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EMOTION AND FICTION

by

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SUE CAMPBELL

A THESIS

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## ABSTRACT

In this thesis I defend the claim that the emotions felt by an audience in response to fictional works of art are real emotions. In Chapter I I present the traditional statement of the problem of aesthetic emotions, i.e., that there are certain conditions for genuine emotional response that aesthetic situations do not provide. I then categorize and analyze some proposed solutions to the problem of aesthetic emotions. I conclude that a solution is not possible without a theory of emotions. In Chapter II I provide a theory of emotions. In Chapter III I apply this theory to aesthetic situations and conclude that those conditions not met in aesthetic situations are not, in fact, necessary conditions for genuine emotional response. I then argue that a certain set of connections between fictional works of art, imagining as an activity, and emotional response, render aesthetic situations involving audience response to fictions ideal situations for genuine emotional response.

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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Tolstoy's Claim

In the aesthetic manifesto, What is Art?, Leo Tolstoy declares that it is, "a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings, and also experience them."<sup>1</sup> Tolstoy's claim is worded ambiguously. I will divide it into the three premisses that the context of the claim most adequately supports:

- (1) the artist has experienced certain emotions which he wants his audience to experience,
- (2) these emotions are intensionally embodied in, or expressed by, the art work,
- (3) if the artist is successful at what he intended, the audience will experience these same emotions on reading, viewing, or listening to the work.

My reading of Tolstoy commits him to viewing the artwork as a vehicle for the safe transmission of emotions.

Tolstoy's three claims are conjointly a manifestation of the expressionist theory of art, the view that art, conceptually, has something or other to do with the emotions. Curiously, each claim individually is a manifestation of a particular version of this theory. The first claim deals with the creative activity of the artist, and Croce and Collingwood have used this activity as the basis of a whole aesthetics; however, it is the part of the expressionist theory with which I am least concerned. The problems in this thesis arise whenever a work of art affects people emotionally, quite independently of whether or not the artist intended his work to have an emotional effect.

The second claim, that emotions are embodied in, or expressed by, an artwork, has confused and occupied aestheticians for many years. What could it be for a painting to embody sadness? I am not interested in this problem simpliciter; however, it will occasionally come up for discussion in conjunction with premiss three.

This thesis focuses on the third claim, identified by John Hospers as that version of the expressionist theory stating that what art does is to evoke emotion in the audience.<sup>2</sup> I care about only a limited part of this claim, as applied to only a limited number of kinds of art. The feature that preoccupies me is the status of our purported emotional response to works of fiction. Whether evoking emotion is the teleological function of art, or one of its ever-present defining characteristics, are issues that do not interest me; it is sufficient that, on occasion, Bambi should cause someone to cry. I use fiction, rather than literature, to identify the considered category in order to exclude lyric poetry and include drama and movies. Novels, plays, and most modern films share common characteristics that distinguish them as a category of art. They are temporal works that involve the representation of human beings in certain situations or predicaments, at least partially through the medium of language.

Why is our response a problem? There are two answers, one general, the other specific. To give a correct account of our emotional response to fiction, one should already hold a correct account of the constituent features of the situation--emotions and fictional works of art. I will not provide a complete philosophical account of these entities. Rather, I will lay out and defend a particular theory of the emotions and indicate why I think it is compatible with most theories of fiction.

More specifically, the authenticity of our emotional response to fiction is frequently called into question. If a child cries when Bambi's mother is killed, he will likely be applauded for his sensitivity. But if he is still noticeably sad a week later, perhaps someone will explain to him that it was only a movie, that no one was really killed, that consequently, there isn't any reason to be sad. There is

an oddity about this situation, and it is this oddity that I intend to investigate.

## 2. The Organization Of This Thesis

The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter I, I present the traditional statement of the problems of aesthetic response. I then examine Kendall Walton's theory of response to fiction, extracting questions, assumptions and omissions concerning the emotions. I conclude that it's not possible to give an account of emotional response to fiction without a thorough study of the emotions. In Chapter II, I defend a particular theory of the emotions. I construct this defence so that it speaks to general issues of emotion theory while having direct application to the specific questions raised in Chapter I. In Chapter III, I apply the theory of emotions to aesthetic situations.

The point of discussing an aesthetic theory prior to my defence of a particular theory of the emotions is polemical. I wish to make clear, by example, the questions about emotions that require consideration. I wish also, by pointing to its failure, to criticize a standard philosophical approach to the problem of aesthetic response. Walton's theory is representative of this method. He talks extensively about the nature of fictions but depends on too many common, and I think, mistaken, assumptions about the emotions. I talk extensively about the nature of emotions and try not to assume too much about fictions. As this is a thesis in aesthetics, it's not clear to me that people will understand why I say so much about the emotions. Chapter I should make this seem necessary. The risk of this organization is that my thesis may have the demeanor of a multiple fracture. I hope not.

As a final point, the objective of this thesis is neither primarily critical nor primarily constructive. It is exploratory. Art is, to many, our most important and characteristically human institution. This attitude derives, in large part, from thinking that proper response to art is of unique social value. It is because of these attitudes that the issue of emotional response to fiction deserves intensive, open-minded investigation.

FOOTNOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

1. Leo Tolstoy, What is Art? (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press), p. 51.
2. John Hospers, "The Concept of Artistic Expression"; in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, ed. by John Hospers (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p.151.

## CHAPTER I: HOW CAN WE BE MOVED?

### A. The Traditional Statement of the Problem

#### 1. Fiction, Emotion, and Belief

It is thought uncontroversial by philosophers that to experience an emotion requires certain beliefs about the object of the emotion. There are two sorts of belief held to be requisite: the belief that the object of the emotion exists, and the belief that it has certain properties that play a logical or conceptual role in determining that the emotion is of a particular kind. Fear requires beliefs about danger, sorrow rests on claims of loss, anger presupposes a taken offence and so on. George Pitcher, in his paper "Emotion", labels the first type of belief, General, the second, Specificatory.<sup>1</sup> It's meant to be a condition of my being scared of a bear, that I believe the bear to exist, or the predicament to be real, and that I believe the bear to have the property of being occurrently dangerous to me. The General and Specificatory Beliefs are held to be related in important ways. Fear requires a belief about the threatening property of a certain object. To believe that an object has a property is to believe that there is an object.

This belief requirement for emotions has an unfortunate consequence for theories of response to fiction. We read novels, attend plays and films, and remark frequently on the ways in which they move us. Movie critic Pauline Kael suggests that the situation may even have gotten out of hand:

An analyst tells me that when his patients are not talking about their personal hang-ups and their immediate problems they talk about the situations and characters in movies like "The Graduate" or "Belle de Jour" and they talk about them with as much involvement as their immediate problems.<sup>2</sup>

But we know that these fictional characters do not exist, and that the sufferings and triumphs they are caught up in have never occurred. Thus the conditions for a genuine emotional response are not met. Benjamin, in "The Graduate", is a prototype for modern, misunderstood, and suffering youth. But his suffering isn't real. How can we be moved?

Some philosophers point out that we are moved, so we evidently can be--fictional situations are just among the things that affect us emotionally. But this is too pat. It's not just odd that we can be moved by fiction; the dilemma can be formulated so as to be logically puzzling. While watching "The Graduate", I know, therefore in the relevant sense believe, that Benjamin does not exist.<sup>3</sup> Yet I pity him. To pity him I must believe that he is suffering, therefore that he does exist. This construction forces us to admit contradictory beliefs or deny the possibility of a genuine emotional response. Either way seems too harsh.

2. Fiction, Emotion, and Desire

A second problem, less discussed but seemingly as serious, arises in relation to desire. Watching Hamlet, we know that the tip of Laertes sword is poisoned, and that Hamlet will soon be poked. We fear for him, yet we do nothing to warn him. But emotions seem to involve desires. If we are angry, we desire revenge, if we are afraid we desire flight, if we fear for someone we desire to warn him. The evident response in this case is that we do not warn Hamlet because we cannot. But should that prevent our desiring to warn him? At least, it might be thought that we should, in claiming concerns, desire that he survive the duel. But it's likely that we have none of the desires that in normal circumstances would be used to substantiate a claim of fear for another. It's often pointed out that we may even feel cheated if the character that we fear for doesn't come to grief.

3. Fiction, Emotion, and Object

There is a third problem, related to belief conditions but stated in such a way as to deserve separate mention. It is sometimes said that fictional characters are not the proper objects of our emotional response.

I suspect that a possible worlds treatment of fictional situations might lead someone to prefer the object formulation of the puzzle of aesthetic response. Hamlet is not suffering in our world. Therefore, although it's appropriate for other characters to pity him, he is not the proper object of our pity. This formulation leaves the type of relation of beliefs to emotions obscure.

#### 4. Osborne's Formulation

In his article, "Aesthetic Relevance", Harold Osborne provides a succinct summary of the problems of aesthetic response:

In fictional art, of which novels and dramas may be taken as paradigms, we are confronted with situations persons and events (I shall use the word 'predicaments' to cover these) which we know to be unreal; but, typically we respond to them with the same emotion that would be appropriate if the same predicaments were believed to be real, although with the qualification that the emotions we experience are not accompanied by the impulses to action and intervention by which they would be accompanied if the predicament were believed to be real. The attitude of knowledge or belief called into play in such confrontations and response is held to constitute a problem or set of problems which have frequently been debated under the umbrella of aesthetics as for example in theories of aesthetic distance, and 'suspension of disbelief'. A subsidiary problem has been held to arise from the fact that in fiction and drama, and some pictures, we contemplate emotionally harrowing predicaments with aesthetic enjoyment.<sup>4</sup>

#### 5. Options

Having presented what I take to be traditional statements of the problem of emotional response to fiction, I will now outline traditional approaches to its solution.

As a general classificatory scheme for theories of response to fiction, I suggest that any theory hangs its hat in one of the following three locations. Advocates of what's called the naive view say that in responding to fiction, we have real emotions directed towards fictional characters. This view entails that either fictional characters exist, or that we sensibly or foolishly believe that they do. The full-scale contradictory of this view is that the emotions aren't real and the char-

acters aren't existent. I will examine a version of this view in the next section. A seemingly moderate option is to claim that the emotions are real, but to reconstruct the situation so as to avoid the consequence that we have psychological states directed at fictional characters. This view may involve the denial of the existence of such entities as characters, or the suspicion that even if they do in some sense exist, they are not the appropriate objects of human compassion or concern. I defend a version of this third option in Chapter III.

There are obvious difficulties to taking on any one of these options. Those who defend the naive view have to somehow make characters real enough so that we can have the same feelings towards them that we have towards people. This seems fruitless to me and I do not raise the view even to criticize it. Whatever the metaphysical status of characters is, they are not people.<sup>5</sup>

Those who defend the opposite view, for instance Walton, are left with the problem of having to give some positive account of the feelings we do have in response to art, all the while confronting our claims that these feelings are emotions. In other words, exponents of the naive view must add "reality" to characters; their opponents must subtract "reality" from our response.

I defend a version of the third option because it leaves characters unviolated and emotions intact. The problem that confronts this approach is sharp and easy to state. If we have real emotions in response to fiction, but these emotions are not directed towards characters, then how do we make sense of the claim, for instance, that "I pity Hamlet". I certainly look to be expressing some feeling for Hamlet, as when I say, "I pity you", I look to be expressing pity for you. I do, in fact, conclude that these statements are parallel, only that neither have objects in the way commonly supposed.

Traditional solutions to the problem of aesthetic response are usually defences of real emotions; they, therefore, fall under the first or the third option. (This should be expected. If the question is how is emotional response to fiction possible, disclaiming it is likely to be unsatisfying and would require very strong grounds.) Within defences



of aesthetic emotions, the solution seems to fall into two rough categories, direct statements of the relation between fiction and belief, and more sophisticated theories of aesthetic attitude. I list the first group merely for the sake of completeness; they are not really theories.

Despair, or a disregard for art, has pushed some philosophers into an extreme version of the naive view; they claim that our emotional response to fiction is genuine, but either incoherent or irrational.<sup>6</sup> A claim of incoherence probably presupposes inconsistent beliefs; a claim of irrationality, needn't. I think it's plausible to suppose that if our response to fiction is irrational, nothing so blatant as inconsistent beliefs is responsible, rather, probably the irrationality of the belief that fictional characters are the proper objects of our emotional states. Any theory that avoids attributing inconsistent or irrational beliefs to the people who respond emotionally to art will be preferable to a theory which makes these attributions, as we do not commonly believe that our response is deficient in this way.

Another non-starter is that we get caught up in fictions and forget where we are, and what's real. I'm not sure that this solves the problem of inconsistent beliefs, and implausibility aside, it is belied by the non-intervient character of our response.<sup>7</sup>

A more fruitful objection is that any suggestion that involves our forgetting, not knowing, or not believing that we are faced with a fiction, throws out the baby with the bath. Beliefs that we are dealing with fiction seem necessary to any kind of appropriate response. Eva Schaper, in "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", comments on the possibility of response to Giotto's fresco of the "Slaughter of the Innocents":

Being able to supply "Herod presiding over a massacre" as a description of what one responds to is based...on certain true beliefs about the painted wall, artistic conventions and artistic intentions. All of these are entailed by one's knowing that one is facing a fresco and not a bloodbath.<sup>8</sup>

Schaper's comment is not about a fiction. Perhaps in a darkened theatre with real bodies littering the stage it is easier for a moment to believe that murder has been committed.<sup>9</sup> But knowing whether to giggle depends

on knowing whether the fiction is a farce or a tragedy, and therefore on knowing that one is facing a fiction.

Aesthetic attitude theories are more interesting. There are two major theories of aesthetic attitude, both cited by Osborne, psychical distance and suspension of disbelief. They are relatively sophisticated by taking on non-intervienience as part of what must be accounted for in response. Both explain our response by reference to the way we regard fictions. I examine the aesthetic attitude theories in a relatively preliminary and say more about them in my positive account of response to fiction. My defence of aesthetic emotions, while not a theory of aesthetic attitude, owes much to this type of theory.

Psychical distance theories are meant to have application to response to all types of art, and are put to a variety of explanatory uses. However, the most famous presentation of the psychical distance theory, by Edward Bullough, in "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle", is meant to have specific application to the seeming breakdown between emotion and desire in response to fiction.

Some philosophers who accept a theory of psychical distance characterize it only negatively, by arguing that the proper response to an artwork is conditional on our regarding it non-practically.<sup>9</sup> Bullough argues that this negative condition has consequences for the way we treat our own response:

The transformation by Distance is produced in the 1st instance by putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self...in short, by looking at it "objectively," as it has often been called, by permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasize the "objective" features of the experience, and by interpreting even our "subjective" affections not as modes of our being but rather as characteristics of the phenomenon.<sup>10</sup>

Rather than taking my horror at Cordelia's death as an affection of mine that might demand action and attention of which I am the focus, I feed it back into the play, regarding its importance as only what it tells me about Lear. Thus, standard connections between feeling and desire are severed. The problem with this theory is that it characterizes the aesthetic attitude only negatively, and does not speak to the problem of

belief.

Suspension of disbelief theories are proposed with the fictions in mind, and speak directly to the problem of belief by describing our cognitive attitude towards fictions. The most notorious solution to the problem of belief, they seem compatible with any of the general classificatory locations. There is no agreed on analysis of the state called 'suspension of disbelief'. (Thus, although it's generally used in service of the naive view, a theory as unnaive as Walton's might also be classified as a suspension of disbelief account.) Proposed by Coleridge<sup>11</sup> as a description of our cognitive attitude while facing fictions, this solution attracts many and baffles as many. It advocates claim that although we do not believe that Hamlet exists, and even believe that Hamlet does not exist, we can and do intentionally put our beliefs aside while watching the play. We are then in a state that allows us to respond as if Hamlet did exist. But because we still in some sense disbelieve in the reality of the play, we do not have the impulses towards action and intervention that we would have, were we actually deceived about the fiction.

I will examine 'suspension of disbelief' more thoroughly in Chapter III. Both attitude theories provide a clue as to what's needed in a proper account of aesthetic response, and suspension of disbelief shows, as well, what's disastrous to have there. The suspicion that the suspension of disbelief captures something necessary to a theory of aesthetic response accounts for its recurrent popularity in the face of a criticism that most of its detractors pose: It doesn't matter where you put your disbelief. Given both it and the fact of response the problem of inconsistent beliefs is not solved.<sup>12</sup> Schaper suggests that this criticism has no force if one of the sets of beliefs is 'pretend', but claims that, "imaginary beliefs with make-believe just around the corner robs the proposal of most of its appeal".<sup>13</sup> Why she would think this will be clear in the next section where I examine Walton's theory of aesthetic response.

## B. Fiction And Make Believe

### 1. Walton's Theory

A recent attempt to provide a full and careful account of how we respond emotionally to fiction is that of Kendall Walton. Two companion articles, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World", and "Fearing Fictions", take up the question of response directly; an earlier article, "Pictures and Make-Believers",<sup>14</sup> lays out an extensive background theory of representation, fictional truth, and the social function of works of art. The companion pieces take up the problematic response to fiction identified earlier as an emotional, non-intervent response. "Fearing Fictions" is meant to be an account of why we believe that fictional characters are the proper objects of our psychological states; "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World", wonders why, in fearing for Hamlet, we do not attempt to save him.

Walton's theory represents the second location--where characters don't exist and emotions aren't real. He argues for these conclusions separately, but given his assumptions about emotions, the second is really demanded by the first. His theory is useful to look at for other reasons as well. He pays equal attention to both the belief and desire aspects of response. This is unusual. Finally, he attempts to account for those intuitions that lead people to advocate suspension of disbelief theories.<sup>15</sup>

I think it's fair to see Walton's theory as the kind of suspension of disbelief theory criticized by Schaper. One set of beliefs is real, the other pretend, and for the purposes of response, the former is somehow put aside in deference to the latter. Although I do not agree with Walton, I hope to show, in Chapter III, that Schaper's scepticism about the value of this kind of theory is only partially justified.

In "Fearing Fictions", Walton begins by acknowledging that we often take ourselves to be responding emotionally to works of fictions. We claim to fear for Tom and Becky, pity Hamlet, and admire Zorro. He believes, however, that to construe these responses, "as consisting in our having psychological attitudes towards fictional entities is to tolerate

mystery and court confusion".<sup>16</sup> To ground this position, Walton sets up a test case to generate the problem of belief and emotion in response to fiction. Charles, watching a movie, is faced with a fictional predicament involving a "terrible green slime":

Charles cringes in his seat as the slime slowly but relentlessly oozes over the earth destroying everything in its path. Soon a greasy head emerges from the undulating mass, and two beady eyes roll around, finally fixing on the camera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on a new course straight towards the viewer. Charles emits a shriek and clutches desperately to his chair. Afterwards, still shaken, Charles confesses that he was "terrified" of the slime. Was he?<sup>17</sup>

Walton denies that Charles' reaction to the slime is a real cause of fear as it defaults on those beliefs which are a necessary condition of its being a genuine emotional response. Charles knows that the slime does not exist and knows that it poses no threat. Thus the relevant General and Specificatory beliefs are both absent.<sup>18</sup>

Two features of Walton's account seem indisputable: that Charles knows that the slime is not real, and remains aware of this throughout the movie, and that Charles knows he is in no danger, and remains aware of this throughout the movie. But some people, while granting this, would still attempt to salvage the possibility of real emotion. The following reply is a possible version of the naive view.

Granted, we have to believe in existent entities with real properties in order to ground an emotional response. But it's wrong to suppose that fictional characters cannot be the objects of the appropriate warranted beliefs. Conan Doyle created the fictional character Sherlock Holmes.<sup>19</sup> There is now this character. We can refer to him and say things about him that are true or false. He is not a person. But he is a non-actual, well-individuated entity, and thus can be the legitimate object of a General belief. Further, we know that Sherlock Holmes has certain properties, because Conan Doyle says he has them. He is, for instance, extremely good at analytic thinking, and so given a legitimate existence belief, is an appropriate object of our admiration. This analysis doesn't exonerate Charles. Fictional characters are metaphysically incapable of doing real people physical harm. But as Walton admits, they

can harm other fictional characters. So it may be appropriate for Charles to fear for someone in the movie. Walton then, has presented a deviant case of an explicable phenomenon that generally involves real emotions founded on true beliefs.

Walton would deny the adequacy of this response. In "Pictures and Make-Believe" and "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World" he develops an account of fictional language which he thinks excludes any possibility of combining real emotion with true belief in response to fiction.

In "Pictures and Make-Believe", Walton attempts to give a fruitful positive account of representation that accepts Goodman's criticism of resemblance theories, while maintaining and supporting the intuitions that make these theories appealing. Fiction is dealt with only peripherally in this article, as a limiting case. Description in the novel, and depiction in painting, both qualify as forms of representation in the arts. There is a large intuitive difference between these types of representation, yet on a conventionalist account like Goodman's, this difference is not easy to spell out. Walton's theory is developed with an ear to making this difference audible. In this way, novels provide a limiting case for his theory of the visual arts, and his attempt to derive a theory with this focus provides the resources for his later efforts to deal exclusively with fiction.<sup>20</sup>

Walton's account of why the novel does not qualify as a visual art is based on a notion of make-believe truth, a notion that grounds his theory of response to all works of art including fictions. It is a philosophic commonplace that many statements, which, when taken literally, are on many semantic theories either false or truth-valueless, have something like truth-value when uttered relative to a particular imaginary context. That Sherlock Holmes lives at 221 Baker Street, is, in some sense, indisputable. Walton examines such claims, prefacing them by the words, 'It is fictionally true that...'. Walton does not explain what it is for a statement to be fictionally true rather than fictionally false. He says that the working out of such an account would be enormously difficult and unnecessary for the purposes of his theory.<sup>21</sup>

I suspect he believes the idea of fictional truth is intuitively clear enough to support the subsequent distinctions he wishes to draw between make-believe and imaginary truth.

