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REFLECTION AND REORIENTATION: THE SEARCH FOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD

by

© GORDON R. THOMAS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled REFLECTION AND REORIENTATION: THE SEARCH FOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD submitted by GORDON R. THOMAS in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

As citizens, our actions are fundamental to the survival of our democratic society. A principal role of social studies, the school subject devoted to the goal of effective citizenship, is to encourage enlightened participation in ensuring the maintenance of our democratic values. Yet, the democratic commitment of society has been clouded by the ideology of technique which has helped to limit the activities of citizens to that of 'coping' instead of 'acting.' 'Coping' is typically unreflective and inactive; citizenship that is caring and participatory is not generated from societal 'coping.' The dissertation focuses on how social studies teachers, in a technological world, can teach for active instead of passive citizenship.

It is argued that citizenship stems from the ancient understanding of community and a more recent understanding of sovereign power. In Greek times, being a citizen meant having a share in the community--a sense of belonging. Combined with Rousseau's description of the citizen as sovereign, citizenship means active belonging; that is, citizenship involves being attentive to public and political questions and accepting the essence of freedom from sharing in the unifying force of

sovereign power.

Although the overriding purpose of social studies is seen to be citizenship education, what it means to be a good citizen has certainly varied. Generally, students have been taught certain knowledge, skills and a commitment to democratic values; participation in societal affairs has also been encouraged. Sovereignty is expressed through the decisions that we make as citizens; social belonging is the product of active participation.

It can be argued, however, that decision-making in citizenship education has been reduced to an empirical way of knowing; active participation has been numbed by the ideology of technique. Teachers encourage students to store up bits of information; to conform, to fit in. There is no process of reflection or reconceptualization. Students are led to accept 'what is' without understanding 'what ought to be.' A more critical social studies is proposed.

The meaning of citizenship is inextricably tied to a conception of the human image characterized by freedom and dignity. Technology, in which survival wins over dignity, and 'efficiency' and 'best' are passwords, is not always tied to that image. It is argued that students need to gain 'civic literacy' in addressing our

world. Characterized by moral reflection, civic savvy, critical thinking, and active belonging, civic literacy is the result of a critical citizenship education. Moral reflection is an ability to judge what is appropriate (especially in view of the challenges of technology and our awesome power); civic savvy is the quality of knowing as a citizen (in particular, the wider knowledge of ideological, power and cultural structures which control, influence and construct our lives); critical thinking is the ability to determine the authority and value of knowledge claims; active belonging involves the restoration of a sense of community and the importance of collective action in an image of what it means to be human.

By combining these qualities, it is possible to teach for a more critical social studies. In the context of being human and in the context of community, students are able to act appropriately and with a sense of belonging. This is a pathway to a wider experience and a richer life characterized by freedom, dignity, and action.

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TEACHING FOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD

Our actions, as citizens, are fundamental to the survival of our democratic society. Democracy, by the very nature of its liberal tradition, hinges on enlightened participation of citizens who wish to improve our world. Social studies, the school subject devoted to the goal of effective citizenship, is critical in ensuring the preservation of democratic values. It is vital that we, as social studies teachers, assist in the development of citizens willing to act to maintain and improve the ideals of our democratic way of life.

QUESTIONS EVOLVE 'OVER LUNCH'

My interest in active citizenship has developed over a period of years, but it was brought to life most vividly as the result of a school accident that could have been very serious. While I was enroute to my noon hour drama rehearsal, a student tossed his orange peel on to the hallway floor and walked away. I called the student, but he kept on walking. In my haste to catch up to the litterbug and acquaint him with my 'someone might slip on your orange peel and injure oneself' lecture, I

slipped on the residuum of his tuna fish sandwich (which also adorned the terrazzo) and slid down the hallway like a curling skip's last rock seeking the button. My slide stopped abruptly when I was poleaxed by a door post. To say the least, I treated the lad to a solid rendition of my 'litter lecture.' From his cozy position (squeezed between my frame and the lockers), he agreed that litter belongs in the garbage can. He said that he would act accordingly in the future. My slide into the post could have been much more serious, I concluded, but at least I had been able to reform one student's behaviour and attitude. His outlook and his way of proceeding would be very different. I had done some good that day!

A few days later I observed the same student deposit his unwanted lunch on the floor of the same hallway. This time I introduced the student to the principal who had some select words for the chap, but the incident caused me to ask some fundamental questions about the student's actions. Even though the student knew that his behaviour was improper, he still bounced his lunch across the hall. I thought I had persuaded him to act in a more caring manner but the student chose not to take responsibility for his actions.

I reflected on the apparent persuasive power of my social studies classes. My students concluded that

population growth is a serious problem; they recognized that there is a limit to the number of people our earth can support. What decisions will they make in planning their own family? Students agreed (and quite emotionally, too) that nuclear holocaust is not a viable choice of futures. What will they do to work toward their overwhelming choice? Fundamental human rights were acknowledged by students, but to what extent would these students accept the responsibilities that go along with these rights? To what extent, if at all, would they be prepared to fight to retain these democratic rights?

I journeyed to the staff room. Some teachers were complaining about the Alberta Teachers' Association. "What does it do for me?" one teacher asked. "We pay our Association fees for nothing," another teacher noted. Yet, neither of my colleagues had ever been active in the Association's affairs. Neither had offered to serve on any of the committees or in any of the Local's executive positions. They were armchair critics--complaining about apparent problems yet ignoring opportunities for action. This situation brought to mind the relationship of commitment and action. I began to question my own teaching of social studies. Now that students developed their own values systems, were they working toward their goals? Were they being active citizens?

I suddenly realized that students were much more passive than active in my classroom. They were willing to receive but not to transmit; they were concerned about the world around them but not necessarily committed to it. They were most interested in the kinds of things I thought were true. But more important, there seemed to be a gap between what students said in class and what they did outside of the classroom. Was this a failing of my social studies instruction? Was this a flaw in the nature of social studies? My questions increased as time went on. Since social studies exists as the school subject that helps to create good citizens, what did my questions have to say about society itself?

This dissertation expresses the author's interest in reforming social studies to make citizens active instead of inactive. If social studies is the school subject in which we become knowledgeable, caring citizens, then what role does this imply for teachers? For students? For society? These are crucial questions in need of answers.

THE NEED FOR QUALITATIVE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION RESEARCH

Active citizenship is, by its very nature, a qualitative issue. There can be no test tubes or Bunsen

burners; no questionnaires, correlations, or statistical measures. Quantitative citizenship research may be unable to judge good citizenship; there may be no distinction between active citizenship which promotes tyranny or democracy on the quantitative research map. Thomas and Parsons (1984) are very helpful in focusing on the qualitative nature of certain research issues which are difficult to treat statistically.

Teaching for active citizenship is a complex assignment--it is difficult for active citizenship to be broken down, studied, and treated. The tasks and responsibilities associated with being a citizen have become increasingly complicated. With the growth of government, the interdependence among nations, and the increase of knowledge that citizens may possess, it appears that the role of the citizen and the opportunities for active citizenship have changed over the course of time. Technology has had a considerable impact on society; technology has also altered what it means to be a citizen. These are all complex issues best addressed qualitatively.

The nature of these profound changes and what they mean in terms of civic competence has a tremendous message for social studies educators. By and large, technology-related changes can cloud the democratic

commitment of our society by limiting the activities of citizens to that of 'coping' instead of 'acting.' 'Coping' is typically unreflective and inactive. Citizenship that is caring and participatory is not generated from societal 'coping.' We are numbed by technology which takes situations out of their human context. Machines--and not people--become more important. We begin to accept technology as a neutral elixir--a cure-all to our problems that leaves no aftertaste. We fail to remember that the same technology that engineered industrial expansion, the Candu reactor, and Saran wrap also brought us pollution, nuclear warheads, and PCBs. It is easy to succumb to an ideology of technique which domineers our mind set and our world view.

What threatens our goal of participatory citizenship? It seems apparent that one of the most important considerations for social studies educators is the impact of technology on our world. In a time when information is generated through greater technological expertise and accepted by those without expertise in an unquestioning, unreflective way, we stand to lose the opportunity to act. The universal advertisement that technology can do more and more of our work for us is more than an invitation to comfort; it is also a push

towards passivity. We still make decisions, but they are not the crucial ones. Increasingly, ethical decisions are replaced by technological ones (e.g., gene splicing, Baby Fae, SDI research). We ask ourselves whether or not we can do something instead of whether or not we ought to. We conclude that gene splicing will allow science to improve on Nature's biological accomplishments but we fail to reflect on the potential of the indiscriminate application of techniques which could be biologically hazardous. We recognize that human life may be prolonged by technological intervention but we do not reflect on the quality of that artificially extended life. We believe that the world will be a safer place when North America can be defended in outer space from a nuclear attack but we do not reflect on the probabilities of moving on the offensive when a strong defense is technologically assured. We are numbed by the technological vista. We welcome the prospect of technology which tacitly expands our opportunities; yet we forget that technology also qualitatively reduces our experiences. The importance and significance of our human experiences is lessened; the act of citizenship is fundamentally altered.

The problem is clear. How can social studies teachers make citizenship education active instead of

passive in an increasingly technological society? In linking citizenship education and technology, it is necessary to develop a dominant inquiry mode that combines interpretive science and critical science. (van Manen, 1975, p. 5) This means that quantitative work is inappropriate to this study; one cannot support a best way to proceed, nor one key technique, nor specific knowledge; nor one right answer. Addressing the issue is an invitation to come to knowledge through an agreement on meanings, a holistic experience that improves the learner and alters attitudes and relationships. In such a discourse, the meaning of citizenship becomes active, not passive, and citizens decide to 'act' and not just 'cope.'

The time has come for social studies teachers to interpret and to act themselves. As Giroux (1983) notes,

> Too much of the literature in the citizenship field borders on despair; not only does it lack any vision, but it seems "frozen" by its own inability to dream, imagine, or think about a better world. The endless studies on the sad state of citizenship education and the existing political consciousness of students are paraded before us as if there was [sic] nothing that could be done. These should be treated as starting points and not as terminal commentaries on the nation's health.
>
> The vitality of any field is measured, in part, by the intensity of the debate that it wages about its most basic assumptions and goals. Citizenship education is in dire need

> of such a debate. The prize to be gained goes far beyond the merits of intellectual dialogue and insight. What appears to be at stake at the present moment in history is the ability of future generations ... to think and act in ways that speak to age-old precepts of freedom and democracy. The task of developing a mode of citizenship education that addresses this issue appears awesome. But when one looks at the consequences of not addressing it, there appears the possibility of a barbarism so dreadful that we can do nothing less than act quickly and thoughtfully, in the spirit of what is just, necessary, and possible, to meet the challenge. (pp. 203-204)

This dissertation is a response to Giroux's call to recast the social studies. The task is to uncover a way of proceeding and to provoke a vital dialogue.

TEACHING FOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP: IDENTIFYING THE QUESTIONS

The central question posed in this dissertation must be clear. In our increasingly technological world, how can we, as social studies teachers, teach for active instead of passive citizenship? What reforms can social studies teachers make to existing practice to help create caring citizens who are prepared to act, with vision and in a human image, to help make their world a better place to be? It may well be that the key to understanding this challenge hinges on the development of a broader perspective that asks different kinds of questions about

how we proceed as social studies teachers. If this is true, it may be possible to reconceptualize the nature of social studies curricula to better achieve a truer form of citizenship. This view would also recast such social studies staples as knowledge, inquiry, valuing, and decision-making.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation includes six chapters. As noted earlier, the dissertation is an 'ideas work' and is qualitative in form. As is standard, this chapter serves to introduce the work by revealing how the questions first arose and came to be of significance; to provide focus to the questions being studied; and to detail delimitations, assumptions, and possible implications of the work.

The second chapter explores the meaning of citizenship. From the Greek understanding of citizenship, the dissertation attempts to provide some illumination of the historical notion of being a citizen. This conception is also applied to the Canadian situation to help come to a fuller understanding of the challenges of citizenship in a Canadian context.

Chapter three addresses the nature of citizenship education. To what extent has the social

studies been able to teach for the meaning of citizenship? Different approaches to citizenship education are examined and clarified and a broader definition of social studies education is presented.

The fourth chapter calls into question the success of citizenship education in its present form. The impact of technology is described and it is argued that the technological framework numbs the essential qualities of the historical notion of citizenship. Utopian, dystopian and socialist views of technology are described and applied to the social studies.

In view of these challenges to what it means to be a citizen, the fifth chapter outlines a broader perspective of technology which helps us bring into clearer focus our developing notion of what it means to be human. A way to proceed--a framework--is suggested for use in reforming social studies in order to create active citizens in the image of the historic notion of citizenship. The final chapter outlines possible reforms to the social studies toward the development of active, caring citizenship in the attainment of 'what ought to be' in our world.

DELIMITATIONS OF THE DISSERTATION

A key delimitation is that the study is

restricted to social studies education (although there may be general applicability to other areas). The dissertation seeks to ascertain curricular direction; it is not embedded in pure philosophy. In this way, philosophers, movements, and certain beliefs will be interpreted insofar as they shed light upon citizenship education. The audience is intended to be social studies educators, not technologists or antitechnologists; in a similar sense, it is written for social studies educators, not philosophers, existential phenomenologists, or critical theorists. This does not mean that the dissertation does not apply to others; it does mean this dissertation is a social studies piece for social studies people. Consequently, it is written in a way that will attempt to encourage social studies people to use the ideas contained herein.

Because the dissertation uses a variety of sources to address questions emerging from the impact of technology on social studies education, there is some fear that the work will be characterized as an 'academic mongrel'--i.e., it crosses diverse strains of research to develop an improved direction for social studies curriculum and practice. It is the direction that should be emphasized. Further, the research is appropriate to the questions posed.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION

The most basic underlying assumption is that the nature of 'democratic' citizenship implies active participation. If this is the case, then being active is generally better than being inactive. Therefore, curricula that engenders action is preferable to curricula that engenders inaction. Milbrath (1965) is very helpful in exploring the active-inactive dimension. (pp. 9-16) He suggests that activity is generally graded by quantity; some individuals engage in an activity with greater regularity and frequency than others. Indeed, some people are inactive; others are submissive; a few are involved or even committed. Milbrath's definition is an instrumental view of activity and there may be more merit in understanding action on the basis of meaning and intent rather than a specific number of acts.

Depending on the situation, civic action may be public or essentially private. It may involve a letter to another individual or a private discussion. It may also involve a letter to the editor or a public discussion. Personal action may be in response to a request to become involved; it may be the result of an irresistible urge to participate; or, it may be the result of a sense of duty. Civic action may be to

provide input or as a response to output; it may be to express one's view or to alter a course of action.

The assumption addresses the kind of activity necessary to maintain a democratic society. Figure 1 helps to explain this assumption. It may be the case that citizens take action when their level of consciousness is raised to a certain level. Some citizens may be content to be inactive until an issue is important to them. In a similar sense, the passive individual may be content to nod one's head until a situation emerges that is individually significant. When a level of consciousness is raised to a certain point, these individuals become very active on a particular matter or matters. A good citizen is not necessarily active at all times. Depending on interests and resources, a good citizen may be more interested in some issues and less interested in others.

It is also assumed that technology has an impact on curriculum choices including what to teach and how to teach it. Technology is seen as non-neutral; the dissertation assumes a need for an increased awareness of the negative aspects of technology. This view calls into question the fundamental reliance in science inherent in the perspective of many individuals.

As well, citizenship education is viewed as the

ACTIVITY, PASSIVITY, AND
INACTIVITY OF CITIZENS



FIGURE 1

core of the social studies. There is, therefore, an important link between civic action and social studies classrooms. Through social studies is seen one way to promote active, caring citizenship.

Social studies is seen to have a reconstructionist message or component--there is assumed to be a notion that social studies can, in some ways, change the world by helping to create caring individuals who work toward 'what ought to be.'

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation may have considerable impact on the teaching strategies, approaches, and techniques of social studies teachers (in a technological sense); but, more important, the study may also point toward a more holistic way of approaching the social studies. In this respect, it may serve as a basis of a new direction in curriculum making. It may have impact on how social studies teachers plan and teach lessons--and even the topic and curriculum structure. The work will be pointed toward changing our world to cast it in terms of 'what ought to be;' to make our world a better place.

The sense of belonging, of active participation, that develops in social studies will also affect other aspects of a student's life. An

understanding of a truer meaning of citizenship may have implications for school experiences and personal relationships. In this sense, the dissertation has implications for other aspects of life in a school.

Another implication of this work is its potential contribution to the reinstatement of a more classical democratic theory--a theory George Wood describes as "participatory" rather than "protectionist." (1985, p. 40) This means that citizens recognize their role as equal decision-makers in "a lived process of participation, a process in which citizens do not merely choose between elites but actually transform themselves through debate and contestation over public issues." (p. 43) It means the support of

> a vision of democracy which continues to be relevant as it humanizes shared social spheres, empowers democratic citizens, and leads to a more effective and efficient decision-making. Ongoing debate into how such participation is to be facilitated in our evolving society is necessary. (p. 43)

In such a way social studies is transformed. A renewed consciousness and dedicated social action help to formulate a citizenship education that pierces the layer of passivity to find a critical path committed to human dignity and action.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A CITIZEN

The term, 'citizen,' has a long history. It is a notion that many of us take for granted. We are born 'citizens' of our country; we are seldom in a position to reflect on what citizenship really means. For baby-boom Canada, being a citizen means having a country to call home. For my parents' generation, democratic citizenship involves defending one's homeland from enemies of freedom. For my grandparents' generation, citizenship means acceptance in a new homeland. For social studies teachers, the notion of citizenship is vital--our efforts are dedicated to the development of democratic citizens by tradition and philosophy. In order to understand what it means to be a citizen, it is necessary to review history to compare and contrast the different conceptions of citizenship. This chapter chronicles the nature of citizenship from ancient Greece to modern day Canada. It seeks to make clearer the original meaning of citizenship and to apply that understanding of citizenship to the Canadian experience.

ANCIENT NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

THE ORIGINS OF CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY

R. Freeman Butts believes that the idea of citizenship can be traced to the rise of the Sumerian city-states in the period from 3000 to 2500 B.C., but the fragmentary historic record and limited influence on the Western tradition serve to relegate this birth of citizenship to a historical footnote. (Butts, 1980, p. 24) Butts notes these points about the origin of the idea of citizenship:

> 1) citizenship was based on membership in a political community regulated by man-made laws rather than upon membership in a family, clan, or tribe based upon kinship, religion, ethnic background, or inherited status; and 2) the predominant view of citizenship in fifth-century Athens was that citizenship meant that the laws were made, administered, and judged by free citizens who were both rulers and ruled, not merely subjects of a king or priest who made or revealed the laws. In the first case, citizenship entailed rights and responsibilities conferred by law (achieved status) in contrast to roles and obligations conferred by inherited class, kinship, or sex (ascribed status). In the second case the free citizens were members of a democratic or republican political community in which the citizen class participated actively in the affairs of the state. (p. 25)

The potential of the uniting power of the political community has not always been apparent. Historically, such factors as kinship and religion have

had more sway in the maintenance of social order and the administration of justice in a traditional society. The move to a common bond of state is a fundamental shift in the organization of community life. Up to the middle of the eighth century B.C., Athens had a monarchical form of government drawn from tribes or clans. From village community it became a city-state, or polis, as a result of increased trade, the establishment of a growing marketplace, and the need for common defense (at an elevated, fortified site--the acropolis). With increased wealth, a small number of individuals captured economic power and challenged the political authority of the king. This council of nobles gained more and more power and eventually eliminated the kingship. The sweeping changes of economic expansion brought political problems for the oligarchy and provided opportunities for tyrants to claim power on the basis of lower class discontent and promises of relief from problems of the day. Gradually, there was dissatisfaction with tyranny which did not bring political oppression to an end. The increased economic strength of the city paralleled with a political consciousness of common citizens contributed to the establishment of democracy. (See Wallbank, Taylor and Bailkey, 1971, pp. 42-46; Burns, et. al., 1982, pp. 171-177) In the course of this expansion, the political

community changed from a sense of tribal authority to a sense of community rooted in a growing number of common concerns. There came to be a single, monolithic structure of power which united all members of the city-state in the attainment of community goals. Membership in the political community overtook the significance of kinship, religion, ethnicity, and status. (Nisbet, 1982, pp. 15-16)

THE ATHENIAN IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP

The oppressive Athenian tyranny was overthrown in 508 B.C. when Cleisthenes promised reforms in return for support from the masses. Cleisthenes provided for the participation of all of the free men living in Athens on the basis of equality. A public assembly of all citizens was the law-making body, and maintained supreme control of executive and administrative functions. Executive duties were handled by the Council of Five Hundred, a new political organization. Fifty members were selected by lot from each of ten new divisions, eliminating the old units which represented traditional tribal or class groups. The new administrative organization cut across divisive factors (especially class, genealogy, and geography) and helped to achieve a feeling of community by focusing each division's

interests on common goals. This was a very significant reform in the development of the Athenian political community. Judicial functions were handled by people's juries selected by lot from a pool of 6,000 members. Executive officials were also chosen by lot and only the Board of Ten Generals was elected, and then for only one-year terms to ensure maximum accountability. A later reform instituted the use of ostracism, whereby anyone deemed by a majority vote of the Assembly to be a threat to the state was sent into exile for a ten-year period. In every way, Cleisthenes's reforms were devoted to the attainment of common, community objectives and the maintenance of a responsible and confident male citizenry.

There were other developments which assisted in the establishment of common goals. War with Persia, which recommenced in 480 B.C., was successfully countered by a competent Athenian navy which was constructed with public funds voted by the Assembly three years before. The navy was the foresight of Themistocles and it saved the city-state from foreign domination. The sailors, selected from the poorer parts of the population, found a kind of solidarity in their vocation and the establishment of a state fleet meant that the sailors' efforts were devoted to the achievement of state goals,

including the defeat of Persia. Bowra sees this as an important phase in the development of citizenship--the fleet was used in the community interest to secure the defeat of the Persians and was a national inspiration which only reinforced the Athenian political structure. (1971, pp. 19-22) As Herodotus explains,

> So the Athenians increased in strength. It is obvious not from their example only, but from many others, that freedom is a good thing; for even the Athenians, as long as they were under a tyrant's yoke, were not one bit braver than any of their neighbors, but as soon as they shook off their yoke they became by far the first. While living under oppression they let themselves be beaten, because they were working for their master; but when they won their freedom each man wanted to do the best he could, because he knew that he would enjoy the fruits of his effort. (Herodotus, V, 78)

It was during the time of Pericles that Athens attained its most complete democracy. Pericles was elected Strategos (general) each year for about thirty years; he was without question the leader, and democracy flourished during his time. Thucydides reports Pericles's speech at the burial of soldiers who died during the first year of the Peloponnesian War--Pericles is at his bombastic best in describing the ideals of Athenian democracy when he addresses the people of his city-state:

> For we enjoy a form of government which does not copy the laws of our neighbours; but we are ourselves rather a pattern to others than

> imitators of them. In name, from its not being administered for the benefit of the few, but of the many, it is called a democracy; but with regard to its laws, all enjoy equality, as concerns their private differences; while with regard to public rank, according as each man has reputation for any thing, he is preferred for public honours, not so much from consideration of party, as of merit; nor, again, on the ground of poverty, while he is able to do the state any good service, is he prevented by the obscurity of his position... The same men can attend at the time to domestic as well as to public affairs; and others, who are engaged with business, can still form a sufficient political judgment on political questions. For we are the only people that consider the man who takes no part in these things, not as unofficious, but as useless... To sum it all up, I claim that our city is an education to all Greece, and that every man among us is an example of independence of mind, versatility of accomplishment, and richly developed personality. (Thucydides, II, 35-41)

Pericles concluded that the efforts of the fallen soldiers had been devoted to the larger aims of the state, and that it was in the collective interest of all citizens to sacrifice personal concerns for the greater welfare of the city:

> You must prove how precious such a spirit of devotion is, not by listening to the praise of heroes, but by daily appreciating the city's greatness, by falling in love with her as you see her, by realizing that her greatness is due to men of courage who know their duty and discipline themselves in its performance. Judging freedom to be happiness, and courage to be the creator of freedom, it remains for you not to fear any risks, but to rival what these men have done. (Thucydides, II, 42-43)

In every sense, the supreme importance of the

community was stressed by Pericles. An individual who did not participate did not really belong--one's citizenship would, in a real sense, be reduced. In fact, the individual would not be properly human. This sense of belonging can be seen in the kind of democracy apparent in Athens at the height of Pericles's leadership.

