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THE ORIGINS OF INTERVENTION: AMERICA, ITALY, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
COMMUNISM, 1947-1953

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
History

Department of History and Classics

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 2008



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ISBN: 978-0-494-46952-1

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ISBN: 978-0-494-46952-1

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ABSTRACT

By late 1947, the United States identified the situation in Italy as critical. After years of warfare, the Italian state was left in shambles, unable to meet basic needs in the wake of shortages, strikes and market breakdowns. As a result, the Italian Communist Party, (*PCI*) and the Italian Socialist Party (*PSI*) garnered increased support. With a national election set for April 1948, the US had but half of a year to effect significant change in the Italian nation. Not only did the US ultimately see itself as successful in the suppression of the Communists, but they established a precedent of covert and psychological intervention and the Western military and economic framework as a means to support liberal capitalist democracy in Italy and across Europe. The concept of national security was soon stretched to include American interests around the globe. As the definition of national security grew, so too did the tools and concepts that would ensure it.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

- FDP* - *Fronte Democratico Popolare per la libertà, la pace, il lavoro*
PCI - *Partito Comunista Italiano*
PSI - *Partito Socialista Italiano*
PSDI - *Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano*
DC - *Democrazia Cristiana*

POLICIES AND OFFICES

- PPS* - Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State
ORE - Office of Reports and Estimates
NSC - National Security Council
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency, descended from Central Intelligence Group (CIG)
and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
ERP - European Reconstruction Plan, The Marshall Plan
ECA - Economic Cooperation Administration
NAT - North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
(NATO)

INTRODUCTION

“Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP)*, and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”¹

With this brief statement, Cold War strategist and statesmen, George Frost Kennan ushered in the “inauguration of organized political warfare.”² Dated May 4, 1948, the unsigned memo from the Policy Planning Staff within the State Department emerged roughly two weeks after Italian voters re-elected the pro-Western centrist government of the *Democrazia Cristiana (DC)* and Alcide De Gasperi. The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council had an integral role in the *DC* victory—or rather the defeat of the *Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI)* and the rising coalition of the *Fronte Democratico Popolare (FDP)*—mobilizing vast resources and capital in an effort to affect not only the electoral results, but the hearts and minds of average Italian citizens.

Intervention in Italian domestic politics in the run up to April 18, 1948 election represents a watershed moment in American foreign policy for a number of important political, economic and strategic reasons. In tackling the specter of Italian Communism, the American government initiated not only a program of organized political warfare in peacetime; but the institutionalization of political warfare as well. Furthermore, this action set a precedent of strategic response that placed intervention in two phases; first establishing stability for a chosen political entity by means of economic and psychological support, and secondly, acting through that selected group to achieve specific American foreign policy goals.

The emergence of anti-communist sentiment in post-World War II United States contributes to the interpretation of the events of late 1947 and 1948 in Italy. After all, it was fear of the rise of a Soviet backed, Communist Fifth Column that turned American attention towards Italian domestic politics in 1947. As the anti-communist ethos settled into American decision making, the concern over a potential *FDP* victory in Italy took on hyperbolic importance. Italians were not simply voting for the party they thought would best serve to reconstruct their

¹ *European Reconstruction Plan, or Marshall Plan. “PPS Memorandum”, Washington, May 4, 1948. *FRUS* 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, p. 668-672. Unsigned, though attributed to George F. Kennan.

² Ibid.

country and provide basic needs for its citizens following a highly destructive and disruptive war; they were casting a ballot for either democracy or totalitarianism. The election came to be seen as black and white choice for either freedom or domination, involving the emergent Cold War powers of the United States and the Soviet Union.³

In addressing the topic of American involvement in the Italian election of 1948, a number of important issues will be addressed. Firstly, as a result of its actions, the United States reversed a long standing tradition of abstaining from interference in European affairs. Add to this the fact that the US created a peacetime intelligence service capable of projecting American policy goals into foreign countries, and it quickly becomes apparent that a revolutionary paradigm shift was occurring that would alter the economic and political future for not only the *DC*, but the international community as well. Chapter 2 will examine the mechanics and implications of the shift from traditional American isolationism to America as an intervening state.

Indeed, the involvement of the United States in the spring 1948 Italian election stands as a major reversal of American foreign policy. In the period between the First and Second World Wars, Americans evinced a form of isolationism representative of their desire to pull away from European affairs. To be sure, the economic and political instability of the interwar period did much to shape the ideas of those who would be in a position to influence the global community following the end of the Second World War. Economic depression and the failure of Wilsonian political idealism instigated a rethinking of foreign policy as the concept of National Security entered the discourse.

As early as 1942, individuals at the US Department of State turned their attentions to the reconstruction of Italy. Fearing a return to economic depression following the end of fighting, officials were keen to foster the emergence of independent spheres of influence based on reformed market capitalism and the stability of democracies across the globe.⁴ Clearly, the link between economic stability and political security became acutely evident to a number of officials in Washington at this time. A New Deal for Europe was envisioned by many as a means of securing the economic and political benefits such a plan would carry. In the eyes of post-war American planners, democracy and free trade were the means to a general peace and international

³ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, February 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948, III, p. 827.*

⁴ See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford UP, 2005).

stability. However, as enmity between the US and the USSR set in, “[d]emocratic state building gave way to an anti-communist crusade throughout the American spheres of influence.”⁵

Importantly, several key documents of this period would capture the thinking of the time. Kennan’s Long Telegram, the Clifford-Elsey Report, the Truman Doctrine and the resultant European Reconstruction Plan (ERP, or Marshall Plan). Each of these documents carried US policy one step further towards interventionism while entrenching anti-communism as an underlying principle in American Foreign Policy. Indeed, American anti-communism played a major shaping factor in the National Security Act of 1947. Out of this emerged the major components necessary to challenge the *PCI* and international Communism, namely the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, both influenced by the nascent Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. In December 1947, the National Security Council supported the implementation of covert psychological operations with its adoption of NSC 4/A. While supporting covert operations, the document vested responsibility for undertaking such actions in the reluctant hands of the CIA. Covert operations in Italy are thus amongst the first to be carried out by the CIA and define a new era in American interventionism.

Thus, by early 1948, American foreign policy had identified a new course of action for ensuring national security and the national interest. The growing support for Italian Communism in the post-war period instigated a series of events that would ultimately see the country tied into an American-led Western political, economic and military framework. Following a major overhaul of both foreign policy philosophy and institutions, the US set about to influence the direction of the Italian government.

American operations in Italy took the shape of a two phase operation. In the first phase, every effort, both overt and covert, was undertaken to secure victory for Alcide De Gasperi and his US-friendly *Democrazia Cristiana*. The NSC defined a number of these policies and goals in their first series of documents, NSC 1, 1/1, 1/2, and 1/3. To be sure, many have commented on the lack of experience evinced by the newly restructured foreign policy departments—the CIA, State Department and NSC. For this reason, Italy in 1947-1948 stood as a proving ground for postwar policy and operations. Furthermore, integration amongst the various offices in a coordinated effort occurred because of the mix of covert and overt actions. Major departments within the government, including the Treasury and IRS, coordinated such tasks as securing and laundering millions of dollars to fund covert enterprises.⁶ Once the CIA had obtained an

⁵ James E. Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: the Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1986), p. 30.

⁶ See Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. (New York: Doubleday, 2007), p. 27.

untraceable supply of cash, they set out to *buy* the elections through bribery, coercion, corruption and threats. The attack was not limited to the politicians, however.

For perhaps the first time, at least in peacetime, the US targeted the Italian citizenry in a concerted effort to shift the focus of the election from reconstruction issues to a global showdown between oppressive totalitarianism and liberal democracy. Many tactics were employed to bring this message home to the average Italian. From letters and postcards written by average Americans urging family and friends to vote for freedom and democracy to the more aggressive tactics of threatening to withdraw aid and close the American borders to Italian emigration. The message became clear: it was in the best interest of Italians to vote for the American backed *DC* candidates.

Ultimately, the *PCI* led coalition saw defeat at the polls on April 18, 1948. The *DC* returned nearly 49 percent of the vote versus the 31 percent garnered by the Communists.⁷ In Washington, policy makers rejoiced at their new ability to influence a nation without resorting to open conflict. American national security policy and the precedent of covert foreign intervention became accepted by the foreign policy community as effective, if not legitimate, tools in the US arsenal.

With the results of the election wrapped up, policymakers shifted focus to the second phase of the securing of Italy within a US-led western framework. Following the *DC* victory in April 1948, the US recognized their success in the effort. However, the job was not yet complete. Having secured a stable, friendly political party through which to influence the direction the nation took in reconstruction, the US turned to the second phase of the operation. From the summer of 1948 to approximately 1953, the US focused their attention on securing Italy within the Western economic and security framework as symbolized by the efforts to win Italy membership in the North Atlantic Treaty as well as the bilateral trade agreements characteristic of the European Reconstruction Plan. Furthermore, the US attempted to direct reconstruction through the Economic Cooperation Agency and later through the disbursement of so-called “counterpart funds” which represented an equivalent sum of money set aside by the country in their own currency.

American foreign policy turned towards influencing Italian domestic politics through Alcide De Gasperi and the *DC*, as well as continuing to pressure Italian citizens to align with the west. Having helped the *DC* coalition retain power in April 1948, the United States secured a means through which it could attain its policy goals in Italy; namely, resisting Communist

⁷ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, April 20, 1948, FRUS, 1948, III, p. 877.*

aggression in “the most ancient seat of Western Culture”⁸ while establishing stable market based liberal democracy.

In the next phase of the American intervention in post-war Italy, Italian Communism would play a contentious role in relations between Rome and Washington as negotiations towards the inclusion of Italy within the American led post-war economic and security framework continued. Rather than focus on securing power or forcing certain policies on the nation, the US worked through the *DC* to secure reforms, economic growth and social developments as the means to reduce the appeal of communism.⁹ To be sure, there were a number of difficulties in implementing the American economic and recovery plans. Internal Italian disaccord, along with cultural disparities between the Americans and Italians created a number of misunderstandings and gaffes that threatened to undo the securing of Italy.

Negotiations to include the nation within the North Atlantic Treaty were not without a heavy manipulation of the potential Communist threat. American and Italian politicians alike finessed the fear of Communist takeover should short and long term development, trade and other goals fail to find a foothold in international discussions. Of utmost importance was the continuity of the *DC*. Through the party of Prime Minister De Gasperi and later Giuseppe Pella, the US had found a willing, if not zealous partner in the emerging Cold War.

In rebuilding Italy into a strong western ally, leading American economists in the administration were keen to assert their control over decisions being made in Rome. Acting through the Economic Cooperation Agency and other funding sources, the US was able to assert their idea of the types of programs and economic decisions that Italian leaders should be making. In return for their cooperation, the *DC* party enjoyed relative security from threats to the continuity of their power. On a number of occasions, the NSC dictated the steps to be taken to liberate the country and reinstate the *DC*, should the Communists take power.¹⁰ Thus, as long as the *DC* were willing to accept the heavy American involvement in the recovery of their nation, they would remain in a position of power within the country. The next question then, is how the Italian population received the American message. In securing Italy as a strategic partner in the Cold War, the American foreign policy community learned valuable lessons about the importance of satiating the citizens of a nation, in essence, winning their hearts and minds. As one of the earliest actions for both the CIA and NSC, Italy stands as an important test case that

⁸ Consequences of Communist Ascension to Power by Legal Means,” CIA, Office of Research and Estimates, March 5, 1948. in Weiner, *Ashes*, p. 26.

⁹ Mario Del Pero, “The United States and ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Italy, 1948-1955.” *Journal of American History* vol. 87 no. 4 (March 2001), p. 1306.

¹⁰ See NSC 1, 1/1, 1/2, 1/3 as outlining the options the US retained in the event of either legal means or insurrection on the part of the communists.

highlighted the consequence should the US fail in its efforts. After all, the *PCI* was eagerly waiting in the wings for any opportunity to either besmirch the US or most threatening, take power of the government.

One of the major questions to be answered through this work is the effect of the American involvement in Italy. Of interest are the areas of Communist sympathies, perceived American imperialism, and the impact of American actions on European security. Fortunately, access to a series of public opinion surveys from the early 1950s has provided valuable insight into the general state of affairs in Italy. The *Istituto per la ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica*, or *DOXA*, offers a wealth of information from citizens in these areas. Through the five surveys under investigation, it was possible to garner a glimpse of the concerns and issues facing everyday Italians in the period from 1948-1953. More importantly, the American actions/policies are placed under the microscope. It is important to note that each survey had its own sponsor, thus perhaps skewing questions to achieve certain results.

The success of the two-prong plan for economic and political recovery offered by the United States can thus be assessed in terms of the responses contained within the *DOXA* series. While these surveys were perhaps undertaken in an effort to gauge the acceptability of the US presence and its policies, they, in effect, offer the average Italian a voice in the international situation. Furthermore, through the use of statistical software, it was possible to sort variables such as geographic location, age, sex, class, etc. Where relevant, disparities in responses due to geographic location have been highlighted. Additionally, the *DOXA* datasets offer insight into the support for Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and his successor Giuseppe Pella and the pro-American alignment they fought so hard to achieve for their country. Finally, an important benefit is in the range of dates of the surveys; American policies and economics had sufficient time to either achieve their goals or fall short in the eyes of Italians.

The *DOXA* series of public opinion surveys offers insight into how the American program was perceived by the average Italian. A relatively untapped resource, notably absent in many of the secondary works on the topic, the *DOXA* surveys relate how one of the first post-war, peacetime operations by the United States was perceived. Knowledge of what went right and what went wrong for the Americans is invaluable when attempting to apply the same tactics to a different government or location. Thus, the apparent success of the United States in securing Italy as a strategic economic and military ally served to instill a confidence that would see the US repeat covert interventions again and again to achieve their foreign policy goals in the Cold War.

The focus of this work is the impact of the Italian election of April 1948 in sparking American involvement not only in Italy, but in the covert tactics and backroom deals that were

becoming accepted as increasingly necessary in peacetime.¹¹ The traditional American indifference to European affairs was abandoned as planners in Washington realized the implications and responsibilities of securing global interests in the post-War world. The oceans were no longer enough to protect the United States from foreign attack.

When the United Kingdom announced it was unable to continue to support the fledgling states of Greece and Turkey against internal Communist pressures, the United States stepped in to take the lead in the global fight against Communist expansion. A new discourse emerged for many involved in the policy making establishment. The idea of national security and its ties to global economic welfare became evident as the US recognized her global security interests. Thus, events around the world, whether in Greece, Italy, or France, would impact the security of the United States by extension. This new thinking led the US into intervention in Italy as a means of forestalling a Communist foothold in Western Europe.

More importantly, Italy stood as a test case for post-war American policy. As the first covert action for the United States following the Second World War, and indeed, one of the first covert actions for the US in peacetime, involvement in the Italian elections and subsequent actions designed to secure the *Democrazia Cristiana* in power are a benchmark from which all future interventions were based. Judged a success at the time, results in Italy were encouraging to those who would attempt covert actions in Iran and Guatemala shortly after. In fact, the threat of Communist takeover in Italy forced the United States to create a number of precedents that would see covert action continue to have a place in the foreign policy arsenal. From the offices and individuals that would shape post-war foreign policy, to the issues of quietly securing funding, events in Italy forced the hand of the United States into accepting a larger role in international security, which was quickly becoming acquainted with the idea of national security.

The issue of combating Italian Communism in 1948 brought the United States into a new era of interaction with states and their citizens. During WWII, military leaders realized the effect of targeting civilians in controlling the decisions and morale of a nation. With Italy, the United States accepted that there was no longer a distinction between wartime and peacetime as they adopted tactics traditionally abhorrent to American sensibilities. International events elsewhere were indicating an impending and lengthy bi-polar system whereby the US and the USSR fought through proxy wars to make minor gains against each other. Suspecting the USSR of employing

¹¹ See National Security Act, 1947, sections pertaining to the mandate for the CIA in performing covert intelligence operations in peacetime. "National Security Act of 1947," 61 Statute 495 (1947). Extract appears in Athan G Theoharis. (ed.) The Truman Presidency: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the National Security State. (Stanfordville, NY: Earl M Coleman Enterprises, Inc., Publishers, 1979), p. 25-27; (section 102(d)(4) and (5)).

psychological warfare in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, individuals such as George F. Kennan realized that they would have to fight fire with fire so to speak, and adopt what they thought were Soviet methods.¹² In order to keep pace with the Soviets, the US accepted certain new roles and actions that went against its traditional morality, and certainly flew against its long tradition of isolationism. What remains important to contemporary studies is the realization that the Italian public was to be the target of the early American efforts.

¹² See Kennan's Long Telegram in Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992), p. 31.

CHAPTER 1 - AMERICA AND ITALY, 1947-1953: SECURING A NATION: A HISTORIOGRAPHY

Following World War II, Italy was left devastated. Industrial capacity and agricultural production were mere fractions of pre-war levels.¹ The economic and political uncertainty, coupled with widespread infrastructural devastation proved to be a breeding ground for leftist sympathies. On 18 April 1948, Italian citizens went to the polls to determine the fate of their nation. The previous months had seen intense campaigning between the two favorite political parties, each supported by emergent superpowers. Throughout the campaign, the main issue shifted from domestic concerns of reconstruction to an ideological question that would decide how Italy aligned itself in the Cold War world. The forces of the left, namely the *Partito Comunista Italiana (PCI)* and the *Partito Socialista Italiana (PSI)* seized on this trend and formed a coalition, the *Fronte Democratico Popolare (FDP)* in 1947. Government officials and policymakers in Washington were quick to realize the potentially disastrous effect that a democratically elected Communist party in Western Europe would have on the resolve of other nations. As a result, attention and efforts soon turned to securing a victory for a party that would be in line with American policies and economics. Once the Americans succeeded in securing a friendly party, the *Democrazia Cristiana (DC)*, they would set out to influence Italy's post war political and economic alignment through that party.

On Election Day, the American backed *DC* managed to win, despite lagging in the polls leading up to the big day. This was seen as a major victory for American foreign policy as the outcome was influenced in part by covert and overt actions. This was the first American intervention of the postwar period. It was also the first operation directed by the National Security Council (NSC). Despite the initial victory, American and Italian officials would continue to face the specter of Communist influence. Within the historiography of the period, American foreign policy is treated as largely successful in its suppression of the Italian Communists. However, one might call into question how much influence to accord to the American policy makers. Furthermore, we might question the exact nature of the perceived Communist threat, in terms of how real it was and how it may have been manipulated by both sides of the debate.

¹ American planners highlighted restoring employment and production as the first goals of reconstruction. Industrial output following the war was 29% of prewar level, agriculture was 63.3% of prewar levels, 2-3 million Italians were unemployed. The second task was to stabilize the internal monetary situation as wartime price controls collapsed and black markets sprang up to meet essential needs. John Lamberton Harper addresses the American response in John Lamberton Harper, *America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), p. 2-6.

After establishing the origins of the policy, and the debate surrounding it, an overview of the various arguments over American reconstruction efforts in Western Europe is necessary. An outline of the aims and nature of American recovery programs will examine the arguments regarding the benefits and shortfalls of participation. In the next section, the Italian Communist party will receive attention. Issues over how autonomous and how much support was received from the Soviet Union will be discussed as well as the dissolution of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi's cabinet twice in 1947. With the interest in Italy peaked by late 1947, the US turned to the first phase of the Italian operation which was to secure a strategic ally in the *Parlamento Italiano*. Following that, a brief investigation into the origins of Italy's inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty will shed further light on the political manipulation of Italian Communism by both sides as the US sought to lock Italy within an economic and military framework directed from Washington. Finally, in terms of overt action, we can look at the involvement of Italian-Americans and others in anti-communist activities. Ultimately, we will end with a discussion of the public diplomacy surrounding the psychological warfare techniques adopted by the Americans in the battle against the Communist party. Taken together, these issues provide a comprehensive overview of the political, economic, and social dynamic of American foreign policy towards Italy in the years from 1947-1953.

AMERICAN POLICY TURNS TOWARDS INTERVENTION

In order to discuss American foreign policy towards Italy in the postwar period, we must first turn to the trends of American policy leading up to the war. In doing so, we can better appreciate the debates and issues that would arise later on. Through most of the twentieth century, the United States maintained a policy of isolation from European affairs. With the exception of World War I and World War II, Americans preferred the security of geographic distance from the old world politics of entanglement. Obviously, in both cases of world war, the US was provoked into joining the already ongoing conflicts. However, World War I had the effect of reinforcing why isolationism was such a desirable policy. The isolationism that came out of 1919 reflected a new strain of foreign policy. According to Hans Morgenthau in his 1952 article, "What is the National Interest of the United States," the US historically pursued a policy of isolationism, but that it differed from the kind advocated in the twentieth-century.² The Federalist conception of national interest, dating back to the first decade of the country's existence, recognized that US goals in foreign policy were distinct from those of the European

² Hans Morgenthau, "What is the National Interest of the United States?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 282, (July 1952), p. 1-7.

powers. Morgenthau made the distinction that isolationism in the twentieth-century reflected more of an abstention from foreign policy than a conscious decision as under the Federalist conception.³ Moreover, he called on the US to embrace the trend towards a Federalist conception of national interest based on position in the Western Hemisphere, a European balance of power, and an Asiatic balance of Power. Morgenthau argued that intervention in both World Wars was, despite whatever moral or idealistic justifications, based in part on maintaining the European balance of power, as essential to US national security.

With that said we can delve into Morgenthau's call for the United States to embrace the increasing trend towards the foreign policy advocated by the Federalists of the first decade of America's existence. The Federalist conception of foreign policy placed national security at the forefront of policy decisions, as many European nations maintained colonies in the Americas, within striking distance of the newborn republic. The twentieth century conception of national security, as defined by Morgenthau, had two manifestations, both of which denied the intimate link between isolation (read security) and a "discriminating active foreign policy." Manifestations in this regard are either an extreme isolation—almost a withdrawal from foreign policy—or an "unlimited, world-embracing interventionism."⁴ If one were to insert morality into the political decision making, isolationists would see intervention as inherently bad. Conversely, Morgenthau contends that modern interventionists see involvement as a good thing, enhancing the collective security by maintaining a strong balance of power system in the international community. In an interventionist framework, there is no distinction between the interests of the US and those of other nations.⁵ American national interest, Morgenthau claimed, was following a path similar to the Federalist conception. However, he saw the US as "stumbling from one extreme to the other" as the immediate post-war period, emotions and ideology had clouded the true importance of national interest, defined by a secure position in the Western hemisphere, as well as a European and Asian balance of power, as the determinant of "a successful and rational foreign policy."⁶

The Morgenthau article, though more than fifty years old, provides an interpretation of policy in the first half of the twentieth century as well as a recommendation of where to go in the future. He raised an important issue: that of the nature of twentieth-century isolationism within America. Thomas N. Guinsburg attended to the questions over isolationism in his article, "The

³ *Ibid.* p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 6-7.

Triumph of Isolationism.”⁷ Guinsburg admitted to the tradition in American politics, however, he pointed out that “it never signified a posture of hermit-like seclusion...”⁸ Traditionalists like Morgenthau may have seen foreign policy in the first half of the twentieth-century as a pulling away from European affairs. However, revisionists such as William Appleman Williams and corporatists like Michael J. Hogan treat isolationist sentiment in a different light. To these historians, the US was never able to fully divest itself of pursuing what was in its best economic interest. True, American policy sought to avoid political and military entanglements. However, the US pursued “conditions favorable to international economic expansion.”⁹ In this interpretation of twentieth-century isolationism, the US sought to avoid the multilateral bodies that would restrict the freedom to make independent policy. These interpretations of the foreign policy debates provide insight into the interwoven nature of the economic and security motivations of the American response to the perceived threat of the Italian Communist Party.

James E. Miller, in his book *The United States and Italy, 1940-1950*, provided an excellent account of the various hurdles overcome in the years leading up to war and after. He placed the genesis of American interest in Italy within the desire to overcome fascism. According to Miller’s interpretation, the 1930s were dominated by a battle between liberal interventionism and conservative internationalist ideas. In the case study of Italy, there were three principles that informed liberal foreign policy. Wilsonian ideals of free trade, the right to national self-determination, and peace through international cooperation dominated liberal decision making. For the liberalists, the war provided an opportunity to redeem the virtue and benefit of Wilsonianism after its failure following the First World War. A second factor influencing policy was the legacy of the New Deal. Vice-President Henry Wallace was the key figure in calling for the extension of a world New Deal. Following his 1942 “Century of the Common Man” speech, Max Ascoli of the anti-fascist Mazzini society was quoted as saying, “our war aim...is a new deal for the world, the adoption of the main principles and institutions of the American New Deal by the rest of the world.”¹⁰ The third factor in influencing liberal policy approach was anti-fascism. Through stressing antifascism, liberals were hoping to overcome any objections conservatives might have while simultaneously gaining the support of popular

⁷ Thomas N. Guinsburg, “The Triumph of Isolationism,” *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993*, Gordon Martel (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1994).

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 91.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 91.

¹⁰ Max Ascoli, “Notes for the Congress,” n.d., “Mazzini society,” Ascoli Papers, New York, in James E. Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: the Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1986), p. 30.

movements abroad. Miller addressed policy formation through a liberal internationalist argument, stressing that decisions were made on the basis of values and idealism.

There is some mention within *The United States and Italy* about the conservative agenda towards Italy. However, Miller contended that conservative internationalism mirrored many of the same policies advocated by the liberals, referring to an article written by John Foster Dulles for *Fortune* magazine in 1941. In the article, Dulles supported many of the same principles that dominated liberal thinking, mainly those of economic growth without imperialism, disarmament and the Wilsonian principles of freedom of the seas, national self-determination, and support for a world peace organization.¹¹

ISSUES OF RECONSTRUCTION - THE MARSHALL PLAN

After much debate, the interventionists were successful in overcoming isolationist sentiment throughout the US. The next major issue to arise was how to secure the nations of Western Europe within an American framework. The answer to this was the Marshall Plan, outlined in June 1947 by Secretary of State George C. Marshall. In early Cold War history, the Marshall Plan stands as one of the most hotly debated issues. Was it responsible for the division of Europe, as some say? Was it the American intention to exclude the Soviets? Or did the US actually intend to extend the plan for reconstruction to the emerging Soviet bloc? What is clear is that the United States attempted to manipulate the outcome of the 1948 elections by threatening the withdrawal of American aid in the event the Communists were voted in.

Since its inception, the Marshall Plan has drawn mixed interpretations from historians as to its motivations and intentions. Some, like revisionists Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, see the reconstruction plan as nothing more than economic imperialism determined to revive a much-needed Italian market for American goods.¹² In their book, *The Limits of Power*, the Kolkos provided a scathing review of American policy towards Italy in the post-war international crisis. As revisionists, the authors framed their argument within U.S. attempts to control the direction of the international economic system. It was essential to American prosperity that the European markets recover in a position friendly to the United States. Correspondingly, they argued that

¹¹ James E. Miller, *The United States and Italy*, p. 23. Miller does an excellent job of outlining the battles between liberal and conservative internationalists. He focuses on the bureaucracy and partisan politics that took place as America fumbled towards both war aims and plans for the postwar future. His account of the events is balanced and well supported with the documentation available at the time. Also see, "Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948." *Diplomatic History*, vol. 7 (Winter 1983): pp. 35-56.

¹² See Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: the World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972).

U.S. policy towards Italy and the other western European nations comprised something of an economic “imperialism,”¹³ with the Marshall Plan as a major tool in securing empire. In this revisionist conception, the motivations were economic in nature, the policies were imperialistic, and the anticipated outcome was international security based on an American economic model.

The post-revisionist critique on the Marshall Plan emerges with the account provided by Alan S. Milward in his seminal work, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*. Milward called into question the very efficacy of the plan in achieving foreign policy goals. Through his analysis, Milward claimed the plan merely built on existing economic trends.¹⁴ Moreover, he asserted that “quantitative measures of [the Marshall Plan’s] impact on the European economies suggest that its contribution to them was greatly exaggerated by Cold War historians and that it also brought few, if any, of the economic advantages to America which ‘revisionist’ historians suggested.”¹⁵ Milward’s economic argument marginalizes the importance of the Marshall Plan. He concludes that the Marshall Plan may have been a tool in the reconstruction of Western Europe, but to claim “that the gains achieved were so large as to have shaped the politico-economic future of Western Europe is nonsense....”¹⁶ However, others have offered that the importance of the plan was in the psychological lift it gave to the so-called demoralized and impoverished of Italy and other west European nations that threatened to elect Communist governments. These arguments will be discussed later in the section dealing with America and the use of psychological warfare.