Sometimes a fictional truth is that, simply because of what someone imagines to be the case. If, in a daydream, I imagine that I am the Queen of England, then, 'Sue Campbell is the Queen of England' is fictionally true relative to my daydream. But sometimes, fictional truths are related to facts about the real world. These facts are usually rules of the game of make-believe in which the fictional truth is embedded. For instance, if we all agree to play a game in which I am the Queen of England then someone else's imagining herself to be the Queen will not make it fictionally true that she is the Queen, relative to that game. Fictional truths that depend on facts about the real world are dubbed 'make-believe' truths'; those that do not are merely 'imaginary truths'.<sup>22</sup>

It is not difficult to guess the rest of Walton's account. Art works generate make-believe fictional truths. Breugel's "Haymakers" depict peasants in virtue of a certain arrangement of blotches of paint on a canvas; The Brothers Karamazov describes Alyosha in virtue of a certain arrangement of words and sentences on a page. Works of art function as props in well-established conventional games of make-believe. The difference in representational type between pictures and novels is one wholly dependent on the rules of these games. We cannot see a page of print as Alyosha because there are no conventional rules that would license our doing so.<sup>23</sup>

Walton uses the make-believe game to explain several features of our response to fiction. The core of his position is that in reacting to fiction we become actively involved in a game of make-believe that uses that particular work as a prop. We do not believe that the character of a play is real; rather we, in response to the work, voluntarily become fictional.<sup>24</sup> From within this extended make-believe world, that includes both the art-work and the spectator, we are able to view, pity, and possibly even save our fictional compatriots.

But that we should be able to save characters, or otherwise interact with them physically, is beyond the range of normal intuitions, and

so, in "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World", Walton applies his analysis to the non-interventive character of our response:

Consider the story of Henry, a backwoods villager watching a theatrical performance, who leaps to the stage to save the heroine from the clutches of the villain and a terrible death....Can Henry help her, despite the fact that he doesn't live in her world?<sup>25</sup>

Walton grants that the heroine can be saved, but denies that Henry can do it. In denying Henry physical access to the lady, he appeals overtly to the conventional rules governing the make-believe games that use plays as props:

Readers or spectators are rarely such that, fictionally they interact physically with characters, nor even such that, fictionally, they can interact physically with them. Of course, it's not impossible that a reader or spectator should, fictionally, shake hands with a character, or lop his head off, or have the ability to do so. But apart from audience participation theatre the conventions governing the make-believe games that we play with representational works usually do not allow this.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, in conventional theatre games, fictional characters can be saved, shot, hung, and helped across busy intersections, but only by other fictional characters.

Walton's account allows for a revisionist theatre game in which Henry could save the heroine. Susan Sontag, in Against Interpretation, describes what appears to be such a game:

Perhaps the most striking feature of a Happening is its treatment (this is the only word for it) of the audience. The event seems designed to tease and abuse the audience. The performers may sprinkle water on the audience, or fling pennies or sneeze-producing detergent at it....What goes on in the Happening merely follows Artaud's prescription for a spectacle that will eliminate the stage, that is the physical distance between performers and spectators, and will "physically envelop the spectator". In the Happening (the) scapegoat is the audience.<sup>27</sup>

Such revisionist theatre is rare, and doubtless poorly attended. Its existence, however, seems to support Walton's contention that established rules prevent our physical intervention in the fictional worlds to which we belong: "The notion of a gulf separating fictional worlds from the real world is thus neatly vindicated."<sup>28</sup>



But Walton claims that this gulf is logical or metaphysical and why this is so is not yet clear. If we can save fictional characters, under the appropriate conventions, merely by becoming involved in the game to which they belong, we seem to hop across fictional boundaries pretty easily. And if Walton's account is correct, why not go for power instead of impotence? As Walton himself says, "Why let mere conventions deter us from saving a life?" Shouldn't we at least desire to save our fictional friends? There is a metaphysical core to Walton's position; in joining a fictional world, we really go nowhere at all.

Walton denies that Henry can save the heroine. He cannot literally save her because she doesn't literally exist. He cannot fictionally save her because, by the conventions of traditional theatre, he doesn't fictionally exist. But perhaps Walton has neglected an option--that Henry literally saves a fictional character. Walton admits that Henry may really disrupt the play thoroughly enough to make it true that fictionally the heroine survives. Hasn't he, then, literally saved her.

Walton's decisive answer is, that when it comes right down to it, there is nothing to literally save. The notion of fictional truth, introduced as a primitive in "Pictures and Make-Believe", is refined in "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World", to the intentional operator, 'It is fictional that...'. The purported statements of fiction are analyzed in one of two ways. Sometimes such statements when uttered, are elliptical for their intentional counterparts. 'The train is approaching', becomes, 'It is fictional that the train is approaching'. These elliptical statements are used in reporting what goes on in a particular book, movie or play. On Walton's account, however, it is more fun to play with books than describe them. Within our make-believe worlds, we utter make-believe assertions. In pretending to be spectators to the events of a play we may well utter, 'The train is approaching' non-elliptically. The corresponding speech-act, however, is not asserting, but pretending to assert. Thus it is still the case that the truth in question is, 'It is fictional that the train is approaching.'<sup>29</sup>

Fictional language, insofar as it can be assigned a truth value, is always given a de dicto reading. It is within the scope of an inten-

tional operator. Fictionality is given no positive account in the article but it is given the following negative one:

To make the statement, 'Robinson Crusoe survived a shipwreck', is not to attribute to Crusoe the property of having survived a shipwreck, to claim that he, literally possesses that property; it is not to refer to Crusoe at all, nor to attribute any property to him.<sup>30</sup>

Fictional characters do not exist, subsist, or possess properties. We do not save them because their there is nothing to save.

This is Walton's explanation of the non-intervenient nature of our response to fiction. We cannot really intervene because fictional characters neither exist nor subsist. We do not really desire to intervene for the same reason. We seldom fictionally intervene because the conventions governing the theatre game grant us a fictional existence of a limited sort.

The conventions do grant us almost limitless possibilities for emotional response. But note the implication of Walton's de dicto account of fictional language. Neither of the belief conditions for a genuine emotional response can be met. Fictional characters have no being, actual or otherwise, and no properties. This account of fictional language, combined with a theory of emotions that makes certain sorts of beliefs a necessary precondition of these emotions requires that our response to fiction be interpreted in such a way as to exclude the possibility of a rational response being one of real emotion towards non-actual entities.

Walton's prior work provides him with the necessary reinterpretation. To return to the situation of "Fearing Fictions", Charles is playing a make-believe game using the movie as a prop. Charles knows that make-believedly the slime is threatening him, and that make-believedly he is in danger. Knowing this is sufficient to cause Charles to be in a state which Walton labels 'quasi-fear', a state similar to real fear in involving certain automatic physical responses, for instance, a pounding heart. Charles' real knowledge that make-believedly he is in danger, plus quasi-fear, plus Charles' awareness of the appropriate rules of the game of make-believe in which he is involved, are jointly sufficient to generate the make-believe truth that Charles is afraid of the green slime.

This truth is not a make-believe truth of the movie, but of the combined make-believe world to which Charles and the slime jointly belong.<sup>31</sup>

## 2. Queries

Walton's theory of response to fiction has some attractive features. It avoids postulating non-existent entities, false or irrational beliefs or irrational emotions. More importantly, using a governing activity, in this case playing a make-believe game, to explain the subtleties of response to fiction is a sophisticated and fruitful approach.

My criticisms of Walton are subordinated to raising a number of questions about the emotions. Some of them are already evident from previous sections of this chapter. I raise them again in respect to Walton because it is useful to have as, an example, a careful piece of writing in aesthetics which still ignores too many of them. Forcing any one of three sorts of consideration causes Walton's account to fall into this nest of questions. The touchy areas are: Walton's reasons for denying fear to Charles, reasons one might want to attribute real fear, and finally Walton's mix of two activities, pretending and imagining, in his account of Charles' make-believe game with the slime.

Walton denies real fear because of his de dicto account of fictional language. But this denial is only entailed by the account when it's conjoined to certain assumptions about the emotions, most obviously, that they require both General and Specificatory beliefs. Walton does not commit himself on the exact relation of beliefs to emotions; it must, however, be conceptual; otherwise, I see no reason for quasi-fear not to be real fear. In other words, the counter-assumption is that an emotion cannot be just a feeling. I take it we're meant to believe that Charles could be in a disturbed state identical to the kind associated with fear, and in default of the belief conditions, still feel only quasi-fear.

Walton's position on emotion and desire is less directly stated. He clearly thinks that if Charles had the beliefs required for fear, we would know this by his desires as manifested in his behaviour. For instance, if Charles believed he were in danger he would call the police or the Coast Guard or warn his family. I conclude from this that Walton

believes that emotions require the desires associated with the relevant beliefs, and that the exact relation between emotion and desire depends on the nature of the relations between belief and desire, and belief and emotion.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, it is evident that Walton thinks emotions have objects, and objects of a particular sort--those that will license the appropriate beliefs. Otherwise he would not talk of "psychological attitudes directed towards fictional entities". My noting this allegiance to objects may seem like too technical an observation to have interesting or important consequences. In Chapter II, I hope to justify my preoccupation with questions of emotion and object.

As I hope is evident, all of Walton's assumptions about the emotions are common and uncontroversial. Walton refers to one as a "principle of common sense".<sup>33</sup> They are, however, the very assumptions that generate the traditional problems of aesthetic response to fiction. This is a sufficient reason for questioning them. Besides, a reading of "Fearing Fictions" provides one with considerable reason for wanting to attribute real fear to Charles.

There is, first of all, Walton's claim about the usefulness of his account. He notes that people have valued a variety of make-believe activities for providing, "an outlet for the expression of repressed or socially unacceptable feelings, preparing one emotionally for possible future crises by providing 'practice' in facing imaginary crises".<sup>34</sup> He suggests our experience of fiction is similarly valuable, and that a theory like his best promotes and explains this value. But if a "dreamer, fantasizer, or game-player" can "come to terms with", "discover", "accept", and "purge" his actual feelings by using his fictional experiences, it would be much better if these experiences resulted in real emotions.

One is also tempted to defend real fear because of the queer status of quasi-fear. The labelling 'quasi-fear' seems conveniently ad hoc. Walton denies that real emotional response is possible, so why give Charles' reaction an emotion label, particularly as it is not this state alone which generates the make-believe truth that Charles is afraid.

Thirdly, Charles' feelings are more explicable if the emotion is

genuine. His actual physical disturbance is involuntary, whereas everything else about a make-believe game seems a matter of free participation. If Charles felt real fear, the involuntary nature of it would be quite commonplace. Further, what in a game of make-believe could plausibly cause sensations that are exactly the same as fear sensations? In a response to Walton, Harold Skulsky expresses incredulity at the answer:

According to the theory, what disturbs the spectator so intensely is his recognition of a cue for pretense. But this is an extraordinary--to my mind, an implausible--thing for a cue to do....By discounting the spectator's testimony, the theory of make-believe is forced to assign to his disturbance a cause that has no discernible connection with its purported effect.<sup>35</sup>

An analysis involving real fear would not, at this point, make the causality more explicable, but it would make the nature of the sensations understandable.

Skulsky's criticism raises a question of whether Walton can legitimately assign the appropriate make-believe states to Charles. Walton denies that Charles meets the cognitive requirements for real fear. As serious is the claim that he defaults on the cognitive requirements for make-believe fear, i.e. knowing that he is playing a game. Skulsky charges Walton with discounting genuine spectator testimony of fright; and, Walton admits that it is a make-believe truth that Charles is afraid, only if Charles understands the relevant principles of make-believe and knows they are in force. Walton does not provide the content of the relevant rules, but if Charles believes himself to really be afraid, this makes the attribution of well-informed sportsmanship suspect. But proving Skulsky's charge is difficult, finally, I think not possible. The complexity of this issue leads me into my last area of concern--the realm of pretence, imagination, and make-believe.

Suppose it is make-believedly true that Charles is afraid of the slime. This truth is generated by several factors, and does not settle the issue of what Charles takes himself to feel while in that state described as quasi-fear. I wish to consider three options: that Charles believes he is afraid of the slime, that he pretends he is afraid of the slime (but knows he is not), and that he imagines he is afraid of the

slime.

Walton states that Charles knows he is not afraid of the slime,<sup>36</sup> so I'll infer, for the moment, that Charles does not believe he is afraid of the slime. Is he then, in feeling quasi-fear, merely pretending to be afraid? Pretence would, I think, be an inadequate analysis of what Charles would think or say about his feeling quasi-fear. It, of all make-believe activities, seems connected with deliberate action, and Charles' quasi-fear is involuntary. Walton does use pretence to analyze many of Charles' assertions about the slime--("Charles is doing just what actors do, pretending to make an assertion.");<sup>37</sup> yet Walton never suggests that Charles, while feeling quasi-fear, is pretending to be afraid of the slime.

What Walton does say, is that on feeling quasi-fear, Charles imagines himself to be afraid of the slime. But to imagine oneself to be afraid is not merely to pretend to be afraid; it is, in this case, "to think of oneself as fearing the slime."<sup>38</sup> This seems precariously close to Charles believing that what he feels is real fear. If Charles, while knowing he is in no danger, truly believes that he feels fear, and undeniably had the appropriate fear-like sensations, one is tempted not to deny his fear, but to find an explanation for it.

I would start the search in an analysis of the difference between two activities--pretending and imagining. Walton pays no attention to their distinctness. Both are, under the umbrella of make-believe; this may mislead Walton into thinking that their differences aren't important to a theory of response which features the make-believe game as a result of the analysis, rather than as its subject.

I will now present some incidental remarks on pretending and imagining, by J.L. Austin, and by Walton, himself. I mean, at this point, to prove the importance of an investigation, not to undertake one.

Austin's contrast between imagining and pretending is in service to a general project--he wishes to narrow the scope of the term 'pretence'. He thinks that philosophers, "who are fond of invoking pretending, have exaggerated its scope and distorted its meaning." His remark about imagining occurs in a discussion of the relative intensities of 'pretending

to...', and 'pretending that...':

Pretending that I am on top of a mountain may seem a less active affair at first than pretending to be on top of a mountain, yet it differs very considerably from merely imagining that I am on top of a mountain: pretending, that is a preliminary to or even accompanied by behaviour such as inhaling deeply or pointing downwards ("Let's pretend we're giraffes and eat the leaves") while imagining--that is a preliminary step perhaps only to asking myself certain questions--How should I feel?,...while my public behaviour will scarcely go beyond a faraway look.<sup>39</sup>

Pretence, Austin suggests, is an active affair, having some connection with publicly observable behaviour, (and he would insist, with dissembling some reality). Imagination, however, is an affair of the heart, subordinated to asking oneself how one would feel about that which one imagines. This, I would claim, is a natural contrast.

Walton, with no attention to the distinction, preserves, in his use of 'imagine' and 'pretend', the same contrast. Pretending to assert but imagining fear is one example. Here is a passage from "Fearing Fictions", that I think contains another:

A therapist may ask a patient to pretend that his mother is present, or that some inanimate object is his mother, and to "talk to her". He may then be asked to "be" the mother, and to say how he feels (when he "is" the mother).<sup>40</sup>

Walton states that the first make-believe activity is one of pretence and this seems the right label given its behavioural character ("Let's pretend we're giraffes and eat the leaves"). I would call the second, unlabelled activity, imagining, (he would then be asked to imagine that he is his mother and say how he feels when he "is" the mother); the reference to feeling makes this the preferred choice.

If it is natural, and I claim it is, to connect pretence with activity and imagination with feeling, the next natural question concerns the status of the feelings that result from imaginings. Could they be real emotions? One supposes that if imagination can be subordinated to asking oneself how one would feel if something were the case, the answer must somehow be based on how one actually feels on imagining that it is the case. Deciding whether Charles is pretending certain things or imagining them, and if the latter, determining the status of

his feelings, are both crucial to deciding what it actually is that Charles is doing, thinking, and feeling in that queer state named quasi-fear.<sup>41</sup>

The intuition behind suspension of disbelief theories is that there must be some psychological state, compatible with true beliefs about fiction, that allows for a genuine emotional response. As a suspension of disbelief theory, Walton's account looks like a cheat; pretend beliefs do not generate genuine emotions; he does not speak for our intuitions.

Paying attention to the difference between imagination and pretence, in the way I have suggested, would not be sufficient to shield the theory from Shaper's criticism. Imagination has no better chance than pretence against a view of the emotions that rigidly demands the beliefs, desires and objects mentioned in this query.

In summary, pursuing any of three lines of attack against Walton presses his account back against a number of unanswered questions about the emotions. He begs some of these questions and ignores others. Examining Walton's reasons for denying fear causes one to question a series of standard assumptions about the emotions. Sound reasons for wanting to attribute fear reinforce this scepticism.

Finally, Walton's unexamined but intriguing mix of the concepts of imagination and pretence makes me suspect that a state compatible with both true beliefs and genuine emotions might yet be found under the umbrella of make-believe, but only if rigid belief requirements for emotions are first defeated. Walton's account of response to fiction, though careful, insightful, and elaborate, lacks the foundation of a theory of the emotions, and without this foundation its actual success as a theory and its potential as a direction are finally impossible to assess.



FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. George Pitcher, "Emotion", Mind, 74 (1965), 335.
2. Pauline Kael, Going Steady, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), p.153.
3. I borrow this way of putting it from Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief" (British Journal of Aesthetics, 18 [Winter, 1978]), pp.34-6.
4. Harold Osborne, "Aesthetic Relevance", British Journal of Aesthetics, 17 (Autumn, 1977), 299.
5. I'm not really all that sure what the Naive View actually entails or who's held it explicitly. It's a popular and perhaps somewhat fictionalized object of criticism among philosophers who now do semantics of fiction. As criticized, it commits its holders to non-real or non-existent persons and perhaps many views of response to fiction require such entities even if this is not made explicit in the view. But philosophers who now argue for some version of the Naive View are more inclined to talk of non-actual, well-individuated entities, without making clear what relation, if any, these entities have to people. For references to philosophers who currently defend what's taken to be some version of the Naive View, see Robert Howell, "Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't" (Poetics, 8 [1979]). To see how the view's stated for the purpose of criticism, see, e.g., Nicholas Wollterstorf, "Characters and Their Names" (Poetics, 8 [1979]).
6. Colin Radford finds himself driven to this position in "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina, I" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 9 [1975]).
7. Colin Radford, ("How Can We Be Moved"), lists all these options, and as well, mentions and diminishes the one that I eventually develop.
8. Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", p.38.
9. "Their import is essentially negative." Curt Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), p.145.

10. Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle", in The Problems of Aesthetics, ed. by Eliseo Vivas and Murray Kruger (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1966), pp.397-98.
11. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shakespearean Criticism, ed. by T.M. Raysor, 2 vols. (London: Constable and Co., 1930), pp.200, 201-02.
12. Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", p.35. I prefer the following criticism of "suspension of disbelief": it offers no explanation of our response. It cannot be that we replace our disbelief with temporary belief in the reality of the fiction. On a dispositional sense of belief, outside of the fact of response, no one behaves in an appropriate way, and on an occurrent sense of belief, no one entertains the appropriate propositions. And, once again outside of the fact of response, everyone behaves in a way consistent with disbelief, and if asked, people would assent to the appropriate propositions. So all "suspension of disbelief" has is the fact of response, with no explanation for it.
13. Ibid., p.34.
14. Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions", Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1978). Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXVII, No.1 (Fall, 1978). Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe", Philosophical Review, 443 (1973).
15. "The theory I have presented is designed to capture the intuitions lying behind the traditional ideas that the normal or desired attitude towards fiction involves a 'suspension of disbelief'." Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.23.
16. Ibid., p.6.
17. Ibid., p.5.
18. Ibid., p.7.
19. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Complete Sherlock Holmes (Doubleday & Company
20. Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe", pp.284-85.
21. Ibid., p.288.
22. Ibid., pp.287-92.
23. Ibid., p.309.

24. Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.23.
25. Walton, "How Remote", p.12.
26. Ibid., p.21.
27. Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (3rd ed.; New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1970), p.267.
28. Walton, "How Remote", p.18.
29. Ibid., p.30.
30. Ibid., p.15.
31. "The fact that Charles is quasi-afraid as a result of realizing that make-believedly the slime threatens him generates the truth that make-believedly he is afraid of the slime." Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.14.
32. Ibid., p.7.
33. Ibid., p.6.
34. Ibid., p.24.
35. Harold Skulsky, "On Being Moved By Fiction", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXIX, No.1 (Fall, 1980), p.7. Walton is also worried about this: "One cannot help wondering why Charles' realization that make-believedly he is in danger produces quasi-fear in him, why it brings about a state similar to real fear." Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.14.
36. Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.16.
37. Ibid., p.19.
38. Ibid., p.16.
39. J.L. Austin, "Pretending" and other essays, in J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, ed. by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.218.
40. Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.25.
41. I did not intend this section to be a full-scale criticism of Walton's theory. The theory has attracted enough attention for other people to take it up. For a criticism of Walton's use of the make-believe game to explain response to art, see Skulsky's article. Howell's article contains an extensive criticism of Walton's semantic theory of fiction.

## CHAPTER II: EMOTION

Not afraid of anything is he,  
and then goes cowering forth, tread paced to meet an obstacle  
at every step...