The administration of Athens was the responsibility of its citizens, but this was not a majority of the population. A citizen was a man over eighteen years of age who was born of Athenian parents. This excluded metics (resident aliens), women and children, and slaves. Agard speculates that approximately one-tenth of the total population had political rights. (1942, pp. 69-70) The electorate, however, was thoroughly democratic, and every citizen was a member of the Assembly which established every foreign and domestic policy. The Council of Five Hundred was the chief executive body of the polis and fifty members held office each month. The Council was elected annually by lot from a roster of citizens over thirty years of age. Popular courts tried all legal cases and the juries consisted of between twenty-one and 1,001 citizens chosen from a panel of 6,000 citizens drawn annually by lot. Even the administrative officers were selected by lot

with the exception of the Board of Generals, which was elected because of the highly technical job of constructing military and naval strategies. The extent of this public service is very significant:

> In practical terms this meant that every citizen of Athens during the course of his life had been engaged in public service. He had military training during the ages of eighteen to twenty; he listened in assembly to the debates, perhaps spoke himself, and shared in the decisions regarding governmental policy; he would probably have served on juries, which decided matters of civil law with no judges to instruct them; and he would likely have been on various commissions and a member of the Council of Five Hundred; perhaps on one day he was actually chairman of the Council (for that office, too, was passed around in a democratic way), so was virtually president of the Athenian Commonwealth. It is obvious, therefore, that the ordinary citizen in Athens had an extraordinary opportunity for participating in political life; freedom to him meant, not so much the lack of restraint as the privilege of sharing in community enterprises. In fact it has been estimated that on any given day one citizen out of every four or five was engaged in some form of public service. As a result there was an extremely well informed and experienced citizenry. (Agard, 1942, pp. 71-72)

It was the shift from the priority of community to an individualism that spelled the end of the Athenian democracy. Athens was not communal in dealings with her allies who supported a fund for mutual defense. There was considerable growth in Athenian imperialism to the point that allied funds destined for defense were diverted to public works projects in the city-state. The

allies had been transformed into a naval empire for the advancement of Athenian interests, and when an ally tried to rebel, Athens crushed the revolt by force and dealt with the city as if it had been conquered. Allies were seen to be inferior states and were not treated in the democratic way Athenian domestic affairs were handled. A revolutionary spirit grew in Athens, as noted by Thucydides:

> The cause of all these evils was greed, ambition, and the love of power, and the party spirit which they created. Leaders of one faction would pretend to uphold the equality of the many, the other the superior wisdom of an aristocracy, whereas in reality both considered only what profit they could make for themselves at the expense of the people. So revolution produced every kind of evil in Greece. In their feeling of insecurity men looked only to their own safety and trusted no one. While conditions of life were in complete disorder, people gave way to uncontrolled passions and disregarded those common laws of humanity in which every person normally trusts for his protection. (Thucydides, III, 82-85)

Conditions were right for the erosion of the sense of political community, and archrival Sparta defeated Athens by 404 B.C., imposing drastic measures including submission to Sparta as a subject state. Oligarchy replaced democracy; opposition was not to be tolerated. Indeed, the glory of the Athenian democracy had come to an end.

The years of Athenian democracy, especially the

time of Pericles, are represented by at least one author as the truest form of democracy recorded in history. As noted by Glover,

> In Athens more than in any other place I have read of, or so far have visited, there is what we may call an equation between city and citizen. The citizen is the city; L'etat, c'est moi, each one of them can say. He does not break the laws; because he makes the laws; they are the expression of his own will; they suit him admirably... The spirit of Democracy then, as we find it in Athens, is belief in men. (Glover, 1927, pp. 62-63)

What did it mean, then, to be a citizen during this period? It is true that there were certain legal requirements and obligations of citizenship. After the passage of Pericles's citizenship laws (451-450 B.C.), males over eighteen years of age were forced to prove the Athenian birth of their father and mother's father in order to be considered as citizens. Athenian citizens were required to complete a period of military service and pay taxes on the basis of financial ability. Citizens held office as drawn by lot, and were paid for their public service and received a crown at the completion of their term if their audit was passed. These are all legal notions of citizenship, but the Greeks used the same word to describe the citizen body and the constitution. This is a crucial point, because to the Greeks, being a citizen involved something more

than citizenship:

> The abstract word politeia reflected the unity of the citizens, not only the sum of the individuals but the living body composed of rulers and ruled, and the political life that was the very life and nature of the citizens. The use of the same word for individual participation in the state and for its general structure shows that the participation was in the main not a purely legal act between individual and state; it reflected the vital adherence of the individual to the citizen body, as also to the other communities inside the state, and therewith was bound to them... (Ehrenberg, 1969, pp. 38-39)

Notwithstanding the legal rights and responsibilities of citizenship, to be a citizen conveyed a sense of community belonging. Patterson argues that the citizenship law of 451-450 B.C. "stands at the beginning of the development of a [sic] abstract and divisible notion of citizenship." (1981, p. 135) Subsequent decisions of the Athenian community created certain classes of legal status--aliens could hold land, certain individuals could speak at the Assembly, others could not vote. The key to citizenship was "not so much a collection of rights (and duties) as simple belonging, having a share in the city and everything it stood for." (p. 135; pp. 129-139)

Perhaps one of the best examples of this 'belonging' is demonstrated in the Athenian oath taken by military cadets after their first year of training:

> I will never bring reproach on my hallowed arms, nor will I desert the comrade at whose side I stand, but I will defend our altars and our hearths, single-handed or supported by many. My native land I will not leave a diminished heritage, but greater and better than when I received it. I will obey whoever is in authority and submit to the established laws and all others which the people shall harmoniously enact. If anyone tries to overthrow the constitution or disobeys it, I will not permit him, but will come to its defense single-handed or with the support of all. I will honor the religion of my fathers. Let the gods be my witnesses, Agraulus, Enyalius, Ares, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone. (Bonner, 1933, pp. 89-90)

When fully developed in Greek times, the meaning of the political community was very indicative of society at large. The 'sense of belonging' was more important than kinship, religion, ethnicity, or social status. Citizenship meant not only legal rights and responsibilities but described a predominant bond between the individual and larger collective aims rooted in a common sense of community. The moral life of the community took precedence; the citizen was a free individual only in community.

PLATO'S VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP

Plato wrote during the decline of the Athenian democracy, the erosion of Greek morals, and the dismemberment of the Greek artistic and cultural achievements. Plato believed that the ideal community

must be constructed and that this could be done with the fuller development of a sense of community to outweigh the conflicts of an imperfect world. By the end of the fifth century B.C., Plato concluded that political unity was impossible in Greece because of growing individualism, immorality, and cultural and social factionalism. His political theory--and his view of citizenship--would help to counter this divisiveness. Plato believed that unity and stability were critical in the attainment of individual freedom and justice.

Harmony is a theme of Plato's work. His view of a political community is that first and foremost there must be oneness:

> 'Can we mention any greater evil to a city than that which rends it asunder and makes it not one city but many? or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?'
> 'We cannot.'
> 'Then does not communion in pleasure and pain bind the city together, when, as far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike over the same births and the same deaths?'
> 'Certainly,' he said.
> 'On the other hand, is not individuality in these feelings a dissolving force, when one part of the citizens are smitten with grief and the other transported with joy over the same experiences of the city or its inhabitants?'
> 'Surely.'
> 'And does not this state of things result when such words as "mine" and "not mine," "another's" and "not another's," are not pronounced in the city in concert?'
> 'Yes, indeed.'
> 'Then that city is best governed, whichever it may be, in which the largest number of men

> agree in applying these words, "mine" or "not mine," to the same thing?'
>
> 'Very much so.'
>
> 'And is it not this that is nearest the condition of a single individual? For consider, when any one of us hurts his finger, the whole fellowship of body and soul which is bound into a single organization, namely, that of the ruling power within it, feels the hurt, and is all in pain at once, whole and hurt part together. And so we say that the man has a pain in his finger. And in regard to any part of the human body whatever, may not the same account be given of the pain felt when a part is hurt, and of the pleasure felt when it is at ease?'
>
> 'Yes,' he said. 'And to return to your question, the life of the best governed city comes very near to this condition.'
>
> 'Then I fancy that when an individual citizen has any experience, whether good or bad, such a city will most certainly declare that experience its own, and the whole city will share his joy or his sorrow.' (Plato, 462)

The unity of the city is an important theme of Plato's work.

Plato rejected a crucial point of Athenian democracy--that citizens were able to alternatively make laws, work in the community, and defend the city in wartime. Plato believed that the city should be organized so that citizens undertook tasks they were most fit to do:

> '... No two of us are by nature altogether alike. Our capacities differ. Some are fit for one work, some for another. Do you agree?'
>
> 'I do.'
>
> 'Well, then, would better work be done on the principle of one man many trades, or of one man one trade?'
>
> 'One man one trade is better,' he said.

> 'Yes, for I fancy that it is also evident that, in work, opportunities which we pass by are lost.'
>
> 'That is evident.'
>
> 'I fancy that things to be done will not wait the good time of the doer. Rather the doer must wait on the opportunity for action, and not leave the doing of it for his idle moments.'
>
> 'He must.'
>
> 'And so more tasks of each kind are accomplished, and the work is better and is done more easily when each man works at the one craft for which nature fits him, that being free from all other occupations he may wait on its opportunities.'
>
> 'That is certainly the case.' (Plato, 370)

The city would be ruled, Plato argued, by a wise, highly educated group of philosophers--guardians of the state who would always proceed in the best interests of the state. As well, there would be a class of workers who would do what they do best--work--and a military class which would defend the city. As the Republic records,

> '... the other citizens as well as the guardians must be set each to the task for which nature has fitted him, one man one task, that so each citizen doing his own particular work may become one man and not many, and thus the whole city may grow to be not many cities, but one.' (Plato, 423)

There is an important irony here. Plato's oneness is to be drawn from a diversity of naturally suited tasks. There is one state, but at least three classes; there is one state but many diverse tasks.

To Plato, there seems to be more than one

conception of citizenship. On the one hand, each member of society performs the task most naturally suited to him. Contributing to the unity of society in this way may be seen to be good citizenship. Indeed, the contribution of the soldiers, the workers, and the guardians is just that--contributing a service in the community interest. There seems, however, to be a special responsibility in the case of the guardian class. Plato seems to be telling us that the guiding and governing of the guardian class is citizenship in his highest form.

Nisbet suggests that there are four key qualities of Plato's guardian class. (1982, pp. 14-16) First, there is a quality of asceticism because rulers must not be pleasure-seeking and must be prepared to forego the material advantages for greater state aims. Second, there must be communism in that the needs of the state must supercede the needs of the individual, and this is more probable when such ties as family, social attachments, or other fellowships are absent from the community. Third, the political community must be monolithic to ensure that the community is powerfully unified at all times. Finally, there is also a quality of mysticism--a coming together of faith and reason--to permit the individual to become fully free in a social

cohesion of belonging. Plato's unity of community is dominant and it contributes to an understanding of justice:

> 'What of the people in our city? What do they call the rulers besides citizens?'
> 'Saviours and helpers,' he said.
> 'And what do these call the people?'
> 'Wage payers and supporters.'
> 'But what do the rulers in other cities call the people?'
> 'Slaves,' he said.
> 'And what do the rulers call each other?'
> 'Fellow-rulers,' he said.
> 'And in our city?'
> 'Fellow-guardians.'
> 'Then can we say of a ruler in other cities that he may address one of his fellow-rulers as a kinsman and another as a stranger?'
> 'Yes, many might.'
> 'Then does he not think and speak of the kinsman as belonging to him, and of the stranger as not belonging?'
> 'Yes.'
> 'But what of your guardians? Could any of them think of or address one of his fellow-guardians as a stranger?'
> 'Certainly not,' he said, 'for in every one he meets he will think he has a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or grandchild or grandparent.'
> 'Excellent,' I said. 'But answer me this also. Will your law prescribe for them only names of kinship, or must all their actions be in accordance with these names? In their behaviour towards their fathers must they not observe all that the law prescribes for this relation--reverence, filial care, and the proper obedience to parents--or else suffer at the hands of God and man? For he who acts otherwise profanes heaven and wrongs man. Will not those sayings be sung by all the citizens, and sound in their ears from their earliest childhood with reference to those who are pointed out to them as fathers and other relatives?'
> 'They will,' he said. 'It would be

> ridiculous if with their lips alone they uttered the names whilst they neglected the acts of friendship.'
>
> 'Then in this city above all others, when any one meets with good fortune or with bad they will join in uttering the words of which I have just spoken, saying "It is well with mine" or "It is ill with mine.'"
>
> 'Very true,' he said. (Plato, 463)

Plato comes to define justice as applied both to the state and to the human being. Justice is each part of society performing the task to which it is naturally suited. For the state, justice is the way in which rulers rule, workers work, and soldiers defend. For the individual, justice is how reason dominates one's actions. (See White, 1979, pp. 13-30) The result is what Nisbet calls "a blend of rigorous social nihilism and political affirmation." (1982, p. 8) The state is cleansed from anything divisive so that the individual can be placed in the most liberating context of the political community. The citizen is liberated in the context of his naturally determined abilities and always in the interests of the state.

ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP

Aristotle's Politics (trans. Jowett and Butcher, 1964) provides valuable information about his notion of citizenship, which contrasts considerably with the view of Plato. While Plato sees the strength of a

community in its unity and stability, Aristotle believes that the community (and the state) is, by its very nature, a pluralistic society. The implications of this view are certainly enlightening--on one extreme one could say that Plato's approach to good citizenship is the fulfilling of appropriate tasks; Aristotle's view could be likened to the civic duty of belonging.

Aristotle begins his discussion of citizenship by asking the question "Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term." (Aristotle, III.1, p. 79) He proceeds to limit the definition by describing what a citizen is not. Residence in a place is not a characteristic of citizenship because aliens are also residents. Citizens cannot be defined by their possession of legal rights because non-citizens have civil rights and may be the benefactors of certain treaty provisions. Aristotle says that a citizen's "special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices." (III.1, p. 80)

Aristotle further explains that there are two kinds of office, "discontinuous" and "'indefinite office.'" "Discontinuous" office refers to specific administrative and judicial duties for the state; "'indefinite office'" refers to the ongoing opportunity to share in the assembly and the courts. It is the

latter definition--citizenship as the holding of "'indefinite office'"--that rings true to Aristotle. It seems apparent that participation (or the opportunity to participate) in deliberating and adjudicating constitutes citizenship. He proceeds, however, to explain that his new definition is itself inadequate. Some forms of government exist, Aristotle observes, that are not democratic since "in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly..." (III.1, p. 81) Aristotle revises his definition of citizenship once again to take into consideration states which are not democratic. A citizen, then, "is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things." (III.1, p. 81) Aristotle's definition of a citizen now seems firm:

> He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. (III.1, p. 81)

For Aristotle, citizenship is reduced to a kind of 'civic' belonging.

Aristotle is sharply critical of Plato's view

of the united state. He believes that a state should be a plurality because it brings together so many different individuals who share and utilize their fundamental differences:

> I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the better.' It is not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. (II.2, p. 36)

There is, Aristotle reminds us, a basic equality of freemen. There is diversity in custom and tradition, and this should not be subverted. There is, in any city, a celebration of family, friendships, and community. These help to preserve "the greatest good of cities." (II.2, p. 37) Aristotle suggests that the loss of kinship ties can lead to the elimination of a key social restraint generated by love and community with others. Responsibilities may become so shared that they become no one's responsibilities. Everyone will be together, but no one will belong. Aristotle's vision of citizenship presupposes a kind of pluralism which furthers an

essential social belonging which tends to be an important theme in the ancient notion of citizenship. Yet, Aristotle's 'firm' definition of citizenship tends to omit the social belonging. It is rooted in civic powers and duties instead of community membership and participation.

Plato and Aristotle agree on two important points. Both see the political community as a way of attaining justice; both see education as a public function rather than a private responsibility of the family or religion. (See Butts, 1980, p. 29) There is, however, a crucial difference between Plato and Aristotle:

> Plato had believed so deeply in the political community that he had desired to see it become all in all; not a community of communities, but instead a community of individuals emancipated from all other communal or associational ties--in short, a monolithic, unitary, absolute community. Aristotle, recognizing the importance, even desirability, of the political community, saw it as destined inevitably to totalitarianism unless its power over human beings was checked and balanced by the powers of other communities within the political order, such as kinship, religion, locality, and others of social or cultural type. And in this difference between Plato and Aristotle we have the essence of the difference, which has survived throughout Western thought down to the present moment, between political monism and political pluralism. (Nisbet, 1982, p. 22)

THE ROMAN IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP

There are many parallels between the development of citizenship in Rome and the development of citizenship in Greece. The key aspect is the creation of a political community which has more significance than the social cohesion of family, kinship, and religion. This evolved more slowly in Rome because of the tremendous social significance of the family.

The father of the family was very powerful and his power (patria potestas) even included the right of life and death over his kinship group. The family, not the individual, was the organizing social unit in Roman society. Consequently, education was a responsibility of the family; property ownership was determined by the father; civil and criminal offences were handled by the family. The family's dominance in daily life, and the powerful sway of the father, began to diminish in the third and second centuries B.C. Butts notes that foreign and civil wars led to the establishment of army commanders as authorities, taking away some of the power of the kinship group and giving it to the state. (1980, pp. 32-34)

Gradually, the power of law was exercised by the state instead of the family under the leadership of

the father. In fact, with the establishment of the empire, Roman law was interpreted and codified. At the same time, Rome expanded throughout the known world, and conferred Roman citizenship in a variety of forms on her possessions. The important point about Roman expansion was that the granting of citizenship more involved the legal provisions of citizens' rights. The key to understanding the granting of Roman citizenship is to apply the notion of 'belonging.' Our vision of citizenship today is one rooted in a legal attachment to state; the acquisition of Roman citizenship was the admission to partnership in an empire--it was the opportunity to 'belong' in some way to the community of victors. The different categories of citizenship granted took into consideration such things as the loyalty of the inhabitants or the danger to the empire. (See Sherwin-White, 1973, pp. 397-424; Kagan, 1966, pp. 67-81) The right to vote or the subjection to Roman laws without voting privileges--these were categories of citizenship but more significant they were categories of 'belonging.'

As the empire crumbled, kinship and family ties regained their influence as a social restraint. Social jurisdiction was claimed by religion, localities, and professions. Feudalism was a completely different kind of political community. The state no longer really

existed--the political structure was localized and the consent of the people was proclaimed by higher authority.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANCIENT NOTION OF CITIZENSHIP

As noted at the outset of this chapter, we tend to view citizenship as a legally determined status resulting from birthright or term of residence. The ancient notion of citizenship is very different, and it is only with Pericles's citizenship law (451-450 B.C.) that citizenship begins to be categorized. The ancient notion of being a citizen is based on a social belonging--membership in a political community. To keep from being 'useless' (to use Pericles's term), 'to belong' means to attend to public affairs and to form judgments on political questions. This responsible view of civic duty insists that citizens be both the rulers and the ruled, based on individual equality and freedom. It is also firmly rooted in community values and rights.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE AGES

As already noted, the medieval period was devoted to political fragmentation and feudal government which placed more emphasis on social restraints than on community. The period served as a transition to the modern notion of citizenship. Political power was

exercised by individuals rather than by the agents of a centralized state. Walter Ullmann reviews the standing of the individual citizen within medieval society. He offers three important conclusions. (1966, pp. 145-151)

First, Ullmann posits that the Middle Ages contributed the idea of the supremacy of law--the rule of law. This application meant that the idea of justice became precise. A sense of community could be gained by following the law:

> The sempiternity of the idea of law as the one and only regulating force within a body corporate--translating the abstract idea of justice into concrete terms of the law--raised the law to a basic principle which impressed itself upon the Middle Ages and far beyond. The respect for, if not the sanctity of, the law was the presupposition for orderly public government and social life. It was the law that was held to have infused permanence, stability, and sempiternity to the body politic; it was the law which breathed life into a public body. (p. 147)

Second, Ullmann writes that the establishment of the supremacy of the law led to an understanding of individual rights of citizens. There was a link between natural law and natural rights--and human reason:

> Man's right reason became the key with which the secrets of orderly, civilized, peaceful social life could be unlocked. The natural rights of man, discoverable by right reason, emerged in the political field as the fundamental rights of the citizen. (p. 149)

One detects a more legal sense of citizenship with a

declining social sense.

Third, Ullmann describes the generation of common law practices. Freedom occurs in a society where laws are not changed without the consent of the people. Feudally inspired common law granted a number of individual rights--on the basis of natural rights. One could argue that this basis--the identification of rights and the primacy of law--established a fertile minefield for the revolutionary times ahead.

MODERN NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

NATION-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

The modern notion of citizenship developed with the rise of European nation-states, which altered the feudal society of medieval times. The Crusades widened the scope of Europeans, ended their isolation, and helped to stimulate trade and commerce, especially in the Mediterranean area. The expansion of the economy helped the reemergence of cities and the reduction of feudal authority. A new society emerged in which kings challenged the power of the nobility and the Church by assuming more and more of the military, judicial and administrative agencies of the modern state. A new political community--the nation-state--was emerging.

As time progressed, a democratic revolution took place across much of the western world and this also expanded and clarified the evolving conception of citizenship. Palmer argues that the period of the democratic revolution (especially 1760-1800) was characterized by a revolutionary movement which grew separately and distinctly in different parts of the western world. In each case, there was a challenge against the established order which was seen as closed and privileged. (See Palmer, 1959)

The modern notion of citizenship, then, emerges with an increased emphasis on political community instead of the medieval array of social attachments. Two key philosophers can be credited with the development of modern citizenship ideas--Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau.

HOBBES'S VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP

Written in 1651, Hobbes's Leviathan is a landmark description of the absolute political community. Hobbes was ruthless in dealing with conflict of any kind which could detract from the singular unity of the state. To achieve this aim, Hobbes advocated a political community without limit on the prerogatives of the sovereign. Hobbes's notion is absolute sovereignty.

Hobbes expresses concerns about the natural character of an individual--before politics, socialization, and acculturation. This individual, Hobbes suggests, is inherently sad, fearful, and insecure. (1642, I.2) In the social state, one finds security and order, and Nisbet interprets Hobbes to mean that

> in time the individual's egoistic desire for his own greatest advantage--that is, his instinct for self-preservation--managed somehow to unite with the reason which is native to man and through which even in the presocial state he could presumably foresee the advantages in sovereignty and absolute political association; and that the momentous result was a "social contract," out of which came, once and for all, the absolute political community--Leviathan! (1982, p. 28)

Without absolute state power over man and adherence to complete sovereign control, man would return to his natural state and be fearful and insecure. (1651, I.14, p. 85; II.18, pp. 112-113) Man is either helpless or he is a citizen of this absolute state.

All authority is centralized; it is indivisible. Property rights are granted by the sovereign. The family is respected, but its principal role is procreation. The church, which Hobbes clearly feared, is totally subordinate to the sovereign--indeed, governed by the head of state. All of these conditions would ensure that the individual would attain his natural

ends.