Finally, from the post-revisionist perspective John Lewis Gaddis offered a somewhat different analysis of the motivations for the Marshall Plan. Gaddis regarded the plan as intrinsic to national security. A stable and prosperous European community would help avoid the conditions that led to World War II. In *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, Gaddis portrayed the main motivation for American involvement in Europe as heavily influenced by national security concerns. Additionally, Gaddis defended the establishment of what Kolko derides as empire by making an important distinction that Kolko failed to see. First of all, there is a difference between an empire of imposition and an empire of invitation.¹⁷ In the American case, acceptance of the Marshall Plan was akin to an invitation of the American economic system. This is an important distinction to make. The Marshall Plan was, after all, a voluntary

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 147.

¹⁴ Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*. (London: Methuen, 1984).

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 91.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 125.

¹⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 27.

programme in which it was up to the Europeans to coordinate and decide their needs. Unlike Kolko and Milward, Gaddis strayed from the strictly economic arguments behind the ERP, and instead focused on the issue of national security motivations in defending the policies and application of the Marshall Plan to Western Europe. Moreover, Gaddis addressed the importance of ERP in providing confidence and stability for governments under threat of Communist subversion. This is not to say that Gaddis is free from criticism.

In their article, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan”, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe provided a reinterpretation of the Marshall Plan. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe conceded that post-revisionism is a step forward, in that it is able to make use of new archival evidence so that we may actually know more of, (if not the whole) story. However, they also faulted post-revisionism with not providing any new thinking on the subject. They claimed that the post-revisionist charge led by Gaddis was nothing more than a traditional account padded with newly available archival evidence.¹⁸ In the place of post-revisionism, they offered a different take on the European Recovery Program and its role in the events of 1948 and the emergence of a bipolar order. Through their article they countered many of the traditional claims regarding Soviet policies and actions that were supposedly responsible for the failure of a balanced international order. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe held that the shape of the aid program actually limited Soviet options and propelled the Soviet Union into a more antagonistic stance towards the West.¹⁹ Important to our debate, the authors held that Stalin was reluctant to get into a confrontation with the West so soon after the ending of the Second World War.²⁰ Was Stalin’s refusal to return the disputed territory of Trieste to Italy, mere days before the April 18 election, evidence of his reluctance to accept a Communist presence in Western Europe which would then invite an increased American presence? This then begs the question of the extent of the ties and even the extent of the threat to the balance of power. For if Stalin would not aid the *PCI* in taking power, it then follows that they would be attempting to do so on their own. Was the relationship between the Moscow power center and the leadership of the *PCI* as strong as traditionally assumed? Or was the *PCI* afforded some latitude in decision making?

¹⁸ Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 7 no. 1 (Winter 2005), p 99.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 103.

²⁰ The article also points out that this view is supported by “conventionally minded” Vojtech Mastny. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy,” p. 104.

ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

In the historiographical debate over Italy's experience in the Cold War, the position of the *PCI* in relation to the Soviet Union has been widely discussed. Was the *PCI* an autonomous, homegrown Communist party, forged by its role in the resistance to fascism? Or rather, was the *PCI* truly subservient to Moscow, unable to flex its own political muscles? Furthermore, how much influence did the United States have in the ousting of the *PCI* from the De Gasperi coalition government?

In his article, "Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War," historian Silvio Pons traced the links between the *PCI* and the Soviet Union. In his assessment, relations cannot be characterized as simply dominated by Moscow. For him, that traditional interpretation ignores the complex and dynamic nature of the relationship between the *PCI* and the Soviet Union.²¹ Pons is sure to point out that there was indeed a "tight link between Moscow and the West European Communist parties requiring them to subordinate their interest to those of the Soviet Union. However, to assert that complete control resided in Moscow ignores the independence exercised by Palmiro Togliatti and the *PCI*. He pointed to the fact that Togliatti turned down Stalin's request that he head the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties) in order to maintain *PCI* prospects.²² Further, he resisted assigning full authority to Stalin; instead Pons highlights the position of *PCI* leader Palmiro Togliatti in guiding the party through strategic decisions. To be sure, Togliatti's policy of moderation and avoiding civil war through coalitions and alliances mirrored the direction Stalin advocated. Finally, Pons claimed that Stalin's policy towards Western Europe "never seemed directed at installing Communist regimes" as he was more concerned with securing an Eastern European bloc.²³ Moreover, the Soviets instead favored supporting the moderate influences in foreign Communist groups in an effort to avoid provoking international responses. Indeed, Stalin preferred not to attempt to exercise influence outside of his own sphere. Leading up to the 1948 elections, the *PCI* was pushing Stalin to make an official pledge of money and food in the event the Communists were successful at the ballot box. Rather than support the local Communists, Stalin refused on the grounds that such a move would be dangerous if interpreted to be a violation of Italian sovereignty.²⁴ In building his case for the complexity of the relationship between Togliatti and the *PCI* and Stalin and the Soviet Union, Pons used newly available documents from the *PCI*

²¹ Silvio Pons, "Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 3. no. 2, (Spring 2001), p. 5.

²² *Ibid.* p. 22.

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 5, 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 20.

archive, specifically notes written by Togliatti, to demonstrate the level of co-influence in policies directed at Italy.

Mario Del Pero explored the link between the *PCI* and the Soviet Union in his article “Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy’s Experience During the Cold War.” Del Pero addressed the nature of Italian leftist historiography and the way in which it plays down the extent of the relationship between the Soviets and the Italian Communists. The revisionist accounts coming out of Italy characterized the link as limited, with the *PCI* able to exercise some autonomy in decisions. However, Del Pero countered this trend, drawing on new evidence from the *PCI* archives to argue that the *PCI* was indeed subservient to Moscow.²⁵ In his view, the leadership of the *PCI* consulted extensively with the Soviets to ensure policies were in accord with each other. He concluded that the *PCI* was accepting of this relationship because it afforded them significant financial incentives. Finally, Del Pero asserted that Stalin and the Soviets had a moderating effect on the party, keeping the calls for revolution down. Indeed, despite some accounts, recent documentation points to the fact that Stalin indeed had a well coordinated plan for the Communist parties of Europe.

In a working paper for the Cold War International History Project, Eduard Mark explored the nature of the National Front Strategy developed by Stalin in the early years of the Second World War. His paper, “Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947,”²⁶ utilized newly released sources from the Eastern bloc to shed new light on the topic of Soviet foreign policy. Unlike the view held by Pons, Mark contended that Stalin indeed had a “highly developed political strategy” for the liberated countries of Europe.²⁷ In the early days of the Grand Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, Stalin was constrained by his connections with the Western leaders. As such, the National Front strategy dictated that Communist groups refrain from making open calls for revolution; instead they were to focus on countering the common threat of fascism. As a side note, and as part of Mark’s thesis, the directive was received by Communist groups worldwide on July 27, 1941—sufficiently early in the war to negate the traditional view that Stalin acted in a defensive manner after the war when securing the Eastern bloc.²⁸

The Italian Communists received their instructions in March 1944. Drawing on *Comintern* documents, Mark revealed how the strategy for Italy was designed so as not to alarm

²⁵ Mario Del Pero, “Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy’s Experience During the Cold War,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol. 8 no. 4, (2003), pp. 541-42.

²⁶ Eduard Mark, “Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947,” Cold War International History Project. <http://wilsoncenter.org>. October 30, 2005.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 7.

or concern the Western powers. The instructions were to “destroy all remnants of fascism in all spheres of Italian life and to establish democracy.”²⁹ In following this path, Stalin hoped to establish a safer identity for the local Communist parties, characterizing them as mass popular organizations. Further, the documents show how Stalin called on the *PCI* to support the Allies, participate in a coalition, and portray themselves as “responsible and effective agents of good government.”³⁰ Eduard Mark’s piece on the National Front strategy for Europe is an important addition to the work already completed on the emergence of the Cold War. It takes advantage of fresh material to disprove the theories of some that Stalin acted in a haphazard and confused manner.

ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY EXCLUDED FROM GOVERNMENT

Another major issue of historiographical debate deals with the expulsion of the Communists from Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi’s coalition. In a 1947 article, historian Herbert Feis was quoted as saying, “we are favoring the countries which we trust...using loans to prove our good will to rulers inclined to bargain; encouraging countries that are wavering in their allegiance to our purposes or our interests; denying those we fear.”³¹ In the traditional interpretation, aid was contingent on domestic politics and the security and stability of a friendly government. As American politicians began to look at Italy, they felt uneasy about providing aid to a government that included Communists. They feared the repercussions should they support that government only to have it fall to Communist influences. Here is where the historiographical debate steps in. There are some scholars, like Feis, who argued that the US was key in influencing Prime Minister De Gasperi to expel the Communists from his cabinet. Others hold that it was a purely internal decision, based on domestic political needs. Finally, there are some who argue that though not fully responsible, politicians in Washington helped speed the situation along.

In the 1978 article, “America and the Postwar Italian Left,” Alan A. Platt and Robert Leonardi defined US policy towards Italy as occurring in three distinct phases. The first phase, 1945-1948, dealt with American efforts to effect political change by baiting the Italians with money. De Gasperi was invited to Washington in January 1947 to discuss his countries

²⁹ Document 174, “Zapiska M. Erkoli (P. Tol’yatti) ‘Ob ocherdnyx zadachax Kommunistov Italii,’ napravlennaya G. Dimitroviym V. Molotovu (1 marta 1944 g),” in Mark, “Revolution”, p. 17.

³⁰ Mark, “Revolution,” p. 18.

³¹ Herbert Feis, “Diplomacy of the Dollar,” *Atlantic Monthly* (January 1947), p. 26 in Simon Serfaty, “The United States and the *PCI*: The Year of Decision, 1947” Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Grey (eds.) The Italian Communist Party: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1980).

precarious position. While there, he met with Secretary of State James Byrnes and President Truman. At that time, De Gasperi expounded on two dangerous situations: the economic plight of his nation and his desire to diminish the influence of the Communists. From this point on, US policy, according to Platt and Leonardi, was focused on supporting the *DC* while hinting not so subtly that the US would respond even more favorably should the government be free of Communists. Although not declaring it outright, Platt and Leonardi insinuated the American influence. The article quoted a cable to Secretary of State George Marshall from Ambassador James Dunn in which the ambassador pondered whether aid to Italy should be contingent on changes in political orientation and policies.³² Immediately following the quoted section, the authors declared that six days later, De Gasperi dissolved his cabinet in order to reform his government minus the Communist and socialist influences. The insinuation doesn't hold up as there isn't much evidence to support this claim, nor do they provide much more than a suggestion.

An alternative point of view on this topic is advanced in "The United States and Italy: the Year of Decision, 1947." This article appears in an edited volume entitled, *The Italian Communist Party: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*.³³ Simon Serfaty agreed that the US was influential in the dissolution of the De Gasperi cabinet. However, he also stressed the duality of the relationship between the powerful United States and the vulnerable Italy. In contrast, Serfaty made a more moderate argument, claiming that both domestic and American pressures led to the breakdown of the coalition government. In Serfaty's account, the bottom line is the powerful influence of the US dollar. According to his interpretation, both the United States and Italy were manipulating each other. The Americans pushed for political changes, hinting not so subtly at their anti-Communist stance, in exchange for continued and increased aid. Meanwhile, the Italian Prime Minister underscored the threat to his government from Communist influences in order to secure financial aid. Indeed, Serfaty claimed that from the minutes of the meeting it is difficult to tell who was manipulating who.³⁴ In the American press, De Gasperi downplayed any American influence, stating, "no political conditions have been set by the American government for its help." To be sure, Serfaty did not say that the decision was black and white. He argued that there were also influences within the ruling government to see the Communists expelled. While in America, a majority of the parliamentary wing of his party requested a break from the

³² See "Cable from The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State," May 28, 1947, *FRUS*, III 1947, p. 911, in Alan A. Platt and Robert Leonardi, "American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 93, no. 2 (Summer 1978), p. 197.

³³ Serfaty, "The United States and the *PCI*," pp. 59-73.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 63.

Communists. De Gasperi and the *DC* recognized that there would be US support for such an undertaking, and moreover, that the absence of Communists would lead more directly to the US chequebook.³⁵ Therefore, the exclusion of the Communists from the coalition was a result of both internal and external factors. The US, in emphasizing the favor they would show a government free of Communists, provided the confidence and support necessary for the change to be made.

The historians mentioned above wrote their works at the tail end of revisionism. As such, their interpretations begin the process of questioning the idea of a forced choice between both poles in the international system.³⁶ Illaria Poggiolini extended that line of reasoning even further, affording still more responsibility to De Gasperi. In her chapter on Italy in *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, Poggiolini discussed a few aspects of Italy's experience during the early Cold War. Pertinent to our debate, Poggiolini tackled the internal dimensions of Italy's pro-Western foreign policy. She disputed a number of issues in the historiography over America's stance to the *PCI*. First of all, she disputed the traditional view that the pro-Western stance was adopted between 1947 and 1949, namely with the 1948 elections and the inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact. According to Poggiolini, the recent historiography points to 1945 as the year the decision was made. De Gasperi became Prime Minister in that year and was present at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.³⁷

Secondly, Poggiolini denied that De Gasperi's trip to Washington in 1947 was responsible for the exclusion of the Communists shortly after. To be sure, it was a major step for Italy in terms of recognition following its status during the war. However, Poggiolini asserted that to call this the moment that it was decided to exclude the Communists is to "overstate the importance of the talks."³⁸ Indeed, in Poggiolini's opinion, it was not necessary for Washington to apply pressure on the Italians as the political deadlock experienced at the time led many to suggest that the solution lay in a new political and economic environment.³⁹ De Gasperi merely visited the US at a time when debate over the economic reconstruction of Europe afforded him the opportunity to press his economic demands on the Americans.⁴⁰ When the US announced the Marshall Plan, it created a stable economic setting, in turn leading to stable political relations between the *DC*, the Vatican, and the United States. Finally, Poggiolini argued that there existed

³⁵ Serfaty, "The United States and the *PCI*," p. 69.

³⁶ Illaria Poggiolini, "Italy" in David Reynolds (ed.) *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 122.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 128.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 130.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 131.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 130.

a unique variable not present in other western European nations faced with the same choice. According to the author, the Roman Catholic Church was influential in organizing a mass base of support for the *DC* and as well for the strengthening of Italian-American relations.⁴¹

ITALY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Following the end of World War II, American politicians were focused on preventing another such conflict. In order to accomplish a lasting peace, the security and stability of Western Europe were emphasized, eventually coming to be embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty. E. Timothy Smith offered an alternative analysis to the traditional justification supported by Truman's memoirs that the true threat to west European stability was from the Red Army stampeding across Europe. In his article, "The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty,"⁴² Smith explored the dynamics between the major Western powers and Italy in coming to agreement over the nature of a collective security situation. In his estimation, Western leaders were more fearful of "Soviet-backed internal fifth columns," than an actual advance by the Red Army.⁴³

Within his article, Smith made use of many primary documents to support his thesis that Italy was included in the North Atlantic Treaty due to the threat of Communist subversion. What comes out in the readings builds on a continuing trend of the threat of Communist subversion employed by the government of Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi in influencing the more powerful Western nations to concede in Italy's favor.

Mario Del Pero examined the Italian efforts to both invite American institutions while resisting substantive change in his article, "Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy's Experience during the Cold War"⁴⁴ Del Pero argued that international tensions and the precarious position of Italy caused its leaders to play down its nationalist tones in favor of pushing for inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴⁵ Moreover, once membership was granted to Italy, the false myth of 'Atlanticism' fostered by both nations was abandoned and the Italians resumed their stubborn stance to American calls for change. Thus, despite hopes to exert

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 140.

⁴² E. Timothy Smith, "The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty," *Diplomatic History* vol. 7 no. 2 (Spring 1983). Smith cemented his research on the role of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty in his book, *The United States, Italy, and NATO, 1947-52*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 139.

⁴⁴ Mario Del Pero, "Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy's Experience During the Cold War," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol. 8 no. 4, (2003), pp. 532-555.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 534.

influence by tying the Italians into an American institution, Del Pero contends that this period saw little ability to effect change.⁴⁶

INVOLVING THE PUBLIC - AMERICANS AND ANTI-COMMUNISM

Throughout much of the thirties and into the first years of the 1940s, many Italian-Americans openly supported the Mussolini Fascists. *Il Duce* restored prestige and power to the Italian nation. However, when Italy declared war on the United States in December 1941, a conflict of interest arose. How does one rectify supporting their adopted homeland while maintaining loyalty to their homeland? By 1947, Italian-Americans were engaged in a massive campaign to influence their friends and family in Italy to vote against a Communist government.⁴⁷ Hundreds of thousands of letters were mailed and shortwave radio broadcasts beamed across the Atlantic emphasizing the importance of the choice to be made. The impetus for much of this campaign lay within the Italian-American community. This leads to our next question of historiographical debate. What was the exact nature of the anti-Communist sentiment amongst Americans of Italian background? There is some debate amongst historians and sociologists that investigates the emergence of anti-communism amongst Americans of Italian descent.

The traditional viewpoint that Italian-Americans possessed an inherent ideological opposition to communism was combated quite early on. In a 1950 article, "Letters from Italy and the 1948 Italian Elections," C. Edda Martinez explored the sociological reasoning behind Italian-American support against communism.⁴⁸ Though severely limited by the fact that it was published a mere two years following the election, the article provides insight into the demographics of those involved. She focused her study on a predominantly Italian neighborhood in Elmira, New York. Her article suffers somewhat from its use of contemporary news articles and first hand accounts that mislead the true nature of anti-communism amongst Italian-Americans. She quoted Italian-American newspaper publisher Generoso Pope from a speech in which he declared the battle against communism to be a "great crusade" and that communism had to be stopped in order to salvage God.⁴⁹ This type of rhetoric represents the traditional view of Italian-American anti-communism.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 535.

⁴⁷ An Italian editorial quoted in Holt and van de Velde, *Strategic Psychological*, p. 188, claims that the letter writing campaign did little to change those with firmly held views. Rather, the letters were most effective against those who had yet to decide on whom to support.

⁴⁸ C. Edda Martinez and Edward Suchman, "Letters from America and the 1948 Elections in Italy." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 1, (Spring 1950), pp. 111-125.

⁴⁹ Speech by Generoso Pope to the Citizen's Committee of the Columbus Scholarship Fund in *Ibid.*, p. 112.

In a recent article, historian Stefano Luconi explored the motivations behind the emergence of anti-communism in Italian-Americans. Traditional viewpoints suggested that Italian-Americans embraced anti-communism on an ideological level following the Italian declaration of war in December 1941.⁵⁰ All things changed when the home nation declared war on the adopted nation. Suddenly, the patriotism of individuals of Italian background came into question. In order to establish themselves as truly American, many turned to the popular sentiments to fit in to the general trend within the US. Norman Graebner is quoted in Luconi, asserting that anti-communism became “the very essence of Americanism.”⁵¹ Thus, in an effort to find acceptance in their adopted homeland, many embraced the ideological crusade.

Luconi updated this argument in his article. Rather than point to ideological or even patriotic reasons for supporting the anti-Communist crusade, Luconi pointed to much more pragmatic reasons. As already discussed above, Italian politicians may have been involved in manipulating the Communist threat in order to extract increased concessions from the American government. Likewise, Luconi claimed that Italian-Americans seized on this opportunity quite early in the postwar period to advance the national interests of their former homeland. When the interests of the homeland clashed with those of the adopted home, influential Italian-Americans seized on the Communist threat to legitimize their continued support for Italy. When the Marshall plan stalled in Congress, the Order of Sons of Italy in America (OSIA) lobbied Senators and Congressmen that refusal to pass the measure would play into the hands of the Communists.⁵²

Following an American decision to handover Italian Navy ships to the Soviets as part of war reparations, American newspaper publisher Generoso Pope criticized the US action, claiming such a decision would confuse the voters of Italy. In exchange, Pope called on the US to revise the peace treaty to cancel Italian reparation payments and secure the territorial borders.⁵³

Luconi outlined six such goals of supporting anti-communism. Of course, patriotism was an important motivation for many. The other objectives reflected the power anti-communism had in winning support from the American government. Indeed, the role of anti-communism amongst Italian-Americans resulted much less from ideological opposition than from the desire to place Italian demands for reconstruction at the forefront of American concerns.

⁵⁰ Luconi, “Anti-communism,” p. 287.

⁵¹ Norman Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study of Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950, in Ibid. p. 287.

⁵² Luconi, “Anti-communism,” p. 296.

⁵³ Ibid. p. 295.

Obviously, Italian-Americans involved themselves in the campaign against the *PCI* for a multitude of reasons. Of primary importance is the way in which the Communist threat was perhaps overstated or overemphasized in order to wrest a measure of power over the domestic situation in Italy from the American government. Anti-Communist rhetoric and the threat of Communist takeover were employed by not only the government, but those with a legitimate concern over the reconstruction efforts and the shape of postwar Italy due to cultural and historic ties.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Throughout the Second World War, the United States, through the Office of Strategic Services and other bodies, was involved in what would become known as psychological warfare (Psywar). Psywar involved attempts to influence the minds of others through propaganda, aid, and subversive tactics including sabotage and demolition. Traditionally, the United States waged war through diplomatic, economic, and eventually military means. With the inclusion of psychological efforts, the term total warfare or total strategy came into use.⁵⁴ To be sure, many within the American administration were uncomfortable with the extension of psywar in peacetime. Fearing a public backlash against a government that would stoop to the level of the Soviet Union, certain branches were opposed.

On the nature of the controversy within the CIA, Arthur B. Darling's book, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* provided a contemporary evaluation of the bureaucratic history of the adoption of covert operations. Published in 1990, the book is a declassified account originally released in 1953. On detailing the controversy over covert operations, Darling focused on the resistance of the CIA to assume responsibility for actions without the benefit of planning or directing them. However, much to the displeasure of the Department of Defense, the State Department, and moreover, Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the CIA was entrusted with the responsibility to carry out covert operations abroad on December 9, 1947 under NSC 4-A.⁵⁵ The value of Darling's book is the descriptions of conflicting views and personalities surrounding the establishment of the CIA.

⁵⁴ An early paper by Harold D. Lasswell outlines the importance of an American program of 'communication' (psychological) research and of keeping the results within the government. A program whereby researchers were free to work for the highest bidder would play into the hands of the Soviets. Harold D. Lasswell, "Psychological Policy Research and Total Strategy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 4. (Winter 1952-1953), pp. 491-500.

⁵⁵ Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: an Instrument of Government to 1950*, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p.245.

Moreover, it does an excellent job in conveying the struggle of the intelligence community to establish itself following the end of the war, in terms of what sorts of activities were pursued.

Where Darling's book served to establish the bureaucratic history of the CIA's involvement in covert operations and psywar, Robert T. Holt offered an analysis of its application to Italy in the periods 1943-1945 and the 1948 election campaign. His book, published in 1960, advocated an increased role for psychological operations as an effective tool in influencing foreign events. Holt contended that the United States pursued psychological efforts in a "haphazard" manner with no real definitive plan and moreover, never fully appreciated or understood the impact psywar could have as a tool of foreign policy.⁵⁶ Despite this, he was able to trace the various efforts of psywar and attempts to analyze the effect on the Italian public.

The value of the book is in the polling results available to the author from the *Istituto per la ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica*, or *DOXA*. Founded in 1946 by an Italian professor, the organization provides statistical data on the political impressions of everyday Italians. The surveys offer insight into how well received American efforts were. For instance, Holt outlined the activities of the Voice of America, the United States Information Service, and other psychological programs before providing an analysis of the effectiveness. According to the survey results utilized, the Americans were felt to be the most disposed to Italy.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, one small flaw is that the survey he uses is from February 1947. The NSC had not even identified Italy as an area of concern until November of that year. Despite some chronological inconsistencies, the value of the polls and surveys remains. Holt concluded that, despite American inexperience, the clear-cut nature of the election issue, namely communism versus anti-communism, combined with the already favorable image of Americans to produce the desired result.

A much more recent appraisal of American efforts at influencing the Italian elections comes from Mario Del Pero. In a 2001 article in the *Journal of American History*, Del Pero traced American policies and practices in Italy from 1948 to 1955 as perceptions about the nature of Italy's problems shifted from economic based to ideologically based. After securing a Christian Democrat win in 1948, American officials were jubilant at their ability to influence foreign political developments through unconventional means.⁵⁸ In the author's view, the initial

⁵⁶ Holt and van de Velde, *Strategic Psychological Operations*, p. 160, 165.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 175. Access to *DOXA* surveys from 1953 was granted by the University of Sienna, Italy and will appear later in chapter 7.

⁵⁸ Mario Del Pero, "The United States and 'Psychological Warfare' in Italy, 1948-1955." *Journal of American History* vol. 87 no. 4 (March 2001), p. 1306.

policies directed at Italy could be “could be characterized by...intrinsic pluralism” and a “consequent inability to produce a unified coherent thesis.”⁵⁹ Truly, officials in Washington struggled to ascertain the nature of Italian communism. Was it an economic issue that could be solved with financial and food aid? Or rather, was Italian communism receiving directions from Moscow? Del Pero maintained that the former was the favored opinion.⁶⁰ It wasn’t until the bipolarity of the Cold War really set in that ideology and anti-communism took over. After that, communism took on a monolithic form that American officials were unable to escape from. Del Pero asserted that by the time the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was formed in 1951, the Cold War had changed sufficiently to foster such a program. He pointed to the escalation of Cold War antagonisms and the adoption of a “symmetric-universalist approach to international affairs” as causes of the shift in policy, notably entrenched in NSC-68.⁶¹

In analyzing the American psychological efforts against Italy, Del Pero concluded that they essentially failed at their prime objective of decreasing the popularity and influence of the Italian Communists, due to the “vagueness of the concept of psychological warfare and the scant collaboration of the Italian government.”⁶² Moreover, he pointed to the fractured nature of American foreign policy organization in allowing Italian individuals and even the government to occasionally exploit their various and competing alliances.⁶³

Overall, the literature on psychological warfare in Italy appears quite narrow. As recently as 2001, Del Pero commented on the “partial and incomplete” nature of the documentary record of the topic.⁶⁴ To be sure, there are many accounts of the covert activities undertaken in Italy; however, there are few that attempt to analyze the effectiveness the campaign. This leads to certain questions about the actual effect of the American efforts which can tie into the reality of the Communist threat. Furthermore, Del Pero touched on the reluctance of the Italian government to accept American calls for economic and political reforms, efforts that could certainly have diminished the power of the Italian Communists. In the author’s estimation, such actions that would limit the Italian Communist party would also limit the political leverage held by the De Gasperi government.⁶⁵

In the period 1947-1953, the United States attempted to secure a stronger Western Europe for any number of economic, strategic and political reasons. Italy became a focal point

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 1330-1331.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 1306-1307.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 1310.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 1331.

⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 1330.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 1330.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 1332.

early on as the local Communist party threatened to take control of the shattered nation and realign with the Soviet Union. The reality of this potential outcome needs to be addressed. Traditionalists have argued that there was a clear threat of communism taking hold in Italy and that this was directed from Moscow. Revisionists attempted to downplay the link between the Soviet Union and the *PCI*. More recent archival evidence points to a moderate relationship between Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti and the USSR of Stalin. Indeed, there is room for an argument to be made that between roughly 1947 and 1953 both the Italians and the Americans utilized the potential for a Communist upsurge to meet their own political ends. Furthermore, recent work has begun to investigate the role smaller players had on shaping the experience of major Cold War players. The experience of the United States in defeating the Communist threat in Italy in the years 1947-1953 was important in the shaping of the nascent institutions, in terms of the tactics, tools, and policies that would be pursued in later years. Fear of Communist subversion, especially in a West European nation, enabled both leaders to land political concessions. De Gasperi and the Italians were able to situate themselves within the western sphere of influence through the North Atlantic Treaty, despite heavy opposition, while the Americans secured a strategic victory by tying the Italian market into a western framework.

This work will look at American motivations for involvement in post-War Italy as it relates to both the expanded definition of national security and the corporatist motivations of securing markets and economic partnerships. It was becoming increasingly clear that through the partnerships and relationships established, the US could, in effect, influence global stability and security. That these two themes were intricately tied together was becoming clear. Further, the relationship between security threats emerging from Italy and the growth of the foreign policy bureaucracy will be explored as Italy represents a precedent setting venture for the Americans.

