the determinism of an all-powerful market is attempted to be left behind in exchange of a more proactive "managed regionalism" (Castro Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013, p.10), but it is also important to notice that *de facto* the determinism of the capitalist world system grounded in dynamics of global competition has not been attempted to be contested (Ceceña, 2009; Kellogg, 2007).

UNASUR, still and all, serves as expression of the comprehension of the region as the most efficient and "viable level to reconcile the changing and intensifying pressures of global capitalist competition on the one hand with the need for political regulation and management on the other" (Hurrell, 2005, p.42). And in addition, as I will specifically develop in the following chapter, UNASUR beyond the economic is maintained as a mode of governance serving the perpetuation of a world system sustained in practices of exclusion and neocolonialism.

From an intra-regional analysis UNASUR has been understood as the result of inter-states arrangements, the product of intergovernmentalism; in other words, most of the analyses of UNASUR are formulated from the premise that regionalism in South America can be principally explained in terms of states' interests. If the threats (whether natural or by other states or regions) pertain to the bargaining possibilities and/or the security of the region as a whole, the interests

of all members are involved and therefore regional entities and regional coordination "are viewed as purposively generated solutions to different kinds of collective action problems" (Hurrell, 2005, p.47).

Within this intergovernmental scheme for the case of South America and particularly UNASUR, the element of the common minimal denominator (Chávez, 2010; Gardini, 2010) or minimal convergence (Briceño, 2010; Sanahuja 2008a) is of special interest insofar as this is defined primarily by looking to the outside. Despite what it is stated in UNASUR's agenda, the minimal convergence is heavily defined in terms of bargaining power, not mainly among different groups and populations, but actually among the members of the regional organization.

3.3 Summing up, Common Interpretations of UNASUR

It is not my intention to underestimate or discredit the rationalist-led intergovernmental perspective among the dominant analyses of UNASUR. The literature reviewed mostly influenced by this perspective gives account of a series of elements that undoubtedly deserve attention for the comprehension of regional dynamics that UNASUR encompasses. Thus, for example, the rationalist-led intergovernmental analysis has allowed us to identify the central place of balance of power (Hurrell, 2005) that was needed and is constantly negotiated between the member countries of the nascent UNASUR. Furthermore, it continues to explore the implications of the leadership negotiations between Brazil and Venezuela, the different strategies of influence and power that they deploy, or the level of

institutionalism that all the different members are willing to commit according to how their perceptions of common interests evolve.

The approach to regions as space of dispute between states' interests, as a strategy within the framework of a global economy, and as a model of development through integration of capabilities further obscured some other elements. On the one hand, the analysis of UNASUR as a governmental technology, a construction of disputing political rationalities through which the region is portrayed as a space of governance, and an instrument through which and upon which the region and its population can be ordered in specific ways remain unexplored (Larner & Walters, 2002; Newstead, 2009). On the other hand, the analysis of UNASUR, and the regionalism of which it is an expression, as a means of governance through the perpetuation of silence and exclusion, in other words, the analysis of UNASUR starting from a broader notion of neoliberalism, its relation to capitalism and both inserted in the modernity/coloniality project.

The "postneoliberal" characterization is contested through a governmentality analysis and a decolonial stance. The former will open the spectrum of the dimensions of the social political field and the types of relations of power to be considered. By perceiving regionalism as a political rationality, the governmentality analysis unveils the determinisms of the capitalist paradigm. The latter, the decolonial stance, emphasizes that regionalism is naturalized as desirable inasmuch approached from intra-modernity perspectives, not giving account of alternative rationalities, alternative modernities, other ways of thinking and being.

Chapter 4: An Alternative Approach to UNASUR as a technique of governance

4.1 Introduction

In the previous sections I have aimed to offer a general description of what has been said so far about the process of regionalization entailed by UNASUR. As observed, the academic work developed allows a review of the features that characterize the UNASUR initiative framed according to mainstream academic approaches to regionalism. Most of these studies agree in conceiving UNASUR as an endeavour that is different from previous initiatives in South America. Scholars have emphasized UNASUR's attempt to overcome economic liberalization as exclusive means of integration as well as the return of a stronger state to sustain the argument of a new trend of regionalism in South America (Castro-Rea & Knight, forthcoming 2013; Gardini, 2011; Da Motta & Ríos, 2007; Sanahuja, 2008a, 2008b, 2012). However, at the basis of a governmentality analysis of rationalities, I aim to highlight a broader understanding of neoliberalism within the modernity/coloniality project. From a decolonial perspective, the argument of "postneoliberal" regionalism is confronted insofar as dynamics of accumulation, domination and exclusion spread beyond the economic sphere in a matrix of neocolonial power at the regional level.

In addition, I have also aimed to theoretically demonstrate that mainstream analyses fold the process of regionalization back on itself (Larner & Walters, 2002). They focus mostly on the identification of differences between UNASUR and past initiatives, but they do not seem to give careful attention to what a

typology and analysis of differences may obscure –namely, the persistence and recurrence of dynamics of exclusion and the silencing of others voices and rationalities of integration. In other words, overcoming the emphasis on unregulated liberalization process through regionalization has not implied overcoming capitalist social relations of power.

Thus, in this section I will approach UNASUR as a means of governance entailing a particular political rationality. I aim to outline the elements that are part of this political rationality, to identify what it does govern over, and therefore how the scheme of UNASUR itself is a way of exercising power beyond an exclusive understanding from a realist intergovernmental frame. The idea of minimal convergence or the notion of the lowest common denominator (Gardini, 2011), repeatedly employed by mainstream analysts and official representatives, seem to imply on the one hand the existence of a multiplicity of rationalities within the project of UNASUR; while on the other hand, as Newstead (2009) and Walter and Larner (2002) have suggested, they also would imply the existence of a dynamic of crash, selection and exclusion, expressions of relations of power and dynamics of governance creating and shaping not only the region and the international realm in a particular way, but also the people within it.

Hence, some of the central questions that I seek to answer in this section are: What kind of political rationality is entailed through UNASUR? Were there or are there still other political rationalities within the process of the constitution and development of UNASUR? How is one political rationality sustained as the official one?

For this section, my strategy of analysis has been strongly influenced by the compilation of articles within the book *Beyond the 'African Tragedy': Discourses on development and the global economy,* edited by Malinda S. Smith (2006), in two important aspects. Although not specifically grounded in the decolonial project, but in a critical theoretical approach drawing on Foucaltian analysis; the various analyses of the New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD) provided an alternative account of the contrasting rationalities at its base. In a summary, the authors in this book aimed to explore the different forces within this initiative and deconstruct the multiple voices within it. Specifically, the chapter written by Smith (2006) reminded us of the centrality of discourse as a performative act. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler (1993) and Rita Abrahamsen (2000), Smith argues that the attention to discourse can not only reveal what is being performed, but it can also unveil what is being evaded or left behind.

In this sense, this section is centered on the identification and deconstruction of rationalities within the processes of the constitution and development of UNASUR, privileging the method of discourse analysis within the perspective of governmentality. I have selected and made use of the "abductive research strategy," inasmuch as it is based on the central ontological consideration of regions as social constructions, as part of "social reality […] product of processes by which social actors together negotiate […] meanings" (Blaikie, 2000, p.115).

The abductive research strategy, according to Blaikie (2000), is epistemologically centered on the interpretation of discourse.[11] That is, on concepts and language that carry meanings and insights of participants, but which also, as emphasized by Smith (2006), carry symbolic power that structures/performs the socio political world. Moreover, the focus on language as a performative means enables us to "elucidate not only *the system of thought* through which authorities have posed and specified the problems for government, but also the *systems of action* through which they have sought to give effect to government" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.275).

Furthermore, it is important to clarify that drawing on the notions of Berg (2007) and Silverman (2001), this study makes use of discourse analysis as the methodological practice of interpretation that would allow the identification of patterns, themes, shared knowledge and core constructions within the imaginary of the subjects involved. Silverman (2001) emphasizes that discourse elaborates in itself a concrete reality, by "working up coherence and incoherence" (p.179) and by making sense of the objects upon which it refers.

It is also important to notice that this interpretative exercise is heavily grounded in the theoretical framework selected—namely, governmentality. By drawing on Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Larner and Walters (2002), and Newstead (2009) I aim to move to a higher level of comprehension where my

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[11] Although there is a methodological debate about the differences between content analysis as a quantitative strategy and discourse analysis as a qualitative one, for the matter of this research we consider both notions interchangeable since we consider the practice of interpretation as equally central in each case. For a detailed review of this debate see Berg (2007) and Silverman (2001).

analysis aims to denaturalize the construction of the region by contemplating it as means of power, as a means through which and upon which certain ways of governance are reproduced. It is important that I explain here my use of the methodological tool of three tenets provided by Rose and Miller (2010).

According to Rose and Miller (2010), political discourse is the broader space of "formulation and justification of idealised schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it" (p.276). It is within this domain that certain patterns and regularities can be identified and considered "political rationalities" containing, in an explicit or latent form, three central characteristics: (a) a "moral form," meaning that political rationalities are elaborated upon some perceived principles of how things should be, including the values and ideals within which governance should be organized, and the display of authority linked to specific understandings of moral responsibilities; (b) a "epistemological character," denoting that political rationalities "embody some account of the persons over whom government is to be exercised," and most importantly a characterization of these *objects* of government in an specific way that ultimately justifies governing them; and finally, (c) a "distinctive idiom," political rationalities are expressed through a specific vocabulary that defines what can be thinkable as a political reality, meaning the language that "codify and contest the nature and limits of political power" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 277).

Following this path of analysis and making use of the same methodological tools of the governmentality perspective deployed by Larner and Walters (2002) and Newstead (2009), I aim to inquire if the wave of new

regionalism actually entails certain political rationality aligned to neoliberalism in a broader sense. Could UNASUR be conceived as a different construction in which a neoliberal political rationality has been negotiated or rejected? What is the actual role or position of UNASUR from an alternative decolonial stance? Although mainstream scholars have already provided the assertion of UNASUR as part of a new model of regionalism, I will develop an analytics of governmentality which begins by inquiring the way the regional space and the regional subjects are objectivised or made intelligible by being made governable. I assert that despite the many differences with previous initiatives, there are still some other important similarities, especially in the way that governance, power and institutionalism is deployed. I reiterate: this does not discard previous analyses, but actually broadens the spectrum of comprehension of UNASUR.

4.2 Making the region intelligible

According to the documents made public in the official website of UNASUR (unasusg.org) and to what has been argued by most of the scholars and other commentators, the process of constitution of the latest South American initiative was initiated in the Summit of Brasilia in 2000. Since this first high-level meeting there were two more so-called Summits of the Presidents of South America (2002, 2004); two regularly scheduled meetings of Heads of State of the South American Community of Nations (2005, 2006) and two more non-

scheduled special sessions (2005, 2007)[12]. After the approval of the Treaty of Constitution of UNASUR in the extraordinary session of May 2008, there were three more regularly scheduled meetings of the Committee of Heads of State and Government of UNASUR (2009, 2010, 2011) and numerous other extraordinary sessions, non-nominated meetings, committees' sessions, etc. (See Annex 1).

This path of summitry towards the constitution of UNASUR has not been exempted from a series of occurrences of different character which have challenged the feasibility of governance of the recently constituted UNASUR[13]. Hence, I do not intend to disregard the non-linear nature of the development of UNASUR, neither the moments of reflection and transformation which have served as basis for other analyses. However I believe that considering solely the linear collection of official declarations of the Heads of State and Government of UNASUR enables us to develop the analytic of governmentality of this regional organization as a "technology of government," to identify patterns that by repetition constitute UNASUR's official rationality.

From the first meeting of Presidents of South America held in Brasilia in 2000 to the present moment this study has focused on the content analysis of two

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[12] During the II Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of States of the South American Community of Nations, which is also known as the I South American Energy Summit (Venezuela, April 16 2007) the change of name from SACN to UNASUR is approved.

[13] For example, the political crisis in Paraguay started in June, 2012, which led to the suspension of this country's participation in any regional organization and caused questions about UNASUR's preventive capabilities.

types of official documents.[14] On the one hand, I have considered in the analysis the official declarations or statements of the Heads of State and Government of UNASUR in regularly scheduled and extraordinary meetings including the Treaty of Constitution of UNASUR and statutes of the special committees. And, on the other hand, I incorporated in the analysis work papers, committees' reports, schedules and documents of reflection requested and elaborated as inputs for the meetings of Heads of State and Government of UNASUR.

