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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

POLITICAL POWER, CLIENTELISM, AND REFORM IN THE USSR

BY

James H. Howland

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Abstract

This thesis examines the nature and role of clientelism in the Soviet political elite. It argues that the Soviet political apparatus is a clientelistic system, i.e., that clientelism plays an essential role in the communication of political power and has become an institutionalised and self-perpetuating aspect of the system.

For the purposes of this study, political power is defined as the capacity to cause action; power is exercised through the exchange of resources which accrue to individual political actors by virtue of their location within a specific political structure. Political authority is defined as the legitimate capacity to require action.

A review of the literature on political clientelism explores its basis in micro-level phenomena and the macro-level impact these phenomena can have when they become institutionalised. Clientelism is shown to be an important part of Russian, and subsequently in Soviet, political culture. In the contemporary Soviet political system, clientelism influences both elite circulation and policy administration.

A case study of clientelism in the Uzbek Soviet

Socialist Republic both during and in the aftermath of the administration of First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov develops this argument further. It finds that political clientelism permeated the republic's political institutions to such a degree that they were to a great extent beyond the control of political authorities in the center, unless they too resorted to clientelistic associations with republic leaders.

The thesis argues that the impact of clientelism on the Soviet political system has been to locate political power in informal structures that are outside the authority of the formal hierarchy. After briefly considering the nature and goals of Mikhail Gorbachev's program of political and economic reforms, it concludes that unless Gorbachev first overcomes the negative influence of clientelism and "reunites" political power and authority, the rest of his reform initiative is unlikely to succeed.

Preface

This thesis investigates the role of clientelism in the Soviet political elite. It is an outgrowth of work begun as an undergraduate at Auburn University; there, lecture and independent study courses under Professor Michael Urban sparked an interest in "informal" political activity within the Soviet political elite and in the potential for employing network analysis to determine the impact of this informal activity on the effectiveness of formal state and Communist Party political structures.

At the University of Alberta, my interest shifted to a review of the literature on political clientelism, which seemed to offer a well-established theoretical framework for my investigation of informal groups within the Soviet apparatus. These early expectations have proved difficult to realise, however; the literature on clientelism is so broad (and indeed at times self-contradicting) that no single theoretical approach has yet emerged which successfully integrates the vast collection of empirical research on clientelism in various settings.

The present study is the result so far of my struggles with this problem. By concentrating on the impact clientelism has on the flow of political power within a

society and on its influence on the extent and rate of political development, it should be possible to develop a political theory of clientelism. This thesis, which falls well short of the mark in this respect, is at best a preliminary effort.

I have benefitted from the assistance of several friends and colleauges in the preparation of this thesis. Michael Urban, Fred Judson, Paul Johnston, and Mark Long gave freely of their time and advice, commented on successive drafts, and offered encouragement when it was sorely needed. Jack Masson and Tom Keating, as Political Science department graduate chairmen, laboured heroically to clear administrative hurdles and, failing that, to drag me across them.

While it is not customary to make special mention of the help of one's thesis committee, I would be shamefully remiss in not making explicit my gratitude to Professors Bohdan Harasymiw, Max Mote, Jeremy Paltiel, and Tova Yedlin. Unfortunate financial circumstances, poverty chief among them, forced me to leave Edmonton and largely to abandon my thesis work for over two years. The willingness of each member of the committee to take me on for the second go-round is more a measure of their long-suffering patience than of my abilities or potential as a scholar. It is my hope that the work presented here at least partly

justifies the faith they have shown and the time they have invested.

In particular, I would like to thank Bohdan Harasymiw of the University of Calgary for sitting on my committee as a co-supervisor. Any informed reader of this thesis will already be aware of Professor Harasymiw's expertise [illegible]ing the Soviet political elite. I can add to the reader's knowledge that Dr. Harasymiw is an astute critic and cautious scholar; his guidance proved to be an excellent counterweight to my tendency to let enthusiasm convince where evidence is lacking or insufficient. Regretfully, due to circumstances beyond his control Dr. Harasymiw was unable to attend the defence of this thesis. Still, the work bears his mark and is much the better for it.

Much that is of value in the following pages owes its existence to the help and encouragement of these friends and teachers. Responsibility for the remainder is of course mine alone.

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Political Power, Clientelism, and Reform in the USSR

Introduction

Statement of the Problem

The nature of power in the Soviet political system is one of the central themes in western scholarship on the USSR. Naturally, though, none of the various theoretical approaches to the sources, "means," and "ends" of political power in the Soviet system answers all the questions they raise. For example, Feher, Heller, and Markus consider the Communist Party leadership the "source of all power," and "bureaucracy, police activity, the penal code, and, last but not least, paternalism" to be the means for exercising this power upon the population. Faced with such powerful weaponry, the population fears the apparatus and dares not challenge its commands, or indeed, its abuses.[1] But this view of an omnipotent leadership fails to account for the apparent inability of the leadership to compel the population to carry out its policies. The literature of Soviet studies abounds with accounts of stifled economic reforms, labour absenteeism, and a wide range of political and economic corruption.[2]

The great majority of the population does not challenge the apparatus, but does not necessarily obey it either.

Or, to take another example, Rigby views political power as

> heavily concentrated in the hands of a small self-perpetuating oligarchy managing all social activities through an elaborate complex of centralised bureaucratic organisations, and this determines the character of the policy-making process and of 'politics' understood as the competitive promotion of individual group ends. Furthermore the authority of this system in its day-to-day operation is still principally legitimated on the same grounds as legitimated its creation: the achievement of communism.[3]

He goes on to liken the structure of power and authority to that of a military command, issuing orders which are transmitted down a chain of command, and acted upon at "operational" levels. Yet this theoretical approach likewise fails to account for the regime's inability to put an end to the presumably undesirable practices mentioned above. These two examples represent some of the best scholarship on power in Soviet politics. The shortcomings noted here do not invalidate the aspects of political power which they <u>do</u> seem to explain; rather, they merely point to the need for continuing research in the field.

Jan Gross suggests that answers to questions about political power in the Soviet political system are not to be found in the party and state apparatus itself

> The Soviet version of the totalitarian state is no interested in power as the capacity to get thing done. It knows about power as a relative attribute reaching perfection when it is its exclusiv

> repository. As a result, it is a state, unique in history, devoted primarily to making sure that no one can get things done.[4]

Yet the Soviet elite must "get things done," if only to protect its dominant position over society. Actually getting things done must be accomplished outside state institutions, i.e., through informal mechanisms, of which clientelism is only one, albeit a very important one in the Soviet system.

This study will argue that political clientelism is an integral component of the Soviet political system, i.e., that like the second economy, for example, it is one of several distinct informal, personalistic or particularistic aspects of the system which must be included in any complete understanding of the system.

In the quite extensive literature on clientelism, discussions of the "idea" of clientelism,[5] the "institution" of clientelism,[6] and indeed the "concept" of clientelism[7] abound, but there seems to be no rigorous, operational definition of the term. After considering some of the reasons for this state of affairs, this study likewise settles for a nominal definition of clientelism: the functioning or operation of informal, non-institutionalised patron-client relationships as a medium for the organisation and communication of power in a polity. This definition has some important limitations, not least of which is that it does not permit measurement or comparison of "degrees" of clientelism or its impact on

a polity, but is nevertheless sufficient for the more modest task directly at hand, which is simply descriptive.

Charles Fairbanks is undoubtedly correct in arguing that "clientelism is one of the most important aspects of politics in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is one of the most important cases of clientelist politics in the modern world."[8] This study will show how patron-client relationships within the Party-state apparatus influence the creation and exercise of political power and authority. The goal of the study is to determine the role and the impact of clientelism in the Soviet political elite during Leonid Brezhnev's period in office and in turn the implications for the program of political and economic reforms Mikhail Gorbachev has undertaken since his accession to the General Secretaryship. It is an effort to determine whether Gorbachev's attempt to revitalise the economic and political systems can succeed in a clientelistic system.

[A note on definitions: "regime" is used here to refer to the matrix of Party, soviet, and ministerial hierarchies which together form the "government" and its administrative apparatus. Furthermore, the discussion throughout this study focusses on the system as it was during Brezhnev's tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU. It is this manifestation of the system which is the object of Gorbachev's program of reforms.]

Structure of the Study

Chapter one begins with a discussion of concepts of political power. If the exercise of power is "the production of intended results,"[9] then studies of the structure and operation of political power in specific settings must answer certain questions: to what ends is political power exercised, and by whom? What institutions or individuals determine these ends? How, and to what extent, are these ends realised? In this study, power is described as an exchange relation among social actors: its components are scope, basis, and means. Political power is the capacity of one political actor to obtain the compliance of another political actor, from whom compliance would not otherwise be forthcoming.

There is considerable agreement among students of Soviet politics that the chief goal of the political elite during Brezhnev's rule was maintenance of the sociopolitical status quo. For an indication of the degree to which this objective was successfully realised, we need look no further than the contemporary Soviet press, where denunciations of Brezhnev's tenure as "the era of stagnation" are popular.[10] Chapter one raises the issue of the role of informal ties and patronage connections among members of the elite in maintaining "stability in cadres." Furthermore, it suggests that the regime's interaction with the rest of the society also was governed by the

primary objective of maintaining an environment conducive to stability within the political elite. While this helps to account for the regime's treatment of dissidents, and its claims to legitimacy based on ideology, economic growth, foreign policy successes, and so on, a detailed consideration of patterns of interaction between the political elite or the regime and the rest of society is beyond the scope of this study.

Chapter two looks more closely at patronage and political clientelism in the Soviet system. Conceptualisation of clientelism is more problematical than is the case with political power. The first section of the chapter examines the basis of clientelism in dyadic or two-person associations and elaborates on the definitions of patron-client relationship and political clientelism which are noted above.

Accounts of "everyday life" in the USSR as well as descriptions of the workings of the political and administrative systems at the micro level show that people throughout Soviet society resort to clientelism, as if instinctively, to cope with certain types of problems. The next section of chapter two therfore considers clientelism as one aspect of the dominant political culture of the Soviet Union. Patron-client relationships and clientelism were common in pre-revolutionary Russian (and non-Russian, "national") politics and society. But historical antecedents do not alone account for the continued

viability of these patterns of behaviour in contemporary Soviet society; for this we must also examine the contemporary political and social structures to find new, or perhaps surviving, system attributes which encourage clientelism. It is suggested here that insecurity, whether in one's career, access to valued commodities, or access to political authority, is the most important contributing factor to the persistence of clientelism in the contemporary Soviet Union. This insecurity is in fact a fundamental characteristic of the Soviet political system; the factors which contribute to this system-wide insecurity, i.e., the unreliability of the economic system and the arbitrary and often ineffective operation of the political system, are examined briefly.

Moving on to an examination of clientelism within the regime proper, patron-client ties are shown to serve two related yet distinct purposes. First, patronage ties play a role in elite recruitment and mobility. But by no means is patronage the only factor in elite circulation--the institutional structure of elite mobility, the nomenklatura system, which determines career paths and timing of advancement, and the qualifications of a candidate for advancement -- all these are obviously relevant. Second, patron-client links mediate the interaction of members of the elite in matters other than advancement, i.e., in administration of policy. This follows from an assumption that patrons and clients are

more responsive to each other than they are likely to be to "strangers."

A case study, presented in Chapter three, of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic examines these issues in more detail. Uzbekistan is a good candidate for a case study of clientelism in Soviet politics for three reasons. First, observers of Soviet politics have enjoyed something of a windfall of anecdotal information in the course of the "anti-corruption campaign" initiated by Brezhnev's successors quite soon after his death. Whether this wholesale sacking and replacement of republic and oblast cadres is entirely in response to "corruption" is debatable, as will be shown below. Be that as it may, reports in the Soviet press have portrayed the administration of Uzbek Communist Party First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov as completely dominated by patron-client ties and petty corruption such as bribery, report-padding and nepotism. A cautious review of this material offers some insight into the workings of a patron-client network in Soviet politics.

Second, a case study of Uzbek politics during Brezhnev's tenure offers the opportunity for comparative analyses. Some data on patronage and corruption in other Soviet republics are already available: there is Simis' account on Georgia in the early 1970s, for example, and more recently there have been much-publicised "anti-corruption campaigns" in other Soviet republics.[11]

Thus the present study may go a small way toward correcting the deficiencies in Soviet studies which Alexander Motyl points out in his recent call for more "comparative nationality studies" by sovietologists.[12]

Finally, this case study sheds some light on the role of patron-client ties in center-periphery relationships in Soviet politics. As Edward Shils has argued, the chief dynamic in center-periphery relations generally is the center's attempt to impose its authority and values on the periphery, and the periphery's resistance to the center's intrusion.[13] Again, a review of Soviet press materials suggests that Rashidov's status as a Brezhnev protege was one of the most significant determinants of political activity between Moscow and Tashkent. Due to the protection that Brezhnev and his son-in-law, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Churbanov, provided, Rashidov and <u>his</u> clients were secure in their positions as long as Brezhnev was in power, regardless of their failure to carry out policy directives from the regime center. The network of patron-client relationships which extended from Moscow to Tashkent and throughout the Uzbek republic became so strong and pervasive that by the time of Brezhnev's death the republic was in reality subordinate to central political authority not as a constituent republic of the USSR, but as the fiefdom of one of Brezhnev's clients. Furthermore, the difficulties Moscow authorities have faced in attempting to control the

clientelistic network Rashidov left behind offers a good illustration of the degree of autonomy the periphery can enjoy in Soviet politics, and the options open to the center as it attempts to assert its authority.

Chapter four is an attempt at synthesis of all the foregoing, for the purpose of outlining the beginnings of a theoretical understanding of political power in the Soviet political system. This understanding suggests some contradictions between what appears to be necessary for effective governance of the Soviet Union and the manner in which political power, authority, and legitimacy are created and communicated. The argument of this chapter is that the concentration on patron-client ties in organising political power did indeed contribute to the stability that was the chief concern of the Brezhnev-era political elite, but had the additional and much less desirable effect of limiting the regime's authority to the networks of patrons and clients which in fact comprise the "power" elite. Put another way, the widespread use of clientelist networks to subvert or circumvent the matrix of formal party and state institutions has made these institutions <u>minus</u> their clientelistic addenda ineffective as governing and administrative organs. The result is Jan Gross's "spoiler state," a regime which possesses the coercive means to prevent any activity it considers threatening in the society, but cannot compel, and obviously does not receive, the cooperation of the society in pursuing the

regime's policies.

Closely connected to the issue of authority, of course, is the issue of legitimacy. The question of the legitimacy of the Soviet regime has been dealt with at length in western scholarship, but for the most part this discussion has focussed on the regime's claims to legitimacy and on the potential legitimising role of various symbols and institutions.[14] Whether the Soviet population accepts the regime as legitimate, however, is the only meaningful test of its legitimacy, at least according to Western conceptions of legitimate rule. And as long as the regime prohibits discussion of the possibility that it may not be legitimate, it is a test which has yet to be administered. Outsiders can evaluate evidence and speculate as to what the results of an open debate in the USSR of the Communist Party's right to rule might be, but this is of course no substitute for the real thing. Changes in the political environment under Gorbachev have made discussions of the sort necessary to assess the legitimacy of the regime less perilous for the discussants, but it is not yet possible to see a resolution of the "legitimacy question."

Chapter five considers what all the foregoing means for Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts at reformation of the Soviet system. It begins with an evaluation of some of the possibilities for the regime's recovery from the current state of affairs. The range of these extends from

"muddling through," Brezhnev-style, which, given the severity of the problems facing the regime, would not appear to offer much promise; to the utter failure and collapse of the current regime, an option which is clearly unacceptable to those now in power.

Certainly other factors in addition to political clientelism have contributed to the development of the Soviet political system along the lines described here; the present study seeks only to identify clientelism as one of the major obstacles to reform of the Soviet system. This chapter presents an argument that successful reformation of the political system must include the institutionalisation of political authority and an unrestricted discussion in the Soviet Union of what the demands of political legitimacy are and the extent to which the regime has or can meet them. Only political institutions which are legitimate can achieve the population's compliance without using or threatening violence or coercion.

The next section of chapter five examines briefly the broad program of reforms now underway in the Soviet Union. An overview of the various aspects of the program: perestroika, glasnost, democratizatsiia, uskorenie, and so on, considers the problems at which each is directed and the intended results. Following this is an assessment of the successes and failures of Gorbachev's program to date, including the nature and sources of the resistance to it.

program have encountered. Finally, the reform program is assessed in light of the central proposition of this study, that for a systemic reformation to succeed, political authority must be taken away from individuals per se, and rooted in institutions which society recognises as legitimate. To accomplish this reunification of political authority, power, and legitimacy within the existing institutional context, political clientelism and other types of informalism must be delegitimised and indeed removed from the system.

Some Reservations

A study organised in the manner proposed here must make several methodological concessions. First are problems of combining micro- and macro-level analyses. Political clientelism is fundamentally a micro-level phenomenon, while power, legitimacy, and authority belong more properly in system-level analyses. In proposing to explain macro-level phenomena in terms of micro-level ones, we run the risk of over-extending the evidence, or trying to explain more than the available data will legitimately permit. On the other hand, as long as we are alert to these pitfalls, conceptualising political power as created at the micro-level offers a unique opportunity to examine the question of how individuals cope with ruling institutions which are ineffective or "weak," and in turn, the consequences for the political system of

individuals' strategies for "coping" with this weakness.[15]

Second, as in almost any conceivable study of the Soviet political system, there is the problem of gathering sufficient reliable data. This is an especially difficult problem for the present study, since it is concerned primarily with informal practices, the unwritten "rules of the game," and the motivations and perceptions of individuals in bureaucracies. Information that is both relevant and reliable is difficult to collect, even in political systems far less secretive than the Soviet one.[16]

In studying patron-client ties in Soviet politics, we rarely have reliable evidence linking specific patrons to specific clients. As will be shown below, even when two individuals can be shown to be connected in what <u>might</u> be a patron-client tie, showing that such a tie does indeed exist is difficult. Using the definitions employed in this study, we are ultimately dependent on the individuals' perceptions, and these are almost never made known to outside observers. As more information becomes available, a more rigorous operational definition of clientelism should be possible. In addition, while we generally know where in the hierarchy of formal positions an individual is situated, we are likely to know very little about the informal aspects of the role he or she occupies. Finally, whether the findings of our case study are generally applicable throughout the Soviet polity is of course a

question which can only be answered with more research and more case studies.

The topic is one which does not permit "final" conclusions. Political activity in the Soviet Union is arguably more energetic, more accessible, and consequently less predictable than at any time since the October Revolution. Until Gorbachev is ultimately successful, co-opted, or deposed, any conclusions as to the likelihood of his success can only be speculative. Be that as it may, the point here is not to say what will or will not happen to Gorbachev or his policies, but rather to establish, given the nature of the polity he "inherited" and the changes to it that he has advocated, some necessary conditions for his success in carrying out those changes. This study argues that reinstitutionalisation of political power is one such condition. Meeting these conditions will not guarantee his success, but failing to meet them would make success unlikely.