His rejection of cultural, geographic, and religious factors was supportive of a political community which would engender a different kind of citizenship. A citizen would enter into the Hobbesean 'social contract' and gain security and a sense of belonging in a community without limits on sovereign power. This structure would, at the same time, enable the individual to fulfill his natural proclivities:

> What Plato did for the ancient city-state Hobbes did for the modern nation-state: gave it an ideal expression that made it triumphant over all competing types of social structure... Hobbes ... located absolute power, not in monarchy, not even in government as such, but in the legal framework of the state. In sum, the state became for Hobbes the legal-political community that is Leviathan: a community which does not permit within itself any lesser form of community that could conceivably challenge its unity, its indivisibility, and its absolute authority. (Nisbet, 1982, p. 35)

Inherent in Hobbes's view are many assumptions about the sovereign.

ROUSSEAU'S VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP

One of the most significant contributors to the discussion of citizenship and political community was Jean Jacques Rousseau whose work The Social Contract (1762) remains a vital statement even today. Written in eighteenth century France, Rousseau was a part of the

Enlightenment and he spoke against tradition and especially the social and political powers of the Christian church. The political community, for Rousseau, was an escape from the corruption of French society. The political community was absolute and could protect citizens from the restrictions of society. Rousseau believed that the individual should be free from social inequality and decay--the political community could provide a means to liberate the individual. This fundamental liberty was from society, but not from the state. The state would always be united and absolute; society was a battleground for divisive forces--the conflicting institutions of family, religion, locality, economy, school and bureaucracy. Natural equality is the result of this liberation, and it is only through the state that the restrictions of society can be brushed off. In order for the state to be able to liberate citizens, there is an obligation to render to the state what the state demands--this is the basis of freedom. Here is where we come to understand Rousseau's vision of citizenship:

> If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
> 'Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part

> of the whole.'
>
> At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State. (I.6, p. 13)

These ideas provide a key understanding of the notion of citizenship. Rousseau sees citizens as sovereign actors who, together, influence the general will and also heed it. Citizenship is a combination of participation, leadership, and obedience:

> In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the workings of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the most frightful abuses. (I.7, p. 15)

When one compares the Social Contract with the prevailing political philosophies of the day, one can see the tremendous impact Rousseau's thinking had. It also helps

to advance the meaning of citizenship from a 'social belonging' or from a set of legal rights to a series of obligations devoted to political sovereignty.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP

A number of views of citizenship have been advanced in this chapter. Citizenship is a set of legal rights that forms a national state of attachment. Yet, citizenship is also more abstract. It represents a kind of community status and a 'belonging' to a unified state. There is an affinity for fundamental equality and unity. There is also discussion of pluralism, absolute sovereignty, and general will. Are these not diverse and maybe even discursive? How can Plato's city-unity evolve from three classes of individuals devoted to diverse, but naturally suited tasks? How can Aristotle's idea of belonging find consonance with his view of citizenship and definite office? What assumptions about sovereignty does Hobbes make in transforming the individual from helplessness to a citizen of an absolute state? What sense can be made of the meaning of citizenship?

The meaning of citizenship can be best generated from its Greek experience and from Rousseau's modern-day application. The first aspect of citizenship comes from the development of political community itself.

Butts never really sees the origin of citizenship; but, rather, he refers to "membership in a political community regulated by man-made laws" and being "both rulers and ruled." (1980, p. 25) He fails to address social belonging. It is social belonging, not the assortment of day-to-day political opportunities of voting, administering, or judging, that is the key point. A person who attended to public affairs and made informal judgments on political questions fulfilled the social (and state) expectations. As a result, he belonged to the political community. This belonging is even clearer when, at a later time, the Greeks granted forms of citizenship that included the opportunity to vote, hold property, or speak at the Assembly, but withheld any uniting sense of belonging. This is a critical aspect of the meaning of citizenship. Second, Rousseau's work addresses active citizens as sovereign. These citizens share in sovereign power and, therefore, accept the obligations of belonging to the state directed by a general will. Citizenship means active belonging; that is, citizenship involves being attentive to public and political questions and accepting the essence of freedom from sharing in the unifying force of sovereign power.

THE CANADIAN NOTION OF CITIZENSHIP

AN ELUSIVE IDENTITY

Only recently have Canadians come to terms with what it means to be a Canadian citizen. Primarily this has been the development of a national consciousness through an ongoing refinement of an elusive Canadian identity.

Why has there been such difficulty in the development of a patriotic spirit and national culture in Canada? Toronto political scientist George Heiman has isolated five reasons for the difficulty in such developments. (1966, pp. 323-340) He suggests that the presence of two nationalities in one country is responsible for contrasting views and comments, and this results in the lack of a culture definition. One might add that the presence of a growing third group in Canada of immigrants (and the very nature of being a 'third group'--an anglicized component that bows to the majority English-speaking culture group) is an additional argument for the inability to fix a definition of Canadian culture. Religious denomination has also made a oneness difficult. The federal system of government, the vast size of the country in geographic terms as well as the extent of the frontier, and the proximity of the United

States have all made the development of an independent patriotic spirit and national culture a difficult task to complete.

LIMITED IDENTITIES

In attempting to uncover a Canadian identity, Ramsay Cook suggests that

> Perhaps instead of constantly deploring our lack of identity, we should attempt to understand and explain the regional, ethnic and class identities that we do have. It might just be that it is in these limited identities that "Canadianism" is found, and that except for our over-heated nationalist intellectuals, Canadians find this situation quite satisfactory. (1967, p. 663)

This concept of limited identities describes the Canadian experience well. It is partly the result of new social forces and political demands; it alters the nature of our Canadian Confederation. A regionalism has developed, or rather has continued to develop from the outset. (Dubuc, 1967, pp. 112-132). This regionalism has considerable implications for our 'belonging' as citizens. Confederation can be seen as the coming together of a number of distinctive Canadian regions, none of which shed its character to wear the image of the typical Canadian. One must recognize that the primary reasons for Confederation included the fear of the United States and its designs upon what Canadians saw as theirs; the

north was a no-man's land; British Columbia was in western isolation. These factors gave added drive to the Confederation movement. The Imperial attitude was significant as well, as Britain viewed colonies as really unnecessary, and so welcomed the consolidation of responsible government. One can conclude that Confederation was more the result of external factors than internal, although the dreams of Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir George-Etienne Cartier cannot be dismissed as insignificant.

Eminent Canadian historian, Professor J.M.S. Careless notes that we measure nation-building according to its goal of a strong and united nation, compared always with the United States. (1969, pp. 1-2) Maybe, Careless suggests, we are viewing this goal from the wrong angle. Regional history has played a dominant theme in the Canadian experience. The early twentieth century allowed the West to emerge as a region; the twenties were the years of industrial expansion, modernization, and social stratification; the depression years brought disruption to the Canadian political scene (class and ethnic strain); the forties were years of national sentiment in external crisis; the decade of the fifties promoted regional expansion, enhancing the regional orientation; and the sixties brought regional

division. (p. 2) Why, then, is this experience of regionalism so prominent and distinctive in Canadian history? Why do we not 'belong?'

One reason is our geographic segmentation. The north to south orientation of regional economic patterns provides difficulty for the predominant (and man-made) east to west relationships in Canada, and in fact can hinder the maintenance of east to west lines. The Anglo-French duality separates two distinctive cultural groups, resulting in an inward-looking approach to national affairs. Urbanization has resulted in reinforcement of regional identity through metropolitanism. In Canada there are a number of key cities which each control a significant trading area (e.g., Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Halifax). Urbanization, combined with metropolitanism, have helped to confirm regional identity. (pp. 3-4)

One must wonder whether or not we, as Canadians, can picture ourselves as Canadians. That is to say, what is the stereotyped Canadian image? Although Americans or Australians might have a ready picture of a Canadian, we do not. Yet, it is not difficult to readily picture a Newfoundlander, a Saskatchewan farmer, or a Quebec habitant. One must ask, as Careless does, if the truth of Canada's twentieth century history would better

be expressed in region-building instead of nation-building. Regions attempt to gain maximum autonomy and maximum advantages from the federal, provincial, or municipal governments. Yet, there is a sacrifice to maintain general union above regional views and aspirations. (pp. 9-10) This regional interpretation of Canada's history is well considered and states the form of Canada's past. Indeed, our very presence since discovery in European times has been one based upon regionality. A number of monopoly holders attempted colonies in isolated Canadian regions; Quebec mentality differed from Montreal, Upper from Lower Canada; and, Canadians were different from west coast residents in the Confederation era. Clearly, Canada's history has been very much predicated by a stringent strand of regionality and diversity. But, our process of 'becoming' is also indebted to external influences.

Within the development of a national consciousness, the anti-American movement is not really new. In the 1790s, the influence of American teachers and texts was hotly contested in Canada. The year 1834 saw legislation forcing Canadian citizenship for certification of teachers in Ontario, and in 1847 it was revealed that about half of the textbooks used in the schools were published in the United States. This report

had profound impact upon education, and very quickly Irish readers--and later Ryerson editions--were in use in Canadian classrooms. In 1833, British visitor to Canada, Dr. Thomas Rolph noted

> It is really melancholy to traverse the province and go into many of the common schools; you find a herd of children instructed by some anti-British adventurer, instilling into the young ... mind sentiments hostile to the parent state; false accounts of the late war ... geographic setting forth [American cities] as the largest and finest in the world; historical reading books describing the American population as the most free and enlightened under heaven and American spelling books, dictionaries, and grammar teaching them an anti-British dialect and idiom. (Hodgins, 1896, III, p. 3)

[It is interesting to observe that almost identical comments have been made in recent years by Canadian publishers and educators.] During Rolph's era in Canada, one would note that Americans were seen by Canadians as power hungry, control gaining seekers. They were looked upon as a threat to Confederation. The question of Canadian survival was indeed considered by some Canadians who saw the giant to the south as a growing menace.

The British North America Act classified education in the provincial domain, and therefore is also subject to a strong regional influence. Identity was regionally oriented in Canadian textbooks and until recently continued in such a fashion. The provincial

perspective remained dominant, and a common heritage was generally absent. Modern historians, however, have departed from this regionalist trend and have attempted to present a national history of Canada. A variety of attempts have been made in this regard, and a review of such projects suggested that the finest Canadian history texts mix the theme of unity with the reality of regional diversity. (Roy, 1976, pp. 180-188)

ENCOURAGING 'BECOMING' AND 'BELONGING'

It is crucial that Canadians continue to address national understanding and unity (a sense of 'belonging') and our national identity (our sense of "becoming'). Since the mid-1960s, this has been an increasing concern for Canadians. Canadian textbooks received criticism from A.B. Hodgetts in his report, What Culture? What Heritage?, released in 1968. Hodgetts noted that the teaching of social studies in Canada was exceptionally poor. The author's document was published at a very significant time, for it followed the fever pitch of Canada's centennial year, which brought with it an awareness of Canada and her heritage. Certainly the excitement of the world's presence at Expo '67, the lighting of the Centennial flame, the arrival and touring of world heads of state--these images one recalls as

being particularly significant in our Centennial experience. Pride and awareness of Canada's heritage was clearly the result. So, in 1968, when A.B. Hodgetts completed his study of civic education in Canada, a bombshell was dropped on Canada's educational circles. Coming as it did, while the one hundred candles of the centennial cake were still smoking, the ballooning pride of Canadians was deflated by the findings. Canadians were not aware of Canada, Hodgetts reported. All history was to many students could be summed up as one teenager said--"nice, neat little Acts of Parliament." (p. 20) History for young Canadians had become a record of a dead past. The Canadian youth were bench-bound listeners, yawning in a classroom ornamented only by chalkdust. Hodgetts said there was a ratio between the awareness of identity and the depth and understanding of common problems. Hodgetts emphasized the importance of giving Canadians a renewed interest in the Canadian destiny through striving for national understanding. To Hodgetts, national understanding was much more achievable than national unity. (pp. 10-11; 119-122) The first step in such a project would be the foundation of a Canadian Studies Consortium, and the creation of well designed and instructed Canadian studies units at all levels of Canada's educational system. One can

understand the significance of such a report at a time when Canadians were discovering their 'Canadianness.' We were 'becoming.'

Thomas H.B. Symons was commissioned to survey the situation pertaining to Canadian studies, and his report, To Know Ourselves, was in part released in 1975. Symons suggests that the knowledge of one's identity is self-knowledge, and it is this self-knowledge that Canadians must seek. Symons further notes that

> If one considers identity in terms of those qualities, ideals, experiences and institutions that we have in common as Canadians and that distinguish us from non-Canadians, our identity will be made up of numberless components, about any one of which may legitimately disagree. However, any contribution to our knowledge of these components, whether they be cultural, sociological, or environmental, could be viewed as part of the search for the diverse elements that make up the total of Canadian identity. (p. 12)

Symons's comments provide a pinpointed focus for the quest for Canadian identity. Certainly one way of striving for this identity is a better understanding of ourselves (Symons's self-knowledge concept). Through Canadian studies, Canadians are able to learn more about their heritage, their present state, and projections for the future of Canada and Canadians. This inward-looking quest for understanding and rationalization of self must be regarded as key in the establishment of what appears

to be an elusive Canadian identity. Symons states:

> The most valid and compelling argument for Canadian studies is the importance of self-knowledge, the need to know and to understand ourselves: who we are; where we are in time and space; where we have been; where we are going; what we possess; what our responsibilities are to ourselves and to others. (p. 12)

It could be argued that Symons leaves his rationale for Canadian studies too open; and, although one can agree that Canadians should know themselves for the sake of knowing themselves, one wonders if a viable rationale is really inherent in such thought. Symons refuses to pinpoint his rationale any closer, resulting in the incomplete rationalization of Canadian studies. (pp. 12-15) Surely, the primary reason for studying ourselves is to uncover a Canadian identity--to help us to 'become.' Canadian studies promotes the search for self-knowledge. With the establishment of such a key to understanding, we gain a better understanding of the consciousness of our nation. Our search for self-knowledge cannot become too parochial, however; the goal should be to disclose the widest interpretive horizons for understanding our global situation as well.

Noted Canadian author and editor, George Woodcock, has reflected considerably in analyzing the Canadian identity. He notes that in 1570, identity meant

"the quality of being the same, absolute or essential sameness, oneness;" but by 1683, the word was extended to include "individual existence." Indeed, a fair turnabout in linguistic progression had occurred. This pattern, Woodcock notes, "reflects faithfully the pattern of our own changing meanings when we talk about Canadian identity." (Woodcock, 1972, pp. 67-74) He further suggests that "at last Canadians see their identity as something that distinguishes them from rather than identifying them with others." (p. 70)

The identity and the country's individuality are definitely related, one could conclude. Identity is something achieved through the consciousness Canadians derive from the real nature of Canadian forms--through art (e.g., the Group of Seven and essential quality of the Canadian landscape); poets (especially during the interwar period when an inner sense of independence was captured); architects (who are able to fit the Canadian land with Canadian form and design--the work of Douglas Cardinal is a fine example of such form and design); all keeping in mind the climatic rigours of the north and the political struggles and storms to the south. As Canada's dean of historians, W.L. Morton, has observed, Canadian identity is irrevokably tied to our northern character, our historical dependence, monarchial government, and

committed national destiny. (1971, pp. 88-89) Morton is certainly accurate, and he includes the northern character of Canada as an important component of overall identity. It is in this context that we 'belong.'

Hodgetts, the Canadian centennial, an analysis of the Canadian university scene, and the sudden and shocking revelations of the Ryerson sale all developed a Canadian awareness (or at least, an awareness of Canadian awareness). This awareness was something that we, as a nation, did not really possess before. Yet, Canadian schools have not played a role in interpreting national identity.

Stamp (1977) has detected five reasons for this lack of Canadian identity, as witnessed in the school systems. The political aims of public school reformers of the nineteenth century help to describe this lack of emphasis on identity. The goal of the educator in those times was to inculcate loyalty to Britain and the British institutions as a way of dousing republican influences of the United States. Emphasis was on a British throne, and nothing Canadian. (pp. 30-31) The nature of Confederation was such, Stamp notes, that education remained a provincial responsibility. Schooling was very much a matter of local concern, and there was no vision of a national scale contribution to Canadian growth.

Culture contentions were obscurred; and, therefore, no federal presence was available to increase the development of a national identity. (pp. 31-32) [One could probably argue well that provincial jurisdiction is a major reason for the heightening of regional differences and, therefore, lack of a focussed Canadian identity.] The political autonomy of Canada and the British Empire was the predominant theme to 1914. During this period imperial loyalty was stressed. Empire Day was created initially as a national patriotic movement, but it soon became an endorsement of the imperialist tie, and from 1897 this broad context was taken. (pp. 32-34) Stamp should not study this with such dissention; during those years patriotism was not patriotism to Canada, but to Great Britain. In the 1920s and 1930s there was a significant swing in Canada to United States periodicals, American radio and cinema, and American heroes soon replaced British heroes without a thought to Canadian heroes. Moreover, two themes became apparent in Canada, and little substance was added to Canadian identity. English-Canadians saw the survival and establishment of Canada as a political entity while French-Canadians guarded the development and survival of the French-Canadian society. (pp. 34-35) This variety of reasons explains to a large degree the failure of

Canadian schools to teach national identity. As former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson noted, our concern about Canadianism is

> not because we wish to live in isolation behind a Canadian curtain of snow ... [but] because we wish to live this interdependent world preserving those national values which have a special meaning for us and which will permit us to serve not only ourselves, but the international community as well. (Stamp, 1977, pp. 36-37)

Pearson expresses well a national desire of all Canadians.

In this regard, Colonel C.P. Stacey has argued that Canadians must "for the sake of our own mental health ... abandon our habit of trying to make like Great Britain or the United States, or both at once; and admit that after all we are relative small fry." (1967, p. 18) Whether we are small fry or not, there are a number of common bonds forming a framework for Canadian identity. One could argue that the simple search for an identity presents a common bond--and a willingness to work together as a nation. Such a desire for an identity is also a step toward nationhood in its every sense. Certainly the geographic, economic and cultural improbability of this nation is a part of Canadian identity. The emphasis upon the survival of majority and minority culture against other cultures and the United

States to the south has been a distinguishing feature of Canada's heritage. The very presence of cultural diversity is a part of our Canadian identity. Physical geography is a very important component of national identity; the vastness of the land and its climatic harshness are readily identifiable. The 'honest broker' concept of Canada can be studied in historical perspective as well, because Canadians have always attempted to settle differences peacefully, and there is no real 'rifle-over-the-door' era in Canadian history. Indeed, our very regionality is a Canadian first, because although we feel secure on our regional axis, we come together as a country. The British heritage we have all enjoyed, mixed with the French era of Canada's history and the American influences, provides an identity base as well. (Laxer, 1970, pp. 113-117) These are all aspects of a true Canadian identity, an elusive concept which receives ongoing definition and refinement according to the Canadian scene.

National unity remains a political obsession and Canadians must define a way of bringing themselves together in this divisive decade just as projects and policies have in the past. The Canadian Pacific Railway, although divisive in construction, proved to be uniting in structure, as the geographic realities of Canada were

shattered by a band of steel. Macdonald's national policy was a manifestation of national sentiment as it crystallized an intangible feeling of difference between Canadians and Americans as well as developing strong markets and industries at home. Such a policy used economic means of uniting Canadians, largely because of the difficulty in using common language, cultural tradition, or religion. (Brown, 1966, p. 161)

Canadian immigration has strengthened Canada numerically and culturally, and the immigrant factor kept the West Canadian. National unity is best served by a leader "who divides us the least." (Underhill, 1944, pp. 114-119; 1950, pp. 133-140) Underhill sees a large part of Mackenzie King's success as Prime Minister of Canada in his ability to balance sectional interests and determining what a majority would demand while recognizing what a minority would tolerate. A national understanding is a route to national unity and national 'belonging.' Both of these goals presuppose an understanding of Canadian identity and national 'becoming.'

ACTIVE 'BELONGING' AND 'BECOMING'

As Northrop Frye has observed,

> there has been too long and too unchecked a domination of the longitudinal mentality in Canada, and ... the tension between the region and nation has finally snapped. (1971, pp. 8-9, 12)

As Canadians, we must restore a sense of national understanding. Through the development of a consciousness as Canadians and Canadian identity, we can achieve this goal. The nationalism inherent in this aim is

> not a narrow sense of relevance nor a parochial kind of nationalism but rather an enlarged awareness of ourselves as another imperfect but nevertheless distinct segment of the human race. (Symons, 1975, p. 15)

It is, then, between national unity and a sense of regionality that we must focus our definition of Canadian identity. We must bring reality in line with vision in a nation-state without nationalizing forces--two languages, pluralism in politics, and multiplicity in ethnic origins as well as geographic bases. We must strive toward national understanding as a stepping stone to national unity. We can do this by concentrating upon what unites us, and not the socioeconomic, regional, and occupational factors which divide us. Through Canadian identity, we must promote cultural diversity and regional equality and

we can fully 'become' Canadian. Canadian citizenship means active 'belonging' (the achievement of national understanding and maybe even unity) in an ongoing process of 'becoming.'

CHAPTER 3

THE NATURE OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES

In a report on social studies priorities, practices, and needs, Superka and Hawke (1982) observe that "citizenship education has been considered the central goal of social studies for at least the last century." Their review notes that citizenship has been referred to in literature through the years as the "primary, overriding purpose," the "centering concept," and the "ultimate justification" of social studies. (p. 119) The revised curriculum guidelines of the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) restate a basic rationale for social studies education: "The basic goal of social studies education is to prepare young people to be humane, rational, participating citizens in a world that is becoming increasingly interdependent." To be able to consider and resolve social issues, the guidelines conclude, means that "knowledge, reason, commitment to human dignity, and action are to be regarded as complementary and inseparable." (NCSS, 1979, p. 262)

Alberta social studies has not drifted far from

the "primary, overriding purpose" of social education. The opening section makes very clear the direction of Alberta social studies:

> Social Studies is the school subject in which students learn to explore and, where possible, to resolve, social issues that are of public and personal concern ...
>
> Effective citizenship is the ultimate goal of social studies. The value, knowledge, and skill objectives of the Alberta Social Studies Curriculum are designed to help students develop intellectual independence, moral maturity and more effective involvement in the political, economic and social affairs of their communities. These characteristics, it is believed, will be required for effective community, Canadian and world citizenship in the coming decades. (Alberta Department of Education, 1981, p. 1)

Alberta social studies is focused on the creation of effective citizens through the process of social inquiry.

CLARIFYING APPROACHES TO CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

If one accepts that social studies is, in essence, citizenship education, then one proceeds to clarify what citizenship education is really all about. On this topic, there is a bit of academic dissention in the social studies ranks. Barr, Barth and Shermis (1977) refer to this as "competing conceptions" of "the seamless web of social studies." (p. 4) It seems that attempts to define the social studies always conclude with more digression than clarification. In describing citizenship

education, Barr, Barth and Shermis (1977) suggest that varying emphasis is placed on a number of components including values and moral development, social science, special interest areas, and decision-making. (pp. 4-12) Newmann (in Shaver, 1977) identifies eight distinguishable approaches to civic education: the academic disciplines of history and the social sciences, law-related education, social problems, critical thinking, values clarification, moral development, community involvement, and institutional school reform. (pp. 4-9; Newmann, 1975, pp. 3-6) Figure 2 summarizes these approaches.