Marianne Moore  
("The Pangolin")

### A. Introduction

It ought to be abundantly clear by now that a proper theory of emotional response is impossible to create or assess without a prior and comprehensive theory of the emotions. Without such a theory, one can rely only on assumptions, intuitions, and dubious principles of common sense. Even if such a method were to result in an adequate theory, how would we recognize it? In this chapter, I mean to provide an account of the emotions. In the last chapter, I will apply this account to aesthetic situations.

I approach the emotions from a traditional philosophy of mind orientation, but my concern--emotional response to fiction--sets the following limit on what I will say about emotions: anything which seems important enough to include in a general discussion of the emotions, but which has no obvious place in my final discussion of aesthetic emotions, is included in footnote form. Much criticism falls into this category. For instance, most current accounts of the emotions concentrate on their being rational or at least useful sorts of states. Amelie Rorty introduces an important new anthology by noting that all the contributors, "presuppose the rehabilitation of the emotions. They take it for granted that emotions are not irrational feelings, disturbances, or responses to disturbances."<sup>1</sup> As my theory does not rehabilitate the emotions, I feel

obliged to include a lengthy footnote explaining why.

I believe that each emotion is a distinct and recognizable feeling. This view is the current corpse of emotion theories; my first step in resurrecting it will be to examine the criticisms against it. In the sections on feelings, I hope to clarify the term, and defend the view that emotions require feelings. This will not show that emotions are only feelings, but this much established head on, I will undertake the rest of the defence at a slant.

In contesting the feeling theory, people have offered the extreme alternative that emotions don't involve feelings at all, are instead a class of judgments or drives. I will spend two sections examining the place of belief and desire in emotion theory, proving that emotions are neither beliefs nor desires, and contain neither beliefs nor desires.

In the second half of this chapter, I offer an account of how emotions are caused, and discuss the relation between an emotion and its consequences. Specifically, I mean to show that the situations which occasion emotions can be described without reference to the response. Finally, I argue against traditional accounts of the relation between an emotion and its object. This will conclude my defence of the feeling theory.

I intend to analyze only those states regarded as the standard emotional plums. There is some dispute, however, as to the identity of the basic emotions. Aaron Hill, a Renaissance theatrical coach provides this fairly list: joy, grief, fear, pity, scorn, hatred, jealousy, wonder, and love.<sup>2</sup> I will eventually provide the criteria for some slight revisions.

## B. Emotions: Feeling, Belief and Desire

### 1. An Emotion is Just a Feeling

To be in an occurrent emotional state seems to involve at least the following: your body feels a certain way to you (he became nauseous while watching the bear), you have certain beliefs about your situation

(he was sure he would be eaten), and you are moved to act in certain ways (he climbed a tree). These three standard elements can be strained off into three single candidate emotion theories. In this section, I will discuss the criticisms of the feeling theory.

Errol Bedford, in a famous critique, designates the feeling theory the "traditional theory of emotions", and states it as follows: "Briefly, anger is a specific feeling, which leads the angry man to show the signs of anger, (striking someone) unless he is willing to or able to suppress them."<sup>3</sup>

The view has potential variations. Some of its advocates hold the feelings to be mental, some physical.<sup>4</sup> Most theorists supplement the account with a thesis as to how the feelings are caused or what actions they in their turn motivate. Feeling theories depend on emotions being primarily occurrent states, rather than dispositional ones.<sup>5</sup> The dispositional use of the word 'anger' is then meant to be parasitic on the occurrent use. To say, "I was angry with him for a year", will be to give something like a history of the past year with respect to feelings of occurrent anger: for a year, I became angry, (had a certain feeling), every time I thought of him, read his name and so on.

There are three standard arguments against an emotion's being just a feeling. I will use the feeling of pain to provide contrast. First, an emotion's being just a feeling entails that we should be able to recognize and distinguish any emotion solely by the quality of the feeling, and since we cannot the thesis is false.<sup>6</sup>

The second argument against the feeling theory is that emotions are intentional, but feelings are not. Emotions are said to make reference to something beyond themselves. We are angry at someone, fear some particular loss or harm. A feeling like pain, on the other hand, may have a location, but has no object.

The third argument against the feeling theory play on a certain vagueness about the nature of a feeling. Some philosophers have analyzed feelings as special sorts of mental entities, some as sets of bodily sensations. This lack of clarity gives critics too easy a go, three arguments for the price of one or two. Arguments two and three derive their

persuasiveness from the physicality of the feelings. If feelings are distinct mental entities, whose to say they can't have objects and a tendency towards unreasonableness that's just as respectable as that of beliefs. On the other hand, argument one is more convincing, the more obscure and mental the feelings can be made to look. And people who weigh it most heavily almost always assume their opponents are mentalists about feelings.<sup>7</sup>

The first step in assessing the feeling theory, then, is to decide what feelings are. I shall treat feelings, as sets of bodily sensations, for three reasons: this direction has the twin virtues of ontological sparseness and theoretical assessability (the presence of a distinct group of mental feels is both cumbersome and probably equally hard to prove or disprove); it seems there's support for this view in how we ordinarily think of feels--as bodily changes of which we are aware; and finally, emotional feelings vary greatly in intensity, and I think it's only possible to account for this if the feelings are physical.

Armed with this tentative conclusion, I offer the following assessments of the arguments against the feeling theory. Arguments two and three are valid but possibly unsound. The second is premised on emotions having objects, the third on their being some direct, non-courtesy sense in which we speak of emotions being more unreasonable than headaches or stomach aches. I reject the soundness of both these arguments, though for the moment on promisory grounds.

Argument one is more difficult to deal with. It has the force of a challenge: if you want to hold the view that emotions are just feelings, then explain how we can individuate them. The assumption of the argument--that feelings can only be individuated by how they feel--is very contentious. My approach will be to keep distinct the question of what an emotion is and how an emotion is individuated and recognized. The positive account that I offer answers the latter, epistemic question, in a way consistent with supposing that the former, metaphysical question, is adequately answered by a feeling theory of the emotions, thus taking the wind out of the challenge.

## 2. The Necessity of Feeling

I wish, now, only to defend the claim that feelings are necessary to emotions. Any emotion can be more or less intense. Claims of intensity are not the same as our assessments of the strength of a cognitive state. To be sure or convinced it will rain tomorrow is to take oneself to have strong evidence, but to be intensely angry rather than merely angry is to have fierce sensations.<sup>8</sup> It is clear then that the category of intensity does not apply to beliefs, and so if an emotion is intense that cannot be because the belief is intense, however beliefs may be related to emotions.

Someone might, however, suppose that there is a relation between emotions and desires such that the intensity of the emotion is derivative of the 'intensity' of the desire--desires after all can be strong or weak. I will defend a view about the relation between emotion and desire under which the strength or weakness of desires could not account for or explain the intensity or lack of intensity of a particular emotion--(in fact, it will more likely go the other way around). But there is this argument against explaining intensity of emotions in terms of the strength of their correlated desires that is independent of my positive theory of the emotions: two agents, (A&B), can feel anger of the same intensity over the loss, by theft, of some treasured possession: but because A believes that the object's value is only sentimental and B believes that the object is extremely valuable, B's desire for retribution and compensation is much stronger than A's. The difference in the strength of the desire is explained by a difference in belief, but does not produce a difference in the intensity of the emotion, hence, the difference of intensity of emotion is not reducible to the difference in the strength of desire. The converse situation also obtains: we can have situations in which the desires are the same in strength although the emotions differ in intensity. For example, A is greatly angered by the theft because he thinks the object is extremely valuable and that his financial situation has been made desperate by the theft: naturally his desire to recover the object is very strong. B is not greatly angered by the theft because, although he recognizes the value of the object,



he also thinks poverty is a virtue; he does, however, have a very strong desire to recover the object because he thinks that the soul of a thief is only cleansed when compensation is made, and he must cleanse the soul of a thief before he can reach Nirvana, which is his highest goal.

We have then the possibility of desires of varying strength correlated with emotions of equal intensity, and desires of equal strength correlated with emotions of varying intensity. These cases are made plausible by allowing the strength of the desire for an object or action to be a function of the agent's beliefs about the value of the object or action; that connection is almost a philosophical platitude. Such cases make it impossible to view intensity of emotion as reducible to or derivative of strength of desire; since we've already seen that they aren't reducible to or derivative of strength of belief ("Judgements themselves are not either intense or tepid, any more than they are either raw or cooked"),<sup>9</sup> we are left with only the strength of feelings to account for the intensity of emotions.

Finally, we can use this result to argue that feelings are necessary for emotions. For any emotion that some agent actually has it is possible to imagine some other agent who has the same emotion but feels it more or less intensely. Since the category of 'intensity' applies to emotions in virtue of the strength of feelings it follows that our actual agent can't have the emotion more or less intensely than some imagined person unless the actual agent has feeling. Feelings are necessary for emotions.

A second argument is that it is not possible to lay claim to an emotion unless you feel or have felt some way that's connected with that emotion. The admitted absence of feeling defeats the claim. This fact finds outlet in our conviction that machines do not have emotions.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, any emotion can't just be something else, or it would just be something else. Less coyly, it's always possible to have all the cognitive and motivational elements in place and deny the emotion. For instance, someone may take himself to be offended, and may desire to harm the offender in turn, thinking that such people ought to be punished for their own good. It is only the presence of the appropriate feelings

that makes it anger.

I now hope to have established that emotions require feelings and that these feelings are sets of bodily sensations.

### 3. Belief: Cause or Constituent?

The feeling theory is, thus far, unscathed, but the role of feelings in emotions will not be completely clear until the role of beliefs and desires in emotion theory is understood.

Emotional response to fiction is thought to be a problem in consequence of the belief criteria for a genuine response not being met. It is an almost unquestioned assumption among philosophers that any emotion depends on having at least two beliefs, that the object of the emotion exists (a General Belief), and that it has a certain property (a Specificatory Belief), the recognition of which is in some way responsible, (causally or conceptually), for our having one emotion rather than another.<sup>11</sup> The first criticism of the feeling theory shows why the Specificatory Belief is thought important; it would allow us to distinguish our emotions. I suggest the importance of the General Belief derives from the following consideration: to believe that an object has a certain property is to presuppose that there is an object.

There are some philosophers who, in reaction to the feeling theory, defend the view that an emotion is a special sort of judgment that has no conceptual connection whatsoever to having certain feelings.<sup>12</sup> The arguments for the necessity of feeling, however, rule out a single candidate belief theory. We require feelings to explain the intensity of emotions; what's more, an emotion cannot be a judgment or set of judgments, because however these judgments are specified, it will always be possible to have them and not the emotion.

The just judgment theory is difficult for even stout-hearted philosophers to intelligently defend. Thus, the conviction that emotions have ties to beliefs finds its release in a number of less exclusive theories. These theories present the relevant belief, once again the Specificatory one, as either cause, or constituent, (or both), of the emotion with which it is most commonly associated.

If having the appropriate belief ("that bear is dangerous"), is linked to, but not sufficient for having a particular emotion (fear), people think that the linking must be one of two sorts: that a person's fear is caused by some belief about the object, or that his fear contains as a constituent some belief about the object.<sup>13</sup>

Some philosophers try to saw a circle around this dispute, by defending the same belief as both cause and constituent of the relevant emotion. Robert Aquilla, in "Causes and Constituents of Occurrent Emotion", considers the position:

If, on some occasion A causes the occurrence of B, where A's causing the occurrence of B is identical with the occurrence of an emotional state of some sort, but where the occurrence of B alone would not be identical with the occurrence of an emotional state, then A, it seems, can be regarded as both a cause and as a 'constituent' of the emotional state in question.<sup>14</sup>

This solution, however, leaves the causal account incomplete. If A causes B, and A and B together are constituents of a particular state, what causes the state, i.e. what causes both A and A's causing B. More simply, it seems that A is not the cause of the same state of which it's a constituent.

Pure constituent views of the role of beliefs in emotions are just as hard to swallow.<sup>15</sup> It's not just mysterious but nonsensical, to suppose that a part of the way I feel, when I feel sad or angry, is my belief, (or that a part of what I feel when I feel sad or angry is what I believe). The only alternative for a constituent theory is that parts of my emotion are not felt; but if what I feel is anger, and my beliefs are not part of what is felt or how I feel, then what is gained other than mere confusion by supposing that a belief is a part of anger?

It is one thing to agree that an adequate theory of the emotions, or of any particular emotion, includes as an essential part propositions referring to and specifying an agent's beliefs; but it is another thing to suppose that the agent's beliefs are a part of his emotion. Propositions can combine with other propositions to form a theory, but beliefs and feelings combine about as well as numbers float on water. In rejecting constituent theories, I reject the mixing of beliefs and feelings

to make an emotion.

If one accepts the Principle of Universal Causality, (or even just mindlessly assumes it), then emotions are evidently caused in some way, and beliefs seem the most reasonable candidates. People seem to have some worries about beliefs causing emotions, but I do not find these worries very bothersome. If one places the belief on the outside of the emotions, one might be left with mere feelings as the effect, and all the alleged problems of the feeling theory recur. A major problem of the feeling theory was its argued inability to provide each emotion with a distinguishing characteristic. On the present view this problem takes a slightly varied form. If the feelings themselves, (the effect), do not provide sufficient grounds for distinguishing the emotions and so we wish instead to use beliefs, the grounds will then lie on the causal histories. Someone is angry rather than afraid, if a friend's insult rather than a bear's ferociousness brings on his unpleasant sensations. For those who argue that feelings must be differentiated by how we feel, this would be an unacceptable consequence, but it would be fine with me.

Other worries have to do with the exact specification of the causal relationship. Causality requires a change in the causal environment; therefore, only events are possible causes. A belief is not an event, but coming to have a belief is an event. Does this mean that when I see a bear, I must come to hold the belief that I am in danger before I feel fear; isn't just noticing the bear enough? Also, a change of belief will often destroy an emotion, but after the cause has done its work, why should it continue to have this kind of influence on the effect?

There is a useful distinction defended by Curt Ducasse, in Causation and the Types of Necessity. It will take care of these problems. While criticizing Mill's account of causality, he points to a distinction that Mill overlooks between cause and causal conditions. Ducasse illustrates the distinction with this example:

If the engine of my car stops, and I ask "Why?", I am not asking for a statement of invariable succession or of law, even though one such may, be inferable from the answer that it was because the magneto wire became disconnected at that moment. What I want to know is whether the latter occurrence was the single difference between the circumstances of

the engine at the moment when it was running and at the moment when it was not.<sup>16</sup>

This single difference will be the cause of the engine's having stopped; the circumstances which remained constant over the two moments, but were necessary to the engine's having stopped will be the causal conditions of this event. Ducasse thinks this distinction is generally overlooked in our eagerness to form causal laws and blames Hume.

Considering an effect, for instance combustion, it's clear that a feature of the causal situation may be the cause of this effect on one occasion, and a causal condition on another occasion. It depends on whether the feature is present as a state, or comes to be present as an event. Usually, the presence of oxygen in a room is a causal condition of combustion. But if all other causal conditions are in place, and the room devoid of oxygen, injecting it into the room may trigger combustion; the injection of oxygen into the room will then be the event that causes combustion. How long will the fire burn?--only as long as the oxygen lasts. After the injection of oxygen into the room, its continued presence is a necessary condition of the fire's continuing to burn. This suggests that a causal feature may also be both the cause of an effect, and a corresponding causal condition of the resultant state or process.

I suggest that in most cases of having an emotion, the Specificatory Belief plays the same role as the oxygen in the last example. Coming to have the belief is the cause of the emotion, maintaining that belief is a causal condition of continuing to have the emotion. In Ducasse's example, once the car stops, there are no positive necessary conditions to its remaining in that state. The causality is final. It's perhaps because people view causality in this way that they try to defend the same belief as both cause and constituent of the corresponding emotion. My suggestion makes this unnecessary.<sup>17</sup>

Even if beliefs are causally necessary to emotions, it needn't be that coming to have the belief is the event that causes the emotion. I have suggested that some causal feature may on one occasion be a cause, and on another occasion a causal condition of some event. This takes care of some of the postulated counter-examples. For instance, if I've

always believed that whenever a bear is near, I am in danger, then just noticing the bear could cause alarm with no violation of the general causal requirements of fear.

I suggest, then, that coming to believe I am in danger, against a background of proper conditions, will be the kind of belief that causes fear, that these Specificatory Beliefs are always the kinds of beliefs that cause emotions, with one further qualification.

Pitcher points out that, in the case where someone knows something, the concept of belief simply isn't relevant.<sup>18</sup> Many philosophers choose the word 'appraisal' as a general label for all the cognitive events that could serve as the cause of emotions.<sup>19</sup> I follow them in this usage throughout the remainder of this thesis.

In the latter part of this chapter, I will offer a theory of emotive appraisals based on an analysis of the types of situations that occasion emotions. I will conclude this theory of appraisal with an assessment of how these judgments relate to what I have called General and Specificatory Beliefs.

#### 4. The Role of Desire

Everyone agrees that emotions move people to act in certain ways and this is a problem for theories of aesthetic emotions. It's alleged that aesthetic emotions do not standardly prompt action or even desire for action. That emotions motivate suggests they are in part, or perhaps just are, a species of desire; it is our desires that most frequently motivate our actions. Also with beliefs on the causal side, characteristic desires stand a better chance than feeling qualities of individuating emotions. I believe, however, that a desire is no part of any emotion and I hope to make that case here.

The view that emotions are just desires is implausible; few philosophers would hold to such a single candidate view. People have, however, held the closely related view that emotions are motives. This theory has a strong historical influence, and many psychologists are still inclined towards it in a fairly brute form. As used in the theory, 'motive' is a blunderbuss term; assessing the view, then, demands care-

ful attention to the kinds of states that motivate action. Desires are of central importance.

In assessing the claim that emotions are motives, I will consider what types of behaviour are common to situations involving emotions, particularly which of these are actions involving desires, and which are reactions or automatic responses.

There are strong connections between emotions and behaviour, and with some emotions, the particular pattern of behaviour is fairly predictable. People who feel shame have a difficult time meeting direct looks; people who are afraid of bears are sometimes found running from them. In this section, I will divide emotional behaviour into three general categories. (I owe much of the terminology of this section to "Movement in Expression of Emotions", by Paul Ekman.)<sup>20</sup> I wish to examine the role of desire in each of the three categories, desire to be understood as desire to do something.

The first category is that of involuntary response. People who are embarrassed blush; people who are sad sometimes cry. A person who blushes easily claims he can't help it, and indeed seems to have no immediate desire to blush, and no remote devious desire that blushing falls under. He probably hates it when he blushes. There is no reason to think of this kind of behaviour as action founded on desire. It often gives rise to desires to suppress or control it and sometimes we can.

Sometimes we talk about involuntary responses as expression of emotions; there is also a wide range of voluntary behaviour that expresses emotion; this is my second category. Such behaviour can be verbal or non-verbal. Saying, "I feel sad", and kicking a table in anger, are both chosen ways of expressing emotion. (Let person 'feel' statements seem to have largely this function.) Expressing an emotion is communicating to others that one has it, and all voluntary expressions of emotion seem based on the desire to communicate one's state to others.

Expression of emotion (including involuntary response insofar as we can control or suppress it), falls under what Ekman calls 'display rules'.<sup>21</sup> A display rule is a social convention, or personal habit, governing who can show what to whom and in what circumstances. Ekman's

example is that at a beauty contest, the winner may cry, but the losers cannot.

Part of the reason why expressing emotion is subject to display rules is because this expression is often subordinated to further ends. Perhaps if you feel sad you want other people to know so that they'll comfort you and you'll feel better. For this project to succeed, it's important that you should express your sadness to the right people, in the right circumstances, in the right manner. If expressing your sadness is subordinated towards your feeling better, it counts as a coping behaviour.

Ekman explains coping behaviour as, "attempts to deal with emotion felt and its source; to increase, diminish, or sustain what is occurring".<sup>22</sup> Most behaviour that emotions give rise to, including voluntary expression, seems to fall within the bounds of this third category. As defined by Ekman, coping behaviour is desire-based action, the desire being to either keep or get rid of what one is feeling. For instance if being with a certain person causes feelings of love, and I find this pleasant, I will probably desire the frequent company of this person, in order to get more feelings, more often.

Coping behaviour is the most interesting behaviour that emotions give rise to. First it seems quite emotion specific; fear begets flight, anger begets vengeance, grief begets mourning and so on. For this reason, anyone wanting to characterize emotions in terms of desires or tendencies to behave will find the desires that ground coping behaviours congenial. Secondly, it might be wondered what general connection there is between this behaviour's being aimed at the relief or heightening of our feelings, and its having as its object the source of the emotion.

In some cases the connection is straightforward, though describing it is not. These are cases where the belief that generates the emotion would be sufficient to generate the desire, even if the emotion did not occur. If I know there is a nearby bear, I will desire to flee from the forest, even if for some bewildering reason I feel no fear. That running away will settle the hair on my neck seems quite incidental. I am not sure though how one would describe the causal sequence, (or wheth-



er it matters). Does fear generate my desire to flee, or does a belief about a threat generate both, fear through an appraisal of danger, and the desire to flee through good sense?

With other emotions there is more reason to believe that having the feeling is a necessary condition of having the coping desire, even though the desire is rationalized by beliefs. Like the fear case, in these cases, source directed action is unmysterious. Love is a good example. The belief that someone's a wonderful person (resulting sometime in an appraisal of cherishable), makes the desire to spend more time with him reasonable. But, in fact, the pleasant feelings I get on spending time with him, may be the deciding factor in whether I desire to do so.