CHAPTER 2 - ISOLATION TO INTERVENTION: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE COMMUNIST THREAT

Hitler's *Wehrmacht* rolled into Poland in September 1939. That same year, a Gallup poll sampling revealed that nearly two-thirds of all Americans felt that entry into the First World War was a mistake, many vowing "never again."¹ Some authors have attempted to define isolationism in a uniquely American sense, that the tendency towards isolation is inherent in individualist American society. Others have pointed to the very establishment of the United States of America as a historic and symbolic break from the entangling intrigue of the European continent. What is clear is that the failure of Wilsonian internationalism in 1919-20 led a great deal of Liberal thinkers to turn to isolationist sentiments.² They joined ranks with the multitudes of foreign policy conservatives who would rather focus on domestic pressures and problems.

To be sure, this early thinking would prove shortsighted. Within a few years, supporters of this ethos pointed to the failure of traditional diplomacy, evidenced by the outcome of the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent impotence of the League of Nations, in producing stability. The chaotic Twenties and ever increasing hostility of the Thirties, were taken as indicators that economic disparity and the subsequent extremist political pressures result in a rise in international tensions and subsequently, in the likelihood of renewed conflict.

As Fascist aggression and international tension began to heat up through the 1930s, President Roosevelt came to grips with this fact, and began to take steps to ensure national security. Emphasizing nonalignment at this time, FDR argued for "an armed and vigilant neutrality,"³ stirring industry into action and the State into readiness. The focus at this point was to maintain national security and prevent American soldiers from fighting in another European conflict. Indeed, between 1935 and 1937, the United States passed three Neutrality acts designed to prevent American involvement in a coming war. The successive legislation was a feeble attempt at best to keep the US out of an impending international crisis. The first act, passed in 1936 restricted businesses in the US from trading in war materials and from extending loans or credits to belligerent nations. By 1937, events in Spain forced an amendment to the previous neutrality act, extending the proviso to include conflicts within nations rather than simply between nations.⁴ After learning a tough lesson about the total nature of twentieth-century conflicts, isolationism received a renewed importance. The acts focused on removing the possibility of the US being drawn into a conflict through a progression of steps, much like in

¹ Wesley Marvin Bagby, America's International Relations Since World War I, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 83.

² Miller, The US and Italy, p.16.

³ Ibid. p. 17.

⁴ Bagby, America's International Relations, p. 83.

World War I. Congress made it illegal, in a war abroad, for a US ship to enter that war zone, as well as illegal to sell arms to belligerent nations, travel on its ships or lend it money. With that said, American businessmen and politicians realized the profit that could come from providing *materiel* to their traditional allies. The pervading feeling amongst Americans was to remain neutral, yet capitalize on the growing thirst for industrial goods. As such, Congress ordered a “cash and carry” policy for US goods in order to remove American shipping from danger (and remove a possible justification for entry into a war.)⁵

Following Fascist aggression in the Far East and North Africa, along with a string of nationalizations, the focus on national security extended from protecting the American position on the continent to protecting US investments and interests abroad. President Roosevelt and his administration began to grapple with the paradox of countering the Fascist threat while preserving isolationism. If the US was to preserve democracy, it would have to abandon their position of neutrality in order to preserve the international balance of power.⁶ Over the next five years, FDR would fight to resolve the gap between ensuring American security and maintaining isolation from European conflict. Starting in 1938, the President began by defeating the Ludlow Amendment to the Constitution, which called for a popular vote of citizens before America could go to war. Though not advocating American entry into war at this point, FDR was merely freeing his hands in order to act in the way he felt most apt to defend his nation. However, a few short years later, isolation would prove inadequate in protecting the US mainland. Pearl Harbor certainly challenged the myth that simply abstaining from conflict would guarantee security. Whilst espousing an isolationist sentiment, the United States had been twice attacked in the twentieth century, drawing the nation into lengthy and costly wars, both in terms of resources and men.⁷ Try as they might, it was becoming increasingly clear to many policy makers that it was no longer possible to rely on the safety the North American continent provided by its geographic position and its protective border oceans.

ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS

There is an obvious thread of economic interest woven through the early post-war policies of the US. Many individuals within the bureaucracy were fearful of a return to a similar economic depression as existed pre-war. To be sure, it was not at all clear that American style democracy was up to the task of managing the postwar reconstruction. As such, new tactics –

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 83-4.

⁶ Miller, *The US and Italy*, p. 17-18.

⁷ The first, arguably, the sinking of the RMS Lusitania on May 7, 1915 by a German U-boat taken many American civilian lives. and the second, Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

new carrots – were needed in addition to the big stick the Four Policemen (US, UK, USSR and China) would represent. With the war coming to an end, there were some within the government who realized that by imposing Western economic and political alliances they could not only slow Communist expansion, but that there was a profit to be made in doing so. A new threat was needed to mobilize both Congressional and public support behind the come about in American foreign policy. Correspondingly, the threat to the West evolved from specifically Fascism to a broader battle against Totalitarianism, effectively encompassing Communist movements worldwide.

Additionally, interventionism/internationalism was defended as part of a global economic argument. In the thirties and early forties, economic relations took on a greater importance in the international arena. Versailles had failed to adequately manage the international system following the First World War, leaving economic and security concerns in a highly flammable environment. FDR recognized the threat posed by Mussolini's Fascist government and independent foreign actors, or rogue leaders in general. *Il Duce* was responsible for pushing out US economic interests in favor of his domestic market-import controls and nationalizations. Furthermore, he insisted on a stable balance of payments with the U.S.⁸ Mussolini's ideology played a role only insofar as it stood in the way of increasing international trade and protecting American foreign investments. The challenge posed by the Fascists was perceived in a much different way than that of the Communists a decade later. Indeed, even the conception of the Communist challenge would evolve into a much more dangerous beast by the end of the war.

Despite the early disposition towards isolationism, by the end of the war, internationalism/interventionism took on a new importance as a tool to alleviate the threat of a return to economic depression. Indeed, there were many within the administration, including President Roosevelt himself, who envisaged post-war policy as taking the shape of a New Deal for Europe. Then Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman remarked in 1944 that "economic assistance is one of the most effective weapons at our disposal to influence European political events in the direction we desire and to avoid the development of a sphere of influence of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and the Balkans."⁹

⁸ Miller, *The US and Italy*, p. 13.

⁹ "Harriman to Hull," January 7, 1944, *FRUS:1944*, IV, p. 1034.

A NEW WORLD ORDER

As early as 1942, American Liberals had more or less outlined their vision for a New World Order. Post-war isolationism would be abandoned for a more involved internationalism as many came to see the Second World War as a second chance at Wilsonian internationalism and as a perfect example of the consequence of not pursuing those goals. At root, economics and trade were the glue to hold the whole international system together. The US planned to develop spheres of influence around the globe based on reformed market-based capitalism and focus on the stability of democracies.¹⁰ The US would serve as the mold from which democracies would be cast. Moreover, the US set out to control the international system through international banks, the reduction of tariff barriers to trade, technical assistance, the stockpiling of critical materials, and the encouragement of private American investment on a massive scale.¹¹

The increase in foreign American economic activity brought with it a concern for the security of the investments being made. Nationalizations by unfriendly governments would hurt the economic stability of the international system and the pocketbooks of major corporations, and as such, those individuals who brought instability to the system would be removed. Secretary of State Cordell Hull expressed specific concern with the Fascists and their willingness to nationalize, as he envisioned increased trade as the way out of a potential post-war depression.¹²

Truly, it wasn't long before economic planners realized that the US would need stable, friendly markets at the end of the war to soak up the vast surplus of American goods being manufactured if the nation was to avoid an economic collapse.¹³ A potential dollar gap, as well as a likely trade imbalance, threatened to stall the post-war economy and the benefits American industry received as a result of their position far from the front lines of Europe and Asia. Such a realization crossed partisan lines as surely every Congressman was anxious to secure the economic well-being of his district after the war.

THE ORIGINS OF POST-WAR AMERICAN POLICY: APRIL 1942

By the spring of 1942, the Policy Planning Committee (PPC) at the State Department took on the task of defining postwar goals for Italy. At the very core, these issues were about how the United States should administer and rebuild Italy following the war. This meeting signals one of the first times the US approached the question of Italian reconstruction. The PPC

¹⁰ See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, (New York: Oxford UP, 2005).

¹¹ Miller, The US and Italy, p 17.

¹² Ibid. p. 13.

¹³ Haper, Reconstruction, p. 7.

attended to the issues of who would lead the intermediary government between Fascism and Western style democracy. While affording Italy a status slightly above that of Germany and Japan, the US could still not negotiate a separate peace with the Italians due to both domestic and foreign policies that restricted negotiation with the Fascists for a separate peace.¹⁴ These policies demanded unique tactics in addressing the reconstruction of Italy. The nation had many historic ties to the US, in terms of the large Italian-American population and its position as the seat of western culture.

Within a month of the PPC meeting, the Italians were being warned to oust Benito Mussolini or face extinction. In his position as director of the Office of Strategic Services, General William “Wild Bill” Donovan extended this warning through the channels of the Catholic Church and the Vatican.¹⁵ It would appear at this time though that the US was unsure of how to administer regime change. After all, there were no organizations in place designed to carry out such tasks, nor was the US fully comfortable with such an undertaking.

One of the first steps for the Roosevelt administration was to align itself with the Italian people and to distinguish them from Fascism as an ideology. Liberals approached the Italian issue as they knew how: by engaging the public. On 8 May, 1942, Vice-President Wallace delivered his “Century of the Common Man” speech in which Liberal plans for a postwar World order were spelled out. Wallace called for American support of popular democratic movements abroad while rejecting the idea of compromise with fascist states, appealing to the many hyphenated-Americans. During a 2 June 1942 meeting of the Mazzini Society, an anti-fascist organization located in New York, live radio and press coverage illuminated the Italian issue to a substantial audience. Furthermore, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke to the Society about how the administration did in fact separate ideology from population and that Italy could expect special treatment in the event of their withdrawal or surrender from the war.¹⁶

ORGANIZING THE ASSAULT ON COMMUNISM

The upshot of the all the political maneuvering tells only one side of the reconstruction effort. To be sure, Miller is quick to point out that despite the apparent acceptance of certain American goals for Italy, the US sacrificed idealism in the means in which it accomplished those goals. Democracy, free trade, and ultimately a general peace would bring stability, yet in order to achieve those ends, their definitions would find themselves blurred as “[d]emocratic state

¹⁴ Miller, *The US and Italy*, p. 29

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 29.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 30.

building gave way to an anti-Communist crusade throughout the American sphere of influence.”¹⁷ Further, despite US pressure on the Italians and Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi to move towards a reform coalition with other parties, Italian leaders ended up dragging the US into ever deeper commitments with the Italian right, which at heart opposed the reformist objectives the Americans held.¹⁸ In short, had there been any leaning towards Wilsonian values of spreading democracy in Western Europe, they were soon overtaken by the more pressing issue of countering the Communist threat. In this crucial battle, optimism and morality gave way to pragmatism and a feeling of ‘meeting the Soviets at their level’.

With the end of fighting in the autumn of 1945, Truman and the American public turned their sights towards a return to normalcy. The armed forces were rapidly demobilized, along with the justification for an intelligence service. Idealism held an aversion to secret diplomacy and intelligence services in peacetime. However, in August 1945, General William Donovan, commander of the OSS, warned Truman,

“[a]ll major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent worldwide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their Government. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.”¹⁹

In the following two years, the issues of creating, organizing, and directing a foreign policy community capable of mirroring supposed Soviet tactics, capable of countering the Soviet geopolitical pressures, would emerge, culminating in the covert and overt response to the economic and political threat of Italian Communism. In this construction, there were a number of influential power players within the bureaucracy, four key documents which determined the direction and tone of the policy line, and finally, a number of offices created and vested with the responsibility of carrying out American plans for its own sphere of influence. It may prove difficult to separate out the individuals from their influence on policy or construction of doctrine. As such, every effort will be made to fully expound on the unique contribution made by each in the wider discussion of the emergence of the National Security state and the foreign policy mechanisms that unfolded in the period 1945-1949.

At the end of 1945, Truman addressed Congress with a declaration that would forever pull the nation out of isolation. In addition to recommending the combination of the War and Navy departments, the president also declared that,

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 30.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 213.

¹⁹ From Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p. xiv-uncited quote, Donovan to Truman, August 1945.

“...all nations...know that desire for peace is futile unless there is also enough strength ready and willing to enforce that desire in any emergency. Among the things that have encouraged aggression and the spread of war in the past have been the unwillingness of the United States realistically to face this fact, and her refusal to fortify her aims of peace before the forces of aggression could gather in strength...”²⁰

Traditional balances of power on the European continent had collapsed. A power vacuum emerged in which the United States and the Soviet Union, two of the largest powers and both capable of a relatively quick recovery, stepped in to fill the void. With the prospect of cooperation between the two emergent super powers melting away, the US gradually assumed a tougher stance. To be sure, World War II had destroyed what historian Alonzo Hamby called the “Eurocentric order based on Capitalism and empire.”²¹ Further, US foreign policy found itself in a position of dealing with the consequences of the war: the collapse of empires throughout Europe, emergent violence in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and finally, world hunger. Additionally, the industrial and economic destruction of much of Europe meant that America’s allies were in no position to bear the brunt of renewed conflict to allow the Americans time to prepare. Hamby characterizes the response as a blend of American idealism with the national self-interest.²²

Deborah Welch Larson defined American policy at this stage as “in a transitional stage,” and “merely negative, confined to passive opposition to Soviet expansion” beyond its sphere of influence.²³ The upshot of this policy culminated in a decision by Secretary of State James Byrnes to cut off aid to Eastern Europe. On September 24, 1946, Byrnes sent a dispatch in which he explained, “...we must help our friends in every way and refrain from assisting those who either through helplessness or for other reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand.”²⁴ With this declaration, the groundwork was laid for later financial support of Alcide De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats in Italy.

The new policy direction was met with an injection of fresh individuals into the mix. Individuals such as Charles Bohlen, W. Averell Harriman, and Robert A. Lovett represent a shift within American politics. These men were neither politicians, nor permanent government

²⁰ “Special Message to Congress, President Truman, December 19, 1945” *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945*. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 547-560 in Athan G. Theoharis (ed.) *The Truman Presidency: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the National Security State*. (Stanfordville, NY: Earl M Coleman Enterprises, Inc., Publishers, 1979) p. 11.

²¹ Hamby, *Man of the People*, p. 338-39.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 338-39.

²³ Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985), p. 294.

²⁴ Byrnes to Clayton, September 24, 1946, *FRUS: 1946*, VII, p. 223, in *Ibid.*, p. 294.

employees. In a precedent setting maneuver to meet the revolutionary demands of the Cold War, the US turned to not only academics and scientists, but to the boardrooms of some of America's largest firms. There are a few possible justifications for such a move. On the one hand, by selecting individuals from the corporate world, the US could have been banking on the efficient managerial policies of these individuals. On the other hand, this move could reflect the way in which the economy became tied into the National Security discourse. Within the period of a decade, the US would restructure much of the international economy, placing itself within a position to control international economic relations.²⁵

Despite this apparent policy victory, John Lamberton Harper declares that while there was resolve and determination within the internationalist community, the United States in the period 1945-49 had neither the intellectual nor political resources required to address Italy's internal problems.²⁶

THREE DOCUMENTS THAT WOULD CHANGE THE COURSE OF US POLICY, 1946-1950: THE LONG TELEGRAM, THE CLIFFORD ELSEY REPORT, AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The foreign policy community in the US following the war had very little personal contact with foreign governments or the foreign services of those governments. There was one such man who had a lifelong relationship with the Soviet Union and perhaps, more than any other individual providing the US with an interpretation of Soviet intentions at a critical time.

George Frost Kennan sharpened his teeth in Moscow between 1933 and 1938 as attaché to the US embassy. What Kennan experienced in this time would leave a lasting taste in his mouth, affecting his opinion a decade later on the possibility of postwar collaboration with the Soviets. Once again finding himself in Moscow, this time in 1944, Kennan was the lone sheriff within US policy circles calling for a tougher stance in relations with the Soviets. Kennan was well on his way to defining the policy of containment, which would later be attributed to him. Ever perceptive, Kennan had come to realize that cooperation with Stalin would be near impossible.

Instead, the junior diplomat called for the establishment of spheres of influence to counter the perceived possibility of a Soviet thrust into Central and Western Europe. Though not explicitly defined as the policy of containment at this point, the characteristics which would come

²⁵ see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 5.

²⁶ Harper, Reconstruction, p. vii.

to be codified within the Truman Doctrine were present.²⁷ Kennan faced an uphill battle in achieving success in influencing policy. In early 1945, he proposed to Charles Bohlen that the US support the division of Europe into two spheres of influence. The US would recognize Soviet control over Eastern Europe, meanwhile they, along with other Western powers, would build up Western Europe to a position capable of withstanding Soviet power.

Despite Kennan's extensive experience with the Soviets, Bohlen brushed off his recommendations as impracticable within a democracy.²⁸ Furthermore, the young Kennan was not yet in a position to assert his dominance over foreign policy. The upshot of this was a growing sense of frustration, futility, and dissatisfaction with his position within the foreign policy community. For in Kennan's mind, he was the one who truly understood the Soviets. While his superiors were clinging to the notion of cooperation with the implacable Soviet Union and Josef Stalin, Kennan was coming to an understanding of the true nature of the Soviet.²⁹ However, as the gap between his beliefs and those of his superiors continued to grow, so too did the frustration felt by Kennan over the inability to affect policy in any way.

As fate would have it, Kennan was about to get his big break. Just as the career diplomat was about to turn his back on the foreign policy community, Soviet actions took a decisive turn, leading his superiors to call for a more definitive policy response. In Kennan's own words, "they asked for it. Now, by God they would have it."³⁰ From Moscow in 1946, Kennan cabled Washington with what he would later term an "outrageous encumberment of the telegraphic process."³¹ In Kennan's estimation, the Soviets were relentlessly expansionistic and hostile to the West. Taking the shape of five sections, the Long Telegram promoted the idea of containment through a firm stance to the Soviets. Additionally, Kennan realized the benefit that the encouragement of American values and ideals combined with a positive program for the rest of the world could have on fostering resistance to the forces of the left.³²

Miscamble describes the Long Telegram as being divided into five sections, much "like an 18th century Protestant Sermon."³³ The dispatch from Moscow would rapidly propel Kennan to the forefront of policymaking at a time when the State Department was stumbling for a new intellectual ethos to guide them. Noting that policy was already in a state of transition, State

²⁷ Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992), p. 22.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 22.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 24.

³⁰ Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 293.

³¹ Ibid. p. 292-295.

³² Hamby, Man of the People, p. 346.

³³ Miscamble, George F. Kennan, p. 25.

Department counselor Benjamin V. Cohen commented that the Long Telegram both, “directly and indirectly...influenced Department thinking.”³⁴ The weight of Kennan’s appraisal carried into the immediate policies being decided for Italy, and would continue to impact State Department thinking for years in other regions. It was clear he wasn’t going to hold back anymore. The tone of the document depicts the Soviet as a brutally repressive regime at home and implacably aggressive abroad.

Secretary of the Navy, James F. Forrestal assumed the role of promoter for Kennan. It was Forrestal after all, who was responsible for the wider distribution of the now famous document. In the wake of the Long Telegram, Forrestal appointed Kennan to a position at the National War College. During his tenure, Kennan was able to devote substantial time to refining his outlook and analysis of the Soviet Union. While at the War College, Kennan came to conceive of the international situation as a “clash of outlooks”.³⁵ However, Kennan was of the mind that this conflict need not necessarily lead to war between the emerging powers. Rather, Kennan began to advocate that the US might achieve her foreign policy objectives through actions other than purely military means. Kennan called for the implementation of economic, political, diplomatic, and most importantly to the discussion at hand, through psychological efforts. However, the young strategist would soon experience the limits of his influence.

Deborah Welch Larson reflects on the effect of the Long Telegram, claiming the document did not end the uncertainty over policy choices for those within the administration. Indeed, “at the end of a year of drift and indecision, of waffling between confrontation and collaboration, Truman still had no new policy, nor did he perceive any alternatives to the present policies, except the unacceptable prospect of war.”³⁶ That said, John Lewis Gaddis asserts that, “from this time on, American policymakers regarded the Soviet Union not as an estranged ally, but as a potential enemy, whose vital interests could not be recognized without endangering those of the United States.”³⁷

THE CLIFFORD-ELSEY REPORT

At the end of September 1946, following closely on the heels of Kennan’s Long Telegram, Special Counsel to the President Clark Clifford presented Truman with a roughly

³⁴ Cohen quoted in Richard L. Walker and George Curry, *E. R. Stettinius and James F. Byrnes*, vol. 14 in *The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy*, ed. Robert H Ferrell (NY, 1964), p. 202.

³⁵ Miscamble, *George F. Kennan*, p. 31.

³⁶ Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment*, p. 301.

³⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, (New York, 1972,) p. 284.

eighty page document entitled, “American Relations with the Soviet Union”, better known as the Clifford-Elsey report. Once read by the President, it would be locked away, deemed too explosive for public release.³⁸

The document may be characterized as a bridge between the Long Telegram of February 1946 and the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The report provided an in-depth analysis of the risk of Soviet military buildup, of the alliances being formed between Moscow and local communist parties across Europe, and finally, of the “ruthless aggrandizement”³⁹ of the Soviets on the continent. Drawing on consultations with various Departmental Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and others, the report came to striking conclusions on the future of Soviet-American relations. Secretary of War Robert R. Patterson cautioned, “we must envisage the possibility of the USSR adopting open use of armed forces on a global scale,” therefore requiring the development of “long range air power, supplemented by atomic and long range weapons, and adequate ground forces to hold and seize key areas.”⁴⁰

Upon review, Kennan agreed with the general tone, finding no fault with its assumptions. Further, Kennan stressed that the document emphasize the fact that high-level discussions and negotiations were unlikely to change the basic Soviet position. Rather, the best chance at influencing Soviet policy came through action and confronting the regime with circumstances that made it clear that action which disagreed with basic American goals would be disadvantageous to Moscow, while friendly and cooperative behavior would be rewarded. These propositions would be echoed less than a year later in Kennan’s “X” article.

Moreover, the Clifford-Elsey report argued that operating purely in a realm of accord, mutual understanding, or solidarity with the Soviets endangered the negotiating power and safety of the United States, as concessions would snowball to the point that Soviet demands would increase exponentially over time, as such actions were taken as evidence of weakness.⁴¹ Further, the report accepted the possibility of a bi-polar international order, with separate and distinct aims, operating in relative isolation from one another. Western Europe and the Italians fell within the economic and military domain of American strategic aims. In facilitating this separation, the report offered a proviso similar to that offered later in the Truman doctrine, specifically, that the US support and protect those democratic nations threatened by Soviet aggression. Of specific importance was the stipulation that military action would be the last line

³⁸ Welch Larson, *Containment*, p. 295-297; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p. 11-12

³⁹ Long Telegram in Miscamble, *George F. Kennan*, p. 31.

⁴⁰ Robert R. Patterson to the President, July 27, 1946, Papers of George M. Elsey, File “Russia,” Harry S. Truman Library., in Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950*, (New York: Columbia UP, 1985), p. 55-56.

⁴¹ Welch Larson, *Containment*, p. 295.

of support. Much more preferred was the use of economic assistance to ameliorate the appeal of communism in devastated nation-states.⁴²

Welch-Larson concluded that the Clifford-Elsey report provided a coherent, convincing interpretation of the nature of US-Soviet relations, as well as on the future of the relationship between the two emergent powers. The document provided sound strategies for countering the expansion of communism into the Western sphere of influence through the maintenance of an armed force sufficient of countering any Soviet threat. Truman, however, took exception to recommendations that the American people be informed of the difficulty diplomats were having in negotiations and “the record of Soviet evasion, misrepresentation, aggression, and militarism.”⁴³

The morning after he presented Truman with the report, Clark Clifford received a telephone call from the president, enquiring,

“How many copies of this report do you have?”

“Ten” was the response

“I want the other nine,” adding later, “This has got to be put under lock and key. This is so hot, if this should come out now it could have an exceedingly unfortunate impact on our efforts to try to develop some relationship with the Soviet Union.”⁴⁴

Clark Clifford would later reflect on the relevance of his report, claiming, “I had no real background” in foreign policy or national security, adding, “I had to learn as I went; it was catch as catch can.”⁴⁵

At the heart of Truman’s concern with Clifford’s report was the fact that in his estimation the American public was not yet ready to accept the reality of a grave new conflict on the horizon, or that after years of fighting a grueling war, the international community was no closer to securing a lasting peace.

Despite this concern, Truman remained naïve as to the warnings coming from various branches of the services that the armed forces, due to a rather chaotic demobilization, were in no position to defend foreign American interests. The report reinforced Truman’s belief that American aid and trade could contain Communist expansion. Robert A. Pollard concludes, “even with the failure of economic diplomacy in Eastern Europe staring them in the face, Truman

⁴² William H. McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, (London: Oxford UP, 1953; reprint New York: Johnson, 1970) in Welch Larson, *Containment*, p. 296.

⁴³ Welch Larson, *Containment*, p. 297.

⁴⁴ Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: William Morrow, 1973), p. 347. in *Ibid.* p. 297.

⁴⁵ Clark Clifford oral history, Harry S. Truman Library. “The Joint Intelligence Committee,” CIA/CSI, 2000. in Weiner, *Ashes*, p. 526 (notes)

and his top advisers continued to believe that economic power could achieve the most vital US foreign policy aims.”⁴⁶

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE MARSHALL PLAN

In 1947, two key foreign policy directives were announced. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, or European Reconstruction Plan (ERP) distinctly shifted American policies towards intervention and internationalism. Notably, these are merely the public pronouncements of policy. As such, they should be interpreted in terms of what the public was being led to believe and what was actually happening. Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine would come to signify a distinct shift in foreign policy and the role of the United States in the World. Truman offered that support should come in the way of “economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.” As the *Partito Comunista Italiano* garnered ever more support in the wake of market breakdowns, industrial strikes, and street violence, undermining the economic appeal of communism became one of the prime goals of US policy.

Finally, the implications of failing to act were clear to the American president. “If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.”⁴⁷ Thus, it was to be the policy of the US to support democracy, freedom of choice and to assist free people in working towards “their own destinies in their own way.”⁴⁸ The response to the announcement of the Doctrine was impressive, yet not quite what Truman had hoped for. The media picked up on the political and military implications of the policy. However, the main point of the doctrine was to “sell the key notion behind American foreign policy—the use of economic aid to stabilize the American sphere.”⁴⁹

In this case, the Truman doctrine, and its inflammatory language, was meant as much for American citizens as for Europeans. In a meeting with Republican Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations Senator Arthur Vandenburg, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned Truman that allowing a Communist foothold in Greece would endanger all of Western Europe. The US, according to Acheson, was going to have to save the free world, with Congress

⁴⁶ Pollard, *Economic Security*, p. 57.

⁴⁷ Excerpts of “The Truman Doctrine, 1947” from *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1963) in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Patterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations Volume II: Since 1914*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), p. 222.

⁴⁸ “The Truman Doctrine, 1947” *Ibid.* p. 221.

⁴⁹ Miller, *The US and Italy*, p. 225.

picking up the tab. Vandenburg advised Truman, “Mr. President, the only way you are ever going to get this is to make a speech and scare the hell out of the country.”⁵⁰

Kennan would comment on the Truman doctrine two decades later, claiming it built “the framework of a universal policy” out of a unique problem. “All another country had to do, in order to qualify for American aid, was to demonstrate the existence of a communist threat. Since almost no country was without a Communist minority, this assumption carried very far.”⁵¹

Essentially, the Truman Doctrine promised economic and financial aid to those who were in a position of resisting either far right or far left political groups. The upshot of the policy was that it linked the security and stability of other nations with the security and stability of the United States. That is, a threat to the international peace was a threat to American national security. Postwar policy dictated that the US would have an active role in protecting this stability. At this point, however, the US was still coming to terms with how to pursue an active foreign policy. Within Italy, in the early years of the Cold War, there was to be some confusion as to how to properly pursue the goals of the Truman Doctrine.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

The Marshall Plan for European reconstruction represented the refined, practical side to the Truman Doctrine. In its application within the Italian political landscape, the Marshall Plan may be characterized as possessing two distinct uses, in two different periods. In the period prior to the April 1948 Parliamentary election, the Marshall Plan carried significant psychological weight and benefited mainly the Christian Democrat coalition of De Gasperi. In the second phase, following the successful re-election of pro-western De Gasperi, the ERP enabled the US to have a hand in guiding the political and economic reconstruction of the nation into a strong American ally. The second phase of the Marshall Plan will be discussed later on when dealing with the post-election finessing of the De Gasperi government into further entrenchment within the American-led Western bloc.