Chapter One: Political Power in the USSR

Conceptualising Political Power

This section outlines the conceptual dimensions of political power which are emphasised in this study. The concept of political power outlined here combines elements of behaviouralist and structuralist approaches and views political power essentially as a form of social exchange relation. It should be made clear at this point that we are concerned here with power, as distinct from authority, legitimacy, control, or influence. These concepts are of course all of central importance to understanding political action, but how we define them depends on how we define power. So it is with power that we begin.

Behaviouralist approaches. Bertrand Russell's definition of power as "the production of intended results" is elegant in its simplicity, though broader in scope than is necessary for analysis of political phenomena.[1] Dahl's more precise definition maintains the simplicity of Russell's. Dahl defines power as the capacity of one actor to cause another to do something which he or she would not otherwise have done. That is,

one actor has power over another to the extent that the first can "produce" the compliance of the second. Actors may be individuals, institutions, states, or any other "human aggregates." Power is thus a relation between two or more actors: without a second actor upon which to exercise power, the concept is meaningless.[8] The source of an actor's power--its base, to use Dahl's term--is the collection of resources, which may include status, material wealth, or weapons, for example, which the actor can employ to achieve the compliance of another. The means of employing these resources may include their actual use, such as the expenditure of money to cause a mechanic to repair a car (economic power), or merely the threat or promise that they will be used. Thus, Dahl writes, the means of a political leader's power could include "the promise of patronage, the threat of a veto, the holding of a conference, the threat of an appeal to the electorate, the exercise of charm and charisma, etc."[9] That is, power may be exercised not only through coercion, or threatened violence, but also through persuasion and influence. Offering rewards for obedience and basing commands on tenets of religion or ideology are examples. Finally, Dahl describes the scope of an actor's power in terms of the responses of the actors upon which that power is exercised. In terms of Russell's definition, the scope of power is the "results" which it actually does "produce." By definition, if one actor can not cause another to

perform a certain act, then that act is not within the scope of the actor's power.[4]

This conception of power is similar to that of Friedrich, who likewise stresses the relational nature of power. Things or qualities, he writes, do not constitute "power taken by themselves. To convert them into power, the power-seeker must find human beings who value the things sufficiently to obey his orders in return."[5] And Lasswell and Kaplan agree: "Power as participation in the making of decisions is an interpersonal relation."[6] That is, the people upon whom one attempts to exercise power must accept promises of rewards or threats of punishment as credible, and they must furthermore regard the avoidance of the threatened punishment or the receipt of the promised reward as worth more than the costs incurred in obeying. Otherwise, they would choose logically to disobey, in which case the attempt to exercise power over them fails.

Structuralist approaches. For Parsons, power is "the capacity of society to mobilize its resources in the interest of goals,... goals that are 'affected with a public interest'"; furthermore, power is "the capacity to make--and 'make stick'--decisions which are binding."[7] In this conception, the range of power--analogous to the scope of power in behaviouralist conceptions--is the complete set of issues over which power may be exercised, i.e., which society may "decide." Power is dispersed, or

distributed, in a particular pattern among the individuals who make up a society. Weber suggests that authority is the means by which this distribution occurs: authority confers power to specific individuals according to their position in the formal hierarchical structure of rule.* Mills defines the set of individuals to whom power is thus distributed as the "power elite."*

In sum, behaviouralist conceptions of power focus on the relational aspects of power; through the exercise of power an actor causes (compels, persuades, or influences) other actors to behave in specific, intended ways. Structuralist conceptions, on the other hand, emphasise the role of social structure in determining the precise nature or "shape" of power relationships in a given setting.

Comparing the two approaches. Most behaviouralists' criticisms of structuralist conceptions of power focus on the point that structural conceptions treat only potential power, and not the specific ways in which actors exercise their power, their motives for doing so, and so on. They argue that structuralists define power as "built in" to certain resources, for example authority, and then stop--without adequately accounting for how these resources convey power to the actors which possess them, or in turn how actors exploit the power at their disposal. Furthermore, a behaviouralist would argue, structuralist theories of power are too simplistic in as much as they

only allow for the exercise, through whatever processes, of power by the elite upon the politically inert base. Such a conception of power cannot account for the possibility of a society rejecting an elite's goals and disobeying its commands, for example.

For their part, structuralists criticise behaviouralists' treatments of power as emphasising individuals' behaviour to such an extent that no concept of community or society is possible. Thus, they argue, behaviouralists have no way to determine whether a specific act of the exercise of power is of any social or political significance. Dahl in particular has been criticised on this point.[10] Since the concern of the present study is ultimately political, this last point merits special attention.

Power and exchange. One solution to the problem of a conceptualisation of power which avoids the disadvantages of both the behavioural and structural approaches is simply to combine the advantages of the two: this study, then, will rely on a behaviouralist conception of power to investigate the creation and exercise of power within a structurally defined or conceptualised elite. Since this approach is so close to that of exchange theory and, more specifically, network analysis, it would be helpful to review the conceptions of power used in these approaches.

In a persuasive argument for integrating the concepts of power and social exchange, Baldwin reviews the

conceptions of power of Dahl and two of the most influential exchange theorists: "if one uses the broad concept of power associated with Dahl, exchange relations appear to be subsets of power relations. For Blau, however, exchange and power are separate and distinct realms; neither is a subset of the other. For Homans, power relations are subsets of exchange relations."[11] Specifically, Blau's concepts of exchange and power are more restrictive: he views exchange as voluntary and power as coercive social relations. Goode, however, shows that coercive social exchange is indeed possible: actors exchange resources, especially compliance, in return for "protection from the use of force," or the avoidance of sanctions."[12]

In such an exchange-theoretical concept of power, power emerges as the inverse of dependence. Thus to the extent actor A controls (i.e., can threaten to withhold) resources which actor B requires and can obtain from no other source, A has power over B. In real, as opposed to abstract, situations, power relationships are seldom one-way exchanges: the fact that two actors are involved in an exchange realtionship is itself suggestive of each actors' perception of a need for something the other controls.

Since the precise nature of the resources at actors' disposal is a result of their locations in networks of social structure, power depends on position in social

structure.[13] Dahl implies very much the same point when he discusses the necessity of "connections" between actors and the actors upon which they would exercise power.[14] Since power is a relation, logic demands that the two ends of a power relation be connected; network analysts concentrate on the exact arrangement of these connections and their implications for the communication of power and other social processes.[15]

An advantage of integrating structural and behavioural conceptions of power is that we can see the "two-way" communication of power within a polity in ways purely structural approaches do not allow. The elite is certainly dependent on the rest of society in certain ways, so the rest of society does have some power with respect to the action of the elite, for example, through threats to depose the elite unless it respects certain social values (e.g., "full employment").

Power and authority. The concepts of political power and political authority are closely related, but must not be confused. Barnard writes that authority is established "from below":

> If a directive communication is accepted by one to whom it is addressed, its authority for him is confirmed or established. It is admitted as the basis of action. Disobedience of such a communication is a denial of its authority for him. Therefore, under this definition the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in "persons of authority" or those who issue orders.[16]

He argues further that an individual will recognise a

directive as authoritative if he finds it applicable to his circumstances and understands its requirements, finds it compatible with the goals of the institution which issued it as well as his own, and is able to comply with it.[17]

Similarly, Raz emphasises the close relationship between authority and legitimacy: "It is common to regard authority over persons as centrally involving a right to rule, where that is understood as correlated with an obligation to obey on the part of those subject to the authority."[18] Like Barnard, he suggests that an institution "has authority" when those who are nominally subject to its directives accept that their own interests are best served by compliance with the authoritative instructions of the institution.[19]

The difference between power and authority is therefore that while power is the capacity to cause action, authority is the capacity to require action. Power, particularly power based on coercion, need not be legitimate to be effective, while authority can only be effective if it is accepted as legitimate. The issuing of directives which are disregarded or disobeyed cannot be considered an exercise either of power or authority.

To conclude, political power is the capacity to control or determine political results. It is, rather, the capacity of one political actor to cause the compliance of another actor, from which compliance would not otherwise

be forthcoming. Put differently, power is the capacity to restrict other actors' options to those which are acceptable to the exerciser of power. This capacity derives from the possession or control of resources which are exchanged to gain compliance. That is, the actors who are the objects of political power exchange their compliance in order to obtain these resources. Actors control specific resources by virtue of their particular location in the social or political structure we are investigating, whether a polity, bureaucracy, family, and so on. And finally, authority is the legitimate exercise of power.

Some Sources of Power in the Soviet Political System

The purpose of this section is to examine briefly how the concept of political power developed above may be applied to the Soviet political system. Recalling the discussion in the introduction of some previous conceptions of power in the Soviet system, we noted that non-compliance with the policy direction of the political leadership is widespread. Within the administrative apparatus itself, this non-compliance takes many forms: "formalism," "localism," "narrow departmentalism," "parallelism," and "inertia" are among those most often singled out for criticism by the political leadership.[20] (These will be discussed in more detail below.) Thus the nearly complete authority of the political leadership to

make policy decisions is by no means automatically accompanied by the political power to see these decisions respected.

The scope of political power. Obviously, if compliance with policy decisions is the most important "result" which the leadership intends to produce, the leadership appears to be quite powerless. Where then is political power to be found in the Soviet system? If we assume that most political power in the Soviet system is to be found among the individuals and institutions comprising the political elite,[21] we can search for its precise locations and sources by asking what results the elite actually does produce. Our definition of political power tells us that whoever has power will exercise it to achieve particular results; these results are the scope of political power.

This study accepts the assumption that the chief "intended result" of the rule of the Soviet political elite (recall that we are concerned here with Soviet politics during the 1970s and early 1980s) is the maintenance of a stable environment for the elite. Here stability simply refers to the security of members of the elite as members of, and their positions within, the elite itself. The point here is simply that Soviet society represents the environment in which the Soviet political elite exists, and that therefore maintaining the social status quo is essential to maintaining the stability of the elite.Bialer writes that "the superstability of

personnel in the middle and late period of Brezhnev's leadership cannot be comprehended as anything other than a deliberate policy of the top leadership followed by their subordinates" and furthermore, implying that acts are indeed accurate reflections of thoughts, that "if there is any single value that dominates the minds and thought of the Soviet establishment from the highest to lowest level, it is the value of order [read: maintenance of the political status quo]."[22] Rigby agrees:

> after a decade of Khrushchev's high-handed methods, constant administrative reorganisations, and switchings and sackings of personnel, Soviet higher and middle-level officialdom wanted nothing more than stability of structures, policies and personnel and a careful, deliberate, consultative style of decision-making.[23]

Other goals, even if more loudly-proclaimed, are of secondary importance except to the extent that failure to attain them puts the maintenance of stability within the elite at risk. These secondary goals pertain largely to relations between the regime and the rest of society, for example the legitimation of the regime's domination of society and the administration of the economy, and will be discussed briefly below. For now, it should be noted that the threats to the security of individual members of the elite stem for the most part from structural conditions that are beyond the influence of individuals, no matter how well-placed within the structure. The organisation of power within the elite must be directed at countering these threats.[24]

The case study presented below in chapter three will provide some specific examples, but for now it is appropriate to point out in general fashion the chief structural factors contributing to the insecurity from which members of the elite, like all Soviet citizens, seek to insulate themselves. These factors may be classified into two groups, i.e., the consequences of either economic or political unpredictability. The Soviet economic system is poorly-suited to react smoothly to fluctuations in either the demand or the supply of production, with the result that shortages and misallocations of resources are common at every level of the economy. At the same time, the emphasis in Soviet-type economies on bureaucratic administration makes specific individuals vulnerable to disruptions in resource distribution which preclude completion of their assigned tasks.[25]

The arbitrary and often ineffective action of the party-state apparatus is a second cause of insecurity among members of the Soviet political elite, and is in many instances due to the shortcomings of the economic system noted above. For example, in their efforts to shield themselves from responsibility for economic failures, officials "reinterpret," i.e., violate or ignore, instructions of their superiors; they submit false reports of their successful implementation of policy; and they exceed their authority, for example by working outside official channels in their efforts to find

alternative sources of supplies.[26] The result is that the higher the level of authority, the more misinformed the officials. Thus "responsible cadres" have no reliable way to determine the extent to which their directives are obeyed. Instructions to subordinates are based on inaccurate information, and are likely to reflect unrealistically high expectations. The more this cycle reinforces itself, the more ineffective is state administration likely to be. Furthermore, the "goal-rational" nature of the administrative system encourages arbitrary behaviour. If goals and results are more important than procedures, then only pro forma, or indeed feigned, adherence to laws and administrative regulations is required of officials.[27] The issue of the need for a "law-regulated state" will be discussed in chapter five; the chief point here is that neither bureaucrats nor their superiors can depend on "recourse to the law" to defend their status within the elite.

The basis of political power. If "stability of cadres" is in fact the chief end to which Soviet political power is directed, what resources are employed to attain this goal? What, in other words, is the basis of the elite's power to maintain its stability? Foremost, of course, is the nomenklatura system of control over appointments to positions in the apparatus. This system effectively determines membership in the elite.[28] Power to manipulate, whether according to formal procedures or informal

patronage, the system of appointment to "elite status" may thus be viewed as a source of power over the elite itself. Stalin's use of the bureaucratic appointment system to reward loyal supporters with promotiton is well known, for example.[29]

An assumption that security of tenure in the apparatus is contingent upon demonstrated competence implies a further source of elite political power. The inefficiencies and structural contradictions of the Soviet economic and administrative systems and the "bureaucratic pathologies" which these contradictions engender make the successful performance of official tasks exceedingly difficult. Widespread, perhaps even universal, failure is arguably inevitable.

For example, Urban suggests that one role of patron-client relationships in the Soviet Union is to solve some of the problems caused by the peculiar nature of political authority there. For now, his argument may be summarised as follows: on the one hand, the regime makes contradictory demands of the populace by saying: "do not let slavish adherence to bureaucratic regulations prevent the fulfilment of plan targets," while at the same time, insisting that all of its contradictory instructions be followed. Everyone is thus guilty of violating at least some of the regime's instructions, yet the regime prohibits (or has until recently) communication or action intended to address the contradictory nature of the

commands themselves. Under these circumstances, patron-client ties linking "enforcers" and "violators" offer a measure of protection to "violators" and give "enforcers" more power to dictate precisely which norms or regulations will be violated and which will be obeyed.[30]

Those individuals within the elite who have the capacity to control the potential consequences of the failures of others thus have considerable power within the system. Indeed, we cannot understand fully the ways political power is created and exercised within the Soviet elite without understanding the informal processes through which members of the elite insulate themselves and each other from the contradictions of the political and economic systems.

The resources exchanged among members of the elite in their efforts to protect themselves and their elite status thus include control over nomenklatura appointments and promotions, information, loyalty or protection, authority, and compliance. Since they are exchanged to subvert or circumvent the functioning of the formal administrative system, the means of exchanging them are generally informal: corruption and patronage. That is to say, our definition of power focusses on the capacity to cause events which would not otherwise occur, the study of political power within the Soviet elite must concentrate on the ways in which its acts deviate from the routine compliance with directives from above.

The means of political power. The "corrupt" exercise of power in the political structure takes many forms.[31] Chief among them is bribery, whether to secure material resources essential to the performance of official duties, or to cause superiors to overlook failure to perform them, i.e., to permit falsified reports to move up within the hierarchy.

This study, however, is more directly concerned with the role of patronage in exercising political power. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is necessary at this point, however, to note that the environment within which political patronage occurs in the Soviet Union is a patrimonial bureaucracy as opposed to a more purely Weberian rational-legal structure.[32] Randall and Theobald contrast bureaucratic with patrimonial administration as follows:

> In place of well-defined spheres of influence, the patrimonial bureaucracy is characterized by a shifting series of tasks and powers, commissioned on an ad hoc basis by the chief or ruler. In the absence of clearcut spheres of influence and regular fixed salaries there can be no unequivocal division between incumbent and office. Accordingly some degree of appropriation of office is endemic in a patrimonial bureaucracy and, in extreme cases of decentralised patrimonialism, all government authority with corresponding economic rights may be treated as a private possession.[33]

It is worth recalling at this point that Meyer characterises the Soviet political elite as "the group which behaves as if it owned the Soviet Union, and which, therefore, in fact does own it."[34] The significance of this distinction for the present study is that the

resources of an office become the resources of its incumbent, which he or she may exploit for personal gain, or for the protection of his or her "possession" of the office itself. This is in fact a definition of political coruption--the misuse of official or state resources for private or personal benefit. Patronage, in turn, is a form of political corruption in which officials use their authority to appoint subordinates or to grant other official favours to establish relationships of indebtedness. The subordinates pay their debts by placing their patron's interests or wishes above the purely disinterested performance of their official duties. In this way, patrons can use the resources of their own office to "buy" other offices and <u>their</u> resources.

Political Power and Regime-Society Relations

Finally, this section will consider briefly some of the implications of the foregoing analysis for the nature of the relationship of the political elite and the rest of Soviet society.

