

is a strong precedent for the incorporation of concerns about race and racism, into pragmatist philosophy. *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race* should be very useful for classes on American philosophy, classes on race and research in both broad subfields.

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Noah Lemos

Common Sense: a Contemporary Defense.

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Gone are the days when walking off a cliff, living in a bathtub, or inventing a new science would have seemed natural outgrowths of philosophical epistemology. Whether this reflects growing modesty or a lamentable failure of commitment, few contemporary philosophers would undertake the radical reforming projects that animated ancient skeptics, early modern natural philosophers, or nineteenth-century Idealists. And fewer yet would countenance a theory of knowledge that abjured the collective beliefs of certain important, non-philosophical communities (except those of Twin Earth or strange swamps). To this extent then, most epistemologists today can be said to respect the common knowledge of some community.

For naturalists of various stripes that community is natural science. Common-sense theorists, though, give at least equal credence to some beliefs of 'common-sense'. They need not credit *all* beliefs of common-sense, but the hallmark of their approach is that at least some such beliefs are as good as our knowledge gets, and that that is more than good enough. But if the naturalist relies on an idealized picture of science that abstracts from incompleteness and internal conflict, the common-sense theorist faces considerable difficulty even in identifying her subject-matter, despite such philosophical chestnut as 'this is a hand', or the familiar injunction to come in out of the rain.

The first example figures prominently in Noah Lemos' book, which looks to the work of Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm for an account of common-sense epistemology. Despite some (unavoidable) vagueness, Lemos thinks we can unpack the notion of common sense by considering various particular propositions: those that are matters of common knowledge, including epistemic propositions (e.g., 'people know things and know that they know things'); those that might not be common knowledge, but are readily available to individuals (e.g., 'this is my hand'); and readily available entail-

ments of those propositions (e.g., 'there are material objects'). Such propositions are typically derived from perception or memory, and so the common sense theorist will be committed to assuming the general reliability of those faculties. But she is no reliabilist: her starting points are simply the particular propositions of common sense. They are starting points not because they are psychologically irresistible, or even indispensable, but because they are genuine instances of knowledge and data for any theory of knowledge.

Lemos' main aim is to show that the common sense tradition is not 'unphilosophical, dogmatic, intemperate or question-begging, at least not in any intellectually vicious way' (182). Part of what drives his defense is an epistemic anti-elitism that denies that knowledge could depend on some intricate epistemological theory accessible only to a few. Instead, Lemos maintains it is much more reasonable to hold that we know — and know that we know — certain common sense propositions with a degree of security no merely theoretical claim can trump. Showing the philosophical respectability of this stance is the task of the rest of the book.

Chapters 2 and 3 consider how to account for the reliability of our faculties. Borrowing from Ernest Sosa to distinguish between the animal knowledge of children and animals and the reflective knowledge of adults, Lemos maintains that the former needs no justification, only the various intellectual virtues that make a belief 'apt'. On this basis, he argues that by starting with a set of apt beliefs that qualify as knowledge, we can justify the reliability of our faculties through abductive inference. Such procedures may be circular, but not viciously so, for holding that some belief is justified by way of other beliefs is simply not the same as holding that it is *generated* by those justifying beliefs. More generally, Lemos points out that although circular accounts can provide some justification by showing how our beliefs cohere, we can look for other virtues and other ways of checking our beliefs besides mere coherence. One way is through wide reflective equilibrium, which Lemos takes to go well beyond a method of adjusting our beliefs for optimal coherence.

Some of the same strategies appear in Chapter 5, where Lemos considers the charge that Moore's arguments against external world skepticism are question-begging. Lemos allows that there is a tension between common sense belief and such meta-epistemic claims as the 'principle of exclusion' and 'sensitivity requirement for knowledge.' Again, he borrows from Sosa to substitute 'safety' for 'sensitivity', thereby disarming skepticism, while showing its plausibility. But even were there no such alternate requirement of safety, Lemos maintains that it cannot be more reasonable to believe in any such requirement than in the particular proposition that 'this is a hand'.