A case that puzzles me though is anger. Why should anger result in a desire to kick the person who made you mad? When I'm afraid of a bear, there's practical action to be taken to avoid getting eaten--it's called flight. When I'm in love, there's practical action I can take so I can go on feeling rosy--it's called keeping company. Kicking the person who insulted me doesn't seem practical in quite the same way. It seems very much to arise from the feeling, rather than from some combination of feeling and pre-emotion belief, and why it should be efficacious in removing unpleasant sensations or usurping them with pleasant ones is somewhat mysterious.

That kicking often brings relief focuses quite an important aspect of coping behaviour; it's highly cultural<sup>23</sup> and I suggest especially so in those cases where the emotion is unpleasant but the causality final. In Ducasse's discussion of causality, he suggests that when my car stops, I want to know the single difference between its running and its now being dead. I think we often look for a single difference kind of causal account because we think the causality is reversible. If I know that my car stopped because a wire is loose, if I tighten the wire, my car will run again. Unfortunately, some emotions are not like this. They are intense feelings that can disrupt our days, and have to be coped with. But with anger, embarrassment, shame, envy, and grief, what's done is usually done; the situation that occasioned the feelings offers no way to give them back. In these cases, elaborate cultural rituals (like kick-

ing) substitute. Although these rituals have some connection to the situation that occasioned the emotion, they offer the clearest example of where the feelings are almost wholly responsible for our having coping desires.

I think there is no reason to believe that any of the kinds of desires mentioned are parts of emotions, rather than caused by our attempts to deal with emotions. The desires fall into two and a half general categories: desires to express the emotion and desires to relieve or maintain it. The other half a category covers my suspicion that some desires thought to be characteristic of emotions, (for instance fear and the desire to flee), actually have much more to do with the situation that occasions the emotion. Yet as all these desires can be given a general description such that emotions form parts of their objects, (they are about emotions, if you will), I do not see how they could be parts of emotions. G. Marshall puts this point succinctly: "One acts from the affection only if one has reason for acting other than the affection itself."<sup>24</sup>

So far, this section has a slight ring of the trivial about it, as if emotions are mental toothaches. And yet the connection between emoting and acting is so serious, that it's unlikely that we would have a category for emotions without it. So evidently, a few things remain to be said.

First, the connection between emotion and action is more noteworthy when one considers that the situations that occasion emotions come up again and again. A lot of time is spent in one emotional state or another, and due to the intensity of emotional feelings, and the real or perceived seriousness of the situations that occasion them, we spend a lot of time behaving in ways directly related to having one emotion or another. But the positive ties between emotion and action account for only part of the seriousness of the connection.

We often use statements about a person's emotions to explain his behaviour. Sometimes the behaviour to be explained falls on the positive side of emotion and action, e.g. "He's kicking me because he's angry". But often we use emotion statements to explain behaviour that has no posi-

tive or particularized connection with an emotion, e.g. "She didn't go to Rome because she's too upset". Any behaviour that takes place around the time of an emotion is related to what emotion by virtue of being either more or less difficult when one's in that emotional state.

Part of the explanation for this negative connection has to do with the nature of appraisals, part with the nature of emotions. Emotive appraisals, as will be argued shortly, restrict our attention, by preventing it from being impartial and by centering on emotive properties which because of their connections with our interests are looked for elsewhere. (One genuine insult begets a hundred suspected ones.) The emotions themselves are intense feelings that make action unreliable, focus our attention on ourselves, and act as a nesting ground for more appraisals causing more emotions. To quote Marshall again: "Being affected confronts the will. When we are affected we are always in a position of having to act, if we do, against the affection, or partly at least, out of it."<sup>25</sup>

In summary, emotions motivate and defeat so many kinds of behaviour, so often, that this is a large part of the rationale for conceptually slicing up our world so that we have an ontological category for them. Yet this does not mean that desires are parts of emotions, and I hope to have shown that they are not.

Using larger categories to label emotions, like motives or tendencies to behave, is accurate but uninformative. A motive is a state of affairs that gives a person a reason to act. To call emotions motives is not to say anything very specific about what they are: it is not, for instance, to say how they differ from itches or unpaid bills.

### C. Emotions: Causes and Consequences

#### 1. Sartre's Criticism

Having now made preliminary decisions about the role of feeling, belief and desire in emotion theory, I am ready to expand my positive account. I do this by analyzing in detail the causes and consequences of emotions.

In my discussion of the role of belief in emotion theory, I argued that beliefs are causes or causal conditions of emotions. I concluded that section by following several philosophers in choosing the term 'appraisal' to replace 'belief'.

Is there anything further that can be said about appraisals than that they are the category of mental events that cause emotions? I think the situations that generate emotions can be delineated in such a way that the notion of appraisal, itself, can be more usefully defined. The need to do so is generated by Sartre's criticisms of psychological theories of the emotions. I will call the kind of situation in question the occasion of an emotion. I will eventually include the consequences of emotions under the term 'occasion', for reasons that will be clear as I proceed.

So far, I've spent a lot of time trying to get beliefs and feelings in proper order with respect to emotions. This methodology dates back a long way and Sartre was very critical of it:

Sartre's contention is that such a theory cannot lead to a complete explanation of emotional behaviour. It will not offer reasons for the occurrence of anger but will merely establish a psychophysiological sequence operative in all cases of anger. What is needed is a radically different method, capable of explaining what relation anger bears to the balance of human experience.<sup>26</sup>

I accept Sartre's criticism of emotion theories and my positive account is guided by it. Suppose the belief that you've been insulted is the sort of belief that causes your anger. Why does it do this, why sometimes and not others, why to you and not others? The juggling of beliefs and feelings distracts us from such questions; yet, the emotions never would have arisen as objects of analysis and theory were they not of fundamental importance in the arena of human experience. Less passionately, "Statements of constant observed conjunctions set a problem as to causes rather than solve them".<sup>27</sup>

The best way, I think, of getting at the importance of emotions is to examine the kinds of situations that occasion them, assuming for the purpose of the examination that these situations all have something in common. This something evidently cannot be the Specificatory Beliefs,

or the appraisals as I shall now call them, as these seem emotion specific. However, isolating the common feature of the occasions which we appraise will help us to an understanding of the nature of appraisals. My analysis of these occasions is a tentative proposal.

## 2. Emotive Occasions

Sartre himself was quite a functionalist about the emotions. He thought that they not only had some purpose but were, in fact, actions taken towards some end. It is his analysis of the occasions that call for emotive action that interests me. His position would, today, be considered moderate. Problems that can't be dealt with in practical ways find emotive solutions. Bell outlines a paradigmatic emotion demanding situation that results in fear:

A man stands before me, pointing a revolver at my head....  
There are no longer any means to achieve my goal (escape)  
...I faint.

Why do I faint when fainting places me all the more at the mercy of the gunman. I faint in order to annihilate the unbearable threatening object. Fainting is certainly not the result of reflection; I am not trying to find a refuge for myself: in fact there is no refuge to be had. My recourse is to annihilate the threat so far as it is in my power. Lacking instrumental means, I transform the world by magic.<sup>28</sup>

Emotions are these magical transformers. They arise in situations where pragmatics fail.

Sartre's theory has been justly and thoroughly criticized, especially the part about emotions being actions. More to my purpose is his evident mistake in thinking that emotions arise when pragmatics have already failed. The seriousness of being paralyzed with fear resides in our inability, while in this state, to force our feet forward to safety. Emotions, especially when intense, seem frequently to lead to failures in pragmatic action, even though courses of action are available and sometimes easy to undertake. Often someone overwhelmed with passion does not act, or does not act in time, or does not act efficiently enough to achieve a goal.

On the other hand, Sartre's theory captures the converse and wide-

spread intuition that emotions often arise in situations where a person faces obstacles, and especially when these obstacles are unexpected.<sup>29</sup>

Both Sartre's intuition (that emotions are the result of pragmatic failures) are so common that both should be given their due in a general description of emotive occasions. We must also keep in mind, that while either intuition would lead to an essentially negative view of the emotions, some emotions are quite pleasant.

I wish first to note, that on either intuition the occasions share a common feature: the outcome of the state of affairs the person is involved in is directly relevant to his interests or concerns. (Otherwise it's difficult to see how failures in practical action, however caused, would be focused on as notable features.) This element of personal interest has been noted by many philosophers; R.S. Peters describes the kind of judgment that causes an emotion as a "non-neutral appraisal".<sup>30</sup>

But any situation I am involved in will have an outcome that affects me; this is obviously and trivially true; my interests go where I go. Yet in emotive situations the element of interest seems exceptionally strong. Some philosophers have tried to capture it by describing the emotions as subjective,<sup>31</sup> but this just seems to push the demand for explanation back on to an obscure, difficult, and historically muddled concept. Others have suggested that the emotions have an, "intimate connection with one's sense and conception of oneself".<sup>32</sup> As a general description of the kind of interest that characterizes all these occasions it will not do; my senses of self seems both irrelevant and superfluous to some emotions; my fear of bears is not based on any conception of myself as especially edible. For the moment, I will leave it at interest.

In so far as we are agents with interests, we care about how situations that affect our interests develop. Once we take note of the fact that how a situation develops affects our interests, we cease to be indifferent to how it develops. But many people, in such situations go serenely about, taking steps to guarantee favourable outcomes, and feeling at most twinges of anxiety or concern, nothing we would want to call an emotion. Sartre's account offers us a differentia. Sometimes there are obstacles to pragmatic action, or no pragmatic steps to be taken,

and then we emote, in the latter case for lack of anything else to do. But this is at odds with the obvious fact that emotions are often not a response to real obstacles.

I think Sartre's theory can be righted with two minor changes. I suggest it's not the actual failure of pragmatic action, but the perceived lack of control over a situation's progress or outcome, that together with our interests circumscribes those situations that can occasion our emotions. This revision makes Sartre's theory consistent with the converse intuition that emotions sometimes cause failures in pragmatic action. It also gives the theory room to account for positive emotions.

In the introduction to this chapter, I quoted a standard list of emotions. I am now ready to offer a similar list. I describe each emotion with respect to the element of control:

fear requires perceived lack of control with respect to a threat to oneself,

anger requires perceived lack of control with respect to the behaviour of others,

pity requires perceived lack of control with respect to the misfortunes of others,

grief and sadness require perceived lack of control with respect to a loss,

jealousy requires perceived lack of control with respect to the success of a rival,

envy requires perceived lack of control with respect to the distribution of benefits,

shame requires perceived lack of control with respect to the harm that you, or a group to whom you belong, did to others,

embarrassment requires perceived lack of control with respect to the discovery of a social blunder.

One might wonder if the description of emotive occasions accounts for the positive emotions of joy, delight and love. This is particularly where Sartre failed. He handles positive emotions in the same way as negative ones by contending that they, too, are attempts to transform a problematic reality that can't be dealt with by other means.<sup>33</sup> Almost

everyone has found this unconvincing. I think the only problem with Sartre's account is that he wants the emotions to do something. This leads him to a thoroughly negative view of the situations that occasion them; problem-solvers require problems. But if the relevant element of the appraisal is merely that of perceived lack of control, the situations needn't be given such a negative assessment. I think love and joy depend on perceived lack of control in fairly straightforward ways.

Joy is lack of control with respect to a benefit, i.e., control over the source of one's pleasure is perceived as being outside oneself. Joy is associated with great good fortunes and often gives rise to gratitude; delight is associated with smaller benefits. Love creates a situation of dependence on another for happiness. This, together with the fact that the other has an autonomous will generates a situation where the lover perceives a lack of control over his own happiness.

This listing of emotions completes my description of emotive occasions.<sup>34</sup> A emotive occasion is the kind of situation in human life where emotions can and do take place.

### 3. Emotive Appraisals

Emotive appraisals are the judgments that cause emotions. I formerly referred to them as Specificatory Beliefs. These appraisals normally mention properties that we associate with some specific emotion, like dangerous, embarrassing, offensive or delightful. I stated that an analysis of emotive occasions would illuminate the nature of emotive appraisals. I will now discuss how the two are related, taking up both the interest and control features of emotive occasions. In this section, as in the last, I'll be satisfied to be roughly right.

When we appraise an object or a situation, we assess or evaluate it; this requires we have an interest in it. The element of interest that is a feature of emotive occasions has seemed to many to be exceptionally strong. I contend that this is because emotive appraisals belong to a class of appraisals that depend on feelings. Our interests always seem strong when our feelings are aroused.

Some appraisals mention properties that depend for their recogni-



tion on their relation to certain feelings of pleasure or displeasure. (The paradigmatic judgments of this class will exhibit this relation.) Obvious examples of this kind of property are activity labels like boring, frustrating or exhilarating. An example of the judgment is, "This activity is frustrating."

Generally, my labelling an activity as 'frustrating' depends on my feeling a certain unpleasant way. Thus, I will call this kind of property 'evaluatively laden'. What's more, since the recognition of these properties usually depends on our having certain feeling, they are not in their situations or objects with the same obviousness as shapes or colours. They emerge as properties of an object or situation when we feel a certain way. They are both evaluatively laden and emergent.<sup>35</sup> This group of appraisals, (appraisals that mention evaluatively-laden, emergent properties), depends on our feelings, but the judgment, "this activity is boring", is not a judgment about one's feelings but about an activity.

The properties recognized in emotive occasions, and mentioned in emotive appraisals are parallel to activity labels like boring or frustrating. They are both evaluatively-laden and emergent. To find something of someone dangerous, offensive, wonderful, shameful, embarrassing, disgusting, or cherishable, standardly involves feeling some way. These feelings explain the feature of intense interest that characterizes emotive occasions.

(But when someone says that mountain-climbing is dangerous, do they necessarily feel some way about it at that time or ever? No more so than a person who believes that departmental meetings will be invariably boring must feel tired or disgruntled. But such judgments will not be called appraisals. Appraisals are always of the particular. One cannot appraise a class of situations as dangerous, although one can appraise one of its members and come to believe that the whole class instantiates this property. As dispositional uses of emotion words are parasitic on occurrent ones, so general uses of appraisal terms are parasitic on particular appraisals. To appraise something is to find it to be a certain way. The locution 'find it' is significant; its force is that of discov-

ering that something affects you in a certain way and we are only affected by particulars.)

I do not want to claim that the feeling on which the emotive appraisal depends is the emotion. The appraisal converts this feeling into a further more intense feeling, and this resultant feeling is the emotion. For instance, I am hiking alone in the mountains, feeling anxious. I see a bear in the distance. It turns and begins to lumber towards me. I realize that I am in danger and this causes fear. The properties that appraisals mention, like dangerous, summarize and capture one's interest in the situation with respect to perceived lack of control.

An emotive appraisal depends on a feeling, but this dependence is not a temporal one. The feeling needn't precede the appraisal. I can judge that I am in danger, and be moved to fear, even though I do not already feel anxious. The judgment that I am in danger may precede, follow, or be contemporaneous with feelings of fright, startlement, worry or anxiety.<sup>36</sup> But appraisals cannot do the work of causing emotions without feelings, and standardly a feeling will be in place before an appraisal is made, (generally, only after we begin to feel bored do we judge that the situation is boring). This order is standard because judging that a situation affects us in a certain way generally depends on being affected by that situation.

Once we have this first level of feeling, we have the material from which to produce an emotion. The appraisal that we lack control over the progress or outcome of a situation that affects our interests is causally responsible for whether the feeling is sustained (being startled becomes fear), heightened (frustration becomes anger), or in other ways sufficiently altered to become converted into an emotion.

My account of emotive occasions and emotive appraisals can be crystallized in an example. What follows is the anatomy of a particular instance of fear:

- I. The first level of feeling
  - (1) P rounds the corner and suddenly sees a fist coming at his face--he is startled
  - (2) P reacts to the surprise attack by:
    - (a) a sudden rush of sensations

(b) instinctively adopting a defensive posture--he ducks and throws his arms in front of his face

II. The appraisal

(3) P recognizes his attacker as a strong and brutal enemy and takes his present situation to be dangerous to himself.

Involved in the appraisal of danger is the recognition that the outcome of the situation is not in his control to the extent he would wish.

III. The emotion

(4) P's judgment that the situation has an enduring (even if only briefly) feature which is tied to his interest in the relevant way, SUSTAINS his feelings. (It may also alter his feelings in various ways--e.g. heighten them.)

IV. An associated desire

(5) P desires to alter his situation so that it coheres in some way with his own interests--e.g., flight, defence, etc.

A different appraisal, for instance that the cause of fright is not dangerous to oneself (you've just recognized your friend) will cause something other than fear, perhaps a different emotion--(anger because your friend has deliberately played a cruel joke on you), or some state that's not an emotion--(relief or the subsidence of feelings on recognizing that your friend accidentally startled you).

I promised to conclude the section on how emotions are caused by relating appraisals to General and Specificatory Beliefs--the belief that some object exists and that it has certain properties. Most philosophers hold that both these beliefs are required for emotions.

The most general way of seeing an emotive appraisal is as a judgment or series of judgments that relates a situation to our interests with respect to our control. But the relation of a situation to one's interests is rarely transparent. The terms of the relation are often too complex to allow for quick analysis.<sup>37</sup> Thus although the appraisal that causes fear is often simple and immediate (good thing too), the

appraisal that causes grief may take place slowly over a number of days and involve a whole series of judgments about how that person's being dead is going to affect your life. When one decides, then one's thoughts on the situation can be finalized in an assessment of 'serious personal loss'. It is at this point that feelings of hurt, shock, and loss have been converted into grief.

The Specificatory Belief, when formulated as a judgment about the situation, can be seen as the end point of this process of appraising, the judgment that sums up the activity of appraising, and does so by mentioning the property that finally characterizes the situation in relation to your interests, a property like dangerous, offensive or so on.

This, then, is an accurate way of describing appraisals: to appraise a situation is to judge the ways in which it relates to your interests; the appraisal (formerly called the Specificatory Belief) is the judgment or recognition that some property has been instantiated.

I have no quarrel with anyone's calling this judgment or appraisal a belief, as long as no one thinks it implies anything about something's existing, or especially about anyone's believing that something exists. I claim there is no logical connection between the appraisal and a General Belief, and since appraisals cause emotions, General Beliefs are not required for genuine emotional response. That is, to appraise a set of circumstances involving a bear as dangerous, and to be caused by this appraisal to feel fear, requires no commitment, logical or psychological, to the existence of the bear or the reality of the situation.

In arguing for this claim, it is first necessary to distinguish between beliefs and propositions. A property belief (e.g., "That bear is threatening"), may presuppose the truth of some proposition asserting the existence of the thing which is said to have the property, but having the property belief does not presuppose that you have the corresponding existence belief. It is only the propositions that are logically connected. As it is a property belief that is relevant to making an appraisal, the existence belief may never come into psychological play. Thus, even if there were the strongest possible connection between property propositions and existence propositions, to believe one but not even

entertain the other remains a psychological possibility.

This concludes my discussion of appraisals, and with it, my discussion of the causes of emotions.

#### 4. The Consequences of Emotions

A feeling that has been sufficiently sustained or heightened is called an emotion. Feelings become sufficiently sustained or heightened by their interaction with a process of appraising--(I suspect this interaction is reciprocal; feelings urge judgments which intensify feelings which strengthen judgments and so on)--but when is this sufficient for them to be called emotions? I think this can only be worked out in the area of their consequences, (if a feeling is intense and lasting we may want to do something about it); which I will now include as a part of the description of emotive occasions. A theory of how emotions are caused involves a description of the occasions in which people can have emotions. A theory of the causes and consequences of emotions is the description of the occasions in which people do, in fact, have emotions.

In my initial placing of the role of desire in emotion theory, I suggested that the relationship between emotions and desires or action is so strong and constant, that it's unlikely that we would have an ontological category for emotions without this connection. Coping desires, ("attempts to deal with emotion felt and its source; to increase, sustain, or diminish what is occurring"), supply the most plausible and intuitive candidates for the consequences that a feeling must be sufficiently sustained or heightened to give rise to, in order to be an emotion. These desires are often source-directed because a way of dealing with an emotion is to alter the situation so that it accords with your interests.

I now define an emotion as follows: An emotion is a feeling, which has been sufficiently sustained or heightened by interaction with appraisals (judgments, made in light of our perceived lack of control over the situation's progress or outcome), for it to give rise to coping desires.

This definition establishes a conceptual connection between emo-

tion and desire at the generic level. It does not entail that on any particular occasion, an emotion must give rise to a coping desire or any desire at all in order to be an emotion. Its being sufficient to give rise to a desire, will still allow that other conditions must be met, before the desire actually arises.

For instance, in the case of joy, I don't see that a coping desire will usually arise. Joy is what it is precisely "because the source of pleasure is perceived as outside one's control. To desire to alter the situation wouldn't be consistent with wanting to sustain the feelings." But even if we hope that our joy will last, if there's no action at all to be taken that could contribute towards this, the notion of sustaining desire may not be appropriate. Rather than wanting it to go on, we probably wish it would or hope it will. Emotions that arise from remembering the past are another evident case where situation-directed coping desires won't arise. They will be replaced by wishes or regrets. Other coping desires, however, seem quite appropriate to cases of remembering; if our memories are unpleasant, we may desire to distract ourselves and thus diminish what is occurring.

The relation between an emotion and its consequences is not direct and transparent. There are a great many factors that govern it. To define fear as the desire to flee or to think that anger always leads to a desire for revenge is a simplistic and misleading analysis that results, I conjecture, from the badly mistaken assumption that to appraise a situation, we must first believe that it actually obtains.