The academic disciplines approach supposes that attention to scholarship will help citizens to deal with civic problems. Newmann seems to combine two diverse approaches into one; somehow he unifies teaching the facts (for the sake of knowledge) and teaching the process of inquiry (for the sake of the structures of the disciplines). Teaching the facts has its own intrinsic value; success comes from knowing things (especially from history and the social sciences). More recently, there has been interest in teaching the inquiry skills used by a practising scholar. The emphasis in such an approach is on social science and the methods of inquiry. This indicates that some critics see citizenship as

APPROACHES TO CIVIC EDUCATION

APPROACH	*WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A CITIZEN*	*SPOKESMEN*
Academic Disciplines	*Good citizens know a lot of facts and also know how to find more facts.*	*Wesley Bruner Krug*
Law Related	*Citizens are law abiding individuals who want to preserve and make more just the rule of law in a democracy.*	
Social Problems	*Citizens understand problems of significant social concern.*	*Engle Oliver Shaver*
Critical Thinking	*Citizens reach informed conclusions which can be justified and explained and are aware of such things as assumptions, bias, selective perception, and incomplete information.*	*Fair & Shaftel Hunt & Metcalf Oliver & Shaver Giroux*
Values Clarification	*Citizens clarify their freely chosen values, prize their decisions, and act on them consistently in day to day life.*	*Raths, Harmin & Simon*
Moral Development	*Citizens see certain principled forms of reasoning or actions as universally better or preferable to other types.*	*Kohlberg*
Community Involvement	*Citizens study and reflect on civic needs and are prepared for involvement and participation.*	*Newmann*
Institutional School Reform	*Citizens have the ability to change the world to make it a better place.*	*Counts Rugg Giroux*

FIGURE 2

process-oriented and not so much rooted in knowledge claims. Citizenship education addresses the ways that social scientists function--they develop a "way of knowing" that will endure past the usefulness of some acquired knowledge. Social science is viewed as a means to the end of producing responsible and knowledgeable citizens. In the case of teaching the facts, a good citizen is seen as an individual who knows things--who can recite information on cue. In the case of teaching the ways of inquiry, a good citizen is an individual who knows where to go to find the answers and how to approach the subject as a full-fledged scholar.

The law-related education approach emphasizes civics and the fundamentals of the legal process. Such an approach includes such subjects as human rights, justice, and law enforcement. In some cases, projects produce materials which may be used in more general social studies courses. As Newmann notes,

> in contrast to the disciplines approach, the goal of law-related education would be characterized not as the general search for truth and understanding, but to preserve and make more just the rule of law in a democratic society. (1977, p. 5)

In this case, one could say that a good citizen is a person who knows how government works in case there is need to get involved. There is an emphasis on how to

conform to democratic law, not on how to democratically reform society or the legal system.

The social problems approach emphasizes current issues and the goal is to understand a social concern. A tenet of this approach is that citizens need opportunities to deal with the specifics of ample social dilemmas. Often these courses surround issues-oriented titles and are devoted to raising the consciousness level of the participants. A good citizen needs practice in responding to social concerns; there is an opportunity to bring a social dilemma into focus and to act on the issue. As well, the citizen comes to understand important social issues more widely.

Critical thinking is not so much an approach as a fundamental component of civic competence. The justification of rational decisions and an awareness of assumptions and bias are components of

> a thinking process that helps to distinguish among different types of issues, that offers a method for testing and evaluating empirical claims, logical inferences, definitional statements [and] value judgments ... (Newmann, 1977, p. 6)

Intellectual skills are identified for instruction; these skills are seen to be inherent qualities of being critical. A good citizen can think about situations, problems, or information without academic spoonfeeding; a

good citizen can test, evaluate, critique, and reflect on these aspects of civic life.

Values clarification in social studies means a program which encourages individuals to make values decisions by deliberately choosing, prizing, and acting. (See Raths, et. al., 1966, pp. 37-38) Social studies teachers help students to make choices, provide opportunities for students to consider alternatives, and encourage students to prize what they cherish and act in accordance with their choices. Instead of teaching subject matter as such, students are able to search for their central values. Often social studies courses have a values orientation as a component of the prescribed curriculum. In this approach to social studies, a good citizen is an individual who makes and defends choices. The quality of the choice is not as important as the ability to choose and defend the choice or that the choice be freely chosen.

The moral development approach leads students to forms of reasoning that demonstrate a concern for such things as liberty, the principles of justice, and the general will. This approach accepts certain kinds of reasoning to be better and more preferable than others; it attempts to help students to resolve conflicts in their reasoning and their moral dilemmas. The higher

forms of moral reasoning are correlated with more advanced levels of cognition. A good citizen is an individual who makes judgments which are more universally regarded preferable choices. In this sense, a good citizen chooses to act in accordance with generally universal standards.

The community involvement approach advocates integration of students into their communities: it is "learning by doing." Students are able to observe the social process while participating in forms of direct citizen action:

> Involvement and participation are emphasized not as substitutes for study and reflection, but as insurance that study and reflection will be directed toward social realities and the building of participation skills. (Newmann, 1977, p. 7)

There are many forms of community involvement--from volunteer service to youth rebellion--and all are devoted to the enhancement of student consciousness and increased attention to the injustices of our society. A good citizen is an individual who can apply the in-school learnings about our world to the real world. Such an individual is involved not just with classroom but with social reality.

The general structure of the school itself may have more to do with citizen education than the

composition of any particular course. If this is so, civic education can be improved through changes in the 'hidden curriculum.' In such a case, there would be a role for the responsible participation of students in school. To change the 'hidden curriculum', however, would take considerable effort. It may be that this revision can only come through institutional school reform. In this case, a good citizen is an individual who recognizes limits to real action and works to change the entire system. The structures of power, ideology, and culture are of particular interest to these citizens.

Hertzberg (1982) concludes that the definition of an appropriate education of citizens has been a central question in social studies history. She believes that any approach can be placed on a continuum which compares and contrasts versions of social efficiency. At one end of the continuum is "a static, hierarchical society in which everyone ... [has] a preordained place." At the other end of the continuum is "an open, changing society in which education ... [enables] everyone to find their own places." Visions of citizenship education have generally tended to approach the latter pole. (pp. 6-7)

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AS A WIDE PROCESS: DEVELOPING CITIZENSHIP COMPETENCIES

As our world changes, new demands are made on citizenship education. The basic elements of citizenship education for today's students must take into consideration a number of changing conditions. Remy (1980) notes that citizenship education--as central to social studies as it may be--is not limited to school. Citizenship education is really a society-wide process which emerges in community, religious, and voluntary organizations as well as business, labour, and family. Related to this is the fact that citizenship education is much more diversified than in the past and programs today include topics considerably removed from history and geography (e.g., values clarification, social issues approaches, global education, moral education, community action, etc.). Finally, Remy suggests that citizenship itself has become much more complex in terms of the tasks and responsibilities associated with the role of being a citizen. These factors include the growth of global interdependence, the expansion of government, a heightened concern for equality, an increase in alienation from social institutions, and the impact of technology and the knowledge explosion. (pp. 1-2)

As open as Remy appears to be to the ongoing

revision of citizenship education, his view of citizenship competencies is very narrow. He argues that there are seven basic citizenship competencies. (pp. 3-49) Further, these competencies are constrained by a commitment to human rights and to participation in the forming and sharing of values:

> 1. Acquiring and Using Information: Competence in acquiring and processing information about political situations.
> 2. Assessing Involvement: Competence in assessing one's involvement and stake in political situations, issues, decisions and policies.
> 3. Making Decisions: Competence in making thoughtful decisions regarding group governance and problems of citizenship.
> 4. Making Judgments: Competence in developing and using standards such as justice, ethics, morality and practicality to make judgments about people, institutions, policies, and decisions.
> 5. Communicating: Competence in communicating ideas to other citizens, decision makers, leaders and officials.
> 6. Cooperating: Competence in cooperating and working with others in groups and organizations to achieve mutual goals.
> 7. Promoting Interests: Competence in working with bureaucratically organized institutions in order to promote and protect one's interests and values.

Where in Remy's basic citizenship competencies can be found the essence of citizenship--social belonging and sharing in sovereign power? It may be true that many of these basic competencies reflect the kinds of skills

necessary for good citizenship, but the framework does not support social belonging and sharing in sovereign power. Indeed, Remy's view is that "citizenship concerns the rights, responsibilities, and tasks associated with governing ... various groups ..." (p. 3) His view of citizenship education is clearly technical; he does not explicitly introduce participation per se until the end of the text and he cautions that mass participation is not necessarily democracy at work. Participation may also be following the leader, he notes. (p. 65) These claims about participation may be true; it is not the notion of participation that is the problem, here. It is the fact that participation is not a basic competence. To Remy, governance is the central aspect of citizenship and, therefore, the cornerstone of citizenship education. (p. 62) Even the process of making decisions regards group governance. Remy is silent about the enactment of any social belonging except from a governmental or technical view.

THE NATURE OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Parker and Jarolimek (1984) express well the underlying role of the social studies when they observe that "sustaining and fulfilling the democratic way of life is the goal of social studies education; citizenship

education is its means." (p. 5) The success of a democracy rests on the willingness and capability of its citizens to meet the responsibilities that spring from the rights of a free society. Equipping citizens with the special skills and abilities of citizenship is the task of citizenship education. Meyer (1979) believes that to attain this goal consideration must be given to four major aspects of citizenship education. Knowledge provides an awareness of the basic principles of a democratic society; skills involve inquiry and intellectual abilities, they may also include leadership and participation skills; attitudes involve the development of an identification with fundamental democratic beliefs; and experiences involves the integration of knowledge, skills, and attitudes in order to reflect civic competence in action. (p. 12)

Morrissett and Haas (1982) identify a different four-part division of citizenship education goals. They view knowledge as it helps prepare individuals for participation in a democratic society; skills as they involve finding, organizing, or making use of knowledge; values as they contribute to good citizenship; and participation as a duty of the good citizen. (pp. 21-25) In each case, the end product is the democratic citizen: "an informed person, skilled in the processes of a free

society, who is committed to democratic values and is able, and feels obliged, to participate in social, political, and economic processes." (Parker and Jarolimek, 1984, p. 6) To Parker and Jarolimek's way of thinking these are the four fundamental tasks of citizenship education: the development of an informed citizen, the possession of civic skills, a commitment to democratic values, and capable participation.

TEACHING FOR INFORMED CITIZENSHIP

Since democratic society not only encourages but also expects participation of its members, it is necessary for citizens to have an adequate base of information in order to make intelligent decisions. This means that citizens need to be knowledgeable about the world around them. The National Council for the Social Studies advocates the inclusion of subject matter from history, geography, government, economics, law, anthropology, sociology, psychology, humanities, and some science. The 1971 Alberta social studies circled around history, geography, political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and philosophy; the 1981 social studies centres on history, geography, and the social sciences. Notwithstanding the selected areas of knowledge, Parker and Jarolimek (1984) suggest that

social studies topics "need to be presented in terms of their contribution to the education of student citizens." (p. 7) This means that knowledge is used to think about and participate in political, economic, and social matters. The fundamental question poses what it is that student citizens need to know to understand the needs and interests of individuals and groups in a community, national, and world context.

DEVELOPING SKILLFUL CITIZENSHIP

Information does not stay static in our society. In a similar sense, learning does not cease upon graduation from school. Social studies, then, must prepare students with appropriate skills to allow them and encourage them to continue learning and participating in a democratic society. Although Project SPAN (Morrissett, 1982, pp. 22-23) reports that this is largely the attainment of the higher levels of Bloom's taxonomy, Palmer and Jarolimek (1984) establish three categories of skills:

> Acquiring information: such as reading to gain meaning; distinguishing between fact and opinion; using and evaluating various sources of information; using maps and graphics.
>
> Organizing and using information: such as identifying relevant factual material; placing data in tabular form, noting cause and effect relationships; identifying key ideas; generating theories; proposing a plan of action

based on information.
Interpersonal relationships and social participation: such as communicating beliefs, feelings, and convictions; assisting in goal-setting for a group; keeping informed on issues that affect society; working individually or with others to decide on appropriate action. (pp. 8-9)

These skills may be among the most enduring of social studies learnings because they come into play throughout one's life. Inquiry skills, problem-solving skills, and decision-making skills may come into focus through this component of citizenship education.

COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Part of social studies is dedicated to the shaping of behaviour of students consistent with societal values. There are certain beliefs that characterize a democratic society. For Shaver and Strong (1982), these beliefs centre around human dignity and a national creed. (pp. 47-49) This is achieved primarily through socialization. Behaviour is influenced by knowledge, skills, and interest in participation. When beliefs which drive these behaviours change, then the behaviour of citizens changes as well.

R. Freeman Butts (1980) outlines a decalogue of democratic civic values for schools: justice, freedom, equality, diversity, authority, privacy, participation,

due process [or natural justice], personal obligation for the public good, and international human rights. (pp. 128-163) The idea of justice he sees as fairness, "the very moral basis of a democratic society." (p. 133) A public sense of justice, then, means that society accepts the same principles of justice. Butts sees freedom as the right, opportunity, and ability to live in dignity and security (freedom of the person and of private action), to express oneself without arbitrary constraint (freedom of the mind and of intellectual inquiry), and to make uncoerced choices in shaping institutions and laws (freedom of the citizen and of public action). (p. 135) Closely tied to justice and freedom is equality. Generally, equality means equal chance or opportunity (and there may be some tension or conflict between equality and freedom). (pp. 137-140) Diversity must encourage understanding, acceptance, and confidence in a composite society. (pp. 141-142) Butts sees authority as "legitimate power, recognized as such and sanctioned by custom, institutions, law, constitution or morality." (p. 143) Privacy and natural justice are closely related; privacy concerns one's right to be left alone and natural justice has to do with the rights of individuals accused of wrongful actions. (pp. 144-147)

The idea of participation is a key democratic

value as is the practice of participatory experiences. (pp. 147-148) Personal obligation for the public good can be viewed as a combination of loyalty, patriotism, discipline and duty; citizens are "officers of the public." (pp. 150-153) Finally, international human rights has to do with a growing notion of world citizenship based on "global interdependence"--it leads to a global state of mind which expresses a strong affinity for the planet as a whole. (pp. 153-163) In these ten values, Butts sees the development of a common core of democratic values. These values are fundamental requirements of democratic citizenship. (See Weissberg, 1974, pp. 174-190) However, Butts fails to recognize the improbability of reaching a consensus on national, uniform values in a pluralistic society. The search for greater meaning is certainly warranted; his assumption that a consensus can be reached is inappropriate.

ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATION

Participation involves the application of knowledge, skills, and values to action. According to Parker and Jarolimek,

> it is difficult to imagine a more potent feature of a comprehensive social studies curriculum than actual citizenship participation. In participation experiences, students are provided opportunities to apply,

> extend, and examine the knowledge, skills, and values they have developed. They are immersed in a heterogeneous social milieu in which there are tasks to be managed, conflicts to be resolved, information to be gathered, alternatives to be weighed, decisions to be made, and moral dilemmas to be thought through. Participation experiences are by nature public and interactive. They can expose students to a rich variety of people, values, ethnic and religious identities, and problem-solving approaches. Consequently, participation experiences demand communication and encourage taking others' perspectives. (1984, pp. 13-14)

A narrow view of citizen participation is enunciated by Lester Milbrath (1965) who develops a hierarchy of political involvement in democratic practices. He sees three distinct participant roles for citizens. There is a group of "apathetics" who choose not to participate. "Spectator activities" are cumulative; they involve exposing oneself to political stimuli, voting, initiating political discussion, attempting to influence another individual into voting a certain way, and maybe even affirming one's choice by wearing a button or putting a sticker on one's car. However, the third group, "gladiators," are drawn into the fray. They engage in "spectator activities" but they may also attend meetings, campaign, become active in a political party, solicit political funds, and run for and hold public office. (pp. 16-29) Although Milbrath's views on political participation are very enlightening,

they are also very restrictive. Citizenship is more than a political act; civic behaviour occurs on a much broader scale. Programs to address this broader view of citizenship participation may be based on community or school resources or both.

A community-based program is described by Conrad and Hedin (in Shaver, 1977) to have five forms of participation: social and political action, community projects, volunteer service, community study, and internships. (pp. 62-72) Social and political action is the result of programs and projects which attempt to influence public decision-making. Although this may occur through participation in a political campaign, it is also possible to become active in a citizen organization devoted to addressing a social issue. Such a program attempts to provide students with the skills and confidence necessary to take action in public affairs. Community projects are similar to the previous form of participation but are devoted to a particular need rather than a public policy and tend to be part of a group effort toward common goals. In volunteer service, individuals are assigned where needs have been identified and participants are really welcome and thus are assigned significant tasks of some responsibility. Community study may include surveying community attitudes, studying

community institutions, or conducting oral history and community research activities. Internships permit individuals to 'get inside' an organization to see how it really works--how decisions come to be made.

A community/school-based approach is suggested by Newmann (1975) and Newmann, Bertocci, and Landsness (1977). The key to this broad conception of citizenship is the development of a competence to exert influence in public affairs. This is a process in which an individual develops some goals through rational social research and moral deliberation, develops support by persuading others of the value of the goals, and, if necessary, modifies these goals to seek a satisfactory level of support. Revised goals could undergo additional review although not usually to forsake one's underlying principles. (1975, pp. 41-43; 1977, pp. 3-5) The English and social studies curriculum developed by Newmann, Bertocci, and Landsness (1977) is aimed at senior students and includes classroom work, observation in the field, and participation experiences. The seven specific civic competences devoted to exerting influence are to:

1) communicate effectively in spoken and written language;
2) collect and logically interpret information on problems of public concern;
3) describe political-legal decision-making processes;
4) rationally justify personal decisions on

> controversial public issues and strategies for action with reference to principles of justice and constitutional democracy;
> 5) work cooperatively with others;
> 6) discuss concrete personal experiences of self and others in ways that contribute to resolution of personal dilemmas encountered in civic action and that relate these experiences to more general human issues;
> 7) use selected technical skills as they are required for the exercise of influence on specific issues. (pp. 6-9)

Starting from the school, this curriculum is an extension of school activities to the community-at-large.

A school-based approach to participation involves much less activity compared to the preceeding approaches. It may include curriculum materials or methods that focus on the skills of participation. As Parker and Jarolimek (1984) note, these activities

> use the classroom as a microcosm of the broader society; consequently, while the activities occur in the classroom, they incorporate in their design key elements of field-based participation activities: experience-based content, active learning, exposure to diverse viewpoints and ways of thinking, opportunities to grapple with the practical problems of group participation, and valuing. (p. 20)

There is little restructuring of the school day; yet, the participation goals are very similar to other approaches.

Encouragement of civic participation is an important goal for social studies educators. It is a component of the social belonging basic to the nature of citizenship itself.

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION SOURCES

Outside the school there are some important sources of citizenship learning. Such factors as the family and the corresponding home life, social status, and community standards tend to be downplayed compared to the school's impact in citizenship education. Dawson, Prewett, and Dawson (1977) outline some of the school sources of citizenship learning, including the curriculum, classroom ritual, and the role of the teacher. (pp. 139-158) The curriculum is certainly a major force; it helps to shape one's loyalty to the nation and the qualities of good citizenship. Patriotism is developed through classroom rituals as is its collective nature. As well, the teacher's actions have considerable impact on political values and acculturation. The important thing is that qualities of good citizenship have a number of school and community sources.

THREE TRADITIONS OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION

When one looks more closely at the social studies classroom, it is possible to identify various generalizations about social studies education. In a landmark article, James L. Barth and S. Samuel Shermis

(1970) outline three fundamental traditions within the social studies. These positions are described as 'social studies as citizenship transmission,' 'social studies as social science,' and 'social studies as reflective inquiry.' (See Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977; 1978) Although there are other definitions of the traditions of social studies, Barth and Shermis's work is identified in much of the social studies literature.

'Social studies as citizenship transmission' infers that there is a content that is transmitted to the student through description and persuasion. Citizenship is characterized by obedience to norms and a good citizen is "one who has internalized the 'right' values ..." This means that the teacher is obliged to inculcate obedience to certain basic values by persuading students of the ultimate rightness or wrongness of certain positions. Citizenship transmission assumes that the best way to proceed is for students to store up facts, principles, beliefs and theories which, although irrelevant now, can be used at a later date. These factual essentials are determined on the basis of tradition by a conglomerate of authorities. Thus, the societal essentials are transmitted to the next generation. (Barth and Shermis, 1970, pp. 744-756; Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977, pp. 59-51; 1978, pp. 33-64)

Teaching 'social studies as social science' means imparting to students a simplified version of the body of knowledge created by social scientists. The purpose of acquiring knowledge in the social sciences is simply to acquire knowledge; it is a process of self-justification. Since the purpose is to generate knowledge, it can be assumed that an individual possessing the knowledge and methodology of a certain social science will be a good citizen. Understanding social science disciplines contribute to an understanding of our complex world, and social scientists assume that an individual can be more effective as a "junior historian" or a "quasi-political scientist." By learning the skills and knowledge of the discipline, one is better able to grasp hold of the world. (Barth and Shermis, 1970, pp. 746-748; Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977, pp. 61-64; 1978, pp. 65-95)

Quite distinctive from 'social studies as citizenship transmission' and 'social studies as social science' is the third tradition: 'social studies as reflective inquiry.' This position describes citizenship as a "process" instead of a "collection of values." The process is decision-making--choosing what is perceived to be better in dealing with a social problem. The teacher identifies the problem and helps the students to clarify

the issue: "The end product of this process is one who is practiced in the skill of identifying social problems, evaluating social data and making rational decisions. This is how a good citizen is defined." The data of inquiry is the way of seeking the knowledge necessary in this tradition of social studies. The teacher may choose the issue, but the students choose the evidence. Decision-making and valuing are crucial aspects of 'social studies as reflective inquiry.' (Barth and Shermis, 1970, pp. 748-750; Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977, pp. 65-71; 1978, pp. 96-138)

The common bond of these three traditions of social studies is their varied attempts to provide citizenship education. Each tradition defines citizenship by the curricular action involved. To what extent do any of these descriptions of citizenship education take into consideration the sharing of sovereign power or the nature of social belonging? What is the relationship of citizenship and citizenship education?

CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

The most enduring conception of citizenship education places much emphasis on decision-making. Although this relationship reflects the thought of John

Dewey, the seminal work on decision-making as "the heart of social studies instruction" is by Engle (1960) who notes that "the mark of the good citizen is the quality of decisions which he reaches on public and private matters of social concern." (p. 301) In other words, Engle is saying that good citizenship is judged by how one chooses to exercise one's sovereign power and how well one's participation achieves predetermined goals or resolves basic concerns.

Engle proposes to recast the nature of citizenship education by emphasizing decision-making instead of remembering. Social studies teachers must abandon what Engle calls "the ground-covering technique" in favour of grasping general ideas about human events: "knowledge must lead to understanding." (p. 302) Key to this understanding is decision-making

> which is reflective, speculative, thought provoking, and oriented to the process of reaching conclusions.... Decision-making should afford the structure around which social studies instruction should be organized. (p. 303)

Increased questioning, a values orientation, the use of multiple resources, and the skills of critical thinking are seen as necessary directions for the social studies. (pp. 303-306) Citizenship education as decision-making is central to the work of other researchers, especially

Newmann (1975, 1977), Shaver (1977), Kurfman (1977), and Shermis and Barth (1982). Decision-making is also seen to be one of the key skills addressed in 'social studies as reflective inquiry.'

Yet, is any form of citizenship education a true reflection of sharing in sovereign power or social belonging? To what extent do social studies classrooms and society in general encourage decision-making? To what extent is there a sense of social belonging and participation in the attainment of social goals? These questions, and others, help to clarify the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

It has already been noted that the true nature of citizenship can be expressed in sovereign power and social belonging. The essential feature of democratic citizenship education is decision-making; there is no escaping the need to make decisions in a democratic society. Sovereignty is expressed through the decisions we make as citizens; social belonging is the product of active participation, caring and sharing in our world. This chapter suggests that decision-making in citizenship education has been reduced to an empirical way of knowing; that we do not truly 'decide,' we 'choose' from a limited number of alternatives. (Weizenbaum, 1976, pp. 258-280) Further, active participation in society has been numbed by the impact of technology on our lives, the ideology of technique, the technological attitude. These factors demonstrate a need for a broader perspective in order to reform citizenship education.