Chapter 6 tackles methodological considerations head-on, arguing that the common-sensist must be a particularist, rather than a 'methodist' — not a matter of religious practice, but of the direction of explanatory dependence. Methodism holds that we need a method for determining what will count as instances of knowledge. But since we lack justified belief in relevant general principles, it entails that we either don't know particular propositions, or

must wait for epistemologists to complete their work to decide if we do. And so methodism (and its evil twin, methodological skepticism) is pretty much ruled out for the common sense particularist, who puts her epistemic stock in particular common sense propositions. This is so even if the normative qualities of epistemology (e.g., being known, justified, reasonable) themselves supervene on other non-epistemic properties of our beliefs (a lesson also applied to moral properties in Chapter 8).

None of this is to deny that there is some room for the general claims we expect from a theory of knowledge or ethics. Chapter 7 seeks to accommodate a priori knowledge, particularly of epistemic principles such as the principle of exclusion, by endorsing a 'modest' a priorism, in which a priori knowledge need be neither subjectively certain nor permanently indefeasible. And so, Lemos makes room for philosophical investigation within the broad common sense tradition. Common sense propositions may provide a starting foundation of data, but we can use them to search for criteria of justification, knowledge and right action through wide reflective equilibrium.

Although Lemos's book is clear and straightforward, it may not fully escape dogmatism in its treatment of common sense 'data'. For Lemos seems to countenance no possibility that these data might be defeasible. If what is at issue is what we have most reason to believe, might we not prefer to hold that no proposition — methodical or particular — is immune to revision? Naturalist accounts typically allow that any proposition can be defeated if the cost of maintaining it is too high. Perhaps we should set the bar for revising common sense propositions quite high, but without making them sacrosanct — any more than theories of natural science take empirical data to be sacrosanct in the long slog towards achieving equilibrium between our beliefs and whatever contributions the empirical world might make in the future. True, I find it hard to imagine that it would ever be reasonable to give up my belief that these are my hands typing on a computer, but perhaps I ought to keep an open mind about both the world and the limits of my imagination.

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Peter Ludlow, Yugin Nagasawa and Daniel Stoljar, eds.

There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Jackson's Knowledge Argument.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2004.
Pp. xx + 463.
US\$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-12272-3);
US\$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-62189-4).

This volume is a selection of papers (of which four are new) dealing with Frank Jackson's famous knowledge argument. The argument considers Mary who is assumed to know all the physical facts. She has so far been confined to a strictly black and white environment. Upon her release, she encounters a red tomato. Jackson claims that she thereby *learns* something new, namely *what it is like* to experience the colour red, and thereby knows a new fact. *Ex hypothesi*, there are therefore non-physical facts and physicalism is false. After the two original papers by Jackson presenting the argument (42-3; 51), the responses are organised according to how much of the original argument is accepted. The following issues are thus addressed in turn. Does Mary learn anything new? If she does, is this factual knowledge or not? If it is, is it only know-how or acquaintance? If not, is it merely knowledge of old facts in a new form? The final two questions addressed in the volume deal directly with the main assumption and the conclusion of the argument: did Mary know all the physical facts prior to her release? Is physicalism false? These issues are clearly presented in the introduction after a very interesting historical context setting of Jackson's argument (6-9).

The book's foreword, by Jackson, does a wonderful job of whetting the reader's appetite for what is to follow. He reminds us why his knowledge argument potentially represents a strong challenge to physicalism, while indicating that he now views the argument to be invalid. The importance of the argument rests first upon the power of the intuition that underpins it. And second, it lies in the failure of two important forms of criticism of the argument, which Jackson briefly argues for. To describe phenomenal knowledge as perspectival is to overlook its objective content: it describes in what way certain agents are similar (namely in their having an identical experience) (xviii). And as for the claim that phenomenal knowledge is just knowledge under a different aspect/mode from that acquired through physics, this leaves open the question of whether this aspect/mode is itself physical (xix).

The responses to Jackson's argument start with an opening salvo from Dennett. He dismisses the whole problem by simply claiming that Mary's having complete physical knowledge about colours would have enabled her to know *what it is like* to see red (62). Dennett is eloquent in his condemnation of those who take on board some of the argument's claims. He talks of the 'woebegone mistake' (65) of the epiphenomenalism entailed by Jackson's conclusion, and of 'the preposterous and ignoble relic of ancient prejudices'