The regime's power over society. If our hypothesis that the chief goal of the Brezhnev-era political elite was the maintenance of stability of the elite itself is correct, it follows that the elite would tend to act as if the "purpose" of the broader Soviet society is to provide a stable environment in which it, the elite, can survive. Such a narrow role implies a certain circumspection in

interaction between elite and society. If the elite's chief demand on society is that it not disturb "stability in cadres," then the cadres themselves need concern themselves only with society's actions which threaten the elite's position "over" society, or their positions within the elite. With respect to the economy, therefore, the elite's maintenance of order requires the correction of structural or systemic flaws only to the extent necessary to prevent the collapse of the status quo. Satisfaction of consumer demands, for example, "need" not be complete; consumers' wants and needs "need" to be satisfied only enough to discourage consumers from acting in ways that would threaten the stability of the elite. This view accounts for the elite's resistance to the variety of economic reforms attempted under Brezhnev. While all manner of indices demonstrated the economy's inefficiency and its capacity for improvement, the elite resisted reforms because any new structures or procedures would have upset the informal system by which the elite manufactured "apparent" economic success necessary to maintain stability in cadres.[55]

If the elite is unwilling to risk its security by attempting systemic reform (economic or otherwise), it must take steps to prevent other parties from advocating such reforms. Therefore, Archie Brown suggests, the elite must maintain three "pillars" of the system by which it dominates Soviet society. These are the concept of the

"leading role" of the Communist Party, "democratic centralism," and repression of alternative viewpoints.[36] Moreover, the claims the party makes of the legitimacy of its occupation of the leading role is significant in this respect. As was noted in the introduction to the present study, no regime can confer legitimacy upon itself, so in view of the Soviet regime's repression of dissent, we must be careful to distinguish legitimating claims from actual legitimacy. White, Cohen, and others suggest that these claims--as to the party's successes in foreign relations and continued vigilance in the face of external threats, the successful attainment of "developed socialism," and so on--serve the function of legitimising not so much the rule of the party, but instead the conservative nature of the party's rule in particular.[37]

Society's power over the elite. Obviously, whatever power the society has to modify the behaviour of the elite is small indeed when compared to the power of the elite. If we recall network analysts' conception of power as the inverse of dependence, however, we can see that the society does have <u>some</u> power. Ticktin, for example, writes of the "negative control" of society over economic production--i.e., workers have no control over plan targets, but they have considerable power to frustrate the regime's attainment of them.[38] Strikes and other such "extreme" tactics have been successful in gaining limited concessions from the regime, but the coercive apparatus of

the state is generally able to prevent the exercise of this form of social power.[39] Finally, although the Brezhnev elite tolerated little discussion or debate outside the elite of policy issues, there were notable exceptions such as the oft-cited debate over pollution of Lake Baikal.[40] And, as Nick Lampert has shown, the regime has been tolerant of, if not always responsive to, individual citizens' complaints of official misconduct--with the important proviso that the complaints refer to individual corruption, not "systemic" corruption.[41]

In this chapter political power has been defined as the capacity of one actor to cause another to act. The exercise of power appears as a relationship among individuals, who exchange the resources at their disposal by virtue of their location within a discrete social structure. Actors exchange resources in order to cause other actors to act in their interest. This conception of power is drawn from behavioural, structural, and exchange theories of social action.

Within the Soviet political elite, actors exercise power over each other and over Soviet society with the chief aim of preserving the socio-political status quo. Power is exercised through manipulation of formal appointments procedures and through the corrupt, i.e. <u>not</u> disinterested, performance of official duties.

Chapter Two: Political Clientelism in the USSR

The first part of this chapter is based on a review of the literature on clientelism.[1] It examines the "dyadic basis" of patron-client relationships, some significant characteristics of patron-client relationships specifically, the roles of patrons and clients, the structural context of patron-client relationships, and the impact of political clientelism on its socio-political environment. The rest of the chapter considers the role and impact of political clientelism specifically in the Soviet Union. It takes into account the place of clientelism in Soviet political culture, then discusses the effects of clientelistic associations on Soviet elite recruitment and in the administration of policy.

Conceptualising Clientelism

Dyads. In its social science meaning, a dyad is simply a distinct social entity consisting of precisely two individuals. The significance of defining a group or relationship as dyadic is simply that to do so stresses as most important the number of people involved, namely two. A dyad is the only species of social group which has no

super-personal existence. The point seems obvious enough--if one person leaves a two-person group, then the group ceases to exist--but it is necessary to emphasise that dyadic groups exhibit characteristics which are unique and of central importance to a thorough understanding of political clientelism. Georg Simmel's work on dyadic relationships is still unsurpassed. He writes that

> the social structure [of the dyad] rests immediately on the one and on the other of the two [actors], and the secession of either would destroy the whole. The dyad, therefore, does not attain that super-personal life which the individual feels to be independent of himself. As soon, however, as there is a sociation [sic] of three, a group continues to exist even in case one of the members drops out.[2]

That dyadic social units have specific characteristics is affirmed by the observation that the addition of a third person to a dyadic group changes the structure and the dynamics of the group entirely, while the addition of a fourth member does <u>not</u> cause further significant changes in the quality of the group.

Simmel has shown that dyadic structures' unique nature results from the fact that dyads cannot, by definition, embody a social framework to which the members of the dyad, <u>as</u> dyad members, are subordinate. In other words, a two-person group cannot develop a structure capable of dominating the two individuals or mediating their intercourse. With no mediating institutional structure to inhibit their interaction, members of a dyadic relationship experience no "disturbance and distraction of

pure and immediate reciprocity."[3]

Dyadic alliances. Lande describes a dyadic alliance as a "voluntary agreement between two individuals to exchange favors and to come to each other's aid in time of need." A favor is an act or object rendered to a specific individual "on terms more advantageous than those that can be obtained by anyone on an ad hoc basis in the market place, or which cannot be obtained on the market place at all."[4] The phrase "to come to each other's aid in time of need" suggests two important features of the dyadic alliance. First, the needs of one party determine the obligations of the other. Second, the expectation of altruism implied in the phrase distinguishes the dyadic alliance from contractual relations. The nature of the relationship requires a partner in a dyadic alliance to exhibit a commitment to the welfare of the other partner, without too exact a calculation of his own sacrifices for his partner's benefit.

Since studies of dyadic relationships emphasise the activity of individuals in society, their most obvious contributions to political analysis are in explaining behavior inconsistent with or inexplicable by group theories or class analysis. In this connection Barnes notes three categories of dyadic relationship of special interest to political scientists:

a) those which cross boundaries between hostile groups, serving thereby to lessen the potential for more open conflict and stabilizing their inequality;
b) those which form part of a dyadic chain which links individuals who could not interact effectively in the absence of such ties, because of gaps of space, culture, socio-economic status, or authority: in other words, brokerage; and
c) those existing entirely within a social class or organization, either enhancing or hindering the cohesiveness of the organization, and either improving or impairing its performance.[5]

It is this third category which is most directly relevant to this study of the Soviet political elite. Furthermore, Lande adds a fourth category, namely dyads established in the absence of effective corporate institutions or organizations. This is an especially important issue for the present study--it is, in fact a basis of the second economy in the USSR and indeed for the important role of political clientelism within the political system. Dyadic relationships requiring trust, and often cemented with bribery, have a very large impact on the distribution of resources outside (ineffective) state institutions.[6] Lande writes that "dyadically structured non-corporate groups may perform tasks which in other societies are performed by discrete [corporate] entities. Insofar as they do this successfully, they lessen the need for the creation of such entities."[7] Indeed, the success of these groups actually inhibits the development of "discrete entities" which would displace them. Lande cites several sets of circumstances under which dyadic groups can perform this

role; two bear repetition here: clientelistic associations can retard political development

> despite the existence of a government, when law is enforced irregularly and with partiality in return for favors supplied through personal connections. Examples of this kind of "corruption" are found in many old and new states.... [and] when the open establishment of voluntary associations is forbidden to some or all sectors of the population.[8]

Dyads and networks. Individuals obviously enter into dyadic relationships with more than one person, and are members of more than one noncorporate group at a time. This simple observation introduces the concept of social network: interconnected dyads, triads, and larger groupings form networks--of people, institutions, or other social actors. Lande's definition of networks as "all individuals who are not totally isolated from each other"[9] is incomplete; a network is a type of social structure: it is not only a collection of individual actors, but those actors and the arrangement of the specific dyadic relationships which link them.

Wellman offers these "analytic principles," or generalisations, about social networks:

1. Ties are usually asymmetrically reciprocal, differing in content and intensity.
2. Ties link network members indirectly as well as directly; hence ties must be defined within the context of larger network structures.
3. The structuring of social ties creates non-random networks; hence network clusters, boundaries, and cross-linkages arise.
4. Cross-linkages connect clusters as well as individuals.
5. Asymmetric ties and complex networks differentially distribute scarce resources.
6. Networks structure collaborative and competitive activities to secure scarce resources.[10]

The political significance of networks rests in their role authority, in restricting or improving communication within organisations, and in encouraging either stability or instability.

Patron-client relationships. The patron-client relationship is a specific--vertical--type of dyadic tie. Like horizontal dyadic ties, patron-client relationships tend to be "whole-person relationships rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds."[11] More precisely, there is general agreement in the extensive literature on patron-client relations that the term properly applies to dyadic relationships which both patron and client have entered voluntarily, in order to advance their own interests; with a direct, "face-to-face" character; in which patron and client possess unequal status, power, or wealth; and in which the exchange between the parties is reciprocal. James C. Scott's definition is the starting point for many discussions of patron-client relationships:

> The patron-client relationship -- an exchange relationship between roles--may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.[12]

The function of the relationship, Eisenstadt and Roniger suggest, is "to combine access to crucial resources... with promised reciprocity, signs of goodwill, elements of

force and respect, solidarity and interpersonal obligations."[13] While there is consensus that patron-client relations are by definition direct, unequal, reciprocal, and voluntary, the literature considers a number of other variables with remarkably less unanimity.[14]

Scott writes of the "resource base of patronage," i.e., the patron's education and skills, property he owns, and property (typically public) he controls indirectly.[15] It is through the exchange of these resources that patrons exercise their power over clients. In addition, Schmidt's research on Colombia shows that an individual's success as a patron depends more on his position or rank than on his personality or any innate skills he may possess.[16]

Stuart describes a patron as a special type of entrepreneur, who seeks to manipulate the social system in such a way as to maximise the value of the resources at his disposal. Patrons, he suggests, amass social credit (i.e., obligate their clients) by interceding on clients' behalf to win them access to resources to which they are already nominally or "officially" entitled, but to which access has been denied.[17] By establishing personal relationships with patrons, clients hope to increase their security in what they take to be a hostile social environment. On this point, Eisenstadt and Roniger write that patrons "attempt to construct a new area of trust in the very central institutional nexus of their respective

societies, and to become institutionalised." By institutionalising patterns of patronage, patrons seek to make their elevated status permanent, thereby reducing their own insecurity.[18]

Furthermore, as Stein and Galt point out, patrons appreciate the importance of clients' and potential clients' sense of insecurity to the maintenance of the status quo and their advantageous positions. Stein asserts that "at the same time that patronage serves as a 'safety valve' for the client, in so doing, it serves as a homeostat for a system of inequality. Patronage requires the very gap which it assists the client in bridging. For surely the patron does not help his client to change the system (or themselves) and thereby abolish the gap."[19]

In his fieldwork in southern Italy, Galt found that patrons actively encourage a distrust of the "official system," or the state bureaucracy, despite the fact that most patrons are themselves bureaucrats. "The maintenance of this image of the official system is extremely necessary to the purposes of those who occupy statuses within it, but who are also links within the network of the real system [i.e., patronage], for it is this image which influences people to turn to patronage."[20]

Eisenstadt and Roniger's research has shown that a necessary precondition for widespread resort in a polity to patron-client relationships is that potential patrons and clients perceive a degree of separation from the

traditional or formal structures which nominally organise their societies. When this sense of the inadequacy of the nominal channels of resource allocation prevails, they write, "strategic resources are then not bonded to corporate units and are converted into legally free floating resources; individuals are drawn into individual-centered coalitions in order to advance their positions in society."[21]

In patronage networks, a client who is himself a patron may use access to his own clients as a resource in negotiations with his patron.[22] More generally, the client is seen as "selling" his compliance and subservience to the patron in return for the patron's assistance and protection. Depending on the extent to which patronage is necessary to overcome scarcity and insecurity, clients will trade more or less of their resources--labour and compliance--in return for the help of a patron.[23] On this point Powell notes that "the needs of the client tend to be critical" and also that "the bargaining power of the patron is by definition greater than that of the client."[24]

It is important to recognise that "patron" and "client" are not people, but roles or functions which people perform. A person may in fact be a patron in one patron-client relationship and at the same time a client in another. This is the basis for brokerage.[25] Although participation in patron-client relationships is a matter

of choice, the role one plays in the relationship is not; it is instead determined by the individual's location in the social structure, and the resources available by virtue of that position.

Clientelistic polities. Clientelism cannot exist separate from any institutional context. The roles of patron and client are determined by status within some institutional framework: without this institutional backdrop, there can be no determination of status, and thus no superior patrons and no inferior clients. It is the ineffectiveness or failure of this institutional framework which encourages resort to clientelism as a remedy. Campbell finds precisely this situation in rural Greece, where the widely-held perception of national government institutions as not only inefficient and arbitrary but "threatening and hostile" leads villagers to seek "an exclusive and particular relationship with persons in power."[38]

This raises the question of clientel-"ism": at what point is it useful to characterise a society, organisation or institution as a clientelistic one? The literature is largely silent on this point. Most conceptions of clientelistic society are little more than vague intimations of the "dominance" therein of patron-client relationships. Without operationalising "dominance," however, these concepts are of little utility. Lande is close to a resolution of this difficulty when he writes

that when institutional relationships "make use of the patron-client model to such a degree that virtually all subordinates are expected to behave, and are entitled to be treated as clients, one may speak of a clientelistic institution."[87] It may seem at first glance that if all subordinates are treated like clients, then none of them in fact is a client. But if we recall his characterisation of patron-client relationships as a type of dyadic alliance in which partners exchange favors, i.e., otherwise unobtainable things, we can see the significance of virtually everyone being a client. As Eisenstadt and Roniger have argued, a clientelistic society is the product of tension between "premises" on the free flow of resources through and within a formal institutional framework and "continuous attempts to limit such free flow." "It is, indeed, this combination of the potential openness of access to the markets with the continuous, semi-institutionalised attempts to limit such free access that constitutes the crux of the clientelistic model."[88] Berman's study of African bureaucratic elites led him to a similar conclusion:

> The individual is effectively related to the political process not through the universalistic role of citizen in the national community, but through being a client of a specific patron. In clientelistic systems, personalism and particularism are not deviations from the norm, they are the norm. We are dealing with a different political universe.[89]

In fact, the elevation of particularism and personalism to the most prominent features of a political

system is perhaps the most significant consequence of political clientelism. As noted above, one of the most important effects of clientelism is the control by a relatively small group of people over access to socially or politically important resources. Clientelism weakens the authority and legitimacy of formal politcal institutions and bypasses the "official" paths of access to the sources of political decision-making. Access to political authority is thus limited to those with direct relationships with the holders of "real," as opposed to "official," authority.

Following Gabriel Almond's conception of system boundaries, Graziano argues that political clientelism blurs the boundary between the social and political systems. He qualifies this point with the observation that "such a boundary is very unevenly maintained: the totalitarian nature of clientelistic politics implies that while many people are excluded from the system, others reach into it directly."[20] Elsewhere he describes a form of clientelism charcterised by some (and not other) groups having "direct unmediated access to political authority--which they treat as a tool for their private aims"--as the "privatisation" of politics.[21]

The second principal effect of clientelism on a polity, closely related to the first, is personalism, defined simply as the reduction of all important political activity to a personal level. Because political success

depends on direct access to persons, not institutions, personal contacts and relationships are immeasurably more important in clientelistic polities. Ideology is de-emphasised, if not ignored. And the formal political institutions which serve as the backdrop, or trellis, for the interweaving of all these "personal" political maneuvers lose both effectiveness and legitimacy. Nathan suggests that one of the most important characteristics of polities in which clientelism dominates is that individuals who seek to participate in political activity do so by "cashing in" on their ties to well-placed patrons.[88] Similarly, Lande's analysis of Philippine politics reveals what he calls the combination of a modern state with a "simple process of favor seeking and favor giving between members of the public and administrative decision-makers." He finds that favouritism undermines impersonal administration of justice and erodes confidence in government, and makes political change dependent (in part) upon "the accident of a particular president's personal views," which he can depend on his clients to consider as equally important as, if not an outright substitute for, government policy.[89]

As in much of the literature on political clientelism, clientelism appears in this discussion as an extension of the patron-client relationship to the level of political systems. A patron-client relationship is a dyadic alliance between individuals who control unequal resources. To the

extent that numerous patron-client relationships interconnect to form clientelistic networks within a political system, the personalism and particularism which characterise the interaction of patrons and clients become increasingly prominent throughout the entire system. In the case of clientelistic systems or institutions, personalism and the obstruction of nominal routes of access to power are so complete that individuals come to place more confidence in informal relationships than in the formal institutions of rule. In this sense, the Soviet political elite is a clientelistic institution. Not all political acts occur between patrons and clients, and not every member of the elite is a patron or client. (Furthermore, it is not the intention of this study to show that the entire Soviet <u>social</u> system is a clientelistic one.) Yet it does appear that a member of the elite must be a client to be <u>assured</u> of access to resources, especially positions within the apparatus, to which he or she may otherwise, by virtue of "formal" qualifications, regulations, or statutes, be entitled. The remainder of this chapter will develop this argument further.

Clientelism in Soviet Political Culture

To repeat, it is not a goal of this study to show that both the Soviet political elite <u>and</u> the society it rules are clientelistic social organisations. We are

concerned here only with clientelism within the political elite. Rigby points out that "political clientelism varies enormously over time and place as to its importance and its role in the political system as whole, and such differences are usually found to depend not only on specificities of political structure but [also] on prevalent norms and practices in the wider society."[84] This section will show that acceptance of and indeed reliance on patron-client relationships and dyadic alliances generally is a part of the political culture of the elite as well as the population from which it is recruited.

Political culture. Parsons' definition of culture as "ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of action, internalized components of the personalities of individual actors and institutionalized patterns of social systems" has had a profound impact on the development of political science.[85] The emergence in the late 1950s of "political culture" as an object of political analysis owes much to Parsons' conceptualisation. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define political culture as "the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population."[86] Likewise, Sidney Verba considers it "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."[87] Processes of socialisation and

interest articulation and aggregation determine the political culture of a specific political system. Socialisation is the process through which individuals acquire or learn political culture. The articulation and aggregation of interests are processes through which political culture mediates the interaction of political actors, such as a state and political interest groups.[38]

Soviet political culture.[39] In examining the values, beliefs, and symbols which comprise political culture in the Soviet Union, we must consider the inheritance of pre-revolutionary political culture and early Soviet attempts at radical social and cultural transformation, as well as current manifestations of political culture.

White has portrayed the tsarist political system as far more dependent on personal power and authority than on institutionalised relationships. This would seem only natural in a regime in which the tsar was considered the personal embodiment of state power. In the "centralised and bureaucractic governing style" of the regime, the tsar retained personal (albeit in most cases indirect, through his chancelry) control over appointments. As Baker concludes, "with the essence of the polity expressed in a person, its mechanisms were necessarily managed on the basis of personal rather rather than legal or constitutional relations."[40]

One result of the combination of personal rule and personal control over the bureaucracy was, as Orlovsky and

others have found, the prevalence of patron-client ties within the regime. Orlovsky identified four bases of these ties: proximity to the tsar or his family; kinship; geographic (that is, upwardly mobile officials brought trusted aides along with them as they were promoted from the provinces to the capital); and institutional ("superiors' success depends upon getting important tasks accomplished, and in the Russian institutional context this was almost impossible without talented and loyal clients").[41] He noted a historical trend toward the emphasis of the second pair over the first, and suggests that the operation of the government would have been "virtually impossible without the practice of such [geographically and institutionally-based] clientelism on a grand scale." Finally, he notes that patron-client ties became more important during the last years of the tsarist regime and even more so within the Provisional Government, where they served to "circumvent blockages."[42]

Given the central control over personnel appointments, the preservation of local autonomy, i.e., the capacity and inclination of local officials to act in the specific interests of their regions or "constituents," depended on the officials' corruption and the poor communications linking them to the capital. White concludes that "Russians were accordingly inclined to regard government as something alien and external to the collectivity within which they themselves lived, and they had little knowledge

of or attachment to the political institutions through which it was conducted."[43]

This aspect of Russian political culture clearly has survived the attempts of the Bolsheviks radically to transform society.[44] Baker attributes the failure of the Bolsheviks' program in general and the persistence of clientelism in particular to the fact that insuring the survival of the regime--i.e., winning the civil war--took precedence over social reorganisation. Therefore the Bolshevik leaders exploited any personal connections they could in commanding the military and in maintaining a degree of order away from the front lines. Furthermore, Baker argues, Lenin's party was simply too small and too accustomed to conspiratorial methods to "impose its mores immediately on a huge society that was indifferent, if not overtly hostile, to them."[45] And as we shall see, the goal of consolidation of power--both of the party over society and within the party itself--remained the primary one of Lenin's and Stalin's regimes.