Overall, the Marshall Plan committed the United States to support efforts at economic cooperation in order to strengthen the security and prosperity of Europe. It was declared to be,

“the policy of the peoples of the United States to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence in Europe through assistance to those countries of Europe which participate

⁵⁰ James Chace, Acheson, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), p. 157 and Dean Acheson, “Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 219. in Weiner, Ashes, p. 527 (notes)

⁵¹ Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 322. in Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, p. 525 (notes to chapter 3.)

in a joint recovery program based upon self-help and mutual cooperation....”⁵²

It is important to keep in mind that the Marshall Plan of April 1948 addressed some of the deficiencies in Truman’s declaration a year earlier. Additionally, it should come as no coincidence that the plan was finalized in the month of the Italian elections. Moreover, the Marshall Plan was designed to dispel the myth that the Truman Doctrine wrote a blank cheque for military and economic aid.⁵³ However, that is not to say that the Marshall Plan was without controversy. Revisionists have been especially critical of the European Recovery Plan. Inclusion in the Marshall Plan meant the acceptance of certain terms and conditions that would see the imposition of American practices and styles. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko conclude that the Marshall Plan was a form of economic imperialism, as policy was directed at securing European markets within an American-led, international economic system.⁵⁴

Other historians have provided a more balanced approach to the issue of the Marshall Plan and its role in the formation of the early Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis contended that the Marshall Plan merely reflected the national security concerns of the US as they sought to strengthen the international balance of power system, in effect, providing the capability to resist outside pressures to those in precarious positions. Furthermore, Gaddis made a distinction between the imposition of empire and the invitation of empire. In Gaddis’ opinion, the United States was invited into Italy.⁵⁵ Of interest to our current analysis of Truman’s foreign policy in the first years of the Cold War are the effects of the Marshall Plan on Italy. First and foremost, the Marshall Plan was intended to foster confidence in the demoralized nation, hoping to stave off the growing support for Italian Communism. In its application however, the Marshall Plan served as bait almost to Western European nations who were wavering between the West and the East.

There is, of course, any number of ways of interpreting the Marshall Plan in its effect and impact on Italy in the period 1948-1953. From a national security perspective, American interest in securing Italy within the economic framework of the Marshall Plan was rooted in the desire to

⁵² “The Marshall Plan (Economic Cooperation Act of 1948)”, *United States at Large, 1948* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1949), vol. 62, p. 137. in Merrill and Paterson, Major Problems, p. 223.

⁵³ Offner, Another Such Victory, p. 214.

⁵⁴ Kolko, The Limits of Power, p. 147.

⁵⁵ Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 27.

“control...raw materials, industrial infrastructure, skilled manpower, and military bases” while preventing enemies from capturing the vast war-making potential of Europe.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, a second take on the Marshall Plan offers a more determined effort to export American economic practices and open the door to global capitalism. The corporatist approach, as characterized by Michael J. Hogan, offered that the American motivation for the extension of Marshall Plan funding resided in the desire to find stability through the integration of economic interests and the realization of a New Deal for Europe.⁵⁷

There is however, a relatively simple way to reconcile these seemingly divergent approaches. Chiarella Esposito offered that strategic and ideological dimensions overlapped consistently within US foreign policy. Intervention came whenever the far left threatened the government, while there was a determined effort to keep the moderate Christian Democrats in power.⁵⁸

ORGANIZING THE OFFENSIVE - OFFICE OF THE PPS

Following a visit to Europe in April 1947, the new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall initiated the first steps towards expanding the foreign policy arsenal of the United States. Recognizing the lasting impact of the Second World War on the economy of Western Europe, Marshall sought to establish an elite group to direct policy. The Policy Planning Staff within the State Department reflects the efforts of the diplomatic arm to influence the direction of international relations. Kennan was appointed as director of the PPS by Acting Secretary Dean Acheson on April 24, 1947.

The PPS carried the mandate to “formulate and develop a long-term program for the achievement of American foreign policy objectives; to anticipate problems; to undertake studies and prepare reports on broad politico-military problems; to evaluate the adequacy of current policy and to coordinate planning activities within the department.”⁵⁹ May 5, 1947 marked the first official meeting of the PPS, at which Kennan was one of only three individuals present. It was at the second meeting, May 8, however, that would see the members take on defining the biggest security issue facing the US.

⁵⁶ Melvyn P. Leffler, “The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan,” *Diplomatic History* vol. 12, no. 3 (summer 1988): 277 and “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948,” *American Historical Review* 89 (April, 1984): 346-381. in Chiarella Esposito, America’s Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.) xviii.

⁵⁷ Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1987) in Esposito, America’s Feeble Weapon, p. xix.

⁵⁸ Chiarella Esposito, America’s Feeble Weapon, xxii-xxiii.

⁵⁹ Miscamble, George F. Kennan, p. 39.

From the minutes of the second meeting of the PPS we can see where the true motivation of pursuing American interests lay. Staff members accorded that their mission was “to bring into acceptable relationship the economic distress abroad with the capacity and willingness of the United States to meet it effectively and speedily; that with Greece and Turkey taken care of and the Korean problem now being posed, the greatest and most crucial problem is Western Europe;...that the problem is both political and economic, not military (except insofar as maintenance of US military effectiveness is concerned; that the approach to the political problem for the moment must be economic.”⁶⁰ This quote may perhaps represent a reaffirmation of the direction the State Department envisaged for the nation, as well, perhaps a direct rebuttal to the President’s overtly militaristic speech of a few months earlier. What remains clear is that members of the PPS, especially Kennan, recognized the link between the economic recovery of Europe and the security of not only US interests, but the health of the United States itself. The link between economic and political factors emerged at this point, and the search for an effective policy to bridge the gap between these two factors began.⁶¹

Kennan recognized however, the need for a psychological boost to keep the Italians and other Western European nations from succumbing to communism.⁶² Consequently, the text of the first PPS report (PPS/1) set forth that efforts should be taken to tackle the causes of communism, rather than the symptoms. As such, the PPS recommended steps to alleviate the economic hardships being experienced by those in Western Europe, including Italy.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1947: CREATING THE CIA AND THE NSC-PUTTING POLICY INTO ACTION

The organization of a cogent policy for counter-balancing the increasing strength of the Soviet Union saw the institutions evolve based on what was acceptable at the time. Months before the declaration in front of Congress, Truman signed an executive order handing over control of the OSS to the State Department. In addition to transferring the “functions, personnel, and other resources of the Research and Analysis Branch and the Presentation Branch” of the OSS, Truman vested authority in Secretary of State James Byrnes to “take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies...”⁶³ By

⁶⁰ Minutes of Meeting, May 8, 1947, PPS records, Box 32. in Miscamble, *George Kennan*, p. 39.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 47. See also, “Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe,” Kennan to Acheson, May 23, 1947, *FRUS*: 1947, III, 223-30.

⁶³ “Letter, President Truman to Secretary of State James Byrnes”, September 20, 1945 *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945*. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 331 in Theoharis, *The Truman Presidency*, p. 16.

January 1946, Truman sent a detailed plan for the coordination of foreign intelligence to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Within this directive, Truman established the foundations of the Central Intelligence Group under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence.

After more than two years of discussion and modification, President Truman was successful in passing the National Security Act in the summer of 1947. Of primary importance, the Act created both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. However, Truman's stab at creating a cogent national security policy faltered in its ambiguity. There was a major gap between literal definitions assigned to the NSC and the CIA, and the expectations on them to secure and influence American wishes abroad. In a few short paragraphs of the National Security Act, the CIA was both created and granted functions:

“to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;”

furthermore, the Act established powers within the CIA,

“to perform other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”⁶⁴

Those two short paragraphs would be interpreted as a blanket authorization for the CIA to carry out covert and psychological operations around the world. That is not to say the new agency was exactly thrilled with their new mandate. At the first meeting of the NSC, September 26, 1947, the President, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the military Chiefs of Staff met with *DCI* Roscoe Hillenkoetter to define the integration of national security with the security of American interests worldwide. Hillenkoetter expressed doubts and concern regarding the pressure to conduct covert operations abroad. Backed by his legal counsel, Lawrence Houston, Hillenkoetter maintained that such operations might be illegal without the expressed consent of Congress. Despite CIA reservations, the White House and the State Department were keen to undertake covert methods. George F. Kennan and his political backer James Forrestal concluded that though the American public may never approve of such methods, “it might be essential to our security to fight fire with fire.”⁶⁵

⁶⁴ “National Security Act of 1947,” 61 Statute 495 (1947). Extract appears in Theoharis, The Truman Presidency, p. 25-27; section 102(d)(4) and (5).

⁶⁵ Houston to Hillenkoetter, “CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions,” September 25, 1947, *FRUS: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950*, p. 622-263.. Kennan to Forrestal, September 26, 1947, Record Group 165, ABC files, 352:1 NARA. Both in Weiner, Ashes, p. 25, 26.

NSC 4/A, issued on December 19, 1947 represented the Council's decision to assign covert psychological operations to the CIA. Relatively short for the widespread powers it appears to authorize, NSC 4/A recognizes, "the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western Powers." Mirroring the aspirations of Kennan, Forrestal and John Foster Dulles⁶⁶, the NSC asserted "the foreign information activities of the US... must be supplemented by covert psychological operations." Finding justification in Section 102(d)(5) of the 1947 National Security Act (quoted above), the NSC directed the *DCI* to "initiate and conduct... covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities" and that such operations be "consistent with US foreign policy and overt foreign information activities."⁶⁷

The State Department, and primarily Director of the Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, remained adamant that operational control for such activities reside in their hands. Disagreement between the Agency and the State Department over operational control continued throughout the action in Italy, certainly resulting in confusion. However, shortly after the apparent victory at the April 18, 1948 elections, the issue of operational control was seen to be settled, culminating in both NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of January 1, 1949. NSC 10/2 vested authority within the Secretary of State to nominate the Chief of the Office of Special Projects. In effect, the State Department held victorious the right to manage covert action within the Office of Special Projects, later the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The Dulles-Jackson-Correa report reaffirmed "the Central Intelligence Agency has been properly placed under the National Security Council for the effective carrying out of its assigned function."⁶⁸

The State Department managed to gain control of covert operations through its role in appointing the Chief of the OPC, something Hillenkoetter abhorred.⁶⁹ Additionally, in the wake of the apparent success of such measures taken in Italy, NSC 10/2 further refined the definition of covert action as,

⁶⁶ see Weiner on Dulles unspoken desire to revive the wartime OSS, Weiner, *Ashes*, p. 24.

⁶⁷ **[Annex to National Security Council Directive 4 "Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Matters," Authorizing Covert Psychological Warfare]** Classification Unknown, Directive, NSC 4A, December 19, 1947, 2 pp. "Digital National Security Archive,"

<<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/cat/displayItem.do?queryType=cat&ResultsID=1148502A3665&ItemNumber=2&ItemID=CIP00003>>

⁶⁸ "The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report to the National Security Council on the Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence, January 1, 1949 [summary] in The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, William M. Leary (ed.) (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p.134-142.

⁶⁹ Darling, The CIA, p. 244-245.

“activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and *support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.*”⁷⁰

Thus, the National Security Council, at the time numbering a half dozen men, had established effective control over the covert activities of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency. In the hands of the policy elite, men like Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, and Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department Kennan, the United States set out into uncharted waters in pursuit of the goal of securing a Western economic and military framework, capable of both providing benefits to the US and staving off the Kremlin’s advances.

⁷⁰ “National Security Council Directive 10/2, June 18, 1948, Establishing the Office of Special Projects.” In *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, William M. Leary (ed.) (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p.131-133. (Italics added).

CHAPTER 3 – PHASE I – SHORING UP THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

American interest in the political and economic future of Italy can be broken into two distinct phases. The first, lasting roughly from the beginning of 1947 to April 1948 encompassed US efforts to engage a secure political ally. They found this ally in the person of Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and in the centrist party of the *DC*. In this initial phase, State Department and embassy efforts centered on backing the party through financial, political, and psychological means. Following the initial success of securing the party of choice, American efforts turned to the larger scale goal of securing the nation as a strategic ally. This represented the second phase of the American effort at securing Italy within the western economic and military framework. To do so, American policy makers in Washington and in Rome would set about to influence Italian policy through the financial and political mechanisms which had won them, and the *DC*, their initial success in 1948; namely, American funding for reconstruction as characterized by the European Recovery Plan (ERP) and the North Atlantic Treaty

SETTING THE SIGHTS ON ITALY, DECEMBER 1947 TO APRIL 1948

Starting in mid-1947, the United States took the tools and framework established by Kennan and the Department of State to focus American foreign policy actions towards the securing of Western European nations within the western security and economic framework. Thus far, an exposition into the transformation of the United States from an isolationist, hemispherically concerned nation into a global superpower, defining its national interest in an international sense has been briefly laid out. Even before the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, the US had identified the grave threat Italian Communism posed to the stability and security of Western Europe. When President Truman signed the Act into law, he set the US on course to defend the interests of liberal democracy around the world as a crucial interest of national security. The situation in Italy was pressing for a number of reasons. Recovery and rehabilitation efforts were hampered by political turmoil as many politicians sought to carve a niche in the system by exploiting the desperate situation, all the while maintaining the *bella figura* or ‘good showing’ which stood in the way of cooperation.¹ More striking, the *Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI)* had polled significant numbers in the 1946 elections. In anticipation of the Parliamentary elections scheduled for April 1948, the *PCI* joined forces with a number of other leftist political parties, including the *Partito Socialista Italiano*

¹ See Esposito, *America’s Feeble Weapon*, p. 152.

(PSI) to form the *Fronte Democratico Popolare (FDP)* to challenge the more moderate forces in the nation for control.

Reports emanating from the US Embassy in Rome highlighted the nature of the situation and provide a detailed look at the information flowing back and forth in the effort to forestall a Communist victory at the polls. Indeed, many American politicians regarded the possibility of a legal victory by the Communists as having far-reaching results, beyond the borders of Italy.

Interestingly, the issue of Communist victory at Italian polls provided a testing ground of sorts for the newly defined American foreign policy direction. The true innovation of policy for the United States comes with the covert and overt psychological operations undertaken within Italy. They represent the first policies authorized by the National Security Council as well as the first covert actions undertaken by the CIA. Moreover, actions targeted against the *PCI* are arguably some of those in the opening salvo of Cold War proxy battles.

Italy took on symbolic importance for many within Washington as a traditional Western state needing to be rescued from the expansive interests of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Italy was in a strategic position for other reasons than merely protecting “the most ancient seat of Western Culture.”² The Joint Chiefs of Staff most eloquently, and candidly, defined the threat posed by Italian Communism and the calls from Italy for the re-appropriation of her colonies in a March 1948 memorandum to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal:

“It is highly important that a friendly government be maintained in strategically important Italy and that friendly relations be regained, and thereafter maintained with the Arab states, because of the significance of Italy and the Arab states in assuring us access to the militarily valuable Middle East oil resources.”³

James Miller points out that despite the shift in tactics, “the stated goals...remained constant: stability through democracy, free trade, and peace.”⁴ Miller, in fact, lays out the intervention in three periods. The first two periods represent traditional diplomacy with the US devoting more energy to the Italian situation in the first, and the De Gasperi government responding in the second. The third stage, roughly January to April 1948, represents Washington’s overt and covert assault on the *PCI*, though we may push this date back to late 1947 as the NSC and Office of Reports and Estimates turn their attention to the ongoing political

² *Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means*,” CIA, Office of Research and Estimates, March 5, 1948, in Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p. 26.

³ *Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)*, Washington, March 18, 1948 (William D. Leahy) FRUS, 1948 III, p. 906-907.

⁴ Miller, *The US and Italy*, p. 213.

struggles in Italy.⁵ With that said, in terms of the current thesis, American intervention encompassed a two-prong approach of securing an allied political party and then working through that administration to achieve American foreign policy aims.

There were other actions which the US was to support and undertake. These included the extension of economic aid to the nation through “favorable US foreign trade policies,” the easing of treaty conditions upon the Italians, pushing hard for the warming of British and French attitudes in terms of acceptance with a strategic partnership, and finally, to “actively combat Communist propaganda in Italy by an effective US information program and by all other practicable means.”⁶

The program took on heightened importance near the end of 1947 as the internal Italian situation quickly degenerated into a violent, chaotic, and uncertain environment. A memo from the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs Samuel Reber to the Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett outlines the affairs of the Italian nation. Reber claims that in the preceding weeks, the Italian Communists had shifted to more direct actions and were deeply involved in attempts to discredit the De Gasperi government through strikes, agitation and violence.⁷

According to Reber’s report, through much of November 1947 the Italian Communists were involved in work stoppages, strikes, and disorders throughout the country. Political opponents were threatened, beaten and even killed. The US Embassy in Paris reported in an unprinted telegram that, as of November 18, the focus of Cominform efforts would be aimed at securing participation within the Italian government.⁸

Ambassador to Italy, James Dunn, reported in a December 5 dispatch from Rome that the Italian government would not be capable of making a formal appeal to the US for military assistance. According to De Gasperi, as reported by Dunn, the political situation could not accept American involvement at the time. Should the US increase its overt military position within Italy, Dunn felt that “the neighbors in the East would increase their clandestine penetration.” Rather, De Gasperi called on the US to improve the arms and matériel of his troops. Shipments of surplus military goods soon commenced.

Within six months, Ambassador Dunn would report back to Washington that,

⁵ Miller, “Taking off the Gloves,” pp. 36-37.

⁶ *Report by the National Security Council* Washington, November 14, 1947, NSC 1/1 “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy.” *FRUS*: 1948, III, p. 724.

⁷ *Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) to the Acting Secretary of State* Washington November 28, 1947, *FRUS*: 1948, III, p. 727.

⁸ Appears as footnote in *Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) to the Acting Secretary of State* Washington November 28, 1947, *FRUS*: 1948, III, p. 727.

“The imagination and industry which under your direction characterized the responses of our colleagues in the Department during this critical period made possible whatever success we may have achieved in supporting and helping the forces of democracy in Italy.”⁹

How did the United States effect such a remarkable change in so short a period of time? Indeed, the issues of responsibility, command and control, and funding were ironed out relatively quickly, and sometimes ingeniously, so that the US could respond to the threat posed by Italian communism.

THE FRONTE DEMOCRATICO POPOLARE ORGANIZES THE LEFT

During the parliamentary elections of 1946, Italian political parties on the left side of the spectrum polled impressive numbers. A memo from Dunn to Secretary Marshall in February 1948 recounts the success of the left in the previous elections. In those elections, Dunn reports, the two million member strong Italian Communist Party (*PCI*) received approximately 4.3 million votes, or around 18.7 percent of the popular vote, or 2.17 votes per party member. In addition, the Italian Socialist Party (*PSI*) polled nearly 4.7 million votes on a party membership of 860,000, about 20.7 percent of the overall vote, or approximately 5 votes per party member. Between 1946 and 1948, both parties experienced growth individually and combined to form the *FDP*. In applying the ratio of popular votes per party member from 1946 to the larger 1948 party membership numbers, Dunn deduced that the *PCI* could possibly receive 5.13 million votes, while the *PSI* had the potential to poll 3.95 million votes. Thus, with an estimated 9.4-9.5 million votes for the newly formed *Fronte Democratico Popolare (FDP)* in the 1948 elections¹⁰, Dunn predicted almost 40 percent of the vote for the parties of the left, updating the figure three weeks later to a *FDP* victory with nearly 45 percent of the vote¹¹, an impressive improvement over 1946. Adding further fuel to the fire, Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi reported to Dunn “in confidence that he had reliable information that the Communist electoral expenditures planned for the three northern industrial provinces alone amounted to over 3 billion lire....” The

⁹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*, Rome, June 16, 1948, *FRUS*: 1948, III, p. 879-882.

¹⁰ The *FDP* consisted of a number of parties. In addition to the *PCI* and *PSI*, the Front included membership from the Christian Social Party, the Labour Democratic Party, and the Sardinian Action Party.

¹¹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*, Rome, March 16, 1948, *FRUS*: 1948, III, P. 850-852.

Ambassador notes that this is “a fantastic amount in Italy which means that the Communists have in fact unlimited funds.”¹²

If the US were to forestall the decline of Italy into a communist dictatorship subservient to Moscow, the time had come to shore up the position of democratic capitalism. Economic, political, and military support would be forthcoming in the coming months in anticipation of a closely contested national election. The Christian Democrat party of the Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi worked hand in hand with the US to counter Italian Communist moves. For its part, the United States put the nascent offices of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, products of Truman’s National Security Act of 1947, to their first test.

ORE 21/1- MAINTAIN A COMMUNIST PRESENCE FOR SECURITY

Turning briefly back to the summer of 1947, issues of Italian recovery within the Western framework, and the potential problems poised by the *PCI* and Moscow were already becoming apparent. In an Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) document issued August 5, 1947, the then Central Intelligence Group debated the possible Soviet reactions to the “proposed aid program, designed to promote genuine economic recovery and to strengthen the traditional ties between Italy and the West...” According to the report, “despair is such that the prospect of aid can be made to raise extravagant hopes leading ultimately to unreasonable, but exploitable disappointment when the program fails to produce manna from heaven.” In response to the proposed American program of aid, Communist tactics were thought to center on “covert sabotage and labor manipulation”, as well as “propaganda to promote the idea that the US contribution to Italian recovery is actually niggardly in relation to the needs of the country and to the benefits which might have been derived from closer association with the mighty and generous USSR.” The Communist response would ultimately take two forms, either a subtle, covert attempt to “finesse” the aid program to their advantage or, failing that, armed insurrection against the pro-Western governments.

“In short, so long as, in the opinion of the Kremlin, there remains a fair prospect of Communist accession to power in Italy by political means, the USSR and the Italian Communists will seek to deal with the aid program by finesse in hope of turning it to their own advantage. If, however, that prospect is eliminated, the USSR and the Italian

¹² *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, February 21, 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, p. 832-835.* 3 billion lire in 1948 is equal to 5.5 m US (1948) or 50.5m in 2007 USD. For currency calculators see www.fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf or www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi.

Communists will do all in their power to disrupt the economic rehabilitation and political stabilization of Italy.”¹³

Additionally, should the aid program begin to work *too well*, that is, to the point that “despite Communist efforts, the aid program was strengthening substantially the political power of the Italian moderates and consolidating Western orientation of Italian policy,” then the Communists, removed from any possibility of accession to power through legal means, would suffer no negative consequence from engaging in a more direct disruption of the Italian economy and political arena. In the eyes of the ORE, covert subversion would turn to overt conflict in the way of “strikes, sabotage, incendiarism, disorders, and possibly insurrection.” This would turn the Italian people against communism and the Soviet Union; however, it would damage the nation to the point that it became an “economic liability as an ally.” Thus, this ORE report, though not explicit, infers the benefit to maintaining a legitimate Communist presence in Italian politics. Paradoxically, and at least in the period preceding the national election, political and economic security would be maintained by tolerating Italian communism within the political framework. However, the covert activities designed to “finesse” the effect of the American aid program to the benefit of the Communists could not be tolerated, and as such, the US undertook to meet the *PCI*, and the Kremlin, at its own game.

THE BEGINNING OF ACTION: THE NSC RESPONDS WITH CONCRETE DIRECTIVES

Such tactics would be one of the first topics discussed by the National Security Council. Arising out of the first meeting of the NSC on October 15, 1947, document NSC 1, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy” recognized the basic objective of US policy in Italy was “to establish and maintain in that key country conditions favorable to our national security.” Further, the document outlines the resentment that Italian Communists had for being excluded from the Cabinet of Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi earlier that spring, under apparent pressure from American diplomats.¹⁴

Following closely on the heels of the first document, further additions to the series, including NSC documents 1/1, 1/2, and 1/3 were among the NSC's first directives to the CIA and recommendations to the President and they represent the origin of the adoption of covert tactics

¹³ ORE 21/1, “Probable Soviet Reactions to A US Aid Program to Italy” CIG, 5 August 1947. Digital National Security Archive,

http://gateway.proquest.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CSE00013

¹⁴ NSC 1 “The Position of the United States With Respect to Italy,” October 15, 1947. Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CPD00001

to counter the Communist threat, without completely defeating it, all while maintaining a measure of deniability in involvement. The series of documents arose as a continuation of the Office of Reports and Estimates document from earlier that summer which defined the internal situation in Italy as “desperate” and “the political situation unstable.”¹⁵

The *PCI* threatened to take control of the Italian nation through legal means in the upcoming national election. In the eyes of Americans, the *PCI* would then align itself with the Kremlin, something wholly undesirable for the United States if it were to establish an economic and politically stable western bloc.

Issued February 10, 1948, NSC 1/2 reassessed the US position with regards to Italian political events. The purpose of US policies at the time were directed towards maintaining “Italy as an independent, democratic state, friendly to the United States, and capable of effective participation in the resistance to Communist expansion.”¹⁶ The report recognized the strategic importance of Italy in maintaining the regional security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Further, the NSC assessed communism as “stronger in Italy than in any other country outside the Soviet orbit...stemming primarily from economic distress.”¹⁷

In fact, American foreign policy architect, George Kennan, pondered the outlawing of the *PCI* in a March 1948 memo to Secretary of State, George Marshall. In light of the political turmoil taking hold in Italy at the time, Kennan suggested that it may in fact be preferable to outlaw the Communist party and to undertake strong actions against the party in the run-up to the elections. Anticipating a Communist counter to such actions, Kennan foresaw such a response as justification for a stronger American presence, including the reoccupation of the Foggia Air Fields “and any other facilities we might wish.” Kennan concluded that,

“If Communists were to win election there our whole position in the Mediterranean, and possibly western Europe as well, would probably be undermined...it would be better that elections did not take place at all than that Communists win in these circumstances.”¹⁸

The NSC urged that the US “make full use of its political, economic, and...military power...to assist in preventing Italy from falling under the domination of the USSR...so long as the legally elected Government of Italy evidences a determination to oppose such Communist

¹⁵ CIG, *Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States*, 26 September 1946. in Karabell, *Architects*, in William J. Daugherty, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency*, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004) p. 116.

¹⁶ NSC 1/2 “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy”, February 10, 1948, *FRUS*, 1948: III, p. 765.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 765.

¹⁸ *The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State* Manila, March 15, 1948, *FRUS*, 1948: III, p. 848-849.

aggression.” To be sure, De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats soon recognized the benefit that the *PCI* existence would play in maintaining a relationship with the United States. For, if there were no communist threat, the US interest in Italy would certainly be far less than it was. Further, at a time when the US was one of, if not the only, power in a position to financially support Italian reconstruction, the presence of the Italian Communist Party would be tolerated by the Italians, though not within a governing capacity.

The NSC decided on a set of actions to maintain the regional balance of power and security through economic and psychological means. Dunn sent a communiqué to Marshall in February 1948, mirroring NSC recommendations included in NSC 1/1, 1/2, and 1/3. In the memo, Dunn confirmed that the *sine qua non* of support for the De Gasperi government rested on the continuing supply of wheat to prevent a reduction in the bread ration as well as the timely transfer of military equipment predetermined as essential to internal security.¹⁹ Wheat and other products would be shipped to maintain the bread ration and allay consumer demands, at least until after the election. Favorable US trade policies would meet short term economic needs while the NSC recommended “urgently adopting and executing the European Recovery Plan...and morally and materially encouraging...Italian participation in this program.”

Thus, through a few documents and the efforts of a small number of individuals within the echelons on the foreign policy community in Washington, American attention had turned to forestalling the *PCI* and *FDP* attempt at capturing control of the Italian Parliament in the April elections. Moreover, interest would soon turn to maintaining Italy within the western economic, political and strategic framework, as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty.

A major logistic issue arose in the American campaign in Italy over how to fund such a program. Namely, the CIA was without a budget for ‘black’ operations or covert activities. As will be discussed later, the CIA and the State Department were quick to find ways around this through a number of innovative programs. Secondly, the United States had to determine how best to undertake winning over the Italian public to the side of the *DC*. By January 1948, the United States had set in place the offices and tools necessary to direct a strategic psychological campaign aimed at winning over the Italian electorate to the cause of western liberal democracy, controlled *de facto* by Washington. The American program of influencing the Italian elections of 1948, and Italy’s eventual inclusion within the western framework, incorporated a variety of tactics, some overt, many others covert.