THE FAILURE OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Cleo Cherryholmes (1980) interrelates decision-making, values and preferences, knowledge and

prediction systems, and institutions and decisions in forming a series of theorems about the true nature of citizenship education. Cherryholmes develops this interrelationship on the basis of prevailing themes in the literature since Engle's call for an emphasis on decision-making in citizenship education in 1960. On the basis of the literature, Cherryholmes observes that citizenship education should increase the rationality of student decision-making, help students develop an awareness of their values and the values of others in making a decision, provide adequate knowledge and skills to accurately predict outcomes of individual and social decisions, create an awareness of models of individual and social decision-making, analyze and contribute to the making of group decisions, and develop an inclination to participate effectively in social and political processes. (pp. 116-123)

But Cherryholmes (1980) does not stop at a review of the literature and theorem formulation. He identifies the underlying assumptions of citizenship education as decision-making and shows that rational decision-making and problem-solving are promoted as scientific activities which aim to produce statements that are empirically testable. Values are separated from facts; projections and preferences based on values

assumptions are just wishful thinking. This position also assumes that facts are never problematic; that once we have the facts we can make the right decision. Cherryholmes's critique of these assumptions radically alters the traditional way of viewing citizenship education.

Cherryholmes (1980) argues that it is not possible to separate facts and values:

> Information and knowledge about social institutions implicitly contain values, norms, and meanings. Facts and values cannot always be clearly distinguished for such institutions. (p. 126)

Further, observations are "not just given"--social phenomena reflect historical, cultural and internal elements. "Facts do not speak for themselves.... Because they are created, they must be interpreted as well as explained." (p. 127) Cherryholmes concludes that social information and knowledge cannot be treated as unproblematic; in fact, "citizenship education as decision-making, where values and attitudes are distinct from information and knowledge, is no longer plausible." (p. 127)

If Cherryholmes is correct, he is hinting at the failure of citizenship education as decision-making. Is the orientation reviewed by Cherryholmes so strong that decision-making is solely an empirical way of

knowing? What does this say about citizenship as sovereign power? Further, what impact does this critique have on participatory and reflective aspects of citizenship education? If Cherryholmes's critique is accurate, social studies teachers have, by and large, indoctrinated their students in societal replication. Could it be that social studies educators have been unable to teach for active citizenship? Is there no sense of social belonging? Cherryholmes's critique raises these (and other) important questions which must be attended to.

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION WITHOUT CRITICAL DECISION-MAKING AND SOVEREIGN POWER

Henry Giroux (1983) applies the categories of Habermas (1971) to critique the traditions enunciated by Barth and Shermis. (1970, 1977, 1978) He notes three modes of rationality: the technical, the hermeneutic, and the emancipatory, and he applies the organizing principles of these modes to the social studies traditions discussed in the preceding chapter.

Citizenship transmission is, by its very nature, a part of a technical rationality. (Giroux, 1983, pp. 178-181) The notion of transmission shows this: it is the view that knowledge is static in that

there are certain neutral, universal assumptions that cannot be questioned or criticized. It fails to recognize that facts need to be interpreted and legitimized. There is affirmation, not explanation. As Giroux notes,

> in the name of transmitting cherished beliefs and values, this model of citizenship education ends up supporting, through its methodologies and content, behaviour that is adaptive and conditioned, rather than active and critical. (p. 179)

Citizenship transmission looks at maintaining a body of information, not acting on it. Teachers transmit and students receive; their roles are fixed. Until recently fading in its North American application, one of the impacts of the back-to-the-basics movement has been to revive factual forcefeeding. In this way, citizens are taught to accept and support a replication of the dominant vision of the present.

Giroux also believes that the social science model of citizenship education is a technical way of knowing:

> What is paradoxical about the citizenship-education-as-social-science model is that on one level it attempts to rescue students as active and critical thinkers; but on a more significant level it falls prey to certain presumptions about knowledge and meaning that results in its mere recycling, albeit in a more sophisticated package, the very assumptions it tries to redress. (p. 181)

Just like the citizenship transmission model, the social science model separates facts and values and, in doing so, validates the knowledge that should be critiqued. As well, the wrong questions are posed:

> concepts are used along with 'inquiry skills' that eventually elicit confirmation from students on problems governed by answers that can barely be challenged. (p. 183)

Although there is the guise of problem-solving, questioning is closed and critical thinking is absent. We learn lots of skills, but the sphere in which these skills are applied is self-contained. By a process of controlled inquiry, we come to accept predetermined knowledge claims.

The reflective inquiry approach fits into hermeneutic rationality, Giroux argues. (pp. 184-190). Since we are always interpreting the events around us, we give our world meaning. We are always in the process of making judgments about our world:

> Hermeneutic rationality is sensitive to the notion that through the use of language and thought human beings constantly produce meanings as well as interpret the world in which they find themselves. Therefore, if we are to understand their actions, we have to link their behavior to the intentions that provide the interpretative screen they use to negotiate with the world. (p. 184)

Social construction of knowledge is particularly emphasized in reflective inquiry--students

make social problems relevant through the exploration of their own values. In this way, meaning and purpose are given to the notion of citizenship, but the critique is incomplete. Giroux notes that

> while it is stressed repeatedly in the rationales of reflective inquiry advocates that schools can and must educate students to participate in the shaping and running of the state, they say practically nothing about how the state affects and reproduces the ideology of dominant social and economic interests in the schools. (p. 187)

Students may learn to exert influence on the state, but reflective inquiry usually neglects to question the constraints placed by the state on schools. The questions move within a rationality which cannot be expanded--there are many pressures to conform--and schools tend to reproduce the arrangements of the status quo.

Giroux sees no example of citizenship education which is emancipatory. Such a social studies program is based on the principles of critique and action and is "aimed at criticizing that which is restrictive and oppressive while at the same time supporting action in the service of individual freedom and well-being." (p. 190) The citizenship education he does see, however, fails to contemplate the kind of democratic, sovereign power that is at the centre of good citizenship.

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION WITHOUT CIVIC ACTION OR SOCIAL BELONGING

In an article which won the 1983 Outstanding Research Award of the National Council for the Social Studies, Shermis and Barth (1982) suggest that social studies has failed in creating active citizenship. Their analysis encompasses ontology, epistemology, axiology, and human nature as well as the assumptions that teachers make about society.

Shermis and Barth describe teachers as subscribers to a tradition of 'naive realism' in which reality is viewed to be somewhere "out there" and that "all reality is capable of being reduced or compressed to assertions that are either true or false, correct or incorrect, right or wrong." (p. 20) As well, teachers carry out an epistemological reductionism which fails to "distinguish between various truth claims" in social studies. (p. 21) This inability to make facts and opinions distinct contributes to the teaching of "the right set of values which are as indubitable as facts." (p. 23) Shermis and Barth argue that students, by nature, do not originate; they respond. Herein lies the essence of passivity, they reason, which the social studies teacher fails to call to action. Shermis and

Barth (1982) further chastise social studies teachers for encouraging students to store up bits of information which may one day be useful instead of addressing the skills of decision-making. (pp. 26-27)

Although Shermis and Barth (1982) tend to place too much blame on the individual social studies teacher and may indeed misapply the modes of rationality, they do recognize the importance of social forces. The impact of technology has tremendous influence on the task of education--especially citizenship education. The authors note that "one need not be a Marxist to believe that schools, as the product of society, were created to meet the needs of that society." (p. 30) The technological creed is to fit into the technological world. This involves preparing students for a proper role in an industrial society--a passive role. It is preparation for work, not citizenship:

> One of the most frequently repeated objections--other than the monotony, repetitiveness, and dullness that go with many jobs--centers around the inability of individuals to assume a major role in making those decisions which affect them. In many jobs, important decisions are made elsewhere and even the most minute of job functions is prescribed in advance. In such vocations, the individual is no longer an individual in any philosophical sense of the term; he or she is an interchangeable part, a cog. The hallmark of such work, then, is passivity in which the person carries out the demands ... made elsewhere.

> What is appropriate, it seems to us, for work as we have described it is promptness, neatness, compliance and conformity, thoroughness, efficiency and the ability to perform without becoming demoralized, depressed or resentful. These, it would appear, are not only characteristics of many vocations, they are also good descriptions of some social studies classrooms. Such classrooms, it need scarcely be pointed out, have nothing to do with creativity, joy, problem-solving, insight, or even understanding. (Shermis and Barth, 1982, p. 31)

If we accept the process of preparing students for an adult world to be a goal of education, we are preparing students for "an unstimulating, dull, repetitive society." Consider the impact of technology on our world. Although it extends human capabilities, it also reduces experiences. In a similar sense, we become cogs in the technological machine as decision-making and control are reduced in the midst of a knowledge explosion. We have more complete information than ever to make decisions, but the decisions we now make are not the fundamental, crucial ones. Even seeing the world in terms of information is to order things according to a technological imperative for use and manipulation; information is seen as neutral and the corresponding need is to develop an improved ability to decide on the basis of the "facts" when a part of deciding is an ability to decide about the information itself. David Suzuki (1985) passionately argues that

> technology commands us all.... As a force in the world, technology has become virtually autonomous, infinitely more powerful than its inventor. Ironically, we have become the servant of that which was intended to serve us. Dependence is insidious, but dependence is not merely on the hardware. The deeper dependence is on the ideology of technique, the belief that a technical world is a higher, better, finer thing than the natural world which gave it birth; the belief that since the human purpose is God's purpose, high technology is consecrate.... Dependence means vulnerability--but it also means servitude. In the course of our domestication by technology, we have to modify our behaviour to meet the demands of the machine. We do what the machines tell us to do. Environment influences behaviour. The simple uni-dimensional environment of the feedlot or the dairy barn is conducive to simple behaviour in domestic cattle. The modern urban environment is uni-dimensional also; the only information we receive is human information mediated by machines. We learn early--we are conditioned early--to a life of servitude to technology: a new generation of improved machines, loyal and faithful servants, believers.

In such a way, sovereign power is fundamentally reordered; social belonging is shattered.

MAKING THE CASE FOR ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP

Shermis and Barth (1982) conclude their condemnation of passive citizenship by noting that:

> When others define the problem for you, provide all the data for you and then dictate the proper conclusions, you have become that which is acted upon. The entire process makes the curriculum creator active, the teacher a neutral conduit of unexamined cultural flotsam and jetsam, and students passive recipients. (p. 32)

The same can be said of the encroachment of technology. When technology identifies the problem for society, generates the data and provides the information which dictates the proper conclusions, society has become that which is acted upon. The entire process makes technology unquestioningly active by transforming means into ends. It makes the researcher--whose blinders only permit a vision of faith and a fundamental reliance in science--an unreflective purveyor of a grab bag of assumptions, and it reduces citizens to passivity.

Citizens cannot be passive in our society. Active citizens cannot just accept the 'givens' in each situation; citizenship means participating fully, not just nodding one's head. There is a process of reflection apparent; a process that raises questions and seeks answers. But when one accepts a force feeding of the issues, digests a mixture of unquestioned facts and values, and spits up an answer on cue, one could seriously question whether or not the citizen has participated. Has there been action? Choice? Or has the citizen been numbed down a technological pathway? Suzuki (1985) says that "we survive because we accept, because in some glazed, insensate way, we tolerate."

We must consider more critical ways to view

technology. The first step is to recognize that technology is not neutral--it has a tremendous impact on our lives as citizens. When one understands the different ways of interpreting technology, it may be possible to link citizenship education in an open, reflective relationship. In such a way, we may come to understand ourselves in a fundamentally human image. This disclosure of meaning may be easier in light of the different views of technology.

UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENT VIEWS OF TECHNOLOGY

The popular notion that technology is a scientific blessing is not representative of the author's viewpoint. The work of authors like Marshall McLuhan (1964) speaks of technological determinism--technology determining our history. We will examine three views of technology and show their implications for social studies and the need for an alternative view of technology.

Writers about technology speak about their subject in different ways. Watkins and Meador (1977) discuss advocates and critics of technology; Florman (1976) fears antitechnologists over engineers; Ferkiss (1969) contrasts critics and prophets; and Davis (1981) refers to technicians and humanists. The clearest categorization of conflicting perceptions of technology

may be found in Gendron (1977) who describes three views of technology: utopian, dystopian, and socialist perspectives.

An understanding of the different conceptions of technology is important. As a concept, technology has considerable importance in social studies. The framework established by a teacher may be crucial in how students view technology. Is technology always good? Is it to be relied on by all of us to make a better world? Do we need to be mindful of negative aspects of technology? Further, technology can be seen in our way of viewing the world, in our way of shaping our approach to ourselves. What implications does this notion of technology as an attitude have for our society?

THE UTOPIAN VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY

The utopian view of technology asserts that most of our social progress has occurred because of the growth of technology: "... technological growth, if left unimpeded by any major disaster, will in the long run bring about the demise of every major social evil." (Gendron, 1977, p. 3) Decisions are best made by technocrats who will eventually solve all of man's social problems by resolving the central economic problem of scarcity. Although Gendron acknowledges that no utopian

writer states the argument quite like this, he claims that the core of the utopian position involves the elimination of scarcity--the primary economic evil. Our major social problems are consequences of our economic problems, he argues (Gendron, 1977, pp. 11-21), and this view is supported by such writers as Arthur C. Clarke and Buckminster Fuller. Clarke, a futurist, projects the invention of a "replicator," a machine that can make any thing out of anything, thus guaranteeing abundance for every member of society. Although the replicator prototype would cost trillions of dollars (and take maybe centuries) to complete, Clarke notes that its first task would be to produce additional replicators. (Clarke, 1964, pp. 160-162) Even more optimistic about the world's future is Buckminster Fuller, who brushes aside gloom and doom by engaging his productive imagination in envisioning cities that float on water, underground habitats that adapt to the earth's available space, and solar powered metropolis spheres that are suspended in the atmosphere. (See Fuller, 1969) It is Fuller's contention that the post-moonwalk generation believes that humans can do anything they need to do. This is encouraging, he concludes, because the time is right

> ... for commanding and executing the ... world-embracing design science revolution, which will result in the conversion of all

> humanity into an integrated, omniharmonious, economically successful, one-world family. (Fuller, 1981, xix)

People care about their future, Fuller argues, and the growth of technology is now providing mankind with limitless potential to continue a technical evolution:

> ... humanity now--for the first time in history--has the realistic opportunity to help evolution do what it is inexorably intent on doing--converting all humanity into one harmonious world family and making that family sustainingly, economically successful. (Fuller, 1981, xix)

Fuller's 'omniharmonious one-world family' is the result of mankind choosing a 'critical path'--a decision-making strategy or a series of decisions that leads to the development of artifacts. It is conscious, mindful control of our future:

> Human minds have a unique cosmic function not identifiable with any other phenomenon--the capability to act as local Universe information-harvesters and local Universe problem-solvers in support of the integrity of eternally regenerative Universe.
>
> At the present cosmic moment, muscle cunning, fear, and selfishness are in powerful control of human affairs. We humans are here in Universe to exercise the Universe-functioning of mind. Only mind can apprehend, abide by, and be led by truth. If human mind comes into control of human affairs, the first thing it will do is exercise our option to "make it." (Fuller, 1981, xxxvi)

Both Clarke and Fuller project the elimination of scarcity and the subsequent demise of social evil.

Clarke, however, fails to adequately explain how society addresses the problem of choice or the 'horn of plenty.' It seems apparent that the technology of replication would bring along a whole new set of social evils and incredible expectations. Fuller himself recognizes that it will be a close race to Utopia or Oblivion but what one suspects Fuller would term 'omnifaith in uni-mankind-functioning' will push humanity to Utopia. One asks if such a critical path--which involves human values over technological values--is really possible. Neither Fuller nor Clarke argues convincingly that the end of economic scarcity will mean the elimination of social evils. This crucial link is simply missing.

Other utopian writers conclude that the most profound impact of technology on mankind affects our collective consciousness. Technology changes perspectives, values, contexts, and relationships; mankind combats social evils through new, improved, adapted, or reconceptualized approaches, techniques, or technologies. This is the basic position of utopian writers such as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1955, 1964), Marshall McLuhan (1964), Alvin Toffler (1980), and Jacob Bronowski (1965).

Bronowski argues that civilization is progressing toward even greater achievements in

technology and humanity. We are always analyzing science--a scientist has no final answers because new discoveries can alter the findings of science. Brownowski notes that scientists are human beings with fears themselves and are not detached beings associated with inhuman laboratories. Scientists have imaginations and an overwhelming interest to investigate, and Bronowski notes that "what science has to teach us here is not its techniques but its spirit: the irresistible need to explore." (Bronowski, 1965, p. 72) Bronowski believes that fundamental and universal human values can be formed by applying the 'methods' of science to all humanity. Science is to help us through imagination and universal values:

> Shame is theirs who appeal to other values than the human imaginative values which science has evolved. The shame is ours if we do not make science part of our world, intellectually as well as physically, so that we may at last hold these halves of the world together by the same values. For this is the lesson of science, that the concept is more profound than its laws, and the act of judging more critical than the judgment. (Bronowski, 1965, p. 73)

Bronowski's place for collective scientific values would be slightly altered, he notes in his preface to the revised edition (1965), by including "a discussion of those values which are not generated by the practice of science--the values of tenderness, of kindliness, of

human intimacy and love." These values, however, do not negate the scientific values apparent in our world, and Bronowski concludes that the exactness of science can give context for our judgments. Yet, science's only real value is the "need to explore." After that, science is concerned with what is and not with what ought to be. Although his claims are sometimes fuzzy, Bronowski's optimism for our destiny involves a collective understanding generated by scientific and human values entwined; his utopian perspective involves justice, good; and level-headedness.

Alvin Toffler is another optimist who sees a utopian future. Although Toffler admits that planet earth may be in for a rough time in the interim, the long range future is very bright indeed. Technology has provided humanity with incredible potential--there is cause for hope amidst concern. Toffler notes that

> ... in the very midst of destruction and decay, we can now find striking evidences of birth and life. [W]ith intelligence and a modicum of luck--the emergent civilization can be made more sane, sensible, and sustainable, more decent and more democratic than any we have ever known. (Toffler, 1980, p. 3)

Toffler's vision of the greatest new wave of the future includes an increased emphasis on community in diversity and democratic principles based on attention to minority interests, semi-direct democracy (e.g., the

establishment of an electronic referendum decision-making system), and the reallocation of governmental decision-making. In a world that is fragmented by our diversity, decision-making becomes a uniting factor of society as long as interest groups and minorities are satisfied with the diplomacy of government. (Toffler, 1980, pp. 419-443) The de-massifying of society which results from specialization and fragmentation of the industrial age promotes a new cohesive direction through a democracy devoted to the post-industrial ideals. In Toffler's future, we individually work together for a collective good very different than the collective of the industrial age. Yet, the goals Toffler describes may be totally incompatable and his grasp of politics very naive. There are competing interests in a capitalist society--economic, political, and social--and Toffler seems to dismiss these forces in what he calls the emergent civilization.

Whether considered a pop philosopher or an all-knowing guru of the communication arts, Marshall McLuhan's work on the extension of man proposes a different way of understanding media. McLuhan tells us that we are about to reach the "final phase of the extensions of man--the technological simulation of consciousness." (McLuhan, 1964, p. 3) His belief is

that media and technology have been influential in developing world history to the extent that a great new age is unfolding around us.

McLuhan argues that "the personal and social consequences of any medium--that is, of any extension of ourselves--result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology." (McLuhan, 1964, p. 7) Technology, then, determines the directions of history. To McLuhan, history can be explained in terms of technological change:

> What we are considering here ... are the psychic and social consequences of the designs or patterns as they amplify or accelerate existing processes. For the 'message' of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. (McLuhan, 1964, p. 8)

McLuhan concludes that "it is the medium that shapes and controls the form of human association and action." (McLuhan, 1964, p. 9) When McLuhan says that "the medium is the message" he means that the "message" of the medium is its impact on the form of society. The content of the medium is not an issue to McLuhan. The medium itself is the content. What one watches on television is not crucial; it is the fact that the medium, television, is there to watch. The medium itself imposes a tremendous impact on society by reordering the communicative and

technological world around us.

When humans first began to speak, an oral tradition was developed which completely modified 'primitive' society: "the spoken word was the first technology by which man was able to let go of his environment in order to grasp it in a new way." (McLuhan, 1964, p. 57) It is interesting that McLuhan would see this extension of oneself--speech--as a technology. McLuhan's instrumental view of language has one difference--technology is non-neutral. With the development of symbols, codification became possible, and the phonetic alphabet became the means of creating "civilized man." (McLuhan, 1964, p. 84) The printing press provided the opportunity for mass literacy, and a different reordering of our civilization.

The new era of electronic media is a key step forward in the technological simulation of human consciousness. (McLuhan, 1964, p. 90) We are now living in a civilization of transition. Through electronic means, we can learn what is happening anywhere on the face of the earth. The printed word begins to lose its significance, McLuhan argues, as we return to an aural predominance and inter-relatedness--an electronic and modernistic parallel to preliterate tribalism. This means that we are living in an age of implosion, not

explosion: we are closer to others in society because of our increased proximity through electrical involvement in one another's lives. (McLuhan, 1964, p. 24)

To McLuhan, citizenship means a kind of belonging. Electronics captures space and time; our separateness diminishes and technology blooms as we become more interdependent in a global village which McLuhan sees as an optimistic future for all civilization. (McLuhan, 1964, pp. 77-105) Yet, McLuhan misunderstands or dismisses a fundamental part of being human: expression through a heritage and culture. While projecting a kind of belonging, he is also projecting a kind of domestication of humanity and a uni-dimensionalism of culture.

The predominance of a collective consciousness is the end product of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's optimistic descriptions of our future. Teilhard de Chardin combines theories and trends by proposing that there is no distinction between matter and spirit, that salvation becomes collective instead of individual, and evolution (which is cultural, not just biological) is the route to redemption: "The consciousness of each of us is evolution looking at itself and reflecting upon itself." (Teilhard de Chardin, 1955, p. 221) Teilhard is telling us that this evolution involves social and cultural

qualities:

> In our time Mankind seems to be approaching its critical point of social organisation ... Man, because he is capable of reflection and of planning his own actions, does not blindly respond to these laws [process of organic determinism] like an animal: he assimilates and transforms them, investing them with a meaning and an intelligible moral value. Our species, let us accept it, is entering its phase of socialisation; we cannot continue to exist without undergoing the transformation which in one way or another will forge our multiplicity into a whole. (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, p. 42)

For Teilhard, the union of an interacting, socialized humanity is metaphysically real. (See Ferkiss, 1969, p. 94)

The development of humanity has led to the creation of a superorganism which Teilhard calls the Noosphere, a collective being that serves as a thinking machine--"an added planetary layer, an envelope of thinking substance." (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, p. 163) The consciousness of the Noosphere is collective and is positively oriented to survival:

> ... at the height of its powers, individual consciousness acquires the formidable property something else comes into operation, a primary attribute of Reflection concerning which we have hitherto said nothing--the will to survive. In reflecting upon itself the individual consciousness acquires the formidable property of foreseeing the future, that is to say, death. And at the same time it knows that it is psychologically impossible for it to continue to work in pursuance of the purposes of Life unless something, the best of

> the work, is preserved from total destruction. In this resides the whole problem of action.... Applied to the individual the idea of total extinction may not at first sight appal us; but extended to humanity as a whole it revolts and sickens us. The fact is that the more Humanity becomes aware of its duration, its number and its potentialities--and also of the enormous burden it must bear in order to survive--the more does it realise that if all this labour is to end in nothing, then we have been cheated and can only rebel. In a planetised Humanity the insistence upon irreversibility becomes a specific requisite of action; and it can only grow and continue to grow as Life reveals itself as being ever more rich, an ever heavier load. So that, paradoxically, it is at that ultimate point of centration which renders it cosmically unique, that is to say apparently incapable of any further synthesis, that the Noosphere will have become charged to the fullest extent with psychic energies to impel it forward in yet another advance....
> (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, pp. 186-187)

Progress is the result of the continued striving for a higher life, and even the development of the atom bomb is praised by Teilhard as heralding "not the age of destruction but of union in research.... [The explosions] proclaim the coming of the Spirit of the Earth." (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, p. 152)

We must believe in progress, Teilhard assures us, or we will be "cast-offs" on this planet. We should view the earth "as a machine for progress--or better, an organism that is progressing" so that "simply by biological predominance, they will tomorrow constitute the human race ... as agents and elements of

planetisation." (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, p. 144)

Progress is achieved through collectivisation:

> It takes the form of the all-encompassing ascent of the masses; the constant tightening of economic bonds; the spread of financial and intellectual associations; the totalisation of political regimes; the closer physical contact of individuals as well as of nations; the increasing impossibility of being or acting or thinking alone--in short, the rise, in every form, of the Other around us. (Teilhard de Chardin, 1964, p. 118)

To Teilhard, there is no future but forward progress; there is only collectivity in consciousness; salvation and collective redemption can be the only goals of technological civilization.