Turning now to contemporary Soviet political culture, it is clear that personalism remains an important factor in relationships both within the political sphere and in everday life. Simis' account is full of anecdotes suggestive of the importance of "connections" in securing resources (from laundry service to "justice") nominally available but in fact only obtainable through informal or even illegal means, for example.[46] DiFranceisco and

Gitelman likewise found that individuals who regard themselves as politically passive rely on connections, "protection," and bribery to thwart the implementation of policies unfavourable to them.[47] It is especially noteworthy that Verba and Nie consider this form of political "participation" the least threatening to the regime's control over policy formation and the institutions responsible for policy.[48] If the Soviet political leadership shares this view, we may expect the leadership to act to restrict popular political participation to these informal patterns of relationship to the regime; Jowitt finds that this is indeed the case, and concludes that these informal practices

> obstruct the development of a political culture based on overt, public, cooperative, and rule-based relationships. Instead they reinforce the traditional community and regime political cultures with their stress on covert, personalized, hierarchical relationships involving complicity rather than public agreements.[49]

To summarise, the patterns of behaviour described earlier in this chapter as dyadic alliances and patron-client relationships played a central role in the operation of the Russian government and in ordinary Russians' relationships to the government. The Bolshevik revolution changed none of this. That is, while the political and social systems were radically altered in 1917 and thereafter (though not at all in accordance with the revolutionaries' plans), the forces motivating these forms of behaviour remained. These were and are insecurity,

either due to the unpredictability of the economic system or the arbitrary exercise of state or party power. Finally, others have concluded that these informal practices are self-perpetuating in Soviet politics and society, and that they reinforce the "leading" position of the Communist Party apparatus. Because individuals appear to be unable to maintain themselves as members of the elite without relying on clientelistic associations, we may say the Soviet political elite is a clientelistic organisation.

Clientelism in the Soviet Political Elite

Rigby has argued persuasively for the interpretation that patron-client networks became important in Soviet politics from the very earliest days of the revolution, though quite unintentionally so. By early 1919, many of the party administrative cadres were new recruits, without the militant discipline of the more senior members; their influence on the party was to "dilute" the political sub-culture of the party with that of the surrounding Russian society. Rigby shows how these local cadres, largely unsupervised from the center, adopted the work and personnel habits of the administrators whom they had just displaced. As noted above, these habits included the abuse of office for personal material gain, the emergence of antagonistic local cliques, and so on. The solution was to send more

disciplined and experienced party workers from the center out to the periphery to enforce the center's will. The result was that "as the 'appointees' got rid of the formerly dominant [local] officials, they were able to promote new ones in their places who were personally dependent on them and ultimately on support from the centre."[60] Thus were formed, Rigby concludes, the clientelistic chains which Stalin was, already in 1921, manipulating to gain control over local political cadres.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will consider the effects of these clientelistic chains on political mobility and administration, and some possible reasons for their continued role in the political system. It will be argued that patronage unquestionably plays a role in recruitment and advancement within the political elite, although its weight in comparison to other variables (e.g. the qualifications of an applicant for promotion) is impossible to establish on a system-wide basis, and furthermore that patron-client relationships exert a negative influence the implementation of policy when administrators rely on them as a defence against firmly-rooted defects in the economic and administrative systems which diminish the security of their positions within the elite.

Clientelism and elite mobility. A central argument of this study is that attainment and protection of positions within the bureaucratic hierarchy are the primary goals of

the politically active members of the Soviet population. This section will examine the role of patron-client relations in securing these goals.

Patron-client ties are clearly a variable factor in Soviet political mobility. Harasymiw finds that recruitment into the political elite itself is carried out on an individualised, case-by-case basis; the fact that individuals decide whether to admit other individuals into the political elite implies the potential for personal preferences and influence to be a deciding factor. Aspiring members of the elite can promote themselves to a certain extent, but the decision made is whether one will be admitted, not whether one will join. Sponsorship, connections, and patronage have much to do with this decision.[51]

The structure of the nomenklatura system suggests that certain officials--party secretaries and instructors at primary party organisations--will have more opportunities to dispense patronage than others. Party secretaries are responsible for making appointments; it is they who have the power to distribute jobs within the apparatus. Instructors are able to act as brokers in this process. One of their duties is to meet with and gather information on prospective appointees and make recommendations to the party secretary. The impressions made in these face-to-face meetings doubtless have a great impact on the aspirant's career possibilities.[52]

Thus personal contacts have a central role in accession to elite status; higher up in the party structure, it seems much the same process is involved in the promotion of apparatchiki to higher posts. The literature on Soviet succession struggles contains ample anecdotal evidence to this effect.[53] Joel Moses notes that the memoirs of Brezhnev and many of his clients and proteges "lauded the enduring life-long nature of their informal networks and personal associations."[54] His research on Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk cohort illustrates the value to ambitious bureaucrats of well-placed friends. Moses found evidence that officials who had worked or studied with Brezhnev earlier in their careers had significantly better chances of being brought to Moscow: Dnepropetrovsk's representation on the All-Union Central Committee rose from 2 in 1956 to 13 in 1976. Moreover, the absence of a pattern in career specialisation among the cohort suggests that some factor other than technical skills was behind their success. Moses is careful not to overstate the significance of this finding--after all, he warns, his research sample consists of only 24 officials--but the implications seem clear.[55]

Furthermore, two observations illustrate the fact that patronage at the "top" and patronage at the "bottom" of the political hierarchy are related. First, Ronald Hill finds some evidence, albeit ambiguous, that turnover in the administrative cadres in Tiraspol' was influenced by

the succession politics in Moscow in 1965.[56] Second, and more conclusive, is Harasymiw's observation that Komsomol recruitment has declined for a period after each change in the party leadership.[57] This suggests that the individuals responsible for Komsomol recruitment anticipate at least the possibility of changes in Komsomol and CPSU recruitment policy as new a General Secretary pursues his own initiatives or seeks to consolidate his power and authority through manipulation of the composition of the political elite.

Yet, just as patronage is a factor in elite recruitment and advancement, it is surely not the only factor. One of Moses' findings is that there is a definite pattern in the career attributes of the successive holders of certain oblast-level positions.[58] Likewise, McAuley and Miller have each found nation-wide patterns in the composition of union republic political elites.[59] Obviously, these are strong indications that patronage is not the only criterion for promotion within the elite. Furthermore, the fact that trends can be detected in the social origin, gender, etc., of new party members shows that more is at work than purely personal politics.[60] It seems, rather, that patronage is necessary to assure the advancement of individuals who are otherwise qualified (by virtue of technical training, for example, or by virtue of their possession of the particular combination of "social attributes" in vogue) for a given posting.

More precise determination of the relative importance of patronage compared to other advancement variables has proven to be problematical with the information available to western researchers. A study in 1972 by Stewart and several colleagues sought to judge the relative validity in the Soviet case of the "patron-client" and "rational-technical" models of political mobility.[81] They generated a list of patron-client pairs by locating individuals in the central administrative apparatus who had been in the same place at the same time at some earlier point in their careers. Such a data base is required for the sort of quantitative study they were attempting, but demands some methodological concessions that must not be overlooked. Simply put, their assumption that working together causes an automatic patron-client tie to develop is questionable; cadres are just as likely not to get along as they are to hit it off, and it is possible that officials who move up in the same hierarchy are members of rival factions, for example. As Jozsa[82] points out, without an opportunity to confirm the validity of Stewart's list of patrons and clients, it is hard to know how much credibility his conclusions merit.

Willerton's efforts to assess the importance of patronage in the Soviet political elite follows the same general approach as did Stewart and his colleagues.[83] Looking at Politburo and Central Committee membership from 1966 to 1976, he found 150 clients of Politburo members

out of a total of 466 Central Committee members. He concluded that patron-client links are indeed significant in Soviet political mobility, and that clients tend to move faster (whether up or down) through the hierarchy. But his study suffers from the same methodological problems as Stewart's: there simply does not appear to be enough reliable data to validate quantitative studies such as these. Moreover, Willerton is perhaps too ready to make assumptions which support his conclusions more than his data would warrant. For example, he defines positions in the central apparatus as "especially important" to the General Secretary when his data suggest a patron-client link between its incumbent and Brezhnev.[84] A more rigorous plan of research might be to find some way of determining the "important" posts and <u>then</u> looking for clientelistic links to their incumbents.

Until sufficient evidence is available, we must satisfy ourselves with the conclusion that patronage is essential to political mobility in the USSR, though <u>how</u> essential remains unclear. To conclude, we can do no better than to agree with Hill:

> when Mikhail Gorbachev says that 'the Leninist principles of selection, distribution, and bringing up of cadres' are violated, and 'the promotion of workers is allowed on the basis of personal loyalty, servility, and protectionism', we must conclude that this problem is sufficiently widespread to be a cause of serious concern.[85]

Clientelism and administration. If patronage has the impact on the recruitment and advancement of the political

elite argued above, it would be unusual indeed for the administration of policy by the elite not to be likewise affected. However, determining the extent of this impact is even more difficult than weighing the impact of patronage on advancement; in the case of advancement, we at least have some "hard" data: combinations of names, positions, and dates. We must rely entirely upon anecdotal information for an assessment of the function of patronage in administration. It seems clear that "patron" or "client" or both are roles that almost every official must play, but our knowledge of what those roles entail is vague.

To understand the impact of patronage on administration, we must consider the structural factors which encourage the persistence of patronage. The historical roots of khvosty and sheftsvo are clearly evident, but these cannot by themselves explain why patron-client ties are still so important to the system. Bauman argues that the cause of these practices in pre-revolutionary Russian society is still acting to encourage them today when he suggests that the political culture of the Soviet Union is still grounded in "peasant behavioural patterns." More specifically, he notes that contemporary Soviet society, like traditional peasant societies, confronts individuals with a high degree of uncertainty which is best overcome through individual, as opposed to group or institutional, action.**

Uncertainty is indeed very much a part of Soviet administrators' lives; Bialer and Fairbanks call attention to the essentially "shapeless" nature of the bureaucracy, which gives administrative responsibility and accountability an ethereal quality.[87] Shapelessness has both advantages and disadvantages for administrators, however: the disadvantages are clear to those who must rely on goodwill rather than authority to have their directives obeyed, while the advantages are apparent when superiors demand to know what office is responsible for a specific failure. In either case, the value of patron-client ties is obvious: in the former, they provide the goodwill necessary to perform tasks; in the former, they offer protection from blame, even when blame is due. As has been mentioned above, the nature of the system demands that in almost any case, administrators are in some way "at fault";[88] Wintrobe suggests that patronage and the formal hierarchy combine to form "a vertical trust network which substitutes for a system of private property rights."[89] Finally, returning to the issue of advancement, there seems to be no routine, orderly process of promotion from one post to another; certain patterns are apparent,[90] but the system seems to offer no guarantees of consistently upward mobility. Again, the result is insecurity; rationality dictates that administrators take the steps necessary--i.e., seek client status--to insure their survival as successful administrators.

It should be pointed out that the argument offered here is not that patronage exists in the Soviet system simply because of its roots in tradition; rather, the argument is that patronage is prevalent now for many of the same reasons that it was in the predecessors to the contemporary regime, even if the two systems are radically different in many other ways. In other words, to suggest that patron-client ties persist because they have become entrenched is to indulge in circular argument, and that is not the intent here.

After influencing advancement, the most important function of patron-client ties appears to be that of providing "protection" of subordinate clients from responsibility for shortcomings, whether actual or contrived. The role of "family circles" is in many ways similar; patron-client ties permit <u>vertical</u> coordination of activity of the same sort. Fainsod, for example, found evidence in the Smolensk Archive of ties between family circles at several levels of administration throughout the oblast, and linking the oblast to Moscow.[71] At least during Brezhnev's tenure, networks of this sort became remarkably stable; Rigby notes that turnover of cadres was very low under Brezhnev, at least until the last years of his rule when age began to take its toll,[72] and Oliver has shown that what turnover did occur left the established "patron-protege groups" largely intact.[73]

White summarises the various forms of protection and

resisitance to central authority in which patron-client networks engage: in the parlance of Soviet journalists, they include "narrow departmentalism," "usurpation," "parallelism," "formalism," and "localism," among others.[74] Each of these breaches of socialist discipline requires cooperation or collusion at more than one level of administration to be either necessary or successful. It seems clear that the capacity of patron-client networks engaged in such tactics to "deprive the central authorities in Moscow of their ability to control the life of the country," as Moore[75] suggests they have, must be a source of considerable concern to the central authorities, and would in fact explain the apparent preoccupation of General Secretaries with cadres policy, overcoming "corruption," and the like.

To conclude, this discussion of political clientelism has shown that clientelism is a distinctly micro-level phenomenon, which can nevertheless have a fundamentally important role in shaping the nature of political systems or institutions, and indeed the form of individuals' relationships to the political system. In the Soviet case, clientelism is a central component of the political culture; members of the political elite are by no means immune to their socialisation in Soviet society. But processes of socialisation do not explain why administrators continue to draw upon this part of their

political culture with such frequency. For this we must look to the idiosyncracies of the structure within which the elite must operate. As in other clientelistic institutions, Soviet bureaucrats depend on patron-client relationships as one of several informal devices for mitigating the risks inherent in the formal institutional structure.

Chapter Three: Clientelism and Power in Uzbekistan

This chapter presents a case study of political clientelism in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic during the last ten years. It explores the factors encouraging patronage and clientelism in the Uzbek political elite, the dimensions or extent of clientelistic phenomena within the elite, and the effects of these phenomena on elite circulation and policy administration.

The question of the relevance of any lessons learned about Uzbek politics to the larger Soviet context is an important one. As noted in the introduction to this study, a relative windfall of largely anecdotal information about patronage in Uzbekistan has reached the West in recent years. However, it is necessary to make explicit some significant methodological concessions which must be accepted if we are to take advantage of this windfall.

Specifically, it is not possible to isolate the causes of patronage, clientelism, and corruption in Uzbekistan with any certainty. While there are strong arguments to be made for the primacy of center-periphery relations, ethnic and national politics, or the "cotton scandal" (each of

these will be discussed below) in encouraging "negative phenomena" in Uzbek politics, it is suggested here that the most important set of causal factors are systemic. That is, while the peculiarities of the Uzbek case no doubt exacerbated the situation, the primary causes f clientelism in Uzbekistan are the same as the prima causes of clientelism throughout the Soviet Union. This is not simply an effort to force-fit the available data into the mold of the argument we are defending in this study. As will be shown below, the political culture of the Uzbek political elite has come to resemble closely, though clearly not to replicate, the political culture of the Soviet apparatus generally. Furthermore, there is some evidence of cases of corruption and patronage, quite similar to those described below, having occurred in the Russian republic.[1]

With the exception of some secondary sources, the following discussion is based on a review of the all-union and Uzbek republic press from 1982 to July 1989, as translated and annotated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press and Radio Liberty Research Reports, and a review of Moscow News from July 1988 to July 1989. As will be shown in the following pages, Brezhnev's successors have been engaged in an "anti-corruption campaign" which has resulted in the removal and replacement of a large segment of the Uzbek political elite. Soviet all-union and local Uzbek newspapers have reported extensively on the forms

and scope of corruption in which ousted republic officials had allegedly been involved. It is important to remain conscious of the fact that the press accounts on which this case study is based were published with a specific political motive (presumably, to justify a purge of the Uzbek political elite without appearing to be an "anti-native" purge) which is not the same as the motive of the present case study. It seems safe to assume that information relevant to a study of Soviet political clientelism will not be made available to Soviet journalists or Western scholars; nevertheless, from a careful reading of these press reports emerge details of the clienteles republic leaders had established during the last two decades.

In only a small number of cases are specific individuals explicitly identified as patron and client in these press reports. However, the "root" of the corruption in Uzbek politics has officially been described as the "improper selection of cadres"; specifically, "the Leninist principles of promoting cadres on the basis of their political, business and moral qualities are sometimes supplanted by considerations of kinship, place of origin and personal loyalty."[2] Thus when there is evidence of republic officials and their subordinates being related or sharing common backgrounds, speculation that patron-client ties exist is not completely out of place. Still, unless noted otherwise, the patron-client

ties described here are presumed, not proven, to exist.

Background to the Case Study

Geographic and economic considerations. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic shares borders with the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tadzhik, and Turkmen republics and with Afghanistan. The republic is divided into twelve oblasts and the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic. However, at the time of this writing, plans for three oblasts to be abolished and their territory incorporated with neighbouring oblasts during 1989 have been announced.[8] This reorganisation may well be in response to a shortage of qualified oblast-level administrators in the aftermath of the anti-corruption drive, as will be discussed below. Tashkent, the capital of the republic, is the fourth largest city in the USSR, with a population of over two million. Other large cities include Samarkand, Namangan, Bukhara, and Fergana.