In addition, the process of analysis of these sources can be characterized as a two dimensional approach. Within a first level or dimension of analysis the review of the material has been *open* insofar as it was expected that the data *speaks for itself*; in other words, the categories of analysis or the broad groups of representation were deduced by the data itself after identifying patterns of enunciation and regular themes. Whilst, the second level or dimension of analysis can be considered *closed,* insofar as the material was reviewed with previous established categories of analysis provided by the theoretical framework, those of the three tenets of political rationality.

The statements, declarations and documents that are part of the official rhetoric within the constitution and development of UNASUR are not only *building* or *creating* this initiative of integration among the countries of South America, but are making the region intelligible in a specific way. These are defining the shapes and tones through which the region and the regional subjects

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[14] We understand as an official source of analysis any document published on the website of UNASUR labeled under the category of Declarations.

are conceived. The dynamics of power that I aim to identify should then be considered subtle ways of making subjects governable, without necessarily being direct patterns of constraint (Rose & Miller, 2010).

Even though the official documentation is introduced in a linear manner, I want to emphasize and especially make visible that this apparent convergence has had its moments of controversy and transformation. The following section presents, in a linear way, an outline of the elements that constitute UNASUR's political rationality based on the methodological assumption of its written statements and declarations as performative. This exercise does not disregard the breaking points in the development of UNASUR, but actually emphasizes how even these have been subsumed by a rhetoric that makes sense of them through exceptions to be excluded.

4.2.1 UNASUR's Conception of Space

According to its official documentation, UNASUR is still primordially established upon a physical - geographical notion of space, also pre-conceived or pre-assumed as *common*, as *shared,* and as a cradle of a high number of *potentialities* in *contradistinction* to the conception of the non-regional or out of the regional space. This is one of the rhetorical elements of utmost importance within the statements of UNASUR because it simultaneously justifies UNASUR's existence. When UNASUR *raison d' être* is presented, for example, with real or unreal sentiments of community-belonging, this justification is not exclusively based on identifying elements that *actually exist out-there* but these are created/enhanced insofar as enunciated. The recognition of the region as a

common space or as a geographical unit is *a priori* condition for the regional space *a posteriori* conceived as governable.

This apparently basic and necessary premise of a shared space full of potentialities is linked to some implications. On the one hand, the rhetoric of UNASUR moves on, in an apparent logical way, to conceive any sort of separation natural or man-created as obstacles that should be overcome. Separation, differences and obstacles are rhetoric resources uploaded with negative connotations. On the other hand, alongside this conception of the inside - common space, the outside space is introduced in contradistinction as the non-geographically determined. Furthermore as overarching, not clearly defined, aggregate of forces, global forces full of challenges and risks that endanger South American own development. In turn, union, integration, and convergence—in the sense of naturalization of the differences, are loaded with repeatedly positive meanings, as achievable solutions with which the outside can be confronted and overcome.

One of the elements of interest within the outline of the political rationality of UNASUR is undoubtedly that the construction of what is governable, the regional space, is for the most part presented as a space of capabilities and of positive prospects. It is inferred that the regional organization through *proper* management has the potential of enhancing a terrain of dormant positive capabilities into competitive attributes. Thus, for example, UNASUR's declaration of Brasilia (2000), statement of Cuzco (2004b), and the final report of the Strategic Commission of Reflection basis for its Constitutive Treaty (2006b)

have introduced the category of *region of potentialities*, simultaneously and by contrast bringing up the category of *outer-space of challenges*, crisis, and instability. The regional space of potentialities has been portrayed under different rhetorical resources, for example in the Report of the Committee of Technical Coordination for IIRSA (2002b), it was presented as following:

> South America is a region rich in natural resources, with high biological diversity, that has maintained an environment of racial and religious tolerance, and it enjoys a high linguistic homogeneity, which has allowed building democratic societies and states conferring a high potential of growth and development. (UNASUR, 2002b, para.1, author's translation[15])

On the one hand the region is constructed in positive terms as a shared space of great opportunities. On the other hand, this image would be incomplete without presenting the outer-regional space not exclusively in negative terms, but as an undetermined force that can constrain and challenge, because of which regional management, regional governance should exist, upon which order and governance are justified.

The understanding of these outer dangers or forces of constraint has changed through the years and the type of governance entailed through the regional organization as well. As indicated by Larner and Walters (2002), the rationality of the new regionalism "tends toward a conception of space as global rather than international" (p.408). While the old regionalism wave did not presuppose a global space to be confronted and regions were understood in

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[15] All the quotes from UNASUR's official documents are translation by the author.

relation to nation-states; in a different way now, regionalism corresponds to the perception of this *global* outer force, UNASUR's rhetoric is still of strategic inclusion.

Thus, for example, UNASUR's declaration of Brasilia (2000) in addition to starting with the recognition of the "South American common space," (para.1) also recognized the "common challenges of globalization" (para.15). In 2006, the Report of the Strategic Commission of Reflection added the historic framework of political instability after the end of the Cold War broadening world asymmetries and deepening the crisis of multilateralism (section 1.2, para2). And similarly, the UNASUR's statement of Quito (2009b) emphasized the financial crisis and recession provoked out of the region, generated in the "developed world" (Challenges to UNASUR section, para.1).

This characterization of *our regional space versus the outer space* has already been identified by some scholars as a core element within the construction of a regional identity (Giacalone, 2006, 2008; Gürcan, 2010; Wendt, 2008). Other authors add that this subjective two-sided construction (positively defined towards inside the region, negatively towards the undefined outside) should more accurately be presented as a means of justification among official representatives to sustain several different integration initiatives than as a existing actual differentiation between the two spaces (González & Ovando, 2008). Real or not this two-sided rhetorical resource, on the one hand, renders invisible some particular national issues and problematics of the member countries; while on the

other hand, it directly responds to a global understanding of the international system.

By leaving national problematics unsolved they are being reproduced at the regional level, for example in the construction of *non regional* subjects, the exclusion of civil participation and silencing of alternative rationalities of integration. And by perceiving a global outer world, UNASUR's countries still aim for regionalism as the better alternative to cope with it (to face challenges and manage the benefits), although not to transform it.

In addition, Newstead (2009) affirms in his analysis of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) that the strength of the neoliberal character of the new regionalism wave was such among the member countries that this rationality is deployed and reproduced through the region, the regional space is constructed as fundamentally a "smooth economic space" (p.164). In the case of UNASUR, interesting enough, the presumption of a global outer space remains. However, while for the mentioned expert this premise originated that the construction of the regional space was then made exclusively in direct economic terms, in the case of UNASUR the overall positive conception of the region has moved away from an exclusively economic construction towards a conception emphasizing notions such as zone of peace and democracy.

The analysis of the official documentation allows observing that although UNASUR does not disregard the centrality of the economic integration in a capitalist way, there are other elements that have been brought into play—linked to economic interests in a more subtle way. It would be entirely incorrect to

assume that because of these new incorporated elements there has been a true complete displacement of the prioritization of economic interests of integration in favour of the advancement of social mobilization, participation, and alternative solidarity.

Thus, I have identified two lines of discourse. The first, in which, the emphasis was on a conception of the space remaining specifically within a geographical framework and in direct economic determinism. Governance is introduced in the terrain of overcoming obstacles of mobility for liberalization and exchange (UNASUR, 2004-2011). The second line of argumentation makes the region intelligible insofar as linked or committed to broader themes, calling for shared values or common principles such as peace, security, and commitment to democracy, within this framework the UNASUR's declaration of 2002a "South American Zone of Peace" was formulated. Yet, these last ones do not exclude the promotion of growth and economic development, the line of argumentation is made more complicated inasmuch as peace and democracy are related to securing accumulation, inversion, competition, and the so-called progress framed within the capitalist system.

For example, the official discourses of the first years (UNASUR, 2000, 2002a,b; 2004a,b) introduced special emphasis to initiatives such as IIRSA and the South American citizenship, both specifically related to the objective of facilitating mobility within member countries. Thus, for example, the declaration of Brasilia (UNASUR, 2000) stated the importance of "the consolidation and *instrumentation* of the South American identity [contributing] to the strengthening

of other organisms, mechanisms, or regional process with a *broader geographical scope* [emphasis added]" (para.11, author's translation). Two years later, the Report of the Committee of Technical Coordination for IIRSA (UNASUR, 2002b) added that:

> Infrastructure as a key element of the South American Integration is based on the notion that the synergic development of transportation, energy and telecommunications can generate a decisive impulse to overcome geographic obstacles, the approaching together of markets, and the promotion of new economic opportunities. (UNASUR, 2002b, para.12)

In posterior declarations like the one of Cochabamba (UNASUR, 2006a) the emphasis on infrastructure, at least at a discursive level, turned towards a different sense of "infrastructure for the interconnection of our people […] responding to standards of social and economic sustainable development" (UNASUR, 2006a, Section 4, para.5). As exemplified with the previous quotation, the contours of UNASUR's rhetoric changed at least superficially, but these have still linked to economic interest and subsumed to them. While the rhetoric of peace and democracy is now present through all UNASUR's official documents, the specific projects that have received broader attention are those of the energy and infrastructure field. Brie (2009) is therefore accurate when he emphasizes that the neoliberal market capitalism, after the crisis initiated in 2008, has suffered a greater delegitimization. Facing this, the rhetoric resources have needed to

change; as Sekler (2009) states, we are facing the renovation of neoliberalism in terms of "neoliberalism with a human, sustainable, face" (p.61).

Furthermore, the rhetorical resources that denote something different as rapidly contested with other such as *realistic objectives* or the determinant doing *what is possible to be done,* these constrain any other possibilities of conceiving the region outside a framework of economic interests. These conditional rhetorical resources are constantly superimposed over what we can understand as different integrational rationalities. I will come back to this point.

As mentioned above, since 2002 the regional space has been made governable insofar as two central features are assumed as existing: on the one hand, as a zone of peace and, on the other, as a democratic space. In this manner, according to the UNASUR's Declaration of the South American Zone of Peace (2002a), the region is recognized as such in direct relation to the commitment of its members to "peace, security and cooperation […] that reinforce mutual trust, impulse toward development and wellbeing" (para.3, author's translation). Eight years later and in a similar way to what was a latent commitment with peace, the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR of commitment with Democracy (2010f) was presented. Notwithstanding, the content of these two broad notions respond to a crisis of legitimization of capitalism, in this sense, democracy is limitedly related to the aim of sustaining order and an empty democratic institutionalism.

Both premises, peace and democracy, have been constantly referred to throughout the official documentation of UNASUR. From being intelligible in

geographical terms, the region went on to be *made* intelligible and therefore governable according to principles and overarching moral values, the uplifting construction in positive terms has however remained somehow attached to logics of competitiveness.

In addition, moving away from the entirely promising conception of region, it is valid to state that regional problems (such as poverty, *financing* inequality or educational/technological delay within a framework of competitiveness) have been recognized and introduced among the official statements of UNASUR; however, it is essential to highlight that these issues are yet portrayed as externally caused challenges to progress and accumulation. The specific construction of the region by UNASUR governs based on a dichotomised understanding of space that hides from critical consideration the role that the region plays in actually reproducing the matrix of neocolonial power. The ordering of South America within the conditions of an imported notion of regionalism reproduces the determinism of a type of integration that sustains the neo-mercantilist capitalist system, but the promising conception of South America overshadows this.

The truth or falsity that is in this construction of the positive regional space would require a broader analysis, but the ways this dichotomised construction of space at least minimizes a *de facto* structure of domination inserted within the national and reproduced at the regional level is a fact. Through the rhetoric of region and regionalization, entailed in UNASUR, in which real issues are obscured or left out of the scope of regional responsibilities, the regional body

escapes its potential of transformation and it only become a means to align with the status quo. Furthermore, a question remains: How is the new conceptualization of the South American region sustained as a zone of peace and democracy? How if issues such as labour rights, gender inequality, racism, lack of representation, etc. are rendered invisible? As we have seen in the previous chapters, regionalism was intended as an outside-in strategy, UNASUR particularly has not achieved to contest this.

4.2.2 Governing Liberally

Official representatives, academics and different commentators have identified UNASUR as a still weak regional organization, lacking an autonomous institutional framework beyond the systems of authority of the members—nation-states (Botelho, 2008; Comini, 2010; Gardini, 2010; Wagner, 2010). This assertion is drawn from the analyses of the mechanism of decisions and mandates centralized within the Council of Heads of State and Governance of UNASUR (the specific body of maximum authority consisting of the presidents of the member countries). Specifically, from the mainstream regionalist perspective, the lack of institutionalism is related to the lack of autonomy of a decision-making apparatus independent from the national structures. However, what can be seen as lack of direct power acquires a different dimension from a perspective of governmentality, through which *commitments*, adoption of *regional mandates,* and *participation* on the different *summits* and *committees* should be perceived as self-governance and self-control under a different kind of power. According to Larner and Walters (2002) "governmentality offers a descentered conception of

power in which government is not reduced to institutional configurations"
(p.415).