Beliefs are true or false, but appraisals are accurate or inaccurate and are so in so far as they accurately relate a set of circumstances to our interests. If there are no actual people, bears or situations around, threatening or offending us, interest does not disappear. We are concerned about situations that are probable, and if their consequences are dastardly enough, even just possible and appraising these kinds of situations can cause emotions. A situation can be judged as dangerous if it's a situation in which I am or would be endangered without any thought as to its likelihood. But to accurately appraise a set of circumstances as dangerous may presuppose some likelihood of its ob-

taining. What this presupposition will amount to will depend on the circumstances in which the appraisal takes place. If I see a bear and appraise the situation as dangerous, the accuracy of this appraisal presupposes the truth of some proposition about that situation's really obtaining. If however, I suspect an intruder awaits me in the dark, and appraise this situation as dangerous, the accuracy of the appraisal does not presuppose the truth of some proposition about the situation's really obtaining. But it may presuppose some proposition about its being probable that the situation obtains.

That an emotive occasion can be governed by some cognitive attitude other than "believing that a situation actually obtains" makes a world of difference to the kinds of desires (and other consequences) that emotions give rise to. No one would deny that "suspecting an intruder awaits me in the dark of my apartment" could easily set off a process of feeling and appraising that results in fear. Accurately appraising a situation that you suspect obtains will involve the assessment of probabilities; the desires consequent on the fear will likely be the desires of caution and investigation. The desire for flight would be an inappropriate way of coping, especially if the probabilities are low.

#### D. Emotion and Object

"Emotions are primarily about nothing"  
--Santayana

I have argued that emotions neither are nor contain beliefs or desires, while granting that emotive occasions typically involve both these states. Having analyzed the role of beliefs and desires in emotion theory, and having described their part in emotive occasions, I now intend to treat emotions as feelings (without worrying about whether they are single feelings or complexes of feelings).

But if emotions are feelings, then do they have objects? This question arose in the criticisms of the feeling theory, and I preferred to delay discussion of it until my examination of the place of beliefs

and desires was complete. Its time has come. To restate the concern briefly, an emotion can't be just a feeling, because while everyone agrees that emotions have objects, everyone also agrees that feelings do not and could not have objects. I suggested that if feelings were a type of mental entity, ineffable as they then might be, there would be no reason why they shouldn't be granted objects. This is no help to me, of course, since I think that feelings are composed of sensations.

My task, in this section, is to render emotions having objects compatible with their being feelings. My discussion of the problem may seem long-winded, but the issue has considerable importance for discussions of aesthetic emotions. Critics of the Naïve View point out that as Hamlet is not really suffering, he cannot be the proper object of human pity: therefore, it can't be pity. My discussion of emotion and object centres on the fact that emotion statements are often used to explain behaviour. My solution is a theory about statements.

Amelie Rorty, in the introduction to The Emotions, says that the force of calling emotions intentional is that, "a person's beliefs, perceptions and the descriptions under which he views the objects of his attitudes",<sup>38</sup> are essential to the identification and understanding of his emotions. This much, no one would dispute. We would not be able to understand or identify someone's being afraid, unless we knew what it was like to view an object (a bear), or a situation (crossing a bridge), under descriptions like dangerous or threatening.

But when philosophers talk of emotions having objects, they do not simply mean the objects that we appraise in coming to have emotions. Most talk of emotion and object weaves around a distinction to which all modern philosophers seem to adhere, that between the cause of an emotion and the object of an emotion. (This distinction is attributed to Hume, although given modern cause/object concerns, the attribution is misleading.)<sup>39</sup> And yet, though all philosophers agree about the usefulness of the distinction, there seems to be a wild diversity in the general and particular specifications of the causes and objects of emotions. Various philosophers talk of causes, producers, occasions, intentional objects, material objects, formal objects, and targets of emotions, but no



one seems to talk about all of them, and if two philosophers happily talk about the same subset, they do not say the same things.<sup>40</sup>

The first step in getting through this muddle is to give a general description of what it is to be an object when we're talking about actions and states of persons. If I kick Mary, Mary is the object of my action; if I believe that my beer glass is half-empty, my beer glass being half-empty is the object of my belief; if I want to eat pyroghies, eating pyroghies is the object of my want; if I love Jimmy Durante, Jimmy Durante is the object of my love. What do these types of objects have in common? Nothing seems to be revealed by these examples except a certain surface grammatical position in statements describing the action or state--the objects are mentioned after the verb when the statement is in the active voice. Further, when the statements mention emotions, it seems to be the grammatical position of the phrase describing the object that leads people to worry about whether cause and object are being confused. For instance, Anthony Kenny, when discussing the cause/object distinction, says this:

There are many cases in which it is very natural to think of the object of the emotion as its cause. "I was frightened by the face at the window", "I was angry because he burst in without knocking", "Her behaviour made me most embarrassed", all assign objects to emotions by means of forms of descriptions that are ostensibly causal.<sup>41</sup>

I will have more to say in a moment about Kenny's examples. But first--a necessary aside.

Many modern philosophers speak of emotions with a teleological edge to their tone. Not surprisingly, they are usually philosophers who think that emotions can be functionally defined. As they wish to retain some notion of object to cover what's in the correct place in the statement, (I am angry about his remark), they make use of an object/target distinction. For instance, in "The Rationality of Emotions", Ronald De Sousa suggests that when I'm angry, what I'm angry at the person for doing is the object of my emotion, the person himself the target.<sup>42</sup>

I see no reason to believe that emotions are the soul's bullets, fired at people or situations, although I admit that anger, love, and

envy conjure up this kind of picture. Even if one believes that emotions can be given a teleological description, their having targets seems like an overly simple way of working this out, (an uncomfortably metaphorical one as well). I intend to ignore for a while this teleological aspect of object, and take a look at the grammatical object of statements describing emotions, to see what cause/object concerns amount to. The analysis will eventually make the object/target distinction clear.

I'll look at one of Kenny's examples first. I suggested that an object, generally described, is something mentioned by an expression following a verb when a statement is in the active voice. Kenny's first example is in the passive voice. If one takes location of the referring expression as an indication of object, it's necessary to first put statements into the active voice. When this is done with Kenny's example, there's no longer the appearance of a cause/object mix-up: "I was frightened by the face at the window" becomes "The face at the window frightened me", a clear description of what causes my fear.

The other two examples are both phrased intransitively, i.e., don't have grammatical objects but complements. If we restate them transitively, using emotion verbs, once again the confusion disappears. We end up with, "His bursting in without knocking angered me", and "Her behaviour embarrassed me". The grammatical object of these sentences is the person who has the emotion, (indicating, I think, that we take ourselves to be passive with respect to emotions).<sup>43</sup>

Having rewritten Kenny's statements are they satisfactory descriptions of emotion and cause? I take it that what we want from a cause is a satisfying explanation of why someone came to feel a particular emotion on a particular occasion. Thus, for anger and fear respectively, he took it as an insult! and 'he saw a bear', seem fine. Doubtless, Kenny's statements could be more precisely put, but as standard, truncated causal explanations they are perfectly adequate. By reducing the grammatical variety of Kenny's statements we see more clearly what should have been noticed all along--these are not statements in which objects are assigned to emotions, "by means of forms of description that are ostensibly causal". The forms of description are not just ostensibly causal, they are

causal; and they don't assign objects to emotions, they assign causes to them.

But rewriting Kenny's statements eliminates a potential cause/object confusion, only at risk of eliminating what it is we want to describe about people and their emotions. When we say, "his remark angered me", we describe a person's having come to be in a certain state, now past; when we say, "I'm sorry about his remark", we describe a person's present state. Grammatical alternatives and variations generally serve alternative and varying purposes, even when the 'content' of what the variations say is the same. When a statement expressing the relation between a cause and its resulting state is put in the active voice, our focus is directed to the cause, which is past. When the same statement is put in the passive voice, our focus shifts to the resulting state, which in many cases will still be enduring in the present. As most of our descriptions of emotions are of the second type, focusing on the state rather than the cause, we must have some reason for this preference. I shall argue that this preference is tied to our use of emotional ascriptions to explain behaviour. Our reasons for preferring a certain kind of statement in talking about emotions will make clear the relation between emotion and object.

In formulating my argument, there are two types of statement that I wish to account for. These statements match the standard distinction between object and target of an emotion. An example of the first type is, "I'm angry about what he did"; an example of the second type is, "I'm angry at him". With the first statement, I mean to examine what gets done that isn't accomplished by the corresponding causal formulation-- "What he did angered me"; with the second statement what gets done by the further mention of being angry at a person. I say "further", because all statements of the second type can be expanded to include statements of the first type, (e.g. "I'm angry at him for drinking my beer"), but this is not a reciprocal arrangement. Another way of putting this is that 'angry at' entails 'angry about', but 'angry about' does not entail 'angry at', and although 'angry about' statements can always be given a causal formulation, 'angry at' statements cannot. If these last points are not

obvious I hope they will become so.

The first step in my argument is to distinguish between what I will call a feature view and a target view. To move a little distance from emotions, suppose that as features of things, I'm well-disposed towards redness and juiciness. Then coming to believe that this tomato is red and juicy will cause me to like this tomato. To say, "I like this tomato", reduces to its having features, taking note of which causes me to like it just because I like things with those features. If on my trips through this or any other possible world, I find something like this tomato in all the relevant respects (redness and juiciness), I will like it too. This is all to say that the features of the tomato that are causally efficacious in my coming to like it, are in fact what I like about it. In this case, cause and object collapse. I suggest that statements like, "I'm angry about that remark", admit of the same analysis. To say that I'm angry about the remark is to say that someone's remarking something (a feature of the situation) was the cause of the anger I now feel. This, I call the feature view, and the statements that fall under it, feature statements.

On the other hand, if I love a person, presumably there are certain features of him that were causally efficacious in my coming to love him. But I can meet dozens of people like him in all those respects and not love them. ("Although there is no doubt some feature of James which is the reason why I love him, I am not obliged to love William as well, just because he shares that feature.")<sup>44</sup> When you love someone, or, I claim, are angry at someone, this person is an object in some way that can't be reduced to his having a causally efficacious feature set. This I will call the target view. I will now give an account of it.

Why will I not love Harry on recognizing in him the same characteristics that brought about my loving Frank? The answer I would give is that with Frank, I now have a certain history of loving but with Harry, I do not. I think in this case we must distinguish between coming to feel an emotion and that emotion's being maintained. (In this case between falling in love and staying in love.) The features of a person that cause us to fall in love are usually not the things that sustain our love over the years. New factors arise, and with loving, one is

often just the fact of having a certain history of familiarity with a person. (Whether we can generalize from the love example such that the distinction between my being 'angry about' and 'angry at' corresponds to a distinction between coming to feel an emotion and that emotions being maintained is not yet obvious. I shall argue that the two sets of distinctions do not always correspond.)

I claimed a while back that the relation between emotion and object would be clarified by considering why we might prefer a certain sort of statement in talking about emotions, a statement that focused on a person's being in a certain state, rather than on the cause of the state. Examining the reason for this preference will complete my description of target cases of emotions.

I suggest that to claim someone loves or is angry at a person involves two things: that the person mentioned is the one whose features are causally efficacious in one's coming to have the emotion, and that the desires or behaviour one means to explain by the emotion statement is the kind had or taken towards particular 'targets' (and in the case of emotions these targets are usually particular persons).

This claim may be more persuasive if I offer a case where examining the associated desire is necessary for determining whether it's a feature case or a target case. If sad endings cause me to admire movies, if I see a movie with a sad ending, I will say I admire the movie. But with 'admiring', we have no grammatical way of telling whether what I admire is a feature of the object, or whether the presence of that feature causes me to admire that object in a way that is not reducible to admiring a feature set, (that is, whether we should analyze it as a feature view or a target view). Suppose we have two people, both of whom are caused to admire movies by these movies having sad endings. Suppose also, that the second person has an interest in the aesthetic evaluation of movies but the first person does not. The first person, when asked what he admires about the movie might say, "the ending", and rest content. But the second person would want to say more, perhaps that its having that kind of ending contributed towards its being a good movie, but what he admires is that movie. This is because the associated

desire, aesthetic evaluation of the movie, requires that movie for its object.

Similarly, when I love a person, I may have been caused to love him by certain of his features. But my loving him gives rise to desires that are not had towards features, or towards any old object with those features, but only towards that particular person. And on a general theory of the use of emotion statements, one claims to love a person when giving an explanation of these desires or the actions or behaviour that results.

I concluded the last section by arguing that emotions have strong connections to desire and action. This bond makes emotion statements a natural way of explaining action, behaviour, and preceding desires and a natural use of emotion statements is to explain why a person is behaving or wants to behave in a certain way. On the target view, emotions have courtesy objects by virtue of emotion statements being used to explain actions and desires with these objects. That emotions have such objects is in no way incompatible with their being feelings.

My initial way of distinguishing between feature cases and target cases was to point out that in the latter, the situation surrounding the emotion has features that may not be causally efficacious in our coming to feel the emotion, that nevertheless seem to justify our saying that we're angry at someone, rather than merely about something. I explain these features by suggesting the reason they licence our being angry at a person, is because they explain our having certain desires on coming to feel the emotion.

Having analyzed target statements, I will now complete my analysis of feature statements. Feature statements (e.g. I'm angry about his remark), are those that lead people to worry about a cause/object confusion. They can in fact always be rewritten so that the feature is only mentioned causally (e.g. His remark angered me). But we rewrite them at risk of losing what we want to say. "His remark angered me", is a statement of a past causal event; "I am angry about his remark", talks about the present state of a person. Further, I included feature statements under a general description of an important function of emotion statements,

that of explaining behaviour.

Given these reminders, I now define the feature view negatively. Feature statements are used to explain behaviour or desires that do not have as their objects those with the features that were causally efficacious in bringing about the emotion. Therefore they can always be rewritten such that the feature is only mentioned causally.<sup>45</sup> We can say they have, by courtesy, the object of the appraisal that caused the emotion. Appraising crossing a bridge as dangerous causes your fear; what you fear is crossing the bridge. Once more, I see no problem with emotions being feelings. I also claim that in feature cases, cause and object collapse.

Emotions have objects because we use statements about emotions to explain behaviour, and actions and desires have objects. This object fills the grammatical place of object in sentences mentioning emotions, when these sentences cannot be rewritten causally.<sup>46</sup>

## E. Conclusion

### 1. Objections to the Feeling Theory

At the beginning of this chapter, I presented the most common criticisms of the feeling theory of emotions: an emotion cannot be just a feeling because emotions have objects (feelings do not), emotions can be unreasonable (feelings cannot), and emotions cannot be distinguished solely by the way that we feel. I stated that the first two arguments depend on emotions having objects and being unreasonable in some non-courtesy sense.

I have argued that emotions have courtesy objects. I also suggest that they are reasonable or unreasonable in a courtesy sense borrowed again from beliefs and desires. We can exercise control over the causes and consequences of our emotions, and through this influence over emotive occasions, we can affect the way we feel.<sup>47</sup>

This leaves only the last criticism, that the feeling theory lacks the necessary resources for an account of how we distinguish emotions; it's said that if they are just feelings, we should be able to disting-

uish them by the way we feel, and we cannot. (I find this criticism very odd, as it seems to me that almost all feelings are distinguished and described at least in part by reference to their attendant circumstances.)

First of all, my list of emotions is properly restrained. As I don't count such pairs as benevolence and sympathy, hope and excitement, melancholy and depression as emotions, I'm not concerned about how they're distinguished. With the basic emotions, I really don't think it's a problem. For doubters, I offer the following ways.

On the local level, some emotions are clearly named and distinguished by level of intensity, that is, by the strength of the sensations. Rage and terror are extremes of anger and fear, and that's exactly what they feel like. Distinguishing anger from jealousy, however, requires a more sensitive touch. It raises the delicate issue of how I recognize I'm in an emotional state at all. I will argue from the premiss that the circumstances of concept formation are adequate circumstances for concept usage.

Ronald De Sousa, in "The Rationality of Emotions", suspects that the following is the right account of how we learn emotion concepts:

We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotions by association with paradigm scenarios, drawn first from our daily life as small children, later reinforced by the stories and fairy tales to which we are exposed, and, later still, supplemented and refined by literature and art. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: First a paradigm situation providing the characteristic objects of the emotion (where objects can be of various sorts, some more suitably labelled "target", or "occasion"), and second, a set of characteristic or "normal" responses to the situation. It is in large part in virtue of the response component of the scenarios that emotions are commonly held to motivate: though this is, in a way, back to front: for the emotion often takes its name from the response disposition and is only afterwards assumed to cause it.<sup>48</sup>

Bruno Bettelheim gives a concrete description of the same phenomenon:

Action takes the place of understanding for a child and this is increasingly true the more, strongly he feels....A child may have learned he can placate adults by explaining his action thus: "I did it because I am angry"--but that does not change the fact that the child does not experience anger as anger, but only as the impulse to hit, to destroy, to



keep silent. Not before puberty do we begin to recognize our emotions for what they are without immediately acting on them or wishing to do so.<sup>49</sup>

Embedded in these descriptions are two promising elements which we can re-identify again and again in order to recognize and distinguish our emotions. One is the kind of situation that prompts them; the other is the actions or responses that they themselves prompt. De Sousa and Bettelheim focus on the second; I think the first is equally, perhaps more, important. I'll call it the history of the emotion.

We often make reference to the history of an event, state or object, to differentiate it from things that resemble it. A man is charged with murder rather than manslaughter because the killing had a certain history; he intended to kill. Some of the propositions I hold count as knowledge, others as belief, still others as supposition; it depends on how I arrived at them. An object's history is often referred to in discussion of art: "The identification of a picture as a genuine Rembrandt print depends crucially on details of how it came to be produced".<sup>50</sup>

In learning emotions and knowing emotions, evidence that we're in an emotional state, and evidence that it's a state of a particular kind, both often come from identifying that state's history. Alston, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, gives this example: "One learns what it is to feel relieved by learning to recognize a pattern of bodily sensations that typically occurs when one discovers a danger ~~has~~ been removed".<sup>51</sup> Young love is another classic example. If you tell someone that you have a stomach-ache, and that you spent the whole day with a pig-tailed red-head, you'd be unusually fortunate to escape a diagnosis of puppy-love. And distinguishing resentment from irritation, shame from embarrassment, anger from jealousy, can all be fairly securely done by analyzing the history that led to the state.<sup>52</sup>

I may know that what I feel is resentment, in part because I've been belittled by someone with more power than myself and I want to put a bomb in his desk. This does not mean that my evidence for feeling resentment is part of the resentment. Wittgenstein argues in the Investigations, that because of the complex circumstances that invariably surround the occurrence of hope, hope ~~cannot~~ be simply a state of a person.

George Rey, in "Functionalism and the Emotions", makes an adequate reply to this kind of objection:

Someone might be said to correctly know that Hannibal crossed the Alps only if Hannibal in fact did so; but this doesn't imply that so knowing cannot just be a state of that person, that it must instead be some sort of phenomena having as parts both that person and Hannibal and/or the crossing. It may just be a state of that person that is correctly described as "knowing that Hannibal crossed the Alps" only if Hannibal did indeed cross the Alps. Wittgenstein's claim that "hope" refers not to a state of the hoper, but to "a phenomena of human life" seems based on a confusion of just this sort.<sup>53</sup>

(I take it that the broadest general description of this kind of confusion is thinking that what's included in a theory about something must be part of the thing itself.)

We may have learned to identify emotions, and consequently are able to re-identify them, on the basis of their histories and consequences. Our learning emotions this way would show why cognitive and motivational elements are part of the account of any particular emotion. None of this is incompatible with emotions being just feelings.

Having said all this, however, I'd like to argue that we can and do recognize and distinguish emotions by what we feel, and that this makes emotions a fairly special class of feelings. Here's a contrast: when someone insults me, I may report that I feel insulted. Insults often cause anger but they can cause hurt or even shame. Thus to say "I feel insulted" is not to say that I feel angry, as opposed to hurt or even ashamed. To say that insulted is, "How I feel when someone insults me", is to individuate the feeling in a non-question begging way. But under the description, many feelings could count as feeling insulted.

Emotions seem not to be like this. If someone responds to danger with joy, we do not say that that's his way of feeling fear. We say, instead, that he reacts to danger in a non-standard way.<sup>54</sup> The grounds for recognizing emotions, in contrast to many other types of feeling, seem to gradually become detached from the paradigm scenarios in which they were learned. There are two things that make this possible. One is that emotional feelings are intense, the other is that they're relatively frequent. The situations that occasion them occur again and again,

and our ways of expressing and coping with emotions become culturally and personally standardized.