Uzbekistan supplies most of the cotton produced in the USSR; it has long been a policy of the Soviet regime to use cotton exports as a source of hard currency revenue. However, Uzbekistan's "internationalist duty" of providing this surplus has been the source of much of the tension that exists between Moscow and Tashkent. So much of Uzbekistan's agriculture, indeed 75% of the republic's arable land, is devoted to cotton production that the republic is dependent for most of its food supply on other

republics. Other problems Uzbek journalists and political leaders have associated with Moscow's insistence on the cotton monoculture include environmental damage resulting from stress on water resources and excessive use of chemical herbicides, the disruption of education as students are seconded to the fields at harvest time, and indeed the political corruption which is the subject of this chapter.[4] Mukhammad Salih, for example, writes that political corruption will remain a serious problem in Uzbekistan as long as the central political leadership in Moscow regards cotton production as the only meaningful measure of the republic's worth.[5] The fact that cotton production targets have indeed been reduced somewhat in recent years suggests that there is at least some sympathy for this view in Moscow, but loyalty to Moscow still seems to require loyalty to cotton.[6]

In 1986, 42% of the population of 18,487,000 was urban; according to the 1979 census, the ethnic composition of the republic's population was as follows: Uzbeks, 69%; Russians, 11%; Kazakhs, 5%; Tartars, 4%; and Tadzhiks, Jews, Karakalpaks, and others, 11%. These figures have doubtless changed, since the rate of population growth among Uzbekistan's Russian population is near zero, while for the republic as a whole it is 2.7% a year.[7] The rapid population growth only aggravates a large labour surplus; Zimmer finds that the response of republic authorities to pressure from Moscow to reduce this surplus

has generally been to slow the pace of mechanisation of agriculture, rather than create new sources of employment.[8]

Ethnic relations between Slavs and Central Asians are strained, though rarely violent; Russians in Uzbekistan are reported to resent their treatment as a minority in the republic, while Uzbeks seem far more aware of their status as a minority within the USSR. Aside from the fact that the great majority of the Russians are part of the urban population, there is little segregation as to residence or employment; the two groups are, however, quite conscious of their cultural differences. The majority of the members of the Uzbek Communist Party are ethnic Uzbeks; moreover, (as of early 1989) most Central Committee members and oblast and raion secretaries are Uzbeks.[9]

Uzbek political culture. One of the handicaps of a case study of politics in Soviet Uzbekistan is that Uzbek political culture and "Soviet" political culture are quite diverse, and indeed in some respects contradictory. A brief consideration of Uzbek culture and its impact on political activity is therefore warranted.

In a preliminary report of their anthropological research among emigres from Uzbekistan, Mars and Altman have outlined some of the "core values" of Uzbek political culture. One of these is an almost obsessive pursuit of control and security. They find an analogy for this

cultural value in the fortress-like construction of traditional Uzbek houses: "those inside have control over the outside--they can monitor the latter while in no way can an outsider get an idea of what happens inside."[10] Another value that is relevant to our study is an ethic of "inconspicuous consumption": it is better to camouflage one's wealth and hide one's good fortune, than to run the risk of inciting the envy or animosity of others. This is an aspect of Uzbek culture that is in direct opposition to one of the chief dictates of traditional Soviet political culture, namely that the Party's success be hailed at every opportunity. The question of how Uzbek members of the Soviet political elite reconcile contradictions such as this is one that the re-centered research of Mars and Altman cannot answer, however.

A third characteristic of Uzbek culture is a tendency not to trust anyone, no matter how secure one's relationships may appear to be. "This is a world," Mars and Altman conclude, "where one cannot trust anyone but oneself." Finally, a fourth aspect of Uzbek culture, closely related to the above three, and which has a bearing on this study, is a predisposition to treat all social relationships as transitory, always subject to reassessment and termination. Mars and Altman find that these aspects of native culture in Uzbekistan have a notable effect on the rules of the republic's second economy. In contrast to their findings on the second

economy in Georgia, for example, they find that in Uzbekistan the inclinations to distrust one's fellows and to constantly reconsider the value of continuing a given relationship cause the second economy to be highly fluid and much less systematised:

> [in Georgia], the value of a proposed partner is assessed in large part on his trustworthiness and on his personal honour and these in their turn are based upon the nature and significance of the support network he can offer to the alliance. In Central Asia individuals stand alone.[11]

All of this suggests that for a network of patronage and corruption of the sort which dominated the Uzbek political apparatus in recent years to sustain itself, either the individuals in the network had to adapt themselves to a new political culture, or ways had to be found to guarantee that relationships would survive constant reassessment. It appears that each of these may have in fact occurred. The vast extent of bribery associated with this network, in the context of a culture which, Mars and Altman have found, considers bribery to be of no utility,[12] suggests both a degree of "learned behaviour" and that an instrument for maintaining the interest of one's partners does indeed exist. Yerezhep Aitmuratov, after having been removed from his position as republic Central Committee secretary for agriculture, told a journalist that

> under [Uzbek First Secretary] Rashidov,... a person didn't have the right to refuse a bribe. "If you refused it, you were half-traitorous. And if you didn't offer a bribe, then you were 100% traitorous."[13]

Clientelism in Uzbek Politics under Rashidov

Rashidov's early career. Sharaf Rashidov was the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party from 1959 until his death in 1983. According to his official obituary, he was born in 1917 in Dzhizak, near Samarkand; he joined the party in 1939, and studied at Samarkand State University then worked as a teacher and newspaper editor until beginning his military sevice in 1941. He did Komsomol and party work at the front until he was seriously wounded, and was demobilised in 1943; the next year he joined the Samarkand oblast party committee. In 1949 he was made head of the UzSSR Writer's Union.[14] Gleason writes that Rashidov, while holding this post, came to the attention of authorities in Moscow as a vocal proponent of Russian language education and "the brotherhood of nations."[15] Perhaps due to his loyalty to Moscow, he was made Chairman of the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet in 1950. The post was largely ceremonial and neither conferred nor reflected a great deal of political power, but it gave Rashidov a more visible platform from which to advocate closer attention to Great Russian interests.

In March 1959, Rashidov became First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. (It is noteworthy that from 1959 to 1961, Khrushchev replaced all the Central Asian republic first secretaries.) That one with no apparent power base

would be named leader of the republic seems a mystery, but Carlisle offers an interpretation that is plausible: Rashidov's appointment came in the midst of a complete reorganisation of the republic's leadership, and the appointment of the pro-Russian, apparently unambitious Rashidov may well have been viewed as a temporary compromise between competing factions in Moscow, Uzbekistan, or both.[16] Rasul Gulmanov, who was at the time head of the Tashkent obkom (and a member of the Uzbek party politburo), offers a slightly different, though not contradictory, explanation. He remembers that the politburo was unable to agree on a choice, so Khrushchev was called. "He asked, 'Who is on the list of candidates?' They read him the list, and Khrushchev responded, 'Of those names I only know Rashidov. We were in India together.' [Rashidov had been in a delegation which accompanied Khrushchev to India in 1955.] That phrase, reported back to the members of the buro, decided their choice." [17]

Rashidov was to hold the post longer than any of his predecessors, and probably longer than anyone had anticipated in 1959. If he had no base of supporters when he became first secretary, he acted effectively to create one: by October 1961, all the members of the Uzbek party politburo had been appointed after Rashidov became First Secretary. The beginnings of a "Samarkand cohort" of cadres born or educated in Samarkand or its neighbouring

oblasts may be seen in these politburo appointments and in others to the Central Committee and obkoms.[18] Nevertheless, as Carlisle points out, Rashidov still had well-placed rivals: Yagdar Nasriddinova, who replaced Rashidov in 1959 as Chairwoman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (and whose husband Sirodzh Nuritdinov had used his position as Tashkent party leader to oppose Rashidov's allies in the republic politburo) and Mankul Kurbanov, promoted in 1961 to Chairman of the Council of Ministers, were both powerful members of the "Tashkent group" which had resisited Rashidov's rise to power.

The final consolidation of Rashidov's position came in the aftermath of the "Pakhtakor incident," a 1969 anti-Russian riot. Simis recounts how Rashidov and his rivals sought to use the Moscow authorities' investigation of the riot to discredit each other.[19] Apparently with Brezhnev's support, Rashidov emerged as the winner: Nasriddinova was "removed" to Moscow to become Chairwoman of the Soviet of Nationalities, while Kurbanov was convicted of bribetaking and sent to prison. They were replaced by Rashidov's clients Matchanov and Khudaiberdyev, respectively. Thus Rashidov and his Samarkand group came by 1971 to dominate the Uzbek political apparatus. Significantly, once Rashidov's consolidation of power was complete, Brezhnev intervened to prevent criminal prosecution of Nasriddinova and to rescind the penalties given Kurbanov. Press accounts have

suggested that Nasriddinova and Kurbanov had protectors in Moscow, including President Podgorny and Minister of Internal Affairs Shchelokov; Brezhnev, having neutralised his client's last major rivals, apparently saw no benefit in prolonging a conflict with their patrons.[20] Through the remainder of Rashidov's tenure as First Secretary, the Uzbek political elite was extremely stable. By the late 1970s, evidence suggested that Rashidov was preparing Asadilla Khodzhaev, another member of the Samarkand group, as his eventual successor

Rashidov's clientele. During Rashidov's tenure as First Secretary a network of patronage and corruption was established which reached from state and collective farms, to raion and oblast party leaders; the republic leadership, and on to Moscow. A Soviet press account calls this network "the supporting column of corruption that held Rashidov up," suggesting that its purpose was to protect the job of Sharaf Rashidov and, indirectly, the subordinates on whom his security depended.[22] As this network has been portrayed subsequently in the press, it concentrated its activity on the production, or rather the non-production, of cotton. According to one of the network's central figures, former Bukhara obkom First Secretary Abduvakhid Karimov, Rashidov's need to impress his superiors in Moscow was the original motivation for creating the network: "To make a name for himself, he forced the republic to produce three years' worth of

output in a single year. He dealt ruthlessly with anyone who opposed him. That is when the deception, report-padding, and machinations began...."[23]

Although this network has usually been described in press accounts as based wholly on corruption of a purely mercenary variety, it is clear that clientelism was perhaps the primary "means" of organising the network. The fact that during Rashidov's tenure "the Leninist principles of selecting cadres" came to be replaced with "considerations of kinship, local favoritism and personal loyalty" is a common theme in accounts of his and his clients' misdeeds.[24] "Trust among cadres" was all the more important in Uzbekistan while the republic's leadership was dependent for its security in office on the help of subordinates in maintaining the fiction of successful cotton production. The subordinates, for their part, followed very much the same patterns at their levels of administration. They filled their staffs with trusted friends and relatives, and used their discretionary powers to advance their own and their clients' interests at the expense of "rigid adherence" to policy or regulations.[25] For the clients' part, "'leaders' promoted in this fashion repaid their debt and, abusing their official position, tried in every way to thank their patrons."[26]

For an indication of the extent of patronage and nepotism in Uzbekistan under Rashidov, we need look no further than the June 1984 plenum of the republic's

Central Committee, during which the drive against Rashidov's "supporting column of corruption" began in earnest. At this single party meeting, dozens of party, law enforcement, and production unit leaders were dismissed. In many cases, the grounds given for dismissal included fostering clientelism. A few examples will serve to illustrate this point. Vakhobzhan Usmanov, the republic's minister of cotton processing industry, was dismissed for, inter alia, "serious mistakes in the selection and placement of cadres." Tukhtamysh Baimirov and Ruzmet Gaipov, first secretaries of the Dzhizak and Kashkadarya oblasts respectively, were sacked for "gross violations of personnel policy." First Secretary Abduvakhid Karimov of Bukhara oblast was also dismissed; he had promoted the oblast's prosecutor and directors of internal affairs agencies, among others, "on the basis of friendship and local favoritism." Ubaidulla Turakulov, first secretary of Dzhizak gorkom, was removed for "putting his own people in responsible positions." Ye. Dadabayev and K. Madaliev, both raikom first secretaries in Namangan oblast, were dismissed for "appointing friends and relatives to responsible positions."[27]

Despite the pervasiveness of patronage and nepotism in the republic's political elite, however, discipline was not automatic. In the apparently rare cases when members of the elite refused to condone corruption or patronage, effective action by patrons was necessary to protect

clients. For example, Mirzaolim Ibragimov, who was in 1976 the First Secretary of the Namangan obkom, was removed from his post. As Ibragimov recalls the incident,

> Rashidov's fury was touched off by my objection to the fact that his minion Adylov had illegally been given 15,000 hectares of land--land simply cut away from three provinces--for the purposes of performing an "agricultural miracle." I was accused of "abuse of key personnel" when several collective farm chairmen were dismissed for report-padding. As a result, without any discussion by the Central Committee, I was removed from Party work.[28]

Ibragimov was made Chairman of the republic's State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports. (In March 1989, however, he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.)

In another case, in 1980 a gorkom first secretary in Bukhara, Ibragim Buriev, complained to the republic leadership that Bukhara oblast's party leader Abduvakhid Karimov was falsifying cotton production reports to hide "serious shortcomings." As noted above, the republic leadership and Rashidov in particular were already well aware of Karimov's activities, and in fact approved of them. For his troubles, Buriev was expelled from the CPSU. Thus disgraced, he left Bukhara and took a job as a factory chief engineer in Namangan. There, Akhmadzhan Adylov (Rashidov's "minion," in Ibragimov's account above) approached Buriev and asked him to be his deputy at the agro-industrial association he headed. Given Adylov's close connections to both Rashidov and Karimov, it is very unlikely he knew nothing of Buriev's history. It is

possible that Adylov sought out Buriev because he or his colleagues thought someone so dangerous to the clientelistic network in the republic should be monitored; another possibility is that Adylov presumed Buriev had been humbled by his experiences in Bukhara and would be more pliable in the future. At any rate, when Buriev learned of Adylov's corruption and nepotism, he reported him to the republic prosecutor's office. A case was indeed initiated against Adylov, but it was soon dropped. When Buriev refused to recant his accusations against Adylov, he was himself arrested, on the charge that he used a state truck without authorisation when he moved from Bukhara to Namangan.[29] In the years since Rashidov's death, Buriev has been vindicated and in fact since 1986 has been the chairman of an oblispolkom in the republic.[30]

Rashidov's patronage network could not have existed in the absence of support from the central authorities in Moscow, specifically Brezhnev himself. The two men apparently met for the first time in 1961, when Rashidov became a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo.[31] According to Telman Gdlyan, the head of the investigative task force which Andropov sent to Uzbekistan in 1983, "Rashidov's chief protector was Brezhnev. Thanks to their 'special' relationship, Uzbekistan was off limits to criticism."[32] Little has been published about their relationship, though it appears Brezhnev put Rashidov's obsequious manner to good use. Brezhnev attended several

conferences in Tashkent in the late sixties and early seventies, at one of which the following is reported to have taken place, according to a third participant:

> Rashidov vowed to produce more than 5 million tons of cotton a year, to which Leonid Ilyich replied, "Sharaf, my friend, round it off to 6 million!" Rashidov answered: "Six million it is, Leonid Ilyich." The next day, the slogan resounded throughout the republic.[33]

If, as recent Soviet press accounts and former Uzbek officials have asserted, Brezhnev knew that reports of successful cotton plan fulfillment were already based on fraud, why would he call for even higher plan targets? The answer may lie in the fact that Brezhnev's role as Rashidov's "protector" depended on Rashidov needing protection in the first place. That is, Brezhnev's leverage over Rashidov, and indeed Rashidov's over the republic party and state apparatus, would have evaporated if fraud was not necessary in claiming successful plan fulfillment. A Soviet journalist found much the same phenomenon at work in the events which came to light during the "cotton trial," which will be described in greater detail below. "The paradox," he wrote,

> was that all of [the leadership of the Uzbek Ministry of Cotton-Processing Industry] had a secret interest in aggravating the difficulties involved in the procurement of cotton. The worse things got, the better it was for them. The more unrealistic the plan was, and the greater the impossibility of fulfilling it through honest work, the more report-padding took place, giving rise to a chain reaction of embezzlement, and the more remunerative positions with administrative functions became.[34]

If the same considerations did in fact motivate Brezhnev's

upward revision of the cotton target, it is plausible that he sought political loyalty, more than monetary bribes, in return for the protection which he expected to provide.

Brezhnev's protection and sponsorship made it possible for Rashidov to circumvent the procedures and practices by which the central party authorities in Moscow normally sought to control politics and political appointments in the periphery. Typically, second secretaries and the heads of "key" secretariat <u>otdely</u> in the union republics are Russians, appointed directly from Moscow; these "monitors" provide the center with a significant influence over appointments made within the republic. But in the Uzbek case, the officials who held these posts were either Uzbeks or Slavs with long backgrounds in the republic.[85] This in itself is no indication of venality, but it does suggest that the normal procedures for monitoring politics in the periphery were not followed in the case of Uzbekistan.

Timofei Ostetrov, for example, was the last Uzbek republic second secretary appointed before Rashidov's death; he held the post from May 1983 until his retirement in 1986.[86] His career biography includes previous Komsomol, party, and Central Committee inspectorate work, as is typical of republic second secretaries. What is unusual is that Osetrov had been in Uzbekistan as first deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers for thirteen years before moving into the second secretary's

position. While no evidence has come to light suggesting Osetrov was actively involved in any of the Rashidov-era scandals, evidence that he was aware of and tolerated nepotism and corruption has recently been made public.[37] Osetrov's predecessor, Leonid Grekov, was second secretary from 1976 to 1983. He too was not a stranger to Uzbekistan when he began work as the second secretary, having been in the republic since 1971.[38] Likewise, Osetrov's replacement, Vadim Anishchev, had been in Uzbekistan for one year as central committee secretary with responsibility for industry before his promotion to second secretary.[39] Second secretaries of oblast party committees no better in protecting the interests of the central ty apparatus; Ivan Golovachev, for example, the second etary of the Kashkadarya obkom from 1972 until 1984, sacked precisely for "tolerating the abuses and ing the failings" of First Secretary Ruzmet Gaipov.[40]

More important in protecting the Uzbek political elite from unwelcome interference from Moscow was the relationship of Yurii Churbanov to Rashidov and other Uzbek leaders.[41] Churbanov is Brezhnev's son-in-law and was from the early 1970s until December 1984 Deputy Minister, then First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. He consolidated an exceptional amount of power over the republic's leaders by protecting them from prosecution for the bribery, nepotism, and patronage which protected the security of their positions. According to

Yerezhep Aitmuratov,

> His word was law for the republic's internal affairs agencies.... The reason was that the [republic's] leadership enjoyed the confidence of Brezhnev, and his son-in-law was First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. In turn, Rashidov and his entourage [presumably including Aitmuratov] gave the internal affairs agencies protection from criticism and checkups.[42]

As several press reports have pointed out, it was essential to Rashidov's success in maintaining the appearance of plan fulfillment that law enforcement officials turn a blind eye to violations that could not have gone undetected. It fell to Churbanov to insure that laws were not enforced against Rashidov and his clients. For this he needed trusted clients in the republic's internal affairs apparatus. And these he apparently found: at his trial on bribery and extortion charges, his codefendants were all from the Uzbek internal affairs apparatus. Specifically, they were the ex-minister of internal affairs for the republic, two deputy ministers of internal affairs; and the directors of internal affairs for Bukhara, Tashkent, Namangan, Kashkadarya, and Khorezm oblasts. Both Yakhyaev's successor as minister of internal affairs, Kurdat Ergashev, and their first deputy minister, G. Davydov, committed suicide before the start of the trial.[43]

During the trial and in subsequent reports it was revealed that Churbanov and his subordinates in Uzbekistan established an extensive network of bribery and extortion; they demanded and received bribes from oblast leaders,

ministry of cotton processing officials, and farm chairmen in return for which they ignored all the cases of report padding, abuse of position, and violations of personnel policy which came to their attention.[44]

A final note on the "Churbanov affair": there is some evidence that Rashidov and Churbanov were competing for control of the law enforcement network in the time between Churbanov's promotion to first deputy minister and Rashidov's death. The most telling evidence of their rivalry is the replacement in 1979 of republic Minister of Internal Affairs Yakhyaev with Ergashev. Yakhyaev had held the post since 1964, and was almost certainly a client of Rashidov: they both studied at Samarkand State University and began their careers as teachers in Samarkand oblast, and Yakhyaev's advancement within the republic's internal affairs apparatus quickened after Rashidov became first secretary of the republic.[45] Ergashev, on the other hand is described in one press account as "Churbanov's man." Shchelokov, Churbanov's superior, is reported to have ordered Yakhyaev to step down as part of a "truce" between himself and Churbanov; (recall that Shchelokov's special interest in Uzbekistan goes back at least to the early seventies, when he was one of Yadgar Nasriddinova's protectors.)[46] That Yakhyaev continued to enjoy Rashidov's favor is suggested by the fact that even after he was demoted from minister of internal affairs to chairman of the People's Control Commission, he was not publicly

criticised as long as Rashidov was first secretary.[47]

Reasserting Moscow's Control: The Anti-Corruption Drive

By the last years of the Brezhnev and Rashidov incumbencies, the central party apparatus had lost effective control over Uzbekistan to the "patronage apparatus." As was mentioned above, even when the central authorities sought to discipline Rashidov's opponents, Brezhnev intervened. As long as Brezhnev was in power, no effective action against the patronage network was undertaken.