In this sense, to govern liberally refers to the exercise of power in different
subtle ways; regions are liberal insofar as they operate through freedom and "at a
distance" (Larner & Walters, 2002, p.415). The member countries of UNASUR
are not obligated to immediately comply with the innumerable agreements,
objectives, assertions, etc., but the sense of *belonging* or the latent potential
exclusion from the scheme imposes certain levels of *self-governance* by each of
the members. The untold dynamics of "inclusion/exclusion" that Larner and
Walters (2002) identified within the rationality of new regionalism and the
rhetoric of the dangers of staying outside in the context of the *undefined outer
region* capture the way through which the region is an instrument to exert power,
accurately defined as "instrument and technology" beyond the states (Rose and
Miller, 2010).

The notions of "zone of peace" or the "commitment with democracy" can
be understood as working in this liberal manner in the regional level. Throughout
the official documentation of UNASUR both of these elements have been
introduced and established as requirements and simultaneously favorable
outcomes of integration, a circular logic that in an indirect way conditioned the
participation of the members. Peace and democracy can be accomplished through
integration while they are simultaneously condition to participate in the process of
regionalization. As I have mentioned in the section above, the Declaration of the
South American Zone of Peace (UNASUR, 2002a) not only defines the region as

absence of armed conflicts, but simultaneously enacts the region governable insofar as there is reliance among the members.

In addition, the notion of democracy has as well been presented throughout the official integrationist rhetoric. From UNASUR's declaration of Brasilia, democracy has been portrayed as a requirement for inclusion in the regional regime, and it has referred to as the "maintenance of the rule of law and the full respect to the democratic regime" (2005b; art.23). However, the exact meanings or implications that these notions encompass are a more extensive matter of analysis.

The declaration of Guayaquil (UNASUR, 2002a) linked the notion of democracy and its potential failure in association to the dangers of financial crises or economic dissatisfaction. According to this document low economic growth can be a determinant for democratic instability. In this sense, security specifically referred to the guarantee of economic stability and democracy to the guarantee that elected representatives will provide and maintain that type of security. Later on, this notion has gone from being economically determined to be politically defined in direct relation to the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Organization of American States, 2001), more specifically to its article n°14 referring to the Strengthening and Preserving of Democratic Institutionalism. Ultimately, the recurrent notion of democracy, either presented in the form of requirement, outcome or as a feature of the South American integration, has been more and more exclusively defined as preserving "constitutional *order*" (UNASUR, 2010f, art.7).

Thus, the events in Pando, Bolivia (2008), in Honduras (2009), and the recent crisis in Paraguay (2012) are examples that have asserted the limited meaning of the notion of democracy within UNASUR. As Judson (2005) stated, democracy in the hegemonic discourse is "formal, electoral, representative, and liberal [….] 'Manipulated, delegated, bought, frightened, commercialized, commodified and demagogic'" (p.157). Whilst the member countries of UNASUR have at least expressed their position about the above mentioned cases of crisis of the constitutional order, they have not presented any official statement when directly criticized about the environmental and social repercussions of IIRSA. Nor for example has expressed any opinion in cases such as the Peruvian one, in which by May 2012 there have been already 245 social conflicts (with 14 fatalities), most of them related to environment issues, commodification of natural resources, and private interests (Defensoría de Pueblo, 2012).

In practice, this has evidenced the limited, economically conditioned, and blurred notions of democracy, security and peace. The emphasis on institutional order has made visible the *absurd* centrality of institutions over human beings (Mignolo, 2010a) and the minimal value to broader aspects of democracy as civil participation. On the other hand, the actual exclusion of Paraguay from the regional body, because of noncompliance of its principles, has showed that the political *gestures* or *cosmetic decisions* ended by debilitating the regional organization itself. The impossibility of providing proactive solutions was actually made visible by UNASUR's inability to establish itself as platform for social inclusion and conflict resolution. Even with a limited understanding of

democracy and what it aims to enhance by it, UNASUR has proven unable to provide a comprehensive understanding of the broader socio-political problematic affecting one of its member country. At the end of the day, UNASUR has proved itself to work better as representation of an empty institutionalism, a watchdog of a *cosmetic* democracy which favors some in disregard of others.

Another element of "governing liberally" as stated by Larner and Walters (2002) has had to do with the organizational structure of the region's governance. The constitution of a regional body as UNASUR has confirmed the central role that problematizing and programming occupy in the midst of making the region intelligible. Furthermore, on the basis of understanding government as a "problematizing activity" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.279), the role of the committees or councils of UNASUR maintains a central place within the endeavor of outlining its political rationality.

There have been established *technical* spheres of governance accordingly to problems previously identified in the path of awakening dormant potentialities. Hence, specific dynamics of management and cooperation are built in order to awake the dormant and shared capabilities of the region. UNASUR's specialized committees, as spheres of action/management/governance, add to the rationality. The rhetoric of the technical is not only identifying areas of problems to be overcome, but by doing so is building the region as interiorly non-political space (Lerner & Walters, 2002; Rose & Miller, 2010; Newstead, 2009). These Committees define the necessity of regional governance, the areas of prioritization of intervention, the subjects and objects of intervention, the proper dynamics of

cooperation and the inappropriate ones of animosity—the ethos of the region *per se*.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to develop an analysis of value of the failures or achievements of the specific committees of UNASUR. Rather, this analysis places greater emphasis on their role as part of the technologies of governance. Thus, each of these committees allows insights of the patterns of governance that have been established through the creation of UNASUR.

UNASUR has established nine spheres of work translated into nine specialized committees: South American Committee of Energy (2008g), South American Committee of Health (2008c), South American Committee of Social Development (2008h), South American Committee of Defense (2008a), South American Committee of Planning and Infrastructure (2009a), South American Committee of Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (2010d), South American Committee for the Global Issue of Drugs Trafficking (2010c), South American Committee of Economy and Finances (2010b), and the South American Electoral Committee (still in process of constitution). Among these it is important to point out that, previous to its formal constitutions, the technical committee of infrastructure existed *de facto* since the year 2000 with the establishment of the portfolio of projects of IIRSA; likewise, the committee of energy met for the first time in 2007. The centrality of some of these committees expressed in the frequency of its meetings or the constitution of specific projects of action, such in the case of IIRSA and the energy one, is an expression of the still preponderant economic objectives for integration. This also makes evident the sort of

problematization which seems in reality to have acquired more attention: the management of natural resources with a commercial perspective of exportation.

For example, when focusing attention on the Committee of Social Development it is interesting to note that the central themes of asymmetries and exclusion are exclusively introduced in economic terms; the focus of its plans of action are centered on dialogue and reflection in contraposition with intervention, and simultaneously the major objective has been so far the creation of a regional data base of information for the identification of *development donors* and reproduction of *development projects*. The design and development of the Regional Observatory for the Social Development was transformed from what seemed to be a platform to secure inclusion, equality and participation as transversal axes across the other committees, into a technical tool for the exchange of information—*Matrix of Supply and Demand of Cooperation* (UNASUR, 2011b). In addition, within this committee, the authority of decisions is (in the same manner as in the others) centralized in the hands of high level representatives; and while the recurrence of the rhetoric resource of "participation of the civil society" can express recognition, this has not implied inclusion or direct participation in decision-making processes.

Ultimately, the leading voice for the development of upcoming plans of action has been given exclusively to the so-called *experts* of development. For example, the declaration of Brasilia (UNASUR, 2005b) stated the promotion of civil participation, as exclusively informing actors outside the authoritative levels: "*disclosure* of the integration and the South American reality through different

systems of communication, education and information [emphasis added]" (art.26, author's translation). This same document has established the relevance of development experts, referring to scholars on the one hand and members of multilateral organizations on the other. Still, in 2011 UNASUR's document of Commitment against Inequality posited the importance of the role of experts and the participation or inclusion of civil society as limited to the disclosure of information, as to keep citizens informed of the decisions already made.

While peace, democracy and even development appear as limited and flowed notions only strongly related to maintenance of constitutional order for the guarantee of inversion and economic growth (Newstead, 2009), the underlying problematization of governance and the determined spheres of intervention confirm the relevance of global capitalist interests. The idea of "postneoliberalism" as still inserted in the capitalist system seeking to reinvent itself through subtle outside of the nation-states resources seems more accurate, than the idea of transformative "postneoliberalism".

4.2.3 Regional (non) subjects.

One other element of greater interest for this study is the recognition of the perennial construction of regional subjects alongside non-subjects. By this, I intend to highlight in this section that the political rationality enacted through the official discourse of UNASUR traces a distinction between who is portrayed as regional actors (in general such as officials, participants, beneficiaries, etc.) and by contrast UNASUR's political rationality overrides all other sectors of the

population, excluding them from acknowledgement in the first place and of *de facto* participation in the second.

Previous analyses of regional initiatives, drawing from the framework of governmentality, had identified how the political rationality of regionalism builds and governs regional subjects. These, mostly characterized as "entrepreneurial individuals" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.200), are ultimately closely related to the neoliberal overarching ethos. Thus, in the case of CARICOM, Newstead (2009) found that the construction of the regional subjects was framed by the final goal of encouraging or making more appealing "behaviours [aligned] with particular forms of economic order" (p.166).

Throughout the official discourse of UNASUR there have still been found similar dynamics of construction, validation and encouragement of this entrepreneurial regional subject; however, there are two other related elements that have gone unnoticed so far. For the case of UNASUR, similarly to CARICOM, there is an increased visibility of a type of regional subject "clearly linked to market friendly attributes such as mobility, entrepreneurialism and skills transferability" (Newstead, 2009, p.166). But also, and this is here strongly emphasized, just because a regional subject is visible does not mean it has been included to politically participate throughout the constitutions of the initiative of regionalization.

As mentioned above, the official discourse of UNASUR is not a linear succession of notions, agreements and mandates without contradictions or at least crashing rhetoric. However, there are certain recurrent elements that give insight

into the predominance of some rationalities over others. Although the rhetorical resource of "civil participation" seems to be a repetitive one (as an intention to secure, at least discursively, the front of popular consultation and inclusion), an exhaustive revision of UNASUR's official documentation can identify the process of decision making, participation, and the alleged *convergence* of objectives and rationalities as only happening among official authorities and high representatives of power.

In fact, the official discourse presents the entrepreneurial regional subjects without this implying actual participation in the process of regionalization as active decision-making actors. The declaration of Brasilia (UNASUR, 2000) offered a central role and an equal consideration as actors of integration to the "private sector, businessmen and labour" (art.30), as the regional subject was mostly determined in relation to its economic role. Moreover, actorship has been closely linked to the notions of competitiveness, labour migration and technological capacity. Not only the regional subjects but more specifically the "South American citizenship" have been particularly determined under these terms (UNASUR, 2006; UNASUR, 2009; UNASUR, 2010).

In this manner, for example, one of the work documents that served as basis for the Constitutive Treaty of 2008, the "Document of Reflection towards the South American Community of Nations" (UNASUR, 2005a), indicated that in the context of globalization and in order to achieve a better strategic participation in the international realm, competitive qualities are essential. Furthermore, in this document, competitiveness is introduced as a pillar of integration alongside

infrastructure and development. The Document of Reflection towards the South American Community of Nations introduced the expression "systemic approach to competitiveness" refers to integration as association of economic clusters, education as technical training, efficiency as simplification of the formal process of intraregional commerce, financiering small and medium business, and promoting technological innovation (UNASUR, 2005a, p.8).

Interesting enough, this regional subject loaded with a series of entrepreneurial attributes lacks a real voice and space for participation in the design of integration (Serbin, 2008; 2011). Participation, throughout the official rhetoric, has been linked to *interaction*, but this interaction is as well limited to a task to exchange of information first, and *facilitating dialogue* second (UNASUR 2000; UNASUR 2008).

Furthermore, regional subjects conceived as entrepreneurial actors have also implied exclusion of others. Larner and Walters (2002) recognized and developed to a greater extent the premises of regions governing through patterns of inclusion/exclusion, as well as governing by ordering populations in a hierarchical manner (p. 418-422). Although these authors deployed their argument analyzing the dynamics of exclusion and organization among member countries, these arguments have facilitated elucidating the analysis of exclusion and/or construction of *non-subjects* for the case of UNASUR.