¹⁹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, February 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 827-830.*

Such efforts were directed from what American ambassador in Italy James Dunn called the “Political Action Committee,” a loose collection of politicians at the US Embassy in Rome. Members of the group included the heads of the Political and Economic sections of the embassy along with Dunn’s own Economic Advisor on the Treaty and the Military, Naval, Air and Treasury attachés. The committee acted as an intermediary between outside suggestions from “friendly outside sources” and the State Department, as well as initiating or supporting programs designed to strengthen the non-communist forces in the country.²⁰

FUNDING THE ACTION-HOW TO PAY FOR ALL THIS

After defining the defeat of Italian communism in the Parliamentary elections as a national security objective, the NSC and the CIA had to determine how to fund the covert and overt assault. By the nature of covert actions, simply asking Congress to appropriate funds was both logistically infeasible and politically undesirable. In addition to the vast amounts of capital investment flowing into Italy, and the proposed funding of reconstruction through the European Recovery Plan, the CIA had to fund its own operations against the Italian Communist Party. It should be noted that at this time the CIA was still without an independent budget and held no contingency fund for covert activities. Operations in Italy certainly were not going to be cheap. The CIA’s Rome Station Chief pegged the figure at nearly \$10 million in cash, which would be distributed through his deep affiliations with the Italian secret service.²¹ This works out to roughly \$87 million in 2007 dollars, a truly significant sum.²² To be sure, at the time it would have been highly difficult to estimate the true cost of the intervention given that it was indeed an unprecedented venture in American foreign policy.

In one of the more intriguing stories related to this adventure, Secretary Forrestal approached Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, a Truman stalwart, in a scheme that would see millions of dollars diverted from the Exchange Stabilization Fund and routed to political fronts created by the CIA in Italy. Established in the 1930s to shore up the value of the American dollar, the fund was converted during the Second World War as a repository for captured Axis funds. By war’s end, the Exchange Stabilization Fund held nearly \$200 million designated for the reconstruction of Europe. Forrestal’s plan saw millions of dollars routed through the personal bank accounts of wealthy Americans to the CIA fronts, and later to Italian

²⁰ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, June 16, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 879-882*

²¹ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p.27. See also William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire*, (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), p. 299-300.

²² Inflation calculations taken from CPI Inflation calculator, www.westegg.com/inflation.

politicians and the Vatican's political arm, the priests of Catholic Action. For their part in the scheme, American 'donors' were instructed to place a special code on the income tax forms, next to 'charitable donations'.²³ This served to both track donations and provide an incentive for the American taxpayer in donating to the front organizations.

In addition to the funneling of part of the Exchange Stabilization Fund, a major funding source for the CIA would be found in the European Recovery Plan (ERP). With the European situation turning toward chaos, Truman approached Congress in March 1948. After an impassioned speech, spelling out the dangers of Communist expansion, the President won approval for the plan. Unbeknownst to most, the Plan gave the CIA further capacity to conduct covert operations in Italy and around the world.

The Plan, as passed by Truman, dictated that recipient nations set aside an equivalent amount of money, in their own currency, to that which they received from US coffers. Five percent of those counterpart funds, or as they were known in Italy, Lira Funds, were made available to the CIA. Congress had appropriated some \$13.7 billion over five years for the plan; the CIA ended up laundering close to \$685 million (approximately \$6.2 billion in 2007 dollars) in this manner for covert operations.²⁴ With a steady supply of untraceable cash, and no Congressional oversight, the CIA either directly undertook or funded a number of fronts and activities designed to undermine the position of communism in Italy and shore up the more moderate parties in the country.

Additionally, the US government focused on business with heavy investments as well as labor unions to donate secretly to the DC. A group in New York City, the Common Cause of New York, served as the middleman for the payments. Further, a Swiss bank account was used to funnel a further \$55,000 to the DC.²⁵

The CIA's F. Mark Wyatt commented years later, "We would have liked to have done this in a more sophisticated manner...passing black bags to affect a political election is not really a terribly attractive thing."²⁶ The fact remained, though, that cash, and lots of it, would be required for the Agency's activities in Italy. Further, as stated above, Communist expenditures in the three northern provinces alone were pegged at nearly 3 billion lire (approximately \$50.5

²³ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p. 27

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28. Currency conversion from www.westegg.com/inflation.

²⁵ Miller, "Taking off the Gloves," p. 48.

²⁶ Interview between Mark Wyatt and Tim Weiner in Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p. 27.

million, 2007).²⁷ Thus, the American response took into account the supposed Communist expenditures and attempted to meet the Soviets at their own game.

DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES

The State Department and the CIA made use of not only direct financial incentives, but influenced internal Italian politics through indirect means. In a 1947 article, historian Herbert Feis was quoted as saying, “we are favoring the countries which we trust...using loans to prove our good will to rulers inclined to bargain; encouraging countries that are wavering in their allegiance to our purposes or our interests; denying those we fear.”²⁸ In short, aid was contingent on domestic politics and the security of the friendly government. As American politicians began to look at Italy, they realized two things: a Communist presence in the Italian government could not be tolerated; and secondly, that financial aid to the country could have a profound effect on influencing the direction its leaders took it.

As mentioned above, Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi had dissolved his cabinet twice in 1947 in an effort to eject the Communist and hardline socialist elements from his coalition cabinet. This action has received important discussion from a historiographical sense.

Platt and Leonardi viewed De Gasperi’s visit to Washington in January 1947 as the beginning of the end for the place of communism within the coalition government. The 1978 article highlighted the importance of money and other incentives in baiting De Gasperi and the Italians to move closer towards the western alliance and eventually expel the Communist influence from the cabinet. The authors highlighted the importance communism played in the discussions between the two parties. The Italian delegation, including De Gasperi himself, stressed the uncertain future the nation faced in light of economic breakdown and the subsequent rise of communist sympathies. For their part, officials including Secretaries of State Byrnes and Marshall, as well as Ambassador Dunn discussed the possibility of tying aid to changes in political orientation and policies.²⁹

²⁷ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*, Rome, February 21, 1948, *FRUS*, 1948: III, p. 832-835; Currency conversion from www.westegg.com/inflation.

²⁸ Herbert Feis, “Diplomacy of the Dollar,” *Atlantic Monthly* (January 1947), p. 26 in Serfaty, “The United States and the *PCP*” in Simon Serfaty, Lawrence Grey (eds.) *The Italian Communist Party: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1980).

²⁹ See “Cable from The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State,” May 28, 1947, *FRUS*, 1948: III, p. 911, in Alan A. Platt and Robert Leonardi, “American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 93, no. 2 (Summer 1978), pp. 197-215.

An alternative point of view is put forward in “The United States and Italy: the Year of Decision, 1947.”³⁰ Historian Simon Serfaty offers a more balanced interpretation of the events, asserting duality in the relationship between Rome and Washington. In his views, the Italians were manipulating the Americans as much as the other way around.

In Serfaty’s account, the bottom line is the dollar. The Americans pushed for political changes, hinting not so subtly at their anti-communist stance, in exchange for continued and increased aid. Meanwhile, the Italian Prime Minister underscored the threat to his government from Communist influences in order to secure financial aid. Indeed, Serfaty claims that from the minutes of the meeting it is difficult to tell who was manipulating who.³¹ In the American press, De Gasperi downplayed any American influence, stating, “no political conditions have been set by the American government for its help.” To be sure, Serfaty did not say that the decision was black and white. He argued that there were also influences within the ruling government to see the Communists expelled. While in America, a majority of the parliamentary wing of his party requested a break from the Communists. De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats recognized that there would be US support for such an undertaking, and moreover, that the absence of Communists would lead more directly to the US pocketbook.³² Therefore, the exclusion of the Communists from the coalition can be explained as a result of both internal and external factors. The US, in emphasizing the favor they would show a government free of Communists, provided the confidence and support necessary for the change to be made.

Obviously, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain how much influence the United States had in pushing the Communists out of the coalition government. Clearly, they had voiced not only their anti-Communist sentiment in discussions with the Prime Minister, but the fact that they would look more favorably upon a united and stable government, free from the prospect of falling into Communist control.

Following the dissolution of his cabinet in early 1947, the government under de Gasperi floundered for two weeks to secure a non-Communist cabinet. This proved to be infeasible, and the cabinet was reformed with a number of Communist and Socialist members. However, the leftist party members lost key positions, including those of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Over the next four months, Blum noted, promised American aid was tied up, “‘frozen’...for reasons not very clear,” until Deputy Ivan Lombardo traveled to Washington to once again request assistance. Members of the Italian left maintained at the time that the Americans were stalling

³⁰ Serfaty, “The United States and the *PCI*,” in Serfaty, Grey (eds.) The Italian Communist Party, p. 63.

³¹ Ibid. p. 63.

³² Ibid. p. 69.

the dispersion of aid until the leftists were purged from De Gasperi's cabinet. Upon Lombardo's arrival in Washington in May 1947, De Gasperi once again dissolved his Cabinet, likely in an attempt to exclude Communist and Socialists individuals from the government in order to secure American financial assistance.³³ Following the reformation of the De Gasperi cabinet, this time free from leftist membership, Blum notes that "exceedingly generous American financial aid flowed into Italy, in addition to the cancellation of the nation's \$1 billion debt to the United States."³⁴

MARSHALL AID CONTINGENT ON FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT

The status of financial aid to Italy was to be the carrot to win over the electorate to the side of liberal democracy, as represented by the favored Christian Democrats. A June 1947 news article in *Il Corriere Della Sera*, quotes Marshall as proclaiming the, "*fiducia degli stati uniti nell'avvenire dell'italia*" (confidence of the United States in the future of Italy).³⁵ Marshall declares in the article that, "Americans have a profound and friendly interest in the well-being of Italy and will continue to help the Italian people that have demonstrated their *sincere loyalty in the democratic method for the defense of liberty and the individual rights of man*."³⁶

In the weeks prior to the election, parties on both sides were seizing on the recently approved Marshall Plan in an attempt to disrupt the position of their opponents. These efforts were fostered by confusion over an interview with Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, Michael J. McDermott that appeared in the *New York Times*. At a press conference, McDermott was pushed on the question of a possible announcement by the US government on the continuation of aid should the Italians elect a Communist government. In McDermott's words,

"No such decision has been reached by the Government of the United States. The story may well have originated from the Senate debate on ERP in the course of which the intent of the Senate was pretty clear. The Communists in Italy have said they don't want ERP and if the Communists should win, which we cannot believe will be the case,

³³ William Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, (London: Zed Books, 1986) p. 24.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³⁵ "Fiducia degli stati uniti nell'avvenire dell'italia" *Il Corriere della Sera*, June 3, 1947, p. 1.

³⁶ (italics mine) "*Il popolo Americano ha un profondo e amichevole interess al benssere dell'Italia; siamo liete di essere stati di aiuto per la ricostruzione dell'economia e daro aiuto al popolo italiano che ha dimonstrato la sua fede sincera e profonda nel metodi democratici per la tutela della sue liberta individuali e del diritti fondamentali dell'uomo.*" "Fiducia degli stati uniti nell'avvenire dell'italia," *Il Corriere della Sera*, June 3, 1947, p. 1.

knowing the spirit and feeling of the Italian people, there would be no further question of assistance from the United States.”³⁷

Dunn reported back to the Secretary of State on the nature of the coverage coming from Italy. The Socialist paper, *Umanità*, reported, “Grave American Declaration. No Help to Italy in Event of Communist Victory,” while the independent rightist *Tempo* stated “America Will Suspend Aid If Front Wins Elections.” The conservative *Messaggero* claimed that McDermott’s statement extended beyond the Marshall Plan aid, to include all forms of aid coming from the United States. Meanwhile, the leftist *Paese* reported on the existence of certain Republican circles which were opposed to Truman’s policy. These perhaps fictitious groups had other plans for Italy and held that in the event of an *FDP* victory, neither economic nor commercial relations would be disturbed.³⁸

These proclamations by the Italian newspapers did little to clarify McDermott’s supposed statement on the status of Marshall Aid. It was not until the Secretary himself made a statement to the fact on March 20, 1948. Once again, *Umanità* and *Tempo* carried the line that should the *FDP* win, aid would certainly cease. Dunn reported, “Doubts in matter...are today definitely eliminated by...Marshall’s speech...His language is crystal clear and renders comment unnecessary; we shall see now whether Italian Communist leaders will be able to distort it.”³⁹

The communist *Unità* responded to Marshall’s assertion that aid would indeed cease upon the election of the *FDP*.

“Marshall’s language clearly shows how US intends to use aid as electoral weapon of blackmail against Italian people. Secretary of State pretends not to know Communist Party has repeatedly declared it is not opposed to American aid, but to...political and economic provisos harmful to our independence...Marshall’s statement confirms aid is intended and reserved not for Italian people but for Christian Democracy, which...distributes it on party basis without any democratic control.”⁴⁰

³⁷ *Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference, Monday, March 15, 1948, Daily News Conferences—Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Press Relations—Department of State, 111, 1948) in FRUS, 1948: III, p. 853.*

³⁸ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, March 16, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 853-854.*

³⁹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, March 20, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III: p. 857-858.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 857-858.

 CIVILIAN PRESSURES

Indeed the central issue of the electoral campaign shifted dramatically from that of internal issues of reconstruction, the economy, industrial recovery, and others, to a theme that would be emphasized continuously over the forthcoming decades. On the instigation of various State Department officials, including the Ambassador Dunn, the election came to take on new significance in a broadening sense of 'us versus them' as the Cold War bipolarity set in. Indeed, Dunn recommended to Marshall that the US,

“must demonstrate convincingly that peace and independence belong to western civilization as does subjugation and tyranny to the totalitarian system of Soviet Union. If every Italian could know the real issues at stake there would be no doubt as to the outcome but if the US is unwilling or unable to go all out to meet Soviet policy in Italy move for move, then I would be inclined to agree with the forecast attributed...”⁴¹

America endeavored to associate a vote for the *PCI* and the *FDP* as an invitation for Soviet domination and control from Moscow. The American campaign focused on the average Italian voter, playing on their hopes and fears in the post-Second World War environment. In delivering the message of a choice between democracy and totalitarianism, the US played on immigration issues and familial linkages, as well as organizing an impressive propaganda and information campaign in the streets and public media of Italy on the benefits of siding with the Western framework.

The threats of restricted immigration for Italian voters became a powerful tool to influence potential votes away from the *FDP* and to the more moderate parties as represented by the ruling *DC* party. At first, the Department of Justice concluded that any Italian known to have joined the Communist party would be denied emigration to the United States. Justification for this move was found in a somewhat obscure Congressional Law from 1924 that barred entrance for anyone advocating the overthrow of the US government. Following this lead, the State Department carried the conclusion further to include an Italian known to have voted for the *PCI* or *FDP*. Secretary Marshall sent a telegram to the American embassy in Rome to clear the issue up:

In reply to journalist who pointed out that certain elements of Ital press were saying a person who voted communist could still immigrate US, official Justice Dept called attention to Congressional law passed October 1924 which specifically denies entry into US of anyone

⁴¹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, February 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 827-830.* The consequence of American inaction would lead to the forecast attributed to the Pope, one in which the Italian nation would fall to Communist domination.

advocating overthrow of US Govt by force (urtel 1207, Mar 18). This has been habitually invoked in cases members Communist party and there shd be no doubt left minds Itals that policy this regard unchanged.”⁴²

In response to the motion from the Secretary of State, Ambassador Dunn noted a shift in the concentration of Communist efforts to the central, southern, and insular regions of Italy. Dunn commented on how these regions were amongst those hardest hit by poverty and where “the dream to migrate to the New World” was strongest, as well as arguing for a strong statement made to the fact that no visa would be issued to those “espousing the communist cause.”⁴³

The case was being made in the hearts and minds of Italians that the April Parliamentary election carried significance beyond the borders of Italy. Further, American threats against Italian civilians insinuated that they had the ability to determine the way individuals had voted, and thus, make decisions as to the acceptability of those individuals for emigration into the United States.

LETTERS FROM AMERICA

On a more personal level, beyond the official government pronouncements, the State Department and Political Action Committee of the American embassy in Rome initiated and supported the use of American citizens in influencing Italian voters through the mailing of letters of persuasion from Italian-American citizens to their Italian brethren. Dunn and the Political Action Committee responded positively to the suggestion from “responsible Foreign Office officials” that the campaign “be placed squarely on the electoral issue of communism or democratic government friendly to the US.” Further,

“the effect of letters or postcards written to relatives, particularly in southern Italy, would be tremendous, especially should those communications urge the addressees to vote in the elections for some party other than the present Communist dominated Fronte Democratico Popolare.”⁴⁴

⁴² *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy* Washington, March 24, 1948. *FRUS* 1948: III, p. 866.

⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 866.

⁴⁴ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*, Rome, March 5, 1948, *FRUS*, 1948: III, p. 842.

Adding further to this recommendation, Ambassador Dunn called on the Secretary of State to recommend “writers include statements to the effect that they would no longer be able to send gift and food packages if the Italians voted the *FDP* into power.”⁴⁵

This direct-to-voter campaign quickly expanded under a number of auspices. Italian-language dailies in America were soon approached by State Department officials with prompts to recommend readers clip articles and editorials highlighting American benevolence to Italy and send them to their friends and relatives. The articles to be distributed were described as “full, factual, and pregnant with good will toward Italy and with appreciation of America’s *unselfish motives*.”⁴⁶ The existence of less-desirable reports was apparent, with the Chargé in Italy expressing that some papers (ha[d] editorial policies which [were] critical of American policy of aid to Europe and therefore should not be approached with any plan such as this.”⁴⁷ With that said, a number of highly-influential editors were approached with this plan, including Generoso Pope.⁴⁸ Indeed, Pope spearheaded a campaign to send one million letters to Italian friends and relatives by election day.⁴⁹

Initially, the program saw individuals urged to compose their own statements to their relatives, however, as it picked up steam, sample letters and finally form letters began to appear in newspapers. As well, pre-written, pre-posted form letters, and other media were soon present, requiring the sender only sign and address the letter. A political group sprang up calling itself “The Committee to Aid Democracy in Italy.” This group was responsible for nearly a half million postcards depicting Italy’s fate should it vote for “foreign dictatorship.” All told, the American postal barrage reached nearly 10 million pieces of mail distributed by various organizations. The US Postal Office initiated “Freedom Flights” to Italy to foster publicity for the cause and ensure the delivery of the American democratic message to Italians.

The tone of the letters carried the desired message across the Atlantic: a vote for the *FDP* in the April elections was a vote for Soviet domination and totalitarian control. A sample of the letters,

“A Communist victory would ruin Italy. The United States would withdraw aid and a world war would probably result”

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 842. Dunn’s suggestion appears in a footnote as the original telegram was not reprinted in *FRUS*.

⁴⁶ *The Charge’ in Italy (Byington) to the Secretary of State Rome, January 28, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 822-823.* (italics mine)

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 822-823

⁴⁸ Generoso Pope was the influential editor of American Italian-language daily *Il Progresso Italo-Americano*.

⁴⁹ Luconi, “Anti-communism”, p. 290. Other Italian-language dailies soon joined in, including the *Italian Echo* in Providence, the *Italian Tribune* in Newark, *Unione* in Pittsburgh, *La Gazzetta del Massachusetts* in Boston, *Il Popolo Italiano* in Philadelphia, *La Tribuna Italiana d’America* in Detroit, *Lo Sveglarino* in Seattle, and *La Gazzetta di Syracuse*.

“We implore you not to throw our beautiful Italy into the arms of that cruel despot communism. America hasn’t anything against communism in Russia, but why impose it on other people, other lands, in the way putting out the torch of liberty?”

“If the forces of democracy should lose in the Italian election, the American Government will not send any more money to Italy and we won’t send any more money to you, our relatives.”⁵⁰

The letter-writing program fostered and expanded by the State Department and American embassy in Rome carried profound effects on the Italian relatives of Italian-Americans. Indeed, veteran newsman Howard K. Smith reflected on the power of such an overture in 1950, stating “for an Italian peasant a telegram from anywhere is a wondrous thing; and a cable from the terrestrial paradise of America is not lightly to be disregarded.”⁵¹

State Department and embassy officials were left to conclude that the campaign had a profound effect on the general political mood in the weeks prior the election. Dunn noted that the “[s]urge of letters and packages mainly to southern Italy from America definitely is harming Front vote prospects to extent that loud protests have been made.”

TRANSMISSIONS FROM AMERICA-MAKING WAVES IN ITALY

In addition to the propaganda campaign in print, the State Department embarked on an overt radio campaign to influence the voting and results in the elections. A State Department estimate from 1946 pegged the number of short-wave radio receivers at 1.2 million.⁵² Given this audience, the State Department and other agencies soon took hold of Italian radio waves, beaming propaganda into the peninsula nation. This information campaign took various tacks to spread the intended message of democracy versus totalitarianism, including government pronouncements and declarations from well known Hollywood figures.

The Attorney General Tom C. Clark went on the air in 1948 to assure the Italians that the election was indeed a “choice between democracy and communism, between God and godlessness, between order and chaos.”⁵³ The simplification of the issue was at the heart of the American message. Italians were making a choice at the polls whether to follow the American-led Western Framework or the Soviet-dominated Eastern Bloc.

⁵⁰ Martinez and Suchman, “Letters from America,” p. 111-125 in Blum, The CIA, p. 25.

⁵¹ Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe, (London, 1950), p. 151, 198-219 in Blum, The CIA, p. 26.

⁵² Blum, The CIA, p. 26.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 26.

William Donovan repeated the message in a radio broadcast in which he proclaimed that should the *FDP* succeed at the polls, a Communist dictatorship would see many of the “nation’s industrial plants...dismantled and shipped to Russia and millions of Italy’s workers would be deported to Russia for forced labor.”⁵⁴

The State Department organized a radio broadcast aimed at winning over the Italians through a honey approach, rather than vinegar. Mere days before the election, Italians were treated to a one-hour benefit from Hollywood. Broadcast over Italy’s *RAI* Red Network on April 13, 1948, the show set about to raise funds for the widows and families of downed Italian pilots from the Second World War. Ambassador Dunn reflected on the success of the show in a brief memorandum to Marshall. The President of the National Association of Families of Fallen and Mutilated Aviators expressed to Dunn appreciation for the broadcast and noted that many of the families of the pilots were “extremely moved.”⁵⁵ Further, Dunn communicates how the performances of many Hollywood stars, including Bing Crosby, Dinah Shore, and Canadian actor Walter Pidgeon in attempting to speak some Italian “generally both surprised [and] pleased” the listeners. In assessing the tone of the program, Dunn confides there were some “mild objections” to the “‘obvious buttering up’ of Italian listeners” though this was attributed by many to the fact that the program was “obviously broadcast...for electioneering purposes.” As well, there was some criticism over the level of self-praise in the broadcast, though many pronouncements of generous American aid “were deleted altogether [along] with [the] Star Spangled Banner finale.”⁵⁶

PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION WAR

Dunn and the Political Action Committee operating within the walls of the American embassy in Rome undertook a number of less overt activities designed to influence the voting of the Italian public. Dunn reflects on these “Informational Activities in his June 16th dispatch to Marshall. It is clear from the activities supported that the goal of this portion of the American campaign was to undercut the attractiveness of the Soviet system through popular media. In doing so, the Americans were able to bring the message out of the high-minded politics of diplomacy and illuminate the potential decision many were about to make. Moreover, the CIA led a determined effort to smear the perceptions of Communist party members. Anonymous

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵⁵ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, April 15, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 875-876.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 875-876.

pamphlets were published by the Agency questioning the personal and sex lives of leading *PCI* candidates.⁵⁷

One of the most important moves by the embassy was the maneuvering which saw the publishing of Soviet defector Victor Kravchenko's 1946 book "*I Choose Freedom*" in the Italian language. Dunn notes that financial aid was provided to "iron out copyright difficulties" arising out of this venture. During his tenure as a Party official and Red Army captain, Kravchenko witnessed many Soviet atrocities, leading him to a highly critical view of Stalin and the Soviet system. In 1944, while posted to the Soviet Trade Mission in Washington, Kravchenko defected, seeking asylum in the United States. His 1949 extradition trial, known as "the Trial of The Century", was publicized around the world, receiving wide coverage, including in the Italian press.⁵⁸

In the run-up to the election, film and newsreels were both widely distributed and viewed by the Italian public. Perhaps better than any other medium, film was able to visually demonstrate the apparent choice that was to be made at the polls. Documentaries and newsreels were disseminated across Italy in an effort to bring to light the American message of goodwill and benevolence within the western framework. Working in conjunction with the Italian Film Board, Dunn and the embassy provided scores of films to be shown, including many which highlighted the democratic process.

Perhaps most damning to the Communist cause was the satirical film "*Ninotchka*". The 1939 Hollywood film starring Greta Garbo as the hard-nosed title character, or perhaps caricature, Nina Yakushova Ivanoff, was an integral tool not only in Italy, but across Western Europe during and immediately after the war. Indeed, Dunn realized the importance of the film in undermining the Communist cause, desperately trying to secure as many copies as possible for Italian audiences prior to the election. Following a protest by the Soviet Ambassador, Dunn recalls, the film enjoyed even further support across the country.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance*, p. 298.

⁵⁸ A number of articles appeared in *Il Corriere Della Sera* in the first two months of 1949 detailing the plight of Kravchenko in the "*processo del secolo*", or trial of the century. *Il Corriere della Sera*, January 27, 1949, January 28, 1949, February 3, 1949, February 8, 1949, and February 9, 1949. For an in-depth discussion on Victor Kravchenko see Gary Kern, *The Kravchenko Case: One Man's War on Stalin*, (New York: Enigma Books, 2007).

⁵⁹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*, Rome, June 16, 1948, *FRUS*, 1948: III, p. 879-882.

 FINANCIAL OVERTURES

The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency managed to orchestrate funding for the campaign against Italian communism in a number of interesting ways, as mentioned above. In his summary memo to Marshall in June 1948, Dunn reflects on the project undertaken with finances from the Lire Fund. These relief and rebuilding projects were aimed at the depressed southern regions of Italy, with many of the projects incorporating a very public recognition of American support. However, it should be pointed out that the Lire Fund was indeed a euphemism for the counterpart funds stipulated by the Marshall Plan. Essentially, Americans were directing how Italian funds were being spent, adding further weight to the argument of foreign control in Italian affairs. That said, Dunn notes that De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats received capital from the fund for projects devoted to relief and rebuilding. These projects included 1.5 billion lire for vocational training for the unemployed; 1.8 million food packages; 20 million lire for a land reclamation project; 28 billion lire was allocated for the railways and 4 billion was spent retrofitting the passenger ships *Conte Biancamano* and the *Conte Grande*; finally, a further 7 billion lire was spent on agrarian aid and development in southern Italy.⁶⁰

At every appropriate occasion, Ambassador Dunn ensured his presence to highlight “the role and true purpose” of American aid and goodwill. The ambassador was there to shake hands and take pictures with Italian diplomats whenever possible as a means to increase the popularity and publicity of American goodwill towards the Italian people.

In the weeks prior to April Parliamentary election, American efforts reached a fever pitch. All the stops were pulled and as Dunn reported, “the gloves were taken off”.⁶¹ The securing of a pro-western democratic party was vital to American geo-political and strategic interests. The money which had been flowing into the nation through laundered sources found its way into the hands of *DC* politicians. The CIA provided money to individual politicians and voting officials in what historian William Corson describes as a transfer of the “corrupt political techniques perfected over the years by the Boss Tweeds.”⁶²

 NEWSPAPER COVERAGE-THE US MESSAGE IN THE ITALIAN PRESS

Carrying the message of American goodwill, newspapers within Italy were vital in illuminating the benefit of a continued American presence within the nation. The information

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 879-882

⁶¹ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, April 7, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 868.*

⁶² Corson, *Armies of Ignorance*, p. 298.

war found an effective tool to reach the masses of the Italian population through the press. William Blum estimates that as much as 82 percent of Italy's newspapers were "in the hands of those unsympathetic to the left."⁶³ What this meant is that the propaganda of American goodwill easily found a home within the pages of Italian newspapers. Stories of American goodwill and of the benefits Italians enjoyed because of the relationship were soon flooding the pages of moderate newspapers. One such daily newspaper, *Il Corriere Della Sera* carried virtually daily updates on the nature of American funding for Italian reconstruction,⁶⁴ the special relationship between the Italian people and the US,⁶⁵ and other policies favored by the Italian government including the potential for revision of the Peace Treaty.⁶⁶

Indeed, Italians received an endorsement from the American business community that "*desiderano ristabilire contatti normali con produttori e commercianti di qui*" (wish to re-establish normal contacts with producers and businesses in Italy).⁶⁷ However, in the interest of protecting American investment in the restructuring of Italy as a strong, independent ally, security and stability would have to return to the nation. The December 12 1947 issue of *Il Corriere della Sera* ran Truman's declaration to protect Italian independence, whether threatened "*direttamente o indirettamente*", through measures most adapted for the maintenance of peace and security.⁶⁸

A retrospective article from March 31, 1949 reflects on the "*primo anno del piano Marshall*." The headline asserts that De Gasperi saw a relation between peace and the supplies furnished to Italy from the United States. Over the course of the year, nearly 700 ships arrived in Italian ports.⁶⁹

By taking the message to the press, the US was focusing their assault on the hearts and minds of average Italians. News stories covered the full gamut of potential Italian concerns and especially highlighted the benefit the American presence was having for the recovery, stability,

⁶³ Blum, *The CIA*, p. 28.