Andropov launched an anti-corruption campaign against the "Brezhnev mafia" soon after he came to power, but Uzbekistan was spared its full force until Asadilla Khodzhaev, Rashidov's apparent choice to be his successor, and then Rashidov himself, died within several weeks of each other in late 1983. The day after Rashidov died, Politburo candidate member Vladimir Dolgikh visited Uzbekistan to call for "the further stepping up" of party organisational and ideological work.[48] Rashidov's successor, Inamzhon Usmankhodzhayev, was promoted from Chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet to the First Secretaryship. With Andropov's obvious support, Usmankhodzhaev moved quickly to replace the rest of the republic's top leadership.[49]

At the June 1984 plenum of the republic Central Committee, Usmankhodzhayev initiated a major purge of the

party leadership.[50] Seven obkom secretaries, two gorkom first secretaries, 15 raion first secretaries,and seven ministers and deputy ministers were among the officials removed. Dzhizak, Bukhara, and Samarkand, from whence a disproportionate number of Rashidov's clients had come, were especially hard-hit. It was in the aftermath of this plenum that the press reports cited above, and numerous similar ones, began to appear with some regularity in the republic and all-union press.

That the campaign is directed against Rashidov's network of clients is beyond dispute, if only for the reason that almost without exception, the republic's political leadership was composed of officials who had "compromised themselves" in their dealings with Rashidov. With the exception of a lull during Chernenko's tenure as CPSU General Secretary, the campaign has continued with considerable energy. So many officials of the republic ministry of cotton processing were convicted or dismissed in the wake of the "cotton trial" which took place in the summer of 1986 that the ministry itself had to be abolished and its responsibilities transferred to the ministry of agriculture.[51] By early 1989, all of the obkom first secretaries were post-Rashidov appointments; 40 of the 65 "Rashidov" obkom secretaries had been dismissed; and all of the Central Committee Secretaries had been replaced. In total, 3000 "employees" and over 250 "officials" had been removed from their posts in

connection with the campaign. Moreover, the proportion of Slavs from outside the republic increased somewhat as the CPSU Central Committee apparently began to reassert some influence over appointments.[52]

But the campaign's success has been disappointing to the Moscow leadersnip. Partly due to a shortage of qualified Uzbeks not tainted by patronage connections, and partly due to the manipulation of appointments by "clients" still in positions of authority, a number of ousted officials have reappeared in the apparatus. Usmankhodzhayev was criticised for not moving fast enough to rid the republic leadership of "negative tendencies" and those who continued to practice them.[53] Finally, in January 1988 he was himself removed from office and charged with accepting bribes. While this last development is indeed ironic, it should perhaps not come as a surpise. After all, Usmankhodzhaev had been one of Rashidov's closest subordinates.

His successor, Rafik Nishanov, spent most of the Rashidov era in the diplomatic corps, and like Mirzaolim Ibragimov, now the Chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, appears to have been "exiled" from politics in the republic for refusing to cooperate with Rashidov.[54] As First Secretary, Nishanov has pursued the anti-corruption campaign with vigor, he has defended the continued dominance of cotton in the republic's economy, and he has carefully balanced the demands of a national leader and

leader of a Soviet Republic.[55] In June 1989, with Gorbachev's backing, Nishanov was elected chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.[56] His replacement as first secretary in Uzbekistan is Islam Karimov; Karimov seems to be free of any ties to scandal, although little is known about his career during the Rashidov era. In 1983, some months before Rashidov died, Karimov was named finance minister of Uzbekistan; from December 1986 until his promotion to republic leadership, he was First Secretary of Kashkadarya oblast.[57]

Since the summer of 1988, a vigorous reaction to the anti-corruption campaign has come from Moscow leaders. Telman Gdlyan, leader of the corruption and bribery inquiry in Uzbekistan and the chief figure behind the prosecution of Yurii Churbanov, announced at the 19th Party Conference in June 1988 that his team had developed cases against four conference delegates whose protection from Moscow meant that "they could in no way be brought to trial."[58] Subsequent reports identified the four as Nazir Radzhabov, Ismail Dzhabbarov, Konstantin Mogilnicheko and Viktor Smirnov. Radzhabov and Dzhabbarov were obkom first secretaries in Uzbekistan and were in fact arrested in November 1988 (though as of this writing not yet tried) for extorting bribes.[59]

Mogilnichenko and Smirnov, however, both worked directly under Yegor Ligachev at the CPSU Central Committee for Party Organisation Work, and both were

actively involved in party personnel matters in Uzbekistan. Gdlyan alleged that both had extorted bribes from Inamzhon Usmankhodzhaev, Rashidov's successor, but were immune to prosecution because they enjoyed Ligachev's protection. Ligachev strongly denied the accusation and went on to accuse Gdlyan and several of his chief lieutenants with numerous "violations of socialist legality" committed during their investigations in Uzbekistan and elsewhere.[60] This latest controversy is not yet resolved at the time of this writing; a special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities is investigating the claims of Gdlyan, Ligachev, and their suppoters, but its report is not expected until mid-1990.

In sum, it appears that as long as Gdlyan and his team were combating bribery, patronage, and corruption in Uzbekistan and among the last survivors of the Brezhnev era in Moscow, Gdlyan enjoyed the praise and support of all quarters of the Moscow political and legal establishments. However, when with the same tenacity that had served him so well in Uzbekistan, he began to challenge Moscow officials not already tainted by ties to Brezhnev, he met with resisitance that may yet prove insurmountable.

The fact that the immense effort to eliminate the network of patronage and protection which Rashidov left behind has met with such decidely mediocre results points

to some of the problems of political power in the Soviet political system. The central authorities cannot be criticised for lack of effort to reassert control over politics in Uzbekistan, and yet they have not succeeded. It appears that the CPSU leadership decided soon after Brezhnev's death (or perhaps before) that the entire Uzbek party apparatus would have to be replaced. But this is far more easily said than done, especially because of the lack of cadres who are immediately available to take the places made vacant in the post-Rashidov purge. A number of officials whose integrity cost them dearly during Rashidov's reign have risen quickly to positions of authority in post-Rashidov Uzbekistan; they appear, however, too be few to affect by their example the changes that the central government wants in the Uzbek political elite's methods of operation. The most recent evidence suggests that Moscow has accepted this fact and is preparing to spend a number of years rebuilding a loyal and incorruptible native elite in Uzbekistan.[81]

This chapter has examined the extent and the impact of political clientelism in Uzbekistan during the rule of Sharaf Rashidov. It has shown how the production of cotton came to be Uzbekistan's main "internationalist duty" with respect to the central government in Moscow; how impossible demands for increased cotton production levels encouraged the republic's state and party officials

to engage in widespread fraud and illegality; and how the vast extent of this fraud greatly increased the vulnerability of individual bureaucrats and officials, so that in turn they required the collusion and mutual protection of almost the entire political apparatus of the republic. The result was a network of patron-client relationships, reinforced by bribery and nepotism, which extended from farm employees, through oblast party and ministerial administrators, to the republic political elite, and indeed on to Leonid Brezhnev himself. There is some evidence that the creation of this network was in fact the motive behind the unrealistic demands placed on the republic's peasants and political officials. Finally, this chapter has shown that after the two main patrons, Brezhnev and Rashidov, died, their clientele remained in place and so far has been surprisingly effective in defending itself against the attempts of the new leadership in Moscow to reassert its control over the republic's political leadership.

Chapter Four: Problems of Power in the USSR

This short chapter represents a synthesis of the concepts and cases presented in the previous three chapters. It has been argued above that in Soviet politics power, i.e., the capacity to "get things done" in the party and state administrative apparatus, is a relational phenomenon which is determined by informal associations established on an individual basis within the formal party and state hierarchies, rather than by status within these hierarchies themselves. In many cases these informal relationships take the form of patron-client relationships, in which patron bureaucrats and their client subordinates exchange protection and sponsorship for information, loyalty, and obedience. It is through relationships of this sort that superiors are able to exercise power over their subordinates, and through which subordinates are able to secure their place within the political elite against a number of threats which are in turn the result of structural inconsistencies. The examination of patronage and corruption in Uzbekistan demonstrates that while the motives for establishing

patron-client relationships within the apparatus are essentially personal, the consequences for the political system as a whole are profound and largely negative. This chapter considers these consequences, which may be divided into two categories: the separation of "formal authority," or the institutions and positions which have a statutorily or administratively-established, "formal" capacity to "require action," and the effective exercise of power, and the consequent delegitimation of the formal authority structure.

The Impotence of "Official" Authority

Chapter two pointed out that one of the most important effects of clientelism in any political system is the control, by a relatively small group of people, of access to socially or politically important resources. Clientelism weakens the authority and legitimacy of formal political institutions and bypasses the "official" paths of access to the sources of political decision-making. Access to political authorities, meaning here the centers of effective political power, is thus limited to those with direct relationships with the holders of "real," or effective, as opposed to "official," authority.

Our case study shows that at least some segments of the Soviet elite quite consciously manipulate the resources of the party and state for their own political or material benefit. The case of Buriev, for example,

demonstrates the manner in which officials used--or misused--the law enforcement and criminal justice systems to punish political opponents, including anyone who threatened the status quo of "protection" and bribery.

Graziano has emphasised the role of clientelism in the misappropriation of political power in other societies.[1] Likewise, Nathan suggests that one of the most important qualities of clientelistic systems is that individuals who wish to engage in political activity do so by "cashing in" on their ties to well-placed patrons.[2] Because successful political action requires direct access to persons, rather than institutions, personal contacts and relationships are vastly more important in clientelistic systems like the Soviet apparatus. At the level of the individual, the situation in the USSR is much like that which Schneider, Schneider and Hansen find throughout Mediterranean Europe, where "fragmentation of power extends, by and large, throughout the social system."[3] Power is reorganised in a "patronage apparatus" and put to personal use, for example in protecting clients from accountability to the "official apparatus" for administrative or economic failures.

From all the foregoing, it seems clear that the institutions in which formal authority resides are largely powerless: "positions" have the "formal authority" to "require action," for example, but have very little capacity to insure subordinates' compliance with directives without resort to clientelism and inducements

distributed through patronage.[4] A local patron uses the authority nominally inherent in his office not for the performance of his "official" duties, but as a means of establishing a "following" which serves both to increase his value to his superiors and also to reinforce his own position--by performing his official duties only for the benefit of his followers or clients, he makes access to authority a rarer and more valuable commodity, which he is of course "selling." Since this corruption of his official position would be impossible without the support or at least passivity of his superiors within the apparatus, he must impede the center's supervision of his activity. The patron therefore seeks a patron of his own at the center who in return for the local official's loyalty thwarts the center's efforts to maintain its control over the local official. It is through this pattern that patronage relationships become institutionalised and supplant formal, legal-rational authority, as was so clearly the case in the relationship between the Uzbek and all-union ministries of internal affairs.

This leads in turn to the development of competing hierarchies of patrons, brokers and clients within the political system. The "broader" these networks become, and the more they are able to marginalise competing networks, the more independent they become of central authority and direction. This again was very clearly the case in Uzbekistan during, and to a lesser degree, since,

Rashidov's rule. One result of this is that political authority has remained highly personalistic, rather than becoming institutionalised as the system matured. In his discussion of the political and social damage wrought by the "bureaucratic deformation of consciousness," Obolonskii emphasises the "indifference to the social meaning, purpose, and consequences of its official activity" and the "replacement... of common state interests by private departmental or corporate (apparatus) interests, and sometimes even by personal interests."[5] Rudinskii adds that this behaviour "discredits Soviet power, undermines its authority in the eyes of the population, and makes it possible for elements of alienation to emerge between the state and the citizens."[6] Breslauer has shown furthermore that under these circumstances, administrators at each level of the system cannot manage their subordinates effectively without the personal loyalty (or affectation thereof) which patron-client relationships engender.[7] Graziano concludes that

> Clientelism, implying as it does a strictly personal use of power, prevents that dissociation between authority roles and their occupants which is the first characteristic of institutionalized authority. Being based on the anti-bureaucratic principle of "regard for the individual," it undermines faith in the "rules of the game" and in the political institutitons which are supposed to enforce such rules....[8]

This phenomenon, of course, reached its apex in Brezhnev's "trust in cadres."

The Undermining of Legitimacy

Another consequence of the separation of power and authority in the administr tive apparatus is that ideology is de-emphasised, if not ignored, except as a legitimating device. That is, the role of ideology is not to guide the actions of party, state, or individual; instead, institutions and individuals use interpretataions of ideology to justify their actions, regardless of actual motive. Walker's semiotic analysis of Marxist-Leninist ideology in particular shows it to be an "empty signifier": "'Marxism-Leninism' provides a singularly stylized and reified form of u[illegible]ertain dimensions to which the CPSU adds its own substantive content."[9] That is, the interpreters of ideology emphasise the immutable teachings of Marx and Lenin as properly understood by party authorities, or, conversely, the "creative" nature of "true" Marxism-Leninism, depending on the requirements of the moment. The primary role of ideology in Soviet politics since Stalin has been not the philosophical guidance of the CPSU and its leadership, but rather the maintenance of something of an apostolic succession from Lenin to the current leader, whose every act is portrayed as at once inspiring and inspired by the development of Leninist ideology.[10] When the ideological underpinnings of the formal institutions of rule are made to be so malleable, the result is that the formal political

institutions of the party and state which serve as the backdrop, or trellis, for the interweaving of all these "personal" political maneuvers, lose legitimacy and effectiveness.

As mentioned above, the question of legitimacy in Soviet-type societies is a complex one. Strictly defined, legitimacy refers not to the set of legitimating claims the regime makes, nor to the means used to communicate them; legitimacy is the degree of acceptance of these claims' validity by the masses. How do we assess this in an environment in which un-acceptance may not be expressed? Nevertheless, speculative assessments of the legitimacy of the Soviet regime have indeed been offered; these suggest that the regime enjoys a certain amount of passive popular support.[11] Other analyses call attention to the fact that in general people avoid dealing with the political system whenever possible, with the result that the passive support the regime receives is insufficient to bestow legitimacy. Vladimir Tismaneanu writes that widespread contempt for politics, and moral pessimism.... Individual and citizen are different entities in these societies."[12] Thus while the population would <u>appear</u> to accept at least some of the regime's claims to legitimacy, at the same time it seems also to reserve the right (and the power) to avoid compliance with the regime's commands whenever they appear to demand more from the population than the regime offers in return. In this connection it is

again useful to recall Gross's description of the Soviet regime as a "spoiler state," ultimately concerned with minimising individuals' options for resistance rather than with maximising their obedience. He argues, and our examination of of Uzbek politics under Brezhnev and Rashidov tends to confirm, that the result is a regime which can "prevent," but cannot govern, social activity.[13]

An entirely different threat to the regime's legitimation is the absence of what Soviet scholars have recently begun to call a "law-governed state" (pravovoe gosudarstvo). Gdlyan placed the blame for the longevity of the "Rashidov mafia" on "the fact that our country's political institutions have failed to ensure legality and to safeguard citizens' rights."[14]

That this is indeed the case is indisputable, but the political dynamics which have produced and maintained this situation are complex. Schapiro has pointed out that although "significant improvement in legal practice took place" after Stalin's death, the party leadership remained above the law and legality itself was still subordinate to the needs of the party.[15] Furthermore, according to Brezhnev-era "socialist legality," "the implementation of a legal norm presumes that the executor of the law will not simply act within the framework of the rules of behavior prescribed by the law but will try to achieve the end the legislative branch had in mind when it established that norm."[16] This presumption confronts administrators,

and indeed all citizens, with a "double bind," or irreconcilable dilemma: whether one achieves assigned tasks or adheres to laws and regulations (as noted in chapter one, it is virtually impossible to do both simultaneously in Soviet politics), he is susceptible to punishment for not having done the other.[17] The result is a thoroughly arbitrary application of law. Brown notes that the resulting opportunities for arbitrary rule and abuse of power remain among the chief problems confronting those seeking reform of the Soviet political system.[18]

An explanation of these aspects of Soviet power must include the role of clientelism in subverting the power of the regime. Graziano suggests that "[c]lientelism prevents the transference of political legitimacy and authority from persons to institutions, thus perpetuating instability; and, as an instrument for co-opting or marginalising potential opposition, it upholds the existing regime whether or not it is legitimate or effective."[19] Here Graziano is discussing the instability of entire systems; the Soviet regime employs repression to insulate itself from the consequences of its immobilism, while individual bureaucrats use clientelistic associations to "uphold the existing regime"-- both its formal and informal aspects-- and their place within it. Clientelism destabilises the system and is at the same time an effective way for

individuals to maximise their own stability or security within it.

Clearly, in this situation, the regime cannot reform or restructure social relations without the cooperation of the subordinate parties to these relations: the members of the political elite and the masses. So long as these supposed "objects" of the regime's power have the de facto options of complying with regime demands or, by turning for protection to the "patronage apparatus," avoiding the regime altogether, the regime cannot compel the compliance of society with demands the latter chooses to ignore. That is, revolution from above cannot be forced on Soviet society; there must be a revolution from below as well.