According to Larner and Walters (2002) the patterns of inclusion/exclusion are intrinsic to the way in which regionalism governs. At the nation-state level, this is made evident through the specific requirements to

become a regional organization member; however, a more subtle logic of inclusion/exclusion is developed among populations under and above the national level. In other words, it is through exclusion, neglecting, or simply not acknowledging existence as regional subjects, which regional organizations achieve to consolidate this idea of "lowest common denominator" (Larner & Walters, 2002, p.419). For the case of UNASUR, exclusion overshadowed by rhetorical resources as the *lowest common denominator* validates integration insofar as this notion gives the impression of participation and inclusion.

Gardini (2010), for example, promotes the notion of lowest common denominator as the basic mean through which UNASUR has actually achieved some level of institutionalism. However, Gardini's analysis is expression of the determinism of imported notions of regionalism in the sense that regionalization through exclusion and minimal convergence are responding to the rationalist-led and Eurocentric scholarship (Hettne, 1994; 2001). This framework sustains that the notion of lowest common denominator as necessary for the case of UNASUR.

There are two embedded dimensions in this notion of non-subjects. On the one hand, throughout the official discourse of UNASUR it is possible to establish that all other individuals who do not accomplish to fulfil the attributes of entrepreneurism or competitiveness cannot be considered regional subjects, basically their knowledge, their interests, their perceptions do not add to the understanding of the region. On the other hand, those individuals who are actually recognized on the basis of *their* different knowledge, outside the requirements to become regional subjects, are made intelligible as *folkloric*, *peculiar, groups of*

interest, under labels such as "our people". However, this acknowledgement does not guarantee any sort of political participation insofar as they are silenced through paternalistic representation.

For example, rhetorical resources such as "speaking in the name of" or the justification of integration as "responding to the mandate of the founding fathers and the wishes of our people" are repeatedly constructions through UNASUR's official documents. These constructions seem to facilitate the displacement from recognition to naturalization and avoidance of active participation. Broad categories such as "our people" imply recognition through homogenization; in turn, political representation as in "speaking in the name of" ends to close the circle by which civil society participation is an empty notion and the preponderance of democracy is limited to maintaining institutional order.

The construction of non-subjects at the regional level underscores the existing hierarchization of different social groups and of their knowledges. According to Walsh (2010), Latin American social structure has been built up on the basis of 500 years of racial hierarchization, "in this construction indigenous and black peoples are still considered (by dominant society but also by the white-mestizo Left) as incapable of serious 'intellectual' thinking" (p.83). This reasoning and justification for "speaking in the name of" at the national level is still undoubtedly repeated at the regional one. Acknowledgement of multiplicity as it is present in some of the documents of UNASUR, has worked in the definition of the region to simultaneously negate other knowledges or rationalities. These dynamics of inclusion/exclusion make explicit how

"regionalism embodies its own kind of classificatory project" (Larner & Walters, 2002, p. 420).

These elements altogether are defining the type of governance in the region. The member countries of UNASUR are actively assuming a political rationality through which they adopt, one more time, a process of regionalization that despite partially overcoming or not doctrines of liberalization or market *laissez-faire* is not promoting a transformation of relations of power. Social relations of power within the region perpetuate exclusion of knowledges outside intra-modernity hegemony, empty democratic institutionalism in which the dichotomy states-civil society remains, and governance of domination based on rhetoric of superiority, competitiveness and progress.

4.3 UNASUR's Political Rationality

These discursive themes and elements appearing throughout the official documentation produced within UNASUR reveal certain regularity that in my opinion has received little attention insofar as the focus has been put on an analysis of differences. The region has been assumed to be an expression of power but not a technique of power itself. The fact that UNASUR is a technique constructing the region but also governing through it can be recognized through the identification of its particular idiom, its moral form and its epistemological character (Rose & Miller, 2010).

First, as we have identified the idiom or the vocabulary of regionalism through UNASUR is one of *dormant potentialities, competitiveness,* and *strategic geopolitical inclusion.* The problematization of authority refers to how to make

more efficient use of the dormant potential to achieve a better position in the international system. It is undeniable that from the moment of the declaration of Brasilia (UNASUR, 2000) to date, there has been a growing recognition and validation of the risks, dangers, and difficulties that South America has to overcome in order to achieve integration. However, the emphasis with which the region seems to be made intelligible and governable is focused on its promises and potentiality rather than with an inside-out view of its recurrent problems, such as excluded populations, outdated institutions, coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000).

The official discourse of UNASUR introduces the vocabulary of a regional level of governance desirable and necessary insofar the region is previously understood in terms of its potential. By contradistinction an outer space cradle of dangers and risks is as well assumed. This regional and outside regional two-sided construction leaves out of the scope of regional responsibilities or consideration the national space, reproducing then some of the national shortcomings of governance at the regional one.

The desirable regional governance, the proper management of the region and the vocabulary of what integration implies has evolved in terms of *convergence, concertation or consensus building,* and *dialogue*. All these terms have been included, promoted and advanced under the broader label of the *lowest common denominator*, however, as it has been stated, this term has served as feature and doctrine of UNASUR to render invisible elements such the construction of regional non-subjects and governance is limited terms of

constitutional order. By identifying some of the recurrent elements of UNASUR's idiom, the characterization of South America through the promise of its potentialities reveals underlying capitalists values and interests. Furthermore, although convergence and the notion of lowest common denominator could be properly considered as the list of objectives to which *everybody* has agreed. Who is included among *everybody*? Is a different question.

As indicated, governing through functions (Larner & Walters, 2002) still responds to the particular rationality of the new regionalism. Along these lines, it is also important to mention the vocabulary of competitiveness and progress. All the specific elements comprising the specific idiom of UNASUR and its broader political rationality still make sense in direct relation to the achievement of economic sovereignty, accumulation through exploitation and progress. If other themes were included to the spectrum of objectives and UNASUR's idiom, these are determinate by the quest for progress and according to the modernity of the West and to the paradigm of global capitalist accumulation.

Second, UNASUR has been built upon a particular moral form, in other words, upon a specific understanding of responsibilities of authority and principles that not only justify the process of integration itself but create actors, roles, and agenda. Through the analysis of the official documentation, it can be established that UNASUR's regional governance has been developed upon two central components that carry the moral responsibility to integrate: the historic endeavour, the grandiose, timeless, and overarching responsibility of continuing the mission of the Latin American fathers of independence; and also, the necessity

of better situating the region in the global world. Historically, as stated in UNASUR's official documents, the founding fathers conceived the countries of the region united in solidarity as *la patria grande* (the great nation) responding to the *will* of the *people*; the desire of the people required a greater responsibility. In this manner, the ultimate responsibility and the moral claim upon which official representatives can conceive and develop regional management and governance is to *interpret*, *represent* and *organize "our people."* As previously demonstrated, the interest and the people that counts are those of the regional subjects, in fulfilment of the expectations of UNASUR's political rationality.

Identifying the moral form of the political rationality of UNASUR has also required making a distinction between *objectives,* on the one hand, and the *guiding principles* for integration, on the other. This distinction is not pre-elaborated as a means of analysis, but it is actually a literal separation among two components that seem understood as different. Through declarations, statements and other documents, the objectives of the constitution of UNASUR broadened in a maximalist agenda (Briceño, 2010); however, the guiding principles have perpetuated a pattern of predominance of institutions over people and interests over needs.

Third, the epistemological character of UNASUR refers to the conception or nature of those whose desires are interpreted and represented. UNASUR seems to introduce a two level discourse: the regional subjects are conceived as beneficiaries of integration or peers insofar as facilitating and enhancing this process, their existence and importance is recognized in direct relation to the

fulfilment of the conditions of competitiveness and entrepreneurialism. The regional non-subjects are those multiple and different social groups or individuals that if recognized are totality erased of their particularities, under the label of civil society and democracy as empty of content.

4.4 The Multiple Excluded Voices outside UNASUR

Through the revision of different sources of information (academia, media, UNASUR's official documentation) from various rhetoric standpoints, I was faced with the central questions to further our analysis: What are these alternative voices of integration in general, and within the development of UNASUR in particular? Is it possible to talk of *an* alternative political rationality? How did these alternative voices remain outside UNASUR's political rationality?

One of the greatest moments of reflection during the constitution and development of UNASUR was the phase between the constitution of the SACN and its later transformation into UNASUR (2004 – 2008). It was during this period that a Commission for Reflection was constituted and countries' representatives attempted to promote particular content in direct relation to their own foreign policy. As well during this period, organized social movements and minority groups attempted to introduce themselves as social active actors within the regionalization process and to present their own alternative rationalities of integration. These other rationalities have struggled to accompany the process led by UNASUR even until now.

For academic purposes I could have attempted to identify the elements of *an* overarching *alternative* political rationality, its idiom, moral form, and its

epistemological character separated from the official rationality of integration entailed by UNASUR. However, and in accordance with the decolonial project's stance adopted in this study –namely, the commitment not to the exclusive advancement of academia but to the advancement of the political cause of transformation (Mignolo, 2009a), I have aimed for recognition/politicization of multiplicity, avoiding systematizing or naturalizing differences. In other words, the focus and the strength of *our* decolonial project is centered in uncovering and emphasizing the multiplicity, the differences, the reinforcement of a "politics of identity advancing multiplicity of identities, instead of attempting an "identity politics"[16], supporting the establishment of an universalizing one (Mignolo, 2009a, p.14).

Thus, on the one hand, it is important to highlight that while it has been our objective to identify dynamics of silencing and exclusion embedded in the official political rationality of UNASUR and in its specific construction of regional subjects, it has not been an objective in a similar manner to identify *an* alternative political rationality. The outside/other multiplicity of voices have been recognized here, as precisely that, diverse and multiple. On the other hand,

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[16] Mignolo (2009a) emphasizes that within the project of modernity/coloniality, different peoples have been characterized under universals. These universal constructions, Western knowledges, have determined domination and exclusion. For him, identity politics (at the basis of the modernity/coloniality project) refers to this historic attempt of homogenization of differences and particularities exacerbating one identity or one specific attribute, while a politics of identity refers to an open process where the multiplicity of identities can co-exist, being this one of the basic principles for transformation.

differing at the core of the notion of political rationality, in that these multiple voices are not intended as part of a discourse of *governance over* but of *governance with*. Outlining a political rationality would have forced a coherence of *governance of suppression* of (governance over) other discourses where it does not exist, a central element of analysis which I will further explore.

Through this section I have proceeded with the stage of data collection employing the same methodological stringency as I did in investigating the official political rationality of UNASUR. I began by reviewing those discourses labelled as *alternative* from the stance of the official rhetoric; this is, from what was contained in official documents and highlighted as outside the mainstream official discourse.

Thus, in this section, I do not intend to outline generalizations about a possible (or not) other integrationist South American political rationality, but to emphasize some of the elements upon which diversity and multiplicity can be features of a transformative UNASUR. Within this diversity some recurrent themes of different tenors are: (a) centrality of recognition and validation or inclusion, (b) different understanding of principles, institutions and institutionality, and (c) centrality of notions outside the logic of progress/competitiveness/capitalism, intra-moderniy.

4. 5. Alternative Rationalities

The spectrum of what is considered *alternative* to the official integrationist discourse entailed by UNASUR is broad and it has received little academic attention. When thinking of alternative rationalities of integration scholars have

focused on initiatives such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) as the only one (Icaza, 2009). Although UNASUR represents a transformation when compared to other previous initiatives of integration, this thesis has also shown continuities among them, in this section I focus on the permanence of governance through exclusion. Alternative voices have been left behind not only in their specific understandings of integration and governance, but also in their basic quest for recognition and participation; these have ended annulled as placed outside the notion of regional subject or they have been homogenized, naturalized and constrained under rhetorical constructions such "*our people.*"

According to Icaza (2009), mainstream analyses of regionalism have also failed to explore alternative integration rationalities inasmuch as these have been simply considered as failing ones. Icaza argues that assuming alternative rationalities as failing because they have not achieved official status simply ignores the structural conditions because of which other thinkings and other proposals do not succeed. I will add, this lack of attention also ignores that some of this rationalities are proposing something completely outside the current paradigm; therefore attention or not to these cannot be defined base on acquiring official level or not.