With the exception of Toffler's short-term problems, the utopian perspective of technology is optimistic at every turn. Progress means expansion of everything that is good and the reduction of everything that is not; social evils are negated by technological advances and a collective consciousness that ensure a future world characterized by limitless potential. This is not to say that the arguments of utopian writers are without loopholes.

Bronowski assumes that the interrelationship of scientific and human values is inherently good in developing universal values. This means that human values can only be formed and judged from a technological

perspective or frame of mind, and this may not be the way to proceed. One could easily argue that Toffler's work is predicated on soothsaying and mysticism. Further, is it really possible to dismiss the upheavals he acknowledges will continue before the long-range utopia is achieved in the third wave of human history? One would want to ask how a 'de-massified society' would develop cohesive direction or if there is a correlation between clarity of projection and the polish of Toffler's crystal ball.

Teilhard de Chardin's utopian visions suffer from an incredible paradox--a disinterest in personal affairs (loneliness, death, etc.) compared to the affairs of state or race and his interest in collective salvation and redemption. One can detect totalitarian tendencies in his writing and an impatience in one's ordinary day-to-day life. Too much emphasis is placed on Teilhard's Noosphere (how can it be metaphysically real?) and the integration of religion, evolution, collective consciousness and progress which serve to obscure his utopian perspective.

Marshall McLuhan's work is certainly optimistic about the future of humanity and his work has been praised by such critics as Foshay who credits McLuhan's technological determinism for summarizing the entire

Western intellectual tradition. (Foshay, 1963, p. 35)

McLuhan has also been criticized for dismissing a role for content in communication. Lieberman (1965) argues, for example, that McLuhan "ignores the power of ideas, of values, of emotions, [or] of cumulative wisdom" and that McLuhan's beliefs are "McLuhanacy" because "McLuhan is so full of jerry-built theory, dogmatic overgeneralizations, non-sequiturs, disorganized successions of parenthetic observations, and bewildering swift and large leaps among high peaks of misconception" that he makes little sense at all. (p. 647-649) [The most entertaining review of McLuhan is by Kitman, who observes that the man heralding the electronic age has written a book. Kitman suggests that one should telephone McLuhan (his number is provided) because to buy his book is to play into the hands of his enemies and would discredit his thinking: "To show you really understand the working of media, try calling collect." (Kitman, 1967, p. 7)] The gap in McLuhan's thinking concerns the human role in the global village he envisages. He may be correct that the technological simulation of consciousness--the final extension of human beings--is possible in view of technological advances, but is the global village possible in light of human values? Because the technological capability exists to link the world, does

this automatically mean that we can or will understand and cooperate? The utopian perspective is optimistic and encouraging, but its argument does have gaps.

THE UTOPIAN VIEW AND SOCIAL STUDIES

It could be argued that by its very nature, social studies has a utopian perspective. A laudable social goal, after all, is the attainment of a better world for everyone. Consequently, social studies tends to be progressive and optimistic. It follows that the world will be better through human effort and that technology can be an important element of an improved world. The force of the progressive view especially takes shape in Alberta's upper elementary grades, where students look at how Alberta and Canada should use (and share) their natural and human resources. The competing values point toward a better future: maximization of personal freedom, cultural understanding, national unity, and international harmony. The social issue often states a values question with which there cannot be disagreement; we say, "Yes, we should do that." The wrong question is posed--it is not "should we" but rather "to what extent can we" proceed in a certain way. This would reduce the perspective from a utopian one to a realistic one. There is no question, however, that

technology is seen to be the builder of an improved world. As well, the world--and humanity--is seen as an object available for use.

THE DYSTOPIAN VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY

The dystopian view of technology is quite the opposite to the utopian perspective. Instead of promoting advancement and eliminating social evils, dystopians believe that technology intensifies social and economic problems. Technology undermines freedom and democracy; it encourages manipulation of the masses; it makes work tedious, commonplace and detached from humanity. The social worth of technology earns mixed reviews. [redacted] foremost opponent of technology is Jacques Ellul (1964, 1980), and he is joined by other critics including Herbert Marcuse (1964), Theodore Roszak (1968, 1978), Lewis Mumford (1933, 1944, 1956, 1967, 1970), and Rene Dubos (1968, 1974, 1980), although their critiques have different purposes and consequences.

Ellul insists that technique has taken over human beings. His definition of technique is wide ranging:

> The term technique ... does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an end. In our technological society, technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute

> efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity. (Ellul, 1964, xxv)

Technique transforms unreflective behaviour into behaviour that is deliberate; it is the search for the 'one best way' of doing things; it turns means into ends and makes efficiency the central concern of technocrats who have the know-how to reduce quality to quantity.

Ellul observes many characteristics of modern technology. It is inherently and absolutely efficient--exemplified by systematization or division of labour--to the exclusion of spontaneity or creativity and favours the reduction of facts to logic. Technique is also artificial and opposed to nature in that it eliminates and subordinates our natural world. There may eventually be no natural environment: "[when] we succeed in producing artificial aurorae boreales, night will disappear and perpetual day will reign over the planet." (Ellul, 1964, p. 79) As well, the process of choosing the one best way becomes self-directing--striving toward maximum efficiency which steers away from personal choice since the results are measured and become indisputable. This automatism gives the technician considerable power. Technology is also self-augmenting since humans have a faith and even reliance in science. We feel assured of technology's superiority--a superiority oriented to

technical progress which is irreversible. (Ellul, 1964, pp. 85-94) Ellul points out that

> technique ... pursues no end, professed or unprofessed. It evolves in a purely causal way: the combination of preceding elements furnishes the new technical elements. There is no purpose or plan that is being progressively realized. There is not even a tendency toward human ends. We are dealing with a phenomenon blind to the future, in a domain of integral causality. (Ellul, 1964, p. 97)

It should be noted as well that technique has become universal--it is constantly gaining ground. Throughout history, technique belonged to a civilization; today, technique has taken over the whole of civilization. (Ellul, 1964, p. 128) Ellul concludes that technology grows independently of our human choices.

This does not mean that we cannot choose, Ellul notes:

> Man is still perfectly capable of choosing, deciding, altering, directing ... But always within the technological framework and toward the progression of technology.... Man can choose, but in a system of options established by the technological process. He can direct, in terms of the technological given. He can never get out of it at any time, and the intellectual systems he constructs are ultimately expressions or justifications of technology.... (Ellul, 1980a, p. 325)

It is unlikely that the wave of technique can be halted, Ellul tells us. His pessimistic view shrouds the future.

Herbert Marcuse observes that technology has

radically altered society by catering to our material wants and reducing the potential for protest or change:

> Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards extending far beyond the individual establishment into the scientific laboratory and research institute, the national government and national purpose, the tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the facade of objective rationality. Hatred and frustration are deprived of their specific target, and the technological veil conceals the reproduction of inequality and enslavement. With technical progress as its instrument, unfreedom--in the sense of man's subjection to his productive apparatus--is perpetuated and intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts. (Marcuse, 1964, p. 32)

To Marcuse, technology is a way toward domination. Society can resist this domination, he concludes, but probably not very successfully: "The totalitarian tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional ways and means of protest ineffective--perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty." (Marcuse, 1964, p. 256) For Marcuse, there is little hope that we can reverse the direction of the one-dimensional society.

One of the most interesting critics of technology is Theodore Roszak, who fears that the final goal of science is the substitution of machines for human beings. (See Watkins and Meador, 1977, pp. 71-76) Machines can provide objective measurement; they do not become emotional and carry no personal involvement or

commitment. Roszak outlines a variety of scientific experiments conducted over the years that demonstrate a science controlled by technocrats and technology that imposes dehumanizing gadgetry and machinery on humanity. (Roszak, 1968, pp. 269-289) Roszak calls on citizens to alter the dominance of science and technology:

> Beyond the tactics of resistance, but shaping them at all times, there must be a stance of life which seeks not simply to muster power against the misdeeds of society, but to transform the very sense men have of reality. (Roszak, 1968, p. 267)

In such a way, nature, which holds the meaning of life, can be explored by civilization which seeks true meaning.

Another critic has written extensively from a human perspective. Biologist Rene Dubos believes that our human nature, formed in the course of evolution, is not suited to life in a technological world. If we do not choose a different direction, we will be doomed. (Dubos, 1968, pp. 247-252) Another critic of technology, Lewis Mumford, has written proliferously of the history of technology. Since World War II, Mumford has been harshly negative of technology and especially of the scientific elite which has developed the decision-making power and the "denaturing" that technology causes through organic emptiness, industrial specialization, and human separation. (Mumford, 1967, pp. 212-233) Technology

disenfranchises the masses of society and diverts them from the natural environment for which they were intended.

All of these perspectives represent a dystopian view of technology. The degree of condemnation varies, but the critics are consistently opposed to the Pollyannaish conclusions of the utopian advocates. Although technology may solve some of the problems related to economic scarcity, dystopians cannot accept the leap to cure the blemishes of social evil. However, the dystopian view that technology is inherently bad is clearly an overstatement.

Ellul offers no real solution and he tends to see even some glamour in the past. He overextends his arguments by concluding that humanity is helpless; he drives home his point so forcefully that he makes the reader numb. Marcuse and Roszak tend to give technology more power than it possesses; technology's advance is like the path of a fire-breathing dragon--does one extinguish the fire, slay the dragon, or run away? Certainly these critics would agree that technology is not neutral. Yet, these critics seem to believe that technology has no redeeming qualities. Instead of just pondering the problems of technology, it may be more worthwhile to enhance technological extensions and

eliminate as much as possible technological reduction of human experiences. Maybe a better philosophical perspective deals with human qualities amidst technological advancement so that the technological good is separated from the technological evil.

THE DYSTOPIAN VIEW AND SOCIAL STUDIES

The dystopian view of technology is certainly not prevalent in Alberta social studies. At the senior high school level, there is some concern about the impact of technology on our world. This concern is expressed in grades eleven and twelve. One unit focuses on declining production and increasing population and the possible futures of our civilization; technology is seen as both good and evil. In grade twelve, students contemplate a future of peace when nuclear technology and the technology of war abound. There is, at least, a sense that we need to proceed cautiously in charting a future path. In this sense, technology is seen to be a problem. There is, however, always the assertion that we will be able to make the right choice.

THE SOCIALIST VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY

The third view of technology is the socialist perspective. (Marx and Engels, 1845, pp. 33-102) The

key problem in presenting this perspective is the small amount of literature dealing with the social role of technology and the complexity of the critique of capitalist society.

Utopians, dystopians, and socialists are in agreement that technological change is a very important factor in social change. It is not primary to socialists, but it is strategic in the transformation of society. Socialists acknowledge that technology has made significant contributions to social progress and they agree that the elimination of social problems requires the continued encouragement of technology. Socialists do not agree, however, that the growth of technology by itself can be progressive. The potential of technology can only be fulfilled when it is not controlled by minorities whose use of technology would be detrimental on the life conditions of others. In some ways, then, socialists agree with the utopian perspective. As technology serves to eliminate scarcity, it helps to liberate humanity.

Socialists agree with dystopians, however, that technology is creating more problems than it is resolving. The socialist scapegoat is not technology itself; it is the capitalist class which is responsible for the bad effects of technology. Technology is not at

fault, the people who control technology are. Socialists believe that the capitalist owner (the ruling class) controls technology and holds political power. Utopians and dystopians would probably agree that technicians are in control--scientists make decisions on the basis of technological reason in a modern technocracy. A socialist would suggest that even the technicians are 'owned' by the capitalists.

Socialists agree with utopians that the elimination of scarcity will lead to the demise of social problems, but socialists believe that the use of technology is not leading to the elimination of scarcity. Yet, socialists cannot defend their claim that socialism will make use of techology in a humane and liberating way. As Grant (1969) notes, "they [socialists] share, with those who appear to them as enemies, the deeper assumptions which have made the technological society." (p. 31) There are restraints and restrictions imposed on society by technology, and these are not addressed by socialists. As well, socialists have not addressed the problem of limiting growth in the midst of technology. Although there are weaknesses in these arguments, their views are sophisticated and complete. (See Gendron, 1977, pp. 1-7, 187-245 for an overview.)

THE SOCIALIST VIEW AND SOCIAL STUDIES

Due to the political nature of such a perspective, the social studies curriculum does not generally contribute to a technological conception or attitude related to the socialist view. Socialism is studied as an alternative political system, but the inherent values of the curriculum tend to be very conservative and representative of the status quo.

DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Is there an alternate perspective worthy of consideration? Can one develop a different philosophy of technology? It is not a matter of supporting or rejecting technology, but these views of technology do not mirror an essential human image. The utopian view of technology charts a machine-filled future where there will be plenty for all, social evils will be removed, material desires will be replicated. The dystopian view projects a bleak, grey future which leads down a variety of paths to human oblivion. The socialist view, that when control of technology is taken away from the capitalists it will be used in a liberating and humane way, is a formula for utopia.

The key is in finding a way to proceed and in a

fuller understanding of what it means to be human. It is not being for or against technology; it is being for or against a conception of the human image and how we come to understand ourselves within the context of that image. The next chapter attempts to develop a broader view of technology in such an image; the final chapter focuses on a way to proceed.

CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPING A BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF TECHNOLOGY AND OURSELVES

The meaning of citizenship is inextricably tied to a conception of the human image. Our acts, as citizens, are fundamental in the process of knowing ourselves. Technology's impact on our lives is so great that we must come to an understanding of the technological framework of how we view the world.

As a response to literature authored by an assortment of technologists and antitechnologists, would-be philosophers have explained that technology will save the human race, that technology will predicate our extinction, and that society can work to control technology. Technology cannot do all three. This chapter examines how we can come to understand ourselves in relation to technology. It puts forward the notion that technology is, at some point, an inherent human choice and that the values perspective becomes crucial in addressing the technological question. A moral barometer--a values based decision-making process of inquiry--transforms the scientific imperative "How should this be done" to the critical perspective--"Why?" or "Is this appropriate?" How, then, can teachers move from a

technical to a critical pedagogy?

HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNOLOGY

Martin Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" (herein cited as QT) is an important beginning place in attaining a fuller understanding of technology. To Heidegger, technology is both a human activity and a means to an end. He links technology to root words such as the Greek term, "poiesis" (poetic), which he defines as "whatever passes beyond the nonpresent and goes forward into presencing ... [a] bringing-forth." (QT, p. 293) This "bringing-forth" takes something concealed into unconcealment--it is a form of revealing:

> What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The answer: everything. For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing ... Within its domain belong end and means as well as instrumentality. Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing. Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e, of truth. (QT, p. 294)

Heidegger traces the word, "technology" to other Greek roots, especially "techne" which he views as

"the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts." (QT, p. 294) As Alderman (1978) interprets,

> it was a matter of techne to uncover beings in a work of art, or to uncover them for use--as in the crafts. The essential and original meaning of techne is then that of 'making manifest' and not merely that of 'making' in the sense of practical construction. (p. 44)

Heidegger clarifies techne in terms of the four Aristotelian causes, which he sees as "a doctrine of responsibility for beings." A bowl, then, is the result of the responsibility of the craftsman: "its standing as a being is dependent on his craft." The potter assumes responsibility for the earth by bringing forth a bowl using his craft and working in harmony with nature. (Alderman, 1978, pp. 44-45; QT, pp. 294-297) Heidegger also considers the Greek word, "episteme" in his unearthing of the essence of technology, and he notes that the term means "knowing in the widest sense." In view of these meanings, Heidegger emphasizes that technology in this form is a way of revealing--a bringing-forth--that is responsive and contemplative. (QT, p. 295)

This positive perspective of technology does not, however, apply to modern technology, which is

> something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on

> modern physics as an exact science ... The revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. (QT, p. 296)

This kind of technology is domineering and challenging; Heidegger refers to it as a "setting-upon" that expedites the energies of nature by unlocking and exposing. (QT, pp. 296-297) This is a different kind of revealing, which Heidegger views in this way:

> The revealing that rules though modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. Such challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. (QT, pp. 297-298)

Whatever is ordered in this way has its own standing, which Heidegger refers to as the "standing reserve." But this standing reserve can be ourselves bound by technological mastery just as it can be the coal that is ready for use as a fuel--we are available in the stockpile for technological purposes just like the unearthed gifts of nature.

Heidegger describes the essence of modern

technology as "Gestell" or "enframing" in which man is challenged forth into revealing:

> Enframing means the gathering together of that setting upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology ... (QT, p. 301)

Alderman (1978) senses an important distinction between science and technology. He observes that science can be scientifically described (in terms of substance and historical processes) but in the case of technology objectivity vanishes because of an identification with resources:

> Science moves beings into position as mathematically theorized objects; whereas technology further positions these beings of science in such a way that they become mere resources relative to a predetermined end; thus, their objectivity vanishes. For science, beings are objects, but for technology beings are resources. (p. 47)

Thus, technology is the will to power--it unleashes mankind as the determiner of being. The key distinction between early and modern technologies is that in early technologies, we were beings within nature, whereas in modern technology we see ourselves as beings over nature. (QT, pp. 307-309) An example of the difference in technologies could be expressed in different forms of boating. Sailboats use currents and wind direction in their form as a thing of the water.

Motorboats overcome the water by dominating their environment--currents and wind are not as important.

Heidegger sees it important to develop a values position about technology because of its impact and he encourages us to recognize its dimensions:

> Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology. (QT, pp. 287-288)

As Heidegger reveals himself, technology has changed through time from a responsive, responsible form of revealing to a domineering, insistent and aggressive form of challenging. We cannot 'opt out' or 'opt for' technology since ultimately the essence of technology is a way of revealing the totality of beings. It is this combination of complete availability and manipulative opportunity that is central to Heidegger's notion of Gestell (enframing).

One may not gain a total understanding of the essence of technology from Heidegger, but one certainly learns the importance of an awareness of technology's domineering spirit and our position in those circumstances. One senses that Heidegger's views represent a kind of free determinism--a perspective that

humans have a technological fate or destiny as they continue to be enveloped by the forces of technological change. Heidegger also brings into focus the importance of reflection, the realm of art, and the thoughtfulness of questioning.

This is a view of technology which calls upon humanity to develop a broader perspective in relating to the world. Such a perspective involves a kind of reflection that is very different to the technological view of the world--it is a kind of relationship with Nature itself that permits a fullness of experience. This personal view is a statement of qualified optimism (if we choose our destiny) or resigned pessimism (if technology advances without control or limit). As our civilization progresses toward Utopia or Oblivion, we must determine our being in relation to nature. As our fundamental freedom is to be open to the truth, we need to develop a more complete relationship with Nature, with the rest of mankind, and with ourselves. We need to understand technology within the context of our human image.

Some critics have addressed the place of technology in our world. Their views range from fears of a technology out of control to satisfaction with what is seen as scientific progress. An assessment of these

perspectives may be helpful in clarifying the importance of Heidegger's vision of technology and in understanding the meaning of a broader perspective.

AFTER HEIDEGGER: CONTRASTING UNDERSTANDINGS OF TECHNOLOGY

TECHNOLOGY OUT OF CONTROL

Langdon Winner (1977) puts forward the notion that technology may be out of human control--that technology breeds technology in a way that rules all forms of thought and activity. Central to his argument is Winner's description of the nature of 'autonomous technology': "that far from being controlled by the desired and rational ends of human beings, technology in a real sense now governs its own course, speed, and destination." (pp. 15-16) What Winner is saying is that technology causes more technology--it is a part of the technological framework to consider use, efficiency and improvement and we accept, without question or reflection, any technological 'advance.' Once reliable notions of technology are now cast into widespread doubt, including

> --that men know best what they themselves have made;
> --that the things men make are under their firm control;
> --that technology is essentially neutral, a

> means to an end; the benefit or harm it brings depends on how men use it. (p. 25)

Yet, the above propositions have the appearance of being really true. Conventional wisdom tends to suggest that there is skill involved in the act of making, design is a human endeavour which offers solutions, and technology is simply a tool ready for 'use'--as a means to a desired ends. This view of technology is an instrumental one. Winner's closer examination of these propositions raises some important questions about technology.

Winner asks three questions about the extent to which people know their own technology: "How much does an individual understand about the total range of technologies that affect his or her life?" (pp. 27-28) One could extend Winner's thinking by asking whether or not an individual understands this range technically or critically. Further, with specialization in so many different areas, we are unable to understand everything that goes on around us--we seldom have the complete picture. We are concerned about doing 'our part' but we do not stop to think about 'the whole.' We are specialized, but often isolated and fragmented.

A second question addresses the extent to which we control technology, to which Winner observes that "the same technologies that have extended man's control over

the world are themselves difficult to control." (pp. 28-29) We are reduced to making choices within the sphere of the technology we put in place. We limit ourselves to choose 'a' or 'b' when a true decision may also include consideration of a completely different option or even a different question.

The third key question posed by Winner makes problematic the neutrality of technology. It must be recognized that technology fundamentally alters our world. Winner observes that

> although virtually limitless in their power, our technologies are tools without handles. Often they seem to resist guidance by preconceived goals or standards ... Human beings will still have a nominal presence in the network, but they have lost their roles as active, directing agents. They tend to obey uncritically the norms and requirements of the systems which they allegedly govern. (pp. 29-30)

We have lost, then, our mastery and our ability to know, to evaluate or sense, and to control our technological means. Winner continually refers to two principal processes--the technological imperative and reserve adaptation. The technological imperative is that technology creates needs which can be satisfied only by technology. One invention leads to another; technology attempts to address the problems caused by technology in the first place. The technological imperative means that

we are always seeking the best way, the efficient method, or the scientifically satisfying [this is Ellul's 'technique'].

Related to this is reverse adaptation--that the nature of technology transforms human beings by adapting them to technology's requirements. Our habits, our beliefs, and our ways of organizing are viewed in light of technology in the modern society. Finally, these two processes result in what Winner refers to as "technical virtuosity." Society's concern for the subject or object of technology is reduced and preference is given to the techniques in the attainment of mastery (or appearance of mastery). In this way, the means take priority without reflection on the goals, directions, or aims of technological interest.

Winner's thesis is a stunning formulation that has received mixed reviews. Based heavily in Ellul's work (and Winner admits this--he calls it his 'starting point'), Winner draws the full extent of our relationship with technology by noting that:

> Man has invested his life in a mass of methods, techniques, machines, rational-productive organizations, and networks. They are his vitality. He is theirs. In body, mind, will, and activity they must now move in unison or both will perish. (p. 42)

Manfred Stanley (1978) accepts Winner's

arguments. He sees technology not as a human project but as an evil invader into our social world. For Stanley, the key to understanding "technicism",

> consists in metaphorical misapplication of some of the assumptions, imagery, and linguistic habits of science and technology to areas of discourse in which such mistakes obscure the free and responsible nature of human action. As such, technicism is a break in the evolution of linguistic understanding and self-control, a cul-de-sac of mystification. (xiii)

The technological society is not interested in moral standards or integrity; survival wins over dignity; 'efficient', 'better', and 'best' are passwords. The moral integrity of the individual, which is basic to human beings, is paralyzed in the society fueled by technique. Our conception of what it is to be human is lost in this technological dash. These are fundamental conclusions in Stanley's text.

TECHNOLOGY IN PROGRESSIVE BALANCE

A full range of views includes commentators who see technology under human control. Such authors describe technology as a balance with nature in the betterment of our world. Some of these hold the utopian view of technology; they believe that technology will cure our ills and make our world just, secure, and perfect.