This is the regime's problem: until now, it has managed to control society without actually having to lead society. Now, the problems regime and society both face are such that strong leadership is necessary to find and implement a solution. In other words, the regime must have the willing cooperation of the masses if it is to keep the system, and its position over it, viable.

Chapter Five: Gorbachev and Reform

This final chapter examines the reform program that has been underway since Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in the light of all that has been examined in the previous four chapters. It argues that while political clientelism is a major obstacle to the reforms Gorbachev has introduced or advocated, certain facets of the program have the potential to reduce the role of clientelism in Soviet politics. Preceding this discussion is a brief consideration of some options in addition to "Gorbachevism," and a review of Gorbachev's program and the successes and failures it has met.

Is There a Solution?

This section will consider some of the options for Soviet policy in the face of the severe challenges which now confront the regime.

"Muddle through." The Brezhnev approach of using increasing investments and borrowing from the west in order to maintain the standard of living without making attempts at (unpredictable, potentially destabilising)

systemic reform had exhausted itself before Brezhnev died. By the early 1980s, Bialer and Bergson had already demonstrated that the Soviet regime could not realistically expect to benefit from the same approach, since the conditions which favoured Brezhnev in the 1970s no longer applied: investment funds had been depleted and the resources for continued extensive development had been exhausted; external pressures (such as Solidarity and Islamic nationalism) had increased, not gone away as Brezhnev apparently hoped they would; and the nature of East-West relations in the early 1980s made the extension of credit from capitalist countries or reductions in military spending highly improbable propositions.[1] Furthermore, the fact that the ineffective Konstantin Chernenko was apparently the ablest representative of this school suggests the extent to which the need for some kind of change was accepted within the leadership of the CPSU.

Increase repression. An option which seems to have more support among Soviet conservatives is to strengthen the military and the police apparatus to cope with heightened internal and external threats to the regime's security. For example, some of Gorbachev's political opponents have sought to blame his loosening of political controls for the outbreak of nationalist tensions and ethnic violence in the non-Russian republics, and have supported the use of the military and the KGB to stifle the expression of nationalist sentiments.[2] This is in fact

a rather passive approach to the problems facing the Soviet regime: it suggests that the best course of action for the regime is to "dig in" and wait for the problems which are not yet threats to the survival of the regime to become so. Increasing the alienation both of Soviet and international society would not appear to offer much promise in the way of actually repairing the structural problems presently afflicting the USSR. Indeed, returning to the issue of "national liberation struggles," it is readily apparent that the problems they present to the central leadership are more deeply-rooted than excessive permissiveness on the leadership's part; to seek a solution to these problems while silencing the people they affect most directly offers little hope for success.

Systemic failure and collapse. Finally, the possibility that the regime will find no solution to the problems it faces and will in fact collapse has been raised. But to remove the "cause" of the problems Soviet society now faces is in no way to solve the problems. It seems unlikely that the CPSU apparatus as an institution would ever "admit failure and stand aside" unless forced to do so; the repressive apparatus which is at present allied with the party apparatus would doubtless make such a collapse exceedingly costly in human terms. That the "leading" role of the CPSU in Soviet politics and society is likely to change in the coming years may well be inevitable and indeed desirable, but for the immediate

future there is simply no alternative authority structure on the horizon to take the place of the party-state apparatus.

Reform. This seems to leave as the only viable alternative some kind of system-wide reform. Various types of these have been discussed in the USSR. Boris Kagarlitsky, a leading figure in what may be characterised as the "left opposition" in contemporary Soviet politics, identifies some of these approaches to reform:

> Some [proponents of reform] merely hoped to force out the Brezhnev "mafia" from leading positions and to occupy the empty seats, while others wished to reinforce the military and political might of the country; a third group dreamed of redistribution of power and rights among departments; a fourth group was sincerely concerned to make Soviet society more free, just, and dynamic. In any event, all were united by the understanding that it was "impossible to go on living in the old way."[3]

If the argument advanced in this study is correct, however, a successful "restructuring" of Soviet society can only be accomplished with the cooperation, the willing compliance, of society with the regime's policies. This suggests that the more cautious, less radical approaches to reform--such "non-reforms" as the replacement of corrupt officials without attacking the factors which encourage corrupt practices, or "economic rationalisation" measures such as the gradual elimination of price subsidies, for example--cannot solve the problems the Soviet regime presently faces. This is true because discussion of reform is by no means a new phenomenon in Soviet politics. For the leadership to gain the confidence

and support of the population, it must make it incontrovertibly clear that "this time" is different.[4]

A Synopsis of the Gorbachev Program

This brief overview of the program of reform initiatives begun under Gorbachev is by no means exhaustive; its purpose is merely to provide a frame of reference for further discussion. It is important to note at the outset that although Gorbachev's reform proposals may be divided into several components, these do not comprise a rigid schedule or set of policy initiatives. As the following paragraphs should make clear, Gorbachev has so far shown considerable flexibility in pursuing systemic reform; he has on numerous occasions allowed that "I can be mistaken on some points--I make no claim to absolute truth. We must search for the truth together."[5]

Economic revitalisation. Gorbachev's earliest reform initiatives concentrated on the acceleration (uskorenie) of economic performance. Implicit in this plan was the view that Gorbachev needed to show some quick improvement in standards of living and economic growth rates in order to gain support for more far-reaching reforms. The plan to accelerate economic performance had two principal components. First was the reliance on "scientific and technical progress" and increased labour discipline (witness the anti-alcohol campaign) to reduce waste and improve productivity.[6] Second was the development of

policies and legislation to increase the independence and responsibility of enterprises in order to alleviate some of the pressure on planning agencies which had clearly demonstrated their inability to direct the national economy.

Aslund's review of the acceleration campaign shows how overly optimistic both the scheme and the reasoning upon which it had been based were. Despite the energy with which the upper levels of the political leadership pursued economic rationalisation, the mobilisation of "hidden reserves" failed to materialise.[7] L. Zile, director of the Latvian Communist Party's Institute of Party History, attributed the failure of this phase of Gorbachev's reform program to the failure to overcome the "braking mechanism," or a combination of structural constraints and "social passivity," which we may define as a reluctance of officials and workers alike to commit themselves to a reform initiative that demanded much but offered little immediate benefit in return.[8]

Glasnost and perestroika. By the time of the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, it had become clear to Gorbachev and his supoorters that more radical steps were required if the reform initiative was to remain alive. In the months preceding the Party Congress, the glasnost drive toward reducing censorship restrictions on the media and on the flow of information generally, was accelerated. This step had three apparent objectives: it demonstrated

the leadership's commitment to far-reaching reform, it allowed the leadership to guage the level of acceptance outside the party apparatus of its reform proposals, and it created an additional source of pressure on the apparatus to pursue reform more energetically. John Battle has observed that "to decrease the alienation gap between government and society, Soviet reformers understood that they must first overcome public apathy and inertia. This could only be accomplished by promoting popular participation in the daily life of the country."[8]

From Gorbachev's perspective, glasnost offers the additional benefit of being a very high-profile initiative which is at the same time more immune to local obstruction or subversion than are policies on economic management, for example. On the other hand, while glasnost is indeed a policy of great novelty and significance for Soviet politics, it is at best a tactical, as opposed to strategic, maneuver: by itself, glasnost solves none of the political or economic problems facing the Soviet Union.

At the 27th Congress itself, not only was glasnost defended and expanded, but the entire reform program reached a turning point. Its focus was explicitly shifted from its earlier primary concentration on economic management and productivity to the restructuring or perestroika of "socio-political relations" through the entirety of Soviet society. Tatiana Zaslavskaya has

described perestroika as "a change not so much in the level of development as in the type of trajectory along which society is moving."[10] Gorbachev himself has said that

> The present perestroika covers not only the economy but also all other aspects of social life: social relations, the political system, the spiritual-ideological sphere, the style and methods of party work, of all our cadres' work. Perestroika is a big word. I would equate it with the word revolution.[11]

The tone of these statements suggests that proponents of reform had concluded that partial reforms, such as economic reform in the absence of broader reformation of the socio-political system, could not succeed. Clearly Gorbachev needed more than simply his authority as leader of the Party to guarantee the implementation of reforms in the face of the opposition they had encountered in the party and state buraucracies. As Patrick Cockburn and Tariq Ali have observed, part of Gorbachev's response has been to foster "a sense of crisis to force through change."[12] Another tactic has been a major initiative to increase the involvement of the masses in the push for reformation.

Democratisation and the rule of law. Having made his call for revolutionary perestroika, Gorbachev had still to solve the problem of how to motivate the citizenry and the party masses to heed the call. This was in fact the main question addressed at the 19th Party Conference in the summer of 1988. Poet Robert Rozhdestvensky, a delegate to the conference, described it this way: "The conference

laid the foundations for the birth of a democratic culture. The chosen few can no longer dominate everything."[13] Gorbachev first raised the idea of convening a party conference at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum, at which the "democratisation" strategy was officially initiated.[14] Election reform, reorganisation of the Supreme Soviet, and the role of "informal mass organisations" were the subjects of lively debate in the months preceding the Conference and at the Conference itself. In his address at the opening of the Conference, Gorbachev placed at the top of the agenda the question of how democratisation could help "to deepen and make irreversible the process of perestroika which was taking place in the USSR under the party's guidance."[15]

The concept of the law-governed state was another issue given special attention at the Conference. According to the "Theses" adopted in the Central Committee in preparation for the conference, "legality, supreme and triumphant, which expresses the people's will, is the pivot of such a state."[16] As is the case with democratisation, the appeal to the rule of law appears to be an outgrowth more of instrumental than philosphical motives. The new emphasis on legality as a way to end the usurpation and abuse of authority by officials who have been practically immune to legal restraint seems to be directed both at increasing the accountability of the apparatus to the law (over which the General Secretary

still enjoys considerable influence) and at increasing mass support for the leadership's policies.

Institutionalisation of Power Relations

This section presents an argument that necessary first steps in any successful reformation of the Soviet political and economic systems are the institutionalisation of political power, the delegitimation of clientelism as a "means" of political power, and finally unrestricted discussion in the USSR of the nature and demands of political legitimacy, and indeed whether the present regime has or can meet those demands. Gill's conceptualisation of institutionalisation bears repetition at this point.

> The key element of institutionalisation is the regularisation of the behaviour of political actors by the direction of their activity into acceptable modes of operation and arenas of action. The level of institutionalisation is high when the scope for action outside institutional channels is limited and very low when few effective institutional constraints are placed upon individual actors to channel their activity into acceptable bounds.[17]

This study has shown that as long as political power is structured in a purely personalistic fashion (albeit within the context of a formal institutional hierarchy), the political leadership will not be able to develop the capacity to motivate, inspire, or encourage the political elite, and indeed the Soviet people, to accept and comply with its policies. The more coercive methods available to

the regime have in the past permitted it to control society, but the demands of the current situation require society's direction, or leadership. The Soviet regime has never (but for World War II) had the capacity to lead the population it rules, and has instead had to settle for control through clientelism and repression.

Our study of political clientelism suggests, however, that political reform of clientelist systems is exceptionally difficult. Not only are reform-minded elites coopted and corrupted, but the population at large generally is not likely to support any changes to the political status quo if they appear to threaten the downward flow of patronage resources. Regimes--such as the USSR's--which are dependent on networks of patron-client relationships for effective extension of control to the periphery and for the preemption of opposition, would most likely resist the sorts of policies that could encourage political (as well as economic) development. Because of this "immobilism" of clientelist systems, reform may well be most likely to succeed when the system has begun to fail to meet the demands of both the elite and the mass.[18]

That the Soviet system has met this criterion for reform is no longer in dispute. The inability of the economic system, for example, to meet the needs of state and society is a topic of debate among the Soviet leadership and in the national press.[19] The essential problem facing Gorbachev's reform initiative is the

mobilisation of the masses in support of a campaign launched by the elite. In this context, Huntington's comments on land reform in developing societies are especially relevant:

> In some instances land reforms may be inaugurated by traditional leaders working within the existing structures of authority. The prerequisite here is a high concentration of power within the traditional system. Typically an absolute monarch supported by elements from his bureaucracy attempts to impose reforms on a recalcitrant landowning aristocracy. Alexander II's emancipation of the serfs, Stolypin's reforms, and the Amin-Arsenjani reforms of 1961-62 in Iran are examples of change imposed through existing political institutions. These instances are the most extreme versions of "land reform from above," and consequently the major problem of such reforms is the mobilization of the peasantry for the sustained action and participation necessary to insure their success.[20]

Interpreted in this light, several aspects of Gorbachev's program of reform appear as means to an end. If Gorbachev is to mobilise the masses to work in support of his restructuring of the Soviet political system, he must first concentrate the political power which Huntington suggests is necessary. This in turn requires the institutionalisation of political power, or rather the "recapture" of power from the elite by the institutions of rule. Thus the "rule of law" is far more than a slogan: Gill cites Lowenthal's conclusion that "legitimacy is generated by a set of institutional procedures which, over time, proves itself capable of producing regularly a competent political elite which will not only act as the guardian of the national interest, but will also be an effective arbiter between the claims of competing group

interests."[21] Without the supremacy of law over the political leadership, the masses are not likely to accept its legitimacy and are consequently unlikely to greet its directives with enthusiastic support.

Likewise, glasnost and democratisation appear to play a role in both the institutionalisation of political power and the mobilisation of society. Without a broader range of "permissible" discourse than was permitted under Gorbachev's predecessors, Gorbachev would have few tools at his disposal for making the apparatus more formally accountable to the General Secretary. By allowing the emergence of a genuine "public" in Soviet politics, Gorbachev has created (or perhaps unleashed) an ally in his conflict with the apparatus. Furthermore, by initiating new procedures for election to (non-party) posts which do more than merely ratify what has been decided elsewhere, and can in fact apparently reject candidates, he has taken a step toward increasing the accountability of the elite. In fact, as Brown has pointed out, if it is indeed the case that party officials who fail to win popular election to local government bodies will lose their party positions, then the newly introduced system of popular elections represents a serious blow to the nomenklatura system. The reassignment of party officials, such as Leningrad party secretary Yurii Solovev, who were defeated in the March 1989 election of delegates to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies may come to

represent an effective popular veto power over party appointments.[88] Boris Yeltsin called for the institutionalisation of this form of popular power in his speech to the 19th Party Conference in June 1988.[89] While it is too early to tell whether such a veto power actually will become institutionalised, the possibility is itself provocative. If patrons within the apparatus cannot guarantee the security of their clients, patronage cannot function and the clientelistic system cannot but collapse.

It seems fair to conclude that, at least at this early stage, Gorbachev's program of reform has the immediate goal of rearranging the formal Soviet political system so that it stands independently of the networks of patron-client relations which have since the early days of the Soviet regime not only coexisted with, but indeed coopted, the "official" hierarchy. This is a step of fundamental importance to the future of any effort to reform the Soviet political system. Until the institutions of the regime--party and state--can be made to be more responsive to the needs (and demands) not only of "civil society," but indeed also the formal political leadership, it seems unlikely that society as a whole will show the willingness to cooperate with the regime which the reforms must have in order to succeed. The problems that the Soviet regime and society face can be solved only through

cooperation; cooperation requires leadership; and leadership in turn requires the effective exercise of power through "authoritative," that is, legitimate, institutions.

Summary and Conclusions

This study has examined the nature of political power in the Soviet Union, and in particular the role of political clientelism as, first, a means of communicating political power, and second, as an obstacle to reformation of the Soviet political system. It has shown that the Soviet political system is a clientelistic one and that the political leadership cannot control the development or reformation of the political system as long as it remains so.

Political Power in the Soviet Context

The study developed a conceptual definition of political power which draws upon behavioural, structural, and social exchange theories of social action: political power is the capacity of one political actor to achieve the compliance of another, when compliance would not otherwise be forthcoming. Power relations structure the exchange of resources, including compliance, which are controlled or possessed by specific actors according to their location within a specific social structure. These

resources are the *basis* of political power; the precise nature of their exchange is the *means* of political power and the result of the exchange, i.e., the resources obtained through exchange, is the *scope* of political power.

In the Soviet political system, political power is found not in exchanges between individuals and political institutions, but rather between individuals within a complex hierarchical structure of institutions of the Communist Party, the state executive, and the hierarchy of legislative bodies. That is, the structure through which political actors exchange (i.e., communicate or exercise) political power is not the "official" structure of the party-state regime, but a secondary, informal structure linking individuals already connected by virtue of their positions in the "official" structure. In fact, according to the concept of power developed here, the formal political system, i.e., the regime per se, has very little political power: its capacity to compel the compliance of society and indeed the political elite with its policies is very limited.

This informal structure is comprised of interconnected patron-client relationships and, though not examined in this study, horizontal dyadic alliances. The resources exchanged in this informal network include sponsorship (i.e., control over nomenklatura appointments), information, protection, loyalty, and compliance, as well

as material benefits such as bribes. The purpose of the exchange--the end to which political power is directed--is to secure the position of the "exchangers" within the Soviet political elite, defined here as the officials whose positions are listed on the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee. The percieved need to act in defence of their position derives from contradictions in the Soviet economic and political systems which preclude the achievement of the tasks by which success and "entitlement" to elite status is judged. One of these contradictions is, in fact, the impotence of the "omnipotent" regime. If the regime possessed the means to gain society's compliance with its policies, the efficiency of the economic system would imporve considerably, and with it the elite's ability to perform its tasks. The means by which power is exercised include patronage and a variety of "corrupt" practices, such as blat, protektsiia, pripiski, and so on.

Political Clientelism in the USSR

Patron-client relationships are vertical dyadic alliances. They are characterised by direct, unequal, and reciprocal exchange. The roles of patron, broker, and client are determined by location in a social structure. Sets of interconnected patron-client relationships form patronage networks. These networks vary in their impact on their institutional context; in "clientelistic

institutions," their influence is such that resources nominally available to an individual by virtue of membership or status within an organisation may in fact only be obtained through the aid of a patron, or conversely, a client.

The Soviet party-state apparatus is a clientelistic institution. Entry to the elite and advancement within it are not governed completely by patronage, but appear to be impossible without it. That is, a member of the elite must act as either a patron or a client (in most cases, as both), but these are not his or her only roles. Clientelism is clearly a part of the political culture of the Soviet Union, inherited so to speak from both Russian and "native" (e.g., Islamic) culture. Insecurity brought about by the contradictions of the economic system and the arbitrary nature of the political system sustain clientelism in contemporary Soviet political culture. Within the political elite, clientelism is a significant influence on elite mobility, although its significance relative to other variables (the candidate's qualifications, the needs of the system, etc.) is difficult to determine, in part because patron-client ties are by definition unique. Clientelism also has a fundamentally important impact on administration of policy within the elite. To the extent that uncertainty and insecurity are inescapable features of the administrative milieu, protection and support transmitted through

patron-client networks act as remedies.