Here I want to introduce other points of enunciation, making visible its existence and its different standpoints. I recognize that an exhaustive analysis of these has not been possible given that each rationality could be object of analysis by its own. However, this section should be considered as the review and

description necessary to make the case of our thesis of UNASUR as a technique of international governance of exclusionary contours. Also, through this section I aim to open the space for more extensive analysis to come.

As mentioned above, within the period between the constitution of the SACN and its transformation into UNASUR *other* discourses and rationalities appeared outside of the path of UNASUR's official statement and declarations: the proposal made by President Evo Morales Ayma (October, 2006) prior to the II Summit of Heads of States of the South American Community of Nations, or the Appeal and Proposals from the Perspective of Indigenous Peoples and First Nations (November, 2006) in the context of the Summits of the Peoples (http://movimientos.org/coberturas.php).

4.5.1 The Proposal of Evo Morales Ayma

Although Morales' proposal can be discredited as alternative inasmuch as his position of enunciation as president at the time, it is important to emphasize that my understanding of the notion of *alternative rationality* is not exclusively made based on the position of enunciation of the actors, but on the specific difference in the content of the discourse. Following Icaza (2009) "here is named alternative […] the non-traditional, and hence less visible, mechanisms, processes, agents and structures," (p.240) the discursive content attempting to formulate other comprehension of integration. In this manner, in this study it has been considered important to highlight some of the elements that the proposal of President Evo Morales attempted to introduce, rather different than the integrationist discourse of UNASUR.

President Morales's proposal represents an alternative discourse within the rationality of integration embedded in UNASUR, different in content insofar as it was centered on the principle of "vivir bien" (to live well). This principle is at odds with the logic of progress, competitiveness and accumulation still serving as the framework of UNASUR's political rationality. Thus, Morales' proposal was in the first place based on a critique of the political and economic status quo, that of the capitalist system; and in a second place, it went further to denounce what has been advance by the South American integration initiatives as aligning to the mentioned system.

Morales' document introduced an integrationist discourse through which the region is not intelligible because of its dormant capabilities, its geographic determinisms or interests of strategic insertion in the process of globalization. This proposal's notion of region was built upon the centrality of *governance with* rather than *governance over*, "integration from the top and from the bottom" (Morales, 2006, para.4, author's translation). The management of the region or the placement of authority and governance is, at least rhetorically, envisioned as being decentralized; furthermore, this could only occurs based on an exercise of naming/recognition of *a multiple actorship* and the foregrounding of principles that, until this proposal, were relegated to the background:

> Our integration is and should be integration from and for the
> people. […] We cannot reduce the South American Community to
> an association to develop projects of highways or financial credits

that end essentially favouring the sectors linked to the global market. (Morales, 2006, para.7, author's translation[17])

On the one hand, the rhetorical category "our people" shifted from been *them,* in contradistinction to *us* as a broad category, to been specifically identified as a multiplicity of social movements, Indigenous Peoples, farmers and small business' owners, feminist organized groups, among others. The category "people," within the open letter of Morales, lost its emptiness and acquired other dimensions by the practice of "naming." In other words, "our people" moved away from been a rhetorical resource *to represent/to speak on the name of*, to be a category which recognizes the multiplicity of actors and sustains practices of regional governance as of resources for the "democratization of democracy" (Radcliffe, 2012, p.242). For Morales, this recognition seemed as a necessary start point since the different groups and the different communities to which he referred were left outside when they were who actually have lived in integration and in solidarity longer and in more harmony than the South American countries' diplomatic bodies (Morales, 2006).

Integration presents broader connotations since it is depicted as a way of living centered on the principle of solidarity, solidarity to live well. Morales (2006) specifies in his proposal:

We say "to live well" because we do not strive to live better than others. We do not believe in the path of progress and unlimited

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[17] All the documents in Spanish at the basis of the analysis of alternative rationalities have been translated, if necessary, into English by the author.

development at the expense of the other and of the environment. We have to complement each other and not to compete. We should share with and not to take advantage of our neighbour. "To live well" is to think not only in terms of per capita income but also in terms of cultural identity, of community, of harmony among us and with our mother earth. (Morales, 2006, para.7)

Besides displacing the centre of authority, recognizing, naming and including other actors as regional subjects, and emphasizing different principles that have already led to a different integration than the one among diplomacies, Morales (2006) introduced other specific elements of integration grouped in four sections: the social and cultural ones, the economic ones, the environmental ones and the politically institutional ones.

These particular elements were expounded and closely explained in accordance with the principle of *solidarity/complementarity* and the objective of *vivir bien*. The elements of integration that Morales proposed brought back the multiplicity, a politics of identity to the fore (Mignolo, 2009a), social and cultural are posed in close relation when he emphasizes the necessity of "defending and promoting cultural diversity," not only in terms of recognizing differences among people "indigenous, *mestizos*, and all the populations that migrated to our continent," but in terms of politicizing this difference. Not in a superficial acknowledgement of folklore and peculiarities, but in relating acknowledgement of diversity to respect and value of socio-economical other production structures and paradigms, "economic diversity comprising forms of private property, public

and social collective" (Morales, 2006, para.11). In other words, for example, according to Morales proposal, inequality has been sustained in exclusion, but more important than exclusion from the hegemonic productive structure and paradigm, he is referring to exclusion of other ways of living and different social productive organization as legitimate to be considered as alternative to the hegemonic one.

Among the economic elements, and unlike the data introduced through UNASUR's official documentation, Morales focused on an analysis of disparities based on per capita distribution instead of macroeconomics. Morales argues that asymmetry exists not only among countries but also among people within them. For Morales, disparities between individuals cannot be over passed to focus on inequalities between states; therefore, he highlights that the economic meaning of the principle of solidarity is applicable in a horizontal and vertical direction, in between countries and through peoples. Morales focus on "complementarity and not unfair competition" (Morales, 2006, para.17).[18]

Within the sphere of environmental conservation, the elements of integration introduced in Morales' proposal (2006) shifted the order of priorities depicted so far by UNASUR's political rationality. The emphasis is placed on needs before interests whether these are publics or privates, keeping as a priority the maintenance of natural resources outside the commercial logic and practices of privatization. While what can be included in the broad category of needs

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[18] From this is established the necessity for the creation of the Bank of the South, an institution different to its predecessors insofar as governed not by commercial interests and profitability.

remained undetermined except for the specific mention of the protection of South American biodiversity and the guaranty of the right of access to water. Notwithstanding, the distinctness of the proposal of Morales at that point of time was made clear through its rejection of the commodification of natural resources. The rejection of the commodification of natural resources by private interests has been as well highlighted within UNASUR's political rationality; however, the return of the developmentalist state did not dismiss the commodification of South American resources by these same so-called progressive states (Ceceña, 2009, Kellogg, 2007). No matter whether public or private interests, this capitalist commodification was portrayed as negative and at odds with preserving the environment, the planet and life in general.

In a similar sense, the political and institutional elements emphasized by Morales (2006) switched the order of attention on creation rather than insertion in the international scenario. Morales emphasized that initiatives of integration in South America could well entail the development of different option*s* of international scenario*s* instead of *better* ways to insert South America to *one given* globalization. This goal was definitely sustained on the basis of a broader recognition: the prevalence of the actual sketched integration within a "unipolar world" (Morales, 2006, para.28).

4.5.2 Continental Social Alliances and the People's Summits

While the proposal of President Evo Morales aimed to achieve political echo among the heads of state of the South American countries prior to the II Summit of the SACN, in parallel the I Social Summit for the Integration of the

People was conceived and developed.[19] Behind this initiative there was a platform for dialogue and political activism of non-governmental organizations under the name of *Alianza Social Continental* (ASC) (Continental Social Alliance).

For the purpose of this analysis, the ASC represents another alternative voice within the constitution and development of UNASUR insofar as, although acknowledged within the official rhetoric, its content and stance of enunciation has been excluded from the official political rationality. Notwithstanding, the ASC has carried its own integrationist discourses and has aimed since 1997 (Bello Horizonte, Brazil) to "transform the policies of integration within the hemisphere" (http://www.asc-hsa.org). By creating a space for activism and politicization of the elements of alternative proposals and promoting broader participation in decision making processes among different social movements and other non-governmental organizations.

The intention of its formation was at first to specifically confront the initiative of the FTAA as well as that of SAFTA; however, after these initiatives did not succeed and in the face of the newest technique of economic liberalization—namely bilateral FTA's, the ASC focused on a political critique of any of the forms of integration perceived as building upon the capitalist system of accumulation. In this manner, for example, ASC condemned the determinism of economic competitiveness through accumulation and exploitation, even as embedded in a model of national mediated neoliberalism.

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[19] For an exhaustive review of the material produced within this summit see:

http://movimientos.org/noalca/integracionpueblos/

As a platform of coordination among all the diverse organization that shared the objective of attempting an alternative integrationist scheme ASC lead the organization of the Summits of the Peoples. In 2006 the ASC organized the "I Social Summit of the People" in Cochabamba, Bolivia, exclusively centered on the theme of South American Integration; in 2007, a second meeting took place named "The Summit for the Friendship and Integration among the People"; in 2008, the scope of attention of the summit broadened once again to the Americas in the so-called "Summit Binding Alternatives[20]; in 2009, the Summit of Trinidad and Tobago "Facing the crisis: Another America is possible" took place; and the most recent in April 2012, the V Summit of the Americas so-called "The True Voice of the Americas" was developed.

The final declaration of the Summit of the Peoples in Cochabamba (2006) undoubtedly symbolized a milestone within the different rationalities and in the path of integration in the South American sub-region. Through this summit, the different actors historically left outside of what was conceived as the official high-level summit of heads of state not only affirmed their very existence, but even most important they affirmed their political organization and presented their own integrationist voices. Although participation in these summits do not guarantee

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[20] It is important to mention that these summits to some extent belong to the broader context of the summits of the people in contradistinctions to the summits of the Americas; it is only during the ones of 2006 and 2007 that the attention was closely linked to the initiative of the South, and although by 2008 the attention went back to the whole hemisphere, the elements of integration introduced were still of relevance and in accordance to the particular cases of the sub-region.

acknowledgement or value at the official level, the multiplicity was depicted as organized, politically concerned, and *loud*.

In addition, within the Summit of the People (2006) two other central elements were foregrounded. In the manifesto of Cochabamba, the rhetorical resource of naming, as in the case of Morales' proposal, removed the emptiness of the category "people" to replace it with the identification of diversity within the shared condition of exclusion. In the final declaration of the Summit of the People the centrality of an authentic social participation built upon the experience of groups of people so far ignored was emphasized: "native communities, farmers, marginalized inhabitants of the cities, women, youth, students, workers, and all social organization" (ASC, 2006, para.5). South America was conceived as a space of possibilities, but possibilities of transformation centered in the rejection of the system built upon inequalities and domination. The scope of transformation proposed by ASC was broadened through this manifest, it was essential to state that the rejection of specific schemes of integration was not it all. The manifest of Cochabamba clearly stated a rejection of a model of production and accumulation perceived as making its way into the region and sub-regions through diverse means and discourses. The ASC was clear and direct about the construction of intelligibility of the South American region; this should be built upon an inclusive alternative mode of production and mode of living, formulated upon cooperation, prioritization of needs over interests, social and state participation, environmental preservation, and equity.

The South American Community of Nations should not be an extension of the free market model based on the exportation of commodities and natural resources [....] cannot be a process that excludes popular demands and this requires genuine participation. We require another type of integration in which first primes cooperation over competition, rights of the people over the commercial interests, food sovereignty over agricultural exports, the decisive action of the State in welfare over privatization, sense of equity over profit motivation, the respect of the environment over the ruthless plundering of natural resources, and gender equity over the unfair division of labour. (ASC, 2006, para.6)

The declaration of the summits of 2006 and of 2007 introduced as well a two-sided problematic with the current model of production, a perceived issue introduced straightforwardly within these documents. On the one hand, the rhetoric of the ASC was for the first time representing, among integrationists' voices, the capitalist mode of production as a structure capturing *all the spheres of the social life* "[expresed] in the extreme concentration of wealth, social and political exclusion of the great majorities, where the power de facto and the great capital have come to control politics, the means of communication, the institutionalism" (ASC, 2007). Furthermore, it was argued that the reality of poverty could not continue to be depicted over and over as an issue of not clear origins: poverty was presented as directly related to asymmetries in distribution, a "social, historic and ecologic debt" associated with the mode of production

centered on the projects of modernity, development and progress (ASC, 2006, section: Conclusions over social rights).