The standardization of response to emotions, contributes to the ease of recognizing and distinguishing them by what we feel. To have a standard response to an emotion is to expand the phenomenological base by which that emotion can be recognized. If I invariably react to anger with a desire to hit someone, that desire, whether acted on or not, will give rise to a variety of sensations, making it easier for me to identify my feeling as a case of anger.<sup>55</sup> This suggests that as we get older and more set in our emotional ways, it becomes more likely that we can and will identify our emotions by the total way we feel.<sup>56</sup>

## 2. Summary

This concludes my defence of emotions as feelings. I hope that throughout this chapter, the landings have been properly guided by the approach. I have taken my cue from George Rey: "Emotional states may not be merely qualitative introspectable states...; but that doesn't mean they are spread all over the countryside".<sup>57</sup>

The theory of emotions I have defended is mentioned briefly by Ducasse, in "Art and the Language of Emotions". I offer this quote from the article as my summary:

The term the emotions ordinarily designates the relatively few feelings...for which names were needed, because their typical spontaneous manifestations, and the typical situations that arouse those particular feelings, present themselves again and again in human life....other feelings are too rare, or too fleeting, or too unmanifested, or their nuances too subtle, to have pragmatic importance and therefore to have needed names.<sup>58</sup>

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. Amelie Rorty, ed., Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.4. My theory is fairly neutral about how helpful emotions are so I don't see the necessity of rehabilitating them.
2. Aaron Hill, "Dramatic Passions", in Actors on Acting, ed. by Toby Cole and Helen Krich Chinoy (New York: Crown Publishers, 1970), p.118.
3. Errol Bedford, "Emotions", in Essays in Philosophical Psychology, ed. by D.F. Gustafson (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1964), p.78.
4. Whether one treats feelings as mental or physical may have something to do with one's criterion for the mental. If it's intentionality, feelings are out; if it's privileged access, they may be in. This dispute does not determine my view on feelings. When I say that feelings are sets of bodily sensations, I mean this in a stronger sense than "composed of", as when we might say, "This table is composed of atoms". This table being composed of atoms has little effect on our concept of a table, whereas I claim that we ordinarily think of feelings as bodily changes of which we are aware; i.e. as sets of sensations. I don't purpose to consider what makes feelings special. My view does not entail that that 'feeling talk' is reducible to 'sensation talk'.
5. It's not clear to me that a view involving mental feelings necessitates this.
6. Evidence that we cannot is reasonably conclusive and comes from three sources: observation, introspection, and experimentation. We judge through observations of behaviour that people are often mistaken about their emotions in a way we do not judge them to be mistaken about their pains. A man will deny he's jealous, for instance, when the behavioural is so irrefutable it will convince even him once it's pointed out. Introspection also yields unfriendly results. Is it possible (it is frequently asked), to differentiate a feeling of embarrassment from a feeling of shame merely by paying attention to the quality of the feeling. All philosophers who say they've tried,

say they've failed. The evidence from experimentation is recent and thought to be impressive. Two American psychologists devised a laboratory experiment in which they injected several subjects with epinephrine, an adrenal secretion which causes certain sensations. They then placed these subjects in various situations which were meant to be either fear-provoking or anger-provoking. Subjects placed in the former reported feelings of fear, those in the latter, feelings of anger. To the empirically-minded this result was thought to prove that recognition and labelling of emotions is a function of applying a causal hypothesis from a particular situation to your sensations and not a function of differentiation from the quality of the feelings themselves. For details of this experiment see, J. Singer and S. Schachter, "Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants of Emotional States", Psychological Review, LXIX, 5 (1962).

7. See, e.g., George Pitcher, "Emotion", Mind, 74 (1965), p.326; also, Bedford, "Emotions", pp.78-9.
8. If we talk of someone's having an intense belief, we are not qualifying the belief but the way he holds it...he gets angry if people question it, etc.
9. Frithjof Bergmann, "The Passions", review of The Passions, by Robert Solomon, in the Journal of Philosophy, LXXV, 4 (1978), p.205.
10. George Rey discusses this in, "Functionalism and the Emotions", in Rorty, Explaining Emotions, p.175.
11. See, e.g., Keith Donellan, "Causes, Objects, and Producers of the Emotions", (abstract), Journal of Philosophy, LXVII, 21 (1970), p.949: "For each emotion there seem to be certain characteristic beliefs that the subject must have about the object of his emotion. With many, if not all, emotions, he must have a belief in the existence...of the object. He must also see the object as having certain properties."
12. Bedford, "Emotions", p.80. The most extreme work in this direction is in a recent book by Robert Solomon, The Passions (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1977).
13. The person who seems to worry most about this is Irving Thalberg. See, for instance, his "Causes and Constituents of Emotion and Action", Philosophical Quarterly, 23 (1973).
14. Robert Aquilla, "Causes and Constituents of Occurrent Emotions", Philosophical Quarterly, 25 (1975), p.347.
15. Since no one believes that psychological states are complex, this

view requires talking about emotion situations (Pitcher's approach), or treating emotions like some sort of social construct à la Wittgenstein.

16. Curt Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), p.19.
17. This takes care of cases where the emotion disappears when the belief changes, but what about when emotions outlive a change in belief. I think this is explained by their being feelings. Also, there is a natural tendency for us to maintain emotions that are in place by making fresh judgments to support them.
18. Pitcher, "Emotion", p.332.
19. See, e.g., R.S. Peters, "Reason and Passion", in Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol.4, 1969/70 (London: Macmillan Press, 1971); also, Paul Ekman, "Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions", in Rorty, Explaining Emotions.
20. Ekman, "Movement in the Expression of Emotions", pp.73-102.
21. Ibid., pp.87-88.
22. Ibid., p.89.
23. Ibid., p.90.
24. George Marshall, "On Being Affected", Mind, LXXVII, 306 (1968), p.247.
25. Ibid., p.249.
26. Anthony Fell, Emotion in the Thought of Sartre (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p.8.
27. Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p.94.
28. Fell, Emotion in the Thought of Sartre, p.16.
29. This is a very common theory of emotions that traces its ancestry back to the early Greeks, who held that emotions were completely of the body and indicated some disfunction or disharmony in its operation.
30. Peters, "Reason and Passion", p.138.
31. See, for instance, Solomon, The Passions, ch. 2.
32. Roger Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and the Common Culture", in Rorty, Explaining Emotions, p.526. This is a relat-

ively common way of fattening up the feature of interest--some sort of peculiar emphasis on oneself as subject.

33. Fell, Emotion in the Thought of Sartre, p.23.
34. I think this account of emotive occasions fits the individual emotions quite well. It explains common folklore about love--that once in control we lose interest, and explains why angry young men want to change the world. When the control element disappears emotions will undergo a further transformation, e.g. grief to resignation, joy to contentment, fear to relief etc.
35. I borrow this terminology from the area of aesthetics.
36. This point relates back to my arguing that something can be a cause on one occasion, a causal condition on another.
37. Ekman, "Movement in the Expression of Emotions", p.84: "Appraisal is not always automatic. Sometimes the evaluation of what is happening is slow, deliberate and conscious."
38. Rorty, Explaining Emotions, p.1.
39. If I understand Hume correctly, objects get their place by being the end point of a teleological sequence involving that emotion, (i.e. what the emotion directs our attention or desires towards). His concerns have no connection to grammatical positioning, nor does Hume even think that emotions have objects in the way some modern philosophers suppose: "But when I am angry I am actually possessed with the passion and in that emotion have no more reference to any other object than when I am thirsty, or sick, or five feet tall." David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby Bigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.415.
40. This example, from Marshall, "On Being Affected", p.244, is not an unfair representation of how people talk about objects: "Affections demand objects. This demand is usually met naturally. It would seem to be usually the case that our being affected by something is occasioned by our having noticed or become aware of it; our attention, and hence an object, is usually involved in our being affected....An affection seems to be the result of attention." Cause, object, and occasion are all roaming around in this passage, making it difficult for me to tell what his view actually is.
41. Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p.71.
42. Ronald De Sousa, "Self-Deceptive Emotions", in Rorty, Explaining Emotions, p.286.

43. I think that people confuse themselves unduly about causes and objects of emotions by standardly looking at statements that are either passive or intransitive. An explanation of this might be that we're used to being the subject of descriptions of our states and actions, but most emotion verbs are reverse psychological verbs, taking the person as object. We have 'anger', 'gladden', 'frighten', 'sadden', 'cheer-up', 'awe', 'embarrass', 'shame' and 'grieve'.
44. Scruton, "Emotion and Practical Knowledge", p.526. Or, if you prefer, Casanova: "Love is not a sentiment or caprice of sympathy; only that object which inspires it can extinguish it or make it burn."
45. An example of where such a statement would be used:  
I am angry about what he did.  
=
- What he did angered me so much I'm going to write a letter to the Dean.
46. Pitcher says of his own view something he could easily have said of mine: "On the present view, it is easily understandable how emotions can have objects; because according to it, emotion-situations consist in part of an element of apprehension and an element of evaluation, and these are paradigms of things that have objects." Pitcher, "Emotion", p.339.
47. In what sense are emotions rational? There is a current strong trend in emotion theory to make emotions out to be rational entities of some sort. I ignore this trend, even critically, except where I briefly exclude the just judgment theory. (This would be the quickest way to make them rational and has been tried by Solomon.) My theory allows for this: if your judgments and desires are generally sound, there's no particular reason to distrust your emotions as indicators of action. It would take too long to criticize all rationality of emotion theories; I'll just say this: they generally hold that the emotions are for something, but the characterizations are either narrow and inaccurate (Solomon--strategies for self-esteem), or so broad (De Sousa--techniques of salience) as to potentially include all our psychological states. Solomon and De Sousa both worry that without emotions we'd be automotons; since we'd have thousands of other feelings this worry seems silly. Also, both assume that since we have standards for distinguishing appropriate emotions from inappropriate ones, the appropriate ones must be good in some strong sense. But we can distinguish good from bad melodramas without thinking any of them are worth watching. For some interesting remarks on the emotions and rationality, see Peters, "Reason and Passion".
48. De Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions", in Rorty, Explaining Emotions, p.142.



49. Bruno Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment (New York: Random House, Inc., 1977), p.31.
50. Rey, "Functionalism and the Emotions", p.181.
51. William Alston, "Emotion and Feeling", in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), p.484.
52. The importance of the history of the emotion can be seen from an example De Sousa provides in "Self-Deceptive Emotions", p.291. He claims that women and men experience anger differently, women as frustration, men as indignation. I suggest this difference would naturally lead to a difference in consequences. Then, what makes it all anger must have something to do with the history.
53. Rey, "Functionalism and The Emotions", pp.182-83.
54. This kind of example undercuts motivation for making emotions all, or in part, judgments.
55. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, p.59: "The existence of characteristic expressions of emotion itself provides a further link between emotion and sensation for the expression characteristic of each emotion--e.g. weeping--is itself felt, and this feeling is a genuine sensation."
56. De Sousa works out this idea a bit in "Self-Deceptive Emotions", p.287: "That theory, which identified emotion with the perception of a bodily state caused by an evoking situation, is almost universally held to have been refuted. The central argument against it is that identical physicochemical stimuli produce divergent emotions depending on the situational and epistemic context. But if we reinterpret the bodily changes involved to include those that amount to, or normally determine, the expressive motor events associated with the emotion, we can say that what we feel in an emotion state is the expressive set of our body....(This implies), with common sense and against prevalent philosophical doctrine, that we can commonly identify our emotions by what we feel. Against this version of James-Lange the standard objections have no force."
57. Rey, "Functionalism and The Emotions", p.184.
58. Curt Ducasse, "Art and the Language of Emotions", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXIII, 1 (1964), pp.109-10.

## CHAPTER III: EMOTION AND FICTION

### A. Introduction and a Note on Fictions

In this final chapter, I do two things. These are distinct projects, although in taking up the second, I assume the success of the first. I apply the theory of emotions defended in the last chapter to aesthetic situations to show that genuine emotional response to fiction is possible. Then, using the theory of emotions as a base, I speculate a little more freely on the nature of this response. Both projects contribute to a defence of the genuineness of aesthetic emotions. To say they're logically possible is not to say that anybody ever has them. I try to make their presence more persuasive by discussing the ways in which aesthetic situations provide ideal emotive occasions.

In the Introduction to Chapter I, I picked the category of cases in which I have an interest, those involving fictions. In keeping with this concern, in the chapter I restrict my use of the term 'aesthetic situation' to those situations where an audience is reading, watching, or listening to a work of fiction. Similarly, I restrict my use of the term 'aesthetic response' to audience response to fiction. I use this general label when I want to be non-committal about whether there are real emotions involved in this response. If I'm assuming the existence of these emotions, either to argue for them or to analyze them, I use the term 'aesthetic emotions'. If I have general claims to make, involving other categories of art as well as fictions, I'll be explicit about the extension of these claims.

The need for these terminological restrictions is on the strong side of cautionary. I realize that explanatory power is a criterion of a good theory, but I see no reason to believe that a proper account of

emotional response to fiction will have any application to the visual arts, music or poetry.

I have already isolated fictions in a way that's rough but adequate for my purposes; fictions are temporal works of art that represent human predicaments at least partially through the medium of language. I am not even very concerned about whether this definition captures all and only those works of art properly called fictions; it captures the group of works in which I have an interest. However, given current concerns of aestheticians, I feel obliged to explain why I'm content to say so little about the kind of art I'm writing about.

In a recent paper, "Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't", Robert Howell makes a firm statement about the obligations of those who deal with fictions:

In what sense, if any, are we committed to the existence of such putative entities as Hamlet, Anna Karenina, Tom Sawyer, and Jane Eyre? And how shall we understand our various claims about these entities? These questions have exercised past writers on aesthetics and metaphysics. And they have become even more acute as philosophers have come to apply to literature various pieces of apparatus from linguistics, formal logic, and formal semantics. In the hard, clear light which such applications cast, it is impossible to avoid saying whether, for example, the name "Hamlet denotes anything or whether the sentence 'Anna Karenina had grey eyes' expresses a literal, actual-world truth.<sup>1</sup> (129)

The extent to which Walton, in answering questions about aesthetic response, is concerned with the structure of fictional discourse, is an indication of how seriously people take the obligation expressed in the final sentence of the quote. In analyzing purported emotional response to fiction, Walton's approach is to first defend a particular semantic account of fictional language. Then, given some fairly uncontentious assumptions about the emotions, he extracts a theory of aesthetic response as a consequence of this theory of fictions.

In Walton's analysis, assumptions about fictions and emotions react to yield the consequence that aesthetic emotions are not possible. The Naive View, wherein characters exist and are as dangerous as men, is an example of the same kind of machinery producing a different product.

One of my projects, in this chapter, is to show that aesthetic

emotions are possible. I choose to do this by concentrating on what emotions are. I believe that the theory of emotions I have defended will not react with any theory of fictions so as to render aesthetic emotions impossible.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, I do not feel obliged to commit myself on the proper semantic analysis of statements about the colour of Anna Karenina's eyes.

The second project of this chapter is to speculate a bit on the nature of aesthetic emotions. The characteristics of fictions that I've mentioned--that it's temporal and represents human predicaments through language--are a sufficient base for these speculations. Theories of representation, fictional language and so on, are outside both the interests and the requirements of this chapter.<sup>3</sup>

## B: The Possibility of Aesthetic Emotions

### 1. Why Possibility is at Issue

Perhaps there is a more interesting rationale for my thinking that details of theories of fiction are not relevant to determining the possibility of aesthetic emotions. It is the explanation of why possibility is what's at issue. Suppose aesthetic response does default on some of the requirements for standard emotional response. Why is this so serious as to threaten the possibility of aesthetic emotions? Given a non-aesthetic situation, philosophers are willing to be moderately lax about the requirements for emotions. For instance, in "Emotion", George Pitcher lists five ways that emotions can be deviant. I'll quote his description of irrational fear:

He acknowledges that there is no danger, and yet he is afraid. Thus it is unreasonable to be afraid of falling if one admits that there is no chance whatever of falling, or of a particular cow if one admits that the beast is harmless.<sup>4</sup>

In cases of irrational fear, the appraisal of danger that Pitcher specifies as the relevant cognitive element seems to be missing entirely. Yet Pitcher is happy to call it real fear, and almost everyone admits the genuineness of these deviant or peripheral cases. There is then, a gen-

eral asymmetry in the ways that philosophers deal with aesthetic and non-aesthetic response. In the former situations, why is the possibility of emotion at stake? Why not think that the admitted possibility of irrational fear established the possibility of aesthetic emotions and then go on, for instance, to argue about questions of rationality?

The answer to these questions rests on the conditions for the application of deviance as a category of explanation. To characterize a phenomenon as deviant, it is necessary that the deviant phenomenon and its standard counterpart both take place in the same kind of circumstances. It is only against some backdrop of sameness that one phenomenon can be explained and analyzed as a deviant case of something to which it is similar. What puts the possibility of aesthetic emotions in jeopardy is not just that aesthetic response appears to lack certain features of standard emotional response. It is also that aesthetic situations do not seem sufficiently like ordinary emotive occasions to provide the necessary backdrop for a claim of deviance.

Philosophers who ground their theory of aesthetic response on a detailed theory of fictions are backdrop theorists. Walton can be seen as attacking the possibility of the backdrop. He denies that aesthetic circumstances are sufficiently like emotive occasions for aesthetic response to be any kind of emotive response. Naive theorists defend or assume that the backdrop is sufficiently similar for aesthetic response to be some kind of emotive response. Nevertheless, even with this backdrop approach, deviance generally isn't seen as a starting point. Aesthetic situations are not so immediately and obviously similar to emotive occasions to argue from a claim of deviance. This is why their possibility and not just their description is always the first issue.

I am not a backdrop theorist. As I ignore the option of arguing that aesthetic emotions are a deviant or peripheral case of emotional response, attention to the aesthetic backdrop is not an important part of my methodology. In deference to Walton, I do think it's a good technique for attempting to show that aesthetic emotions are not possible. It is neither useful nor necessary for showing that they are possible. If aesthetic emotions can be defended as normal, well-balanced emotions,

(and I argue that they can), it is obviously counter-productive to argue that they are deviant or peripheral. This account of the explanatory use of deviance explains my mild, minimal dealings with the theory of fictions while attempting to show that aesthetic emotions are possible.

## 2. The Desirability of Aesthetic Emotions

As the intent of this entire chapter is to make the fact of aesthetic emotions convincing, tactically it seems wise to say a few words on the desirability of having real emotions at our disposal in trying to account for response to art.

First, there is the obvious point that people think they are responding emotionally to art. If I claim to pity Hamlet, there is no reason to doubt my conviction that I do, in fact, pity Hamlet. We often describe our aesthetic experiences by everyday emotional names. Sometimes we rate works and even whole categories of art by how they affect us emotionally. Pauline Kael criticized the movie "The Towering Inferno" for getting its emotional impact from playing on our primitive fears about burning;<sup>5</sup> a criticism of the melodrama may be that the emotional experiences it gives rise to are less intense, important, or profound than those of tragedies. It is not only audiences who are convinced of the authenticity of their response. Artists, performers, critics, art historians, and theorists believe that audiences respond emotionally to fiction. Brecht meant his plays to move audiences to anger. Was he wrong about this possibility? If our response to art is not genuine emotional response, then thousands of people over the years have been and are incorrect or deceived about the nature of aesthetic response. No aesthetic theory should go looking for this kind of opposition.

As well, there is only a slightly more subtle consideration that parallels reasons for wanting a theory of fictional truth. We want a theory of fictional truth so that we can criticize or correct the person who says that Sherlock Holmes took a raft trip down the Mississippi with a Negro named Jim. Similarly, when dealing with response to art, we need some responses to be appropriate in order to set standards by which to measure others as deficient. If someone claims to have found Oedipus'

plight funny, and one wants to criticize his reaction, it would be convenient to be able to say something like, "That's disgusting. You should have felt pity". Criticizing people's purported emotional response as inappropriate, sentimental, morally frivolous, and so on, is easier on a theory that allows for real emotions as the standards then come built into the theory. If aesthetic response is not real emotional response, the standards of appropriate emotional response must then be applied analogically, or some new set of standards for aesthetic response must be proposed and defended.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, as I suggested in my criticism of Walton, any theory which proposes that aesthetic response has a healthy and valuable effect on our emotional life pretty well needs aesthetic emotions to make much of a case.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. The Possibility of Aesthetic Emotions

In this section, I will quickly defend what I call the bare possibility of aesthetic emotions. My approach is perfectly predictable. There are three well-worn assumptions about the necessary conditions of any experience being a case of a genuine emotion. I have discussed them at length in Chapter II; they are that real emotions require appropriate beliefs, desires, and objects. Persistent philosophical observance of these assumptions leads to a problem in aesthetic situations. We believe we are responding emotionally to fictions, but the necessary conditions for real emotions seemingly cannot be met. I now intend to extract Chapter II conclusions and hold them up against aesthetic situations. I conclude that those conditions not met in aesthetic situations are not, in fact, necessary conditions of genuine emotional response. This is to assume the existence of aesthetic emotions and show why they're not a problem. This technique yields no better than the bare possibility of emotional response to fiction.

In Chapter II, I examined the conceptual role in emotion theory of the three features that most emotion experiences seem to exhibit, feelings, beliefs and desires. In aesthetic situations the presence of the appropriate feelings is not at issue; no one denies that we have feelings

in response to art. The reason Walton is willing to label Charles' state as "quasi-fear" is because Charles has certain fear-like feelings:

The only signs that he might really believe he is endangered are his more or less automatic, non-deliberate reactions: his pulse rate, his sweaty palms, his knotted stomach, his spontaneous shriek.<sup>8</sup> (88)

The worry is rather that the appropriate beliefs and desires are absent in aesthetic situations and that these features are as necessary to real emotional response as feelings. Thus the possibility of aesthetic emotions is in doubt. The absence of appropriate beliefs leads to the additional worry of whether aesthetic emotions could have appropriate objects. As the problem of desire does not exhibit this kind of fission, I choose to consider it first. My claim throughout is that the absence of certain beliefs and desires does not count against the possibility of aesthetic emotions.

In Chapter II, I came to several conclusions about the relation of emotion to desire. I denied that emotions could be reduced to desires, but agreed that it is fair to see emotions as motivational states. This is because they often give rise to desires--most commonly, desires to express or communicate the emotion, and desires to cope with it. The second group of desires leads frequently to actions against the source of the emotion--for instance, kicking the person who made you mad. I also suggested that the connection between emotion and desire is so strong and constant that it explains, in part, our picking up a certain group of feelings and placing them in their own ontological category. Desires are commonly the kind of consequence by which we judge that a feeling has been sufficiently sustained to be called an emotion. If all this is true, it establishes a conceptual connection between emotion and desire at the generic level. But granting all this, I argued that there is no particular occasion when any desire has any necessary connection to any emotion.