Samuel Florman (1981) states that fear of technology is unsupportive to the improvement of humanity:

> Perhaps we can find some simple facts that will persuade an open-minded reader that the antitechnologists have been listening to the beating of their own hearts instead of looking at the world around them ... I believe it can be shown that technology is still very much under society's control, that it is in fact an expression of our very human desires, fancies, and fears. (p. 10)

Florman lists some of the technologies that have not caught on, including the rotary engine, holography, and instant movie film development. The individual human being 'chooses' the technology--this means that humans have control of their destiny. And as humans, we can discriminate, change, upgrade, and invent:

> Whenever one really looks at technological development--among inventors, producers, distributors, or consumers--there is the human spirit at center stage, foolish, perhaps, as often as clever, dull as often as radiant, but undeniably, irrepressibly, vitally human. If we cannot put our creations back in the bottle, we can at least continue to bring to bear upon them the discrimination that is uniquely ours. Even successful technologies are subject to human control ... (pp. 20-21)

Florman notes that business executives continue to fly across the nation to meet one another; students choose live university classes over pretaped, televised lectures; drivers pick small foreign cars instead of gas guzzling American models. Florman tells us that we do

have control of our technological destiny.

Yet, all of Florman's ideas move within a technological world view. This so-called choice of technology is made in the context of the most efficient--the best way--of doing things. The discrimination brought to bear on technology is largely economic. The human spirit Florman describes is not human at all; it is technological. It is a part of a technical drive for mastery, efficiency, and control.

McGill professor Witold Rybczynski is not as definite as Florman, but he certainly takes an optimistic stance. Like Heidegger, Rybczynski notes that we have little choice but to continue to live with the machine world. The democratisation of the machine for the masses has radically transformed the place of technology:

> It is the personal use of technology--its universal availability--that has transformed modern times by permitting incredible opportunities but also by placing new stress on society, increasing pollution, etc. (1983, viii)

Rybczynski also notes some historical attempts to control technology. These date back many years, and include the banning of the crossbow by Pope Innocent II (it was too cruel a weapon except against the Moors and other infidels) and the refusal of Elizabeth I to grant a patent for a knitting machine which would increase

unemployment. And Luddites had an even more definite response to all machines. (p. 10)

These are just examples of the perspectives that are fundamentally optimistic about our chances, but these authors--as well as the technological critics who fear that technology is out of control--do have some ideas to help keep technology under the human thumb.

THE CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY

Florman, Rybczynski, Winner, Stanley, and others have different contributions to make concerning the question of technological control. Ranging from the role of the capitalist economy to the proposed expansion of moral education, various authors view the role of technology in our society in different ways.

Samuel Florman (1981) tends to attribute the matter of technological control to market influences. The reason the rotary engine did not whir, so to speak, with the public was that the oil crisis changed the way consumers thought about their cars. Gas guzzlers were out; fuel misers were in. Since the rotary engine used more gasoline than similarly powered engines, Florman notes, it did not enter the kind of market one would have expected. Florman does not recognize that this is all instrumental; the choice was purely technological without

consideration of how the related technology affects our l[illegible]

Florman calls for a tragic view in approaching technology. Tragedy involves a tussle with fate and the potential to soar to new heights of human potential. Too often, in Florman's explanation, humans play one off of the other--antitechnology must be good and technology must be bad, but many of the concerns are the same. Florman points out the need to take action even when the opponents propose nothing:

> We are accountable for what we do or, more often, for what we neglect to do. The most shameful feature of the anti-technological creed is that it so often fails to consider the consequences of not taking action. The lives lost or wasted that might have been saved by exploiting our resources are the responsibility of those who counsel inaction. The tragic view is consistent with good citizenship. It advocates making the most of our opportunities; it challenges us to do the work that needs doing. (p. 191)

It is not a good versus evil kind of argument, Florman concludes, because pesticides do help reduce starvation but also cause problems in the food chain. Pipelines deliver the oil, oil spills are oceanographic disasters; nuclear energy is good, eliminating the hazards is also good. (p. 191) But Florman fails to see some key realities. First, while calling for human control of technology, he is actually advocating a kind of

autonomous technology. He is saying that technology must always respond to technology--that to work to prevent oil spills helps to solve our problems. We are to take, then, the challenges that arise from the problems of technology. It is an ongoing approach to freedom--as soon as another technological dilemma is resolved in a technological way. To Florman, it is the ongoing achievemeht of a more satisfactory--and maybe more efficient--society.

To Rybczynski, the market factors are just part of the potential control of technology. Other than the actual design of the device, which is always based on an attempt to reduce the unpredictability of the artifact, there is the political choice of utility. In other words, human beings choose whether or not or when to use an artifact. There is never any guarantee that a technological device will have a desired effect; in fact, these methods of controlling technology often lead, Rybczynski believes, to drastic decisions and unpredictable results. (1983, p. 195) The key control of technology is often overlooked, but it is obvious to Rybczynski. It involves the interrelationship of technological civilization and humanity as a whole. Rybczynski describes how national civilizations adapt technological forces and devices. Technological

innovation does not flood the world; technology is received, examined, and adapted by different cultures. He uses such examples as the integration of the button or various priorities for public transit. Technology is 'used' in the 'right' way--values decisions are made about how to use technology:

> We can, in the process, find that the machine is more controllable than we have been led to believe. We can have cars without automatically becoming a car culture--nothing stops us from walking, running or bicycling as well, or from rebuilding the center of our cities to the scale of the pedestrian ...
>
> This is not to suggest in any way that a return to supposedly happier, pretechnological times is possible, even if it were desirable. Rather, we are discovering that there are more ways of using machines than we had previously imagined, and that control of the machine resides, finally, in ourselves. It is we who have put machines on pedestals and now we complain that they seem to rule. Perhaps it is time to take them down. (p. 211)

What Rbyczynski is talking about is the purely human matter of making choices about actual use. He points to the fascination with physical fitness in the automobile society; with vegetable gardening in the metropolis. These kinds of adaptation demonstrate values in action, but in some ways this argument stresses the utility of the technology delivered for implementation. Where is the development of various forms of technology questioned? Where, even in this wider view of technological development, is the fundamental

criticism--the 'why' of technological development? Rbyczynski does not reach this level--his vision falls short of fundamental criticism. He accepts the technological device and adapts it for use in each culturally distinctive region. But accepting the technological device also means adapting to pollution, radiation leaks, and so on. The choice is the actual degree of use, not the presence or access of technology. For all of the potential of Rybczynski's explanation, his ultimate control of the technological tiger is a utilitarian and technical, instead of a critical, issue.

Langdon Winner's perspective of technological control has a strong critical dimension. He calls for a search for new technological forms:

> Recognizing the often wrong-headed and oppressive character of existing configurations of technology, we should find new kinds of technics that avoid the human problems of the present set. This would mean, presumably, the birth of a new sort of inventiveness and innovation in the physical arrangements of this civilization. (1977, p. 326)

Winner also calls for such developments to be presented to the individuals affected. In this way, individuals who will feel the full range of social consequences will have an idea of their technological destiny. Winner also seeks to avoid technological systems that "impose a permanent, rigid, and irreversible imprint on the lives

of the populace" and advocates that technologies which create a degree of dependency should be seen to be inferior. (pp. 326-327)

Most important, however, is the need for greater attachment to the historical meaning of technology, a

> return to the original understanding of technology as a means that, like all other means available to us, must only be employed with a fully informed sense of what is appropriate. Here, the ancients knew, was the meeting point at which ethics, politics, and technics came together.... This ability to grasp the appropriateness of means has, I believe, now been pretty thoroughly lost. It has been replaced by an understanding which holds that if a given means can be shown to have a narrow utility, then it ought to be adopted straight off, regardless of its broader implications.... We would profit from regaining our powers of selectivity and our ability to say 'no' as well as 'yes' to a technological prospect. (pp. 326-327)

In this light, the question of how to proceed becomes problematic because "there is no living body of knowledge, no method of inquiry applicable to our present situation that tells us how to move any differently from the way we already do." (p. 328) As Winner notes, "one must also take seriously the fact that one simply does not yet know how to go ahead to find genuinely new means appropriate to the new 'consciousness.'" (p. 329) Winner concludes by calling for a kind of 'epistemological Luddism'--seeking out the essence of

civilization by engaging in deliberate dismantling of technics. Luddites asked important, meaningful, and still relevant questions--if the new device enhanced the quality of the product or if the new device enhanced the quality of the work. Winner's 'epistemological Luddism' would consider:

> (1) the kinds of human dependency and regularized behavior centering upon specific varieties of apparatus,
> (2) the patterns of social activity that rationalized techniques imprint upon human relationships, and
> (3) the shapes given everyday life by the large-scale organized networks of technology.
> Far from any wild smashing, this would be a meticulous process aimed at restoring significance to the question, What are we about? (p. 331)

Winner's argument is in need of extension. To what extent he wishes to tear things down, roll back the clock, and start over is unclear. His position does rely on a values perspective on the critical technological questions, and this has been widely missed by other writers.

Jay Weinstein's critique (1981) of Winner's book is based on a progressive view of technology. Popular sentiment is for technological advancement, he explains, and this somehow reduces the validity of Winner's perspective:

> ... technocratic counterparts continue to delight the corpo[illegible] and individual consumer

> with life prolonging, life-enhancing, and even life-imitating innovations. Where technology-out-of-control implies Luddite tactics to win back our freedom, progressive technology implies that technology has already (or potentially) made us freer than people ever have been.
>
> People ... find it hard to accept that ... powerlessness comes from technology, when the evidence of their senses tells them that technology gives them power. (pp. 574-575)

Weinstein cannot shake the blinders of his technological view. One of the problems of technology is its apparent ability to control people. While Weinstein reminds us that checks are built into technology to correct formerly unanticipated outcomes, he is unable to see the questions of ethics apparent in the very nature of technology itself. Bring on the scientists, Weinstein tells us, and they will squeeze from their test tubes a better world. Our eternity is better nursed by the technical virtuoso than by the countercultural intellectual who, while choosing to be an outsider, feels helpless. And with a few strokes of his pen (or with a few dots of his matrix printer, as the case may be), critical moral, ethical, and reflective questions are dismissed in the name of efficiency, progress, and a fundamental reliance on science. The choice to technology is a non-neutral choice to choose one value over another.

DEVELOPING A SENSE OF MORAL REFLECTION

Some critics suggest that a suitable course of action, in relating technology to ourselves, is through what could be termed moral reflection. Joseph Weizenbaum (1980) makes an important point about our values orientation in the introductory section to the Daedalus issue on science and technology. Because technology opens up different options, it takes a strong value system to control the choice of options. Weizenbaum states that "our culture has a weak value system and little use of collective welfare, and is therefore disastrously vulnerable to technology." (p. 3) Decision-making about technology is made in the midst of incoherent complexity in a society with an impermanence of values. In such a case, "the technological fix becomes [the] most attractive and is at the same time the most tempting invitation to a Faustian bargain." (p. 4)

Manfred Stanley's call for moral discourse in education is crucial in the achievement of a critical consciousness about technology. Stanley (1978) argues that education must restore to individuals power over their own language to reduce the movement to human objectification. Unless this can be done, man will no longer be a subject--an advocate for morality--but only

an object without a sense of literacy. The way around this is to press for moral discourse in schools and to reflect on the key critical questions. Stanley's call is for a values-based education in a critical context--the establishment of a dialogue that reflects on critical issues. In such a way, there may be the development of clearer values systems and some sense of collective welfare. Stanley's conclusion may be philosophically sound, but the actual way to get to his conclusion is more difficult. With social pressures, the pluralism of values, and other pressures extrinsic to the education system itself, Stanley is quiet about directions for transforming his vision into action.

Nevertheless, what Stanley suggests is very important. He begins to take Heidegger's perspective and apply it to the pedagogical world. The task for educators is to create an open learning environment in which opportunity is provided to converse with students about the fundamental human values--those very qualities that make us human beings. It means creating a classroom situation rooted in critical questioning instead of passive transmitting. Moral reflection suggests an opportunity not just to view choices but to question them and propose alternatives for moral action. It means not just influencing choices, but feeling free to question

apparent choices in light of broader possibilities. To dream, imagine, and direct; to conserve, value, and protect: moral reflection falls somewhere in the midst of these actions.

This is challenging to teachers because of our dominant technical framework; our reliance in science to seek out and find the best way and the most efficient technique. Cultivating a broader perspective requires the clarification of a mixture of scientific, technological, and human values and promoting critical thought, inquiry, and a collective consciousness rooted in social action. In this way, we may proceed by questioning, reflecting and acting; not just by calculating and solving. The challenge for teachers is massive, but the challenge of raising a critical consciousness is also vital to the assertion of a broader perspective for all of us.

CHAPTER 6

REFORMING THE SOCIAL STUDIES: WHAT THIS MEANS FOR CURRICULUM AND PRACTICE

Technology, by its very nature, is fragmenting our sense of community. We have come, as Suzuki (1985) says, to depend on the ideology of technique, "the belief that a technical world is a higher, better, finer thing than the natural world which gave us birth." Our collegial nature has declined in view of humanless technology; we render unto technology what it demands. Just as religion, kinship and a rising mercantilism and cosmopolitanism fractured the ancient sense of community, the impact of technology has reduced such opportunities and experiences. Active participation in society, a presupposition in Athenian democracy, is no longer common. We interact with technology as much as we interact with people. When the Athenians became more interested in themselves and less interested in their collective welfare and sense of community, their democratic system collapsed. Social studies and social studies teachers must learn to respond to the challenge of a technological society and a technological determinism that springs from that society.

This chapter develops a way to proceed based on

the broader perspective of technology discussed in the preceding chapter. It calls for a social studies which critically questions our world in a way that preserves our human image and our essential humanity.

DEVELOPING CIVIC LITERACY

Paulo Freire's praxis pedagogy is a beginning place for the development of an understanding of literacy. Freire's work not only strives to interpret but also to change our world by confronting its objectification, the dichotomy of thought and action, and the impact of a technological consciousness on our everyday lives. As Freire notes,

> Acquiring literacy does not involve memorizing sentences, words or syllables--lifeless objects unconnected to an existential universe--but rather is an act of creation and recreation, a self transformation, producing a state of intervention in one's context. (1973, p. 43)

One comes to this by learning to see and analyze one's own way of being; one is then able to understand and to transform one's social context through such a pedagogy.

Henry Giroux (1983) draws from the notion of civic courage which he describes as "a form of behaviour in which one thinks and acts as if one lived in a real democracy." (p. 116) This is the idea that one acts despite the fact that the ideological deck may not be

stacked in one's favour; yet, such action does carry with it a kind of inherent bravery. To act, Giroux (based on Freire's work) calls for "a notion of literacy grounded in the grammar of self-determination and transforming praxis." (p. 116) In this way, one is able to work toward improving the world to what it ought to be.

This is an important point. One can build on this idea to help redefine citizenship education. A critical view of citizenship education would not have 'effective citizenship' as its goal; it would have something we could term 'civic literacy' as its goal. Civic literacy calls for a broader perspective of citizenship education. Literacy, in this sense, is an ability "to read, to communicate, to compute, to make judgments, and to take actions resulting from them." (Graham, 1981, p. 120) Giroux makes the crucial application to citizenship education:

> Literacy in this case not only provides the tools for 'reading' oneself and the world critically, it also becomes the vehicle for demonstrating that education has broader implications than creating an educated and skilled labor force. In other words, this concept of literacy radicalizes the notion of citizenship education and creates new opportunities for positive action. (1983, p. 117)

Giroux's definition of literacy is not a technological definition, which would be highly restrictive. Murchland

(1983) sees the task of citizenship education as equipping individuals with what it takes to make good technological choices. He notes that "just how liberal education can guarantee technological literacy as an integral outcome of the curriculum is perhaps the most important problem facing educators." (p. 24) But there is much more to civic literacy than choosing correct options in a technological sense. Civic literacy has to do with philosophic inquiry in a broader perspective. Maxine Greene (1984) provides a sense of the potential of this kind of literacy:

> Educational philosophers cannot return to prescriptive or directive views in relation to schooling or education. Nor can they claim any privileged insights into the nature of "reality" or rationality or the meaning of life. They can, however, concern themselves directly with concrete issues that have philosophical dimensions to provide perspective on them, to help clarify the language in which they are discussed, to identify relations between them and implications for the domains of social life.... What does it actually mean to 'prepare' young people for life in a high technology society? What sorts of proficiencies are required for dealing knowledgeably with technology? What understandings are required to make appropriate decisions regarding scientific research and technological advance? How can the education of the person be fostered in a context of conflicting external demands? How can imagination be released at a time of focus on cognitive skills? What can be done to nurture ethical sensitivity and responsibility in a highly administered world? What is the function of education in making an 'articulate public'?

> If educational philosophy has an agenda, it has to do with posing the significant questions. It has to do with awakening educators to reflective understanding of their own lived situations, provoking them to attend critically to what is lacking and to move responsibly to repair. And certainly it has to do with showing the meanings of literacy in its multiple phases. There are many modes of intelligence still to release; there are different voices waiting to be heard. (pp. 557-558)

By posing the 'significant questions' in a broader perspective, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of civic literacy in a critical dimension. For me, civic literacy has four components: moral reflection, civic savvy, critical thinking, and active belonging. Each of these components (described more fully below) helps to contribute subjective meanings and understandings about our world in a broader perspective. Each of these components addresses a curricular aspect of the social studies in a dialectical way. This means that alternative viewpoints are exposed and investigated through discussion and reasoning by ongoing dialogue. It means that each of these curricular components becomes cyclical in nature; various positions become clearer with discussion and change when conditions prompt revision. The coming together of these dialectics contributes to the establishment of a critical citizenship education which helps to expand our experiences and understandings

of our society in ways that promote human dignity and action. These relationships are represented in Figure 3.

MORAL REFLECTION

Moral reflection is a dialectic process of valuing. The key force in this dialectic is the ability to sense what is appropriate. In response to the challenges of technology, this force includes the notion that certain projects (e.g., genetic engineering) may be inappropriate. It is possible that these projects do not represent a true conception of what it is to be human; they may be found to be, upon reflection, in contrast to a true conception of the human image. Rene Dubos (1968) reminds us that "planning for better defined and worthwhile human goals has become urgent if we are to avoid the technological take-over." (pp. 231-232) As Hans Jonas (1974) points out in his excellent essay on technology and responsibility, the relationship between nature and humans has changed:

> Take, for instance, as the first major change ... the critical vulnerability of nature to man's technological intervention--unsuspected before it began to show itself in damage already done. This discovery, whose shock led to the concept and nascent science of ecology, alters the very concept of ourselves as a causal agency in the larger scheme of things. It brings to light, through the effects, that the nature of human action has de facto changed, and that an object of an entirely new

TRANSFORMING 'TECHNICAL'
INTO 'CRITICAL' SOCIAL STUDIES



FIGURE 3

> order--no less than the whole biosphere of the planet--has been added to what we must be responsible for because of our power over it. (p. 9)

As a human responsibility, we make decisions and act on our values. However, with technological advances, we are forced to act without complete knowledge. Science chops up our world into segment specialities; we fail to see the whole picture. Some of the technological questions concern our global condition, the future, our continued existence. We have no conception of ethics for such a task because it is a collective action that counts, not so much an individual's sense of right and wrong. As Jonas (1974) notes,

> in the image he entertains of himself--the potent self-formula which determines his actual being as much as it reflects it--man now is evermore the maker of what he has made and the doer of what he can do, and most of all the preparer of what he will be able to do next. But not you or I: it is the aggregate, not the individual doer or deed that matters here; and the indefinite future, rather than the contemporary context of the action, constitutes the relevant horizon of responsibility. This requires imperatives of a new sort. If the realm of making has invaded the space of essential action, then morality must invade the realm of making, from which it had formerly stayed aloof, and must do so in the form of public policy. (pp. 11-12)

What kinds of affirmations can be made to guide this dialectic of moral reflection? There is a parallel here between such a series of affirmations and what Jonas

calls "an imperative responding to the new type of human action." (1974, p. [illegible]) These statements could include:

> 'Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life'; or simply: 'Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth'; or most generally: 'In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will.' (p. 13)

These are important statements; they tie in to our [illegible] to preserve and conserve our essential democratic values. Although there is much room for discussion, debate, and dialogue, there are some values which are for transmission. A debate serves to reinforce the importance of fundamental values shared by a majority. Yet, it may not be possible to undertake the kind of national consensus Butts (1980) discusses in his work. Canada is, after all, a pluralistic society and a strength has been our diversity. To expect the kind of consensus described by Butts (1980, p. 10, p. 123, p. 125) is to expect the impossible. Butts greatly underestimates the divergence in meanings and understandings inherent in a pluralist society; he calls for steamroller tactics to help establish his cherished consensus.

In fact, countersocialization is an important part of moral reflection. This activity is, in part, the

action of questioning forms of democracy, of independent thinking. Countersocialization keeps democracy in balance and helps students achieve the art of criticism--especially criticism of one's own values. Social criticism is crucially important for democracy which is, by its very nature, intellectually demanding. This debate is part and parcel of the discourse necessary for moral reflection.

The ongoing process of questioning what we are about is the discourse necessary for moral reflection. This is a caring view; a view which conserves values and morality basic of the preservation of a democratic system. This is a pluralist view; a view which contemplates both socialization and countersocialization to achieve a majority will braced by minority dissent. The reflection is always based on a collective conception of the human image and a discourse in search of an understanding of what is appropriate.

CIVIC SAVVY

The term, 'savvy,' is very helpful in clarifying a discourse on knowledge. Prewitt (1983) says that

> we speak of savvy people as those persons who act on the basis of a shrewd understanding of the deeper principles and structures that

> govern complex situations. A savvy person has those skills and insights that would make for survival and success in what would otherwise be bewildering and intimidating situations. (p. 17)

We could say that civic savvy is a quality of knowing as a citizen. Since citizenship involves sovereign power, there is the need to act on the basis of knowing. Civic savvy not only refers to the knowledge citizens have to respond to any particular civic question but to the wider knowledge of ideological, power, and cultural structures which control, influence, and restrict our lives. Civic savvy produces citizen-legitimated knowledge represented by meanings and understandings. What can we do, as social studies teachers, to help students gain a kind of civic savvy?

First, we should remember (as detailed in Chapter 4) that facts are interpreted and legitimated, just like values. Here we come to understand that knowledge may have more to do with understanding the essential qualities of things. As Polanyi notes, knowledge is personal:

> We have seen that when we understand or mean something, when we reorganize our understanding or when we confront a statement with the facts to which it refers, we exercise our tacit powers in search of a better intellectual control of the matter in hand. We seek to clarify, verify or lend precision to something said or experienced. We move away from a position that is felt to be somewhat

> problematic to another position which we find more satisfying. And this is how we eventually come to hold a piece of knowledge to be true... The ideal of a knowledge embodied in strictly impersonal statements now appears self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject for ridicule. We must learn to accept as our ideal a knowledge that is manifestly personal. (1959, pp. 25-27)

Giroux (1983) describes what is meant by this definition of knowledge:

> Knowing must be seen as a critical engagement designed to distinguish between essence and appearance, truth and falsity. Knowledge must not only be made problematic, stripped of its objective pretentions, it must also be defined through the social mediations and roles that provide the context for its meaning and distribution. (p. 202)

Students are encouraged to challenge the learning process; they can question and criticize meanings and understandings.

As well, students need an opportunity to speak themselves; to legitimate their own knowledge. Freire (1970) refers to this as "dialoguing" and he notes that

> No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption. (p. 39)

When students recognize the worth of their contributions, then they will be better able to question their world. They will be better able to act and make judgments

because they will recognize the legitimacy of their own view.

Finally, civic savvy means an understanding of those forces which influence and restrict our lives. Social studies can help develop an awareness of these structures and forces and assist in enhancing citizen participation. Fred Newmann (1975, 1977) has addressed this kind of civic action. The point, however, is that civic savvy involves a sense of knowing how to proceed in view of societal obstacles.