On the other hand, it was emphasized that the economic primacy within the model of integration was enforced and dependent on the silence of not only alternative economic modes of production and property, but alternative ways of life in a broader sense. According to the manifest of the Summit of Cochabamba (2006) "it should be also prioritized the recognition, respect and promotion of the contribution of the indigenous communities over the marginalization, exploitation and folklorization of their values and economic and cultural traditions" (para.8). ASC recognizes the techniques of silencing the multiplicity of knowledges and beings; this recognition is therefore conceived and enforced as the basic start point for an alternative model of integration.

The network of organizations comprised by the ASC stated clearly that the initiatives of integration and their apparent attempt of constitution of something different, was empty of meaning without starting from that recognition of multiplicity: "In this diversity, antithesis of dogmatism, sectarianism and hegemony lays its strength and its historical legitimacy" (ASC, 2007, para.4). The integrationist alternative voice promoted by the ASC and the organizations that it encompasses has been centered on the notion of *historic solidarity* among social bases for the achievement of recognition, inclusion, political effective participation and emancipation from any form of oppression.

Among the different summits and its declarations a series of particular objectives were presented. Considering the main purposes of this study it is

especially important to highlight three of them—those in clear contradistinction of the model of integration that South America started in Brasilia 2000. The process of regional integration that ASC proposes went away from being a strategic move for better international inclusion, it was conceived as a process heavily centered on alternative ways of social organization, *to live well,* and human enrichment: "We understand regional integration as a process of mutual enrichment, empowerment of our strengths, our ability of intercommunication with the world, starting from the recognition of the human being, to whose wellbeing and happiness all other public policies must be subordinated" (ASC, 2007, para.9).

First, an alternative model of integration is conceived based on *solidarity economy* admitting a multiplicity of forms of cooperation and complementarity. Second, the emphasis is put on a displacement of power, a type of regional governance with the recognition and inclusion of multiple social actors whose knowledges and alternatives of integration should not be subsumed or standardize. The diverse organizations did not request to be included under an empty democracy, but to democratically open the space of legitimization for alternative ways of being and thinking. Third, the central place of the notion of solidarity was highlighted as the basis for integration, for creating alternative paths to the capitalist mode that standardizes or totally avoids the social struggle for escaping oppression. For ASC solidarity implies recognition of the multiple struggle and the underlying strength in working together in the quest for social sovereignty (ASC, 2007).

4.5.3 The Appeal and Proposal from the Perspective of Indigenous Peoples and First Nations

Among the multiple declarations and statements that were produced and were made public within the platform of the ASC and the social summits of the people, the Appeal and Proposal from the Perspective of Indigenous Peoples and First Nations (2006) received special notoriety. On the one hand, it was associated with the proposal introduced by President Morales a couple of months before; on the other hand it was presented a few months prior to the approval and public release of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) (2007).

The Appeal and Proposal from the Perspective of Indigenous Peoples and First Nations (2006) is a document encompassing a series of elements of alternative rhetoric of integration supported by fourteen various organizations within the sub-region. In a similar manner to the rhetoric of the social summits and the platform of ASC in particular, the document is centered on proposing an alternative model of integration. This one is built upon "other forms of participation in the decisions, including all those who have always been exploited, oppressed and excluded, from the countryside and the city, and among them, with our Communities, *Ayllus, Malocas, Cabildos, Palenques* and other social cells of the Indigenous People and First Nations of the *so-called* 'South America'" (Appeal and Proposal from the Perspective of Indigenous Peoples and First Nations, 2006, para.1).

In this document there was not only recognition of a distinct official integration between nation-states from an integration of communities and people, but also there was emphasis placed on acknowledging that it is the people who sustain the institutionality of the figure of the nation-state and therefore integration among them. The category "people" is once again specifically defined referring to the "constituent subjects of all of its [nation-states'] rights" (para.2). The starting point was depicted as that of necessary acknowledgement prior to the claim and/or request for integration from everyone and to everyone. With this document it was first denounced that "systems of government characterized by maintaining a policy of permanent exclusion, discrimination and impunity, keep […] us distant from the centres of power and decision making" (para.4). Along these lines, processes of integration in response to the capitalist global economy and in avoidance of national relations of power were at the centre of the reproduction of the same dynamics.

> We reaffirm that our vision as Indigenous People and First Nations, and our principles of Duality, Reciprocity and Complementarity, and of the indivisible unity between Pachamama – Community – Identity, meaning between the so-called 'Environment – Society and Culture', which must lead every political and social action, and specially those of the so-called 'South American integration', in order to overcome the pitfalls of one 'development' or 'developmentalism' and its supposed inevitable costs of community, cultural and environmental disintegration. (para.7)

The proposal of Indigenous Peoples was less oriented to the promotion of specific elements of integration than to emphasize the comprehension of South American integration in a broader perception of interconnected fields. In consequence, the attention was driven to bring to the fore their vision as in other principles, other knowledges, and other ways of social organization. Furthermore, this proposal also opened the debate about developmentalism in general, and to the belief of change based on the false improvement of one political sphere, but not in the others nor in the system.

The recurrent themes were the determinism of the current mode of production over the different spheres of life and the absence of authentic social participation of the process of integration. The proposal also made evident the dichotomy beneficiaries of the process of integration and regional actors as participants of regional governance. While this dichotomy does not get to an end, viable integration as transformation is just unachievable; attention to the crisis of only one sphere of regionalism does not imply transformation, only reform.

4.5.4 The Trade Union Confederation and the Latin American Centre of Social Ecology

Likewise, although with less notoriety, other associations and civil organizations have formulated and attempted to emphasize their particular elements of an integrationist discourse, including elements of broader and different socio-political struggles. Among these, we can spotlight the efforts of the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA) (http://www.csa-csi.org/) and of *Centro Latino Americano de Ecología Social* (CLAES) (Latin American

Centre of Social Ecology). These two organizations have not been exclusively centered on the theme of regional or sub-regional integration, neither group aimed for the advancement of a comprehensive alternative discourse encompassing all the matters of its rhetoric, as was the case for the previously presented actors. On the one hand, TUCA has focused its attention on outlining the path of participation and engagement that the union of labour should play in UNASUR, securing with this the respect and promotion of workers' rights at the sub-regional level. On the other hand, CLAES, through specific programs such as *Desarrollo, Economía, Ecología y Equidad – América Latina* (D3E) (Development, Ecology and Equity - Latin América), and *Integración Sur* (South Integration), (http://www.integracionsur.com/), has aimed at monitoring the process of integration of South America, to produce an informed critique of the developmental ethos in which this integration is assumed to sustain. CLAES aims for the promotion of a more critical engagement with the process of integration in the region, it focuses in the production of information as a means of participation, and it considers the notion of living well as a central principle that can enable to make evident the determinisms of our context.

TUCA was founded in 2008 as the "regional structure of the International Trade Union Confederation" (csa-csi.org) with the goal of respecting and acknowledging all the different workers. The specification and recognition of the diversity have taken again a preponderant place, "whether they are nationals, residents or foreigners in rural or urban areas, active or passive workers, of formal or informal economy, of the private or public sector, with or without a contract, of

different age groups, men or women, dependent or autonomous" (Retrieved from http//:csa-csi.org). TUCA has advocated for an integration surpassing the determinism of the neoliberal model, through the active role of the states; but at the same time it is assumed as sustained on a new democratic consensus of popular sovereignty and broadening of the means of participation for the decision making process (TUCA, 2010).

Most important, while TUCA still recognizes the centrality of the economic dimension within UNASUR's rationality of integration, it only recognizes it as viable and honorable insofar as it prioritizes the personal fulfillment and enrichment of the individual, not of the economic model itself. However this has not implied from the stance of TUCA proposing an alternative paradigm of production. Elements such as economic complementarity, reduction of hours of labour, and acknowledgement of non-formal ways of work are emphasized as important issues that should be considered by UNASUR. TUCA's main objective is to foreground the Union's socio political struggle as the start point for the development of UNASUR's social structure for civil participation.

CLAES, for its part, is a non-governmental organization focused on the relation of social life, historical context, the environment, and, at the basis, the ethical commitment of the defense of life (http://www.integracionsur.com). Hence, CLAES has assumed a position as facilitator of the critique of the developmental ethos enforced within the political rationality of UNASUR, which has been perceived as betraying the commitments of overcoming asymmetries and authentic integration beyond the emphasis on commerce and liberalization. In

particular, CLAES has assumed a critical perspective of the characterization of UNASUR as different. This is based on the apparent fact that UNASUR left outside of its priorities the two main problems that its constitutions aimed to tackle: the facilitation of authentic means to promote participation and inclusion, and providing an alternative solution to the asymmetries proper of the model of "development" through accumulation and impudent exploitation of natural resources.

Furthermore, CLAES' critique has been formulated based upon principles such as the decolonization of knowledge, the abandonment of the rationality of objectification or manipulation of people and environment as means to other goals, the acknowledgment of multiplicity and diversity and advancement of dialogue, and alternative conception of nature as inner and a constitutive part of ourselves (D3E, 2011, section: Buen vivir y otros desarrollos).

Different than the previously mentioned proposals, TUCA and CLAES emphasize inclusion within the official rationality of UNASUR and promote some reforms in terms of decision-making participation. However, as I will explain in the following section, while some actors propose from their stances reforms within the hegemonic rationality, some other actors propose actually a critique to the notion of integration itself and alternatives completely outside the modernity/coloniality project.

4.6. UNASUR's Multiplicity of Rationalities, crush and selection at its basis

The governmentality approach has facilitated to identify dynamics of silencing alternative elements of integration and dynamics evading alternative rationalities away from the official political rationality of UNASUR. Specifically,

governmentality offers a different understanding of power and reveals UNASUR as a technology of governance that has rejected market *laissez*-faire and liberalization. Yet, UNASUR is still reproducing social relations of power and it evidences how regionalism is based in exclusionary capitalism. In addition, a decoloniality standpoint further enables us to comprehend that these dynamics remain part of the logic of modernity. Regionalism and regionalization as Western constructions are naturalized outside the geo-political place of its origins, and then they became means of ordering the national and regional space aligned to the modernity/coloniality amalgam.

UNASUR's regionalism in particular is seen, then, as an art of governance in which this neocolonial matrix of power is reproduced. The development of processes of regionalization around the world helped to the disaggregation of the nodes of neocolonial power, power that has not been overcome. In this manner, the official political rationality of UNASUR seems caught in a process of "translation" (Rose & Miller, 2010) or "transition" (Mignolo, 2010a) in which the *de facto* multiplicity and the *potential* open-ended nature of integration are actually reduced.

As explored in this section, UNASUR's political rationality is actually based on an exclusionary moral form that perceives authority and participation as corresponding exclusively to high-level representatives of the member countries. Yet, its idiom is framed in the vocabulary of modernity, progress and competitiveness and it seems determined by a still underlying economic determinism. Furthermore, UNASUR's political rationality presents an epistemological character that recognizes some actors as regional subjects while renders other invisible as non-subjects inasmuch as the latter do not align with the logic of competitiveness and entrepreneurialism.

These elements of UNASUR's political rationality are not sustained *magically* by themselves, but they seem to correspond to the series of determinants presented in the first sections of this thesis as hegemonic mainstream regionalism. UNASUR's rationality is built upon the importance granted to intergovernmentalism to achieve certain balance of power and upon a perception of regionalism as a strategic resource to achieve the best possible position in the global system. Facing this system, UNASUR's rationality is to govern the region to guarantee the best results of integration, to manage the region's dormant capabilities, and to align its subjects according to competitiveness and entrepreneurism. Peace, democracy, and development are introduced as well as at the service of this strategy and result of these strategies, a circular logic that maintains regionalism naturalized as desirable and normal. Among the determinants at the basis of these are still: a perception of states as main actors of integration; the determinism of a strategy from the outside-in; the determinism of economy and mainstreams notions of power as determinants of the international context; the centrality of the paradigm of capitalism which, in turn, sustains still notions of modernity, progress, accumulation, and exclusion.

UNASUR's political rationality is maintained as hegemonic among the multiplicity of rationalities insofar as it corresponds to the modernity/coloniality project. Within the sphere of the control of knowledge and subjectivity, UNASUR has not achieved to overcome the normative aspect of the rationalist approach, which limits and determines the mode of integration privileged. Within the sphere of control of authority UNASUR is embedded, in discourse as in practice, in the neorealist and capitalist political economy in which the better achievable horizon for improvement of the region is that of a certain balance of power, playing certain resistance rather than any transformation. Finally, within the sphere of control of production UNASUR

does not seem to actually escape the logic of exploitation of resources and accumulation, now is the stronger state that leads a still capitalist system.