Some philosophers argue that a claim of fear for Hamlet or the heroine, if genuine, must be backed by some desire which ordinarily accompanies fear for another, a desire for instance to save the character, or a desire that the character be saved by another character. They



also argue that in aesthetic situations there is often no evidence that we have the kinds of desires that would normally accompany a claim of fear for another. Thus Walton asks, "Is our concern for the heroine a fake, a sham?" (14).<sup>9</sup> Why such desires are or seem to be absent in aesthetic situations is something that deserves an explanation; I will provide one in the following sections. Nevertheless what's important here is as there is no logical connection between any particular emotion and desire, what I have labelled the non-interventive character of aesthetic response does not mitigate against any incident of it's being a case of real emotional response.

The description in Chapter II of the role of belief in emotion theory was quite complex and a theory of how emotions are caused. I denied that emotions could be reduced to judgments. I also argued that beliefs or judgments are not constituents of emotions. I abandoned these options in favour of a theory of causality. I argued that this was the right place for cognition in emotions theory.

I offered the following account of how emotions are caused, albeit with a certain amount of caution. Emotions are caused by a certain type of judgment called an appraisal. An appraisal is a judgment that relates a set of circumstances to oneself or one's interests. There are two features which taken together make emotive appraisals a unique class of appraisals. Emotive appraisals involve feelings, and they relate a set of circumstances to our interests in a particular way.

An emotive appraisal is a judgment that depends on a feeling. The feeling may be temporally prior to the appraisal or may occur contemporaneously with it. It may even follow it. The feeling helps rouse one's interest sufficiently to ground this kind of appraisal. It may do this in an occurrent or dispositional way. The feeling of fright may be a catalyst for an immediate appraisal of the situation; feeling tired or bad-tempered may be the precipitate for a number of appraisals over the course of a day. The feeling is necessary to the appraisal in order to explain how appraisals can cause further feelings.

An emotive appraisal is a judgment that: (a) the way some situation progresses is relevant to one's interests; and (b) that the relev-

ant determinants of (a) are not entirely within one's control. In the case of some emotions, e.g., joy, this lack of complete control over the situation is a good thing; in the case of others, e.g., envy, it's not such a good thing. Appraisals usually mention properties that are evaluative and emergent, like dangerous or enviable. These properties summarize the way in which the situation relates to one's interests. An emotive appraisal maintains, intensifies, or in other ways alters the first level of feeling. This second level of feeling is the emotion.

In summary, I argued that an emotive appraisal is a feeling based judgment that relates a set of circumstances to one's interests with respect to one's control over these circumstances. It causes further feelings and these further feelings are what we call an emotion.

Emotional response to fiction is thought to be a problem primarily in consequence of the belief criteria for a genuine response not being met. I stated in Chapter II that most philosophers (Walton's a good example) believe that there are two requisite beliefs for any genuine emotional response: a belief that the object of the emotion exists, and a belief that it has certain properties causally or conceptually related to that emotion's being of a certain type. It is the existence belief that leads people to take a dim view of the possibility of aesthetic emotions, although most would claim that the existence and property beliefs are related in important ways. They would say that Hamlet doesn't exist; therefore, he can't be suffering, or conversely, that to believe he is suffering is to commit yourself to his existence. On either of these formulations the fact that we admit that Hamlet doesn't exist, logically blocks our responding to a portrayal of suffering.

I concluded in Chapter II, however, that the appraisals that cause emotions have no logical ties to existence propositions and no psychological ties to existence beliefs. They do mention properties, but these are properties not of objects but of situations, and given the kind of properties that appraisals mention there is no necessity that the situation actually obtain. Appraisals relate one's interests to a set of circumstances. To appraise a situation as dangerous is to say that I am or would be in danger were I to be in that situation. The appraised

situation can actually obtain, be suspected to obtain, be imagined to obtain and so on.

That existence beliefs are irrelevant to emotive occasions becomes even more clear when the relation between emotion and object is analyzed. Object talk is a real stumbling block for aesthetic emotions. Walton, for instance, construes the possibility of aesthetic emotions, as one of "our having psychological states directed towards fictional entities". But I concluded in Chapter II that emotions have objects only in a courtesy sense. They may have by courtesy the object of the appraisal that caused the emotion, or they may have by courtesy the object of some associated desire that's directed towards the source of the emotion. There is nothing about the non-existence of fictional characters that would prevent aesthetic emotions from having either kind of courtesy object.

Put briefly, in Chapter II, I defended the view that emotions are feelings which have picked out as a species and are differentiated as individuals by their histories and consequences. None of the features that have, in past, black-balled aesthetic emotions, are necessary features of emotion, although they are necessary parts of emotion theory. There is nothing logically, which prevents aesthetic response from being a case of genuine emotional response.

### C. Aesthetic Emotions: Causes and Consequences

#### 1. Introduction

Feelings are categorized by their circumstances.<sup>10</sup> Emotions are picked out as a special category of feelings because of their histories and consequences, and this categorization is reflected in our concepts of what emotions are. If we commit ourselves to the existence of aesthetic emotions, we are then committed to aesthetic situations providing the circumstances by which emotions have been categorized. That, or we recognize the possibility that were our concepts of emotions now derived fresh from aesthetic situations, they might be quite different from the concepts we already have.

I must argue against this second possibility. My project is to make a persuasive case for aesthetic emotions. I have argued for their possibility but I'm still not in a position to actually point at them. The reality of something remains the most difficult of all things to establish by philosophical means. One can only attack the grounds for being sceptical. In this section, I describe in detail the circumstances of aesthetic response, to prove that they are appropriate circumstances for emotive response. Aesthetic emotions are possible and theoretically useful. When they are securely embedded in proper emotive occasions, I will have finished defending them.<sup>11</sup>

## 2. Aesthetic Occasions: The Need for an Activity

To be satisfying and persuasive, a description of the circumstances in which aesthetic emotions take place, (I will call these circumstances aesthetic occasions), must at least deal with all the features mentioned in my description of ordinary emotive occasions. I must say whether each feature is present or absent and in each case why. Those features necessary to emotive occasions, feelings for example, I must, of course, defend as being present in aesthetic situations. Other features, desires for example, are optional but commonplace, and so I must show whether they are present in aesthetic situations. Scouting out the potential trouble spots for a description of aesthetic occasions will allow me to show where I rejoin traditional defences of aesthetic emotions.

To show that aesthetic emotions are caused by appraisals I must prove that the conditions for appraisals are themselves met in aesthetic occasions. These conditions will be necessary parts of aesthetic occasions. There are four conditions for emotive appraisals: feelings, proper circumstances, perceived lack of control, and roused interest. Only the last is troubling.

No one denies that we have feelings in response to art. The only difficulty is with their categorization. Should we call certain of these feelings when had in response to fiction, emotions? Since almost any feeling can be converted into an emotion, given that other conditions are met and the emotive appraisal actually takes place, we are safe in assum-

ing that aesthetic occasions meet the requirement for feelings.

Similarly, we ought to have no difficulty in finding, in aesthetic occasions, appropriate circumstances to appraise. We are fortunate with fictions. In Emotion and Meaning in Music, Leonard Meyer offers an account of affective response to music based on a theory of emotions much like the one I defend. He also accepts that feelings generally are categorized by their circumstances.<sup>12</sup> While suggesting that musical affect might be categorized with reference to musical styles, ("Musical affective experiences, for example, might be differentiated into operatic, orchestral, baroque and so forth"), Meyers argues that as music is non-referential, the affect we have in response to it is "intangible" and "non-referential".<sup>13</sup> I would rephrase his point this way: the aesthetic occasions that music provides do not lend themselves to the kind of appraisals that could cause emotions.

Fiction, however, provides a more fortunate case. Hamlet may not exist, but there is a character called Hamlet. Hamlet may not really be suffering but the character Hamlet is portrayed as suffering. Fictions represent humans in circumstances which, if appraised, would surely cause us emotions. And we are never in control of the story's outcome. After this, however, our luck runs out. The feature of interest is difficult to locate.

An emotive appraisal is a judgment that relates a set of circumstances to one's interests. Yet we need not believe that these circumstances really obtain. In Chapter II, I worked to make these premisses compatible. I used "suspecting an intruder awaits you in the dark", as an example of an uncontentiously emotive occasion where this type of General Belief would be plainly irrelevant. (It wouldn't be a case of suspecting if we believed or knew the intruder was waiting.) Suspecting provides a respectable emotive occasion because one's interests are roused not only by what is happening, but also by what might happen, and in the case of past events by what has already happened. But these are cases where the situations might affect us, or did affect us, or could affect our friends. The situations of fictions are personally remote.<sup>14</sup> Judging that a set of circumstances has some relation to our interests

requires that our interests be present and awake. In aesthetic situations, what activates them?

A description of aesthetic occasions must account for how fictions touch our interests, and also to what extent. "Is our concern for the heroine a fake, a sham?" Emotions require some sort of consequences; activated interests lead to activated desires. Shifting our focus slightly from the necessary features of aesthetic occasions to the optional ones, the problem of interest appears again in worries about the kinds of desires we do not find in aesthetic occasions. It is a common intuition, at least among philosophers, that there really is some breakdown between emotion and desire in aesthetic situations and that this breakdown must be recognized and explained. To quote Harold Osborne again-- although we respond to aesthetic predicaments:

with the same emotion that would be appropriate if the same predicaments were believed to be real...the emotions we experience are not accompanied by the impulses to action and intervention by which they would be accompanied if the predicaments were believed to be real.<sup>15</sup>

Once again, the example of suspecting, from Chapter II, offers a convenient comparison by which to assess the strength of the worry. I used this example not only to show that our interests easily outdistance our existential commitments, but also to illuminate and illustrate the connection between an emotion and the desires to which it gives rise. Many philosophers admit that whether an emotion gives rise to a desire is a contingent matter. But certain emotions have been so closely associated with some particular desire for so long--fear is often defined as a desire to flee--that people tend to think that what desire an emotion gives rise to is completely determined by the nature of that emotion and nothing else. I used the example of suspecting to show that the relation between an emotion and a desire is not so direct and transparent, that to explain this relation its often necessary to bring in the cognitive attitude that governs the entire process of response. For instance, fear that is governed by suspecting (and not believing) will likely give rise to desires to investigate (and not desires to flee). The cognitive attitude that governs the process of response will often be a relevant part of the explanation of why an emotion gives rise to one desire and

not another. That is, it will help us explain why some desires are present but others are absent. What activates our interest in aesthetic situations remains a problem for the description of aesthetic occasions; our worries about the absence of certain desires can probably be explained by locating the attitude or attitudes that govern response to fiction. This particular part of emotion theory parallels exactly the aesthetic attitude theories discussed in Chapter I. It's time to rejoin the regiment.

Suspension of disbelief and psychical distance are accounts of aesthetic emotions that try to explain what's been perceived as a breakdown between emotion and desire in aesthetic situations. Both theories explain this seeming breakdown by reference to our attitude towards fictions, an attitude that allows us to respond emotionally to fictions without ever desiring to disrupt them.

Suspension of disbelief offers this description of our attitude: that audience disbelief in the reality of the fiction is suspended for the course of the work, allowing the members to respond emotionally as if the events portrayed were really happening. But because the audience still, in some sense, disbelieves the fiction, its members do not have the desires they would have, were they actually deceived about the reality of the events.

Psychical distance does not deal with the problem of belief. Instead of characterizing the attitude cognitively, it describes it by reference to our activities with art. It offers only a negative characterization; our activities are not practical ones; therefore, our attitude is a non-practical one. Some psychical distance theorists, I used Edward Bullough's work, believe this non-practical attitude has explanatory force in accounting for the seeming breakdown between emotion and desire. The practical distance between the work and the spectator leads him to view the artwork only objectively and not at all in relation to himself. The only use he will make of his feelings is to tell him more about the work. These feelings do not provide a base for desire and action.

Both theories have problems. The value of both theories is their

suggestion that what's important in explaining an entire process of response is the attitude that governs it. But suspension of disbelief immediately compromises its own insight by making not believing relevant to response. It suggests that each member of the audience must make personal peace with his or her belief that the incidents portrayed in fiction are not really happening. Were this belief to come into play as part of the cognitive process that governs response, I'm sure it would make response difficult. But there's no reason why it need come into play at all.

Suspension of disbelief theorists talk as if our lives are guided by constant awareness of just two categories--the really happening or the merely illusory. Fortunately we have many more categories at our disposal--the probable, the dreamt, the entertained, the suspected, the imagined, and the remembered, to name only a few. We can suppose that many of these categories will involve attitudes that give rise to unique relations between feeling, judgment and desire.

The subtleties of response to life and response to fiction are, as Bullough says, "a question of outlook". Unfortunately, his characterization of our outlook on fictions is only a negative one. We want some positive description. He does suggest a direction,<sup>16</sup> that it is ultimately our aesthetic activities that determine our attitude and through it our response to art. And surely it is our aesthetic activities that will also explain the ways that fictions touch our interests. Although aesthetic emotions are ordinary emotions, philosophers have been right about their needing a special account, the account of what it is that Charles is doing while he watches the green slime advance.

I implied that with a theory of emotions in place, particularly with old assumptions finally stamped out, we could return to Walton's theory and find there the ground on which to build a fresh defence of aesthetic emotions. We can now see Walton's account of Charles' reaction to the green slime, as a suspension of disbelief theory of a particularly sophisticated sort. Charles' response to fiction is analyzed by reference to the activity in which he is engaged--playing a make-believe game that uses the art-work as a prop. Unfortunately, make-believing is



an activity that Walton suggests takes place against an explicitly assumed background of not really believing. Beliefs that the incidents portrayed are not really happening are relevant and in play. Charles is therefore denied real emotions. The account could be seen to be too extreme by depriving us even of an explanation of Charles' sensations.

Walton, however, actually makes use of two activities, pretending and imagining, both of which he counts as types of make-believing. I suggested that he was not careful of the distinction between these activities, that while pretence concerns itself with public behaviour, imagining has some intuitive connection to feeling. The activity of imagining, therefore, might be the appropriate place to look for an explanation of Charles' feelings and a defence of aesthetic emotions.

### 3. Imagining

Imagining evokes feeling and its success as an activity is often measured by the strength and kind of feeling that it causes. No one would want to deny that imagining something is sufficient for causing sensations. Imagine biting into a fresh lemon tart--your mouth waters, with real saliva. Whether these sensations comprise feelings will depend only on the nature of the situation imagined. Imagine that someone close to you at this time being savagely beaten. If you succeed in imagining it vividly, you will find the muscles in your limbs tensed and your jaw clenched. This time you will have feelings (of alertness, anxiety or anger), and not just sensations. Imagining causes feelings because we respond bodily to what's imagined. <sup>17</sup>

The presence of some particular feeling will often provide the criterion for success in imagining. Imagine an object or scene--a person of the opposite sex or a mountain sunrise. Now, try to embellish your fantasy so that you could describe the person imagined as the most attractive person that you have ever seen; or imagine the mountain sunrise as the most awesome spectacle that you have ever witnessed. How do you know that of the many ways in which you might have drawn or coloured your fantasy, that you have filled it with the sorts of details that make it fit the appraisals of "the most attractive person...", or "the most awesome

natural spectacle..."? These are judgments that depend on feelings, and if you succeeded in vividly imagining an awesome sunrise, what you did was sufficient to make you feel a certain way. Perhaps you noticed yourself drawing in your breath or lifting your eyes.

The saliva in my mouth is not an emotion. But then imagining that I am biting into a lemon tart is hardly a fit circumstance for the kind of appraising that leads to emotions. The case of my friend being beaten is better: it, at least, is a situation I can appraise in light of my interests and lack of control, and even if my imagination is a little sluggish, I am bound to reach a certain level of feeling.

Imagining causes feeling, and also sustains the feelings that we already have. Left untended, feelings tend to fade and disappear. What gives them sufficient endurance to last out and ground the process of appraising that converts them? Suppose a first level of feeling caused by some real situation--the hurt, shock, or worry that a lover feels when told his beloved has been unfaithful. He imaginatively constructs the situation; he wasn't there to witness it. Each added visual detail, imagined endearment or betrayed confidence, alters his feelings: perhaps his friend was mistaken--momentary subsidence; no, it's just like her, nothing I do makes any difference to how she acts--anger; maybe this time she'll leave, I couldn't do anything to stop her--fear; I wonder what she told him about me...shame.

Another case: you are vacationing by a lake; it's getting dark and your children haven't yet returned from their walk. Your daughter's only six, but she's with her older brother. Would he have left her? Anger--you've told him before to watch out for her. No--relief--he's at that age where he takes his responsibilities seriously. Age---he's only eleven. You read of an eleven year old that drowned last week. You begin to picture them lost, hurt, and you start to panic. We can conclude from these examples that the difference between the causal efficacy of fantasy and the causal efficacy of reality is probably overrated.<sup>18</sup>

Appraisals depend on a level of feeling being in place; and, therefore, that I should be in a situation which is sufficient to cause the relevant feelings. If I believe, know, or suspect that there is an int-

ruder in my apartment, I am in such a situation. If I imagine there is an intruder in my apartment, I am also in such a situation, although of a different sort. Imaginings can cause feelings, and provide situations to appraise. Imaginings can sustain feelings, heighten them as the imaginings become more vivid, alter them as the contents of the imaginings change.

The conditions for emotive appraisals require that the situation appraised be relevant to our interests. It could be that some interest of ours is explicit in the content of the imagining. I can imagine myself wanting an award and then getting one. I suppose this could be an emotive occasion, but it would take an immensely vivid imagination to get there. A more likely case is where I really want an award, and imagine myself getting one. The situation imagined is relevant to my actual interests, and the real, if momentary delight that follows the imagined blessing of a real interest is just the ordinary way we sustain ourselves emotionally in conditions of scarcity of benefits.

If the emotive occasions that imagining commonly provides depend on our interests being strong, alert, and extant, how does this activity help explain our response to fictions, where the interest is difficult to locate? Fictions as they are related, though not as they are seen, are personally remote. Examples where imagining sustains, heightens and alters feelings, converting the worry of a lover into jealous anger, depend, of course, on feeling and interest being already alerted. But these are cases of automatic imaginings. If our children are late, we cannot help imagining harm to them.<sup>19</sup>

When imagining is taken on as a project however, it is often used to overcome remoteness. It does not create our interests, but encourages the weak and activates the dormant by causing feeling. Perhaps one Sunday morning, I read of an earthquake in Guatemala, and worry about my indifference to suffering, as evidenced to me by my continued feelings of peace and content. To bring my response in line with what I think my concerns are or ought to be, I vividly imagine as many disaster details as are in my repertoire. Imaginings, when taken on as a project, do much of their work on the little-exercised concerns that we already have.

They encourage our interests, coax our feelings, provide appraisable contents, and with much reciprocal interaction between these three, emotions often result:<sup>20</sup> I pity the earthquake victims.

There is a particular word we use to describe the imaginer's success--'vivid'. Exactly what the success amounts to will of course depend on one's reasons for taking on the project. If I wish to feel pity for the victims of an earthquake, I will have succeeded at my imaginative project when I feel this pity. I will have imagined the disaster vividly enough to be moved to pity. A scene vividly imagined is one with a sufficient wealth of affective detail for us to respond in the way that counts as success for that project. But many of us with will and interest cannot create for ourselves this wealth of detail.

Loren Eiseley begins an essay entitled "The Long Loneliness" with a meditation on the loneliness of man, his estrangement from the natural world:

When we were children we wanted to talk to animals and struggled to understand why this was impossible. Slowly we gave up the attempt as we grew into the solitary world of human adulthood; the rabbit was left on the lawn, the dog relegated to his kennel...

It is with a feeling of startlement, therefore, and eager interest touching the lost child in everyone of us, that the public has received the recent accounts of naval research upon the intelligence of one of our brother mammals--the sea-dwelling bottle nosed porpoise or dolphin.<sup>21</sup>

Eiseley is a wise storyteller; about to ask us to imagine that we are dolphins he first locates our interests for us. Now he argues the importance of the experiment:

Let us try for a moment to enter the dolphin's body, retaining, at the same time, our human intelligence. In this imaginative act, it may be possible to divest ourselves of certain preconceptions about our kind of intelligence and at the same time to see more clearly why mind, even advanced mind, may have manifestations other than the tools and railroad tracks and laboratories that we regard as evidence of intelligence.<sup>22</sup>

Eiseley wants us to reach some kind of insight. This is a serious call to imagination, but one with demands that far exceed my single abilities to vividly construct the remotely possible. I cannot even take the first step--sacrificing my hands for flippers:

The result is immediately evident and quite clear: No matter how well we communicate with our fellows through the water medium we will never build drowned empires in coral; we will never inscribe on palace walls the victorious boasts of porpoise kings. We will know only water and the wastes of water beyond the power of man to describe... We will see death in many forms and, on occasion, the slow majestic fall of battleships through the green light that comes from beyond our domain.<sup>23</sup>

I can take up Eiseley's call to the imagination and succeed. I can reach this insight: "If man had sacrificed his hands for flukes, the moral might run, he would still be a philosopher, but there would have been taken from him the devastating power to wreck his thought upon the body of the world."<sup>24</sup> All I need do is follow Eiseley's imaginings, picturing what he describes and lifting my eyes to see the battleships.

There are many whose imaginations are not sufficiently vivid to reach the level of feeling, or perhaps through it the intellectual insight, that is the objective of some particular project. Othello is generally thought to have had an overactive imagination. I think this is a mis-reading of the play. Iago had a particular project in mind--to move Othello to a state of insane jealousy. Othello's imagination is not vivid enough to get him there, so Iago does his imagining for him and then relates the story. All Othello need do is follow along:

I lay with Cassio lately,  
 And being troubled with a raging tooth,  
 I could not sleep.  
 There are a kind of man so loose of soul  
 That in their sleeps will mutter their affairs.  
 One of this kind is Cassio:  
 In sleep I heard him say, 'Sweet Desdemona,  
 Let us be wary; let us hide our loves!  
 And then, sir, would be gripe and wring my hand,  
 Cry, 'O sweet creature!' and then kiss me hard,  
 As if he plucked up kisses by the roots  
 That grew upon my lip; then laid his leg  
 Over my thigh, and sighed, and kissed, and then  
 Cried 'Cursed fate that gave thee to the Moor!'<sup>25</sup>

This joint imaginative project is a clear success. Othello says, "O monstrous! monstrous!"