As Maxine Greene (1984) comments, the acquisition of knowledge "throughout antiquity . . . was oriented not to the understanding of experience but to knowing the essential nature of things." (p. 547) Civic savvy builds on experiential knowing, subjective interpretation, a sense of the unfolding historical context, an intuitive understanding of how to proceed, and good common sense. It is the ongoing product of a knowledge dialectic.

CRITICAL THINKING

According to Beyer (1985), critical thinking may be considered to be

> the process of determining the authenticity, accuracy and worth of information or knowledge claims. It consists of a number of discrete

> skills, which one can use and is inclined to use, to determine such authenticity, accuracy and worth. (p. 276)

Such a process leads to an agreement on meaning, a judgment on validity, and an assessment of value and truth: the process leads to understanding in a critical context. Some scholars believe that the current practices of social studies teachers do not contribute to this understanding.

Henry Giroux (1979) refers to the current direction of critical thinking in social studies as "the pedagogy of the 'immaculate perception.'" (p. 297) He believes that current teaching practices lead to the replication of objective knowledge presented by teachers in an [illegible]ectic way. Values are presented as facts; there is no distinction between theory and fact; one's world is structured and so is one's perception of that world. Schools complete the task of socializing students for the existing society.

Beyer (1985) provides some useful assistance in teaching for critical thinking. For instructional purposes, he believes that critical thinking skills consist of three attributes: procedures, criteria, and rules. A skill becomes operational through a set of procedures--there are steps we take, for example, to determine if an argument is valid. These procedures

involve analysis and evaluation of the data. (pp. 275-276) The second attribute, criteria, points to an ability to distinguish certain features or clues which can be learned, e.g., qualities of bias in a written statement. Such knowledge helps to establish a standard which may be used to judge information or situations. (p. 276) The third attribute involves rules for engaging critical thinking skills; these rules

> provide guidelines about what to do when certain clues cannot be found, about what to look for to identify revealing patterns of evidence, and about what to look for in various combinations in clues. (p. 276)

Although these are all helpful suggestions, Beyer sells himself short. Instead of applying these attributes to the curriculum, he concludes that a consensus understanding of critical thinking will lead to more efficient student learning, more useful social studies texts, more reliable standardized tests, and critical skills portability from room to room and school to school. The activity associated with critique is left undescribed and critical thinking is seen to attain technical ends of efficiency and reliability.

Fundamental to any notion of critical thinking are the skills of critique. Real critique involves learning to move from a simple, literal interpretation of information to a more complex view that brings a wider

sense of the world to the interconnections of facts, concepts, and generalizations. This activity is, in part, related to the notion of countersocialization. Students must learn to ask questions--questions of relevance, structure, and meaning. Critique is also related to action (which is described below).

Another important part of this skills dialectic is the ability to reflect on one's own experiences and make them meaningful. Speaking with one's own voice means finding understanding in one's recollections which corresponds in some way to critique. These are fundamental components of approaching the world more critically. A dialectic of critical thinking helps to ensure the continuation of our democratic way of life and to question and act on those things that can recast the world as it ought to be.

ACTIVE BELONGING

The dialectic of participation can be described as active belonging. This is a crucial part of a social studies which responds to the challenges of a technological world. In our society, technology is becoming more and more revered--it is seen as the solution to our problems. In this sense, our allegiance has shifted from ancient times. Where power was, in the

past, rooted in community action, power is now rooted in technological solutions. In ancient times, being a citizen meant accepting a share in the city and everything it stood for. Is this equalled by technology? Do we share in our better, finer, technological world and everything it means? Are we totally subservient to an ideology of technique?

Historically, a citizen who did not partake in community affairs was considered 'useless' (see Chapter 2). Citizens had an important bond with the state and helped to agree on common goals. There was an active sense of belonging: the sense of community was almighty and supreme to divisive factors like religion and kinship or the individual goals inherent in mercantilism. In some ways, technology has become more important than that historic sense of community. Technology is seen to enhance individual capabilities; it empowers individuals and frees them from dependence on others. Yet we become slaves to the technology and we lose our understanding of community.

What is missing from social studies is a sense of active belonging. We need to restore the historic notion of citizenship with its ties to the community. 'Belonging' is crucial; we are part of a global village. With the challenges to our collective existence, we need

more than ever before, to be united in how we approach our world. This in turn relates back to moral reflection: we are looking for a sense of 'appropriate' belonging in a distinctly human image. Restoration of a sense of belonging will bring together an opportunity for collective action and assist in establishing an ethic Jonas (1974) sees as crucial in the fulfillment of our human destiny. Pearl Oliner (1983) calls for social studies devoted to prosociality. Students would be exposed to forms of altruism, caring, and concern away from situations of personal advantage. (p. 73) A feeling of community, a sense of belonging, would be re-established.

When the importance of the community was lessened in Athenian times, their democracy began to crumble. Our growing dependence, reliance, and faith in technology may sound a similar warning for our democratic existence. The dialectic of active belonging is important to the preservation and rededication of our democracy. It calls to action our sense of allegiance; our sense of common interest.

CIVIC LITERACY AND DIALECTICAL INTERACTION

The interaction of moral reflection, civic savvy, critical thinking, and active belonging is an

important characteristic of a critical social studies. There are three key aspects to the transformation of a technical social studies curriculum into a critical social studies: first, each of the qualities outlined above forms a dialectic; second, each dialectic is engaged in interaction; and third, the social studies is cast in the context of a broader perspective (especially in terms of the impact of technology on our world, as described in Chapter 5). In transforming the social studies curriculum into a critical mode, the technical terms (knowledge, skills, values, and participation) give way to the cyclical processes already described. The four dialectics are also interactive and together they project citizenship education through the understanding of meanings and appropriate action in the context of a distinct human image.

Questions raised in each dialectic will have some relevance for other dialectics; this is the process of interaction which helps to clarify meanings. By following through an issue, it may be possible to see the difference between a technical and a critical social studies. Figure 4 summarizes the differences in the nature of the curricula.

If one were to examine the acid rain problem from a technical perspective, a number of important

COMPARING 'TECHNICAL' AND 'CRITICAL' SOCIAL STUDIES

'TECHNICAL' SOCIAL STUDIES	'CRITICAL' SOCIAL STUDIES
Citizens know the facts and are able to use their knowledge capably, industriously, and efficiently.	*Citizens understand meanings and act appropriately in a distinctly human image.*
Knowledge is important.	*Understanding is important.*
Knowledge must be made objective.	*Knowledge is subjective.*
Knowledge as fact is legitimated by the teacher.	*Knowledge is legitimated by individual selves.*
Facts are facts, ready for digestion.	*Facts are interpreted and legitimated, ready for critique.*
Personal experience is an obstacle to knowing the facts.	*Recollection and experience inform the subject and make meaning.*
Issues are broken down for study.	*Issues are considered in a holistic way.*
Social acceptance is important.	*Social criticism is important.*
Values are presented as fact.	*Values have personal meaning.*
Values are accepted as fact.	*A process of critique legitimates values and facts.*
Students accept objective understandings of things.	*Students develop meanings through acts of creation and recreation.*
There is faith in the progress of science.	*Progress may not necessarily be good; there is conservation in human values and morality.*
Technology is revered; seen as a solution to our problems.	*Technology is seen as non-neutral; as a part of the problem and solution.*
People are passive.	*People are active.*
Students engage in socialization.	*Students engage in socialization and countersocialization.*
There is power in technological solutions to problems.	*There is power in community action, vision, and belonging.*
Social studies addresses citizens as individuals.	*Social studies preserves an understanding of the importance of social belonging and the community.*
It is important to know 'what is.'	*It is important to act toward the attainment of 'what ought to be.'*

FIGURE 4

affirmations would be made. An underlying message would be that technology will resolve the acid rain problem in time; we just need to wait for a solution. Students learn the facts about acid rain, including the impact the drizzling concoction is projected to have on forests, rivers, lakes, and human beings, too. Specific instances of acid rain are studied and many values about the subject are presented (and often as information). Individuals consider action they may be able to take in view of the situation, but emphasis is on knowing the facts.

A critical perspective is much different. An underlying message would be that technology's solution to the acid rain problem may well cause additional difficulties and 'technology as saviour' would then be inappropriate. An understanding would be sought on what acid rain means. Facts would be critiqued; students would accept interpretations of facts and values which have personal meaning. A broader context might include the place of environmental issues; students would be encouraged to use their own experiences to help clarify the subject. Importance would be given to the power of social belonging and community action and how it may be possible to attain 'what ought to be.'

The dialectics (moral reflection, civic savvy,

critical thinking, and active belonging) each inform one another in a critical social studies. The moral reflection dialectic would bring into focus questions about the value of our environment and the need to avoid decisions which reduce the future wholeness of humanity. This can be related, of course, to the kinds of action which may be taken to ensure that the acid rain problem is addressed. It can also be related to specific common sense knowledge and would certainly reflect decisions made with the help of critiquing. Through civic savvy, students become able to deal with the forces which influence their day to day lives; these students have experiences, interpretations of their experiences and an understanding of the historical context. General knowledge of how to proceed can be drawn from such matters as the context of a human image or an understanding of appropriate action. Through critical thinking, students become able to interpret their own experiences and make them meaningful and critique 'what is' with a view to 'what ought to be'; here we return to appropriate action. Active belonging attempts to restore a sense of community, but this means appropriate belonging and, in this sense, there is some reliance on moral reflection. Action is based on common sense and understanding.

In view of the dominant ideology of technique, action becomes even more important. But this action is not just individual (or based on individual priorities), it must reflect a sense of community. Yet, technology encourages technological solutions (which are generally singular and not collective) and our social studies continues to emphasize individual rights and freedoms instead of collective well-being. Technology frees us from our dependence on people. A critical social studies must make clear human responsibilities; this may include threats to the image of human beings. This is crucial, because when we understand the potential threat to humanity we come to a better understanding of what we cherish and we are prepared to act--and act collectively--in the interests of humanity. The threat (rather than the promise) helps to restore a sense of community, it extends a feeling of belonging, it challenges the ideology of technique, and it leads to an understanding which prompts collective action. This is a crucial part of making our world a better place.

APPLYING CIVIC LITERACY TO ALBERTA SOCIAL STUDIES

The 1981 Alberta social studies curriculum for a topic in grade eleven is presented in Figure 5. The issue addresses problems relating to population and

GRADE ELEVEN
GLOBAL ISSUES

TOPIC B: GLOBAL PROBLEMS OF POPULATION AND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION

In this topic, students examine global problems of population and inadequate resource distribution. Inquiries should focus on population patterns and other factors affecting technological development, like food supplies, natural resources, energy and the environment. While the issue should be examined from a global perspective, it will also be beneficial to study contrasting examples of population problems and resource use in countries such as West Germany, Japan, China, India, Eastern Europe, Latin America (including Cuba and Mexico), and selected Arab states. This study should culminate in judgments as to how Canadians should contribute to worldwide improvements in the distribution and utilization of scarce resources.

Competing Values and Social Issue

Global Welfare/National Prosperity
In the light of global imbalances, to what extent should the levels of economic activity (in both more developed and less developed nations) be changed?

VALUE OBJECTIVES

Students will examine the social issue in order to develop the following understandings, competencies, and attitudes. (*Questions in italicized print are illustrative only.*)

1. **Develop Understanding of Values**
   1. Identify values which are in conflict with the value of global welfare.
      - *Given current disparities in the distribution of wealth within and between countries, which values appear to be in competition with global welfare?*
   2. Define global welfare and national prosperity from the perspectives of countries at various stages of development.
      - *How are the concepts of global welfare and national prosperity defined in different national contexts? Is there a relationship between such definitions and how people see the need for technological development?*
2. **Develop Competencies**
   1. In value analysis, by comparing alternative solutions to global disparities from the perspectives of groups who would be the most adversely affected by each alternative.
      - *What groups would be most significantly affected by each alternative solution? Using the Role Exchange Test, attempt to describe the circumstances of the most adversely affected group. Comment on the consequences of the "solution" for this group.*
      - *Which alternative solutions would you be prepared to accept or reject in light of the consequences to the most adversely affected group?*
   2. In decision-making, by selecting from a list of possible solutions the one that is most acceptable in terms of "the greatest good for the greatest number"
      - *For each solution, would the favourable consequences outweigh the unfavourable consequences if that solution were adopted globally? Which solution has the best balance of favourable over unfavourable consequences?*
3. **Develop Attitudes**
   1. Of empathy towards others, by demonstrating a sympathetic understanding of different perspectives on global problems.
   2. Of sensitivity as a responsible citizen, by recognizing relationships between one's own behaviour and the global distribution of wealth.

KNOWLEDGE OBJECTIVES

Students will gain understanding of the following generalization and concepts, as well as factual information appropriate to the inquiry questions that are listed.

1. **Generalization**

   The world is characterized by problems of overpopulation and inadequate resource distribution. Although these disparities are a central issue in international politics, no simple generally applicable solutions are known at the present time.
2. **Concepts**
   1. Scarcity
   2. Disparity in production and distribution
   3. Development
   4. Culture of poverty
   5. Population control
   6. Prosperity
3. **Questions to Guide Inquiry**
   1. What are the disparities in the distribution and utilization of resources within and among countries?
   2. How do the following factors affect the production and distribution of wealth:
      - food production?
      - population growth?
      - technology?
      - geography?
      - education?
      - tradition?
   3. What major efforts are currently underway to redress global disparities, and how effective are they?
   4. What are the implications, for future world stability, of significant disparities in the wealth of nations? What perspectives are reflected in the writings of major contemporary theorists?
   5. What are the interrelationships between culture and development?
   6. What alternative patterns of resource use by Canadians have been suggested?

SKILL OBJECTIVES

Students will develop competence in the following inquiry and participation skills. Skills printed in standard type are emphasized for this topic.

1. **Develop Inquiry Skills**
   1. *Focus on the issue by identifying ways that global welfare and national prosperity can be regarded as conflicting values which underlie problems of population and inadequate resource distribution.*
   2. Establish research procedures by identifying individually the types of data needed for, and the range of sources appropriate to, research into the social issue.
   3. Gather and organize data by
      - paraphrasing major arguments from current source materials.
      - reading and interpreting statistics from tables, maps, graphs and diagrams.
      - constructing tables, maps, graphs and diagrams as necessary to illustrate relationships between statistical data and the social issue.
   4. Analyze and evaluate data by
      - explaining discrepancies in viewpoints, positions, and arguments in print materials.
      - discriminating relevant from irrelevant statistical data.
      - recognizing basic techniques for using and misusing information (e.g., compressing or expanding intervals, omissions of data, biased sampling, inappropriate use of averages, spurious precision).
   5. Synthesize data by
      - stating in writing the relationship of causes and effects to the social issue.
      - deducing logical conclusions from the statistical data.
   6. Resolve the issue by comparing alternative solutions to global problems.
   7. Apply the decision by
      - preparing a plan of action which reflects the students' solution to the issue, and which addresses itself to desirability and feasibility.
   8. *Evaluate the plan of action by judging the worth of the predicted consequences of the plan, using the Universal Consequences Test.*
2. **Develop Participation Skills**
   1. *Communicate effectively by presenting a Canadian plan of action in class, and responding to questions at the close of the formal presentation.*
   2. Interpret ideas and feelings of self and others by assessing the validity of oral presentations in terms of basic persuasive techniques (bandwagon, testimonial, glittering generality, appeals to fear, hate and prejudice, plain folks), logical fallacies, hasty generalizations, false analogies, ignoring or begging the question, misuse of statistics, distortion, selective omissions and quoting out of context. (Note: See English 20 Curriculum Guide — Listening Skills)
   3. *Participate in group work and decision-making by summarizing the main points in an oral presentation.*
   4. Contribute to a "sense of community" by assisting in a group project to raise awareness of the relationship of the human condition to human dignity in specific global situations.

FIGURE 5

production. The 1981 curriculum, which is largely a technical curriculum, exhibits many of the characteristics outlined in the left half of Figure 4. Although the orientation of the program is technical, it is possible to alter some of the components of the curriculum, and more important, the way the teacher approaches the curriculum, to cast Alberta social studies in a critical perspective. Figure 6 details some of the possible questions that could emerge from a critical Alberta social studies. The questions are not meant to be exhaustive, nor could they be; subjective interpretations and meanings would be a vital part of the dialogue. As well, these questions should undergo the dialectical process described in Figure 3.

An emphasis is placed on understanding rather than knowing; on an image of humanity rather than efficiency and industry; on subjective meaning rather than objective information. The questions may move the student within the dialectics; this is how the issue comes to be understood subjectively. It is in the midst of this process that social studies gains transforming power and students attain civic literacy.

THE PRACTICE OF CIVIC LITERACY

It is important to recognize that this work

11B, A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

TOPIC:
WHAT OUGHT TO BE THE CASE IN VIEW OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES IN POPULATION AND PRODUCTION?

MORAL REFLECTION

Is a human image represented in a world without limits to population growth?

Is a human image represented in a world with population control?

Is a human image represented in unequal distribution of production?

Is a human image represented in redistribution of resources?

Is a human image possible where technology improves the situation for developing world nations?

Is a human image possible if technology is not used in the developing world?

CIVIC SAVVY

How did this situation come to be? Why is it like this?

How would experiences in the developing world compare to my own day-to-day life?

What efforts have there been to resolve the population and production problems?

What are the arguments? What are the alternatives?

In what way(s) can I be my own example?

What would it be like to be in the developing world?

CRITICAL THINKING

If we have the power to eliminate starvation, why is there still starvation?

If we have the power to improve production, why is production not greatly improved?

How can the different viewpoints of this issue be assessed?

How do different speakers use and abuse their information?

How plausible or reasonable are various plans of action?

ACTIVE BELONGING

How does this issue represent a threat to the future wholeness of our world?

How can we come together as a global village?

How has technology lessened belonging through dependence, reliance and faith in science?

What represents the common interest and human dignity?

What are our individual and collective responsibilities in dealing with this issue?

FIGURE 6

is essentially utopian in nature. The extent to which a critical social studies may be attained depends upon a number of factors because many things work against such a critical dimension.

The conservative swing of the educational pendulum (characterized as 'back to the basics') is an example of one of these factors. The Alberta government is in the midst of making extensive changes to the curriculum in secondary schools. These changes will not push curriculum into a critical context; in fact, they will enhance the technical orientation of existing curricular practice. The government's intention is to bring the secondary programs in line with the expectations of business and industry; this means education for the workplace and not necessarily for life. The kind of social studies that fits into such a program is clearly technical. A good citizen is defined as a good worker, well prepared for industrial society.

A social studies of this orientation places emphasis on the facts; indeed, citizen passivity and conformity may be welcome in the spirit of productivity and efficiency. In a political environment that wants to see results, value for educational bucks, and a 'return' to traditional morals, a critical social studies is more difficult to achieve. What can the social studies

teacher do to promote critical thinking, for example, when the teacher knows that at the end of the year student (and maybe teacher) performance will be measured on a cognitive test? How, in any way, can critical discourse be promoted when those kinds of skills and interests, as important as they may be for life, are seen to detract from the cognitive abilities more easily measured on diploma examinations? When teacher evaluation (and now practice review) often give priority to such measures as student achievement and general classroom decorum, why would any teacher 'take a risk' to proceed critically? In today's political climate, these are not unreasonable concerns which may call into question the extent to which civic literacy may be achieved.

There are other factors to consider. The structure of schools and the accountability of teachers to school boards may make the attainment of civic literacy more difficult. As Newmann notes,

> teachers' interaction with students is organized in ways that stifle critical discourse. Because they must teach students in large groups, teachers can spend very little time responding to individual work. For managerial reasons, certain instructional activities prevail (e.g., lectures, films, silent seatwork, short-answer objective tests, discussions requiring short verbal responses). Activities more conducive to critical inquiry present cumbersome logistical problems (e.g.,

> discussions soliciting lengthy student responses, one-to-one dialogues between teacher and student, small group projects). (1985, p. 10)

As well, being critical means refusing to take things for granted, questioning things which may appear to be acceptable and striving to make things better. It means grappling with ambiguity, contradiction, abstraction and conflict. It is easier for individual teachers to "emphasize consensus over conflict, certainty over ambiguity, and a hopeful, positive view of social life." (Newmann, 1985, p. 11)

What Newmann is telling us is important. The structure and the bureaucracy of schools naturally works against the attainment of civic literacy. Furthermore, teachers choose not to take risks; we become a part of the system. Mavericks are neither rewarded nor encouraged.

Just as civic literacy encourages students to become critical, so must it encourage teachers to become critical. The structures of schooling, the bureaucracy, and the issues of pedagogy can be placed in a critical context. These concerns can be critiqued, especially in light of the broader perspective (detailed in Chapter 5). In such a way, it is possible to focus on a more critical vision of education and, at the same time, come to

understand the politics of the structures of schooling, the bureaucracy, and the issues of pedagogy. Commitment and action may result from this process, but there is certainly no reduction in the extent of the challenge created by the very nature of the schools and teachers.

TOWARD CIVIC LITERACY IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Civic literacy means that we incorporate moral reflection, civic savvy, critical thinking, and active belonging into a critical conception of social studies education. It means that we restore the ancient notion of citizenship--a combination of 'belonging' to the community and engaging in acts of sovereign power. It means acting collectively with a more unified vision, but always in a human image. Our first and most fundamental question as citizens given such awesome responsibility--of our planet and our future--is one of appropriateness. Are our actions consistent with what is appropriate in view of what it is to be human? Our knowledge reflects a combination of interpretation, meaning, and practical wisdom about our world. We are able to critically question our world; to ask questions in light of our conception of the essence of humanity. And we are able to act, rooted in a sense of belonging. We are a part of one world, we share a basic unity and a

vision, we act in our collective best interests. As Jonas (1974) suggests,

> If the new nature of our acting then calls for a new ethics of long-range responsibility, coextensive with the range of our power, it calls in the name of that very responsibility also for a new kind of humility--a humility not like former humility, i.e., owing to the littleness, but owing to the excessive magnitude of our power, which is the excess of our power to act over our power to foresee and our power to evaluate and to judge. (p. 18)

Our humility and our power call for a broader perspective. As social studies teachers, we need to make decisions about our conceptions of citizenship. Do we teach for civic literacy, or do we teach for technocracy? As Graham (1981) argues, "if the whole world consisted of literate, autonomous, critical, constructive people, capable of translating ideas into action, individually or collectively--the world would change." (p. 133) What could be the product of our dependence on technology? Suzuki (1985) describes this as "the ultimate slavery" which he sees as "a life of suffering, a life on suffrance, a grey and terrible world devoid of stimulation, empty of relationships, sterile, meaningless."

This is a call to a more critical social studies. We must not be blinded by the apparent successes of technology; we must act in accordance with

our human appropriation. Together and individually we have tremendous transforming power through positive action. As Ellul argues,

> it is, in every case, a question of some form of reduction of power: that man accept not to do all that he is capable of doing. The logic of technique, on the other hand, demands that whatever can be done must be done.... Non-power does not mean giving something up, but choosing not to do something, being capable of doing something and deciding against it.... What is at stake is a vital principle ... of setting limits: given that the almost unlimited means at our disposal permit almost unlimited action, we must choose, a priori, non-intervention each time there is uncertainty about the global and long-term effects of whatever actions are to be undertaken. This ethics, this opting for non-power is fundamental, and it is possible ... because it is linked with meaning. Our experience with the power of technique has led us to discover the absence of meaning. Uncertainty as to whether life means anything is the sickness of modern man, and the rediscovery of meaning is conditional upon the choice of non-power.... It is a matter of reaffirming ourselves as subjects, and I believe that insofar as we speak we are still subjects. Neither this reaffirmation nor the raising of ethics as an issue is opposed either to man or society, but is directed towards keeping both alive. That is the task of ethics.... Time-honoured values .... are, however, irreplaceable, because there are no substitutes for freedom and dignity.... (1980b, pp. 245-247)

Social studies needs to reflect this view. As Suzuki (1985) notes, "within each one of us there still lives the ancient will to be part of a greater life enterprise, a wider experience, a richer reality. It is still there."

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