⁶⁴ Ugo Stile, "227 milioni di dollari per aiuti urgenti all'Italia," *Il Corriere della Sera*, November 11, 1947, p. 1; "Il senato degli su approva gli aiuti urgenti all'Italia," *Il Corriere della Sera* November 20, 1947, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Ivanoe Bonomi, "America e Italia," *Il Corriere della Sera*, October 3, 1947, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Ugo Stile, "Washington non e contraria all revisione del trattato," *Il Corriere della Sera*, January 22, 1947, p. 1.; "Gli Stati Uniti favorevoli al principio della revisione," *Il Corriere della Sera*, February 13, 1947, p. 1.

⁶⁷ "L'amicizia degli Stati Uniti-ambasciatore Dunn" *Il Corriere della Sera*, March 25, 1947, p. 2.

⁶⁸ "Una Dichiarazione Di Truman: L'indipendenza dell'italia garantita dagli Stati Uniti," *Il Corriere della Sera*, December 14, 1947, p. 1.

⁶⁹ "Primo anno del piano Marshall," *Il Corriere della Sera*, March 31, 1949, p. 1. (*Il primo anno del piano Marshall – De Gasperi crede alla Pace—Una relazione sui risultati delle forniture all'italia—700 Navi arrivate nei nostril porti—La ricostruzione in atto*)

and prosperity of the Italian people. Furthermore, the implication was clear, that should Italians vote in a communist government, the sources of American aid and goodwill would dry up.

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On Election Day, Italians went to the polls to vote in a campaign that had taken on epic consequences. American propaganda efforts, financed through both explicit financial overtures and covert psychological means, by design placed the essence of the election as a choice between freedom and domination, between democracy and totalitarianism, between West and East.⁷⁰ On this day, the majority of Italians chose democracy over totalitarianism, as American officials would have them believe. The DCs won 307 of 504 Parliamentary seats.⁷¹ Within the offices and halls of Washington, the DC's success was read as an American success in influencing the domestic affairs of other, sovereign nations. Indeed, success came about through a strategic effort on the part of American intelligence officials. Specific seats were targeted for DC victory and the full force of American support was placed behind this goal. Corson reflects on the three types of Italian politician the CIA encountered. The first type enthusiastically took money and support from whomever would help, while others were in the election for personal reasons and were less receptive to American interference. Finally, the third personality required gentle persuasion and sometimes coercion to go along with the American, pro-democracy line. It would be this personality that would lock the CIA and the United States into a continued relationship with Italian politics. Corson quotes the CIA's assessment following the election results: "Although the operation was quite successful, whether we like it or not now we're intimately involved in Italian politics and the next time the price tag will be considerably higher."⁷²

With the re-election of Alcide De Gasperi as Prime Minister the US had succeeded in securing a pro-Western head of state within Italy. The first phase of the reconstruction/reorientation plan for Italy had been successful. Over the next five years, the US would set about to further influence the nation into taking increasing steps to the west.

⁷⁰ *The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, March 5, 1948, FRUS, 1948: III, p. 842.*

⁷¹ Corson, *Armies of Ignorance*, p. 298.

⁷² CIA "after action" assessment quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 298-99.

CHAPTER 4 – PHASE TWO-FINESSING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TO FURTHER SOLIDIFY THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

With the re-election of Alcide De Gasperi as Prime Minister the US had succeeded in securing a pro-Western head of state within Italy. The first phase of the reconstruction/reorientation plan for Italy had been successful. Over the next five years, the US would set about to further influence the nation into taking increasing steps towards full economic, political, and ultimately military alignment with the West.

Over the next few years, American policy aimed at working within this elected pro-western government to further cement Italy within the American policy framework and to forestall communist sympathies. In this second period of American intervention, US officials saw reforms, economic growth and social development as the means to reduce the Communist presence.¹ Within this second phase of American policy toward Italy, the US continued to use the Marshall Plan funding to shore up the economic and political future of the country, this time acting through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Secondly, and most pressing strategically, certain individuals in Washington pressed for prospective Italian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty as a means of ultimately securing Italy within the American-dominated western framework.

They did so in part because of the geographical significance of the peninsula nation as well as the psychological effect of buttressing democratic forces in Western Europe at a time when other nations were struggling. In 1948, Allied forces were busy airlifting supplies into Berlin as the Soviets began to take a stronger stance in international affairs. Meanwhile, international tensions were surely on the rise by 1950 when the Korean War began. These events sealed American convictions on the nature of Communist expansion. At a time when international tensions were heating up elsewhere, Italy provided a sound example of “unorthodox tools of power politics” which helped the US realize options other than open warfare in influencing foreign nations.²

CONTROL OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY THROUGH THE ECA

With the passing of the European Recovery Plan in April 1948, the American foreign policy establishment thought it had created an effective tool to help steer the reconstruction efforts of recipient nations. One of the principle methods of controlling reconstruction was

¹ Mario Del Pero, “The United States and “Psychological Warfare” in Italy, 1948-1955”, *The Journal of American History*, vol. 87, no. 4, (March 2001): 1304-1334.

² *Ibid.* p. 1306.

through counterpart funds. Within the provisions of the ERP, these funds were sums in the nation's own currency, in this case the lira, that were earned through the sale of goods sent by the American government. No dollars exchanged hands; rather the funds were deposited into special accounts that could be used only with consent of American officials. While it was up to the Europeans to decide how the counterpart funds were to be spent, the Americans maintained a veto power over the disbursement and maintained the sole authority to release or block withdrawals. Indeed, this power granted the US one of the principal, albeit weak, means of influencing the economic and political policies of the Italian government in the period 1948-1951.³

With that said, it cannot be taken as a given that simply because the US controlled financing of Italian reconstruction projects through the allocation of counterpart funds that they exercised absolute control over the Italians. Indeed, a number of difficulties would arise over the initial two years of the plan that would forestall American efforts to secure their aims of greater capital investment and currency stabilization.⁴ First off, American policy was directed through three separate channels. On the top was the Economic Cooperation Administration Washington (ECA/Washington). The second level was the Office of the Special Representative (OSR) located in Paris, while the third position was that of the Special Mission representative on the ground in recipient nations. Frequent disagreement between these branches forestalled any cohesive strategy from emerging in the initial few years.⁵

Differing views on the best course of financial recovery emerged throughout the period. The Special Mission representative in Italy, James Zellerbach, more often than not supported the Italian side of the economic debate. While Washington was pushing for ever increasing capital investment in the retooling of industry and agriculture, Italian officials, led by Minister of the Treasury Giuseppe Pella resisted large scale withdrawals from the counterpart funds in an effort to avoid inflation. In the eyes of the Italians, it was far better to maintain a stable currency than to support risky investments with the possibility of inflation.

Furthermore, the Italians resisted submitting a detailed economic plan to the ECA for approval, as determined by the bilateral agreements contained in the Marshall Plan. Internal disagreements and disorganization in defining reconstruction needs led to a severe communication breakdown. By the fall of 1948, all the Italians had come up with was a basic allotment of counterpart investments to various sectors of the economy. In all, 50 percent was to

³ Esposito, America's Feeble Weapon, p. 6-7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵ Ibid., p. 128-136.

go to politically popular expenditures, such as workers' housing, agricultural projects and public works.⁶ This allocation was designed to appease the peasants and unemployed in a move that seemed more political than economic.

Indeed, American planners failed to realize the politicization of the ERP within Italy. The Italian concept of *bella figura*, roughly making a good showing, came into play in ERP matters. Positions of authority within ERP administration were coveted by ministers and civil servants as they were seen to imbue not only prestige but the ability to pursue political patronage. The upshot of this was severe disarray within the Italian economic organization and motivations not necessarily based in the national interest.⁷

Adding further to this disorganization, the Christian Democrat party itself was fragmented into four distinct camps. The *Maggioritaria*, or majority, was made up of party stalwarts like De Gasperi and Mario Scelba. Personal prestige took the place of any strong political platform.⁸ The right side of the *DC* organized around the *Vespisti* faction and was characterized by strong catholic tendencies as well some fascist sympathies. On the left side of the party were the groups led by Giovanni Gronchi and Giuseppe Dossetti. Gronchi's cadre encompassed those who felt that the *DC* relied too heavily on American patronage. Dossetti and his *Cronache Sociali* called for a more active economic role within the government.⁹

The split within the Christian Democrat party becomes important when considering that American support was first and foremost behind Alcide De Gasperi. As such, the Americans favored and supported economic and political moves made by the Prime Minister, regardless of the benefit to reconstruction. Indeed the team of De Gasperi and Giuseppe Pella would come to dominate the Italian side of the ERP debate. Despite the various factions vying for control of the party, the Americans continued to back De Gasperi and Pella as they saw no alternative that would "provide the same guarantees in terms of pro-Western and anti-Communist consolidation in Italy."¹⁰ Minister of the Treasury Pella's policy sought to restrict capital investment to levels sufficient to avoid inflation. Indeed, through their unilateral support of De Gasperi and Pella, the US missed an opportunity to back the moderate leftist forces within the party that would have favored higher investments and more concrete planning.¹¹ Rather, Dossetti and the younger

⁶ Esposito lists the funding as 28% for agricultural projects, 14% for workers' housing and reforestation, and 8% for public works. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 156

⁹ On the various factions see *Ibid.*, p. 156-160.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

leftist influences within the party were undesirable as leaders for the US, and as such, American calls for greater investment went unheeded.

In the summer of 1949, the DC held a party congress in Venice at which they began to cave to American pressures for higher capital investment. One of the major turning points of this conference was the slackening of ECA controls over counterpart fund disbursement policies. In an episode of brilliant politicking, De Gasperi managed to do away with ECA revision of individual projects in favor of counterpart allocation based on broad sector-by-sector funding.¹² In essence, De Gasperi had succeeded in securing greater counterpart funding with less restrictions. In fact, what emerged was a disparity between ECA releases and actual government expenditures. This represented a political victory for De Gasperi as he was able to publicize the success of the program in disbursing funds without necessarily having to spend them. As such, he was able to maintain Pella's anti-inflationary policies.¹³ As well, the funds could be steered towards politically profitable endeavors, rather than strictly financially profitable ones.

In effect crippling one of the arms of American reach into Italian economic affairs, the freeing up of counterpart funding provisions by De Gasperi meant that a new method of influencing the Italians was necessary. By late 1950, the Americans finally came to the conclusion that the anti-inflationist policies of Pella were the main obstacle towards deeper Italian investment in reconstruction. The new method of influencing Italian economic policy came in the person of Zellerbach's replacement, Leon Dayton. As new head of the Rome Mission, Dayton took a strong tack against Italian economic policies that thus far had seen little investment in the economy and little progress in ERP goals.

Determined to reverse what his predecessor had been unable to do, Dayton publicly and sternly criticized both the government and Italian business community on numerous occasions. The newly installed Mission head contended that government was too restrictive and business too reactive to inflationary scares. In a speech before the American Chamber of Commerce for Italy in Genoa, Dayton employed a strong allusion to the fate the business community could share with Mussolini,

“Gentlemen, is there anyone here who believes that half-measures, half-cooperation and timid support of a plan to vitalize democracy, can win anything except the privilege of hanging from the arcade of a filling station, should we lose?”¹⁴

¹² *Ibid.*, p 164-166.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.168.

¹⁴ “‘Business and Industry in the Struggle against Communism,’ Speech by Mr. Dayton Before the American Chamber of Commerce for Italy – Genoa Branch, October 19, 1950”; RG 469, ECA/OSR, Info. Div. –Pol. Plan. Sec., Country Files, box 7 in *Ibid.*, p. 190.

De Gasperi and the *DC* were shocked by the turn taken by the ECA Mission head. Dayton had not only ruffled the feathers of the ruling party, but the *PCI* responded with denunciations of US imperialism and were aghast that the American would make such incendiary public attacks against the government and people of Italy.¹⁵

However, in the light of the rise in international tensions precipitated by the Korean conflict, the US considered that a new tactic was necessary. International inflation was an initial effect which spurred the Americans into action. However, the major influencing factor was that the US now sought Italian military investments. Resistance to a rearmament program would signal a reluctance to cooperate with their alliance. The Cold War was no longer about propaganda victories between east and west. Physical conflict had broken out in Asia and the US used shame to prod the Italians into action. By late fall 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson joined in on the public attack on Giuseppe Pella. Acheson argued that the Italians valued the stability of the currency as more important than rearmament.¹⁶ Backing Acheson's views, ECA official Harlan Cleveland asserted that the US needed to restate its policy clearly laying out "the relationship of the investment program, the military effort and Italian financial stability."¹⁷

INCORPORATING ITALY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Where the US efforts to control the direction of Italian restructuring through counterpart funds and the Marshall plan were unsuccessful, a number of State Department officials recognized an alternative avenue of stimulating Italian engagement with the West. Shortly before the April Parliamentary election of 1948, governments of the Atlantic regions of Western Europe engaged in discussions concerning a mutual defense network known as the Brussels Pact. Negotiations for the inclusion of Italy within the Brussels pact ultimately gave way to negotiations for Italy's inclusion within the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). The documentary records over the negotiation amongst western powers to include Italy within the NAT are telling of both the intentions and the perceptions of leading powers such as the United States, France and Great Britain, with regards to the peninsula nation, under threat from internal and external communist subversion. For their part, Italians played their hand very well at seeing the safety and security of their nation tied into a formal network with the other nations of the Atlantic community. The conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 can be regarded as one of the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁷ Cleveland to Dayton, October 20, 1950; RG 469, ECA/OSR, Progr. Div.- Country Desk Sec., Country Files, box 10. in *Ibid.*, p. 195.

final steps at cementing Italy within the western economic and military framework, dominated by and from Washington.

The road to Italian inclusion with the NAT was a rocky one at best. It certainly was not a foregone conclusion that the former axis nation would have a seat at the western table. Prior to the election results in the Parliamentary plebiscite, the major powers of the Brussels pact, namely France, Britain and the Benelux nations, were hesitant to include Italy within their agreement. During initial discussions towards the Brussels Pact in February and March 1948, Italy's position was tenuous. Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak advocated postponing Italian membership until after the election results were in.¹⁸ To be sure, on the Italian side, membership within the pact carried significant political risk. In response to British foreign minister Ernest Bevin's proposal, Italian ambassador Alberto Tarchiani responded with some hesitation on the apparent secondary position of the Italians within the agreement.¹⁹

Indeed, support for Italian membership would only come following Alcide De Gasperi and the *DC* success at the polls in April. When the Brussels pact was finalized on March 17, 1948, Italy was excluded. Secretary of State Marshall prodded Dunn to inquire on the Italian reaction to this event and whether rapid Italian membership within the pact would serve to solidify the position of the *DC*. Dunn responded that due to the fact that the Italian parliament was still up in the air, De Gasperi did not feel confident in joining any new alliances at the time, but was eager to join such an agreement eventually.²⁰ The Italian Prime Minister was keen on securing his political position at home before engaging his nation in an international defense arrangement. However, the State Department and the Policy Planning Staff continued to see the benefit in Italy's inclusion.²¹ The PPS prodded NAT members to invite Italy to join, should such an overture benefit the Italian leader. Following De Gasperi's and the *DC* victory in April, the US reasserted its position that they would wish to see Italy within the Brussels Pact. With the political situation in Italy somewhat stabilized, and with the American backed Christian Democrats in a position of relative control, the State Department felt assured in offering that

¹⁸ E. Timothy Smith, "The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty," *Diplomatic History* vol. 7 no. 2 (Spring 1983). Smith cemented his research on the role of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty in his book, *The United States, Italy, and NATO, 1947-52*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

¹⁹ Conversations with Tarchiani, 18 February 1948, RG 59, 865.00/2-1848, box 6677, decimal Files, US Department of State, National Archives, Washington. In *Ibid.* p. 141.

²⁰ Marshall to Dunn, 11 March 1948, *FRUS 1948*, 3:45-46; Dunn to Secretary of State, *FRUS, 1948: III*, pp. 53-54. in *Ibid.* p. 141-142.

²¹ "Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff Concerning Western Union and Related Problems, PPS 27," March 23, 1948, *FRUS, 1948: 3*, p. 61-62.

“Italy’s inclusion would be natural and desirable.”²² However, before discussions towards this end could get much further, the geographically limited Brussels Pact soon gave way to a new agreement which would solidify the western powers within a pact of a far larger scope.

Such an agreement was the North Atlantic Treaty. The Brussels Pact, seen as a precursor to the more encompassing NAT, was quickly overshadowed by the trans-Atlantic negotiations occurring over the newly proposed military framework between the major powers of Britain, the United States and Canada. To be sure, the position of Italy within a Western defense scheme remained a source of much debate throughout 1948. There were many issues surrounding Italian membership within the NAT. First, initial Italian reluctance to join the Brussels Pact caused some powers to question Italian sincerity to the point that in September 1948, De Gasperi formally stated his nation’s alignment with the Western states “from [the] point of ideology and common objectives of independence and individual liberty.”²³ Others objected to the apparent liability of including Italy within a military pact as a drain on valuable resources.²⁴

Interestingly, there existed some reluctance within the State Department in seeing Italy included in the NAT. PPS Chairman George Kennan and Counselor Charles “Chip” Bohlen not only opposed Italian membership, but were averse to the whole concept of the NAT.²⁵ Preoccupation with military affairs, Kennan felt, would place economic recovery and political stability across the continent into a secondary, possibly marginalized, position.²⁶

SUPPORT FOR ITALY IN NAT

In the international discussions over Italy’s involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty, there were few advocates for the Mediterranean nation. With that said, there were indeed a number of important reasons to see the nation engaged within either the NAT or the more limited Brussels Pact, including military, political, and economic reasons. Amongst those in the Italian corner were France and the United States. France supported Italian inclusion within the NAT as a source of selfish geographical security. Failure to secure Italy within the military framework would see her southern borders left vulnerable.

American support for Italian NAT membership was embodied in the person of the State Department, Western European Desk’s John D. Hickerson. An early and persistent advocate for

²² “Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff Concerning Western Union and Related Problems, PPS 27,” March 23, 1948, *FRUS, 1948*: 3, p. 61-62.

²³ “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Sept 15, 1948, *FRUS, 1948*: III, p. 252-53.

²⁴ Smith, “Subversion,” p. 145

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 149.

²⁶ Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, (Boston, 1967), p. 402-410 in *Ibid.* p. 150.

Italy, Hickerson defied those in Washington who wished to see the NAT limited in geographic scope. In response to PPS 43, in which Kennan asserted that the agreement should include only those whose shores are “washed by the Atlantic”, Hickerson quoted “an officer in the Pentagon” who “recently referred to a Western Union arrangement omitting Italy as being like a man going out to dinner in evening clothes minus his trousers, thereby exposing a part of the body which should never be exposed....”²⁷ Control over the traditional ‘soft underbelly of Europe’ would not be left to chance. The United States would assert control over the nation, and as such lay a claim to strategic power in the Mediterranean.

The Italian cause found a further friend in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Members of the military recognized the strategic importance of including the nation in terms of Western Europe’s defense and stability. “In terms of land warfare in Western Europe, Italy [was] strategically important. In terms of sea warfare, there is no question as to her critical strategic potentiality with respect to control of the Mediterranean.”²⁸

ITALY PLAYS ITS HAND

Undeniably, there was a definite benefit for De Gasperi to state such alignment at the time. In conversation Social Democrat leader Giuseppe Saragat, De Gasperi highlighted the benefit such an arrangement would carry. Italian membership would all but guarantee US aid in the face of Soviet aggression and that the choice was between a US guarantee or isolation and defenselessness.²⁹ Underlying this reasoning is the continuation of American military and economic aid flowing into the nation to help shore up a signatory member of the agreement.

In their communication with the Western leaders, Italian politicians stressed the political sabotage of failing to secure Italy within either the Brussels Pact or the NAT. Ambassador Tarchiani claimed that the Communists, “would have a field day” over the exclusion of Italy from the western agreements, leading most likely to civil unrest and the destruction of any possibility of economic recovery or political stability.³⁰ The Italian government knew where to hit the Americans to see that inclusion of Italy became a popular cause within Washington and elsewhere. In a move to eliminate Canadian objections, the Italian ambassador to Canada

²⁷ “Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, PPS 43,” November 23, 1948, *FRUS, 1948*: III, pp. 284-85; “Hickerson to McWilliams” November 24, 1948, RG 59, 840.20-11-2448, box C-510, decimal Files, US Department of State, National Archives, Washington. In *Ibid.* p. 151.

²⁸ “Memorandum by Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal),” January 5, 1949, *FRUS, 1949*: IV, pp. 12-13. in *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²⁹ *New York Times*, 7 January 1949, in *Ibid.*, p. 148.

³⁰ “The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Acting Secretary of State,” January 10, 1949, *FRUS, 1949*: 4, p. 18.

exclaimed to Minister for External Affairs Lester Pearson that failure to secure Italian membership would see a reaction so severe it would “endanger the tenure of [the] present government.”³¹

AMERICA GUARANTEES CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT STABILITY

The State Department’s Hickerson would echo these largely political implications in his case for Italian participation within the western security pacts. For him, the case was less about the geographic or strategic importance of Italy, and more about the political importance of securing the nation within an agreement.

“I hated to see one of the mothers of our civilization go communist when I felt that it could be avoided....*We won the election* and I hated to see that lost by having them left out of the treaty.”³²

Hickerson’s statement as to the importance of the inclusion of Italy speaks beyond any other explanation. To be sure, there certainly existed legitimate geographic and military considerations for Italy’s inclusion within the North Atlantic Treaty. However, when taken in context of the fact that the United States had just secured itself a friendly political party within the Italian government, it becomes clear that there was a definite motivation to protect that party, and in effect, America’s ability to influence that party through an additional agreement. Thus, on 8 March 1949, Hickerson met with Tarchiani to formally invite Italy to participate as an original member in the negotiations towards the North Atlantic Treaty. In an interview with historian E. Timothy Smith, Hickerson reflected on the implications of Italy’s inclusion with the NAT. According to Hickerson, if the *PCI* had attempted a coup following Italy’s membership within the NAT, fellow signatories would be obliged to assist the Italian government, in this case the ruling Christian Democrats.³³

Indeed, the National Security Council backed up Hickerson’s assertion in 1950 with NSC 67/1. The document states that in the case of an internal communist insurrection, the Italian government would require assistance and “may be expected to invoke the appropriate provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.”³⁴ Smith concluded that

“the pact not only fully integrated Italy into the Western bloc, but it also created a mechanism that could be used to prevent the *PCI* from coming to power and aligning Italy with the Soviet

³¹ “Steinhardt to the Secretary of State,” 27 January 1949, RG 59, 840.20/1-2749 box C-511, decimal files, Department of State, National Archives in Smith, “Subversion, 149.

³² (Italics mine) Personal interview (Smith) with Hickerson, 18, June 1980 in *Ibid.* p. 155.

³³ Personal interview (Smith) with Hickerson, 18, June 1980 in *Ibid.*, p. 155.

³⁴ NSC 67/1, April 21, 1950, *FRUS, 1950: III*, pp. 1487-89.

Union.” [adding] ... Until Italy could rebuild its strength... the NAT would protect the Christian Democratic government from indigenous Communist ambitions. By providing an adequate physical and psychological defense against internal subversion, Italy’s membership in the NAT provided the security believed essential by the United States for economic recovery.”³⁵

Thus, by 1949, the political, military, and economic future of Italy was protected within an American guarantee to aid the Christian Democrats should the Communists attempt to overtake the democratic process. Where control of Italian economic recovery through the allowance or disallowance of funding through the counterpart provisions of the Marshall Plan was stalling, the inclusion of Italy within the American dominated North Atlantic Treaty provided a modicum of stability necessary to spur further capital investment within the nation.

Additionally, an important precedent is inherent within the American push to extend NAT membership to Italy. As Hickerson stated, the Americans had prevailed in their preference during the Italian election. It was now up to them to protect their investment, so to speak, through the continued military and political support of Alcide De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats. It would be a shame to lose the nation in the second stage of American involvement in Italy after the hard-fought battle to secure a friendly, democratic government in the first phase.

American involvement in supporting the Christian Democrats would not end soon. Interest would continue over the following years and decades. The *DC* would maintain a grip on power for the next forty years, with a large helping hand from their American backers. In 1965, McGeorge Bundy would proclaim the program of buying influence in Italy and supporting the Christian Democrats “the annual shame.”³⁶

The American intervention in Italy was really made up of two periods. The first period represents the US involvement in securing a centrist government with which to deal with. This period is roughly the beginning of 1947 to April 1948. Following the re-election of De Gasperi in April 1948, the Americans had managed to tie up their policies with those of the centrist-moderate and mainly capitalist democratic government.

Over the next few years, the American policy was aimed at working within this pro-Western elected government to further cement Italy within the American policy framework and to forestall communist sympathies. In this second period, US officials saw reforms, economic growth and social development as the means to reduce Communist presence.³⁷ The US used the

³⁵ Smith, “Subversion,” p. 155.

³⁶ 303 Committee Meeting, June 25, 1965, *FRUS, 1965*, 7 in Weiner, *Ashes*, p. 298.

³⁷ Del Pero, “Psychological Warfare” pp. 1304-1334.

Marshall Plan funding, through the ECA in an attempt to influence policy as well as prospective membership in the North Atlantic Treaty.

When De Gasperi resigned as leader of the Christian Democrats, it was time for a new friendly face to assume control of the nation. Giuseppe Pella was that man, voted in August 1953; it was up to Pella to foster the uneasy economic and military alliance between Italy and the United States.

CHAPTER 5-ASSESSING US SUCCESS THROUGH PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

By the early 1950s, the US had cemented their relationship with Italy in a number of economic and military agreements. Metrics of US success emerged in 1952 and 1953 when a number of highly informative public opinion surveys were conducted throughout Italy. These surveys offer a unique and rarely considered version of US success in influencing the hearts and minds of everyday Italians. Further, many accounts of the US intervention in Italy in the period 1947-1953 focus attention on the bureaucratic and diplomatic battles which occurred, while heeding little to the effect and influence these actions had on the average Italian. This relatively untapped resource within the secondary literature on the subject offers a treasure trove of insight into the effects of the American program and intention to maintain a centrist force within Italy politics. A brief introduction to the surveys should prove useful before delving into the information contained within.

Taken between 1952 and late 1953, the series of surveys set about to gauge the public's support on a number of topics including American policies, international agreements, and how deeply the communist thread persisted throughout Italy. Administered by *DOXA*, or the *Istituto per le ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica* a polling agency within Italy launched in 1946 by Professor P.L. Fegiz of Trieste University,¹ the surveys had a number of international sponsors. Amongst these sponsors were the Stern Public Opinion Research Organization in Paris, *Il Giorno Illustrato* in Rome, and the Inwood Institute from New Jersey. The international nature of the survey sponsorship points to the far-reaching implications of Italy's position within the western framework. France, undergoing similar struggles with local communist groups, would surely have been keen to ascertain Italian sympathies towards the Soviet Union and the likelihood of renewed conflict so soon after the destructive Second World War ended. Of relevance to the current topic, *DOXA* surveys S-208a and S-208b, S-326, S-327, and S-328 will be investigated.² These surveys offer relatively small sample sizes, numbering between roughly 500 and 1000 respondents. Thus, the interpretation to follow must be placed within the context of the sample size and the nature of quota sample surveys. Results quoted in the following analysis are given as valid response percentages. Thus, should individuals have

¹ Holt and van de Velde, *Strategic Psychological Operations*, p. 160.

² Special thanks to Julie Hudson, MA, PhD candidate, University of Alberta, Department of Sociology for running crosstabulation analysis and coding of research questions. Access to surveys was granted through an email request to the *Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca sul Cambiamento Politico (CIRCAP)* at the Università degli Studi di Siena, Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Giuridiche Politiche e Sociali.² CIRCAP acquired the raw survey data from the University of Wisconsin and the University of Connecticut and transcribed it into the modern statistical software SPSS. CIRCAP maintains no responsibility for the interpretation of data given within.

abstained from answering, or offered an answer deemed invalid, they will not be counted in the percentage of those responding.

There are some definite limitations to the *DOXA* sources. Primarily, they were taken five years following the 1948 election and the ‘invitation’ of the Americans to the party. International and domestic events, as well as other tensions, may definitely have swayed responses and influenced the results. Furthermore, while difficult, I don’t believe it impossible to draw some conclusions as to the perceptions of the American intervention as felt by average Italians. While limited by sample size, years administered, and correspondingly, the possibility of outside influence on responses, they offer a unique voice to average Italian political supports, fears, and perceptions surrounding America’s involvement in their nation’s post-War redevelopment.