Fictions are the imaginings of others, passing before us in temporal form. Ryle called them "loaned imaginings".<sup>26</sup> When we read or

watch a fiction, we are involved in an imaginative project, a joint project of artist and audience. It is an activity.<sup>27</sup> The novelist tells you what his character sees, but cannot force you to visualize it; the playwright shows you how his character feels, but cannot force you to feel anything. We follow a work of the imagination and participate in it, watching, visualizing, nodding, tensing, feeling. We are Othello, listening to Iago.<sup>28</sup>

Private imaginings with appropriate, appraisable contents can arouse interest, cause feeling, sometimes sustain and, through our appraisals, convert these feelings into emotions. Fictions, when successfully followed, intensify four aspects of the imaginary experience. The fiction supplies the wealth of details that makes the imagining vivid; it helps to sustain the experience for a longer time than we could privately manage: our lack of control over the content of our imaginary experience provides a firm and invariable ground for emotive appraisals; this same lack of control leads to suspense--the anxiety caused by not knowing what's going to happen next further heightens and sustains our feelings. The aesthetic situation is, potentially, a highly emotive occasion.

For a feeling to be sufficiently sustained, heightened, or altered to deserve the title of an emotion, it must, all things being equal, have consequences, give rise to coping desires or some such thing. If we pay attention to the kind of activity imagining is and its objective, and keep in mind a few facts about fictions, we will see that in aesthetic situations, the relation between emotion and desire is not broken or bent. Aesthetic emotions have the usual flood of consequences.

Imagining naturally evokes feelings. This is the kind of activity it is. Imaginative projects are undertaken for a variety of reasons. Incitements to imagine are often meant to have highly practical consequences. (Taking action, modifying opinions and tuning sentiments would all be included.) They are fit for this purpose precisely because feelings and emotions motivate. Imagining someone as Prime Minister is meant to bring a shudder and a vote for the opposition; imagining being hit by a train should bring enough fear to breed care in crossing the tracks. Hundreds of daily calls to the imagination are meant to move people to

practical action, by first, just moving them.

This kind of imaginative project suggests one possible model for aesthetic response as "emotional non-intervient response". This type of imaginative activity encourages a strong emotional response, but the desires these emotions give rise to will not be governed by believing some situation obtains but by the acknowledgement of future probabilities.<sup>29</sup> Suppose I leave my door unlocked in the daytime, start to wonder if this is a good idea and want to decide whether, in the future, to lock my door. If my imagination is sluggish, imagining an intruder hiding in the apartment will leave me unmoved; if I am overly imaginative, I'll start to cry and look under the beds. To succeed at my project, I work myself into as strong a state of fear as possible. I assess the probability of such a situation really obtaining at some future time and match this against the strength of my response to imagining that it obtains. Even against low probabilities my panic suggests I should take action. Tomorrow I lock my door. If there is a thief in the neighbourhood, I may buy a deadbolt. If, however, I find myself wanting to look under the beds, I know I've gone too far. I remind myself that I'm just imagining the intruder; there's no one really in here. Making this kind of General Belief relevant cuts off my imaginative enterprise. My panic subsides.

"The poets function is to describe, not the kind of thing that has happened, but the kind of thing that might happen", or so Aristotle claims.<sup>30</sup> A practical interest in the kinds of things that might happen is the attitude that often governs the process of response set by imagining. I do not suggest that we always try on the situations of fictions to see what to do about them. I go to horror movies for the same reason I ride rollercoasters--the thrill of momentary terror as an end in itself.<sup>31</sup> I say only that this is a common kind of imaginative enterprise and leads to an emotional non-intervient response. Undoubtedly, sometimes our response to fiction contributes significantly towards desires that result in permanent changes in the way we live our lives. And this model, matching probabilities to strength of response may explain why people sometimes demand of serious fictions that they be both true to

life, and strongly moving.

On the other hand, although the poet tells us about the kinds of things that might happen, his telling is past. A movie moves like a news-reel across the screen. One aesthetician suggests our response to "Romeo and Juliet" is governed by our knowledge that Mercutio must die in the way he does because characters are not separable from their fates. This is to confuse past fact with necessary fact.<sup>32</sup> Mercutio must die in the way he does because Shakespeare wrote "Romeo and Juliet" in. Because of what fictions are, our response will be, in part, the response to the author's past imaginings, presently retold. In the face of this unalterability what might have been desires for characters become wishes and hopes for their successes or their downfalls.

We can conclude that interfering sorts of coping desires will play a small role in aesthetic situations; we cannot direct the course of fictional events. But under their general description, "the attempt to deal with emotion felt and its source; to increase, diminish or sustain what is occurring", coping desires are well-evidenced in aesthetic occasions. The novel is giving us pleasure; we want to continue reading it; we wish the author had written a longer book. When fictions cause negative emotions, we desire that these emotions eventually fade and disappear. We need take no action. This desire is often satisfied in advance by the promise of resolution:

While a fairy tale may contain many dreamlike features, its great advantage over a dream is that the fairy tale has a consistent structure with a definite beginning and a plot that moves towards a satisfying solution which is reached at the end.<sup>33</sup>

In the aesthetic situation, we often do everything in our power to heighten and sustain our emotional experiences. We know that relief will come with the resolution of the plot. And if it does not come, or does not come quickly enough, we can always say to ourselves, "This isn't really happening; no one's really suffering; it's only a movie", thus opting out of the imaginative experience and the emotive occasions it provides.<sup>34</sup>

There are as many things to be said about the relation between an aesthetic emotion and its consequences as there are to be said about the



relation between any emotion and its consequences. I cannot say them all. The important point is that the non-intervent nature of aesthetic response is no reason at all to think there is a breakdown between emotion and desire in aesthetic situations. The interference model of desire and action is a very narrow one. I suggest it persists in discussions of fictions only because of entrenched confusions about emotion and object. "Our pity is for Hamlet. We must want to save him."<sup>35</sup> Hamlet is a fictional character. He doesn't exist and there's nothing we can do for him. But the portrayal of his suffering can move us to pity through our imaginative participation in the play.<sup>36</sup>

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1. Robert Howell, "Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't", Poetics, 8 (1979), p.24.
2. Even the view that fictional characters don't have properties doesn't worry me, since on my view, it's sufficient that we imagine that a certain property has been instantiated.
3. For anyone who is interested in current work in theories of fiction, and for anyone who is suspicious about its claimed irrelevancy to my theory of aesthetic response, I recommend Howell's article as a useful introduction to the state of current discussion. He presents all important competitors for theories of fictional language and attempts to rate them on how well they deal with the standard problems in the area. The article includes an extensive discussion of Walton.
4. Pitcher, "Emotion", p.331.
5. Pauline Kael, Reeling (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p.406.
6. On Walton's view, I assume the standards would be a matter of convention.
7. Almost no one's willing to give up aesthetic emotions entirely. People talk about the taste of an emotion, the emotions of art, quasi-fear--thus retaining emotion titles even when they don't think actual emotions result. I think such titles are misleading. Either we have emotions in response to fiction or we don't.
8. Walton, "Fearing Fictions", p.88.
9. Walton, "How Remote", p.14.
10. Even when feelings don't belong to a category we describe them with reference to metaphorical circumstances.
11. There is an added importance of occasions in the case of aesthetic emotions. If it's true that these emotions have truncated consequences this will decrease our feeling base.

12. Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.19.
13. Ibid., p.20.
14. That is, we're not personally involved in the stories of fiction.
15. Osborne, "Aesthetic Relevance", p. 299.
16. Bullough, "Psychical Distance", p.401.
17. Why imagining is this kind of activity is a fertile area for speculation. People who write on the imagination sometimes define it in terms of projecting a situation or entertaining a proposition, but these terms become brute components of the account and are themselves given no further analysis. This is a pity because they may provide a key to imaginary activity. What is it to entertain a proposition? It probably has something to do with acquainting oneself with the consequences of that propositions being true. But for this to count as imagining, it can't just be analyzed as a proposition yielding its consequences in such a way that if you plugged it into a computer, the consequences would come out. We don't think that computers can imagine things. Perhaps imagining is concerned with personal consequences, how something affects the imaginer, perhaps in terms of how he feels. Imagining is a personal activity. It can't just be reduced to impersonally considering something. But it doesn't give rise to the same kinds of consequences as believing something. Perhaps imagining occupies the ground between the two: thinking about / entertaining and feeling / believing and acting.
18. As a matter of fact, people who deny that aesthetic emotions are caused by imagining, sometimes use as a contrast emotions caused by imagining something about a real person. Here they imply, there is no problem. See, for instance, Radford, "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina, I?", p.74.
19. My theory of emotions accounts for cases of emotional overreaction and even cases of irrational emotions, without arguing that such states involve missing or deviant features, by allowing that imagining can pick up where believing lets off. Looking down from a bridge → fright or anxiety; imagining yourself falling → fear.
20. Elder Olson, in Tragedy and the Theory of Drama (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), pp.42-43, argues that imagining is necessary for most emotional reactions, but I think this is a bit strong. I do think that imagining future scenarios may be necessary to transform infatuation into love.

21. Loren Eiseley, "The Long Loneliness" and other essays, The Star Thrower (New York: Time Books, 1978), p.12.
22. Ibid., p.14.
23. Ibid., p.15.
24. Ibid., p.18.
25. William Shakespeare, Othello, Act III, Scene iii.
26. Gilbert Ryle, "Imaginary Objects", (symposium), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp.Vol.XII, (1933), p.32: "Dickens was imagining constructively when he first made up the story of Mr. Pickwick; we are imagining reconstructively when we read it."
27. We often use the verb 'imagine' in the imperative.
28. We aren't particularly conscious of this activity, especially with realistic fictions, but we're bred to it. Our initial encounters with fairy tales, bedtime stories, etc., ("What do you think the monster looks like?"), make it an automatic natural way of responding to fictions. There's nothing at all odd about the idea of loaned imaginings. Richard Wollheim in "Imagination and Identification", On Art and the Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp.70-71, argues that most everyday imaginary activities, while conscious and deliberate, borrow their repertoires (contents) from what we know, read, think, see, are told, etc., and that once the imaginary process is underway, what's imagined is determined by the project and flows automatically.
- We can speculate that different forms of fiction will contribute different features to the imaginary project leaving different things to fill in. Bettelheim and Tolkein despair of the modern habit of illustrating fairy tales: "However good in themselves, illustrations do little good to fairy tales....If a story says, 'He climbed a hill and saw a river in the valley below, the illustrator may catch, or nearly catch, his own vision of such a scene, but every hearer of the words will have his own picture, and it will be made out of all the rivers and hills and dales he has ever seen, but especially out of The Hill, The River, and The Valley, which were for him the first embodiment of the word." Tolkein quoted by Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment, p.60.
- This participation in a mutual imaginary activity explains why one suspects it wouldn't be very interesting to read the Illiad of chimpanzees at typewriters.
29. I wonder if imagination, generally, has some connection to probability, rather than just possibility as is traditionally

- thought. Back in Chapter Two, I talked about appraisals being accurate or inaccurate based on various probability considerations. If I imagine someone kicking my cat, and this moves me to anger, for this to be an accurate appraisal perhaps I think something to myself like "He's just the kind of person who would kick a cat". The emotive occasions that imagining provides seem very often to involve this sort of judgment.
30. Aristotle, The Poetics, 1451a 35.
  31. Whatever the general connections between feeling and imagining, there will be cases with fictions when the success of the imaginary project depends on our reaching a certain level of feeling. I assume that a minimal desire with respect to fictions is to understand them, or maybe to understand what the author was trying to do, and it is not uncommon to adopt the author's criterion for success which is that we should be moved in a certain way.
  32. Harold Osborne, "Aesthetic Relevance", p.299, makes this point about past events.
  33. Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment, p.31.
  34. The fact that we can make certain sorts of existence beliefs relevant in certain circumstances shows that this kind of belief is not normally relevant to the process of response. It seems to me that closure is an interesting feature of aesthetic situations; although, other than John Dewey in Art as Experience (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), no one's made very much of it. Meyer talks about it a bit, pointing out that part of the satisfaction we get from art is that resolutions have some meaningful connection to what he calls the "stimulus situation", Emotion and Meaning in Music, p.23. Dewey goes even further, and points out that although with most experiences the conclusion has value in itself and can be applied to new circumstances, the end of a work of art is significant, "not by itself but as an integration of the parts. It has no other existence." Dewey, Art as Experience, p.55. On my theory of emotions, closure has this significance. Although we may wish to rid ourselves of unpleasant sensations, reciprocal interaction between appraisals and feelings, as well as the security of a focused attention, make it natural for us to work at maintaining our emotions even while trying to get rid of them. The contract of closure allows for both these tendencies.
  35. Here's another wonderful area for speculation; our relation to characters whatever and wherever they might be. I'll say just a few things:  
 Characters allow for both the 'feature' and the 'target' interpretation of emotion statements. They are generally

things we have no history with, but associated desires lead us to talk about characters and we can develop a history with a character through repeated viewings. (For instance, every time I see the P.O.W. movie "The Great Escape", my desire that Ives should make it over the fence is even stronger than the time before, even though I know he gets shot.) Even so, I expect the feature view dominates (we say we were moved to anger etc., phrasing things causally). Although Scarlett's treatment of Rhett may have moved you to anger it would be very odd the next day to claim you are still angry at Scarlett, so I suppose that even if the target view is in operation during the movie, our inability to affect fictions causes our relation to characters to very quickly assume a feature mode. (This may explain why people don't readily acknowledge that aesthetic emotions have consequences.) There's nothing of course that prevent our making other appraisals to maintain the emotion, (for instance becoming angry at someone we know who is exactly like Scarlett), and this establishing or revising the target mode.

One more speculation: do we identify with characters? In terms of old-fashioned empathy theory, (assuming the motor set so that we can see an object in terms of movement), I'm quite sure we empathize with characters. As part of what we feel when we have an emotion is what DeSousa calls the "expressive set" of the body, our ability to empathize with characters gives some strength to Ducasse's claim that art often gives us "the taste of an emotion". Ducasse, "Art and the Language of Emotions", p.110.

36. Why haven't people picked up more on the imagination as governing response to art. I can think of two possible reasons. People contrast it to pretence and make-believe when talking about art, which are more active, and may lead them to underestimate the power of the imagination. They should be contrasting it to various kinds of cognitive activities. Also, Walton, Wollheim and Hospers all talk in terms of imagining the emotion, thus seeing the emotion as part of the content of the activity rather than its consequence.

## CONCLUSION: HOW CAN WE BE MOVED?

Our response to art is a complex and complicated phenomenon. In trying to clear a place for real emotions in response to fiction, I have barely touched the issues of aesthetic response. The difficulty in being able to accomplish more, is that we must not only understand the nature and function of works of art, we must also understand the mechanism of human response. I have limited my project to trying to understand the emotions well enough to see how they might operate in aesthetic situations that involve our activities with fictions. I have used the work of Kendall Walton both to clarify the problems of aesthetic response and to provide, in part, the material from which to build a solution.

The problems of response to fiction involve determining the interrelations of judgment, feeling, and desire in aesthetic situations, and especially in trying to determine how fictional characters, that don't "really" exist and aren't "really" suffering, can be the proper objects of human compassion and concern. Almost all philosophers who have considered these problems, have expressed initial puzzlement about response to fiction. In "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina, I?", Colin Radford gives this expression to the puzzlement:

We weep for her....We pity her, feel for her and our tears are for her.

But all over again, how can we do this knowing that neither she nor Mercutio ever existed, that their sufferings do not add one bit of suffering to the world?<sup>1</sup>

But we need not believe that fictional characters exist to be moved by their plights; all of my conclusions from the analysis of emotions point to the truth of this claim.

Emotions are feelings that are caused by appraising those situations in which we have an interest, as being outside our control; the

situations of fictions are always outside our control. The situations that we appraise need not actually obtain. We are interested in what has happened, what is happening, what will happen, what might happen and what could happen; the incidents portrayed in fictions fall into many of these categories. If we feel remote from situations to which we would like to respond, we can call our imaginations to action. Vivid imaginings cause feelings which can engage inactive interests, urging appraisals, and thereby causing emotions. Imagining is the activity that governs response to fiction and the imaginings that we borrow and follow in aesthetic situations are almost always more vivid and sustained, than those we could privately manage; this feature of aesthetic situations makes them ideal emotive occasions. Our appraisals and feelings often result in desires and action: the emotions caused by fictions have many consequences, ranging from wishing the novel had continued to engaging on a lifelong course of protest against poverty or war.

My solution to the problem of aesthetic response is only a quarter turn of Walton's solution to the same problem. Walton concludes that Charles, in responding to the advance of the green slime, is playing a make-believe game that uses the movie as a prop. I conclude that Charles is engaged in a joint imaginative project of artist and audience, and that the predicament of the slime supplies the content for this activity; I see two major advantages to my theory.

Walton denies fear to Charles, because make-believing takes place against an explicit background of not really believing. Beliefs that the incidents portrayed are not really happening, are a part of the cognitive attitude that governs the process of Charles' response. Under this description, I believe that Walton is then right in thinking that Charles cannot be feeling fear. (One reminds oneself that it's only a movie to cut off a process of response.)

I have argued at some length, however, that believing a situation really obtains or believing it does not really obtain can be equally irrelevant to emotional response, and neither of these beliefs are a usual part of the cognitive attitude that governs response to fiction. This is not an original conclusion. Many people have shared it. Michael



Westin, in replying to Colin Radford's puzzlement, ("How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina, I?"), says this: "in attending to fiction we are not in a situation in which the truth, in the sense which could involve our belief, of what we see or read is even raised".<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, people who have reached this insight haven't depended on a broad or complex enough base of emotional activity to make this point persuasive. Emotions themselves are quite simple entities but they are the centripetal and centrifugal centres of a world of attitudes, activities, thoughts, and desires, as wide as all experience. By trying to build complexity into the actual emotions, rather than trying to understand their circumstances, philosophers have actually belied the complexity of emotional experience. The requirements for a complex package consisting of two beliefs, one desire, feeling, and the kind of object we can kick, has left philosophers unable to account for what look to be the obvious facts of human experience, for instance that we respond emotionally to fictions.

The other major advantage to my solution is that by arguing that emotions have only courtesy objects, I am not left with doubts and puzzles about how we can respond to the plights of fictional characters. "We weep for her", Radford insists. But this only means that our imaginative participation in the novel, Anna Karenina, has moved us to pity and sadness, and that this response has given rise to the consequences that are compatible with our witnessing a fiction, for instance, wishing that the fate of Anna Karenina had not been what it in fact is. We have a common way of describing our response to fiction. We say we were moved, and this locution captures perfectly our being caused to feel emotions in aesthetic situations, without suggesting that we have funny attitudes or desires directed at inappropriate targets. People have paid too little attention to the ways we describe our emotional response to art.<sup>3</sup>

Walton concludes his account by suggesting its relevance to a number of classic puzzles about response to fiction. I began this study with a puzzle of my own. A child can cry when Bambi's mother is killed, and his sensitivity to the movie will be initially accepted and maybe encouraged. But if he is still upset a few days later, he will be reminded that it was only a movie, that no one was really killed, and that

there isn't any reason to be sad. I think that only a theory such as mine allows us to fully understand this type of situation. A child, whose emotional life is not fully developed, may be merely upset by a movie. We can diminish his response by reminding him that it is only a movie. But an adult can develop his response. We are caused to feel real emotions in aesthetic situations. Emotions are feelings and as with many feelings they can be sustained and heightened by fresh appraisals of new situations. When an adult watches Bambi he can perhaps use what sadness he feels as a platform of feeling from which to contemplate further situations (past, actual or imagined), in which animals fall to the misdoings of men. He appraises these situations; his sadness is maintained and heightened; this process of response gives rise to long-range desires and actions; and thus, the response gains an enduring and stable place in his life.

#### FOOTNOTES FOR CONCLUSION

1. Radford, "How Can We Be Moved, I?", p.75.
2. Westin, "How Can We Be Moved, II?", p.83.
3. "Being moved" captures both the strength and the passivity of our response to art. We use the phrase in non-aesthetic situations. When we are spectators to the predicaments of others. I think the passivity of emotions, especially in aesthetic situations, provides the key to understanding the expressionist theory of art, through the connection of passivity to sincerity. (For a start on this see Bernard Williams, "Morality and the Emotions", in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). He tries to establish some relation between moral judgments and emotion through the application of the notion of sincerity to various speech acts. (I suggest the connection depends on our being recognizably passive with respect to emotions.) This, combined with the fact that aestheticians think art is endotelic, (for the sake of itself), lead those who concentrate on emotions in art to demand that artists not deliberately plan to evoke emotion in the audience that they haven't felt. This would compromise the endotelic character of art. Thus if there is emotion expressed in the work, they place it back into the artist: "He had to express it; he felt it"--his badge of sincerity towards his art. See Hospers, Collingwood's aesthetic theories, and also Ducasse: "The conscious planning to evoke feeling in others much rather characterizes the state of mind of the professional manufacturers of emotion who, whether from conviction or for a consideration, go pulpiteering, patrioteering, or promoting through the length and breadth of the land." Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art, p.40.

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