By unveiling other rationalities of integration I have attempted to emphasize the multiplicity of voices of the subaltern as a defence of the *promotion of life* (Mignolo 2009a), "epistemological decentralization" (Mignolo & Tlostanova 2009), or "radical democracy" (Andreasson 2005). In a nutshell, I have outlined the elements of alternative rationalities attempting decentralization of authority, participation, and power which are far different of the rationality of governance over, domination, and exclusion through the regionalism that UNASUR entails.

According to Mignolo (2009a) the greater aim of the decolonial option is placing the multiplicity to the fore and politicize its own existence as possible and valid other modernities. Mignolo adds, this tasks starts with epistemic disobedience, questioning the intra-modern approaches that do not facilitate to envision multiplicity as reality and possibility. This is, perhaps at a basic level, what I have attempted to do so far.

The decolonial thinking does not re-present the subaltern rationalities (this study purposely did not attempted a systematization of an alternative rationality naturalizing it as one).The decolonial option advances the cause, opens the path, unveil the "matrix of power" that perpetuates the voices of the subaltern as always on the periphery. Therefore, the decolonial stance facilitates to visualize to what extent UNASUR reproduces this "matrix of power", but also it requested to recognize the existence of multiple *integration rationalities*. In an upper level of commitment with the decolonial stance, all these rationalities should be politicized as powerful and sufficient for the promotion a regional living and social reorganization sustained in other elements of coalition/solidarity beyond intergovernmental aggregate growth and so on.

In contradistinction to the rationality of regionalism entailed by UNASUR, the alternative voices of integration present principles and objectives, in some cases, clearly built outside intra-modernity logics. First, among the alternative voices there are those actors (TUCA, CLAES) that prioritize inclusion instead of independent recognition. These actors diverge with the others mentioned in this chapter inasmuch as they emphasize participation and inclusion within the hegemonic rationality of integration. Undoubtedly, TUCA and CLAES are critical of some of the elements of UNASUR's political rationality, but these are seen as feasible to be changed through reforms in the planning of regionalism and the process of regionalization. Second, the alternative discourses of Morales, of the Indigenous Peoples, and of the organizations within the platform of ASC recognize that the rationality of UNASUR is inserted in something broader than itself—namely the paradigm of capitalism determining all the spheres of social and political life. Their rationalities are therefore removed from objectives of inclusion; rather these discourses emphasize acknowledgement and viability of difference. Third, although similar to the discourse of Morales and the declarations of ASC, the proposal and appeal of Indigenous Peoples not only highlights principles and objectives, it highlights a completely outside of modernity circular cosmology in which especially *development* is assumed as a pitfall of an unsustainable linear, evolutionary, and exclusionary vision of reality.

In a nutshell, while UNASUR's political rationality depict the regional space as needed to be govern insofar space of capabilities for a better inclusion in the world system; the multiplicity of rationalities depict the region as multiplicity and therefore basis for transformation instead of different inclusion, this on the basis of a politics of identity. While UNASUR's political rationality enacts a governance of functions, of democracy, and of peace at the service of an overarching logic of advancement of

accumulation and empty institutionalism; the multiplicity of rationalities aim to enact a comprehension of governance as radical democratization (Andreasson, 2005), not to govern over the different modernities, but to govern with the multiplicity. Finally, while UNASUR's political rationality constructs regional non-subjects, the multiplicity of rationalities foreground excluded subjects through the rhetoric resource of *naming* instead of *speaking in the name of.*

Kacowicz (2008) stated that the projects of CAN, MERCOSUR and UNASUR have been considered in one of two ways, as expressions of "regional autarchy" or as neoliberal expressions of a "step forward" towards economic globalization (now perhaps "postneoliberal" as with the state in the driver sit towards the same horizon). I believe that, in fact, both analytical considerations are truthful to the South American cases. These regional initiatives have sought to reduce the dependence on United States political institutions as hegemonic institutions and on market as conceived as misleading hegemon; but, all of these initiatives have so far simultaneously revolved around the "colonial matrix of power" and the globalizing force of capitalism, lacking recognition that in a context of decentralized neocolonial nodes of power those that once were considered as exclusively *victims* of modernity, fulfil now their own role as perpetrators. By assuming integration as in intra-modernity ways, South American countries are assuming their own reproduction of the modernity/coloniality project.

Chapter 5: General Conclusions

The broader puzzle of investigation of this study has been exploring the revitalization of processes of regionalization and doctrines of regionalism, particularly in South America, as potential means for transformation. This transformation is understood as radical change of or emancipation from the dynamics of neocolonial power, the system of capitalist accumulation, and the modernity/neocolonial universal project. Thus, the purpose of this theoretical critical study was to explore in detail the apparent new contours of the South American trend of "postneoliberal" regionalism entailed by UNASUR.

I have assessed UNASUR from an alternative analytical stance that aimed to denaturalize its regionalist political rationality in order to re-evaluate its transformative potentialities and its novelty. I aimed to respond to a primary general question: Does UNASUR entail a transformative exercise of government through the region as a technology of governance? Equally, I endeavoured to explore some secondary questions: What does the characterization of UNASUR as a "postneoliberal" initiative imply and how is this characterization formulated? What political rationality does UNASUR contain and perform as a means of governance? This thesis then argued that, seen as a means of governance, UNASUR and the process of regionalization that it leads are techniques of domination through naturalization and exclusion which have so far remained unproblematized. Within this framework, I have further elaborated that the "postneoliberal" characterization of UNASUR can be recognized as determined by mainstream scholarship and by a limited comprehension of neoliberalism as exclusively referring to economic determinisms.

Scholars who have paid attention to the Latin American initiatives of integration, especially those informed by the mainstream scholarship on regionalism, introduce the notion of "postneoliberal" regionalism as restricted to its economic connotations. As showed, this characterization do not explore continuities in the political and social relations of power deployed through the region, it has dismissed attention to the normative connotations that the notion has had in its origins, and most important has not further explored the relationship between the social system—neoliberalism and the overarching paradigm of production—capitalism (only two of the crises of neoliberalism, the crisis of the market and the crisis of integration through liberalization. Nevertheless, "postneoliberalism" has not implied for the case of UNASUR any anti-capitalist endeavour nor the transformation of social relations of power and institutionalism.

The theoretical framework developed for this thesis heavily elaborated on the critical theory of governmentality developed by Foucault (2006), the notion of coloniality of power by Quijano (2000), and the standpoint of the project of modernity/decoloniality advanced by several scholars such as Walter D. Mignolo, Aníbal Quijano, Madina Tlostanova, and Catherine Walsh.

In order to carry on an alternative analysis of UNASUR as a means of governance, this thesis first developed a critique of the mainstream regionalist approach and of the posterior constructivist-led NRA, to in turn delineate the realist perspective through which UNASUR has been analyzed for the most part. This theoretical exploration facilitated to advance the analysis of the academic characterization of UNASUR as different, transformative and "postneoliberal".

Finally, the alternative analytics of governance sustained my attempt to delineate UNASUR's political rationality and to unveil alternative rationalities of integration through the discourse analysis of the published documents and declarations by the main actors, official or not, involved.

I believe that by assuming a critical stance this study has contributed to the de-naturalization of the notions of region, regionalism and regionalization as positive and desirable schemes. This thesis has highlighted these as technologies of governance, and it has further attempted to explore how mainstream scholarship renders them as a natural process in the international realm. Most importantly, this thesis can be considered unique and novel insofar as it contributes with fresh insights about order and power. Bringing together elements of governmentality and decoloniality this thesis presents a promising offer for the understanding of the organization of the international context as sustained in a matrix of modernity/coloniality. Specifically, the constructed region is therefore understood as a means through which this matrix is reproduced. In the process of regionalization, we have seen a series of clashes: struggle and domination taking place in the sphere of the control of authority; but also in the sphere of knowledge, naturalizing regionalization in desirable terms; in the sphere of subjectivity, making region and regional subjects intelligible in a particular way; and in the sphere of production, still sustaining integration most importantly in terms of accumulation, commodification of the environment, indiscriminate exploitation.

UNASUR's official discourse as evident in its declarations, statements, statutes and treaties has revealed the principles, parameters and objectives of the

South American process of integration. Through this discourse, UNASUR is constructing the region and establishing *the* way of governance of *a* possible South American space and its *particular* subjects. As a "technology of governance" (Rose & Miller, 2010) UNASUR presents a particular type of political rationality. Moreover, this rationality remains within the logic of competitiveness, accumulation and exclusion that well defines what Quijano (2000) and other decolonial scholars refer to as the capitalist neo-colonial "matrix of power," which simultaneously sustains and reproduces our modernity/coloniality global present (Mignolo & Escobar, 2010).

In the first section of this thesis I explored the production of knowledge around the phenomenon of regionalism. The main aim was to elucidate how some of the determinism of a specific perspective can sustain the reification of processes of regionalization as normal developments, and of regionalism as a doctrine for the organization of the international system. While studies of processes of regionalization developed within mainstream regionalism do not question the exercise of power in the creation of regions as a way of ordering and governing, the governmentality approach to regionalization and regionalism unveil these as technologies of governance at a distance (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Larner & Walters, 2002; Rose, 2006; Rose & Miller, 2010).

Regionalism mainstream analysis comes from and it is directly related to a particular context, and in a similar manner its methodological approaches respond to it. As this thesis has aimed to demonstrate, the mainstream analysis of UNASUR perpetuates the reification of regionalism as a *natural development* of the international system. That approach at the moment of analysis of UNASUR has

perpetuated the realist focus of analysis, the centrality of states as main actors of integration and, to a certain extent, an economic determinism.

In addition, the tendency not to analyze UNASUR as a technique of governance has given rise to the greater risk of reproduction of the sphere of "control of knowledge and subjectivity" (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2009), which in turn has tended to naturalize Western knowledge over other alternative rationalities. Interesting enough, Western knowledge's constant goal of achieving universal character can be clearly identified, once again, through the case of the spread and reproduction of the notions of regionalism and regionalization.

UNASUR's discourse has obscured how the governance of the region is sustained in a production of (Western) knowledge with surpassed geo-political origins. As well, it renders invisible how its exclusionary type of governance carries the latent repercussion of sustaining a structurating of the world system built on the segregation of some. For example, despite UNASUR's rhetoric of "civil participation" and "integration for the people," the projects prioritized within the framework of the IIRSA made evident that *de facto* integration still responded to the interests of capitalists elites in spite of Indigenous groups. In the region and through the region the modernity/coloniality project is actually enacted. Mainstream regionalism subsumes not only critical approaches to integration, but normatively it also subsumes alternative knowledges and realities of integration.

Capitalist production as a paradigm and neoliberalism, as the "the economics of a new imperialism," (Smith, 2006, p.7) subsume any other system of production and determine a set of moral and values in direct relation to progress and competitiveness. Despite its rhetoric, UNASUR's regionalism sustains a

control for authority is exclusionary terms—only among states and with the highest value on institutions over human beings. Finally, we have seen that, subjectively UNASUR's regionalism makes the region intelligible in specific terms to govern on it (as a space of potentialities, zone of peace and of utmost commitment to democracy, of regional competitive and entrepreneurial subjects).

As was presented in this thesis, regionalism and regionalization are "arts of international organization" (Larner & Walters, 2002) that responded to contextual events, such as post-war reconstructions or diverse crises of economic development, and to specific objectives, such as balance of power or hegemonic interests. The idea of multipolarity through regionalism (Hettne, 1994) by which the new regionalism wave was enhanced, was promising in terms of decentring the nodes of power. The possibility of apparent hegemonic power, sovereign development and progress overshadow that the disaggregation of the centres of power does not represent the transformation of its modes (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2009). Furthermore, the notion of a matrix of colonial power facilitates to highlight that countries in South America when aligning to integration as portrayed with UNASUR are actually in part fulfilling the role of collaborators in the reproduction of this matrix.

While governmentality has given account of the process of regionalization as enacting governance through normalization and exclusion; decoloniality as a broader political project suggests we should understand this technique as part of the repertoire of modernity/coloniality. From the decolonial stance, this study has emphasized that regionalism in general and UNASUR in particular are not only expressions of the distribution of power in a multipolar system but of the disaggregation of domination

and exclusion in a matrix of power at the regional as at the national level. Regionalism in South America ends up reproducing the mode of colonial power.