The lines of questioning may be organized into a few broad categories across the five survey groups under investigation. Of specific interest will be the nature of support across the traditional North/South demarcation that has dominated Italian political and economic life. There will be an attempt at defining both general feelings regarding the likelihood of renewed conflict and the issues most pressing to everyday Italians, as well as more specific areas of questioning regarding the nature of Italian support for American policies and aid programs, Soviet influences, and the support for the *DC* party. Finally, in most cases, figures used are taken as valid percentages of responses, unless otherwise stated.

THE TENUOUS POSITION OF ITALIAN SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY; FEELINGS TOWARDS STABILITY AND COMMON WESTERN DEFENSE

Through a general investigation of the data, a number of questions regarding Italian security emerge. First and foremost, did the US presence within Italy lead to a greater feeling of international security and stability? Secondly, how was the concept of the Western Union perceived? Was there a hesitancy amongst Italians to place sovereignty in the hands of the North Atlantic community?

In the time between the April 1948 election of the western-aligned Christian Democrat party and the 1952 *DOXA* S-208 (A and B) surveys, Italy’s position within the international and European community had changed little. Indeed, nearly half of respondents indicated either war or international tension as their greatest fear, with 31.7 percent and 18.6 percent respectively for a total of 50.3 percent.³

In defining the effect of the western defense network on the feeling of security and stability amongst Italians, nearly 70 percent of respondents answered that a common European

³ *DOXA* S-208B Var016. (Percentage of valid responses)

defense network contributed to the maintenance of peace, while 31 percent responded it made war more probable. While not statistically significant due to the limited sampling size, there is a clear break between the northern regions and the central, southern and insular regions in responses. While the former region favors the stabilization of peace through common defense at 73.5 percent, only approximately 64.4 percent of the latter regions felt that a common European defense network would contribute to the maintenance of peace. Nearly two-thirds of Italians sampled supported Italian participation within a common European defense network as the right policy for maintaining stability and peace.⁴ While some variance exists amongst the different geographic regions, the overall trend was towards support within such a framework. It may be possible to infer that the ideological ultimatum presented by the United States in the 1948 campaign had been successful in stirring support amongst Italians to participate within a common defense network. After all, the moderate and non-communist forces within Italy wished not to be left to stand up to the Communist advance alone.

NATO

Follow-up survey *DOXA S-326* probes Italian support for Italy's continued presence within the Atlantic Treaty. Nearly 69 percent indicated outright approval of Italy's course within the security establishment, while 24.5 percent responded that the nation should discontinue its role within the treaty organization.⁵ Perhaps, this can be attributed to the fact that only about 63 percent of respondents could assert that they had indeed heard of NATO, while almost 18 percent indicated they had not heard of the organization.⁶ Additionally, when questioned on whether individual support for NATO had increased or decreased over the last year, 66 percent of the total number surveyed provided an answer. Of those responses, 54 percent indicated their support remained unchanged, while 26.6 percent indicated their support for the organization had slipped over the preceding year. Conversely, nearly 20 percent of those who gave an answer indicated their support for NATO had grown over the preceding year.⁷

The survey provides some insight into the reasoning for respondents' indication of either growth or decline of support for NATO. Of the total 693 respondents, only 305 offered valid responses to the question. Some 388 either failed to provide an answer or provided an answer differing from those listed on the survey. Favorable responses to NATO received 42.6 percent of

⁴ *DOXA S-208A Var022*.

⁵ Of 481 valid responses. *DOXA S-326 Var 051*. 6.5 percent of valid responses indicated yes with some reserve, while 29.7 percent of respondents abstained from answer the question.

⁶ *DOXA S-326 Var 049*.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Var 052.

the valid answers, with peace (16.4 percent) and security (17.4 percent) outweighing NATO's attractiveness as a bulwark against communism (8.9 percent). For those indicating an unfavorable view of Italy's involvement with NATO, 22.6 percent indicated either that it would cheat the Italian people, that the organization lacked solidarity, or that it tended to treat Italy poorly while serving the interests of the Allies, mainly America.⁸

On the larger question of the best solution to prevent a new war, respondents were split between disarmament for Italy (35.2 percent) and an agreement with America and other democracies to create a common defense network (42.1 percent). In conjunction with this, nearly two-thirds of respondents indicated either not enough had been (35.9 percent), or that what had been accomplished was insufficient (31.2 percent) in increasing the military power of the nation.⁹

Within roughly one year of the *DOXA* S-208 surveys, *DOXA* S-326 reports that 54 percent of respondents in that round of questioning felt that increased European armament would prove to be the best means of avoiding renewed warfare.¹⁰ Correspondingly, for those respondents who favored an increase in Italian armament, nearly 95 percent indicated it was desirable for America to rearm Italy.¹¹

Efforts at creating a strong common European defense force would prove to be invaluable in promoting stability and confidence amongst Italians. Indeed, such an undertaking only grew in importance as tensions were on the rise around the world. Fear of a Third World War was strongest amongst respondents from insular and southern Italian regions (47.5 percent and 46.5 percent, respectively), while central and northern Italians were somewhat more restrained in their fears of such a conflict (35.6 percent and 26.1 percent, respectively.)¹² There is no concrete way of interpreting this disparity other than the traditional break between North and South within Italian politics and economics.

Overall, roughly 43 percent indicated confidence in the Common Defense Force's ability to repel the Soviet invasion, while a further 43 percent split between resisting for a short period (20.6 percent) and occupation followed by a long struggle for freedom (23.7 percent). Italians clearly recognized the importance of tying their security into the larger American framework. They had indicated the belief that should the Soviets attack, the United States and other NATO countries would come to the aid of the Italian people and resist Communist aggressions.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Var 053.

⁹ *DOXA* S-208B Var 021.

¹⁰ *DOXA* S-326 Var 041.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Var 042. 95 percent of the 54 percent indicated support for American rearmament of Italy.

¹² Based on valid responses. Respondents who didn't know or failed to give an answer were omitted from these calculations.

THE RUSSIAN INFLUENCE

During the period in question, both the leaders in the United States and in Italy stressed the possibility of a Communist insurrection and possible accession to power through legal means. In actual fact, documentation emerging from the American embassy in Rome points to a decline in support for the *PCI* in the weeks leading up to the April election. Yet American politicians clearly saw a benefit in keeping them in a position of relative power, as highlighted by ORE 21/1 in 1947.¹³ Clearly, the *PCI* remained in a position of opposition to the *DCs* for the following decades.

To be sure, the *DOXA* surveys may demand a closer investigation of the relative levels of support for communism and the *PCI*. Limited by the number of respondents, they will serve to illuminate overall trends within society and can not be taken as representative of the whole population in general.

In the period 1947-1953, Soviet intervention in Italian affairs appeared to be a major concern for both the *DCs* and their American backers. For the average Italian responding to the *DOXA* surveys, the possibility of renewed warfare in the period 1952-1955 carried 23 percent, with southern and insular regions indicating a slightly higher likelihood at 36.4 and 39.4 percent respectively, while the northern and central regions indicated 15.7 and 20.9 percent respectively.¹⁴ For those answering the survey questions, heightened international tensions did not necessarily entail the reemergence of warfare. These results point to the confidence and importance of maintaining the Italian nation within a common defense network as a requisite for maintaining their position within a larger economic and political framework.

DOXA survey S-208 set about to gauge respondents' thoughts on a number of policy options through a simple agreement or disagreement with given statements. When confronted with the statement "Russia is so strong from a military viewpoint that no one could stop her, therefore it is useless to spend money for our defence," only 22.7 percent agreed, while over 77 percent disagreed.¹⁵ The regional breakdown is not significantly different. Respondents were then given the statement "In case of a conflict between Russia and America our country would certainly be a battlefield therefore no matter who wins, we are going to lose." On this opinion, nearly 70 percent of respondents agreed that Italy would serve as a battlefield in a Cold War

¹³ ORE 21/1, "Probable Soviet Reactions to A US Aid Program to Italy" CIG, 5 August 1947 http://gateway.proquest.com/login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CSE00013

¹⁴ *DOXA* S-208, Var027.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Var 029.

battle between the USSR and the USA.¹⁶ This may well indicate why Italy felt it important to align itself within NATO. Fully 83 percent of respondents agreed that “the countries of Western Europe together with America have good chances of resisting an attack” given unity and full mobilization.¹⁷

Taken roughly one year later, *DOXA S-327* focuses more attention on the relationship between Italy and the USSR. Respondents were asked, taking into consideration human and technical factors, was the US or the USSR stronger from a military standpoint? While the US polled just over 40 percent of the valid vote, the USSR had caught up to a level of more or less parity in the eyes of an equal 40 percent.¹⁸

Meanwhile, given the possibility of a Soviet occupation of Italy, 35.4 percent of responses indicate that those Italians would continue in their everyday normal activity. Fear of the Soviet regime was perhaps not as strong as led on by many. Only 13 percent of responses indicated they would either attempt to hide from the Soviets, or flee abroad (6.4 and 6.7 percent, respectively) while nearly 8 percent would consider the Soviets to be friends.¹⁹

ITALIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

Internally, Italian domestic politics reflected the relative breakdown of other questions within the surveys. Additionally, a parliamentary election in 1953 saw the *DCs* re-elected, this time however, they managed slightly less success at the polls than in 1948. Fully 13 percent of responses indicated that the *PCI* should be strengthened in the interest of Italy, while the socialist *PSI* and *PSDI* received 9.6 percent of the vote for parties to be strengthened in the interest of Italy.²⁰ Meanwhile, the *DCs* polled a response of 41.8 percent in favor of strengthening the party to better Italy.

When questioned as to why the Christian Democrats received less votes in the 1953 election than in 1948, responses indicated both a dissatisfaction amongst the working masses, with the social policy, the level of taxation, and the governments ability to keep campaign promises (35.2 percent). Secondly, nearly 25 percent of responses indicated disapproval of foreign policy and with Italy’s involvement in the Atlantic Treaty.²¹

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Var 030.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Var 032.

¹⁸ *DOXA S-327*, Var 035.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Var 047.

²⁰ *DOXA S-326*, Var 021.

²¹ *DOXA S-328*, Var 034.

Correspondingly, when asked to give an opinion on why the *PCI* managed to increase the number of votes polled, respondents indicated that the party supported the workers (30.4 percent), and that the majority party did not face social problems such as unemployment, high living costs, or produce rapid enough results (16.4 valid percent).²² Thus, the success of the *DC* in meeting the social and economic problems of the Italians inversely related to the level of support for the Communist party. Should the ruling centrist parties fail to secure positive results for the domestic Italian situation, voters would turn elsewhere to achieve what they desired. This correlation was indeed vital for the American backers to recognize should they wish to forestall future Communist success within Italy.

SUPPORT OF DE GASPERI, PELLA, AND THE *DC*

In relation to the general political querying within the *DOXA* survey sets, respondents were given the chance to judge the performance of then former Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and his successor Giuseppe Pella, as well as the *DC* party in general. These responses tie into the overall loss in support in the 1953 election versus the 1948 results. When prompted to assess the performance of former Prime Minister De Gasperi, responses were spread across the spectrum of full approval (10.3 percent) to full disapproval (18.3 percent). Meanwhile, 35.6 percent indicated that on the whole, they thought the former Prime Minister had done well and fully 21 percent of the responses indicated a sense that De Gasperi had done quite poorly, without making too many errors.²³ If we condense the valid responses into categories of either approval or disapproval, 45.8 percent indicate approval of De Gasperi while 54.2 percent indicate disapproval of the former Primer Minister.

It appears that the majority of disapproval for De Gasperi comes from either his affiliation with the Americans (“servile to Americans”, “too tied to Americans”) at 20 percent or from his inability to reverse the social problems plaguing the nation, ie., unemployment, housing, and the cost of living at 32 percent of the valid responses.²⁴

The inability of De Gasperi to meet the social problems and his apparent subservient relationship to the Americans led many Italians to become dissatisfied with the ruling *DCs*. While 61.4 percent indicated fair or full satisfaction over the results of the 1953 election,²⁵ 38.3 pointed to a desire to see the government shift to the left, while 35.8 percent desired to see the

²² *Ibid.*, Var 036.

²³ *DOXA* S-326, Var 026.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Var 027.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Var 021.

government maintain the central line.²⁶ Additionally, social reforms maintained a prominent role in the assessment of the success of the De Gasperi government, as 48.6 percent sought a shift in terms of social reform policies, while foreign policy received 7.4 percent of support for a shift. The combination of social reforms and foreign policy shifts from the status quo received 44 percent of the valid response.²⁷ De Gasperi's inability to meet the demands of the Italian people clearly cost his party at the polls.

In his first few months as Prime Minister, former Minister of the Treasury Giuseppe Pella enjoyed wide approval. Nearly 88 percent of valid responses indicated either full or partial approval for the activities of the newly elected *DC* Prime Minister.²⁸ That said, over 30 percent indicated that, in the interest of the country, they would like to see an extension of Pella's government that included ministers of other parties, while nearly 54 percent indicated that Pella's government should remain in power.²⁹

AMERICAN SUCCESS AT MAINTAINING A CENTRIST FORCE WITHIN ITALY

Following a continued presence within Italy for a number of years, it became necessary to assess in general, the success of American policy and the pro-American Christian Democrat government at maintaining a centrist equilibrium within the nation. *DOXA S-326* attempts to quantify this success through a number of questions designed to get at the heart of support for the American government and the western framework. When given a choice between the British, Germans, French, or Americans, fully 56 percent of the 693 respondents identified Americans as their number one preference of nationalities.³⁰

Respondents were given the chance to choose a number of adjectives to describe the Americans, first in a positive light, then in a negative light. Of the positive attributes, valid responses indicated Americans were overwhelmingly identified as "practical" (36.7 percent), in addition to "hard working" (11 percent) and "cunning" (11.5 percent). Meanwhile, when given the chance to define the US in a negative light, respondents tended to identify the Americans as "conceited" (32.3 percent) and "naïve" (18.8 percent). Interestingly, where only 156 of the total 693 responses were missing for the positive adjective question, nearly half of the responses were

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Var 024.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Var 025.

²⁸ *DOXA S-328*, Var 023.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Var 046.

³⁰ *DOXA S-326*, Var 037.

missing for the negative adjective question (337 of 693 missing), perhaps indicating uncertainty over the anonymity of the surveys.³¹

When defining American diplomacy, the majority of valid responses were split amongst three possible choices: “cunning” received 22.9 percent; “daring” received 23.8 percent; and, “naïve” received 29 percent.³²

In the eyes of the average Italian, American ambitions were global. Nearly 75 percent felt it either true (31.1 percent) or at least partly true (43.6 percent) that the US aimed to dominate the world. Furthermore, respondents were given the opportunity to assess why the US continued to give financial aid to the Italy.³³ Nearly 40 percent of responses indicated a belief that the US was trying to prevent Italy from becoming communist. Only 27.2 percent of responses indicated the belief that the US wished to gain Italy as an ally against Russia, while 20 percent of the responses pointed to a belief that the US wished to use the aids to take over the Italian market.

Indeed, American interest in Italy was examined in *DOXA* S-326. Nearly 40 percent indicated that the US interfered too much in the affairs of Italy. However, 43.6 percent saw US interest as the right amount, while a further 17 percent indicated that the US did not take a sufficient interest in Italy. When prompted to assess whether the US presence had influenced the way of living and tastes of Italians, 73 percent responded affirmatively, while 47 percent of those who responded with affirmative answers indicated that the influence was positive. Conversely, 30 percent of the affirmative responses indicated that this influence was negative, while roughly 23 percent found the influence to be neither positive nor negative.

CONCLUSIONS ON *DOXA* SOURCES

It may well be hard to read into the overall Italian feelings towards the increased presence of the United States within their country following the Second World War. As stated above, sample sizes are relatively low, and thus can only offer a glimpse into the domestic Italian situation. With that said, some interesting trends emerge from the results. For one, the American tactic of broadening the implications of Italian domestic politics to an international scope was successful in fostering a sense of democracy versus totalitarianism within the hearts and minds of the Italian people. Additionally, the majority of Italian respondents indicated that Italian security

³¹ *Ibid.*, Var 038.

³² *Ibid.*, Var 043.

³³ *Ibid.*, Var 040. Respondents were given the chance to rank the five possible responses. In this case, only the frequency of the first response will be used as cell counts drop dramatically after the first response.

depended upon American involvement and the inclusion of Italy within an international, Western security framework.

While the majority of respondents indicated support for these policies, they came at a price to American prestige. While recognizing the importance of American involvement, Italians also came to see the Americans as obtrusive and naïve in international affairs. This dichotomy in perception would plague the United States in its involvements around the world for decades to come.

CONCLUSION

As the Sixtieth-anniversary of the 1948 Parliamentary election in Italy passes, it may well be an appropriate and relevant time to reflect on the nature, means, and objectives of the American intervention in Italian politics. There were a multitude of important precedents set in the American involvement in Italy. Intervention became a favored means of ensuring national security. Economic arrangements and individual financial motivators exercised power in the international system in the wake of the highly destructive Second World War.

Once a relative position of authority was established with the *DC*, the US shifted the focus from reconstruction to an anti-communist crusade. With the mood of cooperation quickly subsiding amongst the former Grand Alliance members, tensions and suspicions arose. Soon, the US would offer a military and economic response to those nations caught between two emergent superpowers. Indeed, with the announcement of the Truman doctrine, nations experiencing a communist threat were in a position to profit from the relationship with the US. The *PCI* were one of the stronger communist parties in Western Europe, and as such, were a perfect foil for the United States.

In defeating the possibility of Communist ascension to power through legal means, and in fact, securing Italy within the US-led western framework following the Second World War, the United States embarked on a path that would take them into ever more intricate interventions across the globe as part of a crusade against the expansionistic, monolithic Communist juggernaut. The policies, departments and practices of foreign subversion were indeed not only ironed out in many cases, but were created in direct response to the political hostilities in Italy. Over the course of five years, the United States government under Harry S. Truman instituted the subversion of the democratic process in foreign countries, setting a precedent for the foreign policy community that would see the US respond wherever they liked, with whatever means were deemed necessary.

WHY ITALY?

The United States came to identify Italy as a security interest for a number of important reasons. First of all, Italy was considered to be “the most ancient seat of Western Culture.”¹ As the Cold War battle of ideologies took hold, defining the legacy of democracy became important, especially when holding it up for comparison to the much younger ethos of

¹ Consequences of Communist Ascension to Power by Legal Means,” CIA, Office of Research and Estimates, March 5, 1948. in Weiner, *Ashes*, p. 26.

communism. To demonstrate the lasting power of democracy in Italy was a major symbolic accomplishment for Washington.

Furthermore, as an extension of the Truman Doctrine, the success of the US in staving off communist aggressions gave teeth to their declared determination to resist communist aggression around the world where and with what means as decided best. Events in Italy were amongst the initial interventions undertaken under the proviso of the Truman Doctrine.

Indeed, a revolutionary philosophy was taking over in Washington. Best defined as the national security ethos, the US expanded what they considered to be essential to protect the United States. In the post-war, early Cold War environment, influential individuals within the State Department, including Kennan, identified that international stability would result from strong power centers around the world, capable of resisting communist subversion. Defined as a principle concept of containment, these independent power centers would be able to resist not only communist advances, but unfair treatment from the Western countries as well.²

As has been shown above, the US radically restructured the foreign policy institutions following the Second World War. President Harry S. Truman initiated the changes with the passage of the National Security Act of June 1947. From the CIA to the NSC, issues surrounding Italian Communism and the ability of the *DC* to balance the vastly disparate internal political situation were the premiere events to be discussed by the nascent bodies. Furthermore, Italy made available a proxy environment for the US and the USSR to jockey for the upper hand in the early Cold War. With the end of the Second World War in the near past, neither side was anxious to involve themselves in a destructive open war. Rather, each side was content to establish spheres of influence. As the Iron Curtain descended across central Europe, from the Baltic to Trieste, both Washington and Moscow sought to secure their interests. With the American definition of national security now stretched to include strategic foreign interests, Washington was pulled into further interaction with not only central Europe, but soon central and south America as anti-communism took strong root in the United States.

PHASE I-PRE-1948, SECURE A FRIENDLY, MALLEABLE GOVERNMENT

Of course, the main focus of this work is on the two-stage intervention whereby the United States secured a foothold in the nation through the *DC* and then exploited that relationship to secure Italy within the Western framework, and essentially, secure the nation from communist subversion. To be sure, many historians have attempted to highlight the inexperience of the

² See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment : a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Americans at this time, pointing to the haphazard nature of organization and communication in the response.³ Indeed, it may be true that the US was highly inexperienced in this regard. However, the initial phase of the operation was flexible and decentralized enough that there was sufficient plausible deniability in black-ops where necessary and ample credit given for the white operations designed to enhance the prestige of the US. Indeed, throughout the American campaign in Italy, the response was adaptable. Perhaps this is the most important lesson to be learned from the bolstering of the *DC* in Italy. Whereas in future interventions the US would focus on paramilitary coups, in Italy the response was of a more total nature, taking into account financial, psychological and military means in addition to alleviating the cause of sympathy for the *PCI*. Likely due to the fact that they were more or less making things up as they went, the operation in Italy is more easily deemed successful by the combination of the small successes the US achieved, rather than one large scale covert coup that may or not be successful. The lesson to be learned by the American involvement in Italy is that not only is it important to win influence over the head of state, but that the citizenry makes up an extremely important and separate segment to be addressed. Italy was the 'break-in' period for the foreign policy community in Washington. Starting slowly at first, the ball was soon rolling on foreign interventions.

From the time the US officially turned its attention to Italian Communism in early 1947 to the return of the *DC* as the majority in the *Parlamento Italiano* on April 18, 1948, individuals in Washington sought to undermine the likelihood of a Communist victory while bolstering the position of the *DC*. Given Italy's dire situation in terms of the market breakdowns, shortages and general destruction caused by German occupation in WWII and the subsequent allied march north from Sicily to liberate the country, the obvious tool was money.

Indeed, the US went so far as to withhold promised financial aid to the *DC* government in 1947 until De Gasperi dissolved his cabinet and restructured it with less Communist influence. It was up to Italian minister Ivan Lombardo to travel to Washington to enquire about the promised aid. It was only following De Gasperi's second dissolution of his cabinet and the banishment of *PCI* members from key positions within his coalition cabinet that the aid was finally released to the Italians. However, in other sectors, the US was all but too keen to publicize the financial and food aid that was flowing into the nation thanks to the close relationship with the west. The link between the US and the possibility of reconstruction was quickly established by the US and Ambassador James Dunn who capitalized on every opportunity to highlight the benefit such a close relationship with the US was having. The

³ See Miller, The US and Italy

correlation became established in the hearts and minds of many Italians. The Americans had the pocketbook and the resources to not only rebuild Italy as a strong independent democracy, but they also had the ability to offer protection to the Italians through bilateral and multilateral agreements. This was not lost upon many Italians, nor would the US allow them to forget. Aligning with the US in the Cold War was the way to prosperity and security.

PHASE II

In the second phase of the American intervention, the US credited itself with a large role in the *DC* victory at the polls. With De Gasperi, and in effect, the Americans winning a mandate on April 18, 1948, attention could turn to entrenching the nation further within the Western Framework in terms of economics, security and political alliances. Indeed, the US had secret plans for responding to Communist subversion in Italy. Under NSC 1/1, 1/2, and 1/3, foreign policy members outlined the proposed responses to either legal Communist success at the polls, or the remote possibility that the Italian Communists should attempt an armed insurrection. This was not enough to guarantee peace and stability in the nation. As such, further agreements were sought to deepen the resolve of the Italians in maintaining a position within the western framework. The Brussels Pact, later the North Atlantic Treaty, served as a deterrent against Communist aggression through common defense. Essentially, the NAT ensured the continuity of the *DC* as the centrist force through which the US guided Italy into deeper association with the West. Finally, the US all but guaranteed the position of the *Democrazia Cristiana* with the passage of NSC 67/1 in April 1950. The document asserted that the US would respond to replace the *DC* in the event of internal Communist subversion.⁴

Economics in the second phase took on a slightly different symbolism. Whereas in the first phase, economic incentives were offered to the nation as a whole in short-term relief aid, in the second phase, the incentives were administered by the American backed *DC*. Furthermore, the ability of the *DC* to secure American aid quickly became tied to the overall success of the party. When De Gasperi managed to win the disbursement of ECA Counterpart funds without the necessary review by the American administrators, De Gasperi was able to capitalize on this minor victory as a means of releasing the funds without necessarily spending them, keeping in line with Giuseppe Pella's anti-inflationary principles. For De Gasperi and the *DC*, they were able to publicize their efforts in securing the American aid for the Italian people, and moreover,

⁴ "NSC 67/1: The Position of the United States with Respect to Communism in Italy", April 21, 1950, *FRUS*, 1950: III, pp. 1486-89.

De Gasperi's apparent victory over the American ECA in releasing funds without American review.

OUTCOME OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION

The upshot of American foreign policy activity in Italy in the period 1947-1953 highlights an important decision that would have to be made over the course of the Cold War. That is, how to respond to leftist activities and aggression in threatened states. One option would be to focus on the military aspect of the conflict, providing security through both men and materiel. The other option followed in Italy was an attempt to reverse the conditions that were leading to sympathy for the Communists. In Italy, neither of these options existed in isolation from one another, and the US foreign policy community utilized both options in the five year period of study. The outstanding objective at the start of intervention was to ameliorate the conditions favorable to communism. That is, provide food and grain shipments along with the provision of financial aid. This had the further effect of fostering support for the moderate *DCs*, as they came to be regarded as the party capable of extracting political and economic concessions from the US. Meanwhile, in the second phase, attention would be paid to securing the Italian nation within the economic framework of the World Bank and IMF, characterized by inclusion within the Marshall Plan and the ECA, and the military framework of NATO and the Brussels Pact. These institutions were heavily influenced by the US and were relatively effective in stabilizing Italian domestic politics

Within a relatively short period of time, the US reversed its traditional stance of isolationism in international affairs, instead turning towards a more interventionist stance in global politics. Where security before the World War II meant a withdrawn position from entangling European politics, and protectionist trade policies, Italy in 1948 was a benchmark in the reversal of the definition of national security. For, with the singling out of the defeat of Italian Communism and the entrenchment of that nation within an American-led economic and military framework, national security became a much more broadly defined term, dependent on the goings on in far away countries and markets. By 1953 the United States was more or less successful in winning Italy over to the Western framework. On March 8, 1949 John Hickerson of the State Department's Western European Desk, with Truman's approval, formally invited Italian Ambassador Tarchiani to become an original member of the NAT. With the conclusion of the agreement, fellow signatories of NAT were now obliged to come to the defense of the *DC* government.

That is not to say that the efforts of the United States were seen universally as stabilizing by the international community. For its political and economic work in Italy, including the security granted by inclusion within the Western defense network, NATO, and the assurances against Communist subversion, the reputation of the US suffered. The *DOXA* surveys highlight the impact of involvement within Italy from the perspective of the Italian citizen. While sample sizes are somewhat low, the surveys illustrate the overall trends present within the Italian public, namely, American policies, international agreements, Communist sympathies, Italian security/sovereignty, and domestic politics.

Firstly, while the majority of Italians were supportive of American aid and the security guarantees, many disagreed with the perceived interference and influence upon the Italian way of life. The American presence and its policies in Italy were tolerated as a means to an end by the Italians. Nearly seventy percent of the population saw common defense as contributing to peace. Meanwhile, 54 percent saw rearmament as the best means to avoid renewed conflict. Of that 54 percent, nearly 95 percent argued that the US should be the country to rearm Italy. As has been stated above, while American policies were more or less well received, the reputation of the US suffered. Italians described the Americans as naïve and conceited while their policies were described as cunning, daring and naïve. Indeed, in Italian eyes, it was true (31.1 percent) or at least partly true (43.6 percent) that the US aimed to dominate the world.⁵ In connection to that, some 40 percent of Italians argued that Italy received US funds because the US was trying to prevent the nation from going Communist. Meanwhile, in another query, some 40 percent of valid respondents indicated that US had too much involvement in Italian affairs. Correspondingly, nearly 73 percent of respondents indicated that the US had influence in Italy, while some 30 percent of those respondents alleged the influence was negative on the Italian way of life.