Clientelism in Uzbekistan

A case study of a patronage network in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic illustrates many of the ideas developed in this study. Advancement within the political elite is influenced considerably by personalistic criteria, such as common background (e.g., Rashidov's closest clients were all from Samarkand) or personal loyalty (e.g., Rashidov banished from party work officials who were insufficiently attentive to his and his clients' interests). Assigned impossible tasks, members of the republic elite apparently did not hesitate to claim equally impossible success, depending on solidarity established through patronage connections to "verify" the pripiski they offered their superiors and on the manipulation of the judicial and personnel systems to maintain "discipline" within the network of patrons and clients.

Clientelism is such an integral part of the Soviet political system that it is not easily eradicated. When Brezhnev's successors set out to destroy the network of patronage and protection Rashidov had built, they found it encompassed almost all of the republic elite. Six years and literally thousands of ousted officials later, Moscow loyalists are still encountering not only the practices

Rashidov's network institutionalised, but specific individuals who have so far been protected in their positions; moreover, most of the replacements for ousted officials are themselves connected in some way to the same network their promotion is intended to disrupt. This is suggestive both of the degree to which effective political control depends not on formal institutional hierarchies but on personal ties, such as those linking Brezhnev and Churbanov to Rashidov and his network, and also the capacity of networks such as these to adapt and survive, even after their central figures depart from the scene. This case study suggests that the elimination of clientelism from the Soviet political system will require considerable time; in the absence of profound (and successful) systemic restructuring and the emergence of new dynamics in regime-society relations, the eradication of clientelism appears to be impossible.

Problems of Soviet Power

The continued political development of the Soviet Union, i.e., any increase in the effectiveness of its political instistutions, seems implausible in the absence of profound structural change. Economic inefficiency and the lack of formal control over the political system, even by its leadership, has presented the system with barriers which it cannot, in its present form, surmount. The immobilism of the system during Brezhnev's rule both

reflected and aggravated these systemic contradictions.

Part of the structural change required is the institutionalisation of political power. Unless the institutions of the regime recover the capacity to act as institutions, their formal authority will continue to be largely irrelevant. It is for this reason that the political clientelism which organises political power in the present configuration of the system represents an obstacle to meaningful reform. As long as clientelism limits access to power and makes all politics personal politics, the political leadership cannot reform the system simply by making changes in the organisation of the formal political structure. Reorganisations of this sort are likely to alter the specific "shape" of patronage networks without restoring power to formal structures.

Several aspects of the program of reform currently underway in the Soviet Union appear to offer more hope for success in attacking the problem of patronage. Glasnost and democratisation, by establishing "public" politics in civil society, are steps toward the de-personalisation of politics. Steps to enforce the rule of law likewise seem aimed at eliminating the arbitrary, personalistic character of political power and it exercise. Finally, electoral reform and the transfer of some of the party's responsibility for administration to government institutions may succeed in transferring officials' accountability from their patrons and dependents within

the bureaucracy to society as a whole.

Whether these measures will in fact prove effective against clientelism in the Soviet political elite, however, is difficult to assess. While Gorbachev has accomplished far more since 1985 than most observers predicted, it is also true that many of the problems he has attacked have become more serious in recent years. The most obvious example is the deterioration of the center's ability to control political tensions along the periphery. Every union republic has experienced a degree of ethnic or nationalist "unrest" since 1986. Certainly glasnost has served to bring long-standing but long-supressed tensions to the surface throughout the USSR.

The irony of the situation is that now, perhaps more than at any time since the Revolution, the Soviet leadership needs competent and trustworthy representatives in the localities. The temptation to rely on patronage in deploying these representatives may well prove irresistable. But at the same time, the central leadership must take decisive steps against patronage and clientelism if it is to overcome the systemic contradictions which, this study has argued, make effective governance of the Soviet Union impossible. It is this paradox which has made clientelism so deeply, perhaps permanently, entrenched in the Soviet political system.

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Notes

Notes to the Introduction

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[13] Joseph Galaskiewicz, Exchange Networks and Community Politics (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979): 24.

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[18] Joseph Raz, "Authority and Justification," Philosophy & Public Affairs 14(Winter 1985): 3.

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[20] Stephen White, "Elites, Power, and the Exercise of Political Authority in the USSR," in Elites and Political Power in the USSR, David Lane, ed. (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar: 1988): 275-79. See also A.V. Obolonskii, "The Bureaucratic Deformation of Consciousness and the Struggle against Bureaucratism," Soviet Law and Government 31(Summer 1988): 30-43; idem, "Mechanisms for Regulating Interpersonal Office Relations in the State Apparatus," Soviet Law and Government 25(Summer 1986): 19-32; M.I. Piskotin, "The Soviet Executive," Soviet Law and Government 26(Winter 1986-87): 32-48; and Iu. Sukhotin and V. Dement'ev, "Economic Reform and the Forces of Inhibition," Problems of Economics 31(October 1988): 64-70.

[21] This study follows Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1984): 11-13, in defining the Soviet political elite as those listed on the nomenklatura of the CPSU.

[22] Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): 95, 145. Emphasis added.

[23] T.H. Rigby, "The Soviet Political Executive, 1917-1985," Paper presented at the 3d World Congress on Soviet and East European Studies, Washington, 30 October - 4 November 1985.

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under Lenin and Khrushchev, as might be anticipated--the consequences of elite turnover, however, were doubtless more extreme under Stalin than any other leader. T.H. Rigby, "Political Patronage from Lenin to Brezhnev," Politics [Sydney] 18(May 1983): 84-89.

[25] Herbert S. Levine, "Possible Causes of the Deterioration of Productivity Growth in the Period 1976-80," Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982): 163-68; Ed A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1988): 153-220;

[26] "Government and Shadow Economy in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies 36(October 1984): 528-43; Nick Lampert, "Law and Order in the USSR: The Case of Economic and Official Crime," Soviet Studies 36(July 1984): 366-85; Stephen Shenfield, "Pripiski: False Statistical Reporting in Soviet-Type Economies," in Michael Clarke, ed., Corruption (New York: St. Martin's, 1983): 239-58.

[27] Graeme Gill, "Institutionalisation and Revolution: Rules and the Soviet Political System," Soviet Studies 37(April 1985): 214-19.

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[29] Rigby, "The Soviet Political Executive"; see also idem, "Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin," Soviet Studies 33(January 1981): 3-28.

[30] Michael Urban,"Conceptualizing Political Power in the USSR: Patterns of Binding and Bonding," Studies in Comparartive Communism 18(Winter 1985): 207-26.

[31] George Schöpflin, "Corruption, Informalism, Irregularity in Eastern Europe: A Political Analysis," Südosteuropa 33, Heft 7/8(1984): 389-401; Charles A. Schwartz, "Corruption and Political Development in the USSR," Comparative Politics 11(July 1979): 425-43; Nick

Lampert, "Law and Order in the USSR: The Case of Economic and Official Crime," Soviet Studies 36(July 1984): 366-85; John M. Kramer, "Political Corruption in the USSR," Western Political Quarterly 30(June 1977): 213-24; and Stephen Shenfield, "Pripiski: False Statistical Reporting in Soviet-Type Economies," in Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Control, ed. Michael Clarke (London: Frances Pinter, 1983): 239-58. Each of these studies differentiates corrupt acts undertaken in the course of performing (or concealing the non-performance of) official duties, and acts undertaken purely for personal enrichment.

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[33] Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985): 63.

[34] Alfred G. Meyer, "USSR, Incorporated," in The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views, Donald Treadgold, ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964): 21. [orig. pub. as part of a "discussion" in Slavic Review 20(June 1961): 369-76.]

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[38] Hillel Ticktin, "The Contradictions of Soviet Society and Professor Bettelheim," Critique, no.6, 1976: 17-44; idem, "The Class Stucture of the USSR and the Elite," Critique, no. 9, 1978: 37-61.

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[42] Nick Lampert, Whistleblowing in the USSR: Complaints and Abuses under State Socialism (New York: Schocken Books, 1985).

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[4] Carl Lande, "Introduction: The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism," in Schmidt et al., p. xiv.

[5] J.A. Barnes, "Networks and Political Process," in Local Level Politics, Marc J. Swartz, ed. (Chicago: Aldine, 1968): 109-110.

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[10] Barry Wellman, "Network Analysis from Method and Metaphor to Theory and Substance," Working Paper Series 1B (Toronto: University of Toronto, Dept. of Sociology, 1981): 23-32.

[11] Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," in Schmidt et al., p. 126.

[12] Ibid., pp. 125-25.

[13] Eisenstadt and Roniger, p. 250.

[14] Others include the mobility of the dyad within the social hierarchy, its longevity, and the means of recruitment into the roles of patron and client. See Eisenstadt and Roniger, pp. 163-64; and Scott, "Patron-Client Politics," p. 131.

[15] Scott, "Patron-Client Politics," p. 129.

[16] Schmidt, "The Transformation of Clientelism in Rural Colombia," in idem et al., pp. 309-11.

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[22] Scott, "Patron-Client Politics," p. 130.

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[24] John Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review 64(June 1970): 413.

[25] Jeremy Boissevain, "Patrons as Brokers," Sociologische Gids 16(November-December 1969): 380.

[26] J.K. Campbell, Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community, in Schmidt et al., p. 262; see also Keith Legg, "Political Change in a Clientelistic Polity: The Failure of Democracy in Greece," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1(Fall 1973): 232-37.

[27] Lande, "introduction," p. xxii.

[28] Eisenstadt and Roniger, pp. 167-68.

[29] Bruce Berman, "Clientelism and Neocolonialism: Center-Periphery Relations and Political Development in African States," Studies in Comparative International Development 9(Summer 1974): 17.

[30] Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," in Schmidt et al., p. 373. Graziano's reference to the "totalitarian nature of clientelistic politics" calls attention to the tendency of clientelism to encourage political actors to establish as much personal control over as many different spheres of activity as possible. His use of "totalitarian," then, stressing individual as opposed to institutional motives

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[81] Graziano, "Center-Periphery Relations and the Italian Crisis: The Problem of Clientelism," in Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations, Sidney Tarrow, Peter J. Katzenstein, And Luigi Graziano, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1978): 297-98.

[82] Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP [Chinese Communist Party] Politics," in Schmidt, et al., pp. 383-84.

[83]Carl Lande, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics," in Schmdt, et al., p. 88.

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[85] Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951): 327.

[86] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963): 14.

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[88] Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure, and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science 1(April 1970): 291-305.

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[41] Daniel T. Orlovsky, "Political Clientelism: The Historical Perspective," in Rigby and Harasymiw, eds., pp. 177-79; See also the essays by Orlovsky, Robert Crummey, and Brenda Meehan-Waters in Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, Walter Pintner and Don Rowney, eds. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980).

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[43] White, "Patterns of Autocracy," p. 31.

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[47] Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and 'Covert Participation' in Policy Implementation," American Political Science Review 78(September 1984): 603-21.

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[51] Harasymiw, pp. 159, 25.

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[56] Ronald H. Hill, Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol' (London: Martin Robertson, 1977).

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[6] Ann Sheehy, "Cultivation of Cotton to Remain 'Internationalist Duty' of Uzbekistan," RL 209/88 (18 May 1988).

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[8] David C. Montgomery, "The Uzbeks in Two States: Soviet and Afghan Policies Toward an Ethnic Minority," in Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, ed. William O. McCagg and Brian D. Silver (New York: Pargammon, 1979):147-53.

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[12] Ibid., p. 201; idem, "The Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy," Soviet Studies 35(October 1983): 546-60; idem, "How a Soviet Economy Really Works: Cases and Implications," in Michael Clarke, ed., Corruption (New York: St. Martin's, 1983): 259-67.

[13] Ibid., pp. 200-203.

[14] "The Column," CDSP 40(no. 29, 17 August 1988): 26.

[15] "Rashidov, Uzbek Party Leader, Dies at 65," CDSP 35(30 Novenmber 1983): 9.

[16] Gregory Gleason, "Sharaf Rashidov and the Dilemmas of National Leadership," Central Asian Survey 5, nos. 3/4(1986): 137.

[16] Donald S. Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-1983)," Central Asian Survey 5, nos. 3/4(1986): 111.

[17] Lois Olden, "Rashidov as Leader: Lies and Corruption," RL 367/88(12 August 1988):2-3. Given the treatment of Rashidov in the Soviet press after his death, as suggested by the title of this RL piece, one might expect a member of the Politburo which nominally or otherwise selected him as First Secretary to attempt to distance himself (and indeed, all Uzbeks) from the decision.

[18] Carlisle, p. 127.

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[21] Carlisle, p. 117.

[22] CDSP 40(no. 29, 17 August 1988): 27.

[23] Ibid., p. 26.

[24] "Corruption, Mismanagement in Uzbekistan," CDSP 36(no. 26, 25 July 1984): 6.

[25] "When Unscrupulousness Becomes the System," CDSP 37(no. 8, 20 March 1985): 21.

[26] Partniinaya zhizn', no. 14(1984): 18; cited by Ann Sheehy, "Major Anti-Corruption Drive in Uzbekistan," RL 324/84 (30 August 1984).

[27] Ibid.; "Corruption, Mismanagement in Uzbekistan," CDSP 36(no. 26, 25 July 1984): 1-6, 13-14; "More Uzbek Party, State Officials Replaced," CDSP 36(no. 33, 12 September 1984): 9-12.

[28] "Bring the Land Back to Life," CDSP 41(10, 5 April 1989): 18.

[29] "Good Name," CDSP 38(no. 1, 5 February 1986): 21-22.

[30] "What Was Done After Pravda Spoke Out: 'Good Name'," CDSP 38(30, 27 August 1986): 29.

[31] Carlisle, p. 112.

[32] "Opposition," CDSP 40(no. 27, 3 August 1988): 23.

[33] "The Column," CDSP 40(no. 29, 24 August 1988): 26. Again, this is the recollection of someone with much to gain by placing all the republic's troubles squarely on Rashidov and his superiors.

[34] "Getting Uzbek Cotton," p. 10.

[35] "A New Second Secretary for Uzbekistan," RL 233/83(15 June 1983).

[36] "More Uzbek Officials Are Removed," CDSP 38(no. 2, 12 February 1986): 9.

[37] Julia Wishnevsky, "The Gdlyan-Ivanov Commission Starts Its Work," R-USSR 1(no. 26, 30 June 1989): 1-7; "Gdlyan, Ivanov: Investigators Run Amok?" CDSP 41(no. 20, 14 June 1989): 9-14.

[38] "A New Second Secretary in Uzbekistan," RL 233/83 (15 June 1983).

[39] CDSP 37(no. 14, 1 May 1985): 12.

[40] Sheehy, "Major Anti-Corruption Drive."

[41] Churbanov's case has of course received exceptional coverage in both the Soviet and western media. The best summary of the patronage aspects of the case is found in "Brezhnev's Son-in-Law Goes on Trial," CDSP 40(no. 36, 5 October 1988): 1-5.

[42] Ibid., p. 2.

[43] Ibid., p. 5.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Bess Brown, "Party Personnel Changes in Uzbekistan," RL 52/84 (2 February 1984).

[46] "Brezhnev's Son-in-Law"; "Brezhnev, Podgorny Condoned Corruption."

[47] Brown, "Personnel Changes"; "More Uzbek Party, State Officials Replaced."

[48] "Rashidov, Uzbek Party Leader, Dies."

[49] Brown, "Personnel Changes."

[50] See "Corruption, Mismanagement in Uzbekistan," CDSP 36(25 July 1984); Ann Sheehy, "Uzbek Central Committee Plenum Reveals Widespread Corruption," RL 254/84(28 June 1984); idem, "Major Anti-Corruption Drive in Uzbekistan."

[81] CDSP 37(no. 3, 13 February 1985): 16; CDSP 38(no. 35, 1 October 1986): 17.

[82] Ann Sheehy, "Slav Presence Increased in Uzbek Party Buro and Secretariat," RL 94/86(24 February 1986); John Soper, "Uzbek First Secretary Criticized," RL 162/87(10 April 1987); "Uzbek, Russian Personnel Help Each Otehr," CDSP 39(4 February 1987):10.

[83] "Uzbekistan at a Turning Point," CDSP 39(no. 13, 29 April 1987): 18-19.

[84] "Nishanov Picked as New Head of Uzbek Party," CDSP 40(no. 3, 17 February 1988): 4; Ann Sheehy, "Uzbek Party First Secretary Elected Chairman of Council of Nationalities," R-USSR 1(no. 24, 16 June 1989): 20.

[85] "Cotton to Remain 'Internationalist Duty'"; James Critchlow, "Unmasking of Rashidov Literary Cult Stings Uzbek Writers," R-USSR 1(no. 1, 6 January 1989): 14-15; idem, "How Solid Is Uzbekistan's Support for Moscow?" R-USSR 1(no. 6, 10 February 1989): 7-10.

[86] "Uzbek Party First Secretary Elected Chairman," pp. 19-20.

[87] "New Party First Secretary Chosen in Uzbekistan," R-USSR 1(no. 25, 23 June 1989): 40; Gavin Helf, comp., A Biographical Directory of Soviet Regional Party Leaders: Part II: Union Republic Oblasts and ASSRs (Munich: Radio Liberty, 1988): 23.

[88] CDSP 40(no. 27, 3 August 1988): 14.

[89] "Investigations Continue," Moscow News, 6 November 1988, p. 14.

[90] Yegor Yakovlev, "Gdlyan and Many Others," Moscow News, 21 May 1989, p. 3; "Investigator Says Ligachev Figures in Corruption Probe," R-USSR 1(no. 21, 26 May 1989): 27-28; "Law--Convenient and Inconvenient," Moscow News, 4 June 1989, p. 13; "Investigators Run Amok?"; Wishnevsky, "Commission Starts Its Work,"; idem, "KGB to Take Over Investigation of Organized Crime," R-USSR 1(27, 7 July 1989): 3-5.

[91] "James Critchlow, "Obduracy of Uzbek Cadres"; idem, "Regionalism Revisited: a Panacea for Nationality Problems?" R-USSR 1(no. 16, 21 April 1989).

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[3] Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider, and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," in Friends, Factions, and Followers, Steffen Schmidt et al., eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977): 471.

[4] See S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients, and Friends (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 226.

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[6] F.M. Rudinskii, "Bureaucratism and Problems of Its Eradication," Soviet Law and Government 24(Winter 1985-86): 47.

[7] George Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982): 275-84.

[8] Graziano, p. 169.

[9] Rachel Walker, "Marxism-Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and the Double Bind," British Journal of Political Science 19(April 1989): 177.

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[13] Jan Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988): 236.

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[15] Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Parry of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1964): 582-83.

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[18] Archie Brown, "Political Change in the Soviet Union," World Policy Journal 6(Summer 1989): 476-77.

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