It has not been our objective to discredit the rationalist intergovernmental perspective of UNASUR. This perspective has allowed us to identify elements such as the central place and importance of the constantly sought "balance of power" (Hurrell, 2005), perennially negotiated between the member countries of the nascent UNASUR. Furthermore, under this perspective the implications of the negotiations of leadership between Brazil and Venezuela, among others, are still being explored. However, this analysis has further obscured to a certain extent some other elements: the analysis of UNASUR as a governmental technology; the existence of disputing rationalities in which the region can be portrayed as a space of governance; and the perpetuation of an official political rationality built on dynamics of silence and exclusion.

Although the contours of South American regionalism expressed through UNASUR have changed, its strategies, its organization and its ethos are still heavily related to how the decision-makers perceive the relationship between regionalism and global system. Modernity and progress are still two central features of this global system determining how South Americans *react*. Under the label of "postneoliberal" regionalism a more *proactive* "managed regionalism" has been argued (Castro Rea & Knight 2013, p.10). Yet, the changes that this entail in the sphere of economics has not proven to have consequences for transformation of the spheres of governance, relations of power state-civil society, and in the approach state-environment.

I believe that the normative necessity of apparent *positive* regionalism and the circular argumentation that results from the analysis of regionalism from mainstream regionalism actually constitute cornerstones of the machinery of soft power or of

neocolonial power. The latter sustains the governance of exclusion through the region and obscures the possibilities of finding "other possible alternative integration" (Cochabamba, 2006, "Summit of the People").

Among the multiple voices around the rhetoric of integration UNASUR's political rationality is still preponderantly one of developmentalism sustained in the neocolonial paradigm, simultaneously evading dissident points of enunciation and therefore reproducing practices of exclusion at the regional level. UNASUR's political rationality presents a specific idiom characterized by the discourse of *dormant capabilities*: The region is a promising space in which governance is *feasible, desirable* and *necessary* in order to achieve *competitiveness*. To date, the path of competition is the one to *progress* and to achieve the desired *development.*

UNASUR's regional governance, on the one hand, has been made possible upon a specific conception of the objects or subjects to govern; UNASUR has its own epistemological character. Through this, regional subjects are portrayed as beneficiaries or merely a public to be informed. On the other hand, those who do not fit in the category of regional subjects according to its specific characterization, those that request organized participation or present alternative integrational rationalities remained *un-named*, non-enunciated and, therefore, *non-existent.* The epistemological character of UNASUR coexists with its moral form; these two simultaneously reinforce each other.

While UNASUR's political rationality depict the regional space as needed to be govern insofar space of capabilities for a better inclusion in the world system; the multiplicity of rationalities depict the region as multiplicity and therefore basis for transformation instead of different inclusion. While UNASUR's political rationality enacts a governance of functions, of democracy, and of peace at the service of an

overarching logic of advancement of accumulation and empty institutionalism; the multiplicity of rationalities aim to enact a comprehension of governance as radical democratization (Andreasson, 2005), not to govern over the different modernities, but to govern with the multiplicity, a politics of identity. Finally, while UNASUR's political rationality constructs regional non-subjects, the multiplicity of rationalities foreground excluded subjects through the rhetoric resource of *naming* instead of *speaking in the name of*.

After identifying UNASUR's political rationality and the different elements of what I have called alternative rationalities, it is pertinent to the question of the role of UNASUR to emphasize our concluding perception: the "postneoliberal" regionalism and the exclusionary political rationality of UNASUR seem closer to "resistance rather than emancipation" (Pieterse, 1998 p.138). A certain resistance in realistic terms, which seeks to provoke at least a balance of economical power, avoids the political intrusion of hegemons and other potentials in the region and provides the region a *"favourable"* position in the context of changing players.

Here it is what is greatly problematic about this: resistance alone is not able to question and disrupt or transform the patterns of coloniality. It may, in fact, become implicated in reproducing oppression within each country, among their people and communities. UNASUR seeks to play under the same old rules, and to participate in the same old game except, now, with new, multiple and changing players. It plays this old game, with new players, but without this signifying a change of the content, a promotion of life and multiplicity of voices in which I believe UNASUR's highest potential of transformation actually resides.

I conclude, therefore, that whether a bipolar or polycentric order, the South American project of regionalization seems to still be reproducing the modern/colonial matrix of power. It continues to enhance the capitalist and globalised project through which, *development, progress* and *modernity* imply and reinforce colonial practises of exclusion and oppression that are unable to overcome the persistence of inequality. The idea of "postneoliberal" regionalism has removed from the spotlight the debate about the type of world and modes of power, in order to pay attention on transformation of the means of an unquestioned paradigm of capitalism. I believe, the notion of "postneoliberalism," based on mainstream analysis, disrupts the quest for transformation highlighting superficial reforms.

Whilst a governmentality perspective has allowed an understanding of regionalism, regionalisation and regions as means of governance, it is a broader decolonial approach to regionalization that elucidates what type of governance underlies it. Taken seriously, a decolonial approach to regionalization and regionalism assumes these notions—namely regionalism and regionalization as part of the project of modernity/coloniality in at least two ways. These notions are part of the production of specific geo-political knowledge that, however universalized, maintains the neocolonial mode of power reproducing in a multipolar way. But also, regionalization and regionalism are the spaces through which the control for authority is disputed under the same realist terms. The decolonial approach requests bringing border-thinking to the centre of the discussion of multiple modernities; in other words, to highlight or to make evident the existence of multiple integrational rationalities. Moreover, the decolonial project necessarily requests a second level of intervention in which this

acknowledgement of multiplicity should be accompanied by political activism. This means that, beyond epistemic disobedience, scholars committed to decoloniality should politicize the alternative rationalities as feasible and as constitutive to other modernities. How this two-level project should be advanced is still a path under construction; but the denaturalization of regionalization and regionalism and the presentation of UNASUR as a space of clashing multiplicity of rationalities is the first step to move in a decolonial direction.

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Appendices

UNASUR's timeline

UNASUR Timeline	
Year – Milestone	Observations
2000 – I Meeting of South American Heads of State	Convened by Brazilian president Fernando H. Cardozo. Trade an commerce remained a pillar, but the importance of a political agenda was emphasized in order to counterbalance the FTAA initiative.
2002 – II Meeting of South American Heads of State	Through the "Consensus of Guayaquil" themes such as infrastructure integration and energy integration were promoted and specialized committees were yet informally constituted.
2003 – Signing of the Agreement of Free Trade CAN and MERCOSUR	The South American Foreign Ministers consolidated the constitution of the free trade area of South America, pillar that remained central throughout UNASUR constitution.
2004 – III Meeting of South American Heads of State	The SACN is constituted through the "Declaration of Cuzco". Strengthening the association CAN-MERCOSUR remained a priority despite critical opinions. President Hugo Chávez referred to these schemes as outdated and irrelevant for authentic people's integration.
2005 – I Meeting of Heads of State of the SACN	Prior to this meeting the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries members provided the document "Towards SACN: Elements for a Plan of Work", basis for the "Agenda of Priorities and Action Plan" presented in the SACN's first meeting. The agreed themes appeared in the following order: Political dialogue, physical integration, environment, energy integration, finances mechanism, promotion of social cohesion, telecommunications.
2005 – I Extraordinary Meeting of the SACN	The process of integration entered a phase of unclear contours when trying to identify its own differences with previous initiatives. The "Strategic Commission of Reflection" is created. Commission formed by selected representatives of the Heads of States, from academics to policy makers. Interestingly, the main two task that the commission was given were the promotion and

	dynamism of the relations CAN-MERCOSUR and the development of an analytical document on a "New Model of Integration of South America".
2006 – President's Evo Morales open letter	Two months before the second meeting of heads of state of SACN, president Evo Morales appealed for a process of integration centered on the notion of "*buen vivir*" (living well).
2006 – II Meeting of Heads of State of the SACN I Social Summit for the Integration of the People[21]	In December, 2006 two parallel summits took place in Cochabamba, Bolivia. In the meeting of heads of state, with official representatives, the results of the "Commission of Reflection" were presented. In the Social Summit, diverse civil society actors congregated for a series of round tables and forums in a clear attempt to highlight the exclusionary character of the process of constitution of UNASUR.
2007 – II Extraordinary Meeting of the SACN	The First specific Summit of Energy of South America took place and its official committee was created. The name of SACN was replaced by UNASUR. As president Hugo Chávez stated, he did not supported the name of SACN insofar it represented the idea of different nations congregated together, but not of only one nation which South America is. According to him, the notion of "union" better represented South America's sentiment.
2008 – Crisis between Colombia and Ecuador, and crisis of Pando, Bolivia Approval of the <u>Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR</u> Constitution of UNASUR's Committee of Security and Defence.	March 2008, Ecuador and Colombia entered a phase of conflict after Colombia targeted a camp site of FARC in Ecuadorian territory. This event caused the momentary rupture of relations between Colombia and Ecuador, beside the increase of military presence of the countries in borders zones (Ecuador and Venezuela). UNASUR called for extraordinary meetings
	May 2008, in a context of regional crisis and conflictual diplomatic relations, the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR was approved. Likewise, the proposal for the constitution of the South American Committee of Defence was approved (officially constituted December, 2008).
	September 2008, crisis and turmoil in Pando – Bolivia between

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[21] The Social Summits for the Integration of the People of the South in their diverse manifestation had continued to happen in parallel to the official meetings. For a complete presentation of these see www.movimientos.org

	official forces aligned with president Evo Morales and the so-called "autonomist forces" among the reasons adduced for this were historical racial conflict, land ownership issues and criticism of the president's management. UNASUR supported Morales and lead further political investigation.
2009 – III Summit of Heads of State of UNASUR	Official establishment of the South American Committees of Fight against Drug Trafficking; Planning and Infrastructure; Social Development; Education, Culture, Science, Technology and Innovation.
2009 - Extraordinary Meeting: Colombia and the establishment of the South American Zone of Peace, Crisis in Honduras	Despite doubts and concerns manifested by the heads of state previous to the extraordinary meeting, UNASUR did not condemned, nor rejected, the establishment of seven military bases in Colombia. Colombia's representative explained these decisions as part of an strategic plan in the fight of trafficking and *narcoterrorismo* (a notion combining trafficking and terrorism). As counterbalance, UNASUR made public the establishment of South America as "Zone of Peace"
	UNASUR did express through its final declaration condemn to the *coup d'état* in Honduras, by which ex president Manuel Zelaya was removed from office. Alongside, UNASUR condemned the disruption of constitutional order and it refused to recognize any convocation to elections by the *de fact* government in power.
2010 - Extraordinary Meetings: Solidarity with Haiti's victims Crisis in Ecuador and the establishment of the axial commitment to democracy	February 2010, members countries of UNASUR subscribed to the "Declaration of Solidarity with Haiti" as a response to catastrophic events of January, 2010.
	May 2010, through the establishment of a humanitarian strategy of intervention in Haiti, the Technical Secretary UNASUR-Haiti is constituted. The three priorities in agenda were strengthening of institutional order, alimentary security and infrastructure.
	October 2010, in response to the events in Ecuador, the attempt of *coup d'état,* and kidnapping of president Rafael Correa, UNASUR consolidated its rejection to any challenge to the institutional authority and affirmed drastic and direct consequences for any future alike events.
2010 – IV Summit of Heads	The decisions taken on October 2010 led to the official approval

of State of UNASUR	of the "Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR of Commitment with Democracy". Alongside, the South American Committee of Economy and Finances is created.
2011 – Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of UNASUR	The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR entered into force
2011 – Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of State of UNASUR	UNASUR subscribed to the "Commitment against Inequality" through which the process of integration is established as instrument for poverty reduction and social inclusion. Also, the development of an agenda of social actions is established as task of urgent character, for which UNASUR decided to convoke a meeting of experts (no date specification).
2011 – V Summit of Heads of State of UNASUR	UNASUR subscribed to the creation of an Electoral Committee of South America in the context of respect to the institutional authority.
2011 – Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Infrastructure and Planning	UNASUR approved a priority Agenda of Integration centered on 31 projects of infrastructure.
2011	December, the General Assembly of United Nations granted to UNASUR condition of observer as in assemblies.
2012 – Extraordinary Meetings of Heads of State of UNASUR Crisis in Paraguay	UNASUR condemned the events that endangered the institutional order of Paraguay after the destitution of president Fernando Lugos, who was as well performing duties as president of UNASUR. UNASUR suspended Paraguay of participation on any agencies, meetings or committees until agreed different. Presidency of UNASUR is granted to the president of Peru for the period of one year.

Note: This timeline was elaborated partially, but not exclusively, upon the chronology of summits and meetings presented in UNASUR official documents.