While flamboyant and still in use, covert action enjoyed a surprisingly short run as a tool to directly subvert Moscow. Indeed, by 1953, President Eisenhower and a select group of foreign policy officials including Kennan, John Foster Dulles, and Walter Bedell Smith met to discuss the future of covert actions. By the end of the so-called “Solarium Project” the idea of rolling back Communism with covert action was abandoned. Rather, the US turned to fighting the enemy in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America. However, the US lacked crucial information and understanding of the people and countries they were taking on as issues of national security.⁶ Indeed, Italy shows the necessity of a working relationship between client

⁵ *DOXA* S-326, Var 040

⁶ See Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, p. 76.

and patron states. Further, the actions of 1947-53 demonstrate the reciprocal nature of these relationships as the image of Italy falling to Communist domination was but one of the many tools used by both sides as political leverage.

LESSONS TO MODEL IN FUTURE ACTIONS

Installing democracy is a difficult proposition. Rather, the US foreign policy should focus more on supporting those conditions which are favorable to the expansion of democracy, rather than attempting to export a quasi system designed to profit a select few. The foreign policy institutions of the United States—the State Department, CIA and NSC—learnt valuable lessons on the dynamics involved when working to shore up democratic capitalism in a sovereign nation. Economics, politics, and security were gradually interwoven into an encompassing response from the US to the threat of communism in Italy. While the initial operation in Italy was one arguably thrown together, representing a reactive approach to the issue, by the time Italy was granted membership in NATO, the idea of a comprehensive, proactive approach to both providing for the security of Italy, along with undercutting the variables that initially made communism enticing was understood by many within Washington to carry forward into future interventions.

One of the first and one of the more successful operations for US foreign policy, the CIA action in Italy in the early Cold War highlights a number of important considerations. Firstly, when attempting to stabilize a nation and bring it into the western fold it is vital to understand that the potential must first be there. Italy stands as a model for the nations struggling towards democracy on their own. With that said, the US can achieve significant results through the bolstering of already present, moderate democratic parties. Secondly, by ameliorating the conditions which breed instability, rather than focusing on defeating an ideology, success may be more forthcoming. Large scale shipments of grains in the weeks and months prior to the election prevented not only Italian starvation, but one of the major draws towards the *PCI*.

IN SUMMARY

Ultimately, the motivations for American involvement in Italy reflect a combination of national security and corporatist motivations. Indeed, these two factors would come to be tied together within the response to Italy: economic stability would secure political continuity. Within much of the existing historiography, there is little attempt to delve into the importance and effect Italy played on shaping early American foreign policy institutions. If discussed, this

event is simply chalked up as an early American victory. While this work agrees that this can be seen as a success, it also stresses the impact this event had on early Cold War policy and the institutions that supported it. It has highlighted the effect that a relatively small player had on influencing the shape and direction policies and responses took through diplomacy, negotiation, and threat of communist subversion. Indeed, once aware that pretty much the only caveat for securing aid was to demonstrate a communist threat, Italy and other smaller powers were able to demonstrate just such a situation. This, of course, is not to downplay the legitimacy of indigenous communist groups, nor the uncertainty that existed as to Stalin's plan for the Western Europe in terms of stirring American fears of communism. However, what comes out from the documentary record between Rome and Washington in this study is a co-influencing relationship that saw the *DC* move Italy into closer alignment with the West.

This work picks up on earlier histories of post-War foreign policy and strives to incorporate an evaluation of the development and effect of anti-communist sentiments. Through an examination of contemporary Italian newspapers and other propaganda means, as well as the *DOXA* surveys detailing Italian perceptions of the American influence on Italian security and domestic politics, it was possible to expound on the successes and impacts of one of the first covert interventions of the CIA and the newly founded national security establishment.

THE ARCHITECT OF CONTAINMENT AND COVERT OPERATIONS REFLECTS

After nearly a half a century involved in the foreign policy community, George F. Kennan famously reflected on his role in the creation of covert operations as “the greatest mistake I ever made.”⁷ Testifying before a Senate Committee in 1975, Kennan made the remarks on the legacy of his involvement in the institutionalization of political warfare as a dominant tactic of American foreign policy. “It did not work out at all the way I had conceived it.”⁸ As covert action came to be common place for the foreign policy community, the plans and the audacity of the US grew. The upshot of American influence in Italy was that the State Department, the NSC, and the CIA discovered an effective method of influencing political and economic outcomes through means short of open warfare. What began with the defeat of the *PCI* in April 1948 and culminated with Italy's inclusion within the Western framework of NATO and other American influenced institutions was widely regarded as the effect of

⁷ Peter Grose, Operation Rollback, America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), p. 98.

⁸ Ibid., p. 98.

American efforts. This led to confidence in the tools of psychological warfare and covert operations, legitimizing them in the emergent Cold War. What was once to be a complimentary tactic in total warfare soon became a primary weapon in the Cold War to battle the USSR through proxy battles as the security of the nation came to be tied to American interests around the World. Through it's response in Italy, the US patently demonstrated that it would call on any tactic necessary, including those more characteristic of the Soviet enemy, in order to counter and contain the Communist threat.

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Appendix 1 - *DOXA* Survey Tables Regarding Common Defense and NATO

DOXA 208-A Variable 021-In your opinion, does the creation of an organization for Western Europe's common defense contribute to the maintenance of peace or make another war more probable?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	MANTAIN PEACE	494	48.8	69.0	69.0
	WAR MORE PROBABLE	222	21.9	31.0	100.0
	Total	716	70.7	100.0	
Missing	DK	269	26.6		
	NO ANSWER	28	2.8		
	Total	297	29.3		
Total		1013	100.0		

DOXA 208-A var021 * GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION Crosstabulation

		GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
		NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
MANTAIN PEACE	Count	264	82	93	55	494
	% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	73.5%	64.6%	64.6%	64.0%	69.0%
WAR MORE PROBABLE	Count	95	45	51	31	222
	% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	26.5%	35.4%	35.4%	36.0%	31.0%
Total	Count	359	127	144	86	716
	% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA 208-A Variable 022-In your opinion, is it right or wrong that our country should take part in this organization?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	RIGHT	476	47.0	69.6	69.6
	WRONG	208	20.5	30.4	100.0
	Total	684	67.5	100.0	
Missing	DK	291	28.7		
	NO ANSWER	38	3.8		
	Total	329	32.5		
Total		1013	100.0		

**DOXA 208-A, var022, PARTICIPATION IN COMMON DEFENCE *
GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION Crosstabulation**

			GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
PARTICIPATION IN COMMON DEFENCE	RIGHT	Count	254	83	87	52	476
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	72.0%	69.2%	63.5%	70.3%	69.6%
WRONG	Count	99	37	50	22	208	
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	28.0%	30.8%	36.5%	29.7%	30.4%
Total	Count	353	120	137	74	684	
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %

**DOXA 208-A Var023-Now that an organization for the Defence [sic] of Western Europe
has been created, do you think America should also take part? * GEOGRAPHICAL
DIVISION Crosstabulation**

			GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
AMERICA IN EURO DEFENCE	YES,	Count	310	98	144	59	611
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	81.4%	75.4%	85.2%	77.6%	80.8 %
NO	Count	71	32	25	17	145	
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	18.6%	24.6%	14.8%	22.4%	19.2 %
Total	Count	381	130	169	76	756	
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %

DOXA 208-B, Var016 Bearing in mind the general situation, What is your Greatest Fear at present?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	WAR	251	24.8	31.7	31.7
	INTERNATIONAL TENSION	147	14.5	18.6	50.3
	OTHER ANSWER	394	38.9	49.7	100.0
	Total	792	78.3	100.0	
Missing	DK	157	15.5		
	NO ANSWER	63	6.2		
	Total	220	21.7		
Total		1012	100.0		

DOXA 208-B GREATEST FEAR_1 * BROAD GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISION
Crosstabulation

			BROAD GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
GREAT- EST FEAR	WAR	Count	109	46	56	40	251
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	26.1%	32.9%	37.8%	46.5%	31.7%
	INT'L TENSION	Count	85	23	30	9	147
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	20.3%	16.4%	20.3%	10.5%	18.6%
	OTHER ANSWER	Count	224	71	62	37	394
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	53.6%	50.7%	41.9%	43.0%	49.7%
Total		Count	418	140	148	86	792
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %

DOXA 208-B, var021 Do you think that what has been done so far to increase the military power of our country is...

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	TOO MUCH	112	11.1	16.0	16.0
	MORE OR LESS	118	11.7	16.8	32.8
	NOT ENOUGH	252	24.9	35.9	68.8
	INSUFFICIENT	219	21.6	31.2	100.0
	Total	701	69.3	100.0	
Missing	DK	265	26.2		
	NA	46	4.5		
	Total	311	30.7		
Total		1012	100.0		

DOXA 208-B var021 INCREASE MILITARY POWER * BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION Crosstabulation

			BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
INCREASE MILITARY POWER	TOO MUCH	Count	78	17	8	9	112
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	20.3%	14.7%	6.1%	12.9%	16.0%
	MORE OR LESS	Count	71	18	14	15	118
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	18.5%	15.5%	10.7%	21.4%	16.8%
	NOT ENOUGH	Count	134	39	51	28	252
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	34.9%	33.6%	38.9%	40.0%	35.9%
	INSUFFICIENT	Count	101	42	58	18	219
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	26.3%	36.2%	44.3%	25.7%	31.2%
Total		Count	384	116	131	70	701
		% within BROAD GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA-326, VAR041 – In your opinion, which is the best of the following ways to avoid a new World War?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Increase European armament	237	34.2	54.0	54.0
	Leave European armament as it is	21	3.0	4.8	58.8
	Start disarmament in Europe	97	14.0	22.1	80.9
	Nothing can be done	84	12.1	19.1	100.0
	Total	439	63.3	100.0	
Missing	DK	254	36.7		
Total		693	100.0		

**DOXA-326, VAR 041How to avoid new world war * broad geographical subdivisions
Crosstabulation**

			BROAD GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISIONS				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	ISLES	
How to avoid new world war	Increase European armament	Count	125	39	43	30	237
	% within broad geographic subdivisions		53.4%	53.4%	51.2%	62.5%	54.0%
	Leave European armament as it is	Count	11	5	2	3	21
	% within broad geographic subdivisions		4.7%	6.8%	2.4%	6.3%	4.8%
	Start disarmament in Europe	Count	61	17	17	2	97
	% within broad geographic subdivisions		26.1%	23.3%	20.2%	4.2%	22.1%
	Nothing can be done	Count	37	12	22	13	84
	% within broad geographical subdivisions		15.8%	16.4%	26.2%	27.1%	19.1%
Total		Count	234	73	84	48	439
	% within broad geographical subdivisions		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA-326, VAR 042, (if increase) Is it Desirable for America to help Italy rearm?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	218	31.5	94.8	94.8
	Yes, but...	3	.4	1.3	96.1
	No	9	1.3	3.9	100.0
	Total	230	33.2	100.0	
Missing	Other answer	1	.1		
	Don't Know	6	.9		
	No answer	456	65.8		
Total		463	66.8		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA-326, VAR051 In your opinion should Italy continue to take part in the Atlantic Treaty?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	332	47.9	69.0	69.0
	Yes with reserve	31	4.5	6.4	75.5
	No	118	17.0	24.5	100.0
	Total	481	69.4	100.0	
Missing	Other answer	6	.9		
	No answer	206	29.7		
	Total	212	30.6		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA-326, VAR 049 Have you read or heard about an organization created for the common defense of Western Countries?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	435	62.8	62.9	62.9
	No	123	17.7	17.8	80.6
	Uncertain	134	19.3	19.4	100.0
	Total	692	99.9	100.0	
Missing	No answer	1	.1		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA-326 VAR 049 Have you heard of NATO? * broad geographical subdivisions
Crosstabulation

			BROAD GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISIONS				Total
			NORTH	CENTRE	SOUTH	ISLES	
Have you heard of NATO?	Yes	Count	217	68	96	54	435
		% within broad geographical subdivisions	63.3%	61.8%	62.3%	63.5%	62.9%
	No	Count	53	15	36	19	123
		% within broad geographical subdivisions	15.5%	13.6%	23.4%	22.4%	17.8%
	Uncertain	Count	73	27	22	12	134
		% within broad geographical subdivisions	21.3%	24.5%	14.3%	14.1%	19.4%
Total		Count	343	110	154	85	692
		% within broad geographical subdivisions	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA-326 VAR 052 Do you favor Italy's participation in the Atlantic Treaty more or less than you did a year ago?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	More favorable	88	12.7	19.2	19.2
	Less	122	17.6	26.6	45.9
	No change	248	35.8	54.1	100.0
	Total	458	66.1	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	200	28.9		
	Other answer	3	.4		
	No answer	32	4.6		
	Total	235	33.9		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA-326, VAR 053 Why? (favorable or unfavorable)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Guarantee of peace	50	7.2	16.4	16.4
	Country's security	53	7.6	17.4	33.8
	Guarantee against communism	27	3.9	8.9	42.6
	The situation seems identical	40	5.8	13.1	55.7
	It is a cheat	69	10.0	22.6	78.4
	Will draw us to war	25	3.6	8.2	86.6
	Italy must be neutral	12	1.7	3.9	90.5
	The question of Trieste	29	4.2	9.5	100.0
	Total	305	44.0	100.0	
Missing	DK/DA	366	52.8		
	Other favorable answer	8	1.2		
	Other unfavorable answer	14	2.0		
	Total	388	56.0		
Total	693	100.0			

Appendix 2 - DOXA Survey Tables regarding Russian influence

DOXA S-208A Var 027 Do you think that during the next three years a third World War will break out or that war will be prevented? * GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION

Crosstabulation

			GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
NEXT THREE YEARS	WILL BREAK OUT	Count	52	18	40	28	138
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	15.7%	20.9%	36.4%	39.4%	23. 1%
	WILL BE PREVENTED	Count	279	68	70	43	460
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	84.3%	79.1%	63.6%	60.6%	76. 9%
Total		Count	331	86	110	71	598
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100 .0%

DOXA S-208 Var 029 Various opinions are heard on what should be the right policy for our country. Here are some of them. For each opinion, would you kindly tell me whether you think it is right or wrong?

A) Russia is so strong from a military viewpoint that no one could stop her, therefore it is useless to spend money on our defence. * GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION Crosstabulation

			GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
RUSSIA TOO STRONG	AGREE	Count	77	27	34	16	154
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	21.5%	25.5%	24.5%	21.1%	22.7 %
	WRONG	Count	281	79	105	60	525
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	78.5%	74.5%	75.5%	78.9%	77.3 %
Total		Count	358	106	139	76	679
		% within GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %

DOXA S-208A-Var030

B) In case of a conflict between Russia and America our country would certainly be a battlefield. Therefore, no matter who wins, we are going to lose. * GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION Crosstabulation

			GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
GOING TO LOSE	RIGHT	Count	236	93	91	63	483
		% within GEO DIVISION	68.8%	74.4%	67.4%	75.0%	70.3%
	WRONG	Count	107	32	44	21	204
		% within GEO DIVISION	31.2%	25.6%	32.6%	25.0%	29.7%
Total		Count	343	125	135	84	687
		% within GEO DIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA S-208A-var032

D) The countries of Western Europe together with America have good chances of resisting an attack, provided they are really united and mobilize all their forces. * GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION Crosstabulation

			GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION				Total
			NORTH	CENTRAL	SOUTH	INSULAR	
AMERICA/ EUROPE EFFECTIVE POWER	RIGHT	Count	286	101	107	68	562
		% within GEO DIVISION	82.2%	84.9%	82.9%	85.0%	83.1%
	WRONG	Count	62	18	22	12	114
		% within GEO DIVISION	17.8%	15.1%	17.1%	15.0%	16.9%
Total		Count	348	119	129	80	676
		% within GEO DIVISION	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA 327 Var 035 USA or US stronger

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Russia	105	15.1	19.6	19.6
	America	220	31.6	41.0	60.5
	More or less equal	212	30.5	39.5	100.0
	Total	537	77.2	100.0	
Missing	DK	151	21.7		
	Other answer	6	.9		
	No answer	2	.3		
	Total	159	22.8		
Total		696	100.0		

DOXA S-327 Var 036 In your mind, which of the following three countries has turned out to be more hostile to Italy after the war?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	France, Britain & Russia	80	11.5	13.4	13.4
	France	8	1.1	1.3	14.7
	Britain	238	34.2	39.7	54.4
	Russia	255	36.6	42.6	97.0
	none	18	2.6	3.0	100.0
	Total	599	86.1	100.0	
Missing	.00	97	13.9		
Total		696	100.0		

DOXA 327 Var 047 Russian occupation of Italy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Consider Russians friends	54	7.8	7.9	7.9
	Continue normal activity	242	34.8	35.4	43.3
	Try to hide	44	6.3	6.4	49.7
	Take refuge abroad	46	6.6	6.7	56.4
	Fight against invaders	116	16.7	17.0	73.4
	I prefer not to answer	76	10.9	11.1	84.5
	DK	106	15.2	15.5	100.0
	Total	684	98.3	100.0	
Missing	Other answer	12	1.7		
Total		696	100.0		

Appendix 3 - DOXA Survey Tables Relating to Italian Politics

DOXA S-326 Var 026 Which of the following phrases expresses best your judgment of the activity carried out by Signor De Gasperi, former Prime Minister?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Fully approve his policy	60	8.7	10.3	10.3
	As a whole he has done quite well	208	30.0	35.6	45.8
	He has done poorly, without many errors	123	17.7	21.0	66.8
	He made a number of avoidable errors	87	12.6	14.9	81.7
	I completely disapprove of his activity	107	15.4	18.3	100.0
	Total	585	84.4	100.0	
Missing	DK	108	15.6		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 027 (If "Made too many errors") What do you mean, particularly?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Foreign policy	10	1.4	13.3	13.3
	Atlantic Treaty	7	1.0	9.3	22.7
	Submitted too much Allies	15	2.2	20.0	42.7
	Question of Trieste	2	.3	2.7	45.3
	Clerical policy	7	1.0	9.3	54.7
	Wrong social policy	24	3.5	32.0	86.7
	Electoral law	6	.9	8.0	94.7
	Methodically opposed left-wing parties	4	.6	5.3	100.0
	Total	75	10.8	100.0	
Missing	don't know, no answer	603	87.0		
	other answer	15	2.2		
	Total	618	89.2		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 021 Are you satisfied with the results of the last elections?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	205	29.6	29.7	29.7
	Fairly satisfies	219	31.6	31.7	61.4
	No	137	19.8	19.9	81.3
	Indifferent	129	18.6	18.7	100.0
	Total	690	99.6	100.0	
Missing	DK/NR	3	.4		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 022 (If "No") Why aren't you satisfied?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	I would preferred more vote for <i>DC</i>	31	4.5	25.8	25.8
	<i>PCI</i> should have obtained more votes	36	5.2	30.0	55.8
	Too many communist votes	16	2.3	13.3	69.2
	The parties of the center have not won	18	2.6	15.0	84.2
	I would preferred more vote for the Rights Parties	19	2.7	15.8	100.0
	Total	120	17.3	100.0	
Missing	DK/NR	561	81.0		
	Other answer	12	1.7		
	Total	573	82.7		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 024 In your opinion should the government shift more to the left or to the right than it does at present in its policy, or should it maintain a strictly central line?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	I don't understand	43	6.2	7.8	7.8
	More to the left	210	30.3	38.3	46.2
	More to the right	99	14.3	18.1	64.2
	Maintain the central line	196	28.3	35.8	100.0
	Total	548	79.1	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	144	20.8		
	No answer	1	.1		
	Total	145	20.9		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 025 (If “more to the left” or “more to the right”) What do you mean by saying the government should shift more to the left or right? Are you thinking of social reforms in the country, or foreign policy, or both?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Social reforms	157	22.7	48.6	48.6
	Foreign policy	24	3.5	7.4	56.0
	Both foreign policy and social reform	142	20.5	44.0	100.0
	Total	323	46.6	100.0	
Missing	DK/DA	370	53.4		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-328 Var 033 In the interest of Italy, which party or political movement should be strengthened?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Communist party	50	10.5	13.0	13.0
	Socialist party	37	7.8	9.6	22.6
	Socialist Democratic	37	7.8	9.6	32.2
	Monarchist	6	1.3	1.6	33.8
	Socialism	16	3.4	4.2	37.9
	Other Centre	10	2.1	2.6	40.5
	Christian Democrats	161	33.8	41.8	82.3
	Liberal Party	15	3.2	3.9	86.2
	National Party	32	6.7	8.3	94.5
	Social Movement	21	4.4	5.5	100.0
	Total	385	80.9	100.0	
Missing	.00	16	3.4		
	DK/DA	71	14.9		
	Others	4	.8		
	Total	91	19.1		
Total		476	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var033 * broad geographical subdivision Crosstabulation

			Broad Geographical Subdivision				Total
			North	Centre	South	Isles	
Political	.00	Count					
id- in			8	0	7	4	19
interest							
of Italy		% within broad geo-sub	3.0%	.0%	4.6%	6.3%	3.3%
	<i>PCI</i>	Count	37	18	18	10	83
		% within broad geo- sub	13.9%	19.4%	11.9%	15.6%	14.5%
	<i>PSI</i>	Count	27	14	15	5	61
		% within broad geo- sub	10.2%	15.1%	9.9%	7.8%	10.6%
	<i>PSDI</i>	Count	32	5	5	1	43
		% within broad geo- sub	12.0%	5.4%	3.3%	1.6%	7.5%
	<i>PRI</i>	Count	4	3	0	0	7
		% within broad geo- sub	1.5%	3.2%	.0%	.0%	1.2%
	<i>Socialism</i>	Count	14	4	8	2	28
		% within broad geo- sub	5.3%	4.3%	5.3%	3.1%	4.9%
	<i>Other center</i>	Count	16	5	5	3	29
		% within broad geo- sub	6.0%	5.4%	3.3%	4.7%	5.1%
	<i>DC</i>	Count	90	26	57	24	197
		% within broad geo- sub	33.8%	28.0%	37.7%	37.5%	34.3%
	<i>PLI</i>	Count	13	4	2	3	22
		% within broad geo- sub	4.9%	4.3%	1.3%	4.7%	3.8%
	<i>National party</i>	Count	14	6	18	10	48
		% within broad geo- sub	5.3%	6.5%	11.9%	15.6%	8.4%
	<i>MSI</i>	Count	11	8	16	2	37
		% within broad geo- sub	4.1%	8.6%	10.6%	3.1%	6.4%
Total		Count	266	93	151	64	574
		% within broad geo- sub	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DOXA S-328 Var 034 What is, in your opinion, the reason why the Christian Democratic Party obtained less votes than in 1948?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Electoral law	21	4.4	8.3	8.3
	Did not satisfy working masses	89	18.7	35.2	43.5
	Proved a bad government	62	13.0	24.5	68.0
	Italians	12	2.5	4.7	72.7
	Wrong electoral campaign	24	5.0	9.5	82.2
	Other parties attracted young people	5	1.1	2.0	84.2
	Voters attracted by MSI and PNM	15	3.2	5.9	90.1
	There were so many parties	14	2.9	5.5	95.7
	Apparently lost votes because of the centrist coalition	11	2.3	4.3	100.0
	Total	253	53.2	100.0	
Missing	other answer	37	7.8		
	don't know	186	39.1		
	Total	223	46.8		
Total	476	100.0			

DOXA S-328 Var036 What is the reason why the Communist Party obtained more voted during the last election than in 1948?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Active campaign	24	5.0	11.2	11.2
	Internal organization	15	3.2	7.0	18.2
	It supports the workers	65	13.7	30.4	48.6
	The majority party did not face social problems	35	7.4	16.4	65.0
	It appeals to the ignorant	26	5.5	12.1	77.1
	Vote of the young	17	3.6	7.9	85.0
	Reaction to the electoral law	15	3.2	7.0	92.1
	Because of <i>DC</i> errors	17	3.6	7.9	100.0
	Total	214	45.0	100.0	
Missing	don't know, no answer	215	45.2		
	other answer	47	9.9		
	Total	262	55.0		
Total	476	100.0			

 Appendix 4 – DOXA Survey Tables Relating to the Effect of American Involvement in Italy

DOXA S-326 Var 037 Do you like better the British, Americans (from the US), Germans, or the French? What would be your order of preference (Americans)?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1st	387	55.8	55.8	55.8
2st	127	18.3	18.3	74.2
3st	72	10.4	10.4	84.6
4th	41	5.9	5.9	90.5
No classification	66	9.5	9.5	100.0
Total	693	100.0	100.0	

DOXA S-326 Var 038A Would you kindly look at this card. If you were to define Americans with three adjectives only, which ones would you choose? (first choice)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Idealists	9	1.3	1.7	1.7
Generous	21	3.0	3.9	5.6
Calm	16	2.3	3.0	8.6
Intelligent	23	3.3	4.3	12.8
Educated	9	1.3	1.7	14.5
Modest	18	2.6	3.4	17.9
Hard workers	59	8.5	11.0	28.9
Practical	197	28.4	36.7	65.5
Brave	51	7.4	9.5	75.0
Cunning	62	8.9	11.5	86.6
Thoughtful	26	3.8	4.8	91.4
Tidy	46	6.6	8.6	100.0
Total	537	77.5	100.0	
Missing .00	156	22.5		
Total	693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 038E Would you kindly look at this card. If you were to define Americans with three adjectives only, which ones would you choose? (first choice)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Silly	7	1.0	2.0	2.0
	Ignorant	2	.3	.6	2.5
	With no ideals	13	1.9	3.7	6.2
	Naive	67	9.7	18.8	25.0
	Lazy	4	.6	1.1	26.1
	Mean	9	1.3	2.5	28.7
	Restless	11	1.6	3.1	31.7
	Untidy	23	3.3	6.5	38.2
	Coward	28	4.0	7.9	46.1
	Clumsy	18	2.6	5.1	51.1
	Conceited	115	16.6	32.3	83.4
	Impulsive	59	8.5	16.6	100.0
	Total	356	51.4	100.0	
Missing	.00	337	48.6		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 039 America is said by some to aim at dominating the world. What is your opinion?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	True	199	28.7	31.1	31.1
	Partly true	279	40.3	43.6	74.7
	False	162	23.4	25.3	100.0
	Total	640	92.4	100.0	
Missing	No answer	53	7.6		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 040_a In your opinion, why has America given and is it giving financial aids to Italy? For some of the following reasons? Or for another reason?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sincerely wants to help Italy recover and become self-supporting	86	12.4	13.0	13.0
	Wants to prevent Italy from becoming Communist	261	37.7	39.5	52.5
	Wants Italy's friendship, to have allies in case of a war against Russia	180	26.0	27.2	79.7
	Takes advantage of these aids to take over the Italian market	134	19.3	20.3	100.0
	Total	661	95.4	100.0	
Missing	Other reason	8	1.2		
	DK, no answer	24	3.5		
	Total	32	4.6		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 var043_a If you were to define US diplomacy with two adjectives only, which of the those shown on this card would you choose, or which other adjectives would you choose?

		Freq	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Coherent	7	1.0	1.3	1.3
	Far-Seeing	22	3.2	4.0	5.3
	Contradictory	19	2.7	3.4	8.7
	Cunning	126	18.2	22.9	31.6
	Short-sighted	40	5.8	7.3	38.8
	Daring	131	18.9	23.8	62.6
	Too Prudent	46	6.6	8.3	71.0
	Naïve	160	23.1	29.0	100.0
	Total	551	79.5	100.0	
Missing	Other Def	26	3.8		
	No Answer	116	16.7		
	Total	142	20.5		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 044 Some people say that America does not take a sufficient interest in Italy, others that she interferes too much in our questions. Who do you think is right?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Don't take sufficient interest	91	13.1	17.3	17.3
	Interest in connection with affairs is right amount	230	33.2	43.6	60.9
	America interferes too much with our affairs	206	29.7	39.1	100.0
	Total	527	76.0	100.0	
Missing	DK	163	23.5		
	Other answer	3	.4		
	Total	166	24.0		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 045 Do you think that our way of living, our tastes have changed during recent years under the influence of Americans?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	347	50.1	73.1	73.1
	No	128	18.5	26.9	100.0
	Total	475	68.5	100.0	
Missing	DK	216	31.2		
	Other answer	2	.3		
	Total	218	31.5		
Total		693	100.0		

DOXA S-326 Var 046 (If "yes") Do you consider this a positive or negative fact?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	146	21.1	47.1	47.1
	Neither positive nor negative	71	10.2	22.9	70.0
	Negative	93	13.4	30.0	100.0
	Total	310	44.7	100.0	
Missing	DK	34	4.9		
	Other answer	1	.1		
	No answer	348	50.2		
	Total	383	55.3		
Total		693	100.0		